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THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN POST-INDEPENDENCE COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA

Matthew Brown

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The Struggle for Power in Post-Independence Colombia and Venezuela

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

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN POST-INDEPENDENCE COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-0-230-34131-9

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First published in 2012 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-34411-6 ISBN 978-1-137-07673-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137076731

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: June 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Natasha

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Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to the financial support that made this book possible. I began the project with a Jean Monnet Fellowship at the European University Institute where I benefited from the advice of Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Bartolomé Yun, and Antonella Romano. I received grants from the Joint Initiative for the Study of Latin America and the Caribbean and from the Society for Irish and Latin American Studies, and generous research leave from the University of Bristol.

In the town of El Santuario I benefited from the kind hospitality of successive mayors, the municipal director of culture, William Valencia Giraldo, and Ninfa Pineda, the curator of the Museo José María Córdova. For their support and advice on Antioquian history, I am most grateful to Humberto Barrera Orrego, Luis Javier Ortiz Mesa, Patricia Londoño, Sergio Mejia, Andrés López Bermúdez, Roberto Luis Jaramillo, and María Elena Saldarriaga. For observations on Colombian and Venezuelan histories, and inspiration, thanks to J. León Helguera, Christopher Abel, Gonzalo Sánchez, Clément Thibaud, Malcolm Deas, Rodrigo García Estrada, Alejandro Gómez, Gustavo Vaamonde, and Reuben Zahler. I thank Katia Urteaga Villanueva, Marco Peña, Martin Alonso Roa Celis, and Angela Gómez for their friendship and hospitality in Bogotá. During a research trip to Bogotá in September 2008 I returned from the archives every evening expecting to be greeted by my goddaughter. Mikaela Peña Urteaga kept my mind on the nineteenth century by being born the day after I left.

For inspiration and support on the project at various stages, I am pleased to thank Karen Racine, Pamela Murray, Raul Fradkin, Karen Hagemann, Sarah Chambers, Eric Van Young, Peter Blanchard, Cath Andrews, Igor Pérez Tostado, James Dunkerley, Rebecca Earle, Catherine Davies, Will Fowler, Edgardo Mondolfi, Maxine Molyneux, Yobenj Aucardo Chicangana-Bayona, Catherine Nettleton, Carrie Gibson, Juan José Perdomo, Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, Edmundo Murray, Joseph Smith, Yaruma Rodríguez, Kevin Whelan, Manuel Herrero Sanchez, and John Lynch. I am extremely grateful to Daniel Gútierrez Ardila who found and sent me new material on James Henderson's links to José María Córdova, even decoding it. Tania Lucía Cambrón provided assiduous research assistance in Marinilla, plucking unexpected archival fruits.

I thank everyone involved with the *Informal Empire* project, especially Nicola Miller, Andrew Thompson, and Robert Bickers. I am very grateful to Jenny Treherne for her research assistance in the Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies in Aylesbury. I am appreciative of my colleagues in Bristol past and present for their support and attentive comments: Carmen Brauning, Jon Hill (who drew the maps), Caroline Williams, Kirsty Reid, Alastair Wilson, Susan Harrow, David Brookshaw, David Hook, Lorraine Leu, Rupert Medd, and Andrew Redden. Alongside this book I have been working with Gabriel Paquette on our *Connections after Colonialism* project. I thank Gabe for his generous and insightful readings of my drafts; this book is much improved as a result of his interventions. Natasha Carver, Jo Crow, Daniel Gútierrez Ardila, and Habib Maroon read versions of the entire manuscript, and their comments improved the final draft immeasurably. Questions from Calum, Keir, Hannah-Morag, and Mairi were a constant source of inspiration. All errors and misunderstandings that persist in the text are mine alone.

I am glad to take this opportunity to thank the custodians and employees of the institutions where I conducted research, including the University of Bristol library, the Biblioteca Central of the Universidad de Oviedo, the British Consulate in Caracas, the National Archives of Great Britain, Ireland, Colombia and Venezuela, the National Libraries of Colombia and Venezuela, the library of the Academia Nacional de Historia and the Fundación John Boulton in Caracas, the Archivo Histórico in the Casa de la Convención in Rionegro, the Archivo Histórico de Antioquia in Medellín, the British Library, the Municipal Archives of El Santuario and Marinilla, and the parish archives of El Santuario, Marinilla, and La Candelaria, Medellín. I wrote the first draft between the sea and the mountains in Ballota, Asturias; I am grateful to our friends in Casa Fernando there.

All translations from Spanish language documents are my own unless otherwise stated.

Prologue

General José María Córdova thought that he had chosen his positions well. The 370 men in his Army of Liberty were waiting at El Peñol, in the northeastern Andes in Antioquia, Colombia, for the arrival of the government forces that were marching from Bogotá to suppress their rebellion. At 5:00 p.m. on October 16, 1829, Córdova's men were arranged so that they could converge on the government expedition as it emerged, tired, wet, and cold from the mountain pass, and defeat it at Los Páramos, a plain to the west of Guatape, before it could regroup and exploit its numerical advantage.[1]

At El Peñol, General Córdova was in control—he was the man who five years earlier had won independence from colonial rule by vanquishing the Spanish Army at the Battle of Ayacucho in Peru. Now he was on home soil in Antioquia, a terrain he knew like the back of his hand, just miles from his family home in Rionegro. He was surrounded by loyal friends who trusted that his famous bravery and judgment would lead them to victory over the forces of tyranny. At Córdova's side was his younger brother, Colonel Salvador Córdova. With them were their closest Antioquian comrades from the Wars of Independence. Capitán Braulio Henao came out of retirement when General Córdova called him to arms. Also preparing for battle were two merchants, Tenientes (Lieutenants) Francisco Escalante and Benedicto González. Standing at Córdova's side as he surveyed the mountains for signs of the enemy's progress were his assistants Francisco Giraldo, an old friend, and José María Arango, who had grown up in the Córdovas' house in Rionegro while they were away campaigning and who now, still aged only 15, was about to experience his first taste of military campaigning. Alongside Arango were a host of other 14- to 19-year-old boys, all born on these highland slopes, such as Eusebio Isaza and Bernabé Hoyos, who were both nervously awaiting their first ever taste of warfare.[2] Sixty-five years later, Arango wrote down his vivid memories of the next twenty-four hours, which are the only detailed eyewitness account of the preparations for the Battle of El Santuario.

According to Arango's account, at around 7:00 p.m. a messenger, Manuel Antonio Gómez, arrived at Córdova's camp at El Peñol. He reported that government forces had crossed the mountains through the San Carlos Pass, which was thought to have been "impassable" at that time of year, rather

than the El Peñol pass where Córdova's army now lay pointlessly in wait. Gómez said that he had been to the village of Vahos that morning, and that he had seen the army recovering from its endeavors and preparing to march down into Antioquia the next day on the road that passed through El Santuario, Marinilla, and Rionegro. Córdova realized that his only chance to defeat the government's forces was to intercept them at El Santuario before they reached Marinilla, a town that was hostile to Córdova's rebellion, which he had threatened to burn to the ground only two days previously. Córdova realized that if he could not get to El Santuario by the next morning and cut off the government forces there, his army would be easily defeated. He, therefore, ordered his followers to break camp, and by 8:00 p.m. the Army of Liberty was on its way. In normal circumstances they would have marched down the valley to Rionegro, and then up the Vahos road, but instead, as night fell Córdova led his men across country by the shortest route. Capitán Anselmo Pineda, who was born and bred in El Santuario, acted as a guide to the precarious and treacherous paths over the many streams and steep valleys that fractured the high mountain territory. Pineda was 24 years old, and had jumped out of the window of the nearby house of his disapproving father to join Córdova's army. He led the soldiers in single file through the mountains until at around 3:00 a.m. and they stopped at a ceramics factory, which occupied a hill about 3 km from El Santuario.[3] Here they paused and sheltered a while from the rain. Some of the soldiers collapsed, exhausted, while others warmed themselves by lighting small fires. At dawn they completed the journey down to the exposed plain of El Santuario.[4] Arango's narrative shows the state of the Army of Liberty as they prepared for battle:

> At 6.am on October 17 the ragged troops began to reach their destination, the El Santuario plain, in complete disorder. Each soldier took off his clothes and wringed them out to try to get rid of the mud and water in which they had been drenched during the dark night's march. By 8.am their arms and weapons had still not arrived at the camp. There was no sign of the enemy and no news of their movements had yet arrived, because the local people had them well hidden. What little food our insignificant force had to eat was only meat, there was nothing else.[5]

That morning the cold was "glacial" and as the darkness receded "the clouds turned the sky into a foreboding slate shroud."[6] The effects of the improvised march quickly made themselves felt. The Army of Liberty was in no state to defend itself, let alone to launch the planned rout of the government forces. Córdova himself, exhausted, fell asleep leaning against one of his officers.[7]

On the hills above them, the Colombian army's "Western Expedition" prepared to swoop down on El Santuario. Having outmaneuvered Córdova and surprised him, they now prepared to destroy him. They were led by General Daniel O'Leary, an Irishman just a year older than Córdova, an old friend from their time together at Simón Bolívar's side in the Wars of Independence. In contrast to Córdova's friends and recruits, O'Leary

was assisted by a group of European-born officers well-used to the rigors of Andean campaigning. Some of them had recently returned to military service in controversial circumstances. One such officer was Comandante Rupert Hand, an Irishman who had been retired from the Colombian army since 1826 when he was controversially cleared of stealing government funds in Mérida (despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt) by court-martial in Bogotá. Another was Coronel Richard Crofton, also an Irishman, who had been court-martialed only a month previously, charged with insubordination.[8] O'Leary was leading his first campaign as a general and was anxious to prove his capability. During the long journey overland from Bogotá to Antioquia, which often took commercial travelers over a month, but which the Western Expedition completed in just 19 days, O'Leary wrote to his wife most days, reassuring her that he was up to the challenge, nervously comparing himself to "a Roman legionnaire" and even "Napoleon . . . who was a mere corporal compared to me."[9] The government had invested significant resources in O'Leary's expedition, leaving Bogotá almost defenseless by giving O'Leary 700 men.[10] By the time they reached Honda on the Magdalena river this had increased to 780, and they had rations and supplies for one month's campaigning. The expedition had sailed downstream on October 5.[11] On the journey O'Leary had set about reorganizing his officer corps so that he could have complete faith in it.[12]

The physical difficulties of the journey over the Andes in adverse weather conditions took their toll on the government's soldiers' bodies but steeled the will of their officers. As they began to climb the mountain paths into Antioquia, O'Leary wrote that "the roads are the worst I have ever seen, the river is abominable and the weather pretty terrible. Nevertheless, all goes well and everyone is happy with me, particularly the soldiers who say that the little white fellow *[blanquito]* is excellent and looks after them."[13] O'Leary had to slow the pace of the march because his body could not cope with the exertion.[14] After struggling along what historian Humberto Bronx called "almost impassable paths,"[15] O'Leary's troops collapsed "starving and nearly naked" at Vahos on October 16.[16] They had avoided Córdova's advance parties and sentries, having been assisted by local resistance, most notably from the town of Marinilla that sent messengers, funds, and offers of horses and soldiers.[17] On October 17, O'Leary's expedition set off early, reaching the Alto de María heights above El Santuario in the mid-morning after "a fatiguing march."[18] Carmelo Fernández, one of the officers, recorded that the soldiers were pepped for battle by "water bottles filled with *aguardiente alcanforado*, a cardiac stimulant, and biscuits that made you drunk" to give them courage.[19]

Advancing with his assistants to a lookout point, O'Leary observed Córdova's troops laid out beneath him on the El Santuario plain. He saw that Córdova had kept his troops together, divided in three units. The right flank was commanded by Benedicto Gonzalez and Ramon Escalante, and the left flank by Salvador Córdova and Anselmo Pineda. The center, with half of the soldiers in its ranks, was commanded by José María Córdova himself, and was formed in front of a small house. O'Leary could not see that a

small detachment of this central section, led by Braulio Henao and Francisco Giraldo, was hidden behind the building.

Córdova's rebel Army of Liberty was waiting for the official Colombian army to present itself. Rousing themselves after their tiring night's exertions, their clothes still damp and their stomachs empty, the soldiers listened to General Córdova's appeals to their bravery and their patriotism. Out of their sight, O'Leary formed his forces ready to attack. The cavalry, commanded by Crofton and Hand, was to charge down the hill and into the Army of Liberty's right flank. The infantry, who were to engage the center, were in two units under two vastly experienced European veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, an Italian, Carlos Castelli, and a German, Heinrich Lutzen. When O'Leary perceived that all was ready, at around 11:00 a.m., he led his troops over the crest of the hill and down toward El Santuario. José María Arango recalled the moment when O'Leary launched his attack:

> And then we saw them, first the high black leather hats on those veterans' heads, and then we could make out their clothes, which were worn and dirty, showing the marks of the terrible journey they had made in order to confront us; we could see that they had passed many days and nights of hunger and exhaustion, and that these were men who had made many sacrifices, and who were accustomed to suffering. We saw three officers appear at the front of the army as it halted on the heights. They observed us for a few moments, then they began the descent, and behind them we saw the hill begin to be covered with soldiers marching with great order and discipline.
>
> When General O'Leary had arrived near to our positions, our whole army heard these words ring out:
>
> "Córdova, Give yourself up, don't sacrifice these few recruits for nothing!"
>
> General Córdova replied with a strong and resonant voice which marked his irrevocable resolution:
>
> "Córdova will never give himself up to a vile foreigner, a mercenary and a wage-earner like you; he would rather succumb!"
>
> So O'Leary turned and walked back to his position.
>
> With the heights covered with such a well-organised force, the cornet was sounded, and the silence was broken by their suddenly opening fire on us from all angles, so well trained and well executed, and down below we began to be covered with hails of lead and a huge black cloud of smoke from the gunpowder. It looked like the most horrific storm as all this descended upon us.[20]

The Battle of El Santuario had begun.

Abbreviations

AC	Archivo Castelli
ACH	Academia Colombiana de Historia, Bogotá
AGNC	Archivo General de la Nación, Colombia, Bogotá
AGNV	Archivo General de la Nación, Venezuela, Caracas
AHA	Archivo Histórico de Antioquia, Medellín
AHR	Archivo Histórico, Casa de la Convención, Rionegro
ANH	Academia Nacional de la Historia, Caracas
APNSC	Archivo Parroquial de Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria, Medellín
BCB	*Boletín Cultural y Bibliográfico*
BHA	*Boletín de Historia e Antigüedades*
BL	British Library
BLAA	Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, Bogotá
BNC	Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá
CAB	Colección Abel Botero, Serie Papeles Varios, Asuntos Familiares Salvador Córdova
CUP	Cambridge University Press
DUP	Duke University Press
FJB	Fundación John Boulton, Caracas
FO	Foreign Office Papers
GYM	Secretario de Guerra y Marina
HAHR	*Hispanic American Historical Review*
HDS	Hojas de Servicio
OUP	Oxford University Press
R	Sección La República
TNA	The National Archives, Kew, London
UDA	Universidad de Antioquia
YUP	Yale University Press

Notes on Style

The term "Gran Colombia" refers to the republic led by Simón Bolívar formed by the territories of New Granada, Ecuador, and Venezuela between 1819 and 1830. From 1831 I refer to the independent republics with those names, and sometimes refer to New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador collectively as "the Gran Colombian region." For clarity, New Granada is the territory today occupied by Colombia (minus Panama), which was an independent republic from 1831 until it changed its name to the United States of Colombia in 1863. When following contemporary sources, when I use the term "Colombia" it generally refers to "Gran Colombia". Surnames such as Bolívar, Páez, and Córdova always carry an accent. Córdova has a v rather than a b, in line with the family's chosen spelling.

Maps below are marked with key places referred to in the text.



Map 1 Antioquia
Source: Courtesy of Jon Hill.



Map 2 New Granada and Venezuela
Source: Courtesy of Jon Hill.



Map 3 The Atlantic World
Source: Courtesy of Jon Hill.

Cast of Principal Characters at the Battle of El Santuario, October 17, 1829 (Place and date of birth in brackets)

The Antioquian Rebels

José María Córdova, General, *hero of the Wars of Independence* (near Rionegro 1799)

Salvador Córdova, Coronel, *younger brother of the General*, *liberal rebel* (Rionegro 1801)

Anselmo Pineda, Capitán, *lawyer, Conservative, colonist, collector* (El Santuario 1805)

Francisco Giraldo, Comandante, *child-soldier, aide to Córdova, pious Catholic* (near El Santuario 1804)

Braulio Henao, Capitán, *landowner, Conservative civil war hero* (La Leona 1802)

The Colombian Army

Daniel O'Leary, General, *friend of Bolívar, historian, diplomat* (Cork 1800)

Carlo Castelli, Comandante, *Napoleonic soldier, provincial governor* (near Turin 1790)

Rupert Hand, Comandante, *mercenary, petty criminal, teacher* (Dublin c. 1795)

Thomas Murray, Comandante, *military administrator* (Ireland c. 1796)

Francisco Urdaneta, Coronel, *provincial governor, career soldier* (Montevideo 1791)

Carmelo Fernández, *Subteniente, U.S. educated artist, chronicler* (Guama, eastern Venezuela, 1810)

Dabney O. Carr, assistant to O'Leary, new recruit, political intriguer (Virginia, USA, 1802)

Introduction

The Battle of El Santuario, which was fought on mountainous Andean terrain on October 17, 1829, is familiar to many Colombians for the same reason as British imperial history has chosen to pretend it never happened. At El Santuario, General José María Córdova was defeated. After the battle he lay wounded, when one of the opposing army's senior officers sought him out and brutally killed him, without explanation, as if carrying out a secret order. The murderer was a British subject, Rupert Hand. His commanding officer was General Daniel O'Leary, who decades later became the British Empire's highest diplomatic representative in the Republic of New Granada (Colombia). This book explores the reconfiguration of European influence in the region after the end of Spanish colonial power, a subject often ignored by historians: it does so through telling the life stories of those who served at the Battle of El Santuario, from O'Leary and Hand to the local people whom Córdova recruited into his army just days before the battle.

It is perhaps not surprising that the British should have no memory of the Battle of El Santuario, it being only one of many dark hours in the history of British imperialism. For Colombians the battle is remembered primarily for Córdova's death, the culmination of his rebellion against the dictatorial rule of Simón Bolívar, the revolutionary hero whose patronage had helped Córdova become an influential general and then minister of war when aged only 28. If he had not been murdered, the legend goes, Córdova would have become a great and patriotic president.

I was intrigued when I learned of the presence of Rupert Hand and Daniel O'Leary at El Santuario, and their involvement in the "assassination" of a national hero. I scratched the surface a little and found that they were not alone. The government forces sent from Bogotá under O'Leary's command were entirely officered by men born many thousands of miles from the battlefield. When I set out to discover why this was so, I found that there was nothing at all written in English on the Battle of El Santuario. I decided to fill that gap by writing a short narrative of the battle and some reflections on its possible relevance for Colombian history. But when I had mapped out exactly who the officers were, I saw a picture emerging that encouraged a more extensive investigation. Many of the veterans of the government forces at El Santuario went on to occupy important positions in public life, despite

having been vilified as "murderers" in the years immediately after Córdova's death. This seemed like an interesting paradox, and I began to acquaint myself with the documents of these peoples' lives, and with the archives of institutions where they had worked or places where they had lived. Following the historiography that presented José María Córdova as the sole protagonist of his rebellion, I assumed that he and his brother were the only individuals of interest on the rebel side. But as I learned more about the young men who had served alongside the Córdovas, I began to appreciate that they had been as fully involved in national politics, commerce, and international relations as those on the government side. The early lives of these individuals are the subjects of chapters 1–3. Chapter 4 describes the battle itself in detail, based on all the sources I have been able to locate, paying due regard to military strategy and the practicalities of campaigning. Describing and explaining the battle was my original aim, but it became instead, with time, the central point of a collective biography of the El Santuario veterans. The events of October 17, 1829, in the Antioquian Andes became the common ground of a much broader narrative of interlinked global, imperial, national, and local histories that seeks to understand and explain the struggle for power and sovereignty in the post-independence period in Colombia and Venezuela. Understanding where they came from and where they went became just as important as knowing what they did on the battlefield. The medium- and long-term consequences of the battle are traced in chapters 5–9. The book owes much to three distinct historiographies, which I introduce below before moving on to discuss the methodology and sources, and present a brief introduction to the chronology of the period.

Historiography of the Battle of El Santuario

There are few serious studies of the Battle of El Santuario. The first published narrative was written by José María Arango in 1896, a veteran of the battle who in his last years felt "compelled to collect together the debris of storms and shipwrecks." The declared aim of his memoir was to "complement the biographies" written about José María Córdova, "one of the most precious lives given in Colombia's service."[1] Arango's memories provide otherwise inaccessible information on topics as diverse as the weather leading up to the battle, the personalities involved, and even some remembered dialogue. They were the only published study of the battle for over half a century, until they were supplemented by the work of Damián Ramírez Gómez, a priest and educator from El Santuario, and great-grandson of one of Córdova's foot soldiers. His publications in 1968 and 1971 were based on municipal and parish archives as well as oral histories recalled by the author and his friends in clerical and educational circles in El Santuario. Ramírez Gómez's patriotic aim was to show how "the men of El Santuario were, are and always will be at Colombia's service."[2]

Humberto Bronx's 1971 account was a much more professional description of the battle and the events that led to the "murder of José María

Córdova by Rupert Hand." Ramirez Gómez was interested primarily in El Santuario, but Bronx broadens the horizon by situating the battle in the history of Antioquia. Concerned above all with the cruel hand dealt by fate to Córdova, Bronx observes that "our hero's end was ironic and humiliating because almost all the officials of the army that defeated him were foreigners."[3] Bronx's fact-gathering suggested that there might be more than "irony" to the predominance of foreigners in Daniel O'Leary's army, and encouraged me to look more closely at the available sources in Colombia, and further afield. Ramírez Gómez and Bronx have recently been supplemented by three newer publications that follow Bronx's emphasis on clarifying the circumstances of Córdova's death at El Santuario. Jaime Pinzón Pinzón (1993), Humberto Barrera Orrego (2001), and Gabriel Jaime Arango Toro (2010) all engage with the legend of Córdova as a tragic hero who was only prevented from realizing his true destiny by an assassin's hand.[4]

This is the sum of the historiography on the Battle of El Santuario. There is nothing in English and, with the exception of a few notes by Ramírez Gómez, not a word on the veterans of the battle later in life. To work toward a collective biography that would place the battle, its causes, and consequences within their imperial, national, and global contexts (without losing the local and regional grounding of existing studies) I had to piece together archival sources scattered across the world. Many of those sources contain a sense of conspiracy, revenge, or self-justification. The death of José María Córdova has lent itself to a narrative that concludes with the unveiling and identification of his killer, for contemporaries, biographers, and historians ever since. Rupert Hand's trial for murder lasted two years (1831–33) and involved most of the principal political players in independent New Granada. But Rupert Hand admitted straightaway that he had killed Córdova and he defended his actions throughout his trial. So the question that remains unanswered was not *who* did it, but rather *why* did he do it? This was never satisfactorily answered by Hand's prosecutors, nor by the often contradictory statements made in his defense. Asking *why* Rupert Hand killed José María Córdova brings us to all sorts of larger doubts and uncertainties and a series of interlinked questions about the relationship between global, national, and local histories. What were the forces that brought Rupert Hand to murder José María Córdova at El Santuario? Why didn't anyone stop him? How relevant were his foreign origins? And, did the presence of Hand, O'Leary, Murray, and the others have anything to do with British imperialism? In order to answer these questions we need to return to longer-term processes that shaped independence and its consequences in Colombia and Venezuela.

The Comparative History of New Granada and Venezuela: 1820–54

The Wars of Independence in Hispanic America were fought and won in the name of identity, prosperity, equality, and liberty. The new republics that emerged out of the wreckage of Spanish colonialism in continental America

then had to overcome long-standing crises of political legitimacy and authority. To this end the rebels who had fought for independence found themselves having to construct national communities that might justify and help consolidate the new states. At the same time, in order to prosper economically and maintain the subordination of groups such as slaves and indigenous peoples, they began to develop reconfigured forms of the very colonial institutions (militias, monopolies, and tax offices) they had previously sought to destroy.[5]

These were difficult endeavors. The fledgling independent states were fragmented and weak during the 1820s as they struggled to establish their authority over preexisting institutions (most notably the Catholic Church), and to win the affection of citizens who often preferred longstanding affiliations (e.g., regions, towns, ethnicities) over the new nations. Efforts to consolidate the national state in Gran Colombia were complicated, as elsewhere, by the continued involvement and intervention of foreign powers. With Spanish commercial and shipping barriers demolished, other empires sensed the opportunity to trade in new markets and influence political development. Great Britain was the most aggressive and immediately successful of these competitors, pushing for preferential trade treaties and the abolition of the slave trade in exchange for informal support and assistance and finally, in 1825, formal recognition of independence from Spain.[6]

The Wars of Independence left political power in the Republic of Gran Colombia in the hands of surviving military veterans who had won prestige and patronage through military success in the early 1820s.[7] The Battle of El Santuario took place in 1829, and in a sense it can be seen as an example of these veterans fighting over the spoils of their victories.[8] Men like José María Córdova felt that they had won the right to be treated like heroes and to be protected when their interests were threatened. Rivalry between the independence heroes was played out on the battlefield, as at El Santuario, and through publications and political discourse, where Córdova, Bolívar, and their supporters traded on the legends that had grown up around their bravery in warfare. Ferocious political pamphlets abounded in these years. The Battle of El Santuario was fought for military advantage, political influence, and economic power, to be sure, and it was also brought about by disagreements over how the new nation should be imagined, and the place of independent republics in the modern world.

Historians agree that the three decades after independence were a "transitional period" between independence and modernization, plagued by civil wars that repeatedly destroyed economic progress and left all the most capable political leaders dead, disillusioned, or in exile.[9] Party formations (one Liberal, one Conservative) slowly coalesced under the pressure of violent conflict and new, popular, participation in the mechanisms of elections and politics.[10] In this transitional period, what Tulio Halperin Donghi called the "aftermath of revolution," heroes of independence enjoyed considerable political capital.[11] Some employed it to pursue personal gain through land grants and corruption; others were more dedicated to installing new

republican and national values and institutions. Historians have demonstrated the continued influence of old colonial political cultures in this early republican period.[12] More recently historians such as James Sanders, Marixa Lasso, and Nancy Appelbaum have focused on nonelite groups in their studies of this period—indigenous peoples, low-status mestizos, and Afro-Colombians—in order to show how new political language was appropriated and exploited by subaltern groups.[13]

Regional histories of Antioquia often see the Battle of El Santuario as a pivotal moment in the formation of the region. Given their interest in and focus on political and ideological developments, however, neither Fernando Botero Herrera nor Fernán González dedicates much attention to military matters.[14] Understandably, they largely interpret José María Córdova's rebellion and the causes and consequences of the Battle of El Santuario in personal and regional terms. In this book, I build on their findings by incorporating the international dimension of events in order to present the full meaning of the battle and its regional contexts. It is only through recent developments in the literature on British imperialism in nineteenth-century Latin America that we can now supply this missing element.

The Foreign Presence in Latin America: Informal Empire?

This book forms part of a new body of scholarly work that is taking a fresh look at the foreign presence in Latin America in the long nineteenth century. Revisionist scholarship seeks to understand and explain the extent of imperial influence after independence. Adrian Pearce, for example, has shown that British trade with Spanish America had risen to unimagined levels by 1808 through the exploitation of formal, informal, and illegal trading opportunities wherever they were to be found.[15] Venezuelan and New Granadan merchants on the Caribbean coasts were absolutely integral to this increase; in many ways they were responsible for attracting and facilitating British trade. Manuel Llorca's research suggests colonial networks persisted and expanded after independence.[16] My own previous work studied the British and Irish mercenaries who served under Simón Bolívar, and argued that foreign presence and influence during the wars of independence was deeper and more substantial than had previously been recognized. Karen Racine has gone further, arguing that British "cultural and intellectual influence" was the dominant factor in shaping elite political culture during the independence period.[17]

But was this "empire," or even "informal empire"? Does such a picture support Stanley and Barbara Stein's influential formulation that "the English had been the major factor in the destruction of Iberian imperialism; [and] on its ruins they erected the informal imperialism of free trade and investment"?[18] Frustratingly, historical research into this period remains limited. British informal empire in Latin America has become associated with the railways, steamships, and financial investments that came after

1860. But if we look at the preceding half-century, we also see British loans, imperial bluster, even land-grabbing as in the seizure of the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands in 1833. James Dunkerley summed up this period of Latin American history as one of "frugal sovereignty" affected by "slight external intervention."[19] Alan Knight recognizes that the extent of British commerce, investment, and "pragmatic meddling in oligarchic politics" might add up to "a kind of loose informal imperialism."[20] But it is clear that we still require much more archival research on understudied aspects of Latin American history before these hesitant conclusions can be supported.

New studies of the "connections after colonialism" have begun to reveal the way that reconfigured imperial networks after 1815 fed into and shaped Latin American history during and after its independence from Iberian colonial rule.[21] One of the features of this research is that it incorporates the realm of culture into the studies of politics, economics, and "generals and diplomats" that have traditionally characterized analyses of British relations with Latin America.[22] In a collaborative and interdisciplinary research project I have attempted to provide a sound conceptual basis for the study of foreign culture, commerce, and capital in Latin America.[23] The collective biography of the El Santuario veterans stands upon the foundations established in that project. It is a broad cultural history approach that pays attention to matters of commerce and capital. It tries to give equal weight to "foreign" and "local" historical actors without privileging either; the collective biography approach provides the opportunity to engage with all aspects of the foreign presence in New Granada and Venezuela, from the personal and everyday to the financial and commercial. This approach fits well with a mode of British activity in Latin America that, as Pearce's work demonstrates clearly, made much use of informal relations even during the colonial period before 1810. Indeed, as Jeremy Adelman has observed, even under Spanish colonial rule the American colonies' commercial relations were carried out by means of "personalized mechanisms of dependency among partners, family members, debtors, and creditors [which] all combined the merchants of empire into transatlantic networks integrated by informal and asymmetrical bonds."[24] British commercial predominance after 1800 made use of the same personal and informal relationships. Yet previous historians' preference for statistics and generalizations over the detail of individual lives has left us ignorant of the friendships, loves, and experiences that sustained and characterized the British presence in Latin America. Opening the analytical field to culture and personal relations allows us better insight into the "fragilities" and "untidiness" of Britain's "tentacular, contested empire" at the same time as we keep the state, trade, and official policies in view.[25] This book attempts to "identify those gradations of intervention and sovereignty that call themselves by so many nonimperial names" that Ann Laura Stoler prefers to call "imperial formations . . . states of becoming rather than being."[26]

Stoler's formulation is useful because it compels us to unearth and describe the ways Latin American regions were affected by empire, rather than seeking to lump them into categories ("informal empire," "postcolonial"), which

may only roughly fit their circumstances and experiences. By tracing the networks and individual lives that connected empire, nation, and locality we can better see what empire, independence, and sovereignty meant—and how they worked in practice. C. A. Bayly's work on the "global connections and consequences" that created the "birth of the modern world" between 1789 and 1914 has convincingly undermined claims that nineteenth-century Europe was the center and motor of historical change elsewhere.[27] The global changes identified by Bayly brought new migrants to Latin America, catalyzed new forms of trade and profoundly affected political, social, and economic development. New states struggled to control these forces then as they continue to struggle today. But was that because of their own weakness, because, in Bayly's words, independence created only "pseudo-nations"?[28] Or was it because of the imperial strength that confronted them in their early years?

Historians' work on "informal empire" suggests that even if Britain had wanted to exercise "effective indirect political control over the internal and external sovereignty of subordinate, though formally independent societies" in Latin America (and they disagree on whether Britain did or did not), it was a very long jump from this goal to achieving it on the ground.[29] British policy was generally left in the hands of its Consuls, who were given cautious instructions and were hamstrung by the communication difficulties separating them from their political masters (return post from Bogotá to London was anywhere upward of five months in 1829).[30] Relatively few resources were assigned to the region compared to elsewhere. The existence of any British informal empire was, therefore, sharply limited in scope, in time, and in place.[31] Those passing moments of effective informal empire that did occur, most prevalent in Argentina or Brazil between 1870 and 1940, were generally the result of local elites seeking out British power or protection, rather than because of effective and active British aggression or aggrandisement.

The picture in the Gran Colombian region in the decades after independence was qualitatively different. Because the foreign presence was relatively small, and because London was generally indifferent to, and remarkably distant from, events in Bogotá, the preeminent historian of Colombia's nineteenth century, Malcolm Deas, is adamant that Colombia "can [not] usefully be considered to be part of anyone's informal empire" and that it might be "best not to encourage this particular form of the culture of complaint and lament."[32] For Deas, as for Rodrigo de J. García Estrada and Frédéric Martínez, foreign influence in Colombia was much stronger at the end of the nineteenth century.[33] For them, as for all previous writers on the period, the mid-century period was one of transition, recovery, and the indifference of the outside world.

Compared to other parts of Latin America, there were few foreigners in Colombia and Venezuela in these years. Official immigration schemes were "almost all complete failures."[34] Fewer European migrants came to New Granada *after* independence than they had *before,* when the Spanish

monarchy theoretically prohibited the entry of nonapproved foreigners. The 1843 New Granadan Census revealed only 1,160 foreigners in the whole country. However, as Deas has recognized, that these individuals "were never sufficiently numerous to form a colony apart perhaps contributed to their popularity and prestige," particularly in the higher social strata where their culture, commerce, and capital were most appreciated.[35] Foreign nationals who were also national citizens were perceived to occupy a special position that allowed them to mediate with the outside world.[36] Their limited number served to magnify the effects of their presence and actions, and foreign subjects were seen as links to commerce and power, even if they may not have thought of themselves in that way. Put simply, while Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston only rarely gave more than two hoots about the activities of Britons in New Granada or Venezuela, those individuals enjoyed high status and exercised considerable influence on the ground because they were *perceived* to have some kind of privileged access to the center of metropolitan and global power. To adapt Adelman's phrase, they were the new "personal cornerstones of empire," linked through kinship and experience into republican elites.[37] The fact that the likes of Daniel O'Leary and Thomas Murray were ignored or derided back in London did not stop them from acquiring influence in New Granada or Venezuela; their status and influence came from elites in Bogotá, Caracas, and Medellín, not from London. They, therefore, became the agents of foreign intervention even though they received no concrete orders. They were the tail that wagged even though they were disconnected from the metropolitan dog. This is a unique "imperial formation," distinct both from colony or informal empire, which took different shapes over time according to the individuals involved.

When formal imperial interventions were attempted—for example, in the use of gunboats or sieges in Cartagena or La Guaira—the results were often very far from what had been intended. Whether officials in London—or Washington or Paris—were engaged or indifferent, on the ground in Cartagena, Caracas, Bogotá, and El Santuario the consequences of their decisions flowed into a messy amalgam of opportunities sought, mistakes made, and enemies being slain. Foreign citizens were one element in the multiplicity of competing interest groups in New Granada and Venezuela. When they entered partisan conflicts their symbolic value added to the feeling among their opponents that popular sovereignty was somehow being infringed. The late nineteenth-century Colombian poet Jorge Isaacs was trying to get at this when he wrote of José María Córdova's death that "the murderer spilt the blood which blessed you as sovereign."[38] The idea that foreign influence still fettered emancipated peoples was held across the continent in the first postcolonial half-century. For the Argentine writer Esteban Echeverría this meant that in 1846 "The great thought of revolution has not been made real. We are independent but not free."[39] As Jeremy Adelman puts it, after independence "ruling classes [would now have] to confront the challenge of what to be loyal to now that they were free of formal European control . . . Sovereignty from empire had been achieved. But how to give sov-

ereignty new meaning remained as equivocal as ever."[40] It was only later in the century that dissidents and radicals began to call for a "second independence," in Walter Mignolo's phrase.[41] In the period under study here, the scope and nature of the first independence was still being felt for. Twenty-first-century scholars have tried to define this sense of troubled sovereignty with the concept of the "coloniality of power."[42] The study of the lives of the El Santuario veterans tries to put some flesh on what this meant for contemporaries. Were foreigners resented? Was the shadow of empire imagined, or was it real?

Some Clarifications

It is essential before proceeding, to provide clear definitions of the concepts that are used in the narrative and analysis that follow. Many of the works cited in the bibliography use "empire," "imperialism," "informal empire," "colony," "nation," "state," "sovereignty," and "independence" in different ways, and they have different opinions of what they meant between 1820 and 1854. Contemporaries never spoke of "imperialism" when they described European or North American attitudes toward the Gran Colombian region between 1820 and 1854. Today imperialism is a much contested word. I follow Cain and Hopkins's definition that imperialism is distinguished by "an incursion, or attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state."[43] These incursions or attempted incursions were, as noted above, frequently commented upon and resisted. Certainly, however, no one living in the Gran Colombian region between 1820 and 1854 ever described themselves as being part of Britain's "informal empire." The term was first used a century later by the historians John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson as they sought to explain Britain's relationships with the rest of the world outside of the formal empire.[44] Contemporaries were much blunter and were less interested in the conceptual niceties suggested by hindsight. Bolívar recognized the extent of British global "power" when in 1815 he asked "Great Britain, the liberator of Europe, friend of Asia, and protector of Africa, [to consent] to be the saviour of America."[45]

From 1810 the term "independence" was used to signify the end of Spanish colonial rule in the Americas. In his 1819 Angostura Address, Simón Bolívar declared that "Venezuela, on separating from Spain, recovered her Independence and Liberty, her Equality and her National Sovereignty. Constituting herself into a Democratic Republic, she proscribed Monarchy, distinctions, nobility, charters, and privileges."[46] Independence and sovereignty were both characteristics that peoples and nations (themselves contested terms) were thought to possess inherently, revolving around their territorial integrity, the ability to pass and enforce their own laws and to choose their leaders in accordance with their own principles. Ideas of popular sovereignty were drawn from traditional Spanish thought and infused with the Enlightenment language of equality and liberty.[47] Once formal independence had been achieved, leaders

like Bolívar turned their attention to the protection and assertion of "the Sovereignty of the People—the sole legitimate authority of any nation."[48] Incursions upon or against sovereignty could be made by foreign powers or by internal "usurpers." What constituted unwanted intervention, however, and what was welcome support, depended on the political circumstances. The vicissitudes in what influence was deemed welcome and what was not, and how similar actions by foreigners could be perceived as bulwarks of sovereignty or infringements of it by opposing parties are, therefore, at the center of the present study.

By emphasizing the study of culture and ordinary lives (including marriage, god-parenting, romance, funerals, for example) in our study of informal empire, alongside high politics, commerce, and capital, we can get a sense of the way in which foreign influence was felt in the decades after independence in the Gran Colombian region.[49] Sovereignty was contested in the fields of culture, commerce, and capital, and argued over in letters and in print. Just as importantly, it was also fought over on the battlefield.

Methodology

In 1829 the two armies that met at El Santuario were fighting, among other things, for different understandings of sovereignty. One side thought that sovereignty should be popular and that its representatives should be as similar to the people they governed as possible (which is to say, they should not be foreigners or appointed by foreigners). The other side understood sovereignty to be territorial, and that national leaders should be the most competent available, regardless of their birth, heritage, or supporters. The diverse origins of the men who lined up at El Santuario mean that a collective biography of them leading to and away from the Battle of El Santuario can provide a compelling insight into the changing conceptions of sovereignty during their lifetimes. This book, therefore, combines collective biography and comparative history, drawing on works in national, imperial, and Atlantic histories in Europe and the Americas. I pay great attention to personal relationships, preferring to treat the El Santuario veterans as individual human beings with feelings, loyalties, and ideas—which changed over time—rather than as one-dimensional representatives of one or other ideology, nation, class, or empire. Private relationships are sometimes taken as providing indications of public actions, and where possible links between the two are identified. In this way, I use the biographical approach to tease out and illustrate wider conclusions regarding social, political, and geopolitical change.[50]

Historians have often turned to biography in an attempt to "explore the contradictions" of the post-independence period.[51] In Kenneth Andrien's words, life histories can "show real people . . . adjusting to the large impersonal historical forces that helped shape their lives."[52] Simple biography can sometimes create a narrow, protagonist-centered view that distorts or misses the bigger picture. A targeted collective biography can avoid this. I hope

that, to borrow Ann Twinam's phrase, "the power of the detailed personal experience [can] illustrate the broader process."[53]

There are some problems with the collective biography methodology adopted here. The available sources (discussed below) mean that the weight of information is inclined toward white men and that there is frustratingly little on indigenous, black, or slave veterans. The absence of firm documentary evidence to attest to the presence of slaves and indigenous peoples in the battle, similarly, does not mean that they are absent from the story told here. Through an immersion in local and regional archives we can deduce that the bulk of the "Army of Liberty," and a part of O'Leary's expedition too, were made up of *campesinos* from the Antioquian countryside around El Santuario and Rionegro. So, although the documentary focus may appear to conform to much conventional military history in that it denies women, slaves, and indigenous peoples' protagonism in the central narrative, it should be plain by the end, as Nancy Appelbaum observed in her study of a later period of Colombian history, that even the strongest elite political and economic dominance "does not preclude agency or dissent."[54] The decision to focus on a military engagement also inevitably meant that women would occupy a peripheral place in the narrative, though women constantly appear in the story as mothers, wives, lovers, spies, and messengers. Although women do not appear to have been physically present in the two hours of fighting at El Santuario, they were very much involved in the preparations for and consequences of the conflict.

The first half of the book traces the early lives and progressive entanglement of the people who would meet at El Santuario in 1829. The second half follows the trajectories of the survivors across the Gran Colombian region and the world. Because Venezuela granted asylum to several of the Bolivarian veterans of El Santuario, from this point the book adopts a comparative history approach with alternate sections dealing with New Granada and Venezuela. The comparative perspective leads us to challenge unspoken assumptions, such as on the relative role of violence in the two political cultures, and to identify singularities, such as the differing treatment of the veterans in the two republics. A comparative reading provides a useful introduction to the divergent post-independence histories of Venezuela and New Granada.[55] When combined with the attention paid to the Atlantic and global dimensions of the subject, as J. H. Elliott notes, the comparative perspective can "provok[e] new questions and offer new perspectives."[56] In this way I draw from what has come to be known as "transnational history," an approach that emphasizes and unpicks the ideological, cultural, economic, and social entanglements between different peoples. This approach often privileges the analysis of mediators or interlocutors in historical encounters.[57] My use of this body of work starts from the premise that there is little point in looking at mediators or interlocutors unless they are studied as an integral part what is being mediated; in this case, empire, and republic.[58] The questions the book seeks to answer are therefore very much global at the same time as they are local, regional, national, and imperial. Inevitably these

questions have been shaped by the trajectories of the El Santuario veterans themselves, and by the fragmentary sources available. As Maya Jasanoff has shown, collective biography can act as a window into global empires in a way that other approaches cannot. The approach helps us to navigate between the general and the particular, between the global and the local.[59]

Sources

Some of the methodological difficulties summarized above can in large part be explained by the nature of the sources available to the historian. We know more about some of the El Santuario veterans because they wrote about their experiences in the form of autobiography (O'Leary), or regular political pamphlets reflecting on their personal circumstances (Salvador Córdova, Thomas Murray, and Francisco Urdaneta). Some of the veterans were lucky enough to have biographies written about them in later life by sympathetic friends or relations (Braulio Henao, Francisco Giraldo, and Anselmo Pineda). Others attracted the posthumous attention of biographers because their lives appeared to be in some way special either as national heroes or villains (the Córdovas, Castelli, and Hand). Some were deemed to be of such significance that their archives and writings were preserved and published (the Córdova brothers again, Daniel O'Leary, and Carlos Castelli). All of these sources have to be approached with considerable care; they can provide useful facts and establish relationships, though their authors' claims to have identified special qualities in their subjects must always be subject to question.

There is one invaluable eyewitness description of the Battle of El Santuario, written in old age by José María Arango, who served at José María Córdova's side. Information has also been extracted from a range of other material, such as military records in Bogotá, which are sometimes surprisingly useful, though more often brief or, worse, missing. Parish records in Marinilla yielded fascinating insights into everyday life in and around El Santuario before and after the battle, as did the regional criminal archive preserved at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Medellín. Of great importance are the witness testimonies given at Rupert Hand's trial. While the manner of fact-gathering and the political inclination of the judicial process left much to be desired, even by contemporary standards (with many of the testimonies alleged to be fabrications), the surrounding bureaucratic paraphernalia does provide clues as to where individuals were and where they went at a given time.[60] Used with care, the evidence collected in the 1831–33 trial can also help us to establish patterns of action and involvement in the battle and its consequences.

Piecing together these fragmentary sources can allow us to recreate both local and global histories. Nevertheless, the veterans about whom we have full, basic information (i.e., name, age, and place of birth) are but a negligible proportion of the whole. General Daniel O'Leary had between 700 and 900 men under his command in the Colombian government forces, and Córdova's "Army of Liberty" contained around 370 men, meaning

that there were around 1,200 veterans in all. We know more about officers than soldiers, an inevitable consequence of the historical sources and their archives, which for the nineteenth century tend to preserve records of the literate and the influential rather than of the illiterate or the dispossessed. Only rarely can we overcome the relative "unknowability" of subaltern lives, through examples such as Francisco Giraldo, who went from illiterate child-soldier to esteemed citizen and, right at the end of his long life, a decorated general.[61]

One of the most fortunate discoveries a historian can make as he or she begins to compile a bibliography of available sources on their chosen topic is that someone might have already dedicated themselves to preserving relevant documents and making them available for posterity. I was lucky to have this experience not once but twice while researching for this book. Two of the El Santuario veterans became compulsive collectors and archivists in later life. The first of these was Anselmo Pineda, who served José María Córdova as a young *capitán* in 1829. In later life Pineda obsessively amassed historical documents, particularly printed pamphlets, which he personally catalogued, indexed, and donated to the state. The Fondo Pineda forms the core of the Colombian National Library's collections for the period in question. The second collector, Daniel O'Leary, fought the last military engagement of his life at El Santuario. Almost immediately afterward, he turned to the practice of history in order to understand and explain to others the great changes he believed he had witnessed in his decade of military service. He wrote a three-volume narrative of these years and filled chests, trunks, and boxes with material relating to his friend and hero Simón Bolívar, picking up original correspondence as well as published pamphlets and draft speeches. These were published in 32 volumes in the 1880s. Both Pineda and O'Leary had political preferences and adopted personal criteria as to which subjects should be documented and preserved. O'Leary was the more partial of the two, and his collections—if taken in isolation—tend to justify what he saw as his own side's actions. Pineda was a more voracious collector, and his donations to the National Library were diverse and enormous, reaching over one thousand bound and indexed volumes by the end of his life.

Any study of foreign influence in Latin America cannot ignore the diplomatic and consular archives that until recently were the absolute staple of the subject. Although the limitations of a reliance on the "metropolitan archive" have been well-demonstrated by a wave of postcolonial historians, I have used many sources from the center of empire here—from the British Foreign Office, the US Department of State, the French Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the Spanish Archive of the Indies. However, I have used these, and the consular reports sent from Bogotá, Cartagena, and Caracas that they include, in tandem with the local sources—newspapers, correspondence, and government records—held in archives in Caracas, Bogotá, Medellín, Rionegro, Marinilla, and El Santuario. In search of a more global perspective on the subject, I spent time away from the libraries and archives too. This meant hiking through the battlefield in El Santuario (much of it

now covered in urban sprawl), and talking to staff and visitors in the one-room museum on the corner of El Santuario's central plaza, which occupies the space where Rupert Hand murdered José María Córdova on October 17, 1829 (though the building itself has twice been demolished between then and now). Taken together and treated with caution these sources allow the causes and consequences of the Battle of El Santuario to be traced with depth and perspective.

The book is divided into nine chapters, which progress chronologically from 1790 to 1854. The description of the 1829 Battle of El Santuario is, therefore, the centerpiece of the narrative. It is now time to begin our exploration of the global, imperial, and local forces that acted throughout the 1820s to bring about the Battle of El Santuario. We left José María Córdova, Daniel O'Leary, and their followers poised on the brink of battle high in the Eastern Cordillera of the Andes in Antioquia. But how did they get there? What were they fighting for?

Chapter 1

The World in Revolution

The paths of the men who would fight at El Santuario began on both sides of the Atlantic, and were shaped by global, imperial, and national factors. This chapter provides a brief overview of the births, backgrounds, and the political trajectories of the principal protagonists in the years before 1820.

In total, 1,150 men fought at El Santuario, according to the most reliable figures: 370 rebels under Córdova and 780 government troops under O'Leary. All of Córdova's army were Antioquians, most of them peasants and farmers recruited in the month before the battle. They included mestizos, slaves, free blacks, and indigenous people as well as white Creoles such as Córdova himself. The nature of the surviving sources means that we know much more about the Creoles than we do about the other groups. O'Leary's army was gathered from battalions barracked in Bogotá and Honda, and was, therefore, a cross-section of Gran Colombian recruits, including many Venezuelans and a sprinkling of Antioquians. We know much more about some individuals than others, and, therefore, the early lives we have must be taken as broadly representative of the whole. The chapter introduces first the principal figures on the government side, and then the rebels.

Imperial powers fought for control of the Atlantic in the late eighteenth century. Great Britain, France, and Spain fought repeated wars over the riches of the Americas. The revolutions in the United States and French Saint-Domingue ruptured the logic of colonial possession and left the European powers scrambling to maintain control of commerce and specie exports. On occasions imperial navies and armies were sent to win control of new colonial possessions, as in Saint-Domingue, a misadventure that cost thousands of lives. British statesmen certainly dreamed of wresting American colonies from Spain's grasp; they did so partly out of fear that France harbored similar desires.[1] Imperial jealousy for control in order to deprive others of the joys of possession created a constant state of uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic. All parties tried to strengthen their state institutions and their military defenses to ward off potential imperial predators. Even when British victory over the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1805 created British naval supremacy in the Atlantic, and when Napoleon was definitely defeated

at Waterloo in 1815, this sensation did not disappear. The Atlantic world had been thrown into revolution, and the consequences would take decades to become clear.

O'Leary's Government Forces at El Santuario: Origins

When French armies swept across Europe in the first years of the nineteenth century, they made a dramatic impact on the lives of many young men. *Carlo Castelli*, born in the village of San Sebastiano Po near Turin, the year after the storming of the Bastille in Paris, was one such boy inspired by the dreams of liberty and equality embodied by Napoleon. Young Castelli left home against his father's wishes, and joined the Bonapartist armies, in whose service he was wounded. In the same year that Bonaparte's armies were defeated at the Battle of Waterloo by Prussian and British troops commanded by the Duke of Wellington, Europe's leaders met at the Congress of Vienna to restore a "balance of power" that they hoped would prevent the continent from falling into internal warfare. They had some success in this, maintaining a mistrustful and resentful peace that prevented European powers from explicitly taking up arms against one another again until the Crimean War of 1853–56. But while the stable door was effectively closed in Europe, the horses of warfare bolted across the Atlantic where they were given free rein in the Americas. Castelli followed these tides of revolution. Believing Napoleon to have become increasingly separated from the ideals he had cherished, in 1814 Castelli left Europe for the Americas to continue the military struggle for independence and freedom. He was one of the understudied "Bonapartist exiles" whose "wider Atlantic and even global significance" is only now beginning to be recognized by historians.[2] Quickly adding a hispanified "s" to the end of his first name, Castelli served the independence armies in the Cauca Valley in New Granada, and following their defeat he sought exile in Haiti, the new black Caribbean republic (formerly the French colony of Saint-Domingue) that Napoleon had failed to repress. When the Haitian president Alexandre Petión introduced Castelli to Simón Bolívar in 1816, the Italian threw in his lot with the Venezuelan [3] During the Wars of Independence Castelli earned Bolívar's respect as a responsible and battle-hardened officer, one of a kernel of European officers whose experience added luster to Bolívar's authority. Coronel Castelli would be the oldest of the European soldiers at El Santuario in 1829. The paradox of Castelli's journey from being an idealistic volunteer in Italy to a seasoned politician and administrator in Venezuela mirrors similar journeys made by younger protagonists of our story, although they had less time to acquire military or political experience before they sailed for the New World.

The quintessential idealistic volunteer in the cause of freedom was *Daniel O'Leary*, who would be the most senior of the three Irishmen who served at El Santuario. A Catholic born in Cork in 1800, O'Leary was a Jesuit-educated relation of Daniel O'Connell, the leader of Irish Catholic organization in the 1810s. Swept up in the waves of popular support in Ireland for the liberation

of Spain's American colonies—and also, aged 18 and looking for something exciting to do—O'Leary joined the expeditions that left London in 1818 to support the independence struggles in Venezuela and New Granada. His family seems to have been respectable, and in Venezuela O'Leary was sharp enough to dedicate himself to learning Spanish and making himself useful, in stark contrast to the majority of his monolingual comrades who waited, generally without success, for honor and glory to come to them.[4] By 1819 O'Leary was Bolívar's aide-de-camp, and he tied his fortunes to Bolívar's from then on.[5]

Castelli and O'Leary are the only two of our adventurers who have merited full-length biographies from historians. It is difficult to work out where their less celebrated colleagues came from, and indeed, who they were. We do know, however, that the 1810s witnessed the acceleration of economic processes that facilitated the transatlantic travel of people like *Thomas Murray, Heinrich Lutzen,* and *Rupert Hand*. In these years population movements (including the forced migration of African slaves, despite the British "abolition" of the slave trade in 1807) increased massively across the Atlantic, which was more than ever a "permeable and permeating structure rather than a contained and containing system" as new global markets and commercial networks developed in response to social and economic change in Asia and Europe.[6] A kind of global "Pax Britannica" was ensured after the 1806 Battle of Trafalgar by overwhelming British naval dominance in areas where the Royal navy chose to exert its considerable numerical advantage. British subjects, therefore, had the world opened up to them after Trafalgar and, especially, after Waterloo. Ship after ship left London, Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow, Leith, Falmouth, Dublin, and Belfast for destinations across the world, their safe arrival more assured than ever before. One of the men who boarded those ships was *Thomas Murray*, who was born somewhere in Ireland in 1796, the son of Eugene Murray and Mary Hill. He was an Anglican by birth (a member of the Protestant Church of Ireland), and was well-educated, having studied Greek and Latin at the University in Dublin.[7] Like O'Leary he joined the British Legion in London in 1818, and used his linguistic skills to earn the position of aide-de-camp to a senior figure, in Murray's case, Admiral José Padilla. He seems to have been an effective administrator from an early stage and did not attract much attention until the late 1820s. José María Samper later commented that Murray "was a man of very liberal ideas . . . who carried his gallantry to sinful excesses, but was always honorable in his public life."[8] This honorable, multilingual, and politically charged young man traveled to South America to find adventure and to fight for the cause of freedom.

Rupert Hand was another adventurer with an acute sense of honor. He was born into a Catholic family between 1794 and 1796 in County Dublin.[9] He joined the British Legion in London in 1818 at the age of around 23. We know nothing about what he was doing before that time, and there is no record of any military service in the British Army. Hand exemplified the young Irish Catholic who sought an outlet for their talents and their

ambitions outside of the British Empire, often raging against the injustice of discrimination suffered by Catholics. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many men like Hand had joined the Spanish army for the same reason. During Hand's lifetime British aristocratic governments made gradual concessions toward equality, most notably Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the "Great" Reform Act of 1832, and the Abolition of Slavery in 1834. Nevertheless, these changes were far too slow for an impetuous man such as Rupert Hand, who was always in a hurry for promotion, for respect, and for adventure. Rupert Hand did not speak any Spanish when he arrived in Venezuela, and events suggest that he was less intellectually inclined than Murray or O'Leary. With the rank of capitán he was given small units of troops to train and discipline between 1818 and 1820, which is where he developed his reputation as a strict enforcer of rules and rank who often used violence to this end.[10]

Like Rupert Hand, *Richard Joseph Crofton* traveled to South America against a background of limited opportunities at home. His service records have been lost, and we can only guess at his age, whether he married and where he came from. His surname suggests that most likely he was Protestant.[11] Some later sources assert that he was Irish, others that he was English, one that he had previously been a Corporal in the British army.[12] He is first mentioned by a reliable historical source in Colombia only in 1827, when he became one of Bolívar's most devoted followers and violent enforcers. Crofton's lack of a documented prestory is a reminder of the limitations of our approach—we simply can't be sure where he came from.

About *Heinrich Lutzen* we can be more certain. He was born in Hanover in 1796 and was trained in the Prussian army. Like the Bonapartist exile Castelli, the arrival of a German like Lutzen in Venezuela was a direct result of the great changes and new connections of the period 1780–1820, identified by C. A. Bayly as "the birth of the modern world."[13] Lutzen's journey from Hanover to London to Venezuela was catalyzed and shaped by "economic changes, ideological constructions, and mechanisms of the state."[14] The military service of thousands of Hanoverians in the British army in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was the precedent for Lutzen's decision to try his luck in South America. Around 600 German-speakers joined the Hanoverian Legions to serve in Gran Colombia. Their most famous official was Johannes Usslar, who settled in Venezuela as Juan Uslar founding a long and successful dynasty of men of letters. Lutzen served alongside his compatriot Uslar in the early 1820s, and was promoted to capitán in the Rifles Battalion, where he distinguished himself for his "good conduct and military experience." Like other the Hanoverians who served at the Battle of Carabobo in 1821 he prided himself on his honor and discipline, especially in comparison to the British and Irish with their reputations for excessive drinking and subversion. His superior officer noted that Lutzen had "some education but little talent: his capacity for bravery remains unknown."[15]

In summary, the European protagonists of El Santuario had no reason to stay in Europe in the 1810s while they had every reason to pursue their

ideals and seek their fortunes overseas. They traveled on transatlantic transport that was accessible, affordable, and available to take them away. Yet despite the positions of command that they achieved at El Santuario in 1829, and the symbolic value that they, therefore, accrue, these Europeans were in the minority at El Santuario. Mobility was not only a transatlantic phenomenon. In the 1810s, lives across the Americas were also being shaped in ways that would lead them to the battlefield in Andean Antioquia in 1829.

The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776 is often held to mark the beginning of the Age of Atlantic Revolution. The principle of self-rule was certainly attractive to Creole elites in Spain's American colonies, though they also recoiled in horror at the prospect of having to fight a similar war for independence against their own motherland. It was the French incursion into the Iberian Peninsula in 1807–8 that forced the question, with elite juntas across Hispanic America opting initially to preserve their loyalty to the Spanish monarchy rather than unilaterally declare independence. Spain's bloody attempts to reconquer and hold on to its American colonies—prolonging Wars of Independence that were much more costly in terms of lives and resources than the conflict in the North—produced the desire for independence. Events and ideologies from the North did inspire emulation in the South, with Antonio Nariño famously convicted in New Granada for translating and publishing the Declaration of the Rights of Man. But many Creole leaders thought that the example of the United States was inappropriate to their situation, most notably Simón Bolívar who constantly guarded against adopting models or experiences from the North. US intervention in the process of independence in the South was correspondingly limited and ill-defined. A few US emissaries and consuls were sent South (most notably to Mexico and to Venezuela) to argue for commercial interests, but they found themselves underresourced and compared unfavorably to their British counterparts. The private citizens who traveled to South America after independence had been achieved were few and far between.

One of them was *Dabney O. Carr*, who was born in Virginia, United States, around 1802. He was the scion of an influential political and landowning family descending from Dabney Carr Sr, who had been a school-friend of Thomas Jefferson and who married the independence hero's sister, thereby assuring himself of local political patronage and reputation. We know little about the education or upbringing of Carr Sr.'s grandson Dabney O. Carr (though we can presume, given what we know about his family, that it was comfortable and respectable). We do know that Dabney O. Carr arrived in Gran Colombia in the late 1820s, aged around 23, anxious for advancement, adventure, and action, like many young men of his generation.[16] The capacity for travel in South America in this period is often linked to the spread of capitalism and the quest for natural resources to be exploited by US or European investors. Yet this is only one side of the story. Dabney O. Carr, the great-nephew of Thomas Jefferson, shared a very similar background with the artist Carmelo Fernández, the nephew of José Antonio Páez, hero

of Venezuela's independence movements and alternatively ally and enemy of Simón Bolívar.

Carmelo Fernández was born in 1810 in Guama, Yarcuy, in eastern Venezuela. He was trained as an artist under French tutors in Caracas, and spent three years in New York at private school paid for by his newly wealthy uncle. Nevertheless he remained "virtually self-taught" given the many degrees of disruption and neglect that characterized his education. He was attached to military service at a young age and numerous officers made use of his talents for sketching maps and campaign routes.[17] When he reached Bogotá in the late 1820s he was surrounded by other military men of Venezuelan birth, most notably Rafael Urdaneta, who would later succeed Bolívar as president of Colombia.

Francisco Urdaneta was Rafael's cousin. He reached El Santuario after a journey that epitomizes much about the upheavals of the early years of independence. He had come from Montevideo, on the eastern bank of the River Plate, where he was born in 1791. The region had long been coveted by and fought over by the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies. In 1806–7 they were joined in contest by the British empire, when Creole elites in Buenos Aires and Montevideo banded together to defend themselves against speculative British invasions led by Sir Home Popham. Aged just 15, Francisco Urdaneta joined the local militia that successfully repelled the forces of British imperialism from Montevideo. Urdaneta's father was the Spanish-born Tobacco Monopoly Commissioner in the city, a position of considerable status and economic and political influence. The boy's contribution to helping to repel the British attack, no matter how insignificant it might have been at the time, was absolutely formational in Urdaneta's personal development. From that day on, he believed, he never deserted the "cause of freedom."[18] With the British gone, young Urdaneta was sent to work for his uncle in the colonial administration in Santa Fe, as Bogotá was known during the colonial period, presumably to keep him out of harm's way during the revolutionary crisis that Urdaneta senior correctly foresaw for the River Plate region. Independence was in the air in the Andes too, however, and in 1810 Urdaneta joined the rebels when they proclaimed the independence of New Granada from Spanish rule. Like the backgrounds of Castelli, Lutzen, and O'Leary discussed above, Urdaneta came from a relatively high social position at home. In New Granada he sought further social advancement in the unfamiliar territory. During the early skirmishes of the 1810s Urdaneta served under Antonio Nariño; his colleagues remembered Urdaneta as a "brave young man, a good horse-rider, with an arrogant presence about him."[19] As the turmoil of warfare died down in New Granada in the late 1810s Urdaneta found himself in Antioquia having reached the rank of coronel, and he married and accepted political appointments there.[20] In many ways he was left as a man without a nation for the rest of his life. In 1830 the eastern bank of the River Plate was declared independent as the republic of Uruguay, with Montevideo as its capital, after a naval war was fought between Buenos Aires and Brazil in ships officered principally by foreigners

to the extent that some claimed it "a war betwixt Englishmen."[21] Urdaneta could never think of himself as a Uruguayan or Argentinean, because he had left the region long before they were independent. He never went back. Francisco Urdaneta struggled for the rest of his life to be accepted by the community into which he married in Antioquia.

Where Did the Rebels at El Santuario Come From? Antioquia in the Age of Revolution

For most of the colonial period Antioquia was a peripheral region of the viceroyalty of New Granada, even though it was the Spanish empire's principal exporter of gold for much of this time. Gold was the main attraction for migrants, who generally established themselves around the gold mines in the northeastern mountains. Antioquia's inhabitants were employed in mining or agriculture until a slow developing commercial culture began to flourish, initially as an intermediary nexus between the Cauca Valley and areas further south, the viceregal capital in Bogotá, and the Caribbean port of Cartagena. In the early nineteenth century, however, the elite was still extremely small, interlinked through marriage and friendship, and owing its wealth and status to government appointments or the trade in gold.[22] Several small towns competed for regional preeminence, including Medellín, Santa Fe de Antioquia, and Rionegro.

Antioquia's Urban Elites

In the early twenty-first century Medellín is a modern urban sprawl with over 2 million inhabitants and is Colombia's economic and industrial powerhouse. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, Medellín had only a few thousand inhabitants. One of the ways in which Medellín became established as the primary urbanization in the region was through education. Before 1800 there were few schools in Antioquia; elite children were educated at home and then sent to Popayán, Cartagena, or Bogotá. As Renán Silva has argued, the legacy of a brief but sustained investment in public investment had long-lasting consequences.[23] During the independence era, new schools were founded to teach practical skills and Enlightenment values to the children of the Antioquian elites. In 1814 the School of Military Engineers was founded in Medellín, where the teachers included scientist Francisco José de Caldas, philosopher José Felix de Restrepo, and military officer Coronel Manuel Roergaz de Serviez. The influence of these three members of the "Generation of 1810" that had declared New Granada's independence was considerable, particularly upon elite culture and the language of reason, liberty, and law in which students were encouraged to frame their political actions. Alongside their belief in the government of reason, they retained a passionate romanticism in matters of identity that often led to political paralysis or violent conflict.[24] Between 1814 and 1816, during the brief period of peace in which they had a stable

cohort of students, Caldas, Restrepo, and Serviez taught many of the sons of the Antioquian elite and created a generation of enlightened students who would guide Antioquia in its transition from colonial periphery into a free, modern region that engaged with and influenced the nation-state of which it now formed part.

The most famous of those students was *José María Córdova*. Born in Concepción near Rionegro in 1799, Córdova was fast-tracked into a military career under Serviez's patronage, helped by his influential father. Even when his mentor was killed in battle in the llanos in 1816, Córdova's ambition and talent kept growing. In 1819, when Bolívar's victory at the Battle of Boyacá caused Viceroy Sámano to flee the capital, the way was opened for Colombian forces to advance on Antioquia and to expel any surviving Royalist forces. Bolívar chose Córdova for this mission, identifying him as his favorite Antioquian officer, and promoting him to the rank of Colonel aged only 20. Córdova, therefore, led the march and secured the military victories that assured the success of independence in Antioquia. Most of the Royalist forces had already fled for Cartagena before Córdova crossed the Western Andes.[25] When he arrived, many people who had been Royalists were quickly convinced of the strength of independence. Córdova managed the transfer of power without too many problems and recruited many young men to the new republic's forces.[26] In the following months, however, the close family ties between Royalists and independents in Antioquia meant that Córdova had to act with increasing subtlety and tact in imposing republican rule upon Antioquian society. This was a task for which he was not well-suited, as he and others recognized.[27] Soon Córdova left political rule to others in Antioquia and traveled south in search of glory in Cauca, Pasto, Ecuador, and Peru, where he reached the rank of general, taking many Antioquians with him, including his brother.[28]

Salvador Córdova, born in Rionegro in 1801, had remained at home when his elder brother marched off to war in 1816. The younger brother developed an inferiority complex that led him to emulate his brother for the rest of his life. His personality was also shaped by the Córdova family history. As Antioquia was still a colonial backwater when the brothers were born, its nobility did not have all the impeccable lineage that might be expected for metropolitan elites elsewhere. The Córdova's maternal grandfather, Gabriel Muñoz, had come from an important Medellín family, but his birth was recognized as legitimate by the Spanish Crown in 1793, only after several years of legal petitioning. His daughter Doña Pascuala Muñoz married into the Rionegro Córdova family, and her children were Vicente, José María, Salvador, Ana, and Mercedes.[29] Their grandfather's initial illegitimacy was used to cast aspersions on the Córdovas throughout their lives.[30] In 1819, when José María Córdova returned, Salvador Córdova was ready to serve at his side wherever necessity should take them. He was one of the many young Antioquians who flourished in the brilliant light cast by José María Córdova's successes in this period, and by 1824 Salvador Córdova had reached the rank of coronel.

Manuel Antonio Jaramillo was José María Córdova's classmate at school in Medellín. He was born in the gold-mining town of Yolombó in 1795 and continued his training as a lawyer throughout the Wars of Independence. Jaramillo was perhaps the student who used his education at the School of Military Engineers most directly in future life. He sketched a plan for a Panama Canal (suggesting the route that was eventually adopted almost a century later), and he translated classical texts in his spare time. In 1826 he married Mercedes Córdova. From then he would be the Córdova family's closest political ally.[31] The Córdova family's political influence was grounded in the town of Rionegro, where they owned a sprawling one-storey complex around a leafy courtyard just off the town's central plaza. Rionegro was growing in importance at the turn of the century, though it was still a small urban center dominated by a few landowning colonial families, such as the Córdovas, who owned slaves they employed in domestic occupations and gold-mining elsewhere.[32] Even in the 1843 Census the population of Rionegro was just 5,004, including 309 slaves.[33] Nevertheless, ambitious young men from surrounding villages came to Rionegro for their education, for government positions, or to trade. Merchants such as *Francisco Escalante* (born Rionegro, 1804) regularly traveled to and from Medellín, Popayán, and Bogotá. The town's market was important for the region's agricultural production, in which some soldiers of the Wars of Independence occupied themselves after hanging up their weapons (such as *Braulio Henao*, born in nearby La Leona in 1802). The Córdovas' army recruited many of its officers from its Rionegro power base in 1829, such as Escalante, Jaramillo, and Henao, but the Antioquian presence at El Santuario was marked not by noble, educated military officers alone.

Rural Subalterns: Marinilla and El Santuario

In 2011 El Santuario was a town of around 35,000 inhabitants. In the early nineteenth century it was a newly instituted vice parish pertaining to the nearby town of Marinilla.[34] On the small plain occupied today by El Santuario's Plaza de Armas, with its bustling cafes, huge church, and bus links to Rionegro (journey time 20 minutes) and Medellín (one hour), in the early nineteenth century there was relative silence. There was only a small chapel dedicated to the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Chiquinquirá, constructed in the 1780s, and one small house with a tiled roof. On the surrounding hills there were various farmhouses, where the descendents of the founders of Marinilla (itself only recently established in 1787) employed indigenous and mestizo laborers in agricultural work that barely went beyond subsistence levels. In the whole of the vice parish of El Santuario, in 1813, there were 1,127 individuals living strung across the mountainside. This was still very much a frontier of colonization, with the indigenous peoples gradually forced from their homes in the area and toward newer settlements in neighboring El Peñol and Coconó.[35]

The fragmentation of historical records in El Santuario means that our knowledge of the locally born participants in the 1829 battle is extremely patchy. The municipal archive has discarded its pre-twentieth-century records. What we know about the participation of the people of El Santuario in the 1829 battle has to be reconstructed from oral histories, military service records, and parish birth, baptism, and death records. It is, therefore, frustratingly incomplete. We assume that mestizos and indigenous peoples made up a significant minority of the soldiers recruited to the battle, but have only sketchy or circumstantial evidence to support this. Neither do the available sources provide any evidence that women took part in the fighting, although this certainly does not mean that we should discount the possibility of female involvement. We do know that there were laborers and artisans, teachers and bakers, professional soldiers as well as conscripted indigenous *peones.* Only one slave's name has survived as having been an active participant in the battle—that of Francisco Villa.[36] But as we know that the Córdovas were substantial slaveowners, and we know that most slaveowners led their own slaves into battle in this period, it seems fair to assume that the Córdovas would also have armed their slaves when faced with military necessity. We can extrapolate a little more about local involvement on the basis of what we know about the few local men whose actions were recorded and preserved. The town of Marinilla experienced a period of rapid growth at the end of the colonial period, based on the growing returns of the gold trade and the town's location on the main route between Antioquia and Bogotá. A population boom created a glut of boys born between 1810 and 1815 who were preyed upon by military recruiters: 200 young men joined José María Córdova's forces here in 1829.[37] These Marinilla-born boys included Eusebio Isaza and Bernabé Hoyos, who were born in 1811, Jesús Jiménez (1814) and Custodio Gómez (1814).[38]

Other slightly older Antioqueños followed José María Córdova into the new opportunities opened up by the rapid expansion of the military. Many of these individuals joined Córdova's forces in Antioquia in 1820, serving with him on the Caribbean coast and then traveling down to Peru to take part in the final campaigns against Spanish power in 1823 and 1824. Braulio Henao was one of these men who gained valuable experience under Córdova; another was José María Botero Villegas, a moneyed young man from Rionegro. At the other end of the social spectrum was Marco Antonio Gómez, born in 1796, who joined Córdova in 1820 as a *soldado aspirante,* the lowest-rank possible, and rose up the ranks through the next decade. Alongside these young conscripts and adventurers, there were also some individuals with family responsibilities who ended up fighting alongside José María Córdova. Baptism records from Marinilla reveal that José María Salazar, Vicente Zuluaga Hoyos, and Nicolas Ramirez all had children between 1809 and 1816. Vicente de Hoyos was a local official who led a clampdown on illegal distilleries when serving as mayor of Marinilla in 1815.[39] They were all at the battle in their neighborhood in 1829. Putting all these names and data together, we can see that the El Santuario veterans

were drawn from a cross-section of society in northeastern Antioquia, comprising the towns of Rionegro and Marinilla and their large rural hinterlands encompassing the parish of El Santuario. We can flesh out the historical circumstances that drew santuarianos into battle in 1829 by looking at two cases about which lots of details do survive.

Francisco Giraldo was born in a rural homestead, Pavas, located between El Santuario and Marinilla, in 1804. The first declarations of New Granadan independence found him aged just six, and he was swept into the army as a child soldier. He was never formally schooled and learned everything he knew from a life of incessant campaigning, first as a flag-carrier and later as an aide-de-camp. In the 1810s he served all over New Granada, though mainly in Cauca and Bogotá. He was captured by Royalists and fought against the independents for several years (under duress, he later claimed) before returning to Antioquia in time to join up with the Córdova brothers in the early 1820s.[40] His experience fits with the pattern of boys being swept up by military mobilization at a very young age, as traced by Clément Thibaud.[41]

From the other end of society in El Santuario came *Anselmo Pineda*. He was born in 1805 in one of the isolated frontier houses in El Santuario. His family was "religious, austere and patriarchal," and he was the great-great-great-grandson of the region's first colonizers. His parents sent him to a church school in Marinilla, where he was, according to his biographers, an assiduous pupil who became imbued with religious faith and a desire to see and learn more about the world. In 1822 he went to Bogotá to study Jurisprudence at the Jesuit San Bartolomé Seminary School.[42] Anselmo Pineda is often held to epitomize the historical figure of the Antioquian colonizer. In popular imagination Rionegro is held to have been a "Liberal" town since the time of the Córdovas, while neighboring Marinilla has the reputation of being "Conservative." Pineda himself, depicted as brave, ruddy, and driven by religious faith, would seem an odd person to be joining José María Córdova's subversive rebellion in 1829. But the material presented here on the Antioquian backgrounds of the El Santuario veterans further supports the contention that such incongruities might have been the norm rather than the exception. A whole swathe of Antioquian population was drawn into the conflict at the end of the 1820s: slaves and their owners, religious zealots and enlightened lawyers, Creoles and mestizos. There they would encounter Europeans like Lutzen and Castelli, and other Hispanic Americans like Urdaneta and Fernández.

Global Connections and Local Historical Change

At this distance, having presented the bare bones of geographical origin and social background, we might be tempted to conclude that the vortex of war must have swept up our protagonists without rhyme or reason, or that forced conscription might have a substantial explanatory role.

Yet stepping back it is also clear from these lives that global connections and long-term local processes of change were both crucial to aligning the

sides at El Santuario. Conflicts between European imperial powers over colonial possessions and the riches to be derived from them, shaped the Atlantic world between 1789 and 1820. Despite the proclamation of a free black republic in Haiti in 1804, and the abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain in 1807, the numbers of slaves transported across the ocean in fact rose, rather than declined, in this period. Increased military conflict created a massive movement of peoples from Europe to the Americas, as well as a renewed demand for precious metals to pay for it. Elites in Antioquia, a key gold-producing region, were able to harness these changes. Some families became richer, and, therefore, purchased more slaves to work their mines or clean their houses. Elite children became better educated and went on to develop a sense of themselves as somehow different from Spaniards and from inhabitants of other parts of New Granada. Economic prosperity triggered economic expansion and population movement up the slopes of the eastern cordillera of the Andes. In the 1810s, therefore, El Santuario and its rural inhabitants were on the frontier of internal colonialism, powered by the migration of poor, Hispanic, farming families like the Pinedas and the Giraldos.

Imperial rivalry, land colonization, commerce, and the beginnings of ideas of national and regional difference: these factors combined to produce a "concatenation of changes" that shaped the early lives of the men who would go on to fight at the Battle of El Santuario in 1829.[43] During the 1820s these individuals' paths became ever more tightly connected. Warfare was the principal motor gathering them together. It took place within the context of the struggle to end colonialism in the Americas. The next chapter explores the political and economic changes of the 1820s, explaining how the dividing lines gradually emerged under the pressure of local forces within their global contexts.

Chapter 2

The Narrowing Stage: From Global to Local

This chapter traces the three distinct pathways that converged in these years, drawing groups and individuals together toward El Santuario from across New Granada, Venezuela, and the Atlantic world. The three strands are: first, Antioquian economic and political networks; second, the military reputation of José María Córdova; and third, Simón Bolívar's efforts to institutionalize the Republic of Gran Colombia with foreign support.

The years from 1820 to 1827 witnessed the strongest influence of foreign powers in the Gran Colombian region in the entire nineteenth century, as statesmen in Bogotá consciously "turned toward the world." They sought diplomatic recognition from the imperial powers and were prepared to grant numerous concessions (especially in commerce) in order to win the desired treaties that would establish them on the international scene.[1] The power of British capital, in the form of enormous loans made in 1822 and 1824, entrenched British influence in Gran Colombia's financial heart. The channels that brought this capital were almost entirely Antioquian. The 1822 and 1824 loans consolidated the long-standing Antioquia-Britain nexus that had its roots in colonial trade through Jamaica. The loans made Antioquian agents like Francisco Montoya extremely wealthy and brought Gran Colombia and Antioquia firmly (albeit temporarily) into the British world. The prestige of British subjects in Bogotá rose considerably in these years, with private individuals as well as Consuls and Commissioners exercising cultural and social influence upon Colombian politicians.[2] A good example is Mary English, who was part of the social circle of the family of the British consul general James Henderson, including his daughter Fanny Henderson, who marveled at English's prestige and status. English, the Hendersons, and the other 150–200 British subjects resident in Bogotá in these years occupied a pivotal role on the boundaries between British commercial, political, financial, and cultural influence in the capital. English-language newspapers were published, British customs respected, and every effort was made not to offend the representatives of such a powerful and

rich nation. British fashions—particularly hats—were adopted out of a desire to emulate the world's principal imperial power.[3] Though generally absent from the capital, Simón Bolívar encouraged the British presence in Gran Colombia. Correspondingly, many of Bolívar's strongest supporters in these years were foreign adventurers like O'Leary and Rupert Hand. In 1826 and 1827, however, resentment of the British began to fester, for two main reasons. First, the 1826 London financial crisis pulled the carpet out from beneath projected waves of British investment; and second, Bolívar's plans to model a strong central government on the British system and under British protection opened him to charges of giving up hard-won sovereignty. I discuss both of these factors in this chapter.

Pathway 1: Economic and Political Networks in Antioquia

The dominance of British capital in Antioquia was manifested in the 1820s through the gradual rise to economic power of the loan negotiators, particularly Francisco Montoya. Already wealthy before his trip to London, and accustomed to lending money to foreigners in Antioquia, upon his return it became increasingly obvious that Montoya was now in a different financial league to his old friends and neighbors.[4] Montoya's new wealth did not assure him of political power, however, because the final moves of the Wars of Independence, culminating with the Battle of Ayacucho in 1824, produced another Antioquian with considerable accumulated prestige and political capital: José María Córdova. Montoya and Córdova became magnets to two very different aspects of society in the 1820s. The tension between these twin motors of political change (first, the language of popular sovereignty fought for and increasingly epitomized by José María Córdova; second, the continued political and economic influence of foreign powers, as manifested by the new extent of Montoya's wealth), became the driving force of political events in Antioquia throughout the 1820s and until the Battle of El Santuario in 1829.

During the 1820s José María Córdova rose to a position of political influence based on his military success and framed by a complicated network of loyalties, affiliations, families, and patronages that were managed by his family and supporters in and around Rionegro. Biographers agree that José María Córdova possessed plenty of what Max Weber called charismatic authority, "gifts of the body and spirit; [. . .] believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody," which were enough on their own to justify him acting as a caudillo in Antioquia.[5] Córdova's rise to regional influence in the 1820s should also be understood as being founded on networks that were commercial, political, and ecclesiastical as well as military and ideological.[6]

One of the key figures in Córdova's financial and commercial networks was Sinforoso García, an important merchant in Rionegro and Medellín in the late 1810s who had migrated from Bucaramanga and had important links to the trade with colonial Jamaica (and, therefore, with British contraband).[7]

He earned the respect of central government and in January 1820 García was named as administrator of the Postal System in Rionegro, a position of substantial economic and political power as it gave him control of the town's purse-strings as well as its mail. Throughout the 1820s García lent money to friends and political allies, including Córdova and José Manuel Restrepo, Bolívar's minister of the interior, to whom García was related by marriage.[8] These debts were important anchors for both men. Credit granted by García allowed them the freedom to follow the fluctuations of warfare without excessive worry about their domestic finances. Córdova remained in debt to García until his death. García certainly had wealth to spare, as illustrated by his extravagant domestic arrangements described by visitors.[9] In 1825, after the victory at the battle of Ayacucho, Córdova wrote to García from La Paz, Bolivia, to complain that the payment of wages to the republican armies was "a joke" and that he lived "like a beggar."[10] More loans from García to the Córdova family duly followed. There were other Rionegro merchants who supported the Córdova family too, including the Spaniard Pedro Saenz. The Montoya family also backed Córdova's rise to power in the first half of the decade. The Montoyas and Córdovas were second cousins, and at first it seemed the financial ascent of the former could go hand in hand with the military promotions of the latter. Sovereignty was the issue that later split the clans.[11]

Córdova's political ascent was supported by his old school-friend Manuel Antonio Jaramillo. Jaramillo had become independently wealthy due to the gold that he sold to the government from his family's mines.[12] In 1826 Jaramillo married the Córdovas' sister, Mercedes, and his cousin Ana María married Salvador Córdova. These kinship links tied Jaramillo to the Córdovas for the rest of his life, overlapping with both families' commercial networks.[13] Manuel Antonio's brother, Valentín Jaramillo, was married to moneylender Sinforoso García's daughter Francisca.

These close-knit Antioquian networks, based on political and kinship affinities, supported by commercial, financial, and gold-mining acumen, and coalescing around the Córdova family in the early 1820s, were strong but were not without fractures. Legal disputes between the Córdova, Jaramillo, and García clans reveal how the wealth of new government contracts awarded by Córdova caused jealousy and allegations of corruption.[14] In one court appearance Jaramillo stated that the "rights of man . . . can not apply unless the nation's sovereignty is observed and maintained."[15] Nevertheless, the Antioquian elite's new wealth depended upon the successful cultivation of external contacts, especially for the export of gold. All of the principal players in the Antioquia-Great Britain relationship were supporters of José María Córdova at this stage, including the family of Francisco Antonio Zea, the Colombian vice president who took charge of negotiating the British loan in 1822 (who died in Bath, England, in November the same year), Minister of the Interior José Manuel Restrepo and educator Felix Restrepo. García, Jaramillo, Sáenz, and the Montoyas all had important external relations that buttressed their social influence, often through the export of gold.[16]

Córdova, therefore, rose to a position of political influence in the Bolivarian regime throughout the 1820s with the support of an Antioquian cartel that aimed to exploit national politics and finance for its own benefit.[17]

Away from the elite, some of the Antioquians who had followed Córdova in the Wars of Independence now settled back into their agricultural and commercial activities. Relatively few of them remained full time in the military. Braulio Henao dedicated himself to local affairs in Sonsón. Others found the region changed upon their return: Miguel Alzate declared that his radical political opinions forced him to "retreat into the mountains to live a wild life, which was the only way to preserve my existence from the treachery of my unpatriotic enemies."[18] Miguel Hoyos settled in Medellín, where he became friends with Francisco Urdaneta, the governor of Antioquia from 1822 to 1825.[19] Urdaneta married Manuela de Giradot, the daughter of a French prospector and gold-miner, Louis Giradot, and sister of one of the great heroes and patriotic martyrs of the first stage of the Independence Wars, Atanasio Giradot.[20] Urdaneta governed Antioquia in accordance with Vice President Santander's orders from Bogotá, and without much noticeable complaint from Antioquians. This may have been because during 1822–25, both Córdovas were away from the province on military campaigns in Ecuador and Peru. Urdaneta was an efficient administrator and he presided over a period of stability and growth in the province. As waves of British capital washed into the region, political disputes lacked intensity. Antioquians dedicated themselves to commerce, agriculture, and developing the region's frontiers up in the Andes.

Very few Antioquians felt the need to leave the region to seek their fortunes in the capital in this period. One who did this was El Santuario-born *Anselmo Pineda*. New ideas shaped Pineda and took him away from the paths followed by his peers in Antioquia. In 1822 he traveled to Bogotá to study at the Jesuit San Bartolomé Seminary School in Bogotá. There he encountered the inspirational teachings in philosophy, physics, and mathematics of Felix Restrepo, the Antioquian who had taught Córdova and Jaramillo a decade previously in Medellín.[21] The ideas that Restrepo passed on to Pineda were also similar to those that Carlo Castelli had received in Turin and Daniel O'Leary in his Jesuit school back in Cork. They placed a high premium on science, law, and reason, in stark contrast to more traditional teachings. Pineda's curriculum also benefited from the inclusion of Jeremy Bentham's new writings on utilitarianism. The education Pineda received in Bogotá privileged modern ideas aimed at bringing progress and civilization to New Granada.[22] Many of the authors he studied were foreign: either British like Bentham, or French like Voltaire. This was not cultural imperialism or informal empire. Pineda and his teachers chose texts that would help their new state to know itself and strengthen its institutions. But if we place Pineda's Benthamite education alongside the British capital that reached Antioquia through the Zea and Montoya families, we can perceive an array of British influence shaping the future rebels at El Santuario. During the years 1820–27 a regional elite network was being forged, at once benefiting from contact

with European powers and ready to protect its interests from the incursions of Bogotá and other interlopers. Social, economic, and political networks eventually coalesced around the figure of José María Córdova because of his military exploits in the foundational fighting of the Wars of Independence. Most important of all was Córdova's role at the Battle of Ayacucho.

Pathway 2: José María Córdova: The Creation of a Hero

José María Córdova was one of the many victorious officers in the important battles of Campaign of the South, including Bomboná (1822), Pichincha (1823), and Junín (1824). He was promoted to general after the Battle of Junín, and served in that capacity—still aged just 25—at the Battle of Ayacucho. His heroism on that December 9, 1824, became the stuff of legend and raised him to the second tier of the *padres de la patria,* behind only Bolívar and Sucre in reputation. As the opposing armies lined up after weeks of skirmishes around the Andean foothills in cold, wet, and misty conditions, Córdova acknowledged to his men that they were considerably outnumbered by the imperial army's forces. He then famously declared:

> Soldiers, the general-in-chief has ordered us to occupy those heights that are crowned with our enemies; the general, therefore, has trusted the success of this decisive combat to your valour. Soldiers, forward! Carry your arms, and march on like victors![23]

The Battle of Ayacucho was short, messy, and bloody: one-third of the troops involved were left dead or injured.[24] The officers who were able to impose some order and discipline on their men were few. Córdova was one of them, leading an effective infantry charge that spread fear and chaos among the royalist ranks.

The Colombian Chief of Staff at Ayacucho was an Irishman, Francisco Burdett O'Connor, who commented afterward that "Bolívar's great work was now completed. Colombia's glorious and invincible army sealed the liberty and independence of South America."[25] José María Córdova, however, came to see Ayacucho as the beginning of the end of Bolívar's idealism. In 1829 he wrote that "our triumph at Ayacucho assured the Liberty of all of South America, but it whet the President's lips for more. He believed that Colombia, Bolivia and Peru belonged to him, that this beautiful patrimony was destined for him alone, so he decided to enchain them . . . and began to dream of empire."[26] For William Miller, an English officer commanding the rearguard behind Córdova, Ayacucho also marked a historical step-change. For him, it should have signaled the end of the era of foreign involvement in Colombian and Peruvian affairs. According to Miller, "the last canon fired today on this field, should be a message to all of us foreigners to leave the country, as there will no longer be a space or role for us here."[27] But Miller did not heed his own advice, and neither did other Europeans like O'Leary,

Murray or Hand, who all remained in Colombia to participate in post-independence politics.[28] Previously liberators fighting against a common enemy, they now started to attract glances suggesting that their presence might be unwelcome.

The Battle of Ayacucho ended the threat of Spanish reconquest of the mainland American colonies. The victorious officers celebrated and rewarded one another. Antonio José de Sucre, the republican general-in-chief, was named Marshall of Ayacucho. José María Córdova was the highest-ranking New Granadan involved in the Battle of Ayacucho (Sucre, like Bolívar, was Venezuelan) and so he was particularly revered when the news of his success reached Bogotá. He became known popularly as "the lion of Ayacucho," and revelled in his success.[29] Córdova's actions at distant Ayacucho were crucial to establishing his legitimacy as a political leader upon his return. His name became common currency and New Granadan chiefs who had not been at Ayacucho now sought out his friendship and support. Other Antioquians distinguished themselves at Ayacucho too. El Santuario-born Francisco Giraldo planted the first republican flag on enemy positions at Ayacucho, and so symbolically marked the victory of independence.[30] Salvador Córdova was also there, aged 23, and he was wounded in action and promoted two ranks from Capitán to Teniente-Coronel.[31]

After Ayacucho, the Córdova brothers and Giraldo remained with the Gran Colombian army in Peru and Bolivia for over a year, during which, by their own accounts, they were relatively inactive in military matters and spent their time womanizing, carousing, and sight-seeing. José María Córdova felt himself superior to the Peruvians and Bolivians he mixed with, and yearned to return to military campaigning "because I am bored sick of this monotonous life, with its almost unsupportable tedium; here there isn't a house, a lady or a countryman with whom one could enjoy interesting society; not even one beautiful girl who could lighten things up with her pretty face... here there are only a few unsatisfactory Indian girls."[32] A probably apocryphal story merits retelling from this period for the light it sheds on future events. In Cuzco, Bolívar was presented with a crown to celebrate the success at Ayacucho. Unwilling to accept such an obvious symbol of monarchy, he passed it to Sucre, who had commanded the victorious army in Bolívar's absence. Sucre in turn gave it to Córdova, saying that the Antioquian deserved it for having led the crucial infantry charge.[33]

In 1826 the young Antioquians (José María was 25, Salvador 23, and Francisco Giraldo 20) made their way back to New Granada. The experiences they had gained "in the service of liberty" lent them a veneer of legitimacy and glory that provided an indisputable advantage in post-independence politics. With no king to guarantee authority, the new republic sought legitimacy wherever it could be found. José María Córdova was one of the most fortunate soldiers who returned from Ayacucho with this aura, and his home town prospered with him. Giraldo and Salvador Córdova returned to their families.[34] The Córdova clan exploited José María's feats as they sought economic

preferment and repayment of debts from the state.[35] But his legitimacy and authority in Antioquia was threatened almost as soon as he returned.

In early 1827 José María Córdova traveled to Bogotá to defend himself from a charge of murder. He believed the court-martial to be politically motivated, but there was no doubt that he had killed a man, in 1823 in Popayán, on the eve of the Peruvian campaign that had cemented his reputation. Córdova admitted killing Sargento Carmen Valdés with a bayonet through the stomach after sleeping with Valdés's finance.[36] He claimed self-defense and was eventually absolved from punishment thanks to the vote cast by the presiding judge, who happened to be his friend and old teacher from Medellín, Felix Restrepo.[37] The evidence shows that Córdova exploited his military status, that he expected lower-ranked inferiors to bend to his bidding, and that he was capable of extreme, frenzied violence.[38] This was not unusual; the claim to self-defense that Córdova employed here was used by most officers who were accused of excessive violence toward their subalterns in this period.[39] It is likely that Simón Bolívar himself intervened in the trial to make sure that Córdova was treated leniently, probably because he still regarded him as an important loyal ally alongside his European friends such as O'Leary, Murray, and Castelli.[40] This might have been because during the late 1820s loyal New Granadan-born Bolivarians like José María Córdova were becoming increasingly rare.

Pathway 3: Gran Colombia's Foreign Forces

By the mid-to-late 1820s Bolívar's most ardent supporters tended to be Venezuelans or foreigners. The majority of the foreign mercenaries who had arrived in 1818–20 had either died or quietly slipped away from Gran Colombia after 1823. Those who stayed loyal to the republican project, and to Bolívar, rose to positions of considerable military and, more occasionally, political influence. I look here at four of them in particular.

Thomas Murray rose through the Gran Colombian ranks during the 1820s, serving on the Magdalena river, in Zulia province, and then as an assistant to Admiral José Padilla in the naval battle at Maracaibo on July 24, 1823.[41] During the Cosiata rebellion of 1826 (normally seen as the first move toward Venezuelan independence from Gran Colombia) Murray published an explicit attack on José Antonio Páez and the other "disaffected Venezuelan chiefs" who had "assumed authority [in Venezuela] through violence." This confirmed him as a loyal Gran Colombian in the eyes of the national government in Bogotá, who observed that Murray "deserved his entrance to the Colombian temple of liberty and glory."[42] With the reputation of a loyal Bolivarian and efficient administrator he took charge of the Department of Zulia and then, in 1828, became departmental governor in Maracaibo, Venezuela.[43]

Carlos Castelli's Gran Colombian career was also marked by a series of successful regional administrative appointments. In 1822 he was political and military commander of the important San Felipe jail in Cartagena,

and then moved to command military and naval defenses in Maracaibo, where he wrote (in English) a detailed description of the potential dangers in the bay "for navigators desirous of entering in the port."[44] Other high-profile roles in Zulia and Coro followed later in the decade. Throughout these years as a traveling governor, serving the administration far from the capital, Castelli proved himself, like Murray, to be a capable pair of hands and an arch-Bolivarian, who merited "respect" from Bolívar, to whom he was "always faithful."[45]

In contrast to Castelli and Murray's quiet ascents through the ranks and into governmental administration, *Rupert Hand*'s military career was characterized by numerous cases of indiscipline and violence. The first of these took place in November 1819 in the Venezuelan town of Maturín, where his unit was quartered at the time. Hand took part in a duel that resulted in a "severe gunshot wound to [Hand's] left testicle." (Hand later claimed that he had received the injury by pulling heavy artillery in the subsequent campaign.) Campaigning in Cumaná, Hand lost the sight in one eye in an unspecified incident.[46] Less than a year later, Hand was again involved in a violent confrontation with a fellow soldier. Out marching in Venezuelan Guayana, Private John Lons verbally insulted Hand. In response, we learn from the lengthy court records that document the encounter, Hand drew his sword and struck Lons twice, leaving him for dead. Scandalized and angry, Hand's entire battalion chased him through the streets, waving their rifles and bayonets, shouting "Kill him! Kill him!" Hand's life was saved only when General Santiago Mariño allowed him to hide in his house and dispersed the angry troops.[47] Hand returned to service after being cleared by a court-martial that approved of his conduct and ordered one in ten of the soldiers implicated to be executed. This led to the deaths of 15 men, in addition to Lons. Instead of reducing, Hand's reputation appears to have been enhanced among his superiors by his use of violence to enforce discipline. He took part in the 1821 Battle of Carabobo, and the coastal campaigns on Zulia, Puerto Cabello, and Coro in 1822. In 1823 he was promoted to Teniente-Coronel (lieutenant-colonel), and in 1824 he was retired due to a hernia injury (probably related to his duelling/heavy-lifting injuries).[48]

After leaving military service in 1824 Rupert Hand traveled south to the picturesque mountain town of Mérida in the Venezuelan Andes. On October 23, 1824, just a few days after his arrival, the window of the post office was broken and all of the money stored inside was stolen. Hand was immediately suspected of the crime. Witness testimonies recalled that Hand had been into the treasury section of the post office three times on October 22, and had been observed to be acting suspiciously. That night there was a torrential downpour of rain. The robbery was discovered early the next morning. Investigators immediately went to Hand's lodgings where they found him in bed, with his wet and muddy clothes lying on the floor. Neighbors confirmed that they had heard him arrive home at 4:00 a.m. In Hand's room they also found 800 pesos in damp bags. In the waste ground

opposite Hand's house, they found a recently dug hole, at the bottom of which were some coins and more of the same money bags known to be used by the post office. The weight of evidence may appear compelling, but Hand was never convicted. The judge ruled that the inspection of the crime scene was not carried out according to regulations, that some of the evidence had been lost, and that many of the witnesses were either slaves or youths, which automatically cast doubt on their trustworthiness. A supreme court-martial received numerous references to Hand's good character from high-ranking officers.[49] We might add, as Hand's own defense does not appear in the surviving documents, that the serious hernia injury that led him to leave the army might have prevented him from entering and leaving via a window. Nevertheless the suspicion remained throughout Hand's career that he was guilty and that the military authorities had got him off on a technicality. Between 1825 and 1829 he appears to have lived in Bogotá on a military invalid pension. There is no evidence that he had any partner or children. In 1826 he placed an advertisement in a Bogotá newspaper claiming to have been robbed of the 3,250 pesos the Colombian government had awarded him for his services.[50] Despite the many allegations against him during this period, Hand continued to portray himself as a victim of crime rather than its perpetrator.

The most loyal of all the Bolivarians studied here was *Daniel O'Leary*. He had traveled to Venezuela in 1818 as part of the British Legion, with no experience of the world outside Ireland, let alone of any armed conflict. O'Leary served as Bolívar's aide-de-camp throughout the 1820s, including at the battles of Pantano de Vargas, Boyacá, Carabobo, and Pichincha. In this capacity he came across José María Córdova on several occasions, and they became friends. In these years O'Leary decided that he would eventually write a biography of Bolívar, and they developed a close working and personal relationship, illustrated by the image recalled by a fellow British mercenary, who walked in on O'Leary and Bolívar at the end of a day's campaigning, with the liberator sitting stark naked in his hammock while he dictated correspondence for his faithful (and fully clothed) assistant to transcribe.[51]

Between 1824 and 1828 O'Leary served as Bolívar's personal diplomatic emissary to Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, meaning that he was absent from the final battles of independence on the Peruvian campaign. In 1826 O'Leary saw himself as someone who was "above the distrust of either New Granadans or Venezuelans."[52] During a brief break in his incessant traveling in this period O'Leary married Soledad Soublette, sister of the Venezuelan general Carlos Soublette. O'Leary had just spent over four years away on active military service, traveling across South America representing Bolívar and being dismissed by some as nothing more than a "letter-carrying aide-de-camp."[53] By the beginning of 1828 he was increasingly desperate to return to the army and to prove himself on the battlefield to Bolívar, to his new wife, and to his increasing number of detractors.

Pathway 4: The Simmering Catalyst for Conflict: Bolívar's 1826 Constitution for Bolivia

The three strands traced so far in this chapter were inextricably tied together by Simón Bolívar's proposals for a strong, centralist constitution that would allow a life president to nominate his successor. Elites in Antioquia saw this as a threat to their economic and political autonomy. José María Córdova feared for republican sovereignty. Foreigners such as Daniel O'Leary attached themselves ever more closely to Bolívar's flag. At this juncture personal and collective fears and grievances combined.

O'Leary was not the only one who felt he had something to prove in the second half of the 1820s.[54] José María Córdova was also hankering for a return to active military service. Simón Bolívar, in contrast, sought to cement his reputation as a lawgiver as well as a revolutionary general. With independence from Spain achieved and assured, Bolívar had retreated to a house on the outskirts of Lima where he drafted a constitution for the new republic in Upper Peru that would bear his name, Bolivia. Struggling to establish legitimate and authoritative government, and trying to keep himself at the center of a political maelstrom in the midst of the claims of indigenous peoples, *pardos,* and Liberals, Bolívar returned to the idea of monarchy. As Germán Carrera Damas has demonstrated, Bolívar envisaged only "selective demolition of the monarchy," and he came to see the monarchical model as a useful guide for combining liberty with the need to keep the "unrestrained multitudes" at bay.[55] The problem Bolívar faced was that the prestige of the Spanish Crown had been diminished by the devastation committed in its name, and so subjection to an absolute monarch was increasingly felt by many in Gran Colombia to be demeaning, dishonorable, and an offense against national sovereignty. The republic's legal and political courts, and their ability to call to account the behavior of state employees and statesmen, had become a touchstone of nascent national self-definition in the absence of the divinely anointed authority of the king.[56] Rumors that he aspired to crown himself king or emperor (as Agustín de Iturbide had done in Mexico) stuck to Bolívar, supported by personal links between Bolívar and Iturbide (the latter's son served as an aide-de-camp) and even with Napoleon (Carlos Castelli and the Frenchman Louis Perú de la Croix had both served Bonaparte).[57]

When he presented his Bolivian constitution in 1826, Bolívar made it clear that even if the most perfect political reorganization could be designed it would not succeed without good fortune and the protection of major imperial powers.[58] The South American republics needed to adopt political systems that would win the approval of powerful nations, particularly Britain. In other writings from the same period, Bolívar was more explicit in calling for British "protection" of Gran Colombia. He wrote that he hoped to unite the American nations as a confederation in which "England would necessarily have to take responsibility for holding steady the fulcrum of this

equilibrium," meaning that it would guarantee the balance of power. Bolívar spelled out the benefits that Britain would accrue from such an arrangement, to the extent that the notes read like preparation for a meeting that would attempt to convince British representatives to join the project. He foresaw that "America would serve Britain as an opulent commercial domain," and that "the character and customs of the British would become models for Americans to strive for in the future." He concluded that "the most distinguished Americans await impatiently the beginning of this project at the Congress of Panama, which could well be the occasion to consolidate the union of the new states with the British Empire."[59]

British representatives in Peru and Colombia encouraged Bolívar in such plans because they wanted to continue to exercise influence over and through him. But Bolívar was far from being an imperial lackey. He encouraged Britain to think that he could be influenced for several reasons. First, because he admired what he saw as the "positive" aspects of the British system, as expressed in the "Jamaica Letter" in 1815 and the "Angostura Address" in 1819. Second, he recognized pragmatically the extent of British power after 1815, especially in the Atlantic, and saw giving limited concessions to Britain as the most effective and least dangerous way of maintaining republican rule in Hispanic South America and preventing incursions from the United States, France, or Spain. His critics nevertheless ignored the geopolitical and imperial context behind the Bolivian constitution. They focused instead on alleging that Bolívar wanted to be king or emperor, seeing him as an existential threat to the republic.[60]

This chapter has traced, on one side, the gradual formation of a prosperous economic elite in Antioquia in the 1820s, benefiting from the flourishing trade in gold and the injection of British capital. On the other side, we see European and Venezuelan officers progressing through the Gran Colombian military ranks in the 1820s, benefiting from their loyalty to Bolívar. In the middle stood José María Córdova, who featured in all the Antioquian networks through family, friendship, economic, or political links, and who was a leading Bolivarian with influence in the capital. Córdova was either unaware or dismissive of the origins of his province's new wealth at this stage, and the links to British capital. He was, however, acutely conscious that only he had the military grandeur of success at Ayacucho, which lent him legitimacy and authority in the post-independence years.

The Battle of Ayacucho may have vanquished Spanish military power from the continental American colonies, and realized their long since declared independence. But it could not prevent the recurrence of warfare. Perhaps this was because so many soldiers had been mobilized, and so much employment destroyed by the wars. Soldiers like José María Córdova knew no other reality but warfare, having matured to manhood in the army, and learned almost everything they knew in that roving institution. Officers like O'Leary found nonmilitary tasks boring and longed for a return to

the adrenalin and excitement of campaigning. Their frustration at inactivity was matched by civilian leaders' dismay that national treasuries were being emptied to pay for armies that were no longer required. In 1828 and the first half of 1829, these buried frustrations began to bubble to the surface in the armed conflict between Peru and Gran Colombia, and then traveled back to Antioquia. The fusion of these frustrations is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

The Road to War

The road to war at El Santuario was the result of the convergence of six often intertwined pathways, discussed in turn here. First, the steep fall in Simón Bolívar's popularity through 1828. Second, the personal and political crisis suffered by José María Córdova. Third, the trajectory of international war between Peru and Gran Colombia, in particular the roles of Córdova and Daniel O'Leary in experiencing and interpreting that conflict. Fourth, the development of imperial conspiracies against Bolívar in Bogotá. Fifth, the convergence of economic and ecclesiastical support for political rebellion in Antioquia. Finally, the atmosphere of fear and anxiety in Bogotá in late 1829 that predicated a violent response to news of rebellion in the provinces. All of these six pathways were essential to creating the conditions for revolution. Each one could have prevented the bloodshed had they taken another course. At all stages we see imperial influence (particularly Britain, though also the United States and France) in both supporting and resisting those who would rebel at El Santuario.

Simón Bolívar's increasing unpopularity and his ill health combined to bring the question of succession to the heart of waves of political crisis across Gran Colombia in the late 1820s. Bolívar's proposals in 1826 for a Life Presidency merged, in the popular imagination, with rumors of plans in 1828 to introduce a new monarchy in Gran Colombia. At the same time, some military leaders moved to exploit Bolívar's lingering power in order to cement their own regional power bases. Thanks to pressure from José María Córdova, for example, in November 1828 Bolívar named Manuel Antonio Jaramillo as governor of Antioquia (he took over on April 1, 1829), and made Salvador Córdova the commander in arms of Antioquia.

The conventional explanation for José María Córdova's rebellion in 1829 is that his ambition had been thwarted and his pride angered by a variety of intrigues among Bolívar's followers, most notably Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera. In this chapter I analyze this explanation and find it of limited value. I contextualize it with a discussion of the Peru-Colombian War of early 1829, and supplement it with discussion of José María Córdova's personal life at this time, most notably his relationship with Fanny Henderson,

daughter of the British consul in Bogotá. Based on newly discovered archival documents, I construct a hypothesis that an important and understudied aspect of Córdova's rebellion was his close relationship with the Henderson family, and thereby with the British Empire. The final section of the chapter examines the moment of rebellion itself, tracing the transformation of Córdova's supporters into an Army of Liberty.

Pathway 1: Bolívar's Fall from Popularity

At the beginning of 1828, Simón Bolívar's rule faced a variety of deep-seated problems. For John Lynch, Bolívar's problem was that he had taken "the revolution so far ahead of its base that he put it beyond his own control and it became impossible to preserve the model of government he had designed; strong, central authority guaranteeing freedom within order and equality within reason."[1] Some of Bolívar's colleagues in government saw the problem in more pithy terms. Santander resented what he saw as Bolívar's inability to relinquish the civilian power that he had acquired through military means. The long-awaited Ocaña Convention was to have resolved Gran Colombia's governance problems, but meeting in March 1828 its members were divided on ideological and partisan grounds, and negotiators struggled to overcome the omnipresent air of intrigue. The convention was fatally undermined when Bolívar's supporters walked out in June 1828. One of the key differences between the Bolivarians and the Santanderistas at Ocaña was Bolívar's plan for the Life Presidency. Bolívar himself was not at Ocaña, but he caused considerable resentment by setting up a temporary headquarters at nearby Bucaramanga and by sending O'Leary to Ocaña as his personal representative. O'Leary found the role cloying, infuriating, and supremely difficult. Upon arrival in the small town he found that his lodgings, in the central plaza, were in the flat next door to his rival Santander, who kept him awake at night (deliberately, thought O'Leary) with extended and noisy political discussions.[2] O'Leary was derided by Santander and his supporters, who saw him as a "jumped up little spy" for Bolívar.[3] Bolívar himself was rather dismissive of O'Leary's capability in this role, observing that "he [O'Leary] wouldn't cope if he had to serve in a normal unit."[4] One of Antioquia's representatives at Ocaña was Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, who loyally supported O'Leary and the Bolivarians throughout.[5] The Ocaña Convention fell apart in June and the two sides drifted away, determined to make amends and impose their plans by whatever means remained to them.[6]

To celebrate Bolívar's 45th birthday (July 28, 1828), Manuela Sáenz hosted a large party at the outskirts of Bogotá. During the festivities an effigy of Santander was constructed and placed on a bench with a sign around its neck that read "Shot for Treason." The effigy was then executed with great ceremony by a firing squad commanded by Richard Crofton. Bolívar was not present at this stage of the proceedings, and the scandal was reported to him by José María Córdova.[7] This was the first stage in Córdova's gradual

disengagement from Bolivarian circles. Córdova was scathing in his dismissal of Manuela Sáenz as "a woman who meddles in government affairs."[8]

Richard Crofton was a very mysterious character. A contemporary, Joaquin Posada Gútierrez, described him as a "barbarous Irishmen of the lowest order," but no sources survive documenting his origins or early life.[9] In March 1828, three months before Sáenz's garden party, he had declared his loyalty to Bolívar's regime with an obsequious publication.[10] Crofton promised his "absolute dedication to sustain and defend Colombia" and its president, who was "destined to preserve the nation from the evils that threaten it."[11] This pamphlet and Crofton's garden-party antics gained him a reputation as an arch-Bolivarian (among his friends) and notoriety as a violent thug (among his enemies). Santander's supporters saw Crofton's promotion to the rank of Coronel not long after the garden-party charade as a mark of the "decadence" of Bolívar's government.[12] Even Bolivarians such as Sucre thought that this set a terrible precedent: "How can the army have discipline or ethics," Sucre asked, "when any rebel who raises a weapon against his superior officer, or expresses the intention to murder him, is rewarded rather than punished?"[13] Córdova observed that Crofton had been "promoting conspiracies and disorder" against Santander.[14] Wherever he had come from, Richard Crofton had established himself as one of Bolívar's most stringent defenders in Bogotá in mid-1828, and his actions were not censured by the government.

Soon after, Crofton was called to take an active part in a wave of repression unleashed against Bolívar's enemies. The catalyst was an assassination attempt on Bolívar, on the night of September 25, 1828.[15] A plot to murder Bolívar in his bed was uncovered and, in the rush to carry it out before the authorities could arrest the suspects, it was botched.[16] Two of Bolívar's assistants were killed—one of them another Irishman, William Ferguson—but Manuela Sáenz helped Bolívar to jump out of the window and then delayed the potential attackers to give him time to escape.[17] In the chaos, lots of people went looking for Bolívar in order to protect him, "many of them foreigners."[18]

Crofton was one of them, as he was supposed to be directly responsible for maintaining order in the city. Reports differ as to Crofton's actions. According to Posada Gutierrez, Crofton hid at home until the commotion had subsided and then made his way "without any order, at the head of a cavalry unit, to kill General Santander." Eventually Crofton, Francisco Urdaneta, and other officers presented themselves to Bolívar, shouting:

> We will be lost without you!
> All of us will be Victims, all of us!
> Colombia will fall apart![19]

In the long term, all three of these predictions turned out to be true. In the short term, however, Crofton and Urdaneta were among the most stringent Bolivarian loyalists in Bogotá. At their side was José María

Córdova.[20] According to an official report, the three worked together to suppress the uprising. Córdova commanded the "persecution" of the fleeing rebels and Crofton gave it "energy and range" leading the pursuit of the conspirators.[21] Once order had been restored in the capital, Crofton was placed in charge of guarding the prisoners, who now included Vice President Santander.[22] Crofton was rough, aggressive, and vindictive, grabbing one prisoner by the scruff of his neck and shaking him fiercely.[23] Ezequiel Rojas, one of Santander's closest confidents, stated that Crofton fabricated confessions.[24] Marcelo Tenorio, a merchant, recalled seeing Crofton being aggressive toward the prisoners in his custody, including Santander, for which Crofton was reprimanded by Córdova, who reminded him that "your illustrious prisoner must be treated with the consideration and respect he deserves."[25]

The conspirators' trial was a politically charged affair in which all of the hatreds and grudges that had been dormant since the Ocaña Convention came out into the open. Rhetoric was unbounded: for one observer the conspiracy was "one of the most infamous, criminal, perverse, black and ungrateful acts against one of the greatest and noblest of our heroes."[26] There were widespread calls for public executions. A special tribunal was set up to judge the prisoners, with three members: José María Córdova, Joaquín Paris, and José María Ortega.[27] The *Gaceta de Colombia* published a list of the alleged conspirators the day after the rebellion.[28] The editorial centered on "these foreigners [who] forgot that they were outsiders, and forgot what they owed to the country where they find themselves . . . the duty of obeying the laws voluntarily adopted by the people of that country."[29] It was quickly obvious that many of these men had significant links with senior military officers, including Santander, as well as with foreign powers such as Spain and France.[30] One of the alleged conspirators, Carlos Wilthew "who is undeserving of the title of Englishman," according to the *Gaceta de Colombia,* was Santander's aide-de-camp as well as a British subject.

Bolívar and his confidants agreed that punishment of the conspirators had to be rapid and exemplary. On September 30 (just two days after the conspiracy), there were five executions. These were Agustín Horment, Wenceslao Zulabar, Rudesindo Silva, Cayetano Galindo, and J. Ignacio López.[31] The black admiral José Padilla's involvement in the conspiracy was extremely tangential—he was in jail at the time of the attack and had no contact with the conspirators—but he was convicted of having lent them support, and later executed.[32]

Historian David Bushnell argued that the attack provided a pretext for stamping down on opposition writers, limiting the freedom of the press and establishing a dictatorship—"not so much a living ideology as a symptom of general exhaustion."[33] Very few of the conspirators were able to escape Crofton's persecution in the last days of September 1828. Mariano Ospina Rodriguez escaped with the assistance of his "intimate and loyal friend," El Santuario-born Anselmo Pineda. According to Pineda's account, a female black slave helped Ospina get from his hiding place in Bogotá to a farm on

the outskirts where he could meet up with Pineda. Ospina accompanied Pineda to Antioquia, disguised as his muleteer. Ospina eventually settled in Antioquia, married, and firmly entrenched himself in Antioquian society through kinship as well as politics.[34]

Foreign involvement in the conspiracy was never proven, and it passed into history as the work of a small cadre of young liberal men loosely linked to Santander and as such resolutely New Granadan in their outlook. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to point out the considerable foreign dimensions of the conspiracy as well as the repression. Most obviously, Wilthew and Horment were both subjects of European kings, and as such liable to be linked to foreign empires.[35] The exiles went to British colonies, including Vicente Azuero who went to Jamaica, and Florentino González dedicated his time in jail in Cartagena to learning English language and British history. In his autobiography González thanked an unnamed "generous foreigner" who supported him during his time in jail, who was most probably the British consul Edward Watts.[36] More contentiously, the foreign diplomatic community was rumored to have been consulted or to have advised the conspirators. British consul James Henderson and the Mexican consul José Anastasio Torrens were both very conscious that their activities might have led them to be accused of complicity. They corresponded over how to react in the event of such an allegation (preserved in Henderson's papers, with Torrens having marked his letters "Confidential"). Henderson sought out high-profile alibis to testify to his innocence.[37]

Pathway 2: José María Córdova's Road to Rebellion

During the period from November 1828 to August 1829, José María Córdova was gradually ostracized from Bolívar and his cabinet. He served as minister of war from the completion of his duties on the Special Tribunal that tried the September 1828 conspirators. He was still seen as, and acted as, a man of utmost loyalty to Bolívar. On November 22, 1828, Bolívar sent Córdova to Cauca province at the head of a cavalry grenadier unit that would lead government repression of the insurrection that regional caudillos José María Obando and José Hilario López had launched there the previous month.

José María Córdova's complicity with Obando and López has been suggested, but the available evidence suggests that he remained loyal to Bolívar throughout his time in Popayán and Pasto. However, it is clear that some key intrigues and personal clashes took place here that triggered his descent into rebellion.[38] He left Bogotá on November 26. He reached the staging post of La Plata on December 12, where he found Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera who, despite having abandoned his post as intendent and commander in arms of the Department of Cauca in the face of Obando and López's forces, had been assigned by Bolívar to be Córdova's second in command. Córdova launched into a tirade of abuse against Mosquera, whom he accused of being a coward and not fulfilling his duty. Moreno de Angel sees this as of "transcendental importance . . . a crucial moment in Córdova's destiny" as it left

Mosquera "wounded in the depths of his soul" and with "an unquenchable hatred" toward Córdova. All biographers agree that Córdova's enmity with the increasingly influential Mosquera was an important step toward rebellion, whether it was caused by Córdova's unnecessary jealousy at Mosquera's promotion, or by Mosquera's humiliation-fuelled intriguing against his rival.[39] In order to settle the scores between Mosquera and Córdova, Bolívar eventually called the two of them to Quito, where a truce was agreed, but Córdova remained far from people he trusted and this distance worked on him to push him further toward rebellion.[40] The next three pathways to be explored in this chapter employ a broader lens to look at the international, imperial, and regional factors that provided an outlet for his disillusion.

Pathway 3: International Warfare

The crucial event which was transformational for both Córdova and Daniel O'Leary was the 1828–29 Peru-Colombia War. This armed conflict was part of the wider national and international movement against the Bolivarian regime in Gran Colombia of which the September 1828 assassination attempt was the metropolitan manifestation. Regionally, Obando and López's uprising in the Cauca was part of this current. War between Peru and Gran Colombia was also triggered by struggles over debts owed by Peru, and by rivalry over the possession of Quito and Guayaquil. Britain, the United States, and France kept a close eye on proceedings and crucially for us, both O'Leary and Córdova acted as unofficial agents of the British Empire during the crisis. Daniel O'Leary was Bolívar's special emissary to the conflict, a role he combined with promoting British mediation in the conflict at the behest of Patrick Campbell, the British Commissioner in Bogotá. José María Córdova, though rather distant from the conflict as he was resident in Popayán, acted as the informant of James Henderson, the British consul in Bogotá, to whom he forwarded insider knowledge of Gran Colombian army strategy and operations. Patrick Campbell and James Henderson may have been agents of the same British imperial state, but they disagreed over the attitude that Britain should take toward Bolívar's dictatorship, as Campbell was very supportive and Henderson was very critical. It is unlikely that they shared with each other the intelligence they received from O'Leary and Córdova, although they both forwarded it to the Foreign Office in London. Though they may not have appreciated it at the time, O'Leary and Córdova were, therefore, acting for two very different branches of Britain's imperial project in Gran Colombia; one that aimed to support Bolívar's dictatorship in the name of stability, and the other that was positioning itself to best exploit what it saw as the imminent post-Bolivarian period.[41]

On August 3, 1828, Daniel O'Leary traveled south from Bogotá as Bolívar's personal emissary to Peru, where he had an official remit to negotiate an alliance between Peru and Gran Colombia against Spain, and secret instructions to work with the Peruvian opposition to overthrow the government. The principal point at issue was the annexation of Guayaquil to either

Peru or Colombia. The ultimate consequence of this would be the independence of Ecuador under the presidency of the Venezuelan general Juan José Flores in 1830. O'Leary's opinion of Peruvians was very unfavorable, and his diplomatic mission to Peru was a failure. It did nothing to prevent or delay preparations for war.[42] O'Leary was denounced as an "intriguer" by Peruvian newspapers and declared unwelcome in the country. Traveling north again O'Leary incorporated himself into the Gran Colombian army under the orders of Flores, where he became the de facto second in command until Sucre was drafted in above them both. He helped out as best he could, contributing several editorials to a local newspaper, *El Colombiano de Guayas*.[43] When the Peruvian navy attacked Guayaquil, O'Leary manned the batteries.[44] A cannonball killed Admiral Guise on board his ship, and the Peruvian fleet retreated, giving Guayaquil time to rest and recuperate.[45]

Also in late November 1828, Córdova marched from Bogotá. Bolívar had intended him to act as a counterweight to the power of the liberal generals Obando and López in the South, who were threatening to take Cauca into an independent Ecuadorian republic, or to form an independent state themselves. Córdova was also ordered to keep an eye on the conflict with Peru, and to enter the action if his forces were required. All news of the Peruvian conflict passed through Córdova on its way to the Colombian capital. Immersion in this war revitalized the dormant military energies of Córdova as it did for O'Leary, and made it more likely that they would seek a return to warfare in another arena.

When the Peruvian army occupied the city of Loja, O'Leary, Flores, and Sucre met up in Cuenca at the end of January 1829. They put their personal disagreements to one side in order to prepare for land warfare. O'Leary formed part of the General Staff. The Gran Colombians had 5,000 men, whereas the Peruvians commanded by President La Mar and General Gamarra had 6,000.[46] Soldiers from both sides had fought together against Royalists at Ayacucho, and Sucre lamented that they were now fighting each other. Warfare was the result of the failure to negotiate solutions to problems such as the status of Guayaquil, Colombian claims for compensation for "liberating" Peru from Spain, Peruvian claims for compensation for Colombia's "invasion" of its territory, and the reduction of armed forces. Notes were sent back and forth between the armies, and peace commissioners (including O'Leary) met on the bridge over the river Saraguro on February 11–12, 1829. Neither side was prepared to compromise on its demands so the two armies circled each other for another week seeking strategic advantage. After struggling over high mountains and narrow passes two Colombian units were surprised by an unexpected Peruvian attack and lost the first exchanges in the dark, rainy early morning of February 27, 1829. Regrouping at dawn, the battle was joined by all parts, and O'Leary directed a *llanero* cavalry change that dislodged the Peruvians from their positions and catalyzed their retreat. The Battle of Tarqui was won by the Gran Colombian forces by 7:00 a.m.[47] O'Leary later recalled that "I have never seen a more horrible battlefield. The army was resolved to give no quarter and to have its revenge—and it was sated."[48]

The next day, February 28, 1829, O'Leary was accompanied by General Flores to negotiate the peace treaty of Girón with Gamarra and Obregoso. The Peruvians were obliged to accept the same terms as they were offered before the battle.[49] A curious anecdote gives some insight into O'Leary's negotiating style. After the Battle of Tarqui, according to Córdova, to whom O'Leary had apparently told it in person, O'Leary had pressed for the mediator between Colombia and Peru to be Great Britain (which was in line with British policy as passed on to O'Leary by Patrick Campbell). The Peruvian representative, Agustín Gamarra, replied that Britain had not recognized the independence of Peru, so it could not properly mediate. O'Leary insisted that this was not a powerful enough reason, and the two agreed that the only way to decide who the mediator should be was to toss a coin. So it was left to the fall of the coin to decide that the mediator in the conflict would be the United States, and not Great Britain. The story does not appear in any of O'Leary's surviving correspondence or his *Narración,* suggesting that he was not proud of it.[50] The story reached London in a letter from Córdova to Henderson, and probably helps to explain why the Foreign Office resisted O'Leary's requests for a formal diplomatic position for several years.[51]

In spring 1829, proposals were being firmed up to invite "a Foreign Prince to be at the head of a hereditary monarchy" in Colombia. At Campbell's request, Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen provided explicit guidance on how to respond to the expected publication of the proposals in Bogotá, although this arrived too late to be of any direct use, as Campbell must have known it would.[52] French ministers were also sympathetic to the plans, "listening to and encouraging" the scheme's promoters in the capital.[53] US minister William Harrison summarized the feeling in the diplomatic community in May 1829: "the country appears to be approaching a crisis. . . . The Republic of Colombia is no longer to exist, and a monarchy is to be established in its stead. The crown is, in the first instance, to be offered to General Bolivar. Should he refuse it, a Foreign Prince is to be invited to accept it."[54] The overlapping networks of foreign influence were intertwined in favor of the monarchy project, although no one power was dominant, just as in the case of the international networks beginning to coalesce around the figure of José María Córdova. Córdova and O'Leary were at the axis of these national and international networks.

Daniel O'Leary operated as a double agent throughout the Peru-Colombia War, in the pay of the Colombian army and writing weekly to Bolívar while also regularly providing inside information to British diplomats. His correspondence kept Bolívar up-to-date with the fortunes of the monarchy project, and constantly gauged the levels of his approval and caution.[55] Patrick Campbell passed on O'Leary's news in his own letters to the Foreign Office, explicitly citing O'Leary as his source and claiming to offer authoritative indications of future government policy, particularly with regard to the monarchy project and the Peruvian conflict.[56] In his dispatches Campbell drew heavily on information O'Leary had provided, for example, quoting private

letters sent him by Bolívar and Sucre. Campbell concluded that a monarchy would be well received in Gran Colombia, but that Bolívar would never agree to reign as king.[57] Documents reveal that O'Leary was well-connected in 1829, both with the Bolivarian government and with British representatives. He perceived a community of interest between the British and the Bolivarians and he acted accordingly. What was good for Bolívar would be good for the British, O'Leary believed. It is clear from O'Leary's comments throughout 1829 that Bolívar's ill-health was leading his supporters away from the idea of a Life President and toward the installation of a European prince in order to allay the fears of European investors about instability in Gran Colombia. Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen noted Patrick Campbell's "strict reserve" on the monarchy question, and approved his continued conduct to the end of appointing a "European prince" on a Gran Colombian throne.[58] The Spanish secretary of state was well aware of British complicity in the monarchy project, which they regarded as a "very poor" policy that trampled over Spanish rights in the region.[59] Thwarted by the loss of a coin from promoting British mediation between Colombia and Peru, O'Leary attempted to convince Bolívar of the merits of the monarchy proposals. In many ways the British were keener on the monarchy project than Bolívar himself.

José María Córdova was also an imperial agent during the Peru-Colombia War. Like O'Leary, Córdova sent news back to a British consular official in Bogotá. As military commander of the Cauca, from his headquarters in Pasto and Popayán, Córdova was able to hear travelers' information and to intercept postal communications. He wrote regularly to James Henderson, who himself passed on Córdova's news (with favorable comments as to its trustworthiness) to his superiors in London (though not to Patrick Campbell, his enemy at the next desk in the British legation in Bogotá). In the wake of the Peru-Colombia War, on April 11, 1829, Córdova promised Henderson that he would intercede on his behalf with Bolívar on the subject of Gran Colombian debt to British investors. This suggests that Henderson was attempting to use Córdova as an informal mediator between British diplomacy and the Bolivarian presidency. In response to hearing that Henderson might be planning a visit to Britain, Córdova hoped "that you will remember your friend who did as much as he could in order to please you."[60] Yet while Henderson might have been using Córdova as an agent of empire, as will become clear later in this chapter, Córdova was also using the disgruntled Henderson as a pawn in his political maneuvers. A few months later Córdova developed this role: he passed on Bolívar's confidential encrypted letters to members of the foreign community in Bogotá.[61] US minister William Harrison passed on to Secretary of State Van Buren the information that he received "from a person of high rank, who has been in the entire confidence of Bolivar, but who is known in opposition to all his schemes of personal aggrandizement."[62] Córdova's reports had international transcendence: imperial representatives awaited his updates so they could adjust their policies.

For some foreign soldiers, the Battle of Tarqui marked the end of their involvement in the Colombian army. Daniel O'Leary, however, set off for Bogotá to report on the success of the campaign. He spoke with Bolívar in Quito between March 17 and March 29. Days afterward, Bolívar wrote a secret letter to his ministers in Bogotá requesting them to "explore the possibility of a British protectorate for Colombia"[63] O'Leary probably arrived in Pasto on April 1, where he met with Córdova, who was still serving there as the Intendant of the Cauca. In Pasto, O'Leary's path crossed with Córdova for the last time before they met on the battlefield in El Santuario. Surviving records of the encounter reveal that both saw further armed conflict as increasingly inevitable and even desirable. As was natural for two high-ranking officers in the Gran Colombian army, O'Leary stayed as Córdova's guest, probably for around a week.[64] They appear to have spent much time in conversation. O'Leary told Córdova the aforementioned anecdote about tossing the coin to decide on the mediation between Peru and Colombia. On April 2, Córdova wrote a lengthy letter to James Henderson, which drew exclusively on O'Leary. Córdova's report on the Battle of Tarqui came entirely out of O'Leary's mouth. Córdova reminded James Henderson that "I did promise to write to you constantly" and, reflecting on his conversations with O'Leary, he confided that news of the continuing conflict in the South was wearing away at his loyalty to Bolívar:

> It looks like I won't be returning to Bogotá for a while . . . Our nation does not have a Constitutional Government, instead it is subject to the will of one man, and that man could almost be called valetudinarian. Although he appears to have extinguished the calls for disassociation, there are other generals in some parts who have military influence, and they could cause us big problems if the country falls into anarchy. The thing is, these matters affect me a lot, and my feelings are dragging me towards involvement in my country's political affairs. My public character obliges me to compromise myself one way or the other. As I said at the start, I am tormented by opposing appeals. . . . In addition I am dominated and tortured more than anything by private matters, which overshadow everything I think of doing.[65]

It is tempting to see Córdova writing this letter to Henderson at night, having spent a day in O'Leary's company in Pasto during which he pretended to be a loyal Bolivarian who was happy in his post, proudly showing off the troops under his command. While Córdova wrote to Henderson, O'Leary seems to have been in a nearby room drafting his own correspondence to Bolívar and Campbell. In his letters from Pasto O'Leary complained of the "terrible weather and roads," and praised Córdova as a "kind and attentive host." O'Leary probably voiced some of his anger about Peruvian conduct to Córdova during this visit, such as the outburst he shared with Bolívar, that "the best way to destroy the Peruvians is to provide them with a battlefield so that they can annihilate each other."[66] O'Leary showed no inkling that Córdova was stewing with thwarted ambition or plotting a rebellion.[67]

It is possible that some of O'Leary's anti-Peruvian ire had rubbed off on Córdova. He hoped to launch a "proper invasion of Peru in an open campaign," and that he would be "called to the battlefields by my honor, my duty, my reputation and my noble aspirations."[68]

O'Leary and Córdova's encounter in Pasto in early April 1829 shows that both were spoiling for a fight. The ideal enemy would be a Peruvian army that both thought could be easily defeated. Alternatively they would fight against whichever enemy could be perceived as standing in the way of the nation's glory, honor, and survival. Both were assiduously corresponding with distant figures who they hoped would shape events in their favor. Both bore grudges against other officers, and both were openly considering their future in the event of "anarchy." Both Córdova and O'Leary hoped that their destinies would be assured in combat in the near future. Neither suspected that they would face each other from opposite sides of that misty battlefield in six months time. Upon his arrival in Bogotá, O'Leary wrote to his brother-in-law Carlos Soublette, urging him to

> Look at our disunited Colombia, tormented by political factions, about to expire forever. Then look at her on the battlefield, eh? *That* is Colombia. But, disgrace! How long will Colombians be enemies of Colombians? How long will they continue to put obstacles in their own path?[69]

Pathway 4: Imperial Conspiracy

International warfare readied our two principal protagonists for civil warfare early in 1829. But to what extent was imperial policy—explicitly, the support given to Córdova by representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and Mexico—a cause of the Battle of El Santuario? A key figure in answering this question is Fanny Henderson, James Henderson's daughter and, apparently, the love of José María Córdova's life. Because many of the sources have not survived, in this section often I have to read between the lines of fragmentary texts.

Córdova met Fanny Henderson at a ball hosted in Bogotá by the Mexican consul, José Anastasio Torrens, on September 16, 1827.[70] She was 13 years old and was described as one of the most beautiful ladies in Bogotá.[71] Historians have been divided over Córdova's relationships with women. Some claimed he was a womanizer, and others that he was gentlemanly and reserved.[72] As I show here, he was both at different times. In 1823 he had killed a man over one woman, and had almost fought a duel over another. Yet his letters regarding Fanny Henderson are tender and romantic. He seems to have viewed her as a restrained, beautiful, and subordinate domestic creature.[73] Fanny Henderson could have been the "private matters" that Córdova referred to in his letter to James Henderson on April 2, 1829, cited above. It seems perfectly possible that Córdova's romanticization of pure, young Fanny Henderson was not incompatible with his womanizing and violence on other occasions.

Córdova confessed his love for Fanny Henderson in private letters to his brother Salvador, which we can take as accurate reflections of his inner feelings.[74] In April 1828 he confessed his love for her, his closeness to her family, in a letter where his political and personal concerns appeared interlinked:

> Every day I like Fanny more, because every day she grows up, and she becomes more beautiful: I will never see a more divine woman. There is a mystery about her that I think I can penetrate, but without confidence. . . . I could not cope if I were to lose her, and for me to successfully possess her there are so many obstacles; these would not include the will of her parents, but there are so many more![75]

This letter is the closest we can get to an explanation of their extended courtship. As Córdova confessed to his brother, for six months between April and November 1828 he had visited the consul's house every night when he could, drinking tea, playing whist, and flattering Fanny.[76] On June 15, 1828, Córdova accepted a loan of 500 pesos from James Henderson.[77] Around the same time he began the legal process toward buying his first house in Bogotá, perhaps as a future marital home.[78] When Bolívar ordered Córdova to take up his post in Popayán, Córdova and Fanny Henderson had one final meeting on November 26, 1828.[79]

Córdova idealized Fanny Henderson. When they were separated he longed to be with her and understand her, yet he believed that his affections were not reciprocated. He corresponded regularly with her father, but Córdova's many biographers have not located any surviving correspondence with Fanny Henderson. It is just possible, however, that a small bundle of scribbled draft letters to "My dear general" (*Mi querido general)*, preserved among other papers in Kew, TNA FO 357/7, were from Fanny Henderson. There are two principal reasons for following this hunch. First, because the handwriting in these notes is very different from her father's normal style, and second, because the level of Spanish is much lower than James Henderson's grammatically correct letters. On March 8, 1829, one of these notes tells Córdova that "we have had a party, music and dancing, quite enjoyably, with some new members of the Hilbo Club—please don't forget to write to me with each post." On March 22, 1829, the writer told Córdova that "it is very probable that we will return to Europe this year." On April 9, 1829, Córdova was informed that "there is no news here, just the same old monotonous things." On April 29, 1829, a scrawled note observed that the writer had met the newly arrived French commissioners and had dinner at the palace. The survival of these drafts in the Henderson papers could be explained by Fanny Henderson's desire to make sure she expressed herself effectively in Spanish; some amendments to spelling in the drafts suggest this may be so. They may have been hurriedly bundled up and packed with James Henderson's personal papers when the family decided to leave Bogotá. There is one further document, though again of doubtful provenance, that attests to their relationship. It is an unpublished note in Córdova's hand, with no date and

no addressee, which could conceivably be for Fanny Henderson. The key clue here is that Córdova uses the intimate "*tú*" form of address, which he certainly did not use for James Henderson, and never used even in letters to his brother. The full text of the note is: "Tell the Consul that I don't write to him on this occasion because there is nothing to tell more than I have told you, so you should tell him all, and that we should wait to find out what is going on in Pasto, which should clarify a thousand things, but it still has not arrived. Córdova."[80]

This documentary evidence of the relationship between Fanny Henderson and José María Córdova, though fragmentary and inconclusive, would seem to suggest (especially the call to "tell him all') that Fanny Henderson was acting as some sort of a go-between for Córdova and her father. It helps us to see the extent to which personal and political matters were mixed up for Córdova in 1829. Other sources show that during his absence from Bogotá and from Fanny Henderson in the first half of 1829, Córdova became increasingly concerned about public morality and about the legitimacy of authority in Colombia. His anxieties about Fanny Henderson and Simón Bolívar became meshed into one heaving sense of grievance:

> I will not return South for any reason whatsoever under the despotic and treacherous government of General Bolívar. . . . Yes, I think about Fanny a lot, a lot. She has haunted my imagination since I met her. And this Patria! And this Poverty! Who knows what will happen? I live in the opposite fashion to you, according to what you tell me; I am tormented by my patria's uncertainty and my lover's indecision.[81]

Whether or not it was Fanny Henderson's distance or indifference that catalyzed his resentment, in the same period Córdova expressed his distaste at Bolívar's public relationship with Manuela Sáenz. Later the same month Córdova wrote to Manuel Antonio Jaramillo that Bolívar "commands us as though we were a rabble of shepherds . . . and I have resolved to sacrifice myself for the freedom of my patria so that its government can be welcomed by all, vigorous, just and liberal."

Córdova's serious moral doubts about Manuela Sáenz were exacerbated by his own thwarted love interests. He resented people treating Sáenz "like a princess" just as much as he hated Bolívar's supposedly imperial designs for ruling "as if he were a Sultan."[82] He felt his nation undermined because an unrepresentative ruler was "dominated" by an immoral woman who "associated with foreigners" and granted them undeserved favors.[83] This shows some hypocrisy on Córdova's part on the subject of Gran Colombian generals having relationships with foreign women (in his own case, Fanny Henderson), and it provides a further level of explanation that prepared the ground for his rebellion.[84]

The uncertainty in Córdova's personal life served to precipitate his political rebellion. At the same time, James Henderson was manipulating both Córdova and his daughter for his own ends, in which Fanny was either a

complicit or a naive piece of bait being dangled in front of Córdova, whose youth and potential for leadership Henderson hoped to exploit for Britain's benefit. Declassified documents from the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs show the extent to which Henderson's complicity was taken for granted at government level in Bogotá, and these alleged that the supposed romance with Fanny Henderson had been a front for private negotiations between the general and the consul, an excuse to justify Córdova's regular attendance at Henderson's house.[85] Personal revolts and imperial plots fed into regional upheaval in the summer of 1829.

Pathway 5: Antioquia in Turmoil

Until early 1829 José María Córdova was one of Bolívar's most loyal generals. His reputation as a heroic New Granadan patriot meant that his voice was listened to in Bogotá, and he became a valuable member of the postwar national elite. He supported Bolívar throughout 1828 and served as a trusted member of the military tribunal that judged and punished the September conspirators. Córdova supported Bolívar's attempt to exert his authority over disgruntled subalterns. But as this wave of repression was formalized and institutionalized into Bolívar's dictatorship, and as it was carried out from the capital into the provinces, it stored up irritation and discontent in many regions and individuals including, eventually, Córdova himself. He represented a newly wealthy region, Antioquia, that was becoming fiercely defensive of its interests. Córdova left his command in Popayán on August 21, 1829, and returned to Antioquia.[86] The following pages reconstruct events there and trace the last steps toward the Battle of El Santuario.

While Córdova's dented pride and confused identity certainly played their part, his rebellion would have come to nothing without the support that it garnered in Antioquia. Here Córdova's call to arms was enthusiastically embraced by the state apparatus, which in 1829 lay in the hands of the Provincial Governor Manuel Antonio Jaramillo and the Military Chief Salvador Córdova.

On September 7, 1829, José María Córdova arrived in Rionegro from Medellín, accompanied by his assistants Juan José Niño and Francisco Giraldo. That night, to celebrate the Fiesta de Nuestra Señora, the merchant Sinforoso García hosted a great ball in his house where all the local nobility would show off their wealth and status, dress themselves in sashes and ribbons, and dance German waltzes until the early hours. Upon arrival in Rionegro, Córdova decided to join the party.[87]

The next morning, September 8, 1829, many people visited Córdova at the family home, and he invited some citizens to a meeting that afternoon. Both Jaramillo and Salvador Córdova had come up to Rionegro to pass the days of the fiesta, and so they attended too. In front of this sympathetic and interested audience, José María Córdova "ran through the reasons why they should stand up and oppose Bolívar's government. The discussion was long, but in the end the judicious and respectful observations made by several very

notable people, including Sr. Jaramillo and Dr Antonio Mendoza, managed to calm the General down."[88]

That evening there was another party, this time in the house of the Spanish merchant Pedro Sáenz, to "which the highest society from Medellín and Rionegro were invited." They were celebrating the marriage of Sáenz's daughter to Dr. Jorge Gútierrez de Lara. According to Arango, "there was dancing and exquisite liquors in abundance, and everyone really let their hair down." Córdova was "so animated that he couldn't keep his mouth shut and told everyone who would listen what he thought of the government." In one of the many toasts offered toward the end of the night, Córdova shouted that Bolívar was a dictator, for which he was heartily applauded. Some partygoers were shocked by such scandalous language, and hurried away back to Medellín to inform Francisco Urdaneta, who had returned to minor office earlier in the year, and who was the nominal authority in the temporary absence of Jaramillo and Salvador Córdova.[89]

Urdaneta received the news of Córdova's drunken toasts when he woke up in Medellín on the morning of September 10. His long experience in the province led him to correctly suppose that Jaramillo and Salvador Córdova had not publicly opposed the indiscrete proclamations of their illustrious relation. Urdaneta, therefore, took charge of maintaining the province's political and military affairs, in the absence and presumed rebellion of the two most senior members of provincial government. Urdaneta recognized that it would be difficult for him to command the population's loyalty if he was ever explicitly challenged by the Córdovas. The proclamation that he issued at this moment, therefore, reveals not political strength but rather the tenuous legitimacy Urdaneta enjoyed as the representative of the Gran Colombian government. He addressed Antioqueños "as an old compatriot, as a friend" who had "lived amongst you for more than seven years."[90] As an outsider, Urdaneta knew that he could never compete with the Córdovas' birth, family, and status. Desperate to be seen to be doing something, however, Urdaneta sent a military unit to Rionegro under Captains José Antonio Vélez and Manuel Herrera, giving them orders to capture the general. This only succeeded in antagonizing Córdova, who immediately had them executed as traitors.[91] Córdova was catalyzed to form his supporters into an army and move on Medellín to take control of the provincial capital.[92] Córdova's officers and men were by necessity at this stage drawn from those who were in Rionegro on September 10 and 11. Urdaneta sent two emissaries further to negotiate with Córdova on the outskirts of Medellín on September 12. Córdova told them: "Tell him that if he does not hand over the city to me, I will shoot him this very afternoon."[93] Urdaneta did as he was told and relinquished control of Medellín and the province to Córdova's armed forces with immediate effect. Most of Urdaneta's soldiers passed over into Córdova's ranks.

During the next two weeks, the levers of provincial government continued to turn, though now in favor of Córdova's insurrection and against Bolívar's government in Bogotá. Records reveal the considerable extent to

which Governor Jaramillo used state institutions to support the insurrection once Urdaneta was out of the way. On September 15, for example, Jaramillo awarded 400 pesos of government money to arm the rebel troops. He ordered the printing press in Rionegro to give Salvador Córdova all of its lead, as well as any weapons found in the city.[94] By now Córdova had drawn together the bulk of the army that he would lead to El Santuario. The officers Salvador Córdova, Francisco Escalante, and Braulio Henao stood loyally at his side. There was no open resistance to him in Antioquia, though some towns, including Marinilla, limited their collaboration as much as possible. There was little movement in El Santuario itself, the parish still only sparsely populated by colonizers moving up from Rionegro and Marinilla. The few surviving archival sources detail the abandoning of one exhausted gold mine, and some isolated farming families appealing to Marinilla for support.[95]

On September 16, 1829, Córdova formalized his political rebellion with the publication of a manifesto that made a forceful attack on the government's "centralized tyranny."[96] One of his key themes was a call to arms against the foreign influences that infringed popular sovereignty. This was vaguely phrased and open to many interpretations. The nation could have meant Gran Colombia, New Granada, or Antioquia. The foreign influence he reacted against was an easy jibe at the Venezuelan origin shared by Bolívar, Minister of War Rafael Urdaneta, and other senior officers, and the explicit support that this group were given by the foreign subjects at their sides (Castelli and O'Leary, for example). Córdova claimed that he had returned to "the land where [he] was born" in order to consider and then launch his rebellion, literally placing himself and his revolution against the external powers.[97] The potential return of monarchy to a land that had only recently become a republic was the last straw for Córdova. He proclaimed that he would "never return my sword to its scabbard until Freedom has been re-conquered." The rhetorical framing of the manifesto was designed to present Córdova as the truly patriotic soldier who would save the republic from its enemies.[98]

After the publication of the Manifesto, Córdova wrote to General José Antonio Páez in Caracas, hoping to garner support. He called Páez to join him in "breaking the chains of tyranny," on the grounds that "you know as well as I do that the Life Presidency proposed by Bolívar is more like a monarchy, whose title has been cautiously changed in the vain hope of deceiving people with republican forms."[99] While Córdova set about disseminating his Manifesto, Jaramillo was provisioning the troops in preparation for the anticipated government reaction. On September 19 Jaramillo allocated 200 pesos of government funds for the manufacture of gunpowder, and wrote to the Ministry of the Interior arguing that it had become politically necessary to "arrest all foreigners."[100] Then, to save money (and to avoid central government learning too much about his own undeclared rebellion) Jaramillo cut off official postal communication with Bogotá on September 26. He demanded that parish mayors supply the "Army of Liberty" with 1,200 recruits,

otherwise warning that Córdova would "proceed against them with all the rigour the current circumstances demand" (this threat was not followed through even though the recruits were not raised). On October 2, Jaramillo advised the local authorities of "the new plan of government which the province has adopted," meaning that Antioquia no longer recognized the national government in Bogotá.[101]

By now the revolution had developed its own momentum. On September 21 Córdova wrote to the Council of Ministers in Bogotá, clarifying the reasons for the insurrection. He appealed for the restoration of the 1821 Cúcuta Constitution until a Constituent Congress could meet in 1831, and claimed that "in the end I have given in to the unanimous clamour of these peoples, moved by my heart's impulses, who called me to lend my sword and lead them in defence of their rights."[102] On the same day he wrote to Bolívar, telling that he felt "terrible" to have to rebel against the man who had protected him and educated him for over a decade. Córdova compared himself to "Brutus in the Senate, condemning his two sons to death in order to safeguard Rome's freedom; that can give you an insight into my spirit's suffering upon having to raise my sword to stop you from enslaving my patria."[103]

At this point the Catholic Church in Antioquia started to get involved. The clergy exercised great power and influence in Antioquia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as Renán Silva has shown,[104] and, therefore, it was vital that Córdova retain ecclesiastical support (or ensure the Church's neutrality) for his armed rebellion. Though his own archive does not survive, Bishop Mariano Garnica's letters can be pieced together from several sources, and a continuity of purpose can be traced.[105] Córdova and Garnica met on several occasions as part of a "communication war," and the bishop aimed to maintain a working relationship with Córdova in the event of his rebellion being successful, while simultaneously keeping up a ferocious campaign of letter-writing and personal lobbying to all the other principal figures in the crisis.[106] Garnica's policy of leaving his criticism implicit rather than explicit meant that local priests in Rionegro and Marinilla could take one side or another in the rebellion, and enabled Córdova to recruit soldiers across the countryside without the explicit condemnation of the Church.

On October 12, Bishop Garnica told Córdova that "you must be aware that none of these peoples want war, because they are peaceful, because they remain loyal to the Liberator, and because they are poor and miserable . . . [All war will bring them is further] ruins, desolation and misery."[107] Nevertheless, altering his tone according to who he was addressing, he wrote to the minister of war in Bogotá warning that the rebellion had substantial popular support.[108]

Córdova recruited heavily in Rionegro and the surrounding areas, demonstrating how popular support was crucial to sustaining the legitimacy of his rebellion.[109] Defensive fortifications were built on several mountain passes from which the approaching enemy could be harassed. But funds and time

were short and measures to recruit new troops became aggressive, including the threat to burn down Marinilla unless men joined up immediately.[110] José María Córdova was relishing the impending conflict, writing to his brother that "I am enjoying this, bring them on!"[111] In the last two days before the Battle of El Santuario, Jaramillo spent government money ordering "sweets and biscuits" for the army, and emptied the provincial coffers to feed the troops.[112]

On October 15 Córdova was focused on sending this army into battle. He told his friend the liberal Rionegro priest Antonio María Gutierrez that "I have 500 men, recruits of course, but I will be able to make them fight; I have some excellent officers, and now I have no alternative but the path of Victory or Death. Within four days I will either be a great victor or eating dirt on the battlefield."[113] Final attempts to negotiate a peaceful end to the uprising were fruitless. Coronel José Manuel Montoya was sent by O'Leary to offer Córdova a foreign ambassadorship and an amnesty if he would lay down his arms. Montoya was an excellent choice as an intermediary: an "intimate friend" of Córdova, also from Rionegro, and the son of Francisco Montoya, the Antioquian merchant who had increased his wealth through the 1824 loan from Britain to Colombia.[114] Montoya hoped that the carrot of a prestigious job abroad and the stick of an army massed against him would persuade Córdova to desist from his rebellion. Montoya exclaimed "General, this time it is impossible for you to win," to which Córdova replied "Ah, but it is not impossible to die, and if that is what I need to do to fulfil my duty, then I will die." Córdova's resolve had hardened and would be sated only by Bolívar's exit from government. Bishop Garnica made one final attempt at mediation early in the morning of October 16. The words spoken at this encounter do not survive. Córdova led his army out of Rionegro at 10:00 a.m. that same morning. The chords that drew Córdova and his followers up into the mountains had tightened: there was no way out now.[115]

If we pause here, on the verge of military conflict in mid-October 1829, it is clear that Córdova's rebellion prospered because it counted on wide political support across Antioquia. The provincial governor and military commander, who both owed their positions to Córdova's influence with the Bogotá government, both joined the rebellion. Córdova also had commercial backing, as evidenced by his association with Sinforoso García and other merchants in Rionegro. The Montoya family had retained enough neutrality to be able to convincingly offer themselves as mediators, and the presence of Henderson in Bogotá augured international support. Crucially, Córdova also had the tacit approval of the clergy in Rionegro. Commercial, civil, and ecclesiastical powers all recognized at least a degree of legitimacy in Córdova's claim to use violence to defend the sovereignty of the people from foreign incursions. These networks had overlapped sufficiently in Medellín and Rionegro to leave Francisco Urdaneta little option but to hand over power to the rebels. The news that Antioquia had openly rebelled against government rule caused panic and terror in Bogotá.

Pathway 6: Government Reaction to Rebellion: The Recourse to Force in Bogotá

During September 1829 rumors flourished in the capital that Córdova was about to rebel in Antioquia, and that he would do so with the support of heavyweight foreign representatives, particularly Henderson, Harrison, and Torrens.[116] New archival research presented in this chapter provides a persuasive sense of the considerable degree to which they were implicated. James Henderson took the precaution of extracting himself from the gossip circulating in Bogotá by spending longer and longer at his weekend residence in Anolaima, 28 kilometres from the capital.[117] On September 2, 1829, his wife Mary Henderson wrote from Bogotá to her husband, her jittery style betraying her nerves that their support of Córdova would be uncovered. This previously undiscovered and unpublished letter, which is the only surviving document in Mary Henderson's hand, lies hidden in the depths of James Henderson's shopping lists and betting slips in the National Archives in Kew. It illustrates the political uncertainty of those days with the acute sense that diplomatic risks were being taken. She wrote that she had heard that letters had been intercepted, that their carrier was now in prison, and pleaded him to "pray send no more particulars as of course I am very anxious."[118]

On September 7, 1829, William Harrison wrote to US secretary of state Van Buren. "The political drama of this country is fast hastening to its denouement," he wrote. The Bolivarians were complacent in their plans for reintroducing monarchy, he thought, "but their security will be their ruin." He thought Antioquia was "ripe for revolt" and believed that "Cordova will act prudently." "It is expected that some time in October or the beginning of November, he will begin by publishing an address to the people."[119] But events now started to move more quickly than planned because of the way Antioquia had supported Córdova's initial drunken proclamations. Concrete confirmation of Córdova's rebellion, and the publication of his Manifesto, reached Bogotá on September 25, 1829. According to William Harrison, the streets were quiet with foreboding, as if the population had feared a repeat of the assassination conspiracy of exactly one year previously, and that the arrival of news of Córdova's rebellion had confirmed their premonitions.[120] The very next day Minister of War Rafael Urdaneta acted quickly and gave General O'Leary command of the 700 soldiers of the Western Expedition.[121] Several sources suggest that Urdaneta was intercepting all correspondence from Antioquia, so that he already knew the extent to which Henderson and Harrison were implicated in the rebellion, and the strength of Córdova's preparations.[122] Together Urdaneta and O'Leary were fast to recall some hardened veterans who would do what was needed, whatever that may be, to suppress the insurrection in Antioquia. They chose to fill the Expedition's officer corps with foreign-born men, including several British subjects. One of these was Coronel Richard Crofton, who in July 1829 had been tried for "insubordination," and absolved by a court-martial in Bogotá (the details of the case do not survive). The presiding officer on that court-martial was

General Daniel O'Leary himself, meaning that when O'Leary personally recruited Crofton to his expedition he did so in full knowledge of his reputation for violence, vindictiveness, and Bolivarianism.[123]

Next, O'Leary turned to another Irishman, Rupert Hand, who had been languishing in Bogotá since escaping punishment for burgling a post office in 1825. O'Leary then poached other reliable foreign officers from the few units stationed nearby: the German Enrique Lutzen, the Italian Carlos Castelli, and the Irishman Thomas Murray.[124] When completed, O'Leary's officer corps was a handpicked group of veterans, certainly, but it was also the meager pickings of a threadbare cupboard, with all the senior and most reliable Colombian officers on active duty either in the South under Flores and Sucre, or in Venezuela. With the officer corps fully arranged, Urdaneta gave O'Leary his final instructions.[125] There is no evidence that these included secret orders to kill Córdova; only Córdova's subsequent death in mysterious circumstances and some odd or ambiguous phrasing in the instructions issued to O'Leary.[126] What Urdaneta did do was order the arrest of Córdova's known associates in Bogotá on the night of September 28. Castelli and Crofton submitted the businessman Marcelo Tenorio to a "severe and exhaustive" interrogation.[127]

Speculation about Córdova's intentions and his international support networks in the capital now ran riot in the capital.[128] On September 27, the young North American officer Dabney O. Carr made a sworn statement that "Consul Henderson knew all of Córdova's plans and was in agreement with them," which he claimed to have heard from Henderson's own mouth.[129] Cabinet ministers in Bogotá, including José Manuel Restrepo and Rafael Urdaneta, believed Carr's testimony and began to brief against Henderson.[130] O'Leary gave Carr a key post as his aide-de-camp: his enemies later alleged that this was Carr's reward for inventing "envenomed slanders" about Henderson and Harrison's involvement in the revolt.[131] More likely it had established him as a dyed-in-the-wool Bolivarian like O'Leary himself. James Henderson was fraught with anxiety, and on September 29, he exchanged coded messages with the US legation.[132] In public he denied everything, but the evidence presented here demonstrates clearly his support of the revolution, building on several years of his interest in Córdova, Antioquia, and its gold mines.[133]

As Henderson's duplicity was exposed, Daniel O'Leary set off for Antioquia. Early in the morning of September 29, he had breakfast at the British legation with Patrick Campbell and Leandro Miranda, and then led his forces out of Bogotá. This seems convincing evidence that he continued to think of himself as a double agent and that he was acting in the interests of the Britain-Bolívar relationship. Rafael Urdaneta accompanied the army to Honda. On their journey Urdaneta asked O'Leary if he knew that Henderson was implicated in the rebellion, to which O'Leary apparently replied in the negative.[134] In Urdaneta's absence, and with most of the military forces departed from the capital, there was a period of calm where those remaining in Bogotá could draw up a new strategy. The remaining members of

government and the diplomatic community in Bogotá were convulsed with the shock that some of its most high-profile members might have colluded in the insurrection in Antioquia. There was much discussion of the revelations that might emerge from intercepted correspondence, and there were rumors that Henderson had been "engaged in raising a loan for the new Government of Córdova."[135] Patrick Campbell told Henderson that he had seen the government's evidence against him, and that the pile of documents "was over two feet in height (spreading his hands graphically!)."[136] The evidence alleged and documented meetings, letters, and "subversive" visits that Henderson was alleged to have made with known conspirators.[137] On October 3, 1829, a small party of foreigners went to visit James Henderson in his self-imposed retreat at Anolaima, including the ex-US minister William Harrison, his secretary James Tayloe, and the Scottish doctor to the Bogotá elite, Ninian Cheyne. This meeting was later used as evidence against both Henderson and Harrison, alleging that they had been conferring on how to proceed in the event of Córdova's victory or his defeat by the government's forces.[138] While they were there, however, James Henderson informed William Harrison, in Henderson's own words, "that there was the most villainous plot going forward, to convict him and myself of crimes of the blackest character, but that he was precluded, by a solemn obligation, from explaining himself further."[139] Harrison's supporters alleged that newly arrived US minister Moore was responsible for "the many preposterous stories [that] were circulated" with the intention of undermining Harrison's political reputation at home.[140] One of these was an assassination plot, for which the US citizen Albert Gooding was arrested, which allegedly targeted Rafael Urdaneta, Patrick Campbell, and senior members of the cabinet.[141]

When he returned to Bogotá in mid-October James Henderson was indicted by the Colombian authorities as a conspirator in Córdova's rebellion as well as in Gooding's revolutionary plot.[142] Henderson was anxious that his involvement with Córdova should not be revealed or discussed in public, but many influential figures, such as the French consul in Bogotá, had already concluded that Henderson was guilty.[143] As they waited in their comfortable Bogotá home, James and Mary Henderson must have expected their lives to be irrevocably changed as soon as José María Córdova's fate was known. We do not know what was going through Fanny Henderson's mind as she watched her parents suffer; perhaps her thoughts were with Córdova's preparations for battle. On the night of October 17 an "authentic" rumor swept through Bogotá that Córdova had defeated and captured O'Leary. Suppressing their initial delight, members of the US legation armed themselves against government reprisals, and "all was quiet expectation and distrust" until the news was revealed as "a government ruse to discover its opponents."[144]

Back in London, the British Foreign Office would not at this stage have been unduly perturbed, that is, if any time at all was spent contemplating events in Antioquia. With O'Leary and Campbell supporting Bolívar, and Henderson backing Córdova, British interests would seem to have been

protected regardless of which army was victorious in Antioquia. There is no evidence that backing both horses had been official British policy; instead it was the unintended consequence of personal relations in Gran Colombia.

On the morning of October 16, 1829, José María Córdova raised his men with the order to break camp and march up into the mountains to engage the enemy. The 370 men left Rionegro at 10:00 a.m., and by late morning they had passed the "absolutely deserted" town of Marinilla.[145] Those residents who had not been recruited into his forces remained "entirely adverse" to Córdova's rebellion and many had headed for the mountains to assist O'Leary's expedition.[146] Marinilla farmers had taken their livestock with them too, meaning that the Army of Liberty marched solemnly through an empty and foreboding landscape as they went to meet O'Leary's forces.[147] They arrived at El Peñol at 5:00 p.m. and settled down for the evening. Forty kilometers away, having just emerged from a different mountain pass from the one that Córdova expected them to have used, Daniel O'Leary's men were camped at Vahos. They feasted on their ample rations and bedded down for the night.

Chapter 4

The Battle of El Santuario

A description of the Battle of El Santuario is crucial to our interpretation of the imperial formations and local processes that shaped Gran Colombia. Surviving accounts of the battle often contradict each other on key points. Telling the story of José María Córdova's defeat and death became, in subsequent years, part of the debate about the birth of new nations and the role of foreigners in aiding or subverting their historical destiny. That is why it is important to try to establish an accurate sense of what happened, and why, at El Santuario on October 17, 1829. This chapter provides the first description of the Battle of El Santuario in English.

The following pages are based entirely on eyewitness accounts. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a firsthand sense of the battle's stages and rhythms, one that avoids the distortions of hearsay and rumor present in many secondary accounts. The disadvantage is that very few of the veterans described their experiences in any detail, meaning that there are some significant gaps in the narrative; most serious of these is that one of the generals did not survive the day, meaning that his perspective is almost entirely lacking from our account. In addition, the accounts that do survive must be approached with caution because of questions about their reliability, either due to political factors or the amount of time that passed before they were written down. The trial of Rupert Hand (1831–33, discussed in the next chapter) obliged several veterans to provide their recollections of the final moments of the battle and their often contradictory testimonies can only be used with care. Nevertheless, over the past 180 years the Battle of El Santuario has acquired considerable political and historical significance that requires a sober attempt to describe what happened, when it happened, and how it happened.

The principal source for the Battle of El Santuario was written by José María Arango in 1886. His description has been relied upon by Colombian historians because he stood at Córdova's side throughout the battle, and because his narrative is fluent, detailed, and vivid. It should be noted, however, that the author intended his narrative to fill out stories of "the precious life" of the "heroic . . . illustrious General Córdova," and as such may

be suspected of being partial toward one side.[1] Also, Arango wrote down his memories at a distance of 56 years from the events he was describing. With these reservations, however, I follow Humberto Barrera Orrego in seeing Arango's account as of "priceless documentary value."[2] The next most useful sources for the events of the Battle of El Santuario are the texts written by Daniel O'Leary. The victorious general wrote several accounts in the hours, days, and months after the events, some on the battlefield itself, others with greater distance and perspective. O'Leary's "Official Report" was accepted by the government as a trustworthy record of what had happened at El Santuario. O'Leary's sources are valuable because of their immediacy and understanding of the overall shape of the battle (knowledge that is conspicuously lacking from Arango's account, for example). However, O'Leary's texts are also problematic because they are inconsistent and sometimes contradict themselves. For this reason historians have doubted the authenticity of some of them, suggesting particularly that an account O'Leary sent to Bolívar had been forged in order to incriminate O'Leary in Córdova's death. I have concluded that all the accounts attributed to O'Leary are genuine, and that their divergences in detail and emphasis can be explained by the different audiences he was addressing, or by the influence of physical circumstances on the accuracy of his recall.[3]

The third major source is Carmelo Fernández's short description of the battle in his memoirs. Fernández was an officer in O'Leary's forces who wrote in objective and calm style, although like Arango he wrote over half a century after the event. Fernández is a useful complement to O'Leary, to whom he remained loyal throughout his life and who he had no reason to contradict except when O'Leary himself was straying from the truth. The fourth collection of sources is the most problematic of all. It is the witness statements given to Hand's trial for Córdova's murder, provided in 1831 and 1832. The testimonies are fresh, though the sections that relate directly to Córdova's death are particularly dubious. The trial was politically charged and many of the statements have been argued by Miguel Aguilera to be untrustworthy and politically motivated attempts to pin the intellectual authorship for Córdova's death on O'Leary. Almost all of the accounts were transcribed by a clerk from oral testimonies, and as such often feature very similar set phrases that cast doubt on whether they accurately reflect what was said. Nevertheless, when used with caution, the court documents still provide useful details and illuminating perspectives on movements and timings not provided by Arango, O'Leary, or Fernández.

The Battle of El Santuario had three distinct stages. The first was General Córdova's initial attack, which was successfully resisted by O'Leary's troops causing Córdova to retreat from the foothills to the plain of El Santuario and occupy defensive positions with his back to the only buildings of any note, a chapel and a small house. This phase lasted perhaps 45 minutes. The second stage saw General O'Leary's forces push down the hill against stiff resistance,

fighting hand-to-hand across a small plain until Córdova took refuge in the house. This second stage lasted two hours. The third stage was the shortest of all, consisting of the storming of the house on O'Leary's orders, the taking of prisoners and Rupert Hand's attack on José María Córdova. The battle, therefore, lasted no more than three hours in total. I do not think that there was any great disparity between the types of weapons employed by the two sides: O'Leary's victory appears as the result of better strategic position and numeric advantage more than any other factors.

Stage 1. When the first shots were fired, at around 11:00 a.m., General Córdova ordered his Light Battalion, commanded by Capitán Braulio Henao, to leave its reserve position behind the house out of sight, and to attack the enemy's left flank in order to prevent its descent from the heights onto the plain. The rest of the Army of Liberty was ordered to "hold its positions" at the foot of the hills.[4]

Henao led his detachment, of between 30 and 40 men, across the side of the hill toward the enemy.[5] This mission looked "impossible" according to Arango. Even before they had advanced more than a few strides, Henao's second in command Francisco Giraldo had been wounded. He was carried away and into the house behind Córdova's central position, which from now on acted as a makeshift hospital. Henao led the attack from the front, but his men were mowed down by the rifle fire from above. Only Henao himself, two officers, and "a few" soldiers survived.[6]

Back in the center, General Córdova commanded his men with courage, according to all sources. He received a bullet wound in the chest early on, but continued fighting.[7] From his rearguard position with the cavalry, who were not called into action in this first phase, Rupert Hand observed a period of "warm and well-contested action."[8] Many of Córdova's officers and soldiers did not survive the first hail of gunfire directed upon them. Comandante Benedicto Gonzalez, Córdova's second in command in the center, was felled by wounds to the stomach and head. He was in "enormous agony" as he was carried into the house by Arango and others.[9] Faced with what already seemed to be impending defeat, some of the soldiers tried to desert; General Córdova killed one of them with his own lance to try to set an example to others who might be tempted to run.[10]

When Córdova realized that Henao's attack had been repelled, he ordered a partial retreat of between 300 and 400 meters onto the small plain, with the house-hospital behind his left and center, and the only other building, the chapel, behind his right flank.[11] O'Leary observed that the first exchange of fire had "forced Córdova to retreat from his first positions [and] re-form his troops in an excellent [defensive] position."[12] Córdova now ordered his troops to fight hand-to-hand to maintain their ground. This retreat to new positions marked the end of the first stage of the battle. Arango reflected that these first 45 minutes had been "enough for them to destroy and defeat us."[13]

Stage 2. As soon as the second stage of the battle began, it stopped again. The two generals conducted a short dialogue in the middle of the battlefield. O'Leary recalled that

> When the battle had recommenced, Córdova saw me, and called out. I ordered my troops to cease their fire, and Córdova stepped forward and spoke loudly to me:
> "General O'Leary, do you want to save the Republic?"
> I responded in the affirmative.
> Then he shouted "¡Viva la República!" to which I answered "¡Viva el Libertador!"[14]

Arango remembered a further exchange: Córdova shouted out that O'Leary was a "a vile foreigner, a mercenary and a wage earner," ridiculing his opponent's claim to patriotism.[15] The two armies then prepared to reengage. As the final orders were given and executed, Carmelo Fernández observed his commanding officers: "General O'Leary and Coronel Castelli were both pallid in the face and stiff in their gestures, and Hand was readying the cavalry charge with a martial air."[16] O'Leary ordered Comandante Enrique Lutzen to attack Capitán Ramón Escalante's rebel guerrilla detachment, which had been posted by Córdova to defend a stream at the foot of a steep incline.[17] Escalante's orders were to harass O'Leary's advancing forces "where they would have to cross the stream" as they descended and spread out on the plain. He had around 70 men to execute this order, though the terrain was open and there were no obvious defensive positions to support him. In the staunch fighting that followed, Escalante died along with almost all of his men.[18] Having routed Henao's initial attack, and now Escalante's forward guerrillas, Lutzen's forces had destroyed perhaps one quarter of the Army of Liberty, killing over a hundred men in total. The Cazadores under Coronel Carlos Castelli were now able to storm down the hill and across the stream in order to attack General Córdova's center, and the left flank, commanded by his brother. The cavalry, commanded by Crofton and Hand, remained in reserve on the hill at this stage.

In his Official Report, O'Leary described the moment the "general battle was joined: . . . The rebels, imitating their caudillo's wild and splendid courage, fought like *desperados.*"[19] The Army of Liberty's left flank crumpled under the weight of the attack. Troops and officers alike, totaling around a hundred men, turned and fled "in all directions."[20] Many were killed and wounded here, and when Crofton and Hand led the cavalry into the action, "pursuing them to prevent a second formation."[21] For Arango it was a "miracle" that Salvador Córdova, Anselmo Pineda, and other officers emerged "intact from the wreckage."[22]

The second stage of the battle came to an end as O'Leary's troops converged on Córdova's center with a "bayonet charge and the cavalry unleashed."[23] Arango saw Capitán Salvador Alzate (a long-serving Gran Colombian officer who had grown up in Antioquia) lead his unit toward them, and he realized

they would soon be surrounded. When Córdova could no longer contain his soldiers' desertions, his assistant Niño brought a horse and pleaded the general to "get on, and save yourself; we will soon be surrounded." Córdova's response to Niño and Arango, and the others who still remained close to him, was a dismissive "Save yourselves, cowards!" Arango turned to run. He snatched one last glance at General Córdova: "He was stood six paces from the house, his jacket was stained with blood from the wound. He looked slowly around him, turned, and entered the house. . . . It was over."[24] Arango and Niño mounted Córdova's abandoned and wounded horse and fled the battlefield. The young men were "absolutely exhausted" and terrified after their first experience of battle, leaving behind them a "considerable" number of fatalities, "most of them dead, the rest wounded."[25] When they came to the top of an incline on the road to Rionegro, they found Salvador Córdova dragging the seriously wounded Anselmo Pineda. Coronel Córdova ordered them to dismount, and the three of them hauled Pineda onto the horse, his "blood soaking everything." The demoralized stragglers took three hours to reach Rionegro, where Salvador Córdova gave many of them refuge in his home.[26]

Back in the house, Francisco Giraldo still lay wounded. He saw José María Córdova enter, proudly acknowledging that "we have lost the battle, but we have done so with honor, because the recruits fought bravely."[27] Teniente Francisco Escalante entered the house at Córdova's side.[28] Sargento José María Yepes was wounded shortly afterward, and when he entered the house he found Córdova was already there with "several others."[29] We can not be certain exactly how many people were in the house at this moment. There are seven officers named in the surviving documents, including Córdova himself. Two of those died that same afternoon, and none of the survivors provided a more accurate numerical estimate than that "some" men accompanied Córdova at this moment. Rupert Hand, who might be expected to have exaggerated the dangers he faced, estimated that there were "20 or 30 men" inside when he entered.[30] Probably the number was somewhere between 7 and 20.

Stage 3. The final stage of the battle was directed outside the house by O'Leary and Castelli. With the Army of Liberty's commanding officers now out of the action, they attempted to impose order on a chaotic situation, and to complete their victory. Córdova's troops and officers were being pursued in all directions, and cavalry and officers were struggling to maintain discipline. What happened now, with O'Leary's forces concentrated opposite the house in which General Córdova was surrounded and wounded, is a matter of conjecture and debate. It revolves around who said what to whom, and what they meant when they said it. The following section examines the orders and directions given outside the house in this phase of the battle, relying only on testimonies from the few eyewitnesses. It is important because the question of whether Rupert Hand received an order to kill Córdova regardless of whether he had surrendered is extremely relevant to the nature of the imperial formations studied in this book.

Carlos Castelli directed the troops as they closed in on the house. His account differs considerably from O'Leary's in its later stages, but it provides excellent detail on the skirmishing and fighting that preceded O'Leary's final orders. Castelli testified that when his cavalry reached the house, having charged the enemy toward it, dispersing them as they went, he

> was fired upon from within the house at very short distance; I shouted orders and sounded the bugle for my troops to cease firing, so as to avoid any danger for our other units or guerrillas who were also heading for the enemy's center. I wanted calm in order to organise an attack on the house, and to minimise our losses. But when I realized that they continued to fire on us occasionally from within the house, which could still be a danger for the chiefs and officers who remained within range, I left two companies on a little plain around fifty paces away, and I then led a detachment to the house's small external gallery. That is where we were bringing together all those who arrived from the guerrillas. A prisoner told me that General Córdova was in the house, and I responded in a loud voice, that if he didn't give up then I would set fire to the house. At this, several officers did come out of the house and surrendered, and I sent them (still with their swords) to our 4th company commanded by Teniente Miguel Hoyos . . . one of the units on the small plain.[31]

Daniel O'Leary's account accords his own role more authority and decisiveness than Castelli allowed. According to O'Leary, "some soldiers, and the horses of the chiefs and officers accompanying me were injured and killed [by shots from the house]. I had no alternative. I gave orders to Comandante Castelli and Second Comandante Hand to force the house, and to give no quarter to any resistance." After ordering the attack on the house, O'Leary said, "an officer came to inform me that an enemy chief, who he believed to be General Córdova, was looking for me in another part of the battlefield, where he wished to give himself up. I flew to protect him, and there I found Comandante Giraldo and other enemy officers who requested my protection."[32]

Castelli and O'Leary were both adamant that shots were being fired out of the house by still considerable rebel forces. In contrast, some of the men who were inside the house claimed that it was a peaceful hospital, that no shots were fired.[33] Whether Córdova had or had not surrendered, and whether he was armed or unarmed, later became crucial to ascertaining what crime Rupert Hand had committed. The testimonies of Nepomuceno Isaza, one of Córdova's Sargentos, and Gabriel Salom, one of O'Leary's officers, both describe the house as a place of turmoil, if not open conflict, at this moment, with officers and troops from both armies inside.[34] Córdova himself was not shooting out of the windows, and the room where Córdova lay was not a scene of continued fighting. However, eyewitness testimonies show that some rooms in the house did still harbor individuals who had not surrendered, and that intermittent fighting still carried on in the house's external galleries.

The order that O'Leary gave to Rupert Hand was remembered differently by all concerned. According to his own carefully worded Official Report, O'Leary ordered Castelli and Hand to "give no quarter to any resistance" in storming the house. Rupert Hand provided several different versions of what O'Leary had said. In the most reliable of his accounts, Hand wrote that

> galloping across the plain, my horse was shot under me and dropt; I was thrown to some distance and received a violence contusion on the head which almost bereft me of my senses; I arose and rushed towards the nearest body of troops with my drawn sabre without knowing friends from foes determined to seek revenge without being aware that I was not wounded. At this moment I met O'Leary. "Away to that house, Sir," said he, "and if Córdova is there, kill him." Like lightning I obeyed, met an officer at the door who offered me resistance that infuriated me more. I entered, there was much confusion, shots were flying in the rear; I scarcely remember what happened.[35]

In the "Confession" he later gave to the court trying him for homicide, Hand refined his account, and stated that "General O'Leary said to me, imperiously, 'Córdova is in that house, find him and kill him now.'"[36] Hand stressed that he was obeying O'Leary's explicit order to kill Córdova, and should, therefore, not be held to account for his actions.[37] Other witnesses do not clarify exactly what O'Leary said. Arango was at this moment fleeing the battlefield, and Fernández avoided the exchange in his account, apparently out of fear of reprisals upon publication.[38] In addition to Hand and O'Leary, there were four individuals who might have heard their exchange. These were Castelli, Urdaneta, Lutzen, and Carr.[39]

Castelli remembered that O'Leary "made some very offensive comments to me, and we exchanged some choice words" before they were reconciled: "O'Leary said that all was forgotten and we should concentrate on the enemy's troops, who were still formed together, and signalling the house whose gallery we could both see, he said 'General Córdova is badly wounded in there.'" At this point, according to Castelli, O'Leary told him "imperiously and in English," to "Kill him." Castelli claimed that he refused, and so O'Leary ordered Hand instead.[40] Urdaneta said that he had heard Crofton and Castelli say, on the battlefield itself, that O'Leary had ordered Córdova to be killed. He also claimed that several days after the battle, Hand had told him that "if I had not received the order, I would not have tried to kill General Córdova."[41]

In sum O'Leary either told Hand to "give no quarter" or, more explicitly, to "Kill him." Thomas Murray later claimed that Hand had brandished an order from O'Leary to kill Córdova; but Murray's accounts of his encounters with Hand on the battlefield do not hold up to comparison with other sources.[42] We know that Hand was exhilarated by the battle and disorientated by the fall from his horse. We know that as Hand went through the door, he was being watched by Castelli, Lutzen, Murray, Carr, and, a little further back, the soldiers of the 4th and 6th companies under Miguel Alzate.

We think that we know that O'Leary had gone to another part of the battlefield while his orders (whatever their exact terms) were being executed. Certainly Rupert Hand felt that he had the blessing of his superior officer for what he was about to do.

The Final Stage: Inside the House. Thankfully there is a more extensive range of witnesses now that we turn to events inside the house, and we can establish the chain of events with some certainty. Our witnesses are these: first, Rupert Hand. Second, the other officers sharing the room with Córdova at the time of the attack: Francisco Escalante, Francisco Giraldo, José Antonio Navarro, Nepomuceno Isaza, José María Yepes, and Benedicto Gonzalez (who was mortally wounded at the battle and may have died before Hand entered the room). Third, there are the accounts offered by individuals who came into the house after the attack, but while Córdova was still alive, who recorded some information about the house and its contents that may have a bearing on our interpretation. These are Manuel Acevedo, Carmelo Fernández, Gabriel Salom, Juan Cristotomo Campuzano, and Daniel O'Leary.

Hand's own account must be used with caution because first, he admitted that he could not remember very much about what happened in the heat of the moment, and second, because his explanation aimed to demonstrate his innocence and avoid the death penalty. In his first recorded declaration, which he made in prison, in English for the British consul in Cartagena in 1831, Hand said that

> I entered, there was much confusion, shots were flying in the rear, I scarcely remember what happened; somebody as if wishing to escape from me said, "that's Córdova, that's Córdova." I thought he was behind a pile of knapsacks so placed as to have protected him from the balls that might have entered from the window. As I glanced my eye upon him I saw him distinctly drawing a pistol from his breeches pocket with intent to shoot me. I rushed upon and instantly sabered him. I immediately retired and informed O'Leary, who then entered the house and conversed with Córdova, who was not yet dead, he said he repented of his ungrateful conduct towards the Liberator, that he justly met his fate, etc, etc.[43]

Later, in his January 1832 "Confession," Hand repeated the same account with the important change that the victim identified himself saying "I am Córdova" in a threatening tone, lifting his hand to his pocket to reach his pistol."[44] Hand later gave another description to the appeal court, and we can see in Hand's three declarations an escalating emphasis on how Córdova was armed.[45] His sabre appears only in the final statement; the pistol is seen in the second statement where in the first he was only reaching for it. The only facts that appear in all three of Hand's testimonies are the chaos in the house and his own disorientation.

Francisco Escalante is the most reliable witness. He was a merchant who had tried to dissuade Córdova from his revolution but had reluctantly been incorporated to his forces and served as a Teniente at El Santuario. He had

just learned that his brother, Ramón, had died leading Córdova's guerrilla defense of the stream. Escalante recalled Thomas Murray entering and talking to Córdova, and leaving before another officer came in:

> This officer asked which of us was General Córdova. The General, who was lying on a bed, responded "I am General Córdova, here you have him," to which the officer responded with oaths and insults, striking him on the head with the sabre he was carrying unsheathed. Córdova was not prepared for the attack, because like the rest of us he was unarmed as we considered ourselves prisoners. After being hit on the head he looked blankly at the officer, who then struck him again, with Córdova trying to defend the blow with his right hand, but it was such an angry attack that it cut off the first three fingers of that hand; and then the officer unleashed a third blow that was so strong that it cracked through Córdova's skull and entered the wall behind him, making a hole four fingers deep . . . he fell from the bed onto the floor, with blood gushing and spluttering out of him. At that point the officer turned to me, as I was next to General Córdova, and asked me who I was, and I replied "I am Teniente Francisco Escalante," and then he turned and left the house.[46]

It is immediately obvious that the attack is more vicious (three strikes rather than two) and more gruesome (the details of the gushing blood) than in Hand's own account. This is consistent with other witnesses on the Antioquian side. Francisco Giraldo was seriously wounded, and was lying on a bed looking toward the wall, so his testimony was based on what he heard rather than what he saw: "five or six blows, to which the General did not resist because he was wounded and unarmed. There was then a profound silence, so I suppose that is when the assassin left."[47] Taken together, the testimonies of the witnesses in the house provide a clear narrative of Hand's entrance and his attack on Córdova. There is, however, another eyewitness account that disturbs the clarity of the picture. Sargento Nepomuceno Isaza's testimony has generally been disregarded because the 1833 court found him to be an unreliable, "vice-ridden" witness who had been "ruined by his dependence on liquor." We know nothing of his origins, although he may have been related to a Marinilla schoolmaster.[48] His memory, however sodden, recalled one intriguing episode. Isaza stated that

> After our defeat, several members of General Córdova's division entered the house. General Córdova leant his lance against a wall, and lay on a bed. Several of us fired out of the windows for a while. When the exchange of fire was finished, Comandante Hand came in, asking which of us was General Córdova. As soon as this identity had been confirmed Hand approached Córdova, struck him four times with his sabre and immediately left the house, leaving a sentry on the door, who a little later shot the General when he tried to get up. Hearing the shot, Coronel Francisco Urdaneta approached the sentry and asked him what had happened. The sentry responded that he had shot Córdova because Hand had left him for dead but he turned out to still be alive; Urdaneta replied that he had done well.[49]

All subsequent historians have followed the prosecutors at Rupert Hand's trial in disregarding Nepomuceno Isaza's account on the grounds that he was an alcoholic. In this interpretation, Isaza must have made it all up in a drunken delirium. But it is worth exploring his story a little with reference to other sources. The sentry at the door was clearly Dabney O. Carr. If Isaza's account is accurate, then Carr was the man who shot Córdova after Rupert Hand had left. But if this really happened, then why did no other witness mention it? This is less surprising than it might seem at first. Rupert Hand had gone, so he would have seen nothing. We know that Francisco Giraldo was looking at the wall throughout, so he saw nothing. We know that by this stage José María Yepes was hiding, which would explain why he saw nothing. But that still leaves Francisco Urdaneta plus two prisoners, Antonio Navarro and Francisco Escalante, none of whom mention the sentry or the shot. It is possible that the two witnesses were lent upon to suppress their memories of the *coup de grace* in order to secure Rupert Hand's conviction (Carr died in 1830, and so was not a useful scapegoat for those persecuting Hand). Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence or any compelling reason why we should take Isaza's word over all other accounts: it is one part of a multidimensional narrative. It does add an intriguing US dimension to the narrative of imperial involvement in the murder.

Taken as a whole, the eyewitness accounts confirm that Hand struck Córdova anything between two and six times, leaving him with wounds in the head and hands. They agree that Hand left the scene immediately after landing the final blow. They disagree as to the dialogue exchanged between the pair, but do suggest that Córdova identified himself. Hand was the only witness to mention Córdova's pistol. Some witnesses mentioned Murray entering the house and asking Córdova if he had surrendered. The conclusion must be that Córdova considered himself surrendered, and expected to be treated with honor and respect by the victors.

Witnesses Who Came Into the House after Hand's Attack on Córdova. According to Francisco Giraldo, "not long after the murder, several of O'Leary's officers came in and took us out of the house, and we had to step over the General's body as he lay on the floor by the door."[50] Those officers included Gabriel Salom, Carmelo Fernández, and Daniel O'Leary himself. In addition there are accounts by some of the prisoners who remained in other rooms of the house, as Córdova lay dying, including Francisco Escalante and Cabo (Corporal) Manuel Acevedo. Acevedo had surrendered outside the house. He saw Hand come out, after which General O'Leary ordered Acevedo and some other prisoners in. That was when "he saw General Córdova lying on the floor, covered in wounds, and almost dead."[51] These sources agree that Córdova took between two and four hours to die after Hand's attack. O'Leary was one of the first to go in to see Córdova. He told Bolívar, in a letter written later that afternoon, that "Córdova asked to talk with me, and he said that he wanted to remind me of our friendship, and to say how sorry he was to have fought against me. I felt sorry for the poor devil, because

I have a compassionate heart. His last request was for me to give him a little opium."[52] In his Official Report, O'Leary recorded that "when I saw the state he was in I forgot about his perfidy and his treachery, and I remembered him for a moment as my old friend and comrade-in-arms. He spoke of his ingratitude and his regrets, and the clemency of the Liberator and the government, and he died after he had received much attention from our chiefs and officers."[53]

Juan Crisóstomo Campuzano was in the house when O'Leary entered. He was one of the principal Rionegro residents who had supported the rebellion. He recounted his story many years later, portraying the emotional nature of the moment: "O'Leary was obviously moved as he came closer to the body, trembling as he stroked Córdova's hair. He listened for a heartbeat, wiped his forehead and calmly closed his eyes. When he left he took with him Córdova's blood-soaked jacket."[54] This detail is supported by Carmelo Fernández's vivid visual description of the scene:

> I noticed that the victor of so many combats lay on the floor, and I observed that he was wearing a sky-blue pantaloon, decorated with a rich stripe on the fringes, and a Turkish-blue *dolmán* jacket, embroidered with black silk. By this time he already had another sword wound which had penetrated his skull. His fingers hung from his right hand. He was losing a lot of blood, and continually asked for water to drink. Our battalion's 2nd *ayudante*, Juan Gudiño, was one of the men who brought him water, and in thanks for this service, Córdova gave him his small pistol. The frequent showers had ruined my hat, which was made of cardboard and coated in black rubber. For this reason I took one of the many hats belonging to Córdova's wounded or captured officers.[55]

One of O'Leary's officers who later became a merchant in Cartagena, Gabriel Salom, corroborated the story of Córdova gifting his pistols, indicating that he was still armed with them when attacked by Hand. (Nevertheless this should not be surprising: defeated officers were normally treated starkly differently from their soldiers who were stripped of any weapons.)[56] The final witness is Francisco Escalante, who was held prisoner in another room during Córdova's death throes. He was granted permission twice to visit and talk to Córdova. On the first the general asked him to prop him up, complained of his wounds, and asked for water. On the second occasion Escalante thought he heard the wounded general say what became immortalized as Córdova's last words, his call-to-arms from Ayacucho: "forward, cornets, play the attack march! Come on boys, charge them with the bayonet, as the enemy are few and cowardly. Long Live Freedom!"[57]

The Immediate Consequences of the Battle of El Santuario. Córdova died of the wounds he received during the battle and its aftermath at round about 5:00 p.m. on October 17, 1829. There are no surviving descriptions of the state of his dead body from that day, but when his corpse was exhumed several years later there were clear cracks in his skull, and its right hand was missing the little finger, the ring finger, and the middle finger.[58] The wider

consequences of the Battle of El Santuario had many layers, and they spread out across Antioquia, New Granada, Gran Colombia, South America, and the world over the next 50 years. The rest of this book maps those global connections as they rippled across local, regional, national, and imperial spaces.

Foremost in our field of vision as we leave the house and the battlefield are the dead and wounded. The government forces suffered 13 deaths and 26 wounded soldiers, according to Arango who had long left the battlefield when the fatalities were being counted.[59] According to O'Leary's Official Report his forces lost just "two dead."[60] None of the names of those killed in the Colombian Army have survived. Córdova's "Army of Liberty" was destroyed. Out of his 370 men, Córdova had lost 200 dead.[61] Very few of those killed have been identified.

After visiting Córdova, O'Leary stood outside the house and quickly wrote two battlefield proclamations. He knew that Córdova would soon be dead, and he tried to explain his death as punishment for his rebellion. The first proclamation was directed at his troops:

> Soldiers! This corpse which you now behold with indignation and sadness is the body of a spoiled child of fortune. The Liberator's generosity raised him to the highest military rank, and heaped honors on him with profusion. Intoxicated with prosperity, he attacked his benefactor and his country. May his fate prove a lesson to ungrateful wretches and traitors; and may your conduct be a model to the faithful servants of Colombia.[62]

At this first moment of victory, O'Leary praised the "valor and constancy" of his soldiers.[63] Nevertheless, very few records were kept of the soldiers involved. Memory of the battle was erased from official records during subsequent years, including being omitted from many soldiers' service records. The second brief proclamation O'Leary made at El Santuario was directed at the defeated prisoners, who he took to represent "the inhabitants of Antioquia." Standing before them, O'Leary asserted that "an ever just Providence has this day chosen to punish General Córdova's manifold atrocities, and to appease the national vengeance with the blood of the rebel." He assured them, however, that "you have nothing to fear."[64] O'Leary then ordered his forces to march on to the town of Marinilla.

As O'Leary and his army advanced upon Marinilla, which they occupied in mid-afternoon, Salvador Córdova, Anselmo Pineda, and the other members of the Army of Liberty who had managed to escape were straggling into Rionegro where they sought sanctuary. Late arrivals brought with them word of Hand's attack on their leader, and his death. When the news reached the merchant Sinforoso García, he sent some of his servants to El Santuario to collect Córdova's corpse and bring it back for burial. They found that some peasants from El Santuario had already tied Córdova's body to a makeshift stretcher ready to carry it away, in order to prevent it from being thrown into the unmarked common grave that had been dug on the battlefield for the

dead soldiers.[65] The stretcher was carried as far as Marinilla, which García's servants reached as night fell, where they left the body in a ditch on the outskirts of town.[66] Córdova's body lay overnight on the ground (while O'Leary and his officers celebrated their victory in the nearby streets). The next morning Córdova was hurriedly buried in Marinilla by residents who worried that his rebellious presence, even in death, might stain their town's reputation for loyalty to the government.[67] Comandante Benedicto Gonzalez was buried in Rionegro cemetery on October 22.[68] Some rebels fled far and wide. Braulio Henao made it to Rionegro with Salvador Córdova, and borrowed a horse from the merchant Don Pedro Saenz in order to go into hiding in the mountains. As he climbed up to the Alto Pelade pass, his horse gave up. Henao saw a man on further up the road, chased him, and "took out his pistol and said 'Give me your horse to continue on my way, or I will kill you.'" The man guided Henao through the mountains, and two days later they arrived in Carricales, where Henao hid from government agents for several weeks in the house of Don José Ignacio Gutierrez.[69] Back in Marinilla, the consequences of what had happened began to sink in for O'Leary. El Santuario had been a personal triumph, and a victory for Bolivar's supporters. O'Leary set about asserting and assuring this victory through proclamations, amnesties, letter-writing, and collecting. The persecution that Henao had feared and fled was far from O'Leary's mind. For O'Leary the battle had been as much a personal challenge and a matter of individual honor as it was a collective battle between two armies. He felt no need to seek out the survivors of the Army of Liberty. Within hours of the battle he wrote to Bolívar:

> My General, my heart tells me that I have fulfilled my duty. I would have died if I had not defended you, and the truth is that when the battle seemed to be going in Córdova's favour I myself sought out the death that he received, so that I would not have to present myself in front of you in disgrace.[70]

With José María Córdova dead and his own honor assured, O'Leary forgave all other Antioquians for their part in the rebellion. On October 18, O'Leary traveled from Marinilla to Rionegro, and found a doctor to "treat the unfortunate wounded from yesterday's battle."[71] On October 19, O'Leary was settled in Rionegro. He wrote to the prefects of the Gran Colombian departments, to inform them that "General Córdova was killed on the field of battle, after an obstinate resistance, and his troops defeated with great loss, though ours was but trifling."[72] He also wrote to his wife Soledad, dedicating the victory to her and their daughter.[73] O'Leary offered an amnesty to Salvador Córdova and all the other participants in the battle except those who had participated in the previous year's assassination attempt on Bolívar.[74] Militarily defeated, Salvador Córdova had no choice but to accept the terms O'Leary offered. The bishop of Antioquia praised O'Leary as a "prudent and able victor" for "having washed a healthy bath of opium over past events."[75] O'Leary heaped all the blame for the rebellion on the deceased general, on the condition that his defeated supporters now

all pledged loyalty to the Bolivarian government. This meant that Córdova's followers could cast themselves as "innocent peoples . . . without blame" and O'Leary could secure pacification of the province without further bloodshed.[76] This policy was so successful that the anxious residents of Rionegro published a "pure and sincere" *Expression of Gratitude* to O'Leary upon his departure, thanking him for his "generosity and the protection he offered in our misfortune, and for the discipline and good order with which his Division has behaved."[77] (O'Leary exploited this good feeling by buying Córdova's relics from the officers who had stripped the corpse. At O'Leary's request, the Division's Commissary, a Jamaican merchant known as Lewis Lewis, paid Carmelo Fernández an ounce of gold for Córdova's hat, and purchased Córdova's sword and scabbard from Subteniente Victor Rocha.)[78]

With Rionegro subjugated and grateful for O'Leary's restraint, O'Leary moved on to the Antioquian capital, Medellín. From there on October 23 he wrote to Bolívar that Córdova "was a terrible General, believe me. Throughout this campaign, and even in the battle itself, his every move was crude and slow, though his bravery was amazing." In this letter to Bolívar, O'Leary wrote his final reflections on the campaign. He told Bolívar that the effort had left him

> very thin and exhausted, and I believe that I will live only a few more years. I would like to pass them at your side, which is where I spent a good part of my childhood, and all of my youth. I am now old. Nevertheless, I will go wherever you order me. I ask just one thing, and that is that you have more trust in me. I told you a long time ago of the well-founded doubts I harboured about Córdova . . . I would like this letter to be printed so that, from now on, those who come up against me will know what to expect. I have never compromised and I will never compromise with those dishonorable wretches . . . If Córdova had been supported by public opinion, then not even the whole Colombian army would have been able to penetrate this province. But Córdova was crazy. He had nothing but his own bravery.[79]

News of the events at El Santuario spread quickly across Gran Colombia. The first national reactions to O'Leary's victory were positive. The *Registro Oficial del Magdalena* observed that "the rebellion of General Córdova has been stifled in the cradle, and this ringleader has been chastised for his enormous crime, with the penalty the law has reserved for traitors . . . Let the melancholy end of this General, on whom fortune smiled as long as he walked in the path of his duty, serve as an example."[80] Juan de Francisco Martín, in a reply from Cartagena, congratulated O'Leary on "the ring-leader's well-deserved death."[81] But O'Leary's victory was not uniformly well-received. Over the next 12 months, his name became synonymous with unpatriotic and brutal Bolívar-loyalism, and with unwarranted foreign intervention in internal affairs. Córdova's death became seen as a murder, and the men implicated in it came to symbolize Gran Colombia's continued colonial oppression. O'Leary may have won the battle, but the war had only just begun.

Chapter 5

Counterrevolutions

By November 1829, with José María Córdova dead and Antioquia's loyalty to the Gran Colombian government restored, O'Leary and his officers were at the apex of their power. But their fall from these heights was rapid, acrimonious, and bloody. Despite its defeat, Córdova's rebellion had dealt a fatal blow to the Bolivarian regime, and on March 1, 1830, Bolívar resigned, later declaring that "he who serves the revolution ploughs the sea." Sick, disenchanted, and disillusioned he prepared to go into exile but died before he could leave Gran Colombia, on December 17, 1830.[1] This chapter follows the veterans of El Santuario as they picked their way through the ruins of Bolívar's dreams, attempting to protect their interests, their ideas, and their lives in the face of incessant waves of political and military upheaval. New Granada's geography played a key role in scrambling the plans and strategies of generals and diplomats in these years. In several cases news of a battle or an armistice in one region arrived too late to prevent further bloodshed or a rebellion in another part of the country, creating new circumstances in one place that triggered further reactions somewhere else by which time, of course, more changes had occurred. The biographical approach adopted here provides a degree of coherence and some insight into the transformations of these crucial years in the development of New Granadan politics and society.

The chapter's structure follows the waves of rebellion and counterrevolution that reverberated between Antioquia and Bogotá in the two years after El Santuario. It begins with the consequences of the battle in the next months, and then follows the victors back to Bogotá as they used force to sustain a militant Bolivarianism at the center of government. The third section moves back to Antioquia, and examines the regional rebellion led by Salvador Córdova against them. With Córdova's victory in 1831, the chapter moves back to the capital, to uncover the fates of the rebels and Bolivarians, as Gran Colombia finally disintegrated, and an independent Republic of New Granada emerged under a government that would have been broadly sympathetic to every word of José María Córdova's 1829 manifesto.

In the wake of the defeat at El Santuario of Córdova's foreign-backed revolution, further attempts at imperial intervention in 1830–31 in New Granada were regarded with great suspicion. Those foreigners who were Gran Colombian citizens—like the El Santuario veterans O'Leary, Castelli, and Hand—increasingly found themselves scapegoated rather than celebrated. This was a period of retrenchment and retreat for empires with pretensions to influence in the Gran Colombian region.

Reaction in Antioquia

Daniel O'Leary remained in Antioquia for two months after the Battle of El Santuario. He tidied up as best he could despite longing to leave and return to Bogotá. His men were lodged with families of the defeated rebels: Carmelo Fernández, for example, was billeted with María Antonia González, the widow of Benedicto González who had died early in the battle.[2] He tried to settle local grievances against central government (by waiving many debts and ignoring Rafael Urdaneta's orders to tax and plunder the defeated rebels). O'Leary accepted most local protestations of loyalty in the hope that they would last beyond the short term. O'Leary also kept an eye out for British interests: he burned all of José María Córdova's correspondence, which might have incriminated Consul Henderson in Córdova's rebellion.[3] Rather than blaming Antioquians, or Henderson, O'Leary turned a blind eye to the involvement or indiscretions of all those who were still alive, and pinned all blame for the insurrection on José María Córdova.[4] The possibility of forgiveness extended as far as Salvador Córdova, who issued a mea culpa to O'Leary immediately after the battle, and weeks later, at the end of December 1829, met Simón Bolívar at Cartago.[5] Both Bolívar and O'Leary assured Salvador Córdova that they believed his claims to have been swept along by family loyalty rather than political antipathy. Salvador Córdova, therefore, returned to Rionegro after receiving his pardon, where he rested with his family.

O'Leary's forgiveness in Antioquia did not extend to the black population of the neighboring Chocó province, which remained formally in rebellion against O'Leary's pacification. On October 31, 1829, O'Leary wrote to Bolívar that

> if that province stills resists after the note I sent them [informing them of Córdova's defeat], then I will march there with two hundred men and I will not leave a grain of gold in their rivers or in their mines. We need to slit the throats of those bloody blacks. In fact I hope that they *do* resist, because this would lighten things up after the tragedy here.[6]

O'Leary was furious and desperate for revenge against the governor of the Chocó, Coronel Fermín de Vargas, who had led the Chocó in support of the Antioquia rebellion. Fermín de Vargas was the uncle of Florentino Gonzalez, one of the 1828 conspirators against Bolívar. O'Leary wrote

"I have learned that this traitor [Vargas] has freed slaves to fight against us and that he has pledged to set the world alight." He promised that "if I catch Vargas I will shoot him straight away."[7] In order to suppress the Chocó rebellion, O'Leary sent Rupert Hand to the Chocó as comandante de armas with Thomas Murray as his military chief. O'Leary's language and his choice of personnel for this mission demonstrate clearly that he intended to "pacify" the Chocó through force. His negative attitude toward the black population in the Chocó was shared by the majority of his white contemporaries. Few documents survive relating to the suppression of the rebellion. Historians Groot and Restrepo later wrote "the people" had risen up, taken over the barracks in the capital, Quibdó, captured Governor Vargas, and temporarily replaced him with "the foreigner Guillermo Coutin."[8] We know also that Hand led a "small unit" to the Chocó, "completed his mission" in the first months of 1830, and then returned to Antioquia.[9]

The repression of rebellion in the Chocó was probably brutal and expected. O'Leary's policy of forget and forgive was, therefore, welcomed gratefully in Antioquia by Bishop Mariano Garnica, whose ambiguous stance toward the rebellion had now been resolved by O'Leary's convincing victory. Garnica was pleased to see "order and tranquillity re-established, with the past being absolutely forgotten."[10] He petitioned O'Leary not to punish the clergy "without them having committed any crime," reinventing his own ambiguous support of the rebellion by claiming that he had "opposed Córdova with the people's inertia" and by "depriving him of resources."[11]

O'Leary left Antioquia in the last week of November 1829, returning to his wife and young daughter in Bogotá.[12] Replacing him as the supreme governmental authority in Antioquia was Francisco Urdaneta, who took on both roles of governor and comandante de armas. Other El Santuario victors remained in Medellín with him; while there, Carmelo Fernández and Rupert Hand were both captivated by the beauty of Urdaneta's eldest daughter, Luisa.[13] As a long-term resident of the region, Urdaneta was less inclined than O'Leary to forget the past. He was particularly unhappy about the amnesty granted to Salvador Córdova and Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, and he sent "powerful reasons" to Bogotá explaining why they should not have been pardoned. On December 24, 1829, he informed Salvador Córdova that he was to be exiled for two years (an order that even before it was issued had been undermined by Bolívar's personal pardon).[14] Conflicts over notions of infringed sovereignty, foreignness, and the legitimacy of authority were never far from the surface during Urdaneta's governorship. The end of José María Córdova's political patronage, combined with the disruption of civil warfare, had plunged Córdova's supporters into economic as well as political difficulties. Sinforoso García took his anger out on the Spanish merchant Antonio Pasos in July 1830, accusing him in court of being a "foreign limpet" who had profited from internal New Granadan conflicts.[15] Violence was never far from the surface: court cases from these months include one relating to Sinforoso García punching Jaramillo's sister in the face as they came out of church after a Sunday mass.[16] Court records from the Rionegro

archives, apparently inconsequential and up to now ignored by historians, serve to reveal how the networks that had supported José María Córdova in 1829 now fell apart along seams of birth, identity, and authority. Most of the rebellion's most prominent survivors chose to withdraw from national and regional politics. Braulio Henao settled in Sonsón, married, and dedicated himself to agriculture and mining.[17] Others saw their retirement as more temporary: when Anselmo Pineda came out of hiding in Rionegro in early 1830, he retired to Marinilla "where I decided to wait for the right moment to cooperate actively in the triumph of the defenders of the legitimate government."[18]

The road through El Santuario was now plagued by bandits rather than soldiers. On November 1, 1830, the post was attacked at Paraje de Sauri, near Pozo on the Juntas road. The suspects, Antonio Maria Alzate and José María Alzate, had probably both served under José María Córdova the year before, as had many of those interviewed in the criminal investigation; 1,453 pesos were stolen from the post, and one of the postmen was knifed through the arm. The fear of ambush and loss of property preoccupied merchants and laborers alike.[19] The sensible thing was to withdraw from activity until things changed again. During 1830 Antioquians like Henao, Pineda, and Salvador Córdova recognized that the Bolivarians, or *serviles* as they were depreciatively called, were frantically trying to reimpose their power on Liberals, Radicals, or any form of political dissent. An anonymous opposition humorist characterized the government punishing its opponents with sadistic glee, declaring "Take this, you Liberal, with Shame and Confusion, For it is a Medicinal Punishment for your Vile Conspiracy, Against God and the Royal Throne." (The throne in question was an ironic reference to the monarchy project against which Córdova had pitted his rebellion.)[20] Government repression succeeded in establishing a central control of most provinces, but this often amounted only to a thin veneer of loyalty being thrown over tumultuous internal upheavals, and served to catalyze stronger resistance in the medium term.

This was certainly the case in Antioquia, where there was a rapid turnover of personnel in the governorship of Antioquia and the comandancia de armas, reflecting the difficulties the Bolivarian regime had in finding a candidate who would be accepted locally. Politics in Antioquia in early 1830 was a strained mesh of accommodation and resentment. Francisco Urdaneta left office in February 1830 but returned again in June 1830. Urdaneta's reemergence on the scene was greeted as "bad news" by some Medellín residents, who complained that he was well known for his "too recent" abuses of power, under which Antioquia "suffered even more than in the times of the Spanish reconquest." The spirit of compromise promoted by O'Leary and Bishop Garnica in late 1829 had unraveled by mid-1830. "How is it possible," it was asked, "that Antioquia has to suffer a chief we do not want?" A group of petitioners in Medellín claimed that they would accept "any commander at all, as long as it is not Francisco Urdaneta."[21]

Antioquians on all sides tried to expel political radicals from the region. Some radical priests were sent to Bogotá to answer for their political activities causing outcry among fellow clergymen.[22] Moderates worried that the power and influence of the Catholic Church would undermine Liberal institutional progress. As a letter signed by over 70 residents of Rionegro and Marinilla made clear, many of whose signatories had served under Córdova at El Santuario, "in this department the clergy has a great influence over the mass of the people, and the views of the priests are the views of the people."[23]

Resurgent Bolivarianism in Bogotá, 1830

Even before news of O'Leary's victory at El Santuario reached Bogotá, the government persecuted individuals known to have sympathized with Córdova. Foreign Secretary Vergara met with British Commissioner Campbell, and urged him to expel James Henderson "without causing disorder or disturbances."[24] Córdova's North American supporters did not wait for the results of the military campaign before they prepared to leave. William Harrison and his aides departed on October 19. James Henderson had already announced that he was "selling off his furniture and other effects at auction." In Guaduas Harrison learned of Córdova's defeat when they saw an envelope containing O'Leary's private dispatch to Rafael Urdaneta, "on the back of which was written "Defeat and death of Gen. Cordova."[25] Once they were back in the United States, their continued interest in El Santuario was motivated by the threat to William Harrison's reputation and political ambitions rather than Gran Colombian matters, to which they were largely indifferent.[26]

O'Leary's Official Report on the Battle of El Santuario reached Bogotá on October 30. The next day, US minister plenipotentiary Thomas Moore visited the Henderson family at home. He observed that "they were manifestly much distressed at the fate of Cordova, but not a harsh or indiscreet expression escaped the lips of one of them."[27] Although the Hendersons were now widely expected to leave Colombia immediately, they did not follow Harrison. Mary Henderson's "severe ill-health" was rumored to be the reason, but as she gave birth to a son in Bogotá in 1830, her advanced pregnancy was probably the (undisclosed) explanation.[28] The boy was named Domingo James Henderson, which suggests that James Henderson felt that he owed much to the protection of Vice President Domingo Caicedo. Caicedo had acted as Henderson's alibi for the September 1828 conspiracy and must have been instrumental in protecting the Henderson family from the new government backlash.[29] The Gran Colombian government was well aware of Henderson's involvement by this stage. Top-secret encrypted dispatches found by Daniel Gútierrez in the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations archive reveal the evidence collected against Henderson. The material, detailing "meetings, visits and activities" relating to the rebellion, was forwarded surreptitiously to Foreign Secretary Aberdeen in London.

Although no public pronunciations were made, Henderson became persona non grata in the capital.[30] His exposure marked the end of an era of official British representatives intervening directly in New Granadan sovereignty. The Hendersons finally left Bogotá in August 1830. On their way back to London they paused in New York, dining with contacts including the former US representative in Venezuela and Mexico, Joel Poinsett.[31] Their itinerary suggests the continued existence of an anti-Bolívar network, or at least some residual sympathy for Henderson from William Harrison's circles. They sailed from New York to Europe on October 16, 1830.[32] The Mexican representative José Antastasio Torrens also left Bogotá for the United States.[33]

Observers in Bogotá in the first six months of 1830 saw the beginning of the final disintegration of Gran Colombia. The first of the many nails hammered into the republic's coffin in these months was administered by José Antonio Páez in Caracas in January 1830. Reacting to news of the Antioquia rebellion of October 1829 (including Córdova's letter to him), and responding to the pleading of the economic and social elite in Caracas who could stand being ruled from Bogotá no more, Páez announced Venezuela's separation from Bolívar's republic.[34] It seems that British naval officers had foreseen the forthcoming fragmentation of Gran Colombia, and were currying favor with the successor states' most likely leaders. Páez had been strongly encouraged by the British Royal Navy officer in charge of the West India station, Admiral Fleeming, who visited Caracas in the week preceding the announcement and held a series of meetings with known secessionist conspirators.[35] Fleeming's intervention with Páez was kept even less secret than Henderson's links to Córdova. Fleeming's activities were a continuation of the informal naval diplomacy from the independence years before the arrival of official British ministers in South America. From March 1830 the New Granadan provinces began to follow Venezuela's lead with increasingly frequent rebellions against the central Gran Colombian state. In Bogotá, nevertheless, a curtailed assembly met to propose a compromise constitution (effectively to complete the work of the aborted Ocaña convention). Given that the republic for which it was designed ceased to exist soon after its work was completed, this is sometimes ironically called the "Admirable Congress." In April 1830 two moderate Bolivarians, Joaquin Mosquera and Domingo Caicedo, were elected as president and vice president. Some military officers, many of them Venezuelan, were unhappy when they saw that their political power and their privileges were being progressively shorn away, first with Bolívar's resignation in March, and then with the promotion of two New Granadans to executive authority in April. In an attempt to heal old wounds, which only succeeded in pouring oil on simmering resentments, Mosquera appointed some Liberals to cabinet positions. One of the appointees, Vicente Azuero, moved quickly to cut military privileges. On June 4, 1830, another step was added to the mountain of grudges and vendettas when Antonio José de Sucre, Bolívar's most-trusted general and friend, was assassinated in Berruecos on the road between Quito and Popayán. José María Obando was accused of being the intellectual author of the crime, though he angrily

denied any involvement.[36] Sucre's death catalyzed another wave of reprisals against the opposition.[37] Political tension often broke into violence in the streets of Bogotá; Manuela Sáenz brandished a rifle at anti-Bolivarians who threw rocks at her; and off-duty soldiers shouted political slogans at each other and brawled in the city center.[38]

In this atmosphere of open political conflict, shifting loyalties, and frequent rumors of conspiracy and insurrection, the foreign powers represented in Bogotá were courted and distrusted by the opposing sides.[39] British policy in Bogotá in early 1830 was hamstrung by the continued presence of the disgraced Henderson, and the strong association of Patrick Campbell with the aborted monarchy project. Both Campbell and Henderson publicly denied that they had intervened in local political affairs, though in private they criticized each other's inept interventions to third parties. Both men also knew that William Turner, previously the ambassador in Constantinople, was on his way to Bogotá to relieve them of their posts. (In an apparently unrelated cost-cutting initiative, Foreign Secretary Aberdeen had decided to abolish the post of consul general and leave Turner responsible for both political and commercial matters.) At the beginning of 1830, therefore, British prestige in Colombia was at a low point, which coincided with a hiatus in momentum while they waited for the new man to arrive, and low morale on the part of its representatives in Bogotá. When Turner arrived in Bogotá he was absolutely dismayed when faced with proof of these British interventions in local politics. On the third day in Bogotá he wrote to London that "in a country like this of which the inhabitants are too ignorant to understand the distinction between Acts performed in a public or private character, or to imagine that the proceedings of any man in a public situation however humble are not authorised by his government, I need not represent to your Lordship the mischief which such an opinion must produce."[40] Turner quickly discovered that "foreigner" was routinely used as an insult in Bogotá.[41] He had a second conversation with Bolívar on April 27, 1830, when they fed off each other's contagious pessimism. Bolívar told Turner that "he was deeply convinced that nothing but the interference of Europe could ever tranquillize the South American states."[42]

Turner made it a policy to defend Bolívar and his supporters at all costs. While he encouraged Bolivarian attempts to regain control of Gran Colombia's direction, he found that British prestige and influence had been exhausted by his predecessors. The representatives of other foreign powers found themselves in similar situations. William Harrison's replacement as US representative in Bogotá, Thomas Moore, similarly struggled to recompose US prestige. Harrison's supporters made things worse by alleging that Moore was a "contempt[able] hypocrite" who told stories of "his nights" pastime with his pimp, the young Bolivar.[43] Secretary of State Martin van Buren authorized Moore to flatter Bolívar as much as possible in order to secure "an entirely liberal and republican order." Moore felt, however, that the British were the principal obstacle to such a goal, writing in October 1830 that he feared British incursions on the sovereignty of Panama (part of

Gran Colombia), having received "strong indications [. . .] of a disposition to acquire an influence in it, fatal to its independence and prosperity, and wholly incompatible with the interests of every other nation having commercial relations with it."[44]

Not unrelated was the fact that a British subject had been appointed commander of the key fort of Chagres in Panama, in 1830; moreover, he was a British subject of Irish origin with a notorious history of interference in Gran Colombian affairs. This was Rupert Hand. Moore watched in horror as Rafael Urdaneta's regime "informed the world that Colombia looked to Great Britain for protection." Moore thought this catalyzed national feeling: "such sentiment thus expressed has had its full share in arousing this docile and amiable population."[45]

In late 1830 Bolívar had recognized that a sea change in the foreign powers' actions was taking place in Bogotá. He declared that Gran Colombia's future was that "once we've been eaten alive by every crime and extinguished by ferocity, the Europeans won't even bother to conquer us."[46] The British, French, and US representatives jockeyed for influence in Bogotá with the increasingly disorientated regime of Rafael Urdaneta. Accusations of conspiracy, fabrication, and negative briefing were made by all sides, and deliberately filtered into the international press.[47] Personal friendships and commitments meant that the foreign legations were divided along party lines and any coordinated policy or strategy floundered with each new piece of news.[48] Attempts to concentrate power in Bogotá as a response to separatist movements served to catalyze "a disastrous era" as Gran Colombia disintegrated into its constituent parts: the new republics of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador.[49]

The Victors from El Santuario in 1830

With Venezuela effectively separated from Gran Colombia in the first months of 1830, the remaining Bolivarians invested all their faith in Bolívar to put a brake on the growing influence of their personal and political enemies in Bogotá. On April 16, 1830, one of them, Carlos Castelli, wrote to Bolívar that "I will always strive to earn your approval and reach your standards."[50] Some of the victors of El Santuario had decided that their triumph in Antioquia would be ephemeral, and had accordingly jumped ship. Carmelo Fernández moved to Ecuador, out of reach of the opposition and the Bolivarians who no longer trusted him because of his kinship with Páez.[51] Thomas Murray went further, and was the first to associate himself with those he had defeated in 1829, and to attack his old comrades-in-arms who now held "humanity's God in their mouth, but a fratricidal dagger in their hand . . . [which they wielded] to assure them impunity for their terrible crimes."[52] Murray tried everything he could to win the protection of powerful opposition figures. He visited Rionegro on May 27, 1830, and went "to pay his respects" to Salvador Córdova, who was absent, causing Murray "due sadness."[53] Murray then proposed marriage to Dolores Estrada Callejas, Salvador Córdova's

second cousin.[54] This was a spectacular about-face, coming only nine months after the Battle of El Santuario where Murray had failed to protect José María Córdova's life, and had fought against the Córdovas, their family, and their supporters. It took Murray considerable efforts and many months to win the approval of the Córdova family.

Most of the El Santuario victors still remained loyal to Bolívar. Daniel O'Leary was increasingly a target for the anti-Bolivarians' ire, and Bolívar resolved to install him as the Gran Colombian ambassador to the United States so that he could weather the storm abroad. (The same post had been offered to José María Córdova in the last negotiations before the Battle of El Santuario.) But O'Leary's reputation and British prestige had both plummeted in the aftermath of the confused interventions of late 1829. An editorial in *El Demócrata* published on May 20, 1830, captures the reaction:

> This man [O'Leary], as well as being a foreigner, only stands out in our history for having killed a New Granadan hero. When it comes to manliness he lacks the principal qualities which are required for such a position [the ambassadorship], and indeed, his Britishness will probably make the North cautious about him. Is such a man adequate to represent our government in Washington? Sending him would be an insult to the people of North America! There are many worthy and capable Colombians who could do that job with honor, but the government must think them inept if they choose O'Leary first![55]

O'Leary withdrew his application for the position and began to prepare for exile. Meanwhile, rumors of the support that some British representatives had lent to anti-Bolívar projects in Venezuela and Cúcuta poured into the capital, making James Henderson's actions seem less exceptional, and harder to brush under the carpet.[56] The presence of foreigners was another touchstone for the escalation of political tension and the gradual recourse to arms. It was little surprise when, in August 1830, these various tensions and struggles stuttered into violence. Carlos Castelli and Florencio Jimenez led the Callao Battalion under their command in a pro-Bolivarian rebellion against President Mosquera's government in the nearby Cundinamarca mining town of Zipaquirá. Among their number was Dabney O. Carr.[57] Recognizing that they enjoyed only limited public support, Castelli and his rebels lay down their arms in return for an amnesty. All the rebels were pardoned on August 23, 1830: in addition to Carr and Castelli their numbers included an Irishman, Thomas Jackson, and an Englishman, John Johnston.[58] Their presence meant that Britain was accused of fomenting the Bolivarian rebellion, and Turner received death threats.[59] Quickly regrouping, Castelli launched another rebellion just four days later, correctly realizing that there were few units in Bogotá that would remain loyal to the government, regardless of public opinion at large. On August 27, 1830, Castelli was victorious at the Battle of Funza, in Cundinamarca outside Bogotá. Carr broke his left arm and left thigh in the battle, perhaps in a fall from a horse.[60] He died two weeks later.[61] The Battle of Funza opened the way for the pro-Bolívar

military forces, with Castelli at their head, to march into and occupy the capital on August 28, 1830, and restore military rule.[62] Castelli claimed that he had done everything he could to "economise on blood."[63] Joaquin Mosquera was compelled to resign from the presidency after just a few months in power and General Rafael Urdaneta took over as provisional president and dictator "until Bolívar could be persuaded to return to power, which he did not want to do."[64] On August 29, 1830, Castelli informed his "dear friend" O'Leary of the good news: the Bolivarians were back in government to save the nation's honor and glory.[65] On September 6, 1830, Castelli wrote to Bolívar himself (who was in Cartagena, having left Bogotá on May 8), telling him that the coup d'état was carried out by "a few old patriotic soldiers . . . whose only property was glory, the glory of the nineteenth-century . . . our victory has been so complete that even we can hardly believe it."

Castelli's loyalty was clearly to Bolívar rather than to the Gran Colombian state. He claimed that "we have acted with such care and delicacy that we did not mention your name at all until we were victorious, when we could no longer suppress the people's voice. Your name then resonated everywhere."[66] In the words of William Turner, "the triumph of the Liberator, without any effort or interference of his own, was complete and splendid."[67] Bolívar, however, was now far from Bogotá, and Rafael Urdaneta ruled as a dictator in his name. In October 1830 Castelli received his reward for his loyalty, being named comandante general del departamento de Antioquia and promoted to brigadier general. Castelli's star was in the ascendant thanks to his successful rebellion and his victory at Funza, and because other Bolivarians had deserted the cause (such as Murray or Salvador Córdova), or were dead (such as Sucre or José María Córdova) and so new opportunities were being opened at the same time as the competition for promotion diminished.[68] Rafael Urdaneta resolved to hold on to central power by destroying regional protests at their roots. In the case of Antioquia he believed that "there will be no peace whilst the Córdovas and the Jaramillos remain in Antioquia."[69] Sending Castelli back to Antioquia was part of this repressive strategy.

William Turner approved in private of the "firmness and prudence of General Urdaneta's government."[70] In public, however, Turner tried to avoid his predecessor's partiality and instead to follow his instructions to be "scrupulously careful to abstain from all improper interference."[71] William Turner could only watch as the consequences of his incapacity were played out in front of him. Perhaps drawing on his experience in Constantinople he lamented Bogotá's great distance from the threat of the Royal Navy that might have provided the British in the capital with "the moral protection which we might have derived from their Fear."[72] Turner also observed as the Congress approved a new Constitution that explicitly guarded against foreign interventions. Its second article could be read as an implicit response to British influence and the failed plans of 1829, declaring that "the Colombian nation is irrevocably free and independent of any power or foreign domination, and it is not, and it will never be, the patrimony of any family or person."[73]

Antioquia Rebels against the Bolivarians, Again

This thirst for sovereignty charged all the political rebellions of 1830. It reflected widespread awareness that the imperial threat now came from Britain and France rather than Spain. Salvador Córdova's resistance to central government in 1830 and 1831 shows how these claims worked in Antioquia.

During the first half of 1830 Salvador Córdova remained in Rionegro with his family. He corresponded with both Bolivarians and Liberals, and claimed to be content in his domestic situation. Yet his correspondents expected that it was "inevitable" that he would be "drawn back into war."[74] When news of Castelli's victory at the Battle of Funza reached Córdova in Antioquia, Córdova offered his services to the new governor, Alejandro Vélez, to defend President Mosquera's "legitimate" government against the "usurping" dictatorship that had replaced it in Bogotá. Vélez twice declined Córdova's offers. Córdova's public eagerness to take up arms again was seen by many as a mistake. The new bishop of Antioquia, Juan de la Cruz Gomez Plata, wrote to Córdova on October 12, 1830, that he was "amazed": "What, I asked myself, surely this is not the same Coronel Córdova, the brave, loyal friend of liberty; the terror of tyrants and usurpers . . . surely he has not turned his innocent sword to the cause of crime, against the Constitution that he swore to uphold?" The bishop questioned Córdova's assumption that Urdaneta's regime was "illegitimate" and that to fight against it would be to continue the struggle for Independence. The bishop argued that continued revolutions would "open deep wounds within the patria" and "expose the nation to disappearing once again from the face of the earth."[75]

At the same time as Córdova first explicitly condemned Urdaneta's regime in Bogotá, that same government was naming Carlos Castelli as domandante de armas of Antioquia, thus setting in march the clash of individuals that would shape Antioquia's relations with Bogotá for the next six months. Castelli was not a choice likely to foment compromise or accommodation. Because of his role at El Santuario in 1829, Castelli had a reputation in Antioquia that did not endear him to Salvador Córdova or his supporters. When Castelli arrived in Medellín in mid-November 1830, he immediately wrote to O'Leary revealing that he had discovered that "Salvador Córdova was plotting a revolution in Rionegro and Barbosa, which I uncovered just in time."[76] Castelli deliberately tried to confront Córdova before he had time to capitalize on his local support and mobilize resistance. When Castelli found Córdova in Barbosa and drew up his troops outside the town, Córdova accused him of "trying to start a civil war" and "disturbing the tranquillity that Antioquia and I have both returned to." "If you take one more step towards me," Córdova threatened, "you will discover the superiority of the free man over the slave."[77]

Both sides mobilized recruits and gathered weapons and resources, but at this stage, there was no set-piece battle, no repeat of El Santuario where Córdova could avenge his brother's death. Instead Córdova recognized that

he was still unprepared, so he turned and fled. Castelli pursued him for three days across the mountains until he finally caught him hiding in a peasant's house, and took him in chains to Medellín.[78] Thus the first stage of Castelli's plan to suppress opposition to his authority was completed.[79] Castelli then exiled Manuel Antonio Jaramillo and Vicente Córdova (who headed for the United States) and imprisoned Anselmo Pineda (who had accused Castelli of being a "tyrant" whose "clumsy efforts, arbitrariness and butchery were notorious") as well as Córdova's mother and her daughters.[80] Castelli wanted to shoot Salvador Córdova there and then in Medellín in November 1830, but was persuaded to follow the correct legal procedures, which delayed the execution. It is possible that Francisco Urdaneta, whom Castelli had replaced, was one of those who interceded with the Italian on Córdova's behalf.[81] Salvador Córdova was thus still in jail in Medellín in January 1831 when news of Simón Bolívar's death reached Antioquia. Seething with anger and grief at the death of his friend and leader, Castelli published a furious proclamation in which he blamed "the envy, ambition and ingratitude" of Bolívar's rivals (the Córdova brothers went unnamed) for pushing the libertador to his death. Castelli raged that "the murder is consummated; it will be hard to forgive them!"[82]

Castelli then resolved to send his prisoner to Cartagena, where he expected Córdova to be executed by the still staunchly Bolivarian regional government in power there. Perhaps Castelli hoped that sending Salvador Córdova to his death would quench some of his mourning for Bolívar; certainly he wanted to use Córdova as an example to scare Antioquians against further rebellion. In early March 1831 Córdova was paraded in chains through Medellín, Rionegro, and Marinilla but this crude humiliation, according to J. M. Restrepo, "caused great indignation rather than the intended terror."[83] Such was the popular support for Salvador Córdova that he was easily able to escape his sympathetic guards on March 14, 1831, and then began to formally organize resistance to Castelli's rule in the eastern mountains of Antioquia. For many, Bolívar's death had removed any justification for Rafael Urdaneta's continued rule in Bogotá, and it provided the final stimulus for provincial rebellions. Throughout this short conflict, Córdova stressed the continuity of his fight for Liberty against the tyranny of outsiders who, he claimed, wished to enslave him and his *patria*. Córdova was joined by Mariano Ospina Rodriguez (who had operated as his brother's political secretary in 1829) and they maximized Córdova's political support and public antipathy toward the "vile adventurer" Castelli. For Salvador Córdova in 1831, Castelli epitomized foreign infringements on popular sovereignty in Antioquia in the same way that Bolívar and O'Leary had done for his brother in 1829.[84]

The rallying cry of infringed sovereignty, according to historian Fernando Botero Herrera, was crucial in persuading Antioquians to recognize the legitimacy of Salvador Córdova's armed uprising. Castelli was an easy scapegoat as not only was he Italian and "arrogant" but he had also threatened to execute Salvador Córdova's mother, a "defenseless" woman.[85] Even so,

Córdova still had difficulty in recruiting soldiers to his army; he had to issue a decree ordering that any man who did not turn up to the selection lottery would be declared a soldier by default, hunted down, "and taken straight to the barracks."[86] Ordinary Antioquians were loath to take up arms against Bogotá so soon after the 1829 defeat. Some of his old comrades from the El Santuario came back voluntarily at Córdova's request, including Francisco Escalante, Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, and Anselmo Pineda. (Castelli had imprisoned Pineda in Medellín but he escaped and was able to rejoin Salvador Córdova in Barbosa on April 8, 1831).[87] Córdova recognized Pineda as "one of the foremost defenders of liberty" who had been forced out of his job because of his "highly liberal opinions," and was glad to welcome him into his army.[88]

An anonymous poem published in this period gives us an insight into the significance that the resentment of the foreigners at El Santuario had in attracting Antioquians to Salvador Córdova's cause in 1831. In this poem, a "young Antioquian" (who is easily identified as José María Córdova) had risen up against the "horrors of tyranny and despotism which enslaved my patria." Against him were sent

> A troop of infamous foreigners,
> Who were slaves of power, but tyrants too.
> At the head of the poor and timid citizens,
> They marched proud and arrogant.
> Ignorance, fear and ambition
> Guided their fratricidal battalions
> To the sad field of El Santuario
> Where a thousand precious lives were lost.
> Brave resistance was overcome by
> The fury of the mercenary chief [Daniel O'Leary].
> Granadan blood flowed in torrents,
> And the degraded son of Albion was victorious
> The patria howled as the world looked on,
> And at the hands of a corrupted coward [Rupert Hand],
> The hero died in a humble hut.

The poet, "eyewitness of these sad events," goes on to tell the story of his escape and seclusion in the "harsh mountains amongst the beasts, away from the victor's rage." This suggests that the poet was either Anselmo Pineda or Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, both of whom published a lot, and who wrote poetry. Regardless of the exact authorship, the poem clearly indicates a direct link between the experience of defeat in 1829 and the return to arms in 1831. The third and final stanza reflects and exhorts the reader to fight again:

> The hero's brother has raised his name and the standard of liberty,
> Called to arms by the people.
> Let us avenge our comrades' deaths,
> Let us rebel in the name of the patria,

And on our hero's tomb, swear to be faithful to the law
[. . .]
Let us fly to the struggle
With freedom on our lips
We will need to be brave,
But we have examples enough
To inspire us.[89]

Carlos Castelli was the principal target of these emotive calls, but Francisco Urdaneta's birth elsewhere was also attacked. His alleged lack of patriotism was conflated with cowardice. For Salvador Córdova's supporters, the resistance against Castelli and Urdaneta was based on a call to expel foreign infringement of the people's sovereignty.[90] It is a clear example of what historians Thibaud and Calderón have called the "redefinition of the community of identity" at the end of the Gran Colombian period as "a local-foreigner dichotomy."[91]

The first military encounter between Córdova's rebels and Castelli's forces took place at 2:00 a.m. on April 2, 1831, at Yolombó, northeastern Antioquia. Despite being outnumbered two-to-one, Córdova was victorious and was able to capture the enemy unit's chief, the Antioquian-born comandante Miguel Alzate, who had served under O'Leary at El Santuario in 1829.[92] Alzate now joined Córdova's forces. There followed ten days of marching and skirmishes as the two leaders attempted to position their troops for the forthcoming battle. In this way they were both trying to avoid emulating the mess that José María Córdova had made of his preparations for the Battle of El Santuario. Indeed the Battle of Abejorral was set up to be a direct repetition of the Battle of El Santuario 18 months earlier, with outnumbered and improvised Antioquian rebels taking on the experienced veterans of the Gran Colombian army led by a European commander. On the afternoon of April 13, 1831, however, Córdova captured 68 prisoners and 100 rifles in a preliminary skirmish. The next morning Córdova led his troops to the strong defensive positions from which he had dislodged the enemy the previous day.

At 8:00 a.m. on April 14, 1831, according to Salvador Córdova's official account, Castelli drew up his forces opposite these positions and shouted out to him. There was no offer of negotiation, however: Castelli simply declared that any prisoners taken after the battle would be executed. The battle lasted an hour and a half. Key to Córdova's victory was the infantry charge led by two turncoats, Teniente Miguel Hoyos who had served under O'Leary at El Santuario, and Teniente Bibiano Robledo, the officer who had been Córdova's prison guard only a month before. Castelli fled the battlefield and Córdova invited all the defeated troops and officers to join his forces, which most of them did. The battle left 15 dead and 21 wounded.[93] That same afternoon Castelli was captured at nearby La Ceja and escorted to Rionegro. Roles were reversed and this time it was the Antioquian rebels, not the government forces, who were victorious. After his victory at the Battle of Abejorral,

Coronel Salvador Córdova published a single-sheet-printed "Proclamation." Independence had been achieved at last, he exclaimed in delight. At the top of the page was an engraved image of a bare-chested indigenous chief celebrating the departure of a Spanish galleon.[94]

Beneath this powerful representation of independence, Córdova proclaimed that "it is not long since the tyrants dragged me away in chains. Today I greet you in rapturous victory. . . . having rid the Department of a vile adventurer's greed; it is now your duty to treat the wounds which his leprous claws have ripped open in the flesh of our oppressed brothers, and in the heart of our enslaved patria." Addressing his soldiers, he concluded: "I have unsheathed the sword belonging to your friend the General [José María Córdova]; its prestige and its valour have defeated the satellites of servitude in three consecutive battles, capturing Castelli the adventurer, thirteen of his officers, their troops and their weapons."[95]

In this proclamation Salvador Córdova displayed his awareness of the continuity of his struggle with that of his brother, "reconstructing the struggle for freedom from tyranny in the name of the people."[96] He was proud that the tables had now been completely turned. Córdova, who had been imprisoned and nearly executed by Castelli in November 1830, had attracted most of Castelli's soldiers to his own side (like Alzate and Robledo). Córdova's biographers revel in his gentlemanly treatment of the prisoners, in contrast to what they see as O'Leary's extrajudicial execution of José María Córdova in 1829, and Castelli's own attempts to have Salvador Córdova executed in 1830. Salvador Córdova himself consciously emphasized the humanity of his actions: he kept Castelli prisoner in a comfortable house, and rather than torturing him, Córdova sent his own wife to serve Castelli's food on a silver platter.[97] On April 15, 1831, the day after the battle, Castelli was able to write from his prison to Francisco Urdaneta. Castelli observed that

> here there are rumours that you are going to lead an expedition to try to liberate me, and this news has created some alarm . . . I suggest that, whether you were planning to or not, you instead stay in Medellín and come to an agreement with Córdova in order to avoid spilling any more blood, and to protect the well-being of all parties.[98]

Córdova later remembered that he had acted with "great generosity, when if I'd wanted to, I could have shot him without any reprisals at all."[99] Urdaneta chose to follow Castelli's advice and gave himself up to Córdova on April 18, 1831, when the victorious forces entered Medellín.[100] With Castelli in prison, Salvador Córdova's ascendancy in Antioquia was confirmed. He added the Battle of Abejorral to the Battle of Ayacucho on his service record, claiming that both had been for the same cause—to expel foreign interventions from national sovereignty in Antioquia. Francisco Montoya was named as the new governor of Antioquia, with Salvador Córdova remaining as comandante de armas. Córdova's power in Antioquia seemed to be assured, with the Bolivarians vanquished and expelled from the region, and peace once more

established. To cement his popular support Córdova publicly exposed the "crimes" of Castelli's administration. He began legal proceedings against Castelli for allowing his troops to steal tobacco in the village of La Ceja during the military campaign. Local people were called to give testimony. Francisco José Marulanda asserted that Castelli had "let his troops break into several houses and take out anything they wanted or needed." A shopkeeper, Carlos Londoño, stated that "everyone saw Carlos Castelli and several of his men knock over people who got in the way" of their sacking and looting. Castelli was duly found guilty after an investigation lasting over a year, though as he never returned to Antioquia, he was not punished. Castelli's legal trial was a largely symbolic demonstration of the extent of Salvador Córdova's power in the province.[101]

After the Battle of Abejorral, Salvador Córdova sent Anselmo Pineda to deliver the news in person to Bogotá, and he wrote to other leaders informing them of his victory. One of the first to learn of the victory was José María Obando, at that time in Caloto, Cauca. On hearing that Córdova had Castelli in his power, Obando urged him to "Kill this evil foreigner! Shoot him, Shoot him, Shoot him!"[102] Pineda arrived in the capital in early May after a fortnight's journey over the Andes.[103] He discovered that Córdova's campaigns in Antioquia had not quite been in vain, but that negotiations for Rafael Urdaneta to resign were already highly advanced even before the Battle of Abejorral had been fought.

Removing Bolivarianism from Bogotá

On April 15, 1831 (the day after the battle), Domingo Caicedo had already reassumed his constitutional rule as vice president, and had indeed already named Salvador Córdova to replace Carlos Castelli as comandante general de armas de Antioquia.[104] In his inaugural speech to Congress, made several months later, Caicedo praised the "splendid victories of Abejorral and Cerinza," which had "confirmed" the triumph of "the sacred cause of liberty" and saved the country from "rightful anarchy and terrible desolation."[105] Despite British minister Turner's alarmism ("How the new government is to stand I cannot imagine; the Treasury is without a dollar and they are surrounded by officers and soldiers clamorous for pay and rations"[106]), Caicedo's coalition provided "a more or less peaceful transition to a post-Bolivarian era." On April 28, 1831, the Apulo Agreement was signed between the various competing factions (this was still a few days before Pineda reached Bogotá with news of Córdova's capture of Castelli), which guaranteed that there would be no reprisals and that all military officers would retain their current posts and ranks.[107] US minister in Bogotá Thomas Moore felt vindicated: "You will recollect that I informed you last September that the English (with scarcely an exception) had embarked boldly in the revolution, and that a day of retribution would come. It has come, and from being masters of everything, they will be deprived of all, and be obliged to endure the bitterest persecution."[108]

After keeping Castelli prisoner for over two months while he waited for news from Pineda in Bogotá, in June 1831 Córdova sent him to be tried in the capital for treason. Córdova published a proclamation claiming that "in cold blood I would not shed the blood of any man, no matter how much of a criminal he was, without due legal process, so I resisted the people's calls, and withstood their sarcasm and accusations of weakness."[109]

On July 13, 1831, Castelli passed through Honda in handcuffs on his way to Bogotá.[110] His guards were ordered to keep Castelli in chains at all times because, according to the Minister of War Obando, "he is a very dangerous prisoner, not because we particularly wish to torture him."[111] Presumably they also wished to avoid Castelli following in Córdova's footsteps again, this time by escaping his prison guards and launching another rebellion. Castelli's "foreignness" was crucial in signalling his politics as dangerous, as Vicente Azuero and others wrote at the time.[112]

Within three days of his arrival in Bogotá, Castelli had been tried for "conspiracy" and sentenced to death by a secret military tribunal. His execution was scheduled for the very next morning, August 12, 1831. Joaquin Posada Gutierrez, who was one of Obando's confidantes at the time, recalled that the speed of these proceedings caused "a great sensation" in Bogotá, with the elite worrying that Castelli's execution might open the floodgates for a wave of related political executions. Castelli's death would also have had international repercussions. The British and French ministers wrote to the vice president to defend the rights of "an unprotected foreigner."[113] William Turner defended his intervention by stressing that Castelli was "a subject of an ally of his sovereign." He urged Caicedo not to "sanction a system of political vengeance . . . outraging the feelings of all the Nations of the Civilised world and thereby seriously compromising the honor of the republic."[114] Castelli's dual identity, as a Gran Colombian officer and subject of the king of Piedmont, undoubtedly saved his skin on this occasion, just as it had antagonised Antioquians and got him into the mess in the first place. Public opinion and diplomatic pressure in Bogotá demanded that Castelli have access to proper legal proceedings, and so Obando reluctantly agreed to take the prisoner from his cell and pass him in front of an ad hoc court-martial. Taking advantage of a momentary relaxation of his prison conditions, Castelli was able to sneak out of his prison and race across the plaza to the cathedral, where he sought and was granted asylum.[115] Obando was dismayed at the limits placed on his power to punish the Bolivarian victors of the battles of El Santuario and Funza, having thought that as a foreigner Castelli would have been the ideal scapegoat as the physical incarnation of the defeats Obando sought to avenge. Obando reluctantly had Castelli's sentence commuted to exile, and sent him to prison in Cartagena "where he should be held as long as the country's political circumstances make it necessary."[116]

The threat of Bolivarian counterrevolution now receded. Thomas Murray recognized the extent of Salvador Córdova's dominance and wrote repeatedly seeking his blessing. Murray's tone was excruciatingly humble and obsequious, writing with "sincerity beyond description" and sending "a thousand

regards to you, sir, and all your family, and all those who are fortunate enough to deserve the name Córdova." In his letters to Salvador Córdova, which tried to bridge the chasm opened up by their participation on opposite sides at the Battle of El Santuario, Murray tried to portray himself as a hard-line Liberal, for whom "half-measures will destroy us."[117] In a similar line, in Bogotá Murray courted José María Obando assiduously, guessing that Obando's protonationalist appeal for New Granadan patriotism would bring him considerable political influence.[118]

By courting Obando, Thomas Murray was several steps ahead of official British policy in Colombia. Under William Turner, British policy remained to support the Bolivarians in private and to pin all hopes on their return to power. When faced with the collapse of Gran Colombia and the regional conflicts that prefigured its disintegration, Turner had no option but to observe events from a vantage point of minimal influence, British prestige having been squandered by Henderson's involvement with Córdova, and Campbell (and later Turner's) close association with the Bolivarians. Ironically, had he remained in the country James Henderson would now have been in a good position to exploit the gratitude of José María Córdova's old comrades-in-arms, who were now in power.

With constitutional rule restored in April 1831, the veterans of the losing side at El Santuario were in the ascendance and began legal battles to restore their reputations. One of these was Anselmo Pineda, fresh from his service in the victorious rebel army at Abejorral and his role as Córdova's personal emissary to Bogotá. On May 25, 1831, Pineda was restored to his job as the treasury administrator in Medellín. He began a lengthy pamphlet dispute with the boss who had sacked him in 1829, José Prieto. Pineda employed rhetoric that echoed Salvador Córdova's proclamations, repeatedly stating that his struggle was not personal but "national" and directed against the "foreigners" and "usurpers" who sought to dominate the republic's politics.[119] There was some resistance to this attitude. An anonymous poem published in 1831 advised that

> A true liberal should love all men, who are good and honorable,
> Without wondering and questioning where they were born.
> He who proudly displays his pure, pure patriotism,
> Whilst breathing provincialism, and persecuting foreigners
> He is a perfidious fraudster.[120]

Pineda's concerns were, however, shared by the Liberals who increasingly dominated the constitutional government in Bogotá after mid-1831. Many of the remaining Bolivarians were pursued and captured or chased into exile. Castelli, as we saw above, was bundled off to Cartagena after narrowly avoiding execution. There were scores to be settled and revenge to be taken for past misdemeanors, and so the whereabouts and activities of foreign Bolivarians like Rupert Hand suddenly became important again. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of El Santuario, Rupert Hand had

been promoted (rather than censured), and sent to the Chocó as provincial governor. He was then ordered to Panama where he was named military governor of Chagres and served for over a year. Hand acted as a prison guard for over 20 political prisoners, who in July 1831 rose up and overthrew him (denouncing him as an unwelcome foreign intruder), proclaiming Panama's opposition to the increasingly precarious Bolivarian regime in Bogotá (it had already fallen by the time news of events in Panama reached Bogotá).[121] Hand was sent to Cartagena in chains, where he was formally arrested and charged with the murder of José María Córdova. He was still in chains in a dungeon of the San Felipe castle when he was joined by his old colleague Castelli, who had just arrived from Bogotá. Hand spent almost two years in this jail: the story of his imprisonment (told in the next chapter) reveals the contradictory mess of foreign influences in early 1830s New Granada. By the time of Hand's arrest in mid-July 1831, relations between the British and US ministries in Bogotá had completely broken down. The US representative Moore was secretly informing the New Granadan government that the British had been plotting to install a military dictatorship. Worse, Moore alleged that Turner had called the locals "animals, savages, pirates and assassins," and that this was one explanation for the "deep and bitter feeling that exists here against the English."[122] While Turner focused his hopes on the Bolivarians, Moore had thrown in his lot with the Liberals. In August 1831 Turner wrote to Palmerston lamenting "the melancholy history of this ruined country since the time of my arrival."[123]

Yet by October 1831, two years of civil conflict, repeated rebellions, and considerable governmental turnover were drawing to an end. Military dictatorship had been overthrown, the Republic of Gran Colombia had collapsed as a meaningful entity, and the Republic of New Granada had been inaugurated. The year 1832 brought constitutional rule, to be studied in the next chapter, which would be marked by the return of Francisco de Paula Santander from exile and his election to the presidency of New Granada in 1833. In the next four years Liberal ideas were put into practice in the realms of education, taxation, and institutional reform. Some Liberals came to see 1831 as the year New Granada had won its independence from Venezuelan rule.[124] From 1832, the victors of El Santuario were cast out into exile, and the defeated survivors finally gained the status and the legitimacy they had fought for in 1829 and 1831. Foreign powers began to rethink and reconfigure their interventions in New Granadan politics. The agents of the sharp end of "informal imperialism" (most notably James Henderson, Daniel O'Leary, and Rupert Hand) had been forced out of the country. They were replaced by a long-lasting official policy of neglect and indifference toward New Granadan affairs, whose flipside featured occasional and unconvincing imperialistic gestures such as blockades, gunboats, and threats of warfare.

Many of the Bolivarians were sent into exile by Obando in late 1831 and early 1832, and the poorer ones apparently left Bogotá, "on foot, with their bags on their shoulders, asking for alms."[125] Some withdrew from public society, and hence from known archival records. Eventually, on January 23,

1832, José María Obando formalized the exile of the military Bolivarians by ordering the expulsion of a large group including O'Leary, who had already left, Crofton, who subsequently disappears from our story, and Carlos Castelli, who was already in jail in Cartagena.[126] Obando did not include Rupert Hand on his list of exiles because he fully expected him to be found guilty of the murder of José María Córdova, and sentenced to death. Hand's trial began in August 1831.

Chapter 6

Trials and Exiles

This chapter examines the two years after the disintegration of Gran Colombia. It was a time of recriminations and persecutions as a post-Bolívar order was painfully constructed, and finally concluded when former vice president Francisco de Paula Santander returned from exile in 1832, and was elected president of New Granada in 1833. (He had spent the years 1830–32 in Europe and North America, where he met crucial political figures of the period such as Jeremy Bentham).

The central figure of this chapter is Rupert Hand. In 1831 he was arrested for the murder of José María Córdova, and was imprisoned in Cartagena. His trial lasted two years, and his cellmates during that time included Carlos Castelli and the French consul, Adolph Barrot. He finally escaped from jail in August 1833, during the chaos caused by slave and military rebellions. All the other protagonists from El Santuario were related to Hand's trial. Many were called as witnesses; others tried to exploit proceedings for their own benefit. Tumultuous political changes at local, regional, and international levels shaped the trial and its consequences. The trajectories of the Antioquian veterans display how the oppositional El Santuario line-up of rebels against Bolivarians had been shattered by 1833. There is no better example of the reconfiguration of loyalties along personal and ideological lines than the case of Thomas Murray, who in this period became a civil servant at the Ministry of War, and who worked against his former comrades-in-arms. His work aided that of Liberals in Cartagena, who allied with those defeated in Antioquia in 1829 and saw the trial as a test case for asserting New Granadan sovereignty against foreigners, and against the machinations of empires.[1] The subjects of those empires in New Granada were also divided in these years, in the wake of El Santuario. Divisions between pro- and anti-Bolivarians restricted US and British actions, in particular. Nevertheless, as the chapter repeatedly demonstrates, the foreign community often acted together, and was often perceived as homogenous by New Granadans. New Granadan sovereignty was, therefore, defined and developed in relation to external actors.

New Granadans learned to manipulate the foreigners in their midst in this period; the limits of empire were becoming clearer to all concerned. When Santander returned from exile he was in a position to manage foreign pressure and petitions on his own terms. In part this was because many of his political enemies from the late 1820s, including most of the Bolivarians from El Santuario, were dead, in jail, or in exile. Hand's escape was a fortuitous affair that illustrates the many diplomatic, social, ethnic, and imperial conflicts that affected the newly independent New Granada in the aftermath of the disintegration of Bolívar's Gran Colombia.

Bolivarian Exiles

The fallout from the Battle of El Santuario plagued British diplomatic efforts in New Granada throughout these years. It left British operations bereft of the experience and contacts that James Henderson had accumulated over six years in Bogotá, and also removed Daniel O'Leary from the scene, depriving the British of the privileged access to the highest offices to which they had become accustomed. Henderson left the diplomatic service, and moved to Madrid, where he published several treatises on British-Spanish-South American relations. (Fanny Henderson went with him, and in 1836 married a lawyer called Pritchard. She returned a portrait of José María Córdova to his family in Rionegro.[2]) British diplomacy was now in the hands of William Turner in Bogotá, but most of the real action took place in the Caribbean port of Cartagena, where (as discussed below) British interventions were always chaotic, sometimes criminal, and occasionally comical.

Like Richard Crofton, Daniel O'Leary spent time in Cartagena before going into exile. When he received the news of Bolívar's death in December 1830 he felt he had lost "a chief, a father, a guide and a friend."[3] He preempted his expulsion, leaving his wife and children in Cartagena, and arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on May 8, 1831.[4] The island had been hit hard by the commercial dislocation of the Wars of Independence. Six months after O'Leary's arrival in Jamaica, a rebellion of slaves began in the west of the island. The rebellion was followed by a period of counterrevolutionary state violence against black people, of whom 312 were executed.[5]

For O'Leary exile in Jamaica was a relief from the chaos of political instability in which he had been enmeshed. During the previous years his loyalties had oscillated wildly. In 1828 he had told his wife that "I dream of abandoning my career and going to live on an island where I would see no one but you."[6] By the time he went into exile on an island he had developed profound hostility toward some of the principal political figures in Colombia, particularly Santander, and his hatred was often reciprocated. He was disillusioned with republicanism and exasperated by his peers' political ambition. Exile in Jamaica gave a new "burst of energy" as he sought to carve himself a new identity as a father and a historian.[7] His time in Jamaica, in particular the experience of exile and of social upheaval in the British colony, turned him from Bolívar's propagandist and an antiquarian (he had been collecting artifacts

and documents for over a decade) into Bolívar's historian.[8] It was in Jamaica that he wrote the first draft of his *Narración* and where he collected most of the documents that were later published as his multivolume *Memorias*.[9] On his way into exile in 1831 O'Leary told his brother-in-law that Bolívar had "authorised me to [write his biography] in the last days of his life."[10]

In Gran Colombia O'Leary had been doubly an insider. He had enjoyed some prestige as being the subject of the powerful British monarch added to his privileged access to Bolívar. But now in Jamaica he was doubly an outsider, as a political exile from Gran Colombia, and as an Irish English-speaker who had spent 11 years away from British (colonial) life.[11] He did not view Jamaica as a step closer to the land of his birth, and he had few friends to support him. By now O'Leary and his wife had three children, Soledad (known as "Mimi," born in Bogotá in 1828), Simón Bolívar (born in Bogotá in early 1830), and Bolivia (born in Cartagena de Indias in early 1831). The names the O'Learys gave to their second and third children demonstrate their continued loyalty to and affection for Bolívar. When Soledad and the children finally joined him in Kingston on November 15, 1831, O'Leary worried that he had been neglecting his paternal duties, describing the children as "uncivilised and crazy."[12] Linked to his fears for his children was his increasing interest in matters of religion, which seems to have grown in Jamaica, perhaps influenced by the prominent role of missionaries in promoting the abolition of slavery on the island. In the early chapters of the *Narración* O'Leary was at pains to stress his own religious belief, often in contrast to Bolívar's agnosticism or atheism, and it is possible that his faith provided some consolation to counteract his profound skepticism and disillusion with the Gran Colombian republican experiment.[13]

In Jamaica O'Leary sat down to write an unashamedly Bolivarian history, where "the friends of Bolívar were the friends of the *patria*."[14] O'Leary was engaged in what Luis Castro Leiva labelled "Bolivarian historicism," where Bolívar was cast as the protagonist of every positive that came out of independence, and where much effort was made to exculpate him from every negative.[15] O'Leary's account conforms with Germán Carrera Damas' analysis of the origins of the "Bolivarian cult," in which "Bolívar is not only the principal actor in the process of independence, but also its most reliable witness."[16]

As he started writing, O'Leary set out his intentions: "I want my narrative of the Liberator's life to be correct and impartial. I do not intend to tell stories or romances. I know General Bolívar's character defects, and I do not contemplate hiding them." Nevertheless, his overriding aim was to "defend Bolívar's reputation."[17] The *Narración* maintained an optimistic emphasis on the achievements of independence, especially in terms of the abolition of slavery and religious tolerance. These achievements "cast the crimes into shade."[18] Bolívar came to symbolize the uninhibited idealism that O'Leary remembered with such nostalgia from his own youth, noting that "there is no error more worthy of indulgence than one which hopes for honorable behaviour from human nature."[19]

Distant from friends and family, and a witness to social disorder and government repression, O'Leary felt uncomfortable in "horrible, deformed" Kingston.[20] O'Leary's dislocation was reflected by the uncertainty he displayed in choosing in which language to write; his "Original Manuscript" begins in English and continues in Spanish after only the first few chapters. O'Leary quickly expanded upon his ambitions to write a biography of Bolívar, and decided to write a life and times. He had a good eye for detail, and his writings contain unique insights, for example, on Bolívar's shaving technique, or what he was like as a friend.[21] O'Leary also took account of the privations of the common soldiers, refusing to blame them for deserting amid terrible conditions.[22] He took care to praise the British adventurers he had served alongside, asking "Was there any battlefield upon which the independence of America was won, where the bravery of Albion's sons did not shine, and where their blood was not shed?"[23]

In his narrative O'Leary rebutted all claims that Bolívar had ever contemplated crowning himself emperor, not only in 1829 but also at any other moment when he might have refused crowns, no matter how symbolically.[24] No doubt the memory of Córdova's rebellion against the monarchy plan shaped O'Leary's view here. Furthermore, and in competition with other memorialists, O'Leary decided to make himself the physical repository of Bolívar's memory. O'Leary requested documents from friends and contacts which would ultimately be published in his *Memorias*.[25] It was in Kingston that he and Juan de Francisco Martín took delivery of the ten chests full of Bolívar's archive, which they divided between themselves for safekeeping and editing.[26]

Rupert Hand in Jail in 1831

Rupert Hand did not get the opportunity to go into exile in 1831. Posted to Panama in 1830, Hand was working first as an assistant to the governor, and then as comandante general in Chagres. In mid-1831 he was arrested and transported to Cartagena, where he spent the next two years in jail (his time there was almost exactly contemporaneous with O'Leary's exile in Jamaica). When Hand first arrived in Cartagena he became a *cause celebre* among the foreign community resident in the port, who were amazed and dismayed at his fall from grace. During his time in Panama, Hand had corresponded with and assisted foreign merchants in their attempts to trade on favorable terms with local merchants. All of them had links with nearby Cartagena. The commercial community represented by the foreign consuls (not only the British) in Cartagena, therefore, had personal interests in seeking his liberation.[27] Their efforts were unsuccessful, however. Hand's trial, which lasted from his arrival in chains in Cartagena on August 12, 1831, through to August 8, 1833, was politically charged throughout.[28] Competing regional and national jurisdictions caused numerous new testimonies to be requested as each sought to exert its own influence over such a high-profile prisoner. Those who might have been sympathetic to Hand

found that they lacked political leverage to quicken the pace. It was widely suspected that diplomatic pressure would be exerted until Hand could be freed on a technicality. But the new regional administration headed by General Ignacio Luque was put under pressure by Obando in Bogotá to find Hand guilty and make the foreigner a scapegoat for the Bolivarians' crimes. Some had personal reasons to convict Hand. The new comandante general of the Magdalena under the restored constitutional government was José María Montoya, a childhood friend of the Córdova brothers in Rionegro, and the son of Francisco Montoya, the merchant and financier who now governed Antioquia as prefect in alliance with Salvador Córdova, the comandante de armas. In a gesture that underlines the supremely symbolic nature of Hand's capture and trial, José María Montoya sent a package from Cartagena to Salvador Córdova in Rionegro. It contained Hand's sword (the sword that had killed José María Córdova) that Montoya had broken in two.[29]

The new Luque/Montoya government in Cartagena engaged in more than just symbolic acts, however. Luque immediately expelled the British consul Edward Watts from Cartagena, accusing him of having collaborated with the government forces that Luque had fought against and defeated in April 1831.[30] Luque explained Watts' expulsion on the basis that the consul had shown a pronounced "spirit of partiality" during the siege of Cartagena by rebel forces: he had encouraged British subjects to volunteer on the government side, and had defied the siege by passing on communications and giving British flags to any vessel that wanted to maintain commercial relations with Jamaica.[31] Lord Palmerston, the foreign secretary, reading the charges back in London, noted in the margin: "It seems to me that these charges amount to little or nothing."[32] Yet Watt's expulsion, and the consequent power struggle within the British community in Cartagena, undermined diplomatic efforts to free Hand. Liberals in Cartagena saw that Hand's trial would be a test case in which the republic could assert its power over meddling foreigners. A spoof "Confession of Roberto Hand [*sic*]" was published, which revelled at the prisoner's plight, having him declare "Yes! I killed him [Córdova] in cold blood in order to sate my bestial desires and to please the tyrant." With deep irony, the publication thanked the people of Cartagena for allowing Hand to "convalesce" in their "comfortable castle" from the "terrible pains that tear at my heart caused by my bitter conscience." The spoof's conclusion illustrated how Hand's continued impunity would be cast as an insult to national sovereignty:

> I enjoy a plenary indulgence which other martyrs like Padilla did not have. I have been chosen like a goodly angel to act as a scandalous example of impunity, and to remind you that you were so harsh on your own compatriots whilst you have been so generous to me and other foreigners like me, even in contravention of your own institutions, against the sovereign will of the people, and against the wishes of your own laws. . . . Colombianos: . . . My crimes enjoy an impunity which makes a laughing stock of your entire nation.[33]

The level of animosity aimed at Rupert Hand created unease in foreign residents in Cartagena who saw his imprisonment as a manifestation of the dramatic reduction in their power and prestige. Under the coordination of the US consul John MacPherson, messages were smuggled into Hand's prison by hiding them inside bread rolls, with the complicity of a baker and a delivery boy called Manuel María Gómez, who was employed by the British merchant Robert Bunch.[34] The daughters of Consul Edward Watts wrote to Hand in this manner, regretting "the distressing situation you have been so unjustly thrown into," believing that "through the unremitting exertions of our countrymen it will soon be relieved and we may be allowed the satisfaction of showing you those attentions which are now so entirely out of our power." Catherine Amelia Watts told Hand that "you will ever find a real friend in yours truly."[35] The involvement of the consul's daughters harks back to the relationship between Fanny Henderson and José María Córdova, and suggests the use of British diplomats' families as an extension of their activities in the region. But the Cartagena authorities, under Luque's leadership, were wise to the foreign communities' stratagems. The buns were opened, Hand's correspondence was intercepted, and his leg irons were tightened.

In the light of Hand's imprisonment, the hemorrhaging of diplomatic influence and the forced exile of Crofton and O'Leary, it could be suggested that the victorious veterans of El Santuario were left with no choice but to flee the recriminations of José María Córdova's heirs and supporters as vengeance was pursued in whatever way possible. But such an interpretation would have to ignore the extraordinary actions of Thomas Murray in this same period. The next part of this chapter examines the way that Murray avoided his fellow veterans' fates, and how he became integrated into the world represented by the losing side at El Santuario.

Thomas Murray in Office: Bolivarian Turned Liberal

Thomas Murray's story reflects the path not taken by British diplomacy in these years. With James Henderson expelled from the country there were few British subjects prepared to side with the anti-Bolivarians in the wake of the disintegration of Gran Colombia. Many no doubt shared O'Leary and Castelli's distaste for the men they saw as having pushed Bolívar to an early death. But this reluctance to engage constructively with the Liberal constitutionalist regime cost the foreign powers their influence in the early 1830s and led to their increasingly distant and rancorous relationships with New Granada in the rest of the decade. Thomas Murray was one of the few who recognized the legitimacy and respectability of the new government, particularly through his relationships with José María Obando and, later, Salvador Córdova. In 1831 Thomas Murray petitioned the New Granadan authorities to recognize his loyalty and his rights, just as did many of his old British colleagues.[36] Murray was one of the few who succeeded in being reincorporated into the army, with full pay.[37] He was soon appointed to an administrative position in the Ministry of War and Navy. It seems that he had sought and

won the trust of two influential anti-Bolivarians, General José María Obando (now minister of war) and the lawyer-journalist Vicente Azuero, who had recently returned from his period of exile in Jamaica. Both Obando and Azuero were mortal enemies of O'Leary.[38] Murray began to assist Azuero in writing and editing the Bogotá Liberal newspaper *El Republicano,* which was staunchly pro-Obando and anti-Bolivarian.[39] Murray's writings from this period became ever stronger and more violent; at the end of 1831 he praised "those who wish to purify this country."[40] He informed on foreign residents who were "enemies of freedom" and signed many arrest warrants.[41]

Perhaps it was Murray's role at the cutting edge of the persecution of Bolivarians that gave him Obando's trust. Certainly, it was Murray who assisted Obando in drawing up the list of officers who were to be removed from the army for their support of the previous regime. One of those was Francisco Urdaneta, who spent the next four years campaigning to clean his reputation and regain his salary.[42] By November 1831 William Turner, the British minister in Bogotá, had come to believe that Murray had attained great and unwelcome influence. Turner accused Murray of wanting New Granada to renegotiate its commercial treaty with Britain in order to tone down the favorable concessions that Britain had won at the time of independence. Turner suspected that Murray wanted to benefit personally from mediating any renegotiation, and thus that there were base motives behind Murray's newly adopted New Granadan nationalism. Turner put this down to Murray being "an Irishman of low origin and bad conduct."[43] In his testimony to Hand's trial, therefore, Murray took care to finger O'Leary as the intellectual author of Córdova's death, while also protecting himself against any suggestion that he might have neglected his duty when he was guarding the wounded prisoner.[44] The historian Miguel Aguilera found Murray's version of events to be "absurd and disgraceful," concluding that Murray exaggerated and lied in order to please his new political master, Obando.[45] (The tribunal accepted Murray's testimony as reliable and trustworthy evidence.)

The long trial gave Thomas Murray the stage upon which to demonstrate his loyalty. In 1832 he harvested the fruits of his assiduous cultivation of Obando, Azuero, and Salvador Córdova. In March 1832 he was granted naturalized New Granadan citizenship on the basis of their endorsements.[46] With citizenship granted, Murray was appointed as comandante militar in Medellín. The census carried out on May 25, 1832, shows Murray living in the central district reserved for the political and business elite. Murray, who at the time was "36 years old, single, and working as Military Chief," lived next door to Don Clemente Jaramillo, a respected businessmen who had a wife, a 2-year-old daughter, and a female slave. Murray lived on the same block as Mariano Restrepo, the influential administrator of the state tobacco monopoly, as well as other bureaucrats and slaveowners.[47]

Murray was now able to convince the Córdova family that he was worthy of their trust and on June 9, 1832, he married Dolores Estrada in the central Medellín church of La Candelaria.[48] Marriage into the extended Córdova

family confirmed Murray's political rehabilitation. Later that same month more papers relating to Rupert Hand's trial arrived on Murray's desk in Medellín, including the crucial testimony that Murray had given in Bogotá. We can only guess what Murray must have felt as he signed the papers, forwarded them on to the Municipal Judge in Marinilla, and ordered him to prepare a case to prosecute O'Leary as the intellectual author of Córdova's death. Reading the heavy bundle of legal documents, Murray would have confirmed that O'Leary and Crofton were now in exile, that Carr was dead, and that Castelli and Hand were both in jail in Cartagena.[49]

On April 8, 1833, Dolores Estrada and Thomas Murray celebrated the birth of their first child, who they named Eugenio after his Irish grandfather. The birth of a male heir was another step in consolidating Thomas Murray's place in New Granadan society. But more immediately, Murray made an audacious move that secured him an important relationship going beyond friendships. The parish records in Medellín reveal that Eugenio Murray's godfather was none other than Salvador Córdova.[50] The fact that Salvador Córdova should agree to be the godfather of Thomas Murray's son demonstrates without a shadow of a doubt the success that Murray had in putting his own dubious involvement on the wrong side of the Battle of El Santuario behind him. On a local level, Murray now had the support of his new father-in-law, Don Francisco Estrada, who at the time was the chief judge in Rionegro parish.[51] Murray's link to Salvador Córdova through *padrinazgo* guaranteed him the support of Antioquian Liberals and soldiers as well as a wider recognition across the republic. In order to reassure the people of Rionegro that Murray had recanted from his previous Bolivarianism, a copy was made of the damning testimony he had given to Rupert Hand's trial. We can speculate that it was either Francisco Estrada or Salvador Córdova who approvingly ordered the copy to be produced.[52]

Rebels' Progress

Rebels like Anselmo Pineda and Salvador Córdova recognized that José María Obando's patronage of the army as minister of war offered opportunities to loyal anti-Bolivarians. Pineda gave up his treasury position in Medellín and returned to Bogotá in December 1831. His loyal service at the Córdovas' sides at El Santuario and then Abejorral now marked him as a tested Liberal and defender of constitutional legitimacy. Obando named him as a captain in the army in April 1832. On September 2, 1832, Pineda married Josefa Valencia Caicedo, a widow from a distinguished Popayán family. His family links and communication skills soon earned Pineda a job as aide-de-camp to a future president, General Pedro Alcántara Herrán.[53]

Pineda's rebel colleagues from the Battle of El Santuario also spent these years dedicated to their family and professional lives. After his 1830 marriage Braulio Henao became mayor of Sonsón, where he ordered and supervised the construction of new municipal buildings. His biographers narrate his disinterested involvement in local politics and his dedication to municipal

and educational matters.[54] Francisco Giraldo's recovery from the wounds he received at El Santuario was extremely slow; he was confined to his bed for many months because, as his doctor remarked in 1834, "the bullet appears to have entered near his groin, and exited his body very close to his anus, and he was repeatedly plagued by painful anal ulcers." Unsurprisingly, Giraldo was granted extensive leave from the army on the grounds of his ill-health.[55] Things were physically less painful, but politically less straightforward for Salvador Córdova in Rionegro, where he found all parties vying for his support. He reluctantly tried to negotiate the "complexities of ephemeral political loyalties," which shifted around foci of personalities, regions, and interests in these years. His escalating dispute from 1832 with the prefect of Antioquia, Francisco Montoya, can be explained by Córdova's willingness to lend his support to José María Obando rather than the promotion of institutionality and the territorial integrity of New Granada, which united President Márquez, Montoya, and other supporters of Santander.[56] Montoya's family had extensive kinship and commercial links throughout Antioquia and New Granada that now began to eclipse Salvador Córdova's power. Francisco Montoya's son was now in political office in Cartagena. Another relation, Dr. José María Montoya, died in Rionegro in 1834, and the inventory of his possessions reveals the spectacular wealth left to his widow, totalling over 25,000 pesos and including slaves and an admirable collection of historical literature.[57] In contrast the Córdova family were struggling with debt and reduced income since the death of General José María Córdova.

The splintering of Córdova's personal networks is illustrated by Francisco Montoya's appointment of Mariano Ospina Rodriguez as his political secretary; a post Ospina had occupied under José María Córdova in 1829 and Salvador Córdova in 1831. Manuel Antonio Jaramillo remained loyal, however. He was in Bogotá in 1833 as a congressman for Antioquia, and in 1834 he was president of the Antioquian Provincial Assembly.[58]

Two Prisoners in Cartagena—British Pressure and Intervention

The domestic and professional tranquillity of Murray, Jaramillo, Pineda, and Salvador Córdova between late 1831 and 1833 could not be of greater contrast with Rupert Hand's sufferings in prison. Hand was joined in the San Felipe jail in late 1831 by Carlos Castelli. Castelli had been sent from Bogotá by Obando after avoiding "by the skin of his teeth" being executed for his part in supporting Rafael Urdaneta's dictatorship.[59] During their long months of confinement together, Castelli and Hand seem to have discussed a defense strategy to lay the blame on O'Leary for Córdova's murder: their testimonies show marked similarities.

Meanwhile, diplomatic pressure on Luque's government in Cartagena was being stepped up. Royal navy officers, acting as "amphibious plenipotentiaries," lobbied the authorities in Cartagena on Hand's behalf and "for humanity's sake" both informally and officially.[60] Yet official British pressure

was limited because it was divided and uncoordinated. This was due to the fallout from the expulsion of Consul Edward Watts from Cartagena in October 1831, discussed above, which irremediably weakened the British position. When George Watts took over as acting consul in his father's absence, he succeeded only in exacerbating matters because it was precisely George's marriage to the sister of the exiled Bolivarian governor Juan de Francisco Martín (who had joined Daniel O'Leary in Jamaican exile in April 1831), which caused Luque to suspect British interference in Cartagena's affairs. Even worse, after Martín went into exile in Jamaica at the end of April 1831, it was the Watts family who "protected and defended Martín's personal and business interests, even though he was not a British subject."[61]

When the British minister in Bogotá, Turner, learned that George Watts was acting as consul, he decided to replace him immediately with "the most respectable merchant I can find." Cartagena, William Turner believed, was "by far the most important post in this country" and he chose the merchant Joseph Ayton for the position.[62] Conflict between Watts and Ayton undermined attempts to free Hand. Popular prints reminded the public of the Watts' family's partiality for the Bolivarians and undermined British attempts to portray themselves as neutral.[63] The economic hardship being endured by merchants and residents alike in Cartagena meant that local politicians exploited divisions in the foreign community for their own regional and national benefit.[64] While Ayton tried to ingratiate himself with local politicians in Cartagena, Watts blustered publicly and schemed privately. These efforts included what Vice President Domingo Caicedo described as "a Plot which had been discovered among the Foreigners of Cartagena for effecting the Prisoner's Escape," which meant that "more vigorous confinement had been rendered necessary."[65]

One of Watts' co-conspirators was John MacPherson, the US consul in Cartagena. He was a political and diplomatic loose-cannon, the brother of the Major MacPherson who had assisted General Montgomery at the assault upon Quebec. He had been close friends for two decades with the most successful US merchant in Colombia, John Glen, but had recently fallen into severe personal debt. Observers called him a "hot blooded fellow."[66] By mid-1830 John MacPherson was bored, writing that "Cartagena has nothing within its walls worth noticing. The history of one day is the history of a year." His relationship with his superior Thomas Moore, the US minister in Bogotá, was so bad that they were not corresponding with each other at all ('which I can only regret, but have no right to complain," wrote MacPherson). In 1831 MacPherson was, therefore, accustomed to acting on his own account without fear of rebuke from his supposed superior. He was also used to subterfuge. He wrote to correspondents in the United States asking them "not to mention my name as an authority for any news from this Country" in case it exposed him to danger.[67] By mid-March 1831, MacPherson had even lost faith in his own ability to observe or analyze local politics: "the affairs of Colombia, for some time past, have fallen into such a mass of terrible confusion, that I have found it impossible to commit

to paper any thing like facts, or to form an opinion founded upon any reasonable dates as to what may be the ultimate issue of the present struggle between Military Chiefs."[68] Disillusioned at work and in considerable straits at home, John MacPherson found the action, interest, and excitement he was looking for by involving himself in the drama of Rupert Hand's continued incarceration.

Exiled from Influence: Bolivarians Haunted by El Santuario

When news of Hand's capture and alleged torture first reached William Turner in Bogotá, he told Domingo Caicedo that this was "strange return for the blood and treasure which my Countrymen had shed and expended in the cause of Colombia."[69]

Yet Turner was so distant from the ineffective machinations of his supposed minions in Cartagena that his many missives fell on deaf or deliberately unresponsive ears. The US consul in Bogotá observed that having previously "aspired to control the country," the "English party are down and, in my judgement, forever."[70] Anti-British sentiment percolated through official circles, for example, with a renewed crackdown on smuggling and unauthorized privateering off the coast at Cartagena.[71] In return Turner's frustration at his own impotence grew into a profound and angry cynicism. He lamented "the impossibility of being sure in this Country that any of the Natives will perform what they promise" but recognized that the central government could not just have intervened to free Hand, because of the opposition of the "authorities of Cartagena." Had such an order been issued, "it is doubtful whether it would have been obeyed, and it is quite certain that it would have excited a clamour among the liberal party which would have led to serious disturbances against it, if not to its entire overthrow."[72] The official government position, outlined by the minister of foreign affairs, Alejandro Vélez, was that it would be an abuse of power to intervene in the judicial process to free Hand "just because this particular Colombian soldier happened to have been born a subject of a powerful nation."[73]

Thanks to the excellent communications between Cartagena and Jamaica, which predated independence, we can be sure that O'Leary and the other Bolivarian exiles in Jamaica (notably the former Cartagena governor Juan de Francisco Martín) were kept well up to date with Hand's arrest and trial. Indeed, O'Leary probably realized early in 1832 that he and Hand were the victims of a judicial and political persecution orchestrated by Obando. As the trial went on, investigations centered on establishing O'Leary as the intellectual author of the murder. Many of the witnesses who attested to O'Leary giving Hand a formal order to "find Córdova, and kill him" had been O'Leary's comrades-in-arms at El Santuario. Having lost his father figure, Bolívar, O'Leary was now discovering that his brothers-in-arms, friends, and colleagues were turning against him. This led O'Leary to reflect on his own involvement in Córdova's death. We can see from the private notes he wrote

in Jamaica that Córdova's memory haunted O'Leary in this period, though he continued to believe that his repression of Córdova's rebellion had been justified. He tried to undermine Córdova's achievements and background, writing in his notebook that "his family [was] below par. His mother [was] a colored woman," and that as a young officer Córdova had been repeatedly promoted "without having at all signalled himself." Córdova's success in his expedition to Antioquia in 1819 was "more easy than was supposed."[74]

At the same time that he reconsidered his involvement in crushing Córdova's rebellion, O'Leary reflected on violent social conflict in Jamaica. He was convinced that slavery should be eradicated in the Gran Colombian region, following Bolívar's philanthropic example, but Jamaica taught him that abolition should not undermine existing social and racial hierarchies or trigger violent conflict. O'Leary had spent his formative years under Bolívar's paternal wing, and had imbibed his oft-expressed fear of *pardocracia*, the rule of colored people. He lauded the "generosity" of planters like Bolívar, and had little time for the rights of slaves.[75]

While O'Leary was sitting out his exile in Jamaica, he learned, in mid-1832, that Santander was on his way back to New Granada and that it was likely—as the obvious figure to unify political groups now that strong Bolivarians had been exiled—that he would be installed as president. O'Leary was outraged. He bore a deep grudge against the men who he felt had been disloyal to Bolívar. Exile had further exacerbated O'Leary's bitterness, and he published a diatribe against Santander, published in English in the *Jamaica Dispatch* on October 3, 1832. Seething with anger, O'Leary blamed Santander for all of Gran Colombia's ills, accusing him of avarice that "was without equal even among the conquistadores." O'Leary then continued with a famous comparison between Bolívar and Washington, instead, in which *El Libertador* came out on top in terms of his oratory, his courage, his talent, and his selflessness.[76] One of O'Leary's major themes in writing his *Narración* was to "demonstrate Santander's injustice in his animosity against his former benefactor."[77] The sections O'Leary wrote in Jamaica frequently measured Bolívar's "greatness" against Santander. O'Leary was a dyed-in-the-wool Bolivarian and no sober reading can see his narrative as impartial, even though he did recognize Bolívar's flaws. Throughout his exile in Jamaica he had kept the company of Juan de Francisco Martín and Edward Watts, two Cartagena Bolivarians, and corresponded with many others.[78] O'Leary had spent over two years in exile in Jamaica when Carlos Soublette wrote from Caracas to confirm that the O'Learys would now be welcome in Venezuela. They packed their bags and left Jamaica without delay. Not even Soledad O'Leary's advanced pregnancy prevented their departure: young Carlos O'Leary was born on the boat, leading his father to joke that the family's identity was by now so disorientated that the children were not sure if Carlos was "a baby or a fish."[79]

The O'Learys arrived in Caracas on June 27, 1833. The British consul in Caracas, Sir Robert Ker Porter, noted in his diary that "they tell me that he is an anxious and irritable person, from Cork, educated and talented."

A month later O'Leary introduced himself personally; Ker Porter now observed that "he seems to have done rather well and made money [out of his adventures in South America]: he has rank, a wife and three children, although he is getting old like many others." Two days later, on July 27, 1833, Ker Porter returned O'Leary's visit and met his wife, "who is fairly beautiful (she is 26 years old) but like all the Creole women after marriage (or its consequences) she already looks rather matronly."[80] In October O'Leary published the Spanish version of his pamphlet criticizing Santander.[81] The reaction in Bogotá was predictably furious, and O'Leary's friends advised him to lay off.[82] Ker Porter noted that O'Leary seemed to have a lot to get off his chest and wondered "whether this government will tell him to shut up, or not."[83]

Santander's Return: A Post-Bolivarian Regime

Santander arrived in Cartagena in September 1832 after three years in exile in Europe and the United States. During this time he had matured considerably as a politician, and his absence from the scene during the undistinguished disintegration of Gran Colombia had only enhanced his standing. Santander's power and authority was apparent to all parties in Cartagena and his return affected local and national politics alike. The British vice consul Joseph Ayton had a short interview with Santander, and asked him to encourage Córdova's family to "request mercy for Hand."[84] Santander may have heeded this request as Córdova's mother subsequently wrote to the government requesting "the sentence be the most benign possible, the most compatible with justice and public opinion."[85] There is more evidence that Santander decided in Cartagena to protect Hand's life. On September 25, 1832, Carlos Castelli wrote to Hand from his neighboring cell, telling him that Santander had "kept his word to me; a safe-conduct passport arrived yesterday and an order to let me go to whatever country I may choose." Castelli was headed for "Curacao or Venezuela," and he was "confident that the Executive will save you in the end."[86] It is possible that Santander had assured him (either in person or through an intermediary) that Hand would not be executed under his presidency.

In Bogotá, William Turner recognized that Santander's return from exile and election to the presidency was the best avenue for his diplomatic petitions. Santander had spent time in Britain during his European exile, and Turner hoped to turn Hand's plight into a test case for European respect for New Granada, which he incorrectly assumed Santander would be anxious to win. Turner warned the Foreign Minister Alejandro Vélez of the "discredit which must fall upon [the government] and on the character of the country if a friendless foreigner were to perish in prison owing to severe treatment and insufficient food."[87] Vélez replied in confident and pragmatic tone, promising to punish the jailors for "any abuses" and wryly noting that "the rigorous treatment which Hand might have suffered was probably due to the substantiated fear that that he might try to escape."[88]

Santander took over from Márquez as interim president in early October 1832, and apparently told Turner in Bogotá that "whatever sentence may be ultimately passed on Colonel Hand shall not be followed by his execution."[89] Turner's conversation with Santander confirms Castelli's earlier letter to Hand, in its belief that Santander was allowing it to be known that he would not permit Hand's execution, while at the same time refraining from intervening in local Cartagena judicial procedures.[90] On May 20, 1833, Rupert Hand made a final appeal to the court that shows he had been influenced by Turner's strategy of casting his case in the language of international relations. He described himself as "a British subject, who was a Colombian Coronel."[91] Hand denounced the legal process to have been an "absurd farce, where all the judges and witnesses are Antioqueños like Córdova." He feared being "killed like an animal sent to the slaughterhouse," and argued that his sentence should be revoked "not for me, but for the reputation of Colombian courts; yes, if they were to hear in Europe that you had executed a soldier who obeyed the orders of his superiors on a battlefield," then the country's reputation would be lost.[92] This was the language of a man who had been well briefed by British diplomats, hoping that the language of British power would save his skin. Nevertheless, Santander's administration remained fully in control of British attempts to influence the case. Vélez informed Turner that "the delay in bringing Hand's trial to its conclusion was caused by some individuals who had an interest in saving him," heavily hinting that these individuals were Bolivarians, and perhaps British.[93] Santander appears to have used Hand's case as an easy way of currying favor with the British, promising improvements in conditions while protesting the limits of his own influence, and as a means of distracting Turner from his pressure over commercial negotiations, where the British wanted preferential treatment to the French and United States, which Santander was reluctant to allow.

After two years in jail, neither escape attempts nor British diplomacy nor President Santander's good offices had yet succeeded in freeing Rupert Hand. The surviving evidence shows that British pressure was relatively fruitless, beyond Pascuala Muñoz's letter, which may have been written at the request of Vice Consul Ayton. Indeed, the examination of the chronological succession of events below casts considerable doubt upon any interpretation that suggests that British informal influence might have saved Rupert Hand's life.

The End of Rupert Hand's Imprisonment

On April 11, 1833, after almost two years in jail, Rupert Hand was eventually sentenced by the Fiscal in Mompox. He was found guilty of Córdova's murder and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Hand's lawyers immediately appealed against the sentence to the Magdalena High Court. Perhaps trusting Santander's private assurances, foreign diplomats resident in Cartagena were confident that the sentence would be overturned and the prisoner released. On August 8, 1833, however, the court announced its surprising

decision to instead sentence Hand to death, with no further right of appeal. The execution was to take place within days. But on the very same afternoon, not long after being first notified of his imminent execution, Rupert Hand escaped from jail. He put on a disguise and walked through the gates that had held him for almost two years. Was this the result of a blind eye being turned by the authorities? Or was it the result of "informal" British diplomatic pressure? The rest of this chapter examines the events in order to cast light on the wider configuration of national and imperial forces in Cartagena in the early 1830s that provided the background to his escape.[94]

The surviving comments of local officials do suggest an acceptance of the inevitability of Hand's escape after the death sentence had been passed. José Angel Calderón, the Cartagena Fiscal, admitted that it was an "unfortunate coincidence" that he had gone homesick on the day the sentence was passed. The timing of Calderón's short illness (lasting only for the afternoon in question) seems to implicate both him and the Mayor, Agrasot, in Hand's escape. President Santander later wrote privately that Hand's escape was the result of a bribe of "2,000 pesos to the Mayor," though he did not speculate as to who had paid the bribe.[95] A bribe could have been paid at any time in the last two years, however. Why now? The local politics of corruption in Cartagena lay against the national internal tensions of Caribbean New Granadan society, and it was these that brought about a chaotic series of coincidences that facilitated Rupert Hand's escape in August 1833.[96] A second layer of explanation can be found in New Granada's own disastrous diplomatic operations, which contributed to the strange set of circumstances that allowed Hand to flee, and which triggered an increasing and unexpected level of coordination between the foreign powers represented in Cartagena who wished to put one over the New Granadan authorities. The beginning of the train of events that led to Rupert Hand's escape had nothing to do with him at all, however. In contrast to the usual peaceful resistance of slaves and other non-whites in the Cartagena region in this period, the catalyst was a political upheaval triggered by a violent slave rebellion.[97]

In late July 1833 a Jamaica-born *mulato* veteran of the Indian Wars in Florida, the retired adventurer George Woodbine, was murdered in his sleep—along with his wife and children—in an attack that sent shockwaves across the region.[98] Travelers recalled that Woodbine had been "well-acquainted" with the navigation of the Atrato River, suggesting that he may have been involved in extraction and contraband export of gold from the Chocó to Jamaica.[99] The murder caused much anxiety in Cartagena. As Marixa Lasso has shown, slave rebellions were the greatest fear of whites in Cartagena at the time, who dreaded "race war, or more specifically, a second Haiti in Colombia."[100] The disturbed and disorientated foreign community in Cartagena, its nerves on end because of the violent death of one of their longest-standing members, was now further rattled by a serious diplomatic affray catalyzed by the arrival of the blood-splattered corpses on the waterfront. According to Ayton's account, when they were unloading the corpses to be taken to the hospital for examination, the French consul

Adolph Barrot put himself in their way, insisting on his right to "assist his [diplomatic] colleagues."[101] When the mayor asked Barrot to get out of the way, the French consul called the mayor a "wretch" and "despicable" before retiring to his house and raising the French flag. Ayton recalled that when Barrot was arrested the next day for these insults, a huge "rabble" gathered to abuse him. Ayton noted that "these disagreeable proceedings have excited as much the indignation of the respectable portion of the community as that of the different foreigners in the place."[102] The authorities referred the affair to the national government, and Barrot remained in prison pending a response from Bogotá. Rumors abounded that a French naval squadron would be sent from Martinique to "demand satisfaction."[103]

At the end of July 1833, therefore, the French consul Adolph Barrot, accused of verbally abusing the mayor of Cartagena, found himself sharing a cell in the Cartagena San Felipe jail with Rupert Hand, who was now three months into his appeal against his conviction for murder. Both Barrot and Hand awaited judicial pronouncements on their cases from superior regional and national courts. On the evening of August 8, 1833, Cartagena was sent into chaos. Rupert Hand had been sentenced to death. News of political insurrection also arrived from Bogotá, a Bolivarian rebellion against Santander's government in Bogotá, led by Coronel José Sardá. Worse still, the Woodbine murderers were now believed to have confessed that their actions were to presage a more widespread black rebellion in Cartagena's hinterland that aimed to "rob and murder the wealthy inhabitants, and then take the government of the place into their own hands."[104]

This was the interpretation given by the US consul John MacPherson who, carried away with the drama of the unfolding events, resolved to exploit them. His dramatic description of Rupert Hand's "extraordinary escape" needs to be treated with some caution, as Consul MacPherson himself plays a surprisingly prominent part in the saga.[105] But MacPherson's account does give a good impression of the chaotic proceedings. Upon hearing the news of Hand's sentence MacPherson claimed that he went straight to the prison, where he found Hand "walking up and down the corridor" because "his room was more than occupied by M. Barrot, who had a large party of visitors with him, at least twenty persons." MacPherson informed Hand of the death sentence passed against him by the appeal court, then helped him to put on a disguise consisting of "an old plain coat," "a pair of boots," "a black hat . . . and my spectacles on his nose." They walked along the dark passageways, past a sentry, through Barrot's room ("General Luque was present and . . . he too shut his eyes as to what was passing") before walking out into the open air.[106] He was rowed out to a French ship anchored in the port, where he found safe refuge.

The next morning, August 9, MacPherson went back to the jail to visit Consul Barrot. While there he heard the Fiscal, Calderón, come looking for Hand, and "finding that H[and] had escaped from the jail he found the jailor and locked him up in the very room which H[and] had occupied." Meanwhile, MacPherson and his friends sent Hand provisions including

clothes and 120 dollars in cash. MacPherson believed that "every person in Cartagena is pleased with this escape" because the sentence had "disgusted every one . . . One thing is certain; it will afford me pleasing reflections as long as I live."[107] In MacPherson's account this would seem to be an early example of secret US intervention in the region. Yet other accounts of the escape, notably Vice Consul Ayton's, did not mention MacPherson's role at all. Ayton told Palmerston only that "a number of [Hand's] own countrymen, assisted by several French gentlemen, enabled him to effect his escape from prison." Ayton praised the "kindness and intervention of the French consul" rather than the North Americans.[108]

On the basis of these contradictory accounts it is difficult to say who played the decisive role. We can certainly agree with MacPherson that it was an unusual "chain of circumstances" that facilitated Hand's "extraordinary escape."[109] Looking back at the accounts of the escape, it is possible to detail the different groups and assess their degrees of complicity. The US consul and the US naval officer claimed responsibility for the success of the operation that they may have planned since the foiled 1831 escape plot. MacPherson was closely linked to aspects of the British community, and his superior in Bogotá, Robert McAfee, believed that he was in such "great [financial] difficulties . . . [that he was] actually subsisting upon the bounty of the British Consul" (presumably Watts).[110] All sources agree on the pivotal role of the disgraced French consul Barrot, his French consular staff, and the French naval officers who carried Hand away to Martinique the day after his escape, and yet they had no verifiable links to Hand, and were perhaps moved to act because of their own treatment by the New Granadans. But it would be inaccurate to portray this as a purely foreign conspiracy against the sovereignty of New Granada's laws and its due judicial process. General Ignacio Luque is most heavily implicated by MacPherson, as is also an unnamed "black fellow" who piloted the canoe that took Hand across the port. Luque, like José María Córdova before him, had been a committed Bolivarian who switched sides in the face of what he perceived as the Bolivarians' dictatorial tendencies.[111] Luque had become disillusioned at what he saw as the unprincipled intervention of Bolivarian foreigners in Colombia after El Santuario, and he became a stalwart of the Liberal opposition in the Caribbean region after 1831.[112] It seems likely, therefore, given President Santander's comments cited above, that Luque had been forewarned to turn a blind eye to any potential rescue attempt.

This line of interpretation is supported by the lack of any attempt to recapture Hand once Calderón realized that he had gone. The French ship remained in the port, with Hand on board, during the entire day and night of August 9, enabling MacPherson and his friends to send their package to Hand before the ship departed the next day. In the intervening time "no active steps were taken" by Luque. Ayton suggested that Hand's "protracted sufferings [had] gained the commiseration of even some of his most bitter political enemies," and the ship passed the Bocachica forts on the morning of August 10 without any question or impediment.[113]

Reaction to Rupert Hand's Escape in Cartagena

Once Rupert Hand had gone, his case was swept under the carpet and all memory of him evaporated. On August 13 his case was archived.[114] Adolph Barrot remained imprisoned for another four days. The Cartagena newspapers that speculated daily on Barrot's actions and fate remained silent on Hand's disappearance. There were no calls for him to be apprehended. Instead, public opinion was concentrated on the French affair.[115] In the absence of the Rupert Hand thorn on the side of British-New Granadan relations, the British tried to insinuate themselves with Luque and the Cartagena authorities at the expense of the French. A remarkable handbill, published by "Los Observadores" in Cartagena one month after Hand's escape, on October 16, 1833, consisted of a paean to Great Britain, "generous friend" of New Granada, and its every line carried an implicit criticism of France. It urged citizens to "treat the British as brothers and as friends," reminding them that "Britain was the only nation to lend a protective hand to our new republics . . . Glory be to Albion for her magnanimity!"[116]

The Barrot affair had much greater transcendence in Cartagena than Rupert Hand's escape. French representatives demanded an apology that the New Granadans were loathe to provide, and French warships duly arrived to blockade Cartagena at the end of September. Fears of a renewed French imperial project were great: rumors abounded that "the affair will end in rendering Carthagena a second Algiers."[117] Yet the blockade served to undermine French political and economic (though not cultural) influence in New Granada for many years.[118] French "arrogance" was at the center of press reflections on New Granada's tense relations with foreign powers. *El amigo de las leyes* observed that France was behaving just like Spain, "treating us like the lowest pirates."[119] A pamphlet published in Bogotá lambasted "the most amazing violation of the proper relations between nations," and "all this in the name of the French people who daily and energetically demand their own laws to be obeyed with exactitude."[120] The French also took legal action in the New Granadan courts against the imprisonment of their consul. One of the French consular officials, Auguste Lemoyne, later published an account of the conflict, and described Barrot's reinstatement in his post in 1834 as "a national humiliation for New Granadans."[121]

We can conclude that Rupert Hand did not escape because of the pervasive influence of British diplomacy, formal or otherwise. He was rather bundled out of jail by an alienated US consul in chaotic scenes triggered by an altercation between the French consul and the mayor of Cartagena, which itself was catalyzed by the slave rebellion in Cartagena and the arrival of news of an insurrection in Bogotá. In the capital, William Turner self-indulgently persevered with his interpretation that British informal influence had freed Rupert Hand.[122] More importantly, Hand's escape from jail and into exile in Venezuela meant that New Granadan territory was now virtually free of the victors of El Santuario. By late 1833, Castelli, O'Leary, and Hand had all made their homes in Venezuela. The subsequent chapters follow their

trajectories there. The acceptance and integration of these military exiles in Caracas would seem to support the conventional interpretation of Venezuela as a more "militaristic" nation in the 1830s and 1840s than the more "civilian" New Granada presided over by Santander.[123] Carlos Soublette's influence soon secured O'Leary a position in a Venezuelan diplomatic mission to Europe. O'Leary left his brother-in-law in charge of his family, joking that the degenerating effects of climate and culture in Caracas could be controlled only if they were watched over by "a strong father acting like a despot."[124] Of the foreign Bolivarians at El Santuario only Thomas Murray and Francisco Urdaneta remained in New Granada; the former had become an extreme Liberal, an *exaltado,* who took a leading role in the persecution of his former colleagues, and the latter had retreated into domestic life while pleading for the government to reincorporate him to the army.

Memory of the defeat at El Santuario nevertheless remained potent in Antioquia, even with the victors mostly dead or exiled. One night in May 1833 José María Córdova's corpse was exhumed from its resting place in Marinilla. The seven individuals who dug up the body and carried it to Rionegro were Salvador Córdova, Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, Don Francisco Bernal, Comandante José M. Botero and his two servants, Rafael and Miguel, and José María Arango.[125] This symbolic act took place at a time when clerics in Marinilla were agitating against Santander's government, which was inclined to support freedom of worship and the establishment of non-Catholic cemeteries. The divide between Conservative Marinilla and Liberal Rionegro was becoming increasingly formalized. When the law to permit other religions to bury their dead in New Granada was passed in 1835 (in the forlorn hope that it would encourage foreign immigration) there was a popular uprising against it in Antioquia. The burial of the dead was shaping political affiliations as much as friendships between the living. Records suggest that all but one of those involved in digging up José María Córdova's corpse in 1833 had been present at El Santuario. In the mid-and-late 1830s, when Antioquia was convulsed by violent conflict again, these figures would remain at the forefront.[126]

Chapter 7

National Consolidation

Nation-states began to be consolidated in the Gran Colombian region in the years 1833–1839. Historians have studied these processes in isolation, tracing the regional reconstruction of Antioquia, for example, separately from the national development of Venezuela. This chapter highlights the way imperial formations linked and shaped these processes. Certainly, lessons had been learned from the previous period. Formal imperial influence was relatively weak, and imperial gestures were ineffective—most notably here the 1836 Russell Affair, which included a rather pointless blockade of Cartagena.[1] British influence was instead transmitted through nonimperial actors, who had no formal link to the metropolis—as in the cases of Thomas Murray, who became the governor of a New Granadan province, Rupert Hand, who fought in a Venezuelan civil war, or Daniel O'Leary, who served Venezuela as a diplomat. The continued involvement of foreigners in the lives of the new states gave credence to calls for popular sovereignty that rallied against foreigners. Indeed, in this period ideologies of nascent nationalism were radicalized and hardened by such discourse.[2] Sovereignty in New Granada and Venezuela was fought over by internal actors and local people, as the existing literature has shown. But they did so alongside imperial formations, under the shadows cast by foreigners like Murray, Hand, and O'Leary, by naval power sailing on the Caribbean, and by commercial activity and its demands (most notably in Venezuela in these years). The lives of the El Santuario veterans take us under the radar and into the realm of the new imperial formations as they coalesced in the 1830s.

The Figure of the Foreigner in New Granada

In the mid-1830s Antioquia experienced a series of political agitations that at first glance appear to be completely local in their characteristics. A clerical rebellion against Santander's government won much popular support from fervent Catholic believers. Liberals in Rionegro, where José María Córdova's remains had just been reburied while the local militia looked on in approval, was opposed to Fr. José María Botero's rebellion.[3]

By 1835 Liberal politicians in New Granada looked back to recent history as often as they looked to the future. The period of Santander's exile (1829–32) became the touchstone for distinguishing a "true patriot" after Santander returned to Bogotá. The years of Santander's absence (the only time for the two decades after 1819 when Santander was not the dominant figure in New Granadan political life) became seen as a guide to how New Granadans had really felt about politics and the nation. Those who had supported the dictatorships of either Bolívar or Rafael Urdaneta were held to be in favor of tyranny; those who had resisted them were the constitutionalists. In particular, resistance to Rafael Urdaneta's dictatorship in 1830–31 had created lasting "links based on camaraderie, *compañerismo* and solidarity."[4] It was increasingly claimed that the Bolivarians and Urdanetistas had been overwhelmingly foreign, and that New Granadan involvement in their armies had been forced, not voluntary.

In 1835 the veterans of El Santuario were working through the "inherited hatreds" that were serving to "fix party loyalties through emotional triggers drawing on the language of blood revenge."[5] But by now the networks that had facilitated those rebellions were beginning to fall apart. Salvador Córdova retained power on the basis of his personal story, though his commercial backing was disintegrating. He still owned property in Rionegro, and exerted local political influence, but his feud with the wealthy and powerful prefect of Antioquia, Francisco Montoya, meant that the military authorities sent Córdova first to the Cauca as Jefe Militar in 1833, and then to Cartagena. This was a successful strategy that prevented him from developing into a fully fledged regional military caudillo in Antioquia. After he fell out of favor with one of the best-connected people in Antioquia, not to mention one of the wealthiest men in the republic, Córdova's support gradually fell away in the provincial capital, Medellín.[6] The people of El Santuario themselves shifted away from overt identification with Salvador Córdova's cause too: archival documents suggest that other social concerns superseded explicit political engagement in these years.[7] Local economic recovery was prioritized over national political activity. Surviving records reveal how Salvador Córdova continued to own slaves despite the rhetoric of liberty that defined his public life.[8]

As he sought to protect his interests, Salvador Córdova's political concerns became focused, at a national level, on the figure of Francisco Urdaneta, the foreign, Montevideo-born officer who had supported the central government against José María Córdova's rebellion in 1829. In 1835 Urdaneta finally succeeded in getting himself reestablished on the military list, and so could work and receive his salary. Salvador Córdova and Manuel Antonio Jaramillo leapt into print to attack him. From Medellín, Jaramillo reminded the public that Urdaneta was a foreigner. The decision in favor of Urdaneta may have been legal, argued Jaramillo, but it was unjust and antinational and compromised the nation's independence.[9] For his part, Salvador Córdova published a withering attack on the decision from Cartagena, where he was commanding the second column of the New Granadan army. He and the men under

his command (they all signed the pamphlet too, though we do not know whether they did so freely) pledged that they would rather resign their commissions than serve under Urdaneta, "this foreigner who has committed all types of political crimes." They asked "Can the Veterans of Liberty maintain their honor at the orders of one of the murderers from El Santuario?"[10]

Francisco Urdaneta published his response in Bogotá, and in it he stressed the legitimacy of his case.[11] His problem was that his birth outside New Granadan territory meant that the 1834 laws on rehabilitation of Bolivarian soldiers did not apply to him. Urdaneta plaintively asked "Do you think I could have chosen where I was born?" He reminded New Granadans that "at the time of the 1810 revolution I was already here, sincerely embracing the cause of independence, already married in Bogotá into a distinguished and patriotic family."[12]

The memory of El Santuario was never far from the surface in this dispute. An anonymous Cartagena publication attacked Urdaneta's supposed legitimacy with color and relish. Signed by *Muchos Cartageneros* but bearing the heavy mark of Salvador Córdova's hand, it decried the impotence of congress for having bowed in favor of private interests. Urdaneta was "a foreigner, active conspirator and vigorous agent of his usurping cousin Rafael . . . as well as one of the cowardly assassins of the illustrious General José M. Córdova." It was "scandalous" that "terror and tyranny's criminal agent" should be rehabilitated while he still had "profane and bloody hands." The *Cartageneros,* therefore, urged Urdaneta, "vile and miserable man," to leave "this land which is not yours . . . and be ashamed."[13]

The rapid-fire publication of pamphlets by Córdova, Jaramillo, and Urdaneta in 1835 reflects the continued salience of focusing political declarations on the figure of the unwelcome foreigner, in this case Urdaneta. But other responses suggest that the pull of this language was beginning to weaken. President Santander saw Córdova's proclamation as an immature and unacceptable act of insubordination, so he called Córdova's bluff and removed him from his post to preempt the promised resignation. Santander forcefully defended the "empire of the law" and the superiority of "New Granada's constitution and honor" over any one individual's "pride, opinions or ambition." Santander could not believe that Córdova would threaten to "use armed force to influence the government and change the law with bayonets." When Córdova received the news, he reacted angrily at the "scandalous . . . illegal . . . unconstitutional . . . arbitrary . . . and humiliating" decree.[14]

Salvador Córdova's failure to keep Urdaneta off the military list in 1835, and his exasperated response, reflected the gradually decreasing support for his attacks on foreigners as threats to national sovereignty. As Santander perceived correctly, Francisco Urdaneta was a very minor figure in the national picture. The networks that had supported rebellion against foreign interventions in Antioquia in 1829 and 1831 were collapsing as the nation's sovereignty was being established, recognized, and legitimized, albeit slowly and painfully. Salvador Córdova's dispute with Prefect Francisco Montoya had already lost him much of the support he had once enjoyed in Antioquia,

and parts of the elite now became distant and distrustful of him.[15] Manuel Antonio Jaramillo had been a key figure in those networks, yet now his influence diminished too. In 1837 Jaramillo was serving as a judge in Rionegro, a lowly position compared to his previous post of provincial governor. Even here he was repeatedly accused of abuses of authority by a growing number of political enemies.[16] These included his old ally Sinforoso García, who appears to have deceived him in business, and even his own brother Valentín Jaramillo. Court records in Rionegro reveal a wealth of mutual accusations between the Jaramillo brothers and García, encompassing charges of treachery, violence, and prostitution.[17] Loans remained unpaid, wives were insulted, and commercial relationships were sundered. Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, who had served as José María Córdova's political secretary in the 1829 rebellion, now supported Prefect Francisco Montoya, and Santander's central government in Bogotá.[18] By the late 1830s various social and cultural triggers called individuals in different directions. Family and friendship relations remained important in allowing individuals to offer support for all parties—what Botero Herrera calls "underground networks of friendship and solidarity created by war in which all who fought in them shared."[19] The memory of the defeat at El Santuario remained, and was often invoked, but it was no longer a certain rallying cry to rebellion in Antioquia. Urdaneta, therefore, continued his rehabilitation in Bogotá. He spent the late 1830s reintegrating himself into social circles linked to the military.[20] Among the men who supported him was Francisco Montoya, prefect of Antioquia and an ever more fervent enemy of Salvador Córdova.[21]

The fragmented nature of local archives from these years means that it is hard to track the other local veterans of El Santuario. Surviving documents in Marinilla reveal disagreements over inheritance and allegations of common criminality, for example. The radical priest José María Botero bought a case against a philosophy teacher "for promoting materialism." (The case was dismissed as the offending material had actually been recommended to him by the national government.) It is hard to find much evidence of political turmoil in Rionegro and its environs.[22]

Thomas Murray as the Governor of Vélez, 1836

Some foreigners worked right in the heart of the new states in this period, despite the gradual embedding of popular sovereignty and independence. One of them had become a relative and ally of the Córdova clan and their friends. In March 1833 Thomas Murray was working as Medellín's military chief, and in that post he signed the service records of Francisco Giraldo, who had been José María Córdova's aide-de-camp at El Santuario. Murray noted that Giraldo was renowned for his valor, great ability, and very good conduct, observing without irony that "I myself saw him gravely injured at the Battle of El Santuario."[23] Murray had by now effectively established himself as a bastion of the new post-Bolivarian order. In April 1833 Murray was sent again as Jefe Militar del Chocó.[24] Murray probably left his new

family in Medellín.[25] He retired from active service in June 1833 and returned to Bogotá while his family remained in Antioquia. He began to publish anonymous political pamphlets that exhorted politicians to continue with Liberal reforms.[26] His identity as the author was well known; President Santander ridiculed his writings as "shameless," telling Salvador Córdova that "no patriot of sound mind would pay any attention to this rubbish."[27] One of the surviving pamphlets, the "Abuse of Power in the Name of a Civilised Nation," displays Murray's acerbic, ironic, and hypercritical style. It is a scathing attack on the "insults and offenses" committed by French diplomacy in New Granada (discussed in chapter 6).[28] It must have pleased his patron, José María Obando, because Murray soon secured his highest appointment—the governorship of Vélez.

Murray's appointment as the governor of Velez in early 1836 was a natural culmination of his integration into the Liberal elite in Bogotá. In this period governors were often foisted upon provinces as a means of tying them to the central state through personal loyalties and friendships. This was Murray's first governorship and constituted a major promotion from his previous roles as Jefe Militar in Medellín and the Chocó. Moreover, he had never previously set foot in Vélez, an agricultural region several hours journey by track from Bogotá through the Eastern Cordillera. The majority *mestizo* population suffered, according to the colonial census of 1777, "worse servitude than slaves themselves, and had less freedom than Polish serfs."[29] After the first few months of his administration, Murray published an analysis of the province, which survives as a repository of the concepts and ideas that dominated his thoughts about Vélez, its people, and its future. It shares the classical tone of many South American leaders of the post-independence period, aspiring to incorporate their lands into the modern and civilized world, directed at Murray's "fellow citizens" in the name of "liberty and order."[30] It is quite strikingly Eurocentric. Murray began by confessing that he "didn't know what to think about the primitive inhabitants of such a rich country" because their histories were "wrapped in ambiguous traditions and great uncertainty."[31] This explained his preference for looking to the future and to the outside world. Murray had found "hieroglifics" [*sic*] in the village of Flórez, ordering copies to be made and sent to the Royal Society in London. Perhaps, Murray noted, "that erudite body will be able to decipher a message from those who lived on this land before us, which might be useful to today's farmers." He suggested founding a museum "for the interest of locals and foreigners alike."[32] In this Murray shared the contemporary elite desire to categorize indigenous societies as "past" rather than "present," and to value European museums, rather than indigenous knowledge, for the understanding of their traditions.[33] Linked to this was Murray's call for foreign immigration to remedy what he perceived as a lack of manpower in New Granada, by which he meant the lack of sufficient white Europeans. Murray modestly suggested that he himself presented a partial example of how successful foreign immigration could be. In Murray's opinion, "sensible philosophy sees the entire world as but one republic; philanthropic men are its only citizens."

Democracy was not an integral part of Murray's political outlook. Philanthropy, patriarchy, and respect for the law were his watchwords. The longest section of the report was dedicated to the improvement of communication routes in Vélez. Murray was convinced that civilization, nationhood, and modernity would all lie at the end of new roads. Improvements would bring trade and industry, and, consequently, better the lives of those who lived near the road, and assure the integration of the nation itself. A new road—for which Murray adviced that a private company should be set up—would shorten the journey from Mompox to Bogotá by more than one month compared to the alternative route via Honda.[34]

After citizenship and communication, Murray's third challenge for the nation was to find a compromise between the needs of religion and education. Although he had converted to Catholicism in order to marry into the Córdova clan, Murray remained an uncompromising anticlericalist. He proposed transferring church assets into the hands of the state, and educating citizens in secular values rather than spiritual ones. New educational policies would be paid for with old church inheritances. The key symbol of this policy in Vélez was the Virgin of Chiquinquirá, one of New Granada's most important and popular colonial icons, which was housed within Murray's provincial jurisdiction. Murray wanted to use the church buildings that housed the image of the Virgin to provide two new provincial schools, arguing that the Virgin was "the beautiful and special property of the New Granadan people. It may have been looked after by various members of the clergy over the years, but the people have never ceded their supreme authority or their rights" to the image.[35] Murray's hard-line position regarding the state-church relationship and his symbolic attempt to appropriate the Virgin's image for the state was unpopular in Vélez, where tension over religious matters was already bubbling away when he arrived.[36]

Another eye-catching proposal was designed to signal Vélez's connections with the enlightened values that Murray associated more with Britain and the United States than he did with the province under his command. He wanted to change the province's name to "Washington." He proposed that "we will erase the name of Vélez from the map, seeing as it only serves to remind us of Spain's decrepit legacy."[37] But he also had more mundane duties, and Murray's correspondence from the time reveals the daily problems that plagued his administration and undermined his projects. Every time he requested extra resources from the government, he received a negative answer alleging lack of funds.[38] Murray's time in government was made even more difficult by a conflict between the land of his birth and the republic he had made his home.

The Russell Affair

In 1836 a British fleet blockaded the port of Cartagena in retribution for the arrest of the British consul in Panama, Joseph Russell. It triggered fears of a full-scale British invasion of New Granada, even though such a major use

of arms would not have been contemplated back in London. Another consequence, this time unintended, was to catalyze the formation of a national consciousness, in opposition to the perceived continued foreign interventions in national affairs.

Joseph Russell was a Buckinghamshire-born adventurer who had sought his fortune in Gran Colombia (he didn't find it), starting in the gold mines of Antioquia the previous decade. Russell began his proconsulship in 1835 in difficult times. After Rupert Hand's escape from jail in 1833, and the French blockade of Cartagena in 1834, his role was to negotiate New Granada's new diplomatic assertiveness. On the evening of January 20, 1836, Russell exchanged insults with the mayor of Panama City, Justo Paredes, a scuffle ensued, and Russell was arrested. Russell's manners were not subtle, and neither was the response of Lord Palmerston back in London. As Malcolm Deas has observed, "the British were not the only ones to apply a cruel pedagogical diplomacy to the new independent republics. Nevertheless Lord Palmerston made this type of display [he ordered the blockade of Cartagena] a kind of personal speciality."[39]

The Russell Affair was predicated on debt. On a personal level Consul Russell was owed money by Paredes, and on the international scale New Granada owed Great Britain money—exactly how much was still uncertain in the wake of the collapse of Gran Colombia, and the consequent need to divide up its foreign debt between New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador. After his arrest, Russell saw himself as the victim of an unprovoked attack on a defenseless foreigner, "almost the only Englishman in this hell upon earth."[40] He was imprisoned and when Palmerston received notification he decided that the case was one of "unprovoked injury and repression, calling loudly for redress." He authorized a ship of war to be stationed outside Cartagena "to demand satisfaction for the insult which has been offered to the British Nation."[41] The New Granadan government sought to defend national honor and popular sovereignty. One citizen felt that the blockade was "just a pretext for them to humiliate us, but if we cannot keep our honor then we may as well not exist."[42] José María Obando saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate that "we would rather die at the point of British bayonets than be rebuked by that race which has never respected the rights of the rest of the world, as the only law they understand is that of force."[43] Thomas Murray, currently the governor of Vélez, adviced President Santander that "I would be loath to trust their [British] professions of goodwill. In fact I am convinced that they intend to take advantage of us as if we were naïve children."[44] Murray's position was unambiguous; he took New Granada's side against Britain. His interpretation of British arrogance in the conflict was shared by others who wrote to Santander. British recklessness surprised even those who had thought themselves unconditional allies of the British Empire since independence.[45] In early 1837 a citizen wrote to Santander from Santa Marta on the Caribbean coast to report that he was convinced that "Mr Palmerston and Mr Turner are just a pair of stupid dodos [*cabezas de chorlito*] who don't realize what they've done or the mess they've got

themselves into . . . they have acted like absolute fools; Palmerston still thinks we are Indians who will be scared by seeing a reflection in a mirror."[46] Russell was eventually released, but the policy was like using a hammer to crack an egg, and its consequences were far more profound than would have been considered in London.

The show of naval force on the Caribbean coast did not tally with the limited scope of formal influence on the ground, which was restricted by geography and distance. Russell was right to see himself as isolated and friendless. In 1836–37 there were only two British subjects in Panama. These were the merchants B. W. Davisson and Lewis Lewis. Lewis was the brother-in-law of the Panamanian Coronel Herrera, and a "good person" according to future president Pedro Alcántara Herrán. Lewis is a mysterious figure against the background of several events in our narrative, and his reappearance here is intriguing. Lewis was a Jamaica-born merchant who had been a commissary in Daniel O'Leary's forces, and was, therefore, present on the battlefield at El Santuario.[47] His place at O'Leary's side in 1829 was a reflection of the valuable Britain-Jamaica-Antioquia trade in a moment of upheaval. His reemergence in Panama in 1836 on the periphery of the Russell Affair suggests that the blockade of Cartagena had paralyzed the mutually beneficial Jamaica-New Granada trade, and that Lewis appeared as a representative of the Jamaica trade in order to mediate an end to the conflict.

In the negotiations to end the British blockade of Cartagena, Lewis would have found himself on the other side of the negotiating table from Anselmo Pineda, another veteran of El Santuario, who in his capacity as aide-de-camp to General Herrán was sent to Panama and then Cartagena to negotiate an end to the dispute.[48] Pineda's appearance here reflects his growing esteem in political circles as (like Thomas Murray) a competent administrator who fulfilled his duties and achieved results. It was thanks to Pineda's mediation that the blockade did not escalate further. When the blockade ended, Pineda was granted a permanent position in charge of military resources in Cartagena, a crucial post demanding maximum loyalty and another step in Pineda's rise to political influence in New Granada. New Granadan sovereignty was slowly being asserted at the expense of the imperial powers: exemplified here by the political rise of Pineda, one of the defeated veterans of El Santuario.

The End of Thomas Murray's Tenure in Vélez

Three factors explain Thomas Murray's ejection from office in Vélez in August 1837. Ecclesiastical opposition to his anticlericalism was one, and his Liberal reformism antagonized political moderates.[49] In March 1837 Murray temporarily left office, and in May his governorship was formally suspended. He resigned in August.[50] The reaction against British arrogance and intervention that swept New Granada in the wake of the Russell Affair was probably the third contributory factor.[51] This was ironic given Murray's staunch support for New Granadan sovereignty during the conflict. Nevertheless the hypothesis is not anomalous when we consider a pamphlet published

in Bogotá at the time, which emphasizes the incompatibility between what it saw as Murray's Eurocentric political utopianism and the reality of the land he governed. The pamphlet, whose authorship has not been established, ridiculed Murray's establishment of Greek classes in Vélez, and rubbished his proposals to rename Vélez as Washington. This "sublime, new and foreign idea should certainly be welcomed and adopted enthusiastically," the anonymous author wrote with heavy irony, "and we all know of the intimate relations and the friendship that Washington enjoyed with the residents of Vélez, of whom he was very well informed."[52] This is strong evidence of resistance to Europeans telling New Granadans what to do. Murray's high-minded proposals for name-changing, like the display of naval force before it, won little sympathy among New Granadans. Murray returned to Bogotá to live off his military pension.[53]

The years 1833–39 saw other veterans of El Santuario engage in local and national politics in New Granada. In 1837 Braulio Henao began to move back toward involvement in regional politics, when he was appointed a Representative of Sonsón in the Antioquian Chamber, which he "felt obliged" to accept.[54] Francisco Giraldo married María Sixta Gómez, which gave him kinship relations with the influential families of Felix de Restrepo and President Santander.[55] Political and economic networks were gradually being reconstructed in this brief period without violent conflict.

Venezuela 1833–39: A Home for Bolivarians

In the early 1830s Venezuela became established as a haven for Bolivarians who had not been able to adapt to post-1830 circumstances in New Granada. Carlos Castelli and Enrique Lutzen were both resident in Caracas, though neither were active in politics or the military in this period, which saw the "unrestricted opening of the Venezuelan economy to foreign merchants" and a warm welcome extended to immigrants.[56]

Rupert Hand had arrived back in Venezuela by December 1833. The New Granadan foreign minister Lino de Pombo quickly requested his extradition, which was refused by Venezuela on March 14, 1834. Hand had been incorporated into the Venezuelan army and, therefore, was recognized as Venezuelan by naturalization.[57] The cabinet, which offered to try Hand again in Caracas if the New Granadans could send across all the relevant paperwork, was peopled by military veterans inclined to support Hand, most notably Daniel O'Leary's brother-in-law Carlos Soublette. Lino de Pombo wrote on July 21, 1834, requesting Hand's extradition for a second time, which was again refused.[58] Now assured of his immunity, Hand dedicated himself to teaching English. He gave private lessons and taught in several schools and clubs, including the Colegio de la Independencia, where he taught Carlos Soublette's children, and where discipline was known to be severe and physical punishment common.[59] Hand also taught English at the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País. This institution sponsored Hand's only known published text, the "Brief Analytical Explanation of

the English Alphabet."[60] But as Hand started teaching English language classes, and, therefore, grew to become an unofficial channel for British cultural influence—not unlike Thomas Murray's decision to begin Greek and Latin language classes in Vélez—the trajectory of his career was interrupted.

The reason was the Reform Revolution (*Revolución de las Reformas),* the central event in Venezuelan history in the 1830s. The revolution was led by military veterans from the Wars of Independence, and it was triggered by the surprising result of the presidential elections of 1834, in which Carlos Soublette, the favored candidate of President Páez, and the military establishment on which Rupert Hand depended, was defeated. The unexpected victor was Dr. José María Vargas, whose new administration (1835–36) was widely perceived to act in the interests of commercial sectors rather than the military veterans associated with Soublette and Páez. Unrest quickly grew into formal insurrection.[61] The leaders of the military rebellion against Vargas were all veterans of the Wars of Independence, although Soublette and Páez were not involved. Many of them had become important landowners—among them were Santiago Mariño, Diego Ibarra, and Pedro Briceño Méndez—and it was this factor that explains their decision to rebel. The revolution was proclaimed on June 7, 1835, in Maracaibo, demanding reforms to benefit the army and the church.

It seems that Rupert Hand was initially torn between his loyalty to his protectors in the military (many of whom joined the revolution) and the commercial sectors represented by Vargas, with their close links to British merchants. When the revolutionaries took control of Caracas in early July 1835, Rupert Hand went into exile in Curazao. In the name of the constitution, and also to protect the commerce with Britain and other powers that he had promoted during his presidency, Páez raised an army to expel the rebels and Hand joined his forces from Curazao. In Hand's own account, provided several years later, "even though my eyes were swollen I followed the orders I was given, and sometimes had to work day and night . . . for several months. . . . Sleeping in barracks or out in the open destroyed my health." Hand served in Caracas and La Guaira, and although no detail of his experiences survives we do know that he lost the sight in his right eye during these campaigns.[62]

In April 1836 Vargas resigned, recognizing that the revolution and its aftermath had served only to demonstrate the power of Páez as Venezuela's ultimate political arbiter. After two brief interim presidencies, Carlos Soublette took power as president in 1837, serving until 1839.[63] In the wake of the Reform Revolution, an influential cadre of British subjects and former Bolivarians like Rupert Hand found unexpected influence. Daniel O'Leary, therefore, remained secure as the Venezuelan representative in Europe. From 1837 to 39 the minister of war in Caracas was the former Gran Colombian dictator Rafael Urdaneta. A naturalized Venezuelan, Edinburgh-born William/Guillermo Smith served in various cabinet posts under Soublette, and was minister of finance and foreign relations from 1839. These indi-

viduals were able to maintain Britain's privileged commercial relationship with Venezuela despite many considerable practical difficulties, as George Edmund Carl showed in his study of British-Venezuelan diplomatic relations.[64] Although political factions fought hard over commercial policy, and battled over the meaning of citizenship and Liberalism, nation-building took place, therefore, under the shadow of the British Empire.[65] The rehabilitation of Rupert Hand and the continued employment of Daniel O'Leary and William Smith show how in mid-1830s Venezuela government remained considerably Anglophile in culture and politics, even though commercial relations were not proving to be as beneficial as profit-hungry merchants would have wished. Granting asylum to Rupert Hand and giving ambassadorial roles to Daniel O'Leary hardly amounts to Venezuela forming part of Britain's informal empire in the traditional sense. But these instances do suggest the extent to which foreign actors had managed to integrate themselves into Venezuelan society. Another El Santuario veteran, Carmelo Fernández, was charged with designing the new Venezuelan national shield, which he did under the careful eye of the British consul in Caracas, Robert Ker Porter.[66]

After the Reform Revolution was over, Rupert Hand returned to his work as an English teacher. He was so secure in his new position in Venezuela that, like many others, he subsequently won a civil case against one of the defeated rebel leaders of the revolution, for the loss of income he suffered during his brief exile. In 1839 Hand was formally granted his retirement from the army, and a pension of one-third his salary. By this time he was almost blind, though he still managed to serve as a member of the Caracas Council Board.[67] Rupert Hand's rise to political and cultural influence in late 1830s Caracas would no doubt have been greeted with scorn or disbelief in New Granada. As Elías Pino Iturrieta has argued, however, the impunity and tolerance offered to a convicted murderer reflects the state's financial weakness and the inexperience, indifference, or limitations of its leaders and administrators.[68]

The 1835 Reform Revolution in Venezuela was followed and mirrored by a dispute in 1837 over the vice-presidential election in New Granada. Both can be seen as the first violent conflicts over the meaning of the post-independence nation. In both cases the supreme leader's choice was defeated (Páez's man, Soublette, and José María Obando, nominated by Santander), in what we might see as the people's continued reluctance to embrace Bolívar's concept of the leader nominating his successor. Both elections, as Eduardo Posada-Carbó has shown, demonstrate the vitality of democracy in the region in the 1830s. The violent conflicts that came hard on their heels showed how far electoral legitimacy still had to go.[69]

Representing Venezuela in Europe

During the 1830s Thomas Murray was at the center of Liberal government in New Granada, conscious of his position within hemispheric historical change and proposing changing the name of the province he governed from

Vélez to Washington. In contrast, the man who in 1832 had penned the first influential comparison between Washington and Bolívar, Daniel O'Leary, spent these years in Europe as the representative of independent Venezuela, traveling to London, Paris, Madrid, and Rome. The very fact that the new Venezuelan republic was represented in Europe by an Irishman tells us something about how far the concept of independence still had to travel; not only that a Venezuelan-by-birth was not chosen for the job, or that the choice may have been influenced by nepotism, but perhaps most interestingly that Soublette and his advisors considered that having a European as their representative might be more effective in securing their national interests.

O'Leary sailed away from Venezuela in 1834, taking his bitterness and prejudices against Santander with him. He spent six years in Europe as a Venezuelan envoy. Historians have not been kind to O'Leary's diplomatic exertions on behalf of his adopted country. The best Jo Ann Rayfield could say was that they were "personally rewarding" and that "he derived much pleasure from his travels and through them became wiser in the ways of the world."[70] Just as when Bolívar named O'Leary as the Gran Colombian ambassador to the United States in 1830, his 1834 appointment to the Venezuelan mission was savaged in the newspapers.[71]

O'Leary took an immediate liking to London and society life and asked his brother-in-law if he could be the Venezuelan consul general "until I can establish myself here."[72] His distance from events in New Granada and Venezuela encouraged indifference.[73] The personal and confessional tone of O'Leary's private letters from Europe open him to the charge that he saw the Venezuelan state as little more than a cash cow to be milked for his personal benefit. In 1835 O'Leary was in Spain as part of the mission—headed by his brother-in-law Soublette—that sought Spanish recognition of Venezuelan independence. O'Leary was ironically proud of picking up a Spanish accent to replace his "barbarous" Venezuelan inflections, but achieved little else.[74] The mission was an absolute failure, due to Spanish demands for financial compensation from Venezuela in exchange for recognition, and to the political upheavals of the first Carlist Wars (1833–39).[75] In February 1837 O'Leary went to Rome where he was to be the new Venezuelan commissioner to the Vatican. O'Leary's mission to Rome was studied in much detail by Luis Navarro. Reconstructing the period based on O'Leary's copious letters to Soublette, Navarro stressed that no one could have negotiated any better than O'Leary in the light of terrible obstacles. These were the Freedom of Worship Law passed by the Venezuelan congress (in February 1834), the expulsions from Venezuela of Archbishop Ramón Ignacio Méndez, and the Venezuelan abolition of church tithes.[76] These considerable problems contrasted negatively with other new states lobbying the Vatican for recognition, such as Ecuador.

O'Leary was disappointed upon first reaching Rome, confessing that he had spent so much time imagining what it would be like that the reality could not match his expectations.[77] He had his first meeting with Pope Gregorio XVI on April 10, 1837. O'Leary noted that he "had [only] the honor of

kissing his hand and receiving his blessing."[78] O'Leary lightheartedly told Carlos Soublette that Gregorio XVI "seems such a nice man, very friendly . . . that I have become a Papist."[79] O'Leary was, however, quickly disillusioned with the task in hand, and complained in his letters home of poor health and isolation.[80] He described the pope as "a good theologian but a terrible politician."[81] O'Leary suffered at least two "violent nervous attacks" in these years.[82] By March 1838 he was "disgusted" by the Vatican's "malicious" attitude and the slow pace of negotiations with "these old hypocrites."[83] After a meeting of Cardinals finally decided that a Concordat could not be reached with Venezuela before its independence was recognized (something that depended on Spanish recognition, itself far from forthcoming as O'Leary knew) O'Leary despaired, and concluded that "General Bolívar always said that in order to turn an American into a good patriot, all you needed to do was send him to Spain; and I am now equally convinced that in order to make a good Catholic embarrassed of his religion, you just need to send him to Rome."[84]

O'Leary's failures as a diplomat in this time may be explained by his less than total dedication to the task in hand. Rayfield suggested that O'Leary's efforts were "half-hearted" because he recognized that he was "predestined to failure."[85] Yet O'Leary's unpublished travel diary detailing the time he spent in Florence and Rome reveals that he had an impassioned "affair of the heart" with a widow he called "F.," which in fact occupied most of his time.[86] In Rome O'Leary was often accompanied by "F." Rayfield remarks that O'Leary recorded in his diary "a painful struggle with his conscience as he wrestled with the moral, emotional and social problems of their relationship," by which she meant, presumably, his adultery.[87] Even if we were to discard personal factors, representing Venezuela was not the passion of O'Leary's life in this period.

As the Rome mission expired, Carlos Soublette got O'Leary another appointment as Venezuelan representative on the tripartite commission in charge of renegotiating the Gran Colombian debt with British financiers in London. O'Leary promised "to do the job as well as I can."[88] The Caracas newspapers complained that O'Leary had only got the job because of his family ties to Soublette, and brought up his being a foreigner.[89] In May 1839 he was living in Cavendish Square in London, with his expenses being paid by the Venezuelan state. He turned his thoughts to the education of his children. Simón was now "nine years old but he still can't read," to which O'Leary blamed the poor quality of Caracas schools, deciding that the boy should be sent to an English school.[90] O'Leary's Eurocentric prejudices and preferences were clear. Resentment against O'Leary's ineffectiveness and his foreignness finally forced Soublette to replace him with Alejo Fortique; O'Leary was relieved as he was now devoting all his energies to getting a job in the British diplomatic service in South America. He believed that his surname, denoting his Catholicism, "was the biggest obstacle" to his pretensions. Once more O'Leary suffered from being an outsider when he reached the center of power. He resigned himself to "returning with empty hands."[91]

The years 1835–39 saw the veterans and consequences of the 1829 Battle of El Santuario begin to fan out across the Gran Colombian region and across the Atlantic. British relations with Venezuela became more comfortable than those with New Granada. This was the period when Venezuela became established as an asylum for exiled Bolivarians. The Bolivarian emigration was paralleled with increasing British presence, commerce, and influence in Venezuela, which marked a sharp contrast with the poor diplomatic relations between Britain and New Granada. The bluster of the Russell Affair and the acrimonious end to Thomas Murray's administration in Vélez, however, show the two sides of British presence in New Granada. On the one hand there was Palmerston's gunboat diplomacy; on the other was Murray's politicking in Liberal circles. Both added potency to Salvador Córdova's calls to sovereignty couched in the threat of the foreigner. The networks traced in this chapter illustrate the many interlinked facets of foreign influence in Gran Colombia, often underestimated in previous studies. The next chapter follows the trajectories of our veterans back into military conflict, as they retook their weapons to fight again for liberty, whatever that meant by now.

Chapter 8

Wars and Repatriations

This chapter deals with a crucial period of the post-independence histories of both New Granada and Venezuela. There are three main subjects to be considered, and the lives of the El Santuario veterans cast new light upon them. They reveal how the two republics were consolidated in contrasting fashion on the fringes of the British Empire. British subjects were perhaps surprisingly involved in all areas covered here. The first episode is the War of the Supremes in New Granada (1839–42), which is conventionally understood as the result of the overbearing ambition of the regional caudillos, the "Supremes" who led its armies. José Manuel Restrepo's verdict became historiographical commonplace: "Wherever there was a demagogue or an aristocrat who wanted to figure on the national stage, you could find independent and sovereign juntas appearing, even in miserable little towns."[1] Salvador Córdova, in this interpretation, was the Antioquian incarnation of the caudillismo that tore the new republic apart.[2] He was captured and executed in 1841. The second phenomenon dealt with here is the strong British influence in Venezuela, illustrated by a flurry of activity and ever closer links in these years. The Mackintosh Question—the thorny and long-standing issue of how to repay public debt to private British investors, left over from the Gran Colombian union—was resolved for Venezuela while Daniel O'Leary was acting British consul in Caracas. The question took its name from James Mackintosh, one of the biggest investors, whose brother John had been a colonel in the Gran Colombian army, and later negotiated for repayment in Bogotá. At the same time as negotiations in Caracas were ongoing, O'Leary was also involved in dealing with the fallout of British imperial expansion on the Venezuela/Guayana frontier. O'Leary was a crucial mediator in the ensuing dispute. The chapter ends with the discussion of the repatriation of Simón Bolívar's mortal remains from New Granada to Venezuela in 1842, an event that brought the two countries briefly together in unity again, and in which the El Santuario veterans were involved as participants, observers, and witnesses.

The War of the Supremes

The War of the Supremes began in June 1839 and lasted until March 1842. Its national aspect was shaped by the presidential elections of 1837, in which José Ignacio Márquez surprisingly emerged victorious despite President Santander having nominated José María Obando as his favored candidate. Some of Santander's moderate followers had supported Márquez, while the so-called progressives and some military officers stayed with Obando. Victor Manuel Uribe Urán cast the War of the Supremes as "a scramble for the spoils of political office" resulting from this electoral uncertainty.[3] The incessant publication of pamphlets, broadsides, and political opinion "joined up unconnected [regional] events into one political and national horizon."[4] Salvador Córdova initially refused to join a rebellion that he rejected as illegitimate and irrelevant. But eventually he could not resist calls to defend popular sovereignty from external threat.

In early 1840 Córdova had still been primarily concerned with waging his vendetta against his old foe Francisco Urdaneta. He told anyone who would still listen that Urdaneta's rehabilitation as a military officer had made New Granada "a laughing-stock in the eyes of foreigners." Córdova returned once again to his conduct at the Battle of El Santuario, comparing himself with the ridiculous and cowardly Urdaneta, who had arrived late at the battlefield and flourished his "virginal" sword to enemies who had already surrendered.[5] When he rebelled against the government later in 1840, Córdova was again concerned to demonstrate his own independence and masculinity.

In Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera's interpretation, Salvador Córdova used the War of the Supremes as "an instrument with which to have his revenge on the present for the memory of the past." When Márquez's government invited the Ecuadorian president Flores to intervene in the conflict, Córdova and his remaining supporters accused Márquez of "selling the country and its honor so that a foreigner [Flores, a Venezuelan by birth] can have his revenge upon his enemies."[6] Yet for Antioquians this discourse retained less power in 1840; the loyalties being tugged were increasingly regional and local in the absence of any obviously foreign influence in Antioquian territory, where the national message resonated only intermittently.[7]

Salvador Córdova launched his rebellion on October 8, 1840, when the conflict in Cauca and other areas had been ongoing for several months already. There are three main points that distinguish Córdova's rebellion in 1840 from that of 1831. First, this was an uprising against a legally constituted government (Márquez had won the election, and the results were not disputed) rather than a dictatorship. Second, some of the groups and individuals who supported him in 1829 and 1831 had passed their allegiances to the constitutional central government, most notably Mariano Ospina Rodriguez and Anselmo Pineda (on whom more later). Third, Córdova was beginning to desist from employing his discourse against foreigners in Antioquia, and to replace it with rather vague calls to "honor."[8] Córdova's critics goaded him with the memory of his brother's death, and this might explain how

Córdova retained the support of many subalterns in Antioquia, especially those who had followed him in the past.[9] Piquinto Gómez, for example, had served in 1829 and 1831, and enthusiastically joined up in Medellín in 1840. Juan Pablo Vallejo embraced Córdova's call to serve as an "armed citizen." Most dramatically, Miguel Alzate emerged from a mountain hideaway to lead a guerrilla unit in support of Córdova's revolt.[10] The cry in support of Córdova was "Long live the Innocent Granadan People! Down with their Unjust Oppressors!"[11] Solidarity with old comrades filled the ideological vacuum created by the absence of foreign enemies against whom to rail.[12]

Much had changed since 1829. Despite retaining subaltern support, by 1840 Córdova had largely lost the backing of Antioquia's commercial networks, as represented in 1829 by Sinforoso García and in 1831 by Francisco Montoya. Making an enemy of Montoya, the most influential merchant and capitalist in his region, had left Córdova short of cash, his support geographically limited, and, therefore, prone to requisitioning resources by force.[13] Even Francisco Obregón, governor of Antioquia, resisted initial overtures to join the insurrections, despite the mediation of Manuel Antonio Jaramillo and the "ties of family and friendship" that joined him to his cousin Córdova.[14] Obregón was slowly convinced by developing events and Córdova's denunciations of infringed sovereignty, citing the decision "to call in the foreigner to oppress our peoples" as crucial in his decision to rebel.[15] Córdova's political alliances through his brother-in-law Jaramillo retained leverage in Medellín too, particularly so in the anti-Bolivarian circles of the University of Antioquia. These students threatened to unleash a furious wave of blood-letting in defense of Córdova and "Antioquian soil."[16] But in the eastern highlands of La Ceja, Abejorral, Sonsón, and Salamina, Córdova was vehemently opposed by supporters of Braulio Henao and Márquez's national government. Hence Córdova's political power, while still strong, was regionally limited in ways it had not been in 1829 or 1831.

Ecclesiastical support had declined most of all between 1829 and 1840. Salvador Córdova retained the support of some individual priests in Barbosa and Rionegro but he was opposed by their counterparts in Medellín and Marinilla, and most importantly, by the bishop of Antioquia, Juan Gómez Plata.[17] Using the same language that the Córdovas had previously used against Bolívar and Urdaneta, Gómez Plata denounced Salvador Córdova's "tyranny and despotism . . . worse than any of the Asian tyrants," comparing him to the "worst of the Vandals and the Goths," claiming that "I would have been treated with more respect even by the Sultan of Constantinople."[18] Fernán González argues that Gómez Plata's opposition to Córdova's rebellion in 1840 presaged the increasing identification of the church with the Conservative Party hierarchy in the 1840s and 1850s (rather than the Liberals, who would claim political lineage from Salvador Córdova).[19]

In 1840 the central government in Bogotá sent considerable forces to suppress a Córdova-led rebellion, just as it had in 1829 and in 1831. From Cauca came General Eusebio Borrero. He was supported by local risings in favor

of the government and against Córdova in Santafe de Antioquia, Marinilla, and Sonsón, now led by Braulio Henao.[20] Defeat at the Battle of Itagui, on January 17, 1841, was the first of several blows to Córdova's rebellion. There followed several months of maneuvering and skirmishing, punctuated by the publication of justificatory pamphlets. In March 1841 Córdova argued that "the government in Bogotá has established the dreadful precedent of foreign intervention in domestic disputes, introducing in this way, in the land of liberty, the European Holy Alliance's international law." Córdova desperately evoked the language of independence, urging New Granadans to "find a way to reorganise our patria, establishing a strong empire of democracy and liberty. If we work together, civil wars will no longer torment us, and aristocrats will finally abandon the throne forever. Long live democracy! Long live liberty!"[21] This proclamation may have encouraged the dedication of one new follower on his way from Bogotá to join Córdova in his rebellion: Thomas Murray.

During the early stages of the War of the Supremes, Murray was back at work in the administration of the Ministry of War and Marine, in Bogotá.[22] Observing Córdova's rebellion in Antioquia from afar, Murray was increasingly drawn toward active involvement. On January 25, 1841 (possibly after receiving news of Córdova's defeat at the Battle of Itagui) Murray published his own apocalyptic proclamation in Bogotá, declaring that "we are on the verge of a terrible abyss. Two great parties are at war: one represents colonial decrepitude, the other stands for this century's democratic progress." Murray argued that only forceful actions, not endless discussions, could "save the country," and that it was no longer time to change names, but rather to act to change reality. "People talk of a government when no such thing exists," concluded Murray.[23] With this, he prepared to sign up to fight.

We know little of Murray's involvement in the War of the Supremes except that it was short and inglorious.[24] He published his pamphlet on January 25, 1841, and six days later he was still in Bogotá, writing to foreign consuls regarding their countries' commercial interests.[25] He then set off to join the rebels in Antioquia. In addition to his ideological decision, he was most likely drawn to support his *cuñado* Salvador Córdova, cousin of his wife and godfather of his son. We do not know if Murray was involved in any military campaigning or battles at all.[26] He was captured by government forces on April 5, 1841, in Sonsón, Braulio Henao's old stamping-ground. When Murray was caught, political prisoners were being moved across the country as bargaining chips as both sides moved toward negotiating a definitive settlement.[27] Murray was taken from Sonsón down to Honda, where he lamented his lot, writing that he had "always loyally fulfilled my duty," that if he was freed "I will leave without asking for a single thing." He claimed that since leaving Bogotá in February he had been in hiding for "more than three months: without any resources or income. It was five years since I saw my son and my wife. I am not an insensitive man . . . I had resisted the urge to rush to my family's side and away from persecution. This has been my crime. I have been ruined by astute and exalted passions." Murray urged the

government to free him in recognition of "the great sacrifices he had made for the country in earlier times."[28]

In Honda, Murray's path crossed with that of Anselmo Pineda, who was charged with leading the government forces from Bogotá to suppress Córdova's revolt. Pineda's writings from this time illustrate most clearly how far Córdova was out of tune with some of his old colleagues. Pineda had been born in El Santuario and had been closely identified with the Córdova family from a very young age. He had supported Córdova in his 1830–31 insurrection against Urdaneta's dictatorship. Pineda had been working as an assistant to the army's Chief of Staff in Bogotá since September 1838. During the war it was Pineda who carried the controversial invitation to the Ecuadorian president, Flores, to invade New Granadan territory against Obando.[29] Pineda followed his patron, Herrán, to Socorro in early 1841 where they were victorious over rebel forces at the Battle of Aratoca.[30] In this convincing victory, Pineda secured the release of another high-status foreign prisoner: Francisco Urdaneta.

When the War of the Supremes broke out in 1839, Urdaneta had decided that it was time to come out of his enforced retirement. He wrote to Mosquera offering his services. He claimed that he had been discriminated against "on the basis of my surname" for eight years.[31] Although "I could have returned to military service in Venezuela six years ago," Urdaneta "chose to live like a normal private citizen, destitute and suffering unfair insults, here in these lands where all my affections are." Urdaneta wanted the opportunity to "fight against the grave, dark domination of impure fanaticism" epitomized by Obando's uprising. Mosquera eventually acquiesced and Urdaneta joined the government armies in Tunja and Pamplona. He was placed in charge of the town of Socorro, and was surprised when it was attacked on January 1, 1841, by the regional "Supremo," Manuel González, and 700 rebels. Urdaneta, who claimed to have only 60 men under his command, was defeated the next morning, receiving a serious bayonet wound in the side.[32] Urdaneta was taken prisoner when he surrendered control of Socorro to González. Eight days later he was freed, however, after Pedro Alcántara Herrán and Anselmo Pineda led the government forces to victory over González at the Battle of Aratoca.[33]

Pineda's involvement with the national military during the first year of the War of the Supremes meant that when Salvador Córdova declared his rebellion there was no way that Pineda could have supported him. Furthermore, at the end of March 1841 Pineda was named by General Herrán to lead the government forces to Antioquia. His second in command was Braulio Henao.[34] Pineda, therefore, occupied the role taken by O'Leary in 1829 and Castelli in 1831, leading the central government's forces over the Andes to suppress another rebellion in Antioquia. Pineda's identity was the key difference that undermined many of Salvador Córdova's claims for the legitimacy of his rebellion. Pineda was a born-and-bred Antioquian, in stark contrast to the Irishman and the Italian who had been sent from Bogotá in the previous conflicts. Pineda played on this in a letter he wrote to Henao, stressing that they had both previously supported Córdova because of friendship and

a shared belief in legitimacy, order, and the constitution, but that these were precisely the things that Córdova was now violating. Pausing in Honda on his way to Antioquia on April 23, 1841, Pineda wrote:

> Everyone knows . . . that Antioquia is a peaceful country, hard-working, supportive of the laws, obedient to the authorities, and sincerely patriotic. Never, ever has it been indifferent to the patria's fate. Let us end the scandals with which some chiefs [i.e. Córdova] have stained the army's glories, with their vile treachery, so distant from the heroic conduct, the bravery and the discipline of the Wars of Independence.

Pineda continued:

> With pain in my heart I will fight against two veterans of the independence struggles, one of whom is my intimate friend [Córdova]. I served under his command in . . . 1831, but he is now working to undermine that very same order. I helped him to win the laurels that earned him the patria's praise and its eternal gratitude . . . but more important to me are my oaths, the tranquillity of my native land, the inviolability of the constitution and the name of Antioquian.[35]

Pineda saw the War of the Supremes as drawing a definitive line between the conflicts that came before and after 1831. For him this was the first national civil war in which Córdova's rhetoric of sovereignty, invoking the presence and influence of foreigners, was no longer valid. Pineda still wanted to "complete the anticolonial revolution," but this now meant fulfilling the ideals of independence by overcoming the social and economic legacies of colonialism.[36] The small numbers of foreigners who settled in the country from now on were to be integrated into the social and economic elite and welcomed as catalysts to economic prosperity, rather than used as scapegoats to signal regional difference.[37] Pineda did not even comment, at least in his surviving correspondence, that while he was in Honda he had under his control an illustrious prisoner of foreign birth: Thomas Murray. Instead, Pineda headed up to the Andes to cross into Antioquia.

Probably not long after Pineda left Honda, in late April 1841, a new turn of events enabled Murray to escape from his prison. The story of Murray's escape from prison was recalled decades later by José María Samper, by then one of nineteenth-century-Colombia's principal Liberal politicians and writers. Samper was 13 in 1841, and he recalled how his father, Don José María Samper, had made a special effort to save Murray's life. Don José María Samper had told his son that they had to "save a foreigner from the firing squad, as he is my friend and a brave servant of our patria." Although the child-author emerged as the protagonist of the drama he narrated (Samper carried messages, guarded horses, and looked for escape routes) the story of Murray's escape is very indicative of the esteem in which he was held. Samper noted that after Murray had jumped the prison wall to freedom, he remembered that he had left behind his favorite blanket, or *ruana,* in his cell. Murray, therefore,

climbed the wall back into the prison, rescued the *ruana,* escaped a second time and fled with Samper. The boy later asked him, why risk your life for a *ruana*? Samper remembered that Murray had responded with "heroic simplicity": "The *ruana* was a present from General Obando, and I could not leave it behind." For Samper this was a "sublime" piece of heroism.[38]

Such extreme unconditional loyalty was a valued commodity during the nineteenth-century civil wars. José María Obando was the main hate-figure for the Bolivarians and exiled veterans from El Santuario, who had been blamed by O'Leary and others for the assassination of Antonio José de Sucre in 1830. He, of course, reciprocated their opprobrium. Murray's loyalty to Obando gained him lasting respect from the many New Granadan Liberals who formed part Obando's political and patronage networks.[39] As Liberals divided into "country" and "city" factions, known as the *ruana* and *casaca* groups because of their preferred dress (poncho-style versus jacket), Murray's symbolic gesture of loyalty won him the kind of support that saved his life.

Murray was able to hide in the Samper family's hacienda during the closing stages of the war. He did not rejoin Córdova for the decisive final part of the campaign. One of the veterans who did stay with Córdova, Francisco Escalante, later told Henao that "Córdova had been very upset and hurt that you, his *compañero* from the days of El Santuario" had chosen to fight against him.[40] Córdova's forces were resoundingly defeated at the Battle of Salamina on May 5, 1841, by government forces led by Pineda and Henao, and filled with Antioquian "volunteers."[41] Henao led a rapid infantry charge down upon Córdova's tired troops, who had just struggled up a steep wet incline to reach the battlefield.[42] Córdova escaped with his life, but he was captured a few weeks later. In early July 1841 Córdova and his fellow prisoners were shuffled around the Cartago-Honda area as though they were chess pieces whose fate was being decided by a player who was reluctant to finish the game against a more experienced opponent. Decisive intervention was eventually provided by General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera.

The day after he arrived in Cartago, General Mosquera ordered the execution of the seven prisoners: Salvador Córdova, Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, Manuel Camacho, Bibiano Robledo, José María Ayala, José Antonio Castrillón, and Juan de la Cruz González. The next morning, July 8, 1841, the prisoners were led to the firing squad in complete silence. Salvador Córdova's last words were to "ask forgiveness from everyone. I joined this revolution not to steal, as has been said, but because I felt obliged to defend its cause."[43] Mosquera claimed that "those men could not be allowed to live without endangering the Republic's health."[44] For Córdova's supporters, the seven "treacherous murders…were events that cannot be described, that produce such indignation and anger that cannot be rendered."[45]

The execution of Salvador Córdova in Cartago in 1841 was, therefore, added to his brother's murder 12 years previously, to produce a tragic narrative for Liberals, which would continue to justify violent actions in subsequent decades. Obando alleged that "foreign support" had been lent to Mosquera's side and condoned the "cold and premeditated massacre" of

the prisoners, despite the "open resistance of the entire nation."[46] But the brothers' deaths were differentiated by many factors, including the increasing marginality of the "foreigner" in this discourse. Salvador Córdova's murderers were an anonymous firing squad, though they were certainly New Granadans, in stark contrast to the Irish mercenary Rupert Hand who killed his older brother. The intellectual author was a quintessentially New Granadan figure, General Mosquera, in contrast to the "that vile foreigner," O'Leary.[47] In this purely symbolic sense, Salvador Córdova's rebellion and death can be seen as the last gasp of a past era. He had declared himself against foreign involvement in popular sovereignty, but was defeated in a war in which foreigners were largely peripheral. There was foreign involvement in the War of the Supremes, of course, but as Thomas Murray's case demonstrates, that involvement was as likely to be with Salvador Córdova as against him. The villains of the piece were now New Granadans like Mosquera, not foreigners like Murray.

In June 1841 Murray was captured for a second time by government troops and this time he was tied up, beaten up, and put on a horse that would take him to Bogotá. As Samper recalled it, however, "the two months grace he had gained by his escape from jail . . . saved his life."[48] When Murray reached Bogotá the circumstances were such that Murray was tried for "conspiracy." The investigating judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence to continue with the prosecution, "even though Murray's departure from Bogotá [at the beginning of the war], the way he left and the road he took, all cast considerable suspicion over him."[49] The case was shelved, although a related one—in which Murray was tried for abandoning his post in the Ministry of War and Marine—did continue.[50] The final fate of this second trial is unknown; no further documents survive. Certainly his involvement in the War of the Supremes and the death of his relative-through-godparenting, Salvador Córdova, made Murray feel even more Granadan than before. As the Liberal "Laws on Foreignness" made clear later, in the 1860s, "every foreigner who involves themselves in any way in civil or international warfare in the country, will give up their neutral status and will be subject to the same punishments and obligations as all other Colombians."[51] This law could almost have been designed with Thomas Murray in mind, establishing that taking up arms for political ends was an intrinsically Colombian thing to do, and Murray's efforts meant that he was no longer understood to be a foreigner.[52]

Anselmo Pineda in Panama

After his victory over Salvador Córdova in Antioquia, Anselmo Pineda continued to fight guerrillas and to supply the forces opposing Obando. In Pasto, Pineda's forces were defeated and he was almost killed by a bullet that went straight through his shirt but left him unscathed. Separated from his men, Pineda had to flee alone through the Patia Valley, "almost naked, with only a straw hat, an old shirt and *ruana*," swimming across the River Guachicono and running until he reached Pasto "where they had given me

up for dead."[53] In Pasto, Pineda was named Jefe Militar and in October 1841 was appointed provincial governor. He demonstrated his organizational capabilities, restoring peace in the region and within the armed forces. Pineda's involvement in the War of the Supremes underlines the reconfiguration of the politics and loyalty in New Granada at the end of the 1830s. He crisscrossed the national territory in the defense of legitimacy and nation, but he had fought against Salvador Córdova, who had saved his life after defeat at El Santuario in 1829. As a reward for his services, Pineda was sent to Panama to negotiate an end to the conflict there. On December 18, 1841, Pineda signed a peace treaty with the "supremo" General Tomás Herrera, who was allowed to retain power in the isthmus with the justification that although he had presided over "change" and "crisis" in Panama, it had not amounted to "revolution." Pineda was "extraordinarily satisfied" to have secured peace without "enormous expenditure, cruel or painful sacrifices, or a long and disastrous war."[54] In August 1842 Pineda returned to Antioquia, where he founded the Sociedad Patriótica de Medellín to promote popular education in the city.[55] In March 1843 Pineda was elected to represent Antioquia in congress in Bogotá. Once in the capital he worked in Conservative collective societies, being the founding secretary of the Sociedad Filantrópica. The vice president of the society was his old friend and increasingly powerful Conservative politician Mariano Ospina Rodriguez.

Pineda's rise to influence seems to reflect a new robustness of the nation. But Salvador Córdova's warnings about sovereignty were not mere rhetoric. US consuls gave credence to Córdova's claims of foreign intervention, noting in October 1840 that "one of the charges made against the present administration is that it is intended to sell the country, or at least a part of it (the Isthmus) to the British government."[56] By November, the same official reported in code that "the British Charge d'affaires is taking an open and active part in favor of the present government, and, I have reason to believe, has offered ships and sailors to reduce the coast to subjection."[57] Encoded British correspondence from early 1841 also attests to New Granadan government attempts to "solicit the protection of Her Majesty's Government to prevent further Revolution," with particular reference to the continued repayment of debt.[58] British involvement in the War of the Supremes was informal and pragmatic, nevertheless, and often restricted to intervening in individual cases.[59] When British attempts to exercise influence were more formal or physical, they left New Granadans unimpressed or downright angry, as in the case of General Carmona, who in 1840 responded to the machinations of Edward Watt in Cartagena by asking "what are you English shits thinking of? Leave my territory this moment, goddamit, or I will have you shot . . . I shit on you all, goddamit."[60]

The experiences of the El Santuario veterans through the War of the Supremes illustrate the extent to which old political loyalties had been overturned during the 1830s. The junctures where old enemies crossed paths, such as when Anselmo Pineda freed Francisco Urdaneta at Aratoca, or when he guarded Thomas Murray in Honda, give us a sense of the distance traveled

from independence and the extent to which nation-states were strengthened and sovereignty established. Córdova and Jaramillo disappeared from the scene, and Thomas Murray retreated to the periphery. Anselmo Pineda and Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, previously enemies of the foreign Bolivarians at El Santuario, would now be at the forefront of efforts to emulate and interact with the European and North American powers.

Peace in Venezuela 1839–42: Increasingly Bolivarian Rule under Páez

In the years 1839–42 Venezuela experienced a period of peace presided over by its dominant national caudillo José Antonio Páez, the overwhelming victor in the presidential elections of late 1838. This period was a marked contrast to the political violence that marked New Granada in the same period. Páez's cabinet was stacked with former Bolivarians. As the leader of a government representing what Venezuelan historians call "oligarchic conservatism," Páez and his ministers proposed and enacted measures that they thought would integrate the republic into the modern, prosperous world, for example, private road-building schemes, national schools, immigration, and repayment of the national debt.

With Guillermo Smith in the Finance (and later, also, Foreign Affairs) Ministry Venezuela's progress was firmly tied to British power in these years. Opposition to this state of affairs became grouped around the newspaper *El Venezolano*, founded by Antonio Leocadio Guzmán in August 1840, and supported by the newly formed Liberal Party. The Liberals, in addition to criticizing Smith's economic policies as not sufficiently beneficial for the Venezuelan republic, accused Páez of using his position for the personal advantage of his cronies. The careers of the El Santuario veterans in Venezuela in these years bear out the Liberal criticisms that sovereignty was infringed by the influential positions occupied by British subjects and their allies in political authority. Was this informal empire? We must be careful not to overestimate British influence in this period, but the evidence shows that the shadow cast by British power was long and keenly felt. Venezuelan elites, whether in government or political opposition, used foreign actors to support their own projects to realign the country's internal power structures. In Daniel O'Leary's words in 1843, "General Paez has always shewn a desire to cultivate the friendship of England in preference to any other country."[61] This did not go unnoticed in Caracas, and correspondingly, foreign attempts to influence national affairs were often resented and resisted.[62]

With his friends and relations now ensconced in power, Daniel O'Leary had returned to Venezuela in January 1840, having been absent from the country and his family for almost six years. While he waited for his contact at the Foreign Office, Lord Clarendon, to offer him a diplomatic appointment, O'Leary worked on his *Narración*, penning a prologue in June 1840.[63] While he labored in his study on a text that would not be read for 40 years, global communications advances acted to speed up Venezuela's links to the

world economy. In 1839–40 the first Red "D" Line steam packet and the first Royal Mail Steam Packet linked England to La Guaira direct, and dramatically reduced transatlantic communication time.[64] O'Leary was then named British consul in the Venezuelan port of Puerto Cabello, a minor post that O'Leary believed was beneath him. He found the duties "routine, mundane, and boring" and Puerto Cabello "worse than hell."[65] When the consul in Caracas, Robert Ker Porter, left on leave to visit his daughter in Russia (where he died in 1842) O'Leary was only too keen to stand in for him.

O'Leary had some success in mediating between Venezuela and the British imperial state. With Smith he negotiated an end to the Mackintosh Question for Venezuela (it dragged on in New Granada for many more years). There were two other important issues to deal with in 1841–42: the Venezuela-Guayana border, and the British Colonial Bank. On the first, O'Leary was correctly accused of a serious conflict of interests over British encroachments into Venezuelan territory.[66] Between 1840 and 1844 the explorer Robert Schomburgk marked out a new border between British Guayana and Venezuela. In these years news trickled into Caracas of Schomburgk's travels, publications, and, most controversially, his arbitrary decision to shift the recognized border some way to the west of the Essequibo river (which Venezuela claimed was the correct frontier) by erecting new boundary posts. As Jo Ann Rayfield concluded in her study of O'Leary's involvement, he "seems to have been able, by exploiting the confidence which many influential Venezuelans vested in him personally, to keep Venezuela from realising the seriousness of the British threat." O'Leary's "primary loyalty" was now with Britain, not Venezuela, and he had no qualms about giving a raw deal to his old compatriots who still believed he had their interests at heart.[67] D. Graham Burnett's "postcolonial" study of the mapping expeditions has marveled at the "expansive, nomadic, and boundary-transgressing technique [which] led Schomburgk to demarcate a highly ambiguous boundary."[68] Venezuelans were less impressed by what they saw as an act of "dominion and empire on the part of Great Britain" against which they might have thought would have been protected by their foreign minister, Smith, and the acting consul, O'Leary, with their excellent contacts and relationships with British imperial power. Alejo Fortique, the Venezuelan minister in London, expressed the fear that among "the people of Venezuela, having seen the British flag wave in their territory [there will be . . .] malcontents [who] will also make it a pre-text for machinations of dangerous consequences." He urged Britain's representatives, including O'Leary, to "preserve order and good morals among a people that has ever afforded to England proofs of amity and good faith?"[69] O'Leary was felt to have played a considerable role in what Venezuelan nationalists later seized on as the "theft" of their national territory by the British Empire.[70] The surviving documents reveal that Soublette trusted in O'Leary's discrete lobbying to defend Venezuela's borders, and that O'Leary was rather devious. O'Leary asked Aberdeen if "from motives of delicacy towards the individual, who has confided in me, that he trusts no trace of [Soublette's]

communication may remain in these archives."[71] O'Leary told Aberdeen that Soublette was "greatly attached to Great Britain," which may in fact have encouraged, rather than diminished, Britain's firm stance not to negotiate the newly established boundaries. O'Leary later told Soublette that "though I have had the misfortune not to concur in the opinion of the Venezuelan government in the Boundary question, I have done what was in my power to smooth the way to an amicable arrangement."[72]

A second example of the mediating role that O'Leary played between British imperial interests and the Venezuelan state was his position as a shareholder of, and lobbyist for, the Banco Colonial Británico, founded in Caracas as a dependency of the Colonial Bank (London) on July 29, 1839.[73] The bank's directors were Leandro Miranda, the British-born son of Francisco de Miranda and Sarah Andrews, and the Scottish merchant and financier William Ackers. Leandro Miranda had married Teresa Dalla-Costa Soublette in Caracas on February 1, 1840. This marriage cemented his links to the Venezuelan government (through Carlos Soublette, his new wife's uncle), to the commercial and financial elite in Venezuelan Guayana (through Antonio and Juan Bautista Dalla-Costa, her brothers) and to the representative of British imperial power in Venezuela, Daniel O'Leary (her mother's brother-in-law).[74] Páez's government gave the Banco Colonial substantial operating privileges in the hope that it would efficiently service and pay the country's external debts.[75] The cosy relationship between the close-knit governing clique and the representatives of British imperial power was noticed and criticized by opposition politicians. Indeed, the Soublette-Miranda-O'Leary axis and the Banco Colonial's strong links to foreign capital combined to catalyze national opinion and led to the foundation of the Banco Nacional de Venezuela by the "oligarchs" in 1841.[76] The two banks battled for financial control in Caracas until 1849, when new government credit laws forced the Banco Colonial to close its doors.[77]

Despite the contempt felt for him by Liberals and nationalists, O'Leary retained a high reputation among the Conservative elite in Caracas. Páez recommended that O'Leary should replace his "dear friend" Robert Ker Porter as consul, because of the "prudence and moderation" with which O'Leary had "managed relations with this government, his circumspection in dealings with all political parties in the country, his good and extensive contacts, his perfect understanding of our laws and customs."[78] In 1843, however, it was Belford Hinton Wilson who got the job of consul in Caracas, not O'Leary. The Foreign Office apparently saw O'Leary as too political a choice, too closely linked to the old Bolivarians, to the independence veterans, to Páez and to Soublette.

Missing out on the post was a financial as well as a personal disappointment for O'Leary; he had just sent his eldest son, Simón Bolívar O'Leary, to an expensive school in England. Personal crisis was exacerbated by national economic crisis in Venezuela, a consequence of global economic retraction in 1842–43. By 1844–45 trade had recovered, with demand in Britain triggering higher prices for Venezuelan exports like sugar, coffee, and cacao.

The Caracas Teaching Community: Rupert Hand and Carmelo Fernández

Like his old chief O'Leary, Rupert Hand spent these years in a position of influence in Caracas. In 1840, as part of his push to improve national education, President Páez gave over buildings from the San Francisco Convent to the Independencia School run by Feliciano Montenegro y Colón, who agreed to provide free education to some poor children, alongside his paying pupils, as part of his contract with the state. Rupert Hand was the English teacher and a stalwart of the strict military discipline imposed on the pupils.[79] Hand's pupils included Soublette's own children, as well as the sons of Francisco Aranda, the new foreign minister, and the historian Rafael María Baralt.[80]

In 1841, when the Universidad Central de Venezuela, in Caracas, decided to recruit a professor of English, Rupert Hand applied.[81] His several years of experience teaching prominent members of the Caracas elite must have made his application particularly attractive; his status as a convicted murder in a neighboring country was presumably ignored. (Daniel O'Leary was on the original appointments committee, though he withdrew during the short-listing process). Hand got the job and started teaching the same year. He remained notorious for the severe discipline he employed, and taught until 1845, when the number of students dropped so low (we don't know why) that the classes were suspended. Hand was granted a military invalid's pension by the government from which he lived out his last years in Caracas.[82]

One of Rupert Hand's colleagues in the small Caracas teaching community in 1841 was another of his comrades from the Battle of El Santuario. Venezuelan-born Carmelo Fernández was the art teacher at the Roscío and La Paz schools. At the same time, Fernández was working with the cartographer Agustín Codazzi on his maps of Venezuela and establishing a reputation as an excellent painter of watercolors and portraits, and as a draftsman, and lithographer. Fernández painted several dozen portraits to illustrate Rafael María Baralt and Ramón Díaz's *Resúmen de la historia de Venezuela*, which were lithographed in Paris.[83] Fernández was married to President José Antonio Páez's daughter Luisa (his own second cousin) and in all his endeavors, whether painting heroes or mapping the national territory, he proved himself to be an integral part of the national project.

Global connections still shaped the lives of the El Santuario veterans. Recuperating from the deterioration of his left arm and right leg, injured in the Wars of Independence, in 1841 Carlos Castelli sailed from Venezuela for Italy. He was charged with bringing back a boat-load of Italian immigrants, but his expedition was shipwrecked on the coast of Tuscany. Castelli was financially ruined.[84] He took advantage of the time he spent in Italy to marry 24-year-old Paula Emilia in Turin on June 27, 1842. One of the witnesses was a Turin senator, Biagio Alasia. By 1844, now aged 54, Castelli had returned to Venezuela, acting as an unpaid Sardinian consul in Caracas.[85] Like O'Leary he was now representing Europe in an official capacity after over two decades in the region.

The Repatriation of Bolívar's Remains from New Granada to Venezuela

With the consolidation of power in the early 1840s of Conservative regimes in both New Granada (under General Herrán) and Venezuela (under General Páez) came the rehabilitation of the memory of Simón Bolívar. The repatriation of Bolívar's remains from Santa Marta (on New Granada's Caribbean coast) to the Venezuelan capital in 1842 provided an opportunity for the two governments to wallow in nostalgia for an apparently lost and glorious past. The repatriation was part of the beginning of the state-sanctioned "Bolívar cult" that mushroomed from then on in Venezuela.[86] Veterans of the Bolivarian armies from El Santuario were heavily involved in the elaborate transfer of the bones, initiated by President Páez.

The staging of the repatriation was consciously Eurocentric. The Italian Agustín Codazzi was commissioned to design and build, in Paris, the carriage that would carry the urn containing Bolívar's remains, as well as "a Victory Arch to adorn the solemn act." Daniel O'Leary was charged with communicating with the Italian sculptor Pietro Tenerani, who was to create, in Rome, a marble monument where the remains would lie. Some of the friends who had been with Bolívar in his last days were also invited, including Alejandro Próspero Reverend, the French doctor who had treated Bolívar. A new urn was commissioned to be made in Bogotá to carry Bolívar's remains to Caracas, though Bolívar's heart was to be left in Santa Marta "as a symbol of eternal friendship between the two countries."[87] Daniel O'Leary was at the time British consul in Puerto Cabello and acting consul in Caracas.[88] It was O'Leary's idea that a British warship should be sent to Santa Marta to assist in transferring Bolívar's remains.[89] The Venezuelan mission sailed for Santa Marta accompanied by the esteemed artist and El Santuario veteran Carmelo Fernández. Throughout the journey Fernández drew 18 sketches of the expedition's progress.[90]

The governor of Santa Marta in 1842 was Joaquín Posada Gutierrez. In his memoirs he recalled that the Venezuelan commissioners arrived at Santa Marta not on their own ship the *Constitución,* but in *La Circe,* the French corvette that had in theory been accompanying them. This was a suitable beginning for a multinational event where the British and French, especially, were ever present. Posada Gutierrez welcomed the commissioners ashore with a speech evoking the memory of Bolívar, "the man whose fame filled the world."[91] When the marble stone was lifted away from the grave, the foreign and national warships in the harbor (the Venezuelan *Constitución* and brig *Caracas*, HMS *Albatross*, the French corvette *La Circe*, the Dutch sloop *Venus*, and the Danish sloop *Sainte Croix*) all began regular cannon-fire to mark the occasion.[92] The exhumation of the remains attracted interest from invited guests and locals alike, who all crowded for a glimpse. The funeral convoy to the port the next day was made up of "all the honorable individuals, regardless of color" who were in the town and "five or six thousand people" waved goodbye to the relics on November 22, 1842, when they

began the 21-day journey from Santa Marta to La Guaira.[93] O'Leary joined the "magnificent" cortege from La Guaira over the mountain to Caracas on December 15, and he walked with the diplomatic community on December 17 when Bolívar's remains were taken into the San Francisco church. They lay there for seven days before moving on December 23 to the cathedral. Dreaming that even in death Bolívar would once again unite people despite their diverse origins or politics, O'Leary noted that "every one seemed desirous that party spirit should be buried in the Tomb of Bolivar."[94] He reported to London that "the British and Foreign naval officers who attended the funeral rites have been treated with great hospitality."[95]

From the moment of their arrival in Caracas, Bolívar's remains were subject to the most pompous and exaggerated accompaniment. The head of state, ministers, generals, the diplomatic community, and "thousands of well-wishers" turned out to the streets. Rafael Urdaneta, at the time the governor of Guayana, recalled that "the foreign residents of Caracas and La Guaira, filled with the same enthusiasm as the locals, had joined in the preparations and mixed in the lines wearing national uniforms."[96] O'Leary and Carmelo Fernández were there, of course; we can presume that Rupert Hand attended too, though no firm evidence survives of his attendance. José Antonio Páez presided over the ceremonies in one of the last acts of his presidential term. As Elías Pino Iturrieta has shown, the intricate choreography of the return of Bolívar's remains was "an important opportunity for the well-dressed sections of society to display how modern they were and to substantiate their claims that they deserved a place on the world stage."[97] The representatives of foreign powers, such as O'Leary, were to bear witness to Venezuela's modernity and the honors it paid to Bolívar.

Reflecting on the success of the ceremony, O'Leary told the foreign minister, Aranda, that Bolívar's most "earnest desire" had always been "to cultivate an intimate connection with England." According to O'Leary, "the British Public, [had] constantly sympathized with him in his generous efforts in the cause of humanity, admired indeed the successful warrior who established by his achievements the independence of a great portion of this Continent, but they admired far more the philanthropic statesman who enlightened his fellow citizens by his philosophy, and exhorted them by his authority, and who vindicating the violated rights of the Indian and the African, proscribed slavery in his own country, and in the other vast territories whose inhabitants had sought his protection and acclaimed him their ruler."[98]

For O'Leary, the repatriation of Bolívar's remains to Venezuela had taken place under British guidance and with British approval. This was only right and proper in O'Leary's opinion, given that (as he had written in 1841) Britain's only "desire [was] to maintain with [Venezuela . . .] the most friendly relations, without aiming at exclusive advantages or pretending to establish any undue influence in the country."[99] Britain's influence in Venezuela was due, not "undue," in the sense that it was owed in return for past support and present trust (in contrast to other imperial powers, such as the French, who only "feigned interest" in the country at times of crisis).[100] The beginning

of the rehabilitation of Bolívar's memory was proof that O'Leary and the Bolivarians at El Santuario in 1829 had been right all along. It might also be a confirmation that the official British policy to support Bolívar even as his internal popularity hemorrhaged, as sustained by Patrick Campbell in alliance with O'Leary in 1829 and 1830, was the right one. For O'Leary this demonstrated once again that those who had opposed Bolívar in 1829—such as José María Córdova and James Henderson—had been wrong and had deserved their fates.

The years studied in this chapter mark the beginning of the end of the story of the veterans of El Santuario. The executions of Salvador Córdova and Manuel Antonio Jaramillo in 1841 contrast strikingly with Rupert Hand's election as Venezuela's first University Professor of English, and Daniel O'Leary's promotion to the post of acting British consul in Caracas, all in the same year. The comparison appears to confirm the defeat of Antioquian Liberals and the extinguishing of their cries for independence, and also to bring out the ways that the Bolivarians of 1829 had been realigned with the forces of British imperial power by 1841. The summary executions of Córdova and Jaramillo also contrast vividly with the lengthy judicial process and foreign interventions that eventually facilitated Rupert Hand to escape death in 1833. Córdova and Jaramillo's fates in Cartago bring into relief the special circumstances that had favored Hand. The image of Rupert Hand strolling through the Plaza Mayor in Caracas on December 17, 1842, as Simón Bolívar's body was paraded through the city, might seem to be an apt symbol for the triumph of British informal influence across Gran Colombia, and a bitter rebuke to the memory of those who had opposed Hand and O'Leary at El Santuario.

But although persuasive, such a one-dimensional interpretation would neglect much of what is so interesting about these years. While Salvador Córdova and Daniel O'Leary might be seen as the two extremes of the El Santuario trajectories (one staying as the rebel against central power, and dying in similar fashion to his brother, the other moving almost seamlessly from Bolivarian general to British diplomat) this would be too simplistic. There are numerous examples recounted in this chapter that show the unexpected paths taken. Anselmo Pineda, Braulio Henao, and Mariano Ospina Rodriguez's conversions to the banners of New Granadan Conservatism, where they found themselves allied with Francisco Urdaneta, is one. Another is Thomas Murray's journey in the opposite direction, leading to his involvement in the War of the Supremes and narrow escape from execution as a Liberal rebel. As the next chapter shows, the 1840s represented a second peak of British prestige across the Gran Colombian region, but one in which the seeds of its decline were increasingly obvious. The veterans of El Santuario were again involved in leading, negotiating, adapting, and resisting foreign influence across the region.

Chapter 9

The End of Bolivarian Networks

This final chapter extends from 1843 to 1854, and the trajectories of the El Santuario veterans draw the consequences of the 1829 battle to a close. On one level this decade sees selected veterans reach their maximum levels of influence and status: Daniel O'Leary became the British ambassador in Bogotá, Thomas Murray was the director of the New Granadan military school, and Rupert Hand was professor of English at the University of Central Venezuela. Anselmo Pineda and Carlos Castelli were both provincial governors. These appointments, and their implications, are studied here in detail. But despite first appearances they do not add up to an apogee of informal empire, in which New Granada and Venezuela were run according to European interests by imperial agents working on the inside. A wider perspective creates a much messier picture.

During this period we see that British imperial policy toward the region was completely fractured, combining aspiration to control with great indifference: land-grabs and support for coup-plotters were juxtaposed with ignorance or half-hearted meddling in elite politics. The lack of focus and attention allowed other powers, especially the United States, to supplant the British as the dominant imperial power during the 1850s. The chapter examines New Granada and Venezuela in turn. Both sections show how old allegiances from 1829 had dissipated and blurred over time—the friendship that blossomed between Pineda and O'Leary is a good example of this.

However, as the third and final part of this chapter shows, at a regional level in Antioquia the events of 1854 show the two sides lining up again in civil conflict. Although many of the original protagonists from 1829 were now dead, their descendents raised old standards to fight new battles. The chapter begins in Venezuela, where the 1840s witnessed a last peak of British influence.

Venezuela, Boundaries and Banking

Between 1843 and 1854, Venezuela experienced political conflict and economic turmoil. The visibility of foreign powers, most notably the British, was a

constant point of contention throughout the period. The presidency of Carlos Soublette (1843–47) was a high point of British influence, even though in early 1844 his brother-in-law Daniel O'Leary left Caracas for a new role as British minister (equivalent to ambassador) in Bogotá. Soublette attempted to reconcile political enemies and to bridge the divide between the military and civilian sectors. Old Bolivarians like Rafael Urdaneta remained in the cabinet but the standing army was reduced and political exiles were allowed to return. In 1845, Spain at last recognized Venezuelan independence.

The British felt secure in their position as the preeminent foreign power in Venezuela under Soublette. Belford Hinton Wilson, the new consul, was more engaged with historiographical debates than he was with combating the rising tide of anti-British feeling in the late 1840s. He worried that Venezuelans thought the British had "indirectly fomented the revolution which led to the dissolution of the late Republic of Colombia." Wilson was particularly keen that "such a notion may not be taken up by future historians" (such as the book you are reading today).[1] British complacence was disrupted by a financial crisis triggered by a fall in demand, from around 1842, for Venezuela's principal exports, coffee and cacao. Artisans began to mobilize against the government's tariff reductions, which were aimed at stimulating trade but which left them defenseless against British imports. In 1846 guerrilla violence broke out across the country in support of the Liberal candidate for the presidency, Antonio Leocadio Guzmán. Opponents railed against foreigners. Some graffiti painted in central Caracas at the time read "Death to [Consul] Wilson, the British, the Blacks and Guzmán" even though, as one Caracas newspaper observed, Guzmán "had never had any dealings with the British."[2] The Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Manuel Manrique apologized to the British, reminding Venezuelans that "the British have always been noble, generous and benevolent towards us, and this powerful and philanthropic nation's sons took an important part in our war of independence."[3]

Rupert Hand's Last Years as Professor of English in Caracas

The beginning of the decline of British influence in Venezuela was paralleled by the last years of Rupert Hand's life. Hand gradually drifted out of public society in Caracas. Attendance dwindled at his English classes and the university suspended his contract. French was taught instead until a new professor, US-educated Cristóbal Mendoza, was appointed to teach English in 1858.[4] Hand had dined with the British consul Sir Robert Ker Porter on several occasions in previous years (Ker Porter had noted in his diary that "Hand is a strange, absent kind of man: which is no surprise if everything they say about him is true"), but in the 1840s he suffered from ill health that prevented him from going out much.[5] His final medical report (submitted in the hope of receiving an increased pension) observed that Hand "can not see out of his right eye, he has lost almost all of his teeth, he suffers from

an uncontrollable hernia problem, he needs to wear a crotch-sling to support his deteriorated and painful testicles, he is incontinent, he suffers from abdominal ulcers and he is incapable of performing any work whatsoever."[6] His friends published statements in the press to rescue his reputation, and he died in 1846 or 1847, either in Caracas or in the Danish colony of St. Thomas, where, rumors circulated, he had gone to recover his health.[7]

Carlos Castelli, a Bolivarian in Caracas 1843–54

General José Tadeo Monagas was President Soublette's anointed successor, and in the 1847 election he was also backed by José Antonio Páez. Monagas' regime continued the hegemony of the Conservative oligarchy and the large landowners who had been enriched by the spoils of independence. However, worsening economic crisis led to food shortages and increased political factionalism. Monagas had been a staunch Bolivarian and defender of the Gran Colombian Republic; in 1831 he had even named one of his sons "José Ruperto," apparently in honor of Rupert Hand.[8] Monagas' presidency nevertheless witnessed the breakdown of British-Venezuelan relations. In an attempt to stimulate local economies Monagas abolished commercial laws of 1834 and 1841 both of which, negotiated by Consul Ker Porter, had proved beneficial to British interests. Consul Wilson protested against the measures, and threatened naval blockades of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello. Monagas recompensed British interests in order to end a potentially damaging conflict.

Economic instability gradually encouraged Monagas to take a more Liberal line than his patrons, Soublette and Páez, had expected. He was generous toward political prisoners and exiles, abolished the death penalty, and incorporated vociferous Liberals into his cabinet. When Conservatives launched a violent rebellion, Carlos Castelli took Monagas' side against Páez, as did several other old Bolivarians who had never forgiven Páez for his disloyalty in 1826 and 1830. In 1848, as Monagas's Chief of Staff, Castelli campaigned in the Apure against Páez. He was then named governor of Maracaibo. Upon his arrival in the port, Castelli published a pamphlet in which he presented himself as an impartial and benevolent governor. Noting that his foreign birth might be an issue for some residents, he claimed that "some of my best friends are from Maracaibo," meaning that he was able to "understand your pain" and help to reestablish justice in the wake of 11 months of "atrocious warfare, hunger, fire, plague, destruction. . . . All committed out of pure evil." Now the agent of a Liberal government, Castelli still espoused strong military rule, where "the rule of force would end the era of insults, and punish all crimes."[9] On March 22, 1849, Monagas promoted him to the rank of general and in 1850 Castelli adopted Venezuelan nationality and became minister of war and marine.[10]

The civil conflict of 1848–49 had caused considerable problems for the British subjects in Venezuela who sympathized with or supported José Antonio Páez, especially when he was defeated and sent into exile. In September 1848 the British legation complained that Monagas' victorious

forces had "succeeded in exciting an ill-feeling toward foreigners among the lower classes of the community."[11] This antagonism was exacerbated by the financial crisis—itself worsened by the devastation of civil war—that wreaked havoc on Venezuelan institutions. The Banco Colonial failed in mid-1849, and the Banco Nacional de Venezuela followed it into liquidation in March 1850. When the British again threatened a naval blockade (February–March 1850), Monagas appeared to give in to the show of force, and promised to pay all bank creditors (both national and foreign) in newly established State Bonds. Some foreign debts remained unpaid, however, reflecting Monagas' growing sense of independence from British influence.[12]

The 1850 presidential election was won by the president's younger brother, José Gregorio Monagas. The close family and clientalistic nature of the Monagas' rule meant that politics and administration became increasingly factionalized and corrupt.[13] Military rule remained unchallenged and Conservative rebellions in the provinces were ruthlessly suppressed. High export prices allowed Monagas to cement his rule by redistributing land to military and political chiefs as a reward for their continued loyalty. There was also a renewed drive to rehabilitate Simón Bolívar's reputation. In 1851 Carlos Castelli took charge of efforts to commission and erect a sculpture of Bolívar (Figure 9.1) in the center of Caracas. A Committee met in Castelli's house on August 3, 1851, and Castelli proposed "a magnificent bronze equestrian statue of the type that very few cities in Old Europe can claim, a statue which the people would claim as their own."[14] His fundraising was

Figure 9.1 Statue of Bolívar in Central Caracas
Source: Photo by author (2011).

successful, with the Italian sculptor Pietro Tenerani charged with casting the monument, which was shipped over and inaugurated in 1852.

As national identities and national imaginaries were being developed and hardened in the decades after independence, the iconography of Simón Bolívar spread across South America in imitation of Castelli's equestrian model. Another El Santuario veteran, Carmelo Fernández, was one of the pioneers of the visual culture of nationhood in the 1840s and 1850s. He illustrated map-making expeditions, sketched national landscapes, and painted portraits of the independence heroes. Bolívar remained the center point of his work, which acquired a "transcendental symbolism" in the latter half of the century.[15] Taken together, though the remaining documentation is scarce, the careers of the El Santuario veterans in Venezuela between 1843 and 1854 reveal how political affiliations were being shaped as much by past military loyalties and the growing Bolivarian cult as by foreign commercial pressures and changing landownership patterns in the Venezuelan interior. Carlos Castelli's survival in political life as a Liberal, and his moves to enshrine the Bolivarian cult, owed much to his good relations with Venezuelan military officers (with whom he shared friendship and godparenting) and foreign imperial powers alike. He distanced himself from the Atlantic powers, serving in positions of political authority in the Venezuelan interior.[16]

New Granada, Rehabilitation and Commemoration

After the War of the Supremes was over in New Granada in 1842, the victorious Conservative government under the former Bolivarian general, President Pedro Alcántara Herrán, passed a wave of amnesties.[17] One crime that would not be pardoned was the 1830 assassination of Bolívar's friend and preferred successor, Sucre. With José María Obando in exile in Peru, a court-martial tried the soldiers who had allegedly committed the homicide on his orders. Anselmo Pineda was one of the members of this court-martial in November 1842, demonstrating the heights of political trust that he had reached. Pineda must have been conscious of the parallels between this trial and that of Rupert Hand a decade earlier. Indeed, the position of the accused in 1842 almost exactly mirrored Hand's in 1831; he was a foreigner (Apollo Morillo, a Venezuelan who had settled in Cali) who was prosecuted in the absence of the crime's intellectual author, and who eventually confessed his involvement to implicate his superior—in Hand's case O'Leary, in Morillo's, Obando. The court-martial found Morillo guilty but, perhaps because of his confession, they commuted his death penalty to exile.[18] Morillo was not as fortunate as Rupert Hand, however, and no foreigners intervened on his behalf. Worse still, President Herrán overturned Pineda's leniency. Morillo was executed in Bogotá's Plaza Mayor at 4pm on November 30, 1842.[19]

Herrán's presidential term ran until 1845, and recovery from the economic and demographic devastation of the War of the Supremes was his principal aim. Herrán's cabinet (which was succeeded by the presidency of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera in 1845) went on to form the bastion of the

Conservative Party, with Mariano Ospina Rodriguez as its dominant force. Ospina's rise to national political power grew out of the growing dominance of political Conservatives in Medellín and in most of Antioquia. By 1842 all of the surviving Antioquian veterans of El Santuario were in the service of the Conservative faction that grasped power in the War of the Supremes. They tightened their grip throughout the decade, at the expense of political rivals as well as foreign interests.[20]

As Herrán's presidency progressed from a war footing toward a peacetime administration he also had several international matters to deal with. British intervention in the Caribbean region during and after the War of the Supremes in support of Mosquera and Herrán's armies was high among these. Critics alleged that "everyone knows that the Liberals' ruin was down to unwelcome intervention in the conflict—armed and unarmed—by British subjects and British representatives."[21] From exile in Peru, José María Obando attacked an agreement signed with Colombian bond holders in Bogotá in March 1842, which contained a clause "which aimed to compromise the British government so that it would be obliged to use its colossal power to intervene in domestic New Granadan affairs." For Obando this was the long-feared "first announcement of an invasion of national sovereignty," regardless of official British policy that denied such a thing.[22] In rhetoric very reminiscent of Salvador Córdova's later proclamations, Obando asked, "Is this what it means to be a nation? Is this the fruit of so many sacrifices and so much glory in the name of becoming sovereign, free and independent? Were these just words invented to pull us out from Spanish domination?" Herrán's government, raged Obando, had negotiated this treaty "in order to attend the funerals of its sovereignty, freedom and independence in sober silence." Inviting British intervention "meant that an illegitimate government could employ at its whim the armies and naval forces of that immense power [Britain], whose name alone would be enough to make New Granada's spirit shiver, and to annihilate all hopes of freedom, honor and justice that might still exist in that land of heroes and republican virtue."[23] While Britain denied that it would intervene in this way, the threat and feeling of empire were scarred onto Obando's mind by past experience.

As Antioquia recovered from the War of the Supremes, some of Salvador Córdova's supporters were sent into exile. Bernabé Hoyos was convicted as a traitor, but was permitted to rebuild his life and economic activities in the commercial river-port of Honda.[24] Another El Santuario veteran, Eusebio Isaza, was sent to Quito, in Ecuador.[25] Those Liberal families who remained at home also felt oppressed and restricted by resurgent Conservative authorities.[26]

Some of the El Santuario veterans who left Antioquia went on to greater political and economic success. When President Herrán sought a reliable governor of Panama who could reconcile local interests with foreign, especially British, concerns in the isthmus, he turned to his old aide, Anselmo Pineda. His reign from the start of 1843 was influential. Finding local commerce still "miniscule compared to the booming colonial period," Pineda

set up three schools to train artisans to manufacture Panama Hats, laying the foundations for the successful export of the emblematic white hats after mid-century. He founded the *Sociedad Filantrópica* in Panama to promote "intellectual and moral education," set up Sunday schools for workers, and increased Panama's number of schools from 5 to 12. Pineda's governorship, which oversaw "Panama's reintegration into the national polity with little or no bloodshed," coincided with the New Granadan government declaring a fresh start for concessions and schemes to build a Panama Canal. Before the California Gold Rush of 1848 triggered great interest, however, the matter was still dominated by adventurers and dreamers.[27] Pineda's governorship was seriously discredited by the collapse of a French scheme to build a canal through Panama, and at the start of 1845 he left office.[28]

In April 1844 Daniel O'Leary arrived in Bogotá from Caracas and presented his credentials as British minister to his old friend and correspondent President Herrán. As a pair of old Bolivarians O'Leary's relations with Herrán were excellent; they had corresponded regularly between 1828 and 1851 and now they often dined together.[29] With Santander four years dead, O'Leary found the atmosphere in Bogotá welcoming, even from old political enemies such as Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, now Herrán's minister of the interior. O'Leary's family lived outside Bogotá in a rented hacienda in Fusgasugá, where Herrán also had a house for use at weekends. O'Leary declared that "if God grants me another ten years to live, and in employment, I will be happy because I will be able to leave these new heroes [his sons] able to make war themselves and to take charge of the defense of the family."[30] Godparenting (*compadrazgo*) links cemented O'Leary's position in Bogotá society with British subjects and New Granadan citizens alike.[31] President Herrán and the Bogotá businessman Raimundo Santamaría were godfathers to O'Leary's sons.[32] All this meant that O'Leary enjoyed good access to government in Bogotá during Herrán's presidency.

O'Leary was understandably apprehensive when in 1845 Herrán was replaced by Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, though he was not alone as "before he assumed office, the prospect of General Mosquera in the presidency was viewed with alarm even by his brothers." In office, the man who had been insulted by José María Córdova, and who had summarily executed Salvador Córdova for the good of the nation, undertook many initiatives to improve communication and commerce, particularly those that had "national rather than merely local importance."[33] O'Leary approved of these programs but Mosquera's presidency also encouraged economic reform in New Granada that gradually favored US interests at the expense of the British. O'Leary's letters to the Foreign Office were pessimistic and negative, but lacked any clear program of policies that he would have preferred New Granada to have followed.[34] This was despite the fact that Britain remained by far the biggest importer into New Granada, retaining more than half of total imports even into the 1850s and 1860s.[35]

One of the principal reasons for the decline of British political influence in New Granada under O'Leary's ministry and Mosquera's presidency

were the consistent rumors, later revealed to be accurate, that Britain was lending support to the attempts to invade Ecuador being prepared by ex-president Flores, and that British representatives, including O'Leary, were indulging Flores' pretensions to restore the Gran Colombian Republic from an Ecuadorian power base. In Flores' military expeditions throughout the 1840s and 1850s, his intimate circle was always well-stocked with British and Irish officers. British military intervention in Ecuador, always linked to Flores, provided a sharp reminder to Venezuelans and New Granadans that the privileged access and influence exerted by O'Leary was not the empire's only way of asserting itself.[36]

O'Leary informally interfered in New Granadan politics on this subject believing that he was "keeping communication lines open" and preventing New Granada and Ecuador from going to war with each other over the alleged plots. However, even Rayfield's sympathetic account of O'Leary's efforts recognizes that they were "unsuccessful in that they made many New Granadans . . . more aware of, and consequently, more sensitive too, British influence in their domestic affairs." This indirectly contributed to the shift toward US influence. In his support of Flores' expeditions, British foreign secretary Palmerston had repeated British toleration of the mercenary armies that had joined Simón Bolívar three decades earlier. Whereas in 1818 Spain was the party offended by the expeditions (whose members included, of course, O'Leary himself) in the late 1840s stories of proposed British involvement in armed conflict in South America triggered nationalist and anti-British responses in New Granada and Ecuador alike. In 1848 Flores moved to Panama with plans to recreate Gran Colombia in league with the exiled Venezuelan former president Páez. Many historians have dismissed the "absurdity of these rumours" but they persisted well into the 1850s.[37] While Rayfield sees O'Leary's unwanted interventions as "occasional blunderings" or "overdiligence," they certainly played a part in diminishing British influence on other matters.[38]

Another stage in the loss of British influence in New Granada was demonstrated by the repercussions of the US-New Granadan Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of June 1846, under which the United States "guaranteed the neutrality of the isthmus and freedom of transit over it."[39] The treaty shaped the failure of O'Leary's first two years in post: it was "a humiliating defeat and loss of face for O'Leary and sealed the fate of the [Panamanian] Isthmus as American rather than European." Part of the problem was that New Granadans had come to believe that the British threat to their territory in Panama was "a real and menacing danger."[40] By clumsily encouraging Flores, and through O'Leary's machinations in Bogotá, they had even encouraged this sentiment. O'Leary thought that matters had been taken out of his hands by increased anti-European nationalism, describing Mallarino's policy as "simply anti-foreign and deliberately anti-European, and as an open invitation to hostility to foreigners."[41] O'Leary still made "unofficial suggestions" that New Granada might like to protect British rather than US interests, and "hinted at" rather than threatening naval blockades.[42] But the

horse had bolted and O'Leary's efforts amounted to little more than sweeping out the stable ready for the next occupant.

It would be easy to cast Daniel O'Leary as the man who let New Granada out of Britain's informal empire. It might be noted that at the time he was also rather busy reordering his notes on Bolívar, preoccupied with collecting fossils and worrying about his health, and, therefore, rather distant from and indifferent to political developments in Mosquera's administration.[43] O'Leary was particularly concerned with his historical writing. When in 1848 he received news from Ireland of Daniel O'Connell's death, O'Leary wrote a lengthy eulogy that was printed in *El Repertorio Colombiano*.[44] He also drew up his will, resolving to leave all his writings and documents to his wife and eldest sons, but prohibiting them from publishing or reading them to anyone until long after his death. He recommended his eldest two sons that they "follow my example, advancing themselves through their own efforts."[45] In 1848, while O'Leary was concerned with these matters, the United States was able to build on its strong position, and Britain was left in the lurch as the Gold Rush across Panama began.[46]

It is clear that O'Leary was not devoted body and soul to the pursuit of British interests in the late 1840s. Serving official British power was, for him, primarily about guaranteeing his family's economic well-being and enjoying a status in Bogotá to which he had become accustomed. What Rayfield called O'Leary's "informal influence" was insufficient to maintain British hegemony in New Granada as much as anything because not even O'Leary was committed to the goal. Furthermore, Mosquera's government was not amenable to O'Leary's charms even when he did choose to apply them. Personal rivalry was at the heart of the problem: O'Leary thought Mosquera "vain, fickle, unreliable and rash." The two had never been close at Bolívar's side during the 1820s, and during the 1830s O'Leary had resented Mosquera's rival project to write a biography of Bolívar. Their relationship now became "increasingly cool and even openly hostile."[47] In his 1847 proposals to encourage immigration to New Granada, Foreign Secretary Manuel Ancizar expressed an explicit preference for "Germans, Italians, Swedes or Spaniards" rather than Britons.[48] European influence in New Granada was beginning to travel along new routes.

Anselmo Pineda in Caquetá: Internal Colonialism

Colonialism was also seeking new outlets in New Granada. In April 1845 Anselmo Pineda traveled from Bogotá to Antioquia with his old friend Mariano Ospina Rodriguez.[49] Pineda had begun to weary of his constant travel, which had left him as "a father without children, a husband without a wife, always on the move from village to village, from town to town, from one end of the patria to another."[50] Like Murray, Pineda had sacrificed family life for national responsibilities. The task of building nations and caring for them in their early years was, as many scholars have pointed out, heavily "gendered," in that women were increasingly excluded from the

"public sphere" during the nineteenth century.[51] Correspondingly men such as Pineda excluded themselves from the domestic arena, and felt detached from their children as these grew older. Pineda regretted this in private correspondence; nevertheless, when President Mosquera took office, one of his first acts was to name the dependable Pineda as the first governor of the newly created Department of Caquetá in the southeast of the country.[52] In that year, therefore, Pineda moved beyond partisan political agitation and dedicated himself to "civilization": he became the epitome of an internal colonialist. He pledged to "exploit the material resources to be found in these rich, uninhabited regions" and, in the same breath, to rescue the people who lived there from their "savagery" and "barbarism." As a stoic and devoted colonialist his only reward would be "satisfaction in my own heart."[53] Bringing "political and judicial authority to provide commerce with security and liberty," Pineda planned to take "hard-working colonists" and "Enlightened missionaries to carry evangelical light to the barbarous tribes and edge the Caquetá towards civilization." Pineda saw internal colonialism as a logical next step in his career, writing that "we won independence with our heroism and our sacrifices. We have conserved it through painful political vicissitudes. We will be more worthy of our Independence if we dedicate all our efforts to the well-being of the peoples and to the prosperity of all." Pineda offered land, tax, and tariff exemptions to all immigrants. Authorities in neighboring regions welcomed Pineda's innovations.[54] During 1846 Pineda focused his attention on internal migration within New Granada, rather than more expensive and difficult foreign immigration.[55]

During his time in Caquetá, Pineda entered into a new correspondence with Daniel O'Leary, the then British minister in Bogotá, who had been his enemy at the Battle of El Santuario 17 years earlier. In the mid-1840s Pineda and O'Leary had come closer together ideologically and personally; they also discovered that they shared a close interest in history and antiquarianism. O'Leary wrote to Pineda, informing him that "he was putting together, in his house in Bogotá, a little museum consisting of fossils, minerals, feathers, insects and objects made by indigenous peoples." O'Leary asked Pineda: "If while you are in Caquetá, an area which is newly discovered by civilisation, your attention is caught by any Natural History objects, then I beg you to buy them for me, and to inform me of their characteristics and their value. Some examples of fossils and minerals would be very much appreciated."[56] Pineda and O'Leary became allies in a shared colonizing and civilizing project. They now formed part of a "collector's network who supported each other and collaborated, and at other times competed for artifacts," according to historian Clara Botero Cuervo.[57]

Pineda wrote back to Bogotá describing the indigenous peoples he met, reporting that Antioquians could teach them a thing or two about traveling quickly on rivers, or panning for gold. He described huts, animals, and the anxiety of the peoples of Mocoa and Yrayacho for progress and for priests. Pineda's conclusion was that building a road to facilitate the export of straw (*jipijapa)* hats would be the best way to integrate the region into the nation

and bring prosperity to the people.[58] In early 1847 the central government sent Pineda on to another newly created department, Túquerres, where he set about the same task of observing, documenting, and recommending ways to improve and civilize the region. While Pineda was governing Túquerres he received an unexpected visitor: Simón Rodriguez. Rodriguez, who had tutored Simón Bolívar in Caracas and Europe over half a century earlier, was now 76 years old. He and Manuela Gómez, his wife, were still dedicated to revolutionary educational projects; in Túquerres, Rodríguez opened a new school, fully supported by Pineda.[59] Pineda's relationship with Bolívar's friend Rodriguez is another example of how the political rivalries of 1829 had disappeared beneath subsequent events and new projects and aspirations. Rodriguez's plans to put education at the center of the nation-building project were shared by Pineda, who had already founded new schools in Panama. Both agreed that indigenous communities needed to be educated and brought into the nation.

In 1847 Pineda received news from El Santuario of the death of his father the previous year, and he returned to his seat in congress in Bogotá. There Pineda resisted the expulsion of the Jesuits, who he had come to see as essential to the process of internal colonisation.[60] In this he again agreed with his new friend Daniel O'Leary. They both argued for a civilizing national project based on education, history, cosmopolitan commerce, and honorable behavior. They were now Conservatives, padres de familia with an outlook on the indigenous peoples of New Granada that might best be described as patriarchal if not colonial.[61] Pineda and O'Leary also agreed with President Mosquera that new communication infrastructure was needed to bring New Granada prosperity and modernity, just as Thomas Murray had argued in his spell as governor of Vélez in the 1830s. In his plans to commission the construction of a railway across Panama, however, President Mosquera saw no reasons to favor Britain rather than the United States.[62] Perhaps surprisingly, nevertheless, Murray's political career was rehabilitated under Mosquera's presidency.

The period of Conservative dominance in New Granada epitomized by the presidencies of Herrán (1841–45) and Mosquera (1845–49) should have meant political isolation for Thomas Murray if he had been nothing more than a client of José María Obando. Yet the last years of his life provide further examples of the intermeshed nature of political relationships in early republican New Granada. We know nothing about Murray's activities between 1842 and 1848, and it is to be presumed that he lived in Bogotá with his family, drawing his military pension. He must have met up with Daniel O'Leary when he returned to Bogotá as British minister, as Bogotá was still a small city and the British community smaller still. In 1848 President Mosquera named Murray as the director of the new Military School in Bogotá.[63] One explanation for this surprising appointment is that Mosquera was building bridges with Murray as a counterpoint to his lack of relations with O'Leary. Mosquera also restored other El Santuario veterans to public life in his administration: Francisco Urdaneta was comandante general de Cundinamarca from

April 1846 to the end of May 1849.[64] No documents have been found from the first years of the Military School, so it is not known whether Murray was able to take up the position. In 1851 Murray published a volume of reminiscences in Bogotá, consisting of various letters and observations on the years 1830–41. The publication reveals much beyond Murray's desire to protect his reputation as a New Granadan patriot.[65] The text was signed "Murría" rather than "Murray," another demonstration of how he had left his foreignness behind in the name of his new citizenship, like Carlo(s) Castelli at the same time in Venezuela. The pamphlet's front cover also suggests a further possible explanation for Murray's political success in the 1830s and his rehabilitation by Mosquera in the late 1840s: he was a mason. The cover is adorned with Masonic symbols.[66] Research on the role of freemasonry in nineteenth-century South America has up to now been quite limited, especially in comparison to the important role Masonic affiliation is held to have had in cementing political allegiances in Mexico.[67] On the British side, Jessica Harland-Jacobs has gone as far as to argue that an empire-military-freemasonry relationship formed the foundations of British global strength in this period, though she makes no mention of New Granada or Venezuela.[68] What we do know is that lodges in Bogotá, especially, seem to have counted many influential men among their members in the 1840s and 1850s—we know this because Anselmo Pineda preserved much of their paperwork. But evidence has not yet emerged that the relationships forged there had any great explanatory value. New sources may change this interpretation.

When Mosquera's mandate ended in 1849, he was succeeded by José Hilario López, the Liberal general who benefited from a split Conservative vote and won the presidency. O'Leary was surprised and impressed by López's "apparently pro-British proclivities" and his relations with López's administration were "more cordial than with any other regime he had to deal with in New Granada," even Herrán's. Nevertheless, the damage had been done under Mosquera's presidency and British influence had already slipped away and out of O'Leary's control. A railway treaty signed by the United States and New Granada in 1850 served to confirm the redundant nature of British claims to hegemony in the region. Although O'Leary believed that the Liberal Florentino González, one of the New Granadan negotiators, was "promoting pro-British sentiment,"[69] by 1850 sentiment had given way to hard fact in New Granada's foreign relations. López's Liberal government pursued some Radical policies—including the final abolition of slavery—that continued a national project of defying foreign influence while attempting to increase external trade. By fragmenting regional government and devolving power to the provinces, López reduced the role of central government and, therefore, the influence of foreign representatives in Bogotá.[70]

Anselmo Pineda still sought to expand the institutional strength of the state. In 1851 he made his first donation to the National Library. It consisted of 425 volumes, which he had ordered and bound himself. In return Pineda was granted a pension of 9,600 reales.[71] The collection, cataloguing, and preservation of National History became the principal interest in Pineda's life.

1851: Rebellion in Antioquia

López was in power for only two years before a Conservative rebellion against his reforms broke out in Antioquia and Cauca. Ecclesiastical reforms and the abolition of slavery were the two principal catalysts. In Cauca resistance to the abolition of slavery was a particularly important factor; and behind the atrocious assassinations that littered the conflict "lay the ghost of [Salvador Córdova] and the memory of [Mosquera's] murders a decade earlier."[72] There was considerable involvement of the surviving El Santuario veterans. Mariano Ospina Rodriguez was the leading Conservative ideologue, and his brother, Pastor Ospina, persuaded Anselmo Pineda to join him in Guasca, Cundinamarca. Pineda later claimed ignorance that "Ospina was planning a revolution or that Guasca would be the scene of a civil war," and that he had desired "only retirement, peace, the care, and caresses of his daughters."[73] Nevertheless in July 1851 Pineda was arrested in Guatavita, Cundinamarca, in a government crackdown on dissent. He was found innocent of charges linking him to the rebellion, but still spent several months in prison.[74] Ospina Rodriguez sought asylum in the French embassy, although he was quickly evicted when he insisted on continuing to communicate with rebellious Conservative leaders.[75]

The rebellion reached Pineda's native Antioquia in June 1851, where it ignited Conservative resentment at provincial reorganization.[76] A lesser factor was the Conservative protection of interests of slaveowners and mineowners. The leader of the rebellion, General Eusebio Borrero, took "God and Federation" as his motto.[77] His second in command was an El Santuario veteran, Braulio Henao, who led followers recruited in Sonsón, Abejorral, Salamina, and Marinilla (including El Santuario).[78] Francisco Giraldo was also involved. He and his wife had been living in Medellín (their daughter Manuela de Jesús was born there on the first day of 1847).[79] Giraldo's Catholic devotion and Conservative sympathies were well known, and he took the rank of comandante in the rebellion.[80] The Conservative rebels, therefore, had a spine of El Santuario veterans, 22 years on. Henao merged his forces with Borrero's, and they were pursued by General Tomás Herrera, a Liberal general sent from Bogotá. The maneuvering armies passed through the sites of Salvador Córdova's final defeat (Salamina) and his greatest triumph (Abejorral) until the rebel forces were exhausted. Herrera, learning the lesson of the 1831 and 1842 conflicts, cleverly pardoned the Antioquian leader, Henao, and captured Borrero, a native of Cauca. The intermediary to negotiate Henao's surrender was another El Santuario veteran, Miguel Alzate.[81] The pragmatic Henao claimed that he had been "deceived" into serving the rebellion and that he would happily hand over all his weapons to government forces.[82] The decisive battle where Borrero's forces were defeated took place in and around the Rionegro cemetery on September 11, 1851.[83] Many Antioquians responded to Henao's self-justification with anger, calling him a "traitor" who had long been "behaving suspiciously." By coincidence, the Conservative rebels were defeated only meters from the grave of José María Córdova.[84]

López's national Liberal government survived, though considerably weakened. When Anselmo Pineda was released from prison he returned to Bogotá to find the National Library occupied by troops and disorganized. Pineda pledged to catalogue and index his collections again and on August 18, 1852, he was officially named Responsible for National Works in the National Library.[85]

O'Leary's Trip to Europe for Malvern Water 1852–54; Absence and Influence

Daniel O'Leary's active involvement in diplomatic and political matters was reduced in the middle of the Antioquia rebellion (in August 1851), when he suffered a nervous attack in Bogotá. Despite his ill health, O'Leary did advance on the Macintosh Question regarding private British debt, which had nagged New Granada since independence. On December 13, 1851, the republic agreed to pay the Mackintosh family 80,000 pesos.[86] O'Leary thought that he had finally ended the dispute, and left Bogotá in 1852 to recover his health.[87] In his absence there was another short British naval blockade of Cartagena in 1853, to demand payment. O'Leary appears to have had nothing to do with it. British attempts to bully New Granada into submission from afar wreaked of desperation, and were ignored as such. In 1857 British residents in Bogotá were still occupied with obtaining payment of these debts.[88]

O'Leary was away from New Granada for over a year. In Paris he stayed in the house of Juan de Francisco Martín, with whom he had shared his exile in Jamaican two decades earlier.[89] He rested in Rome, met Humboldt in Berlin and attended a state banquet in London with his patron, Lord Clarendon, now foreign secretary. Finally for health reasons O'Leary went to the baths at Malvern, Gloucestershire, and visited family in Ireland.[90] In September 1853, O'Leary embarked again for the Americas. He was still in no hurry to get back to Bogotá, however. In the United States he visited exiled Venezuelan presidents José Antonio Páez (in New York) and José María Vargas (in Philadelphia). He went to Washington's tomb and even Niagara Falls. As his return to Bogotá became unavoidable, however, O'Leary promised his wife that he would burn all his travel books, just as Don Quijote had burned his chivalry books.[91] He finally reached Bogotá in mid-December 1853.

Francisco Urdaneta also went to Europe in these years, again ostensibly to recover his health. He returned with many souvenirs of his visit to Europe's capital cities, including a new-design carriage, unique in Bogotá, which caused great amusement when it overturned on the capital's cobbles and deposited him in a deep and dirty ditch.[92] There were other, political, shocks for those who returned to Bogotá in this period. José María Obando had become president while O'Leary was away. Obando, who has been frequently referred to in this study as Thomas Murray's patron and the persecutor of Rupert Hand and Daniel O'Leary, finally became president of New

Granada in 1853. With Obando's ascent to the presidency, Thomas Murray was promoted to the rank of general, and appointed as under-secretary of war and marine.[93] His service was brief, however; Thomas Murray died in Bogotá on December 8, 1853, at the age of 65.[94] His death passed without much public fanfare; no obituary was published in the Bogotá press, and his story quickly vanished among the shadows of political crisis. His son, Eugenio Murray, did not leave any mark on public life and provided no grandchildren who might have wanted to write up the history of their illustrious grandfather (as happened for the Córdovas and O'Leary, among others). Murray's successful "acculturation and [his] adoption of New Granadan customs and cultural practices" meant that studies of foreigners in Colombia have ignored him too.[95] He had reached a position of considerable influence, but did not live long enough to exercise it.

He was briefly able to reward Murray and other supporters for their loyalty, but Obando had exhausted most of his political capital in order to win the election. Once in power he presided over a divided Liberal party, and governed with a new 1853 constitution that weakened central power. The constitution limited the power of the executive, increased provincial autonomy, and introduced broadly democratic suffrage that encouraged the Radical Liberal faction that antagonized the president at every step.[96] Obando's instinct was to persecute some of the Conservatives involved in the 1851 rebellion, including Anselmo Pineda who was accused of having acted like a "traitor and a revolutionary," but was eventually cleared and released.[97]

Daniel O'Leary returned to Bogotá at the end of 1853, but he had little time to reestablish contact with Pineda or to deal with his old enemy, Obando. A year in Europe and a bath in Malvern had given O'Leary's health a deserved respite. He told his friends in Bogotá that he was fully recovered, but within ten weeks of his return he suffered another attack, and died.[98]

The Death and Funeral of Daniel O'Leary

O'Leary died at 1:00 a.m. on February 24, 1854.[99] His passing, and its reporting in the official government newspaper, provides a beautiful insight into the continuity and change that characterized New Granada's foreign relations in the 1850s. O'Leary's death was commemorated because of what he symbolized as well as who he was.

At O'Leary's funeral, military veterans made heartfelt speeches, claiming that he had "died with Christian resignation and stoic tranquillity." Newspapers reported that his wife Soledad had stood at the head of the deathbed, "like a Statue of Pain personified."[100] The newspaper that paid most attention to O'Leary's death and funeral was *El Neogranadino*. Its reports emphasized that "the respects paid to him were due not only to his official character [as British Minister in New Granada] but also to the rank of Colombian General which he reached because of his distinguished services in the cause of Independence . . . regardless of political affiliation, all social classes have mourned his passing; all New Granadans recognized that he was

a true friend of the country."[101] In his diary entry that evening, José Manuel Restrepo noted that "O'Leary was loved because of his educated manners, his sweet character, his class and his distinguished talents. Everyone considered him as a New Granadan, he loved the country and he had resolved to live the rest of his life in Bogotá."[102]

O'Leary's funeral was a major political and diplomatic event, and in some ways it reprised the repatriation of Bolívar's remains to Caracas in 1842. Obando's government invited all national functionaries to attend, and publicized the event with printed posters in honor of O'Leary's "double character of diplomat and Colombian General." O'Leary's body was dressed in diplomat's uniform, adorned with the warrior's medals. A constant theme of the ceremonies was the intermingling of diverse markers of identity. In death O'Leary was celebrated as the personification of good relations between Britain and New Granada, perhaps precisely because his passing marked the end of those good relations, which had been recently superseded by emerging US hegemony. *El Neogranadino* described "the jacket, shoulder markings, stripes, sword and other insignias of a Colombian General" displayed by the coffin. Outside the British legation, it recorded, "the British flag hung at half mast from a black chord to announce to the public the deplorable calamity which had occurred."

The ceremony itself was also characterized by hybrid influences. According to *El Neogranadino,* "the sumptuous coffin, covered with the British flag, was carried by subjects of that powerful nation . . . and then the ceremony began, with all the solemn, pompous and majestic rites of the Catholic creed. . . . It brought tears to the eyes of all those present."

The funeral procession consisted of "three military chiefs, on horseback, with their swords unsheathed, the General's horses, the car, the funeral carriage and the coffin, carried by six English gentlemen, and flanked by the President and Vice-President of the Republic, the President of the Chamber of Representatives, the US Consul, the Commander of the Department, and Monseñor Barili Prelado, the Pope's representative." After them came the mourners, a selection of commercial and political figures of British and New Granadan birth, a crowd, and a division of the New Granadan army. As the coffin was placed into its grave, President Obando made a "brief, meaningful and eloquent speech and bade his final and eternal goodbye." This was the same Obando, remember, who 23 years earlier had dedicated himself to unveiling O'Leary as the intellectual author of Córdova's murder at El Santuario, and who had exiled him from New Granada. The ceremony ended "as the last rays of light of the dying sun" disappeared over the capital.[103]

The funeral report published by *El Neogranadino* ended with three asterisks, presumably a nod to O'Leary's status as a mason. The luxurious description of O'Leary's funeral contrasts sharply, of course, with the agitated dumping, in 1829, of José María Córdova's corpse in a ditch in Marinilla, and subsequent hurried reburial. The honors accorded to O'Leary in death mark the end of a period of British informal influence in New Granada. A fortnight after O'Leary's death, the official *Gaceta de la Confederación*

Granadina reported plans to recruit "Irishmen and coolies as well as locals" in order to build railways in Cartagena. It noted approvingly that "few are as well used to the pick, the shovel and the barrow as the Irish."[104] Daniel O'Leary, Irish mercenary-turned-British statesman who never turned a pick in his life, would no doubt have approved of Obando's government recruiting Irishmen for its nation-building projects. The eruption of popular groups into New Granadan politics less than two months later showed how O'Leary's elite world of intimate acquaintance and quiet words was over.

1854 Artisans and Soldiers: General Melo's Coup

López's Liberal reforms had whet the appetites of some Radicals and antagonized some Conservatives who feared more change. New political actors entered the scene in Bogotá; artisans who were now increasingly organized against free trade reforms that pitted the prospect of cheap foreign imports, particularly British textiles, against their trades and livelihoods.[105] The representatives of the popular classes were courted by the traditional political actors in Bogotá, especially the head of the army, the Liberal General José María Melo.[106] President Obando, frustrated with the limits on his power by the 1853 congressional elections—which left his traditional Liberal faction dominated by Radical Liberals and Conservatives—appears to have encouraged General Melo's plans for a military coup that would give him more scope for reforms.[107] Just a month after O'Leary's funeral, General Melo seized control of the capital.[108] Melo primarily drew his support from the Bogotá military garrison as well as the artisans. A meeting to promote Melo's self-proclaimed rule was hosted in Bogotá by José María Urdaneta, one of Francisco Urdaneta's sons, but it was poorly attended. Days later, Francisco Urdaneta himself took on the role of interlocutor between the revolutionaries and citizens, persuading Melo to reduce his demands for large forced loans from the populace.[109]

There was a little peripheral British involvement in the conflict. José Manuel Restrepo was granted asylum in the British legation between late April and June 1854, which in the wake of Daniel O'Leary's death was being run on an interim basis by his 21-year-old son Carlos.[110] The British merchant Patricio Wilson offered his house as an asylum during the first weeks of the civil conflict, and it was begrudgingly accepted as such by the authorities.[111] Simón Bolívar O'Leary, now back from Europe to console his mother, used his dual identity to carry news between the Caribbean and Bogotá.[112] On May 18 the foreign representatives in Bogotá visited Melo and requested that he act with "moderation and humanity" toward his enemies.[113] Overall this was a limited and peripheral involvement.

1854 in Antioquia: The Return to El Santuario

When news of Melo's coup and dictatorial rule reached Antioquia in mid-May 1854, reactions were confused and contradictory. Veterans of El

Santuario were now prominently spread across the new political spectrum. Some Liberals—Miguel and Salvador Alzate—flirted with supporting Melo, but the governor of Antioquia, Mariano Ospina, eventually incorporated them into his forces to fight against "a traitor's dictatorship."[114] Ospina's supporters attacked Melo with rhetoric that revealed significant continuity back to the rebellions of Salvador and José María Córdova. They denounced "Melo's hordes of bandits, who tore up the Constitution and overthrew the highest public authorities; these home-grown filibusters have continued with their terrible path of pillage and depredation."[115] Ospina's forces also absorbed other units that had been raised elsewhere in Antioquia. One of the leaders of these groups, which were Conservative in nature and called to defend the rule of law against Melo's coup, was Braulio Henao.[116] Under Henao were some of his allies from El Santuario: they included Francisco Giraldo. Also present was Clemente Jaramillo, former governor and Thomas Murray's next-door neighbor in Medellín from the early 1830s.

Roger Brew's interpretation of the 1854 conflict in Antioquia provides a neat conclusion to the story of the El Santuario veterans.[117] It appears to form the final reconfiguration of Antioquian rebellion, with the political fault lines from 1829 again restored to prominence. The Alzate brothers had served under Daniel O'Leary in 1829 in support of Bolívar's dictatorship. In 1854, with O'Leary, Murray, and Rupert Hand dead, and Carlos Castelli and Enrique Lutzen in Venezuela, the Alzates were the last remaining officers in New Granada from the Bolivarian army in 1829. They chose (at least initially) to support Melo's dictatorship in 1854, perhaps in order to defend regional autonomy, perhaps out of antagonism toward growing Conservative hegemony in the province. In contrast, on the other side in 1854, fighting in the name of Antioquian independence and constitutionalism, we find Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, Braulio Henao, and Francisco Giraldo, all of whom had fought under the same slogans at El Santuario 1829. Their leaders from 1829, José María Córdova, Salvador Córdova, and Manuel Antonio Jaramillo, had all died in the name of those ideals. In a sense, then, the 1854 resistance to Melo's dictatorship in Antioquia can be portrayed as the successful culmination of the rebellion launched by José María Córdova's sword and Mariano Ospina Rodriguez's pen in 1829.[118]

The national picture lends some support to this interpretation. Veterans of El Santuario had moved away from their 1829 affiliations, but the events of 1854 served to highlight a primordial faith in either constitutional or military rule. Away from Antioquia, many Conservatives and Liberals shared the interpretation that Melo's coup was a consequence of having placed too much trust in the involvement of popular classes in national politics, as symbolized by the Bogotá artisans and with reference to the "highly active and politicised lower classes" of mestizos, blacks, and indigenous peoples during the 1840s.[119] Opponents to Melo's dictatorship had quickly fled the capital and formed themselves as Constitutionalists. The war, therefore, morphed, in Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera's interpretation, from one grounded in the inclusion/exclusion of popular sectors in national politics, into one

predicated on institutionality or constitutionality. This conflict in the national sphere took place against the background of, and served to catalyze, local violent conflicts based on land disputes, local municipal rivalries, and other issues. National actors often failed to comprehend these variations and struggled in vain to superimpose the supposed transcendence of their own struggle upon them.[120] The principal theater of the national civil war in 1854 was on the plain surrounding Bogotá and in the eastern highlands of Tunja. On the side of institutions and order in these encounters, and opposed to Melo's dictatorship, we find Anselmo Pineda, the old supporter of the Córdovas. Communication problems meant that it had taken several months to raise the alarm in the provinces and to recruit armies ready to confront the regime in Bogotá. Pineda was the Constitutionalists' government secretary and was initially based in Chocontá under the orders of the Panamanian general Tomás Herrera, who had sneaked out of his asylum in the US embassy in Bogotá to proclaim himself "in possession of institutional power" (i.e., that he was an alternative, more legitimate president than Melo).[121] Pineda took charge of 300 troops and went to Zipaquirá, and from there began to march on Bogotá. According to an oral family history, Pineda confronted Melo's forces at the El Común Bridge outside of Zipaquirá. Pineda commanded "14 soldiers and 200 Chia Indians armed with sticks" against an army of "800 men under Manuel Acevedo." According to Pineda's account, given in the last years of his life, he had ordered the Chia to run round and round a small hill in full view of the enemy, and for them to swap their *ruanas* for shirts when out of sight, making the enemy think they were up against a combined army of whites and indigenous men, rather than only the latter, and hence deterring them from attack.[122] The story, whether based in fact or not, serves to reveal something of Pineda's attitude toward indigenous New Granadans: a mixture of the paternalistic and the contemptuous.

On May 20, 1854, Pineda was resoundingly defeated in action by Melo's forces on the outskirts of Zipaquirá. Over 100 of Pineda's men were killed, probably Chia indigenous men in their majority. Pineda escaped capture by hiding in a ditch, and later managed to rejoin the Constitutionalist forces.[123] By late November 1854 Melo's dictatorship in Bogotá was surrounded by the Constitutionalists, now led by Mosquera. The foreign representatives in the capital, led by the embassies of the United States and Venezuela, proposed their services to mediate an end to the conflict. Although they were ignored, the offer showed that a definitive power shift in international relations had occurred: when the following year Justo Arosemena denounced "the formidable empire" influencing national events it was the United States, not Britain, which was the obvious power to be resisted.[124] Pineda was among the Constitutionalists who fought Melo's supporters house-to-house, hand-to-hand, for control of the capital on December 3–4, 1854. Melo was finally obliged to surrender. The Antioquian Constitutionalists had successfully resisted a military government whose principal legitimacy lay in Bogotá.

María Teresa Uribe de Hincapié and Liliana López Lopera see the 1854 conflict as marking the first modern reconfiguration of New Granadan

political loyalties that finally broke away from colonial hierarchies. The narrative presented here suggests that it might also mark the end of the postcolonial imperial formation where British influence supplanted Spanish power. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera see the eruption of a new, modern language of "identity, rights and social inclusion," symbolized by artisan black and mestizo support for Melo. This was opposed by the language of "republican patriotism," which was new and hence attracted Conservatives and moderate Liberals in the name of constitution, law, and order.[125] The decline of British influence in New Granada, symbolized by the deaths of Thomas Murray in 1853 and Daniel O'Leary in 1854, signaled and enabled the end of the discourse of liberty/tyranny that had shaped political debate since independence.

Despite the ultimate victory of his Constitutionalists in 1854, the battle for Bogotá was a personal disaster for Anselmo Pineda. Melo had barracked parts of his forces in the National Library's reading room. During the battle for Bogotá, this room was the scene of fighting that caused much damage to documents, books, and furniture. The library was closed for a year while Pineda once again carefully reordered and catalogued his collections.[126]

Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera spoke for many when he presented the 1854 crisis as part of a continental struggle between Civilization and Barbarism, calling his compatriots to "all unite under the single flag of the republic, which is held aloft by civilized men against a small number of mistaken extremists who wave the standard of barbarism".[127] The idea of a civilization/barbarism dichotomy in Latin America is often attributed to its most renowned proponent the Argentinian Domingo Sarmiento. Here Mosquera applied it to demand the unity of all "men of standing" against the popular threat. The civilizing project had been in development throughout the 1840s, as seen in this chapter. Anselmo Pineda and Daniel O'Leary had seen their collecting and documenting in this way; Pineda also used these terms when speaking of his work as a pioneer of internal colonialism in Caquetá. Most of the political and commercial elites in Bogotá joined Masonic lodges to cement their new alliances: among their number they had counted Murray, Pineda, Urdaneta, and O'Leary, as well as Obando, López, and Mosquera. Old political rivalries were being sidelined by renewed unity among veterans of the Wars of Independence, in the name of civilization, "in order to show the world that Colombia was a civilised country."[128] In Europe, response to revolution in 1848 often adopted nationalism and/or imperialism in the name of maintaining internal order.[129] In New Granada, elite reaction to the threat of revolution in 1853–54 took the form of an internal civilizing mission. Fear of the threat posed by "foreign people" no longer referred to those born elsewhere; this fear had now been fully internalized.

The rhetoric used by, and the ideology propounded by the Constitutionalists in 1854, and summarized by Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera as "republican patriotism," bears strong similarities with José María Córdova's rebellion against Bolívar's dictatorship in 1829. The language of constitutionalism

and patriotic unity in the face of usurpers and unwarranted unconstitutional interventions used in 1854 could have been copied from Córdova's notebooks. This is not just time playing a trick on historical memory, or proof that what goes around comes around. The collective biography approach adopted here allows a further level of explanation. The continuity of personnel between 1829 and 1854 is striking. The fragmentations and incongruent trajectories of the El Santuario veterans between 1830 and 1853 had been remarkable; alliances were broken, new relationships and identities forged. Yet in 1854, the remaining members of the two sides lined up again, on one side supporting order and republican patriotism; the other attempting to define a new nation through military rule with popular support. What had changed was that in 1829 the enemy was seen as being external to the nation, symbolized by foreigners, and in 1854 the intruder was internal, whose power rested on the support of historical actors—mestizos, blacks, and indigenous peoples—whose presence in national life had hitherto been regarded as peripheral.

Epilogue

In 1855 Carlos Castelli was named as Venezuela's extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister in New Granada, where he was charged with negotiating the reconstruction of the grand Bolivarian Republic of [Gran] Colombia. Castelli arrived in New Granada in the wake of the Melo coup and its drawn out politically fractious consequences, a particularly unwelcoming time for proposals that might limit New Granadan sovereignty. The plans were scuppered.[1] Along with dreams of resuscitating Bolívar's legacy, after 1855, British influence gradually disintegrated in both Venezuela and New Granada. Further south in the continent, the British presence was increasing on the back of banking, railways, and, later, association football. In the north, however, US ambition and power moved to eclipse the British, who saw that their best interests would be served by acting as a loyal ally to US forces. US power in New Granada strengthened over the next 50 years, and at the end of the devastating civil war of the One Thousand Days (*la Guerra de los mil dias)* Panama seceded from Colombia and became independent under the tutelage of the new imperial power in the north.[2] The discovery of oil in the early twentieth century was the event that catalyzed the establishment of US hegemony in Venezuela.[3]

The El Santuario veterans in Venezuela exercised power and influence to their last days. In 1857 Castelli was named minister of war and marine again, this time by President José Tadeo Monagas. Monagas' government was soon overthrown by a revolution, and in August 1858 a military rebellion, *La Galipanada,* attempted to restore him. The rebellion was supported by an Anglo-French blockade of La Guaira, and its military forces were commanded by Enrique Lutzen, the German El Santuario veteran. After the failure of the rebellion, both Castelli and Lutzen retired from active politics.[4] Castelli died in Caracas in 1860.

Carmelo Fernández's career as a painter and geographer of renown continued through the 1860s and 1870s. With his death, the history of the El Santuario veterans in Venezuela became one of benign commemoration in the shadow of the Bolivarian Cult. The Venezuelan National Pantheon houses the mortal remains of four veterans of the Battle of El Santuario. Castelli's remains were moved there in early 1876. The pantheon was consecrated on October 28 that year, when Bolívar's remains were moved

there from Caracas cathedral. Lutzen's remains arrived in 1877, O'Leary's in 1882, and Fernández's bones in 1983. Rupert Hand is the only one of the "Venezuelan" veterans of El Santuario who does not lie at Bolívar's side in the National Pantheon. It is not known where he is buried.[5]

The careers of the El Santuario veterans in New Granada after 1854 took two distinct trajectories. The survivors who had supported José María Córdova's rebellion in 1829 tended to develop into Conservatives and some enjoyed long and influential lives. This can largely be explained by the rise to power of Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, Córdova's political secretary at El Santuario. Ospina served as president of New Granada from 1857 to 1861. Having witnessed the way US commercial influence was eroding British hegemony on the Caribbean coast, Ospina's presidency was characterized by the recognition of New Granadan "helplessness in dealing with the power of the US." Although he recognized popular resentment of apparent infringements on New Granadan sovereignty, Ospina welcomed foreign "protection."[6] Devolving power to the regions, Ospina established the Sovereign State of Antioquia, with its capital in Medellín and great independence from Bogotá. In many ways, as Nancy Appelbaum has suggested, this fulfilled José María Córdova's dreams from 1829.[7]

The development of sovereign federal states in New Granada catalyzed simmering regional conflicts and led to another civil war in 1859–63. Ospina's flawed military strategy led to a resounding Conservative defeat, in which Braulio Henao, Francisco Giraldo, and Anselmo Pineda were all on the losing side. Francisco Urdaneta died in this conflict, aged 69, as he defended Bogotá from rebel Liberal troops.[8] In his final proclamation Urdaneta cried that "honor is irreconcilable with indifference."[9] He became (after Dabney O. Carr) only the second foreign-born member of Daniel O'Leary's 1829 expedition to die in active military service.[10] When the Conservatives were finally defeated, a new Liberal constitution was designed and implemented by the Convention of Rionegro in 1863. The convention met, and the constitution was signed, in Salvador Córdova's old house.[11]

Pineda, Henao, and Giraldo were now experienced bastions of Conservatism. Pineda had set up a commercial commission business, and dedicated himself to his family and his Masonic activities.[12] Pineda also continued his work at the National Library, collecting and donating documents and pamphlets that soon amounted to over one thousand bound, indexed, and catalogued volumes. His dedication to donating and cataloguing the collection, in the sure knowledge that his collection was being pilfered and neglected behind his back, suggests an abiding belief in the value of history and education. Pineda never lost his faith in the written word.[13] He died on October 7, 1880, in Bogotá.

Pineda was outlived by just two of his colleagues from the Battle of El Santuario. Francisco Giraldo lived off his military pension until 1897. Giraldo never forgot his roots in El Santuario, although he lived in central Medellín. He provided funds for the parish church tower's clock and bell, and when he inherited his mother's house, sometime in the 1840s or 1850s, he donated

it to the church so as to pay for "ecclesiastical washing and ironing."[14] In his later years, Giraldo himself came to be seen as "one of the holy relics of independence."[15] He died in Medellín in the early hours of September 26, 1897, at the age of 93.[16] Obituaries called for him to be remembered as "a model of abnegation, loyalty and patriotism."[17]

Braulio Henao's "great feats" in Conservative armies were passed down through the generations in families in late nineteenth-century Antioquia.[18] He lived to the age of 102, his long life apparently explained by his "iron constitution" and his "moderation, unimpeachable conduct . . . and correct and traditional habits."[19] During the 1899–1902 War of One Thousand Days, Henao was wheeled out as a symbol of brave Catholic rectitude to inspire resistance against heretic Liberals.[20] Henao lived long enough to see the loss of Panama to the new imperial power, the United States of America. He died in Sonsón in 1904. He was the last of the El Santuario veterans who had fought in 1829.

The men who rebelled against Bolívar's dictatorship and monarchical plans at El Santuario in 1829 had become, half a century later, firm Conservatives. This was not the paradox it might seem. Antioquia's political and economic development in the nineteenth century shows the legacy of José María Córdova's call for sovereignty on a regional and local level. Subsequent myth-making, and the creation of national and regional heroes around military icons such as Córdova, Henao, and Bolívar, have muddied these waters considerably.

In August 2010 I was in the Museo de José María Córdova in El Santuario. I stood on the exact spot, the curator had assured me, where nearly two centuries before Rupert Hand had murdered José María Córdova. As I lingered, two boys, aged 6 and 8, started up a conversation with me. We chatted of buses and the town's famous *buñuelo* pastries. As I turned to leave, I asked the boys why this place was so important in the history of Colombia and the rest of the world. "That's obvious," replied Jorge, the elder of the two, with a mixture of condescension and pride. "Bolívar died here."

Conclusion

This book has revolved around the Battle of El Santuario, its mysteries and its consequences, its protagonists and its contexts. The years before the battle were marked by Atlantic Revolutions, Wars of Independence, and their immediate aftermaths. The years after 1829 were also characterized by recurrent political violence. Anticolonial warfare and civil warfare "did not negate or replace politics, but were extensions of it," as Gonzalo Sánchez has astutely observed.[1] Wars were fought in New Granada and Venezuela over national and regional territories, over "the population's identification with the national territory and whether it would accept the legitimacy of the nation-state's institutions."[2]

By reconstructing the lives of the El Santuario veterans, and placing them alongside one another, we can get some idea of the extent of their personal networks and how these overlapped with national and imperial spaces. These projects and places spanned from the mountains of El Santuario and Bogotá to the Caribbean ports of Cartagena, Santa Marta, and La Guaira that held the national and imperial worlds together.[3] The frequent appearances of the Caribbean colonial islands of Jamaica (British) and Curazao (Dutch) as places of exile throughout the period in question shows how nearby colonial possessions played significant roles in facilitating the comings and goings of political rebels in New Granada and Venezuela. In the other direction, Anselmo Pineda's posting to Caquetá as an agent of internal colonization in the 1840s showed how colonialism was not just something imposed upon Latin America by Europe. Indeed Pineda's movements presaged the growing migration of peoples and extractive industries to the forests and plains in the second half of the century. Bolívar's posthumous journey from Santa Marta to La Guaira in 1842, accompanied by foreign warships, sketched by Fernández, and welcomed to Caracas by O'Leary, is a positive symbolic representation of how these national and imperial networks intermeshed.

The lives narrated here support Fernán González's interpretation of the "tripolar" nature of Colombia's nineteenth century, equally valid for Venezuela. González proposes that historians bring out *local* distinctiveness within an analytical *national* framework that emphasizes the *region* as the place that most often mobilized political rebellion in the decades after independence. The collective biography of the El Santuario veterans shows that

the addition of one further interpretative lens—*empire*—provides a further, essential, level of understanding to the study of the Gran Colombian region in the nineteenth century. Though Spanish power had been expelled by 1825, other foreign powers continued to seek to exercise political, commercial, and diplomatic influence over the new and relatively weak republics. Great Britain, France, and the United States of America were the most prominent of the imperial powers whose interventions in internal conflicts are displayed here. In addition, Ecuador, Venezuela, and New Granada increasingly intervened in each others' affairs after the disintegration of Gran Colombia. Foreign intervention was more often than not already embedded within national cultures, as the lives of Castelli and O'Leary show quite clearly. The picture that emerges from the entangled lives of the El Santuario veterans is one that further muddies the waters of regional and national histories, emphasizing the power of coincidence, chance, and unintended consequences rather than any predetermined history of national emancipation or informal empire that might merit celebration, commemoration, or condemnation.[4]

Imperial Webs

The story of the veterans of El Santuario lends some support to revisionist critiques of nineteenth-century imperialism. Quite clearly, the conditions of "informal empire" as commonly understood—where capital, commerce, and culture combine to allow an empire to infringe upon the sovereignty of another nation—are not found here in any consistent enough pattern to make the term a useful general descriptor. Nevertheless, between 1820 and 1854 Venezuela and New Granada pertained to a peculiar type of what Stoler phrases an "imperial formation", in that they were linked to empire, often intimately and often strongly through unique personal, financial, and commercial relationships.[5] The influence of empires in these countries fluctuated considerably as imperial networks were reconfigured in the half-century after Waterloo.

One thing that emerges quite clearly from this story is how the official representatives of imperial power in Gran Colombia were often "astoundingly inappropriate" for the "delicate tasks of diplomacy", as José María Samper wrote in 1861.[6] Official power was exerted in a manner that was inept and incompetent, almost without exception. The resort to gunboat diplomacy in Cartagena, for example, was a spectacularly ill-considered and expensive way of trying to influence policy several hundred miles away in Bogotá. Furthermore, the primary agents of official imperial power often did not dedicate themselves to the task in hand. Daniel O'Leary was an ineffective negotiator whose lengthy diplomatic career (in Gran Colombia as Bolívar's emissary in the 1820s, as a Venezuelan representative in the 1830s, and in the British service in the 1840s and 1850s) was distinguished only by its many failures. Yet, as Charles Jones observes, "an awakening of the personal dimensions" of British activity in Latin America can show that official diplomatic conduct or market relations "were not the only informal constituents

of empire or of the distribution of power between empires."[7] O'Leary's personal relations with Presidents Bolívar, Soublette, and Herrán, for example, were fixed points upon which British imperial power could rest in Gran Colombia, Venezuela, and New Granada respectively. Conversely, O'Leary's terrible personal antipathy toward Presidents Santander and Mosquera left gaping holes for other powers to exploit.

But how do we begin to think more generally about a phenomenon that seems to fall through the gaps in existing theories of imperialism, neocolonialism, and informal empire?[8] It may help to think of the workings of the British Empire in the Gran Colombian region in the sense of an imperial web, stretching out from its metropolitan center in London across the Atlantic. When this imperial web reached the Caribbean it was reinforced and strengthened in the colonies of Jamaica and Trinidad. Many of the strands of this web were strong, and it was able to cover some areas and significantly limit the freedom of movement of the societies that found themselves under its sway. Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guayana were part of the formal empire, where the imperial web was tough and most restrictive. Moving away from the closely bound and effective sections, the British Empire's global web extended in other directions, including toward South America. Here, the web's strands were thinner and more widely spaced. Indeed there were large gaps in the web where no imperial pressure was exerted at all, and many of the strands hung loosely and ineffectively. The imperial web, therefore, exerted occasional and passing influence on the societies that lay beneath these weaker sections. We might picture the Andes soaring up through this web, which was strung only weakly across its valleys and foothills. The inhabitants of these areas still perceived the web's existence, and sometimes felt they saw it, attached to the persons of foreign travelers and adventurers. They felt themselves to form part of a unique imperial formation, distinct from both colony and informal empire, whose effects changed over time according to the individuals involved. Some wished to encourage this, such as Bolivar in 1828, others to guard against it, as in Salvador Córdova's nationalistic pamphlets of the 1830s. Because people in the Gran Colombian region often feared the threat of empire, perception of the web's potential power created space and freedom for foreigners in these societies: two good examples of this are when Rupert Hand strolled out of prison in Cartagena in 1833, and when Thomas Murray jumped over the wall of his jail in Honda in 1841. Even though British, French and US power may have been, with hindsight, rather weak and constrained in the region in this period, perception of the threat of continued imperial presence had considerable impact on collective identities as well as political and judicial decisions.

At the heart of this book lies the moment that José María Córdova was caught in the web's embrace. Rupert Hand's attack has been shown to have global, national, and regional contexts. Drawn-out political and commercial change in the Atlantic, resulting from the collapse of Spanish colonialism in the Americas, had brought Hand and Córdova face-to-face in the house at El Santuario. Córdova had rebelled against the threat of monarchy, shouting

"¡Viva la República!" during the battle. Rupert Hand murdered Córdova after he had been defeated in battle in the belief that that was what Daniel O'Leary wanted him to do. He thought this because O'Leary supported Bolívar's desire to entrench the power of the central state, mortally threatened by the regional strength of Córdova's rebellion in Antioquia, and knew that this plan had the support of the main representatives of the imperial powers in Bogotá (Britain, the United States, and France). Rupert Hand may have been a drunk, and even a thug. But he was an agent of this bigger project, framed by imperial webs, which failed to account for the nature and meaning of independence.

The imperial web was not an inanimate force restricted to the stratosphere, of course. It was tied to the actions of people who lived and traveled upon it. Sometimes these imperial people pulled the web with them, tugging on it to make it do their bidding, tightening or loosening it with them as they moved. This was the case for Daniel O'Leary in the 1820s and 1840s, as he explicitly tried to work in the interests of British power in Gran Colombia. More often, however, the imperial web became tangled around people, impeding their movements, confusing them, tripping them, and limiting their actions. This was certainly true for José María Córdova, whose love for Fanny Henderson drew him into an unenviable situation where personal, national, and imperial forces pulled him in different directions. His life ended prematurely in a rebellion that was both encouraged and suppressed by contradictory forces of the imperial web.

This picture of an imperial web responding to various forces at different levels is a more accurate depiction of the way the British Empire worked in Gran Colombia in 1820–54 than previous models of "informal empire" or "national sovereignty." It is still insufficient on its own, however. Other imperial webs stretched over Colombia too: a Spanish one, for example, musty but still heavy in terms of cultural legacy. Later Conservative governments in New Granada and Venezuela tried to "regenerate" this old web, to reconstruct it as a roof that sheltered rather than oppressed them.[9] The French imperial web was also present in Gran Colombia, stretched thin but often admired for its aesthetics rather than its effectiveness. The French web maintained a presence and occasionally triggered reconfigurations of alliances and loyalties, as in Rupert Hand's escape and the subsequent blockade of Cartagena, or the dealings in Panama that embarrassed Anselmo Pineda's governorship. For the majority of this period it was hard for locals to make out the presence of the French web in the Gran Colombia region; it was intertwined and often hidden by those of its more visible European competitors.

In the years of this study, the US imperial web in Gran Colombia was new, thin, and rather springy. On few occasions did strands of US imperial influence directly affect events before the 1840s; Dabney O. Carr's intervention at El Santuario was one, the actions of John MacPherson in Cartagena another. Elites saw it strengthening and expanding across North America and into Mexican territory. The 1846 Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty was the

official recognition in New Granada that governments would henceforth pay more attention to the US empire than its British precursor.

Underneath these imperial webs lay new emerging national and regional formations. Sometimes they struggled to fight their way through, lashing out at perceived unwanted foreign interventions and asserting their own strength and sovereignty. Most explicitly, this is seen in the trial of Rupert Hand as orchestrated by José María Obando, the complaints about Daniel O'Leary's diplomatic postings, and the many rhetorical outbursts from local leaders who resisted being told what to do by foreign "intruders." Less ostentatiously, state, national, and regional leaders sought to build strong institutions and coherent collective identities that could withstand the imperial power that encompassed or threatened them. They were not always successful, but their negotiations with imperial webs created spaces for regional autonomy and national politics. The careers of Anselmo Pineda, Braulio Henao, and Thomas Murray, in particular, reflect these uncomfortable years of nation-building in the face of considerable obstacles.

Another way of thinking about this reconfiguration of empire and of sovereignty after 1825 would be to employ the concept of the "coloniality of power" developed by Anibal Quijano. Quijano sees post-independence Latin America as defined by its "historical-structural dependence" upon Europe.[10] By this he does not necessarily mean economic or structural dependence, of the type articulated by so-called dependency theorists of the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, Quijano uses the concept of the coloniality of power to provide an alternative analytical pathway somewhere between economic dependency and cultural subordination, in which the two were mutually reinforcing.

In my work with Gabriel Paquette and others I have tended to stress the significance of social and political change after independence in Latin America within a comparative perspective, while drawing attention to imperial and geopolitical continuities within the Atlantic world.[11] Quijano argues that post-independence power was distinguished by its coloniality, with little meaningful change to social hierarchies or inequalities, especially with regard to race and the influence of foreign capital. The continued invisibility of the nonwhite El Santuario veterans for large parts of this book, reflecting absence from surviving contemporary historical sources, certainly supports the first of these; and there is no shortage of examples linking El Santuario veterans to international capital. (Daniel O'Leary's role as a director of the new Banco Colonial in Caracas is the most obvious.)

Nevertheless, much work on coloniality as practiced by sociologists such as Quijano, Enrique Dussel, and Walter Mignolo continues to lack the historical detail to support its generalized statements. Certainly the claim that "the nineteenth century [was] the setting for Great Britain's neocolonial control over Latin America's economy" can be contested on several levels, and is not born out by historical studies, and certainly not for New Granada or Venezuela. And if there was a "neocolonial pact" between national elites and international capital, it was one of which very few of its protagonists were

conscious.[12] The careers, political trajectories, and personal lives of the El Santuario veterans studied here reveal the interconnectedness of global and local factors that resist easy categorization. New Granadans and Venezuelans like Córdova, Pineda, Henao, Fernández, and Giraldo enjoyed a great margin of agency and freedom to shape their own histories and societies. As Moraña, Dussel, and Jáuregui argue, "Latin America should not be conceptualised as the residue of domination, but rather as a space where coloniality has been perpetrated and perpetuated as a function of capitalism, and where cultural, social and political transformations have been taking place for centuries, in search of emancipation and sovereignty."[13]

The year 1829 was central to this search, poised on the cusp between colonial and independent histories in New Granada and Venezuela. Because José María Córdova did not expect O'Leary to cross the Andes at the Vahos pass, El Santuario and its people occupied briefly and unexpectedly a corner of the empire. Imperial webs thickened and grew together, pushing people in directions that limited their freedom of movement and caused them to enter military conflict. French moves to encourage a monarchy project in Bogotá catalyzed Córdova's resistance to Bolívar's rule, and triggered many Antioquians to join Córdova in defense of their local and regional interests. British fingerprints were all over the weapons that defeated Córdova's army and murdered him. But British support in Bogotá had also been crucial to Córdova's decision to rebel in the first place, and British capital and commerce had helped create the regional wealth that Antioquians threw behind him. The call for sovereignty united them behind Córdova's banners. The foreign soldiers who enlisted in O'Leary's expedition from Bogotá dragged with them imperial webs of many hues, variously commercial, financial and cultural. The aftermath of the battle on October 17, 1829, and the lives of its protagonists, witnessed the unraveling and reconfiguration of these webs, and the gradual construction of national structures and identities that, for all the coloniality of the power they represented, might one day resist them.

Notes

Prologue

1. A figure of 373 comes from [Anon], *Observaciones a la pastoral del Illmo. Sr Obispo.* Most observers estimated between 300 and 400.
2. Information on Isaza and Hoyos, and a wealth of similar individuals, comes from AGNC HDS. More detailed citations to these and others are provided in later chapters.
3. Arango, *El Santuario,* 26.
4. Ramirez Gomez, *El Santuario,* 23. Ramirez Gomez was the priest in El Santuario for much of his life. His great-grandfather Ricardo Ramirez fought at the Battle of El Santuario in 1829, and his historical writings draw from a mixture of archival sources and oral histories.
5. Arango, *El Santuario,* 26.
6. Bronx, *José María Córdova,* 145–151.
7. Ramirez Gomez, *El Santuario,* 23.
8. R. Urdaneta, September 28, 1829, AGNC R GYM, Vol. 462, 98 for Hand.
9. D. O'Leary to S. O'Leary, October 5, 1829, Pie de Sargento, in Carbonnell, *General O'Leary, íntimo,* 215.
10. R. Urdaneta to D. O'Leary, September 26, 1829, Bogotá, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 468.
11. R. Urdaneta to S. Bolívar, October 2, 1829, with an October 5, postscript, Honda, AGNC R GYM Vol. 462, 312.
12. R. Urdaneta to Jefe de Estado Mayor, October 17, 1829, Bogotá, AGNC R GYM, Vol. 462, 188.
13. D. O'Leary to Soledad O'Leary, October 9, 1829, Juntas, in Carbonnell, *General O'Leary, íntimo,* 215.
14. D. O'Leary to R. Urdaneta, October 13, 1829, La Aguada, AGNC R GYM, Vol. 462, 369.
15. Bronx, *José María Córdova entre la historia y la fábula*, 106.
16. Arango, *El Santuario,* 25.
17. This news was published by the *Registro oficial del Magdalena*, *Extraordinario*, on November 1, 1829, drawing on the letters of Federico Rausch, who may have received the news from his countryman Heinrich Lutzen. The translation into English was published in the *Times* on August 1, 1830.
18. O'Leary to the prefect of the Department of Magdalena (Mariano Montilla), October 19, 1829, Rionegro, English translation published in the *Times,*

August 1, 1830. It was later alleged that O'Leary and his officers had been carried over San Carlos pass by *peones cargueros.* Arango, *El Santuario,* 25.
19. Fernández, *Memorias,* 60.
20. Arango, *El Santuario,* 26.

Introduction

1. Arango, "Ultimos episodios," 1–3. The original published version, which omits the preliminary notes cited here, is Arango, *El Santuario.*
2. Ramírez Gómez, *El Santuario,* 9, and Ramírez Gómez, *Combatientes de El Santuario.*
3. Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario*, 84. This is supplemented by the more patchy but still valuable Bronx, *Museo del General Córdova en el Santuario.*
4. Pinzón Pinzón, *De la concha a las brechas del Santuario*; Barrera Orrego, *José María Córdova*; Arango Toro, *El asesinato de un héroe.* The only other historians who have engaged with the Battle of El Santuario in any sort of detail have been biographers of José María Córdova, for whom the battle and the death of their subject is inevitably the dramatic finale of their story.
5. Dunkerley, ed., *Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America.*
6. These mercenaries are the subject of Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies.*
7. Thibaud, *Repúblicas en armas*, 384.
8. This is the interpretation adopted in Gillmore, *Federalismo en Colombia*, 99.
9. Restrepo Canal and Helguera, "1831–1858, época de transición," 31–63; Tovar Pinzón, "La lenta ruptura con el pasado colonial 1810–1850"; Deas, *Del poder y la gramática*, 18; Dunkerley, *Americana*, 31 sees the period as a relatively "characterless hiatus."
10. For more detail on political culture in the first half-century of independence, see in particular Safford, "Social Aspects of Politics."
11. Halperín Donghi, *The Aftermath of Revolution in Latin America.*
12. Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives;* Thibaud and Calderón, *La majestad de los pueblos.*
13. Sanders, *Contentious Republicans;* Appelbaum, *Muddied Waters.*
14. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia de Antioquia*; González, *Partidos, guerras y iglesia.*
15. Pearce, *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808.*
16. Llorca, "British Textile Exports."
17. Racine, "This England, This Now."
18. Stein and Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America,* 155.
19. Dunkerley, "Latin America since Independence," 36.
20. Knight, "U.S. Imperialism/Hegemony in Latin America," 36, 44.
21. Brown and Paquette, eds., *Connections after Colonialism.*
22. Wu Brading, *Generals and Diplomats.*
23. Brown, ed., *Informal Empire in Latin America.*
24. Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution,* 42.
25. Price, "One Big Thing," 612, 624.
26. Stoler, ed., *Haunted by Empire,* xvii; Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty," 135–136.

27. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World,* 473.
28. Ibid., 126.
29. Vargas García, "Imperio informal?" 381.
30. Summary of instructions, Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen to the new British minister in Bogotá, William Turner, July 13, 1830, London, TNA FO 18/76, 5.
31. Vargas García, "Imperio informal?" 367.
32. Deas, "Weapons of the Weak?" 173–186.
33. The same point is made more generally for Latin America as a whole in Knight, "Rethinking British Informal Empire in Latin America (especially Argentina)," 23–48.
34. Martínez, *El nacionalismo cosmopólita,* 102.
35. Deas, ed., *The Role of Great Britain,* 9; García Estrada, *Los extranjeros en Colombia,* 24, 38; Safford, "Foreign and National Enterprise," 513.
36. As Jordana Dym has observed for Central America in the same period, it was not clear "where nationality ended and citizenship began." Dym, "Citizen of Which Republic?" 487.
37. Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution,* 47; Adelman, "Rites of Statehood."
38. Isaacs, "Tierra de Córdova," 507.
39. Echeverría in "The Socialist Doctrine of the Association of May" (1846), in Burke and Humphreys, eds., *Nineteenth-Century Nation-Building*, 161.
40. Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution,* 310, 393.
41. Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America,* 69.
42. Quijano, "On coloniality."
43. Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism,* 54.
44. Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," 1–15.
45. Bolívar to R. Wellesley, May 27, 1815, Kingston, Jamaica, in Bushnell, ed., *Simón Bolívar,* 154.
46. Bolívar, "Angostura Address," 1819, in Brown, ed., *Simón Bolívar,* 84.
47. Jaramillo Uribe, *La personalidad histórica.*
48. Bolívar, "Address to the Constituent Congress in Bolivia," 1826, in Brown, ed., *Simón Bolívar,* 138.
49. This definition and the justification for it are laid out at more length in Brown, "Introduction," in Brown, ed., *Informal Empire in Latin America,* especially 19–21.
50. I am happy to acknowledge my debt to five considerable works in this tenor: Tovar Pinzón, "Tras las huellas del soldado Pablo"; Colley, *The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh;* Jones, "Finance, Ambition and Romanticism in the River Plate"; Hall, *Civilising Subjects;* Bickers, *Empire Made Me.*
51. The phrase comes from Deas, *Vida y opinión de William Wills,* 1: 299. Other notable contributions are Lynch, *Simón Bolívar: A Life*; Fowler, *Santa Anna of Mexico;* Murray, *For Glory and Bolivar.*
52. Andrien, ed., *The Human Tradition in Colonial Latin America*, xiii.
53. Twinam, *Public Lives, Private Secrets*, 22.
54. Appelbaum, *Muddied Waters,* 20.
55. Bushnell, "Vidas paralelas de dos pueblos hermanos," 289–300.
56. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, xviii.
57. O'Phelan Godoy and Salazar Soler, eds., *Passeurs, mediadores culturales y agentes.*
58. For example, Yun-Casalilla, "'Localism,' Global History and Transnational History."

59. Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles.*
60. The court documents were published in their entirety in Ortega Ricaurte, ed., *Asesinato de Cordova*. The originals have been lost when they were transferred from the BNC to the AGNC; they may have been among the papers of the Supreme Court that were destroyed by military action in 1985. A copy of the note that accompanied the bundle to the Supreme Court has survived, in AGNC Asuntos Criminales.
61. Anderson, *Subaltern Lives.*

Chapter 1: The World in Revolution

1. Stein and Stein, *Edge of Crisis*; Robson, *Britain, Portugal and South America*.
2. Blaufarb, *Bonapartists in the Borderlands*, xvii.
3. This paragraph draws on an excellent biography, Mendoza Alemán, *Un soldado de Simón Bolívar: Carlos Castelli*, 41–48.
4. Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies,* chapters 1–2 for these expeditions.
5. There are several biographies of O'Leary: the best are Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* and Mondolfi, *Daniel O'Leary.*
6. Ueda, "Pushing the Atlantic Envelope," 163.
7. These sentences are the meager fruit of intense investigations in archives in Medellín, Rionegro, Bogotá, and London. There is no biography of Murray that surpasses the few pages dedicated to him in Aguilera, *Clave politico,* 39–52. I found the information regarding his parents and country of birth in his marriage certificate, which survives in APNSC, Libro de Matrimonios, Vol. 10, 16.r–f.v. Previous accounts noted him vaguely as "inglés" or "British," for example, Ortega Ricaurte, ed., *Asesinato de Córdova*, 7; Lambert, "General O'Leary and South America," 68.
8. Samper, *Historia de un alma,* chapter 14, "Aventuras de un coronel."
9. For background to Hand's origins, see my *ODNB* biography.
10. Cited in Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 453. This only surviving copy of Hand's service record was held in the archive of the Supreme Court of Colombia, and was apparently destroyed when government troops stormed the Supreme Court building in 1985. Posada's reproduction of the document is therefore invaluable.
11. On Crofton's hazy origins, see Brown, "Ricardo José Crofton."
12. Lambert, "General O'Leary and South America," 68; Ramirez Gómez, *Combatientes de El Santuario*, 4. Neither Lambert nor Ramirez Gómez provide sources to verify these statements.
13. German soldiers were scattered around Central and South America in this period: see Zoraida Vásquez, "Soldados alemanes."
14. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World,* 7.
15. The quote comes from Lutzen's 1828 service records, in AGNC HDS Vol. 25, 744.
16. His surviving letters suggest a passing interest in Colombia. On November 7, 1827, William Wirt wrote to Dabney Carr from Richmond, Virginia, describing a meeting he had had with "Mr Salazar, the Colombian Minister, on behalf of Overton Carr." It is likely that Overton was Dabney O. Carr's

middle name, and that this meeting led to the younger Dabney O. Carr traveling to Colombia where he joined the army. The letter is in the William Wirt Letters, University of Virginia Library, Folder 4, http://search.lib.unc.edu/search?Ntk=Subject&Ntt=Carr,%20Dabney,%201773–1837. A clarification is required here. In all previous works on El Santuario, Carr's surname is presumed to be O'Carr, ascribing him an Irish origin in line with O'Leary and others. However, my genealogical research into the Virginia Carrs, and in particular the recurrence of the rare first name Dabney, certainly links him to the Virginia line of Dabney Carrs described here. The final piece in the jigsaw is a reference to Dabney "killed in a battle in South America," in *The American Carr Families,* http://ia360640.us.archive.org/1/items/americancarrfami00fran/americancarrfami00fran.pdf.

17. González, "Colombia en cuatro tiempos," 4.
18. The quote is from F. Urdaneta, *A la imparcialidad de los hombres de honor.*
19. Espinosa, *Memorias de un abanderado*, 50.
20. Urdaneta's early biography is taken from his obituary in *Gaceta Oficial de la Confederación Granadina*, April 6, 1861, which draws heavily on Urdaneta's HDS.
21. Vale, *A War Betwixt Englishmen.*
22. Botero, *La ruta del oro,* 49–62.
23. Silva, *Universidad y sociedad.*
24. Hoyos Gómez, *La Revolución granadina de 1810,* 433, and Silva, *Los ilustrados de Nueva Granada.*
25. Duque Betancourt, *Historia del departamento de Antioquia*, 543–553.
26. These included Miguel and Salvador Alzate of Marinilla, whose mother Simona Duque famously volunteered both her sons to Córdova's patriot forces, rather than just the one son he had demanded from every family. The brothers began long military careers that led them to El Santuario a decade later, but under O'Leary rather than Córdova.
27. For example, Uribe, *Raíces del poder regional.* Biographers tended to emphasize Córdova's vocation for heroism rather than administration, as in Llano, *Biografía del Procer Americano Jose Maria Córdova*, 221.
28. Palacios and Safford, *Colombia,* 102.
29. The case has been studied by Ann Twinam in *Public Lives, Private Secrets*, 340–341.
30. For example, O'Leary, *The Detached Recollections,* 37.
31. There is no full biography of Manuel Antonio Jaramillo. I am extremely grateful to Humberto Barrera Orrego for giving me permission to draw from his unpublished paper "El capitán Manuel Antonio Jaramillo," which provides a short but well-documented biography of Jaramillo's career.
32. On slavery in Rionegro and Marinilla see UNCM, Fondo Civil, "Cuadernillo de varias solicitudes, 1793–1816," Box 645, Document 12866, 255, esp. 214–220.
33. "Censo de Rionegro, 1843," in AHA Gobernación de Antioquia, República, Censos y Estadisticas, Vol. 2689, No. 19, 381–500.
34. This figure is down from the previous 50,000 because of the internal displacement of much of the population due to the armed conflict between paramilitaries, guerrillas, and state forces in the surrounding region in the past decade.
35. Ramirez Gómez, *El Santuario,* 32, 13.

36. A portrait of Francisco Villa hangs in the Córdovas' old house in Rionegro, now converted into the regional archive. It is reprd. in Melo, ed., *Historia de Antioquia,* 109.
37. Juan Antonio Gómez claimed to have recruited this number, in a statement dated May 15, 1840, Bogotá, in AGNC HDS Vol. 19, 916.
38. Archivo Parroquial de Marinilla, libros de nacimiento 1790–1810.
39. Juan Antonio Cárdenas contra Vicente de Hoyos, UNCM, Box 63, Doc. 3364, 12.
40. There are two biographies of Francisco Giraldo, both of which praise his successes and skim over or ignore less praiseworthy aspects of his career or character. They are Jaramillo, *Biografía del General Don Francisco Giraldo*, and Henao, *Datos biográficos sobre el General Francisco Giraldo.*
41. Thibaud, *Repúblicas en armas.*
42. There are two good biographies of Anselmo Pineda, Gómez, *Biografía de Anselmo Pineda* and the more rigorous Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda.*
43. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 475.

Chapter 2: The Narrowing Stage: From Global to Local

1. Gutierrez, *El reconocimiento,* 321.
2. Scott, *Mary English*, 111, relying on Mary English's correspondence, now at the BL.
3. Otero Cleves, "Jeneros de gusto y sobretodos ingleses," 20–49.
4. See F. Montoya, *Cuaderno de Cuentas Corrientes,* BLAA Libros Raros MSS 082.
5. Weber, "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority," 245–252.
6. Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives,* 17, 158, prefers to cast these networks in terms of access to State or Church positions.
7. On the growing British unofficial and contraband trade with Colombia from the late colonial period through the independence years, see Pearce, *British Trade and Spanish America*, 172–176, Botero, *La ruta del oro,* 54–58.
8. For García's networks see the collection of letters, passports, and lending notes in BLAA, MSC 111, 1–60, and the reference to his family in Martínez Garnica and Gútierrez Ardila, *Quién es quién en 1810? Guía de forasteros,* 54.
9. Robledo, "Boussingault en Antioquia," 3.
10. J. M. Córdova to García, February 26, 1825, La Paz, in BLAA MSS 111, 9.
11. Francisco Montoya had to justify his conduct to Congress during 1825 and 1826, and published his defense as Montoya, *Exposición que hace al gobierno* and Montoya, *Emprestito de Colombia de 1824.* An excellent biography is Molina Londoño, *Francisco Montoya Zapata*
12. Barrera Orrego, "El capitán Manuel Antonio Jaramillo." On assumptions of his wealth locally see AHA, Fondo Gobernación, República, Documentos, Vol. 937, No. 14237, 292–294. In 1827, for example, Jaramillo's sales accounted for 10 percent of the Casa de Moneda's annual purchases. "Manual para tomar razón del oro y plata que se compraron en esta Casa de Moneda de Bogotá en el año cuarto económico desde 1o de julio de 1827 hasta 1o de junio de 1828," BLAA, CDM, Da0221, 12.
13. The marriage produced eight children, one of whom, Federico Jaramillo Córdova, went on to become an important biographer of José María Córdova.

14. For example, "Juicio promovido por Sr Sinforoso Garcia contra la Sra Antonia Jaramillo, por expresiones que le ha infurizado, 1821," AHR, Fondo Judicial, Vol. 598, 1–14.
15. "Juicio promovido por Sr Sinforoso Garcia," 14.
16. On Zea's loan the standard reference work is Barriga Villaba, *El emprestito de Zea y el préstamo de Erick Bollmann de 1822*. Details on these families are in Brew, *El desarrollo económico de Antioquia*.
17. For an illustration of these networks see UNCM, Archivo Judicial, Fondo Civil, Box 12, Doc. 380, 5, and Doc. 361, 12.
18. Miguel Alzate al Presidente de la República, Rionegro, 1852, AGNC HDS, Vol. 3, 223.
19. Hoyos, Service Records dated March 31, 1828, Medellín, AGNC HDS Vol. 54, 829–830.
20. Duque Betancur, *Historia del departamento de Antioquia*, 581. On Giradot's father the French merchant, see García Estrada, *Los extranjeros en Colombia,* 73.
21. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda*, 10–11.
22. Silva, *Universidad y sociedad*, 445.
23. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias históricas,* Vol. 2, 297–301. The Spanish original of the final phrase was "¡Arriba, soldados, armas a discreción, paso de vencedores, marchen!"
24. López, *Recuerdos históricos,* 188–189.
25. O'Connor, *Independencia americana,* 159.
26. Córdova, "Manifiesto," in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 463.
27. O'Connor, *Independencia americana,* 155.
28. Miller served as governor of Potosí and played an important role in early independent Bolivian politics. See Wu Brading, *William Miller.*
29. Córdova's heroic image is analyzed in López Bermúdez, "José Maria Córdova en la tradición historiográfica colombiana," and López Bermúdez, "La eterna presencia del héroe," 210.
30. Henao, *Datos biográficos sobre el General Francisco Giraldo*, 15.
31. Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía de Salvador Córdova,* 39–49. Salvador Córdova's military records are at AGNC HDS Vol. 12, 106. None of the Europeans who would be at El Santuario in 1829 were at Ayacucho. O'Leary was in Chile, submerged in a fruitless diplomatic attempt to enlist Chilean cavalry for the Peruvian campaign. Hand was retired from active service and Murray, Lutzen, and Castelli were on the Caribbean front, guarding against Spanish naval attacks.
32. J. M. Córdova to Sucre, February 20, 1826, Cochabamba, in Moreno de Angel, ed., *Correspondencia y documentos,* Vol. 2, 171.
33. See Barraya, *Biografías Militares.* Vol. 1, 213, Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 32.
34. Henao, *Datos biográficos,* 19; S. Córdova to Santander, March 15, 1826, Medellín, cited in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía de Salvador Córdova,* 53.
35. "Sr Vicente Córdova a nombre de su madre la Sra Pascuala Muñoz," Deuda doméstica No. 182, February 18, 1825, Medellín, BLAA, CDM, Db. 1827, 2.
36. Pinzón Pinzón, *De la concha a las brechas del Santuario,* 58–59.
37. Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 14–22. José Belver, who was a clerk in the court-martial in 1827, published his account in the *Papel Periódico Ilustrado*

in 1885, and in addition to the court-martial verdict, his is the principal source for Córdova's biographers.

38. J. M. Restrepo provided many descriptions of Córdova's character, for example, *Historia de la revolución,* Vol. 4, 126, and Vol. 6, 247–248.
39. See the commentary and documents collected in Barrera Orrego, *José María Córdova*, 62–65, including the court's final sentence, dated November 30, 1827.
40. O'Leary, *Detached Recollections,* 25.
41. Hasbrouck, *Foreign Legionaries,* appendices J and K.
42. *El Constitucional,* October 5, 1826.
43. Meerland, British Consul in Maracaibo, to James Henderson, December 10, 1828, Maracaibo, TNA, FO 357/8, 6. At this time Carmelo Fernández also returned to Venezuela. His links to the outside world, grounded in his expensive four years of education in the United States, were now reinforced through family ties: he found his mother had secretly married a German sailor. González, "Colombia en cuatro tiempos," 3.
44. Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 455–457; Castelli, "The Port of Maracaibo," in ANH, AC, Vol. 3, 76–77.
45. Filippi, ed., *Bolívar y Europa,* Vol. 1, 597.
46. AGNC GYM Vol. 61, 240–242, is Rupert Hand's service record, dated Maracaibo July 8, 1824, including his own account of some of these events. My thanks to Mauricio Tovar for locating this document for me.
47. The court records are in AGNV, Gobernación de Guayana, Vol. 12 and in AGNC R Asuntos Criminales, Vol. 76. The case is discussed in detail in Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies,* 92–93.
48. Cited in Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 453.
49. *La Miscelenea,* Bogotá, May 21, 1826.
50. *El Constitucional,* Bogotá, July 20, 1826.
51. Cowley, *Recollections of a Service of Three Years*, Vol. 1, 242–244.
52. O'Leary to Bolívar, July 15, 1826, Bogotá, reprd. in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 32. O'Leary saw no incongruence between his foreign origin and his feeling, especially since his marriage to Soledad Soublette, like a "true Colombian." O'Leary to Bolívar, March 30, 1828, Ocaña, reprd. in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 175–176.
53. The insult comes from the Chilean newspaper *El Liberal* in 1824, cited by Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 196.
54. These pages draw on Brown, "Enlightened Reform after Independence."
55. For "selective demolition" see Carrera Damas, *Colombia, 1821–1827.* For the term "unrestrained multitudes" see Bolívar to Flores, November 9, 1830, in Bushnell, ed., *Simón Bolívar,* 146.
56. For Venezuela see Zahler, *Lawyers,* and for Colombia see Helg, *Liberty and Equality.*
57. The British Consul in Caracas reported as much in his diary on December 14, 1826. "The newspapers arrive from Bogotá . . . they are full of attacks on Bolívar, criticising his 'Bolivarian Code' and citing the examples of republican ambition in Napoleon and Iturbide, and insinuating similar intentions in the Liberator." Ker Porter, *Diario,* 164. Bolívar addressed all of these charges in a letter to Páez, dated Magdalena [Lima], March 6, 1826, reprd. as "Nor Am I Napoleon" in Bushnell, ed., *El Libertador,* 137–138.

58. Bolívar, "Address to the Constituent Congress of Bolivia," May 25, 1826, Lima.
59. Bolívar, "Thoughts on the Congress," 1826, in Bushnell, ed., *El Libertador,* 170–171.
60. Gutierrez, *El reconocimiento,* 324.

Chapter 3: The Road to War

1. Lynch, *Simón Bolívar,* 250–251.
2. See D. O'Leary's letters to S. Soublette from Ocaña, extracts of which are reprd. in Carbonnell, *El General O'Leary, íntimo,* 138–155.
3. Santander to Vergara, undated, Ocaña, cited in Moreno de Angel, *Santander,* 413–419.
4. Louis Péru de la Croix, *Diario de Bucaramanga,* 122, 153, 208.
5. Barrera Orrego, "El capitán Manuel Antonio Jaramillo," 5.
6. Guerra, *La Convención de Ocaña.*
7. Cordovez Moure, *Reminiscencias de Santafe,* 374–378, and Murray, *For Glory and Bolívar,* 61–62.
8. Santander, *Escritos autobiográficos 1820–1840*, 82; Lynch, *Simón Bolívar,* 239.
9. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 1, 190.
10. In December 1827 Primer Comandante Ricardo José Crofton received 2,700 pesos as *haberes militares* for his services. Only the receipt survives, so the dates Crofton was being paid for remain unknown. "Haber Militar Declarado: Año 1827, Mes de Octubre, #2500 al #2599," BLAA, CDM, Db5494, Receipt #2504, signed Bogotá, December 20, 1827.
11. Crofton et al., *Excelentísimo señor libertador*, BNC, FQ 261, Pza 200.
12. Moreno de Angel, *Santander*, 435.
13. Sucre to O'Leary, August 26, 1829, in O'Leary, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 511–512.
14. Córdova to Bolívar, January 28, 1829, Popayán, AGNC R GYM Vol. 140, 1077.
15. Campbell, "Memoire," 268.
16. Manuela Sáenz to D. O'Leary, August 10, 1850, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 335.
17. Murray, *For Glory and Bolívar,* 65–68.
18. Sáenz to D. O'Leary, August 10, 1850, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 335.
19. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 1, 190.
20. J. M. Restrepo observed that "with hindsight, some thought that Córdova was implicated in the plot" (*Historia de la revolución,* Vol. 6, 126–129) but the evidence is speculative and unconvincing.
21. *Gaceta de Colombia,* September 28, 1828. Less positively, Manuela Sáenz later remembered that Crofton's principal contribution had been to "get in the way" of other officers. Sáenz to O'Leary, August 10, 1850, Paita, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 335. Crofton's own account of these matters has disappeared. *Declaración del coronel R J Crofton, Manuscrito original sobre la conspiración de 25 de setiembre de 1828* is recorded in the Catalogue of the BNC Fondo Pineda as being (before recataloguing in the 1990s) in Vitrina 18, Vol. 7, 484, Pza 36 (MSS 196). By 2002 it could no longer be found.

22. Santander, *Escritos autobiográficos,* 86.
23. Cited in Posada, "La libertadora," 26.
24. Rojas, *El doctor Ezequil Rojas ante el tribunal,* 28–29.
25. Rodriguez Plata, "Santander en el Exilio," 92–93, cited in Moreno de Angel, *Santander,* 471.
26. O'Connor, *Independencia americana,* 102.
27. Pinzón Pinzón, *De la concha a las brechas,* 71.
28. *Gaceta de Colombia,* September 26, 1828, with further information provided in the October 12, 1828, edition.
29. *Gaceta de Colombia,* October 19, 1828.
30. Named by Espinosa in *Memorias de un abanderado,* 77.
31. Cordovez Moure, *Reminiscencias,* 713–743.
32. Helg, "Simón Bolívar," 462, and Lynch, *Simón Bolívar,* 242.
33. Bushnell, "The Development of the Press in Great Colombia," 451–452, Bushnell, *Simón Bolívar*, 192.
34. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda*, 12–13. A lawyer from Cundinamarca, during this period of internal exile Ospina joined José María Córdova's insurrection and served as his political secretary. He was not physically present at the Battle of El Santuario, and it seems most likely that he remained behind in Rionegro. For this reason he is not one of the protagonists of our narrative, but rather an actor whose voice is often heard, and whose presence can be discerned, from off-stage. For some Liberals, Ospina came to epitomize everything Conservative that had to be opposed in politics. See the lengthy discussion of William Will's relations with Ospina and Mosquera in Deas, *Vida y opinión de William Wills,* Vol. 2, esp. 251–267.
35. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 126.
36. González, *Memorias,* 163. There is a reference to Watts on 174 related to Gonzalez's release and exile.
37. Torrens to Henderson, December 17, 1828, Bogotá, in TNA FO 357/7.
38. In this section I draw from Moreno de Angel's account in *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 533–570.
39. Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 538. For an example of their exchanges see Obando, *Apuntamientos,* Vol. 1, 128–129.
40. Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 553.
41. For a sympathetic description of a similar situation in Mexico in the 1820s, see Mackenzie Johnston, *Missions to Mexico.*
42. O'Leary's letters from the period are published in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 362–460.
43. See, for example, *El Colombiano de Guayas,* July 26, 1828.
44. Sandes, "Official Report," Guayaquil, November 28, 1828, republished in *El Colombiano de Guayas,* November 29, 1828.
45. Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 395–408.
46. Sucre, *Documentos de la campaña de treinta días sobre las fronteras del sur de Colombia contra el ejército peruano invasor. Terminada por la batalla de Tarqui bajo la dirección del Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho,* Cuenca: J. Maya, 1829.
47. This narrative is drawn from O'Leary's "Official Report," reprd. in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 449–452.
48. O'Leary to Soublette, May 1, 1829, Bogotá, FJB, SMAM, M21-A02-E1-C512.

49. O'Leary to S. Soublette, February 18, 1829, Tarqui, in Carbonnell, *El General O'Leary,* 208.
50. William Harrison believed that both Britain and the United States had been invited to mediate independently in the dispute. Harrison to Van Buren, March 30, 1829, and May 16, 1829, both Bogotá, both in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, Docs. 1326 and 1332.
51. Córdova to Henderson, April 11, 1829, Pasto, in TNA FO 357/7.
52. Aberdeen to Campbell, August 8, 1829, London, in TNA FO 18/63, 25.
53. Hermann, *La politique de la France,* 58.
54. Harrison to Van Buren, May 27, 1829, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Corresopondence,* Vol. 2, Doc. 1333.
55. O'Leary's letters from this period were omitted from the original publication of the *Memorias de O'Leary* and as such are absent from subsequent reeditions. Extracts from these letters are published in Brown and Roa Celis, eds., *Militares extranjeros*, 141–159.
56. Campbell to O., January 6, 1829, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/64, 8.
57. Campbell, "Memoire," August 20, 1829, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/64, 270.
58. Aberdeen to Campbell, August 8, 1829, London, in TNA FO 18/63, 25.
59. Manuel Gonzalez Salmón to Conde de Ofalia, March 2, 1830, Madrid, in AGI Estado 93 N./1.
60. Córdova to Henderson, April 11, 1829, in Moreno de Angel, *Correspondencia,* Vol. 4, 101.
61. Harrison to Van Buren, June 22, 1829, Bogotá, enclosing a decoded encrypted letter from "Bolívar to One of His Confidential Friends," in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, Doc. 1336.
62. Harrison to Van Buren, July 28, 1829, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, Doc. 1338.
63. Bushnell, *Simón Bolívar,* 197.
64. O'Leary arrived in Popayán on April 12, so he probably remained in Pasto until around April 9. Dates reconstructed from Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 407.
65. Córdova to Henderson, April 2, 1829, Pasto, in TNA FO 357/7, extract in Moreno de Angel, *Correspondencia y documentos,* Vol. 4, 97.
66. O'Leary to Bolívar, April 5, 1829, Pasto, FJB, SMAM, M21-A02-E1-C509. He later advised Bolívar to "conquer Peru, loot Peru and then sell Peru to some foreigners, or give it back to Spain in return for Spanish recognition of Colombia." O'Leary to Bolívar, May 7, 1829, Bogotá, FJB, SMAM, M21-A02-E1-C513.
67. Letters in FJB, SMAM, C-509–510; see also Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 378–401.
68. Córdova to Henderson, May 21, 1829, Popayán, in TNA FO 357/7.
69. O'Leary to Soublette, May 1, 1829, Bogotá, FJB, SMAM, M21-A02-E1-C512.
70. Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 481.
71. Rensselaer. Van Rensselaer to Solomon Van Rensselaer, July 12, 1829, Bogotá, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 1, 504.
72. As observed in López Bermúdez, "José María Córdova en la tradición," 203–204.
73. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia de Antioquia,* 67.
74. At some stage Córdova gave Fanny Henderson a medallion with his portrait inside. It is reprd. in Ortega Ricaurte, ed., *Asesinato de Córdova*, although mistakenly noted as belonging to "his girlfriend Fanny Anderson."

75. J. M. Córdova to S. Córdova, April 27, 1828, Bogotá, reprd. in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía de Salvador Córdova*, 185.
76. Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 483.
77. J. M. Córdova to J. Henderson, June 15, 1828, Bogotá.
78. Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 531. Córdova signed the required forms on October 7, 1828, to buy a house in central Bogotá, next door to the Presidential Palace and the residence of the French Consul Henri Bouchet de Martigny. Córdova's death prevented completion of the sale.
79. Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 537. Many of the letters between Córdova and James Henderson are in TNA FO 18/357/7 and published in Moreno de Angel, ed., *Correspondencia y documentos del general José María Córdova,* Vols. 3–4.
80. Notes in TNA FO 357/7 and FO 357/8, both uncatalogued. The reference to news from Pasto suggests that it was written in Popayán.
81. J. M. Córdova to S. Córdova, July 7, 1829, Popayán, reprd. in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía de Salvador Córdova,* 211–212.
82. J. M. Córdova to M. A. Jaramillo, July 29, 1829, Popayán, in Camargo Pérez, ed., *Archivo y otros documentos del coronel Salvador Córdova*, 136–138.
83. On resentment toward Manuela Sáenz (who was herself married to an Englishman, James Thorne, at the time) see Murray, *For Glory and Bolívar.*
84. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 39–54.
85. Vergara to Moore, October 18, 1829, Bogotá, in AGN, MRE, DT2, Vol. 131, 54–55. Thanks to Daniel Gutierrez for providing me with this source.
86. Córdova wrote to both Bolívar and Henderson to inform them of this decision. See TNA 357/7.
87. Arango, *El Santuario,* 2–4.
88. Arango, *El Santuario,* 5. Antonio Mendoza related another similar meeting the following day, with similar resistance to Córdova's plans. His account is reprd. in Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 576–577.
89. Arango, *El Santuario,* 5.
90. F. Urdaneta, *A los Antioqueños* in Archivo José Manuel Restrepo, Caja 28, Vol. 47, 37, cited in Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 53.
91. J. M. Restrepo described the executions as "an act of terror," cited in Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario,* 87.
92. S. Córdova, *A la nación*, in BNC Fondo Pineda, Vol. 466, Pza 226.
93. Arango, *El Santuario,* 7–8, 11.
94. AHA Fondo Gobernación, República, Vol. 1046, No. 15114, 1–30.
95. See, for example, "Remate de un lote baldío," UNCM Civil, Caja 252, Doc. 5622, September 2, 1828, and "Anuncio de una mina como desierta y petitición para que se le adjudique," UNCM Civil, Caja 44, Doc. 1181, 1–30.
96. For historians' criticisms of the document see Lynch, *Simón Bolívar,* 264, and Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia de Antioquia*, 44–45.
97. All quotes are from J. M. Córdova, "Manifiesto que el general Córdova presenta," September 16, 1829, Medellín, reprd. in D. O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 462–465, 465.
98. Córdova, "Manifiesto," 464. More damning was the message of support Córdova received from the Chocó, which spoke of "disgusting plans for monarchy veiled in republican form," Acta de Quibdó, October 2, 1829, cited in Thibaud and Calderón, *La majestad de los pueblos,* 227.

99. Córdova to Páez, September 18, 1829, Rionegro, reprd. in Arango, *El Santuario,* 15–19.
100. M. A. Jaramillo to Ministry of Interior, no date, 1829, Medellín, in AGNC Fondo Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, Sección: Colección Comandancias Militares, Caja 13, Carpeta 1, 104–105.
101. AHA Fondo Gobernación, República, Vol. 1046, No. 15114, 1–30.
102. Córdova to Council of Ministers, September 21, 1829, Medellín, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 466–467.
103. Córdova to Bolívar, September 21, 1829, Medellín, in BNC VFDPI-4432.
104. Silva, *Universidad y sociedad*, 303–310.
105. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia* has an interesting discussion on "the opposition of Bishop Garnica" (45–49) but it is based only on a detailed reading of Garnica's one published letter to Córdova, and as such neglects the different political messages Garnica was trying to send out to different audiences, and which developed during the time of the rebellion, as discussed here.
106. For example, Garnica to M. A. Jaramillo, September 25, 1829, Rionegro, AHA Fondo Gobernación, República, Vol. 1045, No. 15116, 79. Also Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 49.
107. Garnica, *Carta a José María Córdova,* in BNC, FQ 261, 25.
108. Garnica to R. Urdaneta, October 12, 1829, 488–490.
109. Adelman, "The Rites of Statehood," 402.
110. M. A. Jaramillo to Juez Político de Marinilla, October 9, 1829, Rionegro, AHA Fondo Gobernación, República, Vol. 1046, No. 15114, 33; J. M. Córdova, "A los señores curas de Marinilla y Coadjutor," cited in Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 48.
111. J. M. Córdova to S. Córdova, October 10, 1829, Medellín, in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 219.
112. Jaramillo to Jueces Políticos, October 16, 1829, Rionegro, AHA Fondo Gobernación, República, Vol. 1046, No. 15114, 35–36.
113. Fray Antonio María Gutierrez, *Hoja suelta*, cited in Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario,* 18.
114. Arango, *El Santuario,* 22.
115. Recorded by Arango who heard the exchange, in *El Santuario,* 22–23.
116. The Mexican representative's observations on these events are recorded in Archivo Histórico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de México, *Colombia y México, 1823–1830, diversos asuntos entre ambos paises durante los citados años*, Vol. 2, L. E. 1700, S.F., cited in Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 605.
117. J. Henderson related this in a letter to J. M. Córdova, September 14, 1829, Bogotá, rough draft in TNA FO 357/7.
118. Mary Henderson to J. Henderson, September 2, 1829, Bogotá, in TNA FO 357/8, s.f
119. Harrison to Van Buren, September 7, 1829, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, Doc. 1340.
120. Harrison, *Remarks,* 8.
121. R. Urdaneta to D. O'Leary, September 26, 1829, Bogotá, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 468.
122. As suggested in Mary Henderson's letter cited above, and also in R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, November 17, 1829, Cartagena, in Bonney,

ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 1, 525, which states that intercepts had been successful "for weeks previous."

123. Estado Mayor Avendaño to O'Leary, July 11, 1829, Bogotá, reprd. in M. S. Sanchez, "O'Leary y su misión a Antioquia: Documentos," *BHA* 17:196 (1928), Doc. 2, and O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 462.
124. Murray's conduct was not impeccable; earlier that year he had been in court accused of insulting the Bolivarian General Justo Briceño. See AGNC R Miscelánea General, Vol. 13, 1–3.
125. Rebutted by Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 431.
126. For example, R. Urdaneta to O'Leary, October 4, 1829, Honda, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 470.
127. Marcelo Tenorio, *Confesión,* 499–502, cited in Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 596.
128. Recalled in an extensive description of events in R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, November 17, 1829, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 1, 523–532.
129. Carr's declaration, September 28, Bogotá, in AGNC, MRE, D, T, 2, 198–199.
130. Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución,* Vol. 6, 246–252, which is a good narrative of events; Dabney O. Carr, *Al público,* preserved in TNA 357/7. Castelli heard the same account from Enrique Lutzen, who heard it from Carr in Guaduas at the end of September. See Castelli to Henderson, March 2, 1830, San José de Cúcuta, with further details in Castelli to Henderson, June 10, 1830, Bogotá, both in TNA FO 357/7.
131. Harrison, *Remarks,* 8.
132. One example must suffice: Henderson wrote to James Tayloe that "I am sorry to hear of the circumstances relative to a certain friend [probably Córdova], by which he would sustain some inconvenience, but he will rejoice that nothing disagreeable has been the result." J. Henderson to J. Tayloe, September 22, 1829, Marked "Private," returned by Tayloe to Henderson on October 6, 1829, according to note on envelope. TNA FO 357/7.
133. On Henderson's full career, see Brown, "James Henderson," *ODNB.*
134. J. Henderson, *Draft Memorial,* TNA FO 357/12.
135. J. Henderson to W. Wade, undated, TNA FO 357/8.
136. J. Henderson, *Draft Memorial,* TNA FO 357/12.
137. Vergara to Fernández Madrid, Bogotá, April 7, 1830, AGN, MRE, DT8, caja 509, carpeta 17, 110–113.)
138. Harrison claimed that they had discussed only "a private matter" relating to Cheyne. Harrison, *Remarks of General Harrison*, 8. Harrison's testimony was published in Bogotá in *El Democrata* in installments from June 1, 1830, to August 10, 1830.
139. Harrison, *Remarks,* 21. Harrison claimed that he had no involvement in any plot and his encounters with those implicated had been entirely coincidental.
140. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, November 17, 1829, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 8-9.
141. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, November 17, 1829, Vol.2, 2-3 see also Harrison, *Remarks,* 23.
142. J. Henderson to Foreign Office, Draft Memorial, undated, probably 1830, TNA FO 357/12.

143. M. Bouchet de Martigny to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in *Archives des Affaires Estrangeres* Vol. 4, 1828–1829, Palais du Quai d'Orsay, Paris, cited in Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 597.
144. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, November 17, 1829, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 4.
145. Gabriel María Gómez, "Manifiesto de los 300 Marinillos," 1841, cited in Bronx, *Museo del General Córdova,* 130–131.
146. Arango, *El Santuario,* 22.
147. Gómez, "Manifiesto de los 300 Marinillos," 131.

Chapter 4: The Battle of El Santuario

1. Arango, "Ultimos episodios," 2.
2. Barrera Orrego, *José María Córdova,* 139.
3. See Lecuna, "Carta aprócrifa," 505 and Aguilera, *Clave política,* 112, note 22bis.
4. Arango, *El Santuario,* 27.
5. D. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 673.
6. Arango, *El Santuario,* 27.
7. Ibid., 27.
8. Hand to British Consul in Cartagena, in English, August 23, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 80–81.
9. Arango, *El Santuario,* 27. Ramirez Gomez, *Combatientes de El Santuario,* 14.
10. Arango, *El Santuario,* 27.
11. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 673.
12. O'Leary to Bolívar, October 17, 1829, Marinilla, in FJB, Sección Navarro, 14.
13. Arango, *El Santuario,* 27.
14. O'Leary to Bolívar, October 17, 1829, Marinilla; see also Fernández, *Memorias,* 62.
15. Arango, *El Santuario,* 26.
16. Fernández, *Memorias,* 62.
17. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 673.
18. Arango estimated that 4/5 of Escalante's men died here. Arango, *El Santuario,* 28.
19. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 674.
20. Arango, *El Santuario,* 29.
21. Hand to British Consul in Cartagena, in English, August 23, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 80–81.
22. Arango, *El Santuario,* 28.
23. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 674.
24. Arango, *El Santuario,* 29, O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 674.
25. Arango, *El Santuario,* 28.
26. Ibid., 28–29. They also met other stragglers, as described in Naranjo, October 4, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 58; Ochoa, October 10, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 63. Pineda hid there for three months being cared for by Arango.
27. Giraldo, September 26, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 32.

28. Escalante, November 1, 1831, Rionegro, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 99. Escalante was incorporated to the Gran Colombian forces after the battle.
29. José María Yepes, November 12, 1831, Medellín, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 105.
30. Hand to British Consul in Cartagena, August 23, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 80. O'Leary also suggested "20 men" in the "Parte oficial," 674.
31. Castelli, December 20, 1831, Castillo de San Felipe, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 118–119. Castelli was a prisoner at the time of his declaration.
32. O'Leary, "Parte oficial," 674. This account is dubious because Francisco Giraldo was in the house with Córdova at the time. Nevertheless, Castelli and Murray concur that O'Leary did leave his position at this crucial moment.
33. For example, Giraldo, September 26, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 32.
34. Salom, December 12, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 108–109; Isaza, October 5, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 60–61.
35. Hand to British Consul in Cartagena, August 23, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 81. This was the only account in which Hand's original English has not been translated into Spanish.
36. Hand, January 3, 1832, Castle of San Felipe, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 137.
37. The "Confession" that Rupert Hand dictated to the court (on January 3, 1832) contains remarkable similarities with Carlos Castelli's declaration (December 20, 1831), for example, the use of the adjective "imperiously" to describe the manner in which O'Leary gave Hand the order to kill Córdova. This suggests that Hand and Castelli had discussed Hand's defense together.
38. Fernández prefaced his observations on Córdova's death with some barbed remarks about the freedom of the press in Venezuela in the time of writing, with reference to censorship and publication of the *Memorias de O'Leary* during Antonio Guzmán Blanco's government. In my understanding, Fernández was referring to his self-censorship regarding the question of O'Leary's involvement in Córdova's death. As noted above, O'Leary's own writings about El Santuario were also excised (without explanation) from the *Memorias de O'Leary* published by Guzman Blanco's government in the 1880s, suggesting a hint of a continued cover-up.
39. Carr died in 1830. Lutzen was probably in Venezuela by 1831. Some earlier rumors identified Lutzen, not Hand, as the murderer. See Azuero to Santander, December 1829, Kingston, in R. Cortázar, ed., *Correspondencias dirigidas al general Santander*, Vol. 1, 342.
40. Castelli, December 20, 1831, Castillo de San Felipe, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 118–119.
41. Francisco Urdaneta, December 1, 1831, Bogotá, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 117.
42. Murray's claim is in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 115, refuted in detail throughout Aguilera, *Clave política,* which is supported by O'Leary's explicit denial, reported in Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución,* Vol. 6, 640.
43. Hand to British Consul in Cartagena, in English, August 23, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 81.

44. Hand, January 3, 1832, Castle of San Felipe, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 137.
45. Hand, May 20, 1833, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 269.
46. Escalante, November 1, 1831, Rionegro, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 99–100.
47. Giraldo, September 26, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 33, corroborated in José Antonio Navarro, September 26, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 35–36.
48. He shared a surname with Miguel Isaza, who taught Francisco Giraldo as noted in Henao, *Datos biográficos,* 7.
49. Nepomuceno Isaza, October 5, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 60–61.
50. Giraldo, September 26, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 33.
51. Acevedo, October 5, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 62,
52. O'Leary to Bolívar, October 17, 1829, Marinilla, in FJB, Sección Navarro, 14. O'Leary's version of these events was doubted by Vicente Lecuna and John Lynch because of the apparently ungentlemanly and dishonorable tone it adopts, and because the original copy disappeared in 1923 just four years after it was first found and published. This led them to think that the account was a forgery invented to blacken O'Leary's name. Neither knew that the original, cited above, is in the FJB (published in Brown and Roa Celis, eds., *Militares extranjeros*). It shares literary and handwriting style with O'Leary's other letters, convincing me that O'Leary did write the letter in the heat of victory and admitted to truths that he later tried to conceal. Later, probably in 1832, O'Leary wrote in his diary that "Córdova's death corresponded with the whole tenor of his life. Fighting like a lion, he fell and expired sternly, proud, and unrepentant," *Detached Recollections*, 26. On September 25, 1829, the arch-Bolivarian General Mariano Montilla had written to Córdova warning him to expect to "the bitter fate which awaits traitors." Montilla to J. M. Córdova, September 25, 1829, Cartagena, from the Archivo José Manuel Restrepo, cited by Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 52.
53. D. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 675.
54. Cited in Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario,* 73. It is not clear in what role Campuzano had served Córdova's army, or if he served at all.
55. Fernández, *Memorias,* 63. It is not clear whether Carmelo Fernández entered the house before or after O'Leary.
56. On Salom see Aguilera, *Clave política,* 30–31. Salom, December 12, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 108–110.
57. Escalante, November 1, 1831, Rionegro, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 101.
58. The corpse's exhumation is described in Arango, "Ultimos episodios," 63–65 and with some analysis in Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario,* 77–80.
59. Arango, *El Santuario,* 29.
60. O'Leary, "Parte Oficial," 675. According to R. Urdaneta and J. M. Restrepo, O'Leary's forces lost 1 subaltern officer and 2 soldiers, with 15 wounded. R. Urdaneta to Bolívar, October 31, 1829, Bogotá, in AGNC R GYM Vol. 462, 386; Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución,* Vol. 6, 253.
61. Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución,* Vol. 6, 253; the *Times,* August 1, 1830.
62. O'Leary, "Proclamation to the Troops under His Orders," October 17, 1829, Head-Quarters at El Santuario, translated in the *Times,* August 1, 1830.

I have retained the original *Times* translation despite its many ungainly phrases. The original Spanish version is preserved in FJB, "Proclamas de Bolívar."

63. O'Leary, "Proclamation to the Troops under His Orders."
64. O'Leary, "Proclamation to the Inhabitants of Antioquia," October 17, 1829, Head-Quarters at El Santuario, translated in the *Times,* August 1, 1830.
65. Arango, *El Santuario,* 38.
66. As retold by Don Ignacio Giraldo, Francisco Giraldo's son, and recorded in Revistorio, "Homenaje al General José María Córdova," 7.
67. There is much detail on Córdova's many burials in Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario,* 77–80.
68. "Libro de entierros de Rionegro," Book 5, 22. I am very grateful for Roberto Luis Jaramillo for this information.
69. This account comes from Henao's own oral testimony, given 70 years after the events. Ocampo, *Apuntaciones biográficas*, 32.
70. O'Leary to Bolívar, October 17, 1829, Marinilla, in FJB, Sección Navarro, 14.
71. O'Leary to Juez Político del Canton de Antioquia, October 18, 1829, Rionegro, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 474.
72. O'Leary to Prefect of Magdalena, October 19, 1829, Rionegro, translated in the *Times,* August 1, 1830.
73. Carbonnell, *El General O'Leary,* 88.
74. This meant that only Anselmo Pineda, who had helped Mariano Ospina Rodriguez to escape from Bogotá, was excluded from the amnesty.
75. The pamphlet was authored by "Some Friends" of the Bishop, but there seems little doubt that Bishop Garnica was the author himself. [Algunos Amigos], *Refutando las observaciones contra la carta*. The pamphlet dates O'Leary's amnesty at October 19, though no original copy survives of his decree.
76. [Anon], *Observaciones a la pastoral del Illmo. Sr Obispo.*
77. [Los Vecinos de Rionegro], *Expresión de gratitud,* reprd. in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 501.
78. Fernández, *Memorias,* 66. Some of those relics were later donated to Córdova's family.
79. O'Leary to Bolívar, October 23, 1829, Medellín, in FJB, Sección Navarro, 16.
80. *Registro oficial del Magdalena extraordinario,* November 1, 1829, translated to English in the *Times,* August 1, 1830.
81. Martín to O'Leary, November 2, 1829, Cartagena, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 485.

Chapter 5: Counterrevolutions

1. The quote comes from Bolívar to Flores, Barranquilla, November 9, 1830, in Bushnell, ed., *Simón Bolívar,* 146.
2. Fernández, *Memorias,* 65.
3. James Henderson wrote to O'Leary that "if your intention was to bestow a favour upon me, it would have been better to keep them." In my view this was rather disingenuous. Henderson's notes reveal that O'Leary had threatened

to publish the letters and then relented and destroyed them instead in the belief that this was the best way to sweep Henderson's interventions under the carpet. See Henderson to O'Leary, November 9, 1829, Bogotá (and two alternative unsent drafts) and Henderson to O'Leary, December 2, 1829, Bogotá, all in TNA FO 357/8.

4. O'Leary's correspondence and publications from this period are in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 3, 474–503 and Sánchez, "O'Leary y su misión a Antioquia," Docs. 12–25.
5. They marched together to Piedras, and on January 11, 1830, Bolívar issued Córdova a passport to return to Rionegro. Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 81.
6. O'Leary to Bolívar, October 31, 1829, Medellín, FJB, AOL, Sección Navarro, 17.
7. O'Leary to Andrade, November 4, 1829, Medellín, FJB, AOL, Sección Navarro, 18.
8. Groot, *Historia de la Gran Colombia,* 553, cited in Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 445; Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución,* Vol. 6, 255.
9. R. Urdaneta to Castelli, January 14, 1830, Bogotá, AHN, AC, Vol. 3, 105.
10. Garnica to Urdaneta, October 27, 1829, Rionegro, AHA Fondo Gobernación, R, Vol. 1046, No. 15116, 82.
11. Garnica to O'Leary, November 11, 1829, Rionegro, AHA Fondo Gobernación, R, Vol. 1046, No. 15116, 6.
12. I assume that O'Leary left Antioquia after the letter from Garnica, cited above, and that the journey took around three weeks, meaning that he arrived in Bogotá in mid-December.
13. Fernández, *Memorias,* 65, 68.
14. Urdaneta to S. Córdova, December 24, 1829, Medellín, in Camargo Pérez, *Archivo,* Vol. 1, 157.
15. Testimonies of Sinforoso García and Antonio Pasos, July 13, 1830, Rionegro, AHR Fondo Judicial 620, n.f.
16. M. A. Jaramillo, *Ejemplo heroico*, in BNC Fondo Quijano 259, 37.
17. On September 20, 1830, Henao married Rita Jaramillo, the daughter of José María Jaramillo and Sacramento Gutierrez de Lara. He served as mayor of Sonsón during the 1830s, and kept in touch with Salvador Córdova by letter. Uribe Villegas, *Notas históricas,* 33. Henao to S. Córdova, April 27, 1830, Sonsón, in Camargo Pérez, *Archivo,* Vol. 1, 162.
18. Pineda, *Manifestación comprobada,* 7, and S. Córdova, "Certifico," July 2, 1831, Medellín, reprd. in Pineda, *Manifestación comprobada,* 16.
19. Juicio contra Antonio Maria Alzate y José María García por robo al correo, 1830–32," in UNCM Archivo Judicial, Fondo Criminal, Caja 111, Documento 2344, 1–367.
20. Anon, *Nuevas aleluyas, los Serviles geringando a los Liberales*, in BNC Fondo Pineda.
21. La población de Medellín to Vice-Presidente de la República, in *El Demócrata,* July 20, 1830.
22. "Oficio al prefecto del departamento de Antioquia, solicitándole el destierro del Presbitero Antonio María Gutierrez, por rebellion contra el gobierno," July 16, 1831, Medellín, in AGNC, R, Fondo Negocios Judiciales, Rollo 1, 79.
23. "Expediente relacionado con el juicio seguido a siete jóvenes en Rionegro, por irrespeto a la religión," AGNC, R, Fondo Negocios Judiciales, Rollo 1, 80–85; see also another letter dated June 2, 1831, Rionegro, 89–91.

24. Vergara and Campbell, verbal notes, October 1, 1829 (postscript dated October 14), in AGNC, R, MRE, DT 2, Vol. 312, 69–71. Thanks to Daniel Gútierrez for alerting me to this document.
25. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, undated, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 11.
26. Van Rensselaer promised to "provide more materials to conduct the defence" of Harrison's conduct if necessary. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, undated, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 9.
27. Moore to R. Van Rensselaer, November 1, 1829, Bogotá, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 12.
28. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, December 14, 1829 Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 14.
29. For the Henderson family history see Brown, "James Henderson," *ODNB.* My thanks to Mark Curthoys for digging up the reference to the birth of Domingo James Henderson in the family's papers.
30. See Fernández Madrid to Vergara, January 9, 1830, London, AGNC, R MRE, Delegaciones, Transferencia 8, caja 509, carpeta 17, 42–43, and especially Vergara to Fernández Madrid, April 7, 1830, Bogotá, in AGNC, R MRE, Delegaciones, Transferencia 8, caja 509, carpeta 17, 110–113.
31. R. Van Rensselaer to J. Poinsett, November 20, 1832, Albany, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 45–46.
32. R. Van Rensselaer to W. Harrison, October 9, 1830, Albany, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 35.
33. Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México, Colombia y Mexico, 1823–30, diversos asuntos entre ambos paises durante los citados años, Vol. 2, L. E. 1700, s.f. cited in Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 605. On Torrens and his links to Harrison, Henderson and Poinsett, see Gutierrez, "Iturbide y Bolívar," 58.
34. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 128–131.
35. The gradual Venezuelan disentanglement from Gran Colombia is nicely captured in Ker Porter, *Diario*, 425–450.
36. McGann, "The Assassination of Sucre," agrees with the Bolivarians that Obando was behind the crime. Daniel O'Leary called Obando "Sucre's murderer" in *Desinteres del general Santander.* For a recent account see Sant Ros, *El Jackson granadino.*
37. Uribe de Hincapie and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* describes in detail how Sucre's death became the centerpiece of Bolivarian (and later) Conservative rhetoric in New Granada.
38. Murray, *For Glory and Bolívar,* 75–78.
39. Vergara was "disgusted" that Campbell would not expel Henderson immediately. See Vergara to Campbell, November 14, 1829, Bogotá, TNA FO 357/8. Campbell had earlier pleaded for Henderson to be allowed to stay for personal reasons, pledging to "my dear friend" Vergara that he would be no further trouble. Campbell to Vergara, October 4, 1829, Bogotá, in AGN, MRE, D, T, 2, 326.
40. Turner to Aberdeen, April 20, 1830, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/75, 56.
41. Turner to Aberdeen, May 4, 1830, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/75, 156.
42. Turner, "Memorandum of a Conversation held by Mr Turner with H. E. the Liberator President on Tuesday the 27th April 1830," TNA FO 18/75, 179–184.

43. This was Fernando Bolívar, Simón Bolívar's bilingual nephew, who had studied at the University of Virginia in the mid-1820s. R. Van Rensselaer to W. Harrison, October 9, 1830, Albany, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 34.
44. Moore to Van Buren, October 21, 1830, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, Doc. 1364.
45. Moore to Van Buren, May 7, 1831, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, 448.
46. Bolívar to Flores, November 9, 1830, Barranquilla, in Bushnell, ed., *Simón Bolívar,* 145–146.
47. For example, the extract of a letter dated May 11, 1830, Bogotá, in the *New York Commercial Advertiser*, cited in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 28.
48. These networks emerge most compellingly from the aforementioned letters to and from R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer.
49. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias históricas,* Vol. 3, 135.
50. Castelli to Bolívar, April 16, 1830, Pamplona, reprd. in Mendoza Alemán, *Un soldado de Simón Bolívar,* 221.
51. Herrán to Castelli, January 30, 1830, Bogotá, in ANH, AC, Vol. 3, 118.
52. Murray to Jefe del Estado Mayor de Cundinamarca, September 19, 1830, in Murray, *Reminisencias*, 5.
53. Murray to S. Córdova, May 27, 1830, Rionegro, in Camargo Pérez, ed., *Archivo,* Vol. 1, 149.
54. Dolores Estrada Callejas was the daughter of Don Francisco Estrada Córdova (cousin of José María Córdova and Salvador Córdova's father) and Doña Isabel Callejas. I thank Roberto Luis Jaramillo for his help in confirming Dolores Estrada Callejas's genealogy.
55. *El Demócrata,* May 20, 1830.
56. *El Demócrata,* June 20, 1830.
57. Despite his presence here, Castelli had earlier alleged that Carr "applies himself to nothing but scandal . . . and his conduct becomes every day worse . . . a spy, adulator, traducer and false-witnesses". Castelli to Henderson, May 2, 1830, San José de Cúcuta, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 26.
58. Mendoza Alemán, *Un soldado de Simón Bolívar,* 212–213, following J. M. Restrepo. For Carr's involvement see Joaquin Paris, "Relación de los jefes y oficiales que según las listas de revista del mes de abril último pasado en Pamplona, pertenecían a la División que desobedeció al gobierno," July 3, 1830, Bogotá, AGNC, R GYM, Vol. 480, 9.
59. Turner to Aberdeen, August 12, 1830, Bogotá, in TNA 18/77, 14.
60. This battle is also known as the Battle of El Santuario de Funza or the Battle of El Santuario (Cundinamarca). To avoid confusion I refer to it only as the Battle of Funza. Carr's death was dated as September 7, by C. B. Meyers to R. Van Rensselaer, September 17, 1830, Bogotá, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 33, and September 10, 1830, by Moreno de Angel, *José María Córdova,* Vol. 2, 609.
61. Thomas K. Travers to R. Van Rensselaer, August 30, 1830, Bogotá, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 32.
62. Carlos Castelli, Pedro Dominguez, José del Castillo, and Luis Baralt, *Convenio*, in BNC VFDU1–431, Pza 65.

63. Castelli, *En el campo de San Victoriano*, 29. This was exactly the same phrase that O'Leary had used after the Battle of El Santuario eight months previously, in O'Leary to R. Urdaneta, October 13, 1829, La Aguada, AGNC R GYM Vol. 462, 369.
64. Restrepo Canal and León Helguera, "1831–1858: época de transición," 31.
65. Castelli to D. O'Leary, August 29, 1830, Bogotá, in Mendoza Alemán, *Un soldado de Simón Bolívar,* 222.
66. Both quotes are from Castelli to Bolívar, September 6, 1830, Bogotá, in ANH, AC, Box 3, reprd. in Filippi, ed., *Bolívar y Europa,* Vol. 1, 600–601.
67. Turner to Aberdeen, September 7, 1830, Bogotá, in TNA 18/77, 89.
68. Mendoza Alemán, *Un soldado de Simón Bolívar,* 219; Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias históricas,* Vol. 4, 250–253.
69. Urreta to Castelli, December 7, 1830, Medellín, in AHN, AC, Vol. 1, 103.
70. Turner to Aberdeen, December 7, 1830, TNA 18/77, 252.
71. Aberdeen to Turner, July 13, 1830, London, TNA FO 18/77, 5.
72. Turner to Aberdeen, September 7, 1830, Bogotá, in TNA 18/77, 77.
73. *Constitución de la República de Colombia sancionada por el congreso constituyente.*
74. Letters from Alejandro Vélez, J. de Aranzazu, B. Henao, A. Pineda, M. A. Arrubla, Vicente Villegas, Valentín Jaramillo, Francisco Machado and L. Icaza in Camargo Pérez, ed. *Archivo,* Vol. 1, 159–167. The "inevitable" quote comes from Icaza to Córdova, June 3, 1830, Barbosa, 167.
75. Gómez Plata, *Carta del Illmo Obispo de Antioquia*, in AGNC, CAB, 1, 1, 24. For Gómez Plata's involvement in the 1828 conspiracy alongside Ospina Rodriguez, see Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 105.
76. Castelli to O'Leary, November 1830, Medellín, in Mendoza Alemán, *Un soldado de Simón Bolívar,* 222.
77. Córdova to Castelli, November 25, 1830, Barbosa, in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 85.
78. Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 86.
79. Castelli's detailed plans for the mission are in ANH, AC, Vol. 3, 109–111, dated January 22, 1830, Rionegro.
80. Camargo Pérez, "Prólogo," *Archivo y otros documentos*, xv-xvii; Jaramillo to Pineda, August 11, 1831, Medellín, reprd. in A. Pineda, *Manifestación comprobada,* 6, 21–22.
81. As Córdova seemed to acknowledge in Córdova, *A la nación*, in BNC FP 466, Pza 163. José Hilario López also wrote pleading clemency: López to Castelli, March 10, 1831, Cali, in ANH, AC, Vol. 1, 115.
82. Castelli, *Proclama* (Rionegro: M. A. Balcazar, 1831), in BNC, FQ 259, 47.
83. Restrepo, *Historia de Colombia,* cited in Mesa Nicholls, 87.
84. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 3, 123.
85. In copy of W. Moore to Government, copied and authenticated by R. Illingworth, July 8, 1831, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/83, 236–238. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia, 77*, 80.
86. Córdova, "Comandante en Jefe de las fuerzas en Antioquia," to Jefe Político del Cantón de Rionegro, May 14, 1831, and June 6, 1831, Medellín and Rionegro, AHR Fondo Gobierno Vol. 42, 95–97.
87. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 20; Jaramillo to Pineda, August 11, 1831, Medellín, reprd. in Pineda, *Defensa de un hombre de bien,* 26–27.

88. Córdova, "Certifico," July 2, 1831, Medellín, reprd. in Pineda, *Manifestación comprobada,* 16.
89. Anon, *Recuerdo de gratitud,* no publication details, UDA Periódicos HS1 D152 F186. My translation; the original scans better.
90. Anon, *El buen colombiano* ([probably Bogotá]: Juan N. Barros, 1831), BNC FQ 259, Pza 52.
91. Thibaud and Calderón, *La majestad de los pueblos,* 222–223.
92. Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 89.
93. Córdova, *Boletín*, April 20, 1831, Medellín, cited in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 90.
94. On this type of imagery see Earle, *The Return of the Native.*
95. Córdova, *Viva la Libertad,* UdA, Periódicos HS1 D5 F7.
96. Córdova, *Viva la Libertad*. Thibaud and Calderón, *La majestad de los pueblos,* 237.
97. Camargo Pérez, "Prólogo," xvii.
98. Castelli to Urdaneta, April 15, 1831, Rionegro, in Camargo Pérez, ed., *Archivo,* 208.
99. S. Córdova, *A la nación*.
100. Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 92.
101. UNCM, Fondo Judicial, Doc2347.
102. Obando to Córdova, April 23, 1831, Caloto, reprd. in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía*, 247.
103. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 21.
104. Bronx, *El combate de El Santuario,* 84.
105. Caicedo, Inaugural Address, October 20, 1831, Bogotá, reprd. in the *Times,* January 16, 1832.
106. Turner to Palmerston, May 14, 1831, TNA FO 18/83, 74–76.
107. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 131.
108. Moore to Van Buren, May 7, 1831, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, 448. By October 1832, Moore was able to reflect with some glee that "the last and dearly cherished hopes of the English party here [have fallen]. . . . Now, I think, all their schemes of commerce, monopoly and of political influence are at an end." Moore to Livingstone, October 4, 1832, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 2, 473.
109. Córdova, June 3, 1831, Medellín, cited in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 94–95.
110. Figueroa to Jefe E. M. Cundinamarca, July 13, 1831, AGNC Fondo Enrique Ricaurte, Colección Comandancias Militares, Caja 15, Carpeta 11, 33.
111. Obando to Córdova, July 28, 1831, Bogotá, in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 248.
112. Azuero, June 14, 1831, cited in Thibaud and Calderón, *La majestad de los pueblos,* 238.
113. Turner to Palmerston, September 6, 1831, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/84, 30.
114. Turner to Caicedo, August 11, 1831, Bogotá, copy in TNA FO 18/84, 33.
115. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 3, 124–127.
116. Obando, cited in Murray to S. Córdova, October 7, 1831, Bogotá, in Camargo Pérez, ed., *Archivo y otros documentos,* 322–323.
117. Both quotes are from Murray to S. Córdova, May 4, 1831, Cali, 245.
118. On Obando see Zuluaga, *José María Obando* and Lemos Guzmán, *Obando.*

119. See the many examples in Pineda's publications held in BLAA, MISC1338, Pza 6–8. Pineda gave up and returned to Bogotá in December 1831.
120. [Anon], *Medio seguro de conocer a un verdadero liberal*, in BNC FQ 259, Pza 108.
121. Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 456; Castillero R., *Raices de la independencia de Panamá,* 89.
122. Copy of W. Moore to Government, copied and authenticated by R. Illingworth, July 8, 1831, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/83, 236–238.
123. Turner to Palmerston, August 28, 1831, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/83, 262.
124. An argument elaborated in Lleras Camargo, *Santander.*
125. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias histórico-políticas,* Vol. 3, 119.
126. Reprd. in Duarte French, *América del norte al sur,* 520.

Chapter 6: Trials and Exiles

1. For the actions of the British in Cartagena in the previous period, see Bell, "British Cartagena de Indias".
2. Brown, "James Henderson," *ODNB;* J. Galindo to Tomás Manby, Kingston (Jamaica), October 18, 1836, BLAA, MSS344, 3.
3. Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 469.
4. McNerney, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 307, footnote 28, records that *The Watchman and Jamaica Free Press* (Kingston) 3:38 (May 11, 1831) 8, lists General Daniel O'Leary among the arrivals at Port Royal, Jamaica, on May 8, 1831.
5. Hall, *Civilising Subjects,* 69–83, 105–106.
6. O'Leary to Soledad Soublette, March 24, 1828, Ocaña, in Carbonnell, *General O'Leary, íntimo*, 145.
7. Racine and Fey, eds., *Strange Pilgrimages*, xv.
8. This was O'Leary's claim in the Prologue to O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 1, 3.
9. O'Leary, *Memorias del General O'Leary.*
10. O'Leary to Soublette, April 30, 1831, Cartagena, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 1, 2.
11. On the "double insertion" of the Irish in the Hispanic world I draw on O'Phelan Godoy, "Una doble inserción," 411–440.
12. O'Leary to Soublette, November 30, 1831, Kingston, Archivo Soublette, cited in Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 472.
13. See also O'Leary, *Detached Recollections,* 29.
14. O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 2, 15.
15. Castro Leiva, *La Gran Colombia*, 31–97.
16. Carrera Damas, *El culto a Bolívar*, 70.
17. O'Leary to Soublette, November 17, 1832, Kingston, in O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 1, 2.
18. See O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 1, 13 and 48.
19. O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 2, 334.
20. O'Leary to Soublette, March 10, 1833, Kingston, from Archivo Soublette, cited in Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 491.
21. O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 1, 491–492.
22. Ibid., Vol. 1, 462–463; see also Vol. 3, 151.
23. Ibid., Vol. 2, 292. The answer to O'Leary's rhetorical question was, of course, "Yes"; see Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies,* chapter 2.

24. O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 2, 8.
25. Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 482–483.
26. Bolívar had entrusted the archive to Juan Bautista Pavageau on September 28, 1830, in Cartagena, with the instructions that they should be transported to France. In his will Bolívar ordered the documents to be burned. Polanco Alcántara, *Simón Bolívar,* 696. De Francisco Martín was the executor of Bolívar's will. He went into exile from Cartagena on April 28, 1831, and so arrived in Kingston around the same time as O'Leary. The ten chests probably arrived some time in May or June 1831. See Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 483–484.
27. Hand still had some of their letters in his possession when he was imprisoned; they are reprd. in Ortega Ricaurte, *Asesinato de Córdova,* 71–79.
28. On the political machinations behind the trial see Aguilera, *Clave política,* esp. 16–17.
29. Ramirez Gomez, *Combatientes de El Santuario,* 5, 21. Although the author does not provide any documentary evidence for this, it was confirmed to me in El Santuario and Medellín in 2007. According to Ramirez Gomez, Diego Villegas Villegas acquired Hand's sword on a school trip to Marinilla and El Santuario in 1943. The sword was said to have "LONDON" on one side and "MEREDITH" on the other. It is not known where this sword is now.
30. Daniel O'Leary had mediated between the rival sides, as noted in *Capitulación de la plaza de Cartagena,* in TNA FO/18/85, 262.
31. Watts and Luque conducted a bitter and lengthy correspondence prior to and immediately after Watts' expulsion; it is preserved in TNA FO 18/85–86. See also TNA FO 18/92, 90–158.
32. Palmerston, undated note in margin (probably May 1832) in TNA FO 18/92, 91.
33. [Anon] *Roberto Hand* reprd. in Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 465–467. Posada cites it as being in the BNC, FP, Periódicos, Vol. 5. Due to the reorganization of the BNC and recataloguing, I have not been able to trace the original.
34. See MacPherson's interrogation, September 28, 1831, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 49–56. Bunch was at this stage a merchant "on the verge of bankruptcy," though his son later became the British minister in Bogotá. See Deas and Sánchez, *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 308, and Deas, "Weapons of the Weak?" 178.
35. Catherine Amelia Watts to R. Hand, August 18, 1831, Cartagena, reprd. in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 92–93.
36. Brown, *Adventuring through the Spanish Colonies,* Chapter 7.
37. Murray to Domingo Caicedo, May 29, 1831, Bogotá, AGNC HDS, Vol. 57, 60.
38. On Obando, Azuero, and their *exaltado* supporters see Safford and Palacios, *Colombia*, 126, 136–137.
39. According to Córdova's account, cited in Murray to S. Córdova, December 14, 1831, Bogotá, in Camargo Pérez, ed., *Archivo y otros documentos,* 349–350.
40. Murray to Córdova, December 14, 1831, Bogotá, in Camargo Pérez, ed., *Archivo*, 349–350.
41. Murray's reports are in AGNC R GYM Vol. 155, 102–272.
42. Urdaneta was removed from the list on December 15, 1831; see AGNC HDS Vol. 48, 149.

43. Turner to Palmerston, November 14, 1831, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/84, 182.
44. Murray, October 24, 1831, Bogotá, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 114–115.
45. Aguilera, *Clave política,* 51. See also Carbonell, *General O'Leary, íntimo,* 89; Barrera Orrego, *Jose Maria Córdova,* 147–148.
46. Reprd. in Murray, *Reminisencias*, 7.
47. "Notas estadísticas de los habitantes de la villa de Medellín, 1832," May 26, 1832, AHA, Fondo Gobernación, Censos Varios, Vol. 2647, 29–98, esp. 58. This page of the census was unfortunately damaged by water some time ago, and so some sections on Murray's other neighbors are illegible.
48. APNSC, Libro de Matrimonios, Vol. 10, 16.r–f.v. Murray's request for permission to marry, dated 1832, is in AGNC R GYM Vol. 163, 1–25.
49. O'Leary did not return to New Granada until 1848, so the case was never prepared, and the documents were left to fester in the Miscelánea Section of the AHR. "Declaración del Coronel Murray y otras diligencias sobre complicidad del General O'Leary en el Asesinato del General José María Córdova," AHR, Fondo Gobierno, Serie Común (Miscelánea), Vol. 13, 151–180. Ortega Ricaurte was not aware of these papers when he transcribed *Asesinato de Córdova.*
50. APNSC, Libro de Bautismos, Vol. 19, 83. I checked baptism records up to 1847 without finding another Murray child. It is very possible that Dolores Estrada gave birth to other children elsewhere as well, following her husband's career, but I have found no references to them in any of the texts or archives consulted. Eugenio Murray's godmother was Doña Mariá de los Dolores Jaramillo, most likely a relation of Manuel Antonio Jaramillo.
51. See the documents signed by him in AHR, Fondo Judicial, Vol. 619, No. 61.
52. "Declaración del Coronel Murray," AHR, Fondo Gobierno, Serie Común (Miscelánea), Vol. 13, 151–193. We do not know when the copy was made. The file bears the following note from the archivist Ernesto Tobón: "The documents in this volume came from a lot of old papers which I found in Medellín, and which had been taken from Rionegro some time in the nineteenth century. I sent all the papers to Rionegro in 1952, [signed] Ernesto Tobón, 1959, Cali."
53. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 25. Josefa Valencia had three children with Pineda: Antonio who entered military service, Margarita who was a nun, and Vicenta. Ramírez Gómez, *El Santuario,* 177.
54. Ocampo, *Apuntaciones biográficas,* 33.
55. Antonio Mendoza, undated but stamped 1834, AGNC HDS Vol. 19, 297.
56. For this complex dispute see Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía,* 96–100, and Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 94–96.
57. Mortuario de Dr. José María Montoya, July 2, 1834, Rionegro in AHR Fondo Notorial, Vol. 310, 173–209.
58. Barrera Orrego, "El capitán Manuel Antonio Jaramillo," 6.
59. As noted in J. M. Restrepo, *Diario político*, Vol. 4, note 20.
60. Graham and Humphreys, eds., *The Navy and South America 1807–1823*, xxvii; Arturo Farquahar to Vicente Garcia, December 12, 1831, reprd. in Spanish in Posada, *Biografía de Córdova,* 456–457, my translation. Posada cites the letter as "Manuscript in the Archivo Nacional," though I have not been able to locate it.
61. The news was passed on in an official government note, Pereira to Turner, November 28, 1831, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/84, 190.

62. Turner to Bidwell, November 28, 1831, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/84, 204.
63. For example [Anon], *Los veteranos de la libertad.*
64. Múnera, *El fracaso de la nación.*
65. As told by Caicedo to Turner, and related in Turner to Shee, April 14, 1832, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/90, 350.
66. R. Van Rensselaer to S. Van Rensselaer, December 14, 1829, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 15–18; McAfee to Forsyth, October 10, 1834, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 5, 506.
67. All preceding quotes in this paragraph are from J. MacPherson to R. Van Rensselaer, May 4, 1830, Cartagena, in Bonney, ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 26–28.
68. J. MacPherson to R. Van Rensselaer, March 31, 1831, Cartagena, in Bonney., ed., *A Legacy of Historical Gleanings,* Vol. 2, 42-43.
69. Turner to Shee, April 14, 1832, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/90, 350.
70. Moore to Secretary of State Martin Van Buren, May 21, 1831, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 5, 448–450.
71. Del Real, Fallo del tribunal de Cartagena contra el Capitan Guillermo Clark, March 14, 1833, Cartagena, AGNC R Fondo Negocios Judiciales, Rollo 1, 630–633.
72. Turner to Shee, April 14, 1832, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/90, 350.
73. Vélez to Turner, April 12, 1832, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/90, 362. Palmerston's view of the matter is in his letter to Turner, September 10, 1832, London, TNA FO 18/91 19.
74. O'Leary, *Detached Recollections,* 24.
75. Helg, *Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia*, 199–235; O'Leary, *Detached Recollections,* 49–50; O'Leary, "Original Manuscript," 2–3; O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 2, 102.
76. O'Leary, *Desinterés del General Santander.* On the Washington comparison, see McNerney, "A Famous *Paralelo Entre Bolívar y Washington*," 416–422.
77. O'Leary to *El Mercurio,* May 13, 1833, Kingston, reprd. in Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 477. I have been unable to locate a copy of *El Mercurio* (New York) for 1833; O'Leary's letter was sent from Kingston on May 13, 1833, according to his own account.
78. Compare, for example, O'Leary, *Narración,* Vol. 1, 160, 584, with Vol. 2, 107.
79. O'Leary to C. Soublette, June 26, 1834, La Guaira, in Carbonnell, *General O'Leary, íntimo,* 341.
80. Quotes are from Ker Porter, *Diario,* 611, entry for June 28, 1833, and 614, diary entry for July 25, 1833 (Ker Porter seems unaware that by now O'Leary had four children) and, 615, entry for July 27, 1833.
81. O'Leary *El general Santander*, which includes a Spanish translation of O'Leary's open letter dated May 13, 1833, written in Kingston by O'Leary to the New York newspaper *El Mercurio.* Quotes are from the version published in Bogotá as O'Leary, *Desinterés del General Santander* (hoja suelta, undated), BNC, FQ 259, Pza 140.
82. Santander, Editorial in *Gaceta de la Nueva Granada*, April 13, 1834, reprd. in López Dominguez, ed., *Santander y las comunicaciones*, 395. On advice he received, see O'Leary to C. Soublette, May 29–31, 1834, London, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 13.
83. Ker Porter, *Diario,* 625, diary entry for October 9, 1833.

84. Conversation reported in Turner to Shee, November 6, 1832, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/91, 344, with Turner's additional comment that Santander had reacted positively.
85. Pascuala Muñoz to vice president of New Granada, September 16, 1832, Rionegro, extracted from the *Gaceta de Bogotá,* cutting held in TNA FO 18/91, 346.
86. Castelli to Hand, September 25, 1832, San Felipe jail, Cartagena, in English, reprd. in *Archivo Santander*, Vol. 19, 367–368. There is a very inaccurate translation in Aguilera, *Clave política,* 69.
87. Turner to Vélez, May 30, 1832, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/91, 388.
88. Vélez to Turner, June 2, 1832, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/91, 390.
89. Turner to Shee, November 6, 1832, Bogotá, TNA FO 18/91 344.
90. Eduardo Posada notes that Pedro Alcántara Herrán had already lobbied Santander about Hand's case while both were in Europe the previous year. Posada, *Biografía de Córdova*, 458. It is tempting to speculate that Daniel O'Leary had called in his friendship with Herrán on Hand's behalf, though no evidence survives. Herrán certainly maintained correspondence and working relationships with many European Bolivarians, and later worked hard to encourage European immigration to New Granada. See García Estrada, *Los extranjeros en Colombia,* 41.
91. Memorial of Rupert Hand, May 20, 1833, Cartagena, in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 266.
92. Hand, May 20, 1833, 267. In all his statements Hand referred to "Colombia" rather than "New Granada."
93. Vélez to Turner, November 29, 1832, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/91, 396.
94. This section draws on the more detailed analysis published as Brown, "How Rupert Hand Escaped from Jail."
95. Santander to Córdova, September 18, 1833, Bogotá, reprd. in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía*, 225.
96. For detailed analyses of these tensions see Múnera, *El fracaso de la nación*.
97. See Helg, *Liberty and Equality,* 8.
98. I am grateful to John Weiss, who is writing a biography of Woodbine, for this information on Woodbine's likely ethnicity (personal communication via e-mail, August 4, 2010), which improves upon my inaccurate description of him as "white" in my extended commentary on this episode in Brown, "How Did Rupert Hand Get Out of Jail?."
99. Anderson, *The Diary and Journal of Richard Clough Anderson Jr*, 218.
100. Lasso, "Haiti as an Image of Popular Republicanism," 189.
101. Ayton to Palmerston, August 26, 1833, Cartagena, in TNA FO 18/98, 110; Barrot's account was translated and published in Robertson, "An Early Threat of Intervention by Force."
102. Ayton to Palmerston, August 26, 1833, Cartagena, in TNA FO 18/98, 113. The original insults were "*canalla*" and "*indecente*."
103. G. Watts to E. Watts, August 5, 1833, Cartagena, TNA FO 18/98 40.
104. On the coincidence of all pieces of news reaching the *vecinos* of Cartagena at once, see G. Watts to E. Watts, August 9, 1833, Cartagena, in TNA FO 18/98, 45.
105. Copy of a letter from MacPherson to E. Watts, August 25, 1833, Cartagena, in TNA FO 18/98, 67. I am grateful to Pamela Murray for alerting me to the existence of this source.

106. MacPherson to Watts, August 25, 1833, 68. There is a map of the prison that confirms MacPherson's account, dated July 5, 1793, by José Díaz Pedregal, AGI, MP-Panama-305, taken from Indiferente General 1344. My thanks to Carrie Gibson for her assistance in locating this map.
107. The preceding quotes are all from MacPherson to Watts, August 25, 1833, 69–72. The amount is difficult to decipher—it may be US$170.
108. Ayton to Palmerston, August 26, 1833, Cartagena, in TNA FO 18/98, 113.
109. MacPherson to Watts, August 25, 1833, 68.
110. McAfee to Forsyth, October 10, 1834, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Vol. 5, 506.
111. The change was as much an about face for Luque as it had been for Córdova. In March 1828 Luque was such a committed Bolivarian that he (along with Bolívar's Irish aide-de-camp William Ferguson) dragged a printing press into the street in Bogotá in revenge for its printing opposition pamphlets—and set fire to it. The episode is described in many memoirs of the period; an example is Restrepo, *Diario político y militar,* Vol. 1, 373, entry for March 13, 1828.
112. Obando, *Apuntamientos para la historia,* Vol. 1, 187.
113. Ayton to Palmerston, August 26, 1833, Cartagena, in TNA FO 18/98, 113.
114. Del Real to Pombo, August 13, 1833, Cartagena, AGNC R Fondo Negocios Judiciales, Rollo 1, 556.
115. When he learned of the turn of events, O'Leary described them as "devilishly perverse." D. O'Leary to C. Soublette, June 6, 1834, London, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 18.
116. Los Observadores, *Albion,* Cartagena, October 8, 1833. A copy is preserved in TNA FO 18/98 141.
117. Reported in Turner to Palmerston, September 5, 1833, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/97, 106.
118. It remains understudied by scholars; there is some discussion in Ortiz, *Franceses en la independencia*, and in Lemaitre, *La bolsa o la vida*.
119. *El amigo de las leyes,* November 15, 1833.
120. [Varios militares ciudadanos de la Nueva Granada], *Abuso del poder en nombre de una nación civilisada* (Bogotá: N. Lora, 1833). Given the date, style, publisher, and perspective adopted in this pamphlet, there is an intriguing but distant possibility that it may have been written by Thomas Murray. Nicomedes Lora also published Murray's Vélez Governor's report in 1836 (see next chapter).
121. Lemoyne, *Viajes y estancias en America del sur.*
122. Turner to Palmerston, October 10, 1833, Bogotá, in TNA FO 18/97, 117–118.
123. For a critical summary of the conventional comparison between military Venezuelan and civilian New Granada in the nineteenth century, see Bushnell, "Vidas paralelas de dos pueblos hermanos," 295.
124. O'Leary to C. Soublette, March 14–17, 1834, Kingston, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 9.
125. Arango, *El Santuario,* 39.
126. On Botero's rebellion see Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 141. No evidence survives of Bernal's involvement at El Santuario.

Chapter 7: National Consolidation

1. Deas, "Weapons of the Weak?," 179.
2. Adelman, "Rites of Statehood," 418–420.
3. There is a description of the reburial in *Constitucional Antioqueño,* April 22, 1832, reprd. in Ortega Ricaurte, ed., *Asesinato de Córdova,* 309–312.
4. González, *Partidos, guerras e iglesia,* 25–26.
5. Ibid., 31.
6. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 64–65, 86–90, which draws primarily on S. Córdova, "Satisfacción al público," Archivo J. M. Restrepo, Rollo 35, Fondo II, Vol. 58, 136–142.
7. For example, the cases of Manuel Gómez and Rafael Alzate, in AGNC HDS Vol. 1, 231 and UNCM, Fondo Civil, Caja 52, Doc. 1308, 1–20, dated Marinilla August 21, 1837.
8. Salvador Córdova's ownership of slaves, ignored by all of his biographers, is attested to by the records that show that one of his slaves gave birth to a daughter, Nicolasa. See "Lista de nacimientos, Rionegro, 1834–5," April 2, 1835, in "Papeles varios, 1814–1844," AHR, Fondo Gobierno Vol. 30, 98.
9. Un político (prob. M. A. Jaramillo, given the style), *Felicitación* (Medellín: M. A. Balcazar, 1835), in UdA, HS1 D43 F67. At the time Jaramillo was working as a lawyer in Rionegro. AHR, Fondo Judicial, Vol. 605, November 22, 1834, 9.
10. S. Córdova et al., *Los jefes y oficiales de la 2a columna*, in BNC, Fondo Pineda 803, 569, 1–4.
11. Urdaneta, *A mis conciudadanos y antiguos compañeros de armas*, in BLAA, Manuscritos, HSI 0042.
12. Urdaneta, Petition to Congress, May 20, 1835, Bogotá, reprd. in Urdaneta, *A mis conciudadanos,* 2–3.
13. [Muchos Cartageneros], *Profanación del Santuario de las leyes en el congreso del año de 1835*, in BNC VFDU1–052, Pza 138.
14. Decree of Santander, reprd. as an appendix to Córdova, *A mis conciudadanos*, 3–4; Córdova quote from *A mis conciudadanos,* 2. For the national resonance of the dispute, see [Unos patriotas], *Cuestiones importantes*, BNC FP 466, Pza 45.
15. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 116.
16. Court records, October 9, 1837, Rionegro, AHR, Fondo Gobierno Vol. 52, 291. See also López Bermúdez, "La eterna presencia del héroe," 210.
17. Valentín Jaramillo, *Al público*, in UdA, HS1 D130 F164.
18. Jaramillo to Ospina Rodriguez, September 23, 1838, Medellín, in AGNC, Fondo Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, Serie Generales y Civiles, Caja 82, Carpeta 25, 1.
19. As discussed with clarity in Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 65–68.
20. Urdaneta largely neglects these years in his most detailed autobiographical account, Urdaneta, *A la imparcialidad de los hombres de honor*, BLAA Manuscritos, MISC1139.
21. Statements in support of F. Urdaneta by Dr. Antonio María Gutierrez, Francisco Montoya, Jose de Jesús Calle and J. M. Buitrago, July 15, 1835, AGNC HDS Vol. 48, 101.

22. For some examples, however, see UNCM, Civil Caja 20, Doc. 632, 1–17, and Civil Caja 48, Doc. 1228, 1–3, and Civil Caja 52, Doc. 1308, 1–20.
23. Giraldo's service records, March 1, 1833, Medellín, AGNC HDS Vol. 19, 307.
24. "Lista de oficiales en servicio activo," April 19, 1833, AGNC, R, GYM, Vol. 480, 142. Murray was the only foreigner on the list of 50 New Granadan officials in active service. He was later granted a third of his salary as a pension. See Army Budget, June 17, 1833, Bogotá, AGNC R GYM, Vol. 480, 33.
25. We know that around this time Murray was in Medellín vouching that his friend Hugo Blair Brown was single and legally able to marry. Echeverrí, *Sangre irlandesa en Antioquia*, 64.
26. Murray was in Bogotá to vouch for his conduct of his friend Edward Brand on January 18, 1834, see AGNC, HDS, Vol. 6, 716.
27. Santander to S. Córdova, May 2, 1834, Bogotá, cited in Mesa Nicholls, *Biografía*, 228.
28. [Anon], *Abuso del poder en nombre de una nación civilisada*. The text contains several striking Anglicisms (i.e., "it makes my blood boil"), which, along with Lora being Murray's publisher on other occasions, lead me to suggest Murray's authorship here.
29. Cited by McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, 58. The 1840 census gives a total population of 83,418. *El Seminario de Cartagena,* November 30, 1840, CAB, 1, 1, 35.
30. Murray, *Cuadro que presenta el gobernador de Vélez*, BNC FP 3,310, Pza 1. The frontispiece named the author as Tomás Murray, while the last page bore his signature as Tomás Murría. It was signed on September 15, 1836, along with a comment suggesting that his family was not living with him in Vélez.
31. Murray, *Cuadro,* 1.
32. Ibid., 2. It is posible that some of the British Museum's collections came from Murray in this time. See British Museum Reg-1938–11–11–1, cited and with context in Botero Cuervo, *El redescubrimiento del pasado prehispanico de Colombia*, 171.
33. See Earle, *The Return of the Native*.
34. All preceding quotes are from Murray, *Cuadro,* 2–10.
35. Ibid., 12.
36. On the signs of this conflict, see Archivo Histórico Regional de Tunja, Fondo Militar Histórico, Legajo 3, 88–89.
37. Murray, *Cuadro,* 13.
38. One of many examples is Murray to Obando, May 24, 1836, Vélez, AGNC, R, GYM, Vol. 540, 713.
39. Deas, in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, xlii.
40. Joseph Russell to Sarah Russell, March 13, 1836, Panama, RP, Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies, Aylesbury, DX 685/2/11.
41. Palmerston to Consul Kelly, August 31, 1836, London, TNA FO 55/6, 52–53, reprd. in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 122. See also Deas, "Weapons of the Weak?" 179–181.
42. Francisco Troncoso to Santander, December 20, 1836, Mompós, in Archivo Santander, Vol. 3, 79–80, reprd. in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 362.

43. J. M. Obando to Santander, December 27, 1836, Popayán, reprd. in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 364.
44. Murria to Santander, December 20, 1836, Chiquinquirá, in *Archivo Santander,* Vol. 3, 80, reprd. in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 363.
45. For example, Flores to Santander, January 10, 1837, Quito, in *Archivo Santander*, Vol. 3, 182–183, reprd. in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 402.
46. Miguel García to Santander, January 4, 1837, Santa Marta, in *Archivo Santander*, Vol. 3, 161–163, reprd. in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 389. US observers thought this put their country in the ascendance. See McFee to Forsyth, December 9, 1836, Bogotá, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Dispatches,* Vol. 5, 551.
47. Herrán to Santander, January 11, 1837, Panama, in Deas and Sánchez, eds., *Santander y los ingleses,* Vol. 1, 407; see also Fernández, *Memorias,* 55.
48. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 26.
49. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 76–77.
50. Moreno de Angel, *Santander,* 614. The last letter signed by Murray as governor was dated March 14, 1837, Vélez, AGNC, R, GYM, Vol. 554, 866.
51. Examples of this resentment can be found in [Varios istmeños], *Representación elevada a S.E el Presidente de la*, BNC FP 7, 59; and [Un granadino], *Proclama de un granadino,* BNC FP 7,459, 60.
52. [Anon], *Recuerdo importantísimo a los senadores y representantes*, BNC FP, VFDU1–336, 33, 1–2.
53. For example, Murría, October 3, 1837, Bogotá, AGNC HDS Vol. 42, 554; see also Santander to Murray, March 3, 1838, Bogotá, in Murría, *Reminisencias,* 15–17.
54. Henao to Jefe Político del Canton, July 12, 1837, Sonsón, AHR, Fondo Gobierno Vol. 42, 527.
55. Januario Henao, *Datos biográficos*, 19. "Informe del Movimiento de Población. …," February 28, 1836 for Medellín, in AHA Gobernación de Antioquia, República, Censos y Estadísticas, Censos Varios, Vol. 2647, 170–389, 348.
56. Banko, *El capital commercial,* 131.
57. Díaz to Pombo, March 14, 1834, Caracas, reprd. in Ortega Ricaurte, ed., *Asesinato de Córdova,* 302.
58. The documents cited here relating to the extradition request are in *Asesinato de Córdova,* 299–307.
59. Watters, "A Venezuelan Educator."
60. Hand, *Breve explicación analítica del alfabeto inglés.* I have not been able to locate a copy of this pamphlet. I believe it is in the Archive of the Universidad Central de Venezuela. I am very grateful to all those historians, librarians, and archivists who have helped me in my search.
61. Pino Iturrieta, *Las ideas de los primeros venezolanos,* 34–41, 169.
62. Hand, Statement, July 8, 1839, Caracas, in AGNV IP Vol. 40, 8, plus supporting documents 1–10.
63. Banko, *Poder político y conflictos sociales.*
64. Carl, *First among Equals*, 106–116.
65. Harwich Valenilla, *Inversiones Extranjeras en Venezuela*, 27–30, and more recently, Zahler, *Lawyers Guns, and Money.*

66. Gonzalez, "Colombia en cuatro tiempos." The sketch is reproduced in Ker Porter, *Diario,* 552, lam. 2.
67. Information from Hand's previously cited AGNV IP papers.
68. Pino Iturrieta, *País archipiélago,* 279.
69. Posada-Carbó, "Alternativa y república."
70. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 63.
71. See *El Caletano*, March 13, 1834, and *El Cartagenero,* June 15, 1834, both cited in Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 25.
72. O'Leary to Soublette, October 20, 1834, London, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 31.
73. O'Leary to Soublette, June 6, 1834, London, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 18.
74. D. O'Leary to S. O'Leary, April 15–18, 1835, Madrid, in Carbonnell, *El General O'Leary,* 239–241, and AGI Estado 69 No/3.
75. Soublette and O'Leary's Spanish journeys are described in detail in Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 515–532.
76. Méndez was expelled in 1830 for not recognizing Venezuela's split from Gran Colombia, and again in 1836 for refusing to accept Venezuela's assertion of its right to name bishops.
77. O'Leary to Soublette, April 7, 1837, Rome, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 61.
78. O'Leary to Soublette, March 12, 1837, in Navarro, ed. *Actividades diplomáticas,* 57.
79. O'Leary to Soublette, April 10, 1837, Rome, in Navarro, *Actividades diplomáticas,* 63.
80. For example, O'Leary to Soublette, November 4, 1837, Rome, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 81.
81. O'Leary to Soublette, April 9, 1839, Roma, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 160.
82. Referred to in O'Leary to Soublette, February 16–18, 1838, Roma, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 111.
83. O'Leary to Soublette, March 14–16, 1838, Roma, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 112–115.
84. O'Leary to Soublette, October 15, 1838, Roma, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 143–149.
85. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 50.
86. Cited in Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 39. Rayfield is very reticent about using the diary for personal details, and Manuel Pérez Vila either did not know of its existence or chose not to use it at all. Unfortunately I have not been able to locate the diary, which appears to have been mislaid in its move from the BNC to the AGNC many years ago. My thanks to Maurizio Tovar for all his efforts in seeking the document.
87. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 51, citing O'Leary, "Diary," Book V, entries for November 23, 28, 30, and December 8, 1837.
88. O'Leary to Soublette, March 15–16, 1839, Roma, in Navarro, ed. *Actividades diplomáticas,* 157.
89. *El Correo de Caracas*, January 16, 1839, cited in Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 59.
90. O'Leary to Soublette, May 28–31, 1839, London, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 165.

91. O'Leary to Soublette, October 14–15, 1839, London, in Navarro, ed., *Actividades diplomáticas,* 184.

Chapter 8: Wars and Repatriations

1. Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución en Colombia,* Vol. 1, 150, cited in Botero, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 138.
2. For a good discussion of the historiography of the War of the Supremes, see Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 53–65, 80–81, 89–90. For a general introduction see Earle, "The War of the Supremes."
3. Uribe Urán, *Honorable Lives,* 158.
4. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 77–78.
5. Córdova, *A la nación*, BNC Fondo Pineda, Pza 466.
6. Anon, *Boletin número V.* AGNC, AACH, CAB, Caja 1, Carpeta 1, 28. On the Ecuadorian intervention see Earle, "The War of the Supremes," 123–127.
7. Saldarriaga Pelaez, "La guerra civil de los supremos en Antioquia."
8. S. Córdova, *Boletín liberal*, in BNC Fondo Quijano 260, Pza 310.
9. [Unos Caucanos], *Carta de unos caucanos al Coronel Salvador Córdova*, dated Buga, December 9, 1840; also Martínez de Nisser, *Diario de los sucesos de la revolución en la Provincia de Antioquia*, 9.
10. On Gómez see HDS Vol. 33, 48. On Vallejo see HDS Vol. 45, 621 in 1851 Miguel Alzate described his return to arms: the document can be found in HDS Vol. 3, 223–229.
11. *El Boletín Liberal,* Bogotá, October 20, 1840, 37. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 13. One writer did claim that "600 men spontaneously offered their lives to Córdova" upon hearing his October 9 proclamation, and that he subsequently "went out, arrived, and triumphed." [Anon], *Pronunciamento de Antioquia*, 27.
12. Orlando Melo, "Progreso y guerras civiles," 106.
13. [Unos Observadores, Unos Amigos], *Cuatro palabras al Sor Coronel Salvador Córdova*, CAB, Caja 1, Carpeta 1, 25; [Un antioqueño], *Carta al coronel Salvador Córdova*, BLAA MISC 1505, Pza 64.
14. Obregón, *Francisco Obregón manifesta a sus conciudadanos*, CAB, 1, 1, 39–47.
15. Ibid., 45.
16. [Todos Ellos], *Al público*, in UdA Periódicos HS1 D229 F280; Isaac Benítez and Ruperto Ruíz, *Al público*, in UdA Periódicos HS1 D223 F273.
17. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 121–131.
18. Gómez Plata, *Comunicaciones del Excllmo Obispo de Antioquia,* 333; Gómez, "El Manifiesto de los 300 Marinillos," November 30, 1841, reprd. in fragments in Bronx, *Museo del General Córdova*, 125–133.
19. González, *Partidos, guerras e iglesia,* 35–36.
20. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 88–89.
21. Córdova, *Habitantes del Cauca i Buenaventura*, CAB, 1, 1, 26. Córdova made similar points in a letter to Joaquín Posada Gutierrez, reprd. in Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 69. The message was reinforced in [Anon], *Honor al valiente General Córdova,* in UdA HS1 D1 F1.

22. Murray is cited as a precedent in Roberto Lee, Bogotá, April 30, 1844, AGNC GYM, Vol. 1059, 745.
23. Murría, "Proclama," January 25, 1841, in Murría, *Reminisencias,* 18.
24. Notes of Sr. Fiscal Chian, July 13, 1841, Bogotá, "Incidente del sumario contra Tomás Murray, por conspiración," 1841, BLAA, MSS 154, Pza 4, 2–3. There is a more detailed discussion of Murray's involvement in the War of the Supremes in Brown, "Independencia y las nuevas relaciones."
25. Murray, "Carta a los Señores Encargados de Negocios," February 1, 1841, Bogotá, in Murría, *Reminisencias,* 20.
26. Murría, *Reminisencias,* 29. Murray does not appear in any of the works consulted on the War of the Supremes.
27. Murría, *Reminisencias,* 29.
28. Murray to Simón Bargas, Secretario del Despacho de Guerra y Marina, April 22, 1841, in BNC, FP MS 172, Pza 31, 1–2. Only the first and last pages of the letter survive; the handwriting was obviously rushed, and the meaning is often difficult to decipher.
29. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 27–29.
30. Ibid., 34–35.
31. Urdaneta to Min. GYM, August 17, 1839, Bogotá, in AGNC HDS Vol. 48, 114.
32. Reference to the wound and Urdaneta's "heroic" resistance comes from *Gaceta Oficial de la Confederación Granadina,* April 6, 1861.
33. Urdaneta's service records, dated November 24, 1842, Bogotá, in AGNC HDS, Vol. 48, 149.
34. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 34–35.
35. Pineda, *Carta que el Sor Comandante en Jefe dirige al Sr Braulio Henao*, in UdA, HS2 D2 F2.
36. The quote is from González, *Partidos, guerras e iglesia,* 56.
37. Londoño, *Religion, Culture and Society in Colombia*, 12–13.
38. Samper, *Historia de un alma, "*Aventuras de un coronel."
39. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 177.
40. Uribe Villegas, *Notas y documentos históricos para la biografía del general D. Braulio Henao*, 34.
41. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 131; Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 107.
42. Henao, "Parte oficial de la batalla de Salamina," cited in Posada Gutierez, *Memorias* Vol. 4, 107.
43. Isabel Antia to Pascuala Muñoz de Córdova and daughters, September 15, 1841, Cartago, in CAB, 1, 1, 29–33, 32.
44. Cited in Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 117.
45. Anon, "Contestación al artículo publicado en el número 197 de *El Día*, suscrito por un Cartagueño" (1841, no publication details), in UdA, HS2 D195 F227.
46. Obando, *Apuntamientos para la historia,* Vol. 2, 242.
47. For one example see Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 19.
48. Samper, *Historia de un alma, "*Aventuras de un coronel."
49. Notes of Sr. Fiscal Chian, July 13, 1841, Bogotá, in "Incidente del sumario," 6.
50. "Incidente del sumario," 7.
51. Cited by García Estrada, *Los extranjeros en Colombia,* 49.

52. Murray was not the only Briton to take an active part in the War of the Supremes; another was Thomas Manby, whose involvement is described in Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 85–86. For Murray's feelings see the documents collected in his *Reminisencias.*
53. Pineda, cited in Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 39–40.
54. Pineda to Rufino Cuervo, January 1, 1842, cited in Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 42. Pineda and Ricardo de la Parra to Rufino Cuervo, cited in Anon, *Al pueblo istmeño,* Panama: J. M. Bermudez, February 16, 1842, BNC, FP, BN-VFDU1–1974. J. M. Restrepo, Herrera's brother-in-law was the Jamaica merchant and El Santuario veteran Lewis Lewis. See Alfaro, *Vida del General Tomás Herrera*, and Quijano, *Correspondencia y otros documentos del General Tomás Herrera.*
55. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 45.
56. Semple to Forsyth, October 2, 1840, Bogotá, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 5, 569.
57. Semple to Forsyth, November 21, 1840, Bogotá, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 5, 570.
58. William Pitt Adams to Ker Porter, February 8, 1841, Bogotá, TNA FO80/12, 238.
59. One example is Acevedo, *Expresión de gratitud*, BNC FQ 260, Pza 244.
60. Carmona to Watt, cited by Consul Kelly in Spanish in TNA FO 55/30, trans. Malcolm Deas in Deas, "Weapons of the Weak?," 181.
61. O'Leary to Aberdeen, January 20, 1843, Caracas, TNA FO 80/21, 44–45.
62. Carrera Damas, "Estructura de Poder Interna inmediatamente después de la Independencia," 407–439.
63. Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 557–558.
64. Banko, *El capital comercial,* 225.
65. O'Leary, cited in Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 582.
66. Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 580, 587.
67. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 87–91.
68. Burnett, *Masters of All they Surveyed*, 17.
69. All preceding quotes from Alejo Fortique to Aberdeen, January 10, 1842, London, translation from the original French, Doc. from FO archives, reprd. by Odeen Ishmael, *Guayana's Western Border,* http://www.guyana.org/Western/1842–1857.html. See also Ojer. *Robert H. Schomburgk.*
70. For the legacy of this interpretation see blogs and articles such as http://www.laguayanaesequiba.org/.
71. O'Leary to Aberdeen, Private, March 29, 1843, Caracas, TNA FO 80/21, 115. Traces do remain in 116–125.
72. O'Leary to C. Soublette, March 24, 1843, Caracas, TNA FO 80/14, 128.
73. For his lobbying see O'Leary to Bidwell, February 22, 1841, Caracas, TNA FO 80/14, 35.
74. The first Juan Bautista Dalla Costa had arrived in Guayana with other Italian migrants, including Carlos Castelli, where he married Isabel Soublette, the sister of Carlos and Soledad. Their sons (and Teresa's brothers), Juan Bautista Jr. and Antonio, managed the dominant commercial house in Angostura until 1870. See "Juan Bautista dalla Costa," Fundación Polar, *Diccionario de historia de Venezuela.*
75. Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 586; Nikita Harwich Valenilla, "Banco Central de Venezuela," Fundación Polar, *Diccionario de historia de Venezuela.*

76. See, for example, French Consul Celeste David, May 10, 1842, Caracas, cited in Hermann, *La politique de la France,* 76.
77. Banko, *El capital comercial,* 639, Carl, *First amongst Equals,* 75.
78. Páez, cited in Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 566–567.
79. On the discipline see Páez, cited in Watters, "Don Feliciano Montenegro," 291.
80. Vannini, "La docencia universitaria," 468–470 ; Watters, "Don Feliciano Montenegro," 229, 290.
81. The advert is in *Gaceta de Venezuela,* July 18, 1841.
82. M. Vannini de Gerulewicz, "La docencia universitaria," 457. Hand's service records are in AGNV IP Vol. 40, 1–19.
83. González, "Colombia en cuatro tiempos."
84. The ANH Archivo Castelli contains the documents from the period, including the doctor's report dated Caracas, April 29, 1839; some are published in Vannini, ed., *Carlos Luis Castelli,* 163–178.
85. AGNV IP Vol. 18, 1–75. She was the daughter of a surgeon, Giacinto Sacchero, and his wife, Giuseppa Castelli.
86. On the *culto a Bolívar,* in whose shadow the reputation of O'Leary's writings should clearly be situated, see Carrera Damas, *El culto a Bolívar.*
87. Congressional Decree, April 30, 1842, cited in Fundación Polar, "Restos de Bolívar."
88. Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 572–574.
89. Fermín Toro, *Descripción,* 205–253, Pérez Vila, *Vida de Daniel Florencio O'Leary,* 572.
90. Some of these can be viewed at http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/exhibiciones/america_exotica/obras/306.htm].
91. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 183.
92. List of ships, in O'Leary to Aberdeen, January 3, 1843, TNA FO 80/21, 27–35.
93. Posada Gutierrez, *Memorias,* Vol. 4, 185.
94. O'Leary to Aberdeen, January 3, 1843, Caracas, FO 80/21, 24–27.
95. O'Leary to Aberdeen, January 3, 1843, TNA FO 80/21, 27–35.
96. R. Urdaneta, *Memorias,* 586–588.
97. Pino Iturrieta, *Pais Archipiélago,* 404–410.
98. O'Leary to Aranda, December 31, 1842, Caracas, FO 80/21, 37–40, O'Leary's translation to English of his own Spanish original.
99. O'Leary to Bidwell, February 22, 1841, Caracas, TNA FO 80/14, 40.
100. O'Leary to Aberdeen, January 3, 1843, Caracas, TNA FO 80/21, 32.

Chapter 9: The End of Bolivarian Networks

1. Dismissed in Palmerston to Wilson, October 30, 1846, London, citing Wilson's original letter, in TNA FO 80/37, 46.
2. *Diario de la tarde,* August 5, 1846, Caracas, in TNA FO 80/52, 67.
3. Juan Manuel Manique, *Proclama*, September 24, 1846, Caracas, copy in TNA FO 80/52, 69.
4. Vannini, "La docencia universitaria," 457–481.
5. Hand dined with Ker Porter in 1833, 1836 and 1839. See Ker Porter, *Diario,* 626–628, 756, 855.
6. Medical analysis by Dr. Antonio Parra, July 6, 1846, Caracas, AGNV, IP, Vol. 40, 17.

7. Testimonies collected by "R. W.," and published in "Correspondence: General Córdova and Colonel Rupert Hand," in *Colburn's United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal* (London, 1847, Part 2). My thanks to Alastair Wilson for locating this source. For St. Thomas see Jaramillo Córdova, *José María Córdova,* 142, cited in Fortique, *Dos irlandeses,* 29. There is no mention of Hand in the British Consular records held at the Consultate in Caracas.
8. Rupert was a very rare name in the Gran Colombian region in the nineteenth century, but I have not managed to locate a source to confirm that José Ruperto Monagas was named after Hand.
9. Castelli, *Carlos L. Castelli Gobernador de la Provincia de Maracaibo a sus habitantes*, BNC VFDU1–052, 50.
10. Like Italians in Brazil and Uruguay he had ceased to assert his European identity, see Brilli, "El republicanismo italiano en Sudamérica."
11. Acting Consul Riddell to Palmerston, September 7, 1848, Caracas, TNA FO 420/6, 3.
12. Recounted in Wilson, undated note, TNA FO 420/6, 62–64.
13. On corruption see Zahler, *Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Honor and Liberalism in Venezuela, 1780–1850.*
14. Castelli, *Estatua ecuestre al Libertador.*
15. González, "Colombia en cuatro tiempos," 16.
16. He was interim governor of Carabobo province in 1847. For godparenting with Monagas and Falcón see Vannini, ed., *Carlos Luis Castelli,* 201–272. Falcón sent condolences on the death of Castelli's daughter in 1850, in ANH, AC, Vol. 1, 356. J. T. Monagas thanked Castelli for "the distinction" of being named his son's godfather, on June 4, 1855, in ANH, AC, Vol. 2, 138.
17. For the amnesty in Colombia see Uribe de Hincapie and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 157–165, 493–494.
18. [Anon], *Causa seguida contra el coronel graduado Apolinar Morillo.*
19. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 45–46; Uribe de Hincapie and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 171–177. The other soldier accused of the crime, José Eraso, died in custody.
20. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 150–155.
21. [Anon], *Reclamo de los espulsados de la Nueva Granada a la nación británica*, BNC VFDU1–052.
22. Obando, *Nueva Granada: Opúsculo*, BL RB23G. A note on the inside of the pamphlet reveals that this document was kept in the library of the British Foreign Office until 1991.
23. Obando, *Nueva Granada: Opúsculo,* 13–16.
24. For Bernabé Hoyos see UNCM Fondo Civil, Caja 301, 1–61, and Caja 109, 1–14.
25. There he suffered economic difficulties, documented in UNCM, Fondo Civil, Caja 522, Doc. 11015, 1–5.
26. See the problems of El Santuario veteran José Vicente Gómez, in UNCM Fondo Civil, Caja 62, 1–9.
27. McGuinness, *Path of Empire,* 20–23; Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 47–55.
28. Pineda's conduct was defended in Unos amigos del Coronel Anselmo Pineda, *Vindicación,* BNC BNVFDU1–336, Pza 497.
29. Ovalle, "Archivo Epistolar del General Pedro Alcántara Herrán," 459–487.

30. Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 593–598.
31. O'Leary was the godfather to Dr. Ninian Cheyne's son, Daniel Carlos. Carbonnell, *El General O'Leary,* 356, note dated December 7, 1844, Bogotá. The boy, whose birth O'Leary attended, was named after Daniel O'Leary and Carlos Soublette.
32. Evidence of compadrazgo comes from O'Leary to Herrán, December 13, 1847, Bogotá, in AGNC, ACH, Archivo Herrán, Letra "O," cited by Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 195.
33. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 191.
34. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 148, drawing on O'Leary's letters to Pedro Gual, 1848–52, AGNC, ACH, Colección Pérez y Soto.
35. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 195.
36. For the involvement of Irishman Richard Wright in Flores' 1846 expedition, see the lengthy discussion in the *Times*, January 6, 1846. I thank Marjory Masterson for alerting me to this article. For the background to the expeditions and British support of Flores, see Van Aken, *King of the Night*, 217–235.
37. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 191–192, 220–238; Smith, *Narración succinta*, BNC Fondo Quijano MISC 53.
38. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 139–142.
39. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 217.
40. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 149–150. These fears are detailed in Clayton to Foote, July 19, 1849, Washington, in Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Vol. 5, 362.
41. O'Leary to Palmerston, March 31, 1847, Bogotá, TNA FO 55/70, cited in Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 133–134.
42. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 136, 184.
43. On O'Leary's antiquarianism see Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 600, and the correspondence cited above with Pineda.
44. *El Repertorio Colombiano* (Bogotá) II, 7, 1879, cited and discussed in Rayfield "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 25–29.
45. Daniel O'Leary, "Testament," 1854, reprd. in Carbonnell, *General O'Leary, íntimo,* 110.
46. McGuinness, *Path of Empire,* 28–31.
47. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 252, 197–198.
48. Ancizar, September 19, 1847, in Gaceta de la Nueva Granada, *Colección de documentos sobre inmigración de extranjeros*, BLAA Misc 707, 30.
49. Their travel notes were later published in *El Día* in Bogotá in May 1845, cited in Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 59–60.
50. Pineda to Herrán, May 7, 1845, place not cited, AGNC, ACH, Fondo Herrán, cited by Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 62.
51. Blom, Hagemann and Hall, eds., *Gendered Nations.*
52. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 62.
53. Pineda, To [Blank], *Hoja suelta impresa*, in "Correspondencia de Anselmo Pineda," BLAA MSS 027, 1–2.
54. Joaquín to Pineda, September 1, 1845, Fonte Boa, in "Correspondencia de Anselmo Pineda," 3.
55. Pineda to minister of foreign relations, November 20, 1847, Mocoa, in "Correspondencia de Anselmo Pineda," 10.
56. Cited by Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 67.

57. Botero Cuervo, *El redescubrimiento del pasado prehispánico de Colombia,* 147. According to the same author (161), Carlos O'Leary appears to have sold his father's collection to the British Museum.
58. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 69.
59. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 71–77. Mosquera to Pineda, November 18, 1848, Bogotá, cited in Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 73. In 1849 Rodriguez dedicated to Pineda some articles on "republican education" published in *El Neogranadino.* For background see Miller, "The 'Immoral' Educator," 11–20.
60. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 79.
61. There is a good insight into Pineda's character at this moment in Cordovez Moure, *Reminiscencias de Santafé y Bogotá*, Vol. 1, 806.
62. Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 596.
63. Murray, *Reminisciencias.*
64. Gómez, "Biografía de Francisco Urdaneta," in *Gaceta Oficial de la Confederación Granadina*, April 6, 1861.
65. At the same time as he published *Reminicencias,* Murray requested (with immediate success) his full salary as a retired officer. See Murray to Ciudadano Presidente, Bogotá, May 29, 1851, in AGNC, HDS, Vol. 57, 60.
66. [Anon], "Las Lojas de Bogotá," no date, BNC, FP 824, Pza 15.
67. Romero Valderrama, "La coalición pedracista. Elecciones y rebeliones para una re-definición de la participación política," unpublished PhD thesis, University of St. Andrews, 2011.
68. Harland-Jacobs, *Builders of Empire.*
69. Rayfield, "Daniel Florencio O'Leary," 200–202, 157.
70. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 200–205. López ordered indigenous resguardos to be divided up, expelled the Jesuits from New Granada in May 1850, and finally completely abolished slavery in 1851.
71. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 84–86.
72. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 197–238, 224, 198.
73. Cited by his friend Josefa Acevedo Gomez, March 21, 1853, Bogotá, in Pineda, *Defensa de un hombre de bien,* 8–15. Pineda's involvement is demonstrated in Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 232.
74. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 87–88.
75. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 235.
76. González, *Partidos, guerras e iglesia,* 53. López's reorganization had aimed at breaking up Conservative hegemony in Antioquia and creating a Liberal enclave in Rionegro.
77. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 162–165.
78. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 225.
79. "Movimiento de población, Medellín, 1846–7," AHA Gobernación de Antioquia, República, Censos y Estadísticas, Censos Varios, Vol. 2696, 181.
80. Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 164. An anonymous letter published in the Medellín newspaper *El Tiempo* later lamented that he had been deprived of his military pension because of his involvement in the 1851 rebellion. *El Tiempo,* March 16, 1854. It argued that Giraldo symbolized the sacrifices and glories of the War of Independence, and that he should be protected by the nation, not punished by it.
81. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 228.

82. Salvador Camacho Roldán, 220–222, cited in Botero Herrera, *Estado, nación y provincia,* 164.
83. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 229.
84. Braulio Henao, *Al público*, in UDA, Folletos misceláneos, Vol. 125 cited in Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 200–202.
85. Pineda, *Biblioteca del ex-coronel Pineda*, BL 011903.e.
86. Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 595.
87. Gobierno de la Nueva Granada, *Cuestión Mackintosh: historia de ella y documentos.*
88. Deas, "Weapons of the Weak?," 177; Edward N. Mark to Dr N. Cheyne, March 9, 1857, Bogotá, in BNC FQ 8, 4.
89. Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 601–602.
90. O'Leary to S. Soublette, January 17, 1853, Rome, in Fondo Aquileo Parra, AGNC, Caja 5, Carpeta 9, 89; Filippi, *Bolívar en Europa,* Vol. 1, 377, apparently from O'Leary's "Diario de viaje," cited in A. Rjoas, *Humboldtianas,* Vol. 2; Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 603–604.
91. Pérez Vila, *Vida,* 605.
92. Cordovez Moure, *Reminiscencias,* Vol. 1, 906.
93. Ramirez Gomez, *Combatientes de El Santuario*, 11, affirms that Murray received a letter confirming his naturalization as a New Granadan on February 21, 1852.
94. Aguilera, *Clave política,* 44.
95. García Estrada, *Los extranjeros en Colombia,* 86.
96. Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia,* 115.
97. Pineda to Acevedo Gomez, February 20, 1853, Bogotá, and February 9, 1853, Bogotá, in Pineda, *Defensa de un hombre de bien*, 1–3.
98. Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 357, entry for February 24, 1854.
99. *Gaceta de la Confederación Granadina*, February 28, 1854.
100. Piñeres speech, cited in *El Neogranadino,* March 23, 1854.
101. *El Neogranadino,* March 2, 1854, Bogotá.
102. Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 358, entry for February 25, 1854.
103. Unless otherwise noted, all details on the funeral are from *El Neogranadino,* March 23, 1854. Note that the Spanish original has *bandera inglesa*, which I have translated as British flag. See also Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 358.
104. *Gaceta de la Confederación Granadina*, March 11, 1854.
105. Sowell, *The Early Colombian Labor Movement.*
106. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 359.
107. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 210.
108. On the conflicto see Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 339–353.
109. Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 370, entry for April 18, 1854; 374, entry for April 20, 1854; and 378, entry for April 26, 1854.
110. Restrepo, *Autobiografía,* 45. Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 401, entry for May 25, 1854; see also 416, entry for June 11, 1854.
111. *El Neogranadino,* May 12, 1854.
112. Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 429, entry for July 6, 1854.
113. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 387.
114. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 344–345, 380–382; M. Ospina R., *Gobernador de la provincia de Medellín a sus*

conciudadanos, BNC FP; Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 419, entry for June 17, 1854.
115. Juan de Dios Restrepo, *A las armas habitantes de la antigua Antioquia*, BNC FP cited in Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 448.
116. González, *Partidos, guerras e iglesia,* 59.
117. Brew, *El desarrollo económico de Antioquia*.
118. This sense of Córdova being "out-of-time" is evoked in Courdovez Moure, *Reminisciencias,* 686.
119. Sanders, *Contentious Republicans,* 107.
120. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 355, 384.
121. Restrepo, *Diario,* Vol. 4, 385, entry for May 5, 1854.
122. Pineda's oral testimony was recorded in 1909 by Adolfo León Gómez, who relished stories of his relation's heroism. León Gómez, *Biografía de Anselmo Pineda,* 6–8.
123. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 92; Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 388; León Gómez, *Biografía de Anselmo Pineda,* 9–10.
124. Arosemena, "The American Question and its Importance," 1856, cited in McGuinness, *Path of Empire,* 159–160.
125. Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 393–397.
126. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 95.
127. Mosquera, "Comandante General de las fuerzas," June 15, 1854, BNC FP, 35–1002, cited in Uribe de Hincapié and López Lopera, *Las palabras de la guerra,* 450.
128. Botero Cuervo, *El redescubrimiento del pasado prehispánico de Colombia*, 271.
129. Thompson, ed., *The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas.*

Epilogue

1. Castelli, *Misión del jeneral Castelli a Bogotá*, BNC Fondo Pineda 927, Pza 15, 1.
2. McGuinness, *Path of Empire,* 20–40.
3. Tinker Salas, *Enduring Legacy.*
4. C. N. de C., "La Galipanada," Diccionario Fundación Polar.
5. Castillo Lara, *El panteón nacional.* The Panteón was closed for a lengthy period of renovation when I visited again in July 2011. The records of the British Cemetery in Caracas (held by the British Consultate there) do not record Hand's burial.
6. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 220.
7. Appelbaum, *Muddied Waters,* 44–45.
8. Gómez, "Biografía de Francisco Urdaneta," in *Gaceta Oficial de la Confederación Granadina*, April 6, 1861; see also Courdovez Moure, *Recuerdos,* 198.
9. F. Urdaneta, "Proclama a la 7a División del Ejército," March 5, 1861, Bogotá, in *Gazeta de la Confederación Granadina,* March 7, 1861.

10. Decrees published in *Gazeta de la Confederación Granadina,* April 4, 1861.
11. Safford and Palacios, *Colombia,* 221–226.
12. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 98–100. Pineda's second wife was Ana María Danies Kennedy, a New Granadan of foreign parentage. The marriage produced five children. For the other activities mentioned, see Pineda and M. Sánchez Caicedo, May 19, 1859, letters announcing their new venture on smart new blue header paper, in BNC FP 825, Pza 10; Printed funeral invitation, BNC FP 834, Pza 6.
13. Moreno de Angel, *Anselmo Pineda,* 102; Ernesto León Gómez, cited in A. León Gómez, *Biografía,* 11–12. It was Moreno de Angel herself who renamed the BNC Research Room "Sala Anselmo Pineda" when she became director of the BNC in 1978.
14. Ramirez Gomez, *El Santuario,* 19. The author was a priest and noted resentfully that Giraldo's donation was "appropriated by Mosquera's Liberal government" after 1863. For the land grant that gave Giraldo the funds to do this, see AGNC HDS Vol. 19, 323, dated Bogotá October 11, 1858. The area where the land was granted is not specified. Details of Giraldo's pension are in the same volume, 326.
15. Jaramillo, *Biografía del General Don Francisco Giraldo,* 5–7.
16. Henao, *Datos biográficos,* 27.
17. *El Montañés, Revista ilustrada de literatura, artes y ciencias*, Vol. 1, 55; Henao, *Datos biográficos,* 1.
18. Uribe Villegas, *Notas y documentos históricos,* 1.
19. Ibid., 104; see also Ocampo, *Apuntaciones biográficas,* 11.
20. Ocampo, *Apuntaciones biográficas*, 138.

Conclusion

1. Sánchez, *Guerra y política en la sociedad colombiana*, 17.
2. González, *Partidos, guerras e iglesia,* 15, 26.
3. In Alan Lester's words, "The nodal points holding this expanded imperial web and its extra-imperial trading partners together were ports, and, the means of transmission between them ships," in Lester, *Imperial Networks,* 6.
4. On the difficulties of "commemorating" such a history, see Garrido, "¿Qué celebrar en el bicentenario de 1810?," 377–387.
5. On "imperial formations" see Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty," 136.
6. Samper, *Ensayo sobre las revoluciones políticas*, 206.
7. Jones, "Finance, Ambition and Romanticism," 141, 147.
8. For two recent summaries of the literature that make these gaps clear, from very different perspectives, see Guardiola-Rivera, *What If Latin America Ruled the World?,* 6–10, and Knight, "US Imperialism/Hegemony and Latin American Resistance," 23–34.
9. Adelman, ed., *Colonial Legacies,* 10.
10. Quijano, "Coloniality of Power," 215.
11. See Brown and Paquette, eds., *Continuities after Colonialism,* 1–25.
12. The quotes are from Moraña, Dussel, and Jáuregui, "Colonialism and Its Replicants," 9, 14.
13. Ibid., 16.

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