

SPRINGER BRIEFS ON PIONEERS IN SCIENCE
AND PRACTICE · TEXTS AND PROTOCOLS 9

Chadwick F. Alger

Peace Research and Peacebuilding

 THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
MERSHON CENTER
for
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

 Springer

SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice

Texts and Protocols

Volume 9

Series Editor

Hans Günter Brauch

For further volumes:

<http://www.springer.com/series/11446>

http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_TP.htm

Chadwick F. Alger

Peace Research and Peacebuilding



 Springer

 MERSHON CENTER
for
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

Chadwick F. Alger
Department of Political Science
and Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
USA

ISSN 2194-3125 ISSN 2194-3133 (electronic)
ISBN 978-3-319-00502-7 ISBN 978-3-319-00503-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-00503-4
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013938032

© The Author(s) 2014

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

I dedicate this volume to the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). When I first attended an IPRA conference in Sweden in 1977, I began to learn that attaining peace requires overcoming conditions that prevent people from overcoming different conditions that prevent them from having normal human lives around the world. Therefore, world peace requires cooperation among governments, and civil society organizations, who have different definitions of peace. Ever since that time, members of IPRA from around the world have provided me with the knowledge that I must have in order to have a useful vision of a peaceful world, and the knowledge that I need in order to develop useful strategies for achieving it

Books by the Same Author Published by Springer

Vol. 7: Chadwick Alger: *Pioneer in the Study of the Political Process and on NGO Participation in the United Nations*. SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice No. 7 – presented by Carolyn Stephenson (Cham – Heidelberg – New York – Dordrecht – London: Springer-Verlag, 2014).

Vol. 8: Chadwick F. Alger: *The UN System and Cities in Global Governance*. SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice No. 8. Subseries Texts and Protocols No. 3 (Cham – Heidelberg – New York – Dordrecht – London: Springer-Verlag, 2014).

The cover photograph is of the bronze sculpture “Let Us Beat Our Swords into Ploughshares” that was created by Soviet artist Evgeny Vuchetich, and presented to the United Nations on 4 December 1959 by the Government of the USSR. The sculpture, depicting the figure of a man holding a hammer aloft in one hand and a sword in the other, which he is making into a ploughshare, is meant to symbolize man’s desire to put an end to war, and to convert the means of destruction into creative tools for the benefit of mankind. It is located in the North Garden of the United Nations Headquarters. This photo was taken on 1 October 2001 at the United Nations, New York. Source: UN Photo # 119163 by Andrea Brizzi. Permission is generally granted for scholarly, academic, and non-profit use and free of charge for the following UN photos of the UN landmark building; general views of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice; and photos of UN peacekeepers in action.

Contents

1	Introduction: Peace Research and Peacebuilding	1
2	The Quest for Peace: What Are We Learning?	5
2.1	Introduction	5
2.2	Peacekeeping	8
2.3	Humanitarian Intervention	13
2.4	Self-Determination	15
2.4.1	Revive the Trusteeship Council	18
2.4.2	Give Nations and Peoples World Legal Status	20
2.4.3	Functional Territories	22
2.4.4	New Modes of UN Representation	23
2.5	Preventive Diplomacy	23
2.6	Conclusion	27
	References	29
3	The Expanding Toolchest for Peacebuilders	31
3.1	Our Nineteenth Century Heritage	32
3.2	The League of Nations Covenant	33
3.3	The United Nations Charter	34
3.4	United Nations Practice 1950–1989	37
3.5	United Nations Practice 1990: Present	41
3.6	Non-Governmental Organisations and People’s Movements	43
3.7	Overview of Approaches to Peace	51
	References	53
4	Challenges for Peace Researchers and Peace Builders in the Twenty-First Century: Education and Coordination of a Diversity of Actors in Applying What We are Learning	55
4.1	Introduction	55
4.2	Five Peace Research Trends	56
4.3	“Post-Conflict” Peace Building	58
4.4	Preventing Violent and Disruptive Conflict	60

4.5	Conclusion	63
	References	65
5	Peace Studies as a Transdisciplinary Project	69
5.1	Is Peace and Conflict Studies a Discipline?	70
5.2	Emergence of Peace Tools in the UN System	72
5.3	Emphasis on Multi-Track and Multiple Methods	77
5.4	Growing Diversity of Peacekeeping and NGO/Civil Society Activities	78
5.5	Post-Conflict Peace-Building	79
5.6	Long-Term Peace-Building	84
5.7	Local Conflict Within States	86
5.8	Conclusion	87
	References	88
6	The Escalating Peace Potential of Global Governance	91
6.1	The Emergence of Global Governance	91
6.2	The UN System now involves People from Most Professions and Disciplines	92
6.3	Participation of Parliamentarians of States in the UN System	94
6.4	Participation of NGOs/Civil Society in the UN System	96
6.5	NGOs/Civil Society in World Politics	98
6.6	Participation of Business in the UN System	100
6.7	Business in World Politics	101
6.7.1	Business Groups Putting Human Rights on their Agenda ...	102
6.7.2	Companies Adopting Human Rights Principles	103
6.7.3	Human Rights Training for Employees	103
6.7.4	Independent Monitoring	103
6.8	Participation of Local Governments in the UN System	104
6.9	Local Governments, Organizations in World Politics	106
6.10	Conclusion	108
	References	108
7	There are Peacebuilding Tasks for Everybody	111
7.1	The UN System Involves People from Most Professions and Disciplines	113
7.2	Roles Performed by NGOs/Civil Society Organizations in the UN System	114
7.3	The Business Community in the UN System	116
7.4	Local Authorities in the UN System	118
7.5	NGOs/Civil Society in World Politics	119
7.6	Business in World Politics	124
7.7	Local Authorities, Organizations, and People in World Politics ...	126
7.8	Preparing People to Cope with Local Conflict within States	129

7.9 In Conclusion 131

References 132

8 What Should be the Foundations of Peace Education? 135

8.1 Peace is Possible. 135

8.2 Historical Context. 136

8.3 Basic Concepts 137

8.4 What Have We Learned? The Emerging Tool Chest 139

8.5 Putting the Pieces Together: Developing Peace Strategies
and Peace Education. 144

8.6 Comparative Evaluation of Peace-Building Strategies 146

8.7 Conclusion: The Challenges for Peace Educators 146

References 147

About the Author. 149

About the Book 151

Chapter 1

Introduction: Peace Research and Peacebuilding

I spent 1966–1967 doing first-hand research on the UN system, at UN Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. While there I made personal contact with European scholars who informed me about the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). It then had its headquarters in the Netherlands. In the summer of 1967 I attended an IPRA conference held in Sweden and listened to presentations from peace research scholars from around the world. Here I learned that people tend to define peace as a condition that exists when they overcome the most significant conditions that prevent them from having a normal human life. Thus, people around the world attempting to develop peace have different agendas. This means that achieving world peace requires cooperation among peoples having different peace agendas. This experience stimulated me to add peace research to my agenda, because it had a significant impact on my earlier research on the UN system and on the world relations of local communities.

In Chap 2, “The Quest for Peace: What are We Learning”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, 21–46, I provide an overview of what we learned about building peace in the twentieth century, through both research and practice. This includes peacekeeping operations, humanitarian intervention, self-determination, and preventive diplomacy. Significantly involved in this learning process were both the UN system and NGO/Peoples Movements.

In Chap 3, “The Expanding Tool Chest for Peacebuilders”, 1999, in Ho Won Jeong, *The New Agenda for Peace Research*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 13–42, I extend my analysis of twentieth century learning about building peace. I compare the League of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter. I then summarize what was learned by UN practice in 1950–1989, and by UN practice in 1990–1999. I then also provide an overview of contributions by NGOS and Peoples Movements. I conclude with a “Summary of approaches to Peace”. This includes twenty-six approaches that I place in nine categories. Each is achieved with a different instrument, including words, limited military power, reducing weapons, protecting rights, solving economic and social problems, equitable sharing, and involving the public at large.

In **Chap 4**, “Challenges for Peace Researchers and Peace Builders in the Twenty-First Century: Education and Coordination of a Diversity of Actors in Applying What We Are Learning”, 2000, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 5, No. 1, 1–13, I provide an overview of peace research trends that have accompanied the expanding peacebuilding practice. This includes (1) combining a number of peace tools into a comprehensive peace strategy, (2) pursuing a number of peace tracks simultaneously, (3) taking a long-term perspective, (4) coping with conflict between ethnic groups, (5) linking theory to practice, (6) post-conflict strategies for sustaining peace settlements, and (7) prevention of extremely disruptive and violent conflicts. Obviously, the broadening of the peacekeeping agenda requires the involvement of people in an increasing number academic disciplines, professions, governmental departments, and public activities.

Chapter 5, “Peace Studies as a Transdisciplinary Project”, 2007, in Johan Galtung and Charles Webel, eds., *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, London and New York: Routledge, 299–318, considers the fact that the broadening of the peacebuilding agenda means that it should be on the agenda of many academic disciplines and many professions. This means that, unless a university has a department, or program, of peace studies, or peace and conflict studies, it may not offer students an opportunity to acquire education in peacebuilding. This chapter provides an overview of how the UN system, a diversity of civil society activities, post-conflict peacebuilding, long-term peacebuilding, and local conflict within states have broadened the peace research agenda. Some now say that what is required is “a culture of peace.”

Chapter 6, “The Escalating Peacebuilding Potential of Global Governance”, 2009, in Luc Reyhler, Kevin Villanueva, and Julianne Funk Deckard, eds., *Building Sustainable Futures: Enacting Peace and Development*, Bilbao, Spain: University of Deusto, was presented at an IPRA conference in Leuven, Belgium in 2008. It provides an overview of the emergence of global governance in the UN system and in world relations outside the UN system. The importance of the Millennium Development Goals, and the Culture of Peace Movement, is emphasized. An overview is provided of contributions to global governance of actors in addition to the executive departments of State governments. These include parliamentarians of States, civil society organizations, local governments and business organizations.

In **Chap 7**, “There Are Peacebuilding Tasks For Everybody”, 2007, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, Issue 3, Blackwell Publishing for International Studies Assn., (ISA), I provide an overview of why there are “tasks for everybody”. The expansion of the UN system now means that people from all professions are involved, and that those in these professions outside the UN need to be aware of this. At the same time, the growing involvement in the UN system of civil society organizations, local governments and business organizations, means that people who have links to these organizations should be aware of their UN policies, and participate in the development of these policies. In addition, all of these people should be involved in the development of the world relations of these organizations outside the UN system. Recent events confirm Johan Galtung’s statement in 1980: “There are tasks for everybody” in the pursuit of peace.

In Chap 8, “What Should Be the Foundations of Peace Education?”, 2003, in, Yacov Iram, ed., *Education of Minorities and Peace Education in Pluralistic Societies*, Westport, CT, Praeger, 43–55, I emphasize these six points: (1) Students should attain the belief that peace is possible everywhere, (2) Placing threats to peace everywhere in a comprehensive historical context, (3) Careful use of key concepts, such as peace, violence and power, (4) Broad exposure to what we have learned in our pursuit of peace. (5) Having students prepare their own peace strategies in a specific case of disruptive conflict, and (6) Comparing their peace strategies with those employed by other students working on other cases. In addition, it is very important that students are able to perceive the widespread peace in the world today. Then, with respect to specific disruptive conflicts, they must have the capacity to acquire an “attainable vision” of what might be achieved. They should also be required to develop a long-term peace strategy, and not just focus on what should be done presently.

I hope that these seven chapters will enable readers to become involved in peacebuilding. I expect that you have been challenged to decide what your profession or academic discipline might contribute. In addition, how might civil society organizations and business organizations in which you are involved contribute? And is your local government aware of the need for local governments to be involved in global governance? As you think about these issues, it could be that the first two volumes in this series might be helpful, if you have not read them. In conclusion, I hope that you now believe that peace is possible, and that you have the responsibility to be involved in achieving it. I expect that what you achieve will award you much satisfaction.

Chapter 2

The Quest for Peace: What Are We Learning?

2.1 Introduction¹

I have long believed that we have learned much more about building peace in the Twentieth Century, through research and practice, than we normally tend to apply. As a result, on several occasions I have attempted to summarize this learning process and to produce an inventory of the peace tools that have emerged (Alger 1987, 1989, 1996). This effort has had several purposes. The first is to illuminate a broad array of peace tools that should be examined while developing peace strategies and tactics. Too often we are inclined to employ first tools that are most readily available, ones that have been used successfully on other occasions, ones which require the knowledge of our personal profession or discipline, or even ones whose application make us feel good. The second is to suggest, for those employing specific tools, the way in which those in use by others are linked to, and affecting, their efforts. The third is to show clearly the progress that has been made in the quest for peace (Alger 1998a). As new tools have been devised for probing deeper into the causes of peacelessness, we have at the same time greatly expanded our aspirations. One reflection of this expansion is the way in which global dialogue has been defining, and redefining, key global values. Peace now includes not only stopping the violence (negative peace) but also building peaceful relations shaped by social justice (positive peace). For many Development now includes fulfillment of human needs and human capacities for all the people, and must be sustainable. Definitions of Human Rights are now inclined to include civil, political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. As the definitions of these key global values have been defined, and redefined, the dimensions of each has expanded. In pursuit of their attainment, our aspirations have been enlarged.

¹ This chapter was published first as: “The Quest for Peace: What are We Learning”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, 21–46. The permission to republish this text was granted by Prof. Dr. Ho-Won Jeong, the editor of the journal, in January 2013.

	17th Century	1919	1945	1950 - 89	1990 -	
N E G O T I V E P E A C E	Diplomacy (1) Balance of Power (2) I	League Covenant	UN Charter	UN Practice	UN Practice	NGO/Peoples Movements
		Collective Security (3) Peaceful Settlement (4) Disarmament/ Arms Control (5) II	Collective Security Peaceful Settlement Disarmament/ Arms Control	Collective Security Peacekeeping (9) Peaceful Settlement Disarmament/ Arms Control	Collective Security Peacekeeping Peaceful Settlement Disarmament/ Arms Control	Tract: II Diplomacy (17) Conversion (18) Defensive Defense (19)
			Functionalism (6) Self-Determinism (7) Human Rights (8) III	Functionalism Self-Determinism Human Rights	Functionalism Self-Determinism Human Rights	Non-Violence (20) Citizen Defense (21) Self Reliance (22) Feminist (23) Peace Education (24)
				Economic Development (10) Economic Equity (NIEO) (11) Communication Equity (12) Ecological Balance (13) Governance for Commons (14) IV	Economic Development Economic Equity (NIEO) Communication Equity Ecological Balance Governance for Commons V	VI
	P O S S I T I V E P E A C E					

Fig. 2.1 The emergence of peace tools

Because I have for years focused much of my attention on the UN system, my understanding of this learning process has been significantly shaped by the quest for peace in these organizations. In many respects this is a quite appropriate “laboratory” because of the growth of the United Nations to a membership of 185, including virtually all states. This means that agendas, debates and dialogue are open to contributions from all states, increasingly supplemented by contributions from civil society around the world, thereby enhancing the global relevance of results. The evolving emergence of peace tools presented in Fig. 2.1 is obviously a very simplified version of a very complicated process. Innovation in history is very complex. We are never completely certain when a new idea first arose. Nevertheless, the Figure offers a useful beginning effort to provide an inventory of the emergence of a growing array of peace tools. Minimally it will challenge others to devise their own effort that arises out of their own experience.

This figure has been fully explicated elsewhere (Alger 1996, 22), so only a brief recapitulation will be provided here. It is useful to do this by pointing out several main trends. One has been the development of peace tools for implementation by a multilateral organization, as exemplified by provisions for Collective Security (3), Peaceful Settlement (4), and Disarmament/Arms Control (5) by the League of Nations Covenant. Before this time, the prime tools were Diplomacy (1) and Balance of Power (2), employed by individual states and coalitions of

states. A second trend has been supplementing negative peace tools (stop and prevent violence) with positive peace tools (build peaceful relations among states). Three tools emerged out of League of Nations experience, and were incorporated into the UN Charter as Functionalism (6) (economic and social cooperation), Self-Determination (7) and Human Rights (8).

A number of tools have evolved out of UN practice, including Peacekeeping (9), a negative peace strategy. Others represent the extension of positive peace tools through UN practice. The third trend reflected growing understanding that Functional cooperation is very difficult in a world in which there are a few wealthy states and many poor states. This first led to Economic Development (10) programs, both bilateral and multilateral. Economic Equity (11) then emerged out of understanding that development is constrained not just by factors internal to states but also by the nature of the international economic structure, hence a demand for a New International Economic Order. The fourth trend reflects the impact of new technologies on global relations and institutions. The emergence of Communications Equity (12) reflected a challenge to the belief that “free flow of communications” will necessarily contribute to peace. The demand for a New International Information and Communications Order (NIICO) is based on the fact that “free flow”, particularly when spurred by new communications technology, produces predominantly one-way flow, from the “North” to the “South”. As a result, a few cultures come to dominate the rest, and those who dominate are deprived of the opportunity to acquire full understanding of the rest of the world. This does not build a foundation for world peace. The emergence of Ecological Balance (13) and Governance for the Commons (14) (oceans, outer space and Antarctica) are a result of the impact of new technologies on ecological balance and on the deep penetration of human activity into the commons.

The fifth trend reflects the growing involvement of actors other than states in the pursuit of peace, identified in different contexts as non-governmental organizations, peoples’ movements and social movements. Presently all are included in what is now referred to as “civil society.” Figure 2.1 indicates that eight peace tools have largely been created by actors in civil society. These include Track II Diplomacy (15), Conversion to civilian production (16), Non-Violent movements for social change (18), Defensive Defense—development and employment of strictly defensive weapons and strategies (17), Citizen Defense—employment of non-violent techniques for national defense (19), Self-Reliance—development rooted in the satisfaction of individual human needs (20), Feminine Perspectives with respect to social relations and visions of alternative futures (21), and Peace Education (22). These tools have largely been developed and implemented without government support but have nonetheless had some impact on individual governments and multilateral organizations, as reflected in programs emphasizing the role of women in development and recognition of the significance of peace education by UNESCO.

It is important to point out that our figure is intended to provide a relatively simple means for obtaining a snapshot of available peace tools, with some insight on how the array has gradually grown in this century. It does not illuminate the historic roots of the ideas incorporated in these tools, nor those responsible for placing

them on the public agenda. For example, it is clear that both human rights and ecological balance were placed on the agenda of the UN system, and member states, largely as a result of the initiatives of civil society organizations, and that present efforts to implement standards incorporated in treaties and normative declarations on human rights and ecological balance are largely driven by these organizations.

It is the purpose of this chapter to continue our effort to provide a succinct overview of the development of peace tools by offering our assessment of the present development, and proposals for strengthening, four tools. We have chosen two that have been successfully established: self-determination and peacekeeping, and two that are now being designed through practice: humanitarian intervention and preventive diplomacy. First, self-determination, was rather tenuously inserted in the UN Charter, successfully developed through practice, and effectively applied in the largely non-violent breakup of overseas empires. But then it fell into decline because of failure to adapt it to a new era of self-determination challenges. Second, peacekeeping, invented in the UN laboratory, has been successfully implemented in many challenging situations and has been importantly adapted and strengthened through practice. Third, evolving development of humanitarian intervention has required overcoming Charter prohibition of intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. Justification of its application has often been based on another Charter tool, human rights. Fourth, advocacy of preventive diplomacy has been based largely on the belief that tendencies to react, rather than take preventive action, has led to avoidable chaos, and unnecessary violence. Because it is rarely applied by the Security Council and its most powerful members, there are a plethora of proposals for developing preventive diplomacy in the UN context. These four tools will be discussed in this order: peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, self-determination and preventive diplomacy.

2.2 Peacekeeping

The United Nations has demonstrated remarkably creative elaboration of peace tools that fall between two mainstays of the Charter, collective security and peaceful settlement. Collective security (Chap. VII) permits “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. It was primarily intended to deter military aggression across the borders of states. Peaceful settlement (Chap. VI) can involve a variety of third party roles, including mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. Peacekeeping was invented to fill a perceived gap between the two, with the traditional multilateral peacekeeping force tending to patrol a cease-fire line, employing small arms used for defense only, and having the permission of states on whose territory they patrol. Thus it has frequently been referred to as Chap. VI V2. How far we have come since the Charter was written is dramatized by the fact that peacekeeping forces, as exemplified by the UN Emergency 1 Force (UNEF, 1956–1967) in the Middle East, and the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC,

1960–1964), were challenged as violations of the Charter by the USSR, France, and other members. But their claims were turned aside in an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1962.

Steven R. Ratner quite aptly refers to peacekeeping as “the ongoing experiment of the international community.” (Ratner 1995, 9) Beginning in 1947 with the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), monitoring the Greek border, Robert Johansen lists forty-nine peacekeeping operations through 1997 (Johansen 1998, 119–122). Impressive is the fact that forty-two of these operations were placed in the field after the 1960 constitutional challenge to this application of the “doctrine of implied powers” to the UN Charter. Twenty-eight of these operations (57 %) were put into operation in the 1990s. Seventeen far flung operations still existed in May 1997, Arab–Israeli, India–Pakistan, Cyprus, Syria–Israel, Lebanon, Iraq–Kuwait, Western Sahara, Georgia, Liberia, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia(2), Angola, Guatemala, and Haiti (UN. DPI/1634/Rev.6, May 1997).

But much more noteworthy than the number of operations is the expansion of roles performed by these operations beyond the so-called classic functions of monitoring a cease-fire. These include monitoring elections, verifying military disengagements of force reductions or demobilizations, monitoring cantonment of military forces and equipment, maintaining internal security conditions essential for conducting elections, temporary or transitional administering of government ministries, repatriating refugees, providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, protecting UN personnel and humanitarian relief workers, fielding committees of reconciliation, and monitoring economic sanctions (Johansen 1998, 93). Impressive is the array of types of personnel assigned to single operations. For example, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), in former Yugoslavia, has an authorized strength of 5,000 troops, 100 military observers, 600 civilian police, 480 international civilian staff, 720 locally recruited staff, and 100 UN volunteers. If we browse through the authorized strength of the more recent operations in the 808 page third edition of the United Nations review of peace-keeping operations, *Blue Helmets* (1996), we also find these personnel categories: military liaison officers, military observers, mine-awareness personnel, military support personnel, medical officers, electoral observers, security personnel and logistic support personnel.

As amazing as the array of roles now performed by peacekeeping forces is the array of nationalities involved. For example, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in 1 Croatia (UNCRO) has participants from 38 countries, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, from 36 countries, and the United Nations Advance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 40 countries. These forces draw participants from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, Oceania and North America.

Johansen (1998, 93) concludes, “despite the growing number of functions, most remain within the classic peace-keeping formula of not using force offensively and of relying on the consent of local authorities to cooperate with the UN mandate.” Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the exact dimensions of “mission creep.”

Some of the enumerated functions, such as verifying military disengagements and demobilizations, and monitoring economic sanctions, would appear to be logical refinements of Chap. 6 VI. But fielding committees of reconciliation are closely related to peaceful settlement activities described in Chap. VI. Thus it might be said that their responsibilities are creeping toward Chap. VI, suggesting that they look more and more like Chap. VI 1/4 This is reflected in the tendency to expand the number of civilian personnel.

Particularly notable is the extension of operations into internal political affairs, such as monitoring elections, maintaining internal security conditions essential for conducting elections, and administering government ministries. Others perform local police functions, such as protecting UN personnel and humanitarian relief workers. Still others perform local social services such as repatriating refugees and providing humanitarian assistance to refugees. Thus we see here the incorporation of political and economic aspects of peace building into peacekeeping operations. More specifically, peace tools such as human rights are being combined with peacekeeping into peace building strategies.

Overall, particularly in the 1990s, the capacity of the UN to create peacekeeping forces, the willingness of member states to have their personnel involved, and the creative extension of functions has been very impressive. On the other hand, great difficulties have been encountered, and criticism of performance has been widespread. To those evaluating these shortcomings, Johansen offers this advice: "UN observers need to exercise care to avoid being drawn inadvertently into great powers' scapegoating the United Nations for ineffectiveness while depriving it of the wherewithal to be effective." (1998, 96) He, and others, attribute many peacekeeping deficiencies to the ad hoc procedures employed in deploying and managing the forces. In response, Johansen says that eight problems must be addressed:

1. Insufficient force size, as in Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Georgia, Rwanda and Somalia.
2. Inability to respond rapidly in a crisis. More rapid deployment in Iraq in 1990 and Rwanda in 1994 could have played important preventive roles.
3. Lack of staying power, as in early withdrawals in Angola, Cambodia, Bosnia, Croatia and Somalia.
4. Uneven training, particularly lack of training for coordinated response by nationally separate contingents.
5. Uncertain command, as when units await for orders from their own national commanders.
6. Unreliable and inadequate financing.
7. Inadequate UN staff.
8. Diffusion of cumulative learning, as when useful precedents are forgotten and not passed on to new units (Johansen 1998, 100–102).

The potential of these Chap. 6 1/4–6 1/2 forces, with their array of military, police, political and economic roles, and their tendencies to link peacekeeping to peace building, has engendered a number of proposals for strengthening their potential. There have been a number of proposals for creation of a UN volunteer

force, including the recommendation for a UN volunteer force of 10,000 by the Commission on Global Governance. It is believed that the availability of this force would serve as a deterrent, and that it could be useful in facilitating negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Commission carefully points out that they do not see this force as a substitute for peacekeeping forces or forces made available by member states, nor for military forces held on call under agreements that might be made in the future under Article 43 of the Charter (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 112).

Johansen has made a somewhat more ambitious proposal for a permanent, individually recruited, UN police or constabulary force that would be responsive to most of the problems enumerated above. It would consist of individually recruited persons from many countries, starting as a force of 10,000–20,000 and could grow to ten times that size. It would have the merits of “rapid deployment, reliability and effectiveness, impartiality, equitable burden-sharing, ease of coordination among UN agencies, ability to address inter-state and intra-state conflicts and ‘teaching’ effectiveness.” (Johansen 1998, 105–106) It would emulate a highly effective transnational police or constabulary force. Like the Commission, he sees that this volunteer force could overcome problems arising from delays encountered in deploying ad hoc forces.

Childers and Urquhart recommend a different kind of volunteer force that would also hasten UN competence to cope with domestic strife. It would be a UN Humanitarian Security Police that would protect UN and NGO emergency personnel, their transport and their supplies. “This force would consist of contributed volunteering national police agreed by their authorities to be on standby for rapid formation and deployment to emergencies whether or not UN military forces may be deployed.” The force would be trained in humanitarian security work in courses prepared in consultation with humanitarian relief NGOs. The force would have special rules of engagement, with a graduated range of weapons including armored transport. It would be able to act without the presence of UN military forces (Childers and Urquhart 1994, 204).

Of course, none of these, and other, proposals for strengthened UN rapid competence to cope with disruptive conflict within states would be feasible without adequate financing. In the light of current arrears in payment of assessments by member states, and caps placed on budget growth, there are numerous recommendations for alternative sources of funding. They include levying surcharges on arms sales, on transnational movement of currencies, on international trade, and on international air and sea travel. Johansen proposes a tax on the roughly \$900 billion daily international exchange of currencies. He estimates that a tiny tax of 0.01 % would produce \$28 billion annually, “enough to finance all UN peacekeeping operations and assist in subsidizing some preventive diplomacy and peace building operations” that he has proposed (Johansen 1998, 24).

There are proposals that would circumvent the present United Nations financial constraints. Boulding and Oberg (1998, 137) assert that “the civilian arms of UN peace-keeping missions—the civil Police and Civil Affairs—are grossly understaffed.” They support their argument by drawing attention to three UN documents

that recognize the growing importance of the civilian component of peace-keeping and the importance of better coordination between military forces and humanitarian and other civilian aspects of peacekeeping. The first is a report from the Special General Assembly Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, (GA Doc. A/49/136, 2 May 1994), the second is a resolution of the General Assembly (A Res./48/42, 14 March 1994) and the third is a Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly (A/48 403 S26450, 14 March 1994) (Boulding and Oberg 1998, 129) Boulding and Oberg propose further development of the civilian component of peacekeeping. Their proposals build not only on the growing civilian component of UN peacekeeping forces, but also on the historical experience of a number of small civilian forces around the world, including the Gandhi Peace Brigades in India; a Peace Army recruited by European pacifists in the 1930s; the World Peace Brigade, now active in Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Balkans, Haiti, and other places; Witness for Peace groups in Central America; and Christian Peacemaker Teams in Haiti, the Sudan, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere.

Boulding and Oberg propose that an independent coalition of NGOs substantially strengthen the civilian component of peacekeeping operations by providing trained, unarmed peace teams. This effort would build on the coalition-building leadership already provided by London-based International Alert in its effort to create an early warning system based on NGO networking. Their goal would be to create a “UN peace army” with an array of competencies:

1. Conflict mitigation, mediation, and communication with official local bodies and other groups.
2. Economic and social reconstruction, rebuilding agriculture and human services.
3. Demobilization and retraining of soldiers to participate in reconstruction.
4. Social healing for the traumas of war suffered by women, men and children.

For performing these tasks, they would supplement the UN peacekeeping Blue Helmets, with White Helmets and Green Helmets. The Blue Helmets, supported by civilian police and civil affairs staff, would carry out demilitarization and disarmament and prepare the way for the civilian administrative infrastructure. The White Helmets would be active in community dialogue, negotiation and social problem-solving, and Green Helmets would form reconstruction and environmental development teams. In addition, humanitarian service organizations, such as *Medicins Sans Frontieres*, *Catholic Relief Services* and the *International Red Cross*, would continue to provide emergency assistance and “rebuild the health, education, and social services...” (Boulding and Oberg 1998, 142). They envisage a clear-cut division of labor between UN forces under military command and the NGO teams, and they would see peace teams expanding their activities as the armed forces diminish theirs.

This proposal by Boulding and Oberg, complementary to proposals of Kumar Rupesinghe, of *International Alert* (Rupesinghe 1998), is an intriguing effort to speed up response to the learning process underway in peacekeeping “laboratories” that has gradually extended civilian participation and very slowly explored possibilities for employing peacekeeping as a foundation for peacemaking and peace building. It parallels other efforts by NGOs to supplement underfinanced and understaffed UN

efforts, as exemplified by NGO contributions in implementing human rights and environmental standards. Obviously these NGO efforts raise very important questions about the nature of emerging global governance. Are the White and Green Helmets perceived as temporary—eventually to be replaced by the UN if resources become available? Would they become a permanent form of cooperation between the UN and civil society in an evolving new style of global governance? If self-selected NGOs are permitted to build economic, social and political institutions in troubled countries, does this undermine the emerging democratic nature of global governance?

2.3 Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention has emerged largely unannounced because it has often been called peacekeeping—as exemplified by interventions in Somalia and Rwanda—although it is a fundamentally different kind of peace tool. Humanitarian intervention differs from peacekeeping in that it may take place without the permission of the state involved, thus it is occasionally referred to as Chap. VI 3/4, placing it between peacekeeping and Chap. VII enforcement. Recent humanitarian interventions include the UN Observer Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), UN Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). In these operations the Security Council authorized a group of states to deploy military forces outside the UN context. But in other cases, including Somalia and Yugoslavia, enforcement was entrusted by the Security Council to the Secretary General or another international organization such as NATO. Arend and Beck (1993, 113–114) define humanitarian intervention as “the use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect rights violations there.” It occurs within the borders of the target state without their explicit consent. Vayrynen, after citing the Arend and Beck definition of humanitarian intervention, reports that there is growing opinion that international law permits access to crisis areas in which egregious violation of human rights override domestic jurisdiction. Here, of course, he refers to the provision in Article 2(7) of the Charter: prohibiting intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Vayrynen 1998, 61–62).

But humanitarian intervention can also be used to prevent escalation of a domestic dispute that would jeopardize the security of other states. In this case, support of the Charter is easier, since these cases would seem to come under Article 39 of Chap. VII which applies to “threats” to the peace. In the case of application of enforcement measures under Chap. VII, Article 2(7) does not apply. But some might say that humanitarian crises seem to “endanger” peace rather than be a “threat” to it, calling for use of Chap. VI. By using Article 39, “threat” to the peace, N.D. White thinks that the Security Council has stretched the concept, and developed a new political and legal justification for quick enforcement against “rogue” states or to meet humanitarian needs (White 1993, 38–49, cited by Vayrynen 1998, 63).

Although the development of humanitarian intervention as an acceptable peace tool is still in process, it seems to be widely acceptable that the limits of Article

2(7) have been considerably narrowed in practice, and in legal definitions. Lori Damrosch succinctly describes the change that has taken place:

In a few short years the terms of debate have shifted dramatically. Instead of the view that interventions in internal conflicts must be presumptively illegitimate, the prevailing trend today is to take seriously the claim that the international community ought to intercede to prevent bloodshed with whatever means are available (Damrosch 1993, 364).

Vayrynen clearly discerns the development of a new peace tool. He concludes:

despite the practical intermingling of collective enforcement and humanitarian intervention, they should be considered separate legal and political categories. ...The international community should agree on a set of rules defining the goals, means and limits of admissible humanitarian interventions. They should also be given realistic mandates in which objectives, resources, and rules of engagement match each other (Vayrynen 1998, 65, 67).

There is widespread agreement that mandates should be more clearly matched with objectives, resources and rules of engagement. On the other hand, there is much less certainty about how the rules defining the goals, means and limit of humanitarian interventions should be developed. Farer notes that the Security Council “enjoys a kind of legislative supremacy as long as it commands the support of, if not the great majority of states, then the great majority of states that count in international relations.” But he is not fearful of this “supremacy” because he believes, as attested by “the slaughter in the Balkans,” that “the threat to a humane international order consists not of Council hyperaction, but rather of no action at all.” In these circumstances, he is fearful that some states “may experience an almost uncontrollable impulse to intervene.” Therefore, he would require that these impulses be channeled through subglobal institutions. But he would require that interventions by these institutions be submitted to the Security Council for review, “...while prior authorization should not be necessary, any intervention should be reported to the Council and justified at the time it occurs” (Farer 1993, 330–333).

Damrosch believes that deterrence of unacceptable behavior within states would require clarification by the international community of its expectations in two respects. It must identify its thresholds, and it must clarify the responses that will be forthcoming. Recognizing that this would not be easy, “Nonetheless, attention to developing and implementing international mechanisms analogous to domestic law enforcement should help deter violations of community norms in internal as well as international conflicts.” But she sees tension resulting from the fact that the same organ, the Security Council, fulfills both the function of preserving impartiality and neutrality, and of enforcing norms. As a result, she fears that it may end up failing at both” (Damrosch 1993, 354–355).

This leads her to concerns that thoughtfully illuminate how peace tools have been developed, either explicitly or tacitly. She notes the value of incorporating emerging norms of intervention into treaty but believes that

...any attempt to address the general problem of intervention in internal conflicts by purporting to codify a consensus that is necessarily still in the process of formation not only would be premature, but could even be counterproductive. Rigid formulations could retard necessary evolution and work against flexibility.

Instead, she would “favor allowing trends to continue to develop and precedents to accumulate, without any explicit move in the near term to change existing legal texts....interpretation can accordingly be dynamic and teleological rather than static and literal” (Damrosch 1993, 358–359).

Instead of writing new law defining humanitarian intervention, Damrosch would enhance its legitimacy by treating like cases alike, and by developing case by case consensus in the Security Council, in a process that builds on each new precedent. This would be supported by improving the consultation and transparency in Security Council deliberations and by reforming Council membership so that it is more representative of member states. At the same time, she would strengthen implementation of humanitarian intervention along the same lines of those who would strengthen UN peacekeeping, i.e., by creating a standing UN force that “could enable effective responses to international conflicts where the objective circumstances call for serious treatment, but where no major power has sufficient interest to initiate action” (Damrosch 1993, 361–362).

As we have already noted, this new tool can be perceived as a second delineation of a tool that falls between third party intervention and enforcement in response to aggression across state borders. The first was peacekeeping which, in a sense, introduced a third party with defensive weapons—peacekeeping. But humanitarian intervention would seem to be much more than Chap. VI 3/4 because it is basically a means for stopping violation of human rights within states. Thus, in UN Charter terms, it is actually a tool created by grafting together Chap. VI 3/4 with the seven Charter references to human rights, which are not mentioned specifically in either Chaps. VI or VII. Vayrynen believes that the Security Council has developed new legal interpretations to meet political needs imposed by public opinion and media calling for proactive measures in response to humanitarian crises. His emphasis on the role of the media and public opinion in the emergence of humanitarian intervention is very important in that it suggests that our tool number 12, communications, is quite relevant here. It would seem quite likely that without worldwide reporting, particularly on TV, of events in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and other places, public demand that “something must be done” would not have occurred. Evidence of this is the fact that equally disturbing violations of human rights are occurring in many other places, such as the Sudan and Afghanistan, but without humanitarian intervention. This suggests that we are in need of proposals through which comprehensive knowledge of gross violations of human rights could be widely disseminated. This would be preferable to the present state of affairs in which an arbitrarily selected small set of cases are the subject of temporary media avalanches, while other equally gross violations of human rights are ignored—by the media, by the international community, and by the Security Council.

2.4 Self-Determination

In the Twentieth Century the state system has been remarkably successful in developing multilateral standards for self-determination, creating institutions for fulfilling these standards, and then implementing procedures for peaceful movement

toward self-determination—in the case of colonies of overseas empires.² These developments are reflected in three dramatic steps, between 1920 and 1960. First, the League of Nations Covenant signified that a dramatic change in acceptance of overseas colonies was taking place when the victorious states found it prudent not to seize outright the colonies of the defeated states. Instead fourteen territories were made League of Nation Mandates. Although seven of the victors (Australia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, and Union of South Africa) supervised these Mandates, they were required to report to the League and to justify their treatment of peoples in the territories. The Mandates were placed under the Council of the League, which established, and appointed members of, a Permanent Mandates Commission composed of experts in colonial administration. The Committee received annual reports from the Mandatories and received petitions from indigenous inhabitants, although they had to pass through the Mandatories. Furthermore, the Committee did not have the authority to make on-the-spot investigations of the reliability of reports. Thus, “In summary, the whole mandate system was under the shadow of the philosophy of ‘White Man’s Burden’ and consisted primarily of colonists judging themselves and other colonists” (Chen 1979, 154).

Second, the UN Charter built upon League practice by establishing a Trusteeship Council responsible for ten Trust Territories, composed partly of states administering Trusteeships and partly of those who did not. Extending the powers of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Council was given power to directly receive oral and written petitions, and to send visiting missions, which it did every 3 years until all Trust Territories became independent. Because the Trusteeship Council was made up of half administering states and half nonadministering states it was judged to have “a tendency to be conservative with regard to colonial problems.” (Chen 1979, 15) But the Charter also significantly broadened the United Nations’ concern for overseas colonies beyond that of the League, in Chap. XI: Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories. Although only a declaration, it signified escalating unacceptance of overseas colonies by indicating that all states administering seventy-four non-self-governing territories were obliged “to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions In fulfillment of Article XI the General Assembly established a Committee on Information from Non-Self-governing Territories. Modeled on the Trusteeship Council it had an equal number of administering and nonadministering members, but it was not empowered to receive petitions or to visit territories.

Third, 15 years later, following the seating of sixteen new members from Africa in its historic 1960 session, the General Assembly passed a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This resolution passed 89 to 0, with 9 abstentions by eight colonial powers and the Dominican

² This section includes extracts from Alger 1998a.

Republic. Although the United States abstained, a member of the delegation, Zelma George, an Afro-American from Cleveland, added to the drama by standing and joining the thunderous applause throughout the hall that greeted the vote. Plano and Riggs see this vote as a significant chapter in decline of the legitimacy of overseas colonies.

It was an ideological triumph. The old order had not merely been challenged and defeated in the field—its adherents were no longer willing to be counted in its defense (Plano and Riggs 1994, 195).

In fulfillment of this Declaration, the Assembly established a Special Committee of Twenty-Four to replace the Committee on Information. Consisting of an anti-colonial majority, this committee extended all of the powers of the Trusteeship Council to all overseas colonies. Indeed, Plano and Riggs conclude: “For its terms of reference, the committee was given a blank check—a mandate to do whatever it was able to do in implementing the 1960 declaration” (Plano and Riggs 1994, 195).

This largely non-violent dissolution of overseas empires represents a significant achievement of the inter-state system and its first two experiments in global governance, the League of Nations and the United Nations. It offers an encouraging example of (1) incremental redefinition of a basic value, (2) in dialogue among an ever broader array of participants, (3) gradual development of new institutions for implementing this value, and (4) measured acceptance of a new value and new institutions by states who had power to hold out against them much longer than they did. Certainly the end of overseas colonies stands alongside the victory over slavery as an advance toward more humane governance. At the same time, it represents the most fundamental transformation in the state system in this century, although many scholars and policy makers, largely because of their immersion in the Cold War, have lacked the capacity to perceive it.

Nevertheless, when viewed from 1990s concerns for the “failure” of many of these newly independent states, this evolving drama of responsive statecraft is immersed in a larger sea of failure consisting of two key dimensions. The first has been failure of the major Western states to understand that this phase in the self-determination struggle, preceded by earlier ones, would most certainly be followed by others. After granting political independence to their arbitrary creations, they failed to take into account the broader implications of this successful self-determination struggle for the multi-nation states, and multi-state nations, that they had created, as well as for others throughout the world. Of course, most scholars joined them in this failure, as revealed by this statement in a leading international organization textbook as late as 1991: “The struggle for self-government is a revolution that has nearly run its course.” (Bennett 1991, 371) The second failure was inability to perceive the importance of the institutions that had been created for shifting self-determination struggles from battlefields to the halls of parliamentary diplomacy. It now seems surprising that leading states have employed ad hoc responses to a new era of self-determination challenges instead of building upon institutions which they had created in the earlier seventy-year struggle. Some

scholars and former practitioners, admittedly with hindsight, are now advocating this approach. We will now review a number of proposals.

Halperin et al. offer a succinct justification for, and approach to, reform proposals. They advocate UN institutional reform that draws on past experience, basing their argument on three points. First, they strongly argue that “a more active self-determination policy cannot be premised... on a unilateral approach.” (Halperin et al. 1992) Second, they noted that:

Developments in the protection of minority rights, the promotion of democracy, and the law of recognition point, together with new perspectives on the law of self-determination itself, toward the evolution of a new regime of international law to govern self-determination claims (Halperin et al. 1992, 53).

Third, they conclude that “An approach that addresses self-determination claims only after a ruling government collapses or a wide-scale conflict is underway is dangerous... a better approach would be to develop a set of principles that can inform a timely response to the spectrum of self-determination claims: anti-colonial, sub-state, trans-state, those of dispersed or indigenous peoples, and representative.” (Halperin et al. 1992, 72). We will present four proposed approaches to self-determination claims: (1) revive the Trusteeship Council, (2) give nations and peoples world legal status, (3) establish functional territories and (4) establish new modes of UN representation.

2.4.1 Revive the Trusteeship Council

Proposals for United Nations councils to deal with “failed state” issues obviously draw on experience in responding to the self-determination claims of overseas colonies. One proposal would give organizational recognition to the now wider self-determination agenda of the UN by transforming the UN Trusteeship Council into a clearinghouse for self-determination issues. A second proposal recognizes the intersection between self-determination issues, human rights and democracy by advocating a Council on Diversity, Representation and Governance.

Halperin et al. (1992, 113) propose transformation of the Trusteeship Council into a modern clearinghouse for self-determination, based on their judgment that “The Trusteeship Council is one of the lesser known success stories of the United Nations.” This would be a forum in which self-determination movements could lodge claims, identify and understand their rights, negotiate with government authorities, establish just administration of their affairs, and peacefully work out realistic political and territorial arrangements for the future. The Trusteeship Council could work with member states to develop criteria for recognition of new states. Objectives of the Council would remain as in Article 76 of the Charter, “to further international peace and security, to promote progressive development toward self-government or independence, to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for U.N. member states and their nationals” (Halperin et al. 1992, 113).

Halperin et al. recommend also that it would be possible to create new “trust territories” that would be voluntarily placed into trusteeship by the government of a state for the purpose of resolving a self-determination claim. As provided for in the Charter, the administering authority could be “one or more states or the organization itself.” (Article 81) “A trusteeship agreement would lock in the cooperation or acquiescence of the ruling government.” (Halperin et al. 1992, 113) Noting that this procedure might seem to be implausible, the authors point out that, in the case of seemingly unsolvable dilemmas and bloody civil wars that imperil the existence of a government, this could be a way out. Eventually the area in question could be integrated into the original state, become an autonomous entity in that state, become independent, or become in some way affiliated with a neighboring state.

Halperin et al. also suggest that some new trust territories could be designated “strategic areas” under the Charter because of the threat of civil war. They would then fall under the direct jurisdiction of the Security Council, which could deploy forces or employ sanctions to prevent armed conflict. Halperin et al. don’t underestimate difficulties. “But the current ad hoc manner in which self-determination is being addressed by the United Nations and other institutions urgently requires a more systematic process. If the international trusteeship system is not restored and modernized, some other mechanism will need to be devised” (Halperin et al. 1992, 114).

Childers and Urquhart, two former members of the UN Secretariat, also would build on the Trusteeship Council, in their broad and challenging volume, *Renewing the United Nations*. They offer a new “indicative title” of Council on Diversity, Representation and Governance. It is important that they position their proposal as the first of three in a “Human Rights” category. The other two would make the High Commissioner for Human Rights a Deputy Secretary General and establish an Independent Ombuds-Panel for monitoring compliance “of all major entities of the UN system with all Human rights instruments.” They succinctly define the mission of their proposed Council:

The chief recommendation concerns a set of problems arising from the weakening of the post-Westphalian nation-state, from unresolved legacies of the age of empires, and from the aspirations of cultural and ethnic groups (Childers and Urquhart 1994, 201).

This Council would have a composition and method of election similar to that for ECOSOC (fifty-four members elected by the General Assembly), but member states “should nominate experts in one or more of the disciplines involved in its mandate.” (Childers and Urquhart 1994, 201) The last requirement recalls the expert composition of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.

Their proposal can be most succinctly presented under the two functions of the proposed Council:

Function 1: “The Council should have an exploratory and dialogue function without attempting the formulation of universal policies.”

1. Accommodating cultural and ethnic aspirations.
2. Providing adequate domestic and international expression to groups hitherto treated as minorities within states but aspiring to such expression.

3. Adjusting exogenously established boundaries.
4. Offering creative options for the transition of societies from traditional centralist nation-state structures.

Performance of this function would include invitation of learned papers and dialogue with a wide range of specialists and non-governmental persons that would come from all disciplines, and have a variety of experiences related to cultural diversity, representation and governance. Its rules of procedure would facilitate open and congenial dialogue.

Function 2: “The Council should act as a forum of resort and petition by groups seeking accommodation...”

1. Groups seeking help would be guaranteed, under relevant human rights instruments, that no harm would befall them for making their appeals.
2. Petitions could be referred to a relevant human rights body or to the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
3. In “exceptional instances where a collapsed state, by the ascertained wishes of its communities and their intact leadership systems, should be administered under a UN authority, the council would establish the guidelines, oversee the administration, and decide its termination.” (Childers and Urquhart 1994).

The Childers and Urquhart proposal has four distinctive features. First is its strong emphasis on a broad search for the widest possible input of information and ideas for “peaceably accommodating cultural and ethnic aspirations” from a “wide range of specialists and nongovernmental wise persons in all disciplines and experiences related to cultural diversity, representation and governance.” Second is its emphasis on the importance of “dialogue in the most open and congenial manner.” Third, it explicitly links the work of the council to UN human rights machinery. Fourth is the proposal that members of the Council, although nominated by states, should “be experts in one or more of the disciplines involved in [the Council’s] mandate.” These features do not conflict with the spirit of the Halperin et al. proposal. On the other hand, it must be noted that the provision for “strategic areas” to be established under the Security Council is not in the Childers and Urquhart proposal (Childers and Urquhart 1994, 201–202).

2.4.2 Give Nations and Peoples World Legal Status

In contrast to emphasis on wider definition of self-determination, to be implemented by UN councils with wider authority, supported by enhanced capacity to respond to early warning, Gotlieb focuses on the need of “the international legal system” for “additional concepts and a richer vocabulary to accommodate the national claims that cannot be expressed within existing state structures.” (Gotlieb 1993, 45) He is concerned that “the international legal system lags behind the

political and social realities in many countries.” In recognition of these realities, he advocates a “states plus nations” approach that would permit some external relations for nations while at the same time not undermining the integrity of existing states. He would also give formal recognition to “functional associations” that transcend state borders. These nations and functional associations would then have representation, as appropriate, in international organizations. No doubt many will perceive this approach as “unrealistic”, but Gotlieb is actually trying to break through the exceedingly artificial simplicity of prevailing perceptions of the interstate system. There is no doubt that nations are important actors in world politics—the literature on “failed states” is but one indicator. The question that must be confronted is how this reality should be recognized. At the same time, it cannot be disputed that functional associations transcend state borders throughout the world, as clearly illuminated by studies of border areas (Aykaç 1994; House 1980).

Gotlieb’s notion of “national home regimes” is meant to serve as “a comprehensive response to ethnic claims” while simultaneously maintaining “the integrity and the sovereignty of states” that have claims of national groups within them. It would also recognize that more than one nation can be located in a common territory, as in the case of Bosnia, and that some nations—for example, the Kurds—are divided by state boundaries. Essential would be distinction between the concepts of nationality and citizenship. Citizenship would be derived from the state and nationality derived from the nation. Thus, he could see the issuance of two sets of passports to the inhabitants of a state: national passports to the inhabitants of national-home areas and citizenship passports to the citizens of states. Inhabitants of different nations could carry the same citizenship passport. And a common national passport could be issued to persons of different citizenship. Unfortunately, Gotlieb does not describe the exact uses, nor give us examples of the uses of these different passports. Although administration of this system might be complicated, there is no reason to believe that citizens and nationals could not cope with their dual status. Most already do this, as they play a variety of roles in their daily lives: within their state, within their nation (sometimes across state borders) and in their inter-nation relations within their state. Multinational marriages, unions and business relations confirm this. Fifty-three years ago Harold Guetzkow offered scholarly insight to this kind of widespread phenomena in his still valuable study: *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization* (1955).

Gotlieb proposes that “the international legal community can be broadened beyond states and international organizations... Nations and peoples that have no state of their own can be recognized as such and endowed with an international legal status.” (Gotlieb 1993, 39) Those that are politically organized would be given the right to be a party to treaties and to take part in international organizations. He believes that this could be done without challenging the sovereignty of the states in which these nations and peoples are located. Thus, “peoples organized on a nonterritorial basis” would have a status “similar to that of states, albeit limited to nonterritorial concerns.” (39) Building on existing procedures for Observer Missions at the UN, these “new forms of participation” could be offered a status of “Associated People of the United Nations.” Members could negotiate roles within

the UN which might include the right to address selected UN organs (without a vote) and to display symbols of nationality, such as flags. Gotlieb believes that “this can happen in a manner that, far from threatening the integrity of the states from which they hail, could reinforce their cohesion by providing a coveted outlet for the expression of national sentiments” (40).

2.4.3 Functional Territories

Gotlieb would further diversify the world system by establishing functional associations of peoples side by side with associations of states:

A functional approach involves the demarcation of different layers of lines for different purposes. ...lines drawn for security purposes need not coincide with other lines drawn for other purposes. The functional approach ...encourages the redistribution of competence in land use matters to the local level in order to reduce their contentiousness at the level at which national sensibilities are the most acute (Gotlieb 1993, 46–47).

Gotlieb believes that creative solutions to territorial disputes can be achieved by extending concepts used in domestic territorial disputes to problems transcending state boundaries. Domestically title to territory often involves a bundle of rights in the land rather than ownership of the land. Thus, in cities owners of land can be constrained by regulations on density, residential and commercial use, architectural features, the height of buildings, maintenance of properties of historical interest. The need for specific kinds of regulations often transcends the boundaries of towns and cities. In response special agencies have been created such as historical districts, airport authorities, port authorities, bridge authorities, and park authorities. Gotlieb admits that similar kinds of special regimes transcend state borders but it is his concern that “the basic notions of territorial sovereignty continue to invite settlement of territorial disputes in terms of simple boundary lines” (Gotlieb 1993, 46).

Useful in illuminating not only possibilities, but actual experience with functional associations is Aygen Aykac’s *Analysis of Transborder Cooperation Structures in Western Europe*. He informs us that there are over 30 transborder structures linking local and regional authorities in Western Europe. They are involved in an array of issues, such as tourism, education, regional policy and planning, communications and transport. One group is Working Communities that involve transborder cooperation based on a common historical and cultural past, as well as common economic and communications problems. They have a general assembly, executive committee, committees, and general secretariat. Delegations are composed of elected regional and local representatives. Examples include a Working Community of the Central Alpine Region (ARGELAP), piercing borders of Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Austria, and a Working Community of the Western Alpine Region (COTRAO) cutting across borders of Italy, France and Switzerland. Of special interest with respect to “failed states” is the Alpen-Adria Working Community, founded in 1978, that includes not only regions in Italy and Austria, but also Slovenia and Croatia (Aykac 1994, 1–14).

From one perspective, Gotlieb's contribution lies in his focus on an alternative, or complementary, approach to the UN Council approach that would centralize efforts to anticipate self-determination disputes and resolve them peacefully. His approach would find a new status for nations and functional associations through which they might directly participate in UN bodies. The insight that he contributes is based on the recognition that the realities of political organization are far more complicated than the artificially simplistic state-centered view of world politics. His proposals are based on the assumption that direct representation of nations and functional associations would often diminish the need for conflict resolution in UN Councils. Of course, this would not totally eliminate the need for these Councils. At times, Gotlieb's ideas could also offer Councils another approach to preventing disruptive violence.

2.4.4 New Modes of UN Representation

Gotlieb's proposals provoke speculation on possible forms of representation of nations in the UN reach even beyond his proposals. One possibility would be to give nations representation in state delegations to the UN General Assembly and the assemblies of the specialized agencies. This could, however, violate Gotlieb's desire not to threaten the integrity of the state. On the other hand, it would in some ways be similar to the tripartite mode of representation in the International Labor Organization, in which each member state has representatives from the state government, labor and business. A second possibility would be to admit nations to participation in specific issues and/or specific organizations in the UN system. For example, a persuasive case could be made for admitting nations to UNESCO deliberations on preservation of cultures and efforts to promote cross-cultural dialogue. A third option would be to have a second assembly of the General Assembly, and possibly of some of the specialized agencies, composed of nations, and perhaps also certain transnational functional associations. Over the years there have been numerous proposals for a second United Nations assembly, including ones composed of NGOs, of national legislators and of directly elected representatives. There have been several recent proposals, including the Childers and Urquhart proposal for a UN Parliamentary Assembly directly elected by universal adult franchise (1994, 171–181). But such an assembly, elected by a constituency of 6 billion people would not satisfy the desire of nations for representation. The role of an Assembly of Nations could be limited to certain issues. And, like a number of other second assembly proposals, it could initially be limited to an advisory role.

2.5 Preventive Diplomacy

There is widespread commentary declaring that one of the prime failures in world politics has been the tendency of states and inter-state organizations to respond to crises rather than to anticipate and work to prevent them. The growing number

of proposals for overcoming this failure are now increasingly called “preventive diplomacy.” These proposals illuminate the fact that the institutions of multilateral diplomacy have created potential for monitoring world conditions, anticipating crises, and responding before they erupt into chaos and violence that has only been faintly developed. We believe that “prevention” deserves the status of a separate tool. In his *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1995, 46–51) defines preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” Michael S. Lund (1996, 37) defines it as “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.” For Boutros-Ghali preventive diplomacy requires three elements: measures to create confidence, early warning based on information gathering, and informal or formal fact-finding. “It may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones.”

Kittani (1995) reports that Boutros-Ghali presided over major innovations for institutionalizing preventive diplomacy in the UN Secretariat. They include the creation of regional desks within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) charged with responsibility of monitoring developments around the world, creation of Task Forces on peace operations, and interdepartmental working groups. But after drawing attention to these improvements, Kumar Rupesinghe nevertheless concludes that there are “severe constraints that hinder the United Nations’ attempts to advance preventive diplomacy.” These include inadequate Secretariat staff, lack of long-term commitment of professionals willing to undertake good office missions, inadequate financial resources for missions, and lack of political will on the part of Security Council members (Rupesinghe 1998, 164–165). It is indeed puzzling to compare the vast resources, effort and number of people that the more powerful members of the Council invest in unilateral efforts to collect information, plan and prepare for future contingencies, with the scant personnel, financial support and effort which these states direct towards UN efforts. Is there a more blatant failure to apply learning than that demonstrated by the failure of the Security Council to develop capacity for consistently employing preventive diplomacy?

The challenges confronted in recent UN response to disputes within states, and celebration of the Fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, have produced a great number of preventive diplomacy proposals. Many of these proposals underline the degree to which the United Nations has been woefully unprepared to cope with new challenges thrust upon it in places such as Somalia, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, as these demands on the UN have unfolded, it has been unable to build new capacity to cope with them because it has at the same time been experiencing requirements that personnel be cut and that budgets remain stable. We shall first briefly present an array of proposals for fact finding and early warning, and a proposal for an International Monitoring Agency. We will then turn to proposals for strengthening the capacity of the UN to respond through mediation and dispute resolution, and enticements for demilitarization.

Not surprisingly, fact finding and early warning are emphasized by many practitioners and scholars. Some note the importance of information collected by the Secretary General in his contacts with governments, and with others, and his power to dispatch special envoys. (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 47–48) The Commission on Global Governance welcomes the greater freedom the Secretary General now has to dispatch missions, but is concerned that he does not have the resources for doing the job. (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 99) But there is increasing recognition that the kind of fact finding that is needed for competent early warning would have to draw systematically on the information resources of the entire UN system.

Boutros-Ghali has drawn attention to the valuable UN networks of information on environment, clear accident, natural disasters, mass movement of populations, threat of famine and threat of ease. He underlines the need to synthesize these sources with political indicators, to assess its to peace that they suggest, and to analyze action that might be taken. (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 48–49) The Independent Working Group proposes the creation of an Early Warning and Threat Assessment section in the Secretary General's office. Noting the capacity of the Secretariat to collect and process data from public sources, they assert its need to "access first-hand reports of internal conflicts and economic, social and humanitarian crises from governments, field representatives of UN agencies, specialized agencies and non-state actors." Particular note is taken of the need for early warning of growing tensions among ethnic groups, a significant aspect of this recommendation is that members of the Early Warning and Threat Assessment section would be seconded from UN functional agencies (Independent Working Group 1995, 17–18).

Complementary to this proposal is one by Robert Johansen for a UN International Monitoring Agency that would integrate diverse monitoring activities. Its monitoring tools would include high-altitude aircraft and satellites. In addition to monitoring arms agreements, it could monitor clandestine tests of missiles or warheads, cease-fire lines, economic sanctions, illegal shipments of technology and arms and covert operations to manipulate elections. Of course, early warning would be of little value without the capacity to quickly respond. Toward this end, Johansen suggests that the Security Council authorize the Secretary-General to employ more roving ambassadors to meet with those involved in festering conflicts. He would also establish standing conflict-resolution committees in each major region. These efforts would be supported by a UN Institute for Mediation and Dispute Resolution, "emphasizing early efforts at conflict resolution" that would mediate conflicts, and provide seasoned expertise to conflict resolution committees in each world region. An example of long range application of early timing information would be Johansen's recommendation that UN economic agencies be employed in providing economic benefits for violence prone societies in return for their willingness to lower military expenditures and demilitarize their societies (Johansen 1998, 102–1104).

There are also proposals for engaging NGOs more deeply in preventive action, as exemplified by Rupesinghe's proposal for the mobilization of peace constituencies within countries for designing early preventive action. This would include

forums of eminent persons and round table seminars involving NGOs, international organizations and states. (Rupesinghe 1998, 173) He would build effective NGO coalitions that focus on the non-military aspects of re-conflict peace building, early warning and prevention. (Rupesinghe 1998, 171) Two other examples illuminate searching efforts to more explicitly define future NGO institutions out of emerging NGO activity. Boulding and Oberg propose that peace researchers train both civilian and military practitioners in mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution. (Boulding and Oberg 1988, 150) A very far reaching proposal is Kumar's advocacy of a Global Coalition for War Prevention, including the United Nations, regional organizations, states, and popular movements, with NGOs as *catalysts* (Rupesinghe 1998, 179–180).

There are a plethora of recommendations for making more adequate military forces available in a timely fashion. Building on efforts to acquire early warning, Boutros-Ghali has recommended preventive deployment of forces “in conditions of national crisis... at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 49–51). He notes a number of ways in which preventive deployment might alleviate suffering and limit or control violence. This could include humanitarian assistance, maintenance of security through military, police or civilian personnel and assistance in conciliation efforts. He would see the possibility of involvement of various agencies in the UN system and of non-governmental organizations.

NGOs have become increasingly involved in areas of intense conflict, particularly in humanitarian relief. As NGO involvement has reached beyond humanitarian relief, there are now numerous proposals that NGO involvement in these areas should be extended and more explicitly defined. For example, the Commission on Global Governance asserts that “The world community should recognize the important role—beyond humanitarian relief—that NGOs can play in situations of conflict”, and that they should be given “access to conflict areas...” (1995, 100). One theme in definition of this larger role is for a larger and more explicit role for NGOs in conflict monitoring and early warning. After noting that there are “things NGOs... can do that the United Nations and its governments cannot do,” Elise Boulding and Jan Oberg note that “conflict monitoring is an important contribution NGOs can make”, through humanitarian agencies, conflict analysts, and local grass-roots peace-oriented groups. (Boulding and Oberg 1998, 147) The Commission on Global Governance (1995, 98) not only advocates an improved UN early warning system but also supports proposals “for an NGO Early Warning Service, in which the United Nations would work with relevant NGOs to develop early-warning consultative and operational mechanisms. In a complementary vein, Rupesinghe would integrate preventive action undertaken by the NGO community with preventive diplomacy of “states and state agencies.” Noting that increasing involvement of the NGO community in humanitarian relief and post-conflict peace-building has brought states and NGO into “very close contact,” he concludes: “What is missing, however, is a serious evaluation of the role of NGOs in conflict prevention” (Rupesinghe 1998, 172).

In response to input from conflict monitoring, Boulding and Oberg also recommend the development of NGO Rapid Response Teams of up to 100 persons

that would work with local groups in dampening escalating conflicts. This would be based on the development of an NGO coalition that would establish a coordinating body for training and deployment of peace teams. But they are careful to emphasize that this should not be done without efforts to train local people, and that outside trainers should not replace local peace makers (Boulding and Oberg 1998, 147–148).

2.6 Conclusion

We have reviewed four peace tools toward the end of obtaining a better understanding of their emergence and development. Two might be called “old tools”. Self-determination was placed, but only as a Declaration, in the UN charter. Peacekeeping was invented in the UN “laboratory” in the 1950s. Both have been very successfully applied. Peacekeeping has provided a very useful tool that falls between Chaps. VI and VII. In practice it has developed a number of roles beyond patrolling cease-fire zones, including observation of elections, temporary administering of government ministries, repatriating refugees and fielding committees of reconciliation. Notable is the growth of civilian participation in peacekeeping operations. Self-determination was applied with great success in the largely non-violent granting of independence to components of overseas empires. Beginning with the embryonic Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, successive councils and committees were created to carry out this function. But, surprisingly in retrospect, these procedures were not adapted for employment in more recent demands for self-determination—primarily by sub-units of states created by colonial powers. Proposals for reviving use of these institutions and procedures are largely coming from scholars, and former officials.

We have also examined two “new tools, humanitarian intervention and preventive diplomacy. Humanitarian intervention has risen substantially under the growing influence of another peace tool—human rights. This has involved a remarkable diminution of the scope of the “domestic jurisdiction” clause of the UN Charter. Preventive diplomacy is very much in the proposal stage. This judgment does not, of course, deny that the members of the UN Secretariat, state officials, and others, frequently work to prevent violence and other kinds of crises. But we mean by preventive diplomacy the development of strong institutions for sustained multilateral action. Here there has been only slight achievement, largely because of financial constraints, personnel limitations and lack of support for sustained multilateral action by the most powerful members of the Security Council. But potential is clearly delineated by numerous proposals coming from scholars, former officials, and also from the UN Secretariat.

Overall we have encountered a remarkable capacity to learn from experience and develop institutions and procedures responsive to that experience. This is particularly so in the case of peacekeeping, and in the application of self determination to overseas colonies. Overall we have encountered an impressive tendency to extend civilian roles and procedures that would serve as alternatives to military

roles. Disappointing, however, is the difficulty encountered in applying creative social inventions in preventive strategies. Limited personnel and resources, and limited support from powerful states still too often lead to ad hoc responses, rather than application of preventive measures.

Impressive has been evidence of the growing influence of human rights standards, as reflected by issues confronted in peacekeeping, self-determination, humanitarian intervention, and preventive diplomacy. Notable is the assertion that humanitarian intervention has been propelled by human rights violations perceived by the media and public opinion. On the other hand, we have noted that many equally brutal violations tend to go unnoticed. This suggests that proposed early warning and fact finding proposals should be accompanied by proposals for wide dissemination of their results. If the media and public opinion are to play a role, an effort should be made to provide, and disseminate, reliable information that gives equal attention to all systematic abuses of human rights.

Significant has been the growing involvement of organizations of civil society in the quest for peace, as well as the wide range of proposals for extending their participation. At times it has been frankly admitted by those advancing proposals that they are attempting to fill gaps created by UN institutions with limited personnel and budgets. These proposals, and the reasons that foster them, create a fundamental challenge to choices being made in evolving procedures and institutions for emerging global governance. When should extensive new roles for organizations of civil society be encouraged and supported? What criteria should be employed in making these decisions? To what degree should emphasis be placed on means for raising additional financial resources for the UN system, so it can more ably carry out some of these functions?

As we ponder participation of actors other than states in emerging global governance, Gottlieb challenges us to think beyond civil society, with his proposals for new "legal actors". His proposals for giving a legal role in world politics to nations and functional territories that transcend state borders are a creative challenge to simplistic notions of sovereignty. Nations and certain functional territories are actors in world politics, as well as the states in which those who also identify with nations and functional units reside. Why not recognize this fact, and admit their direct participation in the organizations in the UN system, and in other external relations, in ways that constructively complement the activities of states?

In conclusion, we have learned the twentieth century will be recognized as one in which our array of peace tools has been creatively extended. There are an increasingly impressive number of alternatives to violence in coping with problems that transcend state borders. In addition, a remarkable number of scholars and former practitioners are advancing numerous creative proposals based on their perception of additional potential for strengthening our quest for peace. As a result, the gap of what we know, and what we are able to apply is, unfortunately growing. This should definitely not be cause for pessimism. But it should heighten our determination to acquire deeper understanding of how knowledge can be more rapidly applied in action.

References

- Alger, Chadwick F., 1998a, *The future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-first Century*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1998b, "Failed States and the Failure of States: Self-Determination, States and Global Governance," Conference on "Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects and Consequences," Purdue University, February.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1996, "The Emerging Tool Chest for Peacebuilders." *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 1, Number 2, 21-45.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1989, "Peace Studies at the Crossroads: Where Else?," in George Lopez, ed., *Peace Studies: Past and Future. The Annals*, American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 117-127.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1987, "Peace Studies at the Crossroads: Where Else?," *COPRED Peace Chronicle*, 12(6), 9.
- Arend, Anthony, Clark, and Robert J. Beck, 1993, *International Law and the Use of Force*, London, Routledge.
- Aykac, Aygen, 1994, "Transborder Regionalisation: An Analysis of Transborder Cooperation: Decentralization Tward Regional and Local Governments," Liberias Paper 13, Europäisches Institute GmbH, Sindelfingen, Germany.
- Bennett, Leroy, 1991, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 5th ed.. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Boulding, Elise, and Jan Oberg, 1998, "United Nations Peace-keeping and NGO Peace-building: Towards Partnership," in Alger, 1998, 127-154. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1995, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2nd ed. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, en, Samuel Shih-Tai, 1979, *The Theory and Practice of International Organization*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing.
- Childers, Erskine, and Brian Urquhart, 1994, *Renewing the United Nations System.*: Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Commission on Global Governance, 1995, *Our Global Neighborhood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Damrosch, Lori Fisler, ed., 1993, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 316-347.
- Farer, Tom, 1993, "A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention," in Damrosch, ed., 316-347.
- Gottlieb, Gidon, 1993, *Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
- Guetzkow, Harold, 1955, *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization*. Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University.
- Halperin, Morton H., David J. Scheffer and Patricia L. Small. 1992, *Self-Determination in the New World Order*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- House, J.W., 1980, "The Frontier Zone: A Conceptual Problem for Policy Makers," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 456-477.
- Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, 1995, *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century*. New York: Ford Foundation.
- Johansen, Robert, 1998, "Enhancing United Nations Peace-keeping," in Alger, 1998, 89-126.
- Kittani, I., 1995. "Peacemaking and Peace-keeping for the Next Century," paper prepared for the 25th Vienna Seminar, co-sponsored by the Government of Austria and the International Peace Academy, 2-4 March.
- Lund, Michael, 1996, *Preventing violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Ratner, Steven R., 1995, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War*. New York: St Martin's Press and Council on Foreign Relations.
- Riggs, Robert E. and Jack C. Plano, 1994, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing.

- Rupesinghe, Kumar, 1998, "Coping with Internal Conflicts: Teaching the Elephant to Dance," in Alger, 1998, 155-182.
- United Nations, 1996, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd edition. New York: UN Department of Public Information.
- Vayrynen, Raimo, 1998, "Enforcement and Humanitarian Intervention: Two Faces of Collective Action by the United Nations," in Alger, 1998, 54-88.
- White, N.D., 1993, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Chapter 3

The Expanding Toolchest for Peacebuilders


The basic premise of this chapter is that we have learned much more about building peace in the 20th century, through research and practice, than we normally tend to apply. Therefore, we will attempt an inventory of the available instruments for pursuing peace, Twenty-four peace ‘tools’ will be presented—two that were inherited from the 19th century, and twenty-two that have been developed in this century. Applying the concept ‘tools’ as a label for these twenty-four approaches can help to create a practical orientation toward their application. The enumeration of the tools in six rectangles in Fig. 3.1 can be viewed as six toolboxes.¹

If they were stacked on top of each other, they would be familiar to the auto mechanic as six drawers in a mechanic’s tool chest. If you told auto mechanics that six drawers of tools were indispensable to the peace ‘mechanic’, both as a result of learning through practice and because the world is becoming increasingly complicated as a result of new technology, they would quickly understand. The tool chest of the auto mechanic has ever more drawers because new technology is making automobiles increasingly complicated.

We will present the tools in chronological order mainly to demonstrate that new tools arose out of experience that revealed the shortcomings of older tools. Practitioners of any trade or profession that employs tools can understand this—not only mechanics but also plumbers, carpenters, electricians, surgeons, etc. Of course, it will be obvious that our chronological presentation is very simplified. Innovation in history is very complex. We are never completely certain when a new idea first arises. In some respects all ideas embedded in peace tools are very old. While we would assert that the learning process revealed in Fig. 2.1 certainly is reflected in the experience of some people, it is not based on intensive research on the deep historical origin of peace-related ideas. The basic purpose of Fig. 2.1

¹ This text was first published as: “The Expanding Tool Chest for Peacebuilders”, in Ho Won Jeong, *The New Agenda for Peace Research*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1999, 13–42. The permission to republish this text was granted on 25 September 2012 by Mr. Keith Towndrow of Ashgate Publishing Ltd. in the UK.

Fig. 3.1 The peacebuilders' tool chest



is to offer an orderly context in which to learn about the twenty-four tools and the fact that they are functionally interrelated.

It must be understood that new tools do not necessarily make old tools useless or irrelevant. All twenty-four are presently perceived to be useful by some, for coping with at least some kinds of peace problems. Thus, the challenge for the peacebuilder is to analyse a specific threat to peace and to decide which set of tools might be relevant for that situation. Of course, this can only be done in the light of knowledge about (1) the historical and social context of a specific threat to peace, and (2) the strengths and weaknesses of all available tools. We certainly know that all tools, when employed inappropriately, can make things worse, and even do great damage.

3.1 Our Nineteenth Century Heritage

As we entered the 20th century, the state system had *Diplomacy* (1), a significant human achievement that deserves considerable credit for the fact that states have peaceful relations with others much of the time. The system of embassies that each country has in the capitals of other countries has developed over many centuries. Formerly consisting primarily of career diplomats representing their Foreign Ministry, now many embassies include representatives of other government departments responsible for health, labour, education, trade, environment, etc. Of course, this expansion of diplomatic representation reflects the impact of new technologies on relations between states.

There are significant limitations in the capacity of the inter-state diplomatic system to permit sustained contact among all states. Large states have embassies in virtually all other states—some 185. And all of the smaller states tend to have embassies in the large states. But many smaller states cannot afford to have permanent embassies in all other states, and sometimes they may not really need

permanent representation in distant small states. Instead, one embassy may be accredited to a number of states in a region. Thus, it is important to understand that there are limitations in the capacity of the diplomatic system to sustain linkage among all states.

Although we have emphasised that the inter-state diplomatic system preserves peace most of the time, nevertheless disputes do arise and create situations in which states fear aggression by others. In such cases, Balance of Power (2) may be used to deter aggression. In the sense in which we are using the term, the employment of balance of power means that a state attempts to acquire sufficient military and related capacity to deter aggression, or attempts to deter aggression by making alliances with other states. In some cases, when balance of power is employed as a deterrent, it does indeed deter aggression. On the other hand, reciprocal application of balance of power does sometimes lead to arms races. Many believed that balance of power and accompanying arms races contributed significantly to the outbreak of World War I.

In the aftermath of World War I, states created the first world organisation (members from Africa, Asia, Europe and North and South America) devoted to preserving peace. As many as 63 states became members of this League of Nations, but there were never more than 58 members at any one time. Although the League only made modest contributions to restraining inter-state violence, as the first world 'laboratory' devoted to inter-state peace, it made significant contributions toward the development of the United Nations in 1945.

3.2 The League of Nations Covenant

The League of Nations Covenant, which came into force in 1920, provided members with three main peace tools. First, Collective Security (3) was devised to overcome the weaknesses of balance of power as a deterrent to aggression. Collective Security obligated all who were members of the League to undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. Those who advocated collective security believed that the pledge of all to resist aggression by any member would be such an overwhelming deterrent that none would have reasonable ground for fearing aggression. But the obvious common sense of collective security in the abstract ignores that all may not be able or willing to resist aggression by any other member. This may be explained by longstanding friendships and alliances and perhaps by fear of retribution by powerful neighbours. Also, when the aggressor is very powerful, the practice of collective security in the pursuit of peace may produce an even larger war than the initial aggression. For reasons such as these, collective security did not prevent aggression by Germany, Japan, and Italy that led to World War II.

The second main peace tool in the League Covenant was Peaceful Settlement (4), intended to prevent the outbreak of violence in those instances when routine

diplomacy fails to do so. In cases where a dispute may 'lead to a rupture', the Covenant requires states to 'submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the [League] Council'. In other words, members involved in a dispute agree to involve certain 'third parties' when they alone cannot control escalating hostility. In employing third parties, states are drawing on human experience in a variety of other contexts: labour-management disputes, disputes between buyers and sellers, marital disputes, etc. In giving third party approaches a place in the Covenant, the League obviously drew on earlier provisions for employment of third parties developed in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

The third main peace tool in the Covenant was Disarmament/Arms Control (5). Some who believed that arms races had contributed to the outbreak of World War I thought that elimination, or at least reduction, of arms would enhance chances for peace. This was an effort to codify disarmament and arms control proposals that had been advanced in earlier times. Although Covenant provisions for disarmament/arms control never fulfilled the aspirations of advocates, they did provoke the negotiation of numerous arms control measures in the 1930s. These provided valuable experience, and also a great deal of scepticism, for those who would again face similar circumstances after World War II.

3.3 The United Nations Charter

Following World War II the victorious states once again endeavoured to create a world organisation that would maintain peace. When the United Nations Charter was drafted in San Francisco in 1945, it once again incorporated collective security, peaceful settlement and disarmament/arms control. Experience under the Covenant led to strengthening of collective security by explicitly providing for procedures through which members would make armed forces available for collective security response, and a Military Staff Committee that would plan for the use of these forces and advise and assist the Security Council in their employment. In some respects, means for pacific settlement are more fully defined. Although disarmament/arms control is again made available, the Charter emphasises it less than the Covenant, But the most significant differences between the Covenant and the Charter consist of the addition of three peace tools. The first was Functionalism (6) in which states cooperate in efforts to solve common economic and social problems that might disrupt normal relationships and even lead to violence. Drafters of the Charter had in mind examples such as worldwide depression in the 1930s and the inability of states to collaborate in coping with this disaster. The depression led to strikes, extreme social unrest and violence in many countries and significantly contributed to the development of totalitarian governments and aggression in some cases. Emphasis on economic and social cooperation in the Charter is signified by the creation of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) alongside the Security Council (responsible for collective security) which had been the only council in the League. ECOSOC was created 'with a

view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations...’ Its mission includes the achievement of higher standards of living, full employment, solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems and international cultural and educational cooperation. At the same time, ECOSOC has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of some 30 agencies in the UN system with responsibility for health, labour, education, development, environment, population, trade, atomic energy and a number of other global problems.

It is very important that we appreciate the; degree; to which the League ‘laboratory’ provided the knowledge and experience that led to the significant place that economic and social cooperation is given in the UN Charter. Although the League Covenant gave relatively slight attention to economic and social activities/in practice, the League became significantly involved in a great number of economic and social issues. Indeed, as the days of the League drew to an end before World War II, proposals had already been made to create a League economic and social council.

The second peace tool added by the UN Charter was Self- Determination (7). Here again the UN built on League experience. In granting independence to many nations formerly in the defeated Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the World War I peace settlements recognised self-determination as a tool for building future peace. In addition, parts of the former Ottoman Empire outside of Europe and other colonies of defeated states were placed under a Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, including Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in the Middle East; Cameroons, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanganyika, Togoland, Somaliland and Southwest Africa in Africa; and areas in the Pacific. These territories were administered by states that were members of the victorious coalition, with some attaining independence before World War II. It is very important that the Mandate system established reporting procedures through which administering powers were responsible to the members of the League. This laid the foundation for later growth in the belief that those governing colonies have some responsibilities to the rest of the world. In the UN Charter, the Mandates were called Trusteeships, and placed under a third Council, the Trusteeship Council. But most important for self-determination in the Charter was inclusion of a ‘Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories’, which covered the many overseas colonies not under trusteehip. This Declaration asserts that those administering colonies are obligated ‘to develop self-government... and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions...’

Eventually this Declaration provided the foundation for prodding the overseas colonial powers to begin relinquishing control of their colonies. This led to the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ by the General Assembly in 1960. Both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly played a very significant role in the largely peaceful dismantling of overseas empires. In this respect, self-determination has proven to be a very useful peace tool. This remarkable transformation of the inter-state system more than doubled the number of independent states and the number of UN members.

Now the world confronts a new generation of self-determination demands by peoples in multi-nation states (as in Yugoslavia) and in multi-state nations (e.g., the Kurds). The UN system desperately needs to establish procedures whereby the legitimacy of these claims can be assessed, before severe disruption and violence occur. At the same time, those making self-determination claims deemed to be legitimate must guarantee the rights of minorities that are inevitably present in all political units. The numerous cases in which unscrupulous leaders employ self-determination strategies for personal gain is but one example of the fact that peace tools, as well as all other tools, can be used for both noble and depraved purposes.

The third peace tool added by the UN Charter was Human Rights (8). Although these words were never used in the League Covenant, human rights are mentioned seven times in the Charter, including the second sentence of the Preamble which announces determination ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’. As in the case of economic and social cooperation, the Charter states that human rights shall be promoted in order to ‘create conditions and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations...’ Building on the brief references to human rights in the Charter, the UN General Assembly soon produced the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1947 which is now widely accepted as part of international common law and has even been applied by domestic courts in a number of states.

In order to strengthen the legal status of the Declaration, its principles were, in 1966, put in treaty form by the General Assembly, as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, an array of more specialised treaties have been developed on genocide, racial discrimination, women’s rights, children’s rights, forced labour, cruel and inhumane punishment, rights of refugees and other human rights problems. All of these help to prevent the creation of unacceptable conditions of human depravity that may lead to severe unrest and even fighting.

Readers have noted that in [Fig. 2.1](#) peace tools 1–5 are placed in the category Negative Peace and tools 6–8 are in the category Positive Peace. Put in the simplest terms, Negative Peace is achieved by stopping violence. Positive Peace is achieved by building societies and inter-state relationships that do not generate conditions likely to precipitate violence or other causes of human suffering and deprivation. The first tends to depend largely on the expertise and activities of professional diplomatic and military people. The second draws on expertise in a diversity of professions coping with economic and social problems. The distinctive character of negative peace and positive peace cannot be pushed too far because they are intertwined. But it is important to understand that in this century practitioners learned that in applying tools that focused mainly on stopping the violence, or directly preventing it from breaking out, they often found themselves confronting overwhelming escalations of violence that could not be stopped. In other words, they learned that they were too late and realised that something should have been done earlier to cope with underlying causes of violence, before things got out of hand. This led to supplementing those peace

tools employing a more negative peace emphasis with those more focused on positive peace.

Because the concept of power used to define power politics, super power and world power are frequently employed, in works on international relations, it is useful to point out that our 20th century journey in the quest for peace has greatly expanded the instruments through which power can be exercised. This concept has been frequently associated with one kind of power, military power. Kenneth Boulding insightfully drew our attention to ‘the three faces of power’: (1) threat power—the power to destroy, (2) economic power—the power to produce and exchange, and (3) integrative power—the power to create such relations as love, respect, friendship and legitimacy (Boulding 1989). The peace tools invented in the 20th century apply a diversity of forms of economic and integrative power. Thus, self-determination employs the power of legitimacy in the quest for peace, and functionalism employs a variety of kinds of integrative power. In other words, our quest for peace has revealed that power employed in problem solving is often more effective than threat power.

3.4 United Nations Practice 1950–1989

The post-World War II context in which the United Nations emerged provided two severe challenges to those attempting to apply the six peace tools incorporated into the Charter. First, the East–West conflict escalated into confrontation between two military blocs: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. The Charter assumed that these states would collaborate in the Security Council in employing peaceful settlement and collective security in order to preserve peace. But instead, the ‘policemen’ threatened world war with each other and became indirectly involved in conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. There was particular danger that conflicts in the Middle East and the Congo (Zaire) would escalate into a world war. As a response, Peacekeeping (9) was invented. Although some variations have been employed, peacekeeping essentially involves a cease-fire, followed by the creation of a demilitarised corridor on each side of a truce line. This neutral corridor is patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force.

Peacekeeping is fundamentally different from collective security in several respects. Peacekeeping forces require the permission of states on whose territory they are based. Although big powers have provided logistical support, until quite recently the troops normally come from smaller states deemed to be politically acceptable by the parties to the conflict. The troops normally only carry small arms that are used in self-defence. Their primary protection is the fact that their blue helmets and the UN emblems on their jeeps are given legitimacy by the members of the UN under whose authority they are acting. UN peacekeeping forces have successfully kept peace in the Congo (Zaire), the Middle East, Cyprus and other places for many years. But there has not been equal success in resolving the conflicts that have made them necessary.

The second post-war challenge to the UN was the struggle for, and acquisition of self-determination by overseas colonies of European-based empires. This not only transformed the inter-state system but also brought fundamental changes in the United Nations. There was rapid doubling of UN membership, largely by addition of new members from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands. Widespread poverty has been very significant in most of the new states, thus creating a deeper gulf between rich and poor UN members. Other terms applied to the two groups have been Developed Countries (DC) and Less Developed Countries (LDC). Also the term Third World has often been used for the poor countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as distinguished from the First World (free market, industrialised countries) and Second World (Soviet bloc).

Prodded by the growing divide between the rich and the poor in the United Nations, the three peace tools developed out of UN practice were largely a product of growing insight on the relevance of economic conditions and relationships for peace. Economic Development (10) became a growing policy concern both within the UN and outside. The basic idea was that the rich-poor gap could be diminished if the rich countries provided development aid to the poor countries so that they could 'take off and become developed. It tended to be assumed that development in Third World countries should be patterned after the industrialised countries of Europe and North America. Emphasis was placed on heavy industry and economic infrastructure such as roads, railroads, airports and dams. In earlier efforts, food and agriculture tended to be given low priority. Aid was primarily provided by special development loan funds and technical assistance programmes that emphasised the transfer of know-how, often through providing technical experts and the tools they require. Economic development programmes were established not only by UN agencies and regional international governmental organisations but also by governments in industrialised countries. It was frequently argued that the multilateral programmes of the UN and other international organisations were more fruitful because they were more likely to be based on economic development criteria, but that bilateral programmes tended to be less economically productive because they tended to be more shaped by bilateral political factors.

Many people would argue that both bilateral and multilateral economic development programmes have often contributed to peace by diminishing poverty. But overall they did not diminish the rich-poor gap in the world. Indeed, as economic development programmes grew in the 1950s and 1960s, the rich-poor gap continued to grow. Critics of these development programmes began to argue that the gap was growing because of the nature of the economic relations between the developed countries and the Third World. In other words, they attributed the growth in the rich-poor gap to the international economic structure in which countries in the Third World were perceived to be dependent upon industrialised countries. From this perspective, it was seen that the growth in the gap would continue until this dependency relationship was overcome.

This led to Third World demands for International Economic Equity (11). The Third World movement for a more equitable international economic system was centred in (1) the Non-Aligned Movement, an organisation of some 100 countries

from all parts of the world that were neither aligned with NATO states nor Warsaw Pact states and in (2) the United Nations conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The latter began as a UN conference in 1964 and later became a permanent UN organisation, with headquarters in Geneva. The Third World caucus in UNCTAD came to be known as the ‘Group of IT’ although it eventually included some 120 states. In these two organisations the Third World devised a programme for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Among their demands were (1) stabilisation of the prices of Third World commodities (coffee, tea, cocoa, etc.) in order to build a predictable economic base for development programmes, (2) pegging the price of these commodities to the price of manufactured products which the Third World buys from industrialised countries, (3) access of Third World products to First World markets, (4) Third World access to technology useful in their development programmes, and (5) international regulation of the activities of transnational corporations in Third World countries.

As revealed in the name of the new UN agency, UNCTAD, the basic thrust of these demands were that development aid would be less necessary in an international economy structured so that the Third World could ‘earn a living*’. Instead, it was asserted that the international economy is structured so that the benefits pile up in corporate headquarters and banks in industrialised countries, thus making it necessary for Third World countries to seek aid. Unfortunately, from a Third World perspective, although an extensive campaign was waged in the UN General Assembly for NIEO principles, for the most part, industrialised countries were very unresponsive. This has generated considerable animosity in the Third World as the gap between the rich and the poor continues to grow. At the same time, there was puzzlement over the apparent inability of the Third World to reach the people of industrialised countries with the reasonableness of their appeal. For example, there was a tendency for the press in the United States to picture Third World demands in the General Assembly as reckless demands for special privileges by an ‘African-Asian-Latin American horde’ which was not grateful for all of the aid that they had received.

Frustration over failure to convince people in industrialised countries about the justness of their NIEO appeal contributed to the demands of the Third World for International Communications Equity (12). Observing that the headquarters of the world news agencies (United Press, Associated Press, Reuters, etc.) were in industrialised countries, and citing examples of biased Third World reporting, Third World countries began to ask for a New International Information and Communications Order (NIICO). The demands for the NIICO was also stimulated by technological change in communication. In particular, using communication satellites in geostationary orbit makes it possible to reach into every country and virtually any village in the world. Of course, this technology has been developed, and is largely controlled, by giant communications corporations headquartered in industrialised countries.

The struggle for the NIICO has been largely waged in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), with its headquarters in Paris. This dispute illuminates how technological change may transform

the context in which a peace tool is applied and thereby generate conflict in its definition and use. The UNESCO Constitution, adopted in London in November 1945, asserted 'that ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause... of that suspicion and mistrust between peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war'. The Constitution asserted that these conditions could be overcome through education, pursuit of objective truth and 'the free exchange of ideas and knowledge'. The last would be employed 'for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives'. In practice, what was believed to be the essential spirit of these worlds was incorporated into the words 'free flow of communication'.

But as newly independent peoples in the Third World became increasingly sensitive to the quality of their recently won political independence, they developed a growing awareness of the one-way international flow of news, radio and TV broadcasts, films, books and magazines. Out of this dissatisfaction came a replacement for the earlier 'free flow' slogan: 'free and balanced flow of communication'. But how is 'balance' to be achieved while still remaining 'free'? This is a vitally important peace issue that must be resolved through international dialogue and debate. Ways must be found to structure communications in such a way that they foster peace rather than produce deeply felt animosity.

Although environmental issues have been a significant human problem at least since the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century, Ecological Balance (13) became a widely recognised problem in world relations as a result of the UN Environment Conference held in Stockholm in 1972. But at this time there was tendency for industrialised countries to take the lead and for Third World countries to see it as a strategy to prevent them from industrialising too—thus as a way to keep them poor. But by the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, all parts of the world agreed that ecological balance is a problem confronted by all peoples. Furthermore, whereas in 1972 very few tended to see ecological balance as a dimension of peace, this perspective is now widely shared.

The relationship between ecological balance and peace can be viewed from at least two perspectives. One perspective achieved widespread visibility during the UNCED Conference when disputes erupted about (1) who is responsible for global pollution, (2) which ecological problems should receive priority and (3) who should pay 'to clean up the mess'. In the context of growing pollution, and increasing sensitivity to the negative effects of pollution, these questions are likely to create increasing conflict in the future. Particularly acrimonious at the UNCED Conference was the debate between representatives of industrialised and Third World countries. The Third World drew attention to the fact that industrialised countries are the primary polluters. From this, they conclude that industrialised countries should accept special responsibility for paying for programmes to restore ecological balance. At the same time, Third World countries point out that these same countries have enjoyed the benefits of industrialisation while polluting air, water and land. Therefore, if Third World countries are to be deprived of the opportunity to develop in the same way as industrialised countries, but are to

employ more costly approaches, industrialised countries have an obligation to provide financial support for ‘sustainable development’.

A second perspective on the peace-ecological balance is that by disrupting normal relationships between specific human beings and their environment, pollution directly produces peacelessness for these people. In some cases, as with the destruction of the habitat of people in rain forests with bulldozers and explosives, it is as quick and devastating as war. The rapidly growing intrusion of new technologies on the commons makes provisions for Governance for the Commons (14) an increasingly significant peace issue. By the commons we refer to areas outside the territorial boundaries of states that tend to be assumed to be spaces available to all, a term early associated with the village green in the centre of small towns and also city parks. In the international context, the oceans and space are generally thought of as commons, and many would add Antarctica. We shall use the example of the oceans in our brief discussion, an exceedingly significant commons because it covers 70 % of the surface of the globe. Before the days of more intrusive technology, the two main issues in the ocean commons tended to be establishing agreed upon borders of states, early set at a three mile limit, and insuring ‘freedom on the seas’ in all of the rest of the oceans. But new technologies for ocean transit, fishing, drilling for gas and oil, mining minerals on the seabed and ocean research—as well as increased use of the oceans as dumping grounds for waste produced on land—have raised a host of new problems with respect to the ocean commons.

A historic step in building positive peace was taken in 1982 with the completion of a comprehensive treaty for governance of the oceans, the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty. Completed after 10 years of negotiation, a US negotiator, Elliott Richardson, called it the single most important development in international law since the drafting of the UN Charter. The treaty provides a new organisation in the UN system, the International Seabed Authority, with its own Assembly, Council and Secretariat, as well as an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and a branch to oversee the mining of manganese nodules on the sea bed. The International Seabed Authority became fully operational as an autonomous international organisation in June 1996, with headquarters in Kingston, Jamaica. The treaty also offers new approaches for peaceful settlement of disputes. Not only are there provisions for getting quick decisions from the International Tribunal, but states involved in a dispute are offered four different options for working toward a settlement: the International Tribunal, the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal provided for in the treaty and special arbitral tribunals consisting of experts in the issue under dispute. If parties to a dispute cannot jointly agree on one of these four methods, they are then obliged to accept arbitration.

3.5 United Nations Practice 1990: Present

As the United Nations and its member states have responded to a number of international crises in the changed political context of the post-Cold War period, two additional peace tools have emerged out of the ‘laboratories’ of experience.

Humanitarian Intervention (15) has evolved largely unannounced because it has often been called peacekeeping—as exemplified by interventions in Somalia and Rwanda—although it is a fundamentally different kind of peace tool. Humanitarian intervention differs from peacekeeping in that it may take place without the permission of the state involved, and thus it is occasionally referred to as Chap. 6 3/4, placing it between peacekeeping and Chap. 7 enforcement. Recent humanitarian interventions include the UN Observer Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), UN Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). In these operations the Security Council authorised a group of states to deploy military forces outside the UN context. But in other cases, including Somalia and Yugoslavia, enforcement was entrusted by the Security Council to the Secretary General or another international organisation such as NATO. Arend and Beck (1993, pp. 113–14) define humanitarian intervention as ‘the use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect rights violations there’. It occurs within the borders of the target state without their explicit consent. Väyrynen, after citing the Arend and Beck definition of humanitarian intervention, reports that there is growing opinion that international law permits access to crisis areas in which egregious violation of human rights override domestic jurisdiction. Here, of course, he refers to the provision in Article 2(7) of the Charter prohibiting intervention ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ (Väyrynen 1998, pp. 61–62).

But humanitarian intervention can also be used to prevent escalation of a domestic dispute that would jeopardise the security of other states. In this case, support of the Charter is easier, since these cases would seem to come under Article 39 of Chap. 7 which applies to ‘threats’ to peace. In the case of application of enforcement measures under Chap. 7, Article 2(7) does not apply. But some might say that humanitarian crises seem to ‘endanger’ peace rather than be a ‘threat’ to it, calling for use of Chap. 6. By using Article 39, ‘threat’ to peace, N.D. White thinks that the Security Council has stretched the concept to meet humanitarian needs, and has developed a new political and legal justification for quick enforcement against ‘rogue’ states (White 1993, pp. 38–49, cited by Väyrynen 1998, p. 63). Although the development of humanitarian intervention as an acceptable peace tool is still in process, it seems to be widely acceptable that the limits of Article 2(7) have been considerably narrowed in practice, and in legal definitions.

There is a widespread commentary declaring that one of the prime failures in world politics has been the tendency of states, and inter-state organisations, to respond to crises rather than to anticipate and work to prevent them. Kittani (1995) reports that Boutros-Ghali presided over major innovations for institutionalising Preventative Diplomacy (16) in the UN Secretariat. They include the creation of regional desks within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) charged with responsibility of monitoring developments around the world, creation of Task Forces on peace operations, and interdepartmental working groups. In his *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali defines preventive diplomacy as ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’. For Boutros-Ghali, preventive diplomacy requires three elements: measures to create

confidence, early warning based on information gathering, and informal or formal fact-finding. 'It may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarised zones' (Boutros-Ghali 1998, pp. 46–51).

Not surprisingly, fact finding and early warning are emphasised by many practitioners and scholars. Some note the importance of information collected by the Secretary General in his contacts with governments, and with others, and his power to dispatch special envoys (Boutros-Ghali 1995, pp. 47–48). The Commission on Global Governance welcomes the greater freedom the Secretary General now has to dispatch missions, but is concerned that he does not have the resources for doing the job (Commission on Global Governance 1995, p. 99). There is increasing recognition that the kind of fact finding that is needed for competent early warning would have to draw systematically on the information resources of the entire UN system. Boutros-Ghali has drawn attention to the valuable UN networks of information on the environment, nuclear accidents, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, and threats of famine and disease. He underlines the need to synthesise these sources with political indicators, to assess threats to peace that they suggest, and to analyse action that might be taken (Boutros-Ghali 1995, pp. 48–49).

3.6 Non-Governmental Organisations and People's Movements

The final drawer in the tool chest outlined in Fig. 3.1 consists of nongovernmental organisations and people's movements. The term nongovernmental organisation (NGO) is a concept evolving out of international organisation research and practice to distinguish inter-state organisations such as the UN that have governments of states as members from international organisations whose members consist of national associations or individuals that are not government officials. Prominent examples are organisations such as the international professional associations (doctors and lawyers), international scholarly associations (political scientists and sociologists), international religious organisations (virtually all faiths and denominations), and international organisations focusing on specific issues such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and World Federation of Mental Health. NGOs made up of members from a number of countries are often referred to as International NGOs (INGOs). More than 4,000 INGOs mirror virtually all those to be found within single countries. Many INGO movements arise to address specific peace issues such as disarmament, poverty, human rights and ecological balance. At times, these movements are coalitions of already existing NGOs and INGOs but they may also include, and may be led by, others who become mobilised in response to a specific issue. Thus, because of considerable overlap, we combine NGOs, INGOs and peoples movements in our discussion.

The growing involvement of people outside of government in world affairs, in general, and peace issues, in particular, can be broadly described as People's

organisations (PO). POs have mobilised people for peace action by bringing pressure on governments to employ all of the peace tools that we have enumerated. For example, during the Cold War, it was often peace movements that kept disarmament and arms control on the public agenda at times when governments of both of the superpowers seemed disinterested. Many organisations have had sustained involvement in movements advocating economic aid and adjustment in international economic practices. Many would assert that the towering achievements in drafting and embryonic efforts¹ at monitoring international human rights standards have been attained largely because of sustained PO initiatives and pressure on individual states and UN organisations. At the same time, many would give POs considerable credit for placing environmental issues high on the global agenda. Reflections of this were the widely reported activities of the assembled POs from all over the world at the UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

POs have also been the inventors and advocates of at least eight new peace tools. It must be made clear that these do not replace tools already employed, but they do illuminate weaknesses of old tools, or the fact that there is no tool for coping with specific causes of peacelessness. Second Track Diplomacy (17) addresses the limitations of diplomacy and peaceful settlement by recognising that negotiations stalled or broken off by governmental representatives may be revived by initiatives outside of government. Consisting at least, in part, of people outside of government, this approach offers a 'second track' that may reach into alternative representatives of governments, often at a lower level. This approach has been advocated and employed largely by scholars, often including those who have had wide governmental experience.

One form of second track diplomacy originated by an Australian diplomat turned scholar, John Burton (1990), is given the name 'problem solving workshop'. Burton is concerned that representatives of states often do not resolve conflicts, but tend instead to arrange settlements that 'paper over' underlying grievances which will be the source of escalating conflict in the future. This is because representatives of states sometimes do not adequately represent the needs of all that will be affected by the settlement. To overcome this shortcoming, problem solving workshops assemble both governmental and non-governmental people who can widely represent the needs of all parties, including those not adequately represented by representatives of states. The workshops consist of meetings between these people and social scientists who help them to probe deeply into the basic roots of the conflict, stimulate dialogue between the parties in search of mutually acceptable solutions and introduce social science insights where they are deemed to be useful. Burton is particularly reluctant to have these social scientists pose solutions because he believes that viable solutions must come from the participants themselves. Not all practitioners of this approach share Burton's reluctance. This approach has been widely practised in international disputes, including Cyprus, the Middle East, Northern Ireland and the Argentine-British war over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

The exceedingly slow progress in disarmament/arms control negotiations has provoked the development of four approaches that could, in some instance,

be viewed as supplements to negotiations and, in others as substitutes. These approaches sometimes diminish the need for specific kinds of weapons and, at other times, attempt to offer nonviolent substitutes for weapons.

Conversion (18) is targeted at the conversion of military production to that which satisfies civilian needs, such as housing, appliances, etc. This approach tends to illuminate the domestic sources of arms races in that arms production is often advocated as a way to create jobs for factory workers, engineers and researchers. It follows that the communities, in which those employed in arms development and production live, come to depend on arms production to keep the local economy prosperous. But arms production as a means for providing employment may, of course, contribute to arms races by provoking other countries into responding by building more weapons. Conversion plans, drafted largely by POs in local communities, advocate ways in which more jobs can be created through investment in civilian production than through less labour-intensive military production.

In the 20th century, the explosive power and geographical reach of weapons have increased to the point where virtually any place on earth might be reached with a nuclear missile. On the other hand, it is those who have this long-range destructive capacity that are most fearful that they may be destroyed. Why? Because Country A that has long-range nuclear weapons fears that Country B might destroy its weapons with their nuclear weapons. Why? Because Country B fears that Country A might make a 'first strike' against its weapons. To overcome the fact that those with the most powerful offensive weapons are least secure, some advocate Defensive Defence (19), that is, defence employing weapons that are defensive in nature. This approach has largely been advocated by POs and scholars in Europe.

There is no doubt that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between defensive arms and offensive arms. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that some arms, such as intercontinental missiles, aircraft carriers and long-range bombers, have obvious offensive capacity. Other weapons, such as land mines and fixed shore batteries, can be employed in a strictly defensive capacity. In certain respects, weapons between these extremes could be used for either offence or defence. But it cannot be denied that certain arms are essentially defensive, such as short-range mechanised forces, interception aircraft and mobile anti-aircraft missiles (Fischer 1984, pp. 47–62). Combined with other peace tools, efforts of State A to present a defensive posture to State B diminishes the fear of State B that A will be aggressive. This approach motivates states to acquire understanding, more than they often do, of how their weapons are perceived, and the consequences of this perception. At the same time, the defensive defence approach may stimulate arms designers to employ new technology in the design of weapons that are convincingly limited to defensive purposes. Instead, it would seem that up to this point new technology has largely been directed toward bigger and bigger weapons with ever more distant reach.

Nonviolence (20), used by POs in the pursuit of social change, can be viewed as a substitute for the use of arms. Employment of nonviolence diminishes the need

for police, and military forces employed for internal security within a state, to use their weapons. This can diminish the need for and employment of armed forces in countries where the military are expected to make a significant contribution to maintaining internal order. Indeed, much of the arms trade in the world is less motivated by the fear of neighbouring states than by the fear of internal uprisings.

Presently there is a growing interest in nonviolence throughout the world as an increasing number of people acquire first-hand knowledge of the failure of the employment of arms to bring peace. Significant is the way in which nonviolence training gives those involved penetrating understanding of reasons for the often thoughtless impulse to respond with violence when provoked by others, and the long-term negative consequences of responding with violence. At the same time, they learn reasons why nonviolent responses are more likely to receive nonviolent responses in return. This restrains the launching of violence spirals which escalate into ever larger violent reactions.

Unfortunately, many people still tend to wrongly perceive nonviolent action as passive. Instead nonviolence actively engages in conflict, but without inflicting violence on others and without violating its fundamental values. This strategy is based on the insight that social change created by violence may establish institutions of violence that outlast the revolution and may put in power people who habitually use violence. Those who advocate nonviolence first try to reach opponents through petition, argument and discussion. If that fails, direct action such as non-cooperation with authorities, civil disobedience and fasting may be employed. But fundamental is the consistent recognition of opponents as fellow human beings. As stated by Gandhi in his campaign against British imperialism: 'Whilst we may attack measures and systems, we may not, must not attack men. Imperfect ourselves, we must be tender towards others and slow to impute motives' (Ambler 1990, p. 201).

Citizen Defence (21) is closely related to nonviolence employed for social change, but this tool employs nonviolent techniques for national defence. Citizen defence goes one step further than defensive defence by also eliminating defensive weapons. Fundamental to civilian defence is deterrence through convincing a potential invader that there would be no payoff from invasion. Instead there would be a struggle in which the invader would be continually challenged. Citizen defence requires large scale, well-publicised organisation and planning for massive refusal to cooperate with the invader's military government. Police would refuse to arrest local patriots; teachers would refuse to introduce the invader's propaganda; workers would use strikes and delays to obstruct the invaders from acquiring their needs. Politicians, civil servants and judges would ignore the invaders' orders. Local plans would be made to maintain local media, schools and other local services.

This kind of resistance would have to be backed up by underground broadcasting stations and presses, storage for food, medicine, water and fuel, and plans for dispersion of people to places where these facilities would be located. Gene Sharp, a strong civilian defence advocate and strategist asserts that 'nonviolent action resembles military war more than it does negotiation; it is a technique of struggle.

As such, nonviolent action involves the use of power' (Sharp 1970, p. 21). At the same time, it requires patriots with courage, ingenuity, tenacity and unusual creativity.

People who have lived their entire life in societies in which there is an unquestioned reflex in which violence is responded to with violence frequently have difficulty in accepting the fact that nonviolent defence makes sense. But the argument for nonviolent defence is persuasive enough that it must be included in any peace-makers' tool box. After all, there is always the possibility that military defence will be perceived as potentially aggressive. What often begins as truly defensive precautions may inadvertently involve a state in an arms race. At the same time, arms production and employment always takes resources that could be devoted to human needs. Furthermore, armed defence in modern war almost always results in the destruction of cities, their populations and the economic and social infrastructure. These costs and likely consequences of military defence impel us to approach, with an open mind, an alternative that does not in any way threaten neighbours and that is focused primarily on defence of life and social institutions.

Sharp reports that there have been many instances of effective nonviolent defence, such as early resistance by American colonists, 1773–1775; Hungarian passive resistance against Austrian rule, 1850–1867; Finland's disobedience and non-cooperation with the Russians, 1898–1905; and resistance in several Nazi-occupied countries, especially Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark (Sharp 1970, p. 20).

Self-Reliance (22) emerged as a peace tool in the context of a dialogue focused primarily on the economic dimensions of peace which evolved from functionalism, to economic development, to international economic equity—each successive approach attempting to cope with limitations of preceding approaches. Some critics of the New International Economic Order's approach to obtaining international economic equity are critical of its emphasis on creating a more equitable trading system. They observe that this would tend to increase the utilisation of land in rural areas of the Third World for producing agricultural exports, thereby requiring those tilling small farms to become employees of large plantations. Thus, the rural masses would become dependent on trade in an international economic system in which profits would tend to gravitate to owners of agricultural industries, thereby increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. At the same time, rural people would become increasingly dependent on external sources for food and other necessities that had been produced at home. In making this argument, critics of the NIEO cite, as examples, African areas—formerly self-sufficient in food production—which now import food from abroad. Of course, the drastic change in local economies foreseen would also lead to equally dramatic changes in local culture which is intertwined with the local economy.

A very significant contribution of the self-reliance critique is that it shifts attention to the consequences of international economic relationships for the mass of individuals. It asks: what will the impact of economic development and international economic equity strategies be which are designed and implemented by decisions in national capitals, on the mass of individuals who have not participated in

making these decisions? By raising these questions, insight is gained with respect to the fact that, although our discussions of peace tend to focus on relations between leaders of states and nations, the presence or absence of peace is most accurately measured by the degree to which the masses are experiencing peace in their daily lives.

Emphasised is the fact that self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency, or the absence of trade, but it does mean 'reliance on oneself to the point that your own capabilities are so well developed that if a crisis should occur, then one could be self-sufficient'. Galtung is particularly concerned when a local community, country or region does not make sufficient use of its own potential but submits to long-term economic exchange in which primary products are exchanged for manufactured goods. In this case, he sees that there is enduring acceptance of a long-term inferior position in which it will be difficult to satisfy the basic needs of local people (Galtung, pp. 12–13).

Self-reliance is a useful example of the degree to which there are connections and overlaps between peace tools. We have already noted that self-reliance challenges development practices that might frustrate the full development of individual human potential and that might contribute to conflict produced by growing disparities in wealth. At the same time, self-reliance shares much with self-determination, although in this case, it is not applied to nationality and ethnic groups but to individual human beings and diverse economic units; Also, self-reliance, in its pursuit of human fulfilment, pursues some of the same goals as human rights, particularly those considered to be economic and social.

The *Feminist Perspective* (23) is particularly useful in shedding light on the degree to which values associated with militarism and military organisations permeate societies and how this came to be. At the same time, the feminist perspective provides a vision of alternative kinds of societies. It is necessary to consider the feminist perspective as a separate tool because women's perspectives and experiences have been largely omitted in most works on international relations and peace. One need not be a female in order to approach human behaviour with a feminist perspective, but there is no doubt that the actual experiences of women has sharpened their perceptions and understanding of the roots of violence. This understanding is provoked by the violence experienced by women from the hands of men within societies, through rape and family violence. At the same time, it is women, and their children, who suffer most extensively from militarization and war. This includes not only the growing destruction of civilian societies by war but also the diversion of resources away from the needs of families into military weapons and organisations. Not insignificant is the fact that these military organisations are male-dominated and that they were created by political and military decisions made almost exclusively by men.

The feminist perspective takes note of male dependence on violence within societies, as a means for satisfaction of needs, for solving problems and for signalling individual significance and identity. Why are these attributes so prevalent in men and rare in women? Why are they much more prevalent in some cultures than in others? Why are they so prevalent in some men but not in others? In responding

to these questions, feminists conclude that the tendency to employ violence as a tool for coping with problems in human relationships is learned through early socialisation of males in certain cultures. They are taught that to be a man, you must be aggressive and respond to provocative frustrations with violence. Not to reply with violence is not to be in control and to deny one's 'manhood'. This form of socialisation is then easily transferred in response to disappointments and frustrations in relations between gangs, between labour and management, and readily applied to questions of national and international peace and security.

Thus the fundamental contributions of the feminist perspective as a peace tool are (1) to question the inevitability of violence as a tool in the pursuit of peace and security, (2) to illuminate its negative consequences and (3) to provoke thought about where the roots of the 'violence habit' are to be found. From this, it follows that 'a feminist world security system would attempt to include all people and all nations based on a notion of extended kinship including the entire human family' (Reardon 1990, pp. 138–139). It is very significant that the last question directs our attention, beyond arenas of inter-state conflict, to the daily life of individual societies, including our own.

In other words, the feminist vision of a peaceful world tends to begin with family and kinship relations and then extends the quality of these mutually nurturing relationships to the world; It is less inclined to make unquestioned assumptions about the need for a state/military apparatus to oversee these world relationships. Of course, once again, we are encountering an overlap with peace tools already presented. In essence, the feminist perspective offers insight on the need for positive peace tools. In this sense, the feminist perspective confirms and supports the need for peace tools such as nonviolence, self-reliance, economic equity and human rights. On the one hand, some have achieved their understanding of the need for these tools through experiences in the struggle for peace that revealed the shortcomings of negative peace tools, and of some positive peace tools as well. On the other hand, others (feminists) have attained similar insights by understanding the experiences of women in everyday life as well as in times of war. Of overwhelming importance is the fact that the feminist perspective not only illuminates the need for certain positive peace tools; feminine practice throughout the world also demonstrates that they work!

Peace Education (24) can be viewed as the obvious candidate to be the last tool to be presented because it obviously comprises all that has gone before. But it is certainly not last in importance. Indeed, the successful employment of all that we have learned about peacebuilding in the 20th century is dependent on peace education. Now broadened interdependence has directly involved everybody in diverse human enterprises that either contribute to or detract from peaceful human relations on a global scale. This is why it is now necessary that all begin to comprehend the peace potential generated in a variety of 'peace laboratories' in this century.

Over and over again in real-life 'experiments' with an array of peace tools, practitioners have found the need to probe deeper and deeper into the causes of peacelessness. At the end of the quest, a diversity of nongovernmental/citizens

movements were discerned to be a necessary 'drawer' in the 'peace tool chest' because the roots of peacelessness extend into domestic societies, local communities and even families. Thus, the seeds of peace must be planted, watered, nurtured and cultivated there. This means, of course, that all require peace education. Obviously it is not a subject essential only for present or future government leaders. Indeed, implementation of their peace plans requires the active support that only a citizenry with comprehensive peace education can provide. Furthermore, comprehensive peace education deepens insight on peace potential, particularly with respect to certain positive peace tools, and most specifically, those requiring broad participation. It is obvious that the full extent of this potential has not yet been realised. Most people have not been challenged to join the quest for peace. This should be the purpose of peace education.

There are those who tend to limit peace education to what they call conflict management or conflict resolution. Sometimes these approaches focus on managing or resolving conflicts in the schools, between neighbours, between business enterprises and their customers, and between labour and management. There are many community programmes that attempt to offer conflict resolution alternatives to the courts, thereby relieving overcrowded court agendas. These programmes are very helpful, both in resolving conflicts and in educating those involved about ways for diminishing the social disruption, and violence potential, of human conflict but obviously these approaches are only one aspect of peace education. We believe that peace studies must offer comprehensive coverage of the diverse causes of peacelessness and their relationship. This encourages a long term perspective that illuminates strategies for removing the roots of disruptive peacelessness before they get out of control. History is replete with examples where conflict resolution approaches have offered too little, and too late. Evert those practising the employment of only one peace tool, such as conflict resolution, need to understand where this tool fits in the full array of those available. After all, we would not prefer to have a personal surgeon who is not aware that some gallstones can now be eliminated by drugs and sound waves.

Finally, peace education with a comprehensive view is essential because it will probably be the only occasion in which young people are challenged to put into words their vision of a peaceful world. Because of the emphasis on extreme conflict and violence by the media, and because the academic study of international relations tends to emphasise the same phenomena, young people tend to assume that a world with widespread violence is inevitable. As a result, when students are asked to describe their personal vision of a peaceful world, they find it difficult to describe anything other than what they perceive the present world to be like. But peace education with a broad perspective cultivates the capacity of students to perceive widespread peace in the world, and significant achievements in efforts to diminish the scope of peacelessness. This enhancement of capacity to perceive peace potential makes it easier for students to employ their own values in envisioning their preferred peaceful world for the future.

3.7 Overview of Approaches to Peace

We have presented twenty-four peace tools in our survey of the quest for peace which has spread across the 19th and 20th centuries. The tools were somewhat arbitrarily gathered into six categories: 19th century, League Covenant (1919), UN Charter (1945), UN Practice 1950–1989, UN Practice 1990—present, and NGO/Peoples Movements. Figure 2.1 presented a complementary perspective in which the nine categories are based on the instrument, or means employed in the quest for peace.

The product of our historical inventory will be a list of the twenty-four peace tools filed in nine categories, based on the essential characteristics of each: (1) words, (2) limited military power, (3) deterrent military power, (4) reducing weapons, (5) alternatives to weapons, (6) protecting rights of individuals and groups, (7) collaboration in solving common economic and social problems, (8) equitable sharing of economic, communications and ecological systems, and (9) involvement of the population at large through peace education and organised participation. This product is presented in the conclusion of this chapter as Table 3.1 (see page 41).

Group I basically employs spoken and written words. The enduring significance of this approach was underlined by Jules Cambon (1931, p. 12) sixty years ago: ‘The best instrument of a Government wishing to persuade another Government will always remain the spoken words of a decent man’. Fundamental is diplomacy through a worldwide system of embassies that has developed over many centuries. Very significant has been the development of procedures for widening the diplomatic dialogue to include a variety of peaceful settlement mediators, or ‘third parties*’. Another more recent innovation has been efforts to establish second track diplomacy by bringing in additional government officials, former officials, representatives of private groups and social scientists. Most recently, preventive diplomacy expands the tools available to diplomats for coping with emerging challenges through threat assessment, monitoring, fact finding and early warning.

Group II offers tools between the spoken word and a more traditional military response. Peacekeeping is a means for obtaining and maintaining a cease-fire so that negotiations can then be undertaken for coping with the conflict which precipitated the violence. Humanitarian intervention normally does not have the benefit of a cease-fire and endeavours to apply limited enforcement without slipping over the precipice into warfare.

Group III basically employs military power as a deterrent to aggression, in the form of balance of power exercised through alliances, and the exercise of military superiority through a system-wide collective security system.

Group IV employs strategies for eliminating or reducing the number and destructive power of weapons through disarmament, arms control, defensive defence and conversion.

Group V attempts to diminish the need for weapons by providing alternative means for achieving social change (nonviolent politics) and for national defence (citizen defence).

Table 3.1 Summary of approaches to peace

Name		Instrument
Diplomacy	I	Inter-state communication Good offices, conciliation, arbitration, courts non-state actors Conflict monitoring, early warning
Peaceful settlement		
2nd track diplomacy		
Preventative diplomacy		
Peacekeeping	II	Cease-fire patrol/observation Armed intervention to protect human rights within states
Humanitarian intervention		
Balance of power	III	Military balance Military superiority under system-wide authority
Collective security		
Disarmament	IV	No weapons Reduce weapons Reduce external threat of defensive weapons convert to civilian production
Arms control		
Defensive defence		
Conversion		
Nonviolent politics	V	Diminish need for weapons as instruments for social change Diminish need for weapons for national defence
Citizen defence		
Self-determination	VI	Autonomy/independence for identity groups Legitimise transnational standards for economic, social, political, and cultural rights
Human rights		
Functionalism	VII	Collaboration to solve problems Overcome poverty and develop humans according to their needs
Development		
Self-reliance		
Int'l communications equity	VIII	Overcome one-way int'l comm. Overcome destruction of habitat Sharing equity in use for the commons
Ecological balance		
Governance for commons		
Feminist perspectives	IX	Illuminate roots of violence in society Learn about the causes of peace Broaden opportunities for participation in efforts to implement peace
Peace education		
People's movements		

Group VI basically employs protection of the rights of identity and self-determination for groups as well as protection of the human rights of individuals—economic, social, political and cultural.

Group VII employs collaboration in solving common economic and social problems (functionalism). But in situations in which there are wide gaps between the rich and the poor, strategies are required to cope with poverty and widespread

failure to satisfy basic human needs (development). Furthermore, strategies for overcoming these gaps require a concern for the self-reliance of those who are the targets of development strategies.

Group VIII basically employs approaches that seek to attain equitable international economic, communications and ecological systems. Inevitably this also requires collaborative problem solving in governance for the global commons (oceans, space, Antarctica) and equitable sharing in the use of the commons.

Group IX requires the linkage of the population at large to the quest for peace, through education and organised participation. Feminist perspectives illuminate the roots of militarism and violence within societies. People's movements offer opportunities for people to participate in the building of more peaceful societies. Peace education prepares people for enlightened participation and, at the same time, stimulates them to acquire their own vision of a peaceful world toward which their personal participation is directed.

References

- Ambler, R. 1990, Ghandian Peacemaking, in P. Smoker, R. Davies and B. Muske.
- Arend A. C. & Beck, R.J. 1993, *International Law and the Use of Force*. London, Routledge.
- Boulding, K. E. 1989, *Three Factors of Power*. Newbury Park, Sage.
- Boutras-Ghali, B. 1995, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2nd ed. United Nations Dept. of Public Information.
- Burton, J. W. 1990, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*. London, Macmillan.
- Cambon, J. 1931, *The Diplomatist*. London, Philip Allan.
- Fischer, D. 1984, *Preventing War in the Nuclear Age*. Totowa, New Jersey, Rowan and Allanheld.
- Galtung, Johan, *Self-Reliance and Global Interdependence: Some Reflections on the New International Economic Order*, Unpublished manuscript. Oslo, University of Oslo.
- Reardon, B. 1990, *Feminist Concepts of Peace and Security*. In P. Smoker, R. Davies and B. Muske
- Sharp, G. 1970, *Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives*. Boston, Porter Sargent
- Väyrynen, R. 1998, *Enforcement and Humanitarian Intervention: Two Faces of Collective Action* in the United Nations, in C.F. Alger, 1998, 54–88

Chapter 4

Challenges for Peace Researchers and Peace Builders in the Twenty-First Century: Education and Coordination of a Diversity of Actors in Applying What We are Learning

Recent peace research reveals that the quest for peace is being enhanced by increasing tendencies to (1) combine a number of tools into more comprehensive peace strategies, (2) employ multiple peace tracks simultaneously, (3) take a more long term perspective, (4) bridge theory and practice, (5) deepen insight on conflict between ethnic groups, (6) develop strategies for sustaining peace settlements and (7) create conditions for preventing violent and disruptive conflict. These developments suggest that peace building necessarily involves an array of actors who come from many governmental departments, numerous professions and an array of disciplines. Efforts to coordinate the array of required roles, or at least to make their efforts compatible, presents an overwhelming challenge to peace researchers and peace builders. At the same time, it suggests that peace education must become an element in education in a large array of disciplines and professions.¹

4.1 Introduction

Peace research has made great strides in the last half of the 20th Century. Most significant, our paradigms now include positive peace as well negative peace, thereby inclusive of economic, human rights and ecological concerns. Or, as John Burton might say, they are more responsive to “human needs” (Burton 1990). In other words, we now have a more global perspective on the causes of peacelessness. At the same time, we have broadened our concerns beyond peacemaking (i.e. conflict resolution and conflict management) to include peacekeeping, and most important, peace building. The purpose of this article is to offer my impressions of

¹ This text was first published as: “Challenges for Peace Researchers and Peace Builders in the Twenty-First Century: Education and Coordination of a Diversity of Actors in Applying What We Are Learning”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 5, No. 1, Spring 2000, 1–13, International Peace Research Association. The permission to republish this text was granted by Prof. Dr. Ho-Won Jeong, the editor of the journal, in January 2013.

where present efforts are leading, and thereby to discern the platform which is being constructed for future efforts of peace researchers, peace actors and peace educators. Therefore, it will be focused on research published in the past five years.

In this last decade of the 20th Century there has been such a torrent of literature that it is difficult to comprehend major trends and contributions. What is to follow offers only my impressions, based on the literature encountered in my personal research and teaching. It is not based on a systematic and comprehensive inventory. This effort builds on my earlier efforts to assess progress in “peace studies” that began in 1987 (Alger 1987, 1989) and continued with efforts to portray the “emerging tool chest for peace builders” *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 5, Number 1, Spring 2000 reported in this journal in 1996, and 1999 (Alger 1996, 1999). These efforts were primarily focused on the emergence of peace tools in the United Nations “laboratory” since its founding. This article takes a much broader perspective, although still guided by a desire to focus on research that is likely to be most useful to peace actors.

Peace research is obviously being enriched by the tendency to encompass ever more kinds of actors and issues, and at the same time to illuminate the interdependencies of an array of peace related actors and issues. This, of course, contributes to the challenge confronted in any effort to summarize this literature. Acquiring reasonable brevity necessarily demands selectivity and simplification. We shall identify seven major trends. The first five will be briefly noted with only a few examples: (1) The increasing efforts to combine a number of tools into comprehensive peace strategies. (2) The growing attention to the importance of pursuing multiple tracks simultaneously. (3) The growing tendency to take a long term perspective. (4) Many recent works endeavor to bridge theory building and practice. (5) Special attention is being given to efforts to cope with violent conflict between ethnic groups. We will then develop more fully two broader themes. (6) The growing literature on the need for what is often referred to as “post conflict” strategies so as to sustain peace settlements. (7) The increased emphasis on prevention of extremely disruptive and violent conflict:

4.2 Five Peace Research Trends

First, there are increasing efforts to develop approaches to peace building that combine a number of tools into comprehensive strategies. One example is William I. Zartman’s (1997) edited volume, which describes tools and skills for peacemaking that are currently available and critically assesses their usefulness and limitations. The chapters include negotiation, mediation, adjudication, social-psychological dimensions, problem solving workshops between unofficial representatives, religion, a diplomat’s view, an NGO perspective and training for conflict resolution. Also taking a broad approach is *The New Agenda for Peace Research*, edited by Jeong (1999). A section on approaches to peace includes disarmament, conflict transformation, self-determination, environmental security, development, and peace culture. The volume concludes with a section on transformation of global order.

Second, as reflected in the Zartman work, there is growing attention to the importance of pursuing multiple tracks simultaneously. An unusually comprehensive effort is *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace* by Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996). They strongly advocate multiple tracks and enumerate the following: (1) government, diplomacy, (2) nongovernmental/professional, through conflict resolution, (3) business, peacemaking through commerce, (4) private citizens, through personal involvement, (5) research/training/education, through learning, (6) activism, through advocacy, (7) religion, through faith in action, (8) funding, through providing resources, (9) communications and the media, through information.

Third, there is a growing tendency to take a long term perspective. One example is Fen Osler Hampson's (1996) *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Concerned that peace agreements sometimes contain the seeds of their own destruction, Hampson asserts that it is better to take time to get the details of a settlement right. He observes that peace settlements may require strong support and unified direction from the outside. He reveals what he means by "nurturing" when he advises: "By entrenching their roles and remaining fully engaged, third parties can help settlements take root" (Hampson 1996, 234). Also taking a long term perspective is Downton and Wehr (1997), a creative empirical study of what causes activists to stay with the peace movement over the long term. Based on collective action theories and interviews, they have developed a "model of sustained commitment" (Downtown and Wehr 1997, 152–153).

Fourth, many recent works endeavor to bridge theory building and practice. One concrete manifestation of this effort is that many include case studies. A few examples: (1) Hampson (1996), *Nurturing Peace*: Cyprus, Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia. (2) Lederach (1997), *Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*: four African case studies. (3) Fisher, et al. (1997), *Coping with International Conflict*: Middle East, arms control, bombing campaign in Vietnam. (4) Daniel, et al. (1999): *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*: Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, (5) Jentleson, *Preventive Diplomacy* (1999): Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Congo, Korea. It important that these cases involve many parts of the world, thus challenging those developing peace theories and strategies--most of whom are from a few developed countries in this survey of English language publications--to contend with peacefulness in a diversity of cultural situations.

Fifth, special attention is being given to efforts to cope with violent conflict between ethnic groups. Hannum (1990) offers a broad framework in which to place ethnic conflict in his *Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. He warns that "no society is static, and it is absurd to think that any particular form of government structure now extant will survive unchanged ...International law does a disservice to this necessary evolution, if it is predicated on an unchanging system of states..." (Hannum 1990, 476). Based on consideration of a number of cases, he offers these dimensions of autonomy: language, education, access to government civil service employment and social services, land, control over natural resources and representative local government structures (Hannum 1990, 458–468),

A number of works probe specific factors contributing to inter-ethnic violence and offer models for resolution. We will mention only three that illustrate the available diversity. Vanhanen (1999) asserts that “shared disposition to ethnic nepotism is the common factor behind all ethnic conflicts.” He asserts that “... it may be possible to avoid the emergence of ethnic conflict by inventing social and political institutions that help to accommodate the interests of different ethnic groups.” (Vanhanen 1999, 66). Tellis et al. (1997), in *Anticipating Ethnic Conflict*, offer the analyst a three-stage model for anticipating the outbreak of ethnic violence: structural potential (in political, economic and social realms), requirements for the potential to be converted into likely strife, and how likely strife degenerates into actual strife. Rothman (1997), in *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations and Communities*, presents a model for transforming the power behind passion and leading both parties into new realms of possibility in a process that surfaces differences, articulates common needs and generates cooperative solutions.

Echoing the multiple-tool and longterm approaches already presented, is Lederach’s (1997, xvi) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, which “calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society” through both internal and external means. Fundamental is building top level, middle range and grassroots relationships between antagonists. His twenty year strategy includes stages such as crisis intervention (2–6 months), preparation and training (1–2 years) and designs for social change (5–10 years).

4.3 “Post-Conflict” Peace Building

Sixth, there is also a growing literature on the need for what is often referred to as “post conflict” strategies so as to sustain peace settlements. In *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, Rothstein (1999) expresses concern that “fragile peace agreements” for resolving protracted conflicts fall short of being genuine, stable settlements. He emphasizes the importance of conceptualizing the period after a tentative peace has been negotiated, drawing attention to how pre and post peace periods are different.

Sorenson (1998), in *Women and Post conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources*, notes the importance of women as a reserve labor force in wartime but then is puzzled by the fact that they are expected to withdraw when the war is over. She believes that reconstruction efforts would be significantly strengthened if women were given roles in all aspects of postwar reconstruction.

Kumar has edited two volumes on the role of international assistance under “post conflict” conditions. *Post Conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance* (1998) is concerned with the design, management and evaluation of “post conflict” assistance programs. *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance* (1997) asks three questions:

(1) What sectors require assistance to promote political stability and economic growth? (2) What lessons can be learned from past experience? (3) How can more effective politics and programs be designed and implemented: for food, security, human rights, the military, demobilization, resettlement, and local reconciliation. Closely related to Kumar’s work is Good Intentions: *Pledges of Aid for Post Conflict Recovery* (Forman and Patrick 1999), which focuses on the consequences of failure to fill pledges of aid in “post conflict” situations. The six case studies in this volume contribute to concluding insights on how delays and failures in aid follow-through can undermine peace settlements.

Finally, there is a growing tendency for those involved in post violence/disruptive conflict settlement to employ forgiveness, and some form of truth and reconciliation, as a peace tool. As a result, literature on these topics is beginning to emerge. We will mention three quite different works on forgiveness. The first is an empirical study, “The Propensity to Forgive: Findings from Lebanon”, an effort to apply psychological research on forgiveness to conflict among Catholics, Maronites and Orthodox in Lebanon (Azar 1999). A sample of 48 Catholics, Maronites and Orthodox were asked to respond to brief stories about events in the Lebanese “civil” war. It was found that all respondents “were to a certain extent willing to forgive, at least under some circumstances” (Azar 1999, 177). Educated people were more prone to forgive than the less educated. Surprisingly, “the participants expressed practically equivalent propensity to forgive whether the offender was a member of their religious group or a member of another religious group” (Azar 1999, 180). Very significant is the finding that “when remorse and apologies were present, it was easier to forgive; especially for less educated people” (180). The authors caution that this self-reporting data requires a follow-up based on actual forgiveness behavior.

The second work, Henderson’s (1996) *The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict*, presents thirteen case studies “of morally compelled actors and their effects in various parts of the world over fifty years” since the establishment of a center of reconciliation and change by the Swiss Foundation for Moral Re-Armament. The case studies range across North Africa, Japan, Cambodia, South Africa and the South Tyrol. Most peace researchers who read this volume will be disappointed that no effort is made to draw conclusions out of these fascinating cases that would point toward future research. In a Forward, under the heading of “Science and Faith Come Together”, Joseph Montville (editor of *Conflict And Peacemaking In Multiethnic Societies* 1990) asserts that these cases are “raw data for a rigorous new theory of personal and political conflict resolution that had its origin in spiritual experience and is being studied at diverse secular research institutions” (Montville 1996, xiii). Aside from insight on forgiveness as a factor in peace building, the volume very usefully draws attention of peace researchers to successes, thus rescuing them from a tendency to be focused on failures.

Falling between the micro empirical study of Johnston and Sampson and Shriver’s thirteen “stories”, is Shriver’s (1995) *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*. He (1995, 11) discusses German-US, Japan-US relationships and race

in America, seeking to understand the implications of Christian faith: “The principal purpose of the whole study is to identify both the need and the actual presence of forgiveness in political history, and thus to encourage readers, as citizens, to consider the political wisdom inherent in this neglected virtue. Is forgiveness indispensable for turning political enmity into political neighborliness?” Shriver offers a penetrating analysis of the problems created for the future by the insistence on revenge for past deeds. Then he takes up the diverse facets of apology and forgiveness and the difficulties confronted in mobilizing and implementing them in political contexts involving large numbers of people. But at the same time he offers penetrating insight on the costs of avoidance of these issues.

Closely related to these volumes focusing on forgiveness is the Truth and Reconciliation strategy applied in South Africa after the demise of Apartheid. No doubt this approach to “post conflict” peace building will be the focus of extensive inquiry in the near future. Useful for future inquiry will be *A Brief Evaluation of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Some Lessons for Societies in Transition*, by Graeme Simpson (1998). In considering transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule, he places the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) somewhere between two extremes: the prosecutions of “war criminals” in post-World War II Germany, and the blanket amnesties for gross violators of human rights in post-Pinochet Chile. Simpson, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg, cautions those who might, from a distance, tend to inflate the contributions of TRC to reconciliation. He (1998, 29) believes that the TRC usefully illuminates a process but should not be accepted as “a hard-copy end product.”

Simpson (1998, 29) sees the high level of violent crime in South Africa today as rooted in “experiences of social marginalisation, political exclusion and economic exploitation which are slow to change in the transition to democracy” He (1998, 30) concludes that in order for the rhetoric of reconciliation to become reality it is necessary “to tackle those deep rooted social imbalances, which—at the most fundamental structural level—underpin the culture of violence.” In other words, we might say that he concludes that the TRC approach can only be effective if it is creatively combined with other peace building tools.

4.4 Preventing Violent and Disruptive Conflict

Seventh, an exceedingly significant advance in current peace research is the emphasis on prevention. Kriesberg (1998) has offered a valuable foundation for preventive efforts in *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. It is Kriesberg’s (1998, xiii) intent to “develop an empirically grounded understanding of how people prevent or stop destructive conflicts, but instead wage relatively constructive conflicts.” This volume challenges those engaged in “prevention” to attempt to devise procedures for clearly distinguishing between potentially violent/disruptive conflicts and those that are constructive. It certainly is necessary to seek

the termination of some conflicts, but, in the interest of long term peace, others should be converted into constructive conflicts.

Also offering a valuable foundation for most preventive efforts is research on risk assessment and early warning. Here a significant contribution is Davies and Gurr's (1998) edited volume on *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning*. They are attempting to develop the capacity to diagnose "failures" far enough in advance to facilitate effective international efforts at "prevention or peaceful transformation." Contributors to this volume examine potential early warning indicators in different situations and attempt to judge their effectiveness according to various models.

Different emphases are suggested by the varying terminology employed by scholars emphasizing prevention. Bloomfield and Moulton (1997) wish to "manage" international conflict. The Carnegie Commission (1997) desires to "prevent deadly conflict". Birkenbach (1997); Cahill (1996); Jentleson (1999); Lund (1996) place their efforts under the rubric "preventive diplomacy." Also useful contributors in this vein are Bauwens and Reychler (1994). Cortright (1997); Peck (1998); Reychler (1998); Vayrynen (1997). We choose to mention them separately because I believe that they significantly err in asserting that it is their goal to "prevent" conflict, thereby making a mistake widely encountered in the literature. It is quite obvious, in the light of the contribution of some forms of conflict to useful social change, that these insightful scholars really mean "transformation" most of the time.

Some of the volumes on prevention encompass a wide array of approaches and tools. Lund (1996) in *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, develops a broad "preventive diplomacy toolbox" that includes (1) military approaches (restraints on the use of armed force and threat or use of armed force), (2) diplomatic measures (coercive—without use of armed force and noncoercive), and (3) development and governance approaches (promotion of economic and social development, promulgation and enforcement of human rights and democracy, and national governing structures to promote peaceful conflict resolution). This is indeed comprehensive because these three categories embrace more than fifty individual tools. For example, the noncoercive diplomatic measures are divided into judicial or quasi judicial and nonjudicial. Included in nonjudicial are twelve tools with a diversity of approaches, such as third party mediation, propaganda, and fact finding.

Kevin Cahill (1996), a medical doctor, asserts in his edited volume on preventive diplomacy, 1996 that "it is only natural for me to think of clinical and public health models in contemplating the disorders now threatening the health of the world community." Thus he has sections on "interrupting a global epidemic", "causes and local remedies", "signs, symptoms and early intervention" and "establishing trust in the healer." There are also chapters on early warning, fact finding, economic sanctions, human rights, peacekeeping, the media and education.

After examining why deadly conflicts occur, the Carnegie Commission (1997), in *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, distinguishes between operational prevention and structural prevention. Operational prevention strategies range across early warning

and response, preventive diplomacy, economic measures and “forceful” measures that include peacekeeping, preventive deployments and a rapid reaction “fire brigade.” Structural prevention, employed as a synonym to peace building, addresses root causes of deadly conflict and includes security (from violence), economic well-being and justice. Responsibilities are laid out for states and their leaders, civil society (religion, science, media and business), the UN, and regional arrangements. A concluding section, “toward a culture of prevention”, provides tasks for the mass media, religious institutions, and the United Nations.

Although prevention necessarily involves a diversity of approaches and tools, some volumes focus their efforts on one kind of activity. In his volume on “sustainable peace”, Peck (1998) asserts that the most sustainable means is good governance which addresses root causes and meets basic human security needs. He emphasizes that good governance offers a group a voice in resolving grievances at an early stage. Thus, he proposes the establishment of Regional Centers for Sustainable Peace that would promote more effective national and local governance.

In *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, edited by David Cortright (1997) the focus is on incentives, rather than on coercion, deterrence and sanctions. These positive inducements of an “economic, political or security character” can be focused on deterring nuclear proliferation, armed conflict and defending human rights.

In *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*, Anderson (1996) asserts that the impact of aid is not neutral. She asks, how can humanitarian or development assistance be “given in conflict situations in ways that rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict help local people to disengage and establish alternative systems to deal with the problems that underlie conflict?” Her response includes concern for the implicit ethical message of aid and the impact of resource transfers on conflict. She would use aid in developing local capacities for peace through food for work, village rehabilitation, working with children in the context of civil war and coping with poverty. In a Joseph Bock and Anderson article (1999), the focus is on how aid agencies can defuse intercommunal conflict. Here aid would be used to “inculcate a sense of belonging among a large, more inclusive group” and to “support/strengthen interconnection structures and systems, rather than competitive ones” (Bock and Anderson 1999, 336).

Also offering insight on links between aid and peace is Prendergast’s (1996) study of humanitarian aid and conflict in Africa. He offers ten commandments for avoiding “good intentions on the road to hell”, i.e. providing aid without sustaining conflict. His commandments involve deep analysis based on a diversity of information sources, independent monitoring and evaluation, integrating human rights monitoring, advocacy and capacity building and making aid conditional upon acceptance of humanitarian principles and conflict resolution. He concludes that humanitarian aid is the most important avenue of contact among the international community and conflicting parties, thereby aid offers one of the best policy instruments for preventing escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peace building (Prendergast 1996, 143).

In the light of the prominent use of religious differences by leaders as a basis for waging conflict and war, research advocating the use of religion as a peace tool is an increasingly important response. Appelby (1999), in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, asserts that religion's ability to inspire violence is intimately related to its equally impressive power as a force for peace. He identifies what religious terrorists and religious peacemakers share in common, what causes them to take different paths in fighting injustice and the importance of acquiring understanding of religious extremism.

Johnston and Sampson (1994), in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, opens with a forward by Jimmy Carter asserting that "we all realize that religious differences have often been a cause or pretext for war. Less known is the fact that the actions of many religious persons and communities point in another direction. They demonstrate that religion can be a potent force in encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflict" (Johnston and Sampson 1994, vii). After six case studies of reconciliation, the volume concludes with implications for the foreign policy community and implications for four religious communities: Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu and Christian.

There are other works provoking thoughts of how religion can be used as a peace tool. These include Sampson (1997, 304), who informs us of the institutional moves within some religious communities toward developing "an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding." Johansen (1997) has contributed "Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint Among Pashtuns." Reychler (1997) asks for a serious study of the impact of religious organizations on conflict behavior, a comparative study of the peace building efforts of different religious organizations. He asserts that the world cannot survive without a new global ethic and that the religious ties of parties, passive bystanders, peacemakers and peace builders will play a major role.

4.5 Conclusion

This effort to discern some main trends in peace research reveals that in the year 2000 we have far more knowledge about the causes of peace and peacelessness than we had when the UN was founded, in the mid-twentieth Century, and we know more than we did only two decades ago. On the other hand, it might be more accurate to say that we have growing capacity to ask the right questions! Our survey has revealed that we have growing insight on (1) combining a number of peace tools into a comprehensive peace strategy (2) pursuing a number of peace tracks simultaneously, (3) taking a long term perspective in the pursuit of peace, (4) linking theory to practice, (5) coping with conflict between ethnic groups, (6) "post conflict" strategies for sustaining peace settlements, and (7) prevention of extremely disruptive and violent conflicts. But at first glance it appears to be quite obvious that much of what we know is not being applied. At least with respect to

those violent and exceedingly disruptive conflicts that make the headlines, such as Rwanda, Congo, East Timor, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, it seems that significant response to threats to the peace tends not to come until the violence begins. On the other hand, we must be careful in making these assessments based on the headlines because there is a tendency for the headlines to be focused on failures, not successes. Indeed, we need many more studies of successes!

Certainly one implication of our survey is that peace building is a far more complicated task than most of us had earlier assumed. Relevant government roles extend far beyond foreign offices and the military, including departments concerned with a variety of economic and social issues. Furthermore, important roles must be performed not only by government officials, but also by various professions and groups in what we now customarily refer to as “civil society.” The literature that we have sampled has identified roles in a diversity of societal domains, including business, religion, education, media, ethnic communities, development assistance and local governance. Indeed, it appears that the peace research community is only gradually responding to the advice that Johan Galtung offered twenty years ago. After an extensive effort to map peace strategies, he concluded: “Hence, the answer lies rather *in having tasks for everybody*” (Galtung 1980, 396).

Of course, coordinating these various roles, or at least making them more compatible, presents an overwhelming challenge to peace builders. On the other hand, there is a positive side to the existence of a multiplicity of peace roles in that peace builders now have many more options and resources than they were aware of in times past. Thus, in designing peace strategies they must think more creatively about the long term consequences of development aid. They must not only be concerned about the devastating impact of war and violence on women, they must more often employ them in peace building roles. They must have more penetrating understanding of the contributions that religion and religious leaders can make to peace building. They must acquire more discerning insight on the impact of punishment on peace settlements and on the options offered by truth, reconciliation and forgiveness.

Certainly there are also significant implications for peace education. There is obviously a need for peace education curricula that takes a broad, systemic view of peace building. Although most involved in peace building will tend to perform only one role in a complicated social network, it is absolutely necessary for all involved to know the nature of the entire network, where they fit in the network, and how they are linked to, and interdependent with, other roles. This does not mean, of course, that there is not a need, for example, for specialized training of mediators, human rights monitors, those who deliver humanitarian aid, and peace-keepers. But each must have a concrete understanding of the interdependency of their specific role with other roles.

It also follows that application of what we are now learning about peace building necessarily involves people in a diversity of professions, and therefore should be included in the curriculum not only of all of the social sciences, but also of education for business, medicine, engineering, the media, religion, and many kinds of government service, including local government. Indeed, from one perspective,

the UN Security Council must accept considerable blame for not applying growing peace knowledge in building long term peace strategies for anticipating and acting early enough to avoid unnecessary loss of life in situations like the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Rwanda and East Timor. On the other hand, the members of the Security Council could accurately respond that they have been given impossible tasks because so many others, inside governments and in civil society, are not doing their share! Certainly growing knowledge about peace building informs us that, had many other people been fulfilling their responsibilities—educators, government officials, aid providers, church leaders, businesspeople, and others, some of the overwhelming challenges confronted by the Security Council might never have reached their agenda.

References

- Alger, Chadwick F., 1999, "The Quest for Peace: What are We Learning?", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 21-45.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1996, "The Emerging Tool Chest for Peacebuilders", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 21-45.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1989, "Peace Studies at the crossroads: Where Else?", in George Lopez, ed., *Peace Studies: Past and Future. The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 117-127.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1987, "Peace Studies at the Crossroads: Where Else?", *COPRED Peace Chronicle*, 12 (6), 9.
- Anderson, Mary B., 1996, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.
- Appelby, R. Scott, 1999, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Azar, Fabiola, Etienne Mullet and Genevieve Vinsonneau, 1999, "The Propensity to Forgive: Findings from Lebanon", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 169-182.
- Bauwens, Werner and Luc Reyckler, eds., 1994, *The Art of Conflict Prevention*. London/New York: Brassey's.
- Birkenbach, Hanne-Margret. 1977, *Preventive Diplomacy: Conclusions From International Intervention in Estonia and Latvia in Conflicts Over Citizenship*. Germany, Kiel Publisher
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P. and Allen Moulton, 1997, *Managing International Conflict: From Theory to Policy*. New York, NY: St. Martin's.
- Bock, Joseph B., and Mary B. Anderson, 1999, "Dynamite Under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid Agencies Help Defuse It?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 325-338.
- Burton, John, 1990, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*. New York: St. Martinis Press.
- Cahill, Kevin M., ed., 1996, *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start*. Basic Books: New York, NY.
- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
- Cortright, David, ed., 1997, *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Daniel, Donald C. F., and Bradd C. Hayes, with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 1999, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Davies, John L. and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., 1998, *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield.

- Diamond, Louise, and John McDonald, 1996, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, 3rd ed. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press.
- Downton, James, Jr., and Paul Wehr, 1997, *The Persistent Activist: How Peace Commitment Develops and Survives*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Fisher, Roger, Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Elizabeth Borgwardt and Brian Ganson, 1997, *Coping With International Conflict: A Systematic Approach to Influence in International Negotiation*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Forman, Shepard, and Stewart Patrick, eds., 1999, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Galtung, Johan, 1980, *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*. New York: The Free Press.
- Hampson, Fen Osier, 1996, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hannum, Hurst, 1990, rev. ed., *Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Henderson, Michael, 1996, *The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict*. London: Grosvenor Books.
- Jentleson, Bruce W., ed., 1999, *Opportunities Missed/Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Jeong, Ho-Won, ed., 1999, *The New Agenda for Peace Research*. Brookfield/Singapore/Sydney: Ashgate.
- Johansen, Robert, 1997, "Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint Among Pashtuns", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 53-72.
- Johnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson, 1994, *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kriesberg, Louis, 1998, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. Lanham/Boulder/ New York/Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Kumar, Krishna, 1998, *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Kumar, Krishna, 1997, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Lederach, John Paul, 1997, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press'.
- Lund, Michael S., 1996, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Montville, Joseph V., 1996, "Foreword" to Michael Henderson, 1996, *The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict*. London: Grosvenor Books, xii-xviii.
- Montville, Joseph V., ed., 1990, *Conflict And Peacemaking In Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington, MA : Lexington Books.
- Peck, Connie, 1998, *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict*. Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Prendergast, John, 1996, *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.
- Reychler, Luc, 1998, "Proactive Conflict Prevention: Impact Assessment", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 87-98.
- Reychler, Luc, 1997, "Religion and Conflict", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 19-38.
- Rothman, Jay, 1997, *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations and Communities*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Rothstein, 1999, ed., *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Sampson, Cynthia, 1997, "Religion and Peacebuilding", in Zartman and Rasmussen, eds., 1997, *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 273-318.

- Shriver, Donald W., 1995, *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, Graeme, 1998, *A Brief Evaluation of South Africa's Truth Reconciliation Commission: Some Lessons for Societies in Transition*. Johannesburg: Center for Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
- Sorenson, Birgitte, 1998, *Women and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources*. Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development and Programme for Strategic International Security.
- Tellis, Ashley, J. Thomas S. Szayna, and James A. Winnefeld, 1997, *Anticipating Ethnic Conflict*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Vanhanen, Tatu, 1999, "Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 55-74.
- Vayrynen, Raimo, 1997, "Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: A Comparison of Different Instruments", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1-18.
- Zartman, I. William, and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., 1997, *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Chapter 5

Peace Studies as a Transdisciplinary Project

The titles of the chapters that have preceded this one, and those that follow, make it very obvious that peace studies flows across many disciplines. Chapter titles include various dimensions of conflict formation and transformation, and human rights, gender, journalism, psychology, education, business, and peace movements. Other chapters focus on political science, international law, health, religion and language. Of course, authors of these chapters draw on many other disciplines.¹

No doubt readers of this chapter have a diversity of perspectives on the transdisciplinary aspects of peace studies. Their approach has been shaped by the path that they took into peace studies. It is likely that most readers of this chapter began their education and personal inquiry in a specific discipline. Eventually they became concerned with a specific peace and conflict issue and found a specific dimension of peace studies relevant to the issue that was challenging them. Quite likely this aspect of peace studies also led them to relevant literature in other academic disciplines.

For example, I was educated as a political scientist with a speciality in international relations. I developed a research focus on the UN and was seeking understanding on how inter-state violence might be avoided. My search for insight led me to Johan Galtung's distinction between negative peace (elimination of direct violence) and positive peace (elimination of constraints on human potential due to economic and political structures) (Galtung 1969). Relevant also was my 1967 attendance at a conference of the International Peace Research Association in Sweden, where scholars from Africa, Asia and Latin America offered analyses of structural violence. What an eye-opener it was to learn that people around the world define peace differently, depending on what it is that is preventing them from fulfilling their potential. Will it be caused by quick death from direct violence, or the much more prevalent slow and painful death from structural violence?

¹ This text was first published as "Peace Studies as a Transdisciplinary Project", in Johan Galtung and Charles Webel, eds., *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, 299-318, 2007. The permission to republish this chapter was granted on 27 September 2012 by Rose Bavier of Taylor & Francis (UK).

5.1 Is Peace and Conflict Studies a Discipline?

Of course, peace studies has made great progress in the 40 years since I became aware of its emergence. In 2006, the Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA) and the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Foundation compiled a *Global Directory of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Programs* (Seventh Edition). It profiles over 450 undergraduate, masters' and doctoral programmes and concentrations in over 40 countries and 38 US states. No doubt some readers of this chapter acquired their first knowledge about peace studies with one of these programmes and may consider peace studies, or peace and conflict studies, to be a discipline. But at the same time they too must recognize that they are dependent on relevant knowledge emerging from a range of linked disciplines.

Whether or not peace studies is considered to be a discipline, there is no doubt that research in the past couple of decades has produced a great advance in understanding of the causes of war and other forms of seriously disruptive conflict. At the same time, there has been a remarkable development in knowledge about preventative measures, particularly with respect to strategies for long-term peace-building. Some of these contributions are a result of a distinguishing characteristic of the research of some peace researchers. The research mainstream of much of social science—certainly this is true of international relations—is focused on explaining what caused certain aspects of human conditions that now exist. On the other hand, the agenda of many peace researchers is to acquire knowledge that can be applied in developing strategies for achieving a vision of a more peaceful world in the future.

Unfortunately, the results of this research are not reaching most social science students because of the disciplinary organization of most colleges and universities. Most scholars who have a broad background in peace studies do not have the disciplinary qualifications, particularly publication in mainstream disciplinary journals, that is required for appointment to a position in political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, history, etc. Thus, unless there is a department or programme of peace studies, or peace and conflict studies, scholars with degrees in one of these disciplines tend not to be appointed when the main focus of their teaching and research is peace studies. At the same time, they may receive little credit for their publications in peace research journals, such as the *Journal of Peace Research*, the *International Journal of Peace Studies*, *Peace and Change*, *Peace Review* and *International Journal of World Peace*.

In writing an essay on 'Peace studies as a transdisciplinary project', our first approach was to provide information on the contributions to peace research in each relevant discipline. We quickly decided to take another approach because of the difficulty of giving a disciplinary identity to research that almost always flows across disciplinary boundaries. This would have required frequent discussion of the boundaries that we were applying because there is great diversity in the definition of disciplinary boundaries by different individuals, disciplinary departments and journals. Meanwhile, as we reviewed the literature, we became ever more

aware that current research is revealing how people everywhere, no matter what their profession or occupation, are involved in creating conditions that are leading toward peace or toward disruptive conflict. Therefore, we decided that it would be most useful to provide the reader with concrete examples of the vast range of human involvements in activities that have an impact on peace and conflict conditions.

While reviewing the literature for this essay we also reached the conclusion that peace research does have the qualities of a discipline. It is certainly important that peace research is one dimension of virtually all disciplines. On the other hand, it is vitally necessary that the various dimensions be assembled, as is the need in efforts to develop long-range peace-building strategies. As with all other disciplines, the peace research discipline will always have a need to continually be linked to, and apply, the insights of other disciplines. But, at the same time, other disciplines need the insights that the peace research discipline can offer them with respect to how the dimension of peace research that is an aspect of their discipline fits into a more holistic view of peace.

An indication of the emergence of peace studies as a discipline has been the emergence of peace studies textbooks. David P. Barash, with disciplinary roots in psychology, wrote *Introduction to Peace Studies* in 1991. A revised version, written jointly with Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, appeared in 2002. The chapter titles in this 577-page textbook reveal that the peace research on which it is based reaches across all social science disciplines. The textbook opens with chapters on the meanings of peace, peace movements, the meaning of wars and the special significance of nuclear weapons. Following are chapters on these 'levels': individual, group, state, decision-making, and ideological/social/economic. These are followed by chapters on negative peace that include diplomacy/negotiations/conflict resolution, peace through strength, disarmament/arms control, international organizations, international law, world government and ethical/religious perspectives. Chapters on building positive peace include human rights, women's rights, ideological well-being, economic well-being, nonviolence, and personal transformation and the future.

Another recent, somewhat shorter, textbook of 407 pages, *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction* (2000), was written by Ho-Won Jeong, who has political science disciplinary roots. After providing nine chapters of background necessary in a textbook, Jeong divides a concluding section on Strategies for Peace into nine topics: control of military power, conflict resolution and management, human rights, self-determination, development, environmental politics, global order and governance, nonviolence, and peace movements. Of the 91 sections in the nine topics, at least 80 offer a peace strategy. These topics in the Environmental Politics chapter reflect the disciplinary range: building global consensus, international policies, management of the global commons, international organizations and coordination, nongovernmental organizations, struggles in indigenous communities, sustainable development and prospects for future cooperation.

It is very important to recognize that the impressive growth in peace studies knowledge has taken place in two primary arenas of human activity. One is

research institutes and universities. The other is knowledge acquired by those working in organizations attempting to cope with seriously disruptive social conflict. In this chapter we will primarily focus on the impact of research on the interdisciplinary spread of peace research. But it is also necessary to briefly indicate how practitioners who are coping with challenges in the ‘real world laboratory’ have also made significant contributions.

5.2 Emergence of Peace Tools in the UN System

Because I have for years focused much of my attention on the UN System, my understanding of learning about peace-building through practice has been significantly shaped by the quest for peace in these organizations. In many respects this is a quite appropriate ‘laboratory’ because of the growth of the United Nations to a membership of 191, including virtually all states. This means that agendas, debates and dialogue are open to contributions from all states, increasingly supplemented by contributions from civil society around the world, thereby enhancing the global relevance of results. The evolving emergence of peace tools presented in Fig. 2.1 is obviously a very simplified version of a very complicated process. Nevertheless, Fig. 2.1 offers a useful perspective on the emergence of a growing array of peace activities that reach across ever more academic disciplines. Peace researchers who examine this figure will quickly become aware that there have been times when strategies for long-term peace-building emerged through practice long before they received significant attention from researchers.

Before the League of Nations was founded, diplomacy (1) and balance of power (2) were the primary available peace tools. Because of the tendency of balance of power to result in arms races that ended in wars, the League Covenant attempted to replace it with *collective security* (3), through which military aggression would be prevented by the threat of response with overwhelming military force by members of the League. The Covenant made an effort to strengthen diplomacy by adding procedures for *peaceful settlement* (4) of disputes (through mediation, conciliation and the World Court). The League also created procedures for *disarmament and arms control* (5). These approaches emphasized the use of, and control of, violence in the pursuit of peace, sometime referred to as ‘negative peace’.

Practice under the League and some of the lessons of the First World War, contributed to the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. Significantly, these three approaches were again incorporated into the UN Charter in 1945. The greatest difference between the Covenant and the Charter is three peace strategies added to the latter by those assembled at San Francisco: ‘*functional*’ *cooperation* (6) on economic and social issues, *self-determination* (7) and *human rights* (8). These approaches, in contrast to the earlier three, emphasize the creation of peaceful economic, social and political relationships—sometimes referred to as ‘positive peace’. The new Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was based on growth

in functional activities of the League during its brief history. The Trusteeship Council continued League supervision over the treatment of colonies seized by the victors in war, but it was the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories that opened the way for future self-determination advances under the Charter. And the mention of human rights seven times in the Charter, including the second sentence of the preamble, was a dramatic departure from the League Covenant.

As our most significant peace ‘laboratory’, the present UN System of organizations reflects very significant learning since its founding. We have learned that collective security—actually a form of deterrence—is as dangerous as any other deterrence strategy if it fails. The application of collective security in the Korean War, in which we tottered on the edge of the Third World War, taught us this. On the other hand, *peacekeeping* (9) forces are a useful new invention.

Functional collaboration has flowered as the UN System has developed agencies that cope with a broad array of global issues, such as health, refugees, labour, education, clean water, communications, balance of payments and housing. Self-determination has been one of the United Nations’ greatest success stories, as it has assisted a multitude of states in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to independence and immediate UN membership.

With respect to human rights, under UN auspices the states assembled have drafted standards for human life on the planet through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and covenants on civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, and an array of other treaties on genocide, women’s rights, elimination of racial discrimination, rights of children, rights of labour, environment, hunger and malnutrition, religious discrimination, and many others.

With the attainment of self-determination by states created by colonialism, the number of member states in the United Nations with widespread poverty grew rapidly. Difficulties in achieving successful functional cooperation in a United Nations in which wealth and resources are so unequally distributed among members soon became apparent. Thus began the effort to narrow the gap through *development* (10) programmes in the poorer countries. Despite significant successes in some locations, the gap between the rich and the poor of the world has continued to grow, at the same time that the world economy has become increasingly interdependent.

As worldwide systems for exploitation of resources, production, marketing and communications reached ever more intrusively into the most distant human settlements and rural areas, the peacelessness of population explosion in urban shantytowns in cities in the poorer countries provoked a searching dialogue on the meaning of development. This debate shifted the focus from development projects in the poorer countries to the inequities in the international economic system. A debate that began in the General Assembly grew into a UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to an UNCTAD organization, to a demand for a new international economic order (NIEO). In 1974, this campaign for *international economic equity* (11) produced a declaration for a NIEO, a plan of action for a NIEO, and a Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States.

Frustration over the unwillingness of the industrialized countries to conduct global negotiations over a NIEO contributed to demands for *international communications equity* (12) and emergence in the 1980s of the demand, centred in UNESCO, for a new *international information and communications order* (NIICO). The domination and control of worldwide communications by media corporations based in cities in the industrialized countries mirrors that of transnational corporations for resource exploitation, production and marketing. As a consequence, leaders in the poorer countries complain that control of worldwide communications by corporations in Europe and North America prevent the people in the industrialized countries from learning about the actual condition of people in the poorer countries and the reasonableness of demands for a NIEO.

Questions of *ecological balance* (13), too, can be seen as evolving out of global debate on the meaning of development. Ecological problems became a prominent issue on the agenda of the UN System beginning with the UN Environment Conference in Stockholm in 1972. The initiative came from the industrialized countries, and at first the environment was perceived to be their issue. Initially, many in the poorer countries even suspected that environmental initiatives from the industrialized countries were a covert strategy for preventing their development. But by the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, environmental issues were perceived to be a concern of people from all parts of the world. A new UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) is leading the search in the early twenty-first century for meanings of development that can include ecological balance. At the same time, the squalor, disease and death that result from destruction of the human habitat are increasingly judged to have the moral equivalence of similar peacelessness produced by weapons of war.

As new technology has enabled humankind to exploit more extensively the depth and the breadth of the commons (atmosphere, space, oceans and the two polar regions), this activity becomes an ever greater threat to peace—threatening war, environmental disaster, inequitable sharing of resources of the commons and inequitable access to the transportation and communications potential of the commons. Thus *governance for the global commons* (14) has emerged as a significant dimension of peace. Some consider the drafting of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (1982) to be the most significant event in the struggle to develop peaceful governance for the commons. The Convention sets territorial limits and provides regulations for ocean transit, for sharing of resources in and under the oceans, for control of pollution, and for scientific research. This was followed by the creation in 1994 of the International Seabed Authority, with its headquarters in Kingston, Jamaica, and the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany. Both have 145 member states.

The more recent emergence of *humanitarian intervention* (15) offers a striking example of how the emergence of new peace tools gradually reinterprets the UN Charter. Article 2.7 states: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.' Nevertheless, emerging human rights standards have been

used to justify UN intervention in places such as Kosovo and Somalia. At the same time, interventions in the ‘failed states’ of former colonies reveal how the achievements attained under one tool, in this case *self-determinism* (7), may lead to conditions that require the creation of another tool, such as humanitarian intervention.

At the same time, the recent emergence of *preventive diplomacy* (16) reveals a striking demand from many quarters for preventive measures that take a long-term perspective and thereby overcome the tendency to respond to threats of violence too late to prevent it. This has been accompanied by a remarkably rapid development of academic works that offer relevant insight. The efforts of these researchers and others to make their work useful for policy-makers are striking.

Our brief overview has revealed remarkable progress in fashioning tools that are now available for enhancing peace and well-being in the twenty-first century, as well as reflecting the escalating involvement of more and more disciplines in peace studies. Not only have functionalism, self-determination and human rights been supplemented by economic development, economic and communications equity, ecological balance, and governance for the commons, but these new themes have deepened our insight on neglected dimensions of earlier approaches. We now understand better the full meaning of self-determination, as we have learned about its economic and communications dimensions. We now have insights on the ecological aspect of human rights. At the same time, new conflict resolution institutions, such as the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, have been created.

As practitioners in the UN System have introduced an ever larger array of peace tools, they have created an increasing number of organizations that apply these tools. The names of these organizations offer readers a quick view of the disciplinary range of these organizations. In Table 5.1 we have developed this view by taking key words out of the names of 54 organizations in the organization chart of the UN System (www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html) and placing them in alphabetical order. When reading this list it is virtually impossible to think of a discipline without a reason to include one or more of these organizations in its research agenda. It also appears that members of all professions may be involved in the UN System.

The disciplinary and professional scope of peace studies has also been extended by the escalating involvement in the UN System of NGOs/civil society, local authorities and business. The final column in Fig. 2.1 lists eight peace tools that have been largely developed by NGOs/civil society: Track II Diplomacy (17), Conversion from military to civilian production (18), Defensive Defence, development and employment of strictly defensive weapons and strategies (19), Nonviolent movements for social change (20), Citizen Defence, deployment of nonviolent techniques for national defence (21), Self-Reliance, development rooted in the satisfaction of individual human needs (22) Feminist Perspectives with respect to social relations and visions of alternative futures (23), and Peace Education (24) (Alger 1999: 30–39).

The International Union of Local Authorities was founded before the League of nations, in 1913. Since the Second World War other worldwide associations

Table 5.1 Functions appearing in names of UN Systems agencies (Alger 2006: 6)

Number	UN systems agencies	Number	UN systems agencies
1	Agriculture (sa)	28	Labour (sa)
2	Atomic energy (ro)	29	Maritime (sa)
3	Banking (sa)	30	Monetary fund (sa)
4	Civil aviation (sa)	31	Meteorology
5	Children (ga)	32	Monetary (sa)
6	Chemical weapons (ro)	33	Narcotic drugs (fc)
7	Climate change (sa)	34	Nuclear test ban (ro)
8	Crime prevention (fc)	35	Peacekeeping (sc)
9	Criminal tribunal (sc)	36	Population (fc) (ga)
10	Culture (sa)	37	Postal (sa)
11	Development (ga) (fc)	38	Reconstruction (sa)
12	Disarmament (ga)	39	Refugees (ga)
13	Drug control (ga)	40	Science (sa) (fc)
14	Education (sa)	41	Settle investment disputes (sa)
15	Environment (ga)	42	Social development (ga)
16	Finance (sa)	43	Staff college (ga)
17	Food (sa) (ga)	44	Statistics (fc)
18	Forests (ecosoc)	45	Sustainable development (fc)
19	Health (sa)	46	Telecommunications (sa)
20	High technology	47	Tourism (sa)
21	HIV/AIDS (ga)	48	Trade (ga)
22	Human rights (fc)	49	Trade and development (ga)
23	Human settlements (ga)	50	Training and research (ga)
24	Industrial development (sa)	51	University (ga)
25	Investment guarantee (sa)	52	Volunteers (ga)
26	Indigenous issues (ecosoc)	53	Women (fc) (ga)
27	Intellectual property (sa)	54	World trade (ro)

Notes

ecosoc	Other bodies under ECOCOC
fc	Functional Commission, under ECOSOC
ga	Under General Assembly
ro	Related organization
sa	Specialized Agency
sc	Under Security Council

of local authorities have been created with a special issue focus, including peace, the environment and the challenges confronted by larger cities. Now there is a World Association of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination (WACLAC), a UN Advisory Committee on Local Authorities and projects assisting the economic development of cities in UNEP, UNDP, UNICEF, the World Bank and the UN Human Settlements Programme (Alger 2003: 98–103).

The UN website states that, ‘The business community has played an active role in the United Nations since its inception in 1945. A number of UN organizations have a successful history of co-operating with business. Recent political and economic changes have fostered and intensified the search for collaborative

arrangements' (www.un.org/partners/business). In 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged business leaders to join an international initiative—the Global Compact—that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labour and civil society to support ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. There are now Global Compact Offices in six UN agencies: UNHCHR, UNEP, UNDP, UNIDO and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. A recent volume by Andreas Wenger and Daniel Mockli, *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector* (2003), perceives that there is potential for business to play significant roles in preventing disruptive international conflict.

5.3 Emphasis on Multi-Track and Multiple Methods

The growing disciplinary range of peace research is dramatically reflected in peace research trends. Limited space makes it necessary to illuminate these trends with only five examples: emphasis on multiple tracks and multiple methods, the growing range of activities with respect to peacekeeping and NGO/civil society, post-conflict peace-building, preventive long-term peace-building and concern for local arenas of conflict within states.

An excellent example of the multiple track approach is Louise Diamond and John McDonald's *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace* (1996). Their multi-track approach builds on 'second track diplomacy' that is sometimes referred to as 'citizen diplomacy' because the second track has often involved people who are not government officials. Diamond and McDonald find a need to identify these nine tracks because of the diversity of the professions and activities now included in the 'second track': Government (peacemaking through Diplomacy), Nongovernment/Professional (peacemaking through Professional Conflict Resolution), Business (peacemaking through Commerce), Private Citizen (peacemaking through Personal Involvement), Research, training, and Education (peacemaking through Learning), Activism (peacemaking through Advocacy), Religion (peacemaking through Faith in Action), Funding (peacemaking through Providing Resources), Communications and the media (peacemaking through Information). Their description and analysis of each track includes very informative lists of participating individuals and organizations. This volume offers important insight on the challenges confronted by participants in increasingly significant multi-track diplomacy. They are challenged to have knowledge of an array of peace-building processes, of the ways in which activities in their track are linked to these processes and of the interdependence of their actions and those in the other eight tracks.

Another recent trend has been emphasis on the development of peace strategies consisting of multiple peace tools. This is overcoming a tendency in the past by many to emphasize one or two approaches, such as disarmament or human rights. One example of the multiple peace tool approach is Ho-won Jeong's *Peace and Conflict*

Studies: An Introduction (2000). After providing nine chapters of background necessary in a textbook, Jeong divides a concluding section on Strategies for Peace into nine topics: (1) control of military power, (2) conflict resolution and management, (3) human rights, (4) self-determination, (5) development, (6) environmental politics, (7) global order and governance, (8) nonviolence, and, (9) peace movements. Of the 91 sections in the nine topics, at least 80 offer a peace strategy. These topics in the Environmental Politics chapter reflect the disciplinary range: building global consensus, international policies, management of the global commons, international organizations and coordination, nongovernmental organizations, struggles in indigenous communities, sustainable development and prospects for future cooperation.

The growing disciplinary range of peace research is dramatically revealed in peace research trends that are reflected in the scope of Barash and Webel's textbook, *Peace and Conflict Studies* (2002). Limited space makes it necessary to illuminate these trends with only five examples: emphasis on multiple tracks and multiple methods, the growing range of activities with respect to peacekeeping and NGO/civil society, post-conflict peace building, preventive long-term peace building, and concern for local arenas of conflict within states. William Zartman's edited volume on *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (2006) is another example that reflects the multiple-tool approach to peacemaking. It describes an array of tools and skills for peacemaking and assesses their usefulness and limitations. Included are chapters on negotiating, mediation, adjudication, social-psychological dimensions of international conflict, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of groups of states engaged in violent protracted conflict, roles for religion in peacemaking, the contributions education and training can make to peacemaking, the economic tools of peacemaking, and the role of force in peacemaking.

5.4 Growing Diversity of Peacekeeping and NGO/Civil Society Activities

Another perspective on the growing multidisciplinary range of peace studies can be gained by examining the growing diversity of activities involved in two kinds of peace activities: peacekeeping operations and non-governmental organization (NGO)/civil society activities. Peacekeeping, invented by UN practice, first consisted primarily of lightly armed UN forces patrolling a ceasefire line. It tended to be highly successful in preventing violence but rarely successful in resolving the conflict that led to violence. More recently, peacekeeping forces have been employed in 'humanitarian intervention' before conflicting parties have achieved ceasefires. In addition, missions have been expanded into what Ratner calls The New UN Peacekeeping (1995), that include domestic police forces, supervision of elections, overseeing transitions to new governments, monitoring referenda on self-determination, supervision and delivery of humanitarian assistance and development aid, supervision of the disarming of conflicting parties, creating

and training new police forces, protection of refugees, and protection for NGO/civil society organizations involved in a diversity of economic, social and political activities. Thus peacekeeping has been extended to evolve into what is now frequently called peacemaking.

The relevance of NGOs/civil society to peace studies now ranges from their local to global activities. Jackie Smith (1997: 47) has selected 631 NGOs which she classifies as Transnational Social Movements (TSMOs), and indicates the issues on which they are focused: human rights (27 %), environment (14 %), women's rights (10 %), peace (9 %), world order/multi-issue (8 %), development (5 %) and selfdetermination-ethnic (5 %). The 31 kinds of activities of these TSMOs can be grouped into six types: (1) they create and mobilize global networks; (2) they participate in intergovernmental organization (IGO) conferences; (3) they are involved in meetings of the UN Security Council, Economic and Social Council and Security Council; (4) they facilitate interstate cooperation outside these meetings and at other places around the world; (5) they engage in activities within states; and (6) they enhance public participation in a variety of ways (Alger 1997:262).

Useful insight on the diversity of NGO/civil society roles is illuminated by the roles that they play in peace-building in the field. They are extensively discussed in *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 75–442). They participate in selecting the type of mediation, in identifying the key actors in the mediation, and in designing the mediation process. They are involved in monitoring an array of peace-building activities. They are involved in relief aid and development cooperation. They train local participants in peacebuilding. They are involved in promoting media coverage and endeavour to insure that it is compatible with their aims. They attempt to diminish the impetus of conflicting parties to seek revenge and punishment. They offer images of a peaceful future. They attempt to bring weapons of violence under control.

5.5 Post-Conflict Peace-Building

Two approaches in the development of peace strategies reflect more recent emphasis on combining a broad array of peace tools in long-term strategies: post-conflict peace-building and preventive long-term peace-building. In *Peacebuilding and Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*, Hon-Won Jeong (2005) provides a broad overview of this emerging field. The concerns that led to post-conflict peace-building are illuminated by Robert Rothstein in an edited volume, *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation* (1999). He emphasizes that a peace process is not so much what happens before an agreement is reached but what happens after it and illuminates this conclusion with several case studies and contributions from eight other scholars. The present significance of post-conflict peace-building is reflected in a February 2006 speech in Addis Ababa by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, when he called for urgent support for post-conflict peacebuilding:

In recent years, the international community has come to recognize that conflict resolution calls for a comprehensive approach in which parties emerging from conflict require assistance not only in negotiating peace agreements, but also in building and consolidating peace. That means providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, ensuring security and security-sector reform, promoting good governance, and in the broadest sense demonstrating to people that peace brings real dividends - improvements in their standards of living, in their sense of opportunity, and in the way their societies function. The recent establishment of a new United Nations Peacebuilding Commission is an important step in this regard (UN, SG/SM/10347).

Necla Tschirgi (2004: 9) has listed the ten 'operational principles of post-conflict peacebuilding' in a document prepared for a conference jointly sponsored by the International Peace Academy and WSP International (formerly the War Torn Societies Project): (1) Has political, social economic, security and legal dimensions. (2) Security is key. (3) Requires a holistic approach guided by a hierarchy of priorities in response to the needs of each specific case. (4) The people of the war-torn society must own the process and be actively involved. (5) Support from external actors is necessary but mechanisms must be established so that external and internal actors work within a coherent strategy. (6) A commitment to local capacity building from the earliest stages is vital. (7) Rapid response is vital but reconstruction is a long-term process that may take a generation. (8) Adequate, predictable and flexible funding is essential. (9) Reconstruction requires local, national, regional and international responses. (10) Accountability is vital. Commitment to 'do no harm' is essential.

Numerous volumes have analyzed the significance of one peace tool in the pursuit of post-conflict peace-building. We have space for only a few examples. Krishna Kumar has edited two volumes. One is *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance* (1997). Kumar has particular concern for how more effective policies and programs can be designed and implemented for food, security, health, human rights, military demobilization, resettlement and local reconciliation. The other is *Post conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance* (Kumar 1998). The book is rooted in the belief that election monitoring is important because elections are the cornerstone of creating a democratic political system. The focus is on planning and conduct of elections in eight countries (El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Liberia), the technical and political success of those elections and their consequences for democratization.

Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post Conflict Recovery (1999), edited by Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, focuses on the consequences of failure to fulfil pledges of aid in 'post-conflict' situations. The six case studies in this volume contribute to concluding insights on how delays and failures in aid follow-through can undermine peace settlements. They offer insight on how delays and failures in aid follow-through can threaten vulnerable polities whose collapse would endanger regional peace and security.

Birgitte Sorenson, in *Women and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources* (1998), notes that women have broad local participation and serve as a reserve labour force in wartime, but then is puzzled by the fact that they are expected to withdraw

when the war is over. Also, women rarely participate in formal peace negotiations. She believes that reconstruction efforts would be significantly strengthened if women were given roles in all aspects of post-war reconstruction.

The potential that forgiveness provides for moving on to build post-conflict relationships has recently received wide attention. We will mention three quite different works on forgiveness. The first is an empirical study, ‘The Propensity to Forgive: Findings from Lebanon’,—an effort to apply psychological research on forgiveness to conflict among Catholics, Maronites and Orthodox in Lebanon. A sample of 48 Catholics, Maronites and Orthodox were asked to respond to brief stories about events in the Lebanese ‘civil’ war. It was found that all respondents ‘were to a certain extent willing to forgive, at least under some circumstances’. Educated people were more prone to forgive than the less educated. Surprisingly, ‘the participants expressed practically equivalent propensity to forgive whether the offender was a member of their religious group or a member of another religious group.’ Very significant is the finding that ‘when remorse and apologies were present, it was easier to forgive; especially for less educated people’. The authors caution that this self-reporting data requires a follow-up based on actual forgiveness behaviour.

The second work, Henderson’s *The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict* (1996), presents 13 case studies ‘of morally compelled actors and their effects in various parts of the world over 50 years’ since the establishment of a centre of reconciliation and change by the Swiss Foundation for Moral Re-Armament. The case studies range across North Africa, Japan, Cambodia, South Africa and the South Tyrol. In an introduction, ‘Science and faith come together’, Joseph Montville (editor of *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*) asserts that these cases are ‘raw data for a rigorous new theory of personal and political conflict resolution that had its origin in spiritual experience and is being studied at diverse secular research institutions’ (Montville 1996: xiii–xviii).

In the third work, *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics* (1995), Donald Shriver discusses German—US, Japan-US relationships and race in America, seeking to understand the implications of Christian faith: ‘The principal purpose of the whole study is to identify both the need and the actual presence of forgiveness in political history, and thus to encourage readers, as citizens, to consider the political wisdom inherent in this neglected virtue. Is forgiveness indispensable for turning political enmity into political neighbourliness?’ (Shriver 1995: 11). Shriver offers a penetrating analysis of the problems created for the future by the insistence on revenge for past deeds. Then he takes up the diverse facets of apology and forgiveness and the difficulties confronted in mobilizing and implementing them in political contexts involving large numbers of people.

Closely related to these volumes focusing on forgiveness is the Truth and Reconciliation strategy applied in South Africa after the demise of apartheid. No doubt this approach to ‘post-conflict’ peace-building will be the focus of extensive inquiry in the near future. Useful for future inquiry will be *A Brief Evaluation of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Some Lessons for Societies*

in Transition (Simpson 1998). In considering transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule, he places the TRC somewhere between two extremes: the prosecutions of ‘war criminals’ in post-Second World War Germany, and the blanket amnesties for gross violators of human rights in post-Pinochet Chile. Simpson sees the high level of violent crime in South Africa today as rooted in ‘experiences of social marginalisation, political exclusion and economic exploitation which are slow to change in the transition to democracy’ (p. 29). He concludes that in order for the rhetoric of reconciliation to become reality it is necessary ‘to tackle those deep rooted social imbalances, which—at the most fundamental structural level—underpin the culture of violence’ (p. 30). In other words, we might say that he concludes that the TRC approach can only be effective if it is creatively combined with other peace-building tools.

The growing significance of post-conflict peace-building in practice, and its disciplinary and professional range, is reflected in the number of organizations in the UN System that explicitly consider post-conflict peacemaking to be a dimension of their traditional missions. We will offer very brief examples of the involvement of UNEP, IMF, the World Bank, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, ILO and UNAIDS. The approach of the Post-Conflict Assessment Unit (PCAU) of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) is ‘to demonstrate the linkages between environmental degradation, public health and sustainable development in order to identify risks and promote sustainable resource use. Following assessment activities that reflect local circumstances and realities, a series of workshops and seminars are provided to help build capacities for environmental management and protection, and to ensure that environmental considerations are integrated into the reconstruction and recovery process’ (www.unep.org).

In 1995, the policy on emergency assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ‘was expanded to cover countries in post-conflict situations. This assistance is limited to circumstances where a member with an urgent balance of payments need is unable to develop and implement a comprehensive economic program because its capacity has been damaged by a conflict, but where sufficient capacity for planning and policy implementation nevertheless exists. IMF financing can help a country directly and by catalyzing support from other sources, since Fund support must be part of a comprehensive international effort to address the aftermath of the conflict’ (www.nnf.org). The IMF has a table on its website, that indicates that it provided Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance from 1995 to 2005 to 12 member states (www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conflict.htm).

The World Bank explains the inclusion of post-conflict peace-building in its traditional mission in this way:

Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction are critical to the World Bank’s mission of poverty reduction. Many of the world’s poorest countries are locked in a tragic vicious circle where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty. Eighty percent of the world’s 20 poorest countries have suffered a major war in the past 15 years. On average, countries coming out of war face a 44 % chance of relapsing in the first five years of

peace. Even with rapid progress after peace, it can take a generation or more just to return to pre-war living standards.

Through assessment of the causes, consequences and characteristics of conflict and the transfer of lessons learned, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit works to design development efforts specific to conflict-affected countries. The Post-Conflict Fund provides financing for physical and social reconstruction initiatives in post-war societies. The Bank is playing a significant role in Afghanistan, Africa's Great Lakes region, the Balkans, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, the West Bank and Gaza, and other war-torn areas (www.worldbank.org).

UNESCO has linked its mission to preserve the 'world heritage' to post-conflict peacebuilding through a 'Heritage and Post-Conflict' emphasis, as expressed in these words:

As world events unfold, we have witnessed the tragic destruction of cultural heritage, for the heritage can become a prime target, especially in intra-State conflicts for reasons of symbolism, identity, aggressiveness, misunderstanding and rejection. In the last decade or so, UNESCO has played a leading and high-profile role internationally in coordinating complex operations to safeguard heritage damaged or threatened by conflicts, with the assistance of many different partners, both public and private (www.unesco.org).

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has posted a paper on 'lessons learned' concerning 'post-conflict land tenure and the sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach', along with a consideration of the SL approach in a post-conflict case study. It also describes some of the primary critical issues that may require further attention, so as to tailor both post-conflict assessment and the SL approach to post-conflict settings (www.fao.org).

The World Health Organization (WHO) has posted a 'Post-conflict strategic framework for WHO in Sudan'. There is also a programme 'designed to assist in re-establishing health services in a context of political and economic instability'. A 'guide to health workforce development in post-conflict environments provides practical information and tools for rebuilding a health workforce, as well as examples from post-conflict countries' (www.who.org).

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has an Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict. On the ILO website there is a paper on 'Training and Employment Promotion for Sustainable Peace ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict'. Section 5.4 describes 'ILO's historical Role and comparative advantage in Post-conflict reconstruction'. Another paper discusses the relevance to ILO of 'Gender issues in complex conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building processes' (www.ilo.org).

UNAIDS, a joint programme of ten agencies in the UN System, has declared that 'the relationship between conflict and the spread of HIV is complex, unpredictable and poorly understood. It is influenced by such factors as population mobility, existing prevalence of HIV infection, and level of sexual interaction. The post-conflict period of reconstruction is also a period of heightened vulnerability to infection. AIDS prevention needs to be an integral part of all humanitarian programmes to assist populations caught up in conflict' (www.unaids.org).

5.6 Long-Term Peace-Building

An exceedingly significant advance in current peace research is the present emphasis on prevention of seriously disruptive conflict through preventive long-term peace-building.² Louis Kriesberg has offered a valuable foundation for preventive efforts in *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Kriesberg, 1998). It is Kriesberg's intent to 'develop an empirically grounded understanding of how people prevent or stop destructive conflicts, but instead wage relatively constructive conflicts' (1998: 13). This volume challenges those engaged in 'prevention' to attempt to devise procedures for clearly distinguishing between potentially violent/disruptive conflicts and those that are constructive. It certainly is necessary to seek the termination of some conflicts, but, in the interest of long-term peace, others should be converted into constructive conflicts.

Also offering a valuable foundation for prevention of violent/disruptive conflicts is research on risk assessment and early warning. Here, a significant contribution is Davies and Gurr's edited volume on *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning* (1998). They are attempting to develop the capacity to diagnose 'failures' far enough in advance to facilitate effective international efforts at 'prevention or peaceful transformation'. Contributors to this volume examine potential early warning indicators in different situations and attempt to judge their effectiveness according to various models.

Different emphases are suggested by the varying terminology employed by scholars emphasizing prevention. Bloomfield and Moulton (1997) wish to 'manage' international conflict. The Carnegie Commission (1997) desires to 'prevent deadly conflict'. Cahill (1996), Jentleson (2000) and Lund (1996) place their efforts under the rubric 'preventive diplomacy'. Also useful contributors in this vein are Bauwens and Reychler (1994), Cortright (1997), Peck (1998), Reychler (1998) and Vayrynen (1997). We choose to mention them separately because I believe they significantly err in asserting that it is their goal to 'prevent' conflict, thereby making a mistake widely encountered in the literature. It is quite obvious, in the light of the contribution of some forms of conflict to useful social change, that these insightful scholars really mean 'transformation' most of the time.

Some of the volumes on prevention encompass a wide array of approaches and tools. Lund, in *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (1996), develops a broad 'preventive diplomacy toolbox' that includes military approaches (restraints on the use of armed force and threat or use of armed force), diplomatic measures (coercive—without use of armed force and noncoercive), and development and governance approaches (promotion of economic and social development, promulgation and enforcement of human rights and democracy, and national governing structures to promote peaceful conflict resolution). This is indeed comprehensive because these three categories embrace more than 50

² This section is extensively extracted from Alger (2000: 6–9).

individual tools. For example, the noncoercive diplomatic measures are divided into judicial or quasi judicial and nonjudicial. Included in nonjudicial are 12 tools with a diversity of approaches, such as third-party mediation, propaganda and fact finding.

Kevin Cahill, a medical doctor, asserts in his edited volume on preventive diplomacy (1996), that 'it is only natural for me to think of clinical and public health models in contemplating the disorders now threatening the health of the world community'. Thus he has sections on 'interrupting a global epidemic', 'causes and local remedies', 'signs, symptoms and early intervention' and 'establishing trust in the healer'. There are also chapters on early warning, fact finding, economic sanctions, human rights, peacekeeping, the media and education.

After examining why deadly conflicts occur, the Carnegie Commission, in *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997), distinguishes between operational prevention and structural prevention. Operational prevention strategies range across early warning and response, preventive diplomacy, economic measures and 'forceful' measures that include peacekeeping, preventive deployments and a rapid reaction 'fire brigade'. Structural prevention, employed as a synonym to peace-building, addresses root causes of deadly conflict and includes security (from violence), economic well-being and justice. Responsibilities are laid out for states and their leaders, civil society (religion, science, media and business), the UN and regional arrangements. A concluding section, 'toward a culture of prevention' provides tasks for the mass media, religious institutions and the United Nations.

Although prevention necessarily involves a diversity of approaches and tools, some volumes focus their efforts on one kind of activity. In a volume on 'sustainable peace', Connie Peck (1998) asserts that the most sustainable means is good governance because good governance offers groups a voice in resolving grievances at an early stage. In *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (1997), edited by David Cortright, the focus is on incentives, rather than on coercion, deterrence and sanctions. These positive inducements of an 'economic, political or security character' can be focused on deterring nuclear proliferation, armed conflict and defending human rights.

In *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*, Mary Anderson (1996) asserts that the impact of aid is not neutral. She asks, how can humanitarian or development assistance be 'given in conflict situations in ways that rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict help local people to disengage and establish alternative systems to deal with the problems that underlie conflict?' Her response includes concern for the implicit ethical message of aid and the impact of resource transfers on conflict. She would use aid in developing local capacities for peace through food for work, village rehabilitation, working with children in the context of civil war and coping with poverty. In a Bock and Anderson article (1999), the focus is on how aid agencies can defuse intercommunal conflict. Here, aid would be used to 'inculcate a sense of belonging among a large, more inclusive group' and to 'support/strengthen interconnection structures and systems, rather than competitive ones' (p. 336).

Also offering insight on links between aid and peace is the Prendergast (1996) study of humanitarian aid and conflict in Africa. He offers ten Commandments for

avoiding ‘good intentions on the road to hell’, i.e. providing aid without sustaining conflict. His commandments involve deep analysis based on a diversity of information sources, independent monitoring and evaluation, integrating human rights monitoring, advocacy and capacity building and making aid conditional upon acceptance of humanitarian principles and conflict resolution. He concludes that humanitarian aid is the most important avenue of contact among the international community and conflicting parties; thereby aid offers one of the best policy instruments for preventing escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peace-building (Prendergast 1996: 143).

In the light of the prominent use of religious differences by leaders as a basis for waging conflict and war, research advocating the use of religion as a peace tool is an increasingly important response (Alger 2002; Groff and Smoker 1996; Smock 1995). Appleby, in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (1999), asserts that religion’s ability to inspire violence is intimately related to its equally impressive power as a force for peace. He identifies what religious terrorists and religious peacemakers share in common, what causes them to take different paths in fighting injustice and the importance of acquiring understanding of religious extremism.

Johnston and Sampson, in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (1994), opens with a foreword by Jimmy Carter asserting that, ‘we all realize that religious differences have often been a cause or pretext for war. Less known is the fact that the actions of many religious persons and communities point in another direction. They demonstrate that religion can be a potent force in encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflict’ (1994: 7). After six case studies of reconciliation, the volume concludes with implications for the foreign policy community and implications for four religious communities: Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu and Christian.

There are other works provoking thoughts of how religion can be used as a peace tool. These include Sampson, who informs us of the institutional moves within some religious communities toward developing ‘an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding’ (Sampson 1996: 304). Johansen (1997) has contributed ‘Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint Among Pashtuns’. Reychler (1997) asks for a serious study of the impact of religious organizations on conflict behaviour that includes a comparative study of the peace-building efforts of different religious organizations. He asserts that the world cannot survive without a new global ethic and that the religious ties of parties, passive bystanders, peacemakers and peace-builders will play a major role.

5.7 Local Conflict Within States

Recently, the peace research field has become linked to a larger field that has focused on local arenas of conflict within states, including schools, local communities, business and courts. One example is the Ohio Commission on Dispute

Resolution and Conflict Management: ‘Focused on four program areas—educational institutions, state and local government, courts, and communities—the Commission works to positively affect the lives of all Ohio citizens by providing dispute resolution and conflict management training, consultation and technical assistance in designing dispute resolution programs, and facilitation and mediation services’ (www.disputeresolution.ohio.gov).

Together with the Ohio Department of Education, and other educational organizations, it works to provide Ohio schools with constructive, nonviolent methods for resolving disputes. Through these efforts the Commission helps to build partnerships among communities, courts and schools throughout Ohio. Currently, there are more than 75 community and court programmes serving more than one-half of Ohio’s 88 counties. Together with the Ohio Department of Education, the Ohio Board of Education and other educational organizations, the Commission works to provide Ohio schools with constructive, nonviolent methods for resolving disputes.

These kinds of dispute resolution and conflict management activities now exist in other states in the United States and in other countries. Although many that are involved see them only as a means for coping with local conflict, nevertheless they do see an advantage in sharing knowledge and experiences with those involved in other countries. On the other hand, some involved in the peace research field with a global focus perceive that knowledge and experience acquired in coping in local dispute resolution and conflict management activities enhance the ability of people to cope with these issues in larger geographic arenas. In response to both of these concerns, an International Network (IN) for Conflict Resolution (CR) and Peace Education (PE) has been created. CREPE sees its role as ‘prevention of conflict by stakeholders at all levels including international organizations, governments, education administrators, teachers, and faculty, parents, students and members of the local community’. The Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management is a member of CREPE. Included in the goals of CREPE are conducting research to illustrate the effectiveness of PE and CRE and networking across groups including government, non-governmental and civil society organizations and educational institutions. The functions of the network include creating an inventory of resources such as curriculum and training materials, providing opportunities to share knowledge and expertise, offering a clearinghouse of existing legislation and policies related to PE and CRE, conducting/supporting forums and conferences, providing samples of best practices, and supplying access to existing research and evaluation (www.disputeresolution.ohio.gov).

5.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, the expansion of the functions of the UN System, and the growing diversity of the participants, reveal that virtually all professions are now involved in peace-related activities. We have illuminated the expanding disciplinary range

of peace research by examining five themes: emphasis on multiple tracks and multiple methods, the growing range of peace activities associated with peace-keeping and NGOs/civil society, post-conflict peacemaking, preventive long-term peace-building, and local arenas of conflict within states. We have found that virtually all organizations have peacemaking and peace-building potential: governmental, NGO/civil society and business. In all categories this includes organizations that range from local to global.

Peace researchers are now providing ever more empirical evidence in support of Johan Galtung's conclusion 26 years ago: 'There are tasks for everybody' (Galtung 1980: 396). The General Assembly of UNESCO reached the same conclusion when it issued a Declaration on a Culture of Peace in 1999:

The Declaration defines the culture of peace as a set of values, attitudes, traditions, modes of behaviour and ways of life based on respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and co-operation; commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts; respect for and promotion of the right to development, equal rights and opportunities for men and women, the rights of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information; and adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, co-operation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations (www.unesco.org/education).

In *Cultures of Peace* (1999), Elise Boulding has provided illuminating descriptions of widespread cultures of peace that now exist throughout the world, in families, communities, regions, states and organizations that range from local to global. Because media coverage tends to emphasize violence and seriously disruptive conflict, it is difficult for many people to have a vision of peace. But a distinguishing attribute of many involved in peace research is their devotion to acquiring knowledge that can provide the path to their vision of a more peaceful world. Elise Boulding's volume, and other studies of peaceful cultures, is making an essential contribution to the ever more significant peace research discipline by making it easier for ever more people to have a vision of a peaceful world.

References

- Alger, C.F. (1997) 'Transnational social movements, world politics, and global governance', in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 260-78.
- Alger, C.F. (1999) 'The expanding tool chest for peacebuilders', in H.-W.Jeong (ed.) *The New Agenda for Peace Research*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 13-44.
- Alger, C.F. (2000) 'Challenges for peace researchers and peace builders in the twenty-first century: education and coordination of a diversity of actors in applying what we are learning', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 5,1:1-13.
- Alger, C.F. (2002) 'Religion as a peace tool', *Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1,4: 94-109.
- Alger, C.F. (2003) 'Searching for democratic potential in emerging global governance', in B. Morrison (ed.) *Transnational Democracy in Critical and Comparative Perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 88-105.
- Alger, C.F. (2006) *The United Nations System: A Reference Handbook*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

- Anderson, M.B. (1996) *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Appleby, R.S. (1999) *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, Boston, MA: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Barash, D.P. and Webel, C.P. (2002) *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Bauwens, W and Reyhler, L. (eds) (1994) *The Art of Conflict Prevention*, London and New York: Brassey's.
- Bloomfield, L.P. and Moulton, A. (1997) *Managing International Conflict: From Theory to Policy*, New York: St Martin's Press.
- Bock, J.B. and Anderson, M.B. (1999) 'Dynamite under the intercommunal bridge: how can aid agencies help defuse it', *Journal of Peace Research*, 36,3:325-38.
- Cahill, K.P. (1996) *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start*, New York: Basic Books.
- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission Preventing Deadly Conflict.
- Cortright, D. (ed.) (1997) *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, Boston, MA: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Davies, J.L. and Gurr, E.R. (eds) (1998) *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, Boston, MA: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Diamond, L. and McDonald, J. (1996) *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, 3rd edn, West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press.
- Forman, S. and Patrick, S. (eds) (1999) *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-conflict Recovery*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Galtung, J. (1969) 'Violence, peace and peace research' *Journal of Peace Research*, 6,3:167—91.
- Galtung, J. (1980) *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*, New York: Free Press.
- Groff, L. and Smoker, P. (1996) 'Spirituality, religion, culture, and peace: exploring the foundations for inner—outer peace in the twenty-first century', *International Journal of Peace Research*, 1, 1: 57-114.
- Henderson, M. (1996) *The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict*, London: Grosvenor Books.
- Jentleson, B.W. (ed.) (2000) *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Jeong, H.-W (2000), *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Jeong, H.-W. (2005) *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Johansen, R.C. (1997) 'Radical Islam and nonviolence: a case study of religious empowerment and constraint among Pashtuns', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34,1: 53-72.
- Johnston, D. and Sampson, C. (1994) *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kriesberg, L. (1998) *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. Boulder, CO: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Kumar, K. (1997) *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Kumar, K. (1998) *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Lund, M.S. (1996) *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Montville, J.V. (1996) 'Foreword', in M. Henderson, *The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict*, London: Governor Books, xii—xviii.
- Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA) and the International Peace Research Association (IPPRJ) Foundation (2006) *Global Directory of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Programs* (seventh edition), San Francisco, CA: PJSA.
- Peck, C. (1998) *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict*, Boulder, CO: Rowan and Littlefield.

- Prendergast, J. (1996), *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Ratner, S.R. (1995) *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Land of Conflict After the Cold War*, New York: St Martin's Press and Council on Foreign Relations.
- Reychler, L. (1997) 'Religion and conflict', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 2,1:19—38.
- Reychler, L. (1998) 'Proactive conflict prevention: impact assessment', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 3,2:87-98.
- Reychler, L. and Paffenholz, T. (eds) (2001) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Rothstein, R.L. (ed.) (1999) *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Sampson, C. (1996) 'Religion and peacebuilding', in I. Zartman and L. Rasmussen (eds) *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 273—315.
- Shriver, D.W. (1995) *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, G. (1998) *A Brief Evaluation of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Some Lessons for Societies in Transition*, Johannesburg: Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
- Smith, J. (1997) 'Characteristics of the modern transnational social movement sector', in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 42-58.
- Smock, D.R. (1995) *Perspectives on Pacifism: Christian, Jewish and Muslim Views on Nonviolence and International Conflict*, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Sorenson, B. (1998) *Women and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources*, Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development and Programme for Strategic International Security.
- Tschirgi, N. (2004) *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, New York: International Peace Academy.
- Vayrynen, R. (1997) 'Toward effective conflict prevention: a comparison of different instruments', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 2,1:1—18.
- Wenger, A. and Mockli, D. (2003) *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Zartman, I.W. and Rasmussen, J.L. (eds) (2006) *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, revised edn, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

Chapter 6

The Escalating Peace Potential of Global Governance

The purpose of this chapter is to motivate more peace researchers to illuminate the widespread peacebuilding potential of escalating global governance. I will approach this issue primarily in the context of the threefold research and teaching agenda that I have pursued for many ears: (1) the UN System (Alger 2006), (2) the worldwide links of people and organizations in local communities (Alger 1990, 1999) and (3) peace research (Alger 2007a).¹

6.1 The Emergence of Global Governance

Practitioners in global governance today have important roots in the League of Nations Covenant that focused on the reduction of armaments, prevention of aggression and submitting disputes to arbitration; but the League was broadening its agenda and developing an economic and social council as World War is approached. Building on League experience, those writing the UN Charter included an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), seven references to human rights, and Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories (Chapter XI). The UN now has a Human Rights Council, and most of the territories that were colonies of UN member states when the UN was founded are now UN member states. In addition, the expanding UN System has added economic development, economic equity, communications equity and ecological balance. All of these elements of a broadening agenda are now dimensions of what is often referred to as post-conflict peacebuilding and long-term peacebuilding.

A “culture of peace” movement has emerged that reflects Galtung’s broad view of the peace process (Galtung 1980). In pursuit of this goal UNESCO published UNESCO and a *Culture of Peace; Promoting a Global Movement* in 1995, with a

¹ This text was first published as “The Escalating Peacebuilding Potential of Global Governance”, in Luc Reyhler, Kevin Villanueva, and Julianne Funk Deckard, eds., *Building Sustainable Futures: Enacting Peace and Development*. Bilbao, Spain: University of Deusto, 2009. The permission to republish this text was granted on 14 January 2013 by Luc Reyhler.

second edition in 1997, that declares that “every aspect of social relations can be affected by a culture of peace movement” (121). Another volume that has emerged out of UNESCO’s campaign is *From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace* (1996), with contributions from fifteen scholars, including one by Johan Galtung on “Cultural Peace: Some Characteristics” (1996: 75–92).

The emerging and very diverse peacebuilding agenda of the UN System is also reflected in the Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly in 2000 that called for eight Millennium Development Goals: (1) eradicate *extreme poverty*, (2) achieve universal *primary education*, (3) promote *gender equality and empower women*, (4) reduce *child mortality*, (5) improve *maternal health*, (6) combat *HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases*, (7) ensure *environmental sustainability* and (8) develop a *global partnership for development*.

Obviously the Culture of Peace Movement, and the Millennium Development Goals reveal that visions of emerging and future global governance reach beyond relations between governments of states and includes aspects of the everyday lives of people living within states that are on the agendas of various governmental authorities within states. Of course, this raises very challenging questions about when and how they should be involved.

Those advocating for the Culture of Peace Movement and the Millennium Development Goals obviously have a vastly expanding vision of the responsibilities of the UN System. Of course, it must be recognized that there are very important limitations that the UN System experiences in its efforts to carry out the goals of the Culture of Peace, and Millennium Development. First, even before the Iraq war, the total budget of the UN System was only 3 % of the military budget of one UN member state, the United States. Second, frequently numerous UN member states are not prepared to vote in support of multilateral efforts to develop a Culture of Peace and attain the Millennium Development goals. Nevertheless, those who are developing strategies for overcoming these limitations are making very significant contributions to peacebuilding.

It will be the purpose of the remainder of this chapter to illuminate the fact that the UN System has been evolving toward acquiring the capacity of carrying out these visions of global governance. We will first provide an overview of the expanding array of UN System agencies that now carry out 64 functions. We will then provide an overview of the escalating involvement in global governance of parliamentarians of states, civil society/NGOs, local governments and business.

6.2 The UN System now Involves People from Most Professions and Disciplines

Sixty-three years of experience in the United Nations “laboratory” has led to an ever broader UN System for performing peacebuilding roles. The organization chart of the UN System (www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html) now includes 66 agencies, commissions, programs, funds and other entities. The array of functions that appear in the names of these agencies are listed in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Functions appearing in names of UN System units

<i>Units created by the general assembly (27)</i>	
• Capital development fund	• Children’s fund
• Crime and justice research institute	• Democracy fund
• Development program	• Disarmament research
• Drug control program	• Environment program
• Fund for international partnerships	• HIV/AIDS program
• Human rights, council	• Human settlements program
• Peacekeeping commission	• Population fund
• Project services, office for	• Refugees, High Commissioner
• Refugees, Palestine	• Research for social development
• Staff college	• Trade and development conference
• Trade, international center	• Training and research institute
• University	• Volunteers
• Women development Fund	• Women, research and training institute
• World food program	
<i>UN Specialized Agencies (19)</i>	
• Agricultural development fund	• Civil aviation
• Education, science, culture	• Food and agriculture
• Health, world	• Development, international association
• Finance, international corporation	• Industrial development
• Investment, multilateral guarantee agency	• Investment disputes, international settlement
• Intellectual property, world	• Labor
• Maritime, international	• International Monetary fund
• Meteorological, world	• International Postal union
• Reconstruction and development bank	• Telecommunications, international
• Tourism, world	
<i>ECOSOC Functional Commissions (8)</i>	
• Crime prevention	• Human rights
• Narcotic drugs	• Population
• Science and technology for development	• Statistics
• Sustainable development	• Status of women
<i>ECOSOC, Other Bodies (2)</i>	
• Forests forum	• Indigenous issues forum
<i>Security Council (4)</i>	
• Military staff	• Criminal tribunals, Yugoslavia and Rwanda
• Peacekeeping operations and missions	• Counter terrorism committee
<i>Related Organizations (4)</i>	
• Atomic energy agency	• Chemical weapons prohibition
• Nuclear test-ban treaty	• World trade organization
<i>Other Trust Funds (2)</i>	
• International partnership fund	• Democracy fund

The 66 UN System functions in Table 6.1 reflect the growing reach of global governance in response to the ever widening geographic borders of governance problems. This perspective very usefully reveals that it is essential that we ponder the possible impact of all global governance decisions on peacebuilding. Of course, all of these functions are also performed by regional organizations of

states, by departments of the governments of states and by departments in many provincial and local governments. Obviously, those aspiring to be peace builders face very complex challenges. On the other hand, simplification that ignores the complexity of reality ignores the full array of peacebuilding opportunities. This quick overview challenges those involved in all professions to ponder the roles that their profession plays in the UN System and their personal options for involvement. It also challenges researchers in all academic disciplines to ponder how they might more adequately illuminate these involvements.

This overview also provides an overwhelming challenge to peace researchers. What is the potential impact of all of these functions on peacebuilding? How can the array of peace functions in the UN System be coordinated? Because most of these functions are also performed by governments that range in geographic space from local to global, how can the array of governments involved in each function be coordinated? How can the peacebuilding potential of most professions and disciplines become an explicit part of their education and practice?

As the UN peacebuilding agenda has broadened, there has been growing awareness of the need to collaborate with other institutions that have the same issues on their agenda (Alger 2007b). We will provide brief overviews of the growing involvement of the UN System with parliamentarians of state governments, NGOs/civil society, business and local governments. We will also provide evidence of the relevance of NGOs/civil society, business and local governments to global governance with brief overviews of their involvement in world affairs outside the UN System.

6.3 Participation of Parliamentarians of States in the UN System

In 2004 the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (Cardoso Report) took a broader perspective of participation in peacebuilding when it emphasized that all constituencies relevant to an issue should be included in global governance, including parliamentarians and local authorities, because it “is not only essential for effective action on global priorities but is also a protection against further erosion of multilateralism” (UN General Assembly 2004).

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an organization of members of parliaments of states, was founded in 1889 in Paris. With the goal of “Promoting the concepts of peace and international arbitration, the IPU provided the origins for today’s form of institutionalized multilateral co-operation and advocated the establishment of corresponding institutions... which eventually came into being as the United Nations” (www.ipu.org).

Parliamentarians of states have long been members of General Assembly delegations of some member states. For some years there have been meetings of these parliamentarians. The IPU signed a cooperation agreement with the UN in 1996 that calls for “Parliamentary Hearings to be held every year during the fall session

of the General Assembly. The meeting is usually opened by the UN Secretary General and the President of the IPU. Hundreds of parliamentarians from every region of the world participate” (www.ipu.org/un-e/un-hearings.htm). In 1997, the IPU adopted a Universal Declaration on Democracy that affirms that democracy is an international principle applicable to international organizations and states in their international relations, and that “the principles of democracy must be applied to the international management of issues of global interest” (Johnsson 2003: 22).

In 1995, on the eve of the UN 50th anniversary celebration, the IPU convened a special session of its governing body (the inter-Parliamentary Council) in the UN General Assembly Hall. After a three days debate, the Council adopted a declaration calling for close cooperation between the UN and National Parliaments, and for the IPU to facilitate this process. The Secretary General of the IPU states that it also called for a formal agreement between the IPU and the UN that would provide a framework for cooperation “mirroring at the international level the relationship which exists at the national level between government and the parliament” (Johnsson 2003: 23).

In pursuit of this agreement, the IPU signed a cooperation agreement with the UN in 1996 that calls for Parliamentary Hearings to be held every year during the fall session of the General Assembly. The Parliamentary Hearing at the 61st UN General Assembly, in 2006, focused on “Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: Reinforcing the Key Role of the United Nations”. The discussions centered on the main findings of the Secretary General’s Report on Conflict Prevention, and the new UN Peace-Building Commission.

At the UN Millennium Summit, on 30 August and 1 September 2000, a conference of some 150 speakers, Presidents or Presiding Officers of National Parliaments gave an important impetus to increased cooperation between the UN and the IPU. Their declaration

outlines a strategy for providing a parliamentary dimension to international cooperation... globalization demands that greater attention be paid to the wishes of the people. That, in turn, means reinforcing the role of parliament and its members as intermediaries between the complexities of international decision-making and the day-to-day existence of the individual (Johnsson 2003: 24).

They pledged their support to the IPU as the “world organization for inter-parliamentary cooperation and for relaying the vision and will of its members to intergovernmental organizations” (Johnsson 2003: 25).

After the UN and IPU concluded a formal agreement of cooperation in 1996, the IPU remained an organization with ECOSOC Category I Consultative Status, but in November 2002 the General Assembly granted IPU observer status, with the right to distribute its official documents in the General Assembly. Some refer to it as a “super-observer” status (Johnsson 2003).

The overall mandate of the Office of (the IPU) Permanent Observer (OPO) has three main components: representation and outreach, information and communications, and project support. In particular, the Office represents the IPU at meetings of United Nations bodies in New York, monitors relevant United Nations debates and initiatives, and facilitates the presentation of IPU substantive positions before

the United Nations General Assembly and its subsidiary organs (www.ipu.org/un-e/un-opo.htm).

The IPU website reports that these are the “leading IPU partners within the United Nations system”: UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW), UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF).

These developments challenge the long established practice that only the executive branches of states should represent themselves in inter-state organizations. Should the present; largely IPU-defined parliamentary relationship with the UN be permitted to evolve? Should a more explicit future vision of an IPU-led parliamentary-UN relationship be developed? Instead, would the best peacebuilding strategy call for a directly elected UN Parliamentary Assembly?

6.4 Participation of NGOs/Civil Society in the UN System

The UN Charter says that ECOSOC “may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are concerned with matters within its competence.” Based on this phrase, NGO participation in the UN System has widely expanded through practice (Alger 2002b, 1997). Four hundred NGOs are accredited to the Commission on Sustainable Development (a subsidiary body of ECOSOC), and 1,500 NGOs are associated with the Department of Public Information (DPI). DPI helps these NGOs gain access to, and disseminate information about issues in which the United Nations is involved, so that the public can better understand the aims and objectives of the UN and support its work.

NGO involvement in public decision-making bodies at UN headquarters has now spread beyond observation. Opportunities for NGOs to address public sessions has spread beyond ECOSOC to include committees of the General Assembly. They have also participated in what have been labeled as “formal panels” and “informal panels” of General Assembly committees. It is very significant that NGOs have acquired access to a broad range of private meetings of committees and sub-committees of the General Assembly. Particularly significant is that a “Consultative Group” of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, composed of members of several NGOs, has met informally with Presidents of the UN Security Council.

NGOs have also developed an array of relations with UN Secretariats. The diversity of modes for NGO contact with members of the Secretariat are impressive. They include regularly scheduled meetings with NGOs, representation of NGOs on committees, Annual Consultation meetings with NGOs, symposia for NGOs, and NGO participation on national steering committees. Policy papers are posted on the web for NGO comment. Support for NGOs is provided through training

and financial support and NGO creation. NGOs support secretariats financially and serve as their stand-ins. Secretariats and NGOs collaborate through joint research and joint implementation and monitoring of programs. There are NGO Liaison Offices at the headquarters of UN agencies throughout the UN System. It is particularly significant that the growing involvement of NGOs with UN decision-making bodies and secretariats has come with very little change in formal rules that were established for NGO access to the UN in 1950 (Alger 2003: 90–92).

Special UN conferences have had a significant impact on the styles of NGO participation in the UN System. The holding of UN conferences focused on specific global issues at various sites around the world builds on a tradition that reaches back to the 1932 World Disarmament Conference (Spiro 1995: 49). These conferences have had an impact on evolving NGO involvement in the UN System in at least four respects. First, NGO conferences that run parallel to these governmental conferences has spurred the development of NGO collaboration in the development of policies on specific issues and in presenting them to assemblies composed of government representatives. Second, NGOs have become increasingly involved in the preparatory phases of UN conferences, thereby offering NGOs experience in the pre-public phases of parliamentary diplomacy. Third, because these conferences have been held around the world, they have been accessible to a growing number of NGOs, particularly those in the Third World. Fourth, ad hoc procedures employed for NGO participation at these conferences have led to demands for wider NGO access at permanent headquarters (Alger 2003: 93–94).

NGO gatherings at UN conferences away from UN headquarters has spurred four other NGO conference formats. First, a number of NGO conferences have convened as a follow-up to UN world conferences with an issue focus. Second, building on NGO conferences linked with UN conferences focused on a single global issue, broad-agenda free; standing NGO conferences, often referred to as “people’s assemblies” have emerged. As the proposal for a Millennium UN General Assembly emerged, Secretary General Kofi Annan joined the call for a companion Peoples Millennium Assembly. This proposed assembly met during 22–26 May 2000 under the name “Peoples Millennium Forum.” Participating in the Forum were 1,350 representatives of over 1,000 NGOs from more than 100 countries. Fourth, for several decades there have been proposals for a second General Assembly that have included differing proposals for the nature of its members, including members state legislatures, representatives of non-governmental organizations and directly elected members. More recent proposals include the International Network for a UN Second Assembly (1996), Childers and Urquhart’s proposal for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (1994) and a proposal for an annual Forum of Civil Society in the Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995). Many working for the Peoples Millennium Forum, but certainly not all, saw it as a building block toward a permanent second assembly (Alger 2002b: 112–114).

These proposals raise very significant questions about how NGOs might most effectively contribute to UN peacebuilding. Should their participation primarily be permitted to evolve, as it has since the founding of the UN? Or would their contribution to peacebuilding be more effective if they were part of a permanent

second assembly? This leads to another important question. Should NGOs select the members of this assembly, or should they be directly elected by the people of the world?

6.5 NGOs/Civil Society in World Politics

Although there is no doubt that the number of NGOs involved in world politics has increased in recent years, it is essential that we recognize that this is not a new phenomenon. At a commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Secretary General Kofi Annan reminded his audience:

Before the founding of the United Nations, NGOs led the charge in the adoption of some of the Declaration's forerunners. The Geneva conventions of 1864; multilateral labor conventions adopted in 1906; and the International Slavery Convention of 1926; all stemmed from the world of NGOs who infused the international community with a spirit of reform (UN Secretary General 1998).

Research in the last decade has provided ever more comprehensive knowledge of the wide ranging peacebuilding roles in which NGO/civil society are engaged. These works reveal that NGO/civil society activities can be placed in a fourfold framework. First, it is necessary for those involved in peacebuilding to create and mobilize global networks. Second, in organizing these networks, and acquiring support for their operations, they must enhance public participation. Third, they must become involved with, and endeavor to influence International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and other multilateral political arenas. Fourth, they must become involved in a diverse array of field activities.

It is important to recognize that those focusing on the roles of NGOs in world politics are concerned with only a small percentage of the total NGO population. Two volumes applying terminology from sociology make this fact very clear. Jackie Smith, et al. in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*, define this category of NGOs as "clusters of relatively marginalized actors that promote some form of social or political change" and identify them as "social movements" (1997: 59). Their volume focuses on transnational social movements (TSMOs), i.e., those active across state borders.

Keck and Sikkink, in *Activists Beyond Borders*, prefer the term "transnational network" with this explanation:

By importing the network concept from sociology and applying it transnational[^], we bridge the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms... The networks we describe in this book participate in domestic and international politics simultaneously, drawing on a variety of resources, as if they were part of an international society (1998: 4).

The complexity of the political processes in which NGOs that are the focus of this volume are involved is not only a result of the "sheer diversity" of those NGOs working for social and political change, but also a result of the array of other actors with whom they must interact. They list seven major actors in "transnational

advocacy networks”: (1) international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations, (2) local social movements, (3) foundations, (4) the media, (5) churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals, (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations and (7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9).

NGOs engaged in a diversity of field activities are increasingly informed about the ways in which their activities can impact peacebuilding (Bock and Anderson 1999). For example, in *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War* (1996), Mary Anderson asserts what the impact of aid is not neutral. She asks how humanitarian or ‘development assistance can be offered in conflict situations in ways that do not exacerbate the conflict, but help local people to establish alternative systems to deal with problems that underlie conflict. John Prendergast concludes that humanitarian aid is the most important avenue of contact among the international community and conflicting. Parties, thereby aid offers one of the best policy instruments for preventing escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peacebuilding (1996: 143).

In the light of the prominent use of religious differences by leaders as a basis for waging conflict and war, research illuminating how religion can be employed as a peace tool is extending visions of roles that religious organizations can play in peacebuilding (Alger 2002). Appleby, in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (1999), asserts that religion’s ability to inspire violence is intimately related to its equally impressive power as a force for peace. Cynthia Sampson informs us of the institutional moves within some religious communities toward developing “an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding” (1997: 304).

Recent research has been very informative on the peacebuilding relevance of roles played by NGOs in humanitarian field activities. *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, by Reychler and Paffenholz (2001) is a 543 page handbook for members of NGOs active in peacebuilding in the field. A quick overview of the 55 contributions to this volume, by 57 scholars and participants in NGOs, usefully illuminates the diversity of challenges confronted by NGOs engaged in peacebuilding in the field. 17 aspects of field activity are divided into three sections: (1) preparing for the field, (2) working in the field, and (3) surviving in the field. Preparing for the field also involves selecting people, training people and creating awareness of multicultural environments and gender issues.

Discussion of training people opens with a listing of peacebuilding activities in which NGOs are involved: mediation and confidence building, humanitarian assistance, reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction, stabilization of economic structures, monitoring and improving human rights, interim administration, information and education. It concludes with concern that “at best civilians are introduced to their mission tasks through short-term courses”. Instead, it is advocated that “there is a need for comprehensive training programs that fit the needs of field operations” (Reychler and Paffenholtz 2001: 36).

The concluding section of the volume, surviving in the field (Reychler and Paffenholtz 2001: 443–533), offers essential insights on the survival challenges

confronted by members of NGOs attempting to achieve their goals in strange, challenging, disruptive and often violent conditions. High Risk Job (HRJ) NGOs, such as the International Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, have developed stress-prevention structures within their organizations.

Finally, it is very significant that learning, through both practice and research, about peacebuilding tasks for civil society has had an impact on peace agreements. Bell and O'Rourke (2007) have analyzed 389 peace agreements addressing 48 intra-state conflicts. They found that 139 of these agreements, addressing 41 intra-state conflicts, make explicit provisions for civil society involvement.

In conclusion, it is likely that virtually all readers of this article will be able to identify a role that they are playing, or could play in a NGO/civil society organization of which they are a member that is involved in peacebuilding. Also, peace researchers are challenged to bear in mind the simultaneous involvement of NGO/civil society organizations in a vast array of roles in transnational advocacy networks, humanitarian assistance roles, development assistance roles, religious roles, a diversity of peacebuilding roles in the field and tasks assigned in peace agreements. How can analysis of these activities by peace researchers help those involved to more adequately evaluate the interdependence of this vast array of peacebuilding roles and their impact?

6.6 Participation of Business in the UN System

The UN website states: "The business community has played an active role in the United Nations since its inception in 1945. A number of UN organizations have a successful history of co-operating with business. Recent political and economic changes have fostered and intensified the search for collaborative arrangements" (www.un.org/partners/business). A detailed account of these developments is provided by Jane Nelson in *Building Partnerships: Cooperation Between the United Nations System and the Private Sector* (2002). The United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) was established in 1998 by Secretary General Kofi Annan. UNFIP is responsible for administering and developing partnerships between the agencies, departments, and programs of the UN and the private sector. UNFIP works with UN web foundations and corporations to identify opportunities for partnership and collaboration.

There is a vast literature that reveals the widespread influence of transnational business corporations on world affairs (Macleod and Lewis 2004: 77–98). Recently there have been efforts to involve these corporations in standards that conform to UN declarations and covenants on human rights, labor and environment. Toward this end Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact in an address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 1999. He urged business corporations to join an international initiative involving UN agencies, labor and civil society. In July 2000 more than 50 corporation heads met with the Secretary General at United Nations Headquarters for the launch of the Global Compact.

Now, hundreds of companies from all regions of the world, international labor and civil society organizations are engaged in the Global Compact,

working to advance ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption that are derived from these four documents: (1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (2) the International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, (3) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and (4) the UN Convention Against Corruption. The Global Compact now involves over 2,000 business, civil society, academic and city organizations. There are Global Compact Offices in six UN agencies: UN High Commissioner for Human rights (UN-HCHR), UN Environment Program (UNEP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In April 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed an open debate of the Security Council on the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.

The peace mission of the Global Compact, defined by the UN Global Compact Office in 2005 in *Enabling Economies of Peace: Public Policy for Conflict-Sensitive Business*, identifies a range of actions that governments and international organizations can undertake to assist private-sector efforts to promote conflict-sensitive business practices. The Global Compact Office has also created a Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management (2002, www.unglobalcompact.org). The UN website reminds business of the “contributions of the UN System to commercial order and openness” and informs them of the contributions of specific organizations in the UN system to worldwide business, including the International Maritime Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization, International Telecommunications Union and World Meteorological Organization (www.un.org/partners/business/otherpages/factsheets).

The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument—it does not “police,” enforce or measure the behavior or actions of companies. Rather, the Global Compact relies on public accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor and civil society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the Global Compact is based (www.unglobalcom-pact.org).

In conclusion, there is no doubt that UN efforts, through the Global Compact to involve business corporations in efforts to conform to UN standards on human rights, labor and environment, and to support the development of economies of peace is a significant innovation. This development creates a great need for peace researchers to illuminate exactly what strategies might most effectively induce business leaders to comply with these standards.

6.7 Business in World Politics

The brief overview of business in the UN System reflected diverse dimensions of business involvement in world politics that have been largely ignored by the mainstream of international relations research; but the international economic roots of peacelessness has received growing attention in peace research (Jeong 2000: 87–93). Significant is the recent emergence of literature on the potential roles of business in “conflict prevention”

(Wenger and Mockli2003) and “conflict management” (Haufler 2001). The volume by Wenger and Mockli, *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector*, lays out a broad conceptual framework that incites this reader to ponder not only the “untapped potential,” but also the “uninvestigated impact” of business on international conflict. They begin by a three-fold typology of “roles of corporate enabling” of the preventive role of other actors (Wenger and Mockli2003: 137–143):

Role 1: Funding (e.g. any kind of corporation can fund NGO peace conferences, mediation processes, democracy programs and health measures)

Role 2: In kind support (e.g. selected industries can provide modern communications equipment to peace builders, and education programs, and drugs to AIDS programs)

Role 3: Strategic philanthropy (e.g. any kind of corporation can enhance the management capacity of NGOs and make conflict prevention a strategic issue of social investment)

Wenger and Mockii also present a typology of three more roles that focus on “corporate economic peace building”:

Role 4: Commercial (e.g., contractual agreements with the UN for supplying equipment, relief products and many other services to local or international actors involved in conflict prevention) (16)

Role 5: Semicommercial: “This role requires business operators with the willingness to take on additional risk in the cause of conflict prevention” (149); “semicommercial corporate peace builders are required to carefully coordinate their actions with other actors engaged in conflict prevention if they want to make sure that their involvement creates preventive value rather than harm” (151)

Role 6: Noncommercial: “Companies that take this role offer their extensive economic experience and know-how to any actor seeking to create economic opportunity in conflict-prone countries” (153); “The corporate community can, for instance, advise the local government in creating incentives (such as reduced import duties, tax exemptions, and the right to repatriate profits) that encourage business activities” (154)

Christopher L. Avery has written a report on *Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change* (2000) that “identifies sources of pressure on business to act responsibly, how this pressure is intensifying and how business is responding” (www.amnesty.org.uk/business). This hundred page report opens with a section on “changes in business thinking” (10–21) that is followed by enumerating fourteen sources of pressure on business to take human rights seriously (22–42). Of particular significance for our brief overview are the following four “steps towards change” (43–61).

6.7.1 Business Groups Putting Human Rights on their Agenda

Examples are the Caux Round Table Principles for Business (adopted by a group of US, Japanese and European business leaders, and the US Business for Social

Responsibility (an alliance of over 1,400 companies and affiliated companies). Its Business and Human Rights Program helps companies to develop human rights policies and monitoring systems; to engage in dialogue with human rights organizations, labor unions and governments; and to address human rights issues that arise as a result of sourcing and manufacturing in developing countries.

6.7.2 Companies Adopting Human Rights Principles

Avery reports; “Until the late 1990s only a few companies had adopted policies that seriously addressed international human rights issues. Those in the forefront included Levi Strauss, Reebok and The Body Shop” (Avery 2000: 46). By 2,000 many more companies had adopted human rights policies, including Royal Dutch Shell, BP Amoco, Nokia, Statoil, Norsk Hydro, and Rio Tinto. One example is Royal Dutch Shell’s Business and Human Rights: A Management Primer (1998).

6.7.3 Human Rights Training for Employees

BP Amoco has internet sites providing employees with guidance on human rights issues and contact information on international human rights and development organizations (BP Amoco 1999: 38).

6.7.4 Independent Monitoring

In 1999 nine major US retailers agreed to help fund an independent monitoring of their factories in the Northern Marianas Islands (Sweatshop Watch 1999).

It is not surprising that Avery follows this section of his analysis with a section on “A slow response to the new realities.” He concludes:

The trends discussed above... mean that companies will increasingly find human rights issues coming onto their agenda whether they like it or not... But as the millennium approaches, most companies have still not come to terms with the new reality that they are to be held accountable for their human rights-related record (Avery 2000: 62).

In conclusion, this brief view of literature on potential for enhancing corporate economic peacebuilding reveals this to be a subject that deserves enhanced attention by peace researchers. In addition, it causes us to note that all people live their daily lives in communication, transportation, housing, shopping, recreation, investment and other activities that involve them in the impact of business on human rights and other peacebuilding issues. How can peace researchers help people to make their business involvements more supportive of a peaceful world?

6.8 Participation of Local Governments in the UN System

There is now increasing involvement of local governments in the UN System. Cities were on the agenda of Secretary General Kofi Annan, who said that local governments should be given more authority to deal with the growing number of problems that are emerging as the world enters the “urban millennium.” UN-Habitat (UN Human Settlements Program), established in 1977,

is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all... It has a special relationship with local authorities, including Mayors, Councillors, and their municipalities in countries around the world to strengthen and maintain dialogue with central and local governments (www.unhabitat.org).

Table 6.2 lists examples of local government involvement in the UN System, beginning with UN-Habitat. A UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA) was established in Venice in January 2000, at a meeting called by the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, and attended by mayors from all over the world and presidents of inter-state associations of local authorities. UNACLA held its fifth anniversary meeting in Washington, D.C. in February 2006. A sub-committee of UNACLA, an Advisory Group of Experts on Decentralisation (AGRED), held its first meeting in Gatineau, Canada in March 2004. Its membership includes experts from twelve countries around the world and representatives of Metropolis and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). Its function is “to guide the international dialogue on decentralisation and provide advice on strengthening local authorities around the world” (www.unhabitat.org/unacla).

In 2004 UN-Habitat and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) held a meeting in Barcelona on the theme of “Local Governments, Partners for Development.” At this meeting the Executive Director of UN-Habitat and six mayors selected by UCLG signed an “Agreement of Cooperation” aimed at expanding their collaboration on issues such as: (1) the Global Campaign on Urban Governance, (2) the Global Observatory of Local Democracy and Decentralization, (3) localizing the Millennium Development Goals, (4) the international dialogue on decentralization and (5) UNACLA (www2.unhabitat.org/unacla/agreement_of_cooperation.asp). The Best Practices and Local Leadership Program (BLP) was established in 1997. “It is a global network of government agencies of states, local authorities and their associations, professional and academic institutions and grass-roots organisations dedicated to the identification and exchange of successful solutions for sustainable development” (www.unhabitat.org).

Together with UN-Habitat’s Urban Indicators Program, the BLP forms the Global Urban Observatory (GUO), UN-Habitat’s facility for monitoring global trends in sustainable urban development and evaluating progress in the implementation of the Habitat Agenda. The GUO helps governments of states, local authorities and civil society organizations develop and apply policy-oriented urban indicators, statistics and other urban information. The GUO Network (GUONet) is worldwide information and capacity-building network established by UN-Habitat to

Table 6.2 Examples of local governments in the UN System

UN-Habitat	UN advisory committee on local auth. (www.unchs.org/Committee) Advisory group of experts on decentralization (AGRED) Best Practices and Local Leadership Program (BLP) (www.unchs.org) Global urban observatory (GUO) World urban forum Sustainable cities program (SCP) Municipal development program (MDP) Global campaign on urban governance Urban sanitation and solid waste management Millennium development goal 11, improve the lives of slum dwellers
World Bank	Municipal development program (www.worldbank.org) Local economic development specialists (LED) in urban dev. sector
UNDP	Urban management program (www.undp.org) World alliance of cities against poverty (www.undp.org/hivmayors/worldalliance) Colloquiums of Mayors, 1995 and 1997
UNESCO	The city: network of cultures
UNICEF	Mayors defenders of children initiative, periodical meetings (www.unicef.org) International child friendly cities (www.childfriendlycities.org)
WHO	Healthy cities program
WHO	Healthy cities program
UNEP	Environmental management systems (EMS) for local authorities
UNAIDS	Alliance of mayors initiative for community action on AIDS at local level (www.amicaall.org)
UNCDF	Local development program
UNiTAR	Decentralized cooperation program (DCP)
UN Interim administration mission in kosovo (UNMIK)	(www.un.org/Kosovo)
UN-Habitat/World bank cities alliance: Cities without slums	(www.citiesatliance.org)
UN-HABITAT/UNDP Urban management programme (UMP)	
UN-HABITAT/UNEP Sustainable cities programme (SCP)	

help implement the Habitat Agenda at state and local levels. The local and national Urban Observatories in the network re governmental agencies, research centers and educational institutions that are designated as the “workshops” where monitoring tools are developed and used for policy-making. A Local Urban Observatory are a city or town is the focal point for urban policy development and planning.

Two years after UNACLA was formed, a World Urban Forum met “to examine one of the most pressing issues facing the world today: rapid urbanisation and its impact on communities, cities, economies d policies. It is projected that in the next 50 years, two-thirds of humanity will be living in towns and cities” (www.unhabit at.org). It now a biennial gathering that involves non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, urban professionals, academic, local authorities and national and international associations of local governments.

UN-Habitat has been charged by the UN General Assembly to help governments meet the Millennium Development Goal, target 11, of improving the

lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. The General Assembly mandated UN-Habitat to monitor the implementation of this goal, including designing innovations to collect, manage and analyze ban indicators and to assist local authorities with policy formulation programs.

In conclusion, examples involving ten other agencies in the UN System are listed in Table 6.2. This broad array of examples of involvement of local authorities in eleven agencies in the UN System clearly reveals the growing understanding that efforts to cope with a wide range of issues on the broadening agenda of the UN System requires collaboration with not only the governments of states, but also with the governments of local communities. At the same time it reveals growing appreciation by local governments of the roles that they must play in global governance. This development is clearly revealed in documents and web sites of both the UN System and organizations of local governments. But there is almost no recognition of it in public media and scholarship. This should be an important subject on the peace research agenda.

6.9 Local Governments, Organizations in World Politics

Local governments have joined together to create both global and regional organizations, some with general purposes and some with more limited agendas. The International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) was founded in 1913 in Ghent, seven years before the founding of the League of Nations. Later based in The Hague, it recently merged with the Federation Mondiale des Cities Unies (FMCU), based in Paris, to form United Cities and Local Governments, with headquarters in Barcelona. With membership that includes both individual cities and national associations of local governments, it is “dedicated to promoting the values, objectives and interests of cities and local governments across the globe.” With members from 127 countries, it aspires “to be the united voice and world advocate of democratic local self-government, promoting its values, objectives and interests, through cooperation between local governments, and within the wider international community” (www.cities-localgovernments.org).

There are also organizations of cities with global membership that have a specific focus. Organizations of larger cities include the Summit Conference of Major Cities of the World (SUMMIT) and METROPOLIS. The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) is dedicated to the prevention and solution of local, regional and global environmental problems through local action. The World Council of Mayors for Peace Through Inter-city Solidarity was initiated by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

There are many regional organizations of municipalities, such as Arab Towns Organizations (ATO), CITYNET (Asia and Pacific), Eurocities, Red de Asociaciones de municipios de America Latina, Union des Villes Africaines (UVA), and Union of the Baltic Cities.

Finally, the direct participation of local and region authorities in governance of the European region is a quite surprising development. In fulfillment of its support

of democracy, the Council of Europe (COE) created The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) in 1994. Although only having an advisory role, it does establish the CLRAE as a third component, along with the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, in the Council of Europe. Its responsibilities include helping new member states to make progress in establishing effective local and regional self-government. CLRAE has two chambers, the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions, comprised of 291 members and 291 substitute members that represent more than 2,00,000 European local and regional authorities. The members of CLRAE, composed of only elected local and regional authority representatives, are representative of the various types I of local and regional authority in each member state. Projects developed by CLRAE in fulfillment of its goals include efforts to establish and I strengthen local democracy that include training local officials and transfrontier cooperation. Included in its projects are three conventions. The I European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation recognizes the right of local and regional authorities to co-operate across frontiers I in providing public services and environmental protection. Rights of foreigners are protected by The European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level. There is also a Charter for i participation of Young People in Municipal and Regional Affairs.

The European Union (EU) has a somewhat similar body. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) was created in 1994 to address two main issues. First, because three quarters of EU legislation is implemented at a local or regional level, it is considered useful for local and regional representatives to have a say in the development of new EU laws. Second is concern that the public was being left behind as the EU developed. Involving the elected level of government closest to the citizens was one way of dosing the gap. The Commission and Council of the European Union are required to consult CoR whenever new proposals are made in areas that have regional or local impacts.

CoR has 317 members and the same number of alternate members, appointed for a four year term by the European Union Council, i based on recommendations from member states. Each state chooses its I members in its own way, but delegations from each state are supposed to reflect the political, geographical and regional/local balance in their Estate. All are elected members of or key players in local or regional authorities in their home region (www.cor.eu.int/en).

This brief overview of the involvement of local governments in | world politics has revealed that there are a number of worldwide and regional organizations of local governments focused on peace, the environment, local self-government and other global issues. This illuminates the fact that it is not just that local communities are affected by global forces, but that local economies, cultures and politics also affect global patterns. How might peace researchers assist local governments and their citizens in developing local policies that affect global patterns supportive of peacebuilding? Furthermore, the development of a Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in the Council of Europe and a Committee of the Regions in the European Union challenges peace researchers and peace activists to ponder

possible future options for the participation of local governments in the governance of world regions 3rd in global governance.

6.10 Conclusion

In conclusion, the UN peacebuilding agenda now includes an array of issues that are also on the agendas of government, civil society and business organizations that range from local to global. As a result, emerging global governance has become ever more complicated. Certainly this is a severe challenge to those involved in efforts to build a peaceful world. On the other hand, it also has informed them that there are a larger array of allies than they had realized until quite recently. Obviously Galtung was correct when he declared many years ago that “there are tasks for everybody” in the pursuit of peace. At the same time, to use a more recent term: in efforts to create a “culture of peace,” all can contribute.

Thus peace researchers are now challenged to offer insight on the activities and potential of a very broad range of people involved in peacebuilding. A greater challenge is the need to offer knowledge of how this vast array of peacebuilding roles is linked. But an even greater challenge is for peace researchers to provide those involved with a vision of what the world would be like if all involved were attaining their maximum peacebuilding potential.

References

- Alger, Chadwick F. (1990): “The World Relations of Cities: Closing the Gap Between Social Science Paradigms and Everyday Human Experience.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, 493-518.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (1997): “Transnational Social Movements, World Politics, and Global Governance.” Ed. Jackie Smith; Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco: *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 260-278.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (1999): “The Future of Democracy and Global Governance Depends on Widespread Public Knowledge About Local Links to the World.” *Cities*, Vol. 16, 195-206.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2002a): “Religion as a Peace Tool.” *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, 294-109.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2002b): “The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System; From Article 71 to a People’s Millennium Assembly.” *Global Governance*, Vol. 8, 93-118.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2003): “Searching for Democratic Potential in Emerging Global Governance.” Ed. Bruce Morrison: *Transnational Democracy in Critical and Comparative Perspective*. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, 88-105.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2006): *The United Nations System: A Reference Handbook*. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2007a): “There are Peacebuilding Tasks for Everybody.” *International Studies Review*. Vol. 9, 534-554.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2007b): “Widening Participation.” Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws: *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 701-715.
- Anderson, Mary B. (1996): *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.

- Appleby, R. Scott (1999): *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
- Avery, Christopher L. (2000): *Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change*. Amnesty International, London.
- Bell, Christine and Catherine O'Rourke (2007): "The People's Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 28, 293-324.
- Bock, Joseph and Mary B. Anderson (1999): "Dynamite Under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid Agencies Help Defuse It?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, 325-338.
- BP AMOCO (1999): *Amoco Environmental and Social Report 1998*. At: http://bp.com/liveassets/bpInternet/globalbp/STAGSNG/global_assets/downloads/E/Environmental_and_social_report_1998.pdf.
- Childers, E. and Brian Urquhart (1994): *Renewing the United Nations System*. Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala.
- Galtung, Johan (1980): *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*. The Free Press, New York.
- Galtung, Johan (1996): "Cultural Peace: Some Characteristics." *UNESCO. From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace*. UNESCO, Paris, 75-92.
- Haufler, Virginia (2001): "Is There a Role for Business in Conflict Management?" Ed. Chester A. Crocker; Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall: *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001): *Responsibility to Protect* At: <http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp>.
- Johnsson, Anders B. (2003): "A Parliamentary Dimension to International Cooperation." Ed. Saul H. Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker: *A Reader on Second Assembly and Parliamentary Proposals* (Center for UN Reform). At: <http://www.uno-komitee.de/en/documents/unpa-reader-2003.pdf.20-29>.
- Jeong, Ho-Won (2000): *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK.
- Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998): *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
- Macleod, Sorcha and Douglas Lewis (2004): "Transnational Corporations: Power, Influence, and Responsibility." *Global Social Policy*, Vol. 4, 77-98.
- Nelson, Jane (2002): *Building Partnerships: Cooperation Between the United Nations System and the Private Sector*. UN Department of Public Information, New York.
- Prendergast, John (1996): *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
- Reychler, Luc and Thania Paffenholz (ed.) (2001) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
- Royal Dutch Shell (1998): *Business and Human Rights: A Management Primer*. At: <http://www.shell.com/download/3359/index>.
- Sampson, Cynthia (1997): "Religion and Peacebuilding." Ed. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen: *Peacemaking in International Conflict*. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 273-318.
- Smith, Jackie; Ron Pagnucco and Charles Chatfield (1997): "Social Movements and World Politics: A Theoretical Framework." Ed. Jackie Smith; Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco: *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*. Syracuse University, Syracuse, 59-77.
- Spiro, P.J. (1995): "New Global Communities: Non-Governmental Organizations in International Decision-making Institutions." *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, 45-56.
- Sweatshop Watch (1999): "Retailers Agree to Join Settlement of Class Action Lawsuit Requiring Independent Monitoring of Factory Conditions." At <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/mananas/settlement.html>.
- UN General Assembly (2004): A/58/58/817. At: [http://www.unog.ch/80256ED006B8954\(httpAssets\)/09916F545454357BC1256F5C005D4352/\\$file/A-58-817.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256ED006B8954(httpAssets)/09916F545454357BC1256F5C005D4352/$file/A-58-817.pdf).
- UN Global Compact Office (2002): *A Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management*. United Nations, New York.

- UN Global Compact Office (2005): *Enabling Economies of Peace: Public Policy for Conflict-Sensitive Business*. United Nations, New York.
- UN Secretary General (1998): "Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of Non-governmental Organizations in all Activities of the United Nation System." UN General Assembly A/53/170 (10 July 1998). United Nations, New York.
- UNESCO (1996): *From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace*. UNESCO, Paris.
- UNESCO (1997): *UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement*. 2nd ed. UNESCO, Paris.
- Wenger, Andreas and Daniel Mockli (2003): *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector*. Lynne Reinner, Boulder.

Chapter 7

There are Peacebuilding Tasks for Everybody

This Forum overviews our expanding knowledge about peacebuilding roles and actors and was written for three purposes: (1) to enable potential participants to perceive their opportunities for participation; (2) to enable those engaged in one role to learn how their role is interdependent with an array of other roles; and (Hi) to challenge researchers to more adequately cover the wide array of peacebuilding roles and their interdependence. The Forum first describes how peacebuilding by the UN System now involves people from an ever wider range of professions and disciplines, and increasingly involves NGO and civil society organizations, the business community, and local authorities. It then overviews the existing roles played by members of the NGO/civil society community, businesses, and local authorities in world politics outside the UN System followed by a description of efforts to educate people in local communities regarding how to handle local conflicts without causing serious disruption. The latter is being done not only to make local communities more peaceful but also to create a “laboratory” in which local people can learn how to cope with international conflicts in the same way.¹

Over 25 years ago Galtung (1980: 396) informed us that there are “tasks for everybody” in the pursuit of peace and that includes both positive peace (overcoming structural violence) and negative peace (overcoming direct violence). Since that time, because of learning through practice and research, the truth of his assertion is ever more apparent. More and more people, in an increasing range of professions and disciplines, are participating in peace-related activities that flow across state borders. Unfortunately, the potential that they offer for building a more secure world is perceived by very few. The media is focused primarily on events caused by the failures of state actors to provide a secure world for their inhabitants. Day after day, month after month, and sometimes year after year, the details of the same failures

¹ This is a revised version of a discussion paper presented to the Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Commission (CRPBC) of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) at the latter’s bi-annual conference in Calgary, Canada, June-July 2006. It was first published as “There Are Peacebuilding Tasks For Everybody”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, Issue 3, 2007. Blackwell Publishing for International Studies Association (ISA). The permission to republish this text was granted on 8 October 2012 by Ms. Verity Butler of Wiley (UK).

are reported, but successes are rarely recorded. Also ignored are the thousands of people engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding around the world. They are enhancing the well-being of millions of people and, at the same time, extending our knowledge of the tasks that need to be fulfilled in the quest for peace.

Nevertheless, it is very encouraging that a movement has emerged reflecting Galtung's vision, the movement for a "Culture of Peace." The United Nations General Assembly (1997) has defined the culture of peace as "a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups, and nations" (UN Resolution A/RES/62/13). The UN General Assembly (1999) has asserted that these steps needed for peace and non-violence to prevail:

- (1) Foster a culture of peace through education.
- (2) Promote sustainable economic and social development.
- (3) Promote respect for all human rights.
- (4) Ensure equality between women and men.
- (5) Foster democratic participation.
- (6) Advance understanding, tolerance, and solidarity.
- (7) Support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge.
- (8) Promote international peace and security (UN Resolution A/RES/53/243).

It should not be surprising that UNESCO has been fostering a global Movement for A Culture of Peace (<http://www3.unesco.org/iycp>) in light of the fact that its constitution opens with these words: "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." In pursuit of this goal, UNESCO (1997: 121) published UNESCO and a *Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement* which declares that "every aspect of social relations can be affected" by a culture of peace movement. Another volume that has emerged out of UNESCO's (1996) campaign is *From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace* with contributions from fifteen scholars, including one by Galtung (1996) regarding some characteristics of cultural peace.

Peace research that has emerged in the last several decades also makes it ever more obvious that there are "tasks for everybody" in developing a "culture of peace." Unfortunately, very few people, including many actually involved in efforts to cope with seriously disruptive conflict, are aware of this expanding knowledge. This overview of emerging knowledge about peacebuilding roles, as noted above, has three goals. One is to briefly describe these roles so that potential participants know that they are available. A second is to enable those engaged in one role to perceive how their role is interdependent with an array of other roles. A third is to challenge peace researchers to more adequately cover the wide array of peacebuilding roles and their interdependence.

To fulfill these goals it is necessary to offer concrete examples of peacebuilding roles illuminated by recent research. It is essential that readers understand that the goal here is not to evaluate the success of specific roles, but to provide concrete

examples of existing roles that are deemed significant enough to merit scholarly research. To provide a broad overview of examples in limited space, difficult choices have had to be made. Of course, the effort of any scholar to discuss a broad domain of activities will be shaped by his or her major fields of inquiry. The present author's have been the UN System, the world relations of local communities, and a continual effort to attain a comprehensive overview of the field of peace research.

This essay will (1) briefly describe how the growing UN System peacebuilding agenda now involves people from an ever wider range of professions and disciplines as well as increasingly includes NGO and civil society organizations, the business community, and local authorities; (2) discuss the existing roles played by members of the NGO/civil society communities, businesses, and local authorities in world politics outside the UN System; and (3) overview the efforts to educate people in local communities regarding how to prevent local conflicts from causing serious disruption. The latter is being done not only to make local communities more peaceful, but also to create a "laboratory" in which local people can learn how to cope with international conflicts in the same way. After describing examples of emerging peacebuilding roles in each section of this essay, the author will draw brief implications for future research and practice. These are then pulled together in the concluding section.

7.1 The UN System Involves People from Most Professions and Disciplines

For many years the experiences of governmental and civil society organizations as well as the results of academic research have clearly revealed the very limited usefulness of focusing on crises after they happen instead of focusing on longterm preventive action. The League of Nations experience led to the prominent emphasis that the UN Charter places on global standards for human rights, self-determination, and economic and social justice. 60 years of experience in the United Nations "laboratory" has led to an ever broader UN System agenda that now is frequently referred to as postconflict peacemaking and long-term peacebuilding. As a result the organizational chart of the UN System (<http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html>) now includes over 50 agencies, commissions, programs, funds, and other entities that perform peacebuilding roles.

To provide a quick overview of these roles, Table 7.1 presents a list of 54 functions that appear in the names of these agencies. Of course, this broad agenda includes atomic energy, chemical weapons, disarmament, the nuclear test ban, and peacekeeping. But it also suggests many other alternatives for participation in peacebuilding that exist in the UN System, including agriculture, climate change, crime prevention, drug control, environment, forests, health, human rights, indigenous issues, labor, refugees, telecommunications, and tourism.

Many perceive the 54 UN functions in Table 7.1 to reflect the growing reach of global governance in response to the ever widening geographic borders of governance problems. This perspective very usefully reveals that it is essential that

Table 7.1 Functions Appearing in names of UN Agencies

– UN-Habitat: UN Human Settlements Program (UNHSP)
– (JN Commission on Human Settlements Urban Managements Program (UMP)
– Sustainable Cities Program (SCP)
– Municipal Development Program (MDP)
– Global campaign on urban government urban sanitation and solid waste management
– World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLA), Istanbul, 1996, before the second UN conference on human settlements (Habitat II)
– World Urban Form, before UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 1994
– UN Development Program (UNDP) Urban Management Program
– UNDP colloquium of mayors, 1995 (New York, before Copenhagen social summit)
– World Bank, municipal development program
UNICEF mayors defenders of children initiative, periodical meetings of mayors UN advisory committee on local authorities global compact cities program

we ponder the possible impact of all global governance decisions on peacebuilding. Of course, all of these functions are also performed by regional organizations of states, by departments of the governments of states, and by departments in many provincial and local governments. Obviously, those aspiring to be peacebuilders face very complex challenges. But, in contrast, simplification that ignores the complexity of reality ignores the full array of peacebuilding opportunities. Table 7.1 and this discussion challenge those involved in all professions to ponder the roles that their profession plays in the UN system and their personal options for involvement. It also challenges researchers in all academic disciplines to ponder how they might more adequately illuminate these involvements.

7.2 Roles Performed by NGOs/Civil Society Organizations in the UN System

Perception of alternatives for participating in peacebuilding can also be attained by examining the escalating involvement of actors other than member states and members of secretariats in the UN System. Here, let us examine the activities of NGO and civil society communities, businesses, and local authorities. Currently there are 2,719 NGOs in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and some 400 NGOs accredited to the Commission on Sustainable Development, a subsidiary body of ECOSOC (<http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/faq.htm>). Some 1,500 NGOs are associated with the Department of Public Information (DPI). DPI helps these NGOs gain access to, and disseminate information about, issues in which the United Nations is involved so that the public can better understand the aims and objectives of the UN and support its work (<http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/brochure.htm>). Millions of people are

members of these organizations that are representing them at the UN, but few are aware of this representation. They can easily learn the names of these organizations at: <http://www.esa.un.org/coordination/ngo/search/search.htm>.

Some of these NGOs are now widely involved in the political process at UN Headquarters (Alger 2003: 89–90). They not only observe public meetings of ECOSOC and have access to participants but also address public sessions and are engaged in panel discussions. Some NGO representatives now have access to private meetings that are linked to public policymaking and NGO involvement has extended to the General Assembly and the Security Council. NGOs also have a diversity of kinds of relations with secretariats of organizations in the UN System, including regularly scheduled meetings, representation on committees, joint research, NGO financial support of UN agencies, and UN agency financial support of NGOs (Alger 2003: 90–92). In addition, there are NGO Liaison Offices at headquarters of UN agencies around the world.

NGO presence at UN conferences at sites around the globe has led to significant feedback on evolving NGO participation in the UN System in four respects. First, the practice of having NGO conferences that run parallel to intergovernmental conferences has spurred the development of NGO collaboration in the development of policies on specific issues and to presenting them to assemblies composed of government representatives. Second, NGOs have become increasingly involved in the preparatory phases of UN conferences, thereby offering NGO experience in the prepublic phases of parliamentary diplomacy. Third, because the sites of these intergovernmental conferences have been scattered around the world, they have been accessible to a growing number of NGOs, particularly those in the “Third World.” Fourth, conditions at these ad hoc meeting sites have required the development of procedures for NGO participation that have led to demands for wider NGO access at permanent headquarters (Alger 2003: 93–94).

Another significant venue for NGO participation in interstate decision making that is closely linked to the UN System revolves around conferences called for the drafting of treaties. The contribution of NGOs in the development of the land-mine treaty was recognized by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the leader of the International Campaign to Ban Land-Mines. This successful campaign linked 1,000 NGOs in 60 countries, largely through email.

During negotiations on the International Criminal Court Treaty, “NGOs participated informally, but effectively, alongside governments in a high-level negotiating process. They spoke, circulated documents, met frequently with delegations, and had a major impact on the outcome” (Paul 1999: 3). In preparation for the International Criminal Court conference, the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court brought together a broad-based network of hundreds of NGOs and international law experts to develop strategies and foster awareness. Again, the keys to their network were email and the World Wide Web.

NGO gatherings in the context of these interstate conferences have spurred four other NGO conference formats:

- (1) A number of NGO conferences have convened as follow-ups to UN world conferences with an issue focus. For example, the NGO Forum on Social Development provides NGOs a platform for discussing their role in the implementation of the recommendations of the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen 1995).
- (2) Some have built on NGO conferences linked with UN conferences that are focused on a single global issue and established broad-agenda free-standing NGO conferences often referred to as “people’s assemblies.” They include the Hague Peace Conference in May 1999.
- (3) When the General Assembly designated its fifty-fifth session as a Millennium Assembly, a companion Peoples Millennium Assembly (PMA) met on May 22–26, 2000 under the name Peoples Millennium Forum.
- (4) For several decades there have been proposals for a second General Assembly that would include members of state legislatures, representatives of nongovernmental organizations, and directly elected members. More recent proposals are the International Network for a Second Assembly, Childers and Urquhart’s (1994) proposal for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, and the proposal for an annual Forum of Civil Society (Commission on Global Governance 1995). Many working for the Peoples Millennium Forum saw it as a building block toward a permanent second assembly, but certainly not all.

This brief overview of roles performed by NGO and civil society organizations in the UN System challenges us to ponder the fact that members of several thousand such organizations are generally unaware that they are represented in decision making throughout the UN System. They do not know that they now have easy access to information concerning their involvement at the NGO Global Network (<http://www.ngo.org>), a UN creation. Easy access has also been provided to NGO organizations with broad agendas such as the Global Policy Forum (<http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos>) and NGO networks on specific issues such as the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (<http://www.aicpr.org>). At issue here is: How might peace researchers more adequately reveal the potential for grassroots participation in decision making in the UN System?

7.3 The Business Community in the UN System

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that “thriving markets and human security go hand in hand.” The UN web site states: “The business community has played an active role in the United Nations since its inception in 1945. A number of UN organizations have a successful history of cooperating with business. Recent political and economic changes have fostered and intensified the search for collaborative arrangements” (<http://www.un.org/partners/business>). In 1999, Secretary General Annan challenged business leaders to join an international initiative—the Global Compact—that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labor, and civil society to support 10 universal principles in the

areas of human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption that are derived from these four documents: (1) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) the International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; (3) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; and (4) the UN Convention against Corruption. The Global Compact now involves over 2,000 business, civil society, academic, and city organizations. There are Global Compact Offices in six UN agencies: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), UN Environment Program (UNEP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International Labor Organization (ILO), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In April 2004, Secretary General Annan addressed an open debate of the Security Council on the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding.

The peace mission of the Global Compact, defined in *Enabling Economies of Peace: Public Policy for Conflict-Sensitive Business* (UN Global Compact Office 2005), "identifies a range of concrete actions that governments and international organizations can undertake to better assist private-sector efforts to promote effective conflict-sensitive business practices. The recommendations focus on strengthening existing initiatives and developing mechanisms by which current institutions of peace promotion can incorporate attention to the role of the private sector in conflict prevention and peacebuilding" (<http://www.unglobalcompact.org>). The UN Global Compact Office (2002) *Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management* also includes contributions from officials in UN agencies and NGOs. The UN web site reminds business of the "contributions of the UN System to commercial order and openness" and informs them of the contributions of specific organizations in the UN System to world-wide business, including the International Maritime Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization, International Telecommunications Union, and World Meteorological Organization (<http://www.un.org/partners/business/otherpages/factsheets>).

After stating that "UN agencies are cooperating with businesses on a large scale, to mutual benefit," the UN web site declares that "the projects work in two directions: business provides know-how and resources to the UN, while the UN develops programs that help to create an environment supportive of businesses, economic growth, and sustainable development." Examples are provided of hundreds of case studies on file. For example, Microsoft employees in Europe, moved by scenes of misery in Albania, contacted the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ask how they could help. UNHCR said it urgently needed a computerized registration system that could generate photo-ID cards for Kosovo refugees. Microsoft assembled a partnership with Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, and the European photo-ID card specialists Security and Screencheck to handle the job.

In a volume that provides a broad description and analysis of *Cooperation between the UN and the Private Sector*, Nelson (2002: 308) recognizes the "risks and challenges" that accompany cooperation between the UN System and business and is alert that they may "subvert 'public interest' to 'private gain'". Nevertheless, she concludes

that “the challenges can be managed and that cooperation can be mutually beneficial if based on clear guidelines and accountable, transparent structures, with regular dialogue on evolving roles and responsibilities” (Nelson 2002: 308). In light of the widespread involvement of business communities throughout the world, it would be useful if peace researchers informed people in these communities of their actual and potential roles in UN peacebuilding. Furthermore, what strategies might people involved with these businesses employ in support of the mission of the Global Compact?

7.4 Local Authorities in the UN System

Warah (2001), Editor in Chief of *Habitat Debate* published by UNCHS (Habitat), has expressed an orientation to world politics that often seems surprising to those who assume a state-centered view: “The world is no longer a community of States, but an increasingly borderless network of interconnected cities.” On the eve of the HABITAT II Conference of the United Nations on Human Settlements, held in Istanbul in June 1996, international local government organizations convened a World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities that emphasized the importance of coordination of movements of cities and local authorities world-wide and the need for local government input to the United Nations. The World Association of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination (WACLAC), formed in Paris in September 1996, is the resulting world alliance of international associations of cities and local authorities committed to responsible and effective local self-government for sustainable development. Its mission is to represent the local government sector in the international arena, particularly in the UN System.

Surprising as it might seem for an organization built around states, there is now increasing involvement of local governments in the UN System. Cities were even on the agenda of Secretary General Annan, who said in 1999 that local governments should be given more authority to deal with problems that come with explosive growth as the world enters the “urban millennium.” Only 6 months earlier a UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities was established in Venice at a meeting called by the Head of UN-Habitat (UNCHS); it was attended by mayors from all over the world and presidents of international associations of local authorities.

Although not a complete inventory, Table 7.1 offers evidence of the diversity of kinds of involvements of local authorities in the UN System. Not surprising is the fact that organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF, the World Bank, and UN-Habitat have projects assisting the economic development of cities. Less expected are demands by cities and local authorities for participation in the proceedings of UN-Habitat as well as on its Commission on Human Settlements. Creation of the UN Advisory Committee on Local Authorities responded to these initiatives.

Of obvious relevance for peacebuilding is the Safer Cities Program of UN-Habitat, founded in 1996 at the request of African mayors to prevent urban violence by developing a prevention strategy in cities. “The main objectives of the program are to: (1) build capacities at the city level to adequately address urban

insecurity; and thereby (2) contribute to the establishment of a culture of prevention” (<http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid>). After noting that crime is a serious problem in cities all over the world, the UN-Habitat web site states that “urban violence generates a fear of crime. Crime and the fear of crime are serious threats to the stability and social climate of cities, to sustainable and economic development, to quality of life, and to human rights. Urban violence erodes the social capital of the poor. Insecurity affects the poor more intensely, breaks down sociocultural bonds, and prevents social mobility, thus contributing to the development of urban ghettos and stigmatized neighborhoods.” International conferences on the theme of urban violence and safety were held in Barcelona (1987), Montreal (1989), Paris (1991), Vancouver (1996), Johannesburg (1998), and Naples (2000) (<http://www.unchs.org>).

In *The State of the World's Cities, 2004/2005: Globalization and Urban Culture*, UN-Habitat (2004: 10) places urban violence and other urban problems in a global context: “It is not just that cities are affected by global forces, but that local economies, cultures, and politics also affect global patterns. Global factors become embedded in local culture, practice, and institutions.” One global factor is migration and the report notes that because some cities have been unable to cope with multiculturalism, it has generated xenophobia and ethnic tensions. In response they recommend that “the management of migration flows should not be unilateral. It should include international, national, and local bodies” (UN-Habitat 2004: 83). UN-Habitat voices a conclusion consistent with the emphasis of this Forum: “The criminal justice institutions alone cannot stop the escalation of urban violence or even control it. Public safety should be considered as a public good that must be developed and promoted by all institutions and civil society. International experience shows that reducing crime is everybody’s responsibility” (<http://www.unchs.org>):

Participation of local authorities in the UN System through the World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLAC) and the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities reflects the fact that some local authorities perceive the need for involvement in the UN System. Such motivation is also reflected in the local governance issues on the agendas of UN-Habitat, UNDP, the World Bank, UNICEF, and other UN agencies. How can more local authorities, and their citizens, become aware of this perceived interest for direct involvement of local authorities in global governance?

7.5 NGOs/Civil Society in World Politics

Although there is no doubt that the number of NGOs involved in world politics has increased in recent years, it is essential that we recognize that this is not a new phenomenon. At a commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Secretary General Annan reminded his audience:

Before the founding of the United Nations, NGOs led the charge in the adoption of some of the Declaration’s forerunners. The Geneva conventions of 1864; multilateral labor conventions adopted in 1906; and the International Slavery Convention of 1926; all stemmed from the world of NGOs who infused the international community with a spirit of reform (UN Secretary General 1998: 10).

Research in the last decade has provided ever more comprehensive knowledge of the wide ranging peacebuilding roles in which NGOs and civil society organizations are engaged. These works reveal that their activities can be placed in a four-fold framework. First, it is necessary for those involved in peacebuilding to create and mobilize global networks. Second, in organizing these networks and acquiring support for their operations, they enhance public participation. Third, they become involved with, and endeavor to, influence international governmental organizations (IGOs) and other multilateral political arenas. Fourth, they perform a diverse array of activities in the field (Alger 1997).

It is important to recognize that those focusing on the roles of NGOs in world politics are concerned with only a small percentage of the total NGO population. Two volumes applying terminology from sociology make this fact very clear. Smith et al. (1997: 59) have defined this category of NGOs as “clusters of relatively marginalized actors [that] promote some form of social or political change” and identify them as “social movements.” Their work focuses on transnational social movements (TSMOs), that is, those active across state borders.

Keck and Sikkink (1998: 4) prefer the term “transnational network” with this explanation: “by importing the network concept from sociology and applying it translationally, we bridge the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms. The networks we describe in this book participate in domestic and international politics simultaneously, drawing on a variety of resources, as if they were part of an international society.” The complexity of the political processes in which such NGOs are involved is not only a result of the “sheer diversity” of those NGOs working for social and political change, but also a result of the array of other actors with which they must interact. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 9) list seven major types of actors in “transnational advocacy networks:” (1) international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations; (2) local social movements; (3) foundations; (4) the media; (5) churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; and (7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments.

NGOs engaged in a diversity of field activities are increasingly informed about the ways in which their activities can impact peacebuilding. For example, in *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*, Anderson (1996) asserts that the impact of aid is not neutral. She asks, how can humanitarian or development assistance be “given in conflict situations in ways that rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict help local people to disengage and establish alternative systems to deal with the problems that underlie conflict?” Anderson would use aid in developing local capacities for peace through food for work, village rehabilitation, working with children in the context of civil war, and coping with poverty. In a Joseph and Anderson (1999: 336) article, the focus is on how aid agencies can defuse intercommunal conflict. Here aid is used to “inculcate a sense of belonging among a large, more inclusive group” and to “support/strengthen interconnection structures and systems, rather than competitive ones.” Prendergast (1996: 143) concludes that humanitarian aid is the most important avenue of contact among

the international community and conflicting parties, thereby such aid offers one of the best policy instruments for preventing escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peacebuilding.

In light of the prominent use of religious differences by leaders as a basis for waging conflict and war, research illuminating how religion can be employed as a peace tool is extending visions of the roles that religious organizations can play in peacebuilding (Alger 2002). Appleby (1999), in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, has asserted that religion's ability to inspire violence is intimately related to its equally impressive power as a force for peace. Sampson (1997: 304) informs us of the institutional moves within some religious communities toward developing "an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding." Reychler (1997) asks for a serious study of the impact of religious organizations on conflict behavior that includes a comparative study of the peacebuilding efforts of different religious organizations. He asserts that the world cannot survive without a new global ethic and that the religious ties of parties, passive bystanders, peacemakers, and peace-builders will play a major role.

Recent research has been very informative on the peacebuilding relevance of roles played by NGOs in humanitarian field activities. It is useful to first place them in the context of the sixfold typology provided by West (2001: 13–18) in the introduction to her volume on humanitarian NGOs in Rwanda and Afghanistan, namely, (1) general humanitarian; (2) preventive; (3) protective; (4) relief; (5) forcible; and (6) restorative. Her first two categories usefully link field activities of NGOs with their external roots. West (2001: 17) defines general humanitarian action as "activities whose primary aim is not to deal with a particular humanitarian crisis, but, instead, to raise awareness about humanitarian issues in donor countries and develop general principles of humanitarian action." Prevention is focused on anticipating humanitarian crises and preventing them. It includes monitoring, fact finding, early warning, lobbying, and information sharing. Toward this end, NGOs raise awareness about "alarming humanitarian developments, and pressure governments and IGOs to take action" (West 2001: 14). Thus, preventive activities of NGOs link their field activities to participation in IGOs.

Protective activities seek to maintain basic order and to shield civilians from fighting. Relief action involves the traditional definition of humanitarian action, that is, providing shelter, medicine, clothing, and other things necessary for survival. Forcible humanitarian actions include enforcing penalties for severe violations of international law. For example, the UN Security Council created international tribunals for violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. NGOs have attempted to speed up enforcement of humanitarian law violations in these cases.

Restorative humanitarian action is divided by West into conflict resolution and peacebuilding, a central focus of the case studies in her volume. Conflict resolution attempts to find agreement between belligerents to terminate fighting. West (2001: 17) defines peacebuilding as efforts to "improve general security, establish a legitimate government, and rehabilitate the local economy and civil society."

Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, by Reychler and Paffenholz (2001), is a 543 page handbook for members of NGOs active in peacebuilding in the field. A quick overview of the 55 contributions to this volume, by 57 scholars and participants in NGOs, usefully illuminates the diversity of challenges confronted by NGOs engaged in such peacebuilding. Seventeen aspects of field activity are divided into three areas according to these authors: (1) preparing for the field; (2) working in the field; and (3) surviving in the field. Preparing for the field also involves selecting people, training people, and creating awareness of multicultural environments and gender issues. Some may be surprised with this warning to potential recruits: “Do not join to do someone a favor.” It is feared that “feelings of paternalism or guilt that may motivate some volunteers can hinder effective peacebuilding work.”

Discussion of training people opens with a listing of peacebuilding activities in which NGOs are involved: mediation and confidence building, humanitarian assistance, reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction, stabilization of economic structures, monitoring and improving human rights, interim administration, information, and education. It concludes with concern that “at best civilians are introduced to their mission tasks through short-term courses.” Instead, it is advocated that “there is a need for comprehensive training programs that fit the needs of field operations” (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 36). Creating awareness places emphasis on preparing such workers to cope with a multicultural environment and gender issues.

The longest section of this guide (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 75–442) reveals the diversity of challenges confronted by NGO peacebuilders in the field and the broad range of competences they require to meet these challenges. These are divided into nine topics: (1) selecting approaches to mediation; (2) identifying key actors in conflict situations; (3) designing the mediating process; (4) monitoring; (5) relief aid and development cooperation; (6) training local peacebuilders; (7) media; (8) dealing with the past and imagining the future; and (9) security.

The concluding section of this volume (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 443–533), surviving in the field, offers essential insights regarding the survival challenges confronted by members of NGOs attempting to achieve their goals in strange, challenging, disruptive, and often violent conditions. High Risk Job (HRJ) NGOs, such as the International Red Cross and Doctors without Borders, have developed a stress-prevention structure within their organizations.

Finally, it is significant that learning, through both practice and research, about peacebuilding tasks in civil society has had an impact on peace agreements. Bell and O’Rourke (2007) have analyzed 389 peace agreements addressing 48 intrastate conflicts. They found that 139 of these agreements, addressing 41 intrastate conflicts, make explicit provisions for civil society involvements that they summarize as these tasks: (1) humanitarian relief, in cases where “the state is either nonexistent or suffering a major crisis in its legitimacy and capacity;” (2) peace agreement monitoring, chiefly concerning human rights monitoring; (3) legitimation of peace agreements and resulting administrations—“while agreements are most often negotiated by military elites, they require some level of popular purchase to be successful;” (4) protection and promotion of civil democracy—“many agreements attempt not just to protect an already existing civil society, but

Table 7.2 Overview of NGO/civil society peacebuilding tasks

I. *Broad framework of activities* (Alger 1997)

- (1) Create and mobilize global networks
- (2) Enhance public participation
- (3) Influence international governmental organizations and other multilateral political arenas
- (4) Participate in a diverse array of field activities

II. *Major actors in “transnational advocacy networks”* (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9)

- (1) International and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations
- (2) Local social movements
- (3) Foundations
- (4) Media
- (5) Churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals
- (6) Parts of regional and global intergovernmental organizations
- (7) Parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of state governments

III. *Broad framework for field activities* (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001)

- (1) Preparing for the field
- (2) Working in the field
- (3) Surviving in the field

IV. *Roles played in humanitarian field activities* (West 2001: 13–18)

- (1) General humanitarian
- (2) Preventive
- (3) Protective
- (4) Relief
- (5) Forcible
- (6) Restorative

V. *Diversity of challenges confronted in the field* (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 75–442)

- (1) Selecting approaches to mediation
- (2) Identifying key actors in conflict situations
- (3) Designing the mediating process
- (4) Monitoring
- (5) Relief aid and development cooperation
- (6) Training local peacebuilders
- (7) Media
- (8) Dealing with the past and imagining the future
- (9) Security

VI. *Civil society tasks included in peace agreements* (Bell and O’Rourke 2007: 298–303)

- (1) Humanitarian relief
- (2) Peace agreement monitoring
- (3) Legitimation of peace agreements and resulting administrations
- (4) Transnational governance and institutional development: toward participatory democracy?
- (5) Protection and promotion of civil democracy
- (6) Transitional governance role
- (7) Institutionalization of civil society

to foster the development of civil society;” (5) transitional governance—“some peace agreements provide for civil society organizations to be included in constitution- and legislative-drafting activities that are normally considered the preserve of elected political institutions;” (6) institutionalization of civil society—“some

agreements give civil society organizations distinct deliberative forums to debate and formulate positions and input into formal government policy processes” (Bell and O’Rourke 2007: 298–303). Bell and O’Rourke (2007: 306) carefully underline that this is an “initial analytical mapping of peace agreements” and that “the job of evaluating the impact of [these civil society tasks] remains to be done.”

After reading this description of the vast array of peacebuilding tasks performed by NGOs and civil society organizations in world politics, readers may find Table 7.1 to be a useful summary. It (1) outlines the framework for the global networks that must be created; (2) lists the major actors in “transnational advocacy networks;” (3) provides a broad framework for field activities; (4) indicates the roles played in humanitarian field activities; (5) enumerates the challenges confronted in peacebuilding in the field; and (6) shows the civil society tasks that have appeared in peace agreements:

After careful examination of Table 7.2, it is likely that virtually all readers will be able to identify a role that they are playing, or could play, in a NGO/civil society organization of Broad Framework of Activities (Alger 1997) which they are a member that is involved in peacebuilding. The table certainly challenges peace researchers to bear in mind the simultaneous involvement of NGO/civil society organizations in a vast array of roles in transnational advocacy networks, humanitarian assistance, sustainable development, religion, peacebuilding in the field, and tasks assigned as a result of peace agreements. How can analysis of these activities by peace researchers help those involved to more adequately evaluate the interdependence of this vast array of peacebuilding roles and their impact?

7.6 Business in World Politics

The brief overview of business in the UN System reflected diverse dimensions of business involvement in world politics that have been largely ignored by the mainstream of international relations research, but the international economic roots of peacelessness have received growing attention in peace research (Jeong 2000: 87–93). Significant is the recent emergence of literature on the potential roles of business in “conflict prevention” (Wenger and Mockli 2003) and “conflict management” (Hauffer 2001). Indeed, Wenger and Mockli (2003: 137–143) lay out a broad conceptual framework that incited the author to ponder not only the “untapped potential,” but also the “uninvestigated impact” of business on international conflict. They begin with a threefold typology of “roles of corporate enabling” of the preventive role of other actors:

Role 1: Funding (for example, any kind of corporation can fund NGO peace conferences, mediation processes, democracy programs, and health measures).

Role 2: In-kind support (for example, selected industries can provide modern communications equipment to peacebuilders and education programs, and drugs to AIDS programs).

Role 3: Strategic philanthropy (for example, any kind of corporation can enhance the management capacity of NGOs, and make conflict prevention a strategic issue of social investment).

Wenger and Mockli (2003: 16, 149, 151–153) also present a typology of three more roles that focus on “corporate economic peace building:”

Role 4: Commercial (for example, contractual agreements with the UN for supplying equipment, relief products, and many other services to local or international actors involved in conflict prevention).

Role 5: Semi-commercial—“This role requires business operators with the willingness to take on additional risk in the cause of conflict prevention... semi-commercial corporate peacebuilders are required to carefully coordinate their actions with other actors engaged in conflict prevention if they want to make sure that their involvement creates preventive value rather than harm.”

Role 6: Noncommercial—“Companies that take this role offer their extensive economic experience and know-how to any actor seeking to create economic opportunity in conflict-prone countries... The corporate community can, for instance, advise the local government in creating incentives (such as reduced import duties, tax exemptions, and the right to repatriate profits) that encourage business activities.”

Avery (2000) has written a report that “identifies sources of pressure on business to act responsibly, how this pressure is intensifying, and how business is responding.” The report was written for the Amnesty International UK Business Group “comprised of people with expertise in the socially responsible investment industry, law, social auditing and reporting, academia, and ethical investment” (<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/business>). This 100 page report opens with a section on “changes in business thinking” (pages 10–21) that is followed by enumerating 14 sources of pressure on business to take human rights seriously (pages 22–42). Of particular significance for this Forum are the four “steps toward change” (pages 43–61) that are described. The following is a listing of these steps and examples of business companies that have taken these steps, with documentary references provided by Avery:

- (1) Business groups putting human rights on their agenda. Examples are the Caux Round Table Principles for Business (adopted by a group of United States, Japanese, and European business leaders) and the US Business for Social Responsibility (an alliance, of over 1,400 companies and affiliated companies). The latter’s Business and Human Rights. Program helps companies to develop human rights policies and monitoring systems; to engage in dialogue with human rights organizations, labor unions, and governments; and to address human rights issues that arise as a result of outsourcing and manufacturing in developing countries.
- (2) Companies adopting human rights principles. Avery (2000: 46) reports that “until the late 1990s only a few companies had adopted policies that seriously addressed international human rights issues. Those in the forefront included Levi Strauss, Reebok, and The Body Shop.” A British Telecommunications

report in 1999 includes a statement of business practices. In response, Amnesty International's UK Business Group commented that "this is a significant step for a company which has not been targeted by NGOs and therefore does not have a pressing need to improve its image and appease its critics" (Avery 2000: 48). By 2000 many more companies had adopted human rights policies, including Royal Dutch Shell, BP Amoco, Nokia, Statoil, Norsk Hydro, and Rio Tin to. An example of such a policy is Royal Dutch Shell's (1998) *Business and Human Rights: A Management Primer*.

- (3) Human rights training for employees. BP Amoco has internet sites providing employees with guidance on human rights issues and contact information on international human rights and development organizations (Amoco 1999: 38).
- (4) Independent monitoring. In 1999, nine major US retailers agreed to help fund an independent monitoring of their factories in the Northern Marianas Islands (Sweatshop Watch 1999).

It is not surprising that Avery (2000: 62) follows this section of his analysis with a discussion of the "slow response to the new realities." He concludes: "The trends discussed above... mean that companies will increasingly find human rights issues coming onto their agendas whether they like it or not... But as the millennium approaches, most companies have still not come to terms with the new reality that they are to be held accountable for their human rights-related record." All people live their daily lives in communication, transportation, housing, shopping, recreation, investment, and other activities that involve them with the impact of business on human rights and other peace-related issues. How can peace researchers help people to make their business involvements supportive of a peaceful world?

7.7 Local Authorities, Organizations, and People in World Politics

Particularly after World War II, many local people attempted to "internationalize" their communities and to stimulate distant connections to facilitate international understanding and peaceful relations. One approach has been exchange programs. In many cities, these exchange activities have evolved into Sister City relationships, in which two cities have developed cooperative programs for exchanges between city officials, the general public, and individuals in specific professions and occupations in the two cities. At the same time, the international involvement of many city governments has been primarily focused on the development of city policies to generate exports and foreign investment.

Most people involved in these activities have viewed them as strictly local activities and not linked to the foreign policies of their state. But some more recent local responses to escalating local-global links suggest that the roles of cities and

local regions in world politics are undergoing fundamental change. In some areas, Sister City relationships have evolved into local efforts that replace or supplement foreign activities of states. Prominent here are efforts by “First World” cities to facilitate the economic development of their Sister Cities in the “Third World” in what is referred to as decentralized development cooperation, as exemplified by Towns and Development and Municipal International Cooperation (MIC) programs in Europe. In the United States, and elsewhere, local campaigns have declared local communities nuclear-free zones and have demonstrated against local military production as well as local military bases housing foreign troops. At the same time, there has been local mobilization in support of local immigrants determined to be “illegals” by the government in Washington and local efforts to protect these immigrants from deportation by such authorities, that is, mobilizing local people to change the “foreign policy” of their state through local action (Alger 1990, 1999).

Another challenge to traditions of the state system has been efforts to mobilize local people to impact domestic policies of foreign states. An obvious example is campaigns against apartheid in South Africa that took place in many countries. Closely related are local efforts to change the international activities of businesses in which government is not significantly involved. An example here would be the In-Fact Campaign against the marketing of infant formula in the Third World, primarily waged against the Nestle Corporation and a few other companies.

Governments of cities have joined together to create both global and regional organizations of municipalities, some with general purposes and some with more limited agendas. The International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) was founded in 1913 in Ghent, 7 years before the founding of the League of Nations. Later based in The Hague, it recently merged with the Federation Mondiale des Cities Unies (FMCU), based in Paris, to form United Cities and Local Governments with its headquarters in Barcelona. With membership that includes both individual cities and national associations of local governments, it is “dedicated to promoting the values, objectives, and interests of cities and local governments across the globe.” With members from 127 countries, it aspires “to be the united voice and world advocate of democratic local self-government, promoting its values, objectives, and interests, through cooperation between local governments, and within the wider international community” (<http://www.cities-local-governments.org>).

There are also organizations of cities with global membership that have a specific focus. Organizations of larger cities include the Summit Conference of Major Cities of the World (SUMMIT) and METROPOLIS. The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) is dedicated to the prevention and solution of local, regional, and global environmental problems through local action. The World Council of Mayors for Peace through Inter-City Solidarity was initiated by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And there are many regional organizations of municipalities, such as Arab Towns Organizations (ATO), Organization of Islamic Capitals and Cities (OICC), Eurocities, Red de Asociaciones de

municipios de America Latina, Union des Villes Africaines (UVA), and Union of the Baltic Cities.

Finally, the direct participation of local and local regional authorities in the governance of Europe is a quite surprising development. In fulfillment of its support of democracy, the Council of Europe created the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) in 1994. Although only having an advisory role, CLRAE is viewed as a third component in the Council of Europe along with the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. Its responsibilities include helping new member states to make progress in establishing effective local and regional self-government. CLRAE has two chambers, the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions, comprised of 291 members and 291 substitute members that represent the more than 200,000 European local and regional authorities. The members of CLRAE are elected and are representative of the various types of local and regional authorities in each member state.

Projects developed by CLRAE in fulfillment of its goals include efforts to establish and strengthen local democracy that involve training local officials and trans-frontier cooperation. A number of its projects grow out of three conventions. The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation recognizes the right of local and regional authorities to cooperate across frontiers in providing public services and environmental protection. Rights of foreigners are protected by the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level. There is also a Charter for Participation of Young People in Municipal and Regional Affairs.

The European Union (EU) has a somewhat similar body. "The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the political assembly that provides local and regional authorities with a voice at the heart of the European Union." CoR was created in 1994 to address two main issues. First, because three quarters of EU legislation is implemented at a local or regional level, it is considered useful for local and regional representatives to have a say in the development of new EU laws. Second, there has been a concern that the public is being left behind as the EU develops. Involving the elected level of government closest to the citizens is viewed as one way of closing this gap. The European Commission and European Council are required to consult CoR whenever new proposals are made in areas that have regional or local impacts. CoR has 317 members and the same number of alternate members, appointed for a 4-year term by the EU Council, based on recommendations from member states. Each state chooses its members in its own way, but delegations from each state are supposed to reflect the political, geographical, and regional/local balance in their state. All are elected members of, or key players in local or regional authorities in their home region (http://www.cor.europa.eu/en/presentation/member_mandate.htm).

This very brief overview of the involvement of local authorities in world politics has revealed that there are a number of worldwide and regional organizations of local authorities focused on peace, environment, local self-government, and other issues. Cities have joined together in campaigns on issues such as nuclear-free zones, local military production, local military bases,

and Apartheid. In light of the fact that “it is not just that cities are affected by global forces, but that local economies, cultures, and politics also affect global patterns,” how might peace researchers assist local authorities and their citizens in developing local policies that are supportive of peaceful global patterns? Furthermore, the development of a Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in the Council of Europe and a CoR in the European Union challenges peace researchers, and peace activists, to ponder possible future options and trends in the participation of local authorities in the governance of world regions and in global governance.

7.8 Preparing People to Cope with Local Conflict within States

Recently, some peace researchers with an international focus have seen value in linking with a growing related field that is focused on local arenas of conflict within states, including schools, local communities, businesses, and courts. One example is the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management. “Focused on four program areas—educational institutions, state and local government, courts, and communities—the Commission works to positively affect the lives of all Ohio citizens by providing dispute resolution and conflict management training, consultation, and technical assistance in designing dispute resolution programs, and facilitation and mediation services” (<http://www.disputeresolution.ohio.gov>).

Together with the Ohio Department of Education, and other educational organizations, this Commission works to provide Ohio schools with constructive, non-violent methods for resolving disputes. Through these efforts the Commission helps to build partnerships among communities, courts, and schools throughout Ohio. These kinds of dispute resolution and conflict management activities now exist in other states in the United States and in other countries. Although many that are involved see them only as a means for coping with local conflict, they do see an advantage in sharing knowledge and experiences with those involved in other countries. But some involved in peace research with a global focus perceive that knowledge and experience acquired in coping with local dispute resolution and conflict management activities enhances the ability of people to cope with these issues in larger geographic arenas.

In response to both of these concerns, an International Network for Conflict Resolution Education and Peace Education (INCREPE) has been created. INCREPE sees its role as “prevention of conflict by stakeholders at all levels, including international organizations, governments, education administrators, teachers and faculty, parents, students, and members of the local community.” Included in the goals of INCREPE are conducting research to illustrate the effectiveness of conflict resolution education (CRE) and peace education (PE) as well as networking across groups including government, nongovernmental, and civil society organizations and

educational institutions. “The functions of the network include creating an inventory of resources such as curriculum and training materials, providing opportunities to share knowledge and expertise, offering a clearinghouse of existing legislation and policies related to PE and CRE, conducting/supporting forums and conferences, providing samples of best practices, and supplying access to existing research and evaluation” (<http://www.disputeresolution.ohio.gov>).

INCREPE is fulfilling an important dimension of the UN’s “Culture of Peace” by fostering such a culture through education. Two recent volumes illuminate the broad view of peace education now taken by some. One is by Weil (2002) (Rector of the International Holistic University of the City of Peace Foundation in Brasilia); it is a revised and updated version of a UNESCO document published in 1990. Weil’s detailed program for “training others in the art of living in peace” is reflected in the titles of the following three chapters: *The Art of Living in Peace with Oneself*, *The Art of Living in Peace with Others*, and *The Art of Living in Peace with the Environment*.

An even broader view is portrayed in a volume edited by Eisler and Miller (2004). In a section of this book on “education as a human connection,” Kessler (2004: 76) concludes that “students who have discovered a sense of meaning in their lives, who have a deep sense of belonging, faith, and reverence for life are protected from the self-destructive and violent impulses that ravage so many of their peers. They often have the will and the incipient tools for building social structures that can foster peace and justice at a large scale.” In a section on “moving from dominator to partnership culture,” Byrne (2004: 189) writes that “educational scholars and community practitioners committed to the socialization of children of color and to the ideals of peace and love for humanity and the earth must first teach youth to love themselves. Loving themselves requires an acceptance of who they are, how they look, how they speak, their history, and their cultural heritage.” In their forward to the volume, Eisler and Miller (2004: 10) argue that educating for peace requires a school culture that is “more democratic, more vital, more intellectually honest, and more relevant to the human condition.” They draw attention to “what John Dewey told us so clearly: to maintain a democracy, we must allow our children to participate democratically in the activities designed to educate them. It would be hard to exaggerate the damage we are doing to our children, teachers, and schools through the current mania for testing, standardization, and corrupt forms of accountability” (Eisler and Miller 2004: 9–10).

Presently knowledge is expanding about opportunities for developing local “cultures of peace.” They include (1) the development of programs for coping with local conflicts in schools, local communities, businesses, and courts, (2) peace education in schools, and (3) the development of school cultures that are compatible with “cultures of peace.” These local peace activities are relevant not only for building local peace, but also potentially for building peace that transcends political borders from local to global. Research is needed that illuminates this potential and how it can be maximized. It will help those locally involved to acquire understanding of the wide geographic implications of their local peacebuilding activities.

7.9 In Conclusion

This Forum has had three goals: (1) to describe the broad array of peacebuilding roles that now exist so potential participants can find opportunities for participation; (2) to enable those involved in one peacebuilding role to perceive the system of peacebuilding roles and ponder how their role is linked to, and interdependent with, others; and (3) to challenge peace researchers to more adequately study the wide array of peacebuilding roles and their interdependence.

In the course of expanding our knowledge about peacebuilding roles in the UN System, several conclusions are possible. The many peacebuilding roles in the UN System challenge those in all professions to ponder the involvement that their profession has in the UN System and their personal options for participating in helping to build the “culture of peace.” They also challenge researchers in all academic disciplines to consider how they might more adequately study these peacebuilding roles and evaluate their effectiveness.

An overview of the range of roles performed by several thousand NGO and civil society organizations in the UN System challenges us to think about the fact that most members of these organizations are probably unaware that they are represented in policymaking throughout the UN System. They do not know that there is easy access to information concerning this involvement on the NGO Global Network web pages. How can peace researchers help them to perceive, and activate, their participatory options?

Over 2,900 businesses in 100 countries around the world are involved in the UN Global Compact, an effort to motivate business to support universal environmental and social principles. Most people in local communities around the world are involved with these companies as customers, employees, and investors. How can peace researchers help these people perceive the influence they can have on encouraging businesses to help in fulfilling the goals of the UN Global Compact?

Participation of local authorities in the UN System—through the World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLAC) and the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities—reflects the fact that many local authorities perceive the need for involvement in what the UN System is doing. This interest is also reflected in the local governance issues on the agendas of UN-Habitat, UNDP, the World Bank, UNICEF, and other UN agencies. How can more local authorities and citizens become aware of the direct involvement of the local level in the UN System?

This Forum has also focused on expanding our knowledge about peacebuilding roles occurring in world politics beyond the UN System. For instance, the peacebuilding tasks performed by NGO and civil society organizations in world politics range across seven different types of actors involved in “transnational advocacy networks,” humanitarian assistance, sustainable development, religion, and a wide array of peacebuilding roles on the ground in the field. How can analysis of these activities by peace researchers help those involved to more adequately evaluate the interdependence of this vast array of peacebuilding actors and evaluate their impact?

In the light of the fact that cities are not only affected by global forces while at the same time affecting global patterns, how might peace researchers assist local authorities and their citizens in developing policies at the local level that are supportive of peaceful global patterns? Furthermore, the development of a Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in the Council of Europe and a CoR in the European Union challenges peace researchers and peace activists to ponder possible future options and trends in the participation of local authorities in the governance of world regions and in global governance. All people live their daily lives in communication, transportation, housing, shopping, recreation, investment, and other activities that involve them in the impact of businesses on human rights and other peace-related issues. How can peace researchers help people make their business involvements more supportive of a peaceful world?

To attain the UN's idea of a "culture of peace," is it necessary to first develop local "cultures of peace?" Efforts to enable people to cope with local conflicts within states have led to the development of an INCREPE. It is very significant that some involved in peace research with a global focus perceive that the knowledge and experience acquired in coping with local dispute resolution and conflict management activities enhance the ability of people to cope with these issues in larger geographic arenas. Research is needed that provides insights regarding how variations in education for, and participation in, local dispute resolution and conflict management affect their usefulness for coping with these issues in larger geographic areas.

There certainly are "peacebuilding tasks for everybody." Such a statement has become even more obvious during the course of this Forum. The challenge is to incorporate this complicated array of tasks and actors into a vision of global governance supportive of a "culture of peace." But it must be done. In developing our earlier state-centered view of the world, those of us who are involved in the examination of international affairs have tended to simplify this view so that we could understand it. Now we must take a less parsimonious approach and attempt to comprehend the peacebuilding opportunities that the challenging complexities described in this Forum make possible.

References

- Alger, Chadwick F. (1990) The World Relations of Cities: Closing the Gap between Social Science Paradigms and Everyday Human Experience. *International Studies Quarterly* 34:493-518.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (1997) Transnational Social Movements, World Politics, and Global Governance. In *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*, edited by Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (1999) The Future of Democracy and Global Governance Depends on Widespread Public Knowledge about Local Links to the World. *Cities* 16(3):195-206.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2002) Religion as a Peace Tool. *Ethnopolitics* 1 (4):294-309.
- Alger, Chadwick F. (2003) Searching for Democratic Potential in Emerging Global Governance. In *Transnational Democracy in Critical and Comparative Perspective*, edited by Bruce Morrison. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

- Anderson, Mary B. (1996) *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Appleby, R. Scott. (1999) *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield.
- Avery, Christopher L. (2000) *Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change*. London: Amnesty International.
- Bell, Christine, And Catherine O'Rourke. (2007) The People's Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy. *International Political Science Review* 28(3):293-324.
- Bock, Joseph, and Mary B. Anderson. (1999) Dynamite under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid Agencies Help Defuse It? *Journal of Peace Research* 36:325-338.
- BP AMOCO. (1999) *Amoco Environmental and Social Report 1998*. London: BP Amoco.
- Byrne, Linda. (2004) Strategies for Teaching Caring and Empowerment: Drawing from African American, Mexican American, and Native American Traditions. In *Educating for a Culture of Peace*, edited by Riane Eisler and Ron Miller. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Childers, E., and Brian Urquhart. (1994) *Renewing the United Nations System*. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.
- Commission on Global Governance. (1995) *Our Global Neighborhood*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eisler, Riane, and Ron Miller, Eds. (2004) *Educating for a Culture of Peace*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Galtung, Johan. (1980) *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*. New York: Free Press.
- Galtung, Johan. (1996) *Cultural Peace: Some Characteristics*. In *From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace*, edited by UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO.
- Hauffer, Virginia. (2001) Is There a Role for Business in Conflict Management? In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Jeong, Ho-Woo. (2000) *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Keck, Margaret E., And Kathryn Sikkink. (1998) *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kessler, Rachel. (2004) Education for Integrity: Connection, Compassion, and Character. In *Educating for a Culture of Peace*, edited by Riane Eisler and Ron Miller. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Nelson, Jane. (2002) *Building Partnerships: Cooperation between the United Nations System and the Private Sector*. New York: UN Department of Public Information.
- Paul, J. A. (1999) *NGOs and the United Nations: Comments for the Report of the Secretary General*. New York: Global Policy Forum. Available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos>.
- Prendergast, John. (1996) *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Reychler, Luc. (1997) Religion and Conflict. *International Journal of Peace Studies* 2(1):19-38.
- Reychler, Luc, and Thania Paffenholz, Eds. (2001) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Royal Dutch Shell. (1998) Business and Human Rights: A Management Primer. Available at: <http://www.shell.com/download/3359/index>.
- Sampson, Cynthia. (1997) Religion and Peacebuilding. In *Peacemaking in International Conflicts*, edited by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Smith, Jackie, Ron Pagnucco, And Charles Chatfield, Eds. (1997) Social Movements and World Politics: A Theoretical Framework. In *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*, edited by Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Sweatshop Watch. (1999) Retailers Agree to Join Settlement of Class Action Lawsuit Requiring Independent Monitoring of Factory Conditions. Available at: <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/settleemt.html>.
- UN General Assembly. (1997) *UN Resolutions A/RES/52/13: Culture of Peace*. New York: United Nations. Available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>.

- UN General Assembly. (1999) *UN Resolutions A/RES/53/243: Declaration and a Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*. New York: United Nations. Available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>.
- UN Global Compact Office. (2002) *A Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management*. New York: United Nations.
- UN Global Compact Office. (2005) *Enabling Economies of Peace: Public Policy for Conflict-Sensitive Business*. New York: United Nations.
- UN Secretary General. (1998) *Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of Non-Governmental Organizations in All Activities of the United Nation System*: UN General Assembly A/53/170, July 10. New York: United Nations.
- UNESCO. (1996) *From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace*. Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. (1997) *UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement*. 2nd edition. Paris: UNESCO.
- UN-HABITAT. (2004) *The State of the World's Cities, 2004/2005: Globalization and Urban Culture*. London: Earthscan.
- Warah, Rasna. (2001) The Emerging "Urban Archipelago." *United Nations Chronicle: On Line Edition*, XXXVIII(1).
- Weil, Pierre Gilles. (2002) *The Art of Living in Peace: Guide to Education for a Culture of Peace*. Paris: UNESCO/Unipaix.
- Wenger, Andreas, and Daniel Mockli. (2003) *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.
- West, Katrina. (2001) *Agents of Altruism: The Expansion of Humanitarian NGOs in Rwanda and Afghanistan*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Chapter 8

What Should be the Foundations of Peace Education?

We all approach peace education out of our own personal experience. If we are to empower our students to understand and cope with threats to peace across national and cultural borders, we must understand the challenges encountered by our colleagues in other nations and cultures and how they are coping with these challenges.¹

I have chosen as my title “The Foundations of Peace Education” because I want to present my conclusions about what I believe must be included in any peace curriculum. I am not saying that the elements that I shall present must be included in all peace courses. Nor must they be presented in the order in which I shall present them. Each peace course must be shaped in response to the needs of specific students who are living in specific social contexts. In our courses, we must begin dialogue with our students that is responsive to the circumstances that they are encountering in their daily lives. On the other hand, what I am saying is that students will not be fully prepared to work for peace unless at some point they encounter all of the elements that I will present.

8.1 Peace is Possible

First, I fervently believe that the bedrock of peace education is (1) attainment of belief in the possibility of peace everywhere! Each of us faces the challenge to this belief in different kinds of ways. As a political scientist specializing in international relations, I confront it continually because many in the mainstream of international relations scholarship tend to assume that war is inevitable. This is largely because political and diplomatic history tends to be a history of wars and to treat

¹ This text was first published as “What Should Be the Foundations of Peace Education?”, in, Yacov Iram, ed., *Education of Minorities and Peace Education in Pluralistic societies*. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2003, 43-55. The permission to republish this text was granted by Ms. Suzanne Paris of ABC-CLIO LLC, Santa Barbara, CA, USA.

peace as those intervals between wars. In my own teaching, I prefer not to begin by strongly declaring my belief in the widespread possibility for peace. Rather, I believe that it inevitably develops out of a peace curriculum that offers three more fundamentals: (2) placing threats to peace in a comprehensive historical context, (3) careful usage of key concepts, such as peace, violence, and power, and (4) broad exposure to what we have learned in our pursuit of peace. In addition, I believe that it is very useful to offer students an opportunity to put into practice what they are learning by (5) developing their own peace strategies in a specific case of disruptive conflict and (6) comparing their strategies with those employed by fellow students working on other cases. This chapter will focus on these additional five points.

8.2 Historical Context

In acquiring the necessary historical context for approaching challenges to peace, we must ask three basic questions: (1) Where are we now? (2) Where are we coming from? (3) Where should we be heading? They are in response to Elise Boulding's plea that we should approach peace in the context of a 200 year present (Boulding 1988: 3–15). Too often those immersed in a disruptive conflict are so totally immersed in their present sea of troubles that they have a very narrow comprehension of the present, are largely ignorant of where they are coming from, and have very limited vision of where they are headed.

The first question—Where are we now?—is very important because it challenges us to acquire a *comprehensive* view of the present. We are all aware that most media define news as “bad news”. Thus, peace educators must help students to understand that they must search beyond the daily press, TV, and radio news in order to acquire full understanding of the present and thereby to obtain the ability to perceive potential for building preferred futures. Ada Aharoni has offered a poignant example.

We worked very hard preparing the “20 years to the Bridge Symposium: Jewish and Arab/Palestinian Women for Peace in the Middle East.” We invited all the major media to cover it, so as to spread the climate and hope of peace to the wide public that are so fearful and discouraged nowadays, in both the Jewish and Arab/Palestinian sectors. However, no media came! The next day, one Palestinian was killed in Abu Tor, and one Israeli soldier was attacked near Jerusalem—all the media reported minutely and repeatedly on both incidents. 230 Jewish and Arab/Palestinian women have an intensive Symposium with open, constructive discussions on how to pave the “Peace in the Middle East,” and it is not considered “news,” whereas when 1 or 2 men are killed or attacked it is major news! (Aharoni 1998).

The second question—Where are we coming from?—challenges us to realize that we have a tendency to perceive the past through eyes focused on present conflicts thereby selecting items that illuminate the roots of present conflicts

rather than those that draw attention to past events that reveal potential for peace building in the present. Thus, many in Yugoslavia have quickly forgotten that peaceful communities in the past, composed of cooperating Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, can offer foundations for future peace. From a much broader perspective, Kenneth Boulding has reminded us that historians have devoted a disproportionate amount of research and writing to war: “Therefore, in the interest of human survival, there is a desperate need to develop images of the relevant past... what might be called the ‘other side’ of history, in which peace is seen essentially as the norm and war is seen as an interruption in the long process of the development of knowledge and skill, especially in the management of conflict” (Boulding 1989a: 463–464).

The third question—Where should we be heading?—presents most students with an almost insuperable challenge. Certainly the pursuit of peace requires a vision of a peaceful world. Nevertheless, although students are quick to respond when asked to describe elements of peacelessness in the present, most find it overwhelmingly difficult—virtually impossible—to offer a vision of a peaceful future. This is intertwined with their inability to believe in the possibility of peace. Hopefully students will begin to be liberated from this constraint by elements of the peace education curriculum that follow.

8.3 Basic Concepts

Careless use of concepts contributes much to confusion and failure in efforts to overcome extremely disruptive conflict. The relevant concepts are numerous, but here we shall illustrate this point with four very key concepts: peace, conflict, violence, and power. First, it is absolutely necessary to carefully explore the broad array of meanings of peace. Charles Chatfield has laid the foundations with three components: “a sense of juridical order associated with the Latin word *pax*; a sense of ethical social relationships conveyed by the Greek word *eirene*; and a sense of well-being that flows from spiritual wholeness, conveyed by the Hebrew *J shalom*” (Chatfield 1986: 11).

In more recent peace studies terminology, we begin with a dichotomy. There is “negative peace,” or the absence of physical violence; and there is “positive peace,” or the existence of economic and social justice. These abstractions, extended by examination of a number of dimensions of each, then prepare us for understanding why some people define peace as eliminating weapons of mass destruction and others define peace as conditions in which there is adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. They help us to learn that people tend to define peace as removing that which injects the most severe fear, suffering, and pain into their daily life. Eventually understanding of the diversity of meanings of peace teaches us that the politics of building peace requires that those involved understand the definition of peace of their so-called enemies and begin building social structures that incorporate elements of more than one meaning of peace.

Second, we must carefully distinguish among different forms of conflict. Essential is the distinction between violent and nonviolent conflict. Although the difference is obvious, much confusion is caused by frequent tendencies to use violence and conflict as synonyms and then to propose strategies for “preventing conflict.” Once, during a vigorous debate in the UN General Assembly, a journalist sitting next to me declared: “There they go again, this is supposed to be the United Nations, but they are fighting again.” He failed to understand the triumph that had been achieved by transforming that conflict from the battlefield to a parliamentary debate. Conflict is essential for peace building. It is employed in political campaigns, legislative debates, and diplomatic negotiations. Indeed, Galtung’s manual *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means* declares that conflict is both a destroyer and creator, “as potentially dangerous both now and in the future because of the violence, but as a golden opportunity to create something new” (Galtung 1997: 4).

Third, coping with confusion in the usage of the term conflict is inevitably intertwined with usage of the concepts violence and nonviolence. Many equate nonviolence with a kind of pacifism that avoids conflict and accepts the status quo, because they do not yet understand the role of nonviolent action in peace building. At the same time, in more affluent cultures there is resistance to employment of the term structural violence to identify human suffering and slow loss of life that is caused by economic and social structures. But the term is vitally useful in facilitating dialogue between those fearing quick death (direct violence) and those fearing slow death (structural violence). Of course, would-be peace builders confront puzzling challenges in applying these concepts. One puzzle is, How far can nonviolent action go without becoming structural violence? For example, some of those employing nonviolent action against abortion clinics in the United States can be perceived as perpetrating structural violence against those women who believe that personal choice is their right.

Fourth, it is vital that peace education examine the various dimensions of the concept power. There is a tendency to equate power with force, although, after careful thought, we all know differently. Here Kenneth Boulding is again extremely helpful in his volume *Three Faces of Power* (1989b). He summarizes a far-ranging examination of kinds of power into three dimensions: (1) threat power, the power to destroy, (2) economic power, the power to produce and exchange, and (3) integrative power, the power to create such relations as love, respect, friendship, and legitimacy. His analysis causes us to ponder how selective history, and enduring social structures created for coping with perceived external threats, encourage us to depend on threat power. At the same time, he makes us aware of how neglectful we have been in recognizing the integrative dimension of power in peace studies. Certainly the European Community is now dramatically illustrating the integrative dimension of power. It causes us to ask: Was the fear generated by two world wars necessary for the creation of the Community? Why was the integrative power illustrated by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 not more fully employed?

8.4 What Have We Learned? The Emerging Tool Chest

In peace education it is essential that we emphasize how much we have learned about peace building. Despite the fact that we still have much to learn, the basic problem is that most of the time we are not applying in practice what we already know. It is useful to present what we have learned in the context of the practice out of which it has emerged. This inevitably means that each of us will select that practice emerging out of those human activities that are the subject of our personal experiences, research, and teaching. In my teaching, I focus on peace learning that has emerged out of experiences in the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations (Alger 1996b, 1999).

My peace-building tool chest has ever more drawers, as a result of the impact of the same technological changes on relations between peoples. My most recent version has six drawers, with a total of 24 compartments (see Fig. 3.1). I will present a very quick overview of these tools in the order of their historical emergence, indicating how each evolved out of experience with earlier ones (see Fig. 2.1).

The first drawer, nineteenth-century, has two tools. (1) *Diplomacy* is a significant human achievement that deserves much credit for the fact that most states have peaceful relations with most other states most of the time. The system of embassies that each country has in the capitals of many other countries has developed over many centuries. Formerly consisting primarily of career diplomats representing their Foreign Ministry, now many embassies include representatives of other government departments responsible for health, labor, education, trade, environment, and so forth.

Although we have emphasized that the interstate diplomatic system preserves the peace most of the time, nevertheless disputes do arise and create situations in which states fear aggression by others. In such cases (2) *Balance of Power* may be used to deter aggression. In the sense in which we are using the term, employment of balance of power means that a state attempts to acquire sufficient military and related capacity to deter aggression or attempts to deter aggression by making alliances with other states. When balance of power is employed as a deterrent, it may help to deter aggression. On the other hand, reciprocal application of balance of power has frequently led to deadly arms races.

The second drawer, League of Nations Covenant, adds three more tools. (3) *Collective Security*, devised to overcome the weaknesses of balance of power as a deterrent to aggression, obligated all who were members of the League to “undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” Those who advocated collective security believed that the pledge of all to resist aggression by any member would be such an overwhelming deterrent that none would have reasonable ground for fearing aggression. But the obvious common sense of collective security in the abstract ignores the fact that all may not be able or willing to resist aggression by any other member.

(4) *Peaceful Settlement* was intended to prevent the outbreak of violence in those instances when routine diplomacy fails to do so. In cases where a dispute may “lead to a rupture” the Covenant required states to “submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the [League] Council.” In other words, members involved in a dispute agree to involve certain “third parties” when they alone cannot control or escalating hostility. In employing third parties, states are drawing on human experience in a variety of other contexts: labor-management disputes, disputes between buyers and sellers, marital disputes, and so on.

(5) *Disarmament/Arms Control* responded to those who believed that arms races had contributed to the outbreak of World War I and believed that elimination, or at least reduction, of arms would enhance chances for peace. This was an effort to codify disarmament and arms control proposals that had been advanced in earlier times. Although Covenant provisions for disarmament/arms control never fulfilled the aspirations of advocates, they did facilitate the negotiation of numerous arms control measures in the 1930s. These provided valuable experience, and also a great deal of skepticism, for those who would again face similar circumstances after World War II.

League experience with these three negative peace tools (stopping the violence) revealed a desperate need for positive peace tools (building peaceful social structures). Building on important League experience, the *UN Charter*, drawer three, provided three additional tools, in addition to continuation of the three tools in drawer two. (6) *Functionalism* encourages states to cooperate in solving common economic and social problems that might disrupt normal relationships and even lead to violence. Drafters of the Charter had in mind examples such as worldwide depression in the 1930s and the inability of states to collaborate in coping with this disaster. The depression led to strikes, extreme social unrest, and violence in many countries and significantly contributed to the development of totalitarian governments and aggression in some cases. Emphasis on economic and social cooperation in the Charter is signified by the creation of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) alongside the Security Council (responsible for collective security), which had been the only council in the League. ECOSOC was created “with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.” Its mission includes the achievement of higher standards of living, full employment, solutions to international economic, social, health, and related problems, and international cultural and educational cooperation. At the same time, ECOSOC has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of some 30 agencies in the UN system with responsibility for health, labor, education, development, environment, population, trade, and a number of other global problems.

Following League of Nations practice, some colonies of defeated colonial powers became UN Trustships. But (7) *Self-Determination* was dramatically extended in the UN Charter by inclusion of Chapter XI, a “Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories,” which covered the many overseas colonies not under trusteeship. This Declaration asserts that those administering colonies are obligated “to develop self-government... and to assist them in the progressive

development of their free political institutions.” Eventually, this Declaration provided the foundation for prodding the overseas colonial powers to begin relinquishing control of their colonies. This led to a strengthened Declaration by the General Assembly in 1960: “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” Both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly played a very significant role in the largely peaceful dismantlement of overseas empires. In this respect, self-determination has proven to be a very useful peace tool. This remarkable transformation of the interstate system more than doubled the number of independent states and the number of UN members. Presently the world confronts a new generation of self-determination demands by peoples in multination states (as in Yugoslavia) and in multistate nations (e.g., the Kurds). Unfortunately, there has been as yet no effort to draw on past experience in developing multilateral institutions for coping with a new era of self-determination demands.

(8) *Human Rights* are mentioned seven times in the Charter, including the second sentence of the Preamble, which announces determination “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” As in the case of economic and social cooperation, the Charter states that human rights shall be promoted in order to “create conditions and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.” Building on the brief references to human rights in the Charter, the UN General Assembly soon produced the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1947, which is now widely accepted as part of international common law and has even been applied by domestic courts in a number of states. In order to strengthen the legal status of the Declaration, its principles were in 1966 put in treaty form by the General Assembly as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, an array of more specialized treaties have been developed on genocide, racial discrimination, women’s rights, children’s rights, forced labor, cruel and inhumane punishment, rights of refugees, and other dimensions of human rights. All of these can be applied toward the end of preventing the creation of unacceptable conditions of human depravity that may lead to severe unrest and even violence.

The fourth drawer, UN Practice (1950–1959), adds six tools. (9) *Peacekeeping* is not explicitly provided for by the UN Charter but was invented out of challenges confronted in the UN “laboratory.” In its simplest form, it essentially involves a cease-fire, followed by creation of a demilitarized corridor on each side of a truce line. This neutral corridor is patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force, protected by the UN flag and small arms. The end of the Cold War has permitted rapid expansion of the number of peacekeeping forces, to Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, the Iraq- Kuwait border, Somalia, and other places. In some instances, as in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, UN forces have been employed without first acquiring a cease-fire and in situations where there is no clear authority that could grant permission for entry of the UN force. These efforts tend to be referred to as “peace enforcement,” that is, limited use of arms toward the end of restoring

peace. Whether “peace enforcement” will become a useful peace tool is still much in doubt because even limited use of violence toward the end of “restoring peace” may quickly escalate into widespread violence.

Prodded by title growing divide between the rich and the poor in the United Nations, three peace tools developed out of UN practice were largely a product of growing insight on the relevance of economic conditions and relationships for peace. (10) *Economic Development* became a growing policy concern both within the United Nations and outside. The basic idea was that the rich-poor gap could be diminished if the rich countries provided development aid to the poor countries so that they could “take off” and become developed. Many people would argue that both bilateral and multilateral economic development programs have often contributed to peace by diminishing poverty. But overall they did not diminish the rich-poor gap in the world. This led to a “Third World” charge that the international economic structure was preventing their development. Thus, they demanded (11) *International Economic Equity* (NIEO), often referred to as a New International Economic Order. This included demands for stabilization of commodity prices, pegging the price of Third World commodities to those of manufactured products bought from industrialized countries, access to technology useful in development, and international regulation of multinational corporations. Failure of the Third World to obtain response to these demands contributed to frustration that led to demands for (12) *International Communications Equity*, or a New International Information and Communications Order. After World War II, “free flow of communication” had been emphasized as a prerequisite for peace. But in the 1970s Third World countries became increasingly concerned about the one-way international flow of news, radio and TV broadcasts, films, books, and magazines. Out of this dissatisfaction came demands for “free and balanced flow of communication” that were largely made in United Nation Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) meetings. These demands too have acquired slight response, although the reliable mutual knowledge—across cultures and nations—that is encouraged by balanced flow could contribute to peace in all parts of the world.

The rapidly growing impact of new technologies on the environment and the commons (oceans, space, and Antarctica) has added new dimensions to peace. (13) *Ecological Balance* became a widely recognized problem in world relations as a result of the UN Environment Conference held in Stockholm in 1972. Whereas in 1972 very few tended to see ecological balance as a dimension of peace, this perspective is now widely shared. (14) *Governance for the Commons* has been most dramatically moved forward by the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, completed after 10 years of negotiations, which has established an International Sea Bed Authority with its own Assembly, Council, and Secretariat, as well as an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

The fifth drawer, UN Practice (1990-), adds two more negative peace tools that have gained prominence after the Cold War as a result of growth in multilateral peace efforts. They could certainly be employed as positive peace tools, but they have tended to be employed in reaction to violence and threats of imminent

violence, rather than in long-term peace building. (15) *Humanitarian Intervention* occurs within the borders of states without their explicit consent, responding to egregious violations of human rights and also to prevent escalation of a domestic dispute that could jeopardize the security of other states. (16) *Preventive Diplomacy* is defined by former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” For Boutros-Ghali preventive diplomacy requires three elements: measures to create confidence, early warning based on information gathering, and informal or formal fact-finding. “It may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones” (1995: 46–51).

The sixth drawer, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Peoples Movements, reflects the increasing importance of NGOs and peoples movements, or what we increasingly refer to as “civil society” in peace building. Of course, these movements have from time to time been advocates of all peace tools, certainly including disarmament/arms control, human rights, and ecological balance. But we believe that they have been primarily instrumental in developing eight peace tools. The first, (17) *Track II Diplomacy*, addresses the limitations of diplomacy and peaceful settlement by recognizing that stalled negotiations, or those broken off by governmental representatives, may be revived by initiatives outside of government. Consisting at least in part of people outside of government, this approach offers a “second track” that sometimes may include alternative representatives of governments, often at a lower level.

The next four tools aim at limiting the development and deployment of arms. (18) *Conversion* from military to civilian production undercuts arguments that military production provides jobs—for factory workers, engineers, and researchers—by demonstrating that more jobs could be created by providing for housing, home appliances, and other domestic needs. (19) *Defensive Defense* argues for defense that employs weapons that are essentially defensive in nature such as short-range mechanized forces and interception aircraft, thereby attempting to halt the tendency to acquire bigger and bigger weapons with ever more distant reach. (20) *Nonviolence* is used by social movements in energetic pursuit of social change, while avoiding the use of arms and thereby diminishing the need for armed police and military forces employed for internal security. (21) *Citizen Defense* is closely related to nonviolence employed for social change, but this tool employs nonviolent techniques for national defense. It goes one step further than defensive defense by also eliminating defensive weapons. Citizen defense relies on the deterrence of large-scale, well-publicized organization and planning for massive refusal to cooperate with any invader and to deprive them of the basic needs and services required by an occupying army (Sharp 1985).

The next two peace tools largely focus on creating economic and social aspects of a peaceful society from the grassroots. (22) *Self-Reliance* emerged as a peace tool in the context of dialogue focused primarily on the economic dimensions of peace that evolved from functionalism to economic development to international economic equity. It asserts that development should develop individual human

beings, not things, and that this kind of development requires that people have the capacity to seek fulfillment through self-reliance, thereby avoiding dependency. (23) The *Feminist Perspective* is particularly useful in shedding light on the degree to which values associated with militarism and military organizations permeate societies and how that came to be. At the same time, the feminist perspective provides a vision of alternative kinds of societies, by questioning the inevitability of violence as a tool in the pursuit of peace and security. It illuminates the sources of the “violence habit” and offers visions of alternative ways for solving human problems (Reardon 1990).

(24) *Peace Education* is the last tool to be presented because it comprises all that has gone before. Indeed, the successful employment of all that we have learned about peace building in the twentieth century is dependent on peace education. It makes possible the placing of peace issues on the agenda of the vast array of disciplines and professions that have something to contribute to the pursuit of peace. Peace education should also be placed more prominently on the agendas of the thousands of organizations in civil society that are increasingly involved in peacebuilding movements. To those of us involved in peace education in schools and universities, the entire sixth drawer (NGOs/Peoples Movements) is particularly relevant because it suggests opportunities for all of our students to participate in peace building and thereby to obtain the unparalleled kind of learning that comes out of thoughtful practice (Alger 1995, 1996a).

8.5 Putting the Pieces Together: Developing Peace Strategies and Peace Education

After we have acquired the necessary broad historical context, have attained reasonably precise usage of concepts, and have a well-stocked tool chest, we are much more inclined to believe that peace is possible. At this point we are prepared to put all of the pieces together, that is to apply what we have learned in an arena of intense peacelessness. Thus, in a peace studies seminar, participants might be asked to choose one of the present widely reported cases as a laboratory—for example, Cameroon, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Colombia—so that there is likely to be much material readily available. Then turn back the clock 30 years. Thus, it is now 1973. We know what has happened in 2003, and it is the student’s challenge to develop a peace strategy, in 5-year increments, that would have made 2003 more peaceful than it now is.

The first step in putting the pieces together into a peace-building strategy is to create what could be called an “attainable vision” of what might have been achieved by 2003. This challenging task requires a dialogue among (1) a vision of peace in 2003, (2) conditions in 1973, and (3) relevant earlier history. It is very important to emphasize that this effort to place the case being examined in historical context involves not only; search for the roots of present peacelessness. It also demands an effort to discover past dimensions of peace whose potential failed to be exploited and for insight on why this was so. The effort to construct

an attainable vision inevitably requires an examination of how peace is defined in different sectors of involved societies. An attainable vision will be the product of a dialogue among these different definitions of peace with a result that is responsive to all involved in a specific case of disruptive conflict.

Once an attainable vision has been developed, it is time to open up the tool chest. Of course, this assumes that students have already learned the nature of each tool and have some knowledge of how it has been employed in the past and of appropriate and inappropriate uses. Important here is to overcome the tendency of many people to approach peace-building problems with a propensity to believe that their favorite tool will solve all problems. Each tool must be selected only after careful analysis of the situation in which it is to be applied and after knowledge about when it might be useful and when it might make things worse. For example, sometimes balance of power (in military terms) can restrain aggressors. On the other hand, it can lead to arms races and thereby undermine efforts to achieve peace. Students could be urged to approach their tool box with an assumption that all tools are useful under some conditions and that all tools can occasionally make things worse. They are certainly not required to use all tools, but at the end of their paper, they are required to explain why any tool not employed was left out of their strategy.

Now that the tool box is open, we face the challenge of deciding what should be done first, that is, what will our peace strategy be for the 1973–1978 period? Should we begin to work for disarmament now? Or will this be easier later, after greater economic equity among the contending parties has been achieved? Will political conditions make it possible to begin moving now toward greater economic equity, or will it first be necessary to develop a people's movement dedicated to economic equity? Will this be possible before a people's movement is able to achieve greater civil and political rights that would make an economic equity movement possible? Given the fact that these economic and social changes could take a decade or more, should we simultaneously make at least modest efforts toward some form of arms control?

These few examples make it quite clear that deciding where to begin with a 30-year peace strategy is almost as difficult as developing an attainable vision. Nevertheless, as students are challenged to decide which tool should be used first, and which tools should be used in combination, they acquire a deeper understanding of each tool. And once the first stage strategy has been developed, it is somewhat easier to follow on with the other 5-year increments that lead up to 2003. On the other hand, both students and professor are continually challenged in assessing how long it will take for a specific tool to bring about desired changes. At the same time, there is an inevitable continuing dialogue between efforts to apply peace tools and growing knowledge about the actual state of affairs in 1973 and 2003, as well as between efforts to apply the tools and the definition of an attainable vision. This inevitable fluidity in historical facts, a future vision, and peace strategies offers students deeper understanding of the challenges faced by peace builders. But students face a deadline that is in some respects sterner than that confronted by "real" peace builders: Academic deadlines require that they bring their search to an end.

8.6 Comparative Evaluation of Peace-Building Strategies

In the final meetings of the seminar, there are vitally important opportunities for comparison of the cases. First we ask: What were the root causes of disruptive conflict in each case? In discussion we attempt to make a list of which root causes were very significant and which of lesser significance. In those cases where similar root causes were identified, but different tools were employed, an opportunity is offered for comparative evaluation of different strategies. For example, in two cases where ethnic conflict was a root cause of intensive conflict, why was greater self-determination offered in one case but greater functional economic cooperation across ethnic divisions advocated in another case?

Second, based on a report from each student, we make a table indicating which tools were employed and in which stage of the peace strategy they were introduced. Here we are likely to find that some students tend to see stronger peoples movements with peace-building goals as essential in the first stage of peace building, whereas others place greater emphasis on existing political authorities. Discussion tends to illuminate whether the difference is a result of different conditions in the case being examined or a result of a student's assumptions about the value of people's movements that is independent of factors in the case being examined. This tends to provoke a useful challenge that requires that the person confident in the peace-building capacity of peoples movements justify his or her choice of this tool in this specific case.

8.7 Conclusion: The Challenges for Peace Educators

We began by emphasizing that "the bedrock of peace education" is attainment of the belief that peace is possible everywhere, a belief that is facilitated by the capacity to perceive the widespread existence of peace in the world today. We then stressed the importance of approaching peace in a historical context that links present conditions to a preferred vision of the future and a relevant historical context that does not neglect past conditions of peace. Bringing to bear a broad historical context demonstrates that we have learned a great deal about building peace in this century, as exemplified by the growing array of peace tools that have emerged out of League of Nations and United Nations experience. Different peace educators could, of course, develop a somewhat different array of peace tools out of other contexts. Our choice is based largely on our belief in the value of presenting emerging peace tools as evidence of a historical learning process that is global in scope.

The challenge for peace educators is not only to enable students to acquire knowledge about the growing array of peace tools but also to facilitate the development of student competence in applying them. We concluded with a description of the strategy that we use in challenging students to acquire competence in employing available peace tools by developing a strategy for coping with an

exceedingly disruptive conflict. Our 30-year peace-building exercise illuminates our belief that peace education must emphasize the importance of long-term peace building that illuminates the broad array of political, economic, social, and cultural factors that contribute to peace. At the same time, this broad approach reveals to students how all citizens, no matter what their profession or station in life, can play a role in peace building in their everyday life.

References

- Aharoni, A. (1998). Media and Peace Symposiums. Internet Message to International Peace Research Association, December 16. For this and other relevant citations see her home page at <http://tx.technion.ac.il/~ada/home.html>.
- Alger, C.F. (1995). Building Peace: A Global Learning Process. In M.M. Merry field and R.C. Remy (Eds.), *Teaching About International Conflict and Peace* (pp. 127–162). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Alger, C.F. (1996a). Adult Education for Peacebuilding: A Challenge to Peace Research and Peace Education. In R.J. Burns and R. Aspeslagh (Eds.), *Three Decades of Peace Education around the World: An Anthology* (pp. 263–272). New York: Garland.
- Alger, C.F. (1996b). The Emerging Tool Chest for Peace Builders. *International Journal of Peace Studies* 1(2): 21–45.
- Alger, C.F. (1999). The Expanding Tool Chest for Peacebuilders. In H.-W. Jeong (Ed.), *The New Agenda for Peace Research* (pp. 13–44). Aldershot, UK: Ash-gate.
- Boulding, E. (1988). *Building a Global Civil Culture: Education for an Interdependent World*. New York: Teacher's College Press.
- Boulding, K. (1989a). A Proposal for a Research Program in the History of Peace. *Peace and Change* 14(4): 461–469.
- Boulding, K. (1989b). *Three Faces of Power*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, Publications.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995). *An Agenda for Peace* (2nd ed.). New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
- Chatfield, C. (1986). Concepts of Peace in History. *Peace and Change* 11(2): 11–21.
- Galtung, J. (1997). *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)*. Geneva: UN Disaster Management Training Programme.
- Reardon, B. (1990). Feminist Concepts of Peace and Security. In P. Smoker, R. Davies, and B. Muske (Eds.), *A Reader in Peace Studies* (pp. 136–143). New York: Pergamon Press.
- Sharp, G. (1985). *National Security through Civilian-Backed Defense*. Omaha, NE: Association for Transarmament Studies.

About the Author



Chadwick F. Alger, Mershon Professor of Political Science and Public Policy Emeritus, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. He obtained a B.A., Political Science, Ursinus College (1949), a M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (1950) and a Ph.D., Political Science, Princeton University (1957). Professor Alger's research and teaching interests are centered on: (a) Global problem-solving by international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, primarily focused on the United Nations System; (b) The world relations of local

people, governments and organizations; Inventory and evaluation of available "tools" and strategies for peace building. Subjects of his research have included decision-making in the U.N. General Assembly, the role of non-governmental organizations in the struggle for human rights and economic well-being, evolving roles of NGOs in U.N. decision-making, potential roles of the U.N. System in the 21st century, religion as a peace tool, the expanding tool chest for peace builders, and why the United States needs the U.N. System. Prof. Alger was Director of the Mershon Program in Transnational Intellectual Cooperation in the Policy Sciences (1971–1981) and Director of the Mershon Program in World Relations (1982–1991). During World War II he served in the United States Navy, Aviation Radioman, Second Class Petty Officer, Pacific Service (1943–1946) and after obtaining his BA and MA he worked in the Department of Navy, Pentagon, Naval Intelligence Analyst (1950–1954). He was President of the *International Studies Association* (ISA) (1978–1979) and Secretary General of the *International Peace Research Association* (1983–1987). Among his major books are: *The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-First Century*, edited for IPRA (United Nations University Press, 1998); *The United Nations and Policies of Member States*, co-edited with Gene Lyons and John Trent (United Nations

University Press, 1995); *Peacemaking in the Post Cold War Era* (Tamkang University, 1993); *A Just Peace Through Transformation: Cultural, Economic and Political Foundations for Change*, co-edited with Michael Stohl (Westview Press, 1988); *Conflict and Crisis of International Order: New Tasks for Peace Research*, co-edited with Judit Balazs (Hungarian Academy of Science, 1985).

About the Book

This is the third volume to commemorate the 90th birthday of the distinguished scholar Chadwick F. Alger to honor his lifetime achievement in international relations and as President of the International Studies Association (1978–1979) and as Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association (1983–1987). After a brief introduction by Chad F. Alger this volume includes six of his key texts on Peace Research and Peacebuilding covering “The quest for peace: What are we learning?” (1999); “The Emerging Toolchest for Peacebuilders” (1999); “Peace Studies as a Transdisciplinary Project” (2000); “Challenges for Peace Researchers and Peace Builders in the Twenty-First Century: Education and Coordination of a Diversity of Actors in Applying What We Are Learning” (2007); “The escalating peace potential of global governance” (2009), “There Are Peacebuilding Tasks for Everybody” (2007), and “What Should Be the Foundations of Peace Education?” (2003).