

Language, culture & cognition

Person Reference in Interaction

Linguistic, cultural and
social perspectives

Edited by N. J. Enfield
and Tanya Silvers



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Person reference in interaction

How do we refer to people in everyday conversation? No matter the language or culture, we must choose from a range of options: full name ('Robert Smith'), reduced name ('Bob'), description ('tall guy'), kin term ('my son'), epithet ('birthday boy') and so on. Our choices reflect how we know that person in context, and allow us to take a particular perspective on them. This book brings together a team of leading linguists, sociologists and anthropologists to show that there is more to person reference than meets the eye. Drawing on video-recorded, everyday interactions in nine languages, it examines the fascinating ways in which we exploit person reference for social and cultural purposes, and reveals the underlying principles of person reference across cultures from the Americas to Asia to the South Pacific. Combining rich ethnographic detail with cross-linguistic generalizations, it will be welcomed by anyone interested in the relationship between language and culture.

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Language, culture and cognition

Editor Stephen C. Levinson, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics

This series looks at the role of language in human cognition – language in both its universal, psychological aspects and its variable, cultural aspects. Studies will focus on the relation between semantic and conceptual categories and processes, especially as these are illuminated by cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies, the study of language acquisition and conceptual development, and the study of the relation of speech production and comprehension to other kinds of behaviour in a cultural context. Books come principally, though not exclusively, from research associated with the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, and in particular the Language and Cognition Group.

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Person reference in interaction

Linguistic, cultural, and social perspectives

Edited by

N. J. Enfield and Tanya Stivers

Max Planck Institute, Nijmegen



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Preface

This is the first collective work to emerge from the Multimodal Interaction Project, within the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck Institute, Nijmegen. In this project, we are concerned with describing the formal features of human social interaction, and characterizing their underlying principles. Language is of course at the heart of it, but our guiding position is that face-to-face interaction provides the infrastructure for language in all its facets: production, comprehension, acquisition and structuration. In practice, language is woven into the full visible and interactional setting. Through a range of disciplinary approaches the project asks what makes it possible for human beings to be able to navigate their exceedingly complex social worlds with such aplomb. The topic of ‘person reference’ provides an ideal case study: the simple act of referring to someone takes us straight to the core of multimodal interaction, to the mechanics of conversation, and to a set of fundamental issues in linguistics, sociology and social anthropology.

The chapters of this book take a broadly semiotic approach to the problem of social action. The key skill is people’s ability to recognize and understand others’ actions through their public behavior. One source of guidance for any social participant is the stock of cultural norms: a culture, as Sacks put it, is ‘an apparatus for generating recognizable action’. This suggests variation between human groups, as supported to some degree by this book’s findings. And to the extent that there are natural or otherwise emergent principles of ‘recognizability of action’, we may expect universals in the organization of human social interaction as well (as Sacks no doubt did). Here, again, this book contributes, with evidence for robust underlying principles governing practices of person reference across varied cultures. The relationship between universals and particulars reflects the fundamental questions of anthropology and its subdisciplines: how do humans as a species differ from the other animals, and how do we differ from each other? We hope that this book may serve as a tool for investigating these larger issues of the general, and the particular, in human social life.

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This book represents many ideas that were brought to, and generated by, a workshop on Person Reference in Interaction held at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen. Nearly all of the contributors to this volume presented this work at that meeting as did Vicki Bruce, John Lucy, Leo Noordman and Wietske Vonk. There were many other people who attended the meeting and through discussions both during the meeting and in informal discussion influenced our collective thinking on this topic but whose specific contributions cannot so readily be identified. We thank all of these individuals as well. For assistance with the preparation of this book, we thank Paula Dings, Nikki de Jong and particularly Erica Renckens. We thank Helen Barton of CUP for her support of the project.

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1 Person reference in interaction

Tanya Stivers, N. J. Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson

1.1 Introduction

Person reference is a subject that stands at a central intersection between the various behavioural sciences. How persons are classified and individuated lies at the heart of social theory; how different cultures do so has preoccupied anthropology; how we recognize them from face and voice is much investigated in psychology and the cognitive neurosciences; how we refer to persons has been a central topic in philosophy; and the grammatical machinery involved in tracking protagonists in discourse is an important topic in linguistics. Yet, despite the fact that person reference has this centrality, the empirical study of person reference in natural conversation – the central genre of language use – has been curiously neglected, particularly from a cross-cultural perspective that might throw much light on the relation between culture, social structure and language use.

This volume attempts to fill this gap. Each chapter looks at person reference in a specific language and culture, as reflected in everyday language use attempting to understand unmarked versus marked usage primarily with respect to initial third-person references but also in subsequent and in first-person references. We see quite quickly that how people refer to individuals in interaction is amazingly varied. There are different name formats: simple first name *Laurie*, first-name-plus-surname *Serena Edwards*, title-plus-surname *Missus Hallman*. There are kin titles like *Mommy* or *Granny*. There are more complex possessed kin terms in which kinship references triangulate through someone else: *Suzanne's husband*, *Laurie's dad*. There are descriptions like *that guy who does those c'mmercials*. There are names and descriptions combined into units – *Laurie from our class*, *Silly Dan* – displaying both expansion (e.g., adding a descriptor *from our class* or *silly*) and contraction (e.g., reduction of the baptismal name *Daniel* to *Dan*). Despite this range of expressions, the chapters collected here show that the domain is still highly rule-governed and orderly. By taking a cross-linguistic perspective, we are rapidly led into the specifics of cultural principles for categorizing and naming persons, and the cultural preoccupations that may highlight one or other of

these principles, and bias actual use. At the same time though these studies lend strong support to universal principles that govern this domain, which thus suggest some fundamental shared features of human social organization and principles governing social interaction in general.

In this introduction, we first sketch some of the background that makes this subject so central to philosophy, cognitive science, sociology, anthropology, linguistics and the study of social interaction. We also review some of the specific background in conversation analysis, which has informed and lies close to each of the studies reported in the chapters. Finally, we review some of the general findings that emerge, concentrating on the universal tendencies that are clearly discernable.

1.2 The background: person-identification and reference in cognitive science, philosophy, anthropology and linguistics

1.2.1 *Identifying and categorizing individuals*

There are many reasons for thinking that reference to persons is a fundamental phenomenon at the intersection between language and social structure. In the sociological dimension, all higher forms of sociality rely on distinguishing individuals so that they can be assigned distinctive social roles. In addition to distinguishing individuals (and not all social systems do – for example, sheep do, but ants do not),¹ social systems can work both with the assignment of individuals to absolute categories (worker bees vs. queens, for example) and relational ones (mother vs. offspring, senior vs. junior). These different principles, which long antedate the arrival of humans on the planet, are reflected in linguistic practices with names (*Mary*, *Ramu*), roles (*child*, *postman*) and relational terms (*uncle*, *daughter*, *leader*) cross-culturally reflected in the languages described in this book.

Given the deep phylogenetic basis for being able to correctly identify individual people, it is not surprising that cognitive neuroscience research has revealed two discrete brain mechanisms for face versus voice recognition (Belin, Zatorre and Ahad 2002; Sergent, Ohta and MacDonald 1992; von Kriegstein, Eger, Kleinschmidt and Giraud 2003). Moreover, these two neurological areas, while specialized, are coupled so that when someone hears a

¹ Sheep remember faces of other sheep for over two years (Kendrick, da Costa, Leigh, Hinton and Peirce 2001), showing how deep in the phylogenetic tree human recognition of other individuals by voice and face is. Ants distinguish nest mates from non-nest mates, and castes from one another, using pheromones either innate, or ecological or both, according to species. Their complex chemical societies are built on this basis (Vander Meer, Breed, Espelie and Winston 1998).

familiar voice, they readily access the person's face (von Kriegstein, Kleinschmidt, Sterzer and Giraud 2005).

1.2.2 *From individuation to reference: names and descriptions*

The human innovation, of course, is language, which introduces what Hockett (1960) called the design feature of *displacement* – talking about individuals who are not here now. Communication also presupposes speakers and addressees in potentially different knowledge states (otherwise, why communicate?), and with different relations to the referent, and thus introduces triangulation between speaker, addressee and referent. This will play a large role in this book (see especially Haviland, this volume, for discussion of this triangle).

The speaker's problem is to find a referring expression that will identify, for the addressee, the very individual in mind. Languages offer essentially two fundamental ways to do this, through names and through descriptions. As a first approximation, names (like *George Washington*) are typically non-compositional (or at least, successful reference has little to do with any such compositionality), and reference is achieved by a direct conventional link between the individual and the name, while descriptions are compositional and the whole has a descriptive content that picks out the individual in mind (cf. *The first president of the USA*).

The dichotomy between names and descriptions seems to show up firmly in the psychology of naming. Just like a glimpse of a face may give us instant person recognition, so names may tap directly into a specialized person register.² However, such advantages are countered by signal disadvantages. Names are difficult to remember and vulnerable to loss during brain injury or aging (for a review, see Valentine, Brennan and Brédart 1996). People routinely have more difficulty retrieving proper names than they do retrieving semantic information (e.g., a person's occupation) or naming objects (Brennan, Baguley, Bright and Bruce 1990; Burke, MacKay, Worthley and Wade 1991; Hanley and Cowell 1988; Hay, Young and Ellis 1991; McWeeny, Young, Hay and Ellis 1987). People typically take longer to retrieve familiar names than related semantic information (Johnston and Bruce 1990; Young, McWeeny, Ellis and Hay 1986).³ And, people's abilities to remember other people's proper names are more vulnerable to damage

² If hearing a voice tends to activate the brain mechanism responsible for face recognition at the same time (von Kriegstein et al. 2005), perhaps hearing the person's name brings their face and or voice to mind as well. In this way, person reference may have a special link to human cognition.

³ However, Brédart and colleagues find that frequency of exposure to a name may affect reaction time results (Brédart, Brennan, Delchambre, McNeill and Burton 2005).

(e.g., by attrition in old age) than related semantic information about those people (Brédart, Brennen and Valentine 1997; Milders, Deelman and Berg 1999). Proper names also take longer to retrieve than other semantic information among older adults (Maylor and Valentine 1992).

The most obvious explanation may be the correct one: names, by virtue of their special, direct link with their referents, bypass the web of semantic notions and all the connections they have with one another. Retrieving a semantic notion is like pulling any one of the threads in the web, which eventually will lead, via other concepts, to the specific one sought after, while in contrast retrieving a name offers no such redundancy or multiplicity of routes – there’s just one thread linking the name with the referent. Of course we also associate other properties with the referent, and so psychologists have debated whether these two kinds of knowledge run in serial (Bruce and Young 1986) or in parallel during retrieval (Abdel Rahman and Sommer 2004; Burton and Bruce 1992; and see also Schweinberger, Burton and Kelly 2001). They have also wondered whether it is the uniqueness of the referents or the lack of semantic content in names that is responsible for the retrieval difficulties (Brédart, Valentine, Calder and Gassi 1995; Burton and Bruce 1992).

The dichotomy between names and descriptions, however, can be questioned, at least in part. In philosophy, the dominant view, influentially argued by Kripke (1972), is that indeed names have a special status: Essentially a name is hooked to a referent not by a meaning that picks out the referent, but by a historical – causal chain of events – there was a ‘baptism’ as it were, and then an historical sequence of referring actions that traded on that original act (see also the historical range of views assembled in Ludlow 1997).

Searle (1997[1958]) makes the following point: ‘Suppose we ask, “Why do we have proper names at all?” Obviously, to refer to individuals. “Yes, but descriptions could do that for us.” But only at the cost of specifying identity conditions every time reference is made’ (p. 591). Searle strikes to the core of a theoretical argument for why names work differently to descriptions in the conversationally grounded theory of person reference that motivates this volume’s comparative work. When we *describe* a person, we commit to selecting some features and not others as constituting ‘the description’. Names give us a way to refer by specifically AVOIDING committing to one or another description of the referent:

(T)he uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lie precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. They function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions. Thus the looseness of the criteria for proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language. (Searle 1997[1958]: 591)

The Searlian view perhaps goes some way to explaining why, despite the cognitive problems associated with proper names, we use them so extensively.

Another way to partially erode the distinction between proper names and descriptions is to note that cross-culturally the picture may be more clouded. The giving of proper names, in a liberal sense, seems to be universal (e.g., see Bodenhorn and vom Bruch 2006; Mithun 1984; Tooker and Conklin 1984). However, in many cultures, personal names do not have the properties we normally associate with them – for example, they may not be nouns, but verbs or even whole sentences that thus carry plenty of descriptive content; they may not be freely chosen but strictly inherited (in which case they might be more akin to names for natural kinds than to names with a Kripkean baptism); they may be considered private and never used; and, most out of kilter with the Anglo notion of a proper name, they may not be fixed but endlessly changing. Even when a name looks like the same kind of thing cross-culturally, it is possible that it is understood strictly descriptively in one culture and strictly causally – historically in the other (Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich 2004). Personal names will be universal only under a wide Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’ notion.

Since the naming practices of other cultures inevitably play a role in the chapters of this book, it is worthwhile saying a little more about the observable diversity. On the question of descriptive content, a Mohawk name (an inflected verb) like *Aronhianónhnhá* ‘He watches the sky’ is clearly replete with compositional semantic content (Mithun 1984). Lévi-Strauss (1966) discusses a wide range of practices showing how names can convey substantial information much like descriptions do, for example, names may convey the state of mind of the mother at the time of birth (the Lugbara of Uganda) or the totem of the individual (Aranda of Australia), or even something about his or her place of residence (e.g., Yurok of California). From a semantic point of view, though, this information may play little role in reference – it is arguably connotation not denotation (i.e., it is made available rather than explicitly offered). On the other hand, when the baptismal rights are so restricted that from the name we know the social category (e.g., the clan of the father), these restrictions can play a role in circumscribing possible reference. In many of the chapters that follow, naming systems thus serve to designate the category membership of the bearers. (As this chapter was being written, a news story on the war in Iraq reported thousands of people across the country having their names changed by deed poll to avoid becoming targets of attacks and reprisals because of the religious transparency of their names. The example demonstrates how consequential the information given off by a name can be.)

In addition to differences in practice for bestowing names, some societies make relatively little use of personal names. Bird-David (1995: 73–4) describes the Nayaka as using kin terms or just two sex-linked names in childhood,

followed by the use of frequently changing nicknames in adolescence (cf. Sidnell, this volume), and then kin terms almost exclusively in adulthood. Others make use of names that change through the life cycle, and which within each stage may proliferate through wordplay (see Rosaldo 1982 on the Ilongot). In many societies, the use of names is hedged in with restrictions. For example, Mayali true ('bush') names are hidden private property (Evans, nd). While some societies (e.g., the Yurok) avoid or forbid the use of the same name for two individuals (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 189), others set up quasi-magical relations between namesakes. Australian Northern Territory namesakes are in a taboo relationship (cf. Levinson 2005 and this volume for a discussion of Yéli Dnye namesakes). Throughout the tribal world, sharing a name may be taken to indicate a sharing of essence. And using a name may be circumscribed with social constraints, like using another's personal belongings. Such restrictions can lead to the use of alternate referring expressions (Levinson 2005). They may also lead to culture-specific differences in preferred practices of person reference.

Names, we have suggested, get part of their utility from the Searlian avoidance of descriptive content. They may also offer a hot line to the person-identification system so rapidly accessed by the visual face-recognition system. But when names cannot be used, or other factors intervene (discussed shortly), either relational terms or non-relational descriptors come into play. Prime among the relational terms are kin terms. A huge amount of anthropological investigation has gone into understanding the range of kinship systems, their relationship to inheritance, marriage and demeanour, and to the kin term systems that express them (cf., Fox 1967; Keesing 1975; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Parkin and Stone 2004). In contrast, relatively little work (but see Bloch 1971; Luong 1984; Zeitlyn 1993) has gone into understanding the actual use of kin terms in interaction, and this work has emphasized how, especially in small communities, there are usually multiple competing kinship relations between the propositus and the referent.⁴ The choice therefore becomes strategic not only between say *his daughter's husband* and *his son-in-law* but also between *Ben's son-in-law* and *my cousin*. The strategic perspective is very much in line with the chapters in this book, where a central issue is why some particular mode of reference rather than another has been chosen.

Non-relational descriptions of course enjoin this strategic point of view: There is always an indefinite number of ways by which a thing or person can be referred to. How children learn that the same thing is at stake from different points of view is a puzzle (Brown 1958). The choice between *the neighbour*

⁴ In *Ben's son-in-law* Ben is the propositus. Downing (1996) refers to these as 'anchored kin terms'.

opposite, the man who drives the Porsche, the bastard who yells at my kids is clearly going to be occasioned by what we are talking about, to whom we are talking and what we are trying to accomplish with the utterance. Sacks (1992) pointed out what an extraordinary resource for sociological analysis is provided by the category terms that surface in these descriptions. He pointed out too that they tend to come in contrastive sets (mother, father, child; doctor, patient; teacher, student) that are implicitly articulated in discourse. Curiously, neither sociologists nor anthropologists have capitalized on this implicit ethnosociology.

One might expect that linguistics had a great deal to say about such descriptions. But linguistics has been preoccupied with other aspects of person reference. Firstly, it has focused on the grammatical category of person (Siewierska 2004), reflected in pronoun systems, verbal inflections and more obliquely in constraints on many linguistic operations. Here, of course, the crucial parameters of speaker, addressee and other are focal. Secondly, linguistic work has concentrated not on first mention, as when a new referent is introduced, but on the extensive grammatical machinery for handling subsequent reference or anaphora. There is a huge literature on pronouns, zeros, reflexives and reciprocals, and also on tracking protagonists in narrative, where many languages have such exotic specialisms as fourth persons, switch-reference or logophoric pronouns (see Huang 2000). Even studies devoted to natural usage (e.g., Chafe 1980; Fox 1987) mostly pay scant attention to the form of initial mention of referents including even names. Downing (1996: 95) remarks ‘proper names have gone largely unremarked in the literature on referential choice’. She argues that information structure, what is given, what is new, what is presupposed, plays a crucial role in such choice.

In this book, the prime focus is on initial reference to third persons, and thus on the choice between name, kin term or other relator, and description. If the focus had been on second-person rather than third-person reference, there would be a vast sociolinguistic and anthropological literature to draw on (see e.g., Brown and Gilman 1960; Ervin-Tripp 1986 [1972]). Instead, this volume sails into, if not uncharted waters, at least uncrowded seas. We turn now to the areas of central concern to this book.

1.3 Key notions for the empirical study of initial person reference

In this section, we introduce two sets of concepts that will prove useful in understanding the chapters included here. The first concerns marked and unmarked choices of referring expressions, and the second, a set of principles for organizing initial reference that have come out of work on the conversational organization of English.

1.3.1 *Achieving reference: the logic of linguistic formulation*

Throughout the review above we have noted the perennial issue of the speaker's choice among multiple alternative means of referring, first at the level of which mode to employ (names, relators or descriptions), then at the level of which particular form (e.g., which name) to use. To these should be added non-linguistic means, particularly pointing gestures, which especially in small-scale communities can play an important role, as mentioned in some of the chapters that follow. Many of the chapters (e.g., Brown, Haviland and Levinson) refer to the critical role that co-speech gesture plays in person reference. All of the new contributions to this book are based on video-recorded data, in which we observe hand-pointing to play a role in person reference (cf. Enfield, Kita and de Ruiter 2005; Haviland 1993; Levinson 2005; Schegloff 1984). However, the chapters concentrate on linguistic resources – a systematic treatment of pointing in person reference awaits further work.

What dictates a speaker's choice of referring expression? Contributors to this volume primarily adopt an interactional, social view of reference, where what matters are the actions being undertaken by interlocutors standing in specific social relations to one another in a social context. But to achieve reference, and thereby the associated social actions, speakers and hearers need reliable mechanisms for informational alignment, so that reference actually succeeds. This is not to deny that it may be important on occasion to keep reference vague (see Levinson, this volume and Garde 2003). A key mechanism is the distinction between unmarked manners of formulation and the marked nature of departures from these defaults, along with the special interpretations that these exceptional departures invite. We shall first outline what we mean by marked, as a way of bringing out some basic pragmatic principles of interpretation. We then focus on the informatics of person reference itself.

1.3.1.1 Marked and Unmarked For any recurrent type of coordination problem conventionally solved by the use of language, there should be an unmarked way to formulate it. In other words, if it is the kind of thing you need to say regularly, there will be a standard way to say it (Brown 1958). Correspondingly, saying it in some other way is marked. In one type of markedness, two items differ with respect to the presence of some extra specification. A *semantically* marked item has some extra semantic specification (e.g., Dutch *hengst* 'non-castrated male horse' vs. *paard* 'horse'). A *formally* marked item has some extra explicitly distinct formal specification (*parent's brother* vs. *uncle*). Distinct from these is *PRAGMATIC* markedness, by which an item is unexpected or less usual in some context than a possible alternative

(e.g., *automobile* vs. *car* in everyday conversation) (Ervin-Tripp 1986 [1972]; Levinson 2000).⁵

As an illustration from the realm of person reference, consider the second-person singular pronouns in Dutch: informal *jij* and formal *u*. Suppose that of these two *jij* is semantically bare, meaning simply ‘you’, and *u* has some additional semantic specification that accounts for its polite, formal, deferent, distant meaning (cf. Wierzbicka 1992: 319–24). Despite being formally/semantically unmarked, *jij* may on occasion be the pragmatically marked item. That is, using *jij* for ‘you’ in contexts where *u* is appropriate for reasons of politeness (e.g., in a service encounter) may be taken to index a choice NOT to use *u*, thus giving rise to an implication of disrespect. In such cases, pragmatic markedness is defined neither purely in terms of the linguistic nor the ethnographic system, but rather in terms of more locally defined contextual expectations.

It is critical to clarify what a claim of pragmatically unmarked or ‘default’ entails. Formal and semantic markedness are defined by properties of the linguistic system, and are therefore stable independent of usage context (e.g., in English, plural is formally marked by *-s*; singular is not formally marked). Pragmatic markedness, on the other hand, is by definition sensitive to social situational usage. The value of a particular type of formulation cannot be said to be marked or unmarked ‘for the language’ if this is taken to mean ‘unmarked across the full range of contextual settings in which that language may be used’. When contributors to this volume speak of unmarked or default manner of formulation for a given language/culture, this refers to a specific subset of contexts, in particular those that are characteristic of the kind of maximally informal, self-organizing mode of conversation among intimates that incorporates the fewest constraints on interaction, and which forms the type of ordinary setting from which the data are drawn. (See Haviland’s chapter for critical discussion.) Different defaults may apply in more constrained settings such as court proceedings, meetings and rituals of various kinds.

When a listener encounters a pragmatically unmarked formulation of person reference (e.g., ‘John’ in *Where’s John?*) he/she will not normally reflect on the selected manner of formulation, and as Schegloff (1996a) puts it, ‘nothing but referring is being done’ (but cf. discussion in Enfield’s chapter). On the other hand, when a listener encounters a pragmatically *marked* formulation of person reference (e.g., *Where’s His majesty?*), two questions arise in the listener’s mind. First, ‘Why is the speaker not formulating this reference in the

⁵ Prague School linguists refer to this as a distinction of automatization versus foregrounding (Havránek 1964 [1932]): ‘Automatized linguistic expressions are those which are typical, expected, routine, and therefore immediately interpretable. Foregrounded uses, on the contrary, are relatively unexpected, atypical, and may require special interpretation’ (Hanks 1990: 149–50).

normal, unmarked way?’ A generic answer is that the speaker is saying something other than the usual (Grice 1989) or, for person reference, ‘Because the speaker wants to do more than just achieve reference to the person’ (Schegloff 1996a). A second question for the hearer is: ‘Why is the speaker formulating this reference in THIS way?’ (i.e., specifically as *His majesty* and not any one of a million other possible departures from the unmarked). There is no generic answer to this second question. An analysis must look to the specifics of the formulation, where overt clues in the formulation itself should reveal *what* ‘more’ is being done (see chapters by Levinson, Oh and Stivers, this volume).

1.3.2 *Principles of person-reference emerging from the study of English conversation*

Backgrounded or even absent in much of the research discussed so far is a concern with the social action that is under way by virtue of some mechanism of person reference being selected and employed. This point has been explicitly acknowledged and promoted in anthropology (e.g., Bloch 1971), although it was first combined with detailed structural analysis of the moment-by-moment particulars of face-to-face interaction by Sacks and Schegloff in the early 1970s (following the work of Garfinkel and Goffman). Sacks discussed the concept of a ‘recognition-type description’ for places and objects in story telling. Speakers use this type of description in an attempt to secure a display of recognition from their interlocutor (Sacks 1992, vol. 2, p. 180). In Sacks’ example, a speaker refers to a location as ‘the main entrance there where the silver is an’ all the (gifts an’ things)’. This way of referring is specifically designed to secure some indication from the recipient that she knows the place.

Schegloff (1972) examined conversational reference to places, showing that people select from among alternative expressions in ways that are sensitive to the respective locations of the conversation participants, the social action being undertaken by the utterance in its context, and the identity of the recipient of the utterance (see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 1972 regarding recipient design more generally). These issues were critical to the development of Sacks and Schegloff’s (1979) account of person reference (reprinted as Chapter 2 in this volume). Instead of being considered distinct on formal grounds, kinship terms, descriptions, and names were considered together as types of person reference because they were all used by speakers as means of, at the very least, achieving recognition of a person in the course of performing some social action (e.g., announcing news, complaining).

Sacks and Schegloff treated person reference as a systematic domain with its own structure and proposed two organizing principles for determining how person reference should be formulated: (1) a preference for using

a recognitional reference form: a reference form that the recipient will know and can use to identify a person; (2) a preference for minimization: use a single reference form (whether a name, a description, a kin term, etc.).⁶ Additionally, Sacks and Schegloff proposed that when these two preferences come into conflict, achieving recognition takes priority (i.e., recognition must be achieved even if at the expense of minimization), and the preference for minimization is thus incrementally relaxed in resolving the conflict. This is illustrated in cases such as the following (square brackets indicate overlapping talk):

- A: ... well I was the only one other than than the uhm tch **Fords?**,
 Uh **Mrs. Holmes Ford?** You know uh [**the the cellist?**]
- B: [Oh yes. She's she's the cellist.]

Here, after a failure of recognition by the recipient (at 'Fords?'), the speaker's solution is to expand and add multiple referring expressions, compromising minimality in favour of achieving recognition (see also Heritage, this volume).

Schegloff's later work (1996a) offers more of a framework for the depiction of person reference as a system. As Schegloff frames it, the more general question is how 'speakers DO reference to persons so as to accomplish, on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done, and/or on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice which has been employed' (Schegloff 1996a: 439). Schegloff (1996a) is generally concerned with identifying the unmarked ways of doing person reference in the variety of contexts in which person reference is done (see above), but marked person-reference expressions are also explored.

Schegloff distinguishes between initial and subsequent *position* of reference (i.e., whether the reference is being made for the first time or later in a sequence, regardless of how it is formulated) and initial and subsequent *form* (i.e., types of expression typically used for first, or later reference – e.g., *John* vs. *he*). Unmarked usage features congruence of form and position (initial form in initial position, subsequent form in subsequent position might look like this: A: *You didn't come to talk to Karen?* B: *No she and I are having a fight*). By contrast, one type of marked person-reference involves a mismatch of form and position (initial form in subsequent position looks like this: A: *You didn't*

⁶ 'Preference' refers to the differential value or weighting of alternative courses of action made available to participants in interaction. For example, when an invitation is made ('Wanna come to a party with me tonight?') the relevant alternatives – accepting and declining – are dealt with in qualitatively different ways (e.g., declining is more likely to be delayed, mitigated, and accompanied by an account for why the invitation can't be accepted; (Atkinson and Heritage 1984: 53) see also Sacks (1973), Pomerantz (1984) and Heritage (1984a)).

come to talk to *Karen*? B: No *Karen* and I are having a fight). The converse is to use a subsequent form in initial position – for example, arriving at someone’s house and asking ‘Is *she* home?’ – which treats the person as already on the recipient’s mind and therefore retrievable even though no previous mention of her is available (cf. Chafe 1994; Fox 1987; Givón 1990).

Schegloff (1996a) also differentiates recognitional from non-recognitional referring expressions: that is, expressions that are designed to allow the recipient to link the referring expression to a person the recipient knows versus expressions that convey that the recipient does not know or does not need to know who is being referred to. Among recognitional referring expressions (which dominate our interest in the present volume), Schegloff observes that in addition to the preferences outlined in Sacks and Schegloff (this volume), a further preference can be observed: to use a name (e.g., ‘Mary’) rather than what he terms a recognitional descriptor (e.g., ‘the woman who sits next to John in staff meetings’).

The pioneering work of Sacks and Schegloff is picked up and furthered in the other chapters of this volume. One direction in which we extend the line of research is to test the set of claims made for English against other, often very different kinds of languages, spoken in different kinds of cultures. In each case, this has involved primary field research. These results feed back into a second direction for person-reference research, namely to assess the implications of these findings for further understanding of person reference as a system, towards a more general theory of person reference in interaction.

1.4 Generalizations: towards a theory of person reference

This volume offers comparative investigations of person reference as a general system in an effort to extract both cross-linguistic and culture-specific organizing principles. The chapters test existing claims about person reference made for English and attempt to further develop and refine them. Taken together, the chapters support both hypotheses: firstly, that there are interactional principles that operate independent of culture, and secondly, that there is variation in use across cultures. In this section, we review the contributions and examine their modifications of, and additions to, current understanding of how person reference is done. We then review some of the areas that this collection of papers suggests would make for fruitful future work.

1.4.1 Preference for achieving recognition (via name and otherwise)

Languages differ in the kinds of expression used for unmarked reference to persons in interaction. In spite of these differences, the chapters confirm that referring expressions are designed to achieve recognition: They evidence the

broader underlying principle of recipient design by which speakers make use of a referential form that should enable their recipients to link a referring expression with a real person. This appears to be the case to the extent that if using the (bare) name or preferred possessed kin term will not likely achieve recognition, then another form is used (see especially Brown's and Hanks' chapters). Schegloff's chapter illustrates that such a principle holds even with respect to self-reference. Heritage shows that achieving recognition is closely allied with a principle of achieving intersubjectivity and argues that when recognition looks like it might not be achieved, speakers will halt the progressivity of the turn (or even the sequence) in favour of achieving recognition. The evidence from different languages and cultures is that speakers work to achieve recognition, even when this means delaying the progressivity of the interaction.

Languages differ in whether the unmarked person-referring expression will be a name (whether bare or prefaced by kin titles etc.) or a possessed kin term. In the cultures reported on in this book, names (though not always bare names) are broadly preferred as the unmarked reference form in English, Yéí Dnye, Kilivila, Bequian Creole and Lao. By contrast, possessed kin terms are the unmarked reference form for Yucatec Maya, Tzotzil, Tzeltal and Korean. All languages represented here cluster in one of these two areas (i.e., none of the languages prefer descriptions over all else as their unmarked reference form). However, this result counters the idea put forward by Schegloff (1996a) that names should be a generic solution to the problem of identifying people while simultaneously orienting to the preference for achieving recognition and for minimization. Names nonetheless appear to be one major solution to this problem as evidenced by their unmarked usage in many languages and cultures.

1.4.2 *Preference for minimization*

By the proposed preference for minimization (see the Sacks and Schegloff chapter), a speaker should, where possible, use one referring expression rather than multiple expressions in doing person reference. This preference appears to be supported by all of the languages discussed here (although see discussion of Brown's chapter, below), including in the self-reference context (see Schegloff's chapter). In addition, the preference can be observed even in the way that speakers repair person references such that additions or modifications are done incrementally. Speakers across different languages generally offer a single referring expression and add other expressions to it only when the first expression is unsuccessful. Although logically a speaker could offer a series of referring expressions to virtually guarantee the achievement of recognition, this appears not to be the preferred interactional strategy: and this preference

cuts across languages and cultures (see Enfield 2006a for an account of why this might be). Levinson suggests that the principle should properly be broadened to a principle of economy arguing that there is sufficient evidence not only that speakers prefer only one referring expression but also that they prefer that the expression be as reduced as possible (one name rather than both in a binomial, for instance).

Although the data are not conclusive with respect to this broader principle of economy, we do see evidence for at least minimization and possibly also economy. For instance, even in a community such as that on Bequia where people often have multiple names (see Sidnell's chapter) and where we might expect a speaker to make use of multiple different names to secure recognition, the unmarked way of referring to a person is with one name – the one best fitted to the recipient and to the action the speaker is carrying out.

That said, in Tzeltal the use of multiple referring expressions (e.g., Your brother₁ Alonzo₂) appears more frequent than we might expect on the assumption of a preference for minimization. As Brown discusses, several analyses are possible: (1) The preference for minimization is universal, and the use of non-minimal referring expressions in Tzeltal represents a local departure from the default/preferred option; (2) The preference for minimization is culture-specific and does not apply to Tzeltal; (3) The preference for minimization is universal but is impacted differentially by other preferences in the system (see Sidnell's chapter on the idea of local inflection). Brown's data support the last analysis: that within Tzeltal interaction, there is a preference for minimization as evidenced by cases of interactionally generated expansions of referring expressions (e.g., the addition of referring expressions when the first is not successful). This then calls into question what sort of additional principle might be suggested by these data and whether that principle could be said to be universal or culture-specific.

1.4.3 *A preference for association*

Brown's and Hanks' studies suggest that a third principle may be missing from Sacks and Schegloff's early outline: namely, a preference for association. By this we mean that in certain situations speakers work to explicitly associate the referent directly to the current conversation participants. For instance, 'my sister' (associated with 'me'), 'your husband' (associated with 'you'), 'your wife's colleague' (associated with 'your wife', associated in turn with 'you'), 'her son's classmate' (associated with 'her son', associated in turn with 'her'). The associative strategy appears to be the unmarked form of person reference in Tzeltal, Tzotzil and Yucatec, and is common in situations involving circumspection in Yéli Dnye. In Lao, like other name-preferring languages (e.g., English and Kilivila) people do not by default associate referents explicitly, though the

default use of kin titles with names in Lao (i.e., as Grandfather John) has some affinity with the associative strategy.⁷

Does a preference for association exist beyond these languages and cultures? In English where associative person reference is generally marked for recognitional expressions (see Stivers' chapter), referring expressions that are not designed to achieve recognition typically *do* evidence a preference for association. For instance, non-recognitionals most often take the form 'my daughter', 'a colleague of mine', 'my cousin' even though 'this guy' or 'this woman' would be possible. Preliminary work on Mandarin conversation also suggests a preference for association in non-recognitionals (Chen and Stivers 2005). Although associative person preference is generally visible only in marked usage in recognitional contexts, it is still evidently a preference, and in other languages the preference appears in recognitional references as well as in non-recognitional references.

1.4.4 *Cross-cutting preferences*

The final issue concerns what happens when these multiple preferences come into conflict. Sacks and Schegloff (this volume) observe that if their two preferences collide, the preference for achieving recognition outranks the preference for using a single referring expression. This ordering of the preferences is generally supported by the studies in this volume, but there is now an additional preference to be considered: the preference for association.

Although all the languages/cultures discussed in this volume are sensitive to each of the three preferences, they appear to rank them differently. In English, the preference for association is virtually invisible in recognitional reference since as discussed earlier, recognition and minimization take priority, with names or kin terms being the unmarked outcomes in most contexts. Thus the order of preference appears to be such that recognition outranks both other preferences, and the preference for minimization is further prioritized over the preference for association. The latter is visible primarily in marked usage or in unmarked non-recognitional usage.

By contrast, Brown's chapter shows that in Tzeltal the preference for association is prioritized over the preference for minimization. Thus, if recognition can be achieved with a single referring expression and that

⁷ There are ways in which association may be implicit. For example, when names give off information about (sub-)cultural group membership, then using a name can give off some associative meaning. In a different way, when kin titles are used (*Grandfather John*), then certain associations may be implied (e.g., that he's *our* grandfather). The difference here is that the speaker is not making explicit the association with a particular person (cf. *John's grandfather*).

expression is an associating form, then the preference for minimization is also observed (the preferences have not come into conflict). However, if recognition cannot be achieved with a single referring expression that associates the referent to one of the interactants in some way, then the data suggest that interactants will add a name or some other referring expression (e.g., ‘your sister Xun’) but will not simply use ‘Xun’ even if that would enable immediate recognition. The preference for association is stronger than the preference for minimization though in all cases the preference for recognition ranks highest.

1.4.5 *Variation in principles across cultures*

The studies collected here support a general, cross-linguistically robust framework for interactional principles in the domain of person reference. However, as should be expected, there are several loci of cultural variability. For example, two cultures may commonly follow a given principle while differing in the details of how it is standardly expressed. Within the preference for association, an apparent locus of variation is the person to whom the referent is associated. Tzeltal speakers typically associate the referent to the addressee if possible, even if the referent could be associated to either the speaker or the addressee. Where a preference for association is visible in other languages (e.g., in non-recognitional references in English and Mandarin), it is not clear that speakers prefer to associate referents to speaker rather than addressee, or vice versa. Levinson observes that Yéî Dnye speakers anchor kin terms through senior members of the community so that ‘Yanika’s son’ is possible but ‘Mbyaa’s father’ is not. Haviland suggests the possibility that in Tzotzil men speaking to men generally use other men to anchor their kin terms whereas women anchor their kin terms to other women. This would suggest that how speakers of a language typically anchor their kin terms may be very much a local, culture-specific phenomenon.

Another way in which cultures may differ in the details of how common preferences are applied concerns the relative ranking of preferences – that is, which preference should take priority and be followed when multiple preferences are in conflict. While speakers across languages and cultures may orient to the three principles of recognition, minimization and association, the differential prioritization of these preferences may have consequences for the nature of interaction. Related to this, Levinson raises the issue of whether circumspection is in fact a principle in Yéî Dnye. There was insufficient evidence across other languages to consider this possibility cross-linguistically. Stivers suggests that in English a related phenomenon does not require the introduction of an alternative principle but is generated purely through a failure to optimize on the basis of the existing principles, thereby triggering

recipients' recognition of a marked usage. Additional data will be required to sort this out.

A more general locus of cultural variation is the construal of persons via an 'absolute' versus 'relative' frame of reference (Levinson 2003 and this volume). For instance, using a name would be more absolute whereas possessed kin terms would be relative because the latter associate the referent to a propositus. What might these alternative solutions tell us about the cultural organization of the person reference system? Consider names. Names convey information about their referent, though precisely how much and what sort of information varies by culture. What is special about names though is that once given, whether they pick out particular attributes of the individual or not, they are stable. This means that when a speaker uses an established name they cannot automatically be taken to be highlighting those attributes as a matter of specific communicative intent. Rather, they need not be taken to be doing anything more than simply identifying the individual. By contrast, when speakers make use of a novel description (e.g., 'the girl who wears orange') or identify the individual through a possessed kin relation (e.g., 'my aunt') or other sort of triangulation ('Roger's lawyer'), they are openly choosing some attribute to pick out, or one of the possible attributes or kin relations to explicitly associate the individual with (since any individual can be explicitly tied or associated with a large number of others (A's sister; B's daughter; C's wife; D's friend; E's co-worker; F's neighbour; G's mother, etc.)).

In this sense, irrespective of the information that names provide, names do not overtly tie the referent to any other individual whereas possessed kin terms and other relative types of referring expression do. Moreover, a broad range of people can be expected to use the same name to address and refer to a particular individual. And although many different relative expressions may be referentially correct, and all may be used to refer to a given individual in a particular interactional context, all explicitly associate the referent to someone else. This fundamental difference between the two basic types of referring expression is significant for understanding the basic interactional principles that underlie person reference. A bare name can be thought of as an absolute reference, while a possessed kin term or other triangulation is relative.

What does such variation reveal about the person-reference system? Can the variation be attributed to social structure, or culture? Consider a social structure argument. Drawing on Toennies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* ('community') and *Gesellschaft* ('society') (Toennies 1961) we might speculate that people living in small communities where kin relations are generally known would emphasize their community-ness through heavy reliance on kin terms in their social interactions whereas people living in urban societies where kin

relations are often unknown would no longer have enough sense of community to do this. However, the studies presented in this volume do not support a social structure analysis. Several small-scale developing communities prefer names: See Senft's chapter on Kilivila; Sidnell's chapter on Bequian Creole English and Levinson's on Yéli Dnye. Other ethnographic work also suggests that not all smaller-scale societies prefer the use of kin terms over names: In a Hai//om-speaking community in Namibia, the person-reference system also prefers names over kin terms in much the same way as English and other Western European languages do (Gertie Hoymann, personal communication). In these examples, the communities are small and people know the kin relations well. In terms of social structure, these communities are not unlike the Mayan cultures that adopt relative reference systems. Conversely, Oh's chapter suggests that the use of names is restricted in Korean conversation despite the urban, industrialized social setting from which her data are drawn.

By a cultural account, different practices of person reference will be motivated by qualitatively different sets of local values and beliefs about persons and their position in the social world. What differs culturally is perhaps the view on a person's individuality. To favour absolute person reference over relative reference is to treat the person as a discrete individual rather than place him or her within the domain of responsibility of any other person or group. Enfield's chapter focuses on how the unmarked form of person reference can instantiate the practiced expression of particular cultural values. The default Lao strategy of using names prefaced with kin titles or other social-hierarchical elements indexes the hierarchical relationship between the referent and the speaker. This cultural value effectively becomes invisible to speakers of the language when incorporated into unmarked reference forms, and so in Lao interactions speakers do 'just referring' through the use of these expressions. The format nonetheless works as a mechanism for cultural reproduction and stabilization, consistently reproducing the cultural value of a hierarchical social structure. By the same logic, the English unmarked names may similarly be seen to instantiate a cultural value of relatively flat social structure, by virtue of the implication (given off but not given) of treating everyone in the same way irrespective of relative social position.

Relatedly, by using a marked referring expression speakers perform actions relative to the culture in which they operate. The sort of practices documented by Levinson and by Stivers might work in an inverted way in cultures where the system prefers a relative person reference. It is the departure from the unmarked form that conveys that the speaker is doing something special with the action. Although what might count as special will be different in different languages (e.g., emphasizing vs. de-emphasizing referent-speaker association), we would nonetheless expect the reference form to be well fitted to the action in all cases.

1.5 Conclusion

People in all communities face a constant, generic communicative problem of how to make reference to persons reliably and efficiently in the rapid course of everyday conversation. The comparative research presented in this book demonstrates the systematicity of the practices by which people solve this problem. The results bear upon a surprisingly broad range of issues in semantics, pragmatics, linguistic reference, anthropology and the analysis of conversation. In exploring these issues, the studies collected here offer evidence for both culture-independent and culture-specific principles underlying the organization of referential practice in social interaction. In particular, we hope that the collection has refined our understanding of the structural organization of person reference as a system within and across languages.

More generally, we hope to be contributing to the broader study of human communication. There are important connections to be made between micro-level studies of the organization of social interaction and theories of the structure and evolution of human communication. Like most work on language in its natural home – conversation – the materials in this book establish that reference is not just, indeed not primarily, about giving and receiving information but about navigating social relations. People across the range of cultures discussed in this volume show a concern not only with correctly identifying people and with providing information relevant to their recipient but with navigating the relationships between themselves, their addressee(s) and the referent(s). Reference entails a special kind of cooperation unique to humans (Enfield and Levinson 2006; Levinson 2006). This fits with a view that our entire motivation to communicate, and even our very capacity for language, is in the service of managing social relations (Nettle and Dunbar 1997). Person reference is one among many domains in language and interaction where we see the inextricable integration of informational and affiliational concerns. While it is often imagined that social-affiliative practices serve the transfer of information by clothing the delivery in politeness or ‘procedural’ trimmings, we think it likely that the opposite is true. The case of person reference suggests that, if anything, practices of information transfer are in the service of social-affiliative action.

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Part I

Person reference as a system

2 Two preferences in the organization of reference to persons in conversation and their interaction*

Harvey Sacks and Emanuel A. Schegloff

2.1 Introduction

Research into the social organization of conversation has, as one type of product, the isolation of a 'preference' operating for some domain(s) of conversation and the depiction of the organizational machinery through which that preference is effected. A variety of such preferences and their organizational instruments have been studied. It regularly turns out that several of them are concurrently relevant, concurrently applicable and concurrently satisfied.

However, on some occasions in which some such two preferences appear to figure, the actually produced talk does not concurrently satisfy them.¹ Examination of such materials is particularly useful. They can, for example, give support to the proposal that *separate* preferences are involved, a possibility that the regularity of their concurrent satisfaction obscures. Furthermore, examination of such materials permits the extraction of a 'second-order' organization directed to an *integration* of preferences on occasions when their potential concurrent satisfiability is not realized.

The study of various such second-order devices suggests that they do provide resources that organize adjustment of the concurrently applicable preferences when both are not satisfiable. What is more interesting is that the second-order devices themselves represent *types* of solutions, a common one being to prefer satisfaction of one of the applicable preferences, and the other being relaxed to such a point as will allow the preferred to be achieved: *The non-preferred of the two is not suspended but 'relaxed step by step'*.

We have found this type of solution in a variety of domains in conversation,² operating on occasions when two concurrently relevant and

*This chapter was written in the summer of 1973 while the authors were teaching at the Linguistic Institute, University of Michigan. It was first published as Sacks and Schegloff (1979). See Schegloff, this volume, Section 6.3 for further discussion (and retranscription) of Example 3 in this chapter.

¹ For simplicity of exposition we consider such a case as involves just two preferences here.

² See, e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974).

applicable preferences that are usually concurrently satisfiable do not happen to be. Here, we shall address this problem and describe its solution in one of those domains – that of reference to persons by the use of reference forms.

2.2 Two preferences and their specification for person reference

Two preferences that we have found widely operative in conversation are those for ‘minimization’ and for ‘recipient design’. Each of these is relevant and applicable in the domain of ‘reference to persons’. Each has an expression specific to that domain.

The specification of the general preference for minimization in the domain of reference to persons is of the following sort: *On occasions when reference is to be done, it should preferably be done with a single reference form.* The point is this: For reference to any person, there is a large set of reference forms that can do the work of referring to that person (e.g., he, Joe, a guy, my uncle, someone, Harry’s cousin, the dentist, the man who came to dinner). Reference forms are combinable, and on some occasions are used in combination. But massively in conversation, references in reference occasions are accomplished by the use of a single reference form (as in: (1) Did *Varda* tell you what happened this weekend? (2) Hey do you have a class with *Billy* this term? (3) *Someone* said at the end of the class ‘Could you pl-please bring in a microphone next time?’ (4) If *Percy* goes with *Nixon* I’d sure like that).³ Thereby, a preference for minimization is evidenced.

The specification of the general preference for recipient design in the domain of reference to persons is: *If they are possible, prefer recognitionals.* By ‘recognitionals’ we intend such reference forms as invite and allow a recipient to find, from some ‘this-referrer’s-use-of-a-reference-form’ on some ‘this-occasion-of-use’, who, that recipient knows, is being referred to. By ‘if they are possible’ we mean: if the recipient may be supposed by the speaker to know the one being referred to, and if the recipient may suppose the speaker to have so supposed. The speaker’s supposition will be evidenced by, for example, the use of a first name, first names being a basic sort for recognitionals. Several easily observable phenomena attest the operation of this preference. Having noted that first names are a basic sort for recognitionals, suffice it to remark that they are heavily used. The point is this: In view of the aforementioned availability of a large set of reference forms for any possible

³ These fragments and those cited subsequently are drawn from a large and varied collection of recorded ordinary conversations.

referent, non-recognitional forms (and indeed minimized non-recognitional forms – e.g., ‘someone’) are available to any speaker for any recipient about any referent. Against the background of those resources, the heavy use of first names evidences a preference for recognitionals. Furthermore, names are not only heavily used when known, they may also be introduced for subsequent use when not already known to the recipient, thereby arming him with the resources he may thereafter be supposed to have. The strength of the preference should therefore be appreciated to involve not only maximum exploitation of the use of recognitionals consistent with some current state of ‘if possible’, but to involve as well an interest in expanding the scope of possibility. From the recipient’s point of view also, the preference is extendable. For instance, a non-recognitional having been done, the recipient may find from other resources provided in the talk that he might know the referred-to, while seeing that the speaker need not have supposed that he would. He may then seek to confirm his suspicion by offering the name or by asking for it, characteristically offering some basis for independently knowing the referred-to, as in the following:

Example (1)

- B Wh-what is yer friend’s name.
 B Cuz my son lives in Sherman Oaks.
 A Uh Wenzel.
 B (Mh-mh) no.
 B And uh,
 B If she uh
 A She lives on Hartzuk.
 (1.6)
 B No I don’ even know that street.

These and other such phenomena evidence the recipient design-preference which, to repeat, is: If recognition is possible, try to achieve it.

From this last discussion it should be apparent that there are extensive resources that provide for the compatibility of the preferences with each other, that is resources that allow the two preferences to be concurrently satisfied. The compatibility can be appreciated from either preference’s point of view: Names are prototypical and ideal recognitionals in part because they are minimized reference forms as well; and the stock of minimized forms includes a set (of which names are only one sort) that is for use as recognitionals. (It should be noted that names do not have their uniqueness of reference serve to account for their recognitional usage – for they are, of course, not characteristically unique.)

Massive resources are provided by the organization of reference to persons through reference forms for references that satisfy both preferences concurrently, and those resources are overwhelmingly used.

2.3 Incompatibility and its resolution

Turning to incompatibility, that possibility is structurally recognized, sometimes engendered and potentially restricted in size via a form available to intending referrers, which involves the use of such a recognitional as a first name, with an upward intonational contour, followed by a brief pause. We shall call this form a ‘try-marker’. The use of such a form is understood to be appropriate if a speaker anticipates that the recognitional form being used will on this occasion, for this recipient, possibly be inadequate for securing recognition. If the recipient does recognize the referred-to, such success is to be asserted in the brief pause that the referrer will have left for such assertions. (An ‘uh huh’ or a nod can be used to do this.) A recipient’s failure to insert such an assertion in the pause evidences the failure that the try-marker evidenced suspicion of; recognition is supposed as absent, and in that case a second try is in order. A second try will be treated as in aid of recognition, and also obliges that its success be acknowledged or a third try is in order and so on, until either they agree to give up or success is achieved.

Example (2)

- A: Ya still in the real estate business, Lawrence
 B: Wah e’ uh no my dear heartuh ya know Max Rickler
 h (.5) hhh uh with whom I’ve been ‘ssociated since
 I’ve been out here in Brentwood [has had a series=
 A: [Yeah
 B: =of um - bad experiences uhh hhh I guess he calls it
 a nervous breakdown. hhh
 A: Yeah

Example (3)

- A: ... well I was the only one other than than the uhm tch Fords?,
 Uh Mrs. Holmes Ford? You know uh
 [the the cellist?
 B: [Oh yes. She’s she’s the cellist.
 A: Yes
 B: ye[s
 A: [Well she and her husband were there ...

The existence and common use of such a form obviously bears on a consideration of the concurrence of the preferences for minimization and recipient design, and it bears as well on a consideration of their relative strengths. Since the try-marker engenders a sequence, involving at least the recipient’s assertion of recognition (an occurrence that is in marked contrast to the usual use of recognitionals that do not have success asserted by the recipient), and perhaps involving a multiplicity of reference forms as well, and since it generates a sequence whose desired outcome is ‘recognition’, the try-marker is evidence for the preference for recognitionals being stronger than the preference for

minimization. (Were minimization stronger, then, when recognition via a minimal recognitional were doubtful, a minimal non-recognitional would be preferred.)

Note, however, that the try-marker-engendered sequence has a minimal form used first, even when its success is doubted, and when others are available for combination with it; and in each subsequent try also it uses a single form; and between each try it provides a place for the assertion of recognition, the occurrence of which stops the sequence. Thereby, the try-marker evidences the non-suspension of the preference for minimization, and that it is relaxed step by step in aid of recognition and only so far as the achievement of recognition of this referent by this recipient obliges.

Note, finally, that since the try-marker involves the use of an intonation contour applied to a reference form, and is followed by a brief pause, its use is not constructionally restricted to some particular recognitionals or to subsets of them; whatever recognitional is otherwise available can be try-marked, and thereby used by the referrer to initiate a recognition-search sequence.

An initial second-order device for coordinating an adjustment between locally incompatible preferences having been found, it is common to find others too. Consider then the use of 'who'.

Example (4)

- A Hello?
 B 'Lo,
 B Is Shorty there,
 A Ooo Jest- Who?
 B Eddy?
 B Wood[ward?
 A [Oo jesta minnit.
 (1.5)
 A Its fer you dear.

Note about it first that it is done as a full turn by a reference recipient after an unmarked (without upward intonation or a pause) recognitional. More precisely, it occurs as a next turn on the completion of one in which a recognitional reference figures, which its use locates as unrecognized. Note further that its use engenders a sequence very similar to the one initiated by a try-marker, in which recognitionals are tried by the referrer, one at a time, a pause between each for an assertion of recognition, and a stopping of the sequence by an evidencing of recognition by the recipient. Then, the principle of a preference for recognition, with a relaxation but not suspension of minimization, is preserved when an incompatibility between the two, consequent on the use of a minimal recognitional that does not yield recognition, is noticed by the recipient. A reconciling device is then available for initiation by the referrer or by the recipient.

Certainly there are differences between the referrer-initiated and the recipient-initiated recognition-search sequences. The second try in the 'who'-engendered sequence is very commonly a repeat of the problematic reference form. The try-marker-engendered sequence does not have that feature, and is in that regard potentially shorter, as it is also by virtue of its first try potentially working. On the other hand, 'who'-engendered sequences very commonly occur as inserts into other sequences, and when they do, the assertion of recognition can be dispensed with in favour of the recipient, on recognition, proceeding with his next move in the sequence that his 'who' interrupted. In that move he will characteristically display, but not assert, his recognition in a way similar to how he would proceed if no failures had been involved.

Example (5)

- B I'll get some advance birthday cards. heh
heh ((pause)) and uh Ehhh Oh Sibbi's sister
had a baby boy.
A Who?
B Sibbi's sister
A Oh really?

While there are differences, then, between the referrer-initiated and recipient-initiated recognition-search sequences, both evidence the type of solution to a preference incompatibility which it was our aim here to notice and characterize.

3 Optimizing person reference – perspectives from usage on Rossel Island

Stephen C. Levinson

3.1 On the fundamentals of person reference

This chapter focuses on person-reference in a Pacific island society. Rossel island, roughly equidistant between Queensland, the New Guinea mainland, and the Solomons, is inhabited by a people who speak a language isolate called Yéli Dnye (classed ‘Papuan’, which here means simply ‘not Austronesian’). Ethnographic situations are natural experiments, which indicate the possibility of space for solutions to human problems. In this case, part of the interest is that Rossel Island is a closed universe of 4000 souls, linked by (mostly) known genealogical relations – in principle, any adult participant knows all other possible person referents. This closes off one whole parameter of person reference (the ‘non-recognitional’ of Sacks and Schegloff, this volume) without resorting to experimental control.¹ Another particular source of interest is that, as in many simple societies, the use of names is hedged around with restrictions and taboos. Together these constraints ensure that in many cases participants refer to persons inexplicitly, yet expect recipients to know exactly who they are talking about.

The approach I adopt here is to focus in on *repair* of third-person reference, concentrating especially on cases where recipients have to ask in effect ‘Who?’. The reasons for this focus will be carefully spelt out, but it will be useful to have the main points in advance. Repair is interesting because it tells us what the participants themselves find problematic. It also tells us, by virtue of the nature of the ‘redo’, what ancillary information might be expected to make an insufficient referring expression now do its work. Finally, the order in which upgrades of information are offered tells us, it will transpire, how speakers resolve competing principles that are always operative in this domain, but normally in a covert way.

¹ There are occasional references to persons not on the island, in which case non-recognitional reference may be at stake, but these are so rare that they have little bearing on the general point.

3.2 Some theoretical preliminaries

Sacks and Schegloff (1979, this volume) outline two principles or preferences operating in the person-reference domain. One preference specifies, if possible, the use of a recognitional, that is the use of a reference form that allows the recipient to recognize the referent. This is considered to simply be the specialization of the principle of recipient design in the domain of person-reference (recipient design has two subprinciples – (1) don't tell recipients what they already know, exploit it!, – and (2) if in doubt, oversuppose and undertell). The other major principle is the principle of minimization, in this domain taken to be the preference for a single referring expression, rather than two or more. Sacks and Schegloff propose that, when these are in conflict, it is minimization that is incrementally relaxed, until recognition of the reference is achieved. They illustrate this with examples of the following sort where an initial reference form ('Shorty') fails to achieve recognition, it is supplemented with another (intonationally 'try-marked' – 'Eddy?'), and then a third ('Woodward?'):

(1) (C is caller on a telephone call) from Sacks and Schegloff, this volume

C: Is Shorty there?
 B: ooo jest - Who?
 C: Eddy?
 Woodward?
 [
 R: oo jesta minnit

This idea that person reference is the locus where a number of optimization principles may compete is of considerable importance in what follows. The idea can be supplemented by noting that a number of further principles may be involved, in all perhaps the set in Example (2), here phrased as injunctions to the speaker:

(2) Multiple constraints on person reference²

- (1) Achieve recognition, in the strongest sense possible.³ (RECOGNITION)
- (2) Minimize the expressive means (ECONOMY).

² This list came out of a general discussion across a number of languages but may nonetheless require particularizing for a given language.

³ Recognizing an individual as a name and a face will count as 'stronger' than recognizing him as a node in a network of relations. Suppose I know there's a Dean of Humanities in the university, and I know that he's Jim Bluster. Referring to him as *the Dean* is to locate the office in a network of officials, and doesn't necessarily presume the speaker's familiarity with the incumbent, while calling him *Jim* does. If other principles (like (4)) don't intervene, this version of the preference for recognition will prefer *Jim*, providing the recipient can recognize him under that description. For this reason, Sacks and Schegloff formulated their preference for recognition as 'If possible, use a recognitional', where a first name is a prototype recognitional.

- (i) Use a single referring expression (Sacks and Schegloff's minimization).
 - (ii) Use a name rather than a description if possible (also a likely outcome of (1)).
 - (iii) Use only one name of a binomial if it will do.
- (3) Fit the expressive means to the recipient.
(This principle may be exhausted by (1), but possibly not – consider, e.g., saying ‘mommy’ vs. ‘your mother’ vs. ‘Mary’ vs. ‘Mrs Williams’ when addressing a child. Consider too, cases of bilingualism, where *John* becomes *Juan* for a Spanish-speaking addressee (see Enfield, this volume)).⁴
- (4) Fit the expressive means to the topic or action being pursued (see Stivers, this volume).
- (5) Observe further local constraints (CIRCUMSPECTION) – for example, say ‘Mr Williams’ rather than ‘Jim’ if the school rules forbid pupils to use their teachers’ first names.⁵

This chapter will ignore principle (3) (if it actually exists) and (4) (which indubitably does). Instead it focuses squarely on how principles (1), (2) and (5) are reconciled, and that will already prove quite complex. For the sake of simplicity I have given these three principles the labels in bold above, and I now propose a slight recasting of their content:

(3) Three principles

- (1) **RECOGNITION**: Restrict the set of referents so as to achieve recognition.
- (2) **ECONOMY**: Don't over-restrict the set of referents explicitly.
- (3) **CIRCUMSPECTION**: Show circumspection by not over-reducing the set of referents explicitly.

This recasting, which as in Sacks and Schegloff (this volume) phrases the principles as speaker maxims, makes explicit the *general means* whereby

⁴ Relevant to Rossel island, and mentioned below, is that individuals have in addition to Rossel names, Christian names obtained on baptism (the island has been energetically missionized for fifty years). Christian names are used mostly when talking to foreigners, or in the context of church activities.

⁵ Circumspection is thus a motivation to avoid the selection of the default referring expression (see introduction to this volume). Constraint (4), fitting the form to the action, is another motivation for avoidance of the default. Are, then, the two constraints the same thing? No, although they are related. Constraint (5), Circumspection, is a general principle that dictates a recurring avoidance of the default regardless of the substantive action being done in an utterance, although in another sense these uses signal ‘being circumspect’, just like a joke reference to junior as *the little emperor* might signal ‘being disapproving’.

recognition, economy and circumspection are to be achieved, namely by operating on the set of possible referents for a particular referring expression. For example, for recognition *John* may not do if there are too many familiar Johns, but there are unlikely to be many familiar *John Rickards*. But if *John* does indicate a unique John, on this occasion for this recipient, then Economy motivates *not* saying *John Rickard*.

Circumspection less obviously operates in the Western social world, but it will preoccupy us below on Rossel Island. Nevertheless, the principle is familiar enough: Suppose you spill wine on the carpet, and I go to the hostess and say: ‘We need a cloth – someone has spilled wine on the carpet’. Although it will no doubt become clear in due course who the culprit is, I’ve avoided saying it explicitly (to say ‘Tanya spilled wine on the carpet’ would be to play informer, and assign blame that perhaps belongs to the man who knocked her). Or, suppose I tell you, ‘I’m sorry, they have decided to retrench the workforce’, where you and I both know who *they* are, I seem to have avoided naming the parties to blame (or the person getting the sack!). In any case, however marginal in English, systematic avoidance of names or even of explicit reference by other means can be found in societies across the world, often discussed under the rubric of ‘taboo’ or ‘avoidance’. Thus, in traditional Australia ‘the social custom of name taboo, and the associated proscription on lexical words that have similar form, is of utmost significance for understanding one of the ways in which Australian vocabularies change’ (Dixon 1980: 28):

When a person dies both his name, and also any other form that is similar to it in sound, will be tabooed. This tabooing applies to lexical items ... and also to grammatical words; in 2.1 we mentioned the tabooing of the first person singular pronoun *ngayu* ‘I’ from dialects of the Western Desert language, on the death of a man named *Ngaynya*. (Dixon 1980: 98).

In these cases, indirect reference by hint is all, if anything, that is allowed. For example, by making some vague reference like ‘that man’ with a pointing gesture, effective pragmatic reference may be achieved, even though there may be quite a large set of possible adult male referents who live somewhere in the indicated direction. Circumspection, though, will have been served – the referring expression leaves it open to inference who is in fact denoted.

Now, given these three principles, I have found it useful to think about the interaction between them in the following way. We will stick strictly with the problem domain of the new introduction (first mention) of referents. Suppose we have an inventory of definite referring expressions, for example:

- (1) PRONOUNS: not normally involved in initial reference of course (since they only specify person, number, gender), they can be so used only if the

circumstances make just one particular referent supremely salient, as in Paul Bremmer's announcement of the capture of Saddam Hussein as 'We got him!'.⁶

- (2) MINIMAL DESCRIPTIONS: descriptions of the form *that man, the neighbour, that girl down the street*, where the semantics will leave a wide set of potential referents, but which in context may be sufficient.
- (3) KIN TERMS: *my uncle, John's grandfather, his child*, and the like are likely to have competitor potential referents (assuming that, e.g., most people have had a number of uncles, two grandfathers, and are likely to have more than one child). Still, they are clearly more restricted in referring potential than class 2.
- (4) NAMES: of course names, even of a binomial or trinomial variety, may not uniquely designate, still they are likely to be the most explicit means for reference available in a community.

If we consider just the *semantic* constraints that these expressions put on the pool of possible referents, such a list suggests a scale of decreasing ambiguity of reference: pronoun > minimal description > kin term > name (that is to say, there will be a much larger pool of candidates that satisfy the semantic conditions of *he* than those that satisfy the condition of being called *John Rickard*). In the same way, anyone has had two grandfathers, and many cousins, so *my cousin* fails to pick out an individual without a lot of ancillary information. Still, *that man down the road* – a minimal description – is even less restrictive. Yet the reader may well wonder: Why pick out these expression classes? One of the central goals of this chapter is to ground this empirically, not in the facts of English but in the practice of language use on Rossel island, and the English examples are merely meant to give the idea of some intuitive flesh. We'll see in due course that these are indeed the relevant classes for Rossel language use.⁶

Pending empirical demonstration, grant me the scale temporarily. This allows us to think about our three principles as operating on such a scale, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 3.1.

Here, the principle of Recognition will send the speaker towards the right of the scale, where possible referents are highly restricted. But the principle of Economy will work against this, sending him in the other direction, where there is a much larger pool of competing referents (i.e., referents compatible with the semantics of the expression). Circumspection works in the same direction, but for different reasons. The outcome, the choice of a referring expression, will be the balance between these forces, or if one prefers, the

⁶ We'll also see that minimal descriptions, for example, turn out really to be that – there are scarcely any complex descriptions, involving, for example, relative clauses, or involving rich semantic specification.




Figure 3.1 Competing principles as operations on a single scale.

optimization of the referring expression under competing principles. I'll say 'John' if that is enough for you to get the reference, 'John Rankin' if not. Alternatively, I might say 'That fella' pointing at the neighbour's house, or even 'He' if that is enough.

Before going further, note that this slight recasting of the Sacks and Schegloff (this volume) generalizations captures things that their account leaves vague. Returning to the earlier example, repeated in Example (4), the caller initially tries a nickname. Then, when this doesn't work, falls back on first name, later amplified with a last name. Sacks and Schegloff's notion of Minimization – use only one reference form – does not explain this sequence of amplification: The caller has used three such forms (or if one prefers, a first, followed by a second that contains an artful add-on when recognition of the first name is not immediate).⁷ We need an account that explains the sequence – although the use of nicknames lies beyond the scope of this chapter, the use of single names backed up with a second where necessary is explained by the mechanism just sketched (but not by Minimization). Give enough semantic information to narrow the search domain enough to achieve recognition, but where you've judged wrong, escalate.

(4) (C is caller on a telephone call) from Sacks and Schegloff, this volume

C: Is Shorty there? <- Nickname
 B: ooo jest- Who?
 C: Eddy? <- First Name
 Woodward? <- Last Name
 [
 R: ooo jesta minnit

A point, however, that the Sacks and Schegloff treatment does make amply clear is just how illuminating the structure of this kind of repair sequence is. Normally, first efforts at reference succeed, and then all of

⁷ The sequence does not of course invalidate their generalizations (after all, it's their example). The point is that their principles do not explain why *Eddy* gets transformed on the fly into *Eddy Woodward* – obviously this might aid recognition, but how it works needs to be spelt out.

these competing principles are hidden from view: We simply get an optimized reference form served on a plate. Here, where things don't work the first time or even the second, our eyes are opened to the underlying sociophysics of the system. We see what kinds of things can be SOURCES OF TROUBLE, for example a nickname in the above example (terms in SMALLCAPS I will henceforth treat as technical terms). We see how a recipient can direct an initial speaker to his subjective source of trouble, here by using a specific NEXT TURN REPAIR INITIATOR (OR NTRI): By saying *Who?* rather than *Huh?*, for example, the recipient can indicate that he heard a name but found it insufficient for reference (while *Huh?* suggests he didn't hear adequately, and the initial speaker might simply repeat the prior utterance).⁸ And most importantly, in the dynamics of upgrading as in Example (4) above, we see what was initially thought to be the best REPAIR (replacement with a first name), and then when that seems unsuccessful too, what the next best step in the escalation is thought to be. The example above generates a little scale of escalation from more to less familiar: Nickname > First Name > (First name plus) Last Name. This tells us something about how the participants locate people in their shared social worlds. More illuminating still are examples where we escalate into social descriptors, as in:

(5) Sacks and Schegloff 1979: 19

- A: ... well I was the only one other than the uhm tch Fords?, Uh Mrs
Holmes Ford?
You know uh the the cellist?
[
B: Oh yes. She's she's the cellist.

Above all, and this was the central point of the Sacks and Schegloff paper, notice how these examples show that Recognition takes priority over Economy (their Minimization), so that Economy is relaxed step by step until Recognition is achieved. Moreover, recipients actively pursue Recognition – they interrupt the progress of the talk to establish the identity of referents, if necessary. Thus, in addition to the list of principles in (3), and the diagram of opposing forces in

⁸ It turns out for English this is an inadequate characterization, although it will prove fine for the corresponding items in Yéli Dnye. As often in language usage, a device can be exploited to suggest something else. *Huh?* does not always index a hearing problem but is sometimes used in English conversation to suggest that the prior turn was topically or otherwise inapposite relative to its sequential location (Drew 1997). Incidentally, the term NTRI is strictly speaking misleading, as Sidnell (this volume) points out, since incidental utterances may intrude between the trouble-source turn and the next one: one should rather talk about Next Position Repair Initiators, or NPRIs, where the notion of position captures the place in a canonical sequence. I stick with the established term however.

Figure 3.1, we need a statement of the relative priority of competing principles, as in the following (the place of Circumspection is yet to be established, but the English examples motivate the relative placement of Recognition and Economy):

(6) Ranked Principles:

Recognition > Circumspection > Economy

Because so much is revealed by repair in this domain, I will concentrate in what follows on repair sequences with just the kind of structure in (4).

These observations suggest the sort of thing a full theory of person reference would have to be.

What such a theory should be able to explain is the following:

- (1) The nature of person-referring expressions: It seems, as mentioned in the introduction, that personal names are universal (under a suitably catholic construal anyway). Persons share this property with places.⁹ A theory should tell us why. Similarly, as far as we know, kin terms are universal.
- (2) The principles underlying person reference: A theory should specify the correct formulation of the underlying principles (like Recognition, Economy and their ilk) and where they come from.
- (3) The interaction between the principles: A theory should tell us how these principles interact, and how speakers optimize their choice of referring expression under these constraints.
- (4) The structure of repair sequences: A theory encompassing (1)–(3) should be able to explain why, when trouble arises in reference to persons, it is resolved the way it is.
- (5) Universals and cultural specializations: A theory should tell us which of these features in (1)–(4) should be preserved in all cultural transformations, and which are most likely to differ.
- (6) Origins: A theory of person reference should also tell us why the generalizations specified in (1)–(5) hold. For example, we would like to know where the constraints on this problem-space come from: Are they functional ‘best solutions’ to universal problems? Do they have deep roots in the brain specializations for person recognition in the visual and

⁹ The only language reported to have no place names is Kata Kalok, a sign language used in a region of Bali (because this is a society of Absolute spatial thinkers, pointing will be sufficient – see Levinson 2003).

auditory modalities? Are they, as Sacks and Schegloff suggested, just specializations of more general conversational principles?

In the current state of our knowledge, this list sets the goal posts a long way off, but it is always good to know where we are heading. Meanwhile, the best we can do is try to flesh out the empirical basis for such a theory, by looking at the person – reference systems of different languages and cultures. In the conclusions to this chapter, I will return to these more general themes.

3.3 Rossel Island – the ethnographic background of person description

Rossel Island is the easternmost island in the Louisiade Archipelago, which stretches out from the tip of Papua New Guinea. It has, as mentioned, just 4000 inhabitants, who speak Yéli Dnye, a language isolate not known to be related to any other language. In both language and culture, Rossel Island is an outlier, separate from the Oceanic (Austronesian) languages and cultures of the archipelago and associated D'Entrecasteaux islands, famed for their Kula ring. The inhabitants of Rossel (I will call them Rossels) form one big family: In principle, everyone knows everyone else, at least of their own age or above. In a great many cases, adults will know the genealogical connections between any two people, as Rossels operate with mental genealogies that go back ten generations and cover 1000 or more individuals (Levinson, 2006 a). This leaves little scope for 'non-recognitional', that is for person references where participants judge that other participants will not be able to identify the individual in question – as mentioned above, part of the importance of this ethnographic 'natural experiment'.

We will see below that there are three main ways in which person identity can be overtly circumscribed (i.e., not left primarily to pragmatic bootstrapping): by the use of a name, by the use of a kin term, and by the use of a place name or a pointing gesture. All three of these involve *locating the individual in a network* – in a clan network, in a genealogical network or in a spatial network. For example, we can identify an individual by name, for example *Yidika*; by kinship connection to someone else, for example *Tâdpuwo u chènê* 'Tâdpuwo's nephew', or by place, for example *Wópuchêdê u mâawe*, 'The big man of Wópuchêdê'.

It will be important to understand the naming system, and most of this section is dedicated to it. An individual has a number of names. For example, the aforementioned Yidika (my assistant) has the names *Isidore*, *Yidika*, *Mbwâ* and *N:ââ*. *Isidore* is the Christian baptismal name gained through the Catholic mission – it plays little role in ordinary life. *Yidika* is the crucial, main name: It is the name given to him by his father. By the rules of the baptismal game, a

father gives his child one of a dozen names restricted to the clan of the father. Yidika's father belonged to the Tpyaa clan: He could choose between *Yidika*, *Tēpwa*, *Wet*, *Pikwa*, *Mboo* and so on (there's a separate list for female children). Now the crucial fact is that Rossel clans, of which there are twelve, are *matriclans* – that is, they are matrilineal descent groups. It follows that the sons of Tpyaa clan are not themselves Tpyaa members – they get their clan from their mother (see Figure 3.2). So when you hear someone's name, you know the clan of their father, not their own clan (the reason for the importance of the father's name is that Rossel Islanders also reckon patrilineally – in fact, land and magic and most inheritance goes patrilineally). The other names mentioned above, for example Yidika's names *Mbwā* and *N:āā*, come from his mother, and are scarcely ever used *except* when a taboo forbids the use of the main name, a matter explained below.

Returning to the main name, note that since the pool of names for each clan is restricted, there are bound to be a number of people with the same name (on average, say, a dozen other individuals with the same name – in fact, the demography of clans and the popularity of specific names mean that in some cases there may be thirty people or more sharing a name). Thus, in reference, names may need secondary specification by kinship or place. Note that, although on hearing a Rossel person's name, one knows his or her father's clan, names are just as devoid of meaning proper as English first names. It is simply that, by the rules of Rossel baptism, certain procedural constraints have to be followed. There is thus no reason here to depart from the Kripkean analysis of names as devoid of semantic conditions, but as rather having historical and causal links to a baptismal event (Kripke 1972).

Sharing a name on Rossel establishes a special relationship between the namesakes, who call each other *a penta* 'my namesake' rather than by name.¹⁰ Namesakes are in certain respects identified as a single jural person. Thus, if you hit me (even if I am a wayward child), my namesake has the right to compensation. In fact, a namesake may retaliate in such cases by stealing the culprit's shell money and valuables with impunity. Thus, as in many traditional societies, namesakes are thought to have shared essence, in this case clearly reflecting shared kinship through their fathers. Further investigation will show that the less important names given by the mother often have a root in namesake relations. Thus Yidika's maternally given name *Mbwā* is partly named after sentiment for a distant uncle (MMMZSS),¹¹ but also because

¹⁰ Armstrong (1928:55), the only ethnography of the island, mentions the importance of this relationship (he called it *binda*) but he misunderstood its basis and its attendant rights and duties.

¹¹ I use the kin-type notation: M=mother, F=father, B=brother, Z=sister, S=son, D=daughter, H=husband, W=wife. Concatenation indicates possession, so WF='wife's father', and so on.




Figure 3.2 Name giving and matriclan membership.

Yidika's mother's namesake has a son of that name, while Yidika's other name *N:ââ* is the name of his mother's namesake's husband, father of *Mbwâ*.

Significantly, the only other beings on Rossel that share the same naming system are pigs (gods have non-human names). Pigs are honorary humans.¹² The owner of a pig may give a pig one of his matriclan names (i.e., as if he were the father of it), or alternatively he may name it after one of his clan totems. On the slaughter of the pig, any human namesakes of the pig may claim compensation (usually delivered in shell money), on the basis just mentioned of jural partial identity (see also Armstrong 1928: 89). This is yet another indication of the humanoid nature of pigs – pigs are fed cooked human-style food, and when they are slaughtered it is with the full ceremony that accompanied the eating of cannibal victims.

Now, as in many societies, the use of names is hedged around with restrictions. Notice, for example, that in our own society, for senior close kin relations kin terms take precedence over names, hence *Mom*, *Dad*, *Grandpa*, *Uncle*, *Auntie*, and the like, and some officers (like judges) are properly addressed and referred to by their title not their name.¹³ Similar rules obtain on Rossel. But in addition, there are taboos of varying strictness on the use of names. The strictest taboo holds between in-laws, usually brothers and sisters-in-law, or between parents-in-law and their children-in-law, who have specifically entered into an agreement to treat each other as taboo (the *choko* relation). Such an agreement may tacitly arise, or may be overtly arranged. In this case the parties contract never to utter, as long as they live, any word with the same phonetic content as the other's name – the name may not pass their lips, even if it were to refer to someone else. In

¹² In many societies, this would be unthinkable: 'Names are then what distinguish humans from animals' (Maybury-Lewis 1984 on the tribes of central Brazil).

¹³ The use of kin terms vs. names in English dialects is actually a locus of current sociolinguistic change, in both address and reference, so generalizations are hazardous.

addition people in such a relation use, or traditionally used, an alternate vocabulary for the body parts and personal possessions of the tabooed individuals (see Levinson, 2006c). Less strictly, any in-laws should avoid direct reference to each other. Thus, I might refer to my wife's sister, who is married to Weta, as 'the people of Weta's village', where the plural denotes a large set, as required by the principle of Circumspection described in Section 3.2. (The principle of Circumspection lies behind all the honorific plurals of the world – see Brown and Levinson 1987.) As in many kin term systems (but not in English except, e.g., for *cousin*), the Rossel kin-term system is classificatory – that is, I will have many 'sisters' who are actually maternal cousins. Nevertheless, their husbands are my in-laws. So for some classificatory sister Ani, I will refer to her husband, not by name, but as 'some man of Ani's'.

In addition to avoiding the names of affines, one avoids naming the recently dead – every death is attributed to sorcery, and one alludes rather than overtly refers to the death event with its associated accusations and counter-sorcery. One might say 'that woman, that thing that happened', pointing in the right direction (see Levinson 2005). Finally, one avoids the names of senior kinsmen where a kin-title may be more appropriate, and in addition the names of co-present parties, especially seniors. All of these constraints, summarized in (7), are commonly found in kin-based societies – that is to say the majority of cultures in the world.

(7) Summary of taboos on naming

- (1) Strict taboo on designated in-laws (*choko relation*)
- (2) Taboo on direct reference to other in-laws
- (3) Avoidance of direct reference to the recently dead
- (4) Preferential use of kin terms for reference to senior kin
- (5) Preferential avoidance of the names of co-present parties

I have dwelt on the naming system. As we have seen, names invoke the matriclan system, and thus indirectly the genealogical relations between people. Reference by kin term is also common. Kin terms are, of course, relational, and one reckons from some propositus X, as in 'X's grandson'. X can be the speaker, addressee or most often a named person. Where X is a third party, as in 'Yidika's son', the propositus is always a senior kinsman (thus one doesn't normally refer to 'Ghalyu's father'). For a full description of the kin-term system, which is roughly a Crow III kin-term system with a superimposed alternation of generations, see Levinson (2006a). Finally, I mentioned that use is made of place reference, typically to disambiguate reference by other means. The places named may be districts, but typically they are the home-base villages or hamlets of the persons referred to. Men stay

in their native hamlets, but women typically marry out, and it is then to their marital locations that reference is made. Reference to place (at least when in conjunction with person reference) is far more often by pointing, which is accurately tracked, than by use of place names.

3.4 The natural history of initial reference to persons

If we look at conversations on Rossel Island, we find that nearly all initial referring expressions to persons are of just four classes: names, kin terms, minimal descriptions and ‘zeros’. Names and kin terms have the structure just described. Minimal descriptions involve a deictic and a nominal, of the kind ‘that man’, ‘that girl’, and the like. Now there is more information in Rossel deictics than is captured in such glosses. Consider the following simplified example:

(8) R03_v6 8:09 (see Example (20) for full sequence)

- N: *wu dmââdi* a kèdê Thursday ngê anê lóó
That girl told me she would go across on Thursday
- P: *n:uu ngê?*
Who did?
- N: °(*yi dmââdi*) °
That girl
- P: *Mby:aa tp:oo módó ngê=*
The daughter of Mby:aa did?
- ((2 turns omitted))
- N: (*ki dmââdi*)
(That girl)

Here the girl (*dmââdi*) is introduced with a deictic *wu* meaning ‘the one that is non-visible or indirectly ascertained’, then re-referred to by a deictic *yi* specialized for anaphoric use (‘the one just mentioned’), and finally re-introduced with an unmarked deictic *ki* (which by not being anaphoric suggests a ‘redo’ as if the problem was a hearing problem). Moreover, such references are frequently accompanied by pointing (more in a moment). Thus, minimal descriptions of this sort carry more information than their short forms suggest.

Finally, new referents are also often introduced subliminally as it were, with a zero (i.e., without any denoting noun phrase), and only a verb agreement or some other indirect encoding (e.g., in quotation particles, which are unanalysable elements meaning things of the kind ‘he said to me the day before yesterday’). The usage is perhaps not dissimilar to saying in English ‘They tell me it’s your birthday’, where the reference of *they* is either obvious, or not germane, or both.

These four types of referring expression, as summarized in (9), make up the great bulk of referring expressions to persons in Rossel conversation. They are often supplemented by pointing, about which more below.

- (9) The four major types of referring expression in Rossel conversation
- (1) NAMES, for example *Yidika*
 - (2) KIN TERMS (i.e., a specified relation between a propositus and a referent), for example *móó* ‘Your brother’, *Yidika tp:oo* ‘Yidika’s son’ (in this case the propositus is always senior to the referent)
 - (3) MINIMAL DESCRIPTIONS, for example *kî mââwê* ‘that bigman’
 - (4) ZEROS or inflected predicates, e.g. the quotative particle *yipu* ‘He said to them (three or more) the day before yesterday’

Only 2 per cent of initial references in the sample described below have some other form. One of these exceptional types is non-recognitional reference to persons, always to persons not on Rossel Island (of the kind ‘the white man I was working for’). Others involve a combination of the above types, as in forms glossing ‘that man Yidika’. Thus there is a real paucity of complex descriptions.

What lies behind the choice between one of the four main types? They differ in the conceptual route to the referent. Names give a direct route, kin terms go via the propositus, minimal descriptions attend to the sex, status and deictic properties (present, absent, far away, etc.) of the referent, while zeros rely on pragmatic inference (using the descriptive content of associated predicates). Secondly, they provide increasing pools of possible referents as far as the semantic conditions go: A name denotes one of a small set of people who bear that name, but a kin term usually denotes a larger set. For example, there may be ten Yidika’s on the island, but *Yidika tp:oo* ‘Yidika’s son’ is likely to be in forty ways ambiguous (on the ethnographically reasonable assumption that on average each Yidika has four sons). But a minimal description like ‘that girl’ is going to have hundreds of possible exemplars, while zeros fail to specify even age and gender, so could refer to anyone on the island. Any of these forms may be associated with a pointing gesture, which can serve to narrow the search domain.

Let us now turn to some descriptive statistics about the deployment of these four types. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of initial reference forms over the four types in a forty-minute sample of conversation with a hundred newly introduced references to persons.

The four classes, as listed in (9), account for 98 per cent of all initial references. Note too that names are not much more frequent than any other

Table 3.1 *Frequency of four types of initial referring expression*

<i>N</i> = 100	Examples (in gloss)	Subtotals (in %)	
Names	'Yidika'	28	
Kinship descriptions	'Yidika's son' 'Your grandson'	26	
Minimal Descriptions	'That girl'	25	} 44
Zeros	'_ says'	19	
Total		98 (2 other)	

Table 3.2 *The role of names*

<i>N</i> = 100	Subtotals (in %)	Deictic/anaphoric element (in %)	Involve names (in %)
Names	28	0	28
Kinship descriptions (propositus = name or deictic/anaphoric)	26	16	10 (<i>c.</i> 40% of kinship descriptions use names as propositus)
Totals			38 (38% of all new references involve a name)

type – the distribution across the four types is roughly equal, except that Zero forms are slightly less (at 19 per cent still a large proportion for a form that one thinks of as quintessentially 'locally subsequent' in design, that is designed for non-initial reference, q.v. Schegloff 1996a). Perhaps most surprising is that the Minimal Descriptions and Zeros together make up nearly half the initial reference forms – these are forms that are necessarily vague (or better, designedly underspecified) as far as semantic constraints on reference go.

Although names constitute only a bit over one quarter of usages, they also play a role inside kin-term specifications (as in *Yidika tp:oo* 'Yidika's son'). Although some kin terms have a deictic or anaphoric propositus (as in 'your nephew' or 'his nephew'), 40 per cent have a name as propositus. Table 3.2 shows that once these uses are taken into account, names play a role in over a third of all initial person references.

These four types of referring expression account for nearly all person-referring acts in the vocal–auditory channel. However, they do not exhaust the inventory, because referring acts in the visual–gestural channel, to which we now turn, also play an important role in the natural history of reference.

Table 3.3 *Distribution of pointing over the types of initial reference*

<i>N</i> = 100	Alone (in %)	With pointing (in %)	With other linguistic elements (in %)	Subtotals (in %)	
Names ‘Yidika’	12	11	5	28	
Kinship	18	8	0	26	
Triangulations					
‘Yidika’s son’					
‘His/your grandson’					
Minimal descriptions	8	16	1	25	} Pointing occurs with 60% of these ‘vague’ references
‘That girl’					
Zeros ‘_ says’	8	11	0	19	
Total		46		98 (2 other)	

3.5 The nature of pointing gestures accompanying person reference

Rossel Island is only 40 km long by 25 km wide, although it is rugged terrain with a central volcanic spine nearly a kilometre high, clothed in dense rain forest. Rossels not surprisingly then know where any place lies from any other. They have what I have called an ‘absolute’ spatial reference system, which downplays ‘relative’ left/right distinctions in favour of absolute geocentric coordinates like west/east. Along with this goes a cognitive specialization, a ‘mental compass’ (Levinson 2003). This makes it both natural to produce and fast to comprehend fleeting pointing gestures, which have systematically different properties than those found in ‘relative’ systems (Haviland 1993; Levinson 2003: 247–71).

Pointing plays an important role in initial references, both qualitatively (pointing alone without any words may suffice), and quantitatively, because the frequency of pointing is actually very high as shown in Table 3.3: nearly half of all initial person references occur with pointing. Pointing is especially likely with person references of the Minimal description or Zero types (it occurs with 60% of them – see Table 3.3) – that is, with those references with least semantic content, or to put it another way, where the identity of the referent is indicated almost entirely by gesture.

The semantics of pointing gestures needs some explanation. Firstly, as already noted, pointing gestures have directional veracity, because they are of the ‘absolute’ variety – they indicate the actual direction intended. Secondly, pointings accompanying person references are not generally in the direction of the actual persons (unless they are co-present); they are rather in most cases in

the direction of the referent's home base – that is, his or her hamlet of residence (Rossels live in small hamlets of patrilineal kin – essentially a man and his sons, with associated wives and children). The sequence illustrated in Figure 3.3 makes this special semantics clear. In the frame shown in still 1, the speaker points to the right (west) showing *where* the woman in question has been sent (and thus indirectly indicates where she now is). In still 2, the interlocutor to the left checks his understanding of *whom* the woman is – he points over his shoulder to the left (east), to her village of residence, while at the same time asking ‘Taapwé’s daughter?’. The two speakers are pointing in opposite directions, even though referring to the same person – no misunderstanding arises, because questions of person identification are always settled by pointing to home base.

As is true in many societies, pointing is done not only with the hand. It may also be done with the head. Figure 3.4 shows a way of pointing straight ahead by thrusting out the neck, raising the chin and gazing in the requisite direction. The speaker says (what glosses as) ‘Mby:aa is ill’, and the head point serves to indicate which Mby:aa. When the referent's home base lies to one side of the speaker's body, a head twist and a quick glance in the requisite direction will suffice, as illustrated in the sequence in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 shows a man saying in effect ‘Yesterday (the/an) old woman went across to Kpaap:aa’, naming a district over the mountain where she is married – the directional information serves both to indicate the direction of travel and the identity of the woman (who is introduced with a noun phrase unmarked for (in)definiteness). Such pointing gestures on person references are quick and frequent – Figure 3.6 shows two index finger pointings separated by only 500 ms.

In what follows, the reader should bear in mind that nearly half of all new person references are accompanied by such pointing gestures, and in the case of semantically unspecific references (minimal descriptions and zeros) such gestures occur with nearly two-thirds. Gestures thus form an essential part of the picture.

3.6 Repair in third position

We turn now to examine repair of initial person references. Repairs can be found in various structural loci, including self-repair within a turn or in the transition space between turns as in (10):

(10) Self-repair in transition space (R03_v19_ss2 00:02:20)

M: *ki D:ââkiy:a u lama ka pyede = aa Nteniyé u lama*
 That D 3Poss knowledge is sitting er N 3Poss knowledge
 That D:ââkiy:a knows all about it=er Nteniyé knows it



Figure 3.3 The distinction between home base and current location.



Figure 3.4 (continued overleaf)



Figure 3.4 Pointing ahead with neck, eyes and chin.

Or after a gap, and prompted by a visual signal, and just in time to pre-empt other-correction as in (11):

(11) Self-initiation of self-repair after delay in other-repair (R03_v12_sl 00:06:36)

- R: *mu* *Lêmonkê* *kêle*
 This.nonvisible Lêmonkê (standing behind speaker) wasn't there then
 P: (P looks around to check)
 R: *ee!* (gestures 'not')
 eh-
 (1.0)
Yamî 'n:aa
 (I mean) *Yamî 'n:aa*
 [
 P: *Yamî 'n:aa* <- Note P has delayed correction¹⁴

But here we will concentrate on self-repairs in third turn, after a next-turn-repair-initiator (NTRI) like 'Who?' or 'Which person?' – that is, on sequences like Example (1) with which we began. Recollect that it is these sequences that may be able to tell us something about conflicting principles behind sequential upgrades of person reference. Even in this quite restricted domain, the possibility space is enormous, as laid out in (12).

¹⁴ Note that P has looked around to find that the man referred to as Lêmonkê is in fact Yamîn:aa, but he has delayed correcting R for over 2 seconds – the timing suggests that by the time R has found the intended name, P had already launched his own correction.

Still 1



Still 2



Still 3



Figure 3.5 (continued overleaf)

Still 4
(d)



Figure 3.5 Pointing to one side with head tilt and eyes.

(12)

Types of trouble source ->	NTRI type ->	Types of repair
(1) Names	(1) person-restricted ('who?')	(1) repetitions
(2) Kin terms	(2) unrestricted ('Huh?')	(2) expansions
(3) Minimal Descriptions		(3) replacements

We could examine repairs following specific kinds of trouble sources (e.g., names vs. minimal descriptions), we could examine the different roles that different NTRIs ('Who' vs. 'Eh?' vs. 'Which man?', and so forth) seem to have in determining the sequence type and we could classify the different types of repair that ensue (e.g., repetitions designed for a hearing problem, expansions for an indeterminacy problem, replacements for an understanding problem). To do this properly one would need a much larger data base than I currently have at my disposal – I have found about fifty candidate third-turn repair sequences in a six-hour corpus of conversation. For various reasons, not all of these are usable – they may be inaudible in parts, the repair though initiated may never have been done, there may be doubt over whether the 'Who?' or 'Huh?' is actually an NTRI, or whether the person reference is actually initial. Leaving these dubious exemplars aside, we have twenty nine clear cases, and it is the patterns in these cases that this section is about.

It is clear from the data that general or unrestricted NTRIs, of the 'Huh?' kind, are understood as indicating hearing problems, since they invariably get exact repetitions of the trouble source, as in Examples (13) or (19). (Incidentally, in British English, general NTRIs do not always engender repetitions, sometimes being understood as, for example, failure to see the

Still 1



Still 2



Figure 3.6 Rapid succession of pointing gestures on two person references.

relevance of the trouble-turn, or expressing astonishment at it (Drew 1997; Selting 1996).)

(13) R03_v27_s3 00:19:19

T: *ye ngê Chiipyââ ghee knî december ngê a koko té*
 (my D) Chiipyââ and kids will come up in December

M: *:êê?* <- general NTRI
 What?

T: *Chiipyââ ghee knî december ngê a koko té*
 Chiipyââ and kids will come up in December

Table 3.4 *Distribution of repair types after each type of person introduction*

Trouble source (<i>N</i> =29)	Repair			
	Name	Kin terms	Place	Description
Name	1	1	1	
Kin terms	5	2	1	
Minimal description	1	7		2
Zero	5	1		2

We will therefore focus exclusively on NTRIs that are person-reference-specific – that is, of the type ‘Who?’ (*N:uu?*), ‘Which person’ (*Ló pini?*), ‘Which John?’ (*Ló Kaawa?*) and the like. Altogether we have twenty-nine instances to generalize across. The focus of interest is precisely how a person reference is repaired, that is how when such a reference proves inadequate it is upgraded. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of upgrades after initial person references of each of our four main types (names, kin terms, minimal descriptions and zeros). Each row indicates the type of reference form that occasioned the trouble, with the type of reference forms used to repair the failed reference.

The numbers are not large, but three patterns are well attested:

- (1) When repair is requested after a kin term introduction, a name is normally produced (in five cases; in two other cases an alternative kin reckoning occurs).
- (2) When a minimal description (like ‘that girl’) is produced, and repair requested, the most likely repair is a kin term (seven cases).
- (3) When a zero is queried, a name is normally produced (five cases).

Notice, incidentally, that Names are the initial reference form least likely to need repair, which suggests that other things being equal they make the best reference forms.

There is a better representation of the patterns in Table 3.4 given by the diagram in Figure 3.7, which shows clearly the directional nature of the upgrades.¹⁵ In this figure, each arrow indicates one attested case and the direction of the upgrade, and the arrows link ellipses representing the four major types of person reference, together with two ways of indicating ancillary spatial information about the home base of the referent: pointing, and the use of a place name. Note that pointing and place names may occur alone, as upgrade turns.

Looking at Figure 3.7, it is evident that the most travelled route in this map of possible upgrade types is from Minimal Descriptions to Kin terms (and the next

¹⁵ My thanks to Nick Enfield for first suggesting this kind of representation to me.

most travelled from Kin terms to Names). Example (14) shows such a case in multi-party conversation, where there is considerable overlap between turns. Andrew introduces the referent with ‘This fellow’ (bold), and Raymond asks ‘Which person?’ – and is answered by Ntómuwó with a kin expression ‘son of Kee’.

(14) From Minimal Description to Kin term (R03_v29_s2 00:29:01)

- Andrew: **mu pini** yi doo kmaapî
This fellow was eating people
 [
- Elami: nyââ
 Yes
 (0.8)
- Elami: yi pi dînè mbwó
 that heap of human bones
 [
- Ntómuwó: Kee tp:oo yi doo, Kee tp:oo yi doo
 The son of Kee was doing it, the son of Kee was doing it
- Raymond: **ló pini** yi doo kmaapî, Dâpukada Dyewâ
 Which person was eating them, Dâpukada, or Dyewâ?
 [
- Ntómuwó: **Kee tp:oo**, kee tp:oo, Kee tp:oo Wudichedê
 Son of Kee, son of kee at Wudichêdê
 [
- Elami: ó k:ââ ngee kwo, k:ââ km:ee kî nté a
 kwo,
 The bones are just there, near that
 post
- Raymond: **Kee tp:oo**
(Ah) the son of Kee

Example (15) shows a case of another kind, an upgrade from minimal description to name, in this case within a kin-term specification – that is, the propositus of the kin relationship was unclear. M’s ‘that guy’s son’ gets repaired with ‘N:aaakê’s son’. A third person, Mgaa, then demonstrates recognition of the referent by naming him directly (‘Tootoo’).

(15) From Minimal Description to Name (R03_v19_s2 00:29:35)

- M: mu pini tp:oo mu doo a naa. <- new referent
 that guy’s son was paying his brideprice
- T: e, ló pini tp:oo
 eh, whose son?
- M: ‘N:aaakê tp:oo <- min. desc. replaced
 ‘Naakê (Moses) son by name of propositus
- T: ââ!
- Mgaa: :êê, :êê! Tootoo <- name of referent to
 oh Tootoo demonstrate recognition
- M: Tootoo.




Figure 3.7 The major repair routes – the direction of upgrades.

Let me summarize so far. To signal a recognition problem, recipients use a person-specific NTRI like ‘Who?’ or ‘Which person?’.¹⁶ Especially common repairs were from Minimal Descriptions to Kin terms ($n = 7$), and from Kin terms to Names ($n = 5$). There were only two cases of Minimal Descriptions being upgraded straight to Names, and in the reverse directions only one case of Name being upgraded with a Kin term (see Figure 3.7.). This suggests a scale of upgrading, and thus a scale of informational richness, as in (16):

(16)

Minimal Description > Kin term > Name


Further evidence for this scale comes from multiple upgrades, to which we will turn shortly. If we put (16) together with the observations at the outset (see Figure 3.1), we might outline the following more general scale, where each of

¹⁶ I have one example of a ‘Who?’ which in the end turned out to be a hearing problem (R03_v27_s3, 00:22:53), but the speaker of the trouble source interpreted it as a signal of a recognition problem.

our four types of expression can be augmented by a pointing gesture, giving us an eight-point scale:

(17)¹⁷

Zero (+ Point) > Min. Description (+ Point) > Kin Term (+ Point) > Name (+ Point)



The rationale for the scale is that each step up the scale adds further restrictive semantic conditions on the referent. A zero form is likely to indicate number and grammatical role through verb agreement; a pointing gesture will add directional constraints. A minimal description will add gender and age specifications, and a pointing gesture will again further constrain the set of possible referents. And so on.

If we entertain this scale for a moment, we will appreciate a number of fundamental theoretical points:

- (1) Viewed as heading towards *Zero*, this scale is *not* a scale of formal or phonetic minimality – such a scale would have *Zero* > *Name* > *Minimal Description* > *Kin* relations.
- (2) Such a scale is also *not a scale of semantic minimality* (pace Levinson 1987). A scale of semantic minimization would have *Zeros* and *Names* as neighbours – neither place inherent semantic conditions on the referent (except for grammatical constraints and constraints due to the rules of baptism).
- (3) Rather, such a scale is a scale of diminishing *referential competition*.

It is clear that if you want a sure-fire recognitional form, you should use a name. So why are only a quarter of all new referents on Rossel introduced by a name? The answer of course is that sometimes there are reasons not to use the sure-fire solution. One major reason lies in the art of indirection – the strategic avoidance of nailing down a referent, for reasons of taboo, politics, politeness, gossip and the art of innuendo, as specified in our principle of *Circumspection*.

3.7 Circumspection motivates multiple, sequential upgrades

If Recognition was the only principle operative in this domain, as soon as a recipient indicates trouble of a recognitional kind, a speaker should provide a

¹⁷ This scale may be overly strong as it may be possible that the points add sufficient specificity to allow them to ‘leap frog’ up the scale. Only further work will allow us to sort this out.

sure-fire recognitional, namely a name. (Arguably, the speaker should have used a name in the first place, so obviating the trouble – but as we have seen on Rossel only a quarter of initial references are by name.) In fact, there are many cases where a speaker starts low down on the scale, with a Zero or Minimal Description, and then slowly creeps up the scale step by step. This can only be understood in terms of a contrary principle, like my Circumspection, which specifies ‘Don’t be more specific than is necessary to achieve reference’. Let us look at some cases.

In the sequence in Example (18), K reveals his plan to recover the bride price due to him from a step-daughter: He explains to T that he has persuaded a village magistrate to get a bigman, whose Christian name is Cosmis, to stand up and speak on his behalf at the end of the ongoing ceremony for a new house. However, he introduces Cosmis with a Zero (a third-person future punctual aspect inflection, bold below), with a simultaneous pointing gesture to Cosmis’ home base. This proves problematic, and after the best part of a second’s silence, in which T mouths a silent syllable, K produces a repeat of the pointing gesture to Cosmis’ house without saying anything. Finally, T asks ‘Which person?’ and K produces the name (K:ââmgaa, Cosmis’ real name), but sotto voce.

(18) Upgrade from Zero to Point, and then to Name (R03_v19_s2 00:14:52)

- K: *wod:oo law nkwodo ka tóó.*
 Then law on.top is sitting
 ‘It’s already before the law’
- T: *éé*
 ‘ah’
- K- *ma akapê a kada chi kwo,*
 yesterday he.said.to.me my front 2sIMP stand
 ‘Yesterday he said to me, ‘You go ahead of me
ala dpodo chêdê ngê a pyodopyodo <yed:oo a kââ.><- <points East>
 this work finish ADV is becoming then 3FUT summon/call
 after this work is finished then **(zero) will get up and speak**”
 (0.8)
- T: ((mouths silent syllable!))
- K: ((points E)) <- points East silently
- T- *ló pini?* <- NTRI
 ‘which person?’
 (0.5) <- intense mutual gaze in silence
- K- *°K:ââmgaa°.* <- Name (sotto voce)
 Cosmis
- T- *°K:ââmgaa°.*
 ‘Cosmis!’
- K- *:êê*
- T- *:êê*
- K- ((eyebrow flash))

The interest of the example lies in the fact that K clearly resists immediate upgrade to the name – he waits for recognition, and then repeats silently the gesture to home base (Figure 3.8, still 5), and even when asked, gazes in silence at T for half a second. When he finally answers, he does so very softly. The resistance may have a number of sources: K is implying that T should be able to figure out the reference, and he certainly doesn't want to broadcast his plan to the present gathering. Figure (3.17) gives an impression of the visual cues involved.

In another example from the same conversation, a zero (or implicit person, the payer) is introduced with a gerund ('its repaying'). When questioned, the speaker produces a minimal description with a kin term (referring to two individuals linked by kinship), and after a *three-second* pause, filled by mutual gaze, upgrades to a single name. The recipient asks 'Who?' and gets the other name:

(19) Upgrade from Zero to Minimal Description/Kin term, and then to Name (R03_v19_s2 00:13:38)

- K- *awède nga anî tóó, u pyinè d:a ngmêê, ngmepe,*
'I am here today, I'm looking for its repaying. <-Zero
law nkwoó até ní kmungo.
'I took it up to the law' (eye-points)
- T- *n:uu ye ngmepe?* <- person-specific NTRI
'Who is paying back (to you)?'
- K- *:aa?* <- general NTRI
- T- *n:uu ye ngmepe?* <- repetition of person-specific NTRI
'Who is paying back (to you)?'
- K- *kî pini dy:eemi knî* <- Minimal Description + Kin term
'that man with his brothers in law'
(3.0 seconds) <- prolonged mutual gaze
Kopwo <- Name 1
(2.0 seconds) <- prolonged mutual gaze
- T- *n:uu?*
'who (else)?'
- K- *Wuyópu* <- Name 2
- T- (nods)
- K- *tapî, dipî kede wo*
a Tapi coin

The point is that the upgrade is stepwise up the scale shown in (17), from zero to minimal description and kin term, and finally to two names. It has to be extracted against obvious reluctance. (Notice, incidentally, that as remarked above, a general NTRI gets an exact repetition, while a person-specific one gets an upgrade).



Figure 3.8 (continued overleaf)




Figure 3.8 Upgrade from Zero > Point > Name.

These two examples show us stepwise escalation to names, whereupon recognition is achieved. Let us now turn to a different kind of case, where the speaker appears to completely resist using the name. In Example (20), N introduces a referent with a minimal description, ‘that girl’, using the demonstrative *wu* ‘that.unseen/indirectly.ascertained’ (see discussion of this as Example (8)). After a silence in line 2 (which may invite self-repair), one of the recipients P asks ‘Who?’. N repeats ‘that girl’ sotto voce, withholding further verbal specification – note that now there is an anaphoric demonstrative, glossing ‘the girl I just mentioned’. The recipients now offer a series of four guesses (or three plus one repeat), all phrased in terms of kinship specifications, not as names. The first guess in line 7 is followed by a pause in which assent could have been signalled. The second guess in line 9 is followed by a pause of over a second – again no assent is given. The third guess by P in line 11 is a repetition, overlapped by an aside to noisy kids, during which N (the producer of the original trouble source) produces a slight eye-brow-flash (marked EBF in the transcript) which on Rossel can indicate assent (see Figure 3.9, still (c)). N follows this with a head-point over his shoulder to the home base of the referent – see Figure 3.9, stills (d)–(e). The fourth guess, in line 14, is a rephrasing of the prior one (‘Kpâputa’s wife’ becomes ‘Kpâputa’s widow’), and this overlaps with a reintroduction of the referent by N as ‘that girl’ (now with an unmarked deictic like English ‘that’), and is received by a more expansive eye-brow-flash giving assent (Figure 3.9, stills (g)–(h)). The sequence then lapses.

(20) (R03_v6 8:09)

1. N: **wu** *ámââdí* a kèdè Thursday ngè anè lóó
That girl told me she would go across on Thursday
2. (0.6)
3. P: *n:uu ngè?*
Who did?
4. (0.8)
5. N: ° (*yi* *ámââdí*) °
That.mentioned girl
6. (1.2)
7. P: *Mby:aa tp:oo módó (ngè)*
The daughter of Mby:aa did?
8. (0.6)
9. M: *Kpâputa u kpâm?*
Kpâputa’s wife?
10. (1.2)
11. P: *Kpâputa u kpâm?*
Kpâputa’s wife?
- [

12. M: *ee! ee! ki tɔ̀pòkɔ̀nɪ mwi lee dmyino, Stephen a kwo, mwi lee dmyino ó!*
 Hey kids go over there, Stephen is here, go right over there!
- (
13. N: **EBF** (**Head-point** East
14. P: *Kpâputa u kuknwe apii?*
 Kpâputa's widow, right?
 []
15. N: *(ki ðmââðì) EBF mm*
 (lapse)(That girl) 'you got it'

This kind of sequence (see also Levinson 2005a) has a different trajectory from the first two, as made clear in Figure 3.10, where we have superimposed the upgrade patterns (in bold) on the earlier overall diagram given in Figure 3.7. In




Figure 3.9 (continued overleaf)

Still 3



Still 4



Still 5



Figure 3.9 (continued overleaf)





Figure 3.9 (a)–(h) Stills from Example (21).

(a) Example (18)



(b) Example (19)




Figure 3.10 (continued overleaf)




Figure 3.10 Superimpositions of upgrade routes (bold) over the general pattern in Figure 3.6. (a) Example (18), (b) Example (19), (c) Example (20).

Examples (18) and (19) we get reluctant upgrades by the speaker of the original trouble-source, and finally get a name. But (20) contains no verbal upgrade by the speaker of the original trouble-source at all – he merely points and eyebrow flashes.

The different kind of trajectory in (20), in effect *refusal* to name as opposed to *reluctance* to name, is accounted for by the Rossel principles of name-tabooing. It transpires that N is referring to his own daughter-in-law, already widowed because his son has died. This is a close affine, connected with a recently deceased close kinsman, which by the rules sketched in (7) entails a taboo on the name.

The point we can extract from the examples here is that Circumspection – the force that makes a name a last, rather than a first, resort – has different kinds of motivations. In Example (18) K intended to convey by hints, rather than openly broadcast, his political plan. In Example (19) K seems reluctant to publicly name his debtors, and seems to think that his interlocutor should be able to discern who they must be. In general, politics, gossip, politeness, as well as strict taboo are all motivations behind Circumspection.

What is the relation between mere Economy and more motivated Circumspection? Economy is required to explain how, when doing ‘reference simpliciter’ (Schegloff 1996a, this volume), we prefer, say, a first name (*John*) over first name plus last name (*John Rankin*) when the first name alone will do (achieve recognition). Or why we tend to use one referring expression (*George*

Bush) rather than two (*George W. Bush, president of the United States*). Circumspection on the other hand is required to explain why that economical and sufficient strategy isn't always used. Not using the economical solution is one of the major causes in the Rossel data for the conversational deviations sparked by the initiation of repair – it is a potentially costly, disruptive avoidance of a simpler mini-max solution, i.e. otherwise ambiguous balancing just Recognition against Economy. We can also see now why the hierarchy of principles must be as in (21) (repeated from (6)):

(21) Ranked Principles:

Recognition > Circumspection > Economy

Recognition takes precedence over Economy, as Sacks and Schegloff (this volume) show. Recognition takes precedence over Circumspection, because otherwise the kind of sequences in Examples (18)–(20) would not occur – recipients pursue reference energetically until recognition is achieved, whatever the obstacles, taboo notwithstanding. (Recollect that on Rossel, recognizability can nearly always be presumed.) Circumspection takes precedence over Economy; otherwise it could not block certain economic solutions, like the use of a single name or a kin term in Example (20). Whether Circumspection can be relaxed, and if so how far, depends on the specific motivation (no relaxation in the case of name taboos). But if it is relaxed, it is relaxed step by step, just like Economy, as exemplified in Examples (18) and (19).

3.8 Taking theoretical stock

I began by suggesting that we can think about person reference as the outcome, in each case, of competing principles working on a scale of explicit reference (as in Figure 3.1). Unlike the many scales offered by linguists in the referential domain, this scale is not a theoretical construct; it is a ladder that participants can be seen to climb – that is, when a person specification is under repair, speakers escalate in specific directions. If one takes the four categories of referring expression that exhaust 98 per cent of the Rossel data, we have the escalation scale in (22) (which can be laced with pointing, yielding complex scale (17)):

(22)

Zero > Minimal Description > Kin Term > Name

This scale is motivated by the upgrade patterns summarized in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7, – with only one kind of exception, upgrades are unidirectional, up the scale towards Name. The one kind of exception occurs when one has got to the end of the scale (i.e., used a name) and recognition is not achieved – which can

happen for the ethnographic reasons spelt out in Section 3.3, whereby names are not guaranteed to be uniquely referring. Such cases look like this:

(23) Repair after a name (R03_v27_s3 00:22:53)

- T: **ala** **Téliwà** *nìmo chii*
 this Téliwa I am going to search for him
 (0.5)
- Mg: **ló** **Téliwa?**
 which Téliwa?
 (1.0)
- T: **Kóótpidi** **tp:oo u wo tp:ee**
 Kóótpidi's son's stepson (grandchild of K)
- M: **:ee** <- **NTRI?** (**invitation to correct?**)
- T: **aa**, **Kóótpidi** **tp:oo u tp:ee** *nìmo ye*
 eh, Kóótpidi's son's son, that's what I am saying <- **self-**
correction
- M: **Kóótpidi** **tp:oo u tp:ee**
 ah, Kóótpidi's son's son
- T: (**:ee**)
- M: **u p:o tóó**
 he's at home

But this kind of example does not undermine the scale; it merely shows that reference cannot always be achieved using just one reference form (the name here is not being replaced by a kin term; it is being supplemented by a kin term so that jointly they are sufficient).

Thus for each language and culture, by examining repair sequences, we should be able to extract scales like that in (22) entirely on empirical grounds. My prediction is that such a scale will always coincide with an underlying rationale, namely increasing constraints put on the pool of possible candidates for reference, making reference increasingly unambiguous or specific (as shown in Figure 3.11). A scale like this is part of the underlying order in this domain, where competing principles operate to select a best referring expression – these expressions are not selected out of a hat, as it were (i.e., considered one by one in random order), but rather plucked off a ladder of escalation.

The three principles promise to explain facts that hitherto seem to lack explanation. First, Recognition interpreted as ‘restrict the pool of possible referents in order to achieve recognition’ offers an explanation for the way the above scale is constructed. Earlier ideas, like minimization of form, or minimality of semantic content, do not explain the scale (where Zeros and Names are opposite ends of the scale). Economy interpreted as ‘don’t over-restrict the possible referents’ helps to explain why one would not use two




Figure 3.11 Balance of opposing forces on a scale of reference types as structured by referential restriction.

names where one would do, as well as why one would not perform two referring acts, where one would do (Sacks and Schegloff's Minimization). Circumspection motivates vaguer references, either where conventions like taboos or politeness require it, or where strategic choice as in guarded gossip motivates it.

The three competing principles – Recognition > Circumspection > Economy – seem to have a strict ordering, that is they take precedence over each other in the order shown. A speaker tries to satisfy all of the constraints concurrently, thus optimizing person-reference. When a selection proves insufficient for recognition, the next best solution is tried, by relaxing the lower ordered principles step by step – hence the directional upgrades. The model is as in Figure 3.11.

Now this volume makes clear that there are many different cultural flavours of person reference, and an overall framework ought to help us position these in some kind of possibility space. Firstly, it is clear that the scale can be different in detail. English, for example, makes quite a bit of use of brief occupational descriptions (of the kind *the tinker*, *the tailor*, *the candlestick-maker*), of titles (*Dr Watson*), of nicknames (*Shorty*), and so on. Secondly, a principle like Circumspection has largely local content, for example avoiding the use of first names for third-person reference in formal meetings in English (preferring, e.g., *The Vice-Chancellor* to *Bill*), not operative on Rossel. Likewise, English has no Rossel-like taboo on the names of affines. Third, as mentioned at the outset, the principle enunciated by Schegloff (1996a) that 'recognitionals' should be preferred to 'non-recognitionals' is important in large-scale societies, but largely otiose on Rossel, where virtually all person references are built as recognitionals (i.e., they are definite – they may be vague like 'the girl', but they are not of the form 'a girl'). Fourth, there's an intuition that there might be 'default' solutions of rather different kinds. Thus, Schegloff (1996a) suggests that in American English there is a rule of the form 'If the recipient knows the referent by name, use that name'. (In fact, this does not




Figure 3.12 Default English person-reference?

quite have application across the board – e.g., kin terms may be the unmarked option for referring to parents and close senior kin, at least when the speaker is young.)

The notion of a default, an expected, unmarked usage, is important if recipients are meant to recognize a marked, special usage (see Stivers, this volume). Such an unmarked usage could be context-specific (taking into account the interlocutors, the formality of the situation, etc.) or it could be quite general. Schegloff's naming rule is the suggestion that, other things being equal, names are generally used in American English. It could be that this is where Recognition and Economy come to a balance of forces, schematically as shown in Figure 3.12.

If so, given the relatively small scope for Circumspection in English, we would expect by far the majority of first references to third persons to be first names – an empirically supported prediction. For Rossel, on the other hand, we might have a slightly different centre of gravity for the scale – kinship terms and names are used about the same amount and together account for 54 per cent of all usages, so perhaps the default expectation is just for either one or the other.¹⁸ (It is not ruled out that the centre of gravity is actually, like English, the use of a name – for as we noted in Table 3.4, names are less likely than any other form to occasion repair, but otherwise the evidence is thin.)

If we accept Name or Kin term as the default, expectable usage, that would suggest that as soon as a Zero or Minimal Description is used, the recipients suspect Circumspection is operative, and are set to inferring both why the obliqueness, and whom is nevertheless referred to (knowing the referent must be a candidate for such oblique reference) (see Figure 3.13).

Finally, I would like to return to names, and the very general points made in the introduction. Names, as noted in the introduction, appear to be universal in semantic character (reference achieved by a baptismal event and the

¹⁸ Clearly, there may be cases where a kinship term is simply better suited than a name. For example, elderly people have usually not mastered all the names of the burgeoning population of children junior by two or more generations. It would take more ethnography to settle whether in specific cases a name or kin term is an expected default usage. But for third parties not particularly closely related to the referent, it really seems that usage can go either way. And, in English, there are cases where kin terms appear to be default as in references to parents and grandparents (see Stivers, this volume).




Figure 3.13 Default Rossel person-reference?

historical handing down of a naming tradition), if not in grammar or form. The function of names is to pick out *individuals* – that is, why some societies, like the Tiwi of Northern Australia (Evans n.d.), go to lengths to ensure there is only one unique individual with the same name, and in other societies, like Rossel, those who have the same name share metaphysical essence and jural identity. The peculiar semantics of names is characterized by having no descriptive content that suffices for the application of the expression – whatever the baptismal rites, being male, of such and such clan, and so on, does not make you a Stephen or a Yidika. Names go with the identities of individuals.

Having an explanation for the universal nature of personal names is certainly something we want from a theory in this domain, and perhaps the current formulation goes some of the way. For the principle of Recognition enjoins restriction, that is, using an expression that denotes the smallest set of competing referents, and nothing will do this better than an exclusive name. Even if a name picks out a small set of possible referents and thus fails to uniquely refer, the alternatives are likely to be long-winded descriptions (of the ‘author of Waverly’ sort), which themselves fall afoul of other pragmatic principles, like a maxim of Quantity (or Maxim of Informativeness, specifying semantic minimization) or Manner (specifying phonetic minimization).¹⁹ Names satisfy these various constraints simultaneously: They are generally short (satisfying Manner), they are semantically minimal owing to their special semantics (satisfying Quantity or Informativeness) and they maximally constrain the referent set (satisfying Recognition). (For the full pragmatic story, see Levinson 1987, 2000:112–16.)

Another universal or strong tendency that needs explanation is that nearly all languages have *place* names too. What exactly is the common problem for both persons and places to which names are the best solution? Again recognition-by-restriction seems the source motivation – it is imperative to be able to refer to both persons and places uniquely (or at least minimizing ambiguity). In addition, there may be conceptual similarities in networks of persons (as in the

¹⁹ Searle (1958:591, see the introduction to this volume) claims that names get their utility precisely by avoiding possibly contested descriptions, an elaboration of this sort of arguments.

spatial idioms of kinship, *distant cousins*, *descendants*, etc.) and networks of places (see Enfield 2005). Certainly on Rossel, owing to patrilocal residence, location in space mirrors location in genealogy (just as many European surnames are borrowed from place names): Knowing that so-and-so is the son of Kee is to know where he lives, and knowing where he lives together with his age is likely to make him a son of Kee. The close connection between person reference and pointing exploits this homology between the spatial and genealogical domains.

Seeing names as devices that individuate while optimizing many other pragmatic constraints might reinvigorate the ethnography of naming. Provided we can recognize names in the local language system, then we can look and see what the locals find worthy of naming – objects of such importance that they need unambiguous reference. We live in a world populated by proper names, of buildings and landmarks (the Parthenon, the Statue of Liberty), of ships and airplanes (the Titanic, Airforce One), of landscape features (the Matterhorn), of pets and working animals (Red Rum, Lassie), of operas and groups (La Traviata, the Republican party) and above all the multitudes of brand names that seek to individuate types in a sea of industrial tokens. In contrast, Rossels are rather more restrained, and just as well given the seriousness with which they treat namesakes. Canoes do not have names (although Western-style big boats do). Dogs may have nicknames, as may pet birds, but they don't need to have them. On the other hand, as mentioned, pigs have human names. And gods have names, and although they do not belong to the set of current human names, they are humanoid names. As a result, all sorts of natural features (rocks in the sea, mountain peaks, copses of mangrove) have humanoid names, because they are the avatars or abodes of gods (Levinson, in press). Place names abound, but many of them denote village sites and old village sites, and carry with them the memory of their founders. Thus, many place names identify both places and humans or humanoids – the landscape is peopled by spirits, and named accordingly. Finally, there is a curiosity of Rossel metalanguage. The word for name (*pi*) is the word for person, and for many things with names (but not actually ordinary place names) one questions a name with *n:uu* 'Who?' (as in *nkéli u pi n:uu?* 'The boat's name is who?'). A name thus seems to confer some special human-like properties on objects in the world.

As laid out in the introduction to this volume, person reference is a topic that lies at an important intersection of cognition, social organization and language. Prospectors who dig at this intersection in any single society will find that the riches they unearth simultaneously address the organizational particularities of the society they are working in, and enormously general principles that play an important role in structuring human interaction and language use anywhere on

the planet. In this chapter, I have tried to show that, on the one hand, many aspects of Rossel Island social structure and language use are informatively revealed by working on this topic (e.g., name taboos, pointing practices, the ‘essential’ qualities of names), and, on the other hand, I have tried to sketch some of the intricately interconnected principles (e.g., Recognition, Circum-spection, Economy and the ranking of them) that seem to structure this domain and have culture-independent application.

4 Alternative recognitionals in person reference

Tanya Stivers

When people make reference to other persons, they may make use of a range of referring expressions. As the contributions to this volume document, variations in the form of person reference may be based in general socio-cultural preferences or, within a given culture, may be based in individual or situational factors. One of the primary accounts for the use of one person reference form rather than another has been recipient design (Sacks and Schegloff 1979). For instance, compare the use of a name (e.g., ‘Bill’) to a description (e.g., ‘this guy’). The former conveys that the speaker assumes the recipient would be able to recognize the person by name whereas the latter conveys that the speaker assumes the recipient would not know the referent. Alternatively, the use of a name rather than a particular role description (e.g., ‘the girl that always sits next to you in the staff meetings’) treats the recipient as being able to recognize the person and the selection of referring expression concerns how best to actually *achieve* recognition (see Sidnell, this volume, for cases where reference forms are treated as not well fitted to the recipient).

In this chapter, I argue that the use of one referring expression over another is not only about underlying linguistic or cultural preferences nor is it entirely accounted for in terms of the achievement of recognition.¹ My central claim is that what I term ‘alternative recognitionals’ do more than just refer to a person, and that extra work is concerned with fitting the precise referring expression to the type of pragmatic action that they are otherwise performing. Since, in English, the unmarked reference form for recognitionals is the bare name, a primary means for doing something more is to shift from this sort of ‘absolute’ form to a form that associates the referent to another individual. I will argue that this effectively shifts the referent to being within another individual’s domain of responsibility (or not).

In what follows, I first outline the basic preferences in the domain of referring to persons in interaction that are relevant here. I then identify the unmarked forms of reference for initial references in English. The remainder of

¹ But see, in particular, Brown (this volume) and Hanks (this volume) for discussions of cultural variation.

the chapter is concerned with exploring four primary types of third-person alternative recognitionals in initial position.² The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of these results for a theory of how people refer to persons in conversation.

4.1 Background

As noted in the introduction to this volume, the structure of how speakers refer to persons in initial reference positions in actual interaction has not been much explored. Still, using English language data, two key principles have been shown to underlie person reference: a preference for using recognitional reference terms (i.e., terms that suggest that the recipient can and should be able to identify the individual being referred to) and a preference for minimization (i.e., the use of only one rather than multiple reference forms) (Sacks and Schegloff 1979, reprinted this volume). When put into possible conflict, speakers display a preference for recognitionals over minimal reference forms as evidenced through a successive relaxing of the latter principle in favour of the former when necessary. These basic principles appear to hold in non-European cultures as well (see particularly the contributions of Brown and Levinson in this volume).

Both names and descriptions can be recognitionals under the Sacks and Schegloff rubric. Thus, ‘the girl who always sits next to me in staff meetings’ and ‘Patty’ are both possible referring expressions for a single speaker in a single conversation and both could, to a particular recipient, be recognitional forms. However, Schegloff (1996a) argues that in English names are preferred over descriptive recognitionals. Key evidence for this are cases where speakers who begin to use a descriptive recognitional, replace it with a name. See Example 1 (Schegloff 1996a p. 463).

Example (1) Trip to Syracuse, 1:10–11

10 Charlie: hhhe:h .h hhh I wuz uh:m: (.) .hh I wen' ah:- (0.3)
 11 I spoke teh **the gi:r-** I spoke tih **Karen**

Here, the two references are in bold, and the first is repaired from an incomplete but clearly projectable descriptive recognitional to a name (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977).

² I will not examine cases of first or second person reference though examples appear quite similar (e.g., when the speaker refers to himself as ‘the dealer’ or when the speaker refers to the addressee as ‘the chef’). Similarly, I will not examine subsequent position references though in the data I have examined, alternative recognitionals appear there as well (e.g., after talking about someone by name he is subsequently referred to as ‘the hot guy’).

A second key piece of evidence was a collection of cases where a speaker uses a descriptive recognitional and the recipient subsequently offers a name as an ‘upgrade’ or replacement for the description. See Example 2 (Schegloff 1996a, p. 462).

Example (2) Adato, 5:1

8 Sy: Where did you get that filing box from.
 9 Jay:-> Fro:m uh: : **that fellow who usetuh sit**
 10 -> **uhmback of you, who- who got fired.**
 11 Sy: => Jordan?
 12 Jay: Jordan yeah.

Here, Jay offers two descriptive recognitionals for the person to whom he is referring (‘that fellow who usetuh sit uhmback of you’, and ‘who got fired’). Sy offers the name ‘Jordan’ as an upgrade and an alternative to those descriptions. The data Schegloff offers in support of this claim suggest one possible qualification, which is that names are offered as upgrades to descriptive recognitionals in two main environments: (1) If the descriptive recognitional is treated as under-assuming the recipient’s knowledge or (2) If the name is in some way suggested to be, or assumed to be, unavailable or inaccessible to the speaker. So, in the cases Schegloff shows and in my own data as well, replacements are typically offered when the descriptive recognitional is produced dysfluently, thereby suggesting that its production is problematic. This is evident in Example 2. Note the stretches in line 9 on ‘Fro:m’ and ‘uh:’ as well as the insertion of ‘uh’. This appears to be a case of the latter situation where a recipient treats the speaker as having difficulty accessing the name.

The preferences outlined so far then document the ways in which speakers refer to persons so as to convey, ‘that nothing but referring is being done’ (Schegloff 1996a, p. 439; but see Enfield this volume for a discussion of this). Now I want to focus on a second question Schegloff posed: ‘How do speakers do reference to persons so as to accomplish . . . that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice which has been employed?’ (Schegloff 1996a, p. 439). This question was only partially dealt with in Schegloff’s own chapter. There the primary means for addressing this question was with respect to the relative fit of reference form and position. Schegloff distinguishes between locally initial and locally subsequent with respect to both reference form and position. The unmarked usage then would be initial forms in initial positions and subsequent forms in subsequent positions.³ For instance, descriptive recognitionals and names constitute proto-typical initial

³ I use the term ‘unmarked’ in the pragmatic sense. This refers to the more typical, expected and canonical usage where more than one possibility exists for a given context. Enfield (this volume) discusses markedness more fully. Also see Levinson (2000) and Comrie (1996).

reference forms and thus are typically used in initial position relative to that sequence or activity of talk. Pronouns are proto-typical subsequent reference forms and are typically used subsequent to some initial referring expression.

Schegloff observes that when a speaker uses a subsequent form in initial position, this conveys to the hearer that he/she is expected to know the referent (i.e., that the referent would be assumed to be ‘on the mind’ of the other or could “readily be activated” (1996, p. 451)). Conversely, one use of an initial form in subsequent position is to ‘reconstitute the locally initial reference occasion by re-using the (same) locally initial form; it is not a re-mention, but the initial mention “for another first time”’, (Schegloff 1996a, p. 455). In this way, speakers can compete for first position in making a particular claim.

Returning to the use of initial reference forms in initial position, we also return to how speakers do reference so as to show that they are ‘just’ referring versus doing ‘more’ than referring. This chapter focuses on this question beginning with a brief overview of how speakers refer to third persons in English by way of establishing which referring expressions can be considered marked and unmarked in these initial positions. We then turn to the interactional practice about which this chapter is primarily concerned. Finally, we will examine what this organization tells us about the principles underlying person reference as a system.

4.2 Analysis

4.2.1 *Unmarked recognitional forms for third-person singular*

Schegloff (1996a) established that names, as recognitionals, were preferred over other forms of recognitional references. One form of evidence for this is sheer frequency of use (also see Sacks and Schegloff 1979). In my own collection of 219 instances of initial singular recognitional references to third persons in English, I observed that there were three main types of unmarked recognitional reference forms: kin terms, descriptive recognitionals and names. Kin terms were used for parents and grandparents of the speaker or recipient. Descriptive recognitionals were used when that is how a particular person would be known (e.g., ‘our dentist’) and where names were either not known or problematic. Names were used for siblings, extended family (aunts, uncles, cousins), friends, colleagues, children and partners.⁴ Thus, these reference forms appear to be the forms for ‘just’ doing referring. Most important for our present purposes, if, as far as I could assess, a name was possible, it was used 93 per cent of the time. Possessed kin terms were used in

⁴ Kin titles such as ‘Dad’ used by a speaker to her mother to refer to the speaker’s father were considered names whereas ‘my dad’ used to refer to the speaker’s father but to a friend was considered a kin term.

only 14 per cent of all canonical cases, but where they represented the unmarked form, they were used 100 per cent of the time.

Most of this work was done on English data, but these generalizations and the practice being reported on in the rest of this chapter appear to work the same way in a number of other languages including Danish, Dutch, Italian and Spanish. Therefore, some examples from these languages are included here.

4.2.2 *Departures from unmarked third-person recognitionals*

There are a variety of ways to depart from an unmarked person reference. The prosody with which a particular form is delivered can indicate that 'more' than simply referring is being done. For instance, when a woman tells a story of running into an ex-boyfriend who asked her whose truck she was driving, she reports having responded with a very prosodically marked (something like a taunt) 'my boyfriend's'. On the one hand, as a non-recognitional form, this is not at all marked. That is, references to persons unknown by the addressee appear to be commonly done through the speaker or addressee if at all possible. However, to the reported addressee, her *ex*-boyfriend, this is specifically reported as having been delivered in a provoking manner to accentuate her new relationship.

Related to this, unmarked forms are sometimes reduced (e.g., 'Julie' reduced to 'Jules') or expanded (e.g., 'fat ole Vivian', 'poor ole Gladys' or full names where the use of a single name would do). These changes certainly appear to be doing additional interactional work, but they accomplish this work from within a single category (e.g., the name reference form) rather than through a shift in category (e.g., from name to kin term). I will be most centrally concerned with *categorical* shifts in reference form in environments where the unmarked category of reference was entirely possible. This type of departure from the default is what I term an alternative recognitional. This reference form is an alternative to the default category (whether that be a name or a kinship term). The most common scenario is the use of a descriptive recognitional instead of a name. To be an alternative recognitional,

- (1) the speaker must know the unmarked form (e.g., the name).
- (2) the speaker must (a) assume the hearer knows the unmarked form and (b) assume that the hearer would assume the speaker knows it.
- (3) the form used must still be recognitional for the hearer.

Alternative recognitionals, as would be expected of a marked expression, comprised only 6 per cent ($n=13$) of the original collection of person references. For this study, these cases were subsequently supplemented with a further fifteen cases to have a total collection of twenty-eight instances on which the present study is based. Across these data, there were four types of

alternative recognitionals: (1) Recipient associated; (2) Speaker associated; (3) Demonstrative prefaced; and (4) ‘in the know’ references. In what follows I examine several instances of each type of alternative recognitional. I show that, regardless of type, alternative recognitionals are a way for speakers to not only refer to persons *alongside* accomplishing social actions but through the use of a marked form of person-reference speakers also accomplish or account for particular social actions *through* the form of reference. I then draw some conclusions about the relative differences accomplished by the different types of alternative recognitional (i.e., recipient vs. speaker-associated).

4.2.2.1 Recipient associated: ‘Yer sister’ As mentioned earlier, within the environment of two interlocutors who both know the referent by name, names are the unmarked form of reference for friends, colleagues and acquaintances as well as for siblings, extended family, children and partners. One way in which interactants mark doing something more than just referring to one of these people is to associate their referent to their addressee when no such association would normally be done. See Example 3. Nicole is a hair stylist and owns her own salon. Her mother has just come in the door and is here initiating an interaction with Nicole. Nicole’s son (and thus her mother’s grandson) is having a birthday party that evening in the local park. Shortly before Nicole’s mother arrived at the salon (and unbeknownst to her), Nicole’s aunt (her mother’s sister) had called to ask Nicole whether she had set things up for the boy’s party. In this context the mother moves into a proposal about where to buy items for the birthday party (lines 2–3/4).

Example (3) HS 5 7–23–03 T1

1 MOM: H=hhah:: boy.
 2 MOM: Y’know ah wuz thinkin maybe some uh that
 3 stuff would be cheaper at uh
 4 NIC: hhhh
 5 MOM: Costcos, ((N smiling))
 6 (1.3)
 7 NIC: Which stuff. ((possible smile voice))
 8 (1.6)
 9 MOM: so- what are you grinnin’ (cuz you picked)
 10 [()
 11 NIC: [Cuz **yer s:ister** been on the phone all
 12 mo:rnin’ an’ I told’er-
 13 MOM: ^Which o:ne.
 14 NIC: Aunt Ale:ne? [I got a cramp in my=
 15 MOM: [hehhehhehhehhehheh
 16 NIC: =ne: (h) ck ‘n I gotta g(h)o.
 17 NIC: so- =
 18 MOM: =^Whut did she [want.
 19 NIC: [Sh:e wanted=tuh=w=uh:
 20 everything.
 21 (.)

22 NIC: "Didju check on tha park = didju' -ah sed let
 23 me tell you sump'in. Ah ain' checked on
 24 nuthin' . if y-anything you wanna do? get
 25 on thuh phone 'n do it. = so she done called
 26 Nimvolia park, ...

The alternative recognitional is Nicole's use of 'yer s:ister' to refer to her own aunt. As an extended relative the use of her name 'Alene' or an expanded 'Aunt Alene' would have been the unmarked form of reference. 'My aunt' and 'your sister' are marked because both categorically depart from the unmarked form (i.e., name). Also, because this is the addressee's sister and the speaker's aunt, there is no question that the name is known to both interactants (indeed, at line 14, Nicole names the aunt). This case provides ready evidence for the way that departures from unmarked referring expressions can cause interactional problems. The use of 'your sister' rather than 'Alene' is ambiguous to the addressee, and leads to an initiation of repair (Schegloff et al. 1977) in line 13. The speaker is certainly aware that her addressee has multiple sisters, but nonetheless uses this form. The obvious question is what this form allows her to do that 'Alene' does not particularly lend itself to.

In this interaction, the mother proposes buying 'that stuff' for the birthday party at a Costco's store. Before the proposal is complete Nicole is responding to the action with an audible sigh (line 4) and then a smile. Her verbal response is delayed (line 6) but she then initiates repair on 'that stuff' asking 'Which stuff', thereby problematizing the mutual availability of the indexical reference. The repair contradicts Nicole's just prior visible and vocal behaviour that suggested a negative stance towards the proposal or at least towards the bringing up of the topic of where to buy things for the party, which suggests that she understood the reference to 'that stuff'. And it is precisely this that Mom asks Nicole to account for in line 9 with 'what are you grinnin' (cuz you picked) ()'. It is in Nicole's account that the alternative recognitional figures.

The alternative recognitional is embedded in an account for Nicole's problematic response to Mom's proposal. This account is also a complaint. This is most visible in the use of 'all mo:rnin'', to refer to the length of the call. This formulation is extreme (Edwards 2000; Pomerantz 1986; Sidnell 2004), and that at least partially accounts for the complainability. The use of an alternative recognitional conveys that it is the referent who is responsible for the complainable action. Thus, the complaint is against the referent ('yer sister').

However, this is not only a departure from 'Alene' but it is also a particular use of this type of alternative recognitional: one that explicitly associates the referent to the addressee (rather than, e.g., to the speaker). In this sense the source of the complaint is connected to the recipient in a position just following an action of proposing what to do about the birthday party. The use of this person-reference form does far more than simply refer to Alene. It conveys that

what she has been talking about on the phone is the very topic that Mom brought up on entering the salon (i.e., the party) and that this could be expected given the relationship between the aunt and the mom (i.e., that they are sisters), and that the mother can well sympathize with what would be involved in such a phone call because of that sibling relationship. Although precisely what was discussed is not treated as understood by Mom (note the inquiry at line 18), that lines 11–12 convey substantial information is clear in Mom's laughing response in line 15, which is delivered as she doubles over with laughter. Note that although there is a repair sequence, once the referent is clear, the mom's response to the account/complaint is provided immediately and so I am treating it as a response to the account/complaint.

To sum up then, this instance of an alternative recognitional offers evidence that when speakers depart from the use of a default referring expression, they convey that they are doing more than just referring. This form is a better fit between the referring expression and the action being accomplished (here a complaint) than a name since the latter, in and of itself, is neutral with respect to the action being done. Thus, the use of an alternative recognitional can be used specifically to move the accomplishment of a social action from something that is separated from person reference to something that is being done *through* person reference.

Example 4 is similar. In this case Emma and Lottie (two sisters) are talking on the phone. Emma is reporting on a call she made to her daughter Barbara during which she told Barbara that her husband (Barbara's father) had left her. Importantly, both in calls to Barbara and in other similar contexts, references to parents are generally done as names using 'Mom' or 'Dad' or variants such as 'Daddy', and 'Mama'. Here the alternative recognitional is used, and like Example 3, it is the recipient associated form 'Yer FATHER' (line 10).

Example (4) NBIV.10.R*Rev 31.29

1 Emma: Well this is ree(.)DIculous fer a ma:n that age. =s=I've
 2 I: said the=u-haa-'oh::: come o:n no:w: this is
 reediculous;
 3 'n='e s'ys 'no:' 'e says (.) .hhhhz 'I don'twan' any- (.)
 4 (y)no Thanksgiving |party.' =ah s'z 'oh::,h' (.) .t.hhh
 5 Emma: SO I J'S THOUGHT WHAT THE HE:LL sh'd I: go'n (.)tiptoe fer
 6 HI|:m.
 7 (0.2)
 8 Lot: Ye[:ah.
 9 Emma: [hh SO THEN I CA:LL 'Barbr 'n I said loo:k. (0.8)
 10 Yer FATHER LE:FT ME THE OTHER night_ 'n he siz well yer
 11 always |bitchin' en: |this: 'n tha:t; ...

In lines 1–6, Emma is complaining about her husband who has said that he does not want to have their children over for Thanksgiving and has left his and Emma's vacation home at the beach in a huff stating that he will not return for

Thanksgiving at all. Emma then faces the prospect of cancelling plans with family and revealing their marital problems. In this context of complaining, she reports another complaint: that she had to then call their daughter Barbara to tell her that this was going on and that Thanksgiving might not proceed as planned. This itself, in its original context to Barbara, is hearable as a report of trouble (Jefferson 1988). But it is not a trouble without blame. Here it is specifically a trouble that is being blamed on Bud, the husband, and what is highlighted is the recipient's relationship to the referent with 'Yer FATHER' (line 10). That it is a complaint about her husband is carried by the use of the alternative recognitional rather than the default 'Dad'. Whereas 'Dad' would have been neutral as to blame for the troubles being reported, the alternative recognitional specifically conveys that there is a complaint against him.

Similar to the previous case, the use of 'Yer FATHER' associates the referent to the addressee. In this way, Emma, similar to Nicole in Example 3, places the referent in the domain of responsibility of the addressee. By doing this, Emma also co-implicates Barbara in the resolution of the trouble. And in fact, Barbara is subsequently asked to intervene with her father and does succeed in getting him to agree to attend the dinner. We can see this issue of co-implication dealt with on the surface of the interaction in Example 5.

Here, a co-present Italian family including Enzo, his mother, grandmother, grandfather and great-grandmother (all on the mother's side of the family) as well as his grandmother's brother is visiting. Enzo is preparing to leave the house and, in terms of overall structural organization, this is a structural place where arrangements for a next visit to 'i nonni' (the great-grandmother and her son) might be thought appropriate. In this environment, Enzo instead addresses his mother with a directive to tell his brother Roberto to decide when he would like to plan the visit to their older family member (which according to precedence, should involve both brothers). Embedded in this directive is an account of his inability to plan the visit. Also, the reference to his brother in this turn is done with an alternative recognitional *all'altro tuo figlio*, or 'your other son' (line 3).

Example (5) Rossano LFRMVDN14Dec0201 00:03:18

- 1 ENZ: = *si' lo so lo so lo so*]
 yes (I) that know (I) that know (I) that know
 = yes I know I know I know]
- 2 (1.0)
- 3 ENZ: *Tu devi dire all' altro tuo figlio, (1.0) ((Mom nods))*
 You must tell to=the other your son
 You must tell **your other son**, (1.0) ((Mom nods))
- 4 *di decidersi.*
 of to decide (for) himself
 to make up his mind.
- 5 (1.5)

- 6 ENZ: °Per quando::: ((F pointing with hand)) venire a trovarli°
 For when to come to visit them
 °For when::: ((F pointing with hand)) to come to visit
 them°
- 7 (1.0)
- 8 ENZ: [i nonni
 the grandparents
 [the grandparents
- 9 MAM: [Ah perche'
 Ah because
 [Ah because
- 10 (0.6)
- 11 ENZ: Perche' zio io ci sono sempre.
 Because uncle I clitic pr. am always
 Because uncle I am always available.
- 12 MAM: mm hm °E' Roberto°
 mm hm (it) is Roberto
 mm hm °It is Roberto°

In this case, similar to Examples 3 and 4, there are two issues: (1) the categorical shift from the unmarked name to an alternative recognitional, and (2) the use of a recipient associated form of alternative recognitional. Also similar to the other cases, whereas a directive using the unmarked name would have been neutral with respect to attributing responsibility for the problem, the alternative recognitional conveys that the problem rests with the brother. Additionally, the format associates the referent to the addressee, their mother. This places the referent in the addressee's domain of responsibility, which conveys that she knows the problem and also co-implicates her in finding a solution. And here, the mother validates Enzo's complaint by explicitly blaming his brother (line 12).

So far this section has examined cases involving complaints. Although alternative recognitionals are commonly used in complaints, this is not exclusively the case. See Example 6. Here, several couples are having dinner together. Not everyone is seated at the table yet, and Stanley approaches the table observing that two chairs are free – one on either side of Deborah. Deborah's partner is not yet seated. All of the guests are friends and thus knowledge of names is not at issue when Stanley asks Deborah 'Where's uh: Where's your guy sittin(g).' (line 3). This question is preliminary to his taking a seat and clearly the import of the answer to this question is whether he can take the seat that he has approached or not. Embedded in the question is the use of 'your guy' as an alternative recognitional in place of his name, Clive.

Example (6) Kara 00.35 ((as Stanley is preparing to sit next to Deborah))

- 1 JIM: I mean what is this. grape juice?
 2 ((laughter))
- 3 STA: Where's uh: Where's your guy sittin(g).
 4 DEB: ((body gesture to chair on opposite side of her)) / (1.0)

- 5 STA: Okay.
 6 (0.5) ((Stanley begins to take seat next to Deborah))
 7 DEB: I thi:nk; I don' know.
 8 JIM: Hey you want some more wine than that?

With 'your guy' Stanley conveys that through his request for information he means to minimize his intrusion into the 'couple' of which Deborah is part. He is not asking where 'Clive' is sitting, where this would be neutral with respect to Clive's relationship to Deborah. Rather, asking where 'your guy' is sitting explicitly associates the referent to the addressee and in this way shows the question to be not just one about whether Stanley can sit in a particular seat but as one that actively respects their rights as a couple to sit together. In addition, through the associated reference form, Stanley treats Deborah as in a position to respond to this question: as having a measure of responsibility for 'her guy'. This action is accomplished through the use of an alternative recognitional rather than being done alongside a reference to a third person.⁵

This section examined four cases of alternative recognitionals where the categorical departure is from a name to a recipient associated form. In each case I have argued that by using an alternative recognitional, the speaker conveys that he/she is not *only* referring to the referent but is also doing some particular action *through* the referring expression. Further, I have argued that with the recipient associated form of alternative recognitional, the speaker invokes the social relationship between the recipient and the referent and by intimating that the addressee has some measure of responsibility for the referent, co-implicates him/her in the action either as a co-member of the class of responsible party (e.g., Examples 3, 4 and 6) or as someone who can intervene (e.g., Example 5).

4.2.2.2 Speaker associated: 'My honey' Referents are also sometimes associated with the speaker. For instance, see Example 7. Here Nicole and Shauna, hair stylists at Nicole's shop, are talking. There has been a lapse in the conversation during which Nicole is styling a client's hair and Shauna is sitting at the next styling station. Nicole announces that her boyfriend's birthday is on Sunday. Nicole and Shauna are close friends, and earlier in the conversation Nicole has referred to her boyfriend Rick using his name unproblematically in

⁵ Also observe that this person reference was done on repair. That is, the first turn constructional unit (TCU) (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974) targeting a person reference was aborted with 'uh:' and the entire unit was redone with 'Where's your guy . . .'. One possibility is that had Stanley placed 'your guy' in the TCU following the vocal hitch 'uh:' this would have been vulnerable to being heard as a trouble with accessing the name (return to Example 2). The redoing of the query in this way may work to emphasize this as an alternative recognitional rather than as a descriptive recognitional being used because a name was not available for that moment.

a story to Shauna. Here, though, he is referred to using the alternative recognitional ‘my honey’.

Example (7) HS5 7–23–03 T2 4:00

- 1 NIC: Sunday’s **my honey’s** birthday:;
 2 (0.8)
 3 SHA: Mm,
 4 NIC: Sunday’s **my honey’s** birthday.
 5 (0.2)
 6 SHA: I know:; Whatch[u doin’ -
 7 NIC: [We wuz gon’ go t’ south springs but..

In this case, both the announcement (line 1) and the repair of it (line 4) involve the same alternative recognitional. Although the description ‘honey’ is not as transparent as ‘boyfriend’, ‘father’ or ‘sister’, it is, I would argue, nonetheless clearly identifying a single individual. Although terms of endearment are used to identify children and pets (e.g., ‘my baby’, ‘our good little boy’), ‘honey’ is typically reserved for partners. Although repair is initiated on the turn in line 3, Nicole does not treat the alternative recognitional as the problem and rather simply repeats the turn. Shauna appears to then understand the reference unproblematically (line 6).

The alternative recognitional is tied to the action the speaker is involved in. By announcing her boyfriend’s birthday with this particular reference form, she highlights the announcement as positively valenced: something to be celebrated, rather than a chore to be handled. Additionally, through the use of the possessive ‘my’, the speaker associates the referent to herself, thereby highlighting their relationship. This is different from the cases shown in the prior section, since there, even in cases where there was a relationship to the speaker, this was not the one that was made explicit. And, across all cases, these contrast with a reference form that is neutral with respect to associating the referent to either the speaker or the addressee (e.g., a name). Similar to the addressee-associated cases where some measure of responsibility was attributed to the addressee, here this responsibility is attributed to the speaker. This is evidenced in Shauna’s response ‘Whatchu doin’– where there is a presumption that the speaker will be involved in doing something for her boyfriend.

In Example 8, Nicole is reporting on another birthday, her son’s. In most mentions of him, he is referred to by name (De Shaun), but here he is referred to with an alternative recognitional, ‘mah baby’. Just before, Nicole was on the phone, and here Nicole initiates a resumption of an earlier outlining of what they are doing to celebrate the birthday (line 2) and then accounting for why they are not doing more (lines 3–4). The account is that she has been busy and forgot the birthday entirely. Here she reports this as an enactment of remembering. See line 5 with ‘.hHH O’H: mah baby’s birthday iz on Wednesday.’.

Example (8) HS_5_7-23-03_T1 46:20

1 Shauna: (she'll be back) =
 2 Nicole: =Yeah I'm=uh just have cake 'n ice cream fer him
 3 t'night, c'z honestly I've been so busy it just kinda
 4 (.) 'lost mah m'i:nd_
 5 ' .hHH O^H: mah baby's birthday iz on [Wednesday.'
 6 Shauna: [()]
 7 Nicole: ye:ah:, jist- ((smiling))
 8 Shauna: uhHEH HEH HEH HEH
 9 Nicole: so'ah figger since we havin tha family reunion its d-it

In the design of her report, Nicole conveys the valence of this report, and thus gives information about how her recipient could affiliate/disaffiliate. That is, following a report of bad news (e.g., forgetting an unexpected and time-consuming chore) affiliation would be done differently than here: following a report of forgotten but nonetheless good news. It is not only good news but also news that requires something to be done about it, and this is further conveyed with the speaker possessive 'mah' as in Example 7. And, as in other cases, the possessive explicitly associates the referent to the speaker. Additionally, the term 'baby' rather than 'son' highlights the referent's dependence on her, and this further places him within her domain of responsibility.

This section has offered two additional instances of alternative recognitionals. Taken together with the instances shown in the first section, all cases support the argument that a departure from the unmarked person reference conveys that more than simply referring is being done through the talk. In all cases the extra work has been to fit the referring expression to the action that is otherwise being implemented through the talk, and in all cases the referring expression assists with the implementation of the action (e.g., the complaint or the announcement) and it works to account for the action (e.g., why the complaint is being lodged). In all cases too, there is an issue of responsibility such that by associating the referent to the addressee or to the speaker, the speaker conveys that the referent is within that party's domain of responsibility.

4.2.2.3 *Demonstrative prefaced descriptions: 'That next door neighbour'*

The third alternative recognitional format involves the use of a demonstrative before a description. Unlike the previous two types of alternative recognitionals, demonstrative prefaced descriptions do not associate the referent to either the speaker or the addressee. However, in initial position, they do indicate whether or not the addressee should know who the referent is (Ariel 1990; Schegloff 1996a). Whereas a reference to 'this girl at work' suggests that you either do not know or do not need to know who the referent is, 'that girl'

suggests that you know who I am referring to (Auer 1984).⁶ However, it may convey more than this (see Levinson, this volume and 2005).

With respect to objects, Enfield (2003) uses Lao data to argue that speakers' use the demonstrative determiner *nan*/'that' in environments where the referent is outside of the speaker's interactional focal area or 'here-space'. Conversely, *nii*/'this' is used in contexts where there is either no clear 'here-space' boundaries or when the referent falls within the 'here-space' of the speaker. This analysis is relevant here if we extend Enfield's concept of 'here-space' to include not just immediate interactional focus but also his/her domain of responsibility.

As an initial example, see Example 9 where a family is having dinner together. The father begins a complaint about their neighbour, using the alternative recognitional. As with all other cases, here there is reason to believe that the speaker does know the name of the neighbour he refers to, but even if this were not the case, there is a shift from the likely default 'our next door neighbour' to 'that next door neighbour'. In both recognitional and non-recognitional references, it is common for speakers to associate referents to themselves if a name is not possible (e.g., 'my colleague'; 'my friend'). Here, then that association would be done with 'our'. Instead, 'that' is being used. This alternative is critical.

Example (9) Stew Dinner 28.35

- 1 MOM: They were saying they were gonna close a
 2 few kids in the freezer down there today.
 3 DAD: Oh cool.
 4 CIN: No they didn't,
 5 MOM: Mm::[:? ,
 6 DAD: **[That uh (1.8) that next door neighbour**
 7 **that we've got there**
 8 (0.2)
 9 my god what's he got like a tool shop
 10 going over there, he's got all his buddies
 11 'n (0.5) they got the street loaded
 12 with cars,
 13 (0.5)
 14 MOM: Every da'y,

Once again the alternative recognitional is used to support the action that is being implemented in the turn in a way that is not done through the use of the unmarked reference form. Here again, that action is a complaint, and this is conveyed early on through the use of 'that'. The context also supports the recipient's hearing of this as a complaint since here the girl (Cindy) has been behaving badly at the dinner table and has been told to stop. Example 9 begins

⁶ Note that I am not dealing with anaphoric usage here. I am dealing exclusively with initial mentions of a referent that are treated as initial references.

just after this, where, on the topic of bad behaviour, the mother states that ‘They were saying they were gonna close a few kids in the freezer down there today’ referring to her daughter and the rest of her school class who had been on a field trip to a local restaurant that morning.

This sequence reaches possible completion at line 5 with a confirmation of the claim originally offered in lines 1–2 in response to Cindy’s rejection of the claim at line 5. Here Dad begins his complaint. Note that while ‘next door neighbour’ in and of itself does not convey that there is a problem with the referent, the use of ‘that’ *does* suggest this. In this way the demonstrative determiner argument proposed by Enfield works well if we extend the concept of ‘here-space’. When Dad refers to him as ‘that next door neighbour’, the father asserts that the neighbor is not within his ‘here-space’ and thus distances the referent from both himself and his wife. The ‘that’ helps this action to be heard as a complaint prior to any complaint actually having been articulated. Furthermore, the attachment of ‘that’ to the referent conveys that it is the referent who is the complainable (see also Sacks 1992, vol. II, p. 502–3). This is the case here as the complaint itself shows. The complaint is that ‘he has got like a tool shop going over there, he’s got all his buddies ‘n (0.5) they got the street loaded with cars,’. And the person responsible for this is ‘that next door neighbour that we’ve got there’.

There is further work done by the dad with the expansion ‘that we’ve got there’ since this portrays the neighbour as still further outside the interactants’ domain of responsibility. Dad does not refer to him even as ‘that next door neighbour of ours’. Moreover, embedded in the complaint is an account for the culpability of the neighbour: He has the tool shop going, the buddies are his, and his buddies have the cars that block the street.

Unlike the speaker-/addressee-associated cases shown in the previous two sections, here the demonstrative determiner does not place the referent in anyone’s domain of responsibility. Rather, it affirmatively places the referent *outside* of the speaker and addressee’s respective and collective domains of responsibility, which is a type of *disassociation*. Thus, secondarily the use of this form helps in affiliating the speaker and his wife with respect to the referent.

Example 10 shows a second case. Nicole and Shauna are again talking in the hair salon. Nicole has just been complaining about her father and some of her living situation difficulties due to his role in her life. This complaining is finishing up in lines 1–4 bounded by the use of several different idiomatic expressions marking the end of the topic (Drew and Holt 1995, 1998; Holt and Drew 2005). These are: ‘You know how mah daddy is’; ‘jist that’s i’t’; ‘Take it fer what it’s worth’; and arguably ‘‘ah’m not fee:lin him’ (though what that precisely means is unclear). There is then a shift to a slightly different topic in lines 4/6–8. The transition is to a telling about her

father, which, in the course of its production, is revealed to be both a complaint and to provide a concrete instance and thus evidence for him as complaint-worthy. The alternative recognitional is ‘that nigger’ rather than the unmarked name ‘Rick’ to refer to Nicole’s boyfriend. This reference occurs in reported speech attributed to her father, and there is no doubt that her father knows her boyfriend’s name.

Example (10) HS 7–23-03T2 00:20

1 NIC: j’st (2.5) y’know ah don’t have no
 2 pri:vacy et mah hou:se, y’know mah dad is
 3 always gon’ feel like he gotta contro:l
 4 sumptin_<^You know how mah daddy is:;
 5 (0.2)/(Shauna nods)
 6 NIC: .h jist that’s i’t. ^Take it fer what it’s
 7 worth. (0.6) °ah’m just, ’m not fee:lin
 8 him.°
 9 (0.5)
 10 NIC: .tlk He came ove’ th’other da:y, (.)
 11 ^pulled up in mah driveway(h), (2.0) lookin’
 12 cra:zy,
 13 (1.5) ’(ta ma ro:n) (1.0).Tlk .hh ^Do me
 14 a favor.’ (.) Ah’m like ‘Wha:t.’ (1.3)
 15 NIC: ^Uh: I would appreciate if you would keep
 16 **that nigger** out=you’ car.
 17 (.)
 18 NIC: He goin’ aroun’ tellin’ people that’s his
 19 car.’ Ah said ^Where the he:ck did you get
 20 that from,<He don’t e’en know nobody out
 21 here.’

This case is complicated because of the reported speech, but this is also particularly revealing. The telling begins in line 10. The context of complaining about her father, similar to the ‘bad behaviour’ topic in Example 9, supports an analysis of this as on its way to a complaint. And, there is no marking of this new sequence as topically disjunctive (Drew and Holt 1995; Jefferson 1984). Finally, it affirmatively projects some continuation of the same topic through the anaphoric reference to her father while nonetheless beginning a new sequence with ‘.tlk He came ove’ th’other da:y’. The telling begins with the context of the reported speech that was delivered. Revealed in this is that the reported speech took place in Nicole’s driveway, and that he was ‘lookin’ cra:zy’ (lines 11–12). The reported speech then begins with something that is not understandable but is delivered like a summons ‘(ta ma ro:n)’ and then a reported speech pre-request: ‘^Do me a favour’ (lines 13–14) (Schegloff 1980; Schegloff et al. 1977). After a reported go ahead, Nicole reports her father to go on to make his request (lines 15–16). Embedded in this request is a complaint by her father. This may be partially conveyed through the request sequence and the pre-sequence that may project the base first part action to be delicate (Schegloff 1980). Additionally

though, the use of a marked person reference conveys first that this is a complaint action embedded in the request and also an account for the complaint and thus furthermore for the request that is the vehicle for the complaint (Schegloff, 2006). That this is the case is still further evidenced in that what Nicole reports her father to go on to do is to explicitly account for his complaint (lines 18–19). And with this account he simultaneously accounts for his use of this sort of person-reference form.

Here then, similar to other cases we have seen across this and prior sections, the use of an alternative recognitional is fitted not just to the recipient in terms of achieving recognition, but is fitted to the action. Whereas the unmarked referring expression is *neutral* with respect to the action in which it is embedded, alternative recognitionals differ precisely because they are designed to assist in conveying the action and accounting for the action in which they are embedded. Here, like several other examples, the action is a complaint. It is both a complaint in the reported speech request (by Nicole's father) and by the actual speaker (Nicole). In terms of footing then both the author and the animator are involved in the doing of a complaint (Goffman 1981). And once again it is the person being referred to through the alternative recognitional who is targeted as the source of the complaint.

The demonstrative determiner prefaces shown in this section convey that the action being done is a complaint. Drawing on Enfield (2003), this appears to be managed through the use of 'that' conveying the semantic information that the referent is outside of the speaker's 'here-space' but where the concept of 'here-space' is broadened to include domain of responsibility. In this way with the demonstrative determiner, the speaker disassociates the referent from both the speaker and the addressee.

4.2.2.4 'In the know' references: 'The lady mayoress' The final type of alternative recognitional that I will discuss here are recognitional references that require substantially more common ground (Clark 1996) than other cases to achieve recognition. Most commonly these references involve a definite determiner followed by a description that requires the hearer to simply 'know' who this is. However, they can also involve the use of a name or title in a way that requires the hearer to know who the individual is: a kind of 'code' for the person. As an initial instance, see Example 11. Here Billy has called Edgerton on the phone to congratulate him on becoming mayor. This example comes after Edgerton has initiated the end of the call with arrangements as to when they will see each other next. Here in lines 1–3 he proposes closure of the call with a return to the original reason for the call (Button 1987): 'f'm both'v us many thanks fuh calling?' (line 3). The alternative recognitional is the use of 'the lady mayoress' rather than Edgerton's wife's name which Billy most certainly knows.

Example (11) Heritage 0III-1-5 9.23

1 Edg: .hhhhh A'right Billy well we: we look
 2 forward t' seeeing you the:n en furthe'more
 3 f'm both'v us many thanks fuh calling?
 4 Bil: Not at =a::ll en det uh give **the lady**
 5 **mayoress** a big hug from me en a kiss will
 6 you?
 7 Edg: Ah'll do[the:t ye:s? yes ye]h she's very=
 8 Bil: [.hhhh heh heh]
 9 Edg: =busy ahm .hh She's very busy et the
 10 mo:m'nt,
 11 Bil: Ah'll b[et she i]s.
 12 Edg: [u h dih]dishing u:p<
 13 (0.4)
 14 Edg: uh for the do:gs incident'ly?
 15 Bil: Oh:: ye:s::

In response to the proposal to close the call, Billy first receipts the 'thanks' with 'Not at-a::ll' (line 4) and then directs Edgerton to give his wife a hug and kiss. Embedded in this directive is the use of the alternative recognitional. The use of 'the lady mayoress' indexes that they are still in closings by invoking the reason for his call: to congratulate Edgerton. Through the reference to 'mayoress' the alternative recognitional helps to re-congratulate him, and this also works to move the call towards closing.⁷

Importantly, although alternative recognitionals are commonly deployed in complaint environments, this practice is not one that does complaining. This case shows that alternative recognitionals can be embedded in different sorts of actions. Here, it works to simultaneously re-invoke closings and to re-congratulate the recipient. This form of alternative recognitional emphasizes the closeness of the speaker and addressee even where the action involved is otherwise disaffiliative.

A second example underscores the variety of actions that alternative recognitionals can be used to accomplish. In this case through her use of 'the birthday boy' rather than her son's name in line 1, Nicole better fits her referring expression to her request that her mother pick up her son from a local swimming pool. Embedded is an account for her request and for why it should be granted: it is the boy's birthday.

Example (12) HS 7-23-03 T1 49.13

((Nicole just finished talking to boy on phone))
 1 Nic: Mom, can you go pick **the birthday boy** u:p.
 2 He wants to go to the Plu:nge;
 3 if there's anybody there th't he kn:ws
 4 he can go swimmin' today.

⁷ Edgerton appears to additionally hear this as a possible complaint against his wife in that he accounts for her current activities in lines 7-9 (perhaps accounting for her not speaking with Billy though there was never a declination to do so).

5 Mom: °He needs tuh go to the Plunge?
6 Nic: Yie::ah.

Recognition is not always achieved on an initial ‘in the know’ reference (we saw this problem earlier in Example 3 for a different type of alternative recognitional). For instance, see Example 13. Here, Leslie initiates a telling to Joyce in line 1. The alternative recognitionals are in lines 9 and 12. The unmarked referring expression for this person would almost certainly be his first name. Both forms used here ‘Your friend ‘n mi:ne’ and ‘Mister: R:’ appear to be of the variety that you must ‘know’ who is being referred to. This case is stronger than the others shown in this section since whereas the others are very context-dependent, this one is less so. Thus, this one even more strongly requires the recipient to recognize the referent from a marked form of reference.

Example (13) Holt 2 C85–4

1 Les: °Oh: .° hh Yi-m- You know I-I- I’m broiling about
2 something hhhheh[heh hhhh
3 Joy: [Wha::t.
4 Les: Well that sa:le. (0.2) at- at (.) the vicarage.
5 (0.6)
6 Joy: Oh ^ye[:s,
7 Les: [t
8 (0.6)
9 Les: u (.) ihYour friend ‘n mi:ne wz the:re
10 (0.2)
11 (): (h[h hh)
12 Les: [mMister: R:,
13 Joy: (Oh ee:z) .
14 (0.4)
15 Les: Andem: p ^we (.) ^really didn’t have a lot ‘v cha:ng
16 that (.) day becuz we’d been to Bath ‘n we’d been:
17 Christmas shoppin:g, (0.5) but we thought we’d better
18 go along t’th’sale ‘n do what we could, (0.2) we had’n’t
19 Les: got a lot (.) of s:e- ready cash t’^spe:nd.

((20 lines not shown))

40 Joy: |Oh isn’t he |drea:dful.
41 Les: °eYe-:-s:°
42 (0.6)
43 (): .tlk
44 Joy: What ‘n aw::f’l ma:: [:::n
45 Les: [ehh heh-heh-^heh

Leslie is complaining. She projects this in her pre-announcement (Terasaki 2004) at lines 1-2 to which Joyce gives a go-ahead in line 3. Here Leslie seeks recognition of an event ‘that sa:le’ that fails to get recognition. She adds an increment that, after some delay, does receive an upgraded claim of recognition. Having achieved recognition of the event, Leslie then makes an announcement, part of which is delivered not as the complaint itself but which, through the person reference, conveys that this individual is in some way tied

to the complaint. This is the first and most important alternative recognitional. It is placed at a point where the addressee knows that this person both made her angry and could be somehow connected to the sale at the vicarage and that Leslie could think that Joyce would be able to recognize this person from this reference formulation. However, there is no uptake. In line 12 a second try is offered. Again Leslie offers an alternative recognitional. Although this is very similar to a name, it is both a marked form for a name (Mister X) and it is not offered as a name but as a sort of code through the use of only one letter 'R'. This achieves recognition after which Leslie goes on to deliver her complaint. Joyce conveys her understanding of the complaint as leveraged against this individual in lines 40 and 44.

Here again, the action in which the speaker is engaged is giving a complaint. The alternative recognitional helps accomplish this action, and here (where that was clearly projected through the pre-announcement) it is used to provide an account for the complaint: that this individual is responsible for the problem. It also conveys further information about why this is a complainable matter: namely, that this is someone who treats her and others badly. Thus, this dimension of him is captured as a complainable matter through this reference prior to that being conveyed through the telling of which it is part.

A third instance is shown in Example 14. Here an elderly Danish woman (P) is being assisted in her hygiene by two home help staff (HH1 and HH2) who see her regularly. P has been complaining that they are causing her pain. This prompts HH2 to tell about problems they had with the woman the day before when HH1 was not present. Here, HH2 refers to P (who is present) as *Fruen* 'Madam' (line 4) as part of doing a complaint about P.

Example (14) Heinemann: Pensioner/TH/F4/HH/3-1/MarenandMinna

- 1 HH2: Def:- *Da* (.) ka' jeg godt si' dig vi fik vores
 Def:- Then (.) can i well say you we got our
 Def:- I'll tell you this we had enough on our hands
- 2 *sag for os her i går, Karen å' mig,*
 case for us here yesterday, Karen and me,
 here yesterday, Karen and me,
- 3 HH1: >*Hva' nu da?*<=
 >What now then?<=
 >What happened then?<=
- 4 HH2: =*Fruen* ville ikk' st`å,
 =*Madam-the* would not st`and,
 =*Madam* wouldn't st`and,
- 5 HH1: .hhNejhjh,
 .hhNohhhh,
- 6 P: Hvem?
 Who?

- 7 HH2: Å'- (.) s:::u[re b]lev vi alle tre å[']
 And- (.) a::n[grý b]ecame we all three a[nd]
 And- (.) a::grý all three of us got and
- 8 P: [Hvad,] [H]va'
 [What,] [Wh]at's
 What, What
- 9 *det for'n kone?*
 that for-a woman?
 woman is that?
- 10 (0.3)
- 11 HH2: Eh- *Damen* unds[kyld,]
 Eh- *Lady*-the s[orry,]
 Eh- The lady excuse me,

The formulation *ville ikk' st' å*, 'would not stand' implies refusal rather than inability (something that P later quarrels with), and this assists with the action being hearable as a complaint. In Danish, agreements to a negatively framed utterance are typically done with a negative (Heinemann 2005). Thus, in HH1's immediate uptake *.hhNejhjh*, '*.hhNohhh*' she affirms HH2's complaint as expectable (Heinemann 2005). In this way although she does not treat the announcement as news, she does affiliate with it as a complainable.

The reference form here assists with projecting and accounting for the complaint by pointing to one reason P would refuse: She is not merely a woman but is 'Madam': someone who is not (and should not be) made to do things she does not wish to do. We can see that this form of reference causes no problems for HH1 as the primary recipient, but P claims that it causes her problems (see the initiations of repair in lines 6 and 8–9). But it is unclear whether she is quarrelling with being referred to as *Fruen* or whether she genuinely does not understand who is being referred to. At line 11, we can observe that HH2 displays an analysis of P as doing the former and corrects her reference form to *Damen* ('the Lady') along with an apology.

With this 'in the know' reference, HH2 affiliates herself with HH1 against P. Here this is accentuated because of P's co-presence. Although it does not firmly place P as within anyone's domain of responsibility, by choosing a formulation that requires insight into the speaker's way of thinking to figure out who it refers to, the expression, as others in the section have done, works to position the speaker closer to the addressee than an unmarked referring expression would, and, furthermore, closer than other forms of alternative recognitionals would.

This section offered instances of a fourth type of alternative recognitional. These cases all involve references that require the addressee to 'figure out' who the referent is. This was not the case in the other sections. In these cases I argue that by offering a person-reference form that requires some sort of additional common ground (See Enfield, 2006) or is in some way more

context-dependent, the speaker positions himself/herself more closely to the addressee through the person-reference form. This may be a resource that is used when the action is otherwise disaffiliative with the addressee as a way of mitigating the strength of that disaffiliation. However, it need not be used exclusively in such environments.

4.3 Discussion

This chapter has demonstrated that the alternative uses of person-reference forms are not only about achieving recognition. In line with Schegloff (1996a), this chapter shows that when speakers use marked reference forms where unmarked references are available and known to the participants, more than simply referring is being done. We have seen that even when an alternative recognitional fails to achieve recognition owing to the potential ambiguity of the referent, this type of reference may still be used (e.g., Examples 3 and 13). This chapter advances existing work on the system of person reference by examining the question of what ‘more’ speakers are doing. The argument here has been that whereas unmarked reference forms (most commonly names in English) are neutral with respect to the action being deployed in the speaker’s turn, alternative recognitionals are designed to be fitted specifically to the action in which they are embedded and therefore to work to convey the action or account for it. This analysis holds across all four types of alternative recognitionals: addressee-associated, speaker-associated, demonstrative prefaced descriptions, and ‘in the know’ reference forms. Each of these appears to be designed *primarily* to manage the relationships in the three-way triangle between the speaker, addressee and referent.

With addressee-associated cases, we observed that the form explicitly associates the referent to the addressee, thereby working to place the referent within the domain of responsibility of the addressee. Secondly, this may work to disassociate the referent and the speaker (though this is a secondary rather than a primary effect). We might depict this as in Figure 4.1.

With speaker-associated cases the analysis is nearly inverted. The speaker explicitly associates the referent to himself/herself and through this positions the referent within the speaker’s own domain of responsibility. Thus, this alternative recognitional format emphasizes the closeness of the speaker and the referent. We can further observe a secondary effect of disassociating the referent and the addressee. This is depicted in Figure 4.2.

In demonstrative prefaced description examples, the demonstrative determiner works to disassociate the referent from both the speaker *and* the addressee. Thus, he/she is placed outside of the domain of responsibility of both interactants. This form primarily distances the referent from both speaker and addressee and secondarily invokes relatively greater closeness between the




Figure 4.1 Addressee-Associated References




Figure 4.2 Speaker-Associated References




Figure 4.3 Demonstrative Prefaced Descriptions

speaker and addressee as it invokes their shared position relative to the referent. This is shown in Figure 4.3.

Finally, the 'in the know' references appear to be neutral with respect to placement of the referent in a domain of responsibility. But, they affirmatively invoke the relative closeness of the speaker and addressee by requiring greater knowledge and understanding between the two parties to make sense of the referent. This is shown in Figure 4.4.

This chapter supports prior work arguing that person reference in social interaction is clearly organized with respect to three preferences (Sacks and Schegloff this volume; Schegloff 1996a):

(1) to fit the referring expression to the recipient so that he/she will recognize the referent; (2) to use the minimal number of required referring expressions




Figure 4.4 “In the know” References

(preferably one); and (3) to use a name over another referring expression when possible. This chapter has further examined what speakers are doing when they deviate from these preferences. The main finding is that when speakers deviate from the unmarked reference form, they fit the reference form to the action in which the reference is embedded. This practice then works to convey the action and to account for it, and it at least partially accomplishes this through the positioning of the referent vis-a-vis the speaker and addressee’s domains of responsibility. This chapter also contributes to a growing body of work arguing that in interaction persons are very concerned with epistemic territories (Clift 2005; Heritage 2002a, b; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Kamio 1997; Schegloff 1996b; Stivers 2005). Coming from a Western European perspective, we might not initially expect persons to be a category that can be placed within or outside of a particular knowledge domain or territory. However, the practice documented here suggests that this is in fact the case and that people are exploiting the structure of both the language and the cultural system to do epistemic work.

Acknowledgements

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5 Meanings of the unmarked: how ‘default’ person reference does more than just refer

N. J. Enfield

It’s not that somebody *is* ordinary, it’s perhaps that that’s what their business is. And it takes work, as any other business does. (Harvey Sacks, Spring 1970, Lecture 1)

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck him. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, *Philosophical Investigations* §1.129)

This chapter explores one way in which members of a culture work to achieve the appearance of ordinariness, and in so doing render invisible their most heartfelt concerns. The target locus of behaviour is referential practice, in particular verbal reference to persons in everyday conversation. In this domain, as in any other, to be or act ordinary is to attract no special attention to that way of being or acting. For instance, by dressing in overalls, a plumber at work chooses the default, unmarked course of action. He will not be sanctioned or even commented upon for doing so (unlike, say, were he to wear a dress). When we follow a default course of action in this way, we are in one sense not doing anything special; indeed we may be taken not to be ‘doing’ anything at all. But since it takes work to pull off the invisible appearance of ordinariness, even when our manners of behaviour are rendered literally unremarkable by their conformity, we are nevertheless always doing something by choosing just those manners of behaviour. Along these lines, this chapter argues that default practices of person reference do more than just refer. They instantiate and stabilize culture-specific views of the person. But by their very design, these practices render their own meaning difficult to detect, shrouded in the veil of ordinariness.

In the use and interpretation of language, one key mechanism turns on a distinction between the ordinary and the exceptional. This is the contrast between default and marked formulation of spoken utterances. A default referential formulation is a way of phrasing reference (e.g., to a person,

place, thing) that will be taken to be the standard, nothing-special-intended way of saying it (e.g., *New York* as opposed to *The Big Apple*, *John* as opposed to *His Majesty*, *the dog* as opposed to *the hound*). As the term suggests, a default formulation will represent a path of least cognitive resistance for both the production and comprehension of a referential expression. The term default implies that for a speaker the formulation is virtually automatic, in the absence of any special consideration to selection of that manner of formulation as opposed to some other conceivable one (hence the Prague School's term *automatization*; Hanks 1990; Havránek 1964/1932:9). It's the format you pick when you don't have any special reason to care how the thing you want to say gets said. Given the perhaps infinite number of possible ways of formulating an utterance, the existence of defaults for usage minimizes processing by providing a single, ever-present opt-out. By contrast, a marked (that is, pragmatically marked)¹ referential formulation is defined as an expressive departure from the default (e.g., *his majesty* instead of *John* or *he*). Its *foregrounded* nature serves to alert the listener's attention (Hanks 1990; Havránek 1964/1932:10). By producing an 'unusual' formulation, a speaker displays some special effort, implying their having selected just that formulation for a reason, thereby inviting the listener to wonder why, and eliciting an enriched interpretation (Grice 1975, 1989; Levinson 2000; Wittgenstein 1953: § 1.60).

In their seminal analyses of person reference in English conversation, Sacks and Schegloff (1979, this volume; cf. Schegloff 1996a) rely crucially on this logic of informational contrast between default versus marked manners of referential formulation. Because the default manner of formulation attracts no special attention or enriched interpretation, it is argued to be making literally no contribution to the interaction apart from establishing reference to an individual person. By contrast, with a marked formulation, 'something else in addition to referring is being done' (Schegloff 1996a: 439), above and beyond the mere informational imperatives of communication (e.g., with *his majesty*, I am not just referring to John, but may also be complaining about him; cf. Stivers, this volume). But while a default formulation may not be doing any special, foregrounded or topical communicative work in an interaction, I argue that it may be systematically doing more than merely achieving reference. The evidence comes from the system of person reference in Lao, a Southwestern Tai language of

¹ Haspelmath (2006) advises against any use of the term 'marked' due to its long list of different meanings and uses in the literature (cf. Zwicky 1978; Gair 1988, *inter alia*). He suggests that all relevant senses of marked are handled by independently existing terms/concepts. I appreciate the need for care, but nevertheless find the term handy. See the introduction to this book for further discussion of defaults, markedness, and the like.

Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. Data are from video recordings of natural conversation.

In Lao, default forms of person reference explicitly encode kin-based and other hierarchical social relations between speakers and person referents. As in many other languages (see chapters in this volume), these default formats for person reference publicize key cultural values every time they are used. By giving off information about relative social positioning, these habitual person-reference formats display speakers' commitments to socially generalized values, and through this help in reproducing, maintaining and stabilizing those values. Attention to the details of linguistic structure and its deployment in face-to-face interaction illuminates questions at the heart of social anthropology. In the moment-by-moment flow of human sociality, communication constitutes social action on multiple levels, not only in the foreground of attention, but also in the disattended, quietly purring background machinery of a culture's practiced norms.

5.1 The Lao system of person reference

To refer to a person in conversation, a Lao speaker has many possible alternative formulations to choose from. The complexities of this set of alternatives concern distinctions of social hierarchy, as defined by (classificatory) kinship and other factors that determine relative position of individuals in social structure.

First a point of clarification about the social domain of focus in this chapter. There is significant diversity in the range of social situations a Lao-speaking individual will find themselves in, and this uneven social-interactive landscape is rapidly evolving in a new, modern world (cf. Evans 1999, 2002; Rehbein 2004). Individuals have to apply and negotiate multiple distinct sets of conventions for communication, both ritual and mundane, depending on context. These important complexities are, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. For the argument presented here, I restrict the analysis to maximally informal conversations in village settings. This may be considered the basic, primordial setting for human interaction for most Lao speakers. It approximates a general standard for informal interaction in the home and family environment, and as such represents the typical setting for early socialization, and thus the base from which other, marked types of social-interactive arrangement may be considered departures. It is the common interactive standard in which the generic attitudes of Mead's (1934) 'generalized other' are grounded. In more formal or otherwise constrained situation types, these underlying interactive norms – for example, the conventions of person reference – may be manipulated for special effect. Aspects of Lao that express social-hierarchical distinctions are a site of



Figure 5.1 Two young Lao-speaking sisters, first and second-born, respectively. (P is at right of frame, K at left, arms folded.)

significant sociolinguistic dynamism, thanks to patterns of social mobility and modernization associated with education and global cultural trends. These patterns of rich variation in modern Lao society, and the formally constrained registers of traditional ritual life, are set aside here, but will constitute an important later elaboration on the topic of Lao person reference.

5.1.1 *Ethnographic background to the hierarchical stance in Lao social organization*

The vagaries of Lao person reference are one reflex of a strong streak of verticality or ‘authority ranking’ (Fiske 1992) in Lao socio-cultural organization. At the kernel of this hierarchical system is a special attention to the distinction in age between siblings, and a range of ways in which this is reflected in social practice, both linguistic and otherwise. To illustrate, consider a number of linguistic and ethnographic observations of some of the consequences of relative age status between the two girls in Figure 5.1.

- A. These two sisters use different terms to describe their relationship to the other: There is no word in Lao meaning ‘sister’, the available kin terms obligatorily marking difference of age: K is P’s *nòng4* ‘younger sibling’,

P is K's *qùaj4* 'elder sister'.² (For explication of the many ways in which this sibling age distinction is further reflected in the semantics of the Lao system of kin terminology, see Enfield 2005: 54–6.)

- B. Elder and younger siblings normally use different pronouns with each other, the elder using the bare, 'non respect' forms *kuu3* 'I' and *mùng2* 'you', the younger using polite forms *khòj5* 'I' and *caw4* 'you'. (See below and Enfield 2006b; note that immediately adjacent siblings are sometimes exceptional in this regard, reciprocally using the non-respect pronominal forms.)
- C. Elder and younger siblings use distinct formats for addressing and referring to the other by name, adding different social-hierarchical name titles in accordance with the level of 'respect' displayed by the choice of pronominal in (B), above: Here, the elder will prefix the younger's name with the 'female non-respect' form *qii1-*, the younger will prefix the elder's name with the 'elder sister' form *qùaj4-* (see below sections for elaboration).
- D. Elder and younger siblings have different rights and responsibilities in domestic life. Elder siblings are often directly responsible for the care of younger siblings, especially at a very young age (from, say, 1–4). At the same time, as soon as younger siblings become 'useful', an elder sibling may freely delegate chores for the younger to carry out.
- E. If the younger of these two girls is married before the elder, she is required to perform a ritual of atonement, for making the elder appear a spinster.
- F. There are constraints on marriage defined in terms of sibling order (see Enfield 2005 for details): If the elder is married, the younger may marry her husband's brother, but only if he is the younger brother, not if he is the older; If the children or grandchildren of these two girls want to marry (i.e., as cousins or second-cousins), it is permissible only if the male of the pair is in the elder girl's line – that is, the male should be on the 'higher' line, irrespective of absolute age.
- G. The first-born child gains a special prominence via the practice of teknonymy (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 349, see below), by which the parents come to be known by his or her name.

² Transcription of Lao here follows International Phonetic Association convention, except for *q* (glottal stop), *ñ* (palatal nasal), *ŋ* (velar nasal), *ê* (mid front vowel), *è* (low front vowel), *ù* (high back unrounded vowel), *ò* (low back vowel). There is no standard romanization of Lao. Lexical tones are marked by numerals at end of each syllable: 1 (mid level), 2 (high rising), 3 (low rising), 4 (high falling), 5 (low falling), *ø* (unstressed). Glosses of examples are according to the following conventions: 1/2/3 (first/second/third person), DEM (demonstrative), DIST (distal), F (female), FOC (focus), IRR (irrealis), M (male), PCL (particle), POL (polite), RESP (respect), SG (singular), TPC (topic); (n.n) means there is n.n seconds of silence. Kinship notation follows Parkin (1997:9): F (father), M (mother), B (brother), Z (sister), S (son), D (daughter), H (husband), W (wife), P (parent), G (sibling), E (spouse), C (child), e (elder), y (younger).

H. The last-born is treated differently in that they traditionally inherit the family home and much of the land, and are expected to live with the parents in their old age.

This outline of some practices associated with the simple distinction in age/order between siblings should suffice to give a sense of the degree of importance in Lao social practice of kin-derived hierarchical order. Let's now turn to a more focused consideration of the linguistic practices implicated by this. I begin with a sketch of two basic means for referring to people: pronouns and names.

5.1.2 *Pronouns*

True pronouns in Lao encode four levels of politeness, in each of the first-, second- and third-person singular forms (cf. Enfield 2006b). (See Table 5.1) The system is typical in mainland Southeast Asia (Cooke 1968).

Fewer distinctions are made in the plural. None of the forms encode the sex of the referent. One way of thinking about the distinctions encoded here is of the more polite second-person forms as successively raising the conceived status of the addressee, while the more polite first-person forms successively lower the conceived status of the speaker (Brown and Levinson 1987). This is reflected, for example, in the etymology of the polite forms *khòðj5* 'I' (elsewhere 'slave') and *caw4* 'you' (elsewhere 'lord').

Some nominals such as occupational and kin titles function as pronouns (i.e., are used for tracking reference through discourse in successive non-initial mentions), yet without shifting their reference according to who is speaking. In the following example, the speaker refers to a (present) third person. The referent is not the speaker's actual uncle.

Example (1) (Woman is talking about an elder man.)

K	<i>khòðj5</i>	<i>siø</i>	<i>mùa2</i>	<i>nam2</i>	<i>phòø+1uung2</i>
	1sg-pol	irr	go	with	uncle
	'I _{polite}	will	go with	him_{uncle} .	

The next example shows kin terms where one may expect pronouns, but again unlike pronouns, they do not change their reference in a given context when a different speaker utters them. Among courting youths, the boy is *qaaj4* 'older brother', whether it is him or the girl who utters the word (mutatis mutandis for *nòng4* 'younger sibling', the girl):³

³ This pattern of use of kin terms among courtiers is distinctly old-fashioned/rustic, and is going out of date among the urban youth.

Table 5.1 *Some commonly used Lao pronouns*ⁱ

		1st	2nd	3rd
Singular	Bare	<i>kuu3</i>	<i>mùng2</i>	<i>man2</i>
	Familiar	<i>haw2</i>	<i>too3</i>	<i>laaw2</i>
	Polite	<i>khòj5</i>	<i>caw4</i>	<i>phen1</i>
	Formal	<i>khaa5-phacaw4</i>	<i>thaa1</i>	<i>thaa1</i>
Plural	Bare		<i>suu3</i>	<i>khaw3</i>
	polite	<i>cu-haw2(incl.)</i> <i>cu-khòj5(excl.)</i>	<i>cu-caw4</i>	<i>khacaw4</i>

ⁱThese are the most common pronouns. Further pronouns, and further special uses of the pronouns in Table 5.1, are beyond the scope of this discussion.

Example (2) (Two youngsters courting.)

- B **qaaj4** *hak1* **nòng4**
 eB love yG
 'I_{eB} love you_{yG}.' (as spoken by young man to young woman)
- G **nòng4** *hak1* **qaaj4** *khù2-kan3*
 yG love eB too
 'I_{yG} love you_{eB}, too.' (as spoken by young woman to young man)

It is normal in many contexts for such use of kin terms to persist through a given stretch of interaction, where a kin term like *qaaj4* 'eB' will serve as the form for successive non-initial references – that is, functionally equivalent to pronouns in English discourse (Fox 1987).

5.1.3 Lao names and name prefixes

Lao full names typically have two components, a first name and a surname (e.g., *Kaysone Phomvihhan*, *Phoumi Vongvichit*, *Khamtai Siphandone*). The surname is inherited from the father. These full names are largely derived from the Indic languages, Pali or Sanskrit. They are seldom used for person reference in informal conversation. Nicknames are normally used instead. These may be shortened from the person's full name (e.g., *vaat5* from *thongsavaat5* or *thip1* from *thipphacan3*) or may be independently bestowed upon the person in infancy or childhood, typically on the basis of some attributed physical feature (e.g., *tuj4* 'fat', *còdj1* 'skinny', *lèè5* 'blackened', *nòdj4* 'small'). A few full names are monosyllabic, and so are not in need of abbreviation for everyday use; for example, *kèèw4*, *kuq2*, *mòdn1*. Most names may be used for both men and women.

Table 5.2 *Some kin-related ('upward') name prefixes*

	Female	Male
Elder sibling	<i>qàaj4-</i>	<i>qaaj4-</i>
Parent's elder sibling	<i>paa4-</i>	<i>luung2-</i>
Mother's younger sibling	<i>saaw3-</i>	<i>baaw1-</i>
Father's younger sibling	<i>qaa3-</i>	<i>qaaw3-</i>
Parent's parent	<i>phò-tuu4-</i>	<i>mè-tuu4-</i>

Table 5.3 *Some rank/role denoting name prefixes*

Ex-novice (novice=junior monk)	<i>siang2-</i>
Ex-monk	<i>thit1-</i>
Ex-abbot	<i>caan3-</i>
Monk/teacher	<i>qacaan3-</i>

Teknonymy is common in Laos – the practice by which ‘a person is called the father, mother, grandfather or grandmother, etc., of one of his descendents instead of by his own name’ (Lévi-Strauss 1969:349). When a first child is born, Lao-speaking parents will come to be called by many as ‘father/mother of X’, where X is the child’s name. This means that many people effectively acquire a new proper name when their first child is named.

When Lao speakers refer to people using personal names, in the standard informal village setting, they attach a type of title prefix to the personal name. The prefix explicitly encodes the (classificatory) kin or other relative relation of the referent individual to the speaker. If the referent is someone ‘not above’ – that is, not (classificatorily) older than – the speaker, then a non-respect prefix is used. There are two such prefixes, that distinguish the sex of the referent. The non-respect female name prefix is *qiil*, the male prefix is *bak2*. These look ‘downward’. Morphosyntactically, they are a type of nominal classification device (Enfield 2004). They occur as heads of nominal phrases (and cannot occur alone), taking a range of modifiers, including demonstratives, adjectives, relative clauses and names.

While the non-respect prefixes generalize across the variety of conceivable ‘downward-looking’ relations (e.g., younger sibling, nephew, niece, child, grandchild), referents who are ‘above’ the speaker receive a prefix from a differentiated range of name prefixes, selected from the everyday kinship vocabulary (each form also having independent use as a full kin term) (see Table 5.2).

In addition, a number of name prefixes denote the social rank of a referent (not relative to speaker), for example, as determined by monastic education (see Table 5.3).

So, if a speaker wants to refer to a thirty-year-old man called *Phêt1*, the prefix selected will depend, among other things, on the relative social position of the man to the speaker (3a-c) or the man's absolute status (3d):

(3)

- (a) *bak2-phêt1* – ‘Phêt1, a male who is not above me.’
- (b) *qaaj4-phêt1* – ‘Phêt1, who is an older brother (to me).’
- (c) *luung2-phêt1* – ‘Phêt1, who is an uncle (to me).’
- (d) *caan3-phêt1* – ‘Phêt1, who was once an abbot.’

5.1.4 *Default formulations of initial references to persons in Lao conversation*

In informal, familiar, village conversation in Lao, the default way to formulate initial reference to a person is to use the person's first name prefixed by the form that appropriately denotes the referent's social position relative to the speaker (as in 3a-c). As long as the prefix is of the appropriate level, the ‘prefix-plus-name’ formulation is the default option, and its deployment in interaction will pass without special notice.

The following example is from a conversation between two men, Kou (K) and Xai (X), in Doune Ian, a village with about 500 inhabitants located some 35 km northeast of the Lao capital, Vientiane. Kou is about sixty years old, Xai about forty. Kou is a contemporary of Xai's father, and is Xai's classificatory *luung2* ‘elder uncle’ (PeB). Xai is a bit older than Kou's eldest child. The example features an initial reference by Xai to his own younger brother (line 1), followed by an initial reference by Kou to another man of around Xai's age (line 2). The speakers are both older than, thus ‘above’, both the referent individuals. Accordingly, these speakers formulate their references to these ‘lower males’ by attaching the non-respect male prefix *bak2* to the referents' names:

Example (4) (Xai and Kou are discussing possible routes for a driving trip planned for later that day.)

- 1 X *sum1 bak2+tia4 ñang2 lat1 paj3 hanø nõq1*
 group m_non_resp+T still cut go there pcl
 ‘Tia's_{non_resp} lot still take a short cut that way, right?’
- 2 K *paj3 haa3 baan4 bak2+laa2 hanø*
 go seek village m_non_resp+L tpc.pcl
 ‘(The road) goes towards the village of Laa_{non_resp}.’

Nothing in this stretch of conversation indicates that these explicit indications of ‘non-respect’ are in any way foregrounded in the main communicative business.

The next example is from a conversation that takes place during a visit by Kêêt and Kaap, a middle-aged couple, to the house of an older couple (Grandma and Grandpa) in a somewhat remote village about 50 km outside of Vientiane. Grandpa is recuperating from injuries sustained when he fell off the front steps of his house some days earlier. Kêêt and Kaap live in the city of Vientiane, near Grandma and Grandpa's son Mòòn. In this example, Kêêt reports to Grandma and Grandpa that she had heard the news of Grandpa's accident from Grandpa's son Mòòn. Kêêt's formulation of the initial reference by name to Mòòn is prefixed by the male non-respect form *bak2-* (line 1). In line 2, Kêêt makes subsequent reference to the same individual, using a third-person singular pronoun, here the 'lowest' available (see Table 5.1). This is appropriate to the register in which the prefix *bak2-* occurs. This is a Lao manifestation of a classic sequence of form-occasion alignment (Schegloff 1996a; cf. introduction to this volume, Fox 1987): that is, initial reference form (full noun phrase) on initial occasion of reference (line 1), subsequent reference form (reduced pronoun) on subsequent occasion of reference (line 2).

Example (5) (Speaker reports to Mòòn's parents that she'd heard news from Mòòn in the town.)

- 1 *daj4+ñin2 bak2+mòòn3*
 hear m_non_resp+M
 '(I) heard **Mòòn**_{non_resp}.'
- 2 **man2** *mua2 qaw3 ngen2 nam2 khòòj5*
 3sg_non_resp return take money with 1sg_pol
 '**He**_{non_resp} went to get money from me_{polite}.'

The precise formulations employed in the two explicit references to Mòòn, in boldface, are defined by the social relationship that pertains between him and the speaker.

The examples so far have featured overt marking of names using non-respect 'lower' prefixes. The next example illustrates 'upward' directed marking of person reference. Here, a woman answers a question as to the location of somebody's house. She formulates it as being near the house of an older woman called Teng. The name is prefixed by the term *paa4* 'older aunt' (although the referent is the speaker's classificatory aunt, not her actual aunt):

Example (6) (Speaker describing the location of another village.)

- pèq2 baan4 paa4+teng1*
 next_to village aunt+T
 '(It's) next to **Teng**_{aunt}'s village.'

5.1.4.1 *Maintaining differential perspectives to a single referent in conversation* Since standard formulations of initial person reference include overt marking of social relation on a vertically oriented hierarchy, it often happens that a referent individual occupies a social position BETWEEN two interlocutors. The result is that two speakers will use different formulations for a single referent, not only for initial mention, but persistently, in successive mentions throughout a conversation.

The referent in the following example is a man named Khamlaa. Reference to Khamlaa occurs in a conversation between a group of six or so women who are chatting during a break in a reed-mat weaving session. The first reference to him is by Jot, who is younger than Khamlaa. Accordingly, Jot formulates her reference by prefixing Khamlaa's name with *qaaj4* 'older brother'. In line 2, one of Jot's interlocutors, an older woman named Mòòn, does a partial repeat of Jot's utterance (in line 2). Mòòn is older than the referent individual Khamlaa, and accordingly her partial repeat of Jot's utterance in line 2 features a replacement of the 'older brother' prefix with the non-respect male prefix *bak2-*. This looks at first glance like an 'embedded correction' (Jefferson 1987), that is where one speaker replaces some component of another speaker's previous formulation, thereby achieving a 'correction', yet without having to disrupt the progressivity of the course of interaction. The difference here is that the 'replacement' is not treated as a correction. This differential formulation for person reference is maintained in subsequent occasions of reference in the sequence: In lines 4 and 9, Mòòn refers to Khamlaa using the bare (lowest) third-person pronoun *man2* (cf. Example (5)), while in line 7, Jot refers to him using the familiar level third-person singular form *laaw2*, mirroring the two speakers' choice of prefix in formulating initial references.

None of these choices raises an eyebrow. They are pragmatically unmarked. Yet by their formal/semantic marking, they accurately respect differential relations of social height between each speaker and the referent individual. The ongoing different type of reference might be expected to create disaffiliation among the speakers involved: For example, if I persist in calling him *Johnny* while you persist with *John*, a discomfort may arise that causes one of us to change and accommodate to the other. In this context in Lao, no such discomfort arises. A possible conclusion is that correct social positioning outranks any potential inference of disaffiliation due to contrasting formulation (i.e., by creating a perception of unwillingness to accommodate and settle on a common way of saying it).

Example (7) (Speakers are taking a break from weaving and are chatting. They have just noticed a car driving through the village.)

1	J	song1 send eB+K	←	Spkr J persists with 'upward' marking of referent Khamlaa5.
'(They're) dropping off Khamlaa5_{eB} .' (0.5; omitted line; 1.0)				
2	M	qee5 paj3 song1 oh go send m _{non_resp} +K	←	Spkr M persists with 'downward' marking of referent Khamlaa5.
'Oh okay, (they're) sending Khamlaa5_{non_resp} .'				
3		phiil nòng4 maa2 tèè1 taang1 _{pa} =thêêt4 nòql relatives come from abroad pcl 'Relatives have come from abroad, right.'		
4		qaaJ4 man2 maa2 tèè1 taang1 _{pa} =thêêt4 eB 3sg_{non_resp} come from abroad 'The elder brother of him_{non_resp} has come from abroad.'	←	
5	Q	khaw3 paj3 sùù4 baan3 pa=tuu3 3pl _{non_resp} go buy frame cupboard pa=[tii3 pòng1+qiam4] pòng1+qem4= rdp_expr window rdp_expr 'They _{non_resp} went to buy frames, cupboards, windows, whatever.'		
6	T	[kham2_laa5 saj3] K where 'Which Khamlaa5?'		
7	J	=nòng4 saaj2 laaw2 yG male 3sg familiar 'The younger brother of him_{familiar} .'	←	
8	V	kham2_laa5 phêt1 K. P. 'The Khamlaa5 of Phêt1.'		
9	M	qee5 nòng4 saaj2 man2 intj y.sib male 3sg_{non_resp} 'Yeah, the younger brother of him_{non_resp} .'	←	

5.1.5 Pragmatically marked formulations of initial references to persons

The [previous section](#) described default, pragmatically unmarked referential formulations. We now consider some departures from these norms, before returning to the defaults and the question of what they might be communicating beyond mere reference. We consider cases in which speakers formulate initial references to persons in pragmatically marked ways, thereby

drawing attention to the manner of formulation itself for some interactional purpose (Schegloff, this volume; Stivers, this volume).

5.1.5.1 Pragmatically marked selection of prefix One type of departure from the norm in Lao person reference is to observe the prefix-plus-name format but select a prefix that does not conform with the social relations pertaining. The following example is from the scene in which Kêêt and Kaap are visiting Grandma and Grandpa. In this example, Kêêt makes an initial reference to her own younger sister Daaw. Owing to the inherent downwardness of the relationship between an older and younger sibling, Kêêt's reference to Daaw would normally be marked by the non-respect female prefix *qiil-*: that is, Daaw is referred to as *qiil-daaw3*. However, the present instance calls for restraint. The purpose of the utterance in which Kêêt first mentions Daaw is to move into discussion of the main business of Kêêt's visit to Grandpa and Grandma. It concerns the donation of money by Daaw (who lives abroad), for renovations to the temple in Grandma and Grandpa's village. (Grandma and Grandpa are Daaw's parents-in-law; i.e., one of their sons is married to Daaw.) Kêêt's reference to Daaw is prefixed not by the expected non-respect prefix *qiil-* but by *saaw3* 'MyZ', an 'upwards' kin term that technically refers to the younger sister of one's mother.

Example (8) (Referent is speaker's younger sister, normally would use non-respect prefix *qiil-*)

<i>mùø+khùùn2</i>	<i>phen1</i>	<i>kaø</i>	<i>thoo2</i>	<i>maa2,</i>	<i>saaw3+daaw3</i>	<i>hanø</i>
last_night	3sg_pol	foc_pcl	call	come,	MyZ+D	tpc_pcl
'Last night, she_{polite} called, Daaw3_{MyZ} .'						

The third-person pronoun *phen1* that comes before the prefix-plus-name mention *saaw3 daaw3* in the same sentence is a respect form (see Table 5.1). This higher reference is pragmatically marked for this combination of speaker and referent individual. Kêêt would normally use the non-respect third-person singular pronoun *man2* to refer to Daaw.

The formulation of this reference to Daaw, the younger sister and daughter-in-law, is pragmatically marked, signalling that the speaker is doing something more with this utterance than merely establishing reference to this person. The content of the marked formulation provides the information needed to figure out just what this special action is (Stivers, this volume). By referring to her own younger sister Daaw as 'mother's younger sister', Kêêt both casts herself in a lower-than-normal position (i.e., as niece), and casts the referent in a higher-than-normal position (i.e., as aunt). While pragmatically unmarked references presuppose the relations referred to, a marked usage such as this is akin to a creative indexical (Kockelman 2005; Silverstein 1976), introducing

a new (not previously given) type of relation to the referent by virtue of its occasion of use.

In the next case, Xai makes reference to a man named Saaj, using the ‘older brother’ prefix (line 4). The other speaker, Kou, is Saaj’s older brother, and accordingly Kou refers to Saaj with the non-respect prefix (line 6). However, since Kou is Xai’s ‘older uncle’, Saaj is too ‘high’ to be an ‘older brother’ to Xai. It appears in line 4 that Xai is strategically using this person reference as a means to raise his own rank, pulling himself up in position. This move is entirely in line with his currently upwardly mobile status in life (he is about forty years old, a successful small-time entrepreneur, eldest son of the present village chief).

Example (9) (Referent is Kou’s younger brother; Kou is Xai’s ‘FeB’; thus, referent is too high to be Xai’s ‘eB’. Xai is upwardly mobile.)

- 1 K *dêk2+nòòj4* *maa2 tètè1* *paak5_san2* *phunø*
 child come from P dem_far_dist
- 2 *qiik5 sòòng3 khon2*
 more two person
 ‘There are kids come from Paksan over there, another two.’
- 3 (2.2)
- 4 X *luuk4 qajø+saaj3*
 child eB+S
 ‘Children of **Saaj_{eB}**.’
- 5 (1.0)
- 6 K *luuk4 bak2+saaj3* *phuu5 nùng1*
 child m_non_resp+S person one
 ‘Child of **Saaj_{non_resp}**, one ...’

In the pragmatically marked formulations discussed in this section, speakers creatively manipulate the system to derive pragmatic effects concerning position within the social hierarchy, in one case for purposes of politeness (Example 8), in one case for Machiavellian purposes (Example 9; cf. Bloch 1971 on the notion of ‘tactical’ uses of kin terminology). Such examples are typical in Lao conversation.

5.1.5.2 Omission of prefix A different type of departure from norms in Lao person reference is to avoid altogether using the prefix-plus-name formulation, and instead using the person’s name alone. In the following example, Kou refers to Nick, a foreigner and guest, who is present in the context (holding the video camera). Omission of the prefix signals politeness, derivable by inference (i.e., whereby omission of explicit marking of the expected ‘non-respect’ form implies the intention to communicate respect). The only appropriate prefix here is the non-respect prefix *bak2-*, as determined by the

age difference.⁴ But the speaker refrains from using it. Thus, if the only available prefix clashes with the ‘high’ status of the referent (i.e., where status over-rides age, by virtue of being a present guest), a safe thing to do is to drop the prefix.

Example (10) (Kou [m, sixty-five years] is teasing an unmarried young woman; referent Nick is present.)

nik1 *vaal* *siø* *qaw3* *phua3* *haj5*
 N say irr take husband give
 ‘**Nick** said he’ll get a husband for (you).’

When Nick is out of earshot, Kou would normally refer to him using the non-respect prefix, that is, as *bak2-nik1*. The respect inferable from the omission of an expected ‘downward’ referring prefix in (10) contrasts with what would be standard in informal village interaction. The following example shows that a local of the village gets the non-respect prefix in a comparable situation to (10) – that is, when he is present while being referred to as a third person:

Example (11) (Mek, Kou, Xai, and Nick are standing around waiting; Mek knows that Kou and Nick are going on a trip. He addresses Kou. Mek is the oldest of the group. The referent individual, Xai, is present.)

1 M *mèèn1* *phaj3* *dèè1* *siø* *paj3* *niø*
 be who all will go tpc.pcl
 ‘Who all is going?’
 2 K *sòng3* *khon2* *saam3* *khon2*
 two person three person
 ‘Two (of us), three (of us).’ [Pointing to Xai, present]
 3 M *bak2+saj2* *ka0* *si0* *paj3*
 m.non_resp+Saj so will go
 ‘So **Saj**_{non_resp} is going too.’

There are classes of situation in which the ‘zero prefix’ solution is standard. One such situation concerns newlyweds, that is after they should no longer be using the ‘older brother’ and ‘younger sister’ prefixes (see (2)), and before they are able to use teknonyms (since they don’t have children yet). This operates by a logic of refraining from undesirable options, and perhaps works by means of depriving the liminal pair of any true default option at all – that is, all references will be pragmatically marked. The omission of

⁴ Another possibility is that Kou could transpose, and say *qaaj4-nik1* ‘elder brother Nick’, choosing the term that his interlocutor would have used (i.e., assuming the perspective of his interlocutor).

title prefix to a name works by not overtly putting the referent into any kind of social position relative to the speaker. Since to omit such reference is pragmatically marked, the effect of such omission is to be heard as overtly refraining from specifying the referent as socially positioned relative to oneself.

5.1.6 *Summary: the Lao person-reference system*

The Lao person-reference system standardly requires explicit attention to relative social positioning among people in the village setting. Pragmatically marked forms of person reference in Lao exploit the default status of the prefix-plus-name format, where the prefix situates the referent in terms of social structure (calculated as kinship, at least for ‘upward-looking’ references) relative to the speaker. The pragmatically marked uses derive their effects either by use of unexpected selection of prefix level (either creatively raising or lowering the referent, with the available implication of thereby lowering or raising the self), or by omitting any prefix and refraining from any explicit statement of social position of referent to speaker.

In the Lao system, while the default manner of formulation for person reference produces expressions that are by definition unmarked pragmatically, these expressions are explicitly marked, formally and semantically. We now consider implications of this for a general theory of person reference, and for associated issues of social action by means of the deployment of symbolic code (language) in interaction.

5.2 **Default formulations and what they do**

5.2.1 *How default formulations work*

In conversation, the continuous flow of collaborative action puts a heavy load on an individual’s cognitive processing. It is reasonable to expect that this load will be minimized where possible (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Zipf 1949). One type of solution is to automatize processing (in both formulation and interpretation) by assuming defaults. Current work in developmental and evolutionary psychology suggests that we are cognitively disposed to adopt locally learned defaults as a matter of principle (Boyd and Richerson 2005; Gergely and Csibra 2006; Simon 1990). Unquestioningly adopting convention requires a little trust, but is easy, and makes good sense statistically (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Culture is the supplier of such default conventions for all manner of communicative behaviour and background (Enfield 2000; Levinson 1995). Hence, we come to communication armed with maxim-like common expectations (Grice 1989), shared bases upon which to apply interpretative strategies to what’s being perceptibly said and done in interaction.

Whatever a person says, they have to say it in some way. If we had to ask ourselves upon hearing every piece of every utterance, ‘Why is this person saying that *IN THAT WAY?*’, we would unnecessarily (and, probably, unbearably) overburden our inferential and interpretative processing.⁵ Default, publicly shared, common assumptions about how people typically do and say things provide interpretative channels along which we may travel with minimal cognitive effort. The default is a device by which we can routinely suppress our attention to manner of formulation, and against which we may recognize when something is being done in an unusual way (being then able to ask ourselves why that might be). When a communicative action is done in the default way, the *MANNER* of action itself must at some level be recognizable as irrelevant to our task of interpreting what’s ‘being done’ by that communicative action. It’s against the background of this default that we may recognize the departures, and only *THEN* actively apply our rational interpretation: *WHY THAT NOW?*⁶ (Grice 1989, Schegloff 1996a, b). Further, to calculate what’s being done, it’s not just a matter of ‘why that?’ but also of ‘why not the usual?’; see introduction, and Stivers, this volume. In short, the special role of defaults for communicative formulation is that they allow us to hear what people are saying without always having to wonder why they are saying it *LIKE THAT* and not in some other way. This disattention is the basis of Schegloff’s (1996a) claim that defaults do not, and by definition cannot, ‘do work’ in social interactional terms.

5.2.2 *How defaults are disarmed in conversation analysis by a Members-Only Filter*

The defaults argument just outlined is implied by Grice (1975, 1989) and descendents (e.g., Levinson 2000), and is standardly employed in Conversation Analysis (although it is never discussed there in terms of economy of cognitive processing). Schegloff’s (1996a: 439) argument that default person-reference formulations make no contribution beyond mere referring is in line with a fundamental methodological and analytic tool in Conversation Analysis that I shall call a Members-Only Filter. Members are those people participating

⁵ The relative arbitrariness of the form-meaning mapping in spoken language is facilitated by the phonological medium’s poor fit for iconic and indexical relations to complex ideas. This low motivatedness of the modality is what allows us to best disattend to the specifics of manner of formulation in speech. The greater the potential for iconicity in the modality of representation, the harder it is to bracket out the implications of form selection, since if there is an easily conceivable link from form to meaning, then it may be readily seen as a motivation. This is an issue for comparative work between signed and spoken modalities of language (cf. Kendon 1988; Taub 2001; Emmorey 2002; Meier et al. 2002; Liddell 2003, *inter alia*).

⁶ This is exactly analogous to the finding of Gergely et al. (2002) about the earliest signs of rationality in infants. This kind of reasoning is fundamental to our cognition, and is well in place before we have language or other complex interactional skills (Gergely and Csibra 2006). See also Sperber and Wilson (1995).

in interactions that comprise the data set for analysis (Garfinkel 1967; Sacks 1992). This filter allows the radar screen to display only those actions that are both ‘available to’ and ‘oriented to by’ the interactants involved.

Methodologically, the Members-Only Filter is intended to determine for the analyst what will, and what will not, be counted for consideration as relevant to the interaction and its analysis. For the conversation analyst looking to identify social actions being accomplished in interaction, this filter lets through only those candidate actions that afford ‘some demonstration that the interlocutors in the data being examined have understood the utterances (or other conduct) in question to be possibly doing the proposed action(s) or that they are oriented to that possibility – a demonstration ordinarily grounded in the interlocutors’ subsequent talk or conduct’ (Schegloff 1996b: 172). These interpretative conclusions and the social actions they recognize must be ‘available in the talk’ (Heritage and Atkinson 1984: 8–9; cf. Sacks 1992; Schegloff and Sacks 1973). But what exactly does it mean for something to be ‘available in the talk, available for inspection’ (by interactants and analysts alike)? In one sense of available – let’s call it formally available – something is explicitly coded in communicative behaviour. It can be pointed to.⁷ An example is the system of Lao kin prefixes described in this chapter. In a second sense of available – let’s call it contextually available – something is accessible by being in the shared common ground (Clark 1996). For example, the commonly assumed access to linguistic paradigmatic structures allows us to make inferences based on what has NOT been said. If a speaker uses a T pronoun form when a V form was openly appropriate, it is FORMALLY available that the speaker chose the T form. In addition, it is CONTEXTUALLY available that the speaker COULD HAVE chosen the V form, and thus that they CHOSE NOT TO use the V form. This kind of availability directs your attention to what is MISSING, a critical notion in both Gricean pragmatics and conversation analysis. For a communicative action to be ‘officially absent’ (Schegloff 1968: 1083), hearers need to have stored what the contextually equivalent (i.e., paradigmatically related) options at that moment of inaction might have been. Such presumed or inferred pieces of meaning are contextually available, but not literally present in the talk, that is, not formally available.

But however we define it, availability alone isn’t enough for the Members-Only Filter. Even when something is explicitly available in the talk (such as the hierarchical differentiation of social relations encoded in Lao person-reference title prefixes), if interactants aren’t also demonstrably ‘oriented to’ it – that is, displaying some kind of awareness, attention, recognition – it is said to be

⁷ Sometimes people will recognize it when it is pointed out, and find it so obvious that pointing it out at all is odd; for example, that the word *table* refers to a table. In other cases, they might not have noticed or thought about it before its being pointed out; for example, that *Cinderella* (availably!) incorporates the word *cinder*, indexing her line of work.

irrelevant to the organization of the interaction, and therefore to its description and analysis.⁸ In the case of person reference, default formulations are said to be doing nothing but referring because they are not explicitly ‘oriented to’ by participants. In this view, it’s not enough that the content in question is merely made available.

5.2.3 *What remains unseen depends on where your blind spot is*

In the Lao system of person reference, while overt specifications of kinship and other hierarchical social relations are unmarked or default in pragmatic terms, they are overtly marked both formally and semantically. These markings make explicit a person’s hierarchical position relative to others in the social network, an important principle in Lao speakers’ cultural understanding of personhood and society. A Members-Only Filter would reject any claim that speakers are ‘doing’ anything in social-interactional terms by using these socially hierarchical forms, on the grounds of a lack of ‘orientation’.

Kitzinger (2005) delivers an important challenge to this stance in a study of verbal references to sexual relationships in English conversation (see also Land and Kitzinger 2005). On the one hand, in conversation, gay and lesbian speakers are typically unable to make simple references to their same-sex partners (e.g., as revealed by gender-specificity in English names, pronouns, etc.) without either being taken to be (‘oriented to as’) topicalizing their own sexuality, or resulting in an addressee topicalizing it. In a telephone conversation between Janice and a car insurance salesman (Land and Kitzinger 2005: 396–8), Janice says *I’m wanting insurance for um two named drivers self and spouse*, which a few turns later is glossed by the insurance salesman as *you said you’d like to insure your husband to drive the car*. Here, *spouse* is taken to have meant ‘husband’. Janice is required momentarily to delay the conversation’s progress with a correction *It’s not my husband it’s my wife*, but without delay gets back to the business of the call. A short time after, while waiting for a response from his computer system, the insurance man topicalizes Janice’s same-sex marriage, resulting in an extended sequence of apologies and remarks on the heterosexist assumption. By contrast, heterosexual speakers run little risk of their sexuality being foregrounded when they reveal it to interlocutors in exactly the same simple ways (e.g., gender of names, pronouns, words like *wife*). They make public their heterosexuality entirely in passing, as

⁸ In semiotic terms, the conversation analyst insists on a perceptible interpretant (i.e., a relevant response to the sign that may also be taken to be a response to the sign’s meaning, providing evidence for that meaning – cf. Kockelman 2005; Peirce 1965/1932). The semanticist is looking for an object (in the Peircean sense; i.e., the meaning, in cognitive or abstract terms): as long as he has a sign (e.g., an identifiable word), the semanticist is happy to supply his own interpretant (or bracket the interpretant altogether).

'a commonplace and taken-for-granted feature of social interaction' (Kitzinger 2005: 259). Thus, if a woman states *My husband isn't very well* during a call to a doctor's office (Land and Kitzinger 2005:388, citing Drew 2006), she is unlikely to be taken to be (or 'oriented to as') topicalizing her sexual orientation, although she is nevertheless explicitly making it available.

In concluding her discussion on the distinct UN-remarkability of speakers' revealing their heterosexuality in English, Kitzinger (2005: 259) writes: 'As analysts, we might want not to take a member's perspective on this but rather to treat the interactant's everyday world as problematic . . . [W]e might ask what is happening when nothing special is happening: . . . when presumed ordinary experiences are treated as ordinary – what is happening THEN, how is THAT done, and what kind of a world must we be living in that these things run off smoothly?'

There is a clear parallel between the apparent invisibility of the heterosexist assumption in English person reference (associated with gender of pronouns, gender-specificity of names, relational terms like *husband* and *wife*, among further things) and the apparent invisibility of social hierarchy in Lao person-reference kin titles. For some things to go so unquestioned that their explicit display is unnoticed (but not by all!), we have to be living in a kind of world where people assume just that thing to be the default in interaction. And it is not a matter of what people actually assume (e.g., that people are heterosexual), but of what they assume will generically be assumed by others (Enfield 2002: 16-17). Adopting the attitude of a 'generalized other' is what situates the individual in society and culture (Mead 1934). At the micro-level this matters only as a principle of agreement for communicative pragmatics. When we ask how a particular interpretative convention has come about socio-historically, we may well ask WHY THAT? Why is THAT the default and not something else? In the case of Lao kin prefixes, the encoded meaning reflects the conventional way of doing person reference. The social distinction encoded in the choice of marking reference to *Khamlaa5* with an 'older brother' or a 'younger brother' prefix (see Example (7)) is as invisible and unremarkable in default usages as would be the heterosexuality indexed by a woman's passing use of the term *my husband* in referring to her husband.⁹ When a Lao speaker

⁹ Any difference between cultures in this respect is not a difference in assumptions about the way of the world. That is, in both Laos and England, interactants are necessarily of different ages relative to each other. The difference between the cultures here is in what is habitually made explicit in talk. English speakers don't systematically make relative age/rank available in language. From a Lao perspective, we studiously AVOID it, perhaps like the way a lesbian may be perceived to avoid certain types of relationship references (Kitzinger 2005:258). One has to be a member of another culture to 'see' the social hierarchy so ubiquitous in Lao person reference (Whorf 1956) – I'm not aware of a stigmatized sub-culture among Lao speakers for which such social-hierarchical assumptions are problematic, but one could conceivably exist (e.g., among young people in a globalizing world).

explicitly ENCODES such a relation in person reference, as described in this chapter, she might not be topicalizing it or drawing attention to it in the sense of making it the business of the utterance in which it is embedded. But she is nonetheless explicitly encoding it. This is reason enough to suspect that these encoded social relations are serving socially communicative ends. At the very least they convey a routine willingness to make key social relations public, thereby reasserting, reiterating, and reproducing these core cultural concerns. Such unceasing yet entirely automatized attention to accurate representation of hierarchical social relations in talk is a contribution all Lao-speaking individuals make to the stability of Lao (speaking) cultural values.

Consider what might be ‘available yet not oriented to’ in a more familiar person-reference system, English. The argument based on Lao data may seem straightforward, since the cultural value at hand is explicitly articulated; that is, hierarchical person reference based on asymmetrical kinship. To turn it around, the Lao system of person reference points to what is available yet automatized in the defaults of the English system. When Lao speakers make person references using a name with a kin prefix, they overtly encode that person’s differential social position, publicly reproducing a specific cultural value – we’re all at different positions on an unequal hierarchy – each time they do it. From the outside, we might see this as an obsession with hierarchy. Similarly, when English speakers make person references using a bare name, they not only achieve reference (i.e., convey to their addressee who it is they are talking about), but in addition they make available a virtual assertion of that person’s NON-differential position, publicly reproducing a specific Anglo cultural value – we’re all at the same level on an equal plane – each time they do it. From the outside, one might see this as an obsession with egalitarianism. This is confirmed in widely reported ethnographic observations on the social advantages and disadvantages of speaking English; for example, the ease of having one and only one second-person pronoun rather than being forced to choose between formal/distant and informal/intimate forms; the discomfort of having to call a superior by first name; the discomfort of hearing a subordinate call one by one’s first name (cf. Brown and Gilman 1960; Wierzbicka 1992).¹⁰ While the Lao pattern is to overtly mark relative social status as a pragmatically unmarked way of referring to persons, English has no overt marking. The ‘social statement’ in the English person-reference system is contextually

¹⁰ And default person reference by name in English is no simple matter. Even among first names, there are multiple choices, with multiple meanings. We may not know in advance which of *Fred*, *Frederick*, *Freddy* or *Jer*, *Jerrold*, *Jerry* is the default or pragmatically unmarked form for a given configuration of speaker-hearer-referent. (Although we may know, for example, that *Jer*, *Frederick* and *Freddy* are systemically marked, while *Jerrold*, *Fred*, and *Jerry* are not; Wierzbicka 1992: 225ff, 303.) Furthermore, it may be argued that names fall into type classes, and as such have (at least connotative) meanings (see Introduction to this volume).

available but not formally available. But the English system nonetheless embodies a cultural set of values concerning the social web of personal relations.

While I am arguing against the claim that a default person-reference formulation does literally 'nothing more than refer' (Schegloff 1996a), I acknowledge an important insight behind that idea. It clearly matters that pragmatically unmarked formulations pass in conversation without apparent notice or attention. How can I claim that there is some kind of 'work' being done by a distinction that apparently remains out of awareness? The answer lies in Sacks' observation, cited at the opening of this chapter, that it takes special work to appear so ordinary that one's manner of behaviour becomes literally unremarkable. A key observation made by Sapir, Whorf, and others investigating the relation between language, thought and culture was that much of language is outside our awareness (Jakobson 1957). This motivated Whorf's quest to study languages unlike those familiar to Anglo-European scholars. On the idea of a rule and our native conceptual access to it, Whorf wrote: 'Never having experienced anything in contrast to it, we cannot isolate it and formulate it as a rule until we so enlarge our experience and expand our base of reference that we encounter an interruption of its regularity' (1956: 209). If a group of people only saw blue, he suggested, 'they would hardly be able to formulate the rule that they only saw blue'. To be able to formulate a rule that they only saw blue, 'they would need exceptional moments in which they saw other colors' (1956: 209). Part of Whorf's insight was that we 'march in step' with distinctions that have a 'background character' in our own languages. '[O]ur psychic make-up is somehow adjusted to disregard whole realms of phenomena that are so all-pervasive as to be irrelevant to our daily lives and needs' (Whorf 1956: 210). This 'disregard' is another word for the Conversational Analysts' 'lack of orientation' (see above). Despite the message's availability, its apparent disregard by interactants is taken to mean that it should therefore be disregarded by the analyst as well. But as Whorf pointed out, as soon as pragmatically marked formulations are 'isolated against a background' they bring that otherwise disregarded background into view. And it is no less real. As Lucy (1992: 37) puts it, 'we de-automatize our own language categories by contrasting them with those of other languages.' Contrast reveals what we habitually fail to see in the most everyday phenomena. Something meaningful may be all the while available in the data, but may take some pointing out before it is noticed or registered or oriented to. When we think differently to the defaults (as, say, an egalitarian in hierarchical society, or a lesbian in straight society), even for a moment, the otherwise default becomes marked. Despite members' typical disattention to the routinely available in uneventful interaction, the analyst would be crazy to ignore it. Consider the Lao case. That an entire society of individuals agree to make an explicit distinction in fundamental social

structure in every second spoken utterance yet find that very distinction utterly unremarkable is in itself deserving of special interest.

5.3 Conclusion

In any society, an individual will occupy a set of places in a highly structured constellation of social relationships. And any society will have its conventional ideologies about the nature and structure of that constellation. Accordingly, members of any society will follow fashion in expressing those ideologies and publicly displaying their adherence to them. When Lao speakers refer to persons in conversation, the normal pragmatically unmarked strategy is to employ a formally and semantically marked formulation, by which the mention of a person's name is accompanied by explicit statement of that person's position, relative to the speaker, within a hierarchical system of social relations. This pragmatically UN-marked formulation for person reference is explicitly doing more than simply achieving reference, but this sense of 'doing' need not be the 'foregrounded social action now' that the term sometimes implies (Schegloff 1996a). It's one of many things a person does by silently conforming, and the forms of conformity are, after all, not wholly arbitrary. Lao practices of person reference do the basic work of referring to people, and, in addition, they make explicit the social position of the referent individual relative to the speaker – above or below, and if above, then classificatorily related to the speaker – for example, as sibling, aunt/uncle or grandparent.

By the same argument, English speakers also unavoidably give off a stance on social relationships when employing the person-reference resources made available by the norms of the culture. How could any language give us a way out of this problem? I submit that it is not possible in any context to refer to persons without encoding, implying, or otherwise making available a stance towards social relationships that applies generally in the culture. Indeed, this is just what perpetuates their status as culturally generalized. Formulations of person reference in any language system may well pass without special treatment of the way they are formulated, but they may always do more than just achieve reference. They make publicly overt and thereby instantiate and stabilize cultural values about persons and their social relations.

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Part II

The person reference system in operation

6 Conveying who you are: the presentation of self, strictly speaking

Emanuel A. Schegloff

6.1 Introduction

Of all the practices for referring to persons in talk-in-interaction, the most common and the most straightforward – at least for English – appears to be self-reference. For English, with very few exceptions (Schegloff 1996a: 443–45), a speaker refers to self with the dedicated term ‘I’ (and its grammatical variants – me, my, mine, etc.). This term is opaque with respect to all the usual key categorical dimensions – age, gender, status and the like, and is also insensitive to the history of prior reference – whether for the first or the *n*th occasion in some conversation or across multiple conversations, self is referred to as ‘I’.

In this chapter, I exploit one locus of self-reference that is different from the aforementioned routine – saying or otherwise conveying who you are either to a question inquiring about it (‘who are you?’, ‘who is this?’, etc.) or a sequential juncture that makes addressing this undertaking relevant. This locus is the opening section of American telephone calls before the advent of cell-phones and automatic caller-identification.¹

The forms of self-identification or self-presentation at this interactional juncture are constrained by the same combination of conversational preferences examined elsewhere in the conversation-analytic literature on person-reference (Sacks 1972a, b, 1992; Sacks and Schegloff 1979, this volume; Schegloff 1996a) – recipient design and minimization. It is thus possible to see if these preferences behave in the same fashion in occasions of self-reference as was found to be the case in referring to third parties supposed to be known (or unknown) to the recipient. Furthermore, this investigation should allow us to specify more precisely than has been the case in the past how these preferences, and the preference for minimization in particular, are to be understood in their bearing on practices for referring to persons in talk-in-interaction – whether, for

¹ Accounts of this locus of interaction can be found in Schegloff 1968, 1979, 1986, 2002[1970], 2002a, b, c 2004[1970]. Accounts of this locus, or parts of it, in other languages or cultures can be found in (inter alia) Godard 1977; Hopper 1992; Hopper and Chen 1996; Hopper, Doany, Johnson and Drummond 1991; Hopper and Koleilat-Doany 1989; Houtkoop-Steenstra 1991; Lindström 1994; Taleghani-Nikazm 2002; and the various studies reported in Luke and Pavlidou 2002.

example, it is the amount or complexity of the information that figures in the reference that is to be minimized or the form in which it is ‘packaged’.

In what follows, I first present a few elements of our current understanding of person reference drawn from past work on which the later parts of the chapter draw and which they presuppose. Secondly, I describe briefly some more recent work that complements the earlier work with results on other languages, and thereby contributes to specifying the import of the recipient-design and minimization preferences. Finally, I take up self-reference in the special environment described above – an environment that may fall victim to the march of technology, as telephones come increasingly to be attached to persons and not to places. By the end of the last of these sections, we will see that speakers fashion even more elegant solutions in reconciling the constraints of recipient-design and minimization in doing *self*-reference than is the case in *third-person* reference. Finally, the discussion will turn briefly to extend the analysis from recipient-design as represented in personal recognizability, that is in ‘knowing who it is’, to the bearing on self-reference of the action/ topic/context that has been made relevant by the recipient.

6.2 Past resources

So first a brief overview of some key features of past conversation-analytic work on practices for referring to persons in talk-in-interaction and their organization, drawing mostly on two of the sources mentioned above (Sacks and Schegloff 1979 and Schegloff 1996a).

In studying how reference to persons is accomplished, we are in the first instance asking *how speakers do reference to persons* so as to accomplish, on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done – what I will term ‘referring simpliciter’, or on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice that has been employed. Relatedly, we are asking *how talk is analysed by recipients* so as to find that ‘simple’ reference to someone has been done, or that the referring has carried with it other practices and outcomes as well.

What is meant by ‘referring simpliciter’? What concretely do ‘simply referring and nothing else’ on the one hand and ‘referring in such a way as to do something else as well’ refer to? In Example (1) Mark is chatting with three fellow students in their dorm room; another of the roommates had come in for a moment, interrupting the talk, and has just left.

Example (1) SN-4, 6:1–17

- | | |
|---------|--|
| 1 Mark: | Where were we. |
| 2 | (0.5) |
| 3 Sher: | I dunno.=’ve you been studying lately, |

4 Mark: No, 'not et aw-° not et a:ll:. I hafta
 5 study this whole week. <every ni:ght,
 6 { (hhh) / (0.8) } en then I got s'mthing
 7 a-> planned on Sunday with Lau:ra,
 8 (0.5)
 9 Mark: c-> She- she wen- she 'n I are gonna go out
 10 'n get drunk et four o'clock in the
 11 afternoon.
 12 Sher: huh-huh hhh[h
 13 Mark: [It's a religious: (0.3) thing
 14 we're gonna have.
 15 (0.3)
 16 Mark: I d'know why:, °b't
 17 (0.5)
 18 Mark: b-> Uh:m, (.) No- her ex boyfriend's getting
 19 married en she:'s: gunnuh be depressed so:.
 20 (0.8)

A reference like 'Laura' (at 'a') invites the recipients' recognition of the one who is being referred to as someone that they know; a reference like 'her ex boyfriend' (at arrow 'b') turns out to provide not only a reference to a determinate person, but one that also provides an account for the anticipation of depression on Laura's part (in a way in which 'Paul', or 'a friend of Laura's', or 'your cousin', or 'her accountant' might not, even if they all referred to the same person); and the 'she' (at arrow 'c') does reference (or 're-reference') simpliciter, that is doing *non-initial* referring and nothing else. To repeat the way in which I have broached the undertaking: How do speakers do reference to persons so as to accomplish, on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done, and on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice that has been employed? And, how is the talk analysed by recipients to sort this out as well?

I asserted about 'she' at arrow (c) that it is doing referring simpliciter, but about 'Laura' at arrow (a) that it 'invites the recipients' recognition of the one who is being referred to as someone they know'. Is that not 'doing something else' in addition to referring? No, it is not. 'Inviting the recipients' recognition of the one who is being talked about as someone they know' is a *practice for referring*, not a practice for doing something else, as 'accounting for the depression' is doing 'something else'. For the people who hear transparently who is being referred to by 'Laura', that is how this speaker, speaking to these recipients, on this occasion, and so on, properly refers to her; it is not doing *anything* else. To have referred to her as 'your former room mate' (assuming that she *was* their former room mate) *would have been* doing something else.²

² See the chapter by Stivers (this volume) on 'alternative recognitional' for an examination of some 'something else's that a recognitional person reference can analysably do. Enfield (this volume) proposes to treat the incorporation of attributes such as age, gender, relative status, etc. as 'something else's that negate the characterization of the reference as referring *simpliciter*, but

So what is meant by ‘referring simpliciter’ incorporates recipient design considerations and position in the history of reference in that occasion of interaction. In saying this I do not mean to be asserting a theorist’s prerogative or strategy; I mean to be describing the practices of speaking and understanding employed by the participants.

The mention of ‘recipient design’ considerations gets us to the next bits of the past work that we will need to share here, and that is two preferences that are widely operative in conversation and have specific expressions for the domain of reference to persons.

One is a preference for minimization, that is, if reference is to be done, it should be done with a single reference form. There are of course many reference forms for any person, and many of them are combinable, but massively in conversation, reference is done with a *single* form. One import of the preference is that if more than a single form is employed, it invites inspection for what that is about, about what is getting done thereby; it is accountable *not* in the first instance for us as analysts, but for the *co-participants*. Minimization, then, is clearly implicated in whether some occasion of referring is referring simpliciter or is doing something else as well.

The other preference that is widely applicable in conversation is the previously mentioned preference for recipient design. In its most general sense, this preference has participants shape their conduct – for us, specifically their *talk* – for the recipients to whom they are addressed. This is as key a component as there is to the often diffuse notion of ‘adapted to context’. The way in which referring to persons is shaped by the preference for recipient design surfaced in the brief discussion of Example (1), and specifically the reference to Laura. The claim there was that it ‘invites the recipients’ recognition of the one who is being referred to as someone that they know’; and, indeed, it was selected to do so, the selection reflecting the speaker’s knowing that that is how these recipients knew that person. Of the two main practices of referring to persons that display a speaker’s stance that the referent is known to the recipient (and that mobilize in the recipient the resources for figuring out who that they know could be being referred to that way by this speaker), referent’s name is preferred if possible, and recognitional descriptors less so. We will soon arrive at how this preference figures in person-reference more generally than this particular data specimen. But we can already note this: The possibility that more than referring is being done may be triggered not only by doing a reference that is more than

I take that to embody the orientation of an outside observer, in contrast to that of the hearer(s) for whom the reference is designed, for whom these incorporated features are the transparent means for this speaker’s doing reference to that referent when addressing or in the presence of this/these recipient(s).

minimal, but also by referring in a fashion that diverges from recipient-design considerations (cf. Note 2).

6.3 Minimization and self-reference

We turn now to explore and elaborate empirically what we should understand by a ‘preference for minimization’ as it bears on person reference.

As was said earlier, a single reference form can do adequate reference, and reference is ‘preferredly done with a single reference form’ (Sacks and Schegloff 1979, [reprinted in this volume](#)). When more is used, it is accountable; that is, when more is used, parties to the interaction inspect it to find ‘why that now’ (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 299). A data extract used to exemplify this point in the past is displayed as Example (2) (taken from Sacks and Schegloff this volume), now re-transcribed and somewhat differently analysed.

Ann and Bev are talking about an evangelical preacher who might be speaking in a nearby city, and how to arrange to attend:

Example (2) SBL 2/2/4 (Sacks and Schegloff 1979: 19)

1 Ann:	... well I was the only one other than
2	1-> .hhh than thee uhm (0.7) mtch! Fo: rds.
3	2-> Uh Mrs. Holmes Ford? (0.8) You know the-
4	3-> [the the cellist?
5 Bev:	[Oh yes. She's- she's (a) / (the) cellist.
6 Ann:	Ye: s.
7 Bev:	ye[s
8 Ann:	[Well she and her husband were there, ...

Here Ann makes three tries at referring to the person she means to convey to her recipient. There are three because – and here comes its accountability, for us as analysts, and for them as co-conversationalists – there is trouble. In the run up to the first reference, the trajectory of Ann’s talk displays trouble: The developing course of the talk projects the name to occur at line 1, after ‘than;’ instead there is a break filled by an in-breath; then the ‘than’ is repeated – a second interruption of the talk’s progressivity (Schegloff 1979a); then a potential next word appears but is immediately followed by another stall – an ‘uhm’ followed by silence, and eventually by the name – ‘Fords’.

Referring by name is the prototype for ‘recognitional’ reference, that is referring in a way that conveys that the speaker supposes that the recipient knows (or knows of) the referent, and that the recipient can figure out who-that-they-know is being referred to from the form used to do the reference (Sacks and Schegloff this volume; Schegloff 1996a). When it is possible, recognitional reference is preferred (*ibid.*). So it is a recognitional reference that Ann is in the process of producing, but its production here is problematic (as is partially detailed in the preceding paragraph), and in such environments it is common for

recipients to mark the success of its production by some recognition token. When no such display is forthcoming (after 'Fords'), Ann adds a second try, different from the first and produces it this time *as* a 'try', with its upward intonation contour and space left for a sign of recognition, 'uh Missiz Holmes Ford?' (line 3); and again, this time in quite a long silence, there is no recognition; and before Bev can claim and then demonstrate recognition, Ann has already launched a third formulation, again marked as a try. So we get to see here three distinct instances of 'a single reference form', and we get to see and hear *three* of them because of the problematical-ness of the recognitional reference forms being tried.

Note then that each reference is packaged as 'a form', and that 'a single form' need not be a single word. It can be a phrase; it can be a clause; and, as shown elsewhere (Hacohen and Schegloff 2006, and see below for a summary), it can be less than a word, an affix. Its minimality is not defined by words; it is better understood by its packaging: sometimes its grammatical construction, sometimes its delivery in some recognizably complete-for-now prosodic contour – whether up or down, sometimes a gestural component such as a point, and others. We will have to return later to the question of the 'information load' that a reference form delivers. And we will turn in Section 6.3 to evidence of an orientation to a preference for minimization in the course of production of a single instance, and not just the aggregate observation that reference to persons is massively done with single reference forms.³

With this account of minimization in hand, and with the understanding that a preference for minimization means in part that departure from minimization is accountable for what else is being done besides referring, we turn to interaction in languages with resources for referring to persons that are different in many respects from English. First, Hebrew.

In Hebrew, the verb is inflected in the past and future tenses for person (speaker, recipient, or other), for number (one or more) and for gender. There are, of course, pronouns for self- and other-reference as well; but the deployment of these free-standing pro-terms with past and future tensed verbs (although not with present tense verbs) is, conventionally speaking, redundant, for all the information is already obligatorily included in the verb form. Still, examination of recorded episodes of ordinary talk-in-interaction reveals that such usages of free-standing proterms with inflected verbs are not uncommon. Even if conventionally speaking 'redundant', *conversation-analytically* speaking, these usages are in principle *not* redundant. Speakers 'know' that person is inflected on the verb, and most often do *not* add a pronoun reference

³ Indeed, in the paper in which Example (2) was taken up, one of the key points was that when the preferences for minimization and recipient design cannot both be satisfied, recipient design takes precedence, but minimization is not abandoned; rather it is relaxed step by step, up to the point at which recipient design succeeds in securing recognition. We will return to this point at the end of Section 6.3.

to verbs in past or future tense for which the subject is speaker or recipient. Accordingly, a speaker's deployment of a free-standing pro-term is inspectable (both by co-participants and by investigators) for what else is being done thereby. Here, as elsewhere, observing the preference for minimization is a central feature of referring *simpliciter* – that is, doing 'just referring' and nothing else. Adding a pro-term reference when person is already conveyed in the verb constitutes a departure from this preference, and implements and conveys the accomplishment of something else in addition to simply referring. As reported elsewhere (Hacohen and Schegloff 2006), one environment in which such more-than-minimal references are found is the environment of misalignment – where a speaker is disagreeing or otherwise disaligning from recipient, or is reporting or prefacing such misalignment. And, as with the re-use of a locally initial reference form in locally subsequent position in third-person reference in English (Fox 1987; Schegloff 1996a), what is involved is an additional reference form with no addition to the referential information being conveyed.

Much the same configuration of form, information and action can be observed in so-called zero-anaphora languages. Here I can offer only a single exemplar in the hope of tempting colleagues with the relevant competence to undertake a more systematic investigation.

Of the Asian languages that are characterized by zero-anaphora for speaker self-reference, I draw on Japanese materials from a medical context.⁴ The self-referring pronoun in Japanese is here represented in Roman spelling as 'atashi'.

Example (3) Aida (third visit)

- 01 PAT: -> a=ha::i <¥sensee¥ ata(h)shi(h) i-imaichi yoku- sono:
 Oh, Yes, < Doctor, I(h) not quite well that
 Oh, Yes, < Doctor, I (can) not clearly (tell)
- 02 PAT: hairan- (.) bi tteyuuno ga:
 ovulating- day so-called OP
 so-called ovulating day,
- 03 DOC: n [:
 yea
- 04 PAT: [.hhh ke[kkoo]
 quite
- 05 DOC: [wakari ma]sen [ka?
 tell not Q?
 cannot tell?
- 06 PAT: [ha :i.
 Yes.

⁴ These data are drawn, with thanks, from Ob/Gyn doctor–patient interactions provided by Michie Kawashima in a Ph.D. Dissertation proposal, 'Interactional Practices in Japanese OB/GYN Consultations', Department of Sociology, UCLA, June 2005. For Korean, see Oh, forthcoming.

- 07 DOC: hai.
Okay.
- 08 PAT: (>°wakari masen-°<)
tell not
cannot tell.

As in English and Hebrew, the provision of an additional reference form (one which carries no additional referential information) occurs in a negatively valenced action environment. Firstly, the patient is reporting a failure; secondly, as Kawashima remarks, by referring to ‘ovulating day’ with a ‘so-called’, she displays her problematic control over the medical language pertaining to the trouble for which she has consulted the doctor; thirdly, Kawashima notes that this utterance is infiltrated by laugh particles that in this medical context occurs ‘... around the time when they report something that is not “medically desirable” like drinking and so on. In this case, by inserting laughing particles, the patient may display her awareness that she should have been aware of the information about which she is inquiring’. And fourthly, she does not bring herself to actually articulate the failing that she is reporting, and it is the physician who ends up doing so. So this turn is beset by trouble in production that appears to be related to the trouble in other respects that is being reported. It is in this environment that the speaker articulates the self-referring expression *ata(h)shi(h)* (or, omitting the laugh particles, ‘*atashi*’), which is in Japanese referentially superfluous; it renders the self-reference more than minimal, and does so in the environment of trouble.

So far, then, we have re-use of a full NP where a pro-term could/should be used in ‘third-person’ reference (American English); an articulated deployment of a self-referential pronoun when person is already morphologically inflected on the verb (Hebrew); and the articulation of a self-referential pronoun where zero-anaphora already provides for the person reference to be understood (Japanese) – all of these more-than-minimal reference forms in environments of trouble and disalignment.

6.4 Recipient-design and self-reference

The way telephone conversation openings work in the United States, or at least worked before caller-ID and cell phones, involved the interactional issue of sorting out who the participants were.

On the whole, the issue was mostly mitigated for who the call-recipient was; the caller had dialled a number attached to a location, knew (if it was a so-called ‘personal call’) who the persons at the location were who might answer, and was thus primed not to figure out ‘who the other was’, but to recognize which one of the few people it *could* be, it actually *was*. And if they could *not* recognize that voice, they would figure either that they had dialled or reached the wrong number, or that there was some outsider – a guest, a work/service person and so

forth – who had answered for the people who ‘belonged’ there, and they would ask to speak to one of the residents. Of course it could turn out to be embarrassing if it *was* one of the residents after all, and the caller had failed to recognize them; then there might be talk about having woken them up (cf. Schegloff 2005) or whether they had a cold, or some other account for failing to recognize one who had rights to be recognized by that caller, especially given the advantage of knowing the small set of possible answerers to begin with.

So, for the most part, when callers articulate the name of the answerer, they are not *referring* to them, they are addressing them. I say ‘for the most part’ because sometimes the answerer’s name is part of a question like ‘Is this Ms. So-and-so?’ as in Example (4), and in that case they *are* surely *referring* to them;

Example (4) ID, #295.295a (Schegloff 1979: 73d)

1 IL: Hello,.
 2 MT: -> Hello, is this Missiz Thomas,
 3 IL: Ye:s.
 4 MT: Hello this is Tasha Mann.=I’m calling for:
 5 Southern Nevada Music [Company].
 6 IL: [Yeah.

And there are less determinate instances (e.g., (5)) that could be heard as fully formed questions or as slurred equivocations between a question and upward-toned address term.

Example (5) JG,#73a (Schegloff 1979: 73a)

1 CP: Hello.
 2 FM: -> (z) Miz Parsons?
 3 CP: Ye:s,
 4 FM: Fay Martin, Arthritis Foundation,
 5 the volunteer service,
 6 CP: Um hm.

On the other hand, the identification of the *caller* is virtually always an open issue needing to be dealt with. The issue is: ‘Who’s this?’ That is rarely asked as a question because callers who have no claim on the answerer will have identified themselves, thus answering the question before it is asked (as in the two exchanges just examined), while those who feel entitled to claim recognition are on the whole correct in their judgements, and know just what is needed for this answerer – and remember that they do not know which one it will be until the last minute until they hear the ‘hello’ – they know just what is needed for *this* answerer, at *this* time, given who they themselves are.

So we have here an interactional position in which routinely one person needs to address the issue of who they are – ‘who is this?’ The position can be

characterized in terms of the overall structural organization of the type of conversation set by the medium – telephone conversation: namely, it is in the opening. Within the opening, its exact location can be specified in terms of the ordering and the organization of the sequences that compose an opening (Schegloff 1986), and by reference to the turns in which those sequences are played out: The locus is overwhelmingly in turns 2 through 4. So here is this place, this stage on which successive pairs of parties play out some variation of the tasks needing to get done in the opening of a conversation on the phone, one of which involves getting a solution (and sometimes a confirmation) about ‘who is calling’. How then do callers manage this person-reference issue – who they are, ‘who *is* this?’ And what can we learn from the practices employed here about how person reference works?⁵

The first thing to be done is to round up the usual preferences – recipient design and minimization. Who someone *is* depends on who is asking; and even if no one is asking, it depends on whom one is talking to. So we start with recipient design.

Earlier we had occasion to register one bearing that recipient design has on person-reference, and that was: If it’s possible, use a recognitional. Doing that involved a speaker figuring whether the recipient knew the referent and how; and whether the recipient knew that the speaker knew *that* the recipient knew the referent, and *how* the recipient knew the referent. When we touched on this before, what was in question was reference to so-called ‘third parties’; here, of course, the speaker and the referent are the same. So, from the caller’s point of view, the issue implicated by ‘if it’s possible’ is: Does the answerer know me and how does he or she know me; does the answerer know that I know that they know me and in that way.⁶

⁵ And may I say on behalf of this genre, which is often dismissed for the parochialism it is taken to exude, that it is no less worthy of serious inquiry than political debates, or religious ceremonies, or healing rituals, or any of the other particular settings of interaction studied in societies other than our own. Their familiarity should not breed contempt; it puts distinctive obstacles in the path of indigenous investigators. The discussion in this section draws heavily on an earlier, now virtually inaccessible paper (Schegloff 1979); I am indebted to Steve Levinson for suggesting that its materials could be reworked for this volume’s topic.

⁶ For those who find these iterations hard to follow, perhaps this will help. I often find myself walking on campus and encountering someone coming the other way who was an undergraduate student in my class. And we have this odd game of not-quite-mutual gaze. They look at me half expectantly, and as my eyes start coming to them they look away, figuring that there is no way I would recognize them as they recognize me, and to be caught looking at me like that would be . . . what? Intrusive? Presumptuous? Mocking? And if the *pas de deux* goes their way, we pass each other without ever meeting one another’s gaze and with no mutual acknowledgement; and if it goes *my* way, I trap them, and recognize them – sometimes by name which blows their mind – and we greet each other, and it’s very nice. This is the way the logic plays out when the very issue is whether there is to be any interaction at all in the first place. On the telephone, the parties are already in the interaction, so it plays out a bit

But there is another maxim of recipient design: ‘Don’t tell the other what you suppose – or what you *ought* to suppose – he or she already knows; *use* it’. What bearing might this have on our ‘caller’s problem’? Well, if the caller figures that the answerer knows him or her, and that the answerer knows that that caller figures this, and if the caller furthermore figures that this is what the answerer *ought* to know, then caller *should not tell answerer who he or she is*, but should instead *use or exploit answerer’s knowledge*. And that’s one thing that callers massively do, and this is what it sounds/looks like:

Example (6) TG, 1 (Schegloff 1979: #42)

1 ((ring))
 2 Ava: H’llo:?
 3 Bea: -> hHi:,
 4 Ava: Hi:?

Example (7) NB, #114 (Schegloff 1979: #44)

1 ((ring))
 2 Cla: Hello::,
 3 Agn: -> Hi::,
 4 Cla: Oh: hi:: ‘ow are you Agne::s,

Example (8) HG 2

1 ((ring))
 2 Nan: H’llo::?
 3 Hyl: -> Hi::,
 4 Nan: HI::.

In their first turn, callers do a greeting that in the first instance claims to have recognized the answerer as the person they meant to reach, and which also provides a voice sample to the answerer from which callers, in effect, propose and require that the answerer recognize *them*. In these three instances, it is about as small a voice sample as it could be; some callers are a bit more generous and say ‘hello’, providing the answerer with two syllables from which to recognize. In these three instances, and in a great many more, it works. With no hearable delay, answerers return the greeting in the next turn, which serves not only to reciprocate the greeting, but to claim that answerers have reciprocated the recognition as well. The operative word here is ‘claim’; in Example (7) Clara *shows* that she has recognized the caller (her sister) by addressing her by name; in Example (6) and (8), no such demonstration is provided.

In fact, in both cases, the answerers had indeed recognized their callers. But this is not always the case; it can turn out that the answerer was cheating. In

differently, but the same logic is involved. I know him, but does he know me? and does he know that I know him? and does he know that I know that he knows me?

Example (9), for example, Rebecca's return greeting at line 4, although feeble in its production, claims that she has recognized her caller – a claim that is belied by her exclamation at line 6, which is where she has truly recognized and proves it, and then greets him again, and rather more robustly, at line 8, this greeting making an honest woman of her.

Example (9) Arthur and Rebecca 1

1 ((ring ring))
 2 Reb: H'lo,
 3 Art: -> H'lo
 4 Reb: -> Hi
 5 Art: How you doin
 6 Reb: ->> Arthur!
 7 Art: Yes..
 8 Reb: H(huh [huh] i
 9 Art: [.hhh hoh hoh hoh hoh

In Example (9), the answerer needed just a little more to work on – whether more voice sample, whether a characteristic well-being inquiry, we don't know – but she was able to 'get it' on her own. Sometimes, however, answerers can *not* get it on their own, and perhaps sense that they are too far from recognition to pretend and be able to recognize in time to avoid being caught out. As in Example (10), they are reduced to asking flat out, 'Who's this?'

Example (10) CF, #130 (Schegloff 1979: 49a)

1 ((ring))
 2 Chs: Hello?
 3 Gds: Hello.
 4 (1.5)
 5 Chs: -> Who's this.
 6 Gds: Who is this.= This is your (0.2)
 7 friendly goddess,
 8 Chs: OHhh, uh::, can I ask for a wish

Un-surprisingly, Charlie's girl friend takes a bit of umbrage in her mock-astonished repeat of his question, and then gives him another chance, with a very broad hint.

Even more extraordinary is Example (11).

Example (11) TC I(b)13 (Drew 2002)

1 ((phone rings))
 2 Jer: (W'chuh Delivery,)
 3 Lin: Hey Jerry?
 4 (.)
 5 Lin: .h[h
 6 Jer: [Ye:[s.

7 Lin: [hHi:..h[h
 8 Jer: [HI:[:.
 9 Lin: [He:y- you don'haftuh bring'ny paper
 10 plates
 11 I think ah'll jus:t use the plates ah'v go::t, hh
 12 Jer: -> Who's thi:s.
 13 Lin: Linda.ehh[hhhkhhh
 14 Jer: [OH(h):.
 15 Lin: °henh°
 16 Jer: H*i*:..
 17 Lin: [Wuhdihyou man uwho(h)'s[this,
 18 Jer: [heh heh .hh
 19 (.)
 20 Lin: [.hhhhhhhhhhhh
 21 Jer: [Hm:: . huh hu-eh .hu::[:h.
 22 Lin: [khh[hh
 23 Jer: [Oh::: yeah fine?en you?
 24 Lin: eh-heh (y) uhh.

Here the answerer cheats at line 8, but cannot recover in time as Rebecca did in Example (10), in spite of quite a long utterance at lines 9–10, an utterance so recipient-designed for him that one would have thought that it would be enough of a clue to trigger a recognition even if he *did* fail to recognize the voice as that of . . . his WIFE! Her response at line 16 echoes that of Charlie's goddess in Example (10): 'What do you mean "who's this"!' ⁷

These misadventures aside, the success rate appears to be very high for what is, after all, in its own way a very delicate operation. Out of all their possible callers, answerers have to pick out just who this one is from pretty much the smallest voice sample you can give without mechanical interference – just 'hi'.

So to the question we are pursuing here – what form of person reference is to be used in keeping with recipient-design considerations when the person to be referred to is yourself – one answer appears to be: 'none, if you can manage to do without it'. Of course, if your effort fails, there is embarrassment for both parties, and that may be good grounds for proceeding more cautiously. But we will get to that in a moment.

What if a caller was actually going to articulate an answer to the virtual question, 'who is this?' What should they say? Well, going back to the first paragraph of this chapter (and the previously outlined organization of resources for person reference in Schegloff 1996a), we go to the top, where, you will recall, the most common person references – those for speaker and recipient – are dealt with by dedicated terms, namely, 'I' or 'me' and 'you'. So, surely that is what a caller should do if he or she is going to actually answer the question that is in the air, even if it has not been articulated. And indeed, that is

⁷ Those who would like to know how a husband can come to not recognize his wife's voice can find out, in detail, in a very nice paper by Paul Drew (2002).

what she *does* do in Example (12). It sounds/looks like this:

Example (12) MDE, Supp. (Schegloff 1979: #59)

1 ((ring))
 2 Mar: Hello? =
 3 Mom: Hello it's me.
 4 Mar: Hi.

So here we have yet another instance of a person reference that conveys no new information (following the earlier ones, the Hebrew use of the self-referring pronoun when person is already marked on the verb, using a pronoun when reference is retrievable from zero anaphora in Japanese, and re-using the locally initial reference term in locally subsequent position in disagreement contexts in American English). Perhaps it *could* be said to add *some* information – it provides an expanded voice sample as well as taking up the stance that the caller is someone who can invite recognition via ‘it’s me’; it is a claim of entitlement. In Example (12), the caller is the elderly mother of the answerer.

Earlier I promised to return to the possibility that some callers might proceed more cautiously. So let us go to the most cautious ways of proceeding and then work our way back from there to the more risky, and forward from a simple ‘hi’ to the more cautious, keeping in mind what we are after: Given that the basic resources for referring to self and other, or to speaker and recipient, are dedicated words – ‘I/me’ and ‘you’ – how is self-reference done where these are not usable?

In Example (13), the caller is trying to reach Pat, a friend and colleague teacher whose house had burned down the previous day. She is calling the home of the friend’s parents, whom she doesn’t know and who don’t know her.

Example (13) RF, #180 (Schegloff 1979: #61)

1 ((ring))
 2 Ans: Hello..
 3 Pen: Pt. hh H:i. This is Penny Rankin
 4 from Lincoln.=I’m a friend of Pa:t’s.
 5 can I speak t’her at all?
 6 Ans: Su:re.

First of all, we may note that she does not simply ask to talk to Pat, though she will end this turn with such a request, qualified in a way that shows she is aware of the delicate state Pat may be in (‘at all’ conveys ‘even for just a little’). So one feature of the job this self-reference must do is to legitimate her access to the one being sheltered. How is it done?

The self-reference is done in two referring units, each of which has two components. The first referring unit is delivered as such by its framing with ‘This is ...’; the first referring expression is her name, delivered as first name and last name – not for them to be recognized (therefore not ‘This is

Penny'), but for delivery by the one who has answered to Pat, if indeed the answerer is prepared to be the instrument of access. The turn-constructural unit could have been possibly complete here – it is grammatically possibly complete, it has done a recognizable action, and is on its way to prosodic closure as well. But its prosody is at the last moment modified and extended to include 'from Lincoln'. 'Lincoln' is the name of the school at which she and Pat teach, and this is a name that *is* very likely a recognitional for her parents. So the first referring unit includes a name by which she (the caller) can be referred to in speaking to the target of the call, and a putative relationship to Pat via the work place.⁸

The second referential unit is built to say plainly what the first had only intimated – and that is her relationship to Pat: 'I'm a friend of Pat's'. This TCU is delivered cheek-by-jowl with the first; the speaker interdicts any possibility of the answerer getting to talk before this second instalment has been completed (marked in the transcript by the equal sign in the space between the prior unit and the following one). The upshot then is this: if the callers cannot present themselves or formulate themselves as recognizables – that is by name alone – then they can use a recognitional descriptor, one prototype of which is to formulate themselves by reference to someone who can be referred to by what is for this recipient a recognitional. Here, if you cannot (or will not) say 'this is Penny', you *can* say 'I'm a friend of Pat's'.

Another exemplar of the same sort follows, in (14):

Example (14) ID, #233 (Schegloff 1979: #63)

1 ((ring))
 2 Ire: Hello:,
 3 JsM: Hello, i- This is Jan's mother.
 4 Ire: Oh yes.
 5 JsM: Is Jan there by any chance?

Here, Irene is the mother of a 14-year-old girl, and the caller, after greeting her (line 3), starts to ask for her – the caller's – same-aged daughter; this is the 'i-' that follows the 'hello'. But she stops herself, and first tells who she is, and, with that, why she is entitled to ask this question and make this request (just as, in Example (13), Penny's self-presentation concerned, pre-eminently among other things, the grounds of her entitlement to make the request she is making, and, indeed, to make any claim on the answerer). Here there is no

⁸ I am tempted to push further and note that, though she gave her own first and last names, she gives the school only its first name. By this I mean that it is almost certainly 'Lincoln High School', but to say 'This is Penny Rankin from Lincoln High School' risks being heard as an official call like those in Examples (4) and (5). Referring to it, and her relationship to it, as 'from Lincoln' avoids such a sense, and is the way fellow teachers may refer to the place at which they teach.

giving of name. There is, however, the same practice of self-reference used in (13): a frame for self-identification, ‘This is’ and a recognitional reference and relationship term to the bearer of that recognitional reference, here ‘Jan’s mother’.

In these two instances, in common with the two business calls at (4) and (5), the callers have no self-referential recognitionals to use with their current recipients; the alternative is to refer to themselves by relationship to another for whom there *is* a recognitional. (This associative usage – referring to the referent by giving the referent’s relationship to another who can be referred to by a recognitional reference form – will be found in many other chapters of this volume.)

With Examples (15)–(17) we come to exchanges in which the callers can and do recognize their answerers, and are entitled to recognition from those answerers, but not necessarily from voice sample alone.

Example (15) (ID, #234a) (Schegloff 1979: #30)

1 ((ring))
 2 Bon: H’llo?
 3 Dav: Hi Bonnie. This is Dave.

Example (16) F, #164 (Schegloff 1979: #65)

1 ((ring))
 2 Chs: Hello.
 3 Gen: Charlie?=Gene.
 4 Chs: Oh, Hi=
 5 Gen: =The whole weekend I forgot to
 6 tell you, I have this book,

Example (17) MDE, Stalled

1 ((ring))
 2 Mar: Hello?
 3 Don: ‘lo Marcia,=[(‘t’s) D]onny.
 4 Mar: [Y e a :h]
 5 Mar: Hi Donny.
 6 Don: Guess what.hh
 7 Mar: What.
 8 Don: .hh My ca:r is sta::lled.

And so we find first a display (and not merely a claim) of having recognized the answerer, and then, either with or without the self-identificatory frame, a self-referral by first name alone. In the second and third of these instances, the two parts are compacted: no greeting term for the answerer or a compressed and truncated one, no self-identification frame for the caller or a compressed one, no break between the first name and the second. This is a signature form for either a re-call, that is calling back after having just talked, or for an opening

that displays from the very start the urgency of the business of the call (as is clear in (17)). With or without this compaction, there is no contingency here; the caller does not wait after the initial unit of their turn to see whether the answerer will recognize them, and in the case of (15) where there is no compaction, there is no evidence that answerer was prepared to display recognition before self-identification.

In the next group of instances, however, this is exactly what happens. Here, the callers greet their answerers together with what appear to be uncertain recognitions of their identity. I have argued elsewhere (1979), however, that these upward intonations are different from the ones that embody serious reservations as to the identity of the answerer. These instead provide minimally coercive opportunities for the answerer to recognize the caller without caller self-identification.⁹ In Examples (18) and (19), the recognition is evidenced by addressing the caller before caller self-identifies; in (20) the answerer's 'Oh hi' is apparently good enough for the caller; and in (21) and (22) the callers' addressing of the answerer as 'Mom' or 'Ma' can leave little doubt who the caller is.

Example (18) D, #231 (Schegloff 1979: #68)

1 ((ring))
 2 Ils: Hello:,
 3 Bet: H'Ilo Ilse?
 4 Ils: Yes. Be:ttty.

Example (19) JH, #86 (Schegloff 1979: #69)

1 ((ring))
 2 Dna: [Hello?]
 3 Jim: [Hello,]
 4 Jim: H'lllo, Donna?
 5 Dna: Oh. yeah, Hi Jim,

Example (20) CF, #153 (Schegloff 1979: #72)

1 ((ring))
 2 Chs: Hello.
 3 Max: Hello, Charlie?
 4 Chs: Oh, hi.
 5 Max: Hiya guyz
 6 Chs: Awrightz

⁹ More coercive forms are composed of the same package of greeting + address term, but with downward intonation (as in Example 24); this is almost in the same category as just 'Hi'. The upward intonation in the examples that follow in the text allows a simple confirmation as next turn.

Example (21) D, #296 (Schegloff 1979: #70)

1 ((ring))
 2 Ire: Hello:,
 3 Deb: Hello mo:m?
 4 Ire: Debbie?

Example (22) (RF, #179) (Schegloff 1979: #86)

1 ((ring))
 2 Mom: Hello:,
 3 Deb: Hello M::A?
 4 Mom: Ye:AH!=
 5 Deb: =It's me::.

So it is possible for caller to get recognized without self-reference and without having done a first turn that required recognition by answerer. In Examples (23) and (24) we hear two callers trying to bring this off, and in this connection it may be apt to introduce another practice of recipient design, one which is in a way a corollary of 'don't tell recipient what you ought to suppose s/he already knows; use it'. The corollary is: 'over suppose and under tell'. Its moral is: 'Better to credit your interlocutor with more than they know than to presume they know less than they do'. In (23) and (24) the callers over-suppose and under-tell, and turn out to have to tell more after all, although in (23) Linda protests that she had indeed recognized her caller; and in (24) Charlie as much as tells Joop that hearing from him is so unexpected that the solicitation of recognition had little chance of success.

Example (23) D, #212a (Schegloff 1979: #49)

1 ((ring))
 2 Lin: Hello:
 3 Bon: Hi Linda:
 4 (.)
 5 Bon: 's Bonnie.=
 6 Lin: =Yeh I know=I've been trying
 to call you a- all afternoon.

Example (24) CF, #145 (Schegloff 1979: #48)

1 ((ring))
 2 Chs: Hello?
 3 Jop: Hello Charles.
 4 (0.2)
 5 Jop: This is Joop.
 6 (.)
 7 Chs: Oh hello Joop.
 8 Jop: How are you heh heh
 9 Chs: Alr (hh)ight hah hah it's hh
 10 very funny to hear (hh) from you.

In these two examples, the callers provide a voice sample, and the name by which they are entitled to address the answerer, and wait to see if they can get recognized from those resources alone with no self-reference. We are dealing here with the simultaneous bearing of minimization and recipient design – whether for this recipient the speaker can achieve the relevant outcome, namely, recognition, with the most minimal reference term – zero, as had been done by the callers in Examples (18) to (22). Only the briefest of intervals is allowed for success to be achieved, and, when there is no recognition, the callers yield and provide self-identification by first name alone that succeeds – the minimization embodied in voice sample alone having been sacrificed for the achievement of recipient design.

A similar sort of test is run at another notch up the information scale. In the recently examined Example (20) the caller's 'Hello, Charlie?' was met with an 'Oh hi', and although there was no proof of recognition of the sort delivered by an address term, the 'Oh hi' was accepted by the caller as evidence of having been recognized, and he proceeds to the next sequence type due in the opening, a 'how are you'. It is worth noting the 'oh' that preceded that 'hi'; it is a common token of what Heritage (1984b) terms a 'change-of-state', marking the consequentiality of what has just preceded, in this case its furnishing that material for recognition.

In Examples (25) to (27) we get very similar starts to these conversations, except that the answerers' 'hi's in their second turns are not preceded by the change-of-state token 'Oh', and that appears to trigger for callers the possibility that they have not in fact been recognized. Notice that in each case, the caller subsequently tells who it is, with 'It's + FN', in effect treating the greeting as a mere courtesy and not as convincing evidence of having been recognized.

Example (25) ID, #275a (Schegloff 1979: #75)

1 ((ring))
 2 Bon: .hhh Hello:
 3 Bar: Hi Bonnie:
 4 Bon: Hi.=
 5 Bar: =It's Barbie.=
 6 Bon: =Hi.

Example (26) LL, #30 (Schegloff 1979: #76)

1 ((ring))
 2 Lau: H'ullo: ,
 3 (.)
 4 Mic: Hello, hi Laura,
 5 Lau: Hi:
 6 Mic: Howyadoin. it's Michael.
 7 Lau: Hi Michael, how are you:.

Example (27) ID, #246 (Schegloff 1979: #77)

1 ((ring))
 2 Jim: H'ello,
 3 Bon: Hello Jim?
 4 Jim: Hi-,
 5 Bon: Hi. it's Bonnie.
 6 Jim: Yeah I know

Then in Examples (28) to (31), instead of getting even an 'oh-less' 'Hi' to their 'greeting + upward-intoned address term' they get a confirmatory 'yeah', itself with upward intonation. Then note that in each case, when the caller self-identifies, there is a delay in registering recognition – in each of the specimens at line 6. So use of first name – the first self-reference form to carry information over and above the voice sample – is in these instances only barely sufficient to be met by recognition.

Example (28) JG, Supp. (Schegloff 1979: #78)

1 ((ring))
 2 Cat: Hello?
 3 Sta: Hi:. Cathy?
 4 Cat: Yeah?
 5 Sta: Stanley.
 6 (.)
 7 Cat: Hi Stan,

Example (29) JG, Supp. (Schegloff 1979: #90)

1 ((ring))
 2 Cat: Hello: ((weak))
 3 Lor: H'ello, Cathy?
 4 Cat: Yeah?
 5 Lor: This is Lorraine.
 6 (0.5)
 7 Cat: Oh hi honey, how[areya].

Example (30) LL, #31 (Schegloff 1979: #91)

1 ((ring))
 2 Lan: H'ello:,
 3 Bri: H'ello Lana?
 4 Lan: Yeah?
 5 Bri: This' Brigitte.
 6 (0.3)
 7 Lan: Hi:.:

Example (31) CF, #167 (Schegloff 1979: #92)

1 ((ring))
 2 Chs: Hello?
 3 Mar: Charles?
 4 Chs: Yeah?

5 Mar: Hi this's Marian.
 6 (0.2)
 7 Chs: Oh, hi:.

And, indeed, when callers get to that point – in these openings at line 5 – and give what appears to be still a single reference form but one with more information, as in Examples (32) and (33) where they formulate themselves with FN + LN, they get recognitions with no delay.

Example (32) CF, #177 (Schegloff 1979: #80)

1 ((ring))
 2 Mar: Hello?
 3 Ber: Hello, Mary?
 4 Mar: Yes?
 5 Ber: Hi. This is Bernie Hunter.
 6 Mar: Oh hello. How are you.

Example (33) NB, #109a (Schegloff 1979: #82)

1 ((called to phone))
 2 Ed: Hello:ε
 3 Guy: Eddy?
 4 Ed: Ye:h.
 5 Guy: Guy Huston.
 6 Ed: Hi Guy, howya doin.
 7 Guy: Fine.

So there is another bump up here. The first was from self-presentation without self-reference to self-reference by FN alone, and even that was borderline when the response to the caller's first turn had been merely confirmatory; those callers might be said to have barely gotten away with it. And we have just seen several callers who follow a 'yeah' reception of their first turn without even trying self-reference by first name alone, they go directly to FN + LN.

But just as there were instances where the caller greeted the answerer and waited for recognition, and when it was not forthcoming referred to themselves by FN, so are there callers who test the waters the same way at the next level up. In Examples (34) and (35), they proffer a just FN self-reference, and when there is not quick uptake, they add LN. And just as at (23) and (24) we found in one case the briefest of silences before the caller did a self-reference and in another a longer wait (0.2 seconds), so do we find them here. In Example (34), the caller waits half a second; in (35) there is virtually no silence, only an intonation contour that falls to a full stop at the end of the first name, and then immediately delivers the last name.

Example (34) LL, #25 (Schegloff 1979: #93)

1 ((ring))
 2 Lau: H'ullo:.

3 Pet: Laura,
 4 Lau: Ye:s,
 5 Pet: It's Peter.
 6 (0.5)
 7 Pet: Williams.
 8 Lau: HI: just a minute, let
 9 me close thee uh thing.

Example (35) (TAC, #121) (Schegloff 1979: #94) (no sound)

1 ((ring))
 2 Sus: Hello,
 3 Jud: Hi. Susan?
 4 Sus: Ye:s,
 5 Jud: This's Judith. Rossman.
 6 Sus: JUdith!

In both instances the recognition is betokened by an almost exuberant exclamation from the call-recipient, suggesting that the callers were right in their initial recipient design. In (35), it subsequently turns out that the caller has been away in South America for an extended period of time, and the call recipient has therefore not been oriented to her as 'a potential caller' (Schegloff 1979: 59, 75–6, note 46). Apparently herself orienting to this possibility, the caller has nonetheless tried to achieve recognition from just first name, but has monitored its reception at an exceptional level of granularity, along the following lines: She has, in her first turn at line 3, provided an expanded voice sample, and a display of being on a 'first name' basis with answerer, but has proceeded non-coercively, providing an opportunity at line 4 for answerer simply to confirm her identity; then caller provides a self-identification frame – 'this is', and then her two-syllable name. Given her relationship with answerer, caller may well orient to the possibility that all answerer should need (given all the preceding recognition resources) is the first syllable of the name – 'Jud' – and the greeting might occur in overlap with its second syllable.¹⁰ When the second syllable is delivered with no overlapping uptake, Judith is ready to deliver immediately the last name that would (under other circumstances) not have been necessary. And Susan's uptake may be understood to validate the analysis (both Judith's and the external analysts') – it is only because Judith's presence in the scene is unexpected and surprising that she was not recognized earlier.

¹⁰ I have, in the past, been sceptical about Davidson's claims (1984, 1990) about a so-called 'monitor space' in which a just-finishing speaker can monitor for an aligning or preferred response to the incipiently finishing turn in overlap with the last bits of the finishing turn and anticipate a dispreferred response if no such overlap occurs. Davidson proposed this for turns doing actions such as invitations, offers, requests and proposals, I remain unconvinced that the absence of overlap is so understood as a matter of course in such sequences. But such a monitor space may well be a feature of talk in which close attention is paid to how much of a current turn is needed before recognition of its speaker is achieved and welcomed.

Finally, we may note that, in both instances, the addition of the last name is done as an increment to the preceding turn constructional unit, rather than as a separate turn component.¹¹ This serves as a way of reconciling the claims of recipient design with those of minimization. In each case, the caller has taken up the stance that self-identification by first name alone should be enough to achieve recognition from this recipient. In each case the caller has found that their recipient-designed resource has failed to secure recognition and they add an additional resource. But by making that additional resource into an increment to the preceding turn-constructional unit, the self-reference is made to conform to the preference for minimization by being constituted by a single reference form, while slipping additional information into that single reference form. Therein we can see the joint operation of minimization and recipient design not only in an aggregate of exemplars, but in the moment-to-moment realization of particular instances. And we have here an even more elegant resolution of the apparent problem of concurrently satisfying the two preferences for minimization and recipient design than was found in previous work (Sacks and Schegloff, [this volume](#) and see Note 3) – more elegant in that recognition is achieved from what is brought off as a single reference form.

6.5 The mundane and not so mundane . . . and a conclusion

Most of what we have been looking at (and listening to, for those who have consulted the audio) is mundane, routine stuff – relationships being confirmed or slightly upgraded or downgraded by the supposedly routine bits of business of people’s ordinary lives. But these practices, resources and preferences inform quite un-ordinary and dramatic moments as well – moments in which one might have thought the parties had more than enough other things of moment to be oriented to. So let me end the empirical materials of this presentation with such an instance.

At the outset of this chapter, its topic was characterized as practices for a speaker’s referring to self in a distinctive locus of self-reference – ‘. . . saying or otherwise conveying who you are either to a question inquiring about it (“who are you?”, “who is this?”, etc.) or a sequential juncture which makes

¹¹ As described elsewhere (Schegloff 2001), an increment has the following features: (1) A speaker has brought a turn-constructional unit (TCU) and, with it, ordinarily a turn, to possible completion, pragmatically, grammatically and prosodically; (2) following this, there is further talk by the same speaker; and (3) that further talk is fashioned not as a new TCU, but as a continuation of the preceding TCU, most robustly by making it grammatically fitted to, or symbiotic with, that prior TCU, and, in particular, to *its end*. In linguistic terms, as Ford, Fox and Thompson put it (2002), it is fashioned as a ‘*constituent*’ of the preceding TCU; (4) the positioning of the vast majority of increments is either in the next beat following the possible completion of the TCU as is the last name in Example (35) or following a brief delay following the possible completion of the TCU.

addressing this undertaking relevant'. Until now we have examined only exemplars of self-reference in the second of these loci; so we end with one in which the 'who's this?' question is actually asked.

This is a telephone call from a radio station to a bank that they had heard was being robbed. We do not hear the ring, and we do not hear the answerer's first turn, which we must suppose was not the usual institutional self-identification, but something more like 'hello'. And then this:

Example (36) Bank Robbery

1 (no ring or answer recorded)
 2 WGN/Don: (Wh)'t's goin on out there. I understand
 3 y'got a robbery.
 4 (0.8)
 5 Robber: -> Uh yes. Who's this speaking please?
 6 WGN/Don: -> doubleyou, gee, en. ((WGN))
 7 (0.8)
 8 Robber: doubleyou gee en?
 9 WGN/Don: Yessir.
 10 (0.5)
 11 Robber: W'll this'z the robber.
 12 (0.2)
 13 Robber: 'r the so-so-called robber, I guess.
 14 WGN/Don: Whuddiyuh doin in there.
 15 {(1.8)/(.hhhhh)}
 16 Robber: Well I- (1.0) I just wanna tell you
 17 honestly, WGN, I- I tried to make it
 18 theeuh (1.2) the shortest way possible,
 19 en it's the wrong way.
 20 (0.8)
 21 WGN/Don: W'll what's going on now, sir.
 22 Robber: W'll I- I'm surround('d), en (0.5) at
 23 this moment I would like to uh (0.5)
 24 request that I have a (minister) because
 25 I'm going to take my li:fe,
 26 (0.8)
 27 WGN/Don: No, don't do tha:t. Wait a second.
 28 (1.0)
 29 WGN/Don: Are the police outside, er are they inside.=
 30 Robber: =Yeah. Just a secon.=
 31 WGN/Don: =What's going on there sir,
 32 this'z Don Harris again.
 33 Robber: Yeah=the- (.) they've surrounded the bank here.
 34 WGN/Don: Ye:s,
 35 (0.8)
 36 Robber: And uh:
 37 (1.2)
 38 Policel1 ((yelling)) Awright get 'em up,
 39 (0.2)
 40 Policel1: HOLD IT, RI:GHT THERE,
 41 (.)
 42 Policel1: FREE:ZE. (gu[:y],
 43 ((continues))

Whatever the answerer may have said upon answering the phone, it seems clear that the call was made ‘to the bank’. When the caller says (lines 1–2) ‘I understand y’got a robbery’, the ‘you’ is analysably hearable as ‘the-bank-as-represented-by-its-agent-who-has-answered’. When the answerer confirms the ‘my side telling’ (Pomerantz 1980), he does so diffidently with his ‘uh yes’ (line 4), for he knows he is not the one he has been taken to be. But before addressing that matter, he does as call-recipients do before proceeding to the business at hand: He asks who this is. ‘Who this is’ is, in one sense, Don Harris, as he says at line 32; but in another sense, the ‘who this is’ that ‘called the bank’ is ‘WGN-the-radio-station-as-represented-by-its-agent-who-has-called’. Furthermore, while there is no reason to believe that the questioner would recognize ‘Don Harris’, there is every reason to believe that he would recognize ‘WGN’ – which was at the time the CBS-affiliated radio station in Chicago, and one of that city’s major news stations.

With the caller’s self-reference confirmed (lines 8–9), the answerer now replies. No one has asked him who *he* is, but he knows he has been taken for ‘the-agent-of-a-bank-being-robbed’, and he knows that is incorrect; and he means to correct it. How should he say who he is? No one will recognize his name; he needs to say ‘who-he-relevantly-is-in-the-interaction-in-which-he-is-participating’. The caller has called about the bank’s robbery (‘I understand y’got a robbery’); the caller is ‘the media’; so filling in the missing slot in this scenario, he says ‘This’s the robber’.

Not ‘*a* robber’; ‘*the* robber’ – ‘the robber’ that goes with ‘the bank that’s having a robbery’ about which ‘WGN has called’. The contrast drawn in the preceding sentence is not my invention; it is the answerer’s doing. For he knows that although he is indeed ‘the robber’ for the episode being played out in his life for all the world to hear, he is not ‘*a* robber’. As he says, ‘or the so-called robber, I guess’. Hence, my title: ‘Conveying who you are: The presentation of self, strictly speaking’.

In this last exemplar, we can see how ‘recipient-design’ can have an import other than ‘personally recognizable’, but one grounded in the-course-of-action-implicated-by-recipient – that is, by reference to what the recipient is (taken to be) oriented to. Overwhelmingly (at least in the data so far examined) persons are most known to others – known in the sense of being recognizable – by name; and, just as name is the preferred form of recognitional reference for third party reference (Schegloff 1996a: 458–64), it is name that persons give from which to be recognized on a given occasion, or as a resource from which to be recognized on future occasions. But this may be filled out with institutional affiliation (as in (4) and (5)), intermediary linkages (as in (13) and (14)), the way they figure in recipient’s life (as in (10)), or in a course of action or context in which the parties are implicated

or to which they are oriented. Across the entire range of contingencies, what is wanted is the just-right-for-this-recipient-at-this-moment-of-this-interaction way of referring, implemented in a minimized reference form. And that is what is wanted whether the reference is to someone else or to the speaker her/himself.

7 Person reference in Yucatec Maya conversation

William F. Hanks

7.1 Construing persons

When speakers of any language make reference to objects, persons or events, they do so in terms of the social and linguistic categories of their communities. This is true both when they use standard semantic terms such as definite descriptions and when they use names or indexicals, with or without gestures. Moreover, in referring to a person as ‘Manuel’, ‘my friend from Yucatan’, ‘the guy with the white hat’, ‘your husband’, and so forth, the speaker unavoidably presupposes and activates background knowledge. This background knowledge is part of the perspective under which the speaker individuates the referent.

This practice of individuating under a perspective is what I have called *construal* (Croft and Cruse 2004; Hanks 2005; cf. Langacker 1987). In formulating a person with a descriptor, a name or a participant deictic, the speaker construes the person in a certain way. Indexical construal is a linguistically mediated, cognitively rich act and it must be studied at the token level. Construal unavoidably engages both the local context of utterance and the background of social common sense. It requires what Sachiko Ide (1985, 2005) has called ‘discernment’ (*wakimae*). The speaker must discern the appropriate perspective under which to construe the referent according to social norms that vary from language community to language community.

Research on informal conversation in US English suggests that in referring to persons, the simplest and most unmarked construal is the (first) name (Schegloff 1996a). The name appears to accomplish what we might call bare reference – that is, unmarked denotation without any special pragmatic effects. In Yucatec, I will argue, the unmarked construal of persons involves use of descriptions, especially ones formulated in terms of the referent’s social relations to Speaker (Spr) or Addressee (Adr). In many informal circumstances, the name is actually proscribed, such as when a man refers to the wife of his addressee as *‘a fàamilya* ‘your wife’ rather than by name, or when anyone refers to their own *compadre* or *comadre* using the ritual kin term. In cases like these, use of the simple name is effectively proscribed and perceived as a breach of etiquette. It is also potentially offensive to refer to a senior man

or woman without using the title *don*, *doña* before the name, or to refer to the recently deceased without using the corresponding epithet. In these respects, Yucatec usage appears different from English as described by Schegloff (1996a), but similar to Tzotzil (see Haviland, this volume), Tzeltal (see Brown, this volume) and Lao (Enfield, this volume). If no specific relational descriptions are available (e.g., the referent cannot be connected to the Spr or Adr through any of the mechanisms below), short forms of the name are sometimes used, provided that they are known. Among descriptions, kin relations are preferred, and if preliminary research is indicative, there is a hierarchy of kin relation types:

Consanguinity < ritual co-parenthood < affinity < other

This ordering functions in talk as a preference hierarchy for formulating reference to persons. It is motivated not by semantic or pragmatic simplicity, but by the normative expectation that in referring to a person, one should express recognition of the status of the person, including social ties that bind that person to one or another of the current participants. If two or more kin relations obtain, the hierarchy predicts which relation should be the basis of the description. Like Japanese *wakimae*, appropriate usage relies upon the mostly automatic sense of what is called for and like proper use of honorifics in Japanese, person reference in Yucatec accomplishes several things simultaneously: (1) discernment of what is called for, (2) the display of the speaker's assessment of the current situation as one calling for a certain usage (see Sidnell 2003), (3) individuation under a perspective, that is construal, (4) activation of social knowledge (thereby reinforcing it and reproducing it). Roughly speaking, the more interactants know about the persons they refer to, the more possible ways they could formulate the reference and the more important it is to discern the appropriate way.

In earlier work, I have argued that most interactive situations support multiple deictic construals of objects. Moreover, there is no single trans-contextual hierarchy of functions that predicts which deictic a speaker must select in a given situation. Consequently, the selection of a deictic performs several kinds of interactive work simultaneously, even in unmarked usages (Hanks 2005). The construal of persons does not always involve use of deictic expressions. Nonetheless, it is always indexical in the broader sense that it is sensitive to the speaker-addressee relation and the social status of the referent, to the social circumstances of the talk and to the frames of relevance currently active in the discourse. Unmarked, expectable (automatized) forms of indexical reference are functionally complex, even if they do not trigger the special inferences and effects of marked usage (cf. the Haviland and Enfield chapters in this volume). Similarly, I will argue,

situated construals of person, even the automatized usages that follow the hierarchy, accomplish several kinds of interactive work simultaneously. In what follows, we start by outlining the linguistic resources for person reference in Yucatec, and then proceed to interactional sequences in which they are used.

7.2 Ways of referring to persons in Yucatec

The basis of the current section is extended participant observation in Yucatec, as well as metalinguistic discussions with adult Yucatec speakers. We will start with kinship terms, because they appear to be the most pragmatically unmarked way of making reference to mutually known persons in ordinary conversation among consociates. In earlier work, I have shown that social relations have a pervasive effect on communicative practice in Yucatec, especially in the domestic field, in which norms of avoidance, deference and authority constrain interaction in multiple ways (Hanks 1990). The same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, of most of ordinary Yucatec conversation outside the household. Relations of consanguinity, affinity, solidarity and relative status between participants and referents are part of interaction under all sorts of circumstances. It is in fact difficult to navigate most Yucatec conversations without a basic grasp of the kinship relations among the parties and anyone they mention. The motivation for this fact is social: It is because the social relations crystallized in kinship are important that they are attended to, and for that reason that speakers use them.

In my fieldwork in the Oxkutzcab region of Yucatan, I have found that most people are aware of a wide set of consanguine and affinal kin in their own generation, including their cousins to at least the second degree, their cousins' spouses and perhaps their siblings and children. At the same time, the historical depth of their awareness tends to be limited to the generation of their grandparents. By 'awareness' in this context, I mean that Sprs know their kinsmen by name and relation (e.g., 'my father's uncle Tito Canul Balam'), whether they have any further direct knowledge. Many kinsmen are known from shared sociality on occasions such as ritual feasts, novenas, marriages, deaths and the like. Residence patterns reinforce the relations between brothers, who co-reside canonically in extended patrilocal households that include each brother with his spouse and children, along with the men's senior parents. The same system of residence cuts women away from their natal families, making interaction with wife's or mother's parents and kin relatively rare. Nevertheless, such relations are inflected with deference and respectful demeanor, and the persons are treated as specific kin to whom recognition is due. Some of the commonly used kin terms are illustrated in (1) (for further description see

Bricker 1970; Hanks 1990:100ff; Redfield and Villa Rojas 1962; Villa Rojas 1978).¹

(1) Kinship terms

<i>'in-tiyo</i>	'my uncle'
<i>'in-láak'</i>	'my relatives (especially siblings)'
<i>'in-sukú'un</i>	'my elder brother'
<i>'in-fáamilya</i>	'my wife'
<i>'in-ihos</i>	'my sons, children'
<i>'u-papah Milo</i>	'Milo's father' (Spanish etymology)
<i>'u-tàata Milo</i>	'Milo's father' (Mayan etymology)
<i>'in-sóobrinno Juan'</i>	'My nephew Juan'
<i>tz'oká'an u-bèel in-sukú'un</i>	'My elder brother is married'

As is evident in (1), many of the commonly used kin terms are of Spanish origin. For the most part they are used in standard ways, with the exception of *'fáamilya'*, which, in Maya, designates 'wife'. Kin terms are inalienably possessed and non-vocative use without possessor gets marked with the suffix *-tsil*, as in *untúul tàata-tsil* 'a father'. There are also what might be called 'nick kin terms' sometimes used for spouses, parents or children, often to humorous affect.

(2) Nick kin terms

<i>'in xnoh wíinik</i>	'my fem. great human (my wife)'
<i>'in xnuk t'úul</i>	'my fem. great rabbit (my wife)'
<i>'im byèeho/byèeha</i>	'my old man/old lady (my fa or hus/my mo or wife)'
<i>'ink'uk'</i>	'my buds (my children, male speaker)'

In Mexican society, particularly the indigenous sector, there is an elaborate system of ritual co-parenthood called *compadrazgo*. Originally derived from

¹ Yucatec Maya consonant phonemes are: /p, t, k, ' , p' , t' , k' , b, s, x, h, tz, ch, tz' , ch' , m, n, w, y, l, r/, where /' / = glottal stop following a vowel and glottalization following a consonant, /b/ = voiced bilabial implosive, /x/ = voiceless alveo-palatal fricative, /h/ = voiceless glottal fricative, /tz(') / = (ejective) voiceless alveolar affricate and /ch(') / = (ejective) voiceless palatal affricate. Syllable nuclei are made up of combinations of five vowels (i, e, a, o, u), three tones (high <'>, mid [no accent], low <'>), length and glottalization. Length is indicated by the doubling of a vowel and glottalization is indicated by an intervocalic glottal stop <'>. The canonical vocalic patterns are /i, e, a, o, u/, /í, ée, áa, óo, úu/, /ii, èe, àa, òo, ùu/, /í'í, é'e, á'a, ó'o, ú'u/. However, short vowels with tones also occur and are either derived by grammatical processes or by paralinguistic ones. Note that glottalization is also realized as creaky voice or even by eliminating the glottal stop completely. The latter case results in a long vowel with high- to mid-falling pitch but remains distinct from (nonglottalized) high tone series /í, ée, áa, óo, úu/ which is pronounced variably with rising or falling pitch.

Spain in the colonial period, *compadrazgo* in Yucatan developed into a highly productive system that multiplies the social relations between individuals. Like the Christian godparent, the *compadre* sponsors a child at a ritually significant rite of passage, such as baptism or marriage. The result is a five-way relation in which the sponsor and his or her spouse become *padrino/padrina* ‘godfather/mother’ to the *’a’ihàado* ‘godchild’ and *compadre/comadre* ‘co-father/mother’ to the legal parents. Of the several relations implied, it is the one between co-parents that is the most significant. Co-parents address and refer to one another with reciprocal *’compadre/comadre*. In fact, once the relation is created, they strictly avoid using unadorned proper names in reference or address to one another. The two couples normatively help and stand by one another financially as well as emotionally. The relation to the godchild is considerably less significant, although the two continue to address and refer to one another using the terms *padrino/’a’ihàado* rather than simple names. The occasions at which *compadres* are created in Yucatan include *hetzmèek* ‘christening’, baptism, first communion, marriage and an evidently broad range of other events (Farriss 1984: 258). Unlike the core kinship terms based on consanguinity or affiliation, *compadre* terms do not get marked with the *-tsil* suffix in non-possessed, non-vocative uses.

(3) Compadre terms

<i>’in compadre</i>	‘my compadre’
<i>’a comadre</i>	‘your comadre’
<i>’im padrino</i>	‘my godfather’
<i>’in ’a’ihàado</i>	‘my godson’

When a known *compadre* relation links a human referent to either of the speech act participants, this relation is the preferred basis of locally initial reference to the person. This applies to the godparent-godchild relation as well. Hence the godchild will refer to godparent not by proper name or name plus title, but by *’im padrino/padrina* ‘my godfather/godmother’. The godparent in turn refers to the child not by simple name, but as *’in ’a’ihado/a’ihada*, ‘my godson/goddaughter’. In general, proper names are strongly avoided between the ritual parents and the avoidance is weaker in reference to the child, for whom parents often use the simple first name. Ritual kin terms are used all the more compulsively when solidarity or help are needed, or in ritual contexts, including social visits and *fiestas*.

The next major class of expressions is proper names. Names may be used to augment kinship expressions for referential specificity, as in *’in-compadre Manuel* ‘my-co-father Manuel’ or *’inw-îits’in Lol* ‘my-younger brother Lol’. Alternatively, if kinship relations are inapplicable, the name may be used. Schegloff (1996a) suggests that these are the preferred and simplest referring

expressions in informal English, but we have already seen that for Yucatec there are whole classes of contexts in which it is kin terms that are unmarked. The reason is not that kin terms are semantically simple, but that they express respect and recognition to the relation they designate. Consequently, interactants attend to their kinship relations to one another and between themselves and any third parties to whom they refer. Moreover, the pragmatically unmarked usage is not functionally simple, what Schegloff (1996a) called ‘reference simpliciter’, but combines the indexical effect of displaying respect for kin *plus* the referential effect of picking out the individual. For the same reason, use of the plain proper name under many ordinary circumstances would not accomplish mere reference, but a more complex act: reference *plus* the noteworthy absence of recognition of kin.

Despite their apparent semantic paucity, names convey a great deal of information.² In Yucatec, there are multiple forms of personal names, from the full official polynomial (Marcos Manuel Ix Balam) to the abbreviated name (Manuel Ix, Manuel) or in-group nick name (Tigre ‘tiger’). Given multiple names for any individual, choice of any one unavoidably indexes something about the situation. Full polynomial names are rarely used outside of official contexts, whereas nicknames are usually used in gossip or in reference to persons well known to Spr (or Spr and Adr). Full names are semantically rich: the individual’s given name that indexes gender and birth day, followed by the father’s father’s name, and the mother’s father’s name. This is illustrated in (4).³

(4) Polynomial proper names

[Given name(s) + Fa’s Fa’s name + Mo’s Fa’s name]

Manuel Castillo Euan

Margarita Hoil Kanche

Alfonso Contreras Canul

Sebastian Castillo Mo’

Victor Ix Ek’

Marcos Manuel Contreras Ix

Mario Francisco Contreras Dzul

In effect, the given names in first position (and second position if there are two) designate the individual and the following ‘family’ names designate the union of which the individual is born. Parents’ identity is indexed by patronym, with

² Shanker (2001) presents a useful synthesis of the linguistic and philosophical debates regarding names, and a context-based approach to their meaning.

³ Selection of first name is guided at least in part by the name of the saint corresponding to the day on which the individual was born. This bit of astrologically relevant information is used by shamans in the course of ritual treatments, in which it facilitates diagnosis as well as treatment of patients.

father's preceding mother's. For example, Manuel Castillo Euan's father was Sebastian Castillo Mo, and his mother was Dimitria Euan Poot. Sebastian's father was Santos Castillo Dzul, and his mother was Gloria Mo Ba. From his father Sebastian gets the name Castillo (which he in turn got from his father) and from his mother he gets the name Mo (which she in turn got from her father). Manuel then gets the name Castillo from his father Sebastian, and Euan from his mother Dimitria (who in turn got the name from her father). It follows that the father's name persists from generation to generation whereas mother's names are passed only to their own offspring. In the same way, when full polynomial names are shortened, as they usually are, it is the mother's name that is omitted. For example, Manuel Castillo Euan would often be referred to as Manuel Castillo, but never Manuel Euan. Women retain their natal names at marriage, so that Margarita Hoil Kanche retains this name after she marries Manuel Castillo Euan and their children become Castillo Hoil (shortened to Castillo). Her children do not inherit Margarita's mother's father name, Kanche. This loss of the mother's name is consistent with the fact that, in the dominant patrilocal residence pattern, women lose contact with their natal families.⁴

These terse remarks should suffice to make the point that proper names are very rich with genealogically relevant information. In their full forms at least, they have more in common with kinship terms than with pronouns, in the sense that they invariably encode information about relatedness. There are also phonologically reduced forms of the first name, usually monosyllabic or disyllabic, like those shown in (5).

(5) Reduced forms of first names

Florencio	Lol
Feliciano	Féliz
Dolores	Dol
Margarita	Margót
William	Wil
Leticia	Leyti
Fidelia	Fi
Alfonso	Pónso
Antonia	Toni
Emilio	Milo

Among people who see one another often and who are on familiar footing, the shortened first names are the best candidates for a preferred form of name.

⁴ The parallel between loss of the woman's name and her loss of relations to her natal family was spelled out to me precisely by Manuel Castillo [2.A.400. 1/22/05], suggesting it is something of which adults are quite aware.

If called for, they may be accompanied by titles, as in *Don Lol*, *Doña Toni*, *Don Ponso*, and they may co-occur with the shortened family name, with or without the title: Don Ponso Uitzil, Doña Toni Mo, Lol Ik, Milo Couoh. In my experience, the reduced first name variant is the one that also enters into reputation, and well-known senior men and women are widely known only by title plus first name – for example, Don Ponso (Uitzil), Don Juan (Chi).

There are a couple of titles indexed to life stages. The first is the ubiquitous *don/doña* title, from the Spanish. Like the *compadre* relations, use of this title is much more robust in spoken Yucatec Maya than in peninsular Spanish. Once a woman has a child she is well on the way to becoming a *doña*, and this status becomes more secure with a second child and as she ages. A woman over about forty years with grown children and grandchildren is always a *doña* to non-kin, whereas her husband will use her shortened name and her children and other kin will use kin terms, as in *inchüich* ‘my grandmother’ or ‘*intiya* ‘my aunt’, ‘*incuñada* ‘my sister-in-law’. The terms *don/doña* are usually used with the first name, or first name plus family name(s). Once married, a woman becomes a *señora* ‘missus’, and this term is usually used without any name, or followed by the family name(s). Compare *Doña Toni*, *Doña Toni Mo*, *Señora Mo*, **Doña Mo*, **Señora Toni*. The use of forms like *Señora Mo* and *Señor Uitzil* indexes a Spanish dominant speaker and also suggests that the person so denoted is unfamiliar or socially distant from the interactants. Among Maya dominant speakers, both *doña* and *señora* can be used as simple nouns, as in: *le señòrá o* ‘that lady’, *le dòoñá o* ‘that lady’. The corresponding masculine forms are not used in my experience. Use of either form implies that the Spr does not know the name of the woman referred to, nor any of her potentially relevant kin relations (just as use of the name implies that the referent is not a kinsman of the speaker).

Another, less commonly used qualifier is the one for the deceased, ‘*ánimas*. Derived from the Spanish ‘soul’, or the church bells played at dusk, ‘*ánimas* combines with any of the foregoing ways of formulating persons, including any of the name forms or kin expressions, as in (6).

(6) Referring to deceased persons

‘ <i>ánimas Don Ponso</i>	‘deceased Don Ponso’
‘ <i>ánimas im papah</i>	‘my deceased father’
<i>le ‘ánimas o</i> ’	‘the deceased’
* <i>untúl ‘ánimas tàatatzil</i>	*‘a deceased father’
* <i>le ‘ánimas dòoñá o</i> ’	*that deceased lady’

Use of the ‘*ánimas* element is strongly preferred for reference to the recently deceased. If the individual is the object of sustained discussion, the ‘*ánimas* element is used initially, but is subject to deletion in subsequent references. Thus in an extended discussion of the deceased friend of the Adr, ‘*ánimas Don*

Chabo becomes *Don Chabo*, and ‘*ánimas‘impapah* ‘my deceased father’ or ‘*ánimas‘apapah* ‘your deceased father’, become simply ‘my/your father’, depending on the relations between the interlocutors. This form is commonly combined with possessed kinship terms and names, with or without other titles, but is apparently not combined with unpossessed kin terms, descriptions or nicknames.

There are many nicknames, which are more pragmatically marked, often humorous, and not accompanied by titles. These may be diminutive forms of the given name (long form or reduced), or they may be descriptions. Descriptive nicknames are related to reputation and encode some memorable or humorous attribute of the referent, as in (7).

(7) Nick names

Teresita (<*Teresa*), *Chabito* (<*Chabo* < *Sebastian*)

Potro ‘Stud’ (of man with reputation for promiscuity)

Polok tzo ‘chubby domestic turkey’ (young boy dubbed by young men)

Wixom ‘Pisser’ (hammock-wetting boy dubbed by another boy)

Tigre ‘Wildcat’ (man in 20’s known for brawling)

Barbudo ‘Bearded one’ (of adult man with large beard)

Enano ‘Midget’ (of small young boy by parents)

Gordis ‘Chubby’ (of formerly plump young boy by parents)

Pak ‘it ‘Ass pluggger’ (of adult man who repairs buckets)

Other nicknames appear to be nonsense syllables with highly particular spheres of usage, as in (8).

(8)

Chiki (young girl by mother)

Kib (man in 20’s by co-workers and consanguines)

Speaking roughly, nicknames index jocular familiarity with the referent, and usually presuppose that all current participants know the person referred to. That is, they tend to be used in informal, recognitional reference. Given the implied familiarity, they are not used if the person referred to is the object of deference or *respeto* ‘respect’ from Spr.

In addition to the foregoing resources for person reference, there are indefinitely many ways that a person may be formulated. Some examples are shown in (9).

(9)

‘inw-éetmeyah ‘my co-worker’

‘im-paysano ‘my countryman’

<i>u-yùumil</i>	‘the principal (agent of an act), owner, father, lord’
<i>unùul ‘àak’il-il</i>	‘a person from Akil’
<i>le mekàaniko</i>	‘the mechanic’
<i>le nohoch máak o</i>	‘the big person (by age or status)’
<i>le ‘oótzil máak o</i>	‘the poor guy’

7.3 Situated construals of third parties

In conversation, speakers select one or another of the foregoing ways to formulate a person in referring to him or her. This selection requires that the speaker construe the referent under a perspective, be it a name, kin relation or other description. Speakers’ choices are conditioned by various factors, starting with what they know about the person, and what knowledge they attribute to their addressee. This horizon of background knowledge is a key part of what members of any social formation share, albeit partially. For an ethnographer the question is simply, what do people tend to know about one another, and of their common knowledge, which bits are mobilized in recognitional reference, and which ones avoided? Given that multiple construals are often available, how do speakers select the one to use? There are several factors involved. One is referential adequacy: A successful construal must be sufficiently precise to individuate the referent, at whatever level of specificity is required in context. If a speaker has multiple uncles, ‘my uncle’ may be referentially inadequate and therefore augmented by the first name ‘my uncle Tito’. But this is only a small part of the story, since the speaker must also discern what is normatively called for under the current circumstances. When referring to persons, it is proper in Yucatec to display recognition of their status and kin relations, particularly if the referent is of higher status than the Spr or Adr. This gives rise to kin terms and titles in many situations where an English speaker would use the simple name. Moreover, it forces the question of *which* kin relation is selected, since any individual is defined by multiple relations (e.g., Manuel is brother to Lol, husband to Margot, father to Felix, son to Don Chabo, uncle to José, brother-in-law to Anastasia, *compadre* to Wil). As indicated at the outset of this chapter, there appears to be a hierarchy of kin relations such that consanguinity overrides *compadrazgo*, which overrides affinity.

The use of kin terms further requires that the speaker select the propositus of the kin relation.⁵ For example, if José is talking with Margot about Manuel, he must discern whether to construe him as ‘my uncle’, ‘your husband’ or someone else’s relation. The hierarchy of relation types intersects with the situational relevance of the propositus. There are at least two sources of relevance in this sense: (1) the participation framework, including centrally the Spr-Adr relation, and (2) the discourse context including prior and

⁵ The term ‘propositus’ designates the individual to whom the kin relation is anchored. In ‘John’s brother’, John is the propositus.

co-occurrent talk. Insofar as speakers are expected to display recognition of their own kin relations to referents, the Spr tends to be the propositus (cf. Brown's chapter). Thus, in talking to Margot, José will refer to Manuel as 'my uncle' rather than 'your husband', and in talking to Lol he will refer to Manuel as 'my uncle' rather than 'your brother'. In these cases, selection of the propositus determines the kin relation, with the result that affinity may override consanguinity. The discourse context may also be critical in resolving an otherwise vague expression: Manuel, the Spr, may have several sisters-in-law, but if his brother Lol is the topic of talk, 'my sister-in-law' will be understood to pick out Lol's wife apart from the others. Similarly, if Don Chabo issues a directive to his son Manuel regarding Margot, he may refer to her as 'your wife' rather than 'my daughter-in-law'. Thus the actual construal of persons in context results from the intersection of at least two major principles, the hierarchy of relation types and the selection of the propositus according to local relevance. In this section, I will illustrate the working of these principles at the token level, based on preliminary findings of ongoing research.

Given the complexity of person construal, it is heuristically useful to restrict the class of uses we examine (cf. Introduction to this volume). First, we narrow the field to cases in which the speaker assumes that the addressee knows the individual referred to and can identify him based on the formulation used. Such uses are what Schegloff (1996a) calls 'recognitional' because the referent is accessible in the mutual knowledge of the participants. The second restriction is that we follow Schegloff (1996a) in focusing on locally initial occurrences. Locally initial person reference is the first reference to the person in the conversational sequence, in effect introducing the person into the discourse. The rationale here is that after first introduction, subsequent references to the person are subject to minimization. The name, descriptor or noun phrase may be reduced to a pronoun or other anaphoric device, or even deleted when recoverable. Such reduction applies to many sorts of reference and description, and is by no means limited to person reference. We focus on locally initial instances of person reference to mitigate the otherwise confounding effects of minimization.

In (10) I have phoned my *comadre*, Doña Dolores, whose husband (my *compadre*) has recently arrived in the Chicago area from where I am calling. We have known each other for over twenty years. Early in the conversation I ask if she has any news from 'my *compadre*' (her husband), and she tells me he is fine (line 2). She then shifts topic from my *compadre* to another man, her nephew, who has just returned to Oxkutzcab from Chicago. In line (3) she refers to the nephew for the first time as 'my nephew', and goes on to say that with his return to Oxkutzcab, *compadre* would remain in Chicago 'with his companions' (line 6). Note that she could just as well have referred to her nephew as the nephew of her husband, as my *compadre*'s nephew, as her brother's son, by name, or as 'that guy I told you about several weeks ago'.

Her reference to the man as ‘my nephew’ illustrates the preference for using first-degree kinship relations as the basis of construal. By contrast, her subsequent reference to her husband’s roommates as ‘his companions’ implicates that they are not kinsmen, since if they were, she would have used a kin term. Presupposing that I have understood all these, she goes on to quote the nephew in line (18), in which he refers to her husband as ‘my uncle’. Thus the example illustrates locally initial recognitional reference to the nephew (line 3) followed by a chain of non-initial references in which the perspective taken on the nephew shifts from ‘my nephew’ to a third-person pronoun (he told me), and then to a speaker who construes Doña Dolores’s husband as ‘my uncle’. The nephew’s construal displays respectful recognition of the avuncular relation, and it would be highly marked for him to have referred to his uncle by simple name or by any kin term other than the avuncular one. Doña Dolores’s quote of his utterance in turn conveys to me both the nephew’s proper respect and her current assumption that I recognize who the nephew is.⁶

(10) Uncles and nephews

- 1 WH *hmm, (1.0) pero tooh yool?*
Hmm, but is he OK?
- 2 Do1 *pwes grásyas dyòos e', tooh yóoh. TooH yóol kyáa ten ((2*
syll unintell))
Well, thank God, he’s OK. He’s OK he told me
- 3 *má'alo' pwés ((unintell)) 'óoneàak, 'esteh hó'olheák hk'uch*
ADJ PART DTEMP PART DTEMP PST V
Good well last night um yesterday arrived
in sóobrinó.
A1 N
My nephew
OK, so last night, um, yesterday **my nephew** arrived
- 4 WH (1.5) *mhmm.*
- 5 Do1 *k'uch in sóobrinó á las tàa tyóo'l u ki p'áat tuhùn*
(1.0) *le ti' bey*
My nephew arrived in the aftern-, so he’s staying there
alone, him
- 6 *tée yéteI u chukáanoob o' =*
DLOC RN B3 N TD
There with his companions there
with **his companions**
- 7 WH =*mbi'*
- 8 Do1 *le t sóobrinó e' kutàah,*
It (was) our nephew (who) came
- 9 WH *hàah=*
Yeah
- 10 Do1 *tàah 'esteh hó'olheák h k'uch i'. (.) 'óoxkuzcàab'.*
He came um, yesterday he arrived (.) (In) Oxkutzcab.

⁶ Names of places and persons have been changed to preserve anonymity. Key portions of the examples have interlinear morphemic breakdowns and word-for-word glosses.

- 11 WH 'áam béey (119)
Oh really?
- 12 DoI hàah, 'òonéak
Yeah last night
- 13 WH 'áah sùn nah, sùn nah 'óoxkutzcab? (120)
Oh, he returned, he returned to Oxkutzcab?
- 14 DoI sùn nah ih, mín trèes meses bin kán u bèet eh, kuká 'asùut
tol o'.
He returned. About three months reportedly he'll do, (and then) he
returns over there.
- 15 WH Hmm.
- 16 DoI bèey tyáa ten
So he told me
- 17 WH mhm.
- 18 DoI síi hóol leh kubin e' kyáak e' pwos, toh yóol **in tiyoo** kih
PART DTEMP A3 V TD A3 V TD PART ADJ A3N A1 N QUOTE
Yes yesterday he goes he says well straight his heart my uncle
Yeah, yesterday he goes and says, so 'My uncle's OK', he says, 'he's
- 19 má 'alob' kih tz'ú tz'á'al e meyah tí' o' kih ku. Ku bèeteh kih.
good, he says. 'He's found work', he says, 'He's he's doin'
it' he says.
- 20 'ábusàado ki e, pwes séeb tu kan eh kih =
'He's quick', he says, 'so he's learning fast' he says.
- 21 WH =mhm.
- 22 DoI mmm. Ku túuxtá'a bin tak u t'óox (,) bóolantes bin téé
káayesó'ob o'.
Mmm. He gets sent reportedly even to hand out flyers
reportedly there in (the) streets. [Tel.1.A 09:31]

In line (18) Dolores quotes what her nephew told her by way of news from up north. The nephew automatically refers to her husband as 'my uncle' and not by name or some other description. His usage is the reciprocal of hers, and like her, he displays his attentiveness to the kin relation between himself and the referent by using the kin term. Note that he construes the referent according to his own relation to him (my uncle), and not to his Adr's relation (your husband) (cf. Brown's chapter). At line (22) Dolores continues her report to me of what she learned. Evidently my *compadre* was settling into a job, and was even sent to pass out flyers for a restaurant. When she says this I misunderstand and take her to mean her nephew was passing out flyers, from which I erroneously infer that he was doing this in Oxkutzcab Yucatan, not in Chicago. My confusion provokes laughter and she corrects my misunderstanding of whom she is talking about. 'No, (I mean) your *compadre* in Chicago' (line 23). Once again she could have named her husband or referred to him as 'my husband' but these alternatives would have been awkward because they exclude me. By contrast, construing him as 'your *compadre*' allows her to simultaneously clarify the reference and display recognition of the *compadre* relation that binds me to her husband.

(11) 'No, I mean your compadre'

- 23 Dol (130) ((laughing)) *máa*. 'a *kómpàadreh* =
 NEG A2 N
 No. Your compadre
 No, **your compadre** [Tel.1.A 10:07]
- 24 WH = 'áhm *bwéénoh* =
 Oh OK
- 25 Dol =le *tí' ku - kumáan ut'òox bóolàantes té' ichi*., 'ichi
chikàagó o'
 He's the one going around handing out flyers over there in, in Chicago.
 [Tel.1.A 10:16]

The next Example (12) was produced several minutes later in the same phone conversation. Wrapping up a story about my *compadre* in Chicago, she quotes him at length and then makes the transition to a new topic in line (3). There are two noteworthy features of Dolores's utterance. Firstly, she refers to my wife, whose name she knows well, as 'my *comadre*'. Secondly, she refers to my daughter Madeleine by name. Her use of the *comadre* form here illustrates the same preference that motivates the preceding tokens. Once a *compadre* relation is established between two couples, they address and refer to one another with *compadre* terms thereafter. Simple names are proscribed, especially when talking to any of the other three in the relation. Dolores's use of my daughter's first name illustrates one class of uses in which the name does appear to be the basic preferred form, namely when adults make reference to children, whether their own or those of kin. Given that I am *padrino* to her son, but she is not *madrina* to my daughter, she has no formal relation to Madeleine. Were she Madeleine's *madrina*, the most usual way of construing her would be 'my god daughter ('*in'a'ihàada*)'. Under the present circumstances, use of the first name befits Madeleine's juvenile status and also displays that Dolores knows my daughter's name.

(12) 'And how is my comadre?'

- 1 Dol ... le *tyáalik ten o'* [Tel.1.A 11:14]
 ... that's what he tells me
- 2 *háah*
 Yeah
- 3 Dol *hé'el o' kú'un ((kux túun)) 'in komaadreh,*
 OSTEV TD PART A1 N
 There it is What about my comadre
 There we go, and what about **my comadre,**
- má'alo' 'anih? (.) máagdaleena?*
 ADJ V B3 N

Good is Madeieline
Is she OK? **Madeleine**?

4 WH 'éstèeh (.) *bwénoh máagdalèená tí'an bòoston e*
Ah, Mad is in Boston. [Tel.1.A 11:26]

The next example is taken from a conversation between myself and the younger brother of another godchild of mine, in a different family. My interlocutor is named Juan Antonio and his elder brother's name is Diego, to whom I am *padrino*. Juan is about twenty-five years old and living far away from his natal family, who are in a small settlement in southern Yucatan. After opening exchanges about previous attempts to talk, Juan reports a phone conversation he had had the day before with his family. He learned that Diego had gotten married. This had taken place earlier than scheduled, which is why I express surprise. At line (11) he construes Diego as 'my elder brother' as opposed to 'your godson' or 'Diego', either of which would be equally precise (since he has only one elder brother, I have only one godson in the family, and we both know his name).

(13) 'My elder brother got married'

- 1 WH *Juan?*
Juan?
- 2 Juan *'ééh wíil*
Hey, Wil!
- 3 WH *'ééh bix awanih?*
Um, how are you?
- 4 Juan *má'alob' ((unintell)) sí tint'anech 'anòche ká tinwú'uy*
(unintell)
Good (unintell) yeah, I called you last night when I heard
(unintell)
- 5 *péro mín tz'óok ((unintell)) tz'úsáasta kàasi 'úul*
timbèeta timmeya:h
but I think already (unintell). It was almost dawn when I returned
from work
- 6 WH *hàah*
Yeah
- 7 Juan *bix awanih tèech* How are you?
- 8 WH *pwes chan má'alob', má'alob kux túun tèech*
Well, pretty good, good, how about you?
- 9 Juan *má'alo' má'alo' ðyòos bóotik hàhal ðyòose má' hach táah má'alobi'*
Good, good, thank True God. Not really great,
- 10 *pero má'alo' ((laugh)) (2.0) hàah. Mín hó'olhéak h t'anen*
yéet inwòotoch
but good. Yeah, I think it was yesterday I spoke with home
- 11 *ht'anahen tinwotoch tinwú'uyik tíoo tz'óok ubèel in*
PST V B1 DAT A1 N PST A1 V DAT V A3 N A1
I spoke to my home I heard from them finish his road my

- suku'un** tuláakal
 N RN
 Elder brother everything
 I called my house and heard from them, **my older brother** got married
 and all
- 12 WH *bixih tz'óok ubin?*
 What? He left-?
- 13 Juan *tz'óok ubèeli*
 He got married
- 14 WH *'áan*
 Oh
- 15 Juan *tz'óok ubè:1, sí tz'óok ubèl le máa:k a'* [Tel.1.A 33:01]
 He's married, yup this guy's married.

The strip of talk in (14) is from several exchanges later in the same conversation, when Juan is recounting to me what his elder brother had said when they spoke. It turns out that Diego had videotaped his wedding and was sending a copy of it to Juan. Reporting this to me, Juan quotes Diego as telling him to give the videotape to me, his *padrino*, if we see one another. Notice that Diego could well have referred to me by name since I have been close to the family for over twenty years, yet to do so would have been a failure to display the *padrino* relation to me. Regardless of what Diego actually said to Juan, Juan's sense of propriety leads him to report it to me with the *padrino* form. This is a gesture of considerateness to me, to make me feel included and to display my godchild's attentiveness to the *padrino* relation.

(14) 'Give this to my godfather if you see him'

- 16 Juan *péro tz'ín gráabarta kih hé intúuxtik tech xan ubidèeo le a*
tz'áak xan ti',
 'But I recorded it', he says, 'I'll send you the video too,
 which you'll give
- 17 *'m, ti im: páadrinóoh wá tawileh*
 DAT A1 N CON PST A1 V
 To my godfather if you saw him
 m-, to **my godfather** if you see him.' [Tel.1.A 33:29]

In Examples (10–14), the persons referred to are already known by name by both participants in the interactions. But names are not always appropriate, even when they are known in all of their variants. Similarly, consociates build up a stock of mutual knowledge that would support indefinitely many descriptions of one another when talking to a third party. But these facts of knowledge and potential construal are guided in practice by the heuristic that kin relations take precedence over other forms of construal, except for children. Within the broad sphere of kinship, consanguinity takes precedence over *compadrazgo* in cases like (13), and *compadrazgo* takes precedence over affinity in cases like (11–12).

In (10), the nephew relation (mediated by affinity) takes precedence over name or other description. Hence, we hypothesize the order of preference among relations to be <consanguinity, *compadrazgo*, affinity, name>. These preferences are stronger under some circumstances than others. In particular, when *compadres* are interacting, their respective spouses are always referred to as *comadres*. When people refer to their siblings, it is almost always with the sibling term (with or without an accompanying name to disambiguate the referent if needed). It is rarely safe to refer to another's spouse by simple first name, for to do so fails to display respect for the spousal relation (particularly if the speaker is male and the referent female). On the other hand, as married women become more senior, through childbearing and other accomplishments, they tend to be referred to by non-kin as Doña + first name. Thus the preference hierarchy is not a rigid rule that determines which form is selected. Rather, it is a general normative expectation whose applicability must be discerned by the speaker.

Example (15) is taken from a video recording of interaction between copresent Maya speakers who are unrelated to one another. The one labelled 'DC' is Don Chabo, a shaman, and 'Wi' is the wife of a man whom DC is currently treating for an ailment. The exchange occurred towards the end of a clinical visit in which DC has treated the man with ritual prayer, and is now preparing medicinal herbs for the couple to bring home and give him over the next days. In preceding talk, DC has interacted with the man in the course of dialogue and divination. He has been told the man's proper name and has already diagnosed his condition. The woman is the one who will have to prepare the herbs for ingestion, and DC explains to her how to do it. Notice in line (6) that DC refers to the man as 'your husband'. He could have referred to him with a simple pronoun, by name, with an exophoric deictic, or any number of descriptions. The preference for kinship guides DC to the form chosen, since he is addressing the patient's presumed spouse and that is the most salient kinship relation available. If his adult daughter had accompanied the man instead of his wife, DC would have told her how to give the medicine to 'your father'. The construal by first-degree kin relation displays his recognition of it, while also reinforcing the woman's responsibility to care for her husband. In cases like this, local relevance and the preference for construal by kinship both reinforce his choice.

(15) 'Do this for your husband'

- 1 DC *le tz'áak a', máameh, (2.0) kulòok e_há' o'* ((glancing briefly in her direction))
This medicine Mama, (2.0) when the water boils
- 2 *kahoyik.* ((nodding once))
you steep it

- 3 Wi *mhmm.*
Hmm.
- 4 DC *kintzikbatik tech tayík?*
I'm explaining it to you, got it?
- 5 Wi *mhmm.*
Hmm.
- 6 DC *ká páatak (.) 'a mèentik ti (.) 'awi [cham.*
CON V A2 V DAT A2 N
That it be possible you do it for your husband
So you can, do it for, **your husband**
- 7 Wi
[tyáa yuúk'é:h.
So he drinks it?
- 8 DC yuk'éh. ((quick upward nod))
Yeah [AV.07.39.42-58]

The next example reinforces the point that proper names are secondary in practices of person reference. This is a telephone conversation in which I call the apartment of my *compadre*, and one of his roommates answers the phone. We do not know each other and I am faced with the task of asking for my *compadre* without knowing whether the roommate would recognize whom I meant. The conversation is clumsy and marked by a breakdown when I ask for *compadre* by proper name and he fails to recognize whom I mean. The first notable fact is that the man does not display any knowledge of the proper name of his own roommate. In line (5) we can see that he appears to know someone by the name of Manuel, but he cannot confirm the family name. In a subsequent conversation with my *compadre*, he confirmed that this was typical, saying ‘*chéen pór k’ahóoltbil umèenkó’ob, péro chéen unxéet uk’aab’a*’ ‘they do it just by familiarity, but (they only know) a piece of the name’ [2. A.172. 1/22/05].

We start off in Spanish, but I switch into Maya at line (8), hoping that in Maya the conversation will proceed more smoothly. It has occurred to me that he may be wondering who I am to ask for his roommate by name; so I tell him straightaway that the Manuel I am asking for is my *compadre*, gambling that the roommate might know that ‘Manuel’ has an Anglo *compadre*. By line (13) my attempt to refer to my *compadre* has failed and the man asked me a more relevant bit of information: Where does he work? Since I did not know the answer, his question fails to resolve the reference. At line (14) I make a fresh start on the identification, using the kin relation ‘cousin of José Wech’. This however causes more trouble and he expresses his confusion at line (15) ‘He’s Wech’s cousin?’ At this point he reverts to the most anonymous description available, physical appearance: ‘Is he a stocky guy?’ But even this fails because my *compadre* is not stocky. At this point, he correctly concludes that I am confused, because the only cousin Wech has locally is stocky. At line

(21), I try starting over with the fact that I do not know Wech, but my *compadre* is from Merida and had just come to the area a couple of weeks prior. Finally this elicits recognition, and he corrects the kin relation: not Wech's cousin, but his uncle. By this point I am thoroughly confused, and disfluently agree with him, 'yes, I guess he is Wech's uncle'. Having resolved the reference, he tersely says that the person I am looking for just went to work, and the conversation ends.

(16) Oh, you mean José's uncle?

- 1 Man ((Inaud))
Hello? [Tel.1.A 01:55]
- 2 WH *Manuel Ik' por favor.*
Manuel Ik please
- 3 Man *Manuel Ik'?*
Manuel Ik?
- 4 WH *hàah*
yeah
- 5 Man *n-, no no no sé. Sé un manuel aquí pero no ((unintel)) =*
NEG NEG NEG V V ART N DLOC CON NEG
not not not I know. I know (of) a Manuel here but not
I don't don't know. I know **a Manuel** here but he's not
- 6 WH = 'èeh =
- 7 Man = *no se enkwentra*
He's not here
- 8 WH 'ee, k-, 'u-, 'untúul máak, 'ee , kat'anik wá màayah.
Um, he-, h- it's a guy um, do you speak Maya?
- 9 Man *hàah*
Yeah
- 10 WH *tumèen le máak inwí'uyik tech e', 'in kompadre*
RN ART N A1 V DAT B2 TD A1 N
Because the guy I hear from you my compadre
Cuz the guy I'm asking you about, he's **my compadre**
- 11 Man *haah?*
Really?
- 12 WH *Manuel Ik'.*
Manuel Ik
- 13 Man *tú'ux kumeyah.*
Where does he work?
- 14 WH 'estèeh, máare tuhàahil e' má' inwohe 'u-,bwénoh 'u,
'upriimoh José Wèech
Wow, um, truth is I don't know his- , well, his, his cousin
is José Wech
- 15 Man (1.7) 'u priimo Weech?
A3 N N
His cousin Wech
His cousin is Wech? (~ He's Wech's cousin?)
- 16 WH 'àah (4.8) José Wèech =
Yeah, José Wech

- 17 Man = *gòordo wáa* (*unintell*)
Is he stocky?
- 18 WH *bixih?*
What?
- 19 Man *untú gòordo?*
A stocky guy?
- 20 WH *má' hach gòordó i'*
Not really stocky
- 21 Man *'ah hé'elo', mín má'a má'a leti' wal e'.* *konfundiidóech.*
Oh there, then it's not, it's not him probably. You're confused.
- 22 WH *bwénoh le José Wèech má' in hach k'ahóol i' péro*
inkompàadre le kinwáaik
Well, the José Hoil I don't really know him, but my
compadre, the one I telling
- 23 *tech o', 'estèeh, 'esteh (.) mérida kutàal. (.) 'u,*
tz'ó'ok trèes, tz'ó'o
you, um, um, he's from Merida. He, three (weeks) ago,
- 24 *mín trèes semàanas 'ú'uk. (2.4) 'úuchk u tàa way e'.*
I guess three weeks ago he arrived, he came here.
- 25 Man *'áang (1.5) 'áh utiiyoh joseh ?⁷*
INT INT A3 N N
Oh Oh his uncle Jose
Ooh! Oh, **the uncle of José?**
- 26 WH *'ah utiyah wal e', 'utiyo wal o' - wal e'.*
'Oh his oncle pribably, probably
- 27 Man *'aha hàà.*
Oh yeah.
- 28 WH *hàah má bakáan u p'rimo i' =*
Yeah, evidently not his cousin
- 29 Man = *aha.*
Ahah
- 30 WH *'u-, 'utiy =*
his, his unc-
- 31 Man = *aha táant ubin meyah e'.*
Yeah, he just went to work. [Tel.1.A 03:12]

What is noteworthy about this conversation is that the proper name is of little use in identifying a person who is nonetheless known to both of us. The implication is that my interlocutor does not know the full name of his roommate, and does not even recognize it when offered. The kin relation would have worked if I had gotten it right, and the man's responses give strong evidence that he does know the kin relations and has them at his fingertips. Knowledge of physical characteristics, place of origin and place of employment are key bits of descriptive information, but we do not share them. Finally, the reference to Merida and Manuel's recent arrival in the area

⁷ Note that this example provides evidence in favour of kin-term-plus-fourth-person as default in this system, as argued above – here, when Man finally nails the reference, it's done with 'Jose's uncle', not with a name, as would typically happen in English.

succeed in identifying him, and he concludes with the proper formulation, in terms of the kin relation to José, whom he does know by first plus shortened family name.

The final brief examples further illustrate the interaction of the principles guiding reference to persons. In the course of a long discussion of familial affairs, my *compadre* Manuel explained to me how it was that he decided to travel to the United States. His father, on his death bed, had told him that he would make a long journey before settling down to practice as a shaman in Yucatan. He called him to his side, saying, ‘*ííhoh, nadz abáah waye, bey xan ‘afáamiya*’ ‘Son, come close here, also your wife’ [1.A.350. 5/1/05]. In this utterance, the father could have referred to the wife with equal clarity as ‘*inwilib*’ ‘my daughter-in-law’, or by title plus name (doña Margot). Instead, he construed her with a kin expression with second-person propositus. The motivation for this choice, I believe, was that the reference is part of a directive, which is therefore focused on the Adr, and the kin relation maintains the second person as propositus.⁸ Although the title plus name would be referentially adequate, it would have been entirely inappropriate for him, a coresident consanguine, to use her name without kin relation. In another conversation with *compadre*, he explained that in talk between brothers, the preferred way of referring to their wives is neither by name nor by the wife relation. Rather, the wives are construed as ‘sister-in-law’. Thus, he reported his brother’s offer to come visit his wife, who had been ill, as follows.

(17)

Kó’ox ilik wá yàan tyèempo in háan xíimbat incunáadah yéetel acunáadah
 ‘Let’s see if there’s time for me to visit **my sister-in-law** with your
sister-in-law.’

In other words, where an English speaker might say ‘let’s see if I have time to come visit Margot with Fi’, a discerning Yucatec speaker construes both women via the in-law relation. As *compadre* explained, the title plus name (in this case, doña Margerita) is used by non-relatives, but the in-law term is used between brothers [1.A.600. 1/22/05]. Notice that the second reference, to his own wife, maintains the in-law construal rather than switching to ‘my wife’. I take this to be another example in which an affinal relation overrides the name,

⁸ This therefore looks very much like what Stivers’ chapter calls an ‘alternative recognitional’, or a marked, non-default construal – something special is going on in the interaction specific to the person referred to (a directive), and the reference form chosen seems to serve this. Levinson’s chapter in this volume has a similar discussion, with reference to cases involving ‘circumspection’. See Stivers’ and Levinson’s chapters for relevant discussions.

and the immediately preceding construal via the sister-in-law relation is maintained in the second reference.

7.4 Conclusion

We have seen that Yucatec speakers deploy a wide array of resources for referring to persons. These include kinship expressions, based on consanguinity, *compadrazo* and affinity, as well as multiple forms of the proper name. Titles are a critical part of reference to adults, and the epithet for the deceased adds further specificity. Selection among these ways of construing persons is guided by a strong sense of propriety according to which speakers should display recognition of and respect for kin relations. This is especially true in talk among and about consociates, who are often inter-related by descent, marriage, ritual kinship and co-residence. The method of this chapter has been to select conversational examples in which multiple available designations compete. Only a subset was presented here, but they are consistent with the rest of the corpus. Such data reveal that kinship routinely overrides proper names and that within the sphere of kinship, consanguinity ranks above *compadrazgo* and *compadrazgo* ranks above affinity. This ranking is a matter of sociality and established decorum. In referring to someone as 'your *comadre*' the speaker is displaying the relation in question, reinforcing its social reality and showing respect for the addressee. When a nephew refers to his father's sister's husband as 'my uncle', he is simultaneously denoting him and displaying the respect and care for him that infuses the avuncular relation. The preference hierarchy is ultimately motivated by the ideas that persons occupy positions in the fields of kinship and residence, that interactants are persons and that the proper way to designate someone is through their relations to the present company. Hence the patterns of observed usage arise out of the interaction of normative kin types and local relevance, including the *prima facie* relevance of the participants. The tie to participant roles as the *propositus* of kin relations in turn links construal of persons to deictic construal more generally. Although the data adduced here are too limited to demonstrate the full working of this system, they do show that ordinary, unmarked usage is functionally complex because it combines 'sheer reference' with the normative display of social recognition. Proper names may appear to side-step the complexities of kinship and relative status, but this appearance is misleading. The use of simple names is itself constrained and therefore indexically charged. The niceties of kinship and relative status are among the objective conditions in which practices of person construal take place. To understand these practices, we must therefore look to the social fields in which they arise.

Abbreviations

A1,A2,A3	First, second and third person pronouns of the A series (prefixal) marking agent, possessor or subject of intransitive incompletive aspect
ADJ	Adjective
ADV	Adverb
ART	Article
B1,B2,B3	First, second, third person pronouns of the B series (suffixal), marking object, possessum, subject of equational and subject of intransitive past or optative
CON	Connective
DAT	Dative, benefactive
DLOC	Spatial deictic adverb
DTEMP	Temporal deictic adverb
INT	Interjection
N	Noun
NEG	Negative marker
OSTEV	Ostensive evidential deictic
PART	Particle
PREP	Preposition
PST	Past tense
QUOTE	Quotative particle, inflected for person with B series person markers
RN	Relational Noun
TD	Terminal deictic particle
V	Verb

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8 Principles of person reference in Tzeltal conversation

Penelope Brown

8.1 Introduction

How does one refer to persons in conversation? How does one pick out an individual from the myriad people in one's social world, so that the interlocutor(s) can home in on a specific individual with known properties – a face, a name, a social identity, a personality – immediately called up? This is a problem that is both frequent and universal, since talking about individual people – what they did, where they went, what they are like, what should be done with them or about them – preoccupies a large proportion of conversations around the world.

Achieving reference of any kind is a matter of achieving mental coordination, and person reference is perhaps especially tricky because participants have to coordinate on a definite, unique individual, not just a class of individuals. Foundational work in conversation analysis (Sacks and Schegloff 1979, reprinted this volume; Schegloff 1996a; see Introduction, this volume) has claimed that how reference to persons is formulated is governed by two basic preferences:

- (1) **RECOGNITIONALS** are preferred: that is, when the recipient knows the individual, use a referring expression that allows him/her to recognize the intended individual – for example, a name, or a recognitional descriptor, a description 'designed for the recipient and chosen to indicate how the recipient knows the referent'. There also appears to be a preference for names over descriptive expressions in English-speaker talk.
- (2) **MINIMAL REFERRING EXPRESSIONS** are preferred: that is, using just one referring expression. This means one discrete reference form, however lengthy it has to be to identify the referent to the recipient in the context.

If there is a conflict between these two preferences, successively relax (2) in favour of (1).

If the system wanted only to assure recognition, speakers could 'overtell', being more explicit than necessary, but in conversation speakers prefer not to

overtell (Levinson 1987; see also Schegloff, this volume on recipient design). So an additional admonition might be this:

Don't be overexplicit or the recipient may make additional inferences (e.g., that you think s/he doesn't know the person).

These principles, phrased as speaker admonitions, appear to account reliably for how initial reference to persons – and nothing else (Schegloff's 'referring simpliciter', Schegloff 1996a, this volume) – is achieved in English. Exceptions exist, but they raise the possibility of additional information being conveyed by deviation from the unmarked usage (see Stivers, this volume).

But does this analysis hold for languages and speakers in cultures around the world? Referring to persons, unlike referring to inanimate objects and animals, is a socially delicate operation, since persons are circumscribed by social identities, hierarchical status, and taboos in ways that are highly variable across cultures. Looking at person reference in a small-scale, face-to-face society where everyone knows everyone else or can trace them through kinship relations, and knows many of them by multiple labels (predominantly kinship terms and names, but also by nicknames, titles, and role descriptors), might shed light on this question. This chapter examines initial references to persons in Tzeltal, a Mayan language spoken in a speech community with a social system quite different from the American and European ones where the majority of conversation analytic work has been done.

The society in question is the small rural community of Tenejapa, in the state of Chiapas in southeastern Mexico. In their language, Tzeltal, locally initial forms for third-person reference include the usual repertoire: kin terms, names, honorifics and titles, and descriptive labels of varying degrees of specificity. If speaker, recipient, or other people they know are related to the referent through 'kinship' of various kinds, a kin term (or other relational term like 'namesake') is, as we shall see, the unmarked ('default') option. Names and geographical location (of the referent's home base) are also frequently used, as are role labels (e.g., 'the teacher', 'the worker'), status markers ('the ex-president', 'the deceased') and other descriptive terms.

Inspection of initial references to persons in twenty-five Tzeltal videotaped conversations reveals that, in comparison with person-reference forms in English, two things are remarkable about Tzeltal usage. Initial reference forms are often fairly lengthy, combined into a series in a single referring expression that pins down the referent more exactly (e.g., 'my cousin Juan over at the school' or 'oldman Chikin where your cousin Alonzo's house is now').

More surprisingly, sometimes (in about 10 per cent of person references in the data examined) initial references combine more than one referring expression (e.g., 'the teacher in Juxalja | Jose' or 'oldman our-excl. mother's-brother | Manel Tujk'awil'). This raises the question of whether, contrary to the

Sacks and Schegloff principles, there is actually no preference for minimization in Tzeltal person reference.

This chapter addresses the sequential properties of such combinations in Tzeltal talk, and assesses the extent to which they are a consequence of a lack of prompt recognition signals on the part of the addressee, or whether there are motivations beyond simply reference for their initial formulation in more than one referring expression. Is there a construction that looks less than fully minimal routinely employed in initial person reference, or are there interactional reasons to do with identification of referent (uptake, common ground, etc.) for each of these expanded forms? I will argue that there is a culturally elaborated preference for 'association', locating individuals referred to in relation to the speaker or addressee, and a tendency to go beyond 'simply referring' to specify the referent's position in the social and geographical network of Tenejapan society. To preview my conclusions: I show (1) that 'kinship' rather than 'name' is the default system for recognitional person reference in this society, (2) that the Sacks and Schegloff principles of recognition and minimization are indeed supported by the Tzeltal data, and (3) that a major way in which the preference for minimization gets relaxed is to associate the referent to the speaker, addressee, or both. I therefore propose a slight modification to the CA preference rules for initial person reference.

8.1.1 *Ethnographic background*

Tenejapans are Mayan farmers, growing corn and beans in a largely subsistence lifestyle although some coffee and other crops are grown for sale. Their community is in a remote ruggedly mountainous area of highland Chiapas, and until recently there were no all-weather roads into it, so many people are still relatively isolated from the surrounding Mexican national culture and are effectively monolingual in Tzeltal. Tenejapa is bordered on the east by other Tzeltal-speaking communities (K'ankujk, Oxchuk), but from the northwest to the southeast it is bordered by Mayan communities that speak the closely related language Tzotzil (Chenalho', Mitontik, Chamula, Huistan). Increasingly, intermarriage from across these borders means that some Tzeltal households have Tzotzil-speaking wives in them, with corresponding bilingualism in the home. Greatly increased schooling and mobility in the past 20 years has made people under the age of about 35 partially bilingual in Spanish. But Tzeltal remains the primary language of the community and is universally spoken in the home.

Like inhabitants of each of the neighbouring Mayan municipios, Tenejapans have their own distinct identity with their own local political system, characteristic dress, dialect variations, and economic and cultural practices. They recognize a basic split in kinds of people: Mayans ('us', *indigenas*, including the other indigenous people around them) versus

Ladinos ('them', *kaxlanetik*) who speak Spanish and belong to the politically and culturally dominant group in Mexico. They have increasingly become aware of a third kind of people, *gringos* or *turistas*, that is, foreigners, especially since the town of San Cristóbal de las Casas, about 25 miles away, has become a tourist mecca. At a more fine-grained level, they distinguish Tenejapans – *jluvaltik* 'our-inclusive countrymen' – from the people of other municipios, the K'ankujketik, Oxchuketik, Tzotzleb and so on. Within Tenejapan society, social distinctions are based mainly on sex, age, and seniority due to those who hold, or have held, ritual or political office in the community.

There are about 37,000 Tenejapans, living in scattered homesteads in named hamlets (*parajes*), surrounded by fields. They do not all know each other personally, but they are related to one another through a classificatory kin system as well as through godparent relations (*compadrazgo*) and can usually trace the relationship of any Tenejapan to someone they do know.

8.1.2 *Data sources and method*

I have been working in Tenejapa over a period spanning 35 years, collecting recordings of naturally occurring Tzeltal conversation as part of my research program. For this chapter, I have used only videotaped data (collected since 1980), so that visual aspects of person reference (e.g., gaze, pointing) can be brought into the analysis. I examined twenty-five conversations for the forms of initial third-person reference used, both two-party and multiparty conversations. They range from 3-minute interchanges to leisurely conversations of a couple of hours, including visiting conversations, relaxed chat between siblings at home, talk over tasks like making tortillas, functional visits to obtain things from a neighbour, and the like. The number of different participants in these conversations is more than forty, and the total number of third-person references examined is about 1200.

Initial references to persons were coded for the following properties: formulation as recognitional or non-recognitional, form (kin term, name, honorific, title, description, etc.), complexity (minimal or non-minimal), accompanying pointing gestures and uptake.

8.2 **Resources for doing person reference in Tzeltal**

Here I set out the main linguistic and other communicative resources for referring to persons. Note that use of any of these forms will, if applicable, be accompanied by a socially more or less obligatory further specification: (1) by an age designator (*mamal* 'oldman', *me'el* 'oldwoman') indicating that the

referent is over the age of about 50, or (2) by the word *anima* ‘deceased’ if the referent has died. They may also be (and often are) accompanied by (3) pointing to the referent’s home base location, adding quite specific and accurate information allowing the referent to be identified (see also Levinson, this volume).

8.2.1 *Kin terms and other relationship terms* (‘*your brother-in-law*’, ‘*your namesake*’ ‘*our-inclusive compadre*’)

Kin terms are, I shall argue, the default reference form whenever there is a kin relation of the intended referent to either the speaker or to the addressee, or to someone else related to either of them. But what does it mean to have a kinship relation in this society? Tzeltal has a classificatory kinship system, with kin terms like ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ extended indefinitely outwards to kin collaterally and in ascending and descending generations. Patrilineal clans are indexed with surnames; patrilocality means that women generally marry into a hamlet, so that hamlets are associated with particular patrilineal lines and therefore with particular named clans.

The kinship system is of the Omaha II type (Lounsbury 1969), with father’s sister (-*wix*) structurally equivalent to elder sister, grandchildren equivalent to grandfather, and female’s brother’s son (-*ijtz’in*) equivalent to female’s younger brother. Cross-cousins are distinguished from parallel cousins, the latter being equivalent to ego’s siblings, while patrilineal cross-cousins are equivalent to ego’s children and matrilineal cross-cousins to ego’s mother’s brother and mother’s sister. Terms denoting kin of the same generation or one younger generation are mostly distinguished by sex of propositus (the ‘anchor’ in Downing’s, 1996, terms) and by sex of referent. All this means that these kin terms are informationally rich – indexing things like relative age, sex of propositus, sex of referent, and generation of referent – conveying more information about the referent than do personal (first) names in Tzeltal.

In all, twenty-six kin terms are used for consanguineal and affinal relations. (See Table 8.1.) These are pervasive as person-reference forms in my data. Two other relationship types also frequently appear in person reference: adults related through godparenthood (-*kumpare*, -*kumare*), and a special term for someone with the same first name (-*jelol*). There is also a special word for the youngest child in a family (*k’ox*). Only a few of these terms are unique identifiers (those for mother, father, husband, wife, and *k’ox* at any given point in time), with most referring to a potentially wide range of individuals (although when necessary a ‘real’ brother, etc. can be specified by the word *batz’il* ‘real’ modifying the kin term).

Table 8.1 *Tzeltal kin terms**†

*Lineal*Parents: *-me'*, *-tat*Siblings: *-wix* (ElSi), *-bankil* (ElBr, male ego), *-xi'lel* (ElBr, female ego), *-ijtz'in* (YoBr)Children: *-al* (female ego), *-nich'an* (male ego)Grandchildren/grandfather: *-mam*Grandmother: *-me'chun* (FaMo and MoMo)*Collateral*Father's brother: *-tajun*Father's sister: *-wix* [same as ElSi]Mother's brother (and MoBrSo): *-ichan*Mother's sister (and MoBrDa): *-me'jun*Children of brother: *-ijtz'in* (female ego): *-nich'jun* (male ego)Children of sister (male ego) *-ichan* [same as MoBr]Sons of sister (female ego): *-aljun*Daughters of sister (female ego): *-antzial**Affines*Husband: *-mamalal*Wife: *-inam*Fa-in-law/son-in-law: *-nial*Mo-in-law/daughter-in-law: *-alib*Brother-in-law: (male ego) *-bal*, (female ego) *-mu'*Sister-in-law: (female ego) *-jawan*, (male ego) *-mu'*HuBrWi: *-it'ix*MoBrWi: *-chich*

* Abbreviations for core kin relationships are: Mo=mother, Fa=father, ElSi/ElBr=elder sister, elder brother, YoSi/YoBr = younger sister, younger brother, Da=daughter, So=son, Hu=husband, Wi=wife. These are combinatorial; thus MoBrSo= mother's brother's son (i.e., a cross-cousin)

† Based on Brown (1979:142–148)

This multiple ambiguity is expanded dramatically because these kinship terms are extended to everyone in the same clan (of which eight appear in my conversational data), even if the exact relationship cannot be traced. In other words, everyone with the same Spanish surname is treated as kin with these same kin terms. So, for example, if I'm Xun Gusman Ch'ijk, all people

with the surname Gusman are my ‘brothers’/‘sisters’/‘uncles’/ ‘aunts’ and so on depending on generation, sex and relative age. Similarly, my mother being a Lopez, all Lopezes are treated like my maternal-line kin, and if my in-laws are Mendes (e.g., my brother married a Mendes girl) then all Mendeses are my ‘in-laws’, and so on. As a result, virtually everyone in Tenejapa is related to everyone else, either by blood, clan membership, marriage or godparenthood. Therefore most person references are (potentially) recognitional – they can be elaborated on until the kinship links are clear. But the corollary is that there is potentially huge ambiguity of kin term alone as a reference form.

When used in person reference, Tzeltal kinship terms are obligatorily possessed, so the ‘propositus’ (the person through whom the relationship is reckoned) is always cross-referenced – the link to speaker (e.g., ‘my mother’), to addressee (e.g., ‘your elder sister’), or to third party (e.g., ‘Xun’s grandfather’). To talk about a kin relation type one adds a nominal suffix: for example, *wixil* ‘elder-sisters in general’. There is a certain amount of flexibility in how the relationship is reckoned: it can be reckoned – ‘triangulated’ – through father’s side versus mother’s side, or through the addressee’s relationship versus the speaker’s relationship to the referent (‘my-mother’ versus ‘your aunt’). In these data, it appears that reckoning through the speaker or addressee is preferred, where possible, to reckoning via the referent’s relation to a third party. (See Haviland, this volume, for the same ‘altercentric’ pattern among the closely related Tzotzil Mayans of Zinacantán.)

Kinship relations are indexed by the Tzeltal naming system, to which we now turn.

8.2.2 *Names*

Two distinct trinomial naming systems are operative in Tenejapa. These are used in different contexts, and provide different information about the kin connections of the referent. Every Tenejapan has a Tzeltal name consisting of a first name, a second Spanish-derived clan surname, and a third Tzeltal patriline subclan name. For example, a person with the name Xun Gusman Ch’ijk has as her first name Xun (drawn from a set of about twelve girls’ names); the Gusman refers to a larger exogamous grouping (associated with a specific set of Tzeltal patriline names), and Ch’ijk is the patriline surname. Both Gusman and Ch’ijk names come from her father, but the larger grouping Gusman defines the boundaries of exogamy; you should not marry someone with the same clan surname. Women do not change their names on marriage.

Everyone also has a corresponding Spanish set of names (for school, official documents, etc.). For example, Juana Gusman Lopez could be the Spanish

trinomial name for Xun mentioned above, with Gusman from the father and Lopez from the mother in the Spanish fashion. Thus this set of names does not include information about the patriline (Ch'ijk), but adds the information about the mother's clan association (Lopez).

Both systems are in use in conversation, although the Tzeltal names predominate, especially for anyone over the age of about 30.¹ Reference via surname can use the Spanish (clan) or Tzeltal (lineage) name (e.g., Gusman or Ch'ijk), or both. Using the Spanish name may convey something about public role – either the setting is public (school, public meetings, voting) or the person's relevant-in-context role is public (e.g., teacher, committee chairman). Similarly, for first name reference you can use the Spanish or the Tzeltal first name (e.g., Juana or Xun). Some younger individuals use their Spanish first name as default, but most people have the Tzeltal name as the default.

There are only a dozen Tzeltal first names for men and the same number for women that appear in my data, and a handful of these (Alux, Antun, Petul, Xun, Xmal) are favourite names, so that every Tzeltal household with several children is likely to have children with the same name as adults in the household and also with the same name as some of the people in every other household. As a result, there is a huge ambiguity of first name alone as a reference form. Names for adults are dispreferred, rarely used among persons sharing a household, and names for one's household members are rarely used for non-household members.

There are more Tzeltal surnames than first names, but, due to patrilineal residence, in a given hamlet most men share one of only ten or so surnames as well. Married-in women drawn from the whole pool of Tenejapa have a wider range of surnames. In conversation, referring to people by their family name only – for example, 'woman Chikin', 'girl Tukut', 'boy Osil' – implies that the speaker (or addressee) does not know them well.

A third kind of name – nicknames – is another solution to person reference. What these are for any individual is in-group knowledge; they are usually mocking (referring to personal appearance or history, as in the long descriptive nickname in (1)), and are not normally used when the referent is co-present.

(1)

bankilal tz'et wale' lo'bal
'elder-brother cuts_down_at_base sugarcane and bananas'

¹ This contrasts with usage in the neighbouring municipio of Zinacantán, where the Spanish system of naming is hardly used (Haviland, pc).

Because they are generally used only within the in-group, nicknames are very successful as initial person-reference forms, unambiguously picking out the intended referent with the associated mocking stance.

8.2.3 *Honorifics and role labels*

Two generic honorifics are frequently used. These are *jtatik*, literally ‘father’ plus a plural/honorific suffix *-tik* (a form that I gloss as ‘sir’), and *jme’tik* ‘mother’+ honorific *-tik* (which I gloss as ‘madam’).² Using these terms in reference or address or adding them to a name conveys respect to the referent, so is an indication of relative status/age of speaker and referent. For parents-in-law there are default interpretations of these honorific expressions: *jtatik ku’un* ‘my sir’, is the normal way to refer to one’s father-in-law, and *jme’tik ku’un* ‘my madam’ for mother-in-law.

Other socially expected honorifics are titles for holders of a political or religious office, still used after the referent has left office, when (s)he’s referred to as ‘the former X’:

(2)

jtatik kunerol [lit. ‘sir President’] refers to the Tenejapan president
bankilal [lit. ‘elder brother-NOM’] (title for some other ritual offices)
pasaro + title: e.g. *pasaro jues* ‘former judge’
pasaro kunerol (or just *pasaro*) ‘former President’

A role label (indexing the most relevant or most recent role) is the default reference form for school teachers (*maestro*, *maestra*), and for holders of high religious (Kawilto) or political offices (President, Judge, Scribe, etc.). People in a relationship of *compadrazgo* (godparenthood) use ‘compadre’, ‘comadre’, as default reference forms, indexing the special respect due in this relationship (see also Hanks, Haviland, this volume).

8.2.4 *Minimal descriptions* (‘that one’ ‘the girls’, ‘the boss’)

Minimal descriptors are frequently used as initial person-reference forms. Often they are non-recognitional, but Example (3) shows two recognitional

² The *j-* prefix is a classifier for humans; it also indicates + human on nominalized expressions for kinds of people (e.g., *j’a’teletik* ‘workers’, *j’aneletik* ‘fleeing people’).

ones (initial reference forms are in boldface in the gloss line, in boldface and underlined in the text line):

Example (3) [clip7sopa]

AS: [whispers] *ja' wan ya x-jul-0 li' ta s-na ach'ix-etik mene?*
 ! PT ICP ASP-arrive-3A here PREP 3E-house girl
 PL that_one
 'Does **that one** stay here at the house of **the girls?**' [pointing towards their house]

AO: *ja'*
 'Yes.'

AS's whispered question to AO is about a co-present person (me), and 'the girls' referred to are unmarried grown women (over age 40), so in this situation, circumspection is in order (see Levinson, this volume). Another situation where minimal descriptors are often used is in referring to one's own children, using, for example, 'my-child', 'the boy', 'our-exclusive youngest boy' or 'this little elder brother' instead of a name.

8.2.5 *Pronominal cross-referencing on the verb ('he/she', 'they')*

Tzeltal freely allows ellipsis of nominal arguments, with person obligatorily cross-referenced on the verb. While these are not forms dedicated to initial person reference, one of these person cross-referencing markers is sometimes the only morphosyntactic evidence for reference to a newly introduced person. The third-person singular cross-reference form in Tzeltal is zero, with third person overtly marked only in the plural. Tzeltal is a verb-initial language, so that technically, ALL initial person reference (except in special cases where the nominal referent is in focus and moved to the left of the verb) is via the cross-referencing on the verb, before the noun phrases that (optionally) follow the verb and specify the person referent and other participants. Cases where the verb is immediately followed by the explicit noun phrase(s) I have not treated as cross-referencing only. An example of initial person reference with cross-referencing only can be seen in Example (4) (in the turn marked →):

Example (4) [mampak2, talking about a man who went down to where AN's cornfields are]

PK: *jn. k'an s- li' to k'an jul-uk li' ta: [points] 'li' hm. want s- here PT want arrive-SUBJ here PREP [point] here ta ba ay-0 j-tatik mamal tonchanul ba ay-0*
 PREP where EXIST-3A CL-'sir' oldman LNAME where EXIST-3A

- a'-k'inal-ik i
 2E-land-PL DEIC
 'Hm. He wanted-wanted to arrive here at: here at
 where **sir oldman Tonchanul** is where your land is.'
- AN: *jm*
 'Hm.'
- PK: *ma ay-uk-0 to a'-k'inal tey a?*
 NEG EXIST-SUBJ-3A PT 2E-land there DEIC
 'Isn't there still your land there?'
 (0.6)
- >AN: *ma s-mak-oj-ik ye tz'i*
 NEG 3E-covered-PERF-PL DEIC PT
 'They have taken [lit: 'covered, blocked'] it then.'

AN's reply to PK's question – Don't you still have your land there? – strategically does not mention who it is who has taken over his land, generating the next topic in the conversation. Formulation in this way lets the recipient know that a third-person referent (singular or plural) is being referred to, but beyond that indicates nothing about whether it is a person or who the person is.³

8.2.6 Summary: default person-reference forms

From the foregoing it can be seen that what is default initial person-reference usage in Tenejapa (as indeed, I expect, everywhere) depends on the social identity of the referent and on their relationship (if any) to speaker, to addressee, and to other coparticipants. To recap: Insofar as there is a general default, it is kin terms, since most people in Tenejapa are connected through kinship (including fictive kin, those 'related' by virtue of having the same Spanish surname). Prima facie evidence for this as the default is provided by simple frequency: Kin terms outnumber other kinds of initial reference forms in conversation (46 per cent, as opposed to 13 per cent names; see Table 8.3). Other defaults apply in particular circumstances, as we have seen: for example, the generic-honorific reference forms (*jme'tik*, *jtatik*) for older people in a household and for in-laws, relationship (*komare/kompare*) terms for co-godparents. Reference to children in one's own family, if well known to addressee, often uses a first name or nickname (preceded by *ch'in* 'small' if under age 8 or 10, or if the referent has to be distinguished from an older sibling or cousin with the same name) or *k'ox* 'youngest'; outside the family context it is 'child of X'. For people who are not kin to speaker or addressee, and are socially somewhat distant, the default is *jme'tik/jtatik* + name

³ Actually, the pronoun system supplies one more bit of information in first-person-plural references: there's a distinction between we-inclusive and we-exclusive, indexing whether or not the addressee is included in the reference.

Table 8.2 *Considerations entering into default person reference*

Social identity considerations
Is the referent:
– related through kinship, clan, or compadrazgo to S or H? -> kinship/compadrazgo terms
– same name as S or H? -> <i>jelol</i>
– name and/or location needed to be disambiguated? -> add name, add pointing gesture
– referent over age 50? -> <i>mamal/me'el</i>
– over age 50 and/or warranting respect for other reasons (e.g., inlaws)? <i>jitatik/jme'tik</i>
– office holder? -> title
– child? -> first name, diminutive, 'X's child'
– deceased? -> <i>anima</i> + kinterm and/or name
– Tenejapan not known to H? -> 'boy'/'girl'/'woman'+last name
– an outsider (non-Tenejapan)? -> role descriptor or name
Context considerations
– is it a public (meeting, school) context? -> Spanish names

(respectful), or *me'el* 'oldwoman'/'*mamal* 'oldman' + name (neutral or disrespectful), or a full name. Tenejapans who are not personally known to the addressee are referred to as 'girl'/'boy'/'woman' + surname (e.g., *ach'ix Mentés* 'girl Mendes', *antz Ernandes* 'woman Hernandez'). For non-Tenejapans whom the addressee is not expected to know personally (strangers), person-reference is generally just with a title or descriptive term (e.g., *senyora*, *maestra*, *superintendente*, *jkaxlan*) or a role descriptor, plus or minus a name. Use of the classifier *jtul* 'one-human' indicates that the recipient is not expected to recognize the referent.

These minimal default forms are modified or overridden in particular circumstances. If the person referred to is dead, then the reference form is preceded with *anima* 'deceased'; this is done at first mention and then not carried on through subsequent mentions in the same local context, but if the referent is re-introduced at a later point, *anima* is again by default used. And all defaults for known persons are overridden by a form used if the speaker or recipient shares a first name with referent – then *-jelol* 'my-namesake' (or 'your-namesake') is the default form. This narrows down the range of possible referents to those who share my/your name. It is not obligatory, but expected for intimates and close kin and is a way of foregrounding the relationship. Respectfulness is expected for reference to old people, and to people who have (or have had) political or religious office, warranting honorifics, or title of office held, and sometimes a name as well (e.g., 'the former old-man scribe, this oldman Pak'el').

A summary of the kinds of considerations entering into default choices of initial reference form in Tzeltal is provided in Table 8.2.

Departures from these default uses carry additional meanings. For example, to convey positive affect (affection) for close family members, you can precede the first name or ‘girl’/‘boy’ descriptor with *k-ala* ‘my little’ (especially for one’s own children or grandchildren), or use a diminutive suffix *-il* or *-uch* on the name (e.g., *Xmaruch* is the diminutive for *Xmal*). To convey negative affect you can use mocking nicknames or descriptors. Finally, particular taboos operate; for example, women avoid saying ‘my-husband’, using a more indirect reference form instead.

8.3 Initial references to third persons in Tzeltal conversation

8.3.1 Overview

To get a sense of the relative frequency of these different forms of person reference in Tzeltal, I counted initial person references in a one and a half hour conversation. There were two main participants (plus the cameraman), with one man visiting an older one living in a different hamlet. The two are related as ‘fictive kin’ because the old man’s Spanish surname is Perez, the same name as the younger man’s mother’s (making the older a ‘mother’s brother’ to the younger). But they hadn’t seen one another for several years. Table 8.3 presents the numbers for different person-reference forms in their conversation.

The categories I counted are NAME (e.g., ‘Pedro Gomes’, ‘old man Chikin’, ‘the deceased Erismo’, ‘Juan Gusman here’ + pointing gesture), KIN TERM alone (e.g., ‘my deceased father’, ‘your MoBr’, ‘her husband’) or specified further by name or location (‘the EISi of oldman Alonso Gusman here downhill’, ‘the grandparents of your MoBr Alonzo here’, ‘my ‘sir’ [i.e., Fa-in-law] oldman Yeko Perez’), MINIMAL DESCRIPTION (e.g., ‘the woman’, ‘the carpenter’, ‘the ‘boss’, ‘my boy’, ‘the priest’, ‘that one’ + pointing gesture), EXTENDED DESCRIPTION (e.g., ‘the maid of oldman Kirixpin’, ‘the Kawiltos at the back of the mountain’, ‘the one married to the Chikin woman’), and CROSS-REFERENCING ALONE (e.g., ‘They have taken it then’ in Example (4)).

As can be seen from Table 8.3, on frequency grounds kin terms are the default, occurring as all or part of almost half the total initial person references. The majority of person-reference forms (69 per cent) are either kin terms or minimal descriptions. Starting with a name is relatively rare, but names are often added as second information after a kin term (‘my cousin Alonzo’). The names are as frequent as they are (13 per cent) partly because 26 out of the 116 kin term reference forms are expanded with the name of the propositus. Although 54 per cent of the person references in this sample conversation do not have a kin term, this is usually for clear reasons (e.g., no kin link [reference is to outsiders, or to mythical people], or referent is a young child).

Table 8.3 *Initial person references in one 1.5 hour dyadic conversation*

	Alone or with other linguistic specification	With a pointing gesture	Elaborated with other linguistic specification*	Non-minimal, with another referring expression*	Total
Name	20	14	(5)	(5)	34 (13%)
Kin term	76	40	(29)	(16)	116 (46%)
Minimal description	51	8	(1)	0	59 (23%)
Extended description	22	8		(3)	30 (12%)
Cross-referencing alone	13	2		0	15 (6%)
Total	182 (72%)	72 (28%)		24	254

* Note that these are subsets of the total represented in the first two columns.

Extra information beyond that in the reference form chosen is often provided by concurrent pointing. Pointing localizes the home territory of a referent accurately (height of pointing arm indexes distance, and the point's direction is very precisely calibrated). Pointing to the referent's home base is very frequent with kin term and with name (more than 50 per cent of cases), but much less so with descriptions and with zero (cross-referencing alone). Pointing alone without a verbal reference is rare.

As mentioned above, Tzeltal references to persons, when compared with what we find in English usage, are notable on several counts. Firstly, as just discussed, kin terms rather than names are unmarked. Secondly, even when minimal (one referring expression), initial references are often relatively longwinded (e.g., a complex noun phrase). This can be accounted for on at least two grounds: (1) ambiguity of kin term alone or name alone motivates kin term + name + location as the minimal information necessary to delimit the intended referent to this particular interlocutor, and (2) as we have seen, if relevant, certain information must be conveyed – if the referent is deceased, or over the age of 50, or a former officeholder, for example. Another noteworthy feature mentioned earlier is that, quite often, initial referring expressions are non-minimal, consisting of two or more noun phrases uttered under one intonational contour, as in (5):

(5)

'[deceased oldman] [my grandfather] [this oldman Petul Ch'ijk']'
 '[my mother's brother] [Lorenzo] [the husband of my aunt X'anton]'
 '[my grandchild] [the boy of yours]'

How many of the reference forms in the data examined were ‘non-minimal’ in this way? Consulting Table 8.3, we find that, of 254 initial person references, 24 of them – almost 10 per cent – are non-minimal. Clearly, minimization as a principle holds in Tzeltal, applying to 90 per cent of the cases. But what accounts for the non-minimal ones?

Let us look at some of these initial person references in Tzeltal conversations. First I’ll give some examples of referring expressions that are indeed minimal – one referring expression (one noun phrase) under one intonation contour. In the examples, boldface and underlining in the Tzeltal line indicates third-person references that are initial in the local context; underlining alone marks non-initial person reference in the context.

8.3.2 Minimal person reference in Tzeltal

Truly minimal reference forms occur in conversation within a context where reference is presumed to be unambiguous. This can be readily seen on first arrival of a visitor at someone’s home, asking for the eldest man in the household with the term *jtatik*, as in:

Example (6) [chanit]

AMT: *nakal-0 bal j-tatik?*
 sitting-3A Q CL-‘sir’
 ‘Is **sir** home?’

or, in contrast, for the young man of the household with a first name, as in:

Example (7) [colonia1, v6A]

LM: *nakal-0 bal Antonio?*
 sitting-3A Q Antonio
 ‘Is **Antonio** home?’

The physical context where talk takes place may alone be sufficient to make reference with a simple kin term unambiguous, as in:

Example (8) [trees1; five men trimming branches off of trees next to the house of the ‘elder sisters’ of MO, the ‘aunts’ of X]

1 X: *ja’lek i j-nit-tik ta laso*
 ! good DEIC 1E-pull-1PLincl PREP rope
 ‘It would be good to pull it (a branch) with a rope.’ [to get it out of the way]

2 MO: *ma mach’a jil-em-0 y-u’un-ik i j-wix i*
 NEG who remain_behind-PERF-3A 3E-REL-PL DEIC 1E-ELSi DEIC

- 'None of **these my 'elder sisters'** have stayed behind?' [i.e., no one is home to borrow a rope from?]
- 3 X: *ay-0 mati s-laso-e*
EXIST-3A PT 3E-rope-CLI
'Maybe they have a rope.'
- 4 AK: *nakal-ik i*
sitting-PL DEIC
'They are home.'
- 5 X: *joj k'o-be-ik tz'i j-mech'un-tik-e*
ask-BEN-PL PT 1E-aunt-1PLincl.-CLI
'Then let's ask **our-incl. aunt.**' [co-referential with person reference in line 2]

Apparently long-winded but indeed minimal initial person references, using one referring expression – one noun phrase under one intonation contour – include the following:

Example (9) [sluskox2; AN is visiting SL who now lives in town; they are talking about when they first met one another, years ago]

- SL: *^kuxul-0 to ni bal ya'tik te (.) j-me'tik me' lus kawayu-e?*
alive-3A PT PT Q now DET CL-'madam' DEIC FNAME LNAME-CLI
'Is **that Mrs. Lus Kawayu** still alive?'
- AN: *ej kuxul-0 ek tz'ima=*
eh alive-3A too PT PT
'Eh she's alive perhaps.'

In this first reference to a woman whom AN took up with, as his second wife, at the time when he first met SL, the 'madam' indexes the referent's age, while the full name reflects the fact they have not spoken about this woman to each other for more than 20 years.

The addition of location information, and an index finger point, yields two sources of information, making the reference more explicit, as in Example (10):

Example (10) [mampak2; AN is visiting PK, they are now talking about a man going down to AN's corn fields]

- PK: *jn. k'an s- li' to k'an jul-uk li' ta: [pointing] li' ta*
hm. want s- here PT want arrive-SUBJ here PREP here PREP
ba ay-0 j-tatik mamal tonchanul ba ay-0 a'-k'inal-
where EXIST-3A CL-'sir' oldman LNAME where EXIST-3A 2E-land-
ik i
PL DEIC
'Hm. He wanted to arrive here wanted to arrive here at: [pointing]
here at where **sir oldman Tonchanul is where your land is.**'

In contrast with the previous example, Example (11) is non-minimal. Here the additional information deemed necessary is descriptive rather than locational:

Example (11) [matxil; AN and MXs talking about AN having moved away from the hamlet of Majosik'; MX is asking whether AN still has communal responsibilities to Majosik']

- MXs: *tzakal-0 to nix a'-bil ta Majosik'?*
 grabbed-3A still just 2E-name PREP PLNAME
 'Is your name still attached to Majosik'?' [i.e., to the list of men who owe communal labour in the paraje]
- AN: *ju'uk yu' nix yip xix tzakal-0 y-ala bil a men (.)*
 no because PT only PT grabbed-3A 3E-DIM name DEIC DEIC
a'-bal tz'in te'y mach'aya s-tij-0 karo-e
 2E-Br.in.law PT DEIC who ICP 3E-drive-3A car-CLI
 'No there's just attached the name of **that (.) brother-in-law of yours the one who drives a car.**' NONMIN
- MXs: *aaah, yip xix tzakal-0 s-bil i?*
 ah only PT grabbed-3A 3E-name DEIC
 'Aaah, just his name is attached?'

Here the reference is to AN's own son, but is phrased in terms of the referent's relationship to MXs ('your Br-in-law'); AN's descriptor 'the one who drives a car' serves to pick out which one of his five sons is intended.

Choice between alternate forms of reference for a given referent that are equally known to the addressee may be conditioned by what the topic is at that point. In Example (12), Spanish rather than Tzeltal names are used for the referents summoned to work, full Spanish names being the default usage for work summonses. (Note that one of these references is expanded into a non-minimal expression in line 7, phrasing the relationship through both speaker and recipient):

Example (12) [manosil&AO, v16A: conversation between classificatory 'brothers' about a quarrel between MA's son and his wife, talking about the son failing to show up for a hearing about the quarrel]

- 3 MA: *la sinko media ix a te ik'bil-0 bel ta a'tel*
 ART five half ACS DEIC COMP summon-RES-3A DIRgo PREP work
lum ta s-na j-kompare-tik alonso guzman
 over_there PREP 3E-house 1E-compadre-1PLincl FNAME CNAME
santis-e
 MCNAME-CLI
 'At 5:30 he was summoned away to work over at the house of **our-incl. compadre Alonso Gusman Santis,**'
- 4 AO: *ah*
 'Ah.'
- 5 MA: *s-kajtza-0 losa ma laj a' jul-0 tal*
 3E-put_high_up-3A tile NEG QUOT CMP arrive-3A DIRcome
s-jo'tak te jose-e *ala j-ch'ul ala lajun-tul a'*
 3E-companions DET FNAME-CLI DIM CL-few DIM ten-CL CMP

- k'ot-0 tal lok'el*
arrive-3A DIRcome DIRexit
'putting up a roof, (but) **the companions of José** [i.e., his workers] didn't arrive, only ten showed up (to work).'
- 6 AL: *ala lajun-tul*
only ten.
- 7 MA: *wa'y anima ik'-la-bil-0 bel sok a'-nich'jun*
2E-see quickly summon-DIST-RES-3A DIRgo with 2E-nephew
j-Pedro k-u'un, *sok j-pedro guzman jiron tey ta s-pat*
CL-FNAME 1E-REL with FNAME CNAME MCNAME there PREP 3E-back
j-na xan-e sok antonio tey ta y-an j-na-e,
1E-house again-CLI with FNAME there PREP 3E-underneath 1E-house-CLI
'So you see, he was suddenly summoned out along with **your cousin my Pedro**, also with **Pedro Guzman Jiron there at the back of my house**, and with **Antonio there below my house**,' NONMIN
- 8 AO: *hm*
'Hm.'
- 9 MA: *sok manuel guzman jimenes. animal ik'-la-bil-ik bel*
with FNAME CNAME MCNAME quickly summoned-DIST-RES-PL DIRgo
teme bajt-0.
if go-3A
'and with **Manuel Guzman Jimenes**. They were suddenly called out to go there.
ya x-ba-on xch'a xi.
ICP ASP-go-1A PT he_said
'OK, I'll go,' he [MA's son] said.'

The reference forms here include first name alone (José), full Spanish trinomials, in one case expanded with 'our-inclusive compadre', in other cases with location information.

Another basis for choosing among alternative reference forms is the tendency, when a referent is related to both speaker and addressee, to 'take the perspective of the other' and use the form with the relationship reckoned through the addressee rather than through the speaker. We have already seen an instance of this in Example (11) (where 'your brother-in-law' refers to the speaker's own son). Another example occurs in (13):

Example (13) [sluskox2; AN is visiting SL in San Cristóbal, where she now lives, catching up on gossip and personal history]

- AN: *ja'nix in te '-wix-e j-teb ma a' laj-0*
! PT DEIC DET 2E-ELSi-CLI CL-small_amount NEG CMP die-3A
k-u'un te namej-e
1E-REL DET long_ago-CLI
'It was just like that with **this one your elder-sister**, she nearly died by my fault long ago.'
- SL: *te namej-e*
'Long ago.'

Here AN introduces the topic of his own wife's illnesses years ago by referring to her as 'this one your elder sister', a classificatory relationship calculated through AN's wife who shares the Spanish clan name Gomez with SL. This kinship reckoning, triangulated sometimes with great elaboration, is done on the fly, as when later in the same conversation SL refers to her own husband as *a'nial* 'your deceased father/son-in-law':

Example (14) [sluskoxclip31; summing up a discussion about AN's former drinking habits]

- SL: *yu' niwan solel a'w-uch'-oj-ik-uk tz'i ma*
 because PT PT 2E-drink-PERF-PL-SUBJ PT PT
 'Because perhaps you-PL just sort of drank I guess then.'
- AN: [k-uch'-oj-tik-u:k
 1E-drink-PERF-1PLincl-SUBJ
 'We sort of dra:nk.'
- SL: *te katiyu' nix jich a ya y-a'y-0 ek' i=*
 DEIC PT because PT thus DEIC ICP 3E-experience-3A too DEIC
 'That's just what he did too' =
- AN: [solel tak' in to me k-o-
 really dry still DEIC 1E-hea(rt)
 'If I was really thirs-'
- SL: =anima a'-nial jich la y-a'y-0 tak'(in y-o'tan)
 deceased 2E-Fa.in.law thus CMP 3E-experience-3A dr(y 3E-heart)
 = '**your deceased father/son-in-law** did just that (felt thirsty).'
- AN: [jich nax i
 thus PT DEIC
 'That's just it.'

SL's husband, though AN's age mate when he was alive, is AN's classificatory 'father/son-in-law' because SL's Gomez surname makes her his wife's *wix* (elder sister). These cases in Examples (13) and (14) might suggest that the tendency to reckon through the addressee is not generic but exists when other constraints prevent reckoning through the speaker, here the constraint on mention of one's own spouse with a relationship term reckoned through oneself (see Levinson, this volume, on person-reference taboos).

However, Example (15) (like the one in Example (11)) is a case of triangulated reckoning through a relationship to the addressee that is not accounted for in terms of a taboo on mentioning one's own spouse, and is indicative of a more general practice of relating members of one's own family, where possible, to one's addressee rather than to oneself. (Haviland, this volume, describes the same practice of 'altercentricity' in Tzotzil.)

Example (15) [aluxperez, v27; AN is visiting, AL has been talking about his life here long ago in contrast to nowadays]

- 1 AL: *jich ta kerem (.) ta lom pim ma'yuk yinam i kerem*
 thus PREP boy PREP very plentiful none 3E-wife DEIC boy
li' i
 here DEIC
 'Thus (it is) with boys, lots of boys here have no wives.'
- 2 AN: *ya'tik i?*
 now DEIC
 'Now?'
- 3 AL: *ja' nax-e. (.3) jich ta ach'ix pim ma'yuk s-mamalal.*
 ! PT-CLI thus PREP girl plentiful none 3E-husband
 "binti-u'un te ma s-ta ta y-inam-ik-e?" xon
 what 3E-reason COMP NEG 3E-get PREP 3E-wife-PL-CLI I_said
jo'tik sok tz'i a'w-ichan.
 1PLexcl with PT 2E-MoBr
 'That's it. Thus it is with girls, many have no husbands. Why
 don't they get wives? we-excl. said with **your ichan**
 (classificatory MoBr).' [pointing to referent's house]
- 4 AN: *ja'bi*
 'yeah.'

Here AL refers to his own adult son as *a'wichan* 'your mother's brother', a classificatory term that includes mother's brother's sons. His own son is AN's 'mother's brother's son' by virtue of the fact that his surname is Perez, which is also the surname of AN's mother, making him her 'brother'. The pointing gesture to this son's house nearby makes the reference unambiguous.

Both the need for explicitness to narrow down the field of possible referents, and cultural taboos like the one on mentioning one's own spouse motivate these sometimes extended but still minimal reference forms.

8.3.3 Non-minimal initial person references

Around 10 per cent of initial references to third persons in my data involve two or more referring expressions, more than one noun phrase, even when one could, in the context, be recognitional by itself. Is this evidence of the non-applicability of Schegloff's Preference Rule 2 (use a minimal form)? Or evidence of lack of uptake on the recipient's part? Or evidence that other things beyond simply referring are being done? In examining the excerpts below, I will try to distinguish cases where there is a sequential explanation (a micropause, or recipient looks blank, or doesn't react) from those requiring another explanation.

To understand the examples that follow, it is necessary to know a few things about the Tzeltal conversational feedback system. Repetition of all or part of the prior utterance is the normal (default) response to new information (Brown 1998). A mere 'Hm' by the recipient instead of a repeat is a minimal response that will, in this context, often be taken as not fully accepting or understanding

the prior utterance. ‘Hm’ as a response to an initial person reference may be taken, analogously to a pause, as lack of prompt uptake, in contrast with *ja’bi* ‘That’s it’, which provides firm uptake. Further, in this society mutual gaze is restricted and visual signals of feedback (nods, etc.) are minimal, so lack of mutual gaze cannot necessarily be taken as absence of uptake (Levinson and Brown 2004).

Some non-minimal person references are prompted by slow or hesitant uptake by the recipient. In Example (16), the initial reference ‘sir over there at the viewpoint’ is promptly expanded with a role label ‘sir curer’:

Example (16) [sopa; AN and AS are talking about old times]

AS: *namej. ay-0 (.) ya to y-al me j-tatik [pointing]*
 long_ago EXIST-3A ICP PT 3E-tell DEIC CL-‘sir’
lum ta elawal j-tatik paxil-e
 over-there PREP viewpoint CL-‘sir curer-CLI
 ‘Long ago. He still tells about it **that sir [pointing] over**
there at the viewpoint sir curer.’

At *ya to yal* ‘he still tells about it’ AS gazes towards referent’s home base and points to it, then turns her gaze to the recipient AN. At *elawal* ‘viewpoint’, AS and AN are mutually gazing but the recipient gives no nod or other response indicating comprehension of the referent. Here we may attribute expansion after ‘viewpoint’ as upgrading the information provided so far, without any discernable pause. Note that the upgrade is with a role description, not a name (though the curer’s name is known to both participants).

In Example (17), two pieces of information, kin relation to speaker (‘my deceased grandfather’) and name (‘Petul Ch’ijk’) are supplied in the initial formulation, and after unenthusiastic uptake the speaker adds the referents’ relation to someone the recipient definitely knows (‘the father of the former elder-brother policeman Antun Ch’ijk’):

Example (17) [aluxperez v28; asking about SCL]

- 1 AP: *yak. banti jul-em-0 in ch’i ?*
 yes where arrive-PERF-3A DEIC PT
 ‘Yes. Where has he arrived?’
- 2 AN: *ja’tey jul-em-0 ta s-na anima j-mamal (.)*
 ! there arrive-PERF-3A PREP 3E-house deceased CL-oldman
mamal jmam, mamal j-petul ch’ijk i
 oldman 1E-GrPa, oldman CL-FNAME LNAME DEIC
 ‘It’s there he’s arrived at the house of **deceased oldman (.)**
oldman my grandfather, oldman Petul Ch’ijk.’ NONMIN
 (0.2)
- 3 AP: *aj:*
 ‘Ah’ MINIMAL UPTAKE
- 4 AN: *joo*
 ‘Hm.’

- 5 AP: [ja' kati
'That's it, golly.'
- 6 AN: s-tat pasaro bankilal lejrol j-antun ch'ijk-e
 3E-father former ElBr policeman CL-FNAME LNAME-CLI
 'The father of the former senior policeman Antun Ch'ijk.'
 UPGRADE
- 7 AP: [ja' bi
'Yeah.' [nods - got it!]

In line 1 AP asks for a place identification, and AN responds in line 2 with a non-minimal form ('deceased' + kin term + name). After minimal uptake he expands it into another kinship + role + name reference that places the referent in relation to someone more widely known.

Slow or unenthusiastic uptake is not always an apparent motivation for expanded reference forms. In some cases, however, there is no clear sequential motivation for formulating the referent in two (or more) ways, as in Example (18) ('the two boys' plus 'my younger brothers'):

Example (18) [aluxperez p75, AN telling AP about his father's second wife's shortcomings, including being unkind to his (AN's) siblings, her stepsons]

- AN: ja' obol s-ba te cheb xan kerem-etik-e k-ijtz'in-ab-e
 ! pity 3E-REFL DET two again boy-PL-CLI 3E-YoBr-PL-CLI
 yakal-ik ta utz'inel ya'tik
 PROG-PL PREP pestering now
 'They are pitiful **the two boys my younger-brothers** they are
 being pestered [by the second wife] now.'
- AP: ay-0 to wan a'w-ijtzin-ab ek [CHECKING]
 EXIST-3A PT PT 2E-YoBr-PL too
 'You still have younger brothers there (at home).'

Either 'the two boys' or 'my two younger-brothers' would have sufficed to identify the referent in this context of talk about his father and stepmother at home.

Multiple reference forms in initial reference may be prompted by desire for explicitness, pinning the reference to a unique individual, as in Example (19) ('my deceased grandfather the father of my deceased mother'). Both paternal and maternal grandfathers are called *mam*.

Example (19) [nail, p18]

- AO: hm, yu'n na'x laj kapal a te anima j-mam-e
 hm because PT QUOT like DEIC DET deceased CL-GrFa-CLI

s-tat ek i anima j-me'-e
 3E-father too DEIC deceased 1E-mother-CLI
 'Hm, because it's just like with **this one my deceased
 grandfather my deceased mother's father.**'

NA: ja'bi
 'Yes.'

FIRM UPTAKE

Reasons for non-minimal person reference forms other than lack of prompt uptake include particular cultural expectations. As we have seen, there is a preference for kinship reckoning to be done through the recipient rather than through oneself, although the most general preference is to reckon the referent through speaker or addressee if possible. If both are possible, then the tendency is to reckon through the addressee. In the non-minimal situations where something marked is being done, another motivation for non-minimal forms is an apparent preference for locating the referent in relation to **both** the speaker and the addressee, as in Example (20) (from the conversation cited in Example (12) about the son who didn't show up for a hearing because he was summoned to work).

Example (20) [manosil & AO, v16A]

7 MA: wa'y anima ik'-la-bil-0 bel sok a'-nich'jun
 2E-see quickly summon-DIST-RES-3A DIRgo with 2E-nephew
j- pedro k-u'un,
 CL-FNAME 1E-REL
 'So you see, he was suddenly summoned out along with **your
 nephew my Pedro, ...**'

The list of people summoned to work includes a formulation of the speaker's own son as 'your nephew my Pedro', reflecting the preference for associating the referent to both speaker and addressee.

This tendency shows up frequently in conversational narratives, as in Example (21):

Example (21) [CLIP1sopa; talking about a great locust plague that happened long ago]

[mutual gaze]

1 AS: ja' [points] kuxul-0 tojkel a me k-ijtz'in xu:n lum
 ! alive-3A born DEIC DEIC 1E-YoSi FNAME over_there
ta jejch a'wix xun-e
 PREP side 2E-ElSi FNAME-CLI
 'It was when **that younger sister of mine Xu:n over there
 acrossways your elder sister Xun** was just born.'

2 AO: [aa ja' tojkel ek' a mene
 ah! born too DEIC that_one
 'Ah that one was just born.'

- 3 AS: *ja' kuxul tojkel a*
 ! alive born DEIC
 'She was just born then.'

In this double formulation, 'your EISi Xun' adds nothing to the informativeness of the reference beyond what was provided by 'that younger sister of mine Xun', since innumerable 'younger sisters' of AS will be 'older sisters' of her addressee AO.

A related tendency generating non-minimal reference forms in conversational narratives is a matter of relating the referent to both the time of the story (i.e., long ago) and the time of the telling (now), as in Example (22), where the narrator launches the story with non-minimal introduction of participants (lines 1 and 15), placing them in relation to current people known to the interlocutor.

Example (22) [clip3Sopa; talking about when the soldiers came through long ago] [AS gazes at AO after *sme' tz'i men* in line 1]

- 1 AS: *ta lom bol te anima j-wix-tik [points] s-me' tz'i*
 PREP very stupid DET deceased 1E-EISi-1PLincl 3E-mother PT
men in(.) k-aljun rejrol ya'tik sabastian-e
 DEIC DEIC 1E-nephew policemen now FNAME-CLI
 'Really stupid was our deceased elder sister the mother of that
 (.) my-nephew the current policeman Sabastian.'
 NONMIN
- 2 AO: *ja'bi*
 'Yeah.'
 FIRM UPTAKE

- 11 AS: *jich s-muk'ul ala jil-em-0 ini ala s-tenlej*
 thus 3E-bigness DIM remain_behind-PERF-3A this DIM 3E-level_place
 'There was a little flat place this big remaining there.'
- 12 AO: *jej*
 'Heh.'
- 13 AS: *ja' k-anib jo'tik*
 ! 1E-hiding_place 1Plexcl
 'That was our hiding place.' [from the soldiers]
- 14 AO: *ja' w-anib-ik*
 ! 2E-hiding_place-PL
 'That was your hiding place.'
- 15 AS: *puro k-anib jo'tik sok tz'i men (0.5) k-ichan ya'tik*
 just 1E-hiding_place 1Plexcl with PT that 1E-MoBr now
j-muk'ul ichan j-tatik kawilto-e.
 CL-big MoBr CL-'sir' kawilto-CLI
 'It was just our hiding place with that (0.5) my-MoBr now the big
 MoBr sir kawildo.'
 NONMIN
- 16 AO: *jo*
 'Huh.'
- 17 AS: *ja' tey ya x-ba-on jo'tik a*
 ! there ICP ASP-go-1A 1Plexcl DEIC
 'That's where we'd go.'

Some cases of initial person reference illustrate the cultural preoccupation with kin and geographic setting, with much time spent establishing a referent's place in the social network to make sure that reference is achieved, as in Example (23), where AN is telling AP about the time that AN's father came to this paraje looking for a wife:

Example (23) [aluxperez v28; AN is visiting AP]

- 1 AP: *ajj ma nax kati*
'Ah, goodness isn't it so.'
- 2 AN: [*ay-0 y-inam*
EXIST-3A 3E-wife
'He has a wife.'
- 3 AP: *ja' nax kati j-tatik tz'i s-ta-0 bel to y-inam a k-a'y*
! PT PT CL-'sir' PT 3E-find-3A DIRgo PT 3E-wife CMP 1E-hear
'so it's just that I hear **sir** found a wife.' ['sir' = 'your father']
- 4 AN: *jnn*
'Hm.'
- 5 AP: *ja' nax kati*
'Goodness it is so.'
- 6 AN: *ja' me ye tz'i ay-0 to k'an tal x-ch'omota (.) j-me'jun*
! PT PT PT EXIST-3A PT try AUXcome ASP-woo CL-aunt
slus li' ta (.) ba ay-0 s-na ya'tik ta'ye
FNAME here PREP where EXIST-3A 3E-house now PT
'And so he tried (unsuccessfully) to woo (.) **my aunt Slus here**
where her house is now.' [pointing]
(1.3)

AN makes the initial reference to a woman his father tried to woo in line 6 by connecting her to himself ('my aunt Slus') and to where she now lives (pointing), and although the reference is taken up with an implicit acknowledgement in line 7, he expands the reference in line 8 to specify her father, AN's deceased grandfather Lorenzo:

- 7 AP: *ay wan (0.3) ch'i k'an wan tal xch'omota ch'i*
'Oh did he perhaps come and woo (her)!'
- 8 AN: *k'an me tz'in in (.) tz'in in in (.) tz'in in (.) x-nich'an*
try PT PT DEIC PT DEIC DEIC PT DEIC 3E-son
anima j-mamal mam (.) j-mamal lorenzo
deceased CL-oldman GrFa CL-oldman FNAME
'He tried with **this (.) this this (.) this this (.) daughter of**
deceased oldman my grandfather oldman Lorenzo.' NONMIN
(0.4)
- 9 AP: (...)
(1.6)
- 10 AP: *ej ma xka'y yael*
'Eh I guess I haven't heard (about it).'

Failing to get recognition, AN expands further by connecting the referent to even more people, placing her as a namesake of his deceased mother, then

placing her via name and kin relation and location (with a point) to Xpet Perez married to an Uch' man (whom AP is more likely to know); recognition is acknowledged (with oh that one!) in line 12:

- 11 AN: *ja' nax tz'in in s-jelol tz'i anima j-me' i(.) slus*
 ! PT PT DEIC 3E-namesake PT deceased 1E-mother DEIC FNAME
peres i(.) y-ijtz'in in xpet [points] xpet peres ich'-ot
 CNAME DEIC 3E-YoSi DEIC FNAME FNAME LNAME marry-PASS
uch' i
 LNAME DEIC
 'It's just **this namesake then of my deceased mother (.) Slus**
Peres (.) the younger sister of this Xpet [points] Xpet Perez
married to this Uch'.'
- 12 AP: *aj ma k'an wan tal xch'omota men ch'e*
 'Oh he didn't try to come and woo that one!'
- 13 AN: *[k'an naax*
 'He really tried.'

Tracking kin relations and person knowledge in this way has the function of updating common ground between people who are not up-to-date with one another's life. This is important in this society; one needs to know the relationship links between people, and a considerable amount of conversational time is spent updating this information.

8.3.4 Repair

Further insights into principles of person reference can be drawn from cases when reference apparently fails, when uptake is slow or inadequate. When a recipient fails to identify a referent, in what order does a speaker add additional specifications? Is this done incrementally, as the Sacks and Schegloff rules predict? Here are some examples. In Example (24), in response to a question about his land down in hot country, A replies in line 3: 'They have taken it away' (see Example 4). This is not enough; in line 4, PK asks 'who?' AN replies with a kin description: 'the son of deceased oldman my uncle' and then adds (after a half-second pause) 'the husband of Mrs. Xilom As,' likely figuring that the recipient might not know the son (no name given), but will know the mother.

Example (24) [mampak2; talking about AN's cornfields]

- 2 PK: *ma ayuk to a'k'inal tey a*
 'Isn't there still your-land there?'
- 3 AN: *ma smakojik ye tz'i*
 '**They** have taken [lit.: 'covered, blocked'] it then.'
- 4 PK: *mach'a(uk)?*
 'Who?'

- 5 AN: *ja' nix s-mak-oj-ik tz'i x-nich'an anima j-mamal tajun*
 ! PT 3E-block-PERF-PL PT 3E-son deceased CL-oldman uncle
ya a' w-il (0.5) s-mamalal anima j-me'tik j-me'tik
 ICP 2E-see 3E-husband deceased CL-'madam' CL-'madam'
me' xilom as-e
 DEIC CNAME LNAME-CLI
 'They just blocked it then **the son of deceased my oldman uncle**
you know (.5) the husband of that madam, madam Xilom As.'
- 6 PK: *ja' wan smakojik in te-*
 'It's perhaps (that) they blocked the-'
- 7 AN: *ja' smakojik*
 'It's (that) they blocked it.'

Failure of minimal reference may result in non-minimal elaboration as an upgrade, as in Example (25):

Example (25) [mampak; still talking about AN's land]

- 1 PK: *tey wan ay-0 j-mamal j-jelol ek' a*
 there PT EXIST-3A CL-oldman 1E-namesake too DEIC
 'My oldman namesake is still there?'
 (1.4)
- 2 AN: *tz'in in in*
 'this this this' FAILURE TO TAKE UP
- 3 PK: *mamal pekro chanit pasaro alk'al*
 'oldman Pedro Chanit the former alcalde.' NONMIN UPGRADE
- 4 AN: *ju'uk laj. sujtik me tal lok'el i*
 'No, they say. They say they went back.'

Example (25) illustrates another tendency – when recognition is not achieved, upgrading is often done with non-minimal, multiply specified, reference forms. This is another deviation from Sacks and Schegloff principles, with upgrades not necessarily incremental but elaborated all at once, in one breath.

These examples reveal that there are not always particular sequentially-based motivations for using non-minimal referring expressions, reasons to do with identification of referent (lack of uptake, common ground worries), that can account for these expanded forms.

8.4 Summary: Tzeltal person-reference practices

We have seen that, in recognitional references to members of the community, some or all of the following are routinely used in Tzeltal:

'deceased' + honorific + 'oldman'/'woman' + kin term + title + name + location + point

All of this is often, in the context, default information, non-remarkable. The order of mention is important: Like in the game of twenty questions, the

formulation narrows down the range of possibilities, starting relatively general and going more specific if necessary. The sequence seems to be designed to be truncated if possible, at the first strong sign of recognition by the recipient.

The examples I have presented show that simple treatment-of-a-referent-as-within-recipient's-common-ground is often taken to be not enough in Tzeltal person reference. Formulations of person reference frequently convey things beyond referring simpliciter, things like respect to referent, respect to recipient, orientation to the presence of overhearers, taboo avoidances, and other culturally important observances (see Enfield, this volume). Non-minimal recognitional references signal that something else is being done besides simply trying to achieve recognition in the most efficient manner. What else is being done includes marking the referent's social identity, pre-empting possible misidentification of the referent, indexing the relationship between speaker and addressee, updating the social person-log in the participants' common ground, all things that are routine, unremarkable in the context. In this they are distinct from deviations from the expected, routine formulation to express an attitude to the referent or a stance towards the topic.

8.5 Principles of person reference instantiated in Tzeltal

What then are we to make of the non-minimal person references that crop up in Tzeltal conversation? There are three possible interpretations of the facts that I have presented. The first is to claim that the preference for minimization is culture-specific, and does not apply to Tzeltal person reference. This is belied by the numbers – 90 per cent of the person references in my data set are minimal – suggesting that Tzeltal speakers do indeed have a preference for minimization. Minimality is also supported by cases of interactionally generated expansions that are attuned to the level of uptake.

The logical second interpretation is that the principle of minimization is universal. However, this is belied by cases where non-minimal expressions are unremarkable in the local contexts examined above. A third interpretation is the one that seems to be supported by the Tzeltal data: The preference for minimization is universal but is affected differently by other preferences in the system operating in particular cultural contexts. I would like to suggest that there is a third principle, relatively invisible in English but unmarked in Tzeltal, a principle favouring 'association':

Principle 3: Associate the referent as closely as possible to the current conversation participants.

In Tzeltal this is realized in the practice of reckoning the referent through either or both speaker and addressee, or through another relationship connected to speaker or addressee. It seems that, if recognition can be achieved using a

single referring expression that associates to speaker or to addressee, then minimization is also generally observed. If not, minimization yields to association. Doing this (saying things like ‘our-inclusive elder sister’, ‘your elder-sister’s son my Pedro’, etc.) is unremarkable in the context, not conveying anything special beyond person reference.

Note that, in calling this third principle a ‘preference’, I do not mean that if you do not follow Principle 3, Tzeltal people are surprised, or think that you are doing something special. It’s one extremely common practice, courteous and routine, but it is not obligatory. This third principle is perhaps a natural outcome of using possessed kin terms as a default; it also appears to be operative in two other Mayan cultures – Tzotzil (Haviland, this volume) and Yucatec (Hanks, this volume) – and it is a common solution in taboo situations in Yélí Dnye (New Guinea, Levinson, this volume). We might expect it to turn up in other societies where kinship terms are the default for person reference.

Preference 3 is apparent in the Tzeltal data. But Stivers, Enfield and Levinson argue (introduction, this volume) that it is not just a Tzeltal idiosyncrasy, it is observably operative in English conversation as well, most noticeably in non-recognitional reference, and that different orderings of the preferences account for the priority Tzeltal gives to Preference 3 over Preference 2, in contrast to the preferences in English person reference.

Orientation to these three principles gives Tzeltal person reference a universal interpretability. The characteristic local flavour of Tzeltal person reference derives from a combination of at least four things:

- (1) the different weighting given to Preference 3, in comparison with English usage. Principle 3 – association – trumps minimization in Tzeltal at least some of the time, but not in English where it is restricted to non-recognitionals;
- (2) ‘altercentricity’ – reckoning through addressee rather than speaker;
- (3) the kinship and naming systems, which mean that name alone or kin-term alone often are insufficient for recognition;
- (4) particular taboos, like that against naming or using a kin term for one’s own spouse.

What then does Tzeltal tell us about person reference in general? Like in English, we find alternative forms carry additional social information (Stivers, this volume). Like in Lao, we find expanded referring expressions that are minimal, carrying obligatory social information (Enfield, this volume). Like in Yélí Dnye, we find taboos constraining the use of names (Levinson, this volume). Like in many societies around the world, kinship takes precedence over names when referring to persons. And kinship as the default seems to raise the importance of a preference for association.

There are implications of having kinship as the default person-reference form rather than names, since kinship terms apply to larger collectivities of individuals than do names. Relying on kinship means that initial person references are likely to be more elaborated than in speech communities where names are the default.

Updating this person information is an important activity in and for itself. Tenejapans care about kin relations, the most important social information about anyone in their society. They spend a lot of conversational work establishing them in the discourse and reminding each other about them. They also dwell on where people live, used to live, and when things happened in relation to where people live(d). The form of initial person reference sometimes introduces news – for example, *anima* – goodness, has she died? – providing scope for topic elaboration about just what happened to her.

The person-reference forms we have examined in Tzeltal are generally compatible with the conversational principles that have been established for initial person reference in other languages. We can conclude that interaction does indeed seem to have universal structures, yet in the domain of person reference it has local colouring due to culture-specific constraints. Persons are socially loaded referents, and societies circumscribe what you can say about them in particular ways.

Abbreviations

1/2/3E	First/Second/Third Person Ergative (marking ‘ergative’, possessor)
1/2/3A	First/Second/Third Person Absolute
ACS	Achieved change of state particle
ASP	Neutral aspect
ATP	Antipassive
AUX	Auxiliary
BEN	Benefactive derivation
CAUS	Causative derivation
CL	Classifier
CLI	Clause-final clitic
CMP	Completive
CNAME	Clan name
COMP	Complementizer
DEIC	Deictic particle
DET	Definite determiner
DIM	Diminutive
DIR	Directional
DIST	Distributive

EXIST	Existential predicate
FNAME	First (given) name
ICP	Incompletive
LNAME	Last (lineage) name
MCNAME	Mother's clan name
NEG	Negative
PASS	Passive
PERF	Perfect derivation
PL	Plural
PLNAME	Place name
PREP	Generic preposition
PT	Particle
PROG	Progressive
Q	Question particle
QUOT	Quotative
RED	Reduplication
REFL	Reflexive pronoun
REL	Relational noun
RES	Resultative derivation
SG	Singular
SUBJ	Subjunctive
!	Predicator ('it is the case that')

9 The interactional meanings of quasi-pronouns in Korean conversation

Sun-Young Oh

9.1 Introduction

In our daily lives, we often talk about ourselves, those whom we are talking to, and many other people that we know or even don't know. As evidenced by the chapters in this volume, speakers of any language have at their disposal an array of alternative forms that can be used for referring to people. What factors influence a speaker's choice of a particular form at a particular moment in interaction is therefore of great interest. The present chapter examines Korean speakers' practices of referring to persons using *quasi-pronouns* (i.e., nouns followed by a demonstrative akin to 'this guy/girl' in English). Quasi-pronouns are used very frequently in naturally-occurring conversations (typically as subsequent reference terms), but little is known about how, and for what interactional goals, parties to conversation utilize them. This chapter elucidates the interactional uses of quasi-pronouns in reference to third persons by focusing on the actions and activities that speakers are engaged in when they employ these forms. The discussion will focus on how two sub-types of quasi-pronouns (*ku*-based, and distal demonstrative ones and *i*-based, or proximal demonstrative ones) are distinguished in their usages and their functions. The separate use of the two can not only differentiate among referents (e.g., by marking the protagonist status of the referent) but also index participants' relative knowledge or epistemic authority on the referent as well. Specifically, the *i*-based quasi-pronouns are used to claim authoritative knowledge regarding the referent, whereas the *ku*-based forms may be used to show an understanding of the lack of such authority.

This chapter shares the current volume's collective interest in what it is that speakers are doing when they do person reference as well as its attention to the context of use (e.g., who makes reference to whom). This chapter and Stivers', although they focus on different reference positions, both explore how speakers (of Korean and English, respectively) 'do reference to persons so as to accomplish . . . that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice which has been employed' (Schegloff 1996a: 439). What 'more' do Korean speakers do when they refer to people? This chapter shows how

Korean speakers signal the relative prominence of the referent and/or mark out their epistemic rights to talk about people through how they refer to them. Before proceeding to the analysis, I first describe quasi-pronouns as a referential option in Korean.

9.2 Background

The demonstratives play a significant role in practices of referring to people using Korean quasi-pronouns. Demonstratives have traditionally been viewed as a prototypical case of deixis, which expresses a spatio-temporal location (i.e., proximity or distance) in the context of utterance (Lyons 1977). Demonstratives can also serve anaphoric functions, referring back (sometimes forwards) to entities in the prior (or future) discourse (Diessel 1999; Himmelman 1996). In addition, some researchers have pointed out the uses of demonstratives that may be characterized as ‘secondary deixis’, which involves ‘the displacement or reinterpretation of the spatio-temporal dimensions of the primary deictic context’ (Lyons 1995: 310). They note, for example, that demonstratives can sometimes convey the speaker’s emotional/attitudinal closeness to, or distance from, the referent (‘emotional deixis’, according to Lakoff 1974; Halliday and Hasan 1976). In general, linguists take the spatio-temporal domain as the basic and explain other uses of the demonstratives as an extension of this basic meaning (Diessel 1999).

There have been alternative views, however, which propose that ‘the egocentricity of the deictic context is of its very nature cognitive’ (Lyons 1995: 311), rather than physical. From this perspective several attempts have been made to account for the observed uses of demonstratives on the basis of the concept of ‘focus’ (Kirsner 1979; Linde 1979; Sidner 1983; Strauss 1993, etc.), ‘accessibility’ (Ariel 1988, 1990) or the cognitive status of the referent (e.g., ‘in focus’, ‘activated’ or ‘familiar’) (Gundel et al. 1989, 1993). In an analysis of Lao demonstratives, Enfield (2003) has also challenged the common association of demonstratives with spatial meanings (cf. Hanks 2005). He identifies the ‘here-space’ as a factor that is ‘directly relevant for demonstrative selection’ (p. 90), a concept that denotes the immediate interactional focus but is amenable to expansion (see Stivers, this volume, for the here-space incorporating speaker’s domain of responsibility). This chapter suggests that Enfield’s concept of here-space may be further extended to embrace the speaker’s epistemic territory to elucidate the uses of quasi-pronouns for person reference in Korean. By showing that the opposition between the proximal and the distal demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns may be exploited by the speaker to assert/display greater epistemic authority over the referent or acknowledge the lack thereof, this study contributes to a broader and richer understanding of demonstratives.

A common concern of the chapters in this volume is the issue of unmarked versus marked referring expressions, whether in initial or subsequent position. The terms ‘unmarked’ and ‘marked’ are used in the pragmatic sense (see the introduction to this volume), referring to the more typical and the more unexpected options, respectively, than an alternative in a particular context. One form of marked person reference in subsequent position is an initial reference form (e.g., a proper name) (Fox 1987; Schegloff 1996a). In Korean, which has more than one type of subsequent reference form, a marked reference in subsequent position can also be done by choosing a more marked member of the set of subsequent forms over a less marked one (e.g., using a quasi-pronoun rather than zero anaphora or selecting a marked type between the two kinds of quasi-pronoun) (Oh 2002). In other words, more than one type of departure from the unmarked pattern is possible in Korean in both initial and subsequent reference positions. This study scrutinizes one such departure in subsequent position, which concerns the use of quasi-pronouns.

9.2.1 *Quasi-pronouns in Korean*

Reference to third persons can be done in several ways in Korean. For initial reference noun phrases (NPs) of various kinds are typically used. Category terms such as professional titles and (extensively diversified) kinship terms are used most frequently and often in combination with (either full or last) names; bare names are used but more restrictively. In subsequent position, zero anaphora and pronominal terms are commonly employed (although category terms may be used as subsequent reference forms in particular types of interactions, depending on the relationship of speaker-recipient-referent). The following segment illustrates an unmarked pattern for the speaker to use an initial reference form in introducing a person into the talk, and for subsequent references to that person to be done with zero anaphora (K and S are talking on the phone about S’s husband):

Example (1) [K&S]

- 1 K: <ani ey e <ceki **appa**-nun cip-ey kyeysye yosay?
 NEG there dad-TOP home-LOC exist: HON:IE lately
 <Well, uh, <uh, is **your husband** at home these days?
- 2 S: → ∅ yosay cip-ey iss-e: =
 lately home-LOC exist-IE
 ∅’s at home these days. =
- 3 K → =ee, ∅ chwuwusi-ntey mwe-l kulem ka-sye?
 yes be: cold: HON-CIRCUM what-ACC then go- HON: IE
 =Yeah, what would ∅ go out for in this cold weather?
- 4 S: → ani ∅ incey komantwess-canh-a: .
 no now quit: ANT-NCHAL-IE
 No, ∅’s retired now, you know.

- 5 K: → e: eng, ai ∅ acwu an ka-sye?
 yes altogether NEG go-HON:IE
 I see. uh, is ∅ retired for good?
- 6 S: kulem:.
 of course
 Of course:.
- 7 K: uung.=
 yes
 I see:.=

Once the referent is introduced by an anchored kinterm (Downing 1996)¹ the subsequent utterances by both speakers have no overt reference forms expressing the referent (see the ∅ anaphora symbol in lines 2–5).

Zero anaphora is not the only type of subsequent reference form in Korean. It has been suggested by most, if not all, Korean linguists (e.g., Han 1996; Hong 1987; Kang 1988; H. Kim 1989; J. Kim 1992; W. Kim 1994; Lee 1973) that Korean has two third-person singular pronouns, *ku* and *kunye*, which roughly correspond to English *he* and *she*, respectively (and which were arguably introduced into Korean in the early 1900s under the influence of Indo-European languages (Kang 1988)). These third-person pronouns, however, occur only in particular types of writing and very rarely in everyday speech (there was not a single example of such pronouns in the current conversational database). In naturally occurring ordinary conversations what I call *quasi-pronouns* are found instead in subsequent reference position. Quasi-pronouns consist of a demonstrative followed by a general noun denoting ‘person’. In Korean there are three demonstratives: *i* ‘this’, *ku* ‘that (close to addressee)’ and *ce* ‘that over there (distant both from the speaker and the addressee)’. They are used to point to a person (or an object) corresponding to the physical distance among the speaker, the addressee, and the person/object being pointed to. Some demonstratives are employed not only as spatial deictics but as anaphoric devices as well, referring to someone (or something) previously mentioned. The choice of noun in the construction of quasi-pronouns, on the other hand, displays the relative social hierarchy between the speaker and the addressee or the referent: that is, choosing from among such hierarchical nouns as *pwun* ‘esteemed person’, *i* ‘(familiar) person’, *salam* ‘person’, and *ai/ay* ‘child’. There are also many other candidates (typically category terms) that, following a demonstrative, can compose quasi-pronouns: for example, *namca* ‘man’, *yeca* ‘woman’.

¹ People often address or refer to their own or the interlocutor’s spouse with the terms literally meaning ‘X’s dad/mom’, where X is the name of the child (e.g., *Yucin.i appa* ‘Yucin’s dad’). In Example (1), the use of *appa* ‘dad’ by K referring to S’s husband is an extension of this practice (deleting the name of the child), and is understood by S as such. The use of ‘anchored kin terms’ (Downing 1996) or references that specifically associate the referent to someone else such as the recipient, is widespread in Korean, and is not limited to referring to one’s spouse.

Traditionally, these forms, that is demonstratives followed by a noun, have been considered epithets rather than personal pronouns, and most Korean scholars treat them as a subtype of full noun phrases (NPs) (one exception is Sohn (1999), who calls these forms ‘compound pronouns’, thereby acknowledging their pronominal status). Their status in Korean, however, should be thought of differently than in languages like English. In Korean, it appears, there is no clear distinction between demonstrative-NPs and pronouns. The so-called third-person pronouns in Korean are composites of the demonstrative *ku* and nouns: It is believed that *ku* ‘he’ has developed from *ku-i* ‘that man’, and *kunye* ‘she’, from *ku yeca* ‘that woman’ with some morphophonemic modifications. This being the case, we may then justifiably consider demonstratives followed by general nouns as *quasi*-pronouns instead of full NPs in Korean. Such demonstrative plus noun forms in Korean are on a grammaticalization pathway moving from full NPs towards pronouns (Oh 2002). Third-person pronouns in many other languages similarly derive historically from demonstratives (Lyons 1977).

Quasi-pronouns are recurrently used in spontaneous conversations. They constitute a significant referential category in modern Korean. There has been, however, little attention to them in the literature on referential choice in Korean (for an exception, see Oh (forthcoming), which discusses how quasi-pronouns invoke membership categories through co-present person reference). The present chapter describes Korean speakers’ practices of exploiting quasi-pronouns for non-present person reference with special reference to the speakers’ interactional purposes and outcomes as well as the interlocutors’ orientation to them.

Previous research on interaction has demonstrated that parties to conversation are concerned with ‘the management of rights and responsibilities related to knowledge and information’ (Heritage and Raymond 2005:15). Speakers are oriented to the issues of whether and who has primary or secondary epistemic rights to make assessments or assertions (Heritage 2002b; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Stivers 2005). In offering evaluative assessments of some states of affairs, speakers convey the relative rights to perform the assessments in the talk and through various practices can either upgrade or downgrade the epistemic rights to evaluate the matter under discussion (Heritage and Raymond 2005). An *oh*-prefaced agreement to an assessment, for example, is a way of claiming ‘epistemic independence’ (Heritage 2002b), potentially challenging the epistemic primacy of a first assessment. This type of management of the epistemic claims is quite frequent in the context of agreement (Heritage and Raymond 2005). In a similar vein, Stivers (2005) shows that modified repeats are a resource for doing confirmation that claims the second speaker’s primary epistemic rights to make the assertion as well as his/her greater epistemic authority over the assertion. Modified repeats are found in sequential environments where confirmation is not conditionally

relevant, and as such constitute stronger evidence for the interactants' concern with their own epistemic territories. By positioning the referent vis-à-vis the speaker and addressee's epistemic territories, as will be shown below, the relevant use of Korean quasi-pronouns may 'respect the parties' information territories and their associated epistemic rights' (Heritage and Raymond, 2005: 36). This study thus reinforces the significance of epistemic considerations in talk-in-interaction already documented in many other studies.

9.3 *Ku*-forms as the unmarked quasi-pronouns for non-present persons

Each of the three Korean demonstratives can be used to compose a quasi-pronoun. Among the three, the distal demonstrative *ku*-based form is the unmarked type of a quasi-pronoun for referring to a non-present person, and the other two (i.e., *i* and *ce* forms) are normally reserved for co-present person reference (Chang 1978; W. Kim 1994; Ree 1975). Unlike *ce*-based forms, however, the proximal demonstrative *i* can sometimes be used anaphorically, referring to someone mentioned in the previous talk (although its anaphoric usage is limited when compared with *ku*). That is, *ku*-based quasi-pronouns are the unmarked member of the quasi-pronoun pair. *I*-based quasi-pronouns are the marked member. An argument that *ku* is the unmarked choice for anaphoric reference (using quasi-pronouns) is that the supposed third-person pronouns in Korean (i.e., *ku* and *kunye*) are compounds formed on the demonstrative base *ku*. Another form of support for the unmarked status of *ku* comes from the distributional evidence that *ku*-based quasi-pronouns are normally much more common than *i*-based ones. In one conversation from the database, for example, there were forty-seven tokens of *ku*-based forms (24 per cent of all subsequent references to a non-present singular third person), and eleven of *i*-forms (6 per cent). For the remaining subsequent reference positions, zero anaphora was used ($n = 137$, 70 per cent), suggesting that it is the more typical subsequent reference type than quasi-pronouns.

Once a referent is introduced into the talk with a locally initial reference form such as a proper name, subsequent mentions of that person within that spate of talk are habitually done either with zero-anaphora or *ku*-based quasi-pronouns.² This chapter is concerned only with the use of quasi-pronouns (for

² In certain types of interactions, where the social standing of the interactants with respect to each other has relevance a priori, social titles or kinship terms may be employed instead of quasi-pronouns in subsequent reference position. In such interactions, then, the use of a quasi-pronoun instead of the title, for example, is marked, and appears to do something other than referring. The default forms of reference may thus change according to the context (See Introduction). As far as quasi-pronouns are concerned, however, it remains that *ku*-based forms are the default, and *i*-forms, marked (the influence of the context may still show itself as the

the speaker's choice between zero anaphora and quasi-pronouns, see Oh 2002). To see the use of *ku*-based quasi-pronouns for referents mentioned in the previous talk, let us consider one example. This example is taken from a phone conversation between two male graduate students in the United States. They have been talking about mutual friends and acquaintances.

Example (2) [Chemistry Graduates]

- 1 C: *kulikwu ku osuthin-eyse hakwi ha-si-n Isencwu paksa-nim ilakwu:*
and that Austin-LOC degree do-HON-ATTR Isencwu doctor-HT called
And there is somebody called Dr. Isencwu, who got a degree at Austin
- 2 *ku yaktay nao-si-n [pwun kyeysi-ketun-yo?]*
that pharmacy:college graduate-HON-ATTR person:HON exist: HON-
CORREL-POL
and graduated from the college of pharmacy.
- 3 H: [a : : :]
Oh:::
- 4 C: *hyeng ama ana Ø? molu-na.*
brother probably know:DUB not:know-DUB
You probably know Ø? or you don't.
- 5 H: → *ku pwun-i honca sasi-na?*
QP-NOM alone live:HON-INTERR
Does **she** live alone?
- 6 C: → *yey yey toksin. acik. ku pwun-i hankwuk ka-syess-eyo elma cen-ey.*
yes yes single yet QP-NOM Korea go-HON: ANT-POL how before-TEM
Yes, yes, (She's) single. so far. **She** went back to Korea some time ago.

The non-present person who was first introduced by name plus title (at line 1) is referred to with a *ku*-based quasi-pronoun (*ku pwun*) on subsequent mentions (at lines 5 and 6) both by H and C. In using *ku*-based quasi-pronouns, these speakers do not appear to do more than referring, at least from an interactional point of view.³ As is the case in this segment, speakers very often make use of *ku*-based quasi-pronouns, to the exclusion of *i*-based ones, to refer to persons in subsequent position. I have found no evidence in such cases that the participants orient to *ku*-based quasi-pronouns as performing a special interactional function other than referring. It is in this sense as well as from the relative

choice of the general noun following the demonstrative). Oh (2002) discusses some uses of full NPs as subsequent reference forms in Korean.

³ One thing quasi-pronouns often do, which zero anaphora obviously cannot, is to permit the use of a grammatical or discourse particle – such as the nominative marker *i* in lines 5 and 6 – by serving as a ‘hook’ on which to hang the particle. The discussion of the roles of such particles in person reference, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Speaking in sequence terms, quasi-pronouns appear to be less transparently designed for use as subsequent reference form than zero anaphora. By employing a quasi-pronoun instead of zero anaphora, the speaker displays to the recipients that the current sequence is still open at a higher level, but at a lower level the talk that follows is differentiated in some respect from the immediately preceding talk (Oh 2002).

frequency of occurrence that they are the unmarked type of quasi-pronoun for referring to a non-present person.

Sometimes, however, speakers employ proximal demonstrative *i*-based quasi-pronouns for reference to non-present persons. When does the speaker use *i*-based quasi-pronouns to refer to people? What is the function of such a reference form? Researchers have noted the anaphoric usage of the proximal demonstrative (+NP) (e.g., Chang 1978; W. Kim 1994), but since their descriptions are based on intuition or contrived data, they fail to explicate the interactional functions of these marked usages. If two types of quasi-pronouns are possible, why does the speaker prefer one type over the other in a given context? Is there orderliness in the use of these forms by the speaker? If so, what interactional relevances or import does this orderliness have? Do parties to conversation orient to the use of these forms? By asking the omnirelevant question for parties to talk-in-interaction (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 299), as well as for analysts – ‘why that now?’ – this chapter provides at least partial answers to these questions.

9.4 *I*-forms as the marked quasi-pronouns: signalling prominence of referent and claiming speaker’s epistemic authority

This section develops an account for variation in the use of *i*-based and *ku*-based quasi-pronouns. The first subsection demonstrates that the choice between the two may be implicated in the differentiation among referents, one important criterion for the choice being the relative degree of ‘protagonism’ (Cumming 1995) of a referent. The second subsection shows that speakers use *i*-based quasi-pronouns in environments where they (claim to) know the referent better than the recipients do. In such contexts, recipients commonly yield to the speaker’s claim of epistemic authority, acknowledging their lack of authority with the use of *ku*-based forms for the same referent. Sometimes, however, the recipient challenges the speaker’s asserted authority, in response to which the speaker may switch to *ku*-based quasi-pronouns as a way of backing down in his/her epistemic claim on the referent in question.

9.4.1 I-based quasi-pronouns signalling prominence of the referent

The use of *i*-based versus *ku*-based quasi-pronouns can differentiate referents when more than one referent is being talked about in a spate of talk. Most significant in this regard is the function of quasi-pronouns in defining the relative prominence of a character in a story. In what follows, I examine how the participation status of the characters referred to correlates with the type of quasi-pronoun used.

Those who are referred to with *i*-based quasi-pronouns (e.g., *yay*) tend to be foregrounded as important figures in the talk. In telling a story about her friend's upcoming wedding, a speaker uses *yay* to refer to her friend who is getting married, thereby differentiating herself from the other members of the audience as the authoritative teller (see the [next section](#)). In contrast, she uses *kyay* for minor characters whose identity is relatively insignificant for the story (or unknown to herself). In other words, the speaker shows that she attaches less importance to this referent who is being referred to with *kyay*. This observation thus brings us to an important feature of *yay*, namely, the tendency to use *i*-based quasi-pronouns for those who are main characters in the talk. In story-telling contexts, the story-teller reserves *i*-based quasi-pronouns for the protagonist only, as a display of his/her stance towards the referent. When the teller refers to another third person, who only plays a minor role in the story, s/he uses *ku*-based quasi-pronouns. This differentiation among referents by the speaker is systematic.

In the following excerpt, we see an illustration of the claim that the choice between a *ku*-based and an *i*-based quasi-pronoun does interactional work related to the participation status of the referent. J is telling P about a movie that she saw, in which two famous Chinese actors, Cangkwukyeng (Leslie Cheung) and Yangcowi (Tony Leung) play a gay couple. Throughout her telling, J refers to both these actors with *yay*, never with *kyay*. In contrast, she refers to a supporting actor who serves only a subsidiary role in the movie with *ku*-based quasi-pronouns, which reaffirms that the speaker is accomplishing the differentiation among the referents at least partially by means of the reference form that she uses.

(Korean utterances and the glosses are provided only for the lines containing quasi-pronouns. Different types of arrows are associated with different characters; single-lined arrows are used for Yangcowi, double-lined arrows for Cangkwukyeng, and double-headed arrows for the minor character.)

Example (3) [Boyfriends]

- 1 J: → Yangcowi is (= plays the role of) a man and, °hhh
 2 ⇒ This Cangkwukyeng, (0.8) whenever he's hit- (0.2) He goes to other places
 3 and dates another man h heh heh [°hhhh]=
 4 P: [h h h]
 5 J: =without discretion, and (0.2) if the relationship
 6 does not go very well and he gets sick
 7 → *mak tachi-kwu kule-myen yay-lul chac-a wa:=*
 hard get:hurt-CONN do:so-COND QP-ACC seek-CONN come:IE
 and hurt, then he comes to him.=
 8 P: =I see..
 ... ((7 lines omitted))

- 16 → <And **Yangcowi**,[°]hhh on the contrary,
 17 ⇒ **yay-ka:ç** (1.0) tetikey naass-umyen: >°ku- ke-l pala-nun
 QP-NOM slowly recover:ANT-COND that-thing-ACC hope-ATTR
 >wishes that< **he** (1.0) would recover slowly,
 18 because he would stay with him that way.=
 19 P: Right:: right
 20 J: =Even for a while.
 21 P: I see::
 22 J: ⇒ °hh **yay-nun ceng** (h)mal amwukes-twu an ha-kwu (0.2)
 QP-TOP truth anything-ADD NEG CONN
 °hh **He** doesn't do anything at all and, (0.2)
 23 >always plays (.) the baby< like- like this.=
 24 P: Mm:
 25 J: → =kulem **yay-ka mak** °hhhhh cepsi-takki hayse ton pel-ese (.)
 then QP-NOM hard dish-washing do: PRECED money earn-PRECED
 =And **he** °hhhhh washes dishes to earn money and (.)
 26 >on the way back home< at night=
 27 P: Mm::
 28 J: → =>mek-ul ke sa-kakkwu yay yolihayse mekye-cwu-kwu
 eat-ATTR thing buy-PRECED QP cook:PRECED eat:CAUS-give-CONN
 =>buys food, cooks, feeds, and washes **him**.<
 29 P: Gee
 30 (.)
 31 J: ⇒ °hh kuntey- yay-ka tto- enu nal- mom-i ta naass-taç
 DM QP-NOM again one day body-NOM all recover:ANT-DECL
 °hh But- one day- **he** gets well again, you know.
 32 ⇒ kunikka tto nal-a-k-a pelyess-e yay- nun:.=
 DM again fly-CONN-go-PFV:ANT-IE QP-TOP
 And **he** leaves again.=
 33 P: =Yeah:
 34 J: → >kunikka yay< ne:mwu nemwu ku sangsil-kam- i khu-nteyç (0.3) tch!
 DM QP too:much too:much that loss-feeling-NOM big-CIRCUM
 >And **he**< suffers so much from the loss and (0.3) tch!
 35 ->> →kathi cepsi-takki ha-te-n °hh >namca-ka tto yay-lul-< (0.2)
 together dish-washing do-RETROS-ATTR man-NOM again QP-ACC
 >a guy< °hh who used to wash dishes with him (0.2)
 36 -> [ad(h)or(h)es him, **Yangcowi**. °hhhh]
 37 P: [He likes him? he he ha ha ha °hhhhh]
 38 J: ->> kuntey kyay-nun incey °hh mak tolatani:-te-n ay-yess-ketunç
 DM QP-TOP now at:random go:around-RETROS-ATTR kid-be:ANT-CORREL
 And **he** °h has been travelling around a lot.
 ... ((17 lines omitted))
 56 J: → =And °hhh **Yangcowi** holds and (0.2) looks at the recorder, and (0.3)
bursts into tears.
 57 P: Wow::

- 58 J:-->> e *kunkka-ku salam-i-*> (*icey/kuntey*) tto-< *tokpayk-i nao-myense;*
 yes DM QP-NOM now/DM again monologue-NOM come:out-SIMUL
 Yes, then **he-**> (now/but) < again- with a monologue,
- 59 ->> (0.2)tch! >**the traveling man:**< °hh is in someplace like a lighthouse.

Yangcowi (Y), who has been introduced by name at line 1, is referred to with *yay* at line 7 while *yay* at line 17 refers to Cangkwukyeng (C). The speaker continues to employ the same reference term, that is *yay*, to refer to both of them (*yay* refers to Y in lines 25 and 34, and to C in lines 22, 28, 31, and 32). When there is more than one referent in the (non-story) talk, speakers recurrently make use of both *ku-* and *i-*-based quasi-pronouns to differentiate between referents (Oh 2002). The use of different kinds of quasi-pronouns for the pre-existing and the new referent serves to differentiate between, and thereby easily keep track of, the two referents in subsequent talk.

In this example, we see that J does not follow this regular referential practice but repeatedly employs *yay* at the risk of potential ambiguity. This strongly supports the claim that major characters are referred to using *i-*-based forms. This can be further confirmed by comparing the speaker's consistent use of *yay* for reference to these two protagonists with her treatment of a minor character in the movie. At line 35, J introduces a new referent by using a non-recognitional descriptor, *kathi cepsitakki haten namca* 'a guy who used to wash dishes with him', and subsequently refers to him with *ku-*-based quasi-pronouns (i.e., *kyay* at line 38 and *ku salam* at line 58), or with another recognitional description, *ku tolataninun namca* 'the travelling man' (at line 59). The speaker is thus observably mobilizing referential practices to signal to the recipient that the characters referred to with *yay* and those denoted with *kyay* (or other *ku-*-based quasi-pronoun) should be understood and treated differently in terms of their status in the story.

The use of quasi-pronouns bears these sorts of implications, and for this reason, the two kinds of quasi-pronouns exhibit interesting complementary distribution. Whereas any referent in discourse may undergo zero anaphora and therefore may not be overtly mentioned in subsequent reference positions, only main characters are referred to by *i-*-based quasi-pronouns. Those who are not referred to with *i-*-based quasi-pronouns play only minor parts in the stories (or situations) being told. It appears, therefore, that the degree of protagonism constitutes one important criterion for the choice between an *i-*-based and a *ku-*-based quasi-pronoun. The referential practice observed here may be related to the different degree of focus that some researchers argue is associated with each demonstrative (Kirsner 1979; Nimura and Hayashi 1994, 1996; Nishimura 1996; Oh 2001; Strauss 1993). According to Strauss (1993), the proximal demonstrative *this* in English signals high focus,

newness, and importance, whereas the distal demonstrative *that* is associated with a relatively lower degree of focus, oldness and unimportance. Perhaps relatedly, Korean speakers use proximal demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns in referring to main characters, and distal demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns in referring to those who figure as relatively subordinate characters in the talk.

In sum, Korean speakers make use of the contrast between *i*-based and *ku*-based quasi-pronouns to differentiate between two (or more) referents that concurrently figure in the talk. In stories, differentiated use of the two types of quasi-pronouns is one way that the special status of the character referred to is 'made visible' (Goodwin 1986). Korean proximal demonstrative *i*-based quasi-pronouns like *yay* are used by the speaker to establish protagonists in a story. Minor characters are instead referred to with a distal demonstrative *ku*-based quasi-pronoun such as *kyay* or non-recognitional descriptions.

9.4.2 *I-based quasi-pronouns claiming speaker's epistemic authority on the referent*

Selection of a quasi-pronoun requires orientation not only to the social relationship between the speaker and the referent, as displayed by the choice of the noun following the demonstratives (e.g., *ku pwun* vs. *kyay*), but also to the speaker's stance towards the referent and the recipient (e.g., *kyay* vs. *yay*). The differential status of the parties to a conversation is clearly displayed in a storytelling context. The participation status of the speaker as teller or audience member of a story appears to have a direct bearing on the choice between the two types of quasi-pronouns that recurrently appear in locally subsequent reference positions. In telling a story about a non-present person, only its teller can refer to that person with *yay*, whereas the recipient regularly refers to the same person with *kyay*. One analysis is that the *i*-based quasi-pronoun (e.g., *yay*) attributes greater 'ownership' to the speaker of the referent in question. By using *yay*, the speaker claims his/her authority to speak about, as well as his/her knowledgeability about, the referent. *Kyay*, on the other hand, can be used by the recipient of the telling to display his/her lack of such authority and deference to the teller's authority. Example (4), which is taken from a face-to-face conversation among three female friends, shows the interlocutors' referential options in circumstances where one party is much more knowledgeable about a referent than the others. N has been telling J and S about one of her friends, who got divorced. N has introduced her with a non-recognitional form (*han myeng* 'one person'), as a way of conveying that the others do not know the person she is referring to. On several subsequent mentions, N refers to her using zero anaphora. Immediately before the interaction shown below,

N has explained that the whole process of the divorce only took two weeks after the husband decided to divorce her friend. (In the current section, single-lined arrows are used to point to *ku*-based quasi-pronouns, and double-lined arrows, to *i*-based quasi-pronouns.)

Example (4) [Three Friends]

- 1 J: → >**kyay-nun** *kulem ihon-tangha-n ke-ya kunyang* [*< c e n g s i n - e p s - j i ?*]
 QP-TOP then divorce-suffer-ATTR thing-be:IE just spirit-not:exist-ADV
 Was **she** then just asked for a divorce <unexpectedly?
- 2 N: [Ø *tangha-n ke-ya.*]
 suffer-ATTR thing-be:IE
 Ø was asked for a divorce.
- 3 *ung.*
 yes
 Yeah.
- 4 (0.2)
- 5 J: *ewu ya.=*
 Oh VOC
 Oh, goodness.=
- 6 N: ⇒ [=*kuntey yay-ka*]
 DM QP-NOM
 =And **she**-
- 7 S: ⇒ [=*kuntey kyay-twu*] >*kulen sayngkak-ul ha-ki-n hayss-tay-may.* <
 DM QP-ADD such thought-ACC do-NOML-TOP do:ANT-HEARSAY-SIMUL
 But you said **she** was also >considering a divorce, didn't you. <
- 8 (.)
- 9 N: ⇒ *a kuntey yay-nun:: ku iyu-ka:: sitayk-eyse:*
 a DM QP-TOP that reason-NOM the:family:of:husband-LOC
- 10 >*cakkwu tule- wa sal-lakwu kule-kwu icey* < *cikcang-ul mos*
 incessantly come:in:CONN live-QUOT say:so-CONN now job-ACC NEG
- 11 *kaci-key ha-nikka:: cengmal:: ile-llye-myen nayka way kyelhon*
 have-allow-because really like:this- PURP-COND I:NOM why marriage-
- 12 -*ul hayss-na=ile-n sayngkak-ul ha-myense::,*
 ACC do:ANT-INTERR like:this-ATTR thought-ACC do-SIMUL
 Oh, but for **her**:: the reason was- >because the family of her husband
 kept telling her to live with them, < and did not allow her to get a
 job, so she began to wonder 'why did I get married' ,
- 13 S: *uung,*
 yes
 I see,

In proposing a candidate understanding of the prior talk, J uses the quasi-pronoun based on the demonstrative *ku*, which implies by definition 'distant from the speaker, close to the recipient', to refer to N's friend, with whom she was unacquainted before and knows only through N's previous talk. Unlike J, N uses *yay* to refer to her friend (see N's aborted turn at line 6), revealing her stance as to the relationship between herself and the recipients with respect to

the referent. Note that S – who, like J, is a member of the audience of the story that N is telling – refers to N’s friend with *kyay* (at line 7) as J did at line 1. By using the hearsay marker *tay*, however, S is showing that she has already heard at least part of the story, thereby signalling that unlike J, she is a knowing participant, although she is not as knowledgeable as the teller N. What S is doing in her turn is refusing to align herself with N and delivering her disagreement with N by bringing in information that would undermine N’s prior talk. Facing the interlocutor’s dis-alignment and following a micropause, N starts to defend her position by providing an excuse for her friend for having considered a divorce. Note here that N again refers to her friend with *yay* instead of *kyay*. Due to its significance in claiming authority, the use of *yay* represents a tactical advantage especially in this context where the speaker tries to make a claim to authoritative knowledge on the matter regarding the referent, thereby successfully dealing with the disagreement/ dis-alignment by her interlocutor. Acknowledging that N has a stronger ‘claim’ on the referent than she does, S then backs down by accepting N’s talk at line 13 with *uung* ‘I see’, relaxing her counteractive stance. In the talk that follows the above segment (not shown here) N consistently uses *yay* (or zero anaphora) to refer to her friend.

By not using the proximal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun *yay*, both J and S mark the fact that they do not have authority on this referent. The recipients display their understanding of the lack of authority in other ways, too, attributing to the teller (i.e., N) the authority on the information regarding the referent. For example, J proposes her candidate understanding of N’s prior talk, which only N has the right to confirm or reject. Even in delivering her disagreement with or challenge to N (at line 7), S avoids taking full responsibility for her talk by means of a hearsay marker *tay*. By doing this, S demonstrates that she is only ‘animating’ (Goffman 1979, 1981) the talk, and N should therefore be taken as the author and principal; she also demonstrates that she does not even have the authority to deliver such a disagreement in her own words.

The above example suggests that a speaker’s knowledge (or claimed knowledge) relative to the recipient’s degree of knowledge regarding the referent, influences the referential choices made by parties to a conversation. Speakers with inferior knowledge of the referent use different reference terms for the same referent than do knowledgeable participants. By using either *i*-based or *ku*-based forms, the speaker can display or claim his/her awareness of the imbalance between the recipient and him/herself in terms of knowledge of the referent.

Another clear example of the authority evoked by the use of an *i*-based quasi-pronoun is reproduced in Example (5). Example (5) is taken from a telephone conversation between K and S, who are close friends from high-school. In an earlier sequence, the talk centred around the topic of S’s

daughter's coming to visit Korea. S has been telling K that her daughter, who moved to the United States after marrying a Korean-American man a few years ago, is very anxious to visit Korea soon. At line 1, S lists some of the reasons why her daughter is so impatient. This engenders an extended sequence, where K, aligning herself with S's daughter, tries to justify her emotional state by telling a similar story. We will be focusing on lines 14 and 15, where K and S employ different types of quasi-pronouns for S's daughter for the reasons of S's epistemic authority over the referent, and K's lack thereof:

Example (5) [K & S]

- 1 S: *mwe* \emptyset *chinkwu-tul po-kwu siph-kwu mwe tolatayngki-kwu siph-kwu*
 what friend-PL see-want to-CONN what go:around-want to-CONN
 \emptyset misses her friends and wants to go to places, and,
- 2 (0.3)
- 3 S: [*a y u*]
 Oh my
- 4 K: [*ku-ke*] *icey ζ* (.) *kuleh-tay*
 that-thing now be:so-HEARSAY
That's (.) like this, I heard.
- ... ((7 lines omitted))
- 12 K: =*kulayss-tay*:
 say:so:ANT-HEARSAY
 =he said so (I heard.)
- 13 S: $\textcircled{\text{u}}$ *ung* [*kule-*]
 yes like:that-
 $\textcircled{\text{u}}$ Yeah, so-
- 14 K: \Rightarrow [*kulen*] *simceng-iya*:. *kyay*[-*k a* : . .]
 such feelings-be:IE QP-NOM
 It's such feelings, what **she** has.
- 15 S: \Rightarrow [*kuntey*] *yay-nuun*: ζ *te* (0.3)
 DM QP-TOP more
 But as for **her**,
- 16 >*ceki oylowun key ζ* <
 thing: NOM there lonely
 uh lonelier is- the reason why she feels (0.3)
- 17 K: *uung*
 yes
 Yeah
- 18 S: \emptyset *chinkwu-tul-i eps-ekacikwu ζ*
 friend-PL-NOM not:exist-PRECED
 because \emptyset doesn't have friends there,
- 19 K: $\textcircled{\text{u}}$ *kuleh-ci*: $\textcircled{=}$
 be:so-COMM
 $\textcircled{\text{u}}$ That's right. $\textcircled{=}$

After telling a story about a person who was in a similar situation as S's daughter (from lines 4 through 12), K explicitly states (at line 14) that S's

daughter must have the same feelings as the character in her story, implying that once she comes to visit Korea, her impatience will disappear. K refers to S's daughter with *kyay* at line 14, thereby displaying an orientation to her lack of authority concerning the referent. As it happens, S does not fully align herself with M, and mitigates M's prior talk by providing an additional, perhaps unique, reason for her daughter's being so impatient. As can be expected from her closer (kin-based) relation with the referent, S uses *yay* to refer to her daughter, thereby displaying/claiming her authority on the information about the referent. S brings up a fact that only she has access to, that her daughter does not have any friends in the United States, which makes her feel lonelier than the person in M's story. Here again, the *i*-based quasi-pronoun is a strategic resource for making a claim to authoritative knowledge on a particular subject. As can be seen at line 19, K then aligns herself with S with an acceptance token *kulehci* 'that's right'.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that interlocutors' options with respect to the use of quasi-pronouns for referring to a non-present person can display the interactants' participation status of the moment by differentiating the story-teller from the audience. To repeat, when the story-teller refers to the referent with *i*-based quasi-pronouns like *yay*, they claim authority to speak about the referent, while the recipient displays diminished authority by using *ku*-based quasi-pronouns like *kyay*. (I have no cases of a speaker using an *i*-based quasi-pronoun for a referent whom s/he is acquainted with only through the prior talk of an interlocutor.) The use of such 'referential practice' (Hanks 1990) is not restricted to story-telling contexts, but is also observed in non-story talk, as attested to by the subsequent two examples.

Example (6) is from a gathering of three male friends, in which they are talking about a director at their company. K has made a complaint about the director's inconsistent statements, in response to which N does not align himself with K, providing excuses on behalf of the director. In the immediately preceding talk, N has said that one should be able to 'screen' what the director says and figure out what he really wants. Following an eight-second pause, K initiates a repair (at line 1) by providing a candidate understanding of N's prior talk. As it happens, the sequential implicativeness of the repair initiation is cancelled by N's starting to talk in overlap with K's turn. This extract evidences in particular that a speaker may shift from a *ku*-based quasi-pronoun to an *i*-based one to make a stronger epistemic claim on the referent (see lines 6 and 13):

Example (6) [Three Guys]

1 K: [*phoin*]thu-lul mos cap-ass-ta-nun yayki[-lul ha-nun ke-ya?]
 point-ACC NEG catch-ANT-DECL-ATTR talk-ACC do-ATTR thing-be:IE
 Are you saying that I didn't get the point?

- 2 N: [(ne)] [i seysang-ey] ceyil cal
you this world-LOC most well
- 3 a-nun salam-i **Pakinchel-ilanun salam-iyac**
know-ATTR person-NOM Pakinchel-called person-be:IE
Hey, the one who understands it best in the world is **a man whose name is Pakinchel.**
- 4 (1.5)
- 5 K:→ *nayka ku salam cal anun ke-n nay al-ci.=*
I:NOM QP well know:ATTR thing-TOP I:NOM know-COMM
I know that **he** knows it well.=
- 6 N:⇒ *=ayu ku salam- (.) i salam-i- (0.5) Kimhyenil: (0.5) isa-uy-isa-ka (0.5)*
QP QP-NOM Kimhyenil director-GEN director-NOM
=Gee, he- (.) he- (0.5) Director Kimhyenil's- (0.5) Director (0.5)
- ... ((5 lines omitted))
- 12 *ku-ke-lul- (0.5) ku-ke-l kacang (0.3) Ø ttak ku-ke-n pelcce*
that-thing-ACC that-thing-ACC most perfectly that-thing-TOP already
(The one who knows) that- (0.5) that best- (0.3)
- 13 ⇒ *a-nun salam-i-keteng. (1.0) i salam-un ku-ke-l al-ki ttaymwuney*
know-ATTR person-be-CORREL QP-TOP that-thing-ACC know-NOML because
He knows that already. (1.0) Because **he** knows that,
- 14 *Ø Kim-isa-hanthey- (0.6) piwilul macchwu- nun ke-ya. (1.0)*
Kim-director-to please-ATTR thing- be:IE
Ø puts the Director Kim (0.6) in good humour. (1.0)
- ... ((10 lines omitted))
- 25 N: *ku-ke-lul <al-aya tway:> oylamtoy-cimanun=*
that-thing-ACC know-should:IE presumptuous-though
<You should know> that. It's presumptuous (for me to say it),
though.=
- 26 K: *=kuntey- heyheyhey[heyhey heyheyhe]*
DM
=But- heyheyheyheyhey heyheyhe
- 27 N: [na-twu ale.]
I-ADD know:IE
I know it, too.

At lines 2–3, N introduces a person with a non-recognitional descriptor ‘a person called Pakinchel’, saying that he knows best what the director wants. K’s response, which is itself delayed by a rather long (1.5 second) pause, conveys his possibly non-aligning stance: K rejects N’s proposal about the non-recognizability of the referent and then disaligns himself with N by saying that he already knew what N has just told them about the referent. This gets an immediate response from N (the equal signs signify latched turns), who begins his talk with the same reference form that has just been used by K (at line 5), that is the distal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun *ku salam*. However, N initiates a self-repair, replacing *ku salam* with a proximal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun (*i salam*). (On repair and person reference see the chapters in this volume by Heritage, Levinson and Sidnell.) With this repair, N claims

better knowledge of the referent than the recipient K, especially after K claims his independent knowledge of the referent. In the following talk, N elaborates on the claimed feature of the referent, that is his excellent understanding of the director, saying that he discerns which statements of the director are meant to be acted upon, and does act upon them. In the omitted part (lines 7–11), N refers to the director with the distal quasi-pronoun, that is *ku salam*, whereas he still refers to the man (Pakinchel) with the proximal demonstrative-based form *i salam* (at line 13), and therefore claims better knowledge on Pakinchel than the recipient. In lines 15–24 (not shown here), N contrasts this referent with other employees (including the recipient K), who misunderstand the director and act upon statements that he does not mean to be acted upon, thereby failing to get his affection. N's strong suggestion that K should know this is followed by his own acknowledgement of the presumptuousness of his advice (at line 25), and is thus responded to by laughter from K, who is otherwise beginning to disagree, as signalled by the turn-initial discourse marker *kuntey* (Park 1997).

As displayed above, speakers employ *i*-based quasi-pronouns as a way of claiming authoritative knowledge about the referent in non-story talk as well as in telling stories. Of exceptional interest is that when the speaker's better knowledge or authority about the referent is challenged by the recipient, the original speaker may back down, giving up the *i*-based quasi-pronoun and returning to the *ku*-based one. One such instance is found in Example (7), which displays the exchange preceding Example (6). K has just delivered a complaint about director Kimhyenil, in response to which N does not align himself with K, saying that K should understand the director (at line 1):

Example (7) [Three Guys]

- 1 N: → *tch! kuntey Kimhyenil isa:-nun₂ (1.5) ku salam-ul al-aya tway:.*
DM Kimhyenil director-TOP QP-ACC know-should:IE
Tch! But as for Director Kimhyenil, (1.5) you should know **him**.
- 2 (1.3)
- 3 → *nika- (1.2) <ku salam: cachey-lul?> (.) ihay-lul hayya tway.*
you:NOM QP self-ACC understanding-ACC
do:should:IE
You- (1.2) should understand (.) <**him** himself.>
- 4 (0.5)
- 5 → >°*kulayya tway ku salam-un.°*<
do:so:should:IE QP-TOP
>°You should do that with **him**.°<
- 6 (1.3)
- 7 ⇒ *i salam-un₂ (2.5) caki susulo-uy silik-ul wihayse (0.5) cocik-ey*
QP-TOP self self-GEN interests-ACC for organization-LOC
As for **him**, (2.5) he is not in the company (0.5)

- 8 *iss-nun salam-i ani-ya. (1.2)ku-ke hana- <anya. (0.3)*
 exist-ATTR person-NOM no-be:IE that-thing one no:IE
 for his own interests. (1.2) that- No. (0.3)
- 9 *ku-ke hana-nun °ihayhayya tway:. °*
 that-thing one- TOP understand:should:IE
 °You should at least understand° that.
- 10 (0.4)
- 11 K: *silik- Ø caki-man-ul wihayse iss-nun key ani-lako ha-nun*
 interests self-only-ACC for exist-ATTR thing:NOM no-QUOT say-ATTR
- 12 *ke(ya cikum). (0.3) iss-nun key ani-lako=*
 thing-be:IE now exist-ATTR thing:NOM no-QUOT
 Interests- Are you saying- (0.3) Are you saying that Ø is not in
 the company only for himself?=
 13 N: =°e.
 yes
 =°Yes.
- 14 (0.8)
- 15 K: *kulem Ø wuli-tul-ul wihayse iss-nun ke-lako*
 then we-PL-ACC for exist-ATTR thing-QUOT
 Then, you are saying that Ø is in the company for us, huh?
- 16 (1.2)
- 17 K: *na-n ku-ke-n [ani-]*
 I-TOP that-thing-TOP no
 I don't think that's-
- 18 N: [a i] a i a i [a i]
 No no no no
- 19 K: [na-n ku]-ke ani-lako [sayngkakhay.]
 I-TOP that-thing no-COMP think:IE
 I don't think that's true.
- 20 N: [anya i -] tch!
 No, this- tch!
- 21 Ø *payk phulo: (0.5)wuli- (0.2) wuli salamtul-ul wihayse iss-tako ha-myen*
 hundred percent we we people-ACC for exist-QUOT say-COND
 If I say Ø is here one hundred percent (0.5) for us (0.2) people, then
- 22 >ku-ke-n ku-ke-n calmostoyn ke-ya < kuke kuke-nun
 that-thing-TOP that-thing-TOP wrong thing-be:IE that that-TOP
 >that- that's wrong.< That- That's
- 23 *nemwu cikum hewultayki-ka khun ke-ko: (1.2) ku-ke mankhum (0.2)*
 too:much now exterior-NOM big thing-CONN that-thing as:much:as
 an exaggeration, (1.2) That much (0.2)
- 24 → >ku salam-un< (0.2) i cocik-ul (0.3)>sayngkak-ul ha-ko iss-nun ke-ya.<
 QP-TOP this organization-ACC thinking-ACC do-PROG-ATTR thing-be:IE
 >he is< (0.2) >thinking about< (0.3) this company.

By repeating three times (at lines 1, 3 and 5) that the recipient should know the director who is obviously known to him, N implies that there is (at least) a certain aspect of the referent that the recipient does not know yet. By not providing what that aspect is, however, he projects further talk by himself. The recipient displays his orientation to this by not initiating a turn at talk (see the pauses at lines 2, 4 and 6 following each turn by N). (Alternatively, each of

these silences may represent the absence of relevant uptake by the recipient, with which he shows that he declines to align with the speaker.) At line 7, N finally begins to describe the aspect of the referent that he claims is unknown to the recipient. Unlike in the preceding talk where he referred to the director with a *ku*-based quasi-pronoun (*ku salam* in lines 1, 3 and 5), N employs a proximal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun (*i salam*) for the same referent (see the double-lined arrow). The shift from *ku salam* to *i salam* occurs at the beginning of the provision of the critical characteristic of the referent, on which N claims to have exclusive knowledge. The use of the proximal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun at line 7 is thus part of the strategy used by the speaker to claim better knowledge of the referent. N's claim of better knowledge is challenged by K, who first initiates repair on N's talk (at lines 11–12 and 15), and then begins to deliver an actual disagreement (at line 17). Before K's turn reaches possible completion, however, N starts to back down (at line 18), and in lines 20–24, he yields to the outright challenge by the interlocutor by downgrading his prior assertion: Earlier, he had claimed that the director's working in the company had nothing to do with his own interests, but now he only states that the director cares about the company very much. Concurrent with this change in the speaker's stance (i.e., backdown) is the change of reference form from an *i*-based to a *ku*-based quasi-pronoun (see the beginning of line 24). That is, facing the interlocutor's disagreement, the speaker, who had employed a proximal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun to claim better knowledge of the referent, returns to the distal demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun as a way of backing down.

To summarize, Korean speakers exploit oppositions among the demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns, and the implications carried by each, for social-interactional purposes. These demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns are useful wherever the speaker tries to project his/her own (and the interlocutor's) epistemic authority concerning or knowledgeability about the referent in question. Given the deictic meaning of each demonstrative (i.e., *i* meaning 'close to speaker', and *ku* meaning 'close to hearer'), speakers naturally choose the proximal demonstrative *i* (instead of *ku*) in claiming their authority concerning the referent, because by using *i*, the speaker can depict the referent as being closer to him/herself. Depending on the context, one of the two types of quasi-pronouns (e.g., *yay* or *kyay*) is preferred over the other because the choice between them can claim the speaker's differential status relative to the recipient in terms of knowledge about the referent.

9.5 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated Korean speakers' practices of exploiting quasi-pronouns in reference to non-present persons, paying special attention to the

interactional goals of the speaker who uses a specific type of quasi-pronoun. The study reveals some factors that bear on the use of quasi-pronouns in conversation. The contrast between the two types of quasi-pronouns may serve to differentiate among referents when there is more than one referent being talked about. In particular, the separate use of the two (e.g., *yay* or *kyay*) is one of the ways in which the special status (e.g., protagonist) of the referent is displayed/claimed. The speaker's choice between the two types of quasi-pronouns can also display his/her differential status relative to the recipient in terms of epistemic authority on the referent. Speakers employ *i*-based quasi-pronouns as a way of displaying/claiming authoritative knowledge about the referent, whereas *ku*-based ones can be used to show an understanding of the lack of such authority. The *i*-based quasi-pronoun may thus constitute not only an indicator of the main character status of the referent, but of superior knowledge about the referent on the speaker's part.

Applying Enfield's (2003) concept of here-space, *i*-based quasi-pronouns may be said to signal that the referent falls within the speaker's here-space, where this concept encompasses speaker's epistemic territory. As noted, *i*-based quasi-pronouns are efficacious in environments where the speaker displays his/her authority concerning a particular referent. In circumstances where the speaker's relative knowledge or authority regarding a referent is inferior to the recipient's, *ku*-based distal forms, and not the proximal quasi-pronouns, are used. In other words, *i*-based forms may 'index epistemic authority' concerning the referent, and *ku*-forms, 'subordination' (Heritage and Raymond 2005). This study thus demonstrates that people are concerned with epistemic territories not only in the domain of assessments (Heritage 2002b; Heritage and Raymond 2005) and assertions (Stivers 2005) but also in the domain of person reference, thereby evidencing the breadth of speakers' concerns with territories of knowledge in talk-in-interaction across languages and cultures.

On the other hand, we may compare Korean speakers' referential practices with those of speakers of other languages. Researchers have noted that main character status has a significant influence on the speaker's referential choice in many languages (e.g., Clancy 1980; Downing 1996; Duranti 1984). In Italian, either type of demonstrative – proximal or distal – is used to refer to those who play subsidiary roles, whereas pronouns are used for protagonists (Duranti 1984). Duranti interprets this by means of the deictic nature of the demonstratives since 'the fact that certain referents must be located "somewhere in space" suggests their not being already present or close to someone's mind (or heart)' (Duranti 1984: 279). Downing (1996) observes that the demonstrative *this* in English is often used in combination with proper names in cases where the speaker tries to mark their inferior knowledge regarding the referent. Similar to Duranti, she suggests that 'the connotations of distance between the speaker and the referent' signalled by the demonstrative may be extended to the 'territorial

distance' between them (Downing 1996: 128); this argument, however, may sound unconvincing, considering that *this* implies only minimal distance between speaker and referent. According to her findings, English speakers use noun phrases involving a proximal demonstrative where Korean speakers would use a *distal* demonstrative-based quasi-pronoun. This may be attributable to the fact that, unlike English and Italian, Korean does not have a clear-cut distinction between (third person) pronouns and full NPs marked with demonstratives. Since what constitutes a 'true' pronoun is not well established in Korean, and since the compound forms consisting of a demonstrative followed by a general noun can take roles similar to those of (third person) pronouns in other languages, Korean speakers seem to have developed their own way of categorizing referents.

Partly related to the deployments of the two types of quasi-pronouns in displaying/claiming authority concerning the referent and prominence of the referent may be the observation that between the two, only *i*-based forms can be used for referring to co-present parties. It may be a very effective way of claiming authority, and bestowing significance on somebody, to use for a non-present person a term ordinarily reserved for a co-present person, since speakers can treat the non-present party as being co-present in a metaphorical sense.

I hope to have elucidated the difference in interactional meanings between the proximal and distal demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns as they are used for person reference in talk-in-interaction in Korean. Various interactional considerations are crucial in determining the appropriateness of a particular type of quasi-pronoun at a particular point in the developing talk. This chapter thus demonstrates that, to adequately account for the use of these (and any other) forms, we must include as a first order consideration the interactional basis of the observed practices in our analytic explication. Additionally, the findings from this and other studies in this volume (e.g., Stivers, Levinson) collectively demonstrate that speakers of different languages can depart from the unmarked referential practice to accomplish more than simple referring (Schegloff 1996a), although what 'more' is being done may vary depending on the language and culture. It is in this sense that this chapter exemplifies both the culture-independent and culture-specific nature of the person-reference system.

Abbreviations

ACC	Accusative particle
ADD	Additive
ADV	Adverbializer
ANT	Anterior suffix
ATTR	Attributive
CAUS	Causative
CIRCUM	Circumstantial
COMM	Committal
COMP	Complementizer
COND	Conditional
CONN	Connective
CORREL	Correlative
DECL	Declarative
DM	Discourse Marker
DUB	Dubitative
GEN	Genitive
HEARSAY	'Hearsay' Evidential
HT	Honorific Title
HON	Honorific
IE	Informal Ending
INTERR	Interrogative
LOC	Locative particle
NEG	Negative particle
NOM	Nominative particle
NOML	Nominalizer
PFV	Perfective
PL	Plural marker
POL	Polite suffix
PRECED	Precedence
PROG	Progressive
PURP	Purposive
QP	Quasi-Pronoun
QUOT	Quotative particle
RETROS	Retrospective
SIMUL	Simultaneous
TEM	Temporal Marker
TOP	Topic particle
VOC	Vocative particle

10 Person reference in Tzotzil gossip: referring dupliciter

John B. Haviland


10.1 Gossip in the Who's Who

Zinacantecs gossip continually about the doings of their kinsmen, their neighbours, local officials, ritual officeholders, their friends and their enemies. Among Zinacantecs the great bulk of conversation is just this kind of gossip, targeted at specific people. Stories told 'on' a person may be scandalous or innocent, but they are most delectable when interlocutors know who the person is.

Soon after arriving in Chiapas with the help of George Collier I compiled a Who's Who of Zinacantán by recording groups of Zinacantecs as they gossiped about their compatriots (Haviland 1977). We assembled groups of five to eight Zinacantec men from various hamlets around the township. Each group would march mentally down the paths of one village at a time, conjuring up images of each house and its inhabitants, and trying to think of anything interesting to say about people encountered along the way.

I revisit these Who's Who conversations and some of their sequels to consider the shared theme of this volume: linguistic and cultural resources, competing social motivations, and interactive prerequisites for 'referring to persons'. Several ethnographic themes – 'triangular' kinship, social geography, the semantics of names, and the nature of biographical representations, among others – arise in considering Zinacantec ways of referring to one another. I will argue for the essential multiplex nature of person reference, which in collaborative interaction always involves the indexicalities of stance.

The inhabitants of Zinacantán, Chiapas, speak a distinctive dialect of the Mayan language Tzotzil, which is the most widely spoken indigenous language of the state, with over 300,000 speakers (see Map 10.1). In the village where I work there were about 1200 inhabitants in 1966, but the number has grown to well over 3000 in the intervening years. Whereas it used to be normal for people from opposite ends of a town to know each other, and usually to know the names of each others' children as well, this has long since ceased to be the case. In 1970, the Who's Who panels identified about 170 people from my village – mostly heads of household – about whom there was something notable, usually scurrilous, to say.



Map 10.1

10.2 An initial metadiscourse of names: the new son-in-law, 1970

One of these people was identified in the Who's Who sessions by the nickname *ch'aj Romin* 'Lazy Domingo', which called for an explanation.¹

Example (1) 'Lazy Domingo'²

- 07 cn: *ch'aj romin x- ut -ik un-e*
 lazy Domingo ASP-tell-PL PT-CL
 They call him 'Lazy Domingo'.
 [
- 18 p: *ch'aj romin x- ut -ik*
 lazy Domingo ASP-tell-PL
 They call him 'Lazy Domingo'.
 [
- 19 x: mm
- 20 cn: *j-ejj*
 ((Laughing))
 [
- 21 p: *y- u'un oy to jun mol romin te ta*
 3E-agency exist still one old Domingo there PREP
j-na tikotik un-e
 1E- house-1PLX PT-CL
 Because there is another 'Old man Domingo' there in our
 village.
 [
- 23 cn: aa
 yes

¹ I write Tzotzil using a Spanish-based practical orthography now in common use in Chiapas, although my orthography makes a distinction most Tzotzil writers do not distinguish between [ʔ] (representing a glottal stop, IPA ʔ) and a simple apostrophe ['] which, after consonants, marks them as glottalized or ejective. In this orthography, *x* represents IPA ʃ, *ch* represents IPA tʃ, *j* represents IPA x and *tz* stands for IPA ts.

² Transcribed from tape WW12.2.938 Edit 42, file ww1220990.tr.s.

- 24 p: *mol un*
old PT
He is the old one.
[
- 25 cha: *ja'*
!
Right.
- 26 *ja` s-*
! 3E-
He is the ---
- 27 *ja` s- muk'ta tot nan*
! 3E-big father perhaps
He is (the younger man's) grandfather, perhaps.
[
- 28 p: *s- ban-*
3E-
His older ---
- 29 *s- ba*
3E-
His older ---
[
- 30 ca: *s- bankil nan s- tot ya'el*
3E-older_brother perhaps 3E-father it_seems
The older brother of his father, I think.
- 31 p: *ja 's- bankil ti s- tot un-e*
! 3E-older_brother ART 3E-father PT-CL
Yes, the older brother of (the younger man's) father.
- 32 ca: *mjm*
- 33 p: *ja' bankilal li ali*
! older ART ART
The older brother was ...
[
- 34 ca: *ja`s- tot li lol romin -e*
! 3E-father ART Lorenzo Domingo-CL
He is the father of Lorenzo Domingo.
- 35 p: *ti s- tot li lol romin -e*
ART 3E-father ART Lorenzo Domingo-CL
.. the father of Lorenzo Domingo.
- 36 *ja` mol un*
! old PT
He is the one they call 'Mol'.
- 37 *mol romin un*
old Domingo PT
He is 'Old Domingo'.
- 38 *bweno le` un ja` k'ox romin ch- y- al -be-ik-e*
good that, there PT! small Domingo ICP-3E- say-AP-PL-CL
Ok, so the other one they call 'Little Domingo'.
- 39 g: *mjm*
- 40 p: *ch'aj romin ch- y- al*
lazy Domingo ICP-3E-say
They say, 'Lazy Domingo'.
- 41 *k'ox ch'aj romin*
small lazy Domingo

'Small Lazy Domingo'.

[
 42 ma: y- u`un batz'i vokol nan i- s- tz'ak lum
 3E-agency real difficult perhaps CP-3E-join earth
 ta j- mek
 PREP one-NC
 Because perhaps he had a very hard time starting to grow.]

Talking about people, as exemplified here, not only involves referring to them but also characterizing them. Both dimensions will be relevant to this chapter.

10.3 Economies of reference: triangularity

Reference always invokes a universe of possible referents, access to which is inherently asymmetric, interested and multimodal. That is, only some people can be known, and there are only certain ways to know them, some direct, others indirect, involving multiple kinds of knowing, not equally available to all. The Who's Who in Zinacantán was designed to uncover the universe of possible person referents in the community, and to exploit these asymmetries of access by building them into the discovery process: Different people knew different things about friends, enemies, neighbours and associates, and it was the interactive merging of different sets of knowledge and perspectives that gave the resulting conversations ethnographic and social richness.

I take person reference to be inherently triangular. Every act of person reference is grounded in a speech situation: Minimally, speaker S refers to referent R for hearer H. Necessarily relevant therefore are at least three social relationships: between S and R, H and R, and S and H. Moreover, insofar as S and H may be differently positioned to understand these relationships (S may understand R to stand in a certain relationship to H, for example, whereas H may understand this relationship differently), each of them comes with a perspective or diacritic. There may be further perspectives, but minimally these two are involved in any socially situated act of person reference, because of their immediate relevance to the interactants at hand. Moreover, any given social situation will privilege certain perspectives and relationships, setting parameters for potential reference formulations. Finally, choice of one perspective or another for formulating reference will creatively energize other expectations, helping to define the act of reference (and the activity within which it is embedded) in a particular way.

Enfield (this volume) speculates about the properties of an unmarked or 'default' reference 'formulation [which] is virtually automatic, in the absence of any special consideration to selection of that manner of formulation as opposed to some other conceivable one It's the format you pick when you

Indef. NP -> Def. NP -> Name -> Pron. -> 0

Figure 10.1 Putative hierarchy of referring expressions.

don't have any special reason to care how the thing you want to say gets said'. If interactants routinely refer to persons in a standard way, with a certain sort of formulation, then the formulation itself may not, as it were, instruct interactants to do anything more than calculate the referent. If a professor *always* refers to students and colleagues as 'Mr. X' or 'Ms. Y' (as was the tradition in the Reed College Anthropology Department, in an explicit allusion to alleged custom at the University of Chicago) then such a formulation from that professor inspires no special inference about the professor's relationship to the referent (except perhaps that it is of an academic sort, the sort that activates the specific usage); it simply stands as an instruction to the hearer to pick out the individual so-named.

However, my claim that all acts of reference are inherently triangular suggests that there can in fact be multiple defaults in a given social formation. The professor may adhere to the default just described, whereas the professor's students may routinely refer to other students by first name alone, and to professors by some combination of title and last name – both defaults can coexist, and they may reflect aspects of the difference between professors and students, while still being, on any given occasion, unremarkable linguistic formulations for picking out individuals.

That a social formation might have default ways of performing reference to persons that calls no attention to the formulation used and does nothing more than (attempt to) achieve reference appears to be part of the underlying motivation for Schegloff's notion of 'do[ing] reference (or 're-reference')–simpliciter, i.e. referring and nothing else' (1996: 440). Further motivation comes from the well-studied phenomenon that a referent can be introduced into a patch of discourse via a complex expression, but that subsequent references to the same referent can be progressively abbreviated (Fox 1987). Students of syntax have long recognized a hierarchy of referring expressions in connected discourse, from a kind of maximal form – typically a complex noun phrase, perhaps an indefinite descriptor – through various intermediate reduced forms, including simpler, usually definite nominal expressions, and proper names – to maximally reduced pronominals, including, in some languages, a zero or completely elided or 'unpronounced' form (see Figure 10.1).³ The gradual reduction of form and content in the referring expression is argued to correspond to a reduced functional need, as discourse proceeds, to fully specify a referent that can be identified from context (Givón 1993).

³ Notably, such a hierarchy itself represents a default in that failing to minimize non-initial references ordinarily provokes inferential work. See Oh (this volume) for a related discussion. See also Schegloff (1996a).

The following narrative extract begins by introducing an individual at line 2 with an indefinite NP *jun yamiko* ‘a friend of his’ coupled with an explicit existential predicate. The referent then reappears in line 3 in the guise of a definite NP, subject of a locative predicate ‘there’, which in turn becomes the link⁴ in line 4 to a further new referent, first existentially inserted into the universe of discourse, then named in line 5. But note that the reference to ‘the friend’ in line 4 is zero.

Example (2) A cowboy’s brother (WW26.17, #1)

- 1 a ti vo`ne
ART CONJ long_ago
Long ago
- 2 oy la s-ta jun y- amiko ta kolonya
exist QUOT 3E-find one 3E-friend PREP colony
They say he met a friend in the Colony.
- 3 ali te li y- amiko un -e vakero
ART there ART 3E-friend PT -CL cowboy
The friend was there, a cowboy.
- 4 oy ali s- bankil
exist ART 3E-older_brother
He had a brother, (Lit., Existed his older brother.)
- 5 chep s- bi li s- bankil -e chep meko
Joe 3E-name ART 3E-older_brother-CL Joe fair
José was the name of his older brother, ‘Fair José’.

Similarly, one of Schegloff’s examples of ‘referring simpliciter’ is the pronoun ‘she’ in the second sentence of the following (schematized) example:

‘I got something planned on Sunday with Laura. She and I are gonna go out and get drunk’

where ‘Laura’ introduces the referent (with a form that, by Schegloff’s analysis, ‘invites the recipients’ recognition of the one who is being talked about as someone they know’ (1996a: 440)), whereas ‘she’, according to Schegloff, ‘does . . . referring and nothing else’⁵ [Schegloff 1996a: 440].

⁴ Via a non-zero but highly reduced Tzotzil third person possessive prefix *s-*, thus $[[s-]_1\textit{bankil}]_2$ ‘his₁ older-brother male₂’ where two distinct referents are in play: the original cowboy₁ and his older brother₂.

⁵ An anaphoric device like ‘she’ may be the least elaborated possible referring form; but, note that the exigencies of English require that the pronoun be singular and gendered (i.e., that it agree in gender with Laura) – something that would not be true of the analogous Tzotzil formulation, for example, which would simply involve a third person cross-reference with neither gender nor number specified. Thus even highly reduced referring devices like pronouns index previous talk directly, and rely partly on their inherent predicative value to disambiguate potential referents.

The nugget of my argument is that a socially embedded act of person reference is *never* simple, and that it always – perhaps in devious and underhanded ways – depends on multiple indexical projections, including those involving the social triangle between S, H, and R. Such non-simple referential action I will dub ‘referring *dupliciter*’.⁶

The fragment of gossip (Example 1) about Lazy Domingo depends upon conceptually simple acts of reference – picking out the relevant individual – to talk *about* him. The two sorts of activity are rarely divorced, however, and the gossip displays both a Zinacantec economy of reference with respect to knowledge about social alters, and also an ecology of its use. What is known about ‘Lazy Domingo’ by different interlocutors (and perhaps more importantly, what they care about) is unequally distributed and differentially displayed. In the first lines, for example, the participant CN shows that he has at least heard the nickname applied to the individual in question. By contrast, in lines 21–38, PV and CA collaboratively and competitively assert genealogical and onomastic expertise. Finally, at line 42, echoing an earlier joking theme (about how despite being called ‘small’ the man is really older than he looks), MA adds the further detail that Lazy Domingo grew up as an orphan. These revelatory displays not only contribute to the growing dossier about Lazy Domingo, but also indexically position each speaker in respect both to Lazy Domingo and to the overall economy of social knowledge. Thus, CN locates himself as a senior man from a distant hamlet, who has observed Lazy Domingo’s political shenanigans over a considerable span of years (thus knowing that he must be of a certain age). P and CA reveal themselves to be privy to further genealogical facts, and P also displays at least some claim to knowing about how nicknames come to be distributed in Lazy Domingo’s hamlet (which he shows to be his own by the first-person plural exclusive *ta jnatikotik* ‘in our [excl] hamlet’ – that is, the hamlet that both he and Lazy Domingo inhabit, by contrast to his interlocutors, at least some of whom are excluded from the pronominal range). And MA displays potential sympathy for Lazy Domingo by invoking the latter’s childhood hardships.

A further genealogical link, in fact, lurks in the interactional scene, and it eventually finds its way explicitly into the discourse. As all the gossipers know, P, the most senior man present, is also Lazy Domingo’s father-in-law, having (in 1970) recently bestowed his daughter’s hand on the younger man after a difficult courtship. P therefore speaks from a privileged and not disinterested position, and his fellow gossips carefully monitor his remarks to learn how the new marriage is going.

⁶ Although equally awkward, another possible label would be ‘referring *multipliter*’. My neologism, though it de-emphasizes the multiple factors involved, deliberately suggests the often conspiratorial or duplicitous nature of choosing one referring expression over another.

In fact, P soon elaborated further on the nickname, revealing exactly the sorts of worries a father-in-law might be expected to have. He confesses that even before Lazy Domingo became his son-in-law he had learned of the boy's laziness from this same uncle.

Example (3) 'lazy' means lazy (1970)

- 1 p: *komo le`-e che`e*
because that-CL then
'Because that one ...'
- 2 *y- al li s- muk'ta tot ya`el -e mol romin -e*
3E-say ART 3E-big father it_seems-CL old Domingo-CL
His grandfather - Old Man Domingo - used to say.
- 3 ca: *jmm*
- 4 p: *kere*
'Damn!'
- 5 *pero le` -e batz'imu x- ve`*
but that-CL real NEG ASP-eat
'But that one just can't feed himself.'
- 6 *batz'iben ch'aj xi li mol romin -e*
real well lazy say ART old Domingo-CL
'He's just totally lazy,' said old man Domingo.
- 7 ca: *mm*
- 8 p: *aa x- k- ut*
yes ASP-1E- tell
'Oh,' I told him.
- 9 *muk' to'ox bu och -em tal li romin un-e*
NEG at_that_time where enter-PF DIR[come] ART Domingo PT-CL
At that point Domingo had not yet started his courtship.
- 10 ca: *mm*
- 11 p: *aa x- k- ut*
yes ASP-1E-tell
'Oh', I told him.
- 12 ca: *mm*
- 13 ma: *mu to`ox bu jak'olaj -em ya`el*
NEG at_that_time where ask_for_bride-PF it_seems
So he hadn't yet asked [for your daughter?]
[
- 14 p: *mm*
- 15 *i`i*
No.
- 16 ma: *a*
- 17 p: *ch'aj nox*
lazy only
'He's just lazy.'
- 18 ca: *ja`s- biin -ojo taj*
! 3E-to_name-PF REL that
So that's how he got that name.
[

- 19 p: mu `oy -uk
 NEG exist-IRREAL
 Not yet.
- 20 m: ch'aj romin un che`e
 lazy Domingo PT then
 so he really IS 'Lazy Domingo'!

Thus, the epithet 'lazy' was more than a mere moniker and had already passed into the younger man's public reputation by being institutionalized as his nickname even before he married P's daughter and went on to grow into a *bik'it mol* 'sort of an elder'.

In the next few sections, I outline the repertoire of elements for person reference in Zinacantec Tzotzil.

10.4 Names and nicknames

Zinacantecs frequently use 'names' to refer to one other. In an early study Collier and Bricker (hereafter C and B), citing Goodenough's observation (1965) that names serve both a classificatory and an individualizing function, summarize the Zinacantec situation as follows:

Every Zinacanteco has a surname that identifies the lineage to which he belongs, and most lineages are further subdivided by nicknames that identify individuals belonging to lineage segments. (1970: 290)

If one Zinacantec asks another *k'usi abi* 'what is your name?' the sort of answer he or she will get depends heavily on the circumstances. The question itself is not always appropriate, being the sort of thing normally addressed by an adult to a child (or other semi-person, like a foreigner), or perhaps by a person in authority to an ordinary citizen. In the first case, the answer is likely to be simply a first name – traditionally one of a small number⁷ of Tzotzilized Christian names like *Xun* 'John' or *Maruch* 'Mary'. The original question might then be followed up with a further query like 'Who is your father' or 'John what?' In the second case – an authority to a private citizen – the answer is invariably the full official Mexican name. There are effectively two systems of official names in Zinacantán, which combine one of the limited set of baptismal first names (normally simply called, in third-person possessed form, *s-bi* 'his/her name') with an equally limited set of last names (*s-jol s-bi* 'lit., the head of his/her name'). In the

⁷ In the 1960s, C and B counted 'twenty-seven personal first names for men and sixteen for women' (1970:290). The inventory has grown slightly, with a few 'non-traditional' names emerging and others falling out of use, but even when a child is baptized with an unusual name, a traditional name usually takes over for ordinary use.

traditional system, a Spanish derived surname combines with one of several possible Indian surnames, both inherited from one's father: There is effectively a double patronymic, with both Spanish-derived and Tzotzil parts (see also Brown, this volume). In the official Mexican system, which has all but supplanted the traditional one, the first name combines with a patronymic and a matronymic, both drawn from the limited inventory of Spanish derived surnames with no surviving reference to the second Tzotzil patronymic. Thus, the individual under discussion in Example (1) has a 'full' or official name in Spanish, which would appear on official documents and which he himself would give as Domingo Pérez Gómez.

The difficulty with such a name is that it serves *neither* an individualizing nor a classificatory function. Since there may be many people with the same name, and also several different Pérez lineages, the name identifies neither the man nor his lineage. Commenting on the 'traditional' system of double patronymics, C and B observed that the limited name inventory and the tendency for lineage names to cluster in individual hamlets meant that several individuals frequently share even the same full traditional name making it difficult to differentiate individuals on the basis of first names and surnames alone (C and B 1970: 291). With the still less differentiated Mexican system of patronymic and matronymic, almost exclusively used in dealings between Zinacantecs and the Mexican bureaucracy, the individualizing difficulties only increase, and any residual classificatory function – for example, a reference to traditional exogamous lineages – is completely lost.

10.5 Nicknames

In fact, in the Who's Who conversations, discussion of surnames seemed rarely to be about identifying individuals, and more about establishing – and displaying knowledge of – relevant genealogies. Typical is an exchange like the following:

Example (4) 46.24:

- a: *Maruch Papyan li s-bi-e,*
 Mary Fabian ART 3E-name-CL
 Her name is Mary Fabian
- Santis li s-jol s-bi-e,*
 Santis ART 3E-head 3E-name-CL
 Her surname is Santis.
- ja' Papyan li s-tote*
 ! Fabian ART 3E-father

Because her father was Fabian [whose Spanish surname, as all present know, was Santis]

- b: *Pero ja` a`i-bil* *li Papyan-e*
 but ! understand-PP ART Fabian-CL
 But 'Fabian' [as her name] is what people understand.

This woman's official Spanish name would be something like María Santis Pérez (where Santis is her father's Spanish surname, and Pérez her mother's). But the Who's Who gossipers, after showing that they know the appropriate surname, point out that such a woman would commonly be identified via her first name plus her (prominent) father's first name. This is what C and B dub a 'nickname', which supplements the non-identifying official name.

'There is . . . an elaborate proliferation of nicknames *nearly always used for reference but never for direct address*. Nicknames reduce the ambiguity of reference significantly' (C and B: 291, italics added).

In Zinacantán a nickname is a conventionalized, socially bestowed moniker, frequently originating in some notable personal characteristic of an individual and then 'often extended in application to his offspring or siblings' (C and B 1970: 291). Nicknames uniquely identify individuals in a way that their 'official' Zinacantec names cannot. Thus Example (1) shows that one of the nicknames of Domingo Pérez Gómez is *Ch'aj Romín*; 'Lazy Domingo' is a quite particular Domingo Pérez Gómez.

C and B count as a nickname any 'non-traditional' name – that is, a conventionalized formula meant to refer to the person not by characterizing him or her but as a label, in Jakobson's terms, 'code about code' (1957). C and B enumerate various kinds of Zinacantec nicknames (usually combined with the individual's 'first name') that involve:

1. Mother's Spanish surname;
2. Mother's Indian surname;
3. First name of well-known relative;
4. Reference to an individual's occupation;
5. Reference to a geographical location with which the individual is associated;
6. Humorous reference to an individual's aberrant appearance or behavior;
7. The nickname of a near relative (p. 291)

going on to elaborate as follows:

The first three classes of nicknames need no explanation. They come into use only in situations of ambiguity. Nicknames belonging to the next three classes all refer to distinctive characteristics of the person to whom the nicknames refer. If a person has distinguished himself by assuming a social position few other Zinacantecos attain, he

may acquire his role name as a nickname. He may be called ‘curer’... ‘mayordomo’ ... , ‘cowherd’ ... , or ‘musician’ ... When a Zinacanteco moves from one hamlet to another, he may be called by the name of his former hamlet. If he builds his house near an important natural feature in the landscape such as cliffs ... , a sinkhole ... , a rocky place ... , the edge of a waterhole ... he may be given, as a nickname, the name of that feature. (p. 291)

C and B take as given that referential adequacy is a primary function of names, and ‘measure ... the communicative efficiency of naming components’ (C and B: 299). They conclude that nicknames are much more efficient in differentiating individual referents than are official names. They further link nicknames, which tend to be passed down somewhat in the manner of official names, to gradually emerging socially relevant lineage segments – in principle, exactly what the traditional dual patronymic system (which by native theory distinguished exogamous groups) also labelled.

The Zinacantec interlocutors in Example (1) themselves clearly take the issue of disambiguation seriously. One explanation they suggest for Lazy Domingo’s nickname is that it distinguishes him from another man, his senior uncle, who is simply known as *mol Romin* ‘old man Domingo’.⁸ By contrast the nephew is called ‘little’ (or ‘lazy’) Domingo, or even ‘little lazy Domingo’ – the discussion suggests that part of the significance of the added qualifiers was simply to order the two identically baptized relatives generationally (like ‘Senior’ or ‘Junior’ in English naming).

10.6 The indexicality of names

Except for noting that many nicknames ‘have their origin in the ridicule of an individual’ (p. 292) C and B do not develop the implications of their own striking observation about the *use* of nicknames in Zinacantán: that they are, in their experience, never used for direct address – and one could add, only rarely used at all in the presence of their bearers. Such restrictions pose a puzzle for interactants in this community especially if names are thought of as the most efficient way to identify individuals. Moreover, such restrictions suggest that names are never doing ‘only’ referring. Rather, they are inherently indexical, pointing via the restrictions on their appropriate use to the identities of S, H and R, and perhaps to other aspects of the speech events in which they appear. You may use a Zinacantec nickname potentially to identify its referent uniquely, but only to an addressee who is in a position to recognize the name (the minimal

⁸ By C and B’s definition in this case the baptismal name *Romin* Domingo serves itself as a nickname, a proto-surname that identifies an entire lineage associated with a notable ancestral individual so named. Thus, ‘old man Domingo’ is the paternal uncle of ‘Lazy Domingo’ and father of another individual known as *Lol Romin* or ‘Lorenzo Domingo’.

necessary common-ground condition on any felicitous recognitional), and only in the absence of the referent him or herself. Like a T/V pronoun, a nickname operates on two simultaneous planes: both picking out or referring to an individual, and projecting relationships between the name-user and others (typically including addressee and referent). In this sense, its use always involves ‘referring *dupliciter*’. Moreover, in the case of Zinacantec nicknames, the nature of the baptismal event (ridicule or at least some sort of non-standard or non-official dubbing) itself suggests something about the main restriction on usage: that one does not use the nickname in earshot of the nicknamed.

Building on remarks of Putnam (1975), Silverstein (2004, 2005) elaborates on the multiple indexical properties of Wasco names.

[T]raditionally, names were not used in casual face-to-face or other kinds of reference; definite descriptions, such as kinship expressions, were preferably used. Rather, the essence of proper names is like that of heirloom antiques of relative ordinal economic value as investment property: everyone wanted a collection of them, as many as possible . . . (Silverstein 2005: 15).

Names normally both categorize and individuate their referents, in a systematic and sociologically penetrating way. On the other hand, names have the familiar duplex nature of other referential indexes.

The name as type, as underlying regularity in a semiotic sense, is its position in the system of name-values; the name as token, as instance of use after initial baptism, is the display of someone’s wealth, regardless of who does the displaying (uttering of the name-form) (Silverstein 2005: 20).

The baptismal events that can produce Zinacantec nicknames thus necessarily produce as well different kinds of restrictions on their use. Nor are individuals limited to just one, so that multiple nicknames partition the social universe into people in a position to employ (or recognize) one nickname as opposed to another, and, in fact, allow interactants to distinguish nicknames that CAN be used in the bearer’s presence from those that cannot. A single man called *Xun* may have the joking nickname *Mamal* (reference to a comic fiesta figure) that reflects his supposed propensity to lie; his schoolmates may also know him, both jokingly and affectionately, as *Troni* (short for Spanish *electrónico*) because of his penchant for acquiring such gear. Neither nickname would ordinarily be used to his face, nor obviously will either work for people too far outside his circle of acquaintances, although the first nickname has travelled farther than the second.

Many if not most Zinacantecs will enjoy several names – at least two official names, with distinct parts, plus a collection of nicknames – each with varied conditions of unmarked use. Such multiplicity of names clearly complicates the notion of a ‘default’ formula for person reference, despite the fact that

Zinacantec conversation does make extensive and routine use of names. A name may be the unmarked first choice for referring to another Zinacantec in many circumstances, but since there are many names, the choice of one over another is never neutral. That names may not be used in the presence of referents and that the use of a particular name may vary by addressee both support the claim that names in Tzotzil do not do referring simpliciter.⁹

Tzotzil syntax allows two further diacritics on names, which prefigure the second major device for achieving person reference, kinship, to which I shortly turn. First, Tzotzil proper names frequently occur with (demonstrative) determiners, notably both proximal and distal definite articles. Thus the same delicacy about presupposed and presupposable reference that applies to ordinary nominals also applies to proper names, suggesting something of the classificatory function that a small repertoire of names must necessarily have. If, without preamble, a man refers to another as *li Lol-e* ‘DEF Lawrence+CLITIC’ he presumes that his interlocutor will be able to work out *which* Lawrence is involved; further the use of the proximal definite article suggests a direct and close connection between the speech act participants and the referent (see Oh, this volume) – the speaker’s son, for example, or perhaps his son-in-law, that is, the most relevant Lawrence to the speaker (or to the addressee). Such a form contrasts both with the use of a distal determiner, *ti Lol-e* – which would suggest that the Lawrence in question is remote in time or space – or of an indefinite determiner *jun Lol* ‘a certain Lawrence’ which in effect presumes that the interlocutor cannot be expected to know the person in question.

Personal names are also frequently possessed, so that the choice of name also implies the choice of a mediating kinsman. An adult may say *k-Antun* ‘my Anthony’ to refer to his or her son or grandson named Anthony; an unmarried person might use the same term to refer to a sibling. In both cases the possessed form may serve both to disambiguate the referent – for example, when several people named Anthony are in the discursive universe – and to assert a particular proprietary relationship between the possessor and the person named. When the possessor is third person, inference is thus required to decide exactly what sort of relationship is implied between possessor and referent. Similarly, the full range of Tzotzil person affixes allow further marked specificity: *k-Antun-tikotik* – ‘our Anthony’ with a first-person exclusive plural possessive, for example, identifies this particular Anthony as linked to the speaker and his or her group, and also explicitly excludes the hearer from that same group, a characteristic if simple example of ‘triangular kinship’,¹⁰ where a single kinship term requires the triangulation of multiple relationships between Speaker, Addressee and Referent(s).

⁹ A further caveat: as genealogical distance decreases, so too does the unmarked possibility of using names as a referential default.

¹⁰ For classic cases from Australia see Nick Evan’s discussion of ‘kintax’ (Evan 2003).

10.7 Kinship terms

Kinship relations, even in a fragmented peasant community like the Zinacantec hamlet where I work, provide the most general idiom for identifying and referring to social alters. Though names anchor certain easily identifiable referents – the well-known people of the Who’s Who, for example – many people in the community are not easily nameable, both because their names may not be generally known, or because they cannot be appropriately used. Instead, kinship formulas are an alternative reference formulation. That there are alternatives is part of ‘referring *dupliciter*’: Using one kind of referential device, when another one is equally ‘efficient’ at picking out the referent and equally appropriate in the circumstances, triggers unavoidable inferences about why this as opposed to that.

A classic problem in kinship studies – how to delimit the boundaries of who are ‘kinsmen’ and who are not – also arises in describing how kinship formulas figure in person reference in Zinacantán. There are Tzotzil terms for four generations of consanguines and two generations of affines. There are terms for step-kin. There are also a variety of fictive kinsmen, from people married to your siblings, to godparents and co-parents (the relationship between godparents and the parents of their godchildren). There are respectful address forms that transparently incorporate kinship terms: *totik* (‘our father’, i.e., ‘sir’), or *jatatik* (lit., ‘our grandfather’, i.e., a conjointly known older man.) There are terms for illicit lovers, for second (or subsequent) spouses, and for adopted orphans. There is a term – *chi’il* ‘companion’ – that can stand for just about any sort of distant relative (or a hamlet mate or fellow Zinacantec).¹¹ The difficulty posed by this proliferation of relationship terms for person-reference is that there are *too many* ways to calculate one person’s relationship to another, so that from any given social origo there are alternate ‘kinship’ routes to a given alter, and it would be difficult and arbitrary to try to specify a default path, because much depends on why one wants to refer to that person at all. Is it more relevant that A is B’s son’s ‘wife’ or that she is B’s own ‘daughter-in-law’? Does a story tell better if we learn that X and Y are cousins or *compadres*? Consider the following preamble to a story about a loose woman from the Who’s Who conversations (where, given the composition of the panels of gossips, a male perspective pervades the talk). The woman’s lover – normally *y-ajmul* (literally, her ‘sin-person [of a woman]’) – is characterized instead by his relationship to her ‘old man’, that is her husband.

¹¹ A standard, non-committal form for talking about a Zinacantec as opposed to someone from another Indian community is *jchi’iltik* ‘our (inclusive) companion’.

Example (5) a lover

ja`o la ch-`och s-k'exol li mol k'al ch'abal tey
 then QUOT ICP-enter 3E-replacement ART old when none there
 The old man's substitute entered when he was absent.

The lover is identified as ‘the husband’s replacement’ and stands in no named relationship at all to the wife.

The specifics of the Tzotzil kinship system – which includes consanguineal, affinal and pseudo-kin links (prominently those of the system of *compadrazgo*, cf. Hanks, this volume) – go beyond the scope of this chapter, but there are two semantic components worth mention. First, the system celebrates relative age (cf. Enfield, this volume) between siblings, and it also differentiates sex of ego with respect to both siblings and offspring.¹² Both facts mean that the choice of ego from whose perspective to construct a kin chain to a referent – something that must always be negotiated contextually – can radically restructure the kin formulation used.

Kin formulations are relational in the familiar sense that they always involve both ‘ego’ and ‘alter’. They also involve a choice of perspective, since there are always multiple ways to construe the relations that lead to a given referent. (Minimally, for example, given the gender specificity of ego in terms for children, everyone is either *x-ch'amal* of his or her father or *y-ol* of his or her mother.) There are two further interrelated tendencies in Tzotzil use of kin formulas for person reference that add indexical complexity: alterocentricity and gender asymmetry.

The first is a polite Zinacantec convention that if possible one will begin a kin chain with one’s addressee. A default choice, that is, is to construct the shortest path from addressee to referent, given what you, as speaker, know, as in Example (6).

Example (6) Alterocentricity

ja` s-tot y-ajnil a-kumpare Manvel.
 ! 3E-father 3E-wife 2E-compadre Manuel
 He is the father of the wife of your compadre Manuel.

The referent involved could, in fact, stand in a much closer relationship to the speaker, but he might still propose to use a complex formulation like this one to start the chain with his addressee. (The strategy is reminiscent – though with a different interactive valence – of a mother saying to her husband, ‘Do you know what your son did today?’) The second-person possessive prefix on *a-kumpare* ‘your compadre’ makes explicit the indexical link between the

¹² There are asymmetric neutralizations of both relative age and gender of propositus and propositum in the sibling terminology, cf. Haviland (2006).

referring expression and addressee. As with possessed names, precise person marking on kin terms projects a partitioning of the social universe that typically includes S and H as well as R. To mention *j-tot-ik* ‘our (INCL) father’ explicitly invokes a relationship to the referent shared between speaker and addressee; to say *k-itz’in-tikotik* ‘our (EXCL) younger brother’ encodes S as part of a collectivity standing in the same ‘older brother’ relation to R and explicitly excludes addressee from the same relationship (see Stivers, this volume, for a related discussion), and so on.

In the Who’s Who sessions, exclusively between adult men, ‘anchor points’ or the starting points of kinship chains are usually well-known men, identified via their nicknames. Other main protagonists – often never named at all – are introduced by their kinship connections to the anchors.

Example (7) Kinship link to anchor individual

oy la y-alib taj Chep Meko x-k-al-tik,
 EXIST QUOT 3E-daughter-in-law DEIC Jose Fair ASP-1E-say-PLINC
 Joe Lightskin has a daughter-in-law, as we say
ach’ to i-y-ik’ y-ajnil jun s-krem
 new still CP-3E-marry 3E-wife one 3E-boy
 Recently one of his sons married a wife.

‘Gender asymmetry’ refers to presumptions about how best to calculate kin relative to the gender of interlocutors. In the Who’s Who conversations, women are largely non-persons, and the anchor points of kinship-based referring expressions are nearly always male, even if the gossip has to do with women.

Example (8) 64.31

- a: *lek xa s-maj s-me`lal ...*
 good already 3E-beat 3E-woman
 He really beats his wife
- b: *an much`u s-tzeb le`e*
 why who 3E-daughter that-CL
 Whose daughter is that?
- a: *ja` s-tzeb Xun kasya ajensya*
 ! 3E-daughter John Garcia magistrate
 The daughter of John Garcia the magistrate
- c: *x-cha` = tzeb*
 3E-two = daughter
 His step-daughter
y-ol xa x-cha` = va`al me`el
 3E-child_of_woman already 3E-two =person wife
 The child of his second wife
ti s-tot ja` li s-bankil j-sakil isim Mat-e
 ART 3E-father ! ART 3E-older_brother AGN_White whisker Mateo-CL
 The (real) father was the older brother of ‘White Whiskered.
 Matthew’

Example (8) presents a genealogical discussion of exactly who a particular beaten wife is; she is never named, and all of the kin chains are calculated starting from male origos.

In Example (9) the speaker constructs two applicative clauses to construe the male ‘anchor’, old man ‘Juan K’at’ix’ (the nickname of a well-known man), as grammatically prominent. He is formally the grammatical object of ‘marry’ in the first clause (see Aissen 1987), and the grammatical subject of the passive ‘be married’ in the second. He is construed, that is, as the one who ‘had his daughter married on him’ – that is, something that happened to him, grammatically, rather than to the daughter.

Example (9) Gender asymmetry

ja`to`ox i-y-ik'-be s-tzeb ti jvan k'at'ix-e
 ! then CP-3E-marry-AP 3E-girl ART John Hawthorn-CL
 He recently married Juan K'at'ix's daughter.
 ik'-b-at s-tzeb taj mol-e
 marry-AP-PASS 3E-girl DEIC old-CL
 The old man had his daughter married on him.

By contrast, women seem to prefer (though by no means exclusively) to calculate kin chains via women: *y-ol s-muk li Xunka`e* ‘the child [of a woman] of the younger sibling [of a woman] of Jane’. Such usage involves an implicit and inferable indexicality that projects the interlocutors as female, by contrast with the way men normally talk.

10.7.1 Address

Further complications arise for referential formulas from rules about **address**, which ordinarily also involve both names and kin links. Just as there are conventions of politeness about how people greet one another – men, for example, shake hands if they are of the same age, or the younger man bows and presents his forehead to the older man, who in turn touches it with his hand – there are related conventions about how people should address one another. Men of roughly equal age will address each other by first name, if they know them, or use a variety of name substitutes (e.g., *ompre*, from Spanish *hombre* ‘man’). They will address a boy by name, with the affectionate *tzuk'* if he is very small, or with the less affectionate, somewhat dismissive *kere* (from *kerem* ‘boy’). They will address an older man, by default, as *totik* ‘our father’; but if he is sufficiently well known to them they will add a name, *totik Xun* (or perhaps substitute an honorific, *mol Xun* ‘old man John’ – see the [next section](#)). If they want to claim a closer relationship they can reduce the address term to *tot Xun* ‘father John’ or *jtot Xun* ‘my father John’. And if he really is kin, or

pseudo-kin, or if they want to treat him as kin (and perhaps be treated as kin in return), this will reduce simply to *tot* ‘father’. And if the other is a *compadre* as a result of one of many sorts of reclassifying rituals (a baptismal meal, a wedding, nowadays even a school graduation) any other possible address term is supplanted by *kumpa* ‘compadre’ – a formula that can only rarely be supplemented by an added name when one of several co-present *compadres* is to be singled out, *kumpa Xun*.

These considerations highlight the unavoidable and multiple indexical nuances of kin formulas, the most common form of Tzotzil person reference after naming, and in some circumstances preferable to naming. The choice of a particular formulation responds both to narrative or referential facts – what is relevant to be told – and to contextual facts about who is doing the talking, to whom, about whom, and how all are related.

A Zinacantec is partly constrained by how he or she (or the addressee) ought to address that person. Should the interlocutors’ own relationships be privileged, and if so which? X talking to Y about Z, named *Antun*, who is X’s father but Y’s *compadre*, cannot choose simply to say *Antun*, but instead must say *jtot* ‘my father’ to emphasize her own relationship with Z, or *akumpare* ‘your *compadre*’ alterocentrically to emphasize Y’s, or perhaps *akumpare Antun* if there is more than one potentially relevant *compadre* (say X’s husband as well as her father). If one speaks of an elder woman, considerations of respect, the identity of one’s interlocutor, or one’s own relationship to her, may variously require that one say, for example, *jme`tik Mal Akov* ‘our mother Mary Waspnest’, rather than simply to give the name. Interlocutors may often explicitly correct – or at least supplement – another’s referential formulation, to specify an alternate preferred referring formula, and this correction may have consequences for all subsequent reference to the individual. I may say to you, *li jmeme`tik ta ak`ol* ‘the honorable lady [living] up above’, not knowing her name, and you may supply it; or you may say *jkumale* ‘my *comadre*’ after which I will refer to her as *akumale* ‘your *comadre*’.

10.8 Titles (honorific and dishonorific), geographic monikers and affect

In their classic study of American address terms, Brown and Ford (1964) distinguish two common forms of English address, one involving use of addressee’s ‘first name’ and the other ‘title and last name’, though they say little about the precise indexical properties of the choice of one title over another when there are alternatives. Tzotzil speakers use kinship and pseudo kinship terms as titles in both address and reference, as we have just seen, and there are a small number of title-like non-kin qualifiers often added to names or

nicknames in reference formulas. They are mostly indicators of age: *k'ox* for a child, *mol* for a senior man, *me`el* for a senior woman. The qualifier *anima* is also used when the referent is deceased.

As C and B note, nicknames are frequently built from places with which the bearer is associated or from 'occupations' (including ritual offices or *cargos*¹³) they may have held. In a similar way, geographic and especially cargo specifications are often added to referring expressions, both to narrow the possible referential range in the case of ambiguity, but often to give guidance tailored for particular interlocutors in working out who is being referred to. Frequently, for example, S adds cargo information in reference to R knowing that H's own cargo career is likely to have brought H and R into contact.

These various further elements can combine, so that initial references of the following form are rather common in Who's Who conversations:

Example (10) A non-minimal reference form

anima j-mol kumpa Maryan Valik ta Elan Vó
 deceased 1E-old compadre Mariano Valik PREP Place name
lok'-em j- ch'ul-me'tik.
 exit-PF AGN- holy-mother.
 My late compadre, Mr. Mariano Valik, from Elan Vo', the former
 mayordomo of the Virgen of Guadalupe.

With such a form it is unclear how much of the information offered in the referential formulation is strictly intended to guide interlocutors in picking out the referent, and how much to index S's or H's social networks and knowledge: about distant places, about cargo histories, about kinship and so on.

C and B note that frequently Zinacantec nicknames incorporate characterizing descriptors, often humorous or derogatory. The line between an established appellation and a true descriptor – perhaps on the way to becoming a nickname, perhaps merely a nonce characterization – is of course hard to draw. When people are identified as *koxò Xun* 'lame John', or *tzon-sat Petul* 'hairy-faced Peter', or *bix-`akan Lol* 'bamboo-legged Lawrence' it is not clear whether the speaker has simply added an affect-laden qualifier to a name (because most Zinacantecs do not limp, are beardless, and do not have notably skinny legs), or whether he is, as it were, proposing a candidate humorous nickname, perhaps one whose lifespan will be just this single conversation. In either case, however, the speaker is adopting a specific indexical stance towards the referent, and this is, again, a ubiquitous feature of Zinacantec referring expressions.

¹³ See Cancian (1965).

In a more formulaic way, Tzotzil provides a series of affective diacritics on person reference. One might imagine them as functioning like tiny ‘pre-narratives’ in the sense that the affective inflection they cast over a referential expression cries out for narrative expansion. In the Who’s Who narratives names and titles are frequently preceded by forms like the following:

- prove* (> Sp. *pobre*) ‘poor’
- j-kobel* (lit., ‘fucker’ – a derogatory agentive term)
- j-a’yel* (lit., ‘hearer’ – a less offensive derogatory agentive term)
- mu* (lit., ‘tasty’, i.e., disgusting)
- yil* (> *yijil*) (lit., ‘thick’, i.e., disgusting)

Each such form not only indexes something about the speaker’s stance towards the referent, but also previsages some further clarification about why the referent has been introduced into the discursive universe with such an affective taint.

I have spoken about a local economy of referents, shorthand for the obvious fact that knowledge about people in a community of any size is unequally distributed, and moreover that some people are easier to recognize than others. Any instance of person reference implicitly indexes this economy: Even the simplest of reference forms (perhaps a pointing gesture in someone’s direction, or a bare pronoun) presumes interlocutors’ access to the referent via the expression chosen in the given context, whereas more complex expressions index higher degrees of potential inaccessibility. Direct evidence for the local economy of reference can thus be gleaned from naturally occurring referential expressions.

It would be possible from the Who’s Who conversations to assemble a list of what we might call unmarked referential anchors, at least for adult Zinacantecs like those who participated in these gossip sessions. These would be those well-known men or women who can be most simply identified: by (nick)name alone, or by nickname plus title, or perhaps by title alone.

- mol Sarate* ‘old man Zarate’ (the leader of the Zinacantec *ejido* or land reform movement)
- li komite* ‘the land commissioner’ (a single identifiable civil authority at any given moment, though always relative to a given community)
- santa krus itz’inal*: ‘junior mayordomo of the Holy Cross’ (a unique current ritual officeholder for a given hamlet)

The lack of further qualification indicates precisely that in the current economy of potential referents, and given the current interlocutors, the simplest path to such a referent must be assumed.

10.9 Optimality and upgrades

Having laid out in considerable detail the sorts of linguistic resources Zinacantan gossip marshals for introducing persons into discourse, I now return to the initial claim of this essay: that person reference *always* involves multiple indexicality.

Sacks and Schegloff (1979, [reprinted this volume](#)) (hereafter S and S) propose a kind of proto-optimality model for referring to persons in conversation, in which two potentially conflicting constraints ('preferences') compete for a best solution. The model pits a preference for 'minimization' against another, stronger preference for 'recipient design' – specifically a preference for the use of 'recognitionals' or expressions that make it possible for recipients to work out the intended referent. Thus if a 'minimal' form offered in reference to a person does not achieve 'recognition' between interlocutors it must be 'expanded', so that conversationalists relax the preference for minimization until recognition is achieved.

Names have a privileged place in this story because they are taken to be well designed to accommodate both preferences at once: they are 'a basic sort for recognitionals' (S and S, this volume) and at the same time they evince the sort of minimization said to be involved: They are 'single forms' that can be used alone to refer, that is, not in combination with other referring expressions. Of course, names have no monopoly on satisfying either preference (see Brown, this volume): Other expressions can do a better job of achieving recognition (which on the S and S analysis is the higher goal), and multiple names can be used especially in a community where multiple names are common.

The ploys conversationalists bring into action in the face of non-recognition give S and S further evidence for the contours of an optimal solution when 'minimization' collides with 'recognition': There is a stepwise relaxation of the former in the service of the latter. Suppose A is unsure whether B, her interlocutor, will recognize a provisional 'recognitional' form. She may, in English, say it as an interrogatively marked 'try marker' – effectively inviting the interlocutor to display recognition. When an attempted recognitional fails, what follows is not an outpouring of non-minimal reference forms but, according to S and S, a grudging progression of further 'minimal' upgrades or attempts to secure recognition. Such a sequence of further moves gives explicit evidence not only about the proposed ranking of preferences, but also about what constitutes a recognitional or a minimal formulation in the first place.

If we try to apply the S and S optimality model to the Who's Who conversations, things at first look promising. We often have what looks like a 'minimal' or default name as a first reference formulation, followed when necessary by simple elaborations of the sort described in previous sections.

Example (11) 69.34

- 1 a: *ba sa`-be y-ajval li y-ajnil-e*
 AUX(go) search-AP 3E-owner ART 3E-wife-CL
 He went to find a lover for his wife.
- 2 *oy la s-kumpare*
 exist QUOT 3E-compadre
 They say he had a compadre.
- 3 *mol Antun Uch,*
 old Anthony Possum
 Old man Anthony Possum
- 4 *s-bankil mol Petul Uch*
 3E-older_brother old Peter Possum
 Older brother of Peter Possum
- 5 *lok'em martomjorey ti vo'ne ch-k-a'i*
 exit-PF Mayordomo_Rey CONJ long_ago ICP-1E- hear
 I think he had been a Mayordomo Rey [a prestigious first level
 religious office]long ago.

In Example (11) the speaker signals a new protagonist with an explicit existential and an indefinite NP in 2, literally, 'his compadre existed'. In 3 he gives title plus nickname – a first try to achieve recognition (or maybe a second try, since an interlocutor might in principle have been able to identify the new protagonist simply by the 'compadre' reference – apparently unexpected in this case because of the evidential hedging of the quotative clitic *la* and the explicit existential). Receiving no recognition token, he continues in 4 with a different kind of kin formula, and upgrades further in 5 to a ritual-office characterization.

But can S and S's analysis of English person reference then be exported wholesale to the Tzotzil case? Consider the following sequence.

Example (12) Searching for a name

- 1 a: *te la x- y- il s- ba -ik ta y- ut chob -tik*
 there QUOT ASP-3E-see 3E-self-PL PREP 3E- inside cornfield-PL
s- chi'uk taj
 3E-with that
 They used to meet in the cornfield, with that ...
- 2 *a- kumpare xun k'at'ix a'a*
 2E-compadre John hawthorn indeed
 ... with that compadre of yours, John Hawthorn.
- 3 *taj ali xun ch'en-tik ch- y- ut -ik*
 that ART John cave -PL ICP-3E-tell-PL
 With that guy they call 'John Cliffs'.
- 4 b: *xun ch'en-tik ch- y- al -be-ik noxtok*
 John cave -PL ICP-3E-say-AP-PL also
 Do they also call him 'John Cliffs'?
- 5 a: *i'i jun o*
 no one REL
 No, that's another guy.

- 6 *ja` s- cha`- krem ti mu chep-il k`u x- y- al -be-ik*
 ! 3E-two- boy ART tasty Joe -ATTRIB what ASP-3E-say-AP-PL
 That' the stepson of disgusting Joey, or whatever they call him.
- 7 *ti mol j- tata` -tik lok`-em paxyon*
 ART old 1E-father-PLINC exit-PF pasionero
 That old gentleman, the former Pasionero [a medium prestige
 ritual office]
- 8 c: *mol chep buluch-e*
 old Joe eleven-CL
 You mean Old Man Joe Eleven?
- 9 a: *muk` bu j- na` lek*
 NEG where 1E-know good
 I don't really know.
- 10 *buluch nan li batz`i s- jol s- bi a`a*
 eleven perhaps ART real 3E-head 3E-name indeed
 Maybe his real last name is 'Eleven'.
- 11 *pero s- cha`- krem*
 but 3E-two - boy
 But it's his stepson.

Here interlocutors display various confusions and uncertainties, but it is far from clear that these are about *lack of recognition*. Although recognition is of course important, appropriate labelling is also critical: how best both to characterize and *properly* name the people involved, taking into account the triangular relationship between the various interlocutors and the referent.

10.10 'Referring dupliciter'

In presenting an inventory of referring resources for Zinacantec Tzotzil, I have continually emphasized the ways that the choice of a particular expression involves multiple projections from participants to their interrelationships – no surprise if a central business of talk is maintaining and recasting such relationships. My point is that by referring, interlocutors always 'do' more than refer, so that 'referring simpliciter' is a mirage in the face of the additional (sometimes duplicitous) indexical work simultaneously performed. Even the most unmarked of referring expressions, given the multiplicity of possible alternatives, will in its circumstances operate at some level in contrast to those alternatives. Referential function may be foregrounded, but indexical flavour is never fully bleached. I have also suggested that in Zinacantán it would be hard to discern a *single* 'default' referential strategy, and that even a unilinear hierarchy of referring strategies (cf. Hanks, this volume) is complicated by circumstances that may, in fact, downgrade the importance of referential precision or recognition in favour of other cultural or interactive priorities. In fact, having a single default referring strategy in a specific social situation seems to suggest that the situation itself is, by default, taken as constraining or normalizing the sorts of social relations that are relevant between H, S and R.

(Recall the example of the Reed Anthropology usage: Calling someone by the default ‘Mr. X’ or ‘Miss Y’ reflects not just standard usage but also a specific sort of projected standard set of relationships.)

To conclude, let me return to ‘Lazy Domingo’, now bitterly estranged from his aged father-in-law who forty years before had explained the nickname. The old man now, if he refers at all to Lazy Domingo, uses no names. The younger man, with whom he has fought bitterly over lands and money, is simply unnameable, referred to only indirectly and in the vaguest possible terms – *li jun mol ta jap-osil* ‘the one old man from up on the ridge’, for example – leaving it to the interlocutor to calculate which unmentionable ‘old man’ is intended (see Levinson, this volume). Such a taboo extends not only to Lazy Domingo’s names and nicknames, but to his titles too. He is widely called *pasaro* [> Spanish *pasado*] for his most distinguished civil position, or *mol Romín* ‘old man Domingo’ because of his political authority and age; but his father-in-law adamantly refuses to use such formulas. Such facts reflect again the omnipresent indexicality of person reference. Hostile relations between Speaker and Referent invert the ‘preferences’ for recognition and minimization, and trade on (and simultaneously signal) the precise identities and relationships between speech act participants and referents. Moreover, it is not only the outraged father-in-law who will not name Lazy Domingo. In direct conversation with the old man, his interlocutors, recognizing the mutual enmity, will also often avoid direct recognitionals. In Example (13), talking to the old man about fights between the estranged son-in-law and another man, the local magistrate adopts the same sort of circumlocution – *li jun mole* ‘the one old man’.

Example (13) Indirection and recipient design

A: *komo x-chi`uk i jun mol uk une*
 because 3E-with ART one old also CL
 Like with the one gentleman [i.e., the son-in-law] also
komo muk` bu xa lek x-a-k`opon a-ba-ik-e
 because NEG where already good ASP-2E-speak 2E-self-PL-CL
 Since you don’t get along with him any more
yech`o le:k xa s-ta s-ba x-chiuk une
 thus good already 3E-find 3E-self 3E-with CL
 Therefore [the other man] gets into good fights with him, too.

Even more telling, in the old man’s retold *representations* of the son-in-law’s hypothetical speech, this kind of deliberate referential opacity is inserted into his enemy’s virtual mouth.

Example (14) Reported angry speech

'kavron, tek y-a`i s-ba ti puta mol a`a kavron
 bastard there=IRR 3E-hear 3E-self ART whore old EVID bastard
 ‘Damn, he can just watch out for himself that whorish old man [i.e., the

father-in-law, here the narrator], the bastard.

muk' bu batz'i j-tek'-be tana ok'ob s-ti` s-na'
 NEG where real 1E-step-AP later tomorrow 3E-mouth 3E-house
 I won't be stepping over his doorstep, today or tomorrow',
xi la un
 say QUOT CL
 he is reported to say.

The hated son-in-law is voiced as referring to his father-in-law with an offensive epithet, perfect meta-index of the broken relationship (Haviland 2005). When the name cannot be pronounced, the identity of the referent – object of S and S's optimal constraint – seems no more important than the indexical message projected by his non-identification.

Reference to persons is ubiquitous in interaction. If, as I have argued for Zinacantán, all such reference is simultaneously and necessarily a projection of social relationships, reference to persons becomes a powerful ethnographic and social structural probe. If, in addition, such projection can have multiple orientations, it seems most reasonable to consider that linguistic and interactive resources for achieving reference – from names to kinship formulas, and from affective to evidential inflections – are not simply designed as 'recognitionals' but as intricate and highly structured instruments of interactive social action.

Abbreviations

!	Emphatic predicate
1E	1st person ergative
1PLX	1st person plural exclusive suffix
2E	2nd person ergative
3E	3rd person ergative
AGN	agentive prefix
AP	applicative suffix
ART	article
ASP	unmarked aspect prefix
ATTRIB	attributive suffix
AUX	auxiliary verb
CL	clitic
CONJ	conjunction
CP	completive aspect

DEF	definite article
DEIC	deictic determiner
DER	derivational suffix
DIR	directional particle
EVID	evidential
EXIST	existential predicate
ICP	incompletive aspect
IRREAL	irealis suffix
NC	numeral classifier
NEG	negative particle
PASS	passive suffix
PF	perfective suffix
PL	plural suffix
PLINC	1st person plural inclusive suffix
PP	perfect passive
PREP	preposition
PT	particle
QUOT	quotative clitic

Part III

The person reference as a system in trouble

11 Intersubjectivity and progressivity in person (and place) reference

John Heritage

In a discussion of methods for showing understanding in conversation, Harvey Sacks distinguished between demonstrating and claiming understanding by reference to the following:

Example (1) [Sacks 1992, Vol 2: 141]

- A: Where are you staying?
B: Pacific Palisades.
A: -> Oh at the west side of town.

Sacks comments that the third turn in Example (1) DEMONSTRATES a grasp of the place reference ‘Pacific Palisades’ by re-referencing it in other words. In this way it shows a recognition of the location that is amenable to correction. It is, of course, the character of the re-referencing operation that shows whether the respondent has a correct grasp of the location or not, as Sacks indicates in Example (2), a variant of this sequence, which exhibits a failure of recognition.¹

Example (2) [Sacks 1992, Vol 2: 142]

- A: Where are you staying?
B: Pacific Palisades.
A: -> Oh in the center of town.

By contrast, he suggests, the repeat of the place reference in Example (3) is more equivocal: It may CLAIM recognition of the location, but it does not demonstrate it in a fashion that is amenable to correction.

Example (3) [Sacks 1992, Vol 2: 141]

- A: Where are you staying?
B: Pacific Palisades.
A: -> Oh Pacific Palisades.

¹ Pacific Palisades is on the western (Pacific Ocean) edge of Los Angeles.

Not the least significant feature of these sequences, however, is that all three are invented. Moreover, despite the plausibility of Examples (1) and (2), it is difficult to locate naturally occurring references to either persons or places that approximate them. They are, in fact, sequences that appear to occur very infrequently in normal interaction. Instead sequences in which person reference is accomplished ordinarily run off without any overt claim or demonstration of recognition from recipients. Rather, recipients advance sequence progressivity thereby tacitly claiming recognition. Thus in Example (4), a little flurry of person references passes unregistered as such. That the reference is understood can only be gleaned from Vera's agreement with Jenny (line 6) and subsequently in Jenny's overlapped response to Vera (line 9):

Example (4) [Rah 14:6]

1 Jen: E[hm ih i]t's a bit like eh u eh:m
 2 Ver: [Y e:h,]
 3 (0.3)
 4 Jen: -> Bella's kids you see Mike is good wih th'm
 5 is[n't he <WHERE]z ez you say:eh:
 6 Ver: => [Y e : s .]
 7 (0.3)
 8 Ver: -> eh Freddy dz'n [(bother) 'e tea:]ses [them you see in] stead of
 9 Jen: => [(Freddy takes)] [Y e : : : : :]
 10 (.)
 11 Ver: telling them tuh stop it when (.) when'e she wz
 12 screa:ming 'e-

That and how the referred-to persons are known to Jenny and Vera is treated as understood, and is tacitly managed through the onward movement of the sequence.

Similarly, in Example (5) a reference to 'Margot' a friend of Jane's with whom Edward is only slightly acquainted – passes without any form of acknowledgement from Edward:

Example (5) [Heritage 01:13:1]

1 Jan: How'r you.
 2 Edw: Fi:ne?
 3 Jan: .h Uh:m I wz ↑won'RING IF: you'n Ilene w'd like t' come ovuh
 4 -> fer a (.) drink this evenin:g.h u-juh:: (.) Margot has come
 5 fr'm Coventry.
 6 (.)
 7 Jan: .h And uh:: (0.2) Yihknow I thought thet ih-'d (.) be nice
 8 if we could get t'gethuh,

9 (0.2)
 10 (): .hh
 11 (0.2)
 12 Edw: => Yah. Okay well let me ask her just a moment it depe:nds upon
 13 what she's doing hang on.

Again we see that recognition is managed purely tacitly in the way that Edward moves to secure acceptance of Jane's invitation from his wife. It is particularly notable that Edward has passed on opportunities to claim recognition here since there was an expansion of the recognitional reference to 'Margot' 'embeddedly' accomplished when Jane adds that Margot has come 'fr'm Coventry'. At best, these sequences embody TACIT CLAIMS of recognition: OVERT DEMONSTRATIONS of recognition are nowhere to be found.

The notion that responses that advance sequence progressivity are the main vehicle through which tacit claims of recognition are registered is further supported by speaker conduct in the absence of sequence progressing responses. In contexts where such responses are absent, and despite the fact that any number of considerations could be the source of recipient difficulty, speakers commonly infer that an intendedly recognitional reference has gone awry.

In Example (6) Leslie reports that she plans to bring 'Missiz La:mp'. This report is not taken up, and Leslie treats this lack of sequential progressivity to indicate that there was trouble with the reference. She manages this with an artful expansion of the reference to her place of residence after which she continues on:

Example (6) [Holt C85:6:27]

1 Bod: [So- (.) I: .hhh George was here u-(.) some (of) the
 2 time so (1.1) it might be lmo:re I don't [know.]
 3 Les: [Yes:] I lwas
 4 going t'bring Missiz La:mp,
 5 -> (0.2)
 6 Les: from North Cadb'ry
 7 (.)
 8 Les: but she can't come becuz 'er husband's unexpectedly .hhh
 9 had t'go away so she's comin::g to the f:irst one after
 10 Christmas.
 11 Bod: Oh: () .

In Example (7), Mark fails to respond to Dee's announcement that her future son-in-law has sold his house (line 4). After Mark's click and a micropause (line 4), Dee pursues this with a specification of the location of the house that still fails to elicit uptake (line 6). She then expands yet again with a

specification of the location (line 7) that elicits acknowledgement of where the house is but not of the news. Thus, although reference may not necessarily be the problem, it is common that speakers turn to reference as a source of trouble.

Example (7) [Holt 5/88:2:4: 473–482]

1 Dee: =uh[we're ho[ping that he: .hhhh (0.3) he:'s cz 'ee sold=
 2 Mar: [w- [hhhhh
 3 Dee: =iz own houl:se
 4 Mar: .gnkplk (.) [ihYe::s::
 5 Dee: [↓A:nd it which wz in Frimley:
 6 -> (0.4)
 7 Dee: .hh (.) uh:m::n (0.2) that's sort 'v the Aldershot.
 8 (0.3)
 9 Dee: [()]
 10 Mar: [eeYeh I know roughly where it [is:
 11 Dee: [where it is yes,

Relevantly here, Dee treats Mark's non-response as involving a difficulty with her reference to the house: With the initial mention of the house there is an implied claim that Mark will know where it is.

Finally, tacit claims of recognition that are managed by simply progressing the sequence may later be found to be faulty. In Example (8) Kat's proposal for a get together with four named friends is responded to with a question that singles out the fourth of these: 'Clive'. The question clearly embodies a tacit claim to recognize the person in question and it furthers the sequence:

Example (8) [Holt X(C):2-1-4:145–161]

1 Kat: I[thought maybe we c'd g- have a get together of,=
 2 Les: [.hh
 3 Kat: =Melissa 'n Brian 'n: (0.5) Sarah 'n that ↓bloke, (.)
 4 oh: (.) uh Cli[ve?
 5 Les: -> [Oh is ↑he coming down f'Christmas?
 6 (1.1)
 7 Kat: Uh:m
 8 Les: It's Ma::rk now you know. The other one: n-ih-u[h
 9 Kat: [No no:
 10 I mean um (.) the one 'oo: who--:
 11 Les: .hhh ↑↑OH now ↑CLI:VE. Clive MacArthur yes buh he's
 12 away mah- e-he's awa::y (.) e-Boxing Day an' Christmas
 13 Day apparently
 14 Kat: Is 'e
 15 (0.3)

16 Les: Yes. B't uh |yes I: uh think a (.) get together would
17 be a good idea

However at line 8, Lesley volunteers a remark that Kat understands as indicating that she has not correctly recognized the 'Clive' in question, and it is only at line 11 that Lesley is able to demonstrate that she now recognizes the reference with a full expansion of the person reference 'Clive MacArthur'.

There is a sense in which the infrequency of cases like Example (1) is quite surprising. After all Example (1) is almost a paradigmatic case of speakers arriving at referential common ground (Clark 1992). Indeed a simple fourth turn 'yes' by the second speaker would be sufficient to instantiate a complete state of intersubjectivity between the speakers (Schegloff 1992). Moreover, cases like Example (8) indicate the difficulties that can arise when recognition is assumptively claimed rather than overtly demonstrated. In a social world where the security of intersubjective understanding was a prized outcome, and the security of referential common ground was a privileged objective, we would expect to find numerous sequences of the type that Sacks described.

But these sequences are thin on the ground, and Sacks was obliged to invent them to make his point. Instead the management of references to persons as recognitional and as intersubjectively secure is done embeddedly (Jefferson 1987) through the kind of sequence progression represented in Examples (4) and (5). These sequences exhibit the 'maxim of minimization', which Levinson (1987) argues is a generic feature of conversational practices favouring implicit over explicit methods of accomplishing conversational tasks.

In the context of reference, recognition is assumed unless some form of trouble is indicated. In other words, recognition is treated as the 'default' condition of recognitional person reference.

This paper considers this fact by asking when it is that recipients are moved to offer something like the third turn in Example (1). This requires an examination of the ways in which troubles with person reference are indicated and the dynamics of their resolution. To set the scene for this examination, I begin by introducing some existing literature, and then proceed to consider responses to person references that incorporate repairs to the method or content of the references involved.

11.1 Background

In their well-known 'Two Preferences' paper (1979, reprinted this volume), Sacks and Schegloff observe that two orders of organization inform references to persons. Firstly, there is an overriding preference for recognitional

reference. Without recognition, reference is fruitless. We can consider this preference for recognitional reference as a subset of a more general preference for intersubjectivity and common ground. Secondly, they observe, there is a preference for minimized reference. The two preferences are concurrently satisfied (in Western societies at least), by the use of proper names.

Sacks and Schegloff also note that although various preferences are often ‘concurrently relevant, applicable and satisfied’, there are occasions when this is not the case and that these occasions open up the possibility of examining ‘separate preferences’ as well as organizational methods of integrating them when they cannot be concurrently satisfied. In the case of reference to persons, it is the preference for minimization that is relaxed when the speaker encounters difficulties (either real or imagined) in the achievement of recognition.

In the context of repaired references to persons, these two preferences emerge in a broader form. Firstly, the preference for minimization expands into the organizational domain that Schegloff (1979b, 2006) describes under the heading of ‘progressivity’:

Among the most pervasively relevant features in the organization of talk-and-other-conduct-in-interaction is the relationship of adjacency or ‘nextness’. . . . Moving from some element to a hearably-next-one with nothing intervening is the embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivity. Should something intervene between some element and what is hearable as *a/the* next one due – should something violate or interfere with their contiguity, whether next sound, next word or next turn – it will be heard as qualifying the progressivity of the talk, and will be examined for its import, for what understanding should be accorded it. Each next element of such a progression can be inspected to find how it reaffirms the understanding-so-far of what has preceded, or favors one or more of the several such understandings that are being entertained, or how it requires reconfiguration of that understanding. (Schegloff, 2006)

Schegloff shows that the principle of progressivity operates at both the level of turn construction (Schegloff 1979b), and of sequence structure (Schegloff, 2006). Both levels will be pertinent to this discussion.

Secondly, there is the matter of intersubjectivity and the security of referential common ground. In circumstances where a speaker has repaired a reference to improve its likely recognizability, a recipient’s re-referencing of the now-repaired person reference will unambiguously show (or fail to show) recognition of the person in question.

It is evident that there are circumstances in which the conjoint operation of the principles of intersubjectivity and progressivity will result in conflict. Speakers encountering a difficulty in the management of recognitional reference, and initiating same-turn repair in that context, must perforce disrupt the progressivity of the turn in progress. Here the very fact of repair means that the

principle of intersubjectivity (in the form of recognitional reference) has trumped the principle of progressivity.

Recipients may find themselves in a parallel dilemma. Encountering a repaired recognitional reference, recipients can choose to demonstrate recognition of it, thus maximizing the security of referential common ground. But, as Sacks' examples indicate, this can only be achieved by re-referencing the (now-recognized) referent using alternative linguistic resources, and inviting confirmation of the correctness of that re-referencing from the initial speaker. Security of referential common ground can only be bought by disrupting the progressivity of the sequence in progress. Absolute security of reference is incompatible with progressivity.

In sum, both speakers and recipients can find themselves in conversational contexts in which the two conversational principles are in conflict. We can investigate the playing out of the dilemmas for speakers and recipients that arise from this conflict in the two main theatres of interactional organization – turn and sequence – in which progressivity is manifested by looking at responses to self-repaired references to persons under conditions in which the operations of self-repair and within-turn progressivity vary in their intensity and extent. The initial theme we will pursue is that the resources by which speakers manage repaired references to persons strike a balance between progressivity and intersubjectivity and set the terms for the balance to be struck in recipient responses.

11.2 Calibrating the dilemma: formats for self-repair

As Hayashi (2005) has recently shown in an analysis dealing with referential problems in Japanese, speakers can manage issues of reference repair with varying degrees of disruption to the progressivity of a turn's talk. A minimal form of disruption in the data at hand is the revision or expansion of a person reference at, or just after, a turn-constructional unit boundary, in a form known as transition space repair (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977).

A simple example of a transition space repair is to be found in Example (9). Here the speaker revises an initial turn-initial reference to 'Cyd' to a turn-final full name: 'Cyd Arnold'. Her recipient proceeds to inquire about the person in question:

Example (9) [Holt X(C) 1:1:1]

- 1 Mum: -> |Cyd rang this evening Cyd Arnold
 2 (.)
 3 Les: => How is she?
 4 (0.3)
 5 Mum: Eh: ye:s she's (.) |she's quite |goo:d she said she's...

In this case, the hearer (Lesley), by progressing the sequence, indexes recognition of the referred-to person. With this response, she clearly favours the maximization of sequence progressivity over intersubjective security. Moreover, the progression is managed in a thoroughly embedded way: As in the earlier cases, the matter of whether Lesley does or does not recognize ‘Cyd Arnold’ never reaches the overt conversational surface.

However, person references can be managed so as to make more demands on recipients. Recipients can be invited to acknowledge recognitional references via use of upward, ‘try-marking’, intonation (Sacks and Schegloff [this volume](#)) on the reference that invites a minimal recipient departure from progressivity: an ‘en passant’ acknowledgement of the reference as recognitional. Thus in Example (10) the topic of conversation is the regional variability of house prices in England, and in particular the North–South divide. Dee’s elaboration of her try-marked reference to ‘Jo?’ with ‘oo lives in Lancashire’ begins to develop an evidential basis for her subsequent claim that northern house prices are much lower than southern, while simultaneously providing more resources with which her recipient can recognize the person in question:

Example (10) [Holt 3:May 88:2:4:11:591]

- 1 Dee: And up in the North a little bi[:t
 2 Mar: [The: they uh theh-
 3 Mar: Ye: s. [h.hhh<
 4 Dee: -> [B’t I wz talking to my cousin Jo?
 5 (.)
 6 Dee: -> you know [’oo lives in Lancashire .hhhh uhghhuh on=
 7 Mar: [eYe: h?
 8 =Sun:dee. An’ I mean u-he:r house. is very very
 9 similar to (0.2) ou|rs.

Here the absence of response to the try-marked ‘Jo?’ at line 5, is sufficient to motivate the expansion, while the recognizable initiation of that expansion (‘you know’ at line 6), is sufficient to motivate the claim of recognition that Mark offers at line 7.

In other forms of transition space expansion, recipients are invited to display some recognition of the reference, via formats that more overtly solicit acknowledgement, most prominently ‘you know X’ or ‘remember X?’ just before the revised (and usually expanded) reference form. These are illustrated in Examples (11)–(12).

Example (11) [Her:OI:18:2]

- 1 Jan: Wel- .h uhm ah: j’st hadda ca:ll fr’m uh: (.) Stella=
 2 -> =you remembuh Stella [Hunt?

- 3 Ile: => Ye::s,
 4 Jan: E:nd uh:m, (0.4) uh...

Example (12) [PT:NB:VII:7]

- 1 Emm: .hhh B't anyway we played golf et San or Bud played et San
 2 Ma:rcus so I went down with'im=
 3 -> =yihknow that's back'v Ensk- (.) E[sc'ndido [so,
 4 Mar: => [Ye:ah. [Mhm,

In each of these cases, although there is no indication of recognitional difficulty from the recipient, the speaker finds an initial reference form to be problematic and invites recipient recognition on its expansion. Here then it is the speaker of the reference form who both expands the reference, somewhat delaying within-turn progressivity, and who also invites the recipient to delay within-sequence progressivity by acknowledging recognition of the reference. Speakers in these cases are clearly redressing the balance between progressivity and intersubjectivity in favour of intersubjectivity.

It will be apparent that, across these four cases, it is speakers who have worked to repair or expand person references with, at the most, minimal indications from recipients that person recognition had become, or was going to become, a problem. This is a clear indication that in the context of person reference, as elsewhere in conversation, a preference for self-correction is in operation (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977). However, it is also indicative of the fact that speakers tend to disrupt turn-constructural unit progressivity so as to address the anticipated prospect (whether veridical or not) of other initiated repair. Thus, speakers' referential practices exhibit a preference for sequential over turn-constructural unit progressivity, and for within turn-constructural unit disruption over the less controllable, and potentially ramifying sequential disruptions that can attend other initiated repair and its sequelae.

Further evidence for this preference is found in cases where speakers interpolate entire turn-constructural units to elaborate person references. In Example (13) this takes the form of a post-positioned interpolation:

Example (13) [Holt U88:2:4:12:636]

- 1 Ski: WELL I::'m glad 'ee did eez a nice ol' chap he wz
 2 very much the gentleman was Philip I thou[ght
 3 Car: [Well:
 4 -> that's what Jo (.) ↓thought u uh:,hh she's Jo Adams
 5 -> now who was Jo Applega:te.
 6 Ski: Oh y[es
 7 Car: [An' she said n- (.) He's a(p) (.) Mister Hammond's
 8 a perfect |ge:ntleman.

Here two acquaintances are catching up on mutual friends. Carrie, who is at or near to the conclusion of a turn-constructural unit depicting a third-party's agreement with Skip's evaluation of 'Philip', breaks off to interpolate an additional turn-constructural unit (lines 4–5) devoted to explicating the reference to the third party 'Jo': 'uh:,hh she's Jo Admans now who was Jo Applegate'. After the recipient has acknowledged this expansion, Carrie proceeds to a direct reported speech elaboration of her previous 'Well: that's what Jo (.) ↓thought'. This elaboration clearly converges with the terms of Skip's evaluation of Philip as 'a gentleman' and indeed upgrades that with 'perfect'. An additional touch of authenticity is provided by Carrie's reported speech formulation of Skip's 'Philip' as Jo's 'Mister Hammond'.

11.3 Framing a person reference with an interpolation

Speakers may anticipate problems with the recognizability of a person and devote entire prefatory units of talk to securing their recognition (Hayashi 2005). Thus, in Example (14), the speaker, having initiated a story preface at lines 1–2, proceeds to frame the recognizability of one of its protagonists – 'Cathy' – as problematic. At line 5, she interpolates an entire turn-constructural unit to securing her recipient's recognition, including an expansion of the reference to 'Cathy' with 'Larry Taylor's ex-girlfriend', when there is no immediate uptake to the reference. Here the entire story that is prefigured at line 1 is put on hold pending recipient recognition of the protagonist:

Example (14) [Frankel TCI:9]

- 1 Shi: Ah'm not surprized. .hhh Listen, u- something very very:
 2 cute happened las'night et the Warehouse.
 3 (.)
 4 Ger: Wha[t
 5 Shi: -> [.hhhhh YihKNOW Cathy, (.) Larry Taylor's exgirlfrie[nd,]
 6 Ger: [Yee]ah.
 7 Shi: [.hhhhhhh]=
 8 Ger: [°M-hm?°°]=
 9 Shi: =Okay. Cathy came in las'night. ((sniff))

Only after securing recognition from her recipient, does the speaker proceed to begin the story itself at line 9.

And in Example (15), a reference to 'Missiz Cole' is expanded by reference to 'Philip Co:le' whose recognizability is made the object of overt question 'd' you'member Philip Co:le'. Having been thus framed as questionable, and again given no uptake, this reference in its turn is subsequently expanded with 'Carol's: (.) husba:nd?'

Table 11.1 *Dimensions of person reference repair initiation*

Repair position	Transition space 'Interpolated' additional TCU
Repair initiation form	Try-marking Declarative question ('you know X') Interrogative ('Do you remember X')

Example (15)

- 1 Les: Oh: uh:m: (0.6) ↓Old Missiz Co:le is very ill
 2 -> d' you 'member Philip Co:le, Carol's: (.)
 3 -> husba:n[d?
 4 Mum: [↑Oh ↓ye:s?
 5 Mum: Ye-:s,
 6 (.)
 7 Les: She had a stroke in Cary last week.

Only once she has secured Mum's recognition of the family does Lesley proceed to an account of Mrs. Cole's illness (line 7).

In summary, Table 11.1 provides an overview of the resources with which speakers can index the severity of their concern with adequate recognitional reference.

Moving from top to bottom within each set provides greater opportunities for the recipient to respond to a repaired person reference ('repair position'), and more overt pressure to so respond ('repair initiation form').

11.4 **Recognitional hitches and the management of recipient recognition**

Thus far we have treated repairs to person reference as entirely a speaker-initiated affair. But what is the contribution of recipients to this process? A first thing to note is that, having been invited to acknowledge recognition of a reference through some version of a polar interrogative, recipients ordinarily do so and in this way align with the speaker's treatment of a prior reference as problematic. However, they manage this alignment in minimal fashion and in two ways. Firstly, they minimize the disruption to sequential progressivity by acknowledging recognition of the referent in slight overlap with the repair's production [Examples (12), (14) and (15)] or in unmarked next position [Examples (11) and (13)] (Jefferson 1983, 1986; Schegloff 2000b).

Secondly, the acknowledgements themselves are minimized.² As in the cases above, they consist of (variants of) ‘yes’. They rarely contain turn components that acknowledge any momentary prior recognition problem (as, e.g., ‘oh yes’ might), nor are they expanded into the kinds of alternative reference forms that would display, rather than merely claim, recognition. With these acknowledgements, reference recognition continues to be treated as a default.

We now turn to cases where recipient recognition becomes more problematic or marked. Here it is relevant to distinguish between repaired person references that involve two tries as recognition in contrast to those that involve three or more tries. While every repaired person reference involves an expansion or second try, these cases may vary in terms of whether the recipient has already failed to exhibit recognition of the referent. In cases involving three or more tries, it is almost always the case that some such failure has occurred.

Thus we can isolate a large class of cases in which an initial failure at recognitional reference is followed, after an expansion of the recognitional reference, by a claim of recognition that is unproblematically presented and accepted, as in Example (16) – see also Examples (14) and (15):

Example (16) [Sacks and Schegloff [this volume](#)]

- 1 A: Ya still in the real estate business, Lawrence
 2 B: 1-> Wha e’ uh No my dear heart uh, ya know Max
 3 Rickler h
 4 (0.5)
 5 B: 2-> with whom I’ve been ‘ssociated since I’ve been out here in
 6 Brentwood [has had a series of um (0.7) bad experiences..
 7 A: => [Yeah

In Example (17) a designedly allusive reference to a third party as ‘ihYour friend ’n mi:ne’, which is then – and in the absence of uptake – further expanded with the allusive ‘mMister: R:’, is also responded to with an oh-prefaced acknowledgement in which the oh-preface minimally indexes prior trouble in achieving recognition (Heritage 1984b):

Example (17) [Field Xmas 85:1:4:1]

- 1 Les: °Oh:..° hh Yi-m- You |know I-I- I’m boiling about
 2 something hhhheh [hh hhhh

² Sacks and Schegloff ([this volume](#)) note that a nod is also sufficient to acknowledge recognition of a try-marked reference. Nodding takes acknowledgement of recognitional reference out of the vocal channel altogether, and is thus a method of responding to speakers’ bids for recognition while minimizing any disruption to sequential progressivity. Because this chapter uses mainly telephone conversational data, this dimension of acknowledgement is not explored here further, but see Stivers (2005b).

- 3 Joy: [Wha: :t.
 4 Les: Well that sa|:le. (0.2) at- at (.) the vicarage.
 5 (0.6)
 6 Joy Oh |ye[:s,
 7 Les: [t
 8 (0.6)
 9 Les: 1-> u (.) ihYour friend 'n mi:ne wz the:re
 10 (0.2)
 11 (): (h[h hh)
 12 Les: 2-> [mMister: R: ,
 13 Joy: => (Oh ye:s hheh)

And in Example (18) a try-marked person reference is pursued with ‘(Y’know who) I’m talking about?’ (line 8). Here the overlapping claim of recognition at line 9 (‘Oh yeah.’ is acknowledged by the speaker with a confirmatory ‘Yeah.’ (line 10) before she proceeds with her account. Here the topic is embellished insurance claims:

Example (18) [SN4:11–12]

- 1 Sher: Yihknow when it- (.) came from thee:: I think (a) air
 2 conditioning system it drips on the front of the ca:rs?
 3 (.)
 4 Sher: if you park inna certain place?=
 5 ?Rut: =[mm hmm]
 6 Sher: -> =[·hhhh] (.) Peter. (0.2) Greffset?
 7 (0.5)
 8 Sher: -> [(Y’know who) I’m talking about?
 9 Kar: => [Oh yeah.
 10 Sher: Yeah..hh He collected a fo:rtune fer that. He
 11 claimed all k(h)i:nds of damages.

In all these cases, speakers encountering evidence of recipients’ difficulties in achieving recognition from a person reference expand these references and sacrifice the preference for progressivity. However, the recipient responses that are mandated by these expansions are brief claims of recognition: ‘Yes’ or ‘Oh yes’. They thus confine the element of recipient expansion mandated by the speaker to a minimum and, in this way, respect the preference for progressivity.

Once we encounter sustained efforts (i.e., three or more tries) to achieve recipient recognition, we also start to see recipients doing more than a minimal ‘Yes’ or ‘Oh yes’ to acknowledge recognition of a person reference. In these cases, speakers clearly are abandoning the preference for progressivity and

indexing a prioritization of intersubjectivity over turn and sequence progressivity. Under such circumstances they license, or even mandate, recipients to do the same. Thus, in Example (19), Ann has three attempts at recognitional reference for a person at a party. As the third of these is under way, her recipient acknowledges recognition with ‘Oh Yes’ and then expands her turn with a characterization of the person in question:

Example (19) [SBL 2:2:4 (Sacks and Schegloff [this volume](#))]

- 1 Ann: ... well I was the only one other than .hhh thee uhm
 2 1 -> (0.7) mtch Fo: rds.
 3 2 -> Uh Missiz Holmes Ford?
 4 (0.8)
 5 3 -> You know the- [the cellist?
 6 Bev: => [Ohyes. She’s- she’s (a/the) cellist.
 7 Ann: Ye:s.
 8 Bev: Ye[s
 9 Ann: [Well she and her husband were there

A very similar case is the following, which involves reference to a place name:

Example (20) [SF:2:11]

- 1 B: Whaddiy- you go over t’yer parents () (0.2) Thursday?
 2 M: 1-> .hhhhhh Uh: I’m going dow:n to: San Jua:n.
 3 (1.0)
 4 B: Going down to San Jua:n.
 5 M: 2-> Yihknow where the k- (.) swallows are?
 6 (0.8)
 7 B: Oh:::,
 8 M: 3-> Capistrano
 9 B: => Oh yah. Sa:n Juan Capistrano. With yer family?

It is noticeable that the recipients in both these cases fail to provide clear EVIDENCE of recognition of the referent that, as Sacks suggested, would normally have to involve some expansion or transformation of the reference. In both Examples (19) and (20), the recipients expand their turns with repetitions of reference forms and thus CLAIM, but do not DEMONSTRATE, recognition of the reference. Thus across all the referential repairs discussed so far in this paper, not one has embodied the kind of ‘Pacific Palisades’ to ‘The west side of town’ transformation that, Sacks argued would demonstrate recognition of a referent.

11.5 The salience of recognition and of its demonstration

In a number of cases assembled for this paper the speaker of an intendedly recognitional reference abandons the pursuit of recognition in the interest of progressing the activity of which the reference is a part. This occurs in Example (21). Here, the speaker, Lottie, starts with an intendedly recognitional reference ('Doctor Nelson') and, after an initial move towards a non-recognitional reference, expands it in pursuit of recognition with 'yihknow from uh Glendale?'

Example (21) [NB IV:14:10]

- 1 Lot: So I'm goin up uh hhh Mondee too:. An' uh,
 2 Emm: W-w uh how [long is 'e gonna be gone.
 3 Lot: [Yihknow.
 4 Lot: hhhh God I don't know, he doesn' know either I mean, hhh if it-
 5 -> uh, we talk'tuh Doctor Nelson
 6 -> yihknow this, s-doct-
 7 -> yihknow from uh Glendale?
 8 (0.2)
 9 Lot: -> This friend'v a:rs,=
 10 Emm: => =Mm[hm,
 11 Lot: [He's a big s- one a' the biggest surgeons there in uh,
 12 hhh I think Saint Joseph's uh hospit'1.

Encountering no uptake from her recipient at line 8, Lottie abandons her pursuit of recognitional reference, and substitutes a 'place holder' non-recognitional reference 'This friend'v a:rs,' thereby treating recognitional reference as inessential for her conversational project.

Correspondingly, recipients can make the same move thereby curtailing futile efforts by speakers to expand recognitional reference:

Example (22) [Holt 6:SO:88:1:08]

- 1 Les: =.h h h h and she's on tab]lets. not uhm: radio
 2 treatment.
 3 Les: .hh[hhh
 4 Joy: [Oh I do[hope
 5 Les: [or radium: treatment.hhhh[h . hhhhhh
 6 Joy: [I wz talking to:
 7 -> uhm: .tch .hh Helen Southerby (.) n: nex'door but one here.
 8 -> D'you know Helen Southerby
 9 Les: => hNo:. But I do know the name.hhhhh
 10 Joy: -> ngOh she: :-:-: ohh poor dear .tch .hh back in um: (0.5)

11 wuh-Easter. (0.2) Ye:s Easter she .hh developed a lum:p
 12 in her neck 'n

Here the speaker seeks recognition for the newly introduced 'Helen Southerby' with the expansion 'n:nex't door but one here'. However the recipient manages to discourage any further search for a recognitional formula while simultaneously encouraging the continuation of talk by claiming to 'know the name', thereby treating full recognitional reference as inessential to the speaker's conversational project.

Of course there are circumstances in which speakers can not have, nor can they permit their recipients to have, the luxury of abandoning recognitional reference. Under such circumstances speakers will launch, and recipients will be launched on, a search for the elusive transformations and expansions that unequivocally demonstrate recognition. In Example (23), for example, Ron has called his sometimes friend Gina. Gina's mother, Marsha, picks up the phone. At line 2, Ron misrecognizes Marsha as Gina and, without further attempts on either side to clarify identities, the parties negotiate a message to be left for Gina (line 15). At line 16, Ron asks Marsha who she is, and she responds with a non-recognitional self-identification 'her mo:m'. In his subsequent pursuit of her name (line 19), Ron clearly indicates that he knows her ('I ferget yer name.') and reinforces this claim by offering her his own and inviting its recognition: 'This is Ron Mercahno "d'you remember me?"' (line 21). Here is a sequential context in which the kind of expanded or transformative person reference that shows recognition has become virtually obligatory:

Example (23) [MTRAC 60:1:1:1]

1 Mar: [Ye:h- Hello?
 2 Ron: eHello uh: Gina?
 3 (0.2)
 4 Ron: Is Gina there?
 5 ()
 6 Mar: nNo Gina:'s not he:re.
 7 (0.3)
 8 Mar: C'n I take a message?
 9 (0.2)
 10 Ron: Ye:uh. Uh:: (0.7) eHez she mo:ve:d.
 11 ()
 12 Mar: No:..
 13
 14 Ron: °Oh: (O[])°
 15 Mar: [hhh She's working tihday: <Right now.
 16 Ron: Okay. 'hh Ah:: tell'er Ro::n ca:lled, ah:: this uhis

- 17 is Who is th[is].
- 18 Mar: [whh This is: her mo:m.=
- 19 ???: =[nye:]
- 20 Ron: =[Yes:. I-I fer I ferget yer name.()].
- 21 Mar: Hm:?
- 22 Ron: I ferget yer name. This is Ron Mercahno °d'you remember me¿°
- 23 (0.3)
- 24 Mar: 'hh Oh fer heaven sa:ke Ro:n Yeh this's Marsha. 'hh
- 25 Ron: Marsha right. °([])°
- 26 Mar: [Yer writing fer television.]
- 27 ???: r::[uh::r
- 28 Ron: [y:Ye:ah.
- 29 Mar: The writing fer television Ron.
- 30 Ron: Ye:ah.
- 31 Mar: hh[h
- 32 Ron: [Ro::n: Ron writing fer t(h)el[ev(h) isio(h)n]
- 33 Mar: [hh - hh - hh-]hh 'hhhhhhh
- 34 Ron: [()]
- 35 Mar: [Yeah I do remember you.
- 36 Ron: (An' I:: got)- I ran intuh Gina awhi:le ba:ck.

At line 24 Marsha volunteers a fully emphasized claim of recognition 'hh Oh fer heaven sa:ke Ro:n Yeh' and her own name 'Yeh this's Marsha'. She then supplements this with an expansion that evidences recognition 'Yer writing fer television.' and, upon Ron's acceptance of that, converts that expansion into a version of a proper name 'The writing fer television Ron' (line 29), which, in turn, Ron acknowledges with signs of amusement (line 32).

Similarly, in Example (24), Dave has called Pete to propose that they go on a fishing trip. Evidently, the proposal cannot be addressed unless Pete has some grasp of the destination, and Dave is launched into an effort to describe its location. It is not until Pete's 'transformative' re-referencing of the location of 'Pilgrim Lake' that this matter is settled, albeit approximately.

Example (24) [Northridge 2:3]

- 1 Dave: -> Like yih know whereah:: Pilgrim Lake is i(ts)-=
- 2 -> =that's on the other si:de u'th'Grapevine=
- 3 -> =yihknow this side of the Grapevine
- 4 Pete: => Oh the's jus' up to Bakersfield.

Absent this transformative activity, and the matter of recipient recognition can become questionable. In Example (25) Jay undertakes to tell Tom where he used to live in Naples. Right across the fragment Jay is evidently looking for Tom's recognition of the various place names he mentions. He begins

with a reference to the ‘San Carlo op’ra house’ and solicits recognition of the location with ‘Correct?’, but does not receive uptake. His next turn is occupied with getting recognition by reference to a new place name the ‘Palazzo Rayaleh’. Here he gets a minimal acknowledgement token and, after a further attempt to solicit recognition (accomplished by the translation to the Royal Palace) a repeat: the Royal Palace. And here we see the equivocality of repeating as a display of recognition in an environment of prior trouble. The repeat is certainly not enough for Jay for, in overlap with it, he re-solicits recognition once again with ‘Right?’.

Example (25) [Adato:6:4–6 simplified]

- 1 Jay: Uh you- you were in Naples right? --uh:: I’ll telly’where I
 2 usetuh live.
 3 ... (14 lines omitted) ...
 4 Jay: R:right across the street from the Galleria is the San Carlo
 5 op’ra house. Correct?
 6 (1.4)
 7 Jay: Just a little bit away from the San Carlo op’ra house, about
 8 a half a block, is- the the pah- Pallazzo Raya[leh.
 9 Tom: [Uh huh,
 10 Jay: -> The Royal Palace.
 11 Tom: -> The Royal Pa[lace.
 12 Jay: -> [Ri:ght?
 13 (0.4)
 14 Jay: Across the street, f’m the Royal Palace, is this big church.
 15 Ri:ght?
 16 (0.8)
 17 Tom: [()-
 18 Jay: [You remember now?
 19 ... (12 lines omitted)
 20 Jay: Right across th’stree’f’m th’Palazzo Rayaleh is this bi:g
 21 church.
 22 (0.8)
 23 Jay: ‘n then beyond the big church are like liddle alleys. Ee
 24 Vicoli di Napoli.
 25 Tom: -> Yeah. Small alleys.
 26 Jay: -> Small all[eyes,
 27 Tom: -> [Oh what small all[eyes.
 28 Jay: [Now that ’s where I usetuh live.

The difficulties of lines 1–20 become resolved, though somewhat equivocally, in lines 25–29. Jay’s ‘n then beyond the church . . .’ gets confirmation

through a claim of recognition ‘Yeah’ and then what must be one of the most minimal displays of recognition – a synonymous lexical replacement in which Jay’s ‘liddle’ is replaced by Tom with ‘small’. Subsequently, following Jay’s repeat of ‘small alleys’, Tom’s more elaborated claim of recognition with ‘Oh what small alleys’, appears to be just enough to permit Jay to complete the sequence with ‘Now that’s where I usetuh live’.

In Examples (24)-(26), recipient demonstrations of recognition are mandated by the activities launched by speakers. However, in at least one environment, re-referencing is an activity that is actively pursued by recipients. In this environment recipients misapprehend person or place formulations and, after they have been corrected, work to show that the misapprehension is now put to rest. This is clearly the case as shown in Example (8). As previously noted, Lesley’s line 8 indicates a mis-recognition of the ‘Clive’ who Kat had referred to at line 4. At this point, her full naming of the ‘Clive’ in question (at line 11) is effectively mandated by this misapprehension.

In a parallel case, Example (26), a story is being told about an automobile escapade in which the precise position of the protagonist within the car is critical for an appreciation of the story’s details. The story recipient volunteers an understanding of this position (line 1/3) and is duly corrected (line 5):

Example (26) (Goodwin:G84:M:3)

1 G: => He w'z o:n the opposite side a'the driver ri:ght?
 2 (.)
 3 G: °with iz::°
 4 (0.4)
 5 M: -> No he w- (.) e-he w'z on the sa::me side ez
 6 the driver [r
 7 G: => [Oh on nuh ba:ck seat?=
 8 M: =Yeah in d'ba:ack seat

Given that there is only one location within a car that a passenger can be sitting that is on the ‘same side as the driver’, the recipient (‘G’) can simply re-reference this location to display that his prior misapprehension is now resolved.

It has already been suggested that the kind of re-referencing described by Sacks is vanishingly rare in contexts of ordinary reference to persons, and in contexts where those references are repaired. The upshot of the examples presented in this section is that there are circumstances in which the recipient’s recognition of a person reference becomes the entire focus of a sequence. This can arise either through a speaker’s repeated efforts at self-repair (e.g., Examples (19), (20), (24)), as a product of a recipient’s stated misapprehension, Example (8) and (26), or by other pathways. However they

emerge, recipient re-doings of person references in other words only arise where adequate recipient recognition of a person reference becomes the entire focus of a sequence.

11.6 Adequate reference as shared responsibility

So far we have examined cases in which speakers, having offered names as resources for recognitional reference, expand these references with additional descriptors. Under these circumstances, subject to the exceptions noted in the previous sections, little is required of recipients except for acknowledgements that claim recognition of the referent. Recipients can maintain a broad focus on sequence progressivity until and unless speakers have departed from the within-turn progressivity to the extent of three or more tries for recipient recognition.

However, as Schegloff (1996a) and others have noted, when initial efforts at recognitional reference do not include proper names, recipients will supply them. In all of the following cases, speakers indicate, by repeated referential efforts, that the non-name references they have come up with are sub-optimal. The repeated referential efforts clearly depart from the principle of progressivity. Under such circumstances, recipients can encounter a reciprocal obligation to re-reference the person in question. This is particularly straightforward in cases where the identification and recognition of a person is the entire focus of a question, as in Example (27):

Example (27) [Adato, 5:1 [Schegloff, 1996a, p. 462]

- 1 Sy: Where did you get that filing box from.
 2 Jay: -> Pro:m uh:: that fellow who usetuh sit
 3 -> uhmback of you, who- who got fired.
 4 Sy: => Jordan?
 5 Jay: Jordan yeah.

Or a statement as in Example (28), where the non-recognitional 'someb'dy ↑else:' (line 1) is revised into a search (line 3) for a name that is projectedly known to the recipient with 'you know the bo:y':

Example (28) [Holt 3: &/86:1:2:1]

- 1 Les: -> I kno:w there's someb'dy ↑else: th't rin:gs fr'm Castle
 2 Cary .hhh just to speak t'her occasionally: uh:mn
 3 -> you know the bo:y uhm (0.4) .tch! (0.7) Cutter, (.)
 4 -> Malco [lm Cutt]er?
 5 Tre: -> [Oh::]Malcom Cutter [yes.
 6 Les: [An' he c'n never catch' er at home

7 (0.4)
8 Tre: Oh-:hh

But it is by no means confined to these cases. In Example (29), Jane makes several attempts – ‘the othuh woman:’, ‘the woman who’s actualleh e-hh invo:lved’ and ‘not Missiz No:se but the othuh one’, – to reference the real estate agent that Jeremy is dealing with.

Example (29) [Heritage:0I:3:1]

1 Jer: hhhOh ah(d') know it's (0.4) sick'ning really.
2 (0.3)
3 Jan: Ye::s .hh Uh:: b't=
4 Jer: = (most alye.)
5 Jan: -> Uh:m (.) did did uh: were y'able to pho:ne uh-m: the othuh
6 -> woman:: the :: the woman who's actualleh e-hh invo:lved not
7 -> Missiz No:se but the othuh one,
8 Jer: => Yes Miss ri-Raybee< (1.2) phoned up (dih she) en u-en she said
9 really thet (.) she fee:ls thet sh-shi- (0.2) she cahn't do
10 much now.

In response, Jeremy elegantly embeds the name of the agent – ‘Miss ri-Raybee’ – into a turn that is otherwise occupied in dealing with Jane’s question.

And in Example (30), two efforts to identify a person who appears in television commercials for a supermarket chain engender a little flurry of recognitional references. Here Michael’s post-positioned reference to ‘that asshole’ (line 2) clearly indexes his failure to come up with a name:

Example (30) [Chicken Dinner:]

1 Mic: I hate that fuckin guy who does those c'mmercial's
2 that assho[le
3 Sha: [Weh Al [an: °uh°] Alan Hammil?
4 Viv: [Oh Alan]
5 ...
6 Mic: Guy's a de[t
7 Viv: [Suzanne Summer's °husban'°

These cases suggest that the matter of recognitional reference is ultimately treated as the shared responsibility of two persons: a speaker who must reference the person adequately and a recipient who must deploy resources of memory to retrieve the reference.

This co-construction of adequate person reference is also exhibited in cases where recipients initiate clarifications of speakers’ references, as in

Examples (31) and (32):

Example (31) [Rah:2:7]

1 Jen: David's home?
 2 (0.5)
 3 Ida: -> Yooer ↑Da[vid.
 4 Jen: [Ye:s m[m
 5 Ida: [Oh:.
 6 (.)
 7 Ida: An' - is he a'↑ri:ght?=-

Example (32) [W:PC:1:MJ(1):34]

1 M: Whe:re wz tha::t.
 2 (.)
 3 M: In th'stree:t, in your a:venue:.
 4 J: Nex'door:.
 5 M: -> Neh-iss door[:. The other si::de.
 6 J: [Ye:s.

In both these cases, the recipient's clarification formulates the speaker's reference as having been unclear and offers a solution to the problem. Here then recipients take responsibility for adequate reference, albeit at the cost of sequence progressivity.

Relatedly, speakers who interrupt the progressivity of a turn sufficiently will, in contexts where this is possible, engender recipient activities that are geared to expediting the sequence. In Example (33), Ann encounters difficulties in the place reference for an employment agency 'Reed'. After her hesitation before completing the phrase 'Sussex Street' (line 2) and her apparent initiation of repair on this location formulation, her interlocutor moves to reassure her as to recognizability of the location (lines 4 and 6).

Example (33) [Owen:8B15(A):3]

1 Ann: -> I: (.) went to: Ree::d. Which is in: Sussex:
 2 (0.4)
 3 Ann: -> Is i[t Sussex Stree[t,
 4 Bet: -> [Oh I kno:w [Ye:s::
 5 Ann: [Ye:h,
 6 Bet: [Ye:s I know weh you mean,
 7 Ann: And uh, I thought

And in Example (34) a full-blown interruption of progressivity occurs as the speaker goes into the search for a name.

Example (34) [SBL:1:1:12:23]

- 1 A: Uh she asked me to stop by, she brought a chest
 2 of drawers from um
 3 (4.0)
 4 A: What's that gal's name? Just went back to Michigan.
 5 (1.0)
 6 A: Hilda, um
 7 B: -> Oh I know who you mean,
 8 (1.0)
 9 B: Grady-Grady.
 10 A: Yeah. Hilda Grady.

In all of these cases, speakers and recipients struggle jointly with the competing principles of recognitional reference and progressivity to achieve outcomes that permit the activities that the sequences are implementing to be carried to their conclusion.

11.7 Other recipient expansions of recognitional references

This chapter has documented the extent to which intendedly recognitional references to persons and places are 'nodded through' in the interest of progressing the business of the sequences of which they are a part. It has also offered some evidence that departures from this pattern, that involve recipients in re-referencing persons and locations, are mainly done 'for cause': they follow repeated efforts by speakers to get recipient uptake, or when recipients themselves have exhibited some form of misapprehension. It is for these reasons that cases like Example (1), imagined by Sacks, are so very rare.

However, such cases do occur. In Example (35), a reference to 'Missiz Baker' is responded to with the alternative, and more specific, 'Di:a:nne, °Baker.°'

Example (35) [Holt 5/88:1:2:174–180]

- 1 Les: i↑Yes:: .hh An' I met Missiz Baker 'n we had ↑lunch together
 2 which wz very ni: [ce, .hhh
 3 Joy: -> [Oh did you with Di:a:nne, °Ba[ker.°
 4 Les: [ih-↑ye:s 'n
 5 then: she wz going an' I suddenly re'mbered she'd paid f' the
 6 lo:t fortunately I managed to ↑catch her.

Here the expanded person reference (line 3) is appended to a turn component ('Oh did you') that otherwise invites an expansion of the informing to which Lesley seems to be committed, and which would otherwise embody an embedded claim to recognize the reference to 'Missiz Baker'. However, the potentially

‘disambiguating’, but otherwise redundant, addition of ‘Di:anne, Baker’ is most likely designed to index a failure of recipient design (Schegloff 1972; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974) on Lesley’s part. The replacement of ‘Missiz’ with ‘Dianne’ is a vehicle through which Joyce can indicate that for her, as well as Lesley, ‘Missiz Baker’ is more appropriately referred to as ‘Dianne Baker’.

Similar issues of recipient design also inhabit a related case. Here three men in a backyard picnic have been engaged in an extensive discussion about rebuilding and racing cars. Among the three, Mike is the acknowledged ‘car expert’ while Gary is without question the least knowledgeable. In the datum below, Gary re-introduces a reference to ‘Marlon Little’ that had failed to attract the attention of the others some four minutes previously:

Example (36) [Auto Discussion: 772]

- 1 Gary: Nah this Marlon Little’s been building, roadsters,
 2 in th’str- considered street roadsters he builds.
 3 Curt: Nh.
 4 Gary: B’tche aftuh ra:ce ‘em o[n the tra:ck]s ([]).
 5 Curt: -> [Oh Little.] [Little. Ou:t
 6 -> et uh:m
 7 Mike: -> Yah right up, Por’ [Clin’ Roa:d.
 8 Curt: -> [on Por’Clin’ Road.
 9 Curt: Ye:h.

While Gary’s use of ‘this’ in the phrase ‘this Marlon Little’ is likely designed as back-referring, that is, to index that he is reintroducing this topic, the use of this reference form is vulnerable, at this distance from his – previously disregarded – reference,³ to the hearing that he considers ‘Marlon Little’ as

³ Gary’s original introduction of ‘Marlon Liddle’, offered in connection with Curt’s search for a spare part for an old ‘Model T’ Ford, was overwhelmed by Mike’s reference to an acquaintance with two Cords (a rare and valuable ‘classic car’):

- Mike: [Lemme ask] a guy at work. He’s gotta bunch a’ old
 clu[nkers].
 Gary: [Y’know Marlon Liddle?
 (0.2)
 Mike: Well I can’t say they’re ol’ clunkers eez gotta Co:rd?
 (0.1)
 Mike: Two Co:rds,
 (1.0)
 Mike: [And
 Curt: [Not original,
 (0.7)
 Mike: Oh yes. Very origi(h)nal

unknown to his recipients. In the context of the relative expertise of the participants, it is probably unacceptable that Gary knows of a car builder/racer who is unknown to the others, and both Mike and Curt are at pains to indicate that they are aware of, and recognize, the person in question. They do so by expanded references to Little that explicate their independent knowledge of his whereabouts and, by extension, his activities.

Cases such as Examples (35) and (36), which are quite rare in the data to hand, serve to reinforce the proposal that, in a default context in which unproblematic references to persons are nodded through, expanded re-referencing is also only done 'for cause'.

11.8 Recognition as default

This chapter offers evidence from repair sequences involving person reference that speakers operate under the default assumption that recognitional references are recognizable and recognized. It is this assumption that permits the maximization of within-turn and within-sequence progressivity that pervades not only the implementation of ordinary social interaction, but also most of the departures from 'perfect progressivity' described in this chapter. It is also this assumption that underwrites the absence of the kinds of sequences that Sacks offered as demonstrations of understanding in conversation. The balance between progressivity and intersubjectivity that the preference for recognitional reference embodies is one that is strongly biased towards progressivity, but it ultimately rests entirely on the hidden work that speakers do to ensure that their references to persons are recognizable without the need for repair.

Thus contemplating the following sequence from Stivers' chapter, it is evident that 'Aunt Alene' is the form of recognitional reference that would maximize progressivity.

Example (37) HS 5 7-23-03 T1

- 1 MOM: So- what are you grinnin' (cuz you picked)
 2 [()
 3 NIC: [Cuz yer s:ister been on the phone all mo: rnin' an'
 4 I told'er-
 5 MOM: ↑Which o:ne.
 6 NIC: Aunt Ale:ne? ['I got a cramp in my ne:(h) ck 'n I gotta g(h)o.'
 7 MOM: [hehhehhehhehhehheh
 8 NIC: So- =
 9 MOM: =↑Whut did she [want.
 10 NIC: [Sh:e wanted =tuh =w =uh:
 11 everything.

In this case, as Stivers argues, there are compelling reasons for Nicole to depart from this reference form, but she – and we – may not depart from it too frequently. For the cost of this would be not only the erosion of progressivity, manifested here in Mom’s initiation of repair on the reference to ‘yer s:ister’ (line 5) and Nicole’s repair (line 6), but also the loss of the default against which the special effects of this form of reference can be registered.

12 Repairing person reference in a small Caribbean community

Jack Sidnell

12.1 Introduction: trouble and repair in person reference

There are various kinds of trouble that may beset practices for referring to persons in conversation. The reference can fail because it was not heard, or because the form used has more than one possible referent. Alternatively, it may fail because the form used is unfamiliar to the recipient. It seems reasonable to suppose that these problems will not arise with the same frequency in every community. In a community that uses bare names to achieve recognitional reference but has only a few of these shared between many individuals, problems are likely to arise due to the failure of a given name to provide for unique reference. In a community where people are known by many different names, problems may more frequently result from the fact that the name used is not the one by which the recipient knows the person to whom reference is being made. In this chapter, I examine troubles encountered in the course of making recognitional reference to persons in a small Caribbean community. An analysis of the various practices involved in the repair and resolution of such problems leads to two conclusions:

- (1) Repairs are intricately recipient-designed with subsequent recognitional forms selected to solve particular, context-specific, interactional problems.
- (2) Although person reference and other initiated repair are essentially generic organizations of talk-in-interaction, they are nevertheless adapted to particular local circumstances (such as the local onomastic system) and are thus locally inflected.

Speakers routinely initiate repair of the person referring form using one of several available repair initiators (OIRs) when they encounter troubles in recognizing references to persons.¹ In North American and British English the

¹ These used to be called 'next turn repair initiators' or NTRIs (see Schegloff et al. 1977). However, subsequent research showed that the specification of 'next turn' is a contingent outcome rather than a defining characteristic of the practice (see Schegloff 2000; Wong 2000).

range of forms include ‘who?’, ‘which John?’, ‘John who?’ and ‘who’s John?’, for instance, are common. Examples (1–3) from American English are illustrative:

Example (1) TG Page 19 (Telephone)

01 Bee: Oh Sibbie’s sistuh hadda ba:by bo:way.
 02 Ava: -> Who?
 03 Bee: Sibbie’s sister.
 04 Ava: Oh really?
 05 Bee: Myeah,
 06 Ava: [°(That’s nice.)/[°(Sibbie’s sistuh.)
 07 Bee: [She had it yestihday. Ten:: pou:nds.
 08 Ava: °Je:sus Christ.
 09 Bee: She ha[dda ho:(hh)rse hh. ‘hh]
 10 Ava: [(b a : b y .)]

In example 1, Ava initiates repair with ‘who’, which indicates trouble in finding a referent for this form while at the same time conveying that she has heard that a person reference has been produced. Bee treats the problem as one resulting from insufficiently precise pronunciation: Note that the original ‘Sibbie’s sistuh’ (line 1) is produced with a noticeable derhoticization of the final syllable (indicated in the transcription by *sistuh* rather than *sister*). When Bee repairs her person reference, she repeats the form – now with a fully rhotic final syllable. Ava’s response in line 4 to the news of the baby’s arrival embodies a claim to have recognized the person being talked about.

Example (2) Pyatt and Bush TC II(b):#28 (Telephone)

01 Bus: Hello?
 02 Pya: .h m- Mister Bush,
 03 Bus: Yes.
 04 Pya: Mister Fiatt.
 05 Bus: Yes,
 06 Pya: D’Yknow where Mister Bowdwin is.
 07 (0.2)
 08 Bus: Wha:t?
 09 (.)
 10 Pya: hhuh-hhuh-°hu-° [‘hhh
 11 Bus: -> [Do I know where who?
 12 Pya: Leo is.
 13 Bus: No.
 14 Pya: Oh. Okay.
 15 (0.2)

- 16 Bus: He's down in Mexico or some'ing
 17 Pya: I don't know,
 18 Bus: Oh: . Yer lookin' for him.

In Example (2), Pyatt begins the call with a candidate identification of the answerer – ‘Mister Bush’. When this is confirmed, Pyatt self-identifies as ‘Mister Pyatt’. This use of ‘Mister’ is apparently more formal than is appropriate to the relationship and with it Pyatt seems to mark these opening moves as doing something more than identification-recognition (i.e., joking, see Schegloff, this volume; Stivers, this volume). This becomes clear when Pyatt asks, ‘Do you know where Mister Bowdwin is’ employing ‘Mister’ now for a third time. In this position, the question is hearable as a pre-announcement (see Schegloff’s 1988 example of ‘Do you know who is going to be at that meeting?’; see also Terasaki 2004 [1976]) and Bush’s ‘what?’ in next turn responds, it seems, to the several possible understandings of what might be going on here – possibilities that include a joke or crank call (inferable from the several uses of ‘Mister’), a pre-announcement, a real inquiry about the whereabouts of ‘Mister Bowdwin’ (see Drew 1997 on the use of open class repair initiators where the sequential-relevance of the prior turn is obscure). Pyatt’s laughter in line 10 suggests that a joke was being made and Bush pursues the repair with a ‘who?’ appended partial repeat: a form slightly different from the one used in Example (1).² The repair is produced as a completion of the initiating turn, by this converting it back to the original question though now with the person referring form appropriately designed for this recipient (‘Do I know where Leo is?’).

In the first case, then, ‘who?’ prompts a repeat of the person referring form, in the second, a replacement (‘Mr. Bowdwin’ → ‘Leo’). Different repair types (e.g., repeats, replacements) may index particular kinds of trouble (e.g., hearing, failure to recognize). A question arises as to how the one doing the repair is able to discern what kind of trouble is at issue and, thus, what kind of repair is called for. One solution would be to have a unique mapping of repair initiators and trouble types (e.g., ‘who?’ = I didn’t hear the name). This, however, is apparently not the way all other-initiated repair is organized (see the conclusion however). Rather, participants take into account a range of factors in determining just what kind of trouble a repair-initiator is targeting. In the context of Ava’s repair initiation with ‘who?’, Bee’s pronunciation of Sibbie’s ‘sistuh’ appears to have resulted in a hearing problem to be remedied by a repeat. Consider, by way of contrast, the following case:

² There is some evidence that the [partial repeat + who] is specifically fitted to problems resulting from recognition failure. That evidence is given some preliminary consideration in Sidnell *frth*.

Example (3) Holt 1:8

- 01 Les: And um .t (0.4) an' Janet 's enga:ged?
 02 (0.7)
 03 Mum: Who:?
 04 (0.3)
 05 Les: Sa:rah's sister Janet.
 06 Mum: `Good gra:cious!

Here, Leslie's news announcement is produced in such a way as to suggest she thinks Mum should be able to recognize 'Janet', indeed, that 'Janet' is someone about whom Mum should be updated with respect to important events such as marriages, and the like. Mum's delay in responding, in combination with the 'who:?' she eventually produces, suggests that she has been engaged in a search for the person being referred to by 'Janet'. The evidence of a search provided by Mum's delay in initiating repair, leads Leslie to figure that Mum's problem results not from mishearing but rather a failure to locate a referent on the basis of the form used and it is to *this* problem that the repair, 'Sarah's sister Janet', is addressed.

So the selection of a repair-type conveys the repairer's own sense of what trouble afflicts the talk (Schegloff 1997: 507). Moreover, in attempting to determine what kind of repair (replacement by an alternative expression, repeat etc.) will resolve the trouble in any particular case, speakers take into account not only the form used to initiate repair ('Who?', 'Who's that?' etc.) but also the circumstances in which problems have arisen as well as the evidence provided by the manner in which repair is initiated (e.g., after a significant delay).

Consider now Example (4). Here Prudence is telling Mom and the others at dinner (Wesley, Virginia and Beth) a story that she herself has recently been told. At lines 4–6, Prudence reports that 'Phillips got knee walking drunk at the wedding'. At line 8, Mom initiates repair with 'who?' to which Prudence responds with a try-marked repeat of the name – Phillips.³

Example (4) Virginia (Dinner)

- 1 PRU: ptI heard tuhday, >at first national bank,< >yuhknow Phillips
 2 works at first national.< (0.2) >So=I went downta'thuhbank<an'
 3 Pam did >an' they were tellin' me about thuh wedding.< (0.2) t!
 4 They said that Phillips got uhm (0.5)
 5 ????: `hh[h
 6 PRU: [knee walking drunk.>at thuh reception.<

³ In Example 4, Prudence's 'Phillips_i' is try-marked, displaying an orientation to the possibility that Mom might not recognize Phillips. See Robinson 2006.

- 7 (0.2)
 8 MOM: -> ^Who?
 9 (.)
 10 PRU: Phillips_z
 11 (.)
 12 MOM: -> Wh[o's Phillips.]
 13 PRU: [Pam Bensen's](.) husband.

Mom initiates repair again, now asking 'who's Phillips', Pam in partial overlap repairs the reference with 'Pam Benson's husband'. 'Pam Benson's husband' provides Mom with an alternate route to recognition of the person being talked about.

Repair initiators can thus be differentiated in at least two ways. Firstly, they are differentiated in terms of the type of trouble to which they are fitted. Secondly, they are differentiated in terms of the type of response trajectory they promote. This then raises the intriguing possibility that where certain interactional troubles are endemic, the organization of repair will be adapted to dealing with those particular types of trouble. If so, at the intersection of the generic organizations of repair and person reference we may be able to discern ways in which practices are adapted to particular aspects of the local social setting. We would thus be in a position to argue that although talk-in-interaction is organized by a number of robust, generic principles that are basically independent of culture and language differences (Levinson 2006: 39–69), it is nevertheless locally torqued by the particularly local circumstances within which it is deployed. Where such local circumstances result in recurrent kinds of trouble, repair practices specifically designed to deal with them may develop thus inflecting what is an essentially generic organization in ways that reflect the local situation of use. In the following I make such an argument drawing on data from the small Caribbean island of Bequia.

12.2 Bequia

Bequia is the largest of the chain of Eastern Caribbean Islands known as the Grenadines. It is home to approximately 5,000 permanent residents most of whom live in one of several villages. The largest village is home to about 1,200 people. Bequians are distinctive both in speech and appearance from Vincentians, their neighbours to the north. In fact, even within Bequia there are significant differences that appear largely based on village of origin (Meyerhoff et al. ms). The small population, its relative concentration in a handful of villages, as well as the general dependence of all Bequians on services available only in the harbour area, results in a situation where adult

Bequians can generally recognize one another, if not by name then by sight. Even where Bequians do not know one another in this way they typically know *of* each other and are likely to know a parent, a husband or wife or some other relative. All of this suggests that recognitional reference should be possible for Bequians talking about Bequians to Bequians. Indeed, people generally seem to operate on just such an assumption.

There are, however, a number of complicating factors that make recognition less than certain. Firstly, a number of names are used for more than one individual. As we will see this can result in interactional trouble of a particular kind – a situation in which the recipient needs to discern which person, of two or more possible, is being referred to. Secondly, a number of individuals have more than one name in concurrent use. The issue of multiple names is a familiar theme within the regional (Caribbean) ethnography. Although concurrently operative systems of alternate names are known from many places, in the Caribbean such multiple namings are particularly common (Aceto 2002; Price and Price 1972). On Bequia it is not at all uncommon for a young man to be known by three or four names. In addition to an official name bestowed at birth, the set will typically include two or three nicknames. Use of a nickname tends to be quite restricted to members of a small group. In one case a name was used solely within a single dyad. Thirdly, surnames or what are locally called ‘titles’, rarely provide for unique reference. As has been noted for other places in the Caribbean (Wilson 1973), on Bequia there are a mere handful of such ‘titles’ with hundreds of individuals sharing them. Thus, names such as ‘Miss Ollivierre’ or ‘Mr. Stowe’ have a great many possible referents (and, not surprisingly, tend to be used only in address – see below). A final consideration involves knowledge of names. Given names (e.g., Kitana, Emmanuel) are commonly used, in both address and reference, between members of the same generation. Speakers also typically address and refer to members of the ascending generation using first names although, often, with some honorific prefix (e.g., *Mr David*, *Uncle David*, *Papa David*⁴). However, in reference to members of the descending generation, it is common to use a kin triangulation. In the following example, Shana is talking to her nephew about her niece (see Figure 12.1).

Example (5) [Ac1. 15.30]

18 Shana: -> *dii_laas fu Deevid gorl oon tuu*
 the last for David's girl too
 19 Roxanne: *ye (hh) e (h)*
 ye (hh) e (h)

⁴ Although clearly derived from English kin terms, use of such honorifics in no way presupposes a genealogical relation between speaker and referent/addressee (see Otterbein 1964).




Figure 12.1 Participants and referent – relations of kinship and generation.

- 20 Shana: [ah wish shi kod bring bak somting.
I wish she could pass some of her exams.
- 21 Emmanuel: -> Shan-Shaniik?
Shan-Shanique?
- 23 Shana: -> yea.. [Ah wish
yea. I wish
- 24 Emmanuel: [Shaniik iz tuu-yea-tuumaroo.
Shanique is to- yea tomorrow

In line 18, Shana notes that tomorrow will be the last school exam for ‘David’s girl’ and, in line 20 goes on to say ‘I wish she could pass some of her exams’. Although she is here talking to her nephew about her own niece (Emmanuel’s cousin), Shana refers to the referent using the expression ‘David’s girl’. In contrast with the quite similar examples discussed by Stivers (this volume), use of this alternative recognitional does not appear to generate any inference (see also Schegloff 1996a). At line 21, Emmanuel offers the candidate equivalent form ‘Shan-Shanique’ that Shana confirms at line 23.

While in this example, knowledge of the referent’s name is not in question (Shana knows the name of her own niece), in general, people seem much less likely to know the names of persons in the descending generation than in the same or ascending generations. This is borne out in the distribution of other-initiated repair forms. Thus, in 23 of 29 cases of repaired name use it was possible to determine the relative generation of recipient (the one initiating repair) and referent. In more than half of the cases the referent was in the descending generation. Although the other cases involved a referent either in the same or the ascending generation, in only one case did trouble apparently arise due to the recipient not knowing the name. In the rest, the trouble appears to have been the product either of failing to hear the name or of having multiple possible referents available for the name used. Thus, there is some evidence from repair itself that the default pattern is to use names for members of the same or the ascending generation and some other expression (typically a kin triangulation) for members of the descending generation.⁵

⁵ Except for one’s own children and grandchildren.

12.3 The data

The data for this study come from approximately eight and a half hours of video-taped conversation. The examples used in this chapter come from four situations:

- (1) Q1 and Q2: An extended family consisting of two sisters (Donna and Naomi), their sister's husband's brother (Benson), several of their children and grandchildren, and occasionally a neighbour or two are relaxing in the communal yard in the afternoon.
- (2) AC1 and AC2: Shana, is at home with her daughter (Roxanne) and infant grand-daughter. Her nephew Emmanuel has dropped by for a visit.
- (3) OFB1 and OFB 2: A group of older men (Larry, Cat, Hat) and one middle aged one (Roger) sit outside a local grocery. All are, or were before retirement, fishermen and the talk about recent local events is interspersed with discussion of local waters. The middle-aged woman who owns the store (Miss K) as well as various passers-by occasionally intervene in, or briefly join, the conversation.
- (4) BBQ1 and BBQ2: A well-known middle-aged man, Peter, is selling chicken and pork from a large portable barbeque. Various customers, friends and acquaintances chat among themselves and with the proprietor.

12.4 Person reference and other-initiated repair

Examination of the data used for this study resulted in a collection of forty-three cases in which repair was initiated on a recognitional person reference. In almost half the cases, repair was initiated by 'who?' nearly always as a complete turn constructional unit (TCU) (Sacks et al. 1974). Erti's turn at line 6 in Example (6) provides an illustration:

Example (6) bqv – BBQ1b: 42:12

- | | |
|------------|--|
| 1 Peter: | <i>Hank.</i>
Hank. |
| 2 | (0.6) |
| 3 | <i>hi verii brait gai.</i>
He's a very bright guy. |
| 4 | (0.4) |
| 5 | <i>song laik hi iz a veri (.) intelichen gai.</i>
sounds like he is a very intelligent guy. |
| 6 Erti: -> | <i>huu_</i>
who |
| 7 | (0.2) |
| 8 Peter: | <i>Hank. hi aks a veri gud kweschon.</i>
Hank. He asked a very good question. |

The next most common initiator was a form I designate ‘Who X?’. This involves appending a repeat of the name or other referring expression used – the trouble source – to the category-specific question word ‘who’.⁶ For instance, at line 2 of the following fragment, Shana initiates repair on a reference in the previous turn with ‘Who Rex,’.

Example (7) bqv – AC1: 36:09 – Who Rex,

- 1 Emmanuel: -> *ya bo (.) Reks an dem ting - I miin da iz-*
yeah but Rex and their thing - I mean that is-
- 2 Shana: -> *huu Reks,*
Who Rex,
- 3 Emmanuel: *da iz nat shor ting yana*
That is not a sure thing
- 4 Perry: -> *Fatman*
Fatman
- 5 Emmanuel: *Reks-Reks an ting iz nat a shoor ting*
Rex-Rex and that is not a sure thing
- 6 *da iz moor laik*
That is more like
- 7 Roxanne: -> *Reks fo Blinkton*
Blinkton’s Rex
- 8 Emmanuel: *yeah: da iz moor laik a fren ting*
yeah that is more like a friend thing.

There were four cases in which repair was initiated by a partial repeat of the turn containing the trouble source with ‘who’ standing in for the problematic person reference. Benson’s ‘they really have who?’ at line 2 of the following is an example.

⁶ Instances of ‘who X?’ were differentiated from cases such as the following:

Example (13) bqv – AC1: 5:50

- 4 Roxanne: OOKEE. shii s[ee wen yu don fu duu hor.
 OKAY. she says when you’re done to do her.
- 5 Shana: [Kii-
 Ki
- 6 Emmanuel: -> hu[u. shii?
 who. her?
- 7 Roxanne: [Dana: Dana:
 Donna Donna

Here repair is first initiated with ‘who’. This is brought to prosodic completion before the candidate ‘she’ is produced as a next TCU. Note that *huu shii?* ‘who she?’ produced as a single TCU would have quite different interactional import by suggesting that the trouble resulted specifically from the use of the pronoun ‘she’ in line 4.

Example (8) [Q1.13.09]

- 1 Naomi: *Raksan se shi na noo dis ya: an de wel hav shi*
Roxanne says she doesn't know these kids and they really
have her good
- 2 (1.4)
- 3 Benson: -> *dee wel a uu?*
they really have who?

In another four cases, repair was initiated by the construction 'who is named so?'

Example (9) [AC1.51.27]

- 1 Shana: *tel dem hou yuu an Kimya doz fait.*
tell them how you and Kimya fight.
- 2 Emmanuel: *huu?*
who?
- 3 Shana: *Kimya.*
Kimya
- 4 Emmanuel: -> *huu neem so_*
who is named so.
- 5 Shana: *Kee [tana- litl gorl*
Kitana's little girl
- 6 Roxanne: [Kitana
Kitana

Finally, in eight cases some form other than the ones discussed above was used to initiate repair. This group includes expressions such as 'who is that?', 'who is she?' and the like⁷.

This distribution of cases suggests different functions for each format. The remainder of the chapter explores this possibility.

12.5 Trouble source and repair practices

Episodes of repair are composed of parts (Schegloff 1997, 2000; Schegloff et al. 1977). A repair initiation marks a 'possible disjunction with the immediately preceding talk' while a repair outcome results either in a 'solution or abandonment of the problem' (Schegloff 2000: 207). That problem, the particular segment of talk to which the repair is addressed, is the 'trouble source'. For present purposes the trouble source is some person-referring expression. The trouble source must be distinguished from the basis of trouble

⁷ Cases in which repair was initiated by a repeat, or attempted repeat, of the name used were not examined for this study. Also not considered were cases in which repair was initiated by an 'open class' repair initiator (Drew 1997).

that can be anything from ambient noise, hearing failure, understanding failure (as might result from an esoteric word choice or a misunderstood joke).⁸

This chapter is concerned primarily with the initiation of repair but here it is useful to briefly consider both the trouble source and the practices by which participants reach a repair outcome. In terms of the trouble source, of the thirty-nine cases in which it was possible to determine what type of person reference had been used, 72 per cent of these involved the use of names. The rest of the cases were divided between pronouns (13 per cent) and recognitional descriptors (15 per cent) such as, *ii skuul gyol jos de in fam wan* ‘the school girl just in form one’.⁹ This distribution likely reflects both that people have more trouble with initial references and the normal distribution of names as a common unmarked reference form.

In cases where repair is initiated on a name, the speaker of the trouble source may provide a repeat of the same form in the next turn (see the discussion of ‘who?’ below). Alternatively, or subsequently after a repeat, the speaker of the trouble source may be prompted to provide some other person-referring form that could allow the recipient to recognize who is being talked about. A central argument of this chapter is that repair practices of this sort are recipient-designed and thus take various forms depending on the particular interactional circumstances of who is talking to whom (see below). Because each repair is delicately recipient-designed, a case-by-case analysis is required. That said, there are clear general patterns observable in the aggregate. Thus, in the collection examined the most common subsequent form after a repair initiator, other than a repeat of the original form, was some kind of kinship specification. For instance, in the following example, Erti is telling Peter that he has not received his package from the British Military that he requested in order to apply. At line 1 he remarks that Trudy has already received hers.

Example (10) bqv – BBQ1b: 48:40

- 1 Erti: *(bo) Chruudii don ge ho:r pakaj doo.*
 (But) Trudy has already received her package though.
- 2 Peter: *hah?*
 huh?
- 3 Erti: *Chruudii.*
 Trudy.
- 4 Peter: *Chruudii?*
 Trudy?

⁸ Or nothing at all which is to say that repair initiation can just as well make trouble as locate it.

⁹ Trouble with pronouns typically involved some special kind of interactional circumstance, either a speaker’s turn apparently designed to be ambiguous or a recipient being obtuse.

- 5 Erti: *yeah=bo ai [en tink*
 yeah=but I don't think
- 6 Peter: -> [*huu shi_*
 who is she
- 7 Erti: *bo ai en tink shi sen it yet.*
 but I don't think that she has sent it back yet.
- 8 Peter: *huu dat.*
 who's that.
- 9 (0.2)
- 10 Erti: *uhm::*
 uhm::
- 11 (0.6)
- 12 *yu noo Kouwen?*
 you know Cohen?
- 13 Peter: *okee.*
 Okay
- 14 *Kouwen Mong Plesan- op Levol, ((gaze point))*
 Cohen Mnt. Plesan- up in Level,
- 15 Erti: *yeah::*
 yeah

Here Erti treats Peter's open class repair initiator in line 2 as evidence that he has not properly heard the name 'Trudy' and this is repeated in the next turn. When Peter repeats the name with upward intonation, Erti takes it that he has recognized the person being talked about and is instead querying whether Trudy received the package. At line 5 Erti continues what he was saying before its progress was suspended by the initiation of repair. However, at line 6, Peter interrupts this attempt to continue. Erti does not respond to this initiation of repair and after restarting the interrupted turn brings it to possible completion at line 7. At this point Peter once again initiates repair, now with 'who's that?' In what follows, Erti asks Peter if he knows Cohen – Trudy's father. At line 14, Peter indicates success with 'Cohen' and attempts to display his understanding by proffering a place where 'Cohen' lives. Here then repair is first attempted by a repeat of the form initially used; when this does not solve the problem Erti provides a kin triangulation (see Table 12.1).

In comparison with a number of other communities discussed in this volume (e.g., the Mayan communities discussed by Brown, Hanks and Haviland), Bequians rely heavily on bare names in reference to non-present persons. Kinship is used to achieve recognitional reference where names are not able to do this but even in these cases the kinship used typically involves simply linking two people – the one being referred to and some other person the speaker supposes the recipient will be able to recognize, by use of the genitive connector *fu* (see, for instance, Example (6), line 7 'of/from Blinkton'). The kinship then is not particularly elaborate. In all cases, subsequent forms are

Table 12.1 *Subsequent forms (total cases counted 40)*

	Repeat	No response	Kin triangulation	Point + deictic term includes 2nd pronoun	Description	Alternate name
#	14	13	5	3	3	2
%	35	32.5	12.5	7.5	7.5	5

recipient-designed and responsive to the particular form used to initiate repair (see below).

In word searches, where speakers are, themselves, not able to retrieve the name of the person being talked about (or at least the name by which the recipient knows that person) persons are most often identified by appearance, place of origin or connections of kinship. As mentioned, since Bequia is a small community in which all persons are more or less dependent on services available in a single area (the Harbour), any given adult member of the population is likely to have at least seen any other. When speakers find their recipients unable to recognize a person by name they frequently resort to describing some distinctive feature of their appearance. Such recognitional descriptors often involve quite elaborate gestures. Participants attempting to achieve recognition may specify where a person is from, where they live or where they are often located. In such cases, speakers frequently make use of pointing gestures. It is also not uncommon for a recipient to display that recognition has been achieved through use of a pointing gesture (see Sidnell 2005).

12.6 Who?

In this section, I show that the most commonly used repair initiator ‘who?’ elicits a repeat of the person referring form initially used when that form is a singular reference by name. However, when ‘who?’ is used to initiate repair on some other kind of person reference, the initial form is not repeated. This suggests that there is not a simple one-to-one mapping between ‘who?’ and trouble-type (hearing, understanding etc.) since the same repair initiator is treated as indicating a hearing problem in the former sequential context and an understanding problem in the latter sequential context.

Where repair is initiated on references to a single person by name with ‘who?’, repair categorically takes the form of a repeat. For instance, in the following example, Cat produces the assessment ‘Cardinal is bad. He is no good’.

Example (11) bqv – OFB2: 46:00 WHO?

- 3 Cat: *Kadnal bad. ii en noo gud.*
Cardinal is bad. He is no good.
- 4 Roger: -> *huu?*
who?
- 5 Cat: -> *Kadnal.*
Cardinal.
- 6 Roger: *Ka:di:na:l*
Cardinal
- 7 Cat: (*bad man*)
(bad man)
- 8 Roger: *Kadinal,*
Cardinal,
- 9 Cat: *yeah.*

At line 4, Roger initiates repair with ‘who?’ and this elicits a repeat from Cat in line 5. Roger offers his own repeat in line 6 but when this does not receive a confirmation from Cat he again repeats the name in line 8. As I discuss below, in the context of singular name references, the OIR format ‘who is named so’ unequivocally indicates a recognition failure and this sets up, in this context, an opposition such that selection of ‘who?’ conveys a problem of hearing (not a recognition failure).

Where the initial reference upon which repair is initiated with ‘who’ is some form *other* than a singular person’s name, repair does not take the form of a repeat. In the following example, Erti and Peter are again talking about the packages from the British Military.

Example (12) bqv – BBQ1b: 49:08

- 1 Erti: *ai en chek bai di poo- di poo- di poos afis*
I didn’t check by the po- the po- the post office
- 2 *sins ai ge mai leta ana.*
since I got my letter you know.
- 3 (0.2)
- 4 Peter: *so [o meebii yo paka i de*
so maybe you package is there
- 5 Erti: [()]
- 6 Peter: *ka dis gyol see shi ge horz.*
because this girl said that she got hers.
- 7 (.)
- 8 [*huu bin hia*
who was here
- 9 Erti: -> [*huu_*
who
- 10 (0.2)
- 11 Peter: -> *di gyol huu woz hia.*
the girl who was here.

When at line 6, Peter remarks that ‘this girl’ said she had gotten hers, Erti initiates repair with ‘who’. In overlap with the initiation of repair Peter adds the increment ‘who was here’. At line 11, Peter redoes this now as a repair saying, ‘the girl who was here’.

In the following case, Shana reminds Emmanuel about ‘the school girl in form one’ who is pregnant. Emmanuel initiates repair with ‘who’. In response, Shana abandons the attempt to achieve recognition and instead characterizes the person being talked about as ‘a girl up the road’ using the indefinite determiner ‘a’.

Example (13) bqy – AC2: 1,04:23

- 1 Shana: *luk ii ha ii skuul gyol jos de in fam wan an shii briid.*
look there is the school girl just there in form one and she’s pregnant.
- 2 (1.0)
- 3 Emmanuel: *huu_*
who
- 4 Shana: *a gyol op di rood.*
a girl up the road.

And finally, in Example (14), Benson is talking to a young boy who asks what the furry things on the ground are (the microphones with wind covers on them). Benson asks him to guess and he responds, correctly, saying that they are ‘mics’. At line 7, Benson confirms this and goes on to compliment the boy saying that he is smart. He continues by drawing a contrast with ‘Kitana and them’ (a reference to more than one person). Kitana is an adult woman and it is not clear, to me at least, who the ‘*an dem*’ is meant to include.

Example (14) bqy – Q1: 35:40 – who? (talking to Benson)

- 1 Benson: *eksaklii.*
exactly
- 2 *yu smat man.*
you’re smart man
- 3 (0.2)
- 4 *smat an- an- Kitana an dem*
smart an- an- Kitana and them
- 5 *dem en bin noo iz maik*
They didn’t know that they were mics.
- 6 Shanka: -> *huu_*
who
- 7 Benson: *dem - dem de ((point))*
them- them there

When Shanka, who is sitting next to Benson, initiates repair on ‘Kitana and them’ with ‘who?’, Benson repairs using a deictic expression and accompanying point with his thumb behind his back.

What these examples indicate then is that, in producing a repair, speakers of the trouble source assess what is required by considering not only the form used to initiate repair (e.g., ‘who?’) but also the form initially used to make reference to some person or persons. Where the form initially used is a name referring to a single person, ‘who?’ is understood as conveying a problem of hearing and the name is repeated. This is not surprising since there are other forms which, in this context (i.e., reference to a single person by name), explicitly convey that the problem was an unfamiliar name (‘who is named so?’) or an inability to locate a unique referent (‘Who X?’). However, when ‘who?’ is used to initiate repair on some other form (a recognitional description, e.g., ‘the school girl’, a plural, e.g., ‘Kitana and them’ or deictic reference, e.g., ‘this girl’) a repeat is not used to repair the problem. Rather, the initial speaker must look to the particular interactional circumstances and find a solution fitted to them (see also below). Trajectories of repair are thus responsive to the particulars of the interactional context within which trouble arises.

12.7 Who X?

The form ‘who X?’ (which might be glossed as something like ‘which NAME’) accounts for 19 per cent of the cases in the collection. As noted, this form involves prefacing a repeat of the trouble source – the person referring expression used – with ‘who’. The form ‘who X?’ may be distinguished both from repeats without ‘who’-prefacing (i.e., ‘X?’) and the complete TCU form ‘Who?’ discussed above. Whereas a repeat without ‘who’-prefacing typically requests confirmation that the recipient has in fact heard the name correctly (and if they are correct demonstrates that they have correctly heard it), the use of ‘who X?’ treats the hearing of the name or other person referring form as unproblematic and thus conveys that some trouble other than hearing is at issue. ‘Who X?’ is distinguished from ‘who?’ in a similar way. Thus we have seen that where ‘who?’ is used to initiate repair on singular name references, the trouble source is repeated in the next turn. Repair is never accomplished in this way when it is initiated with ‘Who X?’.¹⁰

A pair of examples from the same situation (AC) illustrate one circumstance in which ‘Who X?’ is used. In 15, Shana is trying to make a phone call. At line 1, her daughter Roxanne asks what number she is dialling. Shana’s ‘eight five?’ is produced with upward intonation and by this seeks confirmation from Roxanne. Roxanne however is apparently unsure of who Shana intends to call and in line 3

¹⁰ In so far as it conveys that some trouble *other* than hearing is at issue, the OIR format ‘who X’ appears to attribute responsibility for the trouble to the speaker of the trouble source. This is confirmed by a repair that involves elaboration or replacement of the original reference form rather than repetition (on the issue of responsibility for trouble see Robinson 2006).

asks whose phone number Shana is attempting to dial. Shana responds with ‘Jay’. Repair is then initiated on this form by Roxanne in the next turn with ‘Who Jay?’ Shana responds with ‘my Jay’ (her son).

Example (15) bqV – AC2: 40:30

- 1 Roxanne: () *dailin momii:*,
dialing mommy
- 2 Shana: *eet faiv?*
eight five?
- 3 Roxanne: *for huu_*
For who
- 4 Shana: -> *Jee. [eet siks?*
Jay. Eight six?
- 5 Roxanne: -> [^o*hh huu Jee:_*
who Jay
- 6 Shana: -> *Jee fu mi i.*
my Jay.

At issue here are two possible referents for the name ‘Jay’. Thus, Roxanne’s talk at line 5 may be glossed as ‘which Jay?’ Consider the next example (which occurred about five minutes after Example (15)). Here Shana asks Emmanuel to lend her his phone so she can phone Jay (lines 1–3). When Emmanuel complies by passing the phone, Shana tells him that Jay is in the United States. This prompts Emmanuel to initiate repair with ‘who Jay?’ Shana repairs the reference by specifying ‘Roxanne’s Jay’.

Example (16) [AC2.45.47–45.55]

- 1 Shana: *ahm: gi mi a [foon kal*
uhm give me a phone call
- 2 Roxanne: [(Anya
- 3 Shana: *fu [kal Jee.*
to call Jay
- 4 (1.0) ((Emmanuel passes phone))
- 5 Shana: *Jee in di Steets yana.*
Jay’s in the States you know
- 6 Emmanuel: *huu Jee- ah-*
who Jay- ah-
- 7 Shana: -> *Raksan Jee.*
Roxanne’s Jay.
- 8 Emmanuel: *i-i-i-if a had moo kash.*
i-i-i-if I had more cash.

Whereas in the last example Shana used ‘Jay’ to refer to her son, here as revealed in the repair at line 7, it is Roxanne’s boyfriend, who is also named ‘Jay’ (or ‘Jayga’), being talked about. The examples then illustrate speakers

oriented to the possibility of multiple persons sharing the same name. In Example (16), Emmanuel is initially willing to lend the phone, indeed, the fact that compliance with the request is done without hesitation is precisely what, for Shana, suggests that he has misidentified the person being talked about. When Shana remarks that Jay is in the States, Emmanuel asks ‘*huu Jay?*’. As seen in Example (14), Shana’s son and Emmanuel’s cousin are also named Jay and have been discussed earlier in the same conversation. It therefore seems likely that Emmanuel initially understood ‘Jay’ to refer to him and not to ‘Roxanne’s Jay’. These examples indicate then that the ‘who X’ format conveys that the initial referring form has more than one possible referent for the recipient and thus that responsibility for the trouble rests with the initial speaker and not the one initiating repair.

In Example (17), the participants are at first concerned to identify ‘Sophia’ and at line 3, it appears they have been successful in doing this.

Example (17) [AC1.06.50–07.40]

- 2 Shana: *Soofii fo: (.) Jenii?*
Jenny’s Sofie?
- 3 Emmanuel: *Ya::*
Ya
- 4 Shana: *Ai-a sh-sh- weet. shi a huu mek di piknii fu yuu?*
he- it was her- wait. She’s the one who had a child for you?
- 5 (0.2)
- 6 Emmanuel: *hh- huu Jenii*
who Jenny
- 7 (1.2)
- 8 *Jen Balad.*
Jenn Ballad
- 9 (0.6)
- 10 Roxanne: *No:*
No
- 11 Shana: *J-no::*
J-no
- 12 Emmanuel: *sh- noo. plii::z. no.*
sh- no. please. no.
- 13 Shana: -> *a huu Jenii:*
who Jenny?
- 14 Emmanuel: *yunoo uhm:*
you know uhm
- 15 Shana: *rong ii rood*
where on the road?
- 16 Emmanuel: *Bill.hh*
Bill.
- 17 Roxanne: *oo iz shii:*
oh it’s her

However, when Shana asks at line 4, *shi a huu mek pikni fo yuu* ‘She’s the one who had a child for you?’, Emmanuel treats this as evidence of a further misidentification – it is now the reference to Jenny that is treated as problematic (the person in relation to whom Sophia’s identity was secured in line 2). At line 6, Emmanuel initiates repair with ‘who Jenny?’ thus suggesting that he and Shana are talking about different people. Emmanuel’s orientation to the possibility that the problem here is the result of there being multiple ‘Jenny’s is seen at line 8 where he provides one candidate as contrastive (note the marked stress on the last name – ‘Ballad’) with another (albeit unmentioned) possibility. At line 12, the idea that he had a child with Jenny is rejected and, at line 13, Shana now initiates repair with ‘a who Jenny?’. Emmanuel has already started to respond to this when Shana asks where the person in question lives (‘where on the road’). In repairing the person reference, however, Emmanuel asks if Shana knows Bill – he goes for a kinship relation rather than a location. Roxanne and then Shana treat this as providing for the recognition of Jenny (Bill is Jenny’s husband).

Here ‘who X’ is used in the local environment of a prior misidentification by the recipient. Such a misidentification evidences a failure of the referring form to uniquely identify some particular person. Shana and Emmanuel appear to have converged on an identification of Jenny and thus to have accomplished recognitional reference of Sophie. However, Shana’s question at line 4 belies an earlier misidentification. This is dealt with in the subsequent talk through repair initiated twice, first by Emmanuel and subsequently by Shana. Such misidentification constitutes, for the participants, evidence that a single recognitional reference form has identified some person other than the one that was originally intended by the speaker. ‘Who X?’ then treats the recognitional form employed as having multiple possible referents and specifically treats this dimension of reference as problematic.

12.8 Who is named so?

Whereas ‘who X’ suggests multiple possible referents, ‘who is named so’ suggests that no person can be attached to that name. Of course, the use of a name conveys that the speaker believes the recipient should be able to recognize the person being talked about. ‘Who is named so?’, which necessarily targets a previous use of a name, indicates that the name is not sufficient to achieve recognition because the form is itself unfamiliar to the recipient.

Consider Example (18) in which Shana asks Emmanuel where he will be staying in town when he goes to college. Rather than answer, Emmanuel asks Shana where Shana is planning to stay. When Shana indicates that this is uncertain, Emmanuel suggests that he will call ‘Sick’ (Cedric). The reference is not try-marked. Moreover, as he says it for the first time he momentarily

looks away from his recipient and pauses. There is no uptake at this point and, when he returns his gaze to the recipient, Emmanuel repeats the reference as the initial component of a new TCU. The content of the talk suggests that this is someone Emmanuel knows intimately and, thus, someone that his aunt is also likely to know. When Shana initiates repair with ‘who is named so?’ at line 11, Emmanuel repairs the person reference by providing a variant form of the same name and links the talk that follows this with what had come before.

Example (18) AC1.35.25–36.00

- 1 Emmanuel: *enii boi toch hor iz(.)chroblo op [in dis plees*
if any boy touches her there will be trouble up in this place
- 2 Shana: *[wa pa yu gon stee.*
where will you stay
- 3 (0.2)
- 4 *in tong.*
in town
- 5 (0.4)
- 6 Emmanuel: *we Shanka steein_*
where is Shanka staying
- 7 Shana: *da iz ii(.) prab [lim*
that is the problem
- 8 Emmanuel: *[ai goo waan laik ai-ai- ai goo kal S::ik.*
I would like like I- I- I will call Sick
- 10 (0.2)
- 11 *Sik tel mi if ah waan stee.*
Sick told me if I want to stay
- 12 Shana: → *huu neem so_*
who is named so
- 13 Emmanuel: *s::iijik fu laik if-if ah ge [wok or::*
Cedric to like if-if I get a job or
- 14 Roxanne: *[oh monchrooz*
oh Montrose

Upon producing an alternate form at line 13, Emmanuel does not provide a place for Shana to display success in recognizing the person being talked about but rather produces an increment to the turn he began before the initiation of repair. In this way, he suggests that Shana will be able to identify the person from the second form used. At line 14, Roxanne associates the name with a place in town – the place Emmanuel would be staying if he were to live with Sick/Cedric – thereby demonstrating that she has found the person being talked about. This suggests that prior problems of accomplishing recognitional reference prompt more elaborate displays of success. Thus, Roxanne demonstrates rather than merely claims that recognition has been achieved

(see Heritage, this volume, Sacks 1992 v. 2: 137–149). In this example, then, a person being talked about has two variant names – Sick and Cedric. Trouble arises because the recipient apparently knows only one of these and the one she knows is not the one used in the first instance.

In the following example, Shana is asking Anya, a child of approximately two years sitting on her lap, to tell the rest of those present about how she and ‘Kimya’ fight. Emmanuel first initiates repair of the name with ‘who?’ and this elicits a repeat from Shana in line 4. However, the repeat does not resolve the problem and in the next turn he initiates repair again with ‘who is named so’. In response, Shana repairs with a relational construction – Kitana’s little girl.

Example (19) [AC1.51.27]

- 1 Shana: *teI dem hou yuu an Kimya doz fait.*
tell them how you and Kimya fight.
- 2 Emmanuel: *huu?*
who?
- 3 Shana: *Kimya.*
Kimya
- 4 Emmanuel: -> *huu neem so_*
who is named so.
- 5 Shana: *Kee[tana- litl gorl*
Kitana’s little girl
- 6 Roxanne: [Kitana
Kitana

All recognitional forms suggest that the speaker believes the recipient should be able to identify the person on the basis of the form used. Here, additional circumstances suggest that Emmanuel should be able to identify the person being talked about. Anya is an infant and does not have an extensive network of persons whom she can recognize by name. Moreover, she is the child of Emmanuel’s cousin so that the small group of people is likely to be drawn from persons he also knows. Finally, the content of the talk suggests that the relation between Anya and the person designated by the name ‘Kimya’ is of a particularly intimate and intense sort. Thus, although the name was not originally selected for *him* (the turn is addressed to Anya), Emmanuel has good reason to suppose that he knows the person being talked about.

In each of these examples an initial person reference is targeted and subsequently repaired either by providing an alternate name or through some relational construction. In contrast to the examples discussed in the [last section](#), here no prior misidentification or other evidence of a failure to uniquely identify some particular person precedes the initiation of repair. Rather ‘who is

named so?’ is employed when the recipient is unable to find some particular person that they know on the basis of the form used.

In the following example, Emmanuel has made reference to Flavia and repair has already been initiated with ‘who?’. The name has been repeated but Shana is still unable to find a referent for it. At line 6, Roxanne, however, marks success in achieving recognition with an ‘oh’-prefaced turn. In the subsequent talk, she adds to her claim of recognition by providing some additional information about the referent – that she has gone to Canada. Emmanuel confirms this in line 9 saying that she is now in Toronto. Shana, however, is still unable to recognize the person being talked about and, at line 10, initiates repair with ‘who is named so?’

Example (20) bqV – AC2: 22.01

- 6 Roxanne: oo Flavia de-
 oh Flavia the-
- 7 Perry: *from di ai[s kriim*
 from the Ice Cream
- 8 Roxanne: [shi gaan Kanada
 she’s gone to Canada
- 9 Emmanuel: *yeah Toronto.*
 Yeah Toronto
- 10 Shana: -> *huu neem soo_*
 Who is named so
- 11 Roxanne: -> *yeah iz Flavia fu Kaal::*
 yeah it’s Karl’s Flavia

Roxanne responds by telling Shana that the one being talked about is ‘Karl’s Flavia’ (Flavia is Karl’s daughter).

In the final example to be discussed in this section, Roxanne is talking about a story she overheard. Here Roxanne says she overheard ‘Anla’ talking to another woman about one of the co-participants – Emmanuel. In Roxanne’s account, the woman talking to Anla says that she ‘won’t have to worry because he’ll be up there’. Thus according to Roxanne’s account these people referred to Emmanuel (she surmises) using a pronoun for which, at the time, she was unable to determine the referent. This is what is meant, in line 13, by *din kal noo neem* ‘didn’t use a name’. However, at line 15 and 17, Shana contributes to the story saying that ‘Anla asked what are you going to do with Hits’. Thus according to Shana, Anla *did* use a name but not the one Shana and Roxanne use for Emmanuel. Rather, Anla used the nickname by which Emmanuel is known among people of his own generation (‘Hits’).

Shana goes on to account for how it was she could hear this and not understand that it was her own nephew being talked about saying ‘I didn’t think

about that' and 'I wasn't expecting that'. Indeed, at line 24 she reports that she thought, by 'Hits', they were talking about another relative of hers.

Example (21) bqV – AC2: 23:30

- 12 Roxanne: [Anla tel bo Anla din kal noo nee:m
Anla told but Anla didn't use any name
- 13 hiir shi (gu duu)
listen to what she said ()
- 14 shi se ai doon haftu biiko[z hil
she said I don't have to because he'll
- 15 Shana: [an den
and then
- 16 Roxanne: [bi op deer
be up there
- 17 Shana: [Anla aks wa yu gona duu wid Hits
Anla asked what are you going to do with Hits
- 18 Emmanuel: tss hih
- 19 Roxanne: aw:::
- 20 Shana: Hits. (.) bo memba mii na stodii=
Hits. but remember I didn't think about that
- 21 Roxanne: =ai din stodii [(ya/it)=
I wasn't expecting that
- 22 Emmanuel: -> [huu= [huu neem soo_
who who is named so
- 23 Shana: = [ai: : Ana-ah aks shii
I asked her
- 24 Roxanne: -> yuu
you
- 25 Shana: ai tink bin [Shugarii_
I thought it was Sugary
- 26 Roxanne: -> [Anla fu Pol.
Paul's Anla.
- 27 Emmanuel: ah

At line 22, Emmanuel initiates repair with 'who is named so?'. This has been delayed and is out of its natural home in next turn position after the trouble source since the last use of a name was in the talk at line 20 (see Schegloff 2000). A question then arises for the participants as to what this initiator means to target as a trouble source. Roxanne initially treats 'who is named so?' as targeting the most recently used name and thus repairs with 'you' in line 24. Clearly, there is something odd about this as the most recently used name was 'Hits' – the name of the one initiating repair! Still there is some rationale to Roxanne's first understanding of what is being targeted. It is, after all, the participant's inability to recognize the name 'Hits' that is partly at issue in the report (see Shana's talk at lines 17, 20, 25). It appears there is something in

Emmanuel's demeanour that conveys to Roxanne that this is not the name he meant to target and, at line 26, 'Anla' is repaired by use of a kinship construction ('Anla for Paul').¹¹

In this section, I have described the use of the initiator 'who is named so?' This initiator is dedicated to situations in which the name initially used is unfamiliar to the recipient. Analysis of these several examples further suggests that 'who is named so?' is often used after repair has already been initiated by 'who?' The reverse ordering, however, does not occur. This suggests that participants are more likely to treat problems as resulting from hearing rather than from the use of an unfamiliar name. This may be based on two factors. Firstly, compared with 'who?', 'who is named so?' typically results in a more extensive digression from the action under way. Secondly, 'who is named so?' conveys that the form used is not recognizable to the recipient – in this sense, it locates a recipient design error and allocates responsibility for this to the original speaker.

12.9 Recipient design and repair in person reference

The data reviewed in this chapter indicate that, in designing a response to the initiation of repair, the speaker must consider not only what form was used to do this (e.g., 'who?', 'who X?', 'who is named so?'), *and* what form was originally used to make reference (singular name, non-singular reference by name, deictic term etc.) but also the particular person who is the recipient (On recipient design see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 727; Sacks and Schegloff this volume). In the Bequia data, as noted above, trouble often arises when reference is made to persons in the descending generation relative to the recipient. The way in which the trouble is repaired in such situations reveals the important role that recipient-design plays here (see Table 12.2).

Where the referent is in the descending generation vis-à-vis the recipient a common and effective repair practice involves naming someone in the recipient's generation who is related to, or otherwise associated with, the referent (e.g., Examples (7), (9), (10), (20)). However, in other cases, repair involves the use of another name, one which the recipient is more likely to know. Thus in Example (22) (shown below), the speaker uses a more common name (Gazer) to repair one (Ellis) the use of which of is highly restricted.

¹¹ In so far as it conveys that some trouble *other* than hearing is at issue, the OIR format 'who is named so' appears to attribute responsibility for the trouble to the speaker of the trouble source. This is confirmed by a repair that involves elaboration or replacement of the original reference form rather than repetition (on the issue of responsibility for trouble see Robinson frth.).

Example (22) qv – AC2.51.30–52.10

- 31 Emmanuel: *Elis man.*
Ellis man.
- 32 Anya: *ah:::*
- 33 Shana: *huu Elis.*
Who Ellis?
- 34 Emmanuel: *Da iz wa ah doz kal Geeza somtaim.*
That's what I call Gazer sometimes.
- 35 Shana: *oo - yu een biin konchriiz satadee nait.*
oh - You didn't go to the countries Saturday night.

Also, in (18), the speaker repairs the use of a nickname by substituting the referent's official name. Given that nicknames are generally used only by members of the same generation this solution is also particularly fitted to a recipient in the ascending generation vis-à-vis the referent. Consistent with Sacks and Schegloff's argument (1979, this volume) that a preference for recognition takes priority over that for minimization, these repairs are recipient-designed in a basic way. Thus, after an initial name is used, the recipient indicates that they are unable to recognize a person on the basis of the form used. Repair is then accomplished by relating the intended referent to some person in the recipient's own generation or by finding a name they are more likely to recognize.

In other cases repair takes quite a different course while, at the same time, being designed for the particular others who are the recipients. Returning to Example (12), Peter knows that Erti was present earlier when he was talking to the woman who he is now referring to. The repair is thus designed for a particular kind of knowing recipient (Goodwin 1987). In Example (14), Benson and Shanka are sitting more or less side-by-side and the referent (or at least one of them, the principal one) is seated behind. In such a situation a deictic reference and associated pointing gesture is particularly well-suited.

Finally, in Example (23), Miss K has come out to ask where 'those guys' went. She is apparently referring to the people making the video recording and is answered by Cat on this understanding of the question. However, when she comes back from the place suggested ('Courts') she asks the same question now using the name of one of the persons involved (Delmas). When repair is initiated on this reference, she repairs not with a kinship triangulation (despite the fact that the referent is in the descending generation) as in the examples above or an alternate name but, assuming that the most relevant way in which these recipients know the referents is by virtue of the recording situation, with a glance at the camera set up and a minimal descriptor – 'the guys'. In this situation then the speaker moves from a more restrictive

Table 12.2 *Trouble source, OI and repair in descending generation referent cases*

Example	Trouble Source	OI	Repair	Solution
7	Rex	Who X?	Fatman, Blinkton's Rex ⁱ	Shift up generation
9	Kimya	Who is named so?	Kitana little girl	Shift up generation
10	Trudy	Who is she? Who is that?	Cohen	Shift up generation
18	Sick	Who is named so?	Cedric	Nickname to 'official' name.
20	Flavia	Who is named so?	Karl's Flavia	Shift up generation
22	Ellis	Who X?	Gazer	From dyad name to common name

ⁱ Fatman and Blinkton refer to the same person – Rex's father.

(name) to a more circumspect ('the guys' and deictic) form after the initiation of repair.¹²

Example (23) bqV – OFB1b: 33:17 Where Delmas go – 'Who?'

- 1 Miss K: *We dem gaiz gaan?*
Where did those guys go?
- 2 (0.2)
- 3 Cat: () *gaan bai Koots. bai Koots*
() went by Courts. by Courts
- 4 Miss K: huh?
- 5 Cat: *dong soo*
Down there

((Miss K goes to Courts, comes back))
- 6 Miss K: *we Delmas dem goo*
Where did Delmas and them go?
- 7 Hat: -> *huu_*
who
- 8 Miss K: *di gaiz an dem goo?*
The guys and them go?
- 9 Larry: *di fela dem*
The fellers
- 10 Hat: *ah doon noo we de gaan.*
I don't know where they went.

Examples such as this suggest that a general pattern in which speakers move from less to more restrictive subsequent forms is sometimes going to conflict

¹² It should be noted that the referents are in the descending generation vis-à-vis the recipient(s).

with the need to design subsequent forms for the recipients. This is due in part to the fact that what a speaker knows about their recipient(s) is being constantly updated – here Hat’s repair initiation at line 7 suggests that he does not know the name of the person being referred to. Miss K apparently takes this into account in selecting a repair. Recipient-design operates comfortably within the twin preferences proposed by Sacks and Schegloff (1979, this volume). By prioritizing ‘go for recognition’ over ‘use a minimal form’ Sacks and Schegloff prioritized the context-specific practice over the general principle (for minimization and economy) since ‘go for recognition’ implies use a term specifically designed for the particular recipient.

12.10 Conclusions

There are essentially three types of trouble to which person references in interaction are vulnerable:

- (1) Hearing – The recipient may not hear the form/name used.
- (2) Non-uniqueness – The recipient may not know to which of several people who are known by the name/form used the speaker means to refer.
- (3) Recognition failure – The form/name used may be unfamiliar to the recipient.

In the community examined here, the first type of trouble is typically handled by ‘who’ (or a candidate repeat of the name/form used in the next turn). The second type of trouble is handled by ‘who X’. The third type of trouble is handled by the repair initiator ‘who is named so’. This last initiator seems specifically adapted to a community in which individuals often carry more than one name and, moreover, where, although recognition is usually possible, knowledge of names is not evenly distributed. We may also note that in the Bequia data the different OI formats appear to be more highly specialized than in the American and British English data examined at the beginning of the chapter. Thus, in the American and British English data, ‘who?’ is used to deal with trouble resulting from the hearing or pronunciation of a form (as in ‘Sibbie’s sister’ in Example (1)) *and* with trouble tied to the recipient’s unfamiliarity with a form and hence to problems of recognition (as in Example (4)). In the Bequia data, when used to initiate repair of a singular name reference, ‘who?’ categorically elicits a repeat suggesting a specialization to problems of hearing. Notice that this specialization is restricted to the particular context of singular name references and notice further that this is the sole context in which the format ‘who is named so’ is used (i.e., this format “who is named so?” is not used to initiate repair on recognitional descriptions such as the ‘the girl in form one’ or plural name references such as ‘Kitana dem’).

In other words, in this context, use of ‘who?’ may be understood as specifically alternative to the use of “who is named so?” and thus as conveying a problem of hearing (repairable by a repeat of the form initially used) rather than a recognition failure (which would require some other kind of repair). American and British English ‘who?’ thus appears to be used in a broader range of interactional environments than the cognate form in the Bequia data.

The link between larger social factors (demography, onomastics etc.) and repair practices is indirect. As I have tried to show, the relation is mediated by recurrent interactional circumstances or local sequential environments of prior misidentification (‘who X?’) or a highly presupposed possibility for recognition (‘who is named so?’). Social and demographic factors may result in recurrent interactional circumstances that in turn constitute the environments to which practices of speaking are adapted. Resulting locally inflected practices of speaking are undergirded by a robustly generic organization of talk-in-interaction – in the case examined here a generic organization of repair and person reference (see also Levinson 2006; Schegloff 2006; Ochs 1984).

In the main, then, the broad organizational patterns seem generic while the particular ways in which they are used are adapted to local circumstances. Specifically, in the Bequia data there is evidence of greater format specialization (‘who is named so’ to problems of recognition, ‘who?’ to problems of hearing) as compared with American and British English. I have argued that although the problems to which the various OIR formats are addressed are common to every community, the particular ways in which they are solved show subtle variation. In the case of person reference, such variation appears to reflect a range of local factors including onomastics, the ecology of interpersonal contact as well as demographic patterns.

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13 Reference and ‘référence dangereuse’ to persons in Kilivila: an overview and a case study

Gunter Senft

Gräfin: Den Namen! Nur kurz.

Baron: Mit dem Namen anzufangen, würden wir
erst in unendliche Umschweife geraten

J. W. Goethe

13.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis and case study of the system of person reference in Kilivila, the Austronesian language of the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea. First, based on conversation analysts’ insights into forms of third-person reference mainly in English (Sacks and Schegloff 1979, this volume, Schegloff 1996a), this chapter presents the inventory of forms that Kilivila offers its speakers for making such references. To illustrate in more detail, a case study on gossiping is presented in the second part of the chapter. In the example analysed, ambiguous anaphoric references to two initial mentions of third persons turn out not only to exceed and even violate the frame of a clearly defined situational-intentional variety of Kilivila that is constituted by the genre ‘gossip’, but also are extremely dangerous for speakers in the Trobriand Islanders’ society. I illustrate how this culturally dangerous situation escalates and how other participants of the group of gossiping men try to repair this violation of the frame of a culturally defined and metalinguistically labelled ‘way of speaking’ (see Sherzer 1983). The chapter ends with some general remarks on how the understanding of forms of person reference in a language is dependent on the culture specific context in which those forms are produced.

13.2 Kilivila, the language and its speakers

Kilivila, the language of the Trobriand Islanders, is one of forty Austronesian languages spoken in the Milne Bay Province of Papua New Guinea. It is an

agglutinative language and its general, unmarked word order pattern is VOS (Senft 1986). The Austronesian languages spoken in Milne Bay Province are grouped into twelve language families; one of them is labelled Kilivila. The Kilivila language family encompasses the languages Budibud (or Nada, with about 200 speakers), Muyuw (or Murua, with about 4,000 speakers) and Kilivila (or Kiriwina, Boyowa, with about 24,000 speakers); Kilivila is spoken on the islands Kiriwina, Vakuta, Kitava, Kaile'una, Kuiawa, Munuwata and Simsim. The languages Muyuw and Kilivila are each split into mutually understandable local dialects. Typologically, Kilivila is classified as a Western Melanesian Oceanic language belonging to the Papuan-Tip-Cluster group (Capell 1976: 6 & 9; Ross 1988: 25, 190ff; Senft 1986: 6).

The Trobriand Islanders have become famous, even outside of anthropology, because of the ethnographic masterpieces on their culture published by the famous anthropologist Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski, who did field research there between 1916 and 1920 (see Young 2004; also Senft 1999). The Trobrianders belong to the ethnic group called 'Northern Massim'. They are gardeners, doing slash and burn cultivation of the bush; their most important crop is yams. Moreover, they are also famous for being excellent canoe builders, carvers and navigators, especially in connection with the ritualized 'Kula' trade, an exchange of shell valuables that covers a wide area of the Melanesian part of the Pacific (see Leach and Leach 1983; Malinowski 1922). The society is matrilinear but virilocal and socially hierarchically stratified into four clans with a number of also hierarchically stratified subclans in each.

13.3 Forms of third-person reference in Kilivila

To refer to a person (or to an object), the Trobriand Islanders may point at someone (or something) with their index finger, with their eyes, with a lifted chin or with puckered lips. However, like most of us, they usually use language – often together with pointing gestures – for such acts of reference. Like all natural languages their language – Kilivila – provides a number of means for its speakers to refer to persons that are present or non-present in conversation.¹ The use of these means is absolutely context-dependent – and in most cases the decision of whether such a method is a recognitional (e.g., a name) or a non-recognitional description must be based on the interactional context in which such a form is used. However, there are some forms of third-person reference that seem to be preferred by Kilivila speakers in some contexts. In what follows I will give an overview on the range of methods employed to refer to third persons in this language.

¹ For forms of spatial deictic reference in Kilivila see Senft (2004).

13.3.1 Names and nicknames

One of the – probably universal – means to refer to a third person is to use names. Speakers of Kilivila can refer to everybody with his or her personal name, regardless of which clan(s) the referent and the speaker belong to. The speaker can use the person's full name, like, for example, '*Luluvasikweguyau*' (a man's name), or abbreviated forms of it, like, for example, '*Luluvasi*' or '*Lulu*'. Syntactically, all names belong to the category 'noun'.

In the Trobriand Islands, as well as in the whole Massim area, proper names are clan property. Thus, any Trobriand Islander hearing the given name of another Trobriand Islander can immediately identify the clan membership of the respective individual. However, the situation is more complex than that. The Trobriand Islanders' 'real' proper names are the names their mothers (as representatives of their respective matrilineal clan) gave them after birth. However, the child's father (who is not related with his child in this matrilineal society!) and his clan also give a name to a newborn child; and finally, when this child is baptized, it usually gets a third name, a 'baptism name' – in general an English proper name. Thus, the woman called '*Iluboku*' (which is the name attributed to her by her mother and her matrilineal kinsfolk of the Lukwasisiga clan) is also called '*Saronai*' by her father and her father's kinsfolk (of the Malasi clan); her 'baptism name' is '*Luti*' (= Ruth). Moreover, members of one and the same clan may get the same name. Thus, in 1989, a newborn boy in Tauwema, my village of residence on the Trobriand Islands, was called '*Kilagola*'; however, '*Kilagola*' was also the name of the chief of Tauwema. If people did not immediately realize to whom speakers referred when they just used this proper name, speakers then immediately specified the reference by adding an additional recognitional descriptor, for example, appropriate adjectives like '*Kilagola tokekita*' (= 'little Kilagola') or '*Kilagola toveaka*' (= 'the adult Kilagola') or '*guyau Kilagola*' (= 'chief Kilagola'). Nevertheless, the use of names is certainly the most preferred form for third-person reference in Kilivila.

The following examples further illustrate the use of proper names (printed in bold italics) on the Trobriand Islands:

Example (1)

Yabilosi (consultant's name):

Silovalala *m-to-na* *tomwaya la kokola*
 day.before.yesterday Dem-CP.male-Dem old.man his corner.pillar
 The day before yesterday this old man [= Topiesi] his corner pillar [for
 his new house under construction]

laka-sali-si, **Vasopi** *e-kapusi amyaga* *ave valu beya...*
 1.excl.-bring-Pl Vasopi 3.-fall what's.the.name what place there...
 we brought, (from where) Vasopi fell, what's the name, what place (is it)

Example (2)

Gunter:

Avela ku-seki kwena?
 Who 2.-give pot
 To whom do you give the pots?

Vapalaguyau (consultant's name):

Avela a-seki kwena, o e-sake-gu-si kaula
 Who 1.-give pot oh 3.-give-me-Pl yams
 To whom do I give the pots - oh, they gave me yams.

m-to-si-na Tolivalu Gerubara
 Dem-CP.male-Pl-Dem Tolivalu Gerubara
 these men, Tolivalu, Gerubara ...

Gunter:

Kwe-tala kwena pela Tolivalu kwe-tala pela
 CP.thing-one pot for Tolivalu CP.thing-one for
 One pot for Tolivalu, one for ...

Vapalaguyau:

pela
 for

Gunter:

Gerubara

Vapalaguyau:

Gerubara, kwe-tala pela Bwema'utila a-seki
 Gerubara CP.thing-one for Bwema'utila 1.-give
 Gerubara, one for Bwema'utila, I give

kwe-lima kwela-tala la-seki Dovana, e
 CP.thing-five CP.pot-one 1.Past-give Dovana and
 six pots I gave (them to) Dovana and

kwe-lima kwela-tala eh kwe-lima a-seki Vabodaguyau e
 CP.thing-five CP.pot-one eh CP.thing-five 1.-give Vabodaguyau yes

bogwa mesinau
 already finished
 that's it.

Besides their proper names many Trobriand Islanders – men and women – also have nicknames that people also often use to refer to them in place of their proper names. Usually, these nicknames are known by all members of a village, and in some cases also by Trobrianders living in other villages, sometimes even on other islands. Some nicknames refer to physical handicaps of persons; these nicknames are usually produced as a noun phrase that consists of a third person demonstrative pronoun (with a classifier or ‘classificatory particle’ (CP) that differentiates between gender and age of the person) and a nominalized adjective, as, for example:

Example (3)

m-to-na to-pem
 Dem-CP.male-Dem CP.male-lame
 this lame man

or

<i>mi-na-na</i>	<i>na-golia</i>
Dem-CP.female-Dem	CP.female-limping
this limping woman	
or	
<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-pwasa</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-ulcer
this man with many ulcers	
or	
<i>ma-gudi-na</i>	<i>to-nagoa</i>
Dem-CP.child-Dem	CP.male-dumb/deaf
this deaf boy	
or	
<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-migaga</i>
Dem-CP.child-Dem	CP.male-ugly
this ugly man	

However, most of the nicknames on the Trobriand Islands are nouns that are usually used to refer to animals, like, for example:

Example (4)

<i>bunukwa</i> ,	<i>ka'ukwa</i> ,	<i>pusa</i> ,	<i>lekolekwa</i>
'pig'	'dog',	'cat',	'cock/hen'

It is interesting to note that such expressions are also used for mildly insulting and teasing people (however, there is no difference or gradation with respect to the seriousness of the respective insult). Thus, there is an at least slightly aggressive connotation that goes with these nicknames, although their use also indicates a closer relationship between the user of the nickname and the person referred to.

Other nicknames refer to strange, but for the Trobriand Islanders obviously hilarious, behaviour patterns of people. Thus, one of my (many) nicknames on the Trobriand Islands is '*uligova*' (= 'crocodile'), and I earned this nickname because of the following incident: The Trobriand Islanders are famous for their carvings, and in 1982, after I had stayed in my new field site for a few weeks people came and asked me to buy their artefacts. The first carving I bought was a small crocodile. I asked, as usual, '*Avaka beya*' (= 'What is this?') – got the answer *uligova*, noted it down and translated it as '(piece of) carving'. After that I referred to every carving I saw with the expression *uligova* and just could not understand why all the people listening started to smile. It was only months later when I – together with my wife and our friend Weyei, the weather magician of Tauwema – was walking around Kaile'una Island that Weyei pointed out to us a crocodile in the mangroves that we had just passed, walking on the reef to circumvent this swampy area. When I asked, 'What's the name of this animal?' (I had made some progress) he started to giggle and said *uligova* – and I learned not only that I once again had made a wrong inference with

respect to the meaning of the name for an object, but also that *uligova* was one of my nicknames in Tauwema. The Kilivila word for '(piece of) carving' is *tokwalu*, by the way.

13.3.2 *Kinship terms, kinship-terms and names, demonstratives and names, role descriptions and other additional descriptors*

Another minimal method for referring to third persons is to address a person present in the interaction and to use the adequate kinship term that describes the relation of this person to the person referred to, like, for example, '*bwadam*' (= 'your younger brother' [male ego], 'your younger sister' [female ego]), '*tuam*' (= 'your older brother' [male ego], 'your older sister' [female ego]) '*inam*' (= 'your mother') '*kadam*' (= 'your mother's brother'), '*tamam*' (= 'your father'). A more complex means to refer to a third person is to use the name of a non-present or present person together with the kinship term that expresses his or her relation with the person referred to: for example, '*latula Sogeya*' (= 'Sogeya's child'), '*kadala Tospsikauya*' (= 'Tospsikauya's uncle').² Kinship terms are inalienably possessed nouns (see Senft 1986: 52, 129f.). These two forms of third person reference are less frequently used than names (but more frequently than nicknames).

In Example (2) I underlined the demonstrative '*mtosina*' (= 'these men') that Vapalaguyau produced together with the names of the first two men, Tolivala and Gerubara, to which he gave pots. And in Example (1) the consultant Yabilosi refers in the first line of his utterance to '*mtona tomwaya*' (= 'this old man'), using a similar NP construction. This is also a very typical and quite frequently used form to refer to third persons – even for first mention: Kilivila is a classifier language, and the classifier within the demonstratives individualizes the noun!³ In my corpus of Kilivila data I have many such references that consist of a demonstrative and a name (see Example (2)) or a role description (Example (5)), sometimes, but much more rarely, also additional descriptors (see Examples (6–8)), and quite often again a name and the relation of the person to the speaker (see Example (9)). The following examples that clearly constitute non-minimal methods for third person reference illustrate these forms:

² In this society everybody knows everybody else and his or her kin relationships; for Trobriand kinship terms see Malinowski (1929: 434ff), Lounsbury 1965.

³ Himmelmann (1996: 210) – on the basis of five languages – claims that 'demonstratives are generally not usable for first mention of entities that are considered to be unique in a given speech community'. Obviously; Kilivila is a counter example with respect to this claim of universal uses of demonstratives.

Example (5)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>guyau</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	chief
this chief	

Example (6)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>gwadi to-sasopa</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	child CP.male-trick
this trickster boy	

Example (7)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-karevaga</i>	<i>Kaile' una</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-be.responsible	Kaile'una
this man	responsible for	Kaile'una Island

Example (8)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-miga-megwa</i>	<i>(pela bwabwau/yagila/valu ...)</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-Redup-magician	for rain/wind/weather
this magician	(for rain/wind/weather ...)	

Example (9)

Yabilosi:

<i>Ka-lile'i-si</i>	<i>vota deli tauwau, i-vokuva avetuta</i>
1.excl.-throw-Pl	net with men 3.-finish when
We threw the net with the men, when it was finished	
<i>laka-silalagua</i>	<i>so-gu Kobayasi ...</i>
Dual.Past.excl.-walk.from.reef.to.the.beach	friend-my Kobayasi...
we two walked from the reef to the beach (I and) my friend Kobayasi ...	

13.3.3 Titles/honorifics and epithets

Example (5) is not only a role description, but also a title. Contrary to all other Massim, the Trobriand Islanders have chiefs (see Persson 1999: 112ff, 145ff) – and etiquette requires not only to address a chief with the title 'guyau' – or, if the speaker is on more intimate terms with the chief, with the expression 'tomwaya' (= 'old man')⁴ but also to refer to the chief with his name and his title in first third-person reference to him; usually, but not necessarily, this form of third-person reference also goes with the demonstrative pronoun, as the following examples illustrate:

⁴ In Example (1) Yabilosi also used the expression 'tomwaya' to refer to Topiesi, the headman of the village sector 'kwevau valu' (= 'the new village') of Tauwema. This is a very polite form of third person reference that acknowledges the status of the person referred to.

Example (10)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>guyau</i>	<i>Pulayasi</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	chief	Pulayasi
this chief Pulayasi (the present paramount chief of the Trobriand Islands)		

Example (11)

<i>guyau Motaesa</i>
chief Motaesa

Other very prestigious titles and honorific forms of address in Trobriand society that are also frequently used in initial third-person reference are the following ones:

Example (12)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>toliwaga</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	master.of.canoes
this canoe-master	

Example (13)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>tolikwabila</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	landowner
this landowner	

Example (14)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>tokabitam</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	master-carver
this master-carver	

Example (15)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>tovakeda</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	dance-master
this dance-master	

Example (8) again is not only a role description but also an epithet. Probably the most prestigious of these epithets – which is not so often used – is the following expression (see also Malinowski 1922):

Example (16)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-kwaibagula</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-good.gardener
this good gardener	

The epithet for a woman that is probably most equivalent to ‘*tokwaibagula*’ (in Example (16)) is the following one:

Example (17)

<i>mi-na-na</i>	<i>na-salau</i>
Dem-CP.female-Dem	CP.female-busy
this busy woman	

Other such epithets – which are also rather rarely used for initial third-person reference – also describe specific qualities of the person referred to, as illustrated by the following examples:

Example (18)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-pola</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-fish
this (excellent) fisherman	

Example (19)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-keosi</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-dance
this (excellent) dancer	

Example (20)

<i>m-to-na</i>	<i>to-pe'ula</i>
Dem-CP.male-Dem	CP.male-strong
this (very) strong man	

13.3.4 Name taboo and third-person reference

The Trobriand Islanders have one name taboo: Etiquette forbids mentioning the name of a deceased person in the presence of one of this deceased person's kinsfolk. Forms of third-person reference that can be used to obey this name taboo usually mention one of the deceased person's relatives together with the appropriate kinship term that expresses their relationship to the relative mentioned by his or her name, as, for example,

Example (21)

<i>Bwegima</i>	<i>tabula</i>
Bwegima's	grandmother

Note that the kinship relation between the deceased person referred to and members of his kinsfolk present during the verbal interaction should not be used at all as a form of third-person reference. However, if the partner of the deceased person is still alive, the name of the partner can be mentioned together with the gender specific role of the deceased person referred to, as, for example,

Example (22)

Vapalaguyau la kwava
 Vapalaguyau's wife

Example (23)

Sibakola la mwala
 Sibakola's husband

If the person referred to was the chief or the chief's wife, speakers refer to them with the following expressions:

Example (24)

tomumwaya bogwa
 the deceased old chief

Example (25)

nunumwaya bogwa
 the deceased old woman (implying: the deceased wife of the chief)

The fact that there are specific lexicalized forms to refer to a dead chief or his dead wife indicates the high status they have in their village community.

13.3.5 *Reference to places in third-person reference*

To refer to a person or a group of persons speakers of Kilivila also quite often use the forms 'tolela' (= 'man from'), 'vilela' (= 'woman from'), and 'mina' (= 'people from') together with a place name that may refer to a village or an island or even a group of islands. Usually these forms are non-recognitionals; however, in specific contexts they can also be recognitionals for the interactants. The following examples illustrate these forms:

Example (26)

Mokeymwenā:
E beya mina Giwa toya mina Kaduwaga lova
 and there people.from Giwa with people.from Kaduwaga yesterday
 And there the people from Giwa and the people from Kaduwaga - yesterday
e-livali-si kalam e-yova'i-si.
 3.-say-Pl one.day 3.-fight-Pl
 they said that one day they fight with each other.

Example (27)

Yabilosi:
M-to-si-ta mina Kaduwaga mbweli-si yovai,
 Dem.-CP.male-Pl-Dem people.from Kaduwaga love-their fight
 These people from Kaduwaga they love fighting,

Example (28)

m-to-si-na *mina* *koyakoya*
 Dem.-CP.male-Pl-Dem people.from mountains
 these people from the mountains (=from the D'Entrecasteaux Islands)

Example (29)

m-tona *tolela* *Gusaweta*
 Dem-CP.male-Dem man.from Gusaweta
 this man from Gusaweta

Example (30)

mi-na-na *vilela* *Labai*
 Dem-CP.female-Dem woman.from Labai
 this woman from Labai

13.3.6 Affixes and demonstratives and affixes

The most minimal means to first refer to third persons is to simply produce a verbal expression that incorporates a subject prefix. However, the use of subject prefixes for initial third-person reference is usually accompanied by a demonstrative, most often together with a deictic gesture. This is illustrated by the following example:

Example (31)

M-to-si-na *e-me-si!* [+ deictic gesture]
 Dem-CP.male-Pl-Dem 3.-come-Pl
 These men have come!

Kilivila verbal expressions consist of subject-prefixes, Tense/Aspect/Mood (TAM)-markers, and the suffix '-si' to indicate Plural (see Senft 1996: 29ff). As indicated above, in specific contexts the third-person subject prefix is all that is needed to make a person reference. I will briefly illustrate this with the following example: In July 2004 the Bishop of the Methodist Church of Papua New Guinea visited the Trobriand Islands. He also came to Kaile'una Island and visited very briefly Tauwema to see and bless the newly built church in our village. However, he first went to Kaduwaga to visit Katubai, the chief who is responsible for the Island as a whole. All the inhabitants of Tauwema were waiting for the Bishop, and when he had arrived one of the men came to me and said:

Example (32)

Bogwa *e-ma[-Ø]!*
 already 3.-come[-Sg]
 He has come already!

Given the context the subject prefix ‘*e-*’ for third person (unmarked with respect to TAM) constituted a clear and unambiguous reference to the Bishop. In this context the simple subject prefix even functioned like a recognitional!

13.3.7 *Preferences in the organization of reference to persons in Kilivila*

Of all the means for referring to present and non-present persons in conversation presented above, the use of names is clearly the preferred one on the Trobriand Islands. This observation is supported by the fact that children play a game called ‘*nene’i nene’i kora*’ (= ‘find find the hidden’) in which one child describes a person – being present or non-present, being a baby or the paramount chief – and the child’s partner in the game has to guess who is meant and then comes up with the person’s name. The following interaction between the 12-year-old boys Nasoni (Lukulabuta-clan) and Pwatai (Malasi-clan) illustrates this game:

Example (33)

Pwatai:
Nene’i nene’i nene’i nene’i kora:
 Find find find find hidden
 Find, find, find, find the hidden:
Te-ta(la) tomwaya to-lela Kaduwaga taga
 CP.male-one old.man CP.man-from Kaduwaga but
 One old man from Kaduwaga, but
la karewaga sena mwau
 his responsibility very hard
 his responsibilities are very serious.

Nasoni:
Katubai!
 Katubai!

Pwatai:
E m-to-na.
 Yes Dem-CP.male-Dem
 Yes, (that’s) this man!

However, as pointed out above this preference for names is constrained by the name taboo that holds for reference to deceased persons. Nicknames are also often used, especially in situations where all the people present know each other and the person referred to very well. Moreover, names and nicknames are often produced together with demonstratives – quite often also with deictic gestures, especially if the person referred to lives in the village in which the interaction happens – and expressions that describe their relationship to the speaker, like, for example, ‘*sogu*’ and ‘*lubegu*’ (= ‘my friend’, see Example (9)).

The use of kinship terms and names together with kinship terms that describe the named person's relation to the individual referred to are also often used, but less frequently than names. If only a kinship term is used, the reference is either speaker centred or recipient centred.

Multiple expressions can be observed, but they are rather rarely used. If speakers use such complex forms for person reference that usually consist of role descriptions and other additional descriptors (see Examples (7) and (8)), they more often than not cannot remember the name of the person referred to, and indeed, these non-minimal references often start with the rhetorical question: '*mna amyaga*' (= 'hm, what's the name' – see, e.g., Excerpt 6, below).

Titles, honorifics, and epithets are used especially in polite speech and usually in more formal contexts.

All these means for third-person reference are recognitionals. In general the Kilivila data support the generalizations made by Sacks and Schegloff (this volume) that persons should be referred to in such a way that the reference is unequivocal (i.e., that the person is identifiable and recognizable, and that this reference should consist of a minimal form – e.g., a name).

However, there are also two other means to refer to third persons in Kilivila, namely reference to places where these persons live, and affixes, often together with demonstratives. If speakers refer to the place where the referred person(s) live(s), the use of a recognitional is often not necessary for the purposes the speakers pursue. If speakers refer to a group of people with this method they may follow the principle of minimization for their reference preferring this method over giving all the names of the persons within this group.

Affixes only are very rarely used for third-person reference; however, as illustrated above, in specific context this minimal form of reference may even function like any other recognitional form.

Triangulated reference, like, for example, '*inala lubem*' (= 'your friend's mother') is possible in Kilivila, but I have not found such an example in my corpus of Kilivila speech data. I cannot say much about the actual use of gestures, facial expressions, and suprasegmental phenomena that go together with these verbal forms of third-person reference because I have not enough data to do so; however, I can refer the interested reader to the films on Trobriand interactions made by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt that are published by the 'Institut für den Wissenschaftlichen Film' (Institute for Scientific Films) in Göttingen, Germany.⁵

After this brief overview of the inventory and use of forms for initial third-person reference in Kilivila I will illustrate the use of these forms and the use

⁵ For further information see the website of I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt's film archive of human ethology: <http://erl.ornithol.mpg.de/~fshuman/index.html>

of anaphoric reference to persons introduced into the conversation with the following excerpt from the gossiping of six men that I recorded in Tauwema in June 2003.

This case study shows that ambiguous anaphoric references to two first mentioned third persons turn out to not only exceed and even violate the frame of a clearly defined situational-intentional variety of Kilivila that is constituted by the genre ‘gossip’, but also that these references are extremely dangerous for speakers in the Trobriand Islanders’ society. I illustrate how this culturally dangerous situation escalates and how other participants of the group of gossiping men try to repair this violation of the frame of a culturally defined and metalinguistically labelled way of speaking.

13.4 A ‘référence dangereuse’ to persons in Kilivila

On 20 June 2003 six men were sitting on the veranda of my house in Tauwema, while I was finishing the transcription of a video-tape with two of my consultants. When we had finished the transcription, I took the opportunity and asked the men to remain seated and to continue with their conversation. I put my video-camera on my tripod in front of the veranda and told them that I would like to video-tape them now. The men did not object, and I collected the data presented here. The six men gossiping are my 25-year-old neighbour Yabilosi, my 40-year-old friend Moagava and his 26-year-old brother Keyeba – (these three men are members of the Lukwasisiga clan) – 63-year-old Yoya, 34-year-old Sose’ula and his 26-year-old nephew Mokeimwena (these three men belong to the Malasi clan). Within the Trobriand clan hierarchy the Malasi clan is the socially highest ranked clan followed by the Lukuba clan, the Lukwasisiga clan, and finally the Lukulabuta clan. However, the clan differences between the men that are gossiping do not play any role here.

The Trobriand Islanders differentiate the genre ‘gossip’ from other genres and refer to it with the metalinguistic term ‘*kasilam*’. Together with a number of other genres the genre ‘*kasilam*’ co-constitutes the ‘*biga sopa*’, the ‘joking or lying speech, the indirect speech’ variety of Kilivila (see Senft 2006). This variety completely disregards social barriers and distinctions (see below).

The excerpt presented here documents a two-minute-long interaction⁶ that happened after the six men had already gossiped for 20 minutes (see also Senft in press). During these 20 minutes they had talked about gardening, yams, fishing activities, betelnuts, a ‘*sagali*’ (see Senft: 1985; Weiner 1976) mourning ritual in the neighbouring village Koma, house building activities, smoking and tobacco, my work, plans for a beach party, the reconstruction of the pre-schoolhouse close

⁶ The interaction starts at the digitized video-document at 20:29 minutes and ends at 22:20 minutes.

to the playground of Tauwema, the rainy weather during the *sagali* at Koma, tensions between the inhabitants of certain villages on Kaile'una Island, a confrontation with spirits, parrots that damage the crops in the gardens, and attempts to stop smoking. Then Keyeba reports the following⁷:

- 1 Keyeba: My friend, yesterday the people from Kuiava brought tobacco-leaves, you won't believe how many!
- 2 Moagava: True!
- 3 Keyeba: One Kina a leaf.
- 4 Moagava: (They are) thick and big,
(2.0)
ok
(3.0)
and nevertheless (they are) light.
- 5 Yabilosi: I (will go and look) for flowers in the old garden if I cannot buy one tobacco leaf for me!
- 6 Keyeba: One canoe - hm, what's the name - from the mountains (from the D'Entrecasteaux Islands) it came.
(2.0)
- 7 Yoya: (From the) mountains?
(2.0)
- 8 Keyeba: Yes,
(4.0)
they search for betelnuts, they want to distribute (them in a mourning ritual and that is why) they want to buy (them)
(10.0)
- 9 Sose'ula: I see, here are betelnuts, one can say a mourning ritual without betelnuts, (that's) enough, (even) the food is finished. =
- 10 Mokeimwena: = Ah no you (know), they are hungry (there is) no food.
- 11 Bystander: Oh by God, but
- 12 Mokeimwena: [They came ...
- 13 Bystander: [they worked in the garden! =
- 14 Mokeimwena: = They came they looked for two things,
(2.0)
one thing was food
(1.0)
and the other one was betelnuts.
- 15 Moagava: Who?

⁷ The excerpt consists of twenty-four turns. These turns are numbered in the transcript presented here. I would like to file a caveat here for readers without anthropological linguistic expertise: I first present here the English glosses of the Kilivila conversation to give the reader a first impression with respect to the contents of the conversation to be analysed. Any sound analysis of Kilivila interaction (and other conversations documented for other non-Indo-European languages) has to rely on morpheme-interlinear transcriptions. Otherwise, these analyses analyse 'translationese' – and this has nothing to do with the speech data to be analysed! Thus, the actual analysis of this excerpt from a conversation given below is based on the proper morpheme-interlinear transcription of the Kilivila data.

- 16 Mokeimwena: These people from Kuiava came.
(4.0)
- 17 Yabilosi: [Give me matches!
- 18 Keyeba: [It
It speeded this dinghy it came it wanted to go to Losuia,
it really speeded it came to our village - its finished - no
zoom (oil/benzine mix) ,
(1.0)
they climbed the betelpalms in our village and returned,
(1.0)
but it came it wanted to go to Vapalaguyau on Tuma (Island),
(2.0)
they wanted to climb (the betelpalms) and it should take the
load of betelnuts and return,
(3.0)
but no, it is finished no zoom, and to our village they return.
(7.0)
- 19 Mokeimwena: This rain there yesterday he made this heavy rain during
this sagali, (1s) well, that's it. =
- 20 Moagava: = Indeed, they behaved badly.
- 21 Mokeimwena: It is bad today the sun burns they will finish the mourning
ritual in our village today.
- 22 Yoya: They will finish (it).
- 23 Sose'ula: But yesterday they almost fought (because) it rained.
- 24 Keyeba: My friend today we definitely won't go to Koma, later we work
(and) it will be finished.

At first sight this conversation looks relatively harmless; however, a closer look at what is really going on here documents that within these few turns something absolutely outrageous is going on – namely the production of the worst insult possible on the Trobriand Islands. Before I analyse this excerpt of the men's conversation I first want to anchor the beginning of the scene within the Trobriand Islander's taxonomy of registers and genres that constitute these registers.

Besides local varieties – or dialects – of Kilivila (see Senft 1986: 6ff), the Trobriand Islanders also distinguish registers that I have called 'situational intentional varieties'. As I have pointed out elsewhere (see Senft 1986: 124ff.; 1991) I refer with this label to registers of Kilivila used in a given special situation and produced to pursue certain intention(s). Kilivila native speakers differentiate and label eight of these varieties. Moreover, the Trobriand Islanders also differentiate a number of genres or text categories that constitute these registers and refer to them with indigenous metalinguistic expressions. One of these genres is 'gossip' – '*kasilam*', and – as mentioned above – '*kasilam*' is one of the genres that co-constitutes the '*biga sopa*', the 'joking or lying speech, the indirect speech' variety of Kilivila. This variety is absolutely characteristic of the Trobriand Islanders' way of speaking – it constitutes the default register of Trobriand discourse, so to speak. It is based

on the fact that Kilivila, like any other natural language, is marked by features that include 'vagueness' and 'ambiguity'. Both these features are used by its speakers as stylistic means to avoid possible distress, confrontation, or too much and – for a Trobriand Islander at least – too aggressive or direct a speech situation. If hearers signal that they may be insulted by a certain speech act, speakers can always recede from what they have said by labelling it as '*sopa*', as something they did not really mean to say. Thus '*sopa*' represents the speakers' 'unmarked non-commitment to truth' (Hanks, personal communication). Trobriand etiquette then prescribes that hearers must not be offended at all by those utterances that were explicitly labelled as '*sopa*'. The Trobriand Islanders employ this variety in everyday conversation, in small talk, in gossiping, in flirtation, in public debates, in admonitory speeches, in songs and stories as a means of rhetoric to avoid possible conflicts and to relax the atmosphere of the speech situation. The '*biga sopa*' variety also contributes to putting forward arguments because it allows speakers to disguise their thoughts verbally and to disagree in a playful way without the danger of too much personal exposure. Moreover, the '*biga sopa*' variety is used for mocking people. As a means of irony and parody it can be used to criticize certain forms of sociologically deviant behaviour, relatively mildly asking for immediate correction. Finally, the '*biga sopa*' variety offers the only license for the verbal breaking of almost all taboos – with the strict exception of the six worst and deadliest insults in Kilivila. These six insults are still taken as unpardonable offences and – contrary to other curses and abusive expressions the use of which is licensed within the '*biga sopa*' variety – their use is outside the realm of this register.

Let us now have a closer look at the conversation excerpt presented above, and this time we will look at the Kilivila text in its proper and adequate morpheme-interlinearized transcription. The excerpt starts with a first third-person reference:

Excerpt (1)

Keyeba:
So- (gwe) lova minu Kuiava e-meye-si
 friend-(my) yesterday people.from Kuiava.Island 3.-bring-Pl
 My friends, yesterday the people from Kuiava brought

tombaiku gala ku-doki yomala!
 tobacco.leaves not 2.-think many
 tobacco-leaves you won't believe how many!

Excerpt (2)

Moagava:
Mokwita!
 True!

Excerpt (3)

Keyeba:
One Kina ya-tala.
 one Kina CP.flexible-one
 One Kina a leaf.

Excerpt (4)

Moagava:
Ya-popou ya-vaka-veaka (2.0) bogwa (3.0) e taga
 CP.flexible-thick CP.flexible-Redup-big already and but
 (They are) thick and big,
 (2.0)
 ok
 (3.0)
 and nevertheless
gagabila.
 light
 (they are) light.

Excerpt (5)

Yabilosi:
Yegu pela lala o ligaba ki(da)mwa gala bogwa
 I for flower Loc old.garden if not already
 I (will go and look) for flowers in the old garden if I cannot
ba-gimwali ya-tala agu tombaiku!
 1.Put-buy CP.flexible-one my tobacco-leaf
 buy one tobacco leaf for me!

Keyeba addresses his friends, especially looking at Sose'ula, Yoya and Moagava, and reports that yesterday people from Kuiava, a neighbouring island, came and brought many tobacco leaves. These '*tombaiku*' leaves grow in the bush on the islands. These leaves were disregarded for a long time by the islanders, because they first preferred twist tobacco sticks of the 'Cowboy' brand and later either 'Mutrus' tobacco sticks or real cigarettes (especially Benson and Hedges). However, the price for tobacco sticks and cigarettes in the stores on Kiriwina Island has risen dramatically, and most of the islanders now fall back on the good old '*tombaiku*' leaves. Moagava, who wants to light a cigarette – despite also chewing betel – moves a bit forward to get some matches, looks at Keyeba and confirms what Keyeba just said. In his next turn Keyeba mentions the price for which the leaves were sold. And Moagava responds again by praising the good quality of the leaves. Yabilosi, sitting on the step of the door to my house, holding a freshly rolled cigarette, joins in and makes the joking comment that if he cannot buy one of these leaves he will go to the garden and smoke the leaves of any odd flower there. During these first seconds of the conversation Yoya just sits on the veranda and listens, while Sose'ula also chews betel and Mokeimwena is preparing to roll a cigarette.

As Moagava lights his cigarette Keyeba initiates a new topic, referring to another canoe that also came to Tauwema the day before:

Excerpt (6)

Keyeba:

Ke-ta (la) waga mna amyaga va koya
 CP.wooden-one canoe hm what's.the.name Dir mountain
 One canoe - hm, what's the name - from the mountains

e-ma (2.0)

3. -come

(from the D'Entrecasteaux Islands) it came. (2.0)

Excerpt (7)

Yoya:

Koya-koya (2.0).

mountain-Redup

(From the) mountains indeed. (2.0)

Excerpt (8)

Keyeba:

E, bi-ne'i-si buva bi-sagali-si
 yes 3.Fut-search.for-Pl betelnut 3.Fut-distribute-Pl
bi-gimwali-si.

3.Fut-buy-Pl

Yes, they search for betelnuts, they want to distribute (them in a mourning ritual and that is why) they want to buy (them).

(9.0)

Keyeba reports that a canoe from the mountains – that is, from one of the volcanic islands of the D'Entrecasteaux group about 100 km south of Kiriwina island – came to Tauwema. Yoya gazes at him and repeats the place name again with a questioning intonation. Keyeba confirms that he got the location right and mentions that the men in the canoe were looking for betelnuts to distribute during a 'sagali' mourning ceremony. Kiriwina Island is well known in the Massim area for its many betelpalm plantations and its excellent betelnuts, thus it is not surprising that even people from far away come to buy betelnuts from the villagers of the island. After Keyeba has finished his turn there is a relatively long silence during which the men on the veranda look at what is going on in the vicinity; they smile and laugh at each other – probably because of a whispered comment on my work. Keyeba looks directly into the camera and laughs at me. Mokeimwena tears off some paper from his cigarette and throws it away, Sose'ula opens a new betelnut and ends the almost ten-second-long pause with the following remark:

Excerpt (9)

Sose'ula:

a-gisi wala (i)-sima buva, ta-uvanana sagali
 1.-see only (3.)-be betelnut Dual.incl-say mourning. ritual
 I see, here are betelnuts, one can say a mourning ritual

gala buva desi wala kaula okwa.=
 no betelnut enough only food empty
 without betelnuts, (that's) enough, (even) the **food is finished**.

He proudly confirms that we have plenty of betelnuts on our island. Then he points out that a 'sagali' morning ritual without betelnuts for all is really bad and emphasizes that the only thing worse than that would be if it was also without enough food. A few minutes ago Yoya had claimed that only one pig was killed for the 'sagali' in the neighbouring village – this is sheer defamation, because food exchanges during these mourning rituals are highly competitive – Michael Young (1971) aptly described this behaviour that can be found all over the Massim area as 'fighting with food' (see also McDowell 1980) – and any form of criticism with respect to the food available during such a 'sagali' is defamatory and extremely offensive for the community criticized in such a way. What has to be noted here is that Sose'ula's last comment 'kaula okwa' – 'the food is finished' is actually extremely close to the worst and deadliest insult that can be made on the Trobriands, namely to accuse a man or a village or the inhabitants of a whole island of having no food! But note that this comment is not accompanied with a person reference at all. The Trobriand Islanders are first and foremost yam gardeners. A good and abundant yam harvest is the pride of everyone because such a harvest proves that a man is hard working, busy and a skilled garden magician: All this indicates the status he has and may claim to have within his community. This insult denies all this – and it results in fighting and sometimes even in murder or in war between two villages no matter to whom it is addressed. Sose'ula must be aware of this, because as soon as he has finished his utterance he scratches his head – this could be interpreted as an act of self-grooming out of embarrassment. Moreover, Yoya and Keyeba smile after Sose'ula's utterance – this may also be because of the fact that he managed to insinuate this insult without actually expressing it in the form that could be taken as the actual insult. However, this is sheer speculation. But what is absolutely astonishing now is what Sose'ula's nephew Mokeimena says directly after his uncle has finished his utterance:

Excerpt (10)

Mokeimwena:

=A gala yokwa, e-kamama-si kaula gala.
 ah no you 3.-hungry-Pl food not

Ah no you (know), **they are hungry** (there is) **no food**.

He brushes his uncle’s elegant insinuation aside and bluntly states that ‘they’ are hungry because there is no food – and with this second part of his utterance he verbalizes this worst insult possible on the Trobriands. However, the form he used for his person reference, namely the affixes that indicate third person plural (underlined in his turn) is ambiguous since it is a subsequent sort of reference in an initial position (see Schegloff 1996a). The subject prefix and the plural marker could be a form of anaphoric reference to either the people of Kuiuava or to the people from ‘the mountains’. Mokeimwena produces his utterance in a rather matter-of-fact way, however with a low voice! Yoya, Sose’ula and Keyeba immediately look at him and stop smiling – and Moagava as well as Yabilosi show no reaction at all. However, a bystander (who is not to be seen on the video documenting this scene) protests the remark as follows:

Excerpt (11)

Bystander (not on video, voice unknown)
 A Yaubada omatala taga
 Oh God in.front.of but
 Oh by God but

Excerpt (12)

Mokeimwena (overlapping):
 [E-me-si ...
 3.-come
They came

Excerpt (13)

(same) Bystander (not on video, voice unknown):
 [e-bugubagula-si] =
 3.-garden-Pl
they worked in the garden!

Excerpt (14)

Mokeimwena:
 = E-me-si e-nene'i-si kwe-yu vavagi, (2.0)
 2.-come-Pl 3.-search.for-Pl CP.general.two thing
They came **they** looked for two things,
 (2.0)
 kwe-tala kaula (1s) kwe-tala buva.
 CP.general-one food CP.general-one betelnut
 one thing was food (1.0) and the other one was betelnuts.

Invoking God as his witness the bystander points out that ‘they worked in the garden’ – implying that they must have food. Note that this anaphoric

reference is still ambiguous, although it is unlikely that somebody living in Tauwema would know anything about gardening activities on the D'Entrecasteaux Islands! But Mokeimwena insists on his statement. He first starts to rephrase it in overlap with the protesting bystander, and after this man has finished his turn he states that 'they' came to look for two things, then he makes a rhetorical pause of about two seconds and first mentions 'food' and then, after another short pause 'betelnuts'. The pauses give this utterance a rather dramatic effect. But the anaphoric reference remains ambiguous – although by now the situation has clearly escalated. This is evidenced by the behaviour of the other men on the veranda. As soon as the bystander comes up with his protest almost all the men – with the exception of Moagava – look at him. Then first Keyeba points with his lime spatula to the microphone in front of them, and as soon as the bystander has finished his turn Yoya even changes his position and clearly points with his pointing finger to the mike to indicate that all this is documented on audio – and videotape! Then Moagava gives a kind of staring look – most probably at the bystander. When Mokeimwena rephrases his statement, Yoya and Keyeba look at him quite embarrassed. In the meantime one of the bystanders has obviously asked Moagava for betelnuts, because he shakes his head and then immediately shows this person his bag without further betelnuts. It seems that Moagava by now has realized that the situation has indeed escalated beyond hope, because as soon as Mokeimwena has finished his turn he bluntly asks him:

Excerpt (15)

Moagava:
Ave!a?
Who?

And Mokeimwena – now forced to disambiguate his so far ambiguous third-person reference – answers this question as follows:

Excerpt (16)

Mokeimwena:
M-to-si-na **mina** **Kuiava** **e-me-si.** (4s)
Dem-CP.male-Pl-Dem people.from Kuiava.Island 3.-come-Pl
These people from Kuiava came. (4s)

He produces this sentence in a very low voice – probably realizing what he just has done. There are signs of embarrassment on the faces of all men now. Even Moagava, who could not suppress the question that led to the climax of

this incident, looks down, suppressing a gaze into the direction of the camera. The men may have realized now that Mokeimwena could have been killed had a man from Kuiava overheard what he had said during the last few seconds. Be that as it may, before someone continues the conversation four relatively long seconds pass.

Here I would like to briefly summarize what has happened during the last seven turns. Mokeimwena produces the worst insult possible on the Trobriand Islands. Someone protests against this insult, Mokeimwena refutes this protest pointing out again that the people he has insulted really came to look for food. During the interaction between Mokeimwena and the protesting bystander Yoya and Keyeba conspicuously point towards the microphone on the veranda, most possibly to make the bystander aware of the fact that this conversation is documented by me. Even if I had overheard the insult – which I actually did during two processes of data transcription – their behaviour indicates that something peculiar is going on here. Moagava may have realized this; he may have assumed that now the situation was beyond hope and by explicitly asking for an unequivocal person reference he forces Mokeimwena to disambiguate the referents of his insult. It may well be that Moagava exposes Mokeimwena to shame him, to make him realize that he has transgressed the border of what is accepted in the '*biga sopa*' variety and to remind him that this transgression is absolutely unacceptable. Mokeimwena's turns were no longer produced within the framework of the '*biga sopa*' variety. He has broken the frame of the verbal interaction and shifted it towards the realm of the '*biga gaga*' variety – the variety that encompasses all situationally and stylistically inadequate uses of speech in communicative contexts and that is specifically constituted by insults – '*matua*' – in Kilivila.

However, this break of etiquette asks for immediate repair if the men want to continue their conversation. They all are aware of the specific interactive situation – they are filmed; they know that what just has happened is documented on video and will be transcribed, translated and analysed! So they have to find a way of how to transform the conversation back into the easy-going and safe framework of the '*biga sopa*'. And this is indeed what happens now. After four seconds of general embarrassment Yabilosi and Keyeba are the first to find their words and to take the floor again:

Excerpt (17)

Yabilosi:
 [Ku-meya manusisi!
 2.-bring matches
 Give me matches!

Excerpt (18)

Keyeba:

[*E-sa ...*

3.-

It ...

E-sakaula ma-ke-na dinga e-ma bi-la-la
 3.-run Dem-CP.wooden-Dem dinghy 3.-come 3.Fut-go-Red
 It speeded this dinghy it came it wanted to go to

Losuia, e-sakaula-ga e-ma o da-valu-si e-okwa
 Losuia 3.-run-Emph 3.-come Loc 2.incl.our- village-Pl 3.-finish
 Losuia, it really speeded it came to our village - its finished -

sopi gala, (1.0) e-mwena-si buva o da-valu-si
 zoom no 3.-climb-Pl betelnut.palm Loc 2.incl.our-village-Pl
 no zoom (oil/benzine mix), (1.0) they climbed the betelpalms in our
 village and

e-ke'ita-si, (1.0)

3.-return-Pl

returned

(1.0)

taga e-ma bi-loki-la Vapalaguyau Tuma (2.0)
 but 3.-come 3.Fut-go.to-Emph Vapalaguyau Tuma.
 but it came it wanted to go to Vapalaguyau on Tuma (Island), (2.0)

bi-mwena-si buva bi-una bi-ke'ita, (3.0) gala-gola,
 3.Fut-climb-Pl betelnut 3.Fut-load 3-return no-Emph
 they wanted to climb (the betelpalms) and it should take the load of
 betelnuts and return, (3.0) but no,

e-okwa sopi gala, o da-valu-si e-ke'ita. (7.0)
 3.-finish zoom no Loc 2.incl.our-village-Pl 3.-return
 it is finished no zoom, and to our village they return.
 (7.0)

After a brief look into the camera Yabilosi addresses Moagava and asks him to pass the matches – and Moagava throws them over to him in the famous Trobriand way (see Malinowski 1922: 352).⁸ Keyeba, who started his turn together with Yabilosi, waits until Yabilosi has finished his request. Then he looks at Yoya and Sose'ula and tells them how and why the people from Kuiava – the just insulted party – came to Tauwema. He informs them that the people from Kuiava actually wanted to go by dinghy to Losuia on Kiriwina Island to buy things at the two stores there. However, the Kuiavans ran out of zoom (the oil and gasoline mixture) for the outboard engine of their dinghy. Therefore they stopped their journey halfway at Tauwema, got betelnuts, and then returned home. The people from Kuiava did neither go to Losuia nor to Tuma Island where Vapalaguyau, one of the important man of Tauwema, and a number of other people from Tauwema started a new village a few years

⁸ Malinowski (1922: 352) describes such transactions during Kula exchanges as follows: 'The etiquette of the transaction requires that the gift should be given in an off-hand, abrupt, almost angry manner, and received with equivalent nonchalance and disdain'.

ago. Their intention was to buy betelnuts there on their way back from Losuia; however, because of the zoom-shortage they changed their plans and just bought their betelnuts in Tauwema. This account of the visit of the people from Kuiava only mentions betelnuts. Food does not come up as a subject here anymore – and thus Keyeba's account kind of 'overwrites' what Mokeimwena said a few seconds ago. Mokeimwena's 'break of etiquette', his violation of the '*biga sopa*' framework by producing the worst Trobriand insult and thus switching into the '*biga gaga*' variety is 'repaired', so to speak. Keyeba has managed to 'reframe' the situation (see Goffman 1974) and to transform the conversation back into the '*kasilam*' genre again. Yabilosi lights his cigarette during Keyeba's turn, and all men relax once more while Keyeba is speaking. At the end of his turn Keyeba looks briefly towards the camera.

His turn is followed by another relatively long pause that is filled by smoking and the chewing of betelnuts. During all that time Mokeimwena had looked down on the cigarette he had been rolling for a while. When the cigarette is finished he looks up, then looks at Yoya and Moagava and starts to speak again, shifting the topic of the conversation back to the weather conditions during the sagali in Koma the day before:

Excerpt (19)

Mokeimwena:

Ma-na-kwa *lova* *beya* *kuna* *e-vagi* *beya*
Dem-Dem-CP.general yesterday here rain 3.-make here
This rain there yesterday he made this

kunubwadela *m-kwe-na* *sagali* (1.0), *ka* *kalabiga*.=
heavy.rain Dem-CP.general-Dem mourning.ritual well that's.it
heavy rain during this sagali, (1.0) well, that's it.

Excerpt (20)

Moagava:

= *Taga* *e-bubuna-si* *gaga*.
but.of course 3.-behave-Pl bad
Indeed, they behaved badly.

Excerpt (21)

Mokeimwena:

I-gaga *lagela* *lilu* *e-kile'i*, *bi-sagalimkolova-si*
3.-bad today sun 3.-throw 3.Fut-finish.mourning.ritual-PL
o *da-valu-si* *lagela*.
Loc 2.incl.our-village-Pl today

It is bad, today the sun burns they could have finished the mourning ritual in our village today.

Excerpt (22)

Yoya:
Bi-gimkola-si.
 3.Fut-finish-Pl
 They will finish (it).

Excerpt (23)

Sose'ula:
Taga Iova bi-yova'i-si e-kuna-kuna.
 but yesterday 3.Fut-fight-Pl 3.-rain-Redup
 But yesterday they almost fought (because) it rained.

Excerpt (24)

Keyeba:
So-(gu) lagela ba-la-la Koma gala-go
 friend-(my) today 1.Fut-go-Emph Koma.village not-Emph
 My friend today we definitely won't go to Koma,

iga(u) ta-paisewa-si bi-vokuva.
 later 1.incl-work-Pl 3.Fut-finish
 later we work (and) it will be finished.

Mokeymwenā – after his break of etiquette – now enters the *'biga sopa'* frame constituted by gossip again. However, in a very typical manner for the genre *'kasilam'* (– note that this term can also be glossed as 'whispering behind someone's back' –) he continues to put blame on somebody else again. Shifting the topic of the conversation back to the heavy rain during the *'sagali'* mourning ceremony in Koma yesterday, he accuses an unmentioned weather magician as being responsible for the bad weather – using (in this context) a non-recognitional third person subject prefix of the verb to refer to this magician. This accusation, however, implies that either the people of Koma did not ask, or were to mean to ask, their weather magician to do magic against rain or that the Koma weather magician's magical formulae were too weak or not properly recited so that another magician's formulae for rain were stronger than the formulae for sunny weather. However, this kind of spreading rumours is part of the concept of *'biga sopa'* – and this time Mokeymwenā is on safe grounds with his nasty innuendoes because such insinuations are licensed by the use of the *'biga sopa'* variety. Moagava picks up this accusation and confirms that the Koma people behaved badly by not taking proper care of the weather. Mokeymwenā – supported by this response – goes on ridiculing the Koma people. He points out that we have fine sunny weather in Tauwema today and remarks that the Koma people could have finished their mourning ceremony in our village. Yoya's response that they will finish their *'sagali'* today can be interpreted as either a criticism of Mokeymwenā's contribution or as just another innuendo, pointing out that the Koma people are simply careless

with respect to properly arranging for such ceremonies. Both readings are possible – and, as pointed out above, this ambiguity is one of the characteristic features of the '*biga sopa*' variety. Soseula mentions again that the weather conditions were responsible for severe tensions between the Koma people and their guests, tensions that almost led to a fight. Keyeba does not take up the possibility to elaborate on this topic but tries to close this part of the conversation by stating that they have already decided not to attend the last part of the '*sagali*' in Koma today because they have to help reconstruct the pre-school house. During this final part of this excerpt of their conversation the men chew betelnuts, lick their lime spatulae and smoke their cigarettes. The atmosphere is as relaxed again as it was at the beginning of the interaction under analysis here – and all six men enjoy their '*kasilam*' again.

13.5 Concluding remarks: reference to persons and the cross-cultural study of human interaction

I began this chapter with an overview of the methods Kilivila offers its speakers for initial third-person references. This overview together with observations on preferences in the organization of reference to persons in Kilivila support the generalizations made by Sacks and Schegloff (1979, this volume) that persons should be referred to such that the reference is unequivocal (i.e., 'recognitional') and that this reference should consist of a minimal form.

The discussion of some of these forms for third-person reference showed that the use of these forms and their functions as a recognitional or as a non-recognitional depends entirely on the context of the interaction. It is not enough simply to know that there are methods for third-person reference in Kilivila that are similar to forms for these kinds of references in English (and possibly also in other languages), or that the generalizations postulated by conversation analysts of generic (basic, universal) organizing principles for these references hold for Kilivila. A comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of person reference cannot be based on interaction information alone. The case study presented here illustrates that we can only reach this aim – to comprehensively describe and understand the forms of third-person reference and their uses, functions and possible consequences for the development and flow of a conversation – if we base our analyses of conversation also on linguistic and ethnographic, and sociocultural information. This is in line with Levinson's ideas on researching the interaction of language, culture and cognition. He suggests that this kind of research should distinguish 'three distinct levels of analysis, or three different kinds of systems, sociocultural systems, interaction systems and language

systems, interlocked in various ways' (Levinson 2005: 449; cf. Enfield and Levinson 2006).

The case study presented here showed that the dynamics of conversation forced one of the participants to disambiguate a reference that turned out to be extremely dangerous because it was coupled with a deadly insult. To understand that the crucial utterance produced the worst insult possible on the Trobriand Islands required ethnographic background, and to understand why the other participants in this conversation had to 'repair' this situation and how they did it required linguistic competence with respect to the Trobriand Islanders' metalinguistic classification and categorization of varieties of Kilivila and the genres that constitute these varieties. Without this linguistic and ethnographic knowledge, it would have been impossible to properly describe and analyse the development and flow of this conversation, and the consequences of a seemingly innocent initial third-person reference.

But let me come back once more to the question of basic organizing principles that seem to underlie human interaction. I pointed out above that the generalizations postulated by conversation analysts with respect to basic and properly also universal organizing principles for third-person reference hold for Kilivila, too. In a recent paper Levinson (2006: 61) postulates a 'universal systematics of interaction' (cf. also Schegloff 2006a). He points out that 'as we learn more about conversational organization . . . we see that there are relatively few, crucial organizing principles' (Levinson 2006: 61). This observation – explicitly linked with Conversation Analysis – is in agreement with Eibl-Eibesfeldt's human ethological claim that we can differentiate a number of probably universal elementary interaction strategies (see Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1984: 642ff; Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Senft 1987; 141ff):

The superficial appearance of human interactive behaviors varies enormously from culture to culture, but with closer examination we can recognize that the various strategies of social interactions share a universal pattern, based upon a universal rule system (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989: 522).

These strategies seem to be identical with (or at least a crucial part of) the 'building blocks for cultural diversity in social interaction' provided by what Levinson calls the 'interaction engine', 'a set of principles that can interdigitate with local principles to generate different local flavors' (Levinson 2006: 56). The enormous variety in human interaction to be observed in different cultures can be attributed to and explained by a few such organizing principles or interaction strategies (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Senft 1987). Together with the demand for a multidisciplinary approach to research human interaction this insight may turn out to be crucial for the systematic cross-cultural study of interaction – a study that has hardly begun.

Abbreviations

1	1st person
2	2nd person
3	3rd person
CP	Classificatory Particle, classifier
Dem	Demonstrative
excl.	exclusive
Pl	Plural
TAM	Tense/Aspect/Mood-marker
Sg	Singular

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