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THINK TANKS AND EMERGING POWER POLICY NETWORKS

Edited by
James G. McGann



Think Tanks and Emerging Power Policy Networks

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Editor

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PART I

Introduction



Think Tanks and Emerging Power Networks

James G. McGann and Aaron Shull

Abstract Think tanks are research, analysis, and engagement institutions that generate policy advice on domestic and international issues, enabling policymakers to make informed decisions and bridging the gap between the government and the public at large. In simpler terms, think tanks serve as “go-to” institutions when experts on particular topics are needed to provide analysis or commentary on the breaking news of the day. These organizations are classified in one of the following categories: for profit, autonomous and independent, quasi-independent, university affiliated, political party affiliated, quasi-governmental, or governmental. These categories helpfully expand the definition of think tanks to overcome the presuppositions of a Western, Anglophone perspective—as think tanks become increasingly prominent around the world, so too does their definition necessarily expand beyond its original boundaries.

Keywords Think tanks • Public policy research organizations • Policy advice • Global research • Foreign policy

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In an age where the power of a computer chip at least doubles every 18 months, where the average young adult will have nine careers—not jobs—in their lifetime, and where flying halfway around the world requires less than a day, the resulting surge of new information often raises more questions than it answers. Henry Kissinger once remarked that being a policymaker was like being at the end of a fire hose. Today policy and the public must both deal with the endless avalanche of information. In this increasingly complex, independent, and information-rich world, governments and individual policymakers face the common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear in governmental decision-making. These incessant technological advances, combined with the forces of globalization, have contributed to a growth of public policy research organizations, or think tanks, over the last few decades that has been nothing less than explosive. Not only have these organizations increased in number, but the scope and impact of their work has also expanded dramatically at the national, regional, and global levels. Twenty-two years ago, when the first global meeting of think tanks in Barcelona, Spain was organized, many of my colleagues suggested that the term “think tank” did not travel well across borders. Today, the term has become an accepted transnational concept.

Think tanks are research, analysis, and engagement institutions that generate policy advice on domestic and international issues, enabling policymakers to make informed decisions and bridging the gap between the government and the public at large. In simpler terms, think tanks serve as “go-to” institutions when experts on particular topics are needed to provide analysis or commentary on the breaking news of the day. These organizations are classified in one of the following categories: for profit, autonomous and independent, quasi-independent, university affiliated, political party affiliated, quasi-governmental, or governmental. These categories helpfully expand the definition of think tanks to overcome the presuppositions of a Western, Anglophone perspective—as think tanks become increasingly prominent around the world, so too does their definition necessarily expand beyond its original boundaries (Table 1.1).

The following table sets out examples of each category, using some of the more well-known think tanks in the world (Table 1.2).

However, a finer line separates internationally oriented think tanks with a domestic focus from those that are truly global or transnational. Being a global think tank requires many of the traits of a multi-national corporation, including established operational centers linked by a shared mission in two or more continents, programs, and operations including field

Table 1.1 Think tank typology

Category	Definition
Autonomous and Independent	<i>Significant independence from any one interest group or donor and autonomous in its operation and funding from government.</i>
Quasi-Independent	<i>Autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor, or contracting agency that provides a majority of the funding and has significant influence over operations of the think tank.</i>
University Affiliated	<i>A policy research center at a university.</i>
Political Party Affiliated	<i>Formally affiliated with a political party.</i>
Government Affiliated	<i>A part of the structure of government.</i>
Quasi-Governmental	<i>Funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of government.</i>
Corporate	<i>A for-profit public policy research organization, affiliated with a corporation or merely operating on a for-profit basis</i>

offices with local staff and scholars, product offerings for a global audience, and a variety of international funding sources. International, however, does not necessarily mean global. Many think tanks conduct research on international issues without being global think tanks. To be a global institution, a think tank must operate on two or more continents and have networked global operations. Some think tanks are regional or merely transnational, meaning they operate in two or more states. When we use these parameters, there are just a dozen or so think tanks that are global and a slightly larger number that are transnational. But the numbers are growing—think tanks have finally gone global. If we count both global and transnational organizations, there are now approximately 60 think tanks that have cross-border operations (see *Global Think Tanks, Policy Networks and Governance* McGann 2011 for a more detailed discussion). Navigating through different global issues and regions poses a unique challenge for global think tanks and global policy networks which domestic policy research institutes do not face. Various global think tanks have distinct approaches to research in the international sphere, which emphasizes that multiple paths can be taken to go global. Flexibility in structure and diversity in funding are key attributes to tackle the politics of separate regions and international issues.

In different regions, global think tanks act differently. Networks are important for sharing reference points and collaboration in various regions.

Table 1.2 Classification of think tanks worldwide (illustrative examples)

Organization	Date Established	Organizational Type
Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany)	1964	Political Party
Jaures Foundation (France)	1990	
Progressive Policy Institute (U.S.)	1998	
China Development Institute (PRC)	1989	Government
Institute for Political and International Studies (Iran)	1984	
Congressional Research Service (U.S.)	1914	
Institute for Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia)	1983	Quasi-Governmental
Korean Development Institute (Korea)	1971	
Woodrow International Center For Scholars (U.S.)	1968	
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (Pakistan)	1947	Autonomous and Independent
Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)	1990	
Institute for International Economics (U.S.)	1981	
European Trade Union Institute (Belgium)	1978	Quasi-Independent
NLI Research Institute (Japan)	1988	
Center for Defense Information (U.S.)	1990	
Foreign Policy Institute, Hacettepe University (Turkey)	1974	University Affiliated
Institute For International Relations (Brazil)	1979	
The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University (U.S.)	1919	

Think tank networks, as well as national, regional, and global policy networks, have emerged over the last two decades and have become a power force in work politics. They facilitate the use of diversity between perspectives as an advantage (Hayes 2015). Some think tanks, most notably those originating in Britain, opt out of thinknets, preferring an independent approach. Although engaged in global research, most British think tanks would rather not complicate the situation by networking (Pautz 2014). Top German global think tanks contrast the British in that they embed themselves in more regions, making them indisputably global (Thunert 2000). US think tanks are open to networking and collaborate overseas, as well as

with Canada and Mexico, on shared issues (Drezner 2015). Global Asian think tanks recently expanded their networks. Because of globalization, Asian think tanks are usually defined by “nationalism, the extent of pluralism or liberalization, and the concentration of power” (Hayes 2015). These characteristics shape the way they operate. Variation is limited because of governmental restrictions, which force all Chinese think tanks to be dependent on the government to some extent (Shambaugh 2002). Nevertheless, Chinese and Asian think tanks mark an opposing Eastern perspective to policy research against the traditionally dominant Western perspective.

While the primary function of these civil society organizations is to help governments understand and make informed choices about issues of domestic and international concern, they also have a number of other critical roles, including playing a mediating function between the government and the public that helps build trust and confidence in public officials; serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; identifying, articulating, and evaluating current policy issues, proposals, and programs; transforming ideas and emerging problems into policy issues; interpreting issues, events, and policies for the electronic and print media, thus facilitating public understanding of domestic and international policy issues; providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy formulation process; facilitating the construction of “issue networks”; providing a supply of personnel for the legislative and executive branches of government; and challenging the conventional wisdom, standard operating procedures, and business-as-usual of bureaucrats and elected officials. The activities involved in fulfilling these functions require a balance of research, analysis, and outreach. The range of activities that think tanks engage in includes: framing policy issues; researching and writing books, articles, policy briefs, and monographs; conducting evaluations of government programs; disseminating their research findings and conducting various outreach activities (public testimony before congress, media appearances, and speeches); creating networks and exchanges via workshops, seminars, and briefings; and supporting midcareer and senior government officials when they are out of office (what I described as a “Human Resource Tank”). Think tanks are a diverse set of institutions that vary in size, financing, structure, and scope of activity. There are currently over 7500 think tanks or policy research centers around the world.

For decades, scholars have tried to define the role of think tanks in the foreign policy process. Wallace (1994) has argued that policymakers need

advisers in order to rethink the dominant assumptions of policy. Think tanks provide this “rethinking” and generate new, innovative ideas when necessary. The data collected and analyzed by McGann (1990 and 2010) supports this observation by providing evidence of surges in the establishment of think tanks clustered around periods of domestic or international upheaval, such as wars or economic crises. Others have identified think tanks as the bridges between academia and the policymaking process, making academic research findings more palatable for politicians and practitioners (Hass 2002; McGann 2002; Stone 2007). Hass and McGann explored the role think tanks play in foreign policy, while Stone’s conceptualization of think tanks consists of experts that provide policy analysis rather than produce new knowledge. In both cases, whether creating, translating, or transforming knowledge, think tanks can set the policy agenda and prioritize certain topics, thus playing an important role in policy design. While definitions and explanations of the exact nature of think tanks vary, two key conclusions permeate the entire literature on think tanks: (a) think tanks play a part—whether large or small—in the policymaking process, be it through setting agendas, legitimating processes, or formulating policy; and (b) think tanks become particularly relevant in moments of change or transformation and in the face of more complex policy demands. Today’s ongoing transformation of the international environment is a moment of critical change that is generating increasingly complex demands for both the so-called emerging world and the established world powers.

The relationship between think tanks and government in the domestic and international context developed due to certain unique social, historical, and institutional realities with respect to the following six sub-themes: sensitizing policy planning to a future orientation; contributing to the generation of creative policy agendas; collaborating among separate groups of researchers for a common purpose; advancing policy-relevant intellectual syntheses; aiding in the dissemination of relevant policy research within government; and, finally, transforming knowledge gained from research into useful overall policy inputs. Think tanks of various sorts have performed many different functions, including carrying out basic research on policy problems; providing advice on immediate policy concerns; evaluating government programs; interpreting policies for electronic and print media, thus facilitating public understanding of and support for policy initiatives; facilitating the construction of “issue networks”;

supplying key personnel to government; and managing the exchange of ideas and proposals, especially in a Track Two context.¹

It is now a completely regular occurrence to see an expert from one think tank or another being quoted in top-tier media outlets on major issues of international policy. While scholars have tried to define the precise role of think tanks in the foreign policy process for years, it is clear that think tanks do much more than provide media quotes. In fact, most observers would agree that they have become an important part of the policymaking process around the world.

This level of influence in the United States and Europe is not surprising, as there is a long-standing tradition of these institutions engaging in the policymaking process.² Indeed, in 1966 the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, remarked on the anniversary of the Brookings Institution's establishment that "after 50 years of telling the Government what to do, you are more than a private institution on Massachusetts Avenue. You are a national institution, so important [...] that if you did not exist we would have to ask someone to create you."³ Engaging in the policy process in this way, however, is not a straightforward exercise; it requires significant financial resources as well as "strategic thinking, credible research, and a clear communication plan."⁴

The impact of this increase in the prominence of think tanks is still slowly being revealed among governments and the policy community, but there is undoubtedly a large potential for positive global policy impact. Global think tanks have the opportunity to provide a constructive forum for the exchange of information between key stakeholders, or a "neutral space" for debate. In a globalizing, fastpaced, informationrich world, think tanks can also provide important field research and efficient, quality responses to timesensitive foreign policy problems. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the attempts to fill this role by having offices in New Delhi, Moscow, Beirut, Beijing, and Brussels each specializing in regionally important security issues. Brookings is doing the same with offices in China, India, and Qatar, focuses on both domestic and international issues. Additionally, when think tanks become global and form networks, it is more likely that they will pool their efforts and aggregate resources to accomplish these goals. Some issues like carbon emissions, health care, and financial systems are inherently global because they require crossnational coordination and may only take second place to domestic issues and agendas within any individual country.

It is in this context that this book seeks to analyze one aspect of the role played by think tanks in the emerging powers: the fostering and strengthening of networks of policymakers, academics, entrepreneurs, and civil society leaders that transcend national boundaries. To properly fulfil their mission to shape the policymaking process, think tanks must actively pursue cooperation with such varied actors. By doing so, they can ensure that local issues are raised at the highest level of diplomatic forums, promote coordination between national governments, and amplify the voices of their host governments in discussions on international policy. These functions are of increased importance for emerging markets seeking to adapt to a rapidly changing global environment that may not have the same institutional experience of active multilateral diplomacy possessed by more established powers. To that end, this book consists of three case studies outlining how think tanks promote the creation of global networks and the impact these developments are having on the policymaking and implementation process.

These national case studies detail the formation and effects of international networks led by think tanks in a wide range of domestic and regional political circumstances. The cases are taken from India, China, and Turkey—three emerging markets taking increasingly assertive roles in global governance. In each state, local think tanks have played the customary domestic roles of providing policy advice and setting agendas, as well as promoting the growth of international networks of researchers, business leaders, politicians, and representatives of civil society organizations, among others. The case studies identify and explain the unique foreign policy challenges that these emerging powers face and suggest how the development of such networks may play a role in producing solutions.

In “Helping Build an Emerging Power Narrative: Re-Forming Global Governance,” contributing authors Samir Saran and Aniruddh Mohan note that while globalization may have led to “a new era of pluralism in international relations,” it has also created an equally robust set of governance challenges. Drawing on the case of India, a rising global power facing a number of these challenges, the authors point to issues of state legitimacy and rampant global inequality as core critiques that must now be addressed in contemporary governance arrangements.⁵ These issues reflect a larger trend in contemporary politics, a trend that is allowing smaller sub-national political entities to gain increasing prominence.

The clearest example of this shift is the creation of the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog). This new institution,

hailed as the Government of India's premier policy think tank, was created to replace a predecessor body—known as the Planning Commission—which employed a nationally mandated top-down governance model. Instead, the new NITI Aayog views the sub-national states of India as important players in the formulation and implementation of policy and seeks to foster cooperative federalism by acting “as the quintessential platform of the Government of India to bring States to act together in national interest.”⁶

The combined, and at times competing, forces of global integration and governance devolution have also led to a sense of lost identity for many, which in turn has inspired a push toward national values, tradition, and culture. These trends are exacerbated by the reality that the distribution of power in the institutions that make up the architecture of global governance, including the United Nations and the Bretton Woods financial structure, fails to account for the interest of the poor in the developing world and for evolving global power dynamics.

Taken collectively, these trends mean that India will need to find ways to help ensure that any new governance arrangements, or any changes to existing ones, materialize in a way that accounts for these broader values and interests—especially since the Indian economy is now both more globally integrated and more driven to access new markets and capital than ever. As a rising power, India will need to pursue this agenda—both through official inter-governmental networks and institutions and through informal Track Two diplomacy—with a view to broadening its base of engagement and international support. It is through the creation of this engagement mechanism that Indian think tanks have a key role to play: by providing a networking platform for policymakers, diplomats, business leaders, journalists, civil society representatives, and scholars from within India and around the world, they can create an environment for substantive engagement and policy reform.

Lying between these official and unofficial channels of interaction and influence are areas where these two disparate paths converge: an area sometimes referred to as Track One and a Half. In “China and G20: From a Think Tank Case Perspectives,” contributing author Wang Wen paints a picture of overlapping interactions between official and unofficial channels in and around the G20. As another rising power, China has become a key player in the global financial structure, including the G20. At the height of the global financial crisis, China played a critical role with its partners through this institution to conceive of—and implement—a large-scale

economic stimulus plan that would walk the global economy back from imminent disaster.

The Chinese have sought to play a more robust leadership role through the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Sino-US Joint Statement on Climate Change, as well as through the push to reform the governance of the IMF. As a corollary to this emerging leadership role on the global stage, China has also encouraged the establishment of think tanks within China.⁷ But, even with their place cemented in an emerging power, Chinese think tanks still face several barriers. There is no track record of engagement with the government, and, as such, policymakers and think tanks do not know how to take the greatest advantage from their respective work. Without a history of tying research to policy-relevant outcomes or engagement, think tanks' products can still be too academic and, thus, less relevant for immediate policy products. That is not to say that there have been no successes. Chinese think tanks have organized significant conferences related to the G20, have been part of the T20—a network of policy research institutes and think tanks from the G20 countries—and have been instrumental in that overlapping interaction between the formal and informal tracks of engagement.

In this way, the descriptor “think tank” can come across as misleading at times because it implies that these organizations only conceive—or think—of beneficial policy proposals without doing anything further on the implementation of those ideas. In “The Emerging Powers, Think Tanks, and the New Security and Economic Architecture,” contributing authors Güven Sak and Selim Koru argue that think tanks can use their networks to deliver on concrete projects that actually make a difference in the face of contemporary policy challenges. Focusing on the Turkish experience, the authors make clear that the forces of globalization have left their mark on this part of the world as well. As global governance descended into multipolarity following the Cold War, the policy choices in Turkey became both more diversified and more complex—circumstances requiring additional coordination between government and private actors, as well as increased policy research and dialogue capacity.

It is telling that the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) was founded in 2004 to address the complexities inherent in this new environment and to help overcome what had largely been perceived as a coordination failure. In a fashion similar to that of their Chinese and Indian counterparts, this group has been active in designing policy frameworks and creating the formal and informal tracks of engagement that

have become the quintessential feature of the work that leading think tanks undertake.

Taken together, the case studies provided by Saran and Mohan, Wen, and Sak and Koru illuminate both the transforming political climate of these emerging powers and the key role think tanks play in that transformation. The contemporary transformation in the international environment is—no doubt—a moment of critical change that is generating increasingly complex demands for both the traditional powers and the emerging ones alike. Therefore, the ability of think tanks in these emerging powers to foster the creation of networks among policymakers, business leaders, the academy, and civil society is now more important than perhaps ever before.

NOTES

1. Joseph V. Montville defines Track Two diplomacy as “an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.” Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” in *The Psychodynamics of International Relations*. vol 2. eds. V. D. Volkan M.D., J. Montville, and D. A. Julius (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 162.
2. The Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) founded in 1831 in London, UK, is often credited as being the first modern think tank. For a history of the growth of think tanks in the United States see Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America* (The University of Chicago Press, 2012); David M. Ricci, *The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks* (Yale University Press, 1993); Donald E. Abelson, *A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks & US Foreign Policy* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
3. Lyndon B. Johnson, XXXVI *President of the United States: 1963–1969, Remarks on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Brookings Institution* (September 29, 1966) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27896>, see also Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.
4. Andrew Selee, *What Should Think Tanks Do? A Strategic Guide to Policy Impact* (Stanford University Press, 2013), 4.
5. Sandy Gordon, *India’s Rise as an Asian Power, Nation, Neighborhood, and Region* (Georgetown University Press, 2014).

6. National Institution for Transforming India, Government of India, Overview, <http://niti.gov.in/content/overview>.
7. Xinhuanet, “Xi Calls for New Type of Think Tanks,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/27/c_133746282.htm, “Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a new type of think tank catered for China as the country looks to modernize its governance.”

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PART II

Three Case Studies



Helping Build an Emerging Power Narrative: Re-forming Global Governance

Samir Saran and Aniruddh Mohan

Abstract The role of the Observer Research Foundation in emerging power networks and the new face of global governance has been influenced by the processes, political environment, and stakeholders to which it is responsible. For an understanding of ORF's role in engaging with, critiquing, and re-forming global governance, it is crucial to first appreciate the contemporary global and national paradigms that must be confronted.

Keywords Pluralism • India • Observer Research Foundation • Global governance • Multilateralism

The role of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in emerging power networks and the new face of global governance has been influenced by the processes, political environment, and stakeholders to which it is responsible. For an understanding of the ORF's role in engaging with, critiquing, and re-forming global governance, it is crucial to first appreciate the contemporary global and national paradigms that must be confronted.

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The end of the Cold War and the processes of globalization have ushered in a new era of pluralism in international relations. This pluralism is characterized by the progressive integration of economies and societies.¹ Technological innovation and multiculturalism, as well as increased interactions between a wide range of actors from governments, international corporations, and civil society, have all led to the creation of a highly integrated world.² Yet, cracks of divergence and discord continue to widen as processes of transnational interaction have alienated and ignored a great share of the world's people.³ Secondly, while a less centralized global system may be the realization of the dreams of many, a more diffused global order also holds the potential to descend into a fragmented international system.⁴ Transitioning to a multipolar order requires continuity of interstate and transnational coordination, the absence of which creates room for escalation of tensions and interstate conflict—as made clear in the cases of the Crimean war and the Syrian civil war.⁵

The challenges facing global governance, when viewed from India, can be broken down into five distinct sets of challenges that could easily be viewed today as real and relatively significant crises. First and foremost is the crisis of *legitimacy*. The state no longer retains autonomy over the economy in emerging markets the primary shareholders in the system—the poor—suffer the Darwinian effects of globalization. Rising inequality has become the incongruous face of globalization for a majority of individuals living in emerging nations, and the poor are the first in line to feel the effects of market failures and insecurities.⁶ The global governance system is, in fact, failing at the first hurdle—that of guaranteeing the right to life for a large share of the world's population. The richest 14 percent of the world's population have a mean life expectancy of 84, while the poorest 34 percent of households live for only 36 years on average.⁷ Violence, extremism, weather events, and other risks visit this demographic with increasing regularity. It is clear that such a governance system will struggle to retain legitimacy in a world of increased information flows and empowerment of individuals aided by technology and access to information.

Second, the crisis of *sovereignty* has been brought to the fore in the multipolar, integrated world in which we operate today. In the post-colonial world order, nations reclaim sovereignty and, at the same time, developing nations seek to aggregate themselves for greater influence and weight. Some developed countries, such as the US, remain wedded to their sovereignty, while others, such as Germany and France, find greater relevance as part of the European Union collective. Developing countries

diverge from one another similarly. For instance, the BRICS countries have strong notions of individual exceptionalism, while African countries seek to aggregate as a collective on issues such as trade and climate. In this way, emerging powers are no different from other global powers, past and present.⁸ They want to extract as many benefits as possible from the international system, a desire reflected in their varying attempts to maintain autonomy or join a collective.⁹

Third, the crisis of the *collective*, which stems from the previous issue, has come into play with a distinct twenty-first-century flavor. Individuals are beginning to question the primary unit of governance. While nations rush into groupings such as BRICS, G20, and G77 quickly than new acronyms can be found, intra-nationally, devolution and disaggregation are becoming increasingly prominent. Power is being distributed to smaller political entities, geographies, and individuals. For example, in India, the Modi government has introduced NITI Aayog, which seeks to create a bottom-up approach to decision-making that involves state governments. State governments in India have, in fact, influenced India's international economic policy, particularly India's engagement with the WTO.¹⁰ The drivers of this third-tier system of governance, such as towns and villages, starkly contrast with the drivers of governance at the first tier—global climate conventions and trade agreements. The needs of the third tier conflict frequently with the long termism that global governance demands. This push from below evidences itself in global forums when countries such as India and China, which share common economic systems, find greater convergence than do countries like India and the US, which share common democratic political structures. Furthermore, when large collectives fail, smaller collectives tend to replace them—as in the case of trade agreements. In the case of financial institutions, an ambitious new order may replace the old-fashioned G7: emerging national and regional strategies could force institutions such as the IMF into playing only a limited role.¹¹ Collectives, however, also create their own issues. For example, India and Brazil both increased their capabilities at the WTO through leading coalitions but had to forsake some of their own strategic flexibility.¹²

Fourth, globalization and modernization have inevitably led to both the integration of societies and, simultaneously, to alienation and loss of *identity* for many. Democratic societies in both developed and developing countries have undergone tremendous social, political, and economic change since the late 1960s.¹³ We are now witnessing a pushback against

such forces and a regression towards emphasizing national values, tradition, and culture. Sectarianism, individualism, and nationalism have replaced the old clashes of the class struggle. Social homogeneity and traditional roles are now being foregrounded to revise the status quo and undo socio-economic change. While modernization may have led to increased autonomy for the individual for the winners, for the losers it involved varying degree of helplessness, increasing alienation, and the omnipresent frustration of being left behind and left out.¹⁴ Economic processes have mirrored traditional power structures and benefitted those who were already in a position to reap the harvest faster and better. Today, economic indicators and access to modern services and provisions disproportionately benefit certain communities and regions: the “haves” have a lot more, and the “have-nots” have little hope to change their lot. While a new global elite—sometimes called “Davos Man”—has undoubtedly emerged with global interests transcending national identities, in certain countries—including India—globalization has accentuated identity divides. Finally, the virtual world has now made possible the aggregation of deviants. Right-wing extremists and social anarchists can all find a voice through the virtual domain and then find like-minded people with whom to convene. These groups have raised their own set of challenges relating to governance of the cyber domain and issues over freedom of expression. Instead of creating a more unified and harmonious global community, we have a world more fractured across identity barriers than ever before. In many ways, the instruments of globalization—financial and trade flows, airplanes and the internet, among others—are all weapons of significant disruption and affirmation of identity.

The last crisis is that of *representation*. The democratic deficit is now a chasm. If perceptions shape identity, and identity shapes policy preferences, then governance outcomes require representation across various perceived identities. This representation becomes extremely difficult in a world more precariously divided than ever before. Distribution of power in institutions, such as the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, or even the new G20, fails to reflect the realities and needs of the majority of the world’s population. Put simply, the global governance, economic, and financial system have not served the interests of the poor in developing countries very well.¹⁵ The IMF underwent governance and financial reforms before the financial crisis; those reforms, however, were not sufficient to win the confidence of emerging economies who argue that not enough has changed.¹⁶ With the US insisting on leading the World Bank and the EU clinging to the leadership of the IMF—and even looking at

the tussle between India and China over the location of the headquarters of the new BRICS Development Bank—the world today finds itself without the generosity to even symbolically allow leadership transition. This reflects poorly on the global capacity to accommodate real change in global governance institutions.

With these five crises characterizing global governance today, it has become imperative for emerging countries like India to find new ways and new alliances to navigate these failures in governance and governance processes. What are the options for these emerging countries? Are conflict and global division inevitable? Can there be pathways that allow other systems and models to develop? More importantly, do these emerging economies and new powers seek to revise the existing order, or are they merely seeking sufficient stewardship roles for themselves? It is unlikely that any emerging power with significant stakes in the global institutions and economy will be sufficiently inclined to effect a radical alteration. They will more likely seek to replace the incumbents in person and in outlook with their representatives and their new rules for the same old road.

Thus, India will need to discover the means and basis for ensuring the new governance architecture, which materializes, and protects its interests and values. Crucially, India will have to do this at a time when it too is undergoing transitions, of which, there are three, in particular, which India must manage.

INDIAN TRANSITIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD

Firstly, it is clear, as these authors have argued previously, that the idea of India has escaped its borders. Never before has the Indian economy been as globally integrated as it is today.¹⁷ Additionally, a large number of Indians are now plugged into the global economy; they are global citizens and are making their voices heard on global debates in real and virtual forums. India's diaspora, once imagined as the talent lost to India forever due to its closed economy and non-existent opportunities, is a powerful force in shaping a new narrative of India and for India.

Today, India must assertively seek ways to create access to new markets, resources, and capital.¹⁸ To facilitate effective economic integration with its neighborhood and beyond, it must also shed its own inhibitions, which have excluded such options in the past and have led India to impose inflexible borders and boundaries on itself.¹⁹ An economically integrated Asia is contingent on the support of Russia, China, and India. Thus, even as India moves toward becoming a powerhouse within the Atlantic system, it will have

to nurture relationships such as the RIC (Russia, India, and China) forum. The RIC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) may become the primordial bodies that could lead to a political conceptualization of Asia, connected through roads, rail, seas, man, material, and ideas.²⁰ Lack of credible regional options (due to the irrationality abounding in its neighborhood) currently reduce the ability of emerging powers like Brazil, India, and China to bargain with the incumbents.²¹ Consequently, virtual neighborhoods, imagined proximity, and global coalitions have to be crafted as well. BRICS is certainly one of the more prominent twenty-first-century coalitions and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) is another. Lastly, an Indian twenty-first century can only form part of the narrative of an Asian twenty-first century. For the latter to happen, the RIC triangle must play a significant role and may be the defining mini-lateral grouping for the coming decades. Certainly for India, the forum is the biggest factor in its regional security agenda.²²

Secondly, India's growing influence and weight in global affairs, as well as its demands for a seat at the top table, means that it must now move from the global "opposition" to a global agenda setter.²³ The movement from being the head of the trade union to sitting in the boardroom can be complicated. On joining the established order, India may well have to tacitly accept a large portion of what were earlier viewed as "western" norms, standards, and rules. These were the same ideals (politically derived and defined) and processes that it struggled to change in the past. This balancing act will be tricky and will require India to broaden its base of engagement, so as to receive support for being part of the global community as a rule-maker. As countries enter powerful cliques in the international system, their embrace of equality and togetherness with their previous collaborators can fade, a case in point being China's resistance to permanent UNSC membership for India and Brazil.²⁴ Indian preferences when it enters the boardroom will also determine the ease of transition. As Kahler notes, if emerging powers do not diverge substantially from the normative status quo, the scope for conflict diminishes.²⁵

The last transition facing India is adopting value-based frameworks for its diplomatic engagements.²⁶ Historically, India has been accused of not espousing democracy as a core and desirable value in its international engagements. Of course this accusation seemed hypocritical as those who accused India of being soft on certain authoritarian regimes were also supporting and sustaining dictatorships, despots, monarchies, and fundamentalists around the world. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there was palpable Indian reluctance in owning an extremely attractive and powerful aspect of its national persona. This hesitation stemmed from its focus

on the importance of sovereignty in international affairs, a legacy of its colonial subjugation. Now, however, we are witnessing how normative principles are working in tandem with economic interests to shape a foreign policy seeking deeper engagement and integration.²⁷ Forums such as IBSA reflect this transition acutely. As a collective of democracies, IBSA is the face of India's transition to value-based diplomacy. Furthermore, through joint maritime exercises such as IBSAMAR, IBSA has allowed India to expand its military footprint and given it a basis for offering financial assistance to countries far beyond its previous economic and geographic reach.²⁸

SHAPING NEW NETWORKS AND PLATFORMS

These three Indian transitions and five global governance challenges in many ways define the agenda for the Observer Research Foundation. This is the political and economic environment that the ORF seeks to research, discuss, debate, influence, and shape. The ORF's role and mandate flows from this reality. The agenda has in many senses selected itself, and the order of the day is re-forming, rather than reforming, the international system and global governance. The ORF's efforts over the past few years have focused on creating forums where India can engage with the transition it must make and smoothen the road for that journey to take place. In a world where the issue of sovereignty and global engagement immediately leads to politicians turning to nationalist rhetoric, informal institutions and platforms may prove far more effective in delivering engagement without the overhanging aura of international imposition.²⁹ Given that developed countries have long held sway over informal networks that span the range of governments, NGOs, and the private sector, it is vital that emerging economies begin to create their own networks to push their agendas.

India's attempt to address this imperative is, perhaps, best exemplified by the Raisina Dialogue, the country's largest conference on geopolitics and geo-economics. In tandem with India's ever-expansive diplomatic outreach, ORF's Raisina Dialogue, held in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs, brings together major world leaders, notable academics, and captains of industry on a common platform in New Delhi every year. The third edition of the Dialogue, which will be held in January 2018, will see the participation of more than 400 international delegates and speakers from over 85 countries. Inaugurated by the Indian prime minister, the Dialogue offers the Indian leadership an opportunity to articulate the country's priorities, invite international views on common global challenges and in effect shape the global agenda.

A key ethic across all of ORF's research and knowledge platforms is the creation of space for young voices. Thus, complementing the Raisina Dialogue, ORF also hosts the Asian Forum on Global Governance (AFGG)—also known as the Raisina Young Fellows Programme. Now in its eighth year, the AFGG is an annual ten-day workshop hosted by the ORF, in collaboration with the ZEIT Stiftung, Hamburg. With the central thematic focus on global governance, each year the forum serves as an instructive and networking platform for young professional leaders—including politicians, diplomats, business leaders, journalists, civil society representatives, and scholars from around the world—to debate and discover ways to navigate the future. As this complex twenty-first-century landscape evolves, governance will arguably need to be recast and repackaged in creative ways to respond to changing circumstances. The forum brings together partners from both the global north and south, with over 1000 young leaders from 70 countries, removing the binaries that plague global debates and catalyzing an informal network among the leaders of tomorrow who can, among themselves, find ways to respond to the social, economic, and political challenges of the day and identify and propose new governance frameworks. The current Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee for External Affairs and the former United Nations Under Secretary General for Communications and Public Information, Shashi Tharoor, is the Founding Dean and Honorary Patron of the forum.

Additionally, ORF has sought to engage with themes and frontiers that will become relevant to emerging powers as they enter the decision-making systems of the international order. To be able to deliver the platforms and policy analysis that will shape Indian positions on such subjects, it is imperative that ORF develops its own capabilities and capacities in this regard. One of the themes that is likely to define the twenty-first-century debates is cyber security. Globalization and the spread of the internet have created new challenges in the management of the global commons. Issues of control and sovereignty are as much a concern in the virtual world as they are in the real one. National borders no longer confine the personal and infrastructure dependencies that are a hallmark of the information age.³⁰ The creation of a virtual domain has also given opportunities for radicals, terrorist organizations, and national opposition groups to create threats in a new environment, threats which can potentially disrupt communication, economic transactions, electrical grids, and flow of information, as well as provide access to sensitive data and manipulation of information for political or military purposes.

In 2013, ORF convened the first edition of CyFy, South Asia's biggest internet policy conference. Last year, the conference hosted over 55 speakers from 12 countries, with 350 attendees discussing issues around internet governance, security, surveillance, freedom of expression, norms of state behavior, and the specific challenges that emerging and developing countries need to address in the design and deployment of these technologies. The conference attracted speakers and participants from the government, business, academic, and civil society communities of over 16 countries, including Ravi Shankar Prasad, India's Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Arvind Gupta, India's Deputy National Security Advisor, Sajid Javid, the United Kingdom's Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, and Uri Rosenthal, former Foreign Minister, Kingdom of the Netherlands.

In a similar vein, the governance of water bodies and the maritime domain is another new space for rule making that must be traversed in the twenty-first century. The Indian Ocean region is currently marked by four T's—turbulence, turmoil, tension, and transition.³¹ The growing power of India and China and the shift in US strategies in the region have all led to new policy questions and debates on how a new regional security architecture will take shape. With the support of the Ministry of External Affairs, the ORF convenes the Indian Ocean Dialogue annually with participants from the Indian Ocean countries and beyond. The conference brings into focus questions on maritime security, sovereignty, protection of sea-based infrastructure, and regional naval tensions that have the potential to destabilize the region. Through the creation of the Indian Ocean Dialogue, the ORF is supporting Indian initiatives to forge partnerships with its regional partners and to enable the empowerment of regional stakeholders in managing their backyard without the involvement of established powers.

At the same time, the ORF's engagement with its partners in the global north continues apace. The Economic Policy Forum—an Emerging Economies Think Tank Alliance for High Quality Growth (EPF) of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the German agency for international cooperation, was created to strengthen the capacities of think tanks from emerging and industrial economies to better shape policy-making processes and improve the quality of economic growth. EPF outputs are intended to shape governmental policy-making processes and to feed proposals into conferences such as the Munich Security Conference and COP 21. Through its extensive participation in the EPF, ORF is creating common ground for India with its

Western partners on issues such as climate change, sustainability, and regional integration.

Last but not least, ORF's outreach has also involved facilitating media exchanges. Given that media reporting in this information age shapes opinions, discourses, and debates, it is vital for emerging powers to understand the viewpoints from each other's perspective. ORF organizes an India-China Media Exchange, in collaboration with the Global Times Foundation, Beijing. It features interactions between Indian and Chinese journalists, examining the relationship between the two countries and the policy issues that come in the way of reportage, creating avenues to understand the world the way others see it, and thereby enhancing one's own viewpoint.

CONCLUSION

Initially conceived as an inward-looking domestic policy-shaping organization, 25 years on, the ORF is now shaping global debates for India and contributing to the networks of emerging powers that are increasingly influential in global governance. At the same time, it has not ignored its national mandate in the areas of health, economy, and education. The ORF's transition has stemmed from the political reality of its time, which calls for a simultaneous confrontation of integration and divergence, of value-based frameworks and realist imperatives, and of collective representation and individual exceptionalism. The ORF works to create platforms and forums for India to find common ground with its partners, thereby enabling the management of common interests in an uncommon world.

India's foreign policy has evolved from one of universalism to multilateralism and now to mini-multilateralism, where it has shaped—and become a member of—a number of small groupings, looking to find convergence with nations on issues such as economic prosperity for its citizens, regional security, and global governance. Multilateralism has taken on new meaning, with the aggregation of rationale (BRICS) now superseding the aggregation of ideologies (Non-Aligned Movement). Small multilateral clubs such as BRICS, RIC, IBSA, and the like constitute what has been called “Plurilateralism.”³² Unlike large multilateralism, engagement with such forums does not pre-condition stances members must take. Members can disagree with other members on substantive issues without fear of recrimination, a key benefit for emerging powers keen to hold on to their sovereignty even as they engage in collectives.³³

India's transition from challenging global norms to framing them is a tricky one. It must manage the expectations of its former partners while at the same time accepting compromises in order to reaffirm its positions of power. In order to truly transition to the top table of policy making, official processes are not enough for India. It needs to make its presence felt through informal forums, platforms, and debates. India needs to find ways to accept certain parts of the status quo while at the same time changing other parts of it. As has been noted elsewhere, the intellectual and institutional infrastructure required to deliver India's embrace and incumbency in global governance is often found to be wanting.³⁴ Expertise and technical knowledge outside the government needs to be leveraged, and ORF's role has been to facilitate that through building relationships and networks among its many stakeholders.

ORF is supporting India in developing capacity to engage with new mediums, like the Raisina Dialogue, and new domains, such as cyber security through ORF's annual CyFy conference—as discussed earlier—and outer space through ORF's Kalpana Chawla initiative, which was launched in March 2015 and seeks to bring together all key stakeholders from the scientific, commercial, and strategic domains of outer space every year to engage on issues pertaining to security, management, and peaceful use of outer space. Simultaneously, ORF is contributing to India's global governance challenges and push for plurilateralism. ORF is the official Track 2.0 coordinator for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the BRICS forum, a think tank forum of member countries that meets prior to governmental meetings and sets the agenda for discussions among member states.

Through such initiatives, ORF has been leading the charge for a new India in the twenty-first century while retaining the values and ideologies that have taken it this far in the first place. There are many challenges that remain for countries such as India to overcome before they can successfully break through the glass ceiling of the international system. Even though the share of global GDP of the north has fallen from 80 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 2012, global rule setting and power sharing has not reflected that transition sufficiently. In the coming years, India must attempt to overcome domestic pressures on its foreign policy initiatives, build capacity both within and outside the government to respond to complex governance challenges, and, lastly, understand its own identity, which can range from leading developing countries in issues such as climate change and trade to being a serious player in forums such as the

G20.³⁵ Leading the international system can bring its own set of challenges, and accepting the status quo upon entry into the boardroom of global policy formulation is mostly different from free riding on existing international collaboration—which can pose risks for global governance—on issues such as climate change, for example, which require rapid and significant shifts in international efforts.³⁶

The ORF's task is to reimagine Indian engagement with global institutions and partners while delivering the research and platforms that contribute to re-forming global governance as per the emerging power narrative. Indian plurilateralism is a policy tool that will not only clear the way for India to assume its position at the global high table along with its emerging nation partners but also allow India to effect some of its much-needed transitions, thereby enabling it to contribute to solving global governance challenges.

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China and G20: From a Think Tank Case Perspective

Wen Wang

Abstract The G20 has become the most important global governance institution. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, leaders from 20 major economies around the world met in Washington, DC to discuss how to deal with the crisis. Through coordinated cooperation, the G20 not only contributed to solving this crisis but also developed into a maturing institution in global economic and financial governance. In the annual G20 Summit, leaders from developed and developing countries can freely exchange their ideas regarding the most critical issues in global economy. The G20 plays an increasingly significant role in building a platform for coordinating different countries' economic policy so that the global goal of economic growth can be realized.

Keywords G20 • China • Economic stimulation plan • Infrastructure investment • International financial reform • Chinese think tanks • Renmin University of China (RDCY)

The G20 has become the most important global governance institution. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, leaders from 20 major economies

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around the world met in Washington, DC to discuss how to deal with the crisis. Through coordinated cooperation, the G20 not only contributed to solving this crisis but also developed into a maturing institution in global economic and financial governance. In the annual G20 Summit, leaders from developed and developing countries can freely exchange their ideas regarding the most critical issues in global economy. The G20 plays an increasingly significant role in building a platform for coordinating different countries' economic policy so that the global goal of economic growth can be realized.

In recent years, China—as the biggest developing country and a powerful emerging economy—has started to play a leading role in the G20. That China hosted the 2016 G20 Summit suggests the country's increased ambition and capability in constructing international institutions. Although China has made great efforts in promoting G20 in many respects, it will take even more significant participatory and leadership roles in the future. Chinese think tanks support the country's ability to perform more actively than before in the G20. As their work on G20 studies and global governance proves to be valuable for China, Chinese think tanks' importance may be increasingly noticeable.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first two parts focus on showing the overall picture of what China has contributed to the G20 and what Chinese think tanks have done in that process. The final part examines the current situation of Chinese think tanks. China has tried to reshape, or at least affect, the world order. The importance of the G20 is becoming obvious to China, and China will even hold the 2016 G20 Summit. It needs think tanks to provide the firm the support necessary to achieve success. New Chinese think tanks, such as the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (RDCY), have been doing this type of work. Chinese think tanks will make a difference at the 2016 G20 Summit, regardless of the conference preparation or the results the Summit generates. Chinese think tanks face high expectations, but the opportunities and challenges these organizations face—including their relationship with the government and their limited professionalization and internationalization—also require examination.

CHINA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE G20

Since 2008, China has been taking part in the G20's work in many fields, such as international financial institution reform, financial supervision, and development agenda. China's contribution to the G20 can be encapsulated in three aspects.

Firstly, China has taken many effective actions—including adjusting its policies at home and abroad—to promote the recovery of global economy, which was the most important goal for G20 at its beginning. According to Jin et al. (2014), after the global financial crisis, the Chinese government took various measures to rapidly deal with the situation. It developed an economic stimulation plan with other G20 members. The global large-scale economic stimulation plan, which would provide 1.1 trillion dollars in total, was announced during the G20 London Summit. At the same time, China also added 50 billion dollars to the IMF in order to promote world economic recovery and international financial stability. China's strong support helped the world economy step gradually out of the mire. As the second largest economy in the world, China's stable and continuous economic growth helps keep the global economy healthy and balanced.

China's contribution to the global economy reflects on infrastructure as well. Because infrastructure investment is important in bringing development and economic growth to most countries, China has taken substantial actions to solve global infrastructure investment problems and has promoted the G20's agenda on this issue. Moreover, China combined its national strategy with the global need for infrastructure investment. China, along with the other BRICS countries, advocated for the establishment of the New Development Bank, an institution with 100 billion dollars of authorized capital. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which China initiated, focuses on infrastructure and is dedicated to building a new institution to prioritize investment in infrastructure. Despite the controversy surrounding its establishment, AIIB can still contribute to the global economy, especially for developing countries.

Likewise, China has adjusted its policies to better meet the G20's common goals. A very credible example is that China has made more practical commitments in dealing with climate change and increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption. During the 2014 G20 Summit, China and the United States released the Sino-US Joint Statement on Climate Change, which claimed that China planned to make its carbon dioxide emissions peak around 2030 and increase the non-fossil fuel to account for 20 percent of its total energy consumption. As China continues to develop at medium to high speed, it demonstrates its commitment to balancing that economic development with ecological responsibility.

Secondly, as a critical power in making the G20 work effectively and efficiently, China seeks to reform international financial institutions.

China's persistence in reshaping global financial governance and addressing inequality has gained support and recognition from many emerging economies and developing countries. Importantly, China seeks to reform the IMF, whose quota and governance system date back to World War II. Li (2015) suggests that after several decades, initially weaker members have surpassed other countries in economic significance. Faced with this new situation, the United States refused to ratify the necessary reforms because of its domestic politics. China, however, steadfastly promotes the IMF reform. Due to the fundamental change of powers in the global economy since the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, China and other emerging economies have realized the importance of increasing their quota in the IMF. Their persistence has unfailingly made IMF reform the hot topic of G20 Summits, especially on the eve of the 2009 London Summit when China started the discussion about reforming international monetary system (Jin et al. 2014). In addition, the establishment of the NDB and the AIIB—institutions whose creation China advocated—has demonstrated that the new regime can provide new solutions for the current dilemma. Throughout recent history, China has accumulated valuable experience in using the G20 to accelerate the reformation of international financial institutions.

Thirdly, China has attempted to provide creative and practical ideas to the G20. Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of People's Bank of China, developed the concept of "super-sovereign currency," which was a highlighted idea during the G20 London Summit. Super-sovereign currency offered a brand-new landscape for the international monetary system. It aimed at breaking the barriers solidified by nation-states' sovereigns and at creating a new kind of world currency as an instrument of international reserve and trade settlement. This world currency could disconnect itself from sovereigns' control and stabilize the currency value. Governor Zhou also proposed concrete and detailed suggestions for the creation of this currency and its corresponding system. Despite criticism that Governor Zhou's plan was overly idealistic, his ideas still demonstrated China's commitment to providing innovative solutions to global problems. Zhou indicated China's aspiration not only to participate in G20 Summits but to provide input on global governance.

It can be predicted that the G20 may get a wave of Chinese wisdom in the next few years and beyond because China hosted the G20 Summit in 2016. There could be more chances to hear various voices from China. The 2016 Summit likely foreshadows both increased opportunities for

Chinese thinkers to contribute to discussions of global governance and, consequently, an influx of Chinese wisdom at the G20 Summits of the foreseeable future.

WHAT DID CHINESE THINK TANKS DO? THE CASE OF RDCY

Chinese think tanks cannot be ignored when reviewing the short history of China's involvement in the G20. Many prominent Chinese think tanks research the G20. Moreover, newer Chinese think tanks have begun to play an irreplaceable role in the process through which China deepens its relationship with the G20. In particular, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (RDCY) embodies this new type of Chinese think tank that has focused on G20 studies almost since its establishment. RDCY's work on G20 studies and its efforts to affect Chinese government's decisions on the G20 demonstrate the influence that these new think tanks could have on Chinese policy.

RDCY has achieved impressive success in leading G20 studies and organizing G20-related conferences in China. Recently, Chinese authorities selected RDCY as the leading think tank for T20 2016 (Wang 2016). This success has three reasons: RDCY's strategic view on G20, its first-rate studies on the G20, and its construction of the G20 countries' think tank cooperation network. These three pillars guarantee the RDCY's unparalleled capacity to enlarge its influence in shaping China's policies on G20.

RDCY's strategic view on the G20 evidences itself throughout the think tank's history. The institute has taken the G20 as one of its most important research areas since its establishment in January 2013. At that time, G20 studies were less popular in China than they are today. However, the post-financial crisis international situation, combined with the Chinese domestic economy, led RDCY to realize that the G20, as an influential global governance institution, could be China's platform to involve itself in international affairs and reshape the world order. G20 could provide valuable opportunities for China to participate in making international rules and exerting its soft power. Consequently, the President of Renmin University of China Chen Yulu—who was then also the Dean of RDCY—first came up with the suggestion that China should hold the 2016 G20 Summit. Afterwards, RDCY organized the first G20 Think Tank Summit in August 2013 at Renmin University to explore the post-crisis global

governance system and to analyze the main challenges faced by all G20 countries. This conference passed the first global G20 think tank joint statement. In the next year, the second G20 Think Tank Summit in September 2014 enjoyed even greater success. RDCY invited Jimmy Carter, former President of the United States, to deliver the conference's keynote speech. The conference linked China and the G20 more closely, making China's voice clearer while letting the nation know what kind of G20 the world expected. Through RDCY's careful strategy, these projects enabled think tanks to build a good foundation for China to hold the G20.

RDCY has continued to keep researching the G20, producing relatively high-quality products. The farsighted institute has proposed significant suggestions on agenda setting and has developed a systemic early-stage preparation path for the G20. For example, RDCY has published its G20 biweekly for quite a long time. The biweekly collects and analyzes almost all of the newest reports about the G20 from global think tanks. Unlike most Chinese think tanks, the institute has already developed a fixed and experienced team to focus on G20 studies. G20 biweeklies such as RDCY's excellent products have been sent to different departments of Chinese government, providing direct assistance for decision-makers to know about the G20 and develop their official plans.

On April 2, 2015, RDCY published a special edition of its biweekly that collected G20 thematic proposals for the 2016 G20 Summit from 43 think tank experts from across the world. This publication received positive feedback after the launch event. Additionally, RDCY frequently organizes symposiums and seminars, inviting famous domestic scholars and related officials to attend. The activities offer many primary materials for the think tank to research. To sum up, RDCY's G20 studies never break away from practical research. RDCY relies on numerous methods to generate its own thought and analysis, the value of which could gradually become even more apparent.

Perhaps the most impressive work done by RDCY is its long-term work to construct G20 countries' think tank cooperation network. While creating a network is difficult, it is meaningful work for China to hold the G20 Summit. RDCY has played a leading role in connecting different scholars and officials from all G20 countries, especially from think tanks. RDCY is confident that a G20 think tank cooperation network can be established globally. What they have done shows that the institute is becoming competent to achieve that goal. RDCY has also successfully organized several large-scale conferences on the G20, the most significant

of which is the annual G20 Think Tank Summit mentioned above. The latest conference was at the end of July 2015. About 500 people, including representatives from top think tanks around the world and some important officials, attended the opening ceremony. With the attendance of officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the conference, China has been recognized officially. In particular, one of the advantages of the conference that cannot be omitted is that it has built a bridge between officials and academia, filling a gap in China's process of preparing the G20.

RDCY has paid much attention to maintaining good relationships with the G20 countries' leading think tanks. It has also laid an excellent foundation for this task by constructing its cooperation network. China has been a member of the G20's troika. Thus, RDCY maintained frequent communication with think tanks in Australia, Turkey, and even Germany (Wang and Yang 2017). For example, in November 2014, RDCY became the first Chinese think tank to organize the G20's official pre-summit in Australia. It drew attention from the government, the media, and the public, thereby widely enlarging its influences. The success of this conference also improved communication between Australia and China. While organizing the pre-summit, Australia provided much useful information to RDCY on G20 preparation and organization. Connections with top think tanks in the key countries are the hubs of the G20 cooperation network.

To sum up, RDCY is a very active new Chinese think tank. Its strategic view, solid research, and growing G20 studies cooperation network may affect China's important decisions on G20. As a typical example of a new Chinese think tank, RDCY could play a more outstanding role in China's G20 preparation process in the future.

CHINESE THINK TANKS' INTERNATIONALIZATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

The important role that Chinese think tanks played in 2016 G20 Summit-related affairs deserves global recognition. Likewise, all Chinese think tanks should advertise themselves and their accomplishments. When the Party's Eighteenth Conference Report suggested new think tanks with Chinese characteristics, that decision promoted the rapid development of Chinese think tanks. China's relatively free speech and its improved financial conditions have both promoted the prosperity of Chinese think tanks. Hence, it has become a popular saying that the best time for Chinese think tanks is coming. The *2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index* (2015),

published by the University of Pennsylvania, calculated that China already has 429 think tanks, meaning that it has more think tanks than any country other than the United States, which has 1830. It seems that Chinese think tanks still have much space to develop as the country continues to face different challenges for those think tanks to study.

However, although the opportunities are abundant, Chinese think tanks face at least three major problems. If these problems remain unsolved, they may prevent Chinese think tanks from developing further.

The first problem is that a good communication and collaboration system has not formed between think tanks and the government. On one side, the government does not take full advantage of think tanks' ability to tackle issues that the government considers unnecessary or cannot address, such as policy results and public diplomacy. On the other side, think tanks without communication from the government would be unaware of what the government really demands and thus would face difficulty in advising the government on policymaking. If the situation cannot be improved, Chinese think tanks may lose long-term motivation. After all, affecting the government's decision is the average think tank's final goal.

Second, Chinese think tanks have not yet reached a high level of professionalization. Real experts dedicated to research for think tanks are few in number, and most of the "think tank experts" remain in universities. Sometimes think tanks' products are too academic to best fit policymakers' needs. Because the differences between think tanks and pure research institutes remain unclear, increasing number of institutes call themselves "think tanks" without changing their research strategies. Moreover, think tanks' functions are always underestimated and limited to research only. Because the work of a professional think tank should include research, media communications, and even public relations, Chinese think tanks should clarify think tanks' roles and functions to accelerate the professionalization process. Meanwhile, the whole think tank industry in China is not yet institutionalized, meaning that these think tanks lack industrial standards or any evaluating systems. These factors form a major challenge.

In recent years—with China's increasing involvement in international affairs—a third weakness in Chinese think tanks has appeared: the low level of internationalization. Only a few think tanks include internationalization in their development strategy. Generally speaking, Chinese think tanks are passive participants at international conferences playing the role of observer rather than actively engaging in discussions and debates. Even if their representatives participate, they offer few valuable views to affect

the rest of the world. For example, on the “Climate Financial Day,” held on May 22, 2015, in the UNESCO headquarters, over 250 enterprises and 1300 representatives from different countries attended. However, only one Chinese think tank sent representatives to represent, meaning that there were few voices from China. The low level of internationalization in Chinese think tanks may cause the loss of many important opportunities and occasions to express China’s perspective. Therefore, Chinese think tanks should try to improve their ability to involve themselves in international affairs. If Chinese think tanks want to play a more critical role, they have quite a long way ahead.

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The Emerging Powers, Think Tanks, and the New Security and Economic Architecture

Güven Sak and Selim Koru

Abstract While policy research is often prescriptive in nature, policy dialogue in a divided society centers around conjunctive learning with the target group through conducting projects on the ground. The projects to be delineated in this paper have come about from the necessity of finding new mediums through which to communicate policy. This method is especially appropriate to the developing world because it encourages actors within divided societies to avoid taking strong ideological opinions. Instead, they can be as technical as possible, infusing policy messages where most effective.

Keywords Turkey • Economic development • TEPAV • “think-and-do tank” • Coordination failure • Technological advancement

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HOW MEDIUM BECOMES THE MESSAGE: THE CASE OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF TURKEY (TEPAV)

In early 2002, academics, businesspeople, and former government employees felt that there was a need for a think tank in Ankara. Turkey was slowly emerging from a decade of turbulent politics and the worst economic crisis in generations, and our group was thinking of ways to better manage these changes. In 2004, the discussions resulted in the creation of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). TEPAV's objective was to devise a policy research and dialogue mechanism focused on Turkey's political and economic transition. At the time, Turkish society was increasingly divided, politicizing every social and economic cleavage. It badly needed a common language, which is why the founders of TEPAV conceptualized the organization as a "think-and-do tank," meaning that it would focus not only on policy research but also on devising concrete projects to grapple with these challenges. While policy research is often prescriptive in nature, policy dialogue in a divided society centers around conjunctive learning with the target group through conducting projects on the ground. Hence, as the philosopher Marshall McLuhan said in his 1964 work, *Understanding the Media: The Extensions of Man*, "the medium is the message." Following this doctrine, the projects to be delineated in this paper have come about from the necessity of finding new mediums through which to communicate policy. This method is especially appropriate to the developing world because it encourages actors within divided societies to avoid taking strong ideological opinions. Instead, they can be as technical as possible, infusing policy messages where most effective.

TURKEY'S DEVELOPMENT STORY

Since the early nineteenth century, the Turkish state has been going through waves of modernization reforms. The Tanzimat reforms of 1839 (translated as the "reorganization") attempted to redefine the Ottoman state's relationship with its subjects as well as to create a modern economy. Under these changes, the state set out a new definition of Ottoman citizenship irrespective of ethnic and religious identity. In addition, the reforms established a central bank, a stock exchange, and a series of universities and scientific facilities required to sustain a modern economy. However, the Ottoman Empire continued to lag behind its European

counterparts, and, after a series of wars, the sovereignty collapsed at the end of World War I. From its ashes, the Republic of Turkey arose in 1923, and with it came a new wave of reforms. Instituting a civil code and establishing a modern economic planning process, Turkey's founding fathers distanced the nation from its imperial predecessor. In addition, Turkey created its first state-owned enterprises, while a fledgling industrial base began to take shape.

In 1950, the country transitioned into multi-party politics, taking on a democratic system of governance. During this pivotal transition, the newly elected government, controlled by the Democratic Party, joined NATO and accepted Marshall Fund aid. These globally centered moves contributed greatly to the mechanization of agriculture and the streamlining of financial institutions in Turkey. The transition to democracy was not entirely positive; however this change brought with it chronic current account deficits and boom-and-bust cycles that would hinder the country's ultimate growth.

By the 1970s, Turkey had become a "classic" developing country. Roughly 44 percent of its population lived in urban areas—a percentage comparable to Egypt at that time—and the country's economy relied on terrestrial exports: edible fruits, cotton, tobacco, and some textiles. To bolster exportation, the government sheltered infant industries and, as was the case with other developing countries, they enjoyed limited success. Turkey's political scene, though nominally democratic, was overshadowed by a military elite. In 1980, when attacks between the Cold War's left- and right-wingers spun out of control, the military took over the government. In response to the abysmal economic success of the previous government, the military appointed a young bureaucrat named Turgut Özal as its deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. In the following decade, Özal would use this opportunity to open Turkey to the forces of globalization.

Much like previous Turkish reformers, Özal did not moderate his efforts. He promoted the export economy by devaluing the Turkish lira, freeing prices, maintaining control over the money supply, and encouraging foreign investment. He also created institutions like the Secretariat of the Treasury, where a core group of technocrats could supervise market reforms. These policies led to the emergence of the "Anatolian Tigers," a new generation of conservative entrepreneurs in the fast-growing cities of Anatolia.

The global mindset of the 1980s foregrounded the Customs Union Agreement with the EU in 1995, in which Turkey reduced external tariffs

to EU levels and adopted its technical standards and regulations. Turkish firms began to integrate into European production networks, developing their logistical links and adopting new technologies and standards. By this point, the country was well on its way to becoming a regional trading power. However, being exposed to market forces also brought greater economic volatility. The 1990s saw ever tightening boom-and-bust cycles, culminating in the financial crisis of 2001.

Following financial collapse, the country elected the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which carefully implemented a macroeconomic stability package designed by the IMF. As a result, the country went through a period of unprecedented macroeconomic stability, with annual inflation stabilizing to an average of 12 percent. In addition, Turkey saw an average economic growth of 4.9 percent from 2002 to 2014 with the poverty rate dropping from 30 percent to 2 percent and the average income per capita rising over \$10,000. The country's economic advance was driven primarily by the move from a rural to an urban economy, the increase in trade volume, and the shift from low- to medium-tech production. Rising foreign direct investment flow, 80 percent of which coming from the EU countries, contributed to this transformation process.

Turkey's trade volume has increased significantly in the past decade, reaching \$400 billion in 2013. Between 2002 and 2014, Turkey's merchandise exports increased fivefold, from \$30 billion to \$150 billion. Turkey's membership in the European Union Customs Union (EUCU) as well as its participation in new free trade agreements (FTAs) laid the foundations needed for this expansion, given that nearly half of Turkey's overall exports went to these countries.

Since its economic decline, Turkey has improved its competitiveness, and its exports have become much more diverse compared to a decade ago. Specifically, the country has increased the share of medium-tech exports among its total exports. In 1980, when Özal took office, Turkey's top five export products were nuts, cotton, tobacco, yarn, and grapes. But by 2010, its top five exports were motor vehicles, mineral oil, steel and iron, large and small trucks, and apparel.

This trend has also changed Turkey's relationship with its neighbors to the south. In 1980, Turkish exports accounted for around \$3 billion, and only 10 percent was in industrial products. By the early 2000s, the figure had increased to \$30 billion with 90 percent being industrial products. Due to the economic conditions created by America's invasion, Iraq became one of Turkey's largest export markets—second only to Germany.

The turmoil in the region meant that the Turkish business community needed independent sources for research and analysis.

Challenges remain, however. There has not been a significant shift in the quality or technological sophistication of Turkey's exports, and the country still lacks a strong presence in global markets. The share of high-technology products in total exports dropped from 8 percent to 4 percent between 2000 and 2014. Likewise, Turkey's export sophistication is low compared to the top 20 economies in the world. Instead, Turkey owes much of its economic growth to rapid urbanization. What Germany and France accomplished in three generations, Turkey reached within a span of 30 years. Between 1980 and 2010, Turkey's urban population increased from about 43 percent to 80 percent. Economic development came almost automatically with this shift, since urbanization brought people from low-productivity rural jobs to thriving cities. Agriculture's share in total employment declined from about 51 percent to less 25 percent in the same period, with its stake in GDP also declining from about 24 percent to about ten percent. By 2010, Turkey's cities were thriving on a well-established urban workforce.

Urbanization has solidified Turkey's status as a centralized nation. The country's ethnic, religious, and tribal groups are now rubbing shoulders in urban centers like never before. Unlike previous periods, Turkey is able to connect by means of instant communication, easy travel, and a proliferation of global trends. This diverse social makeup stands in contrast to a highly central economic and governance structure. Almost 70 percent of Turkey's exports, for example, go out of the Marmara region, around Istanbul. The government is steered almost entirely from Ankara, with 85 percent of government employees working for the central government rather than local administration. This dynamic manifests itself in disillusionment with income inequality, tension between the secular and conservative establishments, and militant Kurdish separatism. Thus, such a setting is difficult for policymakers to navigate, since they need to coordinate between various groups of actors.

THE NEW POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Turkey's new policy environment is part of a global shift. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the multipolar world has left many countries, including Turkey, in the cold. In the past, policy choices were binary in nature. Once one chose a side, the policy framework was readily given.

Turkey had chosen the Capitalist West, represented by the Washington Consensus, and enacted the policy reforms prescribed by that school of thought. As the world started to become multipolar, choices diversified, and the policy community needed to start thinking for itself rather than following prescribed policies. But as late as 2001, authorities were still unaccustomed to meaningful interaction with non-governmental organizations. This was partly because Ankara had very few, if any, of such institutions conducting serious policy research and dialogue capacity outside of the government's in-house policy research departments, which are concentrated within the Treasury, Central Bank, and State Planning Organization. Hence, Turkey's ability to produce its own policy ideas was limited.

In 2004, TEPAV was founded in Ankara to help manage the complexity of this new environment. At the outset, it received an endowment from the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), the country's biggest umbrella business organization—an organization that links 360 chambers across the country and 1.4 million businesses, ranging from the smallest storeowners to multinational corporations. TEPAV used this extensive business network to identify Turkey's most salient policy problems and conceptualize ways to overcome them. Today, TEPAV is Turkey's largest economics “think-and-do tank,” with a project-based business model on topics ranging from regional development to foreign policy. While TOBB covered all of TEPAV's expenses in its early years, the organization now only provides 30 percent of TEPAV's revenue. Today, TEPAV has a wide range of clients and stakeholders who fund it through project and program financing. Its team of 70 full-time staff provide cutting-edge policy research solutions to multilaterals such as the World Bank and the UNDP, private companies like Google and Microsoft, and many regional governments, chief among them Turkey's various ministries. Throughout this development, TEPAV has maintained its organic link to TOBB, which gives it access to Turkey's economic and social grassroots as well as the chamber network around the region and the globe.

Much of what TEPAV does is overcoming coordination failure. The unique circumstances of the developing world in the past half-century have created an environment in which groups that would benefit from coordination are in separate social and economic clusters. In Turkey's case, this can manifest itself in the lack of coordination between government and private actors, or as a deficit in Turkish actors' interaction with those abroad, be they in business, government, or the NGO sector.

THREE AREAS OF ACTIVITY

We Break Down Political Conflicts into Their Practical Components When political actors get into conflicts, each side is typically weighed down by their obligations to the past. Turkey's geographical neighborhood is no exception to this trend. Many of the region's conflicts can be traced back to the large population movements in the first half of the twentieth century as well as the advent of nationalism. Struggles such as the division of Cyprus, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or the Israeli-Palestinian issue have decades of history that weighs down political leaders on all sides. The Turkish government, the largest successor state to the Ottoman Empire, is bound to defend political positions of its own. As a non-governmental institution, however, TEPAV has the liberty to reach across the divide on each conflict and initiate dialogue between the conflicting parties. It has been instrumental in setting up arbitration mechanisms in Israel-Palestine and in Cyprus. Likewise, it has extensively studied the economic and social relationship between Turkey and Armenia and has facilitated Turkey's contacts with European, Asian, and Middle Eastern stakeholders through various events and studies. TEPAV conducts these projects on its own, or it pairs up with governments and international organizations, as well as with TOBB. Below are some examples of these projects.

- **TOBB-BIS Free Industrial Zone in Jenin:** TEPAV has designed and promoted a free industrial zone in Jenin, the northern region of the West Bank. The project, jointly developed by TOBB-BIS Industrial Zones Management Company (a spin-off company founded in 2006 out of TEPAV's work) and the German Development Bank (KfW), covers an area of 230 acres and is expected to host around 100 companies. The zone is open to firms from a variety of industries, including food, construction materials, home textile, chemicals, and many others. With its quota and duty-free access to the US market, relative proximities to Haifa Port (40km) and the Jordanian border (30km), one-stop-shop services, and excellent infrastructure, JIFZ will host many of the region's top outward-oriented firms. By extension, JIFZ will grant Palestinians access to high-quality jobs, teaching them technological skills and providing access to export markets. Since 2010, TEPAV has played a critical role in structuring the project, bringing together key stakeholders

from Israel and Palestine into discussions and providing the content for technical issues and bilateral/trilateral negotiations related to the industrial zone.

- **Turkish-Armenian Startup Weekend:** In November of 2014, Turkish and Armenian youths gathered in Gyumri, Armenia to evaluate the startup proposals of their peers in competition. This EU-financed program hosted a Turkish delegation of 12 entrepreneurs, 12 investors, and a Silicon Valley-based investor. They met more than 30 entrepreneurs from Armenia selected by TEPAV's event partner, the Public Journalism Club, as well as Armenian and American investors, established entrepreneurs, and ICT experts. The project involved a roundtable discussion titled "Getting to Know Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Sector in Armenia and Turkey, and Exploring Collaboration Opportunities", visits to centers of excellence including Armenian National Engineering Laboratories, Microsoft Innovation Center, PixArt, and TUMO, and the Armenia-Turkey Startup Weekend.
- **The Nicosia Economic Forum:** The forum—backed by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO), Greek Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI), the Union of Hellenic Chambers (UHC), and TOBB—was devised to bring together the business communities on either side of the island, as well as Turkey and Greece, to create mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. The parties have so far agreed to set up an arbitration center to ease business transactions on the island. In addition, the groups have agreed to open an incubation center and to organize a Startup Weekend event within the buffer zone to support Cypriot entrepreneurs. By bringing together entrepreneurs affiliated with major universities from both sides of the island, these programs will act to strengthen ties among young people. Furthermore, the Nicosia Economic Forum actively deliberates over the creation for countermeasures to combat natural disasters, an issue which has united the island on several occasions. Forum meetings, which have so far gathered in Nicosia, Istanbul, and Athens, typically conclude with a joint statement reaffirming all sides' goodwill and willingness to see an end to the conflict.
- **The Constitution Platform:** Turkey's current constitution was drafted after a military coup in 1980, and there is political consensus about the unpopularity of the document. In 2011, a parliamentary

commission was established to draft a new constitution that would enhance individual liberties and elevate the country to a higher standard of democracy. This came at a time when the political climate in Turkey was heavily charged. At the time, TEPAV identified a need for extended political discussion to the grass roots level, believing that this alone could yield a lasting social contract. The result was Turkey's first experiment in deliberative democracy. TEPAV held constitutional conventions across the country, compiling detailed data on the public opinion on constitutional matters, such as the freedom of speech, the branches of the government, and the role of the judiciary. TEPAV researchers confronted tough issues, such as the sensibilities of the Kurdish minority, the role of Islam in government, and the place of women in society.

The project was conducted in close cooperation with the Parliamentary Commission for the Constitution. The completed reports, as well as the data comprised by the Constitution Platform, culminated into one of the main sources used by the Parliamentary Commission. Unfortunately, the constitutional process was derailed by political circumstances in the country. It was hard work to set up an environment that was politically neutral and that could coordinate between the majority and periphery of society. However, the lessons learned from the Constitution Platform remain for future projects and for when a new constitution is again politically viable. Though the attempt to forge a new constitution failed, the experience proved that the initiative was possible, and greatly rewarding.

We Help to Design Policy Frameworks and Dialogue Mechanisms for Technological Advancement in Turkey In the 1980s, Turkey shifted its economic policy from import substitution to export promotion, transforming the agrarian-dominated economy into an industrialized one. However, an industrial economy is no longer enough to thrive. Today, technology and innovation are the key driving forces behind economic growth, and, therefore, the world has been undergoing a global technological transformation. In the current economic climate, the hallmark of high-performing economies is their ability to create and harness the power of cutting-edge technology for economic growth. This has been a pervasive trend in industry, services, and agriculture. The transformation stems mainly from three new cross-cutting technology platforms: biotechnology,

nanotechnology, and information and communications technology. These new technology platforms enhance productivity in different sectors and provide solutions for the challenges created by global demographic and sustainability problems. All three technology platforms have the capacity to alter production processes and global value chains while simultaneously raising productivity levels in different sectors.

Currently, many developing countries are striving to upgrade their technological capacity to enhance their productivity and growth. Turkey has recently made a transition from a low to a medium technology structure in its manufacturing industry. However, the share of high technology in Turkish exports is still very low. Turkey needs a new sustainable growth strategy based on technology platforms to achieve this developmental impact. Bio-based solutions to global challenges in human health, food security, sustainable industrial production, and environmental protection provide an opportunity for biotechnology as a key development engine for Turkey.

Though biotechnology is used in many sectors, it is pharmaceuticals that are diffused most rapidly worldwide. For this reason, as well as the fact that it constitutes an important part of public procurement in Turkey, it would be beneficial to use the pharmaceutical sector as an accelerator for biotechnology transfer and diffusion in Turkey and for the design of mechanisms addressing them. The ability to increase R&D in the pharmaceutical sector, which is the sector allocating the highest amount of resources for such research worldwide, is important for sustainable economic growth along with the spillover effects.

In this context, TEPAV's studies and projects focus on providing a comprehensive knowledge set regarding the technology policy design process in Turkey. In addition, TEPAV fills a major gap in the ecosystem by serving as a cooperation platform for the development of a common language and a collaborative mindset between the government and private stakeholders in reference to these new technologies. Below are some examples of these efforts.

- **Pharmaceuticals R&D and Manufacturing Ecosystems Roadmap Design:** The pharmaceuticals industry has the potential to greatly accelerate Turkey's ascent as a high-income economy. The Pharmaceuticals R&D and Manufacturing Ecosystems Roadmap Design engineered the dynamo that could power that movement.

The program began by conducting a value chain analysis of the production and export of pharmaceuticals in various parts of the world. TEPAV then created a taxonomy of various countries and listed the most important aspects of the patterns observed. These lessons were then applied to the situation in Turkey in order to identify the missing links in the Turkish pharmaceuticals value chain. In cooperation with relevant actors in the pharmaceuticals industry, TEPAV set out a roadmap for the development of this industry and continues to track its progress.

- **Public-Private Collaboration Model Design:** The business environment plays a prevalent role in investment decisions, particularly related to high-tech manufacturing activities. Consequently, a healthy dialogue between public and private sectors forms the basis for maintaining industrial transformation. To establish this dialogue, TEPAV, as an objective facilitator, organized meetings with the participation of representatives from several governmental agencies—such as the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Science Industry and Technology, and SSI (SGK)—and from leading pharmaceutical companies. This allowed both sides to develop better understanding of each other’s needs and made meaningful headway in the construction of a common language for policy dialogue.
- **Pharmaceutical FDI and Investment Environment—The Case of the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry:** Attracting investments into the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries is one of the key ways to develop Turkey’s technological sophistication. This study identified the components of ecosystems that attract FDI in the global pharmaceutical industry, analyzed the Turkish FDI environment, and gave an estimation of its FDI loss and multiplier effects. By doing this, the study raised awareness of Turkey’s need to improve its investment, regulatory, pricing, and reimbursement environments, which are essential in attracting FDI. The project also sought to better tap into Turkey’s potential in terms of location and market size.
- **TOBB BIO (TOBB Biotechnology Sectoral Assembly):** Biotechnology is an accelerating tool for upgrading to a high-value producing industry. The sector association of biotechnology industry, TOBB BIO, was established in 2014 in response to the need for industrial transformation. It brings together biotechnology-based

companies from various sectors to develop a common language and strengthen their interaction. By doing this, the biotechnology companies can also communicate more effectively with the public sector and can develop new business models and mechanisms based on these interactions. TOBB BIO is also a platform where biotechnology firms and startups meet. This fosters the entrepreneurial ecosystem and grows the sector as a whole.

We Connect the Local to the Global TEPAV has spent most of its first decade working closely with local institutions, designing district-level development programs and aiding authorities in planning cities. TEPAV is now using these experiences to represent local concerns on the global level, which has gone through a transformation parallel to that of Turkey—a transformation that includes rapid urbanization and industrialization, shrinking poverty, and widening income inequality. TEPAV contributes to the global discussion in forums or through the design of projects in its immediate neighborhood that enhance economic and political cooperation.

- **Contributions to the Turkish G20 Presidency:** The G20 is the world’s premier forum for global governance, addressing issues such as global economic growth, financial regulations, reform of international institutions, and the global development agenda. Every year, it brings together the leaders of 19 “systemically important countries,” plus the EU. In 2015, Turkey acquired the G20’s rotating Presidency. As one of the first developing countries to be given this opportunity, Turkey has widened the G20’s development agenda under its theme of three “I’s,” which call for “Inclusiveness, Investment, and Implementation.” The G20 also has what are called “outreach groups” that allow for non-governmental groups to participate in the policy-making process. The first such group was the Business20, which brought business leaders into the policy-making process. This has since been followed by the Think20 (T20) for think tanks, Civil20 (C20) for civil society groups, Labor20 (L20) for labor organizations, Y20 for youth, and the recently established Women20 (W20) for women. TEPAV was appointed to lead the T20 in 2015; it also coordinated the B20’s content development activities in 2015.

- **TEPAV's four guiding principles during its tenure as the 2015 T20 Lead.** The first is that the T20 has a fundamentally different purpose to the other engagement groups in that it is not an advocacy platform—it does not campaign on behalf of a specific social group with a defined set of priorities. The T20 serves as an “ideas bank” for G20 governments, bringing innovation to the G20 agenda. In this role, the T20 develops new policies, ideas, initiatives, and projects to support the agendas of G20 policymakers and other official G20 engagement groups. In 2015, building on the idea that think tanks and academia are less likely to be constrained by political considerations—freer to think “outside of the box”—T20 Turkey introduced discussion around technological transformation and innovation, as well as on the Internet, into the G20 agenda. This also coincided with the government’s initiative to incorporate the Innovation 20—an unofficial effort that began during Australia’s 2014 G20 presidency—into the T20 framework. The T20’s efforts bore fruit: the word “Internet” was for the first time adopted in a Leaders Communiqué, and the T20 successfully highlighted the development of clean energy technologies with a new emphasis on the critical importance of research and development in this area.

The second principle was to place inclusiveness at the heart of the T20 process in 2015. T20 Turkey sought to significantly expand participation in the T20 regarding the number and geographic span of events organized as well as the breadth of participation. This has involved bringing together a much broader collection of global think tanks, academics, and experts in 2015—including a substantial number of representatives who have no prior experience in the G20—to provide analytical depth to ongoing policy discussions. TEPAV organized T20 workshops in Turkey and collaborated with international partners in hosting thematic and regional seminars. An unprecedented total of 17 different activities were held in locations across the globe, including participants from 22 countries and 146 institutions.

The third principle was T20 Turkey’s establishment of inclusive policy platforms. TEPAV launched a website to ensure closer cooperation among network partners, acting as its major platform of public dissemination. Furthermore, TEPAV invited T20 partners to prepare publications including joint T20 papers on policy issues as

well as blog posts for the T20 Turkey website. The process produced 26 papers and maintained a lively discussion via blog posts.

The final principle was that T20 Turkey ensured its research effectively reached G20 policymakers. T20 Turkey maintained a close working relationship with the G20 Sherpa office at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Turkish Treasury, and the G20 Employment Working Group. T20 Turkey also supported the work of other engagement groups, notably establishing a dialogue and close working relationship between the T20 and B20 in 2015 while also supporting work from the C20, Y20, and W20. A National Advisory Council represented the major think tanks and G20-related academics in Turkey, created public awareness about G20 issues and collected inputs from Turkish scholars. As Turkey hands the baton off to the Chinese presidency in 2016, the T20 will have become a stronger international policy platform, representative of the world's increasingly multipolar makeup.

- **Strengthening Economic Cooperation Between South East Europe and Turkey (SEETRA):** This project, prepared in cooperation with the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), identifies the complementarities between the Turkish private sector and the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia). It focuses primarily on analyzing business-to-business (B2B) trade and investment relations, with the aim of strengthening the region's economic ties to meet its ambitious South East Europe (SEE) 2020 targets. These goals, which the region's governments pledged to pursue, reflect their aspirations to improve socioeconomic prosperity and facilitate eventual integration with the European Union. TEPAV's work complemented the SEE economies' transformation agenda by inserting Turkey into the picture. The SEETRA project pursues avenues where win-win mechanisms may be established between the private sectors, entrepreneurship ecosystems, civil societies, and governments of the Western Balkans countries and Turkey. As such, the SEETRA report is the first step toward the formulation of a symbiotic and complementary transformation agenda in these seven economies' attempt to reach high income levels. The methodology of the report was uniquely designed to overcome the coordination deficit between Turkey and the Western Balkans. In addition, through desk research, TEPAV staff conducted more than 100 in-depth interviews with

business and government actors in all of the countries concerned. In particular, they conducted a comprehensive economic diagnosis of the Western Balkan countries, identified overarching patterns and bottlenecks, and carved out actionable business ideas. The final report was fed directly into the policymakers heading the SEE2020 process.

In addition to the work in the Balkans, TEPAV has completed similar studies focusing on economic synergies between Turkey and Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Malaysia, and Armenia.

CONCLUSIONS: THE LESSONS OF TEPAV

To define TEPAV, it is important to identify what it is not. TEPAV does not follow the common think tank structure that developed in Washington, DC during the 1990s. Under the American model, the think tank commissions senior government officials and academics—often from the foreign policy establishment—to address world affairs, functioning as a storefront in the marketplace of ideas. There is nothing inherently wrong with that model, but such a system cannot suit Turkey's needs. Through TEPAV, Turkey found that its rapidly transforming environment needed an institution that could serve as an interface to the wider world.

In the last few decades, public policy discussions have become incredibly complex. Yet, with the improvements made to communication technology, interactive commentary regarding policy is easier than ever before. The developing world has more virtual and physical “talking shops” from which it can access discussions on topics ranging from battery technology to the growing threat of ISIS. In this new environment, think tanks are no longer transistors of knowledge but rather places where global knowledge is absorbed, configured to the specifications of a country, and presented in a format that can be used by both private and public actors. TEPAV accomplishes this by adhering to three core principles.

First, TEPAV amasses technical expertise. While traditional think tanks rely heavily on academics from the social sciences, TEPAV makes heavy use of experts in the private sector and the government. For instance, TEPAV's work on biotechnology did not use a team solely consisting of economists but instead conducted the work with the aid of scientists and businesspeople from the pharmaceutical industry. TEPAV has brought in experts on technological fields such as geospatial surveying, cyber security, and online retail not only to produce cutting-edge research but also to

gain access into communities of highly technical policy areas. The need for expertise extends to the humanities as well. On political matters, TEPAV has worked with historians of the late Ottoman Empire's population movements and experts on Islamic scripture, as well as senior scholars on Turkey's Aveli, Kurdish, and other minorities.

Second, TEPAV adheres to the dictum that "the medium is the message." Traditionally, think tanks published white papers and produced op-ed columns, which can be effective in stimulating public policy discussions. In today's hyper-saturated environment, however, this can get lost in the cacophony of voices or seem pedantic. Rather than trying to sway opinions in this way, TEPAV catalyzes thought by bringing together various actors. In organizing the Nicosia Economic Forum, for instance, TEPAV did not prescribe areas of cooperation but created an environment in which the business communities represented could identify their own problems. This tactic has yielded authentic solutions and valuable data for TEPAV on the conditions in Cyprus. The Constitutional Platform is another project in which TEPAV did not prescribe its own opinions but went into the field to sample the ideas of the people. Here, the "think tank" no longer limits itself to an elite group of thinkers but also cultivates an interactive channel to the thoughts of others, be they policymakers, businesspeople, or the common individual.

Third, TEPAV bridges the three jurisdictional levels of society: the local, the national, and the global. Globalization has pushed countries like Turkey to overly centralize their policy-making process, and one way of unlocking growth potential lies in overcoming this gap. TEPAV does this by carrying the local to the national through programs such as regional development projects and the Constitution Platform. It coordinates national issues with each other through projects like SEETRA or the Nicosia Economic Forum. But the benefits are perhaps the greatest when elevating local issues, such as addressing women's unemployment in global forums such as the T20. TEPAV started out by operating on the local level and, by default, carries that experience over to international forums. TEPAV's legacy ensures that its contributions to global discussions are authentic answers to real questions on the ground.

In the years ahead, Turkey, as well as other developing countries, will go through increasingly complex transformative processes. In this environment, TEPAV will continue to develop its unique model to fit into national and regional public policy needs.

PART III

Think Tank Presidents' Statements



Think Tank Presidents' Statements

James G. McGann

Abstract These statements express a variety of voices and comment on the multi-polarity of the contemporary world—affirming the need for a range of perspectives to inform global governance. The contributing think tanks differ in scale, focus, and home country—all of which enable them to evaluate the T20 and other policy networks with criteria ranging from economic concerns to issues of international security. Similarly, these think tanks differ in their levels of involvement within T20. Some—including TEPAV, IWEP-CASS, and the German Development Institute—have helped coordinate T20 activities. Others have joined the T20 only relatively recently. This range of perspective offers insights both from those enmeshed in T20 activities and from those able to judge the organization from a more observational standpoint.

Keywords T20 • Influential power policy networks • G20 • Economic concerns • International security • Think tank participation

As the influence of emerging power policy networks—and the think tanks that strengthen and support them—grow in both importance and geographical reach, they become increasingly embedded in global affairs.

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To understand these networks, then, requires a range of perspectives. Thus, the following portion of this book provides the collected thoughts of the presidents of 18 top think tanks worldwide. These presidents composed their statements by considering a number of issues, including the most influential emerging power policy networks in the world, the role and effectiveness of the T20, and the relationships the T20 has with the G20, with think tanks in general, and with the presidents' own think tanks.

These questions have generated noteworthy points of agreement among the participating think tanks. For example, many of the following statements rank BRICS among—and perhaps chief among—the most influential emerging power policy networks. More substantively, many presidents agree that these international networks are poised to address the economic, environmental, and cultural concerns of an increasingly globalized world—as well as the recent rejections of that globalization. Networks that unite emerging powers play a key role in the governance of an interconnected world, as they give voice to nations once excluded from international politics.

Likewise, the presidents' evaluations of the T20 think tank network tend toward cautious optimism. Presidents often express their faith in the T20's positive influence on the G20. At the same time, they recognize that the T20's involvement in the G20 depends largely on the preferences, standards, and regulations of the current G20 president. As a result, many of these statements suggest that the T20 could be more effective if the G20 developed formal guidelines to solidify the T20's role, purpose, and influence.

These statements express a variety of voices and comment on the multipolarity of the contemporary world—affirming the need for a range of perspectives to inform global governance. The contributing think tanks differ in scale, focus, and home country—all of which enable them to evaluate the T20 and other policy networks with criteria ranging from economic concerns to issues of international security. Similarly, these think tanks differ in their levels of involvement within T20. Some—including TEPAV, IWEP-CASS, and the German Development Institute—have helped coordinate T20 activities. Others have joined the T20 only relatively recently. This range of perspective offers insights both from those enmeshed in T20 activities and from those able to judge the organization from a more observational standpoint.

Taken together, these presidents' statements indicate a change in the world order and provide a clear sense of how think tanks should participate—and be allowed to participate—in this changing political landscape. Through mentioning both the commonalities and differences in perspective, these statements provide a holistic understanding of a global set of issues, trends, and organizations.

Name: The Brookings Institution
Location: Washington, DC, United States
Website: <https://www.brookings.edu/>
Date of Establishment: 1916
President: Strobe Talbott

Over the past decade, a set of power networks has emerged to facilitate global cooperation on pressing challenges—often complex, interrelated, and urgent—facing the international community. These include climate change, migration, trade policy, and international order, among countless others.

In addressing these challenges, multilateralism plays an important role. Often, it works best in tandem with what Moises Naim, former editor of *Foreign Policy*, dubbed “minilateralism”—the process of reaching agreement among the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. Emerging power networks can be a critical part of this process.

There are two sets of effective emerging power networks—ones that exist among states and ones that connect states to other global actors. In the first category, the most important networks include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, and India). In the second category, the most important networks include the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. This is especially the case in a political moment in which trade and economic development are squarely on the global agenda.

Membership in the T20 provides an important framework for experts to transmit recommendations based on their research to policymakers focused on problems best solved through global cooperation. Critically, there is no defined T20 membership; the forum is a structured way of engaging with a set of think tanks, which varies depending on the G20 host. This ensures that collaboration is deep and broad.

Brookings was instrumental to the creation of the T20. The institution started bringing together think tanks in an informal way, producing volumes that reflected views from each G20 country in advance of the summits. We called these think tank 20 publications. At the Mexico Summit in 2012, the government formalized a T20 process for the first

time, drawing in no small part on the network of think tanks we had assembled. Brookings was, of course, proud to participate. Since then, every G20 host has had a T20 process.

Brookings largely communicates with other organizations around specific projects. Hence, communication with T20 members usually concerns T20 business. This year's summit involved around 950 participants and included a number of working groups in which Brookings was active. The process of convening and organizing task forces brought together many actors who would not normally have interacted.

Whether the T20 has a strong and productive working relationship with the G20 varies depending on the host country and the host think tank identified as the organizer for that year's summit. In the case of Germany, the T20 had an excellent working relationship with the G20, evidenced by participation of the German sherpa and other officials at T20 events, a formalized process for conveying recommendations from the T20 to the G20, and a substantive effort to establish a new T20 Standing Group on Africa.

Brookings has agreed to be part of this group. The new Director of the Institution's Africa Growth Initiative, Brahim Coulibaly, will take this forward. Brookings has also agreed to host a T20 event in Washington on the sidelines of the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The T20's role is to contribute evidence-driven recommendations, sometimes on issues that may only be taken up at future G20 meetings. As such, metrics such as "recommendations adopted" would not be reasonable to evaluate the T20's success. A survey of host country sherpas and/or officials as to the value of the T20 would be far preferable. Based on anecdotes from officials attending the T20 Summit, I would rate this year's T20 performance as "highly satisfactory." Going forward, it would be useful for the T20 to establish selected research themes that are undertaken in a multi-year context, rather than starting from scratch each year.

Name: Consejo Argentino par las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI)

Location: Buenos Aires, Argentina

Website: <http://www.cari.org.ar>

Date of Establishment: 1978

President: Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini

In the scope of changes in relative power in the international system, power networks that emerged over the last ten years have been fundamental tools in promoting international dialogue between emerging powers (some of them reemerging), which has improved the chances of reaching common standpoints between each power. These processes strengthened regional and international cooperation. Likewise, they facilitated the promotion of alternative international dialogue platforms to address both emerging and long-standing global problems, such as environmental governance or development policy. Although a comprehensive consensus between the different emerging powers has not been reached, each power has been important in the international arena and particularly influential at the regional level.

Regarding emerging power networks, I believe that the BRICS and ASEAN have been the most effective. Looking at Latin America, I think OPANAL has been an effective network in complying with the Tlatelolco Treaty. Countries such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, as well as Germany, Mexico, and Japan, have been leading and shaping policy networks and the T20. As they gain greater influence in both economic and political matters, their demands and ambitions start to conflict with the dynamics of the current order. Nevertheless, these countries continue to be engaged in and committed to international dialogue in the various existing channels of global coordination and cooperation. Mexico had, and still has, an influential role in the think tanks' networks, considering that the Think20 was initiated by the Mexican G20 Presidency. Russia, Australia, Turkey, and China have helped with the T20 process because they each decided to continue it during their respective presidencies.

Our organization faced major challenges regarding its membership in the T20. First, it had to reorient its scarce resources toward its participation in the T20 process. Second, since we will be hosting the T20 Summit in 2018, we will have to devote a great amount of time and resources to the T20 without disregarding our daily tasks and activities. These obstacles

represent the greatest impact that the T20 has had on our organization: being ready, in a relatively short time, to participate in and host a major global network in order to generate valuable insights into the G20 process.

Regarding CARI's communications with other T20 members outside T20 business, the institution is a member of several think tanks' networks where other T20 members participate. Although membership in the T20 enabled CARI to meet and engage with other institutions around the world, the institution already had fluent dialogues with many of the T20 members.

Currently, many of CARI's experts are participating in T20 task forces. Through these task forces, CARI is sharing its research and expertise with other experts from G20 countries and beyond. The T20 task forces helped to expand CARI's network in specific areas that would not have been accessible without T20 membership.

As an advisor to the G20, the T20 plays an essential role as provider of knowledge and innovative ideas. Nevertheless, each G20 presidency has a different relationship with the T20 process. Because of that, I am unable to say if the T20 has a strong and productive working relationship with the G20; it all depends on the coordination of agendas between the T20 and the G20 and the governments' desires for outside ideas.

As the T20 has been created to serve as a bank of ideas for the G20, a useful method for calculating T20 success is the relative impact of the policy recommendations and debates held in the T20 in the discussions and policy consensus reached at the G20. A more challenging form of identifying the importance of the T20 Summits is to evaluate to which extent these forums have introduced new topics in the G20 agenda. Furthermore, T20 success could be measured by the efficiency of the T20 process in its approaches and solutions for the contemporary problems of the governance system.

If you take into account the amount of international actors that are also looking to pursue the same goal, the T20 has had limited but tangible impact in influencing the G20 agenda. In particular, regarding the second way of evaluating the T20's performance, a valuable input of the T20 was the introduction of the topic "Innovation" into the sustainable development debate.

By bringing together and facilitating the exchange of policy analyses from global, regional, and national think tanks and experts, the T20 has become an “ideas bank” for the G20. Considering this, the study does not contemplate the impact or linkage between the T20 and other networks or think tank summits, for example in our case RIBEI, the Latin America Think Tank Forum (LATTTS), or the Council of Councils. These other networks provide organizations with chances to expand and coordinate goals and activities in order to consolidate a better position in the T20. This may solidify think tanks’ positions and facilitate the working process in order to deliver concrete and sustainable policy measures.

Name: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

Location: Barcelona, Spain

Website: <https://www.cidob.org/en/>

Date of Establishment: 1973

Director: Jordi Bacaria

Emerging power networks, such as the Shanghai Cooperation, the BRIC bank, ASEAN, and Mercosur, have played an increasing role in global governance in recent years. They can be vehicles of geopolitical competition and international cooperation alike. The role of emerging powers has been upgraded with their status in the G20 as a platform for consultation on global economic governance issues. As a Spanish think tank located in the city that gave the Barcelona process its name, we have a particular interest in Euro-Mediterranean issues, but also in the Latin American world—in which we maintain close relations.

Latin America has received less attention in the debate on emerging powers than has Asia, yet it is a crucial continent because of its endowment with natural resources such as strategic minerals, land, and water. We have been particularly interested in the potential leadership role of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico and have organized publications and conferences with partner think tanks in these countries. We have also closely followed hotspots of conflict (Venezuela), reconciliation (Colombia), and transition (Cuba).

Spain is only 20 kilometers away from Morocco, and both countries share common history. Morocco has positioned itself as a bridge between Europe, Africa, and Latin America in recent years, and it holds by far the largest phosphate reserves in the world—making it crucial for future food security. We have regularly attended the Atlantic Dialogues conference of the OCP Policy Center in Rabat, which frames transatlantic cooperation not in purely Northern terms but seeks to spur active cooperation of riparian countries in Africa and Latin America. We have also pushed forward Northern and Southern transatlantic cooperation with the EU-funded Atlantic Futures project for which we cooperated closely with think tanks and universities from all three Atlantic continents.

Our interest in the Euro-Mediterranean area is also exemplified by collaboration with the Barcelona-based Union for the Mediterranean and the EUROMESCO think tank network that has members from the southern

and northern shores of the Mediterranean. We are also involved in three of the EU's Horizon 2020 research projects about Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: MENARA, MEDRESET, and FEUTURE. The latter explores the future of EU-Turkey relations, which have seen considerable deterioration in the wake of increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Erdogan administration. The role of emerging powers has increased, and there is need for continuous dialogue. This entails acknowledging considerable differences of ideals of governance and a self-confident propagation of the values of liberal democracies in Europe.

Name: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)

Location: Ontario, Canada

Website: www.cigionline.org

Date of Establishment: 2001

President: Rohinton P. Medhora

The number of international policy challenges seems to get larger by the day. Tensions grow on the Korean Peninsula with increasing advances in nuclear and missile know-how. Terror groups have grown in both scale and sophistication, with seemingly global reach. A refugee crisis, caused by a war in one country, has reverberated around the world with startling consequences. Climate change has stretched our shared understanding of international institutions and the value of collective action. These are problems that require governance solutions at the global level.

In this changing geopolitical landscape, emerging powers will—by definition—take a more important role on these matters as they come into their own on the global stage. Emerging power networks are one mechanism used to amplify the position of the individual states that make up that network. This allows emerging states to maximize their growing power in international affairs.

There may be a number of budding networks among policymakers in emerging powers. Potentially, one of the most influential is the BRICS, comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It has shown that, whenever needed, it can coalesce around shared priorities such as the BRICS bank. Looking forward, if the G20 fades as a result of US disengagement, this forum could become more relevant in terms of agenda setting. Indeed, lacking a strong bilateral relationship with the US, China will be led to spend more political capital in building coalitions with its peers to move the international agenda forward.

The T20 is an informal network of think tanks, academics, and researchers representing G20 and, upon invitation, non-G20 member countries. Its purpose is to provide analytical support that informs the G20 processes and policy decisions with the aim of advancing global governance.¹

While already active as a network, the Mexican G20 Presidency, in collaboration with the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI), brought more structure into the T20 by fostering greater interaction between think tank experts and G20 officials. Likewise, under the Turkish Presidency, the T20 broke new ground by increasing the level of engagement among T20 participants and G20 policymakers.

In the inaugural G20 ministerial and T20 meetings in Istanbul on February 10, 2015, the latter had a joint session with a delegation of G20 finance ministers and central governors to discuss and appraise the agenda under the Turkish Presidency. The Turkish Presidency organized an interactive session between the T20 representatives and a delegation of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in Istanbul.

Unlike other engagement groups, the T20 is not an advocacy group that campaigns for specific issues and policy solutions. Instead, the T20 provides analytical support and policy recommendations that aim to enhance G20 processes in particular and to advance global economic governance in general. The T20 aims to produce value-added research, leveraging on its analytical capacity and diversity, to identify governance gaps and suggest new policy solutions that take into account political constraints. Ultimately, the goal of this is to deliver research and analysis that advances the G20's agenda and strengthens its effectiveness as the premier forum for economic cooperation.

As a global think tank based in Canada, CIGI relies on the T20 to serve as an amplifier and to provide a platform to engage international policy-makers. As an example, the interactive session between the T20 representatives and the delegation of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors provided CIGI with a unique opportunity to draw the G20's attention to a number of matters. In this forum, CIGI raised: unfinished business in the financial regulatory agenda for the year ahead, reform of the international financial architecture and the increasing role of plurilateral financial arrangements, and substantial gaps in the governance of severe sovereign debt crises. In this way, CIGI could marshal its research expertise in a concentrated manner to engage with a core institution of international financial governance.

As a globally engaged think tank, CIGI tends to have fairly robust involvement with peer institutions both within and outside the formal T20 membership community. CIGI communicates regularly with other think tanks on a range of both substantive and operational matters. In addition to regular communication, CIGI engages in both formal and informal partnerships with institutional colleagues. We have undertaken joint events and studies with the Peterson Institute, Brookings, and the Wilson Center. We have hosted visiting scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. We have partnered with the South African Institute of

International Affairs to mobilize and disseminate knowledge created by African-based think tanks through an innovative online Africa Portal. CIGI and Chatham House jointly launched the Global Commission on Internet Governance to advance a strategic set of policy recommendations aimed at securing an open, safe, and responsibly governed Internet. CIGI is also a founding member of the Council of Councils and a member of the International Think Tank Planning and Advisory Group for the Global Think Tank Summit organized by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the University of Pennsylvania. The T20 provides a formalized engagement channel, which reduces transactional costs, and is therefore a welcome addition to CIGI's already vigorous engagement with our peer institutions.

As noted above, the T20 can serve the bifurcated role of message amplification while also providing a readymade institutional platform to engage policymakers from the G20 nations. The interactive session between T20 think tank representatives, G20 finance ministers, and central bank governors in Istanbul was truly unprecedented. This broad-based global engagement with high-level governmental representatives from around the world on pressing global issues would likely not have been possible without an institution like the T20.

There is certainly a productive working relationship between the T20 and the G20. However, as with most arrangements, there is room for improvement. At present the engagement structure between these two groups is driven principally by the relationship between the T20 chair and its own national authorities. As a consequence, the level of interplay between the T20 and G20 is dynamic, and will vary from year to year. Establishing a more formalized mechanism, which relies on a number of members, could assist in remedying this.

The starting point for assessing the efficacy of a think tank is typically the ability of that organization to both produce and disseminate high-quality policy-relevant research. The corollary of this is that think tanks can then engage policymakers on substantive areas of importance and influence the outcome of those policy decisions (hopefully) for the better. In this regard, the T20 is becoming more effective.

During the German Presidency, the T20 established cross-disciplinary task forces in charge of producing policy briefs, which created greater structure for research outputs. This work was organized into discrete areas of substantive focus, presented at the T20 Summit and shared with senior policymakers.

With the additional structure surrounding the substantive research being undertaken, the combined scholarly capacity of the T20 is now exceedingly clear. However, in order to improve efficacy, greater and more structured interactions with the G20 official process are still required. The generation of ideas and assessment of policies is important, but formalizing the mechanism to transmit or relate those ideas into the G20 process would be a significant step toward creating important interactions between the G20 and this engagement group.

Name: German Development Institute (DIE)

Location: Bonn, Germany

Website: <http://www.die-gdi.de/>

Date of Establishment: 1964

Director: Dirk Messner

The Think20 (T20) is a network of research institutes and think tanks from the G20 countries. In 2017 the German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), together with the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), chaired the T20 process during Germany G20 Presidency. The T20 provides research-based policy advice to the G20, facilitates interaction among its members and the policy community, and communicates with the broader public about issues of global importance. In 2017, T20 worked based on thematic task forces to facilitate joint knowledge-creation among think tanks from a broad range of G20 and non-G20 countries. The task forces not only tackled conventional questions of economics and fiscal policy but also considered achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and addressed issues such as inequality, sustainable development in Africa, and climate change. The task forces published a broad range of policy briefs with recommendations for the G20 via a permanent online platform (g20-insights.org). DIE supported the task force process by mobilizing researchers from emerging countries through its Managing Global Governance Programme and from African countries through a T20 Africa Standing Group.

Under the German Presidency, the G20 intensified its dialogue with the various engagement groups. The G20 Sherpa Lars-Hendrik Röller stressed his openness to considering policy proposals from the T20 at the T20 Kickoff Conference in December 2016. Besides numerous interactions between individual T20 task forces and relevant German and international Ministries, the T20 Co-Chairs Dirk Messner and Dennis Snower presented the T20 process and initial policy recommendations at the sherpa meeting in December 2016. In addition, T20 representatives actively participated in various ministerial conferences and working group sessions of the G20 process in 2016–17. At Berlin's T20 Summit on May 29 and 30, 2017, key T20 policy recommendations were presented and discussed with, among others: the Head of the German Federal Chancellery and Federal Minister for Special Tasks, Peter Altmaier; Germany's G20 Sherpa, Lars-Hendrik Röller; the philanthropist and businessman, Mo

Ibrahim; the former director of the World Trade Organization, Pascal Lamy; and the Director of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Jeffrey Sachs.

The key role of DIE during the T20 process in 2016–17 helped the institute to deepen existing ties with think tanks from advanced, emerging, and developing countries. DIE’s engagement in the task forces and its key role in setting up the T20 Africa Standing Group was also essential to establishing new partnerships with think tanks from all over the world. The work within the task forces and the Standing Group supported stable communication patterns, intense networking, and insight sharing that are key to support joint knowledge-creation across various countries and scientific disciplines.

The success of the T20, like the success of the other engagement groups (B20, L20, W20, C20, S20, Y20), is hard to measure. Our assessment is that the T20 has made enormous progress in recent years by organizing conferences that brought together leading T20 representatives with high-ranking officials, business leaders, and civil society actors. Another measure of success is the publication of more than 60 policy briefs—co-authored by more than 300 researchers—that include policy proposals on a broad range of issues relevant to the G20.

Every year, a different G20 government assumes the presidency. Each G20 presidency since 2012 was accompanied by a T20 process that was steered by one or a group of think tanks from the country chairing the G20. This set up of annually rotating T20 chairs proved to be effective by establishing links to the respective G20 presidencies and by mobilizing think tanks from the respective countries. This structure, however, also poses the challenge of ensuring longer-term and continued engagement to leverage the huge potentials of the broad T20 network. The T20 should therefore reflect on the need and shape of an overarching and multiannual structure that is complementary with the respective T20 chairs.

Name: Ecologic Institute
Location: Berlin, Germany
Website: <http://ecologic.eu/>
Date of Establishment: 1995
Director: Dr. Camilla Bausch

This is a narrow variant on the broader theme of policy networks (of think tanks) in emerging countries. It looks at the wider Atlantic as a reemerging geography for policy coordination and cooperation among emerging (new) economies or globally well-established (old) economies and political systems with think tanks at various stages of differentiation and maturity. The area consists of the North and South Atlantic, with the Caribbean, the Mediterranean (including the Black Sea), the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea as extensions. The area includes not only the ocean and the islands within but also the watersheds draining into the Atlantic, the coastal countries (or regions in the case of the large countries also touching on the Pacific or Indian Ocean), and the whole countries on the four continents adjacent to the Atlantic or even the whole continents. For some purposes, the “Arab world,” touching the Atlantic in Northwest Africa, can be considered a “fifth continent.” Antarctica, although a continent touching on and having important exchanges with the Atlantic, is not considered here, for the simple reason that it is home to no independent political system with think tanks. Similarly, the Arctic, an ocean with a unique governance system that involves not only the coastal and other Arctic countries but also the indigenous communities of the circumpolar region is not considered part of the Atlantic, although there are interlinkages.

Particularly now, at a time when every country needs to rethink relations with the US, the wider Atlantic emerges as an attractive space for joining forces and coordinating policies. The four continents around the South and North Atlantic areas are strikingly coherent, dominated by four or five related languages, characterized by relatively similar legal systems, and already integrated to a significant degree thanks to family ties, travel, communication, trade, and investment. Values and ideals with regard to the structure and functioning of the state, as well as the role and rights of citizens, are similar throughout the region. It is also relatively peaceful, and has pre-existing issues networks of experts and think tanks that will be able to exchange ideas and help develop policies for the Atlantic Space.

This account cannot do justice to the long and rich—and little known—Atlantic history of humanity. This history ranges from the trade that brought ancient Egyptians tobacco from the Americas to the later “discoveries” of the Americas by Leif Eriksson and Christopher Columbus, from the trade in human slaves to the musical exchanges that took African rhythms and harmonies to the Caribbean, then to North America, and then back to West Africa to shape Bombino’s riffy Tuareg rock music. Despite its long history, the whole Atlantic was a meaningful area of strategic cooperation only during the short period of union between Portugal and Brazil, and even then this union did not cover the whole area. In recent years, however, there have been attempts to reframe the political map of the Atlantic in the minds of scholars and diplomats. This essay provides a history of these attempts.

The idea of reviving the Atlantic appears to have originated in the court of Morocco’s King about 15 years ago. Various Moroccan think tanks—including the OCP Policy Center, the Amadeus Institute, and a research group at the HEM Business School—remain active in the field to this day. Emissaries from the court discussed the concept of looking at the Atlantic as a whole with politicians, diplomats, and think tanks. Certainly the Gulbenkian Foundation in Portugal was involved in the exchange, from there the idea spread to the Luso-American Foundation (FLAD)—then directed by Charles Buchanan, a former US diplomat—and probably also to the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in Brazil. This first planting of the idea of a wider Atlanticism did not take root, however, and there is no written evidence of output from the early time.

The idea was revived when a scholar, Ian Lesser—later head of the Brussels office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)—went to Lisbon on a Sabbatical hosted by FLAD, picked up the idea and discussed it in a seminal power paper on “Southern Atlanticism.” This paper found an audience in Brussels for two reasons. First, ideas originating, at least seemingly, in Portugal were generally welcome during the EU administration of José Manuel Barroso, the Portuguese two-time president of the European Commission. Second, the paper garnered visibility in the GMF’s Brussels Forum, which was (and is) the pre-eminent annual foreign and security policy conference in Brussels. Subsequent Brussels Forums and the Atlantic Dialogues series of conferences hosted in Morocco by the OCP Foundation and the OCP Policy Center widened and deepened the community

This visibility triggered interest in various ways. For example, the European Commission included the issues in one of its calls for proposals in EU's research funding instrument; this resulted in the Atlantic Future research project under the leadership of CIDOB (Barcelona). Likewise, US-based think tanks, initially—and notably—the GMF and the Center for Transatlantic Relations (SAIS-CTR) at Johns Hopkins University, picked it up, integrating the theme into their program development and fundraising. Similarly, academic researchers in other domains looked at the wider Atlantic as a geography with which to coordinate their work, as well as to cooperate and share infrastructure and data, notably on marine sciences culminating in the AtlantOS research project. Practitioners also reacted by creating Atlantic networks, such as the “Atlantic Cities.”

The growing list of think tanks (of various categories) that were and remain engaged in wider Atlantic analysis and exchanges is as follows (**important ones in boldface**):

- **OCP Foundation and OCP Policy Center (one of the main promoters)**
- **German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF—Washington and Brussels offices)**
- Luso-American Foundation (FLAD), but commitment of new leadership is unclear
- Gulbenkian Foundation (was inactive, but there are signs of rekindled interest)
- Amadeus Institute (through conferences, but without discernible strategic intent)
- HEM Business School (of academic interest; with a reformist agenda in Morocco)
- **CIDOB, as coordinator of Atlantic Future, keeping dissemination of results alive**
- **Atlantic Future consortium**
 - Aberystwyth University, Wales, United Kingdom (no longer active)
 - Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico (passive)
 - **Ecologic Institute: analysis, dissemination, active follow-up, and fundraising**

- Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) Spain †
 - **Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Brazil, analysis, outreach, opens offices, networks**
 - Institut des Hautes Etudes de Management (HEM Business), Morocco, not active
 - Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), Portugal (not active)
 - Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy; focus now on EU external affairs, not Atlantic
 - German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), USA, see above
 - Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany (no longer active)
 - University of Pretoria, South Africa (academic, not a strong focus at present)
 - **SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (US): analyses, book series, web sites, and so on**
- CARI and CIPPEC, Argentina, although they act as observers so far, they are likely to come to the fore as Argentina re-engages with the world after the “Kirchner decade”

These think tanks and research institutes in universities are engaged in other processes, including traditional transatlantic relations (in the North Atlantic or Euro-Atlantic Space), hemispheric relations in the Americas, EU-Latin America relations (especially those on the Iberian Peninsula) in the T20 network, and meetings in Global and Regional Think Tank Summits.

The driving countries are

- Morocco (initiator and now one of the strong animators); all Moroccan think tanks are linked to the Moroccan court and/or government in their program development and funding.
- Portugal (incubator), with a strategic interest in maintaining the (largely Atlantic-based) community of Lusophone countries while trying to align the EU on the issue.
- The EU, through funding rather than the development of forums for policy dialogue and coordination in the Atlantic Space.

- Brazil (the essential partner country in the South Atlantic), but only through FGV; the government is remarkably absent in general discussion but very active in bilateral and small-group cooperation (such as patrolling to suppress piracy).
- The US (through the GMF and the SAIS-CTR), which the government is not particularly engaged. It is unknown to what extent the US government funds and influences the program development of the think tanks involved.
- South Africa, through think tanks and government initiatives, engages in relations within Africa, and across the Atlantic with Brazil; there is no sign of the wider Atlantic agenda having an impact on RSA relations with Europe or the US.

Name: Ethos Public Policy Lab

Location: Mexico City, Mexico

Website: <http://ethos.org.mx/es/>

Managing Director (Director General): José Luis Chicoma

Track Two diplomacy is a series of unofficial, nongovernmental activities and communications between private citizens (mainly from the business community and NGOs) as a method of negotiating between nations. In the decades since the term was officially coined in 1981, Track Two diplomacy has become a common way to find solutions for international issues involving two or more countries. The potential of Track Two diplomacy to support professional politicians and policymakers is significant, as individuals and organizations can engage in discussion through existing policy networks and press for adequate negotiation of sensitive issues.

Due to their nature as research centers that generate ideas and knowledge and that propose and implement public policies, think tanks are often involved as relevant players at the negotiation table. In Mexico, think tanks play an important role across a range of topics, from very specific issues regarding the bilateral relationship with the US, such as the renegotiation of NAFTA or immigration policy, to global challenges like climate change agreements that involve dozens of countries.

A key factor in fostering Track Two diplomacy is developing international networks to serve as cornerstones. Along with hundreds of other think tanks from around the world, Ethos Public Policy Lab has participated in different events that have strengthened the growth potential of these policy networks. These events, including the annual Global Think Tank Summit, various regional gatherings (such as those in North America, Latin America, and Europe), and other more specific summits—those targeted at innovative think tanks or members of G20 countries, for example—are fundamental for bringing together think tanks and organizations from all over the world. The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the University of Pennsylvania has played an essential role as a leader, promoter, and organizer of these events.

These summits have been useful in a variety of ways. One of the main advantages they provide is the opportunity to share information and best practices regarding the different matters and projects that each think tank is developing. Additionally, the diverse cultures, backgrounds, and experiences of each think tank enrich the discussion of different issues, creating shared knowledge and promoting further discussion.

By periodically bringing together different think tanks, these events serve as an excellent first step toward forming international policy networks that transcend domestic politics. The next stage in the development of these networks should focus on transforming the global and regional summits from discussion—and analysis-based events to action-focused activities that aim to increase the impact think tanks have on transnational issues. In fact, the current international political situation might be an ideal context for these policy networks to grow and thrive, as many countries are facing increasingly influential populist movements as a consequence of the new post-truth politics.

Name: Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)

Location: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Website: <http://portal.fgv.br>

Date of Establishment: 1944

President: Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal

Networks with institutions in emerging powers have allowed FGV to further expand its global presence and to establish additional partnerships across the world, which has led to fruitful exchanges on common policy challenges. This is particularly relevant due to two major trends: a growing necessity to take global issues into consideration even when discussing domestic challenges and the shift of power to countries like China and India that makes it indispensable for FGV to have partners in these countries.

The greatest impact that membership in the T20 has on FGV is its greater capacity to establish ties with institutions from around the world, debate policy-relevant issues and thus help promote a broader, more inclusive global debate.

FGV, Latin America's largest think tank, stands in constant contact with numerous institutions from around the world, although it can certainly be said that the T20 grouping has been an additional network of great usefulness. Membership in the T20 has helped broaden FGV's already existing global partnerships, particularly with countries such as Turkey and India, which deal with similar political challenges.

We believe the relationship between the T20 and the G20 is productive, even though the impact of the T20's recommendations to the G20 is, naturally, hard to measure. After all, elaborating the final declaration of the G20 is a complex process involving a multitude of stakeholders. Still, the T20 strikes us as highly useful as it forces think tanks to develop specific policy-relevant recommendations.

Name: Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADe)

Location: New Delhi, India

Website: <http://www.irade.org/>

Date of Establishment: 2002

Executive Director: Jyoti Parikh

I think that power networks create credible positions and give options with more thought than figures like journalists and politicians. One of the most prominent networks is the South Asia Think Tank Forum (SA-TTF), although several other networks, including the World Economic Forum, of which I am a member, LEDS Asia, the Climate Action Network, and Energia—which studies energy and gender—are also noteworthy.

Through our membership in the T20, we can make our work and views known to others and we can ensure the inclusion of our perspectives in the T20's recommendations. Because of our multidisciplinary cooperation, other T20 members seem to share with us similar views on issues like climate change and migrations. Membership has allowed us to connect with new actors to a great extent, especially since the T20 seems to get bigger every year. The T20 is cultivating its relationship with the G20 and, fortunately, has now become a tradition that will continue as it did in China after Turkey and then in Germany.

However, the T20 is still an evolving concept. The most important metrics for evaluating the organization would be whether the T20's recommendations were discussed or noted by the G20 and whether those recommendations added value over and above their political overtones. Formal linkage with the G20 will be helpful. The T20 at least needs to be able to offer a statement at the G20 to prompt further discussion.

Name: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

Location: Milan, Italy

Website: <http://www.ispionline.it/en/institute>

Date of Establishment: 1934

Director: Paolo Magri

Emerging power policy networks play an increasingly relevant role in today's policy circles. On the one hand, this is due to the rising economic and political relevance of emerging countries. On the other hand, in more than a few cases, this trend appears to be emphasized by a coordinated "push for voice" by policy-relevant actors (usually think tanks) within emerging countries themselves. Such efforts may or may not be officially state-sponsored but are often supported by standing governments who see these efforts as a way to increase their voice in regional and international policy circles and, ultimately, to improve their soft-power tools in institutions devoted to global governance such as the G20. As a think tank that was founded over 80 years ago and is mainly devoted to international politics and economics, ISPI has witnessed the rise of emerging power policy networks over the last few decades.

Moreover, ISPI is an official member of the Think20, a network of research institutes and think tanks from G20 countries. Membership in the T20 has allowed ISPI to expand its contacts and to cooperate closely with key global think tanks.

At the same time, membership in the T20 has allowed ISPI to intensify contacts with think tanks that operate in different regions than those classically covered by the ISPI network (Europe, MENA, North America, Russia, and China). New ISPI connections include think tanks from Japan, Australia, and South Africa.

Membership in the T20 has also fostered changes in ISPI's internal organization. As soon as it took part in the T20, ISPI launched its Programme on Global Governance. The Programme aims at accompanying ISPI's activities related to the T20 and other relevant international forums on global governance. As a result, some researchers, especially those specializing in international economics, were asked to broaden their field of expertise to include global governance and related issues.

As for the T20, its role in shaping global policymaking has changed over the years. The relationship between the T20 and the G20 can be

more or less productive, often depending on the decisions taken by the rotating G20 presidency. The T20 was born as a forum that was less formally connected to the main G20 work streams so that new ideas could be openly discussed, even if they were not deemed likely to be taken up by sherpas or ministers. Although it has benefitted the dialogue, this format has also shown some liabilities, as unstructured discussions risk ending up as irrelevant policy ideas. As a result, each G20 presidency needs to make a decision about the extent of “mainstream” work in a T20, which affects the productivity and efficiency of the T20 output.

The fact that policy recommendations produced at the T20 level are considered at higher-level diplomatic or political meetings is an important metric in evaluating the success of the T20. This, in turn, highlights some room for improvement. For example, recent T20 meetings have become very broad, involving a large number of actors whose “airtime” in plenary or parallel sessions has tended to be shrunk to a minimum. While this is a testament to the increasing relevance of the T20 as a policy forum, such a great number of voices being heard at meetings can sometimes create a cacophony instead of a coordinated dialogue.

However, a mid-way solution to help maximize the relevance and efficiency of the T20 can be found. To improve efficiency while ensuring fair representation, T20 meetings should limit participation to one think tank or institution per G20 country. These think tanks can then be supported by the participation of selected stakeholders from international organizations, NGOs, and universities. G20 leaders should also agree upon a (very) soft “institutionalization” of the T20—mainstreaming it within the yearly work of the bodies working toward the Leaders’ Summit. Overall, the combination of scheduling T20 meetings back to back with main sherpa meetings and timing the main topics to be discussed in T20 meetings with the agenda of sherpas or upcoming Ministerial meetings would help to improve the relevance of the main policy forum for global governance issues.

Name: Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IWEP-CASS)

Location: Beijing, China

Website: <http://en.iwep.org.cn/>

Date of Establishment: 1964

Director: Zhang Yuyan

Think tanks play a vital role in the political and policy arenas at local and national levels. They are non-profit organizations that—at least sometimes—operate independently from governments and political parties. Their function is unique, as they provide public policy research, analysis, and advice. An international network can have a number of other critical roles, including providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information; playing a mediating function between the governments and the public that helps building trust and confidence; interpreting issues, events, and policies for the electronic and print media to facilitate public understanding of domestic and international policy issues; serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; identifying, articulating, and evaluating current policy issues, proposals, and programs; and facilitating the construction of “issue networks.”

Emerging power networks formed over the last ten years have been fundamental tools in promoting international dialogue among emerging powers (some of them reemerging), improving the chances of reaching common standpoints among them. These processes strengthened regional and international cooperation. They have also helped to promote alternative international dialogue platforms to address long-standing and emerging global problems, such as environmental governance and development policy. Although they have not reached a comprehensive consensus among the different emerging powers, these networks have been important in the international arena and particularly influential at the regional level.

The T20 has been the most effective of these emerging power networks. Since its inception, the T20 has maintained a character different from that of other engagement groups. The T20 is not an advocacy platform like other engagement groups—which campaign around specific issues—nor does it seek to negotiate an agreed-upon set of recommendations on relevant issues. Instead, the T20 organizes the analyses of global think tanks and high-level experts to provide analytical depth to ongoing G20 discussions and to produce ideas to help the G20 deliver concrete and sustainable policy measures. To do so, the T20 chair forwards a sum-

mary of the ideas discussed at T20 meetings to G20 sherpas. The influence of T20 is gradually increasing.

Our organization, the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), was founded in 1964. It is an Institute of the CASS and is devoted to the study of international economics and politics. IWEP is engaged in policy-oriented and theoretical research, mainly covering global macroeconomics, international finance, international trade, international investment, development economics, international politics, international strategy, international political economy, global governance, and world energy. It is one of the most influential think tanks in terms of China's economic policy, its foreign policy, and international economic policy.

As one of the coordinating think tanks of the T20 in 2016, our Institute—together with Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (RDCY)—has held ten meetings in China, the US, Peru, Germany, Switzerland, and India successively since the launch of the T20 at the end of 2015. During these meetings, experts from the G20, non-G20 countries, and international organizations conducted in-depth discussions on topics such as global economic governance mechanism, economic growth, innovation and structural reform, international finance, international trade, and investment and development issues. They put forward valuable suggestions and reached some consensus. We also sent questionnaires to experts in various countries on relevant issues to pool their insights. On this basis, we proposed the T20 policy recommendations for the G20. Additionally, we set up a T20 website and T20 network in 2016.

Currently, many of IWEP's experts are participating in various T20 task forces. Through these task forces, IWEP is sharing its research and expertise with other experts from G20 countries and beyond. These task forces have been useful arenas for expanding IWEP's network in specific areas not possible without T20 membership. Further, in 2017, we are keeping a very close academic relationship with other T20 members, in the form of workshops, academic exchanges, research collaborations, and other events.

As an advisor to the G20, the T20 provides essential knowledge and innovative ideas. We cannot say if the T20 as a whole has a strong and productive working relationship with the G20; it depends on the coordination of agendas between the T20 and the G20, as well as the governments' need for outside ideas. In 2016, as the chair of the Chinese T20,

we tried to amplify the T20's voice by inviting G20 officers to T20 meetings, submitting policy brief papers to G20 leaders, and creating other forms of outreach. We can evaluate the T20's success through three dimensions: whether it provides professional policy support, whether it allows more think tanks and experts to participate in its activities, and whether it keeps a close relationship with the formal G20 framework. In this regard, the Chinese T20 has served effectively as a "coordinator," uniting official decision makers, the B20, and other engagement working groups of the G20.

Beyond normal T20 business, IWEP-CASS communicates with other T20 members via several think tanks' networks in which other T20 members participate. These networks have also enabled IWEP to meet and engage with other institutions around the world.

We expect that the T20, as an "ideas bank" for the G20, can have a close linkage with other networks, such as the BRICS think tank council and the Latin America Think Tank Forum (LATTS), and can facilitate the exchange of policy analyses from global, national, and regional think tanks and experts. This may solidify think tanks' positions and facilitate the work process in order to deliver more concrete and sustainable policy measures.

Name: The Korea Development Institute (KDI)

Location: Sejong-Si, Korea

Website: http://www.kdi.re.kr/kdi_eng/

Date of Establishment: 1971

Director: Joon-Kyung Kim

Emerging power networks promote their common interests not only by exchanging ideas on pressing issues but also by addressing problems in current global governance.² In addition to pushing for reform within established international organizations such as the World Bank, emerging powers have set up their own alternative institutions such as the New Development Bank. BRICS, which held its first full summit in 2010, is the best-known example, but there are other networks—including MIKTA—as well.

Emerging powers have also been active in the realm of policy networks. The BRICS Think Tank Council, for instance, has held annual meetings and put forth a long-term strategy for BRICS in 2013. China, Korea, and India, among others, have also participated vigorously in global policy networks that include both emerging and established powers. Perhaps the best-known example is Think20 (T20), a network of think tanks in G20 countries.

The origin of the T20 goes back to consultation meetings that a select group of think tanks held with British, Korean, and French G20 sherpa teams in 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. Canada's Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) had played a leading intellectual role in calling for the establishment of the G20 at the leadership level and took the initiative in organizing these consultation meetings jointly with other think tanks such as Chatham House, KDI, and IFRI. The T20 was officially established in 2012 under the Mexican G20 Presidency, with a troika arrangement to ensure continuity. Since then, the T20 has held annual meetings as well as a number of ad hoc small-group meetings. Its membership has expanded from ten or so think tanks in early years to more than 50 today.

As a founding member of the T20, KDI has played an active role in building that network. Although KDI had already established a good relationship with a number of think tanks in the US, Japan, and China, the T20 has helped KDI to develop strong new ties with other think tanks. For instance, KDI and CIGI jointly led an international research project on the post-2015 development agenda. KDI and CIGI also worked with

Lowy and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) on global energy governance issues. To carry out collaborative research projects and hold joint conferences, KDI communicates with other T20 members outside of normal T20 business at least twice a month. KDI's communication with non-members tends to be rare. The T20 has also helped KDI to share its research and expertise with new actors, although KDI has built alternative channels through Korea's Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP).

The T20 has had a strong and productive working relationship with the G20. If the T20's success is measured by the extent to which its advice is accepted by the sherpa teams, the T20 (and its predecessor) was particularly effective in the early years. Back then, a selected group of think tanks spent multiple hours with the sherpa team addressing their concerns in a closed setting, supplementing them with issue briefs and follow-up work. For instance, in 2010, think tanks such as KDI, Brookings, and CIGI provided advice to the Korean sherpa team on issues such as the G20 secretariat and development agenda. In 2014, the T20, led by Lowy, provided substantive policy proposals on issues ranging from infrastructure investment to growth strategy. With the T20's expanded membership in recent years, however, it has become more difficult to formulate substantive advice and spend "quality time" with the sherpa team. In 2017, the T20 under the Germany G20 Presidency effectively ran well-coordinated working group meetings and all-member conferences to address this problem. Given that the members of the T20 have a wide range of resources and commitments, it does not make sense to organize all-member research collaboration projects. A "variable geometry" approach is probably more effective.

Name: Korean Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)

Location: Sejong-Si, Korea

Website: <http://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/>

Date of Establishment: 1989

President: Jung Taik Hyun

Emerging power networks have led to conspicuous changes in our understanding of the world and the global economy. As the emerging economies have grown and become involved in the world economic order, fundamental changes in outsourcing—not only in the manufacturing sectors but also in services—have followed. We can now observe a global network of value chains not only between the developed and the developing but also among developing economies. This phenomenon was wholly unexpected three decades ago.

Major emerging economies need to lead the networks and get along with other developing countries. We need to develop networks and need to find consensus through denser dialogue and through the exchange of ideas. China led the networking effort when it led the G20 Presidency, but other countries including India, South Africa, Brazil, and Russia have been deeply involved as well.

KIEP has contributed to the G20 in many ways, including by providing ideas and opinions to its governments and civil societies. Through T20 membership, my institution can investigate not only the issues of trade and investment, development, and the international macroeconomy but also those of the global commons, international finance, aging, and terror. KIEP is unique among Korea's T20 institutions because it has continued to make contact with other international organizations and research institutions. In this respect, it is beyond comparison to other organizations in Korea. Through the T20, we are able to extend our research networks and exchange researchers.

The T20's relationship with the G20 depends upon who presides over the former group. The German T20 Presidency was able to make a very strong working relationship with the G20. It was very impressive.

We judge the T20's success with three metrics. First, how valuable are the recommendations the T20 makes to the G20? Second, what kind of new ideas and consensus have the T20 meetings produced? Third, how many institutions have been interested in the T20 meetings? We can improve by developing task force activities in each of these areas. We also must consider crisis management, the lessons of history, and security issues such as the threat of the WMD.

Name: Observer Research Foundation (ORF)

Location: New Delhi, India

Website: <http://www.orfonline.org/>

Date of Establishment: 1990

Director: Sunjoy Joshi

The past decade has seen significant shifts in the geopolitical structures of the world, as nations once regarded as part of the third world become political and economic forces. With traditional global governance structures proving themselves to be incompatible in the current global context, new networks have developed to provide a forum where the ethos and aspirations of so-called emerging powers can be shared.

Among these emerging power networks, the most effective has undoubtedly been the BRICS alliance. Despite their geographical disparity, the five BRICS member nations have been able to coordinate on a number of mutually beneficial arrangements. Among other accomplishments, the bloc has been able to establish a new multilateral development bank, push for the reformation of the IMF voting structure, and act as a bulwark against anti-globalization and trade protectionist movements.

The BRICS member nations have also helped lead and shape policy conversations on a global level through their participation in the G20. Russia was one of the key proponents of a global sustainable growth program during its Presidency in 2013. Two years later, in the course of its 2015 Presidency, China was able to successfully create a platform that allowed the perspectives of previously marginalized global actors to be voiced on issues relating to technology transfer and intellectual property rights. India, Brazil, and South Africa have also acted as key contributors on a number of other policy issues over the past decade.

There is no doubt that emerging power networks such as BRICS have provided previously marginalized nations with a dais upon which they can present their views to the G20. Yet it seems the corresponding Think20 (T20), which was originally formed to provide a cooperative forum for policy organizations from the G20 countries to share their views, has not been able to benefit from the emerging power networks.

For the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the benefits afforded by its involvement in the T20 have been ancillary. The T20 forum has afforded ORF the opportunity to showcase some of the work it has conducted on the organization's Gender and Digital platforms. Additionally

the T20 has allowed ORF to engage with certain individuals and institutions that the organization had not previously worked with, although the organization's network was not significantly expanded.

The T20's benefits to the G20 are largely unsubstantiated at the moment. While the body was originally formed as a policy recommendation bank for the G20, it seems that recommendations made under the T20 umbrella have not yet been implemented. The primary benefits appear to have come as a result of outreach and networking, providing for the cross-pollination of ideas across the various think tanks. It should be noted, however, that the propensity toward actionable outcomes is largely dependent on the country holding the presidency, meaning that the outcomes associated with policy recommendations could change in the future.

In order to allow the T20 forum to reach its full potential, it might behoove the G20 to formulate a mechanism that allows for pertinent policy recommendations to be acted upon. Requiring policy papers to have actionable outcomes is a good start, but an additional step could involve linking think tanks to appropriate global governance bodies to ensure adequate follow-up. A metrics-and-evaluation framework could provide feedback regarding the steps that have been taken to implement policy ideas and make the G20 accountable in case of non-action. In order to ensure that rotating presidencies do not create undue delays and interruptions, a separate committee tasked with pushing policy ideas forward could be created. Creating links between the T20 forum and regional think tank networks could also provide a multiplier effect leading to broader outreach abilities, additional capacity for policy recommendations, and extended global buy-in.

Name: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

Location: Washington DC, United States

Website: <https://piie.com>

Date of Establishment : 1981

President: Adam Posen

At a time when both rules-based global economic integration and fact-based economic analysis are under unprecedented threat, think tanks have to stand up. Think tanks can play a constructive role by going beyond truth telling about the costs of policy mistakes or publishing wishful thinking for what should be done—though both are necessary. As I advocated at the Global Think Tank Summit in Yokohama, May 2017, we will be more successful in guiding policymakers by speaking out together jointly across countries. This is especially true when the US government and some authoritarian regimes around the world are trying to degrade the value of expertise and question objectivity. Participation in the T20 process provides an opportunity for all credible policy research institutes to legitimize the cause of global cooperation in the economic sphere. In addition, think tanks can learn from each other on ways to disseminate research in useful, accessible formats to wider audiences.

There is an institutional or public good aspiration for communicating research beyond directly influencing policy. By example and as a source, think tanks should strengthen public support for the role of rigorous, intellectually open, and in-depth study and discussion of economic policy. The public in many countries distrusts information provided by governments and government-related entities. Accordingly, think tanks can inform and shape public debate to a wide audience of business and labor leaders, management and staff at international organizations, university-based scholars and their students, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and the public at large. Exchanging ideas on how to do so, and the differences between audiences (elite and general) across countries, would be a worthy activity at future T20 Summits and other gatherings of think tank leadership.

The Peterson Institute for International Economics has been pleased to participate in the formal T20 dialogues in recent years in Shenzhen, Berlin, and Geneva, as well as in a number of the Global Think Tank Summits organized by TTCSP and partners. The Institute has also developed ongoing cooperative and constructive relationships with specific think tanks in Canada, China, Korea, Morocco, and the EU, as well as with several inter-

national financial institutions and multilateral banks. In many cases this research has led to jointly published or sponsored research volumes and more targeted policy papers and recommendations.

The Institute is proud that its research has helped provided the intellectual foundation for many major international policy initiatives of the past three and a half decades. Among these are reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), initiated by the G-20 in 2009–10, adoption of innovative monetary policies to counter the effects of the global economic crisis of 2008–9, and the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Research by the Institute has also helped many countries understand the positive role of exchange rate cooperation in the world economy.

In addition, the Institute has provided advice to negotiators in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the US and China and supported expansion of trade liberalization with policy proposals adopted in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), and many other trade pacts. Institute scholars have participated in policy debates on diverse matters within countries around the world, notably increasing female labor force participation in Japan and linking fiscal stimulus to structural reform in parts of the euro area and the EU.

All these cooperative links are part of the Institute's mission to provide a body of objective policy research, analysis and commentary independent of governments, official organizations, and international institutions. The goal in our sphere is for such research to elevate the public's understanding of the importance of an international rules-based economic order to enhance sustainable global prosperity for Americans and for all people. Through cooperation and meetings such as those organized by the T20, policy research organizations can strengthen their ability to inform the public and guide policymakers to better outcomes for citizens throughout the world.

Name: Royal Elcano Institute (RIE)

Location: Madrid, Spain

Website: <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/>

Date of Establishment: 2001

President: Emilio Lamo de Espinosa

The world order is changing quickly, even though the old world order has not quite disappeared, and the new one has not yet arrived. The T20 can help to foster this transition by taking into consideration both the plural visions of new players and the older visions of more traditional ones. Among these influential new players are the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), even if the weight of that grouping as such is still under discussion.

The old order was essentially shaped by the liberal West. The arrival of new players is changing that in two ways: by bringing in new influential players and groups of players and by bringing in new issues and approaches. That does not mean that the old order will see its demise but rather that it will have to change to accommodate interests, presence, and values of the new players and, above all, engage with the present and foreseeable problems and risks.

Emerging power networks have the advantage of setting a web or framework with which to discuss these visions and confront them with the ones of a more classical—in many cases liberal—order. The T20 is the most representative framework and power network, although some regional ones in Latin America, Asia, and Africa are important as well. Even the relations between the think tanks of the BRICS countries are worth noting. While China has done more than any other emerging power to foster these policy networks, other countries like Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil have helped as well. Although Russia cannot be considered an emerging power, it has also contributed to this debate.

After the UN, the G20—which is not an institution—is the most representative international framework. Representative, however, does not mean democratic. As a network to discuss with some depth and new breadth ideas and proposals for this renewed order, the T20 plays a crucial role in this process of redefining the world order and managing its problems. It brings together institutions that often did not have direct relations, and with them, their interests, traditions, challenges, and know-how.

Membership in the T20 has put RIE in touch with many think tanks from emerging powers in the T20, and in close contact with different ways

of seeing the problems of the world. The T20 has also helped us develop a truly global—and, thus, multidisciplinary—approach. RIE communicates with other T20 members increasingly often, as we try to build new bilateral relations with think tanks from countries with which we have not previously had operating relations. But we keep in close contact with organizations that are not members of the T20, whether they reside in countries that do not belong to the G20, or whether they reside in countries from the G20 but are not in the T20 network. Membership has also opened new connections with organizations with which we did not have a working relationship, and with topics that were beyond our usual horizon.

However, to have an impact, the T20 must develop new ways of working—first by mediating between national and international think tanks and the governments of their respective countries or geographical areas, second by getting the G20 to consider the briefs the T20 produces, and third by having the G20 commission ideas to the T20. It is then that the T20 will be respected and influential. We can evaluate the T20's success base on the impact of the T20 on subjects discussed and their orientation, the impact of the G20 meetings' statements, and impact of what the G20 requests from the T20. While it would be worthwhile to address political issues, such as liberal vs illiberal order and the de-westernization of the world, social issues deserve attention as well. Finally, we should consider the quality of the briefs produced, such as those that were drafted under the system fostered by the present German Presidency and that have guaranteed that system's longevity.

The T20 must produce its ideas (topics to be debated) and proposals (policies) far in advance—which is not always easy—before the national and international bureaucracies and the media have got into them. To be relevant, the debates and proposals created by the T20 must avoid academicism, raise important issues and new problems “beyond the curve”—that is, outside of what governments usually do—and produce workable recommendations. They should go to the roots of the issues.

Geographically, the T20 should pay more attention to Africa and Latin America, underrepresented in the G20/T20. Functionally, the T20 should do more to address global issues of interest for all countries involved, beyond the environmental, security, or institutional governance issues that are dealt with in other fora. For example, the T20 should address trade (to resist protectionism); inequalities between and within countries and ways to remedy them; rise of populisms and radicalization; and digitalization and the unequal impact of automation.

Name: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)

Location: Cape Town, South Africa

Website: <http://www.saiia.org.za/>

Date of Establishment: 1934

Chief Executive: Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

For much of the previous century, the think tank world had been dominated by institutions in the developed world. The emergence of policy networks from emerging powers has mirrored the changing global balance of power. As these countries' prominence in world affairs has grown, so too has their think tanks' desire to collaborate with other Southern think tanks and to build up international partnerships and profile, although these efforts have not been limited to South-South interactions.

A driver of such networks is the desire to affirm their intellectual contribution to debates in a world where the narrative has been dominated by Northern institutions. Using networks as platforms to exchange ideas and undertake joint research is one way of increasing impact. From a resource perspective, emerging power networks have not always been able to secure sufficient financial resources to be able to execute their vision. In addition, the different political contexts and systems from which the various members of networks emanate have different interests and objectives—some are closely affiliated with governments, or with parties; others are independent. This has not been inimical to the growth of such networks, but it is a characteristic.

Such networks—some more formal than others—have augmented the intellectual and policy linkages among emerging powers, linkages which were significantly fewer two decades ago. The flow of “ideas traffic” and knowledge-sharing for many in the South was directed toward the North rather than focused on deepening relations among Southern emerging powers. Thus these new linkages have been very important in enriching the research and policy interface among emerging power think tanks. Governments of emerging powers have also identified such networks as providing useful channels to hear (informally) the views from other countries through the filter of think tank discussions. They have also facilitated the creation of such networks through the establishment of “outreach” tracks in meetings such as the BRICS Academic Forum and the FOCAC China-Africa Think Tank Forum.

Equally, the North has sought such networks out too, recognizing the importance of engaging with them as one way of gaining greater understanding of those countries' international posture, priorities, and drivers, as well as of the potential intersects for cooperation with their own countries. It also created opportunities for involvement in Southern policy processes, with the possibility of impact.

The effectiveness of emerging power networks needs to be understood on different levels, not just at the level of policy impact: first, the extent to which they enable interaction on substance among think tanks from various emerging powers; second, whether they are taken into account by governments; and third, the extent to which non-emerging power institutions (both state and non-state) prioritize engagement with them. Emerging power networks have probably had a mixed record on those counts. For example, the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST), of which SAIIA is a member, has enabled the first, has made some progress with the second, and, in terms of the third, has attracted the interest of Northern institutions as well as international institutions such as UNCTAD.

In the T20 context, both India and China have played important roles in emerging power policy networks. This has been largely a function of the fact that both countries have chaired the G20 in recent years, which has given them the space to lead in the construction of the debates at the T20 meetings. In addition, it must be mentioned that the first T20 was convened in Mexico when that country chaired the G20 in 2012.

SAIIA's membership in the T20 has enabled it to broaden and deepen its linkages with a number of think tanks from G20 countries (both developing and developed), and who are working on similar themes related to global economic governance. It has raised our profile and enhanced our policy focus on global economic governance themes.

SAIIA communicates regularly with a number of T20 members beyond the normal T20 business either because cooperation existed before the establishment of the T20 or because such cooperation has emerged as a result of interactions at the G20. Specifically, we have communication with think tanks in Brazil, India, China, Mexico, Germany, the UK, and the US. With many of these SAIIA has long-standing relations that preceded the T20 engagement.

Over the years, the T20 has grown both in the frequency of meetings and in the number of participants. The May 2017 T20 meeting in Berlin had several hundred participants from the G20 countries and beyond, and

produced a significant number of policy briefs linked to the G20 agenda of the German Presidency. SAIIA's participation at the event included speaking in plenary panels and disseminating its research both on G20 issues and on other areas of its work. The cross-stakeholder nature of the meeting meant that SAIIA staff was able to meet and network with many actors which would not have been possible otherwise.

The T20's relationship with the G20 has developed over time. Governments recognize the T20 as an important dimension of the whole process, and the organization forms part of the various outreach groups that have been established including the Business20, the Civil20, and the Labour20. At the same time there is an increasing emphasis from the T20 itself to operate in such a way that its work can make a contribution to the policy process at the government level. This probably reached its apogee with the 2017 German Presidency where the T20 co-hosts established a number of working groups mirroring the priorities of the German Presidency and produced specific policy recommendations through more than 70 policy briefings on themes ranging from climate change and Agenda 2063 to international tax cooperation and Africa. The authors were drawn from both developing and developed members of the G20.

Ultimately the T20's success should be linked to policy impact, but there is also significant value in the connections made, which in turn may lead to opportunities for collaboration on policy work. The T20 has a dual role—to provide policy alternatives to the G20 on matters on the agenda and to identify issues that are not on the agenda yet but which states should be aware of as they navigate the increasing complexities of the global economic governance terrain.

The key challenge of the T20 is to identify ways of maintaining continuity from presidency to presidency, especially around the core themes that populate the agenda from year to year. A related challenge is that of resources and the ambition of the hosting country, which unfortunately also depends often on the ability of the hosting government to allocate funding to facilitate T20 engagements. The “loose” structure and organizing principles of the G20 meetings, that is, the absence of a secretariat and the dominance of the host country on the scope and focus of the G20 agenda, have also affected the nature of the T20 engagements. While the technical analysis provided by the IMF through the Mutual Assessment

Process (MAP) to track progress toward meeting the objectives of strong, sustainable, and balanced growth as set out by the G20 in 2009 is very useful, G20 statements tend to be quite general and lack clear implementation schedules and plans. This makes the ambition of the T20 to track G20 commitments difficult to realize. Nonetheless, it has not hindered the T20 from playing the role that think tanks plays best—that of looking beyond the horizon and helping to infuse the G20 deliberations with a strong country focus and evidence base. Specifically from an African perspective, the German initiative led by the German Development Institute to create a T20 Africa Standing Group would indeed support a closer monitoring of G20 commitments to Africa and help to maintain momentum on priority themes for the continent.

Name: Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)

Location: Ankara, Turkey

Website: <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en>

Date of Establishment: 2004

Managing Director: Güven Sak

When the center of gravity of global production started to move toward the East, South-South cooperation achieved a new meaning. It has been in the lexicon for a long time, but only with economic change in the South have similarities in policy positions started to emerge. One important common issue has become the need to redefine the global governance system. That is why the G20 has become a suitable outlet for emerging power policy networks.

Trade, too, demonstrates the need for increased global governance and cooperation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) regulates only software issues of trade—such as its rules—but there is also a set of complementary hardware issues, such as ports. Sending goods to the East from Turkey requires us to send our goods to a Western port first. That is how large container ships collect their goods. Connectivity between southern countries in this new setting has become important.

A similar issue has also arisen in the case of knowledge-sharing. The South needs new technologies for productivity and innovation-based growth. The latter requires new mechanisms for the transfer and diffusion of technology.

New global policy issues provide a solid basis for the development of emerging power networks. We have common global issues. Common issues bring us together at a new level. Debate concerning new policy has become more global for emerging markets.

During the Turkish Presidency of the G20, TEPAV led the T20 process, and we still consider that process an effective tool in facilitating global policy cooperation among emerging markets on global issues. Other think tanks look too regional to us in Ankara. Enabling participants from all countries to discuss global problems provides a good basis for discussion. Helpfully, during the German T20, the network began to work through task forces and to become more structured.

Before the T20, we found the German GIZ-initiated Economic Policy Forum (EPF) to be the most effective emerging power network. TEPAV first met with Brazilian, South African, Chinese, Indian, and Vietnamese think tanks through the help of EPF. That was, however, not on global

issues; instead, it was more like experience-sharing with perspectives from around the world. During the Turkish Presidency, we incorporated EPF totally into the T20. The T20 brings together think tanks from developed developing countries.

The cooperation with the following bodies/countries in advanced and emerging economies has been effective and instrumental in TEPAV's increasing experience and capacity building under T20 networking:

- CIGI (Centre for Innovation and Governance), Canada
- Lowy Institute, Australia
- Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies (RDCY) of Renmin University, China
- Shanghai Institute for International Studies—SIIS, China
- CASS, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
- German Development Institute-DIE, Germany
- Kiel Institute, Germany
- German International Cooperation Agency, GIZ
- Gateway House, India
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies, ISPI
- G8/G20 Research Group, University of Toronto, Canada
- Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil
- Centre for Economics and Finance for the Development of Argentina, CEFID
- Center for Economic Policy Research, CEPR in Switzerland
- ICSTD—International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Developments
- Chatham House, UK
- Brookings Institution, US
- Center for Strategic and International Studies, US

This we have achieved through the T20 network. The Turkish T20 was the most inclusive T20 so far.

TEPAV managed the organization and coordination of the T20 outreach group in 2015 during Turkey's G20 Presidency. This enabled TEPAV to work with public institutions (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Treasury, and other relevant bodies) and to become affiliated with the policymaking process in areas pursuant to G20 matters. Moreover, through its mission as the coordinating institution, TEPAV developed a strong networking enterprise with leading think tanks from G20 countries

as well as those from other invited countries. This helped TEPAV to achieve further cooperation between these think tanks in areas of common interest in research and projects. TEPAV also hosted the T20 National Advisory Council, composed of leading think tanks in Turkey, and this linked institutions for potential cooperation.

Communication and interaction with the T20 members is an ongoing process. T20 networking increased TEPAV's reputation, recognition, and expertise, allowing for further communication and cooperation with other T20 members in relevant areas under the G20 realm (i.e. sustainable development, migration, trade and investment) and beyond the G20 issues like the belt and road initiative of China, as well as regional development issues. Though TEPAV had previously networked with several international actors, the T20 facilitated this contact. Many other national think tanks had no such experience.

Following its solid organization and helpful contribution to the T20, TEPAV was asked to continue its involvement during Chinese and German Presidencies in 2016 and 2017. In this context, TEPAV has been involved in several task forces established by home presidencies in areas including forced migration, trade and investment, and sustainability. TEPAV's director and staff were personally asked to take part in several T20 events in different G20 countries. This helped TEPAV to a great extent to share its expertise and to participate in a mutually beneficial exchange in research outcomes.

The T20 is an innovative and experimental outreach group, operating differently from other groups under the G20 (L20, B20, C20, etc.). The T20 is the so-called bank of ideas, whose influence is linked to the visibility and accessibility of T20 events and to its experience in conceptualizing these ideas. The T20 has brought new methods to share the views of academics, researchers, and intellectuals with actors in global policymaking. The discussions, research, and policy papers under the T20 are now more accessible for policymakers, and the T20's presence and recognition is increasing thanks to stronger cooperation and inventive methods proposed by host institutions each year. Several views and proposals generated by the T20 are increasingly being adopted in G20 summitry statements and other G20 ministerial declarations, thus indicating that the T20's modest steps are being interpreted by policymakers as respectable solutions.

The success of the T20 can be evaluated through four main questions. First, are the proposals made by the T20 in its policy papers (i.e. analytical and opinion pieces by high-level experts on key issues) being adopted in G20 ministerial and summit-declaration texts? Second, have any of these proposals induced G20 members to individually or jointly take steps in realizing policy outcomes? Third, do policymakers in the G20 have an increasing awareness and interest in T20 activities and opinion pieces? Fourth, do those policymakers have increasingly frequent contact at the national level with T20 members?

From our perspective the T20 needs to focus on its sustainability. Likewise, the continuity of T20 networking is essential and needs to be improved. That being said, the T20 effectively makes the G20 and the whole global governance system more inclusive. Within the G20, the B20 and—now—the T20 have become more structured, meaning that the time has come to shape the C20 as well. These outreach groups are making the G20 more inclusive and enlarging the broadband of global policy debate. The T20 is now turning into a mechanism for shaping the future agenda of the G20. Ideas not yet accepted by G20 official partners could now be raised and nourished within T20 task forces. This idea, first raised during Turkish Presidency in 2015, is now taking shape.

Name: International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)

Location: Ankara, Turkey

Date of Establishment: 2004

Director: Selçuk Çolakoğlu

The importance of emerging powers in the realm of global governance soared post-2008, that is, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The G20 Summits, which began convening after this crisis, have—since 2010—been increasingly overwhelmed by member countries left outside the scope of the G7 and the BRICS. Other than the G20, the most effective emerging power networks are ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and, to an extent, MIKTA.

China has led emerging power networks and the T20 with the help of Beijing's allocation of a significant budget to the think tank industry. India, South Korea, Brazil, and Turkey are other leading countries after China.

Membership in the T20 has helped USAK to enlarge its network around the world. USAK has communicated with its T20 partners almost every two months. That being said, USAK has also had monthly contacts with non-T20 members. USAK already had relationships with many member think tanks before the formation of the T20. However, the T20 has facilitated USAK's collaboration with member think tanks and increased the frequency of our sharing of publications and expertise.

The T20 and the G20 do not yet cooperate as much as they should. Still, though, the T20 is a relatively young initiative, founded under the G20 chairmanship of Australia in 2014. When we consider the short history of the T20, it has a good record of assessments. In the future, the T20 should focus on capacity building in some G20 member countries. Member countries like Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Argentina, and Mexico need to develop the capabilities of existing think tanks and to form new ones. Turkish think tanks have faced significant challenges since the declaration of state of emergency in the country in July 2016. A small number of Turkish think tanks have been suspended by executive orders, and the remaining think tanks face difficulties in maintaining financial and academic independence. Other G20 member governments should urge Turkey to respect and support academically independent Turkish think tanks.

NOTES

1. See: Domenico Lombardi and Samantha St. Amand, *Prioritizing International Monetary and Financial Cooperation for the G20 Views from the T20*, available at: <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/prioritizing-international-monetary-and-financial-cooperation-g20-views-t20>.
2. The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a significant power shift in the world economy. The share of the G7 in global GDP, measured at market exchange rates (at purchasing power parity rates, alternatively), declined from 65.4 percent (48.3 percent) in 2000 to 50.3 percent (39.2 percent) in 2010. Emerging powers (in many cases, resurgent powers) increased their global influence and formed their own networks.

Conclusion



Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and National, Regional, and Global Politics

James G. McGann

Abstract Networks—both internal and global—are essential for allowing emerging power think tanks, which will inevitably be underfunded and less equipped than their established rich-world counterparts, to contribute research, create an impact, and access global resources and ideas. At the same time, creating representative and functional networks involves overcoming several significant challenges both structurally and in terms of the identities of constituent think tanks.

Keywords Think tank influence • Global demands • Emerging markets • Emerging countries • Domestic policy • Foreign policy

In today's rapidly changing technological and international landscape, think tanks can provide a key link between research and policy. While governments are often encumbered by the cycle of political parties, the need to respond to urgent threats, and the bureaucratic separation of research, think tanks are able to be more forward-thinking, dynamic, and accommodating of technological advances due to their relative independence. As a result, we have witnessed the rapid expansion of think tanks in terms of

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both their influence and their sheer number since the mid-1980s. Today, in developed countries, the role of think tanks is effectively solidified in the policy-making process, improving countries' ability to grapple with global problems and respond to the shifting international environment.

While both developed and emerging powers alike are facing increasingly complex global demands, emerging markets must simultaneously address internal developmental challenges. Thus, current emerging markets are facing historically unprecedented economic and political challenges, and the development of strong domestic think tanks can heavily influence these markets' ability to prosper. In dealing with these challenges, emerging countries need innovative research, as simply trying to adopt other nations' policies or institutions is unlikely to succeed. Think tanks can provide this research, but emerging power think tanks must also determine the roles they will play nationally and globally.

While the presence of think tanks is firmly established within developed countries and their global institutions, the position of these research institutions in emerging powers, as we have seen with India, China, and Turkey, is rather uncertain. Moreover, emerging power think tanks are inevitably underfunded and less equipped than their rich-world counterparts so they face major challenges in terms of national, regional, and global recognition. By exploring three different case studies—India, China, and Turkey—we have elucidated the nature of some these challenges. In these conclusions, we seek to draw similarities from across the three case studies to identify adversities common to emerging power think tanks and possible strategies to overcome them through the use of policy networks.

With their India case study, Saran and Mohan raise several key questions concerning the identities of emerging power think tanks. First, think tanks, like emerging markets in general, must grapple with the need to balance a national identity with an international role and impact. In the case of India, this means balancing the need to deal with critical domestic problems of severe inequality with the need to address global issues. For India, as an emerging power, one of these substantial global issues is the need to reconfigure the architecture of global governance in order to render them more representative and solidify India's integration. As discussed by Saran and Mohan, the Indian think tank ORF represents a relatively powerful research institution undergoing the process of locating this balance. ORF was created with a domestic policy focus, dealing with national issues such as health, economy, and education. However, in order to effec-

tively assert itself as an influential global think tank, ORF must continue to also address topics of global perspective like cyber security, outer space management, and climate change.

Second, beyond simply addressing global issues, emerging powers and their think tanks must also determine how they will situate themselves in the structure of the international system, as hinted above. The current system is too unpopular in too many quarters to thrive, or maybe even survive, without meaningful reform. Thus, emerging power think tanks must decide to what extent they want to work with or within existing structures and to what extent they want to forge their own more representative bodies and institutions. In other words, they must choose their role in forthcoming systematic reforms, or, as Saran and Mohan suggest in India's case, decide whether they should instead drive a process to fundamentally "re-form" the system.

One of the key challenges emerging power think tanks face in establishing their presence in this international system is how they define their relationships to their home countries. Because newly established think tanks in emerging powers lack both a solid funding base and political recognition, their success largely depends on strong ties to their governments. This relationship raises the question of whether or not these research institutions can function in networks as independent voices open to genuine cooperation rather than just advocates for their national parochial interests. The nature of the structures think tank policy networks take, then, is highly important in determining whether or not emerging power think tanks can attain a sufficient level of independence from their national governments' bias.

As discussed by Wen, this challenge is particularly relevant with respect to Chinese think tanks' relationships to the G20 and T20. In some ways, the T20 network structure seems to exacerbate the problem of strong national identification because each think tank ends up being defined, in part, as a national representative. For Wen, the Chinese government's ability to exert "its soft power" in the G20 and RDCY's influence in think tank policy networks, such as the T20, are intertwined. The mirroring of these two bodies, the G20 and T20, may be problematic in that it limits the potential for think tank policy networks to collaborate to find innovative, global solutions based on objective research. If, for example, Chinese think tanks focus primarily on strengthening China's role in international governance and assisting in the pursuit of Chinese foreign policy goals, they are not contributing, per se, to the goal of these networks to promote

and research good global governance. Because so many contemporary policy challenges require truly global solutions, policy networks built so clearly along national lines mirroring already established government networks may not be the best solution.

Another problem with tying global policy networks to established global governance structures is that emerging markets may encounter the same underrepresentation and difficulty having their voices heard as they already face in these established structures. Though emerging market think tanks and policy networks are certainly growing and professionalizing, there remains a significant gap in institutionalization, capacity, and contacts with the government between such organizations and their rich-world counterparts. If the policy networks do not differ substantially enough in nature from these global governance structures, there is no reason to assume that their power dynamics would be any different.

On the other hand, if national borders do not play a role in defining policy networks, there is a risk that the networks become vehicles for groupthink. The emphasis on spreading largely Western “best practices” has the potential to stifle local innovation and unique perspectives in emerging markets. In other words, without some association between emerging power think tanks and their local governments, established Western practices may dominate, and networks may never benefit from the inclusion of these emerging powers and their perspectives.

While developed countries have much to gain by working with emerging powers through networks to face global problems, for emerging power think tanks themselves, the stakes are higher, as networks are an absolute necessity for survival. With respect to think tanks, we can think of two main forms of networks—internal networks and global networks—both of which are crucial. The nature of these networks was well defined in Sak and Koru’s discussion of their Turkish think tank, TEPAV. For Sak and Koru, the concept of networks, both internal and global, is fundamental to TEPAV’s identity. As they explained early on, the US model of a think tank, as “a storefront in the marketplace of ideas” does not “suit Turkey’s needs” insofar as Turkey requires think tanks to play more a grassroots, or bottom-up, role.

This comment deals with the first form of networks, the internal network. In the USA, the separation of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches makes the policy-making process rather porous to outside forces and groups, like think tanks. This, in combination with the resources and funding American think tanks can acquire through their

positions as nonprofits, gives them the potential to be powerful institutions. As a result, think tanks can relatively easily find ways to influence policy. On the other hand, because think tanks are not necessarily established in the Turkish policy-making process, to be effective they need to be much more active in asserting their role. In Turkey, as Sak and Koru argue, this means TEPAV must bring together technical expertise, private sector experts, and the government, in addition to the usual social science academics. In other words, while the US system itself can function as a sort of network in which think tanks play an intermediary role between research and policy, in Turkey, think tanks must internally create this network. On the global level, this insures that TEPAV's contributions are "authentic answers to real questions on the ground."

However, for TEPAV to even attain a voice in the international system, they also rely on what we referred to earlier as the second form of networks, global networks. TEPAV, and other emerging powers, needs to take advantage of the lower communication costs to form international networks, in addition to the domestic ones described above. This is especially urgent because, with so much research currently being produced, any individual publication is unlikely to draw much attention or have a significant impact if it is not communicated to the right people. As Sak and Koru put it, op-ed columns or white papers published by independent emerging power think tanks "can get lost in the cacophony of voices" in our "hyper-saturated environment." Though in developed countries, these types of publications may have the potential to influence policy, for emerging power think tanks, networks and groups like the T20 are critical for making their voices heard.

To sum up, networks—both internal and global—are essential for allowing emerging power think tanks, which will inevitably be underfunded and less equipped than their established rich-world counterparts, to contribute research, create an impact, and access global resources and ideas. At the same time, creating representative and functional networks involves overcoming several significant challenges both structurally and in terms of the identities of constituent think tanks. First, as discussed with regards to India, think tanks themselves must strike an effective balance between focusing on internal problems and on global issues. For emerging power think tanks generally, this means addressing national problems and global ones, while also paying close attention to overcoming "domestic pressures on its foreign policy initiatives."

A related issue, which we saw in the case of China's RDCY, is that emerging powers must not use their think tanks as a way of strengthening their role or influence in international governance, or think tank networks will never realize their full potential of collaboration based on objective research to combat global problems. This, as discussed earlier, can depend on the form global think tank networks take—whether or not they will mirror established networks as the T20 mirrors the G20. Ultimately, there must be some balance between retaining national identity to ensure there is ample opportunity for local strategies to inform global issues and overcoming national ties to effectively collaborate beyond each government's bias.

Finally, as we were reminded by Sak and Koru's discussion of TEPAV in Turkey, emerging powers cannot and should not necessarily attempt to model their think tanks after the archetype created by developed countries. As evidenced by TEPAV, and by both other case studies for that matter, functioning internal and global networks should play a stronger role in developing emerging power think tanks than perhaps was necessary in the case of rich-world think tanks. Emerging power think tanks are both developing and functioning within a different set of conditions than those in which rich-world think tanks developed, so they face wholly distinctive challenges and will depend far more on actively forming effective networks.

We must continue to examine the changing variables in the global order and assess the conditions in which rising powers develop their international presence. Think tanks in emerging powers will continue both to represent a determining factor in how these nations formulate domestic and foreign policy and to act as part of the investigation of how rising powers develop.

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Human Rights and Development These think tanks are mainly responsible for dealing with poverty, discrimination, gender, sexuality, basic needs, decent living standards, and empowerment such as enhancing working skills to help the lower level of society climb the ladder.

Economic Policy and Business Empowerment These think tanks are involved in providing assistance on economic issues, (monetary, fiscal among various others) as well as overall economic development. They are involved in promoting international trade as well as global economic activities of the country. The Business Development is mainly of a private sector. It involves assistance in setting up of SMEs, providing better management, and incorporating technology and other more efficient tools in everyday business activities.

Security and International Affairs These think tanks deal with military, defense as well as the international relations of the country. These institutions also provide policy advice on border conflicts between countries.

Health and Environment These think tanks are involved in shaping healthcare policies, as well as provide assistance and guidance to deal with severe diseases such as AIDS, Ebola, and so on. Some of them are also involved in the protection of the environment, water resources as well as reducing global warming/climate change.

Education and Science and Technology These think tanks engage in enhancing educational methodologies, schools, and other institutions, as well as providing better access to education. Think tanks involved in the development of science and technology are also under this category.

Agriculture These think tanks are involved in promoting farming, enhancing farming, and agricultural techniques, as well as promoting rural development with a focus on agriculture.

Cultural These think tanks are involved in the study of societal history and traditions, as well as media communications.

Disaster Management These think tanks are engaged in dealing with natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, and so on. These think tanks are engaged in both anticipation and reaction plans.

Energy These think tanks are dedicated to mineral extraction, power supply, and the oil industry.

Good Governance These think tanks promote democracy, civil rights, anti-corruption, and fair elections.

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