Huhua Cao · Jeremy Paltiel *Editors*

Facing China as a New Global Superpower

Domestic and International Dynamics from a Multidisciplinary Angle

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ISBN 978-981-287-822-9 ISBN 978-981-287-823-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015949446

Springer Singapore Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Pte Ltd. is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

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Contributors

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Sustainability of Sino-Canadian Partnership

Huhua Cao

1.1 China as a New International Policy-Maker on the World Stage

The international role and prestige of China have undoubtedly changed since Canada established official diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1970. Since the late 1970s, it has undergone considerable economic growth, allowing it to become the second largest economic power in the world. China has not only joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, but has also become a trade powerhouse and a workshop for the world. China's growing international status allows it to play an increasingly important role in global decision-making. Beyond its significant influence in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, its active role as a mediator in the six-party talks, and its leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (上海合作组织, *shanghai hezuo zuzhi*), the outstanding pace at which its global economy has grown has given Beijing an important position in the G20, with many observers anticipating that China will be competing with the United States for world leadership in the upcoming decades. China's leadership in the development of the multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) will increase the country's influence on world economic order. Lastly, China's recent initiatives for integrating regional economic development through the "One Belt, One Road" policy, announced in 2013, will encourage cultural exchange, investments in infrastructure and broadening trade between China, Eurasia, South and Southeast Asia.

Additionally, Beijing's presence, influence and respect have grown considerably on the African continent. Chinese leaders have strengthened political relations with

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_1

several African countries, while maintaining relations with others, by establishing the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000 (Kaplinsky et al. 2008). The fruits of such cooperation have made China the third largest trading partner for the African continent, with a trade value of $106.8 billion in 2010 (Yajing 2011). Beijing's international prestige has also expanded in the wake of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai.

The above facts suggest that China is no longer a mere international policy-taker, but it is increasingly becoming an international policy-maker, which has naturally made the international community concerned about the evolution of China's foreign policy. In light of these changes, it is in Canada's interest to build a close partnership with Beijing. Canada, alongside other global powers large and small, not only needs to establish a comprehensive domestic and foreign policy strategy to deal with the growing level of Chinese influence worldwide, but it also must ensure the sustainability and long-term strength of this bilateral partnership. Insofar as Ottawa draws considerable political, economic and commercial benefits from China's rise on the world scene, a long-term strategy to secure bilateral relations with China is important. In the process of establishing a policy towards China that promotes dialogue and exchange between academics and policy-makers, Ottawa should closely examine how China's identity, its guiding philosophies, traditions and cultures, as well as its domestic social, economic and political challenges affect its position in the international community. This effort cannot be achieved without a close collaboration and sharing of knowledge between academia and policy-makers in both countries, and the active participation of youth, who constitute the future generation of China scholars in both countries. Such collaboration may help Canada formulate a more grounded foreign policy strategy towards the global Chinese economy. It may also help Ottawa go beyond the foreign policy dead-end with Beijing that was prompted by Canada's over-emphasis on the social and human rights-related problems that still pervade Chinese society.

1.2 The Future of Canada–China Relations

Despite its growing prestige, China still faces considerable challenges domestically, and Canada is a model that China may wish to examine and possibly adopt in order to address some of these issues. Income disparities amongst Chinese citizens have grown considerably since the 1980s, not only across regions and provinces, but also between urban and rural areas, and across social classes (Cao and Bergeron 2010; Lieberthal 2004; Yang 2004). Also, tensions between the ethnic Han majority and China's indigenous minorities have been contributing to increased internal unrest (Cao 2008, 2009, 2010). In June 2011, protests erupted in the Hohhot, the capital of Mongolia, over the death of a cattle-herder who attempted to stop a coal truck convoy from entering the grasslands. The outrage over this incident is due to a

history of Mongolian grievance over economic activities that threaten their environment and traditional livelihood. Essentially, Mongolia is demonstrating against years of cultural insensitivity, political oppression and economic exploitation by the central Chinese government (UK Guardian 2011).

In the context of growing social and economic grievances and with a judicial system that comprises an ineffective and saturated system of letters and complaints, collective protests frequently erupt in various parts of the country. While the Chinese government has shown signs of increasing willingness to accommodate society on some levels, China's intentions, as far as political reforms are concerned, remain difficult to capture. Though recent legal reforms suggest that the government is making efforts towards political transparency and a more rigorous rule of law, particularly President Xi Jinping's anti-grafting measures to crack down on corruption, it is primarily concerned with the survival of its own autocratic regime. In the current environment, China's current leadership appears to be targeting Party members perceived of as immoral, rather than engaging in institutional reform to address these issues. Under such circumstances, democracy remains far from attainable. China's environmental problems, and the broader challenge of climate change, have also been the target of concerns in the West. China has become the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and though it has expressed a commitment to cut the unit GDP carbon dioxide emission level by a range of 40 % by 2020, the need to maintain stable growth may make such a target hard to reach.

Finally, China has been facing considerable challenges with respect to its national sovereignty, including the Taiwan, Uyghur and Tibetan pro-independence movements, prompting Beijing to boost its military resources. China has been involved in numerous confrontations with its South Asian neighbours over China's assertion of sovereignty in the South China Sea (中国南海, *zhongguo nanhai*). In recent months, China has built several artificial islands in the South China Sea, justifying the move as being "within the scope of China's sovereignty" (Hunt 2015). The islands under question are claimed by other countries in the region, including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. These actions parallel China's territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands (钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿, *diaoyu dao jiqi fushu daoyu*) in the East China Sea (中国东海, *zhongguo donghai*) which are currently under Japanese administration (Cheng 2010). While Canada could play a constructive role in advising China on how to address some of the above matters, the clashes between the countries on matters of human rights in China have had a detrimental impact on their bilateral relations, as China is becoming more resolute in its distinct political ideology. What is more, their foreign policy priorities towards one another were not always mutual. For instance, while following the Tian'anmen incident (天安门事件, *Tian'anmen shijian*), human rights became one of pillars of Canada's foreign policy towards China, Beijing's nation-building project increasingly relied upon the rejection of Western liberal-democratic values. Canada's foreign policy vis-à-vis China has also changed several times during the past 40 years, and was in some instances,

inconsistently implemented,[1] which did not help solidify bilateral ties. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper's trip to China in November 2014 focused on primarily economic interests, suggesting a shift away from prior Canadian foreign policy approaches to the country (PMO 2014).

Today, in framing its policy towards China, Canada faces a new reality: it ought to remember that Beijing has reached a position of economic influence in the world that allows it to choose what it wishes to accept from Western powers, and ignore what it believes it does not need. As Frolic (2011) points out, Canada's relations with China over most of the past 40 years shave been premised on a single idea: that China is a major power outside the mainstream of international society so that in partnering with China, Canada can play a valuable, even principal role in improving China's integration into international society and global governance that might thereby advance Canada's international stature. However, China is now a major power inside the mainstream of international society. What will be the new Canadian policy for next 40 years as Paltiel (2011) has posited? In such circumstances, a bilateral policy aiming to impose Western values upon the Chinese government is unlikely to generate satisfactory outcomes for either of the two parties. Keeping that in mind, Canada nonetheless should play an active role, in not only assisting China in becoming an economic power, but also in enhancing its soft power and becoming a responsible international policy-maker. The new generation of China scholars in Canada will have a crucial role to play in guiding Ottawa through that process.

1.3 The New Generation of China Scholars and the Sustainability of the Sino-Canadian Partnership

Establishing a solid, ongoing dialogue between academics, policy-makers and the private sector in both Canada and China is key to stable, fulfilling and profitable bilateral relations. In the process of reinforcing such collaboration, graduate students' perspectives on Chinese politics and Canada–China relations are fundamental for four reasons. First, students in both Canada and China constitute the future generation of scholars, policy-makers and private sector representatives, and

[1]Trudeau, who established Ottawa's first foreign policy towards Beijing, was based on the pursuit of independent international relations with world countries, despite their ideology. In that context, Trudeau's government helped communist China integrate the international community, which contributed to solidifying bilateral relations between the two nations. Mulroney's policy, in 1987, was based on the Canada–China Strategy, but it was not pursued as a result of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Finally, during Chrétien's government, Ottawa's foreign policy vis-à-vis China was based on four main pillars: economic partnership, peace and security, sustainable development; as well as human rights promotion. When Chrétien left office in 2003, however, Canada's strategy towards China was not properly redefined.

are likely to shape their respective countries' domestic policy, influence their country's priorities, identify its stakes and impact its bilateral relations, consequently. To the extent that they are the minds that will help to shape future domestic and foreign policy developments in their respective countries, their opinions about the challenges underlying China's development and Canada–China relations are important. Moreover, familiarizing young scholars to the state of the field of Canada–China relations will help prepare the young generation of thinkers and practitioners to understand the policy challenges to come in their respective professional environments. Second, to the extent that they are associated with new ideas and ways of seeing the world, the upcoming generation of scholars holds greater potential for change and innovation in the tone of Canada and China's dialogue. The younger generation of Canadians will have been more in touch with China and Chinese culture and will thus have different perceptions of the latter, and be better able to establish bilateral relations with Beijing on the basis of reciprocity. Conversely, the Chinese youth will have been more systematically in touch with the Western world, including Canada, an increasing number of who are educated there, and thus, in a better position to bridge potential cultural, ideological and diplomatic divides. Third, while the older generation of scholars and practitioners have emphasized the need to transcend ideological barriers between Canadian and Chinese scholars (Cao and Poy 2011), and promote a multidisciplinary dialogue on the two countries' bilateral ties amongst politicians, policy-makers, academia and the private sector, the younger generation will be responsible for actively pursuing this agenda. Based on the assumption that effective implementation requires participating in a program's conception, the upcoming generation of scholars and practitioners must be involved in the process of identifying Canada and China's policy agenda. Fourth, and not unrelated to the second point, in taking part in current debates, and in developing and extending their bilateral networks as a result, Canadian and Chinese youth will not only ensure that the two countries' relations are long-lasting, but also help such reciprocity extend itself across sectors. The ability for the partnership to last will also depend upon the new generation's ability to sustain that cross-sector dialogue, and ensure that the following generation is as committed to strong bilateral relations with China. Hence, engaging students' in today's debate about how to improve Canada–China relations, and implicitly, understanding China's domestic and international context, is key to ensuring the sustainability of the bilateral partnership.

Two factors facilitate the building of bilateral ties among Canadian and Chinese youth. First, since the twentieth century important Canadian figures have favourably influenced Chinese perceptions of Canada. Dr. Henry Norman Bethune (白求恩, *baiqiuen*) embarked on a medical mission to the front lines of the Eight Route Army (八路军, *balu jun*) and successfully saved many Chinese lives during the Communist struggle against the Japanese in the 1930s. Da Shan (大山, *dashan*), one of the most famous personalities in the country's media industry since the 1990s, has also earned the respect of Chinese citizens for his comic talent and his ability to speak Mandarin fluently. Their contributions to Chinese society at various periods of its history have made them integral parts of the Chinese educational

curriculum. These significant Canadian figures in China have shaped the Chinese youth's understanding of Canada's historical relationship to China, one that is based on solidarity, support and mutual respect. Second, the two countries have demographic relations that help bridge potential cultural and linguistic gaps between students. Today, 4 % of Canadians have Chinese origins, and Cantonese and Mandarin, combined, are the third most spoken languages in Canadian households today after English and French. In the city of Vancouver alone, Canadians of Chinese descent represented 18.2 % of the population in 2008, and in Toronto, they accounted for 9.6 % of the population. What is more, the number of Chinese nationals studying in Canada in 2009 was estimated at 50,000, namely one-fourth of all international students in the country (Canadian Visa Bureau 2010). Conversely, 300,000 Canadians live in China, and while there were about 5,000 Canadian students in Chinese universities in 2008 (Zhang 2010), that number is expected to grow in the next decades, as Mandarin becomes an important international language of communication.

In an attempt to explore the avenues Ottawa may utilize in order to strengthen its ties with Mainland China, this book discusses how Canada holds the potential to overcome the foreign policy obstacles posed by ideological differences with China, from a graduate students' perspective. This book is the first attempt at integrating the views of youth into the debate about the two countries' future bilateral relations, and a crucial first step for the initiation of an ongoing cross-generational and cross-cultural dialogue.

1.4 The Structure of this Book

There are four sections in this book. Each section explores a broad theme related to the changing nature of Chinese society, and its interactions with Canada and the rest of the world. In the first section, there are three diverse and comprehensive chapters assess the changing structure of the state–society relationship in China, concluding that it is evolving autonomously from the West, and also in a break with its own past. Jing Qian attempts to answer the two following research questions: how does China's authoritarian regime deals with the issue of "interest representation" in an increasingly pluralistic society, and what is the role of the People's Congresses (人大代表, *renda daibiao*) in this struggle? By representing diverse interests of social sectors in a corporatist style, the People's Congresses especially Local People's Congresses (地方人大代表, *defang renda daibiao*) act as an intermediary between the state and society—Qian's examination of this arrangement reveals many of the tensions in this relationship still examining the local level, Leslie Shieh approaches governance in civil society, investigating the relationships of the not for profit *minfei* (民非组织) organizations with both the state and society to demonstrate their integral place in the post-reform era welfare system. Moving from policy making and service delivery, Kamyar Razavi's essay continues on the subject of rule of law in China, examining the application of property rights law (物权法,

wuquan fa) in Chongqing (重庆). He highlights the clash between State preeminence in China and the realities of global capitalism by asking and answering the following question: what is the relationship between property ownership and economic development? The subsequent examination of property rights in China reveals the numerous contradictions between private property-oriented legislation, and the continuing dominance of the State's socialist ideology.

The second section of this book is comprised of four chapters that examine Canada's ever-changing relationship with China, and the role of the Canadian-based Chinese diaspora in developing this increasingly important rapport. Eric Lefrançois opens this section with a detailed history of the evolution of Canada's dealings with China (中加关系的演变, *zhongjia guanxi de yanbian*), stressing the importance of creating and maintaining a positive bilateral relationship, especially in light of China's recent economic ascendance. Minxing Zhao then introduces one of the major barriers to achieving this goal: Canada and China's divergent views on human rights (人权, *renquan*), especially in China's continuing use of the death penalty (死刑, *sixing*) and Canada's subsequent refusal to extradite Chinese fugitives, which continues to impede Sino-Canadian criminal justice cooperation. Charles-Louis Labrecque expands on the broader issue of human rights (人权, *renquan*) in Sino-Canadian relations, tracing the evolution of Ottawa's policy of human rights in China since 1970. Addressing a segment of the Chinese population in Canada, Hongxia Shan focuses on the experience of the Chinese diaspora (中国侨民, *zhongguo qiaomin*) in Canada, concentrating specifically on the reality of Chinese immigrant engineers. By sharing the results of numerous interviews, Shan demonstrates that skilled immigrants must make significant alterations to the way in which they communicate, socialize and problem-solve in order to adapt to the Canadian work environment.

The third section including four chapters looks at China in its new context as a global superpower, drawing attention to the positive aspects of its urban development, cultural dissemination and foreign policy. Matthew Skogstad-Stubbs builds on the domestic aspects China's urban transition discussed by Razavi and Han in section two. He emphasizes the importance of the international exchange of ideas in urban development, using Shanghai Expo 2010 (上海 2010 年世博会, *shanghai 2010 shibohui*) to exemplify how the discussions amongst academics, corporations and politicians have contributed to the development of Shanghai as a global city. Adam MacDonald rejects the conventional status-quo versus revisionist power division that currently characterizes the debate over China's international dealings, offering in its place a conceptual model that highlights the three core principles of China's emerging foreign policy (中国新兴的外交政策, *zhongguo xinxing de waijiao zhengce*): access to economic and political resources, assurance of China's intentions as peaceful, and acceptance of China as an emerging great power. Focusing on a specific and important case in China's international engagement, Ajay Parasram uses the Sino-Indian confrontation over the Bay of Bengal to depict how these two emerging powers are locked in a competitive relationship that depends upon soft, not hard, power and therefore still allows for materially meaningful and positive exchanges. Drawing on another case, Matthew Gaudreau

concludes this section by detailing China's rice projects in Mali, drawing attention to the importance and complexities of Chinese cooperation for successful international development in the future.

In the last section, there are two chapters discussing the literature on Chinese identities in a globalized context. Jennifer Lau analyzes the concept of Chinese–Canadian identity in Midnight at Dragon Café and Banana Boys, both of which are set in Toronto's Chinatown (多伦多的唐人街, duolunduo de tangrenjie). She demonstrates how this close-knit area is often the centre of negotiations between Chinese and Canadian identities that result in an ever-evolving sense of identity for the Chinese community in Canada. Min Yang's chapter tackles the debate over Menglong poetry's connection to modernism from a new perspective by suggesting that this relationship is ambiguous in its view towards conflicting issues such as tradition and modernism (传统与现代, chuantong yu xiandai), highlighting the dynamism of the Chinese perspective.

Professor Jeremy Paltiel concludes this book with an encouragement to foster positive future bilateral relations between Canada and China. While a close friendship with China would bring Canada many positive tangible benefits, the exchange of ideas about issues such as minority rights and diversity would be invaluable for both countries. Paltiel encapsulates the important lessons of this book, and looks to the twenty-first century with China at its centre with optimism.

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Part I
Changing State-Society Relations and Policy Reforms

Chapter 2
Corporatist Representation Via People's Congress: An Aspect on the State–Society Relationship in Contemporary China

Jing Qian

2.1 Research Question, Methodology and Outline

The third generation of contemporary Chinese studies aims to depict changes in China via examination of the interaction between state and society (Harding 1984; Perry 1994). This paper takes on the wave of the third generation, aiming to analyze roles of legislatures in shaping the state–society relationship in a decentralized

This paper is written in the year 2009, largely based on my LL.M. thesis (Qian 2009). Due to the length limitation, it tries to include as many substantial empirical findings as possible, while squeezing both the general background and the theoretical framework. Please refer to the thesis for a fuller description of research background and a more complete version of theoretical generalization.

After more than 5 years, it seems the basic logic of the core arguments remains valid, and to some extent intensified by the recent comprehensive strengthening of the United Front policies and initiatives, all of which carry core features of corporatist representation. The key difference is the emphasis on different interest groups along the time based on the needs of governance under the authoritarian regime.

I'd like to express my gratitude to both of my supervisors, Professor Guoguang Wu and Professor Andrew Harding for their constant inspirations and guidance, to Professor Huhua Cao, Professor Jeremy Paltiel and two pseudonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments, and to Matt, Alex and Uncle Ron for their kind assistance during the editing process.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_2

authoritarian regime with marketization and economic development for over three decades.[1] The research question is twofold. First, as a "modernizing authoritarianism" (Wu 2005; Nathan 2003; Oscar 2005) with limited and non-responsive pluralism, how does the current regime deal with "interest representation" in a more and more complex and pluralistic society (Walder 1988; Xiao 2003)?[2] Second, which is more essential here: what functions do People's Congresses (PCs), especially Local People's Congresses (LPCs), fulfill in state elites' responses to conflicts between an authoritarian state and a diversifying society?[3]

With the PC/LPC as the research focus, this paper attempts to illustrate how the state–society relationship is configured into political institutions, and to explore political functions of this representative mechanism in shaping the state–society interaction from the perspective of corporatism, both of which will uncover traces of corporatist representation via the People's Congress in China. This is the first attempt to understand PCs from the perspective of corporatism, to describe corporatist characteristics of this representative assembly, and to label Chinese legislature as corporatist, all of which will enrich the classical conceptual framework of corporatism (Schmitter 1974), and also provide a new theoretical perspective for research on China, Chinese legislatures and comparative legislative studies.[4] Analyses of state–society interactions via the PC can also shed some light on roots deep in institutional arrangements which account for the current widespread social tensions and governance issues.

This project is empirically oriented. Methodologically, empirical sources consist of a combination of primary and secondary materials. First-hand sources are based primarily on the author's field trip to China from March to April 2009, which looked at three randomly selected County level People's Congresses (CLPCs) in Zhejiang Province.[5] In order to preserve anonymity, these three counties will be

[1]On explanation of decentralization in China, see Landry (2008); see also Leslie Shieh's chapter of this volume, which illustrates the decentralization of state service from central to local levels; On the separation of state and society, the emergence of civil society, and the rising up of societal forces in China, see Pei (1995), White (1993), Brook and Frolic (1997), Ding (2001), Gilley and Diamond (2008), McCormick and Unger (1996), Guo (2003), Falkenheim (1987), Burton (1990), Goldman and MacFarquhar (1999), Goldman and Perry (2002).

[2]Another dimension of the diversification of societal forces in current China is displayed by Shieh in another chapter of this volume via introduction of the transfer of welfare responsibilities from the state to the society. Besides, the term "society" here refers to the general idea of society, not to civil society in particular, although it is also commonly used of such.

[3]To understand these two interrelated questions better, please refer to the full version of the author's LL.M. thesis, for further explanations with application of the paradigm of "who does what to whom, and how" (Qian 2009: 3–7). The state elites here mostly refer to the Party leadership.

[4]For example, one of the most classic definitions refers to Schmitter's (1974).

[5]Zhejiang Province is selected as the empirical setting of this research on LPCs (CLPCs) based on two considerations. First, Zhejiang, as a pioneer of private economic development in China, has one of the most complex and pluralistic interest group structures. Not only is Zhejiang an economically well-off area, but its economic composition makes it highly suitable for the study of interest representation of different societal sectors. Second, the province–county relationship in Zhejiang has been a test field in financial management reform (*Sheng Guan Xian,*省管县) ever

referred to as "County A", "County B" and "County C". Empirical materials include interviews with officials in these CLPCs and with related officials from the Provincial People's Congress in Zhejiang Province; interviews with both People's Deputies (PD) and local constituents; as well as some internal information provided by friends in these three CLPCs and the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress.[6] Laws, regulations and related legal documents are also used as the most prominent formal expression of the legislature on different strategies it applies towards certain social sectors, within which we can see preferences and distinguish inducements from constraints. Secondary materials consist of empirical studies on PC/LPCs done by other scholars in English and a critical reading of a selection of Chinese literature, including government documents, newspaper reports, public speeches by PC leaders, published yearbooks and magazines put out by different PCs, and some unpublished internal materials. In addition, a 6-months internship (2007) in the standing committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress, and personal participations in both the fifth plenary session and the 33rd to 35th Standing Committee sessions of the 10th PLPC in Zhejiang Province not only served as the initial inspiration for this project, but also enabled me to see a more accurate image of the PC system.

Figure 2.1 indicates the structure of relations empirically explored to verify a formula of corporatism conceptually tailored here: State–PC/LPC–Society, which also outlines this paper. First, dominance of the PC by the Party will be illustrated to depict why and how the State makes the LPC/CLPC into a representative institution of corporatism and how it penetrates into the structural format of the LPC, and controls its functional fulfillments. I conclude that the LPC (and the PC as a whole) can be labelled as a state apparatus designed and utilized by the central/local states as a corporatist mechanism to shape state–society relations. Second, I will investigate, using a "compare and contrast" method, how the LPC/ CLPC represents certain social segments in processes of deputy recruitment, demand articulation, decision-making and policy implementation by incorporating or excluding different sectors of social interests. This paper also slightly reveals how the LPC mediates among conflicting interests from different social sectors—labour and capital, for example, and how the LPC uses its power to control some social segments, such as the peasants and workers, but to protect others, such as the businesspeople. Qualitative and quantitative analyses of empirically collected data and legal analyses of policies and legislation are adopted jointly to compare and contrast different corporatist strategies the LPC has applied towards a variety of social sectors. A set

(Footnote 5 continued)

since 1953 (except the period of cultural revolution), and the expanding empowerment of counties has been a tradition in Zhejiang, which makes counties in Zhejiang more powerful and autonomous than counties elsewhere in China.

[6]For the requirement of anonymity, interviewees will be generally referred to as "officials", "deputies" and "constituents". Interviews will be referred to as follow, e.g. "interview of officials in County A CLPCSC (18 March, 2009)".



Fig. 2.1 The corporatist formula of State—PC/LPC—Societal Sectors [Scopes of these four social groups need some illustrations here: The social segment of peasants here includes rural residents based on the household registered system (*Hukou,* 户口制度), mainly the population earning an income by engaging in agricultural activities; The social segment of workers here includes labours employed in both state-owned sectors and private sectors; overlaps of these two social segments, such as migrant workers (农民工), are counted on both sides. The social segment of businesspeople here includes business owners and the management layer in both state-owned enterprises and non-state sectors, and if not specifically pointed out, the businesspeople refers to both; The social segment of intellectuals here generally refers to population with a certain level of education, in traditional Chinese sense as *zhishi fenzi*, 知识分子, including mainly white-collar professionals, self-employed artists, members of educational institutions and a variety of think tanks and so on]

of case studies are also presented as supportive evidence and to draw a more vivid picture.

2.2 Contextualization, Analytic Model and Definitional Framework

Although this paper is an interdisciplinary study combining law, political science and sociology, within the framework of contemporary Chinese studies and, more specifically, within studies on Chinese socio-political transition, under the context of the fundamentally altered and still rapidly changing relations between the state and society in post-1978 China; conceptually, this paper also belongs to the family of comparative legislative studies, especially the study of Chinese legislatures. However, unlike previous legislative studies[7] in China, this paper explores the PC

[7]Previous researches on the NPC see: Yu (1964), Green (1964), Bridgham (1965), Solinger (1982), O'Brien (1988, 1990), Shi (1993), Dowdle (1997), Tanner (1994: 56–93, 1999a: 100–128, b: 231–252), Xia (1998, 2000a), Lai 2001; On PLPCs and, generally, on LPCs, see: Lin (1992–1993), O'Brien (1994), O'Brien and Luehrmann (1998), MacFarquhar (1998), Xia (2008, 2000b);

Table 2.1 Criteria of corporatist policies

	Inducements	Constraints
1. PD recruitment/regime support		
1) PCPDs	Favourable	Unfavourable
2) PCSCPDs	Favourable	Unfavourable
2. Interest representation		
1) Proposals and suggestions from PDs	Favourable	Unfavourable
2) Relationship with mass organizations	Favourable	Unfavourable/non-existent
3. Policy-making/legislation	Favourable	Unfavourable
4. Policy implementation/supervision	Favourable	Unfavourable

as a representative institution for interest representation, and an intermediary realm between state and society. Rather than using the more popular approach of pluralism, this paper applies the alternative perspective of corporatism, in which the state, as well as the PC, has an autonomous and dominant role in shaping state–society relations by selectively including or excluding functionally different social segments based on intentions of state elites and policy goals set by them.

The conceptual models and analytical tools of corporatism applied here mostly fit into the third category of Panitch's typology, as "a new form of interest-group politics" ("Corporatism"), and sources of which primarily come from Schmitter (1974), Lehmbruch (1977), Stepan (1978), Collier and Collier (1977, 1979). Based on their excellent works, I have tailored a unique theoretical framework to analyze how the PC functions in structuring and controlling relations between state and societal sectors. Meanwhile, the application of corporatist theory to the case of Chinese legislature also expands the traditional conceptual framework of corporatism.

With Schmitter's classic conceptual framework, Stepan's "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" poles of corporatist policies (1978), and Colliers' subtle rubric of corporatist policies concerning societal groups of "inducements" and "constraints" (1979), an analytical model is developed to mark PCs' corporatist features and distinguish different policies of corporatism PCs apply to various societal sectors. As indicated in Table 2.1, inducements of the corporatist legislature include advantages in selection of PDs to both PCs and PCSCs; priorities in interest representation, including both demands articulated within PCs and via mass organizations representing certain social segments; preferential leanings in policy-making and implementation, such as advantages in legislation; and other personal privileges in both "public" and "hidden" transcripts, such as legislative immunity and honorary benefits as PDs. Accordingly, constraints contain disadvantages of PD recruitments; indifference in interest representation; discrimination in policy

(Footnote 7 continued)

On CLPCs in part, see: Cho (2009), Oscar (2005), Chen (1999: 183–227); On levels of government below the CLPC and on grassroots PCs, see: Manion (2000).



Fig. 2.2 Four types of policy tendencies in a corporatist legislature

formulation and related policy implementation supervision; and restrictions on other representational activities. The following criteria are generated for a contrasting pattern of corporatist tendencies applied by the PC to different societal sectors of interests.

Furthermore, combining Stepan's (1978) two poles with Colliers' (1979) measurements of corporatist policies, as indicated in Fig. 2.2, four combinations are generated for indicating policy tendencies in corporatist legislature: (1) a high level of inducements and a low level of constraints (re businesspeople), which means the state elites seek to gain support and cooperation of certain social sectors, and it should lie on the inclusionary side of the spectrum of state corporatism[8]; (2) a high level of both inducements and constraints (re intellectuals), which means the state cares less about gaining support from certain social sectors but more about controlling it, and it should lie in the middle of the spectrum of state corporatism; (3) a high level of constraints combined with a low level of inducements (re peasants, workers) which means the primary concern of the state is to control certain social sectors, and it should lie on the exclusionary side of the spectrum of state corporatism; (4) a low level of both means the state elites do not care much about certain social sectors.

With all above, a working definition[9] of a corporatist legislature containing both descriptive and comparative aspects, can be generated as follows:

[8]For the spectrum of state corporatism, see Fig. 5.2 below.

[9]Further explanations on linkages between Schmitter's classical definitional framework of Corporatism (1974) and my extension of it to representative institutions, please refer to three hypotheses verified in Qian (2009):

> Hypothesis One: Semi-competitive elections are, in practice, approaching to non-competitive elections;
> Hypothesis Two: Functional representation predominates over territorial representation;
> Hypothesis Three: People's Deputies are approximately equal to leaders of associational interest groups (39–44).

> A corporatist legislature (the PC in China for example), can be defined as a system of state designed/controlled hierarchically ordered representative institution to recruit representatives and articulate/intermediate interests among constituent units catalogued by the state elites into a limited number of singular, quasi-competitive and functionally differentiated groups. (Descriptive)
>
> Representative recruitment, interest articulation, policy formulation and policy implementation are based on an authoritatively structured interests input via selectively inclusionary or/and exclusionary processes. (Comparative)

Accordingly, a corporatist legislature is first a representative institution; second an institutional arrangement for interest representation and political control, and finally a system of representative institutions firmly in control of a relatively autonomous state apparatus which reflects asymmetries in existing distribution of power and privilege to different social segments. The functions of a corporatist legislature include: (1) to recruit representatives from state-structured interest groups, substantive and suppositional, entitative and abstract, tangible and intangible; (2) to articulate demands of these social interest groups and mediate among them and (3) to authoritatively include and exclude certain sectors of social interests in both policy-making and implementation.

Hereinafter are primarily empirical findings to descriptively and comparatively verify the definitional framework via the analytic tools, following the formula of corporatism mentioned above: State–PC–Society. Part III focuses on the former half, while Part IV the latter. It is worth mentioning here, while the theoretical framework and conceptual model is designed to be applicable to the PC system as a whole, the LPC, and county level People's Congress (CLPC) in particular, is chosen here as the subject of empirical research based on several considerations. First, local politics is an important component in comparative studies of politics and governance, while decentralization, or "decentralized authoritarianism" (Landry 2008), makes local politics in China a more appealing research field; Second, direct elections of People's Deputies (PDs) in the CLPC prioritize it from higher level PCs which recruit deputies only through indirect elections, while the organizational completeness of the CLPC makes town- and township-level PCs (TLPCs) inferior. Although TLPCs also enjoy direct elections, they do not have a standing political organ. In short, having both direct elections and a standing committee makes the CLPC a very special political player in both the PC system and local politics. Third, however, most legislative studies in China focus on the NPC. Not until recently did they decentralize to provincial-level PCs (PLPCs), but rarely has scholar focused on sub-provincial-level PCs, let alone the CLPC in particular.[10] Therefore, on the one hand, insufficient research on the CLPC also makes it necessary to shed more light on this county level representative institution in China, but on the other hand, the empirical verifications are primarily based on findings from CLPCs, and are thus relatively limited.

[10]Previous researches on the NPC see are numerous, while on PLPCs and, generally, on LPCs are emerging, but on CLPCs are only a handful: see *supra* note ix.

A further explanation on the research object, see Qian (2009: 26–29).

2.3 State—PC/LPC: A General Description

The re-empowerment of LPCs, especially the CLPC, was one of central items on the reform agenda of the late 1970s. But why is this so, especially given that there are already two other power players in existence: the Party committee and the government? What is the relationship between this newly empowered representative institution and the Party? Here I argue the entire PC system is designed as responses of Party elites in the state to social crises released by economic development in a corporatist style.[11]

Following the market oriented reforms, the socio-economic situation in China has changed, but the dominance of the Party in both state and society remains. What has changed accordingly is the means of control. In terms of the state, the Party retreated from micro-activities in economic development and social management, but still kept "political authority in the hands of top Party leaders" and conducted organizational control of the government via personnel appointments (Wu 2005: 176).[12] In terms of society, direct manipulation via ideology and mass mobilization no longer work well in this diversifying societal context of an information era. Instead, a series of institutions were designed to penetrate into society and draw a corporatist interest representation out of society. The re-empowerment of LPCs was part of these institutional arrangements.

Here, the dominance of the Party on LPCs/CLPCs will be generally demonstrated from aspects of institutional limitations, organizational penetrations and personnel constraints.

2.4 Institutional Limitations

The centrally designed proposal for the LPC reform placed institutional constraints on them. One of the most visible examples is a dual-track system of responsibilities imposed on LPCs. On the one hand, according to Articles 96 and 110 of the Constitution (2004), Article 4 of the Organic Law (2004) and Article 2 of the Electoral Law (2004), LPCs and LPC Standing Committees (LPCSC) are state organs elected from the public via multi-candidate, direct/indirect and periodic elections, and therefore should be responsible and accountable to the constituents. On the other hand, Article 99 of the Constitution (2004) and Article 8 of the Organic Law (2004) make the LPC into a centrally chartered supervisory

[11]It is necessary to introduce the concept of the "Party-state" here, which indicates the Party still remain the "absolute power center" of the Chinese state, and dominates both symbolic interest representation and substantial policy-making from/to the society, and thus the state–society relationship in China is closely related to/fundamentally dependant on the Party–PC relationship (Xia 2008: 20; Xia "The Communist Party of China and the 'Party-State'").

[12]Wu further demonstrates the separation of the Party from the government (2005).

powerhouse to ensure, on behalf of the up-levels' leadership, the implementation of laws and regulations and oversight over misbehaviours of local cadres within certain geo-political boundaries.

Within this institutional design of the dual-track system of responsibilities in the books, a dilemma faces the LPCs: what if demands of the state and interests of the people conflict with each other? As a matter of fact, the "core of leadership" principle of the Party and its universal representation will guide the LPCs to reach a decision in the action.[13]

2.5 Organizational Penetrations

Article 46 in the CCP Constitution (2007) indicates the institutional roots of why and how the Party organizationally exists and dominates everywhere in various state apparatuses, including, of course, LPCs/CLPCs.[14] In fact, right after the re-empowerment of the LPC/CLPC in 1981, the central leadership issued a policy guide to set up Leading Party Member's Groups within CLPCs nation-wide (He 2005: pp. 164–165). Typically, when a Leading Party Members' Group (LPMG) is set up, the principle of "Democratic Centralism" functions in vital decision-making.[15] Simultaneously, the Party's hierarchical ranking system is

[13]On the "core of leadership" principle, see CCP Constitution 2007: Article 46; "Three represents theory", see CCP Constitution 2007: "the party must always represent the requirements of the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China" (the general program). Besides, the gap problem between "law in books" and "law in action" is common in China.

[14]See CCP Constitution (2007):

> A leading Party members' group may be formed in the leading body of a central or local state organ, people's organization, economic or cultural institution or other non-Party unit. The group plays the role of the core of leadership. Its main tasks are: to see to it that the Party's line, principles and policies are implemented, to discuss and decide on matters of major importance in its unit, to do well in cadre management, to rally the non-Party cadres and the masses in fulfilling the tasks assigned by the Party and the state and to guide the work of the Party organization of the unit and those directly under it (Article 46).

[15]Normatively, Democratic Centralism means "The minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the entire membership of the Party to the Central Committee" (CCP Constitution 2007: Article 10). See also, Constitution 2004: Article 3.

Theoretically, Democratic Centralism means "to concentrate power in the top leader and give the Party control over the government and military, according to which the regimes also enforce bans on political activity outside the Party, established controls over the media and civil society, and advocated transformational goals through economic policy, mass mobilization, and use of propaganda" (Goldman and Esarey 2008: 53).



Fig. 2.3 The internal structure of County C CLPC and its SC [Interviews of officials in County C CLPC (24 March, 2009). Although the labour division of functional committees might slightly differ from those in other CLPCs, the LPMG exists with no exception to make vital decisions in both CLPCs and up-level PCs. A ← B, means B is responsible to A, is applicable to all figures in this article]

applied to put CLPC officials under personnel management of the organizational department of the Party committee.[16]

As Fig. 2.3 depicts, the Party organization penetrates into both the CLPC and its SC. On the one hand, a LPMG lies at the heart of the CLPCSC, which actually has the final say in making major decisions on such themes as supervisory activities and vital legislation. The author learned from the director of the CLPCSC Law Committee in County C that the annual theme of supervisory activities should be accordant with the Party's priorities each year.[17] Similarly, at other levels of LPCs, as a vice-director of the PLPC Law Committee in Zhejiang has implied, although the PLPC enjoys certain autonomy in legislation, the LPMG still has to report the annual legislative plan to the Provincial Party Committee and, in 2008, one piece of potentially reformist legislation on household registration systems was called off by the Provincial Party Committee.[18]

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[16]Interview of officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC (5 April, 2009).

Personnel decisions of the LPCSCs are all made via organizational departments of Party committees at the corresponding or higher levels. This is common in all sorts of governmental and semi-governmental institutions nationwide, not limited to the system of PC.

[17]Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (21 March, 2009).

When asked what are major responsibilities of the CLPCSC are, they all replied more or less the same: "the top task of the CLPC is to assist the government in economic development under the leadership of the Party", and also gave examples about supervisory plans in 2008: when the Party was concerned about environmental protection, then the CLPCSC organized deputies to examine the implementation of environmental protection laws; when the Party laid stress on ethnic minorities, the CLPCSC organized laws/policies implementation activities related to protections of ethnic minorities.

[18]Interview of officials in Committee of Law of Zhejiang PLPCSC (9 March 2009).



Fig. 2.4 Party and executive structures of the County C CLPC plenary session [Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (22 March 2009) and plenary session materials sent to PDs of County C CLPC. This set of power relations is similarly structured in other CLPCs, see further He (2005)]

On the other hand, field research presents a hierarchy of Party control over the CLPC plenary session. As shown in Fig. 2.4, two systems of organizations co-exist in the plenary session, and every level of the executive in the plenary session is correspondingly under the leadership of a Party organ. Generally speaking, before the annual plenary session of the CLPC, the County Party Committee would convene a plenary session of the County Party Congress, within which a temporary Party committee (in Figs. 2.4 and 2.5) would be set up to lead and supervise the whole CLPC annual plenary session. The establishment of actual executive organs during the plenary session, including the Presidium, Delegations and Deputy Groups of the CLPC, are arranged by the corresponding temporary Party committees, the compositions of which are highly coincident. In short, the Party controls each and every step of the plenary session. Take the process of policy making, for example, while the Presidium serves as a "filter" for the selection of proposals and suggestions from PDs, the Delegations and Deputy Groups mobilize deputies to make sure motions and candidates endorsed by the state will successfully pass during sessions.

2.6 Personnel Constraints

Personnel constraints, from the Party, on both bureaucrats and deputies in LPCs/CLPCs, are most prominent. On the one hand, bureaucratic constraints, especially on standing committees of LPCs/CLPCs, are crucial. First, many Chief Directors of LPCSCs are concurrently secretaries of the Party Committee at



Fig. 2.5 Varieties of corporatist tendencies towards different societal sectors

corresponding levels,[19] which enhances the position of LPCSCs within the power structure of local politics but, as some scholars note, also subordinates them even more closely to the Party organization so that it becomes a "legal arm" of the Party (Cho 2009). Second, vice-directors of LPCSCs are normally retired chief cadres from the government or other state organs. This makes LPCs into a "hub" for "second-line" (*erxian*, 二线) officials, which actually inactivates LPCs, as most of them are usually conservative Party elders, loyal to the Party; even if some of them are progressive, they are simply too old to be energetically capable (Tanner 1999a). Third, LPCSC staff members are deemed as "politically qualified, while professionally disqualified", especially at lower levels of PCSCs, which implies priorities of political loyalty over professional education in selection of LPCSC staff (Qian 2009: p. 70).[20] On the other hand, controls on PDs, of both elections, and representative activities afterwards, are more sophisticatedly conducted, which will be illustrated below.

Besides setting up the Standing Committee at the county level, another main issue on the reform agenda is to apply "popular, multi-candidate and periodic" elections of PDs to CLPCs.[21] However, does "popular" election guarantee equal political

[19]In all 31 PLPCs in China, the Party Secretaries co-hold the Directorate of the PLPCSC in 25 PLPCs (except four directly managed municipalities and Xinjiang and Tibet; Hong Kong and Macau are not included). See National People's Congress Website. [online]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/dfrd/dfrd.htm (Consulted 1 March 2009).

[20]Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (23 March 2009).

See also He (2005), Qian (2009) (Table 2 A comparison of education level of staff at three levels of LPCs in Zhejiang Province).

[21]See Electoral Law: Article 2, 30, 36; Organic Law: Article 5, 6.

participation? Does "multi-candidate" equal "competitive"? Are the PD selections territorially or functionally based? Are electoral campaigns of candidates autonomous or arranged? Observations made while following a direct election of PDs to the CLPC step-by-step clarify the former two questions above as negative, and answer the latter two by labelling CLPCPD elections as functionally arranged.[22]

Each and every step of the CLPCPD election is carefully arranged by the Party-controlled CLPC. First, an Election Committee (EC), headed by the secretary of the County Party Committee and comprised mainly of heads of important Party and government organs, is established nominally by the CLPCSC to lead and organize the election.[23] Second, electorates are divided and seats distributed by the EC according to corporatist requirements of quotas arrangements among different societal segments.[24] Third, "independent candidates", though the Electoral Law

[22]It is a combination of observations and readings of primary and secondary materials, which is based on interviews of officials in County B CLPCSC (7 March 2009) about the electoral process of County B in the 2006–2007 election and that of County C CLPCSC (22 March 2009), as well as on their work reports [translated by author]; due to length limitation, here only displays key observations from this CLPC election; for a fuller description, see Qian (2009: 72–80); for other descriptions on the processes of direct election, see Cai (2002), Chen (1999: Chap. 3), McCormick (1990: Chap. 4), Jacobs (1991), Zhu (2006).

The rationalities of selecting this type of election also need explanations as follows:

Elections in PCs include: (1) direct elections of PDs to CLPCs and TLPCs; (2) indirect elections of PDs to MLPCs, PLPCs and the NPC; (3) indirect elections of members from PDs of PCs to PCSCs and (4) indirect elections of heads of the government, judiciary and procuratorate by PDs at corresponding levels. Here the main focus lies on the direct election of PDs to CLPCs, because this type of election is considered most difficult to manipulate. With even a lower degree of competitiveness (25–50 % more candidates in indirect elections, as opposed to 33–100 % more in direct elections (Electoral Law: Article 30) and a much smaller population to deal with (i.e. only a certain number of PDs to be taken care of instead of the whole constituency), indirect elections of PDs to SCs and to higher level PCs are much easier to manipulate and, thus, are also predominantly arranged by the Party. Furthermore, the elections of heads to the government, judiciary and procuratorate, often with only one candidate for each position, are basically non-competitive [Interview of officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC (6 April 2009) and County B CLPCSC (10 March 2009); Organic Law (1979): Article 20].

[23]Major responsibilities of an Election Committee include: (1) make rules and plans for the election; (2) draw electoral boundaries and determine the number of seats per electorate; (3) publicize and mobilize for the election; (4) conduct the registration and qualification examinations of voters; (5) collect nominations and finalize lists of formal candidates; and (6) resolute disputes arising from the election (Qian 2009: 72–80).

[24]Interviews of officials in CLPCSCs in County A, B and C (March 2009). This is backed up by Cai (2003) and Jacobs:

> Among people's congress members in local people's congresses at various levels, there must be people chosen from various fields. Among the congress members in the various local people's congress at the county and higher levels, workers, peasants, intellectuals, state employees, the People's Liberation Army, minority nationalities, the various political parties and patriotic personages, returned Overseas Chinese and Taiwanese compatriots must have congress members in suitable numbers. Among congress members, women must have a certain proportion (1991).

permits, are restricted in being nominated or elected.[25] Fourth, any kind of unofficial campaign by candidates themselves is strongly discouraged.[26] Finally, when people vote, there are also traces of manipulation, such as mobile "ballot boxes", suggested "proxy votes", and supervised "secret votes" (Li 2007). Therefore, with such a functionally arranged election, it is not surprising to see in Table 2.2, where actual election results match closely with previous guidelines of corporatist arrangements.

Moreover, as shown in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, the percentages of CCP members are dominant in all levels of PCs and PCSCs, which allow the Party to easily exert controls over their activities. As for the rest, most of them are subordinated and accountable to certain work units, according to the Deputy Law (1992), and almost all of these work units are under the leadership of certain Party organs, according to the CCP Constitution (2007). As for the rest of the rest, the "dual-track" responsibilities system still applies, in relation to which a variety of mechanisms developed.[27] Take the County A CLPC, for example, where it is positively reported that PDs are required to report their works to the CLPCSC as an assessment for accountability.[28] However, evaluation criteria in work reports of PDs in the County A CLPC surprisingly indicate the accountability is not to the constituency, but to the Party Committee and up-level PCs. Most articles are about "how to

[25]Some clarifications here are necessary.

First, ostensibly, the nominations are open to all, but nominations in practice are strictly limited to both joint nominators and some "non-Party" organizations. Priorities are given to officially proved nominees, like those from the Party or Party chartered mass organizations.

On restrictions on nomination for "joint nominators" and "non-Party" organizations, see also Li (2006a).

In addition, quota distribution is another limitation on what types of independent candidates can run for certain seats. For example, if, according to quota allocation in practical electoral procedures, "a woman of relatively high education background with no party affiliation" is required in this electorate, then nominees who fall short of these criteria are not able to become formal candidates (Interviews of CLPCSCs in County A, B and C (March 2009)). Cases of jointly nominated nominees denied qualification for candidacy based on this restriction are also found in Cabestan (2006).

Further, even if joint voters' nominees successfully overcome these obstacles and appear on the nominees' name list, "discussion and consultation" (*xieshang yunniang* 协商酝酿) between the EC and groups of nominators create another substantial barrier for them to become a formal candidate. Legally, when consensuses of "discussion and consultation" failed, "preliminary elections" shall be initiated (Electoral Law: Article 30–31), but, in practice, this procedure is often bypassed, and the EC "harmoniously" finalizes the list of candidates according to a series of occupational, territorial, gender-based, ethnic and other quota requirements of the election (Cai 2002: 75–77; Chen and Zhong 2002).

As Cabestan states, "Primaries (yuxuan,预选) will continue to take place until the 2004 revision (the fourth one) comes into effect (see below), but these are rather murky procedures" (2006); And Nathan also indicates local people's congress elections so far "have not turned into competitive campaigns owing to tight Party control" (1997: 235).

[26]See Electoral Law: Article 33.

[27]See above in the section of "Institutional Limitations"; CCP constitution 2007: Article 3–5.

[28]Interview of officials in CLPCSC in County A (18 March 2009).

Table 2.2 Election results in the County B CLPC (2006–2007)

	Peasants (%)	Workers (%)	Intellectuals (%)	Cadres (%)	CCP members (%)	Women (%)
Requirements of local electoral rules	20	25	20	25	65	20
Outcome of elections	21.4	23.4	27.6	26.6	75.6	25.3

Source County B CLPCSC, Committee of Deputy. Interview of CLPC County B and work report on 2006–2007 election results of the Committee of Deputies in CLPCSC County B

It is also very interesting to read the working report on election written by officials in the PC Electoral Committee. I selectively translate one report as follows, and the tone and style of expression of these work reports on election read quite similarly of all reports at all LPCs

Work report on election 2006–2007, County B CLPCSC [translated by Author]

Sub-title: "Elections of PDs to CLPC and TLPC in our County are Successfully Accomplished"

Abstract Elections of PDs to CLPC and TLPC in our County are successfully accomplished. The population of the county is …, the population who voted is …, the voting rate reached 99.5 %. The composition of newly elected PDs balances both advancement (*xianjinxing)* and representativeness (*guanfanxing*) … within the total number of …, workers …, which consists of 25 %; peasants …, 30 %; cadres …, 35 %; intellectuals …, 15 %; military …, 5 %; Party Members, 65 %; females, 20 % […] The Percentage of different social sector are balanced, allocated, and fully fulfill the expected goals

Table 2.3 Percentage of party–members deputies at different levels of PCs

	Different levels of PCs			
Percentage of Party-member deputies / Years of elections	NPC (%)	PLPC in general (%)	CLPC in general (%)	Country C CCLPC in Zhejiang Province (%)
1992–1993	66.8	68.44	70.4	68.8
1997–1998	72.99	70.25	72.16	70.53
2001–2002	72.99	N/A	N/A	70.58

Source NPC, Xia (2008: Table 8.3); PLPC in general, Xia (2008: Table 4.4); CLPC in general, Liu (2001: 275); County C rendazhi, 人大志, 2004: 78

See also other specific examples of percentages of Party-Members-Deputies in the county PD election: 1. 79.2 % in 2001–2002 elections in CLPC in County H in Anhui Province, He (2005: 139); 2.73.7 % in 1997–1998 election in KuanCheng Manzu Autonomous County PC in Heibei Province, see Cai (2002: 60–99)

On corporatist arrangement of PD allocations in higher level PCs, see Chen (1999: 84–85)

cooperate with the Party committee" and "how to accomplish tasks assigned by up-level PCs", while none given any regard to constituents.[29] Furthermore, PDs' activities during the plenary session are controlled by Deputy Groups and Delegations, and all activities of PDs after the plenary session must be organized by

[29] *Ibid.*

Table 2.4 Percentage of party-members deputies at different levels of PCSCs

	PLPCSC in general (%)	County C CLPCSC in Zhejiang Province (%)
1992–1993	71.78	66.67
1997–1998	71.44	72.73
2001–2002	N/A	85.71

Source Xia (2008: 114, Table 4.7); County C rendazhi 2004: 284–298

PCSCs according to annual plans of deputies' activities.[30] Undirected private PD activities are strongly discouraged.[31] The case of the famous "*Yao Lifa*" (姚立法) and fates of other "independent self-nominated candidates" who "jump out of the ballot box" illustrate not only a liberalizing society in China as many studies claim, but also show how deputy activities are constrained accordingly by the still powerful state.[32]

[30]See Organic Law 2004: Article 19. Annual plans of deputies' activities and annual plans of supervisory activities are made by the Party Committee within the PSSCs, which are common at all levels of PCs.

[31]Interviews of officials in CLPCSC in County A and County B (March 2009).

[32]A great number of "independent-candidates" has emerged in recent years, as Li Fan put,

> Since July 1st this year, many general elections have begun all around China and will continue until the end of 2007. Wuhan and Shenzhen were the first cities we knew that conducted such elections. Both cities had their elections in September; both witnessed a number of independent candidates (candidates nominated by joint endorsement of voters instead of official endorsement by the government) in the urban voting districts. In Wuhan, where there had been no independent candidate s in 2003, there were over 20 independent candidates this year (2006a).

See also Fewsmith (2004), Liu (2003), Li (2006b).

However, much smaller numbers have successfully "jumped out of the ballot box", such as: Wang Liang, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, 2003; Yao Lifa, Qianjiang City, Hubei Province; Xu Zhiyong, Haidian District, Beijing City, etc. The most famous case of successfully elected "self-nominated" PD is Yao Lifa, which I made a case study (Qian 2009: 81–83); for a more detailed account of Yao, see Zhu (2006), Fewsmith (2004), Pomfret (2002).

"Jump[ing] out of the ballot box" means a few independent `write-in' candidates (unapproved by the authorities and thus not included on the list of candidates) run for election to local congresses and finally win the seat (Qian 2009: 84–85). Generally speaking, "the partial liberalization of the political environment and the pluralisation of interests within society have encouraged more and more independent candidates to try their luck" (Cabestan 2006). Technically speaking, the "write-in" article in the Electoral Law makes it possible for any "independent candidate" to be elected, if there are enough voters who do not circle any of the names of formal candidates but write down another name on the ballot. Therefore, although most "independent candidates" lost due to manipulations, there are exceptional winners (Electoral Law: Article 37).

However, on the one hand, as O'Brien's warns, we need to be very careful not to generalize from these rare cases (2009). On the other hand, even though candidates can "jump out of the ballot box", they cannot jump out of the Party's control. The Party Committee and the CLPC either absorb them by education and inducements, or marginalize them in Deputies' activities so as to mute their publicity, or even make them "disappear" by coercive approaches, such as "persuading

To briefly conclude, as a state organ to achieve certain policy goals, not only is the structural format of LPCs and LPCSCs fully penetrated by the Party, but PDs are also under strict control. Elections of PDs are carefully arranged by state elites and quotas of seats distributed to a limited number of singular, quasi-competitive and functionally differentiated social segments. State-endorsed PDs are subsidized and granted a representational monopoly, while unruly PDs have to face obstacles deliberately put forward for them and must often even sacrifice personal liberty and even family safety to fulfill their lawful representational roles. However, although the elections look like a scripted "democratic theatre", the election result is not as meaningless as the election appears, which reflects state elites' rational considerations to "structure, subsidy and control" interests from different social sectors; although the representative process can be considered fundamentally un-democratic, interest representation with corporatist characteristics not just provides legitimacy to the regime, but is also a societal reflection of public policy formulation (McCormick 1990: 34). In the following part, I will explore how this works.

2.7 PC/LPC—Societal Sectors: A Comparative and Contrastive Analysis

After reviewing the corporatist strategy designed by the state to control the representative institution, this part, with the tailored analytic model, specifically explores how the LPC adopts a variety of combinations of "inducements" and "constraints" towards social sectors of workers, peasants, businesspeople and intellectuals, in deputy recruitment, interest articulation, policy formulation and policy implementation in a comparative and contrastive pattern, and to reveal how the LPC controls some social sectors but subsidizes others.

(Footnote 32 continued)

to resign", if they keep actively getting into the forbidden zone and touching the nerves of the leadership (Qian 2009: 85–86 (a case study); Zhu 2006).

A recent article from the "south-wind-window" magazine (*nanfengchuang* 南风窗) titled "Ten Years of 'Independent Candidates'" also describes statuses of several famous PDs elected as independent candidates, in which we can easily identify those who are subsidized, those who are marginalized, and those who are punished: Xu Zhiyong, Zen Jianyu and Lu Banglie are punished; Yao Lifa is marginalized (he never won an election again after 1998) and punished (especially in 2011, the author added); Huang Songhai, Sima Nan, Nie Hainiang and Wang Niang have all been subsidized (Zhang 2009); see also a related introduction of these successful "self-nominated" PDs: Fewsmith (2004), Yao Lifa (2007).

2.8 Recruitment of People's Deputies

Biases in PD recruitment from different social segments are most visible. Institutionally, quotas of representatives to PCs were unevenly allocated to different social sectors in both the Electoral Law and related regulations until 2011, which, to some extent, reflect different corporatist strategies applied by PCs to various social sectors.[33] For example, as shown in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, CCP members predominate over non-Party members at all levels of PCs. In addition, women, ethnic minorities, overseas returned Chinese and the military are all obviously over-represented compared to other societal sectors. So are Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan residents in the mainland (Cabestan 2006).

More importantly here, local electoral directives and practice widen the already uneven distribution of quotas, which allows certain social segments to be discriminatorily underrepresented and unfavourably recruited.[34] Combining-related electoral regulations and specific social sectors, PLPCs usually design local electoral directives and guidelines to suggest a relatively "representative" quota allocation to various social occupations, such as workers, peasants and intellectuals.[35]

[33]Discrimination against peasants' political participation was institutionalized in written law clauses. Rural populations are unfavourably represented at all levels of People's Congresses. Initially, deputies from rural areas represent four times constituents in CLPCs of their urban counterparts do, five times in PLPCs, and eight times in the NPC (Electoral Law 1953). Later, the gap of unequal representation between urban and rural populations shortened to 1: 4 in the 1995 Electoral Law amendments. Until the most recent amendment of Electoral Law passed in 2011 the unequal vote between rural and urban citizens finally evens, but this long tradition of discriminatory representation of peasants has already grown for half a century.

[34]Cabestan observes, "At every level, the CCP in fact applies representation principles that privilege not only national minorities, women and returned overseas Chinese but also urban dwellers over rural residents. […] Firstly, the list of candidates in the 35 constituencies must include enough minority people so that every ethnic minority is represented by at least one delegate. Overall they are supposed to represent at least 12 % of the delegates (13.91 % in 2003). Secondly, a growing proportion of women should be included, although actually this commitment was not respected in 2003 (20.24 % of women as opposed to 21.81 % in 1998). Thirdly, although the gap between rural and urban representation narrowed in the 1990 s (one deputy for 880,000 rural residents and one for 220,000 urban dwellers in 1998 as opposed to a one to eight ratio before 1995), it increased again in 2003 (one delegate for 960,000 rural residents and one for 240,000 urban dwellers). But the best-represented `constituency' remains the PLA, which is estimated to number 2.3 million people. This still provides 268 delegates, a ratio amounting to one deputy for every 8,582 soldiers, as opposed to an average of one deputy for every 435,511 citizens and one deputy for every 1.08 million women! Hong Kong (36 deputies for 7 million inhabitants), Macao (12 deputies for 450,000 inhabitants) and Taiwan (13 deputies for about 33,000 Taiwanese residing on the mainland, as distinct from the Taiwanese business people or Taishang,台商) are also over-represented" (2006).

[35]As indicated in Table 4.1, quotas seem to be equally distributed and generally represent all elements in society. However, those are not as "representative" as they seem to be. On the one hand, percentages of PDs for social sectors are mismatched with the actual percentages of the population. On the other hand, these social segments are authoritatively selected by the state based on certain policy goals, but many other social groups are not included in this quota arrangement.

Table 2.5 Election results in the work report of the County B CLPC election committee (2006–2007)

	Peasants	Workers	Intellectuals	Cadres	CCP members	Women
Suggested percentage (%)	20	25	20	25	65	20
Actual percentage (%)	21.4	24.4	27.6	26.6	75.6	25.3
Actual number	48	55	62	60	170	57

Source County B CLPCSC, Deputy Committee

The total number of PDs in the CLPC in County B is 225; there is one more item in the suggested quota distribution: 10 % consists of "others" in addition to "peasants", "workers", "intellectuals", and "cadres", which brings the total to 100 %

However, in practice, actual election results are not strictly congruent with these arrangements, as local leadership and election organizers prefer intellectuals and businesspeople over peasants and workers when recruiting deputies, even if they have to manipulate some statistics referring to the PDs' occupational allocations to meet criteria set by up-level PCs. For example, after disaggregating the 2006–2007 election result of County B CLPC, their tricks in calculating PD allocation data were visualized.[36] Table 2.5 is directly taken from a work report on election outcome made by the Committee of Deputy in County B CLPCSC on behalf of the EC, in which we can see a nice fit between quotas of PDs from different social segments in the election result and suggested percentages of PDs of different social segments required by local electoral directives. However, based on Table 2.6, in which actual compositions of peasants' and workers' PDs are disaggregated by the author with detailed personal information of each and every PD, we can see how few spaces are really occupied by peasants and workers, as most peasant/worker PDs are actually cadres and managers.[37] By combining the data of these two tables, it can be observed that intellectuals are preferred in PD selection, as they are the smallest group compared to the other three but take the biggest share, while businesspeople are also favourably recruited as, in total, businesspeople occupy almost one third of all seats, which is nearly 10 times of the number occupied by workers and 20 times of the number occupied by peasants.

This discrimination of representation is common all over the nation. As an empirical study in Jiangxi (an agriculture dominated province) indicates, real

[36]During my interviews, I also found several other interesting manipulations by electoral organizers. For example, when calculating the composition statuses of PDs, they distribute registration forms to all PDs to collect personal information. Some local cadres in Township governments and Party secretaries in Village Committees prefer to fill in the blank "which type of PDs are you" with "cadre". However, electoral officers always persuade them to change it to "peasant".

Interview of officials in County A and C (March 2009).

[37]There is always a small "secret" contact booklet containing detailed personal information of PDs. I obtained this one from County B CLPCSC via personal connections.

Table 2.6 Disaggregation of the occupational compositions of peasant/worker PDs

	Peasants				Workers	
Total number	48				55	
Total percentage (%)	21.4				24.4	
Disaggregation	Local cadres	PLA	Managers of TVE	Peasants	Company managers	Workers
Number	24	5	16	3	49	6
Percentage (%)	10.67	2	7.1	1.3	21.76	2.67

Local cadres include Party, government and TLPC heads from towns and townships, as well as Party Heads of Village Party Committees, and the elected Heads of Village Committees; TVEs is short for "township and village enterprises"; PLA refers to the military (in County B, they wanted to make the peasants' percentage look better, so they put the PLA into the peasants' group)

peasant PDs comprise 5.47 % of the PLPC, 0.92 % of the MLPC in Nanchang City, and 5.58 % of the CLPC in Yongxiu County (F.L. Zhang 2006). The situation for worker PDs is by no means better. For instance, they made up only 2.67 % of the County B CLPC in 2006, and only 0.4 % of the Zhejiang (a private economy dominated province) PLPC in 2001 (Li 2005: p. 28). Furthermore, regardless of the exact number of PDs, or the percentage of peasant/worker PDs in PCs, it is astonishing to compare the ratio of businesspeople PDs to businesspeople with the ratio of peasant/worker PDs to peasants/workers. According to an empirical study conducted in Liu City in Guangxi Province, 17.33 % of all 831 local private entrepreneurs (non-state sector enterprise managers or owners) are recruited as PDs or members in Political Consultative Conferences at all levels, which means the ratio of private entrepreneurs' Deputies in both PCs and PCCs to private entrepreneurs is nearly 1:6 (Chen et al. 2008). However, if the suggested ratio of rural PDs to rural population from the NPC Electoral Guidelines (2003) is applied, which says there should be one PD for every 960,000 rural people, it is shocking to even estimate very roughly that the level of representation of private entrepreneurs, excluding all other components in the social segment of businesspeople, is 160,000 times of that of peasants (please note this ratio was calculated based on the 2004 version of the Electoral Law; the 2010 amendments to the Electoral Law substantially narrowed the gap).[38] The ratio might be relatively better for workers, but they still are extremely unfairly represented when compared to either businesspeople or intellectuals. What is also worth mentioning is that this unequal political recruitment worsens in Standing Committees, in which both intellectuals and businesspeople can acquire some seats as part-time (*jianzhi*, 兼职) committee members, while this is impossible for peasants or workers under current circumstances.[39]

[38]The 2010 amendment of the Electoral Law, see Electoral Law revision key to equal rights By Zhu Zhe (China Daily) www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-03/05/content_9540263.htm.

[39]It happened in both Zhejiang and Jiangsu PLPCSC.

Why are small groups of intellectuals and businesspeople favoured by LPCs in PD recruitment over large groups of workers and peasants? As scholars reveal, China's liberalization and political inclusion follows an "elite path", which formed "an elite-based exclusivist ruling coalition", marginalizing and excluding weak social groups like workers and peasants (Pei 2006: p. 15; Tanner 1999b). Intellectual elites are privileged in PD selection primarily for two reasons. On the one hand, this is consistent with principles of cadre selection in the Party. "More revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and more professionally competent" are the "four modernizations" proposed by Deng for cadre selection and promotion in the new era (Deng 1993: pp. 2, 3, 326, 361, 380). Another popular and interesting label, "Innocent Maiden (*wuzhi shaonü*无知少女)",[40] also reflects which groups of people are more likely to be selected as officials and get promoted, including non-Party members ("*wu*, 无"), intellectuals ("*zhi,* 知"), ethnic minorities ("*shao,* 少") and women ("*nü*, 女"). The overlap between these two examples shows that the intellectual is a main target of the state's political inclusion strategy for enlarging the "club" of strategic elites. On the other hand, intellectuals became more "rational" and "realistic" in the post-1989 era, as they became "the beneficiaries of the reform" (Guo 2003: pp. 142–148). They are generally supportive of the current regime and tend to pro the status quo by agreeing the official line that "China's unity, stability, prosperity, and democracy depend on the party leadership" (Guo).

Businesspeople are preferred because there is a symbiotic relationship between businesspeople and local governments.[41] On the one hand, businesspeople value the benefits of being a PD. Not only can this provide a chance for them to influence public policy formation, but it is also deemed as an act of taking public responsibility and doing social charity: good for both reputation and business.[42] Furthermore, and more substantial, the legislative immunity of PDs is a very attractive "protective umbrella" for those businesspeople conducting trade in many grey areas with no clear boundaries.[43] And, thus, on the other hand, due to the pressure for economic development, especially the high GDP growth rate, some local governments use the identity of PD to attract or keep businesspeople, together with their enterprises, and more importantly, their taxes and investments in the local

(Footnote 39 continued)

Interviews of officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC (7 April 2009).

[40]"Innocent maidens" are most wanted, as they meet four criteria at one time, as all PCs intend to make a more "representative" deputies composition to meet the "official guidelines".

[41]Inclusion of the emerging and powerful business sector into the current regime of state elites is also mentioned in Adam MacDonald's chapter of this volume.

[42]Interviews of deputies in CLPCSC in County A and C (March 2009).

Another recent example provided and analyzed by Professor Zhang Qianfan (2011) about an arranged replacement of one elected female peasant PD *Zhao Fangqun*(赵芳群)with one male businessman *Zhao Kaifang*(赵开方)in Shaodong (邵东县) CLPC in Hunan Province (湖南省) is also very illustrative.

[43]There is a special procedure of arresting PD. See Deputy Law 1992: Article 30.

jurisdiction. The following case of *Liang Guangzhen* (梁广镇) reveals how the deal between local economic interests and businesspersons' legislative immunity is conducted in LPCs.

> *Case: A Tale of Two Cities—"Double Representation, Double Protection".*
>
> *Liang, a successful businessman and billionaire in Yun'fu City* (云浮市municipal level)*, Guangdong Province, was accused of committing the criminal offence of defalcation and was investigated by the local authority in 2008. In consideration of the fact that Liang was elected and at that time served as a PD in Yun'fu City MLPC, the Procuratorate reported to the Standing Committee in Yun'fu and got approval to take Liang into custody. However, Liang also served as a PD in Baise City* (百色市municipal level)*, Guangxi Province, and the Standing Committee of Baise MLPC intervened, strongly claiming that their ratification was also necessary to arrest Liang and bring him to trial. Facing two MLPCSCs at odds, the Procuratorate was at a loss, and the case got stalled.*
>
> *It was reported that Liang invested hundreds of millions to re-construct an aluminum factory in Longlin County, and thus he was elected as MLPCPD in Baise City from the electorate of Longlin County. Baise MLPCSC officials also publicly announced that the reason they intervened was that Liang contributed to the local economic development, and they had to protect their local enterprises and entrepreneurs.*

2.9 Interest Articulation and Policy Making

However, as some scholars may argue, peasants'/workers' representatives do not have to be peasants and workers, because intellectuals can speak for peasants, and businesspeople can act for workers (Zhang 2007). This is logically correct and actually happens sometimes, but there are some natural disparities and fundamental conflicts among different social segments, such as tensions between labour and capital. In fact, although all channels of political demand expression are controlled by the PCs, how deputies are chosen does affect the extent to which demands of certain groups will be voiced and policy formulation impacted.[44] At each level of PCs, discriminations in both demand-expressing and policy-making against the weakly represented are visible.

When checking the online legislation database of the NPC, an interesting comparison is found: only 17 statutes and resolutions on state regulations are concerned with labourers' rights, while 118 are concerned with business and economy.[45] Evidences are found coincidentally at local levels. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 indicate how PC legislations are preferentially concerned with economic affairs. Although the biases in legislation may not be directly initiated by PDs from the

[44]Proposals and suggestions during the plenary session have to go through the Presidium; letters and visits from the public go through the PCSC, and PDs' activities organized by the PCSC. See O'Brien (2002: 218).

[45]"*Wenxian ziliao*" (Law and Regulations of the NPC). National People's Congress Website. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/newwxzl.htm (consulted 12 November, 2009).

Table 2.7 Percentage of economic statutes in local legislation (1979–1990)

Province	Zhejiang	Jilin	Shanxi	Jiangxi
Percentage (%)	52.2	56.0	45.2	48.0

Source Xia (2008: 181) (extract)

Table 2.8 Percentage of economic statutes in total legislation (1993–1999)

Province	Heilongjiang	Jiangsu	Guangxi	Hubei
Percentage (%)	69	55	60	58.4

Source Xia (2008: 182) (extract)

businesspeople segment, and economic legislation does not only concern interests of businesspeople, it is not difficult to sense the imparity in public policy formation.

Furthermore, two case studies also reflect the relevance between unequal recruitment of PDs and unequal accessibility of political demand articulation and unequal capability of influence in public policy formation.

Case: Local Legislation of Labour Contract Regulation in Shanghai PLPC. [46]

When the Shanghai PLPC enacted the Labour Contract Regulation in 2001, there were severe conflicts among labourers and businesspeople. Therefore, the Shanghai General Trade Union and business-related associations in Shanghai got involved and tried to steer the lawmaking to reflect their interests, and the PLPCSC played the role of mediator.

There were three rounds of fights on several primary conflictual issues during the law-making process. The first round was concerned with the aim of the regulation. The labour side insisted the regulation's primary goal as "safeguard the lawful rights and interests of labourers", while the business side claimed it as "safeguard the lawful rights and interests of both parties to the labour contract". The business side won. The second round was about the "10 + 3 provision", which meant an enterprise could not "cancel a labour contract or lay off workers who were within three years of retirement after having worked for the company for more than 10 years". The labour side wanted this. The business side rejected. Again, the business side won. The third round was about whether trade unions could interfere with labour contracts. Finally, the labour side won. However, labour unions within companies were actually neither independent nor powerful enough to substantially intervene.

Other than these three major conflicts, it is also noted that during the whole law drafting process, the PLPCSC and the Trade Union severely clashed. As one union leader claimed, the drafting team in the PLPCSC took sides with the businesspeople and the draft was made to generally accord with the demands of the business circle.

From above, we can read preferential leanings of the Shanghai PLPCSC in the processes of interest intermediation and conflict mediation. The percentage of worker PDs in Zhejiang PLPC is only 0.4 %, while businesspeople make up more than 16 %. Although no exact data of those in Shanghai PLPC has been collected, it will not likely be much different from Zhejiang, which shares similar socio-economic contexts.

[46]See further, Qian (2009: 114–115); see the full story, Cho (2009: 32–36).

Table 2.9 Motions/suggestions in County C CLPC (2009)

	Industry construction and commerce-related	Agriculture and peasants related	Labour-related
Number	71 + 41 + 32 = 144	39	14
Percentage (%)	51.4	13.9	5

Table 2.9 below summarizes another case from the County C CLPC, in which we can see disadvantages of interest representation for both peasants and labours, and reaffirm the connection between unfair representation and unequal interest input and, finally, biased policy output (Li 2005). In agriculture-based County C, where the majority of the population is rural, peasant PDs take only 11 % of all seats, while proposals on agriculture and peasants related consist of less than 14 %. Over and over again, the legislative process reveals a bias against labour, with only 4 % seats taken, and 5 % of all motion/suggestions brought up.[47]

However, the relationship between PC and relative mass organizations is at least cooperative, which means the workers still have the Trade Union, while the peasants with no organization at all are even more disadvantageous in policy outputs. Institutionalized discriminations in laws/regulations against peasants can be found extensively. First, the household registration system distinguishes the Chinese population by "rural identity" and "urban identity", which not only unconstitutionally restricts peasants' movement,[48] but also, as indicated by Razavi in Chap. 8 of this volume, discriminately creates a gap between urban and rural values of property rights in China. Second, this dualistic social structure unevenly distributes public goods, such as education and public health care. As scholars warned, "discrimination against rural areas, combined with marketization, means that villagers must pay a disproportionate share of infrastructure expenses for virtually every social service they receive" (O'Brien and Li 1995). As a result, the poorer receive less social benefits and paying more, while the richer and more powerful enjoy better public goods for free. Third, rural labourers, especially migrant workers, face disadvantages in job-seeking and do not enjoy basic labour rights as do their urban competitors. In most cases, an urban worker gets better payment than a rural worker for the same amount and quality of work. Moreover,

[47]Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (21 March 2009): During the CLPC plenary session of County C in 2009, the Presidium received 33 "motions" and 247 "suggestions". Of these 33 motions, 25 are concerned with local construction, 3 with environmental protection, 2 with public transportation, 2 with intangible cultural heritage, and 1 with peasants. Of the 247 suggestions, 71 are about industry, 41 are about city construction, 39 are about agriculture, 32 are about finance, business and tourism, 26 are about education and culture, 22 are about environmental protection, 16 are about public administration, 14 are about labour issues, and 19 are on other topics. As shown in Table 4.5, industry- and commerce-related proposals consist of more than half of all proposals, while only 1/20 of proposals are labour-related.

[48]See *Household Registration Ordinance* 1958; Constitution 2004: Article 33.

peasants are not protected by the Labour Law or the Labour Contract Law, are not secured by the minimum standard of living, and do not even enjoy equal compensation for personal injuries.[49] It is not merely that these institutional norms seriously discriminate against peasants, but "manipulations of policies in the course of implementation" at local levels make it even worse (Oi 1989: p. 228).

Although these institutionalized discriminations against peasants in both national legislation and local directives and practice are not wholly related to or directly caused by weak representation of peasants at all level of PCs, there is no doubt that more peasant representatives could help to heal, or at least narrow, those gaps.

2.10 Policy Implementation

Commonly there are gaps between "law in books" and "law in action" in China, especially those between central policies and local practice. Biases towards different social sectors are also reflected in the PCs' selection of laws and regulations for implementation supervision.

As argued before, besides functioning as an interest representation institution, LPCs were also designed to put more constraints on local cadres' misbehaviours when the central capacity to control weakened after administrative decentralization. In recent years, LPCs grew up to be a supervisory powerhouse, assisting implementation of central and local regulations via a series of supervisory methods, of which the law enforcement examination is the most frequently used (Cho 2009). For example, in 2003, based on instructions from the Party committee, the County C CLPC conducted law enforcement examinations of the *Production Safety Law*, the *Labour Law*, and the *Law and Regulations on the Protection of Rights and Interests of the Elderly*.[50] And in the 2009, supervisory plan of the PLPC in Zhejiang, they choose to implement examinations of the *Agriculture Law*, the *Law and Regulations on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women*, and the *Regulation on Promoting Development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises*.[51]

It seems here more preferences in selection of laws/policies to supervise implementation are given to the weak—peasants and workers over the powerful—businesspeople and intellectuals. The explanation is twofold. First, although the selections of laws/policies implementation supervision are more favourable towards the peasants and workers, the target is not on the businesspeople or intellectual, but mainly at local cadres against their insubordinations within processes of laws/policies implementations.[52] In consideration of both cadres' personal interests

[49]*Tongming bu tongjia* 同命不同价, see Gong (2005).

[50]Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (21 March 2009).

[51]Interview of Officials in Committee of Deputy of Zhejiang PLPCSC (7 March 2009).

[52]A principal-agent perspective can also be explanatory for the law/policy implementation examination here (Ginsburg and Chen 2009).

and regional benefits, local governments are always devoted to economic development and GDP growth, but central policies on protections of both the environment and the weak often put obstacles in the way of their economic pursuits, so local governments are inclined to treat those policies indifferently or even deliberately neglect them. As a result, local economic developments are achieved at the cost of social stability, regime legitimacy, and most seriously, authority of the leadership. Therefore, those weakly implemented and deliberately ignored policies are often selected by the up-level leadership as target laws/regulations for LPCs to examine so as to contain certain local misconduct. Second, the LPCs are quite passive in this function fulfillment. On the one hand, the selection of target laws to supervise and examine should accord with Party polices, or simply is determined by the Party. One the other hand, LPCs are only in charge of detecting flaws in law implementation and notifying the government, but do not have the authority to urge the government to fix those shortcomings. In other words, whether supervision of law enforcement can be successfully implemented and make sense is dependent on the Party's and the government's attitudes towards it.

2.11 Some Concluding Remarks

To briefly sum up, this study begins by jumping out of the traditional framework of legislative analyses in China, and by following instead the path of the third generation of contemporary Chinese studies, to examine roles of the PC/LPC in structuring and shaping state–society relations, and to depict an aspect of state-society interaction in current China via the viewpoint of the PC/LPC. With the extended conceptual framework and customized analytical model of corporatist legislature, this paper followed the formula of State–PC–Society to characterize corporatist features of the PC, and to compare and contrast corporatist policies and strategies state elites used with selected social sectors via LPCs/CLPCs.

Based on the empirical analyses above, criteria summarized in Table 2.1 are filled as in Table 2.10, in which businesspeople and intellectuals enjoy advantages in PD recruitment over peasants and workers, with regard to both LPCs and LPCSCs. Partially because of the existence of those advantages, political demands articulated by intellectuals and businesspeople are treated more favourably than those of peasants and workers. This directly and indirectly leads to the enactment of fewer laws and public policies for protections of peasants and workers than for promotions of industry and commerce. However, although quotas of PDs among peasants and workers can be considered as being equally low, workers' interests are relatively better represented than those of peasants, because workers' demands can at least be expressed via another channel: the Trade Union, with which LPCs work closely. Finally, even though preferences of policy/law implementation supervision are given to peasants and workers, this does not change the overall policies of constraints applied to them. In comparison to peasants and workers, businesspeople and intellectuals enjoy mostly policies of inducements.

Table 2.10 A contrasting pattern of the comparative analysis of corporatist strategies

	Peasants	Workers	Businesspeople	Intellectuals
1. PD recruitment/regime support				
1) PCPDs	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Favourable
2) PCSCPDs	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Favourable
2. Interest representation				
1) Proposals and suggestions from PDs	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Favourable
2) Relationship with mass organizations	non-existent	Favourable	Favourable	Favourable
3. Policy-making/legislation	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	N/A
4. Policy implementation/supervision	Preferences	Preferences	N/A	N/A

Fig. 2.6 Four social sectors on the spectrum of state corporatism

In Fig. 2.6, furthermore, I use a graph to display the relationship between indicators of inducement and constraint, the different corporatist strategy components, and the four examined social sectors. In this figure, the size of the circle symbolically represents the size of the population in each societal sector. The largest circle, that representing peasants, sits at the top left of the diagram. Disadvantages in political participation, discrimination with respect to legislation and public policy-making, as well as coercive repressions of their "rightful protests" (O'Brien 1996) all indicate high constraints but low inducements are put on the social segment of peasants. The circle of workers is placed next to the peasants' circle. Workers enjoy a few more inducements, provided by the Trade Union in the way of political participation for the labour sector. In addition, primary measures for managing workers' conflicts or protests are not as coercive as those applied to peasants, which makes the constraints on workers a little less severe.[53] The circle of intellectuals is located in the top right-hand corner, which shows the state's sensitive corporatist strategies of creating both high inducements to gain support from intellectuals and high constraints to put them under control. The circle of businesspeople is located in the bottom right-hand corner. It reveals that the state still heavily relies on businesspeople for economic development, and thus uses high inducements and low constraints to trade for the support and cooperation from the segment of businesspeople.

[53]Governments' attitude towards a series of strikes led by workers from Foxconn and Honda in mid of 2010 is a good illustration here.

By further grouping these combinations of policies of inducement and constraint with these four social segments into the taxonomy of inclusionary and exclusionary corporatist strategies, and arraying them on the spectrum of state corporatism, we shall see they range from left to right as follows: businesspeople and intellectuals enjoy predominately inclusionary policies, while workers and peasants suffer mostly exclusionary treatments.

Due to certain constraints, there are a number of limitations, or to put it another way, unaccomplished goals, of this study. First, the coverage of field work is largely limited to CLPCs in Zhejiang Province, which is a relatively better off area on the east coast of China. This compromises the empirical verification of theoretical assumptions, and thus applicability of their implications. A more comprehensive empirical study of CLPCs and other levels of PCs covering a wider geographic representation will help to draw a more accurate picture of a corporatist legislature and through which the state and society interact.

Second, the social sectors selected here are both too narrow and too broad. They are too narrow, on the one hand, because there are a variety of other significant social segments not included, such as women, ethnic minorities and the like. To add them in would enrich the comparative and contrastive analyses. The social sectors are too broad, on the other hand, because within each major social sector there are more disaggregated and specific groups that actually exhibit differentiated and even conflicting interests, and thus corporatist strategies from state elites could also be different. Take the segment of businesspeople as an example. The interests of domestic business and international corporations are sometimes in conflict, while private entrepreneurs and SOEs' managers often pursue opposite goals. Besides, although not to be the same degree as the society, the state is also fragmented, which makes combinations of logics of state–society interaction even more diversified and complicated. Therefore, more subtle comparative and contrastive studies of different corporatist policies applied by/to diversified interest sectors would be of greater value.

Third, the theoretical inclusiveness of corporatism can also be extended to studies of other institutions in China, such as the Political Consultative Conferences, in which corporatistly arranged interest representation of the societal sectors are even more obvious when the elections are not required to generate representatives. It is also feasible and rewarding to explore corporatist behaviours of the People's Court. For example, to investigate how courts selectively apply legal clauses, and swiftly adopt laws and policies when facing cases from different social sectors, would be of value in explaining the gap between "law in books" and "law in action", as well as the gap between "public transcripts" and "hidden transcripts" in China.

Fourth, this study only focuses on, on the formal side, the configuration of the state–society relationship into political institutions in current China, while, on the informal side, there is another picture of state–society interaction, such as the emerging groups of House Churches, which is more complicated and need to be carefully examined and more delicately illustrated.

Nonetheless, designated empirical evidence to a great extent verifies theoretical assumptions raised by the author initially about how the state penetrates into this representative body via institutional, organizational and bureaucratic methods, and

further controls the People's Congress in both its formulation and operation, on the one hand, and how this representative institution unequally incorporates functionally differentiated social sectors into public affairs via biased strategies in PD selection, interest articulation, policy-making and implementation, on the other hand, which not only demonstrates the role of the PC in shaping relations between state and society, but also locates the PC in the overall institutional arrangement of state elites for corporatist interest representation during the current transitional era in China. Although the corporatist traces in Chinese State–society relationship via the PC may appear to some scholars as only "forms" (Yep 2000), this study depicts the tendency the Chinese state–society relationship is leading to, and demonstrates that the fertile ground for corporatist interest representation to grow. Actually, considering the PC is getting support of, instead of pursuing autonomy from, the Party; is cooperating, rather than confronting with, the government (Cho 2009: pp. 164–165); plus, considering that the authoritarianism is widely accepted in the general public of China (Teresa 2010), it is fair to say, if there is to be more authentic and effective interest representation, articulation and communication within the formula of state–society relations in China, a corporatist, rather than a pluralistic way, is certainly more plausible. Therefore, the theoretical generalization of a corporatist style of interest representation provides an alternative to the more established and widely accepted state–society relationship study perspective of pluralism, while the framework of empirical verifications of corporatist traces in the state–society relationship proposes a generally applied definitional and analytical model of studying legislatures from a corporatist perspective, especially in authoritarian regimes.

Finally, what implications, both theoretical and practical, can be drawn from this study, in regards to the contemporary study of China in general, and to enhance our understandings about China in the 21st Century?

First, considering the irreversible process of decentralization, even under periodic re-centralization, the completeness of institutional arrangement at the county level and the long tradition in Chinese culture of emphasizing the critical functions of a county government, studies of politics at county level in China deserve more attention. As Xia explains O'Brien's concerns, in studies of Chinese politics, that the very top and bottom are mostly covered, while the middle layers are missing (2008). Based on my experience, empirical investigations on politics and governance at the county level are of unique value in explaining current political, economic and societal transitions in China.

Second, we shall always bear in mind when making inquires about political/economic/societal phenomena in China, that it still remains an authoritarian political status quo, in which the control of the Party/state is not fundamentally relinquished (this is endorsed by MacDonald of this volume as well),[54] but more likely transformed into more delicate ways (such as the re-empowerment of LPCs). While Xia argues the development of the Chinese

[54]Adam MacDonald demonstrates that the Party "appears to have no desire to relinquish its political monopoly".

legislature is synchronized with the development of a market economy (2008), I want to emphasize that marketization will not automatically/necessarily bring about liberalization. With this mentality, we shall see a more authentic China.

However, the political/societal effects of economic development in China, especially in this globalized information era, are inevitably emerging, no matter how gradually. The society is pluralizing and diversifying, while the state is also fragmenting. The state–society interaction, or more specifically, the confrontation from the society towards the state is extremely intensified, as shown by the data of relevance to social stability in China (Lum 2006; Walder and Zhao 2007; Tong and Lei 2010). The economy is retreating to the area where more domination of the SOEs is granted at the cost of losing the private economic sector, although the most recent efforts to reverse the trend are encouraging. The crisis of public trust particularly towards the local governments is by no means improved while the ongoing anti-corruption campaign reveal more and more local maladministration, including the "brought elections" within the People's Congress system.[55] Simply put, the Party itself is no longer able to claim its representation of the interests of all as it used to. What is the way out then? On the one hand, promises of public participation and transparent governance should be realized, both of which can be substantially improved when the interest representation via the people's congress becomes more authentic and effective. Vietnam has been setting up good examples for us in this respect. On the other hand, the current paradigm of state–society interaction needs to be rebalanced via institutionalized arrangements. Otherwise, maladministration can never be effectively contained, nor will social justice be truly achieved, in a sustainable manner. Also the predictability in economic activities will be at serious risk and can easily result in short-term irrationality in a standardized form. Moreover, all sorts of micro but diversified needs in the society can best be met by a vigorously blooming society, and thus a smart mobilization of all newly unleashed societal forces to manage the society itself can be of great contributions to the overall health of the state–society relationship. In the end, it must be realized by both central and local leaders in China that an organically developed society with authentically effective state–society interactions would be beneficial to the quality of governance, sustainability of economic development, as well as stability of the society.[56]

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[55]The case of *Qian Huiyun* (钱云会), and the like, to some extent demonstrates the society is losing trust in the government.

Also, instances of "bought elections" within the People's Congress system as part of the anti-corruption campaign were also revealed. See for example, in Hengyang Nearly 570 Legislators in Hunan City Caught in Election Scandal, http://english.caixin.com/2013-12-30/100623505.html.

[56]Glad to know the *Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations* (《社会团体登记管理条例》); *Regulations on Foundation Administration* (《基金会管理条例》); and *Provisional Regulations for the Registration Administration of People-Run non-Enterprise Units* (《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》) are all currently under revisions, but revising to what direction is yet to know, and what matters essentially are implementations of these laws. See further, interview with Mr. Liguo Li (李立国), Wen and Ling (2011).

Appendix 1

List of Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
PC	People's Congresses
SC	Standing Committee
PCSC	People's Congress Standing Committee
NPC	National People's Congress
LPC	Local People's Congress
PLPC	Provincial-level People's Congress
MLPC	Municipal-level People's Congress
CLPC	County-level People's Congress
TLPC	Town- and Township-level People's Congress
PLPCSC	Provincial-level People's Congress Standing Committee
MLPCSC	Municipal-level People's Congress Standing Committee
CLPCSC	County-level People's Congress Standing Committee
PD	People's Deputy
LPMG	Leading Party Members' Group
PLA	People's Liberation Army
VC	Village Committee
TVE	Town and Village Enterprise

Appendix 2

List of Interviews

Interview 1: Officials in Committee of Deputy of CLPCSC in County B, 10 March 2009
Interview 2: Officials in General Office of CLPCSC in County B, 11 March 2009
Interview 3: Deputies in CLPC in County B, 13 March 2009
Interview 4: Constituents in County B, 12-15 March 2009
Interview 5: Officials in Committee of Deputy of CLPCSC in County A, 16–17 March 2009
Interview 6: Deputies in CLPC in County A, 18 March 2009
Interview 7: Constituents in County B, 19 March 2009
Interview 8: Officials in Committee of Deputy of CLPCSC in County C, 20 March 2009
Interview 9: Officials in Committee of Law of CLPCSC in County C, 21 March 2009

Interview 10: Officials in General Office of CLPCSC in County C, 21 March 2009
Interview 11: Deputies in CLPC and CLPCSC in County C, 22–25 March 2009
Interview 12: Constituents in County C, 23–24 March 2009
Interview 13: Officials in Committee of Deputy of Zhejiang PLPCSC, 5–7 March 2009
Interview 14: Officials in Committee of Law of Zhejiang PLPCSC, 6–9 March 2009
Interview 15: Officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC, 4–5 April 2009
Interview 16: Deputies in Zhejiang PLPC, 6 April 2009
Interview 17: Deputies in Zhejiang PLPCSC, 7–8 April 2009
Interview 18: Staff of the Magazine of Zhejiang Renda (official Magazine of Zhejiang PLPCSC), 9 April 2009

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Chapter 3
Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Development of Community-Based Social Service Organizations

Leslie Shieh

3.1 Introduction: Community-Based Service Industry

Under China's agenda of welfare socialization (*shehuifuli shehuihua* 社会福利社会化), the responsibility to fund and provide social services is increasingly being transferred from the central state to lower levels of government and to social and market actors. The 12th 5-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2011–2015) further places priority on diversifying the types of service providers and service provision methods (People's Republic of China 2011, Chap. 30). At the neighbourhood-level, the term community service (*shequ fuwu* 社区服务) generally refers to responsibilities undertaken by residents' committees (*jumin weiyuanhui* 居民委员会), including assistance to families facing hardships, administrative support such as managing household registrations, and fee-charging programs such as cultural classes and day care (MCA Office of Social Welfare 1993, Sect. 4). The residents' committee, set up under statute during the Maoist era to assist with local policing, had been composed of housewives and retired elderly. Since the 1980s, state-led initiatives have sought to professionalize the committees

I am grateful to the staff at Sunrise and members of the Nanjing New Village residents' committee and seniors' association for welcoming me into their organizations and neighbourhood. I also acknowledge the Institute of International Research at Hopkins–Nanjing Center for sponsoring my stay in Nanjing. I thank the anonymous reviewers and my dissertation supervisory committee and examiners for their critical comments on earlier drafts.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_3

and strengthen their capacity to manage daily affairs and social service delivery within geographically defined neighbourhoods (*shequ* 社区).[1]

Concurrently, marketization, the growth of small independent businesses, and enlarged social spaces have given rise to a less-discussed contributor in community-based social welfare provision—a homegrown non-profit sector, translated into English as "civilian-run non-enterprise units" (*minban feiqiye danwei* 民办非企业单位), or *minfei* organizations (民非组织) for short. This chapter examines the increasing involvement of these Chinese domestic non-profit organizations in providing urban social services.[2] It raises questions about the nature of the *minfei* sector and the working relations *minfei* organizations have with local governments and with other social organizations. The purpose of asking these questions is twofold: to consider the growing number and types of social organizations in China, each exhibiting a different relationship with the state and, in turn, shaping their relationship with each other; and to critically examine a governance model that includes the provision of social services by a newly created non-profit sector.

In existing studies of contemporary Chinese social organizations, an important focus has been the changing state–society relations. One strand, with increased interest in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement, examines the application and relevance of the civil society framework (Whiting 1991; Nevitt 1996; Frolic 1997). A second interpretive framework, social corporatism, seeks to identify the diverse arrangements between the state and social organizations (Unger 1996; White et al. 1996). Examining present-day China more than a decade after the 1989 protests, recent writings observe that past approaches tended to treat state and society dichotomously. Alternatively, these studies explore the motivations and strategies of various actors within state and society (Saich 2000; Ho and Edmund 2008; Lu 2008; Schwartz and Shieh 2010). Focused on actors of *minfei* organizations in particular, this research extends the state–society perspective by contrasting an organization's vertical relations with the state and its lateral relations with other grassroots organizations in the neighbourhood sphere. Through this comparison, this paper shows that a distinguishing characteristic of *minfei* organizations is that they have not been so much co-opted into the system as purposely created to be a fundamental component of the reform-era welfare system.

The chapter is organized into three parts and begins with an overview of social organizations in contemporary China. Next, through the case study of an elder care

[1]Residents' committee reform is part of a nationwide emphasis on neighbourhood-based governance under the Community Construction (*shequ jianshe* 社区建设) policy. For discussions of the policy, see Benewick and Takarhara (2002), Derleth and Koldyk (2004), Wong and Poon (2005), Bray (2006), Yan and Gao (2007), Shieh (2011).

[2]Given the institutional rural–urban divide in China, it is important to point out that this chapter's focus is on urban China, where social services that were previously provided by the state through state-owned enterprises are being transferred to local governments, communities, social organizations and individuals.

service provider, Sunrise Senior Care Services,[3] it examines first the organization's collaborations with local state agencies and then the more reserved neighbourhood relations with the residents' committee and community organizations. The concluding discussion considers the implications of *minfei* organizations for conceptualizing governance and the role of non-profit organizations in China. My analysis draws on government documents and findings from field research conducted in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, in 2007 and 2008. I had the opportunity to volunteer with Sunrise during the initial planning of the care centre I discuss in this paper. In addition to participant observations, I conducted interviews with Sunrise staff, officials in district-level civil affairs bureaus, residents' committee directors and researchers at Nanjing University (NJU) and Nanjing Normal University (NNU) on the development of community-based governance.

3.2 Social Organizations and the Emergence of *Minfei* Organizations

3.2.1 Definition of Social Organizations

Prior to the recognition of *minfei* organizations in 1998, social organizations fell into two basic categories—mass organizations (*qunzhong zuzhi* 群众组织) and social organizations (*shehui tuanti* 社会团体). Mass organizations operate like government agencies, with cadres appointed and remunerated by the state and assigned administrative functions.[4] The major ones include the All-China Women's Federation, All-China Federation of Trade Unions and Young Communist League. They fall under the supervision of the Party or State Council, rather than the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Their memberships are broad and inclusive so that various segments of society can be represented and thus integrated into the Party's constituency (Ma 2006, pp. 82–84).

The second category, social organizations, is a post-reform intervention. Under the 1989 *Management Regulations on the Registration of Social Organizations*, social organizations are defined as non-profit organizations voluntarily founded by Chinese citizens for the realization of their collective purposes and that operate according to their charters (article 2). In the early years of economic reform, social organizations, which did not exist during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, began to form under the sponsorship of government bureaus, but they operated without much regulation or oversight (Whyte 1992, pp. 88–89). The June 1989

[3]The names of people and places in this paper are pseudonyms.

[4]Mass organizations are often used interchangeably with people's organizations (*renmin tuanti* 人民团体). However, Ma (2006, p. 82) makes the careful distinction that the latter term, carrying greater political status, refers to organizations that participated in the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949.

students' democratic movement marked a change in the state's attitude toward social organizing. Three months after the Tiananmen Square event, the State Council approved the 1989 *Regulations* to take effect immediately. Under the *Regulations*, social organizations referred to practically all organizations outside the bureaucracy, from associations to research societies and foundations (White et al. 1996, pp. 102–104). Organizations were required to register with their county-level civil affairs bureaus and to be attached to a supervisory body that oversaw their day-to-day affairs and, if able, provided financial and resource support.[5]

3.2.2 A New Category: *Minfei* Organizations

In 1998, the State Council adopted stricter regulations and reorganized social (popular) organizations into three registration categories—social organizations, *minfei* organizations and foundations—with new regulations for each.[6] The *minfei* category sets apart income-generating private institutions that provide not-for-profit social services. "Civilian-run non-enterprise units", an awkward term in both Chinese and English, were thus named to correspond to the conventional term used for public service institutions—"state-run publicly funded units" (*guoban shiye danwei* 国办事业单位)—that had until recently been the only provider of urban social services such as education, health care and elder care.[7]

Initially, all private (non-state-run) social service providers, for profit and not-for-profit alike, registered with local industry and trade bureaus and were subjected to the same taxation requirements (Sunrise director, interview, 31 October 2007). In 1999, 1 year after the passing of the *Provisional Regulations*, about 6000 organizations were registered under the non-enterprise category (NSB 2006, Table 9-5). In 2008, over 182,000 were registered, representing 44 % of all registered popular organizations. The *minfei* designation encompasses many types of private service providers (see Table 3.1). The education sector, which includes privately funded schools, is the largest. Sunrise Senior Care Services falls under the social services category.

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[5]For a detailed discussion of the regulations on social organizations, see White et al. (1996) for the 1989 *Regulations* and Saich (2000) and Ma (2006) with regards to the 1998 *Regulations*.

[6]The new regulations for social organizations and *minfei* organizations were adopted in 1998: *Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organizations;* (States Council 1998a, b) *Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of Civilian-run Non-enterprise Units*. In 2004, the State Council passed a new *Regulations concerning the Management of Foundations*, applicable to both domestic and foreign foundations. China Development Brief (www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com) has translated the three regulations into English.

[7]In my fieldwork, the term *minfei* was predominantly used by officials and researchers. The alternate term *minban* (民办), or civilian-run, was more often used by the staff of organizations to describe their organization. The latter is likely a more familiar term. Community-run rural schools, also referred to in Chinese as *minban*, have been in existence since the founding of the People's Republic and run in conjunction with state-run primary schools (Murphy 2004).

Table 3.1 Number of social organizations and types of *minfei* organizations, 2008

	Number registered	% of total	% of total
Total number of popular organizations	413,660	100.0	
Social organizations (*shehui tuanti*)	229,681	55.5	
Foundations (*jijinghui*)	1597	0.4	
Civilian-run non-enterprise units (*minfei*)	182,382	44.1	100.0
Education	88,811		48.7
Public health	27,744		15.2
Social services	25,836		14.2
Science and technology	9411		5.2
Culture	6505		3.5
Athletics	5951		3.3
Others	18,124		9.9

Source Ministry of Civil Affairs (2008). Development of Civil Affairs Work Areas for Year 2008 Statistical Bulletin

The definition of *minfei* organizations, which is broad and vague, centres on profit restrictions.[8] Like other social organizations, *minfei* have an official government sponsor, are registered with the civil affairs bureau and are entitled to similar tax exemptions and preferential utility rates (Sunrise director, interview, 31 October 2007). According to the 1998 *Provisional Regulations*, they are defined as societal units (enterprises, groups and individuals) undertaking non-profit social service activities using non-state assets (article 2). Unlike social organizations, they are not dependent on grants and donations. Financially independent, they acquire and control their own capital and assets, sustain their operations through fees, hire and train their own staff, and determine the types of services they offer.

The creation of the *minfei* designation has generated some discussion with regard to characterizing the sector and understanding the implications its growth has for the development of civil society in China. Ma (2006, pp. 68–69) argues that in creating a *minfei* status for private non-profit service providers and placing them in the same regulatory system as other social organizations, the government has created a false sense of an enlarged non-governmental sector. In doing so, it has in actuality brought more organizations under its supervision. Nevertheless, Ma recognizes the significance their formal recognition holds for social change: It has allowed an array of previously unrecognized organizations to register and be given legal protection, following the practices of countries like the United States, where institutions such as private schools, hospitals and nursing homes constitute the majority of the non-profit sector (pp. 183–184).

[8]The term "non-profit" (*fei yingli* 非营利) is used to describe the nature of organizations. As Ma (2006, p. 85) notes, the term "non-profit organization" (*fei yingli zuzhi* 非营利组织) does not refer to Chinese social organizations, but rather tends to be used as a translation of foreign-run groups.

Using case studies of care homes for the elderly run by *minfei* organizations, Wong and Tang (2006/2007) describe them as social enterprises. Examining the agency characteristics and the founders' backgrounds of 137 non-state care homes in three Chinese cities, the authors highlight the characteristics that *minfei* organizational leaders share with their Western social entrepreneur counterparts, such as their sense of social mission, competence and business acumen. More specific to China, they point out, is the predominance of women as social investors, drawing attention to the vulnerability of middle-aged, laid-off women workers and the difficulties they face in entering the mainstream market economy (pp. 639–640).

Lu (2008, p. 120) observes that Chinese non-governmental organizations, including *minfei*, may be not-for-profit in operations and may have been founded by people who believe in and care about social causes, but they are fundamentally business enterprises engaged in social services provisioning. The unfamiliarity of fee-charging social service organizations certainly raises questions about their founders' motivations and their distinction from commercial enterprises in the service industry. Some cynicism exists that these social service organizations were established by people who found loopholes in the registration policy and whose real motivation is profit. Consequently, the public's growing suspicion that the organizations are self-serving rather than driven by desires for social change has plagued the development of China's non-profit sector (pp. 124–125).

Defining and classifying social organizations in China is an ongoing process with sociopolitical implications, and various terminologies exist in official and popular parlance (Ma 2006, pp. 77–81; Lu 2008, pp. 2–5). The labels of NPO, NGO or social enterprise help to capture the characteristics of *minfei* organizations in the English language and are sometimes used by the organizations themselves, but they are also culturally loaded and often carry ideological connotations (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990; Salamon and Anheier 1997). As such, whether these organizations are "sites of democracy and control, sources of innovation and paralysis, instruments of and competitors to states . . . depends on the manner in which the NPSs [non-profit sectors] are constituted in particular societies and on their relationship to other sectors" (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990, p. 153). The *minfei* phenomenon emerged in the context of a changing socioeconomic environment. Primarily, high unemployment among middle-aged urbanites and new opportunities in the private sector created the grounds for the development of *minfei* organizations. Economic restructuring dismantled the work-unit-based system of welfare through work and lifetime employment. Massive layoffs were coupled with an inadequate social welfare system (Wong 1998; Gu 2001; Cai 2006). The directors of *minfei* organizations I met founded their agencies after being laid-off. They were presented with few choices; they were too young for retirement but lacked the education and credentials to compete with university graduates. Wong and Tang (2006/2007, pp. 635–636) similarly found job insecurity to have motivated the founders of the care homes they studied. With the government supporting private enterprises and self-employment under market socialism, many of these laid-off workers re-established a career for themselves in the service sector, particularly in the subsector of community services through the new venue of *minfei*.

3.3 Sunrise Senior Care Services: A Case of State and *Minfei* Collaboration

The new government approach and strategy to caring for China's aging population is summed up in the slogan-directive: elder care at home as foundation; community elder care as support; and state institutional elder care as supplementary (*jujia yanglao weijichu, shequ yanglao weiyituo, jigou yanglao weibuchong* 居家养老为基础, 社区养老为依托, 机构养老为补充; State Council, General Office 2006). In other words, government-funded care facilities are to be regarded as secondary to the family and the neighbourhood. Increasingly, the emergence of *minfei* organizations in the neighbourhood sphere has seen more specialized services such as private clinics, elder care and child care. As agencies engaged in service delivery, community-based *minfei* organizations intersect with the state in complex ways. As opposed to operating under the supervision of residents' committees which have been the principal organizers and managers of community services, the more professionalized *minfei* organizations will typically work with higher levels of government, such as the local hospital and district or municipal bureaus. The working relationship between *minfei* organizations and the local state has been characterized as public–private partnerships (Xu and Jones 2004) and as the outsourcing of social services (Jing 2008). Through the case of Sunrise Senior Care Services, this section examines the nature of the collaboration between *minfei* organization and district government.[9] Their cooperation began at a time when neither local state agencies nor private organizations had a clear understanding of the notion of a non-profit service sector and plural models of social service provision. The projects demonstrate the combined efforts of local officials and *minfei* directors discovering how they could work together.

Sunrise's founder, Director Pan, is a laid-off worker from a now bankrupt state-owned enterprise. The people who work with her, including her staff, social work professors and civil affairs bureau officials, describe her as a risk taker and an unassuming leader. One account I heard often was how to ease some of the tension brewing from workers' resentment at the height of enterprise restructuring in the mid-1990s, Director Pan, as the leader of the workers' union at the factory where she worked, had volunteered to be part of the first group of workers to be laid-off. Under the climate of uncertainty and fear that characterized the time, the significance of the gesture stayed in people's memories. Time and the subjectivity of memory may have exaggerated some of the details, but I found her to be charismatic and entrepreneurial, open to discussing and experimenting with new ideas through learning by doing.

[9]My examination of the nature of Sunrise's collaboration with district bureaus is informed by the five dimensions of partnership discussed by McQuaid (2000, pp. 12–18): (1) the purpose of the collaboration; (2) the structure of the relationship between the key actors; (3) the nature of the partnership over time; (4) the geographic scale of the activities; and (5) the mechanisms through which the activities are carried out.

Director Pan described her organization's relationship with the civil affairs bureau as one of support and guidance, rather than one of partnership. Wong and Tang (2006/2007, p. 241) attribute the subordinate–superior nature of care homes' relationship with the state to the low status of private entrepreneurs and the humility of the founders—many of whom were lower level technical cadres who had been made redundant under economic restructuring—in facing the dominant state. From my observations at Sunrise, I would extend this explanation by adding that local state officials also perceive their role as one of support and guidance. Civil affairs officials and university researchers I spoke to were extremely supportive of Director Pan's endeavours. They invited her to conferences and official study tours to other cities. They saw in Sunrise a vehicle to jointly experiment with translating ideas into practice (Professor, NJU sociology, interview, 24 October 2007).

The state's role in nurturing *minfei* organizations has significant implications. The interdependent relationship between the local state and Sunrise arose over the last decade of experimenting with community-based services. There is a growing recognition by local officials that Sunrise can play an important role in developing and providing care and services. Through a collaboration process, as three initiatives discussed below demonstrate, Sunrise has become closely integrated into the bureaucracy as a mainstream service provider.[10] It is also pertinent to consider the initiatives undertaken by Sunrise and local government bureaus in the broader discussion of China's experimentation-based policy-making process. Local-condition-driven projects, if proven effective, will attract the attention and support of higher level officials and often become starting points of policy experimentation (Heilmann 2008). Kamyar Razav's chapter and Matthew Skogstad-Stubbs' chapter in this volume discuss policy learning in the area of urban development.

3.3.1 *Programming Support: Community College for the Elderly*

Community college for the elderly (*laoren daxue* 老人大学, literally seniors' college) is a government sponsored continuing education program designed for seniors. The schools offer a variety of courses from liberal arts (such as calligraphy, literature and history) to general interests (such as cooking, fitness and gardening). They were initially established for retired Party and government cadres, but their success led to the opening of others by municipal governments and street offices (Olson 1988, p. 255). Today, they respond to the new realities of aging in present-day China by providing a place for social gathering and forming friendships to the many middle-aged workers forced into early retirement during the economic

[10]In his examination of the non-profit sector in Japan, Deguchi (2001) draws caution to the mainstreaming or institutionalization of private social service providers.

restructuring in the 1990s. They fill a gap in care for elderly parents who were increasingly less likely to live with and depend upon their adult children (Zhang 2009).

Sunrise's first residential care project evolved into a community school due to people's unfamiliarity with non-state care facilities. At the time, in the mid-1990s, the *minfei* category had not yet been established and Sunrise was registered with the trade bureau as a business. The facility was located inside a residential compound. The intention was to provide in-home assistance to enable elderly residents to live independently or in residential care in their own or their families' neighbourhoods for those who cannot manage on their own. However, because elder care had been the responsibility of families and the state through work units, having to pay for services was both unthinkable and unaffordable to the older generation. Instead, the facility became a place for the elderly to gather during the day and eat an affordable hot lunch. Rather than closing the facility, Sunrise partnered with one of the local community colleges to provide the programming while its staff maintained the facility, prepared the lunches and assisted in administrative duties such as course registration.

3.3.2 *Bureaucratic Support: Worker Certification and Social Insurance Coverage*

Sunrise employed mainly laid-off and migrant workers. Migrant workers, however, often needed even the most basic training, such as understanding refrigeration and the use of microwave ovens. More experienced caregivers and social work interns gave lessons on everyday urban life, from simple orientations like using kitchen appliances to more complex challenges like hospital visits. College and university professors also volunteered to give lectures on issues such as the nutritional needs of the elderly (Professor, NNU social work, interview, 12 October 2007). In 2001, Director Pan, working with local civil affairs bureaus, formally established an elder care training program with completion certificates. Thus, even if the graduates do not stay with Sunrise, the certificates can help them gain employment with other organizations (Fieldnotes, conversation with a Sunrise staff member, 7 November 2007).

In an even more progressive move, working with the local labour bureau, Director Pan has been able to provide social insurance coverage for her organization's caregivers, urban and migrant workers alike. This is a significant benefit because the majority of migrants are excluded from urban social security schemes (Solinger 1999; Wu 2010). While companies sometimes purchase insurance for technically skilled migrant workers, caregiving is typically regarded as a low-waged, low-skilled occupation. The training certificate and social insurance coverage Sunrise provides give caregivers a sense of recognition and belonging to an organization, which is particularly meaningful to "*danwei*-less" laid-off workers and "floating" migrant workers.

3.3.3 Government Contracts: Outsourcing of Services

Sunrise's third governmental partnership was in the form of service contracts paid for by district governments to provide in-home assistance to low-income elderly who lived alone. In the summer of 2001, the lower Yangtze River region experienced unseasonable heat, and two elderly people living alone in Nanjing died in their homes and were not discovered until a few days later by neighbours who grew suspicious about their absence. The incidents shocked the wealthy city and brought attention to the needs of live-alone elderly.[11] In a departure from the pre-reform period when all welfare services were funded and provided by the state, local governments sought to outsource the delivery of services to private providers. Through an informal tendering process based on past collaborations, Sunrise was offered the service contract for the pilot year. It has since grown from servicing 100 elderly residents in the pilot year to over 1000 four years later (Sunrise director, interview, 31 October 2007).

A point worth noting is that the operational structure of Sunrise's in-home assistance program purposely corresponds to the street office–residents' committee administrative structure.[12] Seniors who are eligible for the program are determined and recommended to street offices by residents' committee directors. Sunrise has appointed monitors who supervise, on average, 20 caregivers working within their defined service areas, which are delineated to correspond to street office jurisdictions. The monitors are all women in their 50s, many of whom were previously directors or members of residents' committees. Their work with Sunrise benefits from and builds on their past work and the relationships they have formed. Under their supervision, one or two caregivers are assigned to each neighbourhood unit, assisting one to seven elderly people for 2 to 3 hours a week. Compared with the last two projects, through service contracts the state-*minfei* working relation has evolved into a more structured partnership—an agreed, cooperative venture that has positive outcome for those involved (Carroll and Steane 2000, p. 37). This contract model, whereby the district government provides the funds and Sunrise is responsible and accountable for the elderly in their care, has rendered the *minfei* organization the mainstream service provider.

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[11]In a 2005 report, the Nanjing Old Age Commission stated that one-third of the city's residents aged over 60 lived with their spouse independent from their adult children and 7 % lived alone. The survey revealed that of those who lived by themselves, close to 40 % did not receive a pension and 42 % lacked access to the public health care system. Moreover, more than one-third did not have children and so were without any family support (Nanjing Municipal Old Age Commission 2006).

[12]Street offices and residents' committees form the base of the urban administrative system. About 1000–3000 households comprise a neighbourhood unit (*shequ* 社区) under the management of a residents' committee. Typically in large cities, 10–15 *shequ* fall under the supervision of a street office (*jiedao banshichu* 街道办事处).

3.4 Lateral Partnerships at the Grass Roots

As a recent phenomenon, the notion of *minfei* organizations and their non-profit designation are still foreign to most people. As is the case for Sunrise, this unfamiliarity exists in part because organizations have not been able to establish strong links with local communities and they have not effectively sought to differentiate the *minfei* sector from the business sector. Like many urbanites who are used to state-run welfare services, residents' committee directors are uncertain of *minfei* organizations' intentions and are somewhat hesitant to promote or collaborate with them to develop fee-charging services (Professor, NJU sociology, interview, 24 October 2007).

Director Pan has alternatively sought support from neighbourhood organizations. Collaborating with the neighbourhood seniors' association of Nanjing New Village,[13] Sunrise began experimenting with the idea of a comprehensive seniors' centre as opposed to establishing another care home.[14] The centre was envisioned as a complement to the main community centre, catering to the interests of all seniors in the neighbourhood. It would provide a range of services, including social activities, meal services, respite care to temporarily relieve family caregivers and long-term care. What is particularly meaningful for the understanding of changing grassroots governance in China is that the centre resulted from collaboration between Sunrise and the seniors' association. It demonstrates a community-initiated action whereby residents, working together with a *minfei* organization, self-organize the social services they need. It also illustrates a means through which *minfei* organizations can embed themselves within the local communities they serve.

While the seniors' association chair had verbally agreed to lend its support, the collaboration was built on the interest of a particular member in Director Pan's proposal. A retired high-ranking cadre in his 70s, Lao Li recognized the lack of available services to fulfill the needs of his friends and neighbours and saw the project as a worthwhile undertaking. He is sympathetic to the government's position and accepts the fact that welfare responsibilities also need to be shouldered by society.

[13]Seniors' associations are neighbourhood-level organizations and fall under corresponding organizations at the street office, district and municipal levels. This vertical integration means that every administrative neighbourhood has a seniors' association, and that while organizing social activities is its primary function, it occasionally undertakes administrative duties as a representative of seniors in the community.

[14]For North American readers, the seniors' centre that Director Pan is experimenting with may not seem like a novel idea. However, it is important to stress that in the context of urban China, the responsibility for elder care has shifted away from work units and onto the local state, communities, and families. Gaps remain in infrastructure, resources and public–private coordination; and new paradigms and models are sought for elder care.

During the planning of the new centre, Lao Li advocated for the type of centre he believed his neighbours wanted and needed. Refusing the help of Sunrise interns who volunteered to conduct a survey on the support and needs of the *shequ*'s elderly, he and his wife visited neighbours who lived alone and those who required various levels of assistance. His influence came from his strong personality as well as his career background. The Sunrise team met regularly in Lao Li's dining room, and it was he who determined the agenda and ran the meeting. In cadre fashion, he often began by emphasizing the increasing need for community elder service provision, citing policy agendas, political speeches and media reports on the elderly. While the relationship was not coercive, meaning that no explicit demands were made in exchange for neighbourhood support, the underlying understanding was that Lao Li's participation was instrumental in garnering community support. He served as the liaison between Sunrise and the seniors' association and residents' committee. Neither the seniors' association chair nor the residents' committee director attended the meetings in his home, but he kept them informed of the plans and progress.

The relationships among the residents' committee, seniors' association and Sunrise raise some questions for thinking about collaborations among social organizations. First, the residents' committee, seniors' association and Sunrise may share the common goal of establishing a neighbourhood-based elder care model, but the privately funded initiative did not fall under the supervision of the residents' committee, rather under that of the district civil affairs bureau. As such, unless it was a formal meeting like the focus group that was convened to gather neighbourhood opinion, the residents' committee did not play a key role.

Second, the collaboration was not a joint project—an agreed, cooperative venture with shared risks and rewards—but a looser, under-defined consultative relationship (Carroll and Steane 2000, p. 37). The residents' committee and seniors' association did not provide funds or space for the facility, and it was unclear whether seniors' activities held at the community centre would move to the new facility. Thus, while the community provided input, neither the residents' committee nor the seniors' association would be liable for Sunrise's actions and decisions. The private–public interests were managed by Lao Li in his capacity as a member of the seniors' association and as a long-time resident and retired cadre. He was a volunteer and, as far as I am aware, did not receive remuneration for his time and work. The more passive role taken by the residents' committee and seniors' association and the active participation by Lao Li suggest that neighbourhood-based collaborations are dependent on the commitment of individuals.

Third, I believe the residents' committee, seniors' association and Lao Li were aware of the support and recognition that Sunrise receives from street office and district officials. This knowledge contributed to their willingness to participate, though to varying degrees, in planning and designing the centre. And so it can be argued that their participation was driven partly by concerns over potential criticism from higher level officials about the governance of the neighbourhood and the leadership of the residents' committee.

3.5 Conclusion: *Minfei* Organizations and Effective Social Service Provisioning

This case study of how Sunrise has experimented and helped shape local elder care programs demonstrates the potential of *minfei* organizations to provide much-needed services and to fill the widening gap between state and family responsibilities. Local governments throughout China are experimenting with contracting out social service provision, more recently referred to in policy documents as "purchase of service contracting" (*goumai fuwu* 购买服务) (Doyon 2012; Teets 2012). As important new actors, their increasing role in the neighbourhood sphere raises significant issues to consider for the development of effective social service provisioning in China. First, rather than contending with their underlying motivation and distance from the state, this research has shown that there exists a more fundamental concern that they have become the state's solution to a pressing problem. Community-based *minfei* organizations are integrated into the design of a new three-tiered social service delivery system consisting of family, community and state. Despite *minfei*'s financial and operational autonomy from the state, the category was created to help realize the state's welfare socialization agenda. As such, *minfei* also possess distinctive features of Chinese state corporatism. Unger and Chan (1996, p. 105) observe that the state corporatist structure in China is not "a mechanism for yet further strengthening the state's grip over the economy and over society, but rather the reverse, a mechanism through which the state's grip could be loosened". Like the corporatist setup observed of trade associations that the state created to carry out managerial and economic functions on its behalf (Wank 1995; Unger 1996; Foster 2002), the relationship between the state and *minfei* is similarly more about the transfer of responsibility than about control. Jing Qian's examination (in this volume) of the People's Congress provides a further discussion of the corporatist characteristics of China's institutional arrangements and their impact on state–society relations.

A second reflection from this case study is the bottom-up effort to provide much-needed services through a *minfei* organization and to monitor its operations. The effectiveness of the grass roots to protect neighbourhood interests, independent of the state, is often overlooked. In the case of Sunrise, state agencies have been more concerned with structural changes such as how its services can work with the existing public service provision system. Regulatory framework and the mechanisms to control quality and level of service are not yet in place. Subsequently, Sunrise has received much support and guidance and experienced few controls and limitations from state agencies over its activities. Monitoring has come instead from neighbourhood organizations. It would seem that a strong collaboration among Sunrise, the seniors' association and the residents' committee would allow them to combine resources and solidify efforts on elder care. However, the distance kept by the directors of the residents' committee and the seniors' association, whether for reasons of competition or distrust, has led Sunrise to act independently and be conscious of its actions. The directors are not unaware of the support that Sunrise

receives from higher levels of government, but within their purview, in their everyday interactions with Sunrise staff, they can choose whether or not to facilitate their entry into the neighbourhood. As Saich (2000, p. 140) has noted, important horizontal relationships exist in society that are often overshadowed by the attention to social organizations' vertical integration. As such, while the responsibility for welfare and social services are being devolved to local and non-state providers, the level and availability of care will increasingly depend on the commitment of individuals, the nature of lateral working relations and the trust and collaboration between local community stakeholders and social organizations.

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Chapter 4
A Chinese Approach to Land Rights: How Bo's Chongqing Model Exposed an Economic Reform Program in Crisis

Kamyar Razavi

To understand the economic growth that has occurred in China over the past generation[1] is to uncover an important paradox. This paradox is about the positioning of Chinese socialism against contemporary notions of classical liberalism. Put differently, it is about policy solutions aimed at integrating competing capitalist and socialist ideologies into a cohesive model of economic development. In this paper, I position this economic paradox using a historical and legal framework. I do this by exploring the question of who owns the land in China. Land is a fundamental building block of economic development. However, the question of land ownership in China remains vague. This is no accident. As I will explain in this paper, the vagueness stems from conflicting ideologies that create what has been called a hybrid or dualist system of law based on disparities over time and space.

Officially, China is a socialist country with deeply entrenched notions of public and collective ownership to property. The constitution underscores the supremacy of state ownership for urban land and enterprise and, in the rural areas, common ownership by village collectives.[2] At the same time, China today is a capitalist country in all but name. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) subscribes to increasingly orthodox ideas of liberal market development and reform.[3] The rift between socialism and capitalism in China comes from an increasingly concerted, albeit incomplete, effort to by the CCP to implement liberal market policies. The

[1]China's economic growth story in the first few years of the twenty first century has been the stuff of legend. In 2005–2007, China registered year-over-year GDP growth between 11 and 14 %. With the stunning rise in GDP growth, however, have come drastic increases in CO_2 emissions, for example. Source: World Bank.

[2]These are contained in Articles 6–10 of the Constitution. Article 10 explains terms of land ownership in the cities versus rural and suburban areas.

[3]The official language that is used is "socialist market economy" but in recent years there has been greater emphasis on the "decisive role of the market in allocating resources." This language is contained in the communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, a copy of which is available at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/15/content_31203056.html.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_4

model is a particular brand of Chinese socialism that it has been used for decades by the CCP to integrate a state-led program of human development with entrepreneurship and, to greater and greater degrees, private capital.[4]

The shift toward Western-style market liberalism began in the earnest in December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress.[5] Paltiel argues that this shift did not turn China into a neoliberal state. The CCP has never upheld the 'invisible hand,' he suggests. Rather, market reform in China happened on "purely instrumental pragmatic grounds" (Paltiel 1989, p. 263). For example, the liberal market reform that began in the 1980s with the de-collectivization of land and the development of private enterprise in the countryside was aimed at improving efficiencies in the form of grain output. The move toward an increasingly unfettered liberal market has accelerated in recent years, all within the parameters of Leninist Party values. Reforms announced at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013 are only the latest, and most forceful, incarnations of the CCP's embrace of market principles under the official rubric of the Marxist-Leninist state.

Benjamin W. James writes about a hybrid system of rural property ownership in China from the point of view of rural citizens. He says: "[t]he principal problem is that it is…a mix of China's socialist past with significant changes toward a market-based future" (James 2007, p. 453). This essay explores this hybrid system and advances the argument that a conflating of socialism and capitalism is routed in irreconcilable views in the law of property ownership.[6] In essence, the Chinese legal system fetishizes socialist ideologies while facilitating capitalist practices. The legal system, right down to the basic concept of what constitutes a property right, is governed by what I argue are irreconcilable conflicts between two totally different approaches—Western-style capitalism on the one hand, and Soviet-inspired Marxist-Leninism on the other. Nowhere is the problem more pressing than in the question of land ownership in China.

Competing claims to how property rights are allocated amid such deep ideological and political differences create spaces for abuse. This abuse is evident in many facets of life in China, from the struggle some villagers face in protecting their land, to ill-gotten gains by corrupt officials. More urgently, environmental violations take place in the absence of good management and in the incessant drive for more capital accumulation. The pursuit of capital accumulation in China is in

[4]Lin Chun discusses the socialist project of the CCP to eradicate poverty and achieve equality in China. She argues these ideals have been side-tracked by the pursuit of capital (Lin 2013, Chaps. 4 and 6).

[5]The plenum spelled out a program of "socialist modernization" known as the 'Four Modernizations.' The requirements for the 'Four Modernizations' were based on "diverse changes in those aspects of the relations of production and the superstructure not in harmony with the growth of the productive forces…" [in Spence (2013, p. 590), citing "Quarterly Documentation," *China Quarterly* 77 (March 1979): 168].

[6]I use land rights as a starting point. Land is a key form of security in China. The split over urban and rural rights and the pursuit of capital has wreaked havoc over the land in China as developers try to exact more and more surplus value from rural land. For more on the capitalist exploitation of land, see Lin (2013, Chap. 6).

the context of a legal system that is half developed. I believe the conflating of official socialism with the official promotion of market reform is to blame for a weak legal system in China.

To explain this scenario, I begin the first part of this essay by unpacking the steady move toward liberal interpretations of property rights that started in earnest in China the 1970s. I aim to demonstrate how the laws on property ownership have steadily progressed toward a model of private rights based on European legal codes. China has embraced Western-liberal economic policies; however, the steady pace toward market reform has not resulted in the jettisoning of the Soviet-inspired Marxist-Leninism that underpins China's constitution. Thus, to understand the current hybrid model of property rights in China is to reflect on the historical trajectory of how property rights law has developed over time.

I put the dilemma over property in context with an urbanization experiment that attempted to reconcile socialist dogma and capitalist practice using land as a starting point. This policy experiment took place in Chongqing, a sprawling urban-rural municipality with a total combined population numbering around 35 million. The experiment is known as the "Chongqing Experiment" or "Chongqing Model" (重庆模式 in Chinese) and it was the brainchild of ex-CCP Party Chief Bo Xilai. The Chongqing Model was a plan to transfer millions of people from the rural countryside into an urban factory economy. Bo's idea was to create a socialist utopia using private capital as the driving force. His strategy, and his rise up the ranks of the CCP, faltered badly, and culminated with his much-publicized ouster in 2012. The implosion of Bo's program exposes the conflating of liberal market values and Leninist party principles. These issues took on added urgency at the Third Plenum in November 2013. However, the CCP has yet to openly reconcile its pursuit of liberal market policies with its dogmatic adherence to Leninist principles.

The basic building block of economic development in China is land.[7] As Potter argues, conflicting claims to property ownership over land in China pit public power against private rights (Potter 2011). The dilemma of how to fold capitalist development into a socialist system is particularly apparent at the nexus of urban and rural land.[8] That is because legal ownership to property in China differs depending on whether that property is classified as urban or rural. In China, the state owns land in urban areas while village collectives own the land in rural areas. Recent reforms have bolstered individual rights of ownership in both urban and

[7]Lin Chun explores the relationship between land and wage labor. On the one hand, land is the source of security for many migrant workers. On the other hand, these same migrant workers are paid low wages for their labor. In this essay, I explain how rural land is systematically undervalued by China's increasingly capitalist economy. In other words, there is more surplus value being squeezed from the value of land. Lin writes that "land right[s] account [sic] for a large share of the cost of labor reproduction in China and ultimately explain[s] the country's 'competitive advantage' in the global labor market" (Lin 2013, p. 119).

[8]Li Ping of the Rural Development Institute says the compensation paid to residents for the expropriation of their land is several times less than the actual value of that land. This problem is particularly acute in suburban areas where farmland is especially valuable to developers (James 2007, pp. 482–483, including footnote 117).

rural areas; however, they have not thoroughly addressed some of the finer points. For instance, they have not spelled out which levels of village government actually possess land rights (Ho 2005, pp. 28–29) nor have they adequately spelled out the public interest specification that is regularly used to justify land takeovers in China (Pils 2009, p. 35).[9]

At the Third Party Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, the CCP upheld its commitment to rural land reform while promising to create a more decisive role for private markets in the Chinese economy. The plenum, however, did not address what I believe is a critical flaw in China's economic development program, that is, the conflating of state supremacy on the one hand, with the legitimacy of market liberalism, specifically, private ownership of property on the other. Over the years, the focus of reforms has shifted gradually toward stronger protection of individual property rights in the sense of Western, consolidated rights of ownership. Thus, reforms announced at the Third Plenum are the culmination of four decades of changes to the property rights system and a steady shift toward a property rights system based on market liberalism.

These reforms are a tacit acknowledgment that China's system of promoting market capitalism by transforming rural agricultural land into urban development land is inadequate. The Chinese leadership wants to close the gap between rural and urban China by granting its citizens greater control over land ownership. However, the language of the constitution conflates the supremacy of the state with private rights. For example, the constitution refers to "lawful" private property but does not spell out what is considered "lawful."[10] Thus, steady progress toward consolidated rights under the official mantra of socialism results in a legal system that serves, first, the Leninist party apparatus.

In 2007, China drafted a landmark Property Rights Law (PRL, 物权法 in Chinese). The PRL is the culmination of years of debate over the extent to which moveable and immovable property should belong to an individual versus to a collective or to the state. However, both the PRL and the constitution of China uphold the sanctity of the state in the ownership of property. The PRL explains ownership of private property in more clear ways than previously had been the case.[11] However, there are no unbridled individual rights of ownership in the PRL.

[9]The public interest refrain is prominent in the constitution and in the PRL. While these documents set terms of property ownership, in both there is reference to the state's right to reclaim land when there is a public interest to do so. Neither document spells out what constitutes a public interest.

[10]Article 13 in the 2004 amendment to the constitution stipulates that "[c]itizens' lawful private property is inviolable." However, Article 12 states that "[s]ocialist public property is inviolable." So the key question here is around the definition of the term "lawful." The PRL uses similar language to set limits on private property. For instance, Articles 56 and 63 limit private ownership of state and collective land, respectively, while Article 184 limits private mortgaging of collective land.

[11]The new law seemingly affords equal legal protection to "state-owned, group-owned and private-owned property" (James 2007, p. 473, PRL Article 4).

But, liberal economic development pre-dates today's CCP. Even prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the imperial court was drawing on European legal influences.[12] By the turn of the twentieth century, concepts of property ownership in China were emulating statutes in the German Civil Code (Chen 2011, p. 7). Those ownership rights continued after the fall of the Qing Dynasty and were written into the Republic of China's Civil Code in 1929. They were not rights in the Western sense of consolidated property rights. The state still maintained supremacy of over property, but not in the frame of Marxist-Leninism that became the official ideology of the CCP after 1949. The conflating of socialist ideology with capitalist tendencies dates back to the Mao-led program of development and economic growth that started in the 1950s. The scholar Lin Chun underscores how the "competing interpretations of China's relationship with capitalism are part of the ideological and discursive struggle" that, she says, promotes a kind of "deformed Marxism" (Lin 2013, p. 69) that began with the CCP's early experiment to lift millions of people out of poverty.

The First Five-Year Plan of the newly formed PRC banned bourgeois private property (Spence 2013, p. 489).[13] Land reforms following the establishment of the PRC created communes with a goal of eliminating a landlord class of capitalists. At the same time, the communes were a way of streamlining farming operations across the country, with an eye toward food self-sustainability (Lin 2013, p. 138). Thus, the CCP borrowed heavily from the Soviet civil code to draft a system based on collective ownership with overarching state supremacy (Chen 2011, p. 10; Spence 2013, p. 461). These interpretations equated private property with a dominating bourgeoisie whose interests ran up against those of the proletariat (Chen 2011, p. 10). As Yuezhi Zhao has pointed out, one of the "greatest ironies" of the PRC is that "the discourse of 'class struggle' was taken to its essentialized extreme when Chinese society was relatively egalitarian during the Cultural Revolution, and was totally suppressed during a process of rapid class polarization during the reform era" (Lin 2013, p. 71, citing Zhao 2009, p. 97).

Western-European legal interpretations continued to influence Chinese jurists right up to the drafting of the PRL in 2007. More, the liberal-democratic interpretations of property ownership came in spite of, not in lieu of, Soviet views of socialist ownership. As Lin has argued, the development of a unique brand of Chinese Marxism stems from this desire to use socialism for the explicit purpose of economic development without, as she writes, enduring "capitalist tortures" (Lin 2013, p. 47). It is precisely this unique brand of capitalist-socialist integration that the CCP has used to lift tens of millions of people out of poverty in China.

[12]Chen compares the Chinese concept of a property right, or wuquan, to the German Sachen and Sachenrecht, meaning 'things' and the 'the law of things' (or property), respectively (Chen 2011, pp. 8–9).

[13]Naturally, there are many references to the CCP's views on bourgeois private property. Spence estimates that shortly after 1949, about 40 % of landlord holdings in central south China were seized and redistributed to the peasant class (p. 462). For more on bourgeois private property, see Zhang (2008, p. 7), Chen (2011, p. 10).

However, as I have argued in this paper, the inexorable pull of global capitalism that began in the early 1990s with Deng's southern tour has created a scenario where market liberalism bumps up against the Leninist principles of the CCP.

I will try to explain this problem by expounding on the move toward market reform during the Reform and Opening movement (改革开放 in Chinese) in the 1980s.

In this period, the elimination of the communes and the creation of a household registration system (HRS, 户口登记制度 in Chinese) allowed rural families to take stock of their agricultural output privately, as individual households, rather than having to pool their output into the collective for the purview and explicit benefit of the state. The economic windfalls of agricultural output were still managed by the collective, but the prevailing wisdom is that HRS nonetheless put China on the path toward market reform. Individual households were thus allowed to take responsibility for the agricultural output of their land (they did not have full property rights of ownership to the land) through *chengbao* land-contracting rights. It was not private ownership, but it was a small step toward greater autonomy and individual accountability.

In 1986, China adopted a new civil code named General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL or 民法通则 in Chinese). This law was the first in what would be a series of moves to better spell out terms of individual property ownership in China. The GPLC created a new provision for chengbao land in rural China, something that has been called a "partial privatization of agricultural production" (Chen 2011, p. 3). The gradual move away from the commune system incentivized production and resulted in dramatic gains in grain production in the first 4 years of the HRS.[14]

In the three decades since the implementation of HRS, increasingly liberal legal doctrines have bolstered the rights that villagers have to land. These laws have generally done this by strengthening the terms and conditions to the use of chengbao land. In 1998, a revised Land Administration Law (LAL, 土地管理法 in Chinese) set out a 30-year contractual term for use of rural land. Five years later, in 2002, a Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL, 农村土地承包法 in Chinese) underscored individual rights by allowing villagers to transfer user rights (something they had been doing anyway before the law came into effect) so long as the ownership and the 30-year contractual time frame for land use rights was not modified (Rosato-Stevens 2008, p. 113). More recently, the language of market liberalism is used in official CCP communiqués to talk about these reforms. For instance, the communiqué from the Third Plenum in November 2013 refers to upholding "the direction of reform towards the socialist market economy" and the need to "deepen economic system reform by centering on the decisive role of the market in allocating resources."[15]

[14]The link between the privatization of agricultural production in rural China and soaring grain production is hardly a matter of debate, though Chris Bramall has compiled compelling evidence to downplay the role that HRS played in economic growth. He argues industrialization actually began prior to the dismantling of the collectives (Bramall 2006).

[15]Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. (or: See Supra Note 3).

As mentioned, Chinese jurists were borrowing heavily from European legal codes well before the founding of the PRC in 1949. These European influences can be observed in the PRL, which, as Potter argues, is "particularly influenced by liberal ideas of private property rights, albeit qualified by imperatives of socialist regulation" (Potter 2011, p. 3). The PRL, thus, can only be thought of as a compromise measure, balancing the protection of individual rights against the sanctity of so-called socialist or public property. The law was designed to address the need for greater clarity in the protection of individual property rights in China. However, it still falls short of accomplishing these goals. The primary reason has to do with the power of the CCP to define the public interest.

China's constitution states that land takeovers can happen when there is a public interest to do so (为了公共利益的需要 in Pils 2009, p. 35; also James 2007, pp. 477–478). Here, the crucial issue is not the definition of a public interest (though a clear definition of the term is missing in the legal language).[16] Rather, the crucial problem is the discretionary power of the CCP to define the public interest in the absence of an adequate process of appellate law or sufficient independence between the powerful political apparatus of the CCP, including powerful government and business officials, and the various national and subnational legal bodies in China.

In China, subnational governments are under substantial pressure to boost economic output. Often this happens by officials looking to burnish their economic development track record. The lack of clear property laws makes it easier for corrupt officials to hand over bribes or otherwise flout what rules there may be in place. More, the lack of an adequate appellate process gives citizens fewer avenues of redress (James 2007, p. 478). Corruption and abuse often result in environmental violations which, in turn, impact public health and quality of life. In terms of land rights, there is a crisis of illegal land expropriations in China. These expropriations are particularly prevalent at the confluence of rural and urban, where the value of vacant land is especially high. As James points out, "local governments stand to make enormous gains from requisitioning rural lands … whatever legal risks they encounter by violating takings laws are mitigated by potential profits" (James 2007, p. 489).

A fresh round of reforms introduced at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress re-affirms the CCP's goal of narrowing the gap between urban and rural *hukou* rights in China. The stated aim of these reforms is to give rural residents a clearer path to the privileges urban citizenship. Urban residents generally earn higher wages and their children have access to better schools and social services. The export-led growth that started in China in 1990s has been a key driver of urbanization, which the CCP equates with development. The CCP sees a "balanced

[16]Problems defining a 'public interest' are not unique to China. In the US, lawmakers grappled with this definition in the 1940s while drafting federal rules pertaining to radio broadcasting (see Pickard 2015).

allocation of public resources between urban and rural areas" as the primary way forward for improving the process of urbanization in China.[17]

One of the experimental models for synchronizing urban and rural China is through coordinated land transfer schemes. These schemes are designed to spur economic development while reducing the spatial inequality between urban and rural geographical spheres. However, the integration of rural and urban China has not eliminated the conflating of public interests and private rights and, by extension, the infringement of the rights of non-elites in society at the hands of all-powerful capitalists. In fact, in some places, the land transfer schemes have only made the problem of a two-tier system of land rights and responsibilities more prevalent. This is because land that is classified as rural agricultural land can only be used for farming. Land transfer schemes have been implemented to allow for the conversion of some of this land to industrial purposes. The result is that rural agricultural land on the fringe of cities is thus systematically undervalued when it is expropriated for much more lucrative commercial applications (James 2007, pp. 482–483).

This process happened in Chongqing with a land transfer scheme known as the Chongqing Model. The Chongqing Model is a policy experiment developed amid efforts at both the national and subnational levels to promote urbanization in China. The goal of policy makers in Chongqing was to use surplus rural land in the countryside to fuel an export-led economic engine in the urban center. Thus, the Chongqing Model was hatched with the goal of spurring economic development in a relatively underdeveloped inland area. In essence, it was a way of integrating rural and urban concepts of land rights with the discreet goal of blending capitalist production into some sort of socialist utopia.

Chongqing was split off from neighboring Sichuan Province by the CCP in 1997. The municipal region was declared a special administrative zone representing 40 different districts stretching out from the banks of the Yangtze River. It was one of the four cities in China placed under direct control from Beijing (these cities are known in Chinese as *zhi-xia-shi* or special administrative cities, 直辖市 in Chinese). The special designation conferred on the Chongqing municipal government a large degree of autonomy to undertake policy experimentation toward building an inland economic hub. Thus, with an eye on urbanization and the better use of vast stores of surplus rural labor, the CCP's top official in Chongqing, Bo Xilai, implemented a landmark pilot project to integrate the rural hinterlands into core urban areas. The model would allow for a socialist-inspired skills transfer from the countryside using capitalist modes of factory production in the city.

Thus, Bo's dream was twofold: an economic miracle on the one hand, a socialist utopia on the other. In Chinese, the urban-rural integration scheme literally means to bring the countryside and the city together (chengxiang yitihua, 城乡一体化). The program was structured on the principle of land exchange markets (tudi jiaoyisuo, 土地交易所). These were land transfers geared at speeding up the urbanization process.

[17]Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. (or: See Supra Note 3).

I, along with three colleagues from my alma mater, Tsinghua University, attended a presentation with the Chongqing government in June 2009 about the Chongqing Model. We also met with students at the Institute of Urban and Rural Coordinated Development at Chongqing University. During the course of these meetings, I discovered that the goal of the Chongqing municipal government was to urbanize as many as 10 million people from their rural districts into urban areas within 10 years.[18] In candid conversations with rural officials, I also learned how the urban-rural integration program juxtaposed the rights of rural residents against the imperative of capitalist-driven economic development.

The ingenuity of the land transfer scheme is that it would not result in the further erosion of China's limited agricultural land. By 2008, when the Chongqing Model started to really develop, the CCP was already extremely concerned about the loss of agricultural land in China. The Party has long prided itself on food sustainability for China, and the notion of becoming a net food importer has long been non-starter. Thus, the CCP is adamant about maintaining a national threshold of 120 million hectares of agricultural land. This is the amount generally considered the minimum necessary to ensure food self-sufficiency. Any urbanization scheme would have to work in such a way so as to protect agricultural land from encroaching industrial development. The Chongqing Model contained such safeguards. It was a clever way of unlocking more land in the urban areas for private development while maintaining the existing equilibrium between urban and rural land.

As mentioned, the model was created on the basis of land exchange markets. The creation of these markets allowed villagers to auction off their land use rights and be urbanized in the process. In an effort to maintain the balance between urban and rural land, the land exchange market is designed to free up one *mu* (1 μ or 亩 = 0.0667 hectares) of rural land for every additional mu of urban land that is made available for construction purposes. The program works on the basis of land transfer tickets known as *dipiao* (地票).

Consider a city and private developer wanting to develop a piece of land near the city. In order to develop that land, the developer must return an equivalent amount of land to farmland. This is to maintain the ratio of urban land to farmland. Then consider 60 μ of relatively low-density rural land (classified as rural construction land, known as 宅基地 in Chinese) that is occupied by village homes, small-scale enterprises, or is sitting empty. The integration plan lets developers bid for conversion certificates, or dipiao. The villagers are, in turn, compensated for the land they agree to vacate upon the completion of the land-right auction. They relocate into higher-density housing in the city.

[18]Much of the information in this section was gleaned from meetings and interviews in Chongqing, including with municipal government officials at the urban-rural integration office (I discuss the goals of this office further on in this essay), and with students at the Institute of Urban and Rural Coordinated Development at Chongqing University. Some interviews were also carried out in the countryside.

Let us now assume this higher-density land, which is developed, occupies a total surface area of 10 μ. This calculation leaves 50 μ of land unaccounted for. It is then reclaimed in the rural setting and used for high-intensity farming operations—in essence, the rural construction land is converted back into arable land. Because 50 μ of land has been made available for agricultural purposes, another 50 μ can thus be used in urban areas for higher-value development usually in the form of industrial operations or other commercial projects such as a business district.

The balance of farmland to urban land is maintained: as x μ of new urban land is developed, an equivalent y μ of land that used to be rural construction land is now available to be claimed as agricultural, or arable, land. Meantime, villagers who occupied larger tracts of formerly underutilized agricultural land are compensated and relocated to the city where they are given residences and factory jobs. Their children are enrolled in school.[19]

The land transfer scheme is supposed to increase the value of far-flung land by creating a market for it. More, it produces a transfer of skills, arguably making more efficient use of surplus rural labor from the countryside. There are windfalls for the Chongqing government as well in terms of greater tax revenue from attracting industry and business to newly created industrial parks and factory operations. As Lin points out, "[s]trides in land market liberalization, especially policies of 'land circulation,' have given rise to de facto privatization" (Lin 2013, p. 127).

The Chongqing government even had a special urban-rural integration office (in Chinese, chengxiang tongchou ban, 城乡统筹办) to work through the complicated coordination required between urban and rural jurisdictions for land transfers. In interviews, this office acknowledged the ongoing difficulty in Chongqing of attracting business in spite of the economic model it had implemented. The key problem areas it identified included:

- Overall economic capacity in Chongqing not strong. More rapid development needed.
- Urban-rural dual structure causes conflict; unbalanced development exists among regions.
- Industrial framework needs strengthening. Competitive ability is not robust enough.
- Opening up both domestically and internationally is slow.
- Weak infrastructure and inadequate public services.

The Chongqing Model was a policy mechanism for vacating rural agricultural land in order to convert it to more lucrative industrial uses. Problematically, it used liberal market methods under the façade of Marxist socialism to achieve its aims. In essence, the failure of the Chongqing Model, followed by Bo's spectacular fall from grace in 2012, is a tragedy of Chinese socialism floundering under the harsh logic

[19]Land transfers were discussed in a special report on China ("Rising Power, Anxious State") in the June 25 – July 1, 2011 edition of The Economist. A link to the article is here: http://www.economist.com/node/18832092.

of capital accumulation; thus, the forced victory of Leninist party principles over the liberal market. In essence, it had become quite apparent to the CCP that Bo had gotten too powerful and that his ideas were falling out of line with the Party's official rhetoric. His model was based on propaganda, and a false promise.

In this paper, I have presented economic development in China as a crisis of identity. I have used the concept of land rights to draw the historical foundations of this crisis. China's turn to capitalism starting in 1978 with the 11th Party Congress, and especially since its ascension to the World Trade Organization in 2001, has happened in the context of the Leninist principles of the CCP. In China, thus, capitalism is expanding unchecked as the state maintains control over the economy via exclusive ownership of assets, particularly the ownership of land.

The conflating rhetoric of socialist values and the liberal market can be labeled Market-Leninism. I have argued that Market-Leninism is a problematic model for the development of a legal system that is not just independent of the political apparatus but streamlined and clear-headed in its approach toward various legal statutes, such as the law of property. Thus, in this paper, I have adopted the position of legal scholars like Benjamin W. James and Pitman Potter to equate the contradictions in the Chinese development model to a problem of the law and to a problem in the law. I have argued that the CCP's dream of a socialist utopia has been usurped by the unfettered pursuit of capitalism. In essence, the pursuit of capital under the official rubric of socialism has hampered the development of China's legal system. This, in turn, leads to sprawl, environmental violations, land insecurity, and insecurity about doing business in China.

I have used the implosion of the Chongqing Model to illustrate the crisis of capitalism in the socialist state. This experimental policy illustrates the conflating of socialist dogma and capitalist practice in one region of China, but its consequences, and indeed its legacy, are mirrored at the national level. Bo's experimental model was not as much a failure of public policy as it was a vivid example of the spectacular clash between market liberalism and the Leninist dogma of the CCP. His ouster, and the failure of the Chongqing Model, is the triumph of Leninist Party principles over the liberal market.

In conclusion, I believe that land rights should be a starting point for eliminating the chasm between the values of a Leninist state and the ethos of market liberalism in China. More, I believe that reform can and should be based on the early ideals of the CCP for equitable human development. Since the late 1970s, the Chinese state has attempted to uphold its welfare status under a system of market liberalism for instrumental purposes[20].

Thus, the crisis of identity in China today is the predictable outcome of the crisis of capitalism and, more aptly, the failure of a forced marriage between the market and Marxist-Leninism. Lin points out, "[e]ven under a heavily disguised (capitalist) ideology of anti-ideology, one does not have to be 'ideological' to see how a gross

[20]For an analysis of community-based welfare organizations and their role within China's social welfare system, please refer to Leslie Shieh's chapter in this volume.

undoing of the revolution has taken place—typically through brutal capitalist accumulation and its predictable social and environmental consequences" (Lin 2013, p. 56).[21]

The need for reform has taken added urgency since the Third Party Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013. However, I doubt that adequate reform can take place without, first, an acknowledgment by the CCP of the crisis of identity at the heart of its development program. I believe there is much hope for socialism in China to spur human development. I explore this question from an empirical, technical, and philosophical standpoint for my doctoral research. In this essay, however, I simply argue that the CCP must acknowledge the irreconcilable conflict between socialist development and the untrammeled pursuit of private capital.

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[21]For an empirical look at the role of "corporatism" within China's legislative bodies, please refer to Jing Qian's chapter in this volume.

Part II
Canada-China Relations and Chinese Diaspora in Canada

Chapter 5
Canada's Foreign Policy Toward the People's Republic of China: Continuity and Change Since 1949

Eric Lefrançois

Considering China's political and economic rise, it is reasonable to argue that a sound foreign policy toward China is a necessity. Given China's increasing economic importance to Western countries, many scholars argue that an antagonistic view toward China is counterproductive (Dobson 2006, p. 306). To better understand the challenges facing Canada in developing a new China policy, this paper returns to the roots of the relationship to understand the evolution of Sino-Canadian relations. The 45 years of this relationship is placed within a framework to explain the underlying causes of its evolution. Through combining contextual factors and path dependency theory this framework suggests that from 1970 until the new millennium, Canada's prime objective was to encourage China's integration into the international community. This paramount goal led to a cohesive set of decisions aimed at influencing China positively. Whereas Canada contributed to China's opening toward the international community, the accomplishment of this goal in the beginning of twenty-first century has left Canada's China policy in search of a new purpose.

5.1 Theoretical Framework

Three types of contextual factors can potentially influence foreign policy: international, domestic, and institutional (Nossal 1997). These dynamic factors form the context in which foreign policy is made. The international context addresses events happening outside of a nation's border having impact on a regional or global scale and potentially affecting a country's relative position toward other nations. The domestic context is characterized by the political situation within a country, including both civil society and political power. The institutional context is related to the inner working of governments, such as bureaucratic structures and the

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_5

discretionary role of unelected or "unpolitical" officials. These contextual factors are present-day forces in constant flux. They mainly impact decision makers when circumstances depart from previous conditions, creating tension forcing policy change and foreign policy revision.

Foreign policy is embedded in historical trajectories that are themselves a result of past decisions and policies (Hall and Taylor 1996). Path dependency provides a structure to understand the evolution of governmental policies in historical perspective, since present-day policy formulation is constrained by the cumulative results of antecedent choices (Mahoney 2000). Path dependency is best suited to explain continuity and inertia, since historical trajectories restrain the capacity of decisions makers to make significant changes (Greener 2005). Whereas historical trajectories both limit the outlook of decision makers and increase the cost of transformative actions, critical junctures are moments in which these historical trajectories are either initiated, reinforced, or modified by choices that draw policies in certain directions. Policy changes are possible at these junctures, but are always constrained by previous trajectories. Path dependency ultimately assumes that decisions are always embedded in historical settings and that present policy options result from previous choices.

Combining these two theoretical approaches enables analysis of continuity and transformative forces in one unified framework. When contextual factors change, these collide with historical trajectories and may create critical junctures that allow decision makers to either accommodate a new context or strengthen the status quo and further consolidate historical trajectories. This model postulates that as historical trajectories are reinforced by subsequent decisions, the amount of contextual change needed to provide lasting modification to policies also increases. Therefore, even major contextual transformations can be insufficient to bring lasting and coherent modification to polices, if historical trajectories have become significant enough to make policy modification costly or even difficult to envision for decision makers themselves. Only significant contextual transformations in all types of contextual factors can enable significant departure from previous trajectories. Otherwise, only incremental change will be possible and these changes might not be long-lasting. Policies are therefore rarely optimal, even considering their normative goal, since they cannot be reimagined from a completely new starting point. They are rather the results of tensions between past choices and current requirements. The Fig. 5.1 illustrates how decision makers are both influenced by forces of continuity from historical trajectories and forces of change due to the evolving nature of contextual factors.

This framework predicts that Canada's foreign policy toward China will follow a constant path until major contextual transformation occurs, enabling a critical juncture toward a new trajectory. Even so, remnants of the previous trajectory might still exist and greatly limit the ability of decision makers to create new policy, making coherent change difficult. This model supports this paper's thesis that from 1970 to 2006, Canada kept a constant policy toward China of positive engagement to achieve the goal of contributing to China's progressive "westernization" and inclusion into the international community. Only significant transformation of the



Fig. 5.1 Theoretical framework

international and domestic context might allow lasting changes in this policy. China's rise and the arrival of a new set of political elites under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper has created favorable conditions for changes, but the institutional context and the strength of the previous trajectory has prevented policy changes from being robust and coherent.

5.2 Sino-Canadian Relations from 1949 to 1970

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, prompting debate in Ottawa on the possibility of negotiating the establishment of official relations between the two countries. However, despite initial talks with China and a positive view or recognition by most Canadian officials, 20 years passed before Canada moved forward with the recognition of the PRC. Considering an "empty" trajectory, the PRC being effectively a new political entity, contextual factors prevented any substantial attempt at negotiation with China during that time.

5.2.1 Failed Attempts by Canadian Diplomacy

Washington's understandable negative reaction toward the alignment of China with communist ideologies is mainly responsible for the inability, or even unwillingness, of Canada to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s. Early efforts by St. Laurent's government to negotiate any common ground with China were quickly thwarted by the Korean War (Beecroft 1985). Despite the humanitarian sale of wheat to China that benefited greatly to Canadian producers, the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker restrained from pursuing negotiations with China because of United States (US) active opposition toward the PRC's potential accession to the United Nations (UN) (DEA 1975). The 1963 election of Pearson's Liberal government, open to negotiation with China, could not overcome the impact of PRC's renewed nuclear tests. Some talks were conducted with China from 1965 to 1968, but China's requirement to make Canada terminate official relations toward Republic of China (ROC) installed in Taiwan and continued opposition of Washington, forced negotiation to remain secret and fruitless (St-Amour 1985).

Regardless of the Liberals' desire to enter into negotiations, the international, domestic, and institutional context ensured that the original decision to not recognize the PRC (so-called 'communist China') remained in place. The international situation, mainly due to the Cold War, prevented Canada from attempting serious efforts to recognize the PRC. In addition, despite the dominant position that Canada should recognize the PRC within the Department of External Affairs (DEA), the DEA was unable to formulate a better argument than the principle of national self-determination to potentially justify recognition; a very weak argument considering the internal chaos of the PRC's totalitarian regime and the poor treatment of its own population. This lack of proper justification as well as a prudent approach toward US position vis à vis China, posed an unfavorable institutional context for recognition (St-Amour 1985). In the midst of the Cold War, the Canadian public was also divided and relatively uninterested to this issue and offered very little potential political reward to the Liberals or Conservatives for recognizing China. Therefore, the international, institutional, and domestic context did not change sufficiently to induce a modification of the status quo. A 20-year trajectory was thus formed, with the result of no official relations with the People's Republic of China.

5.2.2 The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the PRC

Even before his nomination as Liberal party leader, Pierre-Elliot (P-E) Trudeau had revealed his personal opinion about the PRC in his book *Two innocents in Red China*. The Prime Minister to be had argued that "removing China from its isolation

was in the interest of the international community" (Hébert and Trudeau 1961, pp. 150–151). Once in power, his view soon became policy, as he gave a clear mandate to the DEA to negotiate the terms of PRC's recognition. His election confirmed support by Canadians of his electoral promise of forging a new independent foreign policy, this independence being from Washington (Frolic 1985, pp. 189–190). The domestic context was thus changed considerably since a foreign policy somewhat purposely in departure with US foreign policy was now considered politically feasible. This possibility was also strengthened by America's own international relative weakening in the wake of increasing opposition to the Vietnam War. The US had lost part of its moral high ground and could only with more difficulty reprimand its ally on their foreign policy, especially if it had a peaceful and constructive rhetoric. America was also secretly considering improving its relations with the PRC and Trudeau's private discussion of the issue with Nixon in 1969 lead him to think that without approving it, the US would not actively oppose Canada's decision (Appel Molot 1977, p. 235). Signals were also given by the PRC that if it had been mostly indifferent to Canadian efforts for recognition in the last decade, it was now interested in serious discussions (Frolic 1985, p. 202). Additionally, prompted largely by Trudeau's request, the DEA had successfully formed a reasonable rationale to justify negotiations with China. In a speech in May 1968, P-E Trudeau spelled out publicly what would become Canada's overwhelming objective in its foreign policy toward China for the next three decades:

> China needs to become a full member of the international community since many current and future world issues will never be fully resolved without some accommodation with the Chinese Nation. The present situation in which a government representing a quarter of the world's population is diplomatically isolated even with countries with which it is actively trading is evidently unsatisfactory. I would be in favor of any measures including recognition on suitable terms which can intensify the contacts between our two countries and thus normalize our relations and contribute to international order and stability (DEA 1968).

Later the same year, Trudeau's position and commitment to recognize China became even clearer, as this quote from another speech demonstrates:

> Canada has long advocated a positive approach to Mainland China and its inclusion in the world community. We have an economic interest in trade with China […] and a political interest in preventing tension between China and its neighbors, but especially between China and the US. Our aim will be to recognize the People's Republic of China Government as soon as possible and to enable that Government to occupy the seat of China in the UN, taking into account that there is a separate Government in Taiwan (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990, p. 180).

The argument was now made that an isolated and marginalized China was a threat to international stability. The PRC's mounting tensions with Moscow also offered an opportunity to engage with a communist power without involving with the Soviet Union and promote pacific relations between the Capitalist and Communist blocs. Canada's foreign policy toward China had found its coherent objective: positive engagement with the PRC to enhance China's inclusion to the international community in order to contribute to international peace and security (DEA 1969).

The domestic, international, and institutional context was now favorable to a transformation of Canada's policy toward China. In this critical juncture, a departure from the previous historical trajectory was possible since the context had undergone significant change that allowed departure from the previous trajectory without significant "cost." The only such cost was the end of official diplomatic relation with Taiwan, a cost that Trudeau was ready to pay from the start. Negotiation with China culminated on October 13, 1970 with the release of a joint statement that "solved" the Taiwan issue (Frolic 1985, p. 189)[1]:

> The Chinese government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the RPC's territory. The government of Canada takes note of this position of the government of China (Hervouet 1981, p. 79).

Without directly agreeing with the PRC's claim, recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China still meant that Canada would accommodate the One China policy, forcing Taiwan to cease all official diplomatic activities in Canada. This agreement, coined the "Canadian formula," was soon to be adopted by the UN and would become a model for a number of countries that also established relations with the PRC. Without overemphasizing its importance, Canada's decision did contribute significantly to the opening of China's diplomatic relations and was the initiator of an international movement of recognition of the PRC.[2]

5.3 Sino-Canadian Relations from 1970 to 1989

P-E Trudeau followed recognition with an official visit to China in 1973 that laid the basis of the relations between the two countries. Agreements were made in the fields of culture, commerce, academia, sports, sciences and technologies, immigration and also diplomacy (Wylie 1973). These agreements testified to Canada's intention of developing a complete set of relations with the PRC in accordance with its new foreign policy.

Additionally, the symbolic aspect of this visit is paramount to understanding the political importance of this trip. First, it was the first visit of a Canadian Prime

[1]Negotiations started in Stockholm in 1970. The most contentious issue was the status of Taiwan. Canada did not want to accept the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Formosa, but Canadian diplomats new that Canada would have to forgone official relations with Taipei to obtain an agreement. Canada chose to recognize that the Republic of China was not the legitimate representative of "China" and did comment specifically on the PRC's affirmation that Taiwan was part of its territory. This was later coined as the "Canadian formula" (Frolic 1985, p. 189).

[2]In 1970, a majority of American allies did not recognized the PRC, including Italy, Austria, West Germany, Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, Australia, Spain, Portugal and the Unites States of America, but most would follow in the wake of Canada's decision and PRC's accession to the UN.

Minister to China. Second, the warm and cordial relationship that Trudeau entertained with his host marked a clear signal of Canada's commitment to reversing China's isolation. Scholars considered that Canada had established a special relationship with the PRC (Evans 1985). This visit would become the first of a long series of mutual visits of government leaders and high officials of the two countries that consolidated a degree of friendship between representatives of both countries. These visits would thus become part of the fabric of the relationship, and inform the historical trajectory. Canada also opened its doors to young Chinese who wanted to study in its post-secondary educational institutions, a decision greatly appreciated by China which could benefit from the training of its best minds to western standards, despite the official rhetoric of its state's ideology. Considering the minimal amounts of trade benefit for Canada, the results of this visit can be seen as successful attempt to "socialize" China to the western world, and vice versa.

5.3.1 Montreal's Olympic Games of 1976

The 1976 Olympic Games held in 1976 were part of the first dilemma that Trudeau's government would face in consequence to its China Policy. At the time, the ROC, that effectively govern in Taiwan following the escape of the Nationalist government to Formosa as it lost the civil war to the CCP, was still recognized as the legitimate government of China by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), just as was the case in the UN. The PRC argued to the Canadian government that the participation of Chinese athletes under the flag of the ROC would be considered a violation of the 1970 joint statement (Bernasconi 2003). However, Washington threatened Ottawa with boycotting the games if athletes from the ROC were not allowed to compete. Trudeau's government had to decide between respecting its foreign policy and face a political setback with the US, or reversing its position on Taiwan and probably jeopardizing its relations with the PRC. Trudeau himself was involved in negotiating a compromise that allowed him to safeguard his China policy without creating a public rift with the US and also be acceptable to the IOC. Canada demanded that athletes from the ROC compete under the designation of Taiwan uniquely, and not China. In this way, Taiwan athletes could participate in the games but it would not be symbolically implied that their government represented China.[3] Despite this accommodation, Taiwan athletes did not participate in

[3]At the time, China and Taiwan were disputing claim of the legitimate representative of China. There were no significant movement in Taiwan for independence. The concept that athletes from the ROC could represent China was unacceptable for the PRC since it would give legitimacy to the Guomingdang (National Party) claims over China, but the PRC was ready to accept a "Taiwan" delegation. Today, the problem has been somehow reversed, since the PRC wants to make sure that the ROC continues to identify itself to "China" to counter the Taiwan independence movement. This explains why Olympic delegations from Taiwan compete since 1984 under the designation of "Chinese Taipei" insuring a reference to China and avoiding reference to the ROC.

the games since the ROC chose to boycott the games because its delegation could not represent China. Nevertheless, the American delegation did participate to the games since Washington argued that Taiwan was not excluded from the games, but made the decision to withdraw on its own (Bernasconi 2003, p. 148).

This event was the first critical juncture that exposed the strength of the historical trajectory that was being created in the wake of Canada's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China. Indeed, the international context, considering the pressure from the US and criticism from the international press, was more favorable to the position of Taiwan than the logical position that stem from the Canada–China newly established relationship. The potential political cost of antagonizing Washington also made the domestic context more favorable to the US and Taiwan positions. Pressures in Canada were also important since facing the boycott from African nations, US absence would have compromised the success of the games and would have been a serious political defeat for Trudeau. However, Trudeau decided to uphold his foreign policy toward China nevertheless, even if it meant reaching a compromise that did not satisfied Taiwan and that was less than ideal for the US. Ultimately, this decision greatly contributed to solidifying the Sino-Canadian relationship.

5.3.2 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) China Program

In the early 1980s, as China took a new path of economic reforms following the death of Mao Zedong and the return of Deng Xiaoping, Canada chose to try and influence these efforts, not only by expanding trade with China, but also with the establishment of an aid program aimed at providing China with help for its economic and social policies (The Canada-China Cooperation Support Unit 2004). Therefore, CIDA signed a first cooperation agreement with China in 1983 (CIDA 1985). This decision was also the result of efforts within the Canadian government to better align its international aid recipient with the objective and focus of its foreign policy (Morrison 1994, p. 135). Projects financed by CIDA in China covered human resource development, training and transfer of technical knowledge in the field of agriculture, and international business and manufacturing technology (Keith 1992, pp. 325–327). CIDA's China program had the mission to develop networking, institutional links, and people-to-people connections between the two countries to contribute to the social and economic development of China and its integration into the international community (Rudner 1994, p. 300). Despite the limitation in size and scope of the program, Canada pursued specific initiatives that could contribute to China's reforms. Evidently, these efforts were also made in the context of the Canadian interest in opening of China's large economic potential. Still China's future economic rise was a distant horizon at the time and the CIDA program's primary concern was to influence China's reform for the sake of China

itself, rather than enabling Canadian economic gains. Evidently, the modification of the international context, with this opening of China, the easing of China's relation with the US and its past accession to the UN, allowed Canada to establish this program. Far from a departure from China policy since 1970, Canada's aid program with China was an extension of Canada's tools to engage China in clear continuity with the goal of bringing China closer to the international, even capitalist, community. Therefore, this decision and the articulation of this aid program were greatly influenced by the historical trajectory of Canada's China policy.

5.3.3 Resistance to Change Under the Progressive-Conservative Party's (PC) Government

The election of the PCs in 1984 marked the most important change in the domestic Canadian context since the recognition of China. Apart from a brief hiatus following the election and quick demise of the Joe Clark's Conservative government, the Liberals had been in power for the duration of the relationship between Canada and the PRC. During this tenure, the Tories had many times promised to review Trudeau's foreign policy in general and on China in particular if they were to be elected (Hervouet 1981, pp. 75–105). Therefore, the election of Brian Mulroney announced possible changes to Canada's China policy. However, the international and institutional contexts had not significantly changed since the reinforcement of Canada's China policy in the early 1980s, and the main transformation, the reform of China's economy, had been largely addressed by the Liberals. Canada's policy toward China was unanimously seen by DEA officials as more relevant than ever. The weight of the historical trajectory and the lack of significant change in the international and domestic contexts stopped possible transformation of Canada's China policy despite the will of some influential members of the PC Party.

Indeed, the most conservative elements within the party wanted to enforce a more principled approach to foreign policy. The need to stress the importance of human rights issues and Canada's cordial relationship with a communist regime, despite its economic reforms, were seen as a problem by many members of the PC Caucus and its social-conservative wing.

However, Brian Mulroney did not change Canada's China policy, but instead reinforced it in a series of decisions in direct continuity with the historical trajectory set by his predecessors. Indeed, Mulroney became the second Prime Minister of Canada to visit China, following in the footsteps of P-E Trudeau. The 1986 visit was an occasion to reaffirm the links already in place between the two countries and the establishment of further governmental cooperation and agreements, such as the prolongation of the agreement on reunification of immigrant families and the broadening of consular activities of Canada in China (DEA 1986). Mulroney also asked DEA to prepare a strategy to help Canadian businesses strengthen their

presence in China and take advantage of China's reforms. The government also doubled CIDA's China program funds with an investment of 200 million dollars (Paltiel 1990, p. 44). The PC government extended the policies of the Liberals and Canada's China policy remained aimed toward positive engagement that lead to the establishment of the Canada-China 1987 Strategy (Frolic 2011).

Therefore, from 1970 to 1989, Canada progressively established a coherent relationship with the PRC that created a second 20-year trajectory aimed at engaging positively the PRC. This policy was bipartisan and all decisions made during this period reinforced this trajectory and created a strategy decidedly intended at engaging China positively to further its inclusion in the international community and international commerce. Canada was participating actively in transforming China. Trade with China and China's openness to the world, especially the capitalist bloc, were two sides of the same coin; Canada's interest as a middle power being in preventing conflicts to allow a prosper world.

5.4 Tension Between Continuity and Discontinuity After Tiananmen, 1989 to 1993

On June 4 1989, the People's Liberation Army poured into Beijing's Tiananmen Square with armored trucks and tanks to violently repress an ongoing protest by students, intellectuals, and workers requesting democratic reforms. The brutality of this repression, which became known internationally as the Tiananmen Massacre, sustained much media attention and caused a wave of outrage around the world. The next morning on June 5 1989, before official reactions from Washington and Tokyo, Canada condemned this act in a speech by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, with the unanimous support of all members of its House of Commons. Clark immediately announced a series of measures in reaction to the PRC's use of force against its own citizens, including the temporary recall of its Ambassador to China (Paltiel 1990). Relations would be affected by the Tiananmen events, but in the end, Canada's China Policy would not be considerably transformed. Ultimately, the historical trajectory of Canada's China Policy would be sufficiently strong to resist forces of change from the sudden modification of contextual factors in the wake of the Tiananmen events.

5.4.1 Transformation of the International, Domestic and Institutional Contexts

In the months preceding this crisis, factions within the PRC were promoting some form of democratic opening for China. Unfortunately, these voices were repressed brutally in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis (Bergère 2004). Most western

countries reacted with sanctions toward the PRC and many scholars and politicians alike feared China as a potential threat to the US hegemonic position in East Asia, bringing a significant hardening against the Regime from the international community. The international context was thus transformed as human rights issues and the fear of a revisionist China surfaced (Sinha 2003). Canada's domestic context in regards to its popular opinion toward China also changed significantly. Canadians became much more worried about China's communist regime and ended a decade of positive outlook coming from China's economic reforms. Canadian Media, having been at the forefront of international reporting of the Tiananmen crisis also became very suspicious of China and in many ways, remain so until today. Images of a lone man furious at seeing tanks being dispatched against his fellow citizens became a symbol of the repressive nature of the PRC's political regime. Strong public pressure could be felt in Ottawa in favor of reviewing Canada stance toward China (Frolic 1999).

The Canadian institutional context regarding its China Policy was also altered by this crisis. If Canada's China policy was largely a state-centric affair and had been largely imagined by the DEA and the Prime Minister's office, the events of June 1989 triggered calls for including interest groups in the formulation of foreign policy toward China. First, the Chinese diaspora in Canada which had been largely passive in Sino-Canadian relations manifested their opposition to Beijing's decision and multiple cultural and business associations of Chinese origin made their opposition heard in Ottawa (Evans 1993). Second, many militant groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also asked Ottawa to listen to their concerns. Traditionally not inclined to allow consultation from its citizens and interest groups outside of wide discussions on foreign policy white papers, the DEA had to consider these voices and take into account in its institutional process the voices from the Chinese diaspora, citizens, interest groups, business lobbies, and the media in formulating Canada's response to Tiananmen (Frolic 1999). A special consultation in the presence of Joe Clark took place in the months following Tiananmen to build a consensual "post-Tiananmen" China policy. These groups gain influence, even though future policy would be influenced primarily by the pro-business lobby. Consequently, this crisis modified the institutional, domestic, and international context and pressured the Mulroney government to review the objectives and content of Canada's foreign policy toward China.

5.4.2 Forces of Continuity from the Historical Trajectory

The theoretical model chosen for this study also predicts that Canada's China policy would be influenced by the results of previous policy choice and by the historical "weight" of its objective. The policy of positive engagement to fight China's isolation and to promote trade and relations between the two countries was opposed to forces of change prompt by the Tiananmen crisis. Mulroney's government was thus under tension between pressures to modify significantly Canada's China policy to

link trade with human rights and punish the Regime for its infringements, and the continuity of its historical trajectory to pursue positive engagement toward China to combat reactionary policies in the PRC.

On June 30 1989, Canada did announce a series of sanctions against China and suspended some CIDA programs and official visits of high officials between the two countries. A committee was also formed to survey human rights problems in China and a special fast-track process to grant permanent residence for Chinese students at Canadian universities was also created. In a speech given in the House of Commons, Joe Clark explained that Canada wished to minimize all forms of contacts that could benefit the RPC's efforts of suppressing its citizens' voices, but would continue to maximize people-to-people contacts that could contribute to Chinese democratization. Relations between the two countries could not be considered as business as usual, but Canada would not espouse an anti-China position (Frolic 1999). Tensions were visible in this very speech itself, since a clear sign of disapproval of China's actions was sought, but Clark also wanted to signal that Canada would maintain constructive relations with China. Some measures were taken by the DEA to express Canada's disproval of China's action. Ottawa requested to that Canada's officials in China mention repeatedly when meeting with Chinese officials Canada's indignation of the PRC's treatment of political dissent. Three PC MPs, on a private visit to China, were even expulsed from the country after trying to publicly denounce China's poor human rights record. Nevertheless, the dominant view within the government, especially the DEA, remained that Canada needed to preserve its close relationship with China and pursue positive engagement. After all, Canada's China Policy had never encouraged the PRC's "efforts against its citizens", but on the contrary sought to contribute to China's openness by offering positive initiatives to undertake "westernization" reforms.

As months passed, officials within the DEA tried to re-establish, sometimes unofficially, previous projects and discussions with the PRC and CIDA's program slowly restarted (Kristof 1992). Voices favorable to continue the relationship as it had been since 1970 became stronger and were able to ensure that historical trajectory of engaging China positively would not be abandoned. The argument was simply that as it was before, international order would be better served by maintaining a dialogue with China and keep it open to western positive influences. Canada's business community interest in trade with China was also never far away from the concerns of the Mulroney government. To the credence of those inclined to remain conciliatory toward China, international sanctions against the PRC had little impact, if only to increase China's suspicions toward western ideas of human rights and democracy (Simpson 1993).

Questioned on Sino-Canadian relations in 1991, Brian Mulroney explained that severing ties with China would be equivalent to "closing our borders with the US" (House of Commons 1991). The Prime Minister's statement displayed Canada's intent to regain its "normal" relations with China. The Prime Minister was also signaling to Canadian officials that the colder period of the relationship was coming to an end. The success of the previous policy, considering China's 1980s reforms, gave weight to the historical trajectory and was sufficient to convince the Mulroney

government to only suspend its normal China Policy, not to end it. Positive engagement remained Canada's China Policy and despite the suspension of many activities from 1989 to 1992, Mulroney's government did not try to implement a new China policy. The main consequence of these events was the addition of human rights issues on the Agenda of Canada-China relations in response to domestic concerns in Canada (Frolic 2000). The central objective of Canada's foreign policy toward China thus survived the Tiananmen crisis, since this critical juncture did not provide a permanent change of trajectory in Sino-Canadian relations.

5.5 The Renewal and Strengthening of Canada's China Policy, 1993 to 2006

In late 1993, the election of Jean Chrétien's Liberal government ended all uncertainty concerning the direction of Sino-Canadian relations. This critical juncture caused a change in the domestic context that became the occasion of a renewal of Canada's China policy in a spirit of continuity with the existing historical trajectory. Chrétien's government essentially followed the footsteps of the Trudeau and Mulroney governments, with adjustment made to adapt to the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. The historical trajectory of the relation weighed heavily on its objective and characteristics. The Liberal's China Policy was built upon four pillars: (1) Trade and economic partnerships, (2) peace and security, (3) sustainable development, and (4) human rights, good governance, and the rule of law (Department of foreign Affair and Trade (DEFAIT) 1995). These aspects had always been in the scope of Canada's China policy, but given Chrétien's priority of creating jobs at home and China's intensification of economic reforms and development, trade did become much more important. These four pillars were all aimed toward a common objective, Canada's interest in engaging China with the international and business communities to ensure peace and prosperity in the Pacific region.

5.5.1 Trade, Diplomacy, and Sustained Development

The bilateral relation with China under the Liberal government was foremost a sustained commercial relationship. Team Canada 1994, Canada's first official trade mission to China, coincided with the restarting of China's economic reforms following Deng Xiaoping's factions "winning" over reactionary forces within the PRC

after Tiananmen (Bergère 2004).[4] The trade mission timing was ideal for Chinese leaders who were looking to expand international trade and give a clear signal to the world that market economy reform would continue and that the Tiananmen crisis had only been a misstep (Balme 2004). Canada's trade policy with China was to signal to Canadian business the potential profit of trade relations with China and the willingness of the government to support efforts of Canadian industries in this large, but difficult market. On the other side, Canada also wanted to signal to the Chinese government that it wanted to participate in its commercial "open door" opportunity and that it would support and encourage its inclusion in the various infrastructures of international commerce, such as what would later become the World Trade Organization (WTO). Canada also hoped that this would help China progressively elevate its population's living standards and slowly accustom China to the idea of political reforms (Frolic 1997, p. 329). Ultimately, the Team Canada mission launched an era of race into the Chinese market and allowed a full restoration of relations between the two countries (Frolic 2000).

Team Canada not only brought commercial benefits in the form of potential deals worth 9 billion dollars (DEFAIT 1995), but also had an important symbolic dimension, just like the first trip of P-E Trudeau in 1973. It was the first high-level official visit since Tiananmen and so the commercial mission was also a diplomatic visit. Team Canada was used to signal Canada's commitment to renewed political contacts with Beijing and intensification of cooperation between the two countries. Not only did many business leaders participate in the mission, but nine provincial premiers and numerous governmental officials, university representatives, and multiple associations were also present during the trip. Thus, Chrétien's government renewed and expanded the importance of state visits and high-level contacts with China.

Chinese leaders came to Canada on official visits in 1995,[5] 1999,[6] 2003,[7] 2005,[8] and Chrétien met multiple times in China and at international events with Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders. Eventually, Chinese leaders qualified Canada as "our best friend," as Canada became a trusted partner and even a model for its economic and political reforms (Evans 2014, pp. 50–51). The second pillar of Canada's China policy was thus established in the form of sustained high-level

[4]From 1989 to 1993, internal political struggles inside the CCP opposed reformers and leftist on the future of the PRC's regime. Leftist wished a return to more socialist if not Maoist policies and reformers wanted to restart economic reforms. Ultimately, the struggle ended when Deng Xiaoping toured southern Chinese provinces, the Cantonese part of China historically more involved in foreign trade, and supported publicly these provinces' economic position in the state control media, signaling to the CCP that the reformist had won and that reforms needed to resume (Bergère 2004).

[5]Li Peng, the Chinese Prime Minister at the time, visited Canada for the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

[6]Zhu Rongji, then Chinese Premier.

[7]Wen Jiabao, then Chinese Premier.

[8]Hu Jintao, then President of the RPC.

visits and diplomatic relations. In addition to commercial issues, these visits allowed leaders to know each other in a more personal way and discuss peace and security issues frankly and effectively. Indeed, international security issues, human rights issues, and commercial issues were discussed often on surprisingly honest and direct terms in private meetings (Evans 2005).

Talks at lower governmental levels also became frequent. Canada was involved in discussions with China and its immediate neighbors on regional border and territorial disputes, such as the conflict in the South China Sea (McDorman 1997). Canada was also involved in negotiation on Hong Kong retrocession (Frolic 1997, pp. 333–337). Canadian diplomacy also tried to help China accustom itself to multilateral institutions, encouraging China to integrate with the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Zone (APEC), the forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN Forum) and by supporting China's accession to the WTO (Minden et al. 1997). On this note, CIDA's China program financed a number of initiatives to help China implement certain reforms required in its accession to the WTO in the early 2000s. Canada did not necessarily play a front and center role in these initiatives, but it had earned sufficient trust from Chinese officials to be considered a credible and relatively neutral interlocutor that could mediate certain international issues.

Canada also tried to develop efforts to influence China's growth toward a more sustainable model of development. CIDA's China program was mostly responsible for initiatives in this endeavor and from 1994 to 2005, financed more than a hundred projects in environmental management, sustainable agriculture and social development. For example, Canada offered its expertize on proper disposal of agricultural waste and environmental-friendly use of fertilizers in numerous Chinese inland provinces, including Tibet. Canada trained officials and business leaders on environmental regulation, SME and family business management and regional economic development. CIDA also had a number of poverty alleviation projects and numerous small, but very significant projects for rural and poor communities under its special Canada funds project administered directly by officials at the Canadian embassy. Through these efforts Canada sought to influence China's economic development in a more sustainable direction (CIDA 2005b). Track three diplomacy was also encouraged by Ottawa through multiple associations, university and organizational initiatives with China. These efforts were all within Canada's third pillar of aid for sustainable development in its relationship with the PRC.

5.5.2 The Human Rights Issue

The last pillar of the relationship was largely the most controversial. Following the 1989 events, Canada had to find a way to open a dialogue with China on human rights as a consequence of pressures at home. Canada's efforts remained shy of what most human rights advocates wished Canada would do (Woodman and Samdup 2005). Chrétien had publicly announced that he would not link human

rights with Trade. Canada would try and create an open dialogue with China on these issues, but would remain prudent (Melakopides 1998, p. 172). Chrétien actually said in his own outspoken manner in a speech at the University of Moncton in 1994:

> We have never linked trade absolutely with Human rights […] I'm not allowed to tell Saskatchewan's or Québec's Premier what to do. Am I to tell the president of China what to do? […] He's the president of a country of 1.2 billion, if I were to say to China "we are not dealing with you anymore", they would say "fine" (Greenspon 1994).

As explained by Charles-Louis Labrecque in this volume, Canada chose to adopt a tactful approach toward human rights in China with Chinese officials during the Chrétien era. Canada did commit to pressure Chinese officials discreetly on these issues in multilateral meetings, during bilateral events and to use quiet diplomacy to try and influence China to improve its human rights record (Melakopides 1998, p. 179). In this way, despite often elusive responses of Chinese officials in public, human rights were always on the agenda of official visits and multiple successful efforts were conducted behind closed doors to soften the treatment of certain political dissidents (Evans 2005, p. 160). The joint Canada-China Committee on human rights was created in 1997 to discuss gender equality, AIDS, ethnic minorities, social rights, cultural diversity, and other issues related to human rights. The multilateral symposium on human rights, financed by Canada and Norway, was also a venue at which human rights were discussed with China (Woodman and Samdup 2005). Results of these efforts are minimal and did not have direct impact on China. Nevertheless, these forums forced China to consider human rights issues and to build a response, since it could not simply overlook discussing them. Compared to the Maoist era, China was obliged to view human rights as not entirely a domestic issue and did concede that improvement was desirable.

The dialogue on human rights was also supported by a series of projects funded by CIDA under the rubric of human rights, good governance and the rule of law. These projects concerned a variety of issues like Gender equality in the workplace, NGO development, training of lawyers and judges on workers' rights, law and criminal code adaptation to the requirement of multiple international agreements (CIDA 1999). As explained by Mingxing Zhao in this volume, Canada became the first country to sign a treaty of mutual assistance in matters of criminal justice in 1994. CIDA initiative in judicial affairs was built around the same logic. CIDA also had the only bilateral aid program in Tibet allowed by China, ensuring a Canadian presence in this highly contentious region (CIDA 2006). Human rights were now a part of Canada's China Policy in the sense that Canada wanted to open initiatives and dialogue aimed at bringing China to understand these issues and change its perspective, and not aimed at demanding specific action or publicly denouncing China's human rights abuse. China did make progress, considering that its society is enjoyed more freedom at the turn of the millennium than it did during the Maoist period. Much improvement is still needed, but the Canadian government considered that China had come a long way. One of the more tangible results that Canada obtained was the successful attempt of a Canadian delegation from DEFAIT in

convincing China to participate for the first time in sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights (Melakopides 1998, p. 180).

5.6 Running Its Course…?

From 1970 to 2006, Canada hold on to the position that it had to engage China positively because an antagonist policy toward China and its isolation would not favor international peace and security. Canada's main goal was never to curb China's interior policy nor was it exclusively to exploit commercial Canadian interest in China. Human rights, trade, peace and security, diplomatic relations, and international aid were components of an integrated strategy to encourage China toward being integrated, politically and economically, in the international community. Certainly, contextual transformation, such as China's economic growth, the Tiananmen crisis and political change at home, made Canada adjust its China policy and eventually expand the importance of the commercial aspect of the relationship. If Canada had chosen to aggressively pursue human rights demands on China and refused to trade with the PRC, it is very likely that Canada would never have enjoyed any significant influence in Beijing. Canada's China policy remained largely adapted to its context and also faithful to its core objective determined by Canadian interest. This objective grew in importance and the historical trajectory of Canada's foreign policy toward China reinforced itself with time. The theoretical framework of this study provides a guiding structure for understanding that once Canada had chosen a coherent approach toward China, each major decision reinforced this objective and created a trajectory that would need greater change from contextual factors before being reconsidered. The trajectory had resisted Tiananmen and had become internalized in most levels of government by the year 2000. Canada's foreign policy toward China had followed a constant trajectory despite some significant change in the international, domestic, and institutional spheres. However, at the beginning of the new millennium, China was no longer isolated from the international community and was now largely integrated in all international regimes and had adopted most of the western world economic trade structures. When Hu Jintao offered Canada a new "strategic partnership" in 2005, Canada continued largely to think in terms of trade, positive engagement and bringing China closer to international "good behavior". China in 2005 was a key international player, a regional power, and an emerging global power, what Paul Evans called "Global China." Progressively, Canada's historical trajectory that was based on engaging China for ensuring its inclusion in the international community faced a problem: What to do once China is integrated?

5.6.1 China's Rise

In 1970, a bipolar international system had plunged the world into the midst of the Cold War. China could be seen both by the US and the USSR as a potential threat. Being a communist regime and excluded from the UN, despite some rapprochement to the US, the PRC was still largely seen as an enemy of the western bloc. On the other hand, tensions arising between Beijing and Moscow gave rise to conflict, as troops in border regions of the two countries even opened fire on one another on several occasions. China, the Soviet Union, and America being nuclear powers, this triangular relation was seen by Canadian officials as a great threat to global security and Canada's interest. Trudeau's 1970 decision must be seen as an effort to end China's isolation and to further Canadian interest in peace and stability.

The Tiananmen crisis could have initiated a dangerous movement in China in favor of communist hardliners and plunged China into regressing to its Maoist state. Canada's government chose to implement sanctions toward China but remained short of severing the relationship. Canada wanted to keep "lines of communication" open and signal China that it was waiting for it to move on from this tragedy and restart its own journey of reforms. Canada's position cannot be viewed as an important factor influencing China to resume its reforms in 1992, but along with other members of the G7, it certainly contributed to the belief by Chinese reformers that the west would not cut its economic and political ties with the PRC if it chose to pursue its reform program.

In retrospect, after Canada's recognition, China's integration into the international community progressively accelerated and despite Tiananmen was never to be reversed. China obtained its seat at the UN Security Council in 1971 and was recognized by most countries in the 1970s. China then opened its doors to economic relations in the 1980s, emerged as a regional superpower in the 1990s, acceded to the WTO in 1999, became a prominent member of the "six party talks" over the Korean peninsula issue (Choo 2005), became an active member of APEC, of the ASEAN regional Forum (Evans 2006, pp. 283–288), negotiated and signed several free-trade agreements, became a prominent source of international aid and investment, particularly in Africa (Chan 2007), and saw its state-owned enterprises make a significant numbers of acquisitions around the world. Without a doubt, China could be perceived as early as 2001 as a world power. In 1968, when P-E Trudeau said that: "[…] many current and future world issues would never be fully resolved without some accommodation with the Chinese Nation", the future that he was referring to is China's current rise in the twenty-first century. In 2006, the international context, given China's rise, had become entirely inconsistent with a foreign policy aimed at "socializing China to the international community" and "breaking its isolation".

5.6.2 Canada's Domestic Context in the Early 2000s

Paul Martin's Liberal minority government did try to address the problem of engaging a globalized China, but its demise in 2006 cut short these efforts. Indeed, in 2005 Canada and China jointly announced the creation of a "strategic partnership" during Hu Jintao's official visit to Canada. Unfortunately, details of this new partnership never clearly emerged and it seems that China was the initiator of this new policy. It seemed that it would have been principally aimed at commercial relations (Evans 2006, pp. 288–291), following the already established Liberal policy toward China.

The impact of a 35-year-old trajectory was impairing the capacity of the DEFAIT to find a new outlook toward China that did not simply reuse trade, diplomacy, and human rights talk in the same fashion as previously developed. The absence of significant domestic and institutional change was preventing a significant modification of the trajectory. The election of Stephen Harper's conservative minority government in early 2006 would bring about this modification of the domestic and institutional context. Without official announcement, Stephen Harper's government endeavored to change Canada's China policy. Canada quickly became outspokenly critical toward China, in what looked like an effort to influence China's Tibet policy, political liberties and human rights issues, and the integrity of the PRC's regime itself (Kwan 2007, pp. 33–37).

5.6.3 Mounting Tensions with China in the First Conservative Minority Mandate

Tense political relations between the two countries marked the first year of the Conservative government, culminating in the refusal of Hu Jintao to allow a meeting with Canada's Prime Minister at the APEC summit. The Conservative government retaliated by forming a parliamentary committee to evaluate Canada's work with China on human rights issues, although the results of this committee were never referenced in any DEFAIT or governmental papers or policy.[9] Stephen Harper multiplied allusions in various speeches to the importance of not sacrificing Canadian values, such as democracy and human rights, for profit and trade (Bériault 2007). Speaking about being snubbed by the Chinese leaders at the APEC summit, Harper said that: "I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don't think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values. […] "They don't want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar." Canada's relations with China were publicly qualified as a "real mess" (CBC 2006). Canada then accused China of sending thousands of spies to steal

[9]Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2007)

Canadian firm's industrial and technological secrets (Galloway 2007). In May 2007, Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister, Peter McKay, made an official visit to China where he officially and publicly tried to address the case of a Canadian of Chinese descent who was condemned to a life sentence over terrorism charges (Bériault 2007). Tensions remained in 2008 as Stephen Harper chose not to attend the opening Ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Harper was also being criticized for not having visited China after more than 3 years as Prime Minister of Canada, since Mulroney, Chrétien, and Martin had all started preparation for official visit in the first year of their mandate (Beauchemin and Bellavance 2009). When Harper finally made his first visit to China, he was reminded by Wen Jiabao that such a delay was not appreciated (Ibbitson 2009).

Despite the government's hardening toward China, Canada-China commercial relations continued to grow and China became Canada's second largest trading partner in 2010 (Picher 2010). Nevertheless, Canada was losing ground comparably to other countries in this area, especially Australia, and Canadian businesses were complaining of seeing the government's China Policy obstructing potential deals with China. This new China Policy had not been announced nor discussed publicly and it seems that DEFAIT could not clearly explain the rationale that the government was following. After 35 years of positive relations, the Harper government implemented a conflictual approach toward China while thinking it could avoid obstructing Trade issues (Evans 2014).

Since the international environment had been changed significantly and the domestic context was also changed by the arrival of a Conservative government with a background different from that of the Progressive Conservatives of the 1980s, a major critical juncture was possible and was exploited to enforce a departure from the historical trajectory of Canada's China policy. The government also chose to implement a new China Policy without probing deeply within DEFAIT for potential options and strategies, thus modifying the institutional context or more precisely short-cutting it. However, bringing change does not necessarily mean that lasting transformation will occur. Despite these decisions, lasting change will only occur if a new trajectory can be set. The previous trajectory had shaped Canadian governmental institutions, Canadian firms, Canadian experts on China, and the general public to expect a certain kind of attitude of the Canadian government toward China. Combined with the strong Chinese negative reaction to Harper's new way, these expectations and habits would bring strong pressures to restore the previous characteristics of the relationship.

5.6.4 Attempts to Warm the Relationship

The December 2009 visit of Stephen Harper to China marked the beginning of a reversal of the Conservative government attitude toward China. Ministers toned down their criticism of the PRC's regime and efforts were put in place to make progress in the bilateral relationship as Hu Jintao visited Canada in 2010.

Agreements were signed to extend consular presence of both countries respectively and Canada was placed on the list of approved nations for tourism by Beijing. Harper visited China again in 2012 and 2014, with trade deals worth 2.5 billion dollars allegedly signed in the 2014 visit. Stephen Harper also claimed to have raised in private with the new PRC's president, Xi Jingping "every single issue in the areas of consular issues, human rights, governance, the rights of minorities including the case of a Canadian couple imprisoned in China on suspicion of espionage and issues of religious freedom" (Brean 2014). Furthermore, the Conservative government chose to approve the acquisition of a Canadian petro-company, Nexen, by China's state-owned enterprise CNOOC. Canada and China also signed a foreign investment treaty in 2012 that came into effect in 2014.

Although, the economic relations have improved since 2010 and the rhetoric of the Prime Minister toward China was greatly modified, not all tensions between the two countries have been resolved. Canadian officials have continued repeatedly to accuse China of spying on Canadian firms. The Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Richard Fadden who became National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in early 2015, declared in 2010 that China was aggressively trying to influence provincial and municipal politicians (CBC 2010). The same agency reported in 2014 that the National Research Council (NRC) of Canada had been a victim of a highly sophisticated Chinese cyberattack (Radio-Canada 2014a). In 2012, Stephen Harper also made a public reminder to Chinese Companies operating on Canadian soil that they need to strictly follow Canadian rules and laws (Canadian Press 2012). Canada also denied visas to delegates of the Chinese space agency who were set to participate at an international space collaboration Conference in September 2014, days after the Foreign Affair Minister, John Baird, had publicly approved Hong Kong students' manifestations against the communist regime (Radio-Canada 2014b). Previously, China had not sent major representatives to Canada to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. China also denied the access of the Canadian ambassador to Tibet, contrary to what had been granted to the ambassador under the Liberal government (Canadian Press 2013).

The Conservative government abandoned its original policy of acting antagonistically toward China for what seems to be the promotion of Canadian trade interests with China. However, it has yet to develop coherent measures to influence China on other issues. With the folding of CIDA and the dissolution of human rights joint-committees, Canada no longer has the tools to influence Chinese institutions to reflect some Canadian values in their reforms. Pressures from the Canadian business sector contributed to the Conservative government change of heart on China, but the legacy of the previous trajectory also have greatly influenced the current situation. Indeed, the government seems to have simply chosen to resume high-level official visits and diplomatic engagement, as well as to focus clearly on trade opportunities. These were the main tools used by the previous governments since the 1970s. However, these tools were integrated into a coherent approach aimed at engaging China on the international scene. The current challenge for Canada should be to try and bring China to behave like a responsible

international superpower and to promote within its borders a set of values and political reforms that would influence its course toward peaceful relations with western countries. The Conservative government was initially determined to put forward these values, but its failure of having any impact on China with an aggressive approach led the Conservatives to simply abandon this objective, even at the cost of compromising core values of their own party. Devoid of any clear policy statement and with significantly reduced influence on decisions, DEFAIT and Canadian governmental officials have yet to produce any strategy or goal for Canada's China Policy. Actually, Canadian foreign Policy formulation toward China now involves only a small number of officials and advisors around the Prime Minister's office, reducing considerably the role of other actors. The transformation of the international and domestic context allowed the Harper government to initially begin a transformation of Canada's China policy, but the institutional context, marked by what many Ottawa insiders have understood as a general loss of influence of the public service, has impaired the construction of a new coherent approach toward China (Evans 2014, pp. 66–67). Therefore, the government returned to elements of the old policy, promoting trade with high-level diplomatic meetings to simply promote Canadian commercial interest. The weight of the previous historical trajectory, combined with the institutional context, have thus prevented the establishment of a coherent new China policy. Canada now aims simply at promoting trade and occasionally condemning the values of the Chinese regime despite any evidence of real impact of those criticisms and the absence of concrete measures to influence China on these issues.

5.7 Conclusion

Canada's foreign policy toward China was stable and clear for more than 35 years. The following Fig. 5.2 illustrates the evolution of Canada's China policy since 1949 according to the proposed model.

From 1970 to 2006, integration of China into the international community to promote stability and peace was the main objective of Canada's China policy. Engaging China positively with frequent high-level diplomatic relations, trade promotion, official development assistance, and constructive dialogue and aid programing on human rights and related issues were the means to achieve this goal. If trade did become increasingly important, the initial goal remained influential even during China's rise on the international scene. The mounting influence of the historical trajectory of Canada's China policy prevented contextual transformation from bringing more than temporary modification or minor adjustment to the nature of Sino-Canadian relations. At the exception of the Tiananmen crisis that brought a significant adjustment of Canada's China policy, all critical junctures saw decision makers reaffirm the trajectory taken previously. However, extensive transformation of the international context combined with the arrival to power of a party dominated



Fig. 5.2 Canada's China policy 1949–2015

by a new set of Canadian elites, did bring a critical juncture where decision makers initiated important change to Canada's China Policy.

In 2006, the 35-year-old policy needed to be redesigned. However, the institutional context did not favor such a change. The government failed to create a new coherent and successful approach to China and elements of the previous policy remained strongly influential in the operation of relations. Canada's China policy currently remains in a transient phase where the complete transformation of the previous trajectory has yet to happen.

It would be possible to argue that Canada simply decided to pursue commercial objectives toward China, but this does not represent the full picture of current Sino-Canadian relations. First, China, as much as Canada, pursues economic interests in our relationship. The hesitation of the Canadian government on

approving the Nexen-CNOOC deal demonstrates Canada's lack of a coherent policy framework to deal with Chinese economic interests. Canada's position toward Chinese economic interests and its impact on Canada's own economy remains to be coherently addressed (Shenkar 2006). Second, promoting trade is not in itself a strategy or a policy, but simply an interest of any capitalist nation. What matters more is a strategy of how to promote it, and the current government did not take up the task of creating a strategic partnership with China. Third, Canada continues to criticize some of the ways of the Chinese regime and remains uncomfortable with the absence of democratic reforms in China, but has not found a way to engage China on these issues constructively.

As indicated by Paul Evans, Canada must "understand China's identity, philosophy, traditions, culture and its political, economic and cultural challenges to comprehend what affects its China foreign policy" (Evans 2006). Canada needs to redefine its China policy in a way to serve Canadian economic interest and also to insure that China refrains from becoming a revisionist state, since this would jeopardize Canada's interest in international peace. China's rise transforms the international system, or at least the Asia Pacific region, into a multipolar world. Canada should aim at increasing its influence by trying to "bridge between powers […] and become a non-biased mediator" (Shenkar 2006). Canada must learn to engage with the twenty-first century China to participate positively in solving the challenges of China's rise within the international system. In this sense, Canada's China Policy is too "bilateral" and does not focus enough on a global strategy in Canadian foreign policy. It remains to be seen if Canada will eventually stabilize its China policy in a new historical trajectory or if it will remain in an undefined position, but Canada cannot ignore China's influence on the global scene. China was receptive to Canada's efforts for 35 years; the Canadian government should try to regain some of this influence. However, while China needed Canada in 1970, the reality today is that China has far more partners. It is up to Canada to make itself relevant again to China and find a new path for the Sino-Canadian relationship.

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Chapter 6
The Death Penalty in China and Its Impact on Sino-Canadian Criminal Justice Cooperation

Minxing Zhao

6.1 Introduction

Since the People's Republic China (PRC) and Canada established formal diplomatic relations in 1970, the past 45 years have witnessed important progress in judicial and law-enforcement cooperation between the two countries (Beare 2010; Luo 2015). In 1994, Canada became the first country to enter into a treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with the PRC. Over the years, China and Canada have enjoyed increasing cooperation in the field of criminal justice. Recent cooperative initiatives include the establishment in 2008 of regular bilateral law enforcement and judicial cooperation consultations and the signing of a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on combating crimes in 2010 (Government of Canada, Office of the Prime Minister 2009, 2010). In 2013, Canada and China concluded negotiations on an agreement regarding the sharing of forfeited assets and the return of property (Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development 2013). Like the agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, Canada is the first country to establish mechanism on sharing proceeds of crime with China (Mulroney 2015). However, due to Canada's serious human rights concerns over China's extensive use of death penalty and the fairness of Chinese criminal justice system, extradition of Chinese fugitives who have been charged with capital offences became an irritant in bilateral relations. As China is keenly seeking the return of its most wanted fugitives who have fled with significant capital to Canada, particularly those corrupt officials, much attention has been paid to the controversy over the death penalty issue in Sino-Canadian criminal justice cooperation.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_6

This chapter discusses death penalty law and practice in China and how Sino-Canadian criminal justice cooperation has been considerably constrained by the death penalty issue. Section 6.2 reviews the aspects of China's death penalty law and practice that are incompatible with contemporary values and international human rights norms. The historical changes to capital punishment in Canada are also briefly examined with a view to illustrate the differences between the two countries. Section 6.3 explores three forms of cooperation on criminal matters between China and Canada and how death penalty constrains bilateral cooperation in each form. Section 6.4 introduces recent legislative and judicial reforms to China's death penalty. Given the unlikelihood that China will abolish death penalty for the foreseeable future, Sect. 6.5 concludes that despite the significant legal reforms China has made, the death penalty will remain a difficult issue in bilateral criminal justice cooperation as long as Canada continues to promote its high human rights values when engaging with China.

6.2 China's Death Penalty Law and Practice

China has a long history of using the death penalty to combat crimes and to maintain social order (Johnson and Zimring 2009; Johnson 2010). As the world-wide movement to abolish the death penalty gains momentum, China's death penalty law and practice is under increasing international human rights pressure as those countries that have abolished capital punishment vigorously assert that since the death penalty violate fundamental human rights it should be abolished all over the world (Council of Europe 2004). Three disturbing aspects of China's death penalty, including the broad scope of crimes carrying death penalty, high execution rate, and lack of procedural safeguards and transparency in the trials of capital cases, have become increasingly incompatible with evolving international human rights norms.

First, China uses the death penalty to punish a wide range of offences. As Table 6.1 shows, in China's first criminal law promulgated in 1979, there were 28 capital crimes within four broad categories and the death penalty was targeted mainly at an overtly political category of crimes (Cai 1997; Monthy 1998). In 1997 Criminal Law (currently in force in China), however, the number of capital offences greatly expanded from 28 to 68 in response to surging crime waves and the emergence of new criminal activities during the course of economic reforms since the 1980s (Lu and Zhang 2005). Apart from a few major violent crimes, the majority of these 68 capital crimes impose death penalty on nonviolent, economic-related crimes. Since 1997, the 68 capital offences remained stable until the 2011 revision to the 1997 Criminal Law, which, for the first time, removed 13 economic-related, nonviolent crimes (see Table 6.2 for details). At present, the 55 capital crimes fall into nine categories ranging from intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave consequences, such as murder, rape, and robbery to nonviolent crimes, such as graft and bribery.

Table 6.1 Historical development of capital offences in China

Year	No.	Capital offences
1979	28	Counterrevolutionary offences (15)[a]
		Offences endangering public security (8)
		Offences infringing on personal rights (3)
		Property crimes (2)
1997	68	Offences endangering national security (7)
		Offences endangering public security (14)
		Offences disrupting the order of the socialist market economy (15)
		Offences infringing upon citizens' right of the person and democratic rights (5)
		Offences encroaching on property (2)
		Offences disrupting the order of social administration (8)
		Offences endangering the national defense interest (2)
		Graft and bribery (2)
		Offences violating duties by military servicemen (13)
2011	55	13 offences were removed[b]

Source Criminal Law of the PRC 1979, 1997 and Amendment Eight to Criminal Law (2011)
[a]Numerals in parentheses indicate the number of capital offences under this category
[b]See Table 6.2 for details

Table 6.2 Capital offences removed from China's criminal law in 2011

Category	Offences
Offences disrupting the order of the socialist market economy	Smuggling cultural relics (Article 151)
	Smuggling precious metals (Article 151)
	Smuggling rare plants and their products (Article 151)
	Smuggling of ordinary goods and products (Article 153)
	Invoicing fraud (Article 194)
	Financial instrument fraud (Article 194)
	Letter of credit fraud (Article 195)
	Illegally issuing value-added tax invoices (Article 205)
Offences encroaching on property	Theft (Article 264)
Offences disrupting the order of social administration	Imparting criminal methods (Article 295)
	Illegally digging and robbing ancient remains or tombs (Article 328)
	Illegally digging or robbing fossils of ancient human beings or fossils of ancient vertebrate animals (Article 328)

Source Amendment Eight to PRC Criminal Law (2011)

China's interpretation of what constitutes the "most serious crimes" explains the broad scope of capital offences and their incompatibility with international standards (Trevaskes 2008). Article 48 of the 1997 PRC Criminal Law states that death penalty has been restricted to "extremely serious crimes" which comply with the international standards regarding the scope of death penalty, as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that "in countries that have not already abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes… (Article 6)." The UN Human Rights Committee, however, has determined that many categories of crimes or specific offences in China's criminal law do not fall within the "most serious crimes" stipulated in ICCPR because Safeguard 1 of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1984 requires that death penalty can only be applied to "intentional crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences." It can be argued that literally China's principle of using death penalty is in line with international standards, but the legal practice is lagging far behind accepted norms and values. By contrast, Canada removed capital punishment for ordinary crimes from its Criminal Code in 1976 and abolished death penalty for all crimes in 1998.

Second, China is the most prolific user of death penalty but its use remains very opaque. Since the Chinese government never publishes detailed statistics on death penalty, information about the use of death penalty, including the number of persons sentenced to death and the number of executions actually carried out, is not available. But international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, estimate that each year China executes more people than all the other countries in the world combined together (Amnesty International 2015).

Third, the lack of procedural safeguards and transparency in criminal procedure has serious implications for cases involving the death penalty. If judged by international criminal justice standards, those who have been sentenced to death in China have hardly received fair trials. Lack of prompt access to lawyers, lack of presumption of innocence, political interference in the judiciary, and failure to exclude evidence extracted through torture are some of the most criticized procedural deficiencies (Chen 2004; Liu 1991; Peerenboom 2005; Savadove 2006; Jiang 2013). Coverage in newspapers and on the Internet of a series of wrongful convictions has increased concerns, domestic and international, over the problematic procedure of the imposition of death penalty in China. For example, She Xianglin was convicted of the murder of his wife in 1994. He was sentenced to death despite plea of innocence and the fact that he had confessed because he had been severely beaten during police interrogations. She Xianglin's death sentence was commuted to 15 years imprisonment after a re-trial in 1998. Ironically, the alleged murder victim, his wife, Zhang Zaiyu reappeared 10 years later, in April 2005. She Xianglin was released after 11 years in prison and officially cleared of all charges (Liu 2005). Nie Shubin, a young man from North China, was not as lucky as She Xianglin was. He was executed in 1995 for the rape and murder of a local woman. He had reportedly been tortured in police custody. In early 2005, a suspect arrested in connection with another case, reportedly confessed to the same crime Nie was

charged. At the time of this writing, Nie Shubin case was under review to determine whether he was wrongfully convicted and executed (Dui Hua 2015).

While in Canada, one of the reasons leading to its abolition of death penalty in 1976 was the concern of the possibility of wrongful convictions. In *United States v. Burns*, the Supreme Court of Canada succinctly summarized the reasons behind Canada's decision to abolish death penalty. "Awareness of the potential for miscarriages of justice, together with broader public concerns about the taking of life by the state, as well as doubts about the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent to murder in comparison with life in prison without parole for 25 years, led Canada to abolish the death penalty for all but a handful of military offences in 1976, and subsequently to abolish the death penalty for all offences in 1998 (p. 295)."

6.3 Death Penalty as an Irritant in Sino-Canadian Criminal Justice Cooperation

As a common practice of many countries, including China and Canada, international criminal justice cooperation is usually implemented through mechanisms such as mutual legal assistance and extradition. These mechanisms are based on bilateral or multilateral treaties or arrangements or, in some instances, on national law (Lewis 2007). Because of the Canadian government's human rights concerns and the "incompatibilities between Canadian and Chinese political, economic and social institutions" (Burton 2015, p. 56), in either form of criminal justice cooperation, death penalty has been a persistent irritant in bilateral relations. On one hand, Canada cannot provide some forms of legal assistances that could facilitate the imposition of capital punishment in China. On the other hand, Canada generally refuses to extradite capital offenders to China (ibid).

6.3.1 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

In 1994, Canada and China signed the Treaty between Canada and the People's Republic of China on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Canada-PRC MLAT). The signing of the Canada-PRC MLAT was a groundbreaking event in the history of Chinese-Western cooperation in criminal justice and crime prevention (Yang 1998). The bilateral treaty demonstrated both countries' desires to strengthen their cooperation in criminal matters. Article 2 of the treaty states that the two countries shall engage in various forms of assistance such as,

- Service of documents for proceedings in criminal matters
- Taking of evidence and obtaining of statements of persons
- Search and seizure

- Obtaining and providing expert evaluations
- Transfer of material evidence
- Provision of criminal records and court records
- Provision of documentary evidence
- Authorizing or assisting persons, including detained persons, to travel to the requesting party to give evidence or assist investigations and measures related to the proceeds of crime and the restoration of property to victims.

Although the two parties has agreed to share information and evidence related to criminal investigations and prosecutions, Article 7 of the treaty indicates that the requested party may refuse to provide legal assistance if its domestic law prohibits such assistance. Since there is no death penalty in Canada and Canada is bound by its domestic laws not to cooperate with the prosecution of anyone in a country who could be executed, Canada has been unwilling to provide legal assistance that could facilitate the imposition of death penalty in China. A prominent example of Canada's unwillingness to provide legal assistance in criminal matters to China is the high-profile murder case of Chinese student Amanda Zhao in Canada. In October 2002, 20-year-old Amanda Zhao was killed in Burnaby, Vancouver. Her boyfriend, Ang Li, was charged with her death but fled to China before he could be arrested. Due to Canada's concern that the murder suspect may face death penalty if convicted in China, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) refused to provide key evidences to the Chinese authorities for the prosecution of the suspect in China (Mickleburgh 2010). Instead, Canada required the extradition of Ang Li back to Canada to face the criminal charges. But after several unsuccessful requests to extradite Li back to Canada for trial, the RCMP finally agreed to share evidences with Chinese police to prosecute the case in Beijing after secured assurances from China side that Ang Li would not face death penalty if convicted. In 27 September 2012, Ang Li was found guilty of murdering Amanda Zhao and was sentenced to life in prison but the sentence was reduced to 7 year after the defendant appealed (Dhillon 2014).

6.3.2 Treaty-Based Extradition Cooperation

When it comes to extradition cooperation, the Canadian government appears to take an extremely cautious position in response to China's eagerness to bring back its most wanted fugitives for justice through extradition mechanism (Bloom 2008). Under Canada's Extradition Act, Canada may engage in extradition cooperation with foreign countries on the basis of a bilateral extradition treaty between Canada and the state or entity making the request, a multilateral agreement to which both Canada and the requesting party are signatories and which contains a provision on extradition, or a specific agreement entered into between Canada and the requesting state or entity with respect to a person or persons in a particular case (Henchey 2007).

Although Canada became the first country to sign a mutual legal assistance treaty in criminal matters with China, bilateral extradition treaty has not been reached between the two countries. The Chinese government has made clear its desire for an extradition treaty with Canada (Lague 2007). For the Chinese government, an extradition treaty with Canada can not only facilitate the repatriation of fugitives but also function to deter domestic criminals from fleeing to a perceived safe haven in Canada. For the Canadian government, aside from political bias and ideological differences, the main reason that Canada has been hesitating to sign an extradition treaty has everything to do with the extensive use of death penalty in China. Out of concerns that the accused may be subjected to human rights violations and respect of its own human rights obligations under domestic and international human rights law, Canada is extremely careful on extradition of capital offenders to China (Beare 2010).

China and Canada are both parties to a number of multilateral agreements, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). The provisions of the UNCAC and UNTOC provide that these conventions may be used as the legal basis for extradition between states parties that do not have a bilateral extradition agreement in relation to offences that are covered by the convention. There has not been extradition cooperation between China and Canada under the two conventions (ibid). Even if China wishes to make use of the two conventions to seek extradition from Canada, it will encounter the same death penalty problems as both UNCAC and UNTOC provide that, "Extradition shall be subjected to the conditions provided for by the domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition (UNTOC Article 16 and UNCAC Article 44)".

6.3.3 Non-treaty Based Extradition Cooperation

An extradition treaty would streamline the return of suspects to China, but the absence of one does not automatically bar the return of suspected or convicted criminals. Indeed, Canada has been willing to engage China in ad hoc, case-by-case negotiations (York 2007). The Canadian Extradition Act permits extradition to occur without a treaty through ad hoc agreements on a case-by-case basis (Section 10). The Extradition Law of the PRC also allows extradition to happen without a treaty (Article 15). Past and current cooperation between the two countries indicates that Canada is willing to cooperate when the fugitives requested by the Chinese authorities do not face death sentences. Otherwise, it has proven extremely difficult for China to gain approval from Canada for extraditions without a treaty.

On August 22, 2008, Deng Xinzhi, who was wanted in connection with a multi-million-dollar contract fraud, was deported to China after having hidden in Canada for 5 years. Stockwell Day, Minister of Canada's Public Safety Department

issued a statement on the department website, "Mr. Deng's removal from Canada further underscores this government's commitment that our country will not be a safe haven for fugitives. On this our tolerance level is zero. …This is an excellent example of Canada's ability to coordinate efforts and work closely with our international partners in keeping our communities safe (Public Safety Canada 2008)." Not long after Deng's deportation, Cui Zili, Deng's accomplice was returned to China on January 16, 2010 (Reuters 16 January 2010). A statement from China's Ministry of Public Security said Cui was one of the first criminals deported from Canada since China and Canada issued a joint statement pledging to strengthen cooperation on repatriating fugitives in line with their respective laws in 2009 during Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper's historical visit to China (Wang 2010). On October 21, 2009, Canada extradited Liu Xiaoquan to China, another fugitive accused of contract fraud (Germain 2010). What the three fugitives have to face in China are prison sentences, rather than capital punishment.

When the bilateral cooperation involves capital offenders, cooperation becomes more complicated. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides an individual with the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (Section 7). The Supreme Court of Canada in *United States v. Burns* held that absent "exceptional circumstances", in cases in which the imposition of the death penalty is a "reasonably anticipated" consequence of extradition, there is a requirement that the Minister of Justice seek and obtain an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed if the person is convicted in the requesting state (Schabas 2001; Givelber 2002). Thus, Canada may not remove, either by deportation or extradition, individuals from its jurisdiction if it reasonably anticipates that they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the death sentence will not be carried out.

The Lai Changxing case is probably the most notable example that highlights the controversy surrounding the extradition of capital offenders from Canada to China. Lai Changxing, a Chinese citizen who fled to Canada in 1999, was wanted to stand trial in China for smuggling and bribery. He was accused of masterminding a smuggling ring that smuggled goods worth 53 billion Chinese Yuan (US $6.38 billion), with evaded tax totaling 30 billion Chinese Yuan (US$3.6 billion) (China Daily, November 4, 2003). He fled to Canada and lived in Vancouver, where he had been successfully fighting extradition for 12 years by challenging the Canadian government's deportation decision though court system. Lai Changxing's main argument was that he would not get a fair trial in China and that he would face torture and death penalty if returned to China. Over the years, Chinese government had made frequent representations to Canada over the Lai Changxing case. In order to ease Canada's concern that Lai may be sentenced to death if found guilty in China, the Chinese authorities had provided Canada with assurances in a diplomatic note that Lai Changxing would not be tortured, subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, or executed upon return to China (Beare 2010). Ultimately, Lai failed his appeals in the Canadian refugee court and was deported back to China in July 2011. He was sentenced to life in prison in May 2012. It should be noted that the decision to repatriate Lai is not based on an extradition treaty between Canada and

China. Although the resolution of Lai Changxing case has been regarded as an indicator and fruit of the warming up of Canada–China relations around 2011 (Nossal and Sarson 2014), it is evident that death penalty issue was and will still be a roadblock in bilateral law enforcement cooperation.

6.4 China's Death Penalty Reform

Since 2007, the Chinese government has started introducing some major reforms to its death penalty law and practice. These reform measures range from removal of capital crimes from criminal law to procedural safeguards in death penalty trials. The ultimate goal of the reform is to implement a criminal policy of "killing fewer, killing cautiously (*shaosha shensha*)" and "balancing leniency and severity (*kuanyan xiangji*)" in the course of constructing a harmonious society (Trevaskes 2008; Noakes 2014).

The first reform was to reinstate the review and approval of all death sentences by China's Supreme People's Court (SPC), the highest court in China, as of 1 January 2007. This reform makes it mandatory that all death sentences be reviewed and approved by the SPC. The move follows a series of miscarriages of justice since the power to review and approve some capital crimes, such as murder, rape, and robbery, was delegated from the SPC to Provincial High Courts in the 1980s "striking hard" campaigns to punish serious crime "severely and swiftly" (Trevaskes 2013). Although the change made to death sentence review and approval process cannot eliminate all the questionable procedures associated with capital case trials, this reform sent a clear signal to the lower courts and the general public that the SPC is determined to control death sentences. While the true significance of SPC's review procedures will take some time, officials from the SPC acknowledged that the reform has led to declines in the total number of death sentences and executions in 2007 and 2008 (China Daily 27 June 2008; Schabas 2009). The Chinese government does not provide official statistics to support this decline in numbers. At the same time, two international non-governmental organizations, Amnesty International and Hands Off Cain, that regularly monitor the use of the death penalty in China, make different assessments as to the extent of capital punishment in China. The United Nations quinquennial report on capital punishment and implementation of the safe guards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty released in 2010 also recorded this decline (United Nations 2010). Johnson (2010), in his observation of the developing trends of death penalty in Asia, argues that there is no doubt that China has joined the general pattern of decline in the use of the death penalty in Asia.

The second move was the removal of 13 economic-related, nonviolent crimes from China's capital offences list as of May 1, 2011 (See Table 6.2). This is the first time China reduces the number of crimes carrying death penalty since the PRC enacted its Criminal Law in 1979. After China's Supreme Court took back the

power to review and approve all death sentences in 2007, the cut of capital crimes is China's another major move to limit the use of death penalty (China Daily 2 May 2011). The removal demonstrated China's commitment to the United Nations that China is preparing for the gradually restriction of the scope of capital crimes with the aim of final abolition (Hood 2009). The removed 13 offences account for approximately 20 % of a total of 68 capital offences. However, it remains uncertain how this cut may affect the number of death sentences and actual executions since the abolished capital offences are rarely used to punish offenders. Therefore, the abolition of the "capital offences on book" only has a symbolic meaning without any practical significance. Furthermore, the reform has no touch on the issue of outright abolition of the death penalty for economic crimes and the restriction of death penalty only to violent crimes.

The third reform to death penalty is the cut of nine capital crimes from China's criminal law. In October 2014, Amendment Nine to the Criminal Law of PRC (Amendment Nine) was submitted to the National People's Congress (China's national legislature) for first reading. A distinct feature of Amendment Nine is the removal of death penalty for nine nonviolent crimes. The proposed amendment gets approved in the legislature in 2015 and the number of capital crimes in the current criminal law was reduced from 55 to 46. After the 2011 cut of 13 capital crimes, this legislative reform was the second significant removal of death penalty from China's criminal law. Although the number of removal is no greater than last reform in 2011, it at least indicates that Chinese government is on the move to gradually remove nonviolent capital crimes until the completely abolition of death penalty. The major flaw of this reform is the same as last reform, that is, the capital crimes to be removed are seldom or never used. The removal of rarely used capital crimes can significantly reduce the number of crimes carrying death penalty, but they are not meaningful reforms, as they cannot affect the actual number of death sentences and executions every year (Table 6.3).

The death penalty reforms can be regarded as revolutionary events in China's criminal justice history. Why did China make these reforms? Is there a connection between death penalty as a diplomatic friction in China's foreign relations and these legal reforms? Does the extradition issues have an effect on persuading the Chinese government to restrict the application of death penalty? In fact, due to the opacity of the decision-making process of the Communist Party leadership, there have been no clear or straightforward answers to these questions. One can only hypothesize about its reasons. Scott (2010) finds that many forces contributed to China's decision to reform its death penalty law. Apart from domestic factors, international influences are the primary forces to influence China's new moves in its death penalty reform. The international influences come from, on one hand, European Union (EU) human rights dialogues with China and Canada human rights dialogues with China, and, on the other hand, from the refusal of extraditing capital offenders to China. Schabas (2009) finds it is very difficult to tell whether the EU-China human rights dialogues contribute to China's progress with regard to death penalty, but he shows his confidence in the EU-China human rights dialogues in pushing China to make

Table 6.3 Capital crimes removed in 2015 amendment to the criminal law

Category	Offences
Offences disrupting the order of the socialist market economy	Smuggling weapons, ammunition (Article 151)
	Smuggling nuclear materials (Article 151)
	Smuggling counterfeit currencies (Article 151)
	Counterfeiting currencies (Article 170)
	Raising funds by means of fraud (Article 199)
Offences disrupting the order of social administration	Arranging for another person to engage in prostitution (Article 358)
	Forcing another to engage in prostitution (Article 358)
Offences of violating duties by military servicemen	Obstructing a commander or a person on duty from performing his duties (Article 426)
	Fabricating rumors to mislead others during wartime (Article 433)

Source Amendment Nine to the PRC Criminal Law (2015)

its criminal law gradually in line with international standards. As for extradition cooperation, Schabas (2003) in what he terms as "indirect abolition," argues that by refusing to extradite capital offenders to China, western countries may function to indirectly abolish death penalty in China for the categories of crime for which the offenders are subjected to. However, Johnson (2010), through his observation of how the framing of capital punishment as a human rights issue is exported from Europe to Asia, argues, "the most important sphere of influence on death penalty policy is still national, not international or regional." As is clearly illustrated by Adam MacDonald in this volume, China's perceived unswerving commitment to noninterference in its domestic affairs is seen as highly detrimental for Western countries' promotion of human rights.

To briefly sum up, China's ongoing reforms of death penalty law aims to develop options for the reduction of the numbers of capital offences and death sentences. These reforms in both substantive and procedural criminal laws represent progressive developments among China's continuing efforts to introduce such amendments into its legislation and practices as would bring its criminal justice system up to international standards of fairness. Although key systemic challenges remain and no one knows for sure which forces, domestic or international, may ultimately lead China to abolish its death penalty, what is probably true is that as China is increasingly exposed to international ideas and practice, international influences and human rights pressure imposed on China through bilateral criminal justice cooperation play an important role in moving China closer to international norms.

6.5 Conclusion

While China is actively seeking to enhance its criminal justice cooperation with Canada, Canada has been hesitating to provide legal assistance in capital cases and to extradite capital offenders to China due to its deep human rights concerns over China's use of death penalty. Contrary to the findings in Ajay Parasram's exploration of Sino–Indian relations in this volume that great powers can build materially significant positive relations while enduring fierce rivalry over issues of core strategic interest, it is evident that, as long as China keeps death penalty on its criminal law, productive cooperation in criminal justice between the Canadian and Chinese governments will remain problematic and that the death penalty issue continues to be an irritant in diplomatic relations which cannot be resolved by either or both governments.

Currently, although China has made some changes to its death penalty law which move China some distance toward international legal standards, it would not be an easy task to predict whether and to what extent these reform endeavors will be beneficial to strengthening bilateral ties in criminal justice cooperation. Given the key role the Canadian government has played in denouncing the use of capital punishment at the international level, the benefits of tight bilateral cooperation in criminal matters will not outweigh the drawbacks arising from the death penalty issue, even though transnational criminal activities are rising and affecting both countries. In the long run, the only way to make smooth cooperation happen between the two countries is by substantially improving China's death penalty law and practice to comply with international human rights requirements. In addition, strengthened human rights protection mechanism in China's criminal justice procedures will appease the criticisms from the Canadian side and will ultimately contribute to future Sino-Canada judicial cooperation.

The legal and political quagmire highlighted in this chapter is but one illustration of how China's domestic law, governance and politics affect its international engagement. As a rising global superpower with growing influence in world affairs, China's use of death penalty is no longer a simply domestic law issue. Problems with international criminal justice cooperation aside, it has direct bearing on how China's image is perceived internationally and how China could establish its superpower status. But it would be unrealistic to think that China will drop death penalty completely because of international pressure. Even if the Chinese government is determined to resist foreign human rights pressure, its interest in seeking extradition of notorious criminals, especially corrupt officials has prompted it to look more closely at its application of the death penalty. This attention also uncovered abuses in its domestic legal process that it is now determined to reform.

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Chapter 7
The Evolution of Canada's Policy Towards Human Rights in China Since 1970

Charles-Louis Labrecque

7.1 Introduction

Canada's relations with China represent one of its most vital bilateral relations and a major priority for the Canadian government. Economically, China is Canada's second-largest trading partner, still far behind the United States but growing in importance for the Canadian economy every year. During the economic crisis of 2008–2009, natural resource exports to China were what "kept the Canadian economy from a sharper downturn" (Woo 2010). In addition, on the international stage, China is becoming a key player with which Ottawa has to cooperate more than ever to ensure its security. According to former ambassador David Mulroney: "The rise of China is having a direct impact on our health and well-being, and on our security here in Canada. The road to achieving many of our middle-power aspirations now runs through the Middle King
dom" (Mulroney 2015).

Although relations between Canada and China are paramount, the crafting of an effective Chinese policy is a difficult and complex task. How to respond to the challenges of the rise of China is indeed a major foreign policy challenge for most governments around the world, and Canada is not immune from it. In its relations with China, in addition to ensuring prosperity through economic exchange and investment attractiveness, the Canadian government must also try to get China to comply with certain international obligations such as the respect for human rights.[1] The promotion and protection of human rights is an integral part of Canadian foreign policy (DFATD 2015) but the Canadian government struggles to find the

[1]See Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Foreign Policy. http://www.international.gc.ca/rights-droits/index.aspx?lang=eng.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_7

right balance between economic concerns and human rights in their relations with China (Burton 2015, p. 171).

Various issues can complicate Canada–China relations. In the previous chapter, for example, Minxin Zhao in this volume highlighted the differences between Ottawa and Beijing over criminal law, which illustrates a major obstacle for Canada–China criminal justice cooperation. Human rights issues can be a major hindrance to Canada's relations with China, and they can arguably be more disruptive than in any other bilateral relationship. As Canada celebrates the 45th anniversary of its official relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), this chapter examines the evolution of Canada's policy toward human rights in China since 1970. It looks at the different types of policies the Canadian government can implement regarding human rights and considers some of the factors driving these policies under each government since 1970.

7.2 Types of Human Rights Policies

In the conduct of foreign policy, governments pursue different strategies, including various types of policies designed to influence a state's behavior. As is the case for other components of world politics (i.e., compliance with international standards, alliances, trade policy, etc.), the respect for human rights is an aspect that states try to influence in their dealings with a third state. To achieve their goal, states rely on a series of policy instruments that can be diplomatic, economic, military, cultural, or political in nature (Matthews and Pratt 1988; Donnelly and Liang-Fenton 2004). These policy instruments can be ordered according to their intensity and level of assertiveness (see Table 7.1).

States usually use a combination of policy instruments to influence another state's behavior on human rights. Depending on the country toward which the policy is directed and the level of the human rights violations, human rights policies usually rely on the use of certain instruments ranging from low-intensity means to the use of military force.

The selection of instruments depends on the policy chosen by the state. Three main forms of low-intensity policies[2] have been identified in the literature to describe the foreign policy a state will implement to achieve its goal of promoting and protecting human rights in a third country: (1) Silent diplomacy; (2) Quiet diplomacy; and (3) Assertive diplomacy.

[2]After the outspoken policy, a more intense policy is the coercive policy which includes either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force.

Table 7.1 Hierarchy of human rights policy options[1]

Intensity	Policy options
Low intensity	Private discussions
Benign policy	Grants and implementation of formal and informal programs promoting better governance and greater respect for human rights (track-two diplomacy)
	Public declarations
	Suspension of cultural contacts
	Public condemnation
	Suspension or reduction of official development assistance (ODA)
	Publication of official report condemning the human rights situation
	Reduction of official visits
	Suspension official visits
	Boycott of official events
	Multilateral resolutions [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN)]
	Recall of ambassador
	Assistance or support for opposition groups
	Economic sanctions
High intensity	Threat of use of military force
Coercive policy	Use of military force

[1]Based on Gillies (1996)

7.3 Silent Diplomacy

Silent policy is often confused with quiet diplomacy, but the two are in fact quite distinct (Derian 1980). Silent diplomacy can be characterized as a policy of engagement in which the promotion of human rights is almost nonexistent. A government opting for a policy of this kind usually remains completely silent about the internal affairs of another state while maintaining political relations with it. Informal programs can be implemented, but human rights are usually missing from the foreign policy objectives of the state pursuing such a policy.

7.4 Quiet Diplomacy

Quiet diplomacy consists of the implementation of a policy of engagement to ensure the maintenance of good relations with another state while tempering criticism of the human rights situation. The main concerns over human rights are communicated primarily through official private discussions, and the content of those discussions is generally kept confidential (Collin 2004, p. 73). Both states

generally agree on how to tackle the issue. This policy is sometimes referred to as "business as usual" or "behind-the-scenes diplomacy." The reasoning behind this policy is that it is far better to engage a government quietly and behind the scenes than it is through more robust public confrontation (Donnelly and Liang-Fenton 2004, p. 10; Bernstein 2010). The instruments used in pursuit of this policy are essentially bilateral and include, for example, high-level visits during which discussions of human rights can take place in private exchanges, and funding and implementation of informal programs to increase respect for human rights.

7.5 Assertive Diplomacy

Assertive diplomacy differs from the quiet policy in that whereas the latter is more subtle, the former is done with more conviction (Landsberg 2004). Outspoken policy is defined primarily by the use of tools such as open and public criticism to highlight the violation of human rights and democratic principles in a third country (Donnelly and Liang-Fenton 2004, p. 10; Apodaca 2006, p. 17). Other instruments generally used with this kind of policy are the suspension or reduction of political visits and high-level exchanges; the reduction of official development assistance (ODA) or the imposition of conditions on the granting of this aid; international condemnation through resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council; and the use of symbolic gestures such as the recall of ambassadors or a boycott of official events.

7.6 Canada's Human Rights Policy Toward China (1970–2015)

Since the Canadian government recognized the PRC in October 1970, it has pursued various policies toward that country. If engagement has been the "defining and in some ways the distinctive feature of Canada's approach toward the People's Republic of China for at least half of a decade" (Evans 2014, p. XIV), various governments that succeeded each other in Ottawa have used different instruments and policies to manage their relations with China. The various policies used by each government to promote and protect human rights in China are chronicled below.

7.7 Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1970–1979, 1980–1983)

With the election of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968, Canada's foreign policy quickly entered a new phase; it moved away from the internationalism of his predecessor, Lester B. Pearson, toward a stronger focus on Canada's national interests,

objectives, and priorities. In a major speech given on May 29, 1968, entitled *Canada in the World*, Trudeau described his government's intended foreign policy and how its China policy would unfold. In that speech, Trudeau stated that Canada had to pay more attention to Asia in general, and to China in particular (Trudeau 1968).

For Trudeau, the recognition of the PRC in October 1970 as the legitimate government of China was a "no-brainer," it made no sense for him that the anti-communists in Taiwan were still speaking for the one billion Chinese on the mainland (Kinsman 2002–2003). However, the recognition of the PRC was not related to the "third option" (Dobell 1985, p. 165), which sought economic diversification away from the United States. In the 1970 White Paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the commercial potential of the Asia-Pacific region was highlighted, but China was not identified as a priority market for Canadian exports other than wheat (Canada 1970). Instead, it was Japan that was identified as the main target of Canada's trade policy in the Asia-Pacific region (Hervouet 1983).

On the issue of human rights, Canada's policy toward China on this matter was silent. China did not receive special attention at this time from either the Canadian public or the Canadian government. Until the early 1980s, China had remained immune from criticism of its human rights situation from not just Canada, but also from the US and European countries (Cohen 1987). One reason was that the international community was mainly concerned about integrating China into the international system and did not believe it could put significant pressure on the Chinese government (Hervouet 1981). Information about the human rights situation in China was difficult to obtain at the time, and because its isolation from the outside world would make international sanctions mostly ineffective (Kent 1999, p. 34).

Canada began voicing its concerns over human rights violations abroad in the late 1970s, following the new US administration of Jimmy Carter, who was integrating the promotion of human rights on the international stage in its foreign policy agenda (Mahoney 1992), but also as Canada acceded to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member in 1977 (Nossal 1988). Until then, Canada had never before signaled any plans to promote human rights on the world stage.

But while Canada was starting to pay more attention to human rights abroad, the earlier silent diplomacy it had pursued in its relations with China continued. Whenever Canadian officials visited China, they made no reference to human rights. For example, in August 1981, Mark McGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, gave a speech in China on the rule of law, but was complacent toward Beijing (MacGuignan 1981). Furthermore, a 1983 document on Canada–China relations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made no mention of the human rights situation in China (Canada 1983). And when Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Ottawa in January 1984, human rights were again not a topic of discussion (Burton 2011). And as Eric Lefrançois explains in greater detail in his chapter, the

ODA programs that were initiated in the mid-1980s did not aim at advancing human rights; the goal was to enhance opportunities for two-way trade expansion.[3]

According to Kim Nossal, Canadian officials' reluctance to raise the issue of human rights with other countries during the 1970s and 1980s was due to the importance they attached to state sovereignty and their desire not to interfere in other states' internal affairs (Nossal 1988). In the case of China, a combination of factors accounted for Canada's silent approach; at the time, Canada's policy reflected the international situation surrounding the promotion of human rights and the belief that singling out China would have been counterproductive, especially as it was becoming such an important ally in the Cold War against the USSR. Furthermore, Trudeau felt strongly about integrating China to the community of nations and believed it was in Canada's interest to build positive relations with China.

7.8 Brian Mulroney (1984–1993)

Although the Progressive Conservative Party's overwhelming victory in September 1984 had a profound effect on Canada's foreign policy, it did not have a significant effect on Canada's policy toward China. Soon after being elected, Brian Mulroney assured his Chinese counterpart of his intention to pursue the same policy as his predecessor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Frolic 2011). It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise because the China–Canada relationship in 1984 was on the rise and no major issues were threatening it (Evans 1984). From the early 1970s, China had increased its contact with the outside world and had been gradually moving closer to the West. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the economic reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978 accelerated China's opening to market principles and to foreign investment. With the new Chinese leader having abandoned the idea of class struggle in order to prioritize economic modernization, Canada, like the rest of the world, was encouraged and optimistic about China's emergence and of the opportunities it presented.

Just as the 1970 White Paper indicated, the 1985 Green Paper, entitled *Competitiveness and Security*, stressed the importance of trade in Canada's external relations and recognized Asia's importance to Canada's future prosperity. In the document, China was seen as an emerging player in the global economy and was identified as a priority market for Canada (Canada 1985). As stated by the Minister of International Trade Pat Carney during a speech to the Canada–China Business Council in 1986: "[o]ur policy of expanding the trade relationship with China is an integral portion of the government's focus on trade" (Carney 1986). This was reiterated in the *Canadian Strategy for China* in 1987, a strategy designed to

[3]See also: O'Brien (2000).

promote Canadian interests in China and take advantage of the opportunities created by China's opening and modernization (Canada 1987).

Regarding international human rights, Canada's policy began evolving in the late 1970s and was formalized in the mid-1980s. In the Green Paper of 1985, the Canadian government recognized the problematic situation posed by the violations of human rights in various countries, but it did not specify any course of actions. A 1986 report entitled *Canada's International Relations* highlighted the importance of human rights on the world stage and stressed the importance for Canada to "devote more attention to promoting a world that is safer, more prosperous and more human" (Canada 1986).

The human rights situation around the world was slowly becoming a concern for the Canadian government by the mid-1980s. Shortly after, it incorporated the promotion human rights in its general foreign policy objectives and toward China. Canada, which had previously followed a silent diplomacy regarding human rights in China, began to modify its approach. Minister of External Relations, Jean-Luc Pépin, during a speech at a conference on human rights and Canadian foreign policy in 1984, described Canada's approach toward international human rights as "quiet". He explained that Canada was expressing its concerns regarding human rights violations in a "persistent" and "confidential" way, and he explained that Canada's aid and trade with targeted countries would be maintained because the Canadian government did not want to punish citizens for the misdeeds of their governments (Pépin 1984).

This quiet diplomacy began to be applied to China a few years later. On the one hand, Canada was increasing the number of high-level visits and was trying to boost two-way trade; but on the other hand, Ottawa was beginning to raise the human rights issue with China. Canada's policy goals toward China remained the same, but the strategy put forward to achieve these goals was evolving. If Brian Mulroney's visit to China in 1986 was an important element that highlighted Canada's growing interest in deepening economic relations with China, the visit also marked the transition from a silent to a quiet form of policy on human rights. During his trip, Canadian officials accompanying the Prime Minister reported having raised the situation of human rights with their Chinese counterparts (Ruimy 1986). And, even more telling, during a meeting with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, Brian Mulroney, while attempting to solidify the foundation of the Sino-Canadian relationship with the announcement of various measures, reported having spent a significant part of this meeting discussing human rights (The Times 1986). About the meeting, Prime Minster Mulroney said: "I made him aware of Canadian attitudes. No one can challenge the right of a duly elected government to raise any issue with a friend, even though I recognize the traditional Chinese position that this is an internal matter. I didn't raise it in a spirit of hostility. I raised it as the kind of subject that can be discussed between friends" (Rusk 1986). This was a significant departure from Canada's previous stance on human rights (Frolic 2011) and it highlighted the change in Canada's approach toward human rights in China.

This change of policy did not negatively affect the relationship, and until the spring of 1989, Canada had cultivated what it called a "special relationship" with China through a quiet diplomacy. But the People's Liberation Army assault on the protesters at Tiananmen Square on the morning of June 4, 1989, completely changed the situation. Like many other states, Canada imposed various sanctions against China. After a unanimous condemnation of events in the House of Commons on June 5, 1989, Ottawa announced on June 30 its official response, after a series of consultations with experts, interest groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Paltiel 1995, p. 197). Ottawa's response was substantive: it included the cancelation of various programs and aid projects, a restriction on high-level visits, the recall of the Canadian ambassador, and the adoption of measures to facilitate the granting of immigration status to Chinese students already studying in Canada (Gecelovsky and Keenleyside 1995, pp. 564–569).

Following the events at Tiananmen, the Mulroney government became highly critical of China and began to openly criticize Beijing over its human rights record. After 1989, China also became the subject of harsh criticism at the UN Commission on Human Rights, where Canada was a leading proponent of a resolution condemning China's human rights situation. Canada's China policy after Tiananmen was significantly different from the one it had pursued before.

At each bilateral meeting, Canadian officials would now raise the issue of human rights with their Chinese counterparts. For example, in July 1991, Barbara McDougall, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated that she had dedicated her meeting with her counterpart, Qian Qichen, to discussing human rights (Sallot 1991). In addition, during the sessions at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1991 and 1992, Canada strongly expressed its concerns (Gecelovsky and Keenleyside 1995, p. 572). Unlike the period before Tiananmen, Canadian officials were now much more willing to express to their Chinese counterparts their concerns about the human rights situation. China–Canada relations deteriorated even further during this period when, in early 1992, three members of the Canadian parliament, while on an official visit, were expelled from China for having tried to meet with the family of Chinese dissidents connected to the massacre on Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Frolic 1997, p. 325). Following the expulsion, McDougall publicly referred to China's problematic human rights situation and justified her government's efforts on the matter. She stated: "I am particularly offended at this affront to the Institution of Parliament and the treatment of democratically elected representatives of the Canadian people. In my view, this incident confirms the validity of the emphasis we have placed on human rights in our dealings with China" (Canada 1992).

The Canadian government continued to be outspoken about human rights in China until early 1992, even as it was ready to improve its relationship with Beijing and restore its rapport with its counterparts. Ministerial visits were becoming more frequent. In April 1992, Minister of International Trade Michael Wilson made a visit to China, the second high-level official visit since Tiananmen, in order to promote Canada's exports. Minister Wilson reported having privately raised the

issue of human rights with his Chinese counterparts, without raising it publicly during his speech in China (Wong 1992).

After three years of outspoken policy, Canada was gradually returning to a quieter approach toward human rights in China. Chinese high-level visits to Canada, suspended in 1989, were restored in 1993 with the visit by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji. With the two-way official visits being restored, Sino-Canadian relations were getting closer to the level they had been at before 1989. This trend, however, only truly materialized in 1993 with the election of the Liberal Party, with Jean Chrétien at its head (Frolic 1997, p. 325). But the consensus surrounding Canada's China policy was now broken; new players began entering the debate, and two positions were now staked out: one emphasizing Canada's dependence on a good relationship with China and saying human rights should be raised only privately and quietly; and another favoring Canada continuing to openly criticize China for its human rights record.[4]

7.9 Jean Chrétien (1993–2003)

During the election campaign in the fall of 1993, the Liberals were already explicit about the efforts they were going to put into promoting the Canadian economy and creating jobs. A few months later, newly elected Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet declared that "the key priority for this government is to create jobs […] [o]ur interests are to promote trade, to promote the sales of Canadian goods and services" (Caragata 1994). Canada was still trying to recover from the early 1990s' recession; unemployment, debt, and budget deficits were particularly high. Soon after being elected, the Liberals were eager to tap the Chinese market and opted for a policy of openness toward Beijing, launching a major diplomatic offensive that resulted in a series of ministerial visits to China. As soon as January 1994, Raymond Chan, Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific, took a trip to China that "symbolized the Canadian government's own retreat from its policy of giving priority to human rights" (Paltiel 1995, p. 173).

In November, Canada organized its first trade mission to China. Prior to his departure, Prime Minister Chrétien expressed to journalists his intention to raise the issue of human rights with his counterparts, but that he would not do so openly and that he would not threaten to use economic sanctions (Goar 1994). On a similar note, André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Trade, said that Canada would continue to raise the issue of human rights, but would do so discretely and privately rather than publicly (Sallot 1994). Ouellet stated that Canada's key objectives in its relationship with China were to promote Canada's economic growth, and that its "government policy start with the premise that trade and the promotion of human rights are part of a larger set of policy objectives, which are mutually reinforcing" (Ouellet 1994).

[4]See: Brook (1992).

The Canadian government was recognizing the importance of advocating human rights in its foreign policy, and it explicitly intended to do this through the use of economic and trade relations and ODA (Canada 1995). In the case of China, the White Paper of 1995 entitled *Canada in the World* stated, "we multiply the contacts to open the country to Canadian values as it opens to international trade" (Canada 1995).

Jean Chrétien made comments that illustrated this new approach toward China in a speech he gave in 1994 at the University of Moncton. He highlighted the lack of influence that Canada had on China and the importance of not alienating the Chinese powerhouse. Chretien also emphasized the difference in economic and political weight to explain the lack of potential Canadian influence on China over human rights (Greenspon 1994). Chrétien recognized the progress made by China and was confident that as China kept opening itself to the outside world, liberal values would prevail.

The option to prioritize a quiet diplomacy was part of a strategy to restore the bilateral relationship between Canada and China. Aware that sanctions and the confrontational tone the conservatives had pursued toward China had harmed Sino-Canadian relations without having achieved any substantial progress on human rights, the Chrétien government clearly prioritized the strengthening of political and economic relations with Beijing and adopted a complacent approach toward human rights. The Liberals saw their China policy as one of the constructive engagements, while others saw it as a step back from a policy in favor of human rights.

During Jean Chrétien's years as prime minister, the relationship between China and Canada significantly improved and deepened. In 1997, Canada ended its co-sponsorship of the resolution on the situation of human rights in China at the UN Commission on Human Rights and opted to prioritize bilateral measures with China. Instead of the resolution, Canada initiated a bilateral dialogue with China on human rights. Despite the stated objective of advancing the cause of human rights in China, it has been argued that the implementation of this dialogue was primarily intended to satisfy Canadian public opinion and to protect trade relations with China (Rights and Democracy 2001; Human Rights in China 2004).

The promotion of commercial interests had clearly been given priority during the Chrétien era. During this period, the Canadian government focused on the promotion of trade through the Team Canada trade missions. Even during Jean Chrétien's visit to China in November 1998, when the Prime Minister raised the issue of human rights in a more assertive way during a speech at Tsinghua University, his goal was not to embarrass his host. Mr. Chrétien made similar remarks the next day at a banquet hosted by the Canada-China Business Council. Though he was much more direct than usual, the Prime Ministers' remarks were still quite well received by Chinese leaders (Cernetig and Greenspon 1998). During his speech, his most critical remarks were:

> [w]e believe that free and open expression of opposing views is not a threat to anyone or any nation. Indeed, our openness to new ideas has been essential to Canada's becoming the

> modern, prosperous nation it is today. In a spirit of friendship and understanding, we will continue to share our experiences and engage constructively with China (Chrétien 1998).

Canadian officials highlighted that the purpose of the Prime Minister's intervention was not to embarrass his Chinese counterparts or sacrifice such positive and beneficial relations (Cernetig and Greenspon 1998). In the second trade mission to China led by Jean Chrétien in 2001 (his fourth official visit to China), pressure was growing on the Canadian government to take a stronger stand and become more involved in the cause of human rights in China. Indeed, several editorials in Canadian mainstream newspapers were asking the Prime Minister to directly address human rights with his Chinese counterparts (The Globe and Mail 2001; Alberts 2001; National Post 2000). The international movement for Tibet was also growing (Samdup 2000), and Canadian NGOs were beginning to express their discontent toward the Liberals' policy in a much more pronounced way. During the 2001 trade mission, at a contract-signing ceremony involving the Canadian delegation in Beijing, two young Canadian activists, Kate Woznow and Sam Price, unfurled a banner saying "Human Rights Before Profit, Free Tibet" (CBC News 2001), highlighting the ways in which China was becoming increasingly criticized for its human rights record.

During the mission, Jean Chretien delivered two speeches, the first in Beijing and the second in Shanghai, during which he publicly raised the issue of human rights. In his speech to the National Judges College in Beijing, Chrétien emphasized the necessity for China to develop an independent judiciary system. He reportedly stated:

> [t]here can be no justice without a fair trial overseen by a competent, independent, impartial and effective judiciary, a judiciary that applies the law equally for all citizens, regardless of gender, social status, religious belief or political opinion. In Canada our judges are completely independent. And there are strict mechanisms in place to protect their independence (Laghi 2001a)..

In his second speech, presented to a group of students from East China University of Politics and Law in Shanghai, Chrétien stressed the importance of greater transparency in China and the need for the Chinese government to commit to the rule of law. He called on China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Prime Minister pointed out that he was talking as a friend and suggested "Shanghai is a magnet for foreign capital. But investors prize security above all else. They must feel confident that their investments are safe and protected by fair and transparent rules […] Otherwise they won't invest. That's as simple as that" (Alberts 2001a). Chrétien also brought up the issue of religious rights: "as a friend I must tell you that Canadians are concerned when they hear reports from China of interference in the right of free expression. Or that people are imprisoned and badly treated for observing their spiritual beliefs" (The Canadian Press 2001).

Although Jean Chrétien's words were direct, his government's policy toward human rights remained quiet. The Prime Minister was in his last months in office and his speeches appeared to be primarily targeting the Canadian public. He allegedly

sounded like a prime minister wanting to leave the image of someone who courageously promoted human rights in China (Laghi 2001a). Journalists accompanying the Canadian delegation commented that the Prime Minister's spin doctors were eager to tip the media about the human rights content of his speech (Alberts 2001b). In addition, the more direct action of the Prime Minister appeared to have been targeted and selected so as not to offend the Chinese.

With Jean Chrétien's Liberals in power from 1993 to 2003, Canada's relations with China deepened considerably. China replaced Japan as Canada's preferred partner in Asia, and the Canadian government clearly pursued a quiet policy, focussing on the promotion of trade at the expense of a more active approach toward human rights. Jean Chrétien believed that it was by increasing trade and interaction that Canada could have a positive impact on China, but after 10 years the quiet approach he pursued was coming under increasing criticism.

7.10 Paul Martin (2003–2006)

In December 2003, following the resignation of Jean Chrétien as Prime Minister, Paul Martin was elected as his successor at the Liberal Leadership convention. As many commentators noted, Canada had to reformulate its policy toward China. Trade missions under the Team Canada banner had lost their purpose and they no longer corresponded to the contemporary needs of the Canada–China relationship (Woo 2003; Evans and Woo 2004). Once in office, Paul Martin pursued a somewhat different policy toward China, but in terms of human rights, he continued to engage China through a quiet diplomacy.

Soon after being elected Paul Martin faced a major dilemma when the Dalai Lama announced a visit to Canada in the spring of 2004. No sitting Canadian prime minister had ever met with the Tibetan leader, who the Chinese government considered a separatist threatening the country's unity. Despite pressure from the Chinese Embassy, Paul Martin met the Dalai Lama on April 23 in an informal setting, at the residence of the Archbishop of Ottawa. The Canadian government had repeatedly said that the Prime Minister met with the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader and made considerable efforts to avoid giving the impression of receiving a political figure (Valpy 2004).

Martin traveled to Beijing from January 20 to 23, 2005 to discuss political issues, while the Minister of International Trade, Jim Peterson, led a trade mission to Shanghai and Guangzhou. In an effort to differentiate himself from his predecessor, Paul Martin abandoned the large-scale "Team Canada" trade missions prioritized by Jean Chrétien (York 2005). In Beijing, Prime Minister Martin raised human rights in a quiet way, and emphasized the need to expand Canada–China bilateral relations. He stressed the need to "enhance [Canada's] engagement with China—to foster a real partnership that comprises not just economic pursuits, but also the global political agenda: public health, environmental issues, human rights, and culture" (Martin 2005). During his visit to Beijing, Paul Martin also avoided

raising the recent death of Zhao Ziyang, and was critical of a Conservative member of the delegation, Jason Kenney, who tried to visit family members of the former Chinese Prime Minister.[5]

In 2005, the Canadian government launched a series of initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiatives and created various working groups to promote sectors such as energy cooperation and tourism (Evans 2006, p. 158). In October 2005, during Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, the relationship between the two countries reached a new peak as a "strategic partnership." Martin assured the press that he had discussed the issue of human rights with his counterpart. At the press conference following their meeting, Hu Jintao stated: "Given the different national conditions of China and Canada and given our different history and cultural traditions, it is normal for our two countries to have different views about human rights" (CBC 2005).

The 2005 foreign policy statement recognized China as poised to become the largest economy of the twenty-first century, but the document did not put China above the other BRIC countries (i.e., Brazil, Russia and India) and other emerging markets (Canada 2005). Paul Martin's Liberals continued to recognize China's as a huge potential market and key player in international security issues. During his time as Prime Minister, Paul Martin had been slightly more outspoken about human rights, but like his predecessor, he pursued a quiet diplomacy and emphasized the need to engage rather than isolate China. Although the relationship between Ottawa and Beijing seemed to be at its best, Canada's policy with respect to human rights in China was more than ever showing signs of exhaustion. Canada's quiet diplomacy on human rights was now being openly criticized by academics and NGOs for not producing results on the human rights situation in China, and for not having favored stronger economic relations between Canada and China.

7.11 Stephen Harper (2006–2015)

The election of the Stephen Harper's Conservative Party in 2006 quickly led to a major shift in Canada's foreign policy toward China. If the policy pursued by the Liberals toward China since 1993 was inclusive and complacent in regards to human rights, the Conservative government rapidly took a much more distant and uncompromising tone against Beijing.

The Conservatives had been critical of Jean Chrétien's and Paul Martin's policies toward China for years. Their electoral platform accused the Liberals of having

[5]Zhao Ziyang was Chinese Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987 and General Secretary of the CPC until June 23, 1989. He was a progressive leader and his sympathies to student demonstrators during the protest on Tiananmen Square in 1989 placed him at odds with the party leadership. Zhao was then purged politically and placed under house arrest until his death in 2005. Jason Kenney, who was with the Canadian delegation, challenged the Prime Minister Paul Martin and tried to visit Zhao's relatives. He was the first foreign official to do so.

"compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests" (Conservative Party of Canada 2006) and promised a value-oriented foreign policy with an emphasis on Canada being part of a group of western democratic nations that shared certain political values (Barry 2010). However, while this may have indicated a possible change in Canada's foreign policy toward China, the complete turnaround that happened over the following years was not foreseen.

The policy shift happened quickly. The conservative government abandoned the Canada–China bilateral dialogue on human rights[6] and made a series of harsh public declarations on China that contrasted with the tone used by the liberals. In April 2006, Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made some severe accusations against China of economic espionage. These allegations were repeated a few weeks later by the Prime Minister. The information behind these allegations had already been made public in 2004 (Juneau-Katsuya 2008, p. 13) and had been raised by Jason Kenney and Stockwell Day in the House of Commons in February 2005 (Fife 2005), but they had been ignored by the Liberal government.

The Prime Minister and other Cabinet member also championed the case of Huseyincan Celil, a Chinese-Canadian of Uyghur ethnicity who had been deported from Uzbekistan to China in August. Canadian officials, whom had not been granted access to Mr. Celil, were concerned he did not receive due process, and the Prime Minister personally raised this consular case in his dealings with his Chinese counterparts. En route to the APEC summit in Hanoi in November 2006, the Prime Minister, referring to the human rights situation in China, mentioned "[n]ot wanting to sell Canadian values for the almighty dollar" (CTV 2006). After weeks of evasiveness, Stephen Harper finally met with Hu Jintao on the margins of the APEC summit. Following their meeting, Stephen Harper declared: "[p]resently, we run a massive trade deficit with China. The fact of the matter is that neglecting human rights hasn't opened a lot of doors either, so obviously we don't think that you get anywhere by short-changing your values" (Woods 2006).

The Conservatives significantly reduced the number of high-level bilateral meetings with the Chinese. China's ambassador to Canada, Lu Shumin even complained that it took months for Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay to meet with him (Laghi 2006). The Prime Minster also met with the Dalaï Lama in his Parliament office on October 29, 2007, which contrasted with the unofficial meeting the Tibetan leader had with Paul Martin in 2004. This infuriated Chinese officials, who in retaliation canceled a major bilateral meeting planned for November of that year (York and Freeman 2007).

Stephen Harper's outspoken policy toward China was initially viewed somewhat positively in Canada. Although it was criticized by some scholars and journalists (Evans 2008; Pulfer 2009; Simpson 2007a, b; Jiang 2007), Harper's strong stance

[6]The bilateral dialogue on human rights was heavily criticized by some Canadian NGOs since the early 2000s and had been specifically questioned by the Subcommittee on International Human Rights in the House of Commons in 2006.

on human rights was praised by others (Adams 2006; Gilley 2008; Gillis and Mandel-Campbell 2007; Kwan 2007). Furthermore, a 2006 survey by the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada indicated that 72 % of Canadians believed that the promotion of democracy and human rights should be a major foreign policy priority for the Canadian government in Asia (Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada 2006). A different survey made by polling firm COMPAS indicated that 57 % of business leaders did not believe that the Conservatives' outspoken policy toward China would yield any negative effects on their business relations in China (Sorenson 2006).The domestic climate in Canada seemed to support the Conservatives' stronger stance on human rights in China.

However, this policy began to change in 2008. Some cabinet members were not as inclined to publicly lecture China on human rights and the general tone toward China was beginning to change. During a visit to Beijing in January 2008, Minister of International Trade David Emerson did not raise human rights publicly, and declared that:

> China in my opinion is as open as (it has) ever been to hearing our concerns […] I just didn't think it was on topic, and I didn't think this was the audience I needed to lecture on human rights, […] I made my points on human-rights issues with Minister Chen and I didn't think it needed to be repeated in public (Canadian Press 2008).

Later in the year, Prime Minister Harper met with his counterpart Hu Jintao during the G8 summit in Japan, which, according to the Chinese media, signaled the beginning of more cordial relations between the two leaders (Lui 2012). In September 2008, Stephen Harper admitted that he was preparing his first official visit to China. At the same time, and for the first time since 2006, various commentators were calling on the Conservatives to revise their policy toward China (Simpson 2008; Balsillie 2008; Evans 2008). Peter Harder, the Canada–China Business Council's president, declared that Canadian business leaders were now reporting that contracts were being lost as a direct result of the chill between Canada and China (Harder 2008). Moreover, it was as good a time as ever to do business in China; it maintained its relatively high growth rate during the 2008 financial crisis and came out stronger than Canada's traditional and main export markets, the US and EU.

In December 2009, Stephen Harper made his first official visit to China, and to the extent that he publicly raised the human rights issue, his tone was not as critical as before. He stated in a speech in Shanghai:

> Our government believes and has always believed that a mutually beneficial economic relationship is not incompatible with a good and frank dialogue on fundamental values like freedom, human rights and the rule of law. […] And so, in relations between China and Canada, we will continue to raise issues of freedom and human rights, be a vocal advocate and an effective partner for human rights reform, just as we pursue the mutually beneficial economic relationship desired by both our countries (The Epoch Times 2009).

The Canada–China Joint Statement, which highlighted the strong trade and economic complementarities between the two countries, was even more indicative of Canada's shifting position toward human rights. The statement stipulated:

> Both sides recognized that each country and its people have the right to choose their own path, and that all countries should respect each other's choice of development model. Both sides acknowledged that differing histories and national conditions can create some distinct points of view on issues such as human rights. The two sides agreed to increased dialogue and exchanges on human rights, on the basis of equality and mutual respect, to promote and protect human rights consistent with international human rights instruments (Canada 2009).

Following Harper's visit, a series of positives measures were announced. Among other things, China lifted its embargo on Canada's pork and China granted Canada Approved Destination Status, a designation that allows Chinese travel agents to advertise and organize group tours to Canada.

Both leaders met again in Ottawa prior to the G20 meeting in Toronto, and the Prime Minister's Office reportedly "[w]ent to some lengths to keep Hu away from media outlets that have been critical of the Chinese government" (Canadian Press 2010). Hu's visit has been portrayed as highlighting the improvement in Canada–China relations (Meyer 2010). Ministerial official visits, infrequent between 2006 and 2009, were becoming more and more regular. In fact, between June 2010 and February 2012, more than 30 bilateral visits took place. On the 40th anniversary of Canada–China official relations, China's ambassador to Canada, Lan Lijun, declared that both the two governments now had good relations again (Lan 2011), and Stephen Harper used the expression "Strategic Partnership" to characterize relations with China, a first since he became prime minister in 2006.

In November 2014, Stephen Harper made his third official visit to China to attend the APEC annual meeting. At a press conference with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Stephen Harper did not mention human rights, saying only that: "[a]s the Premier mentioned, we discussed the full range of issues in our bilateral relationship in a frank, open and friendly manner" (Harper 2014). As it has been argued, "[r]arely does one see such a dramatic reversal in foreign policy as the one we saw in the case of Canadian policy toward China between 2006 and 2012" (Nossal and Sarson 2013).

The context that began to evolve in the early 2000s, which had favored the Conservatives taking a more assertive approach toward human rights in China, was beginning to fade after 2008. China came out of the 2008 financial crisis stronger than the US and the EU, and Canada's exports to China were becoming more and more important, highlighting the shortcomings of Stephen Harper's neo-continentalist foreign policy and the need for the Conservatives to move away from their unease with China.

It was also becoming clear that the Conservatives' outspoken policy toward China did not yield any positive impacts on its human rights practices, nor did it serve the government's interests. Reports by NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlighted the continued tight restrictions imposed on freedom of expression, assembly, and association; the persistent Internet and media controls; and the widespread arrests in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Amnesty International 2010; Human Rights Watch 2010).

Moreover, support among Canadians to prioritize the promotion human rights and democracy in Asia was declining (Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada 2012).

But if some in the Conservative Caucus were still divided over the kind of relationships they wanted with China (Fekete 2014), pragmatism triumphed over their ideology, and the Conservatives had returned to a quiet form of engagement with China on human rights (Bloomfield and Nossal 2013).

7.12 Conclusion

Canada's policy toward China has greatly evolved since it recognized the PRC in 1970. However, while Canada–China relations may have progressed, they have also been affected by tensions mainly over the issue of human rights. Canada's broad foreign policy objectives toward China remained the same since 1970, but the strategies implemented to deal with that country, however, have varied.

This chapter examined the evolution of Canada's human rights policy toward China. Five shifts have been identified between 1970 and 2015. The first happened under Brian Mulroney in 1986, as the government began raising human rights quietly with China, moving from a silent policy to a quiet form of engagement on human rights. The second shift came after the events of Tiananmen in 1989, and, as a direct response to the Chinese government's violent crackdown on its people the atrocities, human rights became a central theme of the Conservative government's dealings with China and the rationale for an outspoken approach. Even though the Conservatives' policy began to change in 1992, a third shift could only be observed with a change of government, namely, when the Jean Chrétien Liberal government was elected in 1993. Jean Chrétien took a special interest in boosting Canada's trade relations with China, and Paul Martin subsequently played a key role in including China in major multilateral forums such as the G20. Both engaged China quietly on human rights. The fourth shift in Canada-China relations occurred with the election of the Conservative government of Stephen Harper in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008–09, the Conservatives pursued an outspoken policy toward China, before returning to a quiet diplomacy after 2009.

Various factors have been identified in this chapter to explain the types of policies chosen by Canadian governments since 1970. First, external events the international situation in regards to human rights can account for the second shift (1989) and can partially explain the first (1986) and fourth (2006) changes.

Second, taking into account the domestic situation in Canada is also important in shedding light on why Ottawa implemented specific policies toward China. For example, when the Liberals were elected in 1993 (third shift), Canadians were ready to move past the events of Tiananmen and further engage with China. But in the early 2000s, the discontent toward China that was beginning to surface enabled the Conservatives to take a stronger stance toward human rights in China after their election in 2006 (fourth shift).

It is also necessary to take into account the personal views of the Prime Ministers to better explain Canada–China policy. Jean Chrétien's enthusiasm about China's emergence not only explains his government's eagerness to develop better

economic relations with China (third shift), but also reveals why in the early 2000s, as many were becoming more critical of China's lack of progress on human rights, the Liberals of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin kept engaging China through a quiet diplomacy. Stephen Harper's unease toward China has also influenced how Canada dealt with China between 2006 and 2008–09 (fourth shift).

Looking back on 45 years of official relations between Canada and China allows us to take a critical look at Canada's policy toward human rights in China. The debate on how Canada should best address the issue of human rights in its relations with China, especially whether to pursue a quiet or outspoken form of diplomacy, has been going on since the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. On one side, advocates of the quiet approach emphasize the need for Canada to engage and integrate China into the international system as the best way to promote the cause of human rights while also pursuing other interests, such as improving ties with an economic powerhouse. On the other side, supporters of a more outspoken diplomacy highlight the importance for Canada to take a stand on human rights violations that are contrary to Canadian values, and that Canada should forge stronger ties with like-minded countries.

On the prospect of Canada's influence over human rights practice in China, it has been argued that change and reform in China "stems from multiple sources, not just western and international pressure" (Paltiel 2006) and that we have to be "cautious in our expectations about how far Chinese institutions and officials will go to accommodate Canadian suggestions on human rights" (Potter 2003). China indeed maintains that its human rights record is an internal matter and sees foreign criticism on this issue as a violation of its sovereignty. It is legitimate for Canada to express its concerns regarding the respect of human rights; moreover, Canada cannot be seen as silent when Chinese behavior contravenes international conventions, lest it be seen as giving a pass to such behavior. In selecting a policy to address the issue of human rights in China, it is, however, important to remember that in any mature relationship, discussion and remaining engaged can be more productive and yield better results than confrontation.

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Chapter 8
Changing Practices and Shifting Perceptions: Chinese Immigrants "Integrating" into the Engineering Profession in Canada

Hongxia Shan

8.1 Introduction

A good percentage of recent immigrants coming through the point system to Canada are trained scientists and engineers. The number of immigrants with degrees in natural sciences and engineering peaked in 2001, although it significantly dropped in the recent years (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2009). In 2001, of the 44 % of skilled immigrants who identified an intended occupation at the time of immigration, 63 % indicated engineering (all specialties combined) (Lemay 2007). Asia, in particular China, has become the major source area for the recent immigrant professionals in science and technology. In 2000, 39 % of immigrants intending to work as engineers were from China (Couton 2002).

Despite the likelihood for immigrants to be trained in engineering, they are less likely than their Canadian counterparts to be hired in engineering; when they are hired, they are often under-represented in engineer and management positions (Boyd 1990; Boyd and Thomas 2001, 2002; Wong and Wong 2006). Studies have explored a range of barriers professional immigrants face in the host labor market (e.g., Basran and Zong 1998; Chakkalakal and Harvey 2001). Particular to immigrant engineers, some studies have attributed their employment issues to their lack of English proficiency (Boyd 1990; Engineer Canada 2003), and lack of knowledge of the engineering business practices (Engineer Canada 2003). Others have directed critique toward the arcane licensure practices (Girard and Bauder 2007), the systematic demand for Canadian work experiences (Slade 2008), or the imbalance between the supply and demand of engineering labor (CAPE 2006).

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_8

Compared with the attention paid to the barriers immigrants face in the host labor market, little research has been conducted to examine how immigrants manage their working lives after they land a job in their professional fields. This is an unfortunate oversight because, despite all barriers, immigrants are active participants in a range of professional fields. In the case of Chinese immigrants, for instance, according to Statistic Canada, they are more than twice as likely as the general Canadian population to work in natural and applied sciences occupations, including engineering (Chui et al. 2005). With the exception of Wong and Wong (2006), who discussed the obstacles that may prevent Chinese immigrants from being promoted, few studies have examined the experiences of immigrants who have found jobs in the engineering profession.

This chapter starts to fill in the void of the literature by examining Chinese immigrants' experiences of "fitting" into the engineering profession from a learning perspective. Specifically, it focuses on Chinese immigrant engineers' work-related learning, as well as the organizational structuring and conditioning of their learning experiences. Following, I start by illustrating my conception of learning. I then introduce the research methods and research participants, followed by the research findings. I end with a recap of the research findings and a discussion of the implications of the study for policy makers and practitioners working to integrate immigrants into the Canadian labor market.

8.2 Conceptual Framework: Learning as Socially Organized Practices

There are a number of conceptions of learning, ranging from those that treat learning as an inner-directed cognitive practice to those that see learning as socially produced endeavors. My study falls in the latter tradition. Drawing on sociocultural perspectives on learning (Fenwick 2001; Sawchuk 2003; Vygotsky 1978), and institutional ethnography (Ng 1995, 2002; Smith 1987, 1990, 2005), I propose that learning is a socially organized practice (Shan and Guo 2013). The sociocultural perspectives, rooted in Marxist dialectical and historical materialism, posit that learning is an interrelational process; we learn through being a part of social activities where we interact with others through the mediation of tools such as language, texts, and technology. In other words, the social environment is more than the context of learning; it is believed to "bear with [it] the motives and goals of [our] activity, its means, and modes" (Leont'ev 1978, pp. 47–48).

Institutional ethnography (IE) shares with sociocultural approaches of learning a premise on Marxist materialism. IE is a feminist sociological approach that starts with the experiences of grassroots people and that proceeds to unravel the social relations, or extended courses of actions that shape experiences on the ground (Smith 1987, 2005). Of note, IE is drastically different from traditional ethnographic studies, which often focuses on describing and representing the "culture" of

a particular group of people (Merriam 2002). IE is interested in the constitution of a social and institutional function such as law, education (Smith 1987), and in this study, the engineering work.

By bringing sociocultural and IE perspectives together, I have come to see learning as an interactive process that is embedded in social relations extending beyond the local sites that order and organize what knowledge we value, and how we negotiate ways of knowing and doing. Within this conception, an investigation of learning starts with individuals' experiences, perceptions, and identifications. However, the purpose of my IE study is not to make generalized statements about a population. Rather, people's experiences on the ground directed my lens to the organization of the engineering work that refashions immigrants' subjectivities and learning practices in their everyday work and life.

8.3 Research and Research Participants

This paper is based on part of my dissertation research between 2007 and 2009, which was an exploration of the social organization of Chinese immigrant engineers' learning experiences in Canada. The study focused on two research questions. First, *how Chinese immigrants, despite all the barriers they face, learn to optimise their opportunities in the engineering market in Canada.* Second, *what social processes and practices participate in producing immigrants' learning experiences.* My field research took place in Edmonton, Alberta and Toronto, Ontario. In both cities, there is a good concentration of immigrants (Chui et al. 2005), and of registered engineers in traditional engineering disciplines such as civil, electrical, mechanical, and chemical engineering (Ekos Research Associates Inc. 2003).

For the field research, I started by conducting life history interviews (Cole and Knowles 2001; Plummer 2001) with Chinese immigrants. Altogether, I interviewed 14 Chinese immigrant engineers in the traditional engineering fields: seven in Edmonton (two women) and seven in Toronto (three women). At the time of the interviews, 13 of them were between 30 and 40, and one between 46 and 50. All except for one interviewee were married. All married respondents except for one had at least one child. Before immigrating to Canada, one of them held a doctoral degree; seven of them had at least one master's degree; the remaining six had a bachelor degree. Interviews with immigrants averaged 3 hours. They covered respondents' life and work experiences since they graduated in China, with particular focus on their transitional moments and struggles, as well as the shifting perceptions they had while trying to manage their work life in the engineering profession in Canada.

While conducting interviews with immigrants, I also started mapping the organization of the engineering profession and market through using a combination of key informant interviews, even observation and textual analysis. Altogether, I conducted 17 key informant interviews with employers, project managers, senior

engineers, HR recruiters, trainers, and staff at licensure bodies. Key informant interviews ranged from 0.5 hour to 1 hour. Additionally, I observed immigrant training events and analyzed a range of public and policy documents. All the three research methods were used to trace facets of the organization of the engineering profession.

This paper draws only from the interviews with immigrants and key informant interviews. All interviews were transcribed verbatim in the language of interviews, Chinese and/or English, and sent back to the research respondents for "validity check" (Plummer 2001, p. 157), unless the interviewees declined reading the transcripts.

8.4 Changing Practices and Shifting Perceptions

To integrate into engineering workplaces, the Chinese immigrant respondents reportedly made personal and perspective changes. The changes they reported fall into three interrelated areas of practices: manners of communication, patterns of socialization, and ways of problem solving.

8.4.1 Manners of Communication

One significant change related by some immigrant respondents is that they had to change their ways of communication and become more "assertive" in Canada. One immigrant said:

> My experience [working in Canada] is that if you want to move up and get your hands on more responsibilities, as an immigrant, you need to *zi wo biao xian* (自我表现) [volunteer or promote yourself, and demonstrate or showcase your value]. [Employers] would not automatically trust you. You could be a big name in China. Here you are nothing but an immigrant. [Your employers] do not know you. You have to make it possible for them to know what you can do. *Zi wo biao xian*. That is absolutely a taboo in China. In China, people would consider you *zi wo peng zhang* (自我膨胀) [conceited]. You need to be all humble in front of all your people [in China], be they your higher-ups or subordinates. Here, without *zi wo biao xian,* you never expect people to even spot you.

Some others believe that it is also necessary to bracket feeling and emotions when communicating at work. A woman engineer for instance reported:

> At one time, one of the Chinese drafters complained that our team lead was all condescending, and discriminatory towards the Chinese when giving us instructions. I told him that he should treat his job simply as a job. Put it another way, should not be bothered with how people treat you if you want to work in this kind of work environment. What we deal with is an objective world. I have learned to say what I have to say and not to be bothered with [how others think of me] [or] … my accent.

The engineering profession has long been criticized for a macho culture as it essentially prioritizes rationality over emotions and feelings, which are often associated with femininity (Faulkner 2006; Hacker 1981; McIlwee and Robinson 1992). The woman respondent apparently fitted herself well into the macho culture by intentionally dismissing the relevance of feeling as well as how others perceive her or her English and accent at work.

Not all immigrant respondents readily adapted to this macho culture. Another immigrant woman, for instance, complained about the following at her workplace:

> We have a [male colleague]. He really knows how to talk. … he always goes to the boss, and presents his idea on all kinds of projects no matter what projects they might be - I am not going to comment on whether he understands the projects at all. But he presents himself as a knower, as an expert. The boss likes him very much. … sometimes that guy comes to me to discuss [project design]. What I find is that for most of the time I have to explain to him how to conduct the projects. Later on, I found that he was presenting my ideas to the boss as his. But to the boss, he of course is the expert and I am the mute and stupid one.

Apparently, the respondent learned of a macho, individual, and competitive culture of engineering work in the hard way. She further expressed that there was no way that she could stoop low and act the way her colleague did. Meanwhile, she indicated that because she did not put herself forward, she was never appreciated for her full potential at the particular workplace. Clearly, whether the immigrant respondents readily adapted to the competitive culture in Canada, they all recognized the market value attached to the "individualistic" practice of self-presentation.

Of note, while the participants negotiated their ways of communication at work, their personal identity has shifted. Echoing Lau in Jennifer Junwa Lau's chapter in this volume, this study also shows that identity is not a fixed thing, but a process of becoming. Yet, a converging trend observed is that they were oriented to what they constructed as an individualistic culture where presentation of self-worth is of crucial importance.

8.4.2 Patterns of Socialization

One other change related by the immigrant respondents is with regard to their patterns of socialization. All immigrant respondents expressed that they initially wished to network and make friends at work. Yet, all of them downplayed their expectation, and settled with "professional" relations at work, or work-oriented relationship with colleagues (see also Valenta 2008). One immigrant summarized his relation with his colleagues this way:

> … Here [in Canada], personal relationship is simple. It is unlike in China where we worked and lived together – [t]he living area is right next to the office building, [and] everyone knows everyone [in China]. Here, people connect and communicate only at work and you do not have to deal with everyone. What we need is only to finish the project and that is that. After you get off work, you say bye to everyone and go home.

If the immigrants did make some friends at work, it was usually with fellow Chinese or other immigrants, often immigrants from other less-developed countries.

According to some immigrant respondents, immigrants socialize mostly among themselves at work because they had common topics. Others, however, believed that it is the common experiences of marginalization that brought immigrants together. For instance, one immigrant respondent said:

> As far as I know, not only for me, but also for my other Chinese friends, we tend to socialize within the Chinese community. If we do make a friend outside of the Chinese community, it is with people who are marginalized. You tend to identify with each other more.

This particular respondent also related that his workplace was deeply segregated along the racial line, which was complicated by access to work and "good" jobs and vice versa.

> [The company] is very much segregated. The manager for drafters is a Chinese, a Hong Kongese. But the real boss is an old white retiree who was rehired. Even engineers had to listen to the white man. When I joined the place, there was not much to do. …I only got bits and pieces from the Chinese manager. I had only one chance to get my hands on some bigger drafting work. That was when the veterans were away on vacation. When they came back, I had little to do again. The manager …then was on leave and I …got to work on smaller projects only.

Clearly, pattern of association for the immigrants at work is more than about common experiences and shared topics among the workers. It is also a manifestation of workplace segregation and alienation associated with the organization of engineering work and workers.

8.4.3 Problem Solving

One other significant change for the immigrant respondents is in the ways in which they approached technical problems. While some of them were used to "asking" colleagues for help when coming across questions, they started to see the futility of such practices in Canada. Some of them became careful and even strategic with raising questions. Many saw the value of independent problem solving; instead of relying on colleagues, they resorted to studying engineering codes, protocols, standards, and other engineering-related materials to navigate through their problems.

One of the Chinese respondents was extremely frustrated with the fact that her colleagues were not responding to her work-related questions.

> It is my experience - from attending a post-graduate program in Canada, and from working with two companies, that you cannot ask questions. In China [where I worked in a big research institute], people consulted with each other. You could ask anyone any questions. In China, we believe that it is not shameful to ask questions even with people below you. But here, hell, no! When I started [working in the Canadian companies], everything was

> new. It would have saved me a lot of time if someone gave me a hint [for my problems]. But no, that does not work here. … With both bosses, they would get all angry when I asked them questions. They would criticize you for asking questions, and they would not give you any answers.

To some other immigrants, the problem is not with asking questions per se. It is rather about what questions to ask and whom to ask. One immigrant said:

> I make a point of asking questions. But you bet I do not ask any questions. Neither do I raise my questions with anyone. … If I do need some help with my work, say I do not understand a certain function of a program, I ask [a friend outside my workplace], or my colleagues who I trust would not use it to put me down. There is a senior engineer who I worked with before…. He is a senior person and he sort of likes teaching others – I respect him a lot. He likes it when you ask him questions. Basically he loves educating others. I would ask him for help.

According to the same immigrant, when questions are too shallow, the questioners would be questioned. Similarly, when questions are too scientific or academic, the questioners would be frowned upon as engineers are practice-oriented. Some other interviewees also believed that it is "okay" to ask questions, but the questions have to be the right ones; they have to show "people's understanding of projects," and have to carry "weight" and command respect.

Clearly, good questions are those that directly contribute to resolving a work issue. They are not to fill in someone's professional knowledge gap or meet a particular person's professional curiosity. To address individual knowledge gap and practice difference, the study shows, all 14 immigrants resorted to independent study of engineering codes, standards, and other related materials. For instance, one engineer related:

> Here [in this company] they have their own practices. I had a lot of things that I did not understand. But I read. There was no one teaching me. So I learned both about designing and report writing [on my own]. And I read the codes and other documents. I had also 7-year experiences in China, so things became easy for me later.

8.4.4 Social Organization of Learning

Immigrants' experiences point at a highly individualized engineering "culture" in Canada. At the center of this engineering culture, workers are not appreciated as embodied and emotional beings, but for their exchange value, or their productivity, as well as their ability to present their productivity in the capitalist market. Such a culture, my study further shows, is largely maintained through a project-based organization of engineering work, which adds to the alienation and competition immigrant workers experience at work. The textually mediated property of engineering work, however, helps create an independent space of learning, which may increase immigrants' bargaining power at work, although often in macho and competitive ways.

8.4.5 *Project-Based Organization of Engineering Work*

Engineering business is increasingly project based. According to Watlington and Radeloff (1997), the world of work has changed since the recession at the start of the 1990s, in particular in the US. Most engineering work now is project- or problem-based with clear beginning and end. The same trend has also been observed in Canada. For instance, in the context of Alberta, the cycles of boom and bust in the energy industry during the 1980s has restructured the employment patterns in the engineering industry. Permanent employment with one company has become less likely. Instead, contracting and consulting arrangement started to become the norm (Ranson 2001).

In the study, a project manager described the project-based organization of engineering work this way:

> …Like I said, you put a bunch of people together, new, contract, …. You put them on the project. The day you start that job is the day you are working yourself out of a job. And that is the way it is. And you hope that there is another job… that your business development people are getting another job, or everybody will be out of job.

The project-based organization makes it important for workers to communicate their desirability and availability in order to secure positions in new projects. The same project manager continued:

> …if this project gets shut down tomorrow, it is up to [my structural manager] to find me a new position. That is … typical. … Basically I would let him know "listen, I've just done this nickel project, I really would like to do gold. Or in my career review, 'I've done this now, I would really like to …". So I would have to let him know. …He is sort of my agent. It is very strange how it works. And so it is very much about relationship. It is very much about relationship. And if I do a good job here, and [the manager] hears that from people, then he knows that I am going to be easy to sell.

The project-based organization of engineering work leads to the formation of a contingent workforce that can be amassed and dismissed at the beck and call of capital investment. It also adds to workplace alienation among the engineering workforce in general. In particular, it makes it hard to build cohesion or collegiality among engineering practitioners. For example, one immigrant said: "Unlike China where a company is like a family, the turnover rate of the employees is very high [in Canada]. As people are always on the move, it is hard to build relationship." Not all companies that the immigrant interviewees worked for had high turnover rate. Yet, all interviewees were aware that "having project-hours to charge" is closely related to their employment stability.

Within a contingent culture, workers are compelled to market themselves, communicate their availability and desirability, so that they may end up being the pick for the next job. People who are not used to the Canadian ways of "selling" themselves, often people from racialized backgrounds, are clearly disadvantaged in the competitive game. As a result, it was not surprising to find, in my study, anecdotal reports where immigrant engineers were the last to be hired and the first to be fired.

8.4.6 Textually Mediated Property of Engineering Work

If the project-based organization of engineering work renders immigrants who are not good at communicating their desirability, a second class in the engineering workforce, the textually mediated organization of engineering work may offer a life line for immigrants who try to establish themselves in the engineering profession. Smith (1987), and Campbell and Gregor (2002) have pointed out that replicable texts coordinate courses of action in organizational and administrative processes. My study shows that codes and standards, as congealed artifacts (Wenger 1998) for the practices and knowledge particular to a workplace and a discipline of practice, constitute a crucial node in the engineering work process. In particular, they organize the work of engineering practitioners across places.

Engineering design is creative work. Yet, this work is also conducted following the "traditional practices" and "traditional wisdom", which are recorded in codes, standards, and established regulations and protocols. Engineers do not create things out of thin air. They create and design in dialogue with other engineers by referring to, building on, and sometimes extending the work of their predecessors.

By asserting that codes and standards serve as a social organizer of engineering work, I do not mean that engineering principles, protocols, and regulations are final and fixed, and predetermine the work of engineering practitioners. As some of my interviewees well pointed out, codes and standards are never comprehensive; instead, they are constantly updated. At times, engineering professionals have to consult related theories and practices and deduct from existent theories and theorems to deal with issues at hand.

When I treat codes and protocols as social organizers of engineering work, I bring attention not only to the fact that they constitute significant reference framework when engineering work is conducted, communicated, and negotiated; I also highlight that as these coded technical knowledge and tools are entered into and enacted in engineering work, they become nodes of negotiation which are often associated with the exercise of macho power. The latter point is best manifested in the design review process.

Design review is a process where one engineer's design or calculation flow is checked by another engineer. A company principle described the design review process this way:

> So to protect ourselves from errors and mistakes …, we have a review process…. [O]ne engineer designs, and somebody else, usually more senior, reviews and says oh, why did you do this, … it's hard questioning, with the objective of being helpful, the objective of improving quality.

The company principle continued to point out that the management would like to see that engineers participate in the reviewing process in a professional manner, i.e., that they bracket or suspend their feelings and emotions and engage in objective and project-oriented communication.

When being questioned, some immigrants believed that the most powerful response was in reference to established practices recorded in codes, standards, stipulations, and/or theories. One immigrant said:

> [In the company], you need to write up computation workflows for people to check. That poses more challenge. When people start checking, they will pick out problems. … They will ask you different questions. … you've got to tell people where you get the solutions, why you did the project the way you did it. If you read a lot in your discipline, you will have a broader knowledge. You can get rid of them easily.

Clearly, the seemingly objective review process is charged with the issue of power. In this game of power, technological knowledge, as it is coded in engineering codes, standards, theories, and theorems, becomes a point as well as a leverage of negotiation. Below is an interesting story related by one immigrant respondent:

> At one time, my lead and I were responsible for checking the work of a senior engineer. That engineer was too [condescending] you know, as if he was the best engineer. So I came up with a list of detailed questions, some of which did not have to be considered by engineering practitioners. But I was within my right to ask those questions. The guy got very angry, and complained to the manager saying that we were cornering him. The manager then got me and my lead into his office. The manager refrained from laughing and told us not to be too harsh… at the end, I came up with a list of explanations, with specific reference to stipulations, and theories, and some proposition for minor justification, which did not change the whole design. The work of the engineer was actually not bad, but he was too [condescending].

What is interesting to note is that the seemingly objective engineering knowledge is entered into a work process where macho power is at play. Given the role that technological knowledge plays in organizing how engineering work is reviewed, and negotiated, immigrant respondents treated engineering codes and standards as a desirable learning object. Many reported taking courses or conducting self study to consolidate their technical knowledge. Through enhancing technological skills, they sought to get established in their professional fields.

8.5 Conclusion and Implications

Informed by the conception that learning is a socially organized practice, in this paper, I not only explored the learning experiences of 14 Chinese immigrants in the engineering market, but also traced the social organization of the engineering profession shaping immigrants' learning experiences. The immigrant respondents related perception and practice changes particularly in the ways in which they communicate, socialize, and solve problems at work. Core to these changes is the adaptation to what they constructed as an individualistic, macho, competitive, and alienated engineering culture which discourages collegial and interpersonal relationships. Such a culture, I argue, is sustained through a project-based organization of engineering profession. In this contingent culture, the textually mediated property of the engineering work has made engineering codes, protocols, and

regulations, a desirable learning object for immigrants seeking establishment in the profession.

The research findings have implications for policy makers recruiting immigrant professionals, and practitioners looking to integrate immigrants into the engineering profession. To start with, it is important for the policy makers to recognize that the project-based organization of the engineering profession has structurally produced a secondary labor pool. Immigrant professionals can be easily rendered a secondary labor pool in Canada. To ameliorate the impact of business volatility on immigrant workers, up-to-date, and place and field specific labor market information needs to be relayed to immigrant professionals in a timely manner.

The study also shows that workplace "integration" is at best an imagined project for the immigrant respondents. The individualistic engineering "culture" does not foster a sense of community, but encourages competition and alienation. Currently, immigrant integration policies and programs have focused on increasing immigrants' access to the labor market. There has not been much attention to the holistic needs of immigrants for communities, connections, and relationships. Workplace integration or immigrant settlement programs may start addressing these needs in future program design and delivery.

Further, there is also an apparent lack of support for professional learning in Canadian workplaces that would contribute to immigrant engineers' professional development. Immigrant respondents largely relied on studying codes and other engineering texts to bridge any knowledge and practice gaps. Such a finding calls for concerted efforts from policy makers, immigrant settlement workers, as well as the engineering community at large to facilitate the creation of open learning spaces, virtual or real life, so as to maximize immigrant's professional development as well as their social, intellectual, and economic contribution to the host society.

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Part III
China's Outward Thrust: Hard Facts, Soft Power

Chapter 9
Building Shanghai as an International City: Exchange of Ideas

Matthew Skogstad-Stubbs

9.1 Introduction

This paper seeks to provide a small contribution to urban development by looking beyond the narrow depiction of Shanghai's growth as the relationship of global capital and local state power. The central hypothesis of this paper is that urban development is influenced not only by economic and political forces but also by how these two variables culminate in ideas about optimal urban environments.

This paper argues that contemporary analyses of Shanghai's urban development from 1990 to 2010 rightly emphasized the importance of both local governance and global capital in fueling the city's economic growth (Wu 1998, 2003, 2006). Yet to argue that urban development can be reduced or principally attributed to the input of capital and/or the enforcement of good governance omits one of the most crucial factors involved is development activity, namely the exchange of ideas.

In order to explore this point, this paper will employ Expo 2010, Shanghai as a case-study. It will move from a brief history of the event and on to an investigation of Expo using two related methods of analysis: the political economic and the ideational. The political economic analysis argues that Expo 2010 was a proving ground, used by China to demonstrate its growing importance in the world economy and position Shanghai as a "global city" on par with Paris, New York, and London. The ideational analysis argues that Shanghai's desire to host Expo 2010 is best understood as a means to justify its desire of becoming a "global city" (Sassen 1991).

This study uses secondary sources to provide context and analysis for its conclusions. It also makes use of well as over a dozen key informant interviews with Commissioners General and Pavilion Directors of some of the most important pavilions at Expo 2010, gathered by the author while he worked as an Executive Assistant at the Canada Pavilion.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_9

9.2 The Politics and Economics

9.2.1 The Context

In November 2001, Shanghai announced its intention to host the 2010 World Expo. Until then, no Expo had been held in a developing country. Various rationales had been cited to explain this decision: (1) developing countries did not have the ability to host such a large-scale event, (2) developing countries did not have the ability to attract participants, and (3) developing countries did not have the ability to convince the world's corporate and political elite of the strategic merits of a given country's bid. In December of 2002, after a year of planning and lobbying, Shanghai was declared the winner of the bid, beating out Yeosu (Korea), Moscow (Russia), Querétaro (Mexico), and Wroclaw (Poland) for the right to host the event.

9.2.2 Some of China's Motivations for Hosting Expo 2010

Shanghai's year-long campaign to host Expo 2010 provides a glimpse of what Shanghai sought to gain from the experience. At the top of its list were "not only [to] learn from the experiences of other countries to further its reform and opening-up endeavour, especially in areas along the Yangtze River, but also [to] enhance [China's] friendly relations with other countries" (Xiaosong Interview, Xinhua, 2001/11/01). Explicit in this message is a dual emphasis on economic and political development, as well as increased bilateral relations. In addition, Mr. Yu Xiaosong, a Vice-Chairman of Expo 2010, said in September 2002, 3 months prior to the final BIE decision in Monaco, that Expo will "be a platform for the world business community to conduct economic and trade cooperation and technological exchange with China" (Chinese Embassy Briefing on Expo, 2002/09/22).

From the very beginning, Expo 2010, Shanghai was conceived as a means by which to "learn from" the rest of the world, conduct dialogue with the economic and political elite of the global economic system, and improve China's economic competitiveness by upgrading its technology and increasing its international trade. Evident here are the ways in which the exchange of ideas involves not only active learning on the part of both participants, but are also seen to translate into the tangible political and economic competitiveness of China as a whole. Thus, the exchange of ideas that take place during forums like Expo are crucially linked to global economic activity. Expo has helped abet China's ambitions in this regard by providing Shanghai with a site where the Chinese can network and connect with the world's key holders of global capital and technology.

9.2.3 The Importance of Politics

Shanghai's bid was successful in large part because of the support the city received from the central government in Beijing (which boasts considerable power in the authoritarian market system of China). In order to enhance the attractiveness of the Shanghai bid, the Central Government created a Business Supporting Council in 2001, consisting "of 50 domestic and foreign-invested enterprises… to actively participate in the bidding and provide every necessary support" to the bid committee (ibid). Furthermore, the Chinese Government in Beijing, represented by the Deputy Secretary General of the State Council, pledged "to provide Shanghai with all kinds of financial support and preferential taxation policies to host the Exposition" (ibid). This last statement, from Mr. Xu Shaoshi, acting in his dual role as representative of the national government as well as Vice-Chairman of Expo 2010 Shanghai, emphasizes the strong commitment of the Chinese Central Government in supporting Shanghai's successful Expo bid.

In China, political involvement at the highest levels is essential to the legitimacy and effectiveness of business institutions. The importance of implicit and explicit cooperation between polity and economy cannot be overstated. It lies at the heart of all the constructed bonds of trust and understanding between global decision-makers. Moreover, in China the entire concept of competitive legitimacy in the economic realm is intertwined with a recognition of the financial and political support of high-level government officials and offices, a condition that has forced other countries to learn to be more open in the ties between their political and corporate partnerships involving China in order to act properly in the Chinese cultural environment.

9.2.4 The Importance of Economics

The success of Expo 2010 was widely understood to hinge not merely on the active support of the Chinese and Shanghainese governments, but also on Shanghai's position as the economic and financial nexus of one of the most vibrant and promising environments in the world—the Yangtze River Delta in the People's Republic of China.Both the Shanghai Municipal Government and the national government leveraged their unique position in the international community to pressure the entire world's political and economic powers to participate in Expo 2010. The result is that Shanghai 2010 is the largest World Exhibition in history, boasting representation from every single nation on Earth, including the poorest countries of Asia, Africa, and South America. Cuba, North Korea, and Palestine. The rationale of the international community in this regard was simple: it would have cost them too much to refuse participation.

The Pavilion Director of Slovenia, as well as the Commissioner General of Croatia both admitted that had Expo 2010 not been held in China, and had the Chinese not insisted that they attend, the financial burden of participation would

have proven too great (Interviews, 2010). In addition, China's offer to fund the construction of Joint Pavilions for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Island countries meant that European, North American, and Asian countries risked being shamed by the participation of the poorest countries on the planet if they chose to not attend for financial reasons.

9.2.5 How Politics and Economics Come Together

Expo 2010 provides a forum wherein the world's economic and political elite can interact at the highest levels according to mutual interests and with a mutual goal of engaging in constructive dialogue and friendly cooperation. In an interview recorded in September 2010, the Deputy Pavilion Director of the UK Pavilion called Expo 2010 in Shanghai "a thinly veiled economic trade and political show." The key to the success of this platform, he said is Expo's "iconic" importance in providing China with "a legitimate reason," and a legitimate forum "to do business between people who otherwise may not."

At Expo 2010, visits by heads of state or ministerial delegations were designed to include meetings with their political counterparts. As well, meetings and networking events facilitated introductions between economic heavyweights accompanying their various political leaders. The Canada Pavilion alone hosted the visits of 11 Federal Ministers, over 30 Mayors, 4 Provincial Premiers and the Governor General. In addition, every single one of Canada's wealthiest multinational corporations either hosted or participated in events that were attended by their Chinese counterparts, often involving the visit of a relevant Canadian Federal Minister, senior government official(s), the Ambassador of Canada to China, and Consular General of Shanghai.

9.2.6 How Expo 2010 Demonstrate China's Rise to International Prominence

China received similar delegations from every major economic power in the world during Expo 2010, allowed it to act as a hub for dialogue, networking, and the beginning of potential personal relationships between Chinese and international elite. This point is incredibly important because the Chinese custom of doing business and negotiating contracts is heavily influenced by a long and specifically Chinese custom of building and maintaining interpersonal and interinstitutional ties of trust and friendship (known as *guanxi* in China). Expo created a platform for Chinese political, financial, and commercial "heavyweights" to play host to the rest of the world, thereby creating and deepening the kinds of friendships and interpersonal connections that will help China to remove some of the uncertainty of their international economic and political activity.

9.3 The Exchange of Ideas

9.3.1 A Brief Look at the Impact of World Expositions on Ideas About Urban Development

Just like the many World Expositions that have come before, Expo 2010 allowed the local government to legitimate public investment in infrastructure and real estate through large stimulus programs sold to citizens as a necessary part of their Expo responsibilities. Denny Gélinas, Special Adviser to the Canada Pavilion at Expo 2010, spoke of the way in which the Vancouver and Montreal Expos instigated the construction of "rapid transit systems that… have provided a legacy that has gone on for years and years." He also mentions, however, that each Expo poses a series of cost/benefit scenarios. Among them are the "displacement of communities and the decisions made in the interest of the greater good," "budget and funding issues," and the disruption of pre-existing timelines for urban development. Despite the inevitable concerns that arise out of such large and ambitious projects, Gélinas believes that events like Expo have "provided the beginnings of what modern cities need to make [them] healthier and better."

In the period following their bid win, the Shanghai government oversaw some of the most drastic changes to Shanghai's urban environment since the development of Pudong New Area in the early 1990s. Since 2002, the city of Shanghai has constructed eight new subway lines, built a new international airport, radically expanded their highway, bridge, and tunnel network, and begun upgrading their rail facilities. The latter included the construction of new high-speed railway lines from Shanghai to Beijing that underscores Expo's ability to help justify large capital expenditures on disruptive mega projects aimed at improving the city's long-term success and competitiveness.

9.3.2 Big Changes Come from Big Ideas

Expo 2010 provided Shanghai with the opportunity to adopt an urban development plan that brought enormous changes to the urban landscape. Shanghai displaced millions of people and spent hundreds of millions of dollars to transform itself into a city that could attract global multinational corporations, promote international financial activity and trade, and dominate global regional economic activity. Cities that can accomplish these feats are understood in the urban studies literature as "global cities." Global cities arguably mark the apotheosis of urban development, boasting the highest levels of GDP, the highest standards of living in economic terms, the highest real estate values, and the largest populations (Sassen 1991).

Expo 2010 allowed the Shanghai Municipal Government to justify huge expenditures on improving their international airports, accelerating the construction of new metro lines, and installing new high-speed rail lines linking Shanghai to

Northern and Eastern China, Shanghai. Every one of these infrastructure projects will help improve Shanghai's economic competitiveness both nationally and internationally, thereby furthering Shanghai's urban development according to existing standards of how to best achieve urban development.

9.4 Conclusion

Expo 2010 demonstrated that China's recent economic growth has provided it with the political and economic requirements for hosting a World Exposition. Strong national and municipal support for hosting the Expo combined with the Middle Kingdom's growing importance in the global economy allowed China to become the first developing country in history to host an Expo. Moreover, it was able to accomplish a feat no other country has ever managed, namely the participation at a World Exposition of every single country on earth.

While the 2010 Expo in Shanghai has a specific place in the history of World Expositions and the urban renewal of the city, the 6 months from May to November were understood locally as one more step in the Shanghai's urban redefinition: a complete redevelopment of the urban form and spatial structure that had already lasted 20 years. Expo, in other words, can be understood as one instance of Shanghai's long-term development strategy of becoming one of the world's top global cities.

Interviews

Former Director, Canada–China Business Council, Margaret Cornish
Director, Shanghai Office, Canada–China Business Council, Helena Chen
Director, Shanghai Office, United States–China Business Council, Julie Walton
Director of Protocol, Madrid Pavilion, Olivier Starckx
Deputy Pavilion Director, United Kingdom Pavilion, David Martin
Pavilion Director, Slovenia Pavilion, Linda Belina
Pavilion Director, Canada Pavilion, Barbara Helm
Pavilion Director, Montreal Pavilion, Louis Dussault
Deputy Commissioner General, Canada Pavilion, Wayne Scott
Deputy Commissioner General, Australia Pavilion, Peter Sams
Deputy Commissioner General, Italy Pavilion, Maria AssuntaAccili
Commissioner General, Croatia Pavilion, IvicaMaričić
Commissioner General, Japan Pavilion, Hiroshi Tsukamoto
Consul General of Canada in Shanghai, Nadir Patel

Informal Meetings and Discussions

Director of Protocol, Canada Pavilion, Evan Medley
Director of Special Events, Canada Pavilion, James Mitchell
Director of Communications, Canada Pavilion, Jennifer Price
Executive Director, Canada Pavilion, Robert Myers
Executive Director, Canada China Business Council, Sarah Kutulakos
Deputy Commissioner General, USA Pavilion, Tom Cooney
Commissioner General, New Zealand Pavilion, Mike Pattison
Commissioner General, Canada Pavilion, Mark Rowswell
Representative of the Québec Government in Shanghai, Francois Gaudreau
Former Representative of the Government of British Columbia in Shanghai, John McDonald
Director General, North Asia Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Phil Calvert
Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada, Nicole Bourget

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Chapter 10
Access, Assurance and Acceptance

Moving Beyond the Status-Quo/Revisionist Power Debate in Investigating China's Emerging Foreign Policy Strategy

Adam MacDonald

10.1 Introduction

China's emergence as a regional and global power has called into question its intentions towards the international system. Most analyses debate and interpret the nature of China's rise—itself a contested concept (Yue 2008a, b)—as either status-quo or revisionist. While most literature in Western academic and policy circles argues from a liberal institutionalist perspective that China can be integrated or accommodated within the contemporary international system (Examples include Ikenberry 2008; Shambaugh 2013), others disagree. Analyses from neo-realist and power transition perspectives anticipate great power competition and possibly war as China seeks to reorder the international environment to further change the distribution of power towards its advantage, stimulating opposition from the US and other great powers (Examples include Betts 1993; Roy 1994; Dillon et al. 2005; Kagan 2005; Mearsheimer 2001 and Friedberg 2011). Proponents assert revisionist motives are evident in China's military modernization programme; its support for authoritarian regimes; maritime and territorial (mostly island chains) disputes with neighbours; and neglect of human rights issues and notions of good governance. While acknowledging some truth and relevance to these claims, this chapter argues

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_10

that casting China-as a-revisionist power[1] over generalizes Chinese behaviour and motives and thereby underestimates the complexity and evolution of Chinese thinking and action. On the other side, China-as-status-quo positions narrow the debate, juxtaposing China against the Western international order without appreciating the mutually transformative relationship that will inevitably change all parties. In its latest incarnation, the status-quo/revisionist power debate has become encapsulated in an emerging "Assertive China" narrative arguing Beijing has over the past half-decade become more abrasive and obstructionist in its foreign, specifically regional, relations over contested issues (See Friedberg 2015; Mastro 2015 and Yahuda 2013). This new categorization, however, suffers like its predecessor—the China Threat Theory—from a number of theoretical and methodological flaws pertaining to lack of definitions, rigid criteria of evaluating assertive behaviour and the selective mining of the historical record to justify such a portrayal (See Johnston 2013; Lee 2013 and Jerden 2014).[2]

The debate over status-quo-revisionist powers is an unnecessarily polarized dichotomous schema, arising out of a larger paradigmatic debate within international relations (IR) theory concerning neo-liberalism and realism. This debate has constricted investigation out of the desire to locate a primary casual mechanism as the driving force behind Chinese attitudes and action, tying intention and behaviour

[1]Other arguments focus on the nature of Communist regime as the fount of aggressive intentions towards the Western based international system but these have been left out of the analysis to focus solely on IR structural analyses pertaining to Chinese foreign actions and intentions. Examples of these arguments include Gertz (2000). *The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America*. Washington: Regnery Publishing; Menges (2005). *China: The Gathering Threat*. Nashville: Nelson Current; Moshar (2001). *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World*. New York: Encounter Books; Timperlake and William (1999). *Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America*. Washington: Regnery Publishing.

[2]The assertive China narrative suffers from serious theoretical and methodological flaws which not only question its legitimacy as an accurate description, let alone explanation, of this supposed decisive shift but also unpacks the possibilities that China studies are once again increasingly becoming overtly politicized (Matsuda 2014). First, there are very few sources which define the term assertive, simply using it interchangeable with a host of other terms such as abrasive, obstructionist and revisionist which confuses their distinct definitions and applications in international relations and foreign policy analyses. Second, there is no definitional criteria to determine when China is or is not acting 'assertive', thus complicating attempts to justify the timelines usually employed signalling the assertive turn (usually sometime between 2008 and 2010). As a result, therefore, there is a selective mining of the historical and contemporary record to demonstrate that post 2008 there has been a more assertive China vice a less assertive one before; this necessitates, unfortunately, the omissions of both instances of previous 'assertive' behaviour on the part of Beijing and also issues and areas of co-operation and collaboration (Johnston 2013). Domestic forces, while a welcomed addition to China studies conducted by IR scholars who usually neglect these to favour structural factors, have simply not been studied extensively to decisively explain how and to what degree they influence Chinese decision-making (Johnston 2011; Chubb 2013). Questioning of the assertive narrative does not, as a logical extension, assume China is a completely benign agent which is continuously being misunderstood by the international community. Instead, the argument has not been made that there exists a distinct and holistic transformation of Chinese foreign policy in the last half-decade.

Fig. 10.1 China's emerging foreign policy strategy: a conceptual model

under one strict theoretical rubric to the exclusion of others (Friedberg 2005). While some insist that their work is focused on explaining structural influences on states and not on any specific country's foreign policy, the increasing focus on China's rise within the discipline of IR confuses theoretical projections and empirical fact to the detriment to the latter.

Instead, this paper introduces a conceptual model (Fig. 10.1) mapping out those fundamental interests, objectives and principles which have become dominant in shaping contemporary Chinese foreign policy, specifically focusing on behaviour and declaratory policy preferences, leaving space for interpretation of the intentions underpinning them. The conceptual model presented is broken down into a study of three fundamental foreign policy principles: acceptance internationally of China as a responsible great power in a multi-polarizing and globalizing world; supporting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs; and democratizing the international system via consensus building in multilateral settings and institutions. In tandem, these policies are employed to achieve three broad and interrelated foreign policy objectives: *access* to economic and political resources; *assurance* of China's intentions as peaceful; and *acceptance* of China as an emerging great power. These overriding objectives form the pillars of a guiding logic tying together various strands of China's foreign policy reflected in its decision-making. Such a matrix allows for a more complete investigation of influences, including domestic factors, than normally covered by IR analyses and specifically allows for a more complex study of power, both in its understanding and wielding, evident within Chinese foreign policy. China's emerging foreign policy strategy, furthermore,

includes the threats and opportunities which its leaders perceive as well as avenues through which interests are defined and to be achieved. Within such a model, a more elaborate investigation of the *content* of China's foreign policy in ways it identifies norms and values defining the international realm, as well as into the *process*, the means by which existing relationships may be legitimately altered, can be pursued. This analysis, finally, follows a growing body of literature wishing to escape the status- quo/revisionist but there exists a noticeable absence of any other lens in which to investigate Chinese foreign policy, this project attempts to fill such a void.

10.2 China's Rise Within the Status-Quo/Revisionist Power Debate

Generally speaking, the determination of locating China as 'revisionist' or 'status-quo' is filtered through a two-level analysis within the (neo)-realist paradigm, comprising (1) the level of satisfaction of a state towards its place within the distribution of material capabilities currently in the international system; and (2) if unsatisfied the extent and means employed to alter power configurations towards one's favour.[3] A status-quo power, therefore, does not seek to challenge the hierarchy between great powers, while a revisionist power wishes to augments its place, power and influence in the system, challenging and dislodging the other powerful states via some combination of political influence, economic supremacy and/or military dominance.

While not wishing to engage fully in the debate, there exist a number of theoretical and empirical problems with such an exercise, specifically attempts to place China in this either/or categorization. First, the definitions themselves are usually employed in a mutual exclusive way so that actors can have only status-quo or revisionist intentions in mind. Such a rigid categorization neglects the possibility that instances of both sets of behaviour and intention can coexist; instead, states appearing to do so are interpreted as deceptive. There is, also, an assumption of rigidity of an actor's intentions, neglecting of competing ones being held and/or the ability for these to change over time. There exists, furthermore, contestation over

[3]For perhaps the most succinct definition see, Morgenthau (1967). *Politics Among Nations*, 4th Ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 36–37. While originating from his realist theory of international politics, his definition of status-quo/imperialism (which can be substituted for revisionism) has been broadly accepted by many in the debate from varying theoretical backgrounds. Robert Gilpin offers the most detailed criteria for determining whether a state is status-quo or revisionist, moving beyond changes to the balance of power to include also an explicit wish to alter the 'rules of the game'. Gilpin, however, like many neo-realist and power transition scholars, interprets all rising powers as inevitably revisionist as they wish to further alter the international system to accommodate and solidify their augmenting power and influence in a system defined by mistrust and uncertainty between states. See Gilpin (1983), War and Change in World Politics.

defining the referent to which status-quo or revisionist behaviour is evaluated—that of the international system (Johnston 2003). Pu and Schweller (2011), also, argue that unipolarity is the only system where balancing is seen as a revisionist vice status-quo behaviour; within an altering environment defined by still large but diminishing power asymmetries, furthermore, rising states like China may not know and/or accurately predict its future goals vice the dominant power. Second, locating the source(s) and determining such behaviour are often focused on structural conditions of power capabilities between states, neglecting analysis of domestic matters which may better explain an actor's intention and behaviour. Finally, Chinese positions on these matters are almost completely overlooked, most importantly interpretations of Beijing's foreign actions as status-quo but in reference to a different set of definitional criteria than that used by Western scholars (Wang 2005; Zheng 2005). The main arguments with respect to China are outlined as a backdrop to present an alternative model.

Status-quo positions proceed from a liberal institutionalist perspective which argues that the international system's institutional depth and scope makes China more likely to integrate with than fight against. The international system, Ikenberry (2008) asserts, is easy to join yet hard to overturn due to globalization, interdependence and nuclear deterrence, providing access points and opportunities for political communication and reciprocal influence; some neo-realist accounts agree that China's rise shall be peaceful but focus more on strategic constraints, specifically American military superiority, on Chinese ambitions, opening up potential avenues for inclusion in international decision-making (See Glaser 2011; Ross 1997, 2005; Zhu 2008). Lampton (2009) argues that stability of relations is accepted by both Washington and Beijing as their over arching common interest in tackling global issues such as the world economic system, ecological matters and military security though major hurdles remain in moving their relationship towards a more open, conciliatory and co-operative track (See also Foot 2009). While in agreement with the status-quo arguments, these views fail to interpret Chinese foreign behaviour as an evolutionary process with changing paradigms and foreign policy preferences which help to unpack and explain its contemporary positions.

Talk of China becoming integrated within the liberal international order fall short of investigating how China's emergence also involves transforming that order, investigating the dialectical relationship that the process of integration implies. The changing realities to the nature and distribution of power, furthermore, complicate attempts to define the international system. As Nye (2011) has aptly highlighted, power (a concept readily employed yet often under theorized) is not just shifting gradually from the West to the East, and it is becoming more diffused throughout the system at large with certain processes taking a life of their own beyond the control of a select few states as in the past. Diffusion is happening in an uneven manner across various fields from economics which are very multi-polar with many powerful state and non-state actors vice militarily where the US is still by far the most dominant but with certain other states developing niche capabilities increasingly limiting Washington's freedom of manoeuvre, specifically China in East Asia (White 2012). There is, furthermore, an emerging consensus that American

unipolarity is fading (Wright 2015) but it is uncertain how and what future new configuration amongst great powers will develop (Kupchan 2012); while China is a large contributor to such system alteration, it is also encapsulated by the changing nature of power itself, presenting opportunities and placing limitations on its interest development and achievement in this newly evolving system.

China-as-a-revisionist power analyses largely agree that future conflict between the US and China is likely. Stemming from the theoretical work of Waltz (1979), many neo-realist-based analyses argue that Beijing wishes to secure greater power and influence in the international system, provoking resistance from the US and the West, furthering the conditions of uncertainty and mistrust which exist in an anarchic international system. Defensive realists perceive the quest for security as leading to the reoccurring process of a security dilemma motivating balancing behaviour between the great powers, and concerns for how the US will adjust to potentially an Asia-Pacific region governed by bi-polarity (Ross 2010). Other prominent offensive neo-realists such as John J. Mearsheimer and Robert Kaplan argue that conflict is inevitable with a real probability of war because China, like all rising powers, seeks regional hegemony in its attempts to enhance its security. China will not be contempt on becoming simply rich but will consistently act with the purpose of dislodging US superiority, as Mearsheimer (2001) states 'A wealthy China would not be a status-quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony' (See also Kaplan 2005). Both variants of neo-realism, therefore, privilege the relative distribution of material capabilities, largely focused on military power, as the casual mechanism driving and explaining Chinese foreign interests and actions; unit-level or domestic matters have little impact on these macro-processes as China's growing power will inevitably sharpen its foreign policy towards reducing and perhaps replacing the US as the most powerful state in the system.

Unlike Watlzian neo-realism which focuses on balance of power as the result of the decreasing gap of capabilities between great powers, power transition theory interprets the international system as moving from one hierarchy to another (much like Mearsheimer's offensive realism), focusing on these power transitions which result war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1988). China will not be satisfied by its position in the international hierarchy and will eventually increasingly challenge US hegemony, perhaps militarily to decisively become superior. Washington will, as well, increasingly become apprehensive about China's growing power, and will see Beijing's action and intentions through largely antagonistic lenses. Despite their theoretical differences, many analyses interpreted as neo-realist with regards to China's rise are in fact a blending of both theories with a growing focus on how to stunt China's inevitable overtaking of the US as the most powerful state in the system (See Bernstein and Munro 1997; Friedberg 2005).

These China-as-a-revisionist analyses are parsimonious both in terms of conceptual development and empirical investigation, producing explanations and conclusions which are very limited in their ability to interpret contemporary Chinese foreign policy and actions internationally. For those based upon neo-realism, part of the issue stems from an over-reliance on theory, particularly the privileging of

structural factors, anarchy and material capabilities in determining unit behaviour, specifically a fixation with military power. For example, while neo-realism attempts to argue that great power competition and conflict is a reoccurring feature in international politics, predicting when this shall occur is beyond its purview; as Waltz states 'Realist theory is better at saying what will happen than in saying when it will happen' (Waltz 2000). This 'wait and see approach' is intellectually misguided due to an exclusive focus on a select few variables, in this case military power, largely misses the sophisticated understanding and employment of various power resources by the Chinese leadership, and how these processes have altered over time (He and Feng 2008).

Unlike Waltz (1979), furthermore, who sees theory and its components as an artificial construct based on assumptions separate from the real world, Mearsheimer contends his offensive that neo-realism is theoretically based on empirical evidence; or in other words, structural factors are so dominant and obvious in history that it is essentially pointless to discuss leaders and regimes or even consider them meaningful agents in the study of IR. Such certainty of the casual power of structure, therefore, in this theory cannot tolerate much evidence or reasoning that is not within its predictive and prescriptive space. There are, however, numerous contested interpretations of historical examples raised by critics of Mearhseimer, accusing him of arbitrarily picking and choosing Chinese behaviours which support his theoretical position while neglecting alternative explanations and discarding swaths of other behaviours that do not fit into the model (See Haslam 2010). Due to Mearsheimer's focus on China as the latest revisionist challenger (and indeed the test case study for the entirety of his theory)[4], understanding the theoretical underpinnings of offensive realism and its well-documented shortcomings is important.

Power transition theory has been widely criticized for its definition of power and thus when power transitions actually occur, leading many to argue the casual relationship is reversed: war causes power transitions not vice versa (Lebow and Valentino 2009; Levy 2008). As well, as Legro (2008) argues, the dogmatic position that differences between states' material capabilities lead to increasingly obvious and certain behaviour and intentions is handicapping analyses into state's decision-making processes; specifically what they intend to do with their power growth and when and why core intentions of state's concerning international politics change. Furthermore, both neo-realism and power transition theory neglect the forces of social construction which determine how state's determine interests and the prioritization of them, therefore discrediting other influences beyond anarchy which impact their decision-making. Even scholars who accept that security dilemmas are caused in part by structural differentiations of power point out which it is more important to focus on leaders' and regimes' interpretations of power

[4]This is most evident in Mearsheimer's (2014) revised edition of *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. The author admits that most of the books are virtually unchanged from its 2001 publication, except for an extensive chapter focused on applying offensive realism's predictions to the rise of China. He concludes that China cannot rise peacefully and will increasingly come to challenge the US as a regional hegemon due to the structural factors outlined in offensive realism.

realities and how they affect their relationships with other great powers; inclusion of policymakers, and influential factors on their perspectives and abilities to alter and change them, is vitally important (Johnston 2011).

Unlike neo-liberal and realist analyses which interprets China's interests as largely derived from its material capabilities in relation to other states in the international system (specifically the US), this model perceives China's foreign policy orientation as a function of a strategic culture in which issues of realpolitik are dominant and have been for a number of years within Chinese decision-making (Johnston 1995; Christensen 1996). There, however, appears to have been a significant shift in this paradigm, moving from an offensive-realist mindset during the Mao era to a defensive-realist paradigm shaping contemporary Chinese foreign policy (Tang 2008). Furthermore, while the Chinese leadership is focused on matters of balance of power and their rise under US hegemony, pursuing pathways of integration within the contemporary international system has also become dominant (Legro 2008). Such a foreign policy paradigm direction, thus, demonstrates the evolutionary nature of these processes and its malleability towards shaping and changing interests and behaviour both from internal and external influences. The ahistorical assumption of China as inevitably revisionist due to structural material conditions is to foreclose this investigation prematurely, marginalizing a whole complex of historically contextual factors and processes important in understanding contemporary Chinese foreign policy.

10.3 China's Emerging Foreign Policy Strategy: Interests, Objectives, Principles

Beginning with the presidency of Jiang Zemin in the 1990s, the Chinese regime has no longer been defined be a paramount leader but by a developing institutionalized consensus approach where no one leader or group is absolutely dominant (Li 2005). Despite the larger involvement in all areas of governance than compared to previous leaders and consolidating his power base by marginalizing former President Hu allies (Economy 2014), President Xi's reign is still far more diffuse and consensus oriented that either Mao's or Deng's. In foreign policy, multiple government and Party departments (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the Ministries of State Security and Public Security (amongst others) compete for influence to best suit their perceived institutional interests. While ultimate authority rests with the Party Politburo Standing Committee, specifically the President, bureaucratic politics and bargaining processes have become facets within the regime leading to a consensus-oriented decision-making approach (Bhalla 2005; Shirk 2008).

While these processes led to the enlargement of actors, specifically the inclusion of a developing and powerful business class (for more see Jing Qian's chapter regarding corporate representation within the Party state), broad agreement has

developed on projecting a unified image both domestically and internationally to maintain the authoritarian rule of the Party (Holbig 2006; Gilley 2008). The impetus for such a perceived need of unity primarily stemmed from the Tiananmen incident of 1989 with the near collapse of Party rule and their temporary relegation to pariah status internationally. Furthermore, the Party began to develop a more conscious and calculative foreign policy approach with an emphasis on recognizing and managing the interconnected relationship between internal and external issues which could threaten their rule. The Chinese Party state, therefore, should not be interpreted as a monolithic entity but one comprised various and at times rival departments and factional bodies searching for power and influence (For an example on the growing plurality of Chinese actors involved in international affairs, see Matt Gaudreau's chapter concerning Chinese involvement in rice projects in Mali); such competition, though, is mediated by larger agreements of public Party solidarity and an institutionalized process of closed door negotiations and elite brokerage to achieve consensus in an organized and non-abrasive manner to their rule (Fewsmith 2008). The augmentation of anti-corruption campaigns since President Xi came to power in 2012 is simultaneously an attempt to bolster the Party's public image as well as a convenient avenue to remove potential rivals. The most recent corruption investigation into Zhou Yongkang, a former Politburo Standing Committee member and ally of former President Hu, demonstrates the pervasiveness and extensiveness of such investigations, including at the highest levels; though to date they have not threatened the overall powerbase of the Party.

While, as noted, there has been an expansion of inclusiveness within Party decision-making apparatus, the Party appears to have no desire to relinquish its political monopoly. In relation to the citizenry, there is no willingness to restructure the Party's authoritarian rule in any large systematic sense, specifically in creating room for the development of an independent civil society. Instead, since 1989 the Chinese leadership has been in a state of what some scholars call a 'siege mentality', constantly evaluating the configuration of internal and external threats to their hold on power.

Internally, the macro-challenge facing Beijing is to ensure the conditions for continued economic and social development, which has become (along with a renewed sense of nationalism) the key pillar of Party legitimacy following their implicit rejection of Communism/Maoism since the implementation of market reforms and the Open Door Policy. Specifically, issues of social unrest stemming from a multitude of factors including uneven regional development; widening income distributions (particularly between rural and urban); environmental degradation; government corruption; bureaucratic inefficiency and ethnic minority resistance, most notably in Xinjiang and Tibet, have become daily concerns for leaders in Beijing, directing large sums of time, resources and energy in order to ensure they do not become regime threatening (Tanner 2004; Lum 2006; Pei 2006; Shirk 2008). While the development of large-scale social unrest is a constant concern, a Party split is seen as equally if not even a more threatening and probable scenario. Attempts to generate legitimacy, therefore, do not solely extend from the Party to the citizenry but indeed managing elite relations within the Party is a

continuous task. While currently potential Party divisions appear marginal, and with some accounts persuasively arguing the current regime's hold on power is more secure than ever despite decentralization (Nathan 2003; Shambaugh 2009; Landry 2008; Yue 2008a), under circumstances of large social upheaval it is unclear how integrated and united they would remain, including their relationship with government organs and the PLA.

Externally, China's macro-challenge is to create space to further its integration into the international economic and political system to craft conditions beneficial to its domestic development and rise as a great power (Goldstein 2005). Access to resources (not just natural resources but to capital, technology and markets) is of primary concern while ensuring non-interference in their internal affairs is a key priority and perceived necessity to preserve domestic stability; seen as particularly dangerous are strategies of 'peaceful evolution' by Western states pressuring, to varying degrees and levels of explicitly, governance practices and democratic transition following the Tiananmen Square incident which has heightened Party concern regarding the influence of outside forces on domestic politics. The regime, as a corollary, opposes pressures to institute governance and human rights standards as criteria for states inclusion into and deeper involvement within the international system. Stemming from this concern, China's relationship with the United States stands out as the most important aspect of their foreign policy. The regime's ample awareness of the fate of other rising powers has made them very prudent and calculative in their relationship with Washington and the West, attempting to ensure they do not use their current power superiority to stunt China's development.

Furthermore, the essential dilemma facing leaders in Beijing is to achieve a strategy to continue their upward mobility in terms of power and influence within the international system without being perceived as revisionist and drawing the attention and concentration of the established great powers against itself. As Goldstein asserts "China…aims to increase the country's international clout without triggering a counterbalancing reaction." (Goldstein 2005). International acceptance of their rise as a great power as well is a further source of domestic legitimacy of the Party, feeding nationalist sentiments. Nationalism, however, appears to be a double-edge sword in the foreign policy calculus of Beijing, particularly dealing with sensitive relations with the US, Taiwan and Japan has produced difficult circumstances for the regime attempting to effectively manage levels of tension but maintains domestic support by not looking weak or timid (Christensen 2011; Moore 2010; Shirk 2008 and Zao 2005).

The most encompassing document to date in attempting to systematically outline Beijing's foreign policy is 'China's Peaceful Development Road', released in 2005. Although most of the contents are not new, the collection and synthesizing of them into one policy framework demonstrates a new commitment on the part of Beijing to bring clarity to their foreign policy goals and objectives to an international audience. Such a project stems from a heightened interest in image and status,

seeing acceptance internationally as crucial for managing Beijing's intertwined internal and external challenges.[5]

China's declaratory policy of peaceful development rests on three interconnected though not necessarily explicit broad foreign policy pillars: *access, assurance and acceptance*. With economic and social development at the forefront of the minds of the Chinese leadership, access to economic resources including raw materials, capital, technology and markets has become a major motivation behind Beijing's foreign policy. While it is not an exaggeration to say that China's contemporary foreign policy is largely driven by resource acquisition (Shambaugh 2013), access in this sense also implies involvement within the economic, political and increasingly military structures and settings which are embedded in directing and protecting the international system. China's drive to become a great power is largely evaluated upon its ability to shape and influence the international system, and more recently an emphasis on East Asia's political and economic architecture, and not simply respond to it. Enhancing economic wealth within current global conditions, therefore, does not adequately encompass the notion of access; there is a political and increasingly military aspect as well where Beijing wishes to influence these processes to further ensure a host of beneficial conditions exist, hedging against any attempts to stunt their continued developing extensive and intensive ties across the globe.

Access, however, is seen as dependent on the related but not synonymous notions of assurance and acceptance. Assurance denotes Beijing's desire to create a peaceful image, asserting its developing power and influence will not threaten the current international order but rather augment and support it. In particular, ensuring China's rapidly growing resource consumption is not interpreted as a new imperial exercise exploitative in nature (and that it will not resort to unilateral force to achieve its objectives) is a central task in its foreign relations. Finally, while stemming from assurance, acceptance implies a deeper level of agreement by the international community that China's rise is legitimate. Tolerating China's growth is not adequate, for Beijing increasingly desires to become a main decision-maker within the international system. Such a growing acquisition of responsibilities is seen as conditioned upon acceptance from the established great powers and the international community at large that China does deserve and has a right to a larger role in these processes (Scott 2010).

While there exist a multitude of foreign policy positions expressed and increasingly promulgated over the past decade by China, they can roughly be grouped into three broad and interconnected foreign policy principles: (1) Acceptance of China as a responsible great power in a multi-polarizing and globalizing world; (2) Supporting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal

[5]Even the decision to use the term 'peaceful development', chosen over the phrase 'peaceful rise', debated within the upper echelon in the Party from 2003 to 2005 in a pursuit of finding the best one to reflect their non-aggressive intentions is indicative of the sensitive and important nature that status and image have in Beijing's foreign policy. Lampton (2008), *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

affairs; and (3) Democratizing the international system via consensus building in multilateral settings and institutions. Through such a delineation, the manner in which these principles relates to achieving Beijing's foreign policy objectives, and the power resources employed, can be observed as well as a providing a more refined and detailed analysis of areas of contestation/co-operation between China and the other great powers. Finally, while these principles appear to be increasingly becoming solidified into China's foreign policy calculus, they are not absolutes, sometimes coming into conflict with one another, demonstrating a level of flexibility and contingency in their employment.

10.4 Acceptance of China as a Responsible Great Power in a Multi-polarizing and Globalizing World

China's declaratory policy of 'peaceful development' is an attempt to persuade uneasy sources of scepticism internationally that its rise will be not only peaceful but beneficial to other states, creating conditions of 'win–win' relationships.[6] Arguments for supporting peace and co-operation are augmented by repeated rejections of any claim to hegemony and promoting a military policy 'strictly defensive' in nature.[7] Major efforts are made to create certainty in others that Beijing is not a 'destabilizing other' but rather an integrated and committed member of the international system.

In demonstrating this commitment, China argues its willingness to work with other major powers such as the US on a number of global issues including support for the war on terror, non-proliferation, and in general the maintenance of global trade and integration are ample proof of their willingness to be a 'responsible power'. Although key areas of contestation and concern exist within these policy issues, specifically China's ongoing anti-terrorism campaign in Xinjiang (Clarke 2008; Wayne 2009) and their global environmental position (Cao 2010; Morton 2008), these matters demonstrate a multitude of varying rationales at play in achieving a number of interests both domestic and international in nature but should not be seen as only or even primarily aimed at challenging US hegemony.

China's efforts to establish itself as a recognized great power, having a right to continue its developing power capabilities, are tied to its perceptions of the gradual rearrangement of the international system towards a multi-polar and globalized world. While still recognizing US superiority, particularly militarily, their power relatively is decreasing as a number of new major powers mostly from the 'South'

[6]See "China's Peaceful Development Road", Part IV-Seeking Mutual Benefit and Common Development with Other Countries.

[7]"China Defense 2008"—The Security Situation. The increasingly regularity, about every 2 years, of releasing Defence White Papers outlining China's military modernization plans and strategic interests is another manoeuvre to reduce levels of uncertainty of China's use of the military in their development.

including China emerge (Wang 2005). Nevertheless, Beijing is well aware that American security measures, specifically in establishing control over the Commons (sea and airspace), have created an environment where Beijing has so far been allowed to develop without incurring large security costs. Bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as well, while publicly condemned by Beijing are acknowledged as producing a relatively stable security situation, specifically as it pertains to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region, North Korea aside (Posen 2003; Ikenberry 2004).

The so-called 'Pivot towards Asia' (since renamed 'rebalancing') which the US declared in 2011 is opposed by China which views it as a hostile move (Xiang 2012). Nonetheless, Beijing carefully strives to prevent these concerns from overshadowing the entire spectrum of relations with Washington. Still, Chinese leaders now appear focused on altering the institutional framework within East Asia to carve out a greater role for themselves with the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 'one Belt one Road' project. Militarily, Chinese declaratory policies and military modernization priorities indicate a desire to restrain American power and limit its capacity to dominate the region. While of concern to regional neighbours, this should not be interpreted as an aggressive revisionist challenge to promote an alternative geopolitical arrangement (MacDonald 2014). Beijing, however, does seem determined to alter the political landscape of the region in order to become more of a decision-maker congruent to its size and influence.

Such transitions in power, however, are seen by Beijing as long-term processes which will not inevitably lead to conflict but provide opportunities for co-operation and management amongst the established and emerging great powers to maintain and reinforce conditions beneficial to international peace and security (Deng and Moore 2004). To this end, China's concept of a harmonious world is contingent upon promoting a 'new security concept' in which alliances are removed in favour of a security regime of mutual recognition and co-operation in tackling common security issues within multilateral settings (Hu 2005). Although great power balancing is seen as a fundamental pillar of global stability, creating linkages of co-operation and agreement is essential in maintaining stability and prosperity in an increasingly interlinked and interdependent globalized world (China Defense 2008—The Security Situation).

Such positions are built upon Beijing's support for multilateralism, a process incorporating not only economic and political issues but also increasingly security concerns. China's support and contribution to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions as well as their 2009 deployment of a naval task group to the Gulf of Yemen in support of the UN Security Council resolution 1816 combating piracy demonstrates a more sophisticated role of their military forces internationally.[8]

[8]Peacekeeping Operations are in fact seen as an important facet of China's defense strategy, see "China Defense 2008"—Section XII: International Security Cooperation; "Chinese naval fleet sails into Gulf of Aden", *China Daily*, 6 January 2009. Such missions, as well, have practically training value for China's military and allows further interaction with other militaries.

Continued work towards building institutional processes dealing with non-traditional security threats with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the establishment of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), furthermore, exhibit Beijing's growing willingness to tackle security issues within multilateral settings. As noted above, China's evolving military strategy of deploying its armed forces, under UN mandates, abroad reflects an increasing desire to be part of the mechanisms which protect and shape the current international system and not simply operate within them. These are, however, gradual steps of international leadership and involvement. Beijing retains a risk-averse approach to foreign policy matters, usually waiting to see other states' positions before announcing their own (Shambaugh 2013). And while there are certain tenets of the international order Beijing do not agree with, they have largely allowed Russia to become the face of strategic opposition to the West over a host of sensitive issues including the ongoing civil war in Syria and Iran's nuclear programme.

Acceptance of not only China's growing role but also augmentation of multilateralism and co-operation amongst great powers strategically does point towards a hedging strategy against US power superiority, as veiled within China's repeated opposition to 'power politics and hegemonism'. For example, Beijing's interest in SCO is not only related to anti-terror operations and establishing energy relations with Central Asia but also to stymie US influence in the region—a balancing move not contrary to Beijing's official foreign policy discourse (Yuan 2010). On this matter, however, despite noted concerns regarding China's military modernization programme, specifically its accelerating budget, there are many examples including Beijing's nuclear arsenal where they have not transferred latent power to increased military power to reach parity with the US (O'Hanlon and Steinberg 2014). The lack of such development, furthermore, directs investigation into such decisions to maintain a small nuclear arsenal to other areas including different perspectives on the amount of force needed for mutual deterrence; intra-bureaucratic politics; and the regime's acceptance of constraints and mutual vulnerabilities between great powers not normally investigated by IR analyses (Fravel and Medeiros 2010). In this regard, the idea of the obviation of war, specifically between great powers, as a necessary condition for stable IR in allowing new arenas to be developed for disputes to be resolved (i.e. multilateral forums) is critical aspects of Chinese foreign policy usually not mentioned in Western academic and policy discourse (Ding 2010).

Finally, arguments for acceptance of China's rise do not stem only from the demonstrated benefits to the world community, but its status as a developing nation and its tarnished recent history during the 'century of humiliation' ("China's Peaceful Development Road", Kaufman 2010). Varying justifications of China's (peaceful) rise are constructed with a view to demonstrate China's transcendence over power politics and its desire to extend its influence in support of international society through peaceful practice and support for conflict resolution (Wang 2005). Continuous concern regarding China's sometimes abrasive actions in territorial disputes, however, plague Beijing's image and status matters in Asia, as demonstrated by Japan's new defence policy focusing largely on China's growing military power, but the use of military power in a revisionist manner has been sidelined to a

great extent, especially since the Taiwan 1995–1996 crisis; whether this is a function of accepting their military inferiority contra the US and/or part of a new tactic to find other means to resolve conflicts, such as in multilateral institutions, is uncertain.

10.5 Supporting State Sovereignty and Non-interference in Internal Affairs

While officially and the for the most part behaviourally Beijing has rejected resorting to the unilateral use of force to pursue its foreign policy objectives as well as demonstrating a willingness to work within the international framework, to say that Beijing fully supports the norms, values and procedures underpinning this is highly inaccurate. While these differences should not be polarized to an unnecessary extent, discomfort with certain aspects of the international system is obvious in China's foreign policy. Despite support for the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious international system, calls for establishing a new international and economic order have been part of Beijing's declaratory policy for the last two decades.[9] The issue most contested between China and the established Western powers are the norms of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.

China's declaratory emphasis on state sovereignty and the related concept of non-interference provide the basis of Beijing's foreign relations and largely frame their decision-making on a number of international situations. As guaranteed by the UN Charter, China is a strong supporter of state sovereignty, seeing it as essential if the international system is to operate effectively within a framework of common recognition of international equality amongst states, regardless of size or power (Hu 2005). Beijing's stance on sovereignty is strongly Westphalian, wherein state sovereignty is the basis of legitimacy internationally whereas developing notions of sovereignty as responsibility, specifically in relation to standards of governance, is becoming accepted in the Western world (Chan et al. 2008).

The US and others argue that Beijing's declaratory stance in practice implies support for pariah regimes, particularly resource-rich ones such as Iran and Sudan, counteracting international efforts to pressure these regimes to change their internal and external behaviour. Beijing's perceived unswerving commitment to non-interference, furthermore, is seen as highly detrimental for key Western objectives including the promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy in general. Respecting the varying political, economic and social conditions of states is paramount in Chinese foreign policy for it shields American and others attempts to raise perceived internal issues, such as rights of the citizenry, onto the international level. On this point, Beijing argues for respecting states' right to pursue different

[9]See "China's Position on Establishing a New International Political and Economic Order", *The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China*, 18 August 2003.

development paths, seeing attempts to impose conditions concerning 'internal matters' on relations (for example regime type) as a hegemonic project and overall detrimental to international peace and security ("China's Peaceful Development Road"—Part V, Shambaugh 1996). Despite such opposition, China is not openly hostile to democratic forms of government or does it actively promote an authoritarian development model as argued by some (See Kagan 2006). Nevertheless, support for state sovereignty and non-interference has aligned Beijing closely with a number of internationally out-cast regimes, motivating China to join those who oppose giving into international pressures (LaFranchi 2006). Friction, therefore, between short-term interests from these relations, specifically resource acquisition, and international condemnation challenging their long-term interests of seeking assurance and acceptance, is a key dilemma facing leaders in Beijing.

Beijing sees itself (and perceives others seeing it) as rising in an outlier orbit to traditional Western, specifically American, hegemony, raising issues of identity with the established great powers. In response, China's support for independent development paths has been well received in other countries, specifically in the developing world, whose leaders are wary of American interference in their domestic affairs and supportive of China's strategy of building a world of greater inclusiveness and consultation (Ding 2008). Promoting state sovereignty and non-interference further moves the focus of acceptance as a great power and inclusion into international decision-making regimes away from the nature of government or political system to that of the manner in which a state's external behaviour either supports or challenges international peace and security.

China's support for state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, however, is not a static position. While these principles do constitute an essential element, China has shown itself willing to work multilaterally, specifically within the UN, in supporting certain measures concerning the internal affairs of other states. A new development in this respect is their growing support and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, most recently China's pressure on the Khartoum government into accepting a hybrid UN force in Darfur (Gill and Reilley 2000; Stähle 2008; Holslag 2008). While notions of ensuring host-state consent are seen as necessary for Beijing, their willingness to apply pressures on these regimes (though perhaps not of the quantity or speed desired by the West) demonstrates that contrary to popular opinion, Beijing's 'pariah policy' is far more complex, contingent and malleable than usually accepted (Kleine-Ahlbrant and Small 2008). Relations with states such as Burma and Iran demonstrate as well that Beijing does intervene and apply pressure on these regimes which can be interpreted as interventionist but stops short of employing economic sanctions or military action, frustrating attempts to portray such relations as primarily concerned with balancing against US power (Li and Zheng 2009; Nourafchan 2010). Economically, China's acceptance of reforming a variety of laws to conform to the World Trade Organization rules, also, shows a level of conditionality of protecting sovereignty and non-interference (Chan et al. 2008; Kent 2002).

The greatest deviations from this principle have developed over the past half-decade which reflect the influence of a complex host of other interests, policies

and relationships which mould and shape its application. The first was China's initial support for UN Security Council Resolution 1970 authorizing the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya, but quickly withdrew support when it became evident that the Western led coalition was actively targeting Libyan military forces to assist rebel groups. The subsequent inability to create an international agreement on other internal conflicts such as Syria is in part the result of Russia and China refusing to support any such missions as a result of the Libyan experience.

The second deviation has been the refusal to condemn Russia for its annexation of Crimea from the Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent support to separatist forces fighting in Eastern Ukraine. Beijing has benefitted from these developments for it has allowed them to achieve natural resources deals with Moscow as the Putin regime searches for other revenue streams in the wake of Western sanctions. China, also, benefits strategically as the US and the West in general have been largely focused on Eastern Europe with the characterization of Russia as the West's greatest strategic challenge; combined with the ongoing turmoil in a host of Middle Eastern countries has allowed breathing room for China in East Asia, despite the 2011 announced 'Rebalance' by the US to the region (MacDonald 2014). These strategic relations have influenced Beijing's reluctance to criticize Moscow, demonstrating that while non-interference and state sovereignty remain pillars of Chinese foreign policy they are not immune from other factors and pressures influencing their deployment.

10.6 Democratizing the International System via Consensus Building in Multilateral Settings and Institutions

"The democratization of the international system", particularly the inclusion of those states considered the developing world, has been a repeated call of China's declaratory foreign policy ("China's Peaceful Development Road"—Part V). Arising from its support for state sovereignty and, thus, international equality, Beijing argues that it favours multilateralism to curb the reoccurrence of power politics and inhibits moves towards unilateralism. Indeed, China's embrace of multilateralism is evident by its membership in essentially ever large regional and global organization that it qualifies for (Johnston 2003). Furthermore, while this process began over two decades ago with an emphasis on economic and political issues, recently moves towards promoting and supporting security-based organizations have become a new facet in China's foreign policy.

China's lobbying for greater international inclusion of the developing world and its support of state sovereignty has generated considerable support from the South towards China's international positions. Particularly, China's ability to garner support within international institutions has been vital in blocking measures seen as detrimental to its domestic stability, such as the repeated defeat of human rights

reviews in the UN. Support from the developing world, as well, is seen as important towards legitimizing China's rise as a great power, specifically its role on the UN Security Council as a non-European, non-democratic and developing state which differentiates them from the other great powers (Wu and Lansdowne 2008).[10] While garnering support from the developing world is an obvious aspect of China's foreign policy, this should not be viewed as an attempt to generate an opposing block to the Western great powers for China wishes to be included and perceived as both a developing and great power, seeing a need for acceptance from both communities.

Chinese support of multilateralism, however, is highly selective, favouring institutions where they harness large amounts of power. The best example is the UN, particularly the Security Council where Beijing's veto places it on an equal footing with the other great powers. Furthermore, Beijing's support for multilateral arrangements, particularly amongst the great powers, is most likely the result of a mix of perceived benefits towards protecting China's rise including using multilateralism to balance against US hard power superiority; further economic and political integration and participation; using multilateralism as a further justification of China's peaceful development strategy of being a responsible great power; and multilateralism as an effective venue for addressing security concerns (Wu and Lansdowne 2008; Moore 2008). Saying that, however, Chinese leaders have embraced the need for multilateralism, not just in the sense of joining existing organizations but as the examples of the East Asian Summit and SCO demonstrate a greater willingness to be involved in shaping these processes, though the underlying rationales for such behaviour remain open to analysis.

Beijing, furthermore, has taken a leading role in the creation of regional and international institutions, largely focused on economic matters, which are designed to have themselves playing a decisive role in their functioning. The 2014 creation of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Development Bank, for example, has been criticized as a direct challenge to the Western led IMF and World Bank (Totten 2014) which may fracture the international community's ability to contribute to development assistance and crisis funding. Chia's lobbying, furthermore, of the AIIB is another example of establishing a new economic institution whose membership is open—as indicated by the United Kingdom's recent joining—but with Beijing taking a central role in determining the funding and operations of the institution which is largely focused on building integrated networks in Asia (Sun 2015). The creation of such parallel institutions from the mainstream and Western dominated architecture represents a desire by Chinese (and others) leaders to diversify the existing international framework, specifically economically, to better reflect contemporary power realities. Despite Beijing's growing central role in many of these new bodies, they have not promoted the creation of alternative political and military institutions to challenge the Western order in any meaningful sense.

[10]On all three aspects, however, Russia's placement is hazy.

10.7 China's Emerging Foreign Policy Strategy: Reframing the Analysis

China's emerging foreign policy strategy has largely been successful in gaining access to economic and political resources needed to fuel its developing economy and creating international conditions conducive to its rise without provoking a great power coalition to counterbalance it. China's rise as a great power is largely accepted though concerns still remain as to its future strategic intentions and specific foreign policy positions, particularly by the US and regional neighbours, creating an interesting dyad of increased economic and social linkages with distant and mistrustful political and strategic relations (For an example, see Ajay Parasram's chapter concerning Sino-Indian relations, See also Buszynski 2009; Holslag 2009; Ross 2010; Yang 2009). The increasing economic and political interconnectedness among great powers and an acceptance of mutual military vulnerability appears to be embraced by Beijing as a necessary condition for stable great power relations, revealing a complex mixture of balancing, competition and co-operation in its foreign policy. The distinction between process and content aids in the studying China's foreign policy for it unpacks the forces influencing this process; the layered and sometimes competing interests presently privileged by Beijing; and the various power sources employed moving beyond a parsimonious focus on perceived status-quo and/or revisionist tendencies, specifically a fixation with the augmentation of military power (Kim 2003).

Theorizing by Western IR scholars regarding China's rise and its relationship with the international system has tended to argue that its foreign policy is driven in large part by structural forces, specifically the balance of power between Beijing and other great powers. Endeavours to derive decisions pertaining to material capabilities from intentionality, such as Jeffery Legro's purpose transition arguments, are deeply lacking; studies examining the evolution of Beijing's foreign policy over the years including the effects of domestic issues as well are areas underdeveloped. Attempts to fit China into the status-quo/revisionist power debate appear to be an exercise more designed to demonstrate the legitimacy of these academic concepts than towards a tool to understand Chinese foreign policy. Persistent effort to force the issue into this conceptual straightjacket may be an attempt to privilege parsimonious analysis in an effort to provide advice to policymakers. In moving away from the boundaries of the status-quo/revisionist power issue, a more thorough analysis can be pursued which is not overburdened by strict adherence and privileging of a specific theoretical model with the attempt to find the casual mechanism which explains Chinese foreign intentions and behaviour.

While this model has outlined the declaratory foci of China's foreign policy by focusing on policy positions and changes in behaviour which are quite noticeable (current focus on status and multilateralism), the underlying reasoning behind these moves is uncertain. Are such developments simply a non-adversarial approach to soft balancing against the US and the West or do leaders in Beijing believe that these measures have merit in and of themselves beyond a balance of power logic?

Even if the contemporary foreign policy of China is a reluctant accommodation due to their inferior power capabilities to challenge it, will the adoption of these practices socialize Beijing over time towards deeper levels of commitments to them? (Goldstein 2005). While revisionist analyses are right to highlight the perpetual problem of uncertainty between great powers, particularly with regards to changing power configurations, to foreclose debate on China's present and/or future intentions as revisionist is an undesirable position. Doing so discards key issues such as the causes influencing the degree of transferring latent power to military force; the evolving nature of Chinese foreign policy including perception of such concepts as status-quo/revisionist power, globalization, power and great power relations; and behavioural and attitudinal changes over time such as a growing acceptance of multilateralism. On the other side of the debate, conceptual undertakings to determine the ability to assimilate China into the current international order, as some liberal institutionalist argues, are to misperceive the transformative relationship that encapsulates them and assume the matter is one of ensuring Beijing simply reprioritizes its interests instead of investigating the forces and process that are embedded in the actual construction/discarding of them.

China is not simply the next hegemonic competitor in the great power game of relative position in the global hierarchy nor are largely Chinese Confucian-based analyses accurate in explaining and predicting the contours of China's rise (Agnew 2010). If we accept the former, it marginalizes the purpose of policy and policy making to the dictates of balance of power logic. If one accepts the latter, this implies an acceptance of Chinese foreign policy as rigid and solely controlled by domestic cultural factors. Both positions are inaccurate for they neglect to accept and explore the dynamic environment within which China's rise is unfolding.

China's promotion of a 'new type of major power relations' is being taking seriously by both Beijing and Washington, wanting to avoid unnecessary worry and hostility associated with rising and dominant powers as outlined in Power Transition Theory. There are evident disagreements over the mechanisms and steps to achieve this (Hadley and Halen 2015), and a number of evident incongruences across a host of policy issues (Hachigian 2014), but both states appear to realize the mutually transformative relationship they are intertwined in. In this regard, however, China and the US appear to be 'divided by a common language' over the notions of responsibility, legitimacy and order (Leonard 2013) and combined with the construction of parallel institutions by both to promote themselves as the centre of these entities demonstrates the disagreements over the content of the international system.

While in recent years China's foreign policy, therefore, has become more abrasive in some aspects such as relations with the US on issues of governance and regional territorial disputes, our analysis demonstrates that Beijing is determined to present its behaviour as beneficial to the international system, while at the same time acknowledging there are some aspects they are uncomfortable with. While disagreement and areas of contestation exist with other great powers over the configuration of the international system at large, attempts to label China as either a status-quo or revisionist power are largely unhelpful in unpacking these differences;

demonstrate the limitedness of such concepts in this instance; and indeed create false impressions and overgeneralizations of Beijing's foreign intentions and behaviour. China does not fit into either description and indeed continues to be an active contributor to this debate, in part as a reaction to the resurgence of such a matter from Western academic and policy circles. As China continues to further engage and deepen it involvement and influence globally into the twenty-first century, the three overarching objectives of access, assurance and acceptance have become the avenues through which Beijing has decided to pursue its foreign policy goals within the contemporary international context.

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Chapter 11
Orbits of Influence: The Sino-Indian Waltz in South/Southeast Asian New Regionalism

Ajay Parasram

11.1 Introduction

As geopolitics take shape in the twenty-first century, China is progressively freed from the spectre of its twentieth century traumas and its rise increasingly understood as the resumption of a millennial trajectory of power and influence in global affairs. Within Asia, and South Asia in particular, there has been no ambiguity about China's role as a dominant agent in regional and global politics. In the words of a former Director of India's Intelligence Bureau, interviewed in 2009, China has often acted as the "paternal grandfather" to India and Pakistan, staying out of their affairs but interjecting from time to time to offer a corrective spanking (see Doval 2009). Although analytical parsimony encourages catchy terms like "BRIC" (see O'Neil 2001) to describe changes in the global distribution of power and economy, such homogenizing terminology fails to capture the significance of what some scholars are increasingly calling a "Post-Western" world order.

Graduate students interested in twenty-first century China can only look toward Asia and project a future based on knowledge of the century just past. Identifying conceptual problems with the study of Asia in the twentieth century is an essential starting point. China and India were juxtaposed problematically, in the cause of arguments that privileged economic development over political freedom or vice versa. This oversimplification presupposed each state to pursue some version of "Westernness" prescribed in modern discourses of development rather than rec-

I am grateful to Jeremy Paltiel, Paul Evans and Myles Hulme for their insightful comments at various stages of completing this manuscript.

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_11

ognizing the significance for each of these postcolonial states in expanding the orbit of their political influence. In South/Central Asia, foreign policy discourses increasingly favour "look east" orientations and many are gazing toward China on the horizon. Yet, some Chinese scholarship has taken close note of the fact that India's "look east" foreign policy gazes *south*east through deepened integration with the geopolitically important states of Burma and Sri Lanka,[1] as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

This chapter examines the way China and India gaze at one another in the South/Southeast Asian regional spaces in which they interact. One problem with twentieth century approaches to understanding this relationship has been the application of concepts like the Balance of Power (BofP) which bias approaches towards familiar patterns rooted in Western history (see Levy 2004, pp. 39–40). The concept of BofP can yield insights; however, greater returns from theoretical investment come from broadening our outlook to allow greater diplomatic and imaginative agency. Adam MacDonald's chapter in this volume, for example, targets the rationalist fixation with identifying single causal mechanisms driving Chinese foreign policy. MacDonald instead presents a conceptual model that describes the flexibility of Chinese diplomatic strategies aimed at achieving their core diplomatic objectives. Such flexibility, rather than causal determination, is necessary for understanding the regional and sub-regional dynamics driving Sino-Indian relations.

Understanding how Sino-Indian interaction and geopolitical enterprise mutually influence each other to change the strategic configuration in southern Asia ought to direct scholarly attention beyond the imperfect fit of BofP *realpolitik*. Constructivism, as operationalized in Amitav Acharya's work on norm localization, offers a richer (while still incomplete) perspective with the flexibility to understand the contemporary dynamics of the bilateral relationship and how it affects regionalism in the Asian context. Whereas Realism starts with a Western-centric,

[1]The politics of naming in postcolonial societies is important. Following the pro-democracy, anti-junta uprisings of 1988, some pro-democracy activists have refused the junta's 1989 legal renaming of the country to Myanmar claiming that their government does not have the requisite legitimacy to do so. Locally, the territory has long been referred to in writing as Myanmar, while being referred to colloquially as Burma. In essence, the debate over the name Burma or Myanmar speaks to the modern international norm of state sovereignty and the right of formerly colonized states to redefine their national identities on the one hand, while simultaneously bringing into focus the potentially anti-democractic nature of global norms that value the stability of the state sovereignty over human sovereignty. Humans have lived in the territories known today as Burma or Myanmar for at least 10,000 years, with small city–state like entities present, engaging in international trade, and record keeping for some 2,500 years. The Pagan empire eventually brought much of what we describe as modern day Burma/Myanmar into a political union that would fragment and reform based on local geopolitics until the lengthy Anglo-Burmese wars (1824–1885). In the nineteenth century, British colonizers called the territory "Burmah". In Asia, where the norm of territorial sovereignty is extremely important to postcolonial national elites, the junta's renaming of the country as Myanmar has been simply accepted. In this chapter, I refer to the territory as Myanmar when discussing BIMSTEC and Asian relations, but outside of this context, I refer to it as Burma.

Westphalian perspective on power relations, Constructivism offers a more agnostic, learning-based approach to understand international relations (IR) that does not over calcify the importance of structure in determining state relations. The chapter begins by establishing the current bilateral situation at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century before offering a case study of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). This case study focuses on Sino-Indian contestation for influence in the region manifested through Burma and Sri Lanka as "contested gateways" between the South Asian Area for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and ASEAN. The case of BIMSTEC illustrates that even a relatively powerless state such as Burma or Sri Lanka can exploit regional aspirations of larger states like India and China to advance its own national interest. Although relatively unimportant five years ago, the Bay with its access to the Indian Ocean, natural resources and its geographical linkages with ASEAN, SAARC and the watershed Tibetan plateau will be increasingly important in the decades to come.

11.2 'Localizing' the Balance of Power

North American IR and foreign policy scholarship emphasizes political "Realism" to make sense of the world. Realism came to preponderance after World War II (WWII) as an answer to the perceived fallacies of liberal "idealism" which was prominent at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century (see Doyle 1997, pp. 15–39). Realism, especially neorealism, is designed to describe "great power" behaviour, but directs little explanatory energies towards understanding small powers and their influence on great powers (see Waltz 1979, p. 93; Chaudry and Nair 2002, pp. 1–12). Neorealism predicts particular outcomes based on five traditional assumptions regarding the nature of the world: anarchy; military capability; uncertainty of other state's actions; self-help approach to the preservation of sovereignty; and universal state rationalism (see Mearsheimer 1994, pp. 9–10). Based on these assumptions, cooperation (bilateral or regional) will exist to serve temporary security purposes and the pervasive fear of an allied state betraying, or asymmetrically benefitting from an arrangement, seriously limit institutional development. As Waltz clarifies, the a priori assumption of anarchy does not mean that the complexities of human interaction and cultural differences within states do not exist, rather, that in the study of international politics, these considerations do not offer compelling explanatory potential when measured against the more parsimonious notion of Realist BofP (see Waltz 1959, pp. 159–237; 1979, pp. 102–128).

Whereas realism assumes anarchy is a natural structure emerging from a Hobbesian state of nature that inevitably leads to conflict between states (see Waltz 1959, pp. 159–237), constructivism views realism's anarchic determinism as a social creation. Constructivists reject that state interests/preferences are determined exogenously; on the contrary, it is precisely how the preferences and composition of the state are internally negotiated and externally learned/reinforced that makes up a core

component of the research agenda (see Wendt 1994, pp. 384–385). As a structural theory of IR, Wendt identifies three core components of constructivist theory:

> (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are an important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt 1994, p. 385).

Constructivism does not necessarily take issue with anarchy, rather, posits that "anarchy is what states make of it" (see Wendt 1992, pp. 291–325). Indeed, a multitude of different anarchies is possible, based on the interaction and learned behaviour of states (see Hopf 1998, p. 174). As Hopf identifies,

> The neorealist assumption of self-interest presumes to know, a priori, just what is the self being identified. In other words, the state in international politics, across time and space, is assumed to have a single eternal meaning. Constructivism instead assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are a variable; they likely depend on historical, cultural, political, and social context (Hopf 1998, p. 175).

Constructivism isolates the building of identity and the learning process through which participant states discover incentives over repeated actions through "social acts" (Hopf 1998, p. 175). The process of learning is not antagonistic to the logic of anarchy; rather, it departs from violent anarchic determinism to discuss how preferences and learning shape state or organizational identity. It is the willingness to view structures as being inherently dynamic, subject to change/adaptation, and even localization/indigenization that supports a constructivist approach to understand Sino-Indian relations in their increasingly overlapping spheres of influence.

In the context of Sino-Indian relations and the regionalization processes of twenty-first century Asia, Amitav Acharya's call for giving greater agency to "norm-takers" is instructive (see Acharya 2009, pp. 4–6, 14–23; Acharya 2004, pp. 230–275). Norms of proper behaviour tend to favour 'good' practices from the 'Occident', displacing 'bad' local practices from the "Orient" (see Acharya 2009, p. 4; Said 1978). Acharya notes that the manner in which Southeast Asian states have localized norms from India and China historically and the "West" contemporarily displays a considerable amount of *localization,* defined as

> the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors which results in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices (see Acharya 2009, p. 15).

Localization is a purposeful process of "indigenization" based on a "cognitive prior" which can be based on ethnic/nationalistic values, diplomatic interaction or views about how states ought to interact in regional forums. Acharya notes that

> This process was especially important in the Third World, where the postcolonial states would seek to translate their newfound sovereign status into foreign policy behavior. (ibid., 23).

Swaran Singh notes the importance of China and India's postcolonial experience and how the experience altered their perceptions of one another.

> The colonial experience turned India-China ties topsy-turvy, distorting China's image about India from *Tian Zhu* (western heaven) since ancient times to one that saw India as an integral part of the British exports of opium, the Opium Wars and the Younghusband expedition of 1905 (see Singh 2008, pp. 83–84).

India's conceptual shift in Chinese eyes from *Tian Zhu* to opium dealers reflects the ways through which colonial power re-directed relationships, but also how the colonial encounter introduced and normalized an increasingly global incentive structure through which freedom from colonial rule came to be demonstrated through engaging with a colonially produced international system of modern nation–states (see Parasram 2014). Yet, even within this Western-centric structure, considerable agency and "localization" of practices can be observed in ways that limit the utility of theories that overvalue the affairs of "great" powers. Section III below seeks to establish a suitable understanding of twenty-first century bilateral relations between the 'dragon' and the 'elephant' before section IV interrogates Sino-Indian relations through the case of BIMSTEC which bridges South/Southeast Asia. China and India elude parsimonious "Western" theorizing precisely because they are neither longstanding "Great Powers" in a Westphalian sense, nor are they simply "emerging" powers. They are complex, postcolonial political communities with histories of waxing and waning influence throughout South and Southeast Asia, who experienced collective humiliation in different yet related ways at the hands of European powers. They have been learning how to best achieve their strategic objectives as Westphalian states throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and their relationship demonstrates both efforts at collaborative relations *and* crucial points of strategic clash, which illustrates a need for new theoretical research which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

11.3 The Dragon and Elephant Waltz

The coming of the twenty-first century did not revolutionize Sino-Indian relations any more than any other day or year might have. However, there are some important similarities and differences to take note of that affect both the relationship as well as global perceptions of these regionalized hegemons. Both China and India enjoyed military and economic preponderance in East and South Asia, respectively, in the latter portion of the twentieth century, which increased in scale in the twenty-first century. Southeast Asian states, especially Vietnam, have tried to use India to check Chinese influence in the region (see Garver 1987).[2] Pakistan has been the most notorious South Asian state to align itself militarily with China, and is related geographically and strategically to core issues of bilateral contention

[2]Especially, for example, in the third Indochina war, commonly referred to as the "Vietnam" war. Hanoi relied heavily on its diplomatic relations with the governments of Indira and then Rajiv Gandhi, supported tacitly by the Soviet Union as a strategy to build an Anti-China presence in Asia. See Garver 1987.

between the hegemons. To an important degree, the three most significant points of conflict between China and India in the twentieth century persist and are related: the Dalai Lama/Tibet issue, Sino-Pakistani security cooperation and the disputed bilateral border. Bhattacharya notes that China's claim to Arunachal Pradesh in particular relates to ongoing Chinese concern with India's position regarding Tibet, fearing that losing any one part of its sovereign writ could lead territorial losses elsewhere (see Bhattacharya 2010, pp. 678–679).

The Sino-Indian border extends over 130,000 km^2 and has led to territorial contestations in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Ladakh and Kashmir—an especially sensitive region between India and Pakistan since partition (see Stobdan 2010, pp. 14–15). Pakistan's 'gift' of 20 % of the Shaksam Valley (see Bhattacharya 2010, p. 679) less than one year after the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and preceding the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 is no coincidence. As Shyman Saran notes, "China has never hesitated to use its alliance with Pakistan to keep India tethered firmly in South Asia" (see Saran 2010). Following Realist assumptions alone offers insufficient analytical equipment to grapple with crucial moments where Beijing did *not* act in a way that would strengthen its strategic position through Pakistan, however. Significantly, Beijing did not intervene during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the 1971 war leading to the partition of East and West Pakistan,[3] and the Kargil Conflict of 1999 (ibid.). Indeed, as Saran notes, during the 1971 war, Washington "virtually pleaded" Beijing to run military exercises along their border with India to ease pressure on Pakistan. While China did not bend to US requests or independently come to Pakistan's aid, Indo-Vietnamese relations under PM Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s did earn special attention from Beijing. PM Gandhi diplomatically assaulted China through tacitly criticizing the extension of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Gandhi said

> On the international stage, Vietnam and India have been together and will always be together. We shall together oppose all forms of domination and discrimination (see Gandhi, in Garver 1987, p. 1211).

As Garver argues, "domination" was code word for Chinese foreign policy, and Beijing wasted no time in responding. After one week, a Chinese naval squadron, including a supply ship and a destroyer, called on the ports of Karachi, Colombo and Chittagong. The message, argues Garver, was clear: "if you presume to support our neighbors against us, we will feel free to support your neighbors against you" (see Garver 1987, p. 1212).

Why this seeming inconsistency? It is only inconsistent because the theoretical tools are poorly calibrated to the case under study. China and India have both emphasized framing their 'rise' as peaceful and helpful to their regional neighbours, meticulously guarding the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention, which will be discussed further in the next section. As seen above, China could have devastated pre-nuclear India in the 1962 and 1965 wars, yet did not. T.P. Sreenivasan argues

[3]Where East Pakistan became the new state of Bangladesh.

that there are sufficient guarantees to avoid another 1962 in the Sino-Indian relationship because the "Dragon" has learned how to live without "breathing fire" at its neighbours. Sreenivasan argues that the Indian "Elephant", however, must play by the Dragon's rules to avoid being burned (see Sreenivasan 2010). He identifies that while the US, France and the UK all "sang for their supper" in terms of securing positive political–economic relations with India in 2010, China acquiesced to none of India's 'core' diplomatic concerns yet secured agreement for increased bilateral trade up to 100 billion US by 2015 which will asymmetrically benefit China. While Beijing did not support Washington and Paris' outright support for India on the UN Security Council (UNSC), they did break their tradition of multilaterally opposing this goal and said China "understands and supports India's aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations, including in the Security Council" (see Press Trust of India 2010). This nuanced policy illustrates an important and underappreciated acknowledgment that China does not see India's inclusion into the highest echelons of global governance as a strategic threat as they might have in the twentieth century and as their Pakistani allies no doubt would prefer them to. Indeed, on the subject of Chinese opposition to India's ascension to a permanent UNSC seat, India's External Affairs (EA) Minister comments, "China is unlikely to stand in the way" (see Thapar 2010).

Through a detailed study of Chinese perceptions of India through three Chinese academic journals, Manjeet Pardesi synthesizes Beijing's twenty-first century perception of India as one cognizant of the strategic implications of Indian economic growth, the transformation of Indian bilateral relations with the US and Japan, India's limited but significant "look east" foreign policy successes in Southeast Asia, and the growing Indian military capability in the Indian Ocean and beyond (see Pardesi 2010, p. 569). As India's gravitational influences increases, the Dragon and the Elephant may take turns leading the waltz on some 'core' issues to avoid spoiling the dance. For the first time in a public forum, India's ambassador to Beijing explained that India too had "core interests" and that public perception of China in the free press is that Beijing is violating or impinging Indian core interests territorial sovereignty (see Krishnan 2010).

Indian security analysts in particular are quick to emphasize the quiet ways China undermines India's core interests, specifically through acts of sovereignty or counter-sovereignty performed through stapled visas for Kashmiris or post-Eid parties with the Chinese company responsible for developing the Karakoram Highway project in neighbouring Pakistan (see Express Tribune 2010). While this reached a highpoint in 2010, at the high diplomatic level, there is a call for nuance in understanding how Beijing and Delhi are evolving their relationship (see Sreenivasan 2010). Then-Indian EA Minister Nirupama Rao told *The Hindu* that Delhi understands the strategic relationship of Beijing and Islamabad, and in the twenty-first century has sought to deepen bilateral relations with China in terms of trade, counterterrorism and diplomatic gains with respects to a potential seat for India on the UNSC (see Thapar 2010). Overstating the points of geopolitical contention, she argues, undermines the careful bilateral successes as each country learns to communicate and protect their "core interests" with one another. She notes

that it was PM Wen who raised the stapled visa issue with PM Singh in their December 2010 talks, identifying that Beijing saw this as "administrative" rather than "political" and are interested in working bilaterally towards political resolution (see Karackattu 2010; Thapar 2010). The message from Rao is that the relationship between India and China in the last decade is deliberately more nuanced and complex than twentieth century geopolitics, not least of all because China is India's largest trade partner. As India and China continue to grow in gravitational influence regionally and globally, they will have to take careful stock of each other's core sensitivities. India's presence in Oslo for the (controversial) awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo in December 2010 is a case in point, as China was especially opposed to this award and many countries with close relations to China snubbed the event (see Amland and Chang 2010; BBC 2010). So important was snubbing the Nobel committee that China established the "Confucius Peace Prize" in the last few weeks of 2010 in protest (see Tran 2010). It is likely that Delhi's presence in Oslo dampened the outcome of the meetings between Wen and Singh in December 2010 (see Press Trust of India 2010). In terms of long-term security problems, border conflict has remained an obstacle for bilateral relations. Recent military altercations along the disputed 2,200 mile border between China and India have provoked multi-week confrontations in Depsang (2013) and again in Demchok and Chamar (2014) with the latter two unfolding as Chinese premier Xi Jinping was arriving in India for his first meeting with the new Indian Prime Minister, Narindra Modi last September. While the military standoff tended to overshadow the high-level meetings between Modi and Xi, the two state leaders strived to brush aside the conflict, with Xi reiterating Beijing's willingness to upgrade India's observer status in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) to full member (see Burke 2014).

Sino-Indian relation in the context of regional organizations within their shared orbits is an important manifestation of influence that is often under-emphasized. Much of their twentieth century regional aspirations were aimed towards currying ASEAN's favour despite ASEAN's weariness of each country's gravitational influence for different reasons throughout the twentieth century (see Parasram 2009). The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within sub-regional organizations affects the melody to which the dragon and elephant waltz in their shared regional spaces in southeast Asia, and while Beijing had brought New Delhi into the SCO as an observer long ago, China had to "muscle" its way into observer status with SAARC, hedging soft power diplomacy with India's neighbours (Bhattacharya 2010, p. 680). Indeed, Nepal and Bhutan have actively sought to grant China full membership in SAARC and there was indication that Beijing was interested in offering full membership in SCO to India in exchange for admission to SAARC as early as 2010. However, as then-EA Minister Rao noted, SAARC would not be accepting new members: "We have eight members and that is the way it is going to stay" (see Emerging Asia 2010). China, along with Iran, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Myanmar, Mauritius, the European Union and Australia all possess "observer status" within SAARC, which speaks to the perceived importance of the South Asian region in the twenty-first century and also to the future of regional

blocs moving away from older norms of geographical contiguity. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal have all expressed interest in elevating China's status to full member of SAARC, but New Delhi and Dhaka in particular have remained keen to keep political control firmly in South Asian hands. Working ahead of last December's Kathmandu summit at the committee level, India and Bangladesh proposed elevating observer states to "dialogue partners" instead, which would allow them to support projects identified by SAARC. According to the declaration,

> In furtherance of earlier decisions on establishing dialogue partnership with States outside the region, the Leaders appreciated the Study undertaken by the SAARC Secretariat to review and analyze the engagement with the existing Observers to establish dialogue partnership. The Leaders directed the Programming Committee to engage the SAARC Observers into productive, demand-driven and objective project based cooperation in priority areas as identified by the Member States (see SAARC 2014).

The text of the wording is important, as it identifies the observers of SAARC as being "outside the region". While this might seem intuitively obvious in the case of Australia, the EU or America, the limit of "the region" has and continues to be far more contested between China and India. It is difficult to ignore the self-interest in the above statement, as outsiders seem invited to provide funding and investment into policy areas identified by the insiders. As Matthew Gaudreau's study of Chinese multilateral development policy in this volume shows, China has been using a considerable amount of good-will foreign policy amongst states in the so-called Global South in recent years. In this sense, South Asian states stand to benefit significantly from Chinese soft power. China's newfound interest in SAARC in the twenty-first century speaks to the increasing strategic importance of the regional spaces that connect South and Southeast Asia. The Bay of Bengal is one such arena of increasing significance.

11.4 The Bay of Bengal

For at least two dozen centuries, the Bay of Bengal has been a vibrant intersection of culture and political economy. Beginning with Malay sailors, circa 300 BCE, East Africans, Indians, Egyptians, Chinese, Burmans and Thais traversed its waters trading precious Indian textiles which were sophisticated two thousand years prior (see Kelegama 2001, p. 267; Shaffer 1994, pp. 2–8). Indians began traversing its waters in search of new sources of gold during the Mauryan Empire, as their traditional source of gold, Siberia, became too treacherous to reach by land through Central Asia, circa. 321–185 BCE (Shaffer 1994, p. 3). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Bay remains an important economic, cultural, ecological and geopolitical place for Asia.

On June 6, 1997, the "Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Community" (BISTEC) was born in Bangkok (see BIMSTEC 2008a). Although Burma attended the Bangkok meeting, it did not become a member of the regional

group until December 22, 1997, at which point the group was renamed "Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Community" (BIMSTEC). By the sixth Ministerial meeting in 2004, the organization was expanded to include Bhutan and Nepal and renamed the "Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral and Economic Cooperation". The BIMSTEC was created to facilitate trade, transportation and cooperation amongst countries with a shared interest and stake in the Bay of Bengal. Membership is theoretically open to any country which can make the case that its prosperity is intimately tied to the Bay of Bengal (see BIMSTEC 2008a).

BIMSTEC is a heavily bureaucratized regional organization, engaging constituent members in 13 committees, some of which include "Public Health", "Poverty Alleviation" and "Transportation and Communication", which makes development a core aspect of the new arrangement (see BIMSTEC 2008b). Coordinating efforts through the Bangkok Working Group, the BIMSTEC works at the senior Ministerial level and the bureaucratic level. At the Ministerial level, Foreign Affairs Ministers and Trade Ministers meet annually on different policy-making bodies. The Bangkok Working Group at the centre is fed decisions from the Policy Groups, as well as from an operational body representing the 13 subgroups. The BIMSTEC Energy Committee met for the second time in Bangkok in March 2010 where member states agreed to establish a regional energy grid at a BIMSTEC Energy Centre in India (see People's Daily 2010).

The BIMSTEC is an important modern development as it can be conceptualized as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia (see Parasram 2009). Although Southern Asian regionalization throughout the Cold War took the form of ASEAN and SAARC, before either of these existed, local approaches to region building were being entertained. Between 1939 and 1945, future Indian PM Nehru spoke of an "Asian federation" as a way for Asian states to strengthen their sovereignty and guard against colonial powers' encroachment.

> My…picture of the future is a federation which includes China and India, Burma and Ceylon,[4] Afghanistan and possibly other countries (see J. Nehru in Acharya 2009, p. 33).

As Acharya notes, Nehru did not know that a few years later China would be communist and that Pakistan would be carved out of what he thought was India (see Acharya 2009, p. 48), but nonetheless, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia together formed the "Colombo 5" in 1954 with a view to developing local notions of non-intervention, "including the creation of an injunction against participation in collective defense pacts organized under 'greater power orbit'" (see Acharya 2009, pp. 39–40). Three of these original five members would eventually become members of the BIMSTEC four decades later.

BIMSTEC is set to create a free trade area (FTA) between 2012 and 2017 (see Braveboy-Wagner 2009, pp. 208–209) which will institutionally link India to

[4]"Ceylon" was the European colonial name for the island known as the "Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka" since 1972. It was called "Lanka" in ancient Sanskrit texts and "Serendib", the Arabic root word for "serendipity" by Arab traders.

Thailand and Burma who are both in turn linked to ASEAN. BIMSTEC's membership includes all members of SAARC with the exclusion of the Maldives, Afghanistan and importantly, Pakistan. BIMSTEC is seen by some as a more effective way to manage economic integration than SAARC, in large part because of Indo-Pakistani political problems (see Banik 2007, p. 2). In the context of Sino-Indian competition for influence in twenty-first century Southeast Asia, deeper involvement with resource-rich and ASEAN-linked Burma and Thailand can be seen as an Indian project to press its strategic advantage into an area China understands as part of its orbit of influence (see Garver 2001, p. 9). Although the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean region accounts only for a small portion of Chinese trade, its access to the Indian Ocean includes marine Chinese trade with the Middle East and Africa, which prioritizes oil and will likely become more significant as Beijing continues to develop its relationship with African states (see Garver 2001, p. 276). The Tibetan plateau, already an important arena of classic Sino-Indian tensions, is becoming more complex as water security becomes even more important in the decades to come. As Bhattacharya notes,

> The Tibetan plateau is the principal watershed in Asia and the source of 10 major rivers, including the Brahmaputra, Indus, Sutlej, Mekong, and the two headwaters of Ganges. China has plans for major river projects that include production of hydroelectricity and diversion of rivers to its arid regions (see Bhattacharya 2010, p. 681).

BIMSTEC, with its objective of managing resources collectively and its *defacto* inclusion of almost all of SAARC, could conceivably exercise some agency over Chinese plans for water diversion, and it is in this greater context of resource security that China and India's mutual desire to attract the small states of Nepal and Bhutan to their orbits of influence should be interpreted in the future. In light of governance of the Bay of Bengal, though today BIMSTEC is hardly a force to be reckoned with, the strategic importance of the Bay as a conduit for trade, transportation, naval positioning and resource management will likely increase BIMSTEC's importance in the decades to come. At the 2014 BIMSTEC summit in Nay Pyi Taw, the group moved to finalize their draft agreements in trade in goods as well as trade dispute mechanisms with a view to meet their 2017 deadline for the FTA (see BIMSTEC 2014).

Whether the BIMSTEC will be able to hold together as a regional block for mutual benefit over and above the bilateral self-interest of member states is far from obvious, however, especially in light of recent developments in Chinese foreign policy concerning the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Route (known as "One Belt, One Road" in Chinese circles), discussed below. The Burmese gateway is of strategic importance in the Bay of Bengal, providing India's only land link to Southeast Asia (see Kaul 2006, pp. 317–319) but also enables a more direct Chinese access to the Bay and Indian Ocean than the Straits of Malacca. India has sought to build cozy relations with Burma, amidst widespread criticism around the world, in an effort to curb the expansion of Chinese influence (ibid.). Burmese on and offshore natural gas discoveries have provoked bidding wars between China and India. Although theoretically wedded to India through BIMSTEC with a

specific mandate to cooperate on economic issues involving the Bay, when awarding a lucrative resource extraction deal in 2007 that many believed would go to India, Burma instead offered it to China. Amidst a looming UNSC vote on strengthening sanctions against Burma later that year, however, it is not surprising that the natural gas deal went to Beijing, who later vetoed the aforementioned resolution (see Jagan 2006; Srivastava 2007; United Nations 2007; Economist 2007). Indeed, Beijing promised Rangoon that they would veto any attempt at imposing economic sanctions, and had been providing a series of low-interest loans and military equipment to the military junta to combat ethnic "insurgents" along the Chinese-Burmese Border (see Jagan 2006). Yet what Beijing decrees is not always what its regions practice. Burma accounts for just one per cent of China's trade, but it accounts for 24 % of the southern province of Yunnan's trade. In Yunnan, the boundaries of "East" and "Southeast" Asia complicate any easy state-level diplomacy, as the cultural, ethnic and economic relations across the border are of great "micro-regional" importance. Much of this trade is illicit and unofficial, and thus while nation-to-nation conversations pledge support to fight "ethnic insurgents", at the everyday micro-regional level, commercial activity actually helps finance those very ethnic insurgents on the Burmese side of the border. In the recent bouts of fighting between Shan rebels in the Kokang region and the national army, nearly sixty-thousand refugees have moved into Yunnan Province (see Economist 2015). The fighting in Kokang led to Burmese bombs falling on Chinese territory, a mistake Rangoon promised to pay compensation for (see Linxi 2015). That this border region only became part of Burma when ceded to the British by the Qing in 1897 is reflected in the fact that some 90 % of people in the Kokan region are Mandarin speaking ethnic Han Chinese with deep relations across the border (see Economist 2015).

The issue of India becoming a veto-wielding UNSC member, taken in light of Sino-Indian regional contestation for influence in their overlapping orbits through the Burmese gateway, is thus no trivial matter for China. Indian efforts to curry favour with its Southeast Asian gatekeeper persist despite China's apparent success in circumventing the expected norms of BIMSTEC regionalism. On April 4, 2008, New Delhi offered a red carpet welcome for General Maung Aye—second in command of the ruling military junta. Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari and Maung Aye signed a lucrative transportation agreement. As Siddharth Srivastava notes,

> The US$130 million project permits India to develop Myanmar's Sittwe port on the Kaladan River - a project that could turn into an important international trade hub - and possible military logistical base - for the land-locked northeast (see Srivastava 2008).

This agreement creates a stronger transportation infrastructure for continued bilateral relations, and is seen as a key step towards implementing India's "look east" foreign policy (ibid.).

Across the Bay, Sri Lanka has historically relied on close relations with India and the West in its quest for stability and sovereignty. The controversial end to its 26-year civil war between 2006 and 2009, however, led to an important military and diplomatic re-alignment with China and Pakistan (see Parasram 2012).

Colombo's heavy handed tactics in crushing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northeast of the island led to the eventual loss of aid and assistance from the West due to human rights issues associated with military advances into LTTE-controlled territory. Nonetheless, Colombo was able to leverage a fivefold military aid increase between 2007 and 2008 worth nearly US 1 billion from Beijing and used it in part to purchase military equipment from Pakistan (see Sengupta 2008). It was indictments on human rights abuses from the West that invoked an "Asian-way" discourse from Colombo and supports its "look east" foreign policy favouring relations with China in particular and checking India through deeper relations with both China and Pakistan. According to Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona,

> Asians don't go around teaching each other how to behave. There are ways we deal with each another – perhaps a quiet chat but not wagging the finger (see Kahona in Sengupta, 2008).

New Delhi was cornered into an uncomfortable diplomatic and domestic situation by its BIMSTEC partner, as domestic outrage at Colombo's strategy was rampant in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. India was also engaged in an especially contentious federal election in 2009 and Tamil Nadu is an important swing state (see Ramal 2009). Relying on China, Colombo has given space in the Mannar Basin for Chinese oil exploration in exchange for military aid (see Sahoo and Taneja 2010). Oil extraction, significant bilateral trade and investment, and transportation infrastructure has characterized Chinese relations on a state-by-state basis with many small members of BIMSTEC (who are also members of SAARC) and contributed to Indian feelings of being "crowded out" in its traditional sphere of influence (ibid.).

Prior to flying to India to meet with the new Indian PM Narendra Modi in September 2014, Chinese Premier Xi was making the first official state visit to Sri Lanka in 28 years. The two countries are due to finalize a bilateral FTA in June 2015 (see Xinhau, 2014). In a surprising turn of events, longstanding president Mahinda Rajapaksa was defeated in Sri Lanka's January elections by his former Health Minister, Maithripala Sirisena. Part of Sirisena's campaign was to "re-assess" the role of foreign direct investment in Sri Lanka, including a Chinese company's 1.4 billion dollar investment project in developing the controversial "Colombo Port City" project. The environmental impact of the project on the region's fisheries, coral reefs and its associated impact on landslides due to sediment removal needed to build the project has pitted environmental interests against trade/diplomatic interests in the context of a very new Sri Lankan administration seeking to distance itself from the dictatorial image of the previous administration. This has led to some tension in the bilateral relationship, as the Sirisena administration has suspended, then re-opened, and then suspended again port city development project (see Tiezzi 2015, Chamikara 2015). Nevertheless, China has been substantively involved in developing ports in Sri Lanka and Colombo was the first country to endorse China's proposed "twenty first century Maritime Silk Route", which is an ambitious, and somewhat ambiguous, open-ended plan to promote

commercial cooperation and trade through the Indian Ocean connecting China, Africa, South Asia and Europe (see Goodman 2014). The developing plan has been folded into an even broader Chinese led plan called "One Belt, One Road" which seeks to connect China via significant infrastructural development across the region via airspace, roadways, fibre-optic cables, high-speed rail and more. The plan, of which the Maritime Silk Route is a part of, works through the "Silk Road Fund" of significant importance for Pakistan, which has been earmarked for 11 billion in infrastructural development and 33 billion for energy investment from China (see Escobar 2015). At the time of writing in May 2015, Sri Lankan president Sirisena and Chinese Premier Xi have recently discussed a trilateral cooperation arrangement that would include India as a way of addressing Indian security concerns about burgeoning Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean region more generally (see Gupta 2015). On the Sri Lankan side of the equation, Sirisena noted that the problems with China's development projects in Sri Lanka were associated with the Rajapaksa administration rather than China, suggesting that domestic politics rather than regional re-alignment of any sort is the source of the contemporary situation, as new administrations in both New Delhi and Colombo come to new terms with the geopolitical and economic situation in the ocean spaces they share.

The rivalry between India and China has been transformed since the end of the Cold War. Now they are embroiled in a race for resources and trade that China appears to be winning, but India is also benefitting from enormously. China, well aware of South and Southeast Asian fear of their overwhelming military and economic abilities, is working hard to sign "fair" trade deals with its neighbours in the spirit of regional cooperation. As Kaul identifies, however, Chinese policy surrounding Taiwan and the South China Sea helps to maintain a feeling of uneasiness about the 'true' aspirations of Chinese regional hegemony (see Kaul 2006). From China's perspective, one must note Indo-ASEAN integration efforts as well. Although the BIMSTEC at this early stage may not yet provoke tangible challenges to the BofP in Asia, India has unilaterally been pushing its influence into Southeast Asia since 1971. Since the end of the Cold War, India has been pursuing inter-regional "bridging" mechanisms with ASEAN. A non-exhaustive list includes the ASEAN-India multilateral dialogue, Indian inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum, an ASEAN-India Economic Linkages Task Force, a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, and the "ASEAN-Indian Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity" (ibid. 318). ASEAN hopes to counter-balance Chinese influence through India. The ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 frameworks have strengthened China's position in Southeast Asian regionalism even more substantially than the ASEAN-India dialogues have. The BIMSTEC, as a clever alternative to ASEAN and SAARC, offers a more flexible strategy to bridge South and Southeast Asia and its regional potential will be important for future Sino-Indian relations. Indeed, in addition to lauding the "look east" foreign policies of South Asian countries, then-Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa applauded the "look west" foreign policy approach of BIMSTEC *and* ASEAN member states. "The key characteristic of our Organization

has been the meeting of the "Look West" policy of the ASEAN nations and the "Look East" policy of their South Asian counterparts, thereby bridging two of the most dynamic regions in the world" (see Rajapaksa 2014).

Despite the continued Sino-Indian suspicion of the other's encroachment on their respective spheres of influence, bilateral trade between the two countries has been growing rapidly. As Kaul maintains, China is India's second most important trading partner, and there is a growing sense of admiration amongst Indians for China's continued economic prosperity (see Kaul 317). Although bilateral trade between India and China was only 5 billion dollars in 2002, by 2005, bilateral trade amounted to more than a fivefold increase with the balance of trade favouring China (Aiyar 2007) and in 2010 then Premier Wen and PM Singh tagged increasing bilateral trade to US 100 billion as a core objective for the next decade (Thapar 2010). China surpassed the USA as India's top trade partner in 2014, and bilateral trade between Beijing and New Delhi in 2013/2014 was 66 billion USD, with a balance of trade favouring China by 36 billion USD (see Indian Department of Commerce 2015). Measured from April 2014 to January 2015 alone, total trade is already 61 billion USD with 40 billion trade surplus in China's favour; a long way from the goal of 100 billion, but nonetheless well over twelve times the amount of bilateral trade between 2005 and 2015. As Karrackatu observes, it is precisely the market potential in India for China that makes Sino-Indian long-term trade more important than China-EU or even China-US trade (Karrackatu 2010, pp. 4–5). Amidst the pervasive and ongoing geopolitical challenges that afflict the Sino-Indian relationship, foreign policy between the dragon and the elephant seems increasingly aware of a need to find new ways to grow cautiously amongst one another, if not by choice, then by virtue of economic and political necessity.

11.5 Conclusion

What is clear from the preceding exploration of Sino-Indian relations bilaterally and regionally is that conventional theoretical approaches to making sense of their holistic relations are inadequately captured through power alone. While India is no longer *Tian Zhu* to China, they are also clearly not a mere "hegemonic rival" either. It would be too simplistic a conclusion to draw that liberal institutionalism, that is, the collective economic benefits accruing from increased institutional cooperation, has overcome or rendered manageable the relations between China and India. As one Indian journalist explained to me during an interview in 2009, there are two Chinas in India: the military juggernaut of the 1960s, and the producer of cheap commodities of today. Increased economic cooperation did not prevent the three recent border incidents between the two countries, yet in learning and developing their bilateral *and* regional relationships in the south/southeast Asian region, the explosive potential of colliding elephants and dragons was avoided. China has had ample opportunity to offer crushing defeats to India through interventions on behalf of Pakistan, yet has preferred a soft power approach to stretching its gravitational

influence over South/Southeast Asian states. As postcolonial states embedded in a modern global system not of their active design, the two states seem inclined in the twenty-first century to radiate soft power to expand their orbits of influence. This does not mean that rivalry and clashes will not continue to ensue, but learning and agency have clearly textured both their bilateral and regional relations. In essence, they have strived to localize the act of being a state in the twenty-first century, which highlights the centrality of regional cooperation and competition through which small states too exercise considerable influence.

If, as constructivists predict, agents are capable of changing the structure in which they interact, it stands to reason that the twenty-first century regional architecture may at least see a reconfiguration of a more localized understanding of the BofP, especially over resource security and commercial transportation in the crucial Bay of Bengal and Tibetan Plateau region that bridges South and Southeast Asia. India and China together demonstrate that great powers can exist with overlapping orbits of political and economic influence, endure acrimonious relations and fierce rivalry over issues of core strategic interest, and at the same time, build materially significant positive relations. In the competitive relations of China and India in southern Asia, it is clear too that part of negotiating a new and distinct regional politics is taking seriously the perspectives of smaller states, like Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Although China and India struggled with postcolonial challenges as they practiced statehood in the mid-twentieth century, they are today among the most important states on the Earth. Their bilateral and regional relations seem to favour carrots over sticks, both in their efforts to attract South/Southeast Asian states to their orbits, and also toward each other on economic issues. Even a well-polished crystal ball cannot yet predict if the dragon and the elephant will waltz peacefully or fall out of step in the decades to come, but when beasts of this size waltz the rest of us would do well to watch their movements closely, and see how they might change the steps of the dance itself.

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Chapter 12
Plurality in China's South–South Cooperation: The Case of Rice Projects in Mali

Matthew Gaudreau

12.1 Introduction

In recent years, particularly since 2000, there has been much discussion regarding the acceleration of China's presence in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). China's increasing engagement with the countries of SSA, and larger South–South development partnerships, has had a ripple effect throughout communities of scholars and development practitioners. Surely, China's role in South–South cooperation will continue to be of great importance throughout the twenty-first century. As the second largest economy in the world, the increasing international influence held by China, and its multifaceted engagement with other developing countries, gives cause to consider China's role in relation to "traditional" international development actors. However, discussion has often remained in the realm of macroeconomics and state-to-state analysis, with less attention paid to the details of local- and sectoral-level activities. As such, the current analysis of China's presence in SSA has too often been very broad, with little examination of the complexities and pluralities of this relationship with regard to entrenched international actors and third-party partnerships.

In acknowledging Alden and Hughes' (2009) call for the "necess[ity] to go beyond the state-to-state level of analysis," this chapter will examine the involvement of Chinese actors within traditional development space and third-party engagements. By "traditional," what is meant is the typically OECD-led governmental and nongovernmental actors who have historically allocated money and

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_12

resources for the purpose of assisting less-developed countries.[1] Bräutigam (2009b) indicates that agriculture is one area that China has longstanding ties to in its relationships with Africa, and is currently fast developing. As such the case of Mali's rice sector in the context of international development involvement will be used as a gateway to acknowledging China's multifaceted engagements. While this chapter does not intend to examine the policy making process within China, it highlights the space developing between strict "state-to-state" (i.e., China-to-African state) involvement and Chinese private sector involvement (as discussed by Gu 2009). This chapter will make concrete the experience of Chinese actors participating in transnational projects involving third parties from both state and private sectors.

It is argued that the multilateral projects engaged in by Chinese actors offer a learning space for establishing better coordination with countries active in development assistance, and for exposure to international best practices. In this volume, Adam MacDonald has discussed multilateralism at the level of diplomacy in China's foreign policy; this chapter will focus on multilateralism in development assistance, at both the state and non-state levels. The presence of Chinese actors in Mali's rice sector will demonstrate that China is not simply a "unitary actor" (Alden and Hughes 2009) in development as many have perceived. Although bilateral flows have made up a significant portion of the China–Africa story, there is also an increasing trend in which Chinese actors have been engaging with third parties. While some criticisms remain valid, there are potential benefits from the point of view of international cooperation. This dynamic has important implications for developing countries, the future of the existing development architecture, and for how scholars treat China in both the development industry and larger international relations.

In order to examine Chinese development partnerships, a variety of materials will be examined, including newspaper, government, and NGO reports, as well as related scholarly texts. China's experiences in SSA will be overviewed, briefly acknowledging the literature on the subject to date. This review will be followed by an introduction to Mali's rice-producing region and its links with traditional development actors. Three development projects that simultaneously took place between 2008 and 2011 will then be examined—all involving Chinese actors: (i) the Libyan led MALIBYA project, (ii) a Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) funded rice initiative, and (iii) the US Government funded Alatona Irrigation Project (AIP). Finally, this case will be linked to a larger pattern of Chinese actors engaging in the development industry, and outside of the state-to-state framework.

[1]This includes the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank, which is discussed in this paper. Relatedly, the reference to "Western" actors is a generalization to represent major actors from countries in the OECD, such United States, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Japan, Canada, etc., with the inclusion of IFIs.

12.2 The Debate

12.2.1 History of China in the African Continent

In September 2006, the Chinese government held its Beijing Summit on China–Africa Cooperation, part of its ongoing Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This heads-of-state meeting was the biggest of its kind in China, and was the result of previous ministerial-level meetings since the year 2000. This meeting involved the heads of state/representatives from 48 leaders across Africa, and featured the inclusion of Chinese companies to lobby for business services (Xinhua 2006). On this occasion, Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) declared that the Forum had resulted in a "strategic partnership between China and Africa on the basis of political equality, mutual trust, economic cooperation, win-win, and cultural exchanges" (Luan 2006). This event has been the focal point of trepidation to many Western commentators, fearing China's growing influence and resource access across the continent.

To demonstrate China's engagement further, in 2010, then Vice President Xi Jinping (习近平) (now China's paramount leader) attended the latest ministerial conference in South Africa to reaffirm the relationship (Guo 2010). However, as Bräutigam (2009a) has made clear, the relationship between China and SSA is not something that developed in 2006, or even in 2000. Despite the recent increase in economic volume of this relationship, China has had a diplomatic presence in Africa since early in the creation of the People's Republic of China (Bräutigam 2009a). As Bobiash (1992) indicates in his case studies on China's presence in West Africa, these partnerships have been undertaken in a "South–South" framework, developed since the Bandung conference in 1955.[2] Even in 1992, China already had 18 different bilateral rice plantation projects throughout Africa (Bobiash 1992). However, while Chinese sponsored projects have been completed at a smaller scale with states throughout the continent for decades, the volume of projects has increased dramatically since the turn of the twenty-first century. Where Eric Lefrançois, in this volume, discusses Canada's development assistance to China, the dynamic has seen a complete reversal with China now becoming a significant donor in its own right.

12.2.2 Current Debate and Issues

In contemporary China, old international links of the Maoist period have been maintained and new ones developed. In much of the literature, however, it is the new links, with a strong commodity demand factor, that bring the most attention to

[2]The Bandung conference was a meeting to encourage cooperation between newly decolonized countries in Asia and Africa. It took place in Indonesia in 1955.

China's African partnerships (see Tull 2006; Jenkins and Edwards 2006; Broadman 2007). These are particularly embodied in China's relationship with Sudan and Angola, both authoritarian states holding oil-based agreements with China and Chinese companies (in fact Angola is China's single largest supplier of oil). However, China's presence in other countries has also been significant, particularly South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia, with significant financial, oil, and mineral investments, respectively. Since the food price crisis in 2007–2008, the issue of land grabs in SSA has put more attention on China due to the dispossession of peasant farmers (Zoomers 2010), though Western countries have now been recognized as the most significant actors in this trend (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; Cotula et al. 2014).

This engagement has led to many criticisms of China's aid for not conforming to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) "principles of aid effectiveness," and guidelines such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Because Western countries have carried out "development" projects and institutionalized development assistance over the last six decades, these sorts of consensuses on best practices have been created. While China is signatory to non-binding declarations like the Paris Declaration, enforcement of these policies is in question. As China's state-led engagement has offered a "no-strings" alternative to many countries committed to such principles, a potential result is their weakening strength. For instance in the aforementioned case of Sudan, OECD countries had imposed sanctions on Northern Sudan, while China's policy of "non-interference"[3] allowed for bilateral oil investments. This action eventually caused the country to become embroiled in the war in Darfur, and subsequently in the tense partition and eventual civil war between North and South Sudan (Anthony and Hengkun 2015; Large 2009). In similar criticism, Angola had been at the whim of OECD donors through the Western controlled IMF and WB, allowing conditions regarding transparency and good governance to be placed on development loans as criteria to receive certain assistance. China, as a non-member of the OECD DAC, offered bilateral assistance without the stipulations, allowing one of the most corrupt governments in the world to receive oil-backed loans without political reform (Taylor 2006; see also Esteban 2010).

While these two examples are extremes in the development assistance related critiques, they are nevertheless indicative of larger issues that have arisen between China's bilateral aid, traditional donors, and recipient countries. In this light, it is useful to provide an overview of the general macro level statistics between China and Africa. On the level of trade, the growth has been staggering. At $10.5 billion in 2000, trade between the entire continent and China surged to over $200 billion in 2013, with Premier Li Keqiang (李克强) foreseeing trade volume reaching $400 billion in 2020 (Information Office 2010, p. 3; Xinhua 2015). In addition, FDI stock

[3]China's policy of "non interference" in the domestic affairs of other countries was first introduced at the Bandung conference by Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来). This policy has endured since then (Large 2010).

has increased from $982.7 million in 2002 to $18.2 billion in 2012 (Copley 2014; Gu 2009).[4] Although its investment levels are not as deep as OECD investment, and are over-represented by commodity investments (in Sudan, Angola, and now Nigeria), China's presence remains important due to the rapid rate of economic and political growth in this relationship. This can most readily be seen in the state-to-state partnerships that have been so prevalent throughout the last decade, embodied in the commodity-for-infrastructure programs that China has financed through the EXIM Bank of China (*Zhongguo Jinchukou Yinhang*, 中国进出口银行) (Bräutigam 2009a).[5]

However, as has been increasingly noted, the Chinese state-financed infrastructure projects have not been the sole manner in which China has been present in SSA (see Gu 2009; Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009; Bräutigam 2009a). There is increasing private, for profit, business investment, including export processing zones and other commercial activities by Chinese small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) (Information Office 2010, p. 12; Gu 2009). As Gu (2009) finds, these investments can have an important effect on economic development, providing lasting jobs and skills training. In 2006, of the official number of "800 Chinese companies operating in Africa…approximately 85 % were privately owned" (Gu 2009, p. 573).[6] These two sectors, the Chinese state-led and private sectors, operate under different objectives and with different capabilities, reflecting Gu's statement that "Different interest groups have different agendas" (Gu 2009, p. 585).

Evidently, China's private sector and the state-level resource-for-infrastructure involvement are having significant impacts in African countries. This trend is a new one in the last two decades, and development practitioners and scholars have begun to look more concretely at the ramifications for African economies.[7] However, there are also important implications for China's interactions with the entrenched development industry (Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009; Bräutigam 2011; Kaplinsky et al. 2006). Chinese actors have also been increasingly engaging in development

[4]Kaplinksy and Morris (2009) indicate that FDI figures between China and Africa are truly estimates, as such Gu's (2009) is one of several.

[5]Part of Bräutigam's (2009) argument is that China's current aid-for-infrastructure arrangements with SSA states were initially learned through similar arrangements in the 1980 s and 1990 s where Japan secured Chinese resources for Japanese infrastructure investment. Bräutigam also argues, however, that China's relations with many countries in SSA have been much more longstanding, and even independent, of strict resource interest.

[6]Gu (2009) notes that though China's EXIM bank's official estimate is 800 Chinese companies operating in Africa in 2006, the unofficial number is likely higher due to companies that are not registered.

[7]A particularly valuable resource on this subject taking into account global dynamics is Kaplinsky et al. 2007.

projects with third parties, some of which abide by ODA and Paris Declaration principles. This under-assessed manner in which Chinese actors are engaging with SSA is particularly interesting in its multinational dimension and combinations of public and private partnerships. It demonstrates the potential for Chinese actors to engage in internationally cooperative ventures, procure development contracts internationally, and for the traditional and Chinese state-led architectures to engage with one another. The challenge of this dynamic is to conceptualize the manner in which China is partaking in third-party projects, and how these diverse partnerships are affecting the way that China is fitting into the traditional development architecture.

12.3 Mali's Rice Sector

12.3.1 Mali and the Office du Niger

Mali is an ethnically diverse, landlocked country in the Sahel region of West Africa. As one of the least advantaged countries in the world, "Official development assistance (ODA) to Mali accounts for approximately 15 % of its gross domestic product" (Fletcher 2010, pp. 5–6). An issue of great importance in Mali is rice production. Agricultural production in general comprises 45 % of Mali's GDP, an indicator to the fact that Mali is a largely rural country dependent on subsistence farming (CIA 2009). Because of the water supply of the Niger River, through the interior of the country, the nation's economic history has been focused on cotton production (as mandated by the French colonial government); however, Mali also began producing rice in the 1960s and 1970s (Aw and Diemer 2005). In fact Mali has seen a steady increase in rice production since reforms began in the mid-1980s with assistance from the WB, Netherlands, and France, but has maintained its status as a net rice importer due to a parallel increase in domestic consumption (AFD 2005; Aw and Diemer 2005; USAID 2009).

The Office du Niger (ON) was created under colonial rule as a state organization to oversee the prime irrigable land in Mali along the Niger River (Aw and Diemer 2005). As a colonial state monopoly, the land was divided among small farmers who were forced to grow cotton in order to supply the French colonial administration at set prices. Management was reformed to become performance driven in the mid-1990s, and the previous monopoly practices of the ON were discontinued, allowing for private investment and the improvement of irrigation facilities (Aw and Diemer 2005; Cotula 2012). A study from the Agence Française du Developpement (AFD) published in 2005 argued that the most profitable way for Mali to deal with rice shortage was to expand the ON region's production capacity (AFD 2005). To do this involved investment in irrigation infrastructure as well as decisions regarding types of rice seed to use. In 2008, in reaction to rising global food prices and Mali's status as a net importer—and particularly the perceived

potential that lay in the domestic rice industry—the government embarked on a new plan to increase production in the ON.

12.3.2 China and Mali

China has had a unique relationship with Mali in the sense that Mali recognized the government of the People's Republic of China in 1960, shortly after independence. Since that time, China and Mali have kept up political and economic relationships, seeing China assist in over 80 development-oriented projects from 1960 to 2007 (Sanogo 2008). While early engagements between Mali and China centered on the cotton industry, projects expanded. The project most often referred to is Mali's state-owned sugar refinery, built and initially managed by China in the 1980s, spawning other similar ventures (Bräutigam 2009b). Another highly visible infrastructure project included the soccer stadiums built by China for Mali's turn at hosting the Africa Cup in 2002 (Fletcher 2010, p. 12). With regard to trade, in 2012 China was the destination for 7.78 % of Mali's exports (the third highest proportion), and comprised 10.61 % of imports (also the third highest proportion) (Global Edge 2015). Beyond this, China remains relatively less significant to the Malian economy than it is in other countries of SSA, perhaps due to its lower profile of resource endowment available for investment.

China's relationship with Mali, in the area of development cooperation, is most significant in the agriculture sector. With regard to investment, China represented 10.6 % of FDI in Mali in 2006, of which investment in the agricultural sector was only 10.9 % (Sanogo 2008). However, Chinese actors have been present in other ways. China is involved in the Malian rice sector in three different capacities, reflecting the increasing plurality of the country's engagement. Chinese actors, not new to Mali, are new to its rice sector where OECD and WB actors have dominated development initiatives in the ON. Despite China's prominence in SSA agricultural assistance (Bräutigam 2009b), Mali provides an example of a country in which China is making sectoral inroads through international development partnerships. The sector study will prove to be a very telling example of the third-party funding initiatives that China has been able to engage in.

12.3.3 Malibya Rice Project

The first project began in October 2008, when, in response to the Malian initiative to develop the rice-yielding potential of the ON, Libya announced its lease of 100,000 ha of land near Macina (see Fig. 12.1; GRAIN 2008). The Libyan sovereign wealth fund, Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP), through the local subsidiary, Malibya, was the organization in charge of financing this project. This project was intended to eventually produce 200,000 tons of rice, which would



Fig. 12.1 Chinese actors in Mali's rice sector (This map is derived from the following sources: Diakité 2008; GSR 2010; MCA 2010b; Aw and Diemer 2005. The location of the ON is approximate)

increase Mali's current domestic output by 20 % (Diarra 2010; USAID 2009).[8] However, in order to carry out the stated objectives, Malibya contracted the work for both developing the necessary major irrigation systems in the area, as well as the rice grain variety, to Chinese firms.

A specific factor in Libya's choice of Chinese firms to undertake the execution of its investment is the concept of "South–South" cooperation that is touted in the overall partnership between Mali and Libya, and has also been promoted by China (GRAIN 2008; Diakité 2008; Bobiash 1992). On the side of irrigation, the state-owned corporation China GEO-Engineering Corporation (CGC) (*Zhong guo dizhi gongcheng jituan gongsi*, 中国地质工程集团公) was selected to provide the infrastructure needed to develop irrigation in the ON as well as a road network in the area, receiving US$ 55 million (Coulibaly and Monjane 2009; Diakité 2008; People's Daily 2009). As for China's contribution to the project's rice production, it has remained unclear years which Chinese firm will be contributing the seed variety used. There is well-warranted speculation that the executor of this contract is Yuan Longping Hi-Tech Agriculture (YLPHT) (*Longping gaoke*, 隆平高科) (GRAIN 2009), and indeed YLPHT has subsequently hosted training sessions for Malian technicians (Li et al. 2010).

[8]This calculation is derived from figures in a 2009 US Agency for International Development report on Mali's rice sector. In it, the report states that Mali's total rice production in 2008 was approximately 1 million tons.

This project was praised by the Malian government, who saw employment gains in the construction/farming work, as well as higher rice production. However, local farm organizations have concerns due to the displacement of existing small-scale farmers as well as the fertilizer usage that accompanies the high-yield varieties of seeds quoted by officials, and typical to YLPHT (Coulibaly and Monjane 2009). Mali's peasant farming organization has reported that not only are farmers displaced without consent, and insufficiently compensated, but prior to the commencement of the project there was no environmental impact assessment, or any other consultation, carried out (CNOP 2010). As all Malian reports (and the information available from Chinese sources as well) indicate, the details of this three-way partnership were scarce, including the terms of Libya's investment, the Chinese supplier of the seeds, and overall size of contracts. In fact, due to the opacity of the agreement, it is not even known how much of this rice was to reach the Malian market. However, since the 2011 fall of Gaddafi Libya, this project has been on hold indefinitely. The absence of the pivotal financier brought an abrupt end to this instance of South–South cooperation, and a halt to the role of several major Chinese businesses in exporting rice seed and irrigation technology.

12.3.4 The Green Super Rice Project

The second case is called the Green Super Rice (GSR) project (*Lüse chaoji dao xiangmu*, 绿色超级稻项目). The GSR project is a mainly Chinese-led initiative directed by Li Zhikang (黎志康) of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) (*Zhongguo nongyeke xueyuan*, 中国农业科学院) with numerous partner universities and research institutions in China (GSR 2010). It is partnering with the Malian government, along with several other SSA countries, to provide small farms with resilient and high-yield varieties of rice. One of its primary goals is, unlike YLPHT rice varieties, to use as little fertilizer as possible to reduce the necessity of input costs in growing rice in the context of small farmers. There is a test field in Niono in the ON, to determine the suitability/sustainability of the seed varieties being created by the GSR. If successful, the seeds will be available to small farmers, with the implication of displacing local seed varieties.

The GSR project, being a partnership between CAAS and Chinese academic institutions, is a public venture that is privately funded. In contrast to the state financing of the Malibya project, the GSR is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). Based in the United States, the BMGF is a development-oriented foundation focused on "health, development and learning" and describes itself as a philanthropic organization with limits (BMGF 2010; see also Stevenson 2014). Over three years, the GSR project is receiving US $18,243,636 for their projects (GSR 2010).

Although the vast majority of the management team and key scientists of GSR are from Chinese institutions, there are a handful of collaborators from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). The involvement of IRRI in the GSR

project is chiefly through an IRRI-based initiative called Stress-Tolerant Rice for Farm Households in African and South Asia (STRASA). STRASA is a parallel project run by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) with the assistance of the Africa Rice Center (WARDA) (an organization that has been involved in Mali's quest for rice self sufficiency since the 1970s) and is also funded by the BMGF. Funding began slightly earlier than the GSR, beginning in 2007 with the initial phase expiring in 2010. Both initiatives seek to achieve the same goals in their projects in Mali, collaborating with small farmers in the ON region, and researching more efficient rice seed varieties. Given the common funding agent, the GSR and STRASA projects have been collaborating, hold coordination meetings, and hosting training workshops with Malian farmers (Manneh and Namaky 2010).

12.3.5 Alatona Irrigation Project

The third project is one in which a Chinese firm is operating as the executing agent for a large project. Whereas in the Libyan headed example, it is solely Chinese firms involved in the execution of the project, in this third case, the Chinese firm is one of several involved. The Alatona Irrigation Project (AIP) is financed by the United States Government-based Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC was set up in 2004 as a separate, but related, agency from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in which recipient countries themselves are required to apply for funding and carry out much of their own administrative work. In this case, this happens through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) for Mali.

The AIP has included firms from Canada, Israel, Mali, the US, as well as the Chinese firm Sinohydro Corporation Limited (SCL) (*Zhongguo shuili shuidian jianshi jituan gongsi*, 中国水利水电建设集团公司). SCL will carry out the "rehabilitation project for the Office du Niger Main Water Conveyance System" which takes place at a main dam site near Markala (US Embassy 2010). The purpose of the AIP is to provide secure irrigation to small- and medium-scale farmers in the ON with the goal of increasing productivity and continuing down the production phase to include seed selection and product marketing. Like the GSR, this project is focused more on sustainable small-scale farming and meeting domestic Malian demands for rice.

SCL is a Chinese state-owned corporation involved in engineering and construction, operating throughout China and the world. Its receipt of the contract for this project is significant. In the most frequently examined aspect of China's involvement in Africa, which of the state-to-state operations funded by China's EXIM bank through concessional loans, SCL has been a key player. In fact, it has been operating in SSA under these state-level projects frequently throughout the past decade. SCL's ability to win contracts through third-party funding, particularly

from traditional donors, means that it has the skill set to participate in the traditional development architecture and work alongside other multinational corporations in major projects. This particular contract is worth US$46,328,142 (MCA 2010b).

12.4 Analysis and Future Coordination

12.4.1 Chinese Partnerships in Development

The three cases above are not an exhaustive list of development projects in Mali's rice sector, but they are three of the largest and are comprehensive in terms of China's involvement, and occurred concurrently. Dealing with only one sector in one country of SSA, it becomes evident that with regard to development-related initiatives, China is not always the unitary actor that many present it to be. As mentioned above, it is certainly true that with regard to FDI flows, extractive industries are the most represented. However, there is a very important characteristic about China's presence in SSA that can be taken from the case of Chinese actors in Mali's rice sector, and that is the multitude of types of initiatives/contracts that Chinese actors are partaking in with third parties.

It has been shown through the three cases that there is a mix of public and private engagement involved in Mali's rice and irrigation development. These included both corporate as well-research institutions, and take both a leading and contractual role in the cases presented. For example, the Malibya funded contract sees total control of the project execution by Chinese firms, where state-owned CGC has been contracted to develop appropriate infrastructure, and is purportedly in partnership with YLPHT, a private Chinese corporation for seed procurement. This in contrast to the GSR project which began as a public Chinese initiative through CAAS and has continued to be a public venture, though with private, American, funding. And finally SCL, a state-owned Chinese firm, is receiving public US dollars as one of several international firms working together on a project chosen and applied for by the Government of Mali.

As previously mentioned, the vast majority of research has focused on the much larger (in monetary terms) ventures undertaken with state-supported funding allocated through Chinese corporate proposals (Bräutigam 2009a; DFID 2006; Muldavin 2012). However, as is clearly illustrated in Mali's rice sector, Chinese actors are branching out from under the protection of Chinese state funding to partake in ventures through other sources of funding. It is in this type of contract in the realm of development (broadly defined) that Chinese firms are increasingly able to partake, adding new dimensions to China's role in development practice.[9] The three cases illustrate that Chinese organizations (be they commercial or research)

[9]Note that the Libyan procurement is a self-declared development initiative, and both the BMGF and MCC are development funding organizations.

have engaged not only with the Government of Mali, and with actors from OECD countries, but also with the government of Libya. China's position as a developing country with increasingly competitive companies and researchers, and low costs, is enabling its organizations to engage with a broad range of state and non-state actors. While China's state-led development initiatives continue to be the most prominent source of funding for Chinese corporations in SSA, and the private sector remains primarily at the level of SME, this newly increased experience of working with third-party projects offers Chinese actors different work environments to operate under. In addition, these types of partnerships offer a potential way forward to increasing further cooperation between Chinese and traditional actors, potentially to the benefit of African states.

12.4.2 Fitting into the Traditional Sector

In the context of the Malibya project, the Chinese firms have benefited from the "South–South" dialog which is also used by Libya, and which Fletcher (2010) has found is appreciated by Malian government representatives (Fletcher 2010: 7). Thus China's position as a developing country with many multinational corporations that have the ability to execute large-scale projects is allowing its firms to benefit in new ways from the "South–South" discourse it has subscribed to for decades (see Bobiash 1992). However, in the Malibya case, there is an important lesson to be learned with regard to social responsibility in development practice. Similar to the Chinese Government's learning experience from international backlash over its role in Sudan, the Malibya case may be a source of similar backlash from operating outside of the traditional development architecture. Where established lenders like the OECD and WB, as well as newer organizations like New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), have structures in place to perform impact assessments, promote transparency, and provide institutional stability, the Libya example is lacking in all three areas. In comparison, the GSR and AIP projects, with their Western financing, do follow these established guidelines.

Although CGC is only the executing contractor, the issues that have risen from the Malibya project's forced evictions (often without notice or compensation) are being associated with China. As the Malian peasants' organization Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes (CNOP) has reported, displaced villagers interviewed recount stories of Chinese workers, not Libyans:

> "*Les chinois sont venus détruire mon jardin avec tout son contenu : goyaviers, orangers, papayers, oignons… et jusqu'à présent je n'ai pas été dédommagée"* [The Chinese came and destroyed my garden with everything in it, guava, papaya, and orange trees, onions… and even 'till now I haven't been compensated] (CNOP 2009; author's translation).

Chinese workers from executing firms are the face of the operation, regardless of whether they are the source of funding behind it. A situation like this is particularly likely to happen when the source of funding does not have standards found (and

theoretically acting as safeguards) under traditional development architecture. Alden and Hughes (2009) discuss this problem more broadly, and indicate that it may be one benefit for China's engagement with traditional development actors at home and abroad to implement Corporate Social Responsibility standards, though these types of standards to do not come without their own issues (Baur and Schmitz 2012). In this case, the experience offers an incentive to implement such measures as a result of the negative response of local inhabitants. Additionally, given the disruption to this project after the breakout of civil war in Libya, it is clear that the increased interaction of Chinese business interests in insecure areas is posing a new challenge for State–State and non-intervention frameworks. Experiences like this should reinforce the benefits of operating with institutionally stable partners, and adhering to principles that work to prevent disenfranchisement of partner populations.

A related lesson can be drawn individually from CGC, who not long after being awarded the contract from Malibya was separately barred from WB contract procurement. In 2009, the company was banned by the WB until 2014 for violation of their procurement rules, specifically for colluding with three other Chinese state-owned corporations (China Daily 2009). CGC had previously been awarded several contracts through the WB in Africa and elsewhere, worth over $59 million (WB 2010). Thus, as CGC continues to search for work in the development industry, it is coming into contact with the traditional development architecture present in institutions like the WB. Conforming to certain elements of international norms is an important aspect being addressed by Chinese actors (particularly state-owned ones) because the traditional development industry is so lucrative (Alden and Hughes 2009, p. 579). This becomes an even more poignant example for CGC, as their collaboration with Libya has proven problematic, and potentially unprofitable as shown in Table 12.1 and discussed in the suspension of the project.

On the other side of the spectrum, the GSR and the AIP projects have been funded by organizations following good governance principles. These projects have demonstrated Chinese actors engaging in collaborative efforts of a very different nature than the Malibya project. As a result, they have faced different challenges in maintaining project alignment and working in tandem with non-Chinese actors. The GSR and its sister project the STRASA initiative, while working together have been in danger of overlapping. As a report from the two organizations indicates, "linkages between GSR and STRASA…need to be strengthened because the two

Table 12.1 Three rice/irrigation projects in Mali

Project	Chinese actors	Monetary value (US$)	Funding source
Malibya	CGC, YLPHT	$55,000,000 (to CGC)	Malibya (Libyan State Funding)
Green Super Rice	CAAS, Academic Institutions	$18,243,636	BMGF, CAAS
Alatona Irrigation Project	Sinohydro	$46,328,142	MCC through MCA-Mali

Sources for this table are GSR 2010; Diakité 2008; MCA 2010a, b

projects have similar objectives and operate in the same countries…" (Manneh and Namaky 2010). This is not so different from the coordination problems that have appeared in development planning for decades. For example, Bobiash (1992) indicates that China's rice projects in Senegal were carried out in the absence of coordination with other actors, including USAID. However, the tremendous increase in the presence of a new major actor can amplify these coordination problems. Whereas a project like the Malibya project, with its lack of transparency, is not engaging in donor coordination activities, GSR is learning these skills in maintaining a third-party funded project with partner organizations.

Just as significantly, the report also mentions that GSR might make use of its links to separate Chinese ventures in partner countries, more specifically indicating that "Attention should be taken whilst introducing hybrids into Africa so as not to duplicate activities. For instance, testing hybrids with Chinese companies in Africa which are not directly working with GSR national coordinators" (Manneh and Namaky 2010). Thus the monolithic image that China has presented of itself through its large-scale state-to-state projects and FOCAC summits is placing demands on individual actors in multiparty projects. These demands may be unrealistic in the sense that a project like Malibya is not likely to have the ability to form a partnership with GSR and STRASA simply due to the nature of the project. Despite this potential complication, the fact that the GSR and STRASA are coordinating at all under a private American funder in itself is a sign of the multiple ways in which Chinese actors are becoming involved in development planning. This coordination experience and learning is extremely important for all parties involved, from recipient country partners, to new and traditional actors.

Similarly, the financially significant inclusion of Sinohydro in the large-scale AIP, which involves over 20 different firms under the guidance of the Mali's MCA, demonstrates further collaborative efforts in a structured and transparent project. Just as in the GSR project, all transactions are openly posted on the internet, including contract values and project meetings/evaluations. Like all USAID and MCC projects, impact assessments were carried out to foresee potential costs of the project to the surrounding population and environment. Incorporating such requirements did not occur in the Malibya project, which experienced significant local dissatisfaction. Domestically, China's own environmental impact assessment law only came into effect in 2003, and is struggling to be effective in serving its purpose of mitigating negative social and environmental impacts (Zhu and Ru 2008). In this sense, exposure to best practices internationally provides opportunities for institutional learning regarding development practice.

12.4.3 Engaging Institutions

The case of Mali's rice sector has provided a gateway for viewing the complexity of Chinese presence in SSA. Indeed, in the three cases presented, the projects are quite different, representing different values, all happening outside of China's

state-funded dynamic. Thus, in following Alden and Sidiropoulos (2009), this work makes it clear that the overwhelming focus on bilateral relations in China's Africa strategy is not sufficient to encapsulate the dynamics at play. Chinese actors are evidently engaging in more, and varied, multilateral projects, which is allowing for new learning experiences and opportunities for international collaboration. Just as in China's bilateral relationships, not all of these experiences are positive, or will have positive impacts on the environment and those vulnerable people affected, but these multilateral experiences are important for promoting future cooperation and standards in China's multifaceted role in Africa.

Some experiences that Chinese actors have had in Mali have reflected the sort of complications encountered in Sudan, only at the behest of Libya. Rather than being the direct investor in the Malibya case, the third-party engagement of CGC has caused the company (and by extension, China's image) to become embroiled in regional politics and become a potential casualty of civil war in Libya. This may play toward broader learning in choice of partners, and understanding that a policy of non-interference does not play both ways. While China may wish to operate in a political vacuum with regard to domestic politics, domestic politics themselves will not operate in a vacuum with regard to their effects on Chinese actors (see Large 2010). As such, experiences like Malibya and Sudan should underline the fact that not all development partners are created equal—be they in bilateral or multilateral efforts; domestic complexities can implicate Chinese business abroad.

At the same time, CGC's ban from WB contract procurement due to collusive bidding practices highlights the issues being pressed from the other side of the development practitioner spectrum. The norms that Chinese actors are being increasingly exposed to from the other two case examples demonstrate the learning that both Chinese and OECD actors face given newfound cooperation. Of course, there is much to be said about China's state-to-state structure of funding with regard to corruption elimination. Bräutigam (2009a) demonstrates that China's state–state resource-backed infrastructure projects do not transfer funds directly to partner governments, reducing the possibility for misappropriation of "donor" funds. However, there are other elements relating to transparency in development and overall coordination that remain challenges and present opportunities for future collaboration in the realm of multilateralism.

Bräutigam (2009a) also mentions that Chinese companies have been bidding on and participating in "tripartite" international development projects since China "joined the WB in 1980 and the African Development Bank [ADB] in 1985" (Bräutigam 2009a, p. 64). She notes the statement of a WB vice president in 2006 that Chinese firms win approximately "a quarter of all major World Bank construction contracts in Africa, and a half of those funded by the ADB" (Bräutigam 2009a, pp. 179). Table 12.2 shows an overview of WB contracts in African countries awarded to Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010 (WB 2010). It demonstrates that particularly since 2004, Chinese firms have seen a tremendous increase in significant contracts being awarded by the WB across Africa. While contracts from 2000 to 2003 consisted mostly of material procurement (i.e., physical inputs for projects), since 2004 there has been a noticeable increase in

Table 12.2 World Bank contracts awarded in Africa to Chinese firms

Year	# Contracts	Value	Average contract
2010	23	$191,545,000	$8,328,043
2009	29	$360,790,000	$12,441,034
2008	29	$309,530,000	$10,673,448
2007	19	$350,780,000	$18,462,105
2006	24	$354,900,000	$14,787,500
2005	26	$203,430,000	$7,824,231
2004	26	$291,800,000	$11,223,077
2003	29	$52,340,000	$1,804,828
2002	27	$61,790,000	$2,288,519
2001	15	$89,670,000	$5,978,000
2000	18	$32,731,000	$1,818,389

Source WB (2010)

large-scale projects awarded to firms from China. This is evident from the average contract size, which has been almost US$12 million from 2004 to 2010—the result of increased receipt of infrastructure contracts bid on by Chinese firms. In overall figures, the total value of Chinese contracts has varied between US$190 million and US$360 million from 2004 to 2010. This is not a small amount, and represents a significant number of Chinese actors taking part in multilateral projects funded by a mainstay of the traditional development architecture, and the principles it has prescribed to. Recalling CGC's banning from WB bidding processes, it is evident that to some extent this interaction with the principles espoused by the traditional development architecture has been happening.

SCL in particular has been increasingly involved with the WB, in addition to its role in the AIP. After taking part in many state-to-state projects led by the Chinese Government, including Sudan's Merowe Dam, infrastructure in Angola, hydropower in Côte d'Ivoire, and many others, SCL has begun to accumulate significant WB contracts since 2007. In total, between 2007 and 2010, SCL has acquired approximately US$241.41 million in WB construction contracts (WB 2010). In addition to working on WB funded projects, SCL has also won another contract from the MCA in Mali, this one for a separate project to modernize Bamako's airport, worth $71,619,477 for constructing a new terminal (MCA 2010b). Again, this is evidence of increasing presence within the traditional development industry. Just as discussed with the GSR and AIP projects, these sorts of contract procurements require SCL to abide by strict transparency standards, as well as impact assessments and coordination efforts.

Finally, the addition of new large-scale infrastructure companies from China is beneficial for increasing the competitiveness of international bidding processes. Along with the experience given from state-led domestic and international projects, the reason China has been able to acquire these contracts in Mali as well as increase so substantially in the WB is that they are able to outbid many other companies, with costs "one-quarter to one half less than Western and South African firms" (Kaplinsky et al. 2007, p. 8; DFID 2006). Thus in outbidding firms from OECD

states, the price of the project will be less—particularly important when the project is financed by a loan. This reflects a statement from a WB official recorded by Bräutigam that "We want to see the Chinese come in and increase competition on contracts. There is a high premium on European contractors. On that scene, it is very good to have them" (Bräutigam 2009a, p. 148).

12.5 Conclusion

The engagement of Chinese actors, and overall impact of China's multifaceted presence in SSA, is a subject that will only continue to be more relevant as ties between the country and continent expand. Although state-to-state investment and interest in resources have quantitatively been the largest factor in China's presence in SSA, it has not been the only significant aspect. It is the engagement of Chinese actors with third parties, including those from the existing Western-backed development architecture, which provides one of the most promising ways forward in helping to understand the broader impact on the industry itself and in possibilities for future cooperation between China, countries in SSA and traditional actors.

Mali's rice sector provides an overview of how third-party funding and contracting is manifesting. Chinese actors are indeed plural, as demonstrated by the different types of partnerships, all of which are separate from state-led resource-based projects. The rice sector projects present very different funding sources, different goals, and potentially competing interests between actors. This type of sector-level example solidifies the contradiction presented by Alden and Hughes (2009) regarding the illusion of China's singularity. While partnership arrangements will certainly vary by country and sector, these cases are indicative of the limitations to view China as the monolith, and the importance of accounting for diversity in academic and policy analysis.

China joined the WB's International Development Association for the first time as a donor in 2007, providing further evidence of China operating within the traditional development industry (China Daily 2007). This status puts China in a position to channel its own funds for development loans through the WB, an institution in which it recently increased its voting power.[10] Simultaneously, Chinese actors' ability to operate in the traditional development industry has reduced the procurement of WB contracts by OECD actors, cutting individual infrastructure project expenditures. At the same time, many state-led projects are taking place outside the DAC framework, challenging the traditional architecture by operating bilaterally or with other Southern partners without reference to DAC

[10]WB voting structure is loosely based on the amount contributed to the bank. As such, over 50 % of voting power remains in the hands of the 34 OECD countries, and China has increased its share from 2.77 to 4.42 % (Xinhua 2010).

principles. China's recent creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and participation in spearheading the ASEAN's Emergency Rice Reserve also point to the creation of development frameworks outside of the OECD.

In the future, it will be necessary to take into account Chinese actors' growing place and multiple roles in the development industry. Not only is the Chinese state cooperating within the traditional OECD-backed development architecture, it is also operating outside of this architecture through financing bilateral development projects, and creating its own architecture through new initiatives. The multiplicity of Chinese actors allows for interaction with many frameworks, which is not readily seen when focusing solely on high-publicity state-led projects. It is therefore important that scholarship on the subject pay closer attention to the myriad lower profile engagements in addition to the headline-grabbing megaprojects in order to get a better representation of these changing dynamics.

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Part IV
Literary Reflections on Chinese Identities in a Globalized Context

Chapter 13
Thinking through Space: Toronto's Chinatowns in Chinese Canadian Fiction

Jennifer Junwa Lau

Stuart Hall's discussion of postcolonial subjectivity and cultural identity as a process of becoming is one significant contribution to understanding identity formation. In the context of Chinese Canadian identity, there are several points which can further Hall's framework. Formations of Chinese Canadian subjectivity have indeed changed within the past century. While the Chinese minority is still considered a visible minority in Canada, the Chinese community in the demographic area of Toronto, at least, has clearly evolved.[1] Perhaps in the earlier half of the twentieth century, the sense of being part of a minority was more common; as shown in the first story *Midnight at Dragon Café* (2004). The perception of being a minority varies, and racial difference and similarity tints the understanding of Chinese Canadian identity in the twentieth century as will be evinced in this paper. Reflecting upon the subjective formations of Chinese Canadians from the first half and the second half of the twentieth century will then perhaps help us reconsider the category as well as subcategories which are being produced in the twenty-first century. Hall argues that identity is a "production," never complete and always in process.[2] I agree with this notion and wish to borrow the sense of "becoming" to analyze two novels set in Toronto. Taking into account this sense of becoming and the spaces in which these subjective formations are created, molded, and performed,

[1]In a collection of the history of Chinatowns in North America printed in 2005, Paul Yee examines the history of Toronto's Chinatown, marking the forced migration of the original Chinatown to the current Spadina location in the 1960s. In addition, Yee notes the post-1980 suburbanization trend of such Chinese Canadian spaces; what I would also refer to as Chinatowns in the plural. In support of the suburbanization hypothesis, Shuguang Wang, a Geography professor at Ryerson University, examined the trend in Chinese commercial activities in the 1990s. In his article, "Chinese Commercial Activity in the Toronto CMA: New Development Patterns and Impacts" (1999), Wang acknowledges the rapid spread of Chinese retail outside of the three main Chinatowns. The Chinese economy, while retaining mainly ethnic Chinese clientele, Wang argues "is no longer an enclave economy limited only to the central-city Chinatowns" (20).
[2]Hall (1994, p. 392).

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_13

I argue that literary Chinatowns are where negotiations occur and are symbolic of the changes in the Chinese Canadian identities themselves.

Identifying the impact of Chinatowns in forming and grappling with identity, I examine negotiations of subjective formations in two novels: Bates's *Midnight at Dragon Café* (2004) and Woo's *Banana Boys* (2000). Firstly, using Chinatowns as a setting for subjective shock and revelation in *Midnight at Dragon Café,* this paper examines the psychological trajectories of the protagonist Su-Jen and her mother. Two of Su-Jen's visits and one of her mother's journeys to (Spadina) Chinatown, are documented to illustrate confrontations of Chinese Canadianness at this juncture in history, that is, 1950s and 1960s Canada. Second, using Chinatown as a training ground for subjective creation I dissect the character Richard Wong from *Banana Boys* to depict another way of grappling with identity. Taking Chinatown as a stage for performing subjectivity, I read into the bilingual lines of one passage in *Banana Boys*. Through these various scenes in Chinatowns, an invitation is extended to the reader (both of the literary texts themselves and of this paper) to reflect upon identity formation and categorizations. Hongxia Shan in this volume also touches upon immigrant subjectivities by exploring case studies of Chinese-Canadian engineers and their "experiences, perceptions, and identifications." My research wishes to ask, how do these close-knit Chinese Canadian communities at different historical junctures challenge the notion of being Chinese Canadian? What do these literary texts tell us about the subjective categorization of Chinese Canadians who have immigrated and those who were born here? I hope to make use of the texts in order to see the various translations of Chinese Canadian identity, where perhaps an original does not exist.

13.1 Chinatown as Setting for Subjective Shock and Revelation

13.1.1 Su-Jen

Midnight at Dragon Café is told from the point of view of young Su-Jen (also known as Annie). Her interaction with Chinatown shocks her; revealing new expectations with both visits. The *dim sum* restaurant located near Su-Jen's aunt's house on D'Arcy Street is her first encounter with Chinatown upon her arrival from Hong Kong to Toronto. The number of Chinese people in the restaurant counters Su-Jen's original expectations of Canadian community, although she does not relate this experience with the notion of ethnic congregation and solely views this space as a revelation opposing her mother's teachings at this contact point:

> It seemed like a fancy place with tablecloths and Chinese waiters in jackets. The tables were filled with Chinese customers, and the air was loud with Chinese voices. I didn't see any *lo fons* [foreigners] in the restaurant, though I had seen some on the street, along with lots of Chinese people. Maybe my mother was wrong, maybe Canada wasn't full of *lo fons*.[3]

[3]Bates (2003, p. 11).

Here, Su-Jen does not find Canada much different from Hong Kong.[4] All that she previously imagines has been overturned with her interaction with Chinatown.

On another visit, when Su-Jen browses the China Trading Store, she undergoes a shock to her own subjectivity. Chinatown as a setting, indeed, complicates her psychological rendering of her identity as a Chinese Canadian. Su-Jen grows self-consciously aware because of this short encounter with an interracial couple at the store. When she glances over at the couple, a Chinese woman with a Caucasian partner, she cannot help but document her shock: "What sort of person was this Chinese woman to be intimately involved with a *lo fon* man?"[5] The young protagonist explains how previously she had never imagined the possibility of an interracial couple. More significantly, this brief meeting with this couple stirs an unsettling feeling within her because she questions her own subjectivity in her hometown:

> If she had been alone or with a Chinese man I would not have noticed her. But the white man stood out, his skin, his height in contrast to everyone in the store. I couldn't help staring at him, the blood rushing to my face. Was this how I stood out in Irvine? (See Footnote 5).

Here, Su-Jen is traumatized and her body reacts to her psychological distress. Hall's traumatic character of the colonial experience may perhaps be meaningful to compare with Su-Jen's experience here in Chinatown. Hall claims: "They [the West] had the power to make us see and experience ourselves as 'Other.'" [6]While Hall, as well as Mary Louise Pratt, are attacking the power of knowledge production by the colonizing societies, it is obvious that Su-Jen is undergoing a different kind of "power" which makes her "see and experience" herself as being 'Other.' Hall and Pratt's focus on the larger systems of knowledge production of Caribbean, African, and Latin American societies is specific to situations with clearer colonizer-colonized binaries. However, in the postcolonial context, this process of "Othering" occurs on an everyday level as well, without colonial writers[7] picking up the pen to produce knowledge. Su-Jen's understanding of the self and the way she is being seen stem from her own sense of shock. While Hall addresses the power as coming from an external source, the power is actually given back to the subject in this scene. It is her own revelation of "standing out" in her hometown and her own internal reworking of identity, that is sparked by this shock of seeing a Caucasian man amongst Chinese in Chinatown. The power she holds comes with that instant spark of recognition, when she glimpses herself through another's shoes. Here "Othering," then, is not the same as what Hall and Pratt isolate as the creation of the Other which constructs a static, barbaric, and ahistorical Other.[8] "Othering" points to the growing awareness of

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[4]Bates 12.

[5]Bates 191.

[6]Hall 394.

[7]Here I refer to both colonizer and colonized writings during the colonial era.

[8]By writing about the "Other's culture," writers and authors of travelogues were granted authority and given an important role—to help *produce* the "Other." Producing the "Other" refers to knowledge production. Knowledge production includes the scientific knowledge that the European writers were producing by naming plants and creating order among specimens in non-European

different subjectivities and identities in the postcolonial context. Su-Jen's experiencing of herself as "Other" directs attention to an internal gaze influenced by the environment. In Chinatown, her gaze of her "Other" shocks her but at the same time, evinces her ability to understand her own subjectivity. Being the only Chinese girl in Irvine because her family is the only Chinese family in town, she realizes that she may be the object of another's gaze, gaining subjectivity through shock.

13.1.2 Lai Jing

Su-Jen's psychological capacity, revealed to her through interactions in Chinatown, differs from her mother's desires. Her mother's experience of Chinatown depicts another growing awareness of subjectivity in relation to the setting of Chinatown. Lai Jing, Su-Jen's mother, was forced to migrate and marry her husband. Her initial complacent attitude towards Canada is later complemented with feelings of nostalgia for China, making Chinatown an ideal space for her to settle her anxieties of being in Canada. Hence, Lai Jing's embracing of Chinatown, reflects another negotiation of Chinese Canadian subjectivity.

Upon arrival, Lai Jing needs to adjust to Canadian weather and does not show great interest in the Chinese Canadian community at the *dimsum* restaurant she first visits with Su-Jen. As Su-Jen and her mother integrate themselves into the small Irvine community outside of Toronto, they begin to rely on Pock Mark Lee, a Chinese vendor selling "Chinese groceries from Toronto around a circuit of small towns and cities."[9] Pock Mark Lee's magazines are mediums through which Lai Jing reconnects with her Chinese movie stars. In addition, Lee's foods are the ingredients to place her mind at ease, knowing she is cooking "proper Chinese meals" for her family. But these small doses of home worsen Lai Jing's condition.

Leaving Su-Jen's mother with a stronger desire to be with those in the Chinese community, she reconsiders her own identity and her needs based on these negotiations. Notably, the language barrier between Lai Jing and those in Irvine helps to construct her subjectivity as a Chinese individual living in Canada. When the family pays Chinatown a visit, Su-Jen's mother "seemed pleased to be in Chinatown."[10] Exclaiming to Aunt Hai-Lan, Lai Jing explains how Hai-Lan is "'lucky […] to hear Chinese spoken all around [her]." In contrast, Lai Jing also highlights her lack of independence in her small town life: "When I go shopping in

(Footnote 8 continued)

regions, thereby empowered with the gift of producing the "Other" (Pratt 32). Knowledge production also entails the construction of the "rest of the world" through these travel stories, which attribute static qualities to the "Other." Travel writer William Paterson illustrates this producing of the "Other" when he describes the Africans as "cultureless beings" (Pratt 52). For further reading, please see: Pratt (1991).

[9]Bates 63.

[10]Bates 185.

that small town, if what I want is on the shelf, I can manage […] but if I need to ask for anything, I must take Su-Jen.'"[11] The young daughter realizes her mother is content in Chinatown. Analyzing her mother's laughter she recognizes the absence of a sense of belonging for her mother in Irvine:

> At the restaurant, my mother laughed occasionally, but at Aunt Hai-Lan's it [her laughter] had a different sound. Sometimes loud and raucous, but never edged with bitterness or sarcasm, her laughter was spontaneous, tumbling out like notes in a song. *She belonged.*[12]

Thus for immigrants like Su-Jen's mother, her situation as a diasporic Chinese woman in a remote town places further significance on the close-knit Chinatown as an appropriate place of dwelling with a corresponding sense of belonging. Her inability to use the English language paired with the friendship she has with Hai-Lan are two factors which make her idealize the lives of those living in Chinatown. For Su-Jen's mother, she understands her identity in terms of a 'cultural identity' which embodies those "people with a shared history and ancestry h[e]ld in common,"[13] ignoring the various geographical and personal paths taken by her fellow "Chinese" immigrants to Toronto. Staying close to other Chinese-speaking people is of high priority due to the power of this particular understanding of "cultural identity." Lai Jing's lack of independence and companionship in Canada, which causes anxieties for her, is resolved in the end by physically moving to Chinatown. Her understanding of her status, as someone of Chinese descent living in Canada, situates Chinatowns as desirable. Lai Jing's subjective formation is created by coming into contact with Chinatown and the corresponding awareness of her desire to belong in a foreign country, which may always remain foreign to her.

13.2 Chinatown as Training Ground for Subjectivity Creation

In contrast, Terry Woo's *Banana Boys* is about several teenagers who perceive themselves as belonging to Canada, perhaps more than China, if one may slice up a sense of belonging. The story takes place in Chinatowns in northern parts of Toronto, specifically Scarborough and Richmond Hill and is set in the 1990s.[14] This suburbanization of ethnic communities is symbolic of the different subjective formations of the characters in this novel from those in *Midnight at Dragon Café.*

[11]Bates 186.

[12]Bates 193, emphasis mine.

[13]Hall 393.

[14]There are no specific years indicated in the story, only calendar dates accompany the story. However, there are hints as to when this takes place as the one of the five protagonists describes the Communist takeover and escape to post-war Hong Kong as being in his parents' generation (see Woo 80–81).

As Lily Cho shares in "Asian Canadian Futures: Diasporic Passages and the Routes of Indenture," marking the distinction between old and new diasporas "open[s] up a way of understanding the heterogeneneity of diasporic communities while still attending to the continuities of specific historical experiences of displacement."[15] Cho describes the difficulty in separating the two diasporas because they often define one another. While I agree with the existence of the close relationship the two diasporas share, with *Banana Boys*, there are obvious differences in the subjective formations of Chinese Canadian identities which are significant to point out to begin dialogue about potential subjective formations of the twenty-first century.

Five male protagonists along with Shirley (the younger sister of one of the male protagonists, Rick) take part in the narration—reminiscent of the type of story-telling Choy employs in *The Jade Peony* (1995), except each character takes rotational turns at revealing the plot and the overlapping of events is uncommon. Luke, Dave, Mike, Sheldon, and Richard struggle with their Asian Canadian identities to varying degrees. But it is Richard, the good-looking and successful young man who dies at the beginning, which I will focus on to discuss the suburban shift and dynamics of identity for "1.5-generation" children.[16] Here, the importance of Chinatown spaces in Richard's self-proclaimed autobiography will be examined. The consequences of accepting his FOB[17] identity creation as being successful will also be shared—in terms of identity formation and categorizations.

Chinatown spaces allow him to create his identity. Hall's discussion of cultural identity marks the important differences which he claims "constitute 'what we really are'; or rather […] 'what we have become' […] Cultural identity […] is a matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being.'"[18] Through the examination of Richard (or Rick) it becomes clear that the Chinese Canadian experience indeed diverges from the first-generation immigrant experience in the 1950s and 1960s. Rick is not like the other four protagonists who are born in Canada, he was born in Hong Kong, moving to Canada a year after he is born.[19] He transforms himself through relocating and also internally shaping his perceived identity: "Being Richard Wong, Superstar, is hard work. But it was worth it. The old Rick was a loser and idiot. The old Rick came from a middle class family that lives in *marginally-middle-class suburban Scarborough.*"[20] Scarborough, where new Chinatowns have sprouted,

[15]Cho (2008, p. 195).

[16]This is a term used to describe people who were born outside the nation they identify themselves most belonging to, but moved to this location before a formative age.

[17]"FOB" is not a widely accepted phrase in various dictionaries. However, it is generally known to stand for "fresh off the boat," translating into a new immigrant connotation or those who behave as if they are new immigrants. Some consider this term derogatory. More on FOB and its meaning will follow.

[18]Hall 394.

[19]Woo (2000, p. 80).

[20]Woo 80, emphasis mine.

encompasses areas such as Dragon Centre and the Chinese Cultural Centre which was coined Agincourt Chinatown[21]; also known as Asiancourt.[22]

The Scarborough neighbourhood is significant to Rick's upbringing, and not only as a referent to what he considers the social class of those living there. In late grade school, Rick recalls his first battle in the parking lot of the Dragon Centre mentioned above. Describing the cultural make-up of the area, Rick learns racial tensions at a young age:

> Scarborough at that time was an admixture of Chinese and Vietnamese, and I was often picked on by these Vietnamese kids. At first, Mom tried to bail me out, but she was always so busy with the father and her job and Shirley that I eventually had to take matters into my own hands. So I quickly forged an alliance with these two big black guys, Lance and Kevin, and we kicked some serious Vietnamese ass one evening behind the Dragon Centre.[23]

As such, it is in these newly formed Chinatowns that Rick begins to understand cultural conflicts. Early on, the Agincourt Chinatown shapes Rick's self-protection and awareness of his ethnic and cultural difference.

During university, Rick becomes increasingly worldly and hungry for power, his cultural identity becomes performance; using his ethnicity to his advantage. Rick purposefully assimilates into being more like "FOBs" and strives to change his identity by emulating the FOB culture:

> I eventually re-evaluted my position, and realized that the FOBs had *exactly* what I wanted. I observed closely, and imitated. I asked the right questions, emulated the right moves. I worked on thinking in Cantonese, mastering the language, altering my social patterns and behaviour. I practiced with Hong Kong girlfriends I picked up at school, learning a lot from them, right down to the hair, the clothes, the diet, the music. I even picked up *Ka-ra-o-ke*, though I still loathe it. I eventually became what Mike had described me as – the perfect social chameleon. By graduation no one could tell me from a real FOB; no one even remotely could sense my Banana background. I even impressed myself.[24]

He observes, emulates, practices, and ultimately performs a diasporic identity. Thus, the act of performance shows that Chinese Canadian identity indeed involves internal differentiations. Rick's "banana" culture is Chinese Canadian, just as "FOB" culture belongs to a Chinese Canadian experience too. Avtar Brah states, "the concept of diaspora centres on the configurations of power which differentiate diasporas internally as well as situate them in relation to one another,"[25] and Rick's

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[21]Yee (2005, p. 84). Yee comments that three plazas, which were very close in proximity, in Scarborough became known as Agincourt Chinatown by 1984.

[22]Found in Sherwin Tjia's "Shoplifiting Tiger, Bomb-making Dragon," the main characters discuss the coining of "Asiancourt": "We were both born in Toronto, and grew up in a part of Scarborough called Agincourt. Back in the eighties, when there were a lot of Chinese moving into the neighbourhood, people were calling it 'Asiancourt.'" (159). Please see *Strike the Wok: An Anthology of Contemporary Chinese Canadian Fiction*. Ed. Lien Chao and Jim Wong-Chu. Toronto: TSAR (2003).

[23]Woo 83.

[24]Woo 85.

[25]Brah 183.

self-persuaded change in entering another diasporic culture shows this differentiation between old and new diasporas and capabilities of going in between them. The new Chinatowns and ethnic enclaves also help reveal the advantages of having a chameleon-like ability. Rick, although not born in Canada, is not unlike his friends who were, hence naming themselves "Banana Boys." Thus, it is important to understand how Chinatowns have helped him imagine himself as traveling between Banana and FOB cultures. His new-found fantasy (perhaps reality) of living and performing a FOB's life produces interesting questions about the category of FOB itself.

The lack of racial marker between the Banana culture and FOB culture is interesting, and Richard relies on this absence of difference to walk into the FOB landscape. However, when Richard declares success at his FOB act, how does this challenge the FOB category? (In actuality, he is a pseudo-FOB and others around him could also be pseudo-FOBs although he does not consider this.) What makes a FOB a FOB? How is appearance related to reality? The author Terry Woo is not tracing the origins of what a FOB is, but using the category to challenge the categorization itself. FOB is not exclusive, then, as a role; it can be learned according to the text.

The text suggests that by accepting Rick's attempt to be a FOB as successful, the reader also agrees that "FOB" is a clear, distinct, recognizable category. However, this should be problematized with the fact that one can pass for a FOB even when one is not. A FOB's speech ("the right questions" and "mastering the language"), movements ("the right moves" and "altering my social patterns and behaviour"), image ("the hair, the clothes"), and culture ("the diet, the music") can be emulated and learned (see Footnote 24). All these elements of a FOB are arguably assumptions of what the category represents. While highlighting these qualities, it should be remembered that they are superficial. One day, anyone can learn the speech and movements, change their hair and clothes, eat specific foods and listen to certain genres of music. Would this be enough to constitute what a FOB is? By listing out these attributes, Woo points to the assumptions perceived to construct another culture.

Richard's testimony of his becoming of "the perfect social chameleon" cannot conceal his ventriloquist act. In actuality, his reality is that he is a Banana. By admitting to his success, he is actually admitting to being a ventriloquist: "By graduation no one could tell me from a real FOB; no one even remotely could sense my Banana background. I even impressed myself (see Footnote 24)." His pride in being transformed is justified by the truth of his Banana background. Woo, by allowing Rick to boast of his success, undermines the accomplishment itself because Rick cannot forget his true Banana interior. At the same time, Woo is able to challenge the category of FOB and the assumed ease of becoming a FOB.

Rick's performance as a FOB and the appearance of a FOB is staged to beg of the reader to reflect upon the assumed category of FOB. In one scene, he attends a karaoke party with his Hong Kong fiancée, Tasmin, in Richmond Hill. Rick speaks of the FOBs from the perspective of a Banana, referring to the FOBs as another group when describing the *karaoke* bar: "lush, velvety, smoke-filled interiors, filled

with brass fixtures, attractive waitresses, *Armani Exchange-clad Chinese posses.*"[26] His description comes from the perspective as an outsider of the FOB community which he describes as "Chinese posses." Again, Rick identifies himself as a Banana and as an outsider to the others: "Unlike me, she couldn't switch from Cantonese to English too quickly, especially after a night out with the *FOB-crowd.*"[27] Rick is similar to an undercover reporter for readers and his Banana friends, but to others who view him, they may simply judge him to be a FOB like 'any other FOB.' Rick's chameleon ability asks of readers to reconsider who, why, and how they (mistakenly or otherwise) ascribe an unstable category to those they perceive as FOBs.

In the parking lot, the text again challenges the categorization of a FOB. Rick and Tasmin are met with two Caucasian males who verbally abuse Tasmin. It is in these suburban Chinatowns that bring out Rick's chameleon capability, especially in his writing of the scene. Tasmin does not realize what is happening, which highlights Rick's capability as well as his performance:

> "*Ah-**Reet**-chut* [Richard]... *wah **meht** yeh-ah?* (What are they saying?)" asked Tasmin, looking worried. Unlike me, she couldn't switch from Cantonese to English too quickly, especially after a night out with the FOB-crowd.[28]

His linguistic skill is evidence of his capability to go between the two cultures. Richard privileges the reader in translating the Chinese words coming from Tasmin's lips. Not only translating, he reports the scene phonetically as to invite the reader to hear the words, even if the bastardized Cantonese Romanization makes no sense to them. To those readers who do not understand Cantonese, they can rely on the English translation to know what is happening. Moreover, the Romanization brings the reader to the scene, as if they were hearing the conversation, even if they cannot understand. To the readers who understand both languages, the scene reminds readers of their shared linguistic privilege with Richard and reminds them to question their own categorization of themselves and others. Does sharing with this linguistic privilege mean one needs to be a FOB?

Ultimately, this scene of bilingual exchange is useful to critique and examine the ways in which identity categorizations can be misrecognized and/or constructed. Similar to Su-Jen, Richard embodies the growing awareness of subjectivity. Within these close-knit Chinese Canadian communities, Rick trains himself and performs his act of being a FOB. However, as evinced above, this marker of FOB in fact is constructed, unstable, and calls for contemplation of its use.

[26]Woo 180, emphasis mine.

[27]Woo 181, emphasis mine.

[28]Woo 181.

13.3 Conclusion

Analyzing the two novels Judy Fong Bates's *Midnight at Dragon Café* and Terry Woo's *Banana Boys*, I have attempted to situate the role of Chinatown spaces as firstly a setting for shock and revelation and secondly as a training ground for subjectivity creation and performance. While Su-Jen's shock is empowering and her mother's revelation of her needs within the Chinatown community are different than Richard's chameleon nature and ventriloquist act, they are all part of the grappling of Chinese Canadian identity.

Although I situate *Midnight at Moonlight Café* as representative of the 1950s and 1960s Canada and *Banana Boys* as describing scenes set in the 1990s, I am not positing that there is a genealogical trajectory of progress towards being or becoming a Chinese Canadian. In studying literary Chinatowns, I wish only to encourage readers to see fragments of what Chinese Canadian identity are and juxtapose these fragments to find a multifaceted way of constructing identity. Su-Jen, Lai Jing, and Richard are all attempting to negotiate their Chinese Canadian identity, but there is no model in which they are supposed to be emulating or looking towards. Similarly from a *dimsum* restaurant at Spadina, to the Dragon Centre in Scarborough, to the parking lot in Richmond Hill, there is no comparison as to which space is better. When comparing them, there are obvious differences between those built by new and old diasporas. However, each space holds its own history, its own story, and its success and failures. Unfortunately, my present study is unable to discuss the variations in imagining homelands such as Hong Kong or Taiwan and their unique trajectories of identity formation and the nuanced relationship with the marker of "Chinese Canadian." For future scholars, may we strive to study more closely the meaningful nuances of the representations of many generations from Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland China, and other parts of the world.

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Chapter 14
A Vision of Modernity: *Menglong* Poetry from 1978–1983

Min Yang

14.1 Introduction

The *Menglong* poetry (Misty Poetry) movement is associated with the inauguration of Chinese literary modernism in the post-Mao era. However, whether *Menglong* poetry is self-aware modernism or misunderstood romanticism is an unsettled case both in the debate of the 1980s and in later literary criticism. Mapping out the historical origins of *Menglong* poetry and Chinese modernism in the post-Mao era, this essay suggests that the relationship between *Menglong* poetry and modernism is not the static one of "is or is not," but dynamic, constructed within a context of special social and political discourses. In this dynamic relationship, *Menglong* poets hold ambiguous, paradoxical, and conflicting views toward politics, Chinese tradition, and Western modernism. They demonstrate a changed conception of modernism in their poetry when they translate, at least to some extent, Western modernism in their cultural appropriation. Further, I speculate on the implications of this changed modernism on the special experience of Chinese modernity in the post-Mao era, particularly in the context of cultural appropriation in the communication between East and West.

14.2 Debates in the 1980s: Becoming Modernists

The *Menglong* movement can be traced back to activities of *Baiyangdian* School, a group of former Red Guards who composed poems while they were exiled in Baiyangdian, a village in Hebei province, to be reeducated in the early 1970s. These

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_14

young poets, including Mang Ke (1950–), Duo Duo (1951–), and Bei Dao (1948–), founded underground literary salons, reading books which were forbidden during the Cultural Revolution, such as Chinese Modern literature, Western literature and philosophy, and sharing their own poems. In October 1978, Bei Dao and Mang Ke established an unofficial magazine called *Jintian* (*Today*).[1] In December 1978, they posted the inaugural issue as a poster at the Xidan Democracy Wall.[2] *Jintian* mainly published poems written by poets of the underground literary salons, but also included a few short stories, essays, literary criticism, and translations of Western literature. It published a total of nine issues and four collections before it was officially closed at the end of 1980. In 1979, *Shikan* (*Poetry*), the core journal of poetry, published "The Reply" (*Huida*, Bei Dao), "To the Oaks" (*Zhi Xiangshu*, Shu Ting 1952–), and "The Group Poems of Gele Mountains" (*Geleshan shizu*, Gu Cheng, 1956–1993). In 1980, more poems selected from *Jintian* were published in *Shikan*. As a result, *Menglong* poetry surfaced from the underground and became known to the wider Chinese-reading public.

In 1980 *Menglong* poetry suddenly became a heated topic of debate (I will demonstrate the reasons behind this debate later). The controversy first centered around whether poetry should express the individual self or the people and whether poets should turn to Chinese tradition or Western literature for artistic inspiration. Later the debate shifted to whether Chinese poetry itself should be modernized during the time of socialist Modernization or should instead sing hymns for the sake of socialist Modernization. The opponents of *Menglong* poetry argued that self-expression was one of the reasons that resulted in this poetry's ultimate obscurity. They criticized that such self-expression was a consequence of imitating Western modernism, and therefore *Menglong* poetry countered socialist Modernization. For example, Ai Qing criticized Bei Dao's "The Life" for presenting ambiguous imagery and expressing narrow private feelings that deviated from the interest of the people as a whole (1980, p. 33). Feng Mu recounted his failed attempts to imitate T. S. Eliot, warning *Menglong* poets of the danger of repeating the imitative modernism of the May Fourth era. He advocated that innovation should not go astray from "socialist Modernization, the general direction of country and people" (1980, p. 44). Zang Kejia fiercely attacked *Menglong* poetry as a "counter-current" and deviation from the interests of the people (1980, p. 75). Since both self-expression and ambiguous imagery presentations were regarded as fundamental aspects of Western modernism (see Cheng 1991), the discussion later focused on *Menglong* poetry and its connection with modernism.

In the latter debate, the term "modernism" was cited in the arguments of both sides, particularly the arguments of *Menglong* defenders. Gu Gong was the first to associate *Menglong* poetry with modernism. In 1980, responding to Gong Liu's

[1]Meng Ke's original translation is "The Moment." Huang Rui changed it into "Today" from the second issue of *Jintian*. See"An Interview of Bei Dao," *Nanfang Metropolitan Daily* (*Nanfang dushi bao*) 27 June: 2008. B2.

[2]It refers to a long brick wall on Xidan Street, Beijing. In 1978 democratic dissents gave speeches and posted their articles.

article criticizing Gu Cheng's poems, Gu Gong, Gu Cheng's father, compared the historical background of Western modernism with the post-Cultural Revolution era, indicating that it was not surprising that "the lost generation" and modernist-like poetry had appeared in China (1989, p. 42). Around the same time, Xie Mian claimed that "one group of new poets is emerging. They are not confined to one style. They boldly adopt expressions used in Western modernism, writing 'eccentric' poems" (1989, p. 9). In a later essay, he asserted that "modernism can also be found in [the classical poets of the Tang Dynasty ed.] Li He and Li Shangyin" (1989, p. 12). Wu Sijing argued that *Menglong* poetry is modernist poetry but it is not cut off from Chinese tradition. Sun Shaozhen admitted that Shu Ting adopts classical Chinese poetry, folk songs, and modernist poetry, particularly imagism and impressionism (1989, p. 22). More broadly, Liu Denghan pointed out that thanks to *Menglong* poets' appropriation of Western modernism, Chinese New Poetry regained another way of learning (1989, pp. 55–67).

From the above, we can see that both sides associate *Menglong* poetry with modernism; they use modernism as their main point of argument either to praise or denigrate this poetry. Modernism in this debate represents two opposed aspects: it is an advanced human experience and an evil produced by capitalism. In this confusion of understanding or interpreting modernism, *Menglong* poetry is connected with modernism by both sides. In addition, the relationship between Chinese tradition and modernism, though not projected as a main theme, starts to be touched by Chinese intellectuals. This relationship became the dominant theme in the major cultural discussions from 1985 to 1989. In the meanwhile, although *Menglong* poets never directly identified themselves as modernists, they did not resist being labeled as modernists.

Moreover, they gradually incorporated modernist elements to develop and articulate the tenets of *Menglong* poetry. From 1978 to 1979, they mainly fought against the socialist realism and revolutionary romanticism of the Maoist discourse. Then, in 1980 they projected self-expression as a main theme of their poetry. "The purpose behind portraying the world," Gu Cheng proclaimed, "is to portray 'the self'…only if the self participates, resists life-alienating forces, and reforms the world, will art emerge, will a great torrent of schools pour forth, will beautiful planets and the Milky Way come into being" (Siu 1983, p. 13). Given that self-expression was a key, widely recognized characteristic of modernists, *Menglong* poets, by advocating self-expression, implicitly declared themselves to be modernists. Further, this self-expression was summarized as new aesthetic principles: aesthetics should be independent of sociology and "man," an enlightened individual, rather than the collective subject "people," should be expressed as a subject in poetry (Sun 1989, pp. 108–109). Given the original aim of emancipating poetry from the enslavement of politics, *Menglong* poetry represented "modernist poetry [that] has already been formulated in China and has finished its first step" (Xu 1989, p. 283). Thus, through the evolving debate *Menglong* poets came to be known as modernists.

To some extent, the above recounting demonstrates that becoming modernist was the result of conflicting ideas concerning the collective self and individualism,

tradition and Modernization, and mainstream ideology versus ideology from the political periphery. To understand these contradictions in the process of constructing Chinese modernism we need to examine the historical and social discourses from the end of the 1970s to the early 1980s. On the one hand, *Menglong* poetry's dynamic relationship with modernism occurs during a particular, unusual period of social, political, and cultural transformations; on the other hand, it reflects that period's inconsistencies and contradictions. In addition, this process demonstrates that *Menglong* poetry's modernism is formed within the spheres of conflicts between the periphery and the center, both of modernity and Chinese politics.

14.3 Self-expression: Between the Individual Self and Collectivism

The original driving force behind the Chinese modernist movement in the post-Cultural Revolution, in my view, is not Chinese intellectuals but the Chinese government. To a great extent Deng's Modernization movement with its open policy stimulated the modernist movement in China. At the Third Plenum (on December 18th 1978), the Chinese government decided to stop using "classical struggle," affirming that the emphasis of the Communist Party has been shifted into building socialist Modernizations.[3] With this aim, the government encouraged communicating with the West (for more see Adam MacDonald's discussion of Chinese foreign policy in Chap. 19 in this volume). As for the literature, in March 1978, the policy of "hundred flowers blooming" was written into the Chinese Constitution. Later, the Third Plenum set up another principle, "emancipating thoughts." In 1979, the Chinese government explicitly announced the end of the policy that "literature and arts were submitted to politics" in Maoist discourse, promising that the Party would not interfere with the creation of art and literature.[4] Although Deng's government later restrained the freedom of expression in literature and the arts in 1983, political control of the Chinese people was loosened from 1978 to 1981 (see Link 2000).

Responding to the movement of socialist Modernization initiated by the Chinese government, the term "modernism" gradually entered the fabric of Chinese daily life and media language. In 1979, some Chinese prestigious writers and critics, such as Chen Kun, Yuan Kejia, Zhao Yiheng, and Gao Xingjian published articles on modernism, imagism, and French modernism, but their research of modernism was limited to Western literature. From 1980 onward, a large number of books on

[3]It refers to the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee. In this conference Deng set up the policy of Economic Reforms and Openness (*Gaige Kaifang*).

[4]See Deng Xiaoping's "The Speech in the Fourth Congress of Writers and Artists in 1979" ("Zai zhongguowenxueyishu gongzuozhe disicidaibiaodahui shang de jianghua"). *Deng Xiaopingwenxuan*, pp. 175–178.

Western thought and philosophy were translated and introduced into China. Chinese intellectuals embarked upon a new wave of modernism. For example, in 1980 Gao Xingjian (1948–) held seminars introducing modernism to writers. Gao's essay "A Preliminary Examination of Modern Fictional Techniques" (published in 1981) first introduced techniques of Western modernism.[5] This helped to initiate a new trend to Chinese writers. Also during this period the discussion of modernism shifted from exclusive consideration of Western literature to also include Chinese literature and arts. Wang Meng introduced stream of consciousness into Chinese fiction. Chinese filmmakers started to consider a modern cinematic language (see Zhang 1997, p. 233). Chinese visual artists, for example Huang Rui, adopted some so-called modernist elements into Chinese oil painting. "Modern" became a fashionable term and "its unusually high frequency [was] rivaled only by the term 'class struggle' in the Cultural revolution" (Li 1991, p. 128). Accordingly, Modernization entered many aspects of Chinese social and personal lives.

Motivated by the social process of Modernization in the New Era (1978–1989), writers and poets were more or less associated with the word "modernism" due to different concerns. Ai Qing criticized *Menglong* poetry's imitating modernism, but paradoxically he pointed out "what is the feature of our time? It is Modernization." Gao Xingjian criticized that "the discussion concerning Modernism is a 'non-debate' because of ignorance about modern Western literature" (1980, p. 44). Li Zhun in his "Modernization and Modernism" raised the question: "is there necessarily a link between Modernization and Modernism?" Xu Chi employed Marxism theory to study modernism, and declared that Chinese culture in the future should be socialist modernism that was "based on the combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism" (1980, p. 47).

These statements, questions, and critiques demonstrate Chinese intellectuals' confusion in their understanding of "modernism" and "Modernization." Although "modernism" and "Modernization" are two related but different concepts in the West, for Chinese intellectuals during the period between the 1970s and the 1980s, these two concepts are not clearly distinguished. These statements, questions, and critiques also reveal the dilemma of Chinese writers and poets as they interpreted the Chinese government's policy. Some writers and poets, such as Ai Qing, Feng Mu, Li Ying, and Zang Kejia, who established their writing career before the Cultural Revolution, held an orthodox interpretation of the policy of the New Era, believing that the idea that literature should serve for socialist Modernization was obsolete, and reflected all that was wrong in the Maoist time. In contrast, the young *Menglong* poets considered that "they, the older generation as a whole, have fallen behind the times" (Pan and Jie 1985, p. 191). For these younger poets, declaring to be a modernist is an action to disassociate themselves from the old and the irrational. Instead, employing "new principles," "progression," "emergence," "modernism," etc. in their announcements, *Menglong* poets and *Menglong* defenders acted as or performed as social elites. As Bei Dao explicitly declared in the

[5]Gao was politically exile in 1989 and was the recipient of the 2000 Nobel Prize in Literature.

inaugural issue of *Jintian*: "History has finally given us a chance, allowing our generation to sing out that which has been buried in our hearts for ten years" (Yeh 1992, p. 382). Gu Cheng more explicitly pointed out that *Menglong* poets were pioneers who sacrificed for the nation in their seeking a new road in the arts.

This conflict is one of the reasons that resulted in the controversial debate of *Menglong* poetry. Moreover, the debate itself also demonstrates what Berman called "the inner dichotomy" (Berman 1982, p. 17) in his observation of modernity. Chinese people believed that they lived in a new era of Modernization, but the Cultural Revolution was still a fresh traumatic memory. This inner dichotomy was more concentrated on the conflict defining the modern subjectivity between political ideology and the society. Collectivism was continuously emphasized in Deng's program of socialism Modernizations. The slogan of "emancipating thought, millions of people have one heart, unitied together in one direction, and looking forward to the future" explicitly mandated that the value of human beings was realized in the four Modernizations. Collectivism was not only the basic idea of Marxist philosophy but the "bio-power" (Foucault) employed by government to bind up the Chinese people in order to realize Modernization. Modern man, the so-called "new generation in the eighties" (*Bashi niandai sinyibei*) in government projects to cultivate new human beings, was the one who was devoted to a modern career. This was the concept of modern man in collectivism.

However from the end of the Cultural Revolution, individualism gradually entered the discourse of Chinese intellectuals and thereby caused a tension between the consistent emphasis on socialist ideology by the Chinese Marxists and the rebellion against political control on the part of some Chinese intellectuals. In November 1978, big character posters calling for freedom of speech, democracy and antitotalitarianism appeared on the Democracy Wall. Particularly in December 1978, Wei Jingsheng (1950–) posted an article "The Fifth Modernization" on the Democracy Wall, calling for establishment of a political democracy based on the concept of Western democracy. *Jintian*, as the only literary journal on the wall, rode this trend and stood in front of this movement. This movement, though peripheral to the political center, projected individualism into the Chinese dominant discourse.

Immersed in this tension, *Menglong* poets displayed ambiguity toward politics, tradition, and modernism. Thus, albeit emancipating poetry from the control of politics was *Menglong* poets' persistent doctrine, *Menglong* poetry from its beginning nonetheless was bound up with politics. The emergence of *Jintian* and *Menglong* poetry from the underground to the surface was the consequence of particular social and political discourses. Accordingly, it may be viewed that *Jintian* was a literary echo of the democratic movement in a "thaw" period after the Cultural Revolution.

In addition, most *Menglong* poets participated in political activities, and criticizing political tyranny and rereading the history of the Chinese revolution were the dominant themes in their poems. For example, Jiang He's "Monument to the People's Heroes" reinterpreted the Chinese revolution from 1840 to 1949 and Gu Cheng's "A Group of Poems of Gele Mountain" rewrote the stories of the Chinese Civil War in the Red Crag (*Hong Yan,* a revolutionary historical novel by Luo

Guangbin (1924–1967) published in 1962). And nearly all of them started their writing in part to reveal the trauma of the Cultural Revolution.

In addition, *Menglong* poets advocated reforming poetry and renovating the Chinese culture by appropriating Western literature. "Our poems," they claimed, "should absorb the techniques of Western poems, while the mood and emotion must be national" (Gu 1983, p. 2). However, as for what is national, *Menglong* poets provided paradoxical concepts. Yang Lian proclaimed that "I'm opposed to 'tradition,' and I'm opposed to stereotyped style and its stranglehold on people's souls" (Pan and Jie 1985, p. 197). Bei Dao explained that what he called "the national" is not "the Chinese traditional literary forms, such as folk songs, but is the trials and tribulations uniquely experienced by the Chinese nation" (Pan and Jie 1985, p. 199). Gu Cheng advocated "reviving the rich visual-image tradition of Chinese poetry" (Gu 1993, p. X). From these statements we can see that "tradition" is an ambiguous concept for *Menglong* poetry. It could be centuries-old folk songs or classical poetry, or the stereotypes found in the more recent propaganda literature. These statements also illustrated that growing up in the "cultural desert" (Gu1989, p. 40), *Menglong* poets were confused when they were faced with the terms of Chinese culture and tradition, both of which were largely ruined during the Cultural Revolution. This confusion is more evident when Yang Lian initiates the movement of seeking Chinese cultural roots after the *Menglong* movement.

What is more, while claiming to "absorb the techniques of Western poems," *Menglong* poetry demonstrated the same confidence as Lu Xun did in his "pragmatic borrowing" (*Nala zhuyi*). This confidence temporarily eclipsed more important questions: How to select? Can we appropriate the form without taking in the philosophy, culture, and tradition which originated that form? And, according to what criteria do we select? Chineseness or Westernness? Is there a pre-imperialist "Chineseness"? Self-expression is obviously an idea that they took in with the form. However, critically as to the analysis and debates, the self is a deformed concept in *Menglong* poetry. The so-called "national emotion" indicates that self-expression in *Menglong* poetry partly integrates the Chinese collective narrative.

Particularly, *Menglong* poets inevitably formed a confused concept of modern man. On one hand they advocated that modern man should not be "a cog" in the socialist machine of Maoist discourse, but should be an individual. However, although they believed the self "is not in an ideological world but realizes the value of human beings" (Gu 1989, p. 40), the concept of the self seemed to demonstrate a mixture of the collective self from the previous decades of indoctrination and individual self from the West. This ambiguous or confused concept of self consistently appeared in their statements concerning *Menglong* poetry. After 1980, *Menglong* poets gradually formulated the tenets of their poetry, though they never established a uniform manifesto. In "Answer to *Menglong* Poetry" (1983), Gu Cheng pointed out that one feature of *Menglong* poetry is that it emphasizes the authenticity and creativity of the subject. Shu Ting claimed that her poems express her concern for the human race to the fullest (Pan and Jie 1985, p. 197). Bei Dao proclaimed that "poetry has no boundaries, not those of time, space, or the self. But the starting point of poetry should be the poet's self" (Pan and Jie 1985, p. 197).

From above analysis we see *Menglong* poets oscillated between the individual self and collectivism, tradition and modernism, politics and aesthetics. These oscillations reveal the confusion as *Menglong* poets stood in two worlds. One is the memory of ruined idealist heroism, and the other is the new experience of modernity, which they believe they can improve, reform, and change. Standing in the two worlds makes their views and their poetry ambiguous. On the one hand they resisted the Maoist discourse and challenged the restraint of the then-current politics. On the other hand, they tended to believe that the New Era provided them opportunity and the dream of being social elites by their poems. In this sense, they actually participated in constructing the new ideology. This ambiguity is not only frequently reflected in *Menglong* poets' performance in the debate, but also, and more clearly, in their poems. By conducting a textual analysis of selected *Menglong* poems, I next demonstrate that this poetry is a modified modernism rather than the modernist poetry in the sense of Western modernism and self-expression.

14.4 Textual Analyses: Transformed Modernism

Menglong poets appropriated the techniques of Western literature, particularly nearly all *Menglong* poets were familiar with Western modernism after 1980. Therefore, *Menglong* poetry obviously presents similarities with Western modernism "in ethos and techniques" (Pollard 1985, p. 390). It needs to be pointed out that *Shikan* was closed during the Cultural Revolution. In 1976 when it was resurrected, it presented Revolutionary Romanticism as its feature. Most poems in *Shikan* were long political lyrics with repetitive language and hyperbolic vocabulary such as "ten thousand," "millions of people," etc. The dominant images were the color red, the sun, the sea, blood, and fire. The attitude toward nature was exclusively positive. These had been the typical features of contemporary poetry after Mao's "Talk on the Yan'an Forum of Literature and Arts" (1942). In this talk, Mao advocated that the primary function of literature is to serve as instruments of the proletarian revolution. Literature should be written in the language of the masses and only for workers, soldiers, and farmers. Mao also set up a formula of "first, folk song, second, classical poetry" for poetry per se. Based on these principles, socialist realism and revolutionary romanticism were formulated and dominated Chinese literature from the 1940s. *Shikan* maintained the feature of revolutionary romanticism until 1979 when it launched reformation in order to respond the policy of "one hundred flowers blooming" mandated by the Third Plenum in 1978.

Unlike long political lyrics with repetitive language and hyperbolic vocabulary found in Revolutionary Romanticism poetry that was popular in Maoist time, some *Menglong* poetry adopted short lyrics, which is associated with modernist poetry (see Tay 1985, p. 134). In addition, a passive attitude toward life permeates *Menglong* poetry by the repetitive motif of silence (see Yeh 1992, pp. 382–383) and imageries of "lost," "death," "loneliness," "dream," "shadows," etc. which are

associated with Western modernist poetry. For example, "Perhaps/we should shout out suffering as a whole/but keep silence over personal grief" (Shu Ting, "Perhaps"), "Hiding in my lifting dream, How lonely my shadow is" (Shu Ting, "A night in the Deep Autumn in Beijing"), "One lonely wolf goes into, the dust where no one gets lost" (Jiang He, "China, My Key Has Been Lost"), and "Look how the gilded sky is covered/with the drifting, crooked shadows of the dead" (Bei Dao, "The Reply"). This imagery and attitude remind the reader of the wasteland, loss, and gloom in T.S Eliot.

However, *Menglong* poetry also derived from a wide literary background (see Tay 1985, p. 78), from Western modernism, romanticism, realism, Chinese New Poetry in the May Fourth era, to Chairman Mao's classical poems and revolutionary poems. This reading experience, and the political background and backdrop, results in *Menglong* poetry that presents a diversity of styles. Among *Menglong* poets, Gu Cheng is the most controversial poet of the 1980s mostly because his poems are more similar to imagism. However, comparing Gu Cheng with Ezra Pound, I notice that the similarities between these two poets are limited to the form. For example, consider Gu Cheng's "One Generation":

> The Night has given me dark eyes
> But I use them to look for light.[6]

This two-sentence poem reminds readers of Pound's "In a Station of The Metro."

> The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
> Petals on a wet, black bough.

However, in "Metro" the adjectives possibly describing the faces, such as beautiful, ugly, tragic, happy, fearful, etc, are suppressed, replacing with a more generic noun, "apparition." This word indicates not one definite meaning, but several shades of connotations. Yip Wai-Lim alleges that "apparition" calls forth "the uncertain, shady, strongly emotional, ethereal and incorporeal quality of the moment in the word" (Yip 1969, p. 60).

The second sentence suddenly leaves the human world by presenting the images from nature. Petals are identified with the faces, while the wet, black bough enhanced the emotion presented in the word "apparition." By juxtaposing the images of nature and the human world, Pound draws the interpretation of the poem from the surface of imagery into the inward realm of human emotions. As Pound pointed out this poem captured "a thing outward and objective [that] transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective" (Yip 1969, p. 60).

In the contrast, Gu Cheng's poem is in fact very simple, superficial, and political. The night refers to the Cultural Revolution. The black eyes not only represent Chinese, but also symbolize one generation that lives in blindness since the cultural desert and does not enlighten under the control of ideology. Light refers to the

[6]See Tay's translation of this poem in Tay (1985). "'Obscure Poetry': A Controversy in Post-Mao China." p. 132.

bright future, good life, or the light of the life in this generation. Particularly, in his poem, the "I", as its title indicates, is not only the poetic self but also the collective "we." Gu Cheng represents the feeling for the whole generation. It is a critique of Chinese reality and an expression of wandering, loss, and waiting with hope. Thus, this poem largely is a political allegory rather than individual expression. It does not fall neatly within the genre of modernism as that term is used in the West. As Aaron Crippen points out "we see in Gu Cheng's early work a generation's experience in microcosm: Utopian faith in the power of the human mind to transform its environment followed by shattering disillusionment" (1995, p. 15).

Even if there are similar image presentations as an imagist, Gu Cheng's images still primarily reflect political shadows rather than artistic exploration in human nature. For example, one of his poems, "Feeling":

The sky is gray,
the road is gray,
the building is gray,
the rain is gray,
in this blanket dead gray
two children walk by,
one bright red,
one pale green.[7]

The interplay of color in this poem will certainly remind the reader of Imagism (see Tay 1985, p. 134). However, the gray sky and rain obviously indicate the period of the Cultural Revolution. The bright red and pale green of the children suggest that the future and the hope of China after the ten-year disaster. The poem is symbolic and lacks the didacticism of the poems of the Cultural Revolution, but its imagery refers to the broad culture, not the personal. Also, there is an implied hope for a bright future that is typical of Chinese literature in that period and absent in Pound's poems. This poem demonstrates a not uncommon feature, namely, that *Menglong* poetry's image presentation is capable of being read more as a political statement than as a personal or aesthetic expression.

If imagist poems attest to Western philosophy, *Menglong* poetry reflects the ruin of the idealist dream. From images in Pound's poems we travel from the surface into the nature of human beings; from images in the poems of Gu Cheng and other poets in this school we travel externally from the images into Chinese politics and Chinese society. Pound's abrupt image presentation reflects the crisis between a human being and his surroundings. Gu Cheng's image presentation reflects the crisis between the socialist ideology and cultural identity. On the one hand, Gu Cheng emphasizes social values, speaking truly what could not be spoken out in the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, he explores "other humanity fields…. and those mysterious realms of which men can have no clear conception" (Gu 1995, p. 184).

[7]See Tay's translation of this poem in Tay (1985). "'Obscure Poetry': A Controversy in Post-Mao China." p. 136.

Similar political implications and collective self can be found in other *Menglong* poets. For example, the subject of Jiang He's poems is exclusively "people."[8] Shu Ting's "Motherland, My Beloved Motherland" and "To the Oaks" explicitly express her patriotism. Particularly, in Bei Dao's "The reply," the collective subject is more evident:

I tell you the world, I don't believe!
…
I don't believe the sky is blue,
I don't believe in the sound of thunder,
I don't believe that dreams are false,
I don't believe that death has no revenge.[9]

Zhang Hong argues that this poem is a response to Mao's announcement "Long live the People!" (1998, p. 87). McDougall and Kam Louie assert that this poem reflects defiance to the Party Policy (1997, p. 433). In my reading, this poem can be read as an answer by Bei Dao and his generation to Mao's remark "the world is ours, and also yours, but in the final analysis, it is yours," which inspired Red Guards' revolutionary zeal. After the Cultural Revolution, confronted with the ruins of their revolutionary idealism, they reply "I don't believe!"

Therefore, the conception of modernism in *Menglong* poetry is changed. It is not antitradition, but antipolitical. It is not self-consciousness, but self-expression. *Menglong* poets explicitly intend to express "I think, therefore I am," and it is this from which Western modernist attempts to escape. In addition, *Menglong* poetry presents the ambiguity of I and We, self-expression and resisting politics, at least in intention. And given the noted ambiguity their poetry also is capable of being read contrary to the poets' stated intentions of self-expression free from political and broad social messages. By this modernism, *Menglong* poets introduce into the Chinese socialist discourse "man" as a category from Western civilization. This category and what it represented, individualism, disturbs the stability of socialist ideology and its value system. *Menglong* poets wanted to establish a world belonging to the self, "a sincere and unique world, a righteous world, a world of justice and humanity" (Yeh 1992, p. 392). Shu Ting appeals, "They don't welcome me, because I am a human." Bei Dao claims, "in the time of no heroes, I just want to be a human." These statements indicate that they desire to find a language for the individual narrative which is independent of politics and ideology, though this language also incorporated the collective narrative now and then. In addition to the political aspect, this modernism, directed to self-expression, also challenges the cultural paradigm based on socialist ideology. Self-expression, the main stated theme of *Menglong* poetry, embodies the beginnings of seeking identity and individuality outside the political ideology, particularly, apart from country and the Party. As *Menglong* poets claimed: "Today, as we open our eyes anew, we would

[8]Jiang He claimed that the only subject of all his poems is "people." See *Shikan*, 1980: 08, p. 47.
[9]See McDougall's translation in McDougall (1997). *The Literature of China in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Columbia University. p. 433.

not just look vertically at our cultural legacy from millennia past, but begin to cast our gaze horizontally, at the other intellectual horizons all around us. Only by so doing can we truly understand our own values" (Pan and Jie 1985, p. 198).

Further, after the Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983, in which *Menglong* poetry became a main target of criticism, *Menglong* poets bolstered this theme of self-expression in two movements. One was the so-called "root-seeking," led by Jiang He and Yang Lian in the early 1980s, echoing Han Shaogong's root-seeking movement in fictions. This movement aimed at "reinterpret[ing] the spirit of Chinese culture and redefining Chinese identity in the modern world" (Yeh 1992, p. 393). The other was cultural emigration (*Yang chadui*) mainly inaugurated by Bei Dao, Gu Cheng, and Duo Duo. Except for Shu Ting and Meng Ke, nearly all other *Menglong* poets left China to live aboard. After 1989, Bai Dao, Duo Duo, Yang Lian as well as Gao Xingjian and other overseas Chinese writers and intellectuals started political exile. Although these two movements are oriented toward different spatial directions, searching for the Chinese cultural identity outside of the Chinese political ideology was their common goal. Both of these contribute to the transformation of Chinese literature from an ideological tool into an artistic exploration of Chinese psychology and cultural identity. For example, the modernism or postmodernism movement after 1985 "finds its remote (and disengaged) precursor in the poetic and narrative innovations of the early years of post-Mao China *Menglong* Poetry and root-seeking" (Zhang 1997, p. 103) and this literary modernism or postmodernism movement is an important phenomenon in the cultural modernism movement after 1985.

14.5 Conclusion

By studying *Menglong* poetry and its relation with modernism, I chart the beginning of the Chinese modernist movement of the postrevolutionary era. I suggest that *Menglong*'s dynamic relationship with Modernization sheds light on the process of constructing Chinese modernism. The *Menglong* movement formed at the intersection of Western influence, political discourse, and cultural division. It set up the basis for the further development and maturation of the modernism movement in China. Modernism in China is not only an aesthetic movement, but formed as one of the historical entities. Within this context, at such a point of radical national transition following the Cultural Revolution, the ambiguity and shifting of foci of the *Menglong* poets become more understandable.

Further, from this modernism we can more accurately perceive the Chinese experience of modernity. Modernization, as Berman pointed out, is a social process that brings modernity into "being, and keeps it in a state of perpetual becoming" (Berman 1982, p. 16). After 1985, a larger discussion launched on the Chinese cultural stage. The cultural discussion projected many controversial issues initiated in the debate concerning *Menglong* poetry, such as modernism, tradition, appropriating Western culture as well as literary form. Thus this discussion can be

regarded as the completion of the debate in the early 1980s. This discussion surpasses the limits of literary modernism into the cultural comparison between the East and the West. The focus of this discussion later shifted from the binary of East-West conflict to that of a "tradition-modernity transformation" (Zhang 1997, p. 60).

What is more, *Menglong* poetry as the origin of contemporary Chinese poetry opens a path toward a multipolar discourse about China of the twenty-first century. Chinese poetry in the twenty-first century to a large extent directly evolves by performing the role of surpassing *Menglong* poetry and modernism. For example, Han Dong, the representative of so-called the Third Generation poets challenged the grand narrative established in Yang Lian's "Big Goose Pagoda" by questioning: "Facing the Big Goose Pagoda, what can I say?" Xue Ma, an Internet poet of "the New Generation" poets directly subverts the political allegory and metaphor and even the imagery presentation of *Menglong* poetry through parody of Shu Ting's "My Motherland" and Liang Xiaobin's "The White Wall." Self-expression set up by *Menglong* poets as the primary aesthetic principle is employed further by contemporary poets and artists in their Avant-garde movement. In addition, Yang Liang, Bei Dao, Duo Duo, and Mang Ke bridge the communication between West and East in the new century. As dissenters and contemporary prestigious intellectuals, Yang Lian, Duo Duo, and Bei Dao tend to connect their experience of modernity with the Chinese tradition. As Yang Lian states, after purging the political content of his poems, he is more connected by his experience to Qu Yuan, the first poet in Chinese history, who explored the deep reason of human nature and the world. Mang Ke, who stopped writing poems, merges his poetic reflections of life to his painting.

The process of Chinese people construing modernism can be perceived as a coherent process of negotiating between the East and the West, changed political ideology and cultural memory, the desire for attachment by establishing roots, and the flexibility of identity attendant with drifting in a fundamentally changing external reality. This experience "of time and space, of self and other, of life's possibilities and perils" is called "modernity" by Berman (1982, p. 15). In this sense, although the Chinese modernism movement definitely embraces the features of Chineseness due to its language, habit, and social customs, it also surpasses that nation's sphere and enters into the discursive modernity of the world system. Dussel postulated that "modernity was the fruit of the 'management' of the centrality of the first world-system" (Dussel 1998, p. 13). From its beginning, modernity excluded or marginalized Asia, Latin, and Africa and represented either exclusively the European experience or a Eurocentric experience (Dussel 1998, p. 3). Therefore, the Chinese modernism movement actually originated in the periphery of politics in China and the outskirts of modernity in the world system. And by this, when considered in the context of "the world-system" of modernity, it may shed light on our understanding of the paradigms of modernity.

From the fifteenth century, China found itself in the easternmost zone of the interregional system and it had no intention to formulate or participate in the discourse of modernity (Dussel 1998, pp. 6–7). However, from the later

nineteenth century, China started to reorient itself with regard to the West. Particularly, the twentieth century saw China's consistent attempts to challenge the discourse of modernity, from the New Cultural movement, to the modernism and postmodernism movements, and even from Maoist socialism and the socialist Modernizations, if Marxist is a discursive language in modernity (Berman 1982, p. 19). *Menglong* poetry demonstrates an interesting point along this path, one that captures the dynamic natures of cultural appropriation and modernism as the latter crosses national boundaries. *Menglong* poets translated, transformed, or deformed the modernism from the West; thereby modernism at least in a Chinese context is not a stable, hierarchical, continuous, and pure category. At the same time, Chinese culture is in a consistent process of construction. It is transforming, communicating, integrating, and transgressing the West other. If culture always is a repository of assumed resources to which we may return to locate our identity (Said 1993, p. 25), then identity, no matter whether it is Chineseness or Westernerness, is a "hybridity" (Said 1993, p. xxv; Bhabha 1994, p. 199) which is in a process of constructing and reconstructing. In this sense, I suggest that the Chinese experience of modernity exemplifies a particular cultural appropriation and various transitions as it underwent its particular shift to modernism. In this process, the binaries between the outside and inside, peripheral and the central, the heterogeneous and the homogeneous, the East and the West, the third world and the first world, may not sustain the purported stability.

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Part V
Conclusion

Chapter 15
Conclusion: Adapting to a World with China at Its Centre: Reflecting on the Present to Better Engage Our Common Future

Jeremy Paltiel

Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier famously quipped that "The Twentieth Century belongs to Canada". That century has passed, and while Canada made outstanding contributions to developing the global institutions that continue to shape our lives today, we would be hard-pressed to argue that Canada's role dominated the past hundred years. By contrast, it would not be a great act of prophesy to argue that the current century will be shaped by China. After an eclipse lasting nearly two hundred years China is re-emerging as the pre-eminent power in Asia and, for the first time since Eunuch Admiral Zheng He sailed the Indian ocean in the fifteenth century, as a global power on the world stage.

It may be too early to say whether the twenty-first century "belongs" to China, but there can be little doubt that whatever develops over the remainder of this century, China is sure to claim a central role, either by having a direct hand in shaping key decisions, or as a dominant factor shaping the environment in which we live. The papers assembled in this volume examine some of the ways in which China shapes the world, seeps into the fabric of Canadian life and culture, as well as some of the ways in which China's own shape evolves and adapts to its newfound role as a global factor (Evans 2006).

This is not the place to summarize what you have already read, but reflecting on its insights highlights the lessons of this volume. The first point is that China is already here. The Chinese presence is shaping Canadian and global culture, influencing our professional lives as Hongxia Shan demonstrates in the case of engineering, moulding the evolution of the Canadian economy and capturing the attention of our policy makers. China is not "out there" but "in here" and here to stay. It is found as easily in our urban core, as in our outer suburbs embedded in literary creations that Jennifer Junwa Lau explores; it is found as much in our industrial, commercial and financial heartland as on our resource frontier (Cao and

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H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_15

Dehoorn 2011). We should rejoice in the realization that the pre-eminent factor in the world today forms the very fibre of our own sinew and ramifies throughout the length and breadth of our extensive territory (Zhang 2011).

The second is that while we are closely acquainted, we have yet to form an intimate extended family together. *Jiujing jiaole pengyou haimei chengqin* 究竟交了朋友还没成亲。Values and issues, from human rights to attitudes towards law and punishment still divide us. And yet, despite our differences there are many areas where we can learn fruitfully from one another, and areas where our strengths might complement one another. As Mingxing Zhao shows, mutual learning best takes place in an atmosphere of reciprocal interest and respect. The tension between individual rights and public purposes, whether in the area of property law or crime and punishment eludes any definitive answer, but both countries must work to find workable solutions consistent with the rule of law.

China's process of urbanization is still gathering momentum and the solutions that evolve to meet the coming resource constraints and social policy issues will shape both the global natural environment and become embedded in the model blueprints for the cities of the future. These issues are tackled in different ways by several authors in this volume, Kam Razavi and Matthew Skogstad-Stubbs in particular. China's public infrastructure projects will shape the political economy of the future world. At the same time, the engineering and social planning expertise developed within Chinese are already on offer to developing countries throughout the world, as Matthew Gaudreau illustrates. There is a huge potential for Canadian firms and public bodies to partner with Chinese corporations and public agencies in their "going out" strategy, and Canadian public agencies as well as public corporations may have lessons to offer that may lower the tuition costs as China climbs the learning curve of multinational enterprise (Paltiel 2011). This potential will only be realized if we reach out as potential partners and view our interests as complementary, rather than competitive. We Canadians must repudiate any notion of our identity as built around a racial core and reach out as bilingual and multicultural hybrids that can engage Chinese as familiars, not strangers. If we can demonstrate that endeavour sincerely, we can show a way for our Chinese colleagues to engage the world with openness to mutually reinforce our common success in a more diverse world.

Another important lesson arising from this volume is that the rise of China not only challenges us to look at China in a new way, but stimulates innovation in social science research. Two articles in that last section, by Adam McDonald and Ajay Parasram, directly challenge traditional paradigms of international relations analysis in the course of dealing with the issues posed by China's rise (Paltiel 2005). The articles collected in this volume not only represent a diversity of viewpoints and subject matter, but as befitting rising scholars in the field, a wide range of research methods. Our essays collect studies using both quantitative and qualitative methods; survey research, interviews and ethnographic studies. Case studies, data derived from satellite imagery, textual analysis and archival historical research. The diversity of methodological approaches testifies to the diversity of the Chinese subject and the rich data to be uncovered using diverse lenses. Indeed, one

important lesson of this volume is that China's rise is not just a research object or subject whose dimensions we need to grasp in order to make sense of the twenty-first century. China's rise constitutes a valuable theoretical lens in itself, a trope we can grasp in order to discover new ways to study the dynamics of social change. This constitutes one of the advantages in focusing on emerging scholars at the beginning of their academic careers. To study the rise of China is to immerse ourselves in the complex dynamics of social change in the new millennium.

Our volume begins with the evolving relationship between the Chinese state and society. This section makes clear that China's state and society are evolving along a distinct trajectory that is neither congruent with the contemporary West, nor confined to a unilinear projection from China's traditional past. Even political institutions, like the People's Congresses Jing Qiang shows, are undergoing transformations in ways that are not always consistent with desires and directions laid down by China's political centre. At the same time that political centre has had to make compromises and adjust its policies to accommodate new social forces emerging in civil society as demonstrated by Leslie Shieh and to the diverse demands and needs inherent in a complex market society as shown by Kam Razavi in the case study from Chongqing. The next section on China's relations abroad makes it clear that characterizations of China 'versus' the West or China 'versus' modernity are gross simplifications that do not reflect contemporary or historic reality.

The China that successive Canadian governments have engaged at multiple levels is a moving target that requires continuous adjustment. Our policy towards China as reviewed by Eric Lefrançois requires changing modalities freed from the sentimental comforts of the privileged intimacy Canada gained from helping to chaperone China's entry into the community of nations (Burton 2011; Frolic 2011). China no longer needs or desires a chaperone, and her date book is full, so it is up to us to work harder to attract her notice, beyond the superficial attraction of our shiny minerals and natural resources. We must make better use of the human ties produced over four decades of diplomatic relations to place our interests in front of the Chinese state at multiple junctures throughout the state and social structure and across China's shifting economic geography. As Matt Gaudreau shows, we must adjust our frame of thinking to a world where China provides as much of a model for others as we do for China, one where Chinese expertise and newfound wealth is becoming an important factor, especially in developing countries.

To find its place as a global power, the Chinese must learn to jettison the dichotomy of "East" and "West" and anchor a self-confident identity in a way that reconciles continued engagement with China's rich and diverse cultural tradition at the same time that it embraces with openness the influences and experiences China has encountered in its often tortuous encounter with modernity and modernization. The final section on literary reflections demonstrates the complexity of identity when China is becoming part of us in Jennifer Junwa Lau's essay on literary Chinatowns, at the same time that China struggles to reconcile its identity with modernity as shown by Min Yang's essay on the *Menglong* poets.

The articles in this volume make it clear that China does not represent a threat to Canada or to our values. While engaging China, as Charles Labrecque shows in Chap. 7, successive governments struggled in varying degrees to balance and integrate pursuit of human rights with the pursuit of Canadian interests. If our young authors represent the future course of Canadian scholarship on China, there is much room for optimism, not simply because they see China's development as a benign force in the world, but because their clear-sighted empiricism provides hope that we can remove obstacles to better interaction as we engage more deeply, and that we are capable of resolving our difficulties as we move forward. As Adam McDonald shows, China actively seeks to engage the world positively both for its own interests and to prove its worthiness as a Great Power. It is comforting, as Ajay Parasram notes, that China and India are not locked into rivalry and conflict, since our South Asian and Chinese immigrants provide much of the dynamism of our cities, our entrepreneurial culture and our universities. At the same time, as Matt Skogstad-Stubbs shows, China's massive urban development and redevelopment can provide us also with blueprints for the urban spaces of the future. While Canada may not be the exact model for achieving a harmonious world in the twenty-first century, we remain a vibrant example and a willing partner in the process of reconciling identity within diversity. This collection of student authors demonstrates the dimensions of Canadian diversity in a process that mirrors the emergent global diversity which occasions China's rise. We offer this volume both as a contribution to current academic knowledge and as an inspiration to future endeavours.

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Appendix
Major Events in Sino-Canadian Relations Since 1970

Cassandra Cao and Leah Weiler

H. Cao and J. Paltiel (eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower*,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-823-6

Cassandra Cao and Leah Weiler




Canada Context
China Context
Pierre Elliott Trudeau's liberal government 1970-1979
Joe Clark's conservative government 1979-1980
Pierre Elliott Trudeau's liberal government 1980-1984
Brian Mulroney's conservative government 1984-1993
The Cultural Revolution, 1966 – 1976
Beginning of economic reforms, 1978
PRC under Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader, 1978-1997
Hua Guofeng becomes Chairman of the Communist Party of China, 1976-1981
Hu Yaobang becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, 1981-1987
Zhao Ziyang becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, 1987 – 1989
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Formal diplomatic relations between Canada and China are established on October 13th, 1970
PRC receives seat on UN Security Council, 1971
Trudeau visits China, 1973
Montreal Olympics 1976
Canada grants a 2 billion line of credit to China for expansion of economic reforms, 1980
President of China Li Xiannian makes a state visit to Canada, 1985 (the first visit by the President of China to Canada after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries)
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang addresses a joint session of the Canadian Parliament, 1984 (This was the first leader of a communist country to address the Canadian House of Commons)
A general agreement is signed between Canada and China on Development Cooperation, 1983
Trudeau visits China, 1983
Brian Mulroney visits China, 1986
Establishment of Canada-China Strategy, 1987
CIDA aid program is doubled to 200 million dollars, 1986
On June 5th, 1989, the Canadian House of Commons unanimously condemns the Tiananmen incident.
Tiananmen Square protests, 1989*
Canada announces a 350 million dollar expansion on top of a 2 billion line of credit to China to promote bilateral trade, 1986
On June 30th, 1989, Canada imposes sanctions against China.


Canada Context
Kim Campbell's conservative government, 1993
Jean Chrétien's liberal government 1993-2003
Paul Martin's liberal government 2003-2006
Stephen Harper's conservative government 2006-present
Jean Chrétien leads the First Team Canada trade mission to China, 1994
Jean Chretien's liberal government's foreign policy vis-à-vis China is based on four main pillars: (1) economic partnership; (2) peace and security; (3) sustainable development; and (4) human rights.
Canada decides to end the co-sponsoring human rights resolution on China at United Nations meeting and announces a bilateral package of human rights initiatives, 1997
Paul Martin meets with the spiritual chief of Tibetans Dalai Lama in a non-official context in April 2004
Stephen Harper formally meets the Dalai Lama in his Parliament Hill office, 2007
Approved destination status for Chinese tourism to Canada is signed, 2010
Three Canadian Members of Parliament are expelled from China during an official visit to the country, 1992
Team Canada to China, 1996
Team Canada to China, 1998
Team Canada to China, 2001
Team Canada to China, 2003
The Canadian government announces Canada's Asia-Pacific Gateway & Corridor Initiative in 2005
Stephen Harper makes his first official visit to China, 2009
July 2010: Governor General of Canada Michaëlle Jean visits China
1991
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Chinese Premier Li Peng visits Canada, 1995
Jiang Zemin visits Canada, 1997
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visits Canada, 1999
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits Canada, 2003
Hu Jintao visits Canada, 2005
Beijing Olympics, 2008
World Expo, Shanghai, 2010
Hu Jintao visits Canada, 2010
China participates for the first time in the UN Commission on Human Rights, 1996
Foundation of the Canada-China Joint Committee on Human Rights, 1997
China signs the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1998
China officially joins WTO, 2001
Paul Martin visits China, 2005
The extending of honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama by a unanimous vote of the House of Commons, 2006
Expo 2010 in Shanghai, Canada Pavilion, is one of the biggest pavilions in Expo
China Context
Deng Xiaoping's southern tour, 1992
Hong Kong returns to China, 1997
Macau returns to China, 1999
Jiang Zemin becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, 1989 – 2002
Hu Jintao becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, 2002– 2012


Canada Context
China Context
2011
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2013
2014
2015
February 2012: Stephen Harper's second official visit to China
- Uranium export treaty signed
- Declaration of inten tion signed for a foreign investment promotion and protection agreement (FIPA) between Canada and China
Sept 2012: Canadian Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, Ed Fast, and China's Minister of Commerce Chen Deming sign FIPA
Governor General of Canada, David Johnston conducted a State visit to the People's Republic of China, from October 16 to 24, 2013
October 2014: The Canada –China FIPA
November 2014: Stephen Harper's third official visit to China
April 2015: Launching of the China-Canada Year at the Chan Centre for the Performing Arts at the University of BritishColumbia in Vancouver, BC
Xi Jinping becomes General Secretary of Communist Party of China since 2012-present