



The Politics of
Securitization in
Democratic Indonesia

YANDRY KURNIAWAN



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palgrave
macmillan

Yandry Kurniawan
Department of International Relations
University of Indonesia
Jawa Barat, Indonesia

ISBN 978-3-319-62481-5 ISBN 978-3-319-62482-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-62482-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017949883

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe much gratitude to many individuals and institutions for supporting the research from which this publication draws. Undoubtedly, I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rüländ of the Department of Political Science at the Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg, Germany, the institution where he teaches and I studied. From the first until the last day of my research process, Prof. Rüländ provided me with insightful advice and constructive criticisms in a friendly and supportive manner. With great care and attention, he also read and meticulously commented on each draft of my manuscript. I could never have written this volume without his backing and encouragement. For all his counsel and continued faith in me, I am forever grateful.

Of the institutions that have supported the research, the most important had been the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The generous scholarship funding they provided saw me through the course of my doctorate, and enabled me to make many field trips that were necessary for the study. I am also indebted to the Southeast Asia Studies Program at the University of Freiburg, which provided an ideal academic atmosphere for the fruition of this work. The largesse of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the financial sponsor of the program, greatly advantaged me.

This volume rests on findings from extensive fieldwork in three Indonesian cities, namely Jakarta, the Aceh capital of Banda Aceh, and the Maluku capital of Ambon. In Jakarta, I would like to thank a number of notable scholars for sharing with me their knowledge and connecting me to important resource persons. Of those individuals, I would like to single

out Andi Widjanto, Edy Prasetyono, Kusnanto Anggoro, and Makmur Keliat. I am deeply grateful for their mentorship throughout the years. In the initial stage of the research, they played an indispensable role in introducing me to key personages from whom my deeper knowledge on the subject being studied developed. I also deeply benefited from their stimulating conversations, which helped a great deal in keeping my theoretical perspectives in-check.

In Banda Aceh, I received generous assistance from numerous organizations and individuals. In particular, I would like to warmly express my sincere thanks to Amdy Hamdani, Ihsan Fauzi, and Satria Gusra. From them, I received very helpful guidance about the local socio-political context and institutional terrains which I entered as a novice. Of equal importance, their competence, reliability, and remarkable work efficiency had eased much of my logistical burden during my fieldwork in Banda Aceh. In Ambon, I likewise had been fortunate to enjoy great support from various hosts and key persons. First and foremost, I would like to thank Lies Marantika, my very first contact in Ambon. Her recommendations allowed me to secure access to many institutions and prominent figures. I also would like to thank the *Institut TIFA Damai Maluku*, which hosted me for much of the duration of my fieldwork in the city. I deeply appreciate their warm hospitality. The guidance I received from the Institute's director, Justus P. Pattipawae, in particular, was very crucial for the development of my thinking. His astute insights helped shape my arguments on conflict and peace in Maluku. With the same gratitude, I extend my thanks to Hilda Rolobessy, the founder of *Yayasan Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* (YPPM), who kindly introduced me to invaluable resource persons. The discussions I had with a number of individuals were a great intellectual inspiration. Here I would like to express my distinct gratitude to Embong and Ivon Salampessy, Jacky Manuputty, and Prof. Dr. Tony Pariella, whose breadth of knowledge vastly enriched my research experience.

In Freiburg, I enjoyed great assistance from Mikko Huotari, Cahtrin Arenz, and Arndt Michael in dealing with technical, substantial, and institutional matters. Notably, I am indebted to Rachel Hill for proofreading the chapters of this volume. In Jakarta, while finalizing the chapters and preparing them for publication, I received kind support from Avie Azis, Cazadira Fediva Tamzil, and Azhari Setiawan. I also wish to make grateful acknowledgment to the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia: I consider it my wonderful luck to be here. Thank you to my

colleagues, for their confidence in my work, and for allowing a respite from administrative and teaching chores, which made possible the culmination of this product into its final, published form. Finally, my heartfelt thanks go to my family, my greatest support. I cannot thank them enough for their boundless kindness, patience, and understanding. They had to endure long periods of my absence for the purposes of this research, yet their moral support remained unfaltering. It is to them that this book is dedicated, with much affection. Most especially, I thank my wife, Rahmi Wahyuni, to whom I owe immensely a lot.

Last but certainly not least, my most sincere thanks are rendered to all the research respondents who sacrificed their valuable time to answer my questions. I genuinely appreciate, and feel deeply honored by their willingness to share their thoughts and experiences with me. I include in this gratitude all those whom I have not named personally in this acknowledgment, but who have in a great variety of capacities contributed to this publication. I do hope that I have adequately reflected their views. If not, however, any misinterpretations are my sole responsibility.

Depok, Indonesia

Yandry Kurniawan

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Independent, Alliance of Independent Journalists
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
APRIS	Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat, War Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Bais	Badan Intelijen Strategis, Armed Forces Intelligence Body
Bakin	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, the State Intelligence Coordinating Body
Bakorstanas	Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional, National Stability Maintenance Coordinating Body
BBM	Buton, Bugis, Makassar
BEIC	British East India Company
BIA	Badan Intelijen ABRI, ABRI Intelligence Agency
BKS	Badan Kerja Sama Sipil-Militer, Civil–Military Cooperation Bodies
BRA	Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, Aceh Reintegration Agency
Brimob	Brigade Mobil, Police Mobile Brigade
BRR	Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement

COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Center
CORO	Corps Opleiding Reserve Officieren, Reserve Officers Training Corps
COW	Correlates of War (Project)
CPT	Causal Process Tracing
Dandim	Komandan Distrik Militer, Military District Commander
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication
DI	Darul Islam, lit. House of Islam
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer, Military Operation Area
DPD	Dewan Pertahanan Daerah, Regional Defense Council
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representative Council
DPKSH	Dewan Penegak Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum, Security Enforcement and Law System Council
DPN	Dewan Pertahanan Negara, State Defense Council
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council
EU	European Union
EUEOM	EU's Election Observation Mission in Aceh
Falintil	Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste, Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor
Famred	Forum Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi, Student Forum for Democracy and Reform
FKM	Forum Kedaulatan Maluku, Malukan Sovereignty Forum
FKSMJ	Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta, Jakarta Forum of Student Union Communication
Forkap-Malut	Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Provinsi Maluku Utara, People's Communication Forum for the Province of North Maluku
Forkot	Forum Kota, City Forum
Formatku	Forum Organisasi Masyarakat Maluku, Malukan People's Organizations Forum
FPI	Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front

Fretelin	Frente Revolucionária Timor Leste Independente, Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor
FSUIM	Forum Silaturahmi Umat Muslim Maluku, Malukan Muslim Forum
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement
GBHN	Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, Broad Guidelines of State Policy
GBPK	Gerakan Bersenjata Pengacau Keamanan, Armed Gangs of Peace Disturbers
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Gen.	General
GPK	Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, Security-Disturbing Gang
GPL	Gerakan Pengacau Liar, Wild Disturbance Movement
GRPR	Gerakan Rakyat Pro-Demokrasi, Pro-Reform People's Movement
HDC	Henry Dunant Center
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectual
IMF	International Monetary Funds
Inpres	Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction
Interfet	International Force for East Timor
Ipoleksosbudmilag	ideologi (ideology), politik (politics), ekonomi (economics), sosial (social), budaya (cultural), militer (military), agama (religion)
JSC	Joint Security Committee
KAMMI	Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Committee of Muslim Students
KISDI	Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity
KMA	Koninklijke Militarie Akademie, Military Academy
KNIL	Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army
KNIP	Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indonesian National Committee
Kodalops	Komando Pengendali Operasi, Operation Controlling Command
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer, Regional Military Command

Koga	Komando Siaga, Vigilance Command
Kohankam	Komando Pertahanan Keamanan, Defense and Security Command
Kolakops	Komando Pelaksana Operasi, Operations Implementation Command
Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, National Commission of Human Rights
Koopskam	Komando Operasi Keamanan Timor Timur, Defense and Security Command to East Timor Security Operations Command
Koopslihkam	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan / Security Restoration Operation Command
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus, Army's Special Force Command for Restoration of Security and Order
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational
Korem	Komando Resort Militer, Resort Military Command
Kostrad	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Reserve Command
KPA	Komisi Peralihan Aceh, Aceh Transitional Committee
KP-PRA	Kongres Persiapan Partai Rakyat Aceh, Aceh People's Party Preparatory Committee
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
lit.	Literally
LoGA	Law of Governing Aceh
LoI	Letter of Intent
Maj. Gen.	Major General
MBKD	Markas Besar Komando Djawa, Headquarters of Djawa Military Command
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars
NAD	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, lit. State of Aceh, House of Peace
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations

NII	Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic State of Indonesia
OCM	Operasi Cinta Meunasah, Operation Love the Mosque
OKPH	Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum, Operation Restoring Security and Upholding the Law
OSR	Operasi Sadar Rencong, Operation Dagger Awareness
OSW 99	Operasi Satgas / Satuan Tugas Wibawa 99, Operation Authority Taskforce 99
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party
Pangdam	Panglima Daerah Militer, Regional Military Commander
Pangkooopslihkam	Panglima Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan, Security Restoration Operation Commander
Pansus	Panitia Khusus, Special Committee
Panwaslih	Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Aceh, Aceh Election Supervisory Body
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Star Party
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan, Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle
PDMD	Panglima Darurat Militer Daerah, Local Military Emergency Administrator
PDRI	Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia
PDSD	Panglima Darurat Sipil Daerah, Local Civil Emergency Administrator
Pdt.	Pendeta, Protestant Minister
Pepelra	Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora, Dwikora Task-force Administrator
Pepelrada	Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah, Regional Dwikora Task-force Administrator
Permesta	Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Universal Struggle Charter
Perpu	Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, Government Regulations in lieu of Law
Petrus	Pembunuhan Misterius, Mysterious Killings
PID	Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst, Dutch's secret police in the East Indies

PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party
PKMP	Penguasa Keadaan Darurat Pusat, Central Martial Law Administrator
Pokja-Maluku	Kelompok Kerja Maluku, Maluku Working Group
Pol	Police
Polri	Kepolisian Nasional Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Police
PP	Persatuan Perjuangan, Struggle Union
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party
PPRM	Pasukan Penindak Rusuh Massa, Riot Prevention Force
PRA	Partai Rakyat Aceh, Aceh People's Party
Prolegnas	Program Legislasi Nasional, National Legislation Program
PRRI	Pemerintahan Revolutioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic
ret.	Retired
RIS	Republik Indonesia Serikat, Federal Republic of Indonesia
RMS	Republic Maluku Selatan, South Maluku Republic
Rp.	Rupiah
RRI	Radio Republik Indonesia, Radio Republic Indonesia
RUU	Rancangan Undang-Undang, Bill
RUU PKB	Rancangan Undang-Undang Penanganan Keadaan Bahaya, Bill on the Management of Emergency Situations
SIRA	Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh, Aceh Referendum Information Center
SOB	Regeling op de Staat van Orlog en Van Beleg, Regulation on State of War and Siege
Supersemar	Surat Perintah 11 Maret, the 11 March Letter of Order
SvB	Staat van Beleg, State of War Emergency

SvO	Staat van Oorlog, State of War
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Military
TPO	Tenaga Pembantu Operasi, Operational Assistance Staff
TPPUA	Tim Penasehat Presiden Urusan Aceh, Presidential Advisory Team on Aceh
UCDP/PRIO	Uppsala Conflict Data Program/ Peace Research Institute in Oslo
UN	United Nations
UU	Undang-Undang, Law
UZV	Utrechtsche Zending Vereniging, Utrecht Missionary Organization
VAUBEC	Vrijwillig Automobilecorps, Voluntary Automobile Corps
Wanhankamnas	Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional, National Defense and Security Council
Yon Gab	Batalion Gabungan, Joint Battalion
YPPM	Yayasan Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, People's Development and Empowerment Foundation

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Introduction

Global political affairs in the last 200 years have been characterized by a constant pursuit of democracy through the process of democratization. Huntington's waves of democracy,¹ for instance, show us that the first wave of democratization on the global stage was started in the USA back in 1828 and reached its peak in 1922. The second wave began at the end of World War II and reached its peak in 1962 (Kurzman 1998: 43). Finally the third wave began when the Portuguese Flower Revolution took place in 1974, which initially encompassed Southern Europe and Latin America and eventually Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa (Kurzman 1998: 43; Croissant and Merkel 2004: 1).

Why do we need democracy? A general explanation usually refers to the core definition of liberal democracy. This theory argues that democracy guarantees free elections; the separation of state's power; independent government institutions; effective civilian control over the military, political, and civic pluralism; equality before the law; individual and group freedoms; and so forth (Bünthe and Ufen 2009: 6). Another canonical answer relies on the conventional wisdom of democratic peace. At the global level, the proponents of democratic peace have long argued that "democratically governed states rarely go to war with each other or even fight each other at low levels of lethal violence" (Russett 1993: 25). At the domestic level, the democratic peace argument holds that democratic regimes are able to defuse potential violence by diverting popular discontent into institutionalized channels. Dissident movements do not need to

resort to organized violence against state authorities since they can redress their grievances through many forms of non-violent collective action. Such an argument is also supported by statistical analyses that reveal an “inverted U-curve” relationship between repression and civil violence. The U-curve suggests that established democracies are less susceptible to civil war. In short, the benefits of peaceful negotiations in a democracy exceed the benefits of violent conflict (Mason 2003: 26).

Unfortunately, the transition itself to democracy is anything but an easy process.² Previous studies have addressed this issue and shown the significant relationship between democratic transition and the outbreak of violent conflicts, both in the domestic arena³ and in the international sphere (manifested in interstate wars).⁴ These studies posit a relatively similar argument in explaining the outbreak of violent conflicts, especially during the early stages of the democratic transition. Sources of shortcomings during any transition include the threatened old elites, a widening of the political spectrum, the inflexible interests of newly developed groups and lack of time to accommodate those interests, the weakening of the central authority,⁵ a high level of political participation,⁶ the uncertainties of the transition process due to new and multiple centers of power and decision-makers,⁷ and weak political institutions.⁸ All in all, these shortcomings can be summarized by repeating Huntington’s argument that “the typical problem of political development is the gap between high levels of political participation and the weak integrative institutions to reconcile the multiplicity or contending claims” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 22).

The relation of democratization and conflict, as presented above, is supported by the empirical, historical record on the pattern of violent conflicts in the world, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century. The record shows that between 1945 and 1999 there were twenty-five interstate wars resulting in a total of 3.3 million battle deaths, but 127 domestic violent conflicts took place, which resulted in 16.2 million battle deaths (Mason 2003: 19). Some areas where massive democratic transitions took place in the second half of the last century, such as Latin America, Africa, Asia, as well as Central and Eastern Europe, have become the site of almost all domestic violence conflicts. Take some cases, for instance, in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Indonesia, where the democratic transition coincided with a rise in national independence movements, spurring separatist warfare (Mansfield and Snyder 2002a: 297). In number, “of the nearly 100 countries considered as ‘transitional’ in recent years, only a relatively small number—probably fewer than

twenty—are clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization” (Croissant and Merkel 2004: 2). Perhaps, Indonesia, the country central to this study, may fall into this category.

Indonesia’s security dynamics have been through a dramatic change since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order Regime on 21 May 1998. During the period prior to, and after the collapse of the regime, the country once again experienced one of the most severe internal conflicts in its history. It began with a series of massive student protests, followed by the kidnapping of students and activists, the May riots in Jakarta in 1998, other riots in some parts of the archipelago, communal conflicts, and the re-emergence of long suppressed secessionist movements. Soon after Suharto stepped down and the country started its democratic transition, Indonesia suddenly turned into one of the most conflict-prone areas in the world. This fact can be seen both in the outbreak of horizontal conflicts between different groups of society and in the vertical conflicts. In the latter case, local political contenders verbally and physically challenged the legitimacy of the central government. To summarize the scene of the day, in its earlier phase of transition Indonesia had to deal with at least three separatist movements, three violent communal conflicts, and a number of riots. As for the transnational security challenge, Indonesia suffered at least thirty terrorist bomb attacks from 1999 to 2009. And piracy, for example, scored its highest number attacks worldwide in Indonesian waters during the period 1998–2003.⁹ Such a situation caused some observers to start speculating about the breakup of Indonesia (Aspinall and Berger 2001; Emmerson 2000) and commenting about how violence must be embedded in the Indonesian culture (Collins 2002).

However, after roughly seven years of the democratization process, Indonesia has shown a certain degree of positive achievements in both mitigating conflicts and democratizing the country. The terminations of the conflicts in Aceh and Maluku serve as good examples. To a certain degree, the peace in Aceh was not achieved by the military defeat of the separatist group; instead peace was agreed upon in a negotiated manner with the signing of the Helsinki Peace Treaty between the conflicting parties in 2005. In the same vein, the termination of the conflict in Maluku was not through territorial occupation by the military, but with the signing of the Malino Peace Treaty between various hostile groups in this area. Even more, both treaties were the result of the initiative of the ministry of

people's welfare. Furthermore, no violent conflict in Indonesia has been recorded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset since 2005.¹⁰ Also, Freedom House upgraded Indonesia's democratic status from "partly free" to "free" in 2006, and with that, Indonesia is the only "free" country in the Southeast Asian region.¹¹ Compared to its regional neighbors in Southeast Asia like Malaysia and Thailand, "where democratic constitutions are stagnating, if not backsliding, Indonesia, has cemented its status as Southeast Asia's political role model" (Beech 2009). These facts, just to name few, show that Indonesia has moderately succeeded in managing its rocky transition and has cemented itself as one of the most vibrant democratizing states in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The initial factor of the democratic transition in Indonesia was bringing Suharto's authoritarian regime of the New Order era to an end. This regime was directly and indirectly supported by the Indonesian armed forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ ABRI*, later on *Tentara Nasional Indonesia/ TNI*). During this period, the Indonesian military institutions performed a wide range of functions beyond the conventional one, namely defense. For a long period of time, the military had been actively engaged in the daily political routines and had enjoyed a deeply rooted existence and influence at the national and local levels of the country's political and institutional arena. In the context of long-term democratization, the transition process in Indonesia had thus begun with the challenge of creating military disengagement from political, economic, and social fields. At that beginning of the process, stakeholders agreed that it would have had to start at the policy level with the re-arrangement of regulations in the military sector and the implementation of the state's defense function. They thought that new laws in the spirit of *reformasi* would provide a strong regulatory basis for an effective and legitimate democratic transition.

A shortcoming arose when democratic transition took place suddenly and the tremendous pressure to withdraw the military from every political position, including from its extended function as a conflict management institution, became unavoidable. During the New Order regime, the authoritarian government with the backing of the armed forces had generally succeeded in using the military's omnipresence as a deterrent to suppress the country's vulnerable security situation from erupting into open conflicts. In Indonesia's past, the military had thus been a "Leviathan," with the capability of preventing violent actions against the state. Consequently, the military's long time presence in every aspect of political

life had weakened and discouraged the civilian capability of dealing with statehood problems. Hence, the loophole left by the military's withdrawal had opened up the possibility for past sources of conflict to re-emerge and escalate into violent conflicts. During the early stage of the transition process, Indonesia's civilian institutions have arguably not had the institutional capability to fill positions which were left by the military's disengagement. The state's political authority had thus been forced to follow a "trial and error" path to develop an approach to deal with escalating conflicts and to strengthen the institutional capacity to civilian conflict resolution.

As this introduction has shown, I argue that the Indonesian transition is a case showing the inherent problems beneath the democratization process and how the transition has its own security dynamics which need to be addressed. Therefore, states undergoing such problematic transitions have to develop an approach to deal with security issues brought about by the political and security re-arrangement during the democratization period. Since the main objective of these states is to transform a repressive state apparatus, of which the military was central, into a democratic one, this approach must then be able to avoid the risk of politicizing both potential and actual security vulnerabilities.

In Indonesia, the debates regarding how security should be achieved are mainly focused on the creation of an ideal form of a national security system that would be most appropriate during a time of political transition to a democratic regime. Consequently, the process of democratizing the security sector was understood as the development of a framework that can combine these two objectives. On the one hand, it intends to uphold and maintain security, but does so under the conditions of eliminating all authoritarian elements as well as a repressive approach to security reminiscent of the old regime. On the other hand, it looks for additional measures which could consolidate the democratic regime and the security system together (Widjajanto and Keliat 2007). Both the debates and policy-based processes analytically correspond to the dynamics of either securitization (enabling emergency measures and the suspension of normal politics) or the act of desecuritization (removing issues from the security agenda) and are part of a broader process of political, institutional, and legal reform associated with a democratic transition.

With such a background, though the main interest of this study is derived from the Indonesian democratic transition, it does not attempt to provide an all-encompassing analysis of the country's democratization

process. Instead, the objective of this study is to explain the complexity of how security problems during the democratic transition have been handled in Indonesia, while constraining the state's security agencies at the same time. Under such an objective, this study asks the key question: how does Indonesia deal with its security issues during the democratic transition? In order to answer the proposed question, this study focuses on three objects: (1) the nature of the threat to security during the democratization process; (2) the public discourse on how security is perceived and brought into being; and (3) the institutional and behavioral changes among security-related stakeholders. By examining these objects of observation, the study aims to show, borrowing from Tannenwald (2007: 69), some "observable implications" which should be addressed in order to see how the Indonesian government approaches the country's security matters under such a situation. This study thus traces policy development in the field of security at the national level and their implementation, as well as their influence on conflict-termination processes at the local level (the conflict areas). To achieve its purpose, this study applies securitization theory and the causal process tracing method.

There are three arguments why securitization theory can be a powerful tool for achieving the objective at hand. First, though developed in international security studies, it is possible to use the theory for analyzing a state's domestic security. Second, securitization theory, hence, acknowledges internal sources of threat. Third, the theory provides an explanation of the use of force. Last, the concept of desecuritization provides a basis for treating security problems within normal political processes, that is, when, for example, political negotiations and compromises are in order instead of the use of extraordinary measures or coercive instruments. The application of the theory in this regard places an emphasis on the concept of both securitization and desecuritization. By taking on securitization from the Copenhagen School and beyond, this study seeks to provide a new perspective on the theory when the nature of threat is objective, domestic, violent, the state's security forces were deployed, and the unity of the state was at stake. This study puts forth the argument that—in contrast to some authors who place securitization and desecuritization at opposite ends of the spectrum—securitization and desecuritization occur interchangeably in order to tackle the threats to security. The method of causal process tracing is used to shed light on how Indonesia deals with its security challenge during the transition.

NOTES

1. “Waves of democratization,” popularized by Huntington (1991), can be divided into at least three approaches: as rises in the global level of democracy, as periods of positive net transitions to democracy, and as linked sets (among individual cases) of transitions to democracy. The wave of democratization in the sense of the global level of transition started in the USA in 1828. The wave of democracy as positive net transitions started in the 1920s. The wave of democratization as linked sets was initiated by the European and Haitian revolutions following the wake of the French Revolution in 1789 (Kurzman 1998: 42, 43, 49, 51, 56).
2. Arguably, the notion of a “transitional period” in the context of democratization does not provide satisfactory explanation. How long does this transition take? For instance, Indonesia has been experiencing this transition for more than twelve years. The Philippines have been running on the treadmill of democratization since it started the process in the late 1980s. Thailand has more and less been in the same situation for seventy years. Most Latin American countries experienced all three waves of democratization and have been in a transition period for the last 200 years.
3. For a discussion on the domestic level, see Hegre et al. 2001; Mason 2003; Magnusson 2001.
4. For the discussion on the global level, see for instance Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 2002a, Mansfield and Snyder 2002b; Croissant and Merkel 2004.
5. Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 7, 26, 27, 30.
6. Mansfield and Snyder 2002a: 299; Mansfield and Snyder 2002b: 531.
7. Magnusson 2001: 211.
8. Mansfield and Snyder 2002a: 299; Mansfield and Snyder 2002b: 531; Hegre et al. 2001: 34; Croissant and Merkel 2004: 2; and Magnusson 2001: 11.
9. “Annual Death Toll from Piracy Rises,” London, 7 February 2005. Available at <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/96-annual-death-toll-from-piracy-rises>, accessed on 17 July 2005.
10. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is the version v.4-2011, 1946–2010, based on and up-dated by Themnér and Wallensteen 2012.
11. However, in 2014, Freedom House downgraded Indonesia’s status to “partly free,” thereby responding to “the adoption of a law that restricts the activities of nongovernmental organizations, increases bureaucratic oversight of such groups, and requires them to support the national ideology of Pancasila—including its explicitly monotheist component.” Available at http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/indonesia-0#.U_xqUKON6So, accessed on 6 August 2014.

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Securitization Theory: A Theoretical Framework

Studies on security and conflict in Indonesia have largely relied on *culturalists* (those who “emphasize the causal and constitutive role of cultural processes and systems of signification”) and *objectivists* (those who see “a homogeneous form of human subjectivity across time and space”) traditions (Steinmetz 1999). The works of *culturalists* usually cover a longer period, not only focusing on the decisive moment of the conflict. For them, violent conflicts are the end result of long-term social dynamics, and their theoretical approaches to Indonesia’s violent conflicts—among others—are: social psychology (Colombijn 2002; Collins 2002), collective-behavioral (Suryadinata et al. 2003: xxiii, 178; Bubandt 2004; Kreuzer 2002), and historical-cultural (Surata and Andrianto 2001; Sutirto 2000; Warnaen 2002; Abdilah 2002; Trijono 2004; Bartels 2003; Smith 2005; Good and Good 2001).¹ Their analyses of the subject at hand can be summarized into three general conclusions. First, the culture of violence is embedded in Indonesian society. Second, the objective reality of ethnic and religious diversity is perceived as latent sources of threat. Third, modernization and development—the New Order’s cardinal rhetoric—have damaged social and cultural bonds within the society. Hence, it leads to the outbreak of violent conflicts. From *culturalists* we learn how to conduct a long-term observation on certain social phenomena. And, from their literature we learn more about social psychology and the creation of meaning in a society.

The generalizations and conclusions of *culturalists*, however, contain some fundamental weaknesses. First, their speculation on the culture of violence ignores the possibility of external factors triggering violence. For instance, the failure of the state institutions in accommodating people's grievances has become a classic source of riots and violent conflicts. Second, by citing ethnic and religious diversity as sources of conflict, *culturalists* treat these factors as if they are static and homogeneous—which obviously is untrue. More and more studies have concluded that there is only weak correlation between social diversity and the outbreak of violent conflict.² Lastly and most problematically, much of the speculation on culture and conflict is nothing but mere prejudice and leads to the creation of negative stereotypes.³ Security problems will deteriorate if decision-makers adopt such prejudices. What we have then is the institutionalization of racist sentiments.⁴

On the other hand, *objectivists* focus on events which occur over a relatively short period but lead to massive change. We can further differentiate *objectivists* into *materialist* (those who highlight the material interest of whole group, such as Booth 2000; Frankenberg et al. 1999; Soemardjan 2002; Tadjoeuddin et al. 2003) and *rational choice theorists* (those who emphasize the deliberate choices of individuals, such as Mietzner 2003; Aspinall and Crouch 2003; Turner et al. 2003; Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Schulte and van Klinken 2007).⁵ *Objectivists'* analysis on the post-New Order Indonesia's security dynamics generally comes to three conclusions. First, the monetary crisis of 1997–1998—which led to structural changes—caused uncertainty in the political and social landscape. Second, various interest groups treated and manipulated this uncertainty as an “opportunity” to re-negotiate their position in the new political constellation. Third, some of those groups used violence which in turn jeopardized security stability. Just to name one study, Jacques Bertrand's *historical institutionalism* approach is one of the insightful analyses in this tradition. His national framework model and critical juncture shows how conflicts occurred in the final years of the New Order regime and the early years of the *reformasi* era.⁶ All in all, in the rationalist literature we encounter the connection between institutional and structural changes in democratizing Indonesia and the rise of militant movements.

However, *objectivists'* studies on Indonesia's security dynamics also suffer from several deficiencies. Firstly, those analysts who use the large-N method end their explanation after proposing certain correlations between

variables. They leave the very question unanswered: what really does happen during the conflict? Second, the relation between monetary crisis and structural changes does not explain why large-scale violent conflicts happened in only a few regions of the country. Following the crisis, structural changes took place across the country. Yet, large-scale horizontal conflicts broke up only in five regions and the vertical ones in three regions. Third, some researchers conclude that the structural changes made some elites from the old regime turn into security spoilers—in order to preserve their privilege and strengthen their bargaining position in these new circumstances.⁷

Another analysis worth mentioning is Gerry van Klinken's sociological approach (2007). Innovatively re-framing *social movement theory*, van Klinken argues that the source of Indonesia's security problem during the transition lies on the dynamics of "local institutional connections." He argues that "locally significant elites and [...] pressure groups helped organize the crowds on the streets." From van Klinken's approach, we can highlight at least three points: he refutes *culturalists'* subjective speculations, he further elaborates the unanswered question left by *objectivists'* large-N analysis, and he fills in the blanks in Bertrand's *historical institutionalism* approach.⁸ In sum, van Klinken shows the "interrelatedness" of events in complex causal mechanisms of Indonesia's violent conflicts without claiming it as a causal effect that explains "causation" (van Klinken 2007: 15).

Despite the account summarized above, what is surprisingly missing from literature on Indonesia's democratization and violent conflict is the discussion of the state's security policy during the turbulent days. Where the state and its policy are mentioned, at best, some observers argue that it failed to provide security. Why it failed, largely remains under-studied. At worst, some others argue that the state—at least some elements of it—is the perpetrator of violence. This fact raises an important question in order to study security dynamics in Indonesia's democratization: doesn't the state try to do anything at all? There must be some policies and efforts for dealing with the situation.

Also, the above account shows us that if conflicts are a given fact in political life, material interest is paramount, and individuals are deliberate actors. Analysts tend to perceive the above-mentioned three factors as an objective reality and that actors act rationally. However, many political events beg for a deeper introspection and less grand abstract theorizing, since actors do not always follow every kind of rational script, be it written

in the language of self-interest, mutual interest, or dictated by economic circumstances (Hough 2004: 6). In other words, there is a need to scrutinize the cognitive or interactive process of conflict and security in the democratization of Indonesia. This in particular will be the contribution of this research.

Proponents of the cognitive approach emphasize the subjective nature of social events, including conflict and security. Accordingly, social events are defined in a continuous interactive process. Though a group's identity and interest, as well as the pattern of amity and enmity between groups developed over time, it does not necessarily mean that it is rational. The group's identity, interest, and amity-enmity pattern are not an objective balance sheet. To a much greater extent identity, interest, or amity and enmity pattern are subjective, developed on the basis of very selective perceptions (Rüland 2006). In this direction, *social constructivists* have dedicated their research agenda scrutinizing this puzzle and played a leading role.

Resting their analytical framework on a combination of sociological approaches and critical theory, *constructivists* argue that security and threat are socially constructed. Accordingly, the meaning of security and threat change according to the context. Hence, the meaning exists because we have agreed that it should exist in such a way. This happens because the structure—the realm where things happen—not only involves the distribution of material capabilities but also social relationships. By quoting Alexander Wendt, Snyder explains that social structure has three elements: shared knowledge,⁹ material resources, and practice (Snyder 1999: 104–5).

Another *constructivists'* main tenet is that material capabilities (armed forces, weapons system and such) are less important in bringing security into being. On the contrary, non-material or ideational factors¹⁰ in general are central to constructions and practices of security, hence security does not come from constraining the people (Collins 2002: 3). Grounded on such a background, *constructivists* ask fundamental questions, which were largely ignored before, like, what is security: who is secured and what are they being secured against; whose security should we be concerned with; and how should this security be attained (Tan and Boutin 2001: 1)? This set of ontological questions has broadened, as well as deepened¹¹ security discourse.

In short, *constructivists* argue that identity and norms¹² provide the basis for political action, security is a site of negotiation and contestation,¹³ and thus security is a social construction.¹⁴ While sharing such arguments,

constructivists still struggle to explain how exactly such a construction takes place. The Copenhagen School takes this challenge and introduces the theory of securitization (McDonald 2008: 67).

1 THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL'S SECURITIZATION THEORY

Ole Wæver first introduced the idea of securitization in depth in 1995 and then a group of scholars in Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) further developed the idea. Later on the group became known as the Copenhagen School (Mutimer 2007: 60). As an analytical tool, securitization theory received its intellectual credit in 1998, when Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde published their collaborative work entitled *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Since then publications related to securitization and/or desecuritization in periodic international journals have gained a growing popularity (Gad and Petersen 2011: 316). According to one author, securitization theory is one among the most prominent and influential post–Cold War approaches in the field of security studies (Williams 2003: 511). The innovative worth of securitization theory can be found in “its usefulness for the study of the politics of security-policy making” (Knudsen 2001: 358).

The initial authors of securitization theory argue that a strict definition of source for threats and vulnerabilities is missing. Threats and vulnerabilities may arise from many different fields and subjects. Yet, to be labeled as problems of security “they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from normal run of the merely political” (Buzan et al. 1998: 5).

The question then is how to strictly define these criteria. This puzzle largely occurs due to the following facts. First, there is only limited conceptual literature on threats and they are far from satisfying (Buzan et al. 1998: 44). Second, there is an objective approach to threats (there are real threats) and also a subjective approach (there are perceived threats), yet no one can assure the correlation between the two (Wolfers 1962: 151; Buzan et al. 1998: 30).

Securitization theory implies three general features of security. The first feature is that the concept of security is perennially associated with the notion of threat. Threats could be anything. However, to be regarded as security matter, they should pose a degree of challenge to cherished values (i.e. ideology, dignity, integrity, identity) of a security's referent object (states, government, regime, society). Second, the term or concept of

security is an, borrowing W.B. Gallie (1956), “essentially contested concept,” therefore is subjective in nature, meaning there would be no universal consensus regarding the definition of security. Thus, “what is understood as security depends entirely on what is meant by the one who made such a statement” (Williams 2008: 1). The third feature is that the term “security” is political in essence. It means actors who are responsible to handle any challenging issues (usually states) do not always oblige to opt for using the security approach. Since the state is equipped with coercive institutions (i.e. armed forces) as well as non-coercive civilian institutions for mitigating threats and vulnerabilities before escalating into an open violent conflict, the use of a certain approach—whether it be coercive or not—is always a matter of choice. Hence, it is political.

The proponents of securitization theory—just like many other security theories—do not define what security really is. With the absence of universal conformity on the definition of threat, they argue that developing policies and alternative approaches based on a fully scientific inventory of threat becomes impossible. Consequently, defining security beyond the political realm is then neither politically nor analytically beneficial. Therefore “it is more relevant to grasp the process and dynamic of securitization, [to scrutinize] who can ‘do’ security on what issue and under what condition” (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). In this vein, the Copenhagen School defines securitization as “process in which an actor declares a particular issue, dynamics, or an actor to be an ‘existential threat’ to a particular referent object” (Buzan et al. 1998: 69).

Nevertheless through the theory we can understand the situation that can be described in terms of security. The theory contains the proposition that the state of security refers to a turbulent situation “when an issue [is] presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent objects” (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Also, one proponent of the theory suggests that the problem of security—in essence—is its sudden development in which it is directly threatening the sovereignty and/or the independence of a referent object in question. Since that sudden development may lead to a high degree of fatality, it should be addressed with the “mobilization of maximum effort” (Wæver 1995: 54). Shortly put, the distinguishing feature of security problems provide a valid reason for the use of extraordinary measures to deal with those problems.

The next argument put in securitization theory is that any issue is a public issue, yet it derives from different sectors, namely the military, political, economics, societal, and environmental sector. Issues in these

different sectors, however, can be constructed and positioned on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, politicized, to securitized issues. An issue is non-politicized when “the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). An issue becomes politicized when it is “part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation, or more rarely, some other forms of communal governance” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). In this regard, then, politicization of an issue takes place in order to make an issue “to be opened, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility.” Finally, a political concern can be securitized when “the issue is presented an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bonds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). With such a background, securitization is an action “to present an issue as urgent and existential [...] so it [...] should be dealt with decisively [...] prior to other issues” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29).

The question, then, arises how a public issue can be positioned inside this conundrum of non-politicized, politicized, and securitized issues? The main explanation for this inquiry is the idea of security *speech act*. Through the speech act, the non-politicized issues can become politicized through the process of politicization. Accordingly, the politicized issues will get securitized through the process of securitization. The security speech act, however, does not take place merely through the utterance of the “s” word, security. The main actions involved in the speech act are (1) the designation of an existential threat which calls for (2) the use of emergency action or special measures, and (3) the significant audience accepts that designation being made (Buzan et al. 1998: 34).

Just like other theories, pros rarely come without cons. I identify five major criticisms on the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. The first relates to how the theory places its argument *vis-à-vis* the traditional security studies (Knudsen 2001; Bigo 2008; and to certain degree Walt 1991); the second is the role of the state as the referent object (Aradau 2004; McDonald 2008; Balzacq 2005); the third is the role of the speech act and its relation with the audience (Balzacq 2005; Barthwal-Datta 2009; Knudsen 2001; Stritzel 2007; Gromes and Bonacker 2007; McDonald 2008). The fourth relates to some paradoxical terminologies used in the theory (Knudsen 2001; Balzacq 2005; Barthwal-Datta 2009; Aradau 2004). And the last relates to the Western bias in theorizing securitization theory (Gromes and Bonacker 2007; Wilkinson 2007; Barthwal-Datta 2009).

Differences in understanding securitization studies occur due to the fact that the theory is influenced by various traditions in political science (Hansen 2011; Coskun 2011). These traditions include (1) Carl Schmitt's idea on emergency and exceptionality; (2) Michael Foucault's thoughts on emancipation; (3) Jacques Derrida's reflection on the relationship between text, context, and discourse; (4) John C. Austin's theory on performative utterance; (5) Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism on survival in the face of threat; (6) Hannah Arendt's argument on choice and responsibility; and (7) Jürgen Habermas's notion on public space and friend-enemy distinction (Hansen 2011: 4, 5; Coskun 2011: 8, 9, 11, 13). Influenced by different political theories, each researcher naturally highlights different interests and objectives in his or her studies. Guzzini identifies these interests and categorizes it into (1) securitization as a process and a framework for analysis¹⁵; (2) securitization as an empirical theory of security¹⁶; and (3) securitization as a political theory of security¹⁷ (Guzzini, quoted in Hansen 2011: 331).

Facing challenges from their critics, the initial authors of securitization theory have accommodated some of this criticism into their body of work. In the next section, I also include some of the criticisms into my framework for analysis. Altogether, the theory of securitization arguably suits to scrutinize the security dynamics in democratizing Indonesia for three reasons. First, even though securitization theory retains its focus on international security, it does not exclude the possibility for its use in analyzing the state's domestic security (Buzan et al. 1998: 46). In this regard, second, securitization theory acknowledges internal sources of threat. The theory suggests that when threat stems from the internal environment, the military sector of security is primarily about the ability of the state's authority to maintain civil peace and preserve territorial integrity, and the use of state's security instruments to face internal challenges. However, according to the literature on security sector reform, the military should be the last resort for handling internal security threats. These threats then may manifest themselves in forms of militant separatist or revolutionary movements, and a decrease in societal security (Buzan et al. 1998: 50, 121). Here, securitization theory provides an explanation for the use of armed forces. Third, in their concept of desecuritization, the proponents of the theory concurrently maintain a normative stance in dealing with social-political unrest. They strongly argue that instead of labeling any unrest as a security matter, it would be much better for the decision-maker to deal with it within the normal political process, that is, through normal

negotiation and bargaining. These three reasons strongly correspond with Indonesia's security situation during democratization. In this period of transition—or even in general—threats to security in Indonesia have always originated from the domestic sphere, in forms of separatist movements and communal conflict, and have always raised a question regarding the use of state's force. As Indonesia's situation shows how both securitization and desecuritization can be applied, this study will fruitfully contribute to securitization studies in general.

2 SECURITIZATION: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Literature on securitization mostly concerns the development of the theory (e.g. Huysmans 1998; Williams 2003, 2011; Aradau 2004; Balzacq 2005; Alker 2006; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008; Guzzini 2011). Most of these theoretical works largely focus on the speech act and scrutinize it from all perspectives—from linguistic studies to post-structuralism or post-modernism perspective. There are only few works emphasizing other dimensions of securitization, such as the extraordinary measures and the “emergency-ness” of a particular situation (e.g. Knudsen 2001; Oelsner 2005; Floyd 2011). In another account, most empirical works on securitization analyze the construction of non-traditional threats to security (e.g. Roe 2004; Gromes and Bonacker 2007; Wilkinson 2007; Vuori 2008, 2011; Hansén 2011; Trombetta 2011; Sjöstedt 2011). While those works are not necessarily implausible, they might reduce the analytical value of securitization theory. It appears that the theory is only fruitful to analyze an intangible and abstract imagination of threat based on the discursive manner of the speech act. This is, to a certain degree, not fully in accordance with securitization theory which also acknowledges military and political security of the state, respectively. Given this gap between the theory and its applications, this study seeks to apply securitization theory to analyze the Indonesian security dynamics during the democratic transition process. The application of the theory in this regard emphasizes the concept of securitization and desecuritization. By taking on securitization both from the Copenhagen School and beyond the School, I develop a framework of analysis where the nature of threat is real (i.e. not constructed), of domestic origin, with violent episodes, the state's security forces were deployed, and the unity of the state was at stake.

I begin with clarifying several key concepts used in the study. First, I distinguish securitization in terms of emergency and exceptionality,

securitization as a process, and the speech act as an illocutionary act. In regard to the later, I argue different types of speech acts lead to different objectives of the securitization process. I also strictly distinguish components of security and securitization as well as the involved parties in the process of securitization. In the last part I argue that securitization is a combination between the actual process of securitizing and the practice of security. I conclude this section by setting out three criteria for evaluating securitization.

I limit securitization as an inherent process involved in the context of an emergency situation and exceptional measures as a response. This limitation probably will generate debate, but arguably it is still in accordance with the Copenhagen School's main tenet. The School maintains that the sum of all security debate is about survival (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Under such a sense of emergency, the nature of security consequently is a request for exceptionality. In other words, the designation of existential threat to a referent object of security concurrently takes place with the claim for using the extraordinary measure. Mostly—if not always—the use of extraordinary measure is equal with the use of force or the use of the state's coercive instruments. Hence, emergency relates to the threatening situation and exceptionality relates to the use of extraordinary measure. To be clear, I limit the definition of security in this study to the problem of violence and the threat, use, and control of the state's coercive force. I do, however, acknowledge the fact that the source of threat and conflict does not only originate from the military sector. Any possible unrest might derive from political, social, and economic sectors. But as long as they do not turn into violence, they do not need to be considered as an object or problem of security.¹⁸

This limitation normatively is not at odds with the universal principles of statecraft. Even the liberal tradition acknowledges and justifies the suspension of normal rules of the game during an emergency situation (Huysmans 1998: 571). Even more, the existence of organized violence (manifested in, but not limited to, the military institution or armed forces) has been regarded as a sign of modernity of state authority in world history (Harries-Jenkins and Von Doorn 1976).

I thus treat securitization as the decision-making process for the use of extraordinary measures. This argument finds strong support in Wæver's 2011 statement. He admits that "an increasing presence of non-western voices within the discipline should help *return war and violence* to the agenda of critical or now security studies, including securitization studies"

(Wæver 2011: 475, *italic added*). Put differently, securitization theory should not only be applied for analyzing power politics within a society in terms of subjective, abstract, and physically non-violent phenomena such as migration, HIV/AIDS, minority rights, feminism movement and others, which is what most of publications have been focusing on.

I propose four important concepts for understanding security within the context of securitization theory. These keywords are (1) *existential threat*, (2) *referent object*, (3) *emergency situation*, and (4) *extraordinary measure*.

The existential threat refers to the dominance of one issue and is quite different compared to others, and hence must receive absolute priority. The existential threat is of utmost important one compared to others. Here, existential is not referring to a philosophical concept. Existential threat is regarded as threats to the existence of something, usually the state. Referring to Williams (2003), the existential threat is “situations of maximum danger, potentially unlimited struggle and sacrifice that need to be both retained.”

If the relevant referent object does not successfully handle such an existential threat, the issue at hand would put the existence of the referent objects into jeopardy. The referent objects are things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Emmers summarizes referent objects into: (1) the state, in terms of military security; (2) national sovereignty or an ideology, in terms of political security; (3) national economies, in terms of economic security; (4) collective identities, in terms of societal security; and (5) species or habitats, in terms of environmental security (Emmers 2004: 3–4). In this case, the object at hand may not exist or can deal with the issues in ways the decision-makers freely choose. In essence, the very next step after invoking security is the declaration of an emergency situation. By declaring it, the state traditionally will claim “a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development”—that is, extraordinary measures. Therefore, the use of extraordinary measure refers to “the invocation of security [...] to legitimizing the use of force [...], a way for state for mobilize, or to take special powers” (Buzan et al. 1998: 21) (Fig. 2.1).

Next, I specify conditions for identifying how securitization takes place and how to evaluate it. In this part, I will argue for (1) securitization as a process or mechanism; (2) the speech act as illocutionary act with securitizing actors and audience as its components; and (3) a method to evaluate securitization.

To begin with, securitization as a process is also testament to a mechanism. It implies that we have to see a security phenomenon as the result of




Fig. 2.1 Components of security (Source: Own design, derived from Buzan et al. 1998)

a complex mechanism. The quest then is to understand why a complex political process leads to a securitization or desecuritization (Guzzini 2011: 335; Buzan et al. 1998: 34). As a process or a mechanism, securitization can be triggered by an event or be a trigger for another process. Or, in Guzzini’s words, securitization is “both explanandum and explanans.” Therefore, some authors seek to explain what possibly causes a securitization while others explain what securitization has done. Nevertheless, in order to understand a security event, it is perfectly possible for researchers to use it in both directions (Guzzini 2011: 337). In a linear logic, one might develop a scenario that a growing threat has led to a securitization where later on it has a consequential impact either on the threat, the referent object, inter-agency interactions, or state-society relations (Fig. 2.2).




Fig. 2.2 Components of securitization (Source: Own design, derived from Buzan et al. 1998)

Derived from the work of Buzan et al., I propose four components of securitization, namely *the speech act*, *securitizing actors*, *audience*, and *facilitating conditions*. Although the security speech act is not the sole factor in designating a threat and uttering security, it plays a major role. According to language theory, there are three sequential actions in the concept of speech act, namely locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary act. Locutionary act means *to say something*. Illocutionary act means *to act in saying something*. Perlocutionary act, finally, means *to bring something through acting in saying something or an act by saying something* (Balzacq 2005: 175; Stritzel 2007: 259–60; Vuori 2008: 175, italics added). In this regard, I adopt Vuori’s illocutionary understanding of the speech act. Vuori divides the speech act into five types according to each purpose. The first type is an assertive speech act (see Table 2.1). This type takes forms such as statements, explanations, and assertions. The second type is a directive speech act, which takes forms like, orders, requests, and commands. The third type is a commissive speech act where

Table 2.1 Types and forms of the speech act

<i>No.</i>	<i>Types of the speech act</i>	<i>Forms of the speech act</i>
1.	Assertive speech act	Statements, explanations, and assertions
2.	Directive speech act	Orders, requests, and commands
3.	Commissive speech act	Vows, threats, and quarantines
4.	Expressive speech act	Apologies, thanks, and congratulations
5.	Declarative speech act	Declaring a war, pronouncing wedlock, and adjuring a meeting

Source: Vuori 2008: 74

the speaker is committed to doing something. This type takes forms of vows, threats, and quarantines. The fourth type is an expressive speech act where the speaker expresses his or her feeling and gratitude about some state of affairs. This type takes forms of apologies, thanks, and congratulations. The last type is a declarative speech act. In this type the speaker is deciding to change something. This type takes forms of declaring a war, pronouncing wedlock, and adjuring a meeting (Vuori 2008: 74). Vuori also develops five strands of securitization to show different objectives of any securitization act. These strands are (1) securitization for raising an issue on the agenda; (2) securitization for legitimating future acts; (3) securitization for legitimating past acts; (4) securitization for reproducing security status; and (5) securitization to exercise control (Vuori 2008: 75).

Now I turn to the securitizing actors. If securitization is understood in the context of emergency and exceptionality, if extraordinary measure is translated into the use of force, then it is fair to limit securitizing actors in this study to those, borrowing from Carl Schmitt, who have sovereignty to decide about which measures to take once the exception occurs. By and large, it refers to state institutions and authority. The Copenhagen School has provided some common players defined as securitizing actors. They are political leaders, bureaucracies, and government—just to name three (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). The other component is the facilitating condition. These conditions include the grammar or plot of security, social capital of the enunciator, condition related to threat (Wæver 2000: 252–3), and conditions related to audience (Vuori 2008: 70).

With regards to the audience, the Copenhagen School does not specifically define it. However, critics have challenged this concept and have

regarded it as one of weaknesses in securitization theory. Yet, not all authors agree with these critics. From his securitization study in China, Vuori has firmly suggested that there is no need to specify audience. Different socio-political context will lead to different audiences. Hence, it is wise to keep it flexible and leave it in a relatively open definition. Hence, audiences are those who need to be persuaded and convinced by the securitizing actor in order to get their acceptance for the sake of legitimacy for a securitizing move (Vuori 2008).

Another author in fact proposes to downgrade audience's role in a securitization process.¹⁹ According to Rita Floyd, audience—especially if understood the way the public is defined in the West—actually does not play a big part in a securitization process. Moreover, the audience in securitization theory is not an analytic concept but more a normative stance. In her explanation, Floyd argues that the securitizing actor basically declares *a warning* of “the threat” and *a promise* to protect the referent object. Here I adopt her argument that the speech act is the utterance of warning and promise, and securitization is completed when there is a change in the way actors behave after conducting the speech act (Floyd 2011: 428–9).

Lastly, in this part I offer criteria to evaluate whether or not it is a good idea to securitize an issue, or when an act of securitization can be justified. Certainly, this is Floyd's major contribution for filling the conceptual void left by the Copenhagen School. Having argued that “[...] to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue” (Buzan et al. 1998: 34), the Copenhagen School does not provide criteria for conducting such an evaluation. For this purpose, Floyd sets three criteria to justify securitization. First, securitization is justified when there is an objective existential threat. We can observe the objectivity of an existential threat from the intention and capability of the threatening party. In a state-centric context, the capability to threaten comprises manpower for military service, weapons capability, military budget, and political capacity for mobilization. In a non-state context, it consists of the size of aggressor, historical background, and its supporters or allies. Second, there must be a legitimate referent object. The final one is the appropriateness of the response. Response appropriateness falls into two qualities (1) the degree of response must be reasonably equal with the magnitude of threat and (2) the response must genuinely aim at addressing the threat (Floyd 2011: 430–3).

3 DESECURITIZATION: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

By contrast to its concept of securitization, the Copenhagen School does not clearly suggest an explicit framework for studying desecuritization. The School only defines what desecuritization is, briefly mentions how to do it, and takes their normative stand on desecuritization vis-à-vis securitization. Regarding definitions, in their framework of analysis the School defines it as “the shifting out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). In their *Regions and Powers*, Buzan and Wæver define the concept as “a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an exceptional threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 489). For the matter of how to desecuritize an issue, Wæver outlines three options for policy-makers which somehow sound tautological. First, policy-makers do not talk about issues in security terms from the beginning of the conflict. Second, when an issue is already securitized, policy-makers try to contain it and not generate a security dilemma. Third, and last, they can move the securitized issue back into normal politics (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 253). As far as the Copenhagen School’s normative stance is concerned, they argue that desecuritization is more desirable and is the optimal long-range option (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Due to its fundamentally undeveloped nature, in this section I seek to develop an applicable framework to study desecuritization amidst violent conflicts in Indonesia’s democratic transition. To do so, I refer to some existing publications on desecuritization. None of these authors is associated with the Copenhagen School.

Perhaps the ultimate normative question on security is how to determine the best way of conducting security while keeping the balance between its derivative costs and benefits. In the Western political classics, the answer is through the construction of a Hobessian state in the seventeenth century. Under such a construction, the state intentionally creates the “Leviathan.” Therefore the state becomes the sole legitimate actor who can exercise any coercive instrument. Consequently, individuals and groups within the state no longer have the right to the use of force to address their grievances. They have to solve their disputes in political, economic spheres, among others through non-coercive means. Concurrently given such a privilege the state must guarantee the security of its citizens. The rule of law becomes the cardinal principle to peacefully unravel grievances and dispute among citizens (Williams 1996).

In terms of securitization theory, the designation of existential threat and the right to the use of extraordinary measures ultimately rest on the monopoly of the state. The consequence is that the non-military sector of security should be desecuritized. In other words, “more and more [...] activities should become purely ‘economical’, ‘social’, and ‘political’” (Wæver quoted in Hansen 2011: 13). By narrowing the scope of security in such a way, the military sector will be the last resort for the use of force. Thus desecuritization implies the message that “security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing” (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). Especially in the democratic transition setting, participating actors should share the premise that it is counter-productive to the democratic development for the state to hurry in declaring any issue a security problem. Hence, the invocation of security is the failure of normal politics to settle problems arising from non-military sectors.

If securitization is moving an issue out of normal politics, the reverse can also be done. Those who are responsible for securitizing the issue can move it back into the normal political realm (Roe 2004: 282). Hence, desecuritization is the unmaking of an existential threat. Now the puzzle is how to conduct desecuritization. In this regard, Huysmans presents two grounds for desecuritization, respectively: *instrumental and ethico-political* grounds. The instrumental ground means “a security approach is not considered to be an effective way of dealing with the question at hand.” The ethico-political ground suggests that “one does not oppose securitization because it is an ineffective way of dealing with the question at hand but because one cannot ethically justify the specific organization of the political community articulated through security practices” (1998: 589) (Fig. 2.3).

Placing Huysmans’s grounds in the context of democratic transition, I suggest that political and social unrest during the transition actually are linked to non-security questions. These questions generally—if not always—originate from economic, political, and social questions. So instead of opting for the security approach, desecuritization is more beneficial. Desecuritization will open a constructive debate especially about the nature of statecraft under such a particular moment. It opens an opportunity to rethink and reshape, for instance, the authority’s legitimacy and the capacity of state institutions in channeling grievances in the society. Approaching security vulnerabilities is then no longer about naming the enemy for the sake of preserving government’s dignity or narrowly defined state’s sovereignty. Rather, it is about addressing the very source of vulnerabilities and handling it within normal political negotiation and



Fig. 2.3 Desecuritization's framework of analysis (Source: Own design, derived from Huysmans 1998; Oelsner 2005; Hansen 2011)

bargaining processes through democratic channels and principles. In the long run, desecuritization seeks to develop a normative fundamental basis for those who exercise power to be able to articulate alternative concepts of right and wrong, good and evil as well as of constructing alternative means for integrating free individuals into the state based on a given set of values (Huysmans 1998: 589).

In a more simple formulation, Gromes and Bonacker suggest five arguments for desecuritization. First, there is essentially no objective existential threat. Second, there was an existential threat but it never escalated into an open conflict. Third, there is no urgency to opt for extraordinary measures since the ordinary ones are appropriately enough to meet the threatening development. Fourth, panic politics (emergency mode) is not to be effective in dealing with the problem. Finally, though extraordinary measures may solve the problem, the cost is too high and probably may cause some undesired side effects. The use of extraordinary measure in this case will only make the problem worse than it already is (Gromes and Bonacker 2007: 19).

In order to develop a better framework for studying desecuritization, Andrea Oelsner offers two mechanisms for desecuritization, two phases of desecuritization, and indicators for observation at two levels. Her mechanisms consist of passive and active ones. In passive mechanisms, there is a shift in the nature of a particular issue or party, so the securitizing actors and audience in question no longer perceive them as a threat. Within the active mechanisms, one might observe that there is a degree of qualitative change of behavior in the interaction between securitizing actors and audience on one side and the issue or party which was perceived and defined as the threat on the other. Here, trust-building starts taking place between actors of animosity (Oelsner 2005: 4). To put it another way, in the former, change takes place inadvertently, while in the latter it happens by design.

Oelsner's phases of desecuritization include the initiation process²⁰ and the phase of development and consolidation.²¹ Key factors in the initiation process include the avoidance of the use of force, negotiation and strategic cooperation, and the incentive for behavioral change. It is important in this phase to carefully select and convince the critical audience of desecuritization. By and large, this "audience" is limited to factions in the military and in the government (Oelsner 2005: 11–13). In the second phase, interaction between actors of animosity is critical. It will change the way they perceive and define each other. In time, the interaction will eventually strengthen mutual trust among actors and lead to the formulation of alternative policies for settling down differences. In this phase, policy-makers and political elites play the critical role (Oelsner 2005: 14–16).

Next, Oelsner outlines indicators to observe whether or not the consolidation phase has taken place (Oelsner 2005: 15–16). These indicators occur at the governmental and societal level. At the first level, the indicators are coordinated positions, shared discourses, common institutions and projects, joint declarations, cooperation protocols, and mutual visits. At this level, the indicators include a deeper and stronger interaction among civil society organizations from previously conflicting entities. These indicators imply two important factors to consolidate desecuritization. First, the rhetorical aspects are important. Rhetoric, however, must be translated into political will. Secondly, the consolidation of desecuritization requires the establishment of cooperative institutions and organization. Political will as well as institutions and organizations are crucially decisive for developing trust and confidence among adversaries. The actors involved in the later process have to transform the developed trust and confidence into some publicly supported policies.

Next, borrowing from Coskun, I propose four components of desecuritization. The components consist of *desecuritizing actors*, the (*desecuritization*) *speech act*, *audience*, and *facilitating conditions* (Coskun 2011: 21). As far as the question of desecuritizing actors is concerned, Oelsner suggests that “the same actors that had previously advocated for securitization may now encourage the process of desecuritization” (Oelsner 2005: 4). While the process of securitization stresses the important role of the state or formal authority of officials, desecuritization may open up a wider opportunity for non-state actors to involve and participate in the process. Claudia Aradau strongly argues that desecuritizing actors should not be equal with those who previously had been drivers of securitization. For her, desecuritizing actors must include “the previously silenced other” (Aradau 2004: 26). Aradau’s argument firmly grasps the reality during the peace initiation and negotiation process where civil societies or even ordinary individuals can really break the ice in a hostile environment (Fig. 2.4).




Fig. 2.4 Components of desecuritization (Source: Own design, derived from Coskun 2011: 21)

The speech act for desecuritizing an issue is—like in securitization—treated as an illocutionary act. While the securitization speech act serves to designate a threat and call for extraordinary measures, the desecuritization speech act goes to the opposite direction. It is an utterance to stop naming an issue as a threat, remove the security label from the issue, and start calling for normality—as the opposite of emergenciness.

Having presented how desecuritization starts and operates; now I turn to outline the end-product of the process. Referring to Lane Hansen, there are four outcomes of desecuritization, that is, change through stabilization, replacement, re-articulation, and silencing (Hansen 2011: 15–21). Desecuritization as a change through stabilization refers to a situation where there is evidence showing an explicit change in the security discourse through a gradual process. This gradual change brings less militaristic and less violent approaches in a concrete form. This process demands a genuine political involvement, meaning that the conflicting actors first have to recognize the legitimate existence of each other before actually addressing their differences and grievances.²² Replacement refers to a process of desecuritization in which one issue is excluded from the security sphere while another is being securitized. The outcome hence is limited to operating at the issue level which perhaps does not bring any difference on security discourse and, especially, in practice. Re-articulation refers to an action of moving an issue out of security realm by actively offering political solutions to deal with the threat in question and also addressing the very source of the dispute. In re-articulation the conflicting parties realize that collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation will better serve their interest and survival rather than a mutual antagonistic interaction.²³ Finally, based on MacKanzie's work, Hansen refers to silencing as a situation where an issue disappears or fails to register in a security discourse.²⁴ However, this outcome serves merely as a conceptual categorization. Hansen doubts this concept and charges it as being an overstretched theoretical concept to analyze an empirical case (Hansen 2011: 21). Table 2.2 below summarizes the desecuritization outcomes:

4 RESEARCH METHOD

Why does Indonesia provide a good case for the study of security and securitization? The basic answer lies on the geographical and population size of the country. With more than 17,500 islands, Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world. In terms of population, the country is the fourth largest in the world. Also, Indonesia has the largest Muslim

Table 2.2 Desecuritization outcomes

<i>No.</i>	<i>Desecuritization outcomes</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
1.	Change through stabilization	Explicit change in the security discourse
2.	Replacement	One issue is excluded and another is securitized
3.	Re-articulation	Offering political solution to the threat and addressing the source of conflict
4.	Silencing	An issue disappears or fails to register in a security discourse

Source: Hansen 2011: 15–21

population out of all countries in the world, divided into hundreds of ethnic groups, which according to primordial theories of ethnicity, might be a major source of conflict (Geertz 1963: 105–157). Indeed, Indonesia's security dynamics have undergone dramatic changes since the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime on 21 May 1998. After Suharto left power and the country was in the midst of the democratic transition, Indonesia soon turned into one of the most conflict-prone areas in the world. This fact can be seen both in the outbreak of communal violent conflicts between different groups of society, as well as, separatist movements. In case of the latter, some political entities at the local level verbally and physically challenged the legitimacy of the central government. To summarize the scene, in its earlier phase of transition Indonesia had to deal at least with three separatist movements, three violent communal conflicts, and innumerable riots.

Observation made on conflict episodes amidst Indonesia's democratic transition brought about both optimistic and pessimistic interpretation of the events (Mishra 2009a, b). On the one hand, a more optimistic view argues that the country has brought peace to the former civil-war battle ground of Aceh and also ended three decades of insecurity and terror in this province. Furthermore, Indonesian electoral and communal violence following the first ever free elections in 1999 did not match the severity and the relentlessness of such violence in India or the Philippines, for instance, nor did a military coup take place in Indonesia. In sum, what is remarkable about the Indonesian story is that many of the nightmare scenarios familiar in other parts of the world, failed to materialize here. Indonesia did not experience a balkanization as in a post-communist Yugoslavia or a post-USSR Georgia or Chechnya. In dealing with such

security predicaments Indonesia has shown a certain degree of success in both mitigating conflicts and democratizing the country.

On the other hand, the pessimistic view holds that Indonesia might be falling into a trap of repeated conflicts which makes it prone to new episodes of violence. From this point of view, Indonesia is still seen as being susceptible to future conflict due to its history. Arguably, future violent conflicts might stem from the fact that the country is in the middle of a long democratic transition with a rapid proliferation of mass participation and considerable public skepticism of the sustainability of the new political system. Therefore, examining Indonesia's history in dealing with its security problems during the democratization is fruitful for enriching the theoretical and empirical discussion in this field. A thorough examination of Indonesia's experience with security issues and the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization will not only contribute to a better understanding of the country's successes and failures, but also the real constraints that Indonesia has had to reckon with as a result of the multiple, overlapping, and often ambiguous nature of security challenges facing states undergoing democratization.

One particularly important stance in this study is that all of the Indonesian government's responses to the emerging security challenges during the transition can be divided into two broad categories of action: namely, the act of *securitization* and the act of *desecuritization*. The act of securitization is defined as "the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal' politics in dealing with that issue" (McDonald 2008: 567). In Indonesia, the ultimate manifestation of this act is the deployment of armed forces. Meanwhile, the act of desecuritization is defined as "a moving of issues off the 'security' agenda and back into realm of public political discourse and 'normal' political dispute and accommodation" (Williams 2003: 523). The ultimate manifestation of the desecuritization act is the use of political channels in handling security challenges. These strategies may take the form of official or government apologies for past wrongdoings, special autonomy arrangements, and peace negotiations between opposition groups, among others.

Taking the above account on Indonesia's security policy during its democratic transition into consideration, the suitable research method to explore this topic would be the case study method. Referring to Blatter and Haverland (2012: 5), case study method will help to understand the

perception and motivation of Indonesia's security actors in formulating and implementing the country's security policies during its political changes. The application of case study method will also open the possibility to trace processes through which security actors' cognitive dispositions form and change at the given time period. Still referring to Blatter and Haverland (2012: 11), the application of the case study method to explore the topic at hand will provide three benefits. The first benefit lies on the nature of the case study method, which requires intensive reflection on the relationships between empirical evidence and abstract theoretical concepts in order to produce causal inference. In this study, I will employ such an intensive reflection to show how Indonesia's security policies during its democratic transition relate to the concepts of securitization and desecuritization. The second benefit is that the possibility to examine whether the securitization theory provides adequate understanding and stimulating meaning of Indonesia's security policy in the context of democratic transition. Therefore, as I have demonstrated in the previous theoretical section, the application of the case study method has allowed me to upgrade the Copenhagen School's securitization theory in order to squarely capture the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization in Indonesia while the country has to deal with security challenges resulted from the political transition. And the final benefit is that, by employing the case study method, I am able to reduce the complexity of Indonesia's security challenge amidst its political transition by focusing on two cases of large-scale violent conflict: the case of separatism in Aceh and the case of communal conflict in Maluku.

Those three benefits imply that the case study method provides plausible justification to limit this study on two cases of large-scale violent conflict which represent "traditional security challenges" typical for a state undergoing nation-state building. By and large, such security challenges derive from within the state rather than military threats coming from foreign countries. By focusing on the case of separatist and communal conflicts—each of them challenged the Indonesian territorial integrity—the case study method allows me to conduct deeper exploration in order to reflect the relationship between the government security policies in regard to the earlier mentioned violent conflicts and the abstract concepts of securitization and desecuritization.

The application of the case study method implies that the method does not seek for generalization. Rather, this method has been applied in order to produce "comprehensive storylines, smoking guns, and confessions,

which form the empirical basis for drawing causal inferences” (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 16). It means this study is interested in explaining the specific processes and results of Indonesia’s security decision-making during the country’s democratic transition. In this sense, the case study method guarantees a high level of context sensitivity and deeper understanding of the topic at hand. The flipside of this approach, of course, is that the nature of the case study method makes it problematic when it comes to generalizing findings on the larger amount of population, as required by Gerring (2007: 20). Nevertheless, it is exactly at this point where Blatter and Haverland are quite critical. According to Blatter and Haverland, although Gerring uses “case study” on his book’s title, he approaches case study research in a totally different way. Furthermore, Blatter and Haverland argue that:

John Gerring’s *Case Study Research* [...] essentially follows [...] statistical template in presenting guidelines for research design, [with] a clear reference to large-N research, [which] make the book particularly useful for those who are conducting large-N statistical research and want to *complement* this work with case study research (2012: 13; italic added).

In other words, case study research does not aim at making generalization for a wider population. However, what we can expect a case study research to generate is a sort of hypothesis at the end of the research project, which should be further explored by other studies applying mid-N or large-N research method. This study follows Blatter and Haverland’s stance on the case study research method.²⁵ By applying the case study method in this book, I do not seek to generalize for a wider population, yet what I hope to provide is robust findings concerning the topic being studied.

Conflict, in this study, is defined according to Correlates of War (COW) Project as any military conflict that leads to at least 1000 battle fatalities.²⁶ At one level therefore, this study addresses the Indonesian re-arrangement of security policies during the process of the democratic transition as well as its approach in dealing with security problems during the process. At another level, it seeks to analyze these nationally agreed upon security-related policies when locally implemented (on a case-by-case basis). This study specifically focuses on the cases of Aceh (which represents separatist conflict) and Maluku (which represents communal conflict) to illustrate how security-related stakeholders at the local level perceive the shifting of government security policies, endorsed by the central authority. In terms

of methodology, it needs to be emphasized, however, that these two cases are not used to draw causal inference by comparing them. Instead, these two cases serve the limited purpose of showing the Indonesian authority's endeavor in the conflict areas. In terms of case study method, therefore, this research is a case study research which consists of a single observation ($N = 1$), that is, Indonesia, specifically with regard to the country's rearrangement of security policies during the process of the democratic transition as well as its approach in dealing with security problems during the process. However, regarding case study research, Gerring states that "the case under study always provides more than one observation" (2007: 21). Therefore, I construct the observation on the Aceh and Maluku conflict "synchronically by observing within-case variation" (Gerring 2007: 21) at each period of conflict. Such a synchronic analysis is important in this study since the case (Indonesia) is, borrowing Gerring (2007: 27), comprised of large territorial units, which requires the study to observe more than one case in order to provide robust findings.

The justification for the selection of Aceh and Maluku in this study is in the belief that it will solve a simple paradox in a case-oriented research analysis. This paradox is formulated as: Case A and B are different, yet they both experienced outcome Y. What causally relevant similarities between A and B explain this common outcome? (Ragin 1987: 45). In the context of this study, the case of Aceh and Maluku are different, yet they both experienced similar outcomes, namely a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Hence, this research tries to identify the factors that explain the similarities of outcome.

In support of the selection of Aceh and Maluku is also Gerring's technique of extreme cases. Thus, Gerring argues that cases are selected because of their interest values, and he maintains, for example, that the particular interest values of studies dealing with domestic violence is their focus on extreme instances of abuse (Gerring 2007: 101). Following this argument, in the case of Aceh the first interest value is to be seen in the fact that the Aceh separatist movement was the longest lasting separatist movement throughout the history of Indonesia. The second interest value lies in the sheer magnitude of the military operations that took place in Aceh during that time. For instance, in May 2003, the Megawati Sukarnoputri government launched the biggest military operation, second only to the annexation of East Timor in 1976, immediately after she signed a decree to impose martial law in the province. The third interest value of the case of Aceh relates to the fatalities during the conflict, which ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 deaths (Crisis Management Initiative 2012: 9; Amnesty International 2013: 9; Pergub Aceh No. 70/2012: 62).

In the case of Maluku, it was the largest communal conflict in Indonesia's history. The unprecedented level of animosity in the province led to the same bloody communal conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, later on. A conflict with that magnitude also led to another precedent in the history of the use of force in Indonesia. It was the first time that the government had resorted to large-scale military operations to cope with a communal conflict, as the Megawati Sukarnoputri government launched a Security Restoration Operation Command (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan, Koopslihkam*) in June 2002. As for the fatalities, the conflict also demonstrated a breathtaking loss of life since “at least 5,000 people (perhaps as many as 10,000)²⁷ have been killed and close to 700,000—almost one-third of the population of 2.1 million—became refugees” (International Crisis Group, 8 February 2002; Bertrand 2004: 1). These extreme values of the case of Aceh and Maluku should meet Blatter and Blume's real-world relevance criteria for case selection. They argue, when a study strives to configure generalization the real-world relevance of the selected cases is the key criteria (Blatter and Blume 2008: 22). Contextually, the case of Aceh and Maluku should show the real-world relevance as they both add to the understanding of how national security-related policies are implemented at the local level and how they are perceived by the local security-related stakeholders.

This study applies the *causal process tracing* (CPT) method to shed light on Indonesian endeavors in dealing with its security problem during its democratic transition. Process tracing as a research method is “an operational procedure for attempting to identify and verify the observable within-case implications of causal mechanism” (Blatter and Blume 2008: 5). What is examined in a CPT research is “a coherent picture of the object: [...] a continuous flow of steps within a causal process which leads to a specific outcome” (Blatter and Blume 2008: 14). This study, thus, traces such processes in order to identify important mechanisms or configurations which will shed light on the Indonesian policies coping with security problems during its democratic transition.

To be more specific, this study uses a particular subtype of the CPT method, namely the *case-centered research design*. The goal is to gain a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's approach to its security problems during the democratic transition. In contrast to two other subtypes of the CPT method, this study does not aim at drawing conclusions beyond the case of Indonesia. Yet, the results of the study may be useful for cross-country studies with a higher ambition for generalization.²⁸

The application of the CPT method requires two intertwined categories of empirical sources. The first category is sources that allow under-

standing historical developments in a decision-making process or in the public debate, related to the Indonesian security realm during the given time. This means collecting the relevant statistics, selecting media reports, and gathering documents and statements from important organizations and actors. The obvious implication, then, is that archival work is vital. The second source addresses the perceptions and motivations of actors either individually, collectively, or cooperatively. In this category, the actors' cultural context, motivation and participation are collected from biographical studies and narrative interviews. In accordance with the CPT's data collection method, a range of data, documents, and other information were collected from both primary and secondary sources during field work in Indonesia. This field work was carried out in 2012 and 2013 for a period of five months in total in Jakarta and two respective provinces for the cases at the local level, Aceh and Maluku.

Four groups of sources can be distinguished. The first group consists of official Indonesian policy documents created in an attempt to deal with security challenges which emerged during the process of democratic transition. The second group of data is journal articles and academic texts on Indonesia's democratization, especially those which analyze the security dynamics during the transition process. The third group of data has been gathered from non-academic texts from respected non-governmental sources including reports and online news articles from both the national and international media. The last group of data has been obtained from in-depth interviews as well as meetings and seminar papers. The interviews were semi-structured, adapted to each person and their position based on four categories of interviewees: (1) scholars, (2) executive decision-makers, (3) members of parliament, and (4) a group of think tanks. During the fieldwork, I interviewed thirty-two people, and interviews lasted on average between one to two hours each. During the interviews I asked five categories of questions, including: (1) questions regarding the overall security situation during the process of democratization in Indonesia; (2) questions regarding securitization; (3) questions regarding desecuritization; (4) questions regarding the separatist conflict in Aceh; and (5) questions regarding the communal conflict in Maluku.

Some challenges did exist in this study. One of them was identifying when exactly the act of securitization and desecuritization took place, as well as the shifting between the two. This challenge arose due to complex longitudinal developments of security threats in the Indonesian transition process and the way in which the state responded to them. Thus, this study needs to identify different turning points in the causal changes and

to sort out which causal processes explain each subsequent step. These turning points will include the precise moment when conflicts broke out, the point when the acts of securitization and desecuritization were initiated by the authorities, and the time of conflict termination. Due to the complicated nature of the issue and the limited length of this study, some important data for the analysis might be unintentionally excluded. Nevertheless, the value of this study lies in its general *availability* of related data sources on the subject being studied, gathered during the field work.

Last but not least, the timeframe of the research is from 1998 to 2009. Within this period, it is possible to comprehensively cover security-related dynamics during the transition period in Indonesia from the first presidency after Suharto in 1998 up to the last presidency term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in mid-2009. By the end of 2009, Indonesia has arguably been able to consolidate its democratic transition. From security point of view, the first term of Yudhoyono presidency had also succeeded in pacifying much of warring parties. Therefore, even though some observers remain worry about the reversal of conflict period in Indonesia or the spread of low-intensity violence, all of large-scale violent conflict which used to dominate Indonesia's security landscape had diminished. Thus, the study will be able to provide a *post-facto* and parsimonious empirical analysis of the country's inherent security challenges during the democratization process.

NOTES

1. See van Klinken 2007.
2. For example, see Barron et al. 2004, also L. Mancini 2005.
3. For example, see the conflicts in Kalimantan and Maluku which, according to the *culturalist* view, broke out because of the Dayaks' savagery and the Ambones' irascibility (van Klinken 2007).
4. For a more elaborate discussion on the weaknesses of *culturalists'* studies on Indonesia's violent conflicts, for example, see *ibid*.
5. See van Klinken 2007.
6. Jacques Bertrand's historical institutionalism approach also satisfactorily addresses the problem of disaggregate studies (for a further discussion of disaggregate studies, see van Klinken 2007: 34, 38, 45) on Indonesia's conflicts during the transition. In this sense, his approach is applicable to scrutinize both separatist and communal conflicts, while disaggregate analysis has to choose between the two. Additionally, by using the historical institutionalism approach, Bertrand is also able to integrate other analyses—such as political economy motives behind conflicts and civil-military relations—into his analytical framework (Bertrand 2004).

7. See van Klinken, *op. cit.*
8. Though van Klinken and Bertrand in their respective works criticize each other, I argue that their analyses, in essence, mutually complement each other. From their works, we might draw directional arrows showing the causal mechanism that linked monetary crisis, structural changes, local economics modus, and the outbreak of conflicts.
9. Shared knowledge refers to the nature of the relationships between the actors in the system. The social pattern of enmity and amity are important here as competition resulted when actors were so distrustful of one another that they habitually made worst-case assumptions about each other. Cooperation, on the other hand, exists when there is amity and sufficient trust among actors so that none will use force to resolve their disputes (Snyder 1999: 104–5).
10. The argument for ideational factors suggests that “concepts of who we are and what we value encourage particular ways of thinking about where threats to those values might come from, what form they might take and how they might be dealt with” (McDonald 2008: 64).
11. By broadening the security discourse, the studies include more sectors than solely the military and politics, such as economic, environment, and societal sectors. By deepening the security discourse, the studies now include alternative referent objects and actors beside the state (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998).
12. Constructivists define norms as shared expectations about appropriate or legitimate behavior by actors with a particular identity (McDonald 2008: 63).
13. Negotiation happens between political leaders and domestic audiences in particular. Contestation occurs between different actors elaborating different visions of “our” values and how “we” should act. This view has marked another main difference between constructivists and objectivists. The latter view security as something enacted at the level of policy elites. Negotiation only takes place between them and the public has little or no role. Or at least, the public is a relatively passive target of elite policy discourses that bind the individual to the nation-state. Constructivists refute this view and assert the importance of public involvement and support for measuring the legitimacy of policies decided by elites (McDonald 2008).
14. “Threat” posed by an “enemy” comes about through representations (McDonald 2008: 61).
15. Here, researchers seek to shed light on which conditions (political, economic, cultural, etc.), what audience, and which discourse securitization might succeed.
16. Once researchers successfully develop their logical framework to show securitization as a process, they frame the findings with the security complex approach. In general, they will further argue that security is not defined by geopolitical reality.
17. Here, literature does not only scrutinize the meaning and function of security, but, in a more fundamental way, they also elaborate the role played by security in human nature as well as in the political order.

18. This is the common idea shared by the epistemic security community in Indonesia. See for an instance, Keliat 2011.
19. Some researchers believe that the securitizing actor-audience interactions happen in an equal position. It appears that within its structured power a securitizing actor can speak security and designate a threat. On the other hand, with their constitutional rights an audience has the power to decide whether or not to accept a securitizing move. Therefore, there should be some kind of a balance of power between them. As the argument goes, if the securitization speech act can be understood as the illocutionary one, then in most cases, there can barely be equality between the speaker and the listener.
20. For her initiation process for desecuritization, Oelsner relates to two paradigmatic traditions. The first theoretical tradition is *interdependence* and *institutionalism*. This tradition holds the argument that the conflicting parties tend to avoid the use of force as an alternative to settle their dispute since the absolute gain from a negotiated peaceful solution is far more beneficial than the use of force. The second background can be found in the *realist tradition*. The latter suggests that actors will change the way they behave and shift the way they see each other without necessarily being politically defeated once they secure a considerable incentive for doing so (Oelsner 2005: 11–12).
21. In this phase, Oelsner places her explanation on constructivist tradition. Constructivists stress the important role of identity, idea, perception, and understanding which are shared and developed through repeated interactions. They also claim that both interest and identity are not static and homogeneous in essence but they constantly change through practices and habits; that is, through interaction (Oelsner 2005: 14).
22. One weakness of this outcome however lies in its conservative and system-stabilizing character. It means the ultimate purpose of desecuritization in this particular strategy is to bring stabilization into relations among adversaries without necessarily addressing the very source of animosity. Hence, as the result—instead of a rooted ethical acceptance among adversaries—there is no one who can provide a guarantee of both the direct and long-term consequences of this change through stabilization.
23. As a political vision, *rearticulation* is the ideal outcome of a desecuritization process. It bears no conservatism problem as in the change through stabilization and faces no new problem as in the replacement. One challenge for *rearticulation* is more the normative and political question linked to stability and desirability. As Hansen puts it, “*rearticulation* claims finality, yet finality is inherently impossible.” Another remark needed is that *rearticulation* is anything but a smooth process. It is a result of a bitter bargaining process taking place in complex power dynamics and in a hostile environment.
24. This outcome was inspired by MacKenzie’s research on female soldiers in Sierra Leone. MacKenzie presents a finding that the international community and its local counterparts in Sierra Leone’s peace process categorize

- female soldiers merely as victims, abductees, camp followers, domestic workers, and sex slaves. In this case, the international community has silenced and uncategorized those women as soldiers or combatants. Accordingly, MacKenzie categorizes this situation as a *desecuritization*. Though Hansen includes silencing as one of her *desecuritization* outcomes, it appears only for the sake of conceptual categorization.
25. By taking this stance, I do not intent to reject all of Gerring's work on *Case Study Research*. In the following part, I am still referring to Gerring, particularly in explaining synchronic analysis on case study and the technique of extreme case selection.
 26. This definition is adopted from Correlates of War Project. For more discussion on the definition of war and violent conflict, see for an instance, Meredith Reid Sarkees, *The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data)*. Available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>, accessed on 20 March 2011.
 27. The renowned Indonesian peace activist Ichsan Malik, for instance, estimates that the Maluku conflict claimed at least 9700 lives (Kompas, 23 May 2002).
 28. A complete effort for theory-oriented conclusions can be done only when a number of adequate cases are selected. The selection of only one case, in this context the Indonesian security dynamic during the transition, is not sufficient for theory-oriented conclusions. It is thus not possible to generalize on questions as, for instance, "how to maintain security in transition countries when at the same time reforming their security agencies." What, however, can be derived from the Indonesian case is the "lessons learned."

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A Historical Overview on the State of Emergency and Martial Law in Indonesia

In Chap. 2, I have outlined securitization as a process inherently involved in the context of emergency and exceptionality. As the gist of all security debates is about survival in times of emergency, the nature of security consequently calls for exceptionality. My definition of exceptionality is that the designation of a referent object of an existential threat to security concurrently occurs with the use of extraordinary measure. Mostly, if not always, the use of an extraordinary measure is equal to the use of the state's coercive instruments. Hence, emergency relates to the threatening situation, and exceptionality relates to the use of extraordinary measure. The hallmark of an emergency situation is the imposition of martial law. Martial law, to quote Dyzenhaus, "has clear analogs in declarations of states of emergency, in legislative delegations of authority of virtually unlimited scope to the executive to deal with threats to national security, and in assertions of inherent jurisdiction by the executive to respond as it sees fit to such threat" (Dyzenhaus 2009: 2). In other words, the establishment of emergency power with the declaration of martial law brings a state of exceptionality and suspension of normal rules and norms (Lazar 2009: 3). With this background, one important question related to the study at hand is thus: how do the two processes of emergency and exceptionality take place in the Indonesian state?

To answer the question, I will explore Indonesia's experience with states of emergency and martial law in this chapter. Although I do not present new research material here, the discussion of this subject should show the

importance of historical legacies during the democratization of Indonesia in how it deals with existential threats in times of emergency. The chapter will be subdivided into four time periods. The first is the pre-independence period, when Indonesia was still known as the Netherlands Indies. This is an important period, since the colonial government's regulation on martial law became the legal basis for independent Indonesia to formulate similar regulations. In the second section, I cover the newly independent Indonesia in the 1945–1965 period. Concerning the imposition of martial law, there are four different phases in this period: the struggle for independence (1945–1949), the short-lived federal state (1949–1950), the parliamentary era (1950–1957), and the era of Guided Democracy (1957–1965). The third period is the New Order era (1965–1998), with three phases: the transfer of power 1965–1968, the fully established New Order regime (1965–1997), and the final days of the New Order (1997–1998). In the last section, I will cover the post-1998 developments.

My literature review from this period shows that Indonesians had lived under martial law for many years, which was imposed on them by all governments. The colonial government imposed martial law against people revolts and to cope with World War II. From 1945 to 1949, the government of the new state imposed martial law in order to enforce public order, curb opposition, and fight the Dutch military aggression. During the period of the federal state and the parliamentary era, the state imposed martial law as a response to separatist rebellions. In the Guided Democracy era, the president imposed martial law to consolidate central government authority, contain regional revolts, and resolve the dispute over Papua with the Dutch. After martial law was lifted in 1963, Indonesia soon found itself in another dangerous situation as President Sukarno began his politics of confrontation (*konfrontasi*) against Malaysia (1963–1966). Then came the political change and power transfer in the mid-1960s which left the darkest mark on Indonesia's history. The New Order regime brought with it the institutionalization of states of emergency and indirect permanent martial law across the country. Finally, successive governments imposed martial laws several times in order to cope with outbreak of violent conflicts as a result of the post-1998 political transition.

1 MARTIAL LAW IN THE COLONIAL ERA: PRE-1945

Indonesia had a long experience of living with a status of emergency and martial law. We can trace this experience back to the period when the archipelago was still called the Netherlands Indies. Lt. Col. A.F. Raff

declared the first state of emergency when he put the West Sumatera area under martial law in the 1820s. As the revolt against the Dutch colonial government spread in the nineteenth century, other areas like Palembang, Lampung, and Kalimantan were also incorporated into martial law. In the 1870s, Governor Maj. Gen. K. van der Heijden declared martial law in Aceh and his successor, P.F. Loging Tobias, renewed it in 1884 (Haryono 2008: 3). Throughout the nineteenth century, the Indies government enacted martial law based upon Holland's law on the Regulation on State of War and Siege (*Regeling Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg*). The Dutch's initial intention of declaring martial law was to establish peace and order (*rust en orde*) in its colony. To support this, the colonial government also issued a set of supporting regulations, including the emergency law (*noodrecht*) in 1904, the Constitution of 1926 (*Indische Staatregeling*, which explicitly explained the East Indies defense policy) in 1926, the Decree on Banning the Press (*Press Breidel Ordonantie*) in 1931, the Regulation on Supervision (*Toericht Ordonantie*) in 1932, and the Regulation on Assembly and Meeting (*Vereeniging en Vergadering Verordening*) in 1935 (Haryono 2008: 3, 24, 63).

Threatened by the German invasion at home and the outbreak of Pacific War, the East Indies Colonial government formed the Horsthorn Commission in the 1930s to draft more comprehensive legislation concerning emergency situations (Haryono 2008: 25–27). Taking into account the global politics at the time, the commission prepared the new law in order not only to uphold law and order but also to deter external threats. Based on the Commission's recommendation, the colonial government passed the *Regeling op de Staat van Orloog en van Beleg* (SOB) on 28 September 1939. According to the SOB, there were two categories of states of emergency: a state of war (*Staat van Oorlog*, SvO) and a state of war emergency (*Staat van Beleg*, SvB). In both SvO and SvB, only the general governor of the Indies had authority to declare martial law. The governor could execute his power independently from consent of the then-pseudo legislative body, *Volksraad*. In a situation where a particular area could not make contact with the central government in Jakarta (at the time, Batavia), the local military commander had the authority to impose martial law in his territory, but had to report it immediately to the general governor. In order to carry out their task, the SOB provided local military authorities (*militair gezag*) with full reigns to act as they saw fit, including taking over the civilian authority (*burgelijk gezag*).

The colonial government put SOB in effect as World War II was breaking out in Europe. On 10 May 1940, Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer

(the sixty-sixth and last Dutch East Indies Governor General) declared that the entire East Indies was under *Staat van Beleg* (war emergency). As martial law had been effectively imposed, the colonial government banned all activities of every organization and political party, while the Dutch's secret police (*Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst*, PID) took political activists and nationalist journalists into custody. When the German troops invaded Holland, the colonial government also enacted harsh measures against German interests in the Indies. The Dutch detained a number of Germans and confiscated German ships in Sabang (Aceh), Teluk Bayur (West Sumatera), Batavia (now Jakarta), Makassar (South Sulawesi), and Manado (North Sulawesi). As the outbreak of the Pacific War became more imminent, the colonial government initiated a mass mobilization in order to prepare for the threat of Japanese invasion, included the establishment of city guard (*Stadswacht*), plantation guard (*Landwacht*), voluntary corps (*Vrijwillige Oefenkorpsen*), the Voluntary Automobile Corps (*Vrijwillig Automobilecorps*, VAUBEC), the Reserve Officers Training Corps (*Corps Opleiding Reserve Officieren*, CORO), the military academy (*Koninklijke Militaire Akademie*, KMA) and the implementation of a new regime on foreign exchange, the Regulation on Currencies (*Deviezen Ordonantie*), and the Implementation on the Regulation on Currencies (*Deviezen Verordening*) (Haryono 2008: 66–71).¹

This attempt with martial law failed to deter the Japanese arrival and the Dutch surrendered to them unconditionally on 8 March 1942. To consolidate its power, the Japanese military divided Indonesia into three areas: Eastern Indonesia (including Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Lesser Sunda Islands, and Papua), Sumatera, and Java and Madura. The Japanese navy (*Kaigun*) was in charge of Eastern Indonesia and established its headquarters in Makassar. The Japanese 25th army (*Rikugun*) was in charge of Sumatera and established its headquarters in Bukittinggi. Finally, the 16th army controlled the area of Java and Madura and established its headquarters in Jakarta (Haryono 2008: 80–81). From that point on, the Japanese military authority carried out the administration of the former Netherlands Indies. As the nature of “military government is a belligerent’s exercise [...] of government powers in the conquered and occupied territory, the Japanese authority issued various regulations that were similar to martial law, including strict regulation concerning vehicles ownership, private land ownership, press control,² and the creation of militia groups” (Haryono 2008: 34–35, 82–83).³

2 MARTIAL LAW IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATE: 1945–1965

After proclaiming its Independence on 17 August 1945, the government of newly formed Indonesia was faced with great challenges in guaranteeing the stability and security of the new state. It was confronted with resistance from various groups that vocally opposed the new government and state, the communist uprising that was taking place in Central and East Java, and the ongoing Dutch military aggression. In the face of this, Ali Sastroamidjojo, the then-Secretary for Minister of Defense, proposed an idea that the country's president should be provided with the necessary power in order to control the situation, and that such a power should be regulated by a law concerning emergency situations. Amir Sjarifuddin, the then-Minister of Defense agreed with the idea and assigned Ali Sastroamidjojo to draft a suitable bill. After conducting a hearing with other government officials and leaders of political parties in Java and Madura on 30 March 1946, Ali Sastroamidjojo formulated the bill which stipulated that the president required the consent of the parliament for declaring a state of emergency. In essence, the president would have had the power to declare martial law in all or some parts of Indonesia's territory, but the declaration had to be regulated by a specific law. Therefore, the parliament (which was named the Central Indonesian National Committee, or *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* / KNIP) played a significant role in this matter. In agreement with the bill, the government incorporated this draft into Law No. 6/1946 on the State of Emergency on 6 June 1946. Law No. 6/1946, however, did not differentiate the level of emergency situation as SOB 1939 did. Also, the authority at the national level during the implementation of martial law did not rest on the president but on the State Defense Council (*Dewan Pertahanan Negara*, DPN). The objective of this arrangement was to limit the president's power and at the same time to provide him with institutional support. At the local level, the Regional Defense Council (*Dewan Pertahanan Daerah*, DPD) was in charge during the implementation of the law (Haryono 2008: 37–41).

During the independence revolution (1945–1949), the Indonesian government declared three states of emergency. The first time that President Sukarno imposed martial law across Indonesia's territory was on 29 June 1946 under Presidential Decree (*Maklumat Presiden*) No. 1/1946. This was against a background of increased challenges from the

opposition groups, especially from Tan Malaka and his pro-communist Struggle Union (*Persatuan Perjuangan*, PP), against Prime Minister Sjahrir. President Sukarno finally lifted martial law on 2 October 1946 (Heriyono 2008: 97–98). The second occurred with the recommendation from Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta, when President Sukarno imposed martial law in Surakarta, Semarang, Madiun, and Pati with the Presidential Decree No. 23/1948 as a reaction to the communist uprising⁴ in Madiun (East Java). In this case, it only lasted for three months (Haryono 2008: 102–103). The last declaration of an emergency situation was related to the Dutch's military aggression in 1948. As the Dutch seized the state civilian leaders, A.H. Nasution (the then-Military Commander of Java Command, MBKD) issued a decree (*Maklumat*) No. 2/1948 and declared a state of war emergency in all of Indonesia's territory. Under this decree, the military took over all civilian government authorities, and civilian officials functioned as military advisors according to their ranks. Furthermore, the military authorities initiated a mass mobilization of the resources of the military, militias and civilians, and for use in guerilla warfare against the Dutch invasion. Unlike the previous presidential decrees, this time the military leadership declared martial law with reference to SOB 1939 (Heriyono 2008: 107, 109). However, after the Dutch ended their military offensive, the situation in Indonesia was not followed by a full dissolution of the previously established military government.

The Indonesians' struggle finally came to fruition when the Dutch officially recognized their independence in December 1949. In line with the bilateral agreement between the two countries, Indonesia changed from a unitary to a federal state: the Federal Republic of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*, RIS).⁵ Reaching an agreement with the Dutch, however, did not make the country's internal political and security situation any more stable. Throughout the RIS period, the Indonesian government faced three major internal threats. The first threat came from elements of the former Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger*, KNIL) the members of which hesitated to be reintegrated into the newly formed War Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat*, APRIS). Equally important was the creation and reorganization of the Indonesian armed forces, which was a subject of disappointment among the military rank and file, especially since the officers were afraid of losing their power and privileged position (Crouch 1986: 31). The second threat stemmed from the fact

that many political and social groups in Indonesia were not satisfied with the 1949 bilateral agreement. One particularly contested point was the rejection of the federal state and the prolonged dispute regarding the ideological basis of the state. The different ideologies ranged from an idea to establish an Islamic state at one extreme all the way to the proposal of a nationalist authoritarian state at the other end. Thirdly, many armed gangs (non-ideological gangs, disappointed groups, bandits, or Dutch-backed pillagers) also posed a significant threat at the time.

During the period of the federal state, the government declared a state of emergency twice. First, under Presidential Decree (*Kepres* RIS) No. 160/1950, the government declared a state of war emergency in South Sulawesi on 26 April 1950 to handle the KNIL-backed Andi Aziz revolt. On 10 May 1950, the central government expanded the implementation of martial law which included North and Central Sulawesi. Second, under Presidential Decree (*Kepres* RIS) No. 160/1950, the government declared the state of emergency in North and South Maluku on 4 July 1950. It was imposed to curtail the South Maluku Republic (*Republik Maluku Selatan*, RMS) revolt. C.R.S. Soumokil, the former Minister of Justice of the State of Eastern Indonesia, led the separatist revolt with widespread support from former KNIL members. Col. A.E. Kawilarang, the then-Commander of Garrison IX/X—the State of Eastern Indonesia, led the military offensive against these two regional revolts. Despite the existence of Law No.6/1946, the declarations of martial law during the RIS period exclusively referred to the Dutch’s SOP 1939 (Haryono 2008: 124, 126).

The federal state period lasted less than nine months. By 17 August 1950, the federal state was abandoned and replaced by the Republic of Indonesia with its unitary constitution and parliamentary system. Yet, the political and security instability throughout the 1950s remained. Sewak provides a good summary on the security situation in this period. According to him,

the security situation in Indonesia was disappointing. There were gangs of security disrupters in every region: Kartosuwiryo’s *Darul Islam* in West Java, gangs in Merapi-Merbabu Complex around Central and East Java, Kahar Muzakar’s *Darul Islam* in Sulawesi, Ibnu Hadjar’s revolt in South Kalimantan, RMS in Maluku, and bandit gangs in North, Central and South Sumatera. [All of them] organized and disorganized strikes against major companies in big cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Medan, and Surabaya. (Sewak 1955: 306 in Haryono 2008: 134–135)

Facing this situation, the government declared three states of emergency in the period between 1950 and 1956. First, under Presidential Decree No 174/1952, the government declared the state of war emergency across West, Central, East Java, Jogjakarta, South Sulawesi, Seram Islands, and Ambon (in Maluku) in order to curb the *Darul Islam* uprising. Second, under Presidential Decree No. 176/1952, the government declared the state of war status for all Indonesian maritime territory in order to deal with piracy. According to the government, the level of piracy in Indonesian waters at the time threatened both the national economy and the security. On 29 December 1956, the government declared another state of war emergency across Indonesia under Presidential Decree No. 201/1956. This was the central government's response to the arbitrary martial law imposed by regional military commanders⁶ as their expression of disagreement with various decisions coming from Jakarta (Haryono 2008: 136, 139, 144).

In this period, the government made another attempt to formulate a legal framework concerning emergencies. The government replaced SOB 1939 in 1950 with a new government regulation (*Perpem* No. 7/1950) and the Emergency Law (*UU Darurat*) No. 8/1950. The government replaced these two regulations four years later with new legislation on military power (PP) No. 5/1954 (Sebastian 2006: 149). Moreover, the government formed a committee to draft a new martial law in the same year.⁷ In the following year, the parliament also initiated a legal drafting for its version of martial law, but the parliament session finally adopted the government draft and incorporated it into Law No 74/1957 on Emergency Situations. The new law stipulated two levels of emergencies, the state of emergency and the state of war where the latter received higher status. The law provided the president with the power to choose the level of emergency and to impose martial law in all, or only parts of Indonesia's territory, with some limitations. First, the president would have to declare martial law in accordance with advice of the Ministerial Council. Second, the parliament also had power to assess the president's decision, and accept or reject it. Therefore, the declaration of martial law by the president had to be based on a specific law. The president had to submit a bill on the implementation of martial law to the parliament within three days. After receiving the bill, the parliament would also have to state its acceptance or rejection in three days. The government later passed Law No. 23/Prp/1959 to revise the Law No. 74/1957. The revision brought two major changes to Indonesia's legal framework on emergency situations:

the levels of emergency and the power of the president. Law No. 23/Prp/1959 stipulated three levels of emergency situation: the state of civil emergency, the state of military emergency, and the state of war. Unlike the previous arrangement, the new law stated that the president had absolute power as the Central Martial Law Administrator (*Penguasa Keadaan Darurat Pusat*, PKMP). The president was provided with the authority to declare martial law, to choose the level of the state of emergency, and to revoke martial law. For this, the president received assistance from the First Minister, the Minister of Defense and Security, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Regional Autonomy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Chief of National Police. In order to declare and revoke martial law, the president did not need to secure any consent from the parliament (Haryono 2008: 46–47, 51–54).

Under Law No. 74/1957 (followed later by Law No. 23/Prp/1959), the government declared the state of war across Indonesia in July 1957. Although the government initially imposed martial law for only a one-year period, Indonesia was effectively under a state of emergency until mid-1963. In the period between 1957 and 1963, the government executed the following extraordinary measures: forming the National Council on 12 July 1957; controlling the press; the military-led anti-corruption operation; strict control on public political activity and detaining political activists; a military offensive against regional revolts in Sumatera and North Sulawesi; restructuring the military institutions, especially the army; the forming of the West Papua Liberation Front; the nationalization of foreign companies and assets, especially those belonging to the Dutch; the creation of civil–military cooperation bodies (*Badan Kerja Sama Sipil-Militer*, BKS); and finally the announcement of the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 which dissolved the parliament and the ministerial cabinet and marked the establishment of Sukarno’s style of Guided Democracy (Haryono 2008: 174–261; Lev 2009). In the early 1960s, the government started gradually moving away from the state of emergency. With Presidential Decree No. 315/1960, the government changed the status in some areas from the state of war to the state of military emergency or the state of civil emergency. The process continued the following year as the government issued another presidential decree on 1 April 1961. Only on 1 May 1963 did the government lift the state of emergency in Indonesia entirely after it had reached an agreement with the Dutch over Papua (Haryono 2008: 273–274, 306). The agreement specified that the Dutch

would transfer its territory in Papua to an interim UN Administration, which would then hand it over to Indonesia (Ricklefs 2001: 328).

Soon after the government had lifted the emergency status in 1963, Indonesia faced another security crisis. On 3 May 1964, President Sukarno declared the Two People Commands (*Dua Komando Rakyat*, *Dwikora*) as the core of his politics of confrontation against the creation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The *Dwikora* included the strengthening of Indonesia's revolution and created the slogan of crush Malaysia (*Ganyang Malaysia*).⁸ With the *Dwikora* declaration, the government formed the Vigilance Command (*Komando Siaga*, *Koga*) on 16 May 1964. President Sukarno assigned Air Marshal Omar Dhani as the head of *Koga*, with Brig. Gen. Achmad Wiranatakusumah as his deputy. The leadership of *Koga* was responsible for coordinating all military activities toward Malaysia. Next, on 14 September 1964, Sukarno created the *Dwikora* Task-force Administrator (*Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora*, *Pepelra*) at the national and regional levels. At the national level, Sukarno himself was in charge as the Task-force Administrator, and most of the army garrison commanders served as Regional *Dwikora* Task-force Administrators (*Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah*, *Pepelrada*). To support its politics of confrontation, the government launched a limited military offensive, specifically by infiltrating the national liberation movement in Sarawak (one part of Malaysia's territory in Kalimantan) with Indonesian guerilla forces. In order to defend Malaysia, the British deployed about 20,000 troops by January 1965 in the Malaysian part of Kalimantan. Moreover, the British authorized their troops to enter Indonesian territory up to 100,000 yards when carrying out military missions (Haryono 2008: 335; Liow 2005: 97–100; Jones 2002: 235, 272). The politics of confrontation lasted until the second half of 1965, when Sukarno was ousted from power, following the aborted 30 September coup.

Reading through Indonesia's history, the country was almost twenty years under some sort of emergency status. Alongside the many negative consequences, there are also two achievements worth mentioning. First, through declarations of emergency status, the central government was able to curb domestic uprisings, especially regional revolts, during the 1950s. As the result, the central government was relatively successful consolidating its power *vis-à-vis* the regional rebellions. Additionally, the military institutions, particularly the army, also succeeded in restructuring itself and moving toward professional and cohesive armed forces. Second,

the government's determined foreign policy finally succeeded in forcing the Dutch to come to an agreement over the status of Papua. Apart from these two achievements, the protracted implementation of emergency status deeply hurt Indonesia politically and economically. First, the economic situation moved from bad to worse from 1957 to the mid-1960s. One major factor which contributed to this situation was the poor management of the nationalized foreign companies and their assets. The military officers in charge of those companies and assets were either incapable, corrupt, or both (Robinson 1986). Another major factor for the worsening economy was the massive allocation of the state budget for the military. Starting in 1958, 80 percent from the total state budget went to the military. Only by 1963 it decreased to 47 percent (Haryono 2008: 246, 309; Crouch 1993).

The second negative impact was the permanent state of military penetration into political and economic sectors, as well as civilian bureaucracy at national and regional levels. Especially through the army territorial structure, the military effectively controlled the entire Indonesian territory (Sundhaussen 1988: 270; Crouch 1986: 39; Said 2001: 15, 47). The military omnipresence did not end when the government revoked the emergency status in 1963. According to Feith, the situation “was difficult to reverse; the army's actual role did not diminish significantly when its formal power was reduced by a change in the martial law” (Feith 1963: 333).

Third, the central government became excessively dominant and opposition groups lost influence as a result. This situation gradually created a highly centralized form of government.

Fourth, although it was also a subject of political repression, the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) emerged as the only solid and non-corrupt political party. By the early 1960s, the PKI managed to become one of the major political powers in Indonesia (beside Sukarno and the army). This triangle—Sukarno, the army, and the PKI—did not face any significant political opposition, or in Feith's words, it was a “stable conflict” (Feith 1963: 325). If anything, there was a sort of balance of power between the army and PKI, with Sukarno as the central axis and balancer (Crouch 1986: 46).⁹

The following section reveals how the power dynamics between these three would prove to be a notoriously dangerous triangle which would lead to the worst tragedy and bloodshed in Indonesia's history.

3 MARTIAL LAW IN THE NEW ORDER ERA: 1965–1998

The immense animosity between the army and PKI worsened in the mid-1960s and led to the 30 September 1965 tragedy. A group of soldiers abducted and killed six top army figures and one middle-ranking soldier. The army under Suharto's command made up the first government response to this event. As the army top figures were killed, Suharto took over the control over the army in his capacity as the then-Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Kostrad). There is no record concerning the declaration of emergency status following this event. Yet, massive extraordinary measures were executed.

On that day, Suharto deployed troops from the army so that by evening he had already succeeded in controlling the situation in Jakarta. On the next day, he received an order from Sukarno to take over the command of the army, which he accepted and required the absolute authority to restore the public order and security (Crouch 1986: 153). The army leadership had already declared the state of war emergency on 4 October (Crouch 1986: 155). After the celebration of the Armed Forces Day on 5 October, the military announced that PKI was the mastermind behind the murder and tragedy of 30 September 1965,¹⁰ and began organizing anti-PKI youth organizations.¹¹ In October 1965, the killing of communists started across the country, but the worst massacre occurred in Java and Bali. No accurate information on the death toll exists, but conservative estimates take it between 250,000 and 500,000 (Crouch 1986: 171). Suharto institutionalized his authority to restore the public order and security by creating the Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, Kopkamtib) on 10 November 1965. Later on, the military established special military courts in December 1965 to hold trials against PKI members. Realizing the situation had exceeded his expectations, Sukarno reshuffled his ministerial cabinet on 21 February 1966 and banned all mass organizations. Thereby, Sukarno hoped to bring his power back on track, but it failed to create any effect. On 11 March 1966, he signed the famous 11 March Letter of Order (*Surat Perintah 11 Maret*, Supersemar), as the written legal framework for Suharto to take over the situation. Having the *Supersemar*, Suharto and his supporters outlawed the PKI and its associated organizations. On 18 March 1966, the security apparatus detained fourteen members from Sukarno's cabinet. A triumvirate consisting of

Suharto, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and Adam Malik ran the government from then on (Ricklefs 2001: 349).

The extraordinary measures at this time went way beyond simply restoring public order and security. Having such an absolute authority, Suharto and his supporters massively cleaned up the government from every possible PKI influence, as well as from Sukarno aides. The new regime discharged, suspended, retired, or disciplined over 3000 government employees and soldiers, and arrested many others (Ricklefs 2001: 349).¹² Apart from that, the government also directly intervened in political parties and weakened them. Finally, they revoked the Guided Democracy foreign policy.¹³ In June and July 1966, the MPR held a special session. During the session, the MPR ratified the *Supersemar*, banned Marxism as a political doctrine, planned a general election in 1968, demanded Sukarno admit responsibility for his policies during the Guided Democracy period, and banned him from making any further decisions. In March of the next year, the MPR officially impeached Sukarno, stripping him of all of his power and official titles, forcing him into a retirement, abolishing whatever ideological pronouncements he had previously made, and announcing that *Pancasila* would be the sole state ideology.¹⁴ At the same time, the MPR appointed Suharto as acting president. The MPR eventually postponed the parliamentary election which had been planned earlier and appointed Suharto as the president for a five-year term in March 1968 (Ricklefs 2001: 349–351, 353–354, 356). By the end of the 1960s, the new government had effectively eradicated the PKI and fully incorporated West Papua into Indonesia as its twenty-sixth province.¹⁵ Indonesia officially entered the New Order era.

The establishment of the new regime, however, did not annul the state of emergency in Indonesia. The military-backed government retained the existence of Kopkamtib for a couple of decades. During this period, the main tasks of Kopkamtib included surveillance of citizens, ensuring *Golkar's* victory in every election, and screening candidates for all political parties.¹⁶ Hence Kopkamtib had become the regime's ultimate security instrument, overriding other civilian and security agencies. It quickly became too powerful and in Ricklefs's words, "it was acting as a law unto itself" (Ricklefs 2001: 384). In fact, to quote Sebastian, "Kopkamtib was arguably the centerpiece of the entire New Order state" (Sebastian 2006: 80). It exercised a huge privilege, was allowed to bypass the civilian bureaucracy, and even worked freely from the armed forces itself. It had a mandate "to use all the resources of the Indonesian state to destroy what-

ever it conceived to be a threat to the state.” The source of threat might come from every possible direction, for what the new order regime coined the term *Ipoleksosbudmilag* for ideology (*ideologi*), politics (*politik*), economics (*ekonomi*), social (*social*), cultural (*budaya*), military (*militer*), and religions (*agama*). Therefore Kopkamtib focused on “crushing of remnants of the G30S/PKI, groups which threaten security and social order and endanger the well-being and integrity of the state and nation [...], the cultural streams which are opposed morally, mentally and culturally to the *Pancasila*; or even labor disturbances which compromise economic development” (Sebastian 2006: 81). Hence, “by the employment of its considerable military resource in the service of extraordinarily vague and broadly-defined political ends, [...] *Kopkamtib* was a de facto long-term martial law command [...]” (Sebastian 2006: 81).

In September 1988, the government shut down Kopkamtib and replaced it with the National Stability Maintenance Coordinating Body (*Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*, Bakorstanas). Bakorstanas functioned similarly to the Kopkamtib. The only difference was the former that answered directly to the president and the military commander, while the latter reported to the defense minister. This organizational switch was mostly due to the relationship between President Suharto and Murdani (the then-Defense Minister), which had turned sour by the end of 1980s, rather than an institutional upgrading. The military personnel also dominated the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara*, Bakin). As part of this, the New Order regime also established the Armed Forces Intelligence Body (*Badan Intelijen Strategis*, BAIS/*Badan Intelijen ABRI*, BIA) and linked it to the intelligence section at the army regional commands (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2013: 32).

The New Order government identified three mainly latent threats (McGregor 2007: 177) and used these extra-judiciary security institutions to handle it. The first threat was right-wing extremist groups, which were aligned with political Islamists and Jihadist cells. The second threat was left-wing extremist groups, which can be grouped under critical and opposition movements especially student, pro-democracy, and labor activists. The last threat was separatism, which had been underway since the mid-1970s and was principally symbolized by Aceh, and to a lesser extent in Papua and East Timor. However, the government never officially admitted to the existence of secessionist groups in Indonesia. Rather, it used various terms which principally tried to downgrade rebels groups to crimi-

nal gangs (Sukma 2004: v; Miller 2009: xii), like the Armed Gangs of Peace Disturbers (*Gerakan Bersenjata Pengacau Keamanan*, GBPK), the Security-Disturbing Gang (*Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, GPK), or the Wild Disturbance Movement (*Gerakan Pengacau Liar*, GPL).

Throughout its ruling period, the New Order government only deployed two large-scale military operations, one for the annexation of East Timor in 1975 and to fight off the Acehnese rebellion in the late 1970s and in a second operation from 1989 to 1998. To annex East Timor, the government launched a military offensive called Lotus Operation (*Operasi Seroja*) deploying 30,000 to 35,000 troops. The Indonesian troops reduced the military strength of the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor (*Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste*, Falintil) to up to 80 percent in a relatively short period. In July 1976, East Timor became Indonesia's twenty-seventh province. Despite suffering from great losses in their military strength, the East Timorese continued their struggle for independence under the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (*Frente Revolucionária Timor Leste Independente*, Fretilin) leadership and finally seceded from Indonesia in 1999. As the war shifted from guerilla warfare in the rural areas to the major cities, where urban resistance began to take shape, the military headquarters created a special Defense and Security Command (*Komando Pertahanan Keamanan*, Kohankam) to carry out combat operations. In 1984, the military headquarters changed the name of *Kohankam* to East Timor Security Operations Command (*Komando Operasi Keamanan Timor Timur*, Koopskam), and once more in 1989 to Operations Implementation Command (*Komando Pelaksana Operasi*, Kolakops) (Sebastian 2006: 118).

To fight the rebellion in Aceh, the government launched a number of military operations. One major operation was the Red Net Operations (*Operasi Jaring Merah*) which led to the informal creation of the infamous Military Operations Area (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM) in the province. To support this operation, Jakarta sent around 12,000 security personnel (including from the military and the police), but “the Indonesian government did not publicly release figures” of the total number of the troops (Miller 2009: 25).

There is one particular obstacle in studying these operations in East Timor and Aceh in the context of the state of emergency: there was no declaration of martial law at any level according to Law No.23/Prp/1959, prior to the launching of the military offensive. However, there is no

doubt that the nature of the government policy and the scale of military operations in handling the separatist issue were, in essence, extraordinary measures. In fact, Sebastian supports my finding, stating that:

the New Order adopted a completely different approach. Devoid of legitimacy, due to the manner in which it seized power and the violence that accompanied it, the Suharto regime never sought a legal basis to accommodate increased military authority or operations [...]. The Suharto regime's preoccupation was to find a mechanism that would legitimate its political status and not its use of military force. (Sebastian 2006: 150)

Apart from military operations in specific military areas (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM), the existence of the “normal” army territorial structure, which mirrored the civilian bureaucracy all the way down to the village level, can be seen as the institutionalization of emergency measures. This structure, “facilitated political surveillance and police functioned by monitoring and controlling the activities of political parties, religious groups, social organizations and trade union. [...] The territorial structure become a major means for keeping the Suharto regime in power and still remains a considerable source of human intelligence” (Sebastian and Gindarsah 2013: 31).

Beside the presence of the extra-judiciary security institutions and the permanent territorial deployment of the army, the excessive use of draconian law was another hallmark of New Order Indonesia. The most infamous one was the Law on Anti-Subversion. This law was the product of Sukarno's presidential decree in 1963, when according to Lev, “both the civilian and military sides of Guided Democracy's government become increasingly sensitive to crimes against the state, sedition and economic subversion” (Heryanto 2006: 109). I quote the key clauses, under Article 1 of the Law, at length in order to show the sense of emergency it contains. The article states that,

the following shall be convicted of having committed a criminal act of subversion: (1) anyone who has engaged in an action with the purpose of or clearly with the purpose which is known to him or can be expected to be known to him can: (a) distort, undermine or deviate from the ideology of *Pancasila* State or the broad policy line of the State; or (b) overthrow, destroy or undermine the power of the State or the authority of the lawful government or the machinery of the State; or (c) disseminate feeling of hostility or arouse hostility, cause splits, conflicts, chaos, disturbances or anxiety among the population or broad section of the society ...; or (d)

disturb, retard or disrupt industry, production, distribution, commerce, cooperatives or transport conducted by the Government or based upon a decision of the Government or which exerts widespread influence on the livelihood of the people ... (2) anyone who encourages the activities referred to in paragraph (1) shall also be convicted of engaging in subversive activities. (Sebastian 2006: 433–434)

Under such an arrangement, this law

contained provision for the death penalty, for arrest and imprisonment for peaceful expression of opinion, detention for up to one year without charge or trial, the imprisonment of witnesses, an absence of the obligation to inform detainees of the charge against them, the denial of legal representation, prohibition of family visits to prisoners, denial of defense lawyer's access to court documents, and the widespread use of torture. [Hence, it is] the harshest of the repressive legislation available in the history of Indonesia to silence the government's alleged opponents. (Hosen 2010: 270)

To a certain degree, Sukarno's government showed hesitation in using this law. According to a study, the government during the Guided Democracy era charged less than ten people with this law. Yet, the New Order government adopted this decree and ratified it as a law in 1969. Ironically, the new regime used this law to massively arrest leading figures from Sukarno's government, and further thousands of people were locked up under this anti-subversion law during the New Order period (Heryanto 2006: 62).

Probably, the most interesting feature from the anti-subversion law of the New Order regime was what observers and law professionals call the "rubber language." The language for key words in the law was vague, for example, the words "distort," "undermine," "deviate," or "encourage" which can be arbitrarily interpreted. A more distressful word in this law was the auxiliary verb "can." In fact, most of prosecutions largely relied on this verb. The use of this auxiliary verb "can" claims that "no material evidence was required to indicate actual consequence of the defendants' activities in question" (Heryanto 2006: 110–111). In practice, the regime excessively used this law to charge anybody who dissented with the government policies (Hosen 2010: 281–282). Worse, the government in the Suharto period not only continued using this law, but also excessively stretched it to include a wide range of other acts of crime, such as "corruption, smuggling, gambling and even rioters during a soccer match" (Heryanto 2006: 111). With the existence of this law, Indonesia's state during the new order era was practically a state of emergency in its nature.

Facing the deteriorating political stability and security situation at the very end of his reign, Suharto signed Presidential Decree No. 16/1998 on 18 May 1998 giving authority to the commander of the armed forces to implement martial law (Tap MPR No.5/MPR/1998). With this *Supersemar*-like Presidential Decree, Suharto formed the Operational Command for National Vigilance and Safety (*Komando Operasi Kewaspadaan dan Keselamatan Nasional*) and put Gen. Wiranto (the then-Commander of the Armed Forces) in charge of this command and the army chief of staff as the deputy. This letter authorized Wiranto to enact any necessary policy in order to handle the crisis, to take immediate action in order to curb the source of instability for security and public order, and called on all cabinet ministries as well as government officials at national and local level to support the military commander for this purpose. Hence, the military commander had an authority to declare the state of military emergency across or only in parts of Indonesia. Furthermore, the letter also opened up an opportunity for Wiranto to become de facto president like Suharto did thirty years earlier. Nevertheless, Wiranto refused to execute the order. He was concerned that the use of coercive measures under such circumstances would lead to an escalation in violence between protestors and security personnel, cost more victims, or even start a civil war (Wiranto 2003: 82–83, 86). Another speculation on Wiranto’s hesitation to make use of the decree was related to Javanese belief. According to Rinakit, “Wiranto believed that Suharto had yet to transfer his power to him. Suharto had only given him a decree authorizing him to declare martial law. He had not given his mandate (*wahyu*) and power (the ring and the dagger) along with the decree. Therefore, Wiranto did not seize power as he believed this action would only destroy him” (Rinakit 2005: 134).

In this chapter I have shown Indonesia’s constant experience with the imposition of martial law. The Dutch colonial government passed down the regulation on states of emergencies which later became known as SOB 1939. Under this regulation, the Dutch declared martial law after the outbreak of World War II. After declaring independence on 17 August 1945, the first Indonesian government passed Law No. 6/1946 to replace SOB 1939. During the struggle to defend its independence, this government imposed three martial laws through Presidential Decree (*Maklumat Presiden*) No. 1/1946, Presidential Decree No. 23/1948, and a decree of the commander of Java military garrison (*Maklumat MBKD* No. 2/1948). During the federalism era, those in power issued Presidential Decree

(*Kepres RIS*) No. 160/1950 to declare a war emergency in Sulawesi, and Presidential Decree (*Kepres RIS*) No. 160/1950 in the Moluccas. Despite the existence of Law No. 6/1946, the declarations of martial laws during these periods were largely based upon the Dutch SOB 1939. In the parliamentary era, Indonesia made several attempts to regulate the policies of emergency situations. Initially, the government replaced SOB 1939 in 1950 with the *Perpem* No. 7/1950 and the Emergency Law (*UU Darurat*) No. 8/1950. The government subsequently replaced these two regulations with a new legislation on military power (PP No. 5/1954). In 1957, the parliament ratified Law No 74/1957 on Emergency Situations. After the parliamentary system was replaced by Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the government introduced Law No.23/Prp/1959. Under these last two laws, the government declared the state of war across Indonesia in July 1957 and annulled it only in mid-1963. Even though there was no declaration of martial law from 1963 to mid-1965, Indonesia was under a de facto state of emergency due to Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia. After the aborted coup on 30 September 1965, Indonesia entered the next state of emergency. Witch-hunting against alleged communists, a power transfer, the dismissal of Sukarno, Suharto's rise as the new president, and the formation of a new regime marked the period from 1965 to 1968. The political turmoil in mid-1965 brought up the establishment of Suharto's New Order regime. There was no official declaration on martial law during the New Order, yet Indonesia experienced the institutionalization of the state of emergency and was indirectly under permanent martial law. But in any case, the New Order had established, to quote McGregor, "a martial tradition and on-going threats to the nation" (McGregor 2007: 172).

NOTES

1. The members of *Stadswacht* generally came from the local Dutch government. They were incorporated into the colonial army and responsible for guarding local neighborhoods. The members of *Landwacht* were also incorporated into the army and their task was to guard the Dutch plantations. The members of *Vrijwillige Oefenkorpsen* generally came from retired soldiers and their responsibility was to guard vital and strategic objects. The formation of VAUBEC was aimed at supplying drivers for military services such as marine, *Stadswacht*, *Landwacht*, and *luchtbeschermingsdi-ents* (LBD, office of air defense). The colonial government formed CORO and KMA to train some native Indonesians to become military officers.

Through the *Deviezen Ordonantie* and *Deviezen Verordening*, the Dutch de Javasche Bank managed to completely secure their gold and foreign exchange before the Japanese arrival. They succeeded in shipping the gold to Australia and South Africa. Also, via the Netherlands Purchasing Commission in Washington, DC, the Dutch managed to transfer their foreign exchange reserves to the USA.

2. For instance, the Japanese occupational government passed a law on the oversight of announcement and information offices. Under this law, every announcement had to receive an approval from the Japanese and a press union (*Simbun Kai*); all Dutch-owned press companies were banned.
3. For example, the Japanese formed the Center People's Power (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat*, Putera), the Defender of Motherland (*Pembela Tanah Air*, PETA), the Auxiliary Forces (*Heiho*), and a semi-military youth corps (*Seinendan*).
4. According to Anderson, the trigger of this uprising was more an intra-military dispute rather than a communist revolt. Therefore, it is more appropriate to refer to it as the Madiun Event 1948 (1976: 53).
5. The agreement, however, did not incorporate the Dutch part of Papua into Indonesia's territory. The following events showed that this was one of the major obstacles to domestically consolidating the government power and legitimacy for more than one decade.
6. These regional commanders were specifically, Col. Ahmad Husein in Central Sumatra, Col. Maludin Simbolon in North Sumatra, Lieut. Col. Barlian in South Sumatra, and Lieut. Col. Herman N. Ventje Sumual in North Sulawesi.
7. The government formed this committee with the issuance of Presidential Instruction (Keppres) No. 79/1954. The member of the committee included Lieut. Col. Widya (Ministry of Defense), Lieut. Col. A. Bustomi and Basarudin (Army Headquarter), Sudrajat (Ministry of Justice), Suhartono (Attorney General), and Agus Basuki (National Police). See, Haryono (2008: 46).
8. On 27 May 1964, Tunku Abdul Rahman publicly expressed his idea to incorporate the territories of Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, Brunei, and Malaya into one entity called the Federation of Malaysia. Jakarta regarded the Malaysia project as a manifestation of Western neo-colonialism in its backyard. Sukarno and his aides started labeling Malaysia as an "illegitimate neo-colonial creation supported by an Anglophile leadership" (Liow 2005: 97–100).
9. PKI came in fourth in the 1955's general election. However, it never succeeded in putting its members in any key government positions. One benefit PKI did receive from the election result was that it managed to maintain its uncorrupted credibility with the masses. Even A.H. Nasution admitted

that, “it was true that PKI was not yet involved in the government and [thus was] clean. PKI could boast of itself at the time” (Nasution 1985: 25). Furthermore, during the implementation of emergency status the authority had no reason to entirely ban PKI. PKI had always spouted off nationalistic rhetoric which was in line with the government’s effort to curb the regional revolts and the Papua issue. On the other hand, the military image was on the decline among the masses, especially due to corruption cases involving its officers in the nationalized foreign companies. Sukarno was extremely popular among the people; therefore both PKI and the military needed to be close to the president. Being fully aware of this situation, Sukarno recklessly managed the army–PKI conflict in order to maintain his position (Crouch 1986: 44).

10. The military used the acronym of *Gestapu* for this event. *Gestapu* stands for *Gerakan September Tiga Puluh*, (30th September Movement) with clear allusion to the Gestapo of Nazi Germany. In the following period, the government used the term G30S/PKI (*Gerakan 30 September/PKI*, 30th September Movement/PKI). This became the government’s official version concerning the tragedy, despite many scholarly publications which opposed it. On this issue, I agree with Ricklefs’s observation that “[t]he intricacies of the political scene ... and the suspect nature of much of the evidence, make it unlikely that the full truth will ever be known. It seems improbable that there was a single mastermind controlling all the events, and interpretations which attempt to explain events solely in terms PKI, army, Sukarno or Suharto plot must be treated with caution“ (Ricklefs 2001: 338).
11. Among others, the Indonesian Students’ Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, KAMI), with its core elements consisting of Islamic, Catholic, and the former Indonesian Socialists Party’s (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, PSI) youth groups; the Indonesian Youth and Students’ Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia*, KAPPI); and the Indonesian Graduates’ Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia*, KASI).
12. The bureaucracy overhaul also included the placement of military officers as regional leaders. In 1968, seventeen out of twenty-five governor posts were filled with military officers. By 1968, more than half of all positions of mayors and municipality regents were filled with military officers. A massive reorganization also took place within the military institution, which lasted until 1970. In August 1967, Suharto abolished the ministries for four military branches and placed the commander of the armed forces directly under the president (Ricklefs 2001: 356). Between 1969 and 1970, he replaced all commanders of military branches with chief of staff positions and all regional garrison commanders started reporting to the

department of defense and security. In October 1970, he lowered the retirement age for soldiers to forty-eight years which forced eighty-six generals to retire from their service (ibid: 359). Thus, the demobilization of the Indonesian armed forces went into effect and the authority over the forces was perfectly centralized.

13. Among others, between 1966 and 1967, Indonesia abolished its politics of confrontation and soon officially reopened diplomatic relations with Malaysia, rejoined the UN after having resigned in 1963, and froze relationships with communist countries like China and the then Soviet Union. In February 1966, the Indonesian ambassador to the PRC received an order to return home but he refused. He eventually received political asylum from Beijing.
14. *Pancasila* or Five Principles are the official state principles of Indonesia. Those principles are: (1) belief in God; (2) just and civilized humanitarianism; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) people led by wise policies arrived at through a process of consultation and consensus; (5) social justice for all the Indonesian people. In 1967, the MPRS declared *Pancasila* as the sole state ideology. In 1978, the New Order government introduced obligatory courses on Guidelines for the Implementation of Pancasila (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila*, P4) for the state bureaucracy, schools and universities, workplaces, and many other places (Morfit 1981).
15. The disappointed groups regarding this incorporation established the Papua Independence Organization (OPM, *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*), which is still active at the time of writing.
16. *Partai Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups Party, Golkar) is one of the political parties in Indonesia. The history of Golkar began on 20 October 1964 when the Army formed a Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*, Sekber Golkar). The initial objective of the formation of *Sekber Golkar* was to create a coordinating organization for various social and professional organizations (e.g. youth, state employees, teachers, labor organizations, etc.) in order to block the increasing growth of the PKI's influence. After the MPR appointed Suharto as the president in 1968, Suharto reorganized *Sekber Golkar* to become his electoral machine. For this purpose, the joint secretariat was renamed Golkar in 1970 and became an organization which was officially not a party, but still participated in elections. In all elections during the New Order era (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997), Golkar always won with landslide victories. Hence, together with the military, Golkar was the main supporter of Suharto's New Order regime. Soon after Suharto's departure in 1998, Golkar officially changed into a normal political party and remains one of the largest Indonesian political parties until today (Ricklefs 2001: 334, 360).

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The Indonesian Political Changes, (In)Security, and Securitization

As pointed out already in Chap. 1, Indonesia's security dynamics have undergone a dramatic transformation and the country's regime change highlights how democratization has its own security dynamics which need to be addressed. In this context of democratization, Indonesia had to come up with certain policies to deal with its security issues. In general, these policies can be categorized into securitization or desecuritization acts. In order to contextualize the regime change, security dynamics, and how securitization and desecuritization occurred in Indonesia, the object of discussion in this chapter is the post-1998 political and security development. For this purpose, I begin with providing a historical narrative at the point when the Asian Financial Crisis severely hit Indonesia, showing its impact on Indonesian economics, the failure of the Suharto government to deal with it, and how Suharto's political capital declined until finally he entirely lost support from his power circle. In the second section, I will describe how the anti-Suharto popular movements advanced their cause amid the lack of alternative leadership figures, how the student movements become the major driving force for the country's political changes, and how the political turbulence forced Suharto's departure. In the third section, I will provide an overview on the nature of post-Suharto regimes, especially B.J. Habibie's presidency. In essence, while the new regime had broken off from the old authoritarian one, the post-Suharto politics still accommodated elements from the old regime, especially the military. This kind of "pacted transition" occurred mainly due to the fact

that the politicians and “reformists” were highly dependent on the political support from the top brass in the military to prevail in the intra-civilian conflicts and power struggles. Since some elements from the old regime still enjoyed significant influence, the repressive security policies still continued as the conflict resolution mechanism to solve various violent conflicts in Indonesia’s post-1998 polity, which provided the grounds for the domination of securitization acts. The act of securitization, especially in the form of the enactment of extraordinary measures and martial law, is the topic of discussion in the last section of this chapter.

1 THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

In 1997 a great financial crisis shook Southeast Asia. The general agreement among observers was that a “premature liberalization of financial sectors” of the countries in the region was the main cause of this crisis (Rüland 2000: 424). This premature liberalization was stimulated by “high domestic interest rates” which in turn had led to “a massive influx of short-term” foreign capital (Rüland 2000: 424–425). This untimely liberalization also occurred due to the absence of sufficient and reliable rules for the financial sector, as well as the existence of a notorious system of cronyism within the political system. The short-term foreign capital largely fell into the hands of “politically well-connected persons” and was invested in inefficient sectors such as the real estate business (Rüland 2000: 425). Later on, banks became the victims of bad credits since most of their lending “were based on artificially inflated collaterals” (Rüland 2000: 425). In turn, such a fragile economic basis made Southeast Asian countries easy targets for currency speculators.

These speculators first began targeting the currency of the countries in the region in 1996, starting with Thailand. After a year of being victimized, the Thai government eventually decided to devalue the Baht in order to stabilize its exchange rate on 2 July 1997. Unfortunately, investors reacted negatively to the policy which led to a sharp decline in the stock market, not only in Thailand but also in other countries.¹ Currency speculators further contributed to the deteriorating economic situation by betting against other local currencies. The result was a currency free fall which exposed the economic vulnerability of the countries in the region, particularly Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Rüland 2000: 425; Pepinsky 2009: 85). For Indonesia, it was the most severe financial crisis in the thirty-two years of the New Order. Prior to the crisis, the Indonesian

Rupiah (Rp.) had a relatively stable exchange rate of, Rp. 2500 per US\$. However, the crisis caused a huge devaluation and the Rupiah reached its lowest point on 22 January 1998, when it dropped to Rp. 17,000 per US\$ (Pepinsky 2009; Chrisnandi 2006). With its fragile economic foundation, Indonesia was the country most severely affected by the crisis. Yet for some time afterward, global confidence in Indonesia's economy was still surprisingly high. Even the World Bank annual's report in 1997 still predicted an average economic growth of 7.8 percent for the next year (Habibie 2006: 2). The weakening of the exchange rate severely damaged Indonesia's balance sheets, as the country's foreign debts increased up to 95.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in March 1998. Along with the effects on the national sheets, Indonesia's inflation sharply increased to 77.6 percent in 1998, which resulted in economic contraction. The economic growth of 3.4 percent in the third quarter of 1997 became zero in the last quarter of the same year, minus 7.9 percent in the first quarter of 1998, minus 16.5 percent in the second quarter, and minus 17.9 percent at the end 1998. Such disastrous economic contractions consequently led to the devastation of Jakarta's stock exchange and brought the government bonds down to a "junk level" (Chrisnandi 2006). Obviously, the impact of this economic downturn had tremendous consequences for the country's corporate sector. Indonesia's top companies faced a more than 47 percent net loss in 1997, which continued to worsen the following year. The companies' net loss increased to 58 percent, and the average loss per company was around Rp. 27.3 billion (US\$9.4 million). It was an unprecedented downfall in the Indonesia corporate sector (Matsumoto 2007: 5). In sum, the financial crisis caused a harsh nose-dive in the Indonesian stock market, foreign investors lost their confidence, and national business elites withdrew their capital and invested it overseas. Moreover, while this wild fiscal turmoil was taking place, most banks were facing bankruptcy, and the business sector was in shambles, or faced with the prospect of a complete shutdown (Liddle 1999: 17). Consequently, companies had to lay off their employees, and unemployment levels jumped from 4.68 million people in 1997 to 5.46 million people in 1998. Taking the part-time employment or underemployment levels into account, the figures are even worse. The part-time employment in the country was 28.2 million people in 1997 and increased to 32.1 million in 1998. Altogether, the per capita income of the country shrank from US\$ 1155 in 1996 to US\$ 610 in 1998, which was close to the level of the early 1980s. This also resulted in around two-third of the country's popu-

lation to fall below the poverty line. Economists at the time predicted that “the country will not attain the economic development of 1997 till 2005” (Rüland 2000: 426; Habibie 2006: 3; Chrisnandi 2006: 2–3). The economic turmoil was worsened by the disastrous El Niño weather impact on food availability. Particularly on Java Island, “urban population had to contend with drastically reduced food rations. In major cities malnutrition among children was on the rise” (Rüland 2000: 426). Facing with all these events, the economic recovery policies of the Suharto government² failed to slowdown, let alone stop or reverse the economic downturn.

After prolonged negotiations, Suharto eventually, albeit reluctantly, signed the first agreement, also known as Letter of Intent (LoI), with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 31 October 1997. This LoI stipulated, among others, the IMF’s requirement that the Indonesian government had to close down the sixteen most problematic banks. In turn, this policy spread panic among the population, and customers from these sixteen problematic banks massively withdrew their cash and caused enormous capital flight. The economic situation became even more volatile when Suharto presented his unrealistic 1998–1999 economic plan in the national parliament’s (DPR) session in January 1998. In his economic plan, Suharto predicted 4 percent economic growth, 9 percent inflation rate, and the exchange rate at Rp. 4000 per US\$. Many observers ridiculed this plan since it did not reflect the real economic situation at the time. For instance, when Suharto delivered the plan to the parliament, the Indonesian exchange rate had already exceeded the level of Rp. 10,000 per US\$ in international markets. The people’s confidence of the effectiveness of Suharto’s economic policies sunk to unprecedented low levels on 4 May 1998, when the government announced it would cut subsidies on electricity and fuel. While the price of electricity and gas skyrocketed, the Suharto government failed to increase food subsidies, which were also part of the agreement with the IMF (Pepinsky 2009). Disappointed with the government’s economic policies to manage the crisis, the people were increasingly frustrated with the Suharto regime’s policies.

In February 1998, Suharto publicly expressed his “availability” for another presidential nomination—for the seventh time. This time around, he indicated he would nominate the German-trained engineer B.J. Habibie as vice-president.³ Far from his expectation that this move would regain public trust, it instead signaled a negative response in Suharto’s inner circle. Back then, most of Indonesia’s political stakeholders perceived B.J. Habibie’s appointment as a signal that Suharto had also lost the con-

confidence of his two traditional political backers: the military and Golkar. However, the General Meeting of People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR),⁴ the country's highest representative body, on 10 March 1998 re-elected Suharto and B.J. Habibie as the president and vice-president, respectively. Suharto subsequently appointed some other controversial personalities from his inner circle to his cabinet. Two among them were Suharto's oldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, popularly known by her nickname Tutut, as the Minister of Social Affairs, and Mohammad "Bob" Hasan, Suharto's long-time confidant and a plywood tycoon, as the Minister of Trade and Industry. These appointments gave another strong signal to the public that Suharto had indeed lost the confidence of his political allies and was forced to turn to his family and close personal aides. In order to maintain the support of his inner circle, Suharto embarked on policies which greatly favored the vested interests of his cronies. As things went from bad to worse, as the interest of his family and his cronies diverged, according to Liddle, Suharto eventually "chose to defend the interest of his family" (Liddle 1999: 25).

Many regarded Suharto's political decisions as reflecting nothing but his insensitivity amid economic downturn and societal uprising in the population. Such insensitivity caused Suharto to lose political support, even from the center of his power circle, specifically from the military, politicians in the parliament, cabinet ministers, and leading figures from civil society. The military leaders' initial stance in the early days of the financial crisis was to maintain their support for Suharto. In their view, the cost for the military would still be much less if Suharto stayed in power, compared to any unpredictable political change (Mietzner 2009: 110). Nevertheless, the military avoided the use of coercive measures to crack down on the anti-government movements and sought a compromise instead. In this line, Gen. Wiranto, as the then-Commander of the Armed Forces, attempted to convince student protestors and other civilian opposition leaders, like Amien Rais, that the New Order regime had an internal capacity to initiate political reform.

However, Suharto's economic and political moves, as outlined above, were at odds with Wiranto's strategy (Mietzner 2009: 121). Losing confidence with Suharto, the military officials began to shift their stance from defending Suharto's power to opening up to the possibility of political changes. With this newfound outlook, the main responsibility of the military was to find a way for Suharto to depart from power in a dignified and

orderly manner according to existing laws and regulations (Mietzner 2009: 117). For facilitating Suharto's departure, on 7 May 1998, Wiranto formed a team, led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then-Army Chief of Territorial Staff, to design reforms and to mobilize popular support for them. Another indication of the weakening military support for Suharto was Gen. Subagyo H.S. (the then-Army Chief of Staff) and Wiranto's refusal to implement Suharto's plan to establish a new security command emulating the old Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, Kopkamtib) in order to regain control over the political and security situation (Mietzner 2009). Additionally, the military representatives in parliament also joined forces with their civilian counterparts, who began to call for Suharto's resignation. Most importantly, Suharto's decision to resign was strongly influenced by Wiranto. In his interview with Chrisnandi, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Sudrajat (the Chief of the Military Information Center in 1998–1999) recalled that “the commander of the armed forces advised the president to resign. Otherwise, the military would not be able to handle the uprising or reaction from the people, especially in Jakarta” (Chrisnandi 2006: 36).

The first substantial hint of parliamentarians withdrawing their support of Suharto⁵ occurred on 16 May 1998, when Suharto received the chairpersons of the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*—DPR) for a consultative meeting at the presidential palace. Representing DPR, the delegation members were Harmoko (the then-DPR Speaker), Ismail Hasan Metareum, Fatimah Ahmad, Syarwan Hamid, Abdul Gafur (all DPR Deputies Speakers), and Afif Maroef (the then-DPR Secretary General). The delegation brought up three urgent issues: (1) there was a clear and urgent need to implement fundamental reforms (*reformasi total*); (2) there was the growing clamor of the people for Suharto's resignation; and (3) it was urgent to hold a special session of the MPR to decide the fate of the country. Responding to these issues, Suharto pledged to protect the people's property, national assets, and maintain national unity, *Pancasila* (the five principles of the state's ideology) as well as the state's 1945 constitution (*Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*). In order to fulfill this promise, he stressed three points. First, he welcomed the agenda of national reform (*reformasi nasional*). Second, he would try to improve the government's performance by reshuffling the cabinet. And finally, he would exercise his authority as the president to protect the security of the people. When Harmoko asked him about the resignation, Suharto replied: “that it was in the DPR's hands. If the leadership in

DPR/MPR wishes for it, I would step down, however it is not easy to solve the problem” (Habibie 2006: 9–11).

On 18 May 1998, Harmoko held a press conference and announced the convening of a MPR general session, demanded the resignation of President Suharto and that the DPR leaders would hold a meeting the next day to confer the people’s aspiration on reform. The news outlets disseminated the plans for holding the conference nation-wide and on the same day the heads of some of the factions had already responded to the new situation. Hamzah Haz (the then-head of DPR’s United Development Party faction), for example, stated that the demand for Suharto’s resignation was also the aspiration of his faction. Similarly, the head of Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) decided “with all due respect” to ask Suharto to resign. The meeting of DPR leaders on 19 May eventually reached two conclusions: to embark on national reform and to demand Suharto’s resignation. On the same day, Suharto suffered another disappointment after Muslim leaders rejected his reform plan (Habibie 2006: 15–16).

On 19 May 1998, Suharto invited some leading national figures including Islamic scholars and academics to the presidential palace. Among them were Abdurrahman Wahid (the then-leader of Nahdlatul Ulama), Nurcholish Madjid (the then-Director of Paramadina Foundation), K.H. Ali Yafie (the then-Head of Indonesian *Ulama* Council, MUI), H. Abdul Malik Fajar, H. Sutrisno Muhdam (Muhammadiyah’s senior figures), K.H. Cholil Baidlowi (a senior figure from Board of *Da’wah Islamiyah* Indonesia, DDII), K.H. Ma’ruf Amin and H. Ahmad Bagja (Nahdlatul Ulama’s senior figures), Emha Ainun Najib (a Muslim scholar and cultural commentator), and Yusril Ihza Mahendra (the then-Senior Staffer for the Secretary of Cabinet). After the meeting, Suharto spoke to the press that he would not “abandon the constitution” (read: resign) and insisted on leading the national reform. Suharto further announced that he would establish a Reform Committee which would consist of figures from (civil) society and universities. The Committee would formulate the new laws to meet the people’s demand for elections, political parties, the structure and position of the MPR, the DPR, and the provincial and regional People’s Representative Council, as well as laws to prevent monopolies and corruption. He also pledged to hold general elections as soon as possible after a new election bill was passed by the DPR. After the elections, the MPR would hold a general session in order to issue the new Broad Guidelines of State Policy (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*, GBHN), elect the new president and vice-president, and pass other related

regulations. Finally, Suharto firmly announced that he would not accept another presidential term and that he would reshuffle the current cabinet. Hence, the Development Cabinet VII would be renamed and become the Reform Cabinet (Habibie 2006: 19–26). However, the invited Islamic leaders ruled out “their participation in the reform council or the new cabinet” (Mietzner 2009: 132) that Suharto envisaged due to their disagreement with Suharto about the elections schedule. Nurcholish Madjid, one of the representatives of the Islamic leaders, proposed that the elections should be held within a six-month period, while Suharto only came up with the term “as soon as possible” (Mietzner 2009: 132). On the next day, another unfortunate event for Suharto occurred as several of his cabinet ministers submitted their resignation.

On 20 May 1998, led by Akbar Tandjung (the then-State Minister of Housing) and Ginandjar Kartasasmita (the then-Coordinating Minister of Economics, Finance, and Industry/Chairman of the National Development Planning Body), all fourteen of Suharto’s ministers on economic affairs resigned from their posts, stating that they would carry on their duties after the Reform Cabinet was firmly established. In the evening, Suharto had a meeting with B.J. Habibie and gave him the task of solving the problem with the resigning ministers. Later in the night, B.J. Habibie had a meeting with the ministers and informed them about the envisaged formation of the Reform Cabinet. Since some of them would be in the new cabinet, B.J. Habibie pleaded on behalf of Suharto to withdraw their resignation and support the new cabinet. After intense discussions, they reached three decisions. First, they accepted the formation of the Reform Cabinet as a “reality.” Second, they agreed that Suharto would announce the formation of the new cabinet, but as their third condition, they demanded B.J. Habibie to be the one who should swear in the new cabinet. However, B.J. Habibie would never reach Suharto and inform him of the meeting’s results. Instead Saadilah Mursyid (the then-Minister of State Secretary) notified B.J. Habibie that Suharto would resign the next day at 10 am. In accordance with the constitution, the president would hand over his authority and responsibility to the vice-president (Habibie 2006: 33–41).

2 POLITICAL TURBULENCE

The urban working class suffered the most as a consequence of the imminent bankruptcy of Indonesia’s economy. Yet this urban working class did not play a significant role in the political transition process. Their initial

reaction was panic, emptying their bank accounts, and rushing to supermarkets to stockpile basic commodities. Such a phenomenon could be understood as the Indonesian working class was poorly organized and therefore could not be counted on as the driving force of change amid the crisis. With the absence of a significant role from the urban working class during this moment of crisis, loose alliances of individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emerged as the driving forces behind the opposition movements prior to Suharto's departure. Some examples of these loose alliances were the Petition of Fifteen (*Petisi 15*) who call for Suharto's replacement by a new president, the Democracy Forum (*Forum Demokrasi*) who advocated political reforms, academics who were against Suharto's economic recovery policies, a group of researchers from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*, LIPI), and the Voices of Concerned Mothers (*Suara Ibu Peduli*, a coalition of women academics and activists from major women's NGOs and feminist groups) who were against the spiraling prices of basic goods (Aspinall 2005: 213–240). Even though these loose alliances were able to raise public attention, their major impediment was the lack of central figures who could be considered as alternative leaders.

By the end of 1997, at least three figures emerged, who might lead the opposition movements, or even replace Suharto on the national level. The first personality was Abdurrahman Wahid. As the leader of *Nahdlatul Ulama*, the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesia with some 50 million members, and as the founder of the Democracy Forum, many in the opposition groups hoped that Wahid might lead the movement and initiate political change. However, Wahid chose to maintain his and *Nahdlatul Ulama*'s good relationships with Suharto, which had only emerged a few years earlier. To show his position, Wahid publicly stated that *Nahdlatul Ulama* "entrusted President Suharto alone to process succession" and he refused to "to align himself with the movement against Suharto since the late 1997 until the early 1998" (Aspinall 2005: 215).

The second figure was Megawati Sukarnoputri. As Sukarno's oldest daughter and the head of the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, PDI), which was oppressed throughout the Suharto era, the opposition groups also placed their hope on Megawati. Like Wahid, Megawati did not play a significant role in the beginning. According to Aspinall, she "remained focused on internal party matters" (Aspinall 2005: 215). Besides, there were different views in her circle on how to cope with the current political situation at the time. Some groups within

the PDI were more cautious, while others demanded Megawati and the party to play a major role. Even though in January 1998 Megawati stated for the first time her willingness to be president, she “did little to promote her cause” and “made no attempt to mobilize” her supporters (Aspinall 2005: 216).

The third figure was Amien Rais, who had been one of Suharto critics since the early 1990s, especially in a speech in 1994 titled “Succession: A Must.” Apart from that, as the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Indonesian Muslim organization with some 30 million members, Amien Rais was obviously another alternative personality who was supposed to be able to lead the opposition movement. Indeed, Amien Rais had become “the chief of opposition” since late 1997. Yet he hesitated to take decisive action. Even though he accepted a presidential nomination during a talk in 1997, Amien Rais also suggested it was more for “symbolic and educative” purposes, which reflected his reluctance to comment on presidential succession (Aspinall 2005: 216, 221). Hence, although the opposition movement grew bigger in 1998, the envisaged leaders with nation-wide acceptance were still missing.

In order to find credible leaders, Adi Sasono, the then-Secretary General of Indonesian Muslim Intellectual’s Association (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, ICMI), proposed to hold a national dialog involving military officials; figures from modernist Islamic organizations, like Amien Rais; figures from traditionalist Islamic organizations, like Abdurrahman Wahid; and figures from nationalist groups, like Megawati Sukarnoputri. Had such a dialog been successfully held and resulted in the formation of a more solid alliance relative to the existing groups mentioned above, it would have obviously exerted huge pressure on Suharto. However, Adi Sasono’s attempt failed, primarily due to Abdurrahman Wahid’s turning down the dialog proposal, arguing that the military and societal groups would oppose the dialog, and it would be better to wait for a dialog initiative from the government (Aspinall 2005: 219). Another hope appeared when Emil Salim, a minister in Suharto’s previous cabinets, campaigned as an alternative vice-president on 11 February 1998. For this purpose, Emil Salim received support from the Echo of Civil Society (*Gema Madani*) a loose grouping of 128 academics, NGO activists, former government officials, and technocrats.

However, it was another failed attempt to come up with a viable candidate, due to Emil Salim’s “unwillingness to speak out,” refusal to criticize Suharto, and constant message to his supporters “not to act outside the

system” (Aspinall 2005: 219). These circumstances showed that even though the aspirations and movements for change grew stronger, they still lacked good organization. The main reason for this predicament was the inability of those figures to form united actions due, in part, to their personal distrust toward each other, especially among Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Aspinall 2005: 219). When the senior figures in the pro-democracy movements could not find any credible figure to lead and settle their differences, university students filled the gap.

It was the university students who played the most decisive role at the grassroots level. Students, particularly in democratic transitions, where non-government political groups are usually not well institutionalized, often play a prominent role in pushing forward essential political changes. The role of Indonesian students in political changes has long historical roots, which can be traced back even before the country’s independence. They began with the establishment of the Indonesian Union (*Indische Vereeniging*) by Indonesian students in the Netherlands in 1908. Then came the first Youth Congress in 1928, which has been widely recognized as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s nationalism. After the defeat of the Japanese in World War II, a youth delegation put pressure on Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, the first president and vice-president, respectively, to proclaim the country’s independence. During the war for independence from 1945 to 1949, there were heroic narratives about students and youth paramilitaries’ patriotism against the Allied troops and the Dutch’s so-called police action. Finally they also played a decisive role in the mid-1960s’ power transfer. All of these accounts imply that “students were raised in a political environment where they were expected to be able to ‘save the nation during crisis’” (Aspinall 2005: 222). In regard to the student movements amid the financial crisis and political changes in 1997–1998, there are three major factors at play. First, students enjoyed a high level of independence from work obligations. Second, they enjoyed access to relevant sources of knowledge in order to form their own critical opinions. Finally, especially in the case of Indonesia, they were able to mobilize large crowds since campus buildings in general were located in the city center. On a more pragmatic level, the crisis also heavily affected students’ living conditions. There were between 300,000 and 400,000 students in the country unable to pay tuition fees. Most severely affected were those who came from lower middle-class families and those living away from their families (Aspinall 2005: 222).

The students started mass rallies against the government's handling of the crisis in several towns in December 1997 (Aspinall 2005: 213). They initially demanded significant political and economic changes, the underlining theme of which was addressing how the government did their business. Laws and regulations were already there and the students asked the government to enforce them. Hence, the mainstream student rallies barely mentioned the succession of the national leadership. The turning point came in early March 1998, as the MPR held the general session to elect, and eventually re-elect, Suharto as president with B.J. Habibie as his deputy. Outside the parliament building, protestors demanded change in the country's leadership. In a short time the protests turned into the largest student movement in Indonesia's history. As the MPR's session came to an end on 11 March, a large number of student protests took place in major universities in cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, Bandung, Solo, Malang, Manado, Ujung Pandang, Denpasar, and Padang. The protests also reached smaller towns like Kudus and Purwokerto. On several occasions, massive crowds of students from different universities gathered on one campus. For example, in one day at Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, 30,000 student protesters gathered (Aspinall 2005: 221).

In the beginning, students only concentrated their action within their respective campuses. Realizing the growing wave of student protests but also concerned with the infiltration by provocateurs into the movement, the security officers allowed students to join *en masse* as long as they stayed inside the campus and did not pour out into the streets. However, it did not take long for the students to eventually leave the grounds. Bearing in mind the possibility of being infiltrated by unknown parties and provocateurs, the students put on their university jackets and assigned some of them to barricade the rally from the general public. Yet some clashes between students and security forces were unavoidable. Violent confrontations (*bentrok*) between the two became another major headline in the press. The violent clashes between students and troops broke out in no less than fourteen cities and towns around Java, Sumatra, Bali, and Lombok between 11 March and 2 May 1998 (Aspinall 2005: 203, 221).

On 4 May 1998, after agreeing to the IMF's loan conditions, the government released an announcement that it would cut subsidies on electricity, fuel prices, and other basic needs. As the subsidies were cut off, prices began sky-rocketing. This provoked larger and more violent protests, as well as riots. In Jogjakarta, for example, violent confrontations escalated when thousands of residents from surrounding neighborhoods joined the

students in attacking the security forces. In Medan, violence of the troops in handling student rallies angered the wider population and sparked a riot. The city and its surrounding areas were paralyzed for the next few days (Aspinall 2005: 232; Freedman 2004: 189).

The street violence reached its peak with the Trisakti Tragedy in Jakarta. On 12 May 1998, the students at the University of Trisakti were about to leave their campus and march to the parliament building. The security forces halted the rally and told the students to return to their campus. Disobeying the order, the students sat in the street and distributed flowers to the soldiers. This time no violent clashes erupted between the students and the troops. The bloody day began when unknown gunmen began shooting the students right at the moment when they were heading back to campus. Four students were killed. The death of the students triggered the most severe riot in thirty-two years in the history of New Order Indonesia. The riot lasted for two days, from 13 to 14 May 1998. Collective violence, looting, pogroms, arson, all the way to sexual assault marked these two days of rioting in Jakarta. Sutiyoso, the then-governor of Jakarta, reported that at least 4939 buildings were burned and 518 bank offices were destroyed (Habibie 2006: 7). The human loss was even more deplorable. Many citizens, mostly the Indonesian-Chinese, died in the violence. The country's National Human Rights Commission (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, Komnas HAM) reported that the death toll reached at least 1188 people, most of whom were looters trapped in burning shopping centers (Aspinall 2005: 232). Responding to the situation, foreign governments started contacting their citizens in Indonesia. On 15 May, the US foreign affairs office released an order for all Americans to leave Indonesia immediately. Other countries, like Germany, China, and Australia also announced a travel ban for any of their citizens who were planning on traveling to Indonesia (Habibie 2006: 14).

Suharto was not in Indonesia at the time. He was in Cairo attending the G-15 Summit and returned to Jakarta on 15 May. By the time he reached the country the riot had ended, and the mass protest was no longer demanding changes in the political and economic sector. The demand had already been narrowed down into a three-pronged agenda of national reform: to bring down fuel prices, to bring down the price of basic household needs, and to bring down Suharto (Habibie 2006: 14).

On 18 May 1998, a group of student senate leaders from various universities arrived at the House of Representatives. They demanded that the House leaders hold an extraordinary session and comply with the reform

agenda. Of utmost priority for them was the impeachment of Suharto. At the end of the day, there were seventy-five students who insisted on staying overnight in the building. Early the next day, more and more students arrived and together they occupied the building. Thousands of students clothed in their university jackets stormed the parliamentary building; they even went up to the roof, an image which quickly became the iconic picture of *reformasi*.⁶

Massive student movements did not only take place in the country's capital. In some other cities like Surabaya, Semarang, and Padang students also occupied the state-owned radio station and forced the local anchors to broadcast their demands. More than half a million students in Jogjakarta and the surrounding area marched and gathered in the city center. Roughly the same amount of students in Bandung occupied the West Java Governor's Office building. In Semarang, Solo, Makassar, and many other Indonesian cities it was the students who initiated rallies but thousands from other sectors of society joined them. It was the very moment of Indonesia's "popular upsurge" (Aspinall 2005: 233–234). Either having been forced by popular protests or due to the fact that the popular protests had boosted confidence among the legislative leaders, Harmoko finally gave a speech addressing the situation on 20 May 1998. In the nationwide televised address, he issued an ultimatum that Suharto would have three days to announce his resignation. Otherwise, the House of Representatives would immediately launch an impeachment process. On the streets, Harmoko's tough action did not resound well with the masses. While students were chanting for the "hanging" of Suharto, Harmoko, and other members of the ruling elite, the mobs were burning down the house of Harmoko and Suharto's chief crony, Liem Sioe Liong (Aspinall 2005: 234).

3 B.J. HABIBIE'S PRESIDENCY AND POST-SUHARTO PACTED TRANSITION

On 21 May 1998 at the presidential palace, Suharto eventually gave his resignation speech and was replaced by B.J. Habibie. However, B.J. Habibie suffered from inadequate political support, and consequently, his inauguration faced severe opposition. First, the reformist groups regarded B.J. Habibie as one of Suharto's closest cronies, and therefore they doubted his commitment to democratization and the effectiveness of his future policies. Second, the reformists groups viewed the power trans-

fer from Suharto to B.J. Habibie as unconstitutional since it was not conducted in parliament and not preceded by Suharto's accountability speech. For these two reasons, the anti-Habibie groups refused to recognize B.J. Habibie's government and demanded the formation of a transitional government whose main duty was to prepare free and fair elections in the near future. Additionally, the anti-Habibie groups also demanded the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR) to hold a special session and summon Suharto to give an account for the problems during his term of office. The main driving forces in the anti-Habibie camp were radical student coalitions like the City Forum (*Forum Kota*, Forkot), the Student Forum for Democracy and Reform (*Forum Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi*, Famred), and the Jakarta Forum of Student Union Communication (*Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta*, FKSMJ). These student coalitions also received support from fourteen civil society organizations like National Coalition (*Koalisi Nasional*), Pro-Reform People's Movement (*Gerakan Rakyat Pro-Demokrasi*, GRPR); academics; and the group of retired generals called National Front (*Barisan Nasional*) (Rinakit 2005: 91, 96). Facing such a strong opposition from a broad range of social groups, B.J. Habibie's initial reaction was contradictory: it was first an attempt to establish his democratic credentials and, second, to secure support from the most solid institution of the old regime, namely the military.

From his earliest days in office, B.J. Habibie's immediately launched a fundamental reform program toward democratization which was intended as a symbol of the clear break between the *Reformasi* era and the New Order regime. In the political sector, the B.J. Habibie government lifted restrictions on the formation of political parties, announced a schedule for elections, recognized the freedom of the press, dismissed the parliamentarians who were appointed based on family ties, and announced the referendum for East Timor. In the field of law and human rights, the B.J. Habibie government promised to investigate the Trisakti Tragedy and the May riots in order to bring the perpetrators to justice, and to investigate the cases of human rights violations by the security personnel in the past. In the economic sector, B.J. Habibie compiled a list of corrupt businessmen and renewed the financial programs to support farmers and small-scale enterprises (Rinakit 2005: 92–93).

Two of B.J. Habibie's democratic initiatives, namely the liberalization of the political system and the freedom of the press, caused significant side effects for the military establishment. The liberalization of the political

system allowed every “politico-ideological” (Mietzner 2009: 199) group except the communists to form political parties and compete for political positions. This led to a reduction of the military’s influence on everyday politics and hence the officers were forced to redefine their “role, function and even careers” (Mietzner 2009: 199) in the new polity. Such a liberalization of the political system also put pressure on the ongoing military reform in the country. In fact, reforming the military was one of Indonesia’s main democratization goals. During this process, through highly time- and energy-consuming political debates, military reform in Indonesia (1) ensured that there was no more possibility for any military involvement in any level of the political institutions; (2) encouraged the public elimination of the image and reputation of the military of being a “political army”; (3) incorporated the supremacy of civilian and humanitarian principles into laws regarding state defense and the military; (4) ensured the application of universal norms and ethics of just war in military operations; (5) rejected both legal and illegal economic activities of the military; and (6) led to a number of institutional adjustments within the state defense and the military organization in implementing the above points (Widjajanto 2007: 20). Meanwhile, with its newly gained freedom, the press began to publish cases of misconduct and abuses committed by the security personnel. With the help of the press, human rights organizations were also enabled to make their findings concerning the security forces’ wrongdoings public and publicly advocate that human rights violators be taken to trial. While B.J. Habibie’s initiatives might have exerted pressure on the military, the armed forces still remained the most solid institution in the immediate post-Suharto period. Therefore, “among Habibie’s immediate interest was convincing the military to refrain from sabotaging democratic reforms,” but at the same time the post-Suharto *realpolitik* also forced B.J. Habibie to “rely on the military as one of his major sources of power” (Mietzner 2009: 199).

In order to convince the military not to sabotage his democratic initiatives, B.J. Habibie granted the military some concessions, the most important of which was allowing the military the freedom to conduct internal reform.⁷ Accordingly, there were some fundamental steps taken by the military during B.J. Habibie’s presidency in order to reposition itself in the new political landscape. Such steps included the release of the military New Paradigm in July 1998, the restriction for active officers to fill positions in the government bureaucracy in November 1998, the reduction of military representatives in the national and local legislatures in January

1999, the termination of the military's ties with the Golkar, and the separation of the military and the national police. While B.J. Habibie needed to be assured that the military did not disrupt his democratic agenda, he also sought military support for his candidacy in the 1999 presidential bid in parliament, as he did not have enough political capital and was not well accepted by the pro-reform movements.

To secure the support of the military, B.J. Habibie offered Wiranto the vice-presidential position in order to contend with the growing popularity of other candidates like Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri and, to a lesser extent, Akbar Tandjung. However, Wiranto publicly declined the offer in a televised statement. Further political developments also did not favor B.J. Habibie and the possibility of the MPR to elect him dissipated. In the parliamentary elections held on 7 June 1999, with 20 percent of the votes, B.J. Habibie's main political vehicle, the Golkar Party, only finished second, while the most popular opposition party, Megawati's PDI-P, won with 34 percent of the total votes.⁸ The defeat in the parliamentary elections severely eroded Habibie's support in the MPR. On 13 November 1998, the MPR rejected B.J. Habibie's accountability speech during the assembly's special session. Realizing the inevitable, B.J. Habibie subsequently withdrew from the presidential race.

Yet B.J. Habibie was not the only candidate who sought the military's support. A day before the presidential election in the MPR's special session meeting, Abdurrahman Wahid also offered Wiranto the vice-presidential position. During a meeting in the aftermath of the MPR's rejection of B.J. Habibie's accountability speech, some leaders from the Golkar Party, the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN), the Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB), and the military faction in the parliament offered Wiranto a vice-presidential position as the running-mate of Akbar Tandjung, the head of Golkar Party. The final vice-presidential offer for Wiranto came from Abdurrahman Wahid just a day before the presidential election at the MPR.

The MPR finally voted Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia's new president with Megawati coming in second. The election of Abdurrahman Wahid sparked riots, especially in Bali, as Megawati's supporters were disappointed with the voting result. The riots, in turn, alarmed Abdurrahman Wahid's supporters, who were devoted to defend Wahid's presidency. To prevent the outbreak of further political conflicts, Wiranto withdrew as vice-presidential candidate and the MPR finally elected Megawati Sukarnoputri as the vice-president (Wiranto 2003). This *realpolitik* in the

early years of *Reformasi* era leads to the conclusion that the regime change in Indonesia was a *pacted transition*,⁹ rather than a total dissolution and transformation of the old regime.

The Indonesian pacted transition refers to political changes which were brought about by a new regime but at the same time also accommodated elements from the old one in the new political domain, as the result of negotiated regime change between political elites. These elite negotiations occurred, both prior to and after Suharto's departure. Prior to Suharto's departure, the "compromise-oriented military officers" succeeded in negotiating "an intra-systemic transfer" of power from Suharto to B.J. Habibie, and thereby prevented the total dissolution of the New Order regime (Mietzner 2009: 98). After Suharto's departure, the Indonesian political dynamics generated intense intra-civilian competition. Hence, this "protracted tension and competition among civilian political elite" eventually forced them "to be pragmatic and seek support from TNI [...] to confront their political opponent" (Sukma and Prasetyono 2003: 25; Anwar 2002: 213). Such fragmented civilian political forces had provided the military with an opportunity to play a decisive political role as mediator in the early stage of post-Suharto politics. Furthermore, when political parties, the legislature, and the bureaucracy had to adjust to the new regulations, the military became "the only institution with a deeply rooted, functioning infrastructure at the grassroots level" (Mietzner 2009: 225). Therefore, during this early stage of Indonesia's democratization, "neither incumbent governments nor oppositional groups could afford to alienate the armed forces, with both sides constantly approaching the military for their cause" (Mietzner 2009: 225).

Under such circumstances, B.J. Habibie was not the only president who needed military political support. Abdurrahman Wahid also had to secure military support when politicians in the parliament increasingly challenged him. In return, Wahid granted important concessions for the military like prematurely terminating planned fundamental reforms, installing more conservative officers, and ending the negotiations with separatists in Aceh and Papua. When the parliament finally impeached and ousted Wahid, Megawati became "deeply distrustful" of civilian politicians and sought military support for protection against possible betrayals from parliament or political parties (Mietzner 2009: 226–227, 241–242). Apart from intra-civilian power struggles, the continuation of military influence in the ongoing democratization process was also a consequence of the deteriorating security situation in the post-Suharto era.

The deteriorating security situation in post-Suharto Indonesia was related to the increasing activity of separatist movements and the outbreak of communal conflicts. Findings from previous studies show that no less than 10,000 people were killed during the post-Suharto violence (Bertrand 2004: 4). Even though only 17 percent of Indonesia's violent conflicts fall into the category of communal conflicts, they contributed as much as 90 percent to the total death toll (Varshney et al. 2004: 25).

In general, major violent conflicts, both separatist and communal ones, were concentrated in a few provinces. The World Bank reported that until 2008 there were only six provinces out of thirty-three, which had acutely suffered from major violent conflicts. These provinces were Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua, respectively. As conflicts were also sparked in other provinces such as Central, West, and South Kalimantan, these violent incidents can also be added to the Bank's account. Hence, major violent conflicts affected roughly 9 percent of Indonesia's total population (The World Bank 2010; Varshney et al. 2004).

The worsened security situation renewed the government's prime concern for territorial integrity. Indeed, as the country was severely shaken by violent conflicts, predictions of state failure became louder. To give an example, the US-based Center for Global Development released a report mentioning that Indonesia's performance in maintaining security was only slightly better compared to already failed states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, or Haiti (Varshney et al. 2004; Van Klinken 2003). Such a deteriorating security situation was also the unfortunate consequence of B.J. Habibie's structural reform of decentralization. On the other hand, there are also studies which claim that because of decentralization, the separatist and communal conflicts could have been orderly settled with a minimum of violence. However, "most of the extensive literature on Indonesian decentralization even today remains technocratic and fails to consider the security implications" (Turner et al. 2003, quoted in van Klinken 2007: 31).

The policy of decentralization is one of the most important of his initiatives which marked the breakaway of *Reformasi* from the New Order era.¹⁰ Under decentralization, Jakarta re-arranged central-regional relations in favor of the regional governments. For this initiative, the B.J. Habibie government passed Law No. 22 and 25/1999. In essence, these two laws provided a framework for "empowering local parliaments to elect district heads, giving district heads greater budgetary powers, and returning more tax money to resource-rich areas" (Van Klinken 2007: 9). Despite all the

benefits from this new arrangement, decentralization also caused collateral damage in the early years of implementation. This collateral damage took the form of severe ethnic and religious tensions which also included the question of who is in control of the local government. Such competition occurred due to the fact that the local economy of many Indonesian cities and towns outside Java Island deeply depended on government funds for at least two reasons. The first reason was that the main and the most prestigious job opportunities in regions outside Java are local government positions. Second, most local entrepreneurs lived from government contracts, such as projects for infrastructure development. Therefore, once certain groups managed to control the local government, they would have full access to distribute the government budget along communal lines. As this situation occurred under conditions of ethno-religious fragmentation, it fueled communal competition. In turn, the “conflict entrepreneurs” from each community gained opportunities to escalate the competition into violent conflicts in order to control the local bureaucracy and financial resources at the expense of others (Van Klinken 2007). Hence according to van Klinken, this is the background for communal conflicts in Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, as well as in Central and West Kalimantan (Van Klinken 2005). Additionally, while democratization had reduced the formal political role of the military in Jakarta, the decentralization in fact had increased its influence at the local levels, especially through the army’s network of territorial units. The violent conflicts at the local level became more complicated as parts of the military units began taking sides with one or more warring communities (Van Klinken 2006: 134; 2007: 27, 30; Mietzner 2009: 364). Facing a number of major violent conflicts in several regions, many key politicians in Jakarta criticized B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid’s attempts to solve the conflicts through political negotiations and compromises, for being too soft. They believed that the implementation of extraordinary security measures would be more effective in resolving the conflict. This shift in the government’s priority toward territorial integrity favored the military and continued the old repressive methods of conflict resolution among decision-makers, as well as in public discourse.

For the military in particular, the outbreak of “separatist movements, ethnic conflicts and other communal violence in the archipelago” had provided the grounds for the officers to reclaim their perceived “birthright” as guardians of the state (Honna 2009: 240). In trying to reassert its perceived role as the guardian of the state, the military made the impression

that it could, to quote Honna, “exercise a veto power in the relationship with the government and that it can retain a political say in rejecting pressure for reform which are undesirable to the military” (Honna 2009: 242). In other words, the security situation—an unfortunate by-product of the change in government—led to compromise the progress of military reforms in the country. Consequently, though the reform “has withdrawn [the military] from ‘formal’ political process and institutions” (Honna 2013: 198), the civilian authority “was unable to ensure [its] full implementation and completion” (Rüland and Manea 2013: 139). In other words, Indonesia’s military reform had reached a certain level of first-generation reforms, but it was unable to “initiate second-generation reforms” (Rüland and Manea 2013: 139). Even more, at the time when the country was facing imminent threats, the military leadership could still exercise its influence by other means. Or, in Honna’s words (2013: 198), “the military can influence sabotage, and bypass political decision by political authorities and dictate the pace and scope of reform by playing the politics of (in)security.”

4 MARTIAL LAW IN THE *REFORMASI* ERA

In the context of emergency situations, there are two interrelated features that mark the post-Suharto era. On the one hand, the *Reformasi* governments annulled some laws from the previous regime, which dealt with emergencies. On the other hand, the worsening security situation (including social riots, communal conflicts, and the reoccurrence of separatist movements) required a set of new laws in the security sector. These new laws would have to match the spirit of *Reformasi* and provide a strong regulatory basis for the government, and more importantly the security apparatus in the field of enabling it to control the situation. Unfortunately, all post-Suharto governments did not perform well in regards to the latter point. This section, in which I will discuss security policies in the *Reformasi* era, will provide evidence for this assessment. Next, I will discuss the evocation of emergency situations and the declarations of martial law in this period.

On 19 May 1999, the B.J. Habibie government annulled the anti-subversion law with the ratification of Law No. 26/1999. This can be understood in the light of earlier events, namely when the MPR issued the decree No. X/MPR/1998, which required the government to draft a bill on state safety and security (*RUU Keselamatan dan Keamanan Negara*)

to replace the anti-subversion law. Concurrently, many government representatives and social groups also held the view that the law on emergency situations from 1959 no longer suited the current national dynamics. Under these circumstances, the government drafted the required bill with the department of defense and security as the leading actor in the drafting process. Subsequently, on behalf of the government, the then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Feisal Tanjung submitted the draft to parliament on 19 July 1999. The parliament made several major changes to the submitted bill, including a name change. It became the bill on the Management of Emergency Situation (RUU *Penanganan Keadaan Bahaya*, RUU PKB,) on 6 September 1999.

Beyond the government, many elements within society fiercely opposed the bill. They included students, NGO activists, and members of many political parties. Forty-eight researchers from the state's Center of Science and Research (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Penelitian Indonesia*, LIPI) also signed a joint-petition rejecting the bill. Even Moerdiono, the former Minister of State Secretary in Suharto's cabinets, stated his concern about this bill. He saw the bill as potential source of further restraints on individual rights, and hence he suggested that the parliament return the bill to the government.

There were at least five major flaws in the bill. First, the bill would again endow the president with absolute power during emergencies. The government would not need consent from the parliament for declaring a state of emergency. In this regard, the president only needed to consider advice from the National Defense and Security Council (*Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional*, Wanhankamnas) and the Security Enforcement and Law System Council (*Dewan Penegak Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum*, DPKSH). The president formed these councils as presidential security advising bodies. Basing his decisions in times of emergency merely on suggestions made by these councils in essence meant, according to a researcher from LIPI, that "the president [is] listening to himself" (Syamsuddin Haris as quoted in *Kompas*, 23 July 1999). The second point was a tendency in the bill to provide another justification of the military's omnipresence like in the Suharto period. This can especially be seen in the fact that most members in *Wanhankamnas* and DPKSH were military officers. Thirdly, the legal wording in the bill vaguely stipulated three levels of states of emergencies (the state of special treatment, the state of military emergency, and the state of war emergency) without further clarification of how a particular situation should be designated as one of those levels. Fourth, the bill was obviously concerned

with internal sources of insecurity and perceived the people as potential enemies of the state, rather than focusing on external threats. Therefore, various elements in the society regarded this bill as merely another repressive instrument, especially for the adherents of the old regime, to abort the *reformasi* movement. Some even cautioned that the military might use this legal framework as justification for a military takeover. Finally, critics questioned the parliament's legitimacy of passing the law. The fact that general elections had been held in June 1999 and a parliament with an entirely different composition would begin its term in October 1999 made it highly likely that legislators would then have completely different views on security issues. Hence the current parliament, which was a result of the 1997 elections conducted in the authoritarian New Order period, should neither make far-reaching decisions, nor pass new laws (Luwarso 2001: 57–58, 65–66).

Despite facing strong resistance from civilian groups in Jakarta and many other cities, the parliament eventually ratified the bill on 23 September 1999 and sent it to the president for final approval. The civil society organizations responded to the decision with massive demonstrations, which led to another bloody event. On 24 September 1999, thousands of protestors, in the majority students and NGO activists, and members of professional organizations, poured onto the streets in Indonesia's cities. In Jakarta, the masses marched toward the parliament building. The building was heavily guarded by security personnel, and violent clashes with the protestors broke out. By the end of the day, seven protestors were killed and scores of others wounded. Trying to avoid a further deterioration of the security situation, B.J. Habibie refused to sign the bill. The Indonesian legal framework stipulated that the passing of a state law required the signature of the president and the speaker of the parliament. To date, both the parliament and the government have not yet officially annulled this bill and its current status remains in limbo. In fact, rather than controlling the situation, some parties, especially NGOs, called this controversial legal draft as “riot-provoking bill” (Luwarso 2001: 83).

Another attempt of the government to regulate the “state of danger” in the *Reformasi* era was the drafting of a bill on national security. In accordance with the 2004–2009 national legislation program (*Program Legislasi Nasional*, Prolegnas), the Department of Defense formed a working committee¹¹ to draft a bill concerning state defense and security. The objective of this legislation was to differentiate between the state defense and security function. Such a differentiation would subsequently clarify

the authority and responsibility of each state agency involved in governing national security.¹²

In the process which followed, the Department of Defense changed the title of the bill from State Defense and Security to National Security. The aim was to expand the scope of the bill and also to avoid unnecessary semantic debate over its title (Prihatono et al. 2007: 223–225). The new bill on national security included seven dimensions of regulations: the dimension of national security, the creation of a national security council, levels of the states of emergency (“states of danger”), political and operational authority of the national security agencies, the hierarchy of policies in governing national security, rules of engagement for agencies in national security, and democratic oversight on national security governance. Hence, the new legislation on this matter might have helped provide an implementation procedure for article 7 of the constitution: solve inconsistencies in the existing related laws (especially, Law No. 2/2002 on National Police, Law No.3/2002 on State Defense and Law No. 34/2004 on the Armed Forces), and finally to fill any remaining legal loopholes in national security governance (Widjajanto and Keliat 2007: 22–23, 30). In regards to the state of emergency, the bill stated that the president with the parliament’s consent could declare a state of disaster emergency or state of danger in all, or parts of Indonesia’s territory. The president could declare the state of disaster emergency in a situation where natural or man-made disaster had deteriorated national stability, caused a great loss of human life, and crippled local government. In regards to the state of danger, the president could declare civil emergency, military emergency, or war in accordance with Law No. 23/Prp/1959 (Prihatono et al. 2007: 230–231).

Indeed, the legislation on national security was geared toward strengthening the state’s capacity to perform its security function. Ironically, the bill caused heated debates between the Department of Defense and the TNI headquarters *vis-à-vis*, to quote Widjajanto, “a coalition of anomaly,” consisting of the national police, the parliamentary commission on security,¹³ and NGOs (Widjajanto and Keliat 2007: 28). The source for the bitter debate were the legal provisions in the bill dealing with the organizational restructuring of the national security agencies, especially the idea to place the national police under a certain ministry, like the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The regulation on this aspect would force the national police to carry out another institutional restructuring, which might badly impact on its internal consolidation after its separation from the military in 1999. The second source of the

dispute was the possibility of military involvement in non-defense activities. This might expand the military authority into areas which had belonged to the police since the separation from the military. The last source of debate was the possibility of military deployment during emergencies without prior authorization from civilian authority. This point, in particular, raised public suspicion that the bill on national security was just another trick of the military to regain its absolute power and restore authoritarian repression (Widjajanto and Keliat 2007: 27–29). Some elements in society—especially Human Rights NGOs—did oppose the bill but the national police orchestrated the fiercest protest against it. The president, the supreme holder of state authority, never made any conclusive decision addressing the conflict. He preferred to ask the parties involved to “cool down” and “stop every debate” on the legislation concerning national security.¹⁴ In the most recent development, the government submitted the latest draft of the national security bill to the parliamentary special commission on this legislation on 23 October 2012.¹⁵ Since then, however, similar to the previously mentioned bill on the Management of Emergency Situations (RUU PKB), its status remains in limbo.

Since the legislation process regarding the management of emergency situations and national security has come to a dead end, the legal framework for the declaration of martial law currently rests on four existing laws: the amended constitution 1945, Law No. 23/Prp/1959 on emergency situation, Law No. 3/2002 on state defense, and Law No. 34/2004 on the armed forces.

Article 12 of the constitution stipulates that “the President may declare a state of emergency. The conditions for such a declaration and the subsequent measures regarding a state of emergency shall be regulated by law.”¹⁶ Article 14 of the law concerning state defense, as well as Article 17 and 18 of the law on the armed forces, further regulate presidential authority on the use of the armed forces. These two articles stipulated the relationship between the president and the parliament in deploying forces, the presidential authority and responsibility concerning the military deployment during the state of emergency, and the objectives of military deployment. Accordingly, the president has the authority and responsibility for the use of military forces, but only with the legislature’s agreement. In a situation when the country is facing an imminent armed or military threat, the president has the right to immediately deploy the military. However, the president is obliged to report to the legislature within forty-eight hours after the instruction for deployment is made. In a situation where

the legislature refuses to give its agreement, the president must abort the deployment of the forces.¹⁷ Meanwhile the longstanding Law No. 23/Prp/1959 essentially classifies each emergency into levels of intensity and stipulates the levels of emergency situation and the administrators for each emergency situation, together with the authority they fall under.

Despite facing such legal limitations, the first three post-Suharto presidents did declare martial law. Following the horrific riots, which broke out after the 30 August 1999 referendum in East Timor, President B.J. Habibie declared a state of military emergency to restore security in the area based upon Law No. 23/Prp/1959 (Syahnakri 2013: 215). By 7 September 1999, the Martial Law Commander Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri¹⁸ received the authority to supervise all military, police, and civilian operations in the area. Syahnakri did not take command until 9 September when authority was transferred to him by the commander of territorial garrison, Kodam IX/Udayana (Syahnakri 2013: 219). However, the presidential declaration on martial law brought around 15,000 troops into East Timor and substantially increased overall security power. Yet as B.J. Habibie arguably had no effective control over the military and most of the military personnel were against his idea to conduct a referendum, the imposition of martial law failed to bring about any positive impact. B.J. Habibie finally issued Presidential Decree No. 112/1999 to revoke martial law and subsequently gave an authorization to Australian-led international peace-keeping troops (International Force for East Timor, Interfet), which landed in East Timor on 20 September 1999 (Hosen 2010: 271; Robinson 2003: 25, 254; Syahnakri 2013: 237). Apart from the turmoil in East Timor, the military headquarters during B.J. Habibie's tenure also launched a military offensive called the Operation Authority Task Force 99 (*Operasi Satgas Wibawa 99*) in February 1999 to respond to the stepping up of separatist attacks in Aceh (for details, see Chap. 5).

President Wahid made two declarations of martial law during his tenure. The first time, he passed Presidential Decree No. 88/2000 to impose the state of civil emergency in the Moluccas based upon Law No. 23/Prp/1959. Under this decree, the government's extraordinary measures began on 27 June 2002 to solve the communal conflicts in the area. Provided with the authority as the Administrator of Civil Emergency (*Penguasa Darurat Sipil*, PDS), Governor Saleh Latuconsina imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 1120) (for details see Chap. 6). The second time, Wahid imposed a "one-man-show" martial law in

response to his conflict with the parliament. Though he was regarded as a leading figure in civil society and enjoyed democratic credentials, Wahid was a common enemy for most of the other politicians during his short tenure as president. His leadership style reflected an authoritarian tendency, and his favoritism, which economically benefitted his close allies, made him a controversial actor. He was erratic too; he periodically threatened to jail his political opponents and made controversial statements on an almost daily basis. Even in his earliest weeks in office, Wahid had begun firing cabinet ministers, including those who came from coalition parties, and replacing them with his personal associates. He also interfered with legal processes and internal affairs of state-owned enterprises to support the interests of his financial supporters (Mietzner 2006: 27, 30). All in all, many Indonesians sympathized with the statements of the then-spokesperson of the MPR, Amien Rais, describing the presidential attitude as follows: “There are three mysteries in life: when they are going to die, the weather, and what their president is going to say or do next” (Emmerson 2000: 103).

Losing patience with Wahid’s leadership style, the members of parliament issued a memorandum in February 2001 to start an impeachment against the president. In May, the parliament issued the second memorandum on the possibility of dismissing Wahid if he failed to satisfactorily answer the parliament’s questions to him. In response, Wahid threatened to “freeze” the parliament, to declare an emergency, and to deploy the security forces to execute his order. Consequently, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (the then-Commander of the Armed Forces) made a public statement that the military would not support the president if he actually imposed martial law. Nevertheless, in order to prevent any possible harm against the president as the result of the political crisis at the time, Sutarto ordered Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu (the then-Commander of Kostrad) to mobilize his troops and army tanks around the presidential palace to ensure the president’s safety. Absurdly, Wahid perceived such a deployment of force as a sign of the military’s support. Similar to Sukarno’s action in 1959, Wahid eventually issued a presidential decree declaring martial law, but it failed to make an impact, and he lost his position. In 23 July 2001, in a special session of the MPR, all factions in the parliament voted to dismiss Wahid from power and appointed Megawati, the then vice-president, to replace him (Mietzner 2006: 30–31; 2009: 223; Rinakit 2005: 202, 204, 215).

During her presidential term, Megawati made three political decisions in order to cope with the emergency situation. First, when the government perceived the situation in the Moluccas was improving, Megawati passed Presidential Instruction No. 71/2003 to revoke the previously imposed martial law in the area. With this, the security situation in the Moluccas has effectively returned to normal since 15 September 2003. The second of Megawati's extraordinary decisions is in relation to terrorist bomb attacks in Indonesia. After 11 September 2001, the Indonesian government had to deal with external pressure, especially from the USA as it found "new interest in establishing counter-terrorism cooperation with Indonesia" (Mietzner 2009: 230). As the consequence, the Indonesian government should start drafting legislation on anti-terrorism. With this background, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights led the drafting process and submitted a bill on this subject just three months prior to the Bali Bombing in October 2002 (Sebastian 2006: 148). Since Indonesia did not have specific legislation concerning terrorism and parliament was on extended recess after the Bali Bombing, an extraordinary response had to be taken; the government issued two Government Regulations in lieu of Law (*Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, Perpu*). These were Government Regulations No. 1/2002 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism and Government Regulations No. 2/2002 on the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism in relation to the bombing incident in Bali. The Indonesian constitution provided the executive power to issue such a regulation during the state of emergency. However, the president had to seek parliamentary approval first. The parliament eventually approved it and incorporated the government regulations into law on 12 October 2002. Observers believed that this law concerning terrorism was supportive for democratization in the country for several reasons (Sebastian 2006: 153). First, it was sufficiently sensitive of not holding back the hard-gained public freedom of expression. Second, the law forbids discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, and race. Thus, one cannot be a subject of suspicion based solely on group membership. Third, the law protects the basic rights of alleged terrorists and their right to a fair trial. Fourth, the law does not propose any extra power or authority to any anti-terrorist-related security agencies. Finally, those in power cannot apply the law to detain anybody who expresses different views or supports a different ideology. Yet there is a weak point in the law, that is, its definition of terrorism which is too loose and can be used against a "broader spectrum of enemies" like separatist movements (Sebastian

2006: 153). The final of Megawati's extraordinary decisions was the declaration of a state of military emergency across Aceh to curb separatist movement in the province through Presidential Decree No. 28/2003. This decree became the legal basis for the military to launch the Integrated Operations (*Operasi Terpadu*) in 19 May 2003, the biggest military offensive since the annexation of East Timor in the mid-1970s (Nurhasim and Tyas 2006: 101). The next administration of President Yudhoyono revoked martial law in Aceh in 2005 (for details Chap. 5).

NOTES

1. O'Rourke (2002) provides a comprehensive account on how waning investor confidence massively undermined Indonesia's economy.
2. Such government's policies included, among others: widening the trading band of dollar-rupiah, applying a floating exchange rate policy, selling the government's dollar reserves, issuing a ban on loans for new land acquisition in the already oversaturated property market, planning austerity measures, cutting the liquidity reserve requirement, and the easing of money market rates (Henderson 1999: 121, 122, 124).
3. Public rumors and speculation on vice-presidential candidates at the time narrowed it down to four names: Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat from the military circle, and Harmoko and Ginandjar Kartasasmita from Golkar (O'Rourke 2002: 63).
4. The People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia (Indonesian: *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia*, MPR-RI) is part of the legislative branch in Indonesia's political system. Until the post-New Order constitutional amendments took effect in 2004, it was composed of the country's 500 members of the legislature, the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR), 353 representatives of so-called functional groups, and 147 delegates of local governments appointed by the President. Since 2004, it is a bicameral body, composed of the 500 members of the People's Representative Council (Indonesian: *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR—sometimes referred to as the House of Representatives) and the Regional Representative Council (Indonesian: *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, DPD).
5. For a detailed account of the contribution of the Indonesian legislative on the regime change and democratization, see Ziegenhain 2008.
6. For a comprehensive documentary of these events, see Tino Saroengallo's acclaimed film "Student Movement in Indonesia: They Forced Them to be Violent." Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjIGA8BU-Vw>, accessed on 13 May 2014.

7. For the extensive literature on military reform, see, inter alia, Honna 2003; Sebastian 2006; Mietzner 2006, 2009, 2011; Rüländ et al. 2013; Croissant et al. 2013; Heiduk 2011, 2014.
8. Indonesia's Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*—KPU). Available at http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42, accessed on 10 November 2013.
9. See for example O'Donnell et al. 1986: 42–54.
10. See for Indonesia's decentralization reforms, inter alia, Hadiz 2010; Crouch 2010; Holtzappel and Ramstedt 2009; Erb et al. 2005.
11. Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto (the then-Secretary General of Defense Strategy at the defense ministry) led the working group composed of around twenty mid-rank military officers (colonels and lieutenant colonels).
12. *Detik Finance*, available at <http://finance.detik.com/read/2005/08/11/135529/420464/10/tugas-dan-fungsi-tni-polri-akan-disinkronkan-dalam-ruu-hankam>, accessed on 8 October 2012.
13. In the Indonesian parliament, there are nine commissions, and this is Commission I on Defense, Foreign Affairs and Information.
14. *The Jakarta Post*, 23 April 2007.
15. *Kompas*, 23 October 2012.
16. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Article 12.
17. Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense, Article 14; Law No 34/2004 on the Indonesian Military, Article 17 and 18.
18. In the wake of civil war in East Timor, Kiki Syahnakri (a second lieutenant at the time) allowed the first wave of East Timorese refugees to enter Indonesia's territory in 1975. On 27 September 1999 Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri handed over the authority in East Timor to the Interfet Commander, Maj. Gen. Peter Cosgrove, which marked Indonesia's permanent departure from the province (da Cruz in Syahnakri, 2013: xli; Syahnakri 2013: 262; interview with Kiki Syahnakri, Jakarta, 26 March 2013).

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Securitization and Desecuritization Dynamics in the Aceh Separatist Movement

In this chapter, I examine the case of Aceh during Indonesia's democratic transition to explore how the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization occurred in the face of the separatist movement. This conflict was the longest separatist movement in the history of independent Indonesia. Altogether, the Acehnesse liberation struggle lasted for forty years. In terms of fatalities, the case of Aceh demonstrated a high level of violence; during the whole period, between 10,000 and 30,000 people were killed (Crisis Management Initiative 2012: 9; Amnesty International 2013: 9; Pergub Aceh No. 70/2012: 62).

Lastly, the 2003 military operation in Aceh was one of Indonesia's largest military operations, second only to the annexation of East Timor in 1976. To gain more insight into the case at hand, I start this chapter by providing basic figures and general information on Aceh, a historical account of separatism in the province, and how the separatist movement reoccurred in the post-1998 political transition. Next, I frame the Aceh conflict in the context of securitization. In the next two sections, I will provide a detailed analysis on how desecuritization unfolded in Aceh.

I BACKGROUND ON ACEH AND THE HISTORY OF SEPARATISTS MOVEMENT

Home to thirteen native ethnic groups,¹ the province of Aceh is located on the western tip of Indonesia, on Sumatra Island. The total number of

population is more than five million people, all of whom live on an area of 5000 km², which is comprised of twenty-three cities and regencies.² The major local revenue comes from the agricultural sector which contributes 26.90 percent of the regional domestic income. Quite surprisingly for an area rich in oil and gas, only 7.51 percent of the regional domestic output comes from the energy sector. Even though agriculture drives the local economy, average property ownership remains low, at only 0.25–0.6 hectare per family. The overall Acehese general economic figures are also below the national average. With a GDP per capita in the year 2012 (excluding oil and gas, in constant prices) of Rp. 6,718,952 (US\$572), a total of 19.57 percent of the Acehese are still living below poverty line, compared to the national average of 12.49 percent. Similarly, the unemployment rate in Aceh is 7.43 percent, versus the national rate (6.14 percent). Lastly, only 44 percent of Acehese went to institutions of higher education in 2010. This figure places Aceh thirtieth out of thirty-four provinces in Indonesia in terms of the ability of students to move on to higher education (Pergub Aceh No. 70, 2012: 37–9, 42).

In Indonesia, Aceh is famous for three characteristics: its natural resources, religion, and nationalism (Pérez 2009). Aceh is a potentially rich region with important reserves of minerals, timber, oil, gas, and marine resources, which have enabled the province to become one of the major contributors to Indonesia's economy for many years. Secondly, the Acehese are highly acknowledged for their strong adherence to Islamic teaching.³ In Indonesia, the province is called the “Veranda of Mecca.” This name refers to the historical narrative that Aceh was the first entry point of Islam, brought by the Arabs, Persians, and Indians of Gujarat, before it spread out to the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. Aceh was the home of the first Islamic sultanate in Indonesia, Juempa, which was established in the eighth century. Since then, and especially with the establishment of Samudera Pasai, the first Islamic sultanate in Southeast Asia, in the thirteenth century, the region has been the primary port for the *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca for centuries. As for the nationalistic trait, the Acehese have long been known for their culture of resistance against external rule and influence (Sukma 2004: 1). In the 1520s, the Acehese fought a war against the Portuguese.⁴ Later on, they fought a war against the Dutch colonial power starting in 1873.⁵ It took some thirty years before the Dutch could defeat the resistance fighters and start controlling the region (Makarim 2005: 330).

In modern times this tradition of resistance has continued, as the dispute over Aceh's political status within the Indonesian state has been a constant since the early days of the country's independence.⁶ On 15 October 1945, Acehese Islamic leaders (*ulama*) stated on behalf of all Acehese that all elements of Acehese society were united in support of the leadership of President Sukarno. However, not all elements in Acehese society agreed with the Islamic leaders' decision and they were divided into two camps. The first camp, led by the first Governor of Aceh, Teuku Nyak Arif, pledged to remain supportive of the president. The second camp, led by local leader Teuku Muhammad Daud Cumbok, demanded for Aceh to become an independent state. The dispute between these two camps resulted in a local civil war, known as Cumbok War (1945–1946). A further conflict erupted in the aftermath of the declaration of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia*, PDRI) on 19 December 1948. In regard to this conflict, the head of East Sumatra State, Teuku Mansyur, proposed three alternatives: the establishment of a Sumatran state, the establishment of an Acehese state, and to remain a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Teuku Daud Beureuh, in his capacity as the military governor of Aceh, decided that Aceh would remain part of Indonesia (Bhakti 2008: 10–11).

However, the Acehese disappointment with Jakarta reached its peak in January 1951, when the central government decided to integrate Aceh into the East Sumatra province. There are three main sources of Acehese grievances related to this decision. The first one was that the majority of Acehese believed that they deserved to have their own province as a reward for their fierce struggle against Dutch colonialism and for their strong support of the Indonesian state from the very beginning.⁷ Secondly, as the majority of Acehese were Muslim, they felt that Jakarta was being unfair to integrate Aceh into the predominantly Christian East Sumatra. The last source of disappointment was that Jakarta's integration plan went against Sukarno's promise from his visit on 16 June 1948, when he pledged to provide Aceh with special autonomy and freedom to establish Islamic (*Syari'ah*) Law. On 21 April 1953, Acehese leaders jointly expressed their feelings publicly during a national congress of Indonesian Muslim leaders (*ulama*) in Medan. After the congress, Teuku Daud Beureuh declared the formation of *Darul Islam* (House of Islam) in Aceh which aimed for an autonomous Aceh within a wider Islamic state of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*—NII).⁸ This group began a revolt in

which local leaders under the *ulama*, local community members, the police, and the army participated (Bhakti 2008: 11–2; Aspinall 2005: 2; Sujatmiko 2012: 1).

To deal with the Teuku Daud Beureuh-led *Darul Islam* revolt in Aceh, the central government came up with an integrated strategy of a military operation and a political solution. To curb the armed group in the revolt, Jakarta launched a military offensive under the nickname Operation August 17 (*Operasi 17 Agustus*). On the political side, the central government granted amnesty for the supporters of *Darul Islam*. Under such approaches, the government finally managed to control the situation in Aceh by 1957, yet the stability was short-lived. When civilian and military leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi declared the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (the generals are: (1) Tri Sutrisno, the former Commander of the Indonesian Republic (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*, PRRI) and Universal Struggle Charter (*Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam*, Permesta) to challenge the national leadership, the Acehnese leaders also joined forces with the movement. In order to convince the Acehnese to withdraw their support for PRRI/Permesta, the central government issued a decree on 16 May 1959, which stipulated the special autonomous status of Aceh regarding religion, customary law (*adat*), and educational affairs. In general, the central government managed to bring the situation in Aceh under control by 1959, although some elements continued to fight until 1962 (Bhakti 2008: 12–3; Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 5; Schulze 2004: 2).

In the New Order era, Suharto never removed the special status from Aceh but it was also never seriously implemented, which once again created local resentment toward Jakarta. There was, therefore, a threefold process that encouraged Acehnese rebellion during the Suharto era: (1) the administrative centralization; (2) a widespread violation of human rights particularly in Aceh; and (3) the exploitation of natural, oil, gas, marine and timber resources from Aceh, which did not lead to more prosperity for the people (Pérez 2009: 21–22). Based on these reasons, Teuku Muhammad Hasan di Tiro (from here onward: Hasan Tiro) declared the independence of Aceh on 4 December 1976. To this end, Hasan Tiro⁹ and his closest allies formed an organization to free Aceh (*Aceh Merdeka*) on 20 May 1977. In the early 1980s, to quote Drexler, “under the Indonesian military threat perception system, the G for *Gerakan*, movement, was added to *Aceh Merdeka*” (Drexler 2007: 976). From then on, Hasan Tiro’s struggle was known as *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM). Unlike

Daud Beureuh's *Darul Islam* movement with its aspiration for the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia without necessarily separating from Indonesia, GAM explicitly sought the formation of a completely independent state.

The violent conflict between GAM and the government of Indonesia occurred in three periods: the period from 1976 to 1979, the period from 1989 to 1998, and the period from 1998 to 2005. In the first period, GAM was merely a tiny group comprising of only seventy intellectuals which mainly came from Hasan Tiro's hometown of Pidie. By 1979, however, the government succeeded in curbing the GAM struggle militarily and forcing Hasan Tiro into exile in Sweden. In his exile, Hasan Tiro and a few other GAM members continued their struggle and established GAM's military wing (*Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, AGAM).

The second period of GAM's struggle began with the returning of around 1000 GAM members to Aceh during the second half of the 1980s, after receiving military training in Libya, Mindanao (south Philippines), and Afghanistan. Some deserting military and police personnel in Aceh also joined GAM, which further improved the rebels' military strength (Schulze 2004). Unlike in the first period, during this period GAM had transformed itself into a people's liberation movement and began attacking Indonesia's military bases and police stations across Aceh. To deal with this situation, Jakarta launched a military offensive called Operation Red Net (*Operasi Jaring Merah*) in 1990 and Aceh unofficially became a military operation area (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM). Even though the Operation Red Net significantly reduced the number of GAM attacks and forced its members into the underground or to flee the country, GAM never entirely vanished due to three factors. Firstly, GAM leaders remained safe in exile and continued their campaign; secondly, many GAM commanders and members managed to leave Indonesia and found asylum abroad, especially in Malaysia; and finally, the indiscriminate use of force during the military operation gave birth to a new generation of GAM members who sought revenge for their family members (Bhakti 2008; Schulze 2004). The New Order regime never revoked Operation Red Net until Suharto finally stepped down from power in May 1998. The resignation of Suharto, however, marked the development of the next period of conflict between the government of Indonesia and GAM.

The primary focus of this study is the period between 1998 and 2005. The political change at the national level in 1998 presented GAM with the opportunity to grow from a small, armed organization with an intellectual

vanguard into a popular resistance movement, and to pose an ever greater challenge to the Indonesian state. The source for GAM's re-emergence, to quote Sukma, "can be grouped into four basic aspects: economic exploitation; centralism and uniformity; military repression; and the politics of impunity" (Sukma 2004: 3).

The first cause was economic inequality (Tiwon 2000: 98). As previously stated, Aceh is a region with valuable natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and timber. In 1992, it was reported that Aceh provided 15 percent of Indonesia's total exports, and in 2003 the oil and gas fields were estimated to generate US\$1.2–1.5 billion annually. However, despite the natural wealth in 2002 it was reported that Aceh was the poorest province in Sumatra and the second poorest in Indonesia.¹⁰ The second source of GAM's re-emergence was the New Order regime's obsession with the concept of national unity, which forced uniformity on the whole country, in spite of the pluralistic character of Indonesia, which had negative consequences for local identity. The third source was the excessive military repression. Due to massive human rights abuses and the politics of repression exercised by the military, Barber states that "any tolerance of Indonesian rule was almost entirely extinguished" (Barber 2000: 36). The final cause was the politics of impunity. The central government's inability or unwillingness to bring those responsible for human rights abuse to trial obviously contributed to unprecedented levels of disappointment among Acehnese (Sukma 2004: 5). In addition to these causes, Drexler posits the interesting argument that in the post-1998 period the separatists' emergence in Aceh was the result of a "conflict among the state security forces, renegade elements of those forces, remnants of the rebel forces, and corrupt and ruthless opportunists. [Hence,] the Indonesian military and GAM were as much collaborators as opponents in the protracted conflict" (Drexler 2007: 987–988).

2 ACEH SECURITY PROBLEM IN SECURITIZATION CONTEXT

In accordance with the framework for analysis found in Chap. 2, I divide the discussion on the Indonesian act of securitization in its relation to the Aceh conflict into three parts. In the first part, I will frame the conflict of Aceh as a security issue in the context of securitization theory based upon the pertinent analytical categories of *existential threat*, *referent object*, *emergency situation*, and *extraordinary measure*. In the second part, I will

analyze the government's decision to securitize the conflict of Aceh in order to go beyond normal politics and deal with the separatist threat in an emergency mode. This analysis will make a reference to four securitization variables, namely *securitizing actors*, *speech acts*, *audience*, and *facilitating conditions*. In the last part, I will evaluate the effectiveness of Jakarta's securitization act in order to end the conflict.

2.1 *Existential Threat, Referent Object, and Emergency Situation*

When B. J. Habibie became the president in May 1998, GAM was at its weakest point both politically and militarily. However, GAM began to pose an existential threat which led to an emergency situation by stepping up the insurgency since late 1998. This increased level of threat was due to the rebels' disappointment with the unfulfilled promises of the new government and with the military's distrustful attitude,¹¹ as well as their attempt to exploit Indonesia's vulnerabilities in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis and regime change in the national polity. For example, on 2 November 1998, encouraged by a few members of GAM, hundreds of youths in Kandang, a Northern Aceh district, carried out a raid, burned the Indonesian flag, and tortured two military members. In response, twenty-three people were arrested by the military in the area. On 15 November 1998, a state-owned radio station (RRI) was burned and the police arrested some forty-three civilians accused of aiding the escape of the perpetrators. On 29 December, a group of GAM members abducted and later executed seven military personnel. GAM also attacked and intimidated non-Acehnese citizens, especially Javanese settlers (Sukma 2004: 17). Hence, the existential threat could not be denied and the source of the threat, to quote Drexler, "came from people claiming to speak in the name of GAM" (Drexler 2007: 965).

Furthermore, B.J. Habibie's offer of a referendum for the East Timorese also provided more momentum for the Acehnese. Alongside GAM's campaign for independence, Acehnese students, human rights activists, youth activists, and religious leaders from hundreds of organizations held a "Congress of Student and Youth of Aceh" in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh from 31 January to 4 February 1999. The Congress reached the conclusion that "Acehnese youth and students were left no alternative but to fight for an UN-monitored referendum on Acehnese self-determination" (Miller 2009: 31–32). In response, the Congress formed

an Aceh Referendum Information Center (*Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh*, SIRA). Although GAM fought for independence and SIRA wanted a referendum, both parties found enough common ground to work together and succeeded in advocating for the general Acehnese public. While GAM chose to use violent means, SIRA mostly engaged the wider population by organizing mass rallies or by demanding that people did not show up for work and simply stay at home. SIRA's proposal for a referendum, in essence, was a political strategy in order to secure the Acehnese's support for independence. For this, SIRA actively campaigned and urged the Acehnese to vote for independence if such a referendum was ever to be held. The effectiveness of SIRA's strategy became evident as a survey uncovered that 56 percent of the Acehnese preferred a referendum in June 1999 (Miller 2009: 31–32). GAM's armed rebellion movements together with SIRA's non-coercive strategy led to a situation where state bureaucrats and officials were totally absent in GAM-controlled areas, which prevented the state from carrying out its functions and, in sum, created a vacuum of power in the state authority (Miller 2009: 28).

When Abdurrahman Wahid replaced B.J. Habibie in October 1999, GAM had already filled the vacuum of power through various activities like collecting of "state tax" (*pajak nanggroe*), the registering of land sales, the issuing identity cards, and by providing marriage certificates (Miller 2009: 81). The increased number of terror acts against the civilian population, especially in the countryside, included extortion, theft, looting, arson attacks and mysterious killings (*pembunuhan misterius*, *petrus*) against suspected military local spies (*cuak*) or operational assistance staff (*tenaga pembantu operasi*, TPO). Most disturbing, though, was the killing of Acehnese community leaders. The victims of these killings included university rectors, local legislators, and leaders of political parties.¹² Hence Aceh had emerged as Indonesia's most troublesome area during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidential term. In June 2001, GAM controlled approximately 80 percent of Aceh's villages (Schulze 2004: 35). When Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced Abdurrahman in late July 2001, the situation in Aceh had gone from bad to worse and it seemed there was no other alternative for the central government than the use of extraordinary measures (Miller 2009: 107).

2.2 *Extraordinary Measures*

Even though the security situation during Megawati Sukarnoputri's tenure was at its lowest point, the use of extraordinary measures in form of

the deployment of security troops had been visible since B.J. Habibie presidency. The first security operation in Aceh during B.J. Habibie's presidency was Operation Authority Taskforce 99 (*Operasi Satgas / Satuan Tugas Wibawa 99*, OSW 99). The initiative for this operation came from the commander of Lilawangsa military base (*Komando Resort Militer*, Korem), Col. Johny Wahab. It had received an endorsement from Gen. Wiranto, the then-Minister of Defense and Security and the Commander of the Armed Forces. The objective of OSW 99 was to provide support for the Indonesian national police by enforcing law and order in Aceh.¹³ OSW 99 lasted only for one month¹⁴ and was replaced by Operation Dagger Awareness (*Operasi Sadar Rencong*, OSR), which was implemented in three waves. During the OSR, the Indonesian government also deployed the newly formed anti-riot squad (*Pasukan Penindak Rusuh Massa*, PPRM) in Aceh on 7 May 1999. In August 1999, the Indonesian government launched OSR II which added a further 6186 police personnel and 5000 military troops to the forces in Aceh. Together with the already stationed personnel, the total number of security forces was raised to 32,000 troops (Miller 2009: 38; Yamin 2003, Sukma 2004).

Under Abdurrahman Wahid's government, Jakarta replaced OSR II with OSR III, whose objective was to capture about 800 armed civilians in Aceh. In March 2000, Abdurrahman Wahid issued an order to replace OSR III with Operation Love the Mosque I (*Operasi Cinta Meunasah*, OCM I).¹⁵ With the launching of OCM I, the Indonesian government sought to shift the harsh nature of security operation to a more gentle one, in order to improve the image of the state security forces and the authority of the government in the eyes of Acehnese (Miller 2009: 73). On 9 February 2001, Jakarta replaced OCM I with a more offensive OCM II. Although the OCM was formally under the command of the national police,¹⁶ the operation also gained support from 6000 Indonesian troops (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI). The official explanation for the military involvement in OCM was that the police did not have sufficient training and enough manpower to handle GAM's guerilla campaign (Miller 2009: 83). On 11 March, the Wahid administration issued the Presidential Instruction (*Instruksi Presiden*, Inpres) No. 4/2001 concerning comprehensive steps designed to resolve the Aceh problem. In this framework, Jakarta proposed an integrated solution for Aceh which combined a counterinsurgency campaign against GAM with social, political, and economic programs and a special autonomy. Under this decree, the central government launched a new Operation for Restoring Security and Upholding the

Law (*Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum*, OKPH). Under OKPH, Jakarta's objectives were to eliminate some 3000 GAM combatants and to force the rebels to accept Jakarta's offer of special autonomy (Sukma 2004). For operational purposes, the military formed an Operation Implementation Command (*Komando Pelaksana Operasi*, Kolakops) which functioned alongside the national police's Operation Controlling Command (*Komando Pengendali Operasi*, Kodalops) in Aceh. Under these two operational centers, the national police personnel carried out law enforcement operations in Aceh's urban areas, while the military and the national police's paramilitary troops (Mobile Brigade, Brimob) conducted counterinsurgency operations in the rural areas and the navy and air force battalions blockaded the Malacca Straits in order to cut off GAM's weapons supply from Malaysia and southern Thailand (Miller 2009: 87). From a baseline of 5000 to 6000 regular police and 4000 to 5000 troops, the government deployed some 25,000 troops to Aceh by April 2001 (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 104). As a result, the structure of security forces in Aceh was reorganized, with both the national police and the military commander in Aceh given equal responsibility of the operations.

Megawati Sukarnoputri's government issued Presidential Instruction No. 7/2001 to extend the implementation of OKPH for another four months, with the reasoning that the operation was still needed to maintain peace.¹⁷ Through the OKPH, the government's military campaign had succeeded in breaking up GAM units into isolated bands by the beginning of 2002 (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 105). However, repeated armed clashes between the government's troops and GAM rebels still continued. In fact, around this period, rebel hopes were high that Aceh would soon secede from Indonesia; in one popular slogan from those days, independence was *sebatang rokok lagi*—only “a cigarette away” (Aspinall 2005: 9).

The government's major securitization act to combat Acehese rebels occurred when Megawati Sukarnoputri signed Presidential Instruction No. 28/2003, following the advice of the military commander, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and the then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.¹⁸ With this decree, Jakarta declared a state of military emergency and imposed martial law in Aceh. Following this, the then-Presidential Military Secretary, Tb. Hasanuddin, announced the launching of Integrated Operation (*Operasi Terpadu*),¹⁹ whose political goal was to resolve the Aceh problem by attaining two specific objectives: to combat some 5251 GAM members who were armed with 2000

weapons,²⁰ and to curb Acehese support for independence by “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”²¹ The military operation was officially launched on 19 May 2003 and it was the largest Indonesian military operation since the annexation of East Timor in 1975.²² While this operation was initially intended to last for just six months, by early November 2003 the government had stated it would be extended for another six months. On 14 May 2004, Megawati Sukarnoputri signed Presidential Instruction No. 43/2004 to downgrade Aceh’s emergency status to a state of civil emergency. Yet the *Operasi Terpadu* continued into the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, which began in October 2004. On 18 November, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono extended the state of civil emergency for another six-month period. By early 2005, there were some 50,000 Indonesian security personnel stationed in Aceh, the highest number since 1998 (Miller 2009: 157). In order to understand the process of those securitization acts, we need to look at the variables of securitization.

2.3 *Securitizing Actors and Speech Act*

The Indonesian military officers became the dominant securitizing actors in the case of separatist conflict in Aceh. During B.J. Habibie’s tenure, the Council for Security and Law Enforcement (*Dewan Penegak Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum*, DPKSH)²³ constantly urged the government to securitize the worsening situation in Aceh and employ extraordinary measures. This is shown by the Council for Security and Law Enforcement’s endorsement of Wiranto’s proposal to establish a special security squad as a riot prevention task force and as the instrument to respond to security disturbances in Aceh (and other conflict areas). Wiranto, in his capacity as the Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Armed Forces, would naturally become another major securitizing actor. In a public statement or speech act, he announced the postponement of the troop withdrawal after riots broke out in Lhokseumawe in late August to early September 1998. The then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Faisal Tanjung, was another main securitizing actor. For instance, during his speech in the Indonesian national parliament’s (the People’s Representative Council, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) plenary session in mid-1999, he proposed to impose martial law in Aceh. As we have understood a securitization speech act as the utterance of warning by securitizing actors and also how securitization is completed when such warning finally comes into

effect, most of the securitization moves were completed during B.J. Habibie's term. Wiranto succeeded in postponing the troop withdrawal and the Council for Security and Law Enforcement's suggestion went into effect, as Jakarta deployed PPRM personnel in Aceh, although Faisal Tanjung's attempt at imposing martial law did not come to effect. By pushing this idea though, Faisal Tanjung had initiated a new and tougher discourse regarding the Aceh conflict.

During Abdurrahman Wahid's tenure, the role of securitizing actors became more intense. The national police chief at the time, Roesmanhadi, required the government to impose "limited martial law" in Aceh. He argued that the security situation in Aceh was increasingly worsening beyond the capacity of the national police, especially as they were not trained to counter GAM's guerilla strategy (Miller 2009: 72). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who then served as the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, also played a major role as a securitizing actor. In his speech for instance, he urged the GAM to obey the law and stop attacking Indonesian security personnel, otherwise the government would not hesitate to administer stern measures toward law-breakers. Endriartono Sutarto, the then-Army Chief of Staff, made a statement that his troops would continue carrying out their task as long as Aceh presented an increasing threat to the Indonesian state. Even the then-Minister of Defense, Mahfud M.D., the first civilian who had held this position in decades, also occasionally played a role as one of the securitizing actors. For instance, he mentioned in one of his speeches that the military would be able to end the conflict if the government took firm and forceful measures for a short period of time. With such measures, he opined, the government would convince the rebels that dialog was the best way to solve the problem in Aceh (Miller 2009: 83).

Most legislators also began to play a role as securitizing actors, as they generally discarded any attempt to negotiate with the GAM. The number of these politicians was quite significant since, "Megawati's Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan*, PDI-P), Suharto's old Golkar Party, and the appointed military and police representatives occupied more than 60 percent of the seats" (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 2–3). In sum, through securitization speech acts during Abdurrahman Wahid's tenure, again, most of Jakarta's securitization moves were completed, as evidenced by the implementation of OSR II and III, as well as OCM I and II. To his credit, Abdurrahman Wahid rejected Roesmanhadi's limited martial law request (Miller 2009: 72).

However, the long awaited demand for the imposition of martial law in Aceh gained momentum in the next presidency.

During Megawati Sukarnoputri's tenure, most state officials had become securitizing actors and ultimately dominated the discourse on the government's policies toward Aceh. Apart from the security officials and cabinet ministers, now even Aceh's political leaders had become a part of securitizing actors. On one occasion, Megawati Sukarnoputri sent a delegation of thirteen ministers to Aceh, led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, to assess the latest development in the province. After returning to Jakarta, Yudhoyono stated on 22 August 2001 that GAM did not want peace. According to Yudhoyono, GAM was continuing its terror acts through a series of killings, bombings, and arson; hence he endorsed the extension of OKPH (Miller 2009: 107). Later on, in January 2002, Governor Abdullah Puteh led an Acehnese delegation to Jakarta and endorsed Wiranto's previous proposal (rejected by B.J. Habibie) for the re-establishment of an Aceh military command, Kodam Iskandar Muda.²⁴ The Acehnese delegation emphasized that Aceh needed its own military base due to the size of the province and its great distance from Jakarta. In the same vein, an Acehnese parliamentarian Nasir Jamil argued that the re-establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda would allow the military to fully control the defense and security affairs in Aceh and, thus, would reduce inter-security coordination problems in the province (Miller 2009: 113). On 9 January 2002, President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed an agreement for the command re-establishment.

On another occasion, Endriartono Sutarto, who had become the commander of the military, complained that the government could not effectively end the conflict in Aceh because martial law had yet to be implemented and the military only could support the national police, as long as it lacked further authority to address the threat from GAM (Miller 2009: 108). With the worsening situation in Aceh, even a political moderate like Hasan Wirayuda, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, occasionally turned into a securitizing actor. For instance, on one occasion he stated that if Aceh:Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement (GAM) continued its acts of terror, then the government would not hesitate to deploy a stern and measured military response (Miller 2009: 111). Through these securitization speech acts, all of the securitization moves in regard to the Aceh conflict during the Megawati Sukarnoputri government were completed, as exemplified through the reinstatement of the

military command and the extension of OKPH. The culmination of all these securitization moves occurred when Megawati Sukarnoputri signed a decree to impose a state of military emergency in Aceh.²⁵

2.4 Audience

The above examples of securitization speech acts show that the illocutionary type of speech act is the most appropriate one. In Chap. 2, the illocutionary act was defined as meaning to take action through words, and the speech acts in the case of Aceh take a firm, stern stance (in other words, extraordinary measures) by essentially saying that the GAM was a threat to the unity of the Indonesian state. By calling the GAM a threat, it enabled the concept of “NKRI” (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*) to regain momentum and allowed the military to step in as the defender of this concept. As the GAM became more assertive in its armed insurgent movement, the military leadership reemphasized that the existence of the “NKRI” was undeniable and non-negotiable (Bhakti et al. 2009: 10; Nainggolan 2011: 317). Though the military first reintroduced the “NKRI” concept, the idea of preserving Indonesia’s geographical integrity became part of the general discourse of the general public. What had initially emerged as a military slogan, had now massively diffused “in the civilian realm, with party politicians, government officials, the media, and even the civil society organizations integrating the term ‘NKRI’ into their daily vocabulary” (Mietzner 2009: 228). Hence, the invocation of “NKRI” once again reflected Indonesia’s “hypersensitive” character, “especially when it concerns perceived threat[s] to [the] national integrity” (Elson 2008: 331). Therefore, “the introduction of ‘NKRI’ as a dominant political theme in democratic polity” (Mietzner 2009: 228) implies that the military attempted to reclaim its former role in security policy-making and implementing in the country.

Against this backdrop, the state officials’ speeches on security policy for Aceh, such as the postponement of the withdrawal of troops and the suggestion for the extension of OKPH, perfectly aligns with the declarative type of illocutionary acts. The speech act on issues like the need to restore the *Kodam Iskandar Muda* military command, the suggestion to impose martial law, and creating a limited martial law, match the definition of the directive type of illocutionary acts. The speech acts related to the possibility of the government administering coercive measures (if, for instance, GAM continued violating the law and resorting to terrorism or if the

Acehnese presented increasing threats) are in accordance with commissive and assertive types of illocutionary acts. The securitizing actors identified in this chapter also support the claim that they are the ones who have the official capacity to decide on the use of extraordinary measures in dealing with separatist movements in Aceh. By and large, the securitizing actors in the B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri presidencies succeeded in convincing their audiences to allow the securitization acts to come into effect. The government's securitization moves in the case of Aceh also support my framework of analysis which stipulates that the different contexts of a security situation are geared toward different audiences. The first example was Wiranto's proposal to reinstate *Kodam Iskandar Muda*, which focused on President B.J. Habibie as the main audience of securitization. In the second example, the securitization move to impose martial law, initiated by Faisal Tanjung and Roesmanhadi, made the DPR and president Abdurrahman Wahid the audiences. The next example was the Acehnese's initiative for securitization, which endorsed Wiranto's previous proposal for the reinstatement of the military command in Aceh. On this occasion, the Acehnese delegation targeted President Megawati Sukarnoputri and the legislators as their audiences.

A more interesting example of the audience for securitizing the Aceh conflict occurred abroad. While giving a post-9-11 speech in Washington, Megawati Sukarnoputri labeled GAM as terrorists, since the rebels continued their bombing campaign against Indonesian state targets. On this occasion, Megawati played her role as a securitizing actor when she attempted to convince the US government as the audience and secure the support from them for Jakarta's security measures in Aceh. Those examples show that the audiences of securitization are those who need to be persuaded and convinced by securitizing actors in order to gain their official acceptance or agreement before launching extraordinary measures. In the case of securitization in the Aceh conflict, the audiences were parliamentarians, presidents, members of cabinets who held different views than the securitizing actors about the best solution to the conflict, and to a certain degree, foreign governments. Finally, there is no clear-cut distinction between securitizing actors and their audience; they can switch roles according to the time and situation.

2.5 *Facilitating Conditions*

As far as the role of the general public is concerned, I argue that its position on the Aceh conflict was more like one of the facilitating conditions

for Jakarta's securitization acts and it played less of a role as an audience. The public, in general, does not have a direct channel in order to carry out a securitization act. At best, the public's general perception on a certain issue can influence the securitization decision-making process within official state bodies.

The first facilitating condition was that the perception of the Indonesian public toward the conflict in Aceh shifted significantly. In the early period of democratization, the majority of Indonesians showed deep sympathy to the situation and regarded the Acehnese people as victims of the New Order's repressive and unfair policies. However, this perception changed dramatically by the end of 1999 and the majority of Indonesians perceived the Acehnese as "troublemakers who had abused (*sic*) their special treatment by Jakarta" (Miller 2009: 83). A survey related to the Aceh conflict reported in December 2000 that 80 percent of 571 respondents in ten Indonesian provinces agreed that separatism should be rejected, but 65 percent of respondents still felt that dialog was the best way to find solutions. A month later, another survey uncovered a significant change in that most of its respondents favored coercive measures to end the Aceh conflict. This time, 69 percent of respondents supported a government military operation in Aceh, and only 29 percent opposed it (Miller 2009: 83). The change in public perception on the situation in Aceh and the best strategy to deal with it is also related to other facilitating conditions for securitization.

The second facilitating condition for the securitization act in the case of the Aceh conflict was the fact that all three post-Suharto presidents did not enjoy strong legitimacy or political support of their leadership, whereas the military still remained one of the most powerful institutions in the new political landscape. President B.J. Habibie sought military support to enhance his political capital, especially when he approached Wiranto to be his running-mate in the presidential race in 1999 (Mietzner 2006, 2009). In the case of Abdurrahman Wahid, after announcing his agendas for the military reform in his early months in the office, he eventually had to secure the military's support in order to triumph over other civilian politicians in the political crisis. When Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced Wahid after he was impeached by the parliament, she attempted to "secure military support in case the political elite deserted her," and thereby endowed the military with "greater institutional autonomy and increased influence on security affairs" (Mietzner 2006: 34). Hence the political dynamics in Jakarta were the main facilitating conditions for the

securitization of the Aceh conflict, where the military officers were the ultimate securitizing actors and all civilian leadership was forced to secure their support.

From an analytical standpoint, the military's motive for securitization rests on the attempt to preserve two significant and defining principles: "birthright" and "competence" (Koonings and Kruijt 2002: 19–21). The birthright principle refers to the military's interpretation of its history, as it had "sacrificed so much to protect the nation" and without such sacrifices the nation "would not have been formed or survived" (Widjajanto 2007a: 22). The competence principle refers to the idea that the military is, in fact, the best institution to defend the nation and its interests. In Indonesia, these two principles are translated and perceived as the military's "self-created identity" and the military as "the guardian and the savior of the nation" (Widjajanto 2007b). In regard to the latter, particularly, the Indonesian armed forces had launched 249 military operations in the period between 1945 and 2004. These military operations mainly focused on attempts to safeguard the integrity of the state against threats like the war against armed separatist movements in the 1950s and in the 1980s to 1990s, as well as the war for incorporating Western Papua in the early 1960s and East Timor from 1976 to 1999 into Indonesia (Widjajanto 2010: 4, 19). Because of such a self-created image and Indonesia's war experience throughout the history, the military felt it natural to define itself as "the political army" (Finer 1962; Janowitz 1977; Widjajanto 2007a: 21), which would justify its omnipresence also in non-defense sectors, particularly in political and economic ones. Therefore, by playing an active role as the securitizing actors, intentionally or not, the military has maintained its political army character and its influence on the security policy-making process, as well as compromising the pace and scope of military reform. All this might lead to the observation that the military still sought to prolong the privilege which it had previously enjoyed also in the newly democratized polity.

The third facilitating condition for securitization acts in the case of Aceh conflict was, to quote Mietzner (2006), a "nationalist-unitarian renaissance" which began in the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency and grew increasingly stronger during the Megawati government. In fact, those who had always favored coercive measures found powerful positions in the three post-Suharto governments. These nationalist-unitarian groups constantly pushed forward the idea that the end of the Aceh conflict must begin with the annihilation of GAM. They were also skeptical that normal

political processes, like granting special autonomy status to Aceh, would end the conflict. On the contrary, they argued that too much autonomy would weaken the government's control on Aceh and the rebels would use it as an opportunity to push their separatist agenda forward. The fourth facilitating condition was the insufficient defense budget of the Indonesian state. Until the early 2000s, the government could only provide some 25–30 percent of the required defense budget (Sukma and Prasetyono 2003). This situation had forced the military to seek out independent financial sources, “which Aceh's war economy offered in abundance” (Miller 2009: 106).²⁶

The fourth and final facilitating condition stemmed from the external environment, specifically from the US-led global war on terror. In this war on terror, the Bush administration targeted Indonesia as it was the country with the largest Muslim population, and sought its support and cooperation by re-engaging with the Indonesian military. Prior to 9/11, the Indonesia–US security cooperation had declined since the early 1990s.²⁷ With all these facilitating conditions, we shall now see whether the act of securitization was effective in solving the conflict in Aceh.

2.6 *Evaluation of the Securitization of Aceh Conflict*

The proponents of securitization theory of the Copenhagen School leave out the possibility of evaluating a case of securitization as good or bad. To rephrase this in the context of the Aceh conflict, one could also ask whether or not securitization would eliminate the sources of separatism and restore stability in the province. There are two indicators which can be used to assess the effectiveness of an act of securitization: the degree of response must be reasonably equal to the threat magnitude, and the response must be aimed toward the threat. The first indicator is, however, debatable. It leaves open the question of the number of security personnel deployed on the ground, the weapon used in the operations, the number of captured or killed rebels, or anything else. On the other hand, the second indicator provides plausible grounds for the use of force against the GAM since all military operations were basically aimed at crushing the GAM's fighting capability and curbing separatist aspiration among the Acehnese. As GAM activities had led to the absence of an official authority, the absence of functioning governance, and the absence of law and order among the population, the central government had reasonable cause for its act of securitization, in order to exercise its sovereignty.

Until 2001, GAM managed to control a large area in Aceh. With its consecutive counterinsurgency campaigns, Indonesian security forces managed to reduce GAM control over Aceh to only 30–40 percent of the territory by early January 2002 (Miller 2009: 112). However, when Jakarta launched OSR III in February 2000, the aim was to capture about 800 armed civilians, but the estimated number of rebels must have grown in 2001 as the official objective of OKPH became to eliminate some 3000 GAM fighters. When the government eventually imposed a state of military emergency in 2003, it stated that there were 5251 GAM rebels. However, after a year of implementing *Operasi Terpadu*, an official statement pointed out that 5871 GAM members had been killed or captured. Further complications arose some days before the December 2004 tsunami struck, when the military announced that there were still around 2500 GAM rebels. After the successful Helsinki Peace Agreement in mid-2005, GAM officially declared the demobilization of its 3000 combatants (Miller 2009: 72, 76–77, 125, 154). Meanwhile, the civilian death toll in Aceh between 1999 and 2003 reached around 4000 fatalities, and no less than 430 security forces personnel had been killed (Miller 2009: 36, 84, 85, 112, 120; Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 51). With such contradictory figures of the actual number of GAM fighters, it clearly casts doubt on the magnitude of the threat posed by GAM rebels and the effectiveness of Jakarta's extraordinary measure taken against them. The doubtfulness of the effectiveness of securitization in Aceh caused several predicaments in the implementation of the extraordinary measures.

The main predicament was the lack of professionalism within Indonesia's security rank and file. This had led to the indiscriminate use of force and excessive human loss among civilians. Indeed, the implementation of Indonesian extraordinary measures failed to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese people, and instead boosted support for independence or a referendum among the population. For example, the Acehnese no longer held OCM (*Operasi Cinta Meunasah*, Operations Love the Mosques) in high regard, but colloquially referred to it as *Operasi Cari Musuh*, or "Operation Making Enemy" (Miller 2009: 82). In fact, the lack of professionalism of the Indonesian security troops was the primary cause of GAM's regeneration (Schulze 2004; Miller 2009: 185). Indeed, the *Operasi Terpadu* failed to achieve its objective,²⁸ the military operations failed to eliminate the problem in Aceh,²⁹ and the military operation was not strong enough to push the GAM back to the negotiation table.³⁰ At best, the use of extraordinary measures in Aceh had weakened the GAM's

fighting capability, which was only one among several crucial factors, which eventually brought GAM back to negotiations. Other factors were war-fatigue of GAM fighters, the disastrous tsunami of December 2004, and persuasion by the national leadership, most notably Jusuf Kalla, who successfully reached out to Acehese local figures.³¹

The second predicament was the government's failure to address the non-military issues, especially during the implementation of the *Integrated Operation*. The term "integrated" in the operation codename refers to the fact that the military operation was only one element, together with other non-military elements, in a wider framework to solve the Aceh conflict. Therefore, according to Maj. Gen. Endang Suryana, the Aceh Martial Law Administrator, one factor³² that led to the failure of the military operation was that "efforts toward improving the people's welfare did not work well" (Sukma 2004: 32). While in agreement with these arguments and critical about the effectiveness of the securitization strategy in the province, I argue that the Indonesian government had plausible grounds to move away from normal politics and shift into emergency mode when facing the threat of the separatist movement in Aceh. In this case, Jakarta's decision to securitize the conflict in Aceh was an exceptionality to deal with the emergency situation. However, the inherent predicament during the implementation of extraordinary measures further escalated violence on the ground. In other words, the act of securitization against the GAM was initially a response to the GAM's increasing threat, yet it turned out to be the trigger for the re-emergence of the Acehese resistance because of poor professionalism within the Indonesian security apparatus.

3 DESECURITIZING VIOLENT CONFLICT IN ACEH

My discussion on desecuritization in relation to the Aceh conflict will cover the variables of the desecuritization act and analyze the government's actions in order to desecuritize the conflict. The discussion on variables of desecuritization will present *desecuritizing actors*, *the desecuritizing speech act*, and *the audience for desecuritization and facilitating conditions* during conflict in Aceh. In the next section, I will continue with the analysis on desecuritization and will take into account the grounds of desecuritization, the desecuritization mechanism, the phases of desecuritization, and desecuritization outcomes. Throughout these two sections, I seek to present important factors which have contributed to the failure of desecuritization moves during the three immediate post-Suharto

governments, before they finally were successful under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency in 2005.

3.1 *Desecuritization Acts and Actors*

The initiative to desecuritize the conflict in Aceh occurred as soon as B.J. Habibie came to power in May 1998. He started this effort by sending two members of the National Commission of Human Rights (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, Komnas HAM) to Aceh on 4 June 1998, to investigate human rights violations in the province. Three months after his inauguration, B.J. Habibie also instructed Wiranto, the then-Minister of Defense and Security and concurrent Commander of the Armed Forces, to change the security discourse of the Aceh problem. With these instructions, Wiranto visited the North Aceh capital of Lhokseumawe in August 1998 and delivered a public speech. In his speech, Wiranto pledged to end DOM in Aceh, explained his plan for withdrawing troops, and apologized for past wrongdoings by the troops.³³ Perhaps, B.J. Habibie's most important desecuritization speech act occurred on 26 March 1999 during a public meeting in the Aceh capital of Banda Aceh. In his speech, B.J. Habibie apologized for government atrocities in the past, presented the government's new policy on Aceh, promised a proper re-burial for the victims who died during the DOM period, promised to employ the surviving victims as government employees and offered another 2188 job opportunities for families of victims, pledged to personally adopt Acehnese children who had become orphaned during the conflict, and pledged to grant amnesty to 562 Acehnese political prisoners (Miller 2009: 27, 40). These two speech acts, according to Drexler, "marked a crucial shift from a government policy of denying any responsibility for violence in Aceh and refusing to deal with citizens' demands" to the possibility of negotiations and the discussions of the roots of the people's resentment (Drexler 2007: 965). Next, B.J. Habibie issued Presidential Instruction No. 74/1999 concerning the formation of a Presidential Advisory Team on Aceh (*Tim Penasehat Presiden Urusan Aceh*, TPPUA).

Even though the security situation in Aceh had been increasingly worsening since 1999, B.J. Habibie's initial response was to desecuritize it. For this purpose, in the aftermath of the violent events on 30 July 1999, he formed an independent commission to investigate human right violations since 1996 (Miller 2009: 37). This commission succeeded in finalizing a 5000 pages document concerning violent acts and human rights violations

in Aceh, which was later submitted to the Abdurrahman Wahid government. This government also initiated the first dialogues with the rebels. The meeting was scheduled for 24 and 25 July 1999 in Bangkok and would include the rebellion's top leader, Hasan Tiro; top Acehese figure Hasballah M. Saad; Aceh Governor Syamsuddin Mahmud; as well as a top Indonesianist scholar Benedict Anderson of Cornell University. However, the key figures who were expected to attend the dialog—Syamsuddin Mahmud, Hasan Tiro, Hasballah M. Saad—either declined or were unable to make a physical appearance.³⁴ Regardless of the results, these initiatives had shown that B.J. Habibie was a major desecuritizing actor in the post-Suharto period in regard to the Aceh conflict, and he also received strong support from other like-minded actors.

The main supporter for B.J. Habibie's desecuritization moves came from the executive circle in the form of the Presidential Advisory Team on Aceh. Unlike the Council for Security and Law Enforcement, which persistently securitized the situation in Aceh, the Presidential Advisory Team on Aceh constantly recommended desecuritizing it. The DPR was also in line with the government's actions. To support the provision of special autonomy, in September 1999, the DPR passed Law No. 44/1999 concerning the "special status" of the Aceh province. Moreover, when the central government passed two laws regarding local autonomy, (respectively Law No. 22/1999 on regional government and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal balance between central government and the regions), the DPR also supported B.J. Habibie's decision to allow the implementation of these laws in Aceh before any other provinces (Miller 2009: 50). The military, for its part, while constantly promoting the use of extraordinary measures for ending the Aceh conflict, found itself in occasions when high-ranking security officers played a role as desecuritizing actors, too, as exemplified by Wiranto's visit to Lhokseumawe. The military also supported the government's decision to provide special autonomy for Aceh, yet the military establishment was actually divided as to which course of action to take and also discussed military solutions to the conflict (Miller 2009: 49). In fact, the decision to grant special autonomy to Aceh was the most distinctive desecuritizing act of the B.J. Habibie government, which set an important precedent for the following governments.

Following the actions of his predecessor, President Abdurrahman Wahid also granted amnesty to Acehese political prisoners, continued the plans on troop withdrawal from Aceh, launched an investigation on human rights violations, and proposed new policies concerning Aceh's special

autonomy status. As part of the human rights investigation, Abdurrahman Wahid instructed Gen. Widodo, A.S., the then-Commander of the military, to interrogate local commanders who were responsible for the security implementation in Aceh, in the aftermath of the killing of Teuku Bantaqiah, the local Muslim leader, and fifty-two of his followers and family members on 23 July 1999 (Miller 2009: 68).

In regard to the special autonomy status, there were two important initiatives which emerged during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency. The first initiative came from the government, when Ryaas Rasyid, the then-Minister of Regional Autonomy, presented four proposals on Aceh's special autonomy during a hearing session with the DPR on 26 November 1999. Out of these four proposals, Ryaas Rasyid preferred the one which offered Aceh a "full autonomy [...] over all areas except for national economic or fiscal policy and foreign affairs" (Miller 2009: 90). The second initiative came from the Aceh regional parliament, when it submitted a draft law to the DPR on 22 March 2000. Ryaas Rasyid's team adopted and improved this draft, and resubmitted it to the DPR as the government's new bill on Aceh special autonomy. After a protracted debate on 19 July 2001, the DPR finally signed the bill into Law No. 18/2001 (known as the NAD law, or the Special Autonomy Law). In essence, this law stipulated that the province's name change from *Daerah Istimewa Aceh* (D.I. Aceh, Special Region of Aceh) to *Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* (NAD, lit. State of Aceh, House of Peace). It also granted it the right to implement *Syari'ah* law, the right to conduct direct local elections, and stipulated the return of Aceh's natural resource revenue.³⁵ Apart from those desecuritizing moves, a breakthrough desecuritizing move during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency was the unprecedented peace talks between the government of Indonesia and the GAM, with the involvement of a foreign party as the mediator.

The Swiss-based humanitarian NGO, the Henry Dunant Center (HDC), initiated the first round of confidential talks between the conflicting parties on 27 January 2000. The Indonesian representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Hassan Wirajuda, represented Indonesia and the GAM was represented by its Minister of Health, Zaini Abdullah. Altogether, these peace talks were comprised of four rounds of meeting, in January, March, April, and May 2000. On 12 May 2002, the Indonesian government and GAM signed a Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, known as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Humanitarian Pause. This MoU, however, did not address the

fundamental source of conflict, yet it was an agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM which forced them to put aside their differences and focus on providing humanitarian assistance to the Acehnese. To implement this agreement, the MoU stipulated the formation of three committees: a joint committee on Humanitarian Action, a security Modalities Monitoring Team, and a joint Committee of Security Modalities. These committees were responsible for overseeing and monitoring the ceasefire between the Indonesian security forces and the GAM. On 9 January 2001, the Indonesian government and GAM agreed to extend the peace talk process and signed a “Provisional Understanding” for a “one month moratorium to stop violence.” Equally important, the Indonesian government and GAM agreed to “seek a formula for a lasting and comprehensive solution to conflict” which included “democratic consultation, free and fair election, independent electoral commission [and], local-based parties” (Miller 2009: 85). The goal of the last point was to accommodate the GAM and allow its members to participate in Aceh’s local politics. A month later, the Indonesian government and GAM agreed to further extend the Provisional Understanding by ten days in order to implement a “new security arrangement.” With this new security arrangement, the Indonesian government and GAM agreed to the creation of telephone hotlines between the military and GAM military leaders in order to facilitate confidence-building between the two sides (Miller 2009: 81, 82, 85, 86). In addition to the talks in Geneva, the first meeting between the commander of the GAM’s military wing, Teungku Abdullah Syafi’ie, and Wahid’s Cabinet Secretary, Bondan Gunawan, was held on 16 March in the movement’s headquarters in Pidie. Given that in the past Abdullah Syafi’i had always maintained a hardline position, the meeting increased the hope for a quick agreement. Indeed, even though the dialog continued to be marked by a worsening security situation, both sides were determined to bring about concrete results (Sukma 2004: 18).

The initiatives on Aceh’s special autonomy and the peace talks show that the desecuritizing actors still played an important role in Abdurrahman Wahid’s government. Like B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, too, was one of the important desecuritizing actors in Jakarta’s policy-making process in regard to Aceh. Some ministers in his cabinet also acted as important desecuritizing actors, particularly, Ryaas Rasyid, the Aceh-born Hasballah M. Saad, the then-Minister of Human Rights, and Alwi Shihab, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs. The parliamentarians in the DPR also played a major role as desecuritizing actors. For instance, along with Abdurrahman

Wahid's instruction to interrogate military commanders in Aceh in the aftermath of the Teuku Bantaqiah events, the DPR formed a special committee (*panitia khusus*, pansus) for the implementation of special autonomy and the investigation of human rights abuses in the province. For this purpose, the DPR's special committee summoned five retired military generals, who had filled top positions during their tour of duty and four active ministers³⁶ (Miller 2009: 68–71). A final group of desecuritizing actors were the Acehnese politicians in the local parliament, who drafted and endorsed the new law concerning Aceh's special autonomy. Unfortunately, in the following presidency, the role of desecuritizing actors increasingly declined.

Unlike her predecessors, President Megawati Sukarnoputri did not issue a time frame for the troop withdrawal, launch any human rights investigation, or grant amnesty for Acehnese political prisoners. Nevertheless, there were still two important desecuritization attempts which occurred during Megawati Sukarnoputri's term of office. The first attempt went into effect when the president issued Presidential Instructions No. 7/2001 and No. 1/2002 to replace the previous instruction No. 4/2001 on the downgrading of the Aceh emergency status to a state of civil emergency. Presidential Instruction No. 7/2002 stipulated the extension of the OKPH. However, eight out of its nine points emphasized that the termination of Aceh conflict would be achieved through socio-political and economic development programs, the provision of job opportunities, as well as through health, education, and social programs. Meanwhile, Presidential Instruction No. 1/2002 firstly stipulated the establishment of "Desk Aceh" to coordinate its implementation and envisaged a "Joint Consultative Meeting" between the Indonesian government and GAM in Geneva, which would be independent from the military's intervention (Miller 2009: 114–5; Nurhasim 2008: 101). This last point would be the second attempt of Megawati Sukarnoputri's government to desecuritize the conflict in Aceh and to reinstate peace talks, after they had previously turned sour in the last days of Abdurrahman Wahid's tenure of office.

However, the renewal of peace talks during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency was the result of, by and large, foreign governments, particularly the USA. As previously mentioned, the Bush administration sought Indonesian support through the re-establishment of cooperation with the Indonesian military. At the same time, President Bush needed to secure domestic support as many American politicians were quite critical of the Indonesian military track record. Hence, the Bush administration urged

the Indonesian government to return to the negotiation table and solve its problem with GAM. To this end, the Bush administration sent its senior negotiators, retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni and the Deputy Secretary of State, Matt Daley, to visit Hasan Tiro in Sweden in early 2002. In essence, these American negotiators attempted to persuade Hasan Tiro to accept Jakarta's special autonomy offer. From 2 to 3 February 2002, the American efforts bore fruit when the Indonesian government and GAM representatives met in Geneva, with the Henry Dunant Center once again as the mediator. This meeting ended with the signing of a two-point joint statement. The first point was that the Indonesian government and GAM agreed that the Special Autonomy Law No. 18/2001 would be "a starting point to hold a democratic, all inclusive dialog involving all elements of Acehese society that would lead to a review of elements of the NAD law [the Special Autonomy Law No. 18/2001] and the election of a democratic government in Aceh" (Miller 2009: 116). The second point was "the cessation of hostilities in order to build trust and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance" (Miller 2009: 116).

On 9 December, the Indonesian government and GAM met again to negotiate after the failure of the joint statement. This time the Indonesian government and GAM representatives signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), which envisaged three phases of conflict de-escalation: a two-month phase of confidence-building, a five-month phase of demilitarization, and finally, a phase of all-inclusive dialog involving larger groups from Acehese society. To ensure its successful implementation the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement stipulated the formation of a Joint Security Committee (JSC). The JSC's main assignment was to solve disputes during the implementation and to urge both Indonesian security forces and GAM fighters to move from an offensive to a defensive stance (Miller 2009: 121–2). Significantly, the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement received financial support from an Aceh trust fund in order to deliver humanitarian aid and further the post-conflict development and reconstruction process. The Aceh trust fund was inaugurated by the US and Japan governments, the EU, the World Bank, and twenty-four donor country representatives.

Unfortunately, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was another failure. When the violence in Aceh escalated, the Indonesian government called for a Joint Council Meeting. This Joint Council Meeting was stipulated in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement as the final solution if JSC failed to solve disputes between the Indonesian government and GAM

within thirty days. On 17 and 18 May 2003 the Indonesian government and GAM representatives met in that Joint Council Meeting, in Tokyo. The Joint Council Meeting, too, failed to ease the situation, and the next day the Indonesian government declared the state of military emergency and a full-scale martial law was imposed on Aceh.

The above narrative shows that it was the international community that played a dominant role as the desecuritizing actors during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency. The Bush administration initiated the re-establishment of peace talks between the Indonesian government and GAM and furthermore, in July 2002, sternly warned Jakarta of the possibility of "hardening of Congressional attitudes" if Indonesia withdrew from the peace talks when the demand to impose martial law within the Indonesian government policy-making circle was intensifying.³⁷ The American negotiators and the Henry Dunant Center played a key role as the mediators. A previous study even shows that how "the HDC worked behind the scene to secure a formal peace agreement" by revising the previously disputed May 2002 Joint Statement. Only after being revised by the Henry Dunant Center did the Indonesian government and GAM agree to re-negotiate it and finally sign the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in December 2002 (Miller 2009: 116, 120). Meanwhile, foreign governments and donor agencies provided a large amount of logistical support, enabling peace to become reality in Aceh. There were only few officials and politicians in Jakarta who agreed with international efforts to renew dialog to solve Aceh's problems, like Alex Litaay of Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) and A. Syafi'i Maarif of Muhammadiyah.³⁸ In contrast, Megawati Sukarnoputri's government did not come up with any desecuritization initiative apart from Presidential Instruction No. 1/2002. In fact, the securitization speech acts dominated the security discourse on Aceh during this period, rather than desecuritization speech acts. Furthermore, the Indonesian government seemed to be the passive receiver of desecuritization acts from external actors. Nevertheless, the pendulum eventually swung toward desecuritization in the next government.

In Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency, the process of desecuritizing the Aceh conflict had begun, against conventional wisdom, long before the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004. One distinguished desecuritizing actor in this regard was Vice-president Jusuf Kalla. When he still was serving as the Minister of Social Welfare in Megawati's cabinet, Jusuf Kalla had made personal efforts to re-establish

peace talks with GAM. As early as May 2003, Jusuf Kalla sent his personal trustee, Farid Husein, to meet and financially placate GAM leaders in Aceh. Farid Husein succeeded in reaching a preliminary agreement, but it soon collapsed after Megawati Sukarnoputri signed the decree to impose martial law. Amid the ongoing military offensive in Aceh, Jusuf Kalla further asked Farid Husein to identify GAM decision-makers inside and outside of Aceh in order to renew the dialog once an opportunity emerged. In February 2004, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who led the Helsinki-based Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), received Farid Husein in his residence to consult with him on Aceh (Nurhasim 2008: 109, 110, 119; Ahtisaari in Farid Husein 2007).

After Yudhoyono was sworn into office in October 2004, he instructed Jusuf Kalla to renew contact with GAM. Those initial desecuritization steps soon came up with tangible results when the Crisis Management Initiative formally invited GAM to return to the negotiation table, two days before the tsunami struck Aceh. Yudhoyono also asked Jusuf Kalla, as the chairman of the Golkar party, which at the time enjoyed the biggest share of parliamentary seats, to secure the parliamentarians' support. However, despite previously supporting the Aceh special autonomy and, hence, acting as desecuritizing actor, the typical complaints surfacing in all negotiations with the GAM, like recognizing GAM's equal status with the Indonesian state and internationalizing Indonesia's domestic affairs, never completely disappeared. Responding to such criticisms, Jusuf Kalla frequently spoke to the media to defend the progress of the negotiations in his characteristically direct style. For example, when some members of parliament criticized the government for negotiating outside the country, he stated:

GAM wanted guarantees from foreign countries, either ASEAN or the European Union. We had no choice. This goes back to the arrest of GAM negotiators by the police in May 2003. That was a fatal mistake. Negotiators cannot be arrested. The element of trust would be lost. It was like the Dutch East Indies Company which arrested Indonesian negotiators in Indonesia. (Aspinall 2005: 36)³⁹

It was an extraordinary statement for any Indonesian official to use and compare the actions of the government to that of the former Dutch colonialists. On another occasion he maintained that, "If there is no peaceful resolution, doesn't it mean we'll have endless war? Is that what the people

want? If we don't want war we've got to hold negotiations, or meetings. It's funny isn't it—people ask why are we talking with GAM, but they also ask why is there a conflict?"⁴⁰ Or, in his response toward the other critics in parliament, in June 2005 Kalla suggested that those tough-talkers should go to Aceh and fight the war themselves.⁴¹ With his strong determination for dialog, Jusuf Kalla had become the major driving force in the Yudhoyono government to secure the process toward a peaceful solution for the Aceh conflict.

To his credit, Yudhoyono succeeded in ousting the hardliners from his cabinet and top positions in the military. Moreover, he also succeeded in convincing senior military officers to accept the government's policies of terminating the Aceh conflict through the political process and dialog. With such a strong political will from state leadership, most senior government officials became supporters of desecuritization. Even the military commander, Endriartono Sutarto, who had constantly been a major securitizing actor in the previous two governments, now played a key role as a desecuritizing actor. For instance, on one occasion he made a public statement and warned "the TNI leadership that I don't want any senior officers talking out against government policies. If you want to oppose government policies, then you must leave the TNI" (Miller 2009: 159–60). Or, on another occasion, he gave a frank assessment when addressing the Parliament's Commission I on Defense and Foreign Affairs saying that:

It is true that the number of GAM has declined because of the efforts taken by TNI. But it will not mean that it will become zero. Because of that, I hope that the Commission will understand. It seems we have not been able to do what we hoped, so we apologize [...] So long as the basic problems are not resolved, it will be like one dies, another takes his place, two die, four take their place. The problem in Aceh has arisen because of disillusionment. And it is not the role of the military to resolve that. (Aspinall 2005: 12)⁴²

Such a shift in Jakarta's attitude toward Aceh proved to be a fertile ground for the success of the peace talks.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the government and GAM representatives on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland, ended the conflict in Aceh that had raged on varying levels of intensity since 1976. The process of negotiation demonstrated that both sides made significant compromises in order to reach an agreement. While the GAM made major strategic concessions by abandoning its demand for independence, the

government eventually also conceded on several key issues. The mediator also played an important role in these peace talks. Taking a different route from the Henry Dunant Center's approach to mediation, the Crisis Management Initiative's approach was "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" (Aspinall 2005: 22). While including some previously negotiated points during the Henry Dunant Center-facilitated dialogs such as the cease fire, demobilization, among others, the Crisis Management Initiative's framework also included a design of implementation, together with a wider political settlement. This approach provided a better general picture of how to solve political disputes between the two parties before they can agree on it. As a result of the process, the Crisis Management Initiative succeeded in brokering a comprehensive and creative deal on peace, which reflected a strong willingness from both sides to compromise. The peace agreement was creative since it provided a formula for dealing with difficult issues in an indirect way, and avoided the birth of splinter groups and "spoilers" (Aspinall 2005; Sukma 2007). Ahtisaari's personality, as the head of the Crisis Management Initiative, also played an important role during the mediation process. His straightforwardness in expressing his opinions and maintaining his stance enabled him to placate Indonesian and GAM negotiators.⁴³ As one of the Indonesian delegates admits "he was very authoritarian, decisive and sometimes even openly angry, which felt strange to us at first. But his directness made an impression [that] he in no way attempted to coax us to the table. On the contrary, we get the feeling that [we] should be grateful that he agrees to spend time with us" (Ali et al. 2008; 87). In sum, the success of the Helsinki peace talks could not be achieved without the success of the desecurizing actors in convincing the audience of the benefits of desecuritization.

3.2 *Audience*

In the case of Aceh, the audiences of desecuritization were those who stood against those who were against any kind of conflict resolution through political process and opted for securitization. During B.J. Habibie's presidency, the intended audience for desecurizing Aceh was, by and large, the military. To a certain degree, B.J. Habibie and other desecurizing actors managed to convince the military officers, and so, the initial desecuritization moves came into effect when the military withdrew its 659 personnel from Lhokseumawe on 31 August 1998 (Miller 2009: 24). When Abdurrahman Wahid was in office, the audiences of

desecuritization were no longer limited to the military, as civilian critics began to emerge who spoke out against the government's desecuritization initiatives. Civilians like the speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR), Amien Rais, and the speaker of the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR), Akbar Tanjung, claimed the government's initiative on peace talks were a fatal political blunder (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 16). Incidentally, even a group of thirteen researchers from the Indonesian Institute of Science (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*, LIPI) seconded this point.⁴⁴ The critics argued that sitting down and talking with the rebels in a foreign country meant the government had officially recognized the existence of the separatist group, had internationalized the Aceh problem, and had given foreign governments the opportunity to intervene in Indonesian domestic affairs. Meanwhile, Abdurrahman Wahid was challenged over the provision of special autonomy for Aceh from his own cabinet members, like the Minister of Home Affairs, Gen. (ret.) Surjadi Soedirdja, and the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Wiranto. The critics argued that Law No. 44/1999 had provided Aceh with enough concession and they were concerned that "too much autonomy" would increase the likelihood of Aceh eventually breaking away from the Indonesian state (Miller 2009: 96).

Interestingly, during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency, Indonesia was, by and large, the audience of the international community's desecuritization initiatives. While most Indonesian officials, both civilian and the military rank and file, had become securitizing actors in this period, the role of desecuritizing actors increasingly lost in significance as the situation in Aceh worsened. The Indonesian military establishment had always opposed the termination of the Aceh conflict for two reasons. First, most military officers believed that compromising and providing further concessions to the rebels would only encourage further resistance. For these officers, the termination of conflict in Aceh would begin with the elimination of GAM. The second reason had to do with the defense budget. Since the government was only able to provide 30 percent of total defense budget, the military had to seek out independent financial sources, which Aceh's natural resources could provide. Apart from the military establishment, most parliamentarians "in which President Megawati's Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan*, PDI-P), President Suharto's old Golkar Party, and appointed military and police representatives occupied more than 60 percent of the seats"

generally rejected any effort to negotiate with the GAM (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 2–3).

The opposite trend occurred during Yudhoyono's presidency, when most state officials supported the government's desecuritization policies. The president succeeded in convincing the audience of the military establishment. Jusuf Kalla, through his Golkar politicians, succeeded in outmaneuvering the detractors of Helsinki peace talks, especially the politicians from PDI-P and the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB), and managed to secure parliamentary support for the Helsinki peace talks (Miller 2009: 155, 161). Even the signing of the Helsinki agreement did not entirely eliminate opposition to the agreement. Many within the military establishment believed that the Helsinki agreement was not the best solution to the Aceh problem, and even at the time of writing, some still believe that the agreement is just another GAM trick to buy time before they secede from the Indonesian state.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, those audiences who could not be convinced became more and more insignificant, since the international, national, and Acehnese support of a political end to the conflict in Aceh were exceptionally high (Miller 2009: 111). This sort of role-changing between audience and actors in the desecuritization of the Aceh conflict happened as a consequence of conditions that facilitated the desecuritization process.

3.3 *Facilitating Conditions*

These conditions facilitating desecuritization had undergone occasional changes in the post-Suharto period. The political change of power in 1998 was the major facilitating condition during the eighteen-month period when B.J. Habibie was in power. This political change had provided the state leadership with a window of opportunity to initiate political processes in order to solve the problem in Aceh. This new path of problem-solving also gained a momentum when the new polity demanded the re-definition of the military role in the Indonesian state. With national and international pressures on the military, the civilian authority began to have more leeway to actively seek the termination of Indonesia's political conflicts, in which the case of Aceh was the most persistent one. Additionally, B.J. Habibie personally tried to expand his political capital in the new political reality by showing himself as a true democrat, one among others, who were vital in solving the conflict in Aceh. Another important facilitating condition during B.J. Habibie's presidency was

public opinion, which generally saw the Acehnese as victims of the previous regime and also supported the government in desecuritizing the situation in Aceh and finding political solutions to the conflict. During Abdurrahman Wahid's short period in office, the most important facilitating condition was the growing international support for ending the conflict through peace talks. While the Henry Dunant Center was playing an important role as the mediator in the peace talks between the Indonesian government and GAM, foreign governments like the USA, Norway, Qatar, and UAE pledged their willingness to provide financial support for humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction (Miller 2009: 80). During the Megawati Sukarnoputri government, the desecuritization facilitating condition mainly derived from the dynamics within international politics, such as the global war on terrorism. This time, both the Indonesian government and GAM by and large accepted the foreigners' peace talk initiative due to the increasing international pressure which was accompanied by vast amounts of money from foreign governments and donors (Miller 2009: 115, 116, 121). Yet, the conditions that facilitated desecuritization in Aceh changed once again in the government which followed.

During Yudhoyono's presidency, there were two important facilitating conditions to desecuritize the Aceh Conflict. The first condition was that those who had always favored negotiations had been elevated to more powerful positions (Aspinall 2005: 13). While on many occasions he played a role as a desecuritizing actor in the previous governments, in this case Yudhoyono was the drafter of Presidential Instruction No. 1/2002 which stressed that the termination of the Aceh conflict would be achieved through socio-political, economic, health-care, educational, and social programs. One might argue that as a minister in the previous cabinets, Yudhoyono "had no choice other than to comply with [...] policies, which were heavily influenced by military hawks" (Miller 2009: 150). In another account, Yudhoyono's deputy, Jusuf Kalla, enjoyed the credit as being the "peace broker," when he succeeded in mediating between the warring parties during communal conflicts in the eastern part of Indonesia. In the context of the Aceh conflict, he, as mentioned earlier, personally tried to enforce new political solutions to the conflict in the late Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency. Jusuf Kalla managed to make his confidants members of the cabinet, like Hamid Awaluddin, who was appointed as the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, a strategy that also played a great role in desecuritizing the Aceh conflict.

The second condition was the Indian Ocean tsunami which struck Aceh on 26 December 2004. Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla's strong commitment to solving the conflict was due to, in part, to their emotional reaction to the destruction and loss of 200,000 lives wrought by the tsunami. These shocking consequences of the tsunami drastically changed the perception of Indonesian political leaders and the general public toward Aceh. Prior to the tsunami, the government leaders' narrow priority was to maintain the unity of the Indonesian state against the GAM's separatist threat. In the aftermath of the tsunami, their priority was to deliver humanitarian aid for the Acehnese. For the general public, while they had previously perceived the Acehnese as troublemakers, now after the tsunami they urged the government to peacefully end the conflict.

In sum, the facilitating conditions for desecuritizing Aceh conflict derived from, what in Miller's terms, was a window of opportunity, which emerged when the state was structurally weak (Miller 2009: 2, 155, 184–185). Miller's windows of opportunity were the Asian Financial Crisis and the tsunami. In the first case, Indonesia was economically bankrupt, politically powerless, and the powerful actors were on the defensive. These circumstances allowed the national leadership to plan an end to the conflict with political solutions as an alternative to the long-dominant use of coercive measures. With the second opportunity, the tsunami further paralyzed the government in Aceh, as the state infrastructures along the Aceh coastline were entirely destroyed. The Indonesian government was left with no choice but to be completely reliant on foreign aid during the disaster relief and post-disaster development and reconstruction. In this regard, the international community also made it clear that such financial support would only be available when the conflict came to an end and peace was restored. On a cognitive level, the destruction of the tsunami had changed the perception among the majority of Indonesian toward the Aceh conflict and the Acehnese in general.

However, Miller emphasizes, and I am in agreement with her, that the tsunami was more of a violent "circuit breaker" in the Aceh conflict, rather than the independent variable for ending it (Miller 2009: 155). Had Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla not won the presidential election, or Megawati Sukarnoputri would have been re-elected as the president, or the military hardliners had still dominated the Yudhoyono administration, the government might have wasted this window of opportunity, as it did previously in the early years of *Reformasi*. Thus, the prospect for successful peace

talks was doubtful and the possibility of GAM's military annihilation would have been more likely.

However, in the 2004 election, Megawati Sukarnoputri finished in the second place. In the post-election days, Megawati continued expressing her opposition to Yudhoyono–Kalla's decision on peace talks. According to Farid Husein, Megawati stated that had she been elected as president, she would have "tweaked the ear of those people who were involved in the negotiation with GAM" (Nurhasim 2008: 123).

4 ANALYSIS OF THE DESECURITIZATION OF ACEH CONFLICT

In this part, I will analyze the desecuritization in Aceh based upon *grounds for desecuritization, desecuritization mechanisms, phases of desecuritization, and desecuritization outcomes*.

4.1 *The Grounds for Desecuritization*

Firstly, I start with Huysmans's grounds for desecuritization (Huysmans 1998). The whole process of desecuritization in the case of Aceh shows that it rested on the instrumental ground, rather than the ethico-political one. This means that Jakarta opted for desecuritization several times because it saw that the use of extraordinary measures was not the best way to end the conflict. Or, in other words, desecuritization was more effective in terminating the conflict than securitization. Jakarta's instruments in this regard were a public apology, the granting of amnesty, the promise of troop withdrawal, the investigation of human rights violations, the provision of special autonomy status, and the initiation of peace talks. The ethico-political ground on the other hand promotes the idea that one opposes securitization not because it is ineffective, but because there is no ethical justification for using coercive measures as a response to dissenting opinions voiced by different groups in society.

There were few occasions which showed a weak tendency to use the ethico-political ground for desecuritizing conflict in Aceh. On 30 July 1999, for example, while delivering her election victory speech in Banda Aceh, Megawati Sukarnoputri vocally stated to the people of Aceh that "*Cut Nyak* will not allow even a drop of blood to spill on land of *Rencong*."⁴⁶ Another example occurred when Abdurrahman Wahid

delivered a speech in Banda Aceh and stated that “if I were not a Muslim, I would probably have killed myself,” due to his inability to end the conflict (Miller 2009: 93). However, such hints at desecuritizing the Aceh conflict on the grounds of ethico-political consideration never materialized.

4.2 *The Mechanism of Desecuritization*

Taking into account the mechanism of desecuritization in the case of Aceh, it is obvious that the process was an active mechanism, rather than a passive one. The active mechanism in the Aceh desecuritization process can be identified by the qualitative change in behavior especially from the Indonesian government side, as it willingly started political processes as an alternative to the New Order’s policy of the exclusive use of force. However, when Oelsner’s active desecuritization mechanism required trust between the warring parties (Oelsner 2005), this failed to materialize between the Indonesian government and GAM until the Yudhoyono government. The failure of trust-building during the B.J. Habibie government in part related to his failure to fulfill his promises, and in part related to GAM and SIRA’s strong demand for independence and referendum. During the time Abdurrahman Wahid was in office, the failure of trust-building related to the increasingly deteriorated state of security in Aceh and it became worse during the Megawati Sukarnoputri government. Not only did the government’s trust of the GAM to cooperate with the government disappear when Megawati was in office, but most state officials seemed to look forward to the failure of peace talks so they could prove to the international community that GAM did not want peace, and a large-scale military offensive would be the only solution to the conflict. As Crouch and Aspinall observe, “those who supported negotiations were always in a minority in the governments and faced constant criticism from those who favored military action” (Aspinall 2005: 13). In sum, the failure of trust-building between the Indonesian government and GAM during the three post-Suharto governments led to a lack of confidence and sincerity between the two parties. Instead of maximizing opportunity for finding a solution to the conflict, according to an Acehese member in the Monitoring Team for Security Modalities, both the Indonesian government and GAM strictly maintained their own course: everything but independence from the Indonesian government side, and nothing but independence from the GAM side.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, trust and good will

between the Indonesian government and GAM started to evolve in the aftermath of the tsunami and it became a reality during the Helsinki peace talks. This desecuritization mechanism can be better understood if we take a closer look at the phases of desecuritization in the case of Aceh.

4.3 *The Phases of Desecuritization*

The phases of desecuritization comprise of *the phase of initiation*, *the phase of development*, and *the phase of consolidation* (Oelsner 2005: 11–12). The first phase is marked by the avoidance of the use of force, but utilizing negotiation, strategic cooperation, and incentives for behavioral change. The desecuritization moves during the governments of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri already failed during the initial phase. Even though Jakarta apologized to the Acehnese, granted amnesty, and planned troop withdrawal, these moves did not lead to the avoidance of the use of force from both sides. Even more, the use of force by the Indonesian security apparatus totally ignored the principle of proportionality and the principle of discriminate use of force. The high number of civilian deaths was the perfect evidence in support of this argument. On the other side, GAM also increasingly resorted to violence in the later parts of B.J. Habibie's term in office, by killing suspected Acehnese informants who worked for the Indonesian security apparatus, abducting and killing Indonesian security personnel, as well as bombing and looting public buildings and facilities.

In the same vein, the provision of special autonomy for Aceh failed to lead to strategic cooperation among related parties in order to end the conflict, but instead these parties rejected the special autonomy arrangement outright. Some cabinet ministers and members of parliament expressed their strong opposition to Aceh's special autonomy arrangement. The military domination in Aceh left almost no room for the local governments to effectively implement the provision of special autonomy from the B.J. Habibie, Wahid, to Megawati government. The GAM totally rejected Jakarta's offers of special autonomy since the rebels pursued a policy of secession from Indonesia. The corrupt local government, where Governor Abdullah Puteh was at the center of the allegations of corruption in Aceh, neither had the political will, nor the capability to efficiently implement Aceh's special autonomy and to bring concrete results to the Acehnese general public. In fact, the reason behind Jakarta's decision to extend the Integrated Operation and to continue the military government

in Aceh, was, in part, due to the military's lack of faith in Abdullah Puteh (Schulze 2003: 14; Sukma 2004: 31–2). Acehese civil organizations were not pleased with Jakarta's special autonomy arrangements, since some in the organization pursued a referendum and others felt they were excluded from the formulation of special autonomy policy and the implementation process. Furthermore, the special autonomy arrangement for Aceh did not provide incentive for behavioral changes, especially for the Indonesian security personnel in Aceh, the Aceh local government, and GAM. These special autonomy arrangements did not include prosecution of human rights violations; hence it did not contribute to a behavioral change within the security personnel and stop its arbitrary behavior in Aceh. The provision of special autonomy did not come with an effort to strengthen the justice system in the province. Therefore, just as the security apparatus operated in Aceh, there was no punishment for corrupt Acehese leaders. Lastly, the initial special autonomy arrangements did not provide any possibility for the establishment of local parties and direct local elections, which would have been an incentive for GAM behavioral changes. Therefore, the absence of such points in the special autonomy arrangements left no room for the GAM to participate in Aceh's local politics. However, the failure in the initial desecuritization phases in the three post-Suharto governments could be viewed as lessons learned for the next government, when the phase of desecuritization development and consolidation became fruitful during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency.

The second phase of desecuritization, the phase of development, emphasizes the importance of interaction between the warring parties in order to change their stance and perception of one another. In the interactions between the Indonesian government and GAM, the phase of development began taking effect in the Helsinki peace talks, during Yudhoyono's presidency. The indicators of this phase were when GAM dropped its demand for independence and the Indonesian government agreed to change the terms of "special autonomy" to "self-government," as well as the formation of local political parties, and the direct local elections held in Aceh. The changes in both the Indonesian government and GAM's stance and their perception of each other came about from the establishment of mutual trust, which allowed them to move toward the formulation of alternative policy to finally end the conflict in Aceh. This alternative policy was attached to the Helsinki agreement and Jakarta finally incorporated it into Law No. 11/2006 concerning the governing of Aceh (Law on Governing Aceh, LoGA), on 11 July 2006. More importantly, it

provided a detailed framework for re-building and governing Aceh. In fact LoGA has served as “a testimony to the presence of a constituency of peace in Jakarta” (Sukma 2007). The ability of the Indonesian government and GAM to agree on a common policy allowed the desecuritization process to proceed toward the next phase, the phase of consolidation.

The phase of consolidation requires constructive public rhetoric from the warring parties in order show their political will in implementing the points of agreement. Later on, the rhetoric and political will should lead to the establishment of cooperating institutions and organizations. Regarding the rhetoric and political will, the Indonesian government started this phase with the success of the national leadership in compelling the military to conduct itself in accordance with the policies set by the government. Endriartono Sutarto’s earlier mentioned statement to the Indonesian military establishment was one important instance of this kind of rhetoric. With these efforts, the national leadership succeeded in downgrading the hardliners’ voice in public, which otherwise might have jeopardized the peace talk process and the implementation of the Helsinki agreement. On the other side, GAM also showed a strong political will to end the conflict. At the rhetorical level, the commander of GAM’s military wing, Muzakkir Manaf, for instance, publicly announced the plan to demobilize his troops.⁴⁸ On another occasion, one of GAM’s leaders, Irwandi Yusuf, also announced GAM’s readiness to enter the new era and transform the movement into a political party.⁴⁹ This rhetorical and political will from the Indonesian government and GAM led to the successful demilitarization processes including, among others, the demobilization of GAM’s guerilla army and the decommissioning of their weapons, and the withdrawal and redeployment of Indonesian security personnel. These important steps eventually brought about the formation of institutions and organizations to accommodate the sustainability of the desecuritization process in Aceh.

Examples of institution-building after the signing of the Helsinki Agreement began with the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which involved representatives from the EU and ASEAN countries monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement.⁵⁰ The key points of success for the AMM lay in its authority. Unlike committees from previous agreements which failed to carry out their tasks in Aceh, the Helsinki Agreement granted the AMM the authority to investigate and make decisions when disputes and disagreements arose in implementing the points of agreement. Soon after the signing of Helsinki agreement, the

GAM established an Aceh Transitional Committee (*Komisi Peralihan Aceh*, KPA). The main goal of the KPA was to facilitate the reintegration of GAM's ex-combatants into everyday civic life.⁵¹ In regard to coordinating the post-tsunami disaster relief and implementing the Helsinki agreement, the Indonesian government also formed a Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (*Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi*, BRR).⁵² On 2 May 2006, the Aceh government formed an Aceh Reintegration Agency (*Badan Reintegrasi Aceh*, BRA), in order to distribute financial support, as well as three main programs for integrating GAM's ex-members into society: housing, economic empowerment, and social security provision programs.⁵³ Previously, on 16 March 2006 (during the legislation of LoGA in the DPR) the first political party emerged in Aceh with the formation of the Aceh People's Party Preparatory Committee (*Kongres Persiapan Partai Rakyat Aceh*, KP-PRA). After the issuance of the LoGA, KP-PRA transformed itself into Aceh People's Party (*Partai Rakyat Aceh*, PRA) in July of the same year. The LoGA also stipulated the formation of two new institutions in Aceh to support direct local elections in the province, namely an Independent Election Commission of Aceh (*Komisi Independen Pemilihan Aceh*, KIP Aceh) and an Aceh Election Supervisory Body (*Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Aceh*, Panwaslih Aceh) (Miller 2009: 168, 170). All of this institution-building successfully brought about local elections in Aceh after the signing of Helsinki agreement.

On 11 December 2006, the people of Aceh cast their votes in the first ever direct elections in the province. When the result of the ballots appeared, a former GAM rebel, Irwandi Yusuf, and the SIRA leader, Muhammad Nazar, won a landslide victory (garnering more than twice as much of the vote than their nearest rivals) (Miller 2009: 168). Irwandi and Nazar were finally installed as the new Governor and Vice-governor of Aceh on 8 February 2007. Even though some conflict marked the election process, most of the incidents were limited to intimidation and disputes among candidates and their supporters. Apart from that, there were also reports concerning the fact that the Acehnese only voted for GAM's candidates because they had received threats from former GAM members and they were concerned that the violence would return if the GAM lost the election. Also, the Acehnese voted for GAM candidates in the hope that once the rebels had official positions they would stop extorting money (*pajak nanggroe*) from the people.⁵⁴

Despite these negative reports, the overall election process was free and fair. According to a post-election survey conducted by the International

Foundation for Electoral Systems, 94 percent of the 1203 respondents were satisfied with the process and the results of the elections (Miller 2009: 169). In same vein, the EU's Election Observation Mission in Aceh (EUEOM) also reported that the elections were "competitive, transparent and well administered and compliant with international standards of democratic systems" (Miller 2009: 169). The following elections on the city and regency level also repeated Irwandi and Nazar's victory. Until March 2007, GAM ex-members had succeeded in becoming the heads of eleven out of twenty-three cities and regencies across Aceh. With all of these processes leading to the elections in the province, we are finally able to scrutinize the outcome of desecuritization in Aceh.

4.4 *The Outcomes of Desecuritization*

There are four outcomes of desecuritization: the change through stabilization, the replacement, the re-articulation, and the silencing of the security discourse (Hansen 2011: 15–21). In the context of the Aceh conflict, the processes of desecuritization during the four post-Suharto governments led to *replacement* and *change through stabilization*. Replacement refers to the process of moving away from a security milieu and seeking a political resolution to address the fundamental sources of conflict, such as with collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation. The change through stabilization refers to a situation where there is evidence of explicit change from previously warring parties through a gradual process. This gradual process eventually reduces the use of coercive measures in every form. The initiatives to move away from a security milieu and to seek political solutions for the Aceh conflict had begun since the B.J. Habibie government and kept continuing in the following governments until it reached its lowest levels during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency. The major problem during these three governments was that both the Indonesian government and GAM did not value the importance of collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation in the desecuritization process. On the contrary, both sides used the relatively peaceful situation to advance their own agenda in order to challenge their opponents. For instance, Jakarta was upset by the lack of progress in the disarmament process and accused the GAM of violating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Furthermore, Jakarta also accused the GAM of recruiting new members, building up its weapons stocks, committing extortion, and continuing to advocate Acehnese independence during the Humanitarian Pause and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Indeed, GAM initially was never sincere with its participation in the negotiations, apart from exploiting the opportunity to internationalize its agenda. Therefore, GAM's initial participation in peace talks, to quote Schulze, "was motivated less by what GAM could receive from Indonesia than by what it could receive from international community" (Schulze 2004: 51). In the other camp, GAM accused Jakarta of being insincere in implementing the provisions of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, especially in regard to the withdrawal of its troops. Only after the tsunami severely struck Aceh, did both the Indonesian government and GAM find common ground to alter their position and begin to constructively negotiate their demands and accommodate each other's interests.

Even though the initiative to provide Aceh with special autonomy had failed every now and then, overall, it was an incremental process which brought peace to Aceh. If B.J. Habibie had not initiated the provision of special autonomy, if Abdurrahman Wahid had not continued that initiative and initiate peace talks with GAM, if Megawati Sukarnoputri had not continued those two initiatives, no matter how hesitant she and Jakarta's political figures were at the time, then probably, to quote Miller "the Yudhoyono government may not have secured a peace agreement with GAM so soon after the tsunami, or at all" (Miller 2009: 186). At a minimum, the failed negotiations between the Indonesian government and GAM from the B.J. Habibie until Megawati presidencies had opened opportunities for both sides to interact and have first-hand experience in understanding each other's positions. Viewing these failed negotiations as a preliminary process, overall it had led to the success of the Helsinki agreement. Meanwhile, the continued initiatives to provide special autonomy for Aceh during the B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati presidencies had laid the foundation for the Helsinki peace talks, which finally became the fundamental arrangement in the LoGA. These long processes of gradual changes had finally brought political and security stability to Aceh. At the time of writing, it seems that all sources of conflict between Jakarta and Aceh have been thoroughly neutralized. Furthermore, the last elections in Aceh in 2012 brought victory to Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf. The former GAM Minister of Foreign Affairs and the former commander of GAM's military wing now lead the province as the governor and vice-governor with strong support from Jakarta.

In this chapter I have analyzed the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization in the context of the separatist conflict in Aceh. The reinforcement of separatism in Aceh during Indonesia's democratization was

due to four reasons: economic exploitation, centralism and uniformity, military repression, and the politics of impunity. On the one hand, insurgency is generally the most sensitive issue for the integrity and unity of a country. For Indonesia, Aceh's insurgency movement was a "real" existential threat where the unity of Indonesia was the referent object in this case. Given its "cognitive prior" (Acharya 2009), the unity of the state is one of the cardinal concerns shared by Indonesians in general. Even moderate observers, legislators, scholars, and government officials have never completely ruled out the use of military force should other means fail to placate—in this case—the insurgents (Rüland 2014). All attempts of desecuritization had failed during the B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri governments due to several factors: (1) the domination of hardline views in public on how to resolve the Aceh conflict; (2) the lack of common understanding and interpretations on peace agreements from both the Indonesian government and GAM; (3) lack of shared confidence and sincerity between the Indonesian government and GAM; (4) the mediator's failure in bridging gaps between conflicting parties; and (5) the burden of Aceh's local government and the elites in implementing Aceh's special autonomy arrangements. As the attempts to desecuritize the conflict failed and the situation in Aceh continued to worsen, Jakarta recurrently opted for securitization. The problems of securitization in Aceh were related to soldiers' inappropriate approach in the field and Jakarta's lack of efforts toward improving the Acehnese's welfare. While desecuritization moves from 1998 to 2005 had always collapsed, the last attempt in 2005 ended up with fruitful results. Several factors at play in the success of desecuritization during the Yudhoyono presidency were: (1) the desecuritizing actors had been elevated to more powerful positions; (2) the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster had become the conflict's "circuit breaker"; (3) the significant change of the Indonesian government and GAM toward each other in order to find peaceful resolutions to the conflict; (4) the role of the Crisis Management Initiative in facilitating the peace talks between the Indonesian government and GAM, as well as Martti Ahtisaari's personality as the mediator of the talks. The smooth demilitarization process, the institutional and organizational building after the signing of Helsinki agreement, and the issuance of LoGA were the outcomes of long and gradual processes of desecuritization in Aceh, as perceived threats shifted and finally disappeared, and the political and security stabilization in the province consolidated.

NOTES

1. Aceh (majority), Tamiang (in the eastern part of East Aceh), Alas (in Southeast Aceh), Aneuk Jamee and Kluet (in South Aceh), Naeuk Laot, Semeulu and Sinabang (in Semeulue), Gayo (in Bener Meriah, Central Aceh and Gayo Lues), Pakpak, Lekon, Haloban and Singkil (in Aceh Singkil). Each of these ethnic groups has its own culture, language, and traditional identities (RPJP Aceh Tahun 2005–2025, 2009: 30–1). Some people believe that ACEH is an abbreviation which stands for Arabs, Chinese, European, and Hindustan.
2. Banda Aceh (the capital), North Aceh, South Aceh, West Aceh, East Aceh, Southeast Aceh, Southwest Aceh, Central Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Singkil, Aceh Besar, Simeulue, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, Gayo Lues, Aceh Tamiang, Nagan Raya, Bener Meriah, Sabang, Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Subulussalam.
3. The religious composition in Aceh shows that with 98.81 percent, Islam is the major religion in Aceh. The religious minorities in Aceh include Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians. Places of worship for non-Muslims in Aceh include 154 churches, fourteen Hindu and Buddhist monasteries, and two Confucian temples (BPS-Statistics of Aceh Province in collaboration with BAPPEDA Aceh, 2012: 113–114). Although the Muslims make up the biggest part of the population, no inter-religious conflict has been recorded so far (Bhakti 2008).
4. The Aceh Sultanate made treaties and sent diplomats to the Ottoman Empire from 1538 to 1658 to gain protection against foreign powers, especially Portugal, in exchange. See, Bhakti 2008: 8.
5. Since the early nineteenth century, the Aceh Sultanate had developed trading and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, the UK, the USA, France, and Italy. In 1819 when the Sultanate learned that the English colonial power was much stronger than the Dutch, it agreed to sign a defense treaty with the English. However, when the Acehnese realized that the English would not provide the promised protection against the Dutch, it sought a defense agreement with the USA in 1873, right before the Aceh–Dutch war broke out. See *ibid.*
6. For a detailed account of the historical background of the roots of the Aceh separatism, see Kell 1995.
7. This includes a donation from the Acehnese in 1948, which was equal to 20 kg of gold, to buy Indonesia's first aircraft. This aircraft was named Dakota RI-001 Seulawah.
8. On 7 August 1949, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo declared the NII Province of West Java.
9. Initially, Hasan Tiro strongly supported and believed in the creation of an Indonesian state. He was 22 years of age and studying in Jogjakarta (at the time one of the centers of Indonesian republicans and the nationalist

movement) when Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared the country's independence on 17 August 1945. He wrote in 1948 that "Aceh, as it has been in the past, is inseparable from the Republic of Indonesia; therefore the history of Aceh is inherently inseparable from the history of Indonesia; our slogan is one nation, one language, and one motherland." In fact, Hasan Tiro was one of the Indonesian delegates to the United Nations in New York. He moved to the USA in 1950 and studied in New York. Hasan Tiro, however, changed his mind later due to his disappointment with the Jakarta's mistreatment of Aceh. He took sides with Daud Beureueh when the *Darul Islam* movement broke out in 1953. His disappointment toward the central government even worsened, especially after oil and gas exploration started in Aceh in 1971. He stayed and lived as a businessman in the USA until his return to Aceh in 1976 when he declared the independence of the region. See, Bhakti 2008; Reid 2004; and Schulze 2004.

10. *Sinar Harapan*, 31 March 2003.
11. This disappointment related to B.J. Habibie's failures to fulfill his promises of bringing the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice and to plan for withdrawing troops. Among other obstacles was the different interpretation among Jakarta's elites regarding the time period of the crimes. For instance, it was said that there was consensus of the government and the National Commission on Human Rights that the latter's subject of investigation would only deal with cases of violation of rights that occurred after 1998 (*The Jakarta Post*, 3 July 1999). This meant that the investigation would not cover any violations committed prior to 1998. Regarding the second issue, B.J. Habibie's government also had to abandon the plan for withdrawing the troops. The increasing number of riots and the escalation of violence were two major reasons behind this failure. Even the national police requested later that military troops should not be withdrawn from a number of unrest-prone areas. Instead of troop withdrawal, Jakarta planned to establish a military command in the province (*The Jakarta Post*, 27 August 1999). Facing protests by Acehese leaders and observers, the government delayed the plan as a response to "people's aspiration" (*The Jakarta Post*, 31 August 1999). Later on, President Megawati Sukarnoputri eventually signed the re-establishment of the military command *Kodam Iskandar Muda*.
12. Those killed included Syiah Kuala, Rector Dayan Dawood; Acehese PPP parliamentarian, Tgk. Nashiruddin Daud; South Aceh local legislator, Harun Aldy; New York-based International Forum for Aceh, Chairman Jafar Hamzah Siddiq; North Aceh local legislator, Tgk. Ibrahim Ilyas; IAIN Rector, Prof. Safwan Idris; Aceh's Golkar Chairman, Maj. Gen (ret.) Tengku Haji Djohan; and an Acehese member of the peace-monitoring team, Teuku Al-Kamal (Miller 2009: 76–7; Interview with Prof. Yusni Saby, Banda Aceh, 17 May 2012).

13. See Kontras's press release, 12 January 1999. Available at http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&cid=66, accessed on 25 September 2013. Initially, OSW 99 was a response for GAM's action on 29 December, when the rebels captured and killed seven soldiers in Lhok Nibong, East Aceh. Subsequently, the mission of OSW 99 was to locate the captured soldiers and arrest those responsible for their deaths. See, Amnesty International. Available at <http://www2.amnesty.se/uaonnet.nsf/dfab8d7f58eec102c1257011006466e1/b76e82d50366392dc1256714004262f5?OpenDocument>, accessed on 20 December 2013.
14. In his interview with *Tempo*, Johnny Wahab stated that this operation had already failed after four civilian detainees were killed by a group of soldiers. *Tempo*, "Wawancara Johnny Wahab: Operasi Ini Sudah Gagal." *Tempo*, 17 January 1999.
15. *Kompas*, 20 March 2001.
16. *Ibid.*
17. See, Presidential Instruction No. 7/2001 and Miller 2009.
18. Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Tb. Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 16 April 2012.
19. *Ibid.*
20. See, Miller 2009: 157.
21. See, Presidential Decree (Kepres) No. 28/2003, Sukma 2004 and Miller 2009.
22. Kafil Yamin, "Jakarta Offensive in Aceh Drags On," *Asia Times Online*, 27 June 2003.
23. On 9 November 1998, B.J. Habibie signed Presidential Instruction No. 191/1998 concerning the formation of DPKSH. The Council only had one task: to control and coordinate the state's response to the crisis, which might threaten the national stability and the rule of law, in a timely and integrated manner. See, Presidential Instruction No. 191/1998.
24. The Suharto government had previously abolished the Aceh military command in the mid-1980s as part of a national-wide reorganization and consolidation of the army territorial commands (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 106).
25. See Presidential Instruction No. 28/2003 on the Declaration of the State of Military Emergency in Province of Aceh.
26. According to Miller, economic activities of the military included, for example, "providing security to big businesses[,] selling fishing licenses to foreign fishing vessels, selling arms to GAM, extortion [among others]" (Miller 2009: 106).
27. In 1992, the US Congress cancelled \$2.3 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Indonesia as the USA's response to the event at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor, in November 1991, where the Indonesian security personnel shot dozens of unarmed

- civilians. In 1994, the USA banned the sale of small and light arms and riot-control equipment to Indonesia. In 1995 and 1996, the USA expanded the list of prohibited items to include helicopter-mounted equipment and armored personnel carriers. In June 1997, Indonesia withdrew from the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program, after Suharto complained over a “totally unfair criticism of Indonesian human rights practices by the U.S. Congress.” In 1998, the USA suspended the Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) program. After violence erupted in the aftermath of the 1999 referendum in East Timor, the Clinton administration suspended the transfer of defense goods and services to Indonesia as well as military exercises and exchanges (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 113–115).
28. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto in *Media Indonesia*, 9 June 2005.
 29. Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret) Tb Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 16 April 2012.
 30. Interview with Prof. Yusni Saby, Banda Aceh, 17 May 2012.
 31. Interview with Head of Aceh Police Security Management Agency, Sen. Police Commander (Kombes) Budiono, Banda Aceh, 16 May 2012.
 32. The other factor according to Endang Suryana was that “soldiers in the field used an inappropriate approach to win the people’s trust” (Sukma 2004: 32).
 33. *Atjeh Post*, 7 August 2012.
 34. *The Jakarta Post*, 22 July 1999.
 35. Law No. 18/2001 (the Special Autonomy Law, UU No. 18/2001). See also, Miller 2009: 96–97.
 36. The generals are: (1) Tri Sutrisno, the former Commander of the Armed Forces and Vice-president; (2) L.B. Moerdani, the former Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Security; (3) Feisal Tanjung, the former Coordinating Minister on Politics and Security; (4) Syawan Hamid, the former Minister of Home Affairs; and (5) Anwar Makarim, the former Head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency. The active ministers from Wahid’s cabinet were: (1) Wiranto, the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security; (2) Surjadi Soedirdja, the Minister of Home Affairs; (3) Ryaas Rasyid, the Minister of Regional Autonomy; and (4) Hasballah M. Saad, the Minister of Human Rights. See, Miller 2009: 68–71.
 37. *The Jakarta Post*, 31 July 2002. See, Miller 2009: 119.
 38. *The Jakarta Post*, 8 August 2002.
 39. See also *Tempo*, February 8–14, 2005.
 40. *Serambi Indonesia*, 7 July 2005.
 41. *Tempo Interaktif*, 11 June 2005.
 42. See also *Media Indonesia*, 9 June 2005)
 43. Interview with Jusuf Kalla, Jakarta, 14 March 2012.
 44. *Kompas*, 12 May 2000.

45. Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Tb. Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 16 April 2012.
46. *Cut Nyak* is a name for respected Acehnese women. *Rencong* is the Acehnese's traditional dagger. See the report on this speech in *Kompas*, 30 July 1999. See also, Miller 2009: 101.
47. Interview with Prof. Yusni Saby, Banda Aceh, 17 May 2012.
48. *The Jakarta Post*, 28 December 2005.
49. Conciliation Resource, 2008, "Aceh's New Era: An Interview with Irwandi Yusuf," *Accord 20*.
50. *The Jakarta Post*, 30 July 2005.
51. *The Jakarta Post*, 28 December 2005.
52. *Sinar Harapan*, 9 May 2005.
53. "Aceh: Post-conflict Complications" Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/139-aceh-post-conflict-complications.aspx>, accessed on 7 March 2012.
54. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh," Asia Briefing No. 61, 22 March 2007.

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Securitization and Desecuritization Dynamics in the Maluku Communal Conflict

In this chapter, I examine the situation in Maluku during Indonesia's democratic transition, to explore how the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization occurred in the face of the communal conflict, which escalated into widespread religious violence and was the largest communal violence in the history of independent Indonesia. The conflict initially broke out in 1999, and reached its highest point between 2000 and 2001. Yet sporadic violent incidents still took place until 2005. In terms of fatalities, the case of Maluku demonstrated a high level of violence; the three years of conflict claimed almost 5000 lives (the highest estimation is almost 10,000)¹ and created around 700,000 refugees (International Crisis Group 2007). The conflict set the precedent for the use of martial law and military operations to handle communal violence by the Indonesian government. To gain more insight into the case at hand, I start this chapter by providing basic figures and general information on Maluku, a historical account of inter-communal tension in the province and how the communal violence not only reoccurred, but also escalated into an unprecedented level in the post-1998 political transition. Next, I frame the Maluku conflict in the context of securitization. In the last two sections, I will provide a detailed analysis on how desecuritization unfolded in Maluku.

1 BACKGROUND ON MALUKU AND THE HISTORY OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT

Home to a heterogeneous society, both in terms of ethnicity and religions, the Moluccas² is a group of islands in the eastern part of Indonesia. After the country's independence, the Moluccas area became the province of Maluku, until North Maluku separated from the province and became a new province in late 1999.³ The total population in Maluku province is 1,533,506.⁴ The people of Maluku, the Malukan, live on an archipelagic area of around 54,000 km², which is comprised of eleven cities and regencies⁵ and encompasses 632 islands.⁶ The major local revenue source is the agricultural sector which contributes 33 percent of the regional domestic income and provides job opportunities for around 60 percent of the population. However, the overall economic figures are still below the national average given the fact that 28.3 percent of the Malukan live below the poverty line. Similarly, the unemployment rate in Maluku is above the national rate at 12.2 percent (with a 7.6 percent pre-conflict rate). Nevertheless, 54 percent of the Malukan graduated from secondary schools, compared to the national average of 49 percent (The World Bank 2010: 25, 27, 29, 30, 71). These figures on education reflect the fact that there is a certain degree of socio-economic improvement in the province in the post-conflict period, especially in terms of people's access to basic education.

The importance of the Moluccas can be traced back many centuries. As early as the tenth century, the Indonesian sailors had introduced spices native to the Moluccas islands, like cloves and nutmegs to the West through Chinese and Arab merchants (Reid 1990: 12). In the next centuries, the global traders began to recognize the area of the Moluccas as the "Islands of Spices," especially as cloves, nutmegs, and mazes were some of the most valuable commodities in important spice markets like Venice and Genoa from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries (Rosengarten 1969; McNeil 2009; Pezzolo 2013). Meanwhile in the Moluccas, the spice trade had brought deeper relationships between the native people and the Arabs, which influenced the social condition of the local population. For instance, the word "Maluku" can be traced both to how the Arab merchants called the region: *Jazirah al-Mulk* means "the Islands of the Kings," mainly referring to the Sultan, as well as the islands of Ternate, Tidore, Jalolo, Bacan, and Loloda (Permana et al. 2012: 10; Andaya 1991: 5). Likewise, the native people called the Arab traders, *Alifuru*. The word consists of the first Arabic alphabet *Alif* and the local ancient word *Furu*, which

reflects that the first (foreign) visitors to the region were the Arabs. The word *Alifuru* also refers to the native people who had the first encounter with the Arabs. Even today the *Alifuru* remain one of the ethnic groups in the Moluccas (Permana et al. 2012: 10). Through the trading, the Arab merchants also spread their religion, Islam, among the inhabitants in the region. Eventually, Islam spread in the region in the fifteenth century when some local kings began to convert. It started in the Island of Ternate, and later on spread to the rest of the Moluccas, especially to the inhabitants of the coastal areas (Arnold 1961: 391–4).

The lucrative benefits from the spice trade eventually induced the European merchants to look for its place of origin, in order to monopolize the spice markets in Europe. The Portuguese merchants made the first successful attempt. Historical record reveals that “the Portuguese began to obtain large cargoes of Malukan spice in 1513” (Reid 1990: 30). However, the first Portuguese expedition arrived in Ternate only in 1520. In the same year, the Portuguese installed their first governor in the Moluccas and remained in the region until 1575 (Amal 2007: 151). During this period, they installed twenty governors, controlled Malukan spices, and dominated the European spice trade at least for three decades (Reid 1990: 30). Following the Portuguese, the Spanish ships landed on Tidore, another island in the Moluccas, in November 1521. In order to secure their access to spices, the Spanish established a loose alliance with the Sultan of Tidore. Additionally, they established a treaty with the Portuguese in 1580. During their stay in the Moluccas, the Spanish built a small fortress of *San Pedro y Palelo* in Laman Koura in the early 1600s and also built a settlement *Ave Tadura* in 1633. In sum, the Spanish remained in the Moluccas for 142 years, from 1521 to 1663.

Later, in 1606, the Dutch arrived in the Moluccas. Not long after their arrival in the region, the Dutch, through their United East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie*, VOC), became “the unquestioned winner in the competition for control of the spices and the arteries of trade” world-wide (Reid 1990: 11). Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch remained in the Moluccas, and other regions of modern-day Indonesia, until the outbreak of World War II in the 1940s. Lastly, the British also had their influence on the Moluccas, though only for a short period. The first British merchants arrived in the region in November 1579. Four decades later, in 1620, the British East India Company (EIC) decided to establish their trading post in Ambon, after securing permission from the Dutch VOC. However, it was only

short-lived, since the Dutch charged the British representatives with treason against the VOC and beheaded all ten of these representatives in 1623.⁷ Nearly two centuries later, as the result of the Napoleonic War, when the French invaded the Netherlands and the Dutch king Willem IV fled to England, the British returned to the Moluccas and established their authority in the region. In England, Willem IV issued an instruction to all of Dutch governor-generals in all colonies to hand over their territories to the British in order to avoid annexation by the French. After this chain of events, the British began their attempt to control the Moluccas from 1797 and, between 1801 and 1803, established their government in Ambon before they returned the region to the Dutch. As the result of the further complexity after the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch handed over the authority in the Moluccas, and the rest of their colonial territory in Indonesia to the British in 1810 and only regained it in 1817 (Amal 2007: 160, 164, 190). Altogether, the British presence in the Moluccas was just under two decades.

During their stay in the Moluccas, the European merchants also introduced and spread their Christian faith among the inhabitants of the Moluccas. The spread of Christianity in the region began when the Portuguese introduced Catholicism around in the mid-fifteenth century. According to a historical record, Tabariji, the then-Sultan of Ternate, was the first local leader who converted to Catholicism and was baptized as Don Manuel. Later on, Don Manuel declared Ternate a Christian kingdom, at the same time becoming a Portuguese vassal (Amal 2007: 176). However, the Sultan's declaration had no effect since Islam had by then become deeply rooted in the sultanate. The Spanish authority in the Moluccas continued to introduce Catholicism in the region, especially through the Jesuit mission, until 1613 (Amal 2007: 177). In the period after 1621, the Dutch introduced Protestantism in the Moluccas. In doing so, the Dutch caused the decline of Catholicism in the Moluccas "by driving out the Spanish and Portuguese in these islands [...] where upon Jesuit fathers carried off the remaining [Catholics] with them" and also spread Protestantism in the places previously occupied by Islam or Catholicism (Arnold 1961; 394; Yanuarti et al. 2005: 28). However, after more than two centuries (1621–1880) of Protestant influence, the results were negligible, especially in the northern Moluccas. Only since the mid-nineteenth century were there any measurable results, through the work of the Dutch *Utrechtsche Zending Vereniging* (UZV). Until the early twentieth century, the *Utrechtsche Zending Vereniging* built no less than

eighty schools across the Moluccas, with significant financial support from the Dutch colonial government (Amal 2007: 179, 180, 181). With the attempts to monopolize the spice trade on the islands, imperialism and religious missions, the European presence in the Moluccas brought a dramatic shift in the culture and society of the local people.

Unlike the former Chinese and Arab traders, who came to the Moluccas purely motivated by trade, the Europeans came to control the spice trade and to occupy the region, changing the patterns of cooperation and conflict among local authorities. For instance, the Portuguese entered an alliance with the Sultan of Ternate and Tidore to invade the Sultanates of Bacan and Jailolo in the sixteenth century. In 1606, Don Pedro de Cunha, the then-Spanish governor of the Moluccas, attacked the Portuguese's fortress of Gamlamo which led to a complicated power-sharing in Ternate Island: the Sultanate of Ternate controlled the northern part of the island, the Dutch controlled the central part, and the Spanish controlled the southern and western parts. On another occasion, the Sultan of Ternate was forced to seek military backing from the Dutch in order to withstand mounting pressure from the Spanish. In return, the Sultan approved the Dutch's demand for building fortresses (like *Oranje* and *Coillela Baca*), demand for the full authority to govern an exclusive territory, and naturally the demand for a monopoly on the spice trade. Additionally, the Europeans deeply influenced and controlled the succession of the local sultanates, and captured and banished the sultans and royal families who refused to comply with their demands (Amal 2007: 145, 152, 156). Economically, the Europeans' quest for controlling Moluccan spices caused a decline in the local economic activity since the eighteenth century. Even at the height of the European spice market, very little of the profits were passed on to Malukan hands (Stark and Latinis 1996: 54; Andaya 1991: 93; Reid 1990: 11). Socially, the European greed for Moluccan spices had caused protracted internal conflicts in the region due to the formidable changes in the society, culture, and religion of the local people. Such changes created a deeply segregated society, where the causes for conflicts were latent and rooted in ethnicity and religious issues, and caused the outbreak of large-scale violent conflicts. Such conflicts took place time and again in the region, even back at the very start of the Europeans' presence in the Moluccas, such as the Hitu War (1520–1605), Banda War (1609–1621), Huamual War (1625–1656), Alaka War (1636–1646), and Iha War (1632–1651) (Marasabessy 2002: 27). Therefore, it is important to take into account the effect of colonialism on

the social structure of the Malukan, where the latent causes for violent conflict lie, in order to understand the background of large-scale violent conflict in the area. Undoubtedly, the Dutch contributed to the various shifts in the religious and socio-economic structures of the local people during their 400 years of presence in Maluku.

In terms of religious effects, after introducing Protestantism to Maluku, the Dutch relocated the inhabitants in order to strengthen their control over the people's activities, especially the spice production. For this relocation program, the Dutch divided the new settlements into Muslim villages (*Negeri Salami*) and Christian villages (*Negeri Sarani*). Next, the Dutch provided intensive privileges to the Malukan Protestants by allowing access to western educational institutions. Hence, the Malukan Protestants enjoyed uncontested opportunity to serve in the colonial bureaucracy, army, and police services (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 13, 74). By contrast, the Dutch treated the Malukan who refused to convert to Protestantism as second-class citizens and the Malukan received fewer opportunities for education and employment relative to their Protestant counterparts. For instance, only the Sultan's family members could have access to Dutch educational institutions.

As far as the socio-economic factor is concerned, as early as 1652 the Dutch VOC had enacted the "eradication" (*exterpatie*) policy in order to reduce spice production and control the spice price in the European market (Reid 1990: 14). Under this policy, the Dutch restricted the growth of nutmeg trees in Banda Island and clove trees in Ambon Island. In all other regions, the Dutch destroyed "all spice trees and [prevented] their growth in the future, [...] both wild and domesticated [spice] trees" (Andaya 1991: 82–83). During this era of the Dutch's spice monopoly, local leaders (*raja*, lit. "king") were obligated to maintain spice supply as well as to provide and coordinate labor for spice production. In return, they would receive a certain percentage from the profit of spice sale (*pitisgeld* and *hasilgeld*). Another regulation of the Dutch allowed the local leaders to collect a tax of five guilders per family annually. However, the local leaders from Christian villages received an additional fifty guilders from the Dutch for every member of the village who joined the colonial army (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 16–18). In sum, centuries of Dutch presence in Maluku with their various clumsy regulations had irreversibly altered the social structure and deepened the social segregation among the people. Unfortunately, after gaining independence, the Indonesian state has only prolonged this unfortunate situation.

After Indonesia has become an independent state, the Christians continued enjoying a certain degree of privilege in Maluku's bureaucracy, educational institutions, and security offices. Apart from a short disruption during the emergence of the revolt of the Republic of South Maluku (*Republik Maluku Selatan*, RMS) in 1950, the trend of Christian domination generally continued until the late 1980s to early 1990s. However, the political landscape in Maluku began to shift in another direction in the 1990s. This shift in Maluku's polity was an inherent consequence of the change in Suharto's political orientation at the national level. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Suharto had begun to look for support among Islamic groups, especially, in order to reduce the influence of the military in politics.⁸ The clearest watershed in Suharto's political orientation was the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, ICMI) in 1990. Through the ICMI, Suharto began to mobilize support from the Islamic groups, which had previously been marginalized, while gradually sidelining many of his former supporters, especially those with Javanese Muslim and Christian backgrounds. The composition of the cabinet inaugurated in 1993 was further proof of Suharto's political change. The ICMI representatives dominated the cabinet in numbers, while the number of Christian representatives was reduced and they were only given minor positions. Also, Suharto filled military positions with officers who were highly regarded by Muslim organizations (Bertrand 2002: 68). The change in Suharto's political orientation, according to Bertrand (2002, 2004), caused general uncertainty among the Christians in regard to their role in the Indonesian state. In Maluku, where the demographic composition between the Muslim and Christian community is relatively even, such uncertainty intensified since each group vied for government positions.

In Maluku, religious-based patrimonial networks define the communities' access to local resources through the representation of each group in the local bureaucracy. Moreover, the Christian community had enjoyed privilege in the Malukan bureaucracy for a significant period of time. Therefore, when the political shifts at the national level intruded into the Malukan political sphere, it caused a deep uncertainty among the Christian community. On the other hand, the Muslim community perceived such a political change as an opportunity to redress the imbalance and to establish more control in the local polity (Bertrand 2002, 2004).

The most important indicator of the political reorientation in Maluku occurred when a Muslim, M. Akip Latuconsina, secured the Maluku

gubernatorial position in 1993, followed by another Muslim, M. Saleh Latuconsina, in the 1998–2003 term (Yanuarti et al. 2003; Bertrand 2002, 2004; Van Klinken 2007). Governor M. Akib Latuconsina began an attempt to redress the inequality in Maluku by promoting Muslim bureaucrats to fill various positions in the local government. In the period between 1992 and 1996, all important positions in the Maluku bureaucracy were given to Muslims. Unfortunately, M. Akib Latuconsina's attempt failed to establish equality. In fact, some of his steps produced more inequalities and spurred religious politicization in the province. For example, M. Akib Latuconsina's attempt to appoint the new mayor of the city of Ambon and the new rector of the University of Pattimura, in Maluku, in the 1990s was strongly opposed by Malukan Christians. In another example, the provincial authority's attempt to establish balance between Muslim and Christian teachers also produced acrimony among the Malukans. As most teachers in Maluku were Christians, the head of the Maluku education office promoted a large number of new teachers. The problem was that he promoted mostly Muslim teachers, who had originally come from places outside Maluku. As he himself was a Muslim from Southeast Sulawesi, the Christian community saw the attempt as an injustice. The faculty of education is the best faculty at the University of Pattimura and was also heavily influenced by the Christian community. The Malukan Christians did not uncompromisingly oppose the provincial government's attempts to establish a new equality by appointing officers based on religious lines in Maluku. However, they demanded that these attempts should be based on a merit system and the Christian community should be given positions based on their abilities and strengths (Yanuarti et al. 2003; Bertrand 2002, 2004).

Overall, a team of researchers from the Indonesian Institute of Science (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*, LIPI) concluded that the increase of Muslim positions in politics and bureaucracy since the early 1990s was spurred by the rise of Islam in Maluku, which reflected three new demographic developments (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 76). First, it reflected the growing awareness among Muslims in regard to their increasing number. Second, it reflected the awareness among the Muslims regarding their increasing social status. While the Christians traditionally enjoyed educational privileges, the Muslim community also began to have a better access to the education system, especially since the 1970s. For instance, M. Saleh Latuconsina graduated from the respected Bandung Institute of Technology, and finished his master and doctoral degree in France.

Thirdly, as a result of these two developments, Malukan Muslims had become more assertive in expressing their political aspirations. Finally, these three developments cannot be separated from the demographic changes in Maluku since 1960, when the number of Muslims in the province increased.

The first major cause for the demographic change was the arrival of the Javanese in Maluku, mainly due to the government's transmigration program.⁹ Additionally, the increasing number of the Muslims in the local bureaucracy also rose as Jakarta sent more officials to Maluku. The second cause was the arrival of the Buginese and Makassarese people from South Sulawesi. Unlike the Javanese transmigrants, who generally lived in the rural areas and worked as farmers, the Buginese and Makassarese mostly came to Maluku to trade in informal sectors, which after some periods of time, they began to dominate. While the Maluku's demographic landscape had previously been divided between Muslim and Christian villages, the arrival of newcomers set another social classification: the native people (*anak negeri*) and the migrants (*anak dagang*, lit. traders) (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 22). This complex segregation of Muslims, Christians, natives, and migrants meant that the pattern of social interaction in Maluku is dominated by, according to Bartels, "cooperation and conflict, with less competition" (Bartels 2003: 105 quoted in Yanuarti et al. 2005: 193). As the social tension grew in the last years of the New Order regime, the pattern of conflict among the Malukan reached an unprecedented level.

When the Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia at the end of the New Order era, the latent sources of conflict in Maluku subsided into three issues: land ownership, economic disparity, and power struggle for bureaucratic positions. In regard to the land ownership, the flow of newcomers to Maluku and population density increased the need for more land. Consequently, this situation caused disputes over the ownership of communal land rights (*tanah ulayat*) involving Muslim and Christian communities, as well as between the natives of Maluku and the migrants. Relating to the economic disparity, the conflicts arose between native Malukans and the Muslim migrants. As I mentioned earlier, the Christian Malukans traditionally dominated the formal sectors, especially the local bureaucracy. However, the financial crisis had disrupted this sector and job growth decreased. Meanwhile, as was occurring everywhere else in Indonesia, ordinary Indonesians turned to the informal economic sector during the crisis. This was less true, however, for the Christian Malukans since the informal sector had been dominated by the Muslims, especially

by the Buginese and Makassarese immigrants. As far as the power struggle inside the bureaucracy is concerned, the demographic changes also brought more Muslims to fill higher positions in the local government since the 1990s. With such ongoing latent sources of conflict, the social tension in Maluku reached an all-time high as the sudden political transition in the late 1990s raised further uncertainty within communities. There was a growing fear among both the Muslim and Christian communities that each group might lose their relative position *vis-à-vis* the other in the Malukan polity. The Muslims claimed that the Christians were utilizing the political transition in order to restore their dominance which they already had since the colonial era. On the other hand, the Christians feared that the Muslims would use the turmoil of the political transition in order to advance their power at the cost of the Christians. Furthermore, the Christian community was concerned about the “Islamization” of Maluku, which entailed the fear that the Muslims might dominate the local bureaucracy and gain the upper hand in the regional demographic composition (Yanuarti et al. 2005: 7; Bertrand 2002: 58–59; 2004: 114). With all of this social tension, a period of large-scale violent conflict finally erupted in Maluku.

2 THE MALUKU SECURITY PROBLEM IN THE SECURITIZATION CONTEXT

In accordance with the framework for analysis developed in Chap. 2, I divide the discussion on the Indonesian act of securitization in relation to the Maluku conflict into four parts. I will begin this section by outlining the development of the conflict into six phases. The analysis of the phases of conflict should provide a background for the discussion in the following parts. Like in Chap. 5, in the next step I will frame the conflict of Maluku as a security issue in the context of securitization theory based upon the pertinent analytical categories of *existential threat*, *referent object*, *emergency situation*, and *extraordinary measure*. In the following part, I will analyze the government’s decision to securitize the conflict of Maluku in order to go beyond normal politics and deal with the separatist threat in an emergency mode. This analysis will also make reference to four securitization variables, namely *securitizing actors*, *speech acts*, *audience*, and *facilitating conditions*. In the last part, I will evaluate the effectiveness of Jakarta’s securitization act in ending the communal conflict in the region.

A team of researchers from the Indonesian Institute of Science divide the Maluku conflict period into six phases: (1) the conditioning phase, where smaller scale conflicts began to erupt starting in September 1998; (2) the outbreak of large-scale conflicts on 19 January 1999 and their decline in March and April 1999; (3) the post-election period, when a new series of conflicts erupted after the June 1999 election; (4) the arrival of *Laskar Jihad*, an extremist Muslim militia; (5) the declaration of the state of civil emergency in June 2000; and (6) the conflict settlement starting after October 2002 (Yanuarti et al. 2003).

The conditioning phase of Maluku conflicts began with small-scale conflicts and fighting in Bak Air village on 27 September 1998, in Wailete village on 13 December 1998 (these villages are located in Ambon), and Dobo village (in Aru Islands) on 15–16 January 1999. The conflict in Bak Air broke out when people threw pigs which belonged to Christians in the houses of some Muslims. In Wailete, where the Muslims were the majority, the conflict began with a dispute between a soldier and a guest at a wedding party. After the dispute, Wailete village was attacked by the villagers of Hatife Besar. In Dobo, the conflict was merely triggered by a quarrel between two drunken men (Hehanusa 2014: 100). Even though these three conflicts were initiated by three different, yet trivial, causes, the similarity between them was that the villagers were immediately divided according to their religions and they targeted worship buildings for destruction and arson.

The second phase is the turning point of the escalation of the conflict in Maluku. The large-scale conflict was sparked by a youth brawl at the local Batu Merah bus station in the city of Ambon between a native Christian minivan driver and a Buginese migrant Muslim.¹⁰ One version of the story holds that the Buginese, a thug, threatened the driver with a machete and asked for some money. The driver after refusing to do so, escaped from the location, took his machete, and returned back to the bus station looking for the would-be mugger. The Buginese ran to his Muslim majority neighborhood and screamed that a Christian was trying to kill him. The other story maintains that the driver worked for a Buginese minibus owner. When the Buginese owner sent his man to collect the daily cash that the driver was obligated to pay, the latter refused to hand the money over and instead harassed the Buginese messenger with help from his compatriots. The Buginese messenger managed to escape, gathered his friends, and looked for revenge. Yet another version of the reason for the conflict in Maluku was a brawl between villagers from Batu Merah Dalam and Batu

Merah, in the same city. The brawl spread toward the border to the neighboring village of Mardika. Suddenly, the fighting villagers started attacking the villagers of Mardika, who had come out to watch the brawl. Regardless of what the real reason was, for most of the Ambonese at that time, youth brawls were quite common and the villagers would immediately settle their problem after the fights ended. However, the brawl in Batu Merah and Mardika was quite unusual since the brawl shortly escalated into widespread conflicts with a deep inter-religious dimension. Additionally, this conflict occurred exactly on the Muslim's after-*Ramadhan* holiday of *Eid-ul Fitr*. Therefore, the event was also known as “the Bloody *Eid-ul Fitr* (*Idul Fitri Berdarah*).” By that evening, rumors had spread like wild fire. The most destructive rumors, which later proved to be untrue, was that the mobs had burned down the Al-Fatah mosque and the Silo church, the biggest worship houses for Muslims and Christians in Ambon. Due to this rumor, the people of Ambon immediately divided along religious lines, with the Muslims wearing white head bands and the Christian wearing red ones (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 81–88). The rumor about the arson attack spread out beyond the city of Ambon. For instance, the thought that the Christians had burned down the Al-Fatah mosque fiercely provoked the Muslims in the Leihatu region. As a result, on 20 February 1999, the people from several villages in Leihatu headed to Ambon and torched down Christian villages, like Telaga Kodok, Hunuth, Bentang Karang, Hila, and Weiheru, along their way (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 58). After a period of conflicts, the intensity in Maluku decreased and the situation slowly returned to normal in April–May 1999. However, another phase of conflict was about to emerge following the June 1999 general elections.

The third phase was marked by the growing tension of the Malukan Muslims and Christians in the following days after the general elections. However, the increasing political tension between these two groups had been growing since the breakdown of the New Order regime in 1998. Since the Malukan political aspirations had been divided along the religious line, the political parties became symbols of religious affiliation. The Malukan Muslims and the Muslim migrants, especially from the South Sulawesi areas of Buton, Bugis, and Makassar (BBM) associated themselves with Islamic parties and the Golkar party (as the then-President, B.J. Habibie was a Golkar party's elite and a Makassarese). Meanwhile, the Malukan Christians and Christian migrants affiliated themselves with the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan*, PDI-P). The PDI-P was and has never been a Christian party,

but the PDI-P in Maluku was led by a former leader of the Indonesian Christian Party (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*) and some leaders were from the Malukan Protestant Church (Yanuarti et al. 2005: 2, 41; Van Klinken 2007: 101). When the PDI-P won the elections in Ambon with 54.49 percent of the votes, another rumor began to spread: the Christians had used the previous conflict period to drive out tens of thousands of Muslim migrants from Maluku in order to secure the PDI-P's win, and therefore, the Christians would rule in the province (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 60). With the increasing tensions in both Muslim and Christian communities after the elections, a conflict broke out involving residents of a Muslim village of Siri Sori and a Christian village of Ulath in Saparua on 15 July 1999. The second post-election conflict broke out in Ambon's village of Poka on 29 July 1999. On 26 December 1999, the biggest post-election conflict occurred after the arson attacks on the Silo church and An-Nur mosque, the day after Christmas. One result of the conflicts in this phase of Maluku conflicts was the emergence of new labels representing each community: *Acang* (from Hassan) for the Muslims and *Obet* (from Robert) for the Christians.

Another important development in this phase of Maluku conflicts were the strikes in several Indonesian cities like Jakarta, Semarang, Surakarta, Pekanbaru, and others. The student Islamic and youth organizations, like the Indonesian Committee of Muslim Students (*Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*, KAMMI), Furkon (an Islamic youth organization), and the Crescent and Star Party's (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB) youth wing dominated these rallies. Also, some Muslim leaders, like the former minister of finance Fuad Bawazir, Amien Rais of *Muhammadiyah* (also the then-chairperson of *Muhammadiyah* and the then-spokesperson of the People's Representative Assembly, MPR), Hamzah Haz of the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP), Ahmad Sumargono of the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, DDII) and the Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam*, KISDI), and Ja'far Umar Thalib, the chief patron of the *Laskar Jihad* militia, attended the meetings. In general, these protestors demanded the government to take some strong and firm measures in order to end the violence in Maluku and condemn the killings of Muslims in the region. However, those open-air general meetings (*tabligh akbar*) led to the initiative for sending thousands of *Laskar Jihad* militias to Maluku. For example, organizations like the Islamic Defender Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI), the People's

Communication Forum for the Province of North Maluku (*Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Provinsi Maluku Utara*, Forkap-Malut), and the *Laskar Jihad* called for *jihad* and began recruiting volunteers to be sent to Maluku. Until mid-January 1999 several hundred *jihadi* volunteers had already signed up their names. Another report mentioned that some 3000 members, who called themselves the *Ablus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* group, had started military exercises around the Bogor area in West Java province. In April 2000, these *jihadi* militias arrived in Maluku. The security authority in the region gave their permission for the *jihadi* groups to enter Maluku since the latter's official objective was to provide humanitarian assistance for the Malukan Muslims who were being victimized in the conflict. It was reported that by May 2000 there were already some 4000 *jihadi* members in Maluku (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 62; Bertrand 2002: 79, 84; 2004: 127, 131, 132). The arrival of these *jihadi* groups in the region ushered in the fourth phase of the Maluku conflict.

The arrival of *Laskar Jihad* militias in Maluku, on 26 April 2000, suddenly changed the course of the Maluku conflict. Unlike the Malukan fighters, who used traditional weapons like machetes, bows and arrows, and home-made fire arms, the *Laskar Jihad* brought automatic rifles with them, and used sophisticated communication equipment. Therefore, their arrival altered the balance of power between the Muslims and the Christian in Maluku, benefitting the former. The attacks on Christian villages was now better coordinated, with the main strategy to expel the Christians entirely from the Muslim-dominated area or to empty the Christians from the village before burning it down.

The fifth phase of the Maluku conflict was marked by Jakarta's more assertive effort to end violence in the province. One particular attempt in this direction was the declaration of the state of civil emergency and, hence, the imposition of martial law in Maluku. Another major attempt was Jakarta's initiative to broker peace talks between the Muslims and the Christians. These peace talks took place in the South Sulawesi city of Malino from 11–12 February 2002 and became known as the Malino Treaty II (*Perjanjian Malino II*). However, Jakarta's attempt did not bring any satisfying outcome. The imposition of martial law did not significantly reduce the level of violence. Similarly, various violent incidents continued after the signing of the Malino II Treaty. Nevertheless, the violence began to decrease in mid-2002.

The sixth phase was the period when the conflict in Maluku began to de-escalate. Even though some violence, arson attacks, bomb explosions,

and shootings still occurred several times afterwards, these incidents failed to provoke the people of both communities to take any revenge. According to the team of LIPI researchers, the ability of the people to restrain themselves from resorting to violence was the result of the conflict fatigue and the new growing awareness among the Malukans for not responding to provocative issues. Both the Malukan Muslims and Christians began to realize that the conflicts had been used by those benefiting from the ongoing instability in the province for their group's vested interests or political purposes.

2.1 *Existential Threat, Referent Object, and Emergency Situation*

Even though the latent sources for social tension had been on the ground since the 1990s, there was still no strong sign that the communal conflict would begin shortly after B.J. Habibie became president in May 1998. However, the situation began to worsen from September to December 1998. The violence between Muslims and Christians on 19 January 1999, which was also the day when the Muslims celebrated the *Eid al-Fitr* holiday after *Ramadhan*, marked the beginning of prolonged communal conflict in Maluku for the next three years. Hence, the existential threat of this protracted conflict could not be denied since "violence between Christians and Muslims in Maluku was unprecedented" (Bertrand 2002: 84), which made the Maluku capital of Ambon become "the theater of the most shocking violence seen in Indonesia" since the mid-1960s (Van Klinken 2007: 88). In the first month of Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency, the communal violence had dramatically escalated and set a precedent for similar conflicts to break out in other places, especially in the North Maluku province and in the city of Poso, in Central Sulawesi.

The violent conflict in North Maluku was the result of local elites' competition after the central government made this region a new province. Tensions began to rise as a result of a series of heated debates regarding the possible candidate and the new province's capital city. However, the real trigger for the outbreak of large-scale conflict was the clash between the Makians (dominantly Muslim) and the Kao (dominantly Christian) people, related to the creation of a new sub-district in Halmahera. The complicated networks and alliances between religions and ethnicities finally led to religious politicization and the polarization of the society along religious lines. In the next stage, the anti-Christian sentiment had

begun firstly in Ternate and Tidore, which spread out into the rest of North Maluku in a short time. The communal conflict in North Maluku kept recurring for over the remainder of the year and it claimed no less than 3000 lives (Wilson 2008).

Similar to the Maluku and North Maluku case, the communal violence in Poso was also rooted in Muslim and Christian elites' competition to secure the regent post. The first clash in Poso occurred at the same time when the smaller clashes broke out in Maluku, in December 1998. This clash did not escalate into a larger conflict. However, the next clash sharply escalated after it broke out in April 2000 (Aragon 2001). The authorities never released the exact number of casualties during the Poso conflict; however, moderate estimates say that the conflict claimed at least 1000 lives and displaced around 25,000 residents, both the Muslims and Christians.¹¹ Since the communal violence which firstly broke out in Maluku had spread into other regions and mobilized people on religious grounds in many Indonesian cities, the referent object of this conflict was, thus, clearly the Indonesian state.

At the local level, the conflict had not only prevented the state bureaucracy from carrying out its functions and created a vacuum of power in the state authority, but also had the state institutions divided into religious affiliations.¹² In the Maluku capital of Ambon, the general public associated the governor's office with Muslim groups, and the office of the city's mayor office with the Christian groups.¹³ Also, a number of local officials became targets of violent acts. For example, the governor, M. Saleh Latuconsina, revealed how he became a shooting target when he was on the way home. On two other occasions, grenades exploded in the governor's official house, where M. Saleh Latuconsina lived and accommodated a significant number of refugees.¹⁴ With such a worsening development, Maluku emerged as one of Indonesia's most troublesome areas. Especially with the new wave of violence after the June 1999 election, the situation had gone from bad to worse and it seemed there was no other alternative for the central government than the use of extraordinary measures.

2.2 *Extraordinary Measures*

Even though the security situation in post-June 1999 reached its lowest point, the use of extraordinary measures in the form of the deployment of security troops was visible soon after the outbreak of the first major clash in January 1999. The reinforcement of some 5300 additional troops from

the military and the national police to strengthen the existing security forces in Maluku between January and March 1999 marked the first extraordinary measures taken by the central government in order to deal with the situation. The additional security forces also included the elite unit of Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Kostrad) from South Sulawesi. Apart from the *Kostrad* troops, the military leader also deployed the naval units from the Marines to Maluku. However, the number of stationed forces in Maluku remained far from sufficient to handle the clashes involving around one-and-a-half million residents and spreading across more than one hundred islands. With this background, the government's next securitization move took place when the then-Minister of Defense and Security and the Commander of the Armed Forces, Gen. Wiranto, upgraded the Maluku Sub-Regional Military Command (*Komando Resort Militer*, Korem) into the new Pattimura/XVI Regional Military Command (*Komando Daerah Militer*, Kodam) on 15 May 1999, and appointed a Malukan officer, Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela as the commander. The objective behind the creation of this new military command was to simplify the coordination of troop rotation. For example, the military leadership pulled out a significant number of troops from Sulawesi, which predominantly consisted of Muslim Buginese, in order to win the trust of the people and reduce suspicions concerning the soldiers' impartiality. Another major objective was to strengthen the military chain of command and control over the soldiers stationed in Maluku (Bertrand 2002:80; 2004: 128). This newly established military garrison was responsible for overseeing the Maluku and North Maluku provinces. With the establishment of this garrison, the number of military forces stationed in Maluku increased to 6000 troops by November 1999. Two months later, the government deployed even more troops in Maluku and brought some 11,250 soldiers, or equal to five battalions, to Maluku (Bertrand 2002: 78–80; 2004: 127–129; Bhakti et al. 2009: 25).

The government's major securitization act in handling the Maluku conflict occurred when Abdurrahman Wahid signed Presidential Instruction No. 88/2000, following the advice of Gen. Wiranto and Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela. With this decree, Jakarta declared a state of civil emergency and imposed martial law in Maluku (and also in North Maluku). The enactment of this emergency situation referred to the Law No. 23/Prp/1958 on the State of Emergency. For the implementation of martial law, the central government appointed Maluku Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina (together with the acting governor of the North Maluku

province, Brig. Gen. Abdul Muhyi Effendi) as the local civil emergency administrator (*Penguasa Darurat Sipil Daerah*, PDSD). Having received instructions, M. Saleh Latuconsina issued the Instruction (*Maklumat PDSD*) No. 1 on 27 June 2000. The instruction stipulated: (1) the imposition of a dawn-to-dusk curfew in Maluku; (2) the restriction for conducting meetings with ten people or more without any clear objective; and (3) the decision to set a deadline for the people to surrender their weapons on 30 June 2000.¹⁵ Apart from this instruction, M. Saleh Latuconsina also issued the Regulation No. 1/PDSMD/VII/2000 stipulating the investigation of people who wanted to enter Maluku, and Regulation No. 05/PDSMD/V/2002 stipulating the restriction for people who wanted to enter Maluku without any clear purpose.¹⁶

With the enactment of martial law, the security leadership increased the number of security forces in Maluku to some 14,000 personnel, consisting of seven army battalions and two police mobile brigades (*Brigadir Mobile*, Brimob) battalions. In order to balance the number of police personnel stationed in Maluku who were mainly Christians, the security leadership also sent an additional battalion of police from Makassar, South Sulawesi, and another battalion from Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi. The members of both these battalions were mainly Muslims (Bhakti et al. 2009: 25). Within this operational command, the military leadership also formed a joint-battalion which consisted of 450 personnel and was comprised of elite units from all the military branches: the army special forces command, the navy marine corps, and the air-force special force corps (Rabasa and Haseman 2002; 93). M. Saleh Latuconsina also gave instructions for the navy officers stationed in Maluku to investigate everybody who wanted to enter Maluku from the seaports. The aim of this move was to deny access of weapons suppliers to Maluku from places outside the province. Together with this, the navy officers also had the authority to forbid or deport any person or group who tried to enter Maluku and could not show clear documents or behaved suspiciously. With such authority, the navy managed to block at least sixty-seven ships and eight boats carrying weapons and ammunition before entering Maluku (Bhakti et al. 2009: 26).

Another important decision of the security forces' leadership was the replacement of the military and police chief in Maluku. The then-Minister of Defense and Security and the Commander of the Armed Forces, Gen. Wiranto, began this policy by replacing the Maluku police chief soon after the outbreak of violence in January 1999. During the three years of the Maluku conflict, the security forces' leadership replaced the Maluku police

chief seven times and the Maluku military commander three times. The major cause for this replacement policy was to prevent troops from taking sides with the warring parties and decreasing the Malukans' distrust toward the security forces operating in the region. In the Maluku military leadership, Gen. Wiranto replaced Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela, with Brig. Gen. Made Yasa, a Balinese Hindu. Later on, Brig. Gen. Made Yasa also continued this policy within his own garrison. For example, he pulled out soldiers who took sides during the conflict and sent them to East Java, replaced the Maluku Military District Commander (*Komandan Distrik Militer*, Dandim), and replaced the intelligence and territorial officers within the Kodam XVII/Pattimura military command. Simultaneously, the then-Chief of Maluku Police, Brig. Gen. Pol. Firman Gani, also pursued the same course of action in his unit. He sent some 600 police officers out of Maluku and sanctioned at least eighty-seven of police personnel who were involved in the conflict (Bhakti et al. 2009: 27).

The security force leadership also engineered the securitization moves in Maluku to ensure a good coordination between the military and the police at the operational level. For this objective, in May 2002, the then-Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, replaced the Commander of Kodam XVI/Pattimura military command Brig. Gen. Moestopo with Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso. At the same time, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto announced that Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso would also act as the Commander of the Security Restoration Operation Command (*Panglima Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan*, Pangkoopslihkam). To carry out this task, Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso would receive assistance from the then-Maluku Police Chief, Brig. Gen. (Pol) Soenarko DA, as the deputy commander of this newly formed security task force. With the creation of this Security Restoration Operation Command, Maj. Gen. Djoko Susanto held the control of whole security operations in Maluku, including both military and police operations. Nevertheless, the supreme political authority remained in the hands of Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina, as the civil emergency administrator.¹⁷ The creation of the Security Restoration Operation Command, according to M. Saleh Latuconsina, was a result of an evaluation of the effectiveness of martial law, two years after it had been imposed in Maluku. The then-Commander of the Armed Forces, Admiral Widodo A.S., supported the former's statement in his public speech, explaining that the creation of the new operation command was the civil emergency administrator's decision to handle the conflict in the context of martial law.¹⁸

2.3 *Securitizing Actors and Speech Acts*

The Indonesian legislators became the dominant securitizing actors in the case of the communal conflicts in Maluku. Since 1999, the politicians had constantly urged the government to securitize the worsening situation in Maluku and employ extraordinary measures. This can be shown by their public endorsements of martial law, whether it be a state of civil emergency or a state of military emergency to respond to security disturbance in Maluku. Here are some examples of the politicians' securitizing speech acts.

In the late December 1999, legislator Soetardjo Soerjoguritno, the then-deputy spokesperson of the People's Representative Council from the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, opined that "the imposition of the state of military emergency in Maluku was the best alternative to keeping the people from losing their lives [...]. The death of so many people was the result of the government security forces' negligence."¹⁹ In the same vein, legislator Syahrial Agamas from the United Development Party stated that "if the government does not immediately declare the state of emergency status [in Maluku], victims would keep falling."²⁰ Another legislator, Syamsul Mu'arif from the Golkar Party, preferred the imposition of a lower level of civil emergency rather than the military one. According to him, "the declaration of the state of military emergency is an unavoidable option. Nevertheless, it should be the last resort. We should follow the stage of emergency level like starting from the state of civil emergency."²¹ Prior to the declaration of martial law in June 2002, there were increased calls for tougher measures from the government. Amien Rais, the then-chairperson of the People's Consultative Assembly, also stated his support for declaring martial law in Maluku. He told the press that "I agree with the imposition of the state of civil emergency in Ambon. I totally agree. If it is necessary, impose the state of military emergency, since the conflict keeps recurring and even increasing."²²

At the executive level, the role of the securitizing actors is also obvious. The then-State Minister of Human Rights, Hasballah M. Saad, argued that: "it is the obligation for the state to end the violence in Maluku with any necessary means, including the imposition of the state of civil emergency. But, what is important is that the imposition of the martial law must not cause further human right violations."²³ The then-Commander of the Armed Forces, Admiral Widodo AS, also told the press about his agreement to the imposition of martial law, during his visit to the military academy in Magelang, Central Java.²⁴

Apart from politicians and high-ranking state officers, some representatives of civil society groups also played a role as securitizing actors at the height of the conflict. For example, Thalib Hasan, from the Forum of Malukan People's Organizations (*Forum Organisasi Masyarakat Maluku, Formatku*), argued that "it was the only way to save both the conflicting parties in Maluku, and impose martial law in the region."²⁵ After nearly a year of martial law in Maluku, Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina (together with the acting governor of North Maluku province) also requested an extension of martial law in his capacity as the local administrator of the civil emergency. Receiving such a proposal, the then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, announced that the government would continue the state of civil emergency in Maluku.²⁶

The above-mentioned dynamics was the first wave of securitization speech acts in regard to the communal conflict in Maluku. The next wave occurred in mid-2002. Interestingly, the call for intensifying the state's securitization acts emerged after the peace dialogs took place (see the desecuritization part in this chapter). Precisely, the call for upgrading the state of civil emergency into a military one emerged after some supporters of the pro-independence Maluku Sovereignty Forum (*Forum Kedaulatan Maluku, FKM*) raised the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) flag on the RMS anniversary, on 25 April 2002.²⁷ After this incident, the discourse regarding the Maluku conflict shifted to the issue of separatism. Consequently, actors emerged making speeches on the possibility of further securitization.

Protestors in the Maluku capital of Ambon demanded that "tough actions must be taken against those who raised the RMS flag" during a dialog with Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina, Maluku Police Chief Brig. Gen. Soenarko, and Pattimura Military Command Chief Brig. Gen. Moestopo. In Jakarta, Vice-President Hamzah Haz said RMS must be quelled because it was a separatist movement "and it has affected the country's sovereignty."²⁸ The then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, made a statement indicating the possibility of taking tougher action. After attending a meeting with President Megawati Soekarnoputri, Yudhoyono stated, "it is possible to declare the state of the military emergency if the situation is eventually worsening and could no longer be dealt with the state of civil emergency."²⁹ Similarly, the then-National Police Chief, Gen. (Pol) Da'I Bachtiar, confirmed that "there was a movement in that direction, but it

has yet to be decided. If the situation keeps worsening, there is a possibility that the martial law level will be increased.”³⁰

In the legislature, the idea of increasing the level of martial law in Maluku gained momentum. For example, since the situation, especially in Ambon, had become highly destructive, legislator Chatibul Umam Wiranu from the National Awakening Party (PKB) stated that “for protecting the citizens I recommend declaring the state of military emergency only in Ambon city, not in other districts.”³¹

Through these securitization speech acts, almost all of the securitization moves in regard to the Maluku communal conflict were completed. These moves started during the B.J. Habibie presidency, which was marked by the deployment of additional security forces in Maluku and the establishment of the XVI/Pattimura army garrison. Securitization moves culminated when Abdurrahman Wahid signed a decree to impose a state of civil emergency in Maluku, which was continued by the subsequent Megawati Sukarnoputri government. However, a securitization speech act for increasing the level of martial law into the military emergency never took place.

2.4 *Audience*

By and large, the securitizing actors in the B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri presidencies succeeded in convincing their audiences to allow the securitization acts to come into effect. The government’s securitization moves in the case of Maluku also support my framework of analysis which stipulates that different contexts of a security situation created different audiences. The first example relates to the imposition of martial law in Maluku. In this regard, the securitizing actors targeted President B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid as the main audiences of securitization.

Soon after the outbreak of large-scale communal conflicts in Maluku capital of Ambon in January 1999, some securitization speeches, which called on the government to take stern measures, had emerged until B.J. Habibie’s presidency ultimately failed. According to the then-Minister of State Secretary, Akbar Tandjung, President B.J. Habibie refused the proposal to impose martial law in Maluku since he was concerned about Indonesia’s overall image. In B.J. Habibie’s view, taking such action would send the message that Indonesia was not a safe country.³²

B.J. Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, also initially refused to impose martial law. He was concerned that the declaration of martial law,

and therefore the use of coercive means, would only intensify the violence without being able to find more sufficient solutions. His position was that dialogs and negotiations between the conflicting parties would be more appropriate to end the conflict. Inter-community dialogs and negotiations would address the problem at the grassroots level and provide a more effective resolution to the conflict. However, the securitizing actors at the time refused to subscribe to Wahid's idea. For instance, legislator Hamdan Zoelva from the Crescent and Star Party bluntly charged Abdurrahman Wahid with being a source of the problem. He was skeptical of the idea that the Malukan society would be able to solve their problem, stating that "they are obviously fighting against each other. How can they solve the problem by themselves? I argue, there must be the central government's intervention in order to end the conflict."³³ In the end, the securitizing actors succeeded in convincing Abdurrahman Wahid, and he signed the presidential instruction for imposing martial law.

Another example was M. Saleh Latuconsina's recommendation in his capacity as the civil emergency administrator for extending the martial law in Maluku. On this occasion, the Malukan martial law administrator targeted President Megawati Sukarnoputri and the legislators as audiences.

This recommendation, however, showed that the Malukan high-ranking officers had changed their position. When the discussion about the imposition of martial law in Maluku emerged for the first time, Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina and a number of local legislators initially refused the idea. According to a University of Indonesia's sociologist and Malukan scholar, Thamrin Amal Tomaloga, the reason behind the refusal was a concern among the local authority that the military would dominate security affairs in Maluku. Additionally, there was doubt about the impartiality of military soldiers.³⁴

2.5 *Facilitating Conditions*

As far as the role of the general public's opinion is concerned, I argue that its position on the Maluku conflict, like in the case of the Aceh separatist conflict, was one of the facilitating conditions for Jakarta's securitization acts and it played less of a role as an audience. The public, in general, does not have a direct channel to carry out a securitization act. At best, the public's overall perception of a certain issue can influence the securitization decision-making process within official state bodies. In the case of the Maluku conflict, the perception of the Indonesian public generally

supported the imposition of martial law. A survey conducted by the Indonesian national daily newspaper, *Kompas*, from 28 to 30 June 2000 revealed that 76 percent of respondents agreed with the Jakarta's securitization move to handle the situation in Maluku. These respondents were also convinced that the imposition of martial law in Maluku would impact positively on the situation in the region.³⁵ When the call for increasing the martial law level to the state of military emergency occurred in mid-2002, it failed to convince the general public. Another survey conducted by *Kompas* around that time showed that most of the respondents disagreed with the plan to declare military emergency in Maluku in response to the increasing tension in the region. Fifty-five percent of the respondents preferred to make the implementation of the existing civil emergency status in Maluku more effective.³⁶

Similar to the Aceh conflict (see Chap. 5), I also argue that the political dynamics in Jakarta and the insufficient defense budget were the other facilitating conditions for the securitization of the Maluku conflict. Related to the former point, the post-Suharto governments left security issues in the hands of high-ranking military officers in order to gain their support. Related to the latter point, the Maluku case also offered a "conflict economy" for the soldiers in the field. According to the Maluku Conflict Report issued by Kodam XVI/Pattimura military command in 2002, one reason, among others, behind "the involvement of military officers in conflict occurring either individually or assembly (in small groups)" (Bhakti et al. 2009: 28) was economic motivation such as offering their skill "as marksmen" to the highest payer, extorting protection money from the people, "selling ammunition and renting, even selling, military or police rifles" (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 189).

The final facilitating condition stemmed from the social environment, specifically from the Islamic groups. These groups put strong pressure on the government to stop the killing of their Muslim brethren in Maluku. The government's initial hesitancy to declare martial law in Maluku, had, to a certain degree, provided grounds for some conservative groups to take their own action, like recruiting volunteers to fight *jihad* in Maluku. The arrival of those *jihadi* militias intensified the violence in the region. In order to tame those militias, the security authority needed more troops and logistic enforcement, a more sophisticated operational command, specific legal provisions and political decision. Hence, the declaration of martial law would provide the entire requirements needed by the security authorities. Having presented these

arguments, now I will evaluate whether the act of securitization was effective in solving the conflict in Maluku.

2.6 *Evaluation of the Securitization of Maluku Conflict*

In order to evaluate securitization in the context of the Maluku conflict, one could ask whether or not securitization ended the conflict and improved the security situation in the province. For this objective, I will focus on the correlation between the security response and the threat it faced. Using this approach will provide plausible grounds for the use of force for peace enforcement and curbing the fighting capability of the warring groups in Maluku. As the communal violence in Maluku had led to the absence of an official authority, the absence of functioning governance, and the absence of law and order among the population, the central government had reasonable cause for its act of securitization, in order to exercise its sovereignty.

At the beginning, the large-scale violence between the Muslim and Christian communities was limited to the city of Ambon. However, as the rumors about attacks targeting religious buildings spread, it mobilized crowds in other areas. In the following months, the conflict escalated, until almost the entirety of Maluku had become a theater for an unprecedented inter-religious war by the end of December 1999. The Maluku conflict also set a precedent for a similar conflict to take place in Maluku's neighboring regions. Ultimately, the fighters from both communities waged war against each other, on and off, for the next three years. Therefore, I argue that the government's securitization act to end the communal conflict in Maluku was not effective. Instead, the ultimate problem was the lack of professionalism among the security personnel on the ground.

The first predicament of securitization policy in the case of the Maluku conflict was significant. It occurred when a number of security personnel stationed in Maluku failed to maintain their neutrality. During the violence in September 1999, it was reported that the Mobile Brigade (*Brigade Mobile*, Brimop) from Maluku Police headquarters, who were mainly Christians, took sides with the Christian community. On the other hand, the newly deployed Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Kostrad) troops from South Sulawesi, took sides with the Muslim community, since its troops were mainly Buginese and Makassarese Muslims (Bertrand 2002: 84; 2004:

131). In the following time period, the security personnel not only took sides in the conflict but also supplied the warring parties with weapons and ammunitions. The then-Head of Maluku Task Force (*Kelompok Kerja Masalah Maluku*), Let. Gen. Suadi Marasabessy, a Malukan army officer, stated that the warring parties only used traditional and home-made weapons during the early phase of the conflict. However, according to his team's findings, those warring parties began to use standard military weapons in mid-1999 (Bhakti et al. 2009: 26).³⁷ The problem of neutrality within the Kodam Pattimura/XVI military command structure can also be found, where different battalions split along religious lines. The troops of Battalion 734, who were predominantly from Central Maluku and Christians, helped the Christians in several clashes. In the same vein, the troops of Battalion 733, who were predominantly from North Maluku and Muslims, assisted the Muslims. The lack of impartiality of the security forces personnel continued until the imposition of martial law in Maluku. For instance, in the public perception the Joint Battalion (*Batalion Gabungan, Yon Gap*) leaned toward the Christians, while Battalions 407 and 408 supported the Muslims (Bhakti et al. 2009: 27).

In fact, the security forces' leadership officially admitted the problem of impartiality among the troops during the conflict. In a coordination meeting with the People's Consultative Council's Commission I and II, the then-Maluku Police Chief, Brig. Gen (Pol) Edi Darnadi, openly stated that the Maluku conflict had spread beyond its original groups, which also affected his personnel. Therefore this issue was also a problem in handling the conflict. He even made a suggestion to pull out all the existing Maluku police personnel and recruit new personnel from outside the region in order to assure police neutrality. The meeting was also attended by the then-Commander of the Armed Force and Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and the then-Commander of Kodam XVI/Pattimura military command, Brig. Gen Moestopo.³⁸

The second predicament was violent clashes within the security forces. The violence involving security force units not only appeared in the form of supporting one or the other warring party, but also between security units. The first devastating incident occurred in August 1999 when a number of troops from the Army Strategic Reserve Command exchanged fire with men of the Police Mobile Brigade (*Brigade Mobile, Brimob*). This incident claimed one life from troops, injured at least eighteen Kostrad

troops and four Brimob personnel. In the second incident, a number of military personnel supporting *Laskar Jihad* militias were involved when the latter ambushed and occupied the Brimob's arsenal in Tantui area, on 21–22 June 2000. Responding to this incident, the National Police Chief, Gen. (Pol) Rusdihardjo, admitted that the Maluku police leadership had neglected to implement the security policy in Ambon. He said, “[the incident] could have been anticipated.”³⁹

The next incident broke out on July 2001, when a number of Brimob personnel clashed with the military troops from Battalion 408 in Ambon. The incident injured a junior Brimob officer. The then-Head of Armed Forces Information Center, Rear Marshal Graitto Husodo, attempted to downplay the clash and stated that “it happened due to provocation from a third party” without providing further detail on that “third party.”⁴⁰

The last example of this security force infighting was a firefight involving some Brimob personnel and troops from the Army Special Force Command (*Komando Pasukan Khusus Angkatan Darat*, Kopassus), on 14 May 2002 (Bhakti et al. 2009: 26). The incident severely injured two Kopassus troops and three Brimob personnel. The then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, sternly voiced his disappointment concerning the incident. He openly stated that:

I am very sorry that shameful incidents keep repeating. Even though we are still dealing with the implementation, yet the public already show their support for our policy and political decision, as well as for the security personnel deployment. Yet, if this is how the security policy is implemented at the operational level, our effort is useless.⁴¹

The final barrier for securitization act to bring about a positive effect in the Maluku conflict was the central government's unclear policy and directive concerning the imposition of martial law. Critics of Abdurrahman Wahid's declaration of martial law say it came too late. The government should have imposed martial law in the Maluku capital since the early phase of conflict, in mid-1999.⁴² A blunt critique concerning Jakarta's inaction also came from the cabinet. In January 2000, the then-Minister of Human Rights, Hasballah M. Saad, argued that “there is no common shared action plan so far [between related ministerial offices in order to tackle the Maluku conflict]. Worse, every now and then the policy from one minister clashed with the policy of others.”⁴³

Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina also faced blunt critique from Jakarta's politicians concerning his performance as the martial law administrator. For example, on one occasion, legislator Chatibul Umam Wiranu from the National Awakening Party (PKB) criticized M. Saleh Latuconsina by stating that he was clearly "unable to coordinate the military and the police" in Maluku. On another occasion, the then-Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, made a similar comment. According to Hamzah Haz, the creation of the Security Restoration Command was the remedy for the martial law administrator's poor performance.⁴⁴ In general, critics argue that M. Saleh Latuconsina was unable to exercise his authority, to act firmly, to coordinate his own rank and file and that he was reluctant in making a decision.

However, from M. Saleh Latuconsina's stance we can argue that the Law No. 23/Prp/1959 on the emergency situation, as the legal basis for martial law in Maluku, actually stipulates a larger authority for the central government than the local martial law administrator. Therefore, the local administrator could not make his own decisions or take action, until Jakarta gave the directives. Another point is while the Law No. 23/Prp/1959 stipulates that the local martial law administrator has an authority for the use of security forces, it also opens up the possibility for the security leadership to give direct order through the chain of command. In other words, the high-ranking security officers in Jakarta could directly instruct the regional commander, without involving the local martial law administrator. Statements from leaders of both communities also support this view.

Thamrin Ely, the head of Muslim delegation in the Malino II Treaty stated that in practice, it was very difficult for the local martial law administrator to fully control the security forces in Maluku.⁴⁵ This was due to the fact that the military and the police did not answer to the governor, but to its superior commander along the chain of command. Also, while the Law No. 23/Prp/1959 stipulates that the local martial law administrator had authority for the use of security forces, the Law also allowed the possibility of the security leadership in Jakarta to give direct orders to the regional security command and units. In the same vein, Pdt. A.W.J. Hendriks, the Head of Maluku Protestant Church Synod, stated that he could understand the local martial law administrator's problems in implementing policies at the operation level, since the regional military and police leaders would not fully execute it.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the government policy on the use of coercive means to handle the conflict in Maluku began to show significant effectiveness

during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency. Braithwaite and Dunn observed at the time that:

the military and police are now committed to doing their jobs in Maluku. Indeed they seem to be doing it with some finesse [...] firmly enforcing the criminal law against violence [...], and even prosecuting significant numbers of ringleaders of the violence [...] as evidence become available. (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 192)

Therefore, while generally in agreement with critiques about the effectiveness of the securitization strategy in the region, I argue that the Indonesian government had plausible grounds to move away from normal politics and shift into emergency mode in order to end the large-scale communal conflict in Maluku. Like in the case of Aceh, Jakarta's decision to securitize the conflict in Maluku was exceptional in order to deal with the emergency situation. However, due to flawed implementation, the extraordinary measures were not effective in reducing the scale of violence in the region in the period prior to Megawati Sukarnoputri's term in office.

3 DESECURITIZING VIOLENT CONFLICT IN MALUKU

My discussion of desecuritization in the Maluku conflict will cover the variables of the desecuritization act discussed in the theory chapter and analyze the government's actions to desecuritize the conflict. The discussion on variables of desecuritization will include the concepts *desecuritizing actors*, *the desecuritizing speech act*, and *the audience for desecuritization and facilitating conditions* during conflict in Maluku. In the next section, I will continue with the analysis on desecuritization and will take into account its grounds, mechanism, its phases, and its outcomes. Throughout these two sections, I seek to present important factors which have contributed to the failure of desecuritization moves during the early stages of the violence and to its success since 2002.

3.1 *Desecuritization Acts and Actors*

The first initiative to desecuritize the Maluku conflict during B.J. Habibie's presidency was launched by the Human Rights Commission which sent its members, Albert Hasibuan and Benyamin Mangkoedilaga, to Ambon on 30 January 1999. Hasibuan's and Mangkoedilaga's mission was to monitor

the situation in the city after the violence broke out on 19 January 1999. On 14 February 1999, the next desecuritization initiative occurred when B.J. Habibie formed a fact-finding team to investigate the violence in Ambon and find solutions to end it. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Jose Muskitta led the team, with Malukan local leaders, Des Alwi and K. Kapalale, as the prominent members. At the same time, the government also allocated financial support of around Rp. 5 billion (US\$434,000) for conflict termination efforts in Ambon. At the local level, the then-Commander of Military Sub-Region Command 174/Pattimura facilitated a meeting to ease the tension at the grassroots level from 28 February to 1 March 1999. This meeting was attended by traditional leaders, village leaders, religious figures, and the heads of sub-districts from the Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, and Nusa Laut areas (Nurhasim and Ratnawati 2005: 99). Finally, on 12 May 1999, a number of religious, social, traditional, and youth leaders signed a peace concord at the Merdeka Square in Ambon (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 112–114).

In the next presidential term, Abdurrahman Wahid initiated a desecuritization move by inviting some former South Maluku Republic (*Republik Maluku Selatan*, RMS) leaders from the Netherlands to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict in December 1999. In January 2000, the Human Rights Commission mediated a peace dialog between thirty delegates from each conflicting community in Bali (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 170). On 25 January 2002, the military headquarters sent a fact-finding delegation to Ambon. This military delegation was responsible for collecting evidence about the violence and, in particular, to investigate the security forces' infighting in Batu Merah, Ambon. On 20 February 2001, the then-Minister of Human Settlements and Regional Developments, Erna Witoelar, accompanied foreign representatives on their visit to some conflict sites in Maluku. The objective of this visit was to learn more about the actual condition in Maluku in order to prepare international aid for a post-conflict reconstruction program. On 15–16 March 2001, the government also facilitated a national dialog to find a peaceful resolution in Tual, Southeast Maluku. Some 2000 Malukans attended this dialog (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 112–113).

During Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency, the then-Chief of Maluku Police, Gen. (Pol) Firman Gani, initiated another desecuritization attempt by organizing a "children's prayer meeting" of 1000 students (500 children from each community) on 17 January 2001 (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 171). The most obvious desecuritization move during Megawati's

government occurred when the then-Minister of People Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, and the then-Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, facilitated peace talks between the warring parties in Malino, South Sulawesi. Seventy delegates each from the Muslim and Christian communities attended this peace talk, which was held from 11 to 12 February 2002. The peace talks finally brought about the signing of a peace agreement by Muslim and Christian representatives, witnessed by the government's representatives. This peace agreement, which is widely known as the Malino II Treaty, consisted of eleven points concerning: the end of violence, the enforcement law and order, the rejection of separatism, the dismissal of militia groups, the creation of an investigation team, refugee repatriation, post-conflict rehabilitation, security forces neutrality, and the improvement of inter-religious harmony. Soon after the Malino II Treaty, the government sent a joint-team from the People's Welfare Ministry and Politics and Security Ministry to Ambon as the first step to display the government's commitment to the peace agreement (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 112–113, 121–123).

Even though observers give strong credit to Jusuf Kalla and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for their significant role in the peace process leading to the Malino II Treaty, the treaty itself was the result of long desecuritization efforts from Malukan leaders. Prior to the signing of Malino II Treaty, according to Tonny Pariela of the University of Pattimura, the prominent figures and religious leaders from both religious communities had communicated and coordinated steps to lay the ground for the peace process. They had several meetings a month, which took place mainly at the governor's house. The secrecy was important since many open reconciliation attempts faced resistance from the warring parties and became a source for new conflicts. Also, the local figures had begun creating a more conducive situation, particularly, in Ambon in order to ensure the people's readiness and support for a peace agreement.⁴⁷ Once the local figures formulated a peace road-map for Maluku, they began working with Jusuf Kalla's office (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 178).

The next step was an informal meeting in early January 2000. This meeting was attended by Jusuf Kalla, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, M. Saleh Latuconsina, Da'I Bachtiar, the then-Chief of National Police, and 150 Malukan social, religious, traditional, and youth leaders. Five days later, another peace talk in Makassar, South Sulawesi, followed the previous meeting, in which ten delegates from each religious group participated. On 27 January 2000, M. Saleh Latuconsina and an officer from the

People's Welfare Ministry, Basri Palaguna, facilitated another round of peace talks in Makassar. Four delegates from each group attended these talks. On 31 January, the next round of meetings took place in Makassar and delegates from both sides drafted a document on conflict termination and post-conflict rehabilitation. From 6–7 February, the then-Deputy of People's Welfare Minister, Farid Husain, facilitated a meeting in Malino, where delegates from both groups discussed and agreed on the draft from the previous meeting (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 115–116).

The above-mentioned process shows how the state officials and Malukan figures played a significant role as desecuritizing actors in the case of the Maluku conflict. Jusuf Kalla and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became influential desecuritizing actors for their role in facilitating the Malino II Treaty. The Malukans played a significant role in drafting the initial version of, and creating a constructive environment for, a peace agreement. The traditional and religious leaders were also important desecuritizing actors, especially for developing such a constructive environment among the general population. Soon after the outbreak of violence on 19 January 1999, the traditional leaders began to desecuritize the situation and reduce tension in the society through cultural approaches (Wisudo 2010). For example, traditional leaders from a Christian Village, Passo, and Muslim Village, Batu Merah, initiated a traditional *Panas Pela* ceremony in January 1999. The essence of this ceremony was to remind the people from both villages that they were descendants of the same ancestors. Traditional leaders also initiated another traditional ceremony of *Makan Patita* in February 1999, where people from different backgrounds came and ate together, to reconcile the society. Also, the traditional leaders had actively attempted to reconcile people from neighboring villages, like between Waihaong and Kudamati, as well as between Nusaniwe and Simau. For their part, the religious leaders created communication networks between religious lines. From 20 to 22 November 2001, the religious leaders arranged a day of public mourning and prayer at religious buildings and streets across Ambon. The members of Maluku's branch of Indonesian Islamic Leaders Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI) were actively involved in reconciliation efforts and declarations to end the violence. They asked the government to pull out the *Laskar Jihad* militias from Maluku and actively established communication with the Maluku Protestant Church (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 170).

At the grassroots level, peace activists and victims from both religious groups established the *Bakubae* (reconciliation) movement. The objective

of this movement was to decrease social tension through the economic, education, and health sectors, as well as providing an information and communication center for the people. With this approach the *Bakubae* movement managed to establish a number of neutral zones where people from both communities could interact with each other. It turned out the traditional markets were the most effective neutral zones (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 127–131; Wisudo 2010). In cooperation with the Alliance of Independent Journalists (*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen*, AJI), the *Bakubae* activists established the Maluku Media Center in order to reduce the amount of distorted information. The *Bakubae* activists also succeeded in facilitating three major reconciliation dialogs in 2000: the first dialog was held in Jakarta in August; the second was held in September in Bali; and the last one was held with support from the Sultan of Yogyakarta in December in Yogyakarta. Following these, the *Bakubae* activists facilitated a bigger national dialog in Langgur, Southeast Maluku, in April 2001. Some 2000 participants attended the dialog and agreed to end the violence through a traditional and cultural approach. For this, the traditional leaders would guarantee the well-being of refugees and migrants in their territory (Yanuarti et al. 2005: 184; Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 171).⁴⁸

Local female activists, local academics, and Malukan migrants in Jakarta also initiated important desecuritization attempts at the grassroots level. The activists from a local Christian women's organization founded the Concerned Women's Movement in August 1999. At the beginning, the Christian women, due to a lack of security and increased social tensions, secretly invited their Muslim counterparts. In 2003, Malukan academics facilitated a reconciliation dialog for traditional and social leaders. This dialog brought 110 village leaders (*Latupatti*) and intellectuals from all over Maluku to propose ideas on how to optimize their role in society, to end the violence, and to reconstruct Maluku in the post-conflict situation. In Jakarta, Malukan migrants formed the Malukan Brotherhood Committee (*Komite Perekat Persaudaraan Maluku*, KPPM). To promote peace in their hometown, the KPPM came out with the campaign slogan: "Maluku without *Salami* (Muslims) is not Maluku and Maluku without *Serani* (Christians) is not Maluku" (Yanuarti et al. 2005: 184, 189).

Finally, foreign institutions also had a role as desecuritizing actors in the Maluku conflict, for example, the Netherlands-based Management Team Dialog and the Netherland Institute of International Relations Clingendael. In January 2000, these institutions invited Malukan prominent figures from both Muslim and Christian groups to attending a seminar entitled

“The Moluccas: How to Build Peace and Cooperation” in The Hague. During the seminar, these Malukan personalities discussed important points to de-escalate the violence such as security, prosperity, reconciliation, and reconstruction issues. These leaders also succeeded in formulating an action plan for a peace agreement and pledged to implement it once they returned to Maluku. However, with the arrival of the *Laskar Jihad* militias in Maluku the peace plan never came into effect (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 128).

3.2 *Audience*

In the case of Maluku, the audiences of desecuritization were those who stood against any kind of conflict resolution through peace talks. During B.J. Habibie’s presidency, and prior to Abdurrahman Wahid’s decision to declare martial law in Maluku, the audiences were the politicians who were skeptical of the ability of the Malukan society to sit together and solve this issue. The opposite trend occurred after the declaration of martial law, when most state officials supported the government’s desecuritization policies. However, at the time the audiences for desecuritization were the same groups who were involved in the conflict. The resistance to the peace talks, by and large, came from some Islamic groups in Maluku. The first example of rejection could be seen when the Leader of *Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama’ah* Communication Forum, M. Attamimi, refused any initiative for peace talks before the government revealed the background of the 19 January 1999 incident. He stated this rejection during the meeting in January 2002 in front of Jusuf Kalla, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Da’I Bachtiar, and M. Saleh Latuconsina. Such a categorical rejection did not emerge among the Christian delegates, led by Tonny Pariela (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 115). Another rejection from the Muslim groups came from the Malukan Muslim Forum (*Forum Silaturahmi Umat Muslim Maluku*, FSUIM) prior to the signing of Malino Treaty II. This forum, which was a combination of Islamic groups, refused to become involved in any peace talks before law and order could be restored in Maluku (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 115).

After the signing of Malino Treaty II, the Muslim and Christian groups showed a different reaction. The Christians started an internal consolidation in short order to socialize and implement the treaty’s points of agreement. On the other hand, the Muslim delegates received condemnation from their own community. A number of Muslims questioned the

representativeness of the delegates, since those who signed the treaty did not have support at the grassroots level and therefore did not represent the aspirations of the Muslims. The Muslims delegates not only faced demonstrations and blunt condemnation, but also physical threats from their own community. For instance, the mobs burned down the home of Thamrin Ali, the head of the Muslim delegation in Malino II Treaty. Ali's wife and children also became targets of unknown shootings. The mobs also burned down the house of two other Muslim delegates. One delegate had to flee to Jakarta since he was threatened by unknown people (Nurhasim and Ratnawati 2005: 118; Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 179).

The final and most critical audience for desecuritization in Maluku was the *Laskar Jihad* members. Interestingly, the most effective desecuritization speech act to tame the *Laskar Jihad* members came from the Saudi Arabian Muslim cleric Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. In 2002, he issued a *fatwa*, a religious decree issued by authoritative Islamic leaders, that “*jihad* in the Moluccas was now over.” Most of *Laskar Jihad* members viewed “this *fatwa* as authoritative throughout Indonesia and Maluku. For them, the *fatwa* was the important reason why it was right for all *Laskar Jihad* fighters to return to their homes” (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 179). Most of the *Laskar Jihad* members had a less violent attitude as a result of the combined approaches of:

- 1) persuasive overtures from religious leaders they respected in Ambon, Java and Saudi Arabia; 2) elders in the Muslim villages they were protecting thanking them, but saying now it was time for locals to build their own peace; 3) diplomacy that led to an authoritative *fatwa* to withdraw, withdrawing the financial [...], political and military support that were inducing them to fight; 4) shutting down the organization that supported them; 5) shutting down the website that attracted and indoctrinated many of them; 6) cutting off much of the plentiful supply of ammunition they had enjoyed in previous years; 7) surprise night-time arrests of sleeping hold-outs and death in fire-fights for others. (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 180)

As far as the Malukan general public is concerned, the People's Development and Empowerment Foundation (*Yayasan Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat*, YPPM) conducted a survey to identify the public's opinion on the peace process and agreement. The survey showed that 60 percent of respondents supported the Malino II Treaty. They agreed that the treaty was an important step in order to de-escalate the conflict. Only 27 percent of respondents disagreed with the treaty. For

them, the treaty's points of agreement did not reflect the people's aspiration. However, the survey also showed that there were only 44.42 percent of respondents who were optimistic that the treaty could stop the violence in Maluku. For the people, the most important factors to end the violence were the government's concrete and firm action to enforce law and order, to detain violent perpetrators, and to reveal the real cause of the 19 January 1999 incident, as well as the refugees' repatriation, the improvement of the standard of living, and the socialization of the peace agreement at the grassroots level (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 124–125).

3.3 *Facilitating Conditions*

The first facilitating condition of a desecuritization strategy to take effect in the Maluku conflict was the “war-fatigue” among the Malukan. This war-fatigue began to appear after the signing of the Malino II Treaty. After the signing a series of violent incidents kept occurring, such as the arson attack targeting the Maluku Governor's office on 3 April 2002, the attack on Soya Village on 27 April 2002, which claimed twelve lives, and the explosion of a hand-made land mine at Merdeka square, in Ambon on 5 September 2002, which killed four schoolgirls (Yanuarti et al. 2003: 68). However, such incidents did not mobilize the people like in the previous periods of conflict. By and large, a more sensible attitude emerged due to war-fatigue among the general Malukan after living with the conflict for a long period. This war-fatigue emerged at the same time as a more critical attitude among the people toward wildly spreading rumors, particularly in the city of Ambon. With these two developments, the people had developed a sort of social resilience to unverified rumors and provocations. This new situation totally contradicted the period between 1999 and 2001 (Nurhasim and Ratnawati 2005: 147). During this period, the people were highly impulsive, responding to rumors and provocations which resulted in new rounds of violence.

The second facilitating condition was the re-emergence of cultural consciousness among the Malukans to reintroduce the traditional values and customs to society. The reintroduction of traditional values and customs helped to restore the Malukan identity and reunite the polarized society. A significant example is the re-emergence of the *pela* tradition during the conflict period. Literally, the word *pela* means “brother” or “trusted friend.” There are six kinds of *pela* tradition,⁴⁹ but the most dominant in the reconciliation process was the *pela gandong*, where *gandong* means

“born of the same root, a bond based on blood or clan ancestry” (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 180). According to Sholeh, “*pela gandong* tradition is an alliance of two or more people related by marriage, in which they agree to help each other based on family ties” (Sholeh 2013: 305). Braithwaite and Dunn write that “*pela* [is] the heart of a distinctive religious ontology that ties Islam and Christianity together” in Maluku (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 173). Hence, referring to Bartels who quotes a Protestant minister, Braithwaite & Dunn write, “what we must do is take the values of *pela* into the public arena, beyond *pela* villages [...]. So we can revitalize a multicultural *pela* that was always multi-religious” (Bartels 2003: 135 quoted in Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 174). In a different way, a prominent Muslim figure stated during an inter-faith dialog that “cultural beliefs rather than religious beliefs created peace” (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 174). Based on such an understanding, religious figures from both sides in Maluku began “to give *pela* more shared Muslim-Christian spiritual content [and] connect *pela gandong* traditions to stories from Muslim and Christian holy text” (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 174).

These two facilitating conditions changed the perception among the conflicting parties about each other and developed social resilience against negative external influence. Gradually, but firmly, the war-fatigue among the Malukans, the emergence of social resilience, the changes of threat perception between enemies, the reintroduction of traditional custom and values laid the foundation for the process of desecuritization.

4 ANALYSIS OF THE DESECURITIZATION OF THE MALUKU CONFLICT

In this part, I will analyze the desecuritization in Maluku based upon *grounds for desecuritization, desecuritization mechanisms, phases of desecuritization, and desecuritization outcomes.*

4.1 *Grounds for Desecuritization*

Similar to the case of Aceh, the government’s desecuritization move in the case of Maluku shows that it also rested on the instrumental ground, rather than the ethico-political one. This means that the government opted for desecuritization several times because it saw that the use of only extraordinary measures was not sufficient to end the communal conflict.

The government's instruments in this regard were the creation of fact-finding delegations and several task forces, as well as facilitating peace talks between the Muslims and the Christians. The ethico-political ground on the other hand promotes the idea that one opposes securitization not because it is ineffective, but because there is no ethical justification for using coercive measures as a response to dissenting opinions voiced by different groups in society.

There was, however, a massive movement at the grassroots level which showed a strong tendency to use the ethico-political ground for desecuritized conflict in Aceh. This ethico-political ground largely appeared in the form of a cultural movement to revitalize the traditional custom and values in order to bridge the polarized society during the long periods of conflict. Unlike the Aceh case, attempts to desecuritize the Maluku conflict on the grounds of ethico-political consideration were dominant at the grassroots level.

4.2 *The Mechanism of Desecuritization*

Next, taking into account the mechanism of desecuritization in the case of Aceh, it is obvious that the process was an active mechanism, rather than a passive one. At one level, the active mechanism in the Maluku desecuritization process can be identified through the government's recurring attempts to facilitate meetings and mediate peace talks between the Muslims and the Christians. However, when Oelsner's active desecuritization mechanism required trust between the warring parties (Oelsner 2005), this faced a lot of challenges. It took a long while to develop trust between the warring parties and also between the Malukans and the government, both local and central. At the height of the violence, the trust of one community regarding the willingness of the other community to peacefully solve their differences was almost entirely absent. Members from both communities were hypersensitive to negative rumors, easily provoked by small incidents, and were looking for revenge for their suffering and losses. The Malukans also did not trust the government's good will and attempts to end the conflict. The imposition of martial law was obviously not effective in decreasing the violence, let alone stopping it. Worse, the security personnel became involved in the conflict and in a number of infighting incidents. Equally problematic, was that the security force did not show serious determination in dealing with hardliners from

both sides of the warring groups. Lastly, the central government failed to detail a comprehensive policy and provide clear directives for the local authority in Maluku. At the regional level, the martial law administrator did not convincingly exercise his authority.

At another level, the active mechanism in the Maluku desecuritization process can also be identified through the cultural movements at the grassroots level. This grassroots movement sought to reintroduce the traditional customs and values to the Malukans as an alternative social identity. With the reintroduction of traditional customs and values, the society could then perceive their selves as Malukans, as well as sit and talk with each other as Malukans, too. Thus, the society which had previously been polarized and politicized along the religious lines found the forgotten bridge for their differences. With such consciousness, there was growing desirability among the people for, to quote Braithwaite and Dunn, “having Malukan Muslims as opposed to Arab Muslims, Malukan Christians as opposed to Dutch Christians” (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 172). This desecuritization mechanism can be better understood if we view it from the perspective of desecuritization phases.

4.3 *The Phases of Desecuritization*

The phases of desecuritization are comprised of *the phase of initiation*, *the phase of development*, and *the phase of consolidation* (Hansen 2011: 15–21). The first phase is marked by the avoidance of the use of force, rather utilizing negotiation, strategic cooperation, and incentives for behavioral change. The desecuritization moves to end the communal conflict during the governments of B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid already failed during the initial phase. Even though the government sought non-coercive solutions, these attempts did not lead to the avoidance of the use of violence from the warring parties. Even more, there were groups in Maluku, which tried and, to a certain degree, succeeded in sabotaging the reconciliation process. Finally, the impartiality lacking in the security forces was another major problem during the conflict periods.

The second phase of desecuritization, the phase of development, emphasizes the importance of interaction between the warring parties in order to change their stance and perception of one another. In the interaction between the Malukan Muslim and Christian community, the phase of development began taking effect around the Malino II Treaty, during

Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency. Months before the signing of the peace treaty, some prominent personalities from both sides along with the local government had begun to regularly hold informal and secretive meetings. Once they came to an agreement concerning a number of basic points to stop the violence and initiate peace, the central government amplified this effort. The intensifying effort from both Malukan prominent persons at the local level and the central government, especially from Jusuf Kalla's and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's offices, came about from the establishment of mutual trust, which allowed them to move toward the formulation of a peaceful solution. This solution took the form of the Malino Treaty II's points of agreement. Jakarta finally supported it by issuing Presidential Instruction No.77/2003 on 14 September 2003 and No. 6/2003 on 21 September 2003. With the first instruction, the government annulled the imposition of martial law in Maluku (and North Maluku), and the latter instruction aimed at the post-conflict peace-building in Maluku (and North Maluku). The Presidential Instruction No. 6/2003 instruction provided a detailed framework for reconstructing Maluku and reconciling the Malukans. In fact, the Malino II peace treaty created the momentum which can be seen as starting the turning point in the Maluku communal conflict. The ability of the warring parties to agree on a common resolution and the active role of Jusuf Kalla and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono allowed the desecuritization process to proceed toward the next phase, the phase of consolidation.

The phase of consolidation requires constructive public rhetoric from the warring parties in order show their political, or in the case of Maluku, good will in implementing the points of agreement. Later on, the rhetoric and political will should lead to the establishment of cooperating institutions and organizations. Regarding the rhetoric and good will, both the warring parties had succeeded in initiating this phase, especially on a cultural and historical basis. In this vein, during a national dialog attended by around 2000 participants in April 2001, a traditional leader from Masarete Lesksula in South Buru, Raja Jan Andrias Lesnusa, stated that "what kind of war are we fighting here? Since the independence in 1945, this is the only clash which had caused so many lives without any reason. What is this?"⁵⁰ On another occasion mentioned earlier, a Protestant minister proposed to take the traditional *pela* into the public arena in order to revitalize the Malukan multicultural and multireligious identity. Also, the Muslim leaders played a major role in softening probably the most radical

element in the Maluku conflict, *Laskar Jihad*. According to a Muslim leader, quoting Braithwaite and Dunn:

all the religious leaders in Maluku at many different levels, from the greatest Muslim leaders down to the Muslim clerics in the smallest villages were involved in persuading all elements of *Laskar Jihad* to stop fighting and to return to their homes. (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 180)

This rhetoric and good will of the warring parties led to the successful demilitarization processes, including the decommissioning of weapons by the fighters. This important step eventually brought about the formation of institutions and organizations to accommodate the sustainability of the desecuritization process in Maluku.

Examples of institution-building after the signing of the Malino II Treaty began with the establishment of the Independent National Investigation Team. The team's main task was to reveal the facts behind the large-scale communal conflict in Maluku, such as the real trigger for the conflicts and who was responsible in prolonging the conflict. This team had submitted its final report to the president in April 2003. However, the report never went public. For implementing the points of agreement in the Malino II, the government also established the Maluku Working Group (*Kelompok Kerja Maluku*, Pokja-Maluku), consisting of religious and social prominent personalities of Maluku. The working group was responsible for monitoring and enhancing the implementation of the peace agreement. The formation of several institutions also occurred at the grassroots level. Regarding the cultural sector, 627 traditional leaders from every Malukan region established a council in November 2006. The chief purpose of this council was to promote reconciliation between different religions and social groups in Maluku. Regarding religion, representatives from Muslim and Christian leaders established an Interfaith Council in the Maluku capital of Ambon (Braithwaite and Dunn 2010: 175–177; Van Klinken 2007: 89). Despite a smaller number of incidents, which still broke out after the Malino II Treaty, the overall situation in Maluku was positive: the number of incidents and victims declined, and social resilience had developed, the people refused to be swayed by mobilization to wage another battle. With this more conducive situation, we are finally able to scrutinize the outcome of desecuritization in Maluku.

4.4 *The Outcomes of Desecuritization*

Like in the context of the Aceh conflict, the processes of desecuritization during the communal conflict in Maluku also led to *replacement* and *change through stabilization*. Replacement refers to the process of moving away from a security milieu and seeking a political resolution to address the key sources of conflict by collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation. The change through stabilization refers to a situation where there is evidence of explicit change from previously warring parties through a gradual process. This gradual process eventually reduces the use of coercive measures in every form. The initiatives to non-coercive solutions for the Maluku conflict had begun with B.J. Habibie's presidency, but gained momentum during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency. The major problem during the two governments prior to Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency was that the warring parties from both sides did not value the importance of collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation in the desecuritization process. In fact, the most dominant attitude was seeking revenge for each other's losses, exemplified by the Muslims calling for *jihad* and the Christians singing "Onward Christian Soldier." Also, as mentioned previously, the lack of professionalism and the impartiality among the security forces was another major problem, particularly prior to Megawati Sukarnoputri's term in office. The general situation became more conducive for an effective desecuritization process when war-fatigue and resilience against unclear provocations had developed among the people. Only in this situation, could a number of Malukan prominent figures begin a more constructive interaction to finding peaceful solution to the conflict, through informal and discreet regular meetings.

Even though the initiatives to solve the conflict in Maluku through peaceful resolution had failed every now and then, overall, it was an incremental process which resulted in the signing of a peace treaty by the warring parties. If the peace initiatives would not have emerged in the early phase of the conflict, during the B.J. Habibie's presidency and continued in Abdurrahman Wahid's short term in office, Megawati Sukarnoputri's government might have faced a bigger challenge to broker peace talks. At a minimum, the failed negotiations, both those which were brokered by the government and initiatives at the grassroots level, during the two governments prior to Megawati Sukarnoputri's term had created opportunities for the warring parties to interact and have first-hand experience with each other's positions. Viewing the previous failed attempts as

a preliminary process, overall it led to the relative success of the Malino II peace treaty between the Muslims and the Christians. These long processes of gradual change had finally brought political and security stability to Maluku. At the time of writing, there is no indication that new periods of conflict of the same magnitude will reoccur; despite a number of residual problems, which remain unresolved. These unresolved problems mainly are the refugees' repatriation; the post-conflict reconstruction, since a number of destroyed buildings are left in ruins and negatively affecting some people; and the post-conflict land ownership. The most eminent issue, especially in the city of Ambon, is that people still largely live in separated residential areas according to their religion. It seems, the very source of conflict still exists within the society, and a number of violent incidents keep recurring. The latest incident was a clash between the neighboring villages of Hualoi and Sepa in West Seram in December 2012. This incident claimed five lives and severely injured eight others. A week earlier, six people were shot in a fight between villagers from Sirisori Amalatu and Tuhaha in Saparua Island.⁵¹ Fortunately, these and other similar incidents did not escalate into a larger-scale conflict.

In this chapter I have analyzed the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization in the context of the communal conflict in Maluku. The outbreak of communal conflict in Maluku during Indonesia's democratization was due to two reasons: (1) the long-existing social tension in the region as a result of the political change engineered by President Suharto from the late 1980s onward, which took effect in Maluku in the early 1990s; and (2) the uncertainty following the political transition in the late 1990s, where both the Muslims and the Christians feared losing their influence in the region, and, therefore, each community attempted to preserve and, if possible, advance their interests. In turn, the escalating religious violence in Maluku emerged as an existential threat to Indonesia. The mass mobilization at the grassroots level under the obvious religious sentiment and hate-filled public speeches had shaken the harmony of the heterogeneous Indonesian society, in a way never seen before. In the worst-case scenario, the Maluku conflict might have posed a challenge for the unity of the Indonesian state, as it broke out when Indonesia faced other major conflicts in several regions, it gave precedence for similar conflicts to occur, and the central government was vulnerable as a consequence of the country's ongoing political transition. All attempts of desecuritization had failed during the B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid governments due to: (1) the high tension and the absence of trust among the warring parties

in Maluku: (2) the poorly coordinated efforts of the government; and (3) the poor professionalism and the problem of impartiality among the security forces personnel. As the initial attempts to desecuritize the conflict failed and the situation in Maluku continued to worsen, Abdurrahman Wahid finally signed a presidential instruction to declare martial law in Maluku. The problems of securitization in Maluku were related to security forces personnel's professionalism and neutrality, unclear directives from Jakarta, and the ineffectiveness of the Maluku governor as the local civil emergency administrator in exercising his authority. While the desecuritization moves during the previous governments had always collapsed, they ended with fruitful results during Megawati Sukarnoputri's term in office. Several factors were at play in the success of desecuritization during the Megawati presidency: (1) the war-fatigue among the Malukan people; (2) the emergence of resilience among the Malukan against provocations; and (3) the reintroduction of traditional customs and values which celebrated the Malukan multicultural and multireligious reality. The signing of Malino II Treaty was the outcome of three years of a gradual process of desecuritization in Maluku. Although a number of problems remained on the table after the peace talks, the Malino II Treaty still gave legitimacy to a multidimensional local leadership to play further important roles in developing peace in Maluku.

NOTES

1. The renowned Indonesian peace activist Ichsan Malik, for instance, estimates that the Maluku conflict claimed at least 9700 lives (*Kompas*, 23 May 2002).
2. I use the Moluccas to refer to the area being studied prior to the Indonesian independence and Maluku after the independence.
3. The object of discussion in this chapter is limited to the securitization and desecuritization dynamics of the communal conflict only in the province of Maluku.
4. Badan Pusat Statistik, *Sensus Penduduk 2010: Provinsi Maluku*. Available at <http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site?id=810000000&wilayah=Maluku>, accessed on 14 April 2014.
5. Cities: Ambon (the capital) and Tual. Regencies: Western Southeast Maluku, Southwest Maluku, Southeast Maluku, Aru Islands, Central Maluku, West Seram, East Seram, Buru, and South Buru.
6. See World Bank 2010. Total area of Maluku is 712,480 km², but more than 90 percent of it is sea area (See Pemprov. Maluku, 2005, *Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Maluku and Kambut, Profil Kehutanan 33 Provinsi*).

7. This event later on became known as the “Amboina Messacre.”
8. Most observers believe that Suharto’s split with the military establishment was largely caused by his dissent with the late Gen. L.B. Moerdani who criticized Suharto’s family involvement in the country’s politics and economy. For further discussion on this issue see, for instance, Julius Poor 2007.
9. According to MacAndrews, “transmigration is used to refer to the transfer of population in Indonesia from the central islands of Java, Madura, Bali, and Lombok to the outer islands under government sponsorship” (1978: 458). The major goal of such a population transfer program is “to stimulate regional development and create employment opportunities” (Leinbach et al. 1992: 23). However, according to Survival International, a London-based international organization advocating the rights of tribal peoples, the transmigration program is “the World Bank’s most irresponsible project, especially because of the negative impact of the program on deforestation and human rights” (Fearnside 1997: 553). For a comprehensive account on Indonesia’s transmigration, see for example Hardjono 1977.
10. Some observers speculate that the outbreak of conflict in Ambon related to the arrival of some 300 Ambonese criminals from Jakarta in December 1998, following an earlier riot involving them in the North Jakarta suburb of Ketapang. Others speculate that some military figures fomented the Maluku conflict due to the internal competition among high-ranking army officers, or in order to distract public attention from the worsened security situation in East Timor (O’Rourke 2002: 193, 348, 374; Bertrand 2004: 126). Nevertheless, the evidence showing those criminal gang members or the high-ranking military officers’ involvement in instigating the conflict, to quote van Klinken, “remains patchy.” According to him, those criminals involved in the violence were “ad hoc and based on existing neighborhood solidarity [where] religion is part of that solidarity.” Van Klinken is also skeptical on the possibility that the military officers had instigated the conflict since, he argues, “it was not so easy to see why they might want to invest scarce manpower opening new theaters of conflict where none existed, such as in Ambon. Nor do we have the details of [evidence] ... that would confirm such a scenario for the communal conflict [...] In any case, it is apparent that what came before and after 19 January 1999 had more to do with Ambonese dynamics than with any plans wrought in faraway Jakarta” (Van Klinken 2007: 29, 98).
11. *The Jakarta Post*, 13 November 2012.
12. Interview with Hilda Rolobessy, Ambon, 11 May 2012.
13. Interview with Justus Pattipawane, Ambon, 10 May 2012.
14. Interview with M. Saleh Latuconsina, Ambon, 9 May 2012.
15. *Kompas*, 28 June 2000.
16. *Kompas*, 12 May 2002.
17. *Kompas*, 31 May 2002.

18. *Kompas*, 10 June 2002.
19. *Berita Buana*, 30 December 1999.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. *Republika*, 26 Juni 2000.
23. *Kompas*, 28 June 2000.
24. *Media Indonesia*, 26 June 2000.
25. Ibid.
26. *Tempo Interaktif*, 10 April 2001.
27. *The Jakarta Post*, 23 April 2002.
28. *The Jakarta Post*, 27 April 2002.
29. *Bali Post*, 29 April 2002.
30. Ibid.
31. *Kompas*, 30 April 2002.
32. *Kompas*, 4 April 1999.
33. *Berita Buana*, 30 December 1999.
34. *Kompas*, 23 May 2002.
35. *Kompas*, 3 July 2000.
36. *Kompas*, 5 May 2002.
37. See also *Kompas*, 20 October 2000.
38. *Kompas*, 13 July 2001.
39. *Republika*, 26 June 2000.
40. *Kompas*, 16 May 2002.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview with M. Saleh Latuconsina, Ambon, 9 May 2012.
43. *Kompas*, 7 January 2000.
44. *Kompas*, 28 May 2002.
45. *Kompas*, 23 May 2002
46. Ibid.
47. Interview with Prof. Tonny Pariela, Ambon, 8 May 2012.
48. See also *Kompas*, 14 April 2001.
49. *Pela tuni* or *pela keras* (with two sub-categories: *pela tumpah darah* and *pela batu karang*), *pela tempat sirih*, and *pela gandong* (Sholeh 2013: 305).
50. *Kompas*, 19 April 2001.
51. *The Jakarta Post*, 31 December 2012.

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Conclusion: Securitization–Desecuritization Dynamics in Indonesia’s Democratization

1 INTRODUCTION

This study has attempted to explain the government’s security policy and place it within the framework of securitization theory. The preceding chapters have provided a comprehensive account of the security threats in the early years of Indonesia’s democratization process. The first empirical chapter, Chap. 3, provided a historical account of Indonesia’s experience when the state was faced with existential threats and used extraordinary measures to cope with them. The second empirical chapter, Chap. 4, outlined the trajectory of the outbreak of large-scale violent conflicts by uncovering the country’s political dynamics in the final years of Suharto’s New Order regime and early years of the *Reformasi* era. After summarizing the background of the security problems during the political transition, the final two empirical chapters, Chaps. 5 and 6, reviewed the findings of this study regarding government policy by scrutinizing securitization and desecuritization dynamics in the cases of the Aceh separatist conflict and the Maluku communal conflict. This final chapter will now assess the implications of the study on securitization research, especially when the theory is applied to analyzing a state’s security policy amid democratic change.

The following sections will summarize the source of insecurity which escalated into large-scale violent conflicts, as well as the Indonesian government’s policies to address them. I will therefore begin with a summary of the source of security instability prior to, and after, Suharto’s resignation.

As democratization took place at the center of the country's political power, interest groups at the periphery took advantage of the uncertainty to exploit the newfound opportunities, leading to increased tension in the regions. In turn, such tensions escalated into open, large-scale violence as has been shown by the Aceh and Maluku cases. To deal with these violent conflicts, I argue that the government security policies are based on the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization. Thus, I analyzed these policies under a framework of securitization theory. In what follows, I will continue with the reasons for my choice of study on the theory of securitization. Then, I will discuss the securitization and desecuritization dynamics as part of the government's policy in dealing with the conflicts. The chapter ends with some general remarks and retrospective notes on the study at hand.

2 MAJOR THREATS TO INDONESIA'S SECURITY DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

After thirty-two years in power, the New Order finally collapsed when Suharto gave his resignation speech on 21 May 1998. In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, which started in Thailand and spread out to the countries in the region and caused the worst damage in Indonesia, Suharto and his New Order regime lost political and social support. In Indonesia, the crisis demolished the country's business sector which led to the loss of millions of urban, working-class jobs and a huge increase in the price of basic goods, as well as fanning unrest in the society at large. At the same time, pro-democracy groups, which were increasing in both number and influence, began to explicitly challenge the legitimacy of Suharto's government. The student movement which initially led the anti-Suharto movements finally found vigorous support from opposition elites, as well as from politicians. Within the top ranks of the power circle, a significant number of Suharto's cabinet ministers resigned from their posts, the military leadership signaled that they would no longer support Suharto, and the legislators openly called for Suharto to step down. After Suharto finally left office, a phase of democratic transition began in Indonesia's polity (inter alia: Aspinall 2005; Bünthe and Ufen 2009; Crouch 2010; Schwarz and Paris 1999; O'Rourke 2002; Rinakit 2005; Wiranto 2003). Unfortunately, such a power change also opened up the opportunity for long-suppressed domestic conflicts to re-emerge and, in turn, escalate into large-scale and widespread violence.

Hence, the democratic transition in Indonesia has been characterized by a state of insecurity. Evidence of insecurity could be identified both from the re-emergence of separatist conflicts, where local aspirations verbally and physically challenged the legitimacy of the central government, as well as the outbreak of communal conflicts. In the latter case, the violence broke out between different groups in society. Separatism intensified in Riau, Papua, and Aceh, and in the case of East Timor, it even led to the secession from the Indonesian state. Concurrently, large-scale communal conflicts broke out in Central and West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi. In addition to these separatist and communal conflicts, social riots and pogroms were also widespread in Indonesia's towns and cities. All in all, the conflicts breaking out during the early phase of democratization claimed almost 19,000 lives and displaced some 1.3 million people (Van Klinken 2007: 4). Out of all the violent incidents, the study at hand focused on the Aceh separatist and the Maluku communal conflicts on the grounds of selection criteria that were explained earlier in the methodology section.

In order to analyze the government's security policies in dealing with the above-mentioned situation, I have made use of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. The decision to apply this theory is due to the fact that studies on security and conflict in Indonesia have largely relied on culturalist and objectivist traditions (see Chap. 2). From other academic studies influenced by these traditions, we learn that the latent sources of violence developed through a long-term process and erupted into large-scale conflicts when institutional and structural changes occurred within the national government. While the work of culturalists and objectivists have also shown the interrelatedness of events which led to widespread violence, these studies have neglected the discussion of state policies dealing with those conflicts. To address this shortcoming, this study examines Indonesian governmental policies in dealing with the diminished security stability at the time of political transition in the framework of securitization theory.

The choice for securitization theory derives from the usefulness of the theory in studying "the politics of security-policy making" (2001: 258). Originating from the social-constructivist tradition, the securitization theory provides a space to scrutinize the cognitive and interactive process in the government's security policy-making process and its implementation. As I will show in the next section, the call for securitization in response to the worsening situation does not always rest on an objective and rational

basis in order to terminate the conflicts. Since there were non-security factors at play, there was a degree of subjectivity in the security policy-making process. Hence, the use of securitization theory for the study at hand not only enabled an examination of the government's security policies in dealing with the conflict during the country's transition period, but also revealed the subjective nature of those policies. At the empirical level, the twin concepts in securitization theory—securitization and desecuritization—allowed this study to subtly portray the government's coercive (i.e. the deployment of security forces) and non-coercive (i.e. the optimization of peace talks) decisions. Additionally, I assumed that the state officials' cognitive priors (shared knowledge, material resources, practices) in dealing with the country's security dilemma in the past should also have influenced the formulation and implementation of such decisions and, thus, needed to be taken into account.

For social constructivists, every social event is socially constructed and, following the Copenhagen School I argue, this also includes security policy-making. In this sense, the cognitive priors of the Indonesian policy-makers and frontline executors' *weltanschauung* influenced the formulation and implementation of security policies for the conflict during the country's democratization. On this basis, this study has presented a detailed historical account of the Indonesian experience with an emergency situation and the imposition of martial law (Chap. 3). In this discussion, I have maintained that Indonesia's constant experience with the emergency situation could be traced as far back as the colonial era. After gaining its independence, there were times in Indonesian history that the state arbitrarily applied violence to deal with security challenges. In fact, New Order Indonesia experienced the institutionalization of the emergency situation and was indirectly under permanent martial law. These cognitive priors, I assumed, must have influenced the securitization and desecuritization dynamics when the country was dealing with the worsening security situation in the early years of democratization.

3 SECURITIZATION DYNAMICS

The Copenhagen School's securitization theory has provided an alternative theoretical framework based on cognitive factors for scrutinizing the security actors' moves and policies. Although it derives from the tradition of international relations studies, the proponents of the theory do not rule out the possibility to apply the securitization theory to scrutinize security

dynamics at the national level. As a result, critique of the framework notwithstanding, researchers have applied the securitization theory to analyze the security of varied units of analysis at different levels of agency, particularly the international and national levels.

The basic source of the debate stems from the theory's definition. The Copenhagen School proposes at least two definitions of securitization, which lead to different focal points in using the theory. The first definition emphasizes the process of threat construction, defining it as "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community" (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 491). Researchers who use this definition as a departure point in their studies emphasize securitization as a performative or speech act process and analyze "the speech act as a linguistic form" or "the words that refer to [...] a particular issue [which] gradually contribute to the threat construction, and therefore to securitization" (Coskun 2011: 159). Consequently, this definition leads researchers to focus on the grammaticality of speech acts and "the contents and contexts of the speech act" (Coskun 2011: 159).

The second definition emphasizes the exceptionality: the School not only refers to the process of threat construction, but also the process of "requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). This study followed the second definition according to which the most obvious emergency measures are the imposition of martial law and the use of force to deal with the threat at hand. Thus, the study focused on state policies that legitimize the use of extraordinary measures or, to quote Knudsen, "the politics of security-policymaking" (Knudsen 2001: 358).

By looking at Indonesia's security dynamics during the process of democratic transition, this study has shown that the existential threat to the state, as the referent object of security, emerged from both interest groups at the local level which physically challenged the central authority, and the outbreak of large-scale communal conflicts. These existential threats created emergency situations and led to the imposition of extraordinary measures by the state. Therefore, this study also contributed to clarifying the distinction between security and securitization by dissecting the different categories which make up these two concepts.

The distinction between them is an important departing point in securitization studies. Buzan, et al., start the second chapter of their work by asking: "What is Security?" (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). In answer to this question, this study further elaborated on several of the keywords from the

authors' work, especially security which is made up of four categories: It is a situation when (1) an existential threat threatens the (2) security of referent objects which leads to the (3) emergency situation and the use of (4) extraordinary measures. When all of these four categories are accounted for, they provide the grounds for the authorities to "take politics beyond the established rules of game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). In short, these categories of security allow securitization to take place.

Therefore, I proposed that securitization is a process to legitimize the use of extraordinary measures. It is more than merely a language game to intersubjectively name an issue as a threat, since the threat is concrete and real. As this study has shown, one can no longer argue that the existence of armed separatist movements and large-scale communal conflicts, which claimed thousands of human lives, are a so-called threat construction. Therefore, to study the state of "emergency-ness" and exceptionality in using extraordinary measures, one must look at the categories of securitization, namely: securitizing actors, audience, speech acts, and facilitating conditions.

However, the interaction between these categories only shows the securitizing moves, not a completion of the securitization process. Again, a successful securitization process will be indicated by the concrete imposition of extraordinary measures, in other words, by the deployment of security forces. This is the point where I diverge from the Copenhagen School which argues that "a successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency situation, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). They also argue that "a discourse that takes form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is—a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such" (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Against this backdrop, my proposed securitization categories are based on the Copenhagen School with additional categories. Going beyond the Copenhagen School, I argue that a securitization move is complete, not merely because it has been securitized and the audience accepts it as such, but rather because extraordinary measures have been officially imposed.

This study has established the Copenhagen School's proposition on securitizing actors, which are government, security, political, and bureaucracy leaders. In the context of an emergency situation, these are the actors who actually have the sovereignty to decide on the exception,

who can claim “a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game” and to take “an issue out of what under those conditions is normal politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). The analysis of the empirical cases has also shown that the general public does not play a big part as audience in a securitization process. Since audiences are those who need to be persuaded and convinced in order to legitimize the imposition of extraordinary measures, they are, by and large, the power holders in the state decision-making process. Therefore, as this study showed, the “intersubjective interactions” between securitizing actors and audiences occur between those who prefer the use of extraordinary measures and those who prefer to deal with the issue at hand through political negotiations and compromises within the state authority. However, during periods of conflict, securitizing actors and audiences might change their position from one side to another. Hence, the securitization moves do not always reflect interactions and negotiations between the ruling elite (securitizing actors) and society (audience).

In particular, this study implied that we should be critical of the motives which securitizing actors express when claiming the necessity to declare an emergency situation and utilize extraordinary measures. The empirical cases in this study showed that the option of a securitization policy to deal with Indonesia’s security dilemma in the transition period cannot be separated from the political structure and/or struggle among the ruling elite. For instance, the fact that the Indonesian armed forces received an inadequate defense budget from the government forced the military to seek out independent financial sources which the Aceh conflict offered in abundance. Also, post-Suharto Indonesia left the military as one of the most powerful institutions with significant political influence, while the civilian elites did not enjoy a strong legitimacy or political support of their leadership. Since military officers had always been the major securitizing actors, the civilian leadership was forced to agree with their securitization initiatives to secure their support and cooperation in the new political landscape.

In this regard, the imposition of martial law in Aceh and Maluku is an example of how the military reinstalled its political leverage, especially by reasserting its role as the main guardian of the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state, and thus by influencing the security policy-making process. The protracted violent conflicts also led to speculation that it was orchestrated by some security spoilers in order to provide legitimacy for

securitization to take place. Additionally, securitizing actors may assess threat levels not solely based on objective facts, but also from the perspective of how such an analysis can generate additional privileges for their institutions. In the case of Indonesia, for example, the existence of existential threats, the emergency situation, and the imposition of extraordinary measures provided excuses to compromise the process of military reform, which was one of the country's main democratization goals. This example of Indonesia's securitization shows how the dynamics in a security decision-making process can reflect the domestic power struggle between the competing actors. Therefore, a deeper look at the *realpolitik* of the state affairs as an important facilitating condition, in studying securitization is helpful for the analysis of securitization processes.

Finally, I have also shown in this study that the government's securitization acts occur simultaneously with desecuritization acts. This study examined both concepts as the Indonesian government's policies to handle the violent conflicts and examined the dynamics between the two. In general, the government's attempt at desecuritization failed to appease the warring parties. After it failed to desecuritize the conflicts, the government began to opt for securitization. This poses a theoretical challenge which is due to the fact that the concept of desecuritization remains problematic in the securitization framework. The Copenhagen School does not provide any categories of analysis for scrutinizing desecuritization moves. As desecuritization is understood as the opposite process of securitization, it is fair to argue that researchers could simply apply the different categories of securitization to scrutinize desecuritization, with some adjustments. However, due to such a conceptual insufficiency, this study has attempted to develop a desecuritization framework of analysis by utilizing literature beyond the Copenhagen School. The next section will show some implications of the study at hand in order to further develop the concept of desecuritization, particularly in the context of state security policy for dealing with violent conflicts.

4 DESECURITIZATION DYNAMICS

The Copenhagen School does not provide an analytical framework for the empirical analysis of desecuritization. As a result, researchers who attempted to study desecuritization have interpreted this concept in different ways. In the absence of any explanations from the Copenhagen School, maneuvering room has opened up to allow researchers to develop

their own analytical framework. Given this background, I have developed a framework of analysis for this study, with desecuritization being the Indonesian government's policy in terminating violent conflicts during the country's democratic transition. This framework of analysis is aimed at identifying processes which led toward peaceful conflict resolutions. Since such processes to this end often include non-governmental actors, the analytical framework suggested in this study provides room for the involvement of civil society or grassroots initiatives to take part in the desecuritization process, alongside the government's attempts.

The Copenhagen School limits the definition of desecuritization to the process of shifting out of the emergency mode and moving into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). Going beyond the Copenhagen School, my own analytical framework therefore starts with identifying the categories of desecuritization by adjusting the categories of securitization. These categories are, desecuritizing actors, the desecuritization speech act, the audience of desecuritization, and facilitating conditions for desecuritization, which has been adapted from Coskun (2011). The next step is to identify variables for analyzing desecuritization, which include grounds for desecuritization, desecuritization mechanisms, phases of desecuritization, and desecuritization outcomes.

Taking into account all the desecuritization categories, I have shown that desecuritization actors are those who prefer to terminate the conflict through peaceful resolution. Consequently, these desecuritizing actors consider those who prefer to end the conflicts through the use of the state's instruments of coercion as the audiences of desecuritization. Similar to securitization, in this study the intersubjective interactions between desecuritizing actors and the audiences largely take place within the government. In particular, this was the case when the state was dealing with separatist conflicts. On the other hand, the analysis of the communal conflict shows that besides government officials, the non-governmental or the grassroots actors played a significant role as the desecuritizing actors. The analysis of desecuritizing actors in the case of communal conflict confirmed Aradau's argument that the actors should not be limited to those who had enacted the securitization (Aradau 2004).

The analysis on facilitating conditions for desecuritization also revealed interesting findings. In the case of separatist conflicts, it is clear that the unprecedented tsunami disaster of December 2004 and the various changes of government largely changed the warring parties' perception of

each other and facilitated their commitment to peacefully ending the conflict. Meanwhile, the psychological and cultural factors were the major enabling conditions for desecuritizing the communal conflict. The psychological factors took the form of war-fatigue among the warring parties and the growing resilience in society against provocative actions. With regard to the cultural side, traditional customs and values, which celebrate the cultural and religious diversity of the society, were at play.

Answering the question of how to evaluate desecuritization, the empirical analysis in this study showed that the instrumental ground for desecuritization is a more obvious choice compared to the ethico-political ground (see Chap. 2). This means that there were some in the government that held the view that the use of extraordinary measures was not an effective solution to end the conflicts. Or, at least, the use of extraordinary measures was not the only solution to the conflicts. Therefore, a desecuritization process always took place at the same time as the government exercised securitization moves. There were times when desecuritization acts were dominant and others when securitization was dominant during the conflict periods.

This study also shows that desecuritization in Indonesia always occurred within an active mechanism, meaning, there were changes of attitude or threat perception among the warring parties. However, it took a while before they were able to develop enough trust, which meant that all peace initiatives failed in the initial desecuritization phase, in the early period of the conflicts. The warring parties were only able to develop sufficient trust after significant facilitating conditions (tsunami disaster, changes of government, war-fatigue, growing resilience in the society) had occurred. In turn, the presence of trust and facilitating conditions would allow the desecuritization processes to continue the phases of development and consolidation (see Chap. 2). Once it had reached the development and consolidation phases, the desecuritization process smoothly accelerated. This was indicated by the renewed interactions between previous adversaries and the creation of institutions to carry out agreed-upon points in the peace treaty. In the end, all peace processes in Indonesia during its democratic transition led to changes through stabilization and replacement which were the outcomes of desecuritization. Therefore, the non-coercive initiatives as a solution to the conflict were incrementally developed and had been implemented for quite some time before producing any fruitful results. At the time of writing, in the case of separatist conflict, it seems that Jakarta and Aceh have reached the situation which Wæver (1995,

1998, 2002) calls “asecurity,” that is, a situation “not seen in terms of threat and defence” or which “is taken out of the realm of security conceptualization.” Hence, all sources of conflict between the Indonesian government and the Aceh separatist proponents have been thoroughly neutralized. However, the desecuritization process in the Maluku communal conflict only succeeded in ending the long period of large-scale violence. The process has not solved the true sources of the conflict. The proposed desecuritization framework of analysis in this study has thus been able to fill the conceptual loophole left by the Copenhagen School and analyze the desecuritization processes in Indonesia’s democratization context.

5 CLOSING REMARKS

This study has revealed the inherent security problem during Indonesia’s democratization process. While promising more institutionalized solutions to negotiate and resolve disputes among interest groups in the long run, democratization turns out to be more connected to conflict than to peace due to the limited level of legitimacy that the new government system enjoys. The lack of legitimacy of the new political forces in competing for control of the central government opened opportunities for veto players at the periphery to verbally and physically challenge the authority of the government. This was the case in regard to the separatist conflict in Aceh. At the same time, this situation also led to intensified competition among local interest groups which escalated into a series of large-scale violent conflicts. This was the case in the communal conflict in Maluku. In turn, the re-emergence of a separatist conflict and the outbreak of communal conflicts amid the weakening central government posed existential threats and made the state the security-referent object. Hence, the state had a legitimate cause to move beyond normal politics in dealing with the emergency situation and to evoke the use of extraordinary measures.

The government’s decision to use extraordinary measures, such as the imposition of martial law, marked the completion of the securitization moves. The ideal objective for the use of extraordinary measures was to end the violence and provide room for peaceful conflict resolution to take place. However, for a country transitioning from authoritarian rule to a democratic system of government, great obstacles must be overcome first in order to achieve such an ideal objective. The major problems facing a country in such a situation include the lack of political will from the

warring parties, unclear governmental directives, and the lack of professionalism among the security troops on the field, as the frontline executors of securitization policies. Nevertheless, the securitization policies began to show a degree of positive impact as the warring parties started agreeing on a common agenda. In other words, securitization began to be effective when desecuritization had shown a degree of success.

This implies that the government applied securitization and desecuritization acts at the same time during the course of conflict. The securitization and desecuritization policies were not applied separately; hence, there were dynamics between the two. In fact, the government had always opted to desecuritize the conflicts first. The option to securitize the conflict came about as the violence was increasing and spreading irrespective of desecuritization efforts. Put differently, the government securitized the worsening situation after its initial desecuritization attempts had failed. The factor which most decisively affected the failure of desecuritization was the lack of trust between the warring parties. Another less important factor was the presence of security spoilers who benefited from the ongoing conflict and sought to prolong it. Nevertheless, facilitating conditions such as political change in the central government, the tsunami disaster, and “war-fatigue” played an important role in the latter period of the conflicts in making desecuritization initiatives fruitful, allowing the new governments to exhaust all non-military solutions to end the conflicts. Though the effects of securitization should not be underestimated, it was the desecuritization moves which brought the conflicts in Indonesia during its democratic transition to an end.

This study on the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization as the government security policy for resolving conflict in Indonesia during the country’s democratic changes has provided important lessons for further studies on democratization and securitization. Democratization studies generally focus on three areas of interest, namely democratic transition (represented by the “transitologists” who emphasize on the procedures that regulate access to political power), democratic stability (represented by the “consolidologists” who ask why some democracies are more stable than others), and the quality of democracy (which focuses on the study of hybrid systems or “half-baked” regimes) (Munck 2007; Croissant and Merkel 2004: 1, 3; and Armony and Schamis 2005: 114). These areas of democratization studies have certainly helped students in the field of democratization and provided analytical tools to comprehend the dynamics of authoritarian regimes, how such regimes may lose control, what are

the conditions and modes of transition from authoritarianism to democracy and what establishes and consolidates democratic regimes (Whitehead 1996: 353).

However, what is apparently missing in democratization studies is an in-depth elaboration concerning the period of conflict, especially from the point when the authoritarian regime lost power to the point when the democratic regime had finally consolidated its position in the new polity. This is the critical period in democratic transition where violence mostly breaks out, the state of insecurity is at its peak, and people lose their life. In other words, even though there exist few studies addressing this particular concern such as Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder¹ most of the scholarly work on democratization has overlooked the (in)security aspect of democratic transition.

Inspired by the works of Mansfield and Snyder, this study has attempted to fill this lacuna left by most democratization studies. From their decades-long research program we have learned that democratizing states are vulnerable to the outbreak of violent conflicts due to the failure of weak institutions in accommodating mass participation, as well as managing power competition involving old elites, new interest groups, and mass organizations. Mansfield and Snyder particularly advocate for a gradual democratization process so that the country facing political transition would have sufficient time to strengthen its political institutions. They argue that functioning state institutions might anticipate the outbreak of violent conflicts during democratic transition. However, despite their “innovative, intellectually stimulating, analytically rigorous, and eminently readable exploration” (Mason 2003: 468) on the relations between democratic change and the danger of violence, it appears that Mansfield and Snyder limit their analyses on political institutions and have yet to examine security policies available for transitioning states in order to mitigate its insecurity. This is exactly the research void in democratization studies that this study has attempted to fill.

As I have argued in previous sections, this study has shown that the dynamics of the securitization and desecuritization process can be viewed as a manifestation of the Indonesian government’s approach to the country’s security threats during its democratization process. By modifying the initial securitization theory, this study has introduced a framework of analysis which helps to capture better the dynamics between securitization and desecuritization. What also distinguishes this analysis from other securitization studies lies in its claim that it does not place securitization and

deseuritization at the opposite ends of a spectrum. Instead, securitization and deseuritization occur interchangeably in order to address the dynamics and development of a security situation. Altogether, the application of securitization theory in an empirical study on Indonesia's security policy during the country's democratic transition has provided a number of lessons for further studies on democracies and securitization.

First, democratization studies, especially of the “transitologist” variant, should explore more exhaustively the violent period in democratic transitions. Complementary to small-N and qualitative studies like this one, this could be done by large-N studies investigating security policies of the states undergoing transition across time and space at a global level. By doing so, researchers on democratization may find out whether securitization–deseuritization dynamics as those identified in this study, are generalizable and thus constitute a global or regional pattern. This also implies that researchers on democratization should transcend Mansfield and Snyder's argument that institutions matter for avoiding violence in democratic transitions and that the international community should be more cautious in spreading democracy. Researchers on democratization should thereby take into account to a greater extent than hitherto that every democratic project should be accompanied with plausible security policies in order to constrain the unwanted excesses of the political changes.

Second, students of securitization should pay more attention to securitization as a physical extraordinary measure made by political authorities in an attempt to create an emergency situation as a response to an existential threat. By extraordinary measure I mean the deployment of state's armed forces, by emergency situation the enactment of martial law, and by existential threat the occurrence of violent conflict and casualties. This, however, does not mean to diminish the value of existing body of securitization studies emphasizing on the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community. Instead, this in an attempt to return war and violence to the securitization research agenda and provide a more balanced understanding on the use of securitization at the empirical level of analysis.

The empirical analysis of the dynamics of securitization and deseuritization in Indonesia during the country's democratic transition in this study has highlighted several findings. The first finding is that the government's securitization move would most likely succeed under circumstances when the belligerent actors refuse to accept non-violent peace initiatives from central government, public opinion favor coercive measures to end

violence, civil–military relations favor the military side, nationalist sentiment surge, an economy of conflict exists, and when there is a shifting trend in the international environment from protecting civilian freedom to more security in dealing with global threats such as terrorism. The flip-side of this argument is that the government’s desecuritization moves would most likely succeed under circumstances when there is strong commitment from the executive top leader to choose non-violent solutions over coercive measures, peace mediators enjoy a high level of authority, the international community shows strong support for a peace process, community leaders and local civil society groups help create a conducive social environment for peace dialog, war-fatigue among the warring parties increases, and common consciousness concerning the emergence of a shared identity replacing enmity emerges.

The second finding is that although securitization moves were plausible as the government’s security policy, it was desecuritization moves that ended violent conflicts in Indonesia. At this point, we might argue that the act of desecuritization is necessary to terminate violent conflict but it is not sufficient for several reasons. The first reason is that a successful desecuritization move occurred only after a series of failed desecuritization moves in the early phase of conflict. The second reason is that securitization moves had forced the armed belligerents to recalculate their strategy: They eventually found out that only by negotiating they would maximize their gains through, among others, post-conflict rehabilitation programs, power-sharing at the local government, and so on.

Thirdly, and finally, this study has revealed that there is no strong evidence showing whether desecuritization is better for consolidating democratic government. The period of conflicts in Indonesia had showed that every post-Suharto government always opted for desecuritization and failed to pacify secessionist group and warring parties. In fact, the secessionist groups and warring parties perceived the government’s peace initiatives as signs of weakness in the early phase of Indonesia’s democratization process. However, the successful desecuritization move took place in the country only when the democratic system began to consolidate and accommodate mass participation, as well as to manage power competition among elites in the new political situation.

This study has gone some way in explaining the inherent security threats in Indonesia’s democratic transition and the securitization–desecuritization dynamics in order to show how the state coped with the situation. A more general lesson gained from this study is perhaps best encapsulated in the

words of a local king from Maluku who, after surviving the spiral of violence, tried to call his people together again: “What kind of war are we fighting here? [...] This [...] had caused so many lives without any reason. What is this?”

NOTES

1. Mansfield and Snyder have published their works on the relations between democratization and violence in, inter alia 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002a, b, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012.

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