

BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE POLITICAL
ECONOMY: SPERI RESEARCH & POLICY

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THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION

Bruno Wueest

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Building a Sustainable Political Economy:
SPERI Research & Policy

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The Politics
of Economic
Liberalization

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FOREWORD

Institutionalist theory remains of central importance in comparative politics and its applicability to a variety of different cases is unquestionable. What is questioned, however, is whether so-called discursive institutionalism is indeed another-ism and whether it should be treated as a distinctive strand in the literature. Bruno Wueest, University of Zurich, lays out a convincing case for choosing to go with discursive institutionalism as an approach that makes its own contribution to institutionalist theory. He engages with a difficult task: mapping out the different discourses inherent in six major European democracies with regard to economic liberalization and the multifaceted ways in which those discourses rely on common cues and are yet both played out differently and have different consequences. He argues that the similarities between them are to be traced in the common thread provided by globalization and post-industrialization, whereas the differences can be explained by virtue of the distinct institutional arrangements that the countries in question have developed over time. The author succeeds in digging deep into a very rich dataset and provides us with overwhelming evidence of the main arguments used throughout the book. The literature on discursive institutionalism had been missing a quantitative study that takes discourse at a new level of analysis and is applicable to a number of countries and cases that makes it a solid reference point for future work.

Zurich, Switzerland

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PREFACE

This study lays out a case for discursive institutionalism to be an independent theoretical and empirical framework. More precisely, it adds a new quantitative approach to the discursive institutionalist literature. Such an approach has been frequently demanded but not been carried out so far. The study therefore certainly speaks to academics working on comparative political economy, political discourse, Western European politics, and the diverse strands of institutionalist theories. In this regard, this study joins the ranks of works that emphasize the ‘argumentative’ or ‘discursive’ turn in political economy and policy analysis, with a special focus on Western Europe. Beyond that, this book can provide useful background knowledge for political activists and advisors of political organizations. More specifically, everyone engaged in public relations in the UK, Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, or the European Union may find helpful advice on how to further develop their communication strategies. Research for this study received support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (100017-111756).

Zurich, Switzerland

Bruno Wueest

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Introduction: Mapping Economic Liberalization Discourse in Western Europe

Abstract The first chapter outlines the task of the study, which is a mapping of the different discourses inherent in six major European democracies. To this aim, it introduces the theoretical model that will guide the following elaborations on the unity in substance and the differences in structure of public discourses. Sketched in very bold strokes, it is argued that the similarities between discourses are to be traced in the common thread provided by globalization and post-industrialization, whereas the differences can be explained by virtue of the distinct institutional arrangements that the countries in question have developed over time.

Keywords Outline · Discourse · Theoretical model · Structure · Substance

In Western Europe, political discourses in the face of economic challenges usually are fierce, but they mostly result in the same reaction: be it the central banks, the governments or the parliaments, European leaders mostly opt for economic liberalization. Moreover, although Western European countries have particularly idiosyncratic structures in their public discourses on economic liberalization reforms, the outcome of these discourses is strikingly similar. Analyzing discourse in the six Western European countries Germany, France, UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria, this book provides systematic empirical evidence that policy-related discourses are much more than noise, they are detailed expressions of institutional complementarity and political struggles.

In Western Europe, economic liberalization has become a focal issue in both popular and scholarly debates. Liberalized markets may be more efficient in satisfying people's needs, but they tend to create inequalities and produce externalities (see Berger 2000). Economic markets thus provoke considerable resentments in the political sphere (Rodrik 1997; Ruggie 2008). In Western Europe, the increasing helplessness of governments to cope with the consequences of permanent austerity, i.e., the fiscal stress induced by demographic aging and a slowdown in economic growth, further amplify conflict potentials (Pierson 2001). Hence, it comes as no surprise that economic liberalization provokes fierce public debates. At the one extreme, economic liberalization is celebrated as pioneering worldwide economic development or even paving the way for a new era of a liberal peace. At the other extreme, it is blamed for undermining both democratic politics and the sustainability of advanced economies (Streeck 2011). This controversy has become especially virulent in the last crisis-prone years, for example in the political struggles between the leadership of the European Union and the recently successful populist left parties in Greece, Spain and other Southern European countries.

This study aims at researching public discourse itself and not its outcomes in terms of political decisions or policy effects. Following Schmidt's (2008) lead, discourse is thereby understood as the processes in which ideas are conveyed, reflected, and legitimated. By putting emphasis on discourse, this study can simultaneously care for the ideas represented in discursive processes (the *substance* of discourse) as well as the interactive processes among political actors who generate and communicate these ideas (the *structure* of discourse) (see Müller 2015). In terms of substance, most of the discourses in Western Europe are heavily internationalized and have embarked on a pro-market mainstream in the twenty-first century. This convergence of the substantial aspects is tightly intertwined with profound changes in Western European economies since the 1970s. At least until the recent financial and economic crisis, globalization and deindustrialization created strong cross-national convergence pressures toward free market prerogatives. In terms of structure, discourse matches the distinct regulatory regimes Western European countries have historically developed (Schmitter and Grote 1997; Huber and Stephens 2001; Schwartz 2001, p. 31). Accordingly, there is a plurality of at least partly conflicting economic interests, which feeds into multiple conflict lines in the national discourses on economic liberalization. This means that the coalitional setting and the intensity of conflicts vary greatly across countries.

The presence of both differences and commonalities in economic liberalization discourses will be addressed by taking a discursive institutionalist perspective (see Hay 2011; Schmidt 2008; McCartney 2009).¹ Further, with *public* discourse, political contestation in the mass-mediated arena is meant. A discursive institutionalist perspective suggests that we can specify public discourse as a key process how ideas become consequential for institutional change (see Hay 2011; Fioretos 2011, p. 375). As a starting point, it is necessary to trace the ideas that give rise to a particular discourse. Subsequently, as the discourse has become routine, the corresponding ideas become enshrined in the institutional setting of a country (Blyth 2002; Béland and Cox 2011). Under new circumstances, however, the ideas formative to institutions undergo a critical reevaluation and provoke conflicting interpretations by the actors involved in the policy process. Thus, further discourse is provoked, which, in turn, has the potential to reshape a country's institutional setting again. The relationship between public discourse and institution should therefore be conceptualized as an evolutionary and interactive process (Campbell 2004; Béland and Cox 2011, p. 10). Béland (2009, p. 710) calls this “symbolic and institutional translation”, which involves the enrichment of given ideas inherited from a country's particular institutional legacy with new ideas stemming from the iterative and sometimes contentious current discourse. The mass-mediated arena is crucially shaping the perception of the broader public and the political decision-makers in contemporary democracies, a fact that led Manin (1997, pp. 218–235) famously conclude that we live in an ‘age of audience democracy.’

Public discourse on economic liberalization is an exemplary case to study the outcomes of a discursive institutional process. After the breakdown of the Keynesian mainstream in the late 1970s, monetarist ideas started to become prominent (Hall 1993). At most two decades later, these ideas were so much part of economic policy-making that most observers speak of the next, this time pro-market oriented mainstream (Hay 2001; Blyth 2002). One general finding of this study is that this new mainstream is achieved in distinct ways in the different countries and political arenas. This means that a broad range of oppositional actors is struggling against pro-market reforms with degrees of success varying in accordance with the institutional context. Most notably on the input side of the political system—where political potentials are mobilized, innovative ideas are brought up and policy options are debated—the discourse is heavily polarized and opponents of economic liberalization have a strong stance. Hence,

the more open public discourse, and the more it serves to coordinate the perceived interests of the actors involved, the more intense is political contestation in the public arena. This also means that the conflict intensity of public discourse sometimes runs contrary to the expectations derived from the comparative political economy literature. For example, contention is higher in the public discourse in Germany than in France, where we usually assume a more contentious style of economic policy-making (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001; Korpi 2006).

The systematic application of the discursive institutionalist perspective allows to bridge gaps between different literature in the comparative political economy. By exploring the structure of public discourse, it finds that both the accessibility and the functionality of public discourse on economic liberalization—whether discourse is more coordinative or communicative (see Schmidt 2008)—are conditioned by the broader institutional context. It can thus be shown that institutional frameworks create opportunities and constraints for the production and dissemination of ideas of political parties, interest groups, and public authorities (Schmidt 2002). This study therefore confirms the comparative political economy literature insofar as institutional complementarity still structures both the access and the general function of public discourse on economic liberalization (Kitschelt 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 444). This divergence in institutional pathways, however, has much less influence on the substantial aspects of public discourse. Hence, this study also confirms previous scholarly accounts that the substance of public conflicts has converged toward a more internationalized and a more pro-market-oriented discourse over the last decades (Kriesi et al. 2012; Streeck 2009, p. 149). As a result, international regulatory aspects have become very important and economic markets have been allowed to run more freely in the majority of the countries under study.

Located at the intersection between the comparative political economy and discourse literature, this study brings together a variety of research techniques, which offer a rich account of public discourse on economic liberalization. The data basis is provided by extensive and original quantitative content analysis of newspapers and political-economic macro-data collected by the author and a team of researchers (see Kriesi et al. 2012). The macro-data offer insights into the economic development as well as party positions against economic liberalization in the respective countries in question from the 1970s until the 2000s. The content analysis data provide information on the policy positions, valence attributions, and frames of all actors appearing in the public discourse on economic liberalization

from 2004 to 2006. The inductive approach of this content analysis allows to include all actors participating and all policies discussed on economic liberalization into the analyses. In addition, the data aggregation has been carried out more accurately than in similar studies. More precisely, multiple weights are used to control for biases induced by differing statement frequencies across countries and newspaper articles as well as the varying importance of single issues for public discourse. Subsequently, the data are analyzed with descriptive statistics and multivariate models, such as count regressions as well as network, clustering and factor analyses. The key concept introduced to explore the data is the *discourse coalition*. Discourse coalitions can be identified by the similarity of policy positions, framing strategies and valence attributions among the actors engaged in public discourse. Such an identification is built on the assumption that the actors' discursive actions do not happen independently from the interaction with other actors (Schmidt 2008, p. 3). A discursive coalition therefore results from the largely congruent articulation of ideas about economic liberalization. The constellations emerging from the different discursive coalitions identification of discursive coalitions then allows conclusions on the structure and substance of public discourse on economic liberalization in Western Europe.

Evidence from such a quantitative comparison of public discourse in the tradition of the discursive institutionalist literature is still rare (see Béland and Cox 2011, p. 3). In fact, although extant studies are theoretically insightful and empirically rich, they rarely go beyond qualitative case study analysis and thus leave open whether it can be shown that discourse interacts with the institutional and structural context also in a systematically comparative way (see Wueest and Fossati 2015). Of course, there are already numerous approaches applying a systematic comparison of discourse across countries,² however, none of these approaches directly deals with the tenets of the neo-institutionalist literature. Thus, this study also serves as a laboratory to test previous research on a rich data set regarding public discourses on economic liberalization.

1.1 DESIGNING THE INQUIRY

In today's established democracies, policy choices are increasingly affected by politics conveyed in mass-mediated public discourses (Sniderman 2000, p. 75). Most notably, the political economy literature has convincingly shown that discourse among political actors in the pub-

lic or parliamentary arenas ‘play a powerful causal role in determining the trajectory of policy change and, as such, should be treated as objects of enquiry in their own right’ (Smith and Hay 2008, p. 359). In addition, political communication research has long observed that the influence of the media on the policy-making process is continuously growing (Mancini and Swanson 1996; Kriesi et al. 2007). However, while there have been studies in policy fields such as immigration, abortion, and Europeanization, there is little known about public discourse on economic liberalization (see Ferree et al. 2002; Medrano 2003; Helbling et al. 2010).

Building on the ideas of the discursive institutionalist perspective (see Hay 2001), we can assume that the consideration of both institutions and the full variety of ideas conveyed into public discourses are necessary preconditions to study such a complex phenomenon as economic liberalization. On the one hand, this study embeds the discourse analysis into an elaboration of the structural economic and institutional context by means of a thorough literature review and secondary data analyses. This makes it possible to trace historic ideas which are formative to the discourses in the single countries. On the other hand, the following discourse analysis is designed in a flexible and inductive way to leave it open which actors participate in the public discourse to convey their ideas. This means that the study focuses on all actors appearing as relevant during the analyses. In fact, while it is acknowledged in the literature that “normally hundreds of actors from interest groups, governmental agencies, legislatures at different levels of government, researchers, journalists, and judges” (Sabatier and Weible 2007b: 3) are involved in discursive processes, this dictum is seldom applied in research designs. The globalization literature, for instance, tends to restrict the analysis to interactions among governments and/or parties (e.g., Garrett 1998; Dutt and Mitra 2005), whereas institutionalists mostly focus their attention on the relationship between interest groups and public authorities (e.g., Hancké et al. 2007). Such a priori definitions of the crucial players in economic policy-making may be reasonable for some research purposes, but from the viewpoint of a general analysis of public discourse, such restrictions can become an obstacle (Sabatier 1998; Koger et al. 2009; Bartolini 2005, pp. 25–27). Thus, a contribution of this study is its comprehensive research design, since, to the author’s knowledge, there have been no previous studies in discursive institutionalism that map public discourse in six countries by using thousands of statements by all actors appearing in the mass-mediated public arena.

This study centers on an analysis of *public discourse*. In most simple terms, public discourse can be defined as the sum of all public communications related to a particular policy domain (Helbling et al. 2012).³ Hence, it is important to note that public discourse will be understood as a pragmatic device to study public communication which is stripped of the normative underpinnings often brought forward by scholars of discourse quality (e.g., Habermas 1993; Steenbergen et al. 2003). Public discourse may, but does not have to, take the form of a idealized discourse such as well-informed and respectful deliberation on the policies under concern. Public discourse may also be ambivalent, acrimonious and insulting, since nothing less than the control of the meaning of the policy process is at stake.

The policy domain studied is economic liberalization, which by definition includes a broad range of policies regarding privatization, competition and industrial policy, employment regulation, social partnership, as well as trade and financial market regulation. Such a comprehensive conceptualization is necessary for a comparative research design, since conflicts surrounding market liberalization can arise for varying policies across the different national settings. While, for example, one country experiences conflicts on employment regulations, others might be embroiled in disputes on free trade regimes. In general, thus, public discourse is a thematically delimited part of the broader public sphere, which Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991) define as a comprehensive system of communicative exchanges about all kinds of policy domains. More specifically, public discourse is the result of a communication process involving a multitude of actors who take positions, refer to each other, and justify their positions on the basis of their ideas. To put it in the words of Sabatier and Weible (2007a, p. 192), public discourse in a policy domain is inhabited by a specific set of actors who regard themselves as a ‘community who share an expertise’ and who have sought to influence policy-making for an extended period.

Such a definition highlights that ‘discourse is a lot more than talk’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 312). Discourse cannot only bind the speakers themselves to take action, it also shapes the ideas of other actors and the perception of the broader public (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 12). Actors can thus further develop their political clout if they are able to persuade opponents, mobilize fellow campaigners, and involve the audience (Schattschneider 1960, p. 4). This also means that ideas conveyed by specific actors do have a certain stability in public discourses. This stability originates from the actors’ reliance on their previous ideas and the ideas of other actors to develop new ideas and adjust them to the institutional and politico-

economic contexts. Such a conditional understanding of discourse is clearly distinct from the (often, however, only allegedly) exaggerated postmodernist and post-structuralist perspective that discourse can be perceived as ‘reality’ no matter the context (Webster 2014).

Compared to other empirical assessments of policy conflicts, a focus on public discourse has a number of advantages. First, public discourse is not constrained to specific events. The polling day, for example, is the referential event to all studies of electoral campaigns. A public discourse analysis, instead, covers more than specific dynamics of single events. It is able to map all political communication on the policy domain under concern. Thus, a higher robustness for the results can be expected. Second, the design of this inquiry offers a rigorous assessment of a comprehensive set of four discursive actions than usually considered (see Tannenwald 2005; Helbling et al. 2012). First, actors have to enter mass-mediated discourse by using either institutionalized channels of communication or mobilization strategies in order to gain support for their perceived interests (going public). Subsequently, actors need to make their perceived interests visible and need to establish their reputation and competence (policy position-taking and valence attributions). Finally, framing, the actors’ justifications of their statements, is included as the fourth discursive action. These four discursive actions are the essential building blocks of public discourse on economic liberalization.

The country sample of this study includes the three biggest European economies, i.e., France, Germany, and the UK, and three small Western European countries, namely Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria. The three big countries play a pivotal role in the global economy, which is evident in the fact that they are responsible for half of the European Union’s gross domestic product (IMF 2010). Beyond their pure economic strength, these economies also stand out for their different historical pathways of economic development. The UK, next to the USA, is the most frequently cited example of a liberal market economy with overwhelmingly arm’s length relationships between business, interest associations and public authorities (Bonoli 2003). By contrast, most scholars point to Germany when they want to refer to a coordinated market economy, i.e., a capitalist regime with close and mainly cooperative relationships between interest associations (Emmenegger and Marx 2011). France, finally, is considered an exemplary case of a market economy based around an entrepreneurial state, with modernization strategies traditionally relying on major industrial projects with far-reaching state intervention.

The three smaller economies, on the other hand, represent typical cases of coordinated and adaptive Western European economies with a small workforce and traditionally high export market dependency (Katzenstein 1985). However, both Switzerland and the Netherlands can be seen as liberal-leaning variants of coordinated market economies in comparison with other continental European political economies. They differ with respect to their high market capitalization, a comparatively low influence of trade unions and relatively flexible employment regulations (Schnyder and Heemskerck 2008; Hall and Gingerich 2009). Switzerland as the only non-EU member state in the group further allows an evaluation of how much the European integration process affects public discourse on economic liberalization. Austria, on the other hand, with its traditionally strongly important public sector, the social-democratic roots of its welfare state, and its exceptionally strong interlinks to the emerging countries of Eastern Europe, raises yet other questions regarding the influence of specific country characteristics on public discourse. In sum, the variety of country-specific factors in the sample provides a feasible test of the general argument regarding the transformation of public discourse in Western Europe.

Turning to the periods of observation of this study, most analyses will be concerned with the first years of the 2000s, but some considerations are also devoted to the historical development of conflicts on economic liberalization. The second chapter in particular will take the long-term perspective from the 1970s until the mid-2000s into account. This introductory, longitudinal comparison will outline the relationship of globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation with political contestation. It shows that there has been a growing tendency toward an economic mainstream that favors economic liberalization. With respect to more recent discourse, the onset of the 2000s has ushered in an intensification of these conflicts. The rapid liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s occurred in economic domains where advanced economies (like the ones being studied here) had advantageous market positions, e.g., in terms of communications and financial services. In the early 2000s, in contrast, the discourse shifted to politically sensitive economic domains, which is why a stagnation of the liberalization processes in the first years of the new millennium can be observed.

First, some highly salient events regarding the loss of national control over core industries have provoked significant skepticism toward the opening up of national markets: the hostile foreign takeover of industrial giants caused fears of a sell-off of domestic industries in France (Péchiney) and

Germany (Mannesmann), while the UK and Switzerland experienced the painful collapse of flagship companies (MG Rover and Swissair, respectively). Second, the liberalization of the agricultural sector has loomed large in the public discourse of the early 2000s. Most notably, the World Trade Organization (WTO) member states have been engaged in the Doha Development Round to lower market barriers for agricultural products since 2001. The negotiations have not progressed since the ministerial meeting in Cancún in 2003, partly because Western European governments made too few concessions regarding their protected agricultural markets. Third, labor markets have increasingly become the center of attention in the six countries. The French and German governments have tried to introduce similar, broad labor market reforms. While the German government managed to implement the *Agenda 2010* reform in 2003, despite intense protests from the radical left and unions, the French government withdrew its reform, the *Contrat Première Embauche*, in view of the fierce conflicts with the labor movement in 2006. Moreover, the 2005 *Bolkestein directive*, the European Commission's attempt to liberalize the service sector within the Single European Market, was heavily criticized by the left on the ground that it would trigger a race to the bottom in terms of labor market regulations.

As a consequence, political opposition toward further economic liberalization has steadily grown in Western Europe in the first years of the 2000s. The global justice movements have been at forefront since their protests at the WTO summit in Seattle 1999 made headlines. In a similar vein, the radical left has seen a revival in the electoral arena in Europe (e.g., *Syriza* in Greece, *Podemos* in Spain, *die Linke* in Germany or the *Socialistische Partji* in the Netherlands). However, not only left fringe parties, but also populist right-wing parties, such as the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* in Austria or the *Front National* in France, have increasingly started to favor more protectionist and interventionist policies (Kriesi et al. 2012). In sum, the chosen period is likely to reveal interesting evidence on the structure and substance of the public discourse on economic liberalization.

1.2 OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT

A comprehensive assessment of the public discourse on economic liberalization is challenging because its relationship to structural processes and the institutional context is not straightforward. Most of the conceptual insecurities arise because public discourse is a moving target whose precise




Fig. 1.1 Overall heuristic model for the discourse analysis

characteristics also depend on the specific time, country and arena where it takes place. This study factors these insecurities in by developing a heuristic model that separates structural economic transformations such as globalization and post-industrialization from public discourse and changes in the role of the state in the economy (see Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Schmidt 2008). A stylized graph of this model is presented in Fig. 1.1.

Sketched in very bold strokes, structural changes and changes in the role of the state in the economy are intertwined with the transformation of the structure and substance of public discourse. Thus, both the formulation and implementation of policies as well as the general course of the economy are tightly related to public discourses. The nature of these relationships, in turn, is mediated by the institutional context of specific public discourses. To be more precise, country- and arena-specific⁴ opportunities and constraints decisively shape public discourses. Hence, conditional on the institutional context, different types of actors gain influence and convey different ideas in the discursive processes. As Béland and Cox (2011, p. 10) highlight, focussing on discursive processes therefore means perceiving politics not as a mechanical process in which actors have *a priori* formulated and thus inert goals and strategies, but rather as an evolutionary process of dynamic discursive interactions.

As for public discourse, this study distinguishes substance-specific from structural aspects (see the right side in Fig. 1.1). More precisely, the

questions regarding the substance of public discourse on economic liberalization relate to the dominance of ideas (*is there a convergence toward a pro-market mainstream?*) and its dimensionality (*which conflict dimensions predominate in economic liberalization discourses?*). The structural aspects of the study, in contrast, cover questions related to the accessibility (*who enters the public arena with respect to economic liberalization policies?*) and functionality (*is discourse a forum for the communication and legitimization of policy decisions or for consultations between major interests?*).

With respect to the left of the heuristic model in Fig. 1.1, the relevant exogenous developments consist of globalization—understood as an umbrella term for different aspects of economic internationalization—post-industrialization—summarizing structural economic changes like tertiarization and the feminization of the workforce—and the changing role of the state in the economy—privatization and the transformation of the welfare state. Most scholars agree that at least one of these developments is consequential for today’s public discourses on economic liberalization (Krugman et al. 1995; Kollmeyer 2009; Iversen and Cusack 2000). However, there is still a heightened debate on how exactly the relationship between structural changes and the substance of discourse has changed. Much of the early research on globalization maintains that the structural transformations have paved the way for the uniform spread of economic liberalist ideas, which has seen steady progress since the end of the Cold War. Ultimately, this literature concludes that economic liberalism in the long run is singled out as the common ideological belief in advanced economies (Fukuyama 1992; Moses 1994; Ohmae 1995; Reich 2007). Neo-Gramscian accounts agree with this notion of convergence but interpret it as the result of a hegemonic project of transnationally oriented elites (van der Pijl 1998; Forgacs 2000; van Apeldoorn 2002; Overbeek 2004). Both literature, however, tend to overestimate the congruence of perceived interests at the expense of neglecting the still-strong national roots of politics. Accordingly, the research pursued in this study takes a more differentiated perspective. It starts from the assumption that a broad variety of conflicting ideas continuously clash in public discourse. While a dominance of pro-market mainstream ideas in the public arena can indeed be observed, this dominance is neither as hegemonic nor as tacitly accepted as some of the previous studies have concluded. In Western European democracies, there are always counter-discourses which can break through the given time and place is right.

Besides the question regarding the dominant ideas in public conflicts, a further focus with regard to the transformation of the substance of public discourse consists of its underlying dimensions. Globalization, post-industrialization and the transformed role of the state in the economy have given rise to new dimensions of political conflict in advanced economies (Przeworsky and Yebra 2005). Hence, there is ample evidence that the classical left—right divide between support for economic freedom alongside market-enhancing policies and support for redistribution alongside full employment does not structure conflicts on economic policies as clearly as it did until the 1970s (Gourevitch 2002). However, while theories in comparative and international political economy almost unanimously describe such changes, it seems that many empirical applications still implicitly or explicitly operationalize political conflict on economic issues as being straightforwardly structured into a political left and right (e.g., Beramendi and Anderson 2008; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Milner and Judkins 2004; Dutt and Mitra 2005). Moreover, if studies see reason that the dimensionality of political-economic conflicts has changed, there is no consensus on how. Some scholars argue that the structuring by old cleavages and the formation of new conflict dimensions are undermined by the increasing individualization and disaffection among citizens in affluent democracies (e.g., Mair 2001, 2008). Others maintain that the most important division has shifted from economic to cultural areas, such as immigration, thus leaving issues like the liberalization of markets to be merely valence issues on which all mainstream parties agree (Kitschelt 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008). In both cases, however, we would be unable to identify stable conflict dimensions, since the possible divides structuring economic liberalization discourse are blurred by neglect on the side of the political elite or the public.

This study builds on a multidimensional approach, which inductively identifies the major political divides in public discourse. The major finding with respect to the dimensionality of public discourse is that there are two structuring divides: *domestic* liberalization and *international* liberalization. Conflicts on international liberalization are linked to processes of globalization. It is clear from scholarship in the tradition of Ruggie (1982) and Rodrik (1997) that one epicenter of public discourse on economic liberalization lies in disputes about markets which are ever more disembedded from the national political realm (see Block 2007, p. 5f; Tarrow and Caporaso 2009). Hence, the internationalization of trade and finance, the increasing interventions of international and European regulatory agencies, the relocation of production and related issues have undoubtedly pro-

voked discourses with an especially heightened intensity. However, since many core competencies of policy-making on economic liberalization such as labor market regulation remains centered at the national level, a distinctly domestic conflict dimension permeates public discourse on economic liberalization as well (Kriesi et al. 2007; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). Historically, these domestic conflicts are linked to the transformation of the old class divide by the tertiarization and feminization of Western European economies.

Economic and institutional changes not only have implications for the substance of public discourse, the structure of discourse is affected as well. This is the lesson learned from influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political economy, which emphasizes the *divergent paths* thesis (e.g., Kitschelt 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Häusermann 2010; Schmidt 2008, p. 444). Its basic tenet is that political economies are structured by historically developed institutional complementarity and market structures. For scholars of public discourse, this implies that the countries' institutional settings are continuously creating different constraints and opportunities for actors involved in public discourses. Over the long run, the public discourses in different countries therefore become distinct to each other as well. Moreover, the economic developments are rather similar in all six countries, which is why they cannot explain the large variation that is found for the accessibility and functionality of public discourses (see Chap. 2).

The recently most prominent attempt to conceptualize complementary institutional regimes is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). The approach is organized around the employers' coordination capacities as the key distinguishing feature to identify two diverging patterns of adaptation to economic changes (Hall and Gingerich 2009; Hancké et al. 2007). Liberal Market Economies (LME), on the one hand, are characterized by non-cooperative relations between unions and employers, a market-driven financial system, and arm's length relations among firms. In the country sample in this study, the UK most closely matches the premises of this LME category. In Coordinated Market Economies (CME), on the other hand, union—employer relationships are generally perceived as cooperative, industries traditionally have close ties to banks, and employers are organized in associations. This means that business in CME is more intensely involved in processes of interest intermediation between trade unions, public authorities, professional organizations and employer associations.

Various accounts of institutional change in Western Europe contest the conclusions of the VoC approach. First, some scholars perceive the construction of politico-economic regime types as problematic per se. As Herrigel (2007, p. 481) points out, the fact that every country represents a highly complex configuration of institutions, which, correspondingly, allows for many different scholarly interpretations, and thus makes it impossible to define a persuasive typology. However, this study shows that, although regime typologies are inherently diffused in their empirical application, they are very helpful in revealing the peculiarities that form the context of national discourses (see also Adam and Kriesi 2007, p. 138). A second, often raised criticism is that, in the original model, it is necessary to define a residual category (the Mixed-Market Economies) for countries that do not consistently fit into one of the ideal-typical categories. Unfortunately, very important countries for political economy research, such as France, fall in this category. Schmidt (2009) convincingly argues that this misconceptualization is due to the neglect of the state as the central mediating and intervening actor in the economic sphere and extends the two VoC to three—Liberal, Coordinated and State-influenced (SME) Market Economies. While in LMEs the influence of the state is limited to rule setting and conflict settlement, it actively tries to facilitate economic activity in CMEs. However, in a CME the state acts as a co-equal with employers and unions to negotiate employment protection, to participate in wage bargaining, or to set other economic regulations (Schmidt 2009, p. 521). In an SME, by contrast, the state often acts as an entrepreneur and actively decides on business activity (Thibergien 2007). In the context of this study, France can clearly be defined as a SME.

The specification of the regime types have far-reaching consequences on the structure of public discourses in the single countries (see also Wueest 2013). A first consequence is the varying functions public discourses have in the policy processes of the different countries. As elaborated by (Schmidt 2008), there are two basic functions of discourse: the *coordinative* discourse that takes place among political actors to negotiate and deliberate on policies, and the *communicative* discourse in which elite actors disseminate and legitimize their policy decisions via the public. While both functions are essential features of public discourses in general (see Müller 2015, Chap. 1), it is straightforward that the institutional constellations discussed so far shape the importance of these functions in the different national discourses.⁵ LME or SME like France and the UK as well as the Netherlands can broadly be described as systems where

reform agendas are channeled through a single authority (Lijphart 1999; Schmidt 2008, p. 16). Hence, primarily in countries with majoritarian representative institutions, statist economic policy making or heavily centralized industrial relations, there is more ‘simple’ politics in the public arena. Since policy decisions and implementations are usually less well balanced between competing perceived interests, comparatively sophisticated efforts to communicate the feasibility and necessity of these policies are required (Schmidt 2002, Chap. 5). Public administrations that strive to legitimize their policy decisions are therefore expected to be exceptionally important actors in the public discourses in France, the UK and the Netherlands. Moreover, since governing activity is less well supported by negotiations among social partners, the importance of discourse on policy outputs is assumed to be higher compared to the other countries in this study.

Public discourses in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria, by contrast, are assumed to be shaped mainly by coordination. In these political economies, labor market institutions are designed to, at least, partly withstand the volatility of markets (Hays 2009, p. 13). The main strategy to achieve this involves cooperative agreements between employers, trade unions, and the public authorities such as wage moderation or temporary part-time work accords (Thelen and Kume 2006). The necessary concessions by the trade unions, on the one hand, depend on state guaranties to shore up employment protection and to supplement income losses. On the other hand, business has to make binding commitments in order to maintain existing employment and wage levels. The fact that interest groups have a far more prominent role in the policy formulation processes implies that negotiations and disputes in the run-up to policy decisions spill more often into the public arena.

The different institutional frameworks are also carriers of constraints and opportunities for the *accessibility* of discourse for specific actors (Ferree et al. 2002; Hancké et al. 2007). With respect to economic liberalization, the accessibility of the public arena for the labor movement thereby is a crucial cornerstone. As Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, interactions among the different economic interest groups in LME are usually less formal, which is why exogenously induced shocks are more directly passed on to workers in countries such as the UK. This leaves the labor movement in an especially weak position. Public discourse is therefore particularly closed in this country. In polarized pluralist countries such as France, the history of sharp ideological conflict has led to a more confrontational political style,

not only with respect to electoral campaigns, political protests, and labor market disputes, but also in the mass mediated public arena (Kriesi et al. 1995, 2012). Hence, the labor movement is exceptionally militant, which enables it to regularly mount pressure on decision-makers via the public arena.

Among the four CME countries of the study, the Netherlands and Switzerland are characterized by additional peculiarities (Visser and Afonso 2010). Like other continental European economies, the Netherlands and Switzerland have faced high wages and fixed labor costs but, as outliers, they have not experienced sharply rising unemployment in reaction to abrupt economic upheavals (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Both countries have relied on a comparatively flexible labor market, i.e., the extension of part-time and temporary employment, to compensate for economic difficulties (Visser and Hemerjick 1997; Bonoli and Mach 2000). Moreover, although social partnership has been on constant pressure in all four CME countries, labor movements already traditionally play a subordinate role in Switzerland and the Netherlands (Katzenstein 1985). Thus, although public discourse in CME is certainly more accessible than in SME and LME, Switzerland and the Netherlands can be assumed to have a less open discourse relative to Austria and Germany because of the labor movements' weak position. This assumption only refers to the particular public discourse on economic liberalization reforms. Because of their consensus-oriented policy-making processes, and, in the case of Switzerland, its direct democratic institutions, the Netherlands and Switzerland of course have a generally very open public arena. It also only refers to the general success of unions to enter public discourse and not to the distribution of success among different unions.⁶

To conclude, the comprehensive perspective on the mutual effects of structural transformations and institutional contexts, which is applied in this study, allows a systematic assessment of the structure and substance of public discourse in the six countries in question. This study can thus empirically show how, when and where ideas matter for economic liberalization in Western Europe (Schmidt 2008, p. 21). As for the substance of public discourse, there are common shifts toward more internationalization and pro-market orientations. The structural features of public discourse with respect to the accessibility and functionality, in contrast, are most clearly visible in terms of the intensity of conflicts in the different countries. In general, the more open a discourse, the broader the range of perceived interests, which, in turn, increases the intensity of conflicts. Similarly, the more public discourse centers on coordination, the more intense actors

need to engage with opposite interests, which most probably intensifies political disputes.

1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The heuristic model as presented in Fig. 1.1 will guide both the elaborations on the structural and institutional foundations of contemporary discourse (Chap. 2) as well as the presentation and discussion of the design for the content analyses (from Chap. 4 on). While the Chaps. 4 and 5 chiefly build on empirical analysis, the second, more conceptual chapter, will consist mainly of a dialogue between theoretical arguments and first cursory empirical results (see Ragin 2008). It establishes the historical foundations of public discourse and reviews the extant literature. Hence, this chapter will focus on the development of the economic situation in Western Europe over the last four decades and its interplay with the role of the state in economic policy-making. It will show that public discourse on economic liberalization has taken place in a context of increasing internationalization and post-industrialization and against the background of the emergence of the regulatory state. These transformations are linked to changes in the substance of economic liberalization discourse. On the one hand, it becomes evident that mainstream party convergence and the internationalization of conflicts have led to a dominance of pro-market mainstream ideas. On the other hand, Chap. 2 elaborates on the interplay between the institutional context of countries and arenas as well as public discourse. To be precise, it is argued that the openness and coordinative function of public discourse increase its conflict intensity. Chapter 3, further, presents the methods of data collection and analysis. Most importantly, the measurement and aggregation of the four discursive actions—going public, policy position-taking, valence attributing, and framing—are presented.

In the following empirical analysis, public discourse on economic liberalization will be mapped in two steps. First, Chap. 4 offers a first account of the substance of discourse by analyzing the degree and exact nature of internationalization in the different countries and arenas. It shows that public conflict in the six countries are similarly affected by a domestic and an international divide. In addition, Chap. 4 corroborates the finding that the overall policy climate of public discourse has largely converged across countries. More precisely, five distinct discursive coalitions are identified: the radical and moderate mainstream coalitions, which are the linchpins of the pro-market dominance, as well as traditional left, protectionist and inter-

ventionist coalitions challenging the pro-market mainstream. The varying constellation of these coalitions across the different contexts also reveal that although the pro-market mainstream in general prevails, it is heavily challenged in the input arenas and single countries such as France. The study of framing, finally, shows that the prevalence of pro-market ideas also develops in terms of the justifications underlying specific policy positions. Liberalist frames thus mostly eclipse social democratic and mercantilist arguments.

Chapter 5 confirms that, although resourceful actors dominate discourse in all countries, the accessibility and functionality of discourse decisively varies according to the institutional contexts. As a result, conflict intensity, measured as the polarization of policy positions and patterns of valence attributions, varies closely according to the different capitalist regime types and arenas. This leads to the conclusion that the relationship between conflict intensity and institutional contexts is systematic: open and coordinative discourses, such as in Germany, are very contentious, while closed and communicative discourses, such as in the UK, are particularly quiescent. Chapter 6, finally, summarizes the most important empirical evidence and discusses the ramifications of the findings in the light of the broader research questions.

NOTES

1. Following Campbell and Pedersen (2001), the term ‘discursive institutionalism’ is used, since it is most common. Nevertheless, other terms such as ideational or constructivist institutionalism (Hay 2001, 2006), which in general denote a very similar theoretical perspective, circulate as well.
2. The most notable examples include the ‘critical discourse analysis’ (van Dijk 2000), the ‘discourse network’ approach by Steenbergen et al. (2012), the ‘discourse quality index’ by Steenbergen et al. (2003) and the ‘discourse opportunity structure’ framework by Ferree et al. (2002).
3. This definition owes much to conceptions established by Ferree et al. (2002) and Anderson (1978). While Ferree et al. (2002, p. 9) speak of a ‘public discourse about topics and actors related to either some particular policy domain or to the broader interests and values that are engaged,’ Anderson (1978, p. 23) defines public communication as the ‘realm of discourse’ in which ‘the deliberation of public policy’ takes place.
4. Arenas can be defined as sites of political contention separated by specific rules and norms of an either formal or informal nature, for example the electoral or protest arena (see Bartolini 2005, p. 27f).

5. Schmidt (2008) uses the terms coordinative and communicative to separate discourses taking place in public (communicative) and in closed bargaining fora (coordinative). However, it is maintained in this study that both functions of discourse can characterize public discourse.
6. Most notably, the strong export-oriented trade unions in Austria and Germany surely play an important role in public discourses, crowding out other, smaller unions.

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Institutional and Structural Foundations of Discourse

Abstract This chapter consists mainly of a dialogue between theoretical arguments and first cursory empirical results. It establishes the historical foundations of public discourse and reviews the extant literature. Hence, this chapter will focus on the development of the economic situation in Western Europe over the last four decades and its interplay with the role of the state in economic policy-making. It will show that public discourse on economic liberalization has taken place in a context of increasing internationalization and post-industrialization and against the background of the emergence of the regulatory state. These transformations are linked to changes in the substance of economic liberalization discourse. On the one hand, it becomes evident that mainstream party convergence and the internationalization of conflicts have led to a dominance of pro-market mainstream ideas. On the other hand, this chapter elaborates on the interplay between the institutional context of countries and arenas as well as public discourse. To be precise, it is argued that the openness and coordinative function of public discourse increase its conflict intensity.

Keywords Historical foundation · Internationalization
Post-industrialization · Regulatory state · Pro-market mainstream

To have an understanding of today's public discourse on economic liberalization reforms, it is necessary to explore the economic and political transformations that Western Europe has undergone over the last decades

(see Hay 2001). This is important because the political actors' ideas on economic liberalization policies have constantly influenced and adapted to the fundamental political and economic changes. This chapter therefore is concerned with the long-term transformation of the general economic and institutional context as well as the overall developments in public discourse. More precisely, the chapter starts out by discussing the trends which are key to understand the convergence of the substance of public discourse: economic globalization, post-industrialization, and the changing role of the state in economic policy-making. These processes reconfiguring public discourses started with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970 and affected all Western European countries in a similar way (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Boix 2000; Berger 2000).

Subsequently, this chapter shows that profound changes in public discourse have unfolded in lockstep with these structural transformations. The main findings refer to shifts in the dimensionality as well as a convergence in the overall political climate. As for the changes in the conflict dimensions, new dimensions have replaced the traditional, all-encompassing left-right divide. To be precise, the internationalization of the economies and the shifting involvement of the state in the remaining domestic affairs are the main drivers behind the new divides in economic liberalization discourse. It is shown that the convergence of mainstream party positions on economic liberalization lead to a pro-market mainstream that dominates contemporary discourses on economic liberalization reforms. Yet, the discussion provided in this chapter also reveals that two main groups of challengers, the traditional left and protectionist right, are at times able to shuffle up the mainstream dominance in public discourse. On the one hand, the labor movement still is the most important left challenger to the pro-market mainstream in the public arena. On the other hand, many observers point to right-wing populists as increasingly strong opponents of economic liberalization. General political and economic developments and public discourse therefore imply a convergence toward a more internationalized and pro-market-oriented discourse.

However, national peculiarities in the structure of public discourses are persisting even under the influence of strong convergence pressures like globalization and post-industrialization (Crouch and Streeck 1997; North 1990; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Pontusson 2005; Adam and Kriesi 2007). As will be shown, institutional complementarity is responsible for the differences in both the accessibility and functionality public discourse. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will examine how institutions are inter-

twined with public discourses. In the research perspective applied here, the relationship between institutions and public discourses is perceived as mutually reinforcing. Primarily, it is ideas that give rise to political actors' engagement in public discourse (Béland 2005; Lieberman 2002). As those ideas become routines, however, they become enshrined in corresponding institutions. These institutions, in turn, constrain subsequent discursive actions. This means that the actors' ideas are contingent on their interpretations of previously institutionalized ideas, leading to different trajectories of discourse across countries and arenas (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Herzigel and Wittke 2005).

In sum, this chapter will show that only the consideration of economic developments and institutional contexts allows a detailed evaluation of the structure and substance of public discourse in the six countries under concern.

2.1 GLOBALIZATION, POST-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION AND THE SUBSTANCE OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

A concise way of describing the relevant economic transformations for public discourse on economic liberalization is by distinguishing processes of globalization from post-industrialization. On the one hand, economic globalization is driven by the internationalization of industry, trade and services, as well as the deregulation economic policy frameworks (Held and McGrew 2000; Simmons et al. 2006). Since the 1970s, tariffs among advanced economies have been reduced to negligible levels most national markets for manufactured goods and financial transactions have been integrated into global ones (Brühlhart 2009; Brady et al. 2007.) Similarly, the advanced economies have seen an upsurge in the extent of international lending and the displacement of conventional loan businesses by security markets (Hirst and Thompson 1999). The reduction of transport and communication costs has further enabled large corporations to integrate their value chain on a worldwide level and to split their production according to comparative advantage (Berger 2005). On the other hand, tertiarization, i.e., the increasing importance of the service sectors for the economy, and the feminization of the workforce, i.e., the massive entry of women into the working population, are driving post-industrialization (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Both processes have profoundly reshaped Western European economies (Pierson 2001, p. 420).




Fig. 2.1 Structural economic developments and the transformation of the role of the state in the economy in Western Europe. *Notes* All indices were standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European countries of the study. *Sources* KOF (Dreher et al. 2008) and OECD (2010)

Figure 2.1 presents empirical evidence for economic globalization and tertiarization along with two indicators on the general economic development in the six Western European countries in question. First, the index on international economic flows includes data on trade, foreign direct investment flows and stocks, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals (Dreher et al. 2008).¹ Second, service sector production as a percentage of the gross domestic product and the share of service sector employment in total employment, as reported by the OECD² were used to calculate the index of tertiarization. Third, the economic hardship index combines unemployment as well as inflation into a composite measure of the economic difficulties affecting the six countries (See Note 3). All indices are standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 to ensure comparability at this aggregate level. The intensity of international economic flows affecting Western European countries have more than tripled since the 1970s. The growth of the tertiary sector, indicating progressing post-industrialization, was similarly steady and even slightly stronger than the increase in economic internationalization. Thus, while increases in economic productivity have not taken place for decades, the six Western European countries have become much more open and also substantially tertiarized.

An important part of international economic flows takes effect in the financial markets. Accordingly, capital flows have enormously increased in both amount and speed on a worldwide scale, and multinational banks play

an ever more critical role as managers of financial flows and as credit lenders (Kalinkowski and Cho 2009). The downside of positive effects such as the more efficient allocation of financial resources is increasing financial market volatility, since the financial system is more concentrated and less regulated than ever. In consequence, financial crises have become more frequent and more severe, which is not only visible in the recent global financial crisis, but also in the European currency crises of the early 1990s and in the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 (Stiglitz 2003; Bhagwati 2004; Quaglia et al. 2009). Moreover, rapidly industrializing countries, most notably China, Brazil, and India, but also Eastern European states, which have radically opened their markets since the collapse of the Comecon system, have introduced major competitive pressure into the world economy. Indeed, the share of these emerging markets in world trade has tripled since the 1970s (Perraton et al. 1997). In sum, what Katzenstein (1985) once wrote with respect to small Western European countries has therefore become significant for all the countries being studied here: vulnerability in relation to the world economy is an inescapable fact of today's economic policy-making. Of course, this can also be seen in the most recent protectionist tendencies, which are vehemently debated in several European countries under the pressure of right- and left-wing populists.

In addition to globalization, domestic changes related to post-industrialization have transformed Western European economies as well. Both demographic aging and the massive entry of women into the labor markets are major process in this regard (Häusermann 2010b). A second aspect of post-industrialization is tertiarization, that is the movement of labor and production from the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to the service industries (Iversen and Cusack 2000, p. 313f). While the tertiary sector, especially the financial and communication services, has experienced high productivity growth in the last decades, most basic labor-intensive industries such as textile manufacturing have declined in relative terms. The composition of the workforce has accordingly changed with the entry of the majority of the young people into the service industries, while early retirement continues to be a feature prevailingly of the traditional sectors.

One important implication of the macroeconomic developments outlined so far is their interaction with a fundamental transformation of the role of the state in the economy. In lockstep with globalization and post-industrialization, states have increasingly drifted toward more workfare (Jessop 2002), competition (Cerny 2000), and regulation (Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). First, globalization and post-industrialization have led to

a significant erosion of the effectiveness of decommodification measures, i.e., policies to disconnect income streams from market outcomes, such as employment protection or minimum wages (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Grande and Kriesi 2012; Häusermann 2010b). Welfare states are increasingly being rebuilt from providing free-standing social services to incorporating policies that conform to the markets, e.g., employment subsidies, training schemes, and conditional entitlement programs (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Vail 2008). On the industrial relations side, this has also led to increasingly flexible social pacts containing more and more market-conforming policies (Rhodes 2001). Since the beginning of the 1990s especially, labor market liberalization has thus shaped labor relationships in Western European economies. As a consequence, however, economic inequality and job insecurity have increased (Rueda 2005; Anderson and Pontusson 2007).

Second, governments are increasingly absorbed with ensuring the competitive advantage of their economies. In order to maintain success in a globally integrated economy, a reorientation from public production to the provision of support for particular industrial and service sectors has taken place (Sapir 2006; Vogel 1996; Rhodes 2001). Moreover, the last decades have seen a high number of privatizations as well as the relative decline of public investment (Heinemann 2006; Zohlnhoefer et al. 2008). Western European states therefore have partly retreated from lucrative businesses like telecommunications or the energy industry (Schneider et al. 2005). Finally, public authorities have extensively established independent regulatory agencies in a bid to maintain the state's credibility regarding the provision of public goods (Gilardi 2005; Majone 1996; Vogel 1996). The cooperation between administrations and the economic sphere has become more intense, most of all in the form of public private partnerships. Most notably with the extension of the EU's regulatory scope, previously nationally oriented actors have increasingly become involved in transnational decision-making and are now constitutive parts of a multi-level governance process (Kohler-Koch 2003; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, p. 1f). National governments have thus significantly transferred authority on liberalization policies to supra- and international bodies (Simmons et al. 2006). Crucial steps of this process were the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the Single European Market in 1992, and the WTO Uruguay round in 1994. Furthermore, the competition for capital has led to a proliferation of bilateral investment treaties which secure the rights of foreign investors (Elkins et al. 2006). And even in policy domains that have remained predominantly national,

such as labor market regulations, welfare regimes or collective bargaining systems, international and European regulatory networks are now strongly influential (Schmidt 2009, p. 518).

Complementing the arguments on the changing role of the state in the economy, Fig. 2.1 provides an empirical overview of three indices corresponding to processes related to this changing role of the state.³ First, the graph indicates the index for the lowering of national boundaries, which covers the dissolution of various policy instruments designed to shelter the national economy, i.e., measures imposing formal and hidden import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions (Dreher et al. 2008).⁴ Second, the degree of labor market deregulation is shown; this subsumes several variables reflecting employment security. The data, which come from the OECD structural analysis database,⁵ indicate the share of active labor market programs in public expenditures, the strictness of regulation on dismissals, and the use of temporary contracts. Finally, an index of state retrenchment—measured by the number of privatizations and the share of governmental investment in total public expenditures⁶—is presented.

While the lowering of national barriers to economic activity shows an upward trend in all decades, public sector retrenchment begins to stabilize in the early 1990s. The flexibility of labor markets is mostly constant, except for a substantial rise in the mid-1990s. These trends corroborate the findings from the literature and point to growing liberalization, particularly in terms of internationalization, across the whole time period.

The emergence of the pro-market mainstream

Globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation can be assumed to create major pressures on public discourses on economic liberalization. One important question for this study is how this turns out in terms of the conflict constellations in public discourses. From the 1970s on, the embedded liberalism of the post-war decades⁷ was incrementally removed in favor of a multi-level governance system and a network of bilateral treaties leading to more complex interdependence among advanced economies (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Elkins et al. 2006). The increasing political-economic interdependence then provided the basis for the global diffusion of economic liberalism, which found new areas for expansion after the collapse of state socialism at the end of the Cold War. The spread of pro-market ideas was therefore decisively driven by

the support given by the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions to the international monetary system (Simmons et al. 2006).

One of the main consequences of this spread of economic liberalism has been mainstream party convergence. Center-right and center-left parties, which usually dominate government coalitions in Western Europe, have converged on economic issues (Kitschelt 1999; Mair 2001; Kriesi et al. 2008). Over the last decades, the historically very contentious division between labor and capital has lost much of its importance in structuring of political conflicts in advanced economies (Dalton et al. 1984; Hardin 2000). While the ideational change in favor of a more radical economic liberalism in advanced economies first captured parties on the right, such as the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher in the UK, both the left in advanced economies and the political elites in many developing countries followed suit after the end of the Cold War (Vandenbroucke 1998). In lockstep with the parties, the majority of public authorities, such as ministries of finance and central banks, shifted to monetarist and supply-side economic management.

Such changes in the policy mainstream are obviously related to a fundamental reshaping of economic liberalization discourses. More specifically, the structural transformation eroded the plausibility of the left's traditional economic policies. By the end of the stagflation crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, Keynesian economic policies had lost much of their viability (Hall 1993). Therefore, established left parties needed to turn from sharp criticism of capitalism to a more pragmatic approach on economic liberalism if they were to continue to aspire to office (Giddens 2000; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002). Table 2.1 shows the decade averages of policy positions and going public by mainstream and challenger parties in electoral campaigns from the 1970s to the 2000s.⁸ Policy positions show the average direction of the statements on economic liberalization made by four party groups: the left challenger, mainstream left, mainstream right, and right challenger parties. Going public indicates the relative frequency of statements made by each of the four groups.⁹ Radical left parties, such as communists and left-wing populists, are coded as left challengers.¹⁰ Mainstream left parties include mainly green parties and social democrats, while the right mainstream consists of liberals, Christian democrats, and conservatives. Right challenging parties contain right-wing populists and other radical parties.

The comparison of policy positions over time shows three key developments. First, the party systems as a whole have shifted toward pro-market

Table 2.1 Policy positions and going public in the electoral arena

	Left challenger parties	Mainstream left parties	Mainstream right parties	Right challenger parties
<i>Policy position</i>				
1970	-0.57	-0.32	0.12	-0.09
1990	-0.58	-0.23	0.58	0.42
2000	-0.66	0.25	0.36	0.34
Δ 1970/2000	-0.09	+0.57	+0.24	+0.42
<i>Going public</i>				
1970	5.3	32.4	58.7	3.6
1990	5.2	37.3	51.8	5.8
2000	8.5	44.6	39.1	7.9
Δ 1970/2000	+3.2	+12.1	-19.6	+4.3

Notes All numbers are decade averages. Positions range from -1 = full opposition to $+1$ = full support of economic liberalization. *Source* Own data established in collaboration with Kriesi et al. (2012)

positions, since three party camps moved to the right and only the left challengers slightly strengthened their opposition to economic liberalization. Second, the electoral politics of economic liberalization has become more polarized, since positive and negative positions have become further away from each other. Third, and most importantly in the context of this study, the mainstream left and right converged on a moderately pro-market position (0.25 for the mainstream left and 0.36 for the mainstream right parties). Since these two party camps are still important in terms of going public than the other two camps, this adds to the dominance of the pro-market mainstream in public discourses on economic liberalization. While the emphasis on free markets already is the historical position of the political right, the mainstream left therefore underwent a major transformation in the last decades. Social democrats and greens have largely incorporated into their political programs (Kriesi et al. 2008). Examples of this programmatic adaptation are the restructuring of public services by the Blair government in the UK in the late 1990s, and Schröder's labor market reforms (the Agenda 2010) in Germany at the beginning of the 2000s (Ross 2000).

Besides the shifts of parties toward a pro-market mainstream, the pro-liberalization side is reinforced by other actors as well. On the one hand, vertical mechanisms of transnationalization are responsible for the increasing involvement of supra- and international actors in national discourses (Held et al. 1999, p. 80f; Hooghe and Marks 2001). And these actors like

the WTO or the European Commission mostly try to push for the opening up of markets. A telling example is the EU, which, at least until the recent financial crisis, continuously pressured its member states to deepen the Single European Market (Howarth 2006, p. 85f; Thatcher 2007). On the other hand, internationalization furthers the increasing influence of actors such as foreign governments or multinational corporations in the countries' discourse on economic liberalization (Koopmans and Erbe 2004). Starting at least in the 1980s, the biggest financial institutes and other multinational corporations grew out of the national political networks that they had relied upon for decades and began to press for liberalization reforms (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 476f).

The main implication is that mainstream party convergence and internationalization have led to a pro-market mainstream in the public discourse on economic liberalization (Grande and Pauly 2005). More precisely, measures such as trade liberalization, floating exchange rates, the integration of financial markets, and the expansion of transnational production, have been continuously emphasized by international and European organizations—e.g., the OECD and the European Commission—and a large number of Western European governments (Wade and Veneroso 1998; Alesina and Giavazzi 2006; Baccaro and Simoni 2008).

Challenging the pro-market mainstream

Globalization and post-industrialization have reinforced different forms of opposition. Hence, there are traditional and new challengers to the pro-market mainstream in the public discourse on economic liberalization over the last decades. The traditional challengers on the left are radical left parties and trade unions, which firmly opposed too extensive liberalization reforms for much of the twentieth century (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Hironaka 2005). The shift of the mainstream left parties toward pro-market policies has opened up a niche for interventionist and protectionist policy positions. This offers an opportunity for several actors to mobilize the political potential of those who have lost out economically (De Vries and Edwards 2009). According to (Häusermann and Schwander 2011), these economically disadvantaged are best conceptualized as having insufficient marketable skills. Most notably, a low educational attainment impedes mobility in today's flexible and internationalized labor markets (Oesch 2006; Häusermann and Schwander 2011). Accordingly, we can expect challengers to mobilize on claims for social and national protective policy solutions to shelter the less well-off.

Radical left parties are historically well suited to articulate the grievances of the economically disadvantaged in Western Europe. Yet, their only moderate success in the 2000s shows that this has happened only to a marginal degree. As the results from their election campaigning show (see Table 2.1), they mobilized slightly more radically against economic liberalization and also had a stronger going public in the 2000s than in the decades before. But these shifts are rather weak. In general, radical socialist, communist, Maoist, and Trotskyist parties face serious obstacles to a successful revival. Most notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union was detrimental to the electoral prospects of the classical radical left parties, because it undermined their ideological coherence and the credibility of their societal project. As a result, most radical left parties lost much of their importance in the decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain (March and Mudde 2005). Only very recently, radical left parties have gained ground mainly in Southern Europe, with Syriza even able to win the last Greek election.

Trade unions seem to be in a difficult situation too. From the post-war period until the late 1970s, the labor movement became increasingly organized in advanced economies (Wallerstein and Western 2000). Since the 1980s, however, trade union density and absolute membership numbers have tended to fall in most countries, and many centralized systems of wage-setting have been partly breaking down—except in countries with a Ghent system (Regini 2003; Häusermann 2010a).¹¹ Accordingly, strike activity has cooled down markedly since the peak times in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Armingeon et al. 2010). Unions therefore have faced difficulties in maintaining social protection at what they see as a fair level and face continuous pressure to make concessions in light of high unemployment numbers and increasing welfare costs (Baccaro and Simoni 2008). Moreover, the relationship between social democratic parties and unions in Western Europe, until the 1970s a solid political coalition, has significantly weakened in the last decades (Upchurch et al. 2009). The shift of social democrats toward economic liberalism and their experience that strong ties to unions are an electoral liability have made them reluctant to strongly ally with the trade unions. An example is the early 2000s, when German and French unions protested against the sweeping labor market reforms of their governments.

Against this background of a weakening labor movement, other movement actors often are denoted in the literature as taking over the mobilization of discontent with globalization and post-industrialization. Indeed, a variety of movements, commonly labeled as global justice movements,

appeared as countermovement against the deepening of global markets (Ruggie 2007, p. 27). Yet there are two reasons why their influence on public discourses is rather limited. First, since the 1960s, social movements in general have focussed on multi-cultural, pacifist, emancipatory, and cosmopolitan demands, leaving economic issues aside. Hence, most social movements did not join the global justice movements (Hutter 2012). Second, the turn of the new millennium can be considered the peak period of the global justice movement. After the ‘Battle of Seattle’ of 1999, global justice activists were repeatedly able to organize protests against the global political elites.¹² These protests led to an upswing of research by scholars into social movements that gives the impression that social movements are decisively on the march (e.g., Boli and Thomas 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000; della Porta 2007). However, although there has been some other significant mobilization—for example, the ‘indignados’ (outraged) and occupy movements in the USA and most of Europe in 2011—such perceptions are misleading. Organizational coherence and substantial consistency are missing for these movements, so is their influence on economic liberalization discourse (Wueest 2011; Tarrow 2001).

A third group of challengers has emerged out of the conservative right to mainly oppose economic internationalization. Most notably, populist right-wing parties have been successful in exploiting the existing potentials of economic grievances (De Vries and Edwards 2009). They did so by shifting from support of economic liberalization during the early 1990s to protectionist ideas later on (Zaslave 2004; Kitschelt 2007). Hence, although right-wing populists still mainly mobilize on cultural issues like immigration and European integration, they also increasingly campaign against international economic competition (Oesch 2006). The central political program of the new populist right can be understood as ethno-pluralism: specific ethnicities are not necessarily superior or inferior to others, but simply different and thus incompatible with the own ethnicity. In line with this ideology, many right-wing populists see economic globalization and its agents as threats to the national identity (Andersen and Bjorklund 1990; Betz and Johnson 2004; Rydgren 2007).¹³ The rationale is that economic globalization and the creation of supranational legal institutions jeopardize the national economy, which is seen as one of the pillars of collective identification and well-being (Mudde 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008; Berezin 2009). One of the most visible moments of this kind of opposition was the 2005 defeat of the French referendum on the constitution of the European Union. Although radical left forces also rallied for a rejection of the consti-

tution, the mobilization of the Front National was largely seen as decisive for the result.

By pursuing this protectionism, right-wing populists likely side with protectionist business and employer associations. Domestically oriented small- and medium-sized industries as well as low-productive businesses such as agriculture traditionally demand state intervention to protect their privileges (Katzenstein 1985; David and Mach 2006). Tellingly, in conflicts at the European level, there is a significant protectionist wing among business actors which generally opts for a protected European single market (Schneider and Grote 2006; van Apeldoorn 2002). This protectionist faction among business actors is likely to raise its voice ever more given the ongoing economic integration during the last decades.

Conflict dimensions on economic liberalization

It is clear that the just described conflict constellation between a pro-market mainstream and left or right challengers has been accompanied by changes in the underlying divides in the public discourses on economic liberalization. As will be shown, the once overwhelming left-right divide has been eroded (Dalton et al. 1984; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), and a two-dimensional configuration has emerged: a first dimension can be traced back to globalization, while a second dimension relates to post-industrialization.

Previously distant national markets have become more and more intertwined (Tarrow and Caporaso 2009, p. 594). In the case of Western Europe, of course, there is the additional toward the integration of the European markets (Lehmkuhl 2006). As a consequence, international and European actors increasingly intervene in arenas once perceived as strongholds of domestic politics. As Zürn and Walter (2005, p. 273f) highlight, its consequence is a growing political divide between those who profit from internationalized markets and those who profit from the sheltering of national industries (Frieden 1991; Hays 2009). However, even if internationalization has become a central aspect of economic policy-making in Western Europe, many important liberalizing steps, such as privatizations and labor market reforms, are still decided and carried out at the domestic level (Häusermann 2010a; Schwartz 2001, p. 31). Hence, it is evident that the classical ideological antagonism between left and right still influences today's discourses to some extent (Kriesi et al. 2012; Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Apart from the opposition between state intervention and market mechanisms, this divide concerns social policies as well. It divides

the political left, which favors protective and redistributive policies, and the political right, which prefer means-tested benefit structures (Esping-Andersen 1999; Häusermann and Schwander 2011).

To conclude, conflicts on economic liberalization either take place with regard to *domestic* aspects or can be concerned with the *internationalization* of markets (Hellwig 2008; Hall and Gingerich 2009, p. 37). Or, as Kitschelt (2007, p. 1183) puts it concisely, ‘trade always cut across, or was antithetical to distributive class politics.’

2.2 WHY INSTITUTIONS MATTER

The last sections presented the general political and economic trends linked to the transformation of public discourse in Western Europe. The following sections discuss how these general trends are mediated by national and arena-specific institutions. Since, as will be shown, these economic developments are rather similar in all six countries, they cannot explain the large variation in the accessibility and functionality of public discourses. Institutions are understood as sets of formal rules and more informal practices with rule-like qualities (North 1990). Public discourse thereby is succumbed to path dependency with respect to historically developed institutional arrangements (Risse et al. 2001; Brinegar et al. 2004; Medrano 2003, p. 63f). As actors continuously interact with institutions, the ideas underlying them are perpetuated in public discourse (Blyth 2002). The evolution of policy processes on economic liberalization is therefore a dynamic process involving the mutual interdependence of public discourse and institutions (Jackson 2010, p. 65).

Before the theoretical underpinnings of the links between institutions and public discourse are elaborated more in detail, a country-wise overview of key economic developments since the 1970s and electoral discourse in the 2000s is presented. In a first step, economic flows across borders, tertiarization, and the economic hardship index are analyzed to assess how differently the countries have been affected by globalization, post-industrialization, and general economic difficulties, respectively. In accordance with the analyses so far, Table 2.2 shows economic performance in the last four decades with respect to the same indices, but this time for the single countries. The index of cross-border economic flows consists of indicators measuring trade and international financial activities. Tertiarization is a composite number indicating service sector growth in terms of economic output and employment. The economic hardship index, finally,

Table 2.2 Globalization, tertiarization, and economic hardship by the country

	A	FR	DE	NL	CH	UK
<i>Cross-border economic flows</i>						
1970	16.1	2.2	2.1	63.8	47.9	38.4
1980	31.7	19.7	11.8	78.7	63.7	51.7
1990	50.6	38.0	29.2	88.4	77.6	57.6
2000	81.3	54.9	54.5	97.0	91.2	64.7
Δ 1970/2000	+65.2	+52.7	+52.4	+33.2	+43.3	+26.3
<i>Tertiarization</i>						
1970	29.9	39.2	21.8	68.5	n.a.	n.a.
1980	45.5	64.8	49.9	89.2	n.a.	84.6
1990	59.6	80.0	65.0	92.5	72.9	88.0
2000	74.4	86.6	83.0	95.7	79.0	88.5
Δ 1970/2000	+44.5	+47.4	+61.2	+27.2	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Economic hardship</i>						
1970	24.1	42.0	22.8	35.9	14.7	56.9
1980	22.1	54.9	29.5	43.9	9.7	59.3
1990	18.7	40.5	34.6	27.8	15.3	38.4
2000	19.2	33.9	36.5	16.4	11.9	20.1
Δ 1970/2000	-4.9	-8.1	+13.7	-19.5	-2.8	-36.8

Notes All numbers are decade averages of indices which range from 0 to 100 (for the 2000s, however, only the years up to 2007 were considered); *Sources* KOF (Dreher et al. 2008) and OECD (2010)

shows how the countries have been affected by unemployment rates and inflation. All figures in the table represent the decade averages of the standardized indices, which take values from 0 to 100. This makes it possible to compare the six countries directly.

The overall trend with respect to cross-border economic flows is very clear. A strong and continuous increase in transnational trade and financial activity in every country can be observed. The growth is strongest in Austria, which had a low level of integration into the global markets in the 1970s (16.1 index points). In fact, after regaining access to the Eastern European markets in the early 1990s, Austria has rapidly caught up with Switzerland's and the Netherlands' level of trade, although these other two small, continental countries remain by far the most open economies with an average of over 90 index points in the 2000s. Switzerland does not only have an exceptionally high and long-standing export dependency of 80% or more with regard to its most important industrial sectors, above all the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, mechanical engineering, and horology, but it also has a financial sector which is significantly outreach-

ing its own economy. In the Netherlands, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as the financial sector with its center in Amsterdam, are important drivers of economic openness; in addition, the country, with its large overseas ports, is the key transport hub to continental Europe. The UK shows the weakest increase in international economic flows over time (26.3 index points), which means that France and Germany have been able to reach similar degrees of economic openness. However, the UK is still the most open country of the three biggest Western European economies in the 2000s. Its margin, however, has been reduced to about ten index points, while it was clearly ahead with approximately 38 points in the 1970s, compared to the 2 points in France and Germany. The UK thus still profits from its reputation as an exceptionally strong hub for the financial markets. Interestingly, Germany and France have developed almost in lockstep, which hints at their dense economic interdependence, which has emerged out of their common role as core economies of the European single market (Trouille 2007).

To conclude, integration into the European and global markets remains more important for small Western European countries, although its impact nowadays is also substantive for big economies. Note that the timing and speed of economic cross-border flows are highly correlated. The countries which opened early, i.e., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK, experience a subsequent period of slower internationalization compared to Germany, Austria, and France.

The development of tertiarization shows a similarly uniform trend. The steepest growth in tertiarization, however, took place between the 1970s and the 1980s (not in the 1990s as for economic cross-border activity). All six countries belong to the group of early deindustrializing countries (Iversen and Cusack 2000). The picture for the single countries therefore differs only slightly. As with economic openness, the Netherlands is the most tertiarized country (95.7 index points), followed by the UK, France, and Germany. Moreover, Germany exhibits the most impressive growth in the tertiary sector (+61.2), followed by France (+47.4) and Austria (+44.5). In the UK, as far as there are data available, the level of tertiarization remains fairly constant compared to the other countries: it has grown only by 3.9 index points from an already high level in the 1980s. The Netherlands and the UK have a slightly bigger share of the tertiary sector than the other countries in the 2000s, yet the differences are not as substantial as with international economic flows. Further, in contrast to their

high economic openness, Austria and Switzerland are the least tertiarized countries.

With respect to economic hardship, i.e., to the basic economic difficulties in the six countries, the trends are less uniform. The index that combines inflation with unemployment rates shows neither a constant development over time nor a simultaneous course among countries. Switzerland has performed best over the four decades, displaying the lowest degree of economic hardship throughout the period studied and ending up with 11.9 index points.¹⁴ Similarly constant is Austria, which was stable at a level of about 20 index points. In these two countries, the general economic environment has not changed substantially in comparison with the other four countries. Here, the economic context thus seems to exert not much pressure for liberalization reforms across all decades. The pressure for reform in Germany, by contrast, rose considerably over time, as the sharp increase in economic hardship by 13.7 index points indicates. This development, of course, was heavily influenced by the economic burden of reunification (Vail 2008). In the 2000s, the hardship index for Germany was highest among the countries being studied here. In the Netherlands, the *Dutch miracle*, a series of incremental social policy reforms which led to the virtuous co-occurrence of strong growth and low unemployment from the mid-1990s onwards, resulted in the almost halving of the economic hardship index between the 1990s and the 2000s (Visser and Hemerjick 1997). In a similar vein, the UK displays a continuous and drastic improvement in its general economic situation after being far behind the five other countries in the 1970s (−36.8 index points). John Major's Conservative government and the third way Labor governments that followed were able to considerably lower the economic hardship from the 1990s onwards. In France, finally, the level of economic hardship could be reduced as well, but not as substantially as in the UK. The general situation in France has remained almost as dire as in Germany (Vail 2008).

In sum, however, except for the difference between smaller and larger Western European economies in terms of their economic openness and the comparatively high level of economic hardship in France and Germany, there are no substantial variations among the six countries. Long-term economic transformations have thus affected all six countries to a similar extent.

How did this affect electoral politics? Table 2.3 shows the average policy positions and going public shares by the four already defined party groups in the two first elections of the 2000s.¹⁵ The picture looks similar across

Table 2.3 Policy positions and going public during elections in the 2000s

	Left challenger parties	Mainstream left parties	Mainstream right parties	Right challenger parties
<i>Policy position</i>				
Austria	-1.00	-0.15	0.30	0.18
France	-0.44	-0.20	0.39	0.40
Germany	-0.94	0.48	0.44	n.a.
Netherlands	-0.67	-0.11	0.23	0.45
Switzerland	-1.00	-0.20	0.47	0.34
UK	n.a.	0.50	0.30	n.a.
Overall	-0.66	0.25	0.36	0.34
<i>Going public (in %)</i>				
Austria	3.2	29.1	46.7	21.0
France	18.9	33.4	36.0	11.8
Germany	10.6	51.7	37.7	n.a.
Netherlands	7.0	20.1	68.1	4.8
Switzerland	5.5	26.0	48.1	20.4
UK	n.a.	83.0	17.0	n.a.
Overall	8.5	44.6	39.1	7.9

Notes Positions range from -1 = full opposition to +1 = full support. *Source* Own data established in collaboration with Kriesi et al. (2012)

countries as far as policy positions are concerned. All left challenger parties, mainstream right parties, and right challenger parties position themselves quite close to the average position over all countries. The significant outliers are the mainstream left parties, since the social democrats in Germany (0.48) and the UK (0.50) are clearly set apart from the other mainstream left parties, which all moderately or strongly oppose economic liberalization. Nevertheless, this is the only substantial variation, and it can easily be explained by the fact that the mainstream left in Germany and the UK had governmental responsibility in much of the research period. In sum, the evidence on the policy positioning in the electoral arena shows substantial convergence, and thus not much variation in terms of the substance of public discourse.

The going public of the different party families in the 2000s, however, contrasts this finding. The presence of the party families in the electoral arena varies considerably. The extent of this variation goes beyond the easily explained differences due to the different electoral systems—most notably the absence of challenger parties in the UK. The lowest accessibility

is found for the left challenger parties in Austria (3.2%). In France, by contrast, the communists and other radical left parties achieve a share of 18.9%. As for the mainstream left parties, the variation among the countries is even larger. The share in all statements on economic liberalization ranges from 20.1% in the Netherlands to dominant 83% in the UK. In a similar vein, the going public of the mainstream right parties differs heavily across the six countries (51.1% in the UK and 68.1% in the Netherlands). The right challenger parties, finally, are very successful in Austria (21%). In the Netherlands, in contrast, they are almost incapable to enter the public arena (4.8%).

Why is the structure of discourse on economic liberalization running differently across national contexts? It has been shown that the economic developments have created similar conditions for public discourse in all six countries? The answer is that there are distinct forms of capitalist regimes with correspondingly distinct accessibility and functionalities of public discourses (Pontusson 2005, p. 163). Building on the work of Shonfield (1965) and Zysman (1983), such accounts of different institutional trajectories in political-economic development have sprung up in the last two decades (e.g., Albert 1993; Bonoli 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; McCartney 2009; Schmidt 2009). The basic assumption of this literature is that capitalist economies do systematically differ in terms of how interests are intermediated, although each economy is efficiently organized.

The recently most influential attempt to conceptualize capitalist economies is probably the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). The VoC approach is organized around the employers' coordination capacities—however defined—as the key distinguishing feature (Hall and Gingerich 2009). More precisely, it identifies two diverging patterns of adaptation to economic changes (Hancké et al. 2007). Liberal Market Economies (LME), on the one hand, are characterized by non-cooperative relations between unions and employers, a market-driven financial system, and arm's length relations among firms. In the country sample in this study, the UK most closely matches the premises of this LME category. In Coordinated Market Economies (CME), on the other hand, union–employer relationships are generally perceived as cooperative, industries traditionally have close ties to banks, and employers are usually tightly organized in associations. This means that business in CME is more intensely involved in processes of interest intermediation between trade unions, public authorities, professional organizations, and employer associations. In LME, in contrast, less formal interactions are usually assumed to

take place among the different economic interest groups, leading to more confrontational employment relations. From the six countries under study, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland can be classified as CMEs. The different institutional arrangements have straightforward consequences on how countries react to abrupt economic upheavals. As Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, firms in LMEs are quicker to hire and fire in response to a changing economic environment. In CME, labor relations are designed to at least partly withstand the volatility of markets (Hays 2009, p. 13). The main strategy involves cooperative agreements between employers, trade unions, and the public authorities.

The VoC dichotomy comes with several disadvantages. First, it is necessary to define at least one residual category (the Mixed-Market Economies) for countries that do not consistently fit into one of the ideal-typical categories. Unfortunately, very important countries for political economy research, such as Japan or France, fall in this category. In relying on Shonfield's (1965) differentiation between arm's length, interventionist and organized capitalist systems, Schmidt (2009) convincingly argues that this misconceptualization is due to the neglect of the state as the central mediating and intervening actor in the economic sphere and extends the two VoC to three—Liberal, Coordinated, and State-influenced (SME) Market Economies. While in LMEs the influence of the state is limited to rule setting and conflict settlement, it actively tries to facilitate economic activity in CMEs and SMEs. However, in a CME the state acts as a co-equal with employers and unions to negotiate employment protection, to participate in wage bargaining, or to set other economic regulations (Schmidt 2009, p. 521). In an SME, by contrast, the state often acts as an entrepreneur and actively decides on business activity (Thibergien 2007). Such countries traditionally rely on a large public sector and long-term state-led development strategies. In the context of this study, France can clearly be defined as a SME.

A second necessary extension of the classical VoC typology is that the Netherlands and Switzerland need to be separated from Austria and Germany (Visser and Afonso 2010). The Netherlands and Switzerland but they rely on a comparatively flexible labor market, i.e., the extension of part-time and temporary employment, to compensate for economic difficulties due to high wages and fixed labor costs (Visser and Hemerjick 1997; Bonoli and Mach 2000; Iversen and Cusack 2000). Moreover, in contrast to other CMEs like Austria, labor movements traditionally play a subordinate role and business interests are dominated by the large export-oriented

companies (Katzenstein 1985). A last important extension is the neocorporatist distinction of different types of labor and employment relations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). In contrast to the employer-centered view of the VoC tradition, neocorporatists usually focus on trade unions. They distinguish corporatist regimes, which rely on stable bargaining mechanisms among quite centralized interest groups, from pluralist regimes, which denote highly fragmented economic interest group systems. In fact, the VoC typology and neocorporatist classification coincide to some extent. There is congruence between corporatist regimes and CMEs, whereas SMEs and LMEs are characterized by pluralist interest intermediation, leaving trade unions in a comparatively weak position (Sapir 2006).

These more or less coherent types of capitalism have ‘filter’ effects on the accessibility and functionality of public discourse. First, the different types of political-economic arrangements create different opportunities for actors to participate in public discourses (Hancké et al. 2007; Ferree et al. 2002). The strength of the labor movement as one of the most important challengers is a good indicator for the openness of different public discourses. In the LME UK, the labor movement is in an especially weak position, which means that public discourse is particularly closed in this country. In the SME France, in contrast, the history of sharp ideological conflict has led to a more confrontational political style, not only with respect to electoral campaigns, political protests, and labor market disputes, but also in the mass-mediated public arena (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Kriesi et al. 2012). The labor movement is thus able to regularly access public discourse. Public discourse in the coordinated market economies is generally more accessible than discourse in the UK. In Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland, proportional electoral systems foster the position of opposition parties and corporatist institutions strengthen economic interest groups (Lange 1984; Korpi 2006). Switzerland and the Netherlands, however, have a less open discourse relative to Austria and Germany because of the labor movements’ comparatively weak position.

A second important consequence of institutional divergence is the varying functionality of public discourse in the different countries. In coordinated market economies like Germany, Switzerland and Austria, discourses are more inclusive. Since reforms need broad support from the majority of relevant actors in order to be sustainable, coordination plays a bigger role in these countries (Schmidt 2002, Chap. 5). Negotiations and efforts at persuasion in the run-up to policy decisions are more important aspects of public discourse. In the UK with its distinctly majoritarian representative

institutions and in France with its pronouncedly statist economic policy-making, discourse is more communicative. Governments must apply comparatively sophisticated efforts to communicate the feasibility and necessity of their policy decisions. Thus, the top-down dissemination of information from governments to the public after policies are implementation is more important (Müller 2015).

Arenas: Institutional venues of policy-making

Not only institutions provide relevant opportunities and constraints public discourse, they are also provided by the specific arenas of the policy process in which public discourse takes place (Helbling et al. 2012; Varone et al. 2006). Arenas can be defined as sites of political contention separated by specific rules and norms of an either formal or informal nature (see Ferree et al. 2002; Bartolini 2005, p. 27f; Kriesi et al. 2012; Schneider and Grote 2006, p. 2). Naturally, the analysis of public discourse is centered on the public arena through which all political communication is channeled (Ferree et al. 2002). However, this study pays attention to the arenas from where the ideas are conveyed into public discourses.

The different arenas can be organized according to their function in the political process (Howlett et al. 2009; Aberbach et al. 1981; Poggi 1990, p. 1). On a very general level, the arenas are separated into input (governing by the people) and output (governing for the people) arenas (Scharpf 1999, p. 7f). The input side is the forum where political potentials are mobilized, innovative ideas are suggested and policy options are debated. This refers to the parliamentary, electoral, protest, and direct-democratic arenas. The parliamentary arena is characterized by the strict rules on debating and decision-making. Further, the electoral arena is constituted by the rules of party competition and the casting of votes. Protest politics, on the contrary, is not characterized by such formal rules, though today's protests in Western Europe are professionalized, ritualized performances to attract public attention (Tarrow 1994, 94). The output arenas are the sites where policies are implemented and evaluated. This includes the arena of interest intermediation, the political advisory arena and the business arena.

Between input and output arenas are governmental and judicial arenas, which have a *janus-faced* position (Kriesi 2007, p. 263). On the one hand, public authorities interact significantly with the input arenas: they intervene into the decision-making processes in the parliamentary arena by providing expertise for new regulations and influence discourse in the electoral and direct-democratic arenas by political campaigning. On the other hand, they

head the administration and moderate negotiations between social partners in interest intermediation processes. They are thus involved on both sides of the policy process.

Due to their inherent rules and norms, arenas have an impact on the structure of public discourse. First, discourse in the input arenas is *accessible* to the largest number of actors. This is due to the multiplicity of channels for participation that the input arenas provide, most notably in the protest and direct-democratic arenas. Since janus-faced arenas are the sites of decision-making, public authorities crowd out most other actors. Access to these arenas is thus anticipated to be restricted. The output arenas, finally, are hypothesized to be less inclusive than the input arenas, but not as exclusive than janus-faced arenas. Moreover, it is also assumed that arenas differ substantially with respect to their discursive *functionality*, i.e., whether discourse in the different arenas is shaped by coordination or communication among the actors engaged. In general, the input arenas are characterized by a higher degree of coordination, and, correspondingly, more conflict than the other arenas, since opposition to the pro-market mainstream is largest here. Actors such as niche parties and protest movements are expected to be able to mobilize their political potential mainly in the input arenas. In contrast, since government actors dominate in the janus-faced arenas, these arenas should be tightly connected with the communicative function of discourse. More precisely, most actors in the janus-faced arenas care about the reformulation and implementation of policies, which is why the need to communicate clarifications and justifications on these policies should be highest. The output arenas, finally, are expected to occupy a middle ground.

2.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL LEGACIES OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

This chapter has outlined the historical developments that end in contemporary discourses on economic liberalization. While the general economic performance in terms of economic hardship has been rather constant, Western Europe is far more exposed to the global economy and also more post-industrialized than it was four decades ago. This has not only changed the nature of government activity, but is also tightly connected to changes in public discourse on economic liberalization. Accordingly, the internationalization of important aspects of economic policy-making and the mainstream party convergence have led to a pro-market mainstream, which in

general incorporates established parties, governments, public administrations, the EU, International Organizations, as well as multinational corporations and peak employer associations. With regards to the challengers of this pro-market mainstream, trade unions still are important in mobilizing grievances against the consequences of free markets, although the intensity of their opposition has decreased over the decades. The parties of the radical left and social movements can be expected to be only marginally relevant. The populist radical right, finally, which opposes economic liberalization for identitarian reasons, is a newly important challenger. As challengers of the right, they are expected to side with traditionally protectionist businesses. The second major shift in public discourse is the fundamental change toward a new two-dimensional structure: instead of a single left-right bifurcation, public discourse is nowadays characterized by an international and a domestic divide. These two divides are related to conflicts on increasing globalization and post-industrialization, respectively.

The second part of this chapter established that there is also diversity in discourses dependent on the different institutional frameworks. One of the main messages is thus that the study of economic developments is not sufficient to grasp all contextual influences on the structure and substance of public discourse. On the one hand, institutional country differences are key to understanding the variations in the functionality and accessibility of discourse. On the other hand, arenas—institutional venues which further structure the policy process—are influential as well.

The first implication of the country-specific institutional contexts for the discourses on economic liberalization is their accessibility. In comparison with the UK, more actors are able to engage in the public discourse on economic liberalization in France. The history of militant conflicts draws more actors into the public arena than in the liberal market economy UK. In Austria and Germany, the public arena is most accessible because of their balanced neocorporatist institutional setting and the consensus-oriented character of their overall political system. In comparison with these two countries, the labor movement has a comparatively weak position in the Netherlands and Switzerland, which is why public discourse is relatively closed in these countries. In the two majoritarian and pluralist countries, France and UK, public authorities are expected to crowd out discursive actions by other actors more effectively than in the four CME, leading to communicative discourses. In Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands, in contrast, a broader variety of ideas is conveyed into public discourses, increasing the share of coordinative discourses.

With regard to the sub-national level, the analysis differentiates three types of arenas: the input arenas, where political interests are mobilized; the output arenas, which are mainly the forums of policy implementation; and the janus-faced arenas, which are crucial for both the formulation and implementation of policy change. As a first insight derived from this conceptualization, a high share of coordinative discourses is expected in the input arenas. This separates them from the more communication-oriented janus-faced arenas, with the output arenas taking a middle ground. In addition, input arenas are the most accessible sites of the policy process, since they receive the whole spectrum of political mobilization for and against economic liberalization. The janus-faced arenas, in which most policy decision-making takes place, are closed, since they are almost exclusively the sites of government actors. Output arenas again take the middle ground with regard to the accessibility of public discourses.

So far, the discussion has developed from the relationship of economic developments, institutions, and changes in public discourse over the last decades. The next chapter will outline the design of the content analysis applied to assess the structure and substance of contemporary discourses on economic liberalization in much more detail.

NOTES

1. Data retrieved from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch> [08/03/2011].
2. Data retrieved from <http://stats.oecd.org> [08/03/2011].
3. All indices are arranged so that they show increasing liberalization trends on a scale from 0 to 100. They are standardized by setting the highest value to 100 and the lowest to 0. The remaining values are then recalculated correspondingly to fit into the range from 0 to 100.
4. Data retrieved from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch> [08/03/2011].
5. Retrieved from <http://stats.oecd.org> [08/03/2011].
6. Taken from the privatization barometer (retrieved from <http://www.privatizationbarometer.net> [08/03/2011]) as well as the OECD structural analysis database.
7. This regime featured only lightly interdependent national economies organized around Keynesian macroeconomic policies (Ruggie 2008).
8. The following national elections are covered by the data: Austria = 1975, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2006; France = 1978, 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007; Germany = 1976, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005; the Netherlands = 1973, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006; the UK = 1974, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005; Switzerland = 1975, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007.

9. The data stem from a content analysis of newspapers in a two-month selection period up to each election day (see Dolezal et al. 2012).
10. See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the details on the aggregation of parties to party families.
11. A Ghent system is one where the main administrative responsibility for welfare payments, particularly in the field of unemployment benefits, is held by the trade unions, not by public authorities. Belgium and the Scandinavian countries feature such a system.
12. In the same year, activists protested at the IMF and World Bank talks in Washington. Later on, in 2001, massive protests surrounded the third Summit of the Americas in Quebec (talks among leaders from both South and North America held by the Organization of American States), the EU summit in Gothenburg, and the G8 summit in Genoa.
13. At first glance, the results in Table 2.1 conflict with this conclusion. Right-wing challenger parties have actually become more pro-market over the last four decades. From the 1990s to the 2000s, there has only been a slight decrease in their pro-liberalization stance. However, the numbers show the aggregate positions on all economic liberalization policies. In Chap. 4, results will show that most right-wing populists are only pro-market on domestic aspects, while opposing international liberalization.
14. In contrast to the other indices, a negative direction of the trend of economic hardship of course indicates a positive development of the state of the economy.
15. Austria = 2002, 2006; France = 2002, 2007; Germany = 2002, 2005; the Netherlands = 2002/2003, 2006; the UK = 2001, 2005; Switzerland = 2003, 2007.

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Designing the Discourse Analysis

Abstract This chapter presents the methods of data collection and analysis. Most importantly, the measurement and aggregation of the four discursive actions—going public, policy position-taking, valence attributing, and framing—are presented. Further, the research design in terms of the country and newspaper selection as well as the underlying concepts of discourse coalitions are discussed.

Keywords Method · Data collection · Discourse analysis
Research design · Discursive action

The previous chapter has shown that public discourse is systematically connected to institutional and economic contexts. Public discourse, however, could only be assessed very incomplete for political parties. This chapter presents the empirical design of the more comprehensive content analysis that includes the entirety of relevant actors. The focus of this chapter lies on the identification of the actors' discursive action repertoire, i.e., the ways in which actors craft and communicate their ideas. The guiding assumption thereby is that the 'reality' of economic liberalization is constructed from the ideas actors convey into the mass-mediated discourses.¹

This chapter first describes the selection of countries, time periods, and newspapers, before the definition and identification of the four discursive actions (going public, policy positioning, valence attributing, and framing) is discussed. Overall, over 10,000 statements on discursive actions have

been collected for the discourse analysis across the six countries from 2004 to 2006. These statements will be analyzed in the following chapters in order to explore the structure and substance of public discourses. Adopting a rigorous comparative perspective, the analysis goes beyond the study of single countries, actors, or policies. By constructing transparent and reliable indicators for the discursive action repertoire, this study adds a systematic quantitative approach to the discursive institutionalist literature. Such an approach has been frequently demanded but not carried out so far (see Béland and Cox 2011; Schmidt 2008). This study is thus able to increase the robustness of the evidence provided by other ideational research on economic liberalization.

3.1 SELECTION OF COUNTRIES, TIME PERIODS, AND NEWSPAPERS

Public discourse on economic liberalization is analyzed in six West European countries, all stable liberal democracies with consolidated political institutions and advanced economies: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. Other European countries were not considered for conceptual and practical reasons. Eastern European countries were excluded since their democratization began just when contemporary globalization and post-industrialization were accelerating (Dolezal 2008, p. 54). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Eastern European political systems were still in transition, which makes comparison with established democracies difficult. South European countries, except Italy, democratized during the 1970s, again making comparisons over time problematic. Italy was not included in the sample because the breakdown of the First Republic during the early 1990s was attributable more to national idiosyncrasies than to factors that would have made comparison possible (Newell 2000, p. 77f). Scandinavian countries, finally, were not included into the sample because of the lack of necessary language skills among the researchers involved in the data collection.²

The main aim of this analysis is to establish a comprehensive picture of the public discourse on economic liberalization in the six countries. Yet the workload has to be manageable as well. The time period of data collection therefore runs from 2004 to 2006. While the big liberalization reforms in the twentieth century took place in less contested economic sectors, public discourse has turned to very sensitive issues for Western European countries, such as agriculture at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Accordingly, the conflict between the forces pushing for liberalization and the challengers to these forces has become fiercer. This makes an investigation of the structure and substance of public discourse in the mid-2000s especially interesting.

The next step in the content analysis was the selection of newspapers. As a starting point, a large quality newspaper was chosen for each country. These are *Le Monde* in France, *Die Presse* in Austria, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Germany, *NRC Handelsblad* in the Netherlands, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in Switzerland, and *The Times* in the UK. This was a pragmatic decision, due the significant effort needed for the content analyses of public discourse. Given the fact that only one media title could be considered, high-quality newspapers were chosen since they are particularly suitable for the study of public discourse. They remain the leading medium of political news coverage because they report in the most detailed manner the ideas debated on economic liberalization policies and because they influence the editorial decisions of a wide range of other news organizations (Reinemann 2003; Vliegthart and Walgrave 2008). Some coding instructions were also specifically designed to minimize any unintended influence of the journalistic processing of the actor statements. Only editorial articles, but not paid media content, op-eds and letters to the editor, were considered as data source. Furthermore, no explicit expressions of opinion by journalists were included.

There are various other strategies available to analyze public political contestation (see Keman 2007, p. 77). However, while these alternative approaches have their merits, they fail to encapsulate the whole universe of relevant actors. Party manifesto data, for example, are restricted to political parties and ignore interest associations or actors from the protest arena. The same is usually true for expert surveys or content analyses of parliamentary debates.

The sampling of news articles from these six newspapers was done in three steps. First, the relevant events of the public discourse in each country were identified, using various yearbooks (Keesing's World Record of Events, Facts on File World News Digest Yearbook, etc.), as well as the annual reviews of the newspapers themselves. Examples of such events are parliamentary debates on liberalization reforms, protest events against globalization, or regular meetings like those of the World Economic Forum. Second, these lists were translated into an extensive keyword list for each country, which was used to search for the articles of interest in electronic newspaper databases. This made it possible to avoid many false nega-

tive selections, since the substance of discourses was established beforehand in each country. Finally, a chronological sample of 1200 articles per country was created. This sampling strategy allows accounting for the dynamic of public discourse. Time-invariant selection procedures, such as taking all articles about a political issue published on a certain weekday, fail to capture differences in the intensity of discourse.³

3.2 THE ACTORS' DISCURSIVE ACTION REPERTOIRE

In this content analysis, a comprehensive discursive action repertoire, by which actors strive to mobilize supporters, seek alliances, or persuade opponents, is defined (Enyedi 2005). First and foremost, actors have to reach a certain level of attention in the media if they are to influence the course of public discourse (Budge and Farlie 1983). Having a voice in public discourse is not easy to achieve, given that both the media's and the public's attention are subject to many competing perceived interests (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Burstein and Linton 2002; Kriesi et al. 2009). We can therefore start from the assumption that there are specific characteristics such as financial resources which determine why some actors are successful in entering the public arena and others are not. In this context, the concept of *going public* (see Kernell 2006)—originally developed in the context of public relation strategies by US presidents—can be used to describe the ability of political actors to search for public attention. In contrast to similar concepts like standing (e.g., Ferree et al. 2002), going public emphasizes the proactive aspect of competing for public visibility.

After having succeeded in gaining access to the media, actors most importantly need to present their *policy position* to the public (Wolfsfeld 1997). Policy positions therefore are the definitions of the actors' perceived interest that they convey in the public arena (Hay 2004). They are the subjective interpretation of what the actors make of the policies at stake. In conceptualizing policy position-taking, it is further necessary to take the influence of structural transformations and the institutional context seriously. A priori and endogenously defined preferences are convenient to research since they are clear and stable, but they have little to do with the complex dynamics of interactions in public discourses (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 3f).

Not only substantive ideas as conveyed in policy positions, but also ideas purely related to the political contest are important for the actors' success in public discourse. Such actors include the charisma of leaders, the rep-

utation of actors in terms of their competence and trustworthiness, and their media performance (Schofield 2006; Norris 2000; Plasser and Plasser 2002; Schnur 2007). Following Laver and Sergenti (2011, p. 164), the term *valence* will be used here as a catch-all concept summarizing these aspects. Actors have a vital motive to present themselves in a good light in order to convince the public opinion of their good intentions and the validity of their policy positions. This motive is reinforced by the media logic of producing news in political campaigns (Kriesi 2011; Mancini and Swanson 1996). Valence characteristics have an important news value, so mass media are thus keen to exploit the actors' struggle for a better evaluation.

The last element of the discursive action repertoire is *framing*. The study of frames, i.e., the causal interpretations and problem definitions actors provide to link different policies to their ideological beliefs, has become crucial for the understanding of public discourse (Boydston et al. 2013; Scheff 2005; Helbling et al. 2012; Entman 1993). Applied to public discourse on economic liberalization, frames reveal the articulation of specific ideological beliefs (Campbell 2004; Surel 2000; Tannenwald 2005, p. 14). Every policy allows for a variety of frames, which means that actors should aim to emphasize frames that provide the most favorable evaluation of their policy position (Kriesi et al. 2009; Chong and Druckman 2007, p. 112).⁴ In addition to the actors' interests, the resonance of frames with central societal themes is decisive for their success. As Entman (2004, p. 14) puts it, the most successful frames are those 'fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society.' Thus, frames that appeal to widespread stereotypes and the received wisdom in a given society are very effective to achieve political success (Kriesi et al. 2009, p. 357).

An important consequence of these discursive actions is that they combine to discourse coalitions, which can be defined as discourse networks among relevant actors in the policy subsystem of economic liberalization (see Leifeld and Haunss 2012; Weible 2005). Discourse coalitions are exclusively built on the actors' similarities in the discursive action repertoires. Therefore, if actors share specific policy positions and frames and do refer to other actors in a positive way, they can be regarded as members of the same discourse coalition. Actors belonging to the same coalition do not necessarily cooperate with each other in actual policy-making processes, but have a common understanding of these processes, which is traceable in public discourses.

Table 3.1 CSA coding example

‘Mr. Blair has made economic reform the top priority of his presidency, hoping to make labor markets more flexible in order to tackle record un-employment and sluggish growth across the continent. However, he is now likely to face challenges from President Chirac [...]’ (*The Times, May 31 2005, ‘Battle for the heart of Europe’*)

Subject	Polarity	Object	Frames	Arena
Blair	+1	Labor market reform	Social protection/prosperity	Supra-/international
Chirac	-1	Blair	n.a.	Supra-/international

Core sentence annotation

The discursive action repertoire just described is measured using the core sentence annotation (CSA) approach.⁵ CSA is a versatile instrument able to capture the full complexity of political contestation without imposing excessively strong theoretical expectations in advance of the coding (e.g., a priori definitions of classifications). The principal aim is to systematically quantify political statements in written documents (Wueest et al. 2011). Hence, if a relevant actor is found in a relevant text segment, this segment is coded into its basic structure (a *core sentence*),⁶ which contains the subject (actor), the object (policy or actor), the polarity of the relationship between subject and object as well as—if present—the justification of the relationship (frame) and the arena.⁷ This relationship between actor and policy is always quantified as a polarity, using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, where -1 means opposition and +1 means support, with three intermediary positions indicating a vague or an ambivalent relationship.⁸ The example in Table 3.1 illustrates the coding procedure.

The first core sentence refers to Blair’s support of labor market reforms (*policy position*), which is complemented by a social protection frame (‘in order to tackle record unemployment’) as well as a frame related to prosperity (‘in order to tackle [...] sluggish growth’).⁹ The second core sentence consists of Chirac’s likely opposition to Blair (*valence attribution*).

Summarized over all six countries, there are 9841 policy positions, a total of 7636 frames as well as 3697 actor-actor statements in the data set (Table C.1 in the Appendix shows the key figures of the content analysis data). Comparisons of data generated by the CSA approach with data from expert judgments, party manifesto codings, and mass surveys, however, suggest that external validity holds. As Helbling and Tresch (2011) show,

the indicators for actor positions are highly correlated in all countries under study. As for internal validity, a pre-test was conducted. Six different human coders obtained a reliability coefficient of 0.77 for coder agreement on the identification of core sentences. Inter-coder agreement for the correct annotation of actors and policies was 0.88 and 0.85, respectively. Given that the typical level of acceptance is 0.80 (Lombard et al. 2002), the agreement was already within acceptable limits before the actual data collection started. Additional coder training and improved coding instructions were provided to address remaining uncertainties.

Aggregation of indicators

A first step in the analysis of the statements retrieved by the core sentence annotation is to calculate the actors' position as well as the salience measures with respect to policies, frames, and actors. The average policy position of an actor is calculated by taking the mean of all the coded polarity values over all core sentences that contain a relationship between this actor and a given policy. The range of these positions spans -1 to $+1$. The salience of a frame for a given actor is the relative frequency with which the actor takes a position on the issue or frame compared to all statements attributed to this actor. Additionally, going public is defined as the relative frequency with which an actor is cited in the public arena compared to all actors. Finally, it is important to note that these indicators are always calculated using article weights. This accounts for imbalances caused by the selection of articles.¹⁰

The thousands of inductively derived statements are heavily fractionized in terms of their level of abstraction and information content. This is why the actors, policies, frames, and arenas have to be aggregated into substantially meaningful categories. First, the multitude of individuals and organizations need to be classified into concise actor types. This classification starts with a very broad distinction between public authority actors, intermediary actors, and actors that are—strictly speaking—external to the political system (see Table 3.2¹¹). The involvement of the latter in public discourse on economic liberalization is unconventional from a theoretical point of view, since these actors mainly operate in the economic (corporations) or societal realms (experts and public welfare organizations). Public authority actors include international governmental organizations like the WTO, EU actors, foreign and domestic executive actors, administrative agencies, and judiciary actors, as well as legislative bodies. All these actors somehow have a legitimate responsibility to provide public goods or to

Table 3.2 Actor classification

Basic categories	Main types (<i>14 categories</i>)	Further refinement (<i>30 categories</i>)
Public authorities	IGO actors	–
	EU actors	–
	Foreign executives	Executives from advanced (OECD) economies Executives from emerging markets
	National executive	–
	Public Administrations	Economic administrations General administrations
	Judiciary	–
	Legislative	–
Intermediary actors	Employer associations	Chambers of commerce Peak, big industry and moneyed interest assoc. Small and medium-sized business associations
	Trade unions	Private sector union Public sector union
	Professional organizations	Farmer organizations White collar organizations
	Party families	Communists and radical socialists Greens Social democrats Liberals Christian democrats and conservatives Radical and populist right
	Corporations	Global players Niche businesses Public enterprises
	Experts	Economic research institutes and think tanks Public advisors and cultural experts
External actors	Public welfare actors	Aid organizations and churches Global justice movements

Notes Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix provide a detailed documentation of the actor classification

regulate economic markets. Intermediary actors, in contrast, include parties and interest groups, i.e., all actors who aggregate societal problems and demands, and translate them into political claims.

As is mostly the case in empirical research, some of the categories are not mutually exclusive and thus have to be distinguished by heuristic rules.

Most members of parliament in the six countries, for instance, also have a party affiliation, which raises the question whether they should be classified as belonging to the parliament or the political party they represent. In this case, the ambiguity is resolved by attaching all statements from these persons to the party, since party affiliation is assumed to be more important for the actors' preferences than their membership of a legislative body. The category of legislative actors thus entails only statements where the legislative body as such was mentioned (e.g., the German 'Bundestag' or the 'House of Commons' in the UK). A similar intersection holds for governmental actors: party and executive functions overlap in practice. In this case, however, the statements were subsumed under the executive category. Party actor statements thus contain all the observations of their members unless the actor is in government.

Crucially, the actor categorization needs to be sensitive to the policy domain in which the public discourse develops, since every policy domain entails its own potential range of relevant actors. First, this implies that foreign executives are split into executives from advanced economies (defined by OECD membership) and executives from emerging markets. As, for example, the negotiations during the WTO Doha round have shown, governments from emerging market economies often do substantially disagree on specific economic liberalization policies. With respect to the public administrations, the category of economic administrations—summarizing administrations responsible for economic, tax, fiscal, and social policies—is separated from a general category for administrative actors. As for the employer associations, they are divided into chambers of commerce, peak associations, and small business associations. Further, trade unions from the public and private sector as well as farmer and white collar professional organizations are disaggregated. With regard to companies, global players (defined by membership in the list of the world's 2000 biggest companies)¹² are distinguished from niche businesses and public enterprises. This disaggregation makes it possible to examine often-stated claims that global players have become powerful actors in today's public conflicts. And, finally, public welfare actors are disaggregated into organizations (e.g., charity organizations or churches) and the global justice movements.

As for the policy statements, the issues need standardization as well. The domestic and the international aspects of economic liberalization are separated first. However, as Vogel (1996, p. 3) emphasizes, economic liberalization can entail a second dimension between market promotion or the retreat of the public sector in order to activate market mechanisms.

Hence, there is not always a zero-sum relationship between government intervention and freer markets. There are thus policies that are related to the *activation* of markets, which are distinguished from *deregulation* as such.

Each distinction is further disaggregated as far as the numbers of coded observations for each dimension allow.¹³ Thus, for all combinations, two issues are defined, except for international market regulation, which contained too few statements in the content analysis to be further decomposed. General regulatory retrenchment is separated from labor market deregulation policies, yet both are related to the domestic dimension and deregulation. The issues of the category *retrenchment of restrictions* include all statements regarding the reduction of constraints on competition, the increase of business friendly rules of corporate governance, and the loosening of social partnerships. For example, regulations concerning unfair competition, excessive managerial salaries, or social-compensation plans fall into this category. *Labor market deregulation* consists of statements related to more flexible employment regulation, e.g., measures related to dismissal protection or shop opening hours. Further, *privatization*, i.e., the cutting or sale of state production, is separated from general *economic promotion* policies, which, for example, entail tax benefits for businesses or bailout programs of near-bankrupt corporations.

As with the domestic issues, the regulatory aspects of internationalization (*international market deregulation*) are separated from policies aiming at expanding the scope of market mechanisms in the economic sphere. International market deregulation policies include restrictions on interventions in financial markets, trade, and international labor markets as well as the introduction of more flexible tax regimes. And finally, with respect to activating aspects of international liberalization, *internationalization* is separated from *locational competition*. The former comprises the promotion of trade and the free movement of labor, while the latter covers tax competition and the active promotion of foreign direct investment.

Finally, to categorize the frames for the analyses in this study, a two-stage approach is applied. First, Habermas' (1993) three-fold classification of arguments in public discourses is used to make initial distinctions among the many justifications used by the actors in the public arena (see Table A.4 in the Appendix for a comprehensive overview over all frames). This classification has proven to be useful for the analysis of political communication processes in different domains (Trenz 2005; Lerch and Schwellnus 2006; Helbling et al. 2010). As Table 3.3 shows, on the most abstract level,

Table 3.3 Frame classification

General characterization	School of thought	Policy specific frames	Description
Utilitarian	Mercantilism	Intervention	Need for regulation
	Social democracy	Social protection	Redistribution, full employment and social security
Identitarian	Liberalism	Prosperity	Innovation, economic performance and growth
	Mercantilism	Protection	Traditional production, national wealth
Moral-universal	Liberalism	Economic freedom	Self-fulfillment, individual freedom
	Social democracy	Social justice rights	Respect of basic, social justice

Notes A detailed list containing the classification of the annotated justifications into the six categories can be found in Table A.4 in the Appendix

the classification differentiates between utilitarian, identitarian, and moral-universal arguments.¹⁴ Utilitarian arguments are used to justify an issue position by its potential to meet particular aims (Helbling et al. 2012). This kind of problem definition is thus instrumental and underlines the practical benefits of a policy. Identity-related arguments, in contrast, justify positions by referring and values inherent in particular communities. Moral-universalist arguments, finally, refer to general principles and rights that are valid for everyone, regardless of particular interests or cultural identities. Such arguments therefore put policy positions in the context of universal goals like human rights or abstract values like individual freedom.

The Habermasian three-fold distinction only establishes the general framework for the development of policy-specific frames. With respect to economic liberalization in Western Europe, these fine-grained frame categories are most likely to be in line with the pivotal ideologies that have shaped political economy since the beginnings of modern economies (Gartzke 2007; Surel 2000; Thelen 2010, p. 50). More specifically, the frame classification used in this analysis is derived from the three historically dominant schools of economic thought: social democracy, liberalism, and mercantilism. While social democratic and liberal frames have already been defined by many other studies of the framing of economic issues (see

Chong and Druckman 2007), this analysis adds mercantilist arguments to cover identitarian and statist justifications (see Table 3.3).

Two central ideas stand out in classical economic liberalism. On the one hand, the notion of liberty justifies both the emphasis on property rights and on individual freedom as a basic human need (Kitschelt 1994). The category *economic freedom* subsumes these aspects of economic liberalism. On the other hand, the accumulation of wealth plays a crucial role. If individuals strive for their personal success, the whole society profits through the efficient allocation of resources by market mechanisms. This argument matches the *prosperity* frame category in Table 3.3. In turn, this idea that free markets are the best way of organizing an economy is challenged by the social democratic demand for social security in national welfare systems (Ruggie 1982). The core beliefs of this social democratic compromise can be defined as ideas of ‘social protections created to guard against the deprivations that markets might cause’ (Tarrow and Caporaso 2009, p. 598). Accordingly, social democratic ideas in Western Europe aim at correcting the main weaknesses of liberal capitalism, i.e., they ensure *social protection* to prevent the most acute hardships of economic deprivation and respect basic human rights regardless of economic imperatives (*social justice*) (King 2003). Mercantilist doctrines, in contrast, start from the view that trade among nations is a zero-sum game and that states have to protect the own economy at the expense of others (Ekelund and Tollison 1982; Magnusson 2003). Such thinking, for example, is still influential in regionalist efforts in international politics, such as the common EU trade policy (Hurrell 1995; van Apeldoorn 2002). The twin pillars of mercantilism are the focus on national interest (*protection*) and the belief in the need for state *intervention* (see Table 3.3).

3.3 OUTLOOK ON THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

This chapter has completed the preparation of the following discourse analyses by specifying the methodological underpinnings of the discursive action repertoire. The basic tenet of this chapter is that ideas can be identified as discursive actions in newspaper articles. Accordingly, public discourse can be mapped by tracking the actors’ going public, policy positioning, valence attributing, and framing. Going public refers to the actors’ ability to access the public arena. Further, policy positioning and valence attributing describe the actors’ stances on economic liberalization and toward other actors, respectively. Framing, finally, describes the actors’ capability to link

their policy stances with their ideological beliefs. In the end, the patterns of similarity with respect to the four discursive actions lead to the identification of discursive coalitions, which can be used to characterize the structure and substance of public discourse on economic liberalization.

In the following chapters, the structure and substance of discourse on economic liberalization will be assessed. The analysis starts with the exploration of the substance of public discourse. More precisely, the two-dimensional configuration of economic liberalization discourse will be explored before the constellations between the pro-market mainstream and its challengers are revealed. The focus then turns to the structure of public discourse in terms of the functionality, accessibility, and, ultimately, conflict intensity of economic liberalization discourse in Western Europe.

NOTES

1. A fundamental epistemological challenge of research on discourse is that ideas can neither be seen nor touched (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 13). This study examines of the public arena by means of an analysis of mass media documents. The rationale behind this selection is that the mass media precisely are the most important arena where politically relevant ideas appear.
2. The content analysis data set was established by the author and his collaborators in the research project “National Political Change in a Globalizing World” (see Kriesi et al. 2008).
3. Given the still time-consuming coding procedure, only the first twenty core statements in an article were coded. This also minimizes the impact of particular events on the overall results of the discourse analysis.
4. This mechanism of manipulating the importance of specific interpretations of reality is denoted here as framing. However, it is conceptualized in manifold other ways in the literature, e.g., as second-order or second-level agenda setting (see Iyengar and Kinder 1987, p. 63; Kioussis et al. 2006; Chong and Druckman 2007, p. 115).
5. This approach is inspired by Wittgenstein (1921), whose theoretical elaboration on the extraction of the basic message from text documents was first translated into practical coding instructions by Osgood (1959) and Axelrod (1976). Subsequently, it has been adapted to analyze party competition and political discourse in general (Kriesi et al. 2008; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1997).
6. The relationship between grammatical and core sentences is not straightforward, since core sentences are located at the semantic level of texts. One sentence can include no, one or several core sentences. Additionally, a core sentence can span over more than one sentence.

7. The arena is defined as the site where the policy process is debated at the moment that the statement leading to a core sentence was made, e.g., an election campaign in the electoral arena or a demonstration in the protest arena.
8. If, for example, an actor is only potentially or vaguely in favor of or against a certain policy or actor, a value of +0.5 or -0.5, respectively, is assigned. Whenever there is an ambiguous relation, a 0 is coded.
9. Since actors sometimes back their policy positions in public discourse with multiple frames (Lerch and Schweltnus 2006, p. 307), the coding of up to five frames per core sentence was allowed.
10. In fact, the CSA data, i.e., core sentence statements derived from newspaper articles, statistically behave like survey data sampled at two levels, e.g., the country and individual level. In such data sets, the basic assumption that there are equal chances for individuals or statements to be included in the sample is violated because the countries have different population sizes and the articles contain different numbers of core sentences.
11. In addition, Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the Appendix show how the actors found in the content analyses were aggregated into the corresponding categories.
12. See Tables A.3 and B.1 in the Appendix as well as Forbes (2010).
13. All issue categories are formulated in such a way that the dimensions and policies have a clear direction in favor of economic liberalization. Table A.5 in the Appendix offers a precise listing of the content of the categories.
14. Habermas' conceptualization of public arguments has much in common with March and Olson's (1984) two logics of arguments. The pragmatic argument corresponds to the logic of consequence, while ethical arguments relate to the logic of appropriateness, since actors seek to promote the justifications encapsulated in an identity, a membership in a political community or group (March and Olsen 2006).

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Unity on the Substance of Discourse

Abstract This chapter offers a first account of the substance of discourse by analyzing the degree and exact nature of internationalization in the different countries and arenas. It shows that public conflict in the six countries are similarly affected by a domestic and an international divide. In addition, this chapter corroborates the finding that the overall policy climate of public discourse has largely converged across countries. More precisely, five distinct discursive coalitions are identified: the radical and moderate mainstream coalitions, which are the linchpins of the pro-market dominance, as well as traditional left, protectionist and interventionist coalitions challenging the pro-market mainstream. The varying constellation of these coalitions across the different contexts also reveal that although the pro-market mainstream in general prevails, it is heavily challenged in the input arenas and single countries such as France. The study of framing, finally, shows that the prevalence of pro-market ideas also develops in terms of the justifications underlying specific policy positions. Liberalist frames thus mostly eclipse social democratic and mercantilist arguments.

Keywords Substance of discourse · Discursive coalition
Policy position Framing · Internationalization

The historical analyses of the general economic and discursive developments in Chap. 2 came to terms with an increasing internationalization and pro-market mainstream in election campaign discourses. Empirically,

the analyses were restricted to political parties. What these analyses therefore left open is how political configurations and the dimensionality play out in the public discourse that encompasses all relevant actors. Hence, also public authorities, interest groups, and business actors are included into the following explorations of the substance of public discourse. The extend of internationalization and the strength of the pro-market mainstream in public discourse can therefore be determined on the basis of a very large number of statements,¹ which makes a comprehensive quantitative evaluation of the substance of public discourse possible.

The substance of discourse thereby is the outcome of the ideas that actors convey into the public discourses. Such ideas range from ‘quite specific, concrete, programmatic ideas [...] to broader, more general ideas’ (Tannenwald 2005, p. 14). In the following, specific ideas are studied by examining policy positions, while general ideas are grasped by studying frames. Policy position-taking is a key element of the actors’ discursive action repertoire. It provides evidence on the perceived interests of actors. Furthermore, only the study of framing can disclose the ideological aspects of public discourses (Enyedi 2005; Surel 2000).

In a first step, the internationalization of economic liberalization discourse is studied. Given the significant shifts of regulatory responsibility to European and international levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001), as well as the profound impact of globalization processes on Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 2012), it is not a question of whether public discourses have extended beyond the national level, but only to what extent. The results will thus clearly reveal that the internationalization of public discourse is substantial and affects all six countries to a similar extent. In consequence, the left-right divide in economic liberalization discourses has been broken up into two divides (Przeworsky and Yebra 2005). The transformed public discourse is characterized by two dimensions based on the distinction between domestic and international liberalization. This assumption is empirically tested by a factor analysis on the actors’ policy positions in all countries. It will show that the policy positions incorporate two factors capturing the influence of globalization (the international dimension) and post-industrialization (the domestic dimension).

In a second step, this chapter provides insights into the main conflict constellations emerging from the actors’ policy position-taking and framing. More precisely, the analysis of policy position-taking will identify a coalitional constellation consisting of mainstream actors and traditional left, protectionist and interventionist challengers. In general, members of these coalitions show a distinct framing, too.

4.1 THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The first analysis is concerned with the internationalization of public discourse. In a preparatory step, the policy distribution in economic liberalization discourse comes under scrutiny. In Chap. 3, the separation between policies concerning two criteria has been introduced. On the one hand, the policies are separated according to the relationship between the national and the global economy. On the other hand, regulatory aspects and activating economic policies are identified to distinguish different types of economic policies. This classification yields seven distinct policy areas: retrenchment of (market) restrictions, labor market deregulation, privatization, economic promotion, international market deregulation, internationalization, and locational competition. Table 4.1 shows the relative importance of these policies in the six countries. To begin with the most general result, the chi-square test indicates that there is a weak relationship between the policy distribution and the discourses in the different countries. However, they are not exceptionally significant.

Three policy areas seem to be especially important for economic liberalization discourse: privatization, retrenchment, and internationalization. Retrenchment is prevalent in all countries but Austria. Moreover, it is the most important policy area for public discourse in the UK and the Netherlands, with 26.0 and 25.5%, respectively. In both countries, policies concerned with the withdrawal of regulations are at the center of conflicts

Table 4.1 Policy salience by countries

	Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
Retrenchment of restrictions	17.5	17.4	6.4	15.4	25.5	14.2	26.0
Labor market deregulation	8.6	11.1	11.1	12.5	6.6	6.5	3.3
Privatization	18.1	22.5	26.7	12.6	15.9	17.9	14.2
Economic promotion	10.7	10.6	10.1	16.4	8.5	9.2	8.7
International market deregulation	13.3	6.7	9.6	13.1	18.4	12.7	19.1
Internationalization	20.8	19.2	24.6	21.1	16.8	23.8	19.1
Locational competition	11.1	12.5	11.6	8.8	8.2	15.7	9.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9839	1845	1927	1621	896	1410	2140
Pearson's χ^2							50.5* (30 DF)

Notes All shares in %; Only policy statements used; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall numbers. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

in the public arena, since they also exhibit a high share of international market deregulation (19.1 and 18.4%). Further, labor market deregulation has received considerably more attention in Germany, France, and Austria. This seems to be a result that partly depends on the selected time period. Germany and France experienced fierce conflicts on far-reaching labor market reforms (the *Agenda 2010* and the *Contrat Première Embauche*, respectively), while Austria was rattled by unusually intense protests on pension reforms during these years. For the UK, Netherlands, and Switzerland, labor market reforms are less important, which possibly has to do with the fact that labor markets are already comparatively flexible. The issue of privatization, finally, is especially salient in Austria and France, the countries which have long had the biggest public sector among continental Western European economies. These two countries thus struggle most with the retreat of state involvement in the economy.

Confirming Katzenstein's (1985) classic conclusions on the political consequences of economic openness, discourse on internationalization is exceptionally salient in the two small countries Switzerland and Austria. These countries have traditionally had to deal with the benefits and risks of a strong interdependence with global markets. Finally, reflecting the importance of tax competition, which is included in locational competition, this issue is especially important in Switzerland. Putting it all together, there is variation in the prominence of policies in different public discourses. However, the commonalities prevail. This is why, in the next section, the latent dimensions of public discourse can be comprehensively calculated across all countries.

Conflict dimensions of economic liberalization

The once prevailing left-right divide on economic liberalization policies has eroded in lockstep with globalization and post-industrialization. In the following, the results of a factor analysis on the seven issues are discussed, which allow to characterize the two divides more in detail. The analysis as reported in Table 4.2 uses the salience weighted policy positions of all actors participating in public discourse. Potentially, there are 180 possible actors entering the public arena (30 actor types \times 6 countries), but since not all actors appear in every country, the number of observations is 147.

Only two factors reach an eigenvalue above 1, and the analysis seems conclusive since all issue categories clearly load only onto one of the two factors. Most notably, this finding shows that a simple left-right model of political contention is not accurate enough to capture the discourse on

Table 4.2 Dimensionality of discourse

	Dom. lib.	Int. lib.	Uniqueness
Retrenchment of restrictions	0.046	0.587	0.653
Labor market deregulation	0.531	0.214	0.672
Privatization	0.770	-0.148	0.385
Economic promotion	0.689	0.247	0.464
International market deregulation	-0.004	0.455	0.793
Internationalization	0.002	0.608	0.630
Locational competition	0.150	0.542	0.684
Eigenvalue	1.64	1.08	
Proportion in %	19.6	19.1	
N		147	
Likelihood ^a		35.23*	DF = 21

Notes Orthogonal varimax rotated principal component analysis. Country and article weights are applied for the calculations. Labels *Dom. lib.* Domestic liberalization; *Int. lib.* International liberalization. ^aIndependent vs. saturated model. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

economic liberalization. On the one hand, the loadings of privatization, labor market deregulation, and economic promotion load almost exclusively on the first factor (0.532, 0.770, and 0.689, respectively). On the other hand, internationalization, locational competition, international market deregulation, and the retrenchment of restrictions clearly belong to the second factor, with loadings of 0.587, 0.455, 0.608, and 0.542. Hence, while the first factor subsumes the domestic aspects of economic liberalization, the second dimension almost exclusively represents the international dimension. Moreover, as a comparison of the overall saliencies in Table 4.1 of these two dimensions shows, the international dimension is clearly more important with 62.5% of all statements. Policies related to internationalization therefore dominate public discourses on economic liberalization in Western Europe. In the subsequent analyses, public discourse on economic liberalization will often be studied at the disaggregate level of two dimensions which are constructed in the following way. *Locational competition* and *retrenchment of restrictions* are therefore merged with *international market deregulation* and *internationalization* to the international dimension. The three remaining policy areas, *privatization*, *labor market deregulation*, and *economic promotion* are combined with the domestic dimension of the public discourse on economic liberalization. More specifically, the policy statements are not simply summed up by these dimensions. The

factor loadings as additional probability weights to the calculations will be added whenever indicators are aggregated by dimension.

As already mentioned, locational competition does not load higher on the first factor to which all the other domestic policies belong. Actors mentioning this policy are thus focusing more on enhancing national competitiveness toward other economies rather than the creation of supportive infrastructures and regulations, which would have been the interpretation of this issue related to the domestic dimension. A similar finding can be observed with respect to retrenchment of restriction policies. The results indicate that this policy has more to do with conflicts surrounding the internationalization of economies, most notably with respect to the competitiveness an individual economy to attract international businesses.

Regulatory internationalization and public discourse

The previous analyses have shown that the substance of public discourse is heavily shaped by internationalization. Moreover, the increasing policy-making competence of European and international bodies suggests that the involvement of actors from supra- and international regulatory levels likely has grown as well (Hooghe and Marks 2001). This can be examined by looking at the salience of actors identified as European and international public authority actors (e.g., the EU commission and the WTO), foreign executives, non-national lobby groups, and multinational corporations. Table 4.3, accordingly, shows the actors' importance in the public discourses, measured by the share of the different regulatory levels. To calculate these shares, the relative frequency of the statements made by an actor is used.²

Overall, foreign, European, and international actors are responsible for about one third of all statements. The chi-square test reported at the bottom of the table shows that there is no statistically significant variation between the countries. Nevertheless, there are still small differences. In France and Switzerland, national actors make up over 70% of all statements. As far as France is concerned, this corresponds to expectations derived from the comparative political economy literature. Being a state-led economy, the French discourse can be assumed to be more nationally oriented. It seems further obvious that the non-EU member status of Switzerland is related to less international intervention in its discourse.

Actors with an international regulatory origin, i.e., IGO and multinational corporations, are more important than European and foreign actors in every country. While their salience in Switzerland and France is only 11.8

Table 4.3 Salience of actor origins

Level of origin	Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
International	16.2	11.3	20.2	18.6	15.6	11.8	20.5
European	11.3	9.2	14.8	7.6	14.3	9.2	12.9
Foreign	8.5	6.4	12.7	6.9	8.8	7.8	8.7
National	64.0	73.2	52.3	67.0	61.3	71.2	57.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9480	1754	1931	1605	857	2022	1427
Pearson's χ^2	18.0 <i>n.s.</i> (15 DF)						

Notes All shares in %; Actor and issue statements used; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall numbers. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

and 11.3%, international actors account for more than 20% of statements in Austria and the UK. European actors have a similarly low salience in Switzerland and France, but also in Germany, where they have a share of 7.6% in all statements. The influence of foreign actors, i.e., transnational actors from other countries, does not vary much among the countries. Moreover, Austria is the country where non-national actors have the largest influence (47.7%), but also in the Netherlands and the UK they make up about 40% of all statements. However, since the relationship between countries and regulatory levels is not significant, regulatory internationalization affects all countries in a similar way. This corroborates the general finding that internationalization is a common feature of the substance of discourse in all countries.

4.2 THE PRO-MARKET MAINSTREAM AND ITS CHALLENGERS

Having explored the dimensionality of public discourses on economic liberalization, the focus now turns to the conflict constellations resulting from the actors' policy position-taking and framing. In Chap. 2, only the policy positions of political parties could be considered. In the following, the exact nature of the coalitions can be explored. Most importantly, discursive coalitions can be identified for the policy position-taking and framing of all relevant actors.

Policy conflicts in economic liberalization discourse

Figure 4.1 presents the actors' policy position-taking at the most aggregated level of 14 actor categories. The dots show the overall policy positions over all countries, along with the 95% confidence intervals for these positions. Eight out of fourteen actors are clearly embracing liberalization reforms. IGO and EU actors (+0.53 and +0.38, respectively), national executives (+0.32), business associations (+0.42), and corporations (+0.32) decisively embrace liberalization, while experts (+0.22), foreign executives (+0.19), and legislatives (+0.18) are more unassertive but nevertheless in favor of economic liberalization.

Three actors have ambivalent positions, since the the confidence intervals overlap with the neutral position at zero. First, the ambiguity of political parties (+0.07) may highlight that the aggregation to this actor type covers important variation, since a broad range of positions among the parties from the various political camps can be assumed. Second, the ambivalence of judiciary actors can be interpreted in a more straightforward way. As arbiters, judiciary actors need to be ideologically neutral, and their interventions in public discourse are dependent on the interpretation of existing law. Public administrations, finally, are also ambivalent, which reflect their function as mediators between the different interests of employers and workers during the implementation of liberalization reforms.

On this very general level, the majority of actors favoring or being ambivalent toward economic liberalization is challenged by only three actors. Two of them, the trade unions and public welfare groups, can clearly be attached to the political left. Both are fiercely fighting economic liberalization with an aggregated policy position-taking of -0.56 and -0.60 , respectively. However, there is also evidence for opposition from the right. The clear opposition from professional organizations provides a first hint of the existence of a conservative, protectionist camp in the public arena. The professional organizations are dominated by the farmer organizations, which traditionally have protectionist perceived interests in Western Europe.

Hence, the overall position in the public discourses toward economic liberalization reforms is predominantly supportive. Of course, this is further evidence for the dominance of the pro-market mainstream in economic liberalization discourses. The shares of supportive and oppositional statements (results not shown here) lends more evidence to the existence of a pro-market mainstream. Supportive statements on economic liberalization



Fig. 4.1 Policy positions of actors on economic liberalization. *Notes* The points indicate the policy position, the corresponding lines the 95% confidence interval of these positions. Article and country weights applied

reach around 60% of all statements on both dimensions. However, since there is also considerable opposition, the idea that pro-market arguments are hegemonic seems overstretched, too (van Apeldoorn 2002). Instead of speaking of a hegemony or orthodoxy, it seems more appropriate to speak of a pro-market mainstream in public discourses of Western Europe.

Especially the result on the ambivalence of the political parties has shown that the overall positions of actors on an aggregated level might well cover crucial variation within the respective actor categories. Moreover, it is still unclear how the actors' policy position-taking varies across dimensions,

countries, and arenas. Table 4.4 reports the results of Ordinary Least Squares regressions predicting the actors' average positions on the international and domestic dimension. Independent variables are the fine-grained actor classification of 30 categories, the six countries, and the three arenas are included as independent variables. The dependent variable is defined as the average positions on the two dimensions by actor types ($N = 30$), countries ($N = 6$), and arenas ($N = 3$).³ The coefficients for the actors show by how much their position differs from the position of the IGO actors. Since IGO actors are the most pro-market-leaning actors in the public arena (see Fig. 4.1), significant coefficients signal a substantial deviation from the pro-market mainstream. In a similar vein, the overall most supportive category was chosen with respect to the countries (Switzerland) and arenas (Janus-faced). Significant parameters thus point to distinctly less pro-market policy positions here, too.

The F-statistics in Table 4.4 test whether institutional contexts and actor types (or both) have an impact on the policy position-taking. As the significance shows, actor types are important explanatory variables on both divides of economic liberalization. The country indicators add explanatory power only on the international aspects. The arena variables, finally, are not significant at all. Accordingly, a combination of actor types and (only partly) national institutions is sufficient to explain the outcome of public discourse in terms of policy position-taking.

Furthermore, three distinct actor groups can be identified on the basis of their deviations from the reference category: the pro-market mainstream, the protectionists and the traditional left. First, the following actors do not significantly differ from the IGO actors in terms of their policy-positioning on both the international and the domestic dimensions of discourse on economic liberalization: EU actors, foreign executives from emerging markets, among which the governments of China and India are frequently present, national executives, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations, liberals, Christian democratic and conservative parties, global players, i.e., companies from the top 2000 corporations worldwide, and public advisory actors. All these actors can thus be identified as members of the pro-market mainstream. A second group of actors is opposing economic liberalization on both dimensions. Private and public sector unions, communists and radical left socialists, as well as public welfare organizations and movements all belong to this group. This group can be perceived as the traditional left-wing coalition. Rather puzzling is the same finding for the white-collar organizations as well as the economic think tanks. As a matter of fact,

Table 4.4 Determinants of policy positions on domestic and international liberalization

	International liberalization			Domestic liberalization		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P > t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>t
<i>Actors(ref = IGOactors)</i>						
EU actors	-0.233	0.254		0.287	0.403	
For. exec. adv. economies	-0.770	0.253	**	-0.279	0.417	
For. exec. emerging markets	-0.343	0.292		-0.144	0.441	
National executives	-0.449	0.251		-0.104	0.392	
Economic administrations	-0.854	0.277	**	0.133	0.432	
General administrations	-1.156	0.285	***	-0.180	0.425	
Judiciary	-0.737	0.329	*	-0.306	0.471	
Legislatives	-0.823	0.279	**	0.070	0.435	
Chambers of commerce	-0.602	0.314		-0.107	0.543	
Peak employer assoc.	-0.480	0.256		0.003	0.402	
Small business assoc.	-0.816	0.273	**	-0.018	0.420	
Private sector unions	-1.138	0.254	***	-1.088	0.392	**
Public sector unions	-1.463	0.303	***	-1.158	0.404	**
Farmer organization	-0.718	0.314	*	-0.634	0.545	
White-collar organizations	-1.005	0.302	***	-1.272	0.429	**
Communists/Radical left soc.	-1.404	0.315	***	-1.046	0.448	*
Greens	-1.365	0.350	***	-0.509	0.426	
Social democrats	-1.074	0.254	***	-0.364	0.396	
Liberals	-0.482	0.273		0.002	0.420	
Christ. dem./conservatives	-0.147	0.260		-0.306	0.402	
Right-wing populists	-1.491	0.303	***	-0.465	0.457	
Global players	-0.440	0.253		-0.052	0.405	
Niche firms	-0.913	0.251	***	-0.369	0.394	
Public enterprises	-0.948	0.286	***	-0.392	0.397	
Econ. think tanks	-0.923	0.301	**	-1.145	0.545	*
Publ. advisory actors	-0.481	0.256		-0.136	0.403	
Publ. welfare org.	-1.290	0.302	***	-0.960	0.443	*
Publ. welfare mov.	-1.515	0.304	***	-1.445	0.611	*
<i>Countries(ref = Switzerland)</i>						
Austria	-0.251	0.118	*	-0.048	0.139	
France	-0.483	0.116	***	-0.127	0.140	
Germany	-0.304	0.123	*	0.047	0.140	
Netherlands	-0.274	0.123	*	-0.157	0.162	
UK	-0.064	0.121		-0.208	0.148	

(continued)

Table 4.4 (continued)

	International liberalization			Domestic liberalization		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P > t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>t
<i>Arenas(ref = Janus-faced)</i>						
Input	0.036	0.089		0.098	0.104	
Output	0.080	0.086		-0.040	0.105	
Constant	1.013	0.220	***	0.419	0.365	
N	333			286		
Adjusted R ²	0.26			0.21		
<i>F-statistics</i>						
Overall model	4.32		***	3.15		***
Actors	4.52		***	3.85		***
Countries	4.35		***	0.87		n.s.
Arenas	0.44		n.s.	0.84		n.s.

Notes Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors and levels of significance from OLS regression on the level of actors. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

however, white-collar organizations are, on the one hand, dominated by the French umbrella organization for white-collar workers and engineers (*UNSA*), which is traditionally skeptical of liberalization reforms. On the other hand, the *Marburger Bund*, Europe's biggest medical association, which went on strike several times against the new collective wage agreement for the public services in Germany in the second half of 2006, plays an important role in this category as well. These two actors alone accounted for more than one third of all statements, which substantively pulls the position of the white-collar organizations toward the opposition to economic liberalization on both dimensions. And with respect to economic think tanks, organizations which, among others, provide expertise to trade unions, such as the Dutch *Centraal Planbureau*, are among the most prominent organizations in this actor category.

Finally, a protectionist group of actors can be identified. It is supportive of domestic liberalization but opts for protectionism with respect to the international dimension. Not only the right wing populists, farmers' organizations, and small business organizations, but also foreign executives from advanced economies, both categories of public administrations, judiciary actors, legislatives, niche and public enterprises, experts, and the mainstream left parties (greens and social democrats) belong to this coalition. On the one hand, this means that there is exceptionally strong

opposition to the pro-market mainstream on the international liberalization dimension. On the other hand, in terms of the number of actor categories, the protectionist group achieves a majority in the public arena. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, they are not as important with regards to their going public, which is why pro-market positions still prevail in public discourse on economic liberalization.

With respect to the countries, France, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands all have significantly less pro-market discourses than Switzerland on the international dimension. However, only in France, this opposition is substantial and pulls the overall policy position in this country below zero. On the domestic dimension, by contrast, there is no substantial deviation among the six countries. This means that, other things being equal, the country contexts are only weakly relevant for the policy position-taking. The institutional context of the arenas matters even less than the country context. In sum, these results confirm that there in general is unity on the substance of public discourses despite different institutional settings in the single countries and arenas.

How economic liberalization is perceived

The subsequent framing analyses will reveal the actors' underlying ideological beliefs that drive their engagement in the public arena. In the previous analyses, three distinct groups of actors—the pro-market mainstream, the traditional left and the protectionists—were identified. The framing by these groups needs to be consistent with their policy position-taking, because they otherwise cannot advance their perceived interests. To be successful, the members of the pro-market mainstream should thus pursue a mainly liberalist framing, while the traditional left challengers are expected to frequently rely on social democratic frames, and the protectionist actors should more often employ mercantilist frames.

Table 4.5 presents the actors' frame usage.⁴ As for the three general frame categories, there is a large group of actors who pursue a strong liberalist framing. In the case of IGO actors, business associations, professional organizations, and corporations, these frames exceed 50% of all frames. Additionally, EU actors, public administrations, and experts reach a share of over 45%. Except for professional organizations, all these actors also have a solid pro-market policy position and thus apply a framing that is consistent with their pro-market policy positions.

The pro-market mainstream actors show a considerable heterogeneity with regard to non-liberalist frames. First, the public authority actors in

Table 4.5 How actors frame economic liberalization

	IGO actors	EU actors	Foreign exec.	National exec.	Public admin.	Judiciary	Legislatives
Liberalist	Prosperity	42.7	28.9	30.2	40.2	34.1	23.4
	Economic freedom	5.0	12.0	10.2	6.1	0	14.2
Social democratic	Social protection	10.3	9.5	15.7	17.2	22.1	15.9
	Social justice	7.0	14.1	6.8	6.3	9.5	11.8
Mercantilist	Interventionist	19.5	10.6	17.2	22.2	34.3	18.9
	Protectionist	2.3	24.9	19.8	8.1	0	15.7
Total percentage		100	100	100	100	100	100
N		148	397	950	307	50	86
	Business assoc.	Trade unions	Prof. org.	Parties	Corporations	Experts	Publ. welf. actors
Liberalist	Prosperity	15.3	20.1	21.3	48.5	34.2	11.1
	Economic freedom	5.4	45.6	13.1	12.7	9.6	
Social democratic	Social protection	48.2	11.3	24.3	14.1	16.7	8.5
	Social justice	12.9	4.2	9.2	2.1	15.9	26.7
Mercantilist	Interventionist	11.7	17.3	21.8	14.8	10.8	41.3
	Protectionist	19.4	1.5	10.3	7.8	12.8	8.7
Total percentage		100	100	100	100	100	3.7
Pearson's χ^2		469.50 *** (65 DF)					100
N		615	148	1096	1367	698	140

Notes All shares in %. Article and country weights applied for all calculations. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

the upper half of Table 4.5 strongly resort to interventionist justifications as well, insisting on the need for intervention in the regulation of the economy. The only exception is the foreign executives who apply a less pronounced interventionist framing. Additionally, in the lower half of the table, professional organizations and parties also have a comparatively high share of interventionist justifications. In addition, public administrations almost never resort to moral and identitarian frames. Protectionism, economic freedom, and social justice make up only 20.4% of all frames used by them. This is also the case for the judiciary actors, which—besides a few mentions of social justice frames—completely stay away from moral and identitarian frames. Judiciary actors and public administrations thus try to intervene only very pragmatically in public discourses. A second framing pattern is observable among the pro-market mainstream for foreign and national executives as well as the business associations. These actors combine an exceptionally high share of prosperity frames with a relatively low use of protectionist frames. Furthermore, business associations, not surprisingly, add a significant amount of economic freedom justifications to their framing of economic liberalization.

Besides the mainstream, two challenging actor types can be identified through their frequent use of social democratic frames. These are the trade unions and public welfare groups. Over 60% of their framing relates to social democratic justifications. However, the two actors exhibit different preferences for the use of the two social democratic frame categories. While trade unions strongly rely on the pragmatic arguments of social protection, public welfare groups highlight the moral-universalist aspects, i.e., social justice frames.

The remaining two actors, i.e., the parties and experts, pursue a very balanced framing strategy. Although experts have a relatively high share of prosperity arguments and parties use social protection frames more often, the differences between specific frame categories are not as clear-cut as for other actors.

To conclude, the actors' framing of economic liberalization is largely consistent with their policy position-taking. In general, the policy-specific ideas communicated in the public arena are backed by the corresponding ideological ideas. In particular, this holds for the pro-market mainstream, which puts the emphasis on prosperity and economic freedom, as well as for the traditional left, which most often proposes social security and social justice arguments. As we will see in the next section, this pattern also applies at the level of discourse coalitions, i.e., the mainstream and traditional left

◀ **Fig. 4.2** Discourse coalitions by country. *Notes* Article and issue weights applied; Actors with fewer than 5 statements not included; Labels: adm. = General administrations, adm.eco. = Economic administrations, chris.con. = Christian democrats and conservatives, eco.think = Economic think-tanks, EU = EU actors, for.adv. = Foreign executives advanced economies, for.em. = Foreign executives emerging markets, glob.play. = global players, IGO = IGO actors, judic. = Judiciary actors, nat.ex. = National executives, niche = Niche firms, peak = Peak employer associations, pop.right = Populist right parties, pub.adv = Public advisory actors, pub.ent. = Public enterprises, pub.union = Public sectors unions, priv.union = Private sector unions, sm.bus. = Small business associations, soc.dem. = Social democrats, welf.mov = Public welfare movements, welf.org = Public welfare organizations, white-col. = White collar organizations

coalition quite successfully pursue the framing strategy most suited to their policy ideas. The protectionist actors, however, less compellingly advance their most important frames, which points to a considerable heterogeneity of their perceived interests, and, accordingly, a rather weak position in public discourses.

The formation of discourse coalitions

We have seen in the last two sections that economic liberalization discourse is populated by a pro-market mainstream, a traditional left, and protectionists. In the following, this preliminary evidence on the constellations comes under scrutiny in a more precise statistical estimation of discursive coalitions. In Fig. 4.2, the centers of the grey circles indicate the actors' positions on the international and domestic dimension, weighted by issue importance and the distribution of statements across articles. The size of the circles shows the salience of actors, i.e., the relative frequency of statements made by the respective actors, which add up to 100% for each country. Finally, the dashed circles show the discourse coalitions as found by a cluster analysis of the salience weighted positions. The number of clusters was previously determined using an improved kmeans cluster analysis.⁵ These calculations yielded four clusters in the case of France, Germany, and the Netherlands, three for the UK and Austria as well as two in the case of Switzerland.

The idiosyncratic constellations of discursive coalitions across the single countries are evident. First, we can identify the two extreme cases France and the UK. Public discourse on economic liberalization in France, in contrast to all other countries, is characterized by the fact that the upper right

corner of the discourse space—the area of support for both aspects of liberalization—is not the most densely populated. The actors are spread out widely and the most important actors in terms of their going public either oppose or are ambivalent toward international liberalization. We can observe quite the opposite for public discourse in the UK, where the lower half of the discourse space is rather deserted. Hence, there is no significant opposition to international liberalization in the UK. The British actors thus mainly differ with respect to their policy positions on the domestic dimension. There are some similarities in terms of the coalitional constellation in Switzerland with the UK, which explains the finding from above that the policy climate is substantially different in these countries from that in the other countries.

Besides these differences, there are also significant commonalities in terms of the discursive coalitions. The most important actors for the pro-market mainstream are the national executives, the EU actors, and the global players. National executives fully support liberalization in the coordinated market economies, i.e., in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In the UK, national executives are ambivalent toward domestic liberalization. A look at the statements underlying this policy position reveals that this result can be attributed to the UK government's outspoken disapproval of the privatization of the Royal Mail, which was debated for years before being approved in 2010. A peculiarity of the German public discourse, by contrast, is the strong salience of the parties. Both the social democrats and the Christian democrats and conservatives (the *Union*) are among the most important actors. In France, national executives are ambivalent on the international dimension, mainly because they frequently argue in favor of the creation of 'national champions,' corporations created above all in the energy and pharmaceutical sectors for the purpose of being competitive at the global level. This confirms earlier accounts of state entrepreneurialism in France (e.g., Schmidt 2009; Thibergien 2007). The French public authorities deviate from their counterparts in the other countries because they strive more explicitly to maintain control over their national economic affairs. Global players' are mostly embracing economic liberalization as well. However, in the Netherlands in the UK, they are ambivalent or even oppositional with respect to domestic issues. These stances mainly stem from the global players' opposition to liberalization measures in the energy market in the case of the Netherlands and support for bailouts in the case of the UK. With respect to the EU actors, only their

involvement in the Austrian discourse is ambivalent on the international dimension.

The peak employer associations, chambers of commerce, as well as the Christian democrats and conservatives are also rallying behind the pro-market mainstream. Moreover, the Christian democratic and conservative parties are the only actor type with a decisive pro-market stance in all six countries. As for peak employer associations, they only are ambivalent toward domestic liberalization in the UK. This is because they were reluctant to support the privatization of the Royal Mail, as we have seen for the national executives. Niche corporations are pro-market oriented in Austria, the UK, and Germany. Yet, in Switzerland and France, they slightly oppose domestic liberalization, while they are clearly protectionist in the Netherlands and ambivalent toward international liberalization in France.

Liberal parties, which could have been expected to be firm pro-market mainstream contenders, are surprisingly heterogeneous in their positioning across the countries as well. In the UK and France, they are slightly opposed to international liberalization, and in Germany, they speak out fiercely against domestic liberalization. This policy position results from oppositional statements regarding privatization. Further, legislative bodies play an important role only in Switzerland, where they considerably enforce the pro-market mainstream as well.

As for the protectionist coalitions, the populist right parties are the main drivers of it in Switzerland and Austria. They take oppositional stances on internationalization but, at the same time, promote domestic liberalization. In France and the Netherlands, the other countries with important right-wing populist movements, they abstain from public discourse on economic liberalization. This points to the fact that immigration and European integration, not economic liberalization policies, are at the main focus of their political programs. In contrast to the position of the protectionist coalition, small business associations and farmers' organizations are pro-market oriented on both dimensions in Austria, the UK, Germany, and Switzerland. French farmers, however, follow the protectionist approach. Rather surprisingly, the public welfare organizations are also mainly protectionist in Austria and Switzerland. In addition, state enterprises, as expected, frequently disapprove of liberalization reforms. They oppose liberalization on domestic issues in Austria, the UK, France, and the Netherlands, while they are hostile toward internationalization in Germany and Switzerland.

Finally, most but not all all left actors are present in the opposition toward economic liberalization. For the position-taking of the social democrats,

governmental responsibility is key to explaining the country differences (see Chap. 2). In the UK during the whole period under study and in Germany during most of it, the social democrats were in office, which is reflected by their distinctly pro-market-oriented policy positions on domestic liberalization. In Germany, social democrats are even more clearly in favor of both aspects of liberalization. In all other countries, social democrats fiercely oppose domestic liberalization reforms. Thus, the majority of the social democrats did not shift toward the top right corner, which would have marked a third way transformation (Giddens 2000). Especially in France, but also in Austria and Switzerland, they reinforce the traditional left-wing position. As for the other important left actors, both private and public sector unions are essentially consistent in their full opposition to economic liberalization in most countries. Several other actors additionally reinforce the traditional left coalition where they are present. Thus, the communists and left socialists (in France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), white-collar professional organizations (in Austria, the UK, France, and Germany) as well as the public welfare movements (only in Switzerland) join trade unions in terms of their traditional left policy position-taking.

The many single actor positions as such, however, do not tell us much about the general constellation between different discourse coalitions. Therefore, to get a better sense of this, Fig. 4.3 shows the average policy position and salience by coalition. All coalitions are defined on the basis of their policy stances on the two dimensions. With regard to the mainstream coalitions, all coalitions with moderate positions (between 0 and 0.5) are specified as moderate mainstream coalitions, whereas coalitions with a more radical stance are labeled radical pro-market coalitions. Moreover, an additional coalition, the interventionists, emerges from this analysis. These coalitions oppose domestic liberalization but support the international aspects of economic liberalization.

Most notably, the results can explain the anti-market policy climate in France. Here, there is not only no radical pro-market coalition, but also all coalitions except the moderate mainstream firmly oppose international liberalization. Moreover, the salience of this moderate mainstream coalition is the lowest of all countries. In France, supporters of the mainstream are thus not only less radical in terms of their policy positions, they also have less than two-thirds of all statements in France. In the other countries, the pro-market mainstream consisting of the moderate and radical coalitions clearly prevails with an overwhelming salience. This dominance of the mainstream is exceptionally remarkable in the UK, where its relative frequency exceeds




Fig. 4.3 Policy positions and salience of discourse coalitions by country and dimension. *Notes* Average positions and 95% confidence intervals; Article weights applied for all calculations

90% (91.6%). Here, the traditional left coalition is responsible for only 8.4% of the public discourse. Thus, it becomes clear that the potential for pro-market reforms is highest in this country.

Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands (here with two coalitions), in contrast, have a dominant mainstream of about 75% or higher (83.2, 78.8, and 74.6%, respectively). The main difference between the two pro-

liberalization coalitions in the Netherlands is the stronger support for liberalism by the smaller radical pro-market coalition. Together with the radical mainstream coalition from Germany and the French protectionists, the Dutch radicals show the clearest support of domestic liberalization. In Germany, further, there is an especially complex coalitional setting. Besides a comparatively weak radical pro-market coalition with 66.9%, the traditional left in Germany exhibits a very pronounced stance against both aspects of economic liberalization. In addition, Germany has the largest protectionist coalition. As we have seen, protectionist actors are present in the public discourses in all countries. However, they mostly integrate into the traditional left or moderate mainstream coalitions. Except in Germany and France, protectionists therefore do not succeed in forming distinct discourse coalitions.

The final examination of the discourse coalitions reveals whether similarities in the coalitions' policy position-taking also imply shared ideological beliefs. In other words, the following analysis allows for an assessment whether coalition members succeed in developing a common framing strategy. Table 4.6 reports the distribution of frames across the main coalitions as established before. To simplify the interpretation, the two inductively found mainstream coalitions, and the protectionists and interventionists are each summarized in one category.

Table 4.6 Framing by coalitions

		Mainstream coalitions	Traditional left	Protectionists and interventionists
Liberalist	Prosperity	36.9	16.8	31.4
	Economic Freedom	10.9	9.0	15.0
Social protection	Social protection	12.8	40.8	18.2
	Social justice	8.3	16.2	6.7
Mercantilist	Interventionist	16.3	11.3	17.9
	Protectionist	14.8	5.9	10.8
Total		100	100	100
N		3943	985	2227
Pearson's χ^2			37.87 *** (10 DF)	

Notes All shares in %; article and country weights applied for all calculations. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

The pro-market mainstream shows a consistent framing and, quite plausibly, it is the coalition that most often resorts to prosperity frames (36.9%). Yet it also very often employs interventionist and protectionist frames, which points to the importance of public authority actors' perceived interests in this coalition. Mercantilist arguments are preferably combined with liberalist ones to express a program for economic promotion which both entails a clear emphasis on prosperity but also a proactive role of the state in the promotion and protection of specific businesses. With regard to the traditional left coalition, its framing differs from the mainstream in two crucial aspects. On the one hand, it uses much less frequently liberalist justifications and, on the other hand, it strongly emphasizes both categories of the social democratic ideology. Further, the traditional left also employs mercantilist frames less often than the other two coalitions. The mainstream and traditional left coalition therefore very successfully emphasize the justifications which fit their perceived interests. The protectionists and interventionists, in contrast, use more prosperity and social protection arguments than mercantilist ones. Hence, they do not seem to be able to converge on frames, which are consistent with their ideological beliefs. On the contrary, it seems that the other coalitions successfully impose their favored arguments on them.

All coalitions, finally, consistently emphasize the pragmatic frame categories more markedly. This points to the fact that, in contrast to the discourse on highly emotional and moralized issues like immigration or abortion, economic liberalization is seen as comparatively more technical and instrumental issue in public discourses (see, e.g., Hoeglinger et al. 2012).

4.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY POSITION-TAKING AND FRAMING

This chapter aimed to explore the substance of public discourse on economic liberalization by empirically assessing the policy position-taking and framing on economic liberalization. The first analyses on the substance of public discourse have shown that one simple left-right dimension is not enough to characterize the conflict structure of public discourse on economic liberalization. Instead, two dimensions were identified which can be ascribed to the international and domestic aspects of economic liberalization and—more generally—to the impact of globalization and post-industrialization. These divides characterize public discourse across

all countries in a similar way. Policies related to internationalization such as the globalization of trade and finance, the relocation of production, and the increasing interventions of international and European regulatory agencies into national policy-making undoubtedly play the major role in public discourses (Simmons et al. 2006). However, distinctly domestic conflicts on policy areas such as privatization or labor market regulation permeate public discourse on economic liberalization as well, although to a slightly lesser extent.

Subsequent analyses have corroborated the prevalence of the pro-market mainstream in Western Europe. EU actors, national executives, and global players are the linchpins of this mainstream. However, the general pro-market mainstream is differently integrated into the public spheres of the single countries, leading to heterogeneous coalitional settings. In contrast to studies that have identified a hegemonic discourse on economic policy-making in Western Europe (e.g., van Apeldoorn 2002), this analysis therefore provides clear evidence that strong contenders are able to disrupt the pro-market mainstream. France, to begin with, stands out in its tendency of opposing economic liberalization. The French reluctance to liberalize suggests that this country's characteristics of a state-led economy, a traditionally pluralist interest intermediation regime and a polarized political system (see Schmidt 2009; Hallin and Mancini 2004) impose considerable obstacles on a dominance by the pro-market mainstream. Especially with regard to the aspects of international liberalization, the French are skeptical about the benefits of further liberalizing the economy.

In addition, three oppositional coalitions were inductively identified. The trade unions lead the traditional left coalition by most clearly opposing economic liberalization on both dimensions in almost all countries. With regard to the driving forces on the protectionist right, niche firms, and farmers' associations are at least similarly important as populist right parties, which only play a major role in Switzerland and Austria. Moreover, protectionism is not limited to the right. The third way actors, most notably some green and social democratic parties, also oppose international but not domestic liberalization. This preference might originate in their striving for an extension of the welfare system at the European level, which concerns the international dimension of public discourse in this study. The lack of a comprehensive social security framework at the European level is a constant concern for mainstream left actors (Helbling et al. 2010). Finally, interventionist coalitions have emerged in the public discourses in Germany, the

Netherlands, and Austria. In terms of its salience, however, these coalitions are too weak to be an important contender.

Besides policy position-taking, this chapter focussed on ideological beliefs as they are disclosed by a frame analysis. In line with the dominance of the pro-market mainstream, liberalist frames underlie most of the public discourse on economic liberalization. Furthermore, mercantilist arguments complement the pro-market mainstream's ideological profile. Especially public authorities do simultaneously emphasize prosperity and a proactive role of the state in the economy.

With respect to the opposition against economic liberalization, liberalist justifications related to prosperity and economic freedom are less important. As far as the challengers can be attributed to the traditional left, social democratic frames are preferred. Reflecting their status as the major challengers in public discourse, the most important single actors with respect to this framing strategy are the trade unions. However, also more moderate left-wing actors, such as the social democrats, heavily employ social protection and social justice frames to emphasize solutions to economic deprivation and a lack of social rights. Mercantilist frames are not the preferred framing strategy of the interventionist and protectionist coalitions. This again discloses the incapacity of these coalitions to develop a concise appearance in public discourse. Although they oppose economic liberalization on the international or domestic dimension, they do not back these positions with arguments related to national sovereignty, the wealth of their home countries or the need for state intervention.

NOTES

1. 9841 policy statements and 7636 frames.
2. Additionally, probability weights accounting for the uneven distribution of statements are applied across articles and—for the overall numbers only—across countries.
3. This amounts to $30 \times 6 \times 3 = 540$ potential observations. However, since not all combinations exist, the real number of observations is lower.
4. All numbers are relative frequencies calculated using country and article weights.
5. The approach implemented tackles two unfortunate properties of the ordinary kmeans clustering algorithm. First, an algorithm proposed by Arthur and Vassilvitskii (2007) is applied, which calculates optimal cluster centers by minimizing the average squared cluster center distances for all data points before the actual clustering is started. Second, to determine the most ade-

quate number of clusters statistically sound, different cluster solutions are first compared by their ranking on the Dunn (1974) index (see formal definition in Table B.2 and the documentation in Tables C.3 and C.4 in the Appendix).

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Diversity in the Structure of Discourse

Abstract This chapter confirms that, although resourceful actors dominate discourse in all countries, the accessibility and functionality of discourse decisively varies according to the institutional contexts. As a result, conflict intensity, measured as the polarization of policy positions and patterns of valence attributions, varies closely according to the different capitalist regime types and arenas. This leads to the conclusion that the relationship between conflict intensity and institutional contexts is systematic: open and coordinative discourses, such as, for example, in Germany, are very contentious, while closed and communicative discourses, such as, for example, in the UK, are particularly quiescent.

Keywords Structure of discourse · Salience · Valence · Conflict intensity
Institutional context

The empirical analysis of public discourse on economic liberalization continues with the exploration of its structure. More precisely, going public and valence attributions are examined in order to explore the accessibility and functionality of discourses. The actors' going public is the basic discursive action. Only a certain visibility paves the way for their policy position-taking, valence attributing, and framing. Valence attributing, further, reveals the non-policy related interactions between the actors present in the public arena (see Wueest et al. 2013). It is based on statements referring to the reputation of actors regarding their competence and trustworthiness, the charisma of leaders, and their media performance (Norris 2000).

This chapter starts with an overview of which actors are able to engage in public discourses and what role valence plays in discursive processes. Contrary to the considerable congruence in terms of the dimensionality and policy constellations in national public discourses, this chapter will subsequently show that the structure of discourse does substantially vary. This variation is tightly connected to the divergent institutional frameworks among the six countries and three arenas. In other words, while the substance of discourse is similar—discourse in all countries is similarly affected by internationalization and the pro-market mainstream—, the ways in which this outcome is achieved is distinct. More precisely, the accessibility and functionality of public discourses in France, Austria, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are examined. Functionality thereby refers to the degree of coordination or communication in public discourses. This chapter concludes by showing the implications of this diversity in the accessibility and functionality of discourses on the intensity of public conflicts.

5.1 THE ACCESSIBILITY AND FUNCTIONALITY OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Who inhabits the public arena on economic liberalization?

The first analysis is concerned with the overall patterns in the going public in order to show the general visibility of the actors. Going public reflects an actor's willingness and capacity to engage in public discourses. Thus, policy position-taking, valence attributing, and framing fundamentally depend on this appearance in the public arena in the first place. Figure 5.1 provides the first overview by showing the success of the going public for the fine-grained categorization consisting of 30 actors. The bars indicate the mean predicted numbers of statements made by the actors for both dimensions of public discourse on economic liberalization. These mean predicted numbers are the results of count regressions, as reported in Table C.3 in the Appendix. Before the estimation, the data were first aggregated to the 30 actor categories, six countries, and three arenas using article and issue weights—calculated from the factor loadings to account for the different contribution of the issues to the dimensions.¹ However, not all actors are present in every country and arena, which is why the N for the analyses is lower than the maximum of 540 (333 for the international and 286 for the domestic dimension).




Fig. 5.1 Going public, overall and with respect to the two dimensions: Results of count regression models. *Notes* Averages of the number of predicted statements from count regression models on the frequency of statements by actors and countries, controlling for countries and arenas. Country, issue, and article weights applied. For the list of coefficients, standard errors, z statistics, and wald tests of the regression analysis, see Table C.3 in the Appendix

The access to public discourses is clearly easier for actors which have advantages in terms of institutionalized channels or economic resources to establish a solid presence in the media. Most notably, the national executives are the dominant actors in public discourses on both dimensions of economic liberalization. With an average number of about 23 predicted statements on domestic aspects, national executives have a stronger going public than private sector unions and niche firms, who come second and third. Taken their firm pro-market policy positions as found in Chap. 4 into account, national executives thus seem to be at the forefront of pushing for more economic liberalization. Also in general, pro-market proponents decisively have the edge in the public arena. Among the seven actors who have more than ten statements on one of the dimensions, only the private sector unions are challengers. Most other challengers, including the right-wing populist parties, are rather insignificant players in the public arena. Furthermore, the pro-market mainstream more forcefully plays out at the international dimension. EU actors, foreign executives from advanced economies, national executives, and global players loom high on this dimension.

The reason for the overall higher importance of international liberalization—another result from the analysis of the substance in the last chapter—is evident in the fact that most actors speak out more often on this dimension. At the same time, however, many actors from the political left more frequently go public on the domestic dimension. Private and public sector unions, communist and radical socialists, as well as the greens mainly engage in discourses related to the national realm of policy-making, while international and European aspects are left to the challengers of the political right. For obvious reasons, public welfare organizations and global justice movements are an in this regard. In general, they are mainly focused on international aspects such as globalization-related risks.

The social democrats, as well as the Christian democrats, and conservatives are the two party families which traditionally alternate in government or government coalitions. It thus comes as no surprise that they also prevail over other parties in terms of the going public in economic liberalization discourse. Moreover, the social democrats have a stronger standing compared to the Christian democrats and conservatives. They show a more intense going public on both dimensions in public discourse, whereas they won, on average, only 34.9% in the electoral contests which took place closest to the time period of this discourse analysis (2004–2006).² This is considerably less than the Christian democrats and conservatives, who

gained about 37.2% of votes in the corresponding national elections. Also, the communists and radical left socialists have much more weight in the public arena than in the elections, while the importance of liberals and right-wing populists does not substantively vary. The radical left is clearly the smallest party family in electoral contests (3.2%), but they are responsible for more statements than the greens in the public arena. The general implication is that economic liberalization discourses seem to foster the going public of parties from the political left.

Also in terms of business representatives, the resourceful actors prevail. First, peak employer associations outperform small business associations and professional organizations (farmer and white-collar organizations). Additionally, with respect to corporations, global players are the most important actors. It must be noted that the categories for corporations do not include genuinely small companies since they simply did not appear in the content analysis. The niche firms are thus mostly multinational companies as well.³ Small businesses thus do not have a voice in public discourses, although they are often praised as the pillars of Western European economies.

The importance of valence in public discourse

Valence attributing is a strategic discursive action. It is neither directly linked to specific policy positions nor more general ideological beliefs. The importance of valence is important because actors need credibility and trustworthiness in order to influence the policy process via public discourses (Laver and Sergenti 2011). This is especially important since the mass media filter information on policies according to the news value of actors, which increasingly depends on their reputation (Wolfsfeld 1997). Actors thus try to change their and the other actors' reputation by making valence-related statements.

For the following analyses, only valence-related statements are considered. Accordingly, Fig. 5.2 shows the average valence attributions of the references to other actors as well as self-references only (references within the same actor category) for the basic 14 actor categorizations. Additionally, the consistency of these attributions is indicated by the 95% confidence intervals.

The strong tendency toward negativity is the most important feature of valence attribution in public discourses on economic liberalization. It can, therefore, be suggested that, due to the increasing mediatization of politics, negative campaigning has become the prevailing mode of actor-




Fig. 5.2 Overall and self-referred valence attribution. *Notes* Average positions and 95% confidence intervals: Article and country weights applied for all calculations; Positions from actors with less than five statements are not considered for the calculations

specific interaction in public discourses (e.g., Norris 2000). Accordingly, most actors pass more criticism on other actors than on representatives of their own actor category. Note that the self-references needed to be excluded for four of the 14 categories (IGO actors, national executives, judiciary, and legislatives), because they amounted to fewer than five statements. These public authority actors are thus less inclined to campaign

for their own valence in public discourse. Nevertheless, seven out of the remaining ten actors show a much more positive stance toward themselves. Only foreign executives, public administrations, and professional organizations attack members of their own actor group more heavily than all other actors. This is not surprising since all three categories consist of a strongly heterogeneous set of actors. Professional organizations include a broad range of interest associations, e.g., farmers' and white-collar organizations, which are regularly divided over economic liberalization policies. In a similar vein, the different branches of public administrations, e.g., the departments of trade and social affairs, are motivated by different perceived interests. Foreign executives, finally, are obviously a fragmented category as well. The perceived interests of various governments from all over the world are represented here.

Interestingly, national executives and corporations are the only actors which overall apply a positive campaigning strategy, although these valence positions do not significantly deviate from zero. These are the two most important drivers of the pro-market mainstream, and they are thus comparatively conciliatory actors. Negative campaigning, by contrast, is much more often applied by challengers of the pro-market mainstream as well as by pro-market contenders with a low salience in public discourses.

Valence attributions also have implications for the formation of discourse coalitions: in addition to shared policy positions, actors can also signal with a valence attribution who belongs to the same coalition and who does not (Adam and Kriesi 2007). In this context, it is of interest whether actors are deliberately blamed or praised depending on their coalition membership. The average of the valence positions with respect to statements within each coalition and across coalitional borders show that this mainly holds.⁴

Both the mainstream and the traditional left-wing coalitions show a sharply negative stance toward other coalitions while being much more positive to the same coalition. Since their policy position-taking and framing align as well, both coalitions apply a coherent strategy in terms of their full discursive action repertoire. The result for the interventionists and protectionists—the attributions within the coalition are slightly more negative than the one regarding other coalitions—is probably due to the very heterogeneous composition of this coalition. These coalitions entail actors as diverse as mainstream left parties and right wing populists, which certainly have no interest in campaigning in favor of each other. As we have seen in the frame analysis in Chap. 4, actors of these coalitions are at odds with each other.

The tenor of the valence attributions clearly is negative. However, as the partially very large confidence intervals in both the actor- and coalition-specific analyses indicate, these aggregate analyses cover a lot of variation among the actors of the respective categories. One source of this variation is the differences due to divergent institutional contexts, which will come under scrutiny in the next section.

Accessibility and functionality of discourse

After having established the general patterns of going public and valence attributions, the variation in the structure of discourse across the countries and arenas will be explored. The accessibility is the first important aspect of the structure. In general, the greater the number of different actors who have a voice, the more accessible is this realm of public discourses. Further, the less public authorities are dominating, the more coordination among the actors participating in public discourse is possible. The first analysis presented in Table 5.1 correspondingly focuses on going public with respect to the basic actor groups (14 categories) by country and arena. As always, the numbers are calculated using article and country weights to control for potential biases regarding the content analysis. Moreover, the accessibility, operationalized by the “index of qualitative variation” (see Woods 2007), indicates the balance between the three broad categories public authorities, intermediary actors, and external actors on a scale ranging from 1 (perfect balance) and 0 (full overrepresentation of a single actor category).⁵

In general, the distribution confirms previous accounts that the resourceful actors of the pro-market mainstream have the highest visibility. Yet, the differences across countries and arenas are considerable as well. As the significant chi-square tests show, the institutional frameworks of countries and arenas are substantially influencing the accessibility of public discourse. The share of some otherwise almost ignored actors is highest in Switzerland. Legislative bodies, experts, public welfare organizations, and IGO actors all perform best in Switzerland. However, the intermediary and external actors have difficulties to match the strong presence of the public authorities, which results in a rather low accessibility (0.959). This points to the relative closeness of economic liberalization discourse in this country, despite the general openness of the Swiss political system because of its direct democratic institutions and the many informal channels of policy-making (Höglinger 2008). The Netherlands and especially the UK have a relatively closed structure of public discourse as well (0.954 and 0.923, respectively). Public welfare organizations, judiciary actors, and professional organizations fare especially badly in these two countries.

Table 5.1 Going public in economic liberalization discourse

	Overall	Countries					Arenas				
		FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK	Input	Janus-f.	Output	
<i>Public authorities</i>	41.7	37.2	39.2	26.7	47.5	46.6	51.7	27.1	69.7	22.1	
IGO actors	2.5	2.4	1.4	0.9	3.0	4.5	2.1	0.1	3.6	0.7	
EU actors	9.0	5.7	11.8	6.2	12.3	7.7	10.6	1.5	18.4	4.9	
Foreign executives	7.0	5.4	9.3	5.7	8.2	6.2	7.0	1.7	16.1	3.3	
National executives	14.9	19.7	8.5	8.9	17.9	16.5	17.1	13.4	22.0	8.4	
Administrations	5.3	2.2	6.3	2.4	3.9	4.5	12.8	0.5	5.2	4.8	
Judiciary	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.0	0.7	1.2	0.8	0.0	3.6	0.0	
Legislatives	1.9	0.5	0.4	1.5	1.5	6.1	1.3	9.9	0.8	0.0	
<i>Intermediary actors</i>	31.1	37.5	27.5	44.9	24.6	28.9	22.6	58.3	16.4	32.7	
Employer associations	6.3	4.8	7.2	7.9	5.6	5.9	6.5	3.5	3.1	7.6	
Trade unions	8.6	13.3	5.9	8.5	8.3	6.5	8.5	13.2	3.7	15.9	
Professional organizations	1.7	3.3	0.9	2.0	1.3	1.2	1.1	2.7	0.8	2.0	
Parties	14.5	16.1	13.6	26.6	9.4	15.4	6.5	39.0	8.8	7.1	
<i>External actors</i>	27.2	25.3	33.3	28.5	27.9	24.5	25.7	14.6	13.9	45.3	
Corporations	18.6	15.1	24.4	21.0	16.3	13.0	23.2	7.6	8.6	39.3	
Experts	7.1	9.5	6.9	5.4	10.4	8.6	1.5	4.5	4.2	4.8	
Public welfare actors	1.6	0.6	2.0	2.0	1.2	2.8	0.9	2.4	1.1	1.2	
Total percentages	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	9480	1754	1931	1605	857	2022	1427	1446	2787	2218	
Accessibility ^a	0.983	0.985	0.990	0.970	0.954	0.959	0.923	0.848	0.701	0.959	
Pearson's χ^2				90.7 *	(65 DF)				157.4 ***	(26 DF)	

Notes: All figures are in %; ^aIndex of qualitative variation, see Table B.2; Article and country weights applied. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001

In Germany, Austria, and France, public discourse is more open (accessibility scores of 0.970, 0.990, and 0.985). Thus, more actors have the opportunity to shape public discourse. For example, parties have an exceptionally high standing in all three countries. In addition, the high visibility of the trade unions in France (13.3%) can be interpreted as an attempt to influence politics via the public sphere. French unions traditionally have difficulties accessing the inner circles of politics but are usually capable to mount public pressure (Wueest 2011, 2013). Furthermore, business associations perform best in Austria and Germany, two countries where interest groups historically have a high visibility. Although social partnership has been on the constant decline in both countries, their traditionally important role still seems to exert some influence on the respective public discourses. However, corporations are even stronger in these two countries. It appears that corporations in these countries use their resources heavily to ensure that their voice is heard in public discourses, thus bypassing the usually dominant interest intermediation processes.

In general, arenas are much more constraining the accessibility of discourse as the highly significant chi-square test shows. It was further expected that the input side of policy processes is more accessible than the janus-faced and output arenas; however, this is only partly the case. While the input arenas are indeed substantially more accessible than the janus-faced arenas (0.848 compared to 0.701), output arenas actually are by far the most accessible ones (0.959). Different actors are dominating discourse in the three arenas. The public authorities have—with the exception of the legislatives—the highest salience in the janus-faced arenas. IGO and EU actors, foreign and national executives, administrations, and judiciary actors use their established channels to communicate in this arena type. Moreover, the national executives are main players in both input (13.4%) and the output (8.4%) arenas. The other actor categories with a similar overall importance are parties, which mainly engage in the input arenas (39.0%), and corporations, which have about 40% of all statements made in the output arenas. Legislative bodies and public welfare actors are by far most visible in the input arenas (9.9 and 2.4%, respectively), while business associations are important in the output arena. This makes sense since the former specialize in bringing up new policy demands and the latter focus more on the evaluations and negotiations during the implementation phase of policies (Kriesi 2007). Experts, instead, have distributed their statements evenly across the arenas. And trade unions, as well as professional organizations, have most of their statements in the in- and output arenas. With

respect to the overall going public in the arenas, it thus can be concluded that the output arenas is the realm for private interest politics (corporations, business associations, and trade unions), while the input arenas are characterized by party politics.

Going public is not only informative for the accessibility of public discourse. The extend to which national public authorities occupy the public discourse further points to its functionality. Hence, the more national public authorities are intervening in public discourses, the higher is the likelihood that the communication of policy decisions and policy implementations take place. The national executives are most important in France (19.7%), which makes sense given their dominant position in the economic policy-making processes in that country. In a similar vein, public discourse in the UK, with its majoritarian political system and pluralist industrial relations, is correspondingly dominated by the executives (17.1%). This becomes even more evident if the exceptionally high salience of the public administrations in the UK is considered. With 12.8% of all statements, they have more than double the importance than in all other countries. Similarly, the centralized style of corporatist policy-making in the Netherlands (the “Polder model”) gives public authorities an edge in this country (17.9, see Woldendorp and Keman 2007). In sum, the important role of public authorities in the UK and the Netherlands, as well as the exceptionally high standing of the national executives in France, implies that the communicative function is more important in these countries. The comparatively intense going public by intermediary and external actors in Austria, Switzerland, and Germany, in contrast, highlights that the coordinative function is more prominent here.

The differences in the functionality of discourses in the single arenas are even more clear-cut. In the janus-faced arenas, only public authorities such as the EU, foreign executives, and national executives achieve a high standing (18.4, 16.1, and 22.0%, respectively). Moreover, IGO actors, administrations and the judiciary have the highest visibility here. In the input arenas, in contrast, intermediary actors such as the parties are by far most important. This means that the introduction of and deliberation on new ideas dictates public discourses here. Public discourses in the output arenas, finally, is almost monopolized by interest groups and corporations. The strong going public of intermediary actors means that is the prevailing characteristic of the in- and output arenas.

As already outlined, actors engaging in valence attributing are both senders and addressees of positive or negative statements related to compe-

tence, trustworthiness, and media performance. Such valence attributions can thus be perceived as directed relationships in a discourse network. Consequently, the actors responsible for the statements can be seen as vertices in a valence network of the public discourse on economic liberalization. This makes it possible to test the functionality of discourse with respect to the network of non-policy related discursive actions. Combined with the direction of the valence attributions, as shown in Fig. 5.3, the identification of the actors' role in terms of valence attributing in public discourses on economic liberalization is possible.

The analysis presented in Fig. 5.3 indicates the actors' closeness centrality. Closeness centrality measures the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) from a specific actor to all other actors in the network (Bonacich and Paulette 2001; Csardi 2008). This means that actors with a short geodesic distance to many other actors have a high centrality (see definition in Table B.2 in the appendix). The actor-actor statements used in this study allow for the calculation of three different types of closeness centrality: overall centrality, centrality as sender, and centrality as the addressee of statements. The size of the pie charts in Fig. 5.3 indicates the overall closeness centrality of an actor in the network of actor references. As shown in Table C.6 in the appendix, overall closeness centrality and runs from 0.033 (public welfare actors in France) to the maximum centrality of 0.077 (foreign executives in France). Thus, the more central an actor is in the network, the bigger the pie chart. In addition, the pie chart shows whether an actor is more central as addressee (light gray) or as the sender (dark gray).

On first sight, the structure of the valence campaigning network reveals a different distribution of importance in comparison to the going public (see Table 5.1). In general, closeness centrality is highest for the foreign executives from advanced economies. The most important actors in terms of going public, national executives and corporations, only come second and third in terms of their closeness centrality. However, the ratio between the subject- and object-related closeness centrality indicates why foreign executives are so central in the valence networks: they are much more frequently the addressee of other actors' statements than the sender. Similarly, EU actors, administrations, and corporations are more often receivers of valence attributions in every country under study. Thus, these actors are not important because they make a lot of statements, but because they are major targets of other actors' campaigning efforts.




Fig. 5.3 The importance of actors in valence networks

National executives are very important as senders in the valence networks in all countries except Germany. In France, they are joined by the professional associations and the judiciary; in Austria by the employer associations, trade unions, and public welfare organizations; in Germany only by the judiciary, in the Netherlands by the legislatives, employer associations, parties and experts; in Switzerland by the professional organizations; and in the UK, finally, by public welfare organizations. Given the overwhelming negativity in the valence networks of public discourse, it can be assumed that most of these statements made by the sender are used to criticize the competencies and reputation of other actors. In sum, this overall dynamic confirms points to the existence of blame-shifting processes (see Moravcsik 1994; Zürn 2006). National public authorities try to assign the blame for unpopular consequences of their policy-making to the international and European level and—on a smaller scale—to administrations and corporations.

Beyond that, valence networks provide evidence on the varying functionality of public discourses in the six countries. The two actors mainly responsible for a communicative character of public discourses, the national executives, and administrations, are exceptionally central in the valence networks of the UK and France. In the UK, they come first and second in terms of their overall closeness centrality (see Table C.6 in the appendix). In France, they together rank third. Only in the Netherlands, the national executives and administrations are less important. In terms of the valence networks, public discourse in the Netherlands thus resembles the coordinative discourse in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

5.2 THE CONFLICT-INTENSITY OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The last analyses on the structure of public discourses will reveal that the variations in the accessibility and functionality are systematically related to the conflict-intensity in the six countries and three arenas. Conflict-intensity thereby can mean two different things. First, a large diversity of perceived interests can lead to high polarization of discourses. This polarization is different from the negativity of discourse, i.e., how negative actors are addressing each other. Accordingly, Table 5.2 shows the polarization and negativity across the six countries and three arenas, respectively. To assess polarization, a measure based on Taylor and Hermann's (1971) index is used.⁶ As with the original index, the range of values taken depends on the scale of the issue categories and runs between 0 and 1. The higher

Table 5.2 Polarization and valence by country and arena

	Polarization	Negativity
<i>All countries</i>	0.12	-0.32
France	0.24	-0.48
Austria	0.16	-0.03
Germany	0.27	-0.23
the Netherlands	0.16	-0.51
Switzerland	0.2	-0.19
United Kingdom	0.08	-0.34
<i>All arenas</i>	0.12	-0.32
Input	0.24	-0.46
Janus-faced	0.11	-0.36
Output	0.16	-0.14

Notes Labels: Article weights applied for all, country weights applied for overall calculations. See Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix for the definition and calculation of the polarization index

the value, the more polarized an issue, dimension, or public discourse is in general. In addition, the average values of valence attributions by country and arenas are indicated. These numbers are article- and country-weighted averages of the actor references.

In terms of polarization, France, Germany, and Switzerland have the highest conflict-intensity in their public discourse on economic liberalization. Among these, Germany stands out with a polarization index of 0.27. As we have seen in the previous analyses, discourse in Germany is distinctly open and coordinative. Both of these features increase the diversity of perceived interests in the public arena. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the German public discourse is most polarized. In France, discourse is highly polarized (0.24) because its public discourse was shown to be very accessible. An apt example is the parliamentary debate on a failed labor market reform (the *Contrat Première Embauche*) in France during the research period. It was accompanied by fierce disputes, not only in terms of protests on the streets but also in public discourse. In Switzerland, although discourse is relatively closed, polarization is above average since its discourse is heavily shaped by the coordinative function.

The Netherlands, in contrast, have a low polarization in their public discourse (0.16), which is due to the comparatively low accessibility and the high importance of the communicative function. In a similar vein, the UK is the country with the least conflictive discourse with respect to its

polarization. Here, the low accessibility and intense communication by the national public authorities crowds out so many other perceived interests from public discourse that the conflict-intensity is by far lower than in any other country. Polarization in Austria, finally, is the only case that does not match the previously found patterns of accessibility and functionality. With its open and coordinative discourse, polarization should have been higher than 0.16. However, country experts suggest that Austrian politics is shaped by a consensus-orientation which is exceptional among Western European countries, and which is part of the political culture that is independent from institutional peculiarities (see, e.g., Dolezal and Hutter 2007).

In sum, there is a systematic relationship between capitalist regime types and the polarization of discourse. If discourse in coordinated market economies such as Germany is characterized by a higher accessibility, their public discourse is more contentious than public discourse in liberal market economies. Of course, this result stands in sharp contrast to the fact that coordinated market economies are usually associated with a more consensual character of their interest intermediation systems (see Emmenegger and Marx 2011). Hence, public discourse and negotiations among social partners behind closed doors are two different stories.

In the previous analyses on valence attributions, the most clear-cut result is the strong negative tendency in all countries. In Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, however, this negativity is less pronounced (-0.03 , -0.19 , and -0.23 , respectively). Notably, these three coordinated market economies also have a distinctly coordinative discourse. The three other countries with their more communicative discourse, in contrast, feature a quite aggressive discursive climate with respect to valence attributions. In sum, if the communication of policy decisions and implementations takes a large part of discourses, the overall discourse climate is shaped by intense negativity.

The results for the polarization indices by arenas as shown in Table 5.2 match the findings with respect to the accessibility and functionality of discourse, too. The polarization in the input arenas is most pronounced, followed by the output and then the janus-faced arenas. Especially in the janus-faced arenas, there is not much interest diversity and thus contention is very low. Therefore, the pro-market mainstream faces vivid challenges in the input arenas. As far as the negativity by the three arenas is concerned, however, the findings from the analysis of polarization are only partly

confirmed. The input arenas again are the most conflict-intense arenas (-0.46). Yet the output and not the janus-faced arenas are the least conflict-intense arenas.

5.3 THE IMPACT OF GOING PUBLIC AND VALENCE ATTRIBUTIONS

In this chapter, the structure of public discourse was explored. Chapter 4 has shown that the substance of public discourse is similar in the six countries. This chapter, in contrast, provided evidence that the structure of discourse varies in different institutional settings. More precisely, the two discursive actions going public and valence attributions show systematic differences across countries and arenas.

First, an immediate finding with respect to going public is that public authorities, corporate interests, and the established parties clearly have the biggest weight in the public arena. With their institutional and/or financial resources, these actors create imbalances in the presence of perceived interests in public discourse. The most striking imbalance is perhaps the strong stance of big business actors and their representatives among the private interest groups. This dominance of multinational corporations and peak employer associations is highly problematic for small businesses. Usually denoted the pillars of economic productivity in Western Europe, these actors don't have a voice in the public sphere. The imbalance is less problematic for the trade unions, which are strong contenders in public discourses.

Subsequently, comparative findings on the accessibility and functionality of discourses in the six countries and three arenas were presented. Discourse in two of the four coordinated market economies, namely Germany and Austria, as well as in the state-led market economy France is open. Hence, there is path dependency in terms of the accessibility of discourse. In Germany and Austria, the traditionally dominant role of social partnership continues to have an effect. In France, public discourse is still influenced by the polarized pluralism of the political system. In the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK, there is not enough space for the full diversity of actors. The going public by country also revealed a frequent intervention of the national executives in the public discourse in France and a generally high salience of public authorities in the UK and the Netherlands. This means that the communication and legitimization of policy decisions and implementations is comparatively salient in these three countries.

In Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, relatively more actors without policy-making competencies are conveying their ideas into public discourse, making it more coordinative.

The arenas showed highly distinct patterns of going public as well. Intermediary actors dominate discourse in the input arenas. Hence, they take center stage in elections, protests or in parliamentary politics. Output arenas, i.e., the sites of interest intermediation, administration, and political advisory, are almost exclusively occupied by external actors, most of all corporations. In both arenas, accordingly, coordination among actors not responsible for the actual policy decisions and implementations is the more important function. Janus-faced arenas, in contrast, are almost exclusively shaped by communication, since the presence of public authorities is overwhelming here.

The first result with regards to valence is the strong negativity in almost all arenas and in all countries. Hence, aggressive discursive actions prevail. Given this strong tendency toward negative campaigning, it is not even the case that all actors refer to their own category in a positive way. Some actors, most notably public administrations, damage their own reputations heavily, which signals serious public relations problems. The most important mainstream actors, however, accomplish to present themselves in an overall positive way.

Second, the network analysis provided evidence for a strong blame shifting in public discourses. Most notably national public authorities try to shift the blame for the consequences of policy-making on economic liberalization to the international and European levels, administrations as well as corporations. The actors mostly responsible for economic policy-making thus attempt to divert attention from unpopular measures, misled liberalization reforms.

Third, valence attributions within the same discursive coalitions are mainly positive, whereas valence attributions between coalitions are mainly negative. Valence attributing, therefore, contributes to the formation of discourse coalitions by creating non-policy-related proximity and distance between coalitions in public discourses. With regard to the country differences, finally, the results corroborate the evidence found for the going public. The two actors mainly responsible for a communicative imprint of public discourses, the national executives, and administrations, are exceptionally central in the valence networks of the liberal market economy UK and the state-led market economy France. In the remaining four countries, these actors play a less important role.

The differences in the accessibility and functionality of public discourse have clear-cut implications for the conflict-intensity in the countries and arenas. As for arenas, input areas tend to be the most conflict-laden with regards to both polarization and negativity. This corroborates the earlier finding that the challenges to the pro-market mainstream mainly originate on the input side of the public discourse. A high conflict-intensity is a characteristic of open and coordinative discourses also with respect to countries. For example, the public discourse in Germany constitutes an opportunity to exert influence on policy-making: by going public, many peripheral actors mount public pressure in abet to change policy-making processes. In the relatively closed and communicative discourses like the UK, in contrast, public discourse does not constitute a forum for the intense debate on policy alternatives. This is mostly due to the fact that there are no significant challengers of the pro-market mainstream in this country.

NOTES

1. In contrast to simple frequency tables, a count regression makes it possible to estimate the going public of going public of actors in a multivariate model that includes controls for country and arena effects. Furthermore, since the frequency of statements on the two dimensions is a heavily skewed and overdispersed dependent variable (see Fig. C.1 and Table C.2 in the Appendix), the count models were estimated by negative binominal regressions (see Long and Freese 2006).
2. The national parliamentary elections considered for this comparison are: France=2002, Austria = 2002, Germany = 2005, the Netherlands = 2003, Switzerland = 2003, the UK = 2005.
3. The difference to global players is that niche firms are not among the biggest 2000 companies worldwide (see Tables A.3 and B.1 in the Appendix).
4. The coalitional memberships are the same as established in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.
5. See Table B.2 in the Appendix for a formal definition and detailed description of this index.
6. This index was originally designed to measure the degree of left-right polarization in a party system, but it can also be applied to examine how strongly actor positions differ on any set of issues (see Dolezal 2008). It is calculated by taking the sum of variances of the actors' positions, again weighted by their saliencies (see the formal definition in Table B.1 in Appendix B).

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Conclusion: United in Diversity

Abstract This chapter summarizes the most important empirical evidence and discusses the ramifications of the findings in the light of the broader research questions. First, it explains why the literature on discursive institutionalism had been missing a quantitative study so far. It accordingly shows how the adoption of a rigorous comparative perspective, and the construction of valid indicators for the discursive actions, make it possible to draw statistically reliable inferences on the structure and substance of public discourse on economic liberalization. Second, this concluding chapters discusses how the results cater to the influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political economy that emphasize divergence, and, at the same time, also acknowledge the propositions by the globalization and neo-Gramscian research, which argue in favor of convergence among advanced economies. Convergence, or unity, is found in terms of the substance of discourse, which is coined by the emergence of a pro-market mainstream in public discourse. Divergence, in contrast, is found in the structure of discourses. This points to influential historical legacies, which keep public discourses on economic liberalization in the six countries on different paths.

Keywords Structure of discourse · Salience · Valence · Conflict intensity
Institutional context

In recent years, there has been growing scholarly interest in the role of public discourse, but evidence from systematic comparative studies in the framework of the discursive institutional literature is still rare (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 3). By taking the discursive institutionalists' perspective seriously, this study contributes with an empirical exploration of public discourse on economic liberalization. Adopting a rigorous comparative perspective, the analysis went beyond the study of single countries, actors, or policies. By constructing valid indicators for the discursive actions, it was possible to draw statistically reliable inferences on the structure and substance of public discourse on economic liberalization. This study thus increases the robustness and further details previous evidence provided by the literature on the ideational perspective on politics (see Béland and Cox 2011; Blyth 2003; Crouch and Farrell 2004; Sabatier and Weible 2007). Hence, following Schmidt's (2008, p. 21) lead, this study not just sought 'to convince political scientists theoretically that ideas and discourse matter,' but it showed 'empirically how, when, where, and why ideas matter for institutional change, and when they do not.'

The empirical motivation of this study was to comprehensively map the structure and substance of economic liberalization discourse in six Western European countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Economic liberalization reforms are especially conflictive in Western European countries since these countries are struggling more than others with the consequences of rigid welfare systems and a slowdown in economic productivity (Pierson 2001). Based on propositions grounded in the discursive institutionalist literature, and a historical elaboration of public discourse and economic developments, the role of public discourse for the policy processes on economic liberalization has been empirically explored. The study has thus enhanced knowledge of public discourse as a motor of change in a specific policy subsystem of public discourse. First, the regulatory scope of discourses has been expanded to the international levels, manifest in the international dimension of the substance of discourse and the importance of supra- and international actors in the public sphere (see also Beck and Grande 2007). Second, the organizational scope of discourses also covered business actors and showed their exceptionally important role for opinion making processes, which is often unaccounted for. Finally, the communicative scope of previous discourse analyses was extended using the concepts of framing and valence attributing. Actors not only try to get access to the public arena (going public) and state their policy-specific demands (policy position-taking), but they also communicate their ideological beliefs

(framing) and enhance their perceived competence and reputation (valence attributing). Most notably, this study is one of few to explore the framing of economic issues outside the narrow research field of welfare policies (see Chong and Druckman 2007). Furthermore, most media frame studies are not able to specify the ownership of frames, i.e., to differentiate in detail which actor uses which justifications to substantiate policy positions (see Chong and Druckman 2007). This study put emphasis on frame ownership, which revealed potential inconsistencies with respect to the discursive action repertoire, for example, whether the ideological beliefs expressed as frames align with the perceived interest conveyed as policy positions. This comprehensiveness in terms of the discursive action repertoire is necessary, since ideas are best perceived as cluster concepts involving many different forms of communication (see Blyth 2002).

This study showed how public discourses in Western Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century are characterized by both commonalities and differences alike. As a matter of fact, there is unity on the substance but diversity in the structure of discourse. Hence, the similar substance in terms of high internationalization and pro-market orientation is debated in different constellations across the countries. In consequence, Chaps. 4 and 5 have been organized according to institutionally induced divergence (Chap. 5) and the convergence in lockstep with economic developments (see Thelen and Kume 2006; Herrigel 2007, p. 481). On the one hand, the results, therefore, cater to the influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political economy that emphasize divergence (Kitschelt 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 444). On the other hand, the results also acknowledge the propositions by the globalization and neo-Gramscian research, which argue that internationalization is forcing advanced economies to converge to a single pro-market model (e.g., Moses 1994; van Apeldoorn 2002).

Western Europe is far more exposed to the global economy and more postindustrialized than it was decades ago. These developments are accompanied by a fundamental transformation of public discourse on economic liberalization. More precisely, the classical left-right divide between support for economic freedom as well as market-enhancing policies and support for redistribution as well as full employment does not structure discourse as clearly as it did until the 1970s (e.g., Gourevitch 2002; Mair 2001, 2008; Kitschelt 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008). Current discourses on economic liberalization are pervaded by two dimensions: the ‘unfreezing’ of labor markets and industrial policies (domestic liberalization) and the dismantling of national sovereignty (aspects related to international liberalization).

In general, the international aspects thereby are more salient and contentious than the domestic ones, which points to the increasing internationalization of economic liberalization policy-making in all countries under study.

The analyses of the substance of discourse further showed that the internationalization of economic policy-making and mainstream party convergence have led to a pro-market mainstream in public discourse. The coalitions promoting this pro-market mainstream are consistently traceable with respect to all four discursive actions. The actors reinforcing this pro-market mainstream usually include IGO and EU actors, foreign executives from emerging markets, national executives, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations, liberals, Christian democratic and conservative parties, global players, and public advisory actors. Although there are country-specific variations, all these actors support economic liberalization on both dimensions in the calculations over all six countries. On the basis of observations similar to this prevalence of pro-market actors, globalization and neo-Gramscian accounts maintain that spread of economic liberalism has become overwhelmingly dominant since the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama 1992; Ohmae 1995; Reich 2007; van der Pijl 1998; Forgacs 2000; van Apeldoorn 2002; Overbeek 2004). This study, in contrast, could show that both of these literatures tend to overestimate this dominance. The pro-market mainstream is not impermeable, since several challengers have the ability to be serious contenders and to bring alternative ideas into public discourses. Especially in light of the current political turmoil after the EU referendum in the UK, the possibility that the pro-market mainstream could come under even more pressure is even more real. A recent event confirming such a trend is the electoral victory of the radical left party *Syriza* in Greece, but also the demand by many right-wing populists for EU referenda in various European countries.

In general, however, it is the trade unions that lead the traditional left coalition in almost all countries. With regard to the driving forces behind the protectionist coalition, niche firms and farmers' associations are as important as populist right parties, which only play a major role in Switzerland and Austria. Moreover, not only on the right, but also some left actors, most notably single green and social democratic parties, are protectionist. This preference might origin in their striving for an extension of the welfare system at the European level (Helbling et al. 2010). The protectionist coalitions, which are supportive of domestic liberalization but opposes international liberalization, are, thus, relatively strong in terms of their numbers, but very heterogeneous in terms of their underlying motives.

In line with the dominance of the pro-market mainstream on economic liberalization, liberalist frames are underlying most of the discursive interactions in the public arena. In particular, most members of the pro-market mainstream, such as mainstream right parties, corporations, and national executives, apply a framing which is consistent with their policy position-taking. The frame analysis further revealed that mercantilist frames are very often combined with liberalist ones to an economic promotion argument. This result is explained by the role of the public authorities. They justify their positions disproportionately often with interventionist arguments. Although this runs contrary to radical pro-market approaches about a lean government approach, it does not conflict with ordoliberal ideas, which acknowledge the active role of governments in promoting well-functioning markets and the provision of certain levels of regulation (see Miller 2010).

Very much in line with their perceived interests, the traditional left challengers to the pro-market mainstream prefer social democratic frames. The protectionist coalitions, in contrast, mainly communicate ideological beliefs, which do not reflect their policy positions. More precisely, although they oppose economic liberalization on the international dimension, they do not back these positions with arguments related to national sovereignty or the wealth of their home country. Such inconsistencies between the framing and the policy position-taking are signals for the failure of these coalitions to successfully shape public discourse on economic liberalization (Béland and Cox 2011). In other words, if the protectionist coalitions were able to develop a more concise strategy in public discourse, the prevalence of the pro-market mainstream would be put in question more frequently. In the last years, we have seen in both electoral successes of populist parties as well as direct democratic outcomes like the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum that these coalitions actually seem to gain some traction.

The general coalitional setting between a pro-market mainstream and left as well as right challengers is integrated differently into the national discourses. In France, to begin with, there is no radical pro-market coalition. Public discourse in this country in general stands out for its tendency to have more policy positions that are oppositional to economic liberalization in general. The French reluctance to liberalize suggests that this country's characteristics of a state-led economy and a traditionally polarized political system (see Schmidt 2009; Hallin and Mancini 2004) impose considerable obstacles preventing the dominance of the pro-market mainstream. In Switzerland and the UK, by contrast, the dominance of the pro-market

mainstream is remarkably strong. Austria and the Netherlands also have a clearly dominant pro-market mainstream, but it is slightly weaker here. In Germany, finally, there are comparatively weak pro-market coalitions, which face opposition from relatively strong traditional left and protectionist coalitions. Overall, however, the variance of these constellations is limited, which leads to the conclusion that there is a certain unity over the general pro-market policy program across the six countries.

Considerably more variation was found with respect to the structure of discourse on economic liberalization. As a matter of fact, the results of this study imply that the country- and arena-specific institutional frameworks are continuously creating different constraints and opportunities for actors, who, in turn, opt for different discursive actions in response to the same economic developments. In sum, the variety in the structure of discourses points to influential historical legacies, which keep public discourses on economic liberalization in the six countries on different paths (see Streeck and Thelen 2005; Brinegar et al. 2004). The first consequence of this divergence concerns its functionality. In general more majoritarian and, in terms of economic policy making, more centralized and statist countries, discourse is mainly focussed on the communication and legitimization of governmental decisions. Since government activity is mainly channeled through a small political elite, clarifications and justifications in the aftermath of policy decisions are more important. In the UK, France, and the Netherlands, going public is a more important tool for public authorities to influence the policy process. As for the UK, this is due to its majoritarian political system (Lijphart 1999). Similarly, the centralized style of corporatist policy-making in the Netherlands gives public authorities a central role in this country (Woldendorp and Keman 2007). In France, finally, due to its tradition of state entrepreneurialism, reform agendas are more exclusively steered by government activity. Public discourses in Switzerland, Germany and Austria, by contrast, are mainly shaped by coordination (Hays 2009; Thelen and Kume 2006). In consensus-oriented political systems, which also feature comparatively coordinated social partnerships, the debate and negotiations before the actual decision-making assumes a larger part of public discourse. Thus, in these countries, a broader range of actors are involved in public discourse, also increasing the need for coordination.

The second aspect of the structure of public discourse is accessibility. The design of institutional regimes such as labor relations and electoral systems decisively influence the changes of challengers to enter public discourse. More precisely, discourse in two of the four coordinated

market economies, namely Germany and Austria, as well as in the state-led market economy France is well accessible also for peripheral actors. In the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK, there is not room for the full diversity of perceived interests. The public arena is, thus, a relatively closed forum in these countries.

These differences in the accessibility and functionality have straightforward consequences for the conflict-intensity of public discourse in the different countries. A high polarization is a characteristic of open and coordinative discourses such as public discourse in Germany. Here, public discourse constitutes an opportunity for peripheral actors to exert influence on policy-making. In relatively closed and communicative discourses such as the UK, in contrast, public discourse does not constitute a forum for a contentious forum. This is mostly due to the fact that, due to institutional constraints, there are no significant challengers of the pro-market mainstream in this country. Negativity, in contrast, is high in countries, which have discourses that include an important communicative function. In this context, blaming mechanisms and negative campaigns are more important features of public discourse.

Not only countries, but also the institutional characteristics inherent to the arenas are consequential for the accessibility and functionality of public discourse. The majority of the challengers of the pro-liberalization mainstream enters from the input arenas in the attempt to reshape the pro-market mainstream in public discourse, while the overall policy climate in the janus-faced and output arenas is largely favorable to economic liberalization. Hence, in the input arenas, negativity and polarization is highest.

A general result of the analyses on valence is the strong tendency towards negative campaigning in almost all arenas and in all countries. This negativity, however, is less evident in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, three countries with a more communicative discourse. This relates to what Hallin and Manicini (2004) describe as democratic corporatist tradition of media systems, which generate a vivid but relatively moderate public discourse. Moreover, quite plausibly, most actors show a much more positive stance towards themselves than towards other actors, meaning that actors strive to enhance their own valence while attacking the reputation of others. If they attack other actors, it can be interpreted as blame shifting (see Moravcsik 1994; Zürn 2006). Especially national public authorities shift the blame for the consequences of policy-making on economic liberalization to the international and European levels, administrations, and corporations. In addition, the pro-market mainstream and the traditional left coalitions employ a

consistent strategy in terms of valence attributions. They use fewer negative statements with regard to their coalition fellows than to other coalitions. The valence attributions of the protectionists, however, is slightly more negative within the same coalition than towards other coalitions. The members of this coalition—mainly left parties, public authorities, small business organizations, and right-wing populists—are not willing or able to pursue a common valence strategy, since they represent excessively diverse interests beside the policy subsystem of economic liberalization (Kriesi et al. 2012).

The pro-market mainstream which dominates in the six countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century has grown out of mainstream actor convergence and the increasing internationalization of Western European public discourses. However, in single contexts such as France and the input arenas, there is considerable resistance to further liberalization reforms. The reasons why oppositional contenders cannot get their ideas through more decisively are their relative weakness in terms of going public, their restricted focus on the domestic aspects of liberalization and, most importantly, their inconsistencies in terms of valence attributing and framing. This suggests that the pro-market mainstream will presumably stay in command in Western Europe. This unity in the general outcome of public discourses, however, will be achieved time and time again in continuously evolving discourses whose structure remains distinctly context-dependent.

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APPENDIX A

Aggregations

See Tables [A.1](#), [A.2](#) and [A.3](#).

Table A.1 Aggregation of organizations to actor types**IGO**

Annual Summits (G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20); Bank for International Settlements; European Fair Trade Association; International Air Transport Association; International Labour Organization; International Monetary Fund; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; World bank; World Trade Organization; World Health Organization

EU actors

Council of the EU, European Commission, European Council (Ecofin, Gaerc, Epsco etc.)

Foreign executives^a

Advanced economies: Australia; Belgium; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; U.K.; U.S.A.

Emerging markets: Argentina; Benin; Bolivia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Chile; China; Croatia; Cuba; Egypt; Guatemala; Hong Kong; India; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Montenegro; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Philippines; Romania; Russia; Senegal; Serbia; Singapore; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Syria; Taiwan; Tanzania; Thailand; Turkey; Uruguay; Venezuela; Vietnam; Zambia

National executives

National, regional and local executives (names not specified) and associations of municipalities and regions, examples: the "österreichische Gemeindebund" (A), "interkantonale Konferenz" (CH), "Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten" (NL)

Public administrations

Economic administrations (central banks, business development, competition, finance and revenue authorities): Österreichische Nationalbank (A); Österreichische Übernahmekommission (A); Österreichische Industrieholding (A); Austrian Business Agency (A); Finanzmarktaufsicht (A); Übernahmekommission des Bundes (CH); Bundesamt für Privatversicherungen (CH); Eidgenössische Bankenkommision (CH); Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung (CH); Finanzkommission (CH); Greater Zurich Area (CH); Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (CH); Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (D); Bundeskartellamt (D); Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (D); Deutsche Bundesbank (D); Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (D); Conseil Economique et Social (F); Algemene Rekenkamer (NL); Autoriteit Financiële Markten (NL); Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NL); Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (UK); Bank of England (UK); Competition Commission (UK); Financial Services Authority (UK); UK Trade & Investment (UK); HM Revenue & Customs (UK); Federal Reserve; Federal Trade Commission; Internal Revenue Service; Bank of Italy; European Central Bank

General administrations (infrastructure, social welfare, education and consumer protection authorities): Energie-Control (A); Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft (A); Marktamt Wien (A); Wiener Pädak (A); Bundesamt für Kommunikation (CH); Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung (CH); Bundesamt für Umwelt (CH); Bundesamt für Verkehr (CH); Preisüberwacher (CH); Bundesagentur für Arbeit (D); Bundesnetzagentur (D); Stadtwerke München (D); Comisión Nacional de Energía (ES); Agence Française de

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Développement (F); Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi (F); Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (F); Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (F); College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (NL); College ter Beoordeling van Geneesmiddelen (NL); Prorail (NL); Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (UK); Civil Aviation Authority (UK); NHS Foundation Trust (UK); Office of Communications (UK); Office of Fair Trading (UK); Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK); Pension Protection Fund (UK); Pensions Regulator (UK); Strategic Rail Authority (UK); European Aviation Safety Agency; European Research Council; European Space Agency; Police departments in Austria, UK

Judiciary

Österreichischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (A); Verfassungsdienst im Bundeskanzleramt (A); Bundesgericht (CH); Bundesarbeitsgericht (D); Bundesgerichtshof (D); Bundessozialgericht (D); Conseil d'État (FR); Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (UK); European Court of Justice

Legislative

Nationalrat and Bundesrat (A); Nationalrat and Ständerat (CH); Bundestag and Bundesrat (D); Assemblée nationale (F); Staten-Generaal (NL); House of Lords and House of Commons (UK). Legislatives from other countries: Chambre des Députés (LUX); Duma (R); Congress (USA). Regional and local legislatives: Burgenländischer Landtag (A); Freiburger Kantonsrat (CH); Münchner Stadtrat (D). Commissions: Kommission für Umwelt, Raumplanung und Energie (CH); Parlamentarische Untersuchungskommission (CH); Verkehrskommission (CH); Vermittlungsausschuss (D); All-Party Parliamentary Beer Group (UK); Commons Health Select Committee and Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee (UK); Parliamentary Ombudsman (UK)

Interest groups

Chambers of commerce: Bundesverband des Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels (D); Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (D); Bundesverband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten (D); Bundesverband des Deutschen Textilhandels (D); British Chamber of Commerce (UK); Eurocommerce

Interest groups

Peak, big industry and moneyed interest associations: Arbeitgebervertreter des Sparkassenverbandes (A); Automotive Cluster Vienna Region (A); Industriellenvereinigung (A); Institute of International Finance (A); Verband Österreichischer Banken & Bankiers (A); Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (A); Astag Nutzfahrzeugverband (CH); Economiesuisse (CH); Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung (CH); Schweizerischer Anlagefondsverband (CH); Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband (CH); Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (CH); Suisseporc (CH); Verband Schweizer Presse (CH); Vereinigung der privaten Aktiengesellschaften (CH); Vereinigung Schweizerischer Privatbanquiers (CH); Arbeitsgemeinschaft Partnerschaft in der Wirtschaft (D); Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (D); Bundesverband Deutscher Leasing-Unternehmen (D); Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (D); Gesamtmetall (D); Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (D); Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger (D); Telekommunikation und neue Medien (D); Verband der Bahnindustrie (D); Verband der Deutschen Automatenindustrie (D); Verband der Verbundunternehmen und Regionalen Energieversorger (D); Zentraler Immobilien Ausschuss (D); Association des Actionnaires Minoritaires (F); Association de la Transformation Laitière Française (F); Croissance Plus (F);

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Groupement Industriel des Constructions et Armements Navals (F); Mouvement des Entreprises de France (F); UNETEL-RST (Telecom, F); Dutch Fund and Asset Management Association (NL); Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NL); Nederlandse Vereniging van de Research-georiënteerde Farmaceutische Industrie (NL); Vereniging van Effectenbezitters (NL); Vereniging van Nederlandse kabelbedrijven (NL); VNO-NCW (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen and Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond, (NL); Association of British Insurers (UK); Association of Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbrokers (UK); Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (UK); British Bankers' Association (UK); British Energy (UK); British Venture Capital Association (UK); Bundesverband deutscher Banken (UK); Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft (UK); Confederation of British Industry (UK); Institute of Directors (UK); London Investment Bank Association (UK); Publishers Association (UK); Associazione Bancaria Italiana; Cefic (European Chemical Industry Council); European Automobile Manufacturers' Association; European Information and Communications Technology Industry Association; European Metalworkers' Federation; GSM Europe; International Federation of the Phonographic Industry; Union of Industrial and Employer Confederations of Europe

Small business associations: Grüne Wirtschaft (A); Österreichische Hotelierversammlung (A); Ring Freiheitlicher Wirtschaftstreibender (A); Bündner Bergbahnen (CH); City-Vereinigung (CH); Fédération des syndicats hôteliers de Haute-Savoie (F); Gastro Suisse (CH); Hotellerieuisse (CH); Luzern Tourismus (CH); Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (CH); Schweizerischer Tourismusverband (CH); Swiss Retail Federation (CH); Unternehmer-Vereinigung Wetzikon (CH); Verband öffentlicher Verkehr (CH); Verband Schweizerischer Gemüseproduzenten (CH); Vereinigung Bahnhofstrasse (CH); Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d'Entreprise (F); Comité Richelieu (F); Confédération Générale du Patronat des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (F); Union française des industries textiles (F); Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Mittel- und Grossbetriebe des Einzelhandels (D); Interessenverband Deutscher Zeitarbeitsunternehmen (D); Deutscher Hotel- und Gaststättenverband (D); Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher Länder (D); Verein kommunaler Unternehmen (D); Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (D); Zentralverband Deutscher Schornsteinfeger (D); Bescherming Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland (NL); Bouwend Nederland (NL); Federation of Small Businesses (UK); Interprovinciaal Werkgeversverband (NL); Koninklijke Vereniging MKB-Nederland (NL); Association of Convenience Stores (UK); Association of Independent Music (UK); Forum of Private Business (UK); Usability Professionals' Association (UK); International Visual Communications Association

Interest groups

Private sector unions and umbrella associations: Arbeiterkammern (A); AUA Bordbetriebsrat (A); Christgewerkschaft (A); Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten (A); Gewerkschaft Hotel, Gastgewerbe, Persönlicher Dienst (A); Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil-Nahrung (A); Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (A); Comedia (CH); Personal Union SAir Holding (CH); Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund (CH); Travail Suisse (CH); UNIA (CH); Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (F); Confédération générale du Travail (F); Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (F); Loysel (F); Sud (Solidaires

(continued)

Table A.1 (continued)

Unitaires Démocratiques, F); Syndicat des Travailleurs Corses (F); Syndicat Interprofessionnel de Travailleuses et Travailleurs (F); Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes (F); Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (D); Betriebsräte (Daimler-Chrysler, Siemens, Continental, D); IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (D); IG Metall (D); SPD-Gewerkschaftsrat (D); Verdi (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, D); Alternatief voor Vakbond (NL); Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (NL); Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (NL); Amicus (UK); Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (UK); Britain's General Union (UK); National Union of Journalists (UK); Prospect (UK); Public and Commercial Services Union (UK); Rail, Maritime and Transport Union (UK); Scottish Trades Union Congress (UK); Trades Union Congress (UK); Transport and General Workers' Union (UK); Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (UK); European Trade Union Confederation; Fédération des Travailleurs et Travailleuses du Québec; Union Network International

Public sector unions: Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner (A); Gewerkschaft für Post- und Fernmeldebedienstete (A); Aktion Gsundi Gesundheitspolitik (CH); Dachverband Schweizer Lehrerinnen und Lehrer (CH); Gewerkschaft Kommunikation (CH); Personalverband des Bundes (CH); Schweizerischer Eisenbahn- und Verkehrspersonal-Verband (CH); Schweizerische Verband des Personals öffentlicher Dienste (CH); Swissspersona (CH); Verband Schweizerischer Polizei-Beamter (CH); Betriebsräte Landesentwicklungsgesellschaften (D); Gewerkschaft Deutscher Bundesbahnbeamten und Anwärter (D); Transnet (D); Fédération Indépendante et Démocratique Lycéenne (F); Fédération Syndicale Unitaire (F); Syndicat National des Personnels de Direction de l'Éducation Nationale (F); Algemene Bond Van Ambtenaren and Katholieke Bond van Overheidspersoneel (NL); Vakcentrale voor middengroepen en hoger personeel (NL); VVMC Vakbond voor Rijdend Personeel (NL); Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (UK); Communication Workers Union (UK); Jennie Lee Students' Association (UK); Unison (UK)

Farmer associations: Landwirtschaftskammer Österreich (A); Schweizerischer Bauernverband (CH); Arbeitskreis Deutsche Grenzlandwirte (D); Badischer Landwirtschaftlicher Hauptverband (D); Deutscher Bauernverband (D); Confédération paysanne (F); Coordination rurale (F); Jeunes Agriculteurs (F); European Farmers (COPA-COGECA)

White collar associations: Bundeskammer der Architekten und Ingenieurkonsulenten (A); Rechtsanwaltskammer Österreich (A); Vereinigung österreichischer Staatsanwältinnen und Staatsanwälte (A); Federatio Medicorum Helveticorum (CH); Kaufmännischer Verband (CH); Apothekerkammer (D); Berufsverband selbständiger Buchhalter und Bilanzbuchhalter (D); Marburger Bund (D); Confédération Française de l'Encadrement - Confédération Générale des Cadres (F); Fédération Hospitalière de France (F); Syndicat national unifié des impôts (F); Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging (NL); Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (UK); British Medical Association (UK); Family Law Bar Association (UK); General Council of the Bar (UK); Law Society (UK); Union des Syndicats et Associations Professionnelles Indépendants Européens

Experts

Economic research institutes and think tanks: BAK Basel Economics (CH); International Institute for Management Development (CH); Institut Constant de Rebecque (CH); Ifo Institute for Economic Research (D); Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (D); Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung (D); Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut (D); Zentrum für europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (D); Centre d'Etudes Prospectives

Table A.1 (continued)

et d'Informations Internationales (F); Centre lillois d'études et de recherches sociologiques et économiques (F); Institute nationale de la statistique et des études économiques (F); Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (F); Centraal Planbureau (NL); Bruegel (Think tank); Centre for European Policy Studies; Centre for European Reform; World Economic Forum

Public advisory and research institutes and cultural experts: Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung (A); Akademien der Wissenschaften (D); Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (D); Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (D); Académie des sciences (F); Conférence des Présidents d'Université (F); Institut National Agronomique (F); Institut National de la santé et de la recherche médicale (F); Université Claude-Bernard Lyon I (F); Expertenkommission für eine Elektrizitätswirtschaftsordnung (CH); ETH Lausanne (CH); Institut für Publizistikwissenschaften und Medienforschung UZH (CH); Schauspielhaus Zürich (CH); Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung (CH); Veterinärmedizinische Fakultät Zürich (CH); Adviesraad voor Internationale Vraagstukken (NL); Algemene Energieraad (NL); Instituut voor Verantwoord Medicijngebruik (NL); Hanzehogeschool Groningen (NL); Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat (NL); Stuurgroep Sectorplan Wetenschap Technologie (NL); Vereniging van Universiteiten (NL); Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (NL); Royal Commission of Lord Sutherland (UK); the Scotsman (UK)

Public welfare organizations

Aid organizations and churches: Ökosozielles Forum (A); Behindertenzentrum Wabe (CH); Brot für alle (CH); Caritas (CH); Evangelisch-reformierte Kirche (CH); Kulturstadt Jetzt (CH); Schweizerisches Arbeiterhilfswerk (CH); Schweizer Tierschutz (CH); Stiftung für ganzheitliche Betreuung (CH); Stiftung St. Martin (CH); Deutscher Mieterbund (D); Evangelische Kirche (D); Mieterforum Ruhr (D); Komitee für eine sichere Spitalversorgung (D); Volksinitiative für sichere Wohnungen und Arbeitsplätze (D); Emmaus (F); Maison de la Jeunesse et de la Culture Chamonix (F); Commission Tabaksblad (NL); Nederlandse Patienten en Consumenten Federatie (NL); British Council (UK); Campaign for Real Ale (UK); Church of England (UK); Oxfam (UK); Save the children (UK); UnLtd (UK); Which? (UK); Harvard Foundation; Rockefeller Foundation; Transfair; Greenpeace; WWF

Global justice movements: Aktionskomitee Galmiz (CH); Attac; Basel Action Network (NL); Das andere Davos (CH); Ecology & Development (D); Mexiko-Plattform (A); Via Campesina; World Social Forum; World Economy

Notes Parties are listed separately in Table A.2, companies in Table A.3. This is an inductive list and only actors which were annotated by the content analysis are indicated. Sometimes, this of course leads to slight overlaps of the categories. Since the single statements and not the actors listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list serves only the purpose of a proper documentation. The Actors named by unspecific terms in the newspaper documents, e.g., “developing countries” for foreign executives, although coded and aggregated, are not indicated here. ^aIn their own country, public authority actors were of course coded as national executives

Table A.2 Aggregation of party actors to party families

Parties	Country/level
Communists and radical socialists	
KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria)	A
PCF (French Communist Party), Force Ouvrière (Workers' Force)	F
Die Linke (The Left), DKP (German Communist Party)	D
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)	NL
AL (Alternative List), Solidarités (Solitarities)	CH
Greens	
Die Grünen (The Greens)	A
Les Verts (The Greens)	F
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens)	D
GroenLinks (Green Left)	NL
Green Party	UK
Grüne Partei (Green Party)	CH
European Greens	EP
Social democrats	
SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria)	A
PS (Socialist party)	F
SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)	D
PvdA (Labor Party)	NL
Labour Party, Scottish National Party	UK
SPS (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland)	CH
Party of European Socialists	EP
Liberals	
Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum)	A
UDF (Union for French Democracy)	F
FDP (Free Democratic Party)	D
D66 (Democrats 66), VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)	NL
Liberal Democratic Party	UK
Die Liberalen (The Liberals), GLP (Green Liberal Party)	CH
Alliance of Liberals & Democrats for Europe	EP
Christian democrats and conservatives	
ÖVP (Austrian People's Party)	A
UMP (Union for a Popular Movement)	F
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union)	D
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)	NL
Conservative Party	UK
CVP (Christian Democratic People's Party), EVP (Evangelical People's Party), CSP (Christian Social Party)	CH
European People's Party	EP

(continued)

Table A.2 (continued)

Parties	Country/level
Radical and populist right	
FPÖ (Freedom Party), BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria)	A
Front National (National Front), MPF (Movement for France)	F
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn)	NL
United Kingdom Independence Party	UK
SVP (Swiss People's Party), Lega (League of Ticinesi), SD (Swiss Democrats), EDU (Federal Democratic Union)	CH

Notes Only parties that were annotated in the content analysis are included in the classification. Only one small party, the Frysk Nasjonale Partij (Frisian National Party), could not be classified. It is characterized by a distinct regionalist ideology that does not match the more general categories defined here. However, this exclusion should not affect the results since there are only very few statements of this party in the data set. Labels: *A* Austria; *F* France; *D* Germany; *NL* The Netherlands; *UK* United Kingdom; *CH* Switzerland; *EP* European Parliament

Table A.3 Aggregation of companies**Finance-law-IT**

Global: ABN Amro; Accenture; AGF; AIG; Allianz; Aon Consulting; AVIVA; AXA; Banca Popolare Italiana; Bank Austria; Barclays; BNP Paribas; Buck Consultants; Credit Suisse; Delta Lloyd; Deutsche Börse; Deutsche Bank; Dexia; DWS; Electronic Data Systems; Ernst & Young; Erste Bank; Erste Sparinvest; Euronext; EVN; FBD; Fortis; Friends Provident; Gagfah; GE Money Bank; Goldman Sachs; Grant Thornton; HSBC; HypoVereinsbank; IBM; Immofinanz; ING; KPMG; Land Securities; Legal & General; Lehman Brothers; Lincoln Financial Group; Lloyds Banking Group; London Stock Exchange; Man Group; Microsoft; Morgan Stanley; Morley Fund Management; National Australia Bank; Postfinance; PricewaterhouseCoopers; Prudential; Rabobank; Raiffeisenbank; Royal Bank of Scotland; Salomon Oppenheim

Niche: 3i; ABP; Addleshaw Goddard; Allen Overy; Annington; AT Kearney; Atradius; AWS; Bank Burgenland; BAWAG; BDO Stoy Howard; Blackstone; Bysoft; Capital Regional; Casino Austria; CDC-Ixis; Centaurus; Cesmo consulting; Collins Stewart Tullet; CSC; Eversheds; Fortress; Grazer Wechselseitige; Hammerson; Hellman Friedman; Hypo Alpe Adria Bank; IBA Health; Kathreinbank; Kohlberg Kravis Roberts; LAC London Asia Capital; Liberata; Macfarlanes; Maxdata; Meinel Bank; Messe Frankfurt; Montagu Private Equity; Oxford Innovation; Partouche; Partygaming; Paulson; Permira; PGGM; Porr-Solutions; Proxinvest

State: Landesbank Berlin

Retail-tourism

Global: Aldi; ASDA; IKEA; Interio; KarstadtQuelle; Kaufhof; Marks & Spencer; Metro; Morrisons; REWE

Niche: AVA-Edeka; Boden; BQ; Citydisc; Dawsons; Denner; DM Drogerie; Gate Gourmet; John Lewis; Kuoni

Social services

Niche: Birmingham University; Evangelischer Sozialkonzern Augustinum; Rhön-Klinikum; Yale Foundation

State: Fachhochschule Steyr; Universitätsspital Bern; Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt; Capital City Academy

Transport-communication

Global: Aéroports de Paris; Abertis; Air France; Alitalia; Alltel; AUA; Axel Springer; BBA Aviation; Bertelsmann; BMG; British Airways; British Telecom; Continental; Delta; Deutsche Post; Deutsche Telekom; DHL; Faurecia; France Télécom; Frankfurt Airport; KPN; Lufthansa; Mobilkom; News Corporation; One; Orange; Rail Cargo Austria; Reuters

Niche: AZ-Medien-Gruppe; BLS Cargo; Casema; Chiltern; Competence Call Center; Copenhagen Aitport; Easy Jet; Eurotunnel; Future; IPA plus; Kabel1; Lenzerheide Bergbahnen; Märkische Allgemeine; N 24; ProSieben Sat1 Media; Railtrack; Redmail

State: BBC; British Airports Authority; Connexion; Deutsche Bahn; ÖBB; Österreichische Post; La Poste; London Underground; Nederlandse Spoorwegen; Network Rail; ORF; RATP; Rotterdamse Elektr. Tram; Royal Mail; Swiss Post; Vienna International Airport

(continued)

Table A.3 (continued)**Chemistry**

Global: Akzo Nobel; Amgen; Aventis; BP; British Plaster Board; Celgene; Ciba; Clariant; Dow Chemical; DSM; Eastman Kodak; ENI; Gas Natural; GlaxoSmithKline; Henkel; Lafarge; L'Oréal; Novartis; OMV; Roche

Niche: Altana; Amag; ATS; Filtrona; Ipsen; KCW; Kollo Silicium Carbide; Lenzing; Medicom; RHI

State: Gaz de France; Gazprom; Rosneft

Electricity-construction

Global: Areva; Bilfinger Berger; Centrica; E.ON; Endesa; Essent; Hochtief; Holcim; Iberdrola; National Grid; Power-One

Niche: Eneco; Heijmans; Nuon

State: Électricité de France; Enel

Food-textile-wood

Global: Altadis; Associated British Foods; Austria Tabak; British American Tobacco; Cadbury Schweppes; Danone; Heineken; LU; Nestlé

Niche: Amer Sports; Bata; DIM; Emmi; Francas; Gelco; Heindl; Isosport; Palmers; Panzani; Pfanner; San Carlo

Metal-machinery

Global: AEG; Airbus; Alcan Pechiney; Alcoa; Arcelor; Böhler-Uddeholm; BAE Systems; BenQ; Black und Decker; Boeing; Bombardier; Bosch; Corus; Daimler-Chrysler; EADS; Electrolux; Ford; General Motors; Givaudan; Hewlett-Packard; Jaguar; Lada; Land Rover Jaguar; Magna; MG Rover; Mittal Steel; Motorola; Norsk Hydro; Peugeot; Philips; PSA Peugeot-Citroën; Renault; Rolls Royce

Niche: Aldel; DCN; Fendt; Grillo-Werke; Imerys; Leoni; Lexmark; Marconi; Mayflower; Novomatic

State: Nanjing Automobiles

Agriculture-mining

Niche: RAG

Notes All classifications are based on the situation in time period from 2004 to 2006. The list indicates all firms annotated by their proper names and not by collective terms, e.g., “watch industry” or “pharmaceutical sector”. For the sector classification of companies which are active in more than one sector, only the main line of business was considered. Labels: *Global* Global player; *Niche* Company operating in a niche market or domestic-oriented business; *State* Largely state-owned, see Table B.1 for an explanation of the categories. Since the single statements and not the corporations listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list only serves the purpose of a proper documentation

AGGREGATION OF FRAMES AND ISSUES

See Tables [A.4](#) and [A.5](#).

Table A.4 Aggregation of frames

Intervention

Market failure; fiscal policy; bureaucracy; political efficiency; international relations; public goods (education, infrastructure etc.); interventionism in general; economic delinquency (clandestine employment, black market etc.); delinquency in general; security in general; corruption; political stability; inflation policy

Social protection

Employment protection; labor disputes and strikes; reducing unemployment; job quality; occupational health; social dumping; stakeholder interests; social security in general; consumer protection; individual well-being in general; labor relations and union agreements

Prosperity

Innovation; economic prosperity in general (of individuals, companies or sectors); wealth in general; free trade; liberalization; globalization; investments; profits; corporate management; competitiveness; research and development; economic progress

Protection

Protectionism; relocation abroad and foreign take-overs; loss of traditions; answer to globalization; benefit for domestic or local business; national identity; nationalism; national autonomy; national sovereignty; national interest in general; xenophobia; immigration

Social justice

Human dignity; democratic and participatory principles; equality of opportunity; poverty relief (as a moral duty); cultural diversity; gender equality; minority rights; exploitation; peace; solidarity with developing countries; public welfare; noncommercial values; humanitarian law; social justice in general; socialist ideology

Economic freedom

Economic self-interest; entrepreneurial success; blessing of capitalism and free markets; freedom of economic activity in general; neo-liberal ideology; individual responsibility; entrepreneurial freedom; freedom of choice

Notes Contrary to the issues and actors, the frame annotation relied on closed categories, i.e. a general classification system was established before the coding. For the analyses, however, the classification was regrouped into the categories shown here

Table A.5 Aggregation of issues***International deregulation in general***

International deregulation in general: coordination of the European Single Market (e.g., Stability and Growth Pact); European Constitution; global economic policy fora and critics (e.g., WEF, open forum davos, World Social Fora); international authorities (WTO, IMF, G-8 etc.); more social European Union (Social Charter); more social globalization (fair trade); politically or democratically controlled economic globalization; re-regulation of policies on the European or international level; regulation of international issues (patent laws, genetic engineering, copyright, energy security, terrorism); stability of the global economy; third way (bringing globalization and welfare in line)

Trade and international labor market deregulation: Cassis de Dijon principle (free movement of goods); coordination of labor regulation at the European and international level; deepening the European Single Market; employment protection of temporary foreign workers and other foreigners; EU directives (e.g., regarding working time); import quota or other import restrictions; priority for natives regarding employment standards, wages etc.; regulation related to free trade and tariff agreements (bilateral and multilateral); subsidy programs; WTO regulations

Financial market deregulation and flexible tax regimes: banking secrecy; banking supervision; central bank issues (independence and international cooperation); European Monetary Union; fiscal reforms in general and regarding business taxes in specific; interest, monetary, and exchange rate policies; measures against financial crises; private finance initiatives; protection of investors; regulation enhancing competitiveness of financial centers and stock exchanges; regulation of credit business; regulation of financial markets in general; regulation of hedge funds and private equity funds or other institutional investors; regulation of insurances; sales taxes; tax amnesties; tax competition; tax cooperation on the European or international level; tax fraud; tax regulation with regard to all kinds of financial products

Internationalization

Economic globalization in general: adaption to globalization pressures; export risk insurances; export subsidies; inducement of competition in general; international expansion of public enterprises; internationalization and Europeanization of production; internationalization of companies or whole industries (e.g., loans to produce in China); neo-liberal world order (in an economic sense); offshore outsourcing; relocation

Liberalization of trade and free movement of labor: cutbacks of agricultural subsidies (also with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union); decreasing border controls; deepening of the European Single Market; enhancement of trade relations (e.g., via multilateral or bilateral free trade agreements); establishment of free trade zones; free movement of persons in general and the establishment or extensions of agreements (e.g., the Schengen agreement); higher participation of foreigners (e.g., high-skilled or low wage workers); immigration policies; liberalization of the European service sector (e.g., Bolkestein directive); lowering costs for international trade (e.g., lowering fees on parallel imports); opening of national markets for trade in general and specifically (e.g., airline); priority for natives regarding employment opportunities; reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers in general and specifically (e.g., on textiles or agricultural products); WTO negotiations and disputes

(continued)

Table A.5 (continued)***Internationalization***

Opposition to the sheltering of national economies: defense against foreign take-overs in general; Golden or majority share for national shareholders or the government; market access for foreign business; “national” or “European champions” (state-led mergers to prevent foreign takeovers); priority for domestic businesses in public contracts; state subsidies for strategic industries and companies (e.g., defense or aircraft industry); transfer of property to foreigners

Locational promotion

Enhancing tax competition and free capital movements: against double taxation; attracting foreign investments and liberalization of capital movements; coordination of regional and local tax regimes; degressive taxes; ethical or ecological considerations concerning taxation; flat-rate tax regimes; promoting tax competition in general; reduction of stamp taxes and taxes on capital gains and property; reduction of top income tax rates; tax arbitrage policies; tax cuts and reforms in general; tax exemption for specific activities (e.g., public trusts and non-profit associations); taxes on business in general and specific (e.g., taxes for small and medium-sized businesses, multinational corporations, or services)

Locational promotion in general: advancing prestigious projects; cutting prices (road pricing, roaming etc.); development of specific regions in general; enhancing competitiveness (of countries, regions, or cities); fostering educational elites; image campaigns; improving transport and other infrastructure; Lissabon Agenda (EU innovation reform programs); promoting research and development (public and private, e.g., biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, or alternative energies); promoting special economic areas; promoting specific industries overseas (e.g., tourism); provide new jobs at specific locations

Privatization

Austerity programs; better collaboration between research institutes or public administrations and private businesses; compensation and health insurances; downsizing of the public sector in general; e.g., in health care; end of public monopolies (e.g., railways or gambling); energy and tourist infrastructure; energy or telecommunication businesses; full or partial privatization of media (press, television, radio); health care; initial public offerings or sale of public enterprises (or parts of them); nationalization of companies or industries (e.g., in the energy business or area of education); police departments; police tasks; postal services; postal services and armament industries; public administration in general; public housing; public-private-partnerships; reduction of subsidies by the state in general; reforms of public services for more efficiency; regulation of privatized businesses; restructuring of public enterprises; state banks; telecommunication industries; transport infrastructure (highways, railways, airports etc.); universities; waste management

Domestic liberalization

Liberalization of national markets in general: fostering entrepreneurial responsibility; inducing more competitiveness; liberalization of markets in general; liberalization of whole industries or sectors (e.g., the gambling industry); market mechanisms as a general principle

Flexible wage and pension regimes: demands for higher wages (sectors, industries, or individual corporations); early retirement (for the whole economy, sectors, industries or single corporations); incentive wage; income equality (regarding gender, sectoral, or age disparities); low wage jobs; lowering retirement age; minimum wages; more decentralized and flexible wage setting; pay freezes; pension protection schemes (insurances or funds); state subsidies of wages (e.g., for part-time employment); unemployment benefits; wage bargaining in general; wage restraints in hard times

(continued)

Table A.5 (continued)

Industry support: bailouts of industries; encouraging start-ups and other financial incentives to employers; fostering of investments; rescue of production sites; state support in bankruptcy processes; support of sectors, industries, and companies in crises (e.g., airlines, farmers, craftsmen, small and medium-sized businesses)

Labor market deregulation

anti-discrimination regulations (for foreigners, non-residents and disabled persons as well as regarding gender equality or age); dismissal protection; flexible working time legislation in general; general labor market reforms; maternity and fraternity leave; night work; occupational disability guidelines; opening hours of retail businesses and gastronomy (e.g., Sunday or evening shopping times); paid vacations (e.g., new public holiday or minimum paid holidays); reduction of administrative costs with respect to labor regulations; reduction of working time in general; regulation of apprentice and other on-the job training; regulations regarding the work week (40 hours, 35 hours etc.); temporary and part-time work; worker protection from health risks (e.g., prevention of accidents or ban on smoking)

Retrenchment of restrictions in general

Deregulation of national markets in general: complementary regulations to liberalization and privatization projects; corporate governance codes of conduct in general; exorbitant manager salaries; less red tape in general; less state interventions in general; social and ethical values as corporate guidelines; transparency and sustainability of management decisions

Opposition to social partnership and job security: bans on recruitment; bipartite or tripartite negotiations; co-determination rights (of single workers or work councils); corporatism in general; government job guarantee; international collaboration of unions; job cuts; job security in general; labor peace and social partnership in general; reinstatements; reorganization of companies; right to strike; sectoral agreements (on multi-sectoral, national, or plant level); severance payments or other compensation; social plans in case of dismissals; special employment services and professional training for laid-off employees; strikes or other coordinated campaigns by unions

Loosening competition restrictions: antitrust laws and measures (concerning the whole economy, sectors, industries or single companies); distortion of competition; price controls; mergers (only of national companies); sale of business units; take-overs (hostile and friendly)

Notes This is an inductive list and only issues which were annotated by the content analysis are indicated. Sometimes, this of course leads to a slightly overlapping categorizations. Since the single statements and not the issues listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list only serves the purpose of a proper documentation. The direction of the single policy positions was adapted so that a positive polarity always means a pro-liberalization position

APPENDIX B

Additional Classifications and Formal Definitions of Indices

See Tables [B.1](#) and [B.2](#).

Table B.1 Definition of levels of origin and company types

<i>Level of origin</i>	
National	All statements from actors of the country under consideration which are not affiliated with either the European or international level
Foreign	Horizontal transnationalism: an actor's statement is classified as foreign, if the actor is from another country than the one under consideration
European	Vertical transnationalism I: statements from actors affiliated to the European Union (mostly public authorities, but also European parties, interest groups and think tanks)
International	Vertical transnationalism II: statements from actors affiliated to international organizations and multinational corporations
<i>Company type^a</i>	
Global (global player)	The firm is among the top 2000 public companies of the world according to the Forbes magazine or private companies with an economic strength comparable to the ranking. The ranking is based on the performance of the companies on the four metrics sales, profit, assets and market value
State (state-owned)	State-owned enterprises (at least to a substantial degree)
Niche (niche-domestic)	Mostly domestically or regionally oriented businesses or firms operating in smaller market niches

Notes ^aSource Forbes (2010) and own inquiries

Table B.2 Index definitions: Polarization, Dunn index, Kmeans++ weighting, accessibility and closeness centrality

Index	Definition	Description
Polarization	$P = \sum_{k=1}^k \omega_k (\chi_k - \bar{\chi})^2$	ω_k is the salience of actor k , χ_k is the position of actor k on the issue, and $\bar{\chi}$ is the weighted average position of all actors on this scale, where the weights are again provided by the actor-specific salience
Dunn index	$D = \frac{d_{min}}{d_{max}}$	d_{min} denotes the smallest distance between two actors from different clusters, and d_{max} the largest distance of two actors from the same cluster
Kmeans++ weighting	$K = \frac{D(x')^2}{\sum_{x \in \chi} D(x)^2}$	K is the probability that we choose a center x' that is proportional to the overall potential of this center. Since $D(x)$ is the shortest distance from a data point x to the closest center already defined, the selection of x' with K is closer to the optimal clustering solution than an a priori selected cluster center
Accessibility	$A = \frac{(1 - \sum_{i=1}^k P_i^2)}{(k-1)k}$	P_i is the proportion of statements by actor i , while k is the number of actors included into the calculations
Closeness centrality	$C = \frac{ V -1}{\sum_{iv} d_{vi}}$	C is defined by the inverse of the average length of the shortest paths d to and from all the other vertices i in the graph. If there is no direct path between vertex v and i then the total number of vertices ($ V $) is used in the formula instead of the path length

Bibliography

Forbes. 2010. *The Forbes 2000*. Retrieved on Feb. 8, 2011, from <http://www.forbes.com/lists>.

APPENDIX C

Additional Analyses

See Fig. [C.1](#), Tables [C.1](#), [C.2](#), [C.3](#), [C.4](#), [C.5](#) and [C.6](#).





Fig. C.1 Histograms for dependent variables in actor regressions on going public as used in Fig. 5.1

Table C.1 Number of statements coded in the content analysis

Country	Statements directed to		
	Policies	Frames	Actors
France	1847	1521	292
Austria	1927	847	1146
Germany	1621	907	788
Netherlands	896	732	305
Switzerland	2140	2634	452
UK	1410	995	714
Overall	9841	7636	3697

Table C.2 Criteria for the count model selection for the regressions on going public as used in Fig. 5.1

	Mean	Variance	Ln alpha test		Model
			$\ln \alpha$	$\Pr > z $	
International	10.55	239.22	-0.212	*	Negative binominal
Domestic	6.82	85.12	-0.486	***	Negative binominal

Notes Levels of significance: + ≤ 0.1 , * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.005

Table C.3 Results of count regressions on going public as used in Fig. 5.1

	International			Domestic		
	Negative binominal		P > z	Negative binominal		P > z
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.	
<i>Actors (ref = national executives)</i>						
IGO actors	-1.376	0.377	***	-2.319	0.559	***
EU actors	-0.148	0.314	n.s.	-1.042	0.310	***
For. exec. adv. economies	-0.426	0.315	n.s.	-1.929	0.363	***
For. exec. emerging markets	-1.004	0.387	**	-2.765	0.488	***
Econ. administrations	-1.151	0.366	**	-1.873	0.394	***
Other administrations	-1.951	0.393	***	-1.985	0.379	***
Judiciary	-1.363	0.459	**	-1.779	0.465	***
Legislatives	-1.090	0.376	**	-1.142	0.376	**
Chambers of commerce	-2.405	0.475	***	-3.049	0.754	***
Peak empl. assoc.	-1.295	0.329	***	-1.478	0.316	***
Small bus. assoc.	-2.290	0.384	***	-3.250	0.459	***
Private sector unions	-0.900	0.326	**	-0.503	0.281	n.s.
Publ. sector unions	-2.707	0.472	***	-1.871	0.331	***
Farmer org.	-2.075	0.454	***	-3.017	0.715	***
White collar assoc.	-1.999	0.434	***	-1.997	0.381	***
Communists/Left soc.	-2.140	0.475	***	-2.007	0.418	***
Greens	-2.358	0.555	***	-2.141	0.390	***
Social democrats	-0.757	0.327	*	-0.942	0.292	***
Liberals	-1.691	0.372	***	-1.753	0.362	***
Christian dem./Cons.	-1.044	0.339	**	-1.243	0.307	***
Right-wing populists	-1.381	0.422	***	-1.443	0.426	***
Global players	-0.259	0.323	n.s.	-1.156	0.317	***
Niche firms	-0.725	0.317	*	-1.062	0.291	***
Public enterprises	-1.743	0.391	***	-1.287	0.297	***
Econ. think tanks	-2.096	0.431	***	-2.511	0.637	***
Public advisory actors	-1.426	0.331	***	-1.125	0.304	***
Public welfare org.	-2.128	0.431	***	-2.687	0.461	***
Public welfare mov.	-1.771	0.439	***	-2.562	0.778	***
<i>Countries (ref = France)</i>						
Austria	-0.436	0.190	*	-0.183	0.190	n.s.
Germany	-0.065	0.193	n.s.	-0.050	0.181	n.s.
Netherlands	-0.017	0.190	n.s.	-0.368	0.213	n.s.
Switzerland	0.342	0.186	n.s.	-0.099	0.187	n.s.
U.K.	0.042	0.189	n.s.	-0.435	0.203	*

(continued)

Table C.3 (continued)

	International			Domestic		
	Negative binominal		P > z	Negative binominal		P > z
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.	
<i>Arenas (ref = Input arenas)</i>						
Janus-faced	0.327	0.163	*	-0.080	0.145	n.s.
Output	0.375	0.165	*	0.008	0.156	n.s.
Constant	3.065	0.273	***	3.338	0.246	***
N	333			286		
Wald tests						
Overall model	196.41	***	DF=35	173.74	***	DF=35
Actors	166.46	***	DF=28	167.21	***	DF=28

Notes Coefficients, robust standard errors and levels of significance of count regression models on the level of actors; Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.005

Table C.4 Dunn indices of different cluster solutions as used in Fig. 4.2

Country	2 cluster	3 cluster	4 cluster
France	0.270	0.263	0.290
Austria	0.197	0.306	0.300
Germany	0.120	0.221	0.537
Netherlands	0.242	0.187	0.369
Switzerland	0.320	0.209	0.200
U.K.	0.197	0.306	0.300

Table C.5 Cluster centers of coalitions calculated by Kmeans++ as used in Fig. 4.2

Country	1st center		2nd center		3rd center		4rd center	
	int.	dom.	int.	dom.	int.	dom.	int.	dom.
France	-0.614	-0.922	0.270	0.280	-0.740	-0.095	-0.496	0.922
Austria	0.206	-0.192	0.279	0.601	-0.607	-0.121		
Germany	0.458	0.686	-0.902	-0.721	0.328	-0.556	-0.610	0.471
Netherlands	-0.566	-0.175	0.243	0.947	0.335	0.129	0.390	-0.692
Switzerland	-0.131	-0.743	0.312	0.427				
U.K.	0.169	0.052	0.431	0.711	-0.227	-0.854		

Note Labels: *int.* International liberalization, *dom.* domestic liberalization

Table C.6 Closeness centrality overall and by sender or addressee status as used in Fig. 5.3

Countries	Actors	Overall centrality	Subject centrality	Object centrality
A	Parties	0.063	0.048	0.059
A	Foreign exec.	0.067	0.053	0.067
A	EU actors	0.071	0.048	0.071
A	Business assoc.	0.053	0.048	0.036
A	Trade unions	0.056	0.050	0.043
A	Corporations	0.071	0.053	0.067
A	Legislatives	0.042	0.030	0.040
A	National executives	0.059	0.059	0.037
A	Public welfare actors	0.048	0.043	0.037
A	Administrations	0.053	0.043	0.053
A	IGO actors	0.043	0.040	0.042
A	Experts	0.053	0.045	0.048
A	Judiciary	0.043	0.038	0.026
A	Professional organizations	0.045	0.036	0.040
UK	Administrations	0.071	0.031	0.059
UK	Corporations	0.063	0.029	0.063
UK	National executives	0.067	0.037	0.038
UK	Trade unions	0.056	0.030	0.045
UK	EU actors	0.053	0.024	0.053
UK	Foreign exec.	0.071	0.030	0.071
UK	Parties	0.048	0.028	0.040
UK	Legislatives	0.053	0.029	0.033
UK	Business assoc.	0.050	0.029	0.040
UK	Judiciary	0.045	0.028	0.034
UK	Experts	0.050	0.026	0.042
UK	IGO actors	0.045	0.023	0.043
UK	Public welfare actors	0.040	0.034	0.005
UK	Professional organizations	0.043	0.027	0.027
FR	Judiciary	0.043	0.040	0.006
FR	Trade unions	0.053	0.032	0.031
FR	Corporations	0.067	0.036	0.038
FR	Business assoc.	0.053	0.030	0.031
FR	Parties	0.056	0.033	0.032
FR	Professional organizations	0.050	0.032	0.029
FR	EU actors	0.053	0.031	0.033
FR	Experts	0.053	0.031	0.030
FR	National executives	0.056	0.032	0.029
FR	Foreign exec.	0.077	0.029	0.040
FR	Administrations	0.056	0.026	0.034
FR	IGO actors	0.053	0.027	0.026
FR	Public welfare actors	0.033	0.006	0.027

(continued)

Table C.6 (continued)

Countries	Actors	Overall centrality	Subject centrality	Object centrality
DE	Business assoc.	0.056	0.031	0.048
DE	Administrations	0.048	0.028	0.042
DE	Parties	0.056	0.032	0.043
DE	National executives	0.063	0.036	0.038
DE	Corporations	0.067	0.033	0.063
DE	Trade unions	0.053	0.030	0.045
DE	Foreign exec.	0.071	0.029	0.071
DE	Judiciary	0.043	0.040	0.005
DE	Public welfare actors	0.048	0.028	0.033
DE	Experts	0.048	0.029	0.038
DE	EU actors	0.056	0.027	0.056
DE	Professional organizations	0.048	0.029	0.034
DE	IGO actors	0.043	0.023	0.042
DE	Legislatives	0.045	0.023	0.043
NL	Business assoc.	0.059	0.048	0.042
NL	Administrations	0.050	0.033	0.048
NL	Parties	0.048	0.043	0.032
NL	Experts	0.063	0.053	0.043
NL	Corporations	0.067	0.048	0.067
NL	National executives	0.056	0.056	0.038
NL	EU actors	0.053	0.036	0.050
NL	Trade unions	0.053	0.042	0.045
NL	Legislatives	0.048	0.040	0.029
NL	Foreign exec.	0.071	0.038	0.071
NL	Judiciary	0.045	0.037	0.042
NL	IGO actors	0.045	0.031	0.030
NL	Public welfare actors	0.048	0.034	0.036
NL	Professional organizations	0.043	0.034	0.027
CH	National executives	0.059	0.034	0.037
CH	Experts	0.050	0.029	0.040
CH	Corporations	0.063	0.032	0.063
CH	Trade unions	0.056	0.031	0.045
CH	Judiciary	0.045	0.027	0.036
CH	Business assoc.	0.048	0.029	0.034
CH	Parties	0.048	0.029	0.043
CH	EU actors	0.059	0.029	0.056
CH	Foreign exec.	0.067	0.029	0.067
CH	Public welfare actors	0.043	0.026	0.034
CH	Administrations	0.056	0.029	0.050
CH	IGO actors	0.048	0.027	0.042
CH	Legislatives	0.050	0.026	0.043
CH	Professional organizations	0.040	0.033	0.005

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