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THE EVOLUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

The Light in the Darkness

Charles McKelvey

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Preface

This book is written with the hope of expanding popular understanding of the global structures of domination and the possibilities for a social transformation that would be the foundation for a more just world. In seeking to raise the consciousness of the English-speaking peoples of the North, I especially am focused on the people of the United States, who historically and culturally are many peoples, but who must become a united people in political practice, in order to take control of the political, economic, and cultural institutions of the nation to which all pertain.

The book does not conform to the bureaucratic academic structures that separate the disciplines of philosophy, history, economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology, thus fragmenting what would be a unified philosophical historical social science, if understanding were the highest goal. Rather, it is based on the reading of academics who were formed in various disciplines, as well as on intellectuals and movement leaders. Nor does it conform to a concept of objectivity in which the "researcher" ought to try to bracket values and to give an impression of detached neutrality, not appearing to take sides in social conflicts. To the contrary, the book is the result of sustained encounter with the movements formed by the colonized and neocolonized peoples of the world, in which the insights of past and present movement leaders and intellectuals are taken seriously as a foundation for understanding.

Accordingly, the book is interdisciplinary, and it is written from below. Rather than analyzing leaders and movements from a theoretical perspective, it draws upon the speeches and writings of Third World charismatic

leaders to formulate a theoretical understanding. It reflects the dialectical relation between theory and practice, for its insights have emerged from encounter with and participation in the political practice of the neocolonized peoples, and it calls for an alternative political practice of the peoples of the North, based on these insights.

The book reflects my own evolution. As the grandson of Irish and Italian immigrants to the USA, and growing up in a middle-class suburb of Philadelphia, my initial formation was shaped by the prevailing liberal-conservative consensus of the USA. However, as a student at Penn State in the late 1960s, I was influenced by the student/anti-war and black power movements. In my subsequent master's degree study at the Center for Inner City Studies in Chicago from 1970 to 1972, I encountered a colonial analysis of the modern world from the vantage point of the colonized, formulated by African-American and African professors who had earned degrees in political science, history, and anthropology. I could not possibly have overlooked the fundamental difference in assumptions and analysis between black thought and mainstream social science. I wondered if an objective analysis of society were possible, or if understanding necessarily and unavoidably is limited by social position.

I pursued this epistemological question in a doctoral program in sociology at Fordham University. Father Joseph Fitzpatrick and his philosopher colleague Father Gerald McCool introduced me to the work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan. In two important epistemological works, *Insight* (published in 1958) and *Method in Theology* (1973), the eminent Jesuit scholar maintained that an objective understanding is possible, insofar as we place the desire to understand above other desires, and insofar as we move beyond the limitations of our socially grounded horizons through a process of encounter with persons of other horizons. In personal encounter, we take seriously the insights of others, which enable us to discover relevant questions that previously were beyond our consciousness. If we are committed to the desire to know above all other desires, we permit these new questions to lead us toward a reformulation of our understanding, until we arrive to the point that our reformulated understanding makes sense to persons of the other horizon.

Synthesizing Lonergan's cognitional theory with my previous encounter with African-American and African thought, I arrived to the epistemological method of cross-horizon encounter. The method is based on three premises. (1) Understanding of social dynamics, transcending the limits of social position, emerges through encounter with persons of other horizons, where encounter involves taking seriously the insights

of the other and permitting them to stimulate the discovery of relevant questions, leading to a reformulation of one's own understanding. (2) Inasmuch as the dominated and exploited understand the system of domination and exploitation more profoundly than the dominators and exploiters, the process of encounter must include personal encounter with those sectors of society that are dominated, exploited, and marginalized. (3) Encounter must give special attention to the social movements that have been formed by the dominated and exploited, because the social movements express in the clearest and most penetrating form their understandings, values, and aspirations.

In a subsequent study of Marx, I arrived to understand that Marx implicitly followed the method of cross-horizon encounter. Having been formed in the tradition of German philosophy and German radicalism, Marx, after moving to Paris in October 1842, encountered the movement constituted by Parisian workers, artisans, and intellectuals, many of whom had studied idealist socialism. At the same time, Marx obsessively studied the British science of political economy. By 1844, Marx was beginning to write an analysis of human history and of modern capitalism that was based on a synthesis of German philosophy and British political economy, formulated from below, from the point of view of the worker.

In my subsequent study of the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, I came to appreciate that Wallerstein did something similar to Marx on a scale that transcended Europe. He encountered the African nationalist movement during the 1950s and 1960s, which enabled him to understand that African nationalists looked at the world from the vantage point of the colonized and "the colonial situation." Wallerstein's encounter with African nationalism enabled him to arrive to the insight that the Western social scientific assumption of the "society" as the unit of analysis was dysfunctional for understanding, and that historians and social scientists ought to take the "world-system" as the object of their investigation. He proceeded to investigate the historical development of the modern world-system, beginning in the sixteenth century. His work established the foundation for understanding the colonial foundations of the modern world-system, consistent with the vantage point of the colonized.

Since my first encounter with the African-American movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s, I have been guided by the method of personal encounter, seeking to understand the insights of movement leaders and intellectuals of the colonized and neocolonized. This has included

years of direct and personal encounter in Cuba and Honduras, as well as the study of revolutions and the discourses of revolutionary leaders in a variety of lands, including Tanzania, Kenya, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Russia, Haiti, Mexico, and Chile. My orientation has been to seek understanding by taking seriously the insights of past and present Third World leaders and intellectuals, whose cultural and political formation was shaped by the movements that had lifted them up. The understanding that I acquired through this process provided the foundation for writing this book.

The method of cross-horizon encounter establishes the possibility for overcoming the fundamental difference in perspective between the peoples of the global North and South. In the North, as a result of a psychological need for unawareness of the roots of material privileges in domination and exploitation, there is insufficient awareness of colonialism and neocolonialism. In contrast, in the South, the human desire for social justice has given rise to social movements and to the emergence of revolutionary leaders that have educated the people toward consciousness of the structures of colonialism and neocolonialism. In the North, what may be called the "colonial denial" abounds, an infirmity that infects even progressive and reformist movements; whereas in the South, "colonial analysis" prevails, as political leaders and intellectuals continually name the colonial and neocolonial structures of domination that are the foundation of their underdevelopment and impoverishment. In the Third World, not only do the people have consciousness of the processes and structures of colonialism and neocolonialism, but also they consider it their duty to remember them.

The difference between the understandings of social scientists, historians, commentators, and philosophers of the North and those of the Third World is not merely a difference of opinion or points of view. The opinions of the former have been shaped for the most part by a denial of the importance of colonialism, thus ignoring a host of questions relevant to fundamental historical and contemporary facts. Colonial analysis, on the other hand, is rooted in the common experience among Third World peoples of colonialism and neocolonialism, but in addition, it has been shaped by encounter with the various social and philosophical perspectives of the modern world, including the principal currents of thought and social movements of the North. The points of view of the global South and North are not merely different; they are of unequal validity. The perspective of Northern social scientists and historians overlooks

relevant questions, whereas the Third World perspective is rooted in an engagement with relevant questions. In the North, the prevailing perspective functions as an unwitting legitimation of neocolonial structures of domination, but in the Third World, leaders and intellectuals are on the road to a universal understanding that is integrally tied to human emancipation.

Cross-horizon encounter engages and takes seriously the integral and comprehensive understanding, rooted in political practices, that has been emerging in the Third World for the last two hundred years, and that has acquired a renewed vitality during the last twenty years. For intellectuals and activists of the North, the method of cross-horizon encounter is necessary for an understanding beyond ethnocentrism. It is a moral duty in the present historical epoch, in which the neocolonial world-system increasingly demonstrates its unsustainability and increasingly shows signs of a new form of fascism as it discovers its incapacity to resolve its contradictions, problems, and dilemmas.

The method of cross-horizon encounter is a Marxist epistemological method. It affirms the Marxist concept of the dialectical relation between theory and practice, in which theory emerges from revolutionary practice. But in our time, the revolutionary subject is not the same as in the time of Marx. During the course of the twentieth century, and in the first decades of the twenty-first, the dialectical movement between theory and practice has been unfolding in the Third World. The revolutionary leaders of the Third World have been implicitly developing Marxist theory in their speeches and writings, which they formulated in a context of revolutionary practice. Such revolutionary leaders include Mao, Ho, Sukarno, Fidel, Nasser, Nyerere, Allende, Daniel Ortega, Chávez, Evo, Rafael Correa, among others. They have possessed insights into the global structures of domination as well as the potentialities for human emancipation. They were great synthesizers, drawing upon their own cultural and political traditions, yet incorporating the principal values of the bourgeois revolutions of the late eighteenth century and the later socialist and communist movements and revolutions, and with the emergence of new movements, incorporating the insights of women, the defenders of the nature, and the original peoples. Accordingly, they have been pointing the way to a universal human understanding of human history and social dynamics, transcending the colonial divide.

In writing this book, I have selected what I take to be the basic dimensions necessary for appreciation of the significance of the Third World

revolutionary project of national and social liberation. With respect to Cuba, these dimensions include the seeking of political power by the Cuban Revolution from 1868 to 1959; the evolving effort to transform neocolonial structures by the revolution in power, from 1959 to the present; and the structures of popular democracy, developed as an alternative to the increasingly discredited structures of representative democracy. With respect to the world-system, these dimensions include: the historic development of the structures of colonial and neocolonial domination of the world-system; the sustained structural crisis of the world-system, from the 1970s to the present; the incapacity of the global elite to respond to the crisis; the Third World project of national and social liberation, including its renewal since 1994; and the recent emergence of four Latin American nations that have declared themselves socialist. Reflecting on these fundamental historical and social facts, I include a chapter on the possibility for popular democratic socialist revolutions in the nations of the North. In addition, I include an appendix on the rise of Trump, whose election demonstrates the inability of the neocolonial world-system to resolve its contradictions and the incapacity of the US Left to offer an alternative to the people.

The book is comprehensive, and it has a hopeful interpretation. Such characteristics are standard fare in Cuba and among Latin American intellectuals and leaders of the Left. There are, to be sure, certain themes that have my own particular stamp: my formulation of the epistemological method of cross-horizon encounter, pointing to a universal understanding; my reliance on Wallerstein to describe the history of the world-system; and my reflections on the possibilities for socialism in the North. They reflect the fact that I am not Cuban, but a North American living in and committed to socialist Cuba. But the book's interpretations of Cuba, the Third World, Latin America, and the global crisis are very much in accord with the Cuban perspective, and they have been formed by sustained encounter with the Cuban revolutionary project.

The book narrates a story, a grand narrative that interprets human history and projects a possible future for humanity, and that sees the Cuban Revolution as central to this unfolding world historical drama. It is fashionable today to reject grand narratives as inherently partial and as not emancipatory. But the Cuban Revolution and other triumphant popular revolutions in Latin America demonstrate the necessity of grand narratives for mobilizing the people in defense of human needs, against amoral and concentrated forces that use enormous power in defense of particular interests.

The Cuban Revolution, above all, has demonstrated that the taking and holding of power by the people is possible. In the period 1958 to 1961, the Cuban Revolution took political power from the national bourgeoisie and the political elite, both of which were subordinate to US capital; it subsequently put power in the hands of delegates of the people, through the development of alternative political structures of popular power and popular democracy. From the fundamental fact of power in the hands of the people, other things follow: an excellent and free health care system; free education at all levels; high quality television news coverage, free of the ideological distortions of the major international news media; a dignified foreign policy and high-quality discourses at international fora, free of diplomatic claptrap; a public discourse that is knowledgeable and committed to universal human values; the legitimacy of the political system; safety in the streets; and many others things. They all imply a high quality of life, even if this high quality of life, when compared to the societies of the North, occurs at a relatively low material level. The emphasis is on spiritual rewards: a sense of meaning and self-satisfaction that comes from making personal, even if modest, contributions to a dignified national project.

In the late 1960s, we youthful protestors in the USA, with anger at hypocrisy and with hope for the future of humanity, proclaimed "Power to the people!", a call that is as old as the nation itself. All of these years and experiences later, it seems to me a good idea, a possible idea, and a necessary idea.

Havana, Cuba Charles McKelvey

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CHAPTER 1

The Global and Historical Context

A fundamental tendency in human societies since the agricultural revolution has been the formation of kingdoms and empires, by means of conquest. Conquest and the formation of empires made possible great advances in commerce, science, technology, philosophy, literature, and art. These apparently opposed phenomena of conquest and civilization are intertwined, establishing a tendency in human history that may be called "the dialectic of domination and development." Immanuel Wallerstein maintains that since the agricultural revolution there have been many social systems that transcend political and cultural boundaries, which he calls "world-systems." They were not world-systems in the sense of encompassing the entire planet, but in the sense that they were systems that formed a world, composed of various "nations" and peoples yet defined by political and economic structures as well as ideologies. For this reason, Wallerstein uses the hyphenated world-system: "world" does not modify "system;" rather, two nouns are joined to convey the notion of a system that forms a world (Wallerstein 2004, 87–89).

There have been two types of world-systems: world-empires and world-economies. Both are characterized by a dominating center that controls peripheral regions. In a world-economy, the center transforms the economic institutions of the peripheral regions, so that they function to promote the economic interests and provide for the productive needs of the center. In contrast, the empire represents a more limited form of domination, in that the economic systems of the peripheral regions are not restructured. The center has political authority and jurisdiction over the

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peripheral regions and requires them to pay a tax or a tribute, but it does not seek to transform the economic activities of the periphery. The tribute from the periphery functions to maintain a bureaucracy in the center that administers the empire. As the empire expands, the center tends to absorb much of the tribute in lavish lifestyles, rather than maintaining effective administrative control. The over-weighted and gluttonous center is unable to control the peripheral regions effectively, and some of the nations in the periphery are able to assert their autonomy and break free of the empire. Thus empires have a historic tendency to expand until they become unable to control their peripheral regions, at which time they are vulnerable to conquest by other empires or to disintegration. So the rise and fall of empires is common in human history. Most of the great civilizations of the pre-modern Middle East and South Asia as well as those of pre-conquest America and pre-colonial Africa were world-empires. World-economies are much less rare and tend to be shorter in duration. The ancient Chinese civilizations, however, were long-lasting world-economies. Many of the pre-modern world-systems lasted several centuries, but all were confined to a single region of the world (Wallerstein 1974, 15–16; 2004, 89).

Reflecting on the central human tendency toward conquest, Jared Diamond has maintained that the conquering nations have been those with an advanced capacity with respect to the particular components necessary for conquest, and they should not be conceived as a superior subspecies of humans. He maintains that the societies that were able to conquer others were those that had turned earliest to food production, driven by a necessity that was provoked by population growth and/or environmental factors. This necessary conversion to a more productive system enabled them to support full-time specialists, such as soldiers, state administrators, artisans, and priests, who played important roles in wars of conquest (Diamond 1999).

This central human tendency toward conquest as the basis for development attained advanced expression in the modern era, and the modern nation-state played a pivotal role. Cuban political scientist Armando Cristóbal describes the modern nation-state as characterized by centralization of political authority and by unity established on the basis of common ethnic identification. Centralization was a significant force in Western Europe from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries, pushed by monarchs and merchants, because of their common interest in overcoming the local power of feudal lords. National ethnic identification took shape in Spain, England, and France, Cristóbal maintains, as a result of wars of conquest reinforced by natural geographical boundaries. In the

case of Spain, it was a matter of re-conquest in reaction to the Moorish conquest, whereas England and France had continuous wars with each other. The common ethnic identification of the modern nation-state became a unifying force, replacing religion, which had functioned as the central unifying force in the traditional state. This ultimately gave rise to the differentiation of political leaders from religious leaders, reducing the power of the latter, although religion continued to be important for the pacification of the conquered peoples. Common ethnic identification forged the unity of peoples of diverse cultural-religious traditions in a territory governed by a single state (Cristóbal 2008).

With the formation of the modern nation-state in Western Europe by the sixteenth century, the stage was set for a project of Western European conquest on a global scale. From 1492 to 1914, seven European nations conquered or took control of virtually the entire world, establishing the structural foundation of the modern world-system and capitalist world-economy. The process was initiated by the Spanish conquest of America during the sixteenth century. In addition to the factors that had forged the Spanish nation-state, the conquest was aided by the lack of horses and iron in America and the limited resistance to disease among the indigenous populations, as a result of their relative geographical isolation (Diamond 1999; Wallerstein 1974). The European project of world conquest did not always involve direct control by European states. In some cases, formally autonomous empires or societies were compelled to make concessions to European powers, coerced by significant European military presence in the region. In other cases, European military-economic companies contracted by European states made alliances with local political actors whose particular interests coincided with the European agenda, enabling it to take control of the political process. And there were important exceptions: China and Japan. But in essence, during the course of four and one-quarter centuries, Europe conquered the world, enabling it to establish a world-economy and a world-system that responded to its interests.

Structures of the European-Centered Modern World-System

The modern world-system is the economic, political, and social system that extends beyond the boundaries of societies and cultures and that today encompasses the entire world. As noted, it began to emerge in the sixteenth century, with the Spanish and Portuguese “discovery”

and conquest of America. During the nineteenth century, as a result of the conquest of Africa and much of Asia by England, France, and other European nations, the modern world-system became global in scope (Wallerstein 1974, 5, 7, 10–11).

The modern world-economy is the economic component of the modern world-system. It consists of all the economic activities throughout the world that are related to one another through an extensive division of labor, which developed historically in a geographical form, with particular economic activities carried out in specific geographical regions. The geographical division of labor led to the emergence of a world-economy with distinct regions: the core, the historic manufacturing center; the periphery, the supplier of raw materials on a base of forced and cheap labor; and the semiperiphery, which has some core characteristics and some peripheral characteristics. In the fulfillment of its historic function of producing raw materials (agricultural, animal, and mineral products), the periphery did not require advanced technology or complex systems of production, and as a result, peripheral regions have developed with a labor-intensive production and less sophisticated technology. In contrast, the core uses the raw materials imported from the periphery to manufacture various products. Because of the variety of economic activities involved in fulfilling this function, advanced and sophisticated technologies have emerged, with inventions in some sectors applied in others.

The structure of the world-economy thus generates a fundamental inequality between core and periphery. The economic function of each has ensured that the core will have much greater diversity in manufacturing, higher levels of technology, higher wage levels, and higher levels of consumption. The core-peripheral relation has created two different realities: the core with its culture of consumerism, materialism, and individualism; and the periphery, where the basic democratic rights of access to adequate nutrition, housing, education, and health care are denied on a massive scale, giving rise to a popular culture of social struggle and solidarity. In addition, the periphery functions as a market for the surplus manufactured goods of the core, as a consequence of the fact that the traditional manufacturing of the conquered regions was to a considerable extent destroyed. This dependency pertains to equipment and supplies necessary for raw materials production as well as to personal consumption. Consequently, the periphery provides a double benefit for the core: it functions as a supplier of cheap raw materials as well as a purchaser of

surplus manufactured goods, that is, the goods that exceed the capacities of the national markets of the core.

The modern world-economy is a *capitalist* world-economy, organized to maximize profit and to accumulate capital for the international bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie seeks to maximize exploitation of labor in order to maximize profit and accumulation of capital, and this exploitation of labor takes two forms. First, there is *exploitation* in the sense defined by Marx, where the workers are paid less than the value of what they produce. Second, there is *superexploitation*, defined by Wallerstein, where the workers are paid less than what they need in order to live. This dual system of exploitation and superexploitation was developed in response to a dilemma: Low wages are consistent with capitalists' interests, but they limit the capacity of the workers to buy the products that the system produces, thus restraining its capacity to expand. A geographical division in the labor market, in which core workers function to consume as well as to produce and peripheral workers produce primarily, effectively resolves this dilemma. From the vantage point of core capitalists, consumption in the periphery is important only in relation to the purchase of the surplus goods of the core, and not with respect to the capacity of peripheral regions to provide for the basic human needs of the people.

Thus, in both core and periphery, the international bourgeoisie seeks to minimize labor costs, but it does so in accordance with different rules in the two regions. In the core, the workers have organized unions, organizations, associations, and political parties that promote the interests of workers, which played a central role in political processes in core nations prior to 1980. As a result of the historic workers' struggles through such organizations, core workers have attained basic political and civil rights, and a majority have been able to obtain sufficient wages to acquire the basic necessities of life. The capitalist class made these concessions because of pressure applied by workers' action, and especially important was the weapon of the strike. Inasmuch as such concessions had the effect of expanding domestic markets in the core, they were consistent with systemic needs in the long term. So as a result of these historic dynamics, most core workers are exploited in the sense defined by Marx, in that they receive in wages less than the value of what they produce. But they are not superexploited, in that, for the majority of core workers, wages are sufficient to sustain a life with adequate nutrition, housing, clothing, and access to education and health care.

For the workers in the periphery, however, there is a different reality. In the peripheral regions historically, slavery and other mechanisms of brute force were used to obtain labor for the exportation of raw materials to the core. As the system evolved, and as more and more land was used for plantations and mines, the majority of people had no option but to work in the plantations and mines, and coercion became more economic than physical. Sharecropping, tenant farming, and low-wage labor on plantations and mines became the norm, which continues to the present day. Most agricultural and industrial workers are super-exploited; their wages for full-time work are insufficient to acquire the basic necessities of life. Basic political and civil rights, such as the right to organize unions and political parties, were not recognized until well into the twentieth century, and they were often nullified by the political repression of military dictatorships and weakened during the post-1980 neoliberal stage. The people survive through a variety of strategies: working two or three jobs; using several workers from the same household, including children; cultivating food on subsistence plots; and constructing simple huts or shacks with their own hands. And they do without. A majority is malnourished. Many do not have electricity or piped water. The great majority has very limited access to education or health care. They die at birth more frequently than in the core, and they do not live as long. In desperation, many have fled to the core, creating a problem of uncontrolled international migration.

The unequal wage level between core and periphery establishes *unequal exchange,* in which the amount of products that a core worker receives for a given quantity of labor is many times greater than the amount of products that a peripheral worker receives in exchange for an equal quantity of labor (Wallerstein 1979, 71). So labor is performed throughout the core and peripheral regions to make the products marketed in the world-economy, but the sale and consumption of these products are concentrated in the core.

Since 1980, the capitalist class has been more aggressive in the pursuit of its interests in relation to core workers, as a consequence of the profound and systemic crisis in which the system has entered, which we will discuss in Chap. 6. This breaking of the social contract between management and labor in the core is shortsighted, because the relatively high wages of core workers have functioned to provide political stability to the world-system. The shortsighted response of the capitalist class to the crisis is one of the signs of the depth of the crisis and of the incapacity of

the system to resolve it. The breaking of the social contract has led to erosion in the standard of living of core workers, thus undermining the legitimacy of core governments and creating a degree of social instability. Nevertheless, by global standards, the wages of core workers remain relatively high, and the majority of workers in the core have the basic necessities of life.

The Origin of the Modern World-Economy

The sixteenth-century Spanish and Portuguese conquest of the region of the Americas today known as Latin America was made possible by: the superior military technology of the Spaniards and Portuguese (particularly their horses, steel swords, and steel armor); the centralized political structure of the conquering nations; the decentralized political structure of many of the indigenous societies; and the rapid spread of diseases brought by the Europeans and against which the indigenous population had limited immunity. In many of the conquered regions, the indigenous population was reduced 90% as a result of the conquest, the spread of disease, and the brutality of the forced labor imposed in the aftermath of the conquest.

Using gold and silver acquired from America through systems of forced labor, the Spanish and Portuguese purchased manufactured goods from Northwestern Europe, particularly the Netherlands, England, and France. This stimulated commercial expansion in Northwestern Europe, which began at this time to import grains from Eastern Europe. Thus the Spanish military conquest of America played a central role in the emergence of a European world-economy that encompassed Western Europe and Eastern Europe as well as those areas of America under the control of Spain and Portugal. The European world-economy came into being during the period 1492–1640.

There was a geographical division of labor in the emerging modern world-economy. Eastern Europe and Hispanic America were the regions in which raw materials were obtained using three forms of forced labor. (1) The *encomienda* was developed in Hispanic America, in which forced indigenous labor produced gold and silver bullion as well as cattle products (beef and leather) that were exported to Western Europe. The *encomienda* was a system in which the owner, or *encomendero*, was granted the right to indigenous labor by the Spanish or Portuguese crown. The *encomendero* was formally obligated to provide

for the basic needs of the indigenous laborers, but in practice, it was a brutal system of forced labor. (2) In Eastern Europe, a form of forced labor that Wallerstein calls "coerced cash crop labor" was imposed on the peasantry by the Eastern European landholding class. With the emergence of a market demand in Western Europe for grains, timber, and wool, the Eastern European landowning class began to impose demands on peasants for the production of these raw materials. (3) African slaves in America, particularly in the West Indies and Brazil, produced sugar that was exported to Western Europe. The brutality of African-American slavery occurred not only in regard to the slave system of production in America but also in the brutal conditions of the forced transit from Africa to America (Wallerstein 1974, 1979).

Thus, during the period 1492–1640, a world-economy emerged, in which the peripheral regions (Hispanic America and Eastern Europe) produced raw materials (gold, silver, grains, sugar, wood, beef, and leather), using various forms of forced labor. These peripheral regions were providing the raw materials that fueled Western European commercial expansion and economic development, and central to this expansion was the role of American gold and silver. Large quantities of gold and silver were in the hands of Spain, as a result of the Spanish conquest of America and the extraction of the bullion through the forced labor of the indigenous population. The gold and silver were used to maintain the Spanish military as well as other state expenditures, including the salaries of middle-class state bureaucrats, and to support a lavish lifestyle of the aristocracy. However, Spain did not modernize its production to respond to the increased demand caused by the gold; rather, it purchased textiles and other manufactured goods from Northwestern Europe and grains from Eastern Europe. This led to the economic development of Northwestern Europe, particularly England, the Netherlands, and Northern France (Shannon 1996, 55–58).

The transformations of Northwestern Europe had three components. (1) There was the commercialization of agriculture. The landholders of Northwestern Europe ended feudal obligations, including the obligation of serfs to supply agricultural products to the landholder, and adopted instead an obligation to pay rent in the form of money for the use of the land. This turned the agricultural laborers into the direct sellers of their products and induced them to look for more efficient forms of production. (2) Land was consolidated. In the new situation of commercialized agriculture, the great majority of peasants with smallholdings

were unable to make their enterprises commercially viable, and they were forced to abandon the land. But those peasants with relatively larger plots of land were able to improve their financial situation, often acquiring access to land being abandoned by peasants with smaller plots, creating a consolidation of land. Some of these more successful peasants were able to acquire ownership of land from their landholders, becoming independent producers. So there emerged a new class of middle-class agricultural producers, a "yeoman" class, who were both owners and renters on increasingly larger units of land and who were developing increasingly efficient techniques of production. (3) Many landholders converted agricultural lands to pasture, both cattle and sheep. The prices of meat and wool made the conversion to pasture attractive economically, and as a result, the amount of land devoted to pasture went from twenty-five to seventy-five percent. This reduction of agricultural production in Northwestern Europe was made possible by the imposition of a "second serfdom" on the agricultural laborers of Eastern Europe, which facilitated the exportation of grains to Northwestern Europe. In addition, inasmuch as much less labor is necessary for tending to cattle and sheep than for agricultural production, the conversion to pasture displaced many peasants from the land. There emerged a large class of landless peasants who migrated to towns and constituted surplus labor for the expanding craft manufacturing of the towns. Particularly important here was textile manufacturing. Manufactured cloth became England's most important export in the latter half of the sixteenth century, with the cloth going to Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal (Wallerstein 1974).

The transformations in Northwestern Europe cannot be well understood if we observe only the region of Northwestern Europe. From such a vantage point, we might explain them as occurring because of technological innovations and cultural changes. This would be partly true, but it is an incomplete explanation that is very misleading in its implications. On the other hand, if we understand the changes in Northwestern Europe in the context of the emerging European world-economy, their logic becomes clearer. In spite of technological innovations, Northwestern Europe was producing less food, because of the extensive conversion to pasture. But the importation into Northwestern Europe of grains produced in Eastern Europe compensated for the lower production of food. In addition, the steady price of meat and wool and the growing demand for manufactured products were consequences of the gold acquired by Spain through forced labor in America, inasmuch as

Spain used the gold to purchase manufactured goods from Northwestern Europe. Thus, it can be seen that the modernization of Northwestern Europe was integrally tied to, indeed a consequence of, the Spanish conquest of America.

The sixteenth-century modernization of Northwestern Europe, tied to the Spanish conquest of America, involved the modernization of the countryside. Although it expanded craft manufacturing, Northwestern Europe did not modernize manufacturing during the sixteenth century. The modernization of industry would occur later, during the great expansion of the world-system of 1763–1914, when European colonial powers conquered and peripheralized vast regions of Africa and South and Southeast Asia.

Viewing Western development in the context of the expanding world-economy, we can see that the changes in Northwestern Europe in the sixteenth century were occurring because of the economic relations between Northwestern Europe and Eastern Europe and between Northwestern Europe and (indirectly) Hispanic America. Northwestern Europe was transforming itself into a core region in an emerging world-economy in which Hispanic America and Eastern Europe were functioning as peripheral regions. *The key to the economic development of Northwestern Europe is not its technological or cultural innovation but its capacity, by virtue of its function in the developing world-economy, to benefit from the conquest and exploitation of other regions.* The modern world-economy would develop and expand over the next four centuries and become a truly global enterprise. But during its expansion and development, the modern world-economy would continue to have a fundamental characteristic: *the economic development of the core would be related to and made possible by the superexploitation and the underdevelopment of the periphery.*

Stages in the Modern World-System

World-systems in human history are like living organisms. They go through stages in their development. We have discussed above the first stage in the development of the modern world-system from 1492 to 1640, established on a foundation of the conquest by centralized European nation-states of vast regions of the Americas.

The second stage from 1640 to 1815 was characterized by stagnation and cyclical patterns of expansion and contraction. It was a time of a "slowdown in the rate of development of the world-economy"

(Wallerstein 1980, 33), a time in which the world-economy reached an economic plateau following a long period of conquest and geographical, economic, and commercial expansion. Although it was a period of stagnation, the second stage in the development of the modern world-economy was not like the crisis that had marked the last stage of feudalism. The crisis of feudalism was resolved by the abandonment of feudal structures and by the creation of the new political-economic structure of the modern nation-state, in accordance with the interests of the monarchs and an emerging urban commercial bourgeoisie. The emergence of modern nation-states made possible the conquest of America, establishing the foundation for the modern world-economy and the definitive end of feudalism. In contrast, the seventeenth-century economic stagnation of the capitalist world-economy was overcome within the structures of the world-economy, resulting in their consolidation. Throughout this stage, both core and peripheral elites had an interest in preserving the core-peripheral relation. Peripheral elites found the relation profitable, and core manufacturers continued to need the raw materials flowing from the periphery to the core. So the modern world-economy passed through the period of stagnation with the basic core-peripheral relation intact. The boundaries of core, periphery, and semiperiphery continued to be the same as they had been developed during the sixteenth century, with minor changes (Wallerstein 1980, 8, 18–19, 25–26, 33, 129; Shannon 1996, 61–71).

The third stage was characterized by a significant territorial and economic expansion. From 1750 to 1850, the Indian subcontinent, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and West Africa were incorporated into the periphery of the European world-economy, thus expanding its access to raw materials for manufacturing and to markets for manufactured goods. The process of peripheralization involved four main changes in these regions. (1) They were converted into exporters of raw materials through the expansion of cash crop agriculture. There were dramatic increases in the export of indigo, raw silk, opium, and cotton from India; of mohair yarn, raw silk, and cotton from the Ottoman Empire; of hemp, flax and wheat from Russia; and of slaves, palm oil and peanuts from West Africa. Most of the products exported from the four regions functioned as raw materials for manufacturing in Western Europe or as products of food consumption in Western Europe, although the Indian opium and cotton headed for China and the West African slaves brought to the West Indies had different functions. (2) Systems of

coerced labor were established. Cash crop production was not attractive to peasants, since it took time away from the subsistence production necessary for survival. As a result, they were forced, directly or indirectly, to engage in cash crop production, using various mechanisms of coercion, taking a variety of economic and legal forms (Wallerstein 1989, 129, 137–149, 157–166).

(3) Manufacturing was reduced or eliminated. India, for example, had been one of the world's major centers of cotton textile production prior to 1800, but by 1840, Indian textile manufacturing had virtually disappeared as a result of British colonial economic policies, with a tariff structure that favored British manufactures. Colonial economic policies destroyed not only Indian textile industry but also its iron and steel industries. Similarly, the manufacturing export capacity of the Ottoman Empire greatly declined from the 1780s to the 1850s, as a result of a French duty on Ottoman imports of manufactured cotton cloth and British competitive advantage through mechanization of its textile production. In addition, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the British imposed on the Ottoman Empire a commercial accord that functioned to destroy manufacturing in Egypt and Syria. Russia also suffered a significant decline in iron manufacturing, although Russia was able to resist to some extent British efforts to promote her deindustrialization by virtue of tariff protection for its industry accompanied by a strong domestic market and a strong military. In West Africa, cotton and iron manufacturing were able to compete at first with British manufacturing, but West African manufacturing was undermined by cheap British imports during the early nineteenth century. (4) Large-scale economic units were created, resulting in the concentration of economic power. Low-wage plantations and large estates emerged, with small-scale producers trapped by debt peonage (Wallerstein 1989, 149–157; Frank 1979, 88–90).

Thus, the peripheralization of the Indian subcontinent, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and West Africa during the period 1750–1850 converted these regions into producers of raw materials for export, utilizing forced labor, facilitating the concentration of economic and political power, and creating the conditions for the emergence an elite class in the peripheralized region with an economic interest in the perpetuation of the core-peripheral relation. The process of peripheralization reduced the standard of living of the majority, as resources of land and labor were used for the purpose of producing raw materials that

were sent to Western Europe. On the other hand, the peripheralization of these regions functioned to the advantage of Western Europe, in that it provided cheap raw materials for its manufacturing and markets for its manufactured goods. At the same time, the expansion of production and commerce facilitated by the peripheralization of these regions enabled the world-economy to overcome its stagnation and to enter into a period of unprecedented geographical and economic expansion, which promoted the further industrial development of Britain. British textile manufacturing was restructured during the period 1780–1840, in that it was made more efficient by the development of larger scale and more mechanized enterprises. These technological transformations in industry gave Britain an advantage over other core states. In addition, greater access to raw materials and markets after 1780 also promoted the industrial development of Western Europe, particularly France, Belgium, western "Germany," and Switzerland (Wallerstein 1989, 57–86, 125).

Subsequently, the territorial expansion of the world-system proceeded apace. From 1815 to 1914, European nations, particularly Britain and France, established colonial domination over new territories. Vast regions were peripheralized, so that the modern world-economy became truly global in scope. Southeast Asia, for example, was incorporated into the periphery of the European world-economy during the nineteenth century. During this period, many of the agricultural and handicraft systems of Southeast Asia were destroyed. Its land was converted into the production of raw materials for export to Europe. And the region was forced to import European manufactured goods, leading to the destruction of its traditional handicraft systems. The unequal rate of exchange between European manufactured goods and Southeast Asian raw materials promoted the development of Europe and the underdevelopment of Southeast Asia (Frank 1979, 149).

The industry and village handicrafts of the Arab world were destroyed during the period. When Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire, Mohammed Ali attempted to stimulate national and industrial development. But Egypt had insufficient political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire to establish the necessary tariff protection. When Egypt fell under British rule, its deindustrialization continued. Lord Carver, who governed Egypt between 1883 and 1907, observed, "Some quarters [of Cairo] that formerly used to be veritable centers of varied industries—spinning, weaving, ribbon making, dyeing, tent making, embroidery, shoemaking, jewelry making, spice grinding, copper work … have

shrunk considerably or vanished" (quoted in Frank 1979, 155). At the same time, the Egyptian countryside was converted into cotton plantations with a small landowning class. Similar developments occurred throughout the Arab world (Frank 1979, 154–156).

In Africa, several regions were converted into single-crop export zones during the nineteenth century. Agricultural products, including palm oil, peanuts and other oilseeds, and cocoa, as well as minerals, were exported. Mining operations and large-scale commercial agricultural enterprises were owned by Europeans. There also was supplementary cash crop production by peasants, usually coerced through such mechanisms as the hut tax. Peasant income from the production of cash crops was no greater than the tax, so the peasants were in effect producing without compensation. The tax revenues collected from the peasants were used to develop the transportation infrastructure for the exportation of the raw materials to the core. During the twentieth century, the peripheralization of Africa would deepen (Frank 1979, 157–159).

Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the conquest of the world by the principal European nations was virtually complete. Beginning in the early years of the sixteenth century and culminating in the twentieth century, the European project of domination involved conquest of the Caribbean, Central America, South America, North America, North Africa and the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and much of Southeast Asia (except China and Japan). In the wake of the conquest, colonial empires were established, functioning to develop and maintain the peripheralization of the conquered regions and to repress any popular resistance to colonial domination. In this way, the foundation was established for the underdevelopment of vast regions of the world and the development of the nations of the core of the world-system.

The fourth stage of the world-system was from 1914 to 1968, and it was characterized by the emergence of the colonized peoples as important political actors, by a transition from colonialism to neocolonialism, by the spectacular ascent of the USA, and by the overreaching of geographical and ecological limits. This stage reached its culmination from 1945 to 1963, when the capitalist world-economy took shape as a neocolonial world-system under US uncontested military, economic, commercial, financial, political, and ideological dominance. During the period of US hegemony, the transition of the colonized regions into formally independent neocolonies was for the most part completed. The

United Nations was established, in which virtually all of the nations of the world were represented as supposedly independent and sovereign nations. The USA projected itself as a nation that was advanced in the protection of political and civil rights and in providing economic opportunity. As the world-system evolved into a neocolonial system, it proclaimed a liberal democratic ideology of equality among individuals and nations, political and civil rights for all, and the independence and sovereignty of all nations.

At the height of its hegemony, the USA developed control of its neocolonies primarily through economic control, by means of ownership of productive and commercial enterprises as well as banks, with military power being an important but secondary component. The USA provided military aid, but the neocolonial state was legally and formally independent, with the appearance and all of the trappings of sovereignty. With the national bourgeoisie subordinate to US corporations and with the neocolonial government dependent on US aid and support, the USA was able to ensure that commercial regulations enacted by the supposedly independent state favored US interests in access to markets, raw materials, and cheap labor.

Observing the neocolonial world-system under US domination during the period 1945–1963, the characteristics of neocolonialism can be described. They include: a core-peripheral economic relation that in essence is a continuation of the economic relation imposed by conquest and force during the colonial era; rule by large and concentrated transnational corporations, transnational banks, and international financial agencies, which control the economic and financial institutions of the neocolony; within the neocolony, political control through a figurehead bourgeoisie that inserts itself into the structures of economic penetration and exploitation, conforming to the interests of international capital, and benefitting itself at the expense of the majority of people in the nation; social control by the military of the neocolonial state, with necessary training and arms coming from the USA or other core states; ideological penetration to justify the existing political-economic system; and the use of military force directly by the USA and/or other core states when popular resistance provokes political and social instability. When it functions, the neocolonial system gives the appearance of independence to the neocolony, and the function of ideology is to reinforce this image in order to legitimate the world-system.

US Ascent in the World-System

The structures of the modern world-system provide limited possibilities for ascent and decline by particular nations. A spectacular case of ascent was that of the USA, which ascended from a semiperipheral position at the end of the eighteenth century to the hegemonic core power in the neocolonial world-system by the middle of the twentieth century. As has occurred in the history of empires and civilizations, and with the European nation-states in the modern era, the economic development of the USA was based on conquest. For a century following the establishment of its Constitution, the USA expanded its territory through the conquest of indigenous nations and through a war with Mexico that resulted in the ceding of significant parts of Mexican territory to the USA. This territorial expansion established the material foundation for the economic development of the nation. However, central to the ascent of the USA was not direct conquest but its capacity to penetrate economically the colonies and semi-colonies that had been conquered and peripheralized by the European colonial powers. The US drive to ascent, therefore, was well adapted to *neo*colonial structures, and its rise to hegemony coincided with the transition of the world-system from colonialism to neocolonialism.

The ascent had begun in the eighteenth century, when New England and mid-Atlantic farmers developed a trading relation with the Caribbean islands, which had developed extensive sugar plantations utilizing African slave labor to produce sugar for export to Western Europe. To maximize profit, it was rational to utilize plantation lands exclusively for the cultivation of sugar and to purchase food on the international market. As a result, the slave production of sugar in the Caribbean generated an international market for food products. North American farmers, given their medium-sized farms and their proximity to the Caribbean, were strategically located to respond to this market demand. The sale of food and animal products to the Caribbean became a lucrative business for the North American farmers, enabling them to accumulate capital (Frank 1979, 64–68; Shannon 1996, 64; Pérez 2006, 70–71; Galeano 2004, 87; Genovese 1967; Williams 1966, 108–118).

During the nineteenth century, the expansion of the world-economy and of global markets for a variety of raw materials such as cotton, sugar, and tobacco propelled the expansion of the peripheral function beyond the limited confines of Virginia and Charleston. From 1800 to 1860,

the entire Southeastern region of the USA was peripheralized and converted into the production of cotton, tobacco, and sugar for export to core and semiperipheral regions, utilizing low-wage labor, primarily African slave labor. Cotton, the principal raw material for textile production, was central to this expanding peripheralization. The invention of the cotton gin in 1793 made possible the mechanized separation of cottonseeds from the fiber, thereby speeding the process of preparing the fiber for export to the cotton mills that manufactured cloth. By 1800, cotton gins were located throughout the South, and for the subsequent sixty years, there occurred rapid geographical expansion and an explosion in production. By 1860, cotton was grown throughout South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, as well as in parts of Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Texas, and Florida. Although some white farmers cultivated it, cotton and black slavery became intertwined in the South. Corresponding with the expansion of cotton production, the number of slaves grew from less than 700,000 in 1790 to more than 2 million by 1830 and to nearly 4 million by 1860. Slaves constituted one-third of the population of the South (Cooper and Terrill 1991, 190–193, 198–199, 205, 275; Franklin 1974, 138–139).

Farmers and merchants in the northeastern USA, who had been accumulating capital during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the lucrative Caribbean trade, converted their capital into industrial development during the nineteenth century, taking advantage of new possibilities emerging from the peripheralization of the South from 1800 to 1860. During this period, slave production in the South provided cheap cotton for the textile mills of the Northeast, and the peripheralization of the South provided markets for the new and expanding industries of the Northeast, thereby facilitating the industrial and economic development of the Northeast. Therefore, although the Northeast did not utilize slaves as an integral and significant part of its production, it economically benefited from slavery in the Caribbean and in the US South through core-peripheral commerce with these slave regions. Since northeastern manufacturing was central to the economic development of the nation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we are recognizing here the importance of slavery in the economic development of the USA. In accordance with the general pattern of the modern world-economy, the peripheralization of the South promoted its underdevelopment, leaving the region with a legacy of limited industrial development, forced labor, and political repression.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, US industry underwent concentration, a process that was driven by the ethically and legally questionable practices of the "robber barons." The concentration of industry created a situation in which the capacity of the nation to produce goods exceeded its domestic market, exacerbating the cycles of overproduction to which capitalism was prone. In response to this situation, the captains of industry began in the 1890s to advocate a policy of imperialism, an active engagement in the affairs of other nations, in order to ensure that these nations would adopt economic policies that would provide access by US corporations to their markets. The first expression of US imperialist policy was the military intervention in Cuba in 1898 and the military occupation of Cuba from 1898 to 1902. From 1902 to 1932, US military interventions and occupations in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua were implementations of imperialist policies, and they were designed to ensure the access of US corporations to markets beyond US borders (Arboleya 2008, 35–42, 82–86; Josephson 2011; LaFeber 1998; Nugent 2008; Regalado 2007, 116–118).

From 1933 to 1941, there was a constraint on the use of military force by the USA. Popular anti-imperialist movements in Latin America as well as isolationism in the USA led Franklin Roosevelt to develop a non-interventionist "Good Neighbor" policy with respect to Latin America. The goal was to control Latin American governments through ownership of productive and commercial enterprises and banks, without need for direct military intervention, which, however, was constantly present as a threat. During this period, imperialist policy continued to be an important component of US ascent, as the USA established military dictatorships in Latin America through diplomatic maneuvering and economic pressure. But the USA did not directly intervene militarily (Arboleya 2008, 103–107; Regalado 2007, 118).

World War II broke the isolationism of US public discourse, and it facilitated public support for US military presence in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Europe. The conversion to a wartime economy strengthened the USA. It emerged from World War II with unrivaled economic, financial, political and ideological primacy, with an enormous capacity to influence the economic policies of the governments of the world, in accordance with its interests. Coinciding with US attainment of hegemony, the anti-colonial movements of the colonized led to the fall of the European colonial empires. This increased the US advantage,

inasmuch as US imperialist policy sought a new form of domination characterized by economic, financial, and ideological penetration, accompanied by recognition of political independence. The colonized peoples gave the name "neocolonialism" to the new structures of domination, seeking to emphasize that independence was nothing other than colonialism in a new form.

US Hegemony in the Neocolonial World-System

Following World War II, rather than reconverting to a peacetime economy, the USA embarked on an expansion of its war industry. Military expansionism was justified by the Cold War ideology, which maintained that the strengthening of the US military was necessary as a counterweight to the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. This was an ideological distortion, because in reality, Soviet foreign policy was not expansionist; it sought to construct a cordon of security around its territory and to peacefully coexist with the capitalist powers. The extraordinary success of the Cold War ideology, in spite of its mischaracterization of Soviet foreign policy, is explained by the fact that it served the interests of the arms industries by legitimating an arms race (Arboleya 2008, 133–134).

Militarism came to dominate the US political system. "In a kind of militarist application of Keynesian theory, defense expenses replaced public spending as the principal driving force of the economy and the scientific development of the country" (Arboleya 2008, 133). Arms production became central to the economy. "Arms capital merged with other branches of the economy and served the expansion of the large conglomerates and transnational companies of the country. Such was the warning of President Eisenhower, that a military-industrial complex had been consolidated" (Arboleya 2008, 134). The militarization of the US economy shaped the cultural and ideological formation of the people. "Militarism required US policy to be based on the fabrication of a climate of fear and insecurity, because this was required for the arms market. Communism was presented as a phantasmagoric force that intended the domination of the world" (Arboleya 2008, 134). Anticommunism was an enormously powerful ideological tool, enabling the USA to present a distorted image of Third World anti-colonial and anti-neocolonial movements as manifestations of the spreading menace of communism, thus justifying imperialist interventions throughout the world.

Interventions in defense of neocolonial interests were presented as the defense of democracy, and this Orwellian inversion was widely accepted by the people.

The Cold War took shape as the basic frame of US foreign policy during the administration of President Harry Truman (1945–1953). The Truman Doctrine, formulated principally by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, assumed that with the destruction of Germany and Japan and the decline of Great Britain and France, the USA and the Soviet Union were contesting for world power. It further assumed that the Soviet Union was expansionistic and that it sought to impose its will on the world. And it assumed that displays of military power represented the only language that the Soviet leadership understood. It thus adopted a policy of the "containment of communism" through a massive military buildup of conventional forces and arms as well as nuclear arms and through the development of a number of strategic defense alliances throughout the world (LaFeber 1994, 457–511).

The permanent war economy, the anti-communist Cold War ideology, the Truman Doctrine of the containment of communism, and worldwide US military presence were consistent with the principles of neocolonial domination developed during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt with respect to Latin America. The purpose of the Cold War military buildup was to prevent the expansion of communism through the display of force, but it intended to avoid direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union or the new communist giant, China. With communism contained, the USA would be free to attend to the governance of the neocolonies of the Third World. With respect to the latter, the global military presence of the USA was a constant threat, but the desire to avoid direct military intervention in the neocolonies remained a policy goal. The strategy was to control through economic and financial penetration, political maneuvering, and covert operations, without direct military intervention. The anti-communist ideology was functional in this project, for it presented the USA as the defender of democracy and the "Free World," thus adding to its prestige. The economic power and international prestige of the USA facilitated the wide dissemination of the anti-communist ideology in the neocolonies.

With this global economic, political, military, and ideological structure in place, the USA, as the hegemonic core power during the period 1946–1964, pursued imperialist policies in defense of its economic interests without direct military action. But there was one exception: Korea.

The Korean peninsula had been incorporated into the Japanese empire in 1905. Following the surrender of Japan in 1945, US forces occupied the south and the Soviet army occupied the north, with the 38th parallel serving as a temporary dividing line, established in order to avoid confrontation between USA and Soviet occupying forces. By 1949, both USA and Soviet occupying forces had withdrawn, leaving a Soviet-supported government, headed by Kim Il Sung, in the North and a US-supported right-wing government, headed by Syngman Rhee, in the South. During the period 1948–1950, US officials did not consider South Korea to be important for US neocolonial domination of the "Free World." However, in the aftermath the triumph of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and in reaction to an attempt by Kim to unify Korea through the invasion of the South in 1950, the US government quickly responded with a military defense of the South, attaining the support of the United Nations in the military action. US leaders, influenced by the anti-communist ideology, incorrectly believed that the invasion was conceived and supported by the Soviet Union, as a part of its plan for world domination. Accordingly, they saw military action as necessary to contain communism, although they were concerned that US military action in Korea would provoke a reaction by the Soviet Union or China that would lead to a military confrontation with one or both of the communist powers. When Truman became aware that the Soviet Union was not supporting the military initiative of the North and believing that the Chinese army was exhausted from its long revolutionary struggle, he ordered a military action north of the 38th parallel. This US military action, however, did provoke Chinese military movement into the peninsula, forcing US/UN forces to retreat to the 38th parallel. The costly Korean War of 1950–1953 was a stalemate, with North Korea as a socialist nation to this day, and South Korea as a member of the "Free World," with the two nations divided by the 38th parallel (LaFeber 1994, 502–531).

The Korean War was an exception to the general pattern. It was the only case of direct military action by US forces during the period 1946–1964. In Latin America, in accordance with the Truman Doctrine of the containment of communism, the Truman administration provided support for various Latin American governments that engaged in repression against communist, socialist, and progressive organizations, including Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela (Regalado 2007, 121–122). The Eisenhower administration (1953–1960) used various strategies to install military

dictatorships in Iran, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Haiti, and it undermined the popular revolution in Bolivia. In the cases of Iran and Guatemala, the CIA acted to undermine nationalist governments that were seeking to take control of natural resources that were being exploited by foreign corporations, and it supported the consolidation of repressive dictatorships that lasted for years (LaFeber 1994, 544–547; Regalado 2007, 122). But during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the USA attained its political objectives in these nations without recourse to direct military action or military intervention, in accordance with the rules of neocolonial domination.

The foreign policy of the administration of John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) gave emphasis to the Third World as the arena of the Cold War conflict between the superpowers, developing a perspective that viewed the national liberation movements and newly independent nationalist governments as expressions of communism and Soviet influence, downplaying their nationalist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist character (Arboleya 2008, 151). The Kennedy strategy toward the Third World included the development of a US capacity for counterinsurgency, involving armed confrontation with the revolutionary movements of the Third World. The Special Forces ("Green Berets") were developed in order to give the armed forces the capacity for a flexible response in any place or circumstance in the world. In addition, the CIA became involved in training military and paramilitary groups in the neocolonies of the Third World, developing techniques that included "'death squads,' the indiscriminate application of the torture of political prisoners, the assassination and disappearance of alleged insurrectionists, and the dissemination of terror among the civil populations in the zones of conflict" (Arboleya 2008, 154–155; cf. Chomsky 2003, 191–192). In Vietnam, the Kennedy administration provided economic aid and military advisors to the government of South Vietnam, but it stopped short of direct military engagement; its goal was for the government of South Vietnam to become a stable and viable political force in its own right (McNamara 1996). In spite of its active engagement in the Third World, the Kennedy administration avoided direct military action in the neocolonies, in accordance with the strategy of neocolonial domination. It viewed imperialism as a global project with a democratic face. In its view, direct military occupation undermined the US claim to be defending democracy in the world.

Thus, from 1946 to 1963, the US imperialist policies ensured influence over, if not control of, the economic policies of many nations of the world, thus obtaining or protecting markets for industrial and agricultural products as well as sources of raw materials and cheap labor. As the hegemonic power of the world-system, it did not dominate through military power alone. Military force was only one component of an imperialist policy that included a variety of strategies, including *coups d'état*, political maneuvers, support of repressive military dictatorships, and interference by US diplomatic missions in the internal affairs of nations. The various strategies had the primary objective of ensuring that the governments of the Third World adopted policies, laws, and commercial regulations that guaranteed US access. In the continuous pursuit of this objective, a military with nearly uncontested power was developed, but the strategy was to keep military intervention to a minimum and to avoid confrontation with the superpowers of the competitive but significantly weaker socialist network of nations. The constraint on military action was central to the US ideological strategy of presenting itself as the global defender of democracy.

Beginning in 1965, the world-system entered a sustained and profound structural crisis, as a result of the resistance of the colonized, and as a result of the fact that it had reached and overextended the geographical limits of the earth. At the same time, in accordance with normal world-system cycles involving the rise and fall of hegemonic powers (Wallerstein 2000, 255–256), the USA began an economic decline, relative to other core powers. In this situation, the USA began to violate the basic rules of neocolonial domination, which it had played a leading role in developing, and which were necessary for the political stability of the neocolonial world-system. We will be analyzing these themes in Chap. 6.

However, at the heights of its power, the USA confronted the Cuban Revolution, a spiritual and moral force that it was incapable of understanding. Whereas the US story has been one of the spectacular accumulation of wealth and power through insertion into structures of conquest and domination, culminating in the division and confusion of the nation, the Cuban story has been one of resistance to domination, in search of national dignity and human meaning. The remarkable Cuban story has deep roots in its history.

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CHAPTER 2

The Cuban Anti-colonial Revolution

The Peripheralization of Cuba

As has been observed, the conquest, colonization, and peripheralization of vast regions of the world by seven European nation-states from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries involved the imposition of systems of forced labor for the production of raw materials, thus establishing a world-system in which the core nations have access to cheap labor and cheap raw materials as well as markets for their surplus manufactured goods. In the case of Cuba, forced labor included African slave labor, indigenous slave labor, and the Spanish colonial labor systems of the *encomienda* and the *repartimiento*. Five raw materials were exported such as sugar, tobacco, coffee, gold, and cattle products.

1. **Gold** nuggets were extracted from riverbed sand immediately following Spanish conquest of Cuba in 1511 and 1512. Father Bartolomé de las Casas documented the brutal treatment of the indigenous slaves, who toiled in the riverbeds from dawn to dusk. The exploitation of the gold ended in 1542, with the exhaustion of the gold and the near total extermination of the indigenous population, as a result of the harsh conditions of labor, the effects of disease, and the disruption of indigenous systems of production (Foner 1962, 20–32; López Segrera 1972, 35–49; Pérez 2006, 18–22).

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2. **Cattle products**, exported to Spain, or to other European nations via contraband trade, constituted the principal economic activity in Cuba in the period 1550–1700. The cattle haciendas, using low-waged indigenous labor, were ideal for the conditions of limited supplies of labor and capital that existed in Cuba during the period.
3. **Sugar** plantations, oriented to export to Europe, were developed utilizing African slaves. They were first developed in Cuba at the end of the sixteenth century, and they continued to expand, especially after 1750, in conjunction with the expansion of the capitalist world-economy. Sugar plantations and slavery dominated the economy and defined the Cuban political–economic system during the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries.
4. **Coffee** production, like sugar, was developed using African slave labor. It was never developed on the scale of sugar, but it was a significant part of the export economy of colonial Cuba. It expanded after 1750, and it received a boost in Cuba as a result of the arrival of slaveholders and their slaves from Haiti following the Haitian revolution (Barcia et al. 1996, 259–260; López Segrera 1972, 36, 60–158; Pérez 2006, 32–33, 40, 48, 54–65).
5. **Tobacco** production for export emerged in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Whereas sugar, coffee, gold, and cattle products were developed in Cuba in accordance with a peripheral function in the world-economy, tobacco production in Cuba was developed as a combination of peripheral-like and core-like characteristics. It was peripheral-like in that it was a raw material produced for export to the core of the world-economy. However, it was produced not by forced low-waged laborers but by middle-class farmers. By the first half of the eighteenth century, some tobacco growers had accumulated sufficient capital to develop tobacco manufacturing. Tobacco production and manufacturing represented a potential for the development of Cuba that was different from the peripheral role represented by sugar, coffee, and slavery. During the first half of the eighteenth century, there was a possibility that Cuba would emerge as a semiperipheral nation, with a degree of manufacturing and economic and commercial diversity. Contributing to this possibility was the diversity of economic activities in the city of Havana, as a consequence of its role as a major international port. But with the expansion of sugar production after 1750, the peripheral role defined by sugar and coffee

became predominant, although tobacco production by middle-class farmers and tobacco manufacturing continued to exist (López Segrera 1972, 75–76, 90–91; Pérez 2006, 33, 40).

Consistent with the general patterns of the world-system, the peripheralization of Cuba created its underdevelopment. There were high levels of poverty and low levels of manufacturing. The vast majority of people lacked access to education, adequate nutrition and housing, and health care. Relatively privileged sectors, such as tobacco farmers, tobacco manufacturers, and the urban middle class, found their interests constrained by the peripheral role and by the structures of Spanish colonialism. Only owners of sugar and coffee plantations benefitted from the peripheralization of the island, and even they were constrained by Spanish colonialism. Spain played a parasitic role, imposing taxes and a monopoly on commerce (via compulsory government trading posts), and lacking the capacity to provide markets for Cuban products or capital for investment.

The War of Independence of 1868

During the nineteenth century, conditions of underdevelopment gave rise to a Cuban anti-colonial movement, which would have contradictory dynamics. In the colonial situation, the elite within the colony has an interest in substituting its rule for that of the colonial power, but in preventing a popular revolution that would place the newly independent nation under the control of the popular classes. In the case of Cuba, the estate bourgeoisie (plantation owners) had an interest in eliminating the parasitic role of colonial Spain, thus establishing itself as a peripheral elite in a semi-colonial republic, with popular interests and demands contained, similar to the Latin American republics. In contrast, as a result of the deepening of peripheralization, the popular classes and sectors (formed by workers, peasants, slaves, free blacks and mulattos, and the petit bourgeoisie) had an interest in a political and social transformation that would place the popular classes and sectors in power and that would create the possibility for severing the core-peripheral relation and establishing autonomous economic development.

Prior to the development of an anti-colonial movement in Cuba, slave rebellions and other forms of slave resistance were an important part of the political landscape of Cuba (Pérez 2006, 55, 72–74; Foner 1962, 48–50). The conditions during slavery of extreme and brutal repression

made impossible the development of a social movement, able to form organizations and formulate programs and ideologies. Nevertheless, slave resistance and rebellion were an important expression of a spirit of rebellion that emerged as an integral part of Afro-Cuban culture. And because of the high degree of cultural and ethnic integration in Cuba, the Afro-Cuban cultural characteristic of courage and audacious rebellion would become an important influence on the Cuban movement of national liberation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, there emerged in Cuba a number of intellectuals whose writings and teachings provided the foundation for Cuban national consciousness and identity, which as it evolved would unite two critical ideas: the independence of Cuba and the abolition of slavery. The most outstanding of these intellectuals was Father Felix Varela, a professor at San Carlos Seminary in Havana. In general, Catholic priests, many of whom were from families of the Cuban estate bourgeoisie, played an important role in the development of progressive Cuban political thought. The emerging Cuban nation, however, did not join in the Latin American independence movements of the early nineteenth century. Cuban landholders feared that an independence movement would unleash uncontrollable forces from below, as had occurred in Haiti from 1789 to 1805 (Barcia et al. 1996, 12–14; Castro 1990, 5; Larrúa Guedes 1997; Vitier 2006, 5–41).

But a Cuban ethic, integrally tied to social and political movement, continued to evolve, an ethic that sought Cuban autonomy in accordance with universal human values. On this moral and spiritual foundation, the Cuban Revolution was launched on October 10, 1868, when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a landholder and slaveholder in the Eastern province of Oriente, declared, at his plantation La Demajagua, the independence of Cuba and the freedom of his slaves, a gesture followed by other slaveholders present. Seeking to enlist the support of Western landholders to the independence cause, Céspedes called for the gradual and compensated abolition of slavery, rather than immediate abolition. Subsequently, landholders from the central provinces of Camaguey and Las Tunas joined the insurrection. On April 10, 1869, the Republic of Cuba in Arms was established in the town of Guáimaro in Camaguey. Its Constitution declared the abolition of slavery. However, the independence war of 1868 failed to attain its goals. The 1878 Pact of Zanjón ended the war without conceding the independence of Cuba, and it granted liberty only to those slaves who had fought in the insurrectionist

ranks. Various factors contributed to the failure of the Ten Years' War: the opposition to the struggle on the part of the Western landholders, who feared that the unfolding forces would unleash an uncontrollable revolution from below; divisions between the executive and legislative branches of the Republic in Arms, which led to the destitution of Céspedes as president in 1873; the deaths of Céspedes in 1874 and Ignacio Agramonte in 1873, the two principal leaders of the revolution; and a tendency toward regionalism and *caudillismo* in the revolutionary army (Arboleya 2008, 49–51; Barcia et al. 1996, 25–52, 94–96, 140; López Segrera 1972, 112–115, 126–129; Pérez 2006, 86–93; Vitier 2006, 5–8, 42–69).

In sum, the independence war of 1868 was a revolution of national liberation and a democratic anti-slavery revolution. Although it was led by Eastern landholders, it inspired the popular sectors to active participation, including the rural and urban middle classes, revolutionary intellectuals, an emerging proletariat, artisans, slaves in the liberated zones, and free white, black, and mulatto farmers. It forged a common struggle, uniting popular sectors, overcoming divisions of class and race. It failed to achieve its objectives, as a result of disunity among the leadership and the premature deaths of two of its principal leaders (Barcia et al. 1996, 2–3; Castro 1990, 6).

José Martí

José Martí, the son of Spanish immigrants from Valencia and the Canary Islands, was born in 1853 in Havana. His father worked as a bureaucrat in the Spanish colonial administration. The young Martí was greatly influenced by his teacher, the Cuban patriot Rafael María de Mendive, from whom he learned the teachings of Cuban nationalist thought and its concepts of Cuban independence and the abolition of slavery. Martí was imprisoned in 1869 at the age of 16 for his activities in support of Cuban independence, and he was deported to Spain a year later. He subsequently lived in Madrid, Guatemala, Mexico, and New York City, spending fourteen years in the USA from 1881 to 1895. He played a central role in the further development of the Cuban nationalist ethic, seeking to overcome the divisions and ideological limitations that had led to the failure of the independence war of 1868–1878 and the "*Guerra Chiquita*" of 1879–1880. Seeking to establish in political practice the necessary unity and ideological clarity, he formed the Cuban

Revolutionary Party in 1892. He died in combat in 1895, shortly after the beginning of the second Cuban war of independence (de Armas and Rodríguez 1996, 391).

The injustice of colonial domination in Cuba and the violence and brutality against the Cuban black population had a profound impact on Martí. He sought to form a common consciousness that would be the basis for political action and for the forging of a popular democratic revolution by all, regardless of race or class. He envisioned independence not only from colonial Spain but also from the imperialist intentions of the USA. And he envisioned a republic by and for the good of all, regardless of race or class. In reflecting on these issues, he synthesized a wide variety of intellectual and moral tendencies, including naturalism, positivism, and the perspective of the indigenous peoples of Mexico and Central America (de Armas and Rodríguez 1996, 387–390; Vitier 2006, 74–78).

Martí formulated his vision at a time in which conservatism and reformism dominated the public discourse in Cuba. Even in its most progressive expressions, reformism did not advocate independence, much less an independent republic characterized by inclusion and social equality. Thus, what Martí proposed seemed impossible. But Martí believed that the task of Cuban patriots was to make possible the impossible. And this is attained through a commitment to integrity and duty, which involves above all the seeking of truth, thereby overcoming distortions and confusions. For Martí, the delegitimation of the distortions that emerge from colonialism, slavery, and domination constitutes the necessary foundation of a struggle for liberation. He believed that heroes emerge that lead the way, heroes that are dedicated to the "redeeming transformation of the world" (Vitier 2006, 91) through sacrifice and the seeking of the truth (Vitier 2006, 78–91).

Because of the confusion dominating the public discourse in Cuba as well as restrictions imposed by the colonial situation, Martí focused his efforts on the Cuban émigré community. But even the Cuban emigration was characterized by many divisions: class divisions between the petit bourgeoisie and the factory workers (concentrated in tobacco factories in Florida); racist attitudes among white Cubans; various currents of conservative and reformist thought among the petit bourgeoisie; and currents of socialist and anarchist thought, which held nationalist patriotic struggles in disdain, among factory workers. Accordingly, Martí formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1892, with the intention of forging an ideological unity in support of fundamental principles:

the independence of Cuba; the formation of an independent republic not controlled by colonial or imperialist powers; the development of an inclusive republic by all and for the good of all, regardless of race or class; and identification with the oppressed and the poor (Arboleya 2008, 55–57; de Armas and Rodríguez 1996, 403–411; Vitier 2006, 92–97).

As a result of his fourteen years in the USA, Martí was aware that capitalism was entering a phase of monopoly capital, that is, large and concentrated industries and banks, and that this made possible an imperialist penetration by the global powers in nations that are formally politically independent, a phenomenon that we today call neocolonialism. He thus considered anti-imperialism to be a necessary component of a genuine struggle for national liberation. He believed that imperialism has a psychological base in disdain for the peoples of the world and an ideological base in the belief in the superiority of whites over blacks and of Anglo-Saxons over Latinos. He believed that the Cuban struggle for national liberation was part of a global struggle against US imperialism that not only would establish the sovereignty of the colonized peoples but also would save the dignity of the people of the USA (Arboleya 2008, 58; de Armas and Rodríguez 1996, 392–399).

The vision of Martí stood in opposition to powerful interests: colonial Spain; the USA, increasingly penetrating economically in Cuba and positioning itself to emerge as a neocolonial power in relation to Latin America; and the Cuban estate bourgeoisie, owners of sugar and coffee plantations in Cuba. The emerging industrial bourgeoisie could support the vision of Marti, to the extent that its economic interests were tied to the vitality of the domestic market. Recognizing the formidable enemies that such a vision would create, Martí conceived the Cuban Revolutionary Party as a political structure that would unify the popular classes and sectors that had an interest in the development of the alternative society. These popular classes and sectors included agricultural workers, small farmers (independent and renting), urban workers, the middle class, blacks and mulattos (Arboleya 2008, 55–58; Raimundo 2009, 88–90).

Although Martí had discerned the need a coalition in defense of popular interests, as against the interests of the national bourgeoisie, he had not read Marx. As a result, he underestimated the tenaciousness and the unpatriotic boundlessness of the national bourgeoisie. He believed that, to the extent that the popular revolution advanced toward the attainment of its goals, the Cuban national bourgeoisie would join the independence struggle as the best option in defense of its “diminished

interests" and that it would join in the construction of a society "by all and for the good of all." In fact, however, the national bourgeoisie actively supported the counterrevolution in the 1890s, and it did not abandon the colonialist cause until 1898, when the military incapacity of Spain and the impossibility of its restoring the Cuban economy became evident. Beginning in 1898, many members of the Cuban national bourgeoisie incorporated themselves into the US-directed counterrevolution, which sought to contain the popular revolution through the imposition of neocolonial structures (Arboleya 2008, 60–61).

The Second War of Independence, 1895–1898

The Cuban revolutionary movement under the leadership of Martí launched the second war of independence in 1895. Martí was killed in battle, at the age of 42, in the first months of the war, an incalculable loss to the Cuban revolutionary movement. Tomás Estrada Palma assumed the direction of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, which during the independence war of 1895–1898 functioned as a government outside the country parallel to the revolutionary forces in Cuba. Estrada Palma is described by Jesús Arboleya, as having been an "obscure but respected figure" who had participated in the independence struggle since 1868. However, he did not share the anti-imperialist perspective of Martí, and he considered that once the Cuban people attained its independence from Spain, annexation by the USA would be an acceptable democratic option (Arboleya 2008, 61; de Armas and Rodríguez 1996, 387–390; Vitier 2006, 74–78).

During the war, the revolutionary forces, directed by Generals Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, adopted a strategy of burning the sugar fields in order to destroy the production and commerce that sustained the colonial regime. Responding to this strategy, the colonial government placed the rural population in concentration camps in towns and cities, with the result that 200,000 persons died from malnutrition and disease. Apart from the civilian losses, it was a war with high casualties, with one-third of the Spanish soldiers and one-fifth of the revolutionary troops killed in battle. The war was unsustainable for Spain, as a result of popular opposition in Spain, provoked by the high level of casualties; escalating government debts caused by the war; and the destruction of the Cuban economy. By 1898, Cuban revolutionary forces controlled the countryside and the Spanish army controlled the most

important population centers, which were under siege by Cuban forces. The revolution was approaching triumph (Arboleya 2008, 59–60, 63).

As the Cuban revolutionary forces advanced, many members of the Cuban national bourgeoisie abandoned the country and pressured Estrada Palma to support a US military intervention, which was being proposed by some sectors in the USA, because of the threat that the popular revolution posed to US imperialist intentions. Estrada Palma came to support US intervention, without insisting upon any guarantees of representation of the Cuban people, or with respect to the role of the Cuban revolutionary military forces, in an independent Cuba (Arboleya 2008, 60–63; Barcia et al. 1996, 519–523).

Cuban scholars call the Spanish–Cuban–American War the conflict that US historians have called the Spanish–American War. Cuban historians emphasize that the support provided by Cuban revolutionary forces was indispensable for the USA taking of Santiago de Cuba, the only bastion of importance in which US interventionist forces were able to attain control. In the subsequent peace treaty, negotiated without Cuban participation, Spain ceded Cuba to the USA. Ignoring Cuban interests, the treaty prohibited the entrance of Cuban revolutionary forces into the cities, and it contained no terms for the transfer of power to the Cuban revolutionary forces. Estrada Palma supported the treaty and persuaded the revolutionary military chiefs to accept it, presenting the USA as an ally of the Cuban revolutionary movement (Arboleya 2008, 62–64; Instituto de Historia de Cuba [IHC] 1998, 3).

In this historic moment characterized by US maneuvering in pursuit of imperialist interests, with the collusion of Estrada Palma and the Cuban national bourgeoisie, the absence of the advanced understanding of Martí was a critical factor. Máximo Gómez wrote in his diary, "It is a difficult moment, the most difficult since the Revolution was initiated. Now Martí would have been able to serve the country; this was his moment" (quoted in Arboleya 2008, 63). Also critical was the death in combat in 1898 of Antonio Maceo. Maceo unified the most radical sectors of the revolution as a result of the enormous prestige in which he was held by the popular sectors, rooted in his refusal to accept the Pact of Zanjón in 1878 and his leadership of a continued political–military resistance that sought to attain independence and the total abolition of slavery, which came to be known as the Protest of Baraguá (Arboleya 2008, 59, 61, 63, 68; Barcia et al. 1996, 140–149, 503–504).

The US interventionist government was established on January 1, 1899, under the command of Major General John Rutter Brooke. A necessary precondition for the establishment of a republic in Cuba under US control was the dismantling of Cuban revolutionary institutions, which was accomplished during 1898 and 1899, with the dissolution of the three principal Cuban revolutionary institutions, namely the party, the army, and the legislative assembly. (1) On December 21, 1898, Tomás Estrada Palma had dissolved the Cuban Revolutionary Party that Martí had established. (2) A Representative Assembly, elected in zones controlled by the Government in Arms, constituted the civil authority of the revolution. But its authority was not recognized by the US military government, and it lost the confidence of the people by seeking to dismiss Máximo Gómez from the position of Chief of the Liberator Army. The Representative Assembly dissolved itself on April 4, 1899. (3) Rather than demobilizing, Máximo Gómez kept the revolutionary army quartered, maintaining that Cuba had not yet attained independence. Gómez considered the possibility of mobilizing the Cuban revolutionary forces, in spite of possible repercussions, such as an expanded US occupation or US annexation of Cuba. However, in light of divisions and distrust between Gómez and the civilian leaders and the absence of a consensus to continue the armed struggle, he concluded that this was not a viable option. The revolutionary army was demobilized, and the soldiers received compensation through funds donated by the US government (Arboleya 2008, 66–68; IHC 1998, 7–11).

On July 25, 1900, the US military governor convoked elections for a Constitutional Assembly. Suffrage was limited to men who had financial resources or were literate or who had served in the liberation army, thus excluding all women and two-thirds of adult men (Pérez 2006, 182). The elections were held on September 15, 1900; thirty-one delegates from three recently formed political parties were elected. Inasmuch as the revolutionary institutions had ceased to exist, the development of a revolutionary plan of action with respect to the Constitutional Assembly was not possible. Political games were played, and candidates without commitment to Cuban self-determination vis-à-vis US imperialist intentions presented themselves as *independentistas*. The Constitutional Assembly was a confusing mix, with ideological divisions within parties and alliances across parties. In addition, there was the pressure established by the continuous US threat of a permanent military presence if the results were not in accordance with US interests (Arboleya 2008, 67–69; IHC 1998,

24–27; Pérez 2006, 182). Because of these dynamics, the Constitution did not reflect the experiences of the Cuban national liberation struggle, and it had a "made in the USA" character. As Arboleya, writes, "The Constitutional Assembly was the burial of the Republic of Martí. It created a government whose structure copied in its fundamentals the North American model.… Nothing was said in relation to social rights, nor of the obligations of the state in the economy and in the protection and aid of citizens, nor of the strategy that ought to be followed with respect to foreign capital, the monopolies or the large estates" (Arboleya 2008, 69).

The US government, however, was not satisfied with the results. It insisted that the Constitutional Assembly approve an amendment that would grant the USA the right to intervene in Cuba. The USA insisted upon the Platt Amendment, as it would be called, in order to demonstrate to European powers, especially Great Britain, its determination to establish economic control over Latin America, and to show to US corporations its political will to protect their investments from foreign competition. Under threat of continuous US military occupation, the Constitutional Assembly approved the Platt Amendment on June 12, 1901, by a vote of 16 to 11, with four abstentions (Arboleya 2008, 70–71; IHC 1998, 28–34).

The Establishment of the Neocolonial Republic

Following the approval of the Cuban Constitution of 1901, mechanisms were established for elections. Máximo Gómez, sensitive to the fact that he was Dominican, declined to be a candidate for president, in spite of popular clamor in support of the Chief of the Revolutionary Army. Tomás Estrada Palma and Bartolomé Masó emerged as the leading candidates. Both had been involved in the independence struggle since 1868. Estrada Palma was a believer in limited government and *laissez faire* economics, and he was an admirer of the USA. As we have seen, he assumed the leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Party upon the death of Martí in 1895, and he dissolved this important revolutionary institution on December 21, 1898. Masó, in contrast, was an opponent of the Pact of Zanjón of 1878 and the Platt Amendment. He was suspicious of US intentions, and he demanded the absolute independence of Cuba. US military governor Leonard Wood, acting in accordance with US interests, supported Estrada Palma. He filled the electoral commission with Estrada supporters and took other steps that created suspicion of electoral fraud. In light of this situation, Masó withdrew, with

the result that the only candidate on the ballot was Estrada Palma, who received votes from 47% of the electorate (IHC 1998, 37–41).

Jesus Arboleya maintains that the election of Estrada Palma was a reflection of the political vacuum that resulted from the dismantling of revolutionary institutions and the emergence of nebulous groups that formed alliances on the basis of particular interests, personal loyalties, or interests of a local character. These dynamics made impossible the formation of political parties with clearly defined analyses and programs of action, and they facilitated a political fragmentation that the USA was able to exploit in order to attain its imperialist interests. The administration of Estrada Palma, who was inaugurated as president of the formally politically independent Republic of Cuba on May 20, 1902, principally served US interests rather than the needs of the people or the true sovereignty of the nation. It rejected government interference in the economy, and it followed a program of low taxes, limited spending, and limited social programs. There was no support for small farmers, as was demanded by the people. The government did not adopt laws restricting foreign ownership of land, as was proposed by Senator Manuel Sanguily (Arboleya 2008, 75–76; IHC 1998, 46–49).

In 1906, the USA again occupied Cuba, in reaction to violence associated with the reelection of Estrada Palma. Charles E. Magoon, who had previously governed the Panama Canal Zone, was named to govern the island by President William Howard Taft. Magoon named the principal leaders of Cuban political parties to government posts, leading to high levels of corruption. The second US occupation ended in 1909, and constitutional and electoral "democracy" was restored. From 1909 to 1925, there were three elected presidents, which also were notorious for their corruption. During this period, commercial relations between Cuba and the USA were ruled by a Treaty of Reciprocal Commerce, which the two nations signed in 1903, during the government of Estrada Palma. The Treaty reduced US customs taxes on Cuban sugar, tobacco, and other products by 20%, and it reduced Cuban tariffs on many US-manufactured products by up to 40%. The treaty increased the organic integration of the Cuban export of crude sugar and tobacco leaf with the sugar refineries and tobacco factories of the USA. And by expanding the access of US manufacturers to the Cuban market, it undermined the development of Cuban manufacturing, and thus contributed to the "denationalization" of the Cuban economy (Arboleya 2008, 76; IHC 1998, 46–211).

US commercial and financial penetration of Cuba, which had begun during the period of 1878–1895, dramatically increased after the establishment of the neocolonial republic. US corporations became owners of sugar, railroad, mining, and tobacco companies in Cuba, displacing Cuban as well as Spanish and English owners. The rapid entrance of US capitalists was made possible by the ruin of many proprietors in Cuba, caused by the establishment of the dollar as the currency of exchange in the Cuban domestic market, provoking the automatic devaluation of other currencies, and by the denial of credit to competitors of US companies. In the first decade of the republic, US investments in Cuba multiplied five times. By 1920, US corporations directly controlled 54% of sugar production, and US ownership reached 80% of the sugar exportation companies and mining industries. Thus, we can see that in the early years of the republic, the Cuban government promoted the interests of US corporations, rather than protecting the interests of Cuban capitalists through such measures as the protection of the national currency, the providing of credit, and the establishing restrictions on foreign ownership (Arboleya 2008, 52–54, 65–66, 80; IHC 1998, 110).

Because of increasing US ownership, the Cuban bourgeoisie was in the process of being reduced to what Arboleya calls a "figurehead bourgeoisie." It had two principal tasks in the evolving neocolonial system: firstly, to administer foreign companies and provide them with legal and financial advice; secondly, to control the population and ensure political stability. In addition, US neocolonial domination had an ideological component. More than one thousand Cuban schoolteachers received scholarships to study in the USA, and US textbooks were used in Cuban schools. North American secondary schools emerged to compete with Catholic schools in the education of the Cuban bourgeoisie and middle class. Large US companies created cultural enclaves, and North American social clubs provided social space for interchange between the Cuban bourgeoisie and representatives of US companies. Cuban architecture imitated the great buildings of the USA; North American films appeared in Cuban cinemas; Cuban newspapers provided news from the Associated Press and the United Press International; and Cuba became a favorite destination for US tourists (Arboleya 2008, 65, 80–81, 91–92).

The neocolonial situation made corruption endemic, as personal enrichment through the state became the principal means of individual upward mobility (Arboleya 2008, 77–78). The government could not respond to the common good as demanded by popular movements,

but it could provide a career in public life for officeholders. Inasmuch as governments have significant revenues that are distributed in various public service and public works projects, they provide opportunities for economic enrichment for many who have relations with the officeholders. And this situation of economic opportunity connected to the state occurs in a political context that is devoid of a meaningful social project. Pérez's description (2006, 214–220) of the distortions of the political process as facilitating corruption in the early years of the republic provides insight into the social sources of corruption in neocolonized Third World countries.

In analyzing the transition from Spanish colonial domination to US neocolonial domination, Arboleya notes that the Cuban revolutionary leadership of the era was not sufficiently unified or ideologically prepared to resist the new form of domination being imposed. The leadership was ideologically prepared to effectively resist most efforts by the USA to reimpose *colonial* domination under its tutelage; accordingly, the Cuban government prevented the USA from claiming jurisdiction of the Isle of Pines, the largest island of the Cuban archipelago; it was able to reduce US demands for four military bases to one. But the Cuban leadership was unprepared to defend the Cuban nation against *neocolonial* domination, as indicated by the signing of a Treaty of Reciprocal Commerce, which strengthened US control of the Cuban market and reinforced Cuban dependency on the USA. This failure to defend the national interests in the face of *neocolonial* domination was a result of ideological penetration, which had generated confusion and limited understanding. The death of Marti was an important factor in facilitating lack of unity, purpose, and understanding in relation to national interests and popular needs (Arboleya 2008, 68–71, 75–77).

Thus, we see that in the early years of the Republic of Cuba, the basic structures of neocolonial domination were established: A political process that is unable to respond to the interests and needs of the people; the preservation of the core-peripheral economic and commercial relation that was established during the colonial era; the reduction of the national bourgeoisie to a figurehead bourgeoisie that is unable to lead the nation in the development of an autonomous national project; ideological penetration of the neocolony by the culture and political concepts of the neocolonial power; and endemic corruption, as a consequence of its being an available strategy for upward mobility. The neocolony is the survival of the colony in a new form, and it lives on a foundation of

fiction, for it pretends to be democratic. As the Cuban poet, essayist and novelist Cintio Vitier has written, "The colony was an injustice; it was not a deceit. The Yankee neocolony was both" (2006, 122–123).

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CHAPTER 3

The Failure of the Cuban Neocolonial Republic

Instability in the Neocolonial Republic

Two conditions are necessary for the stability of a neocolony. The first is economic. The neocolony and the neocolonial world-system must have sufficient resources to partially satisfy popular demands, so that the state in the neocolony can make use of concessions (combined with political repression) to limit the influence of the radical sector of the movement leadership, which seeks a revolutionary transformation of the neocolony. The second condition is political. There must be commitment by the core neocolonial power to satisfy the material interests of the figurehead bourgeoisie, so that the latter will have sufficient interest and credibility to mobilize political and ideological resources in defense of the neocolonial system. These two conditions are intertwined. When global economic resources are reduced, the political commitment of the core neocolonial power to support the figurehead bourgeoisie is weakened. Within the neocolony, when national resources are reduced, the figurehead bourgeoisie has less capacity to carry out its political and ideological role of social control and containment of popular movements. In the case of Cuba, the necessary conditions for political stability did not exist in the period 1920–1933, because of economic and political developments both in Cuba and in the world-system. The result was that advanced revolutionary movements, beyond the capacity of the figurehead bourgeoisie to contain, emerged in Cuba from 1923 to 1935. The neocolonial republic entered a period of crisis (Vitier 2006, 111–146).

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The first sign of crisis was the "crack" of 1920, provoked by the abrupt fall of sugar prices during the second half of 1920. The vulnerability of a peripheralized economy to the boom and bust cycles in raw materials is a normal tendency, because of its dependency on one or two raw materials for export. Prior to 1920, Cuban sugar producers expanded production in response to high prices, utilizing loans obtained from Cuban banks. However, with the sharp fall in prices, Cuban producers were unable to meet debt payments to Cuban banks. The Cuban banks had been functioning as intermediaries, borrowing from North American banks in order to make loans to Cuban producers. As a result, the fall of prices placed Cuban banks in a position of being unable to make debt payments to North American banks. Initially, the Cuban government protected the Cuban banks by decreeing a moratorium on debt payments by Cuban banks. But North American companies located in Cuba as well as the Roosevelt administration, acting on behalf of the interests of North American banks, pressured the Cuban congress to enact laws in 1921 that ended the moratorium, that established procedures for the liquidation of Cuban banks, and that reorganized the banking system of the country (Arboleya 2008, 91; IHC 1998, 194–195).

As a result of the new laws, twenty Cuban banks were liquidated. At the end of 1920, 80% of deposits in banks operating in Cuba had been in Cuban banks, but by the end of 1921, 69% of Cuban bank deposits were in foreign banks operating in Cuba, led by the National City Bank of New York and the Royal Bank of Canada. At the end of 1920, Cuban banks had been the owners of 71% of bank loans, but by the end of 1921, foreign banks operating in Cuba held 82% of bank loans (IHC 1998, 194–197). As Jesus Arboleya has written, "North American financial capital became the proprietor of the national wealth as well as the monopolist of the system of commerce and credit, which meant the nearly total denationalization of the sugar industry and banking of the country" (2008, 91). Aggravating the situation, US sugar producers, responding to the lower price of sugar, pressured the US Congress to modify the Reciprocal Trade treaty of 1903 and to increase the customs duties on Cuban sugar during 1921 and 1922, with negative consequences for Cuba.

These political decisions by sectors of the US elite had the effect of reducing the power and authority of the Cuban figurehead bourgeoisie, thereby reducing its capacity to fulfill the ideological and political functions necessary for the stability of the neocolony. And this would occur

precisely at a time when the declining price and market for sugar would have negative consequences for Cuban popular sectors, reducing income and increasing unemployment. The deteriorating social and economic situation of the popular sectors in the early 1920s gave rise to the emergence of leaders who could channel popular discontent into popular protest. They established organizations that were able to analyze the denial of popular needs as rooted in the neocolonial situation; that named the national bourgeoisie as collaborators with an imperialist power, violating the sovereignty of the nation; and that could mobilize the people to collective social action.

During the early years of the neocolonial republic, workers had organized in defense of their rights. But the Cuban workers' movement prior to 1917 was limited by tendencies toward apolitical anarchism (which disdains efforts to take power), trade unionism (which organizes workers separately in each trade), and reformism (which seeks concessions from the bourgeoisie rather than the taking of power by the working class). However, the Russian Revolution of October 1917 provided a stimulus to its evolution to a more advanced stage. In 1918 and 1919 in Cuba, as elsewhere in the world, there emerged: an identification with the Russian Revolution; the beginning of assimilation of the principles of Marxism, connecting it to anti-imperialism; the putting forth of political and social demands in addition to labor issues; and an increasing tendency toward class unity as against craft unionism. And there occurred a significant increase in strikes and mass action by railroad, construction, tobacco, and dock workers and truck drivers, putting forth demands that responded to the most important concrete needs of the workers, such as wage increases, recognition of labor unions, and an eight-hour workday (IHC 1998, 79, 124–126).

In the societies of the North, the capitalist class was able to channel the labor movement in a reformist as against revolutionary direction through a combination of repression and concessions to workers' demands, which were made possible by profits generated through the superexploitation of the colonies and neocolonies of the world-system. And the labor movement in the North developed in a context of ideological justifications of colonial domination, an ideology of racial superiority, and a social custom of racial segregation. But the workers' movement in Cuba developed in a different context that would channel it toward revolution. When it emerged during the first two decades of the neocolonial republic, popular consciousness in Cuba already had taken significant

steps to overcome social divisions among whites, blacks, and mulattos, as a result of the legacy of Martí. As the contradictions of the neocolonial republic became evident, popular consciousness of the neocolonial situation continued to develop. Thus, in the 1920s, the labor movement in Cuba began to evolve in a form integrally tied to a popular struggle for national liberation, which saw the resolution of the problems confronted by each sector as necessarily tied to the national problem of foreign domination (IHC 1998, 128, 223–226; Vitier 2006, 133).

Julio Antonio Mella

The Cuban popular movement of the 1920s was an integrated movement that addressed issues of race, class, gender, and imperialism, and that included diverse actors, such as industrial workers, agricultural workers, small farmers, students, women, small merchants, professionals, and intellectuals. An inclusive popular movement was emerging in practice, and it would lift up charismatic leaders who would formulate a popular revolutionary understanding, such as Julio Antonio Mella.

Born in Havana in 1903, Julio Antonio Mella was the son of Nicanor Mella and Cecilia McPartland. Nicanor was born in the Dominican Republic; he was the son of a general who was a hero of the Dominican independence struggle. Nicanor received his secondary education in France, and he migrated to Cuba in 1875, at the age of 24. He lived for fifteen years in the Cuban province of Matanzas, where he apprenticed as a tailor. He was married to a Dominican woman, with whom he had three daughters. In 1890, he relocated to Havana, where he was proprietor of a prosperous tailor shop, located in the commercial center of Old Havana. His income provided a comfortable living, and he often traveled to the USA for the purchase of cloth and other supplies. He met Cecelia McPartland in New Orleans about 1900. She was born in Dublin, and she was the daughter of a poor Irish farmer who had migrated to the USA. Nicanor and Cecelia lived for several years in Havana, without being legally married, and they were the parents of two boys, Julio Antonio and Cecilio. Nicanor transmitted to his sons his admiration for his father the military general, his support for the independence struggles in the Dominican Republic and Cuba, and his opposition to the US military intervention of 1898–1902 and to the imperialist projections of the USA toward Latin America. Nicanor regularly read the principal

newspapers and news magazines of the era, with particular attention to international news (Cupull and González 2010, 15–20).

Julio Antonio Mella was enrolled in various private schools in Havana, New Orleans, and Mexico. He was an avid reader, particularly appreciating the works of Martí, and he became an advocate of Latin American unity in a common struggle for true independence. With the triumph of the Russian Revolution, he became influenced by Marxism and the (Third) Communist International, but he remained a strong advocate of truly independent Latin American republics, in accordance with the ideals of Bolívar and Martí. He traveled to Mexico in 1920, and the Mexican Revolution also influenced his thinking. He entered the University of Havana in 1921 at the age of 18, and he immediately was integrated into a group of leaders of a student organization against corruption, which had become one of the principal problems of the neocolonial republic. In December 1922, Mella was the leading force in the establishment of the University Student Federation (FEU), which on January 10, 1923, issued a manifesto calling for the autonomy of the university, the participation of students in the administration of the university, and reform of the curriculum. On January 15, the students took control of the university campus, which resulted in recognition of FEU as a student organization by the Cuban government (Cupull and González 2010, 9–10, 13, 20–40, 46–65; IHC 1998, 220–221).

FEU convoked the First National Congress of Students in 1923. It emitted a "Declaration on the Rights and Duties of the Student," which included the right to freedom of teaching, without government interference, based on scientific knowledge; the duty to respect the great teachers, who make sacrifices for the well-being of humanity; and the duty to work intensely for personal development with respect to moral and intellectual truth. The Congress also declared its opposition to a permanent treaty between Cuba and the USA, and it called for Latin America unity against the Pan-Americanist project of the USA. A motion signed by Mella and others was read to the Congress. It decried the hypocrisy of the imperialist nations, which "have formed an unspoken international partnership of crime, pillage and oppression, impeding the self-determination and the progressive development of the peoples." It protested "the outrages committed against the peoples of the Caribbean, Central America, the Philippines, Ireland, Egypt, India, and Morroco," calling for the true self-determination of said peoples. And it called for

diplomatic recognition of the Russian socialist republic (Cupull and González 2010, 65–70; IHC, 1998, 221–222).

Although Mella was the leading force in the university reform movement of 1922–1923, it was clear to him by the beginning of 1924 that the reform of the university could not be attained as long as the country remained under neocolonial domination. He had concluded that a social revolution was necessary in order to make a university revolution. In 1923, Mella was a leading figure in the establishment of the José Martí Popular University, which was dedicated to the formation of the working class. Mella gave lectures on such themes as "The failure of the political system" and "The danger of Yankee capitalism," and he taught a course on the History of Humanity and Cuba. The Popular University became a center for exchange of ideas between students and workers, until it was closed by the government in 1927 as part of a campaign of repression against the popular movement. In August 1924, Mella presided over the creation of the Confederation of Students of Cuba, which brought together university and pre-university (high school) students. It declared its commitment to the principles of the First Congress of Students, and it called for the absolute independence of all educational institutions from the control of the state, with freedom of action for teachers and students, and for the dismissal of corrupt professors. It proclaimed its "antipathy to the political parties," and it declared that "the greatest enemy of the peoples of America is Yankee imperialist capitalism, which bribes governments and corrupts public opinion in order to exercise its tutelage over the peoples of [Latin America]" (Cupull and González 2010, 74–87, 101; IHC 1998, 223, 225, 260–261; Vitier 2006, 135).

With Carlos Baliño López (1848–1926), Mella founded the first Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) in 1925. Baliño, a pioneer of Marxism in Cuba, was a tobacco worker and one of the founders with José Martí of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1892. The PCC was immediately declared illegal, and it was condemned by the press. Its leaders were murdered, with the number of assassinations reaching 150 during its initial years. Many of its members were deported or incarcerated. It survived, however, operating clandestinely. It was the most disciplined and politically conscious organization of the country, although it had some tendency to apply European concepts to the Cuban situation, a characteristic not shared by Mella. The PCC had considerable influence among workers and peasants, and it was a recognized affiliate of the Third

International (Arboleya 2008, 97; Cupull and González 2010, 80–81, 104–106; IHC 1998, 227–230).

Mella was formed in the moral and intellectual environment established by the powerful teachings of Martí. But Mella had experienced the "rotten fruit" (Vitier 2006, 131) of representative democracy. He had seen what Martí could not imagine: the participation of the Cuban national bourgeoisie in the imperialist project of the USA, reducing itself to a figurehead bourgeoisie; the participation of ample sectors of the middle class in the corruption of the Republic; and the loss of direction, the "moral blindness" and the "inertia of the soul" (Vitier 2006, 125) that defined the society of the Republic. From Mella's vantage point, Martí's formulation of a society made by all and for the good of all, in which the national bourgeoisie and the popular sectors would cooperate, seemed impractical. Mella discerned the need for a struggle by workers, peasants, and the poor that would take power from the political class that had surrendered its dignity to the interests of US corporations and that had forgotten the needs of the humble. Thus, Mella gave a Marxist reading to Martí. By deepening its awareness of the dynamics of class differences and contradictions, he pushed the legacy of Martí to a more advanced stage. But he preserved essential dimensions of Martí, such as anti-imperialism in defense of national independence as well as the ethical messages of Martí, such as the need for personal sacrifice in defense of ideals. Mella, therefore, contributed to the evolution of Marxism–Leninism, in which its political theory and practice would be integrally tied to the struggles of neocolonized peoples for full independence (IHC 1998, 223; Vitier 2006, 124–136).

Mella was arrested on November 27, 1925, falsely accused of having placed a bomb in a theater. He carried out a hunger strike from December 5 to December 23 in protest of his unjust arrest. The government was compelled to release him, as a result of national and international protest. With the government seeking to detain him again, Mella departed Cuba clandestinely in January 1926. During three years of exile in Mexico, he continued his revolutionary activities. Only 23 years of age when he arrived in Mexico, he joined the Mexican Communist Party and became a part of its Central Committee. Mella was assassinated in Mexico City on January 10, 1929, by an agent of the Cuban government, an event that provoked international protests. Mella was an important figure in the evolution of a Cuban ethic, tied to political

theory and practice, and in the evolution of Cuban Marxism–Leninism. He is remembered and appreciated in Cuban popular consciousness today for his important contributions to the development of the Cuban Revolution and as a symbol of the revolutionary tradition of Cuban students (Cupull and González 2010, 107–114, 120–121; IHC 1998, 260, 274–277; Vitier 2006, 136).

The Cuban Women's Movement of the 1920s

In the early 1920s, Cuban women experienced profound prejudice and discrimination, rooted in law and social convention. The immense majority of women of employment age did not work, and working women received salaries much lower than men for the same work. Women did not have the right to vote or to hold public office. The rights of women in the family also were minimal, as is illustrated by a law effectively granting a husband authorization to kill an adulterous wife (IHC 1998, 217–218).

In 1918, the Feminine Club of Cuba was formed, which led to the establishment of the National Federation of Feminine Associations of Cuba in 1921. The Federation convened the First National Congress of Women, held from April 1 to April 7, 1923, in which thirty-one organizations participated. The delegates to the Congress were middle-class women with a variety of political, social, and religious perspectives, but on common ground with respect to the issue of gender. The Congress called for a campaign for woman suffrage; a struggle for the attainment of full and equal social, political, and economic rights for women; a battle against drugs and prostitution; the securing of laws for the protection of children; and the modification of teaching and education. The Second National Congress of Women, held from April 12 to April 18, 1925, passed resolutions similar to those of the first Congress (IHC 1998, 217–218).

The evolution of social movements is significantly influenced by the political, economic, and ideological environment, and accordingly, the evolution of the women's movement in Cuba has been different from its evolution in the USA. The women's movement in the USA was formed in the 1840s, and it developed for the next twenty years in a national environment influenced by the abolitionist movement and the subsequent struggle for the protection of the rights of the emancipated slaves. In this progressive environment, the women's movement called for full political, economic, and social rights for women, challenging laws and

social conventions with respect to women in all areas of life. But from the 1870s to the beginning of the twentieth century, the nation turned to the Right, developing laws and customs of racial segregation and discrimination, and developing imperialist policies with respect to other lands. In this conservative ideological context, the women's movement narrowed its program to the protection of the right to vote, and it de-emphasized calls for a comprehensive transformation of the economic and social position of women. The US sociologist Stephen Buechler (1990) describes this process as the transformation from a women's rights movement to a woman suffrage movement. Later, in the context of the social movements that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, the women's movement would rediscover its liberationist roots, and it would be able to affect significant and permanent social changes with respect to women, although it has been restrained since the restoration of the conservative mood in 1979. At the same time, consistent with limitations in the development of US popular movements, the evolution of the women's movement would be characterized by limited integration with movements formed by other popular sectors of African-Americans, Latinos, indigenous peoples, workers, and farmers.

In contrast, the women's movement in Cuba emerged at a time of the revitalization of popular revolutionary movements in the 1920s, and it evolved in the context of the continuing popular revolution, which triumphed in 1959. For both the women's movement and the various popular sectors that formed the revolution in Cuba, the compelling mutually beneficial political strategy was the integration of women's demands into the popular struggle. At the same time, the turn of the popular movement to Marxism–Leninism, with its prior appropriation of the principle of full equal rights for women, gave ideological reinforcement to the integrationist strategy. Thus, the dynamics in Cuba favored the tendency for the women's movement to continue its radical demands for the full political, economic, and social rights of women and for a social transformation with respect to gender, integrating itself into a general popular struggle that was seeking a fundamental political-economic-social-cultural transformation.

Machado and the Promise of Reform

In the presidential elections of 1924, Gerardo Machado launched a vigorous campaign full of promises of reform, such as more scrupulous management of public funds; respect for the Constitution and for public

opinion; the limitation of the presidency to one term; recognition of the autonomy of the university from the government; the raising of workers' salaries; and the protection of national industry through tariffs and other measures. The campaign rhetoric of Machado was a departure from the traditional electoral language, and it represented the aspirations of the petit bourgeoisie as well as the sector of the bourgeoisie most connected to national industry. His candidacy thus enjoyed the support of ample social sectors (IHC 1998, 240–242).

Machado had extensive ties with the North American financial oligarchy, including the above-mentioned National City Bank. He also had strong ties with Spanish large-scale merchants in Cuba and with the Cuban political class that had emerged to dominate the republic in the period 1902–1924. His governing strategy was to support the interests of all of these sectors as well as popular demands. Seeking to stabilize sugar prices, he imposed restrictions on sugar production, and he attempted to induce the sugar-producing nations in Europe and Japan to also set limits on sugar production. Seeking to protect Cuban sugar producers from losing land to the large US sugar companies in Cuba, he established temporary restrictions on the development of new sugar plantations and processing plants. In order to stimulate employment, particularly during the "dead time" in sugar production, the Machado government initiated an extensive program of public works, using funds borrowed from the Chase National Bank of New York. The public works plan included the construction of the Central Highway, the National Capital, schools, hospitals, aqueducts, and a sewer system (IHC 1998, 242–249).

In 1927, the government of Machado enacted a tariff reform, with the intention of diversifying industry and agriculture. The reform was modest, seeking to protect certain branches of Cuban production without challenging fundamental US interests in Cuba. The areas of Cuban production that benefitted included coffee, beer, cornmeal, butter, cheese, cement, matches, fans, starch, furniture, soap, paper, sausage, chocolates, sweets, footwear, lime, putty, bricks, clay tile, straw hats, cigarettes, rope, and bottles. The tariffs also protected industries that had not yet emerged in Cuba: textile manufacturing; certain lines of milk; petroleum refining; and the manufacture of paints, tires, and chemical and pharmaceutical products. Some US companies were able to take advantage of the new tariff regulations to establish factories in Cuba in branches of production that had not yet been developed or to establish

control of Cuban production in a protected sector. For example, US companies developed factories in Cuba for the manufacture of paints and pharmaceutical products. Colgate-Palmolive signed an agreement that enabled it to control the production of soap and a line of perfume products in Cuba, and Esso Standard Oil developed a petroleum refinery in Cuba (IHC 1998, 249–251).

The Machado plan to balance the interests of the international bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the demands of the popular sector did not succeed. World sugar producers did not participate in the control of production, generating a new situation of overproduction and lower prices. The USA reacted by reducing its purchase of Cuban sugar, in accordance with the interests of US sugar producers. Thus, Cuban income from sugar production declined significantly during 1927 and 1928. And the protection of national industry and agriculture provided by the Machado plan was not sufficient to generate significant expansion and diversity in production. The Machado plan was reformist, seeking to reform the neocolonial system, not break the neocolonial relation. Such a project, seeking to satisfy elite interests as well as respond to popular demands, can succeed only in favorable moments, as for example, when the national income generated by sugar is high. Inasmuch as the neocolonial system involves the appropriation by the core of profits generated by peripheral and semiperipheral production, it depends upon the superexploitation of peripheral and semiperipheral regions, thus placing inherent limits on the satisfaction of popular demands. Therefore, popular demands cannot be met through the reform of the neocolonial system, except in the short-term and in favorable moments; the long-term and sustainable satisfaction of popular demands requires breaking the core–peripheral economic relation and establishing structures that facilitate the autonomous development of each nation, supported by mutually beneficial trade among nations (Arboleya 2008, 113, 132, 135, 156–157; IHC 1998, 245–253).

In spite of his promise of reform, the Machado government from the outset encountered popular opposition. In reaction, Machado turned to repression, including assassinations, imprisonment, and deportations of leaders in worker and student organizations. In addition, Machado engaged in political and legal maneuverings to ensure his reelection to a second six-year term as the only candidate on the ballot. The university administration supported the Machado campaign of repression, expelling students who were involved in the popular movement. Meanwhile, the

major newspapers sought to generate popular sentiment against the popular movement, maintaining that, due to the pernicious influence of foreign anarchists, the movement was engaging in terrorist acts (IHC 1998, 253–277).

The Cuban Popular Revolution of 1930–1933

The repression of the Machado government could not force the end of the popular movement. Beginning in 1930, new popular political leaders emerged who were influenced by Marxism and were tied to the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which had been established by Mella and López in 1925. They brought the PCC to a position of prominence in the popular revolution during the period 1930–1932. Rubén Martínez Villena became the *de facto* leader of the Cuban Communist Party and the National Worker Confederation of Cuba (CNOC), a nationwide confederation of workers' organizations representing agricultural and industrial workers, after the exile and assassination of Mella and the assassination in 1926 of Alfredo López, who had been the leading force in the CNOC. Martínez Villena was a poet whose verses of 1923 had described the "moral blindness," the "inertia of the soul," and a "profound sensation of the impossible" that characterized the neocolonial republic, and they evoked the sun that illuminates the revolutionary imperative that would cast aside the fatalistic sense of the impossible, driven by a "yearning for the salvation of the beloved land" (Vitier 2006, 125–128).

PCC, CNOC, and other organizations tied to both called for a general strike for March 20, 1930. Under the slogan "Down with Machado," the demands announced by PCC/CNOC included: the revocation of a government measure that declared CNOC illegal; the release of workers who had been detained for promoting the general strike; respect for the right of workers to organize and to strike; freedom of press and of association; the limit of the working day to eight hours; and measures in support of the unemployed, including an assistance payment, suspension of evictions and rent and debt payments, and aid for transportation, meals, and lodging. In spite of the always-present fear of reprisal, two hundred thousand workers and employees responded to the call, and the economic activities of Havana and various other cities were paralyzed for twenty-four hours. The success of the strike demonstrated the prestige that Martínez Villena and the PCC had attained among the popular classes, overcoming

obstacles created by the repression of the government. Further demonstrating that it was a strong political force, the PCC led mass demonstrations in Havana and in other cities in commemoration of the First of May (IHC 1998, 288–289; Vitier 2006, 137).

In addition to addressing concrete demands of workers, the platform of the PCC embraced without ambiguity the demands of peasants and agricultural workers for land and for the cessation of evictions. This enabled it to have success in the rural areas in the organization of leagues and committees of peasants and agricultural workers. Its general strategy was to form organizations of workers and peasants in urban and rural areas and to organize strikes and demonstrations in order to develop a popular, democratic, and anti-imperialist revolution that would evolve to a socialist revolution led by the working class. Its goal was to establish a socialist government, controlled by popular councils composed of workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors (IHC 1998, 287, 296).

In addition to the PCC and CNOC, other organizations emerged during 1930–1932. In the fall of 1930, the University Student Directorate (DEU) was formed, and it organized student demonstrations. On September 30, it issued a reformist manifesto, "To the People of Cuba," which condemned the crimes of the Machado tyranny against workers, students, and political opponents; denounced the assassination of Julio Antonio Mella; criticized the corruption of the regime; expressed disapproval of the growth of the public debt; called for the restoration of constitutional democracy; embraced the principles of university reform; and called for a struggle against the Machado tyranny. Its insurrectional practices included strikes, student demonstrations, underground propaganda, sabotage, and execution of government dignitaries and henchmen. The DEU was characterized by diverse ideological tendencies, with the result that, in early 1931, Leftist students split from DEU to form the Student Left Wing (AIE). AIE denounced the reformist orientation of DEU, and it called the students to an anti-imperialist revolution of national and social liberation, a revolution directed by the proletariat in alliance with the peasants and the radical petit bourgeoisie (Arboleya 2008, 98; IHC 1998, 289–290; Vitier 2006, 137–138).

Women's organizations also actively participated in the popular uprising against the Machado tyranny. The Feminist National Alliance established the right of women to vote as its principal slogan. In May 1930, the Feminist National Alliance was reorganized as the Labor Union of Women, and a few months later, Oppositionist Women was formed,

although it primarily had a reformist orientation. On January 8, 1931, the police violently broke up a demonstration of women in front of the Presidential Palace. After that date, the repressive brutality of the Machado regime made no gender distinction, and many women were included among the detained and, in some cases, the assassinated. In addition, many intellectuals, professors, and professionals also were opposed to the Machado tyranny, the great symbol of which was Enrique José Varona. Most professors, for example, adhered to the positions of DEU, and most professional organizations adopted positions of reformist opposition to the Machado government (IHC 1998, 290–291).

There also was a reformist opposition composed of leaders of traditional political parties that sought to bring down the government of Machado by means of armed struggle. This group, which called itself the "Revolutionary Junta of New York," included Mario García Menocal, the third president of the neocolonial republic. In spite of its use of the word "revolutionary" and the means of armed struggle, its goals were reformist. It sought through the armed struggle to induce the USA to withdraw its support of the Machado tyranny and to overthrow the Machado government, with the intention of establishing a "democratic" government that would not be detrimental to US interests and that would close the road to popular revolution. In August 1931, the Revolutionary Junta organized an armed expedition that disembarked on the north coast of the western province of Pinar del Río, and it coordinated uprisings in the central and eastern provinces. But the expedition soon surrendered to government troops without offering resistance, and the other uprisings were quickly put down (Arboleya 2008, 98; IHC 1998, 292–293).

Among those who participated in the armed insurrection led by the Revolutionary Junta of New York was Antonio Guiteras Holmes. Born in 1906 in Montgomery County near Philadelphia, Guiteras was the son of Calixto Guiteras Gener, a Cuban who was the son of a teacher and had earned a degree in engineering, and Marie Theresse Holmes Walsh, an Irish-American from Philadelphia. The family lived in the USA, speaking English in the home, until 1913, when the family relocated to Cuba, and Antonio and his sister learned Spanish, even though the family continued to communicate in English. The family relocated to the western province of Pinar del Rio, where Calixto taught French. Antonio completed pre-university studies in Pinar del Rio, and he entered the University of Havana in 1924, enrolling in the pharmacy program. When the Student Revolutionary Directorate was formed in April 1927, he was elected by

the pharmacy students as their representative in the organization. Upon receiving a Doctor of Pharmacy degree in August 1927, he began to work as a pharmacist in Pinar del Rio (Cairo 2007, 327–355).

Guiteras relocated to Havana in 1929, and in 1931, he became involved with anti-Machado conspirators, activities that brought him to Holguin and Santiago de Cuba. As part of the actions of the Revolutionary Junta in August 1931, Guiteras and his followers engaged government troops in a brief combat in a plantation in the eastern province of Oriente. The rebels suffered three casualties, and they were captured and imprisoned. During his four months in prison, Guiteras worked with Felipe Fuentes in winning followers among the prisoners. Fuentes was a communist leader from Oriente and was one of the founders of the Student Left Wing (Cairo 2007, 357–360; IHC 1998, 292).

Following the failure of the insurrection led by the Revolutionary Junta of New York, Guiteras severed ties with the Junta and formed an independent organization, the Revolutionary Union, in order to develop his own revolutionary project. Guiteras was influenced by a number of revolutionary movements and ideas, including: Cuban revolutionary theory and practice, in which Martí and Mella were the most influential leaders/intellectuals; the Russian Revolution; the Mexican Revolution; the struggle of Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua; the Irish independence movement; the ideas of Antonio Blanqui on the role of the revolutionary vanguard; the ideas of the French socialist Jean Jacques Jaurés; and the analyses of Marx and Lenin. The Revolutionary Union united a number of existing small insurrectional groups in the eastern and central provinces. Its members included professionals, intellectuals, artisans, service employees, workers, farmers, veterans of the independence war, and students. It advocated a popular, democratic, agrarian, and anti-imperialist revolution of national liberation that would create conditions for the gradual construction of a socialist society in Cuba (Arboleya 2008, 99; Cairo 2007, 360–361; IHC 1998, 293–294).

The strategy of the Revolutionary Union was urban and rural armed struggle, utilizing such tactics as sabotage, execution of government representatives and police officers, the taking of military barracks, and guerrilla actions in the countryside. Guiteras conceived a plan for the taking of the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, with the intention of arming the people and creating a guerrilla struggle in the eastern mountains, but the plan was frustrated by the maneuvers of the army. On April 29, 1933, the Revolutionary Union took the barracks of San Luis,

but Guiteras and his followers were forced to withdraw in the face of an army counterattack, although they were able to avoid capture. In the second half of 1933, small guerrilla units, composed principally of peasants, emerged in the eastern and central provinces of the country, under the direction of Guiteras and the Revolutionary Union, and they continued to operate until the fall of Machado on August 12, 1933 (Arboleya 2008, 99; IHC 1998, 294, 297).

In addition, ABC, a fascist organization, was formed by a group of intellectuals and lawyers in August or September of 1931. It was opposed to the Machado government and to the popular movement. Its leaders were admirers of Mussolini, and its program was influenced by Italian fascism. It was organized in secret cells, and its methods included assassinations of government leaders, sabotage, and propaganda. It had a degree of support among the popular classes, particularly the middle class (Arboleya 2008, 98; IHC 1998, 293).

Thus, the panorama in Cuba in the period 1930–1933 was characterized by a "democratically" elected but brutally repressive government, a popular opposition that was mostly revolutionary but that included reformist elements, a bourgeois reformist opposition that launched an aborted armed struggle, and the emergence of fascism. The two principal popular organizations, the PCC and Revolutionary Union, had revolutionary goals, for they sought to develop a revolution of national and social liberation and to establish a socialist society ruled by popular sectors. They had different strategies, both implemented with a degree of success: The PCC was organizing and educating the people, and the Revolutionary Union was able to sustain armed struggle in rural areas. The neocolonial republic was in full crisis, and the inherent contradictions of neocolonialism were fully exposed. The USA, concerned that its interests would be compromised by the coming to power of the popular revolution, began to search for a way to end the Machado regime but to preserve a neocolonial republic in accordance with its interests.

US Mediation and the Rise of Batista

With respect to Latin America, Franklin D. Roosevelt continued the imperialist policies of his predecessors. He sought to reactivate and increase the sale of US manufactured products in Latin America and the purchase of Latin American raw materials by the USA. His strategy for this revitalization of the core–peripheral commercial relation, weakened

by the Great Depression, was to negotiate trade agreements with Latin American governments. However, because of the influence of popular anti-imperialist movements in Latin America, he sought to avoid direct US military intervention and to present US policy with a more democratic face, proclaiming that the USA desired to be a "Good Neighbor" (Arboleya 2008, 103–107; IHC 1998, 297–298; Regalado 2007, 118; Toussaint 1999, 171–172, 179–180; Zinn 2005, 392–396, 401–403).

Roosevelt named Benjamin Sumner Welles as US ambassador to Cuba. Welles' task was to bring about the end of the political conflict and the restoration of constitutional authority by means of personal mediation and without US military intervention. Welles arrived in Cuba in May 1933, and Machado was obligated to accept the mediation of the US ambassador, because of pressure from US companies in Cuba as well as the Cuban national bourgeoisie. Welles proposed the restoration of constitutional guarantees and freedom for political prisoners; the holding of elections in 1934, with Machado staying in office until May 20, 1935, when he would be replaced by the newly elected president; the cessation of anti-government activities by the fascist (ABC) and reformist opposition; amnesty for members of the Machado government for crimes committed by the regime; and a clampdown on the revolutionary opposition (IHC 1998, 298).

The reformist opposition and ABC accepted Welles' proposals and suspended all activities in opposition to the regime. However, the revolutionary opposition, consisting of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), the National Worker Confederation of Cuba (CNOC), and the Revolutionary Union, rejected the proposals. After some hesitation, the reformist University Student Directorate (DEU) also rejected Welles' proposals. Thus the popular organizations ignored the mediation of Welles and continued the offensive. In August 1933, a general strike was organized by PCC and CNOC, which put forth social and economic demands as well as a demand for the removal of Machado from power. Machado proposed acceptance of the social and economic demands but not his departure. The leadership of PCC and CNOC recommended acceptance of Machado's proposal, but the workers, meeting in general assemblies, decided to continue the general strike until the dictator be overthrown. The leaders of PCC and CNOC conceded to the workers' desires, and the general strike continued (IHC 1998, 298–299).

Concerned by the possible triumph of the popular revolution, and fearful that the national situation could provoke a US military

intervention, which could lead to the dissolution of the Cuban armed forces, high-ranking army officers rebelled on August 12, compelling Machado to resign. The plans of the US ambassador for an orderly transition to a post-Machado government and the re-establishment of order to the neocolonial republic were ruined. With the flight of Machado, US ambassador Wells maneuvered to establish a government that would be capable of frustrating the popular revolution. He pressured the Congress to designate as president Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a bland politician who possessed a level of popular support, by virtue of being the son of the first President of the Republic of Cuba in Arms, established in 1869 during the first Cuban war of independence. In accordance with the desires of the US ambassador, Céspedes was designated president on August 13 (IHC 1998, 299–300).

The Céspedes government was supported by the national estate bourgeoisie as well as the reformist opposition to Machado. In addition, the fascist ABC, with paramilitary structures of direct action, was an important social base of support. However, inasmuch as the Cespédes government had been established by the US ambassador, it was lacking in moral authority in the eyes of the people. The Céspedes government tried to take advantage of popular hostility to Machado by setting aside the changes that the Machado regime had made in the Constitution, placing the Constitution of 1901 in full vigor. But the workers continued with the wave of strikes, directed by committees elected by the masses, putting forth economic, social, and political demands. At the same time, the Communist Party of Cuba, the Revolutionary Union, and the University Student Directorate sought to bring down the Céspedes government, each using different strategies. The Céspedes government lasted only three weeks, and it was characterized by vacillations. It was a moment of anarchy, including executions of Machado government officials by the enraged people (IHC 1998, 300–302).

In the Cuban army and navy, there had emerged a caste division between the officers, who proceeded from the upper and middle classes, and the non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and sailors, who were from the lower classes. The officers lived in a privileged manner, and they were abusive toward non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, whose salaries were low. In addition, non-commissioned officers were disheartened by the role that the army had played during the Machado regime, lowering its prestige among workers and peasants. As a result, revolutionary and reformist ideas permeated the ranks of enlisted men, and there

were significant contacts between them and Guiteras, the Revolutionary Union, and the University Student Directorate (IHC 1998, 302–303).

On September 4, 1933, the sergeants, corporals, and enlisted men seized control of the military base of Columbia. With the participation of leaders of the University Student Directorate and some university professors, they formed the Revolutionary Group of Cuba, which declared itself to be the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Cuba. It announced a program that reflected the reformist proposals of the University Student Directorate: the convoking of a constitutional assembly; affirmation of the principles of representative democracy; the establishment of special tribunals for the trial and punishment of officials of the Machado government; protection of the life and property of citizens and foreigners; and recognition of the good faith and patriotism of the members of the Céspedes government. The Revolutionary Group received the support of the units of the army, navy, and police throughout the country, so that chiefs and officers were replaced by sergeants, corporals, and soldiers across the nation (IHC 1998, 303–304).

Among the members of the Revolutionary Group was Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. He suggested that the key leaders of the rebellion in Columbia, located in Havana, travel to the cities of Matanzas and Pinar del Río, in order to control the uncertain situation in the barracks of these cities. This enabled Batista to personally conduct negotiations in the early morning of September 5, with respect to the first public proclamation by the recently created Revolutionary Group. The "Proclamation to the People of Cuba" was signed by sixteen civilians, two ex-military men, and only one military man in active service, Batista, who signed the document with the self-designated title of "Revolutionary Chief Sergeant of all the Armed Forces of the Republic." Later that same day, Batista issued a public statement in the name of the armed forces, signed by him, and he met with the US ambassador. In this way, Batista came to be identified in public opinion as the leader of the sergeant's revolt. When the other leaders returned to the capital, they decided to accept the facts that had transpired, including the new prominent role of Batista, rather than undermine the sergeant's revolt through an internal struggle for power (IHC 1998, 303–304).

On September 5, the Revolutionary Group established a collective presidency of five persons, implementing a proposal to this effect that had been put forward a month earlier by the University Student Directorate. The "Pentateuch," as it was called by the people, could

not function, because ideological divisions among the five prevented the emergence of consensus. So the Pentateuch was dissolved on September 10, and Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín was named President. During its five days of life, the Pentateuch promoted Batista to the rank of coronel. The era of Batista had begun (IHC 1998, 304–305).

The Government of "100 Days"

The government of Ramón Grau San Martín lasted from September 10, 1933, to January 15, 1934. Although short-lived and characterized by internal contradictions, the "government of 100 days" was an important moment in the neocolonial republic, because it was independent of the USA, and it enacted a series of progressive reforms that had potential implications for the breaking of the neocolonial relation.

There were three factions in the Grau government, in contradiction and conflict with one another. The Rightist faction was led by Batista, who refused to enter the cabinet but controlled the armed forces. Batista supported the interests of US imperialism and the Cuban oligarchy, and during the Grau government, he was in constant communication with the US ambassador. The second faction, the nationalist-reformist element, was led by Grau and leaders of the University Student Directorate. It advocated: the convoking of a constitutional assembly; the capitalist economic development of the country; laws for the protection of the rights of workers and the people; the eradication of racial and gender discrimination; the expansion of educational opportunity and of access to culture; the distribution of land to peasants and agricultural workers, but in a form that was consistent with the interests of the Cuban estate bourgeoisie; and the protection of Cuban political sovereignty, without undermining the alliance between the USA and Cuba. And it had an anti-communist ideology. Like Machado in 1924, the nationalist-reformist faction sought to reform the neocolonial system by making concessions to popular demands and at the same time protecting the interests of the US corporations and banks and the Cuban national bourgeoisie. However, in the neocolonial situation, such a reformist program can have success only in moments when prices for raw materialist exports are high, and it is not sustainable in the long run (IHC 1998, 306–307).

The revolutionary faction was led by Antonio Guiteras, who held the important cabinet post of Secretary of Government and War. As we have seen, Guiteras had led the armed struggle in the eastern and central

provinces against the Machado regime. As a prominent member of the Grau government, Guiteras sought to establish a government "where the interests of workers and peasants are above the profit desires of national and foreign capitalists" (quoted in IHC 1998, 308). He advocated the economic independence of Cuba with respect to the USA, the gradual nationalization of public services, the immediate distribution of land to peasants and agricultural workers, and social and employment equality for women (IHC 1998, 307–309).

The Grau government enacted a number of legislative reforms, proposed by Guiteras and made possible through tactical alliance between the revolutionary and reformist factions. The government adopted measures that sought to remove those tied to the Machado government from the political scene: the dissolution of the political parties; the designation of governors and mayors in the provinces; and the establishment of tribunals to sanction those who had been responsible for crimes committed by the Machado regime. With respect to economic policy, the orientation of the Grau government was toward greater intervention in the economy. Economic measures included the regulation of the sugar industry, with regulations favorable to small producers; suspension of the payment of the debt contracted by the Machado government with the Chase National Bank; and reduction in electricity rates. With respect to labor, the government recognized the rights of workers to form unions and to strike; it established a minimum wage; and it limited the working day to eight hours. In foreign affairs, the government adopted an anti-imperialist posture, calling for the abrogation of the Platt Amendment and rejecting US interference in the affairs of Latin American nations (IHC 1998, 309–310; Vitier 2006, 141–143).

The government of "100 days" was an independent and progressive government, even though troops under the command of Batista engaged in a ferocious repression of striking workers and the Communist Party of Cuba, made possible through a tactical alliance between the right and reformist factions, and a source of considerable conflict between the Batista and Guiteras factions. Citio Vitier writes that the government "emitted an impressive series of truly revolutionary laws and decrees." He describes it as "an audacious anti-imperialist offensive, the first realized in Cuba *from power*." With reference to Guiteras, he writes, "As incredible as it seems, Cuba was governing itself in the person of that pale, serious, direct and unyielding youth of twenty-six years of age" (Vitier 2006, 141–142; italics in original). Because of its progressive

character, the Grau government was under constant attack by the Cuban estate bourgeoisie, the associations of Cuban and foreign capitalists, the societies with roots in Spanish colonialism, the ex-officers of the armed forces, the reformist opposition to Machado, the fascist ABC, and the reactionary press (IHC 1998, 311–316).

The Roosevelt administration did not recognize the Grau government. On the day of the September 4 *coup*, Batista began to meet with Ambassador Welles, who was impressed immediately, and he soon came to view Batista as the best hope for an order consistent with US interests. By the end of October, Wells and Batista had arrived at a plan to replace Grau with Coronel Carlos Mendieta as president, with Batista as head of the armed forces. At first, there was opposition to the Batista-Wells plan by the Cuban elite, as a result of the fact that Batista was a mulatto of humble origins. But as the Grau government came to be increasingly influenced by the revolutionary faction, Wells and his successor, Jefferson Caffery, continued to lobby for the replacement of Grau. Under pressure, Grau resigned on January 15, 1934. Mendieta was installed as president on January 18, and the Mendieta government was recognized by the USA on January 23. Thus emerged a government that was "delivered by Caffery, directed by Batista, and represented by Mendieta" (IHC 1998, 304, 313, 316–318).

With the *coup d'état* of January 15, 1934, that ended the Grau government, Guiteras went underground, with the intention of organizing an armed revolutionary struggle against the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government. In March of 1934, Guiteras established *Joven Cuba* (Young Cuba). The preamble to its program states that Cuba continues to be a colonial state. The Cuban economic structure, according to the preamble, is subordinated to foreign capital, designed by and for foreign interests, and does not serve the collective needs of the people. The preamble maintains that the nation can attain stability only through a socialist state, which is constructed in various stages. It affirms anti-imperialism and defense of the sovereignty of the nation as basic principles. Its program advocates: agrarian reform; nationalization of public utility companies and of natural resources; nationalization of teaching; attention to the health, cultural, and housing problems of workers and peasants; diversification of foreign commerce; and elimination of racial and gender discrimination. *Joven Cuba* proposed the formation of a revolutionary struggle, composed of all classes and sectors that were victimized by neocolonialism, which would seek to take power and to establish a

revolutionary dictatorship that would utilize the power of the state to implement a popular, agrarian, anti-imperialist revolution of national liberation, which would serve as a preamble to the necessary socialist revolution. It advocated the taking of power by means of armed insurrection, including rural and urban guerrilla war, propaganda, sabotage, mobilization of the masses, revolts by soldiers and sailors, partial strikes, and revolutionary general strikes (IHC 1998, 327).

Joven Cuba spread rapidly, and cells were established throughout the island. Its activities included propaganda, sabotage, assassinations, and preparations for the breakout of a revolutionary war. It planned for an insurrection in stages, beginning with rural guerrilla forces supported by urban sabotage, and culminating in uprisings in the armed forces and a general revolutionary strike (IHC 1998, 327). However, in this stage of the revolutionary struggle, sectarianism was a central problem. The PCC and *Joven Cuba* had different strategies, and they were unable to form an alliance. Beyond these two principal organizations, a wide variety of small revolutionary groups emerged during 1934 and 1935, with different programs and tactics, giving rise to "constant antagonism and frequent confrontations among them" (Tabares del Real 1998, 328). The antagonism among the popular organizations was an important factor in enabling the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government to consolidate its power. As José Tabaras concludes, "The defeat of the revolutionary process ought to be attributed, not so much to the power of those who were opposed to it, but to the division of the revolutionary forces. Rather than uniting into a solid bloc the vast sectors of the people interested in a democratic and anti-imperialist revolution, the popular organizations wore themselves out in internal conflicts, proposing in an exclusive manner dissimilar political projects" (1998, 333).

Antonio Guiteras was killed by the army of Batista on May 8, 1935, in the city of Matanzas, as he was preparing to depart for Mexico in order to make preparations for the launching of a rural guerrilla war in Eastern Cuba, which were to be supported by urban units. Killed with Guiteras was Carlos Aponte, a Venezuelan who had been a coronel in the army of Sandino in Nicaragua. The remaining expeditionaries with Guiteras and Aponte were imprisoned. Ramón Grau San Martín went into exile in Mexico on January 20, 1934. Upon his arrival, he was acclaimed by a great multitude, which believed that he was the principal force behind the progressive laws that Guiteras had championed (IHC 1998, 319, 332; Vitier 2006, 143).

Batista Takes Control

Prior to the overthrow of Machado, "the chiefs of the armed forces were subordinate, in law and in fact, to civil authority, and they did not participate in the taking of political decisions" (Chang 1998, 320). The role of the armed forces of the neocolonial republic prior to 1934 was limited to carrying out repressive measures authorized by the president and other civil authorities, in exchange for which the chiefs were granted participation in the looting of the public treasury. But the *coup d'etat* of September 4, 1933, which led to the Grau "government of 100 days," and the *coup* of January 15, 1934, which established the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government, greatly strengthened the role of the military in political affairs. Accordingly, after the fall of Machado, "Batista and his army emerged as the true arbiters of the situation. The traditional political parties, fragmented and involved in endless fights that promoted their ambitions, only would occupy the space in governmental management that the formal maintenance of republican institutions required. Real power would be in the hands of the military chiefs, with Batista at the head" (Chang 1998, 346).

Through a series of laws and decrees between February and April of 1936, a number of institutions were created, all under the direction of the chief of the army and dedicated to such tasks as the creation and operation of rural schools and the providing of social services and services of public health. By virtue of a law of August 28, 1936, these various institutions were united in the Corporative Council of Education, Health, and Welfare, which pertained to the military. These measures increased the power of Batista and the military, by giving them control over areas that ought to be under the civilian authority of the government. The Corporative Council appointed teachers to the rural schools as well as health specialists, social workers, and administrators necessary for the various programs of social and health services. In addition to increasing his power, the Corporative Council also enabled Batista to improve his image, which had been severely damaged by his "well-earned fame as an oppressor of the people" (Chang 1998, 349), earned during the Grau government. The programs of the Corporative Council involved the military with the rural peasantry, converting officers and soldiers into agents of social change that were improving the conditions of life. However, taking into account the paternalistic character of the program, its idealistic solutions, and its lack of technical support, the program can

be interpreted as primarily intended to attain social support for the personal ambitions of Batista (Arboleya 2008, 109; Chang 1998, 348–350).

In August 1937, Batista launched the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction, a program dedicated to improving the conditions of life in the countryside. The program was launched by Batista personally, and it was accompanied by an ample propaganda campaign that proclaimed its benefits to the people. However, the proposed program did not touch the large landholdings, which constituted the principal structural source of rural poverty. And although the proposed program would have provided some support to small and middle peasants dedicated to sugar production, it provided no support for landless peasants or for peasants who were not tied to sugar production. In fact, analyses of the proposal maintain that, if it had been implemented, it would have led to loss of land and pauperization for 60% of peasant small landholders. The Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction can be interpreted as a further example of Batista astutely attempting to expand his personal power. He understood that he could not obtain the support of the workers and students through a program apparently designed for progressive social change, as a result of his previous repression against these sectors. So he was attempting to establish a social base of support in the rural population, which had less developed political consciousness and had been less directly repressed by the armed forces under his command. But the plan never attained the popular support that Batista had envisioned, as leaders of the popular movement provided penetrating analyses, exposing its deceptions and contradictions (Arboleya 2008, 109; Chang 1998, 357–360).

With respect to US–Cuban economic relations, Batista fully cooperated with US interest in increasing its access to foreign markets for its industrial and agricultural products. The Reciprocal Agreement between Cuba and the USA of 1934 reduced the tariffs on thirty-five articles exported from Cuba to the USA and 400 articles proceeding from the USA to Cuba. By increasing the Cuban percentage of US imports of sugar, the agreement facilitated a recovery for Cuban sugar producers. However, the recovery was merely partial, because the Cuban share was still only half of what it had been in the period 1925–1929, before US sugar producers began to lobby the US government to reduce the Cuban share, in response to the effects of the Great Depression. The Cuban recovery, moreover, had limited advantages for Cuba, for it was on the base of the historic peripheral role of sugar exportation; sugar comprised four-fifths of Cuban exports. In addition, the agreement

deepened overall trade dependency on the USA. By the end of the 1930s, Cuban trade with the USA reached three-fourths of Cuban foreign commerce (IHC 1998, 336–341).

Furthermore, the 1934 trade agreement, by reducing tariffs for US manufactured goods, failed to defend the development of Cuban national industry. Federico Chang notes that, in this respect, Cuba was different from other Latin American countries of the period, which had a "solidly defined policy of import-substitution," seeking to develop national industry. He notes that the Cuban oligarchy delivered "without reserve" the Cuban internal market, thus demonstrating its "complete subordination to the United States." Its "most abject servility" was revealed in its declarations that "praised the negotiations with the U.S. government as 'beneficial for the country'" (Chang 1998, 338–339, 342). Similarly, Francisco López Segrera (1972, 274) maintains that the 1934 commercial agreement frustrated possibilities for industrial development, reinforcing the position of Cuba as a consumer of manufactured products and producer of sugar. The agreement represented the mutual interests of US imperialism and the Cuban sugar oligarchy. The agreement deepened the core–peripheral relation between the USA and Cuba, in spite of the formal political independence of the island, thus exemplifying the process of neocolonialism.

Since the times of José Martí, the Cuban revolutionary movement sought to break the core–peripheral relation and the neocolonial structures that sustained it. But in the period 1933–1937, the revolutionary movement was unable to overcome its divisions, in spite of its considerable advances in theory and practice during the 1920s and 1930s. Batista was able to astutely combine repression of the revolutionary movement with concessions to the masses, adopting rhetoric that "integrated the revolutionary and nationalist protest into a counterrevolutionary and anti-nationalist neo-populism, disguised as democracy and worker concessions" (López Segrera 1972, 274). The result was a deepening of the core–peripheral relation with the USA.

The Return and Consolidation of Neocolonial "Democracy," 1937–1940

The national and international situation was changing, which was establishing conditions for a Batista alliance with the progressive and revolutionary popular forces of the nation. The new direction began in December 1937, when a government decree of amnesty resulted in the

release of 3000 political prisoners. During 1938, the Batista government initiated a series of reforms that involved the restitution of political and civil rights that are central to the functioning of representative democracy. In addition, in 1938, the government: ratified the autonomy of the University of Havana, a long-standing demand of the student movement; announced the postponement of the Plan for Social-Economic Reconstruction, which had been rejected as demagoguery by the popular movement; and announced its decision to convoke a constitutional assembly, another long-standing demand of the popular movement. Moreover, Batista met with Ramón Grau San Martín, the head of the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party, and Grau agreed that his party would abandon its persistent policy of abstaining from elections. And on September 13, 1938, the Communist Party of Cuba and other organizations were legalized, so that the PCC could now conduct its work of organization and popular education openly and without fear of repression (Chang 1998, 360, 372).

Various factors pushed Batista toward a democratic opening. Firstly, the usurpation of power by Batista and the military had generated opposition from the Cuban oligarchy, on whom he was dependent for support. He, therefore, needed to make concessions to the civilian political actors that represented the interests of the bourgeoisie. Secondly, Batista's move toward fascism during 1936–1937, symbolized by his combination of repression with a populist demagoguery particularly oriented to the rural population, could not reach its culmination, as a result of the changing world situation. The emergence of fascism in Europe was giving rise to a global conflict between fascism and democracy. Cuba, totally dependent on the USA, had to ally itself with the democratic camp and participate in the emerging global anti-fascist front. Thirdly, on August 17, 1937, Jefferson Caffery was replaced by J. Butler Wright as US ambassador to Cuba. Whereas Caffery had close ties with Batista, Wright was more attentive to the interests of other sectors in the development of US policy. Fourthly, the popular movement was growing in strength, in spite of the repression and demagoguery of the regime. The opening of political space for the popular movement was necessary for political stabilization (Chang 1998, 371–372).

Elections for the Constitutional Assembly were held on November 15, 1939. Continuing divisions among the opposition parties complicated the elections. Eleven parties nominated candidates. They were grouped in two electoral blocs: the Democratic Socialist Coalition,

headed by Batista; and the opposition bloc, led by the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC-A) of Grau. The Communist Party proposed to incorporate itself into the PRC-A, but Grau rejected the proposal, maintaining that the Communist Party candidates ought to be presented in the elections as members of their own party. At the same time, the bourgeois political parties that belonged to the Batista coalition proposed the inclusion of a popular program in its platform and an alliance with the Communist Party. Thus, the voters were presented with a confusing scenario. There was, on the one hand, the opposition bloc headed by the well-known reformer but anti-communist Grau, and, on the other, the bloc headed by the dictator Batista, who had been cultivating a democratic image and who now was allied with the Communist Party. In the end, of the seventy-six delegates elected, forty-one belonged to the four parties of the opposition bloc, and thirty-five pertained to five parties of the Batista bloc, including the Communist Party (Chang 1998, 376–377).

The Constitutional Convention was convened on February 9, 1940. With delegates of nine parties participating in the debates, and with all delegates free to express their personal views, a wide variety of positions were expressed. Juan Marinello, Blas Roca, and Salvador García Aguero, three of the six delegates of the Communist Party, provided important defenses of the rights of workers, peasants, and other popular sectors. The new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on June 8, 1940, and it was signed on July 1, 1940, in a ceremony held in Guáimaro, in the place of the signing of the first Constitution of an independent Cuba, establishing the Republic of Cuba in Arms, on April 10, 1869. The Constitution of 1940 was a product of the advances in theory and in practice of the Cuban popular movement, and it was advanced for its time. It recognized the full equality of all, regardless of race, color, sex, class, or similar social condition, and it affirmed the rights of women to vote and hold public office. It included articles on the regulation of work, including the obligation of the Cuban state to provide employment, the establishment of a maximum workday of eight hours and a maximum workweek of forty-four hours, and the recognition of the right of workers to form unions. It recognized the principle of state intervention in the economy, and it declared natural resources to be state property. It proscribed large-scale landholdings, and it established restrictions on the possession of land by foreigners. It established protections for small rural landholders, and it obligated taxes on sugar

companies. With respect to the restrictions on foreign ownership of land, it should be noted that the US government and its Cuban allies had attempted to limit the scope of the Constitutional Convention, concerned that it could establish restrictions on foreign ownership. But these interventionist maneuvers were denounced and repudiated by the popular sectors (Chang 1998, 376–381).

In accordance with the democratic opening, general elections were convoked in 1940. Batista and Grau were the contenders for the presidency. With the support of the alliance of the bourgeois parties and the Communist Party, Batista attained a solid victory, with 800,000 votes, as against 300,000 for Grau, in a total population of four and one-quarter million. The election was accepted by all as clean and fair (Arboleya 2008, 111–112). This turn to democracy occurred at a time in which economic conditions in Cuba were more favorable than they had been since prior to the "crack" of 1920. World War II halted sugar production in many countries, provoking an increase in sugar prices. At the same time, the war disrupted the flow of US manufactured goods to Cuba, creating possibilities for Cuban national industry. Accordingly, neocolonialism in Cuba was moving toward its full expression: superexploitation of Cuban labor; core access to sugar at low prices; core access to needed markets for surplus manufactured goods; the channeling of popular movements in a reformist direction; the appearance of democracy through elections; a degree of economic space for national industry, without contradicting the interests of international capital; and a level of political space for a political class centered around the military leadership, headed by Batista, which had a cooperative relation with the US government (López Segrera 1972, 281, 290). Cuba had arrived to be a "perfect neocolonial system" (Arboleya 2008, 112).

The Ultimate Failure of Neocolonial "Democracy," 1940–1952

In spite of favorable economic conditions in Cuba during the Batista presidency of 1940–1944, serious economic problems continued, including: expansion of unemployment in some sectors; and an increase in the cost of living, as a result of decline in the purchasing power of the national currency. These dynamics had significant negative repercussions for the people, generating popular discontent with the Batista government. Capitalizing on its role in the struggle in opposition

to the dictatorships of Machado and Batista, the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party emerged as the "great hope" of the people. Ramón Grau San Martín won the elections of 1944, defeating Carlos Saladrigas, the presidential candidate selected by Batista. True to the reformist orientation that characterized Grau's political career, Grau promised support for all sectors. He proposed to harmonize labor–management relations, without necessarily implying support for the workers in just demands that impinge on the interests of the national bourgeoisie. He promised agrarian reform, without specifying how, and without challenging the interests of the landed oligarchy. Recognizing an international context defined by a global conflict between democracy and fascism, he pointed to Cuba's system of representative democracy, and he proposed to increase economic and cultural relations with the USA (Arboleya 2008, 114–115; Le Riverend 1975, 324–326; Vitier 2006, 147).

The Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party was a party of the reformist national bourgeoisie, formed principally by an emerging industrial bourgeoisie. But the industrial bourgeoisie continued to be weak with respect to the landed estate bourgeoisie that controlled sugar production and that was allied with US capital. New industrial enterprises were created as a result of the decline of manufactured imports during World War II, but the number of new companies was not great, and some of the new investments in industry came from the landed oligarchy. Thus, the Cuban national industrial bourgeoisie continued to be subordinate to the Cuban landed estate bourgeoisie and to foreign capital. Its political party was in no position to propose a project of ascent through the protection of national industry and through the strengthening of the domestic market by increasing the purchasing power of the people. Although some members of the national industrial bourgeoisie proposed such reforms, the Authentic Party was not in a position to propose a combination of import-substitution industrialization and concessions to popular demands, thereby placing its interests in tension with those of the Cuban estate bourgeoisie and foreign capital, as was occurring in other countries of Latin America at the time (Arboleya 2008, 115–116).

When political actors who have recently arrived to power are unable to pursue a national project for economic and social development, they tend to focus energy on satisfying personal ambitions through newly available opportunities for enriching themselves. In accordance with this tendency, the Grau government turned to corruption, creating new forms of plundering the public treasury, surpassing what had been

previously established by Machado and Batista. The Italian-American Mafia in the USA, which had entered Cuba in the 1920s and had concluded lucrative agreements with Batista, found a new partner in the Authentic Party (Arboleya 2008, 116). This turn of the Grau government to corruption was disheartening to the people, given the role that Grau had played in the Revolution of 1933. The corruption of the neocolonial republic had arrived to be so pervasive that even the ideals of the revolution had become corrupted. Vitier writes: "The Grau government was characterized by bloody fights and pseudo-revolutionary factions and groups that made Havana look like the Chicago of the gangsters, and by the unrestrained sacking of public funds. Fiction, the symbol of the neocolony, had taken hold not only of the republican ideal, as had occurred up to the time of Machado, but now also the revolutionary ideal" (2006, 147–148).

With the election of Carlos Prío Socarrás to the presidency in 1948, the unresponsiveness of the Cuban system of representative democracy to the needs of the people continued. Prío had been a prominent member of the University Student Directorate of 1930, a member of the Grau "government of 100 days" of 1933, and a prominent member of the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party. But in spite of his previous connections to reformist and revolutionary tendencies, the economic program of the Prío government supported the interests of the Cuban oligarchy and foreign capital. And in spite of Prío's campaign promise to reduce corruption, unrestrained corruption continued during his presidency (Arboleya 2008, 116–117; Le Riverend 1975, 333; Vitier 2006, 148).

In reaction to the corruption of the Authentic Party government of Grau, the Orthodox Party of the Cuban People was established in 1946. When Grau selected Prío as his successor, Eduardo Chibás, who had been a prominent member of the Authentic Party, accepted leadership of the Orthodox Party. Arboleya writes of Chibás: "Master of fiery speech, Chibás was known for his crude attacks and his eccentricity. A rabid anticommunist, Chibás attached both the Left and the Right, although his criticisms of the United States were to considerable extent comedies that did not go beyond the external imperfections of the system. His false crazy acts were constant news in the press, including various suicide attempts to gain the attention of the people. In 1951, one of these attempts, broadcast live on his radio program, cost him his life, which created an immense commotion among the people, and which conferred mythical virtues on him from that moment" (2008, 117). The Orthodox

program proposed important economic and political reforms rooted in the Constitution of 1940, but Chibás' speeches were superficial and lacked an informed analysis of the causes and the solutions of the problems of the neocolonial republic. However, he was enormously popular among the people. Backed by the pseudo-industrial national bourgeoisie, and with the slogan of "shame on money," he likely was headed toward winning the presidential elections at the time of his suicide (Aboleya 2008, 117–118; Le Riverend 1975, 332–333, 336).

Meanwhile, Batista was preparing for a return to power. He had formed the Unitary Action Party and had been campaigning for president in the 1952 elections. However, it was evident that the Orthodox Party was headed to victory, in spite of the death of Chibás. Accordingly, in order to check the popular movement, and with the support of the national bourgeoisie and international capital, Batista carried out a *coup d'état* on March 10, 1952, shortly before the presidential elections. The chiefs of the army and the police were replaced with the military officers who had been involved in the *coup*. The Congress was dissolved. The Constitution of 1940 was abolished. The presidential elections of 1952 were canceled (Arboleya 2008, 119–120; Le Riverend 1975, 336–337; López Segrera 1972, 275; Vitier 2006, 150).

For decades, the Cuban system of representative democracy had been characterized by the pursuit of particular interests, deception, robbery of the public treasury, periodic repression of popular movements and assassination of charismatic leaders, and the replacement of representative democracy by dictatorships when the popular movement emerged as a serious threat. By 1952, the people were disgusted and disheartened. They rejected the Batista *coup* of March 1952, but they also received it with indifference. As Arboleya comments, "Nearly no one would cry for the loss" of representative democracy (2008, 119). There were exceptions, however, to the popular indifference. University students demonstrated their rejection of the *coup*, and they asked Prío for arms to defend his constitutional government. But Prío did not give the students arms; he instead boarded a plane for the USA in order to enjoy his millions. Cuba went from representative democracy to military dictatorship without a single shot being fired (Arboleya 2008, 119).

A notable exception to the popular indifference was a document submitted to the Emergency Court of Havana on March 12, two days after the *coup*. The document maintains that Batista had committed crimes for which, if he were to be sanctioned according to the law, would deserve

a punishment of more than 100 years. And the document maintains that society requires a legal order rooted in historical and philosophical principles. The author of the document was a 25-year-old lawyer, whose name was Fidel Castro (Vitier 2006, 180).

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CHAPTER 4

The Taking of Power by the People

The Republic of Martí Lives, Hidden

Cuban poet, critic, and essayist, Cintio Vitier writes that there were three periods of disillusionment and fatalism during the Cuban revolutionary process that began in 1868. The first followed the Pact of Zanjón of 1878, which ended the first Cuban war of independence without the attainment of independence or the abolition of slavery. The second followed the US intervention of 1898, which ended the second war of independence with US imposition of the structures of the neocolonial republic. And the third followed the fall on January 15, 1934, of the only independent government during the neocolonial republic, leading to the consolidation of power by Batista and the deepening of the core–peripheral neocolonial relation with the USA. Each period of disillusionment lasted approximately twenty years, and they were characterized by a fatalistic belief that the transformation of unjust structures of domination through heroic action was impossible (2006, 151).

Following the fall of the 1933 "government of 100 days," the popular movement with its internal conflicts and lack of unity continued to struggle, and these efforts culminated in the Constitution of 1940, as we have seen. But with the election of Batista as president in 1940, Cuba had evolved to be a "perfect neocolonial system" (Arboleya 2008, 112), and the fictions of the neocolonial republic prevailed. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1934 deepened the historic core–peripheral axis of capitalist exploitation, reinforcing conditions of underdevelopment and massive poverty,

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yet it was presented as a progressive policy of the "Good Neighbor" to the north. Politicians elected on false promises robbed the public treasury and pretended to be public officials with legitimate authority in a system of representative democracy. The materialist consumerism of the "American way of life" pervaded the island, provoking distorted and unrealistic expectations among the people. The country was empty and hollow (Vitier 2006, 152).

But the soul of the nation was alive. "It lived in the quiet suffering of the poor or middle-class family, in its capacity for resistance and hope, in its irrepressible popular laugh, in its unbeatable music, in the lamp of the intellectual, in poetry" (Vitier 2006, 152). The nation that Martí had envisioned lived, hidden in the quiet sufferings and hopes of the people. Intellectuals played an important role. Many sought "to discover and show the true face of the nation" in different ways, but united in "the common faith in education and culture as the road to national salvation" (2006, 153). Some, for example, sought to discover and exalt the ethical values that formed the foundation of Cuban nationality in the nineteenth century. In this vein, the anthropologist Fernando Ortiz described the saving virtues of Cuban culture, with particular emphasis on the immense contribution of the population with African roots to the Cuban social conglomerate, thus pointing to a decolonization of Cuban culture. Others analyzed the complex work of José Martí, focusing on particular aspects of Martí's thought, including the ethical, political-social, literary, journalistic, philosophical, and educational dimensions. Juan Marinello, for example, made a presentation at the Union of Writers and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, demonstrating the anti-imperialist character of Martí's political thought and its opposition to the Cuban neocolonial regime. Marinello and others also placed the work of Martí in the context of Latin American thought (Vitier 2006, 152–162).

Cuban poetry also expressed a political and hopeful message in the context of the frustrations of the neocolonial republic. Nicolás Guillen, a member of the Communist Party of Cuba since 1937, was a poet whose work gave voice to the people, the concrete, exploited, and suffering people of the frustrated republic. He and other communist intellectuals believed that literary and artistic expression was a form of struggling for liberty and justice. In addition, Cuban poetry of the period affirmed the possibility of the impossible. Rejecting an interpretation of the impossible as meaning "not possible," it sustained that the impossible possesses a light that most people cannot see, and a force that the prevailing

attitude does not know. But the hidden light of the impossible can be made visible, and its unknown force felt. Human hopes can experience incarnation. In the depths of the national soul is found a thirst for the historical coming, for the incarnation of poetry in reality (Vitier 2006, 164–167, 170–171).

Thus, during the period of disillusionment from 1933 to 1953, Cuban intellectuals kept hope and faith in a dignified Cuban nation alive. They affirmed an ethical attitude in the face of corruption and the pursuit of personal gain and particular interests. They prevented the country from falling into a corruption so pervasive that it corrupted the soul of the nation.

The Cuban Tradition of Heroism

In *La Edad de Oro*, a collection of stories written for children, José Martí wrote, "liberty is the right of all men to be honest, and to think and speak without hypocrisy." Any person who obeys a bad government or unjust laws is not an honest person. Many people, he wrote, are living without dignity. They do not think about what is happening in their surroundings; they are content to live without asking if they are living honestly. Some persons, however, are not content to live without honesty and dignity. "When there are many men without dignity, there are always others that have in themselves the dignity of many men. They are the ones that rebel with terrible force against those that rob the peoples of their liberty and that rob men of their dignity. In these men walk a thousand men and an entire people; in these men, human dignity is expressed. These men are sacred" (Martí 2006, 11). Martí identified three such "heroes," all of whom were leaders in the independence movements of Latin America in the early decades of the nineteenth century: Bolívar of Venezuela, San Martín of Río de la Plata, and Hidalgo of Mexico. Martí describes them as men who fought for the right of America to be free, and who protested the enslavement of blacks and the mistreatment of the indigenous peoples. They read the philosophers of the eighteenth century, observes Martí, and they explained the right of all to be honest and to think and to speak without hypocrisy (Martí 2006, 9–16).

Cintio Vitier maintains that Martí considered truth to be the highest duty of the human being. Accordingly, he believed that there can be no political liberty without spiritual liberty, and that "the first task

of humanity is to reconquer itself" (quoted in Vitier 2006, 88), that is, to know the essence of human life at its roots. He believed that through truth, honesty, and integrity, the impossible can be attained. Furthermore, Martí believed that the world is divided between "those who love and found, and those who hate and destroy" (quoted in Vitier 2006, 96). In this conflict between good and evil, our duty is to stand on the side of the good, through the constant practice of generosity, service, and sacrifice; and through the cultivation of knowledge and the prudent exercise of reason. And reason must be accompanied by heart, by universal love, which brings us to identify with the weak and the oppressed and to cast our fate with the poor of the earth. Together, reason and heart provide human redemption (Vitier 2006, 87–88, 96–97).

Martí profoundly influenced the development of the Cuban revolutionary movement, establishing a fundamental moral perspective. Julio Antonio Mella, who founded the Communist Party of Cuba in 1925, embraced the notion of the need to sacrifice in defense of the great ideals. "All of the great ideas," Mella wrote, "have their Nazareth" (quoted in Vitier 2006, 132). The central concept of heroic sacrifice in defense of the moral world was kept alive by the intellectual class during the period of cynicism and fatalism of 1934–1953. As a result of their efforts, the idea of heroic sacrifice would be central to the generation of young men and women who emerged as decisive political actors in the aftermath of the March 10, 1952, Batista *coup*, youth who possessed a sense of justice and believed that the world promised by the heroes and martyrs was in their hands to attain.

Moncada: A Great and Heroic Act

In a manifesto released on July 23, 1953, Fidel Castro called upon the people to "continue the unfinished revolution that Céspedes initiated in 1868, Martí continued in 1895, and Guiteras and Chibás made current in the republican epoch" (quoted in Vitier 2006, 181). The revolution, he maintained, was the revolution of Céspedes, Agramonte, Maceo, Martí, Mella, Guiteras, and Chibás. This single revolution, having evolved through different stages, now was entering a "new period of war" (quoted in Vitier 2006, 181). The initiation of the new stage was proclaimed dramatically three days later, on July 26, when Fidel led an attack on the Moncada military garrison in Santiago de Cuba. The intention of the assault was to seize weapons for the launching of a guerrilla

struggle in the mountains. The assault failed, and 70 of the 126 assailants were killed, 95% of them murdered after capture by Batista's solders in a four-day period following the assault.

Although the Cuban intellectual class during the period 1934–1953 had kept alive an ethical attitude in the face of the cynicism and fatalism generated by the neocolonial republic, there had emerged among the people by 1953 the sentiment that an ethical attitude is not enough; one must act. Therefore, the Moncada attack can be interpreted as a great act, which broke the barriers that were confining the movement to the verbal expression of an attitude, an act that opened the possibility for a new stage in the Cuban Revolution. Moncada, however, was not only an act, it also was a *heroic* act, and thus it called into being a new stage of struggle that would advance through personal courage and sacrifice. In his address at his trial for the attack, Fidel expressed the significance of the emergence of a young generation of Cubans prepared to sacrifice in defense of the nation.

> It seemed that Martí would die during the centennial year of his birth, that his memory would be extinguished forever.… But he lives; he has not died; his people are rebellious; his people are dignified; his people are faithful to his memory. There are Cubans that have died defending his doctrines. There are youth who in magnificent selflessness have come to die beside his tomb, to give their blood and their lives in order that he would continue living in the soul of the country (quoted in Vitier 2006, 177; Castro 2014, 84).

Thus, the Moncada assault involved heroic sacrifice, in which young Cubans risked and sacrificed their lives. It brought to the political foreground the Cuban tradition of personal and collective sacrifice in defense of national dignity (Vitier 2006, 182). And it was a collective *act*, advancing rejection of the established order from ethical attitude to revolutionary practice (Vitier 2006, 189). Moncada responded to the needs of the people and the revolution in that historic moment, providing an example of the heroic struggle that the people were able to understand and were ready to support. Moncada was an "enormous, ripping and creative new force that would project itself over the future of Cuba in an irresistible form" (Vitier 2006, 186). And it lifted Fidel to the position of the charismatic leader of the new stage of the revolutionary struggle, a role assumed in earlier historical moments by Martí, Mella, Martínez Villena, and Guiteras.

Following the failed assault, Fidel was arrested and placed in solitary confinement, and he was brought to trial in a procedure separate from his comrades, which was not open to the public. He was permitted to address the court, and his address on October 16, 1953, was delivered from memory. A written version of the address was smuggled out of his prison cell, and it subsequently was distributed clandestinely. Fidel concluded the address by saying, "History Will Absolve Me," and the underground document became known by that phrase (Castro 2014).

In his October 16 address to the tribunal, Fidel described the organization and the carrying out of the assault, its intentions, the reasons for its failure, and his capture (Castro 2014, 15–21). He condemned the soldiers who had tortured and murdered captured revolutionaries, maintaining that they had degraded the uniform of the army (2014, 22–24, 50–51, 56–61). He harshly criticized the career of Batista and his deceitful message to the people on July 27 (2014, 44–49). He praised the courage and heroism of the young insurrectionists who had carried out the attack (2014, 42, 51–52, 61–62). In addition, Fidel argued that the assault of the Moncada garrison was legal. He maintained that in early 1952, although the people were not satisfied with government officials, they had the power to elect new officials, and they were in the process of doing so. They were engaged actively and enthusiastically in public debates in anticipation of elections. The Batista *coup* of March 10, 1952, ended this process. Fidel referred to the writ that he had submitted to the Court on March 12, maintaining that the *coup* was a criminal act that violated several laws of the Social Defense Code, and asking that Batista and his seventeen accomplices be sentenced to 108 years of imprisonment, in accordance with the Social Defense Code. But, he noted, the Court took no action and the criminal strides up and down the country like a great lord. The assault on the Moncada garrison, he maintained, was an attempt "to overthrow an illegal regime and to restore the legitimate Constitution" (2014, 62–66).

In the October 16 address, Fidel noted that Batista established the so-called Constitutional Statutes to function as a replacement to the 1940 Constitution, and in this Batista was supported by the Court of Social and Constitutional Rights, which was established by the 1940 Constitution. But, Fidel argued, said Court violated the Constitutional article that established it, and thus its ruling is not valid or constitutional. Fidel maintained that the 1940 Constitution remains in force, including Article 40, which affirms the right of insurrection against tyranny.

And the Batista regime, he maintained, is tyrannical. It has eliminated civil liberties and suffrage, and it has uprooted democratic institutions. In "using tanks and soldiers to take over the Presidential Palace, the national treasury, and other governmental offices, and aiming guns at the heart of the people," Batista has established "Might makes right" as the supreme law of the land. As soon as it took power, the regime engaged in repression against popular organizations, cultural institutions, and journalists, including arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, and murder. Furthermore, the regime placed in top positions the most corrupt members of the traditional political parties. The previous regime was guilty of plunder of the public treasury and disrespect for human life, but the Batista regime increased pillage tenfold, and disrespect for human life a 100-fold. It served the great financial interests, and it redistributed loot to the Batista clique (2014, 67–76).

Fidel proceeded to remind the tribunal that the right of the people to revolt against tyranny was recognized by the theocratic monarchies of Ancient China, the city-states of Greece, and Republican Rome, and it was affirmed by the philosophers of Ancient India. In the Middle Ages, the right of the people to violently overthrow a tyrant was confirmed by John Salisbury, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther. In the early modern era, it was sustained by the Spanish Jesuit Juan Mariana, the Scottish reformers John Knox and John Poynet, and the German jurist John Althus. The right of the people to overthrow despotic kings was the foundation of the English Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution of 1775, and the French Revolution of 1789, and it was affirmed by John Milton, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, the US Declaration of Independence, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Fidel provided succinct summaries or quotations from these mentioned sources, with the most extensive quotation being from the US Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 (2014, 71, 77–82).

Fidel expressed the patriotism of the young people who assaulted the Moncada garrison.

> We are Cubans and to be Cuban implies a duty, not to fulfill that duty is a crime, is treason. We are proud of the history of our country; we learned it in school and have grown up hearing of liberty, justice, and human rights. We were taught from an early age to venerate the glorious example of our heroes and martyrs. Céspedes, Agramonte, Maceo, Gomez and Martí were the first names engraved in our minds; we were taught that Maceo had said

> that one does not beg for liberty but takes it with the blade of a machete .... We were taught to cherish and defend the beloved flag of the lone star, and to sing every afternoon our National Anthem, whose verses say that to live in chains is to live submerged in an affront and dishonor, and to die for the country is to live. All this we learned and will never forget (2007, 68–69; 2014, 83–84).

Fidel maintained that if the assault had succeeded, the revolutionaries would have had the support of the people. He described the people in the following terms.

> When we speak of the people we do not mean the comfortable and conservative sectors of the nation, who welcome any regime of oppression, any dictatorship, any despotism, prostrating themselves before the master of the moment until they grind their foreheads into the ground. We understand by people, when we are speaking of struggle, to mean the vast unredeemed masses, to whom all make promises and who are deceived and betrayed by all; who yearn for a better, more dignified and more just nation; who are moved by ancestral aspirations of justice, having suffered injustice and mockery generation after generation; and who long for significant and sound transformations in all aspects of life, and who, to attain them, are ready to give even the very last breath of their lives, when they believe in something or in someone, and above all when they believe sufficiently in themselves (Castro 2007, 26–27; 2014, 29).

He described the sectors that comprise the people: 600,000 unemployed; 500,000 agricultural workers who work only four months of the year and who live in miserable shacks; 400,000 industrial workers without adequate salary, pension, or housing; 100,000 tenant farmers, working on land that is not theirs; 30,000 teachers and professors who are poorly paid; 20,000 small businessmen who are weighed down by debt and plagued by graft imposed by corrupt public officials; and 10,000 young professionals in health, education, engineering, law, and journalism, who find that their recently attained degrees do not enable them to find work (2014, 30–31).

Fidel maintained that if the Moncada garrison had been successfully taken, five revolutionary laws would have been immediately broadcast by radio. (1) The re-establishment of the Constitution of 1940, with the executive, legislative, and judicial functions assumed by the revolutionary government, in order that the government would be able to implement

the popular will and true justice, until these governmental structures, presently distorted by dictatorship and corruption, can be restored legitimately. (2) The ceding of land to tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and squatters who occupy parcels of land of less than five *caballerías* (67 hectares or 165 acres), with compensation for the former owners. (3) The granting of the right of workers and employees in commercial, industrial, and commercial enterprises to 30% of the profits. (4) The granting of the right of tenant farmers to 55% of the yield of sugar production and a guarantee to small-tenant farmers of their participation in the sugar commerce. (5) The confiscation of property that was fraudulently obtained as a result of government corruption, with the establishment of special tribunals with full powers to investigate and to solicit the extradition of persons from foreign governments. Fidel explained that these five revolutionary laws would have been followed by other laws, based on further study. These further laws would have included agrarian reform, the integral reform of education, the nationalization of (US-owned) electric and telephone companies, the return to the people of the excessive money that these companies have collected through high rates, and the payment to the government of taxes that have been evaded (2007, 28–30; 2014, 32–33).

Fidel explained the structural roots of the social problems of Cuba. Cuba is an agricultural country, an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods; it has limited industrial capacity. More than half of the productive land is foreign-owned. Eighty-five percent of small farmers pay rent, and many peasant families do not have land to use for the production of food for their families. These economic conditions generate inadequate housing, low levels of education, and high levels of employment. The solution to these problems, Fidel maintained, cannot be based on strategies that protect the interests of the economic and financial elite. A revolutionary government would ignore such interests and would act decisively in defense of the needs of the people. It would mobilize capital to develop industry; distribute land to peasants; stimulate the development of agricultural cooperatives; establish limits to the amount of land that can be owned by an agricultural enterprise, expropriating the excess acreage; reduce rents; and expand and reform the educational system (2014, 34–41).

In formulating a program for the next stage of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro did not mention US imperialism, nor did he cite Marxist thinkers or mention Lenin or the Russian Revolution. Jesus Arboleya writes of "History will absolve me:"

> Although some historians consider it a manifesto less radical than that of the *Joven Cuba* of Guiteras in 1935, in which the anti-imperialist and socialist ends of the revolution were clearly expressed, the key to the genius of Fidel Castro lies precisely in his explaining the anti-neocolonial project on the basis of a unifying proposal, avoiding ideological prejudices that would have limited its reach (2008, 121).

Given the ideological distortions that are integral to the subjective conditions of the neocolonial situation, to speak of socialism or to speak in Marxist terminology would have generated confusion, and it thus would have been less effective in communicating the motivation and the goals of the revolutionary leadership, and it would have generated division within the popular movement. Thus, Fidel focused on the unjust conditions that are experienced by the people in their everyday lives and on the concrete steps to be taken to resolve these problems. Only later, more than two years after the triumph of the revolution, having implemented concrete steps in defense of the people, did Fidel proclaim that the Cuban Revolution was a socialist revolution. So Fidel used an intelligent strategy for educating the people concerning the meaning of revolution and of socialism, focusing first on practice and later on theory.

Fidel's capacity to develop an effective strategy of popular education, moving from practice to theory, was a consequence of his exceptional capacity to think both theoretically and concretely. On the one hand, he understood issues in historical and theoretical terms, and thus he possessed a solid grasping of the structural roots of problems and the steps necessary for their solution. But on the other hand, he did not explain to the people in historical and theoretical terminology, except briefly and succinctly. He primarily explained in concrete language that connects to the worldview of the people. He possessed not only understanding of the historical development of social dynamics, but he also had what the philosopher Bernard Lonergan called the intelligence of "common sense."

Fidel's commonsense intelligence is rooted in his appreciation that the perspective of the people is based on their experience of problems: "subsistence, rent, the education of the children and their future" (2014, 22). The solutions proposed in "History will absolve me" responded to these concrete problems: the ceding of land to tenant farmers, the sharing of profits by workers in industry and mining, and increasing the small farmer's share of the sugar yield. When the proposal goes beyond addressing concrete popular needs, it connects to resentments that are felt and

expressed by the people: nationalization of foreign companies that charge exorbitant rates and just punishment for corrupt government officials. And the proposal that the revolutionary government would assume executive, legislative, and judicial functions, in order to act decisively to implement the popular will, was fully consistent with the frustrations of the people, who have experienced that governments that do not respond to popular will but to the interests of the powerful. The Moncada program was a proposal that was full of commonsense intelligence, and as such, it was connected to the sentiments and the understanding of the people.

But the Moncada program was not only connected to popular sentiment. It also was rooted in an understanding of the objective conditions of the neocolonial republic and a philosophical concept of social justice. It was based on an understanding of the structural roots of the problems of the nation and the kinds of concrete measures that would be necessary in order to transform the neocolonial reality into an alternative more just and democratic reality. Fidel understood what the most advanced intellectuals of the time understood: the historical development on a global scale of capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism; and the emergence of revolutions that must necessarily be socialist, if they are to transform unjust structures. This advanced understanding was revealed in his explanation of the structural roots of the problems of Cuba. But his explanation was succinct. He understood that one does not begin with a lecture in philosophical historical social science. That would come later in the reconstruction of the society and the cultural formation of the people, a process of transformation that was proposed in "History will absolve me" simply as a proposal for the "integral reform of education."

Fidel combined the best characteristics of academics and social activists. Often academics have a limited understanding, because of the fragmentation and the bureaucratization of knowledge, and those who have an advanced understanding often think in historical and theoretical terms that are alien to the language of the people, who think in concrete terms. In contrast, activists are connected to the people, but often they do not have an adequate understanding of the structural roots of the concrete problems that the people confront. Fidel, however, combined theoretical and historical understanding with connection to the people, and thus he was able to express proposals in concrete terms, in the context of a continually unfolding process that includes the theoretical and practical education of the people. Although these exceptional qualities reflect unique personal characteristics, they also were shaped by the social context of

Latin American popular movements. In Latin America, higher education has been less fragmented than in the USA, and the popular movements have been more connected to the academic world and intellectual work. As the Cuban poet and essayist Citrio Vitrier explains, Fidel inherited, appropriated, and drove to a more advanced stage a social ethic that had been developing in Cuba since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The author of "History will absolve me" also was a person of exceptional moral qualities, who analyzed social dynamics from a vantage point rooted in the conditions of the exploited and the oppressed, and who was committed without compromise to justice for the oppressed. Like his intellectual perspective, these moral qualities also were formed by Latin American and Cuban popular movements, and in addition, they were a consequence of family influences and of the impact of his education in private Catholic primary and secondary schools.

Fidel concluded "History will absolve me" not by asking for freedom. He requests to be sent to the prison on the Isle of Pines, where he would be able to join his comrades and share their fate. "It is understandable," he proclaimed, "that honest men should be dead or in prison in a Republic where the President is a criminal and a thief .... Condemn me. It does not matter. History will absolve me" (2014, 83–85; 2007, 69–70).

The Forming of a Charismatic Leader

A heroic act like Moncada itself is not enough; the energy that it galvanizes must be captured and creatively channeled and sustained. Here the role of the charismatic leader is vital, for a discourse rooted in a deep understanding of the sources of the problems must be formulated, and practical solutions to the problems must be proposed; and these formulations and proposals must be expressed in a form that connects to the people. In the case of Cuba in 1953, the necessary dimensions to bring the popular revolution to a more advanced stage were present. "History will absolve" was distributed clandestinely, providing an explanation to the people of the necessity and purpose of the new stage of the revolutionary structure. And Fidel possessed the necessary exceptional qualities, enabling him to fulfill the role of the charismatic leader in the new stage of the revolution.

Fidel Castro Ruz was the son of a landholder, but he was not socialized into the bourgeois culture. His father, Angel Castro, had peasant

roots; and his mother, Lina Ruz González, had been born into a poor Cuban peasant family. Neither parent had a formal education; both had taught themselves how to read. The couple lived on their plantation in the Eastern Province of Oriente, and they had no social contact with members of the bourgeois class. Angel, from a poor peasant family of Galacia, Spain, migrated to Cuba at the beginning of the twentieth century. He began as a worker for the United Fruit Company, and later, he became a contractor who organized groups of workers. The earnings enabled him to acquire property, and he became a landholder who owned significant extensions of land. His plantation was dedicated primarily to the cultivation of sugar and secondarily to cattle and to the exploitation of wood. A variety of fruits and vegetables also were produced. Near the family house, there was a dairy, butchery, bakery, and store, all owned by Angel; there also was a public school, post office, and telegraph. By the 1930s, there were about 1000 people living on the plantation (Castro 1985, 89–100,138, 153–154; 2006, 52–53, 65–67).

Fidel's first social world as a child was formed by the poor workers of his father's plantation. They were mostly Haitian immigrants, and they lived in huts of palm leaves with dirt floors. The children of these families were Fidel's first playmates, and they continued to be his friends and companions of Christmas and summer vacations throughout his childhood and adolescence. Although the workers were poor, the plantation of Angel Castro was an oasis among the US plantations in the region, which were characterized by absentee ownership and total neglect of worker's needs during the "dead time." Angel always was generous with respect to any request for assistance, and he employed more persons than the plantation required, in response to requests for employment. Later in life, Fidel expressed his belief that the conduct of his father with respect to his workers was an important ethical example in his formation. He maintained that he learned from his family at an early age an ethical sensitivity and certain ethical values, an awareness that there is difference between right and wrong, and that one has the duty to do what is right (Castro 1985, 97–104, 114, 153–154, 160–161; 2006, 66–67, 105).

At the age of four, Fidel began attending the primary school on his father's plantation, a small school with fifteen or twenty children. The schoolteacher advised his parents that Fidel had an advanced aptitude, and she recommended that he be sent to school in the city of Santiago de Cuba. At first, Fidel was sent to live in the house of a tutor. Subsequently, he was enrolled in the Colegio de LaSalle, of the Silesian

Brothers, from the first through the fourth grades; and in the Jesuit Colegio de Dolores in Santiago de Cuba for the last two years of primary school and the first two years of secondary school. In his third year, he transferred to the prestigious Jesuit institution, the Colegio de Belén, in Havana, from which he graduated in 1945 at the age of 18. These schools were private Catholic boarding schools for boys, whose students, for the most part, were the sons of the bourgeoisie (Castro 1985, 108–142; 2006, 66).

The ethnical sensitivity that Fidel learned from his family was reinforced by his education in Catholic schools, particularly the education of the Jesuits. Fidel later would maintain that the Jesuits preached and practiced the virtues of good character, honesty, sacrifice, and discipline. In Fidel's view, a developed ethical sensitivity is the foundation for political consciousness and for a commitment to social justice; the religious martyr and the revolutionary hero are made from the same mold. At the Colegio de Belén, Fidel also developed an approach to learning that would serve him and the revolution later in life. He often did not pay attention to teachers in class, and his attendance was erratic; he was more attracted to the Explorer Scouts, including hikes of several days to the mountains and sports. But he was driven by a sense of pride and honor to earn good grades. So he learned on his own from books, studying intensely in the days before exams. Thus, he "developed a certain capacity to decipher the mysteries of physics, geometry, mathematics, botany, and chemistry simply with texts" (Castro 1985, 143–146, 154–157; 1998, 54–56; 2006, 92–94, 117).

Fortunate to have attended the finest schools for the bourgeoisie, and fortunate to not be burdened by the prejudices of bourgeois culture, Fidel Castro arrived at the University of Havana in 1945 with a basic concept of justice that had been formed in his family and in Catholic primary and secondary schools. And he arrived as a "profound and devoted admirer of the heroic struggles of our people for independence in the nineteenth century," and as an admirer and follower of Martí, as a result of "the enormous attraction of Martí's thought for all of us." This formation in the heritage of Martí and of national liberation was deepened by the fact that he had read "practically all the books that were published" on the two Cuban wars of independence. But he arrived with little political consciousness. He would later describe himself as a "political illiterate" at that time. He had possessed a basic concept of justice; he had seen extreme inequality; and he had knowledge of and identification

with the historic Cuban struggle for independence. But he had limited understanding of political economy and class divisions and conflicts, and he had not been involved in any way in political activities. His thinking and his life would be transformed during his five years at the University of Havana (Castro 1985, 158–159; 1998, 51, 69; 2006, 115–117, 122).

In 1945, the University of Havana was an educational institution for the rich and the middle class, a social place where there was mixing of the relatively privileged sector of the popular classes and the bourgeoisie, in an environment that included some professors of the Left. In the 1920s and the 1930s, in the epoch of Mella and Martínez Villena, anti-imperialism had been the dominant tendency among student leaders. However, student consciousness had become confused as a result of the emergence of the anti-communist reformism of Grau, and many students had been influenced by this tendency, leading to a decline of anti-imperialism. With the election of Grau as President of Cuba in 1944, the university administration and the student leadership fell under the control of the government of Grau. By 1945, there had emerged a reaction to Grau reformism among students. This tendency would ultimately be expressed in the establishment in 1946 of the Orthodox Party of the Cuban People, which beginning in 1948 would be led by Eduardo Chibás. Fidel, as a consequence of his personal tendency toward rebelliousness and his ethical sense of justice, immediately identified with the emerging anti-Grau tendency at the university, which protested the corruption of the Grau government; and he became actively involved immediately with the political activities of this tendency among university students (Castro 1985, 162; 1998, 60–61; 2006, 114, 116).

Fidel's studies during his first two years at the university led him to become what he would later call a "utopian communist." Especially important was a course taken during his first year, taught by a professor of political economy, Delio Portela. The course, which included 900 pages of mimeographed material, discussed the laws of capitalism and the various economic theories. His study led Fidel to question the capitalist system, and he arrived at the conclusion that the capitalist system was absurd. However, his interpretation was utopian, in that it was not based on a scientific analysis of human history. It was simply recognition that capitalism is bad, that it does not work, and that it generates poverty, injustice, and inequality. Other courses that influenced Fidel's development included the "History of Political Ideas," taught by Raúl Roa García, and "Worker Legislation," taught by Aureliano Sánchez

Arango. Roa had been a prominent member of the student revolutionary movement in the 1920s, and after the triumph of the revolution, he would become the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba (Castro 1998, 51, 69; 2006, 117, 122, 642).

During his third year at the university, Fidel began to read avidly the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Drawing upon his good relations with party leaders in the university, he had access to books of the library of the Communist Party. *The Communist Manifesto* was one of the first that he read, and it had the most impact. It made clear to him the role of class divisions and class interests in human history, thus enabling him to understand why politicians in Cuba behave so badly: They make promises to the people, in order to obtain the political support of the majority; but they are financially supported by the bourgeoisie, and thus they respond to its interests. This period of self-directed reading was the culmination of an intellectual and moral development that had included, as we have noted, an ethical formation in Christian values, socialization, and reading with respect to the Cuban heritage of struggle for national liberation, and a study of bourgeois political economy that had led him to utopian communism. As a result of this period of new reading, Fidel would become a Marxist-Leninist by the time he graduated from the university in 1950. But since it was a form of Marxism-Leninism that was synthesized with the Cuban tradition of national liberation, he "would not have been able to convince a party member that his theories were correct" (Castro 1985, 157–159, 161, 167–168; 1998, 69–70, 2006, 123).

By 1951, Fidel had developed a complete revolutionary conception and a plan for putting it into practice, taking into account the conditions of the country, which included the confusion of the people resulting from the dissemination of anti-communist ideology.

> I conceived a revolutionary strategy for carrying out a profound social revolution, but by phases, in stages; what I conceived fundamentally was to do it with the great non-conforming rebel mass that did not have mature political consciousness for the revolution, but constituted the immense majority of the people. I viewed that great modest, healthy, rebel mass of the people as the force capable of carrying out the revolution, as the decisive factor in the revolution; one must bring that mass toward the revolution, and one must do it in stages (Castro 1985, 164).

The first stage involved focusing on the discontent of the masses with respect to concrete problems (unemployment, poverty, and the lack of

hospitals and housing) by proposing concrete solutions. The masses attributed these problems to government corruption and to the perversity of the politicians, but from a scientific Marxist-Leninist perspective, one could see that these problems are rooted in the capitalist system and that their solution requires a transformation to socialism. However, the political education of the masses pertained to the second stage (Castro 1985, 162, 164–165, 169; 1998, 70–71).

The plan was put into action with the assault on the Moncada garrison of July 26, 1953. The first stage of the revolutionary program was proclaimed in "History will absolve me."

Fidel's Cuban Reformulation of Marxism-Leninism

In "History will absolve me," there is no notion of a proletarian revolution or a proletarian vanguard, as is found in the tradition of Marxism-Leninism. Instead, we find a concept of a people prepared to support a revolution, a people coming from various social classes and sectors. Fidel would call himself a Marxist-Leninist. But it would be Marxism-Leninism reformulated for the conditions of Cuba, and more generally, for the neocolonial situation.

In an extensive interview in 1985 with the Brazilian Dominican priest Frei Betto, Fidel described his initial reading of *The Communist Manifesto*. He explained that the work had a significant impact on him, because of its simplicity and clarity, and particularly important was its understanding that human societies are characterized by class division. Fidel's life experiences, in which he had "seen up close the contrasts between wealth and poverty, between a family that possessed extensive land and those that have absolutely nothing" (Castro 1985, 161), confirmed the truth of Marx's insight into class division. And the insight, for Fidel, had explanatory power, for it made clear that social phenomena are not consequences of the evil or immorality of men, but of factors established by class interests (1985, 157–170). In this description of his reading of *The Communist Manifesto*, we can see that Fidel was making an immediate Cuban interpretation of Marx as he read. In confirming the validity of Marx's insight for the reality of Cuba, Fidel was focusing not on the exploitation of the industrial workers, which was the social context in which Marx formulated the concept, but on the unequal distribution of land, rooted in the colonial and neocolonial situation of Cuba. Fidel was appropriating from Marx from a perspective that

was shaped by neocolonial conditions of Cuba and by the consciousness of the Cuban revolutionary theory and practice since 1868, especially Martí.

Fidel Castro was first a nationalist and a Cuban patriot. He was formed in and committed to national liberation when he arrived at his moment of encounter with Marxism-Leninism. His nationalist formation enabled him to grasp the insights of Marx and Lenin, and he immediately proceeded to formulate a revolutionary project based on a synthesis of national liberation and Marxism-Leninism, with an orientation to practical implementation. As Fidel said, "I believe that my contribution to the Cuban Revolution consists in having realized a synthesis of the ideas of Martí and of Marxism-Leninism, and having consequently applied it in our struggle" (1985, 163–164). However, Fidel did not present his ideas to the people as a theoretical reformulation of Marxism-Leninism. He did not offer an analysis of the development of the concept of a proletarian vanguard, describing the social context in which the concept emerged, and explaining why a reformulation, which projects a vanguard from and of the people, is necessary for the different neocolonial context. Rather than making a theoretical defense of his reformulation from proletarian to popular revolution, he simply presented the new formulation in the practice of leadership. He called all of the people, and not merely workers, or the workers and peasants, to the revolution. He formulated a manifesto that described succinctly what the people already knew in experience. He formulated a program of action, which included concrete solutions.

Fidel, primarily through the spoken word, formulated an important theoretical advance in the evolution of Marxism-Leninism, adapting the tradition to the neocolonial situation. But it was not presented as such, for it was conceived and expressed in revolutionary practice.

The Revolutionary Faith of Fidel

Fidel was sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years on the Isle of Pines for his organization and leadership of the attack on the Moncada Barracks of July 26, 1953. He and his companions were released on May 15, 1955, as a result of a popular amnesty campaign. Following his release from prison, Fidel continued to work on putting into practice his revolutionary plan. The 26 of July Movement was established on June 12, 1955, under the direction of a small group of trustworthy

and capable leaders, led by Fidel, who then went to Mexico to organize the armed struggle. On December 2, 1956, Fidel Castro and 81 armed guerrillas, having trained in Mexico and having traveled by sea for seven days, disembarked from the yacht "Granma" in a remote area of Eastern Cuba, with the intention of establishing an armed struggle in the mountains known as the *Sierra Maestra*. The Granma disembarking, however, was a total disaster. The boat arrived two days behind schedule, thus undermining the strategy of a simultaneous uprising in Santiago de Cuba, intended to distract Batista's army. As the rebels disembarked, they encountered swampland so difficult that they had to abandon most of their weapons. Three days later, they were surprised and routed by Batista's army, dispersing in small groups and in different directions.

Fidel would not be deterred. When twelve of them were able to regroup under the protection of a local peasant, Fidel was jubilant. "We will win the war," he declared. "Let us begin the struggle!" As described by Universo Sanchez, one of the twelve, it was "faith that moves mountains" (quoted in Vitier 2006, 197). The faith of Fidel is not, observes Cintio Vitier, "a religious faith in supernatural powers, but a revolutionary faith in the potentialities of the human being" (2006, 197). It is an "uncontainable force" that "sees in history what is not yet visible" (2006, 197). Such faith proceeds from and is nurtured by three sources: "a moral conviction that defends the cause of justice; profound confidence in the human being; and the highest examples in human history" (Vitier 2006, 198). And such faith is integrally tied to a dynamic view of human history: "for the revolutionary, it is not a matter of history *been* but of history *being*, where the highest examples continue acting; not of a stagnant and fixed human being but of the human being becoming, in evolution." And this becoming is above all "oriented toward *duty*" (Vitier 2006, 198; italics in original).

The unshakable faith of Fidel, "contagious, irradiating and attracting with the moral magnetism of heroism,… became a live experience in the terrain of the struggle" (Vitier 2006, 198). Whereas the skepticism of the theoreticians could see only the objective conditions and the correlation of forces, revolutionary faith sees the possibility of changing these conditions and forces, following the highest examples in human history. And this faith would be fed by the evolving social dynamics in which it was acting: The rebel army in the mountains and the clandestine struggle in the cities were creating new objective conditions. Vitier believes that

the revolutionary faith of Fidel saved the revolution from falling once again into the abyss of the impossible, in which its fulfillment does not seem possible. Fidel was driven by a faith that was "nurtured by analysis" and that therefore could discern the reality hidden by the perception of the impossibility of things, and it could discern that what appeared to be impossible was, in reality, possible and attainable (2006, 198).

After the imposition of the neoliberal project in the world, the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the advent of the "special period" in Cuba, Fidel would frequently proclaim: "No one has the right to be indifferent to the suffering of others;" and "No one has the right to lose faith in the future of humanity." These declarations go against bourgeois democratic concepts of freedom of thought and freedom of expression. Fidel believes that people do not have the right to think and say anything they want. The freedoms of thought and expression, for Fidel, are intertwined with duty: a duty to be concerned with the well-being of others, and a duty to have faith in the possibility of constructing a better world. For Fidel, conformity to duty is the essence of human life and human fulfillment, not the possession of property, material things, and consumer goods. In his view, the kind of human being that capitalism seeks to create is a degradation of the human being; socialism, in contrast, seeks to create a new kind of person, who lives in solidarity with others and who has faith in the future of humanity, a kind of person that up to now has been exemplified by a minority and has existed in the majority in the form of human potentiality.

Unifying the Various Tendencies in the Revolutionary Process

During the Cuban revolutionary war of 1957 and 1958, there were organizational, tactical, and ideological divisions. The revolution was able to triumph and sustain itself by virtue of its capacity to overcome these divisions. As Fidel was directing the armed struggle in the *Sierra Maestra*, the national direction of the 26 of July Movement, located in Havana, was responsible for organizing all its activities throughout the country. Two types of activities emerged: A clandestine struggle in the cities, characterized by sabotage and the formation of secret cells among workers and the radicalized sector the petit bourgeoisie; and the guerrilla struggle in the *Sierra Maestra*, which as it evolved would increasingly

have peasant participation. Many of the urban leaders of 26 of July Movement saw the guerrilla struggle in the mountains as of secondary importance. Using the Revolution of 1930 as their guide, they believed that a combination of mass action and sabotage in the cities would bring down Batista. But the leaders and soldiers of the rebel army believed that they would acquire the military capacity to defeat Batista's army and to force the surrender or flight of the dictator. At the same time, there was an ideological division within the 26 of July Movement: some were Marxist-Leninists who favored an alliance with the Communist Party, whereas others were anti-communist, an ideological division that existed both in the urban front and among the guerrillas (Arboleya 2008, 123–125; Castro, 1985, 229–231).

Although the 26 of July Movement was by far the organization with the most popular support, as a result of its heroic action on July 26, 1953, it was not the only revolutionary organization. The second most important was the Communist Party, which had changed its name to the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) in 1944, in consideration of the global united front against capitalism. The PSP was strong particularly among urban workers, and it possessed a significant capacity to organize urban workers. In general, the PSP membership had far more experience and political consciousness than the members of the 26 of July Movement. Many of the PSP had a distrustful attitude toward the 26 of July Movement, due to the latter's diversity of ideological viewpoints, including an element of anti-communism, and its relative political immaturity. Another important revolutionary organization was the March 13 Revolutionary Directory, a student organization led by José Antonio Echeverría. The Revolutionary Directory experienced the same tactical and ideological divisions that were found in the 26 of July Movement (Arboleya 2008, 125; Castro 1985, 235–238).

Events during 1958 would demonstrate the greater viability of the guerrilla struggle as against the urban front, and they would solidify the dominance of the 26 of July Movement within the revolution and would strengthen the authority of Fidel within the 26 of July Movement. The leaders of the urban front of the 26 of July Movement called for a general strike and actions of sabotage for April 9, with the intention of provoking the fall of Batista. But as a result of the lack of cooperation between the PSP and the urban 26 of July Movement, the general strike failed. The PSP, with its network among urban workers, had the capacity to mobilize workers, but the PSP was not participating in the mass action. Although

the 26 of July Movement had enormous prestige among the people, it lacked organizational structures to mobilize the people. The leaders of the urban 26 of July Movement mistakenly had believed that a general call would bring the people to strike and acts of sabotage, in spite of its lack of organizational strength, because of its high prestige (Arboleya 2008, 126).

The failure of the general strike had two consequences. First, priority was given to the guerrilla struggle. At a meeting of the national leadership of the 26 of July Movement on May 3–4, it was decided to transfer headquarters to the *Sierra Maestra* and to place the organization under the direct control of Fidel. Henceforth, all resources and arms were to be sent to the guerrilla forces. Second, Batista was emboldened, and on May 24, he launched an offensive against the rebel army, seeking to totally annihilate it. Ten thousand soldiers were sent against the guerrilla forces, which at the time consisted of no more than 300. There were 30 battles in 76 days during the offensive, and the rebels were forced to retreat to an area of twenty kilometers from the highest point of the *Sierra Maestra*. But the rebel retreat to some extent was strategic. As the Batista army advanced, it was more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks and more isolated from its bases of support. By the end of the offensive, the Army had suffered one thousand casualties, and the guerrillas had taken 400 prisoners, turning them over to the Red Cross with great publicity. They captured arms from Batista's forces, and they increased their numbers threefold. The Batista army was exhausted and demoralized. On August 18, Fidel announced on *Radio Rebelde* that the offensive had failed and that the guerrillas would soon begin a counteroffensive. The rebel army expanded from its base, and battles began to acquire characteristics of conventional war. Che Guevara and Camilio Cienfuegos commanded columns that marched to the west, supplementing the front to the east that Raúl Castro had established prior to the army offensive. Fidel moved the 26 of July Movement headquarters from the mountains to the plains. The tide had turned; the guerrillas were occupying towns at a dizzying pace, and Batista's army was in disarray (Arboleya 2008, 126–128; Buch and Suárez, 2009, 17–18, 25–26; Castro 1985, 232).

The spectacular march toward victory by the guerrilla forces during the second half of 1958 brought to an end all tactical debates within the revolutionary movement. Clearly, the guerrilla army, expanding in numbers and moving west and east, was the force that was bringing down the dictatorship. As often occurs in revolutionary movements, differences within the movement are resolved in practice as the revolution evolves.

Batista fled Cuba just past midnight on January 1, 1959, and the revolutionary army occupied Santiago de Cuba and Havana, with an enthusiastic and celebratory popular reception. The revolution had triumphed, and the complete ascendency of the 26 of July Movement and of Fidel Castro within the popular revolution was established. With the taking of power, Fidel would continue to demonstrate an exceptional mastery of the art of politics, at the national level and in the international arena. And he would continue to be faithful to the genuine calling of the charismatic leader, namely the defense of the oppressed and superexploited, in the face of the intentions and maneuvers of the powers-that-be.

The Initial Inclusion of the Bourgeoisie in the Revolutionary Government

During 1958, the 26 of July Movement had taken steps toward the formation of a provisional government. At a meeting in the *Sierra Maestra* on May 3, 1958, the 26 of July Movement named Manuel Urrutia Lleó as its candidate for president of the provisional government that would be formed in the fall of Batista. Urrutia had not been part of the revolutionary movement, but he was appreciated for his vote as a judge in 1957, in which he affirmed, in opposition to the other judges in a trial against captured guerrillas and insurrectionists, the constitutional right of Cubans to resist oppression. Later that month, Fidel took initial steps toward the establishment of an anti-Batista coalition of organizations and parties. As a result of this initiative, representatives of the 26 of July Movement, on July 20 in Miami, established the Revolutionary Civic Front, a coalition of various parties and organizations that publicly affirmed their opposition to Batista and their support of his overthrow by means of armed struggle. The coalition included personalities and organizations representing a variety of views, including representatives of the bourgeoisie and including those that wanted to restore representative democracy but did not have an interest in breaking the core–peripheral economic relation that was at the heart of US neocolonial domination of the island (Buch & Suárez 2009, 6–8, 18, 24–25, 191).

The Revolutionary Civic Front proclaimed a Declaration of Unity, widely disseminated by the mass media, calling for the united participation of Cubans of all classes, races, religions, and ideologies in overthrowing the Batista dictatorship by means of armed struggle. The Declaration was subscribed by a number of organizations and parties,

including the traditional parties of the period 1940–1952 and student organizations, but not including the Communist Party. On August 11, at a meeting in Miami, the Revolutionary Civic Front, upon the recommendation of the 26 of July Movement, approved Urrutia as provisional president, although he was not supported by the revolutionary student organization, the March 13 Revolutionary Directory, on the grounds of his lack of participation in the revolutionary struggle. In preparation for his assumption of duties, Urrutia arrived in the *Sierra Maestra* on December 7 (Buch and Suárez 2009, 23–25, 28–29, 192).

Fidel's plan was to attain a transition to a new government in which the 26 of July Movement had oversight, but not direct power. His strategy was to establish a government that would not provoke an immediate hostile reaction from the Cuban bourgeoisie, in order to give the revolution time to prepare itself to take the steps required for a profound economic and social transformation, which necessarily would provoke the antagonism of the national and international bourgeoisie (Buch and Suárez 2009, 74, 194). Fidel understood the fundamental facts of the neocolonial order. He understood that the attainment of true Cuban sovereignty and the protection of the social and economic rights of the people would require a structural social and economic transformation, including an agrarian reform and land redistribution program of substance. And he understood that such steps unavoidably would provoke an aggressive response by national and international interests that benefitted from the established order. Fidel nonetheless was committed to lead the people in taking these decisive and necessary steps. Ever mindful of Cuban history and the frustration of the Cuban Revolution in 1878, and again in 1898, and again in 1933, he was determined that the aspirations and hopes of the Cuban people would not be deferred again.

In accordance with the strategies of a coalition with anti-Batista forces and the inclusion of representatives of the bourgeoisie in the provisional revolutionary government, Fidel opted to not take power personally, in spite of the immense political and moral authority that he held in the eyes of the people. And rather than establishing a provisional government controlled by the 26 of July Movement, he formed a coalition government of anti-Batista forces that included conservative lawyers who were organically tied to the national bourgeoisie. The Provisional Revolutionary Government was established on January 2, 1959, in Santiago de Cuba, and Uruttia took the oath of office as president. On January 3, the government established headquarters at the library of the

University of Oriente in Santiago de Cuba, and several ministers of the government were sworn. On January 5, the government relocated to the Presidential Palace in Havana. A Council of Ministers was formed by Urrutia in consultation with Fidel and other leaders of the 26 of July Movement. Most were lawyers who had ties with the national bourgeoisie. Some, including the President and Prime Minister, had no connection with the anti-Batista movement, although most did participate in some way. Only four of its eighteen members were leaders of the 26 of July Movement (Buch and Suárez 2009, 30–31, 35, 42–45, 50–54, 63, 74, 193–196).

Having declined to enter the government, Fidel did not directly participate in the decision-making process during the month of January. However, he was by far the most powerful person in Cuba, inasmuch as the people supported him overwhelmingly and enthusiastically. Moreover, the provisional government named him as Chief of the Armed Forces, the principal branch of which was the army formed by the guerrilla struggle, which also arrived to include some Batista army battalions that were incorporated as the dictatorship collapsed. During this time, Fidel functioned as an "overseer," criticizing the government when he perceived errors or shortcomings (Buch and Suárez 2009, 31, 47, 67). Obtaining time through the coalition strategy, Fidel utilized the period of January through mid-February: to meet with the people, spontaneously visiting them in places of work, seeking to deepen his understanding of their concerns and hopes; to feel out representatives of various Cuban political parties and currents of thought; to assess the reaction of the USA; to travel internationally and test the international climate of opinion; to promise the people that decisive steps in their interests were soon to come and to warn them that they should be ready to defend their interests; and to formulate the specifics of the agrarian reform plan. In the first months of 1959, Fidel was preparing himself, his party, and his people for the inevitable confrontation with the powers-that-be.

During its first month, the Provisional Revolutionary Government adopted some measures of importance. On January 7, in reaction to the participation of the courts in the brutality of the Batista dictatorship, it suspended the authority of the judicial branch, with anticipation of its reconstitution. On January 23, it established the Ministry of Social Welfare, with the intention of addressing serious social problems, such as child mendicancy; and it suspended city mayors that had been appointed by Batista, replacing them with three-person executive commissions for

each municipal government. However, the process was slow and inefficient, and many important measures remained pending. Uruttia was a judge by profession, and he had little administrative capacity. Under his leadership, council meetings were characterized by endless discussion. Much time was consumed by debates between Uruttia and Prime Minister José Miró Cardona, who perhaps was oriented to creating a crisis, so that he would be named to replace Uruttia as president. By early February, the people were becoming impatient (Buch and Suárez 2009, 57, 64, 65, 73, 197).

Some of the members of the Council of Ministers believed that its dysfunctional character was creating a crisis for the revolution. They believed that it would be necessary for Fidel to take a leadership role within the government, for only he possessed the authority of prestige that could make the government effective. Fidel was reluctant to enter the government, inasmuch as he was still in the midst of his mission of meeting with the people, testing the international climate of opinion, and formulating an Agrarian Reform Law. However, aware of Fidel's sense of obligation to duty, the ministers approached Fidel and asked him to assume the position of Prime Minister, arguing that the situation required him to assume this role. Not wanting to enter into a complex situation, Fidel indicated that he would be willing to assume the position, if it were established that the Prime Minister is to have direct control of general policy, without undermining the legal authority of the president (Buch and Suárez 2009, 74–75).

Acceding to Fidel's condition required an amendment to the Fundamental Law, which had been passed on February 7 and had not yet been printed for distribution to the people. The Fundamental Law was based on the Constitution of 1940, with some modifications for the facilitation of the revolutionary process. On February 13, the Council of Ministers unanimously approved a change in the language of the Fundamental Law with respect to the position of Prime Minister. Rather than "representing" general policy, the Prime Minister will "direct" general policy. This set the stage for Fidel's entrance into the government as chief of state, and he immediately began to chair the sessions of the Council of Ministers. Uruttia continued as president, whose signature continue to be required on all measures, but his role was reduced considerably. At the same time, Fidel was freed from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, a position that was assumed by Raúl Castro (Buch and Suárez 2009, 72, 75–76, 79).

Decisive Revolutionary Steps of 1959

On February 16, the day that he assumed the position of Prime Minister, Fidel proposed to the Council of Ministers a reduction in the salary of the ministers by 50% and the elimination of a surplus payment that the ministers received for "Representation Expenses." The proposal was approved that same day. The Council of Ministers also approved on February 16 various measures that were designed to protect employment: a ban on the dismissal public employees; suspension of the dismissal of employees in the private sector, when this had been done to reduce costs; and restoration of employees that had been dismissed for this reason. These measures with respect to employment were designed to respond to the inquietudes of the people. In previous changes of government, there had been a massive and arbitrary dismissal of public employees, in order to facilitate nepotism and the fulfillment of commitments made during electoral campaigns. In his encounter with the people during the month of January, Fidel had found that unemployment was among the highest concerns, and there was fear that the changing political situation could provoke the elimination of jobs (Buch and Suárez 2009, 67–69, 83–84, 91).

On February 17, the Council of Ministers approved a law that made legal all acts that had been prosecuted as criminal acts during the period of March 10, 1952, to December 31, 1959, when such acts were directly or indirectly part of the movement against the Batista dictatorship. On February 20, in response to efforts to create disorder by instigating peasants to occupy the land, the Council approved a law stipulating that all persons who occupy land without waiting for the enactment of an Agrarian Reform Law would forfeit their right to receive land under said law. The Council of Ministers also approved on February 20 funding for the completion of construction of ten hospitals that had been left partially constructed as a result of corruption during the Batista government. On February 28, the Council approved a law proposed by Faustino Pérez, Minister of the newly created Ministry for the Recuperation of Embezzled Public Funds, confiscating the property of Batista and persons associated with the Batista regime. The law affected the property of Batista and his collaborators; officials of the armed forces that had participated directly in the *coup* of March 10, 1952; ministers of the Batista government during the period 1952–1958; members of the spurious Congress of 1954–1958; and candidates in the sham elections of November 1958 (Buch and Suárez 2009, 51, 85–88).

On March 3, the Council took action against the Cuban Telephone Company, a US-owned company that had been operating in Cuba since 1909. It approved a law authorizing government intervention in the affairs of the company, and it annulled an increase in telephone service rates that had been implemented on March 13, 1957. On March 19, the Council approved a law that reduced housing rents. A scale was established, with the lowest rents reduced to 50% and the highest rents reduced to 70% of their previous level. On April 21, the Council abolished beach concessions to persons and societies of recreation. These concessions effectively had nullified an 1890 decree that made beaches available for public use; the action of April 21 returned the beaches to the people (Buch and Suárez 2009, 89–92).

Thus, we see that in February, March, and April of 1959, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, with Fidel as Prime Minister, took decisive steps in defense of the interests of the people and in accordance with popular desires. The most significant step, however, lay ahead. The Agrarian Reform Law would strike at the heart of the neocolonial relation, and it would mark a definitive break with the bourgeoisie. The promise of agrarian reform had been a central part of the July 26 Movement. In *History Will Absolve Me*, Fidel had observed that more than half of Cuban productive land is foreign-owned, and eighty-five percent of small farmers are tenants who do not own the land on which they work, creating a situation of poverty, miserable housing conditions, and limited or no access to schools and health services. He had proposed a number of concrete measures, including agrarian reform. The promise of agrarian reform was reinforced by the fact that on October 10, 1958, the General Command of the Rebel Army in the Sierra Maestra had promulgated a law giving ownership to tenant farmers and sharecroppers working on land of less than 5 *caballerías* (67 hectares or 165 acres) (Buch and Suárez 2009, 103–104).

Following the triumph of the revolution, Fidel prepared the country for an Agrarian Reform Law that would change the social and economic base of the country. He repeatedly committed to agrarian reform in his statements to the press and the media of communication and in his meetings with political groups and the people. At the same time, he met discretely with a small group in the House of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in order to formulate an agrarian reform proposal. In addition to Fidel and Che, the group of seven persons included Vilma Espín, the wife of Raúl Castro who would later become Founding President of the Federation

of Cuban Women; and Antonio Núñez Jiménez, who later would become a well-known and respected adventurer, ecologist, and writer. The group did not include any members of the Council of Ministers, other than Fidel. On February 10, the Council of Ministers had formed a commission for agrarian reform under the direction of the Minster of Agriculture, Humberto Sorí Marín, one of the conservative members of the Council and an ally of the landholding sector, but the commission never functioned (Buch and Suárez 2009, 104, 198).

The Agrarian Reform Plan that was developed by Fidel's group was presented to the Council of Ministers on April 28 by acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Augusto Martínez, inasmuch as Fidel was on a twenty-one-day trip to Canada, the USA, and Argentina. The Council, still presided by Martínez, ratified the proposal on May 5. In a session of the Council on May 12, presided by Fidel, the proposal was considered further. It was agreed that the next session of the Council would be held on May 17 in the *Sierra Maestra*, for the purpose of promulgating the Agrarian Reform Law. The date was chosen in order commemorate the 1946 assassination of Niceto Pérez, a peasant who had defied the government of Ramón Grau by occupying and cultivating land belonging to the state (Buch and Suárez 2009, 104–107).

In the May 17 ceremony in the wooden shack that had been Command Headquarters of the guerrilla army in the *Sierra Maestra*, Fidel declared that the Agrarian Reform Law "will give the country a new economic and social order, creating and developing new sources of work to the benefit of the poorest and dispossessed social classes, of the peasant and working class, forgotten by previous governments" (quoted in Buch and Suárez 2009, 108). During the ceremony, the proposed law was approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Council created the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and it named Antonio Núñez Jiménez, one of Fidel's small groups, as its Executive Director. Following the ceremony, Fidel addressed the nation via *Radio Rebelde*, proclaiming that the law "initiates an entirely new stage in our economic life" (quoted in Buch and Suárez 2009, 109). Minister of Agriculture Sorí, who as noted was an ally of the landholding sector, was not in agreement with the new law, but he agreed to sign it (Buch and Suárez 2009, 110), apparently deferring to the prevailing political mood of the country.

A Forum on the Agrarian Reform Law, convoked by the 26 of July Movement, was held in the National Capitol from June 28 to July 12,

1959. Seventy-eight national delegates participated, representing intellectuals of various tendencies, workers and peasants, and including sectors opposed to it. In addition, there were representatives of fifteen Latin American nations, the USA, Canada, and the Organization of American States. In an address to the opening session of the Forum, Raúl Castro proclaimed that the first and highest objective of the Cuban Revolution is the definitive establishment of Cuban sovereignty. He noted that the Revolutionary Government has listened with respect to the criticisms of the Agrarian Reform Law by the US Department of State, but the principle of sovereignty requires that "*we* decide, in accordance with our interests, the needs of Cuba, and the interests of the Cuban people" (Buch and Suárez 2009, 112–113). Addressing the closing session of the Forum, Fidel maintained that the revolution adopts measures that defend the interests of the poorest sectors and the interests of the nation, even when these measures are in opposition to the interests of some national sectors and to foreign interests. He noted that the Agrarian Reform Law seeks to promote the welfare of "that sector of the country that has suffered the most and is the most forgotten and abandoned," and he described the Agrarian Reform Law as an "essential economic measure, if the people are to be freed from underdevelopment and are to attain a higher standard of living" (Buch and Suárez 2009, 113–114).

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 abolished large-scale landholdings, tenant farming, and sharecropping. It established a maximum limit of 100 *caballerías* (1340 hectares or 3311 acres) for sugar or rice plantations or cattle estates. In accordance with the law, the government subsequently would confiscate the land of 4423 plantations, distributing approximately one-third of it to peasants who had worked on it as tenant farmers or sharecroppers, and establishing state-managed farms and cooperatives with the rest. The former owners were offered compensation, based on the assessed value of the land for taxation purposes, and with payment in the form of twenty-year bonds. Inasmuch as some US-owned plantations covered land of 200,000 hectares, the law had a significant effect on the Cuban structure of land ownership and distribution. It provided the foundation for a fundamental transformation in the quality of life of the rural population that endures to this day (Arboleya 2008, 145; Buch and Suárez 2009, 114; Castro, 2006, 244; Pérez 2006, 241–244).

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 was and is the defining moment of the Cuban Revolution. It was a radical step that constituted a definitive

break with the bourgeoisie, both Cuban and international. But it was a necessary step, if the triumphant revolution were to deliver on its promises. In a neocolonial situation, any government that seeks to overcome underdevelopment and poverty must bring to an end two patterns that are integral to the neocolonial world-system: The unequal distribution of land and the use of land to provide cheap raw materials for the core of the world-economy. A government committed to the people must take land from the national estate bourgeoisie and transnational corporations and establish alternative land-use patterns and alternative patterns of land distribution that are able to promote and sustain national development. With the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law, the radical anti-neocolonial character of the Cuban Revolution was made manifest. As Cuban scholar and diplomat Jesus Arboleya would write nearly a half century later, the Agrarian Reform Law "showed that the balance was inclined irremediably toward the most radical sectors," and it "defined the anti-neocolonial character of the revolution" (2008, 144). The die was cast: The triumphant revolution was not seeking a return to representative democracy in a neocolonial context, but a transformation of the neocolonial structures that had defined the Cuban situation since 1902.

Radicalization of the Revolutionary Government

With the decisive step of the revolution in support of agrarian reform, the revolution was now headed toward a confrontation with the national bourgeoisie and the USA. From the point of view of the beneficiaries of the neocolonial order, the Cuban Revolution was a dangerous example. It struck with courage and insight at an essential dimension of the neocolonial world-system. If a small island nation with limited natural resources were permitted to challenge the world-system in this way with impunity, what lessons would be drawn by the people of large neocolonized nations that possessed important natural resources for manufacturing and energy and significant markets for surplus manufactured goods? The world must know that any nation that seeks genuine sovereignty will be made to suffer.

This situation of confrontation with powerful actors made it necessary for the revolution to maintain the firm support of the people. In order to do so, the government would have to respond creatively and effectively to the needs of this people. Thus, there emerged a move by eight "vanguard ministers" of the government to replace government ministers

who were less than enthusiastic about the agrarian reform, and who, in their view, were not developing their ministries in an effective and dynamic manner. On June 11 and 12, five ministers (State, Agriculture, Government, Health and Social Assistance, and Social Welfare) were replaced (Buch and Suárez 2009, 117–121, 198–199).

The President of the Republic, Manuel Urrutia, was out of step with the radicalized Council of Ministers. The vanguard ministers had been unsatisfied with the conduct of the President from the beginning. He possessed what they considered an "absurd radicalism," which expressed itself with respect to three issues. First, his refusal to conclude his taking of the oath of office with the phrase "so help me God," thus provoking criticism of the revolution from religious groups, who mistakenly believed that the removal of the Supreme Being from the Cuban constitutional process was ordered by Fidel. Second, he was opposed to the granting of safe-conduct to hundreds of persons who had entered Latin American embassies seeking political asylum, thus provoking problems for the Cuban revolutionary government in its diplomatic relations with Latin American governments. Third, he made public statements calling for a full and immediate suppression of gambling, in spite of the effects that such a measure would have on employment. Although an extreme radical on these matters, he was conservative concerning important issues, including agrarian reform. In addition, he invoked a clause of presidential exemption from the reduction in salaries for ministers, and thus received the same excessive salary as Batista. In conjunction with his pension as a retired judge, this enabled him to purchase a new house in an exclusive neighborhood. And, after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law, he delayed in signing laws and measures that were approved by the Council of Ministers (Buch and Suárez 2009, 66–67, 124–130, 141, 202, 205, 216).

But the issue that provoked a governmental crisis was Urrutia's anti-communist rhetoric. After the passage of the Agrarian Reform Law on May 17, the phantom of communism was invoked by the USA and the counterrevolution. In this context, anti-communist declarations by the President, expressing concerns about communist infiltration in the revolutionary government, were undermining the revolutionary process. Urrutia, for example, declared to the press, "I believe that the communists are doing terrible damage to Cuba, and I openly declare here that they want to create a second front in the revolution. Therefore, I always have said that I reject the support of the communists, and I believe that

true Cuban revolutionaries ought to reject it openly also" (quoted in Buch and Suárez 2009, 210).

The anti-communist public declarations of Urrutia placed Fidel in a difficult position, inasmuch as Fidel sought to reduce the influence of the anti-communist ideology. As Prime Minister, Fidel was under the formal authority of the President. On the other hand, with the real power that Fidel possessed, it would not have been difficult to have the President removed from office. But any such display of power would be viewed by the world as a *coup d'état*, yet another example of political intrigues and conflicts in Latin American politics. At the same time, if Fidel, as Prime Minister, had criticized the President publically, such criticism of a higher official would have been disloyal and not proper. In this situation, Fidel on July 16 submitted his resignation from the position of Prime Minister. He explained his reasons to the people in a television address on the evening of July 17, describing his disagreements with the President, giving particular emphasis to the anti-communist public statements of the President. The reaction of the people was overwhelming: The President should resign, and the Council of Ministers should not accept Fidel's resignation. In the face of this public reaction, Urrutia immediately resigned, and the Council of Ministers quickly named Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado as President. Prior to his television statement, Fidel had communicated secretly to three Council members that, if Urrutia resigns, Dorticós should be named to take his place as president (Buch and Suárez 2009, 124–146, 201–219, 236–240).

Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, at the time of his call to serve as President, was a member of the Council of Ministers, holding the position of Minister in Charge of Review and Study of Revolutionary Laws. A lawyer by profession, he was responsible for ensuring the legal validity of the new laws and measures proposed by the ministers. He had been born in a middle-class family in the city of Cienfuegos. His father was a well-known surgeon, and his mother was a teacher. He attended private Catholic schools in Cienfuegos and Santa Clara, and he later studied law at the University of Havana. He became a leader in the revolutionary student movement in Cienfuegos in the 1930s, and he studied Marxist works. However, with the turn to representative democracy in the late 1930s and the subsequent emergence of the politics of corruption, his revolutionary hopes were dashed. He settled into a career in law in Cienfuegos; he continued to read widely, but without political participation. He became a prestigious lawyer, respected for his studious nature

and his well-developed knowledge of law and culture (Buch and Suárez 2009, 221–227).

With the attack on the Moncada military garrison on July 26, 1953, his submerged revolutionary fervor was awakened. Beginning at the end of 1956, he became actively involved in clandestine activities, and he became coordinator of the Civic Resistance Movement in Cienfuegos in July 1957. Following the failure in April 1958 of the 26 of July Movement general strike, Dorticós was named coordinator of the 26 of July Movement in Cienfuegos. He was arrested and tortured in December 1958. The chief of the provincial military forces of Batista negotiated an agreement with the 26 of July Movement, in which Dorticós would be released, if he left the country. He was transported to Miami. But denied entry by the US government, the 26 of July Movement arranged for his transport to Mexico, where he was granted political asylum. With the triumph of the Revolution a short time later, he immediately returned to Havana. He was named to the Council of Ministers on January 5 (Buch and Suárez 2009, 221–236).

Upon assuming the office of president on July 17, Dorticós joined with the people in calling for Fidel to return to the position of Prime Minister. Fidel's resignation never had been accepted by the Council, so technically he was still Prime Minister. But Fidel had made the resignation publically, and he was reluctant to return. The popular demand for Fidel's return continued for days, including work stoppages and the suspension of the chiming of church bells. The popular call culminated in a mass act on July 26 in the José Martí Civic Plaza (today the Plaza of the Revolution), in which one million peasants arrived to defend the Agrarian Reform Law and support the revolution. During the act, speakers and the assembly repeatedly called for the return of Fidel to the government, including Dorticós, who declared, "the people order Fidel to comply with his duty." Later in the act, Dorticós took the microphone from Raúl Castro in order to proclaim, "In the most emotional moment of my life, I am able to announce that today our comrade Fidel, before our mandate, has agreed to return to the office of prime minister" (Buch and Suárez 2009, 146–150, 244–255).

With the reincorporation of Fidel as Prime Minister, the designation of Osvaldo Dorticós as President, and the replacement of five conservative ministers with radicals, the Provisional Revolutionary Government was now prepared to push forward with the revolutionary transformation of the neocolonial order and to wage battle with the national and international forces that were mobilizing to defend that order.

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CHAPTER 5

The Cuban Revolutionary Project

Stages in the Cuban Revolutionary Project

Jesús Arboleya has identified seven stages in the development of the Cuban revolutionary project: national liberation, 1959–1961; Cuban socialism based on industrial development, 1961–1965; Cuban socialism based on sugar exportation, 1966–1970; institutionalization, 1970–1985; rectification of errors, 1986–1989; special period, 1989–2001; and integration into the Latin American revolution, 2001 to the present.

National liberation, 1959–1961. The first stage of the Cuban revolutionary project was the stage of national liberation, "understood as the breaking of the political and economic ties that established the dependency of the country in relation to the United States, and the end of the neocolonial model established at the origins of the Republic" (Arboleya 2008, 164). As we have seen, the first decisive steps in the Cuban revolutionary project were taken in 1959. They include significant reductions in housing rents and telephone and electricity rates; the renegotiation of labor contracts, resulting in higher wages; the seizing of the property of those who had been government officials from 1954 to 1958 (during the second Batista dictatorship); and the reduction of luxury imports through tariffs and licensing. The most significant step, however, was the Agrarian Reform Law, which, as noted above, expropriated sugar and rice plantations and cattle estates in excess of 3333 acres and real estate in excess of 1000 acres, providing for compensation in the form of twenty-year bonds at 4.5% annual interest, with prices determined by

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assessed value of land for tax purposes. A total of 4423 plantations were expropriated, with approximately one-third of the acreage distributed to peasants who worked on it, and two-thirds becoming state property, utilized for the establishment of farms and cooperatives (Arboleya 2008, 145; Pérez 2006, 241–244).

University of North Carolina Professor of History Louis Pérez sees the nationalization of sugar properties as driven principally by the logic of the Moncada program of action rather than by a commitment to socialism or as a reaction to US hostile policies.

> The revolutionary government was driven to adopt socialist structures by the logic of its reform agenda, especially the requirements of the Agrarian Reform Law. The nationalization of sugar properties involved the state directly in the organization and management of a strategic sector of the economy in varying degrees of decline, the revival of which, Cubans were convinced, required central planning and state-sponsored development. Cuban leadership employed socialist mechanisms early, not in reaction to hostility from the United States but as a response to national economic needs. These were strategies designed to implement reforms as fully and as quickly as possible and at the same time guarantee the political ascendancy of revolutionary elements (2006, 253).

As we have seen, Jesús Arboleya sees the Agrarian Reform Law as defining the anti-neocolonial character of the revolution.

> The Agrarian Reform Law…. constituted a fundamental ingredient of the political program of the Cuban Revolution, inasmuch as agrarian property ownership constituted the economic means of support of the national oligarchy and the neocolonial system as a whole. Transforming this reality not only was a requirement in order to advance the social improvements demanded by the revolution, but it also meant a radical change in the reigning structure of power in the country. For this reason, the agrarian reform did not limit itself to the distribution of idle lands—although they represented nearly 30% of the total available land—since the principle objective was the proscription of the plantations, with the intention of giving a death blow to the Cuban oligarchy and the large US companies. In this manner the agrarian reform defined the anti-neocolonial character of the revolution before socialism was thought of as an immediate option and before their existed official contacts with the Soviet Union (Arboleya 2008, 144–145).

Decisive steps in advancing the Cuban revolutionary project and in breaking the neocolonial relation with the USA continued in 1960. Cuba and the Soviet Union signed an economic agreement that included Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar as well as Soviet provision of credit and technical assistance. The agreement also included the selling of Soviet crude and refined petroleum at prices considerably below those of the foreign oil companies. When foreign oil refineries in Cuba (Standard Oil, Texaco, and Shell) refused to refine Soviet oil, the Cuban government nationalized the refineries. With the relation between the USA and Cuba deteriorating, the Cuban government proceeded with further nationalizations, including utility companies, sugar mills, and banks, including Cuban-owned as well as foreign-owned properties (Pérez 2006, 247–248; Arboleya 2008, 168–170).

The decisive steps taken during the stage of national liberation, especially agrarian reform and nationalization, generated a counterrevolution. The Cuban counterrevolution was formed fundamentally by those whose interests were adversely affected by the abolition of the neocolonial system and by those who were influenced by ideological penetrations of the neocolonial system. In *La Contrarrevolución Cubana,* Arboleya (1997) describes the principal social groups that formed the counterrevolution during the stage of national liberation: Cubans that were part of the Batista dictatorship, especially those who had been involved in abusive conduct, such as soldiers who had engaged in torture or rape, or politicians involved in corruption on a large scale, for whom reconciliation with the revolution was not possible; members of the national bourgeoisie, especially after the radicalization of the revolutionary government; middle- and upper-middle-class persons influenced by anti-communist ideology; and politicians connected to the *Auténticos*, the political party that had been in power from the period of 1944–1952, who now found themselves without popular support or legitimacy (Arboleya 1997, 46–76, 2009, 18, 32–41; Pérez 2006, 237–238, 244–245).

Such individuals with economic, political, and ideological motives of opposition to the Cuban Revolution emigrated in large numbers: 62,000 in 1960; 67,000 in 1961; and 66,000 in 1962 (Perez 2006, 255). Arboleya notes that the Cuban counterrevolution found that, weakened by expatriation and by its lack of popular support in Cuba, it had to accept US sponsorship and support, which gave it an anti-nationalist character and thus served to further discredit it in the eyes of the Cuban people. As a result of its weakness, it turned to terrorism as a form

of opposition. "The counterrevolutionaries had to organize themselves with the acceptance of US tutelage, which came historically conditioned and which was the only form in which they could attain the cohesion and the potential that they did not possess by themselves. The lack of popular support led them to adopt terrorism as a fundamental method of struggle" (Arboleya 2009, 24–25).

As a response to acts of sabotage and terrorism emanating from the Cuban counterrevolution in Miami and with logistical and financial support of the USA (Arboleya 2009), the Cuban Revolution adopted measures for popular self-defense during the stage of national liberation. In 1959, the Ministry of the Armed Forces organized a civilian militia, which reached 100,000 members in 1960 and nearly 300,000 in 1961. In September 1960, the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution was organized in neighborhoods for the purpose of vigilance over sabotage and terrorist activities carried out by counterrevolutionaries. In addition, the stage of national liberation also included the expansion of mass organizations. As a consequence of the overwhelming popular support of the revolution, the Federation of University Students and the Federation of Cuban Workers were under the leadership of revolutionaries, and efforts were made to expand their numbers and deepen popular participation. In August 1960, the Federation of Cuban Women was formed. In May 1961, 100,000 farmers were organized into the National Organization of Small Agriculturalists (Pérez 2006, 251).

Cuban socialism based on industrial development, 1961–1965. In 1961, on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, with agrarian reform and nationalizations implemented, Fidel Castro proclaimed the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution. During this second stage of the Cuban Revolution, the policy was to develop through the industrialization of the country. Cuba eliminated private appropriation of profits and also constrained personal income, thus making available funds for investment in social benefits and the industrial development of the nation. The strategy was to give priority to satisfy the basic needs of the population while investing in the formation of human resources through the expansion and improvement of education and public health, while at the same time utilizing capital for investment in industry. This approach envisioned that Cuba would have neither rich persons nor beggars. The majority would be assured satisfaction of basic nutritional needs and access to free education and health care. The majority of the population would have a higher standard of living than the majority of persons in the Third World, but

doctors, lawyers, scientists, engineers, architects, and political leaders would have a standard of living lower than their counterparts in other nations (Arboleya 2008, 164, 171–173).

The Cuban philosophy of "equality at a low level" required a high degree of collective consciousness and a will of sacrifice, inasmuch as the people were asked to leave aside the irrational consumerism characteristic of the capitalist societies. Accordingly, Che Guevara's concept of the "new man and woman" attained considerable influence. The Cuban approach required a vanguard of exemplary revolutionaries, leaders with advanced consciousness and high levels of commitment, whose comportment would be models for others. The revolutionary vanguard would be recruited from all classes, including professionals, urban workers, rural workers, agricultural cooperativists, and peasants. This concept of a vanguard from and of the people differed from the confused concepts of other Latin American revolutions of the era, presuming, in some cases, that the vanguard would come exclusively from urban proletariat, or assuming, in other cases, that it would be recruited exclusively from the rural peasantry (Arboleya 2008, 171–173).

Incorporation into the socialist bloc provided some attenuation of the sacrifice entailed by the Cuban approach, and it provided some reduction of the negative impact of the hostile US policies against Cuba. The Soviet Union provided commercial credit, and it guaranteed a market for Cuban products. It provided machinery that was integral to the strategy of orienting the economy toward industrial development, seeking to end a dependent relation based on the exportation of raw materials and the importation of consumer goods. However, the strategy of industrial development came up against serious obstacles. For many of the industrial projects, the country lacked sufficient financial capacity to develop the projects with sufficient force, and in many cases, it lacked a sufficient level of technological culture or technicians or a culture of business organization (Arboleya 2008, 175–176).

Cuban socialism based on sugar exportation, 1966–1970. Given the obstacles that industrialization confronted, the revolution embarked on a strategy of obtaining the necessary capital for industrial development through expansion of sugar production. With the triumph of the revolution, the focus had been to break from sugar production, given its central role in the development and the maintenance of the neocolonial system. But this was re-evaluated in light of the difficulties in the development of industry. It came to be believed that in the context of

the revolutionary project, sugar exportation would not play the same pernicious role that it played during the neocolonial republic, inasmuch as the profits would not be privately appropriated but appropriated collectively for investments in industrial development (Arboleya 2008, 176).

In 1964, agreements were signed with the Soviet Union, in which the Soviets agreed to annual purchases of five million tons of sugar. Agreements were also made with other countries of the European socialist bloc and with China. These agreements led to the establishment in 1970 of a goal of a ten-million-ton sugar crop. In order to accomplish the goal, new fertilizers and new varieties were introduced, and investments were made to modernize the sugar industry. As a result of difficulties in the modernization, millions of Cubans were mobilized to cut the sugar cane. As a result of these efforts, a record crop was attained. But it was short of the ten-million-ton goal, and the mobilization of workers from other sectors had been costly and had caused problems in these sectors. Fidel Castro announced the results of the sugar harvest a lost battle, assuming personal responsibility for the failure (Arboleya 2008, 176–177).

Consolidation and institutionalization, 1970–1985. The institutionalization of the Cuban Revolution was made possible by, first, the weakening of the counterrevolution, given the evident failure of its efforts to destroy the revolution, and secondly, an improvement in the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The integration of Cuba into the socialist bloc included arrangements favorable to Cuba, such as good prices for sugar exports and relatively low prices for the importation of petroleum supplies. There were negative aspects of this relation, such as the tendency for the Cuban system to tolerate inefficient and costly productive practices and a tendency toward bureaucratism and dogmatism, to some extent abandoning the values that had formed the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. However, the period of 1970–1985 was a time of substantial improvements in the protection of the social and economic rights of the people as well as consolidation of the revolutionary process (Arboleya 2008, 177, 181–184; Hamilton 2002, 21). Bell Lara writes: "In thirty years, from 1959 to 1989, Cuba achieved levels in the principal life standards and life quality indicators superior to those of Latin American and underdeveloped countries as a whole. The level of indicators that measure results in this terrain were similar to those of the most industrialized countries of the capitalist system" (2008).

There were, for example, important achievements with respect to illiteracy. At the time of the triumph of the revolution, the illiteracy rate in Cuba was 24%. In 1961, the revolution launched a literacy campaign, in which 271,000 people, including many student volunteers and professional teachers, were organized into instructional brigades. Some were dispatched to live for a time in rural areas. Others worked part time in urban areas. By 1962, the illiteracy rate had been reduced to 4%; by the end of the decade, illiteracy had been completely eradicated. And there were important gains in education. In 1953, some 56% of children aged six to twelve were enrolled in school; this percentage rose to 88% by 1970 and 100% by 1986. The percentage of the population completing sixth grade increased from 20% in 1953 to 32% in 1970 and to 61% in 1981. University enrollments increased tenfold. The number of university centers increased from three in 1959 to forty in the 1980s. There also were significant changes in the fields of study of university students. Enrollments in the humanities, social sciences, and law declined, while enrollments in education, natural sciences, medicine, engineering and architecture, and agricultural sciences increased (Pérez 2006, 273–275).

There were important gains in nutrition. A rationing program guaranteed to every Cuban family at least a minimal diet, and malnutrition was eliminated. By the early 1980s, the Cuban daily per capita calorie intake was 2705, above the generally accepted minimum daily requirement of 2500 calories. And there were dramatic gains in health care. The doctor/population ratio declined from one doctor per 1000 people prior to the revolution to one doctor per 490 people by 1984. The infant mortality rate declined from 32.3 in 1953 to 16 in 1984. And having eliminated many communicable diseases that afflict underdeveloped countries, the leading causes of death in Cuba became heart disease, cancer, and stroke, as in the developed countries (Pérez 2006, 275–278).

Prior to 1989, the Cuban economy had an average annual growth rate of 4.3%, which was higher than the Latin American average. Between 1971 and 1985, the Cuban economy grew at an annual rate of 6%, while the Latin American index during these years was −1%. In addition, the Cuban system had invested in industrial development and in human resources. In 1989, Cuba had the highest number per capita of scientists and engineers among Third World nations, double the level of Chile and Brazil, and comparable to South Korea and Taiwan, which had the highest level among historically underdeveloped countries. The Cuban socialist system had been able to provide for the basic needs of

the population and to improve the quality of life in a variety of ways as well as to promote the economic and scientific development of the country (Arboleya 2008, 198–199).

The period also was characterized by the institutionalization of the revolutionary process in the form of the development and approval of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, discussed below. The Constitution represented a transformation of the state apparatus, establishing structures of Popular Power and establishing legal relationships between the governing structures of Popular Power and the mass organizations formed by workers, students, women, farmers, and neighborhoods (Arboleya 2008, 183).

Rectification of errors, 1986–1990. As the European socialist bloc in the 1980s was beginning a process of revision that incorporated elements of capitalism, Cuba was going in the opposite direction, returning to the centralized direction of the economy and to the promotion of moral work incentives over material incentives. Distancing itself from "real socialism," Cuba sought to restore values that had been central to the revolution of the 1960s and to the thought of Che Guevara. There began of process of the "rectification of errors and negative tendencies." But before the implications of this turn could be fully developed, the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc collapsed, creating an entirely different economic and social context for the Cuban revolutionary project (Arboleya 2008, 191; Castro 1990).

Special period, 1989–2001. The collapse of the socialist bloc placed in doubt the gains registered by the Cuba revolutionary project, and it established the possibility that the socialist project in Cuba could collapse. Alongside the disappearance of its trading partners, the US embargo was maintained and strengthened, and Cuba was without access to credits and loans through international finance agencies. In three years, the gross domestic product was reduced by 23%, due principally to the impossibility of importing capital goods and raw materials. The purchasing capacity of the country was reduced from 8 to 1.7 billion dollars. The supply of petroleum declined from 13.4 to 3.3 million tons, while national production of petroleum fell 17.8%. As a result, electric energy was reduced to 70% of its 1989 level, and steel production was at 19% of its 1989 level. The sugar cane harvest declined from 7 to 4.3 million tons, and agricultural production and animal husbandry declined by 53%. Consumption declined dramatically, and the people began to live under conditions of extreme scarcity. A good part of the day was spent

without electricity. The system of public transportation was drastically reduced, and many people walked or rode bicycles. In the context of the stress provoked by a rapid and drastic change in the standard of living of the people, religiosity increased (Arboleya 2008, 199–201).

The Cuban government adopted a series of measures of adjustment to the economic crisis. Cuba's adjustment policies were in important ways different from the structural adjustment policies adopted in Latin America during the same time period (López 1994). Firstly, the Latin American structural adjustment was being imposed by international finance agencies, whereas the Cuban adjustment policies were being developed by Cuba, in response to the new international economic and political situation, and were not being imposed by outside agencies. Secondly, the Latin American structural adjustment policies were designed to increase corporate profits in an era of stagnating profits and markets, without regard for the social consequences of the measures; whereas the Cuban adjustment was designed to protect the standard of living of the Cuban people, in the context of a commitment to preserve the social gains of the revolution. Thirdly, unlike the Latin American structural adjustment, the Cuban adjustment policies were developed in a context of wide citizen participation. There was a "popular consultation" in regard to the measures during 1993 and 1994, involving the mass organizations of workers, peasants, students, women, and neighborhoods. The popular consultation gave the people an opportunity to make recommendations, many of which were implemented, as well as to gain a greater understanding of the international and national economic situation and of the necessity for the measures.

The specific policies of Cuba's adjustment were designed to accomplish particular goals.

1. In order to overcome its historic pattern of economic dependency on a particular region or nation, Cuba sought to diversify its trade and commercial relations.
2. In order to escape the pitfalls of an over reliance on raw materials exports, Cuba sought to expand its production in industries that have higher prices and higher wage rates than the classical peripheral exports, such as sugar. Accordingly, Cuba sought to expand investments in certain branches, such as tourism (with foreign and Cuban state capital), the pharmaceutical industry and biotechnology (with Cuban state capital), petroleum (with foreign and Cuban

state capital), and nickel (with foreign and Cuban state capital). This expansion included efforts to attract foreign capital, but under conditions of strong regulation by the Cuban government, fundamentally distinct from the privatization of companies and the opening to foreign capital that was occurring throughout the world with the imposition of the neoliberal project. Most agreements with foreign hotel companies, for example, were joint ventures, with terms that protected Cuban interests. The strategy was to attract foreign investment not by selling natural or human resources cheaply, but by providing an educated workforce, political stability, and an opportunity for reasonable profitable investment.

3. In order to improve Cuban production, government-owned enterprises were decentralized, with many branches or enterprises expected to become fully or partially self-financing in accordance with a timetable, with the particular expectations shaped by the marketability of the goods or services that the enterprise produces or provides.
4. In order to generate employment, possibilities for self-employment were expanded significantly.
5. In order to attract foreign currency, the possession and trading of foreign currencies by Cubans were legalized. This led to the development of a dual economy: one based on "national money," and another on "Cuban Convertible Pesos" (CUC). Foreign currencies entered the country through relations with foreign companies and through family remittances. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, 60% of the Cuban people would have regular access to CUCs, through one form or another (Arboleya 2008, 203).
6. In order to ensure that the state rather than the people pay the greater cost of the adjustment, when a center of production or service was closed, the state continued to pay 70% of the salaries of people who lost employment until they could be placed in new employment.
7. In order to preserve limited resources, rationing of electricity and gasoline was developed.

These policies enabled the country to emerge from the depths of the crisis in 1993 to a level of recovery by 2001. Beginning in 1994, there was a steady growth in the gross domestic product. Hamilton observes:

> The net economic effect of the changes introduced during the Special Period was positive. The economy was saved from collapse and after 1995 began to show significant rates of growth—0.7, 2.5, and 7.8 percent in 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively, compared with an average annual rate of growth of 4.3 percent from 1959 to 1989 and a 3.5 percent average for Latin America and the Caribbean in the mid-1990s. Expansion has continued, with growth in GDP of 2.5 percent in 1997, 1.2 percent in 1998, and 6.2 percent in 1999 (2002, 24).

The recovery largely was based on growth in tourism, biotechnology, mining, and petroleum.

1. Tourism has become the principal industry of the country. During the 1990s, it grew at a rate of 18% per year, increasing from 340,000 tourists in 1989 to 1,774,000 in 2000, reaching 2 million tourists annually in 2007. The hotel capacity on the island has increased threefold from 1989 to 2007 (Arboleya 2008, 204). Continuing to grow since 2007, the number of tourists reached four million in 2016.
2. There have been significant investments in the biopharmaceutical industry, with the intention of developing high-technology exports that command high prices in the world-economy. Cuban scientific research centers have developed fifty products and services that have received international patents, including a Hepatitis B vaccine. These centers have begun to sell these products and services in the international market, although there are obstacles due to the US blockade as well as monopolization of the market by the large pharmaceutical corporations (Arboleya 2008, 205).
3. Joint ventures in the nickel industry brought its production to a record level by 2001. Cuba is the world's sixth largest producer of nickel, and it has the largest nickel reserves in the world (Arboleya 2008, 205).
4. Petroleum production increased sixfold from 1991 to 2001, and Cuba now produces enough petroleum to be self-sufficient in the generation of electricity (Arboleya 2008, 205).

As the dynamics of recovery unfolded, Cuba maintained its commitment to the education and health needs of the people, and it has been able

to preserve the system of health and education developed prior to 1989. Arboleya maintains that the crisis of the special period unfolded in a form very different from economic crises in capitalist economies. "There were great shortages, but not starvation; unemployment, but not alienation; there were tensions, but not uprisings, much less generalized repression, as would have been normal in the rest of the world. In the worst moments, the health system was maintained and the schools continued functioning with used books, paper, and pencils" (Arboleya 2008, 206). The socialist project was able to endure through the crisis as a result of the commitment of the people. "Few imagined [in 1994] that Cuba would be capable of overcoming this crisis. Even a good part of the international Left predicted the anticipated internment of the Cuban Revolution…. The overcoming of the crisis to the present level constitutes a fact explainable only on the basis of the cohesion created by the Revolution and the virtues of the socialist distributive system" (Arboleya 2008, 201–202, 206).

Some of the measures adopted during the special period had the effect of generating a level of social inequality that, while low by Latin American standards, represents a level of inequality unknown in Cuba since the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Particularly important in this regard were the authorization of possession of foreign currencies and the expansion of tourism, self-employment, and private agricultural production, measures that led to differing levels of access to CUCs. Contributing to this phenomenon has been the expansion since 1990 of economically motivated emigration, in which the emigrants maintain strong family ties in Cuba and regularly send family remittances (Arboleya 2008, 203–204). Therefore, the policies of the special period reversed the tendency of decreasing inequality since the triumph of the revolution (Pérez 2006, 272) and initiated a tendency, still in evidence today, of increasing inequality. However, the dynamic of increasing inequality is an unintended consequence of necessary policies, and it is no sense dismissed as unimportant. It occurs in the context of widespread commitment, in the government, and among the people, to the principals that the basic necessities of all persons must be met, and that the state has the right and the duty to intervene in the economy to accomplish this end. It occurs, in other words, in the context of a widespread commitment to the Cuban socialist project.

Although with some tendencies that it must observe and analyze from a productive and moral point of view, the Cuban Revolution has endured, and it has to a considerable extent recovered from the

economic shock occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc. The recovery was made possible by two factors. Firstly, intelligent adjustment policies, which were designed to expand production and commerce and at the same time to protect the sovereignty of the nation and the needs of the people. Such a goal was possible because the Cuban state is under the authority of the people, as is explained below, so that it possessed the necessary political will. In contrast, states in capitalist economies and representative democracies are under the indirect control of the corporate class, and they respond to economic crises in a manner that defends the interests of said class, disseminating ideological justifications of their self-interested policies, thus confusing the people. As we will see in Chap. 6, when the capitalist world-economy entered a sustained systemic crisis in the 1970s, the global political-economic elites of the core nations responded by abandoning their nations and their peoples, disseminating a "free-market" ideology. But the Cuban state of the 1990s was structured in a form that facilitated a response consistent with historical social scientific knowledge and with democratic and socialist values, defending the people rather than abandoning them. Secondly, the Cuban recovery was made possible by the remarkable willingness of the people to make sacrifices in support of the socialist project, which itself was a consequence of the historic commitment of the socialist state to the nation and the people. The support of the people enabled the Cuban socialist project to endure through its most difficult moments. The persistence of socialist Cuba through the emergence of the global neoliberal era and collapse of the socialist projects of Eastern Europe is an historic fact that the movements of the Third World are today aware and celebrate, as we will discuss in Chap. 7.

Integration into the Latin American revolution, 2001 to the present. Reflecting the international legitimacy of the Cuban Revolution, Cuba has become an important participant in the process of change presently in development in Latin America, playing a significant leadership role. The most important nation in this process has been Venezuela, which has proclaimed its intention to develop "Socialism for the Twenty-First Century." The revolution in Venezuela has characteristics different from the revolution in Cuba, as a consequence of the different particular conditions. But both are national liberation movements that took decisive steps to break with the neocolonial system and are based on a commitment to defend the social and economic rights of the popular classes (Arboleya 2008, 217–224).

Other nations that are important in the present process of Latin American union, in addition to Venezuela and Cuba, include Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. A new Latin American political landscape has emerged, creating a level of independence from the colonial or neocolonial power that is unprecedented in the history of Latin America. Opposition to neocolonial world-system structures is expressing itself throughout the Third World, although it is most advanced in Latin America. As Arboleya observes, these developments demonstrate that the Third World is the driving force of the global revolution of our time (Arboleya 2008, 217, 225).

This new process of Latin American and Caribbean unity and integration is of great significance for Cuba and the world. It is discussed further in Chap. 7.

The Cuban Social and Economic Policy of 2012

In order to improve efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and services, increase domestic industrial and agricultural production, increase the capacity of state enterprises to attain goals, and reduce corruption, the Cuban National Assembly of Popular Power in 2012 approved the Guidelines of Economic and Social Policy. The Guidelines were submitted to the National Assembly by the Cuban Communist Party. They had been formulated initially by the Party, disseminated to the people, and significantly modified as a result of a popular consultation led by the Party. The formulation of the new policies was motivated by the belief among Party members that there was a growing dissatisfaction among the people with the generally low level of personal income.

Without question, the overwhelming and principal dissatisfaction since the 1990s has been with respect to the level of production, the limited resources of the country, and the low income of most people. This material dissatisfaction has become stronger in recent years, and it has arisen because of an increasing popular tendency to use the consumer societies of the North as a frame of reference, a phenomenon that has emerged as a result of the growing number of tourists, and because of emigration to the societies of the North by Cubans who support their families in Cuba. Tourism and emigration have been central to the economic recovery since 1993. But they have contributed to a material dissatisfaction among the people, even as material needs have been increasingly met. The rising expectations of the people include desires for

necessities (better housing and transportation), items that are not necessary but useful (cell phones and Internet access), and what Herbert Marcuse (1964) called "false needs" (designer clothes and jewelry).

The Cuban leadership responded to this new situation with the economic and a social model of 2012, which is a concerted national campaign to increase production in order to satisfy the expectations of the people. The campaign includes decentralization of decision making, accompanied by exhortations that the people should openly identify sources of problems in production, so that the problems can be addressed and efficiency improved. It includes an expansion of cooperatives to non-agricultural sectors, with the hope that this will expand work incentive and improve efficiency. And it includes changes that can be seen as movements toward capitalism or a capitalist attitude: expansion in self-employment, expansion of small-scale capitalism, less restrictions with respect to foreign investment, and the connection of wages to productivity. These capitalist-like measures, it should be understood, are not concessions to a national bourgeoisie or to foreign capital; they are concessions to the people, and they are made with the belief that they will improve production to the benefit of the people. And they are made with recognition that the people have sacrificed much, and their needs and desires should be met.

The concessions to the people with respect to self-employment and small-scale capitalism reflect a dynamic that has been unfolding for many years. In poor societies, people create concrete ways to survive and/or improve their material circumstances. These include working as small-scale retail traders and independent service providers in such trades as carpentry, plumbing, house repair, hairdressing, taxi driving, and cafeteria services. In Cuba prior to 2012, there was limited space for such individual entrepreneurship in the formal economy, so people engaged in it "on the side." When they needed materials for their crafts, they often would acquire them illegally from state employees who had access to them. Inasmuch as the materials were destined to some other purpose in state planning, this form of corruption contributed to inefficiency in government projects. This dynamic had been present in socialist Cuba from the beginning, but with the economic difficulties following the collapse of the socialist bloc, it increased significantly, becoming a serious problem.

The new social and economic model of 2012 seeks to address this situation. In expanding self-employment in 2012, the government was

recognizing small-scale entrepreneurial work as legitimate and as part of the formal economy, so that people now can much more readily attain licenses in these trades and services. At the same time, the government is making necessary materials available for purchase in state stores, so there is no need to buy them on the side, a reform that is coupled with government clampdown on corruption, so that state projects can be carried out more efficiently. In significantly expanding small-scale entrepreneurship, the Party and the government have taken a decision that goes against the classic socialist view that work should be collective. But the Cuban government has taken the view that dignified individual work has a place in a socialist society, insofar as the workers are organized into labor organizations, and they are part of a society in which the principal institutions of the economy and the media are managed by the state, which is controlled by structures of popular democracy. The concession of small-scale entrepreneurship by the revolutionary leadership to the people, going against classic socialist theory, illustrates the fact that the people define socialism in practice.

From a socialist point of view, the desire of the people for dignified individual labor is not as challenging as the growing consumerism of the people, stimulated by tourism and emigration, which is in tension with the view of the new socialist person formulated by Che Guevara in the 1960s. The Cuban revolutionary experience of the last twenty years shows that it is very difficult to cultivate and maintain a purely socialist attitude among the people in the context of a capitalist world-economy and an international consumer society. Although it cannot reasonably be said that the people of Cuba have become the "people of Che," as Fidel once expressed his hope, it is indeed the case that Cuba has been able to develop the new socialist man and woman among a significant minority, comprising roughly 25 to 30% of the people. Formed by educational institutions and the media, with the support of families with revolutionary traditions, these exemplary women and men have a solid understanding of national and international dynamics, and they have a strong commitment to universal human values. They serve as dedicated professionals in health, education, journalism, and other fields, and they serve as leaders in the mass organizations and in the political structures of popular power. They form in practice a revolutionary vanguard, and they are central to the survival and continued growth of the revolutionary project. They are of the people, for they come from all sectors of the people, and they are connected to the people, by blood, emotion, and

spirit. But a distinction can and should be made between the vanguard and the people.

The recent national congress of the Union of Communist Youth, covered on national television, provided clear evidence of a youth vanguard with advanced understanding and commitment to socialist values, a youth vanguard that has been formed in spite of the fact that its members were born in the depths of the special period. One of the delegates eloquently expressed the view that a "war of thought" is on the horizon, as US ideas and presence will increase in the next years. He called upon the delegates to be effective in explaining to the people the virtues and benefits of socialism. Another delegate described it as a battle between a society that calls people to a form of being and a society that manipulates people to acquire things. In his address to the Congress, Cuban Vice-President Miguel Díaz Canel expressed it as a struggle between a society guided by universal human values and a society ruled by the market. The Vice-President also noted that the proceedings of the Congress clearly demonstrated that the revolution had succeeded in forming the new men and women that Che envisioned.

Cuba today faces new challenges, defined by the need to make materialist and consumerist concession to the people, the possibilities of greater relations between the USA and Cuba, the new counteroffensive of the Right in Latin America (discussed in Chap. 8), and the emergence of new forms of fascism in the nations of the North (discussed in the Appendix). In this challenging scenario, the Cuban vanguard of exemplary socialist revolutionaries is prepared for the "war of thought," which Fidel has called the "Battle of Ideas." Its members persistently demonstrate high moral and intellectuals qualities. In addition, among the Cuban people as a whole, there is a deep fund of respect for the revolutionary project and the revolutionary leadership, even if the people do not fully embody the new socialist man or woman.

The evolution of the socialist project in Cuba parallels the evolution of the popular movements in Latin America, where "Socialism for the Twenty-First Century" has been declared, with Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua at the vanguard (discussed in Chap. 8). Today's Latin American socialism distances itself from twentieth-century socialism in Eastern Europe, but it has embraced twentieth-century socialism in Cuba, considering Cuba to be the model of Latin American dignity. Like twentieth-century socialism, today's Latin American socialism sees the state as playing a central role in economic development, but it recognizes

multiple forms of property as legitimate, including private property, cooperatives, and joint ventures with domestic and foreign capital, in addition to state ownership. Like twentieth-century socialism, Latin American socialism today is led by charismatic leaders and a vanguard in each nation; however, the vanguard is not conceived as being formed from the working class, but from multiple popular sectors, including workers, peasants, professionals, students, women, the middle class, indigenous persons, and ecologists.

From 1959 to the present, the development of the Cuban political-economic system has passed through various stages, involving basic changes in assumptions, beliefs, and strategies. Each stage in the development of the system was characterized by a particular context defined by the international situation and domestic issues of the particular time. Each stage and each moment of change are unique. But the process of change itself has been the constant. The changes of 2012 should be understood in the context of a constant process of change and shifting strategies that have characterized the Cuban revolutionary project since 1959.

Popular Democracy in Cuba

During the neocolonial republic, the political process followed the model of multi-party representative democracy. The Cuban experience of this model was not positive, as we have seen. One president (Gerardo Machado 1924–1933) was elected president on the basis of a reform platform, but during his second term, he delivered a brutal repression of the popular movements seeking more extensive changes. Two presidents, Ramón Grau (1944–1948) and Carlos Prío (1948–1952), promised reform, but they delivered corruption. A short-lived reform/revolutionary government in 1933 was brought to an end by the first Batista dictatorship, formed through the political interventions of the US ambassador and established with US support. The second Batista dictatorship (1952–1958) interrupted the electoral process that likely would have led to the election of a relatively new reformist political party (Arboleya 2008, 101–119; Pérez 2006, 187–219).

With the triumph of the revolution of 1959, the revolutionary movement seized control of the state through the formation of a revolutionary government, recognized by the people as legitimate. The traditional political parties found themselves completely discredited in the public

consciousness. The period of 1959–1961 represented a period in which the revolutionary government sought to act decisively in support of the interests of the majority. The government and the people rejected multiple party elections, seeking to empower people and channel expressions of popular will through such mechanisms as mass assemblies and mass organizations of workers, small farmers, women, and students as well as Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (August 1999, 184–197).

In 1970, there began a process of the institutionalization of the revolution, which culminated in the 1976 Constitution (August 1999, 202–220). The Constitution establishes a system of government based on a foundation of local elections. Urban neighborhoods and rural areas are organized into voting districts, each consisting generally of 1000–1500 voters. Every two and one-half years, the voting district conducts elections, in which from two to eight candidates compete. The nominations are made by anyone in attendance at a series of nomination assemblies that are conducted in each voting district. The nomination assemblies generally have a participation rate of 85 to 95%. Those nominated are candidates for office without party affiliation. A one-page biography of all the candidates is posted in a wide variety of public places. The nominees are generally known by the voters, since the voting districts are small. If no candidate receives 50% of the votes, a runoff election is held. Those elected serve as delegates to the Municipal Assembly.

The elected delegates to the Municipal Assembly participate in the process of developing a list of candidates for the provincial and national assemblies. This is a complex process. There are national and provincial candidacy commissions, composed of representatives of the mass organizations. The candidacy commissions receive proposals for pre-candidates to the national and provincial assemblies from mass organizations at the national, provincial, and municipal levels. After further consultations with the mass organizations, the candidacy commissions present a list of pre-candidates to the municipal assemblies. If no one raises an objection, the pre-candidate is accepted as a candidate. If someone raises an objection, a vote is held by a show of hands, and if there is more than 50%, the pre-candidate is accepted as a candidate. Once the full list of candidates is developed, the general assembly has a secret vote, in which each delegate can affirm or deny each candidate. Those with more than 50% of the votes are presented as candidates to the people for the general election. They are candidates from the particular municipality for the provincial and national assemblies. No more than 50% of the candidates

for provincial and national assemblies can be delegates in the municipal assembly. This is to enable the identification of people who are not well known to the people but who are devoted specialists in their fields and have important contributions to make.

August (1999) provides intimate portraits of the candidates in voting districts that he extensively observed, and his account enables us to appreciate the moral and intellectual qualities of many of the candidates as well as their modest social roots. The "campaigns" for provincial and national assemblies are very different from the political campaigns of the representative democracies. They enable the candidates and people to meet one another, and they also have an educational function in regard to the Cuban political process. August's description of the meetings of the candidates with the people provides a portrait of the modesty and the dignity of the Cuban political process.

The national, provincial, and municipal assemblies all make laws appropriate for their levels of jurisdiction. They constitute the legislative branch of the government. The legislative assemblies have supervision over the various ministries, such as health and education, in their levels of jurisdiction. The responsibilities of the assemblies include the selection of administrators of the state at the appropriate level. These state administrators are salaried professionals who work on a full-time basis. They administer the various ministries of the state in their jurisdiction, and they are accountable to the assembly.

At the national level, the selection of state administrators takes the form of selecting the 31 members of the Council of State, including the President of the Council of State. This is done through a process in which the National Candidacy Commission receives proposals from the deputies of the National Assembly, and from these proposals, it submits a list for presentation to the assembly, each deputy having the option of voting yes or no for each candidate. To be accepted in the Council of State, the candidate must receive more than 50% of the votes. The Council of State functions as the executive branch of the national government. Fidel Castro was elected to the position of President of the Council of State in 1976, and he was re-elected various times to five-year terms, until he retired for reasons of health at the beginning of 2009. Fidel's longevity in this position was a consequence of the absence of term limits in the Cuban system, and of his enormous prestige, due to his exceptional moral and intellectual qualities, and due to the role he played as the historic leader of the Cuban Revolution.

The delegates and deputies to the municipal, provincial, and national assemblies work on a voluntary basis, without pay, above and beyond their regular employment, except for those elected to serve as officers of the assemblies. Although the assemblies meet only a few times per year, the work is ongoing in the form of committees and meetings with constituents. Since these responsibilities, particularly at the lower levels, include meeting with the people, the delegates tend to spend many hours per week meeting with groups and individuals and trying to respond to their needs. This is a burdensome obligation, inasmuch as the delegates continue to have responsibilities in careers and families. As a result, there is a high turnover in the assemblies, as many delegates and deputies assume the duty for one or two terms and then retire from this particular responsibility. Some delegates and deputies, however, continue to serve in the assemblies for many years.

In Cuba, there is a very high level of participation in the electoral process. During the 1997–1998 elections, for example, 36,343 nomination assemblies were held nationwide, in which 86.5% of the people participated. August's descriptions of some of these assemblies show the care that is taken to ensure that there is full and open participation by the people. In the subsequent voting for delegates (from among competing candidates) to the municipal assemblies, 97.59% of the people voted. Later, in the voting for provincial and national assemblies, 98.3% of the people voted. This is the election in which the ballot provides an option of yes or no for each candidate, and 94.45% voted for all the candidates.

The high level of voter participation is a continuing characteristic of the Cuban system. In the 2012 partial elections, 94.21% of the voters went to the voting booth. They were to select one candidate from two or three candidates for delegate to the Municipal Assembly. In 93.7% of the voting districts, one candidate received 50% or more of the vote, and thus, they were elected as delegates. In 9.7% of the voting districts, no candidate received more than 50%, and runoff elections were scheduled.

The elections in Cuba have consistently demonstrated the high level of popular support for the Cuban political process. Counter revolutionary groups have called upon the people to demonstrate opposition to the Cuban political system by turning in blank ballots or ballots marked in such a way that they will be declared invalid. In the 2012 partial elections, 90.45% of the ballots were accepted as valid votes for one of the candidates; 9.55% were declared invalid, either because they were left blank (4.97%), or because they were annulled for being completed in a

form not consistent with the rules (4.45%). If we also take into account the 5.79% who did not vote, we could interpret the results as indicating that 84.79% of the people affirmed their support of the Cuban political process by casting a valid vote for one of the candidates, while 15.21% expressed a protest in one form or another, either by not voting, turning in a blank ballot, or by submitting a ballot inappropriately marked. The voting is secret and anonymous, so that those counting the votes have no way of knowing the identity of the person who turned in the ballot. The technology and style of the voting is the essence of simplicity and dignity: a sheet of white paper with the names of the candidates and squares beside the names for marking an X, folded in half by the voter, who inserts it into a slit in a wooden box, which is constantly guarded by two school children, dressed in their school uniforms, who salute the voters as they cast their ballots.

The Cuban Constitution of 1976 also established requirements for consultation by the national, provincial, and municipal assemblies with mass organizations. The mass organizations are nationwide organizations of workers, peasants, students, and women as well as the neighborhood organization, the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). There is a high level of participation in these organizations: 84% of the population aged fourteen and above participate in the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; 84% of adult women participate in the Federation of Cuban Women; and 99% of paid workers participate in the Federation of Cuban Workers (Bell Lara 2008). Workers, peasants, and students are organized in their places of work or study; women and the CDRs are organized in neighborhoods. Regular meetings are held in places of work or study and in neighborhoods to discuss problems and concerns and to search for practical solutions. The discussions range from concrete problems to major global issues, but most of the conversations deal with practical problems, such as the local doctor not always being available, a street or street light in need of repair, or the location of the bus stop. The members of the mass organizations elect representatives to serve in positions of leadership at the local, regional, and national levels. The great majority of Cubans participate in two or three mass organizations simultaneously, in their places of work or study and in their neighborhoods.

The high level of legitimacy of the Cuban political system is indicated not only by the very high level of participation in the electoral process and in the mass organizations, but also by the absence of popular

criticism of the political system, such criticism being directed almost entirely toward the need for improvement in the production and distribution of goods and services. At the same time, Cubans have a high level of consciousness of the political dynamics of representative democracies. The Cuban press and people follow with great interest the electoral campaigns of the representative democracies, especially those in the USA, recognizing that the results of elections can have important implications. There is a widespread perception in Cuba that the electoral campaigns of representative democracies constitute an "electoral farce." There are good reasons for this perception: The candidates must raise considerable sums of money in order to pay for political advertising, thus putting politicians in debt to the corporations and the wealthy; the process is characterized by sound bites rather than reasoned debate of issues; and the people often are poorly informed, especially in the USA. Cuban television and newspaper coverage of the political processes of representative democracies has the effect of reinforcing the legitimacy of the alterative process of popular democracy that has been developed in Cuba.

There is a marked tendency for the peoples of the North to make value judgments concerning the Cuban political process from a vantage point that assumes representative democracy to be the only legitimate form of democracy, without examining and reflecting upon the alternative structures of popular democracy. Many believe that Cuba is a dictatorship or that Cuba does not respect the political rights of its citizens, without observing the actual mechanisms of the Cuban political process. Such judgments and beliefs, without base in empirical observation, cannot reasonably be defended. As a participant observer in the Cuban political process for twenty years, I have seen that Cuba has developed a system in which elected and appointed public officials feel obligated to respond to the needs of the people, who constitute the highest authority. The positive results are multifaceted. The people have universal and free health care and education, with teachers and professors who are well informed about human history and the world. The people benefit from state support for the arts, culture, and sport. They see television programing that is educational as well as entertaining, and they have easy access to high-quality news reporting on international events, with analysis by knowledgeable journalists as well as professors and researchers. They are able to read in their daily newspapers on a regular basis the full transcripts of the speeches of public officials and leaders of mass organizations, who possess knowledge of the world and commitment

to universal human values. And because of these results, they experience political stability. In contrast, in representative democracies, elected officials are beholden to those who make financial contributions to their electoral campaigns, so that they become skilled at the art of pretending to defend the people as they defend corporate interests. Politics degenerates into antagonistic accusations and counteraccusations, generally superficial in nature and often focusing on alleged personal shortcomings or sins. It is a system that increasingly is characterized by delegitimation in many nations, a sign of the profound structural crisis of the world-system, which we will discuss in the following chapter.

Charismatic Leadership

Reflection on the Cuban political process must include discussion of the role of charismatic authority, given the considerable charismatic authority exercised by Fidel Castro from 1953 to 2008. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the German sociologist Max Weber defined power as the ability to carry out one's will, in spite of the resistance of others. He distinguished power from authority, which he defined as legitimate power. He maintained that power is legitimated in one of three ways. First, it can be legitimated on rational grounds, in which a person has legal authority on the basis of norms and rules established by a hierarchical bureaucratic system. A president of a country with a system of representative democracy is an example. Secondly, power can be legitimated on traditional grounds, on the basis of "the sanctity of immemorial traditions" (1947, 328) and the status of a chief. An example would be a king in a seventeenth-century European nation-state. Thirdly, authority can be charismatic, resting on devotion to an individual person with exceptional and exemplary characteristics.

Charismatic authority "is sharply opposed both to rational, and particularly bureaucratic, authority, and to traditional authority.… Both rational and traditional authority are specifically forms of everyday routine control of action; while the charismatic type is the direct antithesis of this" (1947, 361). "Every charismatic authority would have to subscribe to the proposition, 'It is written…, but I say unto you…' The genuine prophet, like the genuine military leader and every true leader in this sense, preaches, creates, or demands *new* obligations" (1947, 361; italics in original). With reference to the charismatic person, Weber wrote, "The term 'charisma' will be applied to a certain quality of an individual

personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These as such are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader" (1947, 358–359).

Weber's concept of charismatic authority, adapted to the context of the revolutionary processes in the modern world-system, helps us to understand the general dynamics of revolutions. In modern revolutionary processes, persons with charismatic authority are those who possess an exceptional capacity to discern and understand the unfolding of events, and they possess a faithful commitment to the values of social justice that are the foundation of the revolution. Such charismatic leaders have emerged in revolutionary movements from the nineteenth century to the present. Although an exceptional individual, the leader is a product of a historical social movement and has been formed by it. The leader formulates a more advanced understanding; yet possessing a historical consciousness, he or she defines the historic roots central to the development of the revolutionary movement. As the leader speaks, he or she is lifted up by the people and is named by the people to speak on their behalf. Moreover, if the charismatic leader is genuine, and not a false prophet, he or she demonstrates fidelity to the values and ideals of the movement, in spite of having been raised to a higher level of power. As a consequence of the gift of analysis and the demonstrated fidelity, the leader becomes a symbol of the movement, with enormous charismatic authority.

Examples of social movement leaders with charismatic authority include Toussaint, Lenin, Gandhi, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Simón Bolívar, José Martí, Augusto Sandino, Salvador Allende, Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa, among others. The emergence of a leader with charismatic authority is necessary for a social movement to attain significant goals, because only a leader with charismatic authority is able to unify the various tendencies, often contradictory, within the movement. The death of a leader before the attainment of movement goals can lead to its fragmentation and/or disorientation, as perhaps can be said in regard to the premature deaths of Martí, King, Malcolm, and Allende.

In the case of the Cuban anti-neocolonial revolution, Fidel Castro emerged as a leader with charismatic authority. In accordance with the

general pattern, Fidel was formed by a tradition of social movement and struggle, defined and established by José Martí and the subsequent struggles during the neocolonial republic. At the same time, Fidel pushed the movement to a more advanced understanding. He recognized the necessity of armed struggle and of the need for a bold armed action that would galvanize the people. He was able to formulate a specific program of action, in *History Will Absolve Me*, giving concrete direction to the movement and strengthening its popular appeal. He was able to appreciate the insights of Marx and Lenin, yet adapt them to the neocolonial situation of Cuba.

After the taking of power by the revolution, Fidel continued to demonstrate an exceptional understanding of global dynamics and mastery of the art of politics. Key moments include the formation of the Cuban Communist Party, unifying various revolutionary tendencies, with the intention that the Party would function as a permanent structure for leading the revolution; Fidel's leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement in the late 1970 and early 1980s, calling for global implementation of the historic revolutionary Third World project and a rejection of the neoliberal project of the global powers; Fidel's analysis of the origin of the Third World external debt, describing it as morally and politically unpayable; Fidel's leadership of the Cuban nation in the adjustments of the special period; Fidel's incorporation of the issues of gender equality (1960s) and ecology (1990s) into the fundamental principles of the Cuban Revolution; Fidel's search for common ground between the Cuban Revolution and the Catholic Church (beginning in the 1980s), not only in Cuba, but also at an international level; and Fidel's leading of the Cuban Revolution toward participation and leadership in the process of Latin American union and integration (beginning in the 1990s). As the revolution proceeded through various challenges, Fidel continually displayed fidelity to the movement's goals, reinforcing his charismatic authority. During this entire process, he gave pedagogical speeches, thus forging a creative theoretical synthesis of the Third World perspective and Marxist-Leninism in the development of a socialist ideology adapted to the neocolonial situation.

The great historic leader of the Cuban Revolution died on November 25, 2016, at the age of 90. Following his retirement from the position of President of the Council of State in 2009, Fidel wrote reflections that were widely disseminated in the Cuban media, and he received international visitors at his residence, the last of whom was Tran Dai Quang,

President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on November 15, 2016. Affection and respect for Fidel in Cuba is without bounds, as was evident in the remarkable display by the Cuban people during memorial acts from November 28 to December 2. Reflecting on the popular outpouring of affection and expression of commitment to his teachings, one Cuban journalist observed, "Fidel has been declared sacred by the Cuban people."

The Cuban Communist Party

The Cuban Communist Party was never conceived as a mass organization (Castro 2011, 17–20), and thus, it is not open for anyone to join. Sixteen percent of adults are Party members (Bell Lara 2008), and they are selected by the Party itself in a thorough process that includes interviews with co-workers and neighbors. Those selected are considered model citizens. They are selected because they are viewed as strong supporters of the revolution; hard and productive workers; well liked and respected by their co-workers and neighbors; leaders in the various mass organizations of women, students, workers, and farmers; people who take seriously their responsibilities as spouses and parents and family members; and people who have "moral" lives, such as avoiding excessive use of alcohol or extramarital relations that are considered scandalous. As with those who are elected to the various assemblies, membership in the Communist Party is very time consuming, and Party members carry out their responsibilities on a voluntary basis, without pay or compensation.

The Cuban Communist Party is not an electoral party: It does not nominate or support candidates for office. Moreover, it does not make laws or select the head of state; these functions are fulfilled by the assemblies, which are elected by the people, and for which membership in the Party is not required. The role of the Communist Party is to act as the vanguard of the revolution. It makes recommendations concerning the future development of the revolution, and it criticizes tendencies it considers counterrevolutionary. Jorge Lezcano writes:

> The essential functions and role of the Party are defined by article 5 of the Constitution, which expresses that the Communist Party of Cuba, Martían y Marxist-Leninist, organized vanguard of the Cuban nation, is the highest leading force of the society and the state; it organizes and guides the common effort toward the high goal of the construction of socialism. An

> analysis of this definition enables us to appreciate that the Party does not have constitutional political authority, and it cannot participate in elections. As a consequence of restrictions imposed by Law and by the fact that the Communist Party of Cuba is not an electoral party, it does not nominate or support any candidate…. The Party carries out its work through persuasion, convincing people, education, and close and permanent ties with the masses. The influence of the Party is based on the fact that it is the population itself that proposes candidates for Party membership, and it is the population itself that provides the final evaluation for acceptance for membership. In addition, the influence of the Party in the masses is based on the good example of its members as well as permanent connections with the people (2003, 47–48).

The role of the Party in the Cuban political process can be seen in the process that led to the Guidelines approved by the National Assembly in 2012. The Guidelines were formulated by Party leaders, and they were disseminated to the people, who were given an opportunity to express their views in meetings held throughout the nation in places of work. Party leaders directed the popular consultations, and they were present to take note of the views of the people. Subsequent meetings of the Party, at national and provincial levels, involved reformulations of the guidelines in light of the recommendations of the people. The reformulated Guidelines were submitted to the National Assembly, which approved them. Meetings of the Party since the approval of Guidelines by the National Assembly have focused on their implementation. The Party does not always play such an active role in the formulation of important legislation. For example, in the economic adjustment policies of the early 1990s, the original proposals were developed by the Council of State. A subsequent popular consultation was held, involving participation by all of the mass organizations in places of work or study and in neighborhoods. Following the extensive popular consultation, the revised proposals were sent to the National Assembly for approval.

From the outset, the Cuban Communist Party understood that it confronted the challenge of accomplishing the institutionalization of charismatic authority of Fidel. As early as 1961, Fidel was speaking of the importance of replacing the direction of the party by one person, necessary up to that time, with a collective leadership of a party that would be a vanguard political party (Castro 2011, 20–22). The first attempts at the formation of a vanguard party occurred in 1961, when the Revolutionary Integrated Organizations (ORI) was formed

through the integration of the three principal organizations that had combated the Batista dictatorship: the 26 of July Movement; the March 13 Revolutionary Directory, a student organization; and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the old communist party. ORI, however, was a complete failure. It was dominated by the veteran leaders of PSP, and it had taken control of government posts in an undemocratic manner, establishing a nest of privilege for the leaders. Responding to popular protest of these practices, Fidel invoked his charismatic authority in order to eliminate these abuses and to develop alternative procedures, including popular participation in the selection of ORI members. Thus, although one of the principal goals of ORI was to institutionalize the charismatic authority of Fidel, the net effect was to strengthen and reinforce his charismatic authority. As LeoGrande has observed, what occurred was a "reassertion of charismatic authority against that of a developing party apparatus" (1979, 457–462).

A second effort toward the formation of a vanguard party was made beginning in 1965, with the formation of a new Communist Party of Cuba. The Party continued to struggle in the late 1960s, however, as a result of a low number of Party members as well as a limited number of trained cadres. The Party functioned as a weak institutional appendage to the enormous charismatic authority of Fidel. But in the 1970s, the Communist Party of Cuba began to develop as an institution and to make considerable progress toward developing an institutional foundation for the formulation of political policies and goals, less dependent on charismatic authority, such that one may speak of a relation between the Party and Fidel, as two distinct entities. LeoGrande attributes this to several factors: expansion of Party membership; a clearer delineation of functions between the Communist Party of Cuba and the Cuban state; and a reduction of conflicts between the members of the July 26 Movement and the PSP, which had been one of the sources of difficulties in the 1960s (1979, 466–479).

Given the authority of the charismatic leader, the full institutionalization of charismatic authority is not possible when the charismatic leader remains active and present. The work during this stage is focused on preparing the Party for its functioning as a vanguard that inspires confidence in the people, once the charismatic leader is no longer present. Cuba in the period since 2009 is to some extent a test of this principle, inasmuch as Fidel withdrew for reasons of health. But not completely so, since Raúl Castro, who assumed the positions of President of the Council

of States and Ministers and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, also possesses considerable charismatic authority, as a consequence of the fact that he has been one of the principal leaders of the revolutionary process since July 26, 1953. On the other hand, Raúl arrived at the position of leadership of the revolution at a time when circumstances compelled the Communist Party of Cuba to assume a more active role as the vanguard of the Cuban revolutionary process, and as head of the Party, he has been exhorting the members to assume responsibility for critical reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of the system in the formulation, development, and implementation of the Guidelines.

At the final session of the National Congress of the Party in 2012, prior to the submission of the Guidelines for a New Social and Economic Model to the National Assembly, Fidel was present for the first time during the process, and he did not speak. Following the meeting, he wrote a brief reflection, noting that he had observed the process on television, that he was impressed with the capacity of the younger members of the Party to formulate constructive critical analyses of the system, and that he was confident that they in the future will fulfill their duty as the vanguard of the Cuban people and the Cuban Revolution. Fidel has declared, "I am confident that the youth of Cuba will do its duty." Fidel's last public appearance was before the National Congress of the Party on April 19, 2016, four months prior to his ninetieth birthday, in which he noted that he will soon die, but that his ideas will endure in the Cuban Communist Party.

A Revolution of, by, and for the People

The Cuban Revolution does not look like what one would expect from the viewpoint of classic European socialism. It would be led not by a proletarian vanguard, but a vanguard formed from various popular sectors, directed by a charismatic leader whose father was a landholder, who attended private schools and the university, and who became a lawyer. And it would come to power, not through the patient educating and organizing practices of the Cuban Communist Party, but in an unconventional guerrilla war that moved from the country to the city. Since the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban people, taught by Fidel, have become a revolutionary people. As they evolved, they would move forward in a way that reflects the cultural characteristics that are uniquely theirs. However, the Cuban Revolution was in a sense foreseen Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. For they intuitively sensed that the socialist

revolution would be forged in practice by the people, and that it would be led by exceptional leaders who were sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of their own people, and who would lead them to new levels of human achievement, with the people moving in their own way, in accordance with their own rhythm and unique characteristics.

Like the biblical prophets Moses and Amos, the Cuban Revolution denounces the pretensions of the global powers, and it defends the rights of the poor. But it fulfills the prophetic role in a historical epoch in which the peoples of the world have demonstrated their capacity to form movements in their defense, precisely at a time when such movements are necessary to save humanity. The Cuban Revolution reveals the Word of God not by being perfect, for it is full of human imperfections, but in its best sons and daughters, who today, nearly six decades after its triumph, form an educated and committed vanguard, exemplifying the essential dignity of the human species.

The Cuban Revolution has developed economic and cultural relations with socialist revolutions at different historic moments in its evolution: The Soviet Union, Chile, Vietnam, Nicaragua, China, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, among others. These revolutions have embraced Cuba as a dignified example of national and social liberation. Today, as social movements in many nations of the Third World seek to construct an alternative to the neocolonial world-system, the persistence of socialist Cuba is an important example, and Cuba's solidarity with the nations and peoples of the world seeking social justice is a vital component of the quest from below of an alternative world-system. Cuba's significant and prominent participation in the global movement for a just, democratic, and sustainable world-system is the key to the meaning of the Cuban Revolution. We who form the peoples of the North have the potential to appreciate the Cuban Revolution, learn from it, and permit ourselves to be inspired by it, seeking to develop in our own nations our own versions of it, so that we can participate in what has become a great social movement formed by humanity in defense of itself.

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CHAPTER 6

The Structural Crisis of the Neocolonial World-System

The Cuban Revolution demonstrates that a popular social movement can formulate a national project that is an alternative to the project imposed by the neocolonial world-system, and that it can obtain the support of the people in taking power and can proceed to implement policies in accordance with the interests and demands of the people. The Cuban Revolution has registered significant gains, in spite of the constant opposition of the hegemonic neocolonial power, creating a society fundamentally different from the societies that follow the established rules of the capitalist world-economy. Cuba, however, is constructing socialism; it has not yet fully attained socialism. No country can be fully socialist in the context of a capitalist world-economy, which establishes economic, ideological, and political obstacles to socialist transformation in a particular nation. The socialist transformation can be fully attained only at an international level; it can only be a transformation of the world-system. The long-term viability of the Cuban socialist project depends, in the final analysis, on the extent to which humanity can develop a world-system that accepts socialism as a legitimate option for nations in the exercise of their rights of sovereignty and self-determination, which in short could be called a socialist world-system.

There are two current developments on the global scene that point to a possible transition from a capitalist world-economy to a socialist world-system: the structural crisis of the world-system, compounded by the economic relative decline and militarization of the USA; and the new political reality in Latin America, indicating possible movement toward

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the development of an alternative world-system. We discuss the first development in this chapter, and the second in subsequent chapters.

Since its origin in the sixteenth century, the world-system expanded by conquering new territories and peoples, incorporating them into the periphery of the world-economy, where they functioned to provide cheap raw materials and superexploited labor and to purchase surplus manufactured goods. But during the course of the twentieth century, the world-system reached the geographical limits of the earth, and thus, it ran out of lands and peoples to conquer. As a consequence, beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the world-system could no longer expand as it had for most of the period of 1492–1939. During the period 1945–1965, the world-system continued to expand economically on the basis of the reconstruction of the massive destruction of World War II. But by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the economic implications of having reached the geographical limits of the earth became manifest.

The early 1970s was also a time in which the USA, the hegemonic core nation of the period 1946 to 1973, began an economic decline relative to other core nations. During the 1970s, the spectacular ascent of the USA, which had begun in the eighteenth century (discussed in Chap. 1), came to an end. The decade was characterized by a lower level of economic growth, higher unemployment, high inflation, increasing government debt, high corporate debt, high consumer debt, and balance of payments deficits. The deterioration of US hegemony is evident in key economic indicators: In 1950, the US economy accounted for 20% of world commerce and 40% of world gross domestic product, whereas in 1980, it accounted for 11 and 21.5%, respectively. During this time, the economies of the European Union and Japan were dynamic, and they were able to close considerably the gap with the USA (Cobarrubia 2006, 187–189).

There were various factors that caused the US relative decline, including spending in excess of productive capacity, overspending in the military sector, and insufficient investment in new forms of production. Such hegemonic decline has been a historic normal tendency in the world-system, as hegemonic core powers spend in ways that maintain dominance in the short term but undermine productive capacity in the long run, whereas other core powers are more dedicated to improving their productive capacity in order to catch up (Wallerstein 2000, 255–256).

In addition to the simultaneous occurrence of the world-system reaching the geographical limits of the earth and the relative decline

of the hegemonic core nation, there was another ominous sign for the future viability of the world-system, namely the incapacity of the world-system to reform itself.

The Incapacity of the Neocolonial World-System to Reform

With some level of appreciation of the unsustainability of the world-system as a neocolonial system, there were four projects during the course of the twentieth century that intended to reform the neocolonial world-system. None of them could be sustained, because they envisioned reforms that did not adversely affect the interests and privileges of elites, and thus, they were not committed to the structural transformations that were necessary to establish the sustainability of the modern world-system.

Roosevelt's post-World War II vision. As World War II came to a close, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had imagined a post-war reconversion of industry to a peacetime economy. He anticipated peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, with economic competition but not military confrontation. He expected a degree of economic space for the national bourgeoisies of the neocolonies, with aid to promote the social and economic development of the neocolonies, moving gradually toward greater global equality within the context of the neocolonial relation. But Roosevelt died before the war ended, and his plan for the peaceful reconversion of US industry was complicated by high levels of unemployment, by difficulties in the reinsertion of soldiers in the post-war economy, and by the central role of the war industries in the US economy at the end of the war. His vision was cast aside, and the USA embarked on a permanent war economy, justified by the Cold War ideology (Arboleya 2008, 113, 132, 135; Lowentin 1997, 2–7).

The developmentalist project of the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie. During the course of the twentieth century, most Latin American nations developed nationalist projects directed by the national industrial bourgeoisie. They sought to promote industrial development in light industry, substituting the importation of manufactured goods from the core with goods produced by national companies. The developmentalist project was consistent with the interests of the urban working and middle classes, because it implied more employment and higher salaries. Accordingly, the developmentalist project was connected to and for the most part supported by urban popular movements. The movements generally focused

on demands for improvements in education, employment, salary, and working conditions. The movements tended to go further than the vision of the national bourgeoisie, calling for a more genuine form of economic and political independence than existed under neocolonial structures (Regalado 2007, 131–138).

The developmentalist project reached its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s. The Latin American developmentalist project did not succeed, because Latin American nations did not have a sufficient domestic market to sustain industrial development. To be successful, the project needed to expand the domestic market through an agrarian reform program that redistributed land to peasants, thereby increasing the standard of living in the countryside. However, land redistribution plans of substance were opposed to the interests of the Latin American estate bourgeoisie, which controlled Latin American states. Accordingly, in order to accomplish its goal of national industrial development, the national industrial bourgeoisie, with the support of the popular classes, had to take power from the Latin American estate bourgeoisie, but it did not have the political will to do so (Regalado 2007, 131–132).

The revolutionary wing of the urban popular movements advocated agrarian reform as well as the nationalization of industry, two fundamental measures necessary for strengthening the domestic market, promoting the autonomous development of the nation, and elevating the standard of living of the majority. It envisioned breaking with the peripheral role of supplier of cheap labor and cheap raw materials, and ending the neocolonial relation with the USA. It sought not ascent of the nation in the world-economy, but a fundamental transformation of national institutions as well as a new way for the nation to insert itself in the world-economy. However, neither the national industrial bourgeoisie nor the estate bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary proposal, and their resistance created confusions and divisions in the urban popular movement. The basic ideas of the revolutionary proposal were implemented briefly in some nations (Brazil, 1960–1964; Peru, 1968–1975; and Chile, 1970–1973) before being reversed by the reaction of the Latin American estate and industrial bourgeoisies with the active support of the core governments and the core bourgeoisie (Prieto 2009).

Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Whereas the Latin American developmentalist project was an effort at reform from below, the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s proposed a reform from above. The "Alliance for Progress" intended economic reform of the neocolonial

system in Latin America, including reforms in land tenancy and in the distribution of wealth. The policy involved an abandonment of the traditional landowning oligarchy that up to then had been considered as sustainer and protector of the neocolonial system. Proclaiming a "revolution of the middle class," the Kennedy strategy was to support the reformist sector of the national bourgeoisie, which up to that point had confronted the powerful obstacle of the traditional oligarchy. The Alliance for Progress committed twenty billion dollars over a decade for concrete projects for the development of this reformist sector, which also would have the consequence of establishing new possibilities for US investment (Arboleya 2008, 156–157).

The Alliance for Progress did not represent fundamental structural changes that would involve a transition from a neocolonial system to an alternative more just and democratic world-system. They were proposed reforms of the neocolonial system. "The modernization that Kennedy proposed for Latin America was not based on the development of an independent national bourgeoisie as an alternative to the traditional oligarchy. Rather, it was based on producing a 'new class' that, more than related to, would form a part of US transnational corporations and would share their interests. In short, it aspired to consolidate US neocolonialism in the region, through the articulation of a new relation of dependency, which would require a national class organically tied to foreign capital" (Arboleya 2008, 157).

Kennedy's proposed economic reforms of the neocolonial system did not succeed. The Kennedy plan encountered political opposition from those sectors of US capital historically tied to the traditional oligarchy in Latin America. In addition, the emerging industrial national bourgeoisie did not have sufficient economic and political strength to play the role assigned to it by the plan. There was in this regard a fundamental contradiction: The urban national bourgeoisie, according to the plan, would transform itself into a class independent from the national estate bourgeoisie, but economically dependent on foreign capital; however, such subordination to foreign interests would render it politically incapable of mobilizing popular support and challenging the power of the oligarchy. The Kennedy plan did not see that an economically dependent national bourgeoisie cannot lead the nation in a project of independent economic development (Arboleya 2008, 157).

Carter's policies of human rights and trilateralism. The presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) began with a twofold approach to foreign

policy. The first dimension was trilateralism, which envisioned cooperation among the three centers of global power, namely the USA, Western Europe (especially West Germany), and Japan. Carter had been a member of the Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 by Columbia University professor Zbigniew Brzezinksi and New York banker David Rockefeller. The commission was a private group of US, western European, and Japanese businesspeople, officials, and academics; twenty-two of whom were employed by the Carter administration. In taking the trilateral approach, Carter was recognizing that the USA was no longer the hegemonic power, but was now one of the three centers of power. The second dimension of Carter's foreign policy was a commitment to human rights. In a 1977 speech at the University of Notre Dame, Carter declared: "Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined is in that fear." He hoped that an emphasis on human rights in foreign policy would restore the idealism that had been lost as a result of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Carter appointed a human rights activist as assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs (LaFeber 1994, 646, 682–683, 686).

Both trilateralism and human rights collapsed during the period 1977–1979. The three powers could not arrive to cooperation with respect to trade, policies toward the Middle East or the Soviet Union, or nuclear weapons. Each had particular interests with respect to these issues, and they could not come to agreement. At the same time, the Carter administration found that it had to set aside its commitment to human rights in its policies toward South Korea, China, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Iran, for it had to take into account its economic interests in these countries (LaFeber 1994, 686, 692–697). The failure of these policies reflected the realities of the neocolonial world-system. As a major core power, the relatively high standard of living of the USA was maintained through the superexploitation of vast regions of the Third World, thus provoking popular movements that seek to transform the neocolonial structures that promote the poverty of the majority. The maintenance of the neocolonial world order requires repression of such popular movements, and thus support for repressive Third World governments. In the context of the neocolonial world-system, the protection of human rights in the nations of the Third World is unworkable. Furthermore, the three global powers of the neocolonial world-system in effect are engaged in a competitive quest for natural resources and

cheap labor. The gain of one implies the loss of the others, especially in a context in which the world-system has reached the geographical limits of the earth. The trilateral approach unrealistically expected the global powers to cooperate during a competitive game in which the basic rule is to maximize political power and economic profits.

Trilateralism and respect for human rights would be able to work only in a context in which the three centers of power were committed to a structural transformation of the neocolonial world-system, in recognition of the fact that the world-system must develop structures that are sustainable in the long run. With such political will, the repression of human rights in peripheral and semiperipheral zones would not be necessary, and cooperation among the global powers would be possible. Such political will by the three centers of power would have been possible in the 1970s, if the global powers had been paying attention to the governments of the Third World, which in 1974 had attained passage in the UN General Assembly of a proposal for a New International Economic Order, as we will discuss in the following chapter. But the Third World proposal was dismissed by the global powers.

Incapable of mobilizing the necessary political will to reform, and confronting the reaching of the geographical limits of the earth and the relative decline of the hegemonic core nation, the world-system entered a profound structural crisis. The sustained crisis has been expressing itself since the 1970s itself in a variety of forms: the elimination of the gold standard as a quick fix to overspending; the US trade and state budget deficits; the imposition of neoliberal economic policies on the world; factory relocation to peripheral and semiperipheral zones; escalating financial speculation; new wars of aggression by the core powers, led by the declining hegemonic power; among others.

The Elimination of the Gold Standard: An Irresponsible Quick Fix

In 1944, the major global powers agreed at the Bretton Woods conference to fix the value of the US dollar at $35 per ounce of gold, so that the dollar could function as an international currency with objective value, thus providing stability to the international financial system. The agreement was a reflection of the global military, productive, commercial, and financial dominance to which the USA recently had arrived. It assumed

that the amount of dollars placed in circulation by the US Department of the Treasury would have backing in gold reserves. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, the USA began to circulate dollars without adequate backing in gold reserves, in order to finance military expenditures, including global defense commitments. This created a situation in which the dollar was overvalued. By 1971, the USA was no longer able to guarantee the convertibility of dollars into gold, because there were too many dollars in circulation relative to the gold reserves held by the US government (Castro 1983, 79–82; Michie and Smith 1999, 153–154, 200). As explained by US Foreign Policy specialist Walter LaFeber:

> Some $40 billion was held overseas, but only $10 billion in gold remained in the United States to support it. Foreigners began to doubt that the dollars they held were truly "as good as gold." That doubt turned to near panic in 1971, when figures revealed that, for the first time since 1893–1894, the United States had imported more goods (such as oil and automobiles) that it had been able to sell abroad. It marked a moment of historic importance. Foreigners and Americans alike started to cash in their dollars for gold and other securities (1994, 644–45).

In response to this situation, President Richard Nixon took two steps. First, in August 1971, he announced a ten percent surcharge on goods imported to the USA, in order to reduce purchases of foreign-made products by US consumers. The measure had a drastic effect on the economies of Japan, Canada, Western Europe, and the Third World. Secondly, in late 1971, he obtained a new monetary agreement from US allies, in which the gold value of the US dollar would be adjusted periodically. The first adjustment of 1971 had reduced the value of the dollar, thus making the US goods cheaper and more competitive in the world market. However, the system of adjustable exchanges rates was abandoned after two years. Since 1973, the value of all currencies, including the dollar, has been established by the market of currency exchanges, so that all currencies have a value relative to one another. In contrast to the monetary policy of a fixed-dollar rate, the system of currency exchange rates has been characterized by volatility and short-term instability, which leads to price uncertainty in international commerce (Castro 1983, 79–82; LaFeber 1994, 646–647; Michie and Smith 1999, 153–154, 200).

The US Double Deficit: Undisciplined Spending

By the late 1960s, the USA had accumulated a "double deficit," that is, a government deficit, involving higher government expenditures than income; and a balance of trade deficit, in which the nation imports more goods and services than it exports. The double deficit was a result of various factors: the maintenance of military bases throughout the world; the costs of the war in Vietnam; a modest increase in social programs of the US government, in response to popular demands and social movements in the USA; the increasing productive and commercial capacity of Japan and Germany; and an increasingly higher pattern of consumption in the USA, particularly in the middle class, that was beyond the actual productive capacity of the nation. The US government as well as US corporations and consumers were financing the double deficit with loans, but this strategy had its limits, because the debts could reach the point that creditors would consider further loans to be an unacceptable risk.

The 1971 and 1973 devaluations of the dollar alleviated the situation. The devaluation of the dollar reduced the relative value of outstanding debts, thus improving the credit worthiness of the debtors. Further, with relatively easy access to what continued to be the primary international currency, the USA was at an advantage relative to other countries. The US government, corporations, and consumers could maintain the same level of expenses without pushing the double deficit beyond its limits. However, the elimination of the gold standard was merely a temporary solution to the double deficit problem. Fiscal responsibility required constraints on spending, but this option was not viable politically, because it would have involved a reduction in military spending, a reduction in social programs, and/or a reduced level of consumption in the middle class. In the long run, the USA would have to either reduce its spending or increase its productivity of goods and services, but it did neither.

In the 1980s, the double deficit grew. The trade deficit increased dramatically, in part as a result of significant reduction in farm exports, and also as a result of an ongoing tendency to invest in military expenditures rather than improving production on non-military goods. At the same time, the government deficit grew, as the Reagan administration slashed taxes while significantly increasing military expenditures. By 1988, the USA became the world's most indebted country (LaFeber 1994, 645,

711–712). Faustino Cobarrubia, of the Center for the Study of the World Economy in Cuba, observes:

> Japan supplanted the United States as the dominant creditor nation and financial power. While the Japanese economy became the principal exporter of capital in the world, the US economy became in 1985 a net debtor for the first time since 1914. Never before in the history of international finances has there been such a decisive change in a so short a period of time. In less than five years, the richest country in the world had reversed a tendency of a century, becoming the most indebted nation in the world (2006, 191).

And as LaFeber writes, "The world's great moneybags between 1914 and 1970, the United States, after 1971, lost much of its ability to compete in the world marketplace and then, between 1981 and 1987, shockingly turned into the world's greatest debtor" (1994, 737). Similarly, as expressed by Paul Kennedy in his study of *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*:

> The uncompetitiveness of U.S. industrial products abroad and the declining sales of agricultural exports have together produced staggering deficits in visible trade—$160 billion dollars in the twelve months to May 1986.… The only way the United States can pay its way in the world is by importing ever-larger sums of capital, which has transformed it from being the world's largest creditor to the world's largest debtor nation *in the space of a few years* (1989, 526; italics in original).

Neoliberalism: A Sign of Profound Crisis

In the late 1960s, the post-World War II rapid expansion of the capitalist world-economy came to an end. Thus, the American power elite in the 1970s simultaneously confronted the declining economic position of the USA and the stagnation of the world-economy. It responded to this situation by using its control of international financial institutions to impose neoliberal economic policies on the world.

The first steps toward the neoliberal project were taken by the Reagan administration, with the rejection of Keynesian policies, cutbacks in domestic programs, the initial steps toward international financial deregulation, and the initiation of movement toward a free trade area that encompassed the USA, Canada, and Mexico. More systematic

application of neoliberal policies on a global level was adopted by the administration of George H. W. Bush (1989–1993). With respect to Latin America, the Bush administration sought to restructure the inter-American system of domination. First, it supported representative and parliamentary democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, replacing the military dictatorships of national security. This so-called transition to democracy had been made necessary by the popular movements against the military dictatorships and their lack of legitimacy. The transition was possible, as a result of various factors: the increasing concentration of capital; greater dependency of the Latin American elite; declining autonomy of Latin American governments as a result of the external debt; and the limited organizational capacity of the popular movements as a result of repression by military dictatorships. Secondly, the Bush administration turned to the imposition of neoliberal polices and free trade agreements. Thirdly, it established a greater military presence in the region, using the "war against drugs" and the "war against terrorism" as pretexts (Regalado 2010).

The Clinton administration continued to develop the restructured inter-American system of domination that Bush had established. In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented; and the First Summit of the Americas, seeking to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas, was held in Miami. However, the Clinton administration encountered opposition. On the domestic front, labor organizations were opposed to the free trade agreements, concerned with their implications for the job security of US workers. At the same time, mass demonstrations emerged in Latin America in opposition to the free trade agreements and the neoliberal project. This stage of the Latin American popular movement was inaugurated with the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico in 1994 (Regalado 2010).

Neoliberal economic theory is a recasting of classical liberal economic theory formulated by Adam Smith in the *Wealth of Nations* in 1776. Smith had maintained that in order to maximize the possibilities for economic development, rather than each colonial power protecting its industry and its imperial markets, it would be better to follow a principle of international free trade. Liberalism was the dominant economic theory from 1776 to 1929, but it was not followed in practice by the global powers. Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain, Germany, and other European nations as well as the USA for the most part protected their industries. The notion that the period prior to the Great

Depression of the 1930s was an era of free trade is a myth, even though it is a myth perpetuated by most economists (Bairoch 1993, 1–55; Raffer 1987, 1–3; Hayami 2001, 233, 238–239).

The neoliberal project of the 1980s and 1990s was developed on the basis of the economic theory proposed by Milton Friedman and others at the School of Economics of the University of Chicago. Its premises are: (1) the state should not distort the natural and spontaneous economic order; (2) governmental policy should be based on the principle of the unlimited supremacy of the market; (3) states should not interfere with the free play of supply and demand; and (4) governmental interference in the economy ought to be eliminated. Applied to the peripheral and semiperipheral zones of the world-economy, specific neoliberal policies include: the elimination of government protection of national currency and the trading of currency at a free market rate; privatization of government-owned enterprises; reduction of protection for national industry, reducing or eliminating tariffs and taxes on imported goods; facilitation of the free flow of capital into and out of the country; and the elimination of union restrictions on the free play of supply and demand (Prieto 2009, 108–111).

Neoliberal policies have been imposed on Third World nations by international finance agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which used the Third World debt as a tool for imposing the neoliberal project. Rather than acting collectively to seek cancellation or renegotiation of this unpayable debt, the governments entered individually into negotiations with the international finance agencies and core governments, reaching agreements that sustained payments on the debts and left the governments even more in debt. These debt payment rescheduling agreements were on the condition that the debtor nations adopt neoliberal economic policies. So Third World debt payments were sustained, and the debt became an instrument for the widespread imposition of neoliberal policies (Hernández 2006, 102; Castro 1989).

The external debt of Third World governments was a consequence of core banks seeking to maximize profits from surplus deposits. Northern banks in the 1960s and 1970s had excess liquidity (more money to lend than available borrowers) as a consequence of a long period of rapid capitalist expansion from 1945 to 1968 and as a result of the oil price increase of 1973. In response to the excess liquidity problem, representatives of Northern banks descended in droves on the countries of the South during

the 1960s and 1970s, offering governments and companies high amounts of low-interests loans, but with floating rates. As an indication of the scope of this phenomenon, by the early 1980s, more than 500 banks had made loans in Mexico, and more than 800 banks had made loans in Brazil (Hopkins & Wallerstein 1996; Michie & Smith 1999; Millet & Toussaint 2004; Prashad 2014, 50–55; Raffer & Singer 2001; Toussaint 1999).

In the early 1980s, Third World governments found themselves unable to sustain debt payments, as a result of interest rate increases during 1979 and 1980 as well as declining terms of payment for raw materials exports. The Third World debt crisis was announced to the world in 1982, when Mexico suspended payments on its external debts. In response to this crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank stepped in to function as global collection agencies. They offered new loans and a rescheduling of debt payments, a maneuver that enabled the debtor countries to maintain debt payments. The maneuver served the interests of the core, for it prevented default on the loans, which represented a considerable part of the capital assets of Northern banks. In 1982, the money owed by Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile represented 141% of the capital assets of Morgan Guaranty Bank; 154% of the capital assets of the Chase Manhattan Bank; 158% of the capital assets of Bank of America; 175% of the capital assets of Citibank; and 263% of those of Manufacturers Bank.

At the same time, the IMF maneuver greatly increased the long-term debt for Third World governments, creating a situation where they paid more money than they ever owed, but owed more than ever. From 1980 to 1992, Third World countries paid $1.7 trillion, an amount three times what they owed in 1980. But by 1992, their debt was three times what it was in 1980. Expressed differently, for every dollar owed in 1980, the developing countries have paid $7.50, yet they still owed $4. The payment of this debt interest by Third World governments has seriously negative consequences for the people. Inasmuch as a percentage of government expenditures must be used to service the debt, and since budget austerity is imposed as a condition for rescheduling debt payments, there is a reduction in government spending on social services, including such areas as education, health care, and nutrition. And there is a reduction in government subsidies for such necessary services as electricity and buses. In addition, the payment of the debt precludes the possibility of an autonomous development project that would increase the standard of living of the people and promote the sovereignty

of the governments of the Third World. Indeed, the imposition of the neoliberal project brought to an end hopes and visions for the social and economic development of the Third World.

The imposition of neoliberal policies on the Third World had direct short-term benefits to core corporations. The Third World governments were required to eliminate government protection of national currencies and to permit the trading of currency at a free market rate, thus greatly increasing the purchasing power of the US dollar in Third World nations, reducing the costs of labor. Third World governments were compelled to privatize government-owned enterprises, thus making economic enterprises available for purchase at devalued prices. They were required to reduce protection of their national industries, reducing or eliminating tariffs and taxes on imported goods, thus expanding the market for the goods of core corporations. In addition, neoliberal policies facilitated the free flow of capital into and out of countries, thus making possible enormous profits through financial speculation. And neoliberal policies reduced or eliminated union restrictions, thus increasing profits to core corporations through the exploitation and superexploitation of labor in the Third World (Prieto 2009, 108–111).

The neoliberal project of the core powers was an aggressive response by the global elite to the structural crisis of the world-system, and it had a certain logic to it, for it facilitated the flow of capital from neocolonies to the core. But the influx was not used to address the productive and commercial decline of the USA, and its relative economic decline continued; nor was it used by the other core powers to address the structural contradictions of the world-system, such as the decreasing capacity of the core nations to sustain the relatively high standard of living of their middle and working classes, and the increasing threat that human production posed to ecological stability. The benefits were short term, undermining the sustainability of the world-system in the long run. The application of aggressive policies with destructive long-term consequences is an indication that the global elite is not capable of responding to the challenges that the world-system confronts; it is a sign of a system in profound structural crisis, incapable of addressing its contradictions.

Looking at the shortsighted application of the neoliberal project from the vantage point of the Third World, Osvaldo Martínez, Director of the Center for the Study of the World Economy in Cuba, maintains that “free trade” is a rhetorical phrase that was used to promote the interests of the transnational corporations and the governments that represent them.

He maintains that neoliberal rhetoric is full of contradictions, inconsistencies, and myths. (1) Neoliberalism believes that economic success can only be attained through minimal state involvement. In reality, important examples of ascent in the world-economy were attained through significant state action (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore). (2) Neoliberalism assumes that the world-economy consists of small businesses in a market that follows the rules of supply and demand in setting prices for goods and labor. In reality, as a result of concentration of industries and the emergence of monopoly capitalism, these conditions no longer exist. (3) Neoliberalism believes that the state is essentially inefficient. In reality, the efficiency of an enterprise is not related to the form of ownership. There are numerous examples of inefficient private enterprises. (4) If neoliberalism would have followed its own precepts in the case of the Third World foreign debt, it would have done nothing to facilitate payment of these unpayable debts. The banks would have assumed the losses, caused by their erroneous judgment in lending money to institutions that could not repay the loans. But instead, global powers intervened to save the banks. These contradictions and myths are increasingly understood by the popular movements of the world, and as a result, neoliberalism is in crisis, and it is no longer politically sustainable as a global project (Martínez Martínez 1999, 2005, 2006).

Factory Relocation: Abandoning the Nation and Weakening the World-Economy

The declining rates of profit led manufacturers to search for reduced labor costs by relocating factories to semiperipheral and peripheral zones, where labor costs are considerably cheaper (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996, 212–233). Industrial parks, regulation free zones, and *maquiladoras* have emerged. Although this phenomenon increases the level of industry in the peripheral and semiperipheral zones, it is not the kind of industry that promotes economic development, since it is based on low wages, low levels of technology, relatively low levels of profits, and foreign ownership. Given these characteristics, it is structurally different from the kind of industry that fueled the development of the core during the period 1750–1914 (Pérez García 2006a, 260; 2006b, 252).

Although modern capitalists always looked for ways to reduce labor costs, they did so within the context of the principle of a dual labor force, which viewed peripheral and semiperipheral workers as cheap and

superexploited labor, and core working and middle classes in a relatively high-waged labor force, exploited but not superexploited. This principle had functioned to expand the global market, since the constantly rising wages of core workers continually increased consumer demand. By abandoning the core working and middle classes in a quest for profits, the corporate elite has been acting in a form that has undermined an important mechanism of expansion for the system as a whole, undermining the capacity of the world-economy to expand in the long term.

Financial Speculation: From a Cycle to a Trend

Immanuel Wallerstein maintains that the capitalist world-economy, like all historical systems, has cyclical rhythms that result from normal fluctuations in its enduring structures as well as secular trends (or ongoing unidirectional tendencies) that result from the constant evolution of its structures (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996, 8). During the neoliberal era, financial speculation has been transformed from a cycle to a trend. Investments in productive and commercial enterprises since 1973 have been lower than what they previously had been, and they have been lower than investments in financial speculation. In search of profits, capital has moved to financial speculation, further eroding production and commerce. This has given rise to a continuous expansion in financial speculation, which has resulted in the transformation of historic high–low cycles of financial speculation into an ongoing trend of increasing financial speculation.

In analyzing this phenomenon, Osvaldo Martínez distinguishes between the real economy and the speculative economy. The real economy is the economy that creates goods and services that satisfy human need and that stimulate real economic growth. The speculative economy refers to the buying and selling of stocks and goods in search of speculative profits, which does not contribute to use value or surplus value in real terms. Although the speculative economy does not contribute to the real economy, the speculative economy is where high and fast profits are made. It is a question of buying today on the basis of speculation that the price will be higher tomorrow, thus converting markets into gambling casinos. The real economy and the speculative economy are related, however, in that large transnational corporations engage in both production and speculation, and in addition, a crash in the speculative economy can affect the real economy (Martínez 2010).

After 1979, there has occurred a progressive deregulation of currency exchanges and bond and stock markets (Toussaint 1999, 59) as well as futures markets in petroleum, foods, and raw materials (Martínez 2010). As a consequence, there emerged during the last quarter of the twentieth century an elevated volume of financial transactions that pertain to the speculative economy. By 1995, the daily volume of financial transactions reached $1300 billion dollars, as against $18 billion daily in the early 1970s. The daily volume of foreign exchange transactions in 1995 was equivalent to $312 trillion annually, far out of proportion to the $5 trillion annual trade in goods and services (Michie and Smith 1999, 151). Martínez has observed that "it is calculated that for each dollar emerging from the real and productive economy, there are between thirty and fifty dollars emerging from the financial market touring in the roulette wheel of the casino economy" (Martínez 1999, 22). In 1970, 90% of the capital employed in international transactions was real, while at the end of 1995 such capital was no more than 10%.

Neoliberal deregulation of financial transactions was in the interests of the corporations, banks, and finance agencies, because it facilitated the fast and easy money that comes from financial speculation. However, elevated levels of financial speculation direct capital away from investment in the real economy. In addition, there is the possibility of a crash or the bursting of the financial bubble, since buyers will gravitate to the risky certificates, inasmuch as these have a higher potential yield on investment. Such a bursting of the financial bubble occurred in 2001 in the information technology sector, with large companies such as Enron and World.com declaring themselves bankrupt, an event that was a precursor to the financial crisis of 2008. To avoid these dangers, Martínez maintains, the financial sector must be regulated and controlled, and there must be policies that favor investment in the productive sector of the real economy, as Keynes understood. The global elite, however, has maintained its position in support of financial deregulation (Martínez 2010).

Ignoring the Rules of the Neocolonial World-System

The US turn to the imposition of neoliberal policies ignored the rules of imperialism that were developed by the USA during its hegemony in the neocolonial world-system. In the global system of neocolonial domination, stability was attained through attention by the core powers to the needs of the neocolonial state and the national bourgeoisie of

the neocolonies. The neocolonial state needed political space to enact some modest protections of its industry and its financial system; and the national bourgeoisie required economic space for a modest industrial development. Such concessions by the global elite and core states were necessary, in order for the political class and the national bourgeoisie of the neocolony to present themselves with credibility to their peoples as defenders of a project of national development, and accordingly, as defenders of the sovereignty of the nation and the needs of the people.

Both the Latin American developmentalist project, formed from below, and the Alliance for Progress, proposed from above, discerned that the stability of the neocolonial world-system required concessions in some form to the neocolonies, granting political and economic space to key actors in the neocolonies, including the state, a sector of the national bourgeoisie, and the popular classes. In contrast, the post-1980 neoliberal project ignored the needs and interests of the neocolony. As a result of the neoliberal "opening" of national economies to foreign penetration, the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie had to abandon the developmentalist project and to incorporate itself into the neoliberal project and into an economy increasingly dominated by international corporations. In being compelled to abandon a national project that at least pretended to national autonomy, and that had attained modest gains with respect to needs of the people and the sovereignty of the nation, the national bourgeoisie undermined its credibility in the eyes of the people, rendering it incapable of fulfilling its role of channeling popular demands and maintaining social control in the neocolonized nation. The neoliberal project, by undermining the credibility of a class that functioned to maintain social control, undermined the political stability of the neocolonial world-system.

Since the American and French Revolutions, the historic tendency of the world-system was toward the development of a democratic façade, proclaiming the ideals of democracy in order to obscure structures of exploitation and domination. In accordance with this tendency, colonial empires had been eliminated; the sovereignty and equality of all nations had been affirmed; and necessary political and economic space to the neocolonies had been granted. But now this historic tendency was being reversed by the neoliberal project. Disrespect for the sovereignty of nations and disregard of the rights and needs of the people now became blatantly exposed.

Appreciating the essentially undemocratic, colonial, anti-sovereign, and anti-popular character of its turn to neoliberalism, the global elite was

smart in the implementation its neoliberal project. It obscured the anti-democratic turn by initiating a "transition to democracy," in which the USA would now support the strengthening of structures of representative democracy, bringing to an end the era of military dictatorships and repression of popular movements. At the same time, the USA presented neoliberalism as a move toward a free market and free enterprise. The USA thus presented itself as the champion of the political and economic freedoms of the peoples of the world. This clever political-ideological move left popular movements in the neocolonies, in many cases already weakened by years of repression by military dictatorships, in confusion and disarray. Accordingly, by the end of the twentieth century, the ideology of the neocolonial world-system had evolved toward the increasing proclamation of the particular US vision of democracy, not only with formal recognition of the equality and independence of all nations, but also with affirmation of free commerce and representative democracy.

However, this was a weak ideological claim, even though it was effective in confusing the people for a time, from 1980 to 1995. When placed against the harsh consequences of the implementation of the neoliberal project in the neocolonies, neoliberalism lacked credibility and legitimacy. Charismatic leaders would emerge to denounce the global powers and the national politicians who allied with them. After 1994, Third World movements would regain their voice, as we will see in subsequent chapters. Ultimately, the neoliberal turn would undermine the political stability of the world-system.

The Militarization of US Policy and the Post-1989 Wars of Aggression

As we have seen in Chap. 1, once the USA attained hegemonic maturity in a world-system in transition to neocolonialism, it constrained itself with respect to direct military action. Its foreign policy was based on appreciation of the need to maintain the stability of the neocolonial world-system as a system that apparently respected the sovereignty and equality of all nations. And its policy was based on awareness of the importance of its international prestige as a defender of an allegedly democratic world order. However, just as it violated the rules of neocolonial domination in the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, the USA also has ignored neocolonial rules in its ever-increasing reliance

on the use of military force. The USA began this militarist violation of the rules of imperialism and neocolonialism in Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh was the son of a Confucian scholar who encountered socialism in Paris and studied Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. As the founder and principal leader of the Indochinese Communist Party, Ho forged a synthesis of the Confucian tradition of Vietnamese nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. The Party attained significant popular support, as a result of its clear advocacy of Vietnamese independence and the redistribution of land to peasants. In the wake of Japanese military occupation, the Party formed and led the Vietminh, a coalition of popular organizations dedicated to Vietnamese independence and to resistance to Japanese occupation by means of armed struggle. Following the Japanese surrender, local committees were established that functioned as provisional local governments, taking power from the Japanese occupation army with the support of popular armed militias and in the name of the Vietminh. On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Duiker 2000; Fall 1967; García Oliveras 2010; Ho 2007).

In seeking to reconquer its former colony, the French established in 1949 a puppet government, headed by the former emperor Bao Dai, as an alternative to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The USA began to send economic aid and military advisers to the Bao Dai government in 1951. Following the spectacular defeat of the French forces by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords of 1954 established North and South Vietnam as temporary political entities. North Vietnam was based in Hanoi and headed by Ho Chi Minh; and South Vietnam had its capital in Saigon, headed by former emperor Bao Dai, who named Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister. The USA provided economic and military aid to the Diem government, increasingly defining South Vietnam as a permanent state (García Oliveras 2010).

In the early 1960s, the policy of the Kennedy administration was to provide economic aid and military advisors to the government of South Vietnam, in order that it would become a stable and viable political force in its own right. However, inasmuch as the government of South Vietnam was nothing more than a puppet government with very little popular support, it was unable to contain a popular military-political insurgency organized by the Indochinese Communist Party as a coalition of popular organizations in the National Liberation Front (NLF). With its vision shaped by an anti-communist Cold War ideology, the Johnson

administration, concerned with the increasing advances of socialist and Leftist governments in the region, considered that a collapse of the government of South Vietnam would be unacceptable. Going against the declared intentions of the US government in the early 1960s, the Johnson administration turned to a major military escalation during the period 1965 to 1968. In the beginning of 1965, there were 23,000 US military advisers stationed in Vietnam, but by 1968, US combat troops would number 550,000. During the escalation of 1965–1968, the USA also engaged in extensive bombing of North Vietnam (García Oliveras 2010; McNamara and VanDeMark 1996).

After 1968, the US government was on the defensive before growing opposition to the war in the USA and the world. Richard Nixon, who had assumed the presidency in 1969, announced a policy of "Vietnamization," in which the USA would gradually withdraw troops, but would maintain economic and military support to the government of South Vietnam. Only 3000 US troops remained by the end of 1972. The troop withdrawal was combined with an incredibly massive bombing campaign that lasted from 1969 to 1973. As a result of a January 1973 peace agreement, total US withdrawal was carried out by March 1973. In 1975, in the face of a joint offensive by the army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the NLF, the government of South Vietnam rapidly collapsed. A unified nation, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, was established, with Hanoi as the capital city (García Oliveras 2010; LaFeber 1994, 638–644, 665–666; McNamara and VanDeMark 1996; Prina 2008, 32–35, 137).

Including both the bombing campaign and the ground war in the South, US military intervention in Vietnam left approximately 4 million Vietnamese dead, nearly half of whom were civilians. Nine thousand villages and towns and millions of productive acres were bombed, along with cities, bridges, dikes, reservoirs, railroads, roads, factories, bridges, hospitals, and schools. The USA dropped on Vietnam more than 6,300,000 tons of bombs, far in excess of the 2,000,000 tons of bombs dropped by the USA during World War II. In addition, 58,015 US military personnel lost their lives. Moreover, fields, crops, animals, farms, and persons were sprayed with napalm and other poisonous chemicals (LaFeber 1994, 639; Prina 2008, 93–98).

In unleashing such barbarity, US policymakers during the period of 1965 to 1973 violated in a fundamental way the rules and guidelines of neocolonial domination, according to which control is to be established

through commercial, financial, ideological, diplomatic, and covert means, with direct military action used minimally, and as a last resort. The Vietnam War undermined the capacity of the USA to maintain its hegemony in the neocolonial world-system in two ways. (1) The war was an important factor in the economic decline of the USA, in that the costs of the war greatly exceeded its productive capacity. (2) The war was damaging to the prestige of the USA, especially in the Third World, where the war was perceived (correctly) as a colonialist war inflicted upon a nation that was committed to an anti-colonial struggle in defense of its right to sovereignty.

Consistent with its military escalation in Vietnam, the Johnson administration also engaged in direct military action in the Dominican Republic in 1965. And the Johnson administration abandoned the Alliance for Progress, so that there was no longer any effort at economic reform of the neocolonial system. Interventionism, alliance with the Latin American estate bourgeoisie, and support of military dictatorships again defined US policy in Latin America. The Johnson administration supported *coups d'état* in Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1964), and Argentina (1966), and it provided economic and military assistance to governments that were participating in the US counterinsurgency strategy, including Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay (Regalado 2007, 143). These interventionist maneuvers were consistent with the rules of military constraint guiding neocolonial domination, but in conjunction with the Vietnam War and the military intervention in the Dominican Republic, they had little credibility, to the extent that they were known.

Like the Johnson administration, the Nixon administration supported military dictatorships and, when necessary, installed them. This included the installation of military dictatorships in Bolivia and Uruguay, and most infamously, support of the *coup d'état* in Chile on September 11, 1973, which overthrew the government of Salvador Allende and established the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Allende, a socialist who had been elected president democratically, had nationalized properties owned by US copper companies as well as Pepsi-Cola and IT&T. These military dictatorships were characterized by systematic and widespread violations of human rights, with the goal of completely eliminating popular organizations, including not only socialist parties but also parties and organizations tied to the reformist developmentalist project of the emerging national industrial bourgeoisie (LaFeber 1994, 654–656; Regalado 2007, 147). The interventionism of the Nixon administration in Latin Americas

was consistent with the neocolonial strategy of avoiding direct military involvement, but in the context of the sustained war in Southeast Asia and the extensive bombing of Vietnam, they lacked legitimacy.

The policies of human rights and trilateralism of the Carter administration implied a reduced militarism. But these policies proved unworkable. With the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (in support of the Afghan government) in December 1979, the Carter administration returned the nation to militarism. The return to militarism was announced in Carter's January 1980 State of the Union address, in which he declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [would] be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." Seeking to maintain US military superiority, he proposed to the Congress a $36 billion dollar cut in domestic spending and a $47 billion expenditure in new weapons systems, the largest new weapons systems program in nearly thirty years. The Carter administration also provided military aid to the Afghan rebels operating in resistance to the Soviet occupation (LaFeber 1994, 699–701).

In the context of the relative economic decline of the USA during the 1970s, and taking advantage of the general "malaise" and the feeling of losing control among the people of the USA as well as the taking of hostages at the US embassy in Iran in 1979, Ronald Reagan was able to win the presidential elections of 1980 with a simplistic and ultra-conservative discourse. The turn to the Right provided a clearer sense of direction and purpose to the nation, but the measures adopted by the Reagan administration did not address the structural causes of its decline, and it strengthened some of the tendencies that were factors in weakening the US position, such as high military expenditures and high levels of government and consumer debt.

In the early 1980s, the people of the USA were affected by the "Vietnam Syndrome," a reluctance to send US troops to foreign lands. For this reason, the Reagan administration in Central America and Afghanistan adopted a strategy of "low-intensity conflict," sending money and arms to indigenous troops and paramilitary groups, without direct engagement by US troops. Reagan invoked a rhetoric that declared US-supported paramilitary groups to be "freedom fighters" who are dedicated to the defense of democracy. In addition, the Reagan administration launched in 1983 a military invasion of the small Caribbean Island nation of Grenada and deposed the progressive government of the New Jewel Movement, as a punishment for its relations

with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The US invasion was launched with the pretexts that Grenada's air base could be used by the Soviet Union to bomb the USA, and that the lives of 595 US medical students were endangered. Although the invasion was complicated by some logistical problems, the tiny island nation was conquered relatively quickly, and the conquest functioned to help the people to overcome its "Vietnam syndrome" (Chomsky 2003, 97, 115–117; LaFeber 1994, 724).

In 1986, the USA bombed Libya, following a demonizing propaganda campaign directed against Muammar Muhammad al-Qaddafi, which included false claims that the government of Libya was responsible for a terrorist act in West Berlin, which had killed an American and a Turkish citizen. Since 1969, Qaddafi had directed a revolutionary government that sought economic and social development and the establishment of structures of popular participation under the guidance of Gaddafi's philosophy, a synthesis of Islam with revolutionary nationalism and socialism (LaFeber 1994, 707–708, 714–716, 720–722; Targ 2013).

The demonizing of the governments of Nicaragua, Grenada, and Libya in order to justify direct military action or low-intensity conflict constituted what Noam Chomsky has called the first war on terrorism (2003, 116–117). These nations were presented falsely as threats to the peace and security of their regions and to the national security of the USA. In fact, they were threats to the USA only in the sense that they sought an autonomous road to social and economic development, in violation of the political and economic interests of the USA. Their examples, if followed by others, were threats to the established structures of the neocolonial world-system and to the nations that benefitted from them. Whereas the low-intensity war in Nicaragua was consistent with the concept of military restraint in neocolonial domination, the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya, like the Vietnam War and the military intervention in the Dominican Republic, were not. The Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan administrations were moving the nation away from the parameters that had guided US foreign policy in the exercise of its neocolonial domination from 1933 to 1964, when it was approaching or at the heights of its power.

In 1989, the administration of George H.W. Bush launched a military invasion of Panama. The invasion was justified on the grounds of President Manuel Noriega's involvement with drug trafficking, and it was part of the Bush administration's renewal of the "war on drugs," initially declared in the early years of the Reagan administration. Civilian

neighborhoods were bombed, and thousands were killed. Noriega was captured and taken to Florida, where he was imprisoned for crimes mostly committed while he was on the CIA payroll (Chomsky 2003, 107–108, 117–118; LaFeber 1994, 750–752). The US military action in Panama represents a continuation of (1) disregard for neocolonial legitimating structures and (2) wars against weak states in order to overcome the "Vietnam Syndrome" and re-establish popular acceptance for foreign wars. So during the period of 1981–1989, a fundamental change in the nation has become evident. The USA was no longer a dominant neocolonial power, exercising military restraint in order to maintain a democratic façade. It now has now become a declining power, with its economic capacity and its international prestige in decline. However, with a strong military capacity intact, it is now taking the initial steps toward maintaining its global power through military means.

In 1991, the Bush I administration launched a war against Iraq, which was the first war of aggression in order to directly attain specific economic objectives since the US invasion of Nicaragua in 1926, before the nation ascended to neocolonial hegemony. Iraq had invaded Kuwait in 1990, seeking to acquire strategic islands and oil fields that had been in dispute since British colonial officials had established an arbitrary boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. Saddam Hussein believed that the USA, with whom he had been allied during the 1980s, was signaling permission for the invasion. But in fact the USA had good reason to be opposed to the invasion, because it threatened US access to oil. Kuwait and neighboring Saudi Arabia together had control of 40% of the world's known oil reserves, and both governments were solidly in alliance with the USA and US interests. In contrast, Hussein was an ally, but not necessarily an ally that could be controlled. When US opposition became clear after its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq proposed a withdrawal in the context of general regional settlement that would address the Israeli-Arab conflict. But the Bush administration dismissed the Iraqi proposal, claiming that there was a huge Iraqi military buildup on the border of Saudi Arabia, which was more a concern for the future than an actual fact. The Bush administration was able to put together an effective alliance of nations for the invasion, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and it attained support from the United Nations. Following a massive bombing campaign against Iraq, the USA launched the invasion, and possessing overwhelming military superiority, it pushed the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 100 hours. But still suffering from the Vietnam

syndrome, it limited its objective to reclaiming Kuwait, and it did not push on to conquer Iraq. In any event, it would not have had support from its Arab allies for a military campaign to replace Saddam Hussein (Chomsky 2003, 18, 158, 181–182; LaFeber 1994, 760–766).

The Clinton administration continued the US policy of direct military action, albeit through US control of NATO. "Humanitarian intervention" emerged as a new ideological justification of US military action in pursuit of its political and economic interests. The new ideological manipulation was most clearly evident in the cases of Bosnia, bombed in 1995, and Kosovo, where the USA launched a massive bombing campaign in 1999. The US Kosovo intervention was described as conducted solely for the benefit of the people of the region, who were victims of an "ethnic cleansing" campaign carried out by the government of Serbia. However, the US bombing preceded the ethnic cleansing campaign and other atrocities, and it was the US-backed Albanian guerrillas who did most of the killing. Although the USA claimed that its military actions of 1995 and 1999 were humanitarian responses to ethnic cleansing, in reality the motive was to preempt threats to US interests and to sustain American primacy in the region (Chomsky 2003, 22, 54–58).

During the Clinton administration, a number of conservative think tanks financed by international corporations reformulated the conservatism of Reaganism, seeking to adapt to changes at the end of the century, including the end of the Cold War. The neoconservatives sought to reverse the decline of US hegemony. They envisioned the establishment through any means necessary, including military force, of the American concept of democracy and American civilization as the universal world standard. Accordingly, they favored expansion of military expenditures and the maintenance of US military dominance. They sought to convert popular insecurity resulting from the deep structural crisis of the world-system and from the US hegemonic decline into a social fear that would generate support for militarist policies. They envisioned strategies of creating enemies and threats in order to establish pretexts for military action. A number of prominent neoconservatives supported the candidacy of George W. Bush, some of whom became members of his cabinet when he assumed the presidency (Nils Castro 2010, 11–12; Schmitt 2003).

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, provoked an opportunity for the neoconservatives to more aggressively pursue their vision. In 2002, President George W. Bush announced a doctrine of "preventive war," justifying US military invasion against any country that has the potential or

the capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction. Inasmuch as nearly all countries could be portrayed as possessing such potential, the declaration in effect proclaims that the USA has the right of aggression in defense of its political and economic interests. It sets aside internationally accepted standards concerning the legal and moral use of force by states, thus dismissing as irrelevant international institutions that have been developed since the end of World War II (Chomsky 2003, 11–16, 21, 28, 42–43, 125, 143). Inasmuch as the USA, as the hegemonic neocolonial power of that historic moment, had played a prominent role in the development of these international institutions, ignoring them signaled an abandonment of its own established structures of imperialist neocolonial domination.

In accordance with the preventive war doctrine, the Bush II administration launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and expanded US global military presence. A significant increase in military spending occurred. The US defense budget in 2001 was $316 billion and increased to $685 billion in 2010, an increase of 67% in constant dollars. In 2009, the military expenditures of the USA represented 43% of the total military expenditures of all the countries in the world, placing the USA far ahead of second place China (Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mundial [CIEM], 2010a; CIEM, 2010b; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 2010, 11). Inasmuch as the USA has been losing the economic and financial capacity to control its neocolonies, direct US military control functions to ensure the continuation of the raw material supplies and access to markets that are necessary for its economy. For example, the US military occupation of Iraq in 2003, with 10% of world oil reserves (second only to Saudi Arabia), enabled the USA to take control of the Iraqi political process and its oil production. And Afghanistan is important as a route of transit for the petroleum and natural gas exportations of Central Asia (Chomsky 2003, 163; Diez Conseco 2007, 110–111; Pichs 2006b, 167–172).

By the end of the presidency of George W. Bush, the neoconservative orientation was questioned by the people, largely as a consequence of the prolonged war in Iraq and the financial crisis of 2008. In this context, Barack Obama won the elections of 2008, promising “change.” The Obama administration rejected the neoconservative policy of aggressive pursuit of US interests through unilateral military action. In its view, this strategy had backfired, because it alienated US allies and thus weakened US influence. So the Obama administration adopted a new approach of using “soft power.” The term was coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in 1990,

and he further developed and explored the concept in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, published in 2004. Nye was Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration.

Nye defines soft power as the ability to influence the behavior of others and get what you want through attraction and cooptation rather than by coercing with threats or inducing with payments. A country possesses soft power when people are attracted to it because of its values, political institutions, cultural products, exemplary conduct, advanced technology, prosperity, openness, and far-sighted foreign policies. A country with soft power can co-opt people and institutions in other countries, using its attractiveness to get them to do what it wants. In contrast, hard power attains interests through coercion, which can be military or economic, and economic inducement. In Nye's formulation, economic hard power includes coercing through economic sanctions or inducing through economic aid and bribes (Nye 2004, x, 2, 5–8, 14, 31, 44–62). So defined, soft power is an integral and necessary component of neocolonial domination. Nye, in effect, was criticizing the George W. Bush administration for its excessive reliance on military action, forgetting that a balance of hard and soft power is necessary for effective domination.

However, in spite of the soft power rhetoric of Obama, the militarist policies of the Bush administration in essence continued during the Obama administration.

> Beyond the gestures and the words, in relation to the principal issues, the foreign policy of the government of Obama represents more continuity than change from the government of Bush: it pursued the essential components of the 'war against terrorism,' it maintained troops in Iraq, it tripled military presence in Afghanistan, it extended the conflict to Pakistan, and it found a new target in Yemen in order to combat the Al Qaida network and Islamic radicalism (Cinatti 2010, 75).

Like Bush, the basic goal of Obama in Southwest Asia was to reaffirm US power in the region and to gain access to the petroleum and natural gas reserves of the Caspian Sea (Cinatti 2010, 63). In addition, military expenditures continued to grow during the Obama administration, such that US military expenses became roughly equal to the military expenditures of the rest of the nations of the world combined.

In spite of the invocation of "soft power" as a recent ideological device, the USA is less and less in a position to utilize a balance of hard

and soft power in the conduct of its foreign policy. The soft power of the USA has declined in recent decades, especially in the Third World, as a result of its barbarous violence in Vietnam, its imposition of the neoliberal project on the world, its tendency to unilateral military action since 1980, and its turn to aggressive wars following 2001. At the same time, the US capacity to implement economic hard power has declined, as a result of the economic and commercial decline of the USA since 1973. Previously, at the height of its hegemony, the USA was able to perceive military engagement as a secondary strategy, to which the USA resorted only when political and social control broke down. It relied primarily upon a combination of soft power and economic hard power, with military power held in reserve as a threat. But after 1973, military intervention became increasingly necessary. Today, the USA is no longer able to control its neocolonies through overwhelming productive and commercial presence and its enormous prestige. On the other hand, it has retained its enormous global military advantage, thus making military force its most practical and effective strategy.

Lacking a vision that would enable it to define a US role in the development of a just and sustainable world-system, the US power elite is ideologically trapped in a perspective that only seeks to maintain US power and wealth in the short term. Taking into account its economic decline and its decline in prestige, this ideological orientation pushes the USA toward military intervention and wars of aggression. Inasmuch as other core powers do not have interest in the preservation of US hegemony, this may increasingly involve unilateral military action.

The Possible Turn to Neofascism

The new wars of aggression and increased US dependency on military action possibly may indicate a turn from liberalism toward a new form of fascism. Both liberalism and fascism are forms of capitalist-class domination, and both have emerged as projects with global projections. They differ with respect to strategies of global domination. Whereas fascism involves the seizing of economic control through military aggression, liberalism formally respects the sovereignty of nations, attaining domination of other lands through economic and financial penetration of national economies and through political and diplomatic influence.

For the most part, liberalism guided the foreign policy of the USA from the 1890s to 1980. Prior to the collapse of the European colonial

empires, the USA, as an ascending power with a dramatically expanding economy, increasingly was able to economically and financially penetrate independent but poor nations, without having direct political control. During the first half of the twentieth century, the USA increasingly projected itself as a global power that represented a progressive alternative to the European colonial empires. Later, as the hegemonic core nation in the post-World War II neocolonial world-system, the USA was able to economically, financially, and ideologically penetrate Third World nations, whose formal political independence was recognized.

Whereas liberalism is a viable international policy for a hegemonic nation with a decisive productive, commercial, and financial advantage over other core nations, like the USA from 1946 to 1965, fascism is a more viable strategy for a core nation without such advantage. In its classic twentieth-century form, fascism involves the military seizing of control of the forces of production, commerce, and banking, and the placing of them under military government control. Accordingly, fascism requires only military advantage, and not productive, commercial, and financial advantage. Such is the position of the USA today, inasmuch as it is a declining economic power, but remains a hegemonic military power. This makes logical, in the short term, a policy of continuous wars of aggression. In the long run, however, militarism further undermines the economy, by directing resources away from investment in sustainable and marketable forms of production. Inasmuch as military strength ultimately depends upon economic strength, a policy of continuous wars of aggression is not sustainable in the long run. Wars of aggression are a sign of economic weakness, and they are a sign that the US power elite is not capable of forging a sustainable national project.

What has been occurring since September 11, 2001, has been the application of military force by a declining hegemonic neocolonial power, in the pursuit of economic objectives that it no longer has the capacity to attain through economic productivity, economic competitiveness, and commerce. If we understand fascism to mean, in part, the attaining of economic goals through military force, the US wars of aggression point to the possibility of the emergence of a neofascist global dictatorship. Such a US-directed neofascist global dictatorship would be guided by rules different from those of the neocolonial world-system. Neocolonialism seeks to control commercially, financially, and ideologically rather than through force, even though its foundation lies in force, conquest, and colonialism. Neocolonialism endeavors to give the

appearance of democracy, and thus, it provides support to key actors, such as the middle and working classes in the core and the national bourgeoisie in the periphery and semiperiphery. As a sign of the incapacity of the world-system to maintain itself as a neocolonial world-system, these limited forms of democracy and sovereignty allowed by the neocolonial world-system have been increasingly abandoned by the global elite since 1980.

The emergence of a neofascist global dictatorship would not mark the end of the world-system, but the evolution of the world-system to a new stage. It would mean the end of the dominance of the idea of democracy, which emerged during the eighteenth century, but which, under the constraints of the established structures of the world-system, could go no further than representative democracy (as against popular democracy) and formal political independence (rather than true sovereignty). By turning to a new form of fascism in its hour of crisis, the global elite would be directing the world-system to a return to its roots, inasmuch as the world-system was established on a colonial foundation of force and conquest.

This possible turn to neofascism perhaps is indicated by the election of Donald Trump. In its first 100 days, the Trump administration has proposed a significant increase in the military budget and has launched attacks in Yemen and Afghanistan, thus continuing the trend of increasing reliance on military action in the conduct of foreign policy. In addition, the Trump administration has escalated scapegoating rhetoric and is adopting anti-immigrant measures. Moreover, it is proposing a narrow economic nationalism, and it invokes a populist rhetoric. These are signs of a new form of fascism. Further reflection on the first 100 days of the Trump administration is found in the Appendix.

There is, however, an alternative possibility for humanity, namely the transformation of the world-system, rooted in colonial domination and superexploitation, into a different world-system, more just, democratic, and sustainable, based on solidarity and cooperation. This possibility is favored by the demonstrated incapacity of the power elite to respond constructively to the multi-dimensional global crisis and by increasing awareness of the need for a fundamentally different kind of world-system, if humanity is to survive. This alternative possibility is being developed by the movements of the peoples of the Third World, who have reaffirmed their commitment to their historic project of national and social liberation. We turn to this theme in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER 7

The Third World Project of National and Social Liberation

We have seen that the global elite, rather than searching for a reasonable and enlightened response to the structural crisis of the world-system, took an aggressive turn, driven by the pursuit of short-term particular interests. It sought to reassert its control over the world-system. It imposed the neoliberal program on the neocolonies, using the debt of Third World governments as leverage, thus rolling back concessions that had been made to the Third World during the course of the twentieth century. In dismissing the needs of the majority of humanity, the neoliberal project provoked popular indignation, giving rise to a renewal of the historic Third World movements that sought structural transformation of the world-system. The renewal dates from 1994, when the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico denounced the neoliberal-inspired North American Free Trade Agreement; and when Hugo Chávez was released from prison and formed the Bolivarian Fifth Republic Movement, seeking to cast aside a national political establishment that had collaborated with the imposition of the neoliberal project.

The Third World Project of 1948 to 1979

The historic Third World project of 1948 to 1979 was based in the twentieth-century anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa and anti-imperialist movements in Latin America. The giants of the era, who had enormous prestige based on the leadership of their peoples in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles, met to formulate a united vision

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for the future of the world-system and to develop cooperative strategies of action. They sought to transform the structures of the neocolonial world-system, which were ensuring the preservation of European economic, financial, and cultural domination, and which were obstacles to the genuine sovereignty and the economic and social development of Third World nations.

In Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, representatives of twenty-nine newly independent Asian and African nations met. Sukarno of Indonesia was the leading force; Nehru of India, Nasser of Egypt, Zhou En-lai of China, and U Nu of Burma were among its prominent participants. The Bandung conference declared the importance of Third World unity in opposition to European colonialism and Western imperialism. It advocated economic cooperation rather than exploitation as the base of international relations. It sought to break the core–peripheral relation, in which the Third World nations export raw materials and import manufactured goods, and thus, it called for the diversification of the economies of the formerly colonized nations and the development of their national industries. It supported the regulation of international capital flows. It advocated international control of arms, the reduction of military forces, and the prohibition of nuclear arms. It denounced cultural imperialism and the suppression of national cultures. The Bandung conference had a tremendous impact on the peoples of the Third World. As Vijay Prashad writes, "From Belgrade to Tokyo, from Cairo to Dar es Salaam, politicians and intellectuals began to speak of the 'Bandung spirit'" (Prashad 2007, 32–33, 36–46).

In 1957, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was held in Cairo. Egyptian head of state Gamal Abdel Nasser, an advocate of "Arab Socialism," was a prominent spokesman for the Third World project. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was dominated by the Bandung Spirit, and it was strongly partisan against the First World, more so than the Bandung conference, which had been characterized by a distancing from both the First and Second Worlds (Prashad 2007, 51–61).

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established by Venezuela, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The creation of OPEC was one example of a general Third World strategy of creating public commodity cartels that united exporting nations, with the hope of curbing the power of the private cartels that had been formed by core manufacturers and distributers. Public primary product cartels, it was believed, would enable exporting nations to set prices for their raw

materials exports, thus generating more income for investment in national industry and social development. In addition to petroleum, public cartels were formed by nations that were producers and exporters of cocoa, sugar, rubber, copper, and bauxite (Prashad 2007, 69–70, 180–186).

In 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, representatives of twenty-three governments of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe established the Non-Aligned Movement. Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru, and Nasser were its founders. U Nu, Ben Youssef (Algeria), Sukarno, Nkrumah (Ghana), and Osvaldo Dorticós (President of Cuba) were present at the first Summit in Belgrade. The Summit called for the democratization of the United Nations, particularly with respect to the Security Council, which holds unbalanced power vis-à-vis the General Assembly, and which is dominated by the core powers. The Summit called upon the nuclear powers (USA, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. And it supported the armed struggles of national liberation movements in Algeria and the Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola, and Cabo Verde) in Africa (Prashad 2007, 95–97, 100–104, 110).

In 1964, seventy-seven nations of the Third World formed the Group of 77 (G-77), an organization that functions as a bloc within the United Nations. It called for the First World nations to finance Third World projects, as compensation for colonialism, and to permit Third World states to use protective tariffs without sanctions. It supported Third World efforts to improve the prices of raw materials, and it called upon the Third World nations to develop new forms of mutually beneficial trade among one another in order to ameliorate the effects of imperialist exploitation (Prashad 2007, 70–71).

In 1966, the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America was held in Havana, convoked by the revolutionary government of Cuba. The 513 delegates represented 83 governments and national liberation movements from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, including the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau. The conference named colonialism and imperialism as the source of Third World underdevelopment, and it defended nationalization as an effective strategy for attaining control over the national economy. It supported armed struggle as a necessary tactic in opposition to colonialism and imperialism, and it pledged solidarity to the Vietnamese struggle against the USA (Prashad 2007, 106–113, 310).

At its 1973 Summit in Algiers, the Third Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement declared that the international order continued to promote the underdevelopment of the Third World nations. The Summit supported the creation of public cartels to transfer power to raw materials exporters; it called for a linking of the prices of raw material exports to the prices of imported manufactured goods; and it affirmed the principle of the sovereignty of nations over their natural resources, including their right to nationalize property within their territories. The Summit endorsed a document on the New International Economic Order, which had been in preparation by Third World governments for a decade (Prashad 2007, 189, 330).

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted the Third World document on a New International Economic Order, which was supported by the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77, and the socialist nations. The document affirmed the principles of the right of self-determination of nations and the sovereignty of nations over their natural resources. It advocated: the creation of raw materials producers' associations to give raw materials exporting states control over prices; a new international monetary policy that did not punish the weaker states; increased industrialization of the Third World; the transfer of technology from the advanced industrial states to the Third World; regulation and control of the activities of transnational corporations; the promotion of cooperation among the nations of the Third World; and aid for Third World development. Later in 1974, the UN General Assembly approved the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," which drew upon the New International Economic Order. It affirmed the right of the nationalization of foreign properties, endorsed the establishment of raw material cartels, and called for the creation of a system with just and equitable terms of trade (Castro 1983, 27–28; Prashad 2007, 189, 334–335).

In 1979, the Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Havana. Ninety-three countries of the Third World reaffirmed their commitment to national sovereignty, economic integrity, cultural diversity, and nuclear disarmament (Prashad 2007, 113–114). They declared: "The Chiefs of State and Government reaffirm their deep conviction that a lasting solution to the problems of countries in development can be attained only by means of a constant and fundamental restructuring of international economic relations through the establishment of a New International Economic Order" (quoted in Castro 1983, 25). Cuba, representing the

Non-Aligned Movement as its President from 1979 to 1982, called upon the United Nations to respond to the desperate economic and social situation of the Third World. It proposed: an additional flow of resources to the Third World through donations and long-term low-interest credit; an end to unequal terms of trade; ceasing of irrational arms spending and directing these funds to finance development; a transformation of the international monetary system; and the cancellation of the debts of less developed countries in a disadvantageous situation (Castro 1983, 25).

The Third World project, formulated with clarity and commitment and on a basis of a knowledgeable understanding of the world-system, confronted the hostile opposition of the global powers. It thus found itself in a war on two fronts, on the one hand, with the aggressions and maneuvers of the global powers, and on the other hand, with the colonial legacy of underdevelopment and poverty. And it would be temporarily derailed by Third World spokespersons who were tied economically and ideologically to core corporations and international organizations, and who promoted their particular interests.

Derailing the Third World Project

From the beginning of the emergence of Third World anti-colonial movements, there was a sector of the Third World national bourgeoisie that had an economic interest and/or ideological orientation to develop national independence in a form that preserved the economic structures established during the colonial period. This included, for example, those members of the national bourgeoisie who owned enterprises dedicated to the exportation of raw materials or the importation of manufacturing goods. In addition, significant numbers of the national bourgeoisie had been educated in Western institutions, facilitating the dissemination of ideas that justified the established world-system.

Thus, in reflecting on the Third World, we consistently have to maintain a distinction between accommodationist and revolutionary leaders/intellectuals of the Third World project. During the transition to independence and the subsequent evolution of the neocolonial world-system, the global powers continually gave support to the accommodationists and attempted to undermine or assassinate the revolutionary leaders. Many newly independent Third World governments tried to maintain a balance, making concessions to revolutionary aspirations and popular

demands, but trying to maintain friendly relations with the global powers. Some political leaders adopted the balancing act out of genuine concern for the people and the nation, but others became skilled at presenting themselves as defenders of the people as they protected the particular interests of the national bourgeoisie. In contrast, in those nations that developed a clearly revolutionary project, there emerged charismatic leaders with an exceptional capacity to explain the necessary transformations to the people, to delegitimate the accommodationists as representatives of colonial and neocolonial interests, and to lead the nation in the development of a radical national liberation project. Such charismatic leaders included Fidel, Ho, Nasser, Sukarno, Nkrumah, and Nyerere, who in the eyes of the people became heroic figures in the formulation and defense of the Third World project.

During the period 1946 to 1979, the global powers were aggressive in attacking and undermining the radical Third World project, and they were determined and persistent in constructing obstacles to any transformation of neocolonial structures that would be detrimental to their interests. As a result, the Third World project was able to accomplish less improvements in the material conditions of the formerly colonized nations than had been hoped. The people became disappointed, and popular dissatisfaction tarnished the image of the Third World project and its revolutionary leaders, even as the most insightful understood that the cause was the uncompromising commitment of the wealthy and the powerful to the protection of its privileges.

As we have discussed above in Chap. 6, the world-system entered a long structural crisis during the 1970s, as a result of the fact that it had reached the geographical limits of the earth, and it could no longer expand by conquering and peripheralizing new lands and peoples. In response to the crisis, the global powers accelerated its ideological attack on the Third World project, particularly its view that the state must play a central role in the national development project. Intellectuals and academics were called to the attack on the state, arguing that a corrupt and overly bureaucratic state was to blame for persistent Third World underdevelopment. This implied not only an attack on the Third World revolutionaries, but also on the host of Third World states that had sought to balance the needs of their peoples with the demands of the global powers. The powerful demanded that concessions to popular demands by Third World governments be rolled back. Modest protections of national

industries and national currencies, moderate regulation of capital flows, state ownership of key national industries, and social programs in defense of the people had to be eliminated, the spokespersons of the core powers insisted. The "free market," neoliberalism, and the "Washington Consensus" (for the apparent agreement among policymakers in the US capital) became the clarion call.

The global ideological turn of 1979–1980, signaled by the elections of Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, provided the opportunity for accommodationist Third World leaders, economically and ideologically tied to the neocolonial powers and transnational corporations, to seize upon the weakened international position of the revolutionary leaders and to derail the radical Third World project. At the 1983 Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi, moderate accommodationists gained the upper hand, led by Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. Rajaratnam maintained that the world had entered a "systemic crisis" in the 1970s, and as a result, each Third World nation needed to be motivated primarily by national interest. The best policy, he maintained, is the elimination of state-directed development and the reduction of the role of the state to protecting people from extreme inequalities by redistributing income, but "without deadening competitive spirit" (Prashad 2007, 211–212).

Rajaratnam spoke on behalf of a Third World national industrial bourgeoisie that had been born after colonialism and the anti-colonial movements. The members of this class had benefitted from the protective measures of the national liberation state, but they now experienced the structures that had enabled them to flourish as shackles. They formed a self-confident class that was emboldened to defend its particular interests rather than the interests of the people as a whole. They envisioned the development of new information technology in the Third World, through their expertise and entrepreneurship, thus taking advantage of opportunities provided by the technological development of the world-economy. They rejected the radical Third World project and adopted an anti-Soviet, pro-USA stance. Many of the accommodationists to neoliberalism had been socialized in the international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, controlled by the core powers, or in transnational corporations. And they were especially well represented by the national bourgeoisies from the better-off Third World nations, such as the "Asian Tigers" (Prashad 2007, 212, 215).

Standing against accommodation, Fidel powerfully defended the radical Third World project of national liberation. His speech, "The World Economic and Social Crisis," was enthusiastically received by the delegates, and it was the only speech at the 1983 New Delhi Summit to receive a standing ovation. Many delegates felt emotional attachments to the classic Third World agenda of national liberation, even as the world political and economic situation and the political situations in their own countries compelled them to adapt. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in her capacity as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, steered a middle ground between the two positions, not wanting to concede too much to the revolutionary camp, but at the same time not wanting to adopt a pro-USA line. Nevertheless, the New Delhi Summit marked a definite move toward neoliberal ideology (Prashad 2007, 210–211, 213).

Fidel Speaks to the World at Its Historic Juncture

As the world turned to neoliberalism, the Third World project of national liberation remained alive in the aspirations of many. Fidel became "the moral embodiment of what the Third World was," and his speech at the New Delhi Non-Aligned Movement was published in an expanded version and distributed in various countries in different languages (Prashad 2007, 210–213, 221). The printed version (published in 1983 by the Cuban government with the title of *The Economic and Social Crisis of the World: Its repercussions for the underdeveloped countries, its dismal prospects, and the need to struggle if we are to survive: Report to the VII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement)* was prepared by Fidel with the support of scholars of the Cuban Center for Research on the World Economy, the Center for Research on the International Economy of the University of Havana, and the Economics Faculty of the University of Havana. It provided a thorough and informed analysis of the problems that the world-economy confronted, and it proposed an alternative direction to that being implemented by the global powers. It is at once a comprehensive historical, economic, and political analysis, and a prophetic moral call, proclaimed on behalf of the colonized peoples of the world.

The Economic and Social Crisis of the World understands the global crisis to be fundamentally rooted in the structures of a neocolonial world-system that are based on centuries of colonial and neocolonial exploitation. At the same time, it identifies particular steps taken during

the 1960s and 1970s by the hegemonic power that sent the system spiraling toward crisis. In the view of the report, these steps were taken by the USA in an effort to preserve its hegemony in the system; the results were disastrous, because the preservation of US hegemony was not possible, a fundamental fact never understood by US leaders.

The report notes important characteristics of the post-World World II period of 1946 to 1970, a period that began with uncontested US hegemony. It was above all a period of commercial expansion and long economic growth for the developed capitalist nations, uninterrupted by depression or long recessions. And it was a period characterized by: important technological and scientific advances, which facilitated the emergence of consumer societies in the developed capitalist nations as well as a tremendous increase in the destructive capacity of military weapons; the emergence of transnational corporations to a position of dominance, accompanied by increasing concentration of power, capital, and production; an increasing role of states in their economies, including state ownership or co-ownership of companies in many states; and a relative decline in industry and the emergence of service as a more dynamic sector of the economies of the developed capitalist nations. And the same time, it was a period of enormous inequality between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, during which the underdeveloped world established mechanisms to challenge the structures of the system. And Japan and Western Europe (especially Germany) emerged to challenge US hegemony, establishing by 1970 three centers of power in the capitalist world, namely, the USA (still dominant), the European Economic Community, and Japan, which were united in their opposition to the protest movements in the underdeveloped countries (Castro 1983, 17–19, 54–55).

The report notes that from the 1944 Bretton Woods conference to 1971, the US dollar enjoyed a privileged position in the international monetary system. Since the value of the dollar was fixed in gold, possession of it was equivalent to the possession of gold itself, and thus, the US dollar functioned in practice as the fundamental holding of international reserves. As a result of its privileged position in the international monetary system, in conjunction with its unchallenged dominance in production and commerce, the USA could obtain financing through the simple mechanism of a policy of monetary expansion, used from 1946 to the late 1950s to finance massive exportations of capital as well as programs of reconstruction in Europe and an enormous military budget that included maintenance of military bases throughout the world (Castro 1983, 79–80).

But in the late 1950s, the favorable position of the USA began to suffer erosion. Of primary importance was the emergence of competition from Japan and Western Europe, reducing the growth of US exportation of goods and services. Beginning in the early 1960s, the USA responded to its declining position by the emission of dollar bonds, which were increasingly less backed in gold, other currencies, or in the exportation of goods and services. This strategy financed investments by US transnational corporations as well as programs of "foreign aid" (tied to political conditions) and military expenditures abroad. This was a successful strategy for the attainment of political and economic objectives in the short term, but it had the consequence of undermining the position of the dollar, and it was one of the primary sources of the high level of inflation of the 1970s, which began in the late 1960s. In spite of the weakened position of the dollar, the price of the dollar remained fixed in gold, so that the dollar was overvalued, until it was freed from the gold standard in 1971, when it suffered devaluation and a subsequent devaluation in 1973 (Castro 1983, 80–81).

The 1970s was a decade of high levels of inflation. The inflation was caused by the issuance of bonds by the US government to sustain unproductive state expenditures, especially military expenditures, as well as by control of prices by the transnational corporations that controlled international commerce, including international commerce in petroleum. Although some Western economists blamed the inflation of the 1970s on the 1973 OPEC price increase for crude petroleum, the 1983 Castro report argues that that nationalized petroleum companies of the OPEC countries controlled only the supply of petroleum, while the transnational petroleum companies maintained control over technological and commercial aspects. The report maintains that the US inflation rate during the 1970s was almost entirely generated by domestic inflation (Castro 1983, 80–82, 157, 160–161).

The weakened position of the dollar and high levels of inflation were signs of an international monetary system in crisis. The crisis had particularly negative effects on the nations of the Third World. The inflation rate was higher for the underdeveloped world: Underdeveloped countries that were exporters of petroleum had inflation rates from 10.5 to 18.8% during the period 1973 to 1981, and underdeveloped countries that were importers of petroleum had inflation rates from 22.1 to 36.9% during the period; in contrast, the seven principal developed countries

had inflation rates from 7.0 to 13.3%. Moreover, changes in financial relations between the North and South during the 1970s had negative consequences for the Third World. Private banks in the core significantly increased the amount of lending to Third World governments and decreased investment in Third World production, inasmuch as profits from loans became higher than profits from production. As result, capital flows between the banks of the North and Third World governments increased, while the participation of Third World countries in world commerce declined. By the end of the decade, Third World debt payments to the banks of the North greatly exceeded investments by banks, governments, and corporations of the core in Third World production (Castro 1983, 20–23, 54–55, 82–83, 95, 146–147).

High prices for manufactured goods and low prices for raw materials historically has been central to an unequal exchange between the developed capitalist countries and the underdeveloped world, inasmuch as for the latter, income from agricultural and mineral raw materials constitutes the principal source of income from the exportations. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, declining terms of exchange between raw materials and manufactured goods occurred, making the situation worse. For example, in 1960, the sale of a ton of coffee enabled purchase of 37.3 tons of fertilizer, but by 1982, a ton of coffee could buy only 15.8 tons of fertilizer; in 1959, twenty-four tons of sugar could buy a sixty-horsepower tractor, but in 1982, 115 tons of sugar were needed to buy the same tractor; and in 1959, six tons of jute fiber could buy a seven-ton truck, but in 1982, twenty-six tons of jute were needed. The declining terms of trade were aggravated during the 1970s by inflation and the high cost of petroleum, generating a chronic situation of a commercial balance deficit for the underdeveloped countries. The negative commercial balance of the Third World countries during the period 1973 to 1981 became the basis for the Third World debt problem (Castro 1983, 23, 59–66, 88).

The 1983 Report to the Non-Aligned Movement especially focused on dynamics of the world-economy from 1979 to 1982, the period of the Cuban presidency. In 1979, responding to the unprecedented situation of stagnation combined with inflation, the developed capitalist countries departed from Keynesian economic policies and adopted a monetary-fiscal recipe of combining a monetary policy of high interest rates (to increase money reserves and reduce money in circulation) with a fiscal policy of reduced government spending (by reducing budgets for

social programs and rationalizing government employment), thus giving priority to the problem of inflation. The result was moderation in the inflation rates but reduced industrial production and high levels of unemployment in the seven most developed countries of the world by 1982 (Castro 1983, 30–37).

The Report considers that "the indiscriminate elevation of the rate of interest, promoted by the government of the United States, constitutes, without doubt, one of the most arbitrary economic measures of recent years." The policy had negative consequences for the economy of the USA, and it deepened the crisis of the international financial system. And it had "disastrous economic repercussion for the underdeveloped countries," for which it has meant the "nearly complete ruin of their economies and the cancelation of hopes for improvement." The high-interest rate policy increased the cost of the servicing of the external debt of Third World governments, thus increasing government budgetary deficits as well as increasing the percentage of capital flow to the core in the form of interest payments on loans as against profits from production. At the same time, the policy increased the value of the dollar, leading to its overvaluation, and a corresponding reduction in the value of the national currencies of the nations of the Third World. It thus intensified the problem of the balance of payments deficit of the underdeveloped countries (Castro 1983, 30–31, 36–38, 46–48, 82).

The severity of the situation, the Report maintains, has obligated an increasing number of countries to adopt "adjustment" policies that are not a result of their own decisions in the context of a development plan formulated in the exercise of their sovereignty. Rather, these policies are adopted as emergency measures in response to balance of payments and government deficits. And they are adopted as conditions for receiving new loans from the International Monetary Fund. The measures include devaluation of national currencies, reduction of government expenditures, and opening the economy to the merchandize and investments proceeding from the developed capitalist countries. The measures do not reduce the deficits, because foreign capital invests in its own profit and not in forms of production that promote the development of the nation. They are presented as measures that follow from technocratic considerations, but they are in reality neocolonial measures that are integral to an international monetary system that responds to a small group of five countries (Castro 1983, 48–49, 87).

Thus, there has occurred in the period 1979 to 1982 a deterioration in the situation of the less developed countries: a decline in the value of national currencies with respect to the dollar, a fall in the prices of raw materials and declining terms of trade with the advanced capitalist nations, a reduction in rates of growth, and a spiraling escalation of the external debt (Castro 1983, 12, 14, 41–44). With respect to the external debt, the report states:

> The external debt of the Third World—considered by many authors as irrecoverable and unpayable in strict technical terms—with its exorbitant sum, its incredible rate of growth, and the continuous worsening of its conditions, is probably one of the best indications of the irrationality and unviability of an outmoded international economic order (Castro 1983, 49).

The 1983 Report on *The Economic and Social Crisis of the World* also describes the alarming increase in the influence of transnational corporations on the economic relations of the world. The spectacular growth and proliferation of transnational corporations began in the 1960s, but it particularly took off in the 1970s. The growing presence of transnational corporations in the underdeveloped countries constitutes a serious threat to the national sovereignty of these countries. Transnational corporations do not adjust their operations in accordance with the legislation of the countries in which they are located. They interfere directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of the countries in which they operate. They ask the governments of the countries from which they come to pressure the governments of the countries in which they are operating, in support of their particular interests. They attempt to obstruct governments of the underdeveloped countries from exercising control over their natural resources. The Report maintains that US transnational corporations profit highly from its Third World investments. However, the transnational profits from Third World investments have been principally in the form of loan interest payments to transnational banks (Castro 1983, 66–69, 131, 141–144, 150–151).

The Castro report maintains that the transnational corporations have a perspective on the development of the Third World countries, which it refers to as the "transnational ideology." This ideology proposes a model of development based on transforming underdeveloped countries into "exporting platforms." This model of development, the Report maintains, does not respond to the basic requirements for the

true economic development of these countries; rather, it responds to the needs of capital, and in particular, the need of capital for a cheap workforce that elevates profitability. The exporting platforms, although they in degree contribute to employment, are isolated from the rest of the economy in the countries where they are located. They therefore have an extremely limited effect on the national economy, and they could not be considered as promoting independent economic development. In order to attract investments by international corporations in exporting platforms, governments grant enormous liberties to foreign capital, including unlimited transfer of capital out of the country and exemptions from taxes, as well as unlimited access to cheap labor and to natural resources. By 1975, exporting platforms had been developed in seventeen countries in Asia, thirteen in Africa, and twenty-one in Latin America (Castro 1983, 148–149).

The 1983 Report also discusses the environment. It maintains that "human action on the natural environment is provoking in an accelerated manner changes without precedent in the stability, organization, equilibrium, interaction, and even the survival of the principal ecological systems of the planet." Issues of concern include desertification, the accelerated erosion of agricultural soil, the increasing contamination of water and the exhaustion of its sources, and deforestation. The Report maintains that "the market economies of the developed countries are directly responsible for an important part of the degradation of the environment," including contamination of the air, lakes, rivers, and oceans as well as an enormous quantity of chemical and nuclear residues that have been deposited in the atmosphere, the fresh waters, and the seas. It also maintains that transnational enterprises are responsible for the exhaustion of mineral, agricultural, and forest resources of numerous underdeveloped countries (Castro 1983, 118–125).

Fidel Castro did not consider that these maladies of the international financial system and the neocolonial world-system could be rectified within the structures of the international economic order. But he believed that they could be overcome through the mobilization of a global political will for the creation of a New International Economic Order, as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement and approved by the UN General Assembly. He maintained that the peoples of the Third World must struggle to create a more just world order, recognizing that the peoples of the Third World constitute the immense majority

of humanity, and that the development of the Third World economies would be beneficial to the world-system as a whole. He suggested that the economic and social development of the Third World would enable the world-system to overcome its structural crisis. Accordingly, the peoples of the Third World must struggle: to transform the structures that promote unequal exchange and declining terms of exchange; for the cancellation of the Third World debt; for new and more equitable international monetary and financial systems; for a form of industrialization that responds to the interests of the Third World; for necessary socioeconomic structural changes, such as agrarian reform; for the adoption of measures by states that control and limit the activities of transnational corporations; and for an elevation of the prestige of the United Nations. The struggle requires the unity of the peoples of the Third World, in spite of political and cultural differences, in recognition of their common experience of colonial domination (Castro 1983, 223–229).

In the 1983 Report, Fidel formulates a concept of development that is not based on the model of Western development, which Fidel considers impossible to repeat in present global conditions. The development model proposed by Fidel involves strong state action in order to break the core–peripheral relation, in which, as we have seen, the underdeveloped countries export raw materials and leave industrial production in the hands of the developed countries. To overcome core–peripheral structures, the underdeveloped countries must mobilize national resources for the development of technically advanced industries. In this vein, Fidel maintains that the forms of industry that have been developed recently in the underdeveloped world will not lead to their economic development. Recent industrial expansion in the Third World has been in labor-intensive industries that have low levels of technical development, such as textiles or manufactured food products, which have been attractive to transnational capital because of the Third World cheap labor supply. In contrast to emphasis on low-wage export-oriented manufacturing, Fidel advocates investment in the Third World in those branches with technological-industrial complexity, such as nuclear, chemical, or petrochemical energy, or the aerospace industry; this would stimulate the growth of Third World internal markets (Castro 1983, 127–140).

Fidel's understanding of Third World development included the concept of South–South cooperation. The 1983 Report notes that cooperation among the underdeveloped countries has been a historic objective

of the Non-Aligned Movement, and it is an important component of the 1974 program for a New International Economic Order. Cooperation among the countries of the Third World would be a weapon of struggle against neocolonial dependency, which derives from the colonial empires, reinforces underdevelopment and poverty, and aggravates the present crisis of the world-system. South–South cooperation would be a powerful, dynamic factor contributing to autonomous development, and, Fidel maintains, it is a real practical possibility. The Third World as a whole has ample petroleum, agricultural and mineral resources, and some of the Third World nations possess a certain level of industrial development as well as a sufficient supply of highly qualified specialists, technicians, and doctors. If developed with a strong political will to protect the sovereignty of the nation over its natural resources, South–South cooperation could be a mechanism for controlling the actions of transnational corporations. At the same time, the concept of cooperation among the nations of the Third World does not negate the possibility for North–South cooperation. The Third World continues to seek mutually beneficial commerce with developed countries; it seeks to put an end only to unequal exchange and exploitative trade with the developed capitalist countries (Castro 1983, 165–170).

Fidel concludes *The Economic and Social Crisis of the World: Its repercussions for the underdeveloped countries, its dismal prospects, and the need to struggle if we are to survive*: *Report to the VII Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries* with a call for Third World unity, proclaiming that the Non-Aligned Movement has the objective:

> To struggle with determination for the strongest unity of the Non-Aligned Movement and all the states of the Third World. To not permit anything or anyone to divide us.. .. Let us form an indestructible group of peoples in order to demand our noble aspirations, our legitimate interests, our irrefutable right to sovereignty as countries of the Third World and as an inseparable part of humanity.
>
> As we have faced difficulties, we have never been characterized by resigned submission or defeatism. We have known how to confront difficult situations in recent years with unitary consciousness, firmness, and resolve. Together we have strived, together we have struggled, and together we have obtained victories. With the same spirit and determination, we should be prepared to fight a great, just, dignified and necessary battle for the life and future of our peoples (1983, 229).

Fidel stood at central stage, speaking to the colonized peoples of the earth, at a historic moment when the global powers were preparing to roll back modest concessions to the Third World nations as well as to the popular movements of the core, as they endeavored to preserve material privileges in the context of a world-economy confronting structural crisis. Like an ancient biblical prophet, Fidel denounced the wealthy and the powerful, in defense of the poor. But unlike the prophets of old, Fidel's denunciation was rooted in scientific analysis. Like Marx, Fidel and the Cuban economists were analyzing social scientific knowledge of the world-economy from below, from the vantage point of the history and the human needs of the overwhelming majority of the peoples of the planet, common victims of European colonial domination. From such vantage point, Fidel could arrive at insights that the defenders of the established order could not see, for they were driven primarily not by the desire to know, but by defense of the particular interests of the wealthy, the corporations, and the powerful nations. Moreover, unlike the ancient prophets, Fidel did not predict the unleashing of the vengeful wrath of God. Rather, driven by a moral commitment to the people, and aided by a scientific analysis from below, Fidel was able to envision a world in which the people would have the capacity to defend their interests. He thus called the peoples of the Third World to a unified and dignified struggle in defense of themselves, for the sake of the future of humanity.

The global powers could have no reasonable response to the words of the twentieth-century prophet. They would attack the proposal for a New International Economic Order and its proponents, and they would foment division with the Third World, in order to prevent its implementation (Prashad 2014, 37–38, 42–47). They would proceed to implement their economic war against the people, confusing the people for a time. But the people could not forget the words of the prophet. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the peoples of the Third World would rediscover their spirit of struggle. They would begin again to strive for the creation of a more just, democratic, and sustainable world-system, proclaiming Fidel as their *comandante*.

Renewal of the Third World Project Since 1994

1994, the year of the Zapatista uprising and the release of Hugo Chávez from prison, marks the beginning of the renewal of the Third World project, during which the peoples and nations of the Third World retook

the radical Third World agenda that had been formulated by the charismatic leaders, social movements, and revolutions of the Third World during the period 1948 to 1979. The renewal was born in rejection of the neoliberal project by the people, who experienced the negative consequences of neoliberal policies, such as: the devaluation of their currencies; increases in the costs of water, electricity, natural gas, and buses; reduction in government programs and services; the undermining of local agricultural production; and higher levels of unemployment, crime, and violence. Drawing upon decades of anti-colonial, anti-neocolonial, and anti-imperialist movements, leaders emerged who were able to reformulate the concrete demands of the people with respect to specific grievances into a broader political and social critique of neoliberalism, imperialist policies, and the neocolonial world-system. Thus, there emerged a popular movement across Latin America, the Movement for an Alternative World, proclaiming that "A Better World is Possible."

The Alternative World Movement spawned new political parties that sought to take power away from the traditional political parties that had cooperated with the global powers and transnational corporations in the imposition of the neoliberal project. The new popular parties were able to win presidential and/or parliamentary elections in a number of Latin American nations, including Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Paraguay. In addition, led by the Leftist and progressive governments, Latin America and the Caribbean developed new regional organizations of economic, political, and cultural cooperation, challenging US imperialist policies and seeking to develop alternatives to the structures of neocolonial domination. The charismatic leaders of four of these nations (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) proclaimed that they were seeking to build "Socialism for the Twenty-First Century," and leaders from throughout the region affirmed their admiration for Cuba as a "model of Latin American dignity."

Latin American and Caribbean Unity and Integration

The new political process seeks Latin American and Caribbean union and integration. It seeks to bypass existing exploitative structures of the core–peripheral relation and to replace them, step-by-step, with alternative structures for relations among nations, shaped by complementary and mutually beneficial intraregional commercial and social accords. It is an effort to construct, from below, an alternative world-system.

The new political process is developing in practice an alternative civilizational project, one that draws from various political and cultural horizons. It presents itself as an alternative to the neocolonial world-system in crisis, which places markets above people, seeks military solutions to social conflicts, pays insufficient attention to the ecological needs of the earth, and induces consumerism and cynicism among the people.

The new Latin American political process proclaims the fundamental principles and values that can constitute the foundation of an alternative and more just world-system. These principles and values include the responsibility of states to protect the social and economic rights of all persons, including the rights to a decent standard of living, housing, nutrition, education, and health care; respect for the sovereignty of all nations, even those that are not wealthy or powerful; and the development of forms of production and distribution that are ecologically sustainable. The new political process has arrived to affirm these fundamental values through a synthesis of the perspectives formulated by the movements of the peoples of the world during the last two and one-half centuries: the bourgeois democratic revolutions that proclaimed the rights and the equality of all; the socialist and communist movements that expanded these rights to include social and economic needs as well as the right of workers and peasants to the more participatory structures of popular democracy; the Third World national liberation movements that proclaimed that rights pertain not only to individuals, but also to nations and peoples, and that such rights include self-determination and true sovereignty; movements formed by women that proclaimed the right of women to full and equal participation in the construction of the society; and the movements formed by those who have sought to defend nature and the ecological balance of the earth. These movements have formulated "universal human values," that is, values concerning which there is consensus in all regions of the world, and which various international organizations and commissions, including those of the United Nations, have affirmed.

In accordance with these values, the new political process seeks to develop in practice the commercial, social, and financial relations that are necessary for an alternative, more just and democratic world-system. The first practical steps toward the development of the project of Latin American and Caribbean integration and unity were announced in December 2001, when Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez proposed the formation of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America

(ALBA), as an alternative to the US-proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The ALBA proposal was formalized with the signing of an agreement between Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro on December 14, 2004. On April 29, 2006, Bolivia was incorporated into ALBA with the signing of a joint agreement involving Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia. In 2007, Nicaragua and Ecuador entered ALBA. In 2008, Dominica and Honduras jointed ALBA, but Honduras suspended its participation following the 2009 *coup d'état*. In 2009, Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines became members.

The 2004 Joint Declaration by Cuba and Venezuela presented ALBA as an alternative to FTAA, maintaining that the US proposal no longer was viable, principally because of opposition from Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil. The declaration maintained that integration in Latin America historically "has served as a mechanism for deepening dependency and foreign domination," and it described FTAA as "the most recent expression of the appetite for domination of the region." It proposed an alternative form of integration based on cooperation and solidarity: "Only an integration based on cooperation, solidarity, and the common will to advance together with one accord toward the highest levels of development can satisfy the needs and desires of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, and at the same preserve their independence, sovereignty, and identity." The Joint Declaration proclaimed that ALBA seeks social justice and popular democracy: "ALBA has as its objective the transformation of Latin American societies, making them more just, cultured, participatory, and characterized by solidarity. It therefore is conceived as an integral process that assures the elimination of social inequalities and promotes the quality of life and an effective participation of the peoples in the shaping of their own destiny."

The ALBA declaration maintained that just and sustainable development is one of the principles of ALBA, and this implies an active role of the state. "Commerce and investment ought not be ends in themselves, but instruments for attaining a just and sustainable development, since the true Latin American and Caribbean integration cannot be a blind product of the market, nor simply a strategy to amplify external markets or stimulate commerce. To attain a just and sustainable development, effective participation of the State as regulator and coordinator of economic activity is required." The Ecuadorian economist René Baéz observes:

> A fundamental premise of ALBA is its understanding of integration as a process for improving the conditions of life of the peoples. It has a focus diametrically opposed to that of conventional agreements—like the Association of Free Commerce of Latin America and the Caribbean, the Central American Common Market, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Central American Free Trade Agreement, or Andean Community of Nations at present—that are designed with a cost-benefit logic and, taken by themselves, function in the interests of regional and extra-regional monopoly capital. Among the characteristics of ALBA worth emphasizing are: compensatory commerce, a form of exchange that does not require the expenditure of currency; a setting of the price of goods distinct from the prices determined by the world market; advice and aid in regard to energy; and the providing of services of health and education to the impoverished strata, including third countries (poor strata in the United States are benefiting from these programs) (Báez 2006, 184–185).

ALBA became the basis for the formation in 2008 of the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR), a process led by Brazil, where the Workers' Party led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had taken power in 2002. The Constituent Treaty of UNASUR, signed by all twelve nations of South America, proclaims that "South American integration and union are necessary in order to advance sustainable development and the welfare of our peoples as well as to contribute to the resolution of the problems that still affect the region, such as persistent poverty, exclusion, and social inequality." The Constituent Treaty affirmed a number of economic, social, and ecological objectives: social and human development with equity and inclusion in order to eradicate poverty and to overcome inequalities in the region; the eradication of illiteracy; universal access to quality education; energy integration in order to utilize in solidarity the resources of the region; the development of an infrastructure for the interconnection of the region; the protection of biodiversity, water resources, and ecosystems; cooperation in the prevention of catastrophes and in the struggle against the causes and the effects of climate change; universal access to social security and to services of health; and citizen participation through mechanisms of dialogue between UNASUR and diverse social actors.

The process of Latin American unity and integration culminated in the formation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2010, consisting of the governments of the 33 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. On January 29, 2014, at

its Second Summit held in Havana, CELAC issued a declaration, affirming its fundamental goals, concepts, and values. The Declaration affirms the commitment of the 33 governments to continue the process of Latin American integration, to expand intraregional commerce, and to develop the infrastructure necessary for expanding integration. It affirms a form of integration based on complementariness, solidarity, and cooperation. It promotes "a vision of integral and inclusive development that ensures sustainable and productive development, in harmony with nature."

The 2014 Declaration of Havana endorses the protection of the social and economic rights of all. It affirms food and nutritional security, literacy, free universal education, universal public health, and the right to adequate housing. It advocates giving priority to "persons living in extreme poverty and vulnerable sectors such as the indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, women, children, the disabled, the elderly, youth, and migrants." It calls upon the nations of the world to seek to overcome inequality and to establish a more equitable distribution of wealth. It calls for the eradication of poverty and hunger. And the Declaration affirms the principle of the right of nations to control their natural resources: We "reiterate our commitment with the principle of the sovereign right of States to make best use of their natural resources, and manage and regulate them. Likewise, [we] express the right of our peoples to exploit, in a sustainable manner, their natural resources which can be used as an important source to finance economic development, social justice, and the welfare of our peoples."

The Declaration affirms "a more ethical relation between Humanity and Earth," giving special attention to the issue of climate change.

> Convinced that climate change is one of the most serious problems of our times, [we] express our deep concern about its increasing adverse impact on small island countries in particular, and on developing countries as a whole, hindering their efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development. In this regard, and in the context of the principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, we recognize that the global nature of climate change requires the cooperation of all countries and their involvement in an effective and adequate global response, in accordance with the historical responsibility of each country, to accelerate the reduction of world emissions of greenhouse gases and the implementation of adaptation measures pursuant to the provisions and principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

With respect to indigenous rights, the Declaration recognizes that "indigenous peoples and local communities play a significant role in economic, social and environmental development." It affirms "the importance of traditional sustainable agricultural practices, associated with biodiversity and the exploitation of their resources," and "their traditional systems of land tenure, seed supply systems and access to financing and markets." It recognizes "the essential role of the collective action of indigenous peoples and local populations in the preservation and sustainable use of biological diversity as a significant contribution to the planet." It reiterates "the need to take steps to protect the patents on traditional and ancestral knowledge of indigenous and tribal peoples and local communities to prevent violation by third parties by registrations that ignore their ownership, and to promote their fair and equitable share of the benefits derived from their use."

The Declaration recognizes the urgent need for a "new Development Agenda" that "should reinforce the commitment of the international community to place people at the center of its concerns, promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth, social participative development, and protection of the environment." Accordingly, the Declaration proclaims that foreign investment should promote the development of the region, and it rejects the establishment of conditions for investment that violate the sovereignty of nations. We "express our conviction regarding the relevance of direct foreign investment flows in our region and the need for them to contribute in an effective manner to the development of our countries and translate into greater wellbeing for our societies, without conditionalities being imposed and with respect for their sovereignty, in keeping with their national development plans and programs."

The Declaration supports the Islamic Republic of Iran, without mentioning it by name, for it affirms the right of all nations, without exception, to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Similarly, the Declaration expresses the solidarity of Latin American and Caribbean governments with Cuba. We "reiterate our strongest rejection of the implementation of unilateral coercive measures and once again reiterate our solidarity with the Republic of Cuba, while reaffirming our call upon the Government of the United States of America to put an end to the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed on this sisterly nation for more than five decades." In addition, the Declaration welcomes the continuation of the development of relations between CELAC and China, Russia, and the European Union.

The Declaration of Havana demonstrates the total collapse of the Pan-American project. It constitutes a rejection by the 33 governments of Latin America and the Caribbean of US-directed integration of the region and of the objectives and strategies that defined US-directed integration. The Declaration mentions directly the USA only to condemn its policies in relation to Cuba. It obliquely criticizes the USA when it invokes the principle of differentiated responsibility and calls upon the nations that are most responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases to accelerate efforts to control them. And it adopts positions that are in opposition to US policies: in calling for respect for the patents and knowledge of indigenous peoples; in taking a perspective on development that places the human needs at the center; in insisting that investments be free of conditions; and in affirming the right of all nations to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The Renewal of South–South Cooperation

As we have seen, South–South cooperation was a central proposal of the Third World project of national and social liberation of 1948 to 1979. It was believed that by trading among themselves, the nations of the Third World would be able to break the neocolonial relation with the USA and the European ex-colonial powers. With the intention of promoting South–South cooperation, seventy-seven nations created the Group of 77 in 1964. However, the vision encountered many obstacles: inadequate capital to develop industry, necessary for providing manufactured goods to the nations of the South; a distorted transportation infrastructure, which had been developed by colonial powers to serve North–South commerce; and the hostility of the global powers, which used all necessary means to preserve their structured advantages in the world-system. The modest gains that were made with respect to South–South cooperation were eliminated with the imposition of the neoliberal project on the Third World by the global powers.

Today, however, in conjunction with the emergence of the project of Latin American and Caribbean union and integration, South–South cooperation has been retaken. The concept has been given impetus by Chinese foreign policy in recent years. China recognizes that economic ascent through domination in the form of the classical empires or in the style of modern European colonial domination is no longer a viable option for humanity; and that a Chinese quest for ascent in such a form would create

military and ideological confrontation with the USA and the European powers. Accordingly, China has turned to a policy of seeking mutually beneficial commercial relations with the nations of the Third World, on a foundation of cooperation rather than domination and exploitation, thus sidestepping global structures by creating alternative norms and institutions. The significant increase of Chinese commerce with Latin America is an indication of the new direction in Chinese policy.

The formation of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in 2009 also has stimulated the renewal of South–South cooperation. The five nations of BRICS have never been in the core of the world-system, nor have they ever been among its most impoverished nations. They have different histories, but they have in common the fact that they are at the upper levels of the semiperipheral region of the world-economy. The nations of BRICS have the highest levels of industry and technology among the semiperipheral nations. They comprise 41.6% of the world's population, 19.8% of the world GDP, and 16.9% of world commerce. In recent years, their economies have been growing at a much faster rate than the economies of the most developed nations. BRICS was formed for the purpose of developing mutually beneficial trade among its five members. And in 2014, under Chinese leadership, BRICS expanded its mission to include the development of mutually beneficial commerce with the other nations of the South. As an indication of this, it has formed the BRICS Bank of Development, with the intention of providing funds for investment in the nations of the Third World, in projects that are integral to autonomous national development, without the inevitable distortions that are components of interested investments by core governments and banks and core-controlled international organizations.

The importance of South–South cooperation was reiterated on January 8, 2014, by Bolivian President Evo Morales, in his capacity as President of the G-77 plus China, which now consists of 133 member nations. South–South cooperation also was reaffirmed by Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, in his speech accepting the Presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on January 29, 2015, and in his speech in assuming the presidency of the G-77 plus China on January 13, 2017. And at the VII BRICS Summit, held in Ufa, Russia, on July 9, 2015, BRICS reaffirmed its commitment to promoting an international order based on "mutually beneficial cooperation" among nations. It affirmed the principle of South–South

cooperation along with North–South cooperation: "We are committed to further strengthening and supporting South–South cooperation, while stressing that South–South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to North–South cooperation, which remains the main channel of international development cooperation." It expressed its "intention to contribute to safeguarding a fair and equitable international order."

The Spirit of Bandung Lives

We have seen that the Third World project of national and social liberation of the period 1948 to 1979 was formulated by Third World governments for the purpose of transforming neocolonial global structures and creating a new international economic order that would: respect the sovereignty of all nations; recognize the right of nations to control their natural resources; accept the right of states to nationalize properties; advance the industrial development of the underdeveloped nations; promote mutually beneficial trade among nations; regulate international financial flows; and reduce military expenditures. It was formulated by the giants of the anti-colonial struggles, who met in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, inspiring the peoples of the world with the "Spirit of Bandung." And we have seen that the Third World project confronted many obstacles, especially the unprincipled opposition of the global powers, who used any and all methods in support of accommodationist Third World leaders, in order to prevent the implementation of the radical Third World project. As a dimension of this, Third World accommodationists were able to take control of the Non-Align Movement in 1982, in spite of the powerful denunciation by Fidel. Ultimately, the modest attainments with respect to the social and economic development of the Third World were eliminated during the implementation of neoliberal project of the global powers. The global powers set aside Third World hopes, and the IMF assassinated the national liberation states of the Third World.

However, influenced by the rising global popular movement in opposition to neoliberalism, the Non-Aligned Movement began to retake its historic radical Third World project, beginning in 2000, with the presidencies of South Africa and Malaysia, when its summits issued declarations critically analyzing neoliberal economic policies and rejecting the

"right of humanitarian intervention" (Chomsky 2003, 24). The return was clear by 2006, when Cuba assumed the presidency for the second time. The Non-Aligned Movement's 2006 Declaration of Havana, endorsed unanimously by the 118 member nations, called for a "more just and equal world order," and it lamented "the excessive influence of the rich and powerful nations in the determination of the nature and the direction of international relations." It rejected the neoliberal project as promoting global inequality and "increasing the marginalization of countries in development." It affirmed the principles of the UN Charter, including the equality and sovereignty of nations, the non-intervention in the affairs of other states, and "the free determination of the peoples in their struggle against foreign intervention." It proclaimed that "each country has the sovereign right to determine its own priorities and strategies for development." It called for the strengthening and democratic reform of the United Nations, and it proposed South–South cooperation as a complement to North–South cooperation. It rejected the politicization of the issue of human rights, and the double standard used by the global powers, as a pretext for intervening in the affairs of a nation of the Non-Aligned Movement. It proclaimed its support for the peoples of Palestine, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Iran in their conflicts with the global powers.

Since 2006, the Non-Aligned Movement has maintained its rejection of the established world order, consistent with its founding principles formulated in Bandung in 1955 and Belgrade in 1961. This was evident at the Seventeenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held from September 13 to September 18, 2016, in Isla de Margarita, Venezuela, where Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, gave the gavel of the presidency to Nicolás Maduro, President of Venezuela, which holds the presidency until 2019. The Declaration of the Seventeenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, endorsed by its 120 member nations, affirms the historic principles of the movement, including its call to the peoples of the Third World to struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism and to participate in the construction of a more just and peaceful world, established on a foundation of solidarity and cooperation. It reaffirms the historic commitment of the Movement to the principles of the sovereignty and equality of nations and the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination. It affirms "the right to development as an inalienable, fundamental and universal right."

The 2016 Declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement maintains that states should not interfere in the affairs of other nations, and accordingly, it rejects "the illegal policies of regime change aimed at overthrowing constitutional Governments, in contravention of international law." It condemns unilateral sanctions and universal coercive measures as violations of the UN Charter and international law and of the principles of non-intervention and the self-determination and independence of nations. It maintains that each state has the right to exercise freely its full sovereignty over its natural resources and economic activity. The Declaration recognizes South–South cooperation as an important strategy for sustainable development, as a complement to North–South cooperation, which should be oriented to technology transfer and the promotion of productive capacity. It recognizes that the implementation of these principles would require "a profound change in the international economic structure, including the creation of economic and social conditions that are favorable to countries in development."

The Declaration calls for the democratization of the United Nations, including the strengthening of the authority of the General Assembly and a reform of the Security Council. It calls for reform of the international financial architecture and the democratization of the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, the Declaration calls for the development of an alternative media of communication that is rooted in the history and cultures of the peoples of the world. It calls upon the mass media of the countries of the North to respect the perspective of the South. It rejects the use of the media as an instrument of hostile propaganda against targeted countries of the South, with the intention of undermining their governments. In addition, the Declaration calls upon the developed countries to fulfill their responsibilities with respect to the threat of climate change. It also affirms the principles of "full gender equality and the empowerment of women," and it asserts its commitment to "fight against all forms of violence and discrimination against women and girls."

These affirmations express the historic fundamental principles and goals of the Non-Aligned Movement. As it did in the period 1955 to 1979, the Non-Aligned Movement today is formulating the basic principles of an alternative international order. In the 1970s, it called for a "New International Economic Order"; today, a "more just, democratic and sustainable world" is envisioned. Then, as now, the Movement

calls for an alternative and more just world-system, and it condemns the global powers for policies that violate the international norms that they themselves have proclaimed. Representing peoples who have been victimized by colonial and neocolonial domination, the leading governments in the Non-Aligned Movement speak with moral authority in defense of their nations and peoples and in opposition to the structures of a world-system that continues to exist on a colonial foundation. They call for its structural transformation, in accordance with the values that humanity has proclaimed.

Unlike the 1970s, the Third World today not only announces its project, but also is taking concrete steps toward its implementation. Today, a number of nations (including China, Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) have proclaimed themselves to be constructing socialism. These nations, in addition to domestic social transformations, have developed foreign policies that are dedicated to the principles of South–South cooperation and mutually beneficial relations, as a necessary foundation for a sustainable world-system. In addition, the largest economies of the semiperiphery, the nations of BRICS, have organized themselves to expand South–South cooperation among themselves and with other nations of the South. And the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) has been formed with a commitment to solidarity and mutually beneficial trade. In the 1970s, the more radical nations of the Third World proclaimed the need for a new international order; today, concrete steps are being taken in practice, with the proclaimed support of the 120 governments of the Non-Aligned Movement. The construction of a more just, democratic and sustainable world-system by the formerly colonized peoples of the world has begun.

Moreover, the Third World is beginning to construct an alternative world-system precisely in the historic moment when the world-system is experiencing a profound structural crisis, and heads of core governments and transnational corporations are demonstrating their moral and intellectual incapacity to understand the sources of the crisis or the steps that are necessary to protect humanity. The incapacity of the world-system to understand and resolve its systemic crisis gives increasingly greater legitimacy and viability to the alternative being developed in theory and practice by the peoples of the Third World.

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CHAPTER 8

Socialism for the Twenty-First Century

As we have seen, there has been since 1994 a renewal of the Third World project of national and social liberation. It has been characterized by the retaking of the revolutionary Third World agenda by the Non-Aligned Movement, which now has 120 member governments. And it has been characterized by the effort to put the concept of South–South cooperation into practice, through the formation of ALBA, CELAC, and BRICS. And this alternative movement from below is occurring in the historic moment when the neocolonial world-system has entered a sustained structural crisis, demonstrating its unsustainability and making more manifest its fundamentally undemocratic character. As these dynamics have unfolded, the peoples in movement of the Third World have repeatedly put forth the slogan of a just, democratic and sustainable world-system.

A just world-system The ethical concept of a just society has ancient religious roots. In the earliest sacred texts of Ancient Israel, we find a concept of a God who acts in history to liberate the people from oppression and to defend justice for the oppressed. Later, as Israel evolved to a nation, the prophets of Israel denounced economic injustices as well as the luxury in which kings lived while people were living in poverty. The prophets condemned the lust for economic power, and they declared economic inequality and social injustice to be sins. They defended poor farmers who suffered at the hands of powerful landlords. They called for a change in lifestyle and for social justice. And they proclaimed that history is not governed by powerful empires but by God. Subsequently, the religious

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traditions of Israel influenced the development of Christianity and Islam, and the concept of the ethical responsibility of the faithful to construct a just society became central to liberation theology in both religious traditions. Today, the peoples of the world, influenced directly and indirectly by these religious traditions, have appropriated the ethical principle of social justice, and they are demanding a *just world-system* (Anderson 1986; Ansary 2009; Brown 1984, 1993; Gutierrez 1973, 1983; Schulze 2000).

A democratic world-system The bourgeois revolutions of the late eighteenth century established the principle of a society in which all citizens are equal and have inalienable rights. But at first, the rights were confined to political and civil rights for white men with property or education. For the next two hundred years, social movements emerged that would attain respect for citizenship rights of all persons, regardless of class, race, ethnicity, or gender. And the popular movements would deepen the concept of democracy to include social and economic rights, such as the right to a decent standard of living, education, and health care. When the anti-colonial and anti-neocolonial movements of national liberation emerged in the Third World, they proclaimed that nations have rights, such as the rights to sovereignty, equal participation in the community of nations, self-determination, and development. Today, when the peoples of the Third World today demand a democratic world-system, they have in mind a concept of democracy in this expanded and deeper sense that includes social and economic rights as well as the rights of all nations to self-determination. They seek true independence, so that they can put into practice the most fundamental of all human rights, the right to development, in order to protect the right of the people to a decent standard of living.

A sustainable world-system Historical world-systems have risen and fallen. The great majority of them were not sustainable, many because of their gluttonous imperial centers, and others because of ecological factors. In the world-system today, ecological contradictions and political conflicts constitute the greatest threats to the stability and sustainability of the world-system. The peoples of the world today proclaim that the world-system must have a harmonious relation with the natural environment, and it must develop in accordance with the ethical norms of cooperation among nations and solidarity among peoples.

The Argentinian sociologist and political scientist Atilio Borón maintains that Latin American nations are unable to overcome the legacies

of colonialism and underdevelopment and to contribute to the development of a more just, democratic and sustainable world-system within the structures of capitalism. For this reason, one must look for an alternative not capitalist, in the field of socialism (2016, 78–79). In accordance with this insight, in 2005, in a context in which the word "socialism" had disappeared from public discourse, Hugo Chávez proclaimed "socialism for the twenty-first century," thus stimulating much reflection (Borón 2016, 148–149). In the new political reality that has emerged in Latin America, four nations have declared themselves to be seeking to construct socialism for the twenty-first century: Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. In this chapter, in order to complete the picture of the post-1994 renewal of the Third World project of national and social liberation, we briefly review the development of socialism in these four nations.

The Chavist Revolution in Venezuela

As we have seen, world-system structures, forged by the European colonial powers from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, are characterized by the exportation of raw materials from peripheral and semiperipheral zones. In the case of Venezuela, petroleum emerged as the principal raw material export during the period 1917–1960. The petroleum companies were foreign owned and largely unregulated. As the result, the Venezuelan state received little income from petroleum, and the benefits to the economy and the people of Venezuela were minimal.

A popular movement emerged to demand greater national control of the petroleum industry. After 1960, this became the prominent popular demand, such that the period of the 1960s and 1970s is known as the era of "petroleum nationalism," in which the people were demanding that the state maximize its income from the exportation of petroleum. As a result, the management of the companies became increasingly Venezuelan, as the foreign companies sought to ensure political stability, such that the companies were under Venezuelan management by the 1970s. This process culminated in the nationalization of the petroleum industry and the formation of a state-owned petroleum company (*Petróleos de Venezuela, Sociedad Anónima*, or PDVSA) in 1976.

However, inasmuch as the Venezuelan managers previously had been socialized into the norms and values of the international petroleum

companies, the transition to Venezuelan state ownership had little effect on the dynamics of the industry. PDVSA adapted itself to the neocolonial world-system, exploiting petroleum in accordance with the norms and interests of the international petroleum industry. Like the foreign-owned oil companies in other neocolonized countries, PDVSA sought to reduce payments to the Venezuelan state. Accordingly, PDVSA adopted a strategy of channeling surpluses to investments in production and sales, including the purchase of refineries and distributorships in other countries. By transferring surpluses out of the country, thus PDVSA evaded payments to the Venezuelan state. In 1989, with the turn to neoliberalism, the government of Venezuela greatly reduced its regulation of foreign investment in all branches of commerce, industry, and finances. With respect to the oil industry, PDVSA was given responsibility for supervising the "opening" of the country to foreign investment. Under PDVSA supervision, many international petroleum companies formed joined ventures, with terms highly favorable to the foreign companies. PDVSA, therefore, had emerged as a state within the state, with significant autonomy and with limited control by the state, and without any effort to develop the petroleum industry in a form that was integrated with a project for national development.

During the 1990s, popular rejection of the neoliberal project emerged, as a consequence of its concrete negative consequences for the people. There emerged popular disgust with the political and economic elite for its collaboration with the global powers in the imposition of the neoliberal project, and with the failure of the nationalization of the petroleum industry to promote national economic development. In this context, Hugo Chávez emerged as a charismatic leader with the capacity to describe the global and national structures of domination in understandable terms, and who was able to project an alternative political reality. He possessed the capacity to forge that consensual reflection and united action necessary for a social transformation in defense of popular interests and needs. He emerged as the central leader in the forging of a new political reality in Venezuela and in Latin America.

Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was born in Sabaneta, a rural village of Venezuela, on July 28, 1954. Chávez describes his family as a poor peasant family. His father was a school teacher who earned his teaching diploma by studying part-time. Although his mother and father lived nearby, he was principally reared by his grandmother, a peasant woman who was half indigenous. He describes himself as a mixture of indigenous, African, and European. In 1971, at the age of 17, Chávez entered the Military Academy

of Venezuela, and he earned a commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1975. His study during his years in the military academy established the foundation for his revolutionary formation. He read the writings of Simón Bolívar, Mao Zedong, and Che Guevara, and he developed a perspective that he describes as a synthesis of Bolivarianism and Maoism. He investigated these themes further in a master´s program in political science at Simón Bolívar University. He continuously read books of historical, political, social, and literary significance during his military and political careers (Guevara 2005, 14–15, 71–72, 76–79; Chávez 2006, 104).

During the 1970s and 1980s, Chávez had considerable success leading young officers in the forming of a reform movement within the military. On February 4, 1992, with the participation of approximately 100 fellow officers, he directed an attempted *coup d´état*, with the intention of overthrowing the government and convening a constitutional assembly. The *coup* failed, and he was imprisoned. Upon his release in 1994, he resigned from the military and formed the Bolivarian Fifth Republic Movement, again with the intention of convening a constitutional assembly, but now seeking to attain power through the electoral process. He was elected President of Venezuela in 1998, and he assumed the presidency on February 2, 1999. He immediately issued a decree convoking a Constitutional Assembly. Elections for a new constitution were held, and a new Constitution was approved, establishing the Fifth Republic. He was elected to two six-year terms as president under the new Constitution. He died of cancer in 2013, before completing his second term (Guevara 2005, 9–39).

Hugo Chávez understood that the underdevelopment of the peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia is a consequence of colonial domination (Chávez 2006, 132). He understood the negative effects of neoliberalism, which he condemned in moral terms. He castigated the subservient behavior of Latin American elites before US imperialist intentions:

> How much damage was done to the peoples of Latin America by the initiative of the Americas, neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus, and the well-known package of measures of the International Monetary Fund. And in this continent nearly all the governments were kneeling, one must say it in this way, the elites of the peoples were kneeling undignified, or better said not the elites of the peoples but the elites of the republics, were kneeling before the empire, and in this manner the privatization orgy began like a macabre wave in these lands, the selling of very many state companies. (Chávez 2006, 263–264)

Chávez believed that US imperialist policies are a threat to the survival of the human species, and that the peoples in movement must prevent this from happening (Chávez 2006, 346–347).

Chávez promoted a concept of autonomous economic development that he described as "a model of endogenous development that is not imposed on us by anyone, neither the Creole elite nor the imperialist elite, our own economic development" (Chávez 2006, 319). This model seeks to develop national production, giving emphasis to the development of energy, agriculture, and basic industry, and providing support for small and medium producers. Endogenous development is rooted in the cultures and traditions of the peoples, particularly the indigenous peoples, and it has to be developed with a consciousness of history. The study of history often has been only partially developed in the educational systems of neocolonial republics, and historical consciousness also has been undermined by the ideologies of the empire. Chávez maintained that history must be rediscovered.

Chávez believed that humanity stands at a critical time in world history. "The capitalist model, the developmentalist model, the consumerist model, which the North has imposed on the world, is putting an end to the planet Earth." We can observe such phenomena as global warming, the opening of the ozone layer, an increasing intensity of hurricanes, the melting of the ice caps, and the rising of the seas. Moreover, in the social sphere, rather than accepting their superexploitation and social exclusion, the peoples of the world are increasingly in rebellion. Humanity is approaching a critical point, in which "in the first five decades of the twenty-first century it will be decided if in the future there will be life on this planet or if their will not be life." It is a question, he believed, of "socialism or barbarism," citing Rosa Luxemburg (Chávez 2006, 195, 256).

At this critical and decisive moment in human history, Chávez possessed that hope in the future of humanity that is the hallmark of the revolutionary. He believed that "the great day of liberty, equality, and justice is arriving." This is exemplified, he believed, by the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, which is constructing a "socialism of the twenty-first century" that will not be the same as the socialisms of the twentieth century. It will be "a socialism renewed for the new era, for the twenty-first century.… It will not have only one road; it will have many roads. It will not have one model; there will be many variants of socialism. It will have to adapt to the circumstances of each country, of each region. … Socialism for Latin America cannot be a replica, it has to be a

great and heroic creation, a heroic construction of our peoples" (Chávez 2006, 193, 198).

The central proposal of Chávez's Bolivarian Fifth Republic Movement was the establishment of a constitutional assembly to bring to an end the Fourth Republic of Venezuela, which was adapted to neocolonial domination and to rule by a Venezuelan elite. When Chávez assumed the presidency on February 2, 1999, one of his first acts was to sign a decree calling for a constitutional referendum. The opposition sought to annul the decree through challenges to the Supreme Court, but the referendum was held, a Constitutional Assembly was elected, and a new Constitution was developed and approved. The new Constitution establishes structures favoring participatory democracy, and it protects state enterprises from privatization. In 2000, Chávez was elected under the new Constitution to a six-year term from 2001 to 2007. In 2006, he was elected (with nearly 63% of the vote) to a second term from 2007 to 2013, serving until his death in 2013.

The government of Hugo Chávez sought to reduce the autonomy of PDVSA and to incorporate its resources into a project of national development. The Chávez government appointed new directors of PDVSA, replacing the directors appointed by previous governments. With the new leadership of PDVSA, the state income from petroleum increased significantly, and the new funds were directed toward various social projects in education, health, and housing as well as to wage increases, financial assistance to those in need, and the elimination of foreign debt. Most of the social projects are designated as "missions."

A literacy program, Mission Robinson, was developed with Cuban support. Named for Simón "Robinson" Rodríguez, who was Simón Bolívar's teacher, it taught one million people to read in 2003. Other missions in education emerged: Mission Ribas, named after independence hero José Felix Ribas, is a program for the completion of high school; Mission Sucre, named after Antonio José Sucre, one of the heroes of the Latin American revolution of 1810–1824, is a scholarship program for university education; and Mission Vuelvan Caras provides opportunity for vocational training. Mission Barrio Adentro is a medical mission that is financed by the Venezuelan state and relies upon the participation of 20,000 Cuban doctors, providing health care services in the poorest regions and neighborhoods of Venezuela. In 2004, Mission Barrio Adentro attended 50 million cases, providing free health care services and medicine (Chávez 2006, 50–54, 110–111, 141, 241–242).

The Chávez government sought to institutionalize the process of the popular participation that had been emerging during the 1980s and 1990s. The government initiated the development of structures of popular democracy that include community councils, workers' councils, student councils, and councils formed by small farmers, which are incorporated into confederations of local, regional, and national councils. Chávez envisioned the gradual integration of popular councils into the state, "progressively transforming the bourgeois state into an alternative state, socialist and Bolivarian" (Chávez 2006, 317, 325–327). However, the structures of popular participation have been developed only partially in practice.

The government of Chávez played a leadership role in forging the unity and integration of Latin America and the Caribbean as well as South–South cooperation, discussed in Chap. 7. Chávez is widely recognized in the Third World as the leading force in the development of a new reality in Latin America, independent of US neocolonial and imperialist intentions.

When Chávez became ill with cancer, he called upon the Bolivarian Movement to name Nicolás Maduro as his successor. Initially serving as interim president, Maduro was elected president for a full term in 2013, in accordance with the 1999 Constitution. Maduro is a former bus driver who received his formation in political, historical and ethical consciousness through union leadership. During the neoliberal era, he was a candidate of the old Socialist Party for president. He later became a leading member of the Bolivarian Fifth Republic Movement of Chávez. He was minister for foreign affairs of the Chávez government, and he attained a level of international recognition for his elegant discourses in defense of the Bolivarian Revolution in various international fora. He is the first worker president in the history of Venezuela, and he is the first president who is Chavist, that is, an activist in the Bolivarian Revolution led by Hugo Chávez.

As a popular revolutionary project that seeks to attain the true sovereignty of the nation and to develop its own endogenous project of national development, the Chavist Bolivarian Revolution is a threat to the neocolonial world-system. The neocolonial world-system requires and demands the subordination of the governments of the world to the neocolonial structures and the interests of the global powers. Since the emergence of the revolution in Venezuela, the US government has sought to undermine it through the support of those sectors in

Venezuela that have interests in opposition to the revolutionary project, sectors that in one way or another benefit from the neocolonial world order. These sectors include: the technocratic elite that managed the petroleum industry prior to 1998; the business elite, owners of import–export companies; leaders of the union of petroleum workers, who occupied a privileged position relative to the majority of workers; the landed estate bourgeoisie, historic beneficiaries of the core–peripheral relation; and the traditional political parties, junior partners in the imposition of neocolonial structures and in the implementation of neoliberal policies. These opposition sectors control the private media of communication, and they can count on international financial support and the active engagement of the US embassy.

During the period of the Chávez presidency from 1998 to 2013, the opposition generated much conflict, but the Chavist forces prevailed. However, with the death of Chávez in 2013, the opposition escalated its tactics, seeking to destabilize the government of Nicolás Maduro. In February 2014, fascist gangs were organized to attack citizens and property, and the international media falsely presented the violent groups as peaceful student protestors. There were calls for US intervention. But Maduro weathered the storm. The government arrested and prosecuted, in accordance with the law and the constitution, thirteen persons. And it proposed dialogue with the moderate opposition, with the promise of attending to any legitimate demand or grievance. Thus, the government was able to prevail in the first stage of the conflict by isolating the violent extreme Right.

The Venezuelan economy, however, is overly dependent on oil income, and it imports many necessities, such as food and medicine. The government of Chávez gave emphasis to taking control of the oil industry, channeling oil revenues to social missions, and developing a foreign policy of cooperation and unity with Latin America and the Caribbean, offering favorable terms of oil purchases as a dimension of the policy. The diversification of the economy and increasing national production were long-term goals, but they have not yet been achieved, and the national economy remains overly dependent on oil and on the importation of necessary goods. In 2014, there was a sharp decline in oil prices. Seeking to take advantage of this situation to promote destabilization, Venezuelan import–export companies, which form an important part of the opposition, ceased with their importation and sale of necessary goods, thus producing shortages and inflation. In addition to this

economic war, violent gangs were organized. The international news media began to portray Venezuela as a country in crisis and civil disorder.

Most people think in concrete terms about the problems they confront, and not with a political, economic, and historical perspective. When problems such as shortages and high prices occur, most people blame the government, and they do not necessarily have a clear understanding of the sources of the problem. In the case of Venezuela, the opposition created a problematic situation for the people through its economic war, and then it sought to take advantage of this situation, blaming the government for it. Many people did not have sufficient political consciousness to reject the opportunistic opposition for its treasonous behavior in defense of its particular interests and in defense of foreign interests. As a result of these dynamics, the Bolivarian Revolution lost the parliamentary elections of December 2015. Political parties of the opposition had formed a coalition, the Table for Democratic Unity (MUD). With MUD parliamentary candidates speaking in vague terms in favor of change, the opposition coalition took a majority of the seats, although the party of Chávez remains the largest single political party.

But MUD did not arrive to a parliamentary majority with a political platform. It envisions a return to the neoliberal past, a vision not expressed to the people in the parliamentary campaigns. If MUD were to propose neoliberal policies, it would risk popular rejection. So the strategy of the parliamentary opposition has been to seek to remove Maduro from office prior to the completion of his term, and to destabilize the constitutional process, hoping to provoke US intervention. The government of Maduro has responded with calls for respect for the constitutional process, maintaining that the parliamentary majority ought to recognize the constitutional limits of its authority and respect the authority of the executive and judicial branches and the counsel on elections. With respect to the economic war, the government has attempted to supply necessary goods at lower prices in state stores, but the process is complicated by the phenomenon of opportunistic individuals purchasing goods and reselling at higher prices. In addition, the government has intensified and expanded its efforts in the diversification of the economy, the expansion of national production, and the further development of popular councils.

The government calls for dialogue with the opposition, and some conversations have taken place. In a situation in which the opposition has a majority in the parliament and the Chavist Revolution has control

of the executive branch of the government, the judiciary, the electoral commission, and the military, an important theme of dialogue for the government is the safeguarding of the constitutional authority of each of the powers. Another important theme for the government is the economy, which confronts serious problems as a result of the economic war by the opposition. The government insists on the principal of the sovereignty of the nation as the only legitimate frame for discussion; it rejects efforts by the opposition to employ lobbyists that satanize the Chavist government in the countries of the North and in the international media, seeking to establish pretexts for foreign intervention. A theme of importance to the opposition is the so-called political prisoners, which the government insists are persons that have been found guilty in judicial processes of acts of violence, inciting violence, and/or corruption. The opposition has demonstrated divided and half-hearted commitment to dialogue with the government.

The loss of a parliamentary majority by the Chavist Revolution is a significant setback. It is to be expected that the unfolding global popular revolution will have its setbacks. The forces opposed to its agenda are powerful, inasmuch as they include the governments of the most powerful nations as well as the largest international corporations, which control the international media of communication, and they include those sectors of the national bourgeoisie connected to international capital. Moreover, the transformation of the established structures of the world-system, which promote the underdevelopment of the majority, confronts many obstacles.

The Movement Toward Socialism in Bolivia

Bolivia, a landlocked country in the mountains, historically has been the poorest country in South America. It is the most indigenous country in Latin America, with 61% of the population identifying themselves as pertaining to one of the several original nations of the region. In accordance with the norms and patterns in the development of the modern world-system, Bolivia has played a peripheral role in the world-economy, supplying raw materials for the core nations on a foundation of cheap labor. Systems of forced labor were imposed following Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, which included the indigenous nations of present-day Bolivia. During the course of time, first silver, then tin, and then natural gas and petroleum were extracted and exported to the industrializing economies

of the North. From the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, Bolivia's peripheral role existed alongside autonomous indigenous communities, which were agricultural societies with communal forms of land ownership. As the world-economy expanded, it increasingly consumed indigenous land and autonomy, such that by 1930, the indigenous lands comprised only one-third of national territory, and the number of landless peasants exceeded the number of persons living in indigenous communities.

Bolivian mine workers, peasants, and factory workers formed a popular movement during the twentieth century, resulting in a government committed to the developmentalist project from 1930 to 1985. As was the case generally in Latin America, the project was forged through an alliance between the popular sectors and the national bourgeoisie. It attained some concessions to popular demands and some protection of national industry, protections that did not, however, threaten the interests of foreign corporations. However, beginning in 1985, the imposition of the neoliberal project in Bolivia resulted in the elimination of the modest protective measures for the people and for national industry that had been put in place. In the 1990s, mass mobilizations emerged, protesting specific measures that were part of the neoliberal package. From 2000 to 2006, the popular movement intensified, with mass mobilizations, road blockings, general strikes, work stoppages, and hunger strikes, culminating in the resignation of the president in 2005 in the midst of a generalized chaos.

As the renewed popular movement unfolded in the period 1990–2005, new political parties were formed, and they were effective in undermining popular support for the traditional political parties that had cooperated with the imposition of the neoliberal project. One of the parties was the Movement toward Socialism (MAS), a federation of social movement organizations and unions, founded in 1995. Its principal leader was Evo Morales, an indigenous coca farmer who had been born and raised in a poor town in the Bolivian high plains and who emerged as a leader in the coca farmers' union. Proposing a constitutional assembly and the nationalization of the natural gas and petroleum companies, Morales won the presidential elections of December 18, 2005.

The government of Evo Morales sought to put into practice an alternative economic model based on control of the natural resources of the nation and the establishment of national sovereignty. Seeking to break the core–peripheral relation, it followed a vision of an autonomous development that responds to the demands of the popular movement,

which includes indigenous organizations, peasant organizations, unions of workers in the petroleum and gas industries, professionals, and small- and medium-sized businesses. In accordance with his campaign promise and a fundamental popular demand, Morales convoked a Constitutional Assembly, which assembled to begin the formulation of a new Constitution on August 6, 2006. Although confronting various maneuvers by the opposition, the new Constitution was approved by popular referendum on January 25, 2009, with 61.4% of the vote.

The 2009 Constitution recognizes the autonomy of the indigenous communities, and thus it establishes the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Constitution establishes a maximum extension of land of 5000 hectares for personal property; it guarantees access to health services, education, employment, and potable water as constitutional rights; and it prohibits the establishment of a foreign military base in the country. In addition to establishing an alternative constitutional foundation, the government of Evo Morales renegotiated contracts with natural gas and petroleum companies, resulting in a great increase in state revenues, which are used to develop a variety of social programs, including programs in literacy and credit for small farmers. The Morales government has initiated a land-reform program, beginning with the appropriation of land that was unproductive or that was fraudulently obtained, a common practice during the era of the neoliberal governments. And Bolivia became the third member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), joining Venezuela and Cuba.

By 2007, a counterrevolution had taken shape, formed by the owners of the large estates, large-scale businesspersons, leaders of the traditional political parties that benefitted from the previous political-economic order, and transnational corporations. The US government has provided financial support to the counterrevolution. But Morales and MAS have been able to maintain political control. In 2009, Evo Morales was reelected president of Bolivia with 64.22% of the popular vote. MAS won a majority in the National Assembly, including a two-thirds majority in the Senate. MAS won control of six of the nine departments of the country and 228 of the 337 municipalities.

Along with Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo Morales has emerged as one of the charismatic leaders in the new political reality that has been forged in Latin America, which has challenged not only the neoliberal project but also the structures of the neocolonial world-system. Reflecting this reality, Bolivia served in 2014 as

the President of the G-77 plus China, and Morales led an anniversary commemoration in which the presidents adopted a declaration, "Toward a New World Order for Living Well." The declaration is an indication of the international leadership of Evo Morales, and it echoes historic declarations of Third World charismatic leaders before international fora during the period 1948–1983.

Correa and the Citizen Revolution in Ecuador

A popular movement in Ecuador in opposition to neoliberal policies emerged in the late 1990s. By 2005, the movement arrived to express widespread popular disgust with the established political class and the traditional political parties. Popular mobilizations were demanding the dismissal of the President, the Supreme Court, and all the politicians. Opposed to the structural adjustment policies that required cutbacks in education, public health, and social security in order to make payments on the external debt, the popular mobilizations demanded payment of the "social debt" before the external debt. Rejecting the failure of the political establishment to defend the sovereignty of the nation before the neocolonial intentions of the USA, the movement was opposed to the US proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and it called for terminating the US military base in Ecuador and Ecuadorian participation in the US-sponsored Plan Colombia.

In 2006, Rafael Correa emerged as the leader of the popular movement. Correa was born into the lower middle class, but he was able to attend a Catholic university in his native city of Guayaquil in Ecuador and to earn a masters' degree in Belgium and an M.S. and Ph.D. in economics at the University of Illinois, becoming a college professor in Ecuador. As a young man, he worked in a Catholic mission among the indigenous in the Andes, and he continues to be a practicing Catholic. He arrived to national prominence in 2005, when at the age of 43, he was named to the cabinet of the government of Alfredo Palacio, and he immediately proceeded to criticize publicly the International Monetary Fund. As Minister of the Economy, he promised to channel petroleum income more toward social services and less to the payment of the external debt. He asserted that he intended to seek a renegotiation of the debt payments, and that a proposed free trade agreement with the USA would be submitted to a popular consultation. However, because of conflicts with the government of Palacio, Correa resigned his post.

By now a favorite of the middle class, Correa established an alternative political party, Nation Alliance, which adopted a strategy of entering only the presidential elections and not congressional elections, placing its hopes in the immediate formation of a constitutional assembly. Correa finished second among 13 candidates in the 2006 presidential elections, receiving 23% of the vote, thus qualifying for the runoff elections. His support was mostly from the middle and upper-middle classes, especially progressives with ties to social foundations and non-governmental organizations. He received a low percentage of votes from the poor sectors, as a result of the fact that he had not been involved in the popular mass organizations or the political parties of the Left.

In the runoff elections, however, Correa received the endorsements of labor, peasant, and indigenous organizations as well as some of the political parties, which viewed him as a much better option than Álvaro Noboa, who had the support of the Ecuadorian national bourgeoisie, the US government, and transnational companies. Noboa supported the proposed FTAA, and he proposed changes that would strengthen foreign investment and facilitate access of international capital to Ecuadorian natural resources, including petroleum. He favored privatization, including those sectors that provided vital human needs to the population. He also asserted that Ecuador ought to sever relations with Cuba and Venezuela.

Standing in sharp contrast to Noboa, Correa declared during the campaign that he would renegotiate the Ecuadorian external debt with the international finance agencies, basing the negotiation on conditions established by the Ecuadorian state, and not on conditions laid down by the international finance agencies. He promised that his government would not sign a free trade agreement with the USA, and that instead of an economic integration with the USA based on "free trade," Ecuador ought to be oriented toward an economic and social integration with Latin America, seeking to strengthen ties with emerging regional associations as well as Venezuela and Cuba. He also declared that his government would not renew the agreement with the USA for the use of the Ecuadorian Air Force Base in the city of Manta by the US military. And he declared that he would not permit the country to participate in the Plan Colombia of the USA. Correa asserted that he would convoke a constitutional assembly, thus establishing alternative structures that would create new mechanisms for the effective participation of the citizens in the public decisions of importance for the country. The constitutional assembly ought to

be formed by the various sectors of the country, including representatives of workers, peasants, students, and retired persons.

Correa defeated Noboa in the runoff presidential elections with 59% of the vote, and he assumed the presidency on January 15, 2007. That same day, he initiated the steps for a popular referendum on a Constitutional Assembly. The National Congress, in which Nation Alliance did not have representation, tried to block the referendum, but the Electoral Court, taking into account the strong popular sentiment for a referendum, ruled that it should be held. In March 2007, a popular referendum approved the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly. On September 30, elections to the Constitutional Assembly were held, in which 70% of the voters supported candidates that shared the political-economic project of Correa, and Nation Alliance won 80 of the 130 seats in the Constitutional Assembly. A new Constitution was developed by the Assembly, and it was approved in a popular referendum.

Under the new Constitution, elections for President, Vice-President, and the Legislative Assembly were held on April 26, 2009. Correa won the elections in the first round, with 52% of the votes, far ahead of Lucio Gutierrez with 28% and Álvaro Noboa with less than 8%. The Nation Alliance attained an ample victory in the elections for Legislative Assembly, and the Pachakutik movement, the Democratic Popular Movement, and the Socialist Party also won strong representation, giving overwhelming control of the Legislative Assembly to the newly formed non-traditional parties of the Left. Correa was reelected president in 2013; the Nation Alliance and its allies from newly formed non-traditional parties of the Left continue to have a strong majority in the Legislative Assembly.

In addition to a new Constitution, the Correa government has renegotiated external debt payments on the basis of the principle that it will make payment only on debt that was legitimately contracted. As a result, social spending has exceeded payment of external debts, and poverty was reduced significantly. In addition, the Correa government has stimulated investments in strategic industries, such as the hydroelectric industry, petroleum refineries, and the transportation infrastructure. It has provided incentives to national production, with the intention of responding to the food needs of the population. It has nationalized property poorly utilized. It has not renewed the agreement for the US military base in Manta.

Correa maintains that the Citizen Revolution in Ecuador seeks to construct “socialism for the twenty-first century,” which involves a form

of socialism "applied to the particularities of Ecuador." Correa maintains that socialism for the twenty-first century has important points of coincidence with the scientific socialism of Marx and Engels, including the principle that "it is the people who ought to command, and not the market" as well as the concept of "the importance of collective action." But socialism for the twenty-first century, Correa maintains, is different from classic socialism. Firstly, while classic socialism "sought state ownership of all the means of production," Ecuadorian socialism for the twenty-first century seeks state ownership only of those means of production that "are strategic for the economy of the nation, and therefore cannot be in private hands." Secondly, classic socialism had a concept of development not very different from that of capitalism, in that it utilized "the same concept of industrial development and growth in production." But socialism for the twenty-first century seeks to formulate and practice an alternative model, based on the concept of sustainable development. Thirdly, socialism for the twenty-first century expresses itself in various forms, such that the model of one country is not replicated in another. "We ought to speak of principles, and not of models" (Correa 2014).

On January 29, 2015, Ecuador and Rafael Correa assumed the presidency of CELAC. In his speech at the closing of the Third Summit of CELAC in Costa Rica on January 29, 2015, Correa invoked the memory of the heroes of Latin America and the Caribbean, including Toussaint, Bolivar, Zapata, Sandino, Che, Allende, and Chávez. And he maintained:

> The fundamental question is who directs the society: the elite or the great majority; capital or human beings; the market or society. History teaches us that the attainment of development requires working together; collective action; political will; and an adequate but important intervention of the state, a state that is nothing other than the institutionalized representation of all of us, the means through which the society realizes such collective action.

Correa proposed that CELAC would work toward implementation of a plan of action focusing on five central themes: the reduction of extreme poverty and inequality; the expansion of education and the development of research and knowledge in a form that serves the public good; the protection of the environment and the struggle against climate change; the development of an alternative regional financial infrastructure; and the strengthening of the power of CELAC as a regional bloc.

Correa criticized the historic conduct of transnational corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and he noted that bilateral treaties of investment obligate the states of the region to surrender their sovereignty to courts in the North, which act in an arbitrary manner to sanction unjust arrangements. "Latin America and the Caribbean needs foreign investment, but we ought to take on the task of creating a more just and balanced framework of relations between States and transnationals, which would make possible mutual benefit and respect for human rights and the rights of nature." He also criticized the USA for its manipulation of the issue of human rights as a mechanism to preserve structures of neocolonial domination.

Correa concludes his address to CELAC with the observation that humanity possibly is passing through a transition to a more just world-system, and in this process, the peoples of Latin America could play a central role:

> The twenty-first century ought to consolidate the supremacy of the human being over capital. The human being is not one means more of production, but the end itself of production…
>
> We are conscious of the fact that Latin America and the Caribbean has become the international standard of the recuperation of human dignity, through the application of public policies in the interests of the great majority.
>
> We do not fear the role that history has assigned to us. We have faith. Today more than ever resounds the prophetic voice of Salvador Allende, who foretold that someday America will have a voice of the continent, a voice of the people united, a voice that will be respected and heard, because it will be the voice of peoples who are the owners of their own destiny.

Correa was not permitted by the Constitution to serve a third consecutive term, so Lenin Moreno was the presidential candidate of Correa's Nation Alliance party. In an election characterized by distortions and disruptive maneuvers by the Right, Moreno won the presidential elections in the second round, held on April 2, 2017, with 51% of the vote.

The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua

The Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) was established in 1963 for the purpose of overthrowing the US-supported Somoza dictatorship. The Sandinista Revolution triumphed on July 19, 1979,

and it was in power from 1979 to 1990. It developed a new constitution, following the principles and practices of representative democracy. The first elections under the new constitution were held in 1984, and Daniel Ortega of the FSLN was elected president, receiving 63% of the vote. During its rule from 1979 to 1990, the Sandinista government developed a program consistent with long-standing goals and proposals of the Latin American popular movement, including nationalization of companies that had been owned by Nicaraguans who abandoned the country following the fall of Somoza; programs in health, literacy and education, and food production; and an agrarian reform program. These measures resulted in significant reductions in illiteracy and poverty. Nationalization and agrarian reform led to a significant redistribution and decentralization of land. In foreign policy, the Sandinistas followed a policy of nonalignment, seeking to diversify its commercial relations to include the socialist bloc and the Third World in addition to the USA and Western Europe (Prieto 2009, 34–36; Regalado 2008, 78; Walker 1991).

Beginning in 1980, the USA embarked on an economic, ideological, and military campaign against the Sandinista revolution, including economic and military assistance to a counterrevolutionary guerrilla army known as the contras, most of which were stationed in Honduras along the Nicaraguan border (Booth and Walker 1993, 140–146). The contra war was a key factor in the Sandinista loss in the 1990 elections to a coalition of parties supported by the USA. Although the election ended Sandinista control of the government, it did have the positive consequence of establishing an environment that facilitated the signing of peace accords and the disbanding of the contras.

From 1990 to 2006, the Nicaraguan state was directed by governments that implemented neoliberal economic policies. The illiteracy rate tripled, and gains in health were rapidly reversed, while "a negligible minority was enriched without end" (Prieto 2009, 147). Nonetheless, the gains represented by the Sandinista project and its termination of the US-supported military dictatorship were not completely reversed. The country continued to follow the democratic constitution developed during the Sandinista government. The military, which was formed from the Sandinista guerrilla army and had replaced the brutally repressive National Guard of Somoza, continued during neoliberal rule. And the Sandinista party comprised approximately 40% of the national assembly, the largest single party in the nation, during the period. The neoliberal governments of 1990–2006 could not roll back the redistribution of

land that had been implemented by the Sandinista government. In the era of Somoza, properties of fifty acres or more encompassed more than half of the arable land; but today, 82% of the land is in the hands of small farmers as cooperatives (Fonseca 2009, 49–50).

Consistent with the tendencies in Latin America since 1994, Ortega and the FSLN were returned to power in the elections of 2006. Since 2007, the FSLN has headed a coalition of parties in a Government of Reconciliation and National Unity, with Daniel Ortega as President. During this second phase of the Sandinista revolution, the government has had more success in diversifying trade relations and investment partners, leading to investments from a variety of new sources. And the government has implemented an extensive program of distribution of land titles to indigenous and Africa-descended communities on the East Coast, which had been somewhat ignored during the first stage, as a result of the geographical isolation of the region as well as the limited resources of the country. In addition, the Sandinista government has been able to build upon the family and cooperative economy established by the redistribution of land during the first phase. Families and cooperatives produce 53% of the GDP and employ over 70% of the workforce in what the Sandinistas describe as a "popular, non-capitalist economy." Ninety percent of consumed foodstuffs are produced in the domestic economy; a cooperative bank with 50,000 associates is an important financial resource, independent of the private banking sector; and popular markets are the main distributors of imported goods. In its second phase, the Sandinista Revolution is having success combining state ownership in key sectors with small-scale private property and cooperatives. This approach has been described as "inclusive domestic economic democratization" by Tortilla con Sal, a collective based in Nicaragua. It is being developed in the context of a sovereign economic and international projection, independent of the historic imperialist and neocolonial demands of the USA or the more recent neoliberal demands of international finance agencies. In 2007, along with Ecuador, Nicaragua joined Cuba and Venezuela in ALBA.

The New Counterattack of the Right

From the beginning, the Latin American popular socialist revolutions generated a counterrevolution by national and international sectors with interest in the perseveration of the neocolonial core–peripheral relation. Taking advantage of a 2014 fall in raw materials prices, and of

overly high expectations that many people have with respect to revolutionary transformations, the Right has had some success in a new counterattack. The strategy has been to form new political parties and make vague promises of change, formulating a discourse that sounds progressive, and to launch distorted attacks on the government in the corporate-owned mass media, using as well social media. As noted, in the case of Venezuela, the counterattack also has included economic warfare. The counterattack of the Right has been directed not only against the proclaimed socialist governments, but also against the progressive governments of Argentina and Brazil, which have been allied with the socialist governments in the forging of Latin American unity and integration.

In this context, the Left suffered two electoral defeats in 2015, namely the loss of the presidential elections in Argentina, and the loss of the parliamentary elections in Venezuela. However, the proclaimed socialist governments were able to maintain themselves in power in the presidential elections in Nicaragua in 2016 and Ecuador in 2017. In the case of Brazil, the Workers' Party fell apart, and the Brazilian parliament, on August 31, 2016, voted to remove President Dilma from office, on the basis of unsubstantiated charges of corruption. The vote was declared by the socialist governments of the region to be an illegitimate parliamentary *coup d'état*.

The resurgent Latin American Right has no viable project to offer. In Argentina and Brazil, governments have returned to neoliberalism, adopting measures that include privatizations, reductions in social programs, and greater opening for foreign capital, provoking a new wave of massive demonstrations. In Venezuela, the opposition parliamentary majority seeks to disrupt the constitutional process, and the opposition increasingly has turned to violence, seeking to provoke a US intervention. In response to the counterattack of the Right, some in the Latin American Left are calling for a deepening of the popular revolutions, which would involve greater changes in the institutionalization of Latin American societies, implying not only a redistribution of wealth, but also changes in the structures of power. Proposals include a more significant turn from representative democracy to popular democracy and greater changes in property ownership and land distribution. Although such a radicalization of the revolution is necessary, it is politically complicated. A revolution cannot get ahead of the people; it must take steps that the people understand and support. In addition, the leadership cannot act in a form that breaks the popular consensus and unity necessary

for sustaining the revolutionary process. In each nation, the leadership must discern, taking into account the challenges to the revolution and the political conditions, the extent to which a deepening of the revolution is possible; accordingly, such radicalization would not occur to the same degree and at the same pace in the different nations. There can be no doubt, however, that deeper structural transformations will be necessary in the long-term for the consolidation of the popular revolutions. Moreover, such consolidation is necessary for humanity. As the world-system increasingly falls into disorder and chaos, it becomes more evident that humanity confronts a choice between socialism, understood above all as power in the hands people and not the transnational corporations, and barbarism.

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CHAPTER 9

Renewing the Historic Quest for Socialism

We have seen that, in reaction to centuries of conquest, colonialism and peripheralization, the colonized peoples of the world, for the most part, have not sought vengeance. The prevailing concept of justice among Third World peoples has not been that of just punishment for crimes committed. Rather, the colonized peoples for the most part have held to a concept of social justice, which has led them, with full consciousness of the past, to project a different future for humanity, leaving behind the legacy of domination and superexploitation. In the period 1948–1979, the leaders of the Third World movement for national and social liberation formulated a vision of a New International Economic Order, which would be characterized by full respect for the equal sovereignty of all nations, the protection of the social and economic rights of all persons, and harmony with the natural environment. And they accomplished a formidable political task, in that they attained international organizational unity of the formerly colonized peoples, in spite of cultural differences, on the basis of a consensus with respect to fundamental principles.

But the New International Economic Order was disdainfully cast aside by the global powers, as they aggressively attacked the Third World project. There was no moral restraint on their methods: they sent the armed forces; they assassinated leaders; and they created the phenomenon of the external debt and used it to impose neoliberal economic policies on weak or accommodating states of the Third World. In the Islamic World, taking advantage of the tension within the Islamic movement between anti-colonial modernism and traditionalism, they supported

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Islamic extremism in order to derail national liberation, yet without any intention of accepting a world envisioned by the Islamic traditionalist. Through their military and economic aggressions and their duplicity, the global powers were able to block movement toward a New International Economic Order and to preserve the colonial foundations of the neocolonial world-system. But in doing so, the global powers failed to attend to the fundamental contradictions of the world-system. These contradictions included the economic need of the system to expand without limit, consuming natural resources on a planet whose finite limits had been reached and overextended. And they included the contradiction between, on the one hand, the democratic ideals of the sovereign equality of nations and the rights of all persons, and on the other hand, the negation in practice of these ideals, through economic and financial penetration, military intervention, and military dictatorships.

Although Third World hopes were deferred, the vision of national and social liberation remained alive, and it expressed itself in a renewed form beginning in 1994. During the period 1994–2014, self-proclaimed socialist governments would appear in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua; progressive governments would emerge in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay; socialist Cuba would endure and attain respect and admiration throughout the world; China and Vietnam would persist in their historic socialist projects, and they would deepen ties with the socialist and progressive governments of Latin America; popes would applaud the new tendencies in Latin America and would deepen relations with the socialist and progressive governments of the region; the Islamic Republic of Iran would persist in its insistence on its right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and it would expand economic and cultural relations with the Non-Aligned Movement and with socialist and progressive governments of Latin America; and the nations of the Third World would reaffirm their historic commitment to the Third World project of national and social liberation and to South–South cooperation.

Meanwhile, as the Third World project renews, the global powers have used all available means to undermine it. Hypocritically and cynically declaring itself to be defending democracy and human rights, the USA seeks to delegitimate and destabilize the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua and to undermine BRICS. As in the 1970s and early 1980s, the global powers fail to attend to the fundamental contradictions of the neocolonial world-system, seeking only to defend their particular short-term interests. They strive to

preserve their domination in a world-system that increasingly demonstrates its unsustainability. There are numerous signs of the unsustainability of the neocolonial world-system, as we have seen in Chap. 6.

The sustained crisis of the world-system increasingly affects social and political dynamics in the core, as nations of the core experience a declining capacity to respond to the needs and aspirations of their middle and working classes. During the twentieth century, transnational corporations made concessions to popular demands in the core and accepted a certain level of social programs by core states. The social programs were financially feasible as a result of core exploitation of peripheral regions and through a strategy of government deficit spending. But as profits stagnated and government debt became overextended, the global elite launched in the 1980s an ideological attack on the state, preventing core governments from making adjustments in a form that would have preserved social programs, which were necessary for political legitimation and social control. As a result, core states are ideologically and financially limited in their capacity to make concessions to popular demands, reversing a tendency that had been evolving since the nineteenth century and especially in the post-World War II period. Since 1980, the peoples of the nations of the North increasingly have been abandoned by their governments, giving rise to a loss of faith in the state and a delegitimation of the political process of representative democracy. Although the lack of structures of popular education in the North facilitates that the peoples of the North do not understand the sources of the global crisis, they nevertheless correctly sense that they have been abandoned.

In the absence of a proposed political project that defends one or more sectors of the people, the political system of representative democracy has degenerated. Politics has become the technique of fund-raising and political advertising, accompanied by the art of appearing to defend the people while actually defending particular interests that finance electoral campaigns. In the context of the decadence of the political system of representative democracy, and the limited understanding and anxieties of the peoples of the North, politicians emerge with neofascist messages, speaking against immigrants, gays, and terrorists. In this panorama, the Left shows signs of life, but the European and US Left have failed to propose a comprehensive, moral, and historically informed political-economic alternative that would be able to attain the support of the people.

On three different occasions (see Chap. 6), the global elite failed to implement reformist proposals that, while preserving basic global neocolonial structures, would have softened the negative economic and political consequences for the peoples of the Third World. Furthermore, the elite ignored the 1974 Third World proposal for a New International Economic Order (see Chap. 7), which would have implied transition from neocolonialism to a more just and democratic world-system. Instead, the global powers since the 1970s have unleashed an ideological, economic, and military attack on Third World. As a result, we have today a world-system that increasingly shows signs of profound structural crisis: wars of aggression unleashed by core states in semiperipheral and peripheral zones; terrorism; uncontrolled peripheral–core migration, provoked by social and economic disintegration in peripheral and semiperipheral zones and by wars of aggression; organized and individual crime; violence in a variety of forms; social and economic insecurity; environmental degradation; ideological manipulation; political delegitimation; and spiraling financial speculation. It is a world from which many seek retreat, through cynicism, consumerism, individualism, religious fundamentalism, or various unhealthy or healthy addictions.

The Twelve Characteristics of Socialism

Inasmuch as the global elite has responded irresponsibly to the structural crisis of the world-system, the need for the taking of power by the people has become evident, thus giving us the duty to reflect on the meaning of and the possibility for socialism. The principles and characteristics of socialism cannot be formulated idealistically, on the basis of abstract concepts isolated from real social movements and without reference to the practice of socialism in nations where socialist revolutions have triumphed. Accordingly, if we want to understand the meaning of socialism, we must observe popular revolutionary movements and socialist nations through encounter, that is, with a listening that seeks understanding. When we do so, we learn that the meaning of socialism has evolved over the last two centuries and that there are a diversity and plurality of socialist practices. But we also discern that there are common practices in socialist nations. Twelve such practices can be identified, on the basis of observation of two nations that once were socialist (Russia in the time of Lenin and Chile under Allende) and seven nations that continue to develop socialist projects (China, Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela,

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua). These twelve practices have not been fully developed in all nine cases, but they can be identified as general patterns.

1. Power is in the Hands of Delegates of the People Socialism seeks to develop a political process that is an alternative to representative democracy, which is a type of government originally created by Western bourgeois revolutions and subsequently developed by the Western powers. Representative democracy is susceptible to elite control, for the elite is able to impose a debt on elected officials through its capacity to finance election campaigns, and the elite can frame and manipulate public discourse by virtue of its ownership of the media of communication and as a result of its capacity to fund "think tanks." As an alternative to representative democracy, socialist nations have developed popular democracy, which is established on a foundation of a multitude of small popular assemblies. The people meet in numerous local assemblies in order to discuss problems and issues and to make recommendations, and this structure of face-to-face dialogue weakens the capacity for ideological manipulation by a wealthy class. The popular assemblies also meet to select delegates to serve in a higher level of popular power. The elected delegates in turn select delegates to serve in a still higher level, until ultimately the highest political authority of the nation is established. In socialist nations, citizens who serve in the highest levels tend to have the same demographic characteristics as the people: They are professionals, workers, peasants, students, women, and members of ethnic groups. Political parties tend not to participate in the selection of those who hold political authority. Political parties play more of a role of educating, disseminating ideas, and participating in the public discourse. Citizens who hold political authority are selected by the people without mediation by political parties, and they are selected on the basis of personal characteristics that they possess. In some socialist countries, like Cuba, representative democracy has been eliminated, and the country is governed through structures of popular power; in others, like Venezuela, structures of representative democracy and popular democracy exist side-by-side.

2. Sovereignty The nations of the Third World are historically colonized. Their most important economic, political, and cultural institutions were under the control of the colonizers. They successfully struggled to attain political independence, but the independence that they achieved in most

cases was not a true independence, as a result of the fact that the colonial powers were able to preserve important economic and commercial structures established during colonialism. Responding to this neocolonial situation, socialist nations of the Third World affirm the true sovereignty of the nation as a fundamental principle. They maintain that each nation has the right to decide on its type of government and form of development, and the right to control over its natural resources and the cultural formation of its people. In accordance with their commitment to definitive independence, the socialist nations have played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement, which has called for a New International Economic Order that is based on the principle of respect for the sovereignty and equality of all nations.

3. Cooperation Among Nations The socialist nations of the Third World maintain that the world-system should be guided by the principle of cooperation among nations, and they have tried to develop cooperative relations with other nations. This has not always been possible, because the global powers have adopted a policy of seeking to undermine socialist governments. But socialist governments have welcomed opportunities of cooperation with other governments. Today, as the crisis of the world-system deepens and as the incapacity of the global powers to respond constructively to the crisis becomes manifest, many progressive governments are taking the road of cooperation with the socialist governments. This can be seen with respect CELAC and BRICS, which are establishing in practice an alternative model for humanity: The development of a world-system based on cooperation and mutual respect rather than conflict and domination.

4. Solidarity Among Peoples Parallel with the principle of cooperation among nations, socialism has practiced solidarity among peoples. There are numerous examples of persons who, driven by commitment to social justice, have gone to other countries to join in a political struggle for liberation. Socialism calls for international support for any people confronting hardship, whether its roots be political, commercial, or climatic. Socialist governments have fostered cultural, academic, and sports exchanges. They have supported other nations, as is illustrated by the support of the Cuban government for the government of Angola in the 1980s and by its sending of medical missions to Africa in response to the Ebola epidemic of 2015.

5. Social and Economic Rights The concept that democratic rights include the social and economic rights is one of the most important principles of socialism, and socialist governments have invested considerable resources to national projects that seek to provide a minimal standard of living, adequate nutrition and housing, access to education, and health services. Socialism maintains that these goods and services, necessary for living well and in dignity, should never be distributed on the basis of market principles, and it maintains that decisive state action is necessary to ensure that the economic and social rights of all persons are protected.

6. State-directed Economic Development Plans and Various Forms of Property Although nationalization of the major means of production has been an important feature of socialist nations, socialist nations in practice have sanctioned other forms of property as well, giving varying degrees of emphasis to them in accordance with productive and commercial needs under particular conditions. These forms of property, in addition to state ownership, include joint ventures with foreign capital, cooperatives, medium and small-scale capitalist enterprises, and private entrepreneurship. What has distinguished the socialist nations is the central role of the state as an economic actor and as the author of a national plan for economic development. In socialist nations, economic development is not left to market demands, nor do capitalists' interests shape economic policy. Economic policies are developed by the state in representation of the interests of the various popular sectors. When socialist states grant space to private capitalist enterprises, they have made the judgment that such a policy can contribute to the production and distribution of goods and services, always a pressing concern, and as such it is beneficial to the people and to the long-term development of the nation.

7. Diversity in Production Triumphant Third World socialist revolutions came to power in conditions in which the economy of the nation was characterized by the exportation of two or three raw materials and the importation of a variety manufactured goods and food products. This created a situation of economic and political dependency on the international market and on one or two core nations that were the destiny of its exports and the source of its imports. In order to facilitate true independence, the socialist nations have tried to strengthen and diversify their manufacturing and agricultural productivity. This is often a difficult challenge, as a result of limited capital.

8. Public Media Socialist governments have sought to place the media of information under public control. Socialism does not believe that state ownership of the media restricts freedom of speech. To the contrary, it maintains that private ownership of the media limits and distorts dissemination of knowledge and information, placing constraints on the capacity of the people to develop as persons. When there is state ownership of the media, the directorship of the various networks and outlets of the media are appointed by ministers of the state, which are appointed by political authorities that are directly and indirectly elected by the people. This implies that editorial judgements, rather than being guided by the particular interests of corporations and the powerful, ultimately must respond to the political leaders of the people, thus increasing the possibility that the media will serve the public good. Some socialist nations, like Cuba, essentially have eliminated private ownership of the media; others, like Venezuela, have invested in the expansion of the public media at the international, national, and local levels, which exist alongside a regulated privately owned media.

9. Gender Equality Socialist nations have been at the forefront of the struggle for the rights of women. They have been guided by the principle of the full participation of women in the construction of a socialist society, including positions of authority in political and economic institutions. This has been accomplished in a form that has not been conflictive. In Cuba, for example, the struggle for gender equality has been consistently presented as "a women's revolution within the socialist revolution," and it has been supported from the beginning by the highest levels of leadership of the socialist revolution. The integration of the women's movement into the socialist revolution has been the most effective means for attaining gender equality in practice.

10. Ecological Sustainability Socialist nations were not at the forefront of the ecology movement prior to 1990. However, beginning in 1992, the socialist nations began to integrate the issue of the protection of the environment into its comprehensive project for the creation of an alternative, more just and sustainable world-system. They have recognized and proclaimed that the current patterns of production and consumption of the world-system are unsustainable and are leading to climatic and ecological consequences that could threaten the survival of the human

species. While they recognize that all nations have a responsibility toward nature, they also insist on a "differentiated responsibility," in which the industrialized and consumerist nations of the North, which are primarily responsible for environmental degradation and have greater resources, take a particular responsibility for responding to the environmental crisis. Within their own nations, socialist nations seek to protect the environment, to the extent that their resources permit, and taking into account that they must balance ecological issues with the need to provide for the basic necessities of the people (see Pichs 2006).

11. National Identity and Patriotism Inasmuch as the popular struggles in the Third World were struggles for the sovereignty of the nations, their charismatic leaders were great patriots, and they called the people to patriotic service of their nation. Ho Chi Minh, for example, formed in the tradition of Confucian nationalism, at the age of 29 took the name of Nguyen the Patriot. Fidel Castro, educated in the nationalist tradition formed by the Cuban revolutionary José Martí, constantly invoked patriotic symbols in his discourses. Revolutionary patriotism in the Third World, however, is unlike patriotism in the North, where politicians manipulate the patriotic sentiments of the people in order to induce them to support foreign wars, which often are imperialist wars and wars of aggression. In the Third World, the patriotic sentiments of the people are invoked in order to defend the sovereignty and the dignity of the nation against imperialist interventions.

12. Spirituality and Revolutionary Faith Third World socialist revolutions have been guided by spirituality. Revolutionary spirituality draws from and is influenced by religious traditions. Ho Chi Minh, for example, was formed by Confucian scholars; Fidel was educated in Catholic schools. But revolutionary spirituality re-expresses religious spirituality. It proclaims the essential dignity of the human species, and it calls upon all to live in accordance with human dignity and to fulfill duties toward humanity as a whole and to nature. Revolutionary spirituality sets aside the cynicism of the North, and it is based on faith in the future of humanity. As the Cuban essayist Cintio Vitier has observed, "revolutionary faith" is an "uncontainable force" that "sees in history what is not yet visible" (2006, 197). When it looks at the structures of domination and exploitation in our world, it does not escape to other-worldliness

or to personal acquisitions; rather, it proclaims that "a better world is possible."

In reviewing these twelve characteristics of socialist revolutions, we can see that the socialist revolution of our time does not have the characteristics that Marx anticipated. However, the socialist revolution in our time is in a broad sense the realization of the revolution that Marx foresaw. Marx envisioned a socialist revolution on the basis of observing the contradictions of the capitalist system from the vantage point of the exploited class, and from this vantage point, he recognized that the contradictions cannot be resolved without structural transformations that imply the end of the system itself and its transition to something else. From this vantage point from below, Marx could see that one possible outcome was the transformation of the system in a form that would protect the rights of all. Such a resolution, Marx discerned, would be consistent with human progress and with advances in natural and social scientific knowledge, thus making such a resolution all the more likely. In our time, we can see such a possibility unfolding: A resolution of the contradictions of the capitalist world-economy, which can be discerned from the vantage point of the neocolonized, who seek, through decisive and informed political action, a more just and democratic world-system.

The post-1994 resurgence of revolution by the neocolonized peoples of the earth provides a clear choice for humanity: A choice between, on the one hand, a neocolonial world-system that places markets above people and the privileges of the powerful above the rights of the humble; and on the other hand, a dignified alternative being led by charismatic leaders whose gifts of discernment, commitment to social justice, and denunciations of the powerful remind us of the prophet Amos, who condemned the structures of domination and privilege of the ancient Kingdom of Israel as violations of the Mosaic covenant, a covenant that was a sacred agreement between a homeless and marginalized people and a God who acts in history in defense of the poor.

Popular Democratic Socialist Revolutions in the North

The renewal of the Third World movements and the development of cooperation among key nations of the Third World can be interpreted as the first steps in the development of a socialist world-system, in which the twelve practices of socialism would be the norm that guides the

comportment of many nations. The possible transition to a socialist world-system would be enhanced, if popular movements in several nations of the North were to take power away from the elite and put it in the hands of persons who are morally and intellectually prepared to defend the rights of the people, the well-being of the nation, and the sustainability of the world-system. Nation-states are principal actors in the world-system, and thus the transition to a socialist world-system would require that popular revolutions triumph in various nations, and especially important are the more powerful, wealthier, and larger nations. The decisive steps toward transition to a socialist world-system would be possible through cooperation among socialist and progressive governments of the world-system, just as the transformation of Latin American political reality has occurred through cooperation among socialist and progressive governments in the formation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and just as BRICS is developing an alternative through the cooperation of governments that are mostly socialist or progressive. But how can popular revolutions triumph in the nations of the core? To address this question, let us observe what triumphant socialist revolutions have done.

The Taking of Political Power In socialist nations, popular movements emerged that took control of the political institutions of the nation, using such political power as a base for seeking the transformation of economic, financial, media, educational, and healthcare institutions. The taking of power by the people is necessary. Popular movements mobilize protests and issue demands, but they alone are not enough; they must be seen as strategies that facilitate the goal of the taking of power. Elites make concessions to protests and demands, but in a form in which they maintain control of the political-economic system. It is idealistic to think that, in the context of the crisis of the world-system, a just and sustainable world-system can be created without the taking of power by the people in various nations. The taking of political power must be an explicit goal of the popular movements of the North.

A Popular Movement The movements that have taken power are popular movements and not proletarian or industrial working-class movements. The emphasis on proletarian revolutions has been central to the Marxist intellectual tradition. But from the beginning, the revolutions were formed by social subjects of various popular classes. Marx emphasized the industrial working class, because he discerned that it would become

increasingly important as capitalism developed. The movement to which he was tied, however, was formed by artisans and intellectuals as well as industrial workers. Emerging seventy years after the Western European Revolution of 1848, the Russian Revolution was a revolution of peasants and workers. In interpreting the Russian Revolution, Trotsky emphasized the industrial working class, because of his understanding of the particular conditions of Russian industry, and Trotsky's interpretation influenced Trotskyite parties to adopt a classic Marxist formulation of a revolution of the industrial working class. Lenin, on the other hand, adapted Marx to Russia by formulating the concept of a worker-peasant revolution, led by a working-class vanguard.

The concept of the working-class vanguard would undergo further modification as popular revolutions emerged among the colonized and neocolonized peoples. In Vietnam, the revolution was formed principally by the petit bourgeoisie and peasants. Ho Chi Minh adopted the orthodox formulation of a working-class revolution, but he transformed its meaning, by interpreting professionals and peasants as workers, for they would become workers during the process of socialist transformation. It was an astute maneuver, an indication of Ho's creative and practical political intelligence. Unlike Ho, who studied in the Soviet Union, Fidel studied Marx, Engels, and Lenin on his own, and he rather freely adapted Marxist concepts to the Cuban situation. He understood the revolution to be a popular revolution, formed by various sectors of the people, including agricultural workers, industrial workers, tenant farmers, small businessmen, teachers, professors, and professionals. With the emergence of new social subjects in Latin America in the 1980s (women and indigenous persons), the example of Fidel to view the people, composed of various popular sectors, as the revolutionary subject was taken by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia.

We can today arrive at the formulation that the socialist movements of the world have been popular movements, formed by various sectors of the people. We also should be aware that the great majority of the leaders of the popular movements, but not all, have come from the petit bourgeoisie.

Charismatic Leaders The popular movements have lifted up charismatic leaders. At first, responding to some injustice, popular protests emerge. But during the mobilization, charismatic leaders appear. Charismatic

leaders are well-read, and they have studied intellectuals and leaders of their own nations and other lands, especially those who were connected to popular movements. They have developed exceptional gifts for understanding the structures of domination and exploitation and the strategies that should be adopted. And they possess an exceptional capacity to explain to the people and to connect to the concerns and hopes of the people. They also are highly committed to the people and the nation. Many gifted leaders spontaneously emerge, but one or two leaders with exceptional gifts emerge to be a symbol of the movement of the people. Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel, and Hugo Chávez are emblematic.

Charismatic leaders are a product of the movement, nurtured and formed by it. As the leaders mature, and the movement recognizes their gifts, they are lifted up by the movement to speak on its behalf. Speaking with charismatic authority, they denounce the global powers and the structures of the established system, and they speak in defense of the poor, the oppressed, the exploited, and the excluded. They lead the movement to a more advanced stage, and they play the important role of unifying the movement, which invariably is divided into different tendencies. Their presence is indispensable for the triumph and subsequent gains of the revolution, once it attains power.

Charismatic leaders are the prophets of our time, and their speeches and writings are sacred texts, like the texts of the words and the teachings of the prophets of ancient Israel, Jesus, and Muhammad. They are the teachers of all of us, transcending the culture and the nation in which they spoke. They are the most important part of the universal culture of humanity, and their teachings constitute important advances in human understanding of social dynamics. We need to study them all, regardless of the particular nations any one of us is from, if we are to understand what is true and do what is right.

An Alternative Political Party During the movement, an alternative party emerges, led by the charismatic leader. It is an alternative to the traditional political parties that represent the established power. And it is an alternative also to other parties of the movement, whose understanding is flawed in some aspect or other. The party is only secondarily concerned with elections. Its principle role is to educate the people, to develop their political and social consciousness, and to call the people to action, even heroic action. The members of the party are well informed about the history of the nation, the structures of domination, the

possibilities for emancipation and liberation, and the international situation. And they have complete loyalty to the charismatic leader, as a result of their personal awareness of his or her exceptional gifts. The charismatic leader cannot be everywhere at the same time, but the party can be. The party members are the voice of the charismatic leader in every place of work and study, in every factory, field, university classroom, and neighborhood. The party is indispensable for the education of the people and for the united and mass action of the people.

A Manifesto Popular revolutions have issued manifestos, which explain the present situation of the nation and the popular struggle in historical and global context. They denounce the structures of domination and exploitation, and they explain the necessity of the taking of power by the people. *The Communist Manifesto*, written by Marx and Engels during the Western European popular movement of the 1840s, is the most famous popular manifesto. *History Will Absolve Me*, the testimony of Fidel at his 1953 trial for the attack on Moncada Barracks, functioned as the manifesto of the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s. It galvanized the people and announced a new stage of the Cuban Revolution, and it put Fidel and the July 26 Movement at the head of the Cuban Revolution.

A Platform The popular revolution has a platform, a set of concrete proposals that address the most pressing injustices that the people confront. The platform of Lenin involved the transfer of power from the parliament to the popular councils (soviets), the withdrawal of Russia from World War I, and the distribution of land to the peasants. It galvanized the people, and it put Lenin and the Bolshevik Party at the head of the Russian Revolution. The platform of the Cuban Revolution was contained in *History Will Absolve Me*. Its concrete proposals included the restoration of the Constitution of 1940, agrarian reform, profit-sharing for workers and employees, educational reform, nationalization of US-owned utility companies, and the confiscation of property that had been fraudulently obtained through government corruption. All of these proposals responded to abuses and injustices that the people experienced, which were provoking disgust with the Batista regime and alienation from the neocolonial republic. They were proposals that Fidel and the July 26 Movement promised to implement when they arrived in power, a promise delivered through decisive action by the revolutionary

government, thus conserving and reinforcing the political power of the triumphant revolution.

The Institutionalization of Charismatic Authority After the charismatic leader is gone, the party and its leaders continue to lead the people, on the basis of the teachings of the charismatic leader, in a constantly evolving national and international situation. The party must be organically tied to the people. Its members must be from and of the people, living among them, and not living apart. It must listen to the concerns of the people, which was one of the most important gifts of the charismatic leader. In the case of Cuba, efforts to form a new vanguard political party uniting the principle revolutionary organizations that would function to replace the personal authority of Fidel were initiated in the 1960s.

In sum, in observing the revolutions of the world, we see that the people have taken control of political and other institutions of the nation through the formation of popular movements that have lifted up charismatic leaders, have formed alternative political parties, and have issued manifestos and platforms. And we see that triumphant socialist revolutions seek to transform economic, financial, educational, media, and health service institutions, albeit in conflict with counterrevolutionary sectors with opposed interests. Socialist revolutions also seek to develop structures of popular democracy and popular power, in order to nullify the ideological manipulations and maneuverings of the deposed elite.

This formulation of the key components of possible and necessary popular democratic socialist revolutions in the nations of the North is based on observation of the essential aspects of the Third World socialist revolutions from 1930 to the present as well as the October Revolution of 1917. We may have other conceptions concerning how revolutions ought to occur, but we should be guided by the general process through which the elite has been dislodged from power in other lands. If human experience is to be our guide, we should understand these revolutionary dynamics and take them into account, as we reflect on what needs to be done by the people in the nations of the North. We should learn from the revolutions of other lands and permit their experiences to influence our conceptions, so that our understanding, even if optimistic and rooted in faith in the future, would not be idealist, because it would be connected to real historical social processes.

Final Reflections

Like the pre-modern empires and civilizations, the modern world-system and the capitalist world-economy were established on a foundation of conquest, although the modern structures of domination were advanced in their scope and depth. During the period 1945–1965, the system enjoyed economic and commercial expansion. It attained political stability through concessions to the national liberation movements in the neocolonies, without breaking the core-peripheral relation, and to the popular movements in the core, without permitting political control by the popular classes. It financed the concessions to the core working class through superexploitation of the neocolonies as well as through government deficit spending. However, beginning in the late 1960s, the world-system confronted its limits. Having reached the geographical limits of the earth, it could not expand by conquering new lands and peoples, as it did during the formation of the European empires. At the same time, the neocolonies were moving toward an increasingly radical agenda, demanding a New International Economic Order, a fundamental political and economic restructuring of the world-system. In addition, government deficit spending became overextended.

In response to this situation, rather than an enlightened turn to a sustainable and more just world-system, as proposed by the Third World project of national and social liberation, the elite unleashed in 1980 what would become a sustained economic, military, and ideological attack on the Third World. And it began a rollback of the social welfare benefits that had been conceded to the popular movements of the core. The movements, in both the core and the Third World, were left in disarray and confusion by the attack by the global elite. The popular movements in the core remain in a state of confusion. However, since 1994, the Third World movements have experienced renewal, and they have been seeking to construct, in theory and practice, a more just, democratic and sustainable world-system.

Although the system has become unstable and the global elite losing control of the world-system, the global elite nonetheless remains in control of the core states, the international corporations, and the international finance institutions. And it continues to pursue neoliberal policies and wars of aggression, seeking to sustain the neocolonial world-system, and competing with one another for power and profits. Since 2014, it has had some gains in a counterattack against the Leftist governments of Latin America. Nevertheless, the Third World movements and revolutionary

governments persist in their quest for the development of an alternative world-system, more just, democratic and sustainable.

Humanity thus confronts a choice between two models of human economic and cultural development. One is based on domination and superexploitation, and the other is based on cooperation and solidarity in search of social justice. The two models are not merely idealistic formulations of intellectuals or visionary theoreticians. They have been forged in theory and in practice. They define the real practical choice that humanity faces.

Cuba today is a symbol to all those who are committed to social justice. It has attained this exalted status as a result of the openness and vitality of its people, the gifts of its charismatic leaders, the heroic persistence of its people, and its quality as a David who repeatedly defies its neighboring Goliath. As the world increasingly falls into darkness, resulting from its inattention to its social sins, Cuba shines as a light, indicating for humanity an alternative road toward a world where justice and peace will reign. Do we not have a duty to commit ourselves and our energies and capacities to a rejection of the darkness and a defense of the light?

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Appendix

The Rise of Trump and the Failure of the Left

In the first 100 days of the administration of Donald Trump, its project has taken shape: continuation of the post-2001 "war on terrorism," with its ahistorical and ethnocentric assumptions; enforcement of immigration laws, overruling the interests of some corporations in the superexploitation of illegal immigrant labor; reduction in legal immigration, with reforms orientated toward admission of applicants with higher skills; an economic nationalism that protects US industries and that induces US corporations to invest in production in the USA; a taking of the corporate side in the six-decade conflict between corporations and the ecology movement; an increase in military capacity; greater support for law enforcement agencies; and populist rhetoric. The Trump project has components in common with twentieth-century European fascism, which was characterized by military expansionism, suppression of structures of representative democracy, scapegoating, repression of religious and ethnic minorities and political dissidents, populist and nationalist rhetoric, economic nationalism, and alliance with the economic elite. The Trump project, however, is different from twentieth-century fascism, in that its scapegoating is more subtle, its political propaganda and manipulation are more sophisticated, and it allows minorities and women to assume leadership roles. It thus should be understood as fascism in a new form, or neofascism.

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Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice,
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The emergence of Trump and ultra-right parties in Europe is a sign of the sustained structural crisis of the world-system, a consequence of the fact that the world-system, which must economically expand through territorial expansion, has reached the geographical limits of the earth and has overextended its ecological limits. During the course of the twentieth century, the global elite lacked the political will to carry out the reformist visions of Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, and Jimmy Carter, even though they were nothing more than reforms of the neocolonial world-system, designed to foster the political stability of the world-system, as we have seen in Chap. 6. Once the signs of the profound structural crisis became manifest, the global elite responded by launching, beginning in 1980, what has been, in effect, an economic and military assault on the Third World. These post-1980 dynamics established conditions favorable to the emergence in the Third World of an extremist strategy, a new type of terrorism characterized by the indiscriminate killing of civilians; and they generated desperate economic and social conditions in the Third World, creating an uncontrolled international migration. These two phenomena have provoked fears and anxieties among the peoples of the North, making it possible for the Trump project to attain a certain degree of popular support.

The emergence of Trump also has been aided by the failure of the Left to formulate a narrative, based on encounter with the Third World movements of national and social liberation, that is an alternative to the mainstream American narratives. The Left has not created an alternative narrative that explains to the people the role of colonial domination in establishing the foundations for the present inequalities in the neocolonial world-system. It has not expressed a narrative on the American Republic, which acknowledges that US ascent was based on insertion into structures of exploitation and domination, yet which calls for a future for the Republic on the basis of an expansion and deepening of the values of the Founding Fathers. It has not developed an alternative political party that educates and organizes the people, that formulates a politically effective comprehensive and historical explanation of the global structural sources of the problems that humanity confronts, and that offers intelligent proposals, capable of mobilizing the people.

Let us analyze the two issues have particularly agitated the peoples of the North. First, since 1967, there has emerged a "distinctive genre of violence" as a social phenomenon (Ansary 2009, 332) that we know today as terrorism. It is different from the classical strategy of terrorism

that was debated internally in popular and nationalist movements, which was far more limited. Classical terrorism involved the assassination of officials of the state, especially those known for their brutality, or the assassination of collaborators with the regime. Moreover, although classical terrorism was debated within revolutionary movements and apparently was adopted in some cases, it was used on a very limited scale, even in cases in which the struggle took the form of a guerrilla war. The Communist International took an explicit position against terrorism and prohibited its member parties from practicing it. The 26 of July Movement in Cuba rejected the practice as immoral and unethical and as a dysfunctional political strategy.

The terrorism that has emerged since 1967 as a new social pattern involves a much higher level of violence. It kills civilians intentionally, not as an accidental byproduct; moreover, it kills indiscriminately, without selecting the people who are its victims on the basis of their specific role in the political and social system. The deliberate indiscriminate killing of civilians by clandestine groups occasionally occurred prior to 1967. But after the Six Day War of 1967, the new form of terrorism emerged in the Arab world as a social phenomenon, occurring with a degree of regularity. The clandestine groups adopting the new terrorist strategy take the Islamic concept of jihad, historically understood as struggle to defeat the enemies of Islam, and they present themselves as Muslims. However, their understanding is very different from the great majority of Muslims, so they should be referred to as "jihadists," rather than "Islamists" or Islamic radicals.

Following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, jihadists from the Arab world and Pakistan flocked to support the Afghan guerrilla resistance, supplied with money and arms by the accommodationist Arab states and the USA. As jihadism grew during the 1980s, it spread to the non-Arab Islamic world, and it increasingly turned to the killing of civilians, with citizens of Western nations included among its victims. Jihadism promoted and created an apparent clash between Western and Islamic civilizations, casting aside the effort since the 1950s by Third World nations, including those of the Islamic world, to forge universal human values through various international organizations, including the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement (Ansary 2009, 321–322, 332, 344; Huntington 1997, 19–39; Prashad 2007, 272–273).

In order to understand the emergence of the new form of terrorism, let us remember relevant history. As the European colonial empires fell, the strategy of the West was to block the creation of the more just world-system advocated by the revolutionary Third World project of national and social liberation. The West supported the Third World sector that was tied to Western interests and advocated an accommodationist nationalism, subordinate to the interests of the West. In the Arab world, the Third World project of national and social liberation was most fully represented in the 1950s and 1960s by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. In 1952, Nasser led a group of young military officers in overthrowing a corrupt monarchy that was subservient to European interests. The officers represented various strains of Egyptian political thought, including nationalism, Islamic modernism, the Muslim Brotherhood, communism, and Pan-Arabism. Once in power, Nasser forged the ideology of Arab socialism or Islamic socialism, by which he meant a socialist society built on a foundation of the principles of Islam. The Egyptian revolutionary government of Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal; nationalized foreign companies and banks; refused to participate in military alliances against the Soviet Union; purchased arms for the modernization of its army from Czechoslovakia, avoiding the political conditions that were tied to the US offer of arms; and recognized the Popular Republic of China. Egypt became a center for solidarity organizations from Africa and Asia as well as for nationalist organizations from the Arab world, and Cairo hosted the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in 1957. Nasser was one of the leading voices (along with Sukarno of Indonesia, Nehru of India, and Tito of Yugoslavia) in the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. During the period 1956–1967, Nasserism was the hope of the Arab world (Ansary 2009, 324–326; Prashad 2007, 31–34, 51–52, 96–99, 148; Schulze 2000, 148–152).

In its desire to block Nasserism, the global elite came to the support of a limited project of "development" directed by the Arab elite. This project promoted a form of religious fundamentalism known as Wahhabism, named for the eighteenth-century Arabian cleric Abdul Wahhab. In the aftermath of the European domination of the Islamic world, Wahhab called upon Muslims to eliminate Western influences and to return to the pure, original form of Islam. As it developed, Wahhabism preached that Muslims ought to follow literally and exactly the Islamic laws on prayer, fasting, and alms-giving. It taught that jihad is a religious obligation, and it defined the enemies of Islam as including

Muslims who loosely followed Islamic laws, who were hypocritical in their Islamic professions, or who introduced innovations into Islamic theology and practice. Wahhabism attained enormous influence throughout the Islamic world by the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly among the rural poor (Ansary 2009, 249–257, 306–307). During the course of the twentieth century, it increasingly would be promoted by the elite of the Islamic world, offering it to the poor as an alternative to the emerging project of Third World national and social liberation.

Among those schooled in Wahhabism was Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia, who created the World Muslim League in 1962. The League was organized to "disrupt the growth of Third World nationalism and its secular sense of community, and to recall in its place the sublime bonds of religion." It established an international Islamic news agency and Islamic cultural centers, and it held regular conferences for the purpose of consolidating the struggle against Third World nationalism and communism. In creating the World Muslim League, Faysal acted in accord with the wishes of leaders in the Islamic world who "rejected Third World nationalism, its secularism and its socialism as well as its type of modernity," because "Third World nationalism was ideologically predisposed to the dismissal of hierarchy, and the domination of certain classes and clans." Whereas "Nasserism and Communism promised equality, the Saudis proffered a celestial equality" that "accepted the hierarchy of the world" (Prashad 2007, 260–262; Schulze 2000, 173).

Throughout the Islamic world, the established upper social classes promoted literal interpretations of Islam such as Wahhabism, seeking to derail the progressive and socialist readings of the Islamic tradition that were integral to the Nasserist Third World agenda. This ideological strategy was supported by the USA, which also gave full political, economic, and military support to monarchies and dictatorships in the region, as alternatives to Nasserism (Ansary 2009, 340; Prashad 2007, 267–268; Schulze 2000, 128–129, 138, 151–152). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the World Muslim League was still limited in influence. Its role was to provide comfort and support for "scholars and activists who felt beleaguered in their societies for their anachronistic ideas about modernity and statecraft" (Prashad 2007, 268). However, it soon would grow rapidly.

Following the defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the Six Day War of 1967, Saudi Arabia emerged as the regional leader, taking the place of Egypt. With oil wealth and US political and military backing,

Saudi Arabia funded Wahhabis Islamic organizations throughout the world. One organization that benefitted from the resurgent Islamic literalism was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by an Egyptian schoolteacher in 1928. Envisioning a transnational Islamic unity, it opposed the division of the Islamic World into separate nation-states. It stood against nationalist leaders in the Islamic world, whether they be accommodationist nationalists dependent on Western elites, or autonomous nationalists allied with the Third World project of national and social liberation. With a strong following among the urban working-class poor, the Muslim Brotherhood grew with expanding urbanization. The Brotherhood evolved into "a pandemic low-level insurgency—seething against secularism and Western influence, seething against its own modernist elite, against its own government, against all nationalist governments in Muslim countries, even against the apparatus of democracy to the extent that this reflected Western values" (Ansary 2009, 310). Since the 1930s, the Brotherhood had been a thorn in the side of autonomous nationalist leaders, who found themselves simultaneously battling imperialism from above and Islamic insurgency from below. As the Muslim Brotherhood spread throughout the Arab World after 1967, it began to sprout increasingly radical offshoots that gave emphasis to the concept of jihad as a duty for true Muslims (Ansary 2009, 308–310, 326–327, 331–332).

Islamic literalism spread at a rapid pace for various reasons: the limited gains of the revolutionary Third World project of national and social liberation, blocked by the West; the limited capacity of the Nasserist project to deliver on its promise of autonomous national economic and social development, inasmuch as it was hampered by Western opposition and sanctions; the decline in prestige of the Nasserist project that resulted from the Six Day War; the growing class inequalities generated by accommodationist governments; the subordination of accommodationist nationalism to Western economic interests; and the increasing obviousness of the hypocrisy of accommodationist politicians with respect to nationalist aspirations and Islam. Islamic literalism was a turn to the past, driven by a loss of faith in the future that Nasser had envisioned and by a rejection of accommodationism, for its lack of dignity. In the 1970s, developmentalism and modernism remained the dominant motif as national liberation states attempted to reform from below the neocolonial world-system, but Islamic literalism has become influential among the marginalized and excluded (Ansary 2009, 342).

In the 1980s in Afghanistan, the USA turned to direct support of the Islamic insurgency, not only indirectly through support of Saudi Arabia. The Islamist guerrilla resistance was backed with money and arms by the Saudi-financed World Muslim League, which generally supported Islamic literalists, and by the CIA, which hoped to involve the Soviet Union in an unwinnable war. The 8-year anti-Soviet guerrilla war "totally empowered the country's Islamist ideologues" and "attracted Islamist zealots from around the Muslim world, including jihadists from the Arab world" and Pakistan (Ansary 2009, 344), who repackaged themselves as freedom fighters. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Afghan communists, the USA disengaged from Afghanistan, making no effort to rebuild the war-torn country. The jihadists made Afghanistan, now reduced to a rubble, as their base of operations for a war against the West. They helped to develop the Taliban (Ansary 2009, 344–347; Prashad 2007, 271–272; Schulze 2000, 229–233).

Long-term global trends also favored the decline of the Third World project of national and social liberation and the rise of Islamic insurgency. As the global powers turned to the neoliberal project and as the International Monetary Fund pushed states toward the abandonment of social services in health, education, and relief, the Islamic organizations affiliated with the World Muslim League filled the void, thus expanding exponentially. With the imposition of neoliberal globalization on the world, the sovereignty of states was undermined, and the idea of nationalism and patriotism was severed from a context defined by the "secular-socialist nationalism of the Third World agenda" and placed in a worldview formed by a cultural nationalism imbued with traditional religious concepts (Prashad 2007, 274). By the 1980s, it had become clear that Islamic leaders of the Left could not make their dreams real, and Islamic literalism thrived among the excluded people of the lower classes (Ansary 2009, 343–344; Prashad 2007, 271, 273–274; Schulze 2000, 248–249).

Taking into account the recent history of the Arab and Islamic worlds, let us ask: What has caused the emergence of the new form of terrorism characterized by the indiscriminate and deliberate killing of civilians? The answer is logical, even if scarcely acknowledged in the discourses of the North: firstly, the blocking by the global powers of all reasonable political efforts by the peoples and movements of the Third World to protect their national sovereignty and to establish economic and cultural autonomy; secondly, the adoption of strategies by the USA that gave space

to those ideological sectors in the Islamic world most inclined to adopt extremist measures. In using any and all means to block reform from below of the neocolonial world-system, the global powers gave credibility and legitimacy to extremist violence.

When the new form of terrorism emerged as a social phenomenon in the 1990s, the "war on terrorism" was one possible response for the societies of the North. But another response would have been possible, one based on recognition of the fact that the inequalities and injustices of the neocolonial world-system have consequences even for the societies of the North, and thus these injustices have to be addressed. Here is where the Left in the North should have been prepared, explaining the political, economic, financial, and ecological unsustainability of the neocolonial world-system and proposing North–South cooperation for the construction of a just, democratic and sustainable world-system. The Left should have been proposing cooperation with the Third World project of national and social liberation as the best way to eliminate terrorism.

The second problem that has agitated the peoples of the North is the problem of immigration, or more precisely, the problem of uncontrolled international migration. In the USA, some politicians have reacted to the problem with proposals of exclusion, while other politicians as well as activists focus on inclusion and respecting the rights of the immigrants. Neither band analyzes or proposes solutions to the global problem of uncontrolled international migration.

In his first 100 days in office, President Donald Trump has taken decisive steps toward controlling and reducing immigration to the USA and deporting undocumented immigrants, consistent with his campaign rhetoric. The measures taken by the Trump administration, although they have generated a high level of conflict and controversy, respond to concerns and fears of the people, inasmuch as there is widespread belief that the government has not been taking sufficient steps to control illegal immigration, and that the USA does not have sufficient employment or social services to receive immigrants, legal and illegal, from the impoverished and conflicted areas of the world. Gallop polls in early 2017 show that 59% of non-Hispanic whites in USA worry about illegal immigration, a figure that was even higher in the period 2001–2011. Although the Left portrays concern with illegal immigration as xenophobic and racist, the polls show that 67% of Hispanics and 57% of non-Hispanic blacks also are worried about illegal immigration.

Popular concerns may be fueled to some extent by the sometimes cavalier attitude with respect to immigration laws on the part of some of the defenders of the rights of the immigrants. When the Left demands nonenforcement of immigration laws and advocates direct action resistance, it gives the impression to the people that the Left does not recognize that government regulation of international migration is necessary for social order. With its posturing, the Left gives an impression of immaturity, irresponsibility, and idealist disconnection from real problems; it conveys an image that does not inspire confidence, thus ensuring its limited influence among the people.

In the case of the USA, immigration today is fundamentally different from the great migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The world-economy has become stagnant since the 1970s, having overextended its geographical limits; moreover, the US economy has declined since the 1970s, relative to other core economies. The immigrants today to the countries of the North are not being pulled by expanding economies; rather, they are being pushed by the increasing deterioration of economic and social conditions in peripheral and semiperipheral zones of the world-economy and by the violence and chaos resulting from wars of aggression and interventions by the core powers.

The world situation is today out of control, with poverty and violence in many regions of the world and uncontrolled migration from the most desperate countries. The political elite, committed primarily to the defense of its interests and those of corporations, does not respond adequately to the situation. Living in an exclusive manner, the members of the power elite are less adversely affected by the problems that the people face, such as that of uncontrolled international migration. This is sensed by the people of the USA, who do not have good understanding of global dynamics, but they do have the commonsense intelligence to intuit that the global situation is out of control and that the elite is responding only to its own particular interests. As a result, Trump's anti-immigrant messages and executive orders are attractive to a significant sector of the people.

In this situation, the Left does not have an adequate response. It defends the rights of the immigrants, which of course is demanded and required by ancient prophetic calls of justice for the poor, the oppressed, and the foreigner. But defending the rights of legal and illegal immigrants is not enough. What is required is a credible and workable alternative to the anti-immigrant discourse and policies of the Right.

The Left, however, fails to take seriously the concerns of the people and propose solutions to address them. Rather than dismissing the concerns of the people as xenophobic, the Left should recognize the duty of governments to enact and enforce immigration laws, and it should propose more just immigration laws, designed from the vantage point of the well-being of the people and the nation.

The US guest worker program, for example, could be reformed, such that, instead of a maximum of 1 year, the worker's participation could be renewed for a period of 5–7 years, following which the worker would be eligible for permanent residence and citizenship. The reform could include guarantees for the protection of the workers' rights, including minimum wage and the right to organize. It also could establish that criminal behavior would give the government the right to deport the worker. The reform of the guest worker programs could be the basis for a controlled, orderly, and legal migration. It would respond to the need for workers in fields where labor is in short supply, and it would respond to the desire of persons to migrate to the USA. At the same time, such a reform would address the concerns of people in the USA with respect to the present uncontrolled character of immigration. Such specific proposals for immigration reform should be at the forefront of the Left's message, for they would convey a much more mature and responsible image than do calls for non-enforcement of laws and direct action resistance. It is a question of having the political intelligence to propose solutions to problems and having the patience and the capacity to educate the people on the reasonableness of the proposed solutions.

In addition, the Left should be explaining to the people that uncontrolled international migration is one of the several symptoms of the sustained structural crisis of the neocolonial world-system, which demonstrate its unsustainability. It should make clear that, in the long run, the problem of uncontrolled international migration will be overcome when the regions from which the migrants come experience economic and social development. Accordingly, the governments of the North should be cooperating with the governments and movements of the Third World, seeking to promote the development of peripheral and semiperipheral regions, so that a just, democratic and sustainable world-system can emerge.

Thus, both problems of the new terrorism and the uncontrolled international migration can be effectively addressed by a comprehensive global project of North–South cooperation. This should be the proposal

of the Left, explaining the necessity of such a global project, given the unsustainability of the capitalist world-economy. The Left should be projecting a hopeful vision of a just, democratic and sustainable world-system, developed through cooperation among the peoples and nations of the world, in accordance with the proposals and practices of a number of significant Third World governments.

A third issue that Trump has been able to political exploit is the abandonment of the nation by the corporate elite since the 1970s. As the US economy was declining relative to other core nations, US corporations did not use their increasing control of both major political parties to establish protectionist policies. Rather, their strategy was to globalize: internationalize the productive process, utilizing the cheaper labor of other nations to effectively compete with foreign companies, thereby reducing its dependency on US labor and relatively high US wages. The strategy was supported by the US government, through a tax structure that lowered taxes for US companies that produced goods, or component parts, abroad and sold them in the US market. And the strategy was supported by most governments of the peripheral and semiperipheral regions, which were compelled by the US and international finance agencies to open their labor to direct foreign exploitation, with a minimum of restrictions.

Although the global strategy was in the short-term interests of US corporations, it hastened the relative decline the USA. It reduced the supply of relatively high-waged jobs, and thus it constrained the growth of the US domestic market. In addition, it had negative consequences for the world-economy. The development of low-waged, export-oriented manufacturing, disconnected from the national economies and in no sense integral to autonomous national development plans, does not improve the development prospects for the peripheral and semiperipheral nations where the global strategy is manifest. In producing negative effects for the world as a whole, the strategy limited the possibilities for sustainable US economic development, inasmuch as the development of the USA is tied inescapably to that of the world-economy.

However, because the political careers of US politicians depended upon corporate support, no sector of the political establishment emerged to explain to the people the self-interested behavior of the US corporate elite. At the same time, US activists and academics of the Left, although not beholden to the elite, developed in the context of a horizon limited by the American experience, and they were not capable of explaining to

the people that the solution to the problem of factory relocation, like the problems of terrorism and uncontrolled international migration, is North–South cooperation. Thus, the people have understood the issue of factory relocation only partially, but they have sufficient commonsense intelligence to intuit that they have been abandoned by the US corporate elite and the US political establishment, with jobs, free trade, and factory relocation functioning as buzz words expressing their discontent.

In this context of betrayal and discontent, as well as the failure of the Left to mobilize the people in a politically intelligent form, Donald Trump emerged, declaring himself against the political establishment, against free trade, and for the people. His plan is economic nationalism. Trump intends to protect US workers by withdrawing from or renegotiating free trade agreements, imposing a protective tax on imported goods and services, and restructuring taxes so that companies would have an economic incentive to manufacture in the USA.

The Trump administration is doing the right thing in going against free trade agreements, but not for the right reasons. Trump wants to place US interests first, without analysis of the impact of US protectionist policies on other nations or the world-economy, and the protections proposed by Trump likely will have strongly negative consequences for many countries and for the world-economy. What is required is for nations to practice a form of economic nationalism that is accompanied by a spirit and practice of internationalism, solidarity, and cooperation. The challenge is for each nation not only to protect its economic interests, but also to cooperate in the creative development of mutually beneficial trade, so that world commerce expands and both trading partners have their interests protected. Such a new form of mutually beneficial trade is precisely what the nations of Latin America have proclaimed and have been seeking to develop since 2001. If the political will were present in the USA, US policy could turn to cooperate with the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, which also are seeking mutually beneficial forms of trade with China and Russia. The Trump administration, however, is proposing a narrow economic nationalism that stands in opposition to the cooperative internationalism that is necessary for responding to the sustained structural crisis of the world-system in a manner that is based on the common interests of humanity.

Although its policy of narrow economic nationalism puts the Trump administration in conflict with the considerable sector of the corporate elite with a globalist orientation, the administration is taking decisive

action in support of corporate interests with respect to the 50-year conflict between corporations and the ecology movement. This conflict is in essence over government regulations, with the ecology movement advocating strong government regulation of corporations in order to protect the environment, and with the corporate world so opposed to regulation that it has undertaken campaigns to create a false image of division among scientists. The corporate elite clearly demonstrates its irresponsibility, placing profits above nature and above knowledge. But on the other hand, the ecology movement is often idealist in its conceptions, not seeking to balance ecological concerns with the material needs of the people of the nation and the world. This idealism is sensed by the people, limiting its influence among the people, not only for the ecology movement but also for the Left in general.

Donald Trump has an effective populist rhetoric. He began his inaugural address of January 20, 2017, with a succinct and true description of the abandonment of the people and the nation by the political establishment and the corporate elite, and with a stirring proclamation that, from this day forward, the government will be controlled by the people. He declared:

> Today we are not merely transferring power from one administration to another, or from one party to another—but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the American People. For too long, a small group in our nation's Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost. Washington flourished – but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country. Their victories have not been your victories; their triumphs have not been your triumphs; and while they celebrated in our nation's capital, there was little to celebrate for struggling families all across our land. That all changes – starting right here, and right now, because this moment is your moment: it belongs to you. It belongs to everyone gathered here today and everyone watching all across America. This is your day. This is your celebration. And this, the United States of America, is your country. What truly matters is not which party controls our government, but whether our government is controlled by the people. January 20, 2017 will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again. The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer.

Defending the interests of the people is a good thing. Indeed, it is necessary in today's world, as humanity confronts a sustained and profound global crisis. But populist rhetoric that appeals to the disappointments, discontents, and resentments of the people, while not seeking to educate the people and mobilize them with respect to their true interests, is a manifestation not of popular democracy but of fascism. The similarities between Trump's project and twentieth-century European fascism should not be overlooked. It is, however, a new form of fascism that includes leadership roles for women and people of color, in accordance with post-1965 rules of equal political and civil rights for women and minorities. And it manipulates rather than intimidates, relying less on violent gangs and more on a sophisticated public discourse. Although attacks on immigrants and Muslims are likely to continue rising during the Trump regime, scapegoating and the silencing of opponents will be far more subtle and more advanced than the dynamics of Germany and Italy in the 1930s and early 1940s.

But we should understand the Trump neofascist project in the context of the evolving political culture of the USA. The Trump project stands on a historic foundation that includes continuous imperialist policies since 1898 and a permanent war economy since 1945, and it includes noxious tendencies since 1980: an increasing militarism, subtle racism, a banal public discourse that obscures the economic decline of the nation, news reporting that does not know the meaning of analysis, a permanent war on terrorism, and a Left constrained by the limitations of the political culture. This historic development since 1898 has involved taking decisive steps away from the promise of democracy powerfully articulated by Thomas Jefferson. But Trump takes further steps: an escalation of the scapegoating rhetoric, a move toward a narrow economic nationalism, and the adoption of a populist rhetoric that casts Trump and his team as defenders of the people against the corporations and the media. Trump did not create the new form of fascism; rather, he represents a decisive step in a historic descent toward neofascism.

The Left must reflect on its failure, made evident by the emergence of the Trump neofascist project, and it must reconstruct its discourse. The attack by the global elite on the Third World, which stands without moral and reasonable defense, must be understood by the leaders and intellectuals of the Left in the North, and it must be central to the narratives that they formulate for presentation to their peoples.

Alternative narratives of the Left in the North must be moral indictments of the global powers, for their irresponsibility in rejecting the proposals of the Third World project and in leading humanity to a condition of deep and sustained global crisis. In the USA, such a narrative would empower the Left to mobilize the people in opposition to the neoliberal policies of Reagan–Bush I–Clinton–Bush II–Obama as well as the neofascist project of Trump and his team. It would delegitimate both neoliberalism and neofascism for their false "war or terrorism." It would discredit the one for failing to respond to the sources of uncontrolled international migration, and the other for attacking the human rights of immigrants.

The Left narrative ought to include a number of key points.

1. It ought to include an alternative narrative on Islamic history. It ought to defend and explain the project of Nasser as a form of Islamic modernism, which took a middle position between accommodation to the West and Islamic traditionalism, and which envisioned modern, independent, and republican nation-states in the Arab world. It ought to make clear the strategy of Western governments to block the project of Nasser, whose crime was a desire to be truly independent and not subject to the neocolonial domination of the West. And it ought to expose the support of the USA and its accommodationist allies for Islamic traditionalism and Islamic extremism, in its efforts to destroy Nasserism (see Ansary 2009, 261–268, 324–326; Prashad, 2007, 31–34, 51–52, 96–99, 148; Schulze 2000, 148–152, 174–175).
2. A narrative of the Left ought to explain the formation of OPEC in 1960 as an example of the general Third World strategy of creating public commodity cartels that united raw materials exporting nations. It ought to defend this Third World strategy as justified, for it had hoped to curb the power of the private cartels that had been formed by the manufacturers and distributors of the West, with the belief that public primary product cartels would enable exporting nations to set prices for their raw materials, thus generating more income for investment in national industry and social development (Prashad 2007, 69–70, 180–186; 2014, 16–21). The narrative of the Left ought to support all Third World efforts to promote the economic and social development of the Third World, declaring that the development of the poor nations is necessary, if humanity is to attain a world-system

that is not only just, but also politically stable and economically and ecologically sustainable.

3. A narrative of the Left ought to expose the strategy of the US government in the 1970s to pressure Arab governments to invest oil surplus money in the banks of the North and to purchase arms manufactured in the West, thus severing oil surplus revenues from the Third World project of national and social liberation. The goal of the strategy, in addition to obtaining funds for the banks and arms manufacturers of the North, was to stimulate a limited form of development in the Arab world that was consistent with the interests of the West. This successful strategy led to an accommodation between the Arab elite and the West, an accommodation that included support for an Islamic version of religious fundamentalism. Islamic literalism grew significantly with US and Saudi support as the Nasserist project was unable to attain its hopes for social and economic development (Ansary 2009, 335–342; Prashad 2007, 21–24).
4. A narrative of the Left ought to make clear that the USA turned to direct support for Islamic insurgency, rather than indirectly through Saudi Arabia, in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Ansary 2009, 344; Prashad 2007, 272). US support for jihadists in Afghanistan had a boomerang effect, which may or may not have been intended by US policymakers, inasmuch as Afghanistan became a base of operations for jihadists who were undertaking a war against the West, including the adoption of the new form of terrorism.
5. A narrative of the Left ought to present an alternative approach to the war on terrorism. In the short-term, the pursuit and prosecution of terrorists by law enforcement agents and criminal justice institutions is necessary. But long-term anti-terrorist policy ought to be based on recognition that the blocking by the West of the reasonable and just changes sought by Nasserism and other Third World projects of national and social liberation created a political and social environment favorable to terrorism. Long-term policy should seek to develop strategies of support and cooperation with movements and governments of the Third World, based on the cessation of all efforts by the core powers to preserve neocolonial structures.

6. A narrative of the Left ought to explain the sources of the uncontrolled international migration in the structures of the neocolonial world-system. The Left must recognize that uncontrolled international migration is a social problem that reflects social disorder and insecurity in the migrants' countries of origin, and it implies a level of social disorder and insecurity in the countries where the migrants arrive, provoking popular concerns in said countries. The Left must intelligently analyze the problem of uncontrolled international migration, and it must formulate politically intelligent proposals that defend the rights of the migrants and that also attend to the social disorder that is both source and consequence of uncontrolled international migration. And it ought to explain that international migration would be reduced by the transformation of neocolonial structures and the development of a just and sustainable world-system, which among other things, would respect the right of all nations to economic and social development and the right of all persons to have the possibility to earn a decent standard of living in their native lands. To this end, the narrative of the Left should include proposals for North–South cooperation, in which the governments of the North cooperate with the governments and movements of the Third World in developing mutually beneficial trade and in promoting the economic and social development of the Third World.
7. The Left narrative should be integral, global, and historical. It should be formulated on the basis of encounter with the social movements of the Third World, which speak on behalf of a humanity that is neocolonized, dispossessed, and excluded. In response to the prevailing ahistorical and ethnocentric public discourse in the nations of the North, the narrative of the Left should explain the historical development of the structures of the world-system. As a rejoinder to the myopic concept of American exceptionalism, the Left narrative ought to explain the historic insertion of the USA in colonial/neocolonial structures, thus facilitating its spectacular ascent. In response to the ideological attack on the state of recent decades, the alternative narrative should explain the necessary role of the state as defender of the interests of the people, making clear that this role includes regulation and active engagement in the economy. And as a rejection of imperialist and neoliberal policies, the Left narrative ought to affirm the obligation of all nations to develop foreign

policies that respect the sovereignty of all nations, as a necessary precondition for a politically stable world-system.

8. The narrative of the Left ought to focus on the nation. In listening to the discourse of the movements of the Third World, we see that the various issues are integrated around the organizing principle of the nation. The theoretical integration does not give primacy to race, nor to gender, nor to class, as occurs with grand narratives developed in the West. Rather, primacy is given to the nation: the right of the nation to exist and to be sovereign; the historic development of the nation; the values that are the foundation of the nation; the place of the nation in the world; and the values that ought to guide relations with other nations. In the Third World narratives, patriotism is fundamental; it is the foundation of commitment to the cause of justice that is formulated with respect to the various issues of national liberation, class, gender, race and ethnicity, and ecology. The Third World tendency of giving primacy to the nation could serve as an inspiration for those committed to social justice in the North. All modern nations have a story that includes a struggle for democracy in some form or other, even those nations that became colonizing or imperialist nations in the world-system. These stories can be the foundation for national narratives that mobilize the peoples in defense of the true and the right. Patriotism is central to the neofascist discourse of Trump and his team. They want to defend the nation, against foreign companies that steal jobs and sell their products in the national market, and against immigrants who enter the country without an adequate process of regulation. Their patriotism, however, is narrow, for it ignores the rights of other nations. The Left can effectively counter Trump's narrow patriotism not with a belief that patriotism is an antiquated sentiment, possessed only by those who lack sophistication, nor with a posture that gives insincere lip service to narrow patriotism. Rather, neofascism can be effectively countered with a form of patriotism that is guided by an internationalist spirit, that recognizes that all nations have rights, and that proclaims that such was the full intention of the American promise of democracy, even though the founders of the American Republic could not, in the context of their times, grasp its full implications.

The Left must be present with a scientifically informed and politically effective narrative, explaining that a more just, democratic and sustainable world-system is necessary for the survival of humanity and for the continued development of human societies and human civilization. The Left should present to the people a well-formulated alternative to the neoliberalism that reigned from Reagan to Obama and the neofascism of Trump.

Present conditions make possible and necessary a politically effective alternative political party of the Left. Its success in attracting the support of the people would be a consequence of its capacity to formulate explanations and proposals that are analytically sound and politically astute, taking advantage of the current historic moment, which is characterized by the demonstrated moral and intellectual incapacity of the global elite to respond to the sustained crisis of the world-system and by the growing disgust of the people with the established order and the political establishment. Alternative political parties, therefore, must be formed in the nations of the North. They should be political parties dedicated to taking power from corporations and putting it in the hands of the people's delegates. The new parties should not be merely electoral parties, but political parties that also educate and organize the people. Accordingly, they should generate manifestos that provide grand narratives that scientifically explain the sustained structural crisis of the world-system in historical and global context. They should develop platforms that constructively address the concerns and anxieties that are rooted in the confusions of the people. They should form people's schools where manifestos, platforms, and proposed programs can be studied and discussed. They should develop a discourse that is sensitive to the values of the people, a discourse that is confident, without being arrogant or morally righteous, and hopeful, without being idealist. The new political parties should form and lift up exceptional leaders who have gifts similar to those possessed by the great revolutionaries of the past, whose teachings enlighten and inspire us in the present.

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