Global Power Shift

Ryszard Zięba

The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century

From Cooperation to Crisis

Springer

Global Power Shift

Comparative Analysis and Perspectives

Ample empirical evidence points to recent power shifts in multiple areas of international relations taking place between industrialized countries and emerging powers, as well as between states and non-state actors. However, there is a dearth of theoretical interpretation and synthesis of these findings, and a growing need for coherent approaches to understand and measure the transformation. The central issues to be addressed include theoretical questions and empirical puzzles: How can studies of global power shift and the rise of 'emerging powers' benefit from existing theories, and which alternative aspects and theoretical approaches might be suitable? How can the meanings, perceptions, dynamics, and consequences of global power shift be determined and assessed? This edited series will include highly innovative research on these topics. It aims to bring together scholars from all major world regions as well as different disciplines, including political science, economics and human geography. The overall aim is to discuss and possibly blend their different approaches and provide new frameworks for understanding global affairs and the governance of global power shifts.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10201

Ryszard Zięba

The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century

From Cooperation to Crisis

Springer

Ryszard Zięba
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies
University of Warsaw
Warsaw
Poland

ISSN 2198-7343 ISSN 2198-7351 (electronic)
Global Power Shift
ISBN 978-3-319-79104-3 ISBN 978-3-319-79105-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018937692

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my children, Ola and Przemek

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction

1 The Subject of the Euro-Atlantic Security System

At the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s the communist systems of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed, Germany was united, the Eastern Bloc eroded, and the USSR disintegrated. The Cold War division of Europe into two political and military blocs was overcome and a new international order began to take shape. As a result, a Euro-Atlantic security system emerged to replace the previous division into East and West. In essence, that two-part system was based on a functional balance of forces, which was simultaneously a balance of fear. It ensured the political and military security of countries belonging to both of its elements, that is, to either the Eastern or Western subsystem. Both were hierarchical, and their hegemonic leaders were the USA and the USSR, which determined the functioning of the blocs. The participants in the East-West system behaved similarly; the countries and their allies, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, acted to maintain and increase their power while expecting a like reaction from their opponents, in accord with the theory of political realism. Their policies contained the 'security dilemma' which John Hertz and Herbert Butterfield had described in the middle of the 20th century: a country's increase in its own potential and capabilities causes its opponents and rivals to feel a growing sense of threat, resulting in their equalizing actions, which can even lead to war.[1] These policies created an arms race, with the result that the equilibrium was attained at an ever higher and more costly level. Until the middle of the 1980s the countries of both blocs increased their spending on armaments. The tempo of spending declined only when the new leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced a policy of reshaping his country (*perestroika*) and a change in foreign policy consisting in seeking agreement with the West.[2]

After the Cold War, the Eastern Bloc ceased to exist, and the Central European countries, which had been under the domination of the USSR till that time, set

[1]Herz (1950), pp. 157–158, Herz (1951), pp. 3–4, Butterfield (1951), pp. 19–23.
[2]Gorbachev (1987).

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_1

themselves on a course of cooperation and integration with the West. In the 1990s, the Western countries began to expand their multilateral and integrative institutions to the democratizing countries of Central Europe. The new security system constituted the application in practice of the liberal vision of building security based on the values and norms prevailing in the Western world. An organization for collective security was not created—as had occurred after the First and Second World Wars—and the institutional basis of the new security system was the multilateral structures of the West, which in accepting new member countries was supposed to extend the sphere of stability, democracy, prosperity, and security. Thus in the Euro-Atlantic area the degree to which security was ensured was asymmetrical: higher for the West and increasingly weaker in the eastern direction. Andrew Cottey even claims that the same transatlantic or Western security community that had taken shape during the Cold War in Western Europe in the 1990s expanded to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the institutional sense it is based on NATO and the European Union. The countries of this extended security community[3] adopted a common policy toward the rest of Europe. The relations between the European security community and the countries that found themselves beyond its borders began to resemble a center-periphery model.[4] This produced challenges and tensions in the regions lying on the peripheries of the newly broadened European security community, particularly in the Balkans and in the post-Soviet space.[5]

The situation evolved in this way because the Western countries agreed to expand their international structures to the democratizing countries of Central Europe, while Russia and other post-Soviet countries were not given guarantees by the West (and Russia did not at all expect such guarantees). Because Russia was weak and struggling with serious socio-economic problems that had arisen during the transformation of its political system, it agreed to asymmetrical cooperation with the West, while remaining basically outside the Western security community. On the other hand, certain post-Soviet countries, which remained under Russia's influence, did not indicate a desire to join western structures, especially as the West did not make any concrete offers to them.

NATO's first enlargement, in 1999, to three Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) led to objections from Russia, which viewed the move in traditional political and military categories as the West's 'approach' to Russia's borders. When another enlargement of NATO occurred in 2004, to as many as seven countries, including three former republics of the USSR—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—and then the EU expanded to eight Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), Russia became convinced that the West was engaged in geopolitical expansion toward Russian borders. Furthermore, Moscow objected to the 'export'

[3]One German scholar uses the term 'Transatlantic security community'. See Risse (2016).

[4]Cottey (2013), pp. 13–17, 259.

[5]Ibidem, pp. 260–261.

of democracy eastward in the form of 'color revolutions' in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kirgizstan (in the years 2003–2005). All this led Russia to block the West's 'expansion.' On February 10, 2007, at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, accused the USA and the West in general of expansion, of seeking world domination, of violating international law, of militarizing international relations and announced that Russia would resist such moves.[6] This development made clear that the Euro-Atlantic security system had run into a conflict of interests among its members. It began to evolve from cooperation toward rivalry, which led to its crisis, which manifested itself during the events in Ukraine beginning with the autumn of 2013.

The above reasons speak for a need to study the Euro-Atlantic security system's functioning and evolution in the 21st century and of its international implications.

2 The Neorealist Research Perspective

In the social sciences there is no one inter-subjective definition of a 'system,' but the majority of scholars point out that the essence of a system is that it constitutes a certain whole whose elements are appropriately organized. Thus it comes down to the participants in a system and the feedback loops between them, or in other words, their ties, interactions, and arrangements.[7] In the opinion of many authors, a system is formed only by these arrangements.[8] In the present work, the idea of an international system is used in the ontological sense, as a real existing international system in the Euro-Atlantic area. Thus it is an inductive approach consisting in drawing conclusions from a sequence of recent—21st century—historical facts. In this sense, it adopts the methods that have been used by such scholars as George Modelski, Robert Gilpin, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Barry Buzan and Richard Little to analyze the history of international systems.[9]

The well-known American realist, Stephen M. Walt, in reflecting on which theory can be used to clarify international relations, points out that realism, liberalism, radical (Marxist) theories, and constructivism predominate in studies. He concludes:

[6]In conclusion he said: "[W]e would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all." Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, *Washington Post*, February 12, 2007.

[7]Easton (1965), p. 36, Kukułka (1978), pp. 162–164.

[8]Pietraś (1984), p. 117. "A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes in arrangements are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts." Waltz (1979), p. 80.

[9]More see Pawłuszko (2014), pp. 125–151.

> [E]ach of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of world politics. Our understanding would be impoverished were our thinking confined to only one of them. The 'complete diplomat' of the future should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism's vision of change.[10]

In following this directive in the present book I will make use of realist theories.

In keeping with the theses of the leading political realism theorists, from classical theorists such as Hans Morgenthau through the neorealists, the main participants in the international political system are states, which are unitary actors and behave rationally in the international arena, as they are guided by their own national interests.[11] The creator of structural realism, Kenneth Walt, wrote that "states are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones."[12] The preferences of states in the international system are permanent in nature and unavoidably conflicting. Realists consider the existing international institutions to be unimportant for the international system.[13] John Mearsheimer wrote that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world."[14] Waltz claims that international institutions are subordinate to countries' aims and are not autonomous, and that the example that confirms the rule is NATO.[15] Randall Schweller states that international security institutions serve for the projection of force and the use of power by the countries that dominate in them: for example, the USA's use of NATO.[16] In security studies, realists also give a central role to states. Edward Kolodziej, for instance, justifies such a view using two arguments: first, states are the basic units of political organization for the world's populations, and second, a state, including the contemporary nation-state, has a legal monopoly on the use of force against the its own population and also to defend (independently or with its allies) its population and territory in the event of aggression or attack by another country, or, for instance, against transnational terrorists. This means that the state is the most important actor empowered to use force and violence and as such is the main security entity and the subject of security studies.[17]

In the conditions of anarchy that prevail in the international system, the fate of political entities depends on themselves. The ultimate means of realizing policies by

---

[10]Walt (1998), pp. 110, 44.

[11]Viotti and Kauppi (1987), pp. 6–71; K. Waltz represents a different approach. He considers the premise about the state's rationality to be unnecessary, and in his view the system affects the behavior of the state through processes of socialization and competition. See Taliaferro (2000/2001), p. 156.

[12]Waltz (1979), p. 93.

[13]See: Morgenthau (1967), p. 509, Donnelly (2000), pp. 131–135, Hoffman (1973), p. 50.

[14]Mearsheimer (1994/1995), p. 7.

[15]Waltz (2000), p. 18 *et seq.*

[16]Schweller (2001), pp. 177–179.

[17]Kolodziej (2005), pp. 26–27.

a given actor is the use of force. The main rule in the international political system is thus the principle of self-help. Power is the most important element defining a state's potential range of action.

Realists understand power in static and relative categories simultaneously, as possibilities. They ascribe the key role to material factors, that is, to the military and economic components of power—'hard power.' For Waltz, power is the sum of military, technical, economic, and other possibilities at the disposal of a state. A state's power depends on all the factors: the potential of the population, the size of the territory, natural resources, economics (economic potential), the size of the armed forces, political stability, etc.[18] Power should be seen in relative and not absolute terms. It is a function of the capabilities of a given actor and the capabilities of other participants in international relations.[19] In the opinion of realists, an essential element of power is the awareness of a state's position in the hierarchy of prestige, which legitimizes it to influence other participants of the international system.[20] Joseph Nye, who does not belong to this school of thinking, points out that in addition to *hard power*, *soft power* should also be taken into consideration—the prestige, persuasion, and attractiveness of the West and its multilateral and integrative institutions such as NATO and the EU.[21] It should be noted that although orthodox realists do not appreciate these elements of power, they are still important in contemporary international relations. Considering power in the relative and broad sense, it has to be said that in the second decade of the 21st century the power of the US, measured in absolute terms, has not decreased, although the US's possibilities in relation to other states, particularly the newly emerging powers, appear today to be much smaller.

Taking into account the elements contributing to a state's power in his theory of *power transition*, A. F. K. Organski divided states into five categories: dominant nations, great powers, middle powers, small powers, and colonies/dependencies.[22] In contemporary studies, the traditional division of states into three groups is generally adopted: great powers, middle (-range) powers, and small powers (or small states). As this division is imprecise it is worthwhile to adopt Robert Keohane's view that distinctions should be based not only on consideration of states' dimensions but also on their self-perceptions.[23]

Among the states participating in the Euro-Atlantic security system there are great powers, medium states (middle powers), and small states. In this book I will analyze security concepts and activities undertaken mainly through the intermediary of international institutions by great powers and by Poland, a middle power.

[18]Waltz (1979), p. 131.

[19]Viotti and Kauppi (1987), op. cit., p. 64; Donnelly (2000), p. 60.

[20]Gilpin (1984), pp. 29–34.

[21]Nye (2002–2003). For more, see Nye (2004).

[22]Organski (1958), p. 326.

[23]Keohane (1969), p. 296. Constructivists accord greater significance to this aspect of states' differentiation.

Consideration of Poland makes it possible to show the specific evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system, which in the 1990s grew stronger by expanding to the Central European countries and in the next decade ran into problems connected with that expansion and the behavior of the new member states in the international arena. The main participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system are the great powers, the middle states, and international organizations such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

As has been pointed out by scholars taking a systemic approach, the most important element in studying international systems are a system's internal ties. According to Waltz, it is these that form the structure of a system. Structure is defined by the arrangement of parts; only a change in that arrangement is a structural change. States are not the only actors in international relations, but as the main actors they are the ones that shape the structure of the international system. International systems, in contrast to internal systems, are anarchic and decentralized. The first element in the structure of an international system is its ordering or organizing principle, and Waltz considers that principle to be anarchy.[24] Anarchy in international relations does not entail chaos but solely the lack of a supreme power over the political units in a given system. In adopting Waltz's method, the main principle organizing the Euro-Atlantic system must be grasped. Undoubtedly, in the period between 1989 and 1992 that principle was anarchy, but in the following years cooperation predominated among the various participants in the security system, and the model that took shape from those activities is described as cooperative security. American authors from the Brookings Institution have defined cooperative security as

> [A] model of interstate relations in which disputes are expected to occur, but they are expected to do so within of agreed-upon norms and established procedures. While tolerating diversity and even animosities among disparate governments and cultures, this kind of international system allows for conflicts to be resolved recourse to mass violence. (…) Cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security much as preventive medicine differs from acute care. Cooperative security is designed to ensure that organized aggression cannot start or be prosecuted to a large scale. By contrast, collective security is an arrangement for deterring aggression though military preparation and defeating it if it occurs.[25]

Further, these authors claim that the two strategies are not mutually exclusive but in reality support one another, because "a fully developed cooperative security framework would include provisions for collective security as a residual guarantee to its members in the event of aggression."[26]

The second element of systemic interaction (structures, to use Waltz's term) is the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions.[27] Units have

[24]Waltz (1979), pp. 79–105.

[25]Nolan (1994), p. 5.

[26]Ibidem, pp. 5–6.

[27]Jack Donnelly uses the term "functional differentiation". See Donnelly (2012), p. 617 *et seq*.

different characters; they differ in their greater or lesser abilities to fulfill similar functions. In the case being examined here, it is a matter of the functions fulfilled by the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system, which create interactions between them and strengthen or weaken international security. In my analysis of the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century, I hypothesize that as a result of the growing divergence of interests between the West (enlarged to Central European countries) and Russia, and due to the reconfiguration of the world order, this system finds itself in crisis. The symptoms are a return to rivalry over spheres of influence and the suspension of mutual ties of cooperation. In consequence, the level of security has been lowered in the Euro-Atlantic area and the position of the West has been weakened; consequently, the significance of the entire Euro-Atlantic security system in the global international order has declined.

The third element in the structure of the international system is the distribution of capabilities across units. Waltz claims that in a state of anarchy this is the element that differentiates units, which vary according to their greater or lesser ability to accomplish similar aims. The potential of a state is a characteristic of participants in a system, but the distribution of capabilities between individual states is a trait of the system.[28] Depending on the distribution of capabilities between the main actors, a state can adopt one of two approaches in the international system: balancing or bandwagoning.[29] 'Balancing' involves cooperation with other states against a strong state; 'bandwagoning' involves joining with the stronger state. In Waltz's opinion, states much more often make use of balancing than of bandwagoning in their foreign policies. Two types of such behavior can be distinguished: internal balancing and external balancing. *Internal balancing* implies the expansion of a state's potential, particularly militarily. *External balancing* consists in a state's seeking allies to support it against a strong state. Waltz states that "as nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced by unbalanced power, states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance".[30] Mearsheimer is right when he contends that internal and external balancing are simply two different forms of the same behavior.[31] Most authors take a narrower view and focus only on external balancing. The neorealist theory of balancing is widely confirmed by the history of international relations, particularly after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which ended the Napoleonic Wars,[32] and will be useful for analyzing the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century.

[28]Waltz (1979), pp. 97–98.

[29]Ibidem, p. 126.

[30]Waltz (1997).

[31]Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 156–157.

[32]Parent and Rosato (2015), pp. 60–85.

Important observations were made by the Italian scholar Davide Fiammenghi, who introduced the 'security curve' and 'security threshold' to neo-realism. He writes:

> A precise sequence of balancing and bandwagoning is associated with the security curve. Bandwagoning is the prevalent tendency before a state reaches the security threshold and after it crosses the absolute security threshold. Between the two thresholds, states will seek to balance a rising power, which will generate a sharp decrease in the aspiring hegemon's security. (…) Finally, determining the security threshold is a crucial task (…). It would be a flawed procedure to raise the security threshold when balancing does not occur or to lower the security threshold when balancing takes place. Establishing reliable proxies for dominance and testing the balancing proposition autonomously are important tasks for the future.[33]

The predominance of the West's power, in the broad sense, gave it a better chance of ensuring security and shaping the entire new international order in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the West and its institutions were perceived by Central Europe, which was weak, destabilized, and undergoing transformations, as the main provider, or even guarantor, of security, and also as the promoter of democracy and prosperity. These expectations increased the strivings of the new governments in Central European countries to join NATO and the EU. Consequently, in the Euro-Atlantic area the post-Cold War security system was based on the extension of Western structures to the east and on the West's hegemony.

In the 21st century, particularly after the financial crisis of 2008, a new distribution of power took shape and was unfavorable for the West. The newly emerging powers, consolidated their position, while new security threats and challenges appeared, such as, for instance, cybercrime, uncontrolled migration, and terrorism, which though existing previously came to be perceived, in conjunction with religious extremism, as a new element. These negative phenomena affected the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system, which began to evolve from cooperation toward a confrontation between the West and Russia. The aim of this book is to explain why the Euro-Atlantic security system has shifted from cooperation at the beginning of the 21st century to the crisis of the present moment, and what are the causes, manifestations, and international consequences for the security system and for the entire international order.

In order to test my hypothesis, I have asked several key research questions: What characterized the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 1990s? How is the reconfiguration of the international order manifested in the 21st century? What are the common threats and challenges for security in the Euro-Atlantic sphere? What are the security concepts (strategies) of the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system? How does the Euro-Atlantic security system function and what are the signs that it is in crisis? Why are the divisions between the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system deepening? Why has NATO become the main

[33]Fiammenghi (2011), pp. 153–154.

institution of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century? Why is the EU not an effective actor in security policy? Why did the OSCE lose its importance? What was Russia's reaction to the situation? What did the Ukraine crisis signify for the Euro-Atlantic security system? What are the international consequences of the crisis in the Euro-Atlantic security system and what are the prospects for the future?

This analysis provides new knowledge on conflicts of interests and on the gradual appearance of asymmetry in the Euro-Atlantic security structure. The West increased its security and expanded its influence to the countries of Central Europe. However, when it proceeded to encroach on Russia's sphere of influence in the non-Russian, post-Soviet countries, Russia moved—already in 2007—to a policy of balancing and containment to hold back the West's expansion. Earlier, Russia had questioned the West's policy of promoting democracy, human rights, and the free market economy, considering such promotion to be a great power policy that would bring benefits exclusively to the West, while harming Russia, and particularly its security interests.

What is unusual about this book is that it follows a neorealist research perspective, particularly in the sense of the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz, and the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer and other scholars like Stephen Walt. I show that the participants in the Euro-Atlantic system, regardless of the values they profess, are guided in the international arena by clearly defined interests and make use of their power and influence. Moreover, the effectiveness of their activities depends on the structure of the international system, which determines the redistribution of power (capabilities) within the system. When Russia was a weak and poorly governed country in the 1990s, it collaborated with the West and incurred painful losses in geopolitics and prestige. When cooperation with the newly emerging powers (within the BRICS group and beyond) brought Russia more strength and prestige in the following decade, it embarked on a policy of balancing in regard to the West, which viewed its actions as revisionist power politics. I try to show that the breakdown in cooperation between the West and Russia occurred when the West wanted to continue extending its influence and Russia decided to resist. Consequently, cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic security system—which was unequal in any case—was limited. A rivalry arose and led to the crisis in Ukraine, when the competing influences of the West and Russia clashed on that country's territory. The highest price was paid by Ukrainian society.

This book shows the crisis without recourse to the liberal approach, which is based on the illusion of promoting democracy in areas where rival entities pursue their own security interests and economic benefits. In contrast to the huge amount of moralizing, appraising, and far-from-objective literature in existence, this book tries, by making use of the rarely applied premises of neorealism, to meet the need for a cooler analysis and to clarify the differences and clashes of interest we are witnessing today between the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system.

This book explains the changes occurring in the system and partially in the global international order and points to the prospects for further transformation in the international scene. It provides needed and detailed information and explanations of the changing situation in the 21st century Euro-Atlantic security system,

which has evolved from cooperation to great-power rivalry and crisis. I present this evolution from the perspective of Poland, a medium-size Central European country, whose security is particularly dependent on the changing international order, especially on the relationship between the West and Russia.

3 The Structure of the Book

The first part of the book concerns the premises of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century. The second chapter contains the characteristics of the Euro-Atlantic security system as it took shape after the Cold War and functioned for around a decade. It shows the genesis of the system, pointing to the fact that it included the democratizing states of Central Europe which were admitted to NATO and the European Union, and that cooperation between the participants within the system was based on the concept of cooperative security. This was a system based on the cooperation of all the participants—the states and their multilateral organizations, including NATO and the EU. In that decade the Euro-Atlantic security system evolved in the direction of an asymmetry of security: larger in the Western part and lesser in the Eastern area. Russia was a weaker participant and agreed to cooperate with NATO, which it viewed as a potentially dangerous political-military bloc with a Cold War pedigree.

The third chapter contains a presentation of the evolving threats and challenges for international security in the Euro-Atlantic area. I differentiate between challenges and threats, and present the reconfiguration of the international order as a result of the West's relatively weakening position and the growth in importance of the newly emerging powers, including Russia, which, strengthened under Putin's rule, has shifted to a policy of balancing the West's influences and has begun to demand joint decision-making in matters of security in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the global international system. I point to the intensification of terrorism as the main threat in the 21st century, and then to the persistence of military threats connected with the arsenals of nuclear weapons in the possession of Russia, the USA, France, and Great Britain, and on the danger of the proliferation of these weapons. I present the state of conventional arms, the arms trade, and the growing arms expenditures of Russia, the USA and the countries on NATO's eastern flank, while attaching particular importance to the ongoing threat of terrorism. I also mention other threats, such as cyber, economic, and ecological threats, and point to uncontrolled migration as a serious challenge for Europe.

The fourth chapter is devoted to an examination of the security concepts of the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system, that is, of the program documents containing their security concepts (strategies, doctrines), which identify security threats and challenges. I consider the main participants (actors) in the system to be the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland (as an example of a middle power), NATO, the EU, Russia, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization connected with Russia and I note these entities, with the exception of Poland, treat

terrorism as the main threat and display an evolution in their perception of other challenges and threats. I then characterize the aims and means of these entities' security policies. In the final section, I point similarities and differences between the security concepts in the light of theories of international relations. The conclusion is that along with the growing divergence in interests in the Euro-Atlantic security system there has been a return to a traditional, militarized approach to security, in accord with the premises of the realist paradigm.

The second part of the book is concerned with analyzing the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic system of security in the 21st century from cooperation to crisis. The fifth chapter is devoted to showing the failure to eliminate terrorism, which is commonly seen as the main threat for international security in the Euro-Atlantic area. I show that the US's 'War on Terror,' which was proclaimed in 2001, has generally been a failure. The activities of the EU in this area have also proven to be unsuccessful, and Western Europe is the most affected by terrorism. Cooperation between Russia and NATO on combating terrorism began relatively favorably at the beginning of the century but did not bring any tangible results. On the other hand, there were visibly positive effects from the intensive development of cooperation between the countries associated in the CIS in regard to combating terrorism. In general, I conclude although the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system are conceptually and organizationally well prepared to combat terrorism, they are unable to deal with this global phenomenon.

The sixth chapter examines the domination and expansion of the West in the Euro-Atlantic area and Russia's reaction to it. The first conflict of interest and disturbance of the West's relations with Russia were caused by the West's policy of promoting democracy in the Western Balkans and in the non-Russian post-Soviet states. In the 1990s, Russia already considered that the US, NATO, and the EU were hiding their own strategic interests under the cover of that policy, and viewed the West's activities as interference in the internal affairs of countries in the eastern part of Europe. The greatest clash of conflicting interests took place in Ukraine: first during the time of the Orange Revolution at the turn of 2004–2005, and then during the crisis that began in the autumn of 2013. Russia had opposed NATO's expansion to the east since the previous decade but was unable to prevent the first two rounds of NATO's post-Cold War expansion, in 1999 and 2004. However, when in 2008 NATO announced that it would accept Ukraine and Georgia into its number, Russia was strong enough to oppose the move. It displayed its military potential during the Georgian War in 2008, and then interfered in Ukraine in 2014. As NATO reacted by reinforcing its eastern flank in Europe, a dangerous confrontation, reminiscent of the situation in the Cold War years, emerged.

The seventh chapter is concerned with analyzing the crisis of the EU and its negative impact on the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Symptoms of the crisis in the EU appeared in the course of work on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which began in 2002. The Treaty, which was signed in 2004, did not enter into force, due to its rejection in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Subsequently the Treaty of Lisbon was drafted and entered into force in 2009; it strengthened the intergovernmental nature of the EU, and thus

hampered efforts to overcome the stagnation of the CSCE. The EU could not function as a successful actor in security policy due to the financial crisis, which affected the euro zone in 2009 before causing a recession throughout the EU. The EU did not have a current security strategy, and *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* was drafted only in 2016. At the time, the EU was struggling with the migration crisis, which had begun in 2014. For many years, nationalist and centrifugal tendencies had been growing stronger, threatening the survival of the EU as an integrative project. In 2016, the British decided, by a referendum, to take their country out of the EU. The EU's power to act weakened and the EU did not play a positive role in the crisis in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the EU has made successive attempts to invigorate the CSDP, particularly by establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

The eighth chapter describes the progressive marginalization of the OSCE. This organization had lost its importance by the middle of the 1990s, even though it is the broadest multilateral security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area (encompassing 57 states), and has unique instruments of soft power for ensuring security. Such a situation is due to the entire system's being dominated by NATO, which is an institution whose guarantees of security rely on hard power. Attempts to invigorate the OSCE were undertaken in 2010 at a summit in Astana, and then during the crisis in Ukraine, in which the OSCE, as the sole multilateral institution, has played a minor role in supervising the peace agreements concluded in Minsk in 2014 and 2015. The OSCE still has a chance to play a larger role in shaping Euro-Atlantic security, but this would require agreement between its main participants, especially the Western countries and Russia.

The third part of the book contains a presentation of the consequences of the gradual breakdown in cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic security system, leading to the Ukraine crisis, and shows the prospects for the system's evolution. In the ninth chapter I demonstrate that the Euro-Atlantic security system's shift from cooperation to rivalry for spheres of influence reached its apogee in the Ukraine crisis. In autumn 2013, the crisis was internal in nature, but an international crisis was born in February 2014 after nationalist and pro-Western groups seized power in Kiev and Russia intervened. Like John Mearsheimer and Richard Sakwa, I hold that the crisis in Ukraine was a struggle between the West and Russia.[34] The West attempted to draw Ukraine into its sphere of influence, while Russia countered by annexing Crimea and militarily supporting the secession of an eastern province (Donbas). The crisis had a very negative impact on the Euro-Atlantic security system and led to geopolitical rivalry, military confrontation, and the weakening of Ukraine. I try to analyze the chances for resolving this crisis, pointing to the need for compromise by the three parties, that is, Ukraine, the West, and Russia.

The tenth, final chapter contains conclusions of my analysis of the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century. In it, is confirmed the hypothesis that the system finds itself in a crisis which consists in a return to rivalry

[34]Mearsheimer (2014), Sakwa (2015).

for spheres of influence and in the suspension of mutual ties of cooperation. In observing the redistribution of power (capabilities) in the global international system, I note the gradual weakening of the West, the simultaneous growth in Russia's international position, and the worsening sense of security in the states of Central Europe, which feel a threat from that power. Inspired by neorealist ideas and by Charles Kupchan,[35] I predict a further weakening of the importance of the entire Euro-Atlantic security system in the global international order and the growing anarchy of world security. In conclusion, I point to the need to introduce new institutional arrangements to halt these negative phenomena.

References

Butterfield, H. (1951). *History and human relations*. London: Collins.
Cottey, A. (2013). *Security in 21st Century Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Donnelly, J. (2000). *Realism and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Donnelly, J. (2012). The elements of the structures of international systems. *International Organization, 66*(4), 609–643.
Easton, D. (1965). *A framework for political analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Fiammengi, D. (2011). The security curve and the structure of international politics: A neorealist synthesis. *International Security, 35*(4), 126–154.
Gilpin, R. (1984). *War and change in world politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gorbachev, M. S. (1987). *Perestroika: New thinking for our country and the world*. Scranton, PA: HarperCollins.
Herz, J. H. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. *World Politics, 2*(2), 157–180.
Herz, J. (1951). *Political realism and political idealism: A study in theories and realities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hoffman, S. (1973). International organization and international system. In L. M. Goodrich & D. A. Kay (Eds.), *International organization: Politics and process* (pp. 49–73). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians' dilemmas: Small states in international politics. *International Organization, 23*(2), 291–310.
Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). *Security and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kukułka, J. (1978). *Problemy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych*. Warsaw: PWN.
Kupchan, C. A. (2012). *No one's world: The west, the rising rest and the coming global turn*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994/1995). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security, 19*(3), 5–49.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the west's fault: The liberal delusions that Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs, 93*(5), 1–12.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace* (4th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

[35]Kupchan (2012), pp. 5–8.

Nolan, J. E. (Ed.). (1994). *Global engagement: Cooperation and security in the 21th century*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
Nye, J. S., Jr. (2002–2003). Limits of American power. *Political Science Quarterly*, *117*(4), 552–555.
Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
Organski, A. F. K. (1958). *World politics*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Parent, J. M., & Rosato, S. (2015). Balancing in neorealism. *International Security, 40*(2), 51–86.
Pawłuszko, T. (2014). *Kategoria system międzynarodowego w badaniach stosunków międzynarodowych*. Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
Pietraś, Z. J. (1984). *Podstawy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych*. Lublin: UMCS.
Risse, T. (2016). The transatlantic security community: Erosion from within? In R. Alcaro, J. Peterson, & E. Greco (Eds.), *The west and the global power shift Transatlantic relations and global governance* (pp. 21–42). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sakwa, R. (2015). *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the borderlands*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Schweller, R. L. (2001). The problem of international order revisited. A review essay. *International Security, 26*(1), 161–186.
Taliaferro, J. W. (2000/2001). Security seeking under anarchy: Defensive realism revisited. *International Security*, *25*(3), 128–161.
Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (1987). *International relations theory: Realism, pluralism, globalism, and beyond*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Walt, S. M. (1998). International relations: One world, many theories. *Foreign Policy, 110,* 29–46.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Company.
Waltz, K. N. (1997). Evaluating theories'. *American Political Science Review, 91*(4), 913–917.
Waltz, K. (2000). Structural realism after the cold war. *International Security, 25*(2), 5–41.

Part I
Background

Chapter 2
The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 1990s

1 The Genesis of a New System

1.1 The Fall of Real Socialism and Political Transformation in Eastern Bloc Countries

After the period of Cold War confrontation between the West and the Eastern Bloc in Europe, conditions arose in the eastern part of the continent in the second half of the 1980s favoring the demise of the political system of real socialism in the countries of the Eastern (Soviet) Bloc. The notions of *glasnost* and *perestroika* preached by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), played a decisive role in this process and became a force generating change in the USSR.[1]

Several years later, Poland came to be the leader of change. It is there that, in the spring of 1989, discussions took place between the political opposition and the reformist wing of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) which ruled Poland and was headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. By having agreed on the principles for a democratic transformation during the Round Table talks (6 February to 5 April 1989) and by winning the right to decide about their social and political system, the Poles set off a chain of events that led to democratization in the GDR and other Eastern Bloc states. Poland thus made an important contribution to the breakdown of the Cold War division of Europe, to opening the door for the dissemination of democratic values to the east of the continent, and to the change of political systems in Central and Eastern European countries.

The Polish transformations preceded by several months the collapse of real socialism in other Central European countries. Only in Hungary were market reforms gradually introduced in mid-1989. But the political breakthrough in other countries of the Eastern Bloc came in November and December 1989 and consisted,

[1]See, for example Ullman (1991), pp. 3–22, Hyde-Price (1991), pp. 67–88, Dean (1994), pp. 3–21.

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_2

in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, in the opposition either taking over or sharing power. This rapid process came to be called the Autumn of Nations. Its course was peaceful in all the countries with the exception of Romania, where fighting broke out between demonstrators demanding change and the country's interior security forces, with the result that over 1100 persons lost their lives and three times that many were wounded. In Poland the change of power took place as a result of a compromise between the forces in power and the democratic opposition. A similar model of transformation was applied in Hungary, where first an opposition round table was organized and then, at a "triangular table," the opposition, the ruling party and social organizations agreed on a plan of reforms (June 13-September 18, 1989).

Generally, it has to be said that the transformation of the political order in Europe began with the revolutionary—in the historical sense and in terms of tempo—change of the internal systems of the communist countries, and this in turn led to change in the institutional shape of the international system. This created a very difficult situation for the former communist countries which—while making a political choice that stood for liberty, democracy, and greatly improved chances for prosperity—had to face the challenge of building their own security in a greatly altered geostrategic situation. The western states had to take a stand with regard to this challenge. The aspect that especially began to complicate decision-making by countries in both parts of Europe was the prolonged and secondary, as it were, internal destabilization of those countries, which had embarked on system reforms and, at the same time, found themselves in a different geopolitical situation.

The former communist countries had to face unprecedented challenges as they built a democratic political system and a market economy in conditions of deep crisis left over by the old political system and the economic collapse it brought. The pioneering tasks taken on by the democratic forces were carried through without the benefit of historical experience, as there was none. For the first time in history a society was moving from a communist system to capitalism and from an authoritarian system to democracy. The Spanish model of building a parliamentary democracy on the rubble of Franquist authoritarianism provided few patterns to emulate.

The progress of democratization was affected by many factors, among which the level of social and economic development of each nation was of key importance.[2] The countries of Central and Eastern Europe varied greatly in this respect, so the political reforms proceeded at different paces, and the social and economic difficulties they entailed were a gradated feature. After a few years of transformations, the overall success of the reforms in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were apparent. The transformations were less advanced in the other Central and South-Eastern European countries, while a unique situation existed in the area of the former USSR, where reforms had been implemented within the old political framework and in conditions of protracted economic crisis.

[2]Fukuyama (1991/1992), pp. 14–16.

There were considerable threats to political stability in those ex-communist countries where the transformation processes ran into greatest difficulties. For those countries' elites and societies, these were serious challenges which, if not met and successfully resolved, caused serious perturbations in the functioning of the state. Such a situation persists till this day in some post-Soviet states. As a result, their security policies and diplomatic activities were marked by chaotic and unpredictable initiatives leading to the anarchization of the international environment and to the reduction of the state and perception of security. Examples of such initiatives include the controversial ideas of the Polish president, Lech Wałęsa, in 1992 about the creation of the so-called NATO-Bis, or the 1993 proposal by the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, to create an Eastern and Central-European Security Area (the Kravchuk Plan). The West saw as particularly dangerous the internal destabilization of those post-Soviet states that possessed large military potential—especially nuclear weapons (such as Ukraine)—and that were in dispute with their neighbors or were involved in ethnic conflicts.

In the first years after the Cold War ended, liberal theory was triumphant. Its leading propagators, imitating Francis Fukuyama, claimed that an era of democracy and peace had come, and that democratic transformation was an effective means to that end and to international security. Liberals and neoliberals claimed that the foreign policy of democratic states is more predictable because it is guided by an understanding of national (state) interest that is easier to discern by external partners, and because it is less frequently affected by the voluntarism of politicians and their world view informed by negative stereotypes and, as such, does not create threats to international stability and security. Such scholars hold that democratic states 'do not fight one another,' and that the dissemination of democracy in countries' political systems contributes to building a 'democratic zone of peace'.[3] This research current adheres to the liberal (idealistic) vision of social reality and sees a direct relationship between the evolution of political systems and those countries' foreign policy. In opposition to the neo-realists,[4] it promotes an optimistic view of the development of democracy, which is to favor the dynamic shaping of countries' foreign policy, their security, and international peace.[5] In the first years following the Cold War it seemed that—under the influence of this current of thought—the developed West-European countries, and the Central and Eastern European ones undergoing transformation, had a common interest in expanding collaboration and in the maintenance of lasting peace, because "both on the periphery and within the center, the probability of war will be lesser in those regions in which there is more economic interdependence and political democracy."[6]

---

[3]Morgan and Howard Campbell (1991), Russett (1993), Muravchik (1992), Layne (1994), Spiro (1994), Owen (1994), Ullman (1990), Wiśniewski (2015).

[4]On the subject of the dispute between neoliberals and neorealists, see Baldwin (1993).

[5]Ullman (1991), p. XI. Compare similar thesis Van Evera (1990/1991).

[6]Goldgeier and McFaul (1992).

But the experience of transforming Central and Eastern Europe does not fully bear out this thesis, as great difficulties arose in stabilizing the political systems in those countries and populist and authoritarian tendencies appeared.[7] The phenomenon that was manifested in Vladimir Mečiar in Slovakia, Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, Ion Iliescu in Romania, Sali Berisha in Albania, or even to a degree Lech Wałęsa in Poland, did not arise by chance, but was caused by the difficult economic situation of societies bearing the cost of reforms. In this context it is worthwhile to recall the view expressed in 1990 by the outstanding German sociologist and political scientist, Ralph Dahrendorf, who wrote of the specter of semi-fascist dictatorships that circled over post-communist Europe.[8] Other scholars pointed to the fact that this part of Europe is lacking a deep social and cultural transformation.[9]

The above-mentioned economic difficulties were further compounded by problems in relations with neighboring countries related to reheated territorial disputes and ethnic conflicts, especially on the territory of the former USSR and in former Yugoslavia. Ethnic conflicts opposing the societies of a number of countries in transformation made that the danger that authoritarian and chauvinistic regimes might arise that much greater.[10] It thus turned out that the (neo) liberals had generally overestimated the importance of democratic values and idealized the newly-established state institutions. Gradually, Central and Eastern Europe as a whole was undoubtedly becoming more democratic, but this does not mean that it was stable, and this in turn reduced its level of security.

A country's internal stability favors the growth of international collaboration and makes it possible to seek new political and institutional solutions in the sphere of security. Stability thus emerges as a necessary condition for the construction, or the dynamic shaping, of a security system. This means that the category of stability is functional with regard to security in the wide sense, as a developing process in international relations.[11]

In consideration of the above-mentioned dependence between internal and foreign policy, the systemic transformations in Central and Eastern European countries should be seen as one of the many important factors affecting the security of the countries in question, and the political destabilization that accompanies the reforms as an important challenge for the security of each of the countries individually and of Europe as a whole. It is worthwhile to recall a view that stands in opposition to the main neoliberal current: it claims that in allowing the brief transitional destabilization of political systems, democratization, like autocratization, can lead to wars.[12] This thesis was corroborated by the growing political role of the military

[7]Compare Szulc (1996), pp. 58–61, Schöpflin (1994).

[8]Dahrendorf (1990).

[9]Jowitt (1992), Schmitter and Karl (1992), Kaldor and Vejvoda (1997).

[10]See Nodia (1992), Blank (1994).

[11]Compare Andor (1996).

[12]See Mansfield and Snyder (1995).

which accompanied the political destabilization in countries of Central and Eastern Europe undergoing transformation. It is demonstrated, for instance, by the support the army granted Boris Yeltsin during the conflict with the Supreme Council in the autumn of 1993,[13] or by the statement by a group of higher army officers in Poland that they supported Lech Wałęsa in his attempts to expand presidential powers in autumn of the next year. The growth of the political role of the army was particularly visible in countries entangled in armed conflicts, such as occurred in the former Yugoslavia in 1991–1995 or in Russia during the first war to prevent the secession of Chechnya (1994–1996).[14] Other examples of a lack of transparency in civilian and military relations in many countries involved the insistent and public demand for greater military expenditures by high-ranking officers and some defense ministers, occasional criticism of the signing of disarmament agreements, and the resistance of entrenched military-industrial complexes against policies to restructure the defense industry.[15]

It can generally be stated that the social and political destabilization that accompanied the transformations in former communist countries in the 1990s represented a serious challenge as a problem to be overcome and resolved by means of democratic procedures. Such an outcome was made the easier by the introduction at that time of democratic institutions, political pluralism, and the free media, and growing inter-dependence with the Western world.

1.2 Dismantling of the Eastern Bloc

The USSR, both on account of the choice made by Mikhail Gorbachev and of its own mounting internal economic and ethnic problems, allowed for democratic transformations to take place in its Central-European allies.

The change in political leadership in those countries entailed not only a choice of new domestic policies but also the simultaneous reorientation of their foreign policy. In choosing an orientation toward rapprochement or even integration with the West, these countries put in question the importance of their bilateral relations as allies of the USSR and the multilateral structures of the Eastern Bloc, i.e., the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). In reality, the new democracies of Central Europe did not terminate any of these agreements, but in the rapidly changing internal and international situation, it was obvious that those pacts had lost their binding force. When, at the beginning of 1991, the USSR attempted to transform the COMECON into the International Organization for Economic Cooperation with consultative-advisory powers (with the participation of the 9 previous members plus Yugoslavia and Germany),

[13]Taylor (1994).

[14]For more on the subject of the army in Russia, see Umbach (1996), Romer (1992).

[15]Nelson (1993), pp. 162–163.

its European members were not interested. Consequently, the organization was dissolved by an Executive Committee decision taken in Budapest on June 28, 1991, and after 90 days it formally ceased to exist. The Central European countries, including Poland, again rejected proposals to create in its place a new economic organization with the participation of the USSR (and later Russia).

Even though the Warsaw Pact had been extended a few years earlier (on April 25, 1985), in the new situation Hungary demanded its termination. In May 1990, the Hungarian government even threatened that it would unilaterally leave the Pact. Poland and Czecho-Slovakia approached this postulate more cautiously, and proposed the dissolution of the Pact's military structure as a first step. For Poland, the matter had two important contexts. Firstly, it was important not to hurry the elimination of this form of imperial dependence on the USSR given the unclear position of the German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in the question of the final settlement of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse. Secondly, Poland—like the western countries—considered that an agreement to limit conventional arms in Europe should be carried out in full (the CFE I was concluded in Paris on November 19, 1990). This agreement introduced collective ceilings on five types of weapons for NATO and the Warsaw Pact; it was thus necessary to maintain the political structure of the Warsaw Pact in order to have the requisite forum to share the responsibility between the member countries.

After the armed intervention by Soviet troops (OMON forces) in the Baltic countries which were attempting to regain their independence, the ministers of foreign affairs of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, at a meeting in Budapest in January, 1991, put forward a proposal to dissolve the military structures of the Pact by the middle of 1991, and the remaining organs by the end of that year. The USSR decided to 'move forward' and proposed to accelerate the entire process. As a result, it was decided to dissolve the Pact's military structures by March 31, 1991. The political alliance, on the other hand, was disbanded during a sitting of the Advisory Political Committee of the members of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991 in Prague. Poland was represented there by President Lech Wałęsa. On this date, the Eastern Bloc formally ceased to exist.

At the same time, the bilateral allied treaties concluded in the 1940s and 1960s between the countries of the Soviet Bloc became obsolete. Even though these agreements had not been formally denounced, in the altered circumstances negotiations were undertaken to replace them with new bilateral friendship and cooperation agreements that did not have the character of alliances. During the talks, which were finalized in the first half of the 1990s, the former Central-European allies of the USSR, with the aim of joining NATO, rejected the so-called enemy clauses proposed by Moscow. These were supposed to introduce the prohibition against entering or supporting an alliance directed against another party to agreement (the 'Falin-Kwiciński doctrine'); only Romania agreed to the proposal, signing a treaty on cooperation, good neighborliness, and friendship with the USSR on April 5, 1991.[16]

[16]For more, see Socor (1991).

For some of the USSR's former allies, another major problem was how to eliminate another form of dependence on Moscow, that is, the stationing of Soviet Army units on their territory. This concerned the GDR, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary. In the case of the GDR, the question was resolved through the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany on September 12, 1990, which stipulated that the Soviet army would withdraw from the eastern lands by the end of 1994. In actuality, the process ended earlier (by August 31, 1994). The last Soviet soldiers left the territory of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia in June 1991. The withdrawal the Soviet troops from Poland was more complicated on account of the large number of Soviet army units remaining in united Germany and the difficulties of bilateral talks between Poland and the USSR. In the end, the last soldier of the former USSR left Poland in September 1993.

1.3 The Breakup of the USSR and the Emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States

One of the consequences of the USSR's systemic transformation was the breakup of that state. It began with the final phase of Gorbachev's reforms, during which strong nationalist currents appeared. The first republics to proclaim that they were leaving the Soviet Federation were Lithuania (March 11, 1990), Estonia (March 30, 1990), Latvia (May 4, 1990), and Georgia (April 9, 1990). The first three were countries that had been annexed in 1940 by the Soviet Union. Their return to the international arena as independent countries encouraged other republics to follow their path. Mikhail Gorbachev tried to save the Soviet Union by proposing the establishment of a new federation agreement with the constituent republics. On August 19, 1991 his political opponents, who favored the status quo, mounted a coup and removed him from power. Although the coup collapsed after three days and Gorbachev returned to his office as President of the USSR, the collapse of the federal state was hastened. The most serious blow turned out to be the declaration of independence (on August 24, 1991) of Ukraine, which after a referendum on December 1, 1991 broke from the USSR. Ukraine was followed by all the other republics with the exception of Russia (which settled for a declaration of sovereignty on June 12, 1990). On December 25, 1991, the USSR formally ceased to exist. Mikhail Gorbachev transferred power, with the launching codes to the powerful Soviet nuclear arsenal, to the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. Russia became the legal heir of the Soviet Union, succeeding to the international agreements made by that state and to its place as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and took over the formerly Soviet nuclear arsenal. On December 8, 1991, during the last phase of the USSR's collapse, the Commonwealth of Independent States was formed by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. On December 21 a further eight countries joined, and on October 1993 Georgia did as well. The three Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) remained outside the CIS.

The collapse of the USSR completed the breakup of the Eastern Bloc. It created an advantageous situation for the Central-European countries, which were finally freed from imperial dependence. However, serious challenges appeared: completing the settlements with Russia in relation to historical events that Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had initiated with the USSR; the demarcation of borders, which in communist times had been of negligible importance (with Ukraine, Latvia); economic settlements (with practically all the post-Soviet countries); and the establishment of new relations between the former satellites or parts of the USSR and Russia, which had returned to the international arena as the USSR's legal heir. The western countries were faced with the great challenge of including the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in the sphere of international cooperation, including in matters pertaining to security.

1.4 The Unification of Germany

Immediately after the democratic changes started in Poland the rather unexpected process of Germany's rapid unification began. Not quite two months after the emergence of a non-communist government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland, the Berlin Wall came down; in response to public pressure, on November 9, 1989 the East German leaders decided to open the border with the FRG and West Berlin. After this event, unification proceeded very rapidly. German politicians, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl in particular, stressed clearly and repeatedly that the catalyst for unification had been the political victory of Solidarity in Poland. Years later, they no longer mentioned it and the European media now most often treats the fall of the Berlin Wall as the beginning of the post-Cold War era.

The formal inclusion of the eastern Lands in the FRG occurred on October 3, 1990. It happened with the agreement of the four powers responsible for Germany as a whole (the USA, USSR, Great Britain, and France) and after their relinquishment of their rights in regard to Germany. The conditions and principles of Germany's unification were set forth in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990. This was a document negotiated at the end of the "2 + 4" conference, that is, with the participation of the two German states (the FRG and GDR) and the four great powers. The Moscow treaty stated that united Germany does not have territorial claims in regard to other countries and furthermore required Germany to conclude, without delay, a treaty with Poland to confirm the existing border between the two countries. This was done on November 14, 1990. The peaceful nature of united Germany had been confirmed by the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation signed between the FRG and the USSR on November 9, 1990.

One very important provision of the treaty signed in Moscow was the agreement that united Germany could belong to the European Community and to NATO. It was stipulated, however, that while Bundeswehr units forming part of NATO could

be stationed on Germany's eastern lands after the withdrawal of Soviet troops (which was to happen by the end of 1994), they could not be equipped with the means to transport nuclear weapons. In addition, it was stipulated that no foreign armed forces or nuclear weapons or their means of transport were to be stationed in the eastern lands.[17]

For the first time in history, a united German state had emerged peacefully; it accepted its existing external borders and accepted the obligation to limit its military potential. It became a member of western structures—NATO and the European Community—which in this manner reached the western border of Poland. Consequently, a large German state was established in the center of Europe, and the direction of its future foreign policy had not been fully settled.[18] This fact became an important new issue in European security.

Poland was the country made most uneasy by the unification of Germany. Actually, it had supported that process, as the new political elites who had risen with Solidarity had no other choice. After all, the unification of the two German states was the realization of the Germans' right to self-determination, and the Poles had taken advantage of such a right in choosing the course of democratic political reforms. Nevertheless, Polish politicians were seriously concerned about whether the united German state would unequivocally recognize Poland's western border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse, which had been established at the Potsdam conference in 1945. There were serious grounds for doubts on this question, which was of vital importance for Poland's national interests. Firstly, there were the bad experiences of relations with West Germany during the Cold War, when the FRG had openly questioned the Polish-German border, and then after signing an agreement on the bases for normalizing mutual relations in 1970, had interpreted the border issue as a temporary settlement of a *modus vivendi* type. Secondly, there was the attitude of Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself, whose ten-point plan (of November 28, 1989) for the unification of Germany had omitted the question of the borders. For these reasons Poland demanded Germany's unambiguous final recognition of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse in a treaty binding under international law. In the end, thanks to the unequivocal support of the four great powers, this was achieved.

In Poland, the unification of Germany gave rise to fears connected with the then unregulated status of the German minority in Poland and, to an even greater extent, questions connected with the property claims of the some 3.5 million Germans expelled from Poland pursuant to the Potsdam Agreement. Similar uneasiness was felt by Czecho-Slovakia, which after the Second World War had confiscated the property of the more than 3 million Sudeten Germans it had expelled on the basis of so-called decrees of President Edward Beneš.

---

[17]Russia later referred to those commitments as it opposed NATO enlargement to the east and to the deployment of elements of America's missile shield on the territory of new NATO member states in Central Europe.

[18]See Stolarczyk (1995), pp. 196–206, Zięba (1995).

In the countries neighboring Germany and having experienced harm from the Germans in the past there were strong fears about the direction of united Germany's foreign policy. The debate underway in the FRG on the subject was followed with anxiety, and fears were expressed over whether united Germany would not abandon the course toward Europeanization in favor of a return to a policy of expansion toward Central Europe, in keeping with the former idea of building a German *Mitteleuropa*. These worries were most strongly expressed by Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.[19]

The unification of Germany did take place within the framework of Bonn's European policy after all. In his unification plans, Chancellor Kohl pointed, among other things, to the need for the European Communities to be open to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for the role of the CSCE to be increased, and for new institutions of cooperation to be created; he emphasized the importance of disarmament and also spoke of shaping a new order in Europe.[20] Warsaw and Prague's suspicions, which were justified by negative historical experiences, were thus calmed, because Germany was creating the opportunity for its eastern neighbors to associate with the European Communities and, in the future, to join NATO. As Polish politicians—Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki or Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski—were wont to say, this opened the shortest route for Poland's 'return to Europe.' The politicians of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary spoke in the same vein.[21] Germany quickly confirmed its pro-European policy by supporting the efforts of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary to join the European Union[22] and NATO.[23] Such a policy was dictated to the Germans by a good understanding of their own economic and security interests. Drawing the countries of Central Europe which were most advanced in terms of democratic and market transformations into western structures created a sort of buffer between Germany and the pulsing instability prevailing in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In this manner, the dual aims of Germany and the countries of Central Europe met half way, and this only increased Germany's hegemonic position in post-Cold War Europe.

1.5 Accelerating European Integration

At a time when the political systems of real socialism were eroding and the Eastern Bloc was collapsing, in Western Europe the integration process entered its most intense phase. In keeping with the provisions of the Single European Act (of 1986), the countries associated in the European Communities embarked on the establishment of the European Union—as proposed in the Stuttgart Declaration of June

[19]Handl (1993), Líska (1993). For more on the German debate on the subject of *Mitteleuropa* see Koszel (1999), Xiang (1992), p. 411 *et seq*., Garton Ash (1994), Zięba (1996).

[20]Tomala (1991), pp. 11–14.

[21]Pick (1995), Bombik and Samson (1995), Fülöp (1994), pp. 118, 123–126.

[22]For more, see Zięba (2010).

[23]Rühe (1993).

1983—and the creation of a fully common market. On July 1, 1990, part of the provisions on the creation the Economic and Monetary Union went into force, and at an extraordinary session of the European Council in Rome in October of that year, 11 countries approved the plan for the Economic and Monetary Union.[24]

In the middle of December 1990, work began in Rome at two simultaneous intergovernmental conferences, one devoted to the question of the Economic and Monetary Union, and the other to political union. The European Council recommended that both conferences should finish by a date that would allow the member countries to ratify the treaty by the end of 1992. The basis of talks was a French-German plan that had been laid out in detail in a letter by François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl to their partners on December 6, 1990.[25]

The intergovernmental conference on political union resulted in agreement on a plan for a treaty establishing the European Union. Luxemburg's proposal in regard to the institutional structure of the European Union was adopted. This structure can be compared with the construction of a Greek temple. A pediment over the whole—this is the European Council—and three pillars. The first and most important pillar was formed by the European Community (the word 'Economic' disappeared), covering areas regulated by the Founding Treaties (of 1951 and 1957) and having new competencies; the future Economic and Monetary Union; and the provisions referring to European citizenship. The scope extent of majority voting was widened, and the role of the European Parliament was reinforced. As a second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was established to replace the previous European Political Cooperation. The third pillar encompassed cooperation in the areas of the justice administration system and internal affairs. The functioning of the two last pillars was based on intergovernmental procedures that had been used to that time. Such measures were treated as temporary; they were meant to guarantee the member countries of broad use of the attributes of sovereignty, and the limited role, in both pillars, of such institutions as the Commission and the Parliament.

Among the most controversial points of the conference on the question of political union was whether the proposed EU Common Foreign and Security Policy would include matters of defense, which in practice might have meant deciding the future of the Western European Union (WEU). It was finally agreed, in accord with a proposal by Great Britain, that the WEU would remain a separate organization, executing EU decisions of a military nature.

At a meeting in Maastricht on December 9–10, 1991, the European Council agreed on a draft of the Treaty on the European Union. After it was given legal form it was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992 by the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of finance of the Twelve. The Treaty went into force on November 1, 1993, after a ten-month delay caused by difficulties with the ratification process. The European Union formally exists from that day.

---

[24]British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed the introduction of a common currency, and voiced reservations to the proposed political union.

[25]For more, see Zięba (2006).

As European integration was deepening, the countries forming the European Union declared their openness to candidates from Central and Eastern Europe. Poland and other new democracies of the region tried to take advantage the emerging opportunity to join the elite club of highly developed and democratic countries. This created for them the prospect of rapidly overcoming the economic crisis, modernizing their countries, and hastening civilizational development. As the European Communities' member countries had clearly made the acceptance of new members dependent on meeting demanding political and economic criteria, this strengthened the Central European countries' commitment to introduce democratic and market reforms with determination. The European Community encouraged their partners and candidates for membership with aid programs such as PHARE, TACIS, and so forth.

In addition, the European Community supported the sub-regional groupings emerging on the edge of the former division of Europe with financial aid and expert advice. The encouragement to develop such rather informal structures as the Visegrad Triangle (from 1993 the Visegrad Group), the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), the Central European Initiative (which earlier had been called the Quadragonale, Pentagonale, or Hexagonale), the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation[26] came from leading Western European politicians, representatives of the European Commission, and also influential advisors of the US administration. The European Commission and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development financially supported a range of projects conducted by these three groupings. The European Community also initiated and co-financed various projects of trans-border cooperation in the form of so-called Euro-regions.

The countries of Central Europe were thus motivated, on several planes, to join the process of European integration. The pro-European and Euro-Atlantic orientation of their foreign policies was consequently strengthened.

1.6 From Military Confrontation to Arms Control

When the inter-bloc confrontation due to ideological enmity was subsiding in Europe, countries changed their approach to their traditional means to assure security, that is, arms and armed forces. In addition, a change was needed in East-West relations; it began with Soviet-American political dialogue at the highest level in autumn 1985 in Geneva. It is then that the leaders of both superpowers declared that they would strive for a sharp reduction in their nuclear capabilities. In order to achieve such an agreement between the main rivals a change had to take place in the position of the USSR, which under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev had decided to demilitarize its own foreign policy and free it from ideology. The well-known motto of the new Soviet leader, which referred to Lenin's 'one step back, two steps forward' tactic, facilitated the undertaking of constructive disarmament talks. As a result, it became

[26]For more, see Zięba (1992), Özer (1997), Hansen (1997), Bremmer and Bailes (1998).

possible to eliminate the disproportions in military potential, which gave the advantage to the USSR. This involved Moscow's agreement to unilateral concessions, opening the path to the conclusion of precedent-setting agreements on the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons and to the introduction of new confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).[27]

Milestones in cooperation between the USSR and USA and the countries of the two military blocs were the agreement to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles (INF), signed on December 8, 1987, and the treaty to reduce conventional arms in Europe, signed on November 19, 1990 (CFE I). These historic agreements, which relied on the political philosophy of Mikhail Gorbachev, opened the way to succeeding important disarmament agreements for the reduction of nuclear weapons: START I (July 31, 1991) and START II (January 3, 1993); the unilateral decision of the USA (September 27, 1991) and USSR (October 5, 1991) to withdraw from short-range ground-based nuclear missiles (battlefield weapons), the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons of January 13, 1993, the series of politically binding CSBMs (the 'open skies' treaty of March 23, 1992 and the succeeding Viennese documents of 1990, 1992, and 1994, which were agreed upon in the document of the Stockholm Conference of September 19, 1986), the indefinite extension on May 11, 1995 of the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), the signing of an agreement on the complete prohibition against testing nuclear weapons (September 24, 1996),[28] and the treaty on the prohibition of land mines (December 3, 1997).[29] These were accompanied by the evolution of military doctrine in the direction of defense, both within the coalition (NATO) and within individual countries, including the former participants of the Warsaw Pact and the successors of the USSR.[30]

The above-mentioned agreements show that the European countries, along with the USA and Russia, had made intensive efforts to decrease the danger that war would break out by reducing arms and armed forces and introducing norms to ensure transparency in regard to the aim of activities of a military nature. However, these positive facts did not mean that Carl von Clausewitz's idea that war is the extension of politics by other means had lost its currency. Unfortunately, among some former communist countries, along with the growth in nationalisms and the deepening political destabilization, armed conflicts erupted, and the threat of further

[27]Strictly speaking, the only disarmament agreement until that time was the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (the BM Convention), which was signed on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. For more about agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons, see Rimanelli (1995).

[28]The CTBT: Looking Ahead … (1996), Johnson (1996), Edmonds (1994), Timerbaev (1994), pp. 393–396, Kaczmarski (2008).

[29]The text of this treaty was adopted on September 18, 1997 at an international conference in Oslo. During the signing ceremony in Ottawa, the USA, Russia, China, India and North Korea withheld their signatures.

[30]This question is discussed at greater length by Ghebali and Sauerwein (1995).

ones remains extant. It is true that civil wars predominated, but their intensity and the engagement of third parties indicates the persistence of the danger that the military element will be used for political ends. The means of war remaining at the disposal of states constituted a threat to European and world security.

The type and quantity of conventional weapons in the majority of European countries was shaped by the CFE treaty of 1990. It introduced limits on five categories of equipment (tanks, artillery over 100 mm, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) in terms of the blocs—as a unified ceiling for the 16 countries of NATO and the 6 of the Warsaw Pact. As a result of the implementation of these provisions over 40 months there was a significant reduction in the above-mentioned types of arms, particularly for those countries that had previously had the advantage—the former members of the Warsaw Pact. The limitations were asymmetric in nature: on average the Western countries had to reduce their conventional weapons by 10%, while their partners in Central and Eastern Europe had to reduce them, in certain components, by up to 45%.

In November 1995, the signatories of the CFE treaty finished eliminating over 50,000 pieces of heavy offensive weapons, including the destruction of over 47,000 of such weapons (16,000 belonging to NATO countries, and 31,000 belonging to Warsaw Pact countries). Within the framework of this reduction, 18,300 tanks, 17,800 armored combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers, armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles), 8900 artillery pieces, 2100 combat aircraft, and 300 combat helicopters (attack helicopters and combat support helicopters) were destroyed.[31] For the treaty provisions to come into force, the system of control implemented—consisting in international inspections and periodic exchanges of information about the size, dislocation, organization, and leadership structure of land and air forces—was very important; it was supervised by a Joint Consultation Group (JCG), composed of all the signatories of the treaty, and operating within the structures of the OSCE.

The CFE treaty was supplemented by the *Concluding Act of the Negotiation of Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (the CFE IA Agreement) adopted at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on July 10, 1992. This treaty was a political agreement—reached not without difficulties—involving individual countries' declaration of the size of their armed forces. Thus the upper limit of armed forces personnel in Russia was declared to be 1,450,000; in Turkey 530,000; Ukraine 450,000; Germany 345,000; France 325,000; Italy 315,000; Spain 300,000; Great Britain 260,000; the United States within the CFE area 250,000 (at the end of 1996 it reduced its army in Europe to the level of 76,500); and Poland 235,000. The limitations established by the CFE agreement on equipment and armed forces personnel concerned 30 countries in all. 25 countries participating in the OSCE found themselves outside the regime. For many years the two CFE treaties, of 1990 and 1992, constituted the basis of military stability in Europe, but

[31] *Atlantic News,* No. 2670, October 25, 1995.

Table 1 Limits placed on countries subject to the CFE treaty, in November 1995

	Army size	Tanks	APCs	Artillery	Planes	Helicopters
Armenia	60,000	220	220	285	100	50
Azerbaijan	Undeclared	220	220	285	100	50
Belarus	100,000	1800	2600	1615	260	80
Belgium	70,000	334	1	320	232	46
Bulgaria	104,000	1475	2000	1750	235	67
Canada	10,660	77	277	38	90	13
Czech Republic	93,333	957	1367	767	230	50
Denmark	39,000	353	316	553	106	12
France	325,000	1306	3820	1292	800	352
Georgia	40,000	220	220	285	100	50
Germany	345,000	166	3446	705	900	306
Greece	158,621	1735	2534	1878	650	142
Hungary	100,000	835	700	840	180	108
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	315,000	348	339	1955	650	142
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	9000	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	20,000	210	210	250	50	50
Netherlands	80,000	743	1080	607	230	69
Norway	32,000	170	225	527	10	0
Poland	234,000	1730	2150	1610	460	130
Portugal	75,000	300	430	450	160	26
Romania	230,248	375	2100	1475	430	120
Russia	1,450,000	6400	1480	6415	3450	890
Slovakia	46,667	478	683	383	115	25
Spain	300,000	794	1588	1310	310	71
Turkey	530,000	2795	3120	3523	750	43
Ukraine	450,000	4080	5050	4040	1090	330
United Kingdom	260,000	1015	176	636	900	384
USA	250,000	4	372	2492	784	518

Source Meric, Ch. (1996); Lachowski, Z. (1996).

Russia unilaterally violated the CFE treaty when it increased the number of its troops in the region of the Caucasus after its armed intervention in Chechnya.[32]

As a result of the implementation of the two agreements forming the CFE regime, there was a significant reduction in the capacities of conventional forces in Europe. In actuality, their statuses in the middle of the 1990s were close to the agreed-upon limits, which are presented in Table 1. In the following years, a

[32]For more, see Kapuśniak (2005).

significant reduction in armed forces personnel occurred in connection with the professionalization of the armies in many countries and cuts in defense expenditures.

1.7 The Beginning of NATO's Transformation

The main defense structure of the Western bloc, that is, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came out the victor from the Cold War. At a meeting in Brussels on May 29–30, 1989, a few weeks after the end of the Round Table talks in Poland, the leaders of NATO countries issued a declaration in connection with the 40th anniversary of the alliance. They referred with appreciation to the internal changes occurring in the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact and set forth the alliance's position on overcoming the division of Europe and shaping a new international order. They announced the Alliance's long-term objective to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West, but favored the maintenance of a credible and effective deterrent and defense, which in essence meant the continuation of the strategic concept in force till that time. At the same time, they called for the hastening of the Viennese talks (begun in March) on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe (CFE) and for a reduction in the numbers of American and Soviet armed forces personnel stationed abroad.[33]

A broader assessment of the international situation was made by NATO ministers of foreign affairs and defense, just after the Autumn of Nations, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on June 7, 1990. In the *Message from Turnberry*, they invited the countries of their former opponents to work together to "build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy."[34] Gathered in London the following month (July 5–6, 1990), the heads of states and governments of the NATO member states issued the *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, in which they stated that "NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship".[35] Confirmation of this intention was a proposal directed to the member countries of the Warsaw Pact to sign a common declaration that the two sides would no longer treat each other as opponents and confirming the will to refrain from threats or the use of force in respect to the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. They also asked the governments of the countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact to establish regular contacts and undertake practical

[33]Declaration of the Heads … (1989).

[34]Message From Turnberry … (1990).

[35]London Declaration on a Transformed … (1990).

collaboration with NATO. They announced that they would engage in the transformation of NATO in accord with the changed international situation and would limit the quantity and role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance's overall strategy.

The evolution of the idea of NATO security was expressed in a declaration drawn up at the NAC in Copenhagen on June 6–7, 1991 entitled *Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*. This document contained the view that the security of NATO countries is "inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe," and that "the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to"[36] the NATO countries. This declaration constituted a step forward in defining the 'material concern' that could incline NATO to react to an attempt to coerce the countries of Central and Eastern Europe or threaten their territorial integrity. The North Atlantic Council also pronounced itself in favor of intensifying contacts and inviting the countries of the Warsaw Pact, which still existed then, to participate in various forms of non-military NATO activities.

One problem that arose immediately after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the USSR was NATO's definition of itself, that is, the rationalization for the Alliance's existence in a situation where its previous opponent had disappeared. As the outstanding French expert on NATO issues, Pierre Lellouche, said, it was a paradoxical situation, because NATO was undergoing the most important crisis of its history, and yet it enjoyed greater popularity than ever before, particularly in the East.[37]

The disappearance of an opponent caused the member countries to debate NATO's future; numerous academics were engaged on the subject, including, on one side, neoliberal institutionalists, and on the other, neorealists. Two rival views emerged.

The first, by referring to neoliberal theses, claimed that the disappearance of NATO's opponent from the times of the Cold War divisions had put in question the sense of the alliance's further existence.[38] It should therefore be replaced by a regional system of collective security on the order of a 'European United Nations,' built on the basis of the CSCE or Western European Union, or the two organizations together.[39] The proponents of this view provided additional arguments both against the further existence of NATO and against expanding it to include new members. Assuming, however, that NATO were to persist, then it should be transformed into a 'civilian community,'[40] and possibly join an expanded European

[36]Partnership with the Countries … (1991).

[37]See Lellouche (1992), p. 90.

[38]For more, see Hellemann and Wolf (1993).

[39]Chalmers (1990), Flynn and Scheffer (1990), Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), Betts (1992), Joffe (1992), Rusi (1991), Souchon (1993), pp. 249–257, Ullman (1991), pp. 63–79, Spiezio (1994), pp. 51–88.

[40]Brenner (1995), p. 8.

Union.[41] The neoliberal adherents of such an option—basing themselves on the theory of the mutual dependence of peace and democracy—came to the conclusion that NATO was not only an alliance to ensure mutual defense but a community of shared values.[42]

The other view was held by the neorealists. They considered that national interests are of decisive importance in international relations and thus NATO should be maintained as a system of collective defense because after the Cold War rival powers might once again compete over spheres of influence in Europe.[43] The neorealists thought that NATO had proven itself to be the 'best system of security'; it had provided the West with a historic victory in the Cold War that had just ended and still constituted "the sole effective system of security and defense," (pt. 35) with a large role to play in the future Europe. Furthermore, "in the foreseeable future there is no real alternative to it."[44] The proponents of this view also warned that NATO would not survive if it adopted new functions.[45]

The political finale of this debate was the adoption of at a NATO summit in Rome on November 7–8, 1991. In the document it was stated that NATO's basic purpose, set forth in the Washington Treaty and confirmed in the London Declaration of the preceding year, is to ensure the freedom and security of all the member states by political and military means in keeping with the UN Charter, and to strive for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

In consideration of the new security context, the document claimed that the opportunities to achieve the Alliance's aims by political means were larger than at any time previously, because security and stability have political, economic, social, and ecological components as well as the indispensable element of defense. In this situation, meeting the diverse challenges facing the Alliance required a broad approach to the question of security. In this connection, the Alliance's security policy would contain three mutually supporting elements: (a) dialogue; (b) cooperation, and (c) maintaining the capability for collective defense. Such a tripartite policy was to prevent the emergence of crises, or to overcome them, and to favor the building of real partnership with all the European countries in resolving common problems of security. The *New Strategic Concept* stated that the Alliance "is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary."[46] The basis for NATO's strategy was to remain deterrence and the presence of North American conventional forces and US nuclear weapons in Europe. The Alliance also declared that it would continue its arms control and disarmament policy, in order to increase

[41]Kupchan (1996).

[42]Boyer (1993), p. 121.

[43]For typical stances espoused by the neorealists, see Walt (1991), Mearsheimer (1990).

[44]Glaser (1993), Hickman (1993). For more on the subject of maintaining NATO and the continued presence of US forces in Europe, see Perle (1991).

[45]Harries (1993).

[46]The Alliance's New Strategic … (1991).

international security and stability by reducing armed forces and armaments to the lowest level possible.[47]

In the *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation* issued at the end of the summit, the leaders of NATO countries stated, as their point of departure, that the new security challenges facing European countries could only be resolved by a single organization, but that they should be addressed in collaboration with the mutually complementary institutions binding the countries of Europe and North America into a system of mutually dependent and supporting structures. For this reason, the North Atlantic Alliance, acting on behalf of the new European security 'architecture,' would work with the OSCE, the European Community, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe.[48] This was the so-called concept of *interlocking institutions*.

NATO's shift to the new concept of reinforcing European security was reflected in the decision to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a consultative body bringing together NATO member states, former Central and Eastern Europe members of the Warsaw Pact, and the other European countries. The decision at the Rome Summit was based on a desire to draw the countries that had found themselves in 'a security vacuum' into a framework of cooperation on behalf of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to create an arms reduction control mechanism (provided for by the CFE). The NACC began to function in Rome on December 20, 1991.

The following year, as it faced the escalation of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO expanded its military functions to include the possibility of conducting peace-keeping operations under the aegis of the OSCE (June 4,1992) and the UN (December 17, 1992). This exceeded the stipulations of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which only provides for the use of force for the purposes of the territorial defense of member states that have been attacked. The agreement to new types of military operations, which were called *out-of-area* operations, represented an expression of NATO's preparation to assume tasks that are typical of collective security organizations.[49] In the eyes of Central European countries, the North Atlantic Alliance was perceived above all as an effective instrument of defense. Thus NATO remained the most attractive security institution—one that should be joined—despite its internal dilemmas connected with expanding its functions, and difficulties with its internal and external transformations.

[47]Ibidem.

[48]Rome Declaration on Peace … (1991).

[49]The Western European Union underwent a similar evolution—in June 1992 it undertook to conduct the so-called Petersberg tasks (operations), which entailed not only humanitarian and rescue tasks and conflict prevention and peace-keeping operations, but also tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. NATO did not embark on such far reaching out of area operations.

2 The Structure of the System

2.1 Participating States

In keeping with the premises of political realism, states are the principal players in the international system. By somewhat modifying the theory of Organski and Keohane, four categories of participating states can be singled out in the Euro-Atlantic security system—the superpowers, the powers, medium states, and small states.[50] The United States, a hegemonic superpower and the principal victor in the now closed Cold War confrontation, has a special place in this system. On the opposite side, seemingly, was the disintegrating USSR, which in 1991 was replaced by its successor—Russian Federation. Russia inherited the formal status of a great power from the USSR but for over a decade remained a weak regional power—without giving up its great power ambitions. The USA—often referred to as a hyperpower—worked with its NATO allies, which included two formally great powers, the United Kingdom and France, both of which were permanent members of the UN Security Council, and united Germany, the strongest civilian power in post-Cold War Europe. In the first post-Cold War decade, the international, Euro-Atlantic, and global system was unipolar in character and the leading role in it was played by the United States.[51]

There is a very extensive literature on great powers,[52] but the literature about medium states is rather modest and often treats them in the same category as small ones. There is also a problem with defining this category of states.[53] Toward the end of the 1960s Robert Rothstein wrote about medium states,[54] and in the 1980s Carsten Holbraad described them using the term "middle powers."[55] Martin Wight, one of the leading representatives of the English School of international relations theory, dealt with the category of medium states (medium rank) of which he distinguished two types: regional great powers and middle powers. He argues that "the most obvious middle powers today are the powers which have lost the status of great powers as a result of two World Wars: Great Britain, France, Germany or Japan". Then he differentiates small powers and middle powers. The first "cannot stand by itself, but need the protection and support of others". The second "has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others", whereas "great powers are those which have a distinct superiority over their neighbours".[56] According to Hedley Bull, another outstanding English School scholar, the fate of weaker, including middle states, is uncertain in conditions of an

[50]Organski (1958), p. 326, Keohane (1969), p. 296.

[51]Krauthammer (1990/1991), Brzezinski (2004), Mastanduno (1997), Zartman (2009), Ikenberry (2010).

[52]Klieman (2015), Włodkowska (2004).

[53]See Robertson (2017).

[54]Rothstein (1968).

[55]Holbraad (1984).

[56]Wight (1978), pp. 63, 65, 299–300, Vayrynen (1971).

anarchical international community dominated by the principle of balance of power, because they fall prey to the great powers. Such was the case, according to him, with the partitions of Poland by Prussia, Russia, and Austria.[57] The international order is maintained thanks to the sacrifice of smaller and weaker states to the interests of the great powers.[58]

Looking at it from this perspective, the roles of middle-sized powers are shaped under the influence of a certain fatalism imposed on them by the great powers' power politics. In order to avoid this, states of this group usually prefer the method of multilateralism, and the adoption of a stance based on moderation and mediation. This causes them to stand out as states that stabilize the international system. They can also seek to increase their international status and strive to have that status recognized by the community (other actors). Given that they dispose of greater material and immaterial resources than small states, they can consciously choose their specializations. "Carrying more weight than small states, they can to a greater degree affect the course of events, crises, wars and, ultimately, the evolution of the international system."[59]

From the viewpoint of political realism, it is commonly thought that small states cannot play significant international roles given that the resources at their disposal are modest. But constructivist scholars disavow objective quantifiers of greatness for states, and stress the self-perception of small states and the way they are seen by other actors.[60] For example, the Polish diplomat and scholar, Przemysław Grudziński, emphasizes the importance of self-definition and self-perception in the motivation of states on the international stage and points out that "there are no reasons to ignore a factor that has to do with self-esteem, prestige, political culture and legitimacy of the governing circles."[61] Grudziński thus concludes that

> [I]t isn't objective criteria, like size of territory, population of national income that are factors determining the classification of a state as a small, medium or great one […]. The individual choice of the path to be followed by states and nations in the world, the functions and roles that states play in their international environment, and the values states espouse [are what] determines their caliber. Each state, irrespective of its size is a certain axiological project. Axiology and not ontology, flexibility and mobility in relation to other larger states in the system [is what] provides the fundamental instrument for classifying states.[62]

All this signifies that it is not objective criteria that determine a state's place but the given state's function in the international system.[63] More precisely, it should be stated that the international roles played by a state are of decisive importance.

---

[57]Bull (1995), p. 103. See a similar view in Sheehan (1996), p. 116, Craig and George (1995), p. 21.

[58]For more, see Handel (1981), pp. 169 *et seq*., Sheehan (1996).

[59]Grudziński (2008), p. 56. Also see Holbraad (1971), p. 56.

[60]Hey (2003), p. 3.

[61]Grudziński (2008), op. cit., p. 36.

[62]Ibidem, pp. 37–38.

[63]Ibidem, p. 52.

Participants in the newly emerging order in the Euro-Atlantic area included many middle rank states which are members of the European Union, such as Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Nordic countries, neutral Austria and Switzerland, and Canada. After the Autumn of Nations in 1989, medium states which had until then been part of the Eastern Bloc regained their full sovereignty. These included Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and a dozen countries which had emerged from the ruins of the USSR. Of these, the appellation 'medium state' suited countries like Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.

Another group of participants in the new order is made up of small or weak states such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, the countries lying in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan) as well as the countries that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia and Albania. The last group of participants in the international order in post-Cold War Europe consists of Western Europe's mini-states, such as Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, San Marino, and Andorra, but they do not play any significant international roles.

A very important aspect of the Euro-Atlantic security system that emerged after the Cold War is the inclusion in it of the countries of Central Europe and Russia and all the remaining post-Soviet republics. All of those countries began to work with the democratic West, a fact which in principle entailed their recognition of co-dependent interests and even a shared community of values with the West. This was the case to the greatest degree for the countries of Central Europe, all of which had ties with Mediterranean civilization. The emergence of an extensive new security system entailed not only the increase of the number of participants in the system, but also a qualitative change, consisting in recognition of the indivisibility of security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area extending from the west coast of North America, through Europe, all the way to the Asian outer reaches of Russia on the Pacific coast. This new international security system became the widest system ever —one that bordered unstable areas of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southern and North Eastern Asia. The system stood a chance of playing the leading role in shaping global security.

2.2 International Institutions

The multilateral alliances of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Tashkent Treaty were important elements of the Euro-Atlantic security system which took shape in the 1990s.

NATO and the WEU have a Cold War pedigree, and are based, respectively, on the North-Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949 and the Treaty of Brussels of March 17, 1948 (as modified in October 1954). At the beginning of the 1990s, NATO had 16 members—the USA and Canada, thirteen countries of Western Europe (the United Kingdom, France, the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium,

Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece), and Turkey. In 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined this organization. In contrast, the WEU entered the post-Cold War period with nine member states belonging both to NATO and involved in the European integration process (France, the United Kingdom, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal). In April 1995, Greece joined the WEU. During the decade of the 1990s, the WEU expanded its network of ties in the form of associate memberships (Iceland, Norway, Turkey and, since their admission to NATO, also Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), observer status (Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Ireland) and associate partnership (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia). All in all, twenty eight European countries are associated in the WEU. In the 1990s NATO and the WEU underwent a deep internal transformation. Consequently, in 1992 they added peace-keeping and peace-restoration tasks extending beyond the *casus foederis* inscribed in art. 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty and art. V of the modified Brussels Treaty to their basic functions of collective defense.

The Treaty of Tashkent, signed on May 15, 1992 by a number of CIS member states, is a military alliance on the one hand, and a collective security accord on the other. Its founding members are Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993 it was joined by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus. On April 2, 1999 it was renewed by only six states—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan. On October 7, 2002 its signatories created the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The accord (the Statute and the Agreement on Legal Status of the CSTO) came into force on September 18, 2003.[64] The CSTO coordinated the foreign policy of member states in matters pertaining to regional and global security. The Tashkent Treaty that preceded it was to be an instrument by which Russia opposed the West's preparations for NATO enlargement. The CSTO then began to work on instruments to ensure security in the highly destabilized post-Soviet space, but it remains an organization of little cohesion and effectiveness.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a specifically pan-European multilateral security institution active since the 1970s. It initially had 35 participatory countries—33 from Europe, plus the USA and Canada. It was joined after the Cold War by countries which had not participated until then. These included Albania, the mini-states (Andorra) and states that had emerged after the disintegration of the USSR, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugoslavia. As a result, on 1 January 1995 the CSCE—known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—had a total of 56 member-states from the Euro-Atlantic area. The OSCE was the broadest dialogue structure in that area and expanded its mechanism of so-called 'soft instruments' of security. A specific trait of this institution is that in the majority of cases under review, decisions are taken on a

[64]Uzbekistan was also a member of the CSTO from 2006 to 2012.

consensus basis, an approach that encourages negotiations until an agreement is reached by all participants.

In the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic security system an important role was played by sub-regional groupings of states, with a degree of formalization that varied and was usually limited. At the same time, at the junction point of the old division in Central Europe, sub-regional groups emerged, such as the Quadragonale (subsequently transformed into the Pentagonale, the Hexagonale, and the Central European Initiative—CEI), the Visegrád Group, the Council of the Baltic States, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council.[65] A special role was played by the Weimar Triangle, established in August 1991, with the participation of Germany, France, and Poland. The makeup of the participants in all these groups indicated that Europe was overcoming its divisions and was becoming a region of cooperation on many levels.

2.3 *Intersystem Ties*

Kenneth Waltz referred to the ties occurring between a system's units as the structure of that system. In keeping with his view the structure consists in the arrangement of the components. Its first component is the principle on which the system is organized or ordered, which he considers to be anarchy. The second component consists in the functions played by its various elements and the interactions between them. The third is the distribution of capabilities between the system's components.[66]

In adopting Waltz's way of thinking the main principle that ordered the Euro-Atlantic security system after the Cold War can be identified. During the 1989-1992 breakthrough years this was undoubtedly ***anarchy***. It was compounded by the political transformations and accompanied by social and economic destabilization in the countries that were emerging from real socialism, the dismantling of the old political system, and the introduction of democracy and a market economy. The rise of nationalism in some countries led to their breakup (the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czecho-Slovakia) and even to the outbreak of ethnic wars (in South Caucasus, Moldova, and especially Yugoslavia). At the same time, albeit after some delay, certain states and international institutions took steps aimed at conflict prevention, mediation, or resolution. These were taken by the UN, the OSCE, the European Community/Union, the WEU, NATO, and the Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia (the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia). This method of restoring stability—conflict prevention and resolution—is referred to in the language of OSCE and NATO documents as ***cooperative security***. In other words, anarchy was dominant until the emergence of overlapping and multifaceted

[65]For more, see Vukadinović (1997), pp. 75–95, Cottey (1999), Zięba (2004), pp. 275–293.
[66]Waltz (1979), pp. 79–105.

collaboration between various participants on behalf of security. The model that produced in this manner was described as cooperative security.

The ***functions of the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system*** are the second element of systemic interactions ('structure' in Waltz's parlance). The point is that the behavior of those participants either reinforces or weakens international security. Generally, it could be observed that the USA and western countries did not have a uniform stance in regard to the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. On December 17, 1919, united Germany recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. It did so without regard for the countries with which it was in the process of instituting the European Union and a mere week after the provisions of the Treaty on the EU—calling for a Common Foreign and Security Policy—had been agreed on in Maastricht. In the view of many experts, this precipitated the breakup of Yugoslavia and contributed to the outbreak of ethnic wars there.

It should be noted that this initiative was condemned by Germany's closest allies—France, the United Kingdom, the USA, and the UN Secretary General. In 1992, when war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number of countries, including Germany, the USA and Hungary, broke the UN arms embargo and smuggled weapons and fuel to the parties to the bloody conflict. The most burdensome aspect of the western countries' stance was their indecision at the WEU, their failure to intervene militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as proposed by France and their passivity while the USA did so instead. Russia, in turn, very eagerly intervened militarily in the conflicts under way in certain post-Soviet countries (the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the ones in Georgia, the one over Transnistria in Moldova and in Tajikistan) in order to force the warring sides to cease fighting and to preserve its great-power influence in those republics. The UNPROFOR operation in former Yugoslavia, the international mediation of the UN, the EU, the WEU, the Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia, and the OCSE all proved unsuccessful. The use of force by NATO against one side of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the Bosnian Serbs—brought about an equalization of forces and consequently led to the Dayton peace accords at the end of 1995.

The third element of the structure of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 1990s was a highly varied ***distribution of capabilities among the participants***. Considering the West in the broad sense, with its material aspects and mindset, the superiority and attractiveness of the West's power and strength were striking. These gave it the greatest chances of ensuring security and supporting democracy and development in the former communist countries. Thus it could meet the expectations of the societies and governments of Central European countries, which sought not only to establish advantageous bilateral relations with western countries but also to join their multilateral structures—the European Union and NATO. Russia, which was opposed to this, was mired in crisis and chaos and was too weak to prevent the extension of western structures eastward. The alternative security system it established on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty was not able to slow the expansion of the rich and powerful West. The West's hegemony in Europe grew stronger, and the

cooperative security system that emerged in the 1990s provided fuller guarantees of security for the countries of Western Europe, and for those Central European countries that were integrating with it, than for Russia and other post-Soviet republics.

3 The System's Functioning and Evolution

The Euro-Atlantic security system that emerged at the end of the Cold War was facing serious threats and challenges, which arose from the breakdown of the real socialist systems in the countries of the eastern half of Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Bloc. Toward the end of the 1980s, a revolution began in Central and Eastern Europe. Countries of the region were changing their political systems and their foreign policy orientation. According to Stephen M. Walt, one of the leading American neorealists, by altering the balance of threat revolutions most often set off increased rivalry between countries in regard to security and even make the outbreak of war highly probable.[67] Luckily, such wars between those states were averted, even if the role of the military in the political systems of some countries grew—as did its participation in the rivalry between different organs of state power (for example, in Russia and Poland). The growth of the military's political role was especially visible in countries involved in armed conflicts, as was the case in the new Yugoslavia in the years 1991–1995 or in Russia during the Chechnya War of 1994–1996.[68]

Another serious threat in the countries undergoing transformations was internal destabilization, leading to the emergence of so-called weak states that exhibited populist or authoritarian tendencies which threatened to spread to other countries.[69] This was counter to the idea that was popular at the time among liberals, who felt that supporting the democratic transformation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would contribute to building a 'democratic zone of peace,' because—they claimed—democratic states 'do not fight one another.' For this reason, the basic response formulated by experts and politicians of western countries was to accelerate the democratic processes, strengthen the rule of law, enlarge the protection of human rights and basic liberties, and reinforce the market economy. Such aims were supposed to be furthered by the Central and Eastern European countries' association agreements with the European Union and their admission to the Council of Europe, and then by admission to NATO and the EU for those that met the democratic criteria.

---

[67]See Walt (1996/1997). For more, see Walt (1996).

[68]For more, see Umbach (1996), Romer (1992).

[69]The German scholar Gerhard Wettig claims that one of the main factors affecting the security of states is the phenomenon of 'weak states' which, despite resorting to dictatorial methods, prove unable in the long-run to maintain internal order. See Wettig (1995), pp. 140–143.

The opposite view, that democratization, by causing destabilization, could lead to wars, was favored by a definite minority. Evidence to support this view was supplied by the emerging nationalisms and ethnic conflicts in a number of countries and by the resultant outbreak of civil wars in former Yugoslavia and the Chechnya wars in Russia. Despite the popular thesis of American political scientist Francis Fukuyama,[70] world history did not end after liberal ideology triumphed over the communist one. Europe experienced the practical aspects of what Samuel Hungtington called the clash of civilizations,[71] as seen in the religiously motivated conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the one in Chechnya.

A high degree of uncertainty was caused by the institutional void that emerged after the breakup of the Eastern Bloc structures and by fear about the foreign policy of a united Germany, and of Russia, which had returned to the international stage after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In Central Europe in particular, it was feared that Germany might revert to its old path of political expansion and might seek to rebuild *Mitteleuropa*, or that Russian might treat its western neighbors as its 'near abroad.' These fears led the elites in Central European countries to take steps to join the 'tried' structures of the western world, i.e., NATO and the European Union. In contrast, the strengthening of the OSCE, as suggested by western countries, rapidly turned out to be insufficient, especially in the face of the conflicts that broke out in Yugoslavia and the USSR.

The principal concern of the new elites in the Central European capitals was to obtain 'hard' security guarantees. But the West was not prepared for this and, instead, the new governments in the east were offered assistance and support in the introduction of democratic and market reforms—something that was to further the expansion of the 'democratic zone of peace.' Experts who doubted this would ensure peace in post-Cold War Europe were a rarity.

One of the most influential, the outstanding neorealist John Mearsheimer, published an article in 1990 in the journal *International Security*. His text suggested that in a post-Cold War, multi-polar Europe the emergence of serious crises and even war would be a possibility. Mearsheimer based this pessimistic conclusion on the argument used earlier by Waltz, who said that the distribution and nature of military might in the international system are the source of war and peace. He predicted growing rivalry between the powers and the return of hyper-nationalism in Europe. In a polemic with the liberals writing of 'democratic peace' he stated that it was not the internal attributes of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that would determine their behavior, but the structure of the system, which would cause the democracies to behave no differently than non-democratic states. He ended his text with the very pessimistic conclusion: "If the Cold War is truly behind us, the stability of the past 45 years is not likely to be seen again in the coming decades."[72]

[70]Fukuyama (1992).

[71]Huntington (1993).

[72]Mearsheimer (1990), pp. 5–56.

However, the new international security system, built laboriously by the West with the eager help of Central European elites, was based on a different philosophy, which was rooted in the liberal paradigm. It was not a system that respected the principle of balance of power, but one that gave the West a clear advantage. This advantage found expression in the enlargement of the West's two main institutions, i.e., NATO and the European Union, and the admission of the Central European countries to them despite Russia's opposition; in granting NATO primacy in crisis resolution operations (such as the wars in former Yugoslavia, for example); and in the neglect of the CSCE/OSCE as an organization regrouping all countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. Western leaders assumed that peace would be democratic, but the means of achieving it can hardly be seen as democratic. The West took advantage of its greater power and ignored the interests of the weaker Russia.

The West was better prepared than Russia for crisis-reaction operations and preferred forceful methods during operations of this type. During the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994–1995, NATO made use of the so-called 'reinforced mandate' willingly, in keeping with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and became a de facto opponent of the Bosnian Serbs while supporting the coalition of Muslims and Croats. Several years later, during the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, the West stood on the side of the Kosovan Albanians, and NATO's military intervention in March 1999 was made without the authorization of the UN Security Council and, thus, was illegal. It turned into a war of aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), led to the seizure of power by the Albanian nationalist UÇK (the Kosovo Liberation Army) and de facto to the separation of Kosovo from the Yugoslav state. A few years later, the western states recognized Kosovo's proclamation of independence in February 2008. NATO's political and military involvement in the Kosovo conflict produced a very unfortunate precedent for the violation of international law. This and other precedents created by NATO in the Balkan wars seriously weakened international cooperation on behalf of security and made it very difficult in the second half of the 1990s to say that the Euro-Atlantic security system was a system of cooperative security. Ignoring the views of Russia, which opposed such unilateral actions, and NATO's 1999 decision to admit three Central-European countries in spite of sharp Russian criticism, undermined the cohesion of the European security system. This created conditions for a serious crisis, which appeared a few years later, when Russia had become stronger under the government of Vladimir Putin and could oppose the hegemony of the West.

The Euro-Atlantic security system also failed to work properly in resolving the conflicts in post-Soviet countries. In the 1990s, NATO and the European Union did not engage in peace missions in these regions, with the exception of CSCE/OSCE field missions in a few countries. The Minsk Process, which was a dialogue led by France, Russia, and the USA with the aim of settling the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, was under way from March 1992. However, after the Budapest summit of the CSCE in December 1994, it was transformed into the 'Minsk Group' and ceased to be effective. In December 1992, the CSCE mission in Georgia began preventive and mediation activities to bring

about a political settlement of the conflict over Southern Ossetia and then over Abkhazia (in cooperation with the UN observation mission—UNIMOG). It was an unsuccessful mission, and both of these provinces seceded from Georgia. The mission's mandate expired in 1998. In the years 1994-2006, a mission was operating in Estonia to mediate in the dialogue between the Estonian authorities and Russian army retirees. In February 1993, a preventative and mediation mission for Moldova was established to facilitate a political settlement of the conflict over Transnistria, resolve problems of a humanitarian nature, and aid in building democratic institutions. In the years 1993–2001, a preventative mission to Latvia was operating with the task of facilitating the integration of the Russian-language population with Latvian society. In February 1994, a mission was sent to Tajikistan, which had been destabilized by internal fighting. The mission's main aim was to further contacts and dialogue between the government and the Islamic opposition, promote respect for human rights, and build democratic institutions in that country. In the years 1994–1999 a mission to Ukraine was operating; its aim was to defuse tensions between the central authorities in Kiev and the Russian-language population living in the Crimea. In the years 1995–1999, the Assistance Group operating in Chechnya in 1995–1999 was the first peace-keeping mission within the territory of the Russian Federation. As a consequence of the increasing authoritarianism of Belarus' president, Alexander Lukashenka, an Advisory and Monitoring Group was working to help the authorities in Belarus develop democratic institutions and meet OSCE obligations, and also to observe and report on this process. It should be noted that in general the CSCE/OSCE field missions conducted within the CIS region were unsuccessful. The Liaison Office in Central Asia, with headquarters in Tashkent (from July 1995) and the OSCE Centers in Almaty, Ashkhabad, and Bishkek (from November 1998) were of particular importance for OSCE field missions within CIS. These institutions tried to work with the authorities of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan to implement OSCE general aims in the region.

In order to resolve certain conflicts, Russia had been proposing, since 1992, the creation of CIS Collective Peace-Keeping Forces.[73] With the symbolic participation of certain CIS countries, Russia undertook peace-keeping missions, but these were in fact military missions: (after the autumn of 1993) in Tajikistan, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Moldova. The missions were broader than is traditionally understood by the term 'peace-keeping'; they were expressed rather in the Russian term *mirotvorchestvo*, or 'building peace.[74] Russia's manner of

[73]Only in October 2000 was an agreement signed in Bishkek about the establishment of coalition rapid reaction forces of the collective security system, and in May 2001 in Yerevan it was decided in Yerevan to form the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces in the Region of Central Asia. These were initially supposed to be made up of soldiers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan, but were ultimately made up of forces from the Russian Federation. In 2009 a multi-task Operational Reaction Force was established to combat new threats in the region. It is to be made up of 10-15,000 soldiers from member states of the CIS Treaty on Collective Security.

[74]Shashenkov (1994), Mathers (1996).

conducting peace-keeping missions brought criticism from Western and Central European countries, as well as from Turkey and Ukraine (and of certain political forces in other CIS countries). This kept the OSCE from officially awarding its full mandate to the CIS peace-keeping missions. Russia was encouraged to work for such a mandate by an entry in the declaration of the CSCE Helsinki II summit in 1992 to the effect that the CSCE, in undertaking peace-keeping operations, would seek the support of international institutions such as the European Community, NATO, and the Western European Union, and the CIS peace-keeping mechanism.[75] A step toward the CSCE's recognition of Russia's peace-keeping missions, which were being conducted as CIS missions, was the decision on December 1, 1993 by the CSCE Council in Rome to allow for one-time 'third-party engagement' in specific instances, with the reservation that the third party's use of peace-keeping forces in an ongoing conflict would be in complete accord with the aims and principles of the CSCE.[76] In reality, this entailed acceptance of Russia's deciding role within the CIS region and given the reservations as to the accordance of Russian missions with CSCE principles, the decision was a concession to Russia and a confirmation of the powerlessness of the CSCE, which had neither the operational capacity nor sufficient authority to achieve its aims.

It should be noted, however, that this initial agreement of the CSCE in regard to CIS peace-keeping operations within the post-Soviet area was a move that had already been indicated earlier by the UN, which had recognized that multinational operations, planned and implemented by a single country with the support of others (as in the case of the US's Desert Storm operation against Iraq at the beginning of 1991), were more effective than enterprises that were truly multilateral. The difference lay only in that the technical and financial support of the CIS countries for Russia was much smaller than the support provided to the US by its partners.[77] Another, more dangerous, precedent for giving Russia (CIS) a mandate to conduct peace-keeping operations was the UN Security Council's acceptance of the US's intervention in Haiti, which began in September 1994.

It has to be conceded, however, that none of the multilateral institutions, including the UN and the OSCE, could offer a more realistic alternative to the Russian peace-keeping operations.[78] Thus in July 1994 the UN Security Council awarded its mandate to the CIS peace-keeping forces in Georgia, and this was interpreted by Russia as sanctioning the CIS's role in conducting peace-keeping operations and activities to stabilize the situation in the conflict regions within CIS territories.[79] On the other hand, the western countries continued to maintain their objections as to the legality of all these Russian activities. The paradox is that in spite of their criticisms they did not themselves display a desire to join in the

[75]See CSCE Helsinki Document … (1992), pt. 20.

[76]See Final document of the fourth meeting … (1993).

[77]See Kobrinskaya (1996).

[78]Shashenkov (1994). See also Mihalka (1996).

[79]See Vystupleniye postoyannogo predstavitelya … (1994), p. 62.

conduct of such peace-keeping missions and to restore peace. Experts in the West took note of the fact.[80]

The Euro-Atlantic security system functioned as intended, but from the beginning a disproportion was visible in it, in the sense that the western countries were better secured, while the eastern part, including in the western Balkans and post-Soviet areas, serious threats appeared and challenges for the security policy of individual countries and international institutions. These were partially eliminated or delayed (for instance, by bringing about the completion of the Dayton Accords on the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, in spite of the considerable presence of NATO, the EU, and the UN in this country it is hard to claim that a permanent end of the conflict and conclusion of peace had taken place. Bosnia and Herzegovina—like Kosovo, which was separated as a result of NATO military intervention in 1999—is not a stable country, and thus the threat of a potential disturbance of the peace there has remained. Conflicts with an ethnic background that had broken out in the post-Soviet regions of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Azerbaijan (Nagorny Karabakh), and Russia (Chechnya) were also frozen. This means that the Euro-Atlantic security system as a whole was not in a condition to stabilize the situation in a lasting manner in many of its eastern regions. At the same time, after the Cold War there was an eruption of armed conflicts, which generated terrorism and transnational organized crime, and also led to deepening misunderstandings between the main western participants in the system and Russia, which had its own interests in the post-Soviet space and in the Balkans. These misunderstandings arose mainly in connection with how operations were conducted in a crisis. The West showed clear bias and favoritism in regard to the Croatians, Muslims (Bosniaks), and Kosovan Albanians at the cost of the Serbs during the Yugoslav wars, and supported Chechen separatism, while Russia supported the separatist movements in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Thus operations in the 1990s that were supposed to resolve conflicts demonstrated the conflicting interests of the countries conducting those stabilizing activities.

At the same time, from the middle of the 1990s, when NATO and the EU embarked on the policy leading to the admission the countries of Central Europe, Russia began to feel threatened. Russia justified its opposition to NATO's expansion to the east on security reasons, and Moscow claimed that NATO was 'approaching' its borders. This view was based on the traditional realist perception of NATO as a classic political-military bloc which was moving its rim to the east. Russia did not accept the western argument that NATO's expansion constituted solely a broadening of the zone of peace, democracy, and security, but considered the move to be a cover for territorial expansion to increase its state of possession. Russia considered that NATO's expansion constituted a breach of the promise it had received from the USA and FRG during negotiations in February 1990 in regard to the unification of Germany. Opinions on this question among scholars publishing in West are divided; however, one view is that Moscow is correct and that the American archives contain documents confirming that in the spring to

[80]See Marantz (1997), Johnson and Archer (1996).

autumn of 1990 American representatives made informal assurances to Russia that NATO would not be expanded.[81] One confirmation of NATO's promises are the provisions of the final settlement in respect to Germany (of September 12, 1990) which state that the united eastern lands were to have a special military status that would not allow for the stationing of foreign NATO forces there.[82] Russia considered that the promises made to it in 1990 were broken and repeated this fact during succeeding rounds of NATO expansion to the east and NATO military build-up on Russia's eastern flank. Moreover, the EU's eastern policy was perceived by Russia as being aimed above all at Russian economic interests and as imposing its political model on the countries integrated or associated with the EU.

It can be noted that the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic system of security functioned in a manner that was not accepted by all its participants. Three types of assessment can be distinguished. The western countries thought that their entire system of values and political principles should be disseminated and that their institutions such as NATO and the EU should be expanded to those countries that accepted a democratic system and market economy. Such a view arose from the West's policy being based on liberal ideology. Moreover, the Central European countries, which feared Russia and were mindful of their cultural ties with the West, demanded to be accepted into NATO and the EU as rapidly as possible. On the other hand, Russia and the majority of the post-Soviet republics were distrustful of the West and viewed the West's security policy, including its eastern policy, and as a manifestation of its desire to increase its sphere of influence.

Generally, the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system consisted in implementing the partnership-based, harmonious cooperation instituted at the beginning of the 1990s. However, that collaboration encountered a number of problems; the resultant unilateral actions by the West and Russia then undermined the previously accepted idea of cooperative security. At the end of the decade, cooperation was disrupted by NATO's expansion to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and by NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia (the war over Kosovo). This was a clear announcement of a coming crisis in the entire Euro-Atlantic system.

References

Andor, L. (1996). Economic transformation and political stability in East Central Europe. *Security Dialogue, 27*(2), 207–225.

Baldwin, D. A. (Ed.). (1993). *Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Betts, R. K. (1992). Systems for peace or causes of war?: Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe. *International Security, 17*(1), 5–43.

[81]Itzkowitz Shifrinson (2016), p. 11 *et seq*.

[82]Ibidem, p. 42.

Blank, S. (1994). The return of the repressed? Post-1989 nationalism in the «New» Eastern Europe. *Nationalities Papers, 22*(2), 405–425.

Bombik, S., Samson, I. (1995). Bezpečnostné perspektívy strednej Eúropy: pohlad zo Slovenska, *Mezinárodní vztahy*, *30*(2), 24–31.

Boyer, M. A. (1993). *International cooperation and public goods: Opportunities for the Western alliance*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.

Bremmer, I., & Bailes, A. (1998). Sub-regionalism in the newly independent states. *International Affairs, 74*(1), 131–148.

Brenner, M. (1995). The multilateral moment. In M. Brenner (Ed.), *Multilateralism and western strategy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Brzezinski, Z. (2004). *The choice, global domination or global leadership*. New York: Basic Books.

Bull, H. (1995). *The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Chalmers, M. (1990). Beyond the alliance system. *World Policy Journal, 7*(2), 215–250.

Cottey, A. (Ed.). (1999). *Subregional cooperation in the New Europe: Building security, prosperity and solidarity from the barents to the black sea*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Craig, G. A., & George, A. L. (1995). *Force and statecraft: Diplomatic problems of our time*. London: Oxford University Press.

CSCE Helsinki Document 1992. The challenges of change, CSCE, Helsinki, July 9–10, 1992.

Dahrendorf, R. (1990). *Reflections on the revolutions in Europe: In a letter intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Warsaw*. New York: Times Books.

Dean, J. (1994). *Ending Europe's wars: The continuing search for peace and security*. New York: A Twentieth Century Fund Press.

Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, May 29–30, 1989.

Edmonds, J. (1994). A complete nuclear test ban—Why has it taken? *Security Dialogue, 25*(4), 375–388.

Final document of the fourth meeting of the csce council of ministers, CSCE, Rome, November 30—December 1, 1993.

Flynn, G., & Scheffer, D. J. (1990). Limited collective security. *Foreign Policy, 80,* 77–101.

Fukuyama, F. (1991/92). Democratization and international security. *Adelphi Papers, 32*, 266.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.

Fülöp, M. (1994). La politique étrangère hongroise dans le contexte de l'Europe central. *Politique étrangère, 59*(1), 115–128.

Garton Ash, T. (1994). Germany's choice. *Foreign Affairs, 73*(4), 65–81.

Ghebali, V. I., Sauerwein, B. (1995). *European security in the 1990s: Challenges and perspectives* (pp. 30–34). New York: UNIDIR, United Nations.

Glaser, Ch. L. (1993). Why NATO is still best? Future security arrangements for Europe. *International Security, 18*(1), 5–50.

Goldgeier, J. M., & McFaul, M. (1992). A tale of two worlds: Periphery in the post-cold war era. *International Organization, 46*(2), 467–491.

Grudziński, P. (2008). *Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli*. Toruń: Adam Marszałek.

Handel, M. (1981). *Weak states in the international system*. London: Frank Cass.

Handl, V. (1993). Germany and central Europe: Mitteleuropa restored? *Perspectives: Review of Central European Affairs*, (Prague), *1*, 45–51.

Hansen, E. (Ed.). (1997). *Cooperation in the Baltic Region, the Barents Region and the Black Sea Region,* (*FAFO Paper* No. 4), Oslo: Oslo University: Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science.

Harries, O. (1993). The collapse of the West. *Foreign Affairs, 72*(4), 41–53.

Hellemann, G., & Wolf, R. (1993). Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the future of NATO. *Security Studies, 3*(1), 3–43.

Hey, J. A. K. (Ed.). (2003). *Small states in word politics: Explaining foreign policy behavior*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hickman, W. F. (1993). NATO: Is it worth the trouble? Naval War College Review, XLVI(3). *Sequence, 343,* 36–46.
Holbraad, C. (1971). The role of middle powers. *Cooperation and Conflict, 6*(1), 77–90.
Holbraad, C. (1984). *Middle powers in international politics*. New York: St Martin's Press.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs, 72*(3), 22–49.
Hyde-Price, A. G. V. (1991). *European security beyond the cold war: Four scenarios for the year 2000*. London: SAGE Publications for RIIA.
Ikenberry, J. (2010). *Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Itzkowitz Shifrinson, J. R. (2016). Deal or no deal? The end of cold war and the u.s. offer to limit NATO expansion. *International Security, 40*(4), 7–44.
Joffe, J. (1992). Collective security and the future of Europe: Failed dreams and dead ends. *Survival, 34*(1), 36–50.
Johnson, L., & Archer, C. (Eds.). (1996). *Peacekeeping and the role of Russia in Eurasia*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Johnson, R. (1996). The in-comprehensive test ban. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists, 52*(6), 30–35.
Jowitt, K. (1992). *New world disorder—The leninist extinction*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kaczmarski, M. (2008). Problematyka zbrojeń i rozbrojenia. In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie* (pp. 520–546). Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Kaldor, M., & Vejvoda, I. (1997). Democratization in central and east European countries. *International Affairs, 73*(1), 59–82.
Kapuśniak, T. (2005). Struktura reżimu o rozbrojeniu konwencjonalnym w Europie (CFE). *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska* (Lublin—Polonia), XII(Sectio K), 75–98.
Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians' dilemmas: Small states in international politics. *International Organization, 23*(2), 291–310.
Klieman, A. (2015). *Great powers and geopolitics: International affairs in a rebalancing world*. Heidelberg: Springer.
Kobrinskaya, I. (1996). Russia and UN peacekeeping. In G. Flikke (Ed.), *Russia and international peacekeeping*. (*NUPI Report,* No. 206). (p. 6–24). Oslo: NUPI.
Koszel, B. (1999). *Mitteleuropa rediviva? Europa Środkowo- i Południowo-Wschodnia w polityce zjednoczonych Niemiec*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
Krauthammer, Ch. (1990/1991). The unipolar moment. *Foreign Affairs*, *70*(1), 23–33.
Kupchan, Ch. A. (1996). Reviving the west: For an Atlantic union. *Foreign Affairs, 75*(3), 92–104.
Kupchan, Ch A, & Kupchan, C. A. (1991). Concerts, collective security, and the future of Europe. *International Security, 16*(1), 114–161.
Lachowski, Z. (1996). Conventional arms control and security cooperation in Europe, *SIPRI Yearbook 1996* (pp. 709-739). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Layne, C. (1994). Kant or Cant: The myth of the democratic peace. *International Security, 9*(2), 5–49.
Lellouche, P. (1992). La France et l'Otan, quel avenir? *Relations internationales et stratégiques, 7,* 90–98.
Líska, L. (1993). Německo jako problém evropské polityky. In A. Ort et al. (Ed.), *Česká republika v měnící se Evropě. Sborník statí* (pp. 101–104). Praha: Středisko mezinárodních studií Jana Masaryka.
London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. *NATO Press Communiqué*, S-1 (90)36, July 6, 1990.
Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (1995). Democratization and the danger of war. *International Security, 20*(1), 5–38.

Marantz, P. J. (1997). Neither adversaries Nor partners: Russia and the West search for a new relationship. In R. E. Kanet & A. V. Kozhemiankin (Eds.), *The foreign policy of the Russian federation* (pp. 78–101). Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Mastanduno, M. (1997). Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and U.S. grand strategy after the cold war. *International Security, 21*(4), 49–88.

Mathers, J. G. (1996). Russian national security policy after the cold war. In M. J. Davis (Ed.), *Security issues in the post-Cold War world* (pp. 40–56). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security, 15*(1), 5–57.

Meric, Ch. (1996). Bilan du processus du désarmement conventionel en Europe (p. 320). In *Memento défense-désarmement 1995/96. L'Europe et la sécurité internationale*, Bruxelles: GRIP.

Message From Turnberry, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 7–8, 1990.

Mihalka, M. (1996). A marriage of convenience: The OSCE and Russia in Nagorny-Karabakh and Chechnya. *Helsinki Monitor, 7*(2), 13–28.

Morgan, T. C., & Howard Campbell, S. (1991). Domestic structure, decisional constraints, and war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35*(2), 187–211.

Muravchik, J. (1992). *Exporting democracy: Fulfilling America's destiny*. Washington DC: A.E.I.

Nelson, D. N. (1993). Democracy, markets and security in Eastern Europe. *Survival, 35*(2), 156–171.

Nodia, G. (1992). Nationalism and democracy. *Journal of Democracy, III*(4), 3–22.

Organski, A. F. K. (1958). *World politics*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Owen, J. M. (1994). How liberalism produces democratic peace. *International Security, 9*(2), 87–125.

Özer, E. (1997). The black sea economic cooperation and regional security. *Perceptions, II*(3), 76–106.

Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen 6–7 June 1991. *NATO Press Communiqué*, M-1(91)42, June 6, 1991.

Perle, R. N. (Ed.). (1991). *Reshaping western security: The United States faces a United Europe*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Pick, O. (1995). Středni Evropa padesát let posle druhé světové válce. *Mezinárodní vztahy, 30*(2), 5–9.

Rimanelli, M. (1995). East-west arms control and the fall of the USSR, 1967–1994: Radical change or expedient accommodation? *East European Quarterly, 29*(2), 237–274.

Robertson, J. (2017). Middle-power definitions: Confusions reign supreme. *Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71*(4), 355–370.

Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, *NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)86,* November 8, 1991.

Romer, J-Ch. (1992). Une armée russe: quelle armée? *Politique étrangère, 1,* 63–73.

Rothstein, R. (1968). *Alliances and small powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rühe, V. (1993). Shaping euro-Atlantic policy. *Survival, 35*(2), 129–137.

Rusi, A. M. (1991). *After the cold war: Europe's New political architecture*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Russett, B. (1993). *Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-cold war world*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schmitter, P. C., Karl, T. (1992). The types of democracy emerging in southern and eastern Europe and south and Central America. In P. M. E. Volten (Ed.), *Bound to change: Consolidating democracy in east Central Europe* (pp. 42–68). New York, Prague: Institute for EastWest Studies.

Schöpflin, G. (1994). The rise of anti-democratic movements in post-communist societies. In H. Miall (Ed.), *Redefining Europe: New patterns of conflict and cooperation* (pp. 129–146). London: Pinter Publishers for RIIA.

Shashenkov, M. (1994). Russian peace-keeping in the 'near abroad'. *Survival, 36*(3), 46–69.

Sheehan, M. (1996). *The balance of power: History and theory*. London: Routledge.
Socor, V. (1991, May 3). The romanian-soviet friendship treaty and its regional implications. *Report on Eastern Europe,* 25–33.
Souchon, L. (1993). *Die Renaissance Europas—Europäische Sicherheitspolitik—Ein internationales Modell*. Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH.
Spiezio, K. E. (1994). *Beyond containment: Reconstructing European security*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Spiro, D. E. (1994). The insignificance of the liberal peace. *International Security, 9*(2), 50–86.
Stolarczyk, M. (1995). *Podział i zjednoczenie Niemiec jako elementy ładów europejskich po drugiej wojnie światowej*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
Szulc, T. (1996). Unpleasant truths about eastern Europe. *Foreign Policy, 102,* 52–65.
Taylor, B. D. (1994). Russian civil-military relations after the october uprising. *Survival, 36*(1), 3–29.
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. *NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)85,* November 7, 1991.
The CTBT: Looking Ahead, (*UNIDIR NewsLetter,* No. SI 2/96, Special Issue), Geneva: United Nations 1996.
Timerbaev, T. (1994). A hostage to political realities: A russian commentary. *Security Dialogue, 25*(4), 389–392.
Tomala, M. (1991). *Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Aspekty międzynarodowe i polskie*. Warsaw: PISM.
Ullman, R. H. (1990). Enlarging the zone of peace. *Foreign Policy, 80,* 102–120.
Ullman, R. H. (1991). *Securing Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Umbach, F. (1996). The role and influence of the military establishment in Russia's foreign and security policies in yeltsin Era. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 9*(3), 467–500.
Van Evera, S. (1990/1991). Primed for peace: Europe after the cold war. *International Security, 15*(3), 7–57.
Vayrynen, R. (1971). On the definition and measurement of small power status. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *6(*1), 91–102.
Vukadinović, R. (1997). *Postkomunistički izazovi europskoj sigurnosti: od Jadrana do Baltika*. Mostar: ZIRAL.
Vystupleniye postoyannogo predstavitelya Rossiyskoy Federatsii pri OON J.M. Vorontsova w Soviete Bezopastnostii. *Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik,* No. 15–16, August 1994,
Walt, S. M. (1991). Alliances in theory and practice: What lies ahead? In Ch W Kegley & E. R. Wittkopf (Eds.), *The global agenda: Issues and perspectives* (pp. 189–197). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Walt, S. M. (1996/1997). Rethinking revolution and war. *Security Studies, 6*(2), 174–196.
Walt, S. M. (1996). *Revolution and War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Company.
Wettig, G. (1995). A new types of challenge to European security. *Aussenpolitik, 46*(II), 136–145.
Wight, M. (1978). Power politics. In H. Bull & C. Holbraad (Eds.), Leister: Leister University Press.
Wiśniewski, B. (2015). Teoria demokratycznego pokoju. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), *Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych* (pp. 47–66). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.
Włodkowska, A. (2004). Mocarstwowość w polityce zagranicznej państw. In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej* (pp. 163–176). Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
Xiang, L. (1992). Is Germany in the Western or in Central Europe? *Orbis, 36*(3), 411–442.
Zartman, I. W. (2009). *Imbalance of power: US hegemony and international order*. Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Zięba, R. (1992). »Nowy regionalizm« w Europie a Polska. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 1–2,* 25–44.
Zięba, R. (1995). Zjednoczone Niemcy w nowym ładzie europejskim. In K. A. Wojtaszczyk (Ed.), *Niemcy po zjednoczeniu* (pp. 137–160). Warsaw: Instytut Nauk Politycznych UW.
Zięba, R. (1996). Rola zjednoczonych Niemiec w Europie Środkowej. In K. A. Wojtaszczyk (Ed.), *Zjednoczone Niemcy* (pp. 130–131). Warsaw: Instytut Nauk Politycznych UW.

Zięba, R. (2004). *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego; koncepcje—struktury—funkcjonowanie*. Warsaw: Scholar.

Zięba, R. (2006). Współpraca Francji i Niemiec w kształtowaniu polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, III*(4), 169–184.

Zięba, A. (2010). *Rola Niemiec w rozszerzaniu Unii Europejskiej*. Warsaw: Poltext.

Chapter 3
Changing Challenges and Threats for Euro-Atlantic Security in the 21st Century

1 Understanding the Challenges and Threats for International Security

In the study of international relations, the notion of security has to do with the process by which the needs and interests of the participants of international life are met. This process takes place in an international environment, and its consequences affect not only the countries interested, but the entire international system. Therefore, the basis for the typology made for analytical purposes is the criterion of subjectivity. Based on it, one can distinguish: (a) national (state) security, which is a unit category and refers to individual states and to their societies and nations; (b) international security, which is a term usually serving to characterize the security of a given group of states, and to characterize the international system.[1] In the tradition of political realism security is understood in the context of threats originating externally in relation to states, as the main participants of the international system. The present chapter analyses threats to international security in the Euro-Atlantic system as well as the challenges for states' security policy and for the international institutions making up that system.

1.1 Threats

In light of the tradition of political realism, threat is the contrary of security, and it arises from the outside. We thus ignore threats of an internal character. External threats give rise to anxiety and a sense of insecurity. For this reason, every state-entity seeks to influence its external environment so as to remove, neutralize or at least to postpone threats and to eliminate its own fear, concern, anxiety and uncertainty.

[1]For more, see Zięba (1989), pp. 52–68.

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_3

In the first sense, a threat refers to a certain real phenomenon which is considered to be unfavorable or dangerous. It can include factors causing this state of uncertainty and fear; those are thus the real actions of other participants in international life—actions that are unfavorable or dangerous for the fundamental values and vital interests of a given single or collective entity. They are real threats. In the second sense, the threat may just be a state of mind or a state of awareness triggered by the perception of phenomena which are seen as unfavorable or dangerous. The judgments formulated by the given entity are particularly important in this context as they provide the grounds for actions taken by that entity in order to reinforce its own security. In this sense the threat takes place in the sphere of consciousness and is subjective in nature. The general definition of a threat can be accepted as the "the possibility that some negatively perceived phenomenon might arise".[2]

A threat indicates a subjective (dependent on the perception of the perceiving entity) and/or objective (real) existence of a danger for the values considered by the entity in question as important for its security. A phenomenon or merely a disproportion in resources can be considered a threat. It is asymmetrical in character, and this means that the given entity feels anxiety and fear.

In any analysis of threats, the perception of the perceiving entity is very important. It can be the reflection of a real state (a real, potential or probable threat) or can be false (a so-called misperception). Often, a misperception is as if a natural effect of the high degree of complexity of the security environment (especially the international one), the simultaneous circulation of real and false information, and also of cognitive limitations of perceiving entities and, as is often the case, their lack of professionalism.[3] These considerations, as well as the considerable fluctuation in time and space of the elements making up security, produce difficulties in the cognitive process, and these difficulties cause scholars to give up on their efforts to seek a general theory of security. One can, therefore, focus the search for the essence of security solely on the analysis of objective and subjective aspects of threats,[4] or even treat security as a state of consciousness, i.e., an exclusively subjective notion.[5]

1.2 Challenges

In taking up the study of the security of various entities, including international security, it seems useful at the outset, as it were, to distinguish dangers from similarly perceived phenomena, which are merely challenges. This is a rather difficult task, as both are at times negatively perceived. The entities of security,

[2]Kaufmann (1970), p. 152.

[3]For more, see Jervis (1976), Vogler (1989), Kukułka (1992), p. 93.

[4]Frei (1977), pp. 17–21.

[5]Pietraś (1986), p. 162.

including states, treat security as an existential need and, in seeking to ensure it they can't take only negative steps aimed at the elimination of threats. They also take up the challenges that arise and seek to shape their security using positive methods, doing so even when they do not experience threats. This means that the analysis of security in the context of threats requires a certain significant modification. Infrequently, threats are understood as an excessively wide array of phenomena that are seen as negative. Yet in fact, the nature of some of these phenomena is not that of threats but challenges to the entities, like new situations in which inalienable needs arise that require the formulation of a response and the taking of appropriate steps. Only when they are unresolved, can challenges take the form of a danger for the security of the entity, its society, and for nations and states. Given that challenges appear as difficult situations in public perception, it happens that they are unjustly seen as dangers. The border between uncertainty created by challenges and a real threat is fluid and depends on the definition of the values that are subject to protection, and also on the individual sensitivity of the perceiving entity. But the very perception of security by people is subjective in nature. In reality, the sense of certainty which is synonymous with the sense of security is most often only subjectively perceived, and not objectively based. For this reason, and in order to avoid misunderstandings in the subjective differentiation between challenges and threats, it is worth considering them jointly, and to treat them as different types of risks to international security.[6]

A challenge gives rise to uncertainty, but not necessarily to a threat. But if the entities of security do not take appropriate steps in time to resolve the emerging problem, challenges can generate threats. Scholars from the Copenhagen School and proponents of constructivism describe the process by which challenges evolve into threats, a process which they call 'securitization'. They point out that the moment when the debate about a given phenomenon ends and steps are taken to eliminate it or mitigate its effects, is the moment when securitization begins. This process is often extended in time and years can go by before a challenge begins to be viewed as a threat. Securitization can be perceived as an even more radical form than the politicization of an emerging phenomenon or problem.[7] Such was the case, for example, with the degradation of the natural environment which was treated as a challenge as late as the 1980s, but began to be seen by politicians and societies as a threat. In more simple terms, it can be said that challenges and threats lie along the axis of a continuum of sorts, in which a need gradually arises and then transforms itself into a necessity for the entity to take action in order to ensure its own security.

Taking up challenges is positive and preventive in nature, because it does not entail eliminatory or negative actions. But when challenges become a threat, the entities must take negative and eliminatory actions, and only then positive ones, i.e., ones that prevent the recurrence of threats. This means that security measures

[6]Certain authors use the term 'challenge' in connection with both phenomena. For example, see Ghebali and Sauerwein (1995).

[7]For more, see Wæver (1995), Buzan et al. (1998), Emmers (2007).

constitute a certain sequence of alternating positive and negative actions. Challenges and threats to the security of various entities thus implicitly form a class (group) of phenomena inclining states and other institutions to take positive and negative actions.

In practice, we are dealing with a two-fold understanding of security. The first, a narrow view that Joseph S. Nye calls negative,[8] holds that security is the absence of threats and concentrates on analyzing the steps an entity takes to ensure the security of its important internal values. The second, positive view, focuses on the shaping of the entity's certainty of survival, state of possession, functioning and developmental freedom. In the first approach security is defined in opposition to threats, while the second defines it through the analysis of the entity's creative actions taken early, at least at the stage of emergence of challenges. Using the positive approach, we can define security in short as an objective and subjective certainty of a given entity's existence, survival, state of possession, functioning, and prospects for free development.[9]

2 The Reconfiguration of the International Order

For a dozen years after the Cold War, there was an international security system based on the hegemony of the United States, which was the main winner in the confrontation between East and West. The USA was dominant as a political and economic actor, and also as a promoter of democratic and mass culture values. In keeping with the premises of structural realism, the dominance of one actor naturally gives rise to its competitors' striving for balancing. This uneven strength of the American hegemon elicited just such balancing efforts from its rivals. In keeping with Kenneth Waltz's 2000 thesis, balancing the hegemony of the USA would to take place slowly and be an inevitable process. He claimed that bringing about a poly-centric (multi-polar) world would not take place very quickly, but would be inevitable. And what could we observe after a few years? The pressure exerted by various pretenders, among whom Waltz saw the European Union or a coalition under the leadership of Germany, Japan, China and, in the longer run, also Russia,[10] brought about visible results after the financial crisis, which began in 2008 and from which the West came out much weakened. New pretenders to world leadership also emerged, like China, India or Brazil.

The premises and manifestations of the progressing redistribution of potentials were already visible in (a) the systematic rise of China's economic power and, to a lesser degree, also that of India and Brazil, (b) the EU's temporary integration success (the admission of the Central European countries) in the first decade of the

[8]See Nye (1989), p. 54.
[9]Zięba (2015), p. 94.
[10]Waltz (2000), p. 30.

21st century, (c) the acceleration of Africa's development, (d) and Russia's growing economic and military strength, which allowed it to conduct a more assertive policy with regard to the USA and the EU.

Many authors see this diffusion of power in the international system, pointing to the weakening of the USA's position, but falls into the liberal trap, which leads them to make unwarranted conclusions. For example, G. John Ikenberry and Fareed Zakaria claim that the evolution taking place in the world is beneficial for the United States, because America's competitors are following in its footsteps, and this will allow the United States to maintain its dominant position in the international order in the 21st century.[11] This a prognosis is based on the observation of Robert Kagan, who wrote that the "elites in the West have operated on the ideological conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that other forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory".[12] However, a few years later, Charles Kupchan formulated the thesis that the future international order will not be dominated by one state or region, but that "the next world will have no center of gravity. It will be no one's world".[13] As if polemicizing with the above-mentioned authors, he claims that "a global community will not warmly embrace Western values and conceptions of order".[14] Later, he argues:

> [T]he problem is that the defining attributes of the West—liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, and secular nationalism—are not being replicated as developing regions modernize. To be sure, capitalism has demonstrated its universal draw. But most rising powers —China, India, Turkey, and Brazil among them—are not tracking the developmental path followed by the West. They have different cultural and socioeconomic foundations, which give rise to their own domestic orders and ideological orientations. Accordingly, emerging powers will want to revise, not consolidate, the international order erected during the West's watch. They have different views about the foundations of political legitimacy, the nature of sovereignty, the rules of international trade, and the relationship between the state and society. As their material power increases, they will seek to recast the international order in ways that advantage their interests and ideological preferences. The developmental paths followed by the rising rest represent alternatives to the Western way, not temporary detours on the road to global homogeneity.[15]

A similar view was formulated by other experts who claim:

> In this world, a new order will not be based on the modernist ideas and institutions such as nation states, markets, individualism, science and technology, and progress. These ideas and institutions will be challenged by newly empowered ideas and institutions such as global enterprises and transitional organizations, the rise of sharing and donation, communitarianism, spirituality, and environmentalism. The new global order, in fact, will be

[11]Ikenberry (2008), pp. 25, 37, Zakaria (2008), p. 218.

[12]Kagan (2007), pp. 18–19.

[13]Kupchan (2012), p. 5. Similarly, Zbigniew Brzeziński has advanced the thesis that the future world will be increasingly chaotic, not dominated by any hegemon or even by a global hierarchy. Brzeziński (2012), p. 76 *et seq.*

[14]Kupchan (2012), p. 5.

[15]Ibidem, pp. 7–8.

> determined somewhere in between. […] The world's resurgent great civilizations will compete for supremacy with the established Western powers.[16]

From this perspective, the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order creates serious challenges for the entire West and all dimensions of its policies, including for its political systems, social organization, economic model, and security,[17] especially because nationalist movements have appeared in many western countries in the present decade, along with a rejection of liberal economics and increasing criticism of globalization.[18] It is difficult to predict the future policy of the newly emerging powers, and it is hard for the United States to come to an understanding not only with Russia and China, but also with Brazil and India.[19] In analyses of the reconfiguration of the international order, scholars attach fundamental significance to the shaping of asymmetric bipolarity in the coming decades. China is expected to move into first place as the economic leader of the world and the United States will remain, for many years yet, the leading military power. Subsequently, if the current trends continue, other players, such as India, could join in shaping the global order in the concert of power.[20] On the other hand, opinions are divided on the subject of how these two leading powers (China and the USA) will manage their mutual relations.[21]

As the authors (Bruce Jones, Thomas Wright, Jeremy Shapiro, and Robert Keane) of a February 2014 Brookings Institution report wrote, due to the redistribution of power in the international system, political rivalry and the risk of conflict between the great powers has returned for the first time since 1991. The greatest risks of keen rivalry in security matters exist between China and Japan in the East China Sea; in Southeast Asia between China, its neighbors, and the USA; and to a lesser degree in Eastern Europe.[22] Thus a qualitatively new situation has arisen, in which serious threats to international security have appeared, as well as obstacles that might also complicate international cooperation to tackle common challenges.

One institutional expression of the redistribution of power in the international system was the emergence of the BRIC group (2006–2009), which became BRICS in 2011. Today the group includes not only the newly emerging powers of China and India, but also Russia, Brazil, and the Republic of South Africa. On Russia's

[16]Herberg-Rothe and Son (2018), p. 215.

[17]Cox (2012), pp. 369–372.

[18]For more on Russia's and Hungary's growing distance from liberal democracy, see Oliker (2017), Boyle (2016).

[19]Pant and Super (2015), Hakim (2014). For a discussion of the view which presupposes that the USA will strive to come to an understanding with India in order to counterbalance the growing influence of China, and that India will voluntarily tend to lean towards the USA and its allies, see Sridharan (2017), p. 68.

[20]Stuenkel (2016), pp. 66–96, Cottey (2013), pp. 37–44.

[21]Barrass and Inkster (2018), pp. 62–64.

[22]Jones et al. (2014), Fels and Vu (2016).

initiative in September 2006, collaboration began with a meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of the emerging powers in the corridors of a UN General Assembly session; this gathering was followed by regular meetings of the heads of the five emerging powers. In 2011, the group adopted the name BRICS after it was joined by South Africa. The financial crisis, which led to an economic crisis in the western world, confirmed earlier prognoses (including by Goldman Sachs in 2003) that these countries would become world powers. The literature about the countries forming this group began to speak of them as emerging powers.[23]

In 2017, the BRICS group comprised around 41% of the world's population (including China's 1.391 billion and India's 1.317 billion citizens) and 29.4% of the world's territory. It created 32.02% of world GDP, 40.5 billion USD in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), or 84% more than in 2009. The political role of the BRICS countries in the international arena also grew in correspondence with their improving economic positions. It was no longer confined to the criticism of the macro-economic policies conducted by international financial institutions dominated by the West. On July 9–10, 2015, at a meeting in Ufa, Russia, the leaders of the five emerging powers established the Currency Reserve Pool and the New Development Bank, to aid in rebuilding the international financial system, which is based on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The participants of regular summits of the five countries work to produce a common position on the most important international problems involving the Middle East (including Syria), North Africa, Afghanistan, terrorism, Iran, and other issues. The BRICS countries are coordinating their efforts to create a new, polycentric world order, the democratization of international relations, and the increased effectiveness and importance of international organizations, particularly the UN and G-20. In coordinating their position before major conferences within the UN system, and specifically in November 2010, China and Russia supported India's efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It should generally be observed that the BRICS countries are a group of players which are growing in power. They are collaborating bilaterally, and increasingly closely multilaterally, in an increasing number of areas, and the entire group is becoming the driving force of great global changes in the 21st century. This is confirmed by the eighth BRICS summit on October 15–16, 2016 in Panaji (Goa). The final statement of the summit set forth a program of joint action between the five powers in practically all areas, and their cooperation in resolving international problems.

> We reiterate our common vision of ongoing profound shifts in the world as it transitions to a more just, democratic, and multi-polar international order based on the central role of the United Nations, and respect for international law.[24]

At the next summit on September 4, 2017 in Xiamen (China) BRICS leaders in reference to present challenges and threats to international security, declared:

[23]Nadkarni and Noonan (2012), Stuenkel (2013).

[24]8th BRICS Summit Goa Declaration … (2016).

> [D]evelopment and security are closely interlinked, mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace. We reiterate our view that the establishment of sustainable peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equity and cooperation, that addresses the causes of conflicts, including their political, economic and social dimensions. We condemn unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations. We emphasize that no country should enhance its security at the expense of the security of others.[25]

As can be seen, the international order that is taking shape before our eyes contains many unknowns, and above all, questions as to whether the newly emerging powers want to be revisionist powers with respect to the order that took shape during the West's dominance and, if so, if they will attempt to introduce changes by peaceful means or by force.[26]

A similar challenge is created by the increasingly good cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is emerging as a competitive structure with respect to the West. A summit of the SCO was held on July 10, 2015 in Ufa, simultaneously with the meeting of the BRICS leaders. The six founding countries—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—accepted the membership of India and Pakistan as well. These decisions came into force a year later. From the viewpoint of—individual countries, as Olivier Stuenkel writes,

> The biggest winner from the SCO's expansion and growing importance, however, is Beijing. The SCO allows Chinese economic might to project itself in a more institutionalized manner and gain a platform to articulate its ambition to play a more visible role in the region.[27]

The decision to expand the SCO was undoubtedly a success for all eight states, including Russia, which has thus come to form, with its Asian partners, a platform for cooperation that is an alternative to the West, and is finding a way to enter the global arena and jointly create a polycentric international order.

It is worth noting that cooperation within the framework of these new structures, that is, BRICS and the SCO, is a rejection of the unequal partnership that the West cleverly tries to impose on its partners, and promotes a different path than the West's to development and progress. This clearly shows that in the 2010s, a polycentric and multilateral order is growing stronger. The increasing influence of the newly emerging powers and their multilateral structures means that the West is facing unprecedentedly serious challenges. These are also affecting collaboration with Russia, which is ever more frequently stating its great power aspirations, and in addition can call on the support of ever stronger partners in the BRICS and SCO groups.

---

[25]BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration … (2017).

[26]Schweller (2015).

[27]Stuenkel (2016), p. 160.

The greatest challenge for the USA and the entire West is the increasing collaboration of Russia and China; the growth and extent of this collaboration rather supports the theory that Russia is strengthening its international position in spite of the conflict with the West over Ukraine. Western experts only noticed this challenge in the autumn of 2016, pointing out that the Chinese-Russian partnership was intensifying not only in the economic sphere, but also in the areas of foreign policy and security. In their opinion, this is reflected in such facts as the following: in May 2015, the presidents of Russia and China, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, signed a *Joint Statement on Cooperation on Behalf of a Connection between the Silk Road Economic Belt and Eurasian Economic Union* and the *Chinese-Russian Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Supporting Win-win Cooperation*, and in June 2016 they signed a document on *China-Russia Joint Statement on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability* during President Putin's visit to Beijing. In September 2016, the two countries organized joint military maneuvers. As experts observed, "the key driver of the current rapprochement between the two countries is China and Russia's increasingly similar views on the state of international affairs—including a shared hostility towards the United States."[28] On can add that during the visit of China's President Xi Jinping in Moscow on July 2017 at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the leaders reached important agreements on strengthening cooperation in various fields and discussed pressing international issues, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The result of the visit was the signing of a package of 40 bilateral agreements. Moscow and Beijing announced their intentions to develop the contacts and cooperation in the military and technical field, and to withstand regional and global challenges together.[29]

In noting the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order, China's growing economic position should be pointed out, along with its growing activeness in initiating multilateral enterprises providing it broad expansion within the region of Asia and the Pacific, as well as in regard to Europe.[30] China is pushing for the establishment of a free trade zone with the 10 member countries of ASEAN and is participating in talks with the ASEAN countries and Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, and South Korea, on establishing an economic bloc which would undoubtedly constitute competition for two structures in which the United States wants to engage, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership,[31] and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which has been in negotiation since June 2013. In order to complete the picture of China's ongoing expansion, mention should be

[28]Duchâtel and Godement (2016), p. 3, Charap et al. (2017), Meick (2017), Maçães (2018), pp. 54–65.

[29]Russia … (2017).

[30]It should be noted that some authors, while pointing to the growing importance of China in the international system, continue to claim that the unipolar world still exists. See Brooks and Wohlforth (2015).

[31]On January 23, 2017, the new President of the United States, Donald Trump, withdrew the USA from the TPP Agreement.

made of Xi Jinping's project of two Silk Routes, named 'One Belt, One Road,' which he proposed in the autumn of 2013. One is to be a land route to Europe, and the other a maritime route. In general, it should be stated that the growth in China's power and its initiatives signal a clear aspiration to attain supremacy in the world, and are an unprecedented challenge to the current hegemon, the United States, and also the entire West.[32] This means that the newly emerging international order is becoming polycentric and it is uncertain if it will be confrontational in nature. This seems to confirm the theses of the neorealists about the inevitable replacement of one hegemonic state by its competitors and, therefore, about the return to anarchy in the international system.

In the first decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, the powers of the Euro-Atlantic zone and China generally worked together to resolve problems of international security. However, this cooperation was disrupted due to the rising international position of the emerging powers of the BRICS group, including Russia, and the reconfiguration of the international order at the beginning of the 21st century. The first important signal that this group of countries is reconsidering the principles of the international order was a speech on February 10, 2007 by the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, at a conference in Munich on international security. In his speech, Putin openly criticized the policies of the USA, accusing it of striving for world domination, violation of international law, and militarizing international relations.[33] After this speech, Russia acted to hinder American 'expansion,' and to promote Russian interests in the international arena. Russia's policies made use of the rhetoric of building a polycentric international order—one that would respect the UN Charter. A year later, in regard to the Euro-Atlantic area, Dmitry Medvedev voiced the idea of creating a new European security architecture.[34]

When Moscow's warnings and proposals were rejected by the West, and NATO announced (at a summit in April 2008) that Ukraine and Georgia would become members in the future, Russia was extremely disturbed. It responded disproportionately to the Georgian army's attack on its peace-keeping forces (formally, CIS peace-keeping forces) in South Ossetia in August 2008. It did not join the Eastern Partnership proclaimed by the EU in May 2009, and when the EU decided to enter into a new association agreement with Ukraine (in November 2013), Russia decided not to allow the new authorities in Kiev to separate Ukraine entirely from Russia. After the US and NATO joined this rivalry over Ukraine, Russia intervened militarily and annexed Crimea in March 2014; supported by Russia, the secession of Donbas began. Indubitably, Russia broke international law, violated the principles of the UN Charter and threatened the security of Ukraine, and other Central European countries.[35] During the crisis in Ukraine it became clear that Russia had

[32]Góralczyk (2016). For more, see Pilsburry (2016).

[33]Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy … (2007).

[34]Kortunov (2010), pp. 241–267, Karaganov (2010).

[35]For more, see Chap. 9 in this volume.

become a first-rank power, and that its violation of international law—in spite of verbal condemnations and economic sanctions imposed by the western countries—was in fact accepted by the main actors on the international stage, not only those of the BRICS group, but also the western powers. Regardless of the ethical and legal assessments we might make of the old and new powers, it is a fact that the international system has become polycentric.

A new manifestation of the reconfiguration of the international order was Iran's late return to international cooperation, after the lifting in January 2016 of the sanctions imposed by the UN in connection with Iran's atomic energy ambitions. After the countries of the 'Big Six' (the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, and Germany) signed an agreement with Iran on July 14, 2015, western states, China and Russia began a race for contracts in Iran. Iran returned to the world market as holder of the world's second largest natural gas deposits and fourth largest petroleum deposits; it was also opening its market of 80 million consumers to imported goods. The lifting of sanctions favored Iran's return as one of the leading players on the international stage. Of particular importance is Iran's position in regard to the destabilizing, long-lasting conflicts of the Middle East. Thus the emerging new international order is increasingly pluralistic, and the United States, in losing its hegemonic position, must increasingly take the position of Tehran into account. This should incline it toward more considered policies in regard to the Middle East. A chance has therefore arisen that a solution to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria can be found, and also that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be mitigated.

A major sign of the changing international system is Russia's intervention in 2015 in Syria's civil war. While Moscow and Washington prefer different methods and even have different goals with respect to that country, they have both been fighting the Islamic State by bombing Syria from the air, and on September 10, 2016 they even agreed on a ceasefire in the ongoing civil war between Bashar al-Assad's regime, which is supported by Russia, and the moderate opposition, which is supported by the US and its allies. The US, Russia, and the Syrian government forces undertook to continue to coordinate their armed activities against the Islamic State and Al-Nusra Front, which is connected with Al-Qaida. Even though this agreement was soon broken by Russia and al-Assad's government forces, it proved the US's recognition of Russia's co-decisive role in resolving one of the cruelest conflicts in the region. The growing role of Russia, as well as that of Iran and Turkey, is reflected by the ceasefire agreement in Syria in December 2016, which was guaranteed by these three states, and which began those three countries' cooperation in extinguishing the civil war in Syria. The USA and the entire West is slowly—and for the time being selectively—coming to accept polycentrism in the international system. The above example shows that the reconfiguration of the international order that has been taking place for the last decade and a half is a challenge that has been taken up in the US's security policy. Another sign of the West's cooperation with Russia, and also with China, are the uniformly critical reactions to the nuclear weapons tests that North Korea has been conducting since

2006, including the fifth test of August 9, 2016, carried out with the most powerful warhead until then, and the first test of a hydrogen bomb on August 3, 2017.

In conclusion, it should be stated that the reconfiguration of the international order, which has been occurring for the past decade and a half, constitutes a serious challenge for the West,[36] including in terms of its security policy. In order to meet that challenge properly and not allow new threats to international security to arise, it is not sufficient for the western security system to be consolidated; the West should also conduct a dialogue and pursue collaboration with its competitors and rivals.

3 Terrorism

In the 21st century, the most visible threat to security is the rapid growth in political terrorism. Terrorism is, in fact, not a new phenomenon, and has affected Europe since the 1960s, including in Northern Ireland and Spain (the Basque Country). The most serious threat is Islamic terrorism, which developed along with successive phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the 1990s in connection with Chechen separatism within the territory of Russia. Various Arab and Muslim states have supported terrorism. The wave of terrorism that has affected Europe and the USA since the beginning of the 1990s and that presupposes radical Islam's global war against its enemies (mainly the USA and Israel) is called 'new terrorism' by Andrew Cottey.[37] Other states have also made major contributions to its growth, and terrorist attacks have also been committed by the citizens of western countries. For the countries of the Euro-Atlantic sphere, the suicide attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, in which some 3300 people were killed, including about 300 first responders who died during rescue operations, were a turning point, after which President George W. Bush proclaimed a 'War on Terror.' The first large operation on an international scale was the military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 by the USA and its 'coalition of the willing' for the officially stated purpose of destroying Al-Qaida's training bases in that country.

This 'War on Terror' continues till this day and is one of the generators of Islamic terrorism. A major generator of terrorism was the US military intervention in Iraq with the help of its allies—the UK, Australia, and Poland—beginning in March 2003. In spite of the official withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq in December 2011, the destabilization and civil war caused by the intervention go on.[38]

---

[36]Stuenkel (2016), pp. 156–161, Brooks and Wohlforth (2015), p. 7 *et seq*., Hofmann and Bravo De Moraes Mendes (2016), p. 831 *et seq*.

[37]Cottey (2013), p. 51.

[38]In March 2015, an international association of medical organizations published a report stating that over 1.3 million people were killed in the wars conducted by the USA in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This terrible number does not include victims in other countries attacked by the USA or its allies, such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Syria. See International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War … (2015).

During the American war on terrorism, a kind of deformation in the perception of terrorism occurred: it consists in blaming Muslim countries and establishing an equation sign between terrorism and Islam. This view began to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The number of terrorist groups increased and their attacks became more frequent. A growing number of terrorist groups admitted their allegiance to Al-Qaida. This was the case with the attack committed in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and the attack in London on July 7, 2005. In the first, 191 persons died and over 1900 were wounded; in the second 52 persons were killed and over 700 injured. Al-Qaida claimed responsibility for both attacks.

The West's lack of strategic thinking and irrational actions from the beginning of 2011 with respect to the Arab Spring created even more conditions for the growth of terrorism. The military intervention of NATO countries in Libya and Syria reinforced a very dangerous new wave of fanatic terrorism propagated by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), which emerged in 2014 in part of the territories of Iraq and Syria.[39] The intervention of Western states (under the aegis of NATO) led to the death of over 30,000 people, and about 50,000 were wounded. The civil war in Syria in conjunction with the intervention of Western states and Russia in that country have cost the lives, according to some estimates, from 330,000 to over 475,000 people, while the number of wounded stands at about 2 million. Most of the civilian casualties (70–75% in 2016) were due to the actions President Assad's governmental forces. A state of humanitarian disaster has arisen in both Libya and Syria.

Islamic extremists, including ISIS fighters, have launched retaliatory actions, mainly in Europe. ISIS fighters are responsible for a series of terrorist attacks in Paris: the first attack occurred on January 7, 2015 in the editorial office of the weekly *Charlie Hebdo*. 12 persons died and 11 were injured. In the spring of 2015, world opinion was shocked by the news of terrorist attacks committed by Islamic fundamentalists in Tunisia (23 tourists died in Tunis on March 18) and in Kenya (147 persons were killed on April 2 at Garissa University College). On the night of November 13, 2015, Islamic terrorists conducted a series of attacks in the capital of France. 129 persons died and 350 were injured. Four months later, on March 22, 2016, three bomb attacks were coordinated in Brussels: 3 suicide bombers and 32 other persons died; 316 were injured. On July 14, 2016, 84 persons died and 202 were injured in an attack in Nice; 12 died and 48 were injured in a similar attack in Berlin on December 19, 2016. On May 22, 2017, 22 persons died and nearly 120 were wounded in an attack in Manchester; 14 persons died and 130 were wounded in attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils on August 17, 2017. ISIS claimed responsibility for the majority of these attacks. Other attacks were prevented by the special services of several western European countries, but the threat has remained.[40]

[39]Comp. Kuźniar (2015), pp. 36-38. The Islamic State also is known as *Islamic State* of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and by its Arabic language acronym Daesh.

[40]Zięba (2016), pp. 219–221.

A specific kind of terrorism is Chechen terrorism on Russian territory. It is linked with both Chechnya's struggle for national liberation and with Islamic fundamentalism. This kind of terrorism is linked with the war of independence of the Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus.

The second Chechnya War, during which Russian troops committed crimes on a large scale against the civilian population, lasted from 1999 to 2009. This war generated a series of bloody retaliatory terrorist attacks throughout Russia. The largest attacks committed outside of Chechnya's territory were the following: On October 22, 2002, Chechen commandos occupied the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and 129 hostages and all 50 attackers died during the anti-terrorist forces' intervention; on August 1, 2003, 50 persons died and several dozens were wounded in an attack on a military hospital in Mozdok, in North Ossetia; on February 6, 2004, 41 persons were killed and over 100 were injured when a Moscow metro train exploded; on June 21, 2004, during an attack on Nazran, the largest town in Ingushetia, about 100 people died; on August 1, 2004, Chechen terrorists occupied an elementary school in Beslan in North Ossetia, taking over 1100 hostages, mainly children. During an attack by Special Forces, 334 children were killed and 700 were injured. On October 13, 2005, 83 died and 116 were wounded in an attack of Islamic extremists on government buildings in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, in the North Caucasus. On November 27, 2009, 39 people died and 100 were wounded in an attack on a Moscow-St. Petersburg passenger train. Terrorist attacks also occurred by Islamic extremists recruited outside Chechnya, and after the end of the Chechnya war.[41]

While the number of European victims of terrorism, numbering in the hundreds, cannot be compared with the several hundred thousand victims of the West's various interventions in the Middle East and in Afghanistan during the last decade and a half, and while Muslim countries suffer incomparably more from terrorism than western countries, political terrorism as such, and especially radical Islamic terrorism, has grown into one of most serious threats to international security, including that of the Euro-Atlantic countries. It threatens the existing international order and its norms.

Political terrorism is connected with transnational organized crime, which is unusually difficult to combat.[42] This criminality functions in various areas of social life and various forms. Particularly dangerous types of organized crime are those involving drugs; the transport of illegal immigrants; the trade in women, children, and human organs; arms; radioactive materials; the corrupting of politicians, the justice system, and businesspeople; and money laundering. The operating methods of organized crime include political, religious, biological, and chemical terrorism.[43]

[41]On 3 April 2017 a bomb exploded in a subway train in St Petersburg, as a result of which 15 people were killed (including the attacker), and about 50 were wounded. The suicide attacker turned out to be a citizen of Russia of Kirgiz descent.

[42]Politi (1997), p. 4, Williams (1994).

[43]For more, see Ryan and Rush (1997), Ranstorp (1996), Purver (1996/97).

4 Military Threats

Armaments are generally considered a threat to international security. This reflects a certain reflex that is deeply rooted in the discipline of international relations of the realistic paradigm, and which suggests to us that there exists in international life a so-called security dilemma, consisting in that if the military strength of one country increases the sense of threat among its rivals and opponents grows automatically, as it were. An important reservation should be made here, one that is advanced by constructivists, who point out that material objects, i.e. including armaments, do not in themselves cause threats, because the question of whether a weapon is to be used or not is determined by the political will of decision makers. We will, however, generally abide by the realistic paradigm and retain the traditional, albeit simplified, perception of armaments as a threat to international security.

4.1 Nuclear Weapons and the Threat of Proliferation

In spite of the disarmament treaties the world had signed and implemented in the twentieth century, it entered the following century with large arsenals of nuclear weapons. The overwhelming majority of these were in the possession of powers in the Euro-Atlantic sphere, that is, Russia, the USA, France, and Great Britain. Thus at the beginning of 2001, Russia had a combined total of 9196 active nuclear warheads (including 6806 placed with its strategic forces); the USA had 8876 (including 7206 with its strategic forces); France had 348; and Great Britain 185. This means that within the Euro-Atlantic area there were then 18,605 nuclear warheads, or 96.6% of the world's entire nuclear arsenal, which then amounted to 19,265 nuclear warheads.[44] It should be noted that this enormous nuclear potential constituted less than one third of the nuclear arms that countries possessed in the middle of the 1980s (that is 28.9% of a total of 64,374 nuclear warheads).[45] The INF (1987), START (1991), and New START (Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms—2009) treaties, as well as the superpowers' reduction of their nuclear arsenals for rationalization purposes, were all of major importance. Nevertheless, the world is not safer now at the beginning of the 21st century as the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons still possess tremendous overkill potential, being many times over able to wipe out life on Earth. The nuclear weapons reductions that were carried out have been outweighed by the ongoing technological race for nuclear arms, and after the US's

[44]At the beginning of 2001 China had 410 nuclear warheads (including 290 as part of strategic forces), India—up to 30, Pakistan—from 15 to 20, and Israel—200. See Kristensen and Handler (2001).

[45]Norris and Kristensen (2006).

unilateral repudiation in December 2001 of limitations on antiballistic weapons (the ABM Treaty of 1972), Washington's construction of an anti-missile shield in Europe produced new dangers. In this situation, initiatives aimed at strengthening the regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, at implementing the agreement of June 23, 1994 on halting the production of plutonium for military purposes, and at combating the organized smuggling of fissile materials, are very important.

The countries of the Euro-Atlantic area were also made anxious by the non-observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996 by India, Pakistan, and North Korea. India first tested a nuclear bomb in 1974, and after Pakistan made a similar test in 1998, both these countries engaged in a series of nuclear explosions.[46] It was a bad signal for the world when two countries that were at odds with each other came into possession of nuclear weapons. Further uneasiness, particularly in the US, was aroused by North Korea's first successful nuclear test in 2006. It can generally be stated that the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons continues, in spite of the indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995. The perpetrators are countries that have not joined the treaty. Since 2002, Iran's nuclear program has occasioned great concern. Years of anxiety and tension were only ended with the conclusion in July 2015 of an agreement between Iran, the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, and Germany, with the participation of the EU, on inspection of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for lifting international sanctions. The problem arose, though, of how to rebuild cooperation between the West and Iran after decades of misunderstandings.[47]

In the course of the first decade and a half of the 21st century, the world's arsenals of nuclear weapons have been reduced by over 20%, and according to SIPRI data, at the beginning of 2017 there were approximately 14,935 warheads, of which 4150 were deployed in operational forces, and 1800 were in a state of high alert. Although this is 460 less warheads than the previous year, the decrease is slow, and Russia and the USA still possess 93% of the world's nuclear warheads. The decrease is chiefly due to the implementation of the New START treaty since 2011. But this general picture is somewhat misleading because, while the stockpiles have been reduced, both Russia and the USA have been pursuing extensive and expensive nuclear modernization programs. In 2017, the ranking of countries in terms of the number of warheads they possessed was as follows: Russia—7000; USA—6800; France—300; China—270; Great Britain—215; Pakistan—130–140; India—120–130; Israel—80; North Korea—10–20.[48] The share in nuclear weapons of the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area is still high and amounts to close to 96% of all weapons of this type in the world. It should be noted that this is still an enormous arsenal of the world's most lethal weaponry, and the very fact that countries possess such weapons precludes any full sense of international security.

[46]Walker (1998), Duval and Le Guelte (1998), pp. 35–36, Baklanov (1998).

[47]Khalaji (2015), Shirvani and Vuković (2015), Tertrais (2015).

[48]Global nuclear weapons … (2017).

Despite the fact that there are many important international agreements are in force, the threat of nuclear proliferation still exists and will continue. The three main motives inducing non-nuclear countries to seek access to nuclear weapons are considerations of national security, prestige, and internal politics.[49]

Joachim Krause saw several dangers for the countries of Western Europe in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are: (a) the possibility that the armed forces of the western countries participating in various peace-keeping missions could meet with armed resistance involving the use of weapon of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; (b) a direct military threat to the territories and populations of western countries by 'rogue states,' which have obtained missiles and nuclear weapons; (c) the risk resulting from changes to the regional balance of power (along with the global effects of such changes); (d) the possibility that a lack of regional equilibrium, compounded by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, could be disadvantageous for the security of western countries; (e) the negative effects of the erosion of international norms and the international order; (f) the danger of accidents involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or events leading to the unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon; (g) new types of terrorism, making use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons for the purpose of blackmail.[50] Other European countries and countries on other continents could also entertain some or all of the above-mentioned concerns.

It thus follows that working to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to maintain close control over the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes will be the common task of the entire international community.[51] This need also concerns other, de-legalized types of weapons of mass destruction, that is, chemical and biological weapons, which in spite of the binding conventions on their complete illegality, are an object of interest for certain countries that are breaking international norms, and for organized terrorist groups. Preventing the proliferation of the most dangerous kinds of weapons is one of the most important tasks of a rational policy to consolidate international security, although the aim of completely eliminating weapons of mass destruction should not be relinquished.[52] However, the views of countries on the subject of how to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are divided, and the existing non-proliferation regimes, such as the NPT, the IAEA, the biological and chemical weapons conventions, and the associated international controls, are ineffective. This means that the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will persist and will give rise to controversial political dilemmas.[53]

[49]Spanier (1990), pp. 525–533.

[50]Krause (1996).

[51]Roberts (1995). See Heuser (1992), Dossier: Les enjeux de la prolifération nucléaire … (1995), pp. 57–199, Schmitt (2001), pp. 1–52, 159–169.

[52]See Walker (1997). Compare Mutimer (1998).

[53]Cottey (2013), p. 50.

4.2 Conventional Weapons

The conventional arms race continues to be a source of threats. At the beginning of the new century the size of armies within the Euro-Atlantic area was limited in fact, but a technological arms race is underway and armies are being supplied with increasingly modern equipment. Local armed conflicts create a direct threat to international security: for instance, the Georgian-Russian War in August 2008, and the outbreak of conflict in the spring of 2014 in eastern Ukraine (Donbas), where pro-Russian separatists fighting the government forces of Ukraine are supported militarily by Russia. Moreover, Russia's suspension of the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in December 2007, followed by a similar decision taken by NATO member states in November 2011, had a negative impact on the sense and state of security in the eastern part of Europe.[54] This enabled increased military activity on both sides in subsequent.

The ongoing arms race is accompanied by a rapid growth in the arms trade and the smuggling of small arms and light weapons. In July 2001, at a UN conference, 140 countries adopted non-binding limits on the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, but later no agreement was reached in the matter. This meant that the resources to conduct armed conflicts, which are occurring chiefly outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere, are widely available. In April 2013, the General Assembly adopted a treaty on the arms trade, to permit the management of international trade in various types of conventional arms, from warships and planes to small weapons and light arms. The treaty entered into force on December 24, 2014. It created instruments for the control of the illegal trade in conventional weapons by the international community.

The arms trade is one of the greatest threats to international security. Even when registered—that is, when legal—this trade does not contribute to strengthening international security in the final analysis, but on the contrary results in the proliferation of arms, which are used in conflicts. Arms reach parties to conflicts and criminal organizations, including terrorist ones. From the beginning of the century, the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area—the USA, Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain—have had the largest share in the world's arms trade.

In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the largest exporter of arms was the United States, which in the years 1997–2001 provided 44.5% of the entire transfer of arms in the world. In 2001 its share fell significantly, but it still retained first place as a supplier of arms, with 28% of the world arms trade. In second place was Russia, which in the years 1997–2001 provided 17% of the world's arms transfers. As a result of the 24% growth in Russia's arms exports in the years 2000–2001, Russia passed the US and became the world's number-one arms exporter, with a 30.7% share of the world's arms trade. France's exports also grew; in the years 1997–2001 it provided 10% of the world's supply of arms. The next place was occupied by Great Britain, with a 7% share at that time. Fifth place was held by

[54]For more, see Chap. 9 in this volume.

Germany (5%), and sixth by Ukraine (2.6%). In the years 1997–2001, the recipients of the largest amounts of military supplies were Taiwan, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and India. These countries together accounted for 35% of world arms imports. As China continually increased its purchases of arms abroad in 2001, it was in first place for arms imports that year. India was in third place after Saudi Arabia.[55]

From the beginning of the present century, the trade in arms has systematically grown. As in the 1990s, the United States and Russia remain the largest exporters of arms (exporting respectively 33 and 23% of the whole in 2012–2016). As a result of a large growth (by 74%) in its sales of arms, China was in third place among suppliers in 2012 (a 6.2% share), passing France (6.0%), Germany (5.6%), and Great Britain (4.6%). The largest importer of arms in 2012–2016 was India (13% of purchases), followed by Saudi Arabia (8.2%), the United Arab Emirates (4.6%), China (4.5%), Algeria (3.7%), Turkey (3.3%), Australia (3.3%), Iraq (3.2%), and Pakistan (3.2%). According to SIPRI, the volume of the world arms trade grew by 8.2% in 2012–2016 in relation to the arms trade in 2007–2011.[56] Nevertheless, the size of the world arms trade is now one third smaller than at its peak at the beginning of the 1980s.

4.3 Military Spending

The rapidity with which armaments are growing is reflected in the expenditures for military purposes. After the end of the Cold War, when the role of military means in resolving conflicts declined, expenditures for military purposes also fell. They were at their lowest level in 1998 but thereafter grew at a rate of 5% in real prices in all regions of the world. Direct military threats had not yet appeared, but under pressure from the arms industry, which was growing in power, politicians pointed to other types of threats, of a more or less known nature, which might appear in the future and should be feared.[57]

In 2000, world military expenditures reached a peak of around 798 billion USD in current prices, that is, around 130 USD per capita, and their share in world GDP was 2.5%. The US had the largest share in these expenditures—37% in 2000. Military expenditures by the US grew by 2.3% a year, mainly in connection with the decision, taken in 2001, to build an anti-missile shield. Russia's military expenditures grew even faster in the 1990s, although at a significantly lower level: in 1999–2000 they grew by nearly 44% in fixed prices. In 2000 they amounted to only 6% of world military expenditures; they were 10% higher than France's but 85% lower than the USA's. For NATO, increasing expenditures for the Defense

[55]Hagelin et al. (2002).

[56]Trends in International Arms Transfers … (2017).

[57]Sköns et al. (2001), p. 266.

Capabilities Initiative (established in 1999) was a political problem. In 1995–2000 the member countries had increased their combined expenditures for the purchase of arms by 11% in real prices, but this too turned out to be insufficient and was criticized by the USA. Therefore, at a NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was replaced with a less ambitious program, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

In observing the first years of the 21st century, it should be stated that world military expenditures grew uninterruptedly in the years 1998–2011. Actually, this growth was quickest in the non-European areas, but nevertheless the greatest collection of military forces remained within the Euro-Atlantic region, especially in the USA and Russia. Later, for three years, there was a strong declining trend in those two countries. US military expenditures fell then in real prices, primarily in connection with the US's withdrawal of its armed forces from Afghanistan.

The return of a rising trend became apparent in 2015 (by 1.0%), when world military expenditures reached a high of 1676 billion USD, or 2.3% of gross world product, or 228 USD per capita. In the following year, there was a marginal growth in military expenditures of around 0.4% in real terms over 2015 (to the level of 1.686 billion USD). In 2010–2014, the military expenditures of the USA and Western Europe fell—by 21% in the case of the USA. At the middle of the decade after 2006, military expenditures had decreased by 3.9%. In 2015 military expenditures in the USA amounted to 596 billion USD but in 2016 they grew again for the first time since 2010, by 1.7% to the level of 611 billion USD.[58] This is an enormous sum and amounts to more than the combined expenditures on arms of the following top-spending countries (China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Great Britain, India, and Germany). The US allocates to the military more money than its largest adversaries, that is, China (215 billion USD) and Russia (69.2 billion USD), although it should be noted that the military expenditures of Beijing and Moscow show an ongoing growth trend. Generally, the military expenditures of the USA constitute 36% of world military expenditures, while those of China and Russia are respectively 13 and 4.1%.[59]

Military expenditures in Europe in 2016 amounted to 334 billion USD, which was 20% of entire world military expenditures. This was undoubtedly the effect of the Ukraine crisis and NATO's well-known decisions (in 2014–2016) to strengthen its eastern flank. In 2015 and 2016 expenditures on arms grew, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2016 this growth in Western Europe amounted to 2.6%, in Central Europe to 2.4%, and in Eastern Europe to 3.5% in comparison to the previous year. The greatest increase in expenditures on arms was noted in 2014 by Russia, and by the countries of Central Europe that feel threatened by Russia. The largest growth in military expenditures in 2015 occurred in the countries

[58]Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the USA has significantly increased defense spending in the 2018 budgetary year (October 1, 2017–September 30, 2018) to the level of 696 billion USD.

[59]Trends in World Military Expenditure … (2017). In December 2017 president Putin announced the reduction of military spending in Russia for 2018 to the level of 2.85% of GDP. See Rosja zmniejszy wydatki wojskowe … (2017).

bordering Russia and Ukraine, that is, Poland (by 22%), Romania (11%), Slovakia (17%), Lithuania (33%), Latvia (14%), and Estonia (6.6%). The high level of military expenditures continued in 2016, and the largest percent of growth occurred in Latvia (44%) and Lithuania (35%). Among the countries of Central Europe, Poland has the greatest share in military expenditures; in 2015 it allocated 10.6 billion USD to that end, or 44% of the entirety of Central Europe's military expenditures.[60] In 2016, total military expenditures by European NATO members (excluding Turkey) amounted to 918.3 billion USD and were nearly 3% higher in comparison with the previous year. At the same time, these countries' main rival—the country perceived as an opponent, that is, Russia—increased its military expenditures by 4.1% (to a total of 69.2 billion USD) in comparison with 2015, constituting a growth of 87% over expenditures in 2007.[61]

The increase in military expenditures by the countries bordering on Russia was caused by the conflict that erupted in Ukraine and became internationalized in the spring of 2014. It is worth noting that earlier, budget cuts had occurred in the leading countries of Western Europe: France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain as a result of the ongoing financial and economic crisis in the years 2008-2011. Geopolitics—the distance separating these countries from the conflict in Ukraine—is also significant.

5 Other Threats and Challenges

In contemporary studies on international security, importance is accorded to non-military aspects, which are usually underappreciated by realist paradigm authors. Adherents of the liberal approach focus their attention not only on national security but also on the security of individuals and social groups. This leads them to observe non-military threat and challenges, and even unintentional ones, that is, those that are not created by humans, for instance, forces of nature. Taking into account the needs of individuals has inclined researchers on the threshold of the 21st century to formulate the concept of "human security."[62] Some states, such as Canada and Japan, began to officially support this concept, and in 2003 it was adopted by the UN Commission of Human Security, arguing that the security of

[60]Trends in World Military Expenditure … (2016), Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries … (2016). In 2016 Poland's military expenditures were reduced to 9.35 billion USD. In October of the following year, the Polish president signed an law providing for an increase of defense expenditures in 2018 to a minimum of 2% GDP, to 2.1% of GDP in 2020, and to a minimum of 2.5% of GDP in 2025. The law changed the way of counting the defense budget amounts by referring to the GDP of the current year instead of the previous one. The law also provided for increasing the armed forces to 200,000 soldiers. See Prezydent Andrzej Duda zwiększy wydatki na Siły Zbrojne … (2017).

[61]Trends in World Military Expenditure … (2017).

[62]David (2000), pp. 87–121.

countries should be supplemented by a concept of human security concentrating on individuals and societies and presupposing that they should be guaranteed protection not only in connection with violent conflicts but also in terms of basic economic security, health protection, and education. In 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan established a high-level panel that demonstrated that poverty, contagious diseases, environmental degradation, and transnational organized crime should be perceived as central challenges for security, along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

In considering such an understanding of security it should be noted that international security in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century is also shaped by the above-mentioned non-military threats and challenges of a global nature.

5.1 Cyber Threats

As a result of rapid progress in the development of information and communications technology and dynamic globalization, a new type of threat to national and international security had appeared by the end of the twentieth century—cyber threats. These involve the use of modern technology to steal ICT data or to block the access of individuals, transnational corporations, or national or international institutions to their own data or the global network.[63] The main forms of cyber threats are cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism. They are a kind of piracy, that is, computer and internet (cyberspace) crime against data content, and the violation of copyright laws. Particularly dangerous are crimes involving public safety (within nations), critical infrastructure (electricity grids, telecommunication systems, transport networks, water supply systems, fire and rescue services), or the institutions ensuring national or international security. The most dangerous form of cyber crime is cyber-terrorism, which is defined in the Polish literature as "a politically motivated attack or threat of attack on computers, computer networks, or computer systems for the purpose of destroying infrastructure and frightening or coercing the government and citizens for far-reaching political and social aims). In the broader sense, cyber-terrorism means the use of the internet by terrorist organizations for communication, propaganda, and disinformation."[64] Cyber threats create "a large danger both for nations, as political organizations, and for social groups and individuals. They could have a negative effect on social and economic systems, and consequently on international security."[65]

[63]For more, see Lakomy (2015), Martin (1997), Wilkinson (1994), Schmitt (2005), Lukasik et al. (2003).

[64]Zając (2009), pp. 39–40.

[65]Ibidem, p. 40.

5.2 Economic and Energy Threats

The continued growth in international interdependence—which appeared first in international economic relations and was then hastened by globalization—increased countries' sensitivity to disturbances in their economic ties. The sensitivity of the economies of countries that had had sanctions and economic restrictions imposed on them were the earliest ones to show such sensitivity. This was the case, for instance, with the effects of the economic blockade imposed by western countries at the height of the Cold War against the countries of the Eastern Bloc. In 1973, the Arab countries belonging to OAPEC used oil as a weapon, lowering the amount extracted to cause the price to rise, with deleterious effects for the USA and its allies supporting Israel.

Economic and financial crises have a negative impact on security. Such consequences were visible in Russia and other CIS countries after the collapse of their financial markets in 1998, and an even greater danger was created by the financial crisis in the USA and western markets in 2008. This second collapse of the financial markets caused an economic crisis lasting several years, which weakened the economies of the western countries. It was the worst economic crisis in the western world since the worldwide crisis of the 1930s. As a result, the western countries lowered their expenditures on arms, and the European Union was not in a condition to animate its own Common Security and Defense Policy. But the economic crisis after 2008 did not have any major influence on relations between the great powers; it did not increase the likelihood of war between them. In the global dimension, however, there was a shift in economic and political power from the West to the non-western world. New conditions were thus created for the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Participants in this system now have to function in a multi-polar world, where the non-western countries have become major players.[66]

In the literature on the subject, the following phenomena are recognized as threats to economic security: unequal economic development, financial crises, international indebtedness, energy threats, and threats to food security.[67] Generally, economic threats create negative consequences for individuals, social groups, nations, countries, and the stability of the international system.

Specific kind of economic threat is the threat to energy security. This threat can be understood differently depending on what area of energy security is studied (supplies of oil, natural gas, or electrical power), and which groups of countries are concerned: consumer, producer, or transit countries. For the consumer countries that do not have sufficient resources and are forced by economic necessity to import, the threat could involve an interruption in the supply of oil or gas, or a jump in the price of these kinds of fuel. For the countries producing and exporting these raw materials, a threat might involve a deep reduction in need by importers, including a boycott by certain producers or suppliers. For countries through which

[66]Cottey (2013), pp. 61–62.

[67]Włoch (2009), pp. 106–116. See also Księżopolski (2011).

energy resources are transported, a fall in oil or gas shipments through their territory could create diminished financial inflows, which might be painful for their economies. Most often in the literature on the subject, a reductive definition of energy security appears, formulated from the viewpoint of the consumer countries: energy security is treated as secure access to energy at an affordable price.[68]

Based on this definition, we can claim that an energy threat arises when a country has difficulty accessing energy resources (oil and natural gas) due to an interruption in their supply, or economic (price) or political extortion. It could also be the result of shrinking resources in a rapidly developing world.[69] The politicization of energy threats causes them to be exaggerated by certain politicians (and various authors who follow in their traces). Such an appraisal could be made of the obsessive perception of a threat in Poland and its eastern neighbors' reliance on fuel supplies from Russia. In the meanwhile, the European Union as a whole rather perceives a mutual dependence between itself and Russia in regard to fuel and treats the subject more in business categories than geopolitical ones. Such an economic view means that the threat to energy security is seen primarily in the lack of conventional energy sources (fuel). However, the danger that supplies will be interrupted for political reasons has been noticed, and the EU as well is increasingly aware of the need to coordinate energy policy with environmental protection, particularly in regard to the climate. Thus attention should be paid to the fact that threats to energy security are connected with ecological dangers. This concerns nuclear energy in particular.[70] The European Union is trying to shape its energy security in connection with its climate policy; one result is the promotion of renewable energy sources.

5.3 Environmental Threats

Since the beginning of the 1980s scholars of international relations have been pointing to the growing threat to international security resulting from destruction of the natural environment. They show the increasing degradation of various trans-border ecosystems, with the resultant negative effect on people's quality of life, the worsening health of societies, and even the threat to the biological survival of inhabitants of areas that have suffered ecological disasters. Moreover, if we take into consideration the depletion of nonrenewable resources, it seems that the worsening state of the natural environment is becoming the source of unacceptable inequalities between people, and this inclines countries to include this issue in their security policies.[71]

[68]Kaczmarski (2011), p. 14.

[69]Klare (2008).

[70]Młynarski (2016).

[71]See Homer-Dixon (1994), Renner (1996), Maull (1989), Brown (1989), Zięba (1991).

Moreover, because environmental threats fairly easily spread beyond borders, they create strong new international interdependence and the need for countries, and international organizations, to make common efforts to protect the natural environment. Activity of this type is increasingly provided for in contemporary concepts of strengthening international security, particularly in those that combine security with sustainable development. The growing interdependence between development, security, and preservation of the environmental was detailed by the World Commission on Environmental Protection and Development (working under the direction of Gro Harlem Brundtland) in a 1987 report entitled *Our Common Future*. From that time, a series of international debates has been conducted and documents have been drawn up pointing to the growing ecological dangers. The most important of such documents in the 21st century were produced by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (January 26–August 4, 2002), the UN climate summit in Copenhagen (December 8–18, 2009), and the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, called COP21 (November 30–December 12, 2015).

However, it should be observed that in essence environmental threats have a global reach, or only global consequences, thus they are not always considered or appreciated in debates concerning international security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Much greater significance is attached to intentional threats, including those involving violence.

5.4 Migration Challenges

Alongside the above-mentioned threats, international migration is a growing challenge for the security policies of Euro-Atlantic countries and international institutions.

Migrations have always occurred and are linked to demographic problems – high natural growth in certain regions and the desire to find better living conditions in other countries. Although at the beginning of the 1990s there were large movements of people from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe, they did not create serious threats to international security. With time, migrations from non-European countries, particularly from Africa and the Near East, turned out to be much more threatening. What is important in this case is the cultural and religious otherness of the immigrants and the resultant difficulties in assimilating them into European societies. The policies of multiculturalism conducted by Western European countries have generally not been successful. Ghettos emerge in which newcomers from Africa and Asia find themselves in isolation from their surroundings have appeared in many Western European countries.

Already at the threshold of the 1990s western experts were opining that if the growth of the European population continued to be modest, and that if the current trend was maintained, within the course of three or four decades the populations of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea would nearly double, resulting in the influx of 25–30 million inhabitants of the Maghreb to the northern

and western Mediterranean shores.[72] Victor-Ives Ghebali wrote that this prognosis could come true, because the demographic imbalance is increasing as a result of the desperate widening of the economic development gap and the worsening state of the natural environment (droughts),[73] and François Heisbourg foresaw that the Maghreb "would become for Europe the functional equivalent of what Mexico is for the United States," and that "the prospect of boat people from the Maghreb is not all that distant."[74]

The incoming wave of immigrants—in connection with the rebirth of Islamic fundamentalism, political extremism, and terrorism in Arab countries and numerous cases of immigrants being carriers of the HIV virus—greatly disturbed Western European politicians and experts. Following the right-wing view, they pointed out that increasing the influx of immigrants and refugees to Europe would create serious challenges of an economic, political, social, demographic, cultural, religious, and even environmental nature for the societies receiving them.[75] Thus increasing attention was devoted to the whole issue of security in the Mediterranean region, which was even named the 'soft underbelly' of Europe. Italy and Spain proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin.[76] The European Union, which was established in 1993 and was guided by democratic values and political correctness, remained open to accepting refugees and immigrants and delayed the production of a common immigration policy.

As mentioned above, two decades later, a serious cause of the increasing wave of immigrants, particularly from the countries of the Near East and North Africa, was the misguided policy of the United States and its European allies of intervening in the internal affairs of numerous Arab countries, and also the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. The wars conducted by the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq and by NATO in Libya are among the main causes of the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. At the same time, the most visible effect of these wars and the West's support for the Arab Spring, as a supposed democratization of the Arab world, has been the enormous wave of refugees and migrants. The war conducted by the USA and its allies in Iraq caused the death of several hundred thousand Iraqis (some sources put the number at over half a million victims) and forced around 2 million people to flee abroad and another 1.7 million to become internal refugees within their country. From 2014, additional victims have been caused by the growth of the so-called Islamic State, which has been responsible for crimes against humanity. The internal conflict in Syria, which erupted in 2011 and involved the intervention of western countries and then of Russia (which bombed areas held by the Islamic State), by the Spring of 2016 had produced over 4.2 million refugees and 7.6

[72]See Windgren (1990), p. 761, Demographic Imbalances between Countries on the Mediterranean Basin … (1991).

[73]Ghebali and Sauerwein (1995), p. 102.

[74]Heisbourg (1991), p. 35.

[75]For example, see Domenach and Piconet (1995), pp. 112–124.

[76]For more, see Ghebali (1996), pp. 136–143.

million internal refugees, while the number of people living in Syria who require urgent humanitarian aid is estimated to be around 12.5 million.[77]

In Libya in 2011, after NATO's intervention and the overthrow of the dictator Muammar Gaddafi, nearly 1 million refugees fled the country (mainly to Tunisia), and around half a million attempted to reach Europe on unsafe boats and thousands have drowned while doing so. The humanitarian situation of the populations in the destabilized countries of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, as well as the migrants striving to reach the European Union from Africa and the Western Balkans is very difficult. All this in conjunction with the wave of Islamic terrorism affecting the countries of the Near East, North Africa, and the Sahel, caused hundreds of thousands of refugees and illegal migrants to head for Europe from 2014 on.

The scale of the problem for the EU is indicated by the enormous number—283,000—of persons who illegally crossed the EU border in 2014; in 2015, the number was an unimaginable 1,823,000 people, and in 2016 over 503,700 people.[78] This created an unprecedented challenge for the EU member countries, which were not able to reach a consensus on a policy in regard to this huge wave of incomers. Fears about the socio-economic and cultural consequences of their admission, and also of Islamic extremism and terrorism—which were most loudly voiced by the countries of the Visegrad Group—created the feeling that the refugees constituted a high threat to the internal security of the EU member countries. This feeling is justified to some degree because transnational organized crime is involved in the transport of migrants and refugees to the EU's external borders and in the smuggling of people across borders. Weakened by the financial crisis, Brexit, and nationalisms, the EU was unable to manage the influx of refugees and immigrants. The danger continues that there will be a further influx of illegal arrivals to the European Union.

The problem of the growing influx of migrants and refugees primarily affects Greece and the richest countries of the EU; in the meanwhile, the United States has not involved itself in any search for a its resolution, even though its policies toward the Muslim world have been one of its causes. The migrants are also not heading for Russia or other post-Soviet countries. The migration of Chechens, and also Georgians and Tajiks, to the EU has persisted at a low level.

References

8th BRICS Summit Goa Declaration: Here is the full text adopted by the member nations. *The Indian Express*, October 16, 2016.

Abboud, S. N. (2016). *Syria*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

[77]Abboud (2016), p. 188, UN concerned by Humanitarian Crisis in Aleppo … (2016), Raport … (2015).

[78]The understanding signed between the EU and Turkey on March 18, 2016 contributed to a reduction in the flow of migrants to Europe. See Batalla Adam (2017), pp. 44–58.

Baklanov, A. (1998). Posle yadernykh vzryvov v Indii i Pakistane. *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 7,* 21–29.
Barrass, G., & Inkster, N. (2018). Xi Jinping: Strategist behind the dream. *Survival, 60*(1), 41–67.
Batalla Adam, L. (2017). The EU-Turkey deal one year on: A delicate balancing act. *The International Spectator, 57*(2), 44–58.
Boyle, M. J. (2016). The coming illiberal order. *Survival, 58*(2), 35–66.
BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration. Xiamen, China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, September 4, 2017.
Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2015/16). The rise and fall of great powers in the twenty-first century: China's rise and the fate of America's global position. *International Security, 40*(3), 7–53.
Brown, N. (1989). Climate, ecology and international security. *Survival, 31*(6), 519–532.
Brzezinski, Z. (2012). *Strategic vision: America and the crisis of global power*. New York: Basic Books.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis* (pp. 23–24). Boulder, CO: Lynne Renner Publishers.
Charap, S., Drennan, J., & Noël, P. (2017). Russia and China: A new model of great-power relations. *Survival, 59*(1), 25–42.
Cottey, A. (2013). *Security in 21st Century Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cox, M. (2012). Power shifts, economic change and the decline of the West? *International Relations, 26*(4), 369–388.
David, Ch-Ph. (2000). *La guerre et la Paix: approches contemporaines de la securité et de la stratégie*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016), *NATO Press Release*, Communique, PR/CP(2016)116, July 4, 2016.
Demographic Imbalances between Countries on the Mediterranean Basin, Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, document 6462, June 27, 1991.
Domenach, H., & Piconet, M. (1995). *Les migrations*. Paris: PUF.
Dossier: Les enjeux de la proliferation nucléaire. *Relations internationales et stratégiques*, 17, printemps 1995.
Duchâtel, M., & Godement, F. (Eds.). (2016, November 4). China and Russia: Gaming the West? *China Analysis, European Council on Foreign Relations*, 1–4.
Duval, M., & Le Guelte, G. (1998). Les essais nucléaires de l'Inde et du Pakistan hier, aujourd'hui, demain. *Défense nationale, 11,* 21–36.
Emmers, R. (2007). Securitization. In A. Collins (Ed.), *Contemporary security studies* (pp. 109–125). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fels, E., & Vu, T.-M. (Eds.). (2016). *Power politics in Asia's contested waters: Territorial disputes in the South China Sea*. Heidelberg: Springer.
Frei, D. (1977). *Sicherheit. Grundfragen der Weltpolitik*. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer.
Ghebali, V.-I. (1996). *L'OSCE dans l'Europe post-communiste, 1990–1996. Vers une identité paneuropéenne de sécurité.* Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant.
Ghebali, V.-I., & Sauerwein, B. (1995). *European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and perspectives* (pp. 30–34). New York: UNIDIR, United Nations.
Global nuclear weapons: Modernization remains the priority. SIPRI, July 3, 2017.
Góralczyk, B. (2016, April 21). Wielka gra, czyli jak Chińczycy Amerykanów przechytrzyli i co z tego wynika, *Wirtualna Polska* (wp.pl) https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wielka-gra-czyli-jak-chinczycy-amerykanow-przechytrzyli-i-co-z-tego-wynika-6027397677585025a. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Hagelin, B., Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T., & Chipperfield, N. (2002). *International arms transfers, SIPRI Yearbook 2002* (pp. 373–402). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hakim, P. (2014). The future of US–Brazil relations: Confrontation, cooperation or detachment? *International Affairs, 90*(5), 1161–1180.
Heisbourg, F. (1991). Population movement in post-cold war Europe. *Survival, 33*(1), 31–43.

Herberg-Rothe, A., & Son, K.-Y. (2018). *Order wars and floating balance: How the rising powers are reshaping our worldview in the twenty-first century*. London: Routledge.
Heuser, B. (1992). What nuclear strategy for post-cold war Europe? *Orbis, 36*(2), 211–225.
Hofmann, S. C., De Moraes, Bravo, Mendes, B., & Campbell, S. (2016). Investing in international security: Rising powers and organizational choices. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29*(3), 831–851.
Homer-Dixon, Th F. (1994). Environmental scarcities and violent conflict. *International Security, 19*(1), 5–40.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West. *Foreign affairs, 87*(1), 23–37.
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. *Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the "War on Terror" Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan.* Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa, March 2015.
Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jones, B., Wright, Th., Shapiro, J., & Keane, R. (2014, February). *The State of International Order*. Policy Paper, No. 33. Brookings Institution.
Kaczmarski, M. (2011). *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Unii Europejskiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Kagan, R. (2007). End of dreams, return of history. *Policy Review, 144,* 17–44.
Karaganov, S. (2010, June 9). Soyuz Yevropy: posledniy shans? *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Federal'nyy vypusk, No. 5229 (150).
Kaufmann, F.-X. (1970). *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag.
Khalaji, M. (2015). Great expectations: Iran after the deal. *The Washington Quarterly, 38*(3), 61–77.
Klare, M. T. (2008). *Rising powers, shrinking planet: The new geopolitics of energy*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Kortunov, S. V. (Ed.). (2010). *Mirovaya politika v usloviyakh krizisa*. Moscow: Aspekt Press.
Krause, J. (1996). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the risks for Europe. *Chaillot Paper*, 24, 5–21.
Kristensen, H. M., & Handler, J. M. (2001). Table of nuclear forces, *SIPRI Yearbook 2001* (pp. 457–486). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Księżopolski, K. (2011). *Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne*. Warsaw: Elipsa.
Kukułka, J. (1992). Postrzeganie międzynarodowe. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe—International Relations, 16,* 91–103.
Kupchan, Ch. A. (2012). *No one's world: The West, the rising rest and the coming global turn*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuźniar, R. (2015). Liberalny interwencjonizm Zachodu po zimnej wojnie – przesłanki i konsekwencje. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe-International Relations*, *51*(3), 29–43.
Lakomy, M. (2015). *Cyberprzestrzeń jako nowy wymiar rywalizacji i współpracy państw*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
Lukasik, S. J., Goodman, S. E., & Longhurst, D. W. (2003). Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Cyber-Attack. *Adelphi Paper*, 359. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maçães, B. (2018). *The dawn of Eurasia: On the trial of the new world order*. London: Allen Lane.
Martin, D. (1997). *La criminalité informatique*. Paris: PUF.
Maull, H. W. (1989). Energy and resources: The strategic dimensions. *Survival, 31*(6), 500–515.
Meick, E. (2017, March 20). China-Russia military-to-military relations: Moving toward a higher level of cooperation. *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report*.
Młynarski, T. (2016). *Energetyka jądrowa wobec globalnych wyzwań bezpieczeństwa energetycznego i reżimu nieproliferacji w erze zmian klimatu*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ.
Mutimer, D. (1998). Reconstituting security? The practices of proliferation control. *European Journal of International Relations, 4*(1), 99–129.

Nadkarni, V., & Noonan, N. C. (Eds.). (2012). *Emerging powers in a comparative perspective: The political and economic rise of the BRIC countries*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Norris, R., & Kristensen, H. (2006). Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2006. (Federation of American Scientists). *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 62*(4), 64–66.
Nye, J. S. (1989). Problemy badań nad bezpieczeństwem. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 6,* 51–64.
Oliker, O. (2017). Putinism, Populism and the Defence of Liberal Democracy. *Survival, 59*(1), 7–24.
Pant, H. V., & Super, J. M. (2015). India's 'non-alignment' conundrum: A twentieth-century policy in a changing world. *International Affairs, 91*(4), 747–764.
Pietraś, Z. J. (1986). *Podstawy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych*. Lublin: UMCS.
Pilsburry, M. (2016). *The hundred-year marathon: China's secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower*. New York: St Martin's Grifin.
Politi, A. (1997). *European security: The new transnational risks*. *Chaillot Paper*, 29.
Prezydent Andrzej Duda zwiększy wydatki na Siły Zbrojne. *Rzeczpospolita*, October 23, 2017.
Purver, R. (1996/97). Chemical and biological terrorism. *Conflict Studies, 295*, 10–16.
Putin's prepared remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. *Washington Post*, February 12, 2007.
Ranstorp, M. (1996). Terrorism in the name of religion. *Journal of International Affairs, 50*(1), 41–62.
Raport: milion imigrantów przybyło w 2015 roku do Europy, IAR, PAP, December 23, 2015.
Renner, M. (1996). *Fighting for survival environmental decline: Social conflict, and the new age of insecurity*. New York: Worldwatch Institute.
Roberts, B. (Ed.). (1995). *Proliferation in the 1990s*, (A Washington quarterly reader). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Russia, China reached important bilateral agreements during Xo's Visit to Moscow, *Sputnik International*, July 5, 2017. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201707051055232446-xi-visit-moscow-agreements/. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Ryan, P. J., & Rush, G. E. (Eds.). (1997). *Understanding organized crime in global perspective: A reader*. London: SAGE Publications.
Rosja zmniejszy wydatki wojskowe. *Rzeczpospolita*, December 23, 2017.
Schmitt, B. (Ed.). (2001). Nuclear weapons: A new great debate. *Chaillot Paper,* 48.
Schmitt, B. (Ed.). (2005). Information security: A new challenge for the EU. *Chaillot Paper*, 76.
Schweller, R. (2015, October 7). Rising powers and revisionism in emerging international orders, *Russia in Global Affairs*. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Rising-Powers-and-Revisionism-in-Emerging-International-Orders-17730. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Shirvani, T., & Vuković, S. (2015). After the Iran nuclear deal: Europe's pain and gain. *The Washington Quarterly, 38*(3), 79–92.
Sköns, E., Loose-Weintraub, E., Omitoogun, W., Stålenheim, P., & Weidacher, R. (2001). *Military expenditure and arms production. SIPRI Yearbook 2001* (pp. 233–322). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Spanier, J. (1990). *Games Nations Play*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.
Sridharan, E. (2017). Where is India headed? Possible future directions in Indian foreign policy. *International Affairs, 93*(1), 51–68.
Stuenkel, O. (2013). *Potências Emergentes e Desafios Globais*. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Konrad Adenauer.
Stuenkel, O. (2016). *Post-Western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order*. Malden MA: Polity Press.
Tertrais, B. (2015). Iran: An experiment in strategic risk-taking. *Survival, 57*(5), 67–73.
Trends in international arms transfers, 2016. SIPRI Fact Sheet, February 2017.
Trends in world military expenditure, 2015. SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016.
Trends in world military expenditure, 2016. SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2017.
UN concerned by humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. *TRT World*, May 4, 2016. http://www.trtworld.com/mea/un-concerned-by-humanitarian-crisis-in-aleppo-99674. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Vogler, J. (1989). Perspectives on the foreign policy system: Psychological approaches. In M. Clarke & B. White (Eds.), *Understanding foreign policy: The foreign policy systems approach* (pp. 135–162). Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and securitization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On security* (pp. 57–58). New York: Columbia University Press.

Walker, R. (1997). Nuclear disarmament: Zero and how to get there. *Security Dialogue, 28*(2), 137–147.

Walker, W. (1998). International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test explosions. *International Affairs, 74*(3), 505–528.

Waltz, K. (2000). Structural realism after the cold war. *International Security, 25*(2), 5–41.

Wilkinson, P. (Ed.). (1994). *Technology and terrorism*. London: Frank Cass.

Williams, Ph. (1994). Transnational criminal organizations and international security. *Survival, 36* (1), 96–113.

Windgren, J. (1990). International migration and regional stability. *International Affairs, 66*(4), 749–766.

Włoch, R. (2009). Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne. In K. A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Materska-Sosnowska (Eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo państwa* (pp. 106–116).

Zając, J. (2009). System bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. In K. A. Wojtaszczyk & A. Materska-Sosnowska (Eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Wybrane aspekty* (pp. 31–56). Warsaw: ASPRA-JR.

Zakaria, F. (2008). *The Post-American World*. New York: Norton.

Zięba, A. (2016). Oczekując nieoczekiwanego: zagrożenie terrorystyczne w Unii Europejskiej. In Z. Siemiątkowski & A. Zięba (Eds.), *Służby specjalne we współczesnym świecie* (pp. 217–233). Warsaw: Elipsa.

Zięba, R. (1989). Pojęcie bezpieczeństwa państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 10,* 49–70.

Zięba, R. (1991). Wpływ procesów internacjonalizacji na ewolucję bezpieczeństwa państw. In J. Kukułka (Ed.), *Internacjonalizacja życia narodów i państw* (pp. 81–82). Warsaw: Instytut Stosunków Międzynarodowych UW.

Zięba, R. (2015). Teoria bezpieczeństwa. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), *Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych* (p. 94). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.

Chapter 4
The Security Concepts of Participants in the Euro-Atlantic Security System

The changes in the global international system in the 21st century gave rise to the need for participants in the Euro-Atlantic international system to bring their security concepts up to date. A security concept is a specific thought-out and imagined state of affairs which, in the opinion of its authors, should become real. It is, therefore, a category belonging to the sphere of social consciousness: it is an expression of values and interests of an entity (states and/or groups of states) that are to be pursued through that entity's relations with other participants of the international system. In the concept, those values and interests take on the form of a system of basic (strategic) aims. As it is a general plan of action, the concept is not fully disclosed to the public. The latter only has access to the security doctrine, which is made available in the form of published documents, and which contains an internally cohesive and hierarchic system of aims, among which aims of lower importance serve to achieve aims of the basic sort. The entity formulating the security policy chooses the means to attain those aims. The general security doctrine is then concretized through sector doctrines, such as the military doctrine, the anti-terrorist doctrine, etc., and through programs, which define the directions, planes, means and methods of action of the security policy.

Following the neorealist assumption that the entities with the greatest influence on the international system are its most powerful—and therefore, the most important—participants, the documents that should be analyzed are the ones setting forth the security strategy of the great powers i.e. the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, followed by that of Poland as a middle power, those of collective entities, such as NATO, the European Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_4

1 Identification of Threats and Challenges

1.1 Terrorism as a Main Threat

The security strategies published in the second and third post-Cold War decade differ from the documents which preceded them in the 1990s in their definition of the threats and challenges facing the security policies of the participants of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Usually in first place they mention the threat of political, mainly Islamic, terrorism organized by al-Qaeda and, since the middle of 2014, also by the Islamic State which emerged on part of the territories of Iraq and Syria.

USA

The first definition of terrorism as a global threat, against which the United States pledged to wage a ruthless and uncompromising struggle, is to be found in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* from September 2002.[1] Treating terrorism as the main threat for the security of the USA and of the entire world was maintained in successive US national security strategies issued in 2006, 2010, 2015 and, essentially, in 2017. During the presidency of George W. Bush, the USA held the view that terrorism had its sources abroad, while the security strategy of 2010, published under the presidency of Barack Obama, for the first time also named domestic terrorism as a threat that should also be fought.[2] The White House parted with the rhetoric of then previous administration and instead of a 'War on Terror' spoke of a 'war against Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents' and declared that the USA would continue to be involved, also by means of armed intervention abroad, in counteracting terrorism in placed where terrorist attacks are planned and terrorists are trained, i.e., in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places.[3] What distinguished the Obama administration's doctrine from that of the previous one's is to be found in the *2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (NSCT), which identifies rule of law as one of the principles guiding US counter terrorism efforts:

> Adherence to those core values – respecting human rights, fostering good governance, respecting privacy and civil liberties, committing to security and transparency, and upholding the rule of law – enables us to build broad international coalitions to act against the common threat posed by our adversaries while further delegitimizing, isolating, and weakening their efforts. The United States is dedicated to upholding the rule of law by maintaining an effective, durable legal framework for CT operations and bringing terrorists to justice.[4]

[1]The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), p. 5.

[2]National Security Strategy (2010), p. 18.

[3]Porter and Bendiek (2012), p. 500.

[4]National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011), p. 4.

The new strategy maintained the USA's determination to fight al-Qaeda (and its affiliates and adherents), but announced an operational shift on behalf of prevention extremism and terrorism.

In January 2017, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45th President of the United States. In a number of statements and speeches, he announced far-reaching changes in Washington's security policy, in keeping with his 'America First' electoral campaign slogan. As the leading threat to America he named alternately the states of the 'Axis of Evil', mainly North Korea and Iran, or 'radical Islamic terrorism'.[5] The National Security Strategy signed on December 18, 2017 names as the greatest clear threats "the dictatorships of North Korea and Iran", and "Jihadist terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida", which "are determined to attack the United States and radicalize Americans with theirs hateful ideology".[6] President Trump's earlier statements did not lay out a cohesive and sensible US security concept,[7] while the published text of the NSS "is implausible as a description of the president's actual views" and "is a departure from previous administrations".[8]

United Kingdom

The USA's European allies followed in Washington's footsteps and also recognized terrorism as the main threat to their national and international security. The national security strategies of the United Kingdom from 2008 and 2010 both name terrorism as a first-rate risk. The first of them spells out that it is "a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists, claiming to act in the name of Islam".[9] It goes on to say that "terrorists also aspire to attack our critical national infrastructure; and to use new methods, including electronic attack".[10] The second strategy speaks of "international terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland".[11] The British security strategy that which followed in 2015 tied the phenomenon of extremism with that of terrorism and declared that it would fight against it jointly.[12]

France

France is a country that has been exposed to terrorist attacks at least since the 1970s. An increase in terrorist attacks there took place in the second decade of the 21st century. It is precisely for this reason that terrorism is perceived in France as

[5]Waśko-Owsiejczuk (2017).

[6]National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), pp. 2–3, 7.

[7]Dombrowski and Reich (2017), p. 1013 *et seq*.; Walt (2018).

[8]Schake (2017).

[9]The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in the Independent World (2008), p. 10.

[10]Ibidem.

[11]A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (2010), p. 28.

[12]National Security Strategy and Strategic and Defence Review 2015 (2015), p. 37.

the main threat to security. In 2006 the French government even issued the *White Book on Terrorism*. This document calls for the creation of a new doctrine of actions against terrorism, which is defined as a threat of strategic nature to French interests in the world.[13] The *White Book on National Defense and Security* issued two years later states that the most dangerous scenario for France is a simultaneous terrorist attack on national territory using ABC weapons and an attack on a strategic location beyond the country's borders. It also introduced the assumed existence of strategic uncertainty as one of the bases for France's defense and security policy and defined that policy's most important aims as the anticipation of threats and the protection of the population. The main instruments of this policy are to be the European Union as a global actor and global management, which should be effective and enjoy international legitimacy.[14] The *White Book on National Defense and Security* from 2013 in turn does not name terrorism in first place on the list of threats. It notes the continued threat of terrorism and its geographical spread, made easier in conditions of globalization, especially on the territories of weak states that are destabilized by local conflicts. In this context, it names the region of the Sahel and Sahara, northern Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and the Afghan-Pakistani border areas.[15] The Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017 proclaimed by President Emmanuel Macron names terrorism, especially Jihadist terrorism, as the most pressing threat. This threat will likely reconfigure itself, extending into new regions and will continue to strike against French and European societies.[16]

Germany

Another European country that often falls victim to terrorist attacks is Germany. An important turning point in the development of Germany's security strategy was the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001. It is under the influence of these events that Germany adopted the so-called anti-terrorist packages. The first of these was adopted by the federal government on September 19, 2001. It called for the strengthening the competencies of organs monitoring the activeness of radical groups suspected of terrorism and having ties with international organized crime. The second anti-terrorist package was voted by the Bundestag on December 14, 2001. It introduced 17 amendments to acts of law concerning Germany's internal security. The premises of the two anti-terrorist packages were gradually introduced through acts of law (*Anti-Terror Gesetze*) that made counter-acting terrorism easier.[17]

[13]La France face au terrorisme: Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme (2006), pp. 5–6, Słomczyńska (2008).

[14]Défense et Sécurité nationale. Le Livre blanc (2008), p. 39.

[15]Livre blanc: défense et sécurité nationale 2013 (2013), p. 44.

[16]Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017 (2017), p. 21.

[17]Zięba (2008), pp. 130–131.

Task related to countering terrorism in Germany were entrusted not only to the internal security services, but also to the Bundeswehr. This was provided in the security policy guidelines (*Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*—VRP) announced by the Minister of Defense on May 21, 2003, and above all in the *White Book on the Security of Germany and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (*Weissbuch zur Sicherheit Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr 2006*) of April 28, 2006.[18] In the White Book 2016 adopted by the federal government on July 13, 2016, the most important threats include transnational terrorism of Islamic organizations, above all al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The document also provides a role for the Bundeswehr in combating terrorism.[19]

Poland

Poland, a mid-size and middle rank country, has not been affected by terrorism. But in its national security strategies of 2007 and 2014, terrorism is mentioned as one of the more remote threats to its national security. The first document names it in seventh place only, as a threat to Europe and thus, to Poland.[20] The 2014 strategy in turn mentions international terrorism along with organized crime in fifth place among threats for global security, followed by cybercrimes and cyber-terrorism.[21]

NATO

After 1999, NATO didn't update its strategic concept for over ten years. Only at the Lisbon summit in November 2010 did it adopt a new strategic document for the ten following years. It is characterized by the fact that it names terrorism in third place on the list of threats to security in the Euro-Atlantic area, "as a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. […] Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities."[22]

The European Union

For a long time, the European Union also lacked an appropriate security strategy. Yet in its doctrine it recognized the threat that terrorism represented. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA, it adopted a package of documents enabling it to combat terrorism. In December 2003, the European Council accepted the European Security Strategy, entitled *A secure Europe in a better World*, in which terrorism was named in first place as a 'key threat'. It stated that terrorism "puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to

[18]Ibidem, pp. 131–133.

[19]White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016), p. 34.

[20]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2007), p. 8.

[21]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014), pp. 18–19.

[22]Active Engagement (2010), p. 10.

undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe", and that the "most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism."[23]

The most important documents concerning terrorism seem to be *The EU counter-terrorism strategy* adopted by the EU Council on November 30, 2005 and the solidarity clause in case of terrorist attack contained in art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which came into force on December 1, 2009.

The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, adopted in June 2016, and entitled *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe* (EUGS) names terrorism in first place as a threat for EU citizens and territory, followed by hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and energy insecurity.[24]

Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization

The threat of terrorism is also recognized in Russia. In the Russian Federation's concept of foreign policy from July 2008, terrorism is named in first place among the challenges and threats facing Russia.[25] On the other hand, in the national security strategy of the Russian Federation of 31 December 2015, terrorism is named in second place, after the activities of foreign intelligence services, as one of the principal threats to state security as an institution and to Russian society.[26] The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016 calls the intensification of international terrorism one of the "most dangerous realities in the contemporary world" and states that the global threat of terrorism had qualitatively entered a new phase with the emergence of the Islamic State and other similar groups.[27] In turn, the security strategy adopted by the Russian-directed Collective Security Treaty Organization on October 14, 2016 lists the intensification of international terrorism and extremism in distant 9th place as a challenge and threat to the collective security of the organization's members.[28]

1.2 Changing Perceptions of Challenges and Threats

A characteristic trait of the security strategy of the participants in the Euro-Atlantic system is a wide perception of threats to their individual and international security

[23]A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003), p. 3. For the text of the strategy, see Missorili (2003).

[24]Shared Vision, Common Action … (2016), pp. 18–19.

[25]Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2008).

[26]Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2015).

[27]Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2016).

[28]Strategiya kollektivnoy bezopasnosti Organizatsii … (2016).

and new challenges for their security policy. For those among them that are most affected by terrorism, i.e., the USA, France, Germany, and Russia, this phenomenon occupies a leading place on the list of threats, while for countries which have had no experience of terrorist attacks, such a Poland, the first places on the list are taken by other threats and challenges.

A common aspect in the perception of threats and challenges in western countries is the NATO coalition security strategy of 2010 and the global strategy of the EU's foreign and security policy from 2016. A different approach to threats is to be found in the Russian program documents. It is those three strategies whose character is most comprehensive and which constitute the conceptual foundation for the actions taken by the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system. But to gain a greater understanding of the entirety of the challenges and threats to their security and their evolution, the security strategies of the main participants of the Euro-Atlantic system should be subjected to at least a summary analysis.

USA

All American security strategies announced after the end of the Cold War contained a wide definition of threats to and challenges for the security of the USA. Their characteristic trait is the absence of reference to the possibility that the territory of the USA might be attacked by some specific hostile power and the outbreak of a great war like the one that had been expected during the previous period. But the substance of those documents shows that the USA took such a possibility into account and provided for a wide array of instruments to ensure its own security. In the 1990s stress was placed on the outbreak of regional conflicts, in which US interests and international security would be at risk, and also various traditional and transnational threats, including terrorism. It is also then that the threat caused by 'rogue states' first appeared in the American doctrine. The United States continues to point to the threat caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the development of missile technology by 'rogue states.'

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the situation changed when America's the doctrine saw in terrorism the main threat to freedom, democracy and human dignity. In formulating tasks of foreign and security policy, the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 related them to regional conflicts, seen as yet another threat, and among which were to be found Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the proliferation of ABC weapons and the development of missile technology. 'Rogue states' and terrorist organizations are made responsible for the two latter in the strategy.

In the US National Security Strategy of March 2006, President G. W. Bush drew attention to the fact that in the 20th century we witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism, and that "a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last

century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression".[29]

The widening of the range of threats to US security took place under President Obama, in the US National Security Strategy of May 2010. The strategy defines terrorism as one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age, and states that the gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. In addition, the list of threats included susceptibility to attack on space and cyber-space, dependence upon fossil fuels, environment pollution, climate change and pandemic disease, failing states which breed conflicts and endanger regional and global security, global criminal networks.[30] A similar definition of threats to and challenges for the security of the United States and international security was to be found in the US National Security Strategy of February 2015. For the first time, it included the statement that a serious threat was created by "Russian aggression in Ukraine", and that "Russia's aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted".[31] This and other similar formulations were introduced in the last published American security strategy following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis.

In his first pronouncement as president, Donald Trump reiterated the traditionally defined challenges and threats facing the national security of the United States. In speaking at the UN General Assembly on 19 September, 2017, he mentioned North Korea, Iran and Venezuela as hostile regimes and named radical Islamic terrorism, trade in narcotics, arms and people, mass migration and cyber-terrorism as other threats.[32]

The National Security Strategy from December 2017 contains a very wide range of threats for the security of the United States, including the new statement that "China and Russia challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity".[33]

United Kingdom

A wide definition of threats to and challenges for national security are also to be found in the security strategy of the United Kingdom of 2008. While in it one can read that there is "a very low risk of military attack on the United Kingdom in the foreseeable future" and that Britain's "ability to forecast emergencies and catastrophic events, and reduce their impact, is improving", it states that "the security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable", and that London has to face

[29]The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), p. 1.

[30]National Security Strategy (2010), p. 8.

[31]National Security Strategy (2015), p. 19.

[32]Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (2017).

[33]National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), p. 2.

"a diverse and interconnected set of challenges".[34] In addition to the main threat of terrorism, it names the following phenomena: nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; trans-national organized crime; global instability and conflict, and failed and fragile states; civil emergencies (the risks of infectious disease, extreme weather, and man-made emergencies); drivers of insecurity, including challenges to the rules-based international system (caused by globalization), climate change, competition for energy, poverty, inequality, and poor governance, globalization. The strategy shows the interdependence of threats, risks and drivers of insecurity.[35]

A similar definition of challenges and threats for the security of the United Kingdom was contained in the security strategies of 2010 and 2015. The latter document drew attention to challenges caused by the wave of migration to Europe and Russia's aggressive behavior in the Ukraine conflict, with regard to NATO, and its growing expenditures on armaments. It did state, however, that "Russia is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and notwithstanding our differences, we will seek ways of cooperating and engaging with Russia on a range of global security issues, such as the threat from ISIL".[36]

France

In the White Books on national defense and security of 2008 and 2013 the importance of globalization as a process creating a new environment for international security is stressed. The document from 2013 names the following strategic changes affecting the international system:

- the financial and economic crisis, which reduced the international position of Europe and of the United States, and didn't hinder the growing power of China, India or Brazil;
- events in the Arab countries, the so-called Arab Spring, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- the strategic shift of the USA in the direction of Asia and the Pacific region (the so-called Asia pivot), which entails a change in Washington's geopolitical priorities;
- the multi-level European Union crisis, which hampers the EU's assumption of greater responsibility not only for its own security, but also for that of the entire world, something the USA expects of it.[37]

The White Book divides the typical threats to international security into the following groups:

[34]The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in the Independent World (2008), pt. 3.1.

[35]Ibidem, pp. 10–24.

[36]National Security Strategy and Strategic and Defence Review 2015 (2015), p. 18. For more on the security strategy of the United Kingdom, see Cornish and Dorman (2015).

[37]Livre blanc: défense et sécurité nationale (2013), pp. 27–33.

(A) Threats connected with the use of force. It points out that the radicalization of national sentiment could transform itself into dangerous nationalism and this could lead to the outbreak of wars. The White Book also draws attention to the accelerating armament of Asian countries and Russia, which uses energy issues in its foreign policy, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East (Iran) and the Korean Peninsula. It also mentions the threat of chemical and biological weapons.
(B) The risk of weakness. Weak states constitute a source of threats, because they can be used by criminal or terrorist groups as a safe haven from which to plan and stage attack on other countries. In this context, the White Book mentions the countries of the Sahel, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
(C) Threats whose impact is made the greater by globalization (terrorism, cyber threats, natural, sanitary and technological catastrophes, and climate change leading to the melting of Arctic ice cover.[38]

Another, updated perception of threats for French and international security is found in the Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017. This document notes that France and Europe exist in an uncertain strategic environment, the dominant features of which are instability and unpredictability. As the main challenges and threats it names the undermining of the existing international order, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia and tensions within the European Union; the destabilization of the Middle East, including the war in Syria; persistent vulnerabilities in the Sahel region; the great power ambitions of China and Iran; the French territory's exposure to terrorist attacks; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; demographic and migration pressures; energy rivalry, the effects of climate change, pandemic risks, trafficking, organized crime and the growth of threats in cyberspace.[39]

Germany

The White Book on German security policy of 2016 also defines challenges and threats in the wide sense. It enumerates the following phenomena as threats: transnational terrorism, challenges from the cyber and information domain, interstate conflicts, fragile states and poor governance, global arms build-up and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to information and communication systems, supply lines, transportation and trade routes as well as to the secure supply of raw materials and energy, climate change, uncontrolled and irregular migration, epidemics and pandemics. The German White Book draws attention to two phenomena that are disrupting European security. The first is the "renaissance of traditional power politics, which involves the use of military means to pursue national interests and entails considerable armaments efforts, elevates the risk of violent interstate conflict—even in Europe and its neighborhood, as is illustrated by the example of Russian actions in Ukraine" and the fact that

[38]Ibidem, pp. 33–46.

[39]Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale (2017), pp. 17–50.

"non-state actors and in particular state actors are resorting to methods of hybrid warfare. This involves the use of military means below the threshold of a conventional war. The aim is to undermine a state in a covert manner".[40] The second phenomenon concerning European security is the growing challenge presented by migration.[41]

Poland

Poland finds itself at the opposite pole of the European Union. On account of the fact that it borders on Russia, Moscow's attempts since 2007 to counterbalance the influence of the West on security in the Euro-Atlantic area are seen in Poland as Russian reverting to an imperial policy. Fears of Russia have grown after the Georgian-Russian war of August 2008. Even though such fears were voiced in public by Polish politicians, they were not reflected in the doctrine as fears of military threat from Russia. After the end of the National Security Strategic Review, which lasted from 2010 to 2012,[42] Poland published *The White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland*. In this document, Poland's security environment was defined at global, regional and national (homeland) levels and stated that the security of Poland to a large extent depends on the development of relations between Russia and the West, and it is difficult to clearly define its perspective. It is to be seen whether Russia will continue to attempt to restore its former status as a 'great power', by ignoring the interests of the others, especially its neighbors Belarus and to certain extent—Ukraine.[43] Fear of Russia clearly grew in Poland at the time of the Ukraine crisis when, in 2014, Crimea was severed from Ukraine and Russian intervened in the Donbas in the form of hybrid war. These events reinforced fear of Russia within the Polish political elite. Some Polish politicians went so far as to state that Russian would not stop with the annexation of Crimea but would even initiate war with the Baltic States and Poland.[44] The doctrinal result of such thinking was the inclusion of a direct military threat from Russia in the National Security Strategy of November 5, 2014. This document stresses, first and foremost, threats of a political and military nature, threats of war in the form of military activities beneath the threshold of classical war and even a less probable large-scale conflict. For the first time in Poland's security doctrine Russia was thus

[40]White Paper (2016), p. 38.

[41]Ibidem, pp. 34–45.

[42]The National Security Strategic Review was an institution established in January 2010 by President Bronisław Komorowski. The aim of the NSSR was to assess comprehensively Poland's national security and formulate conclusions regarding the state's strategic objectives and practices in the field of security as the preparation of the national security system. He author of the present book was a member of the NSSR Commission. The Report of the NSSR Commission, containing key conclusions and recommendations concerning Poland's security policy formed the basis for the publishing in April 2013 of the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (2013).

[43]White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (2013), pp. 126–127, Zięba (2015).

[44]Zając (2016), pp. 146–147.

named as a country being the source of a threat to Poland's security. This can be seen in two following sentence: "The reassertion of Russia's position as a major power at the expense of its neighborhood, as well as the escalation of its confrontational policy, an example of which is the conflict with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has a negative impact on the security in the region".[45] This formulation is often presented by Polish politicians in a more literal form as a direct threat of aggression from Russia.

This type of thinking was greatly reinforced in the fall of 2015 when the conservative and nationalist party Law and Justice (PiS) took power in Poland. In numerous pronouncements made by Polish politicians, Russia is presented as Poland's adversary and an enemy threatening Poland's security. The Defense Concept of the Republic of Poland, a strategic review published in May 2017, clearly states that the Russian Federation's aggressive policy is the principal threat to Poland's and international security.[46] The *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021*, in turn, adopted by the Polish government on September 12, 2017 states officially that "Poland's security environment has deteriorated considerably as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Russian-provoked conflict in eastern Ukraine."[47] Further on, it mentions the anxiety caused by "Russia's self-proclaimed readiness to treat military force as an instrument of foreign and security policy, evidenced by its actual conduct" and by "the scale of hybrid warfare put to use in Ukraine".[48]

In addition to the military threat from Russia that Polish politicians keep pointing to, since the end of the 1990s they have also been drawing attention to the need to diversify Poland's sources of supply in energy resources, especially oil and natural gas.[49] Polish government propaganda exaggeratedly formulates the view about the threat to Poland's energy security that allegedly arises from the country's dependence on natural gas supplies from Russia.

NATO

NATO Lisbon strategic concept from 2010, having been drawn up in conditions of a changing security environment, has lost its currency after jest a few years, especially with respect to Russia and its policy of balancing out the West's dominance. This document states that "today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. […] However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses

[45]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014), p. 21.

[46]The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland (2017), pp. 23–24.

[47]Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021 (2017), p. 6.

[48]Ibidem

[49]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2003), pt. 31.

a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area."[50] This estimation was formulated by the allies before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and Russia's use of military force in Crimea and in the Donbas.

In second place in the Lisbon strategy, after the security strategies of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, mentions "the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery" among other threats.[51] Terrorism came in third place.[52] This is followed by the observation that instability or conflict beyond NATO borders "can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people".[53] In fifth place came cyber attacks, which are "becoming more frequent, and more organized, and more costly for government administrations, businesses, economies, and critical infrastructure.[54] In sixth place the strategy mentions "dependence of some NATO countries on foreign energy suppliers".[55] In seventh place comes hampering access to space through the use of "laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies," thus affecting NATO military planning and operations.[56] In eighth place in the NATO strategic concept comes "key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs, what will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations".[57]

The European Union

The European Security Strategy of 2003, commonly referred to as the Solana Strategy, rapidly became outdated. The European Union had barely begun conducting crisis-response operations and had commenced the task of drafting a new treaty to become the Constitution for Europe, when Europe—and the rest of the Western world—was engulfed by the financial and economic crisis. When, after a few years, the EU began to emerge from the crisis, it turned out that deep changes had taken place in the international order. The voice of the new emerging powers—which, on the whole, had not only come out of the crisis unscathed but with an enhanced international position—began to sound ever louder. Russia, which had been one of the EU's strategic partners, embraced a policy of force and of breaking international law. Moreover, earlier threats and challenges—such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and immigration to EU countries—grew. The European Security Strategy (ESS) became an increasingly outdated guidepost for the policies

[50]Active Engagement (2010), pt. 7 and 8.
[51]Ibidem, pt. 9.
[52]Ibidem, pt. 10.
[53]Ibidem, pt. 11.
[54]Ibidem, pt. 12.
[55]Ibidem, pt. 13.
[56]Ibidem, pt. 14.
[57]Ibidem, pt. 15.

of the EU and many of its member states, which were much weakened by the economic crisis and the rationalization of their policies.[58]

During the course of the financial crisis, the first attempts had been made to bring European security strategy up to date or to formulate a new one that would be adequate for the rapidly changing European security environment. The first step in this direction was the European Council's adoption in December 2008 of a report by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, about the implementation of the European Security Strategy. The new document, entitled *Providing Security in a Changing World* assessed the previous strategy and contained proposals aimed at supplementing it and improving its implementation.

As new threats to international security, the Solana report mentioned internet crime, dependence on energy supplies, compound climate change and the financial crisis. It admitted that the ESS of 2003 had not been fully implemented and stated that "to build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now."[59]

It should be noted that the critical opinions formulated by experts and politicians often omit the fact that, after 2003, the European Union worked out a number of sectoral strategies related to ensuring security in various areas. Such program documents include the European Union's sectoral strategies in regard to the spread of weapons of mass destruction (December 12, 2003), the above-mentioned on fighting terrorism (November 30, 2005), the internal security of the European Union (March 25, 2010), EU cyber security (February 7, 2013), energy security (May 28, 2014), and maritime security (June 24, 2014).

Progress toward formulating a new EU general security strategy was happening.[60] By December 2013 the European Council mandated Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, not to deliver a new ESS, but to 'do something' about strategy by producing a report on changes in the global environment and on the challenges and opportunities arising for the EU. An important voice in the debate was the expert group report entitled *More Union in European Defence*, written under the guidance of Javier Solana and made public in Brussels on March 9, 2015. Next in June 2015 the European Council bound the High Representative, who will be preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with member states, to submit it to the European Council by June 2016.[61]

According to the timetable established in Brussels, on June 28, 2016, the European Council approved *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, a*

[58]More see Biscop (2005).

[59]Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World (2008), p. 12.

[60]On the subject of the path leading to the drawing up of a new EU global security strategy, see Mälksoo (2016).

[61]Tocci (2015).

Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, submitted by Federica Mogherini. This document (EUGS) consists of four parts. The first defines the interests of citizens of the Union, the second gives the principles guiding the EU's external action, the third the priorities of these external actions, and the last part, how the EU should implement its priorities in moving from vision to action.

The EU's 2016 global strategy for foreign and security policy is a classic strategy; it does not thus discuss challenges and threats to the EU's security but concentrates on displaying the EU's aims in the international stage and on the ways and means of achieving them. Threats and challenges are solely noted and the priorities of the EU's external activities are listed.

Certain conclusions about how the EU has perceived the threats and challenges to its security in the last few years could also be drawn on the basis of the above-discussed national security strategies. On the one hand, France and Germany, as the leaders of the EU, take a broad view of the threats and challenges of international security; on the other hand, Poland shows a greater sensitivity to the threat from the East.

Russia

Russia views threats and challenges for its security and for international security similarly to Western countries and their multilateral institutions, as was stated in the *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation* of December 17, 1997 and of January 10, 2000. In the first document it was emphasized that the greatest threats for Russia do not come from the international system, but are rather various negative internal phenomena. It was stated that Moscow's expectations in regard to shaping a multilateral world would increase and that the danger of direct aggression against Russia had declined. It was noted, however, that at that stage there was still a strong tendency to create international structures based on unilateral—including military and coercive—solutions. It was pointed out that "NATO's expansion to the east and its transformation into the dominant military-political force in Europe is creating the threat of a new division of the continent, which is particularly dangerous given the concentration on the continent of mobile army groups, nuclear weapons, and also insufficiently effective multilateral peace maintaining mechanisms."[62]

In the 2000 document, Russia noted that many states were strengthening their international position and that there was a tendency toward multilateral management of international processes. Russia declared that it would promote the establishment of a multi-polar order on this basis. It was also observed, however, that there was an equal or even stronger tendency by Western countries, led by the United States, to dominate international relations and to resolve world problems by military means while failing to observe the basic norms of international law. Among the main threats to its security, Russia pointed to NATO's expansion and

[62]Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (1997).

the possibility of foreign bases and army contingents appearing on Russia's immediate border, and also the weakening of the OSCE, the UN, and integration processes within the CIS framework.[63] It is worth noting that this program document was announced scarcely a few months after the first post-Cold War expansion of NATO (in March 1999) and NATO's armed intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (March–June 1999). Abroad, and particularly in the media of neighboring Central European countries, Russia's new security concept produced anxiety due to its lack of acceptance for the direction in which the world's strategic relations were developing, and the increased emphasis on the role of Russia's nuclear weapons.[64]

A few years later, the situation had changed even further. The national security strategy adopted by a decree of President Dmitry Medvedev on May 12, 2009 points to globalization as a process that contributes to exacerbating the differences between countries on account of their unequal development. As a result of the strengthening of new centers of economic growth and political influence, a qualitatively new geopolitical situation has arisen. A tendency is forming to seek solutions to existing problems and crisis situations on a regional basis, without the participation of forces from outside the region. The strategy states critically that the "ineffectiveness of the existing global and regional architecture, which is oriented, particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region, solely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and also the imperfection of the legal instruments and mechanisms, are increasingly creating a danger for international security."[65] Further on, in referring to NATO's plans to strengthen its eastern flank, the Russian strategy states that for Moscow, "the advance of the Alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's borders and attempts to give the Alliance global functions, contrary to international law, will be unacceptable."[66] The strategy declares that Russia is prepared to expand relations with NATO on the basis of equality and in the interest of increasing security for the entire Euro-Atlantic region, but the Alliance must recognize Russia's legitimate interests. Russia also demands equal partner status in its relations with the USA.

As phenomena that have a negative impact on Russia's national interests, the strategy mentions the probable continuation of a unilateral, use-of-force approach in international relations; the disputes between the main global political actors; the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or that they should fall into the hands of terrorists; the increasing capacity for unlawful activity in the spheres of cybernetics, biology, and high technology; the growth in threats to the stability of industrialized and developing countries, their socio-economic development, and democratic institutions; the growth of nationalism, xenophobia, separatism, and greater extremism, including religious radicalism; the worsening of the

[63]Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2000).
[64]Mróz (2000).
[65]Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2009).
[66]Ibidem, pt. 17.

global demographic situation and problems of the natural environment; the growth of threats connected with uncontrolled and illegal migration; increased trade in narcotics, trafficking in human beings, and other forms of international organized crime; the probability of epidemics created by new, previously unknown viruses; and the growing shortages of drinking water.

Russia's security strategy points out that in the long-term perspective the possession of raw energy sources, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other regions of the Arctic, and in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, will have an impact on international relations. In the mid-term perspective, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the conflicts in the Near East, in many countries of South Asia, in Africa, and on the Korean peninsula will continue to have a negative influence on the international situation. The strategy states that the use of armed force in the resolution of problems related to competition for resources cannot be ruled out, and this could disturb the existing balance of power in the vicinity of the Russian Federation's borders and of its allied countries.[67]

As can be seen, Russia takes a broad view of the challenges and threats to its national security and to international security. One new element is the policy of countering the hegemony of the USA and the domination of the West; this policy, which was announced by President Vladimir Putin at the Munich security conference in February 2007, is reflected in the security doctrine of 2009. Thus the document contains a critical appraisal of the Alliance's plans to strengthen its military infrastructure on its eastern flank. It is worth noting that this security strategy was issued after NATO, at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008, announced that Ukraine and Georgia would be accepted to the Alliance in the future, and after Russia, in August of that year, had reacted with disproportionate force to Georgia's commencement of the war over South Ossetia.

Since then, Russia's relations with the West have become even more exacerbated, as a result, among other things, of NATO's expansion to include Croatia and Albania in April 2009; the announcement of the EU's Eastern Partnership, which Russia did not join; and the crisis in Ukraine beginning in the autumn of 2013. This worsening of Russia's relations with the West was reflected in the new security strategy adopted by President Putin on December 31, 2015.

This document points to the threats listed in the preceding document. It states that Russia's conduct of an independent foreign and internal policy has "produced counter-measures by the USA and its allies, which want to maintain their dominance over world affairs. Their policy of containing Russia assumes that political, economic, military and propaganda pressure will be used against it."[68] In referring to NATO's decisions of the past few years, the new Russian strategy claims that "[i]ncreasing NATO's military potential and giving it global functions is being done in violation of international law; this leads to the intensification of military activities by the countries of the bloc, to the further expansion of the Alliance, and to the

[67]Ibidem, passim.

[68]Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2015).

advance of its military infrastructure closer to Russia's border, and all this constitutes a threat to Russia's national security".[69] The placement of elements of the American anti-missile system in Europe, regions of Asia and the Pacific, and in the Near East is also criticized. The strategy points to the USA's practical realization of the concept of a 'global strike,' the introduction of strategic non-nuclear high-precision weaponry systems and the placement of weapons in outer space.[70] Finally, the Russian security strategy mentions the migration crisis in Europe, accusing the NATO and EU bloc of approaches that prevent the resolution of this problem.

The most recent Russian security strategy sees the Ukraine crisis critically. It claims:

> The position of the West, whose aim is to prevent integration processes and to create a center of tension in the Euro-Asiatic region, has a negative impact on Russia's realization of its national interests. The support of the USA and the EU for the unconstitutional coup d'état in Ukraine led to a deep division in Ukrainian society and to the outbreak of armed conflict. By strengthening the extreme rightwing nationalist ideology, intentionally disseminating the image of Russia as an enemy among the Ukrainian population, and openly supporting armed resolutions to internal conflicts, along with the deep socio-economic crisis, Ukraine has been transformed into a long-term source of instability in Europe, and it is directly on Russia's border.[71]

Russia also critically assessed other actions of the West, accusing it of pursuing a policy of overthrowing the legal authorities of other states, producing instability and conflicts. This, together with the tensions in the Near and Middle East, in Africa, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula, create new 'hot points,' and expands the areas that are not controlled by states. The territories where there are armed conflicts become bases for the expansion of terrorism, ethnic and religious hatred, and other manifestations of extremism. The appearance of the terrorist organization the Islamic State and its growing impact is a result of the policy of double standards that some countries have adopted in the struggle against terrorism.[72]

The Russian Federation's security strategy of 2015 indicates that Moscow has opted for an intense rivalry with the West and consequently will seek to eliminate its domination in the Euro-Atlantic security system and in the world. This means that Russia feels stronger and is undertaking the great challenge of transforming the entire international system into a polycentric system.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established in 2003, is connected with Russia. CSTO brings together six states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, Armenia, and Belarus. It is not an effective security structure.

---

[69]Ibidem, pt. 15.

[70]Ibidem.

[71]Ibidem, pt. 17.

[72]Ibidem, pt. 18.

On October 14, 2016, at a summit of the six member countries in Yerevan, a security strategy for the group was adopted. It contains a list of the Organization's priorities to 2025. The strategy that the allies formulated after several years of work does not clearly define threats to their collective security. A considerable amount of space in this document is devoted to distinguishing the notion of 'challenge' from that of 'threat' to the collective security of the CSTO. But what the member countries recognize as direct threats and as challenges is given in one list, without distinguishing between the two groups of phenomena.[73]

In first place among the challenges and threats to their collective security, CSTO member countries mention the risk of escalation of existing and arising international and internal conflicts; second, the use of force to achieve political and economic aims, including economic pressure and propaganda, and the practice of interfering in the internal affairs of countries; and third, use of the technology of the 'color revolutions' and 'hybrid wars.' In seventh place, the expansion of existing military blocs is mentioned, with the construction of military infrastructure in the vicinity of CSTO's sphere of responsibility. Only in last place is the growth of international terrorism and extremism listed. The latter phenomenon is also viewed as a threat of a domestic nature. The further part of the strategy refers to the wave of illegal migration to South and Southeastern Europe, pointing to its increase in and through CSTO member countries from third countries.[74] It is thus visible that CSTO perceives the threats to its security in a fundamentally different manner from the Western countries and their groupings, which CSTO blames for creating its leading threats.

2 Security Policy Aims, Means, and Methods

USA

The security strategies of the main participants of the Euro-Atlantic system define the main aims of their security policies similarly. In the 1990s, during the presidency of Bill Clinton, the national security strategy of the US assumed the realization of three basic goals: strengthening US security, supporting national prosperity, and promoting democracy in the world.[75] The next president, George W. Bush, introduced a different view of the aims of US security policy after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In his first national security strategy of 2002 these aims, presented in grandiloquent form, were: "to help make the world not just safer but better."[76] US goals on the path to progress are: "political and

[73]Ostryna (2016).

[74]Strategiya kollektivnoy bezopasnosti Organizatsii … (2016).

[75]Zięba (2000), p. 51.

[76]The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), p. 1.

economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity".[77] Its specific aims were to champion aspirations for human dignity; to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the USA and its friends; to work with others to defuse regional conflicts; to prevent US enemies from threatening it, its allies, and friends, with weapons of mass destruction; to ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; to expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; to develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and to transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.[78]

One very important aspect of this document, which is colloquially known as the 'Bush doctrine,' was the announcement that not solely actions of a defensive nature would be undertaken but also preventive and preemptive ones if the security of the US were threatened by its opponents. These were words that evoked considerable controversy around the world, including among the US's allies.[79] In the next national strategy, in 2006, Bush added one specific aim, namely, to engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.[80]

President Barack Obama departed from formulating American security policy goals by using slogans and essentially reverted to defining US interests in terms of three main aims, that is, (a) strengthening national security by maintaining the fight against al-Qaida and other extremists connected with the group; (b) supporting prosperity; and (c) concern for values—with the US setting the example—the promotion of democracy and human rights in the world, along with human dignity. In attempting to depart from the policy of unilateralism pursued by his predecessor's administration, Obama devoted considerable attention to a strategy of shaping the international order by strengthening alliances, developing partnerships with other centers of influence in the world, supporting institutions and mechanisms of cooperation, and expanding cooperation in regards to the main global challenges. A clear stress was placed on the use of diplomatic methods for the resolution of problems and international disputes. However, military methods were not abandoned as an instrument for the implementation of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the use of force was supposed to be a last resort rather than a preventive measure. The defense strategy states: "When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the UN Security Council."[81] The USA claimed to retain the right to undertake unilateral action, while simultaneously observing the norms regulating the use of military force

[77]Ibidem.

[78]Ibidem, *passim.*

[79]Zając (2008), p. 51, (2010).

[80]The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), pp. 47–48.

[81]National Security Strategy (2010), p. 22.

("We will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force."[82]). Basically, the same arrangement of aims was adopted in the US national security strategy of 2015. A certain novelty was extension of the specific goals to include strengthening national security through increasing US internal security and improving global health security. In reference to the situation after the world financial and economic crisis, the new American strategy stressed an increase in energy security and the shaping of the "Global Economic Order." The US's reaction to the growing role of the newly emerging powers was to draw up a strategy whose section headings in the part devoted to the international order included "Advance Our Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific", "Invest in Africa's future", and "Deepen Economic and Security Cooperation in the Americas".[83]

The National Security Strategy of December 2017 defines widely the aims of American security policy, whose leading motive, as expressed in President Trump's speeches, is to put 'America First'. Its aims were divided into four pillars. The first—to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; the second—to promote American prosperity; the third—to preserve international peace through strength; and the fourth—to advance American influence in the world. The first pillar contains the formulation "to secure U.S. borders and territory", and names to enhance missile defense system "focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks" as priorities. The reservation was made, however, that "enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China."[84] The strategy also calls for defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD); combating biothreats and pandemics; strengthening border control and immigration policy; defeating Jihadist terrorists; dismantling transnational criminal organizations; keeping America safe in the cyber era; and promoting American resilience.[85]

New and dangerous elements of the US national security strategy are the parts concerning the third and fourth pillars. Namely, they contain a doctrinal presentation of the statements Trump made about using instruments of force and on the evolution of American security policy toward unilateralism and hegemonism[86] or as others claim toward a robust conservative internationalism.[87] As part of the third pillar, it is said as a remedy to the challenges represented by "the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the 'rogue states' of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups," United States "will seek

[82]Ibidem, *passim*.

[83]National Security Strategy (2015), pp. 23–28.

[84]National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), p. 8.

[85]Ibidem, pp. 8–14.

[86]Juul and Gude (2017). For more, see Brands (2017–2018).

[87]Popescu (2018), p. 91 *et seq*. See the papers of the prominent scholarly advocate of this school of thought: Nau (2017, 2018).

areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength, foremost by ensuring our military power is second to none and fully integrated with our allies and all of our instruments of power".[88] For this purpose the USA announced that it would greatly increase and modernize its military potential, including nuclear weapons, the use of outer space, cyberspace and intelligence. Diplomacy was relegated to the back seat.

In the fourth pillar, the strategy states that the "United States offers partnership to those who share our aspirations for freedom and prosperity. We lead by example. The world has its eye upon America."[89] This offer seems neither credible nor adequate to the changing international order. Firstly, given his populism President Trump is not a credible partner even for the majority of America's allies in Europe, while the USA's new rivals, the emerging powers, mostly follow a different value system than the USA and take exception to America's hegemonic position.

In the regional Euro-Atlantic context, the NSS 2017's assurances that "a strong and free Europe is of vital importance to the United States" and that "the United States fulfils our defense responsibilities and expects others to do the same" are highly important. Just as important are the declarations that on NATO's eastern flank the USA "will continue to strengthen deterrence and defense, and catalyze frontline allies and partners' efforts to better defend themselves", that the USA "will work with NATO to improve its integrated air and missile defense capabilities to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats, particularly from Iran" and that it "will increase counterterrorism and cybersecurity cooperation".[90] For America's European allies and partners, those are official assurances that the USA will remain engaged in their security.

United Kingdom

The United States' European allies have formulated the aims of their national security policies more modestly. However, Great Britain and France indicate their global ambitions in their security policies.

In its security strategy of 2008, Great Britain announced that, in addition to combating terrorism, it would undertake the following actions: countering the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; tackling transnational organized crime; tackling global instability, conflict, and failed and fragile states; planning for civil emergencies and building resilience; defending the United Kingdom against state-led threats (using independent nuclear deterrence and strong conventional forces); strengthening and reforming the international system; tackling

[88]National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), pp. 25, 27.

[89]Ibidem, p. 37.

[90]Ibidem, pp. 47–48.

climate change; tackling competition for energy and building energy security; tackling poverty, inequality, and poor governance; responding to global trends. The strategy states the interdependence of threats, risks and drivers—and proposes an integrated response.[91]

In its security strategy of 2015, Great Britain announced an increase in defense spending to the 2% of GDP recommended at the NATO summit in Newport in September 2014. It also formulated an ambitious program of exerting global influence with the aim of reducing the likelihood of threats materializing and affecting the UK, its interests, and those of its allies and partners.[92]

France

In its White Book on Defense and National Security of June 2008, France presented its European and international ambitions. In preparing to assume the leadership of the European Council, it set forth a broad program to make the EU a full security actor capable of playing a global role. It proposed that a white book on EU defense and security be drafted. It favored the renewal of transatlantic relations, France's return to the integrated military structure of the Alliance, a greater role in the Alliance for France and integrated Europe, and ensuring the complementarity of NATO and the EU in the security field. It also proposed the creation of an effective collective security system within the UN framework, with the principle of multilateralism as a foundation.

The White Book acknowledges that globalization has deeply changed the foundations of the international system by redistributing power to the benefit of Asia and producing competitors in the form of new powers. Thus the typology of threats and risk requires a redefinition of national and international security, while taking into account the changed role of military instruments and the complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment.[93] Consequently, France needs to take anticipatory measures. The following list of five activities thus becomes important: reconnaissance and anticipation; prevention; nuclear deterrence; defense; intervention using France's entire national potential, in cooperation with other European and international players.

During Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency, there was a major evolution in France's security concept toward closer transatlantic cooperation within the NATO framework. In April 2009, France officially returned to the NATO military structure.[94] An extensive justification and elaboration of moving France's security concept in

[91]The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in the Independent World (2008), pp. 25–57.

[92]National Security Strategy and Strategic and Defence Review 2015 (2015), pp. 27, 47 *et seq*.

[93]Défense et sécurité nationale (2008), p. 13.

[94]For more on France's return to NATO see: Rieker (2017), pp. 107–128.

the Atlantic direction was given in a report by a former minister of foreign affairs, Hubert Védrine; it was presented to the president of the Republic in November 2012. This document stresses the importance of the Europeanization of NATO and of the French concept of *l'Europe de la défense*. In conclusion, the report summarizes the French vision of security as follows:

> In all events, France must maintain its own capacity for analyzing, forecasting, proposing and contributing to planning, which inspires its action and its policies within the European Union, within the Alliance and with the other Europeans. Changes in American foreign and defense policies, along with uncertain events in a shifting multi-polar world, make it more necessary and less impossible for Europeans to play a greater role in their own defense, with the expectation that one day they will assume most of the responsibility for it, while remaining allied with the United States. This policy needs to be implemented simultaneously within the European Union, within NATO and within ad hoc groups, using suitable tactics for each case and each organization and with an eye to anticipating events. It is a bold and forthright policy to achieve greater influence within the Alliance, which will facilitate France's European efforts. Naturally, it is critical to maintain a certain level of capability for this policy to succeed.[95]

The next official step in the evolution of the French security concept was France's White Book of Defense and Security of 2013. It formulates five strategic priorities:

- protecting the territory and citizens of France and ensuring the functioning of essential state functions;
- jointly ensuring the security of Europe and the North Atlantic area;
- jointly stabilizing the European neighborhood (Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Sahel, Mauretania, the Horn of Africa, and part of Sub-Saharan Africa);
- participating in stabilizing the Middle East and the states of the Persian Gulf;
- contributing to world peace.

A special section of the White Book was devoted to France's involvement in NATO and the EU. Attention was also paid to the need to make clarify the law on self-defense contained in art. 51 of the United Nations Charter in regard to cyber attacks or terrorist activities committed by non-state entities from the territory of states that are too weak to control such territory.[96]

The Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017 views strategic autonomy as the most important aim of France's defense policy. This corresponds to the views of President Macron, who once quoted General Charles de Gaulle saying that "if France goes to war, it has to be its own war".[97] A spirit of independence permeates the *Strategic Review*, and is justified as follows: "In an

[95]Védrine (2012), p. 23.

[96]Livre blanc: défense et sécurité nationale 2013 (2013), pp. 32, 47–68.

[97]Lasconjarias and de Saint-Victor (2017).

international system where instability and uncertainty prevail, France must preserve its capability to decide and act alone to defend its interests."[98] The document stresses that France will strive to reinforce international security by collaborating with its allies and partners, and will first and foremost engage itself in strengthening European defense within the framework of the European Union by expanding the CSDP, cooperation on the bilateral (above all with Germany and with the United Kingdom) and the trans-Atlantic (as part of NATO) planes. The North Atlantic Treaty is treated in it as a 'key component of European security,' France confirmed its support for the Alliance's decisions, taken during the summits in Newport (2014) and in Warsaw (2016), about strengthening the Alliance's eastern flank and increasing defense spending to the recommended 2% of GDP by the end of 2024.[99] The Defence and Strategic Review calls for the support in Europe, within and out of the EU and NATO frameworks, of all promising initiatives that would "strengthen strategic convergence among European nations regarding their shared security".[100] For this reason, France wishes to work towards "increase[ing] Europe's strategic autonomy, which requires the development of a common strategic culture."[101]

Germany

Germany, the third most important international actor in Europe, has a highly developed concept of security, but attaches limited importance to military instruments in its pursuit.

In contrast to the previous White Book of 1994, the White Book on German Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr of April 28, 2006 considered Germany's fundamental interests in regard to security and defense to involve protecting the freedom, security, and prosperity of German citizens and the inviolability of their national territory. The aims in regard to internal security did not change. In regard to external security, the White Book mentions the following:

- To prevent conflicts and to resolve regional conflicts;
- To obviate the threats of international terrorism and prevent the further dissemination of weapons of mass destruction;
- To respect human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law;
- To support free trade, with the aim of promoting Germany's prosperity and of closing the gap between rich and poor regions.[102]

---

[98]Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale (2017), p. 56. [«Dans un système international marqué par l'instabilité et l'incertitude, la France doit conserver sa capacité à décider et à agir seule pour défendre ses intérêts.»].

[99]Ibidem, «élément clé de la sécurité européenne».

[100]Ibidem, p. 63. [«la convergence stratégique entre Européens et intéressent leur sécurité commune»].

[101]Ibidem [«"renforcement de l'autonomie stratégique de l'Europe, ce qui nécessite le développement d'une culture stratégique commune"»].

[102]Zięba (2008), p. 132.

This document confirms that transatlantic relations remain the security basis for Germany and the EU, and that membership in NATO is the foundation of Germany's security and defense policy. It is emphasized that German–American relations require special attention, deepening, and ongoing consultations. As a member of the EU, Germany is interested in strengthening the international role of this organization in particular. The EU and NATO are not competitors but strong pillars of European security. Germany also supports the OSCE, and ascribes a special role to the UN in ensuring world peace. The White Book claims that the Bundeswehr is the most important instrument of German security and defense policy.[103]

The White Book of 2016 adopts the following as Germany's strategic priorities:

- Guaranteeing a whole-of-government approach to security;
- Strengthening the cohesion and capacity to act of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union;
- Unhindered use of information and communication systems, supply lines, transportation and trade routes as well as the secure supply of raw materials and energy;
- Early recognition, prevention and resolution of crises and conflicts;
- Commitment to a rules-based international order.

As key areas of engagement in German security policy admits: (1) at national areas of engagement: Strengthening and expanding of German strategic capacity; Developing sustainable security; Enhancing the comprehensive approach; Promoting security and resilience: a whole-of-society endeavor; Assuming responsibility for international stability and security; (2) at international areas of engagement: Germany in the United Nations; Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance; Germany in the European Union; Germany in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; Bilateral and multilateral partnerships and ad hoc cooperation; Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.[104]

Poland

Poland has yet to issue an official document containing a full presentation of its current security strategy. The documents from the years 2007 and 2014 have lost their political significance. Officially and formally, the National Security Strategy of November 2014 is in force. It lists three priorities in security policy: (a) ensuring readiness and demonstrating determination to act in the field of security and defense, as well as strengthening national defense capabilities; (b) supporting processes aimed to reinforce NATO's ability to provide collective defense, developing the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, strengthening strategic partnerships (also with the US) and strategic relations with partners in the region;

[103]Ibidem, p. 132.

[104]White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016), pp. 47–82.

(c) supporting and selectively participating in actions of the international community, conducted under rules of international law, aimed at preventing the occurrence of new sources of threats, responding to crises and counteracting their spread. The so-called operational strategy part provides for defense, security, social, and economic action in the sphere of security.[105]

This document is very general, even academic, in nature and places more importance on the text's form and layout than on the contents. In other words, it is a not very useful guide for security policy. Because it was prepared during the presidency and government of Civic Platform (PO), and because Poland has been governed since 2015 by the conservative-national Law and Justice (PiS), it should be expected that a new national security policy for Poland is being prepared. Judging by the numerous pronouncements by representatives of Law and Justice, it will be a militarized concept, relying on security guarantees granted by the US. Such an outcome is signaled in the Defense Concept of 2017, which states that: "For the first time in our modern history, Poland will possess effective deterrence potential. We want to be capable of defending Poland, and—if necessary—to offer assistance to our Allies. This is our absolute priority."[106] The *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021*, presents it more broadly:

> Poland's security requires simultaneous measures in three complementary dimensions: (1) Allied: enhancing NATO credibility, boosting the EU's potential, and maintaining close ties with the United States; (2) Regional: closer cooperation with countries in the region, especially Romania, the Visegrad Group, and the Baltic and Nordic states; a pro-active Eastern policy; (3) Domestic: significantly bolstering Poland's own defense capabilities.[107]

The present government of Poland intends to intensify the activities outlined in the national security strategy of 2007,[108] when the postulate of collaborating with alternative suppliers of natural gas and petroleum was officially stated for the first time.

NATO

NATO's strategic concept, which was adopted in 2010 in Lisbon, is partially the consequence of the national security strategies of the Alliance's member countries. However, it is less extensive than, for example, the program documents of France, Great Britain, or Germany. Above all, it expresses the proposals of representatives of the Alliance's armed forces, particularly the American ones. This can be seen even in the layout of the text of the Lisbon strategy.

The Strategic Concept states that "NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means." It adds, self-justifyingly, "Today, the Alliance remains an essential source

[105]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014), pp. 27, 29–42.

[106]The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland (2017), p. 40.

[107]Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021 (2017), p. 7.

[108]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2007), pp. 16–17.

of stability in an unpredictable world."[109] This appraisal is strongly questioned by NATO's rival, Russia.

NATO assumes that the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, in accordance with international law:

(1) Collective defense, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
(2) Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises—before, during and after conflicts;
(3) Cooperative security. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations.[110]

The Strategic Concept also stresses that NATO will continue to remain the essential and unique transatlantic forum, in terms of consultation for all matters as defined in Article 4 of Washington Treaty.[111]

The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary, but it announces that no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. The deterrence remains a core element of NATO's overall strategy and is based on a mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities. The Strategic Concept states that the supreme guarantee of the Allies' security is provided by the Alliance's strategic nuclear forces, particularly those of the United States, and the independent strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain and France.[112] The Alliance declares its desire to promote international security by cooperation on such issues as arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; and by an open-door policy for all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion would contribute to common security and stability; and by partnership with countries and organizations around the globe. NATO declares its willingness to develop a true strategic partnership with Russia, on the basis of reciprocity.[113]

The European Union

The EU's global strategy (EUGS) of 2016 defined primarily common interests of the Union and its member states: security of citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order. Furthermore has defined the principles that will guide the EU: unity, engagement with others, responsibility, enhancing external partnerships.

[109] Active Engagement (2010), pt 1.
[110] Ibidem, pt. 4.
[111] Ibidem, pt. 5.
[112] Ibidem, pt. 16–18.
[113] Ibidem, pt. 26–35.

To promote the shared interests, adhering to clear principles, the EU will pursue five priorities:

(1) Security of the Union itself—intensification of action in defense, counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security, and in strategic communication;
(2) Neighborhood—investment in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa; a more effective migration policy;
(3) An integrated approach to conflicts and crises—the EU will pursue a *multi-phased* approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle. It will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilization, and avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere. The EU will therefore engage further in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries;
(4) Cooperative regional orders—the EU will promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas. The Union will invest for a close transatlantic partnership, both North and South, through NATO and with the United States and Canada;
(5) Effective global governance for the 21st Century—the EU will act for a global order based on international law, which ensures peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons.

The EUGS declares the EU will pursue above mentioned priorities by mobilizing its unparalleled networks, economic weight and all the tools at its disposal in a coherent way. To fulfill the defined goals, the EU must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union—across its external policies, between member states and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of its policies. This appeal is not by accident has been formulated, as the EU is mired in deep and multifaceted crisis.[114]

The EUGS combines internal and external security of the EU; assumes that EU's home security depends on peace beyond its borders. Therefore, to ensure the internal security of the Union, Global Strategy provides for external actions on a larger scale. Such a wide definition of the EU's external action priorities, their connection with actions within the EU and, as a result, the allocation to them of highly varied means and instruments is the reflection of a wide understanding of security and also indicates that the EU is a modern form of a security community.

This new strategy was adopted when the European Union found itself in a crisis, a few days after decision on Brexit and while the Visegrad Group argues in favor of loosening the Union. It is a specific initiative to advance the supporters of the European project. As Javier Solana said, "Without their voice it would be heard only votes for the fact that Europe should be less and less. In the coming months we

[114]Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe … (2016), pp. 18–44.

must carry forward our security policy and implement the objectives of this strategy. Those of us who care about Europe to go forward, they cannot remain silent today".[115]

Russia

The Russian Federation's national security concept of 1997 states, that Russia's interests in the security sphere encompass the basic interests of individuals, society and the state. The following are enumerated among the state's interests: protection of the constitutional order, sovereignty, and Russia's territorial integrity; ensuring political, economic, and social stability; unconditional application of the law and observance of law and order; the development of international cooperation based on principles of partnership. The complex of the principal interests of the individual, society and the state, determines Russia's national interests in the spheres of the economy, internal affairs, foreign affairs, defense and information, social affairs and in the spheres of spiritual life and culture. Russia's national interests in regard to defense consist primarily in ensuring the security of individuals, society, and the state against the armed aggression of other countries.

The pursuit of Russia's national interests in the international arena "requires the conduct of an active foreign policy aimed at strengthening Russia's position as a great power—one of the influential centers shaping a multi-polar world."[116] The main elements of this foreign policy course are:

- assisting the integration, on a voluntary basis, of the member-participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
- developing equal partnerships with other great powers—centers of economic and military might;
- expanding international cooperation in combating transnational crime and terrorism;
- consolidating Russia's important role in mechanisms for the collective management of global political and economic processes, and particularly strengthening the UN Security Council.

The strategy emphasizes that an unconditional priority of Russian foreign policy is and will be efforts to ensure the inviolability of its borders and territorial integrity, and defense of the constitutional order against eventual violations by other countries. Then it sets forth a broad catalog of activities aimed at ensuring Russia's national security in all spheres.

An important element of the Russian security concept was to give a leading role to the armed forces and nuclear weapons. The armed forces are to provide nuclear deterrence for the purpose of preventing both nuclear aggression and conventional

[115]Solana (2016).

[116]Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (1997).

aggression—either regionally or on a large scale, and also to perform Russia's obligations in regard to its alliances. In order to fulfill this task, Russia should have nuclear potential and be capable of striking any aggressor state or coalition of states. It is also significant that one of the most important strategic aims in the sphere of military security for Russia is effective action and cooperation with the countries belonging to CIS, and also the mention that the armed forces must ensure the realization of Russia's peace-keeping operations, and that the armed forces will be involved—on the basis of concluded agreements—in certain neuralgic regions of the world.[117]

The Russian Federation's security concept of January 2000, which was adopted after NATO's expansion to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, was particularly extensive, and had changed in comparison to the concept of December 1997. Among the possible military means of ensuring security, attention was drawn to expanding the possibility of using nuclear weapons against an aggressor "in every situation",[118] which could equally mean the preventive use of a nuclear weapon. This was a danger signal to the neighboring countries that had decided to join NATO. It produced anxiety, particularly in the neighboring countries of the Central Europe. The worries increased when on April 21, 2000 Russia adopted a new military doctrine (to replace the preceding one of November 2, 1993). In this document, the principle of 'no first use' of a nuclear weapon was omitted, and there was confirmation of an earlier mention of the possible deployment of troops outside Russian territory in reaction to a new risk to Russia's security.[119]

The national security strategy of 2009 added to Russia's main national interests "the goal of transforming the Russian Federation into a world power, and announced the main national security priorities of the Russian Federation are national defense, state and social security."[120] From that time, defense has been the main aim of Russia's national security strategy. Nevertheless, in this document, the principle introduced in 2000 of using nuclear weapons in any kind of conflict situation was not repeated. Nor did it appear in the following security strategy of 2015. We find a clarification of this question in the military doctrines of February 5, 2010 and December 30, 2014, in which Russia reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction being used against itself and (or) its allies, and also in the case of aggression against Russia with conventional weapons when the existence of the state itself was threatened.[121]

[117]Ibidem

[118]Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2000).

[119]Sakwa (2004), p. 214.

[120]Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2009).

[121]Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2010), Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2014).

Russia's security strategy of 2009 contains an outline of foreign policy activities to ensure strategic stability and equal strategic partnership. These activities were treated as conditions for realizing the Russian Federation's national interests. In the following strategy, of 2015, this part of the strategy was expanded.

The planned activities aim to create a stable and balanced system of international relations based in international law on the principles of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in countries' internal affairs, mutually advantageous cooperation, and resolving global or regional political crises. Russia considers the UN and the Security Council to be the central element of the system of international relations, and is in favor of intensifying cooperation in the groups of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the RSA), RIC (Russia, India, China), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asia-Pacific Forum for Economic Cooperation, the G-20, and other international institutions. Russia claims that CIS, with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which are not recognized by other states) is one of its key areas of foreign policy, and emphasizes the significance of cooperation within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Union State (Russia and Belarus). Russia intends to work toward transforming CSTO into a common international organization capable of undertaking regional challenges and threats of a political-military or strategic-military nature (including international terrorism and extremism, the illegal trade in intoxicants and psychotropic substances, and illegal migration), and also threats in the information sphere. Russia has claimed that it will develop comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation with China, treating that state as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability. Russia attaches great importance to privileging its partnership with India. It is in favor of creating a non-bloc mechanism serving the maintenance of stability and regional security in the Asia and Pacific area, as well as improving the effectiveness of economic and political cooperation with countries of the region, and the expansion of cooperation in the areas of science, education and culture, including within the framework of regional integration structures. Russia is developing partnership relations with the countries of Latin America and Africa and their regional groups.

Only in one of the last places in the strategy does Russia declare a desire to work with European countries and the EU, and to harmonize integration processes in Europe and the post-Soviet areas. Russia repeats that it is in favor of creating an open collective security system on a clear legal basis in the Euro-Atlantic region. Then Russia declares that it is in favor of developing a mutually beneficial partnership with the USA. Subsequently, it expresses its readiness to further reduce its nuclear potential on the basis of international agreements. In the nearly last place (in pt. 106 out of 107), Russia refers to relations with NATO. Russia states that what it finds unacceptable and of major importance is the Alliance's increased military activeness and the advance of its military infrastructure close to Russia's borders, its creation of anti-missile shields, and its attempts to give NATO a global nature—and

all this while violating international law. Moscow declares its readiness to expand relations with NATO on the basis of equal rights for the purpose of increasing global security in the Euro-Atlantic region. The depth and content of these relations will depend on the willingness of the Alliance to take into consideration the Russian Federation's justifiable interests in realizing military-political planning and in observing the principles of international law.[122]

In general, it should be noted that Russia's security strategy is very broad; it contains both civilian and military elements, but since 2009 the military instruments have been given the leading role in ensuring Russia's national security. For this reason, the doctrine has acquired a confrontational tone, which is to facilitate not only Russia's fuller insurance of its national security—as Moscow believes—but also realization of its policy of transforming the international order into a multi-polar system.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization

In their founding document of October 7, 2002, the countries forming CSTO declared that they would "co-ordinate and unite their efforts at struggle with international terrorism and extremism",[123] and with other non-military threats (illicit trafficking of drugs and psychotropic substances, weapon, organized transnational crime, illegal migration and other menaces to their security). In the collective security strategy signed in October 2016, CSTO confirmed its engagement on behalf of establishing relations with the members of international society on a basis of equality and the indivisibility of security. It declared that it would refrain from threats or the use of force in resolving problems, while giving priority to political and diplomatic methods. At a summit in Yerevan, the leaders of the member countries signed documents referring to combating international terrorism. Among the documents was a directive in the matter of establishing a uniform register of organizations considered to be terrorist groups. It was also decided to create a CSTO crisis center for information and analysis. The CSTO security strategy foresees the creation of an effective collective mechanism for preventing the illegal migration of citizens of third countries.[124] However, it was not possible to come to a consensus on other key questions of international security. Generally it can be considered that this was another CSTO summit that did not live up to expectations. In this situation, it is hard to expect Russia's postulate of recognition for the CSTO in the international arena to be realized.[125]

[122]Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (2015).

[123]Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (2002).

[124]Strategiya kollektivnoy bezopasnosti Organizatsii … (2016).

[125]Ostryna (2016), Lidery stran ODKB utverdili strategiyu … (2018).

3 Similarities and Differences Between Security Concepts in the Light of International Relations Theory

In studying the security concepts of the main participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system, the ideological differences at the basis of those actors' policies should be borne in mind. The western states and institutions honor the liberal ideology, which they consider to be the sole proper one. Russia, regardless of how it may describe itself as a democratic country, prefers so-called sovereign democracy and authoritarian methods of government. Consequently the same phenomena and actions are viewed differently. It can generally be stated that how the world is viewed and what security policy aims are formulated (with their ways and means) depends on the given state's ideology. The dominant ideology tends to determine the choice of research perspective as well: liberalism dominates in the western states and political realism in Russia.

In the main, it can be observed that the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system understand security in the broad sense, and see states, societies, and even individuals as its subjects. This is a new perspective in comparison to the understanding of security during the Cold War, when the state-centered view, drawn from the theory of political realism, dominated. Then the subject of security was the state, as the main participant in international relations. The state was viewed as a unitary participant, behaving rationally on the international stage. States represent nations (societies) and have the responsibility of ensuring the security of their citizens and societies (nations) and of themselves as institutions.

Political realism derives from the Hobbesian tradition and is based on the premise that security is the main policy aim of states. Security is formed by a state's use of violence in an anarchic international system. This theory prefers a traditional, military understanding of security and concentrates on studying the instruments of power in state policies and the balance of power in the international system (the structural realism of Kenneth N. Waltz), while overlooking questions of morality and ideals.[126]

The striving of states to consolidate their own national security is reflected as the permanent goal of foreign policy. The activities of every state are accompanied by similar efforts on the part of its rivals and opponents. Strengthening the security of one side could entail the simultaneous diminution of the security of the other side and vice versa. This 'security dilemma' has been described for several decades in the academic literature.[127]

Edward Kołodziej justifies giving states a central position in contemporary security studies by two arguments: first, the state is the basic political organization of the world's populations, and second, the state—including the contemporary nation-state—has a legal monopoly on the use of force against the people inhabiting

[126]Morgenthau (1967), Waltz (2000).

[127]Herz (1950), pp. 158–180, Jervis (1978), Glaser (1997), Collins (2004), Tang (2009), pp. 587–588.

it, as well as for the defense of its population and territory (independently or with allies) in the case of aggression or attack by other states (or in the case, for instance, of transnational terrorism). This means that the state is the most important actor empowered to use force and violence and as such is the main entity of security and the subject of security studies.[128]

The first definitions of national security (state security) were formulated by theorists of political realism, who connected it with the category of national interest defined by the not very precise term 'power,' understood as force, might, strength, authority. Power, in the classical view of the realists, also means the aim of a state's actions on the international stage, as well as the instrument of achieving that aim.[129] In essence, what is involved is to insure the existence, the survival, of the state, and thus its security. This means that security is the main aim of a state's foreign policy; it expresses the internal needs, interests, and values of a given society (nation) and its political system, and orients them toward the international environment. A national security policy is thus premised on striving to protect the state and society primarily from external threats.[130] This traditional view is expressed in the oft-cited definition by M. Berkowitz and P. G. Bock, who wrote in 1960s that "National security can be most fruitfully defined as the ability of a nation [state] to protect its internal values from external threats".[131] As can be seen, the definition reduces security to its external aspects and omits the entire internal sphere in which threats also arise and security policies directed at those threats and their elimination are produced.

Realists were not interested in what forms the state, or in society, or in the nature of a country's political system. Sometimes they have compared the international system to a billiards table on which states move like billiard balls. The ball has a hard outer shell that hides its contents. Thus what matters is solely the trajectory of the ball once set in motion.[132] This premise allowed the realists to claim, fairly controversially, that there was no meaningful difference in the motives behind the USA and the USSR during the Cold War, when each side did everything possible to maximize its relative strength.[133]

In the realist paradigm, which developed most expansively during the Cold War confrontation between East and West, the most important interest of states was to ensure their own security. In the objective sense this meant ensuring the security of the state's essential internal values against external threats and particularly armed aggression. Threats arising inside the state itself were not then perceived, and consequently ensuring security was the work of a state's foreign policy in

[128]Kolodziej (2005), pp. 26–27.

[129]Morgenthau (1967), pp. 25–26.

[130]Zięba (2004), pp. 50–52.

[131]Berkowitz and Bock (1965), p. X.

[132]For more on this subject, see: Viotti and Kauppi (1987), pp. 6, 55, Gilpin (1984), p. 16, Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 17–22.

[133]Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 192–193, 229–230, 322–327.

connection with its own or borrowed military potential. In the 1960s the famous French scholar Raymond Aron wrote that the main participants in international relations are diplomats and soldiers.[134]

In facing the threat of military aggression from outside, states sought security through diplomatic activity and the development of their own military potential. When their individual preventive measures did not bring advantageous results, they entered into political and military alliances and created coalitions to balance the powers of their opponent—that is, they used the method of 'balancing,' or more rarely the policy of 'bandwagoning,' which consists in joining the opponent, with the idea that 'if you can't beat them, join them.' Balancing involves cooperation with other states against a stronger one; bandwagoning consists in cooperating with that stronger state.[135] Later, the sense of a 'bandwagoning strategy' changed and today it means joining a stronger but allied state, for instance, the leader of a bloc. The choice of strategy depends on the state, its potential, and the circumstances created by the international system.[136]

After the end of the Second World War, the principles by which states ensured their (national) security changed fundamentally. Europe and the world were divided for over forty years into two rival political-military blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In those times the realist paradigm triumphed and states had to subordinate their national security policies to coalition strategies. Like relations between East and West, security policies were militarized and strongly ideological. The rival ideologies of western liberalism and eastern authoritarianism (communism) were sharpened by an even more irreconcilable conflict of interests in the sphere of security. The foreign policy of the majority of states participating in the two blocs was reduced to security policy and conducted in the shadow of the threat of total war between the blocs. The large likelihood that an immensely destructive war could erupt meant there was a balance of fear. In reality, it was not a balance of military potential, but a functional balance, based on the existence of equality in the ability to cause damage that would be unacceptable to the opponent, and even to destroy life on earth in the event of a total nuclear war. The greatest responsibility for not allowing such a war to start rested on the two superpowers leading the two blocs, that is, the USA and the USSR. Thus it was they who were proponents of the militarization of security and international relations and forced the remaining states of the East and the West to militarize their security policies as well. In those conditions, the Cold War was no place for security in the broad sense and the perception that something other than states were its subjects, or that it had other aspects besides the political and military ones.

After the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, Waltz's neorealist theory was strongly criticized. It was held against it that it didn't foresee the fall of the Eastern Bloc and of the breakdown of the bipolar system of East-West relations, which had

[134]Aron (1962).

[135]Walt, S. M. (1987), pp. 21–22, 147–180, Moul (2002), p. 659, Schweller (1994), pp. 92–93.

[136]Waltz (2000).

been stable for more than forty years. As had happened earlier, after the First and Second World Wars, the liberal approach, with a strong element of idealism, came to dominate; the fashion increased for constructivism, which had already appeared in the previous decade. The latter created large opportunities to make interpretations that took into account states' identities, including states with collapsing real socialist systems.

When democratic forces came to power in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Eastern Bloc fell, preference for a liberal approach, with a broad, de-militarized, understanding of security, came to the fore through the statements of politicians and scholars. Liberals also advanced theories about the need to eliminate all political-military blocs and replace them with agreements creating a system of collective security.[137] Just as Wilson's vision of democratic peace in the world became popular after the First World War, or the idea of building a system of collective security in the form of the United Nations took hold after the Second World War, now the liberal vision of ending ideological rivalry became fashionable. It was expressed in ideas like Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history'[138] and that of creating a 'European UN.'[139] Liberals accepted, however, that force could be used under the control of international law to restore security by punishing aggressors. The domination of liberalism made it easier for many scholars to devote their attention to analysis of international institutions, including organizations that created ties between states and could become the structural basis of the transforming international order.[140]

Differences in positions between states, however, concerned the ways and means of arriving at such a system. The western powers, which felt more secure and had the support of the new democracies of Central Europe, strove to assemble their own group structures, that is NATO and the WEU, in the former security system in Europe. Russia, on the other hand, preferred the classic concept of building a system of collective security on the global and regional scale.[141]

The concept and practice of building a new security system in post-Cold War Europe gradually acquired elements based on political realism. To the liberal vision of expanding the zone of peace, democracy, human rights, a market economy, and prosperity was added the maintenance of the North Atlantic Alliance as a guarantor of the collective defense of the member states. At the Rome summit in November 1991 it was decided that NATO would remain and would keep its defensive character, but that it would develop partnership with the non-member states, including with its former Warsaw Pact adversaries. The leading American proponent of defensive realism, Charles Glaser, justified the need to maintain NATO as

[137]Reus-Smith (1992), pp. 23–28.

[138]Fukuyama (1992).

[139]See Chap. 2, note 37 in this volume.

[140]See Keohane et al. (1993).

[141]Zięba (2004), pp. 49–50.

the best security arrangement for the West and for Europe.[142] In the middle of the 1990s it was decided that NATO would expand to include the new democracies of Central Europe. The subsequent implementation of a policy of extending NATO to the east, in spite of Russia's opposition, showed that the West was returning to the realist canon in its approach to shaping security. The fears of states that did not then have a chance of acceding to NATO were somewhat mitigated by the Alliance's continued offer of cooperation and the expansion of the European Union. Nevertheless, Russia's fears for its security grew as it was gradually losing the chance of rebuilding its former sphere of influence in Central Europe.

It became clear that the European order could not still be analyzed through the prism of liberal-idealist concepts of expanding the sphere of freedom, democracy, and peace. After all, that rhetoric hid the individual and group interests of the Western states, and a simultaneous lack of respect for Russia's interests. Although on the conceptual level the European order was dominated by liberal ideology, the group and great power interests of its states appeared increasingly clear. The idea of cooperative security, which was announced in 1991 at the NATO forum and then also the CSCE/OSCE forum, did not signify equal cooperation and benefits for all sides. Russia, as well as other post-Soviet states that did not fully accept the values of the western world, felt threatened. In the following decade, Russia's power, which increased in the first years of Putin's leadership, meant that the country demanded recognition of its equal rights in the sphere of security and of joint decision-making not only in European but also world affairs. Russia's postulates concerning the construction of a polycentric world were supported by its BRICS partners. The hegemony of the US and the West was significantly weakened after the financial crisis of 2008, as was reflected in Euro-Atlantic security affairs.

The realist paradigm regained its explanatory power, particularly in regard to analyses of the growing tension on the West-Russia axis in connection with the Georgian-Russian War (2008) and the Ukraine crisis (beginning in the autumn of 2013). Certain growing challenges and threats, such as the destabilization of Arab countries, migration, and terrorism, could be well explained by the liberal paradigm, particularly the so-called new liberalism of Andrew Moravcsik and the constructivist approach (Aleksander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil, Peter Katzenstein).

The general tendencies in analysis by researchers into international security and the ideas adopted by politicians are reflected in the concepts and doctrines formulated by participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system.

In general, it can be observed that the strategic documents of the great powers are extensive and reveal a broad view of security. However, ensuring defense and security by use of the armed forces come first in the American and Russian strategies. While in the American doctrine, this can be viewed as a permanent feature, temporarily increased in the strategies of George W. Bush (2002, 2004) and Donald Trump (2017), in the Russian doctrine the shift toward greater use of the

[142]Glaser (1993), pp. 47–50.

armed forces can be observed from 2000, that is, after NATO's first post-Cold War round of expansion (to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). Then in 2009, Moscow clearly formulated the postulate of shaping Russia into a world power. This has meant a return to great power rivalry.

In addition to a preference for the militarization of security policy, the American strategies contain elaborate parts concerning the promotion of human rights throughout the world. Both in the American and the Russian documents considerable place is devoted to economic aspects of these countries' security. Both powers declare and conduct a global policy—Russia has been doing so increasingly clearly since the West's financial crisis in 2008.

The security strategies of the EU countries are multidimensional and encompass all aspects of security policy, from defense through economics, communications, ecology, society, human rights, and individual security. The security strategies of Great Britain and France are particularly extensive and reveal their ambitions to conduct global policies. Germany's security strategy is also broad. Even though its strategy documents ordinarily also concern reform of the Bundeswehr, Germany reveals itself above all as a civilian actor of security policy. Poland differs in this context by introducing its over-sensitivities (which it did not officially express earlier) in perceiving a military threat on the part of Russia, and thus resting on the grounds of traditional *realpolitik*, presented with the use of the realist paradigm.

The security concepts of both collective entities, NATO and the European Union, generally reflect the viewpoints of their member countries. NATO concentrates on functions of collective defense and crisis management, while the EU has a broad, multidimensional strategy of foreign and security policy, preferring civilian and humanitarian aspects. It has ambitions to become a real global actor. As the EU is aware that this is not very likely given the weakness of its CSDP, it is planning to strengthen the military component of this policy as well.

It is also worthwhile to stress that Russia's national security strategy is also broad and multidimensional. It encompasses the security of the state, society, and individuals. Since 2009 Russia's ambitions to equal the position of the USA and the West and to create a multilateral international order have become ever clearer. Among the participants of the Euro-Atlantic security system, Russia is isolated in its plans and actions and the Collective Security Treaty Organization of the six states of the CIS, which it has constructed, is not a major participant in this system.

References

A secure Europe in a better Word: European Security Strategy (December 12, 2003). Brussels: The European Union.

A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: The national security strategy. Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, London, October 2010.

Active engagement, modern defence: Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic treaty organization. Adopted by Heads of States and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 10–20 November 2010, NATO, Brussels 2010.

Aron, R. (1962). *Paix et guerre entre les nations*. Paris: Calmann Lévy.
Berkowitz, M., & Bock, P. G. (Eds.). (1965). *American national security. A reader in theory on policy* (p. X). New York: The Free Press.
Biscop, S. (2005). *The European security strategy: A global agenda for a positive power*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, October 7, 2002. http://odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1896. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Collins, A. (2004). States-induced security dilemma: Maintaining the tragedy. *Cooperation and Conflict, 39*(1), 27–44.
Cornish, P., & Dorman, A. M. (2015). Complex security and strategic latency: The UK strategic defence and security review 2015. *International Affairs, 91*(2), 251–370.
Défense et Sécurité nationale. Le Livre blanc (juin 2008). Paris: La documentation française.
Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2017). Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy? *International Affairs, 93*(5), 1013–1037.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.
Gilpin, R. (1984). *War and change in world politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Glaser, C. L. (1993). Why NATO is still best? Future security arrangements for Europe. *International Security, 18*(1), 5–50.
Glaser, C. L. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. *World Politics, 50*(1), 171–201.
Herz, J. H. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. *World Politics, 2*(2), 158–180.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under security dilemma. *World Politics, 30*(2), 167–214.
Juul, P., & Gude, K. (2017, May 1). *Reckless endangerment: President Trump and the use of military force*. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/05/01/431566/reckless-endangerment-president-trump-use-military-force/. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., & Hoffmann, S. (Eds.). (1993). *After the cold war: International institutions and state strategies in Europe, 1989–1991*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). *Security and international relations* (pp. 26–27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, utv. Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 10 yanvarya 2000g. No. 24 [The concept of national security of the Russian Federation, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 January 2000 No. 24]. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/14927/page/2. Accessed January 17, 2018.
Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, utv. Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 dekabrya 1997g. N 1300 [The concept of national security of the Russian Federation, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997 N 1300]. https://zakonbase.ru/content/base/24975. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 30 noyabrya 2016g. N 640 [The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian federation, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016 No. 640]. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201612010045?index=1&rangeSize=1. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 15 июля 2008 *goda* [The foreign policy concept of the Russian federation], July 15, 2008. http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/785. Accessed January 27, 2018.
La France face au terrorism: Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorism (2006). Paris: La documentation française.
Lasconjarias, G., & de Saint-Victor, F. (2017, October 27). Chasing Grandeur? What you need to know about the 2017 French strategic review. *War on the Rocks* (Texas National Security Network). https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/chasing-grandeur-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-2017-french-strategic-review/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Lidery stran ODKB utverdili strategiyu kollektivnoy bezopasnosti do 2025 goda [Leaders of CSTO countries approved collective security strategy until 2025]. http://www.belta.by/politics/view/lidery-stran-odkb-utverdili-strategiju-kollektivnoj-bezopasnosti-do-2025-goda-214775-2016/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Livre blanc: défense et sécurité nationale 2013 (2013). Paris: La documentation française.

Mälksoo, M. (2016). From the ESS to the EU global strategy: External policy, internal purpose. *Contemporary Security Policy, 37*(3), 374–388.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Missorili, A. (Ed.). (2003). *From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: Core documents*, Vol. IV, *Chaillot Paper*, No. 67, December 2003, pp. 324–333.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace* (4th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Moul, W. (2002). Dangerous balances, 1816–1989: A simple theory with longitudinal evidence. *Review of International Studies, 28*(4), 657–676.

Mróz, M. (2000). Zmiany w koncepcji strategicznej Rosji 1997–2000. *Informacja* (Warsaw: Sejm, Biuro Studiów i Ekspertyz), No. 719.

National security strategy (February 2015). Washington, DC: The White House.

National security strategy (May 2010). Washington, DC: The White House.

National security strategy of the Republic of Poland (2003). Warsaw: National Security Bureau.

National security strategy of the Republic of Poland (2007). Warsaw: National Security Bureau.

National security strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014). Warsaw: National Security Bureau.

National security strategy of the United States of America (December 2017). Washington, DC: The White House.

National security strategy and strategic and defence review 2015: A secure and prosperous United Kingdom. Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, London, November 2015.

National strategy for counterterrorism (June 1, 2011). Washington, DC: The White House.

Nau, H. R. (2017, August 28). Trump's conservative internationalism. *National Review*.

Nau, H. R. (2018). Why "Conservative", not liberal, internationalism? *Orbis, 62*(1), 22–29.

Ostryna, S. (2016, Ocbober 24). *Strategiya kollektivnoy bezopasnosti ODKB ne vidit ni odnoy ugrozy* [CSTO collective security strategy does not see a threat]. Novosti VPK, Belarus, October 24, 2016. http://vpk.name/news/166422_strategiya_kollektivnoi_bezopasnosti_odkb_ne_vidit_ni_odnoi_ugrozyi.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Polish foreign policy strategy 2017–2021 (2017). Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland.

Popescu, I. (2018). Conservative internationalism and the Trump administration? *Orbis, 62*(1), 91–104.

Porter, A. L., & Bendiek, A. (2012). Counterterrorism cooperation in the transatlantic security community. *European Security, 21*(4), 497–517.

Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd session of the United Nations general assembly (September 19, 2017). New York: United Nations.

Report on the implementation of the European security strategy—providing security in a changing world, Doc. S407/08, Brussels, December 11, 2008.

Reus-Smith, C. (1992). Realists and resistance Utopias: Community, security and political action in the New Europe. *Millennium, 21*(1), 1–28.

Revue Stratégique de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale 2017 (2017). République Française.

Rieker, P. (2017). *French foreign policy in a changing world: Practising Grandeur*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sakwa, R. (2004). *Putin Russia choice*. London: Routledge.

Schake, K. (2017, December 19). How to grade Trump's national security strategy on a curve: Strategizing for this president isn't easy. But that excuse only gets you so far. *Foreign Policy*. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/19/how-to-grade-trumps-national-security-strategy-on-a-curve/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back in. *International Security, 19*(1), 72–107.

Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy (June 2016). Brussels: The European Union.

Słomczyńska, I. (2008). Koncepcja bezpieczeństwa Francji. In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie* (pp. 105–121). Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.

Solana, J. (2016). Odważna strategia dla Europy, wp.pl, 01.08.2016. http://opinie.wp.pl/javier-solana-odwazna-strategia-dla-europy-6021385222407297a. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Strategiya kollektivnoy bezopasnosti Organizatsii Dogovora o kollektivnoy bezopasnosti na period do 2025 goda, 14 oktyabrya 2016 goda [The collective security strategy of the collective security treaty organization for the period up to 2025, October 14, 2016]. http://odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=8382. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 31 dekabrya 2015g., No. 883 [The national security strategy of the Russian Federation, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015, No. 883]. https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 12 maya 2009g. No. 537 [The national security strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 12, 2009 No. 537]. https://rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia-dok.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Tang, S. (2009). The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. *Security Studies, 18*(3), 587–623.

The defence concept of the Republic of Poland (2017). Warsaw: Ministry of Defence.

The national security strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in the independent world. Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, by command of Her Majesty, London, March 2008.

The national security strategy of the United States of America (March 2006). Washington, DC: The White House.

The national security strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). Washington, DC: The White House.

Tocci, N. (2015). Towards an EU global strategy. In A. Missiroli (Ed.), *Towards an EU global strategy—background, process, references* (pp. 115–120). Paris: Institut d'Etudes de Securité de l'Union Européenne.

Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 31 dekabrya 2015 goda N 683 "O Strategii natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Decree of the president of the Russian federation of December 31, 2015 N 683 "On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation"]. https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Védrine, H. (2012, November 14). *Rapport pour le président de la République sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l'OTAN, sur l'avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l'Europe de la défense*. Paris: Présidence de la République.

Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (1987). *International relations theory: Realism, pluralism, globalism, and beyond*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 30 dekabrya 2014g. [Military doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 30, 2014], *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*—Federal Edition No. 6570 (298), 08. https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 5 fevralya 2010 goda [The military doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010]. http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Walt, S. M. (1987). *The origins of alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walt, S. M. (2018). US grand strategy after the cold war: Can realism explain it? Should realism guide it? *International Relations, 32*(1), 3–22.

Waltz, K. (2000). Structural realism after the cold war. *International Security, 25*(2), 5–41.

Waśko-Owsiejczuk, E. (2017). Is America safer today? The first changes to U.S. foreign and security policy during the presidency of Donald Trump. *Przegląd Politologiczny, 3,* 161–178.

White book on national security of the Republic of Poland (2013). Warsaw: National Security Bureau.

White Paper 2016 on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr (2016). Berlin: The Federal Government.

Zając, J. (2008). Koncepcja bezpieczeństwa USA. In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie* (pp. 43–61). Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.

Zając, J. (2010). Doktryna uderzenia wyprzedzającego w polityce bezpieczeństwa USA. In J. Symonides (Ed.), *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń* (pp. 362–374). Warsaw: Scholar.

Zając, J. (2016). *Poland's security policy: The West, Russia and the changing international order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zięba, A. (2008). Koncepcja bezpieczeństwa Niemiec. In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie* (pp. 122–146). Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.

Zięba, R. (2000). Miejsce Europy w ogólnej koncepcji bezpieczeństwa USA u progu XXI wieku. In E. Cziomer (Ed.), *Udział USA w systemie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego* (pp. 51–65). Kraków: Meritum.

Zięba, R. (2004a). Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa. In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa* (pp. 37–58). Toruń: Adam Marszałek.

Zięba, R. (2004b). *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego; koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie*. Warsaw: Scholar.

Zięba, R. (2015). Poland and France: A cross analysis of security threats and national interests. In M. de Langlois (Ed.), *Vers une nouvelle stratégie européenne de sécurité* (Vol. 25, pp. 46–54). Paris: Laboratoires de l'IRSEM, Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École Militaire.

Part II
The Functioning of the System: From Cooperation to Crisis

Chapter 5
The Failure to Eliminate Terrorism

1 The American War on Terror

At the beginning of the 21st century, members of the Euro-Atlantic security system came face-to-face with an intensified form of terrorism. A new stage in confronting this phenomenon began with the reaction of the United States, its allies and its partners to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and on the headquarters of the US Defense Department, the Pentagon. Those two attacks—and one against the White House which was foiled by the passengers of a third airliner—were the first attacks on such a scale aimed at important targets in the USA. They made the George W. Bush administration and millions of Americans aware of the fact that American territory was not inviolable. The resulting shock led the US president to proclaim a global 'War on Terror' on September 20, 2001 before the joint houses of Congress. At the time, the United States had yet to recognize officially that there was such a thing as internal terrorism. As this admission was made, few people in America remembered that an internal, home-grown form of terrorism already existed in the USA, even though many bloody attacks had been carried out by Americans in the past. Almost immediately, President Bush recognized that the attacks had been inspired and carried out by foreigners led by the global terrorist organization al-Qaida, whose principal training centers were located in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and, for this reason, he announced a global 'War on Terror.'[1]

On September 12, 2001, the NATO allies decided, for the first time in the Alliance's history, to reach for the *casus foederis* clause contained in art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the defense of an attacked member state. In the event, two issues weighed most heavily: the first was the recognition that the 9/11 terrorist attack met the definition of 'armed attack', and the second was the fact that all the members of the Alliance adopted a solidary stance in defense of the Alliance's

[1]Zając (2005), p. 29, Masci and Jost (2001).

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_5

unquestioned leader—the USA—which hadn't sustained a foreign assault on such a scale since Pearl Harbor and whose territory had been seen as a sanctuary of sorts. The NATO allies' doubts had to do not with whether to support the USA, but how to justify the decision to refer to art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. For this reason, in the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of September 12, they pointed to the need to demonstrate that the attack on the USA had been conducted from the outside, i.e., from beyond American territory and from beyond the area of the Alliance's direct responsibility. This reflected the allies' commitment to the spirit and the letter of the Washington Treaty whose text, unchanged since 1949, specified that a *casus foederis* existed solely in the case of an external attack on one or a greater number of allies. The not entirely convincing evidence of the attack's outside inspiration and organization that US Secretary of State Collin Powell presented on October 2 was thus adopted that same day by the North Atlantic Council in support of the above-mentioned interpretation.[2]

The terrorist attacks were condemned by most of the world's states, including Russia and China, and a 'Coalition of the Willing' supported the war operations that the USA launched against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 (the *Enduring Freedom* operation). But NATO as a whole did not join this operation. This was in keeping with the wishes of the USA, which clearly preferred unilateral action and didn't want to tie its hands by having to consult the entire operation with its allies. It is only at those allies' request that a number of them joined the operation (those included Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland), while others extended logistical support from their own or common NATO resources. All in all, in the operation against Afghanistan, the USA enjoyed the direct support of 27 states, while over 80 states made up the entire anti-terrorist coalition.

The USA was determined not to involve the Alliance itself in the operation against Afghanistan. Instead, Washington chose to go with the more convenient option of using the support of individual participants of a wide coalition, most of whom were not NATO members. The European allies did not take kindly to the fact that even though they had triggered the *casus feoderis* (art. 5) of the North Atlantic Treaty and had expressed a clear willingness to take part in the war with Afghanistan, the USA ignored most of them, preferring to include non-democratic states of Central Asia and Pakistan in the anti-Afghanistan coalition while leaving most democratic West European states out.

The question of whether the Alliance should operate in regions that are geographically far removed from treaty territory remained politically unresolved. Instead, the USA opted for the gradual enlargement of the group of members who supported giving the Alliance a global character by drawing them into operations conducted within the framework of an ad hoc coalition.

Paradoxically, despite the fact that the Alliance had stood firmly on the side of the USA after the terrorist attacks and had chosen to give a 'broad' interpretation to the North Atlantic Treaty's art. 5, NATO played no active military role in the armed

[2]Invocation in Context (2006), pp. 89–106, Gordon (2002).

operation against Afghanistan but only provided support to the Alliance's leader. This later made it easier for the USA, which was planning to build a National Missile Defense System, to overcome its West European allies' resistance to the idea, and Russia's opposition to the USA's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty of 1972. It also made it easier for the USA to encourage—unsuccessfully, as it later turned out—its European allies to build the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the NATO framework while slowing down development of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy.

After the first phase of war operations in Afghanistan came to an end in December 2001, some NATO members joined the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stabilization operation, which had been instituted in that country under UN auspices and involved over 5500 soldiers.[3] Initially, these peacekeeping forces were under the command of Great Britain and Turkey. Germany and the Netherlands took over in February 2003, and on August 11, 2003 command over the ISAF was placed under NATO command. Thus, even though NATO embarked on its first mission beyond Europe with reluctance, it de facto sanctioned Alliance involvement far beyond the area of its treaty obligations.

Generally it should be stated that in political terms NATO lived up to the test as an agent of international support for the American anti-terrorist campaign, as a tool for disciplining allies, and as a foundation for wider coalitions based on bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Institutions of cooperation with outside partners also functioned as expected; the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the partners of the Mediterranean Dialogue proclaimed their condemnation of terrorist acts and solidarity with NATO actions. A temporary enlivenment in the work of all these forums occurred. The post-Soviet Central Asian countries' joining in the declaration of the North-Atlantic Council of September 12, 2001, and then their logistical support for the USA in the campaign against Afghanistan, turned out to be particularly significant. These moves not only contributed to activate the EAPC but also facilitated closer military cooperation between these countries and the USA.

The administration of President George W. Bush treated the military intervention in Iraq—which began on March 20, 2003 without the authorization of the UN Security Council—as yet another stage in the war on terror. The view that it was a war on terror is not supported by the facts, however, as Saddam Hussein's Iraq was

[3]Initially, 33 states took part in ISAF. NATO provided 95% of the personnel, and the greatest share was that of Canada—1900 soldiers, Germany—1500, France—548, United Kingdom—267, and Poland—12. The German general Götz Gliemeroth was appointed the force's commander, while the Canadian general Andrew Leslie became his assistant.

not a country that trained terrorists nor did al-Qaida have support there.[4] It is also important that this war was conducted without the support of NATO as an alliance. Rather, certain NATO countries, especially Great Britain and Poland (as well as Australia, which is not a NATO member) participated in yet another 'coalition of the willing' on the side of the USA, and from September 2003 administered 'stabilization zones,' or what opponents of the war called 'occupation zones.' These facts argue for not viewing the engagement of the USA and its allies in Iraq as an activity conducted in the name of the Euro-Atlantic security system. It should, however, be noted that the war in Iraq caused a serious division among the allies within the NATO framework. Germany, France, and Belgium decided to oppose that armed intervention, while certain other allies and EU members—Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Denmark, and Portugal—supported the United States. The war in Iraq strongly divided the allies and strained relations between the European Union and the United States.[5] Russia, as well as China, opposed the invasion of Iraq.

The United States was reluctant to conclude international agreements on fighting terrorism, because it wanted to avoid having to coordinate joint activities with its partners. In this situation, the legal and political solutions that Washington unilaterally implemented remained its chief instruments for fighting terrorism. In February 2003, the USA adopted the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (NSCT). This document was an elaboration of the third chapter of the US National Defense Strategy of 2002. It concentrated on not allowing terrorists within US borders. In addition, it provided for direct and concentrated actions against terrorist organizations for the purpose of destroying terrorist networks and bringing terrorists to face charges in the justice system. And finally, it emphasized the need to organize an international coalition to combat terrorists, but specified that in case of need the USA would act independently.[6] In September 2006, another *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* was published; it presented the USA's achievements till that time in combating terrorism and further detailed plans of action.[7] It was not till the presidency of Barack Obama that there was doctrinal support for a change of approach to combating terrorism. The *2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism*

[4]On June 16, 2004, an independent investigative commission called into being by the US Congress to examine the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, published its preliminary report in which it wrote that there is no credible evidence pointing to collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. According to the commission, even though bin Laden had turned to Iraq for assistance in the mid-1990s, Saddam's government had never responded to him. The influential *New York Times* called upon President Bush to "apologize to the American people", after the commission questioned the presidential administration's claims about Saddam Hussein collaboration with bin Laden's network. The *Washington Post* in turn, stressed that even though the commission didn't question the fact of contacts between Saddam and al-Qaida, the Bush administration had inflated their importance and tied them with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

[5]For more, see Lindstrom (2003).

[6]National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), pp. 1–3.

[7]National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), pp. 1–23.

spoke of respect for human rights and the construction of a broad international coalition for the purpose of fighting terrorism.[8]

In general, a glance at the American strategy for combating terrorism is sufficient to reveal that the USA undertook military action in the international arena for the purpose of combating terrorism. This was followed by the establishment in the USA of a number of domestic institutions charged with combating terrorism. As early as in October 2001, President Bush signed into law *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001*. This act, commonly referred to as the *Patriot Act* made it possible for US intelligence services to seriously curtail the civic rights of Americans. At the international level the USA preferred unilateralism and embarking on preventive wars or preemptive actions/wars—in the sense of the US National Defense Strategy of September 2002—without regard for international law.[9] Subsequently, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US's European allies in NATO were ignored and NATO was treated as a 'tool box.' Despite this, as it prepared for a long-term presence in Iraq, the US wanted to obtain the support of its allies in NATO and the EU. The USA only reverted to working with its allies and partners with the presidency of Barack Obama (2009–2017). On the other hand, from an observation of the first months of Donald Trump's presidency, it is hard to expect that there will not be a return to unilateralism in the 'war on terror.'

2 The Actions of the European Union with Respect to Combating Terrorism

The European Union, which from its start was unable to bring about closer collaboration with the US in combating terrorism, took action within the framework of its third pillar (collaboration in police and judicial matters) and later within the framework of the ESDP, which was part of the second pillar. Immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the EU's activities were based on a plan adopted by the European Council at an extraordinary meeting in Brussels on September 21, 2001.[10] The plan began with the institution of a program to increase cooperation between the EU member countries in regard to countering biochemical and biological terrorism. On October 23, the European Council established a *Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection*

[8]This was largely declarative in nature: while the Obama administration put a stop to the use of torture in the USA, large scale human rights violations continued through the use of drones to combat terrorism abroad, a policy that led to uncounted casualties among innocent bystanders, and through the renditions program, which was continued, also with respect to US citizens. See Show (2017), Schwarz (2016), Madej (2012).

[9]See Zając (2005), pp. 30–31.

[10]See the documents from this meeting in Rutten (2002), pp. 150–154. For more on the role of the EU in combating terrorism, see Duke (2002), Dubois (2002).

assistance interventions; this program began on January 1, 2002 and in June of that year a decision was taken to expand the mechanism to include cooperation in countering terrorism involving nuclear or radioactive weapons. Action was then taken at the community and national level to improve the security of the EU civilian population (including with the participation of military personnel); collaboration also began with countries from outside the EU and with international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.[11] At a meeting in Seville on June 21–22, 2002, the European Council decided, for the purpose of increasing the EU's role in combating terrorism, and to include the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in this effort.

The EU undertook new initiatives after the bomb attacks on March 11, 2004 in Madrid by an organization connected with al-Qaida, in which 192 people died and over 1500 were injured. At a meeting of the European Council on March 25–26, 2004, the leaders of 25 then and future EU countries adopted the *Declaration on Combating Terrorism* and plans of action were revised to reflect the EU member countries' "determination to combat the continuing terrorist threat through a comprehensive and integrated approach."[12] The office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was established. The heads of state and governments symbolically referred to the 'solidarity clause' in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. This clause provided for the mobilization of all resources, including military, to come to the aid of a country that was the victim of a terrorist attack (art. I-43). Given the lack of agreement over the controversial idea of establishing a European CIA, EU leaders asked the EU's foreign minister, Javier Solana, to prepare a proposal on creating an intelligence cell within the framework of the Council where the EU countries could exchange information pertaining to the terrorist threat. The European Council also called for an increase in contributions to the ESDP for combating terrorism, in accord with the decisions taken by the leaders of EU countries in Seville in June 2002.[13]

Much attention was devoted to the issue of combating terrorism at a sitting of the European Council on December 16–17, 2004. The heads of 25 EU countries appealed for the rapid entry into force of the *The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union* (November 4, 2004),[14] which partially referred to combating terrorism, and in particular improving the ease of exchanging information between anti-terrorist agencies. The heads of the EU countries supported revision of the action plan for combating terrorism, and additional reports presented by Javier Solana and the European Commission relating to

[11]For more, see Lindstrom (2004).

[12]The text of both documents can be found in EU Security and Defence: Core Documents (2004), pp. 31–42. The adopted strategy for combating terrorism also calls for a series of specific initiatives, such as the introduction of biometric visas and passports—with fingerprints or a scan of the iris—by the end of 2005.

[13]In Seville, the leaders of the 15 EU countries adopted immigration and asylum policy guidelines.

[14]EU Security and Defense … (2004), pp. 264–270.

combating terrorism. They appealed to the European Council to prepare a long-term strategy and action plan in this area by June 2005.

Generally, it should be said that within a few months in 2004, the EU adopted a range of new institutional solutions within the third pillar and made recommendations to the member countries in the question of countering terrorism. However, practical application met with difficulties and delays, particularly in regard to the member countries' introduction of appropriate legal regulations and undertaking collaboration between national investigative organs and the courts. Similarly, due to its limitations the newly established office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was unable to fulfill its mandate effectively.

In December 2004, the European Council recommended combining EU defense policy with the fight against terrorism. For this purpose it adopted the presidential report containing a document entitled *The Conceptual Framework of the ESDP dimension in the fight against terrorism*. This document included an appeal for broader action to increase military, civilian and inter-operative capabilities; to exchange military intelligence data; to protect EU citizens in third countries; to support third countries in their struggle against terrorism; and to develop the EU's ability to make a rapid defensive response and to collaborate with NATO in the sphere of civil defense.[15]

At an informal meeting on March 18, 2005 in Luxembourg, the EU defense ministers opted for the ESDP to contribute to combating terrorism. They admitted that defense policy did not play a first-rank role in combating terrorism, but only a supporting role. They spoke in favor of making better use of the EU's military resources for fighting terrorism in case of need. They considered that it was possible to make such use in the sphere of prevention or the protection of infrastructure or a population threatened by attack. The chairman of the meeting, the Luxembourg minister of defense Luc Fieden, emphasized that the EU would be successful in fighting terrorism only if it used all its available resources in cohesive actions.

On November 30, 2005, the European Council adopted *The UE Counter-Terrorim Strategy*. In this document, the European Union announced four areas of activity: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. It bound itself to "combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice."[16] The EU decided that the main responsibility for combating terrorism rests with the member countries and that the EU's contribution should take four main forms: strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation, developing collective capability, and promoting international partnership.[17] In contrast to American antiterrorist strategies, this European strategy emphasizes the necessity of

[15]Ibidem, pp. 336–339, 356.

[16]The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Council of the European Union, Brussels, November 30, 2005, doc. 14469/4/05 rev. 4.

[17]Walker (2011), p. 10.

respecting human rights while combating terrorism.[18] Its implementation, on account of the democratic standards in force in the EU, has been characterized by a not very high level of effectiveness, as is proven by the successive terrorist attacks conducted in the countries of Western Europe.

One very important decision by the EU, which increased the significance of its anti-terrorist policies, was to include the clause on solidarity in the case of a terrorist attack in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which was signed in Lisbon on December 13, 2007. The clause bound the EU and its member countries to render assistance to a country that had been the object of a terrorist attack or a victim of a natural or manmade disaster (art. 222, TFUE). The second of the treaties that were signed then, the Treaty on the EU, also expanded the catalog of operations for responding to a crisis (the Petersberg Tasks) to include disarmament measures, military support and advisory missions, and—what is much more significant here—supporting third countries in combating terrorism (by separate missions or as an element of other missions) (art. 43.1, TEU). Both treaties came into force on December 1, 2009 and form the legal basis for the EU's activities for the purpose of combating terrorism.

As in the case of NATO after 9/11, after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, at France's request the EU referred to the clause contained in art. 42.7 of the Treaty on the EU on allied solidarity of the *casus foederis* type, which is to be set in motion in the case on an armed attack. This can be viewed as an act of symbolic significance, like the support rendered to France by its EU partners. It should be pointed out that France should rather have invoked the so-called solidarity clause in art. 222 of the TEU, which speaks directly of a 'terrorist attack.' Nevertheless, setting in motion art. 42.7 of the Treaty on the EU was a precedent. It signifies that the countries have decided to combat terrorism by every available means, including military ones.

Researchers on the issue of anti-terrorist policies call attention to the divergent approach of the EU countries to combating terrorism in comparison with the policy conducted by the US. As Peter O'Brien writes, while the USA prefers

> "a hard power approach at the cost of human rights […] European governments respect human rights in the fight against terrorism. The normative argument for human rights stems from the ethical core of liberalism that prescribes equality and freedom for all individuals regardless of race, nationality, gender, religion, and the like. A practical extension of the argument, regarding efforts to combat Islamist violence, contends that guaranteeing equal rights to Muslims is ultimately the surest weapon against terrorism; inversely, denying equal rights is the surest way to foment terrorism." However, their actions resemble those of the USA in that "no European state confines its counterterrorism strategy to soft power".[19]

The EU's specific approach to combating terrorism while ensuring the respect for human rights is revealed in such actions as the adoption in 2009 of the document *Community Policing Preventing Radicalization and Terrorism*, which recommended police to work in concert with community agents. Next in 2011, to bolster

[18]The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy … See also Gasztold (2017).

[19]O'Brien (2016), pp. 368, 371.

the 'community based approach,' the European Commission (2015) established the Radicalization Awareness Network.[20] This is a network of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work daily with people who have already been radicalized, or who are vulnerable to radicalization.

3 Cooperation Between the EU and the USA

After the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001, international efforts were made to increase cooperation between countries and among the collective participants of the Euro-Atlantic security system. The EU showed its solidarity with the US in combating terrorism. On September 12, at a special meeting in Brussels, the EU Council made a declaration on the matter[21]; a day of mourning was announced on September 14 and the heads of EU countries and governments, the head of the European Commission, and High Representative for the CFSP jointly declared their solidarity with the victims of the attack, their families, and the American people.

On September 20, 2001, the EU Troika (Louis Michel, the Belgian minister of foreign affairs acting in the name of the Presidency; Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP; and Chris Patten, Commissioner for Foreign Relations) paid a visit to Washington, where along with US Secretary of State Colin Powell issued a declaration stating their intention to combat terrorism. In this document, collaboration between the EU and USA in the following areas was announced:

- the security of civilian aviation and other types of transport;
- police collaboration, and in justice administration, including in regard to extradition;
- a ban on the financing of terrorism, subject to financial sanctions;
- a ban on supporting terrorism by other means;
- controls of export and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- border controls, including in regard to visa and document authenticity matters;
- the legal expansion of access to information and the sharing of electronic data.[22]

During the May 2, 2002 summit, the EU and USA restated their desire to work together in combating terrorism; they agreed to intensify bilateral cooperation in the sphere of asylum, migration, and border-crossing policies. However, the American side was unwilling to conclude the necessary agreements.

In practice, a working dialogue was initiated, but collaboration between the EU and the US met with a series of obstacles of a political and legal nature. Washington

[20]Ibidem, p. 379.

[21]See the text in Rutten (2002), pp. 143–144.

[22]Ibidem, p. 149.

did not want to tie its hands with agreements, yet insisted that its European allies and partners support the actions undertaken unilaterally by the US. Washington proved unwilling to coordinate its efforts in the 'war on terror' with its allies, so as not to cramp its freedom to use military force. It was more willing to enter into bilateral agreements with leading EU member states than with the whole community. This had a mitigating effect on EU actions. The main political obstacles were caused by the diametrically opposite attitude of the two sides in regard to resolving various international security issues. The European Union, in accord with the dispositions of its successive constitutive treaties and the documents defining its security strategy, has from the beginning inalterably expressed itself in favor of observing international legal norms and of a multilateral approach involving the cooperation of other participants in international relations. The US, on the other hand, particularly during the presidency of George W. Bush, preferred to use force and act unilaterally.

While many people in Europe, including experts and politicians understood the causes of the US's proclamation of a 'war on terror,' they did not accept the military methods by which it was conducted, or its basis in a simple dichotomy between 'good' and 'evil.' In particular, Europe did not accept the armed intervention in Iraq in 2003, or the confusion of terrorism with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 'rogue states,' or the treatment of these phenomena as a single great threat. As Andrew Cottey writes:

> European opponents of the Iraq War argued that it would be a major distraction from the more central task of countering al-Qaeda and associated Islamic terrorist groups, polarize opinion in the Middle East against the USA and the West, and thereby act as a recruiting sergeant for Islamic terrorism.[23]

Cottey further points out:

> Europeans were also concerned about the extent to which the 'war on terror' led the USA to cast aside international human rights commitments. The decision of the USA to define al-Qaeda/Taliban prisoners captured in Afghanistan as 'enemy combatants' rather than 'prisoners of war' (thereby ensuring that they were not legally subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions), the detention of these prisoners at the US military base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and the decision to try some of them before secret military tribunals left these prisoners in a legal limbo and created the impression of an America trying to avoid both international and domestic law. Accusations by some of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners of human rights abuses and the 2004 scandal surrounding human rights abuses against prisoners held in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq reinforced the perception of the USA being willing to disregard international human rights standards. (…) For many Europeans, these elements of America's 'war on terror' not only represented a serious challenge to global human right norms, but were also likely to be counter-productive in addressing terrorism, since they reinforced the perception in the non-Western world of a hypocritical USA (and wider West, including Europe) willing to abuse human rights and flout international law in its anti-terrorist campaign.[24]

[23]Cottey (2013), p. 213.

[24]Ibidem, p. 214.

The matter of the 'war on terror' also had a specific dimension in transatlantic relations: The USA repeatedly broke international law, and maintained secret prisons in other countries and tortured detained persons. There were instances of citizens of EU countries being held in Guantanamo and other prisons. The governments of these countries demanded the freeing of their citizens, particularly as there was no convincing evidence that the prisoners were in fact terrorists. Nevertheless, these governments wanted to avoid confrontation with the US. Consequently, in several cases the efforts to free these imprisoned persons were successful, but in other cases they were not. Several governments of European countries were accused by the Council of Europe and European Parliament of complicity, under US pressure, in breaking international law by allowing American planes to land on their territory with captured al-Qaida or Taliban fighters, and of setting up secret prisons where these prisoners were tortured (such countries included Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, and Romania). The events have not been fully elucidated and have remained a matter of controversy.[25] One factor that contributes to the cautious approach of the EU member states to cooperation with the US in the 'war on terror' is the fact that the EU is inhabited by a large and growing Muslim population.

Other factors hampering cooperation between the US and the EU in combating terrorism were the two sides' different stances on important international issues. Already during Clinton's second term, and especially during the presidency of George W. Bush, the US preferred to act unilaterally and without regard for international law and the opinion of its allies and partners. Although this unilateralism was somewhat less pronounced during Bush's second term, it remained an obstacle to the growth of real strategic partnership between the EU and USA. In addition, Washington only reluctantly accepted the European Security and Defense Policy established in 1999, viewing it as a competitor to NATO and the US's leading role in the West's security policy. In any case, from the very beginnings of the EU, the US had not wanted to treat it as a partner of equal rank, capable of expressing itself as a full and equal entity on the international stage. Then, at the beginning of the 21st century, the Bush's administration—in deciding to unilaterally impose the leadership, or rather the outright hegemony and unprecedented supremacy of the United States—provided much evidence for its disregard for the EU and for its European allies in general. Washington was eager to discuss economic questions within the framework of the Transatlantic Partnership, but sought to resolve international political problems either at the NATO forum or through bilateral contacts with individual European states. This was more convenient for the US given its great advantage in such configurations. On its side, the EU was not always capable of showing a cohesive stance and thereby being stronger than the sum of its member-countries' potential. The US took advantage of this situation during Bush's presidency skillfully, and often unceremoniously. Even though the US had declared its support for European integration since the 1950s, when the EU

[25]Ibidem, p. 215.

began to emphasize its political ambitions on the international stage more strongly, Washington increasingly often used existing divisions within the EU and supported or even encouraged specific EU member states to act independently, thereby delaying the moment at which the EU would become a cohesive or unified international player. The same thing took place during the 'war on terror' when the EU —as a whole—did not agree to condone, in any form, the American intervention in and occupation of Iraq. Washington nevertheless persuaded several European countries, including Great Britain and Poland, which was about to join the EU, to participate in this intervention in breach of international law.[26] However, the EU was interested in downplaying the dispute that had arisen as a result, as it weakened the whole transatlantic community. In practice, even those countries which publicly expressed opposition to the use by the United States of secret prisons and to the forceful interrogation of detainees, embarked on close bilateral cooperation with American intelligence.[27]

In spite of the numerous disagreements and tensions that emerged between Europe and the US in connection with the Bush administration's 'war on terror,' the EU and its member countries were interested in expanding cooperation with the USA with respect to counter-terrorism measures. Such cooperation involved regular summits of US and EU leaders. The documents adopted during those summits provide for close cooperation, but many of these declarations remained on paper. The most extensive program of collaboration was announced at a meeting in Dromoland Castle in Ireland on June 26, 2004.[28] It was presumably influenced by the series of terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004.

Recognition of the US's political and strategic importance for Europe, and of terrorism as a common threat, inclined the EU and US to conclude agreements concerning cooperation on counter-terrorism measures. However, the conclusion of agreements led to unending disputes and discussions in connection with fears that the standard of Europeans' human rights protections would be affected.

The EU quickly delegated Europol to work with the US. In December 2001 an agreement was reached on the sharing of strategic and technical information. In December of the following year, an agreement on the sharing of personal data was reached and US and EU liaison officers were posted at the headquarters of Europol and of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The next step was the establishment, in 2006, of contacts between Eurojust and the USA with respect to the investigation and prosecution of suspected terrorists. Collaboration in Customs and Border

[26]One example of breaking EU unity was the so-called 'Letter of the Eight' prepared by the USA, and championed within the EU by the United Kingdom, which was signed by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, and Poland, and by the president of the Czech Republic. The letter was published on January 30, 2003 in the leading European dailies called on Atlantic solidarity which, in practice, meant support for the military intervention in Iraq that the USA was preparing. Zięba (2013), p. 221.

[27]See Aldrich (2009).

[28]EU-U.S. Declaration on combating terrorism (2004).

Protection (CBP) was introduced in 2002 on a provisional basis. The UE-US relevant agreement was approved by the EU Council in May 2004.

At the EU-US summit of June 2003 two agreements were signed: one on extradition and one on mutual legal assistance [MLA], which gave pursuing organs access to bank accounts in the EU and US for the purpose of prosecuting serious crimes, including terrorism. Both agreements came into force only after they were approved by the European Parliament in 2010.

The EU and US have also undertaken to work together on strengthening aviation and maritime cargo security. In April 2004 a cooperation agreement was reached which includes commitment to extend the US Container Security Initiative.[29] An agreement on coordinating air cargo security measures was reached in 2008, and in June 2012 the US and EU agreed on an air cargo security partnership.

The greatest controversy was produced by negotiations between the EU and US in the matter of sharing personal and financial information. In 2002, on a temporary basis, EU air carriers to the US transferred the passenger name record (PNR) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This turned out to be a very controversial affair. In May 2004 a formal EU-US agreement was concluded. This accord proved controversial in Europe and raised fears that it violated the right to privacy of EU citizens and was short on personal data protection clauses. Consequently, the European Parliament filed a case against the PNR agreement with the EU Court of Justice. The court annulled the accord in May 2006.[30] Only in July 2007, was a seven-year agreement in the matter signed, as was the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP).[31] These agreements gave rise to serious reservations in the European Parliament on the grounds that they limited the right to privacy, but nevertheless they entered into force. They constituted a large compromise on the part of the EU, which considered that combating terrorism should not occur at the cost of the liberty and rights of the individual.[32] Due to the doubts that were expressed, the EU undertook negotiations with Barack Obama's administration to revise the PNR agreement. The negotiations were concluded in May 2011, but talks to revise the agreement were undertaken again. A new arrangement was concluded only in December 2011 (with Germany and Austria abstaining). It entered into force on July 1, 2012 and is to be binding until 2019.[33] Another revision of the agreement was negotiated in December 2015, after the revelation (in June 2013) that American spy agencies had been eavesdropping on European politicians and diplomats. The revision was approved by the European Parliament in April 2016.

Another very controversial matter was the question of the US's access to financial data in regard to international SWIFT bank transfers. In 2006, the US revealed data from such transfers going back to 2001. Then in June 2007 and in

[29]Cottey (2013), p. 216.

[30]Lovelace (2015), p. 279.

[31]The TFTP Agreement came into force earlier—on August 1, 2010.

[32]Porter and Bendiek (2012), p. 498.

[33]Archik (2014), pp. 20–21.

November 2009 agreements were reached between the US and EU on access to SWIFT data. However, in February 2010, the European Parliament refused to ratify the agreement of 2009, on the grounds of concern for the protection of personal data and privacy. After the US agreed to changes in response to some of the reservations, the European Parliament ratified the agreement in July 2010. After the disclosure in June 2013 that American intelligence had been monitoring EU diplomatic offices and computer networks, as well as German chancellor Angela Merkel's cell phone, new doubts as to the SWIFT agreement appeared in Europe. These were expressed in the Moraes Report. It was approved by a European Parliament resolution in March 2014, which asserted that the US-EU SWIFT agreement should be suspended.[34]

This divergence in positions meant that Europe was criticized in the USA for not wanting to take adequate counter-terrorism measures, and in Europe, the US was accused of insufficient concern for citizens' rights—and especially that it was unwilling to grant EU citizens the legal guarantees in regard to data protection that it provided for its own citizens. In addition, it should be noted that international cooperation in regard to counter-terrorism measures is not an easy undertaking. Police organizations and special services unwillingly share information and this cooperation depends on the general atmosphere of relations between the partners—even those who may be allies or partners in the process of integration.

In spite of the mutual declarations of collaboration in security matters—including in regard to terrorism—that were often signed at EU-US summits, to the end of George W. Bush's presidency no transatlantic breakthrough in relations occurred. Proclamations were made of the will to work together, but in the end, there was a lack of binding agreements and real action reflecting the supposed cooperation. After Barack Obama came to office in January 2009, a more favorable atmosphere emerged in transatlantic relations. President Obama introduced deep changes in the security policy of the USA ('change' was his campaign slogan), and contributed to the rebuilding of partnership with the EU. Obama's administration abandoned the 'war on terror' language, brought about the closure of the network of secret prisons located in other countries. It also ended with Bush-era 'enhanced interrogation techniques' and reined-in the expanded use of extraordinary rendition, albeit this did not lead to its complete cessation.[35] Nevertheless, differences of opinion remained in many of the questions that had appeared earlier (PNR and SWIFT transfer data). Contrary to Europe's great expectations, no new agreements to strengthen collaboration between the EU and US in combating terrorism were concluded, and those that had been reached previously continue to evoke reservations in Europe. It is hard to expect that the new president, Donald Trump, will change the US's approach to terrorism. In the first months after he took office in

[34]Ibidem, pp. 13, 16.

[35]In the end, President Obama failed to close down the prison in Guantanamo Bay, as he had promised.

2017 he repeatedly vowed to keep the prison in Guantanamo Bay open and to use it to detain 'bad dudes,' including American ISIS supporters.[36]

4 NATO's Cooperation with Russia

Serious problems hampered the West in working with Russia on combating terrorism. Since the beginning of the 1990s Russia was unable to control Chechen terrorism. This variety turned out to be as brutal as the kind affecting western countries, and it also includes motivations from Islamic fundamentalism. However, for the Chechens it was an aspect of their fight for independence, thus the West generally sought justifications for this kind of terrorism and criticized Russia, which was conducting a bloody pacification war against Chechen separatism.

The situation changed politically after the 9/11 attacks. President Putin was the first to telephone Bush and not only offered expressions of solidarity but "stressed that Russia would stand full-square with the United States in the struggle against international terrorism."[37] Russia joined the American anti-terrorist coalition. Two days after these attacks, on September 13, 2001, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council made a declaration condemning these attacks and expressing readiness to act together in the struggle against the terrorist threat,[38] and a month later a plan of joint actions in regard to the new challenges to security had been agreed upon. Both sides have much to offer each other, and Russia not only has experience in fighting terrorism but possesses good intelligence services and has influence in countries that are sources of terrorism. Thus in the joint Rome declaration signed on May 28, 2002 on relations between NATO and Russia and establishing a new NATO-Russia Council (the NRC), the struggle against terrorism was singled out as the main area of practical collaboration between the parties.[39] Collaboration between the Alliance and Russia also became easier due to the agreement, which had been negotiated since 1999, on the opening of a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. This mission began to function in Moscow on May 27, 2002. Its aim is to increase transparency and to develop practical military cooperation between NATO military organs and the Russian ministry of defense.

A Temporary Working Group on Terrorism was then established as a new mechanism of collaboration. NATO and Russia experts began to collaborate on the preparation of analyses concerning the terrorist threat and on the use of the military in combating terrorism. Anti-terrorist collaboration is also developed in the sphere

[36]Forever Prison (2017).

[37]Sakwa (2004), p. 216.

[38]Meeting in Extraordinary … (2001).

[39]Other areas of collaboration were supposed to include crisis management, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and confidence building measures, theater missile defense, exploratory and rescue operations, military cooperation and civilian extraordinary situations. See NATO-Russia Relations (2002).

of civilian planning for emergency situations. In June 2004, during a NATO summit in Istanbul, the NRC reached a breakthrough agreement in the matter of preparing annual plans of action for the struggle against terrorism. Six months later, in December 2004, the NRC approved a general NATO-Russia Action Plan against Terrorism, which set forth a unified strategy for preventing terrorism, combating terrorists, and dealing with the consequences of acts of terrorism. This plan made it possible to move on to practical cooperation in countering terrorism.[40]

Even though in the US and other western countries—except the ones with the most anti-Russian attitudes, such as Poland or Lithuania—there was growing understanding for Russia's motives in eliminating Chechen terrorism, particularly outside the borders of Chechnya, there was criticism for the Russian anti-terrorist forces, for whom the number of casualties was no object, particularly in connection with their operation during the hostage crises at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow (2002) and in Beslan (2004). Such criticism was mainly based on the belief—widespread in the West—that Russia was moving away from democratic principles and was becoming an authoritarian state, even if the terrible consequences of these operations provided in themselves sufficient grounds to criticize the methods used by Russia's anti-terrorist forces.

However, Russia is conceptually well prepared to combat terrorism on its own territory. Following on the events in Chechnya, on July 25, 1998 the Russian Duma adopted Federal Law No. 130-FZ on the struggle against terrorism. This law defines terrorism as a type of criminal act, regardless of the motives behind it, and creates a legal framework for anti-terrorist operations. In terms of organization it places Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) at the top of the list of agencies responsible for combating terrorism. This law was a clear sign that the stress in Russian anti-terrorist policy was increasingly shifting toward military methods (preemptive action and acts of retortion directed at specific persons, and secret operations aimed at reducing the terrorists' capabilities). Moscow justified the militarization of the fight against terrorism in Russia by the second Chechen war in the years 1999–2009. A law on countering terrorism was adopted on March 6, 2006 and then amended on May 3, 2011. Among other things, it created the legal and organizational bases for the use of the armed forces in anti-terrorist operations.[41] The Anti-Terrorist Plan approved by President Dmitri Medvedev on October 5, 2009 is an important element of Russia's anti-terrorist policy. This document defined terrorism as a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, and set forth a nationwide counter-terrorism system, and defined methods and principles for international cooperation in combating this dangerous threat.[42]

The CIS countries are intensively and successfully expanding their collaboration in regard to combating terrorism. The CIS member states had embarked on this

[40]Kelin (2005).

[41]Zięba (2017), pp. 43, 271.

[42]Kontseptsiya protivodeystviya … (2018).

cooperation before the EU and US became active in this sphere. On June 4, 1999 they signed an agreement on cooperation in the fight against terrorism. They connect their activities with the struggle against other types of crime.[43] The balance of this collaboration is positive, but this does not mean that the phenomenon of terrorism in Russia and other CIS countries has ceased to be a problem.[44]

In general, it can be said that although the participants in the Euro-Atlantic security system are conceptually and organizationally well prepared to combat terrorism, they are unable to deal with this phenomenon. Terrorist attacks still take place frequently. They increased in frequency after the US proclaimed its global 'war on terror' at the beginning of the 21st century. They have occurred often in the following decade as well. The first factor that hampers their prevention is weak international criminal law and the fact that, in the European cultural sphere, respect for the principle that the response to a crime can only take place after the crime has been committed. The imperative that preventive actions must be conducted with respect for human rights led the US during Barack Obama's presidency to tone down some of the more drastic solutions that were introduced after the 9/11 attacks and that violated civil rights.

The second factor is the impetus given to Islamic terrorism by the West's inept conduct—and the western media's presentation—of the 'war on terror.' In practice, terrorists are often equated with Muslims. This strengthened fundamentalist attitudes not only in the societies of Muslim countries but also among immigrants from Muslim countries, mainly Arab ones, in the societies of Western Europe. The West erred in politically supporting the Arab Spring, which began at the end of 2010.[45] Instead of the expected wave of democratization in North Africa and the Middle East, countries were destabilized and extreme religious fundamentalism appeared. In addition, the West's thoughtless wars, in the form of the US and its allies' intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, reinforced the extremist attitudes of the people and the fundamentalist organizations resorting to terrorism. The Islamic State, one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations to this time, emerged in the middle of 2014, within parts of the territory of Iraq and Syria. A side effect of this phenomenon was the enormous wave of immigrants and refugees that began to flow toward the EU, mainly by illegal paths. This only worsened the internal security of the EU countries, and produced disagreement between them on the question of distributing such a large number of unexpected, and largely unwanted, newcomers. Some of the countries, for instance, those in the Visegrad Group, refused to accept any immigrants. Generally, Europe still faces the threat of extremism and terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism. Examining the sources of such phenomena is a subject for another book, however.

[43]For more, see Zięba (2017), pp. 273–279.

[44]On April 3, 2017 a bomb exploded in the St Petersburg subway. Fourteen persons were killed and 49 wounded. It was a terrorist suicide attack carried out by a Russian citizen from Kirgizia, 22-year old Akbarzhon Dzhalilov.

[45]Bremberg (2016), pp. 430–432; Dadush and Dunne (2011), pp. 131–145.

References

Aldrich, R. J. (2009). US–European intelligence co-operation on counter-terrorism: Low politics and compulsion. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11*(1), 122–139.

Archik, K. (2014, December 1). *US-EU cooperation against terrorism*. Washington DC: CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service.

Bremberg, N. (2016). Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab uprisings: Foreign policy practice at the time of crisis. *European Security, 25*(4), 423–441.

Cottey, A. (2013). *Security in 21st century Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dadush, U., & Dunne, M. (2011). American and European responses to the Arab spring: What's the big idea? *The Washington Quarterly, 34*(4), 131–145.

Dubois, D. (2002). The attacks of 11 September: EU-US cooperation against terrorism in the field of justice and home affairs. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 7*(3), 317–335.

Duke, S. (2002). CESDP and the EU response to 11 September: Identifying the weakest link. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 7*(2), 153–169.

EU. (2004). Security and defence: Core documents. In *Chaillot paper* (Vol. V). 75, February 2005.

EU-U.S. (2004). *Declaration on combating terrorism*. The Council of the European Union, Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004, No. 10760/04 (Presse 205).

Forever Prison. (2017, February 22). *Retro report*. https://www.retroreport.org/video/forever-prison/. Accessed January 22, 2018.

Gasztold, A. (2017). Strategie antyterrorystyczne USA i RFN po 11 września 2001 r. *Kwartalnik Naukowy OAP e-Politikon, 21,* 155–183.

Invocation in Context. *NATO Review*, Summer 2006. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art1.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Kelin, A. (2005). NATO-Russia cooperation to counter terrorism. *NATO Review*. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art2.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Kontseptsiya protivodeystviya terrorizmu v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Rossiyskaya gazeta—Federal'nyy vypusk No 5022 (198) [The Concept of Counteracting Terrorism in the Russian Federation, Rossiyskaya Gazeta—Federal Issue No. 5022 (198)], https://rg.ru/2009/10/20/zakon-dok.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Lindstrom, G. (Ed.). (2003). *Shift or rift: Assessing US–EU relations after Iraq*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Lindstrom, G. (2004). Protecting the European homeland: The CBR dimension. *Chaillot Paper, 69,* 39–54.

Lovelace, D. C. (Ed.). (2015). *Terrorism: Commentary on security documents* (Vol. 138). The Resurgent Terrorist Threat, Oxford University Press.

Madej, M. (2012). Drone war on terrorism—użycie bezzałogowych pojazdów latających (UAV) w walce z terroryzmem. *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, 65*(3), 55–77.

Masci, D., Jost, K. (2001, October 12). War on terrorism: Can the U.S. contain the global terrorist threat? *CQ Researcher, 11*(35). http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2001101200. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Meeting in extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial level, Press Statement. *NATO Press Release*, September 13, 2001.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006, National Security Council, Washington D.C., September 2006.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Security Council, Washington D.C., February 2003.

NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, Rome Summit—28 May 2002. *NATO Basic Text*, Rome, Italy, May 28, 2002.

O'Brien, P. (2016). Counter-terrorism in Europe: the elusive search for order. *European Security, 25*(3), 366–384.

Porter, A. L., & Bendiek, A. (2012). Counterterrorism cooperation in the transatlantic security community. *European Security, 21*(4), 497–517.
Rutten, M. (Ed.). (2002). From nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents (Vol. II). *Chaillot Paper*, No. 51.
Sakwa, R. (2004). *Putin Russia choice*. London: Routledge.
Schwarz, E. (2016). Prescription drones: On the techno-biopolitical regimes of contemporary 'ethical killing'. *Security Dialogue, 47*(1), 59–75.
Show, I. G. R. (2017). Robot wars: US empire and geopolitics in the robotic age. *Security Dialogue, 48*(5), 451–470.
Walker, C. (2011). *Terrorism and the law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zając, J. (2005). Koncepcja polityki zagranicznej USA po zimnej wojnie. In J. Zając (Ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna USA o zimnej wojnie* (pp. 15–32). Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
Zięba, A. (2017). Systemy antyterrorystyczne Federacji Rosyjskiej i Republiki Litewskiej. *Studia Politologiczne, 43,* 266–294.
Zięba, R. (2013). *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Chapter 6
The West's Dominance and Expansion and Russia's Response

1 The Promotion of Democracy by the West

In the current century, the western countries and their international institutions have continued their policy of promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and a market economy in the former communist countries of the eastern part of Europe. This policy is based in the democratic systems of the western countries and their liberal ideology, which presupposes that their fundamental values should be accepted by all European countries and the distant region of Central Asia. We can see here the idea expressed by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, at the beginning of the post-Cold-War era, about the 'end of history' after the fall of communism and the arrival of an era of democratic capitalism and liberal ideology.[1] Such views were put to the test in the countries undergoing transformation in the eastern part of Europe, where populist, nationalist, and conservative concepts and opinions appeared. The outstanding German sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf even sensed the specter of authoritarianism and dictatorship in post-communist Europe.[2] Such trends emerged in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Belarus, and even, to a lesser degree, in Poland in the first half of the 1990s. A rebirth began after 2004, when some of these countries joined the European Union. Then populist, conservative, and nationalist tendencies grew in the policies of the Visegrad Group, in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. In the current century, the most important thing for the West was to promote democracy in the countries lying in the Western Balkans and in the post-Soviet area.

The western countries, which have group organizations in the form of NATO and the EU at their disposal, consider that the basis for lasting peace rests on democratic political systems, respect for human rights, and market economies. The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states that its signatories will protect freedom, and the common heritage and civilizational achievements of their nations, based on

[1]Fukuyama (1992).
[2]Dahrendorf (1990).

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_6

the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law. In adopting the policy of expanding to the east, the western countries declared that they intended to extend the sphere of stability and democracy in Europe. The European Union acted on the conviction underlying the integration process in severely war-torn Europe at the beginning of the 1950s—that economic integration is of key importance for ensuring peace. Then a catalog of democratic norms and values was added as a pre-condition for that peace. After the Cold War, the EU adopted the concept of 'Wider Europe,' which it began to implement by concluding with its eastern neighbors association arrangements that led to the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, and to the admission of new members. At the basis of this policy lies the principle of conditionality, which assumes that the EU offers its partners specific advantages in exchange for the fulfillment of the political and economic criteria that lead to ensuring democracy and a market economy.[3] The so-called Copenhagen criteria were formulated for the countries of Central Europe, and other candidates for membership in the EU. They are contained in the following statement of the European Council in June 1993:

> Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.[4]

These criteria clearly state the political and economic conditions that candidate states had to meet in order to join the Community. The policy also assumes the construction of a community of security, on the model proposed in 1957 by Karl Deutsch.

The EU has at its disposal several instruments for the promotion of democracy. These include development aid, 'general' cooperation with external entities and the financing of projects within the framework of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and political and economic sanctions against the elites of third countries.[5] The EU makes use of these instruments in its external, bilateral, and multilateral relations with third countries. In actuality, the EU exports its values, promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law through involvement in the prevention of conflict, reaction to crises, building or reconstructing peace after conflicts, and this second group of activities is consistent with the EU's identity as a 'civilian power,' as it is defined by its peaceful means of managing crises, multilateralism, and concern for the observation of international law.[6]

---

[3]The subject literature distinguishes four models of promoting democracy: (a) compulsion, (b) conditionality, (c) persuasion, and (d) socialization. For more, see Beichelt (2012).

[4]European Council in Copenhagen (1993), p. 13.

[5]Kotzian et al. (2011), p. 998.

[6]Börzel and Risse (2009), pp. 6–36.

The United States uses similar instruments, even if a clear preference for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries can be observed. Since the beginning of the 1990s the promotion of democracy has been among the primary goals of its foreign policy concepts and it connects these aims with its own national security. As G.W. Bush recalled in his memoirs, in the 'Bush Doctrine' formulated after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, one of the activities to ensure the security of the US was supposed to be the promotion of 'liberty and hope' as an alternative to the enemy ideology of 'repression and fear' (in connection with the 'war on terror'). The goal was announced as part of the 'freedom agenda' to support 'inexperienced democratic governments' (for instance, in Palestine, Lebanon, Georgia, and Ukraine), as well as dissidents, and democratic reforms in countries under 'repressive regimes'—Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Venezuela.[7] On this basis, the United States conducted a policy of 'regime change,' along the lines set out by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think-tank established in 1997. This was not a novelty in American strategy, as this policy had been practiced in the preceding decades, using the CIA to subvert governments that the US found uncomfortable in a number of countries, particularly in Latin America.

The Brazilian researcher Luis Alberto de Vianna Moniz Bandeira points out that the policy of regime change implemented by President George W. Bush was inspired by the strategy of 'non-violent struggle' elaborated by Professor Gene Sharp,[8] whose publications explain the uses of the non-violent struggle and subversion strategy. He writes that non-violent struggle is conducted by civil society through various means, but protests organized by democratic forces need financial and informational support from abroad, and, in addition, diplomatic sanctions against authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. His main work, a long essay entitled *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, was originally published in 1993 in Thailand (for distribution among Burmese dissidents). It has been updated many times, translated into more than 30 languages, and disseminated around the entire world. Institutions participating in the realization of American strategy, such as Freedom House, the Open Society Institute, the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the CIA, were involved. The book served as a manual for organizing the 'color revolutions' in former communist states and then to inspire and support the Arab Spring. The implementation of Gene Sharp's 'subversion strategy' led to

[7]Bush (2010), pp. 323–324.

[8]Gene Sharp has been a professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth since 1972. In 1983 he founded the Albert Einstein Institution, a non-profit organization devoted to studying and promoting the use of nonviolent action in conflicts worldwide. The AEI has received funding between others from the International Republican Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy. From 1970s Sharp has developed the theory of nonviolent resistance and conflicts. His main book is *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. London: Serpent's Tail (2012).

rebellions, revolutions, and popular uprisings, which in their majority remained on the border of legality, without recourse to violence, at least on a large scale.

Moniz Bandeira explains that in regard to the post-Soviet areas, American economic interests lay behind these American instruments for the promotion of democracy:

> Washington believed the transport of oil and gas over Russian territory made western markets vulnerable. As long as Russia appeared to be the main rival of the US, therefore, problems should be avoided by commanding oil reserves and their transport routes. This became the fundamental geopolitical goal and it had to be ensured by controlling the countries that used to belong to the Soviet Union through the installation of pro-western regimes. And the United States employed more than military assistance to win them over. They deployed their 'export of democracy' policy through the NED [The National Endowment for Democracy], CIA and such civil entities as Freedom House, USAID, the Open Society Institute (renamed Open Society Foundations [OSF] in 2011), created by mega-investor George Soros, and other non-governmental organizations. They served as a front to promote regime change policies without a coup.[9]

One important international institution created by the Western states is the Community of Democracies, which was established during a ministerial conference in Warsaw in June 2000. It is a global intergovernmental coalition of democratic states, whose aim is to promote democracy and to strengthen democratic norms and institutions around the world. The idea for the conference came from Poland's then minister of foreign affairs, Bronisław Geremek, and the US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright. The Community of Democracies is based on the declaration *Toward a Community of Democracies* signed by the representatives of 106 countries. The Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies has headquarters in Warsaw.

Specific projects serving to support democratic reforms and the development of civil society, including in the post-Soviet countries, are agreed upon within the framework of the Community of Democracies. Poland has been very much engaged in the post-Soviet area in this respect, and in March 2011, the Polish-American Democracy Dialogue was established. Poland tries to pass on its experience of more than twenty years of systemic transformation and even brought about the creation, in March 2013, of the European Endowment for Democracy, which is supposed to support democratic reforms and the construction of civil society in the entire EU neighborhood.

Moreover, to promote democracy Western countries use international organizations of which they are members, like the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the International Monetary Fund and numerous non-governmental organizations.[10]

[9]Moniz Bandeira (2015), pp. 42, 46.

[10]Włodkowska-Bagan (2013), p. 148.

1.1 The Western Balkans

On important group at which the West's policies for promoting democracy are addressed is the group of countries that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia and Albania. The EU is interested in stabilizing these countries, which in the 1990s were submerged in civil wars. Although the wars ended with the peace agreements in Dayton in 1995 and other final agreements of NATO's intervention in 1999, that part of Europe has remained 'the Balkan furnace,' which could explode given the right conditions. The UN, OSCE, and EU have combined to 'build peace after conflict' in these countries and, as the best path to the end, they have chosen to strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions there. With the participation of international donors, they have also engaged in reconstructing the economy on a market basis. This is a particularly important task for the EU, as these countries neighbor on it and have aspirations to join it.

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), inaugurated in 1999, have served this purpose. The aim of the latter is primarily the integration of these countries with the EU. In accord with the EU's principle of conditionality, the progress achieved in political and economic reforms by specific Balkan countries is rewarded by the conclusion of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA). The main trait of the agreements is to bind the signatories to conclude agreements on regional cooperation and to create free trade areas between them. On November 24, 2000, a summit of the leaders of EU countries and the West Balkans was held in Zagreb. It was decided to organize regular meetings at the ministerial level between the EU and the countries participating in the SAP, and to initiate a program of technical and financial help (CARDS—Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) for the years 2001–2006. This program was replaced in 2007 by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). The summit also gave rise to the beginning of the 'Zagreb Process' in 2002, with the aim of strengthening the mechanisms of political dialogue and regional cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan states. Consequently, in May 2003, the European Commission initiated the New European Integration Partnerships for the Western Balkans. In this manner it was confirmed that the SAP would remain the main institutional forum for EU cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans and that there would be a gradual adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, cooperation in regard to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, internal affairs, and the justice system, and increasing participation in various EU programs (particularly in regard to education).[11]

Progress in the democratization of the countries of the Western Balkans was recognized by the European Commission, which on March 26, 2003 proposed eventual accession to the EU to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. In May

[11]For more, see Zięba (2007), pp. 148–156, Drygiel-Bielińska (2016), pp. 161–167.

2003 new European Integration Partnerships for the Western Balkans were initiated, and in June 2003 at a meeting in Thessaloniki the European Council reaffirmed that all SAP countries were potential candidates for EU membership. Since May 2007, the Stability Pact has been part of the framework of the broader South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) set up in the previous year, and since February 2008 its activities have been continued by the Regional Cooperation Council. Its financing is divided in thirds between the EU, the countries of the region, and external donors.

In its policy toward the Western Balkans the EU undertakes several parallel activities in regard to promoting democracy and the rule of law, aiding market reforms and economic development, and encouraging the countries of the whole Balkan region (including Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) to develop regional and trans-regional cooperation. In March 2008 the European Commission adopted a program entitled *The Western Balkans: Enhancing the Balkan Perspective* [SEC (2008) 288].

The first Balkan country to accede to the European Union was Slovenia, on May 1, 2004; Bulgaria and Romania, which had negotiated together with the countries of Central Europe, joined on January 1, 2007. Of the post-Yugoslav countries, Croatia was admitted to the EU only on July 1, 2013. The negotiations for Croatia's accession showed what difficult problems that country had to solve as a result of its war of independence.

The negotiations conducted with Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey are also difficult. Other candidate countries are Albania, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, which have the status of potential candidate countries. The Copenhagen criteria, which have had to be met by all the candidate countries till this time, are applied by the EU to the countries of this region as well.

As can be seen, these are high standards that are difficult to attain for the countries of the Western Balkans aspiring to join the EU. Thus the EU—and the Western states in general—are devoting a great deal of attention to this region. In the current century, it is chiefly a matter of strengthening democracy in those countries; this, together with the prospect of their acceptance to the EU, provides a chance for the stabilization of the region, which was so badly damaged by wars of an ethnic nature in the last decade of the 20th century. It also has to be admitted that the EU's policy in the Western Balkans is generally not contested by other European countries. The exception was the United States' and EU countries' recognition of Kosovo's independence, which was formally announced in February 2008. Russia decidedly condemned this step, and then considered it a precedence justifying its recognition in August 2008 of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had broken away from Georgia in the 1990s, and also its annexation of Crimea in March 2014.

The United States has purely political goals, without any further-reaching promises of economic support, for the countries of the Western Balkans. The US wants to expand its political influence and drive out Russia's influence. After the collapse of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) began to help the democratic movements in Serbia,

Montenegro, and Kosovo. As Moniz Bandeira writes, from September 1998, the NED allocated large sums of money to finance the newly created student opposition organization Otpor! (Resistance!), and around 3 million USD were handed out in Serbia. The NED acted in concert with the Soros Foundation and several European foundations. It concentrated on financing independent media, human rights organizations, NGOs, various think tanks, trade unions, and so forth. In 1999 the Otpor! management received several hundred thousand USD from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and 1.8 million USD from the International Republican Institute (IRI). During the 18 months preceding Milošević's fall, the EU and US expended approximately 80 million USD in the country. The multimillionaire George Soros invested a total of 100 million USD in Yugoslavia after 1991 to finance the movement against Milošević, including the Otpor! groupings. Moreover, when the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was set up after the Serbian forces were driven out of the province by the bombardment of the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Soros invested a further 50 million USD to purchase the mining complex of Trepca, a conglomerate of around 40 mines and factories, the majority of which were located in Kosovo, and which had been appraised as high as 5 billion USD.[12]

Supported by large amounts of money, America's engagement, which is presented here in brief, brought about the overthrow of Milošević's regime in Serbia. At the beginning of October 2000 a group of workers who had entered Belgrade on bulldozers began demonstrations, which, attended by many thousands, ended in the protestors charging the Parliament building. On account of this event, the change of regime in Serbia is called the Bulldozer Revolution (*Bager revolucija*).

1.2 The Countries of the Former Soviet Union

The West's political, logistical, and financial support for democratic forces in the post-Soviet countries was resisted not only by post-communist forces and local oligarchies, but also by Russia, which feared the West's interference in its domestic affairs, and the loss of its sphere of influence in other countries which had arisen from the ruins of the USSR, particularly the countries that had joined the Commonwealth of Independent States at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover Russia, as the successor of the USSR, undoubtedly had psychological difficulties with being a 'fallen power,' and thus it was very sensitive to actions of other countries that could threaten its sovereignty.

The EU, since the time of its expansion in 2004, has divided the CIS countries into three categories in regard to policy. The first category was Russia, as a special strategic partner; the second, the countries encompassed by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) announced in June 2004, and by the Eastern

[12]Moniz Bandeira (2015), pp. 24–25.

Partnership of 2009; and third, the countries of Central Asia.[13] The main instruments of the EU's policy toward all the post-Soviet countries are agreements of partnership and cooperation.[14] These are so-called third-generation agreements, combining development aid with clauses referring to respect for human rights and thus 'hooking onto' issues addressed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 2014, the EU signed new association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova; the agreements also establishes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

The EU's most important partner in the post-Soviet area is the Russian Federation.[15] In June 1994, the EU signed a 10-year agreement on partnership and cooperation with Russia which came into force on December 1, 1997. After ten years, an unsuccessful attempt was made to extend the agreement, but it remained in force. New clauses on cooperation in the areas of the rule of law and human rights were thus not introduced. This turned out to be advantageous for Russia, when in the following decade its political system began to evolve in the direction of 'sovereign democracy,' questioning Western democratic standards.

In June 1999, at a summit in Cologne, the leaders of the Fifteen announced the first ever common EU strategy, which was addressed to Russia. The document stated, among other things, that the EU's strategic aims in regard to Russia are:

- a stable, open, and pluralist democracy in Russia, governed on the basis of law and supporting a developing market economy, which will bring benefits both to the Russian nation and to the European Union;
- maintenance of stability in Europe, promotion of global security, and meeting common challenges on the continent through intensifying cooperation with Russia.

The common strategy defined the bilateral aims of cooperation and also called for the drafting of common initiatives with Russia in regard to third countries and regions in matters of preventive diplomacy and the resolution of crises, particularly in the neighborhood of Russia, in the Balkans, and in the Middle East. In this manner, the partnership program with Russia was extended to all three pillars of the EU.[16] The development of transborder and regional cooperation was also declared within the framework of the EU's Northern Dimension, established in December 1999.[17] The common strategy was projected for four years; in June 2003 it was extended by another year (to June 24, 2004), after which it ceased to be valid.

[13]From the outset, the EU treated the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, former Soviet republics, as being part of Central Europe. They were admitted into the EU on May 1, 2004.

[14]See Hillion (1998).

[15]For more on the subject of EU-Russia relations, see Bryc (2004), pp. 76–78, 116–125, 172–174, de Wilde and Spetschinsky (2000).

[16]Common Strategy of the European Union … (1999), pp. 1–9.

[17]For more, see Ojanen (2000), Myrjord (2003).

In the meanwhile the emphasis in relations between the EU and Russia shifted to the 'common areas' agreed upon in May 2003, which involved questions of freedom, education, and culture, in connection with the promotion of democracy. In practice, there were difficulties in implementing the ambitious agreements that had been signed.

In spite of the officially implemented strategic partnership in relations between the EU and Russia, there has never been a lack of contentious issues. As a Swedish scholar writes, the partnership between the EU and Russia was never either strategic, or real, and the two sides were at odds about problems in the areas of security, trade, and energy.[18] From the beginning of the 21st century, the development of Russia's political situation, which is based on centralization of power, limitations on freedom of the press, and restrictions on the actions of non-governmental organizations, has evoked the dissatisfaction and criticism of certain EU member states. Criticized since the 1990s for its bloody suppression of separatism in Chechnya, Moscow claims that the conflict is its internal affair, and its use of brutal pacification methods fit within the context of fighting terrorism, while its political system has the democratic nature that suits Russia's specific conditions.

The US became strongly engaged in promoting democracy and regime change in the post-Soviet states, using for this purpose institutions connected with the State Department, non-governmental organizations, and the media. As Moniz Bandeira writes, after the departure of the Clinton administration, the Pentagon gave the role of key player in this neo-containment policy to Georgia. The aim was to prevent, once again, Russia's domination in the Caucasus region.[19] The Rose Revolution of November 2003 removed President Eduard Shevardnadze from power, and placed Mikheil Saakashvili as the Georgian head of state.[20] Later, after tensions arose with the separatists of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the new president of Georgia, urged on by the US, insisted on that country's admission to NATO.

A year after the political turnaround in Georgia, at the turn of the years 2004–2005, the Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine. This revolution, which was supported by US advisers and financiers, brought about a change in the authorities, including the election of the pro-West politician Viktor Yushchenko to be president of Ukraine. As Moniz Bandeira writes:

> It is therefore no secret that the Pentagon invested millions to encourage 'color revolutions' in the region of the defunct USSR to surround Russia. They did this through the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), the State Department and various non-governmental organizations, including Freedom House, […] and the National Endowment for Democracy, […]. Ukraine was turned into a geostrategic issue not because of Moscow, but because of the United States, which […] refused to abandon its Cold War practice of encircling Russia and pulling all former Soviet republics to its side. Located between Russia and the new NATO members Poland,

[18]Schmidt-Feltzmann (2016), pp. 99–103.

[19]Moniz Bandeira (2015), p. 47.

[20]More see Stent (2014), pp. 103–110.

> Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, Ukraine really gained an enormous geostrategic significance to the United States.[21]

Another operation supported by the US to change a regime from a pro-Moscow one to a pro-Western one was the Tulip Revolution in Kirgizstan in March 2005. After parliamentary elections were won by the party of the then president, Askar Akayev, there were claims that the election results had been falsified. The opposition forces, led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, took control. The leading role in inspiring and directing this non-violent revolution was played by NGOs such as the Coalition for Democracy, Civil Society, Kel-Kel, and Birge; the revolution was supported by financing from George Soros's Open Society. Funds from that foundation were transferred to Kirgizstan by the intermediary of the NGO Civil Society Against Corruption, whose leader, Tolekan Ismailova, recommended the translation of Gene Sharp's revolutionary manual, which had been used earlier in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and later in the Arab Spring.[22]

On the other hand, in governing circles in Russia, the opinion is held that the country has justified interests in the 'near abroad,' which is understood to be primarily the countries that at the beginning of the 1990s joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia thus perceives attempts to democratize these countries as attempts to draw them into the West's sphere of influence. The aspirations of these societies—for instance, in Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova—are ignored, and Russia views the West's support for democratic forces through the prism of *Realpolitik*: as an expression of the West's desire to increase its reach. Democratic forces are most often perceived as having been instigated by the West, as foreign agents, as being guided by liberal illusions, or as nationalist or even fascist groups (in Georgia and in Ukraine). Thus Russia tries to realize a strategy of isolating the post-Soviet countries from Western influences and the democratic standards promoted by the EU, US, and other entities, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Russia counters the West's standards with the idea of 'sovereign democracy,'[23] which President Putin's deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov defined as "a form of the political life of a society in which the authorities, their bodies and actions are selected, formed and directed exclusively by the Russian nation in all its diversity and integrity for the sake of achieving material well-being, freedom and justice by all citizens, social groups and nationalities that forming it"[24].

In 2004, Russia refused to participate in the European Neighborhood Policy, expecting distinct treatment and wishing to avoid a situation in which it was considered equal with the EU's other neighbors. In addition Moscow perceived the ENP as a challenge to the domination of Russian influence in the western part of the CIS and the Southern Caucasus, as expressed in Russia's clear criticism of the program in the first months after its proclamation by the EU. The most important

[21]Moniz Bandeira (2015), p. 50.

[22]Ibidem, p. 52.

[23]Stent (2014), p. 142, Ambrosio (2009), pp. 45–72, Jahn (2012), pp. 110–111.

[24]Surkov (2006).

source of tension was the different approach of the two sides to the 'color revolutions' in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kirgizstan. Russia viewed the democratic movements in the former Soviet republics with deep suspicion, considering that they were arranged by the USA and its European allies for the purpose of installing pro-Western regimes in Russia's legitimate sphere of influence. In Russian thinking, the aim of the 'color revolutions' was to limit Russian influence under the cover of promoting democracy, and these revolutions constituted a direct threat to Russia's ability to project power.[25] Observation of the emerging difficulties and disputes between the EU and Russia have inclined certain authors to opine that many of the political agreements concluded between the sides are solely of a declarative nature and do not imply real activities.[26] A general clash between the EU and Russia occurred during the Ukraine crisis. Then it emerged that the EU—as Richard Sakwa claims—has a concept of 'Wider Europe,' while Russia has the idea of a 'Greater Europe,' which consists in building a loose Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, with traditional centers of influence in Brussels, Moscow, and Ankara.[27] During the Ukraine crisis it became clear just how different the EU's and Russia's perceptions and visions were.[28]

It is worth noting that the West also gave strong support to democratic forces in Belarus, which has been under the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenka since 1994. In the autumn of 1996 the first serious crisis arose in Belarus. After a favorable referendum on November 24, Lukashenka arranged the extension of his own term by a year and a half and the removal of opposition deputies from parliament. The political opposition in Belarus was eliminated from state organs, and Lukashenka's regime embarked on the open restriction of civil rights. This caused considerable anxiety, including in Poland, which was also worried about the approximately 300,000 Poles living in Belarus. Then Warsaw decided to conduct a clearer policy in the region; on November 20, 1996, the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania made their first joint declaration. It was directed at the authorities of Belarus and was an appeal to resolve the political crisis by constitutional means and to respect civil rights and democratic freedoms, in accord with international standards. Belarus rejected the declaration as interference in its internal affairs. Russia also criticized the declaration. The Western countries did not recognize the referendum to change Belarus's constitution, due to the violations of democratic standards that had occurred.[29]

In June 1998 relations between Belarus, the EU countries, and the US were severely strained, after the Belarus authorities ordered the diplomats of the Western countries to leave the Drozdy settlement (under pretext of a planned renovation). The Western ambassadors left Belarus, and the EU and USA imposed sanctions on

[25]Wilson (2010), Tsygankov (2013), pp. 160–161, Becker et al. (2016), p. 120.

[26]Forsberg (2004).

[27]Sakwa (2015), p. 26.

[28]Riecker and Lundby Gjerde (2016), pp. 305–306.

[29]Zięba (2013), p. 242.

the country, consisting in a prohibition against Belarusian state functionaries entering EU or US territory.[30]

The US, like the EU, reacted negatively to the coup d'état in Belarus when, in the fall of 2004, Alexander Lukashenka dissolved parliament and held a referendum that opened the way for him to have a third term. At the same time, the Belarusian authorities began to suppress the political opposition. The EU criticized the move and imposed personal sanctions on representatives of the Belarusian regime. The US Congress passed the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, in which the anti-democratic moves of the Belarusian authorities were condemned and visa restrictions were announced against the country's high officials, with a ban on working with them, and support for Belarusian civil society.[31]

In April 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, at a session of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius, gave a clear answer to the questions "first, is the United States supporting regime change in Belarus? And second, will the United States support the demonstration route as opposed to elections, which they feel will be neither free nor fair?" by answering, "Well, what we talked about was several ways that we could support these efforts in Belarus," and adding "we will support the idea that elections, when they are held, should be real elections. They should not be sham elections and the international community ought to be prepared and ready to help Belarus to carry out free and fair elections in 2006."[32] The last remark could be applied to the elections of March 19, 2006, which according to the official results were won by Alexander Lukashenka with 82.6% of the votes, making him president for a third term.

The US secretary of state used to describe Belarus as one of the world's 'guardians of tyranny' and as 'the last true dictatorship in Central Europe,' placing the country in a group with Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe.[33] In June 2006, the US administration announced outright that the last presidential elections in Belarus had been falsified and as such constituted a threat to the security of the USA. On December 8, 2006, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution entitled the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006, in which it mentioned the failures of the Republic of Belarus, condemned the authorities in Minsk for violating the principles of democracy and human rights, defined the nature and extent of American aid to active civil society in Belarus, and set forth economic and visa sanctions for the Belarus authorities.[34] In the years 2007–2008, the diplomats of both countries were expelled after being recognized as

[30]Poland did not join in these measures, and the recalled Polish ambassador returned to Minsk as early as January 1999.

[31]The Belarus Democracy Act (2004).

[32]Press Availability at the NATO Ministerial … (2005).

[33]See Rice: Belarus is 'dictatorship' … (2005), Rice calls for change … (2005).

[34]Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act (2006).

personae non grata.[35] The Belarus authorities rejected the criticisms of the US and EU and pointed out that they amounted to interference in Belarus's internal affairs, with the intention of destabilizing the country as in the case of the 'color revolutions,' particularly in Georgia and Ukraine. The same appraisal was made by Russia's leadership, which supported the authoritarian powers in Belarus.[36]

Barack Obama's administration also engaged in promoting democracy in the post-Soviet countries. For example, in December 2011, the House of Representatives passed the Democracy and Human Rights Act, which condemned the manner in which presidential elections were conducted in Belarus in December 2010, and demanded the release of all political prisoners and the ensuring of media freedom. It also maintained visa sanctions against the Belarus authorities.[37]

The EU and the US were especially strongly engaged in supporting a pro-Western course in Ukraine. This could be observed during the Orange Revolution in that country at the turn of 2004–2005.[38] The West became involved in Ukraine with even greater determination after the beginning of street demonstrations against the regime of Viktor Yanukovych in the fall of 2013. This issue will be discussed in Chap. 9.

2 Further NATO Expansion

In keeping with the arrangements at the NATO Jubilee summit in Washington in April 1999, the Alliance implemented an 'open door' policy for the countries of Central Europe seeking to gain membership, including the Balkan countries. The three-year Membership Action Plan (MAP) was a fundamental element of the preparations for NATO enlargement. Gradually the idea of a broader expansion became clear; the opponents of such a step did not make any serious efforts to prevent it, and the member countries refrained from public pronouncements as to which of the nine candidates mentioned in the declaration of the Washington summit would receive invitations. There weren't any disputes between the states of the 19 in regard to the candidates, as had happened before the Madrid summit in 1997. A further element favoring successive expansion was the political and institutional breakthrough in relations between NATO and Russia that had been under way since autumn 2001, although Moscow continued to take a negative view of the Alliance's preparations to expand. Moscow argued that its security was

[35]Czachor (2011), p. 245.

[36]Ambrosio (2009), pp. 105–109.

[37]Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act (2011).

[38]This question was examined in many other publications. For example, see Wilson (2005), Kuzio (2006), Stent (2014), pp. 110–116.

weakened by the Alliance's approach to its borders,[39] and also feared the dissemination of democratic values that accompanied NATO expansion.[40]

Important political decisions in regard to the following post-Cold War round of expansion were taken at a summit in Prague on November 21–22, 2002. At this summit, the heads of the 19 member states decided to invite seven countries, that is, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, into the Alliance. The candidacies of Albania and Macedonia were not accepted, nor of Croatia, which had been participating in the MAP for a couple of months. The accession talks lasted only a short time and on March 26, 2003 the accession protocols were signed. In accord with the schedule, the expansion was quickly ratified and on March 29, 2004, NATO was admitted the seven above-mentioned countries.

The heads of state who decided in Prague on a large NATO enlargement considered that it would increase the Alliance's territorial reach and strengthen it politically. The traditional argument about expanding the area of stability and security in Europe and the whole Euro-Atlantic area—which is not threatened by any country—was raised.[41] At the same time, the enlargement strengthened the US's political role in NATO—as was shown by the behavior of the new allies during the trans-Atlantic disputes over the Iraq intervention—and made it easier for the US to oppose 'new Europe' (the countries acceding to the EU) to 'old Europe' (the countries belonging to the EU), as was done in 2002 by the US secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld. From a military standpoint, the Alliance did not gain much, as the newly members did not have new capabilities either in terms of defense or in terms of the potential to conduct rapid response operations, and in addition, they had to make great efforts to become inter-operational with the Alliance. Politically, however, it was a major decision, as the three Baltic republics, which had been part of the USSR in the years 1940–1990, were accepted. In Moscow, this was viewed as another large and dangerous step by NATO toward Russia's borders. A resolution adopted on March 31, 2004 by the lower house of parliament, the Duma, said that NATO's move eastwards contradicted a pledge to enhance the alliance's co-operation with Russia in counterterrorism, peacekeeping and other areas contained in an agreement signed in 2002. It also warned that Russia may revise a promise to limit troop numbers in its Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, and the North-Western Pskov region near Estonia, if NATO tried to change the military-political balance in the whole region. The Duma said it would also recommend that the government strengthen Russia's nuclear deterrent and consider the deployment of additional troops on the country's western borders.[42]

---

[39]Incidentally, Moscow forced the candidates for NATO membership which neighbored on it (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) to join the CFE Treaty, and these countries submitted the appropriate declarations.

[40]Ambrosio (2009), pp. 151–155.

[41]The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation … (2003), p. 20.

[42]Russia Condemns NATO's Expansion (2004), Alexeev (2004), pp. 2–4.

After the 'color revolutions' in Georgia in November 2003 and in Ukraine at the turn of 2004 to 2005, power in these countries was taken by pro-Western forces, which set the course for accession to NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance announced outright its support for their aspirations and offered these post-Soviet countries special relations. On April 21, 2005 the North Atlantic Council suggested to Ukraine that it could begin an 'Intensified Dialogue' on its aspirations to membership and relevant reforms, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. A similar step was taken with regard to Georgia on September 21, 2006. However, neither country was offered the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

The NATO summit organized in Riga at the end of November 2006 had a symbolic dimension, as a dozen or so years earlier Latvia had been a part of the USSR. At the Riga summit the decision was made to continue the enlargement of the Alliance. It was also announced that three countries with a MAP, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, would be invited to join at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia were invited to join the Partnership for Peace. At the next summit, in Bucharest at the beginning of April 2008, NATO invited Albania and Croatia to join, but not Macedonia, on account of its dispute with Greece over its name. The Alliance did not offer the MAP either to Georgia or to Ukraine because of the opposition of France and Germany, in spite of the strong support of the USA and Poland. At the request of these latter two countries, the final declaration of the summit stated that Georgia and Ukraine would be accepted in the future to the Alliance. NATO's 'open door' policy for 'European democracies' was reiterated. On NATO's 60th anniversary, on April 1, 2009, Albania and Croatia were officially admitted to the Alliance. Montenegro joined a few years later, on June 5, 2017.

This chronicle of enlargement shows that in spite of the declaration at the Bucharest summit, after 2004, when Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were admitted into NATO, the Alliance's extension to successive post-Soviet countries was halted. This was connected, above all, with the objections of Russia, which since Vladimir Putin's famous speech at the Munich security conference in February 2007, had opposed the West's expansion policy, and in August of the following year Russia had very forcefully resisted the Georgian attack on its peace-keeping troops stationed in Southern Ossetia. NATO's expansion thus went in the south-eastern direction toward the countries of the Western Balkans. From a strategic viewpoint this is advantageous for the West, as it gives it a bridgehead in the direction of Russia. It is also advantageous for stabilizing the Western Balkans, which in the 1990s were severely damaged by civil wars. Russia, on the other hand, views NATO expansion as a worsening of its position, although not as distinct a worsening as in the case of NATO's expansion in the post-Soviet republics. Generally, Moscow does not accept NATO's arguments about extending the zone of democracy and peace, but views the Alliance as a tool of power politics, in the sense of the realist paradigm. The accession of Montenegro to NATO in June 2017 also met with sharp criticism from Russia. When in April 2017 the parliament of Montenegro ratified the protocol for the country's accession to NATO, the Russian ministry of foreign affairs issued a declaration expressing its "deep regret" and

adding that "the country's current leadership and its Western sponsors ultimately failed to heed the voice of reason and conscience" and "openly flout all democratic norms and principles."[43] Moscow emphasized that given the strategic consequences of Montenegro's step Russia would take the necessary steps "to safeguard its interests and national security."[44] It can be expected that NATO will attempt to continue to expand to other countries in the Western Balkans and that this will bring condemnation from Russia. On the other hand, it does not seem likely that the Alliance will accept new members from among the post-Soviet states.[45]

In this situation, another possible direction for NATO enlargement would be the Nordic countries, that is, Sweden and Finland, as a result of the growing importance of the Baltic Sea region in connection with worsening relations with Russia after the Georgian war in 2008 and particularly after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2013. The US and its allies are motivated by concern about the vulnerability of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to Russian aggression. It is a matter of strengthening NATO's north-eastern flank, given the Western Military District and Russian deployments of advanced weapons systems to Kaliningrad oblast. In this context, the question of the potential accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO becomes important.[46]

Although they have neutral status, both countries already actively cooperate with NATO in many areas. This cooperation has been reinforced over the years since Finland and Sweden joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. These states are most active partners and valued contributors to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, only Sweden contributed to NATO's military operation in Libya in April 2011. Finland and Sweden participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF). The important priorities for cooperation is to develop military capabilities and maintain the ability of the Finish and Swedish armed forces to work with those of NATO and other partner countries in multinational peace-support operations. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up consultations and cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the Baltic region. Both countries actively support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, also Sweden hosts the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre. Finland plays a greatly valued role in training the forces of NATO partner countries by supporting several NATO-led Trust Fund projects aimed at promoting defense and security reform in partner countries.

In the current security context with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up cooperation with Finland and Sweden. This means

[43]Comment by the Information and Press Department … (2017).

[44]Ibidem.

[45]Compare German (2017).

[46]Shlapak and Johnson (2016), Chivvis (2017).

expanding exchanges of information on hybrid warfare, coordinating training and exercises, and developing better joint situational awareness to address common threats and develop joint actions, if needed. Both countries are participating in the process of defense and security sector reform, are contributing to the development of a new military crisis-management concept and the EU Battlegroup concept. Another major area of bilateral cooperation is civil emergency planning. The aim is for Finland and Sweden to be able to cooperate with NATO Allies in providing mutual support in dealing with the consequences of a major accident or disaster in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea, NATO's collaboration with Finland and Sweden has grown much closer. At the Wales Summit (September 2014), Finland and Sweden are identified as two of five countries (along with Australia, Jordan and Georgia) that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives, which will have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies (known as 'Enhanced Opportunities Partners').[47] Along with Finland and Sweden signed a memorandum of understanding on Host Nation Support, which addresses issues related to the provision of civil and military assistance to Allied forces located on, or in transit through, their territory in peacetime, crisis or war. The agreement was ratified by the Finnish parliament in 2015 and by Swedish parliament in 2016. On May 20, 2016 the Swedish foreign minister, Margot Wallstroem, and Finnish foreign minister, Timo Soini, have taken part in their first-ever NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels. Their participation was hailed as a sign that the two non-aligned countries are moving closer to the North Atlantic Alliance. As NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, "This illustrates both, the importance of NATO and EU cooperation and the vital role of Sweden and Finland on issues of common concern, such as hybrid threats and the security situation in the Baltic Sea".[48]

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw (July 2016), the Allies underline the importance of further strengthening cooperation with Finland and Sweden, including through regular political consultations, shared situational awareness, and joint exercises, in order to respond to common challenges in a timely and effective manner. Finnish President Sauli Niinistö joins Summit discussions on current security challenges in Europe and on sustaining support for Afghanistan. In November 2016 President Niinistö visits NATO HQ—the first Finnish President ever to do so—discussed with the Secretary General cover a wide range of issues, including the situation in the Baltic Sea region. In April 2017 in Helsinki was signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing a European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in the Finnish capital. Both Nordic countries frequently participate in military exercises organized by NATO.

NATO's increased cooperation with Helsinki and Stockholm has brought the question of the possible simultaneous accession to the Alliance of these countries

[47]Lété and Basagni (2016).

[48]Kirk (2016, May 20). Sweden and Finland Upgrade NATO Relations. *EU Observer*.

into political debates in Finland and Sweden, and it is also being discussed by experts.[49] Russia has repeatedly declared that this would be a hostile step towards it.[50] Although such an option does not appear to be near, it is nevertheless being taken into account, in spite of the expected serious crisis in relations with Russia that it would cause. More likely, and less risky, is increasingly close NATO military cooperation with these countries, without adopting the formal obligations resulting from membership in the Alliance, particularly art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the end, however, the opportunity to accede to NATO depends on the societies of Finland and Sweden, which are traditionally attached to their countries' policies of neutrality and peace. Around half of the populations of these countries are opposed to NATO membership. In a situation of confrontation between the West and Russia, the Finns and Swedes who identify with the West are open to closer cooperation with NATO, but they would prefer to avoid the choice, and it is very probable that if the opportunity to improve relations between the West and Russia arises, their openness of recent years to the NATO option would decrease.[51] The Finns and Swedes are proud and mutually dependent nations. They would decide themselves, through democratic procedures, about any simultaneous affiliation with NATO or maintenance of their non-alignment policies.[52] Public opinion polls in both countries show that supporters of NATO membership represent a clear minority.[53]

3 Strengthening NATO's Eastern Flank

In analyzing NATO's eastern policy from the perspective of political realism, particularly in Kenneth Waltz's version of neorealism and the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer, it should be noted that NATO's shift to a policy of strengthening its collective-defense function (art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), of continuing its military intervention in Afghanistan, and of militarily fortifying its eastern flank were not coincidental. At the turn of the century Waltz wrote that if an imbalance appears and one international actor has more strength than others, it becomes a potential danger to those others. Thus countries aim for equilibrium through a policy of balancing. This general view can be brought to bear on both NATO's and Russia's policies. NATO's expansion to the east must therefore produce the resistance and then countermeasures of Russia, which feels threatened. When Russia announced in 2007 that it would counteract such expansion (and in 2008 took military action to that effect—the war with Georgia), NATO's spread to

[49]Pedrotty (2016).
[50]Eriksson (2016).
[51]O'Hanlon (2017), p. 12.
[52]Compare Eellend (2016).
[53]Domisse (2016), pp. 4–5.

succeeding post-Soviet states (Georgia and Ukraine) was stopped, although NATO continued to expand in the Balkans (in accord with Mearsheimer's idea of offensive realism).

At the same time, Russia's objection to the Alliance's spread produced a growing sense of danger from the side of Moscow, particularly in the countries of Central Europe that had earlier been accepted to the Alliance. The Georgian-Russian war meant that the countries bordering Russia—and above all Poland and the Baltic countries—began to demand that NATO should concentrate on its basic function of collective defense as described in art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is worth remembering that since the beginning of the 1990s the Alliance engaged in rapid reaction operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, after which it began a war in Afghanistan. The accent was shifted to tasks beyond the Alliance's treaty obligations. During the presidency of George W. Bush, the US treated NATO instrumentally, as a tool useful—like its allies—for the intervention in Afghanistan (the 'toolbox approach'). NATO's importance as a guarantee of security for its member countries decreased, and the US unilaterally conducted NATO's security policy.

In the meanwhile, although NATO's security environment had evolved, its doctrine had remained unchanged from the time a new strategic concept had been adopted at the Washington summit in 1999. New challenges appeared, if only in the form of Russia's move to a policy of balancing, while NATO's infrastructure in the newly accepted countries was not consolidated, and no allied troops were stationed in those countries, in accord with the agreements in the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, signed in Paris on May 27, 1997.[54] There was also a lack of up-to-date contingency plans. During the financial and economic crisis in the years 2008–2011, the expenditures on armaments of most of the allies fell, and in 2016 among NATO allies only five countries—that is, Poland (since 2002), the USA, Great Britain, Greece, and Estonia—had observed the principle that defense expenditures should rise to constitute not less than 2% of the previous year's GDP.

The new foreign policy of US president Barack Obama enabled NATO to undertake work on a new strategic concept for the Alliance. At a summit in Kehl and Strasburg in April 2009, it was decided to create a group called 'the Wise Men Group,' under the leadership of the former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright. Poland, which was worried about Russia's adoption of a rigid stance toward the West, loudly articulated the expectations of the Central European allies. On the day before the NATO summit in Lisbon, Polish president Bronisław Komorowski gave an interview to *Gazeta Wyborcza* in which he insisted that the Alliance's defense function, as set forth in art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,

[54]*The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation* signed in Paris 27 May 1997 says: "NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."

should be confirmed, with a possible *casus foederis* extension on cyber-terrorist attacks. He said he wanted the balanced distribution and modernization of the Alliance's defensive infrastructure, including, (a) a guarantee that contingency plans would be updated (in the event that some threat or crisis appeared on Poland's borders)—he pointed out that Poland had received the first such plan in 2001; (b) further investment in NATO's defensive infrastructure on Polish territory; (c) completion of work undertaken at the beginning of the preceding decade to create a NATO rapid reaction force; and (d) joint exercises by NATO units—he argued that only these constituted a proper preparation for NATO's effective joint action in the case of necessity. He also spoke in favor of an 'intelligent' continuation of the crisis response operations and emphasized the old idea that NATO should be the foundation of the West's unity and of the USA's presence in Europe. He repeated support for the idea of NATO's further expansion, including to Ukraine and Georgia if they fulfilled the criteria for membership. However, Poland's stance in regard to the development of partnership between NATO and Russia was not clear. President Komorowski only said, "I believe that as advantageous changes occur in Russia, which could bring that country closer to the West, Russians themselves will not perceive a threat to their interests in such a development of the situation".[55]

On November 19, 2010, at the NATO summit in Lisbon, a new strategic concept was adopted. It set forth the aims of the Alliance for the next decade. One success of Poland and other countries on the Alliance's eastern flank was the inclusion of a solidarity clause (art. 5) and confirmation that NATO's main obligation was to maintain its capacity for collective territorial defense. At the same time, the allies supported the rationalization of NATO missions going beyond the dispositions of this article, that is, the intent to continue NATO's crisis management operations outside the Alliance's borders, combining political, military, and civilian means in a comprehensive approach, agreed upon and possibly implemented together with the Alliance's partners. They were also in favor of the idea that ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic zone should be based on a broad partnership network with countries and organizations around the globe, while "cooperation between NATO and Russia has strategic importance and contributes to a mutual sphere of peace, stability, and security," and that "the security of NATO and of Russia are intertwined".[56] The North Atlantic Alliance announced that it was determined to expand political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of common interest, including anti-missile defense; combating terrorism, narcotics, and piracy; and promoting international security in the wide sense. It was announced that the opportunities created by the NATO-Russia Council would be used for dialogue and joint activities (pt. 34). This second formulation was a serious challenge for Poland and simultaneously constituted a departure from the concept—launched by the Bush administration—of NATO as a global alliance and a 'toolbox' used for ad hoc

[55]See Sojusz z przyszłością … (2010).

[56]Active Engagement, Modern Defense … (2010).

coalitions formed by the US. Although Poland remained suspicious, it supported the proclamation of a new strategic partnership between NATO and the Russian Federation. The Lisbon document also declared NATO's continuation of its 'open door' policy.[57]

However, it should be clearly said that in spite of the inclusion of such formulations in NATO's new strategic concept, concerns still remained in regard to the dilemma of whether to enlarge the Alliance's defensive capacities or its functions that are more characteristic of a collective security organization. The countries on NATO's eastern flank were particularly interested in the former. If in addition, one were to take into consideration the continuation of NATO's open door policy as declared in the new concept, the problem deepened and gave rise to a fundamental question: would NATO still be an effective guarantor of the allies' security and defense?[58]

The challenge, particularly for the new NATO member states, was how to develop the partnership between NATO and Russia. The new members supported this postulate only in a general sense; its concretization required NATO to have a new strategic concept. Certain politicians from NATO countries wondered how to do this. In March 2010, the radical proposal was put forward by several German politicians (including former defense minister Volker Rühe) to admit Russia to NATO.[59] This caused some uneasiness in Poland,[60] which is sensitive to possible threats to its security that could originate from Russia.

The construction of an anti-missile shield in Europe is a particular kind of enterprise to strengthen defense. According to the plans of the Bush Administration, it was supposed to be a shield against ballistic missiles (supposedly Iranian) flying in the direction of US territory. Radar equipment to detect such missiles was supposed to be constructed in the Czech Republic, and an anti-missile battery was to be built in Poland, in Redzikowo near Słupsk, in Pomerania. Poland and the US signed an intergovernmental agreement on the matter on August 20, 2008; notably,

[57]Ibidem, pt. 27.

[58]More see Deni (2017), p. 7 *et seq*.

[59]In March 2010, a group of influential German politicians and generals spoke in favor of "NATO opening the door" for Russia. In their opinion, Russia's admission to NATO, and even the prospect of such admission, would greatly reinforce the North Atlantic Alliance. The article carried the signatures of former defense minister (under Helmut Kohl) Volker Rühe, former German ambassador in Poland Frank Elbe, and also of two generals: the former chairman of the NATO Military Commission Klaus Nauman, and Rear-Admiral Ulrich Weisser, who had been the head of the Planning Committee at the German defense ministry. See Ex-Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühe fordert Aufnahme Russlands in die NATO, *Der Spiegel*, November 6, 2010.

[60]Polish foreign policy shows a lack of consistency with regard to Russia and NATO's eastern policy. This can be seen, for example, in Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski's statement that Russia could be admitted to NATO in the future if Moscow would wish it. The Polish politician made this statement on March 30, 2009 in Toruń at the 4th Copernican Debate organized by the Nicolas Copernicus University.

Poland took this step a couple of weeks after the outbreak of the Georgian-Russian War, making use of the fear of Russia propagated by politicians and the media.[61] The American plans for the shield were not adequately prepared. This led to doubts among the allies, who feared that its introduction would lead to unnecessary internal divisions. Furthermore it was generating vigorous opposition on the part of Russia, which considered that it would be used to neutralize Russian missile potential. In September 2009, the new president of the USA, Barack Obama, gave up the idea of building such a shield. In exchange, the USA presented a new concept of anti-missile shield, which is supposed to be in the nature of an allied system and with major American input.

At the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 it was decided to build such a system in multiple stages. It is to be composed of a command component financed by all the allies and will combine intercepting missiles and sensors, which will be the property of individual NATO countries. The American contribution (European Phased Adaptive Approach—EPAA) is to be used to protect the NATO allies and countries of the Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia). The decision to make use of it will be taken by all the allies on a consensus basis. Originally, the EPAA concept had four stages:

- First—deployment by 2011 of Aegis class ships equipped with SM-3 IA missile interceptors in the Mediterranean Sea and the deployment of a AN-TPY-2 mobile radar in Turkey for the purpose of ensuring a point of defense for critical infrastructure and armies in Southeastern Europe against short-range (1000 km) and medium-range (1000–3000 km) ballistic missiles;
- Second—the dislocation in Romania by 2015 of a land version of the SM-3 IB sea-based system, and also a land-based one at the Deveselu facility (the so-called Aegis Ashore), and also very advanced radar systems, ensuring the defense of the majority of European areas against short-range (to 1000 km) and medium-range (1000–3000 km) missiles;
- Third—placement by 2018 of SM-3 IIA ground-based ballistic missile defense interceptors capable of protecting the entire NATO European territory from short-range, medium-range, and limitedly, medium-to-longer range missiles (3000–5500 km) in Romania and in Poland.
- Fourth—the installation in Poland by 2022 of the most modern, SM-3 IIB, strategic missiles which have not yet been produced. These missiles are to protect Europe (average range 3000–5500 km) and the USA (intercontinental missiles with a reach of over 5500 km).

At the following NATO summit in Chicago on May 20–21, 2012, the leaders of the 27 allied countries confirmed the decisions to dislocate an anti-ballistic defense system in Europe. They announced that the initial dislocation would take place in

[61]Looking through the prism of offensive realism, the Georgian-Russian War was the manifestation of rivalry between Russia and the USA for domination in the Southern Caucasus, and Russia chose the path of war to restore its domination in that region. See Karagiannis (2013).

December 2011 in European bases of AEGIS ships with a sea-based anti-ballistic system. They announced the continuation of the program, which could not thus be blocked by Russia. Another important NATO decision was to strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU. In this context NATO declared to work closely with the EU, to ensure that "announced allied initiative of Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing initiatives [from 2010] are complementary and mutually reinforcing."[62]

However, on March 15, 2013, the American secretary of defense, Chuck Hagel, announced that the US was abandoning the planned construction of the fourth (final) stage of the anti-missile shield. The decision was justified by budget limitations, technological delays, and above all the necessity of increased anti-missile protection against North Korean nuclear weapons.[63] The US decided to build 14 new interceptor launchers in Alaska, a new type base of this type in the contiguous USA, and super-modern radar in Japan. North Korea undoubtedly influenced these decisions by having earlier, in December 2012, used its own rockets to launch a satellite into orbit, and in February 2013 conducted its third, successful, underground nuclear test. The general conviction in Warsaw was that America's decision not to install in Poland a strategic anti-ballistic launcher which could shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) was the result of the USA's 'reset' of relations with Russia, as announced in 2009, and the shift of emphasis in US security policy. It was said that the US wanted to devote itself to the defense of its own territory and to pursue allied defense based on its own appraisals, and at the time these excluded Russia as a real strategic opponent.[64]

Poland accepted the new American offer of an anti-missile shield and agreed that it would participate in building the NATO anti-missile shield (EPAA) on the basis of an annex to the 2008 agreement, signed on July 3, 2010. Construction of elements of the shield, as a launcher of SM-3 IIA missiles, in Redzikowo near Słupsk was supposed to be finished by 2018. These interceptors were not only supposed to protect Poland's territory—in conjunction with the remaining elements of the EPAA in the Mediterranean Sea and in Romania—they will also be able to shield all the European member countries of NATO against the threat of missiles from the Middle East. The US bound itself, in exchange for Poland's agreement to accept an anti-missile shield, to the rotational stationing in Poland of Patriot batteries, which are to protect Poland against any eventual missile and aircraft attacks from

[62]Chicago Summit Declaration … (2012).

[63]Hagel (2013), Stent (2014), p. 229.

[64]Mention was also made in this context of the failure to maintain confidentiality during the bilateral meeting of presidents Obama and Medvedev, held on March 26, 2012 in Seoul. Behind the scenes of the summit, devoted to nuclear security, the microphones of TV cameras picked up words whispered a bit loudly by Obama: "This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility". "I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir [Putin]," answered Medvedev, also nearing the end of his term in office. See Reset tarczy … (2013).

abroad.[65] This arrangement was not satisfactory to Poland and on June 13, 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Poland and the USA. In its implementation from November 2012, instead of the above-mentioned anti-aircraft and anti-missile battery, US multi-role F-16 fighter jets, Hercules C-130 cargo aircraft, and 250 American service personnel were deployed in Poland on a rotational basis.[66] The U.S. Aviation Detachment was to be stationed quarterly for training purposes.

In reaction against the Russian Federation's increased defense spending and its measures to revise the international order in Europe, Poland's feelings of being threatened from the east grew. In 2012, on the initiative of the president, a program was devised to strengthen air defense and to build so-called counter-surprise capabilities. The point was to lessen Poland's susceptibility to a military attack by being able to withstand the first strikes and survive until NATO allies could arrive with effective military aid. This program was called the 'Komorowski doctrine.'[67]

At the same time, Poland sought to bring about permanent allied bases and soldiers on NATO's eastern flank. From November 2012, the US Aviation Detachment has been stationed in Łask, on the basis of a quarterly rotation. The detachment is composed of pilots, technicians, and specialists in logistics and communications. The Americans normally remain in Poland for around a month, and make joint flights over the entire country with Poles from various units of the Polish air force. Poland effectively took steps to increase the American military presence in the country after the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, in which Russia became militarily involved in the spring of 2014. Consequently, Poland obtained a small increase in the above-mentioned rotational presence of US and NATO personnel on its territory. Among other things, the US sent additional multipurpose F-16 planes (12), a single-time mission with AWACS long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and additional personnel (250 persons) to the airbase in Łask within the Aviation Detachment operation; the US also decided to extend the rotational military presence at that base. American and Polish F-16 and C-130 planes conduct joint training exercises at Lask, Krzesiny, and Powidz airbases, strengthening Poland's military cooperation and interoperability. The presence of a U.S. Av-Det in Poland also makes it possible for Poland to host other Allied Air Force elements and to serve as a regional hub for air training and multi-national exercises. Also Poland has expanded its long-term cooperation with the United States, particularly through the purchase of American equipment for the modernization of its armed forces.[68]

[65]The rotational stationing of members of the US Armed Forces in Poland for the purpose of training the Polish military was regulated on the basis of an agreement signed on December 11, 2009 about the status of US military personnel on Polish territory (SOFA).

[66]Zięba (2015), p. 14.

[67]Fryc (2014).

[68]For more, see Zając (2016), pp. 120–125.

The NATO summit in Newport, Wales on September 4–5, 2014 was important for the process of strengthening NATO's eastern flank. At the summit it was decided that NATO would maintain a permanent presence, and activities in the air, on the ground, and at sea, in the eastern part of the Alliance, on the basis of rotating forces. In order to facilitate the undertaking, NATO announced the establishment of appropriate command and control structures in the territories of the Alliance's eastern countries, the construction of infrastructure, the deployment of equipment, better intelligence cooperation within the Alliance, the updating of defense plans, and more frequent exercises.

The leaders of the member countries adopted a Readiness Action Plan and decided to strengthen the military presence on the eastern fringes of the Alliance. According to the final declaration of the summit, the Readiness Action Plan is also supposed to address specific threats connected with a so-called hybrid war, conducted with the aid of various military, paramilitary, and civilian means. The exercises conducted by the Alliance are to take into account threats connected with a hybrid war. The Alliance already has multinational NATO Response Forces, which combine land, air, and maritime forces with special operations forces. They can be deployed around the entire world for the purpose of collective defense or crisis management. In Newport, it was agreed to establish within the framework of these forces a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a 'spearhead' of several thousand soldiers, which will be able to respond immediately to threats and can be deployed very rapidly. The secretary general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stated that the VJTF is to be composed of several thousand soldiers. The Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania announced their readiness to accept these forces. The summit's final declaration also states that the readiness and command capacity of the Polish-Danish-German multinational North-East Corps in Szczecin will be raised and its role as a 'center of regional cooperation' will be increased. In Newport it was further announced that the Alliance's obligation of collective defense also encompasses attacks on cybernetic systems, and this means that defense against cyber-attacks has become part of NATO's main task, that is, collective defense. The NATO countries stated that they would reverse the tendency toward lesser military spending and would increase expenditures to the level of 2% of GDP within a decade. In Newport it was decided that NATO would allocate around 15 million euro in support for Ukraine, and also other funds from individual countries of the Alliance within the framework of bilateral agreements. This support was to concentrate on such areas as cyber-security, logistics, leadership structures, control, and communications, and also on the rehabilitation of veterans. It was recognized that as an alliance NATO could not provide Ukraine with military equipment, but that individual member countries could do so.[69]

The next summit of NATO leaders, in Warsaw on July 8–9, 2016, addressed the concretization and extension of the decision to strengthen NATO's eastern flank. During the summit, it was decided to establish an enhanced forward presence

[69]Wales Summit Declaration … (2014).

(eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to unambiguously demonstrate "Allies' solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression."[70] NATO leaders let it be known that four battalions would be deployed in Poland and the Baltic countries on a rotational basis. It was decided that the US would be the framework country of the battalion in Poland, Canada of the one in Latvia, Germany of the one in Lithuania, and Great Britain of the one in Estonia. During the Warsaw Summit, it was further resolved to develop tailored forward presence (tFP) in the Black Sea region and to include the Romanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade.[71]

As a result, in January 2017, an American armored brigade (Armored Brigade Combat Team, ABCT) made up of about 3500 soldiers was stationed on NATO's eastern fringes. In the spring of 2017 the Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) was deployed in Poland, Romania and Lithuania in order to reinforce capabilities to provide logistic for actions conducted as part of the Atlantic Resolve operation.[72] In the middle of 2017, America sent to Europe the Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), whose base is located in Germany, but part of it has been transferred to Poland, Latvia and Romania. In July 2017, a multinational command headquarters of the newly formed Multinational Division North East were located in Elbląg. Its task is to coordinate and supervise training and preparation activities of the four enhanced eFP Battlegroups.

At the Warsaw summit, the initial operational readiness of the ballistic defense system (in the Mediterranean Sea and Romania) was announced. NATO took over command of the project from the USA. The system's official task is to provide protection against missiles which Iran could fire toward Europe. NATO and the EU signed the first agreement in history on mutual cooperation within the field of security, including in the question of hybrid threats and cyber attacks by Russia. Cyberspace was recognized to be a new sphere of operational activity. NATO reiterated its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. As the secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said, the Alliance condemned Russia's 'deliberate destabilization of the situation' in the east of Ukraine.[73] It was also decided that NATO would make early warning and reconnaissance planes (AWACS) available to the coalition fighting the Islamic State. NATO also decided to turn the present 'Active Endeavour' sea mission into a new mission named 'Sea Guardian.' Its aims were defined as support for the EU mission 'Sophia,' which is engaged in combating human smuggling and the struggle with the migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, training the Libyan border guard, and implementing the UN

[70]Warsaw Summit … (2016).

[71]Ibidem.

[72]Operation Atlantic Resolve is a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to defense security through a series of actions designed to reassure NATO allies and partners of America's dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine. The Operation was established within the European Reassurance Initiative—a program initiated in June 2014.

[73]13 najważniejszych decyzji szczytu … (2016).

embargo on supplying arms to Libya. The Alliance decided to begin a training mission in Iraq to help in fighting the Islamic State. In addition, NATO reasserted its 'engagement' in regard to the potential of conventional and nuclear weapons, indirectly addressing these remarks to Russia.[74] For the Alliance, the decisions taken in Warsaw had three implications: they expressed the allies' unity and solidarity, demonstrated the necessity of opposing the confrontational actions of Russia, and constituted a partial admission of the partnership policy's lack of success. One of the difficult problems the summit managed to avoid was the undermining of the credibility of the Alliance in the face of growing anti-liberal trends in certain of its member countries, including Hungary and Poland.[75]

All the activities of the NATO countries involving the military reinforcement of NATO's eastern fringes caused anxiety in Moscow. Since 1999, when NATO accepted Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, Russia has been systematically increasing its military expenditures, which in terms of fixed prices (of 2015) amounted in 2016 to 73.3 billion USD. At the same time, military spending has grown uninterruptedly in the USA, amounting in 2011 to a record sum of 749.5 billion USD. According to SPIPRI data, in the years 1999–2016, US military expenditures grew by over half, from the level of 399.8 billion USD to 606.2 billion USD, while Russia increased its military spending four and a half times—but from the low level of 15.5 billion USD to 70.3 billion USD.[76]

This incomplete data shows the clear trend toward an arms race between the West and Russia, which questions the West's hegemony. If in addition we take into account NATO's decision to strengthen its eastern flank, it should be said that there is a clear indication of military rivalry, which undermines the earlier agreement between NATO and Russia on cooperation on a partnership basis. Since the Georgian-Russian war, and particularly since the crisis in Ukraine, we have been observing deepening divisions and a return to rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War period. Fortunately for the Euro-Atlantic security system, Russia and the West still have a sphere of cooperation in regard to terrorism and a common interest in non-European problems, particularly in the Near and Middle East.

References

13 najważniejszych decyzji szczytu NATO w Warszawie, TVN24, July 9, 2016.

Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Adopted by Heads of States and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon November 10–20, 2010, NATO, Brussels.

Alexeev, D. (2004). NATO enlargement: A Russian outlook. *Russian Series*, No. 04/33. Conflict Studies Research Centre.

[74]Warsaw Summit Communiqué … (2016).

[75]Zima (2016).

[76]SIPRI Military expenditure data (1949–2016).

Ambrosio, T. (2009). *Authoritarian backlash: Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Becker, M. E., Cohen, M. S., Kushi, S., & McManus, I. P. (2016). Reviving the Russian empire: The Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens. *European Security, 25*(1), 112–133.

Beichelt, T. (2012). *The research field of democracy promotion. Living reviews in democracy* (Vol. 2, pp. 4–12). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich.

Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011, 112 Congress, 1st Session, H.R.515. http://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hr_515_final_text_on_passage.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006, https://belarusdigest.com/story/full-text-of-belarus-democracy-reauthorization-act-of-2006/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2009). Venus approaching Mars? The European Union as an emerging civilian world power. *Berlin working paper on European integration*. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.

Bryc, A. (2004). *Cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosji*. Toruń: Adam Marszałek.

Bush, G. W. (2010). *Decision points*. New York: Crown Publishers.

Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, *NATO Press Release* (2012) 062, May 20, 2012.

Chivvis, C. S. (2017, June 30). Sweden, Finland, and NATO (The German Marshall Fund), *Policy Brief*.

Comment by the Information and Press Department on the vote in Skupstina on Montenegro's accession to NATO, April 28, 2017. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2740071. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia (1999/4147/CFSP). *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 157, 24.6.1999.

Czachor, R. (2011). *Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Białoruś w latach 1991–2011. Studium politologiczne*. Polkowice: Wydawnictwo DWSPiT.

Dahrendorf, R. (1990). *Reflections on the revolutions in Europe: In a letter intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Warsaw*. New York: Times Books.

de Wilde, T., & Spetschinsky, L. (Eds.). (2000). *Les relations entre l'Union européenne et la Fédération de Russie*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Insitute d'études européennes.

Deni, J. R. (2017). *NATO and article 5: The transatlantic alliance and the twenty-first-century challenges of collective defense*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Domisse, A. (2016). Enlargement to the North? Sweden, Finland and NATO. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Facts & Findings, 212.

Drygiel-Bielińska, M. (2016). *Unia Europejska w procesie budowania pokoju w regionie Bałkanów Zachodnich. Problemy adaptacji*. Warsaw: ASPRA.

Eellend, J. (2016, June 13). Friends, but not allies: Finland, Sweden, and NATO in the Baltic sea. *Baltic Bulletin*. The Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/06/friends-not-allies-finland-sweden-nato-baltic-sea/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Eriksson, A. (2016, May 2). Russia wary as Nordic states mull closer Nato ties. *EU Observer.*

European Council in Copenhagen, Presidency Conclusions, June 21–22, 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1.

Forsberg, T. (2004). The EU-Russia security partnership: Why the opportunity was missed. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 9*(2), 247–267.

Fryc, M. (2014). "Doktryna Komorowskiego"—Próba scharakteryzowania. Idea, zakres, priorytety, realizacja. *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, II*(30), 41–72.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.

German, T. (2017). NATO and the enlargement debate: Enhancing Euro-Atlantic security or inciting confrontation? *International Affairs, 93*(2), 291–308.

Hagel, C. (2013, March 15). *Missile defense announcement*. U.S. Department of Defense. http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1759. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Hillion, C. (1998). Partnership and cooperation agreements between the EU and the new independent states of the Ex-Soviet Union. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 3*(3), 399–420.
Jahn, E. (2012). *International politics, political issues under debate* (Vol. 1). Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag/Springer.
Karagiannis, E. (2013). The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of offensive realism. *European Security, 22*(1), 74–93.
Kotzian, P., Knodt, M., & Urdze, S. (2011). Instruments of the EU's external democracy promotion. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 49*(5), 995–1018.
Kuzio, T. (2006). The orange revolution at a crossroads. *Demokratizatsiya, 14*(4), 477–492.
Lété, B., & Basagni, L. (2016, June 29), NATO's enhanced opportunities partners. The German Marshal found of the United States. *Blog*. http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/06/29/natos-enhanced-opportunities-partners. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Moniz Bandeira, L. A. (2015). *The second cold war: Geopolitics and strategic dimension of the USA*. Heidelberg: Springer.
Myrjord, A. (2003). Governance beyond the Union: EU boundaries in the barents euro-arctic region. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 8*(2), 239–257.
O'Hanlon, M. (2017). NATO's limits: A new security architecture for Eastern Europe. *Survival, 59*(5), 7–24.
Ojanen, H. (2000). The EU and its 'Northern Dimension': An actor in search of a policy, or a policy in search of an actor? *European Foreign Affairs Review, 5*(3), 359–376.
Pedrotty, D. J. (2016). *Prospects for Finland and Sweden to pursue closer defense cooperation with NATO* (Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive, Thesis and Dissertations). Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.
Press Availability at the NATO Ministerial, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Forum Palace, Vilnius, Lithuania, April 21, 2005, US Department of State, Archive, https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/45017.htm. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Reset tarczy. Kim dał pretekst do uspokojenia Rosji?, TVN24, 16 March 2013.
Rice calls for change in Belarus, BBC News, April 21, 2005.
Rice: Belarus is 'dictatorship'. CNN.com, April 20, 2005.
Riecker, P., & Lundby Gjerde, K. (2016). The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue—Different readings of the crisis in Ukraine. *European Security, 25*(3), 304–325.
Russia condemns Nato's expansion, BBC News, 1 April 2004.
Sakwa, R. (2015). *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Schmidt-Feltzmann, A. (2016). The breakdown of the EU's strategic partnership with Russia: From strategic patience towards strategic failure. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29*(1), 99–127.
Sharp, G. (2012). *From dictatorship to democracy: A conceptual framework for liberation*. London: Serpent's Tail.
Shlapak, D. A., & Johnson, M. (2016). *Reinforcing deterrence on NATO's Eastern flank: Wargaming the defense of the baltics*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
SIPRI Military expenditure data: 1949–2016. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Accessed on January 27, 2018.
Sojusz z przyszłością, (Prezydent Bronisław Komorowski dla "Gazety"), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 18, 2010.
Stent, A. E. (2014). *The limits of partnership: U.S.—Russian relations in the twenty-first century*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Surkov, V. (2006, November 20). Natsionalizatsia Budushchego. *Ekspert* online 43. http://expert.ru/expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_buduschego/. Accessed January 27, 2018.
The Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, Public Law 108-347–October 20, 2004. http://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pl108347.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.
The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris 27 May 1997.

The prague summit and NATO's transformation: A reader's guide (2003). Brussels: NATO.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2013). *Russia's foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales. *NATO Press Release* (2014) 120, September 5, 2014.
Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw July 8–9, 2016. *NATO Press Release* (2016) 100, July 9, 2016.
Wilson, A. (2005). *Ukraine's orange revolution.* New Haven–London: Yale University Press.
Wilson, J. L. (2010). The legacy of the color revolutions for Russian politics and foreign policy. *Problems of Post-Communism, 57*(2), 21–36.
Włodkowska-Bagan, A. (2013). *Rywalizacja mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim*. Warsaw: Difin.
Zając, J. (2016). Implikacje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla stosunków polsko-amerykańskich. In K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, & M. Stolarczyk (Eds.), *Stosunki Polski z mocarstwami w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku* (pp. 114–127). Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski.
Zięba, R. (2007). *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Profesjonalne i Akademickie.
Zięba, R. (2013). *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Zięba, R. (2015). Implikacje stosunków polsko-amerykańskich dla polityki zagranicznej Polski. *Przegląd Politologiczny, 2,* 7–20.
Zima, A. (2016). Sommet de l'OTAN à Varsovie: Un bilan. *Politique étrangère, 4,* 153–165.

Chapter 7
The European Union in Crisis

The European Union entered the 21st century as a particular type of international actor, enjoying recognition on account of the successful functioning of its common market and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, which in 1999 had been supplemented by the European Security and Defense Policy. Experts viewed the EU as a world power, although it did not yet have sufficient defense potential.[1] The EU was also an integrative structure which numerous European countries wanted to join; twelve of them were negotiating accession agreements and others—mainly the countries of the Western Balkans—were intensively working toward that end. On May 1, 2004, eight Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), and two Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and Malta), joined the EU. Not quite three years later, on January 1, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania also found themselves within the EU. This large expansion significantly strengthened the EU politically and meant an extension of the zone of well-being, stability, and security. After a few years, on July 1, 2013, Croatia joined the EU as well.

1 Problems with the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

Before the accession negotiations for the first ten candidates to the EU were finished, Brussels and other European capitals became aware of the need to negotiate a comprehensive new treaty to replace the treaties in force, which regulated questions of European integration and had often been updated. What was required was to simplify EU structures and to make the EU a unified international organization. At the time, the EU had two structural spheres of a different legal nature. One sphere

[1]Zięba (2003), p. 268. For more, see McCormick (2006), Telò (2006), Bretherton and Vogler (2006).

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_7

comprised the two European Communities, which had legal personality: The European Community (the former European Economic Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community taken over on July 23, 2002, after expiration of the Paris Treaty of 1951) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which constituted the 'basis' of the EU. The other encompassed the 'policies and forms of cooperation' established on the basis of the TEU and placed in the second and third pillars of the EU, that is, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.[2]

The legal literature emphasizes that the basic difference between these two structural spheres of the EU is that the EC was governed by a specific community regime (established by community law), while in the EU sphere, which comprises 'policies and other forms of cooperation,' the member countries engage in intergovernmental cooperation based on universal international law.[3] This was undoubtedly an excessively sharp delimitation of the two elements, as both the second and third pillar of the EU exhibited an increasingly clear tendency toward communitarization. Nevertheless, it has to be said that from the beginning the EU had components that differed in their methods of cooperation: the European Communities the method of supranational integration was dominant, while the method used in the second and third pillars was that of intergovernmental cooperation. Of course, from the viewpoint of the external world, it was irrelevant whether the EU's activities were undertaken on the basis of the TEU (by majority vote) or by unanimous decisions within the second and third pillars. The EU's international influence is measured, after all, by the results of its actions and not by its various voting procedures. The addressees of EU decisions always evaluated those decisions on their merits and not in terms of how they were arrived at. Whether the EU's imposition of economic sanctions within the framework, for instance, of the common trade policy, occurs on the basis of a qualified majority of votes at the Council or of intergovernmental decisions of the member countries within the framework of the CFSP, they are legally binding and perceived by third countries as the work of the EU. In the literature on the subject, the view prevails that the EU is an active player and not only a passive participant or a mere 'extra' in international relations.[4]

Work on a new treaty for the EU was conducted by the European Convention in the period from February 2002 to July 2003, and was led by the former French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Afterward, the EU Intergovernmental Conference was convened, and consequently the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe was drafted. It was signed by heads of state and government on October 29, 2004. This undoubtedly comprehensive treaty made the legal

[2]Until the Amsterdam Treaty came into force (on May 1, 1999) the third pillar encompassed a wider range of issues making up cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. Some Parts of these issues were shifted to the first pillar by virtue of the Amsterdam amendment.

[3]See Timmermans (1999), p. 181 ff.

[4]For more on the subject of the doubts about whether the EU is an international "actor" or just an "extra", see Gompert (2002).

basis of the EU uniform and was to replace the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty on the EU, and the acts and treaties that supplemented or amended them. It ran into difficulties, however, in the ratification process. In the referendum conducted in France on May 30, 2005 and the one in the Netherlands on June 1, 2005, voters in those countries rejected the draft of the new treaty. This came as a great surprise, as the majority of observers had not expected such a decision in countries that to the time had been strongly engaged in the process of European integration. Most likely, voters took a critical view of the effects of the EU's expansion in the preceding year and had fears about the economic and social consequences of accepting the countries of Central Europe into the EU. The referenda had a negative impact on the further course of the ratification process for the constitutional treaty; it was relinquished even though it had been ratified by 18 countries. Thus the negotiation of a new and ambitious treaty for the EU ended in fiasco.

2 New Regulations in the Treaty of Lisbon

Due to Germany's very active engagement, a lesser, so-called 'revised treaty' was signed on December 13, 2007 in Lisbon. This treaty, which is colloquially known as the Treaty of Lisbon, is composed of two agreements: the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which constitutes a separate document, was not annexed to the text, and Euratom, which is connected with the EU, remains outside its structure. The new treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009.

The difficulties in the process of drafting the new treaty on the EU were an augur of future problems with the EU's functioning. Namely, after the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected, Great Britain, which had insisted that the treaty should not strengthen the EU too much, was joined by others who wished to strengthen the EU's intergovernmental nature: particularly Poland's president, Lech Kaczyński (2005–2010), the president of the Czech Republic, Vacláv Klaus (2003–2013) and the prime minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán (since 2010).

The new European Union Treaty introduced a major innovation in defining the international status of the EU. It eliminated the European Community. The elimination of the EC was accomplished within the framework of a broader solution consisting in removing the division between the three EU pillars. The EU replaced the EC and is its legal successor (art. 1 of the TEU in the consolidated version),[5]

[5]In this book, use was made of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, which takes into account the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (2016).

and the EU acquired a legal personality (art. 47). It thus became a homogenous international organization.

The Treaty of Lisbon enables the EU's international position to be strengthened, because it creates new instruments that can contribute to increasing the cohesiveness of the EU and its impact on the international environment.[6] This depends, however, on the will of the member countries, because the treaty simultaneously intensifies the intergovernmental nature of the whole EU, including its CFSP. Decisions at the European Council and at the Council of the EU are taken unanimously (art. 31), with certain exceptions where a qualified majority suffices. The latter are situations where:

(a) The Council takes a decision defining the actions or position of the EU, on the basis of a European Council decision concerning the strategic aims and interests of the EU;
(b) takes a decision to define the EU's actions or position in accord with a proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, submitted as a result of having received a special request from the European Council, of its own initiative or on the initiative of the High Representative;
(c) it decides to implement a decision defining the actions or position of the EU;
(d) it names a special representative.

The new institutions created by the Treaty of Lisbon in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are:

(1) The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who
    (a) Combines the existing functions of the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations;
    (b) Acts as the deputy-chairman of the European Commission and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council;
    (c) Gains the right to initiate legislation;
(2) The European External Action Service (EEAS)—a kind of EU diplomatic service, which supports the High Representative;
(3) Certain new competences gained by the European Parliament, for instance, the High Representative will consult with the EP the drafts of decisions constituting mandates for EU operations, mandates for negotiating in regard to international treaties, and strategies within the CFSP framework.

Within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy, which is an integral part of the CFSP, the new regulations are:

[6]Compare Edwards (2013), p. 276 *et seq.*

(4) The creation of solid treaty bases for the EU's defense policy; the European Security and Defense Policy was renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP); the CSDP acquired a legal, treaty basis;
(5) The insertion of a *casus foederis* clause, as it appears in military alliances. Art. 42, par. 7 states that "[i]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." This new provision clearly indicates that the EU has declared its intention to become an organization of territorial defense on the model of military alliances.[7]
(6) The European Defense Agency, which has been operating since 2004, was included in the treaty, and in particular, its tasks were defined: formulating aims for the military capabilities of the member countries; supporting the harmonization of operational requirements and establishing effective and cohesive methods of performing orders; supporting research into new types of arms; contributing to strengthening industrial and technological bases in the defense sector; and increasing the effectiveness of military spending (art. 45 TEU).
(7) Permanent Structured Cooperation was established—it will enable the start of cooperation between groups of countries that are to increase their military capabilities to conduct more demanding missions (art. 42 and 46, TEU).
(8) Enhanced cooperation was extended in all areas of the EU's non-exclusive competence, including the entire CFSP, together with defense and military affairs (art. 20, TEU). A prerequisite is the participation of 9 countries in this cooperation (the threshold was raised from 8 countries). In accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the countries should submit a request to the Council. The Council subsequently directs the request to the High Representative, who opines on the cohesiveness of the planned additional cooperation with the CFSP, and to the Commission, which gives its opinion concerning, in particular, the accordance of the planned additional cooperation with other EU policies. The request is also directed to the European Parliament, for its information (art. 329.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union);
(9) The crisis response missions (Petersberg missions) were extended to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and

[7]This is, however, a general provision whose practical application requires relevant and detailed procedures decided by the European Union Council. The institution of an alliance clause does not entail that the European Union has already become a defensive alliance, as only the European Council, through a unanimous vote, can make such a decision. Of high significance in this context are the reservations added in the Treaty on the European Union to the effect that the newly adopted clause "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation." (Art. 42, Section 7).

peace-building.[8] There was a connection with the situation in Iran. In negotiations with that country the EU was represented by the so-called Troika (Great Britain, France, and Germany), as there were no treaty bases on which to appear as a whole.

(10) A solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack was included; it obliges the EU and its member countries to give every assistance to a country that has been the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster (art. 222, TFEU);

(11) A clause or principle was included to introduce energy policy in the spirit of solidarity in the field of energy, within the common market (art. 194, TFEU).

Of major importance for emphasizing the intergovernmental nature of the entire CFSP is the statement in the Treaty of Lisbon that the European Union "shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State" (art. 4.2 TEU).[9]

In general, although the Treaty of Lisbon created new institutions delegating major functions in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the European level, it also strengthened the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. In practice, the newly chosen EU leadership, which did not enjoy great authority, took largely conservative measures that were strongly dependent on the position of the member countries.[10] Such an outcome was determined by decisions made by the EU Council in filling important positions for the first time: Herman van Rompuy was appointed to lead the EU Council, and Catherine Ashton to the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Both were little-known politicians, and persons without leadership qualities. Undoubtedly they did not contribute to strengthening the EU's international authority. Charles Kupchan considers:

> The problem is that Europe's institutions and its politics are on divergent paths; its institutions are getting more European and its politics more national. As a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, the member states are to give Brussels more say over foreign policy. In response to the euro-zone crisis, the EU has deepened fiscal and financial integration. All the while, however, politics in the European street is heading in the opposite direction—away from Brussels and back to the nation-state—risking that Europe's more powerful institutions prove hollow and lack popular legitimacy.[11]

---

[8]According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU may conduct the following crisis response missions: "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism on their territories." (Art. 43.1).

[9]For more on the subject of the innovations introduced to the CFDP by the Treaty of Lisbon, see Węc (2015).

[10]Aggestam and Johansson (2017).

[11]Kupchan (2012), p. 154.

Making use of the possibilities created by the Treaty of Lisbon depends thus on the political will of the member countries and on what direction the EU wants to go.

3 Stagnation of the CSDP

3.1 The United Kingdom's Growing Euro-Skepticism

In spite of the new above-mentioned treaty provisions, the Common Security and Defense Policy entered a phase of stagnation. The causes were the growing Euro-skepticism of Great Britain, which was one of the three most important participants in the CSDP, and in budget limitations, which were a consequence of the financial crisis begun in the autumn of 2008.[12]

The United Kingdom was traditionally unwilling to strengthen the EU's security and defense policy. It is worth remembering that when in 1990 at the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels negotiations were conducted on forming the second pillar of the EU into the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Great Britain, with the Netherlands and Denmark, opposed joining the Western European Union to the European Union. Great Britain declared itself in favor of maintaining the ties between the WEU and the future EU, but wanted the first to remain as an autonomous defense entity; Great Britain saw EU defense policy as a long-range idea, which must not interfere with NATO. On the other hand, in Great Britain's opinion, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy should be intergovernmental in nature and should be conducted on the principle of unanimity.[13]

There were two main causes for such a position. The first involved an unwillingness to transfer security and defense affairs to the EU, even in the form of divided competence, as they are traditionally treated as an expression of the sovereignty of member states. The second concerned the fear that if the EU were to be equipped with defense competences it would constitute a certain competition for NATO and could weaken transatlantic solidarity, or even threaten the presence of the US military in Europe. Great Britain has been in the habit of considering that it has a special relationship with the US.

The issue returned at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996 in Turin. Then Great Britain was against the communitarization of the CFSP, and agreed solely to the introduction of the so-called constructive abstinence from voting into the Treaty of Amsterdam (so as not to block the realization of common activities in the second

[12]Authors making use of the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony claim that the causes of the crisis of the CSDP lie deeper than in the lack of a strategic understanding between the EU member states. They indicate that "a key reason for the failure to develop a strategy for the CSDP is a continuing dependence on the USA." Kempina and Mawdsley (2013), pp. 55, 56.

[13]For more, see Hurd (1994), Nuttall (2000), pp. 166–169, Petersen (1993), pp. 17–23, Duke (2000), pp. 88–92.

pillar of the EU), and to establish the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It did not agree to include the WEU officially in the EU structure, but only on granting the EU, alongside the WEU, the competence to conduct crisis management operations, which were at the time called Petersberg tasks or missions.[14] It introduced a new provision in the Treaty of Amsterdam to the effect that the Western European Union, as an 'integral part of the European Union's development,' will ensure operational abilities in conducting the Petersberg missions (art. 17.1).

This was a solution that remained on paper, as the EU did not have any resources or capabilities to conduct such operations, and those that the WEU possessed and could put at the disposal of the EU were also insufficient to conduct military crisis management operations. Basically, neither the WEU nor the EU could undertake independent crisis response operations, and if they wanted to do so, they would have to come to an agreement with NATO (and thus, in practice, with the USA) to provide them with intelligence data and military support. Great Britain was not interested in shaping the defense policy of the EU, even though such a possibility was foreseen by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. Great Britain considered that the defense of the western European countries should be ensured exclusively by NATO.

In spite of the formal strengthening of the CSDP, the EU remained an ineffective actor, unable to take up challenges such as reacting to the ongoing crisis in the Balkans. During the ratification process of the Treaty of Amsterdam, an urgent need arose to strengthen the EU's CFSP and to supplement it with the resources required to undertake military crisis response operations. Thus before the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force on May 1, 1999, it emerged that the new arrangements were already insufficient.

In the fall of 1998, while the ethnic conflict in Kosovo grew, Great Britain changed its position. Consequently, after the signing of the Saint-Malo Declaration with France on December 4, 1998, Great Britain joined the two main proponents of equipping the EU with an effective defense policy, that is, it agreed with the position of France and Germany. Thus in June 1999, the EU Council, in accord with its newly acquired competences in the Treaty of Amsterdam, produced guidelines for the establishment of a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as an instrument for the realization of the CFSP, and half a year later, in December 1999, it detailed the creation of an armed force of at least one corps (60,000 soldiers). The building of the armed force was to be based on voluntary contributions by the EU member and associated countries (a bottom-up approach). By November 2001, the EU member and candidate countries (with the

[14]The Petersberg missions (tasks) are humanitarian and rescue operations, peace missions and combat tasks intended as a response to crisis situations, including the restoration of peace initially taken on by the WEU beyond the territories of Eu member states. They were instituted by a decision of the WEU Ministerial Council on June 19, 1992 as operations lying beyond the provisions of art. V of the modified Treaty of Brussels. For more, see Zięba (2000), pp. 56, 57, and 235.

exception of Denmark, which does not participate in the ESDP/CSDP) had declared a total pool of over 100,000 soldiers, around 400 fighter planes, and around 100 warships. All these contributions were solely declarations 'on paper,' and the forces offered for the needs of the ESDP were characterized by numerous shortfalls and deficiencies, which made it impossible to send them effectively into crisis regions. Despite the decisions taken at the EU in subsequent years, no large European rapid reaction force was created.[15]

The ESDP was not, in essence, a defense policy, but a policy to shape security outside the borders of the EU, and its main task consisted in conducting civil and military crisis management operations. London did not agree to the full unification of the WEU and the EU, thus it was decided only to transfer the organs managing military affairs, and resources in the form of WEU armed forces, which were expanded into a rapid response force subject to the EU. As the 'big three' were not in complete agreement, it was decided on France's request to preserve the Brussels Treaty as a political-military alliance.[16] It was not determined, however, whether in the future these obligations would be adopted by the EU. A further problem that kept the EU member countries from full incorporation of the WEU was that the EU members also included neutral countries, which were not inclined to change their status by adopting the obligations contained in the Brussels Treaty, or the North Atlantic Treaty. It was only agreed thus that the EU would take over crisis management from the WEU.[17]

The Treaty of Nice, which was signed on February 26, 2001, did not lead to any important changes in the newly proclaimed ESDP but only sanctioned it in a declaration appended to the treaty text. As a new arrangement, it expanded the existing integrative principle of closer cooperation,[18] which until then had been part of the 1st and 2nd pillars, onto the CFSP. The previous type of cooperation was changed into 'enhanced cooperation.' There was the reservation, however, that enhanced cooperation in a narrower group of member countries (at least 8 were needed) could involve solely the implementation of common positions or common activities and could not concern matters having implications for the military or in the area of defense (art. 27b).[19] The last restriction, which was introduced at the request of Great Britain, was established at the Intergovernmental Conference 2000. London maintained its position in the first phase of the Intergovernmental Conference 2003 during work on the constitutional treaty. The position of Poland, which was acceding to the Union, was even less in accord on the question of extending enhanced cooperation to military and defense matters. Moreover, Poland

[15]For more on the subject of building the EU's military capabilities see Zięba (2007), pp. 95–101, Zięba (2005), pp. 65–75.

[16]Marseille Declaration 2000.

[17]Blanc and Fennebresque (2001), pp. 30–33.

[18]See Philippart and Edwards (1999).

[19]See Jaeger (2002), pp. 314–316, de La Serre (2001), Colard (2001).

opposed the establishment of structural cooperation within the framework of the ESDP.[20]

For the next several years, the development of the ESDP advanced; the member countries offered rapid response forces, police forces, and civilian experts for the needs of the policy; in July 2004 they created the European Defense Agency to coordinate work on the creation of rapid response forces and a system of weapons supply. From 2004, they formed EU Battle Groups. In 2003, the EU began to conduct civilian (police) and then military rapid response operations.[21] Great Britain was one of the most engaged countries, particularly in conducting the EU's foreign operations.

The situation changed after the departure in 2007 of the Labour prime minister Tony Blair. His successors, Gordon Brown (2007–2010) and the conservative David Cameron (2010–2016), strongly accented British independence and sovereignty, and were against closer integration within the EU framework. In the autumn of 2008, a financial crisis began and turned into a several-year-long economic recession in the western world.

3.2 The Impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the CSDP

The financial crisis had a negative effect on the real economies of the EU member countries, as was proven by the above-mentioned drop in GDP by 4.1% for the EU as a whole in 2009. In certain countries, there was a drastic breakdown of production (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Hungary), while in others, the problem of a lack of financial stability appeared (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy).[22] In the autumn of 2011, Greece's deepening financial problems threatened to bring about the disintegration of the euro-zone.

In essence, this crisis was overcome. In the EU, steps were taken to stabilize the banking sector, including in particular to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In order to prevent disturbances of financial stability in the EMU, in 2012 it was decided to create a Banking Union of the 18 countries of the euro zone, with the possibility that other member countries could join. The Banking Union is a system of bank supervision and bank restructuring and orderly liquidation on the basis of regulations in force throughout the EU. The Single Supervisory Mechanism began to function in November 2014, and the uniform restructuring and orderly liquidation mechanism, called the Single Resolution Mechanism, in January 2016. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), however, is to reach its planned level of financing only in 2023.

[20]Zięba (2013), p. 81.

[21]For more see Hughes (2010), Gross and Juncos (2011), Nováky (2015).

[22]Only Poland noted a GDP increase of 1.7%, even though it didn't take advantage of European Central Bank support.

3.2.1 Cuts in Military Budgets

The financial and economic crisis caused a drop in spending on armaments in the leading EU countries. Their potential for sending their soldiers, police, and experts on crisis management operations was also limited, because in accord with the prevailing mechanism for financing in the EU (ATHENA) the costs are borne by the sender countries (except for administrative costs in the field).

During the crisis, military budgets were cut in nearly all the member countries of the EU (to the level of 1.0–1.5% of GDP). The largest restrictions on spending, on a scale comparable to the cuts after the end of the Cold War, were introduced by Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and the Czech Republic. Even Poland, which had a legislatively guaranteed level of defense expenditures at the level of 1.95% of GDP, temporarily had to decrease defense spending in 2013 to a somewhat lower level. Defense budget cuts forced many EU countries to give up national plans for the modernization of their armies; thus it was particularly hard for politicians to justify decisions to finance joint enterprises within the CSDP framework. This is confirmed by the opposition of Great Britain and several other members of the EU in December 2010 to the plan to increase the budget of the European Defense Agency. It should be remembered that the majority of societies in Western Europe are convinced that their countries are not facing any military threat, and see chiefly dangers of a social nature: migration, cyberterrorism, and political terrorism. Solely the interference of the Russian army in Ukraine in 2014 slightly changed the pacifist convictions of part of the elite of these countries, and it especially strengthened the feeling of being threatened by armed aggression in the countries in the eastern part of the EU.

In several countries, a policy of rationalizing defense spending began, including reductions of personnel. For example, since 2010 Germany has been implementing a program to reduce the number of soldiers from 250,000 to 185,000 and to eliminate a number of barracks.[23] Only in connection with the crisis in Ukraine did Germany's minister of defense, Ursula von der Leyen, declare to the media in February 2015 that the process of 'shrinking' the army would cease; she also announced that the number of tanks in the Bundeswehr would not be reduced and that the armored divisions would be strengthened.[24] On the other hand, in 2008 France announced the elimination of 74,000 positions (mainly administrative) in the armed forces over the course of the next ten years.[25] Budget cuts forced a reduction of personnel in the British army, along with changes in the functioning of the British armed forces. In 2010, Great Britain adopted a plan to modernize and at the same time reduce the professional armed forces, from an original 102,000 to 82,000 full-time soldiers in 2017. Not only individual positions but entire military units fell victim to these cuts. It was announced that certain infantry and mechanized

[23]Niemcy redukują liczebność … (2011).

[24]Niemcy wzmacniają … (2015).

[25]Francja spowalnia … (2013).

formations would be eliminated. Such a major reduction, however, entailed the necessity of increasing the numbers of the reserve forces, which in 2013 were expanded to 30,000 soldiers.[26] It should be noted that the reserve soldiers cannot be sent on crisis management missions, which require comprehensive preparation.

Taking the defense spending cuts into account, the EU's Council in the conclusions on military capability development of December 9, 2010, declared that pooling & sharing was a solution with which they planned to save money and increase the military efficiency of their resources. The Council encouraged the EDA to intensify its work to facilitate the identification of areas for pooling and sharing.[27] NATO is pursuing similar aims with its Smart Defense initiative, made official at the Alliance's summit in Chicago in May 2012. The term 'pooling' means national capabilities are provided to other countries; a special multinational structure is set up to pool these contributions and coordinate their deployment. The second term 'sharing' is understood as one or more countries provide their partners with capability or equipment (such as airlift) or undertake a task for another country. If this occurs on a permanent basis, the partners can cut this capability—and save on costs.

3.2.2 Limitations on Crisis Reaction Operations

After the financial crisis of 2008, the EU's activeness in conducting foreign military operations decreased. This is a kind of paradox, because the EU was then relatively well prepared for such activities. From January 1, 2007, the EU had two Battle Groups on duty. These are units that have 1500 soldiers in principle and are capable of being sent to conflict regions within the course of 15 days. These and successive Battle Groups were not used, even though the number of conflicts threatening international security was growing. The EU continued the civilian and military operations it had begun, but on the basis of national forces allocated for the needs of specific operations and led by the 'framework country.' At the end of 2008, for the first time, a situation arose in which the EU did not heed Sweden's and Belgium's request for crisis response operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Great Britain and France opposed the request.

In connection with the unstable internal situation in Libya after NATO's military intervention (2011), in May 2013, the EU Council established a civilian advising and training mission in that country (the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya, EUBAM Libya). Its aims were to improve the abilities of the border service, strengthen the operational potential of the proper institutions, and to advise on developing an integrated strategy for managing Libya's borders. On account of the unstable situation in Libya, the mission was located solely in Tripoli, but in August 2014 the EU decided to evacuate the mission temporarily to

[26]Redukcja brytyjskiej … (2013).

[27]Council of the European Union (2010).

Tunisia. In February 2015, the mission ceased any kind of advising work with Libyan partners. Nevertheless, its mandate was extended several times. Due to the political situation and extent of danger, the mission was ineffective.

If the CSDP were to be appraised through its crisis management operations alone, then the drop in interest of the EU member countries would have to be noted. As these missions are the main instrument of the CSDP, the EU member countries are losing motivation to invest in the policy. Observation of the situation in the countries to which missions have been sent—particularly after the end of the missions—does not provide cause for optimism. Such a negative appraisal is confirmed by media reports, the reports of NGOs, and the evaluations of experts and some EU politicians. Furthermore, united Europe is generally pacifist, and concentrated on its own needs and interests. Because the majority of EU member countries do not feel threatened from far beyond their borders, they do not want to invest additional funds to finance not very effective expeditions. They concentrate on ensuring their own national security, and, in recent years, on increasing contributions to NATO, as they consider it to be an important collective instrument to insure the security of the countries of the expanded West. The costs of undertaking operations and the complicated mechanisms for financing them, which are supranational in the case of civilian operations and in principal intergovernmental in regard to military operations (based on the ATHENA mechanism), are also of some significance. In the present situation, it is difficult to expect that the EU member countries will decide to make changes to the mechanism.[28]

4 Attempts to Revive the CSDP

4.1 The Idea of Creating a European Army

Paradoxically, given the stagnation of the CSDP and the ongoing financial crisis, from time to time politicians of EU member states put forward various proposals to establish a European army. These proposals have not always been thought through or consulted with EU partners.

Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński did so during a visit to Berlin at the end of October 2006, before the financial crisis even broke out. He presented German Chancellor Angela Merkel with the idea of a 100,000-strong European army, to be subordinated to the President of the European Commission, but commanded by NATO Headquarters.[29] The Germans were taken aback by the proposal, for two reasons. Firstly, because the European Commission does not deal with EU defense policy and has no experience in the matter, and secondly, the idea of placing this army under NATO command could signify that it would de facto be

[28]Terpan (2015).

[29]J. Kaczyński wymyśla … (2006).

subordinated to the Americans, who have most to say in NATO, and this would defeat the very purpose of creating a EU army. The Polish prime minister's point of view was supported by President Lech Kaczyński who, in an interview given a few days later to the *Financial Times*, also stated that a 100,000-strong army tied to NATO should be established to defend Europe and to be sent to various trouble spots.[30] The credibility of Poland's proposal was undermined by the fact that, at the time, Warsaw called for rejecting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe while, simultaneously, the Polish president claimed that the European Union should remain an association of sovereign states, and not a federation. It was thus difficult to build large EU armed forces while insisting on an EU that was intergovernmental in character.

Nonetheless, the euro-skeptical Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość—PiS) party maintained its position in subsequent years as well. In September 2011, during the Economic Forum in Krynica, its leader Jarosław Kaczyński said that the formation of a common army by the European Union would give the EU the status of a superpower comparable with the United States.[31]

In March 2015, a new impulse for discussions about providing the European Union with its own armed forces was given by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker who, on the pages of German weekly *Welt am Sonntag*, called on EU member states to establish a common European army. In his opinion, such armed forces could more effectively ensure security for Europe, and an EU in possession of its own army could more credibly react to threats to peace in EU member states or in neighboring countries. He added that it would also send the message to Russia that "we take our intention to defend European values seriously".[32]

Juncker's initiative was presented when the results of work on a new security strategy conducted by the groups of experts working under the chairmanship of Javier Solana—former NATO secretary general and head of the EU diplomatic service—were already known. These results were set out in a report entitled *More Union in European Defense*. This document states that the ultimate and indispensable aim of defense integration should be the creation of a European Defense Union—EDU. This report defines the shape of such a Union as a cornerstone of a comprehensive civilian and military security architecture in Europe. Its recommendations include concentrating on territorial defense contributions that would complement those of NATO and creating within the EU framework 'political and military capabilities' for the EU to carry out interventions beyond EU borders. Moreover, experts proposed the creation of an EU military general headquarters in Brussels.[33]

---

[30]Kaczyński (2006), Cienski, J., & Wagstyl, S. Poland proposes an EU army tied to NATO. *Financial Times*, November 5, 2006.

[31]Military Unity … (2011).

[32]Juncker (2015).

[33]More Union in European … (2015).

Juncker's initiative of creation of a European army was assessed by other experts as feasible within the framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty of Permanent Structured Cooperation, but as a condition of its realization indicated the use of "a Schengen approach to defense integration, ambitious and pragmatic at the same time, building on those member states which are engaged in deeper cooperation already".[34]

After a decisive referendum on leaving the UK with the EU (June 23, 2016) calls have intensified to create a European army. European politicians realized that Brexit will mean a weakening of the EU's military capabilities, but at the same time getting rid of a country that always blocked the military ambitions of the EU for fear of creating competition for NATO. From a purely military point of view Brexit means for the EU a major weakness. And although security guarantees to Europe from the UK will not disappear, because the result of NATO membership, but the EU will be even more difficult to carry out military missions abroad. Unless quantitative weakness offsetting a qualitative jump in the military cooperation, what some politicians call for.

In summer 2016 for closer military cooperation within the EU have urged leaders of France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Polish Euro-skeptic leader—Jarosław Kaczyński.[35] The most concrete plan presented Foreign and Defense Ministers of Italy, who proposed the creation of a defense Schengen, which is limited to a group of countries a greater defense cooperation on the model of the area without border controls. German minister of defense Ursula von der Leyen proposed to create a 'European Defense Union,'[36] and together with her French colleague Jean-Yves Le Drian developed a document in which they demand the creation of a 'road map' of further steps. Ministers proposed the creation of a EU common army headquarters, and as a seed of it a medical command that will coordinate responses to actions of medical troops of each country during the international operation. Berlin and Paris want to additionally strengthen personally and technically the Eurocorps which currently is about 1000 soldiers.[37] In this context, Poland's decision to withdraw in March 2017 from its agreement to become a full and framework country of this elite European military unit, instead of having observer status, is surprising.[38]

One of the most comprehensive concepts for strengthening EU defense cooperation was presented by French president Emmanuel Macron in his speech about the future of Europe given at the Sorbonne in September 2017. In it, Macron formulated three main proposals: to establish "a common intervention force, a

[34]Janning (2015).

[35]Kaczyński (2016).

[36]Skutki Brexitu (2016), Niemiecka minister … (2016).

[37]Niemcy i Francja … (2016).

[38]In 2019 Poland was supposed to assume command of the Eurocorps. 'Macierewicz: Polska nie wycofuje się z Eurokorpusu', *Rzeczpospolita*. March 28, 2017.

common defense budget and a common doctrine for action".[39] In Daniel Keohane's view,

> his proposals are more akin in spirit to building a de facto military alliance from the bottom-up, which would include many forms of intergovernmental military cooperation, than establishing a top-down federal EU army directed by the institutions in Brussels. Macron wants to supplement the instinctive Atlanticism of most EU governments on military matters by strengthening their European intuition.[40]

4.2 The Issue of the EU General Headquarters

Despite the significant growth in the number of EU organs involved in external security after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there is a lack of EU operational command for the conduct of crisis management operations.[41] In the EU there is a disconnect between the structures responsible for leading military operations from the central organs of the CSDP, which are located in Brussels. The EU member countries decided that the EU Military Staff (EUMS) will not perform tasks connected with leading military crisis management missions and thus cannot function as a typical, operational, military command. On the other hand, the functions of such headquarters can be filled either by the main NATO headquarters (SHAPE) (in the case of operations carried out on the basis of the agreement between the EU and NATO concluded in the Berlin Plus format[42] of 2003), or one of five national operational headquarters proposed by France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, and Italy. This means that the EU entrusts command to a so-called framework country. This country forms an ad hoc operational headquarters and organizes the mission with the participation of other countries. After the end of the operation, the headquarters is dissolved. In practice, this gives rise to problems and has a negative influence on the process of preparing individual operations. The countries most interested in strengthening the ESDP had already raised this issue at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2003. Great Britain and Poland were also against the creation of planning organs for the preparation and conduct of EU crisis management operations. The main argument against such organs was that they could weaken transatlantic and NATO relations. The tactic of delaying work on a

[39]Keohane (2018).

[40]Ibidem.

[41]For more, see Steindler (2015).

[42]The Berlin Plus format was arranged at the Washington NATO summit in April 1999. It provides for the EU's access to the Alliance's resources, capabilities and planning data in conducting crisis management operations by the European allies without US involvement. The name originates from earlier agreements which were made during a Berlin meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1996, and which concerned the conducting of such operations by the WEU. In preparation for conducting military operations within the framework of the CSDP, the EU concludes an agreement with NATO in the Berlin Plus formula, if it intends to make use of the Alliance's resources.

new treaty was maintained by Warsaw even after the ministers of foreign affairs of the big three (France, Germany, and Great Britain) reached a compromise agreement in Naples on November 29, 2003 on the establishment of a permanent EU planning unit within NATO headquarters (and simultaneously the creation of a NATO liaison office in the EUMS). The meeting in Naples opened the way for an 'agreement on defense issues.' When the EU Council, at its next session in Brussels on December 12–13, 2003, supported the request of the Italian presidency to agree to the planning unit, in Poland, the media and politicians of different options criticized the EU's attempts to give autonomy to the ESDP because this would supposedly harm Europe's alliance with the USA and weaken NATO unity. Poland's reaction was decidedly premature, as Washington had not objected to the new EU arrangements in the matter of the ESDP. Poland's objection to the establishment of an EU planning unit in the supreme NATO headquarters in Brussels was basically an attempt to force the EU to treat with NATO, and in particular to subordinate itself to NATO's strategic concept, that is, the adoption of the so-called NATO paradigm—which is actually American.[43]

The EU's direction of crisis management operations inclined the member countries to create two separate units: for planning its own (autonomous) operations, and for operations using NATO resources. In the latter case, a deep difference of opinions emerged between the countries that favored EU operational autonomy and the countries that were afraid that such autonomy would weaken transatlantic relations and NATO. Thus the creation of operational planning organs was delayed. In January 2005, the building began of a Civilian-Military Unit, which could create an Operational Centers for individual operations, within the framework of the EUMS. Subsequently, on November 3, 2005, the Permanent NATO Liaison Team at the EUMS was established, and on March 1, 2006, the EU Planning Unit at NATO Headquarters. This was undoubtedly progress, but the EU needed one central operational command in the form of a headquarters (EU Operational Headquarters, EU OHQ) similar to NATO's. Consequently, the EU system of planning and conducting military operations within the ESDP framework is divided into two phases: political-strategic and operational. This delays and weakens the effectiveness of operations. However, the problem cannot be resolved on account of the member countries' lack of political agreement in the question of the necessity to establish a permanent organ engaged in operational planning. Proposals for a deep reform of the system of planning and conducting crisis response operations were presented by France while it held the presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2008. Great Britain was opposed and was supported by the new EU members from Central Europe.

At the same time, the creation of permanent EU organs for operational planning and command is an obvious need if we take into account the EU's ambitions to become a global international player. As Louis Simón writes,

[43]Zięba (2013), p. 82.

> Permanent institutions engaged in military planning is an issue of unity with the aims the EU has set itself, namely, with the decision to establish a common foreign and security policy and a common security and defense policy. Their lack sends a clear signal that the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defense policy are not supported by the necessary potential supporting EU political ambitions. This lack erodes its diplomatic influences and possibilities at the moment, and what is worse, it will undermine economic prosperity, political stability, and security (including the security of the values constituting the pillars of the EU) in the future. The lack of permanent planning structures not only harms the EU's external activities but also its internal unity, in so far as it is even possible to divide the external and internal dimensions of the EU. It also increases the existing disappointment with the CSDP. This kind of atrophy contributes to two other very disturbing drawbacks of the EU: its resistance to political integration and unwillingness to use military force.[44]

The EU should be equipped by its member countries with permanent abilities to plan for eventualities, because without it will continue its previous policy of reacting to crises only after their outbreak. Only thanks to this can it overcome its lethargy and pacifism and effectively perform the functions of prevention, deterrence, and intervention as needed.

While Donald Tusk was prime minister of Poland (2007–2014) a rather unexpected change in Poland's position in regard to EU defense policy occurred. From the middle of 2009, Poland began to act in concert with France, and to be very engaged on behalf of the concept of *L'Europe de la défense*. At a meeting at Chobielin in July 2009, Poland's minister of foreign affairs, Radosław Sikorski, spoke to France's head of diplomacy, Bernard Kouchner,[45] in favor of increasing the operational abilities of the CSDP, and as an initial step he proposed that the two countries should cooperate in the field of security and defense. France, which in the previous six months had held the presidency of the EU Council and had launched an important intensification of EU defense policy, accepted the Polish initiative without hesitation, considering it to be a chance to revitalize EU defense. In April 2010, the ministers of foreign affairs of the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, Poland) had put forward an initiative to strengthen the CSDP. Then Poland, in preparing to take over the presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2011, worked out a packet of proposals—in consultation with France and Germany—aimed at strengthening the CSDP.

On December 6, 2010, the three countries presented detailed proposals in a letter from their ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defense to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. The proposals were supported by Spain and Italy. The letter suggested that work should be conducted on three levels: on the strategic level—improvement of planning abilities and the realization of civilian-military and military crisis management operations based on existing structures; on the tactical level—activities to adapt EU Battle Groups to operational needs; and at the operational level—work on

[44]Simón (2011), pp. 13–14. For more, see Simón (2010).

[45]Chobielin is a locality not far from Bydgoszcz, where Minister Radosław Sikorski occasionally hosted his foreign partners in his country house.

increasing EU abilities to conduct military operations. In the letter, the ministers argued for the necessity of strengthening the planning structures for EU security operations, and proposed the creation of joint civilian-military command for EU operations, which would be complementary to national and NATO resources. All these undertakings were to occur within the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation established by the Treaty of Lisbon. As was written in the letter, the three countries were interested in improving the capabilities of the CSDP, making it more cost efficient and effective, and having it occur in full cooperation and complementarity with NATO.[46]

On January 31, 2011, the EU Council accepted the letter and bound the High Representative to report on the CSDP in order to enable concrete arrangements to be initiated by the end of the year. In July 2011, the head of EU diplomacy presented a report, with clear 'reluctance': the proposals of the ministers of foreign affairs of Poland, France, and Germany were appraised as being 'satisfactory and realistic'. Nevertheless, Great Britain vetoed the prepared conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This meant that further discussion of strengthening the CSDP was blocked.

Before beginning its presidency of the EU Council, Poland increased its activeness in the matter of reforming the CSDP. In June 2011, it put forward an initiative to increase the usefulness of the EU's rapid response forces. This was one of the priorities of the Polish presidency. Then on October 5, 2011, the Ministry of National Defense sent Catherine Ashton a letter in regard to the reform of EU Battle Groups. Warsaw proposed adding civilian planners to the staff of these units, lengthening the service period of groups from six months to a year, and combining the financing of Battle Groups with so-called common costs. The groups' training, transport, and use would be financed by a special military fund of the EU, to which all member countries would contribute (with the exception of Denmark, which did not participate in the CSDP), and not, as to that time, by the country that created a battle group.[47]

Poland's activeness on behalf of invigorating and strengthening the CSDP accorded with France's diplomatic offensive on behalf of building *L'Europe de la défense*, which in practice was supposed gradually to increase the EU's responsibility for security and defense in Europe, as the administration of Barack Obama had expressed the intent to have the US less engaged with the Old Continent. France perceived a chance to strengthen the EU's operational abilities for the purposes of conducting crisis management operations outside the borders of the EU and of developing EU cooperation in the armaments industry. So-called territorial defense was to be ensured by NATO, including by France's nuclear potential.

[46]Text of the Weimar letter—author's archive.

[47]For more, see Węc (2014), pp. 110–116, Ciupiński (2013), pp. 387–398.

These policies facilitated France's return to NATO military structure in April 2009, and meant that from that time, "France's commitment to the Alliance is no longer an issue."[48]

However, France, seeing the resistance of Great Britain in the matter of strengthening the CSDP and taking into account cuts to the defense budget due to the recession, decided to implement a pragmatic, alternative path to strengthen European security. For this purpose, it increased its bilateral military cooperation with London. Both countries offered each other mutual benefits and on November 2, 2010 they signed treaties on defense and security and on nuclear cooperation outside the CSDP (the Lancaster House Agreement).[49] Great Britain, which was governed by a conservative and liberal-democrat coalition, openly questioned the sense of making any sort of investment in the CSDP. Closer military cooperation with the Nordic countries—Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland—began to expand outside the EU framework. The latter two countries then initiated military cooperation with NATO and are beginning the debate on whether to join that alliance. Germany as well, which was occupied with reforming its own army, was less interested in developing the CSDP, which did not mean that it relinquished the idea of strengthened EU defense. On the other hand, after Moscow's suspension of the CFE treaty provisions in December 2007, the countries of Central Europe which border on Russia gradually lost interest in strengthening the CSDP (including Poland, after the national-conservative PiS party formed a government in the autumn of 2015). In the case of Poland, this was a decisive turnaround in relation to the policy of the previous liberal-people's government.

4.3 New Efforts to Strengthen the CSDP

Attempts to invigorate the CSDP were nevertheless undertaken, during the crisis of the EU, as an integrative project, as described in the third chapter of *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. Afterwards, there were increased efforts to strengthen the CSDP. In May 2017 the Council endorsed the modalities to establish a coordinated annual review on defense (CARD), starting with a 'trial run' involving all member states starting in autumn this year, and in June 2017 the European Commission started the European Defense Fund (EDF) to co-finance the development of military technology and potential in the EU. Also in June 2017, the European Council decided to begin Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), as provided by the Lisbon Treaty, to deepen EU defense

[48]See the report prepared by the former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine (1997–2002) and submitted to president François Hollande in December 2012: *Rapport pour le Président de la République Française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le Commandement Intégré de l'OTAN, sur l'avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l'Europe de la défense*, November 14, 2012.

[49]Gomis (2011), Ostermann (2015).

integration. In November-December of that year, 25 EU member countries gave notification of their readiness to participate in PESCO (without Denmark, Malta, and Great Britain, which was leaving the EU) and fairly general obligations were undertaken to strengthen their defense capabilities.[50] The substance of the notifications does not prove, however, that the member countries were ready for real defense integration. Some—for instance, Poland—clearly declared that they had reservations as to the PESCO project. Nevertheless, the notifications were a political signal that the EU has the will to overcome stagnation and to revive the CSDP with the participation of a majority of member countries. PESCO was officially launched on December 11, 2017 by a decision of the EU Council, which at the same time confirmed an initial list of 17 projects to be undertaken in the area of security and defense.[51] In connection with the CARD and EDF, it has a chance to become one of the basic political and institutional mechanisms within the CSDP which will be implemented.

Thanks to participation in PESCO, the distinct majority of EU member countries avoided different integration speeds in regard to defense, along with the misunderstandings that such diversity would have entailed. Ensuring that the participation of almost all member countries doesn't lead to weaker cooperation will be a challenge, however, the more so as the organization of relations between the CSDP/PESCO and NATO remain difficult and a potential source of discord. It is worth remembering that the idea of PESCO was proposed by adherents of hastening European integration, that is, by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. In spite of the above-mentioned EU decision of 2017, it is doubtful whether this cooperation will lead to increased European engagement in transatlantic security and to the greater credibility of NATO's deterrence and defense policy.[52] Among the participants of this cooperation are Central European countries with a decidedly pro-American orientation, which are traditionally afraid of increasing the EU's strategic autonomy and of doubling NATO's defense functions.

It can generally be said that the EU as a whole does not face a military threat from abroad. This strengthens the increasingly widespread prevalence of pacifist attitudes among the population, particularly in Western Europe, and causes a lack of interest in building common defense as provided by the Maastricht Treaty. At present, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU does have a *casus-foederis*-type clause on the model of a political-military alliance, but it is hard to imagine a common defense action when the EU does not have a common defense system. This means

[50]For example: considering the joint use of existing military capabilities, the acceleration of national procedures for deciding to use armed forces in crisis management operations, the regular increase of national defense budgets, greater efforts for cooperation in cyber-defense, participation in at least one new project concerning the creation of new military capabilities, participation in the EU's Battle Groups, preferences given to European cooperation in armaments purchases.

[51]See: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) first collaborative PESCO projects—Overview http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf (Accessed January 27, 2018).

[52]Zięba (2017a), p. 51.

that the most that could be imagined would be military assistance granted by individual member countries and NATO. As most EU countries—22 altogether—belong to NATO and the EU simultaneously and rely on the guarantees of the North Atlantic Alliance, they do not feel a need, as a whole, to build their own defense system. Security is a permanent need, however, and moreover should be considered with a view to the future, in the hypothetical situation where the USA should withdraw from Europe, or become weaker.

5 The Migration Crisis

The EU turned out to be insufficiently prepared to manage the large wave of immigrants and refugees crossing its borders in the years 2014–2016. It is estimated that at that time around 2.7 million people came to the EU-28 from North Africa, the Middle East, and also from Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Western Balkans. The border services of member countries—particularly Greece and Italy, to which most illegal migrants from beyond Europe arrived—fell short, as did FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The police services of the member countries were also unable to deal with the wave of immigrants, which peaked in 2015 when a record number of immigrants—1,822,000 persons—entered the EU, according to Eurostat data. Most of the immigrants tried to reach Germany, which in 2015 accepted a record number: 1,543,800 (including those who had been refused by other EU countries). Of these, 441,800 submitted applications for asylum.[53]

Such a mass of people needing protection and social assistance evoked a feeling of threat, particularly as in the years 2015 and 2016 there were media-hyped terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany, and a few of the attackers had earlier arrived as immigrants to the countries. In addition, this gave support to the racist attitudes of many EU citizens; rightwing parties that were opposed to accepting immigrants fed on xenophobia. Such anti-immigrant attitudes were propagated in France by the Front National, in Germany by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), by the ruling party in Hungary, Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance), and in Poland, by the Law and Justice party (PiS).

The immigration crisis quickly produced internal divisions in the European Union. That is, the old member countries of the EU, guided by the values inscribed in the constituting documents, consider that immigrants should be treated humanely and accepted, even the illegal ones arriving, for instance, across the Mediterranean. They consider that the member countries should show solidarity in accepting immigrants. For this purpose, on August 20, 2015, the ministers of internal affairs of the EU countries voted to share the first group of 120,000 refugees between the

[53]Migration and migrant population … (2017). In total, in the years 2014–2016, 1,424,000 immigrants applied for asylum in Germany.

member countries. The decided majority voted in favor of the agreement, including Poland, but the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania voted against, and Finland abstained. From the first estimates, it was determined that Poland should accept 4500 to 5000 people. A new Polish government was formed by the PiS party in November 2015; it questions the findings and obligations. Subsequently, it offered to help refugees who remained outside the EU—in their countries of origin, or in transit countries such as Turkey or Greece. The leading Polish politicians, including the president, Andrzej Duda, from the PiS party, repeatedly criticized the position of the EU, and especially laid the responsibility for the large influx of immigrants to Europe on the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, who advocated giving them refuge. At the beginning of October 2016, a referendum was organized in Hungary on whether the EU should be able to oblige that country to allow immigrants to settle there without the agreement of its parliament. Although 95% of the votes were negative, the referendum was not valid as scarcely 40% of those entitled to vote participated and the threshold for validity was 50%. In spite of this blow to his prestige, the conservative prime minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán, did not change his negative stance on the immigrants' issue.

On March 18, 2016, the EU negotiated an agreement with Turkey on cooperation for the purpose of stopping the wave of migration. The agreement was that after March 20 of that year all the migrants who illegally arrived on Greek islands would be sent back to Turkey. In exchange, the EU bound itself to begin before long to accept Syrian refugees directly from Turkish camps. The political price for the agreement between the EU and Turkey was supposed to be the acceleration of negotiations for Turkey's accession to the EU and the liberalization of visa restrictions for Turkish citizens. The EU also undertook to convey 3 billion euros to Turkey for the support of Syrian refugees within its territory, and even promised to double its aid to Turkey for this purpose.[54] The signed agreement 'hung by a hair' after the EU criticized the Turkish authorities' announcement of a state of emergency and their repressions following the failed coup attempt in Turkey, which was quashed on July 15, 2016. The president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, criticized the EU, the agreement, and Brussels' dilatoriness in EU accession negotiations. Turkey continued to pursue closer cooperation with Russia, Iran, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, treating the latter as an alternative to the EU. The referendum in Turkey on April 16, 2017, in which—through numerous abuse of the electoral law—a majority of voting citizens agreed to the replacement of the parliamentary system with a presidential one, was a serious blow to Turkey's European prospects.

[54]Batalla Adam (2017), Collett (2016).

6 Threats to the EU as an Integration Project

The financial crisis of 2008 and the accompanying recession were catalysts for many successive disadvantageous phenomena threatening the EU as an integration project. For the first time in the history of European integration, since the 1950s, the possibility of the EU's unravel appeared. The Lisbon Treaty, which had come into force at the end of 2009, turned out to be a facilitating factor. The treaty strengthened the intergovernmental nature of the EU, and this produced a need for more intense cooperation between the member countries, but there was a clear lack of political will for such cooperation in the enlarged, 28-member community. In reality, crises had appeared earlier in the European Community, but they were overcome by a 'leap forward' of sorts consisting in demarcating new goals and tasks in the ongoing process of integration. This time, toward the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it emerged that there was a lack of new goals and in the Lisbon Treaty the member countries had defined the aim of integration fairly conservatively—no longer as the creation of a supranational community but rather of an international organization with a basically intergovernmental nature. This is shown by a series of clauses in the new Treaty on the EU, including a clause that formulates, *expressis verbis*, the possibility of a country leaving the organization (art. 50). In other words, the Lisbon Treaty rather put an end to incompletely specified desires to define *la finalité européenne*. At present, the aim of integration is not to create full political union but only an intergovernmental organization with supranational elements (mainly in matters of economic and currency union). Thus the EU is not being formed according to the idea of the federalists and the voice of the inter-governmentalists is predominant in this arrangement.

When the leaders of the EU, in order to save the euro zone from collapse, proposed a community solution, the countries that did not belong to the zone feared that an EU of different speeds would arise. Such worries were obvious in the reservations voiced by such countries as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and above all, Great Britain. The continuing problems with the stability of public finances in the euro-zone countries in the south of Europe and the EU's slow emergence, as a community, from the economic recession, stimulated the renationalization policies of member countries and the fragmentation of the EU integration process. The wealthy EU countries, such as Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria, were in favor of further integration of the common market, saving the euro zone, and creating new EU institutions for that zone, without concern for the position of the newly accepted member countries of Central Europe. Such a conscious choice of action was also a kind of expression of a desire to 'overturn' the effects of expanding the EU, that is, to marginalize the importance of certain 'new' member countries. The main symptoms of such an attitude were:

- the lack of social acceptance—appearing as early as 2005—in certain Western European countries for expanding the EU to include the poor and less well-prepared countries of Central Europe, as was reflected in the negative

results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty;
- the unwillingness of societies in the 'old' member countries to enlarge the common market;
- lack of political will on the part of Great Britain and its supporters for a real strengthening of the CFSP and CSDP;
- the Lisbon Treaty's guarantee of the possible organization of so-called enhanced cooperation and permanent structural cooperation (in security questions) could lead, without increased integration, to the creation of groups of countries that are either integrated or marginalized within the EU framework.
- the difficulties involved in completing new, effective mechanisms of EU cooperation with NATO in security issues, made toe worse by Turkey's opposition after the acceptance of Cyprus to the EU in 2004;
- the inability of certain new member countries (above all, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Croatia) to adapt to the EU and their perception of threats to their sovereignty, national interests, and even national identity;
- the growth in certain countries of nationalist tendencies, and dislike for 'foreigners' and immigrants (in France, Germany, and Ireland; in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia as well, after the migration crisis; and in Great Britain, after the Brexit referendum in June 2016);
- the lack of authority of EU political leadership.

The EU's reduced cohesion has been caused by euro-skeptical attitudes in many of the founding countries (Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands), and also in the newly admitted countries: in Poland in the years 2005–2007, in Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to a lesser degree. Presently, the national-conservative governments in Hungary (since 2010) and in Poland (since 2015) have especially critical attitudes toward the EU. It might be noticed that this euro-skepticism is an expression of dissatisfaction with integration within the EU framework, which for the societies of the 'old Union' means the necessity of supporting the poorer, newly accepted countries, and for the new countries means integrating in spite of income disproportions, including those that arose during the systemic transformation. This fosters populism, and populist politicians have named themselves defenders of the newly accepted countries' sovereignty, which has supposedly been restricted by the EU. Thus rightwing leaders such as Jarosław Kaczyński or Victor Orbán demand the curbing of 'the power of Brussels' and a greater role for nation states. For this reason, among others, the leaders of the Visegrad Group did not agree on the European Commission and EU Council's requested relocation of immigrants among the member countries. A similar attitude in defense of sovereignty was displayed by Great Britain, which demanded an EU *à la carte*—that is, participation in those EU policies and programs that are advantageous to Great Britain—and did not agree to undertake all the responsibilities of an EU member. The common denominator for euro-skeptics from Western and Central Europe is a narrow understanding of the essence of EU integration as the

creation of a common market, without adopting other obligations based on respect for the shared catalog of European values.

In observing the behavior of member countries during the EU's emergence from the economic crisis, the well-known American political scientist Charles Kupchan wrote in alarmist tones in August 2010 that the EU was collapsing, in part economically, but above all on account of the increasingly frequent renationalization of political life. In his opinion, that renationalization was spilling out 'from London through Berlin to Warsaw' and was expressed in a return to sovereignty at the cost of devotion to a common idea, and that meant that the European project was endangered.[55] Other experts point to the fact that harm to the rule of law done by the populist governments of Poland and Hungary have an impact not only domestically, but also entail a huge risk of contagion to the EU as a whole. Consequently, European leaders and institutions feel the need to step forward to defend EU values.[56] It's not an easy task, as a wider trend away from liberalism can be observed not only in post-communist Europe, but in Western Europe and the rest of the world as well.[57]

The difference in the member countries' attitudes in various matters—from typically domestic ones such as the right to work of citizens of new member countries, through questions of energy, migration, and security—appeared after the EU's large expansion in 2004 and are difficult to overcome for more reasons than simply a diversity of interests. Some problems, for instance, in regard to the CFSP and CSDP, can not be resolved because the binding principle of inter-governmentalism means that decisions must generally be unanimous. In addition, from the EU's more than 20-year history, we know that unanimity in the EU has been weakened by the influence of external actors, particularly the USA and Russia, which have tried not to treat with the EU as a whole but to reach agreement with individual member countries on a bilateral basis. The American-British understanding, which London calls its 'special relationship,' and the numerous agreements between Russia and Germany, France, and Italy, are the better well-known examples. Another striking example of breaking the unity and acting with self-interest was the agreement reached by German and Dutch firms in 2006 on

[55]Kupchan (2010). Also see Jones (2017).

[56]Grabbe and Lehne (2017). On December 20, 2017 the European Commission undertook measures to defend the independence of the judiciary in Poland. It has concluded that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland. The EC started the infringement procedure under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission has also issued a complementary Rule of Law Recommendation, setting out clearly the steps that the Polish authorities can take to remedy the current situation. Should the Polish authorities implement the recommended actions, the Commission is ready, in close consultation with the European Parliament and the Council, to reconsider its proposal. Furthermore, the EC has decided to take the next step in its procedure against Poland for breaches of EU law by the Law on the Ordinary Courts Organization, referring Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU. Whilst taking these unprecedented steps, the Commission has maintained its offer for a constructive dialogue with Polish authorities to remedy the current situation.

[57]For more, see Modern Populism and Its Effect in Foreign Policy (2017), Luce (2017), Jones (2017–2018).

building the Nord Stream gas pipeline across the bottom of the Baltic Sea, over the opposition of Poland and the Baltic countries. As American scholars of the EU's common foreign and security policy have observed, the EU is characterized by a special disaggregation, which consists in the fact that the EU is able to define its common policies but is not able to prevent the member countries from conducting their own independent foreign policies.[58]

The weakening of the EU's internal cohesion and the lack of a real common foreign and security policy has led to a situation where the EU is threatened with collapse. The first step in this direction was taken by the British, who, by a referendum on June 23, 2016 set themselves to leave the EU. Consequently, the EU and Great Britain began the steps necessary to bring about Brexit. The Brexit process was officially inaugurated on March 28, 2017, when Prime Minister Theresa May signed a letter of intent in regard to Great Britain's departure from the EU. The document was then delivered to the head of the European Council, Donald Tusk. The negotiations have proven difficult and their course is hard to predict, as are their consequences. It can be supposed that on account of the strength of the British economy, the largest negative consequences could occur to the common market. Another serious problem is to guarantee the employment rights of the approximately 3.3 million EU citizens living in Great Britain, including nearly 1 million Poles. Their rights could be threatened by Great Britain's departure from the Community. However, it is in the interest of both sides to keep the losses to a minimum.[59] The most important political consequence, though, could turn out to be the weakening of the EU's cohesion, as a few member countries could follow London's example. The situation is most difficult for the Central European countries, which on the one hand, are the largest beneficiaries of the EU, and on the other are insisting—like the Visegrad Group—on weakening integration on behalf of a conservative conception of inter-governmentalism.

It can generally be stated that the above-mentioned threats could lead to the downfall of the EU. If this were to occur, then—in addition to the negative effects for the integration process and the civilizational development of its member countries—there would be a decrease in the state and sense of security in Europe. The potential disappearance of the EU or its preservation in a diminished form would have an essentially negative impact on the Euro-Atlantic security system, from which an important participant would disappear or be replaced by a much weaker one. The West, which is already declining, would be weakened even further in the global international system, in which the newly emerging powers, particularly those in the BRICS group, are demanding recognition of their positions with increasing insistence.[60] The redistribution of power and its further dissipation

[58]Orestein and Kelemen (2017).

[59]On December 8, 2017 the EU and UK reached an initial agreement on citizenship rights, the border with Northern Ireland and a divorce bill. It paved the way for the two sides to move onto the next phase of negotiations on the future relationship in the areas of trade, security and defense.

[60]For more, see Zięba (2016).

would thus be greater. Russia would gain, as it could more easily implement its bilateral policy of seeking arrangements with individual European countries; Turkey, which is disappointed by its unsuccessful attempts to join the Union, would also gain. Temporarily, the role of the US could grow in Europe, which might become a terrain for rivalry over spheres of influence, and consequently Europe's security would not be guaranteed as it has been to this time.

References

Aggestam, L., & Johansson, M. (2017). The leadership paradox in EU foreign policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 55*(6), 1203–1220.

Batalla Adam, L. (2017). The EU-Turkey deal one year on: A delicate balancing act. *The International Spectator, 57*(2), 44–58.

Blanc, É., & Fennebresque, M. (2001). La défense européenne après le Conseil européen de Nice. *Défense nationale, 2,* 23–34.

Bretherton, Ch., & Vogler, J. (2006). *The European union as a global actor*. London: Routledge.

Ciupiński, A. (2013). *Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej: geneza—rozwój—funkcjonowanie*. Warsaw: Difin.

Colard, D. (2001). L'Union européenne et les petits pas du traité de Nice. *Défense nationale, 3,* 18–31.

Collett, E. (2016). *The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. *Official Journal of the European Uni*on, C202, *59*, 13–45, June 7, 2016.

Council of the European Union, Council Meetings 3055th and 3056th, Foreign Affairs: Defence and Development, Press Release 17745/10, Presse 342, Brussels, December 9, 2010. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-10–342_en.htm Accessed January 27 2018.

de La Serre, F. (2001). Le traité de Nice: déconstruction ou refondation de Union? *Politique étrangère, 2,* 259–275.

Duke, S. (2000). *The elusive quest for European security: From EDC to CFSP*. Houndmills: Macmillan.

Edwards, G. (2013). The EU's foreign policy and the search for effect. *International Relations, 27* (3), 276–291.

Francja spowalnia modernizację armii i redukuje etaty w resorcie obrony, 03.05.2013, http://www.defence24.pl/3008,francja-spowalnia-modernizacje-armii-i-redukuje-etaty-w-resorcie-obrony. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Gomis, B. (2011, March). *Franco-British defence and security treaties: Entente while it lasts?*, Programme Paper: ISP PP 2001/01, Chatham House.

Gompert, D. C. (2002). Akteur oder Statist? Die Rolle der Europäischer Union auf der Weltbühne. *Internationale Politik, 57*(1), 17–22.

Grabbe, H., Lehne, S. (2017, November 15). An existential threat, *Berlin Policy Journal*, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/an-existential-threat/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Gross, E., & Juncos, A. E. (Eds.). (2011). *EU conflict prevention and crisis management: Roles, institutions, and policies*. London: Routledge.

Hughes, J. (Ed.). (2010). *EU conflict management*. London: Routledge.

Hurd, D. (1994). Developing the Common foreign and security policy. *International Affairs, 70*(3), 421–428.

J. Kaczyński wymyśla 100-tysięczną euroarmię. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 3, 2006.

Jaeger, Th. (2002). Enhanced cooperation in the treaty of nice and flexibility in the common foreign and security policy. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 7*(3), 297–316.
Janning, J. (2015). *(April 1*. European Council of Foreign Relations: A pragmatic approach to building a European Army.
Jones, E. (2017, July 6). Populism and the crisis of European integration: An Interview with …. *EuropeNow*, http://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/07/05/populism-and-the-crisis-of-european-integration-an-interview-with-erik-jones/. Accessed Jan. 27, 2018.
Jones, E. (2017–2018). From the end of history to the retreat of liberalism. *Survival*, *59*(6), 165–174.
Juncker, J-C., (2015, March 8). Halten Sie sich an Frau Merkel. Ich mache das!, *Welt am Sontag*. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article138178098/Halten-Sie-sich-an-Frau-Merkel-Ich-mache-das.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kaczyński, L. (2006, November 6). UE potrzebuje własnej armii. *Wirtualna Polska* (wp.pl). https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/lech-kaczynski-ue-potrzebuje-wlasnej-armii-6037670794683009a. Accessed January 27, 2018).
Military unity could make EU a superpower: Kaczynski, September 10, 2011. http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/poland-politics.c3t/. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Kaczyński: Musimy wyjść z inicjatywą zmian UE, *Rzeczpospolita*, June 26, 2016.
Kempina, R., & Mawdsley, J. (2013). The common security and defence policy as an act of American hegemony. *European Security, 22*(1), 55–73.
Keohane, D. (2018, January 15). EU Military Cooperation and National Defense, (The German Marshall Found of the United States), *Policy Brief*.
Kupchan, C. (2010, August 29). As nationalism rises, will the European Union fall? *The Washington Post*.
Kupchan, C. A. (2012). *No one's world: The West, the rising rest and the coming global turn*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Luce, E. (2017). *The retreat of Western liberalism*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
Marseille Declaration, WEU Ministerial Council, Marseille, November 13, 2000.
McCormick, J. (2006). *The European super power*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Migration and migrant population statistics, Eurostat Statistics Explained, March 2017 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Modern Populism and its Effect on Foreign Policy. (2017). The SAIS. *Review of International Affairs, 37*(1), 3–100.
More Union in European Defence. Report of a CEPS Task Force, Brussels, February 2015.
Niemcy i Francja stawiają na europejską armię, *Dziennik.p*l, September 10, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/530597,niemcy-i-francja-stawiaja-na-europejska-armie-to-bylaby-wlasciwa-odpowiedzia-na-brexit.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Niemcy redukują liczebność Bundeswehry. *Newsweek,* September 21, 2011.
Niemcy wzmacniają armię. 800 żołnierzy i 40 czołgów w wojsku pancernym, *Telewizja Republika*, February 27, 2015 http://telewizjarepublika.pl/niemcy-wzmacniaja-armie-800-zolnierzy-i-40-czolgow-w-wojsku-pancernym,17691.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Niemiecka minister obrony chce "europejskiej unii obronnej", *Dziennik.pl*, September 8, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/530449,niemiecka-minister-obrony-chce-europejskiej-unii-obronnej-razem-jestesmy-bardzo-silni.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Nováky, N. (2015). Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective. *European Security, 24*(4), 491–508.
Nuttall, S. J. (2000). *European foreign policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Orestein, M. A., & Kelemen, R. D. (2017). Trojan horses in EU foreign policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 55*(1), 87–102.
Ostermann, F. (2015). The end of ambivalence and the triumph of pragmatism? Franco-British defence cooperation and European and Atlantic defence policy traditions. *International Relations, 29*(3), 334–347.

Petersen, N. (1993). The European union and foreign and security policy. In O. Nørgaard, Th Pedersen, & N. Petersen (Eds.), *The European community in world politics* (pp. 9–30). London: Pinter.

Philippart, E., & Edwards, G. (1999). The provisions on closer Co-operation in the treaty of amsterdam: The politics of flexibility in the European union. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 37*(1), 87–100.

Redukcja brytyjskiej armii weszła w kluczową fazę, 20.06.2013, http://www.defence24.pl/927,redukcja-brytyjskiej-armii-weszla-w-kluczowa-faze. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Simón, L. (2010). *Command and Control?* (p. 81). Planning for EU Military Operations, Occasional Paper, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Simón, L. (2011). Zarządzanie kryzysowe nie jest receptą na dalsze cięcia: planowanie wojskowe i wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony po Lizbonie. In M. Terlikowski (Ed.), *System planowania i dowodzenia misjami Unii Europejskiej. Struktura, problemy i możliwości reform* (pp. 7–18). Warsaw: PISM.

Skutki Brexitu: Europejska armia bez Brytyjczyków, *Rzeczpospolita*, August 23, 2016.

Steindler, C. (2015). Mapping out the institutional geography of external security in the EU. *European Security, 24*(3), 402–419.

Telò, M. (2006). *Europe, A civilian power?: European Union, global governance, world order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Terpan, F. (2015). Financing common security and defence policy operations: explaining change and inertia in a fragmented and flexible structure. *European Security, 24*(2), 221–263.

Timmermans, Ch. (1999). The EU and international public law. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 4*(2), 181–194.

Węc, J. J. (2014). *Pierwsza polska prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej: uwarunkowania—procesy decyzyjne—osiągnięcia i niepowodzenia*. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.

Węc, J. J. (2015). *Dynamika wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony po wejściu w życie traktatu lizbońskiego*. In J. Zając, A. Włodkowska-Bagan, M. Kaczmarski (Eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe Polska–Europa–Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej* (pp. 427–444). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.

Zięba, R. (2000). *Europejska Tożsamość Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony: koncepcje—struktury—funkcjonowanie*. Warsaw: Scholar.

Zięba, R. (2003). *Unia Europejska jako aktor stosunków międzynarodowych*. Warsaw: Scholar.

Zięba, R. (2005). *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe.

Zięba, R. (2007). *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Profesjonalne i Akademickie.

Zięba, R. (2013). *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Zięba, R. (2016). Współczesne wyzwania i zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe. International Relations, 52*(3), 9–31.

Zięba, R. (2017a). Próby ożywienia polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej. *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe*, *XIV*(1), 35–52.

Chapter 8
The Marginalization of the OSCE

1 The Achievements of the CSCE in Previous Years

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is the broadest international structure in the Euro-Atlantic area, with 57 members: all European countries, including those that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the non-European former Soviet republics, the United States, Canada, and Mongolia. It has been functioning under its present name since 1995; earlier it was called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its genesis goes back to the era of the Cold War, and its constituting document is known as the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on August 1, 1975. The aim of the CSCE was to strengthen international security in the broad sense through dialogue and cooperation above the existing divisions in Europe. The acceptance of Poland's proposal to organize the conference on a 'supra-bloc' basis, in which the countries of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and the group of neutral and non-aligned countries (N+N) participated, was very important. Such a premise signified that sovereign states were participating in the conference, although, as it later emerged in the course of work, bloc mechanisms predominated.

To the end of the Cold War, the CSCE did not concern itself with questions of disarmament, but concentrated on building security through agreements on the principles of relations between the participating states, promoting economic, scientific-technological, and ecologic cooperation, and collaborating on sensitive—at that time—humanitarian areas such as culture, education, exchanges of information, and interpersonal contacts, that is, on issues having a direct effect on respect for the rules of human rights protection and fundamental values.

Another important trait of the CSCE was its method of arriving at agreements in questions of security through dialogue and political cooperation. Cooperation was recognized as the main factor for building security, and due to the adoption of this method, after the Cold War the manner of shaping security in Europe was called cooperative security. When Europe was divided, the CSCE worked as a broad

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_8

diplomatic mechanism for reducing tensions and setting the path toward democratic changes in the communist countries. This is clearly confirmed in the agreements contained in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting in January 1989, which provides uniform minimal standards in regard to respect for human rights and distinguishes the 'human dimension' of the CSCE. It thus favored the promotion of the democratic changes that were about to occur in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.[1] Twenty years later, one of the signatories of the CSCE Final Act, the former president of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, wrote that in facilitating the 'penetration of Western values' to the East this document began all the positive changes in Europe that took place over a dozen years later, including *perestroika* and the downfall of the Soviet empire.[2]

A new stage in the development of the CSCE process was opened by decisions to hold a special meeting of heads of state and governments (participants in the CSCE) in Paris on November 19–21, 1990. Breakthroughs included the signing of a treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE I) by 22 member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the opening day of the summit; a declaration in which the countries of both blocs stated that they had ceased to treat each other as opponents; and the signing on November 21 of the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* by 34 countries participating in the CSCE.

The Paris Charter outlined a vision of universal security in an undivided Europe. The charter stated that "[t]he era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended," and proclaimed "a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe," based on mutually held values such as "democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries."[3] In confirming the viability of the 10 principles of international relations in the Helsinki Final Act and the need for the full performance of all the CSCE's obligations, the Paris Charter set forth the directions for future cooperation between the participating countries, in order to build a stable, secure, prosperous, democratic Europe, based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and open to the world.[4] The political philosophy of the Paris Charter rested on acceptance of the liberal concept for strengthening peace and international security, in which the proper road to lasting security leads through respect for human rights and basic liberties, democracy and the rule of law, the protection of national-minority identities, the spread of market economies, the development of friendly relations between countries, and cooperation on arms control and disarmament.

In order to ensure the realization and development of the pan-European process along the new line agreed upon in Paris, the structural institutionalization of the CSCE began. As a result, the process began to evolve in a direction that

[1]Heraclides (1993a), pp. 100–108. For more, see Lehne (1991), Ghebali (1989).

[2]Giscard d'Estaing (1995).

[3]Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1991).

[4]Ibidem.

transformed it into a regional international organization.[5] At the beginning of the 1990s, its distinguishing priority was to develop the human dimension, and by a decision taken in Paris, a coordinating role was entrusted to the Office of Free Elections in Warsaw, which in 1992 was changed into the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

It should be noted, however, that at the beginning of the 1990s, the countries that were most interested in strengthening the CSCE were the Western countries, because NATO's expansion to the east was not yet expected, and the CSCE suited them as a broad structure for cooperative security. At the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991, the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance launched the idea of maintaining and fortifying a system of interlocking institutions, that is, a pluralist system in which the CSCE was expected to play an important role. After 1993, when the question of expanding NATO appeared as a topic in European diplomacy, Russia proposed strengthening the CSCE and making it the main or coordinating institution of European security.[6] The leading NATO politicians and representatives of the US administration responded by ruling out the subordination of the North Atlantic Alliance to the CSCE. They inclined however toward strengthening the CSCE and closer cooperation between existing organizations in Europe, as interlocking institutions.[7] The role of the CSCE was never actually increased; it was only changed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 1, 1995.

When NATO decided to expand in August 1995 (and issued its *Study on NATO Enlargement*), the countries of Central Europe and Western Europe lost interest in the OSCE. Work continued on a concept Russia had announced in 1994 of a model for 21st-century security in Europe, but the *Charter for European Security*, which was adopted in November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, was not particularly important. In actuality there had been a departure from the concept of cooperative security.[8] In March 1999, NATO admitted three Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), and ten other countries were standing in line. This meant a reduction of the OSCE's importance; in the Charter adopted in Istanbul it was no longer called a 'central' organization of European security, as it had been at the end of 1996 during work on the document.[9]

In the 1990s, the structure of the pan-European process took shape. It had a political dimension, a human dimension, economic and ecological dimensions, a military dimension, an anti-crisis mechanism, and a mechanism for supervising the observance of its provisions.

---

[5]For more, see von Bredow (1992), Heraclides (1993b), pp. 13–19, McGoldrick (1993), Sneek (1994), Kovács (1994), Szonyi (1994), Mötölä (1995).

[6]Pismo ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii … (1994). See also Kokkinides (1995), pp. 92–93, Deacaux (1994), Kozyrev (1994).

[7]Kokkinides (1995), p. 93.

[8]Charter for European Security (1999).

[9]Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe … (1996).

Generally, the functioning of the CSCE/OSCE, that is, the pan-European security mechanism, could be reduced to, firstly, setting the direction of changes in the Euro-Atlantic area by (a) raising the standard of international norms and behavior, and (b) disseminating and promoting democratic values; and secondly, to stabilizing the peace in this area by (a) preventive diplomacy, and resolving crises, including long-term missions in the field, and (b) shaping and stabilizing the military order.[10]

2 The Declining Importance of the OSCE

The course of discussion conducted in the years 1995–1999 on the subject of the future model of security for Europe corresponded to the divisions existing within the OSCE. They reflected the divergent interests of the participating states. In this debate, the Western and Central European countries were on the side of the proponents of a multi-level 'architecture' for the European security system, in which the OSCE would receive the broadest role but would not be based on obligations of a legal nature. It would have a structure promoting democratic values and adopting so-called soft security guarantees. They saw the main guarantees of security as laying in NATO, which had expanded to the east in 1999, and to a lesser degree, the European Security and Defense Policy, which had been proclaimed at the time by the European Union. There was a return to the realist paradigm, which was made easier by the misunderstandings with Russia on account of its criticism of NATO's interventions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the 'Kosovo War'). In the West and in the new NATO member countries of Central Europe, the conviction grew that 'hard' guarantees of security should be pursued and the engagement of the USA in the question of European security should be deepened. This conviction was made the stronger by the replacements and supplementation of weaponry by NATO's new member states, and by the growing interoperativeness of their armies due to their involvement in US and NATO military adventures (in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Afghanistan respectively). Furthermore, politicians in the new, Central European members of NATO considered that they should behave as the US wished, while activeness within the OSCE would not bring benefits, particularly as Russia supported the organization. Feeling their own strength, NATO and EU countries did not appreciate the need to make use of the OSCE's unique and peace-building instruments. They also did not sufficiently appreciate that the OSCE is the broadest and most democratic forum in the Euro-Atlantic area. The reason for the OSCE's weakening can be seen in the doubling of its functions by the Council of Europe, the EU, and to a lesser degree, the Community of Democracies founded in Warsaw in 2000.

[10]For more, see Zięba (2004), pp. 326–342.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the West attempted to use the OSCE to promote democracy in the eastern part of Europe. The USA and the EU, including Poland, tried to involve the organization in supporting the so-called color revolutions. In Poland, the policy of exporting democracy in this manner was conducted especially actively by the nationalist right in the years 2005–2007 by PiS governments and by the president, Lech Kaczyński. Attempts were made to use the Warsaw Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to this end, but the OSCE as a whole did not allow for such a policy of promoting democracy. Thus for the Western countries the OSCE turned out to be practically useless. In an exposé by the Polish minister of foreign affairs, Stefan Meller, in the Sejm on February 15, 2006 the OSCE was not even mentioned individually by name.

On the other hand, when the new head of Polish diplomacy, Anna Fotyga, appeared in the Sejm in the following year, she recognized the OSCE and ODHIR as the basic plane for Poland's regional activities. She claimed that Poland supports the ODIHR in its activities, appreciating above all the role and importance the ODIHR in the regional dimension. She stated:

> Poland supports the ODIHR in its actions, appreciating above all the role and importance of the ODIHR for the democratic processes taking place in the world. Poles have participated in many election observation missions and we know how important such measures are. We want the ODIHR to be able to maintain its independent role and its current framework of action. We are afraid that political factors could limit what to this time has constituted the ODIHR's great value that is, being guided above all by democratic principles. Poland supports the ODIHR. The Polish authorities attach great significance to the human dimension of their security policy, to supporting democratic processes and values and respecting human rights.[11]

In Poland's National Security Strategy of 2007 it is stated that "Poland shall continue to be involved in the work of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe",[12] as in the Council of Europe, the OECD, and other multilateral institutions.

After the Istanbul summit in November 1999, the OSCE was marginalized by the policies of the Western and Central European countries. Its organs functioned but the next summit took place only in December 2010 in Kazakhstan (in Astana). The choice of location for these summits proved the departure from democratic standards as neither the Turks nor the Kazakhs respect human rights in their domestic legislation and policies.

Russia contributed to a certain revival of the OSCE when it announced, in June 2008, the 'Medvedev Plan' for rebuilding the architecture of European security and concluding European Security Treaty (EST).[13] However, the suspension in December 2007 of the implementation of the CFE Treaty by Russia, followed in August 2008 by the Georgian War and Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in

[11]Informacja Rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej … (2006).

[12]National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2007), p. 14.

[13]Lukyanov (2009), Layton (2014), Dunay and Herd (2010), Lomagin (2015), p. 181 *et seq*. In Kanet (2010), Karaganov and Bordachev (2009, December 8–10).

response to the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by western countries were all factors which complicated relations between the West and Russia. Later, in an attempt to reduce tensions between the two sides, a dialogue was conducted within the framework of the 'Corfu Process' at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna,[14] inaugurated at an informal meeting of ministers of foreign affairs on the Greek island of Corfu on June 27–28, 2009. The majority of the OSCE member countries viewed the Russian initiative unfavorably. According to Angela Stent:

> The Western response ranged from lukewarm to hostile. From the U.S. point of view there was no need for another legally binding Euro-Atlantic super-treaty. The OSCE had already taken care of that. Several clauses in the proposed Medvedev treaty particularly worried NATO because they implied that NATO's commitment to collective defense should be superseded by an all-European commitment to collective defense.[15]

In these circumstances it was agreed to forward the Russian proposal to the OSCE. However, it should be noted that, already then, while Russia supported the OSCE as a multilateral mechanism, it didn't accord much importance to this organization. According to Elena Kropatcheva:

> [I]f in the early 1990s Russia used the OSCE in high profile politics, today Russia tends to use the OSCE more in 'low politics'. The 'low politics' issues have become more important for regional European security and stability. This is why, the OSCE format remains important for Russia on the issues of transnational threats rather than as a forum for discussing its EST initiative. The OSCE is still used to promote Russia's role as a great power, and, if it were reformed, Russia could use the Organization more in this sense.[16]

As part of the 'Corfu Process' dialogue, it was agreed that the OSCE should be strengthened in regard to preventing and resolving crises by, among other things, the necessary modification of its existing mechanisms (and where necessary the formation of new ones) and maintenance of the Organization's role as a consultation forum in matters of Euro-Atlantic security.

3 Attempts to Revive the OSCE

The 'Corfu Process' did not lead to any significant progress, however, and the leaders of the OSCE member states who came together in Astana on December 1–2, 2010 after an 11-year hiatus stated only that "[t]he time has now come to act, and we must define concrete and tangible goals in addressing […] challenges. We are determined to work together to fully realize the vision of a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security community throughout our shared OSCE area".[17] This was a proposal

[14]Kortunov (2010), Karaganov (2010), Grudziński and Pietrusiewicz (2001), pp. 54–55.
[15]Stent (2014), p. 239.
[16]Kropatcheva (2012), p. 382.
[17]Astana Commemorative Declaration (2010).

for talks aimed at creating a 'security community' within the OSCE area, based on an idea proposed over half a century earlier by Karl Deutsch.[18]

This meeting gave rise to considerable expectations, particularly in the countries of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, which was chairing the Organization. Seventy-three official delegations of member countries and OSCE partners took part in the summit, as did representatives of the leading international and regional organizations: the secretary general of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon; the head of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy; the heads of the Islamic Conference Organization, CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other organizations. However, many member states—including Poland and the USA—were not represented in Astana by their heads of states but rather by their ministers of foreign affairs.

The representatives gathered at the summit indicated that on the East-West axis it was a question of cooperation between the EU and NATO on one hand and the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the other. In this manner the transatlantic integration constructed in the previous century could be, in a natural manner, supplemented by trans-Eurasian integration. In Astana, a difficult stage in the history of the OSCE was concluded and many speakers called for its revival in new conditions, in the 'spirit of Helsinki'. The president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, proposed to work out a comprehensive Treaty on Security in Eurasia. The participants stressed in their speeches that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms should be the foundation for lasting security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian areas. In connection with this, Kazakhstan proposed that religious tolerance should be made one of the OSCE's dimensions, and also offered a range of initiatives to increase the number of OSCE baskets and institutions, for instance, to place economic and financial security in the 'second basket' of the OSCE, to create an OSCE Ecology Forum, and to open an OSCE Security Institute in Astana.[19]

Subsequently, France, Germany, Russia, and Poland joined the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community—IDEAS, in connection with the idea of community security adopted in the OSCE Astana Summit Declaration. In December 2011, at a session in Vilnius, the OSCE Ministerial Council supported the joint project presented by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland, and Russia. In the following year, expert institutions from these four countries[20] organized a series of four seminars (in Berlin, Warsaw, Paris, and Moscow) on the subject "Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community". The result was the joint document *Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: From Vision to Reality*. It was presented by four

[18]See Deutsch et al. (1957), p. 5.

[19]Zlecone: Rezultaty szczytu OBWE … (2010).

[20]They were the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Foundation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO).

institutes at an informal meeting of the ambassadors of the OSCE member countries on October 23, 2012 in Vienna.

This report, which was addressed to all the countries belonging to the OSCE, contains the following proposals for common activities to lead to the creation of a security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok:

- reinforcing the arms control system and confidence-building measures;
- common responsibility for resolving conflicts within the OSCE area;
- cooperation to increase the stability and security of Central Asia and Afghanistan;
- measures taken to reconcile countries and societies;
- closer cooperation to address transnational threats and challenges;
- joint action on behalf of sustained economic development;
- reinforcing the effectiveness of the OSCE's 'human dimension';
- dialogue with Muslim communities within the OSCE;
- creating a network of academic institutions supporting the OSCE's activities.

The document, drawn-up by analysts from four countries, provides a new look at the challenges involved in strengthening Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. It favors connecting the entire area of the OSCE into one whole. This is the opinion not of governments but uniquely of experts. However, the report was not heeded. The Western countries were unwilling to strengthen the OSCE and in autumn of 2013, after the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, relations with Russia significantly worsened and dialogue on the subject of building a security community was suspended.

The US has a very critical approach to the OSCE and places the entire responsibility for the crisis in the organization on Russia, for violating the organization's principles. The US opposes the structural changes proposed by Moscow, as well as the idea of giving the OSCE a legal personality and multi-year budget.[21] The American position is supported by the majority of NATO and EU members. This means that the West has abandoned the idea of a comprehensive and integrated approach to security that combines hard and soft aspects and is built by political dialogue with the equal participation of all 57 member countries of the OSCE.

The Western countries deliberately ceased to treat the OSCE as a necessary institution for closer cooperation and greater security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Such a political choice is a departure from the path taken in the recent past, even in the first years after the Cold War. It also signifies the relinquishment of a comprehensive approach to shaping international security, with consideration for so-called soft aspects of security. But this choice cannot be seen as a reasonable one given the continual appearance of new challenges and security threats of a non-traditional and non-military nature. If we look at the Ukraine crisis, it has to be stated that the OSCE is the sole organization that is acting toward its resolution. With some reservations, the OSCE is accepted by both sides to the conflict and has

[21]Haltzel (2016).

participated in working out and supervising the Minsk peace agreements (of September 5, 2014 and February 12, 2015).[22] Even the US has shown some interest in the role the OSCE has played in the Ukraine crisis.[23]

In spite of the generally limited interest shown by Western countries in reviving the OSCE and strengthening its role as a security institution, on the initiative of the 2014 Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in close co-operation with Serbia and Germany at the OSCE Ministerial Council 2014 in Basel on December 4 was launched the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. It was composed of 15 eminent personalities with long-standing practical expertise in European security in all its dimensions from all OSCE regions, and mandated to provide advice on how to reconsolidate peace and security in the OSCE area on the grounds of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. This body prepared the basis for an inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, reflecting on how to re-build trust among OSCE participating states, and examining perceived threats in the OSCE area and potential common solutions. The Panel has produced two reports: an *Interim Report on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine* (June 2015), and a *Final Report on the broader issues of security in Europe and the OSCE area at large* (November 2015).

The Final report consists in presentation of different views of the West, Russia and states in between, evaluates the current crisis in European security and its dangers, and formulates recommendations to set in motion a robust political and diplomatic process to overcome the present crisis. It recommends how to avoid military accidents or incidents (inter alia to reactivate of the NATO-Russia Council), and a new start for Ukraine by complete the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The Report appealed for organizing the next Summit Meeting of the OSCE and to undertake by next Chairmanships, starting with Germany in 2016, to continue the consultations on reinvigorating security in the OSCE area.[24]

The OSCE Ministerial Council, meeting on December 8–9, 2016 in Hamburg, agreed to continue supporting the work of the OSCE and to use the Organization as a platform for dialogue and to continue addressing migration-related issues where the OSCE has expertise, with the aim of developing effective measures and common approaches to this challenge. It also decided to increase its efforts to prevent and combat terrorism. These decisions have more political than practical significance, but they are important because Europe, and particularly the EU, is unable to deal with either the migration crisis begun in 2014 or with terrorism. Ministers also initiated a Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area. The subsequent OCSE Ministerial Council in Vienna on December 7–8, 2017 concentrated on filling key posts within the organs of the

[22]Schläpfer (2016), Haug (2016).

[23]Hopmann (2015).

[24]Back to Diplomacy: Final Report … (2015).

organization, on the continuation of the Structured Dialogue, but failed to make any significant decisions strengthening the OCSE.

Real conditions in the Euro-Atlantic area should definitely incline countries to favor broad solutions based on international dialogue, and the OSCE is the broadest existing international security institution, bringing together at one table 57 countries from the entire area between Vancouver and Vladivostok. It is worth remembering that the OSCE is one of the oldest organizations promoting democratic norms and values, and that this is important in the current situation where other organizations of Euro-Atlantic security are weakening. The OSCE could thus turn out to be useful as a modern 'embedded security organization'.[25] Taking all the above into consideration, it is worthwhile to paraphrase an idea from the book of a well-known American political scientist, Charles Kupchan, who claims that we should all, in the Euro-Atlantic area, learn how to make friends of our enemies and build a lasting peace.[26] The OSCE still has the opportunity to create such a community of security.

References

Astana Commemorative Declaration. (2010). *Towards a security community, organization for security and co-operation in Europe*. Summit Meeting, Astana 2010, December 3, 2010, doc. SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1*, http://www.osce.org/mc/74985?download=true. Accessed on January 27, 2018.

Back to diplomacy: Final report and recommendations of the panel of eminent persons on European security as a common project. Belgrade: Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project, November 2015. http://www.osce.org/networks/205846?download=true. Accessed on January 27, 2018.

Charter for European Security. OSCE, Istambul, November 1999.

Charter of Paris for a New Europe. OSCE, Paris 1991.

Deacaux, E. (1994). CSCE institutional issues at the Budapest Conference. *Helsinki Monitor, 5*(3), 18–26.

Deutsch, K. W., et al. (1957). *Political community and the North Atlantic Area: International organization in the light of historical experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dunay, P., & Herd, G. P. (2010). Redesigning Europe? The pitfalls and the promises of the European security treaty initiative. *OSCE Yearbook 2009*, *15*, 77–98. Baden-Baden: Nomos, IFSH.

Ghebali, V.-I. (1989). *La diplomatie de la détente: la CSCE d'Helsinki à Vienne (1973–1989)*. Bruxelles: Éditions Émile Bruylant.

Giscard d'Estaing, V. (1995). Le commencement de tout. *Politique internationale, 68,* 43–48.

Grudziński, P., & Pietrusiewicz, J. (2001). Building a modern security community in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 19,* 51–62.

Haltzel, M. (2016, April 27). *Sticking to the rules: The United States view on strengthening the OSCE*. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

[25]Mosser (2015), p. 579 *et seq*.

[26]Kupchan (2010).

Haug, H. (2016). The Minsk agreements and the OSCE special monitoring mission. *Security and Human Rights, 27*(3–4), 342–357.

Heraclides, A. (1993a). *Security and co-operation in Europe: The human dimension, 1972–1992*. London: Frank Cass.

Heraclides, A. (1993b). *Helsinki-II and its aftermath: The making of the CSCE into an international organization*. London: Pinter Publishers.

Hopmann, P. T. (2015). The United States and the OSCE after the Ukraine crisis. *Security and Human Rights, 26*(1), 33–47.

Informacja Rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2006 roku. Wystąpienie Ministra (Government information about polish foreign polish in 2006, Minister's speech). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, February 15, 2006.

Kanet, R. (Ed.). (2010). *Russian foreign policy in the 21st century* (pp. 181–203). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Karaganov, C. (2010, July 9). Soyuz Yevropy: posledniyshans? (Union of Europe: The last chance?). *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, *5229* (Federal Issue, 150).

Karaganov, S., & Bordachev, T. (2009, December 8–10). Towards a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Report of the Russian Experts for the Valdai Discussion Club Conference, London, Moscow. https://docgo.net/towards-a-new-euro-atlantic-security-architecture-report-of-the-russian-experts-for-the-valdai-discussion-club-conference. Accessed on January 27, 2018.

Kokkinides, T. (1995). L'OSCE: une opportunité perdu pour la sécurité européenne? *Relations internationales et stratégiques, 18,* 89–99.

Kortunov, S. V. (Ed.). (2010). *Mirovaya politika v usloviyakh krizisa*. Moscow: Aspekt Press.

Kovács, L. (1994). The institutionalization of the CSCE. *Studia diplomatica, XLVII*(4), 87–90.

Kozyrev, A. V. (1994). Russia and NATO: A partnership for a united and peaceful Europe. *NATO Review, 42*(4), 3–6.

Kropatcheva, E. (2012). Russia and the role of the OSCE in European security: A 'Forum' for dialog or a 'Battlefield' of interests? *European Security, 21*(3), 370–394.

Kupchan, C. A. (2010). *How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace*. Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Layton, S. (2014). Reframing European security: Russia's proposal for a new European security architecture. *International Relations, 28*(1), 25–45.

Lehne, S. (1991). *The Vienna meeting of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, 1986–1989: A turning point in East–West relations*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century. In *Lisbon Document 1996,* Lisbon: OSCE, December 3,1996.

Lomagin, N. (2015). *Medvedev's "fourteen points": Russia's proposal for a New European security architecture*.

Lukyanov, F. (2009). Rethinking security in "Greater Europe". *Russia in Global Affairs*, *3*, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13589. Accessed on January 27, 2018.

McGoldrick, D. (1993). The development of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe—From process to institution". In B. Jackson & D. McGoldrick (Eds.), *Legal visions of a new Europe* (pp. 135–182). London: Graham & Trotman/M. Nijhoff.

Mosser, M. W. (2015). Embracing "embedded security": The OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture. *European Security, 24*(4), 579–599.

Mötölä, K. (1995, February 21–25). *Neonormativism and the OSCE: A commentary on the theory and practice of producing international security*. Paper prepared at the 36th Annual ISA Convention, Chicago.

National Security Bureau. (2007). *National security strategy of the Republic of Poland*. Warsaw: National Security Bureau.

Pismo ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii A. V. Kozyreva ministru inostrannykh del Ispanskoy Respubliki, deystvuyushchemu predsedatelyu SBSE A. Martino, 23 iyunya 1994 g. [Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A. V. Kozyrev to the

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Republic, the acting CSCE Chairman A. Martino]. *Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik,* No. 15–16, August 1994, p. 23.

Schläpfer, C. H. (2016). Ukraine crisis and mediation. *Security and Human Rights, 27*(3–4), 327–341.

Sneek, T. (1994). The CSCE in the New Europe: From process to regional arrangement. *Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, 5*(1), 1–33.

Stent, A. E. (2014). *The limits of partnership: US—Russian relations in the twenty-first century*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Szonyi, I. (1994). Institutionalization of the CSCE. *Studia diplomatica, XLVII*(4), 127–142.

von Bredow, W. (1992). *Der KSZE-Prozeß. Von der Zähmung zur Auflösung des Ost-West-Konflikts*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Zięba, R. (2004). *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego; koncepcje—struktury—funkcjonowanie*. Warsaw: Scholar.

Zlecone: Rezultaty szczytu OBWE: "Ku wspólnocie bezpieczeństwa", PAP, 10.12.2010, http://zlecone.pap.com.pl/cp/en/news/info/2020,25,zlecone-rezultaty-szczytu-obwe-ku-wspolnocie-bezpieczenstwa-;jsessionid=4A6WZMyiVd0Jkvioun6Z4yXU.undefined. Accessed on January 27, 2018.

Part III
Consequences and Prospects

Chapter 9
The Ukraine Crisis and Its Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Security System

1 Two Aspects of the Ukraine Crisis

The term crisis comes from the Greek *krísis*. In the social sciences, a crisis is considered to be a situation, a breakthrough moment or a process in which the ties between given entities are broken as a result of conflicting needs, values or interests, thus leading to confrontation. This is accompanied by a high degree of emotional tension and by psychological war. An unfolding crisis can lead to armed confrontation. In contrast, a crisis resolved by peaceful means can create a new framework for cooperation between the entities concerned.

The Ukraine crisis has two aspects—an internal and an international one. Distinct paradigms or theoretical approaches need to be applied in order to analyze them.

1.1 The Internal Crisis

The liberal and the constructivist approaches need to be applied in order to analyze the internal dimension of the Ukraine crisis. The first makes it possible to grasp the true relations between the Ukrainian state on the one hand and Ukraine's society and the nature of Ukraine's political regime on the other; the other makes it easier to define Ukraine's contemporary identity as a state and as a nation.[1]

The internal crisis in Ukraine is structural in nature and is a crisis of power—a political, economic and social crisis. In the words of Henry Kissinger, the nature of this crisis lies in that "[t]he politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other.

[1]The two following works can be recognized as representative of the two approaches: Moravcsik (1997), Wendt (1992).

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_9

That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. […] We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction. […] Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse".[2]

It turned out that after 23 years of independence, Ukraine presented signs of being a fallen state. The arrival in power of the political opposition and Kyiv's Independence Majdan (called the Euromaidan, after its outcome), which had been demonstrating since November 2013, laid bare the symptoms of a deep crisis. The new authorities that emerged through revolutionary means do not represent all of society, or even of the opposition (representatives of Vitali Klitschko's party Udar were absent from Arseniy Yatsenyuk's government), yet that government included representatives from Euromaidan's semi-fascist organizations Svoboda and Pravyi Sektor. In the words of former EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, spoken to radio WDR 5, "the problem does not really lie in Moscow or with us [in the European Union]. The problem lies in Kyiv, where we have the first government in the 21st century whose members include fascists".[3]

Many of Verheugen's pronouncements were echoed by Polish right-wing priest Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski who, speaking on the TVN24 television station, pointed to the fact that, for the first time in 70 years, the nationalist heirs of Stepan Bandera entered the government, a situation that had never taken place before. This is very threatening—he added. Yatsenyuk's cabinet included nationalists from the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda, such as Oleksandr Sych, who became Deputy-Prime Minister of Ukraine; Andriy Mokhnik who became minister of the environment; and Igor Shvaika, who became minister of agriculture.[4] Former Polish Prime Minister and leader of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Leszek Miller also spoke out critically about the new Ukrainian authorities on repeated occasions. The highly critical pronouncement of Gregor Gysi, a deputy of The Left (Die Linke) in the German parliament (Bundestag) who, while criticizing the policy of Angela Merkel's government, which supported the new Ukrainian authorities, said on the March 13, 2014 that "[f]ascists hold important positions and are dominant in the

[2]Kissinger (2014).

[3]Verheugen ostrzega przed Kijowem … (2014).

[4]Father Isakowicz-Zaleski noted that one of those ministers, Andriy Mokhnik "is an excellent example of the aggression of Ukrainian nationalism, because four years ago, he broke up a conference devoted to the genocide in Volhynia". In the priest's opinion, the consolidation of the pro-Bandera party Svoboda is convenient for Russian president Vladimir Putin. The Polish government should support the pro-European aspirations of Ukraine and, at the same time, say clearly that it doesn't wish "to pal around" with nationalists and banderists, because they are anti-Polish, and not entirely European. He also expressed the fear that Putin will take advantage of the fear of the banderist movement in order to split up Ukraine, and "the worst possible outcome is the disintegration of Ukraine, because then there will be no counter-balance for Ukrainian nationalism". See Jesteśmy na progu podziału Ukrainy … (2014).

defense sector. Never in history have fascists freely given up power once they had gained it".[5]

Jack Matlock, a former US ambassador to the USSR who knows east-European countries well, has also commented on Ukraine's internal divisions and stated that a deeply divided Ukraine was brought to independence by an alliance of "anti-Soviet nationalism from western Ukraine" with the "communist nomenclature of the country's east", where inhabitants "are mostly Russian-speakers, but wanted to leave (the USSR) because they didn't like Gorbachev's reforms".[6]

Politicians in western countries tried not to notice, or tried to belittle the extent and the depth of Ukraine's internal crisis. They failed to see extremist forces underestimated the internal sources of Ukraine's problems, faulting Russia exclusively for the crisis situation. They supported the new authorities in Kyiv politically and promised economic aid for Ukraine subject to the introduction of drastic reforms. They saw the crisis above all in international terms.

1.2 The International Crisis

The crisis in Ukraine that we have been witnessing since the fall of 2013 takes the form of a rivalry for Ukraine between two external entities: the West (USA and the EU) and Russia. This rivalry grew more acute the following spring. Yet, despite the media coverage and the views of 'television experts' that prevail in the USA, in Poland and Lithuania, it is not an open military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, for if this were to be the case, Ukraine would stand no chance in the face of Russia's military superiority. It also isn't a conflict between Russia and NATO, because Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and can't count on its armed assistance. A particular bilateral feature of this crisis is the limited armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in which the latter lost the Crimea and is struggling against separatism in its eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine is the injured party in this entire crisis, and its interests have been pushed into the background, while the foreground has been occupied by the great powers' conflicting interests in Ukraine. As in all sharp conflicts, the parties to it have embarked on psychological warfare with the aim of presenting their opponent in as unfavorable light as possible, by attributing to it the vilest of intentions, and by heaping derision on the them. Politicians and their subservient media have taken part in this propaganda, and Poland plays a leading role in it.

Of all theories, that of political realism is of greatest explanatory usefulness for the purpose of analyzing international crises. This theory presupposes that the state is the most important or the dominant player in international relations, that it is a sovereign and unitary (uniform) actor and that it speaks with one voice on the

[5]Plenarprotokoll 18/20 … (2014).

[6]Były ambasador USA w ZSRR Jack Matlock … (2014).

international stage. It acts rationally and the nature of its internal political system is of no significance, because a state's behavior on the international stage is depends on the distribution of power and the foreign policy it conducts. Hans Morgenthau, a classic of political realist thought, claimed that the foreign policy goals are determined in terms of national interest, understood as power, and that the national interest has a 'hard core',[7] while Frederick Hartmann introduced the notion of 'vital interests' by which states are guided on the international stage.[8] According to the realists, the main aim of the state is to ensure its security, and the most important means of used to ensure this is power, which is understood in many ways, but usually as the military capabilities a state possesses. The international system is anarchic and power distribution or capabilities distribution is of utmost importance within it. The international system is dominated by a state of balance, which arises from the decisions and actions taken by states (Henry Kissinger) or which takes shape independently of state agents (Kenneth Waltz). The behavior of states in the international system is dictated by the interests they represent (H. Morgenthau's classic realism) or the structure of the international system (K. Waltz's structural realism). Recent years have seen the emergence of realism's clear division into defensive realism—which assumes that states concentrate on ensuring their own survival and security, i.e., a *status quo* as part of the international system (Charles Glaser); and offensive realism—holding that the aim of states is to maximize their relative power and that the international system creates motives for expansion (John Mearsheimer). The newest attempt to depart from this dichotomy is provided by neoclassical realism which, while acknowledging the primacy of the international system, recognizes the importance of the impact of a state's internal conditions or preferences about the manner in which it responds to the impulses arising from the system (Steven Lobell, Randall Schweller, Jeffrey Taliaferro). It indicates that states assess and adapt to change in their external systemic environment as a function of their specific internal structure and political situation.[9]

In attempting to analyze the international crisis centered on Ukraine, the most useful perspective seems to be that offered by offensive realism, based on the interpretation proposed by John Mearsheimer. This scholar noticed that the policies of the great powers are, in a sense, tragic, because the anarchy of the international system forces them to seek domination at others' expense, thus condemning even peaceful nations to a pitiless struggle for power.[10] If we were to associate these western theories with some geopolitical analyses currently enjoying a renaissance in Russia despite their anachronism, above all those reflecting the views of Alexander

[7]Morgenthau (1958), pp. 65–66, (1967), pp. 5, 519.

[8]Hartmann (1962), pp. 6, 14. The category of 'vital interests' is also in use among British scholars. For example, see Frankel (1970), pp. 73–76, Northedge (1976), pp. 194–197.

[9]Kaczmarski (2015).

[10]Mearsheimer (2001).

Dugin,[11] we will appreciate the usefulness of the strength/power category in contemporary international relations. And this means that if we concentrate on the external aspects of the growing two-pronged rivalry between the West and Russia over Ukraine, we should refer to classic *Realpolitik* and to the theory of political realism.

It is the very politicians of the powers engaged in competition in the post-Soviet area who made the need to do so plain. Among Russian leaders, it is above all President Vladimir Putin, who is feeding the Russians' longing to 'rise from their knees' and is striving to restore their former pride centered on their country's great-power position. US-President Barack Obama in turn, sought to satisfy Republican expectations by demonstrating an ability to act on Ukraine following the military setbacks of Afghanistan and Iraq (inherited from the George W. Bush administration) and Libya, and the diplomatic setbacks sustained at Russian hands in the matter of Syria[12] and Iran.[13] It turned out in 2014 that great-power rivalry had made a comeback, and Ukraine had become—in the words of Dmitri Trenin—a battleground in the American-Russian 'fight for influence' in that country.[14]

Polish politicians and those of some other new EU-member countries are also thinking in terms of rivalry with Russia. In order to justify their policy of 're-pulsing' Russia from Europe, they claim it harbors expansionist intentions and seeks to establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In this sense, what is one to call the intense support extended to pro-Western aspirations in a politically-torn Ukraine? Is it not democratic (liberal) messianism combined with a republican (realistic) drive for expansion? Would Ukraine's association with the European Union and its future membership that club not constitute a gain for the West at Russia's expense?

During the initial phase of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 one could clearly see that the aspirations of the Ukrainians themselves had been pushed into the background and were overtaken by the rivalry between the West and Russia. This was reflected in the great propaganda campaign which was unleashed in Poland and the USA, and in which politicians and the media outdid each other in criticizing Russia, and especially in sneering at its president, Putin.[15]

---

[11]Dugin (1997).

[12]This concerns efforts made by Russia and China to prevent the UN Security Council from authorizing an armed intervention in Syria for the purpose of toppling the regime of Al. Assad.

[13]The Russian government convinced the Iranian authorities to submit their nuclear program to international control—something the United States proved unable to do.

[14]Trenin (2014), p. 1. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

[15]Former Polish prime minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, until then known for his toned down pronouncements, stated in March 2014 on one of the Polish television stations, that "Russia had shown the face of a thug", and that its leading politicians lie so, that they are all growing Pinocchio noses. See Rosja pokazała gębę bandziora … (2014).

2 The Outbreak of the Crisis

During the summit of the European Union's Eastern Partnership, held on November 28–29, 2013 in Vilnius, Ukraine was to sign an association agreement with the EU. The text of the agreement, agreed upon earlier (on March 30, 2012), also called for the establishment of a "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement" (DCFTA). On November 21, a week prior to the Vilnius Summit, the Ukrainian government decided to suspend preparations to sign the association agreement. As Ukraine's Deputy-Prime Minister Yuryi Boyko explained, his country had done so in order to deal with its worsening trade relations with Russia and because the EU had not proposed to Ukraine any compensation for the losses that this situation entailed. President Viktor Yanukovych in turn said that the EU's declaration of financial aid for Ukraine in exchange for signing the agreement had been 'humiliating' and had been extended to Ukraine as a 'candy in a pretty wrapping' for three years, while the aid had been made conditional upon Ukraine's signing of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He openly stated that Ukraine should not be belittled like this, because it is a serious European state.[16]

The decision of the Ukrainian government gave rise to violent social protests in Kyiv and in many cities of Western Ukraine. These protests then turned into a long-lasting occupation of the central square in Kyiv, the Independence Maidan (Euromaidan). This was the greatest wave of violent protests by proponents of integration with the EU since the time of the Orange Revolution in 2004–2005. Initially, the demonstrators demanded that the authorities change their stance and sign the agreement that had been prepared. Later these demands were compounded by calls for change of the entire political system, the removal of the Mykola Azarov's government and for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych. Gradually, the Euromaidan's demands grew more radical, barricades were erected and government administration buildings were occupied in Kyiv and in provincial capitals in the country's western provinces. The tone of the radical demands was set by the nationalist group Svoboda under Oleh Tyahnybok and by the radicals from the Right Sector (*Pravyi Sektor*) of the Euromaidan, whose leadership ultimately fell into the hands of Dmytro Yarosh. Gradually, the demonstrations took on the nature of an anti-systemic revolution. The Right Sector preached nationalist slogans and some of its leaders even voiced territorial claims against Poland (the return of the land of Przemyśl and Chełm—15 districts in all).

Russia expressed concern with the demonstrations in Ukraine and accused Western countries of supporting radical and fascist-like groups from western Ukraine. The West didn't want to negotiate with Russia, while many western politicians, including many from Poland, took part in the Euromaidan protests. A good occasion to hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin was squandered in February 2015 during the Sochi Winter Olympic Games, which western

[16]Janukowycz … (2013).

politicians boycotted. The West's motives for supporting the protests in Kyiv while avoiding talks with Russia were questioned in Moscow, and not only there.

On February 21, 2014, the mediation of the foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany and France)—with the participation of a Russian representative, a fact worthy of note—led to the signing of an understanding between the leaders of the political opposition and President Victor Yanukovych. The following day, it turned out that the radical leaders of the Euromaidan demonstrators rejected the agreement, and Yanukovych abandoned his office and left Kyiv, most likely out of fear for his own life, and power was taken over by the opposition acting under the influence of the Euromaidan radicals. The West failed to abide by the agreement reached with such difficulty. One would thus be entirely justified in inquiring how much importance it accords to the old Roman law principle that *pacta sunt servanda*.

Ukraine's Supreme Council entrusted the responsibilities of the president to its own chairman, Olexander Turchynov. On the February 23 it abrogated the 2012 Act on the bases for language policy. This act gave privileged status to minority languages in regions of Ukraine where large groups of those minorities were to be found, which means that it was beneficial for ethnic Russians living in the south and east of Ukraine. Although legally invalid, the abrogation of this act sparked outrage in many regions of Ukraine. It also drew protests from Russia, as well as from Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and even Bulgaria. The Polish authorities, however, failed to react.

A political coup took place in Kyiv. After a few days the Supreme Council of Ukraine produced a new government, headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, one of the leaders of the party Batkivshchyna (Fatherland). The government included activists from that party, from the Svoboda party and Euromaidan leaders. Not included in the government was Udar, the party of Vitali Klitschko, one of the three leaders of the political opposition. The new government turned for assistance to western governments and proclaimed its readiness to quickly sign the association agreement with the EU.

The signatories of the agreement of February 21, the European Union and the USA recognized the new authorities, announced they would give aid—including financial assistance—to Ukraine—and launched a critique of Russia, which reacted very negatively to what had taken place in Kyiv. In Russia's view, power in Ukraine had been taken over illegally by nationalist and fascist forces. It declared that it would extend protection to Russians living in Ukraine and Russian politicians predicted that the Ukrainian state would break up and even a Ukrainian civil war.

Moscow then supported the secession of Crimea using Russian troops stationed at the navy base in Sebastopol and with the assistance of 'little green men', that is soldiers without insignia indicating to whose armed forces they belonged. On March 16 a referendum was held in Crimea, 58.5% of whose inhabitants are Russians. The voter turnout was 83.1%, and 96.8% of the voters opted to join the Russian Federation. This entailed the rejection of the proposal to remain in Ukraine as a territory with wide autonomy. On March 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin

and the authorities of Crimea and Sebastopol signed an agreement concerning the incorporation of these two entities into the Russian Federation. If Russian public opinion polls are to be believed, 92% of Russians supported this decision. After the completion of the ratification process, this agreement came into force on March 21, 2014.

The referendum and the annexation of Crimea were sharply condemned by Ukraine's new authorities and by western countries, which suspended Russia's participation in the G8 group and imposed sanctions banning travel to the USA and the EU and freezing the assets of 33 individuals responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. These sanctions were directed at persons from Crimea and Russia. The USA and EU imposed successive sanctions on Russia, wanting to force it to cease supporting separatists in Ukraine's eastern provinces (the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk) inhabited by a Russian speaking population that doesn't recognize the new authorities in Kyiv. The West accused Russia of violating international law and of escalating the conflict in Ukraine.[17] Given the inflexibility shown by Moscow, this in practice led to a sharp confrontation reminiscent of Cold War times.

The secession and annexation of Crimea encouraged other regions of eastern Ukraine to take up efforts to leave the Ukrainian state, or at least to obtain a wide degree of autonomy within it. This separatism met with the political and military support of Russia. Initially, the Ukrainian army did not take up effective action against the separatists, and it happened that entire units of this army would take the side of the rebellious regions. Only after the presidential elections (May 25, 2014, which were won in the first round by the oligarch Petro Poroshenko), did Ukraine—acting on the political advice of the USA and the EU and benefiting from aid in the form military equipment from NATO member countries—begin to truly defend its territorial integrity. This resulted in a growing number of casualties, especially among the civilian population, and in a large wave of refugees. According to the figures of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from early August 2014, about 730,000 persons left Ukraine this year because of the fighting in the east of that country and found themselves in Russia. A real exodus from the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk took place in July 2014 when inhabitants fled, fearing the approaching offensive of government troops. To this number one should add a further 117,000 Ukrainian internal refugees, whose number increased by about 1200 daily for several months. The UNHCR report indicated that the humanitarian situation in Donetsk and Luhansk was growing worse daily—there were serious problems with supplies of food, water, electricity and medical services.[18] Russia alerted the world that the Ukrainian authorities had

[17]Authors analyzing the issue from a constructivist standpoint claim that the EU imposed sanctions against Russia for having violated Ukraine's sovereignty and the right of Ukrainians to self-determination. See Sjursen and Rosén (2017).

[18]ONZ … (2014).

produced a humanitarian catastrophe, by shooting at their Russian-speaking citizens in the eastern provinces who had stood up for their right to self-determination. The West remained deaf to those reports and failed to provide any humanitarian aid, it also rejected the postulate of Ukraine's federalization or decentralization which, had it been carried out at an early stage, could have prevented the conflict.

The decision to draw Ukraine into the western sphere of influence and to condemn and 'punish' Russia for its opposition to this was a key element in the West's policy. On March 21, 2014, the European Union and Ukraine signed the political part of the association agreement. This was a symbolic gesture of support by the EU for its eastern neighbor and for the temporary government in Kyiv at a difficult moment for Ukraine following the loss of Crimea. The new Ukrainian authorities then obtained economic assistance from the EU, the USA and the IMF. Several days after the election of the new Ukrainian president, on June 21, 2014 the EU and Ukraine signed the commercial part of the association agreement. The agreement is one of the most ambitious of such documents. It gave Ukraine access to the EU market through the gradual abolishment of duties and quotas and through the harmonization of EU and Ukrainian law and norms in various areas. The agreement provisionally came into force on January 1, 2016.

As a bloody civil war broke out in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014, two types of initiatives could be observed in the West: the first, in the 'forceful' form of economic sanctions, reinforcing the presence and activeness of NATO forces in Central-European countries, and supporting the Ukrainian government with equipment and advice; and the second, in the form of negotiations with Russia. The result of those diplomatic efforts was the Geneva agreement of April 17, 2014. This was a joint declaration by the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, the USA and the EU, which set out what needed to be done in order to extinguish the conflict in south-eastern Ukraine. It contained calls addressed to 'all sides' to refrain from using force, to disarm all illegal armed groups and to cease the occupation of public buildings and spaces. It also entrusted to the Special Monitoring Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the main role in bringing about the de-escalation of the conflict, and provided for the obligation for Ukraine to carry out a 'constitutional process' (which entailed federalization) with the participation of all regions. The declaration stressed the importance of Ukraine's economic and financial stability.[19] As *The Guardian* commented, the OSCE was "given the job not only of making sure the agreement will be put into practice but also of helping to implement it. The US, Russia and European countries would provide monitors to beef up the OSCE's manpower, which would be given access across Ukraine".[20]

Missing in the document was, firstly, any reference to Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolability of its boundaries, and so any reference to Russia's annexation of Crimea, something Moscow's interpreted simply as the West's

[19]Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine (2014).

[20]Borger and Luhn (2014).

recognition that the matter of Crimea was closed. Secondly, in calling for de-escalation the issue of external military support and interference by Russia was also omitted. Although the document still placed obligations on Ukraine, Russia succeeded in avoiding the use of the formulation 'Ukrainian government' in the document, agreeing to 'Ukrainian authorities' instead.

The Geneva agreement was thus a major success for Russia, which later made reference to this document on repeated occasions, pointing to the fact that none of the postulates under which the Ukrainian foreign minister had placed his signature had been carried through by his country.

3 The Motives of the Parties Involved

3.1 The West's Motives

The European Union became involved in the Ukraine crisis as a community interested in spreading democracy, human rights and the free market. On the initiative of Poland and Sweden, the EU inaugurated the Eastern Partnership program in 2009 and, later, decided to conclude a new association agreement with Ukraine. This agreement provides for the establishment of closer ties between Ukraine and the EU, the introduction of most EU law in Ukraine and also the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Such a prospect not only entails a decision by Ukraine to bring considerable changes to its internal policy, but also to opt for the West in the geopolitical sense. This new orientation in Ukraine's foreign policy—if it were to be maintained—would have specific long term consequences for the Russian Federation, which was then preparing to establish the Eurasian Economic Union based on a customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia ended up establishing such an organization on January 1, 2015, but without Ukrainian participation.

But neither in the 2012 initialized version of the new EU-Ukraine association agreement, nor in its final version signed in stages in 2014, was there any mention of Ukraine's membership in the EU. This was because already during the Vilnius Summit in November 2013, at France's request, the sentence stating that Ukraine, as a European country, has a chance of joining the EU in the future upon meeting the appropriate criteria, had been crossed out from the agreement's preamble. The EU nonetheless stood for a 'Wider Europe' concept that presupposed tying Ukraine to the EU, but without granting it membership. That alone was at odds with the Russian idea of a 'Greater Europe' calling for the construction of a loose Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, with traditional influence centers in Brussels, Moscow and Ankara.[21]

[21]Sakwa (2015), p. 26.

By offering to Ukraine the establishment of the DCFTA, the European Union intended to tie that country with the EU common market and, in due course, with the trans-Atlantic free trade area. The interest of the West required that Ukrainian consumers, of which there are over 45 million, be secured for the common market. The term 'consumer' should be used because it would be difficult to imagine Ukrainian goods competing freely on the European common market in the foreseeable future. The association agreement did not only concerned with tying Ukraine with EU trade, norms and law through the DCFTA, but also with the wider EU foreign policy aims, especially its normative political aims such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.[22]

Yet the European Union failed to offer an appropriate financial shield. It only proposed economic assistance through the intermediary of the IMF and thus de facto assumed that Ukraine would embark on costly reforms that this country could rather ill afford. While the EU didn't offer any appreciable or sufficient financial assistance to Ukraine, while Russia did. The idea of a trilateral EU-Ukrainian-Russian agreement proposed by President Vladimir Putin was rejected by the EU and the USA. This additionally explains why the authorities then in power in Kyiv held back with signing the text of the association agreement agreed upon earlier with Brussels, leading to months of demonstrations by proponents of a pro-European course in Ukrainian policy and opponents of President Viktor Yanukovych. During that time—according to known American historian Stephen F. Cohen—in a reckless and ultimatum-like manner, they demanded that the democratically elected president of a divided country choose either Europe or Russia.[23]

It is only when power in Kyiv was in the hands of the Ukrainian opposition, i.e., proponents of Ukraine's integration with the EU, and as a result of growing pressure of Russia, which was supporting the secession of Crimea, that Brussels offered an aid package worth 11 billion euro to the new government in Kyiv. The European Union, as an organization of 28 countries which at times have differing interests was not able to impose sanctions on Russia swiftly, and its more severe restrictions were only agreed upon toward the end of July 2014. Tellingly, they did not affect imports of natural gas from Russia or certain contracts signed earlier in other areas, and certain EU member countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia, criticized the sanctions policy.

As a whole, the policy of the European Union, but also that of the USA, toward Ukraine was vague and inconsistent. The proposed association agreement was not a preliminary step leading to EU accession at a later time. Its aim was to promote and consolidate democratic and market reforms that would have drawn Ukraine into the West's orbit. This aim can be seen in the decided support given to the Maidan demonstrators in Kyiv, the West's acceptance of the coup d'état consisting in the toppling in February 2014 of Ukraine's legally elected president, and in the support

[22]Smith (2016), p. 35.

[23]Cohen (2014b).

the USA and the EU then gave to Ukraine's new nationalist authorities. For this reason, one can only agree with the view of John Mearsheimer, who places the principal responsibility for bringing about the Ukraine crisis on the USA and its European allies.[24] It should be noted, that the USA and Poland turned out to be the two countries most sharply criticizing Russian pressure and interference in Ukraine's internal affairs, even though these actions were mostly a response to the actions of western countries.

The United States became deeply involved in the Ukraine crisis and extended political support and economic aid to Kyiv.[25] Before that the USA quite effectively pursued a policy of extending their influence in Eastern Europe. But starting in 2008, they had to face the growing resistance of an increasingly powerful Russia. The Georgian-Russian war showed that it would be difficult pursue further NATO enlargement and to continue promoting democracy eastwards. It is difficult to treat the desire to turn Ukraine into a democratic state governed on the western model as a rational motive. The earlier fiasco of the Orange Revolution in 2004–2005 showed how difficult a task this would be, above all on account of the lack of political will on the part of the Ukrainian elite. A few years later the West once again used this motive as justification to work for a pro-western choice by the Ukrainians themselves. Kyiv's Euromaidan demonstrations—which began in November 2013 and lasted over a year—were seen as a confirmation of that choice.

There is no information, however, about whether the western countries played a role in preparing and directing the demonstrations, or about the nature of the aid given by the West to the armed forces of the new Ukrainian government during the pacification campaign (the so-called 'anti-terrorist operation') conducted since the spring of 2014 against the separatists in Ukraine's eastern provinces authorities. After the victory of the Orange Revolution, it turned out that aid, including financial aid, flowed to Ukraine. The question thus arises if the situation was similar this time or different. It is unclear in this context, why the Polish government did not react with a diplomatic note to Russian President V. Putin's public accusation made on March 4, 2014 that Poland (and Lithuania) trained armed groups from the Euromaidan.[26] The geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia in Ukraine can be in the fact that the western governments were not disturbed by the presence of nationalist politicians in the new Ukrainian government formed in February 2014. This government won the support of the USA and European leaders. Following Russia's intervention in Ukraine, the West embarked on a policy of selective containment of Russia and selective engagement with the Russian government on issues of mutual interest, such as Iran, Syria, or North Korea.[27]

---

[24]Mearsheimer (2014), p. 1.

[25]For more, see Morelli (2017), pp. 36–41.

[26]According to Putin, the protesters in Kyiv were trained in bases near the border in Lithuania, Poland and in Ukraine itself. The spokesman of the Polish defense ministry denied this information on Twitter. See Świat … (2014).

[27]Stoner and McFaul (2015), pp. 181–184.

Mearsheimer called the involvement of the USA and the European Union in the Ukraine crisis a case of liberal and messianic delusion. Even if we were to ignore this harsh definition, the question remains as to the real intentions behind the involvement of both players. An analysis of the USA and the EU in the region could help answer this question. The West, by seeking to draw Ukraine closer, had no intention to include it in the EU, but only to let it into the EU's 'antechamber', but certain politicians from the USA, Poland or the Baltic countries thought it possible to admit Ukraine to NATO, as was spelled out in the communiqué from the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008. This latter accession was especially sought by the Alliance's new members, who neighbored on Russia and who felt threatened by it. Had Ukraine successfully tied itself to the West, it would have been the realization of the aim—called for by the Ukrainian *zakhidniks*—of joining the EU but also NATO, primarily in order to obtain guarantees of defense against Russia, which was firmly opposed to such a scenario. Both options were very difficult to carry through, yet no one seemed to realize this in Washington or in the Central European capitals.

From the above, it follows that the West, i.e., the United States and the European Union, decided to draw Ukraine into its sphere of interests. The clearest explanation of the causes for the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis was formulated by the outstanding American realist Prof. Stephen Walt of Harvard University, when he wrote:

> Moreover, the Ukraine crisis did not begin with a bold Russian move or even a series of illegitimate Russian demands; it began when the United States and European Union tried to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and into the West's sphere of influence. That objective may be desirable in the abstract, but Moscow made it abundantly clear it would fight this process tooth and nail. U.S. leaders blithely ignored these warnings – which clearly stemmed from Russian insecurity rather than territorial greed – and not surprisingly they have been blindsided by Moscow's reaction. The failure of U.S. diplomats to anticipate Putin's heavy-handed response was an act of remarkable diplomatic incompetence, and one can only wonder why the individuals who helped produce this train wreck still have their jobs.[28]

It seems that the Unites States—while losing its hegemonic world position—decided to strengthen its influence in Europe by using to this end the Ukraine crisis, caused primarily by the eastern policy of the European Union. The USA thus saw an opportunity to reinforce its influence in the post-Soviet area, and to contain Russia's increasingly assertive policy with regard to the West. During the Ukraine crisis, the United States punished Russia politically for its interference in Ukrainian affairs, condemning Russia's violations of international law and, as the first country to do so, imposed economic sanctions in Russia. Another aim was to weaken Russia as a participant in the increasingly active BRICS group and as a close partner of China. Moreover, by deciding to strengthen NATO's eastern flank militarily, it additionally influenced its European allies which feared Russia to send troops to the eastern flank and to increase expenditures on defense. Very helpful in this regard

[28]Walt (2015).

was the policy of Poland, the Baltic States and Romania, which were asking for supplementary military security in the face of a potential armed conflict with Russia. It doesn't seem that Washington expected such a conflict, but it effectively used the fears of its Central-European allies, and this also had a disciplining effect on its allies in Western Europe, who rather did not harbor fears of a possible armed conflict with Russia.

Poland's involvement arises from the basic assumptions of its foreign policy, which treats the consolidation of Ukrainian independence and of its pro-western foreign policy course as one of the fundamental guarantees that Russia will not revert to an imperial policy. Russia is treated in Warsaw as the main threat to Polish security, and the consequence of this is a policy that seeks to push Russia away from Europe and of fencing it off with a buffer strip in the shape of pro-western countries on Poland's eastern boundary. This is a contemporary manifestation of the Jagellonian idea, the concept of Prometeism and the concept of Juliusz Mieroszewski and Jerzy Giedroyć.[29] Poland's support for Ukraine, which dates from when that former Soviet republic proclaimed its independence on July 16, 1990, is above all an anti-Russian policy.[30] Since that time, Poland has supports the democratization of Ukraine and its rapprochement to European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Warsaw sees future Ukraine as a member of the European Union and also of NATO. Especially as the Ukrainian crisis grew, Polish politicians tried to involve the Alliance with the affairs of that country, and justified this with the need for defense against a possible or even an expected Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by an invasion of the Baltic States and Poland. In the words of Mieczysław Stolarczyk, "Many Polish politicians and commentators reacted with disappointment when the representatives of the United States and other NATO and EU members were declaring that they were not considering a military option against Russia in reaction to Moscow's annexation of Crimea or even in the case of eastern Ukraine. Completely irresponsible ideas were even voiced in the Polish public debate such as that NATO should declare that the alliance's air force would take control of Ukraine's airspace".[31] As they pursued a policy of supporting Ukraine's anti-Russian attitude, they were not bothered by the fact that government in Kyiv was in the hands of politicians who violated the rules of democracy, human rights and who had built their fortunes thanks to enormous corruption in an oligarchic economy. They closed their eyes, and continue to do so, to the Ukrainian government's tolerance for neo-fascist and anti-Polish nationalism in western Ukraine and to the building of Ukrainian identity by reaching for anti-Polish struggle models, including the tradition of OUN-UPA and Stepan Bandera. In the media propaganda inspired by the country's leading politicians, the obsessive image of the alleged great threat represented by Russia and its involvement in Ukraine

[29]Zając (2016), pp. 48–52, Osińska (2009), pp. 133–136.

[30]Zięba (2013), pp. 200–202.

[31]Stolarczyk (2014), p. 62.

prevails.[32] Poland behaved as if the fate of its very independence was about to be decided. Warsaw's diplomatic service was not a mitigating factor in the Ukrainian crisis, but quite the opposite, it played a conflict-generating role and, for this reason, its opinion counted for less and less in the global confrontation between the powers that played out in Ukraine. Poland played a leading role in initiatives aiming at reinforcing the involvement of NATO forces in Eastern flank countries and in bringing about the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the EU. On the latter account, Poland incurred considerable losses from the West's sanctions on Russia and so has its prestige as a country which doesn't seek understanding with its great neighbor but consciously chooses setbacks instead of working rationally to gain advantages. This is borne out, for example, by Poland's exclusion from the group of states working on a solution for the Ukraine crisis. During the first phase of this crisis Poland participated, within the framework of the Weimar Triangle, in seeking an understanding between the parties to the conflict. When the crisis became internationalized, Poland was not invited to take part in the so-called Normandy Format searching for a peaceful solution.[33]

3.2 Russia's Motives

In Russia, Ukraine is seen as being a part of Russia, as the so-called 'Little Russia'. It is for this reason that attempts to link Ukraine with the European Union, and also the earlier 'color revolutions' in CIS countries supported by the West are perceived as a desire to weaken Russia and to spread the West's sphere of influence. Russia rejects the western countries' argumentation that it is only a matter of promoting democracy and the rule of law, and seen their actions as interference in the internal affairs of countries Russia has a special relationship with and an attempt by the West to extend its influence in order to pursue its strictly material and political interests. Moscow ignores the increasingly strongly articulated aspirations of societies in post-Soviet countries to build democratic systems and to embark on a western civilizational path. For Russia, it seems obvious that these societies, these segments of the 'Soviet nation' belong to the 'Russian world' (*Russkiy Mir*) [34] and that the recurring pro-western aspirations are imposed on them by outside forces. This means that Russia uses the classic interpretation of the behavior of western countries in light of the theory of Hans Morgenthau, all the while treating its own relations with post-Soviet states as internal matters.

[32]Łagowski (2014).

[33]The Normandy Format is a group of four states: Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine to resolve a conflict in eastern Ukraine. The group was created on June 6, 2014, when France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine leaders met on the margins of the 70th anniversary of the D-Day allied landings in Normandy (in 1944).

[34]Busygina (2018), pp. 113-114. For more see Laruelle, M. (2015).

Russia did in part fear losses of its own that would follow the institution of a free trade zone between the European Union and Ukraine,[35] but above all it refuses to acquiesce to Ukraine binding itself geopolitically with the West. For this reason, when on February 22, 2014, power was taken over in Kyiv by nationalist anti-Russian and pro-western forces, Moscow began to act. In opposing the West's 'expansion' it decided to retain its influence in Ukraine and to bring some corrections to the division of the USSR in 1991 through the 'gathering of Russian lands' and by protecting the Russian minorities scattered through other post-Soviet countries, including in Ukraine, where 8.3 million of them live.

In March 2014 is supported the secession of Crimea politically and militarily. This territory's annexation by Russia, sharply condemned by the West as an act of aggression, constituted an important gain of strategic significance for Russia, as it gives freedom of operation to Russia's Black Sea Fleet based in Sebastopol. Crimea's secession raised fears about whether it would prove to be a precedent leading to the further truncation of Ukraine's territory of its eastern and southern lands inhabited by a numerous Russian minority and by Ukrainians fearing the western Ukrainian nationalists. And so, Russia openly violated the international order in Eastern Europe. In fact, it did so with impunity, because the West, including the European Union as a whole, is not in a position to effectively punish it by political means, while the economic sanctions which it imposed, while painful for the Russian economy, have not altered Moscow's policy. In its actions, Moscow made use of the precedent of the similarly illegal support of the West for the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, or even the proclamation of Ukraine's independence during the disintegration of the USSR (when Nikita Khrushchev's decision to hand over Crimea to Ukraine was sanctioned without Russia's agreement). Following the signing of the agreement to incorporate Crimean Peninsula into the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin justified it using two arguments: the first was the realization of the rights of the inhabitants of this territory to self-determination, and the second was preventing the take-over of the base in Sebastopol by NATO,[36] which had already spoken of including Ukraine among its members. He took the opportunity to add reassuringly that Russia has no plans to further partition Ukraine and that relations with 'the brotherly Ukrainian nation' will always be of key importance for Russia.[37]

---

[35]In Minsk, during the August 26, 2014 summit of the EU and the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, with the president of Ukraine participating, Russia's president said that Ukraine's signing of an association agreement with the EU would cause Russia to lose over 100 billion rubles (about 2.1 billion euro). See Mińsk … (2014).

[36]Cohen wrote "It was to that that Putin reacted. It was to the fear that the new government in Kiev, which overthrew the elected government, had NATO backing and its next move would be toward Crimea and the Russian naval base there… But he was reacting, and as Kiev began an all-out war against the East, calling it the 'anti-terrorist operation,' with Washington's blessing. …". Kovalik (2015).

[37]Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 18 marta 2014 goda [Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Accessed January 27, 2018.

The second argument clearly points to thinking in categories of political realism justifying Russia's policy of expanding its sphere of influence and of consolidating its security at the neighbor's expense. Russia thus took up the rivalry imposed on it on a military and strategic plane.

The rivalry over Ukraine also took place on an economic plane. Russia came forward with a counter-proposal with respect to the EU's offer (DCFTA), in the form of an offer to include Ukraine in the planned Euroasian Economic Union being prepared on the basis of the existing customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This new community began to function on January 1, 2015. It is worthwhile to note in this context that, while less attractive in the long term, to the circles of President Yanukovych and to his supporters the Russian offer seemed optimal for Ukraine which was struggling with very serious economic difficulties. Moreover, Russia has one very important advantage—it is the largest supplier of energy for Ukraine and a major destination for its exports.

This implied serious difficulties for Ukraine in its commercial relations with Russia, made worse by Ukraine's nearly total dependence on Russian energy resources. Gazprom and other Russian intermediaries alone supplied 2/3 of the gas used in Ukraine; 42% of Ukraine's exported goods (of questionable quality) were sold in 2013 on the territory of the Customs Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan), while only 30% found their way onto the EU market; and almost 3 million Ukrainians worked in Russia. The Ukraine's association with the EU and the institution of a customs union with it was incompatible with the maintenance of existing economic ties with Russia. In addition, Russia resorted to economic pressure and blackmail.

During its rivalry with the West over influence in Ukraine, and during its annexation of Crimea, Russia also made use of other innovative arguments which are far removed from the premises of realism and which proponents of neoclassical realism divide into three categories: nationalistic appeals, geopolitical discourse, and cooptation of international, Western, and liberal norms.[38]

3.3 Third-Party Assessments

The rivalry between the West and Russia in the post-Soviet area was observed from a distance by the emerging powers associated (with Russia) in the BRICS group. Let's use as an example the case of India. That country's ambassador in Moscow, former Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kanwal Sibal, stated that the USA and the EU who, in attempting to maintain the leadership of the West, resort to setting off crises "to destabilize Russia's relations with such countries as Ukraine;

[38]Becker et al. (2016), pp. 123–126. Roy Allison proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations for Russia's operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. See Allison (2014).

they used to this end the instruments of human rights and democracy". The Indian diplomat noted that it is "fictitious to state that the West had always supposedly responsibly acted in the interest of peace and stability, in contrast to the undemocratic and authoritarian regimes, and that its striving to spread democracy and human rights is directed at making the world better and safer". Sibal wrote that "while condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine, the West once again claims to speak in the name of the 'international community' while ignoring the stance of India and China", while "India recognize Russia's legitimate interests in Ukraine".[39] He further noted that in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, that "the West is creating conditions for a new 'Cold War' in Europe by seeking to weaken strategically an already weak post-Soviet Russia".[40] China in turn did not condemn Russia for the annexation of Crimea, but declared that they recognize Ukraine's territorial integrity and, at the same time, stressed that it does not interfere in other countries' internal matters.[41]

Incidentally, it is worthwhile to note that Russia's annexation of Crimea met with the understanding of former German chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt, as well as that of former US ambassador to the USSR, Jack Matlock.[42]

Generally speaking, it should be said that the West extended its sphere of influence in post-Cold War Europe and engaged Russia to that end in the post-Soviet area: In 2004 three former Soviet republics—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—were admitted to NATO and then to the European Union; during the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, the future admission of Georgia and Ukraine to the North-Atlantic Alliance was announced; in May 2009 the European Union launched the Eastern Partnership program addressed to six post-Soviet countries; and in the fall of 2013, it decided to sign an association agreement with Ukraine. This could not fail to alarm Russia, which claimed that the West is realizing its strategic aim of 'encircling' Russia in this manner. In Moscow it is thought that the West is imposing its own systemic models on Russia's neighbors and that, under the guise of 'democratization', it is infringing on the principles of sovereign equality and of non-interference in their internal matters and, in so doing, it is undermining the legal principles of the international order.

Merely considering the motives that guide the West and Russia as they intervene in Ukraine's internal matters is not enough. It is necessary to take into account the first research directive formulated by Morgenthau who indicates that in foreign policy not only the motives of political acts performed matter, but also "the fore-

[39]Kryzys na Ukrainie … (2014).

[40]Ibidem. See also Sibal (2014).

[41]Góralczyk (2014).

[42]Helmut Schmidt … (2014), Były ambasador USA w ZSRR Jack Matlock … (2014).

seeable consequences of these acts."[43] It is thus worthwhile to reflect on the consequences of the rivalry in Ukraine between the West and Russia for European security.[44]

4 The Consequences of the Crisis for the Euro-Atlantic Security System

4.1 Geopolitical Rivalry

Security in the Euro-Atlantic area after the Cold War was based on the principle of recognition for the territorial status quo and on cooperation between states and international organizations. The guiding idea behind its shaping was the theory of liberalism entailing the concordant cooperation to maintain the peace and to simultaneously promote democratic transformation. It was called cooperative security and gave an illusory and idealistic conviction that the differing interests of states making up this system could be reconciled through cooperation. But the system as it took shape in the 1990s didn't fully take into consideration the interests of all its participants. The western portion of the continent reinforced its security through the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, while in the East a sense of uncertainty, and in Russia a sense of being 'encircled' by the West persisted. The Russian leaders—Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin or Dmitry Medvedev—made attempts to bring about cooperation between equals with the West and always considered that Russia was a part of Europe. But the West failed to see this orientation in Russian politics, seeing only the shortage of democracy in Russia's political system and in its policies and continues in its efforts to 'Europeanize' that large country. This is not conducive to deeper cooperation with Moscow, least in the sphere of international security.

Russia was not treated as an equal in the resolution of arising problems, such as the ending of the war in former Yugoslavia, already disregarded in 1991 during the first military invasion against Iraq, in 2003 during the second one, and between them during the war in Kosovo in 1999. During the 1990s, the first post-Cold War decade, the West and especially the United States attempted to cooperate with Russia, but treated it as a weak junior partner which was not in a position to stand up to the USA and to look after its own interests. And to, the first NATO enlargement took place despite Russia's opposition in 1999 when three former Soviet allies—Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—were admitted to the Alliance; five years later seven other countries were admitted, including three that had once been a part of the Soviet Union—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. It is worthwhile to note that this 'encroachment' on post-Soviet area was taking place

[43]Morgenthau (1967), p. 4.

[44]In the next two sections I use the theses contained in my article Zięba (2017b), p. 117 *et seq*.

while Russia found itself under the efficient and initially definitively pro-European leadership of President Vladimir Putin. The West not only failed to take up Russia's offer of closer cooperation, but it is precisely then that it supported the 'color revolutions' in various non-Russian independent CIS states—in Georgia, in Ukraine, in Kirgizstan and also attempted to trigger a similar 'revolution' in Belarus. Moscow saw these actions as the West's expansion toward its boundaries.

The Ukraine crisis revealed to public opinion that the West and Russia had different and incompatible interests. This incompatibility manifested itself on the plane of military and strategic relations. The European Union's offer to Ukraine of a new association agreement was supposed to strengthen the pro-western course in that country's policy. Yet, it was a neutral country that remained under the 'shadow' of Russian influence. The leasing by Russia of the naval base in Sebastopol was a visible sign of Ukraine's submissiveness to its powerful neighbor. The acceleration of democratic and market reforms in Ukraine as a result of the association agreement with the EU would have in an obvious manner led to a change in Kyiv's foreign policy from one that balances between Russia and the West to one that clearly opts for a pro-western course. It is for this reason that the leaders of western countries accepted the rejection by Kyiv's demonstrating opposition of the agreement signed with President Yanukovych on February 21, 2014 and accepted the participation in the newly formed temporary government of Arsenyi Yatseniuk of nationalist or semi-fascist politicians.

The spring of 2014 saw the violation of the post-Cold War international order in Europe. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, followed by Russian military support for the separatists of Ukraine's eastern provinces made plain that when threats to its interests arose, Russia decided to break international law and OSCE principles. Interestingly, this was done by a state which calls itself a defender of international law and condemns sharply all of its violations. During the fighting in the Donbas in the spring of 2014, the West supported the dirty war conducted by government forces against the separatists (the 'anti-terrorist operation' in the Kyiv's terminology), Ukrainian citizens. The West also failed to react to the reports of humanitarian organizations pointing to the humanitarian disaster taking place in eastern Ukraine; it didn't send convoys with aid for the suffering civilian population in the Donbas. This means, in terms of the premises of Morgenthau's political realism, that states that speak of universal moral norms nevertheless choose effective political action that brings them advantages.[45]

The contradictory nature of Western and Russian interests on the military and strategic plane is also shown by the calculations of certain western politicians who are counting on bringing Ukraine into NATO on the one hand, and Russia's fear that yet another, decisive, NATO 'approach' to its south-western boundaries may be about to take place and seriously block the Russian fleet's ability to operate on the Black Sea on the other. Should such a scenario materialize, Russian security would be seriously compromised.

[45]Ibidem, pp. 9–10. Morgenthau, H. (1967). *Politics among Nations*..., p. 9-10.

The conclusions to be drawn from the Georgian-Russian of 2008,[46] and from the Ukraine crisis are that Russia will actively stand up to the West and will not allow NATO to admit any further countries lying on Russia's boundary. Montenegro's admission to NATO took place on June 5, 2017 and the Alliance's further expansion can take place in the direction of the western Balkans and, possibly, Scandinavia (Sweden and Finland). This could strengthen NATO and give it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.[47]

4.2 Military Confrontation in Europe

The landing operation conducted by Russia in Crimea using 'little green men' devoid of insignia, and subsequent military support for the separatists in the Donbas in the form of arms supplies and Russian soldiers were clear signs that war had broken out in Europe. It was, however, a limited war, and Russia's intervention is described as 'hybrid warfare'.[48] On the one hand, Russia became militarily involved on the side of the Donbas separatists in its efforts to hinder the expansion of the West's sphere of influence and, on the other, fighting broke out between Ukrainian government forces and the separatists.

Ukrainian government forces, which included foreign mercenaries, took up sharp pacification measures. This cruel armed conflict brought thousands of victims, most of whom were civilians from the Donetsk and Luhansk districts. Form the summer of 2014 on, information began reaching the media about the humanitarian catastrophe in the fighting areas. This war, with the war in former Yugoslavia, became the cruelest armed conflict in Europe in the post-Cold War period. Interestingly, the Western countries, urging the Ukrainian government to put down the rebellion in the Donbas, did not hurry to provide humanitarian aid. In contrast, Russia sent humanitarian convoys, but these were criticized by western politicians and media as a means to smuggle war materials and equipment.

NATO's reaction to the armed conflict in Ukraine was to reinforce its eastern flank, in reality to emerge from its lethargy and to prepare itself to fulfill its collective defense function. The United States send to Poland additional F-16 multi-purpose planes (increasing their number by 12); an AWACS distance reconnaissance plane on a one-time mission; sent personnel for the airbase in Łask (about 250 soldiers); decided to prolong their rotational military presence at that base; and also undertook to patrol the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian sections of the Baltic coast, and the Bulgarian and Romanian sections of the Black Sea coast. NATO as a whole decided to increase the frequency of military exercises, to build equipment depots in case there is a need to transfer NATO troops to

[46]See Karagiannis (2013).

[47]See Wolff (2014).

[48]Freedman (2014), pp. 8–12.

Poland; to systematically update contingency plans; and also expressed the interest in further enlargement to include the Balkan states as well as Sweden and Finland, if those states decided to join the Alliance. During the NATO Summit in Newport (September 4–5, 2014), members were bound to increase the expenditures on defense to a minimum of 2% of GDP. During the summit it was also announced that a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the so-called 'picket' would be established and that the battle readiness of the Multinational Corps Northeast stationed in Szczecin would be increased. All these decisions undoubtedly strengthened the cohesion and the engagement of NATO and the USA in the security of Central Europe. It was decided in Newport that NATO would earmark about 15 million euro for support to Ukraine and also from individual members of the Alliance as part of bilateral agreements.

In the spring of 2015, NATO debated the possibility of sending military equipment to Ukraine. It had been initiated by American Republicans, who demanded that at least defensive weapons be supplied to Ukraine. Such proposals were strongly criticized by Stephen Walt, who wrote that "arming Ukraine, on the other hand, is a recipe for a longer and more destructive conflict. It's easy to prescribe such actions when you're safely located in a Washington think tank, but destroying Ukraine in order to save it is hardly smart or morally correct diplomacy".[49] The Barack Obama administration did not agree to arm Ukraine. Only from the spring of 2015 did a few NATO members engage in training Ukrainian soldiers. These included Great Britain, USA, Canada and Lithuania. Poland did not send its military instructors to Ukraine, but trained Ukrainian soldiers on its own territory. In December 2017, however, President Donald Trump approved the plan to sell lethal weapons to Ukraine, including anti-tank missiles. Moscow viewed this negatively, as something that would encoure Ukrainian nationalists to resort to force in the Donbas.[50]

NATO also conducted a series of military maneuvers on its eastern flank, the largest of which—Swift Response-2015—took place on the territories of Bulgaria, Romania, Germany and Italy from August 20 to September 13, 2015. The latter were one of the largest international airborne exercises since the days of the Second World War and the largest NATO maneuvers since the 1980s. The maneuvers involved soldiers from eight NATO countries, including Poland, and their number was not made public. The aim of these exercises was to integrate high readiness units of NATO members and to prepare them for joint and effective reaction to security changes on the territory of Alliance. In this manner, NATO demonstrated to Russia that it was ready to respond to any potential aggression. Russia behaved in similar fashion, holding maneuvers along its border with Ukraine and the Baltic states and, since the middle of 2014, for several months the air force of the Russian

[49]Walt (2015). op. cit. See another critical view in Marten (2015), p. 200.

[50]Lee et al. (2017), USA dostarczą Ukrainie … (2017). Incidentally, western information agencies gained access to State Department documents showing that Ukraine had been buying small quantities of such weapons for several years, both before and after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine and in succeeding years.

Federation was particularly active in the Baltic Sea area. The situation was thus quite dangerous, because it was reminiscent of the climate of confrontation from the worst moments of the Cold War. Subsequent decisions about reinforcing NATO's eastern flank were made at the summit of NATO leaders in Warsaw on July 8–9, 2016. As a result, in the following years, military units made up of American, British, German and Canadian soldiers were sent to Poland, the Baltic countries and Romania.[51]

All these actions were carried out as the Alliance's reaction to Russia's involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. It should be noted that although NATO's decisions constituted a significant reinforcement of the alliance's eastern flank, not all its European members were as enthusiastic in this matter as the USA, Great Britain or Poland. Germany, for example, adopted a more restrained stance, not wishing for a stronger confrontation with Russia.[52] Although NATO's decisions were sharply criticized by Moscow, they did not constitute a significant military strengthening of the Alliance, as much as a manifestation off the readiness of NATO members to oppose any potential aggression from Russia. During the Warsaw summit, like during the earlier meetings of NATO leaders, no decisions were taken in the matter of any direct military action involving NATO troops on the side of Ukraine. The reason for this is that Ukraine is not a NATO member. In other words, the Ukraine crisis sharpened the military confrontation between Russia and NATO, but both sides showed restraint to avoid outright war.

4.3 The Weakening of Ukraine

The revolution which began in Ukraine in November 2013, called by the Ukrainians the 'Dignity Revolution,' led to a coup d'état; the removal from power of Viktor Yanukovych, the country's legally elected president the following February; and a change of government. The euphoria following the victory of the Kyiv Euromaidan was great, especially as the demonstrators had managed to topple one of Europe's greatest satrapies. The Ukrainians paid a high price for this revolution. About 100 persons lost their lives during the Kyiv Euromaidan, and several hundred were wounded; while estimations of the number of victims during the fighting in the east of Ukraine varied. Generally, the losses caused by the war in the Donbas are great, but credible estimates are lacking. As the Ukrainian foreign ministry declared on the third anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict, since the fighting began almost 10,000 people were killed, about 23,000 were wounded, and

[51]See Chap. 6 in this volume.

[52]Belkin et al. (2014), p. 4.

almost 1.8 million were left homeless.[53] Estimates from the separatist authorities of the fighting districts of Donetsk and Luhansk are not available, however. It is worthwhile to note that, despite the Mińsk-2 ceasefire concluded on February 12, 2015, fighting in eastern Ukraine, if less intense, continued nonetheless.

The policy of reforming Ukraine's economy comes up against numerous internal difficulties. Firstly, because this economy remains under the control of oligarchs; because of widespread corruption; and because impoverished society's expectations aroused by the change of government are extremely high. Moreover, the demands of the radicals who have emerged on the political stage following months of demonstrations are difficult to realize. The unavoidable worsening of the economic situation strengthens the populists, radicals and nationalists from the OUN-UPA. Ukraine is facing a long road to reform the country, and other political perturbations remain possible.

The seriousness of Ukraine's situation is also reflected in the appearance of highly irresponsible ideas among those presently in power calling for access to nuclear weapons. Deputies of the party Batkivshchina and Udar submitted a bill in March 2014 about Ukraine's renunciation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of July 1968.[54] In this context, it is worthwhile to recall the difficulties Ukraine had in its relations with the West during its first years of its independence, when it retained (until mid-1996) its post-Soviet nuclear weapons.[55] Moreover, in reaction to Russia's support for the separatists in the Donbas, Ukrainian politicians demanded NATO aid, supplies of armaments from western countries and admission of Ukraine to NATO. One could at times have been forgiven for getting the justified impression that Yatseniuk's government was interested in war with Russia, and was seeking the support of the North-Atlantic Alliance to this end. Perhaps such a course seemed like the only one allowing him to remain in power.

The ongoing internal destabilization of Ukraine and the continuation of the pro-western and anti-Russian political course by the forces in power in Kyiv create a serious threat to international security. It is difficult to imagine in Europe a great war with Russia. Nonetheless, the ongoing fighting in Ukraine's eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk could prove to be the germs of such a war. Despite the conclusion of a second peace agreement in Minsk, the fighting in eastern Ukraine continues. Neither the separatists, which are supported militarily by Russia, nor the Ukrainian government forces abode by the agreement, and Kyiv is postponing in time the federalization of Ukraine provided for in the Minsk Agreement.

The partition of Ukraine is increasingly looking as an irreversible fact, but neither side to the conflict is willing to admit it. For the separatists, autonomy is too little,

[53]10 tysięcy ofiar śmiertelnych konfliktu na Ukrainie … (2017). The conflict in Ukraine continued unabated, and at the beginning of 2018, UN sources put the number of persons killed at 10,300. This figure includes the 298 passengers of the Malaysian Airlines plane shot down by separatists over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014.

[54]On 25 March 2014, Yevhen Perebyinis, the spokesman of the Ukrainian foreign ministry, declared that his country does not plan to revert to the status of nuclear power.

[55]See van Ham (1994), pp. 13–14.

because they are in fact seeking to detach the territories they inhabit and to incorporate them into Russia, while the Ukrainian authorities see federalization as a setback, which those in power don't want to accept, the more so as they are counting on the West to assist them in regaining control of those territories. The Ukrainian authorities thus accept the postulate of federalization of Ukraine only formally, even though this seems as a pre-condition for any attempts to resolve the crisis politically and to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity, if only in the formal sense. Pressure from Germany, France, and the USA (Obama administration) aimed at convincing the authorities in Kyiv to accept the federalization of Ukraine has caused much emotional upheaval in Ukraine. In July 2015, the Ukrainian parliament finally adopted an amendment to the constitution making federalization possible.[56] It seems that Ukraine's allies—Germany, France, followed in short time by the United States—have understood that this gridlock situation must be addressed and sought to incline the Ukrainian authorities to fulfill the relevant point of the Minsk agreement. Yet the Ukrainian authorities have not taken any steps in this direction. When American foreign policy changed under President Donald Trump, Ukraine's parliament, encouraged by Washington, on January 18, 2018 passed the *Law on the Reintegration and De-occupation of the Donbas Territories* occupied by pro-Russian separatists. The Russian foreign ministry stated aid that this document "has retained its main focus which is to legislatively reinforce Kiev's commitment to resolve the 'Donbas issue' by military force. In particular, it announced a reformatting of the so-called antiterrorist operation into a regular military effort and transferring command to the military, which will have all other law-enforcement and security departments subordinated to them".[57] It further said that "Ukraine's current 'law-making' is completely at odds with the Minsk Agreements, which are a universally recognised and the exclusive basis for settling the conflict in Ukraine".[58] In closing, the Russian foreign ministry declared: "Amazingly, the adoption of this law coincided in time with the announcement in Washington that the United States is willing to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine".[59] It is evident, therefore, that the position of the Ukrainian authorities remains unchanged, which means the continuation of the fighting in the east and the total loss of the Donbas for Ukraine.

The Ukrainian economy has suffered much from several months of work stoppages, from the disorganization of production, supplies, distribution and trade. The already inefficient Ukrainian economy was plunged into a crisis, and the system of social benefits is seriously threatened. Undoubtedly the costs of daily upkeep will continue to rise. But it is worthwhile to know that Ukrainian society is living on a very low level. The average wage in Ukraine is a little over 25% of what it is in Poland, and generally in Ukraine poverty if widespread. Ukrainians need large injections of capital to rescue state finances. In February 2014 the USA and the

[56]Nuland zatrzęsła Kijowem … (2015).

[57]Comment by the Information and Press Department … (2018).

[58]Ibidem.

[59]Ibidem.

European Union offered the new Ukrainian authorities 2 billion USD and 1.6 billion euro of emergency relief respectively. This, however, only sufficed to cover the state's most pressing needs until the presidential elections. After Ukraine accepted the anti-crisis package and adopted a budget amendment it became practically possible for the West (IMF, EU, USA and other countries) to provide further financial assistance, whose cumulative amount came to 27 billion USD in 2014–2015. Yet the IMF loan, so important for servicing Ukraine's foreign debt, was extended on the condition that the government implements plans aimed at stabilizing public finances. These entailed drastic cuts in social benefits and large increases in the price of official prices (for natural gas, for example). This, in turn led to a worsening social climate. At the beginning of 2015, renowned American financier George Soros stated that this assistance seems insufficient and called for granting Ukraine at least 50 billion USD of additional aid to balance the losses incurred following the Russian sanctions and the fighting with the Donbas separatists.[60]

Ukraine now needs to carry the weight of the market reforms that the association agreement signed with the EU entails and it isn't certain it can rise to the challenge. In addition, Ukrainian society is tired of the ongoing crisis and the civil war in its eastern regions. It is thus uncertain if the vague prospects of the pro-European choice will be able to convince this society to assume the cost of socially painful reforms. The frequently raised analogies to the Polish situation at the time of the introduction of Balcerowicz's plan seem inadequate. A clear promise of membership was made to the Poles in 1991 by the then European Community, whereas such a promise was not made to the Ukrainians, who additionally have to face economic pressure from Russia.

Ukraine's relations with the Russian Federation, which is applying economic pressure as a means to exert influence, are of key importance for the economic situation in Ukraine and its association with the European Union. Russia has terminated all existing agreements giving Ukraine price discounts for purchases of natural gas, which meant that the price of the gas supplied by Russia increased on April 1, 2014 from 268.50 USD to 485 USD for 1000 m^3. The Ukrainian government did not agree to such a sharp price increase, as it could not be sustained by the Ukrainian economy. At the same time, Russia placed an embargo on selected products exported by Ukraine. This led to a drop of Ukrainian exports and, in consequence, to an important fall in production. This situation was unavoidable, so to speak, especially as Ukraine had signed the DCFTA agreement with the EU. Ukraine chose—without consulting with Russia—the competing geopolitical option, entailing membership in a free trade area of which Russia is not a part. Russia is pursuing steadfast *Realpolitik*, but this was to be expected.

[60]Kublik (2015).

The situation in Ukraine is far from stable. Economic and political reforms are introduced slowly and with difficulty, but corruption is not decreasing.[61] This leads to impatience among society, which does not feel any improvement in the economic situation. On April 14, 2016 the prime minister of Ukraine was replaced. The newly appointed head of government was the former chairman of the Supreme Council Volodymyr Groysman. This trusted aide of President Poroshenko stated that the greatest threats that Ukraine has to face are corruption, ineffective government and populism. He announced that his government will bring a new quality to Ukraine and to ensure the exchangeability of the European integration course.[62] International institutions remained anxious about the state of affairs in Ukraine. In order to 'assist' the Ukrainian authorities in the introduction of the reforms, on April 24, 2016 former Polish minister of finance Leszek Balcerowicz was appointed special counsel to president Poroshenko and as the president's representative in the new government. This politician responsible for the Polish reforms declared that Ukraine needs a program of restructuration and privatization of state owned firms, that the budget needs to be stabilized and so do all sectors of the economy in order to eliminate monopolies, among other things. He proposed that a team of strategic advisors working for all centers of Ukrainian government—the government, the president and the parliament—be appointed in order to improve coordination and participation in the decision-making processes from the very beginning. The second co-chairman of the advising team is former Slovak minister of finance Ivan Mikloš. These personnel moves show that Ukraine is attempting to carry out the reform program announced since the breakthrough of February 2014. Whether it will be successful remains to be seen.

Four years after the change of government in Ukraine one can't rule out that serious political perturbations may also be in store for this country. The government exercises its authority beyond Kyiv only with difficulty. The structures of the corrupt Ukrainian state have collapsed. The new authorities in Kyiv are encountering serious political difficulties. The expectations of the radicals, made the greater by months of demonstrations, are difficult to satisfy. If attempts to improve the economy prove unsuccessful, the influence of populists, radicals and nationalists will gain in strength. Additionally, the secession of Crimea and separatism in the east of the country, supported by Russia, represent the greatest threat to the new authorities in Kyiv. It is worthwhile to remember that from the beginning of Ukraine's independence the country was differentiated in terms of political attitudes; the population of the western areas exhibits nationalistic and pro-European attitudes, while the inhabitants of the eastern and southern districts fear the new authorities' pro-European course, and perceive Russia differently—as a lesser threat or even as a brotherly country, and many of them can even imagine reintegration

[61]The American political elites are convinced that Ukraine faces two main threats: Russian aggression, and corruption. For this reason, they think that, on the one hand, Ukraine should be given lethal weapons and, on the other helped to combat corruption. See Carpenter (2018).

[62]Nowy ukraiński rząd zaprzysiężony … (2016).

with Russia. These and other differences speak for the need for federalization of Ukraine, something the presently governing political forces are against.

At the same time, one can see that the conflict in Ukraine's eastern areas is simmering, albeit with lesser intensity, and Crimea has remained with Russia. This means that the entire tug of war between the West and Russia over Ukraine will be frozen. Ukraine has incurred territorial losses, but has entered the free trade area with the European Union. This does not mean that it has gained chances for membership in the EU in the future. The existence of opposition to that idea can be seen in the results of the Dutch referendum of 6 April 2016 in which as many as 61% of voters pronounced themselves against the association agreement with Ukraine.[63]

4.4 The Weakening of Euro-Atlantic Security

The Ukraine crisis was the result of the ongoing rivalry for spheres of influence between the West and Russia. By accepting the argumentation of the realists, it has to be stated that it was due to an offensive policy in the case of the USA and the European Union aimed at drawing Ukraine toward the West, and a defensive policy in Russia's case aimed at protecting the status quo in Ukraine, which was to remain a buffer state shielding Russia from the West but respecting Russia's influence in that country. The change of government in Kyiv to a pro-western one led to offensive behavior by Russia which, anticipating Ukraine's expected admission to NATO, annexed the Crimea along with the important naval base in Sebastopol and supported the secession of the Donbas. The war in the Donbas that began in the spring of 2014 is an instrument serving to weaken Ukraine and, thus, to preclude its accession to NATO, as it is clear NATO will not grant admission to a country in the midst of a civil war and a territorial dispute with Russia. The latter had already made use of this scenario in 2008 with Georgia, which also harbored Atlantic aspirations. And so, Ukraine became hostage to the rivalry between the West and Russia, as well as of its own ambitions which a significant portion of its own population didn't share. This logically leads to the conclusion the policy of rivalry for spheres of influence pursued by both the West and Russia has led to a weakening of European security, including Ukraine's national security.

It is highly debatable whether the military strengthening of NATO's eastern flank carried out following the decisions taken at the summits in Newport (2014) and Warsaw (2016) contributed to reinforcing international security. From the

[63]The Netherlands ratified the association agreement only in June 2017, after the European Council had, in December 2016, had adopted a compromise declaration stating that the agreement was not an introduction to Ukraine's membership in the EU, it does not obligate the EU to defend that country, and does not open the EU labor market to Ukrainian workers. This made it possible for the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU to come into full force on September 1, 2017. See to Busygina (2018), p. 192.

viewpoint of NATO members neighboring on Ukraine and Russia, one can say that the continued rotational presence of allied units in these countries may be interpreted as a reinforcement of their defense abilities. But from the general point of view, having taken into account the increased military activeness especially of Russian air force near the airspace of those countries and of other NATO members further to the west (on the English Channel), the activeness of the Russian Navy in the Baltic, and the *Zapad 2017* maneuvers in Belarus, it has to be noted that the level of militarization of relations in Europe has grown, and this increases the threat of the outbreak of an armed conflict, if one of limited scale, between Russia and NATO. This has undoubtedly led to a lower level of international security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. It should be remembered that the rivalry over Ukraine has contributed to this.

The decisions of NATO's summit in Wales, recommending that the allies increase their defense spending to 2% of GDP in relation to the previous year's GDP have had a similarly negative impact on the state of Euro-Atlantic security. Certain countries of NATO's eastern flank have considerably increased their military expenditures: Slovakia by 7%, Romania by 11%, and Poland—which had a relatively high level of defense spending since 2002 at 2% of GDP—declared in the fall of 2017 that this level would be increased to a minimum of 2.5% of GDP by 2025 and has signed a number of large arms purchase contracts with the USA.

Another unusually important factor that worsens the situation is the warlike rhetoric that accompanies the crisis. In order to justify their confrontational steps, both Russia and the West mutually accuse each other of creating threats. Following the experience with Russia's 'little green men' (soldiers without insignia) in Crimea, many politicians and experts in the USA, Poland and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) began to propagate the idea that Russia might attack its NATO neighbors in the form of a 'hybrid war'. Romuald Szeremietiew, former Polish Deputy-Minister of Defense, even stated in March 2015 that Russia could attack Poland using tactical nuclear weapons.[64] This propaganda was yet another factor leading to the weakening state of security in the center of Europe.

One sign that reflected the level of tension in the Euro-Atlantic area was the reduction in the frequency of consultations between NATO and Russia within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which had been instituted by accords in 1997 and 2002. Following the annexation of the Crimea, such consultations were suspended on April 1, 2014 by a decision of the NATO ministers of foreign affairs. But channels of political dialogue and military communication were kept open and the NRC as such was never completely suspended. The first meeting following this suspension occurred only on April 20, 2016, following which they took place every few months, but they did not lead to a rapprochement in positions between NATO and Russia. Regular meeting were held once a year by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including Russia. NATO tried to discuss the Ukrainian crisis with Russia, as well as the need for the full implementation of the

[64]Zając (2016), p. 147.

Minsk accords, and Russia's military activeness around the territories of NATO member states, with particular emphasis on reducing the risk that such activeness entails. Russia, in turn, expressed anxiety with the decisions and successive actions leading to the reinforcement of the Alliance's eastern flank. In an interview given to the daily *Izvestia* on February 10, 2017, Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, commenting on the dislocation of NATO troops (an armored brigade) in Poland and the Baltic states, stated that these actions are provocative and destabilizing in nature. He added that the countries neighboring on Russia are also modernizing their armed forces and expanding their military infrastructure. He also pointed out that, aside from this, the Russian authorities are also concerned with the construction of the US missile defense system in Europe, whose real anti-Russian nature is not doubted by anyone in Russia. He commented that the 'old new' policy pursued by NATO to contain Russia, including the unilateral decision to freeze civilian and military cooperation with Russia is leading to a drop in confidence and a violation of the existing balance of power on the continent.[65]

The lack of results from the talks at the NATO-Russia Council reflected the continued high level of tensions in relations between NATO and Russia. But the positive aspect of those talks was keeping communication channels open. This meant that NATO and Russia showed considerable restraint during the Ukraine crisis by themselves a way out of the situation. Nonetheless, the militarization of the policies on both sides not only worsened the state of international security, but made a return to constructive dialog difficult.

The Ukraine crisis showed very clearly how great power *Realpolitik* prevails.[66] The sharp criticism of Russia's actions did not prevent the severing of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine. The position of the West was ignored by Russia which pointed out—not without some justification—that the western states had violated international law earlier and mentioned as examples to the war in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya. Western politicians and commentators generally play down or reject Russian arguments outright. But looking at them objectively, it is impossible to challenge their legitimacy, because in the case of the war over Kosovo with former Yugoslavia (1999) and the war in Iraq (2003) there was no authorization from the UN Security Council, and in the case of the two other wars, the UN mandate was considerably exceeded. In addition, the West's armed interventions cost tens of thousands of lives in the FRY, and hundreds of thousands in Iraq and caused enormous material damage. It is a regrettable that western politicians don't wish to remember this. To all appearances, they feel other standards should be applied to Russia.

The sanctions imposed on Russia by the USA, the EU and a number of other western countries, even if imposed sensibly and with gradually, turned out to be unsuccessful. Russia did not return the Crimea, and the effects of the economic sanctions are two-edged, as Russia responded with countermeasures. Russia turned

[65]Lavrov: gotovy rabotat's administratsiyey … (2017).

[66]For more, see Bieleń (2015).

out the looser, but so did the West, and the real beneficiaries of the return of tensions between the West and Russia turned out to be powers like China and India, or food suppliers in Belarus, Serbia, Turkey and countries of Latin America. Isolated by the West, Russia began to compensate by developing its cooperation with China, India and the other rising powers. This accelerated the reconfiguration of the international order that had been under way for over a decade.

The Ukraine crisis, and especially Russia's part in it, shows the sad truth that a stable and just international order depends on the cooperation between the great powers. The lack of such cooperation gives the powers a 'free hand'—they can break international law and pursue their interests through the use of force. It is the West which first decided that Russia's vital national interests can be ignored. Whether we like it or not, Russia has such interests in Ukraine. The European Union, by proposing to Ukraine an association agreement embarked on a task that is reminiscent of the separation of Siamese twins, of which only one is to remain in good health. Russia was not offered anything in return and, moreover, it was dismissively argued that Russia has no say in the matter. This was continuation of a policy that had nothing to offer for Russia and consisted in repulsing it from Europe, a policy that began after the disintegration of the USSR. It thus should come as no surprise to western politicians that Russia decided to get involved in Ukraine. It is a banality to recall that several million Russians live in Ukraine and that the establishment of a customs union between the EU and Ukraine has an unfavorable impact on Russia's economy.

In addition, the rise in international tensions between the two leading players, i.e., the West and Russia, set a bad example and even an encouragement for states to break international law and resort to force. As if in confirmation of this thesis, in the summer of 2014 Israel launched yet another military offensive against Gaza, during which it committed genocide on Palestinian civilians. The world was absorbed by the conflict in Ukraine, while about 2000 km away a bloody and unequal war was taking place, and the Middle East Quartet (USA, Russia, the UN and the EU) did not find the time to deal with the drama taking place in Palestine. The situation grew more complicated in Iraq and Syria, where in June 2014 the establishment of the Islamic State was proclaimed.

Generally speaking, it should be noted that the West seems to have lost its way strategically following the financial crisis of 2008, various diplomatic setbacks, and in the case of the USA also military setbacks (in Iraq and Afghanistan). Not knowing how to find its way in the changing international order, and remaining on the defensive diplomatically in the face of new emerging powers, chose as its rival Russia, which it attempted to maneuver into a corner. The point here was not so much Ukraine and its European prospects, because those continue to be unclear, but rather the fact the Russia under President Putin is becoming increasingly stronger and plays an increasingly active role on the global stage. It is for this reason that the West decided to 'wrest' Ukraine from Russian influence, and when Moscow opposed this, it condemned it politically, isolated it and imposed on it sanctions aimed at slowing down its economic development. One can only agree with the assessment of John Mearsheimer, who placed the main responsibility for the

Ukraine crisis on the shoulders of the United States and its European allies,[67] or at least with the conclusion reached by Russian experts who claim that "both Russia and the West bear responsibility for the mistakes and miscalculations that have resulted in their most serious crisis in relations".[68]

It is difficult to believe that the 'hawks' pushing for confrontation with Russia have no awareness of the possible consequences of their confrontational policies. They have either forgotten or simply do not know what the negative and long-term consequences could be of a new Cold War.[69] In Europe it is worthwhile to remind people of this because in the not too distant past, three decades ago, we have lived the experience of being a hostage to the confrontation between two blocs.

5 How to Emerge from the Crisis?

The Ukraine crisis demonstrated the old truism voiced by realists that there is no equivalence between moral principles and state interests. Although the two main entities competing over Ukraine—the West and Russia—seek to justify the legitimacy of their actions, their explanations clearly indicate that they have specific political, strategic and economic interests there. One should, therefore, judge their actions as if they were our own. This leads to the conclusion that one should avoid moralizing judgments, and propaganda seeking to pillory the adversary or rival. Experts should show restraint in their assessments and politicians in their actions.

The world is so made that weak states generate problems and powerful ones seek to take advantage of them in their own interest. The Ukrainian crisis was brought about above all by the Ukrainians themselves who for over 20 years of independent existence proved unable to build a democratic and efficient state and an efficient market economy. Ukraine thus became a victim of its own will, a protectorate as it were of Russia, which has there its political interests and its cultural and economic influence. It is worth recalling that the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 ended unsuccessfully. Ukraine's then pro-western reformers continued the oligarchic politics and caused great disappointment, especially among the younger segment of Ukrainian society. Ukraine remained a buffer state between Russia and the West.

But by 2013 the situation around Ukraine had become less favorable to the realization of a program of democratic and market reforms, especially as Russia, which had its own interests in Ukraine, had become significantly more powerful, and the West much weaker. Generally speaking, the West came out of the 2008 financial crisis much weakened and it now had more competitors in the form of the newly emerging powers. The reputation of the United States and NATO had been marred by the lost wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, by their support of the Arab

[67] See Footnote 24.

[68] Arbatova and Dynkin (2016), p. 71.

[69] See Cohen (2014a).

Spring, and by the intervention in Libya. The European Union in turn only managed to overcome the crisis in the Euro zone, and had to face the prospect of disintegration as a result of the nationalisms that were tearing at it. It is in this situation that the USA and the EU decided to draw Ukraine into its sphere of influence, by supporting the entirely justified European aspirations of a large segment of Ukrainian society. In order to change Ukraine's political course, what was missing was consensus among its very citizens. The pro-European option was supported mainly in the western and central part of the country, while the Ukrainians of the eastern and southern parts feared the nationalism of their western compatriots. These fears were stoked by Russia, which didn't recognize Ukraine's new authorities which had been chosen in an unconstitutional manner in February 2014. In addition, Russia cleverly took advantage of the opportunity to secure its strategic interests, by annexing Crimea along with the naval base in Sebastopol and, in some measure, managed to delay economically the entry into force of the commercial part of Ukraine's new association agreement with the European Union. Of course, this assessment does not touch upon the question of the legitimacy of Ukraine's European aspirations, but concentrates only on the matter of rivalry over this country by external entities in keeping with the directives of the theory of political realism.

The Ukraine crisis, even though it gave Ukrainians hope for a better life, turned out to have crippling consequences for the Ukrainians themselves. It was increasingly out of control, it was a threat to the world and it strongly undermined the much needed cooperation between the West and Russia in the resolution of other problems (such as the conflict in the Middle East including the problems in Iraq and Syria). It is difficult to understand why western leaders seem to be unaware of this. As John Mearsheimer rightly points out, the United States and its European allies faced a choice in Ukraine. The first scenario entailed continuing their existing policy, which would increase enmity toward Russia, as a result of which all sides to the conflict would end up losing. The second scenario gave the possibility to 'shift gears' and act to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine—one that would not threaten Russia and would allow the West to repair its relations with Moscow, in which case all would be the winners.[70]

Polish politicians, who so often present themselves as good Christians, would perhaps do well to consider the thoughts of one of the fathers of the Church, Saint Augustine, who preached that even the worst enemy can be a friend. But it is difficult to suspect that our Christian politicians would have heard of this profound thought. Yet if they are in the least educated, perhaps they would read the work of known American political scientist Charles Kupchan entitled *How Enemies Become Friends: the Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton 2010), in which the author carried through a logical argument based on an in-depth analysis of the history of international relations and answering the question in the title. Kupchan's answer confirms the old wisdom of Saint Augustine—lasting peace, and even the most

[70]Mearsheimer (2014), p. 12.

effective community of security can be created, as it was repeatedly in history, with our enemies. A difficult condition has to be met, however—the partner in such collaboration needs to be taken treated seriously, i.e., as an equal.

Thus if nothing more detrimental takes place in relations between Russia and the West in connection with the Ukraine crisis, stabilizing the situation may be possible. A calming down of relations between the West and Russia is also a necessary precondition for bringing Ukraine out of the crisis. It should be added that cooperation with Russia will be necessary to that end. The question of relations between the West and Russia has become very complicated with the advent of the Ukraine crisis. From the outset there were and there remain chances for a return to normality in the Euro-Atlantic area. Both Russia and the West should become conscious of the benefits that rebuilding their cooperation could bring. Much harm has taken place until now. The West had barely come out of the financial crisis and recession when it started to compete with Russia on such a sensitive and uncertain ground as is Ukraine. This can only benefit our Asian competitors. It is an illusion that the impasse can be rapidly overcome or that a close partnership between the West and Russia can be established quickly, but it is better to recognize that finding some *modus vivendi* is necessary.

After a few years since the Ukraine crisis began, one can attempt to point to a number of factors making it possible to hope an end to the rivalry over Ukraine is possible. Even if they are not presently very great, certain signs of a breakthrough in the crisis can be seen.

The agreements signed in Minsk (on September 5, 2014 and on February 12, 2015), so strongly criticized in Poland, have helped calm down the situation, despite being violated in the Donbas. Much effort needs to be exerted to find a formula leading to a political solution. Such a solution—much awaited by Russia and Ukraine's western allies, Germany and France seems to lie in the federalization of the country and in the Ukrainian authorities granting autonomic status to the rebellious eastern provinces in the Donbas. Despite the fact that the authorities in Kyiv are approaching the idea with great anxiety and much dilatoriness, in July 2015 they nonetheless took the first step in this direction. To many politicians in Kyiv, this looks like capitulating to the separatists and to Russia, built it is worthwhile to remember that Ukraine has lost the war in the east militarily, and that the separatists want much more—separation from Ukraine outright and to join the Russian Federation, as happened with Crimea in March 2014. In the event, the principles of restraint and compromise suggested by the theory of political realism thus seem in order.

Even prior to the annexation of the Crimea, Henry Kissinger, one of the outstanding spokesmen of American realism, called for such an approach. Before the conflict in the Donbas escalated, he wrote that the Ukrainian question is placed on the knife's edge definitely too often: Ukraine will either join the West, or the East. If Ukraine is to survive and grow, it can't opt for either of the sides against the other, but should function as a bridge between them. Russia has to accept the fact that any attempt to turn Ukraine into a satellite country, this being tantamount to Russia shifting back its boundaries westward, can condemn it to a repeat of the

historic and self-perpetuating cycles of mutual tensions involving Europe and the United States. The West in turn must understand that Ukraine will never be simply a foreign country for Russia. Russian history began in Kievan Rus. It is from there that Russian Orthodoxy radiated. For many centuries, Ukraine was a part of Russia, and the history of the two countries is interwoven. Further, Kissinger proposed that Ukraine should have the freedom to freely choose its economic and political partners, including the European Union, but it should not join NATO. On the international stage Ukrainian leaders "should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia".[71]

Even Zbigniew Brzeziński, known for his anti-Russian stance, in May 2014 called on President Obama to take decisive steps with regard to Russia, but for the purpose of communicating clearly to President Putin that the United States is ready to use of its influence to ensure that a fully independent and territorially indivisible Ukraine conducts a policy toward Russia similar to the one effectively pursued by Finland. It is a policy based on mutual respect toward neighbors and extensive economic relations with Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Finland is expanding its ties, but without participating in NATO, which is so threatening from Moscow's perspective. The Finnish model can be an ideal example for Ukraine, the European Union and Russia.[72] Former US ambassador in Moscow, Jack Matlock, spoke in a more conciliatory manner and said that the fundamental condition for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict is an honest commitment on the part of the West that Ukraine will never become a NATO member because, otherwise Russia will not accept any understanding. He also stated that by offering membership to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008, NATO had crossed a 'red line' and he called on the West not to do this a second time, for "Russia is a nuclear power, and no one in his right mind will use force against a nuclear power".[73] Also worth mentioning are the words above cited author, who wrote that "the solution to this crisis is for the United States and its allies to abandon the dangerous and unnecessary goal of endless NATO expansion and do whatever it takes to convince Russia that we want Ukraine to be a neutral buffer state in perpetuity. We should then work with Russia, the EU, and the IMF to develop an economic program that puts that unfortunate country back on its feet."[74]

Another type of complementary solution was advanced by former EU enlargement commissioner Günter Verheugen, who suggested the West react calmly to Russia and propose to Moscow a European-wide security system that would

[71]See Footnote 2.

[72]See Brzezinski (2014).

[73]See Footnote 6.

[74]Walt (2015).

include NATO and Russia and, in addition, a special "economic cooperation area from Lisbon to Vladivostok".[75] The second of these was also proposed by former Polish ambassador in Russia, Stanisław Ciosek. This Polish politician has on repeated occasions made public calls to "draw Russia toward Europe, because otherwise we will have an eternal source of conflict. Many difficulties could have been averted had the policy toward Russia been different after the collapse of the Soviet Union".[76] In April 2015, the idea of a free trade zone "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" gained the support of Angela Merkel.[77] It is worthwhile in this context to note that these proposals refer to the initiative—announced in January 2010 by the then Prime Minister Putin—for a "harmonious economic community from Lisbon to Vladivostok" and its later extension to include elements of humanitarian cooperation and in the sphere of security.[78]

In December 2014, in the weekly *Die Zeit*, over 60 persons from the German world of politics (of different orientations), science, culture, medias and the economy signed an appeal 'against war' with Russia and for a 'new policy of détente', which was directed at the federal government, to the deputies of the Bundestag and to the medias.[79] In August 2015, former German Deputy-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher argued in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, that while the West can't recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea, it needs to embark on a dialogue with President Putin because he is a pragmatic politician, the West should 'extend its hand' to him and lift the sanctions imposed on Russia.[80] French politicians are also calling on a return to cooperation between the European Union and Russia.[81] As some Norwegian researchers claim, there are chances for a dialogue between the European Union and Russia about resolving the crisis, and the idea of such a dialogue is supported by France, Germany and the Chairman of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. Any understanding based on mutual concessions would imply the failure of the EU's existing policy consisting in the dissemination its values, as well as an admission that there are geographical limits to the EU's vision of building a security community using the mechanisms of political and economic integration.[82] Perhaps Putin's proposal, renewed in September 2017, to send UN peacekeeping troops to the Donbas represents a chance to end the armed conflict in Ukraine.[83]

---

[75]See Footnote 3.

[76]See Sekielski … (2014).

[77]Od Władywostoku do Lizbony … (2015).

[78]See Vystupleniye i otvety na voprosy … (2014).

[79]Wieder Krieg … (2014). See also Stolarczyk (2015), pp. 356–358.

[80]Stadler (2015).

[81]Kryzys w Rosji … (2015). https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/unia-europejska/wiadomosci/artykul/kryzys-w-rosji-paryz-obiecuje-moskwie-pomoc,145,0,1871761.html. Accessed January 22, 2018. Compare with David (2017).

[82]Rieker and Lundby Gjerde (2016), pp. 319–320.

[83]Pond (2017/18), p. 152. For a critical view of this proposal, see Rogin (2017).

The above-quoted statements made by retired and active politicians from western countries indicate that there are chances of reaching an understanding with Russia to resolve the Ukraine crisis. They suggest more restraint in the stances of all parties involved in the Ukraine crisis. Reaching an understanding requires political will among the main decision makers, above all in the United States. Even if this seems difficult to achieve in the short term, it is possible. The international understanding concluded in July 2015 in the matter of Iran's nuclear program shows that Russia is a necessary and useful partner for the West.[84] Other problems await resolution by the western world and Russia, such as fighting Islamic terrorism and, especially, the Islamic State. The Ukraine crisis has shown that without Russia's collaboration any expansion of Western influence is impossible, as are the Ukrainians' dreams about the European Union.

In Kissinger's words, "absolute satisfaction" is unattainable, only "balanced dissatisfaction" can be attained, because "if some solution based on these or similar elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough".[85] Let's remember this voice from an experienced old American diplomat who, as he himself says, has in his own lifetime seen four wars "begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins".[86] Having read the words of this outstanding realist, one can conclude that in the contemporary world, in which the hard interests of states, and great powers in particular, are decisive, one has to take them into account. This means that the realistic paradigm remains of great explanatory usefulness in the study of international relations.

Paradoxically, the Ukraine crisis should make all the external entities involved in it aware that an understanding between the West and Russia in the matter of Ukraine could prove to be a breakthrough with a very positive impact on the global international order. Freezing the conflict at the present lower intensity level only postponed addressing a problem that will need to be resolved by means of an understanding between all the interested parties.

References

10 tysięcy ofiar śmiertelnych konfliktu na Ukrainie, Polsat News, 21.02.2017. http://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2017-02-21/10-tysiecy-ofiar-smiertelnych-konfliktu-na-ukrainie/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

[84]In December 2016, Russia, Turkey and Iran brought about a ceasefire between the governmental forces and the moderate opposition in Syria. It was an obvious success of Russian diplomacy, which showed that if collaboration with the West doesn't work, it can find other partners.

[85]See Footnote 2.

[86]Ibidem.

Allison, R. (2014). Russian 'deniable' intervention in Ukraine: How and why Russia broke the rules. *International Affairs, 90*(6), 1255–1297.

Arbatova, N. K., & Dynkin, A. A. (2016). World order after Ukraine. *Survival, 58*(1), 71–89.

Becker, M. E., Cohen, M. S., Kushi, S., & McManus, I. P. (2016). Reviving the Russian empire: The crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens. *European Security, 25*(1), 112–133.

Belkin, P., Mix, D. R., & Woehrel, S. (2014, July 31). *NATO response to the crisis in Ukraine and security concerns in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service.

Bieleń, S. (2015). Powrót do *Realpolitik* w stosunkach Rosji z Zachodem jako konsekwencja kryzysu na Ukrainie. In K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, & M. Stolarczyk (Eds.). *Implikacje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski. Aspekty polityczne, wojskowe, gospodarcze oraz społeczne* (pp. 387–404). Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej.

Borger, J., & Luhn, A. (2014, April 17). Ukraine crisis: Geneva talks produce agreement on defusing conflict. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/ukraine-crisis-agreement-us-russia-eu. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Brzezinski, Z. (2014, May 2). What Obama should tell Americans about Ukraine: The crisis is getting worse. It's time for the president to rally the nation. https://www.politico.com. Accessed November 24, 2017.

Busygina, I. (2018). *Russia-EU relations and the common neighborhood*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Były ambasador USA w ZSRR Jack Matlock: Ukrainie lepiej będzie bez Krymu, An Interview of Jack Matlock to Polish Press Agency, PAP, March 21, 2014.

Carpenter, M. (2018, January 4). Ukraine needs U.S. help to fight corruption: Domestic reforms are just as important as defending against Russian aggression. *Foreign Policy*.

Cohen, S. F. (2014, September 15). Patriotic heresy vs. the new cold war: Fallacies of US policy may be leading to war with Russia. *The Nation*.

Cohen, S.F. (2014, March 3). Distorting Russia: How the American media misrepresent Putin, Sochi and Ukraine. *The Nation*.

Comment by the Information and Press Department in connection with Ukraine adopting the so-called Law on Re-integration and De-occupation of Donbass, January 18, 2018. http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3023218. Accessed January 27, 2018.

David, D. (2017). Vivre avec la Russie. *Politique étrangère, 82*(1), 61–70.

Dugin, A. (1997). *Osnovy geopolitiki* [*Fundamentals of geopolitics*]. Moscow: Arctogeya.

Frankel, J. (1970). *National interest*. London: Pall Mall.

Freedman, L. (2014). Ukraine and the art of limited war. *Survival, 56*(6), 7–38.

Góralczyk, B. (2014, March 31). Rok 2014 może być początkiem nowego ładu na świecie, Wirtualna Polska. wp.pl, March 31, 2014. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/prof-bogdan-goralczyk-dla-wp-pl-rok-2014-moze-byc-poczatkiem-nowego-ladu-na-swiecie-6031298977018497a. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Hartmann, F. (1962). *The relations of nations*. New York: Macmillan.

Helmut Schmidt: działania Putina na Krymie "*całkowicie zrozumiałe*"*, sankcje to* "*głupota*", TVN24, March 26, 2014.

Janukowycz: deklaracja UE była upokarzająca. Nie pozwolę, by Ukrainę ktoś poniżał, PAP, TVN24, November 26, 2013.

Jesteśmy na progu podziału Ukrainy. Banderowcy w rządzie "to błąd", TVN24, March 28, 2014.

Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17, 2014: The full text. *Washington Post*, April 17, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/joint-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-from-april-17-the-full-text/2014/04/17/89bd0ac2-c654-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html?utm_term=.453b3a09631c. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Kaczmarski, M. (2015). Realizm neoklasyczny. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), *Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych* (pp. 13–27). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.

Karagiannis, E. (2013). The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of offensive realism. *European Security, 22*(1), 74–93.

Kissinger, H. (2014, March 5). To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html?utm_term=.4e54a4c1fdff. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Kovalik, D. (2015, July 7). Rethinking Russia: A conversation with Russia Scholar Stephen F. Cohen. *The Blog*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-kovalik/rethinking-russia-a-conve_b_7744498.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Kryzys na Ukrainie. Indyjski polityk krytykuje USA i Unię Europejską, 25.03.2014. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/kryzys-na-ukrainie-indyjski-polityk-krytykuje-usa-i-unie-europejska/5kee2. Accessed February 20, 2018.

Kryzys w Rosji. Paryż obiecuje Moskwie pomoc w odbudowie kontaktów z Unią Europejską, Money.pl, August 2, 2015.

Kublik, A. (2015, January 8). Soros apeluje o 50 mld dol. pomocy dla Ukrainy. *Wyborcza.biz*. http://wyborcza.pl/1,155290,17227735,Soros_apeluje_o_50_mld_dol__pomocy_dla_Ukrainy.html?disableRedirects=true. Accessed January 29, 2018.

Łagowski, B. (2014, October 7). Rusofobia to jest obecnie ideologia państwowa. Onet.pl, 07.10.2014 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/prof-bronislaw-lagowski-rusofobia-to-jest-obecnie-ideologia-panstwowa/51vhw. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Laruelle, M. (2015). *The 'Russian World': Russia Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination*, Washington, DC: Center on Global Interests.

Lavrov: gotovy rabotat's administratsiyey Trampa po vsey povestke [Lavrov: Ready to Work with the Trump Administration on the Entire Agenda], *Izvestia,* February 10, 2017.

Lee, M., Berry, L., & Isachenkov, V. (2017, December 23). US agrees to send lethal weapons to Ukraine. Angering Russia. *ABC News*. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/us-officials-lethal-weapons-headed-ukraine-51965891. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Marten, K. (2015). Putin's choices: Explaining Russian foreign policy and intervention in Ukraine. *The Washington Quarterly, 38*(2), 189–204.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the ukraine crisis is the west's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs, 93*(5), 1–12.

Mińsk: Petro Poroszenko i Władimir Putin uścisnęli sobie dłonie. TVN24, PAP, August 26, 2014. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/minsk-petro-poroszenko-i-wladimir-putin-uscisneli-sobie-dlonie-6025267898974849a. Accessed February 20, 2018.

Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. *International Organization, 51*(4), 513–553.

Morelli, V. L. (2017, January 3). Ukraine: Current issues and U.S. policy. *Congressional research service report*, No. 7-5700.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1958). *Dilemmas of politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). *Politics among Nations: The struggle for power and peace* (4th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Northedge, F. S. (1976). *The international political system*. London: Faber.

Nowy ukraiński rząd zaprzysiężony. Wołodymyr Hrojsman premierem, IAR, PAP. April 14, 2016,

Nuland zatrzęsła Kijowem. Plotki o tajnej umowie Obamy z Putinem, TVN24, July 31, 2015.

Od Władywostoku do Lizbony. Merkel chce w przyszłości strefy wolnego handlu także z Rosją, April 17, 2015. https://wpolityce.pl/swiat/241314-od-wladywostoku-do-lizbony-merkel-chce-w-przyszlosci-strefy-wolnego-handlu-takze-z-rosja. Accessed January 27, 2018.

ONZ: ponad 700 tys. Ukraińców uciekło z powodu walk do Rosji, TVN24, August 5, 2014.

Osińska, L. (2009). Miejsce Ukrainy w koncepcjach polityki wschodniej RP. *Dialogi Polityczne III RP*, II, 129–149.

Plenarprotokoll 18/20. Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht. 20. Sitzung Berlin, Donnerstag, den 13. März 2014, p. 1524. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18020.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

Pond, E. (2017–18). War in Ukraine: Is this the way it ends? *Survival, 59*(6), 143–156.
Rieker, P., & Lundby Gjerde, K. (2016). The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue—Different readings of the crisis in Ukraine. *European Security, 25*(3), 304–325.
Rogin, J. (2017, November 26). Putin's proposal for Ukraine is another trap for Trump. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/putins-proposal-for-ukraine-is-another-trap-for-trump/2017/11/26/2b238622-cfc3-11e7-9d3a-bcbe2af58c3a_story.html?utm_term=.051a9a754a25. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Rosja pokazała gębę bandziora, TVN24, March 5, 2014.
Sakwa, R. (2015). *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Sekielski pyta Cioska: Czy należy negocjować z bandytą Putinem?, Radio Tokfm, March 12, 2014.
Sibal, K. (2014). Kanwal Sibal on how the US bungled in Ukraine. *India Today*, March 11, 2014.
Sjursen, H., & Rosén, G. (2017). Arguing sanctions. On the EU's response to the crisis in Ukraine. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 55*(1), 20–36.
Smith, N. R. (2016). The EU under a realist scope: Employing a neoclassical realist framework for the analysis of the EU's deep and comprehensive free trade agreement offer to Ukraine. *International Relations, 30*(1), 29–48.
Stadler, R. (2015, August 20). Genscher fordert Neuanfang mit Putin. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.
Stolarczyk, M. (2014). Dylematy bezpieczeństwa Polski w kontekście kryzysu i konfliktu ukraińskiego w latach 2013–2014. In K. Czornik & M. Lakomy (Eds.), *Dylematy bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej dekady XXI wieku* (pp. 13–40). Katowice: Wydawnictwo Regionalnego Ośrodka Debaty Międzynarodowej.
Stolarczyk, M. (2015). Polska i Niemcy wobec kryzysu i konfliktu ukraińskiego. Zbieżność i różnice intersów. In K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, & M. Stolarczyk (Eds.). *Implikacje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski. Aspekty polityczne, wojskowe, gospodarcze oraz społeczne* (pp. 349–386). Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej.
Stoner, K., & McFaul, M. (2015). Who lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin. *The Washington Quarterly, 38*(2), 167–187.
Świat: Rosja oskarża Polskę o szkolenie euromajdanowców, IAR, March 4, 2014.
Trenin, D. (2014). *The Ukraine crisis and the resumption of great-power rivalry*. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center.
USA dostarczą Ukrainie "śmiercionośną broń". Jest odpowiedź Rosji. PAP, TVN24, 23.12.2017. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/565286,usa-dostarcza-ukrainie-smiercionosna-bron-jest-odpowiedz-rosji.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.
van Ham, P. (1994). Ukraine, Russia and European security: Implications for western policy. *Chaillot Papers*, 13.
Verheugen ostrzega przed Kijowem. Rząd, w którym zasiadają faszyści, TVN24, March 18, 2014.
Vystupleniye i otvety na voprosy Ministra inostrannykh del S. V. Lavrova v khode vstrechi so studentami i professorsko-prepodavatel'skim sostavom MGIMO(U) [Speech and answers to questions of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey V. Lavrov at a meeting with students and faculty of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)], Moscow, September 1, 2014. https://spain.mid.ru/web/spain_ru/sovremennost-/-/asset_publisher/P2WtTlLbh04P/content/id/7192598. Accessed January 27, 2018.
Walt, S. M. (2015, February 9). Why arming Kiev Is a Really, really bad idea. *Foreign Policy*.
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization, 46*(2), 391–425.
Wieder Krieg in Europa? Nicht in unserem Namen! *Die Zeit*, December 5, 2014.
Wolff, A. T. (2014). The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis. *International Affairs, 91*(5), 1103–1121.
Zając, J. (2016). *Poland's security policy: The West, Russia and the changing international order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Zięba, R. (2013). *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Zięba, R. (2017b). The Ukraine Crisis as a Rivalry for Spheres of Influence between the West and Russia. *International and Security Studies*, 1, 115–132.

Chapter 10
Conclusions: Consequences of the Crisis of the Euro-Atlantic Security System and Prospects for Its Evolution

1 Growing Divergence of Interests and Rivalry for Spheres of Influence

The evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century clearly points to a growing divergence of interests among the states that are its main participants. In accordance with the principles of the realist paradigm, the basic foreign policy aims of these states can be reduced to four: (a) ensuring security in international relations; (b) assisting the efforts of society and the state on behalf of the country's development and its increased power in international relations; (c) increasing the state's international position and prestige; and (d) shaping and optimizing the rules by which the system of international relations functions.[1] In this sense, security is the highest aim in the hierarchy of states' foreign policy goals, but how security is achieved may vary. Great powers, given the resources and capabilities, they possess, tend to prefer unilateral action, and engage in cooperation with other states only when doing so will bring them specific benefits. Thus they try to subordinate international security to their own individual, egoistic national interests. Middle-range and small states usually prefer to work toward international cooperation. This means that for them international security is a means to strengthen their own national security. Functioning within a fixed international system, states must generally respect its rules and take into account the interests of the other participants. Consequently, their security policies are subject to systemic socialization and the outcome is that international security pulsates and evolves.

International security in the Euro-Atlantic system in the 21st century is subject to change. The factors of this changeability are, first, the changing threats to the security of states and international security and new challenges for the security policies of all the participants in the system, both individual and collective. Among the threats that have been consolidating the Euro-Atlantic security system are

[1] Zięba (2004), pp. 50–58.

R. Zięba, *The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century*,
Global Power Shift, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79105-0_10

terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the increased influx of illegal immigrants to the European Union has not had a positive impact on international cooperation. The reconfiguration of the international order and the appearance of new powers did not incline the Western states to compete harmoniously with them. On the contrary, the West shifted to a previously agreed policy of curbing Russia's great-power ambitions, and thus indirectly strengthened Russia's strategic cooperation with China and India. This is a kind of paradox, as Russia is culturally and politically closer to the United States and its European allies than to Asian and communist China.

It is worthwhile to adopt the neoclassical realist premise that the foreign policy of a state will be guided by the state's own interests based on its position in the international system, which modifies those interests in regard to the internal preferences that influence political decisions. This makes it possible to state that on the international stage states pursue a strategy of promoting their own type of regimes (political systems).[2] Thus the second group of factors affecting the evolution of security in the Euro-Atlantic area is the foreign policy of its participants. Thus the foreign policies of members of the Euro-Atlantic system form the second group of factors affecting the evolution of security in the sphere. In seeing to promote regimes that are advantageous for themselves, states also strive for goals other than security or for security in a different sense. The West—especially the EU—favors a broad understanding of security, linking it with the promotion of democracy and a market economy. Russia, on the other hand, has a traditional, realist view that reduces security to its political and military aspects. From the time of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the different visions of regime promotion in the foreign policies of the two sides, that is, the West and Russia, have been evident. The EU concentrated on facilitating the development of democracy in Ukraine, while Russia pursued a zero-sum game aimed at preserving a Ukrainian regime that was friendly to itself. After a few years of growing competition between the EU and Russia, there was a crisis in Ukraine. During the crisis it has been possible, among other things, to observe relations between the large, strong players and the weak smaller state, which is located in an area where the major players' spheres of influence overlap.[3]

The most important factor in the changeability of Euro-Atlantic security is the promotion of democracy by Western states and institutions in the former communist states, that is, in the Balkans and in the post-Soviet space. Russia is disturbed by these activities in regard to its western and southern neighbors, and attempts to counteract them, because it considers that the West aims to change the foreign policy orientation of these states to a pro-Western one. The disputes of 2003–2005 over the 'color revolutions' in the post-Soviet states, and more recently the attempt to draw Ukraine closer to the West from 2013 on, led to strong Russian resistance involving violations of international law and the use of military force.

[2]Rose (1998), Schweller (2003), Taliaferro (2006).

[3]Smith (2015).

It is an important circumstance that the West's promotion of democracy in the post-Soviet republics does not meet with a determined pro-democratic stance there. The democratic forces in those countries do not constitute the majority of society; their championing of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the introduction of a market economy do not constitute convincing arguments for societies that have never known a democratic system. The accompanying attempted market reforms have not brought quick results in the form of a growth in the standard of living in those societies, which are accustomed to command and distribution economy conditions. Market reforms are most often associated with high social costs, the increased poverty on the one hand, and the enrichment of a small number of individuals on the other. The oligarchization of the economy, the corruption, and organized economic crime have negatively affected social support for the market reforms recommended by the West. In the older segment of those populations, this has fostered nostalgia for the times of the USSR, and among the younger generations, a sense of disbelief in positive transformation, and among some, even the illusion that it would be possible to rebuild ties with Russia. Russia takes advantage of these social moods in many of the post-Soviet countries, and offers the myth of a reconstructed 'Russian world'—especially to the Slavic societies.

This situation shows that the West is attempting to promote the liberal model of civilizational development, but its support is not effective due to the high economic costs and unprepared mentalities of the societies to which the model is offered. It would be best to find a compromise with Russia and to seek a solution that would be acceptable to all sides, that is, the societies of the post-Soviet countries, including Russia, and the West. However, the parties do not have the political will for such compromise and the lack furthers the geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia, with the post-Soviet societies being basically the object of the game.

The lack of understanding in such an important question entails the return to rivalry over spheres of influence. NATO's expansion, from the middle of the 1990s, over Russian objections, is an indication of this. It is worthwhile to point out that the clear intensification of disputes between the West and Russia occurred after the victory of the 'color revolutions' in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2005), when the idea of admitting these two former Soviet republics to NATO first appeared. NATO announced its intention of admitting these states in April 2008, and in August of that year the Georgian-Russian war broke out. This meant that the West had crossed a 'red line' and that Russia had decided to defend its sphere of influence. The EU's proclamation in the following year of the Eastern Partnership only supplemented the political idea of drawing six post-Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) to the West. It is thus not at all surprising that Russia refused to take part in the program. When in autumn of 2013 the political and economic association between Ukraine and the EU was to be contractually formalized, and in February 2014 the West recognized a de facto coup d'état in Kyiv, there was an outright crisis in the Euro-Atlantic system.

Generally, NATO's and the EU's eastern policy produced serious limitations in their cooperation with Russia. For instance, there was a two-year break (2014–2016) in meetings of the NATO-Russia Council and a slowdown in trade due to the

sanctions that the entire West imposed on Russia from the summer of 2014 on; Russia's countermoves also limited the import of goods from Western countries.

Another reason for the weakening of the entire Euro-Atlantic security system—and at the same time a result of its crisis—is the crisis of the EU as an integration project. Due to the financial turmoils in 2008, the EU limited its diplomatic activeness as a participant in international relations and an actor in security policy. The renationalization of the policy of its member countries, which undermines the EU cohesion, had an impact on this situation. In addition, Russia sought understandings not with the EU as a whole but with its individual member countries, and especially with Germany, France, and Italy. It is no coincidence that the EU did not play any sort of mediating role in the crisis in Ukraine, and the peace negotiations have been conducted in the so-called Normandy Format, that is, with the participation of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine.

Similarly, since the end of the 20th century, the diminishing role of the OSCE as a security organization has been evident. The summit in Astana in December 2010 was held 11 years after the previous meeting. The OSCE was weakened when NATO moved into the leading position in the Euro-Atlantic security system, but it did not entirely lose its usefulness, as it was entrusted with the role of monitoring the talks in Minsk aimed at extinguishing the armed conflict in Ukraine's eastern provinces. The Collective Security Treaty Organization of the six CIS countries, which was established in 2003, did not play a major role in the Euro-Atlantic security system, as its security strategy was only agreed upon in October 2016.

In pointing to the geopolitical rivalry in the Euro-Atlantic area, the rivalry between the West and Russia has to be seen in the wider global context.[4] Here are some well-known examples: China is making aggressive demands in regard to off-shore waters; India is supporting diplomatically Russia's efforts to bring about a revision of the international order; Iran is trying to make use of its alliance with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East; Turkey is reinforcing its policy 'at all points of the compass'; Russia, Turkey, and Iran became involved in trying to bring an end to the civil war in Syria; in June 2003 three large pluralistic, multicultural and multiracial countries—India, Brazil, and South Africa—launched the IBSA Dialogue Forum to promote South-South cooperation and build consensus on issues of international importance; and Brazil and the Republic of South Africa are supporting each other and rivaling the West in the resolution of conflicts and peace-building.[5]

Chester A. Crocker, in observing the above-mentioned phenomena, claims that what is happening is a 'global drift,' which will lead to a state of international disorder. The sole positive aspect he sees in it is that this 'admittedly disorderly world' should make the leaders of the West aware that they have to

[4]Mead (2014).

[5]The fullest analysis of the redistribution of power presently underway is found in Klieman (2015).

learn to manage that which cannot be resolved today, and establish priorities in diplomatic relations with powerful states including Russia and China. They might reflect—at least by analogy—on the Concert of Europe [after the Congress of Vienna in 1815—author's note], where quite diverse major powers developed habits of talking and listening in a forum where their arguments on concrete problems made connection and where statesmen were expected to justify their actions.[6]

2 Redistribution of Power in the System and the Weakening of Euro-Atlantic Security

In the 21st century we have been observing a redistribution of power in the Euro-Atlantic security system. In the first years of the century, the main participants in the system were developing economically without disturbances. In the US such growth was based on the use of new technology and high labor productivity; the EU enjoyed the positive effects of the expansion of the common market in 2004 to nearly 500 million consumers. Russia benefited from high demand for its raw energy resources—oil and natural gas—in the extraction of which it was one of the world's leaders. Nevertheless, in the autumn of 2008 the world of finance's growing disconnection from the real economy led to the outbreak of a worldwide financial crisis, followed by a three-year-long economic recession. These negative phenomena were reflected in the military budgets of the leading participants in the Euro-Atlantic system, and for this reason, among others, the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU went into stagnation. The entire West emerged weakened from the crisis, while Russia's economy maintained its relatively strong position.

Another important element of the redistribution of power was the weakening cohesion and activeness of both Western structures. After its expansion in 2004, NATO was composed of 26 countries and in the following years came to have 29 members. Although the decisions at the forum of the North Atlantic Council were taken unanimously it was yet obvious that there were differences of opinion in the most important international questions. When the USA went to war in Afghanistan in 2001 it invited only selected allies to participate in its military operations, even though art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, containing the *casus foederis*, had been activated for the first time in history after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. The US's next military adventure, against Iraq in 2003, elicited serious reservations from France, Germany, and Belgium. In addition, the USA chose only three countries to join a coalition with it: Great Britain, Poland, and non-NATO member Australia. In both cases, the US took a 'toolbox approach' with regard to NATO. The organization's cohesion was also threatened by the later idea, originating with President George W. Bush's administration, of building an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.

[6]Crocker (2015).

At the Alliance's summit in Bucharest in 2008, in spite of the unwillingness of the Western European allies (Germany and France), the US and Poland insisted that the final declaration include a statement to the effect that Georgia and Ukraine would be accepted to NATO. This mention was made although neither country had been offered the Membership Action Plan. NATO's weakness is also shown by the fact that during the Georgian-Russian War NATO did not take any action to restrain Russia from its disproportionate military response to the Georgian army's attack on its peace-keeping forces in South Ossetia.[7]

Since 2008 the EU has been exhibiting weakness and lack of internal cohesion as a security-policy actor. This is further confirmed by the EU's failure to take military action in Libya in 2011 during the Arab Spring, or establishing a humanitarian mission in that country, which was embroiled in internal struggles. The military operation (Unified Protector) was carried out mainly by France and Great Britain under the aegis of NATO, with the significant participation of the US but without the participation of the majority of NATO allies.[8] Only Russia's military engagement in the spring of 2014 in the conflict in the east of Ukraine inclined NATO to increase its internal cohesion, to strengthen its eastern flank, and to raise its expenditures on defense. The EU, however, remained internally disconnected.

In the meantime, Russia was implementing a 'rebound' strategy designed to deliver a rapid return to power and status,[9] systematically consolidating its international position and intensifying its diplomatic activeness. In 2006, President Putin initiated meetings of what would later be the BRICS group. Earlier, on July l6, 2001, president of the Russian Federation and president of the People's Republic of China signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between their countries. In 2004, Russia managed basically to resolve its difficulties in relations with China[10] and then to establish a strategic partnership with this emerging power, as well as with India, another emerging power. Russia also actively participates in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which enables the coordination of Sino-Russian interests in Central Asia, and to develop military cooperation within the framework of the entire Organization.[11] The increase in Russia's international position outside the Euro-Atlantic area was made possible by its involvement in 2015 in bringing to an end the civil war in Syria and its key role that same year in bringing about an agreement in the matter of the Iranian nuclear program. Russia was strengthened, and after the change of government in Ukraine in 2014, decided to intervene in the conflict in that country in order to prevent it

[7]During his visit to Poland, Giorgi Margvelashvili, the president of Georgia, said to the media on November 9, 2017 that the West's lack of reaction to Russia's military operation against Georgia in 2008 encouraged Russia to intervene militarily in Crimea and in the Donbas in 2014.

[8]See Chivvis (2012).

[9]Sussex (2017), *et seq*.

[10]Russia and China resolved the last unsettled territorial issue related to the eastern section of their border. The two powers signed agreements in October 2004 and in July 2008. The latter one on the demarcation of the border ended a long-running territorial dispute between two states.

[11]Leichtova (2014).

from joining the West's sphere of influence. Although the US, NATO, and the EU condemned Russia's actions and imposed economic sanctions, they did not manage to force Russia to return Crimea, which it had annexed.

Before the crisis in Ukraine unfolded, the Central European countries bordering on Russia were growing very much more uneasy about their security. This was caused by Russia's growing power, including its military potential and its shift to a policy of containment with regard to NATO and EU influence in Eastern Europe. President Putin's speech at a Munich security conference in February 2007, in which he announced that Russia would resist the West's expansion, made a negative impression on the countries of Central Europe. The declining sense of security in these countries induced them to increase their own defense potential, and to seek confirmation of the validity of art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, to seek agreement for an American or, later, NATO anti-missile shield, and to strengthen NATO's eastern flank. The leading country in these policies was Poland, whose historical experience of relations with Russia has not been positive. It was supported by the Russophobic Baltic countries and then also by Romania.

The growing sense of threat from Russia and also the unilateral policies of President George W. Bush (2001–2009) worsened the situation in Europe. In 2006, the US administration's offer to Poland and the Czech Republic to build an American anti-missile shield in those countries accelerated the arms race with Russia. After negotiations between the USA and those two Central European countries concerning this missile shield began in July of the following year, Russia suspended the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) as of December 2007.[12] Russia demanded not only the rapid ratification of the modified CFE treaty from 1999, but also the introduction of further changes to the treaty, above all the abolition of the so-called flank limits the Russian Federation is bound by. NATO and its member states have on many occasions called for Russia not to do this, stressing the importance of maintaining the CFE regime for European security and cooperation and expressing the willingness to continue the dialogue with Russia. The discussions about resolving the situation and the possible modernization and updating of the treaty did not bring any results. In the end, in November 2011 all NATO member states which were signatories of the CFE Treaty informed Russia they were 'suspending' the further implementation of the Treaty with respect to Russia. On March 11, 2015 Moscow decided to suspend its participation in the Joint Consultation Group dealing with the implementation of the CFE Treaty. Russia did not denounce the treaty altogether, and formally speaking remains a party to it, but not actions arising from the treaty are being pursued.[13]

[12]Stent (2014), pp. 155–156.

[13]Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov's interview with Interfax, March 11, 2015. Moscow: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. http://www.mid.ru/en/publikacii/-/asset_publisher/nTzOQTrrCFd0/content/id/1090147 (Accessed on Jan. 27, 2018).

The militarization of relations between NATO and Russia in the succeeding years caused a decided deterioration in the region's security. Paradoxically, the Euro-Atlantic security system was increasingly incohesive and weakened by the rivalry over spheres of influence between the West and Russia. From political and economic rivalry, the parties passed to military rivalry. This undoubtedly demonstrates that the security system, instead of strengthening international security, has generated new threats of a traditional type, connected with the danger that military force will be used.[14] At the basis of this situation lies the conflict of interests that has led to rivalry over spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space.

3 The Weakening of the Euro-Atlantic Security System in the Global International Order

The growth of international contradictions and the crisis of the Euro-Atlantic security system have not only worsened the state of international security in the Euro-Atlantic area but have also hampered the resolution of urgent security problems outside that sphere.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been underway since the end of the 1940s. The so-called Middle East Peace Process of the 1990s broke down in 2000, and due to a difference of opinions between the leading Western powers and Russia it was not possible to return to the negotiations. This unresolved conflict is one of the generators of Islamic fundamentalism and terror. The unilateral policies of George W. Bush's administration, especially the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, also contributed to reinforce 'Islamic' terrorism. Around 2010, the West, without accurate intelligence, officially supported the Arab Spring, which it wished to see only as democratization wave. Instead, since the uprisings Arab Spring was quashed' there has been an increased wave of extremism and terror. In the middle of 2014, on part of the territories of Iraq and Syria destroyed by American intervention and civil war, a 'caliphate' called the Islamic State arose. In this manner a very dangerous terrorist organization emerged and undertook to fight its perceived enemies. France, Germany, and Belgium were the countries that experienced the worst terrorist attacks in Europe.

Cooperation on combating terrorism has generally been positive within the Euro-Atlantic security system, although outside that area problems do arise. Russia opposed the intervention of NATO countries in Libya in 2011, and criticized them for exceeding the mandate given by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, that criticism turned out to be warranted for another reason as well, as the intervention led to deep destabilization in Libya, which favored the growth of terrorism and increased the numbers of illegal immigrants attempting to reach Italy across the Mediterranean Sea.

[14]Sakwa (2017), pp. 187 *et seq*.

Serious differences of opinion arose between the West and Russia with regard to the civil war in Syria, where the USA and EU supported the 'moderate' opposition and insisted that President al-Assad should leave office. Russia took the side of al-Assad's regime, treating the opposition as if it were the same as the Islamic State. In 2015, Russia intervened in the conflict by intensively bombing opposition groups and supporting the regime army. This brought results—in spite of the increased number of victims among the civilian population—in the form of suppressing the civil war. On December 29, 2016, a peace agreement was concluded in Syria; the guarantors were Russia, Turkey, and Iran, and not the West. This is a prestige defeat for the West, and at the same time a success for Russia, as well as for Turkey and Iran, which are regional powers with ambitions. The civil war in Syria has continued, with the West and Russia supporting the warring sides. In the meanwhile, Russia, Turkey, and Iran have advanced as the main mediators in the conflict.

On November 22, 2017 Russia's President Vladimir Putin, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iran's Hassan Rouhani stated in a joint statement issued after their summit in Sochi that they would continue to cooperate actively in order to restore peace and stability in Syria. They expressed the satisfaction with the level of tripartite coordination to maintain and strengthen the ceasefire in Syria whose guarantors are Iran, Russia and Turkey. The three presidents said that the success achieved over the past months after the establishment of the ceasefire agreement in December 2016, led to the elimination of Daesh (IS), al-Nusra front and other terrorist organizations that the UN Security Council identified. Moscow, Ankara and Teheran also agreed to maintain cooperation together until these groups are totally eliminated. They also agreed that the Syrians should contribute to the reunification of the country and reach a political solution to this crisis through a comprehensive, free, fair and transparent process. This will result in the establishment of a constitution with the support of the Syrian people and holding free and fair elections.[15]

Generally, the West—and especially the USA—finds it difficult to come to terms with real conditions in the Middle East and is trying to impose on the parties agreements that do not take into consideration their arguments or the interests of other actors. It is also worth pointing to the positive role that Russia played in July 2015 in bringing about an agreement in the question of Iran's nuclear program (the so-called P5 + 1). Although the US was a signatory to the agreement, President Donald Trump openly questioned it in September 2017 at a UN General Assembly session,[16] thus causing anxiety in the EU, which favors full implementation of the agreement.[17] Despite this announcement, president Trump did not withdraw the USA from the nuclear agreement with Iran, but only brought about its so-called decertification, which provides for a possible redefinition of US policy towards

[15]See: Putin, Erdogan and Rouhan (2018).

[16]Kahl (2017).

[17]Remarks by Federica Mogherini … (2018). See also Pieper (2017).

Iran. This example shows how hard it is for the US to accept the changing configuration of the international order.

The weakening of the West, to which we have been witness since the financial crisis of 2008, is favoring the growing international role not only of China but also of Russia and other emerging world and regional powers. In the analyses of American experts, however, the view prevails that the redistribution of power that is currently occurring does not threaten the US's dominant position. Professors at Dartmouth College claim, in reference to the premises of Mearsheimer's neorealism,[18] that countries that pretend to being great powers have to have the capabilities to undertake a 'serious fight' against the leading state. In the 21st century, these capabilities are measured by three indicators: (1) military capacity, (2) economic capacity, and (3) technological capacity. Taking these into consideration, the authors state that in the future international order second place will be occupied by China and further places by other, undefined, powers.[19] It is hard to agree with such an optimistic prognosis for the USA, as it ignores the strength of the political influence wielded by the emerging powers, particularly Russia and India, and even the entire BRICS group. It is difficult for Americans to accept the increasing number of facts that demonstrate that their state is losing its position as the global hegemon, and that the world is becoming polycentric. Still, some scholars, such as Charles Kupchan, for instance, in his penetrating analysis of 2012, have predicted:

> America's military superiority will remain unquestioned well into the next decade. However, the influence that comes with such superiority is already diminishing as the economic playing field evens out. In the coming years, the rising rest will acquire new geopolitical aspirations and the military wherewithal to realize them.[20]

Other American scholars of a neorealist orientation have gone a step further:

> If uneven growth rates persist, however, China will become a peer competitor of the United States. As that happens, both countries will compete feverishly for security, increase military spending, develop new military platforms, and react swiftly to the other's capabilities.[21]

They are aware of the growing power of China and are disturbed by Beijing's increasingly assertive policies in regard to Japan in connection with the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea, and to several neighbors of Southeast Asia in connection with the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The second dispute concerns the right to exploit raw energy resources at the bottom of the sea. China is also building, in the South China Sea, artificial islands that could be used as military bases with a large rotating fleet of aircraft carriers and the most modern bombers. This makes many countries in the region (particularly the

[18]Mearsheimer (2001), p. 404.

[19]Brooks and Wohlforth (2015/2016). Comp. Beckley (2011/2012).

[20]Kupchan (2012a), p. 85.

[21]Parent and Rosato (2015).

Philippines and Vietnam), and also the US, uneasy.[22] It is no coincidence that Mearsheimer writes that proxy wars led by China's and the US's allies should be expected.[23] Certain experts in contemporary history, in observing the worrisome situation in East Asia, see an analogy to the situation in Europe when disputes led to the outbreak of World War I.[24] In 2016, experts from the RAND Corporation published a report containing speculations on the possibility of armed conflict between the USA and China.[25] Christopher Layne argues that, "[u]nless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions."[26] It is thus understandable that in the US, in the intense ongoing debate on the subject of the need to elaborate a successful policy strategy toward China,[27] there are beginning to be serious neorealist analyses pointing to the growing significance of China's nuclear weapon capability, and the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and China, and to propose an increase in the US's damage-limitation capability.[28] Considering that the USA was entering an era of greater uncertainty, when its global leadership was being ever more clearly contested—mainly by China and Russia, and other non-liberal actors on the international stage—calls were made to examine the strategic cultures of the newly emerging powers,[29] and ten years later, to work out a cohesive new national security strategy for President Obama's successors.[30] Paradoxically, the choice of Donald Trump to be the 45th president of the US has meant that the US has turned away from liberalism. This has raised additional doubts about the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance. The fundamental threat to NATO's future is Chinese-American rivalry, which will create security dynamics that likely will lead to a weakening of the North Atlantic Alliance. It can be agreed that

> China's rise will reveal divergent strategic interests and priorities among the members of the Atlantic Alliance, with a real possibility that America's rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific could intensify perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic of NATO's declining geopolitical value and relevance.[31]

Because the West, since the end of the 1990s, has been pursuing a policy of pushing Russia out of its historical sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, Russia decided—having grown internally stronger under Putin—on a policy of balancing, which consisted in blocking NATO's

[22]Mahmud Ali (2015), pp. 107–146, Stuenkel (2016), p. 74. More see Fravel (2005), Fels (2017).

[23]Mearsheimer (2014), p. 27.

[24]Chong and Hall (2014).

[25]See Gompert, Cevallos and Garafola (2016), pp. III, 13–18.

[26]Layne (2018). Also see Allisson (2017).

[27]Friedberg (2015).

[28]Glaser and Fetter (2016). Also see Quek and Johnston (2017/2018).

[29]Donnelly (2006).

[30]Goldgeier and Suri (2016).

[31]Maher (2016).

'encroachment' on its borders and attempts to surround it. As NATO and the EU have continued their present policy, Russia entered into strategic partnerships with China and India. Thanks to this, Russia ensured itself of China's friendly neutrality and the support of India for its intervention in the Ukraine crisis. Thus pressured by the West, Russia is managing its affairs with the support of the emerging powers in the BRICS group. Turkey, on the other hand, which is aiming to be a regional power, has engaged on a more independent policy. It entered the civil war in Syria, and increased its repression of the Kurds. After quashing an attempted coup d'état in July 2016, it severely restricted human rights, and it has engaged in cooperation with Russia and Iran to become one of the three guarantors of the above-mentioned agreement with Syria, signed in December 2016. Earlier, it began collaborating with countries belonging to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

4 The Need for New Institutional Solutions

The evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century reveals the deepening ineffectiveness of the system. The growing divergence of interests among its participants has led to rivalry over spheres of influence and the breaking of common ties of cooperation. Consequently, the level of security in the Euro-Atlantic area has decreased, and the position of the West has grown weaker. Furthermore, the importance of the entire Euro-Atlantic security system in the global international order has declined. In this situation, the question arises of whether mechanisms of cooperation on behalf of international security are effective and if not, how can they be made more so?

It should indubitably be noted that in this system, multilateral cooperation structures are functioning alongside of states. The strongest such structure is NATO, which has a Cold War pedigree and is a political and military bloc for ensuring the collective defense of its member states in the event of an external armed attack (art. 5). After the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, NATO awarded itself the right to conduct operations going beyond the dispositions of art. 5 (out of area operations).[32] This right was not introduced into the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, and thus it was based solely on the political decisions of the member countries. It cannot therefore have been recognized without reservations by other countries. In every case, the right to use force in crisis response operations should be subject to an authorization in the form of a UN Security Council resolution or OSCE decision. Moreover, this question was disputed within NATO before the Washington summit in April 1999. The US declared itself in favor of conducting such operations on the basis of only a general international legal authorization, while France required that the basis for such NATO actions needed to be established each time. As a result, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, which was

[32]Barrett (1996).

adopted then, does not contain clear provisions on the subject. It claims that NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to lead crisis response operations in accord with international law, in joining operations subject to the competences of the UN Security Council and OSCE, but there was a lack of clarity in "its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans".[33] NATO's 'Deny Flight' operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted with a 'strengthened' mandate from the UN Security Council to allow for the use of force in accord with the dispositions of chapter VII of the UN Charter against the parties to the conflict. The next operation, 'Allied Force,' which involved the bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the period from March to June 1999 (the 'Kosovo War'), had no authorization from the Security Council. In other words, it was illegal, and its justification by the so-called 'right of humanitarian intervention' turned out to be highly controversial.[34] The intervention did not lead to a settlement of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo.[35] It was condemned by Russia and China as an illegal act, a violation of international law, and as an act of aggression against a sovereign state, which had not attacked any of the NATO members. The operation was also criticized by a portion of the public in the countries belonging to or cooperating with NATO.[36] The operation caused the temporary freezing of cooperation between NATO and Russia, and was never again repeated in the same form in relation to another country.

Russia considered that NATO lawlessly ascribes to itself tasks that properly belong to collective security organizations, and performs them for the purpose of realizing its own particular interests. In order to prevent similar activities, among other reasons, in May 2002, at the Rome summit, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a new NATO-Russia Council, which was to work in the format of 20 countries, that is, the 19 members of the Alliance at the time and Russia. The agreement implied the obligation to work closely together to resolve arising problems that could threaten international security.

However, what hampered cooperation between NATO and Russia was the NATO's continued policy of expanding into the countries neighboring Russia, including those that had in the past formed part of the USSR. In 2002, being unable to prevent further NATO expansion, Russia brought about the establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty of 1992. This organization simultaneously became a military alliance and a collective security organization on the model of what NATO became after 1992. The CSTO

[33]The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th AprilThe Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999. *NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65*, 24 April 1999.

[34]Sénarclens (2000), McCoubrey (1999). On the justification for this intervention see Ronzitti (1999), Dupuy (2000a, b).

[35]Ghebali (1999).

[36]Zięba (2000).

has not played a visible role, however, in shaping security in the Euro-Atlantic area. In actuality, it has become an instrument of Russian policy toward the five other countries belonging to the CIS (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus).

When the first proposals to expand NATO eastward appeared in 1993, Russia proposed strengthening the CSCE to make it into the main security organization in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, the Russian proposals, although they were partially supported by Germany, France, and Switzerland, were not for the most part implemented. All that was done was to transform the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 1, 1995. When the process of expanding NATO entered into the realization phase, the OSCE lost importance and was engaged solely in the use of 'soft' means of security. The West, and the Central European countries that were integrating with it, favored the hard guarantees of security provided by NATO and integration within the EU framework. In 2004, seven countries joined NATO and eight Central European countries joined the EU. Thus the three Baltic republics—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—found themselves in both Western structures. When in the spring of 2008 NATO announced that it would accept Ukraine and Georgia in the future, Russia was already conducting a policy to counteract the expansion of Western influence in its own immediate vicinity. In June 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev proposed the creation of a new architecture for European security, based on international law. Importantly, the Russian proposal aimed in essence to conclude a collective security treaty in Europe, and it was announced at a time when the OSCE had been shoved to the side, as an institution without real significance. Medvedev's plan was rejected by the Western states, but the problem remained.

At the OSCE summit in 2010 in Astana it was decided to begin discussions on the subject of creating a Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian security community. In actuality, the Western states did not display the will to strengthen the OSCE by creating legal foundations for it and establishing a multi-year budget. In autumn 2013 the crisis erupted in Ukraine and led to sharp disputes between the West and Russia, the freezing of dialogue channels, and the militarization of international relations. It emerged that there was a lack of an effective forum for seeking agreement and resolving the crisis situation. The OSCE was given only a modest role in supervising the peace agreement on an end to the conflict in the Donbas. On the other hand, to resolve this crisis it would have been necessary to strengthen the OSCE and make it into a full-fledged collective security organization. Indubitably this institution, being an international organization in the Euro-Atlantic area and bringing together 57 countries, should acquire a strong mandate to shape security. It can be supposed that it would be easier to strengthen the OSCE than to create a new structure from the ground up. However, as is understandable, neither President Obama's administration nor the US's allies have shown an interest in negotiating a

new deal on Europe's security architecture. Certain experts write that "The potential for success at such talks seems like a long shot at best, and the status quo, while unpleasant, is not hugely detrimental to US interests."[37]

From the global perspective, it is worth taking into consideration the suggestion of Charles Kupchan, who writes:

> The goal should be to forge a consensus among major states about the foundational principles of the next world. The West will have to be ready for compromise; the rules must be acceptable to powers that adhere to very different conceptions of what constitutes a just and acceptable order. The political diversity that will characterize the next world suggests that aiming low and crafting a rules-based order that endures is wiser than aiming high and coming away empty-handed. What follows is a sketch of what the rules of the next order might look like—a set of principles on which the West and the rising rest may well be able to find common ground. (…) New players and diverging ideologies are challenging the Western order and the traditional institutions of authority on which it rests. If the West can help deliver to the rest of the world what it brought to itself several centuries ago—political and ideological tolerance coupled with economic dynamism—then the global turn will mark not a dark era of ideological contention and geopolitical rivalry, but one in which diversity and pluralism lay the foundation for an era of global comity.[38]

In considering the growing international role of the newly emerging powers, including those united in BRICS, the West should weigh the creation of a new multilateral institutional framework for consulting with them the urgent issues that arise and threaten security and international peace. It is better to talk and negotiate, even if the subjects are difficult, than to allow them to grow more complex and worse. Negotiating with the new claimants to the power of deciding the world's fate makes it possible to encourage them to respect the norms and principles that currently prevail in the international order. In addition, there has to be the political will to accept compromises.[39] One paradox of the present situation is that the United States and its allies are unable to do this effectively with regard to Russia.

Finally, it is in the general interest of all countries to strengthen the security system of the UN. The way to achieve this could be not so much a revision of the UN Charter as the creation of consolidated legal bases for the UN, by adding the most important resolutions and conventions concerning world security to the Charter.

A more difficult problem is the question of expanding the number of permanent members in the Security Council. The candidates to this important organ undoubtedly include India, Japan, Germany, Brazil, and South Africa. Reaching a consensus in these matters is difficult but not impossible. In certain areas, regional organizations fulfill or even replace the UN,[40] and certain of the emerging powers, such as Brazil and the Republic of South Africa, which are not members of the Security Council, are very strongly engaged in them.

---

[37]Charap and Shapiro (2015), p. 38.

[38]Kupchan (2012), pp. 187, 205.

[39]See Patrick (2016), pp. 23–24.

[40]Compare Crocker (2015), pp. 14–15.

It would be worthwhile to increase the role of regional organizations by increasing their competences, which to this time have been fairly broadly regulated by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and also to grant them wider competence in regard to the use of force, which is restricted in Chapter VII of the UN Charter to the Security Council. The result would be that the newly emerging powers would be more involved at the regional and global level and their engagement on behalf of increasing peace and world security would be strengthened. This would mean larger accommodation of regional organizations within the framework of the UN and taking into consideration the preferences of the newly emerging powers,[41] for instance, in the question of using force within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework. Especially after NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011, the BRICS countries were concerned that the West was interested in increasing its influence and implementing a strategy of regime change at the cost of observing humanitarian norms and the sovereignty of countries in crisis.[42] Consequently, in 2011 Brazil announced its 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP) initiative, in competition with R2P.

In April 2014, Brazil organized a world summit in São Paulo on the future of Internet governance (The Global Multi-Stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance—NETmundial). During the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011), Brazil announced new ideas on regional integration in America and initiated discussions on a broader scale on the subject of the challenges created by poverty and inequality.[43] Examples of China's activeness in global affairs include its important role in stabilizing South Sudan and sending soldiers within the framework of UN peacekeeping missions to that country (UNMISS) after the outbreak of armed conflict in December 2013.[44] China has important plans, launched in October 2013 by its leader, Xi Jinping, to build two 'silk routes' to Europe: 'One Belt, One Road.' China is also displaying great activity in its own neighborhood, including in underdeveloped Central Asia, which Russia is trying to bind to itself through a regional organization—the Eurasian Economic Union.[45]

At the UN it would also be good to formulate the right of nations to self-determination with greater clarity. From experience of the functioning of the

[41]Hofmann et al. (2016).

[42]See the articles derived from a conference on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) held under the auspices of the Center for American and Global Security at Indiana University-Bloomington, 15–16 May 2015. Ziegler (2016). Also see Tocci (2016).

[43]Stuenkel (2016), p. 114, Stefan (2017).

[44]In January 2017, 2639 Chinese soldiers took part in this mission, and the Chinese president announced that the Chinese contingent would be increased to as high as 7000 soldiers. Later, following a decision by the UN, China reduced its contingent to 1033 soldiers in October 2017. Larger contingents have been sent by India (2333 soldiers), Ruanda (1945), Nepal (1710), Bangladesh (1592) and Ethiopia (1447). Initially, a large numbers of soldiers were also sent for this mission by Brazil (1303) and South Africa (1427). https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss (Accessed on Jan. 27, 2018).

[45]For more, see Kaczmarski (2017).

Euro-Atlantic security system we can see the problem that arose in regard to implementing this right by the Albanians living in Kosovo and also by various nations scattered about the countries that emerged after the collapse of the USSR. The fall of the USSR in the 1990s led to the emergence of 15 new countries, created on the basis of *uti possidetis*, that is, within the boundaries that existed between the Soviet republics, which were sometimes artificial. As a result, the right of nations to self-determination was not entirely realized. Around 25 million Russians have remained outside of Russia, including around 12 million in Ukraine. In 2013 there were 8.3 million Russians in that country; around 1.6 million live on the Crimean Peninsula alone. The unfinished process of implementing the national right to self-determination creates a challenge, and as can be seen from the example of Crimea, even a threat for international stability. The attempt to implement the right is in conflict with the principle of countries' territorial integrity and is used by powers in their policy of geopolitical rivalry. Russia has made use of the political upheaval in Ukraine to annex Crimea, invoking international law (the right to self-determination), and the precedents created by the West, which supported and recognized the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. In helping the inhabitants of Crimea to realize their right to self-determination, Moscow 'forgot' that the Chechens had taken arms in defense of that right and had had their aspirations for independence severely suppressed. Furthermore, the West, in condemning the rebels in the east of Ukraine and denying them the right to secession, behaved with a lack of impartiality; it allowed—and even encouraged and supported—the authorities in Kyiv in their pacification of the insurgent regions ('anti-terrorist operation').[46] The West also closed its eyes to pacifications in other countries, for instance, of the Uyghurs in China.

We continue to observe the instrumental, and in practice arbitrary, treatment of the right of nations to self-determination. The lack of precision in international law for the conditions in which the right of nations to self-determination must be implemented allows the great powers to treat this right depending on their interests and capabilities to back their arguments by force. Thus the realist paradigm still has explanatory value in analyzing international relations. The West's strong criticism of Russia's behavior in regard to Ukraine is highly ideological. The West's attitude did not change when Russia pointed to the state of near catastrophe in humanitarian conditions in the conflicted eastern regions of Ukraine, which had been attacked by government forces within the framework of 'anti-terrorist operation' i.e., pacification activities against the separatists. And yet it would have been proper to invoke the principle—propagated by the UN and the West—of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the civilian population, which was endangered by the ongoing armed conflict.

An important lesson to be drawn from the Ukraine crisis is that Russia's violation of the decisions contained in the Memorandum of December 1994—in which Russia, the US and Great Britain guaranteed the independence, sovereignty, and

[46]Cohen (2014).

existing borders of Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine's turning its nuclear warheads to Russia and joining the NPT—could make it harder to persuade other states to relinquish their nuclear weapons. Now these countries could doubt the credibility of the great powers' guarantees and could develop their own nuclear arms programs. Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of the international order.[47]

From an analysis of the functioning of the Euro-Atlantic security system in the 21st century it can be concluded that the system constitutes the core of the world security system. The system's evolution has limited cooperation between the West and Russia and led to its replacement by great-power rivalry over spheres of influence, and to the crisis in Ukraine. Consequently, the level of security in the Euro-Atlantic area has fallen and thereby the importance of the entire Euro-Atlantic security system in the global international order. The world's center of gravity has moved to Asia, and today China and India, along with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are among the leading international players. Their strategic partnership with Russia is changing the geopolitical map of the world. That change is hastening the rapidly rising importance of other emerging powers. The most useful tool for analyzing such changes turns out to be the neorealist paradigm, as the author has sought to demonstrate in the pages of this book.

References

Allisson, G. (2017). *Destined for war: Can America and China escape the Thucydides's Trap?*. London: Scribe.

Barrett, J. (1996). NATO reform: Alliance policy and cooperative security. In I. Peters (Ed.), *New security challenges: The adaptation of international institutions, reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989* (pp. 123–152). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Beckley, M. (2011/12). China's Century? Why America's edge will endure. *International Security*, *36*(3), 41–78.

Brooks, S. G., Wohlforth, W. C. (2015/2016). The rise and fall of great powers in the Twenty-first century: China's RISE and the fate of America's global position. *International Security*, *40*(3), 7–53.

Charap, S., & Shapiro, J. (2015). Consequences of a new cold war. *Survival, 57*(2), 37–46.

Chivvis, Ch. S. (2012). Libya and the future of liberal intervention. *Survival, 54*(6), 69–92.

Chong, J. I., & Hall, T. H. (2014). The lessons of 1914 to East Asia today: Missing the trees for the forest. *International Security, 39*(1), 7–43.

Cohen, S. F. (2014). The silence of American Hawks about Kiev's atrocities, *The Nation*, July 17, 2014.

Crocker, Ch. A. (2015). The strategic dilemma of a world adrift. *Survival, 57*(1), 7–30.

Donnelly, Th. (2006). Countering aggressive rising powers: A clash of strategic cultures. *Orbis, 50* (3), 413–428.

Dupuy, P.-M. (2000a). L'Ingérence humanitaire: vers uin nouveau droit international? Débats et commentaire du professeur Hubert Thierry. *Défense nationale, 3,* 32–36.

Dupuy, P.-M. (2000b). Une évolution en quatre phases. *Défense nationale, 3,* 27–31.

[47]Yost (2015).

Fels, E. (2017). *Shifting power in Asia-Pacific? The rise of China, Sino-us competition and regional middle powers allegiance*. Heidelberg: Springer.
Fravel, M. T. (2005). Regime insecurity and international cooperation; explaining China's compromises in territorial disputes. *International Security, 30*(2), 46–83.
Friedberg, A. L. (2015). The debate over US China strategy. *Survival, 57*(3), 89–110.
Ghebali, V.-I. (1999). Le Kosovo entre la guerre et la paix'. *Défense nationale, 8–9,* 62–79.
Glaser, Ch L, & Fetter, S. (2016). Should the United States reject MAD? damage limitation and U. S. nuclear strategy toward China. *International Security, 41*(1), 49–98.
Goldgeier, J., & Suri, J. (2016). Revitalizing the U.S. national security strategy. *The Washington Quarterly, 38*(4), 35–55.
Gompert, D. C., Cevallos, A. S., & Garafola, C. L. (2016). *War with China: Thinking through the unthinkable*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
Hofmann, S. C., De Moraes, Bravo, Mendes, B., & Campbell, S. (2016). Investing in international security: Rising powers and organizational choices. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29*(3), 831–851.
Kaczmarski, M. (2017). Non-western visions of regionalism: China's new silk road and Russia's eurasian economic union. *International Affairs, 93*(6), 1357–1376.
Kahl, C. (2017, September 26). The Myth of a 'Better' Iran deal. *Foreign Policy*, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/26/the-myth-of-a-better-iran-deal/ (Accessed on Jan 27, 2018).
Klieman, A. (2015). *Great powers and geopolitics: International affairs in a rebalancing world*. Heidelberg: Springer.
Kupchan, C. A. (2012). *No one's world: The west, the rising rest and the coming global turn*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Layne, Ch. (2018). The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the pax Americana. *International Affairs, 94*(1), 89–111.
Leichtova, M. (2014). *Misunderstanding Russia: Russian foreign policy and the west* (pp. 145–146). Farnham: Ashgate.
Maher, R. (2016). The rise of China and the future of the atlantic alliance. *Orbis, 60*(3), 366–381.
Mahmud Ali, S. (2015). *US-China strategic competition towards a new power equilibrium*. Heidelberg: Springer.
McCoubrey, H. (1999). Kosovo, NATO and international law. *International Relations, XIV*(5), 31–36.
Mead, W. R. (2014). The return of geopolitics: The revenge of the revisionist powers. *Foreign Affairs, 93*(3), 69–79.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014, October 25). Can China rise peacefully? *The National Interest*, pp. 1–43.
Parent, J. M., & Rosato, S. (2015). Balancing in neorealism. *International Security, 40*(2), 51–86.
Patrick, S. (2016). World order: What exactly are the rules? *The Washington Quarterly, 39*(1), 7–27.
Pieper, M. (2017). The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. *European Security, 26*(1), 99–119.
Putin, Erdogan and Rouhani meet in Sochi, Middle East Monitor, November 24, 2017. www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171124-putin-erdogan-and-rouhani-meet-in-sochi. (Accessed on Jan. 27, 2018).
Quek, K., Johnston, A. I. (2017/18). Can China back down? Crisis De-escalation in the shadow of popular opposition. *International Security*, *42*(3), 7–36.
Remarks by Federica Mogherini on the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran nuclear deal), European Union External Action, Luxemburg, 16/10/2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/33997/Remarks%20by%20Federica%20Mogherini%20on%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20Joint%20Comprehensive%20Plan%20of%20Action%20(Iran%20nuclear%20deal) (Accessed on January 27, 2018).

Ronzitti, N. (1999). Lessons of international law from NATO's armed intervention against the federal republic of yugoslavia. *The International Spectator, XXXIV*(3), 45–54.
Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policies. *World Politics, 51*(1), 144–172.
Sakwa, R. (2017). *Russia against the rest: The post-cold war crisis in world order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schweller, R. L. (2003). The progressiveness of neoclassical realism. In C. Elman, M.F. & Elman (Eds.), *Progress in international relations theory appraising the field* (pp. 311–348). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sénarclens, P. (2000). Le 'droit d'ingérence' et inutile et sa rhétorique peut-être néfaste. *Défense nationale, 3,* 6–13.
Smith, N. R. (2015). The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine: Assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the Ukraine crisis. *European Security, 24*(4), 525–540.
Stefan, C. G. (2017). On non-Western norm shapers: Brazil and the responsibility while protecting. *European Journal of International Security, 2*(1), 88–110.
Stent, A. E. (2014). *The limits of partnership: U.S.—Russian relations in the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton: Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.
Stuenkel, O. (2016). *Post-Western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Sussex, M. (2017). The triumph of Russian national security policy? Russia's rapid rebound. *Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71*(5), 499–515.
Taliaferro, J. W. (2006). State building for future wars: Neoclassical realism and the resource extractive state. *Security Studies, 15*(3), 464–495.
The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999. *NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65*, 24 April 1999.
Yost, D. S. (2015). The budapest memorandum and Russia's intervention in ukraine. *International Affairs, 91*(3), 457–685.
Zięba, R. (2000). NATO wobec konfliktów etnicznych na terenie Jugosławii. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe—International Relations, 21*(1–2), 33–52.
Zięba, R. (2004). *Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa.* In R. Zięba (Ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa* (pp. 37–58). Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
Ziegler, Ch. E. (Ed.). (2016). Critical perspectives on the responsibility to protect: BRICS and beyond. *International Relations*, Special Issue, *30*(3), 259–405.

Bibliography

Allison, R. (2014). Russian 'deniable' intervention in Ukraine: How and why Russia broke the rules. *International Affairs, 90*(6), 1255–1297.
Atlantic News, No. 2670, October 25, 1995.
Cienski, J., & Wagstyl, S. Poland proposes an EU army tied to NATO. *Financial Times*, November 5, 2006.
Ciupiński, A. (2013). *Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej: geneza—rozwój—funkcjonowanie*. Warsaw: Difin.
Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016. *NATO Press Release* (2016) 100, 9 July 2016.
Dunay, P., & Herd, G. P. (2010). Redesigning Europe? The pitfalls and the promises of the European security treaty initiative. *OSCE Yearbook 2009, 15,* 77–98. Baden-Baden: Nomos, IFSH.

Ex-Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühe fordert Aufnahme Russlands in die NATO, *Der Spiegel*, November 6, 2010.

Fülöp, M. (1994). La politique étrangère hongroise dans le contexte de l'Europe central. *Politique étrangère, 59*(1), 115–128.

Glaser, Ch L. (1993). Why NATO is still best? future security arrangements for Europe. *International Security, 8*(1), 5–50.

Gordon, Ph H. (2002). NATO After 11 September. *Survival, 43*(4), 89–106.

Heraclides, A. (1993). *Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992*. London: Frank Cass.

Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, utv. Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300 [The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997 No. 1300], https://zakonbase.ru/content/base/24975. Accessed January 27, 2018).

Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 30 noyabrya 2016g. N 640 [The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 1504 30, 2016 No. 640], http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201612010045?1505index=1&rangeSize=1. Accessed January 27, 2018. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997 No. 1300], https://zakonbase.ru/content/base/24975. Accessed January 27, 2018).

Kupchan, Ch A. (2010). *How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace*. Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Le Guelte, G. (1998). Les essais nucléaires de l'Inde et du Pakistan hier, aujourd'hui, demain. *Défense nationale, 11,* 35–36.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014b). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs, 93*(5), 1–12.

Memento défense-désarmement 1995/96. L'Europe et la sécurité internationale, Bruxelles: GRIP 1996.

Meric, C. (1996). Bilan du processus du désarmement conventionel en Europe (p. 320). In Memento défense-désarmement 1995/96. L'Europe et la sécurité internationale, Bruxelles: GRIP; Lachowski, Z. (1996). Conventional arms control and security cooperation in Europe (p. 716, 731). SIPRI Yearbook 1996, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nuttall, S. J. (2000). *European foreign policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Oliker, O. (2017). Putinism, populism and the defence of liberal democracy. *Survival, 59*(1), 7–24.

Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. *Washington Post*, February 12, 2007.

Rapport pour le President de la République Franҫaise sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le Commandement Integre de l'OTAN, sur l'avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l'Europe de la défense, novembre 14, 2012.

Rieker, P., & Lundby Gjerde, K. (2016). The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue—Different readings of the crisis in Ukraine. *European Security, 25*(3), 304–325.

Tertrais, B. (2015). Iran: An experiment in strategic risk-taking. *Survival, 57*(5), 67–73.

Tocci, N. (2016). The responsibility to protect in Libya and Syria: Europe, the USA and global human rights governance. In R. Alcaro, J. Peterson, & E. Greco (Eds.), *The West and the global shift power: Transatlantic relations and global governance* (pp. 221–246). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vayrynen, R. (1971). On the definition and measurement of small power status. *Cooperation and Conflict, 6*(1), 91–102.

Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (1987). *International relations theory: Realism, pluralism, globalism, and beyond*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Zięba, R. (2000a). Miejsce Europy w ogólnej koncepcji bezpieczeństwa USA u progu XXI wieku. In E. Cziomer (Ed.), *Udział USA w systemie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego* (pp. 51–65). Kraków: Meritum.

Zięba, R. (2015b). Teoria bezpieczeństwa. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), *Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych* (pp. 87–106). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.

Zięba, R. (2015c). Poland and France: A cross analysis of security threats and national interests. In M. de Langlois (Ed.), Vers une nouvelle stratégie européenne de sécurité, *Laboratoires de l'IRSEM*, (Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École Militaire), *25*, 46–54.