

POLITICAL POWER IN SPAIN

**THE MULTIPLE DIVIDES
BETWEEN MPS AND CITIZENS**

*Edited by
Xavier Coller,
Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo,
and Fabiola Mota*



Political Power in Spain

“Spanish politics has been in constant effervescence since the *indignados* movement (2011) shook the basis of the party system. The explosive mix of a severe economic crisis, the austerity policies, and corruption scandals opened a vast rift between citizens and political elites negatively affecting the representative link. This rich and illuminating book sheds light on many aspects that feed the tension between the representatives and the represented. Touching upon who the national and regional MPs are, where they come from socially and politically, how they view their representative role, and how they think politics and the state should operate, this book is an excellent resource for anyone interested in understanding key aspects of political representation in Spain. Written by a young and vibrant cohort of excellent scholars, this book will be highly engaging both for readers interested in Spanish politics and for those interested in political representation and legislative studies.”

—Laura Morales, *Professor of Comparative Politics, Sciences Po, France*

“This extraordinary volume provides a treasure chest of fascinating findings on the attitudes, experiences and characteristics of political representatives in Spain and on their contrasts with ordinary citizens. The excellent team of volume contributors offers insightful analysis of the rich empirical results of extensive survey research. *Political Power in Spain* will be a required reading for students of political elites, analysts of the nexus between representatives and ordinary citizens and scholars of contemporary Spain.”

—Robert M. Fishman, *Professor of Sociology, Carlos III University, Madrid*

“This book is a splendid example of how a classic field in between political sociology and political science, such as parliamentary studies, can be largely renewed through a solid new empirical research and a deep revision of the topics that are analyzed. In addition to being exhaustive in providing a full knowledge of the field, attitudes and opinions of citizens complement the parliamentarian elite survey in building a complete picture of Spanish democracy in this domain. This book is a compulsory reading for students, scholars, and practitioners.”

—Leonardo Morlino, *Professor of Political Science, Luiss, Rome, Italy, and former President of the International Political Science Association*

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Political Power in Spain

The Multiple Divides between MPs and Citizens

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To Juan J. Linz, in memoriam.

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The Need for the Study of Parliamentarians in Spain

*Xavier Collier, Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo,
and Fabiola Mota*

1.1 WHY STUDY PARLIAMENTARIANS?

Justifying the need for a book such as this is relatively easy if we consider two interrelated phenomena: alienation and lack of knowledge. Firstly, the early years of the 21st century have been marked by growing public discontent with politics in Europe. Although this is not an entirely new phenomenon, as can be seen from the literature on political trust dating back several decades (Crozier et al. 1975), the alienation between politicians and citizens in Spain appears to have reached a dimension previously unknown. The

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surveys of the CIS (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Spain's Center for Sociological Research) consistently reflect a progressive alienation of the citizens from their representatives which is manifested in the perception that "politics" (parties, government, politicians) has become one of the three most important problems. This situation has lasted too long for it to be considered circumstantial and its most evident expression is heard in the cries of "they do not represent us" that have accompanied many mass public demonstrations which began with the 15-M movement and were followed in Spain by other voices of protest, such as "Real Democracy, Now!", the demonstrations around the Congress and the Catalanian Parliament, the "green tide" of protests over education, the "white tide", over health, and the movement of the platform of persons affected by mortgage foreclosures. The results of the different regional and national elections which have taken place in 2015–16 have brought to light the expressions of this discontent in different options which confront "old" and "new" politics. "New" politics is epitomized in the emergence of Podemos (left) and Ciudadanos (center or center-right), while "old" politics is represented mainly by traditional parties like socialdemocrat PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) and right or center-right PP (Popular Party). In general, as Maravall (2016) suggests, there has been a growing demand on democracy (the quality of representation, redistribution via public policies, and institutions of political competition) that politicians and their parties had hardly anticipated and were mostly unable to cope with successfully.

Secondly, although the first index of parliamentary transparency elaborated by Transparency International does not give a poor score to the 19 Spanish parliaments (in comparison with local councils, for example),¹ the lack of transparency in political activity, the lack of public interest and disengagement from public affairs may have led to widespread ignorance about who the politicians are, where they come from and what they do. In some postgraduate social science courses, we have carried out the following experiment: social science students (who are supposed to be among the most educated population concerning politics) were asked to explain, for example, what the members of parliament (MPs) in the different legislative assemblies did, why they thought that they were involved in politics, what they were like in general, or what they believed the politicians thought about a possible reform of the constitution. The generalized lack of knowledge that they displayed could well be shared by less educated sectors of the population. It is not that Spaniards are ignorant in general. The problem is that the number of studies about politicians is very scarce and usually limited to works about some institutions or they take the form

of newspaper articles, generally with little supporting empirical evidence. There is a black hole in the knowledge about political elites in Spain.

Nevertheless, a glance at the scientific literature on political elites allows us to state that academic interest in studying this power group has increased lately, although there still exists a number of voids which are, little by little, being covered. We have a slightly better understanding of the social profile of MPs at certain times and in some legislative assemblies, and of their evolution,² but we do not yet know if they resemble the society that elects them, although instruments do exist to establish comparisons based on the Electoral Bias Index or the Social Disproportion Index (Coller et al. 2016). Thanks to diverse contributions,³ we are relatively well aware of the late, progressive and differentiated incorporation of women into institutional politics, although the effect that this is having remains to be determined, especially as regards legislative action. Neither do we know much about the criteria that are applied in the selection of one person rather than another to form part of an electoral list, other than the rules that appear in party bylaws or from studies of the executive.⁴ There are partial gaps in our knowledge of the motivation that leads some persons to enter politics and to make it their professional career, especially at the regional level.⁵ Although there have been some studies, we have hardly any knowledge of whether professional or ideological reproduction exists in the families of politicians, whether the MPs of the non-statewide parties in general behave differently from parties operating on a statewide scale, or whether there are differences between the representatives of parties with experience of government and those without.⁶ Neither do we know much about what they do in parliaments, how they do it, the relationships which are established between parliamentarians of rival groups and even between members of the same group when influenced by hierarchy and decision-making discipline.⁷ We are also largely unaware of the beliefs and attitudes of political representatives, their cognitive schemata or their opinions on relevant questions such as the reform of the constitution, the organization of the State in autonomous communities, the European Union (EU) or corruption in politics. And above all, despite some progress, we know little of whether MPs and their constituents coincide on aspects which are relevant to the political dynamics in a multilevel Spain.⁸ In short, we still know little of many facets of political representatives at all levels of representation, of those persons whom the citizens have entrusted with the government of society and with decisions that affect them.

The studies which partially cover some of these vacuums in Spain are generally focused on a specific assembly or a particular period or legislature. As Linz predicted with respect to the studies of Spain, the federalization of

the country has meant that the State has lost its pre-eminence as an object of study and the center of attention has shifted to the regions, but there has been no effort to make comparisons (Newell 2011, p. 71). This book largely attempts to fill these gaps, taking into account the fact that the institutional evolution has made MPs of Congress and Senate and those of the 17 regional legislative assemblies to share political responsibilities. Our purpose is to improve our knowledge of who the persons occupying a seat in any of the 19 representative chambers in Spain are and what they think.

1.2 STUDIES OF PARLIAMENTARIANS

Studies of MPs are not new. They make a long-standing tradition in the social sciences for at least two reasons. Firstly, in comparison with studies of other types of elites, parliamentarians are easily identifiable since they occupy a visible position in the institutional power structure in any country. Secondly, they are a relevant part of the population and make up a segment of what Mills (1956) called the “power elite” insofar that their decisions are important to the lives of the citizens and for the quality of democracy. For these two reasons, there have been myriad studies of parliaments and parliamentarians.

Since it focused on the study of US legislative assemblies, especially the rigid seniority rules of the Senate (Shils 1982, p. 20, in Von Beyme 1995, p. 16), the theorization of the “power elite” contributed to the consolidation of the institutional anchorage in the study of the political elite. The work of Polsby (1968), Eulau and Czudnowski (1976) and Czudnowski (1982) provides an institutional perspective as they focus on the analysis of parliaments and their members in the USA (and other countries). Although not all studies of the political elites focus on parliaments (see, for example, Dahl 1961 or Putnam 1976), the analysis of the institutional framework is based on the interest in who the parliamentarians are and the way they are recruited in the USA (Seligman et al. 1974; Jewell 1982; Marwick 1976; Kim et al. 1976; King and Seligman 1976; Mann 1986). This interest is also seen in Europe (Rush 1969; Norris 1997), where, as Best and Cotta (2000, p. 16) acknowledge, in response to the invitation of Aron (1950a, b) to study the elites, it was probably Sartori (1965) and Blondel (1973) who took the first steps and opened up the path for other relevant studies of a more or less comparative nature (Suleiman 1986; Best and Cotta 2000; Loewenberg et al. 2002; Genieys 2010; Freire et al. 2016a) or which focused on a single case (for example, Williams 1979; Cotta 1979, 1982; Norton

1981, 2005; Di Palma and Cotta 1986; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Esaiason and Holmberg 1996; Saafeld 1990; Verzichelli 2010; Freire et al. 2016b; Di Virgilio and Segatti 2016).

This book falls within that tradition of studies of parliamentarians *qua* power elites. These studies are usually one of two types. Firstly, there are those which seek to improve our knowledge of who the political representatives are and what they are like, how they win their seat, what political record they develop and what they do in the assemblies. The study by Best and Cotta (2000) is probably the most ambitious undertaken in Europe, as it took a historical perspective in the analysis of 11 countries, based on existing data about politicians (social profile, recruiting, political career), and the study by Norris (1997a), which compared recruiting in nine democracies (four in Europe) based on contextual and survey data.

Secondly, there are those studies which focus on what the people who occupy a seat think about different aspects of the political system, their beliefs, attitudes, cognitive schemata and so on. This type of study is less common and is usually the result of surveys or interviews. The work by Esaiason and Holmberg (1996) in Sweden and that of Norris and Lovenduski (1995) in Great Britain are two referents which have nurtured the study of Spanish MPs to the extent that some questions are a replica of the questionnaires in these studies. The work by Katz and Wessels (1999), although limited to the European Parliament, addresses similar issues to those considered in this text (representation, recruitment, social profile, etc.) and it is complemented by the surveys carried out by Simon Hix and Richard Whitaker of European MPs which, in several waves (2000, 2006, 2010, 2015), sought the opinion of these representatives on diverse issues which are similar to those addressed in this book.⁹

The study that serves as the basis for this book is the result of a survey of a representative sample of Spanish parliamentarians and it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its type that has been completed in Spain. Personal interviews were held with 580 MPs in 2009 and 2010 with a wide-ranging questionnaire which included the concerns of other studies and whose questions have been partially used to interview citizens, thereby facilitating comparison.¹⁰ With the data from the MPs survey and its comparison with that from the citizens' survey,¹¹ this book attempts to shed light on some of the limitations detected in our knowledge about MPs and their relations with society. In doing so, the study falls within a tradition in the social sciences with long historical and geographical roots which combines from the very beginning the institutional framework (assemblies, parties) with individual factors (values, beliefs and identities among MPs),

thereby reflecting the need to combine the analysis of the institution, the individual and the context (March and Olsen 1989).

The questions that inspire and structure this book fall into two main areas. The first is the question of who the MPs are, what they do and how they come to hold a seat: What are the distinctive characteristics of the Spanish representatives? How did their political vocation develop? How and why are they selected for the lists that will take them to the parliaments? Do they develop multilevel professional itineraries within a quasi-federal institutional structure? What do they do in the legislative assemblies and how do they do it? That is, how do they perform their function as political representatives?

The second area concerns the questions about what MPs think and what attitudes they have with respect to a number of key matters regarding democracy and the government of the country: What is their ideology? How do they develop it? To what extent does it coincide with that of the citizens? How do they structure their national identity? What do they think about the territorial model of the State? Do they consider constitutional reform necessary? Are there differences between national parties and regional parties? What is their relationship with Europe? To sum up, both these areas of questions attempt to throw light on some of the gaps detected in our knowledge of Spanish political representatives. The answers to these questions are to be found in the plan of the book.

1.3 PLAN OF THE BOOK

The general focus of this book is the description and analysis of the issues covered. It has a dual purpose. Firstly, to participate in the international academic debate with the basic findings of the study and, secondly, to make the work accessible to the general public. This requires a certain balance between the demands of the scientific community and the need to communicate with a wider public. In seeking this balance, we have attempted at all times to maintain rigor in the use of data and to frame the analysis within the relevant academic debates on each specific issue. A more in-depth, detailed examination of other aspects remains for other current and future research projects.

This study is divided into 16 chapters, grouped into two blocks. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 analyze the nature of our parliamentarians, why they are involved in politics, how they reached the legislative assemblies and what they do in parliaments. The second block comprises eight chapters which examine the opinions and attitudes of the representatives;

that is, their cognitive schemata are dissected with respect to certain issues which are relevant to the current political situation and the future of Spain: distrust of politics, collective identities, ideology, the organization of the State in autonomous communities and the EU. Each chapter addresses a substantive topic which forms part of the most relevant academic debates. General conclusions are deployed in Chapter 16. This book makes thus a dual contribution. Firstly, each chapter offers different analysis of the subject of study and thereby contributes to academic debates through the provision of unique, original data. Secondly, in a more generic sense, this work can help us to know better the Spanish political representatives, until now the great unknowns of democracy in the country.

Chapter 2 studies the internal composition of the parliamentary political elite, paying special attention to the social profile and the differences between parties and with the electorate. The analysis offered in this chapter allows us to determine to what extent parliaments are a mirror image of the society that elects them and gives us an idea of the majority profile: male, university-educated, high social class, lawyers or academic professionals. However, there are certain differences between assemblies which lead the authors to detect informal access filters which differ in the national parliament and the regional parliaments.

Gender aspects are examined in greater detail in Chapter 3 from the descriptive representation point of view, together with their effect on substantive aspects (Pitkin 1967). After an analysis of the social profile of female MPs in comparison with their male colleagues, the authors analyze the responses of MPs and conclude that, despite the increased presence of women in legislative assemblies,¹² no changes can be observed in the manner of holding political debate, although there has been change in the issues and priorities of parliamentary activity and the type of relationship that exists with civil society. Furthermore, this chapter also reveals significant differences between men and women on the opinion about quotas for women in electoral lists.

Chapter 4 deals with the motivations that brought MPs to politics, with special attention to the family of origin. This chapter identifies one soft family socialization mechanism (the frequency with which politics is discussed at home: ideological transmission) and another hard mechanism (direct example, family background) and it concludes that both are relevant. Spanish politicians come from homes that are more politicized than those of the citizens in general, and almost half have had politicians in their family. The chapter also shows that MPs from left-wing families and

those with family members involved in politics are more likely to mention the family as the origin of their political vocation and affiliation, and that the family continues to be an important explanatory factor in their motivation to enter politics and militate in a given party.

The authors of Chapter 5 focus on an aspect of which almost nothing is known: how candidates are chosen for inclusion in electoral lists. Applying Norris's (1997b) funnel of causality model and the dimensions of inclusivity and centralization of Rahat and Hazan (2001, see also Rahat 2013), this chapter shows that the candidates are elected exclusively and centrally; that is, far from the rank-and-file members and the local territorial level. Furthermore, it is revealed that, in contrast to the stipulations of the bylaws of some parties, MPs become candidates thanks to the offering of a position in the electoral lists made by a leader of the party, especially at the regional level. Loyalty, party dedication and training appear to be the principal reasons for choosing candidates, although there are significant differences between parties.

Chapter 6 analyzes the development of the political careers of the representatives from three points of view: the transition between political arenas (local, regional and national), the professionalization of politics, and valuations and aspirations with respect to different political destinations. The chapter shows that local politics is the main starting point of political careers and that there is a certain hierarchical order from regional parliaments to the Spanish parliament, though this hierarchy is much less visible in territories with differentiated party systems and among the younger representatives who have begun their career in a Spain in which the autonomous communities are fully institutionalized. The data also suggests that political representatives are highly professionalized, with a predominance of lawyers and public employees.

Chapter 7 examines the operation of parliamentary groups, confirming the existence of strict parliamentary discipline in Spain, as observed earlier by Sánchez de Dios (1996). The MPs themselves (with practically no distinction between parties or chambers) appear to support this strict discipline, although this does not necessarily translate into a vertical operation in the parliamentary groups. The data analyzed shows that the power of parliamentary groups is concentrated in the hands of professional politicians who have built their careers within the parties, which hinders access to positions of power by professionals from other areas. At the same time, women are less likely than men to access positions of leadership in the parliamentary groups.

Chapter 8 considers the way in which MPs conceive parliamentary political representation and contrasts it with the perceptions and preferences expressed by the citizens. Applying Rehfeld's (2009, 2011) analytical scheme, this chapter identifies four predominant modes of representation: "Burkean independents", "bureaucrats", "volunteers" and "Madisonian legislators". The parliamentarian's political party, rather than the legislative assembly where they act as a representative, appears to be the determinant of the type of representation. This finding is especially useful with a view to interpreting the discrepancies observed between citizens and MPs with respect to the representative relationship.

Chapter 9 analyzes the perceptions of the political representatives with regard to the causes of political disaffection and distrust of parties. The data shows that MPs tend particularly to attribute the causes of distrust of parties to internal factors of the parties themselves, especially the cases of corruption. Despite this, MPs, and especially the representatives of the PP and PSOE, tend to minimize the scope of corruption in Spain in comparison with the perception held by the citizens.

From a constructivist focus, Chapter 10 explains the collective identities of parliamentarians. Although there are notable differences between territories and parties, most members of legislative assemblies have a dual identity (like the population that elects them) which makes them feel both Spanish and also of their own region. Nevertheless, the authors highlight that parliamentarians who are born in the region which elects them (natives), the younger MPs and those who identify themselves with the ideological left tend to embrace less the pole of the Spanish identity and position themselves closer to the regional identity. The authors also analyze what "Spain" means as a collective referent and study the relationship between collective identity and nationalism.

This chapter is complemented by Chapter 11, in which the authors focus on the identity differences between MPs and citizens, studying the variations that exist in each party and each region in the cases of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country. They develop the thesis that there is a significant gap between parliamentarians and citizens in terms of national identity.

Chapter 12 analyzes the ideological distribution of MPs and compares it with that of the citizens. On the basis of the information provided, it is found that MPs identify themselves as significantly more to the left than the citizens. It is also found that, as suggested by Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996) in Sweden, the original social class of the MPs does not affect their

ideology, but the political climate in their family does, and that religious beliefs has a much greater weighting in their ideology than beliefs in egalitarian values.

The authors of Chapter 13 analyze the opinions and preferences of MPs with respect to the territorial organization of the State. They find that membership of a national or regional party is a factor that generates wide differences between MPs, especially as regards the degree of autonomy achieved by their community, the preference for a symmetrical rather than an asymmetrical federal model, and the position regarding a constitutional reform of the model of the State. Nevertheless, the analysis of MPs of the main two national parties (PP and PSOE) shows that the differences within each party are due to different factors: in the former, the differences are explained exclusively on the basis of the level of representation of the MPs (regional parliament versus Congress and Senate), while in the latter, the relevant factor is their region of origin.

Chapter 14 is devoted specifically to the representatives of regional and nationalist parties in Spain. The data analyzed confirms that the regional level in the organization is of greater relevance, although this does not bring with it a greater weighting of the local level. Nationalist and regional parties are also distinguished by the greater weight of rank-and-file members in the organization, as well as a greater propensity to factionalism. With respect to demands for self-government, the representatives of all these parties—with the exception of the regionalists—hold positions which are very similar to each other, coinciding in the demand for the fiscal autonomy of their respective regions. However, in terms of linguistic policy, the nationalist parties of Catalonia and Galicia hold positions which are less open to the freedom of choice than the representatives of the different branches of Basque nationalism.

Lastly, Chapter 15 addresses the study of the opinions and experiences of Spanish MPs with respect to the politics and institutions of the EU. Firstly, it is observed that, as was predictable, the majority of the members of the regional and national parliaments recognize the relevance and benefits of European politics. However, despite the fact that MPs show some type of involvement in European affairs during their activity in the chamber, they express little dedication to or interest in European politics, focusing principally on regional and national matters. The generalized disinterest with respect to the institutions and politics of the EU is also observed in the lack of interest they show in a political career at that territorial level of governance.

Throughout the book, the chapters make a comparison (whenever possible) with society using the CIS studies ES2827 (MPs) and ES2930 (citizens). We have highlighted and documented four major gaps: social profile, ideology, collective identities and conception of the representative function. The reader will discover the distance between MPs and citizens and inevitably will connect these gaps with recent political events in Spain: public contestation, emergence of new parties (like in other European countries) and disaffection.

NOTES

1. The first transparency index of Parliaments (2014) gave a mean score of 64.1 out of 100. The most transparent legislative assemblies were Cantabria (98.2) and Navarre (87.2), followed by the Senate (83.8). The least transparent assemblies were Murcia (42), the Canary Islands (42.3) and the Balearic Islands (45). The Congress was in 10th place, with 65 points.
2. Linz and de Miguel (1975), EDP (1977), Pitarch and Subirats (1982), del Campo et al. (1982), Morán (1989), Capo (1992), Jerez and Morata (1995), Jerez (1997), Márquez (1997), Coller (1999, 2004, 2008), Calvet (1999), Martínez and Méndez (2000), Linz et al. (2000, 2003), Morata (2004), Genieys (1998, 2004), Sánchez Herrera (2004), Coller et al. (2008), Feliu (2010), Agirreazkuenaga et al. (2011), Jerez et al. (2013), Coller and Jaime (2013). See also number 32 of the journal *Pôle Sud* (2010) and the volume edited by Subirats and Gallego (2002), among others.
3. Sevilla (1997), Uriarte (1999), Uriarte and Ruiz (1999), Álvarez (2000), Sánchez Ferriz (2000), Biglino (2000), Roig (2002), Valiente et al. (2003), Valiente et al. (2005), Mateo Díaz (2005), Verge (2006, 2009, 2012), Serra (2008), Roig (2009), Delgado (2011), Pastor (2011), Diz and Lois (2007, 2012), Santana et al. (2015, 2016).
4. See Cordero and Coller (2015). On the selection of ministers and their careers, see Rodríguez Teruel (2009, 2010).
5. See, however, Uriarte (2000) and López Nieto (2004) on motivations in the Congress and Galais et al. (2016) for a comparative perspective. On the record of members of the executive, see Botella et al. (2010, 2011), and of the legislative, Botella (1997). On both of these, but with data from Latin America, see Alcántara (2012).
6. Even so, see Coller and Santana (2009), Pérez-Nievas (2010), Barrio and Barberá (2010).
7. The exceptions are Sánchez de Dios (1996, 1999, 2005) and Caballero (2007), who focus on the Congress, and Jaime and Martínez (2013) who use the results of this study for Andalusia.

8. See Méndez-Lago and Martínez (2002), Martínez and Paradés (2013).
9. For further information about this survey, see <http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/EPRG/MEPSurveyData.aspx>
10. See the work of Esaiason and Holmberg (1996), Norris and Lovenduski (1995), and the questionnaires of the *Comparative Candidate Survey* (<http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/5>), which were “discovered” once the Spanish MP survey was completed.
11. For further information of how this study was carried out, the problems faced by the researchers, and the questionnaire, see Coller et al. (2016: 323–60).
12. See also, in this respect, Santana et al. (2015, 2016).

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The Composition of Spanish Parliaments: What are the MPs Like?

Inmaculada Serrano and Sandra Bermúdez

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The basic question that underlies any study of elites is who holds the power in a society and what are the elements that enable achieving such position (Uriarte 1997, p. 249). In representative democracies this issue has important implications. From a normative point of view, plural and inclusive representation is a matter of justice and equity and it signals that access to elite positions is open and democratic. From a functional point of view, the non-representation of specific social groups may involve the marginalization of their specific interests as well as the exclusion of potential innovations and new talents, introducing inefficiencies in the legislative process and a destabilizing component (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 94; Mateo 2005, p. 112; Coller and Santana 2009, p. 43).¹

The pluralistic perspective of democracy favors (in a normative sense) a model in which citizens have a fair chance of entering the parliamentary elite, regardless of their social extraction and characteristics. Such a model would lead to a form of “demographic” representation in which

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parliaments would amount to a “microcosm” of the population (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 94). In this sense, Putnam defines two opposing ideal types. On the one hand, the model of independence, where social extraction plays no role in accessing the parliamentary elite. On the other hand, the agglutination model, in which there is a strong correlation between social stratification and political structures, so that “a socioeconomically privileged caste monopolizes political leadership” (Putnam 1976, pp. 21–22).

The conclusion of the studies that have addressed this question is generally that a majority of the people who occupy the highest positions of the structures of power in Western democracies come from the middle-high strata of society (Aberbach et al. 1981; Keller 1963; Putnam 1976; Verba 1987). Two classic ideas help explain this finding. On the one hand, Sartori’s *rule of distance* (1963, p. 317)² establishes that citizens of more disadvantaged social environments have to “travel” a greater social distance and overcome more barriers to gain access to the political elite. On the other hand, Putnam’s *law of increasing disproportion* establishes that the difficulty of accessing the political elites also increases with the hierarchy and prestige of the institution or political position (Putnam 1976).

In contrast, Pareto’s theory of elites’ circulation establishes that the groups that make up the elites enter, leave or remain according to changes in their social relevance (1966, §§2034, 2054)³ and that individuals in turn circulate in and out of such elites (Pareto 1935, §§2025). For example, after the consolidation of labor movements during the twentieth century, a significant presence of the working-class was to be expected, based on its increased political and social relevance. Also, given the greater social mobility of modern societies, an increased presence of upward social trajectories (for example, from working-class families to the middle or upper classes) can be expected, thus facilitating the renewal of the elites.

The normative considerations of the pluralistic perspective can be nonetheless nuanced by the quest for excellence in elites. Weber’s classic proposal is that certain social profiles have a greater affinity with and suitability to perform representative work. Notably, a higher educational level and professional careers in education or law could facilitate political and legislative performance (Weber 1981).

This chapter explores, first, the socio-demographic profile of Spanish parliamentarians, with the aim of determining to what extent Spanish parliaments constitute a microcosm of society, or whether certain social profiles dominate the legislative chambers. The main findings show a high

degree of homogeneity among parliamentarians, both in the national and regional parliaments, particularly in terms of educational level, age and gender. Second, the chapter compares the social profile of the members of parliament (MPs) of different parties with that of their respective voters, finding a significant distance in those three dimensions—education, age and gender—as well as in terms of religiosity.

Finally, the chapter explores the social extraction of MPs and to what extent Spanish parliaments are composed of MPs with upward, downward or immobile social trajectories. On the one hand, the under-representation of the intermediate and working classes is confirmed, bringing Spanish parliaments closer to the agglutination model. On the other hand, parliaments are composed to a large extent of upward social trajectories—practically half of the parliamentarians. In other words, although Spanish parliaments do not follow a model of independence, they do not constitute either an armored institution but are permeable to the social mobility present in the society.

2.2 THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SPANISH MPS

Gender is certainly a basic dimension of demographic representation. This dimension has received particular attention in the last decades⁴ as women systematically constitute a minority in the parliamentary elites of Western democracies. Only the Scandinavian countries are close to a gender parity representation (Uriarte and Ruiz 1999, pp. 207–208). The proportion of women among Spanish parliamentarians is 39%, still far from parity, although this presence has increased significantly in recent years (Coller 2008; Valiente et al. 2003; Verge 2012; Santana et al. 2015).⁵ This rate places Spain in the leading group among European countries, just behind the Scandinavian countries (Uriarte and Ruiz 1999, pp. 207–208; Uriarte 1997, p. 264; Santana et al. 2015).

Age is another important dimension of demographic representation: first, from a perspective of generational representation and renewal; and secondly, from a life cycle perspective, age influences the accumulated experience and personal circumstances of parliamentarians. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, p. 188) show that there is a systematic over-representation in Western parliaments of people between 40 and 50 years old, followed by the age group between 50 and 60 years old. In this context, Spanish parliamentarians have traditionally stood out as relatively

young (in comparative perspective) since the transition to democracy in 1978. But their age has increased over time as a result of the parliamentarians' continuity in the different parliaments (Coller 2008, pp. 139–140). Still, the average age of Spanish MPs is not high within the European context (49.3) and this average is even lower in the regional parliaments (48.2), as compared to the Congress and Senate (51.8) (see Table 2.1). This finding is in line with previous studies (Coller et al. 2008, p. 1; Coller 2008, p. 139; Genieys 1998).

In order to assess age representation, we divide the parliamentarians into three large cohorts, in line with those identified by Montero et al. (1998). The first cohort consists of those MPs who reached adulthood during the beginning or heyday of the Franco regime. These parliamentarians were over 50 years old at the time of the survey. The second cohort consists of those who reached adulthood in the final years of the Franco regime or during the transition to democracy (36–50 years old). Finally, the third cohort is formed by those who were born and socialized during the democratic consolidation and did not live under the Franco regime (under 36 years old at the time of the survey). The majority of parliamentarians belong to the first cohort (48%), followed by the 36–50 years old group (40%). Only 12% of the MPs were under 36 years old at the time of the survey and have been socialized in democracy.

It must be noted nonetheless that the presence of female and young MPs is not evenly distributed across Spanish parliaments: the Congress and the Senate have a lower presence of women and young people (34% and 10%) than the regional parliaments (41% and 13% respectively).⁶ Several factors can explain these differences. On the one hand, regional parliaments are frequently an entry point to the political career.⁷ Since female parliamentarians are younger and have less political experience than their male colleagues, this could explain their larger presence in regional parliaments.⁸ On the other hand, women tend to be more affected by difficulties in balancing family and work. These difficulties increase in the case of the national parliament, since the geographic distances between Madrid and the places of residence of MPs living outside the city are greater.

The prevalence of university degrees among the political elite (in much higher proportions than for the rest of society) is a historical constant, and as Keller notes it is “the most important entry requirement” to that elite (1963, p. 121).⁹ The proportion of parliamentarians with a university degree in the European parliaments ranges from 65% to 85% (Gaxie and Godmer 2007, p. 114). Similarly, liberal professions, particularly those

Table 2.1 MPs socio-demographic profile (in %)

	<i>Congress and Senate (a)</i>	<i>Regional parliaments (b)</i>	<i>Difference (a)-(b)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Gender				
Men	66	59	7	61
Women	34	41	-7	39
Total (N)	100 (195)	100 (385)		100 (580)
Age (average)				
	(51.8)	(48.2)	(4)	(49.3)
Over 50	59	42	17*	48
50-36	31	45	-14*	40
Under 36	10	13	-3	12
Total (N)	100 (131)	100 (445)		100 (576)
Educational level				
Primary	2	3	-1	3
Secondary	10	12	-2	11
University	81	77	4	78
Postgraduate or higher	7	8	-1	8
Total (N)	100 (193)	100 (385)		100 (578)
Type of school (secondary education)				
Public	41	55	-14*	50
Private	53	44	9*	47
Multiple	6	1	5*	3
Total (N)	100 (195)	100 (378)		100 (573)
Profession				
Management and administration	10	8	2	9
Lawyers and legal professionals	22	16	6	18
Teachers	20	24	-4	23
Technicians and professionals of natural sciences	17	15	2	16
Technicians and professionals of social and human sciences	20	24	-4	22
Other	11	13	-2	12
Total (N)	100 (185)	100 (345)		100 (530)
Religiosity				
Practicing Catholic	29	26	3	27
Non-practicing Catholic	33	33	-	33
Indifferent, agnostic or atheist	38	40	-2	39
Other religion	-	1	-1	1
Total (N)	100 (194)	100 (378)		100 (572)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: * $p < 0.05$

related to law or education, dominate in the political elites of almost all Western democracies (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Coller and Santana 2009, p. 42; Uriarte 1997, p. 268). The dominance of liberal professions among parliamentarians is explained by the affinity of these professions with the legislative work, in terms of the speaking and writing skills required in both arenas. Similarly, these professionals are “dispensable”, in the sense that they enjoy a higher degree of flexibility in their professional activity, including the possibility of taking their jobs back once they leave the political career, particularly in the case of civil servants. In addition, liberal professionals have valuable resources to support their dedication to politics, including social and professional networks and relatively high levels of economic security (Weber 1981; Putnam 1976; Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

In Spain, the dominance of higher education among parliamentarians is intense, with 86% of university graduates (see Table 2.1). In contrast, only 17% of the population in Spain holds university degrees (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística* [INE] 2010). In addition, the majority of MPs are either teaching professionals (23%), lawyers (18%), or professionals within the field of humanities and social sciences (22%). The presence of managers (9%) or professionals of the natural sciences (16%) is much smaller. In contrast with these dominant features, the attendance of public or private schools (during secondary studies) divides Spanish MPs in almost two perfect halves: 47% have studied in private centers. This proportion is even larger in the national Congress and Senate (53%).

Religiosity is another important dimension of representation that is frequently overlooked. In the case of Spain, the majority of parliamentarians (60%) declare themselves Catholics, but over half of these consider themselves to be non-practitioners. This means that barely a third of Spanish parliamentarians are Catholic practitioners. In contrast, almost 40% declare themselves to be indifferent, agnostic or atheist.

To conclude, the main finding of this section is the high homogeneity among parliamentarians in terms of gender, age and educational credentials. Although these representation biases are common for all Western democracies, the predominance of this pattern in comparative perspective should not obscure the issue of the imperfect representation of women, youth and less educated people in Spanish (and Western) parliaments. In the next section we further explore whether such biases in demographic representation are accentuated or diffused depending on the political party.

2.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTIES AND THEIR ELECTORATES

Previous studies of parliamentary representation have always analyzed the differences between parliamentarians and society in general (Coller 2008; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). However, in the current context in which the representativeness of the traditional political parties is increasingly questioned by non-traditional and populist movements, it is relevant to pay attention to the distance between party representatives and their specific electorates. Parties are in fact the fundamental player in the recruitment, selection and attraction of those who will become part of the political elite (Alcántara 2012). But, do different parties attract, recruit and promote different socio-demographic profiles? And, as a result of this, to what extent do party representatives reflect the socio-demographic profiles of their own voters?

We use survey data collected after the 2008 national elections to identify party voters and their socio-demographic profile.¹⁰ We then compare the voters' socio-demographic distribution to that of the party representatives across national and regional parliaments. A positive difference means that the characteristic considered is over-represented among parliamentarians with respect to their voters, and a negative value means that it is under-represented.¹¹

Focusing on the MPs' profiles, the conservative party PNV is closest to gender parity (47%) followed by the left-wing PSOE (43%) (see Table 2.2). The other two parties on the left (IU, ERC) have lower proportions of female MPs (22% and 33%). Two left-wing parties (ERC and PSOE) have the oldest representatives, with a majority over 50 years (67% and 56%) and an average of 50.8 and 49.9 years old respectively. In contrast to these parties, PNV and IU have the youngest parliamentarians with an average age of 45.3 and 46.6 years old respectively. IU stands out with a percentage of young parliamentarians (24%) significantly higher than the rest of the parties.

Considering the voters distances, we find that all parties register a similar gender gap relative to their voters' characteristics (around 12 percentage points), with the exception of IU and ERC, which register an even larger gender gap (around 20 percentage points). Moreover, all parties also similarly under-represent their younger voters (in approximately 10–15 percentage points), with the exception of ERC and CiU, in which youth under-representation reaches 20 percentage points. A relevant distinction

Table 2.2 MPs socio-demographic profile by political party (in %)

	<i>PP</i> (<i>and</i> <i>UPN</i>)	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Gender								
Men	62	57	78	62	67	53	69	61
Women	38	43	22	38	33	47	31	39
Total (N)	100 (248)	100 (239)	100 (18)	100 (16)	100 (9)	100 (17)	100 (35)	100 (582)
Age (average)								
Over 50	43	56	47	50	67	29	32	48
50–36	47	31	29	44	22	53	54	40
Under 36	10	13	24	6	11	18	14	12
Total (N)	100 (247)	100 (237)	100 (17)	100 (16)	100 (9)	100 (17)	100 (35)	100 (578)
Educational level								
Primary	2	4	6	–	–	–	3	3
Secondary	8	14	12	6	–	6	11	11
University	85	71	82	81	89	88	77	78
Postgraduate or higher	5	11	–	13	11	6	9	8
Total (N)	100 (246)	100 (238)	100 (17)	100 (16)	100 (9)	100 (17)	100 (35)	100 (578)
Type of school (secondary education)								
Public	41	60	67	13	33	18	73	50
Private	57	37	33	73	67	76	27	47
Multiple	2	3	–	14	–	6	–	3
Total (N)	100 (245)	100 (236)	100 (18)	100 (15)	100 (9)	100 (17)	100 (33)	100 (573)
Profession								
Management and administration	13	6	–	7	12	19	6	9
Lawyers and legal professionals	27	12	13	7	12	13	9	18
Teachers	13	30	31	14	38	6	25	22
Technicians and professionals of natural sciences	18	15	6	29	13	–	22	16
Technicians and professionals of social and human sciences	20	21	31	43	25	56	22	23

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

	<i>PP</i> (<i>and</i> <i>UPN</i>)	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Other	9	16	19	–	–	6	16	12
Total (N)	100 (220)	100 (221)	100 (16)	100 (14)	100 (8)	100 (16)	100 (32)	100 (527)
Religiosity								
Practicing	54	3	–	35	11	23	9	27
Catholic								
Non-practicing	41	27	–	59	–	71	15	33
Catholic								
Indifferent, agnostic or atheist	5	69	89	6	89	6	76	39
Other religion	–	1	11	–	–	–	–	1
Total (N)	100 (244)	100 (234)	100 (18)	100 (17)	100 (9)	100 (17)	100 (33)	100 (572)

Source: CIS study 2827

emerges nonetheless between left-wing and conservative parties: the former (ERC, IU, PSOE) over-represent the oldest cohorts, whereas conservative parties (PNV, CiU, PP) over-represent their middle-aged voters.

The differences in educational background between left-wing and conservative parties also include type of education: parliamentarians of conservative parties (PNV, CiU and PP) have studied mainly in private secondary schools, while parliamentarians of progressive parties (PSOE or IU) have studied mostly in public schools (see Table 2.2). But it is in non-statewide parties (on both sides of the ideological scale) where we find the highest proportion of MPs formed in private secondary schools: 76% in the PNV, 73% in the case of CiU, and 67% in the case of ERC. There are also relevant differences in the professional profile of parliamentarians according to their position in the ideological spectrum: while law is the profession most practiced by the PP's parliamentarians (27%), teaching is the most common profession among PSOE, IU and ERC parliamentarians (above 30%).

The educational distance between parties and their electorates is large for all parties. But that distance is accentuated among conservative parties (PP, CiU and PNV), for which the percentage of MPs with university degrees is 60 points higher than in their electorates. The educational distance between left-wing parties and their voters is smaller, approximately 40 points for PSOE and ERC and 30 points for IU (see Fig. 2.1). This




Fig. 2.1 Educational differences between MPs and voters by party (in %) (Source: CIS studies 2827 and 2920. Note: The differences come from Table 2.5 of the Appendix)

smaller distance is due to the lower educational level of the representatives of the left, since electorates have similar educational levels across parties. The only peculiar electorate is that of IU, which registers a higher educational level than the rest. This combined with a lower educational level of IU parliamentarians, makes IU the party closest to their voters in terms of educational credentials (see Table 2.5). This finding is in line with Coller's study (2008, pp. 151–152), which concludes that left-wing parties in Spain are closer to society, whereas conservative parties have better educational credentials.

The distance between parties and electorates is also very significant in terms of religiosity, although with opposite signs for left and right wing parties (see Fig. 2.2). To begin with, the left-right axis clearly explains the religiosity levels among parliamentarians: left-wing parliamentarians are less religious than conservatives—this relationship is in fact statistically significant.¹² This finding is a constant in comparative perspective: for example in the UK 85% of Conservative MPs declare themselves religious versus 33% of Labour parliamentarians (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 88). A more revealing finding is that left-wing representatives (from PSOE, IU and ERC) are less religious than their voters, whereas conservative representatives (from PP, CiU and PNV) are more religious than their voters.




Fig. 2.2 Religiosity differences between MPs and voters by party (in %) (Source: CIS studies 2827 and 2920. Note: The differences come from Table 2.5 of the Appendix)

More specifically, a majority of PSOE, IU and ERC representatives declare themselves indifferent, agnostic or atheist, whereas a majority of their voters declare themselves non-practicing Catholics. The differences within the group of conservative parties are more heterogeneous. In the case of the PP, the most relevant difference lies in the level of religious practice: PP representatives declare themselves practicing Catholics to a larger extent than their voters, who register a higher proportion of non-practicing Catholics. In contrast, CiU representatives are simply more religious than their voters, among which there is a higher proportion of agnostics, indifferent or atheists than in the party's parliamentary ranks. The PNV representatives reflect more closely the levels of religiosity among their voters, but they also under-represent their non-religious voters.

To conclude, the main finding of this section is that the biases in socio-demographic representation (in terms of gender, age and educational level) found in parliaments are reproduced by all parties—relative to their own electorates—albeit to different extents. In particular, the gap in educational levels is smaller among left-wing parties. A more striking finding is that all parties distance themselves from their electorates in terms of religiosity, although in opposite directions following the ideological

divide: left-wing parties are less religious than their voters, whereas conservative parties are more religious than their electorates.

2.4 SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social class is undoubtedly one of the fundamental dimensions of political representation, given that class interests and preferences frequently collide. The agglutination model covers scenarios in which the more privileged classes dominate in the political structures. This in turn would be explained by Putnam's law of increasing disproportionality or Sartori's norm of the distance. If such over-representation of the more privileged classes exists, an additional question becomes relevant: whether this is the result of social reproduction and endogamy within the parliamentary elite, or whether these elites are at least open to the processes of social mobility.

There are different ways of defining and observing social class and social mobility (for a detailed discussion see Echevarría 1999; Carabaña 1999 or Salido 2001). One of the most utilized schemes is that developed by Goldthorpe and Eriksson (1993), who define social class based on the economic and social status derived from three different occupational categories. The *service class* includes professionals, administrators, managers and large employers. The *intermediate-class* is composed of non-manual employees, service workers and small-holders. And finally, the *working-class* is made up of manual and agrarian workers.

In order to assess social mobility, a distinction is usually made between intergenerational and intra-generational mobility. The former refers to the difference between the social class or stratum of the father and that of the child, while the latter refers to the differences within the life cycle of the same person (Echevarría 1999). In order to assess the social mobility of Spanish MPs, we have established their social class based on their professional occupation before becoming full-time politicians. We compare this social class status with that of their parents (intergenerational mobility) and with their current social class as parliamentary (class of service following the scheme of Goldthorpe and Eriksson).

The data show that an overwhelming majority of parliamentarians (89%) belonged to the service class before becoming full-time politicians (see Table 2.3). This leaves a marginal representation of the working-class (2%) and the middle class (9%) in the Spanish parliaments. However, the social extraction of the MPs is not necessarily that privileged: as Table 2.3 shows, more than half of the parliamentarians come from working-class families (20%) or intermediate-class families (33%). Most of these MPs

Table 2.3 Social mobility according to the fathers' profession (in %)

MP's social class	Father's social class			Total MPs (N)
	Service class	Intermediate class	Working class	
Service class	44	28	17	89 (449)
Intermediate class	3	4	2	9 (45)
Working class	--	1	1	2 (10)
Total fathers (N)	47 (234)	33 (168)	20 (102)	100 (504)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: The shading indicates the degree of upward social mobility

have not reproduced this social status but have experienced upward intergenerational mobility, becoming part of the service class even before becoming full-time politicians.

In fact, almost half of the parliamentarians (47%) have experienced upward mobility trajectories. More specifically, 28% of parliamentarians were born into intermediate-class families and 17% were born into working-class families and ascended to the service class. Similarly, 2% of parliamentarians experienced upward mobility as they were born into working-class families who transitioned to the intermediate-class. Trajectories involving social reproduction (collected on the diagonal of Table 2.3) represent the other half of Spanish parliaments (49%). The vast majority of these parliamentarians were born into families belonging to the most privileged class and they have reproduced this class position. Only 4% and 1% of the MPs have reproduced intermediate- and working-class positions, respectively.

In short, parliamentarians come overwhelmingly from the most privileged social class but have accessed this status through two different paths: class reproduction and upward social mobility, both with a similar weight. Therefore, although belonging to the service class seems to be a requirement of entry to the parliamentary elite, the latter is permeable to the processes of social mobility present in society. However, the intermediate and working classes—as well as downward social trajectories, which reach 22% in Spanish society (Martinez and Marín 2012, pp. 140–141)—are clearly under-represented in Spanish parliaments.

This picture varies significantly depending on the political party (see Table 2.4).¹³ MPs from leftist parties register higher percentages of

Table 2.4 Social mobility according to the fathers' profession by party (in %)

	<i>PP (and UPN)</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Before being MP								
Social reproduction	58	43	37	67	40	29	39	49
Upward mobility	37	57	57	33	53	71	55	47
Downward mobility	5	–	6	–	7	–	6	4
Total (N)	100 (206)	100 (214)	100 (16)	100 (15)	100 (15)	100 (7)	100 (31)	100 (504)
As MP								
Social reproduction	59	35	31	67	47	29	39	47
Upward mobility	41	65	69	33	53	71	61	53
Total (N)	100 (206)	100 (214)	100 (16)	100 (15)	100 (15)	100 (7)	100 (31)	100 (504)

Source: CIS study 2827

upward intergenerational mobility—PSOE (57%), IU (57%) and ERC (71%)—in contrast to conservative parties, which are characterized mostly by social reproduction—PP and UPN (58%), CiU (67%).¹⁴ These differences are accentuated if we measure intergenerational social mobility against the MPs' social class as parliamentarians (service class), since this class can only be accessed via social reproduction or upward mobility. This assessment confirms that leftist parties have a significant role as social class elevators for their MPs (between 65% and 71% of these), while conservative MPs have mostly maintained their inherited social status (between 47% and 67%).

It can be concluded that the processes of social mobility that characterize Spanish society have reached the parliamentary elites but not in a homogeneous manner. Cases of social ascent are found mostly in the political forces of the left (PSOE, IU or ERC) whereas in the political forces of center or center-right (PP, CiU or PNV) situations of social reproduction are most common. This is in line with observations in other democratic societies (Aberbach et al. 1981; Putnam 1976), where the recruitment channels of political parties in the left are more open and fluid than those of conservative political parties, closer to the model of agglutination.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

There is a clear predominance of some social categories among Spanish parliamentarians. They are mainly men of relatively advanced age, with university qualifications, mostly in the human and social sciences, and in particular in the fields of teaching and law. On the one hand, although this profile follows a common pattern in advanced democracies, the significant under-representation of women and young people (under 36 years old) should be highlighted. On the other hand, the idea of an enlightened parliamentarian elite is confirmed by the overwhelming presence of university graduates and professional careers related to the legislative work. Although all parties register a significant under-representation of their female or younger voters, there are certainly differences among them. Notably, ERC is much more aged and masculinized than its electorate. Female under-representation is also acute in IU, but this party also has a much larger presence of MPs under 36 years of age than any other party. The PNV also stands out with a combination of high female and youth presence among its parliamentarians. But the distances between the parties and their electorates in terms of gender and age are large in all cases.

Despite this relative homogeneity in key dimensions of socio-demographic representation, there are some characteristics that mark differences between parliamentarians, particularly between different parties. In this sense, the left-right axis seems to have a clear influence on the educational and religious profiles of parliamentarians, as well as on the distance with their electorates in these dimensions. In terms of their educational profile, PSOE and IU have the highest percentage of MPs with primary or secondary education and who have undertaken their secondary studies in public centers. Non-statewide parties (PNV, CiU, ERC) stand at the opposite extreme, with the highest percentage of university students. The ideological axis also clearly influences the religious profile: conservative parliamentarians are clearly more religious than left-wing parliamentarians. However, both leftist and conservative parties move away from the religious preferences of their electorates, albeit in opposing directions: conservative MPs are more religious than their voters, whereas leftist MPs are less religious than their own voters.

Finally, the data analyzed show that parliamentarians overwhelmingly belong to the most privileged social class. However, almost half of them have undergone a process of upward social mobility, confirming that the deep socio-economic transformation of Spanish society has facilitated the social ascent of citizens also toward the parliamentary elites, mainly through left-wing parties' membership.

APPENDIX

Table 2.5 Voters socio-demographic profile of and differences with their parties (in %)

	PP (P UPN)		PSOE		IU		CiU		PNV		ERC		Total	
	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.
Age (average)	49.74	-0.22	49.49	0.42	42.79	3.78	51.20	-2.09	49.61	-4.26	42.98	7.82	47.93	1.41
Over 50	44	-1	46	10	28	19	49	1	38	-9	33	34	40	8
50-36	30	17	27	4	35	-5	25	19	32	21	33	-10	30	10
Under 36	26	-16	27	-14	37	-13	26	-20	30	-12	34	-23	30	-18
Total (N)	100		100		100		100		100		100		100	
	(1998)		(1260)		(374)		(160)		(47)		(52)		(3891)	
Gender														
Men	50	12	45	12	52	26	51	11	38	15	48	19	49	12
Women	50	-13	55	-12	48	-26	49	-12	62	-15	52	-19	51	-12
Total (N)	100		100		100		100		100		100		100	
	(1998)		(1260)		(374)		(160)		(47)		(52)		(3891)	
Religiosity														
Practicing	30	23	12	-9	7	-7	17	19	20	3	-	11	20	7
Catholic														
Non-practicing	61	-20	63	-36	35	-35	50	9	57	14	46	-46	58	-24
Catholic														
Indifferent, agnostic or atheist	7	-2	23	46	57	32	32	-26	23	-17	54	35	21	18
Other religion	2	-2	2	-1	1	10	1	-1	-	-	-	-	1	-1

(continued)

Table 2.5 (continued)

	PP (C UPN)		PSOE		IU		CiU		PNV		ERC		Total	
	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.	Voters	Dif.
Total (N)	100 (1973)		100 (1232)		100 (361)		100 (157)		100 (44)		100 (50)		100 (3817)	
Educational level														
No studies	4	-4	7	-7	1	-1	3	-3	-	-	-	-	4	-
Primary	57	-55	59	-55	37	-32	49	-49	40	-40	31	-31	53	-50
Secondary	20	-12	18	-4	28	-16	23	-17	32	-26	33	-33	21	-10
University	18	67	16	55	33	50	22	59	24	65	25	64	21	57
Postgraduate or higher	1	4	0	11	1	-1	3	9	4	2	11	0	1	6
Total (N)	100 (1999)		100 (1260)		100 (374)		100 (160)		100 (47)		100 (52)		100 (3892)	

Note: Differences (dif.) are elaborated subtracting MPs' percentages (from Table 2.2) to voters' percentages

NOTES

1. The concept of symbolic representation (Pitkin 1967) establishes that it is necessary to have representatives coming from social groups or minorities, especially if these groups have specific interests and may require or demand particular public policies. For this reason it is of special relevance to ask how much the political elite is diverse and to what extent it reflects or not the complexity of the social structure. See, for example, Mills (1956, pp. 19–23), Keller (1963), Domhoff (1967, p. 142), Bottomore (1993), Linz et al. (2003, p. 91), Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006).
2. Cited in Di Palma and Cotta (1986, p. 51).
3. Cited in Coller (2008, p. 148).
4. For the Spanish case, see for instance: Coller and Santana (2009), Coller (2008), Mateo (2005), Serra (2008), Uriarte and Ruiz (1999), Valiente et al. (2003), Verge (2006, 2012).
5. This situation has been reinforced with the approval of Organic Law 3/2007. This law, better known as the Equality Act, seeks the effective equality between women and men. For a broader discussion of the effects of this Act, see this chapter.
6. These differences between national and regional-level parliaments are statistically significant, and they are also in line with findings in previous studies (Coller et al. 2008, p. 10; Coller 2008, p. 139; Genieys 1998). For a more in-depth analysis of gender representation in regional parliaments, and a classification of these parliaments in terms of gender representation see the work of Coller et al. (2008) and Santana et al. (2015).
7. For further discussion see Chapter 5.
8. For further discussion see Chapter 3.
9. See also the work of Norris (1999) and Best and Cotta (2000).
10. *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, study number 2920 of 2008.
11. It is important to note that we have small-size samples of representatives from non-statewide parties (CiU, ERC and PNV) and from IU (N = 20 or less). Thus, the results of these parties should be taken cautiously.
12. Pearson's Chi-squared test (361,828) (Sig. 0.000).
13. The category of “social reproduction” reflects the sum of the percentages of the diagonal of Table 2.3 specified for each of the parties. Upward moves are obtained from the upper part of the diagonal, while downward trajectories are obtained from the sum of percentages of the lower part of the diagonal.
14. The exception is the PNV, which is in an intermediate place.

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Gender and Parliament: The Impact of the Political Presence of Women

Tània Verge, Amparo Novo, Isabel Diz, and Marta Lois

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, more than 60 countries have adopted legislative electoral gender quotas with a view to ensuring an equal presence of women and men in political institutions (Krook 2009). The gradual advance of women in political positions, in general, and in parliaments, in particular, has raised different questions both about their impact on legislative agendas and on the ways of exercising politics (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Based on an integrated perspective of political representation, this chapter examines how the presence of women matters in institutions. More specifically, it analyses whether changes in descriptive representation (which characteristics the representatives have) have an impact on substantive representation (how representation is exercised).

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Several works have revealed the vitality and expansion of this field of research in Spain. On the one hand, some studies have focused on the differences in the profiles of male and female members of parliament (MPs) (Verge 2011a). On the other hand, the presence of women in high-ranking positions within legislative chambers has been examined (Valiente et al. 2003; Diz and Lois 2007; Roig 2009; Verge 2009; Diz and Lois 2012), revealing a horizontal and vertical segregation of the responsibilities assumed by female and male legislators. Lastly, some works have analyzed the impact a greater presence of women in parliaments has on legislation (Delgado 2011; Pastor Yuste 2011).

The Organic Law 3/2007, of 22nd March, for effective equality between women and men, better known as the Equality Law, modified article 44bis of the electoral legislation (LOREG), incorporating gender quotas on the “principle of balanced presence or composition”. The lists presented by political parties must comprise a minimum of 40% and a maximum of 60% of candidates of either of the two sexes. In order for those candidatures to be proclaimed by the respective provincial electoral boards, parity must be respected both throughout the list and in each section of five positions. The implementation of the “principle of balanced presence” since 2007 has led to gender-balanced or close to gender-balanced legislative chambers, making Spain an ideal case study to measure the consequences of the incorporation of women into decision-making.

The chapter is structured into five sections. The first describes the evolution of the presence of women in the statewide parliament, which includes the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, and in regional parliaments and the second presents the support for gender quotas among citizens and MPs. The third section reviews the theoretical debate surrounding the interaction of gender with the three main dimensions of political representation, namely descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation. The two following sections analyze the impact of women’s political presence on the descriptive and substantive dimensions of political representation. The last section presents the main conclusions of the research.

3.2 THE PATH TOWARDS EQUALITY IN THE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS

The role played by feminist party members of the main left parties was decisive in boosting the idea of ‘parity democracy’ through the adoption of voluntary quotas (Valiente et al. 2005; Threlfall 2007). In the late 1980s,




Fig. 3.1 Women's representation in Spain, 1979–2016 (in %) (Source: Compiled and updated by authors, based on Verge 2012)

parties of the left (PSOE, IU, PSC, ICV) introduced a quota of 25% for women both in internal positions and in electoral lists. This percentage was gradually increased until reaching parity in 1997, with a minimum of 40% and a maximum of 60% for any of the two sexes (Verge 2006). Gradually, a “contagion” effect took place, in such a way that in 2004 all the parties had adopted gender quotas or assumed targets or recommendations for the representation of women, thereby facilitating the path towards the introduction of a legislative quota in 2007. Spain has then followed an “incremental track” in the representation of women (Verge 2012).

As can be observed in Fig. 3.1, the presence of women in the Congress of Deputies increased from 6.3% in 1982 to 12.9% in 1989, just after the adoption of the 25% quota by some parties. The percentage reached 28.3% in 2000, three years after the quota adopted the gender-neutral proportion 40/60%, and 36% in 2004. The legislative quota introduced in 2007 significantly boosted the percentage of candidates on the electoral lists of the Congress from 34.4% in 2004 to 47.4% in 2011, and from 33.7% to 46.9% in the Senate (Ministry of the Interior 2008, 2011). The strategic discrimination applied in the allocation of safe positions in the lists, especially among the parties rejecting quotas, such as the PP, has limited the impact of the law in both chambers. After the last general elections, 39.4% female deputies and 39.9% female senators were elected.

In the regional parliaments, women's representation also follows the evolution of quotas, mirroring the trajectory observed at the statewide level. Since 2007, however, the percentage of female deputies is higher at

the regional level, reaching 41.4% of female deputies in 2011 and 45.1% in 2015. On the one hand, the greater average size of the districts in the regional level has facilitated the effective application of parity by the parties, which have included more female candidates in top positions. On the other hand, in some regions the adoption of zipping, whereby women and men alternate throughout the lists (Andalusia, Balearic Islands and Castile-La Mancha) or of a percentage of 50% for either of the two sexes (Basque Country), measures that are compatible with the statewide Equality Law, has brought strong increases in the percentage of female deputies elected. For example, while in these regions an average of 47.4% of women were elected after the 2011 regional elections, in the rest of the country the average was 39.5%—the difference was reduced to 48.2% and 44.5%, respectively, after the 2015 elections.

3.3 SUPPORT FOR GENDER QUOTAS

Gender quotas have been conceived of as a mechanism aimed at correcting the negative effects of the persistent inequality between men and women, so deeply rooted in society. Although its effectiveness in increasing the presence of women in institutions has been demonstrated, the introduction of quotas is not without controversy. The main opposition is based on the potential violation of the meritocratic principle, with some sectors arguing that quotas prevent the selection of the “best” candidates (for an exhaustive review of these arguments see Bacchi 2006). What opinion can be observed in Spain? Citizens clearly support gender quotas. After the Equality Law was passed in 2007, 65% of citizens claimed to strongly agree or agree with the legislative quota, compared to 26% who stated they disagreed or strongly disagreed. The support was 71.2% among women and 58.2% among men (CIS 2007).

The opinion on quotas also differs between male and female deputies. In all the items analyzed, the differences are statistically significant at the maximum level ($p < 0.01$), as shown in Table 3.1. Bearing in mind that women make up 50% of the population, do MPs think that women should be represented on a par with men in positions of responsibility? 67% of the individuals interviewed agree. This percentage increases to 76% in the case of female deputies and reduces to 61% among male deputies. However, how to guarantee an equal gender representation divides political representatives. Only 57% of the individuals interviewed maintain that quotas are an essential measure to remedy the under-representation of women, a

Table 3.1 Differences in the opinion on quotas among MPs (in %)

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>
Women make up 50% of the population and should be represented on a par with men in positions of responsibility	61	76***	67
Quotas are an essential measure to remedy the under-representation of women and increase their number in the parliament	52	64***	57
Quotas are not necessary. Women should be elected for their qualities and competence	53	41***	48

Source: CIS study 2827

Notes: Sum of the percentage of “Strongly agree” answers and “Agree” answers. It is compared with a second category that contains the “Indifferent” + “Disagree” and “Strongly disagree” answers. The level of statistical significance (p -value) associated with the Chi-squared test is shown: *** $p < 0.01$ (when the confidence level is 99%); ** $p < 0.05$ (when the confidence level is 95%); * $p < 0.1$ (when the confidence level is 90%)

lower degree of support than that shown by citizens. This percentage increases to 64% in the case of female deputies and reduces to 52% among male deputies. As regards the argument that quotas are not necessary since women should be elected for their qualities and competence, 48% of the sample agrees, although the support for this claim reduces significantly among female MPs (41%, compared to 53% male MPs), with the latter thereby identifying the barriers—often invisible—that women face when accessing a political position.

This notwithstanding, female deputies are not a homogeneous group, as can be observed in Table 3.2. Although we could expect that the career of female deputies would affect their position on gender quotas, with newcomers perceiving a greater need to use quotas to overcome the barriers women face when accessing political positions compared to longstanding female deputies, or that the support for quotas would be greater among statewide MPs than regional MPs, the only statistically significant variable is ideology. As regards the statement that women should be represented on a par with men since they make up 50% of the population, we observe the practically unanimous support of female deputies from the left (91%) while those from the right are more divided (59%). For 95% of MPs from the left, quotas are essential to remedy the under-representation of women, an opinion that is shared by only 29% of MPs from the right. Lastly, 75% of female deputies from the right maintain that women should be elected for their qualities and competence, while among MPs from the left this opinion is marginal (10%).

Table 3.2 Differences in the opinion on quotas among female deputies (in %)

	<i>Career</i>		<i>Ideology</i>		<i>Parliament</i>	
	<i>Veterans</i>	<i>Incoming</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Statewide</i>	<i>Regional</i>
Women make up 50% of the population and should be represented on a par with men in positions of responsibility	74	79	91	59***	83	74
Quotas are an essential measure to remedy the under-representation of women and increase their number in the parliament	60	70	95	29***	71	61
Quotas are not necessary. Women should be elected for their qualities and competence	44	37	10	75***	41	41

Source: CIS study 2827

Notes: Sum of the percentage of “Strongly agree” answers and “Agree” answers. It is compared with a second category that contains the “Indifferent” + “Disagree” and “Strongly disagree” answers. The ideology variable is measured on a scale of 1–10, with no cases of categories 9 and 10. Thus, the variable has been recoded in left (positions 1–4) and right (positions 5–8). The statistical significance level (p -value) associated with the Chi-squared test is shown: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

3.4 GENDER AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

One of the most relevant debates in the field of gender and politics has been that about political representation. Feminist political science departs from Pitkin’s multidimensional concept of political representation (1967), distinguishing between descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation and analyzing how these aspects are connected (Phillips 1995; Young 2000; Carroll 2001). Firstly, descriptive representation establishes a socio-demographic correspondence between the representatives and the represented, looking at which characteristics or qualities they share. It is assumed that the person represented is present in the parliament in so far as the representative, and with them the parliament, is as faithful a reflection as possible of the population being represented, ensuring that the political activity reflects the interests of the citizens. Therefore, it entails a way of “standing for” others, in this case, women. Thus, this dimension

assesses the gender composition of the parliamentary institutions and the differences or similarities in the profiles of male and female MPs.

Secondly, substantive representation refers to the fact that the represented are present in parliament through what the representatives “do”. In this case, it does not concern their characteristics, but the content of their political activity and the way in which they exercise their representative labor. In this regard, the question considered is whether elected women make a difference, that is to say, whether they influence the contents by defending women’s interests. Specifically, it refers to the fact that the female MPs perform activities in favor of the interests of women in such a way that they “act for” them (Mansbridge 1999). Likewise, it is considered that women have a different political style, one that is more connected to civil society actors and that involves less confrontation (Dahlerup 1988; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). In this way, substantive representation focuses on the decisions made in institutions, both in relation to their content and their procedure.

Lastly, symbolic representation refers to the effects produced by the representatives in the people represented. The greater or lesser political presence of women makes up the social meaning of representation in a way that affects all women. In this regard, a low percentage of female MPs creates the social meaning that women are not suitable for politics (Phillips 1995). On the contrary, a greater presence of women in politics increases the political efficacy of citizens. Women who hold public positions are role models for other women, contributing their presence to reducing the perception that politics is a male business (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). Therefore, it involves a type of representation that means “standing for” others, in terms of attitudes, perceptions, values and/or beliefs.

Fig. 3.2 summarizes the impact of the presence of women in institutions in the political system, the legislative activity and society, as well as their interaction in different dimensions of political representation. As can be observed, descriptive representation may bring about changes in relevant aspects associated with substantive representation and symbolic representation.

While the empirical analysis of descriptive representation is well established, the substantive and symbolic dimensions are more difficult to analyze, because, as we have seen, the theoretical definitions provided are wide and, on occasions, disputed. The literature has been careful when establishing a strong causality between the presence of women and




Fig. 3.2 The impact of the presence of women in institutions (Source: Verge 2011b)

political agendas that are sensitive to gender issues or change in citizens' political attitudes, since the relation is mediated by variables such as the gender bias present in public opinion, the amount of time elected women remain in their position, their position of power within institutions, or the ideology of the parties to which female representatives belong (Childs and Krook 2006). In this chapter, the same caution is taken.

While descriptive representation can be adequately measured with quantitative data and analyses, substantive representation is harder to assess with surveys, reason why we can only partially examine it in our empirical analysis. Similarly, the analysis of symbolic representation requires comparing data about citizens' political attitudes prior to and after the feminization of the parliaments. These studies are feasible in countries where the legislative quotas have brought an overnight change, with women's representation moving from low to high levels, while the impact of women's political presence is much more difficult to measure in countries, such as Spain, which have followed an incremental track. Thus, we cannot address symbolic representation in this research.

3.5 DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

As has already been indicated, the Spanish regional assemblies have recently reached gender-balanced representation and the statewide parliament is close to it. To what extent do the profiles of parliamentary elites differ across sex? The analysis of descriptive representation reveals the resources and motivations individuals bring with them in political recruitment

processes, known as “supply factors”, such as professional experience, political capital and time availability, which are crucial factors when competing for a position (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris and Franklin 1997).

According to a survey conducted in 2002 among the Spanish population, 77% of women and 62% of men consider that women have more difficulties than men at holding positions in politics (CIS 2002). Political life is extremely demanding in terms of hours and trips, and thus has a large impact on work and family reconciliation. Although political dedication generates many or a lot of reconciliation difficulties both for male MPs (68%) and female MPs (75%), for the latter it imposes a greater constraint, especially for those occupying their seat in the Congress of Deputies (81%) since they are required to be away from the family home for at least three days per week. The differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

Indeed, gender differences in reconciliation difficulties are evident in the civil status and in the number of children. The political career conditions the life choices of female MPs to a greater extent than that of male MPs. Only 21% of male MPs do not have a partner, while the percentage rises to 38% in the case of female MPs ($p < 0.01$), suggesting that the civil status influences their progress in their political career. The differences are especially significant in the regional assemblies. Accessing statewide politics tends to require more experience and, therefore, it occurs at a stage of life when personal sacrifices have probably already been made. Likewise, the political career, as in other professional fields, can mean relinquishing maternity. Thirty three percent of female MPs do not have children, compared to 14% of male MPs ($p < 0.01$). Due to the persistent inequality in the distribution of household and care work, we do not observe a reduction in gender differences across age groups. In fact, if we take into account all sampled political representatives, the greatest disparity can be found in the youngest age group (less than 35 years of age): 44% of women do not have children, a situation observed in only 7% of young men ($p < 0.01$). Indeed, 53% of female MPs state that holding public office requires having no family obligations or counting with family assistance, compared to 43% of male MPs who share this opinion ($p < 0.05$).

As regards the educational profile, as can be seen in Table 3.3, statistically significant differences between men and women are not observed, although more female MPs (64%) have a background in social and human sciences ($p < 0.05$) than male MPs (59%). As regards the educational level,

Table 3.3 Socio-demographic, educational and political profile (in %)

	<i>Male MPs</i>	<i>Female MPs</i>
Age (average)	50.9	46.8**
Social and human sciences	70	77**
Postgraduate, PhD	5	12**
Party membership prior to 1991	30	58***
Party officeholding (average number of offices)	1.7	1.5**

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: Statistical significance levels (p -value) associated with the Chi-squared test and the Anova test in the case of the averages: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

female MPs, in general, surpass male deputies. Although more than three quarters of male and female MPs have university studies, 12% of female MPs also have postgraduate or PhD studies, compared to 5% of male MPs ($p < 0.05$). The differences are even larger when veteran male and female MPs are compared with newcomers. Thus, female MPs who obtained their seat after the Equality Law was passed present a higher educational level than both their male peers and veteran female MPs ($p < 0.05$).

Preparation can also be measured with the political experience prior to holding the current position. The partisan affiliation of female MPs is subsequent to 1991 in 58% of the cases, compared to 30% of the male MPs ($p < 0.01$). That is to say, the partisan affiliation of male MPs is more extensive, although it is important to point out that length of affiliation also reflects the fact that male MPs are older compared to the female MPs (50.9 years versus 46.8 years). Male MPs have held, on average, more positions in their parties than female MPs (1.7 positions versus 1.5 positions, $p < 0.05$). However, while male veteran MPs present a slightly higher level of experience in these positions than recently elected male MPs, in the case of female MPs, the inverse trend is found, although the differences are not statistically significant in either of the two groups.

3.6 SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

Our empirical measurement of substantive representation has focused, firstly, on the assessment of the legislative priorities of MPs, bearing in mind their closeness to certain groups. On the one hand, Table 3.4 shows that 75% of the individuals interviewed agree with the fact that women

Table 3.4 Gender differences in the perceived impact of the presence of women (in %)

	<i>Male MPs</i>	<i>Female MPs</i>	<i>Total</i>
Topics			
Women bring other opinions, perspectives and talents to politics	68	86***	75
More initiatives of a social nature are debated	63	42***	56
There is a greater sensitivity towards reconciliation with one's professional life	62	56	60
Functioning			
The behavior and language used in parliament are less aggressive	18	29**	22
There is more consensus in parliamentary commissions	8	19**	12

Source: CIS study 2827

Notes: The sum of the percentage of "strongly agree" and "agree" answers is shown. Levels of statistical significance (p -value) associated with the Chi-squared test: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

bring other opinions, perspectives and talents to politics. This percentage rises to 85% among female MPs and falls to 68% among male MPs ($p < 0.01$). Among female MPs, as shown in Table 3.5, no relevant differences are observed between the female veterans and new arrivals or among female MPs from the left and the right, but support for the previous statement rises to 92% in the case of female MPs in the statewide parliament, compared to 83% in the regional parliaments, although again the differences are not statistically significant.

As regards the question of whether more initiatives of a social nature are debated, 56% of the politicians interviewed agree with this question (see Table 3.4), although gender differences are wide. The difference per sex is 20 percentage points between men and women, 63% for the former, and 42% for the latter ($p < 0.01$). In the case of women (see Table 2.5), the main difference is between MPs from the left (71%) and those from the right (40%) who support this statement ($p < 0.01$). The difference between statewide female MPs (70%) and regional female MPs (55%) is also notable, although it does not reach statistical significance. In the same regard, 60% of the politicians interviewed consider that the incorporation of a greater number of female MPs has led to an increased sensitivity towards work and family reconciliation in the parliamentary venues. In

Table 3.5 Differences among female MPs concerning the perceived impact of the presence of women (in %)

	<i>Career</i>		<i>Ideology</i>		<i>Parliament</i>	
	<i>Veterans</i>	<i>Incoming</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Statewide</i>	<i>Regional</i>
Topics						
Women bring other opinions, perspectives and talents to politics	85	86	86	85	92	83
More initiatives of a social nature are debated	55	61	71***	40	70	55
There is a greater sensitivity towards reconciliation with one's professional life	58	55	62	49	65	54
Functioning						
The behavior and language used in parliament are less aggressive	27	32	33	23	36	27
There is more consensus in parliamentary commissions	18	20	19	19	27	17

Source: CIS 2827

Notes: The sum of the percentage of "strongly agree" and "agree" answers is shown. Levels of statistical significance (p -value) associated with the Chi-squared test: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

this case, there are no significant differences between female MPs according to their seniority, ideology or type of parliament where they work.

Furthermore, it is observed that female MPs are mainly concentrated in the parliamentary committees dedicated to social welfare, disability, equality, women, immigration, human rights and health. Specifically, 41% of the female MPs from the parliaments of the two territorial levels (statewide and regional) are attached to one of these committees, compared to 12% of male MPs, as shown in Table 3.6. On the contrary, there are twice as many men as women in the committees of international relations, territorial policy, infrastructure, industry and economy. In this way, the data point to a horizontal segregation of the legislative activity via which women are assigned to or specialize in—an aspect that we cannot

Table 3.6 Horizontal segregation by parliamentary committee (in %)

	<i>Regional parliaments</i>		<i>Statewide parliament</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>H</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>M</i>
Local and public administration; presidency; institutional relations; international relations, territorial policy	>20	<9	>10	<2	>17	<7
Education; culture; sport; youth; language	15	12	13	21	14	14
Infrastructures; housing; environment; transport; local development	20	15	>22	<9	>20	<13
Industry; energy; science and innovation; tourism; trade	>17	<10	>13	<2	>16	<8
Social welfare; disability; equality; women; immigration; human rights; health	>8	<40	>22	<42	>12	<41
Economy and employment	>13	<5	12	11	>13	<6
Justice and home office	7	9	9	13	8	10

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: Set of multiple answers. The percentages correspond to total answers, not to cases. The statistical significance of the cells is indicated by the adjusted standardized residuals of the cross tables: “>” indicates there are more cases and “<” indicates that there are fewer cases than would be expected under the assumption of independence between both variables

determine in this study —areas more focused on care such as social policy and welfare, as has been found by extant research (Thomas 1994; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Mateo Díaz 2005; Diz and Lois 2012).

Simultaneously, the horizontal segregation of the committees is coupled with a vertical segregation, that is, a gender biased distribution of high-ranking positions (President, Vice-President, Secretary and Spokesperson). In those committees where more women are found, the distribution of positions is essentially equal, although female MPs represent more than two thirds of their members. Conversely, in those committees traditionally considered more prestigious, the proportion of men and women in positions goes very much to the former’s favor (Valiente et al. 2003; Oñate 2014). Vertical segregation is also observed in the distribution of the positions in the governing bodies of the chambers, such as the Bureau and the Permanent Deputation (Verge 2006; Santana et al. 2015).

Secondly, as regards how the representation is exercised, it has been considered that female MPs are characterized by a greater closeness to

citizens, in addition to having a more consensual and relational political style. On the contrary, the typically masculine style is characterized by being more focused on internal work within the party or in the parliaments themselves and by a more confrontational and hierarchical style (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Childs 2001, 2004). The data obtained by the survey on parliamentary elites confirm the expectation of a different style in the exercise of representation. Specifically, 75% of female MPs contact or meet with representatives of citizens' associations or interest groups in their constituency very frequently or quite frequently, compared to 68% of male MPs ($p < 0.1$), especially the female veteran MPs on the regional level (82%).

On the contrary, in light of the opinions of political representatives, the hypothesis that female MPs have a more consensual political style than men is not corroborated. Only 22% of the politicians interviewed consider that the behavior and language used in parliament are less aggressive since there are more women representatives, a percentage that rises to 29% among female MPs and reduces to 18% among male MPs ($p < 0.05$). Nor is the expectation that there is more consensus in parliamentary commissions confirmed. Only 12% support this statement, although there are 11 percentage points of difference between men (8%) and women (19%) ($p < 0.05$). Among female MPs, there are no remarkable differences in the perception of these aspects, on grounds of seniority, ideology or type of parliamentary venue.

3.7 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have sought to respond to the question about the impact of the presence of women in parliaments, following an integrated perspective of political representation. The incremental track through which women incorporated into the legislative assemblies, to a large extent due to the adoption of voluntary quotas by some parties as well as by the recent legislative quota, has modified the composition of the political class. All the Spanish legislative assemblies reach gender balance or, at least, have more than 30% women. Thus, from the perspective of descriptive representation, parliaments are today a better reflection of the social body than they were several decades ago.

Our data show that the profile of parliamentary elites differs across sex. On the one hand, we find strong differences regarding aspects related to reconciliation. The work-life balance, in this case politics, conditions

female MPs to a greater extent, something that is reflected in family models. Female MPs are in relationships less frequently than male MPs and have fewer children. On the other hand, female MPs have a higher educational level but a more recent partisan affiliation prior to obtaining their seat than their male counterparts. The number of positions held in their party is similar between male and female MPs. Since male and female parliamentarians have a similar preparation, the opposition to quotas based on meritocratic arguments is not supported by empirical evidence.

As regards the interaction between descriptive representation and substantive representation, the following conclusions can be drawn from our empirical analysis. Firstly, the majority of the politicians interviewed think that women contribute different opinions, expectations and talents, as well as other concerns, for example, that related to reconciliation. More initiatives of a social nature are also debated. A horizontal segregation is observed in all the chambers which confines women to areas related to care, and further research is needed to distinguish whether it is the preference of the female MPs themselves or not. Secondly, the results of the analysis point to a change in the exercise of representation, with a more frequent relationship with civil society being observed among female MPs. However, we cannot conclude that a greater share of women representatives leads to more consensual parliamentary practices or less aggressive behavior or language in parliament.

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Political Socialization and Motivation

Carol Galais

4.1 POLITICAL MOTIVATION

The “candidate-citizen” theory (Osborne and Slivinski 1996) suggests that politicians are not exceptional, but common citizens with a particular job: political representation. Choosing this job is the result of a combination of individual features and preferences, a costs and benefits calculus. Indeed, although Spaniards tend to have negative feelings towards politicians (Torcal et al. 2003; Torcal 2014), entering representative politics is still a type of political participation analogous to getting involved in associations or social movements. Hence, why some people decide to become professional politicians is a question that can be addressed using political behavior theories. The Civic Voluntarism model, for instance, suggests that whether citizens get engaged in politics depends on individuals’ resources, motivations and mobilization (Verba et al. 1995). In other words, citizens become involved in politics because they can, because they want to and/or because they have been asked to. In turn, the will to be politically engaged depends on political socialization, a process by which citizens internalize social norms and develop the political attitudes that predispose them to participate.

From another point of view, the political career has some specificities that make it different from other types of political participation. The

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public service motivation theory claims that some individuals have a certain predisposition to get engaged with institutions and public organisms in which they undertake a service to their community (Perry and Wise 1990; Brewer and Selden 1998; Brewer et al. 2000). The phenomenon includes four dimensions: attraction to the design and implementation of public policies; engagement with public affairs; civic duty; compassion and self-sacrifice (Perry 1996). Hence, individuals scoring higher in these dimensions are more oriented towards public service, more prone to work in the government and more likely to do it better than other individuals without this orientation, since they obtain a reward from the mere act of doing their job (Wright 2008).

But, what makes some individuals more prone to develop this public service orientation? Some authors claim that this phenomenon is linked to personality and its origin is, hence, difficult to explain (Prinz 1993; Maestas et al. 2006). Yet most literature resorts to political socialization mechanisms, just as for any other aspect of political culture (Clarke and Price 1977). A stream in this literature highlights the gender differences in the nature and propensity to public service (Fox and Lawless 2011), as different patterns for men and women have been found, even among the most politicized individuals (Verba et al. 1997). The fact that politics has been traditionally considered a men's thing (Constantini and Craik 1977) affects the kind of motivations that make female representatives enter politics and pursue their political career.

As for the main socialization agency, literature agrees that for both regular citizens and politicians we should look at family influence. Parents' ideology or previous political experiences, as well as political discussion at home have been proven to affect individuals' interest in politics. Family can boost political engagement directly (Clary and Miller 1986) or indirectly, by enforcing some of the dimensions of public service, such as compassion or self-sacrifice, both values closely related to altruism.

Furthermore, family may exert influence on public service vocation by offering individuals a precedent. Having relatives involved in politics constitutes an antecedent and a reference for the individual, lowering the perception of the costs of entering politics. It also generates expectations among the individual's family that may, in turn, work as incentives. This is what the literature calls "hard" political socialization, as opposed to the subtler influence of political discussion in the household (Van Liefferinge and Steyvers 2009). The more extreme version of hard political socialization might generate political dynasties whose members would have some

advantages getting started and thriving in their political career, by taking advantage of the reciprocity networks forged by their ancestors and benefiting from the celebrity of their own family name. We know, for instance, that politicians coming from families in which some of their members have been involved in representative politics start their career and make achievements earlier than their colleagues lacking this family background (Van Liefferinge and Steyvers 2009).

One of the most controversial aspects of this “hard” political socialization is that it can pave way to nepotism or establish political castes, whose internal logic and capacity to respond to citizens do not correspond exactly to the principles of liberal, representative democracy. If we stick to the softer or more classical aspects of political socialization (that is, the transmission of values and attitudes), we should make clear that family is not the only relevant agent of socialization. Also, infancy is not the only period in which this process takes place. On the contrary, the literature is increasingly paying attention to other agents and stages of socialization, with special emphasis on youth and post-adolescence (McFarland and Thomas 2006; Jennings et al. 2009). This also applies to political representatives, whose more relevant political experiences would have taken place after adolescence and outside the family household (Kornberg and Thomas 1965; Prewitt et al. 1966). More precisely, early experiences with associations allowing first contact decision making have been proven especially relevant for the development of political careers, although their role is more closely analyzed in other chapters of this volume.

4.2 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Both the political citizen theory and the literature concerned about the origin of political ambition and vocation stress the role of the family in the development of the attitudinal bases of the political career. It remains to be seen, though, if family is really that influential, as compared to other socialization agencies operating in later stages of life. Other relevant questions on this matter concern how early the political vocation is generated and by which mechanisms. Our survey can tackle these questions, as it includes questions on political ancestors and within-family dynamics that might help us differentiate between “hard” and “soft” familiar political socialization. Table 4.1 offers a first approximation to the relationship between having (had) relatives involved in politics and the main characteristics of Spanish members of parliament (MPs): sex, region and party. Almost half (47%) of

Table 4.1 Relatives involved in politics (in %)

	Sex		Region					Party			Total	
	Male	Female	Andalusia	Catalonia	Galicia	Basque country	Other regions	PP	PSOE	IU		Other parties
Does not have relatives in politics	55	53	63	51	61	52	51	54	55	39	55	54
Mayor or councilor	24	24	25	21	16	27	25	26	22	17	23	23
National MP (high/low chamber)	3	2	1	3	0	6	3	5	2	0	3	3
Regional MP or counselor	2	2	0	2	0	2	2	1	0	6	4	2
Provincial MP or president	1	1	0	2	5	0	1	3	0	0	1	1
Free appointment charges in the administration	2	1	2	0	2	0	2	2	2	0	0	2
Position in political party	3	3	1	3	2	0	4	1	5	6	3	3
Party affiliated	5	3	2	9	2	6	4	1	6	17	4	4
Activist (union, grassroots orgs)	2	6	3	8	2	4	3	2	5	17	3	4
Several (more than one)	3	3	1	2	7	0	3	5	1	0	3	3
Other	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	1
Total (N)	100 (335)	100 (209)	100 (86)	100 (65)	100 (40)	100 (47)	100 (309)	100 (225)	100 (231)	100 (18)	100 (71)	100 (580)

Source: CIS 2827

Note: The Chi2 values for each crosstab between "relatives in politics" and the independent variables are the following: Sex = 10.7 (N = 567), Region = 39.8 (N = 569), Party = 62.2** (N = 568). Asterisks mean: ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05. Bold font indicate residuals higher than expected in the case of independence

MPs answered that they have or had in the past at least one relative involved in politics. This is a very similar proportion to the one observed by Kornberg for the Canadian MPs, 66% of which had relatives who were active politicians or belonged to very politicized families (Kornberg et al. 1969). Similar proportions were observed by the same time in the USA (Prewitt et al. 1966). Hence, Spanish MPs do not seem to be an exception.

Table 4.1 also reveals that most of these political relatives conduct their activity at the local level, as 50% of those claiming to have a relative in politics state that such relative is a mayor or city councilor. Four percent of the sample have family ties with party affiliates, and another 4% are relatives with political activists. Three percent of them are related to MPs or with individuals holding a function in a political party. Bold figures point at significant relationships between parliamentarians and the type of office or function developed by representatives' relatives. Only IU (United Left) representatives are more prone to have relatives as MPs, although this is only the case of 6% of the members of this party. IU members are also more likely to have relatives affiliated to a party or being involved in social movements as activists, the opposite to PP's representatives. In sum, some family traditions may pave the way to getting involved in representative politics, although not to the point of configuring political dynasties.¹

Another way by which the family exerts a socializing effect on Spanish MPs, is the “soft” mechanism of discussing politics in the household. Comparing data from Study 2250 carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in 1997 with data of the survey presented here, we can conclude that most MPs do not come from extremely politicized families. This trend is clearer now than it was in 1997, when only 5% of the MPs claimed to come from families where there was no political discussion at all. This is the case for 21% of current Spanish MPs. In the same vein, almost 40% of the MPs interviewed in 1997 claimed that they discussed quite often about politics with their family while they were growing up. This is the case for only 2% of the MPs in the most recent study. This is intriguing because the MPs interviewed in 1997 were socialized during the Franco dictatorship, and the literature agrees that Spanish society was barely politicized at the time, as it was dangerous to get interested in politics—especially if individuals opposed the regime—although in the privacy of the family home other factors might have operated. Our data suggest that younger representatives, raised in a democratic regime, talked less about politics with their families; maybe because the political situation was less dire and, ultimately, less interesting.

Another relevant comparison is that between representatives and constituents. One of the most recent Spanish representative surveys asking about political socialization revealed that 3% of Spaniards came from families in which politics never was a matter of discussion. Forty one percent claimed to talk not very often; 16% talked about politics quite often and only 7% did it very often.² Hence, Spanish politicians seem to come from more politicized families than their constituents. However, the time trend suggests that MPs are increasingly similar to their constituents in terms of their socialization patterns.

Finally, it is possible that family politicization is related to MPs' socio-demographic traits or ideology. Table 4.2 rules out the possibility that there are significant differences between male and female MPs. However, women come from slightly more politicized families, which might suggest that political discussion with parents is more important for women than for men when it comes to develop a public service vocation (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). As for differences regarding parties, only Basque (not shown in the table) and IU representatives exhibit a greater tendency to come from highly politicized families. Furthermore, 33% of Basque parliament MPs come from families that discussed politics very often, while this is only the case with 17% of Catalan chamber MPs. Both figures suggest that maybe the more intense political repression in the Basque Country during Francoism could have spurred more political talk at home, as political repression for Basques often affected more than one element of their political identity. Unlike a regular Spaniard, a Basque could be repressed as a result his/her positioning in the left-right axis and also for his/her territorial identification, which constitutes an additional source of topics for political discussion.

Table 4.2 Frequency of political discussion at home while growing up (in %)

	<i>Sex</i>		<i>Party</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>Other parties</i>	
Never	19	14	19	16	18	13	17
Seldom	38	35	36	41	23	28	37
Quite often	24	24	24	21	22	35	24
Very often	19	27	21	22	37	24	22
Total (<i>N</i>)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(354)	(224)	(247)	(239)	(18)	(74)	(578)

Source: CIS 2827

Note: Bold font indicate residuals higher than expected in the case of independence

4.3 REASONS TO ENTER POLITICAL LIFE

The reasons to enter political life are studied by the literature on political elites and candidates as an aspect of political recruitment (Norris 1996). According to this literature, MPs' motivations for entering politics allows classification of them into diverse types of candidates. Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008), for instance, suggest that there are four different types of candidates. The first one is "party loyalists", and they abound in closed-lists, big-constituencies and systems that beget strong party identifications. "Constituent servants" are more independent from the parties; they emerge in decentralized parties and small constituencies, with few barriers to independent candidates and non-conventional coalitions. "Group delegates" are loyal to a union, religious group or professional association, since they emerge in parties and systems where interest groups have the last word when it comes to select candidates. Finally, "entrepreneurs" are typical where the electorate can step forward as candidates, parties are decentralized and have open lists, and financing is underwritten by individuals.

Due to the features of the Spanish party and political system, the first and second types of candidate should be prevalent. Table 4.3 displays the most frequent motivations put forward by Spanish representatives when asked why they enter political life.

When asked about their main motivation for entering politics, most MPs (43%) answered that they were driven by their vocation of public service. Other popular motivations were the will to influence society following an ideology and ideological affinity with their party (21% and 19%, respectively). Those who got into politics in order to represent a group or to pursue a particular goal/topic barely reached 8%. Ambition and prestige are reasons even less admitted by Spanish politicians. Therefore, it seems that public servants and party loyalists are the majority among Spanish MPs, as suggested by the theoretical framework of Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008). But has this always been so?

The 1997 study carried out by the CIS revealed that 31% of the Spanish MPs claimed that they entered political life as a way to serve society, 28% said that they did so in order to express commitment to their values, 22% of them wanted to contribute to social change, 16% felt attracted to political activity, 13% felt compelled to enter politics as part of their opposition to the Franco dictatorship; and only 7% admitted that they were following a family tradition or a request from a friends (Uriarte 2000).

Table 4.3 Motivations for entering politics I (in %)

	<i>Sex</i>		<i>Party</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>Others</i>	
Public service	39	48	50	40	28	29	43
Influencing society following an ideology	23	18	14	28	34	21	21
Ideological affinity with my party	21	16	13	20	19	39	19
I was invited to participate	6	8	10	3	10	5	7
A specific issue or policy	6	7	7	7	9	4	6
Professional or personal career (ambition)	2	1	3	0	0	1	2
Representation of a group	3	1	3	1	0	1	2
Prestige, social esteem, notoriety	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Total (<i>N</i>)	100 (345)	100 (212)	100 (242)	100 (228)	100 (17)	100 (70)	100 (557)

Source: CIS 2827

Note: The Chi2 values for each crosstab between “Motivations for entering politics” and each of the independent variables are the following: Sex = 12.5 ($N = 557$), Region = 41.9* ($N = 558$), Party = 61.1*** ($N = 557$). Asterisks mean: *** $P < 0.001$; ** $P < 0.01$; * $P < 0.05$

More than ten years later, public service and ideological factors remain the main motivations of MPs entering political life and have become even more determining factors. The will to transform society has disappeared from the list of motivations, while others have appeared, such as interest in a particular policy.

Table 4.3 shows no significant differences between males and females regarding their motivations for entering political life. This contradicts findings and literature on political ambition and gender in the USA. Fox and Lawless, among others, point out that women have less political ambition than men, this is, a less intense desire to step forward for office (2005). Also, women are recruited by parties with less probability than men, regardless their level of preparation or experience (2011). Yet Table 4.3 does not point out significant differences regarding the sex of the MPs with respect to their political ambition—a motivation not very

often mentioned by Spanish MPs. Similarly, there are not significant differences between males and females with regards the tendency to enter a party by invitation, that is, to be recruited by party elites.³

Public service is the most mentioned reason to enter politics among the PP and the PSOE (50% and 40% respectively), while other parties tend to mention more often ideological reasons (39%). The PP stands out for the lower tendency of its MPs to enter politics by ideology and a greater propensity to enter by invitation (10% admit this path). The same proportion is found in IU, but only 3% of the socialists mention this reason. These figures confirm that within the PSOE there are fewer “starlets” and more ideologically driven candidates than in the PP. This can be due to two different phenomena. From the point of view of the “candidate-citizen” theory, the mobilization mechanism suggested by Verba et al. (1995) would be less frequent among the PSOE politicians. From the much more specific literature on access to power and political recruitment (Norris 1996), these results suggest that ideological variables play a role in candidate selection in Spain, besides the contextual constraints introduced by the electoral system. In this case, leftist deputies are more likely than the rest to follow their political vocation because of reasons related to ideology and affinity with their party.

Table 4.4 explores the relationship between the reasons for entering politics admitted by Spanish MPs and another set of relevant factors related to political socialization. First of all, we consider parliamentarians’ cohort of birth. A political cohort is a group of individuals who have a distinctive character, due to the factors making the general context of its upbringing. Cohort studies are standard practice in political socialization studies, and consist in comparing the evolution of two or more generations in relation to one or more aspects of their political culture (Glenn 2005). Although we can only refer to one moment in time—hence potentially mixing age with generational effects—we will explore the reasons given for entering politics in relation with the MPs’ birth cohort, considering three groups. The Francoism cohort gathers those born before 1959, and whose primary socialization took place entirely under the dictatorship institutions and political culture. The Transition cohort gathers those born between 1959 and 1973, and is supposed to be affected by the events that implied the end of the dictatorship. Finally, the Democracy cohort is formed by those born after 1973.

We will also take into account the fact of the MPs having (had) relatives involved in politics, the fact of having been involved in political activism

Table 4.4 Motivations for entering politics II (in %)

	Cohort			Family ideology			Has relative(s) in politics ^a	College activism ^a	Total
	Francoism	Transition	Democracy	Left	Center	Right			
Public service	43	43	46	37	53	44	42	33	43
Influencing society following an ideology	23	19	16	28	12	19	23	28	21
Ideological affinity with my party	16	21	26	24	20	16	19	23	19
I was invited to participate	7	7	5	3	6	10	5	5	7
A specific issue or policy	7	7	3	6	7	6	8	6	6
Professional or personal career (ambition)	2	1	0	0	2	2	2	2	2
Representation of a group	2	1	4	1	0	3	1	2	2
Prestige, social esteem, notoriety	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Total (N)	100 (269)	100 (222)	100 (63)	100 (191)	100 (106)	100 (249)	100 (264)	100 (236)	100 (557)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Notes: The Chi2 values for each crosstab between "Motivations for entering politics," and each of the independent variables are the following: Cohort = 21.4 (N = 557), family ideology = 33.3 *** (N = 547), relatives in politics = 8 (N = 557), college activism = 26.9 *** (N = 557). Astersisks mean: ***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05. + = Dichotomous variables. Only percentages for the "yes" (presence of the variable) are shown

Note: Bold font indicate residuals higher than expected in the case of independence

while in college and, finally, MPs' families' ideology. The Ideology categories derive from a 0 to 10 scale. Those on the left placed themselves in rungs under the value 4. The center gathers those placing themselves in positions 4, 5 or 6. The "right" category includes those placing themselves in positions 7–10 of the ideological scale.

Age does not have a significant effect on the alleged reasons for entering political life. Yet younger MPs have a greater propensity to mention ideological affinity with the party (26%); while older parliamentarians tend more to see politics as a way of influencing society. Those coming from left-wing families are more likely to mention ideological affinity with their party as the reason why they enter politics (24%). Those who grew up in a centrist family are more prone to enter politics to fulfill a public service (53%). Furthermore, those who come from left-wing families tend to mention more the will to influence society as a motivation to enter politics (28%). On the other hand, those from right-wing families are more likely to say that they entered politics because they were invited to do so (10%). Participation in student movements is also related to the motivations to enter politics: those who have activist experiences in college mention public service less (33%) and more the desire to influence society following an ideology (28%).

4.4 ORIGINS OF POLITICAL VOCATION AND PARTY AFFILIATION

The origin of parliamentarians' political vocation is hardly known. The MPs surveyed could mention up to two causes. Family influence was the most mentioned pathway to political vocation (mentioned by 26%). The next step is to analyze the bases of these different sources of political vocation. We proceeded by estimating a multinomial regression in which the reference category is "public service", mentioned by 11% of the sample.⁴ Table 4.5 presents the main results of this estimation in the form of predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable.

Firstly, public service is significantly related to MPs' cohort, chamber, region, college activism, familial politicization and the predominant ideology in the family of origin. Basque deputies are the less likely to mention this pathway of political vocation. Also, parliamentarians from left-wing families are less likely to mention public service than those who grew up in right-wing families. MPs coming from families that did not discuss

Table 4.5 Origins of the political vocation. Predicted probabilities

	<i>Familiar influence</i>	<i>Personal abilities/ professional environment</i>	<i>Inequalities, ideology, various activisms</i>	<i>Anti-Francoism/ transition</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Public service</i>	
Cohort							
	Francoism	0.25 (0.2-0.3)	0.14 (0.1-0.18)	0.26 (0.21-0.31)	0.1 (0.06-0.14)	0.16 (0.11-0.2)	0.10 (0.06-0.13)
	Transition	0.27 (0.22-0.32)	0.16 (0.12-0.21)	0.31 (0.25-0.37)	0.03 (0.01-0.05)	0.09 (0.05-0.13)	0.13 (0.09-0.18)
	Democracy	0.3 (0.2-0.4)	0.12 (0.05-0.2)	0.41 (0.29-0.52)	0 (-0.0-0.0)	0.11 (0.04-0.18)	0.06 (0-0.12)
Chamber	National	0.28 (0.24-0.32)	0.11 (0.06-0.16)	0.29 (0.23-0.36)	0.06 (0.03-0.09)	0.16 (0.1-0.2)	0.16 (0.11-0.2)
	Regional	0.23 (0.18-0.29)	0.17 (0.13-0.21)	0.30 (0.25-0.34)	0.07 (0.04-0.09)	0.11 (0.08-0.14)	0.08 (0.05-0.11)
Freq. political discussion	Never	0.07 (0.04-0.1)	0.18 (0.11-0.24)	0.38 (0.3-0.46)	0.08 (0.04-0.12)	0.15 (0.09-0.2)	0.14 (0.09-0.2)
	Very	0.51 (0.43-0.6)	0.1 (0.06-0.15)	0.19 (0.13-0.25)	0.04 (0.01-0.07)	0.09 (0.04-0.13)	0.06 (0.2-0.09)
Relatives in politics	Yes	0.31 (0.26-0.36)	0.13 (0.09-0.17)	0.28 (0.22-0.33)	0.08 (0.05-0.11)	0.1 (0.06-0.13)	0.1 (0.06-0.14)
	No	0.21 (0.17-0.26)	0.16 (0.12-2.)	0.31 (0.26-0.37)	0.05 (0.03-0.07)	0.15 (0.11-0.19)	0.11 (0.08-0.15)

(continued)

Table 4.5 (continued)

	<i>Familiar influence</i>	<i>Personal abilities/ professional environment</i>	<i>Inequalities, ideology, various activisms</i>	<i>Anti-Francoism/ transition</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Public service</i>
Family's ideology	0.32 (0.25-0.38)	0.15 (0.08-0.21)	0.29 (0.22-0.36)	0.05 (0.03-0.08)	0.13 (0.08-0.2)	0.05 (0.02-0.09)
Center (6)	0.24 (0.21-0.28)	0.15 (0.12-0.18)	0.30 (0.26-0.34)	0.07 (0.04-0.09)	0.12 (0.1-0.15)	0.12 (0.09-0.14)
Right (9)	0.17 (0.1-0.25)	0.14 (0.06-0.22)	0.29 (0.18-0.4)	0.08 (0.01-0.14)	0.10 (0.03-0.16)	0.22 (0.10-0.34)
College activism	0.26 (0.21-0.31)	0.15 (0.1-0.2)	0.35 (0.29-0.4)	0.08 (0.05-1)	0.11 (0.07-0.16)	0.05 (0.02-0.08)
No	0.28 (0.23-0.32)	0.15 (0.11-0.19)	0.26 (0.21-0.31)	0.05 (0.02-0.07)	0.13 (0.1-0.17)	0.14 (0.1-0.18)

Source: CIS Study 2827

Note: 95% confidence interval for each probability in parentheses. Cell entries represent average probabilities, which have been calculated based on a multinomial logistic model controlling for cohort, MP's chamber, region, party, frequency of political discussion at home while growing up, having (had) relatives in politics, family's ideology and college activism. The probabilities for region and parties have been calculated, but not presented for the sake of simplicity and economy of space

politics at all had a 14% chance of feeling compelled to enter politics because of a duty towards public service. If they used to talk a lot about politics, they are only 6% likely to mention this way into politics. Recalling an activist past in college decreases by 9% the probability of mentioning public service as the origin of political vocation; and deputies educated during the Transition or Francoism are twice as likely to mention public service than younger deputies (10–13% vs. 6% probability). Similarly, national parliament MPs are twice as likely as the regional ones to mention public service (16% vs. 8% of probability).

MPs tend to mention family influence as the origin of their political vocation mainly under five circumstances. Coming from a family with a political background increases the probability of mentioning this origin by 10%. High frequency of political discussion at home while growing up increases the probability of mentioning family influence by more than 40%, as compared to those who never discussed politics at home. When MPs refer to personal capacities or professional environment when asked about the origin of their political vocation, this is mostly explained by the chamber in which they develop their representative activity. National parliament's MPs have 6% less probability than the autonomous ones (11% vs. 17%) of mentioning this pathway to political vocation.

As for inequalities and ideology as the origin of their vocation, this is mostly related to their families' ideology and MPs' chamber. Regional deputies have a 1% higher chance of mentioning this pathway than national MPs (30% vs. 29%). Familiar ideology seems a more explanatory factor, but the predicted probabilities associated with this variable suggest that its effect is non-linear. Individuals whose family are from the center of the political spectrum (5–6 on the 1–10 scale) have 30% more chances of mentioning inequalities and ideology as the origin of their vocation, while those on the left and on the right are less likely to do so. On the other hand, while MPs socialized once democracy was established have a 41% probability of mentioning inequalities or ideology as the origin of their vocation, those socialized during the Transition have a 31% probability of doing so, and those raised during the Franco regime have only a 26% probability.

Historical references such as the struggle against Francoism and during the Transition are only significantly associated to the deputy's chamber (at $p < 0.1$) and past youth activism. National MPs are 1% less likely than regional ones to mention these historical periods as the origin of their vocation (6% vs. 7%), and those who were political activists while in col-

lege are 3% less likely than those without an engaged past to mention this factor as the origin (5% vs. 8%, respectively). Familial ideology and college activism help explain “other” sources of political vocation as deputies raised in leftist families and those with an engaged youth are 5% and 2% more likely to refer to these “other” origins of their vocation than the rest, respectively.

In short, participation in students’ movements is related to a higher propensity to mention any of the various sources of political vocation presented in Table 4.5 (and particularly, activism during Francoism or the Transition) rather than the generic “vocation of public service”. Thus, college activism is confirmed as a relevant socializing agent. This is consistent with the expectations of Perry (1996) and other authors concerned about public service motivation, who give importance to college environments and to the age range in which these studies are carried out in the development of the political vocation. These results also suggest that the family does not have the monopoly of influence on MPs’ decisions to engage in politics, despite its central role (Kornberg and Thomas 1965). Finally, we find an intriguing significant relationship between family ideology and four of these sources of political vocation. The more to the right the parliamentarian’s family is, the less likely he or she is to mention family, professional or other sources of influence, but the more likely he is to refer to public service as the source of his vocation.

Now we will look more closely at the decision to enter a specific political party, an act much more directly related to MPs’ role as political representatives and also to political ambition and recruitment phenomena (Norris 1996). When asked why they joined their parties, most parliamentarians (60%) answered that it was an individual decision, although 11% acknowledged that they were asked to enter the party and 6% among them said that they were invited to enter an electoral list. The latter reveals that incentives and opportunities and, more specifically, mobilization by third parties (“I was asked to”) are decisive in 17% of cases. Table 4.6 shows the predicted probabilities obtained by a multinomial regression estimation for the most explanatory variables and categories.

Only one factor makes the political representatives more likely to mention the influence of the social, family and work environment, and is the fact of having a relative in politics. Those with at least one relative in politics have a 16% chance of mentioning this pathway as a reason to getting into their party, while those who do not have relatives in politics only have a 6% probability of mentioning this reason.

National parliament MPs are more prone than regional ones to allegedly being offered a position on an electoral list or in the party as a reason to enter a political group. More specifically, regional MPs have a 19% probability of being invited against the 30% probability that national parliamentarians have. Andalusian and Galician MPs are less prone than those from the slow-track regions' parliaments to admit that they were offered a post. Those who frequently discussed politics with their parents while growing up are half as likely to be offered entry to a party as those who did not discuss politics as much (15% vs. 30% probability). MPs with relatives in politics are also less likely to mention this path of entry to their party than those who do not have relatives in politics (17% vs. 26% probability).

As for the involuntary ways of entering the party—that is, by absorption or fusion with another political group—we find that older parliamentarians tend to mention this cause significantly more than younger ones (9% vs. 0% probability). Finally, PSOE parliamentarians are less likely to refer to this path. In both cases this is consistent with the contemporary history of political groups in Spain. Not surprisingly, older parties have suffered more transformations than more recent ones, and the PSOE stands out for its stability in contrast to parties that are the result of large coalitions (IU) or more recent restructuring processes (PP).

As for the reference category, “individual decision”, we note that younger parliamentarians are more likely to mention it than older ones (64% vs. 56% probability). Regional parliamentarians are more prone to mention the individual decision than the national ones (62% vs. 54% probability). Those raised in families that used to discuss a lot about politics or who got involved in political activism while in college are slightly less likely than the rest to mention this path of entry to their party (59% probability in both cases).

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has addressed the political motivations and socialization of the Spanish political representatives, connecting both phenomena. We can conclude that most MPs refer to their attraction towards public service as the source of their political vocation and as the main reason they got involved in politics. Thus, the majority of MPs represent the “voter server” profile, although references to public service seem to be characteristic of a less committed speech, since it is more frequent among politicians raised

in centrist families and less frequent in parliamentarians with a politically engaged youth (college activism).

As for the origin of the political vocation of the MPs, this chapter has shown the central socializing role of the family. Several times across the questionnaire the respondents had the occasion to refer to the causes and influences of their motivation to enter politics in general or their party in particular, and “family” was a recurring response. This agency exerts its influence in three ways. The first is familial political antecedents or “hard” family socialization. Having relatives in politics offers role models to imitate and generates expectations about individuals’ career future. It also facilitates resources (from networks to a reputation connected to individuals’ family name) that pave the way for a future political profession. Almost half of the MPs reported having or having had relatives in politics, a proportion more or less similar to that found in classic American and Canadian studies. We also know that most of these relatives are involved in local politics, are connected with the MPs in the first degree of consanguinity, and were either appointed or elected.

The second type of family influence is the direct transmission of values and beliefs during the socialization process, which is reflected in the correspondence between parents’ and children’s ideology. These complex mechanisms are addressed in chapter 12 dealing with MPs ideology. However, we know that politicians raised by left-wing families are the ones who most often refer to their family as the origin of their vocation. In the same vein, those who used to talk a lot about politics while growing up at home are the ones most often mentioning willingness to transform society following an ideology as a motivation to enter politics. Parliamentarians from centrist families, on the other hand, are the most likely to mention their own abilities or their professional environment as the main source of their vocation.

The third way in which family affects political motivation is a more indirect one, and has to do with how the family discussed and dealt with public/current issues, politicizing MPs’ upbringing and stressing the importance of politics. We have seen that Spanish politicians come from households that are more politicized than the average citizen’s, in the sense that they more often discuss political topics. Thus, family acts as a socialization agency that filters the perception of the political reality and conveys certain values and political knowledge related to these historical facts and periods that are discussed at home.

Table 4.6 Reasons for affiliating to a particular party. Predicted probabilities

		<i>Influence of social environment (family, work, college)</i>	<i>I was offered/ asked to enter (the electoral list/the party)</i>	<i>Absorption/ merging with other parties + other reasons</i>	<i>Individual decision</i>
Cohort	Francoism	0.13 (0.08–0.17)	0.22 (0.17–0.27)	0.09 (0.05–13)	0.56 (0.5–0.6)
	Transition	0.11 (0.06–0.15)	0.22 (0.16–0.3)	0.05 (0.02–0.08)	0.62 (0.56–0.69)
	Democracy	0.15 (0.05–0.26)	0.21 (–8–9)	0.00 (–0.0–0)	0.64 (–2.9–4)
Chamber	National	0.11 (0.06–0.16)	0.3 (0.22–0.37)	0.05 (0.01–0.09)	0.54 (0.46–0.63)
	Regional	0.12 (0.09–0.16)	0.19 (0.15–0.23)	0.07 (0.04–0.09)	0.62 (0.57–0.67)
Freq. political discussion	Never	0.08 (0.03–0.13)	0.3 (0.2–0.37)	0.03 (0.0–0.05)	0.6 (0.52–0.68)
	Very	0.16 (0.1–0.2)	0.15 (0.09–0.2)	0.1 (0.05–0.16)	0.59 (0.51–0.68)
Relatives in politics	Yes	0.16 (0.11–0.21)	0.17 (0.12–0.22)	0.05 (0.03–0.08)	0.61 (0.55–0.68)
	No	0.07 (0.04–0.11)	0.26 (0.21–0.32)	0.07 (0.04–0.11)	0.59 (0.52–0.65)
Family's ideology	Left (3)	0.16 (0.09–0.23)	0.17 (0.11–0.24)	0.07 (0.02–0.12)	0.6 (0.5–0.67)
	Center (6)	0.11 (0.08–0.14)	0.23 (0.19–0.27)	0.06 (0.04–0.08)	0.6 (0.56–0.65)
	Right (9)	0.07 (0.01–0.13)	0.29 (0.16–0.41)	0.05 (–0.0–0.1)	0.6 (0.47–73)
College activism	Yes	0.13 (0.08–0.18)	0.19 (0.14–0.25)	0.08 (0.04–0.12)	0.59 (0.52–0.66)
	No	0.11 (0.07–0.15)	0.23 (0.19–0.28)	0.05 (0.02–0.08)	0.61 (0.54–0.66)

Source: CIS Study 2827

Note: 95% confidence interval for each probability in parentheses. Cell entries represent average probabilities, which have been calculated based on a multinomial logistic model controlling for cohort, MP's chamber, region, party, frequency of political discussion at home while growing up, having (had) relatives in politics, family's ideology and college activism. The probabilities for region and parties have been calculated, but not presented for the sake of simplicity and economy of space

The influence of other agents of socialization such as early activism in students' organizations has been shown to be intimately related to the origin of political vocation. However, the family is confirmed as a crucial socializing agent. It would be interesting to compare the effects of this institution with those of other classical agents, such as the school, the church or unions, since previous literature has emphasized its importance in the formation of political attitudes.

These data allow us to affirm that the apple does not fall far from the tree. Although family influence seems beneficial in the sense of promoting the vocation of public service, it also raises some doubts about the composition and closure of the political class. From a pessimistic perspective, such strong family influence could turn politicians into an impermeable group and limit leadership renewal, as the authors on political dynasties in the Anglo-Saxon world have already warned. Also, references to "invitations" or offerings question the nature of the public service vocation of some politicians, and draw attention to the recruitment strategies of the political groups, a topic that is addressed in more detail in the following chapter.

NOTES

1. Among the Spanish MPs who admit having relatives in politics, 46% are in fact family in the first degree, while 42% are less closely related to them (including cousins, uncles and the like).
2. Study CIS 2760 (2008) "Memories of the Civil War and Francoism".
3. The only significant relationship between MPs' region and their motivation to enter politics is found in Andalusia. Andalusian MPs are more likely than the rest to mention public service as the main reason to enter politics (62%).
4. This is set as the reference category because it is the vaguer—less specific—one, and because it talks to the literature on public service motivation.

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Recruitment and Selection

Xavier Coller, Guillermo Cordero, and José M. Echavarren

5.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most relevant and least-known aspects of political elites is the way in which candidates to be included in electoral lists are selected. To a large extent, the selection of the parliamentary elite is the result of the decisions of *selectorates*, persons and party organs that decide who are to stand as candidates for the different chambers (Rahat and Hazan 2001; Siavellis and Morgensen 2008; Best and Cotta 2000, p. 9). These persons who decide who is to be included in the lists and who is to be rejected usually hold high office in the party, while the organs are made up of more or less permanent commissions within the party structure. Although the formal rules which regulate this selection process are usually public and are part of the bylaws of the parties, we do not know what criteria the selectorates mobilize to guide their selection, the pressures to which they may be subjected or the criteria used to select one candidate rather than another

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(Fujimura 2012; Bermúdez and Cordero 2016; Cordero and Coller 2015).

The scarcity of studies of this type is all the more surprising in a context of crisis and disaffection in which politicians and the way they have entered parliaments are being questioned (Coller et al. 2016b). In this context, it is useful to know how parliamentarians are selected, how they perceive this process, how the selection is initiated, why they believe that they are “the chosen ones” and their perception of the power to select them held by different groups within their parties. In the final analysis, as several studies have shown, selection affects two main pillars of democracy: legitimacy and its results (Wessels 1997, p. 78). As pointed out by Field and Siavelis (2008), the selection affects the type of candidate chosen and, therefore, the behavior of the legislature and its “social representativeness”, the internal cohesion of parliamentary groups (and, therefore, the stability of parliaments and, even, of the executive) and the distribution of power in the parties; in short, the quality of democracy.

This chapter offers an analytical framework for the analysis of the elaboration of electoral lists and goes on to respond to three blocks of questions. In the first block, the structural elements and formal rules of the parties which determine the selection of the parliamentary elite are analyzed. To what extent do the electoral system and the party system influence the selection of candidates? How do the main parties formally organize the elaboration of electoral lists of candidates for the different chambers?

The second block refers to the degree to which Spanish parliamentarians perceive that those selection mechanisms are centralized and exclusive.¹ Gallagher and Marsh (1988) and Rahat and Hazan (2001) speak of different degrees of centralization and exclusivity in the selection, depending on the players who take part in decision-making regarding the lists. To what extent is the selection controlled by the central organs of the party or more open at regional and local level? Is it the party oligarchs who exclusively make the selection or are there more participatory processes? Are there any differences between the parties?

The third block of questions refers to the selection criteria used. According to the parliamentarians, what criteria are applied when choosing one person rather than another among those available? Does loyalty to leaders (local, provincial, regional or national) play any role? Is merit and professional training taken into account or is party dedication given priority? This chapter demonstrates that Spain has a centralized, exclusive

selection process in which regional leaders become the main players in the selection of political personnel.

5.2 SUPPLY AND DEMAND

The starting point of our analysis is relatively simple and begins with an old question asked by Matthews (1985, p. 32): how do people become parliamentarians? That is, what steps do they follow until they enter a parliament? The initial answer is based on the decision of an individual to offer to form part of a list or to accept the offer made by another person or by a party organ. But these decisions are not taken in a vacuum. As well as the motivation for political participation dealt with in the previous chapter and the influences of primary groups and interest groups, there are institutional factors that limit or encourage some people to consider entering politics (or to refrain from doing so), since they expand (or reduce) the institutional window of individual opportunity (Czudonowski 1975; Carey and Shugart 1995; Bowler et al. 1999; Hix 2004).² Norris (1997, p. 2) combines these factors in the “funnel of causality”.³

The author understands that the recruitment of politicians is the result of the interaction between elements which affect the supply and demand. On the supply-side, the combination of the legal system, the electoral system and the party system creates a structure of opportunities so that there may exist a pool of persons who are available to enter into institutional representational politics. Obviously, this supply is skewed by elements such as social origin, family history, ambition, education, the recruitment channel, gender, political (and economic) capital, prior political track record, profession and even the incentives to enter politics rather than following other professional alternatives.⁴ These elements “filter” the individuals who have a political vocation and who, therefore, are available for election.

The combination of these elements generates a pool of potential candidates from whom the selection is to be made. But the selection generally takes place within the parties, and this is where we find the “black box” where formal criteria are applied (the rules and procedures which regulate the approval of the lists) as well as informal criteria, which are lesser-known, activating the demand for candidates. Leaving aside the formal rules, in order to discover the functioning of the “black box” researchers analyze the results of the decisions of selectorates: the electoral lists or the composition of the parliaments. Prior literature has shown that the

selectorates introduce certain selection biases which, for example, favor men rather than women, lawyers and teachers rather than other professional groups or natives rather than immigrants, among others.⁵

5.3 STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS

According to the “funnel of causality”, the elements of the electoral system⁶ make up the earliest phase of the chain which determines the selection of the elites. These structural elements also decisively influence the way in which parliamentarians are elected in Spain (Bermúdez and Cordero 2016). Some of these elements are: application of a pro-rata by means of provincial constituencies,⁷ the application of the D’Hondt formula and different electoral barriers in the distribution of seats or the use of open lists (Senate) or closed lists (Congress and regional parliaments). The conjunction of these particular factors has an effect on the recruitment of Spanish parliamentary elites.

Firstly, the high number of electoral districts for Congress and Senate established under the Spanish electoral system has a potential effect on the selection of the parliamentary elites in both the national and regional parliaments⁸ and the system of territorial organization (Bermúdez and Cordero 2016), since the level of decentralization of the States is related to the level at which the composition of the lists is decided. Furthermore, the pro-rata of seats is provincially based, which usually favors the selection of the provincial elite at provincial rather than local level (as in the paradigmatic case of the UK, Hopkin 2001)⁹ or regional level (as is the case in Germany, Detterbeck 2013).

Secondly, the low proportionality generated by the high number of districts in Congress and in the Senate is aggravated by two additional elements of the electoral system: the use of the D’Hondt formula and electoral barriers. This is reflected in the over-representation of some territories (the least populated) and parties (those receiving most votes in a larger number of districts, traditionally the UCD, PSOE and PP). However, the system has led to under-representation of medium-sized parties with more disperse electoral support, as has been the case of IU.

Some other elements of the electoral system are also relevant in recruiting and selection. For example, the use of closed lists in all parliaments—with the exception of the Senate, which has open lists—increases the independence of the parties to decide who is to be included in the lists and in what order (Cordero et al. 2016). An additional characteristic of the electoral system which has significant consequences for the selection of the

parliamentary elite is the application of the Equality Act, under which, from 2007, the lists may not contain less than 40% or more than 60% of persons of the same sex.¹⁰

To study the extent to which these structural elements are reflected in the selection of parliamentary elites, it is necessary to examine the internal regulations of the parties. Rahat and Hazan (2001, pp. 298–299) focus their research into the methods of selection of the parliamentary elite around four questions: Who can be a candidate? Who selects them? At what level do they do so? With what procedures? The possible answers to these questions are categorized by the authors in a classification ranging from the most “exclusive” to the most “inclusive” and democratic methods. The most “exclusive” procedures are those in which the candidatures may only include members of the party with specific characteristics (such as the number of years of membership or prior experience in certain offices), and the candidates are elected by the leaders of the party without any direct participation mechanisms. In contrast, in the most inclusive system, any citizen may be a candidate and all of the electorate may take part in their selection by means of a democratic process.

The literature contains ample debate about the suitability of these more democratic means of selection of the elites and their real consequences (Hopkin 2001; Katz 2001; Field and Siavelis 2008; Cross and Katz 2013; Cordero and Coller 2015; Sandri et al. 2015; Giannetti 2016). In Spain, these more inclusive formulas are usually confined to the election of candidates to the more relevant executive positions, such as the office of Prime Minister or the Presidency of the regions, without parliamentary elites being subject to them. Based on the Rahat and Hazan classification, the main parties in Spain combine more and less inclusive elements, though the PSOE has the most open mechanisms for the selection of its parliamentary elite. However, these formal mechanisms are not always translated into greater effective control by the party rank-and-file (Hopkin 2001; Katz 2001).

Without taking into account the new parties (Podemos and Ciudadanos) that gained electoral muscle around 2015,¹¹ the formal selection of parliamentary elites in the PSOE is the most decentralized. It begins in the local party offices, which, by means of open lists, propose candidates to the provincial executive commissions. This, however, is a control mechanism (Katz 2001), since these commissions undertake the task of elaborating a list of candidates for the National Executive Commission, in which they can include new candidates, and they send the list to the Federal Committee for final approval. Although there is a possibility in the PSOE of holding

primaries, these are limited to the election of candidates for the position of Prime Minister and Regional President, and the mayoralty of the larger cities (Méndez-Lago 2000; Hopkin 2001). Primaries for PM were introduced in 1998 and only affiliates can vote.

Among the large national parties, the PP is an example of the opposite situation, in which the elaboration of lists of candidates to national and regional parliaments originates at the provincial level and has no internal democratic mechanisms.¹² The provincial electoral committee, or the regional electoral committee (in the case of regional parliaments), elaborates and proposes a list of candidates for each constituency, which is finally approved by the National Electoral Committee. Finally, the formal process for the elaboration of lists of candidates to parliaments in IU begins at regional level, although in the case of elections to the national parliament, it ends with the approval of the Federal Political Council (at national level). However, the level of inclusivity of the process depends on whether the regional federations unanimously agree on the composition of the lists. If not, the selection is made by means of primary elections with closed, blocked lists. Primary elections for PM were introduced in 2007.

5.4 EXCLUSIVITY AND CENTRALIZATION

The “structural elements” create windows of opportunity so that some individuals may decide to enter institutional politics and are selected in accordance with the formal rules applied by each organization. But the formal selection mechanisms mask informal processes which can only be revealed by direct observation or by questioning the players involved (Fujimura 2012; Bermúdez and Cordero 2016; Cordero and Coller 2015). In this section, the perceptions of the parliamentarians allow us to elucidate the extent to which the selection process is closer to market mechanisms (the supply, that is the candidates, respond to the demand of the parties to complete the lists) or, on the contrary, whether it is the selectorates who take the initiative by showing the power of the party (or of a very specific group within the party) in the selection of candidates. This way of viewing the process allows us to look more deeply at the degree of exclusivity of the selection process in line with the model of Rahat and Hazan (2001), which ranges from one inclusive extreme, in which all of the citizens may elect the candidates, to the other extreme, in which it is the leader who selects the members of the electoral lists. (Fig. 5.1)




Fig. 5.1 Means of selection, by political party and chamber (%). Source: CIS study 2827. NB: The interviewees were asked: “How were you selected for inclusion in the lists? I am going to give you four alternatives and I would like you to choose one” and “Who proposed that you should be in the electoral lists for an elected office?” The parties with an insufficient number of observations (less than 5) were included in the “Other” category, in order to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents

From the data analyzed, it can be concluded that, in Spain, the initiative to form part of the lists for election to the different parliaments very rarely begins with the candidates themselves (6%), as can be seen in Fig. 5.1.¹³ In contrast, the most usual way of becoming a representative is for the party (organs or leaders) to offer the candidates a place in the lists. Almost two out of every three candidates are selected in this way, and the proportion is even higher among “rookie” parliamentarians (the youngest, those who have been members of the party for less time, those with less experience in the post and also, due to the recent inclusion of parity in the lists, women).¹⁴ This majority mechanism (Hopkin 2001) is to a certain extent attenuated in the case of the Catalanian nationalist parties and IU, where the rank-and-file membership are responsible for between 7% and 20% of selections. Lastly, around 13% consider that their inclusion in the lists was “taken for granted”,¹⁵ an opinion which was more widespread among older males, those with a long track record in the party, those who have held different offices in their respective chambers, those with more legislatures in office and those who see themselves as “decision-makers” in the parliamentary group.¹⁶

Both in the central and in the regional parliaments, party office holders appear to play a crucial role in offering a place on the electoral list. Despite the fact that, formally, in the main political parties, it is not the party leaders but the organization that designs the lists (Méndez-Lago 2000; Cordero and Coller 2015), 36% of the members of the Congress and Senate, and 54% in the regional parliaments reported that they were selected for office by party elites, as can be seen in Fig. 5.1. According to Rahat and Hazan (2001), this suggests a highly exclusive, personalized selection, especially in nominations for regional parliaments, and more so in the national PSOE and the regional PP, as well as PNV, CiU and other non-nationalist parties.

As can be seen from Fig. 5.1, in the national parliament, one of every three parliamentarians formed part of the lists thanks to an offer from a party official and the other third thanks to a selection by the party organs. This latter portion is divided between those who say that their election was taken for granted, that the decision was taken by the party or that it was through direct offering by the candidate. Although the PSOE is the only one of the large parties whose bylaws state that local party branches can propose candidates in open lists, nobody in the party acknowledges the role of the local party branch as the promoter of his/her candidature. Almost 80% of the socialist candidates are elected by party officers or

organs. In contrast, PP officers, organs or the party in general, appear to have intervened in a lower percentage of selections, although two out of every three parliamentarians recognize the role of the party in their inclusion in the lists. The percentage of those who apply directly is also lower. However, the proportion of parliamentarians who consider that their selection was taken for granted is comparatively high (one out of every four parliamentarians).

The party organs are less important in the selection of the parliamentary elites in regional parliaments. As can be seen in Fig. 5.1, while these organs are involved in 14% of selections, a specific party officer is responsible for the selection of over half of the parliamentarians. The role of these officers is especially relevant in the PNV and the PP, but is, in contrast, marginal in the case of IU. In this case, the party organs appear to be responsible for the selection of almost one third of its regional parliamentarians, a figure which is somewhat lower in the PSOE. In contrast, the party organs are not involved in the selection of any parliamentarian of CiU or ERC at regional level. In these parties, it is more frequent for parliamentarians to offer themselves directly, probably because they have more members of parliament (MPs) with less experience in office and the selection is very local.¹⁷ Lastly, rank-and-file party members are responsible for 20% of selections in the case of ERC, 10% in CiU, and slightly lower proportions in PSOE, IU and PNV, though none in the case of the PP.

In short, it appears that the initiative for the selection of parliamentary elites in Spain depends little on the candidates themselves (as in the paradigmatic case in the USA, see Pennings and Hazan 2001 and Craig 2016), pushing the balance towards the demand side, and thereby handing great power to the parties (Cordero and Coller 2015). From the point of view, at least, of those who managed to become first a candidate on their respective lists and then members of the different parliaments, the parties exclusively hold the initiative. This, though, is not rooted in the party rank-and-file, but in the upper echelons, and especially in the party leaders in the case of members of regional parliaments and, to a lesser extent, in selection for the Congress and Senate.

Up to now, we have analyzed the level of exclusivity in selection, but we have not offered any information regarding the degree of centrality in the process. The selection system appears to tend towards some centralization in Spain (van Houten 2009). This scenario is confirmed when, following the example of Norris and Lovenduski (1995), MPs are asked about the power held by different players in the selection of candidates for electoral

lists for parliamentary elections. According to the parliamentary elite, the elaboration of lists for elections is a relatively centralized process. Regional leaders have the greatest power in the process for all chambers, both in the central government and in regional parliaments (with a mean score of 5.8 and 6, respectively), as seen in Table 5.1. The progressive federalization of Spain has led to the emergence and consolidation of regional party structures with growing power, to the point that their leaders are perceived as the most relevant group in the composition of electoral lists. The second and third groups with greatest power vary between the chambers. In the case of the Congress and Senate, they are, in order, national and local leaders (5.1 and 4.3), while in regional parliaments, the most powerful are local and national leaders (4.4 and 3.7). The rest of the players mentioned score relatively low values.

However, the selection is not perceived in the same way in all parties. Although, according to the bylaws of the PP, the selection of candidates begins at the provincial level, it is the party in which the national leaders appear to hold greatest power in the elaboration of the lists (6.2), although, as is to be expected, in regional parliaments, it is the regional leaders who appear to be mainly responsible for the lists' design (6.4). In the PSOE, whose bylaws contain mechanisms for local participation, the power of regional leaders is even clearer (Van Biezen and Hopkin 2006), as they are perceived as being the most relevant, also in the selection of candidates for the Congress and the Senate (5.5 for the Congress and Senate, and 6.0 for regional parliaments). In IU, power appears to be shared more widely among intermediate levels and the party rank-and-file. In contrast to the bylaws of this party, and despite the power of regional leaders (4.7), its parliamentarians perceive that the process is highly inclusive, since internal groups (4.8), party members (4.8) and local leaders (4.3) are those perceived as being responsible for the selection of the party's candidates. Lastly, regional leaders stand out as being responsible for the selection of the elite in nationalist and regionalist parties (6.1 in CiU, 5.6 in ERC and 5.2 in PNV), with the PNV and ERC scoring high values in selection at local level (5.2 and 5.0, respectively).

This is a selection which, despite the internal rules and guarantee procedures, rests to a large extent on the capacity of the leaders to include their people in the lists, as confirmed by Jiménez et al. (2017). The personalization of the selection can inevitably bring significant consequences with respect to accountability (To whom are they accountable?

Table 5.1 Power of the different players in the selection of candidates, by political party and chamber (mean values)

	<i>Congress and Senate</i>				<i>Regional parliaments</i>								
	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>Rest</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>Others, nat.</i>	<i>Others, non-nat.</i>	<i>Total</i>
Relevant Personalities	3	3	2.8	3	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.9	2	3.1	3.4	2.8	3
National leaders	6	4.3	4.4	5.1	4.2	3.5	2.2	NP	NP	NP	NP	3.4	3.7
Regional leaders	6.1	5.5	5.5	5.8	6.4	6	4.7	6.1	5.6	5.2	4	5.6	6
Local leaders	4	4.7	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.8	4.6	3.4	5.1	4.4
Internal groups	2.6	3.1	3.4	2.9	3	3.4	4.8	3.6	3.8	4.4	3.1	3.7	3.3
Party officials	1.6	1.2	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.7	2.4	1.7	1.4	2.3	2	1.9	1.7
Local members	2.6	3.5	4.5	3.2	2.8	3.5	4.8	3.8	5	5.2	5	4.5	3.4
N	87	90	16	193	158	149	14	12	5	14	13	16	376

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: The interviewees were asked: "On a scale of 1-7, where 1 is little and 7 is very much, please tell me: How much power do the following groups hold in your party in the selection of parliamentary candidates?"

To the leader? To the party? To the parliamentary group? To the electors?) and with respect to a type of parliamentarian for whom personal loyalty is a criterion of political action which is more important than others, such as service to society or the choice of the best alternatives (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Depauw and Martin 2009).

5.5 FIDELITY, DEDICATION, TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE

One of the least known aspects of studies of the selection of political personnel is the criteria used to choose one person rather than another. The formal rules are known, but not the criteria which guide the selection. It has been usual to study the composition of parliaments as the result of the decisions of the selectorates and, therefore, as a reflection of the criteria used for selection. This is an indirect method which does not take into account the biases introduced by the supply-side filter in the Norris (1997) model. There are two ways of avoiding these biases. The first is to directly ask the members of the selectorates. The second is to ask the parliamentarians about the reasons for which they believe they were chosen. Using the data of this survey, we have taken the latter option. We shall see below the causes which, in the opinion of the parliamentarians, led to their inclusion in the lists. From these, we deduce the criteria applied by the selectorates in the selection of candidates. These are informal criteria, under the definition of Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 727), they are unwritten, but they are shared and conveyed in an unofficial manner.

The data in Table 5.2 confirms that, after “knowledge of the problems”, two of the most important criteria which led the party selectorates to choose among potential candidates are related to the internal life of the party: dedication and loyalty. The next two in importance are related to their abilities: training and experience, factors which may be associated with merit. Prestige or public image (a relevant element to attract votes) is another factor which is taken into account, as are the political skills of the candidate: the capacity to reach agreements, which implies a vision of politics as negotiation among the selectorate. Elements such as family influence and the support of local and provincial party organizations are relatively unimportant.

The main differences with respect to these perceptions are to be found in what Bourdieu (2000, pp. 146–148) called the “institutionalized cultural

Table 5.2 Perceived reasons for selection, by political party (mean values)

	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>Other nat.</i>	<i>Other non-nat.</i>	<i>Total</i>
Knowledge of problems	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.1	3.8	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.1
Dedication	4.0	4.0	4.1	3.6	3.6	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.0
Loyalty	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.3	3.0	4.4	3.5	4.1	3.9
Training	3.8	3.8	3.3	3.7	3.8	4.0	3.2	4.2	3.8
Experience	3.9	3.8	3.3	4.0	3.7	3.3	3.8	3.5	3.8
Prestige	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.3	4.0	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.6
Support of leader	3.4	3.4	2.9	3.4	2.8	2.4	2.7	3.7	3.3
Reaching agreements	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.8	2.4	2.9	2.6	3.1	3.2
Local party organization	2.8	3.0	2.5	2.9	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.2	2.9
Provincial party organization	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.3	1.8	2.9	2.4	2.8	2.6
Family	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.4
Other	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.2	5.0	4.6	4.0	4.0	4.5
<i>N</i>	246	235	17	16	9	16	14	17	570

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: Interviewees were asked: "In your case, why do you believe you were offered a place on the electoral list or your offer to stand was accepted? I'm going to give you a list of criteria and I would like you to tell me whether, in your case, they were very (5), fairly (4), somewhat (3), little (2), or not at all (1), important to your being offered a place in the electoral list"

capital" of the parliamentarian. Those who do not hold university degrees believe that their election is more closely related to their loyalty (3.8), prestige (3.6), capacity to reach agreements (3.1) and the support of local party organizations (3.2) than those who do have such qualifications. Like diploma holders, they believe that their training had little influence (3.0). In contrast, those with university studies attach less importance to their dedication to the party (3.8), experience (3.2), loyalty (3.4) or the support of local and provincial party organizations (2.2 and 2.1) than those without university degree. However, they believe that the fundamental reason for the inclusion in the lists is their training (4.4). There are also significant differences with respect to experience in the party. Those parliamentarians who have spent a significant portion of their life in politics¹⁸ believe that they were included in the lists for their dedication and party loyalty, experience in representative institutions, knowledge of the problems of the region

or because they represent the provincial party organization. In contrast, those who have spent less time in politics understand that their inclusion in the lists was mainly due to their professional training.

5.6 CONCLUSIONS

Although the literature focused on describing the profiles of the political elites is relatively abundant, there have been very few studies which have attempted to analyze how parliamentary elites are selected, beyond the application of the formal rules of the party. The identity of the selectorates, the level at which they operate and the motives which drive their decisions are particularly relevant questions at a time in which citizens are increasingly distrustful of parties and politicians.

Furthermore, the literature has on many occasions analyzed the implications of the different means of selection in very different aspects of political life, such as, for example, descriptive representation (Katz 2001), the agenda of parliamentarians (Gallagher and Marsh 1988), the cohesion of parliamentary groups (Cordero and Coller 2015; Close 2016) and the internal distribution of power in parties (Hopkin 2001), as well as the stability of governments (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

The use of data from the survey of the parliamentary elite allows the analysis of the informal mechanisms which operate behind the elaboration of electoral lists (Fujimura 2012). Furthermore, it is a contribution to the scant, partial literature which has studied these mechanisms (Cordero et al. 2016). This chapter has demonstrated, in accordance with the model of Rahat and Hazan (2001), that the selection of the parliamentary elite in Spain is characterized by exclusivity, since party officers are behind the selection in most cases. It is also characterized by its relative centrality, since it is the regional leaders (though to a lesser extent than the national leaders and far ahead of local leaders) who decide who is to be included in the electoral lists and who is not. In this way, one of every three parliamentarians in Congress and the Senate were included in the electoral lists as a result of a direct offer made by a party officer, a figure which rises to one half of the parliamentarians in regional chambers. Contrary to the bylaws of the parties, regional officers make up the main selectorates within the parties, while the rank-and-file members appear to be responsible for the nomination between 1% and 2% of the representatives, percentages which are somewhat higher in the case of the nationalist parties. It is true that this situation appears to be changing rapidly with the incorporation of primaries in some

parties and, especially, with the emergence of new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos, who make inclusive selection a hallmark of the party. Future research will be needed to ascertain whether inclusive practices become consolidated and to analyze their consequences in terms of what Pitkin (1984) called substantive, symbolic and descriptive representation.

Lastly, with respect to the motives underlying the selection of the political elite, a certain tension can be perceived between elements which are more focused on loyalty (which, according to the literature, translates into greater internal cohesion) and elements more focused on professional training (which encourages greater freedom within the group). Party loyalty and dedication appear to be particularly sought after in parties such as PSOE, PP, IU and PNV. With respect to the profile of the parliamentarian, those who do not hold a full university degree and those who have devoted more time to the party are those who believe that their loyalty is the main reason for their inclusion in the electoral list. In contrast, those who are better trained and less bound to the party perceive that their training is the reason for their inclusion.

In accordance with other papers, the most exclusive parliamentary selection processes (as is the case in Spain) produce more cohesive parliamentary groups, which are related to greater stability in the party and in governments (Czudnowski 1975; Hermens 1972; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Bowler et al. 1999; Sieberer 2006; Field 2013; Cordero and Coller 2015). In short, the loyalty and discipline of parliamentarians depends to a large extent on how heterogeneous the selectorate is, that is, those who decide which individuals are to be included in (or who are to be reappointed to) safe positions on the electoral lists. More inclusive mechanisms result in the individuals selected being accountable to a wider electorate which will judge their activity, but when the selection depends on only a few (in the case of Spain, located mainly at regional level), the loyalty of the parliamentarians is oriented more towards those who have selected them (Cordero and Coller 2015).

NOTES

1. Note that, in both this chapter and the rest of the book, the study works with a sample of current, active parliamentarians, and so it does not reflect the perspective of those who, having stood for election, were not elected to any parliamentary chamber, as is the case of the Comparative Candidate Survey (<http://www.comparativecandidates.org/>).

2. Among the contextual factors which affect the individual decision to enter politics, Matthews (1985, p. 34) concluded from several studies that “primary groups—friends, family, acquaintances—and interest groups are important in encouraging candidature”. Among the institutional factors which stand out are the structure of the state and the type of electoral system.
3. See also Norris (1997, p. 100). Siavellis and Morgensen (2008, p. 12) proposed a slightly different model (though based on the work of Norris), focusing on legal and contextual determinants of the selection methods of the political elite.
4. See Marvick (1976), Aberbach et al. (1981), Norris and Lovenduski (1995), Norris (1997). With respect to Spain, see Linz et al. (2000) for members of the Spanish Congress, Coller et al. (2008) for regional parliamentarians, and Galais et al. (2016).
5. On the bias introduced in Spain and its quantification in an index of social disproportion, see Coller (2008) and Coller et al. (2016a). On the degree of internal homogeneity of the parliamentary elite, see Coller and Santana (2009).
6. Defined by Lijphart as the “set of methods for translating the votes of citizens into seats of representatives” (1994, p. 29). The electoral system is composed of the following elements: constituency (or district), candidature, votes, barrier and electoral formula.
7. The seats are distributed in provincial constituencies, except in some regions with a single province and in the island regions.
8. This characteristic is related to the degree of decentralization of selection (Epstein 1967; Hermens 1972; Czudnowski 1975; Matthews 1985; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Carey and Shugart 1995; Hix 2004; Bermúdez and Cordero 2016). The existence of single-member districts propitiates more decentralized selection processes, linked to local levels, while larger districts tend to generate more centralized selection models (Gallagher and Marsh 1988).
9. Though recognizing the power held by the central elites of the parties in the process (Hopkin 2001, p. 353).
10. Law 3/2007, of 22 March, on the effective equality of women and men. This new legal requirement increased the percentage of female candidates, though, in the smaller districts, the “safe positions” on the lists were mainly occupied by men, who were finally elected to the parliaments (Martínez and Calvo 2010).
11. Both parties tried to channel citizens’ discontent with the crisis and had some electoral success in the European and regional elections (2015), and in the national ones (2015 and 2016). They could not be incorporated to the sample of this project.

12. In 2017 the PP has introduced primary elections to select a pool of candidates for the organs of the party to choose among them the leaders of the lists.
13. Among male parliamentarians, 7% applied directly themselves, while only 4% of women access the lists in this way. There are also differences with respect to the level of education. Of the parliamentarians who have secondary education or lower, 10% applied directly themselves, while this percentage is under 5% among those with a university education. Direct application is more common among the parliamentarians of CiU (30%) and ERC (20%) than in other parties (where it is under 10%), as can be seen in Fig. 5.1.
14. 74% among candidates under the age of 37, and 68% among those who have only sat during one legislature, 70% among women. Women parliamentarians have on average spent less time in politics than men (19 years of membership, on average, in comparison with an average of 25 years of men). These differences are statistically significant, at 0.05.
15. The category “taken for granted” refers to those candidates whose inclusion is not due to a selection process or designation for a specific party office, but neither can they be considered self-nominated. This category typically includes parliamentarians whose inclusion in the leading positions on the list was not disputed, given their relevance and their long track record in the party.
16. 17% among men, 15% among over-50s, 26% among those with four or more legislatures in office and 20% among “decision-makers”.
17. The mean number of years of membership in the party of ERC and CiU parliamentarians is the lowest among the more traditional parties (a mean of 21.5 and 22 years, respectively). The mean figures of the PP are also low for parliamentarians (20.7 years), as they are for other recently created groups. The global mean number of years of party membership is 22.4.
18. Obtained by dividing the number of years that the parliamentarian has been a party member by their age.

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Professionalization and Parliamentary Careers

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6.1 INTRODUCTION

The study of political careers in multilevel contexts has frequently focused on the impact of new institutional arenas on representatives' careers. Stolz (2001, 2003) highlighted two different phenomena. First, social differentiation, related to the professionalization of the parliamentary elite as a whole. Second, territorial differentiation, referring to the creation of a new group of regional politicians with political careers distinct from national politicians. Although we will analyse both phenomena, the latter is more consequential for territorial politics. The appearance of a regional elite, distinct from the national elite, could be consequential for the evolution of self-governing institutions. The dynamics of decentralization will be different if regional politicians become a driving force for further regionalization rather than an agent of territorial integration (Stolz 2001).

The USA and Canada are, respectively, examples of integration and bifurcation dynamics. In the USA, the incentives within the political system to pursue ascendant, multilayered careers have promoted the integration of the political elite (Polsby 1968; Ruchelman 1970; Shin and Jackson 1979;

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Pound 1992; Francis and Kenny 2000), a dynamic which also prevails in Germany among the members of *länder* parliaments (Stolz 2003). By contrast, Canadian federalism has weakened the vertical integration of political parties and created differentiated legislative careers (Barrie and Gibbins 1989). However, this distinctive dynamic has not prevented the members of Canadian provincial assemblies from experiencing an increasing professionalization similar to the one experienced by the members of the US state legislatures (Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Moncrief 1994, 1998).

Which of these two trends prevails in the case of Spain: integration or bifurcation? What is the typical path of politicians in Spain's autonomous communities? What is the role of parliamentarians in the autonomous communities? Are they considered a temporary appointment in an ascending path towards Spanish-wide representation, or, on the contrary, are they regarded as an independent route unconnected from Spanish politics? To what extent do parliamentarians at the various government levels exhibit different degrees of professionalism?

In order to answer these questions, we will analyze the profiles, career paths and opinions of Spanish representatives at different territorial levels. Traditionally, studies of parliamentary careers use representatives' censuses to provide a comprehensive description of the career paths across various institution levels (see Coller 2002; Coller et al. 2008, for the case of Spain). In this chapter, we use, instead, sample data. Although the use of a sample prevent us from providing an exhaustive description of the representatives' political careers, it offers two advantages. First, it enables us to interview representatives and enter into the subjective world of opinions and aspirations regarding their political careers and future perspectives. Second, the recent nature of our data allows us to update previous analyses thirty years after the establishment of regional institutions.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, we analyze the representatives' degree of professionalization in the different institutional arenas. Second, we examine their aspirations and the institutional level in which they would prefer to develop their careers. Finally, we describe the representatives' career paths taking into account potential differences based on age, seniority, autonomous community or parliamentary party.

6.2 PROFESSIONALIZATION OF REPRESENTATIVES

The concept of political professionalism is not univocal. It implies different dimensions such as paid employment, exclusive dedication, or the possession of specific skills and knowledge (Uriarte 2000, pp. 111–112). Here we will

examine the representatives' professional background, time dedication, and academic background to assess their degree of professionalization. First, both the lack of previous professional experience and the time devoted to parliamentary activity indicates professionalization: no experience outside politics and full-time dedication to parliamentary functions constitute clear signs of professionalization. Second, given that some professional careers and skills are strongly related to the parliamentary activity—for instance, legal knowledge or the ability to speak for public audiences,—we will also take into account the representatives' academic and professional backgrounds.

In our sample date, more than 90% of the members of parliament (MPs) state that they worked in a profession before becoming a representative, although almost 20% of them did so for fewer than five years. Logically, younger parliamentarians have shorter careers and professional experience out of politics. Indeed, the majority of those who went directly from their formal education to become legislators with no other professional experience, are among the youngest parliamentarians. Nevertheless, the share of parliamentarians with some professional background is too high to find significant differences based on party affiliations or territorial levels.

In terms of time dedication, the dominant pattern is full-time parliamentarians. Only 20% of our respondents combine parliament with other professional pursuits and, among those who combine political and non-political occupations, almost all of them belong to occupations related to teaching or legal activities. Full-time dedication does not only indicate professionalization, but it also drives it: the longer the years spent in parliament, the more difficult is for legislators to resume their previous careers. Indeed, when we ask our MPs which factors hinder their return to their original profession, one out of three recognizes that the need to go through a retraining process to resume their professional careers would constitute an obstacle (see Table 6.1). Full-time dedication, together with the acquisition of skills during the parliamentary tenure which are rarely applied in non-parliamentary occupations, are two factors that hinder the return to non-political occupations and reinforce the trend towards further professionalization among representatives. They may even lead to parliamentary careers being prolonged by necessity rather than choice.

Despite political professionalization being the norm, representatives do not seem comfortable with this situation. When forced to describe their activity as a profession or as a vocation, they overwhelmingly describe it as a vocation.¹ This perception contrasts with a reality in which it is increasingly difficult for politicians to pursue or resume professional careers outside politics. Although convictions and vocation may be what lead

Table 6.1 Perceived difficulties by parliamentarians to resume their original occupations (in %)

	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>Others</i>
Company or organization has disappeared	6	5	5	10	5	9	3
My position no longer exists	5	5	5	5	0	0	9
I would have to retrain significantly	44	37	57	33	42	18	39
It is a job I no longer want to do	3	3	0	0	5	0	6
I am about to retire	8	10	5	0	0	0	12
None	27	32	5	38	42	73	24
Other	8	8	24	14	5	0	6
(<i>N</i>)	(186)	(173)	(21)	(21)	(19)	(11)	(33)

Source: CIS Study 2827

individuals to devote themselves to politics, parliamentary activity often becomes a job, a professional career, and the only possible source of income (Leach 1995, p. 12).

Regarding parliamentarians' original occupations and training, the usual biases emerge. The professions that prevail are solicitors and teachers, and the most common training is in the fields of social sciences and humanities. The over-representation of these professional groups can be explained by two factors. First, the correspondence between those professions and certain skills required in politics and parliament, in particular, rhetorical skills (Weber 2004). Second, more practical aspects such as being better at combining certain professions with political activities and, in particular, the ease with which civil servants return to their original profession in Spain (Uriarte 1997, pp. 266–270). Many of the teaching staff and some of the jurists belong to the civil service. This facilitates their access to (and potential exit from) politics. Unlike other professional groups, those who earn their income from the private sector may see their professional future jeopardized if they go into politics. This latter aspect is so decisive that it has changed the profile of parliamentarians. Throughout the twentieth century, the presence of civil servants has risen continuously at the expense of other professional groups in Spain (Jerez 1997, p. 127).²

Despite this general bias which affects both national and regional parliaments, some professions are more common among certain types of representatives.³ Teachers and scholars are particularly numerous among

Table 6.2 Original occupations by cohort and party (in %)

	<i>Teacher and scholar</i>	<i>Lawyer and jurist</i>	<i>Natural humanities professional</i>	<i>Natural sciences professional</i>	<i>Business management and public administration</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>(N)</i>
Cohort							
Born 1958 or earlier	30	10	17	22	8	12	(253)
Born 1959–1973	17	24	27	12	9	11	(219)
Born 1974 or later	10	20	38	4	8	20	(50)
Party							
PP	25	20	19	15	12	9	(213)
PSOE	11	22	15	30	6	16	(196)
IU	14	27	9	32	0	18	(22)
PNV	14	52	0	10	19	5	(21)
CiU	11	37	26	16	11	0	(19)
ERC	9	27	9	45	9	0	(11)
Others	10	23	20	25	5	18	(40)

Source: CIS Study 2827

older parliamentarians, but less frequent among the youngest group. A generational factor and an institutional factor may explain this difference. First, the fact that both school attendance and university access expanded several decades ago, may explain the concentration of educators among the oldest generation (see Table 6.2). Second, the aforementioned fact that teachers and scholars belong predominantly to the civil service facilitates long political careers, which contributes to their prevalence among senior representatives. In terms of age, the other significant difference is the growing weight among young parliamentarians of professionals and experts from the social sciences and humanities at the expense of those who are linked professionally to the field of natural sciences. This difference would suggest an increasing degree of specialization in the training of those with a political vocation.

Depending on the parliamentary party, some differences are also observed (see Table 6.2). Teachers and scholars are more frequent among left-leaning parliamentarians, accounting for a third of PSOE and IU members, and five of the 12 members that ERC had in the Catalan

parliament. By contrast, educators are less common among right-leaning parliamentarians in favor of law (PP) and social sciences professionals (CiU and PNV).

6.3 POLITICAL AMBITIONS AT THE VARIOUS TERRITORIAL LEVELS

One of the fundamental characteristics of political careers is that tenure depends on two factors exclusive to the political profession: being selected to stand as a candidate by a party and being elected for office by voters. Unlike other occupations where the skills or the expertise in performing the task are the determining factors for keeping the position, these factors are subordinated in a representative's career to the double election of party and electorate.⁴ This may result in parliamentarians holding positions they do not wish or for which they lack the appropriate experience or skill set.

When asked this question, the most answer from our respondents is that they prefer their current position to any other representative position: more than 33% of the members in any of the regional parliaments and 45% of the members of the Spanish parliament state that they hold their preferred position. However, there are some noteworthy differences between different parliaments (see Table 6.3). On the one hand, parliamentarians from autonomous communities with nationalist parties are less interested

Table 6.3 Position that the representative would like to hold by institution (in %)

	<i>Andalusia</i>	<i>Catalonia</i>	<i>Galicia</i>	<i>Basque Country</i>	<i>Other autonomous communities</i>	<i>Spanish parliament</i>
Regional chamber	37	38	45	49	39	6
Congress	15	2	2	7	13	31
Senator	2	2	5	5	2	17
Councilman	12	7	5	2	10	11
Mayor	32	38	38	28	29	30
European MP	3	12	5	9	8	5
(N)	(60)	(42)	(42)	(43)	(253)	(126)

Source: CIS Study 2827

in moving from the autonomous parliament to the Spanish houses of parliament. Members of the Catalan parliament are particularly reluctant to move. On the other hand, Basque and Galician parliamentarians are particularly satisfied with their position, showing a slightly higher correspondence between the position they hold and their preferred one.

Among those representatives who would like to continue their political career in another arena there is a clear preference: local politics and, in particular, becoming their hometown's mayor. Around 30–40% of parliamentarians express the desire to become either a councilman and the mayor of their home municipality. In short, given the dilemma of moving to a higher territorial arena such as the European Parliament, or moving towards a more proximate local politics, the parliamentarians who are willing to move choose overwhelmingly the latter.

Finally, when we ask representatives which destination they would prefer in ten years' time, the preferred option is, by far, withdrawing from active politics (see Table 6.4). Naturally, this option is particularly common among older parliamentarians. Among the other alternatives, moving to an executive body—either the regional or the Spanish government—or becoming a mayor are particularly frequent responses. Finally, the low numbers of those who choose the European Parliament as their future destination show again the limited interest of Spanish representatives in moving to European politics.⁵

Table 6.4 Desired future in ten years' time by party (in %)

	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>Others</i>
Retired from politics	40	53	68	48	45	75	74
Councilor or mayor	13	10	9	14	5	17	5
Member of autonomous parliament	7	9	0	14	10	0	5
Member of autonomous government	13	12	9	14	30	8	16
Member of Spanish parliament	15	7	0	0	10	0	0
Member of European Parliament	3	4	0	10	0	0	0
Member of Spanish government (<i>N</i>)	8 (235)	6 (214)	14 (22)	0 (21)	0 (20)	0 (12)	0 (43)

Source: CIS, Study 2827

6.4 CAREER PATHS BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY ARENAS

To gain greater insight into parliamentary career paths across different arenas, we can look at the political trajectories of representatives that had previous political experience in other territorial levels—local, regional, Spanish and European—by legislative body.

Breaking down these data by the institution of origin, it becomes evident that a majority of parliamentarians, both from the autonomous parliaments and the Spanish parliament, come from the local sphere. Around two-thirds of the MPs have experience as councilmen and/or mayors of their municipalities. This shows that the local arena is strongly integrated into the representatives' careers, often as an entry point for posts in higher territorial areas. Such integration should facilitate the connection between municipal administration and legislative bodies and the incorporation of local government needs in legislation.

By contrast, the percentage of representatives with experience in the European Parliament is marginal. This shows that the European Parliament is not a usual entry point for a political career. The limited number of positions—54 seats elected every five years—constitutes a significant limitation. It also suggests that the European Parliament is rather a terminus than a starting point in representatives' careers.

While the autonomous parliaments and the Spanish parliament share traits such as the presence of politicians with municipal experience and the lack of representatives with a European background, they differ significantly in the direction of transfers between the two arenas. Almost 40% of the Spanish parliament members come from an autonomous parliament, whereas only 9% of the latter have previously been members of the former. This difference indicates that the Spanish multilevel system has a hierarchical structure in terms of career paths. The autonomous arena is often the entry point towards Spanish politics, whereas the transition from the Spanish parliament to the autonomous parliaments is far less frequent. Therefore, the autonomous parliaments do not appear as an attractive possibility for most of the members of the Spanish parliament who seem to envisage the Congress and the Senate as destination points in their careers as representatives.

6.5 PARLIAMENTARY CAREER PATHS IN THE DIFFERENT AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES

The nature of our data allows us to go further and analyze the factors behind the different career paths. First, we want to know if the trend of intense movement from the regional arena to the Spanish arena is repeated

Table 6.5 Prior political experience of autonomous parliamentarians by parliament, party, cohort and seniority (multiple-choice) (in %)

	<i>They have been members of the Congress/Senate</i>	<i>They have been elected officials at the local level</i>	(N)
Parliament			
Andalusian	13	75	(60)
Catalan	7	58	(43)
Galician	7	72	(43)
Basque	2	59	(44)
Other autonomous parliaments	11	66	(257)
Party			
PP-UPN	12	74	(242)
PSOE	9	65	(218)
IU	11	26	(23)
CiU	0	71	(21)
ERC	0	33	(12)
PNV	0	59	(21)
Others	6	58	(43)
Cohort			
Born in 1958 or before	12	70	(188)
Born between 1959 and 1973	9	66	(200)
Born in 1974 or after	2	56	(57)
Seniority			
1 Term	9	64	(183)
2 Terms	6	68	(141)
3 Terms	13	67	(72)
4 Terms or more	16	69	(51)

Source: CIS Study 2827

across all autonomous parliaments. One would expect the autonomous parliament being more frequently a destination rather than a transit point in those autonomies with distinctive party systems. It could be that in these territories the autonomous parliament is more disconnected from the Spanish parliament and few representatives transition from the former to the latter.

Table 6.5 distinguishes the fast-track autonomous communities from the rest.⁶ It shows some interesting differences. First, the percentage of autonomous parliamentarians with experience in the Spanish parliament is the lowest in the so-called historic communities: Catalonia, Galicia,

and the Basque Country. Thus, while autonomous parliaments are rarely the destination of former members of the Spanish parliament, this career path is even less common in autonomous communities where strong nationalist parties exist. In these territories, autonomous parliaments do not seem to be perceived as the culmination of a political career, but as a different arena in which to pursue alternative career paths. Bifurcation rather than integration is the dominant pattern in these autonomous communities.

We could expect to find the same pattern among the Spanish MPs elected in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. As a reflection of the low number of members of the Spanish parliament in autonomous parliaments where significant nationalist parties exist, we could also expect a low number of former autonomous legislators among the representatives elected to the Spanish parliament in the so-called historic communities. It would be an additional sign of bifurcation.

The data appear to be pointing in this direction although the small size of some sub-samples forces us to be cautious (see Table 6.6). While among the other autonomous communities the members of the Spanish parliament who come from autonomous parliaments reach the 60% mark, in parliaments with a significant presence of nationalist parties the figure is lower. The presence of former autonomous parliamentarians is particularly low among representatives from Galicia and the Basque Country: only 38% of the members of the Spanish Congress and the Senate elected in these territories have previously been members of the Galician or the Basque parliament.

Thus, we have observed a clear hierarchical structure in the Spanish system of multilevel representation. While the local sphere is a common starting point for politicians who move from local politics to legislative bodies, the transfer of representatives between the autonomous parliaments and the Spanish parliament tends to take an upward direction. However, in autonomous communities where specific party systems exist a bifurcation pattern is more prominent, so the upward movement from the autonomous parliament to the Spanish parliament is much less fluid.

6.6 CAREER PATHS BY POLITICAL PARTIES

One of the reasons behind the distinct pattern observed in the historic communities could be related to the career paths of nationalist party members. Nationalist parties tend to consider the autonomous parliament as

Table 6.6 Previous political experience of Spanish parliament members by autonomous community, party, cohort and seniority (multiple-choice) (in %)

	<i>They have been members of an autonomous parliament</i>	<i>They have been elected officials at local level</i>	(N)
Autonomous community			
Andalusia	44	45	(18)
Catalonia	55	53	(29)
Galicia	38	43	(8)
Basque Country	38	33	(8)
Other	60	44	(70)
Party			
PP-UPN	37	65	(54)
PSOE	27	69	(51)
IU	75	75	(4)
CiU	71	86	(7)
ERC	17	67	(6)
PNV	25	50	(4)
Others	71	57	(7)
Cohort			
Born in 1958 or before	48	65	(81)
Born between 1959 and 1973	21	72	(39)
Born in 1974 or after	9	55	(11)
Seniority			
1 Term	29	71	(55)
2 Terms	37	71	(41)
3 Terms	44	61	(18)
4 Terms or more	53	53	(19)

Source: CIS Study 2827

the most relevant legislative body and the focus of their political action. This contrasts with state wide parties which tend to consider the Spanish parliament as their main arena. This distinct priorities could be reflected in different career paths.

On the one hand, we could expect that fewer members have legislative experience at both the autonomous and the Spanish parliament in the case of nationalist parties. Nationalist parties only contest a few constituencies in the general elections and tend to obtain worst results in general elections than in regional elections. Therefore, they have few positions to fill in general elections, which creates few opportunities for transfer from the

most accessible autonomous parliament to the Spanish parliament. However, there is also the possibility that two alternative dynamics stimulate a higher number of transfers between territorial levels among nationalist parties. First, downward flows from the Spanish parliament to the autonomous parliament is not a demotion in a nationalist party career, which could facilitate this kind of trajectory. Second, the short number of positions they have to fill in general elections could produce that they look for experienced representatives and select them from their large pool of regional parliamentarians, stimulating upward trajectories.

To assess the importance of these opposite dynamics, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide evidence of the dominant career paths among representatives from nationalist parties. Table 6.5 shows that the downward mobility from the Spanish houses of parliament to an autonomous parliament is far less common among members of nationalist parties. Regarding the opposite path, Table 6.6 show inconclusive clear evidence: while there are significant transfers from the autonomous parliament to the Spanish parliament in the case of CiU, other nationalist parties show fewer upward transfers than statewide parties. In addition, the evidence on nationalist parties is based on very few observations and, therefore, no definitive conclusion can be drawn on their ascending career paths.

Despite the limitation of our data, the available evidence points to a greater disconnection between legislative bodies in the case of nationalist parties. However, the evidence does not support the alternative hierarchy in which being a member of the Spanish parliament is for a nationalist parliamentarian a starting point towards the culmination of his or her political career in the autonomous parliament. Bifurcation seems to be the pattern.

6.7 WHO IS MOVING? CAREER PATHS BY AGE AND SENIORITY

Given the lack of longitudinal data, we can only gain insight on how political trajectories might have changed over time by distinguishing the career paths of parliamentarians according to their age and seniority. In the Spanish legislative bodies, we find both representatives that started their careers with a fully developed State of the Autonomies and parliamentarians who began their careers at the founding period of the autonomous communities. It is possible that the career patterns of these two groups of

parliamentarians differ because they developed under different institutional contexts. It is true that young parliamentarians had fewer opportunities to occupy different representative positions than older representatives, but part of the differences may also be due to the transformation of the Spanish political system over the past decades.

The role of autonomous parliaments as an intermediate step in the path towards the Spanish parliament seems to have weakened over time. Table 6.6 shows that almost half of the members born before 1958 have gone through some autonomous parliament before being a member of the Spanish parliament, but the figure decreases to 21% for the intermediate generation and to 9% for those who were born after the dictatorship. By contrast, there is no similar downward trend in previous experience in local politics. Table 6.6 shows that there are no generational differences among Spanish MPs regarding their experience as representatives of local institutions, which contrasts with the striking differences regarding their experience as autonomous parliamentarians. This suggests that upward careers from autonomous parliaments to Spanish parliament are less frequent now.

More pronounced is the opposite trend: members of the autonomous parliaments with prior experience in the Spanish houses of parliament account for 12% of those born before 1958, 9% of those born between 1959 and 1973, and barely 2% among the youngest cohort (see Table 6.5). Again, regarding local politics experience, differences are also observed but less pronounced. It seems that among the youngest generations of parliamentarians there is a tendency of separating the autonomous parliament and the Spanish parliament career. Bifurcation seems also more prevalent among the youngest parliamentarians.

The same pattern is evident if we focus on representatives' seniority. Table 6.6 shows that just 30% of the new members of the Spanish parliament come from an autonomous parliament, while this figure increases to 53% among those who have been in the position during four or more terms. By contrast, local experience does not follow the same trend: it is far more common that members with less experience come from the municipal world (71%) than senior members (53%). This difference suggests again that there is a greater disconnection in the legislative careers of the less experienced parliamentarians. However, this disconnection does not include the local level which continues to be an important gateway to politics—which may even have gained importance over time.

In the case of members of autonomous parliaments, the trend is similar: it is less common for the newest members to have passed through the Congress or the Senate than for the more senior members (see Table 6.5). However, no significant differences appear between generations regarding their tenure in the municipal institutions. Once again, the evidence collected suggests a growing bifurcation between an autonomous legislative career and a Spanish legislative one.

The lack of longitudinal data compels us to exclude firm conclusions about possible changes in career paths over time. However, the changes in the connection between the regional and the Spanish spheres reinforces the previous evidence that something has indeed changed in the representatives' career paths. The evidence suggests that the autonomous arena is either held in higher esteem among representatives than in the past or, that it does not constitute the entry point to politics that used to be in the first stages of the state of autonomies.

6.8 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have analyzed the extent to which Spanish political representatives combine their political activity with other professional activities, their future aspirations, and the career paths they have followed across territorial levels.

Regarding professionalization, the evidence shows that the majority of parliamentarians in Spain are full-time representatives, regardless of the institution they represent. Among the members of the different parliaments, traditional professions such as jurists predominate, although our data confirm the growing presence of civil servants in legislative bodies detected in previous studies. The representatives' satisfaction with their job is also quite spread: only a small number of representatives would be willing to move to another representative position. Among those who would like to move, preferences are very clear: going back to local politics and hold the position of mayor in their municipalities.

The career paths of representatives are important because they condition the evolution of institutions. We could expect a different development of the state of autonomies if the representatives' careers follow a path of ascending integration instead of territorial specialization. In fact, the question of territorial differentiation has a wider impact on the political

system as a whole, affecting also to the internal organization of parties and the integration of elites (Botella et al. 2011).

We have identified some trends. First, the local arena constitutes the starting point for political careers both of members of autonomous parliaments and members of the Spanish Congress and Senate. Second, ascending careers predominate: there is a substantial number of legislators who were representatives in an autonomous parliament before being a member of the Spanish parliament. However, we must introduce two qualifiers to territorial integration dynamics. On the one hand, upward careers are much less frequent in territories where distinct party systems exist. In these contexts, low integration between parliaments predominates. On the other hand, we have observed that the move from the autonomous parliament to the Spanish parliament is less frequent among the youngest parliamentarians, which could indicate that the institutionalization of the autonomous communities' regime has translated into less integrated political careers.

NOTES

1. 538 out of 564 interviewed parliamentarians stated that they consider being a politician a vocation. Only 26 representatives describe their activity as a profession.
2. A factor related to this has already been mentioned: the specialization required to develop parliamentary functions is usually not useful in professional life. The parliamentarian who returns to his or her original profession can rarely perform professional activities in which parliamentary experience constitutes a valuable skill (Botella 1997).
3. There are no differences between members of the autonomous and members of the Spanish parliament. The distribution of professions is very similar in both types of legislative bodies.
4. See Chapter 5 "Recruitment and Selection".
5. See Chapter 15 "Parliaments and the European Union".
6. Fast-track autonomous communities obtained full autonomy since their establishment, while slow-track communities had to wait a minimum of five years after their establishment to obtain full autonomy. Among the former, we find the so-called historic communities (that is, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, which enjoyed autonomy during the Second Spanish Republic), and Andalusia, that accessed full autonomy after a referendum on the issue.

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Parliamentary Groups and Institutional Context

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7.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND PARTY DISCIPLINE

Spanish political parties are characterized by a high level of coherence, “defined as the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior of party members” (Janda 1980, p. 118). This organizational coherence is analyzed in terms of cohesion and factionalism. On the one hand, cohesion is related to the degree to which parties vote in unison in the legislative bodies (Maor 1997, p. 135). It is what is commonly known as party discipline.¹ On the other hand, factionalism refers to any group within the party whose members share an identity and common ideas and who coordinate among themselves to act collectively as a different block within the party (Zariski 1960, p. 33).

The Spanish case is a clear example of a party system characterized by high cohesion or party discipline, and a very reduced, almost non-existent, level of factionalism, at least as far as the parliamentary sphere is concerned. Many theoretical arguments have been put forward to explain the presence

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of united political parties in a specific context. For example, according to Duverger (1964), the more centralized a party, the greater its tendency to the left, and the more extreme its ideology, the greater the parliamentary cohesion. Other authors (Maor 1997, p. 137) have related parliamentary cohesion to the strength of the party in terms of territorial implementation and organization. Thus, parties with a wide mass of members present more united parliamentary groups, while the organizational weakness of the party coincides with low cohesion in the parliament. Lastly, from an organizational and systemic stance, authors such as Epstein (1980) have considered that the separation of powers typical of presidential systems is a key variable when explaining the low cohesion in the USA compared to other countries. In fact, apart from exceptions in which voting is done in blocks, and about which many theories have been put forward (Eguia 2011), North American representatives tend to act independently. This situation has also been explained paying heed to the way in which representatives are elected. Thus, since the end of the 1970s, Fenno (1978) has indicated that the election of members of parliament (MPs) in single member districts is a key variable in explaining their independence from party leaders and, therefore, the low parliamentary discipline. This line of argument has also been used by Sánchez de Dios (1996, 1999, 2005) to support the existence of high party discipline in the Spanish case.

Following this claim, this chapter maintains that the high parliamentary discipline in Spain stems precisely from the existing proportional electoral system based on closed and blocked lists in every chamber—except the Senate, which is selected via a majoritarian limited vote and open lists. Furthermore, despite such differences, there are important reasons to consider that the motives that should lead to high parliamentary discipline in the rest of the representative chambers are also applicable to the Senate. Firstly, the fact that candidates for the Senate stand in the elections under the name of a party and following an internal selection process, where the party itself has the last word. Secondly, the existence of multimember districts (where different candidates are affiliated to political parties) means that the link established between voters and representatives is much weaker than in single member districts in which a majority electoral system is applied. In addition to this, there is low visibility in the Senate (compared to Congress) and voters have little knowledge about individual candidates. All of these factors mean that, in elections for the Senate, voters vote massively for candidates within a party list—generally, the same party as in

Congress (Sánchez de Dios 2005, p. 233)—and that, therefore, the accountability of representatives is more directed towards the party than towards the voters—even more so since not all the senators are elected by direct vote; some are appointed by the legislative bodies of the autonomous communities, maintaining the proportionality of party representation in the chamber.

In general, the electoral system determines two main aspects (Sartori 1994, p. 3). On the one hand, the way in which the votes are translated into seats, whether by majority, or proportionally. On the other hand, the relationship between the citizens and the candidates both at the time of voting, and during the actual term of office, once the parliamentary representative has been elected. This is because, depending on the type of electoral system involved, the voters either choose a specific candidate from the district (majority systems with single member districts), or a list of candidates proposed by the party to which they belong (proportional systems with multimember districts). That is to say, the type of electoral system determines the greater or lesser interference of the political parties in the selection of candidates and, therefore, the greater or lesser level of dependence of the representatives elected as regards the political parties under whose name they ran in the elections.

Thus, while majority electoral systems based on personal candidatures discourage party discipline in the parliament, since the selection of candidates does not depend as much on party leaders as on the actual competence and ability of the politician in question, the same does not occur in the case of proportional electoral systems. In these, especially if they are based on closed and blocked lists, party discipline is encouraged, since the MPs themselves are encouraged to follow the guidelines of their respective parties with a view to promoting their future inclusion in the lists, and, therefore, ensure their future access to the parliament (Caballero 2006, 2007; Kam 2009). This is because, in general, in such proportional systems, the lists of candidates who will run in the elections are selected in a centralized way from within the party itself.² As such, it comes as no surprise that, while majority systems in single member districts encourage representatives' accountability towards the electorate, in the case of proportional systems with closed and blocked lists, the MPs' accountability is directed to a greater extent towards the party than towards their own voters (Sartori 1994; Jaime and Martínez-Cousinou 2013, p. 101).

7.2 PARTY DISCIPLINE IN ACTION

In the Spanish case, the ownership of the seat belongs legally to the representative, and under no circumstances to the party sustaining them, since the Spanish Constitution expressly prohibits the imperative mandate in art. 67. However, in practice, deputies are elected in closed and blocked lists through an electoral system in which it is impossible for voters to reward or punish specific representatives with their vote. Apart from the case of the Senate, where voters choose specific candidates, in the rest of elections in Spain voters only have the possibility to reward or punish the party as a whole, voting or not for the closed and blocked list of candidates previously selected by the party.

This generates a situation according to which representatives serve the interests of the party which they join, meaning that the relevant political actor in the Spanish parliamentary system is not the individual MP, but the political group (Sánchez de Dios 1996, 1999; Caballero 2007). Therefore, although legally the seat belongs to the MP, in practice it is understood that the movement of a seat between groups contradicts the underlying structure of property rights. This has led to what is known as *transfuguismo* (party defection) becoming the subject of criticism in the political sphere, although in the legal sphere, there are judgments in the Constitutional Court that declare as unconstitutional any attempt at limiting this.³

What do the MPs think about the property rights concerning the seat? Do their opinions differ greatly from those of citizens concerning this matter? As can be observed in Table 7.1, both citizens (93%) and representatives (96%) agree that a MP who decides to leave their party should also give up his/her seat to another candidate from the same political group through which he/she had been elected. That is to say, both MPs and citizens reject party defection and tend to put the party (represented by the parliamentary group) above the individual representatives, despite these being legally owners of the seat.

However, certain differences can be observed between political parties and legislative chambers. The representatives of major parties (PP and PSOE) support their parties' property right to the seat to a greater extent than minority parties (IU and other small parties). On the other hand, representatives of the Congress and the Senate, as well as those from the Parliament of Andalusia and Catalonia, compared to other regional representatives, display a lower tolerance to party defection and a greater

Table 7.1 What a MP who leaves her group must do, per party and chamber (in %)

	<i>Keep the seat</i>	<i>Give up the seat</i>	<i>Total</i>
Citizens according to vote choice			
Did not vote	8	92	100 (377)
PP	8	92	100 (581)
PSOE	6	94	100 (463)
IU	8	92	100 (148)
Other parties	9	91	100 (268)
Blank	1	99	100 (70)
Total	7	93	100 (1,907)
Representatives per party			
PP	3	97	100 (246)
PSOE	3	97	100 (230)
IU	6	94	100 (16)
Other parties	9	91	100 (74)
Representatives per parliament			
Congress and Senate	2	98	100 (191)
Andalusia	2	98	100 (51)
Catalonia	3	97	100 (35)
Galicia	6	94	100 (36)
Basque Country	5	95	100 (38)
Other parliaments	6	94	100 (215)
Total	4	96	100 (566)

Source: CIS study 2827 and 2930

adhesion to giving up the seat should the MP decide to leave their party. The opinion of citizens regarding the subject of property rights to the seat is consistent with that of representatives. More than 90% of voters of all parties state that a MP who decides to leave their group should give up their seat to another candidate from the party on whose lists they were elected.

Another important question related to party discipline is how conflicts between individual representatives and the group to which they belong are resolved. To answer this question, MPs were asked how they should act should they disagree with their party over a specific topic on the parliamentary agenda, providing them with a range of answers in accordance with the distinction proposed by Hirshman (1970) between loyalty, voice and exit. Following this approach, when a situation of discrepancy arises between an MP and their party, the MP can act in three different manners.

Firstly, they can remain loyal to the party, disregarding their own beliefs (loyalty). Secondly, they can express their own opinion within the parliamentary group, although, in the end, they will have to comply with party discipline when voting (voice). And, thirdly, they can ignore the guidelines defined by their group (exit). This can occur in two different ways, either through abstention, which would be the most moderate form of exit, or by ignoring party discipline and voting according to one's own beliefs, which would be the more extreme exit option.

As shown in Table 7.2, the majority of the representatives interviewed stand in favor of the option "voice" (83%), with the two manifestations of the "exit" option (abstain and ignore party discipline) receiving least support in all the parties. However, there are important differences between political parties and parliaments. PSOE MPs to a greater extent stand in favor of party discipline, with 13% of MPs supporting the "loyalty" option and only 2% who, in the event of any disagreement, consider that the MP should abstain or ignore the guidelines defined by their group. IU MPs also support the "voice" option, in their majority, but with a lower percentage (75%), with 13% of them supporting the more extreme "exit" option (ignore party discipline) and a reduced 6% who consider that, in

Table 7.2 What should MPs do if they disagree with the parliament group, per party and parliament (in %)

	<i>Vote with their party</i>	<i>State their opinion but accept discipline</i>	<i>Abstain</i>	<i>Ignore discipline and vote independently</i>	<i>Total</i>
Party					
PP	10	83	4	3	100 (241)
PSOE	13	83	2	2	100 (237)
IU	6	75	6	13	100 (16)
Other parties	12	80	1	7	100 (75)
Parliament					
Congress and Senate	9	84	4	3	100 (193)
Andalusia	10	84	0	6	100 (49)
Catalonia	0	86	3	11	100 (35)
Galicia	6	94	0	0	100 (36)
Basque Country	29	68	0	3	100 (38)
Other chambers	13	81	4	2	100 (218)
Total	11	83	3	3	100 (569)

Source: CIS Study 2827

any event, the MP should always vote following the guidelines defined by their party.

Relevant differences can also be observed between answers from MPs depending on the parliament in question. On the one hand, representatives of the Parliament of the Basque Country are, by far, those who most support the option “loyalty” (29%), compared to representatives of the Parliament of Catalonia, who under no circumstances consider this option. On the contrary, a higher percentage of Catalan MPs support the more extreme “exit” option (11%), that is to say, ignoring party discipline and voting independently. This option is not considered in any of its versions (abstain and ignore party discipline) by representatives of the Parliament of Galicia, who most support party discipline, either stating their opinion previously (94%), or voting according to the party guidelines (6%).

A specific case of conflict between the MP and the group can arise when the party’s interests collide with those of the district or autonomous community through which the MP was elected. Citizens and representatives show diverging opinions on this matter. As can be observed in Table 7.3, while the former consider in their majority that, in the context of a conflict, the interests of the province or community must be prioritized (62%), the representatives interviewed defend as the main option trying to influence and moderate the position of their party as regards the topic in question (77%). That is to say, although only a very low percentage of citizens (10%) and representatives (6%) defend party discipline through-and-through, the representatives mainly refuse to stand in the way of the interests of the party to which they belong, even when these come into conflict with those of their district or autonomous community. Citizens, on the contrary, mainly understand that their representatives should place the district’s interests above any other consideration, with much fewer of them (28%) defending more conciliatory or intermediary stances.

Despite the option of trying to influence and moderate the party’s stance being in the majority in all the groups, if the data are analyzed per political party and chamber, it can be observed that representatives of IU (12%) and deputies from the Parliament of Andalusia (14%) defend party discipline in the event of a conflict of interests more than others. On the contrary, deputies from “other parties” (34%) and those from the Parliament of Catalonia (30%) are most in favor of prioritizing the interests of the district above those of their party.

Table 7.3 What to do in the event of a conflict of interest between the parliamentary group and that of the district (in %)

	<i>Give priority to the interests of their province or community</i>	<i>Follow the guidelines defined by the team</i>	<i>Try to influence and moderate the party's stance</i>	<i>Total</i>
Citizens according to memory of vote				
Did not vote	65	7	28	100 (401)
PP	60	11	29	100 (591)
PSOE	61	11	28	100 (479)
IU	61	10	29	100 (152)
Other parties	65	8	27	100 (278)
Blank	65	6	29	100 (72)
Total	62	10	28	100 (1,973)
Representatives per party				
PP	18	7	75	100 (230)
PSOE	12	6	82	100 (230)
IU	12	12	76	100 (17)
Other parties	34	3	63	100 (73)
Representatives per chamber				
Congress and Senate	13	4	83	100 (182)
Andalusia	14	14	71	100 (49)
Catalonia	30	0	70	100 (37)
Galicia	14	6	80	100 (35)
Basque Country	9	9	83	100 (35)
Other parliaments	21	6	73	100 (212)
Total	18	6	77	100 (550)

Source: CIS study 2827 and 2930

The opinions expressed by the MPs themselves confirm that, both standardly and de facto, MPs support and contribute in general to the maintenance of a high parliamentary discipline system. They only soften this stance, from a normative point of view, when the interests of their party contradict those of the district through which they were elected. In this case, they understand that the best option is to mediate so that the party moderates its stance in this respect—an option that is not supported by the citizens who mainly think that such conflicts should be resolved in favor of the interests of the district through which the representatives were elected. It is here that citizens believe the limit of party discipline should be placed, despite them mainly thinking, like the representatives, that the seat belongs to the party, rather than to the individual MP.

7.3 DECISION-MAKING

The high level of party discipline analyzed in the previous section should be reflected in decision-making processes, as well as in other spheres. Therefore, it is important to ask whether party discipline translates into an internal hierarchy within the parliamentary group as would be expected or, on the contrary, whether decisions are made horizontally.

According to the data appearing in Table 7.4, there is a divided opinion among those representatives who think that decisions should be made on the basis of general discussion and that, therefore, the internal functioning of the groups is horizontal (52%), and those who believe that decision-making is hierarchical and non-inclusive. Within this latter group, on the one hand, there are those who think that a small number of individuals make decisions, and then communicate them to the rest (24%) and, on the other hand, those who state that a few individuals consult other members of the parliamentary group and then decide (24%).

Important differences can be observed according to political party, in such a way that while only half of the members of the PP and PSOE state that in their group decisions are made following a general discussion, in the case of the IU and the other groups, the percentage rises to 88% and 60%, respectively. That is to say, more representatives of the IU perceive

Table 7.4 How decisions are made per party and parliament (in %)

	<i>General discussion</i>	<i>A small group make decisions</i>	<i>A small group asks for advice</i>	<i>Total</i>
Party				
PP	50	23	27	100 (233)
PSOE	50	30	20	100 (238)
IU	88	6	6	100(16)
Other parties	60	12	28	100 (74)
Parliament				
Congress and Senate	38	28	34	100 (186)
Andalusia	68	12	20	100 (52)
Catalonia	59	22	19	100 (36)
Galicia	83	9	8	100 (36)
Basque Country	53	14	33	100 (36)
Other parliaments	55	29	16	100 (215)
Total	52	24	24	100 (561)

Source: CIS study 2827

that their group operates horizontally than the other parties. On the contrary, representatives of the PSOE perceive that their parliamentary group functions in a hierarchical manner, with 30% stating that a few individuals make the decisions and then communicate them to the other party members; a figure which in the case of the PP is 23%.

If the data are analyzed by parliament, notable differences can also be observed. On the one hand, representatives of the Parliament of Galicia (83%) perceive more than others that decisions in parliamentary groups are made following a general discussion. On the contrary, MPs of the Congress and the Senate perceive the internal functioning of parliamentary groups to be more hierarchical. As a whole, these data indicate that there is a relation between the size of the parliamentary group and the degree of internal democracy in decision-making. In general, in smaller parliamentary groups (minority parties and regional parliaments that are notably smaller than the Congress and the Senate) it appears that the decision-making process is more horizontal than in large parliamentary groups that have a more hierarchical structure. However, it cannot be concluded that there are differences between the parties on the basis of their ideological orientation.

Although the perception MPs have of the decision-making process provides a general perspective of the internal organization of the parliamentary groups, it is also important to know the degree of influence that each individual representative has in said decision-making process. For this reason, MPs were asked to what extent they consider that an ordinary deputy, without a position in the group, has autonomy to make decisions on a parliamentary committee.

According to the data shown in Table 7.5, the majority of those interviewed (41%) believe that ordinary deputies have autonomy but it is advisable to consult with group leaders before making decisions, and only a minority (4%) consider that representatives are totally autonomous when making decisions. In the case of IU deputies, and the rest of the groups considered (except the PP and PSOE), the majority opinion is that the representatives have autonomy although there are some general guidelines that must be adhered to (47% and 45% respectively). Likewise, in the IU and the other minority groups, there is a higher percentage than in the case of the PSOE and the PP of individuals interviewed who consider that, in general, MPs are completely autonomous when making decisions. In fact, lesser autonomy among deputies in decision-making and greater subordination of these to group leaders is observed in the two major

Table 7.5 Autonomy of deputies per party and parliament (in %)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Total
Party						
PP	5	29	43	13	10	100 (236)
PSOE	1	28	44	17	8	100 (236)
IU	12	47	23	12	6	100 (17)
Other parties	11	45	30	9	5	100 (74)
Parliament						
Congress and Senate	2	22	43	21	12	100 (184)
Andalusia	8	38	40	12	2	100 (52)
Catalonia	6	42	30	19	3	100 (36)
Galicia	3	38	46	11	2	100 (37)
Basque Country	10	37	50	0	3	100 (38)
Other parliaments	4	33	39	13	11	100 (216)
Total	4	31	41	15	9	100 (563)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: (1) Generally they are totally autonomous, (2) They have autonomy although there are general guidelines to which they must adhere, (3) They have autonomy but it is advisable to consult with group leaders before making decisions, (4) They have little autonomy because they are usually told the group's stance, (5) Generally they do not have autonomy

parties. Likewise, deputies from the Parliament of the Basque Country believe to a greater extent than other MPs (10%) that, in general, there is total autonomy in decision-making. On the contrary, in the Congress and the Senate it is perceived that ordinary deputies have less of an influential capacity. In fact, 21% consider that they have little autonomy because the group's stance is usually already stated, and 12% perceive that generally they have no autonomy.

In short, there is divided opinion among those representatives who perceive the decision-making process as more horizontal, and those who think it is directed by a few members of the parliamentary group. Despite these initial divergences, MPs recognize that the autonomy of ordinary deputies when making decisions in the parliamentary group is limited. The data also suggest that, although there is high parliamentary discipline in all the parties (as could be observed in the previous section), differences can be observed between parliamentary groups in the decision-making process because of structural rather than ideological characteristics. Specifically, smaller parliamentary groups also have a more horizontal functioning than large groups, where decisions are made in a more hierarchical and centralized way. A possible explanation for this is that larger

groups need a more developed formal structure to manage the parliamentary work efficiently.

7.4 THE LEADERSHIP OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

In the first part of this chapter, it was stated that parliamentary groups operate with high party discipline, while the decision-making process is more or less horizontal depending on the size of the parliamentary group. According to the analysis in the previous section, representatives tend to perceive that they have an intermediate to high influence on the decisions made in parliamentary groups. However, this general perspective conceals important variations in the individual capacity for influence within each group, since all the parliamentary groups have prominent figures who hold leadership positions compared to the other members in the group. Therefore, this section focuses on the characteristics of those holding positions of leadership in the parliamentary groups; in other words, the factors explaining the different degree of influence of each individual MP on the decisions made in groups is analyzed.

Theoretically at least, it is important to think that there are different alternatives when establishing the leadership criteria in a parliamentary group. A first possibility is that positions of leadership are obtained as a result of the power in the political party. A second possibility is that leadership is reached through parliamentary experience. That is to say, as MPs serve more terms in parliament, they gain access to positions with a greater influence within the group as a result of their greater experience of the legislative tasks. A last possibility is that the degree of influence in the parliamentary group is the product not so much of their political qualities but of the previous professional baggage with which the MP arrived into politics (this would be the case for politicians with a technical profile). In this case, it should be expected that those MPs with longer professional experience will have a greater influence on the decisions of the parliamentary group. To contrast these hypotheses and determine which of these three dynamics (or combination of them) operate in Spain, a regression analysis was ran, the results of which are presented in Table 7.6. On this specific point, the analysis is limited to nationwide parties—PP, PSOE and IU—given the heterogeneity of the parties that fall under the category of “other parties”.

In the regression analysis, the degree of influence each MP has on the decisions of the parliamentary group is used as a dependent variable. Although this variable measures the subjective perception of the MPs

themselves, rather than the capacity for influence measured objectively, it is a valid way of determining the distribution of power in parliamentary groups. Table 7.6 contains the estimations of four different models. The first model seeks to test the idea that influence within the parliamentary group is the result of a previous position in the political party, and as such, the key explanatory variable in this model is holding a leadership position in the party. Additionally, as control variables in this model and those following, the party to which the MP belongs, the parliament (distinguishing between regional parliaments and Congress and Senate) and sex are included. The second model seeks to capture the effect of parliamentary experience on the degree of influence, and as such, the number of terms in the parliament is added as the key explanatory variable, maintaining the

Table 7.6 Factors explaining leadership in parliamentary groups. Regression analysis (OLS)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Party (reference category: PP)				
PSOE	-0.292 (0.180)	-0.277 (0.180)	-0.249 (0.184)	-0.233 (0.183)
IU	1.535*** (0.428)	1.605*** (0.426)	1.494*** (0.430)	1.567*** (0.428)
Parliament (reference category: Congress and Senate)				
Regional parliament	0.819*** (0.187)	0.797*** (0.186)	0.893*** (0.191)	0.871*** (0.190)
Leadership position in party	0.008 (0.228)	-0.007 (0.227)	0.001 (0.233)	-0.011 (0.231)
Sex (reference category: male)				
Female	-0.496*** (0.180)	-0.418** (0.182)	-0.578*** (0.186)	-0.501*** (0.187)
Terms of office in parliament		0.211** (0.086)		0.219** (0.087)
Professional experience			-0.021** (0.010)	-0.021** (0.010)
Constant	5.977*** (0.348)	5.459*** (0.405)	6.305*** (0.394)	5.770*** (0.446)
R ²	0.093	0.104	0.105	0.117
N	(471)	(471)	(455)	(455)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: ***, ** and * indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors appear in brackets

other control variables. The third model analyses whether parliamentary influence can be acquired through the technical competence provided by professional experience. Therefore, professional experience is included as the key explanatory variable, measured as the number of years that the MP exercised a profession before joining parliament.⁴ Lastly, the fourth model seeks to test the explanatory power of each of the parliamentary leadership logics presented above jointly, and as such, it contains all the explanatory variables of the previous models.

The results presented in Table 7.6 reveal very interesting patterns, while they also indicate that the effect of the explanatory variables considered is relatively robust, in so far as the coefficients are similar in the four specifications. Firstly, as regards the logic of parliamentary leadership based on the position of power in the political party, the data indicate that holding a leadership position in the party does not have a significant effect on the degree of influence in the parliamentary group, contradicting the first of the hypotheses set out above. It is important to note, however, that this result is the product of the low variability of this explanatory variable, since the majority of MPs hold a position of responsibility in the party, something that they already had before being elected as MPs. The most plausible interpretation is that loyalty to the party is a previous requirement to hold a notable position in the electoral lists that give access to parliament, but it does not mark a difference as regards the degree of influence that a MP has in their group.⁵

Experience has a positive and significant effect on the influence in the parliamentary group, since the number of terms of office in the parliament has a significant and positive effect. This means that as an MP acquires experience in a specific parliament, their power in the parliamentary group increases. In other words, parliamentary groups appear to be governed by the veterans of the group. This result confirms the second hypothesis, in that, as an MP acquires greater experience, they access positions that are more influential in the parliamentary group. Nevertheless, there is a possible alternative explanation that cannot be refuted with the data at hand, and that is the possibility of reverse causality. If this were the case, these results would tell a somewhat different story, according to which those MPs who have more power in the parties are those who manage to repeat as candidates in the first positions of the lists for longer, and as such, the power structure of the parliamentary groups would reproduce the distribution of power in the political parties (Coller et al. 2012). This alternative explanation would be more in line with the first logic described above than with the second.

As regards the technocratic logic, according to which MPs could have more influence depending on their technical skills in spheres other than politics, the results clearly contradict this hypothesis, and suggest a radically different interpretation. Professional experience has a significant but negative effect on parliamentary influence. Thus, the power of parliamentary groups appears to be concentrated in those MPs who have developed their career within the parties. This result also suggests that the incorporation of “independents” into the electoral lists can be a resource that parties use to attract votes, more than an attempt to incorporate their professional experience into the sphere of politics.

As regards the effect of the control variables, firstly, it is observed that the degree of influence of MPs is not the same in all the political parties and in all the parliaments. In this regard, IU MPs consider that they have a greater degree of influence than MPs from the PP and PSOE, which is consistent with the previous descriptive analysis and with the fact (also revealed in the previous analysis) that the distribution of decisive power in the IU is more equal than in the other two parties. In addition, representatives in the regional parliaments also perceive that they have a greater level of influence than the MPs of the Congress and the Senate. The fundamental explanation for both results is that the degree of influence of an individual MP appears greater the smaller the size of the parliamentary group, which means that the distribution of power in small parliamentary groups is more equal. It is also important to highlight that female MPs have a lower degree of influence in the parliamentary groups, even after controlling for the other variables introduced in the models presented in Table 7.6. This result reveals that, despite the growth in the number of women in parliaments, differences still remain in the access to positions of leadership in parliamentary groups, in men’s favor.

These results have important implications on the way in which the parliamentary groups are organized and on how the power is distributed within them. The data reveal that influence in parliamentary groups reflects the process of acquiring equivalent positions in the political parties. The capacity of influence in parliamentary groups is directly proportional to political experience but inversely proportional to professional experience prior to politics, which indicates that parliament leaders essentially develop within the parties, hindering access to positions of power to those professionals coming from other spheres. Lastly, it is important to highlight the difficulties women face in accessing leadership positions in the groups.

7.5 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the logics of the internal functioning of parliamentary groups in the representative chambers in Spain have been analyzed. The starting point is the literature establishing a close relationship between the electoral system and the internal cohesion of parties (Fenno 1978; Sánchez de Dios 1996, 1999, 2005). According to this approach, the proportional-type parliamentary systems with closed and blocked lists tend to produce greater cohesion and parliamentary discipline in so far as the accountability is directed from the representative to the party, rather than from the representative to the voters. In the Spanish case, the data reveal high parliamentary discipline, which is common to all parties and parliaments. Moreover, the large majority of voters also consider that MPs should not be free to change parliament group, but when a representative leaves the party through which they were elected, they should give up their seat to be replaced by a member from their party. The only situation in which citizens consider that the representatives should break parliamentary discipline is when the interests of the party contradict the interests of the autonomous community or the province through which they were elected. In such cases, the majority of citizens tend to think that the MP should put the interests of the district ahead of those of the party.

High parliamentary discipline does not necessarily translate into a vertical functioning of the parliamentary groups. According to the perception of the representatives themselves, ordinary MPs have relative autonomy in the groups, although the perceptions on the process of decision-making are divided into two groups: those who think that decisions are made following a general discussion, and those who think that decisions are made by a select few, with or without consulting the rest of the group. Thus, in the decision-making process, important differences are observed in the perceptions of MPs. In general terms, the process is more horizontal in small parliamentary groups compared to larger groups. This indicates that as the group increases in size, the structures of some tend to become more hierarchical.

This overview suggests that within the groups there are individual MPs who concentrate a greater capacity of influence than colleagues in their group. The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that influence in the

parliamentary groups is acquired the higher the number of terms spent in the parliament. Nevertheless, holding a leadership position in the party is not necessarily a determining factor for influence on the group, since the majority of MPs hold positions in the party through which they were elected. Lastly, previous professional experience has a negative effect on influence. This suggests that those MPs coming from other professional activities have fewer possibilities of accessing positions of leadership within the parliamentary groups. On the contrary, those who have developed a career within the parties have more possibilities of accessing these positions.

NOTES

1. Some authors, however, distinguish between party cohesion and party discipline. Cohesion would refer to the “majority direction of the vote of a parliamentary fraction and to the percentage of legislators that are removed from this”. Party discipline would refer to “legislators’ compliance with the stance of the party leader or the parliamentary fraction” (Casar 2000, p. 196).
2. For a more in-depth analysis of the subject see chapter 5 “Recruitment and selection”.
3. The Constitutional Court Judgement (STC) 5/1983, of 4 February, states that “the representatives give effectiveness to the right of citizens to participate and not that of any organisation such as the political party”, adding that “the right to participate corresponds to the citizens, and not to the parties; that the representatives elected are representatives of the citizens and not of the parties...”. Likewise, the STC 10/1983, of 21 February, warns that the function constitutionally attributed to parties is that of “acting as an essential channel” and expressly rejects, contrary to the Constitution, the theory that the parties and not the candidates are those who receive the mandate from voters, stating that the representatives represent “the whole electoral body”, without parties being able to end this relationship between representatives and the electoral body. For an analysis of this subject see Santaolalla (1986).
4. This variable takes the value of 0 for those MPs who state that they did not have a career before entering politics.
5. In chapter 5, “Recruitment and selection” the relation between organic positions in the parties and the creation of electoral lists is analyzed.

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Parliamentary Political Representation

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8.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, we have witnessed the resurgence of discourse dealing with the crisis of political representation in advanced democracies, particularly as a result of the political effects of the latest global economic crisis. In Spain, as in other countries within Europe, new political citizen protest movements have emerged, which have focused their demands on changing the mode of democratic political representation, the way of understanding the bond between political representatives and those they represent.¹

However, any study made of parliamentary political representation today must take into account “where we come from” and “how we got here”. Back in the 1970s, the field of political science noted certain limitations and deficiencies in democratic regimes in terms of their representative dimension (Crozier et al. 1975), chiefly resulting from the emergence of new social movements (Offe 1988). Since the 1990s, having corroborated the resistance of advanced democracies to the “crisis of representation”, a great deal of scientific interest has focused on analyzing the stability of democracies in spite of the widespread phenomenon of democratic political disaffection² (for example, Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam

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2000), on the one hand, and on examining the effective functioning of mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability within the representative political process (Manin et al. 1999), on the other. At the same time, as an alternative or complement to the traditional institutions of representative democracy, new theorizations have emerged regarding deliberative and participatory democracy (Barber 1984; Fishkin 1991), which have inspired the spread of mechanisms for direct citizen participation at the municipal level of government (for example, participatory budgets). Furthermore, new theoretical developments have been proposed about the substantive and symbolic value of sociological or descriptive representation (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Young 2000), which have found their correlate in the spread of gender representation in a number of democratic political systems through the use of quotas.

This chapter tackles the empirical study of new theoretical categories of political representation (Rehfeld 2009, 2011) with a view to shedding light on answers to the following questions: Do members of parliament (MPs) and citizens coincide in their way of understanding political representation in Spain? How do MPs understand political representation? Are there differences between Spain's different autonomous communities? And are there differences between the political parties?

Pursuing an exploratory objective, this chapter firstly points to the existence of discrepancies between citizens and MPs regarding certain attributes of political representation: aim of parliamentary representation, representation of territorial interests, and MPs' source of judgment. Secondly, it explores different modes of political representation in accordance with three criteria: aim of parliamentary representation, source of MPs' judgment, and responsiveness to sanctions; and two key variables in parliamentary exercise: territorial level of government (central vs. regional) and political party. Thirdly, it concludes by identifying the main modes of political representation in Spain and proposing future strands of research.

8.2 CITIZENS AND THEIR POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES

One crucial aspect of representative democracy encompasses how society is represented and the channels used to this end, on the one hand, and on the other, how and to what extent society feels properly represented. Accepting that political representation does not entail full identification between representatives and their constituents, since a representative can never be fully identical to their electors when the latter are not identical

with one another, similarly representatives cannot be expected to act as those they represent at any given time (Garrorena 1994, p. 5). However, it appears that some kind of connection or affinity must exist between representatives and their constituents, at the very least a bond that can be used to inform the actions of the former, bestowing legitimacy on the representative government and ensuring the quality of the democratic political process.

This chapter, firstly, examines the extent to which Spanish society feels represented by their MPs. To this end, it is not sufficient, although necessary, to ascertain the opinions or preferences of the Spanish people regarding the mode of representation, but it is essential to compare these preferences with those of their political representatives.

First of all, we need to talk about the aim of parliamentary representation; in other words, who or what is represented in parliament. In legal terms, the Spanish Constitution (SC) reproduces (in the same way other liberal constitutions of the surrounding area do) the liberal postulate of the “national mandate”, “free from imperative instructions” and “not responsible or revocable” (section 67.2 SC). This corresponds to the modern notion of political representation, which is essentially defined as a mechanism that determines general interests on the basis of two key premises: the formation and definition of a broad and relatively homogeneous socio-territorial space, that of the Nation State; and the understanding of politics itself as a sphere in which general interests are determined, which is autonomous and separate from ancestral ties of *dominium*, and affirmed within the principles of national sovereignty (Porras and de Vega 1996, pp. 9–10). Although such a notion of representation might hinder accountability through voting, to the extent that an MP only appears in the system in his or her common and undifferentiated capacity as “member of parliament for the whole Nation” (Garrorena 1994, p. 30), insofar as the SC accepts political pluralism (section 1.1) and recognizes the rights of citizens to be represented in their plural options (section 23.1 and section 6), it anticipates overcoming classical liberal schema in order to pay greater attention to specific aspects of the representative relationship: political affiliation of the elected, preferences and interests of voters. Hence, parliamentary political representation through political parties has been fully integrated into the Spanish code of laws, although ambiguity still prevails with regard to the relationship between electors and representative when the representative moves away from the option for which she was elected (Arruego 2005, pp. 171–178).

The answers given to the question of whom MPs represent in their parliamentary activity, and who citizens think MPs represent, shows the plurality and difference of opinions that exist not only between the two collectives but also within each group (Table 8.1). Given that the response categories are not identical, comparison between the opinions of citizens and their political representatives must be taken with a certain degree of caution. However, taking as a reference the majority opinions expressed by citizens, certain differences are noted with regard to the responses given by the MPs.³ Hence, a third of citizens expressed the opinion that MPs represent all Spanish people, whereas only 2% of the MPs interviewed

Table 8.1 Objective of political representation (in %) and ideology

	<i>MPs</i>			<i>Citizens</i>		
	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean value ideology (N)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean value ideology (N)</i>
All citizens in my region	54	307	4.6 (301)	–	–	–
Voters of the party/ <i>of her party</i>	14	80	4.4 (80)	19	454	4.6 (386)
All electors in my constituency/ <i>in her province or constituency</i>	21	118	4.3 (118)	7	172	4.9 (145)
The political party I belong to/ <i>she belongs to</i>	6	34	4.7 (34)	32	751	4.6 (611)
A specific group in society/ <i>a specific group in society</i>	3	19	4 (19)	1	12	4.6 (8)
Electors and citizens in general, society as a whole	2	8	3.8 (7)	–	–	–
<i>All Spanish people</i>	–	–	–	33	782	5.1 (654)
The underprivileged	1	4	2.5 (4)	–	–	–
<i>Themselves</i>	–	–	–	2	51	4.9 (41)
<i>The rich, the powerful</i>	–	–	–	3	63	4.1 (47)
Total (<i>N</i>)	100	571	4.5 (569)	100	2344	4.8 (2007)

Source: Studies CIS 2827 and 2930

Note: The question asked of MPs was: “Whom do you think you represent during your parliamentary activity? I will give you several options and I would ask you to choose just one”. The question asked of citizens was: “In your opinion, whom do you think our MPs represent? (Just one answer)”. The wording of the response categories in the survey administered to citizens is given in italics. For the variable “ideology”, mean scores are presented on the ideological scale, where 1 represents the extreme left and 10 the extreme right, for MPs and citizens who chose one of the response categories.

stated that they represent society as a whole.⁴ The former are located in ideological positions that are further to right of the scale (5.1) than the average, whereas the latter are situated further towards the left (3.8). Almost another third of citizens believe that MPs represent the political party to which they belong, an opinion only shared by 6% of MPs, with no ideological differences observed between the two samples. Such discrepancies endure, albeit greatly reduced, in the opinions expressed regarding the representation of voters for the parliamentary party: 14% of MPs and 19% of citizens offered this response from very close ideological positions. Finally, the spontaneous responses encoded⁵ clearly reflect the disparity of opinions between the two collectives: whereas 1% of MPs—located more to the left of the ideological scale—state that they represent “the underprivileged” members of society, 3% of citizens—also situated more towards the left of the ideological scale than the average—say that MPs represent “the rich and powerful”, and 2% say that MPs represent “themselves”. In short, there is greater discrepancy than agreement in the opinions and preferences expressed by citizens and MPs regarding the objectives of political representation in Spain, and there are also highly varied positions observed among the individuals from each collective.

It could even be posited that, within a decentralized and plurinational state such as Spain, the purpose of political representation could be defined according to regional interests and political identities, in addition to affinity to or membership of political organizations that express certain values on the ideological scale of left and right. In particular, when faced with the dilemma of how an MP should act when the official position taken by her party regarding an issue clashes with the interests of her province or autonomous community, the responses chosen mostly by citizens and political representatives are clearly different: 62% of citizens prefer an MP to give priority to the interests of the province or region (an option also expressed by 17% of MPs), whereas 77% of MPs opt for the intermediate position of seeking to moderate the party’s position regarding the issue at hand (an option also expressed by close to 30% of citizens). However, citizens and MPs both express lower levels of support to the option of following party directives in the event that they clash with regional interests (9% and 6% respectively), which is coherent with the State of Autonomies and with the territorialization of statewide political parties.⁶

In addition to the issue of whom MPs represent, or put another way, which interests are prioritized in the performance of parliamentary duty, political representation is defined by the independence or mandate that govern the actions of the representative. Although the classic theoretical controversy between independence and mandate has been largely overcome—since political representation not only requires the representatives to act at any given time as the people they represent would, but similarly does not understand the relationship between an individual political representative and her electoral constituency without referring to the existence of disciplined political parties (Thomassen 1994)—the preferences expressed by citizens and MPs in this regard help to determine the extent to which the former feel they are represented by the latter.

The results from Table 8.2 show that almost half the MPs (49%) agree with a vast majority of citizens (80%) in favor of political representation being more delegated than independent, in other words, taking into account the preferences and opinions of electors when making political decisions even though these might not coincide with the personal judgment of the representative. It is important to highlight that MPs and citizens coincide in terms of their position on the ideological scale, very close to the average for both collectives, so it seems logical to state that these individuals share a vision regarding political representation that rests on the relationship, and the problem, between agent/representative and principal/constituents (Bendor et al. 2001). However, the other half of MPs (49%) choose to follow their own judgment, regardless of the preferences of the electors, although they would attempt to persuade electors regarding the decision they believe to be correct, whereas only 13% of citizens expressed their agreement with this option. In this second group, we find that MPs are located slightly further to the left and citizens slightly further to the ideological right than the respective mean scores for each collective. Insofar as this second response category represents a more elitist or aristocratic vision of political representation (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2009), ideological differences between MPs and citizens would add an important layer of incongruence between representatives and represented in Spain, especially with regard to representation of the left. The elitist vision of representation is manifested by a greater proportion of MPs than citizens; the former are situated in more left-wing positions than the latter, and especially further to the left on the ideological scale than citizens who hold the same “aristocratic” opinion of representation.

Table 8.2 Opinions about the representative's source of judgment (in %) and ideology

	<i>MPs</i>			<i>Citizens</i>			
	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean value ideology (N)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean value ideology (N)</i>	
Elected politicians must seek to discover what the electors think	49	275	4.7 (272)	Representatives must take their electors into account	80	1859	4.7 (1528)
Politicians should have their own ideas	49	275	4.2 (268)	Representatives should only follow their own criteria	13	295	5.3 (253)
Both	2	12	4.8 (12)	Depends on the issue	8	180	5 (135)
Total	100	561	4.5 (569)	Total	100	2334	4.8 (2007)

Source: studies CIS 2827 and 2930

Notes: MPs were asked which of the following statements they felt closest to: (i) Elected politicians must endeavor to discover what electors think about problems, the solutions that electors feel are best, their most immediate interests, and transfer them to politics, legislation, etc. (regardless of the principles and ideas of the politician); (ii) Politicians must have their own ideas, their own analyses and solutions to problems, even if these do not coincide with those of the electors, seeking to explain, discuss such solutions with them, and persuade them; (iii) Both options (encoded subsequently). Citizens were asked which of the following statements they agreed with the most: (i) Political representatives must exclusively follow their own criteria when taking political decisions, even if these do not coincide with the criteria of their electors; (ii) Political representatives must take into account the opinions of their electors when making political decisions, even if these do not coincide with their own criteria; (iii) Depends on the issue at hand (not formulated). For the variable 'ideology', mean scores are presented on the ideological scale, where 1 represents the extreme left and 10 the extreme right, for MPs and citizens who chose one of the response categories

8.3 MODES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

The central normative problem of representative democracy has generally been approached in terms of how close the political decisions of representatives are to the preferences and will of the people they represent. This classic problem has sometimes been formulated as the dichotomy between the theory of independent representation and the theory of representation by mandate. It has also been articulated using the terms "trustee" and "delegate", which refer to whether the legislative action of political repre-

sentatives responds to what they consider to be best for the nation or to the wishes of those they represent (Pitkin 1967). Some theoreticians of democracy have questioned the utility of this formulation of the problem for the empirical analysis of representative government (for example, Mansbridge 1999, 2003, 2011; Rehfeld 2005, 2009, 2011). In particular, Rehfeld argues that if the analysis of representation focuses on the specific aspect of political decision-making, it is more useful to develop various concepts of representation in order to explore what a representative is and which activities we believe denote the act of representation, and then to explain separately what is meant when we say that a certain thing or activity is representative of another (Rehfeld 2011, p. 631).

The following analysis is based on the proposal of Rehfeld (2009), which distinguishes between eight modes of political representatives according to the decisions they make regarding the following three issues that affect representation in the course of their legislative action.

1. Aims of legislation: *republicans* (those who often promote the good of all, but not necessarily the “nation”) are distinguished from *pluralists* (those who often promote the good of a part, but this is not necessarily their electoral constituency).
2. Source of judgment: Distinguishing between whether representatives are *independent*, trusting in their own judgment or criteria, or *dependent*, trusting the judgment of a third party, in order to determine the substance of objectives (the pursued good).
3. Responsiveness to sanctions: distinguishing whether representatives are more or less responsive to re-election or any other type of sanction.

Hence, it is possible to describe the classic trustee representative in contrast to the delegate representative as a representative who (1) depends on or trusts in their own judgment over that of those they represent, (2) promotes the good of all over the good of some, and (3) is less responsive to sanctions that imply non-re-election (acting in accordance with civic virtue). However, according to the three issues mentioned previously, the classic dichotomy can become eight modes or types of parliamentary political representation that can be identified empirically: Burkean trustees, Bureaucrats, Madisonian legislators, Anti-Federalist, Volunteers, Ambassadors, Professionals, and Pared-Down Delegates (Rehfeld 2009, p. 223).

This approach is particularly suggestive as it assumes that the mode of political representation adopted by MPs is the product of their own free decision. This implies that it is possible for a completely “independent” representative to use their independence to pursue the good of all, although this common good is judged by the constituents, and in a way that is responsive to sanctions; and on the contrary, it is possible for a fully “delegate” representative to be instructed by the people they represent to pursue the good of all in accordance with the judgment of the representative, and without worrying about future sanctions.

Furthermore, this perspective allows us to explore the hypothesis of whether, in a decentralized democratic system such as Spain, the notions held by MPs regarding which aims they represent in their legislative action might be conditioned by the territorial level of legislative power—central or regional—and within the latter, the differences derived from asymmetry between the various autonomous communities and historical nationalities. Similarly, it also allows us to observe differences between the political parties as organizations that play a third role in the relationship of dependence between representatives and electors, in which the party rather than the people constitutes the “pluralist” objective of representation (Converse and Pierce 1986, pp. 664–696).

This chapter will now explore each of the three dimensions of political representation among Spanish MPs—aims of representation, sources of judgment, and responsiveness to sanctions, in this order—with a view to identifying the predominant modes of political representation in Spain according to the territorial level of representative government, regional differences and political party.

8.4 AIMS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

The issue of whom MPs believe to be representing in their parliamentary activity indicates whether, in their role as legislator, the predominant conception of representation is republican or pluralist.⁷ Table 8.1, above, showed the distribution of frequencies for this variable in comparison with the opinions of citizens. The aim now is to explore whether the differences observed between MPs correspond to the territorial level of political representation (central vs. regional), to the territorial chamber of representation, or the political party to which they belong.

The response categories to the question “Whom do you think you represent during your parliamentary activity” can be interpreted as a contin-

uum from maximum republicanism to maximum pluralism. At the republican end of the scale would be the response “society as a whole”, which would correspond to the limits of the concept of State, followed by “all the citizens in my region”, which would represent the domain of sub-national democratic government, and “all the electors in my constituency”, which would be closer to the pluralist idea than the republican notion in the strictest sense. The end corresponding to maximum pluralism is occupied by two response categories: “a specific group in society” and “the underprivileged”; followed by the responses “political party of affiliation” and “party voters”.

Table 8.3 presents the frequencies of this variable according to the different legislative chambers (distinguishing between MPs from the *Cortes Generales*, those from regional parliaments governed by section 143 of the SC and those from the four regional chambers governed by section 151) and political parties. On the side of republican preferences, significant differences were observed between MPs from the *Cortes Generales* and those from the “ordinary” autonomous communities (section 143 of the SC), insofar as the former are less likely to cite representation of citizens from their region, but instead are more likely to believe they represent society as a whole (maximum republicanism) or electors in their constituency (minimum republicanism). MPs from the other autonomous communities, on the other hand, manifest opposing tendencies. These statistically significant differences point to theses about the effect of the political system and institutional design on the way of understanding and exercising political representation (Rehfeld 2011). In particular, this raises the question of whether the way in which the objectives of political representation are understood also depends on the MP’s political party, since it is reasonable to expect that representatives of political parties who have held national government, and who hold the majority of seats in the *Cortes Generales*, namely the PSOE and PP parties, should share a more republican understanding of the legislative objective than representatives of non-statewide parties with no experience in national government. The results show that, in effect, a higher percentage (above 75%) of MPs from the PSOE and PP-UPN parties, but also from ERC and “other regionalist parties” (such as, Coalición Canaria), align themselves with the republican categories of representation. However, the statistically significant differences are highly relevant in terms of distinguishing between representatives from statewide parties with experience in national government (PP and PSOE) and the other parties. Although MPs from PP-UPN are more

Table 8.3 Republican-pluralist objectives by parliamentary chamber and party (in %)

	<i>Electors and citizens in general, society as a whole</i>	<i>All citizens in my region</i>	<i>All electors in my constituency</i>	<i>Party voters</i>	<i>The political party to which I belong</i>	<i>A specific group in society</i>	<i>The underprivileged</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>
Andalusia	2	59	22	10	3	0	3	100 (51)
Catalonia	0	45	21	25	0	7	2	100 (36)
Galicia	0	57	14	17	5	7	0	100 (36)
Basque Country	0	48	18	21	4	9	0	100 (38)
Other regions	0*	68	11*	12	7	2	0	100 (221)
<i>Cortes Generales</i> (central parliamentary chambers)	4	38*	33	13	7	4	0	100 (188)
Total	2 (8)	54 (307)	21 (118)	14 (80)	6 (34)	3 (19)	1 (4)	100 (571)
PP and UPN	1	59	19	12	7	0	3	100 (241)
PSOE	2	52	26	13	5	0	2	100 (236)
IU	0	27*	9	34	5	21	5	100 (18)
CiU	0	36	30	19	4	0	11	100 (16)
ERC	8	70	17	6	0	0	0	100 (9)
PNV	0	53	13	21	9	0	5	100 (16)
Other nationalist parties	0	43	11	21	6	0	21	100 (16)
Other regionalist parties	0	73	6	11	10	0	0	100 (14)
Other parties	0	17	0	83	0	0	0	100 (5)
Total	2 (9)	54 (309)	21 (118)	14 (80)	6 (34)	1 (4)	3 (20)	100 (574)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Notes: The Chi-square test shows an association between the variables with a significance level of $p < 0.05$. The percentages given in bold font are statistically significant with the above level of confidence, and the cells marked with an asterisk (*) obtained a negative value for corrected standardized residuals

likely than the average to express the representative objective of “all citizens in my region”, and MPs from PSOE are more likely to state that they “represent all citizens in their constituency”, in the two parties, the republican conception of representation still dominates. MPs from the political party *Izquierda Unida*, IU, express beliefs that are closer to those of MPs from non-statewide parties; in other words, they express pluralist objectives of political representation: they are more likely to represent party voters and the underprivileged, and less inclined to represent citizens from their region. Among the non-statewide parties, MPs from *Convergència i Unió*, CiU, and “other nationalist parties” (such as BNG or NaBai) display a greater tendency to represent “a specific group in society”, the most pluralist category. Finally, the predominance of pluralism can also be seen among MPs from the category “other parties”, who are more likely to represent voters of their own party.

8.5 REPRESENTATIVES’ SOURCE OF JUDGMENT

The second dimension in the analysis of political representation refers to the type of decision made by MPs regarding the source of judgment to be followed when performing their legislative duties: whether representatives trust in their own judgment or criteria (independent) or in the judgment of a third party (dependent) to determine the substance of objectives (the pursued good).⁸ However, representation, by its very nature, implies that the representative cannot identify fully with the demands or interests of the constituents, nor can she be divorced completely from them. In fact, some empirical studies about political representation have shown that MPs commonly situate themselves in intermediate positions between the two ideal poles (Converse & Pierce 1986, p. 497). In particular, the influential empirical typology developed by Eulau and Wahlke (1959) regarding styles of representation distinguishes between delegates, trustees, and politicians, depending on whether they follow the ideas and wishes of their voters. MPs who express adhesion to the opinions of party voters may be considered delegates; those who claim that MPs should follow their own judgment are classed as trustees; and those whose response depends on the issue at hand belong to the category of politicians (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, p. 509).

The sample of MPs is divided between those who think that representatives should have their own ideas, and be guided by their own judgment, 49%, and those who consider that they have to discover what the electors

think, and act in accordance with the latter's judgment, a further 49% (since only 2% spontaneously added the category of "both" options).⁹ When asked about their reasons for the preference expressed, they offered coherent beliefs that explain each of the options.¹⁰ Hence, MPs who opted for independent judgment expressed beliefs that chime with an elitist conception of democracy, highlighting the role of ideological vanguard and social transformation played by the political elite. Representatives in favor of dependent judgment, on the other hand, share reasons that underscore an understanding of representation that is very close to the principal-agent relationship, highlighting the public service role of the MP and the value of pragmatism. However, the manifestation of reasons that indicate an "intermediate stance" should also be noted, at percentage levels of between 7% and 10%, which should be considered an indication of the category of "politicos" rather than "delegates" or "trustees".

So, where do these preferences expressed by MPs come from? Are they generated by the role they play in a specific institutional context? If this is the case, we should see significant differences depending on the legislative chamber (central vs. regional) to which they belong, and also between the different autonomous communities. However, in accordance with the coherence of motives expressed by dependent and independent representatives, it seems more reasonable to suppose that their affiliation to a particular political organization would provide the main explanation for the way in which representation is understood from the perspective of the MP's source of judgment.

The results presented in Table 8.4 show a very marked contrast between the parliaments of Andalusia and Catalonia, with the former expressing a predominance of dependent judgment (64%) and the latter expressing mostly independent judgment (67%). Furthermore, the greater presence of "politicos" in the parliaments of Catalonia (8%) and Galicia (6%) is also striking. However, the differences observed in this variable essentially reflect the differences between the political formations of the MPs rather than the territorial chambers of representation to which they belong. On the one hand, belief in dependent judgment is particularly widespread among representatives of PP-UPN (62%), PNV (65%) and other regionalist parties (64%), although significant differences are only observed in the first case, meaning that these MPs are more likely than the average to express a dependent judgment. On the other hand, independent judgment is largely expressed by representatives of PSOE (58%), IU (78%), ERC (75%), "other nationalist parties" (80%) and "other parties" (80%),

Table 8.4 Types of judgment by party and chamber (in %)

	<i>Dependent judgment</i>	<i>Independent judgment</i>	<i>Both</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>
PP and UPN	62	36*	2	100 (236)
PSOE	40*	58	2	100 (233)
IU	22*	78	0	100 (18)
CiU	40	47	13	100 (15)
ERC	25	75	0	100 (8)
PNV	65	35	0	100 (17)
Other nationalist parties	13*	80	7	100 (15)
Other regionalist parties	64	36	0	100 (14)
Other parties	20	80	0	100 (5)
CHAMBERS				
Andalusia	64	36	0	100 (50)
Catalonia	25	67	8	100 (36)
Galicia	46	49	6	100 (35)
Basque Country	49	51	0	100 (35)
Other regional chambers	51	46	3	100 (213)
Congress and Senate	47	52	1	100 (191)
Total (N)	49 (275)	49 (275)	2 (10)	100 (560)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Notes: The Chi-square test shows an association between the variables at a significance level of $p < 0.05$. Statistically significant percentages at the above level of confidence are shown in bold, and cells marked with an asterisk (*) obtained a negative value for corrected standardized residuals.

although these differences are only statistically significant for the categories of PSOE, IU and “other nationalist parties”. The differences between political parties seem to suggest ideological divergences in beliefs regarding the source of the representative’s judgment. And in effect, a statistical correlation test shows the existence of a significant association between the MP’s ideological position and preference for one mode of representation or another.¹¹ The further to the left of the ideological scale, the more likely an MP is to express belief in the representative’s independent judgment; and, on the contrary, the further to the right, the more likely an MP is to express affiliation to the concept of dependent judgment.

8.6 RESPONSIVENESS TO ELECTORAL SANCTIONS

The third and final dimension of this analysis of representation refers to whether MPs make political decisions taking into consideration possible sanctions from their electorate. Study of this aspect of political

representation raises two basic considerations. On the one hand, in the political institutional context of Spain, where political parties act as the gatekeeper of political representation through a system of voting on the basis of closed blocked lists, it seems logical for MPs to be more responsive to sanctions of their party than of the electorate (Méndez-Lago and Martínez 2002). Furthermore, it is to be expected that some MPs will be located in the intermediate category of pure “politicos”, in contrast to the alternative between delegate (full responsiveness to the electorate) and “electoral” trustee (absolute party discipline).¹²

Two indicators show whether an MP displays greater responsiveness towards sanctions from the electorate or whether they fear sanctions from their own party more. Firstly, the response they feel to be most appropriate in the event that the official party line contradicts the interests of their province or autonomous community. This is a fairly frequent occurrence in national and regional parliaments and has been particularly visible within the two main statewide parties (PSOE and PP).¹³ The results show that, in effect, there are statistically significant differences between legislative chambers and political formations.¹⁴ MPs from certain political parties (ERC, CiU and other nationalist parties) and certain chambers (Catalonia, and the “ordinary” autonomous communities) are more likely to be responsive towards sanctions from the electorate. These MPs would express a dependent understanding of representation from the perspective of responsiveness towards sanctions from the electorate. Furthermore, a significant difference was only obtained in the chamber of Andalusia in the sense that its MPs are more likely to respond following a party directive, and so would act as pure delegates of the party. Finally, the majority of MPs express themselves in the manner of “politicos” (77%) since they take an intermediate stance: they endeavor to moderate the party line regarding the issue at hand (Eulau and Wahlke 1959). This intermediate position is significantly higher among MPs from the PSOE and from the *Cortes Generales*, and less prevalent among MPs from ERC, other nationalist and regionalist parties, and regional chambers of the “ordinary” autonomous communities.

A second indicator refers to parliamentary party discipline and how an MP should act in the event of disagreement with the proposals of her party in the chamber,¹⁵ which is a less valid indicator than the alternative between party and electorate since it can measure a representative’s absolute independence from either type of principle. Put another way, knowing whether or not an MP follows the party line in a parliamentary vote,

or the extent to which she does, does not clarify the question regarding whether or not the representative acts only in accordance with her own conscience. However, the results show significant differences between political parties and legislative chambers that can complete observations of the dimension pertaining to responsiveness to sanctions.¹⁶ In first place, in the Basque chamber, and among MPs representing PNV, there is a greater tendency to comply with the party vote whip. This result can be partly attributed to the greater level of party institutionalization found in the PNV party in comparison with other nationalist parties.¹⁷ At the other end of the scale, MPs in the Catalanian chamber are less likely to maintain party discipline, showing a significant tendency to ignore party discipline and vote independently. The lowest level of sensitivity to political party sanctions is found among MPs for ERC and IU, followed by representatives of CiU (and those in the category “other parties”). Finally, as expected, the intermediate category of “políticos” (those who make their opinions known but accept party discipline) is the most numerous in all chambers and in all political parties, with no significant differences observed between them.

8.7 CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the modes of political representation expressed by Spanish MPs has revealed significant differences in the three dimensions studied. The differences found show that the institutional political system within which the representative acts (central vs. regional legislative) and also the nationalist nature or historic character of the autonomous community, and particularly the political party of the MP, contributes to the notion of political representation expressed by MPs. This result is particularly relevant, since it provides a more nuanced understanding of the discrepancies observed between citizens and MPs with regard to political representation in Spain.

Firstly, we found that the republican objectives of representation (pursue the good of the whole over the good of a part) predominate among MPs in the *Cortes Generales* and the regional chambers of the “ordinary” autonomous communities. Furthermore, a greater propensity towards expressing republican objectives is observed among MPs from the PSOE, PP-UPN and ERC, followed by representatives of the PNV and CiU, although in this latter party there is also a significantly high level of pluralist objectives expressed (representation of the party’s voters, the party itself, and in particular, specific groups in society). At the other end of the

scale, MPs for IU, as well as representatives of “other nationalist parties”, express fundamentally pluralist objectives. Therefore, when almost two thirds of citizens perceive that MPs pursue basically pluralist objectives (in particular that they are representing their own party, their voters, or specific groups of society), it is important to bear in mind that said perceptions are constructed on the basis of different realities depending on the party or legislative chamber taken as reference.

Secondly, the study of the source of judgment that governs representatives’ decision-making processes has highlighted that the type of legislative chamber does not have any effect in this regard. For this variable, differences between MPs depend on the political party, and are associated with ideology. Representatives of PP-UPN, PNV and “other regionalist parties” state a dependent source of judgment to a greater extent, whereas representatives of PSOE, IU, ERC, “other nationalist parties” and “other parties”, state that they follow their own judgment when making parliamentary decisions. At the same time, a large majority of citizens (80%) coincide with half the MPs who express a dependent understanding of judgment, in other words, they take into consideration the preferences and opinions of electors when making political decisions, even if these do not coincide with the personal judgments of the representative. However, the other half of MPs express an elitist or aristocratic notion of political representation, according to which representatives should be guided by their own judgment, but only a small portion of citizens share this vision of political representation, and they are also positioned further to the right on the ideological scale than these MPs.

Thirdly, an MP’s responsiveness towards sanctions of the electorate once again yields differences between parties, chambers, and regions. On the one hand, representatives of CiU, ERC and “other nationalist” parties express greater responsiveness to sanctions from the regional electorate than from their own political party. This dependent notion of representation is also predominant in the chamber of Catalonia and in the parliaments of the “ordinary” autonomous communities. At the other end of the scale, representatives of the PSOE party display less responsiveness to sanctions from the regional electorate and greater responsibility towards sanctions imposed by their political party. PSOE also accounted for a higher proportion of the typical intermediate position taken by “politico” representatives, who shun extremes. This intermediate position predominates among all parties and chambers, but is particularly strong among MPs in the *Cortes Generales*. Citizens, on the other hand, show less sup-

port for this intermediate option, and chiefly support prioritizing the interests of the province or autonomous region over party decisions, which stands in particular contrast with the preferences expressed by representatives of the PSOE. These results are further developed with those obtained through the analysis of parliamentary party discipline, where we found that greater independence from the party (supposed dependence on the electorate) was expressed in the chamber in Catalonia as well as in the ERC, IU, and CiU parties. On this occasion, at the other end of the scale were the Basque chamber and the PNV party, where MPs stated greater voting discipline (independence from electorate).

In accordance with the three dimensions studied, which shape the different modes of political representation, it is possible to identify four of the eight categories or types of political representatives that make up the model proposed by Rehfeld (2009): (1) “Burkean trustees”; (2) “bureaucrats”; (3) “volunteers”, and (4) “Madisonian legislators”. MPs for the PSOE party fit in fairly well with the “Burkean trustee” type of representative, expressing republican objectives, pursuing the good of society in accordance with their own judgment, and less responsive to pressures from the electorate. Secondly, MPs for the PP-UPN correspond basically to the “bureaucratic” type of representative, a category that also includes MPs for the PNV party. This category of representative also pursues the good of society or the whole, but here MPs are more dependent on the judgments of the electorate when deciding which public good to pursue. According to Rehfeld (2009, p. 224), the term “bureaucrat” alludes precisely to the role of the civil servant who acts to serve the common good, in accordance with a third party’s definition of this common good (for example, the legislation that they themselves execute), and, therefore, they consider that their action is not subject to sanctions. It should be noted that MPs for the PNV party, who display significant pluralist objectives, could be located in the category of bureaucrats, but closer to the position of “ambassadors”. Thirdly, MPs for the IU party, as well as those from “other nationalist parties”, display preferences typical of the “voluntary” type of representative. This type pursues pluralist objectives, the good of a section of society, which could be their electorate or another collective, but such individuals use their own judgment to determine which good they will pursue. Since they are committed above all to the good of those they represent, they are also less responsive to sanctions. The term “voluntary” alludes to the intense and passionate work of a volunteer who acts to improve their community in the way that they believe it should be

improved, without considering what the community itself believes to be the correct course of action, and is not dissuaded by the possibility that sooner or later they might be asked to leave (Rehfeld 2009, p. 224). Fourthly, and finally, MPs for ERC and CiU are positioned within the category of “Madisonian” type legislators. This type of representative pursues the general good, using their own judgment to determine the common good they will pursue, but unlike “Burkean” and “bureaucrats”, they are very responsive to sanctions from the electorate. The term “Madisonian” refers to the type of political representative defended by James Madison in his famous work *The Federalist* (Rehfeld 2009, p. 224). It should also be noted that the expression of pluralist objectives among MPs for CiU situates them closer to the “professional” type of representative, although it seems more correct to position them within the “Madisonian” type described above.

The results of this exploratory analysis into the modes of parliamentary political representation in Spain invites further study into the modes of representation adopted by MPs and the modes of representation preferred by citizens. In particular, further analysis is required to explain the differences observed, focusing particularly on the characteristics of MPs’ political careers that have not been incorporated into this article (experience and length of parliamentary service, posts of responsibility held within the party, among others). Furthermore, future research should examine the relationship between ideology and political representation among MPs and citizens.

NOTES

1. In particular the movement “Democracia Real Ya” (Real Democracy Now).
2. This concept alludes fundamentally to the fact that democratic citizens are distanced from their institutions and mechanisms of political representation, with all this entails, in theory, for the legitimacy and stability of democracy (Mota 2006, pp. 231–232).
3. Indeed, 54% of the sample of MPs stated that they represent citizens from their own autonomous community, an option not presented to citizens, and which also did not emerge in their spontaneous responses. Furthermore, although the percentage of MPs who express this opinion is higher among samples of regional MPs (62%) than in the *Cortes Generales*, Spain’s two parliamentary chambers (38%), in both cases this was the most frequently given response.
4. Although the wording of the response categories is not identical, it is reasonable to assume that the reference is practically the same.

5. The interviewees who chose the response that MPs represent specific groups in society were asked to specify which groups.
6. See in this regard Chapter 13.
7. From the perspective of studying legislative behaviour, the objectives of representation would correspond to the purposive role of MPs, in other words, with the “purposive or functional conception of the ultimate objective of their activities” (Wahlke et al. 1962, pp. 11–12).
8. This second type of decision corresponds to the representational role of the MP, understood as a set of rules that deal with the method or process of making decisions that the individual deems to be appropriate in order to pursue substantive objectives (Wahlke et al. 1962, pp. 11–12).
9. This 2% must be considered in the category of “politico” representatives as opposed to the alternative of “delegate” and “trustee”.
10. The full results can be found in Mota (2016, pp. 157–158).
11. The statistical correlation between the variables on the ideological scale (with values ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the extreme left and 10 the extreme right) and the representative’s source of judgement (with the following values: 1 dependent; 2 both; 3 independent) yields a weak Spearman’s Rho coefficient ($-0,180$), but nonetheless statistically significant with a confidence level of 99%.
12. The problem of a typology that only distinguishes between sanctions from the party and those of the electorate is that it does not reveal complete independence from either type of sanction. However, experience in Spain’s democracy seems to indicate that when an MP makes decisions based on their responsibility to the electorate rather than party discipline, this circumstance concludes either in the formation of a new political force or in the shifting of the MP’s party affiliation.
13. To cite just one example, the conflict between self-governing regions with regard to hydrographical authority has on a fair number of occasions given such a dilemma to MPs from within the same political group.
14. The full results can be found in Mota (2016, pp. 160–161).
15. One relatively recent example can be found in Catalonia’s Parliament (see for example, the newspaper *El País*, 16 January 2014), in which three PSC MPs voted against their party’s proposal to reject the request made of Congress regarding regional competency to hold a referendum on independence.
16. A more complete and detailed analysis of this variable is presented in Chap. 7.
17. For example, party loyalty is an important issue in the recruitment of PNV candidates in relation with other peripheral parties. In this regard, see Chapter 14.

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Political Disaffection

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9.1 THE CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL (MIS) TRUST

The concept of political trust has been widely studied in the literature over the past four decades. In accordance with Zmerli and Hoogue (2011, p. 2), political trust has a clear effect on political behavior in the sense that it guides or inhibits voting, contributing to a more structured electoral behavior (Denters et al. 2007). The general concept of political trust has been traditionally defined within the framework of political support (Easton 1965, 1975). In accordance with Easton, citizens can rely on different elements in the political system, whether this means the political community, the principles of the political system, the functioning of the political system, its institutions or the representatives occupying representative positions. Some of these elements can be replaced if they do not receive generalized support from citizens, as occurs with political representatives, but others, such as institutions, the principles of the democratic

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regime and the political community cannot be as easily replaced, on account of their persistence and how essential and fundamental they are for the political system.

Popular support for institutions, the principles of the regime and the political community is what Easton defines as diffuse support, since these elements are the most essential and fundamental. Furthermore, support for political representatives and the results of the regime is called specific support, since it is based on more superficial exchangeable elements within the political system (Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999; Dalton 2004; Newton 2006). In this way, low specific support would not harm democratic life, while levels of diffuse support remain unchanged. However, a persistent decrease in specific support may result in the erosion of diffuse support in the long term.

Kasperson et al. (1992) break down the concept of political trust into various elements: (1) competence as regards the ability to perform the activity in accordance with expectations; (2) intrinsic commitment, referring to the expectation that the measures and decisions will be taken in favor of the citizens' interest; (3) extrinsic commitment, in the sense that the representatives are subject to accountability; and (4) predictability, which spares citizens the risk evaluations and monitoring efforts.

When these conditions occur and citizens evaluate the results positively, the decisions will be perceived as fair and the citizens will tend to accept and comply with political decisions (Dalton 2004; Marien and Hoogue 2011; Rudolph and Evans 2005; Weatherford 1987). Rudolph and Evans (2005) and Miller (1974) consider that citizens trust in institutions and representatives when they perceive that there is correspondence between expectations and performance, in such a way that a logical consequence would be compliance with regulations that may be seen by them as demanding. In this way, political trust makes citizens comply with regulations, even if they are not in their favor. Moreover, those "critical citizens" demand a higher level of accountability from representatives.

In this regard, the performance of institutions determines their legitimacy, and individuals' evaluation of events and institutions are the main source of support or loss of support from citizens (Miller 1974; Torcal and Montero 2006). As a result, the discontent associated with specific policies and actions is a source of political apathy and cynicism that has three dimensions: (a) the meaning of political support as such, evident in citizens' reduced trust in politicians and institutions; (b) political cynicism on an individual level; and (c) a calling into question of the idea that moder-

ate policies can solve problems, leading to a radicalization of political options (Citrin 1974). Therefore, the persistence of generalized mistrust in institutions would suggest that the normal channels via which conflict is managed in society and in the political system are no longer fully operational (Miller 1974).

Despite the centrality of the concept of political trust, it is widely acknowledged that political trust has experienced a decline in the majority of Western democracies (Bowler and Karp 2004; Cohen 2004; Hoogue and Zmerli 2011; Newton 2006; Rudolph and Evans 2005; Weatherford 1987). Firstly, some authors highlight the cognitive mobilization process as the main cause for this decrease in trust, pointing to a greater sophistication and higher levels of political information in the citizens of our societies, with a consequent increase in that expected of representatives, but without a generalized decrease in the levels of support for the democratic system (Bowler and Karp 2004; Hoogue and Zmerli 2011; Newton 2006). Furthermore, other theories consider the reason for mistrust in political representatives to be the result of policies and institutional performance, and whether they meet citizens' expectations or not (Miller 1974; Rudolph and Evans 2005).

According to Newton (2006), the causes for the decline in political trust, and more specifically, the decline in the trust in representatives, can be classified in five main explanations: (1) the growing expectations of the action of governments; (2) the effect of globalization and the increasing number of actors and variables that affect the results and the political decisions; (3) the effect of the media; (4) the decline of social capital; and (5) the results of the policies. In addition to these theories, as indicated above, several accounts attribute the decline in trust to the greater political efficiency of citizens, and their increasing political sophistication, which gives rise to a more demanding evaluation of the institutions and the political actors by those who are defined as "critical citizens" (Norris 1999) or "unsatisfied democrats" (Klingemann 1998).

9.2 PERCEPTION OF THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL MISTRUST

In order to understand the reasons members of parliament (MPs) attribute to the decline in political trust, they were asked what motives they believed were behind the damaged prestige of politics in general, and of political parties in particular. As regards trust in politics, a list of eight

reasons was included so that the MPs could assess on a scale of 1–5 what importance they would attribute to each of them when explaining citizens' loss of trust in politics in general.

According to the results presented in Table 9.1, the MPs appear to be certain that the main reasons for the loss of trust in politics are corruption scandals (4.3), followed by the continuous tension in political life (4.0) and the constant criticism by the media (3.9). On the contrary, the reasons MPs considered to be least important are those related with the training of the people occupying representative positions, and the willingness to not find people capable enough for the lists (1.9) or the difficulty in finding qualified people to fill the positions (2.5). Other aspects, such as the problems stemming from the funding of campaigns and parties, the lack of contact with the average citizen's real problems and the way in which

Table 9.1 Reasons why politics is perceived as an activity in disrepute (averages 1–5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party								
PP	2.75	3.93	4.24	2.60	3.78	3.14	2.97	2.03
PSOE	2.05	3.76	4.39	2.90	4.17	3.04	2.91	1.72
IU	2.13	3.74	4.00	3.17	4.04	3.64	3.87	1.83
Other parties	2.71	3.92	4.35	3.20	3.95	3.29	3.18	2.02
Parliament								
Congress and Senate	2.36	3.90	4.24	2.86	3.92	2.88	2.90	1.90
Andalusia	2.15	3.85	4.28	2.44	4.00	3.02	3.05	1.68
Catalonia	2.40	3.95	3.86	2.81	4.05	2.93	3.09	1.70
Galicia	2.36	3.52	4.33	3.07	3.75	3.00	2.83	1.79
Basque Country	2.52	4.02	4.52	3.07	3.98	3.36	2.80	1.70
Other parliaments	2.59	3.85	4.38	2.85	4.00	3.33	3.13	2.05
Sex								
Male	2.59	3.82	4.27	2.82	3.91	3.17	3.06	1.97
Female	2.24	3.92	4.36	2.87	4.04	3.10	2.95	1.81
Total	2.45	3.86	4.31	2.84	3.97	3.14	3.02	1.91
N	(575)	(578)	(578)	(576)	(576)	(575)	(578)	(571)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: (1) Difficulty finding suitable people to fill the positions; (2) Constant criticism by the media; (3) Corruption of some politicians; (4) Problems stemming from the funding of the campaigns and parties; (5) The continuous tension in political life; (6) Lack of contact with the average citizen's real problems; (7) The way in which representative institutions operate; (8) There is a willingness to not find people who are suitable for the lists. The scale to measure the variables goes from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree)

the representative institutions function also receive a high score from the MPs (around 3), but lower than corruption, tension, and the media.

It can be said that the perceptions of MPs are consistent, to a great extent, with the theoretical explanations for the lack of political trust, since they both highlight the role of corruption cases and the media. Thus, for example, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) and Seligson (2002) indicate that the perception of corruption is one of the main causes eroding political trust, which would be a consequence of the fact that corruption reduces trust in institutional efficiency and impartiality, which are direct predictors of political trust (Miller and Listhaug 1999). In turn, Pharr (2000) states that corruption scandals are a better predictor of levels of trust than the indicators of political efficiency. Likewise, the media, and particularly the television, have been identified as a cause of political discontent in contemporary democracies (Newton 2006). This is on account of the emphasis on conflictive dimensions and tension when presenting political information (Robinson 1976), an aspect placed in third place by MPs.

A disaggregated analysis of the data presented in Table 9.2 reveals that there is a high level of agreement among MPs surrounding the diagnosis of the problems that lead to mistrust in politics. The differences according to the party or the chamber are relatively small, which leads to two essential conclusions being drawn. The first is that the perception of politics' discredit is not a partisan question, since the representatives of all parties are aware of the problems that generate mistrust in politics. And although there are differences in terms of the scores for particular items, the order of the reasons for mistrust is the same in all parties. The second is that the perception of politics' disrepute occurs with a similar intensity in the different levels of political representation (Congress and Senate or regional parliaments).

The reasons behind the loss of trust in political parties is specifically analyzed in the level of trust in the objects making up the political system. Again, on a scale of 1–5, the MPs were asked about the factors which, in their opinion, explain the loss of trust in parties. As occurred in the case of the discredit of politics, the MPs also highlighted as the main reason for the loss of trust in parties the fact that corruption cases damage the credibility of parties (with an average of 4.6). With lower scores, they indicate that the media are fiercely critical of parties (3.8), the lack of contact with the average citizen's real problems (3.3) and that people do not tend to trust in the party winning the elections if it is not theirs (3.3). Lastly, despite receiving the lowest scores, they also attribute considerable impor-

Table 9.2 Reasons for mistrust in political parties (averages 1–5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party								
PP	2.83	2.47	3.85	2.81	3.19	2.71	3.32	4.55
PSOE	2.71	2.37	3.75	2.37	3.36	2.74	3.17	4.68
IU	2.70	4.35	4.00	3.78	3.09	3.27	3.82	4.50
Other parties	2.97	3.43	3.69	3.07	3.29	2.74	3.43	4.64
Parliament								
Congress and Senate	2.73	2.62	3.97	2.81	3.26	2.87	3.25	4.58
Andalusia	2.79	2.40	3.86	2.66	3.16	2.62	3.21	4.49
Catalonia	2.88	3.05	3.88	2.70	3.12	2.79	3.14	4.58
Galicia	2.79	2.79	3.56	2.56	3.10	2.56	3.19	4.49
Basque Country	3.07	2.70	3.88	2.48	3.57	2.48	3.40	4.91
Other parliaments	2.79	2.66	3.70	2.78	3.30	2.79	3.38	4.63
Sex								
Male	2.83	2.64	3.69	2.86	3.24	2.82	3.29	4.64
Female	2.77	2.72	3.96	2.52	3.31	2.64	3.32	4.56
Total	2.81	2.67	3.79	2.73	3.27	2.75	3.30	4.61
N	(572)	(572)	(569)	(572)	(567)	(568)	(570)	(565)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: (1) Mistrust is a logical consequence of the game of parties, government and opposition; (2) It is the result of the tendency toward bipartidism in the practice of Spanish politics; (3) The media are fiercely critical of parties; (4) The parties are no longer ideological and their political platforms are similar; (5) People do not tend to trust in the party that wins the elections if it is not their party; (6) Mistrust is a consequence of the lack of internal democracy in the parties; (7) On account of the lack of contact with the average citizen's real problems; (8) Corruption cases damage the credibility of parties. The scale to measure the variables goes from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree)

tance to the fact that mistrust is a logical consequence of the game of parties, government and opposition (2.8), that it is a consequence of the lack of internal democracy in the parties (2.7) and that it is the result of the tendency toward bipartidism of Spanish politics (2.7).

Here, a certain parallelism with the theoretical explanations can also be observed as regards the effect of corruption and the echo this makes in the media. In this regard, Lau (1982) states that negative information about political subjects receives more attention than positive information, determining citizens' perceptions of their political systems to some extent. Furthermore, Dalton (2004) suggests that the effects of the media are one of the most important factors explaining political trust. This author considers that the media, especially the television, are gaining ground in

terms of shaping the political landscape and individuals' evaluations. In recent years, the trend in the media and especially the television, to focus their attention on scandals contributes to the deterioration of the perception of political actors.

However, the little importance MPs attribute to the lack of internal democracy in parties is noteworthy, compared to that indicated by the literature. In accordance with Miller and Listhaug (1999, p. 365), systems with more voice opportunities to show discontent should present greater support towards the political system. Berggren et al. (2004, p. 24) and Anderson and Guillory (1997) highlight that the more opportunities citizens have to choose candidates or parties, or the closer citizens perceive election channels to be, the better their evaluation of the political system and, therefore, the greater their support and trust (Miller and Listhaug 1999, p. 366). Nevertheless, MPs tend to focus their explanations of mistrust in the parties on factors that are unrelated to the internal structure of parties.

In view of these data, the question arises as to what extent politicians' perceptions correspond to those of the voters as regards the loss of trust in politics in general and parties in particular. The main reason for mistrust indicated by citizens, and representatives alike, is political corruption, in line with that indicated by the literature. Specifically, this cause is mentioned by almost eight out of every ten individuals interviewed (CIS study 2939). The rest of the causes mentioned are given much lower scores. The priority politicians give to their interests is mentioned by one third of the sample, and the scarce concern for citizens' problems by 27%. The lack of preparation of those occupying public positions, the poor functioning of political institutions, and the image of conflicts between leaders are mentioned by less than one fifth of those interviewed. It is particularly striking that the critical image by the media is only mentioned by 3%, compared to the representatives who placed it as one of the most important reasons for mistrust.

9.3 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS EXPLAINING MISTRUST

In this section, the factors explaining the loss of trust in politics and in parties are divided into two dimensions according to the ability of the parties to take action in each type of factor. The first dimension includes the internal factors which are those that depend on the action of the political

parties themselves. The second dimension includes the external factors which are those that form part of the institutional setting and, therefore, are not directly modifiable by these. The individual score of each MP in each of the dimensions is obtained as the average score in the items belonging to each dimension.

In this classification, the internal factors are based on values which, according to Offe (1999), bring about trust in modern societies, since, as the latter sets out, the institutions must represent a specific spectrum of values to obtain the trust of the citizens. In this regard, the institutions and representatives generate trust, first of all, in so far as they undertake to tell the truth and, therefore, detect and monitor any violations of this regulation. This value will be reflected, among other aspects, in the parties' action towards corruption. Secondly, the value of impartiality and neutrality is relevant in so far as it represents equality before the law and political participation in equal conditions. This value is fundamentally connected with the degree of internal democracy in parties and the recruitment processes of political leaders. Lastly, the value of solidarity fosters trust in so far as it protects citizens in adverse situations. And this value would be related with the parties' involvement in the real problems of citizens. The external factors, in turn, are not connected with this core of intrinsic values; rather, they refer to contextual aspects that condition the activity of the parties but go beyond their actual ability to act immediately.

Internal factors considered in the analysis of trust in politics in general are: the corruption of some politicians, the lack of contact with the real problems of people, and the fact that there is the willingness to not find people who are prepared for the lists. The following external factors have been considered: difficulties finding suitable people to fill positions, the constant criticism by the media, problems stemming from the funding of campaigns and parties, the continuous tension of political life, and the way in which representative institutions operate.

As regards the analysis of trust in parties, the following internal factors were considered: the parties are no longer ideological and their political platforms are similar, mistrust is a consequence of the lack of internal democracy in the parties, the lack of contact with the real problems of people, and the fact that the cases of corruption damage the credibility of parties. The following external factors were included: mistrust is a logical consequence of the game of parties, government and opposition, it is the result of the tendency toward bipartidism in the practice of Spanish poli-

tics, the media are fiercely critical of the parties, and people do not tend to trust in the party that wins the elections if it is not their party.

The preliminary hypothesis is that MPs' perceptions of political mistrust should be influenced by their position within the respective parties and parliamentary groups, as well as by their degree of political professionalization. It can be expected that those MPs who hold leadership positions in the parties and parliamentary groups have a different perception of the political activity and the reasons of political disaffection, since their degree of responsibility regarding the decisions made in the parliamentary groups is greater. Therefore, there is an expectation that the MPs making up the leadership core of the parliamentary groups attribute a lesser importance to internal factors. On the contrary, those representatives who do not hold leadership positions within the parties and parliamentary groups would be more willing to recognize the importance of the internal factors in the parties themselves in the generation of mistrust. As regards the effect of leadership on the importance attributed to external factors, the hypothesis is that those MPs less influential within the parliamentary group also attribute them greater importance, in so far as they are factors beyond their control.

Another hypothesis is that those representatives who are most committed to the ideology of the party that they represent should give greater importance to the factors that are external to the parties, while those representatives who are more distant from the party's main ideological stances should attribute more responsibility to internal factors. Similarly, one might think that those who have served more terms in the parliament have a greater tendency to blame politics' discredit on external factors, while newcomers should attribute more importance to the internal responsibilities of the parties in the generation of mistrust.

As regards the impact of the professionalization of MPs, it is important to take into consideration the effect of their professional expectations. Those who have less professional experience outside of the political sphere have less incentive to blame the internal factors of the parties' organization, in so far as their expectations of future professional development are linked to the organizational model of the parties in which they are active. On the contrary, those MPs who have a longer professional career and, therefore, greater professional development expectations outside of politics should have a more critical view of the internal operation of the parties.

In the regression analysis presented in Table 9.3 to verify these hypotheses, the scores for each of the internal and external factors in the levels of trust in politics in general and trust in political parties are used as dependent variables. The explanatory variables in each regression include: legislative experience, measured by the number of terms in the parliament; previous professional experience, measured by the number of years that a particular parliament member performed a profession before working in

Table 9.3 Explanatory factors of the mistrust in politics and the mistrust in parties. Regression analysis (OLS)

	<i>Trust in politics</i>		<i>Trust in parties</i>	
	<i>Internal factors</i>	<i>External factors</i>	<i>Internal factors</i>	<i>External factors</i>
Party (reference category: PP)				
PSOE	-0.107 (0.071)	-0.053 (0.059)	-0.157*** (0.060)	-0.063 (0.062)
IU	0.045 (0.169)	0.214 (0.137)	0.495*** (0.142)	0.548*** (0.146)
Other parties	0.057 (0.094)	0.143* (0.078)	0.089 (0.079)	0.289*** (0.081)
Parliament (reference category: Congress and Senate)				
Regional parliament	0.217*** (0.069)	0.082 (0.057)	0.025 (0.059)	0.003 (0.060)
Parliamentary leadership	-0.042*** (0.017)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.029** (0.014)
Ideological distance	0.018 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.015)	0.021 (0.015)	0.031* (0.016)
Terms in parliament	-0.073** (0.031)	-0.020 (0.026)	0.009 (0.026)	0.033 (0.027)
Professional experience	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Sex (reference category: Male)				
Female	-0.085 (0.067)	-0.033 (0.055)	-0.114** (0.056)	0.117** (0.058)
Constant	3.556*** (0.177)	3.266*** (0.146)	3.641*** (0.149)	3.048*** (0.154)
R ²	0.046	0.028	0.075	0.070
N	(526)	(529)	(519)	(523)

Source: CIS study 2827

Note: ***, ** and * indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors appear in brackets

politics;¹ parliamentary leadership measured by the degree to which MPs consider that they have influence in their parliamentary group on a scale of 1–10; and the ideological distance with the party. This ideological distance was measured by the square of the difference between the MP's ideological position and the average of the positions of the MPs from their own parliamentary group.² In addition, the following control variables were included: political party, chamber, and sex.

Overall, the findings reported in Table 9.3 provide evidence in favor of the hypotheses set out. Beginning with the hypotheses related to the position of MPs within the parties, it is observed that parliamentary leadership has a negative and significant effect on the perception of the causes of mistrust. Those who have more influence within their parliamentary group are less likely to attribute the responsibility for mistrust in politics in general and of mistrust in parties to internal factors within the parties themselves. They are also less likely to attribute the mistrust in parties to external factors. In short, those MPs with higher ranks in the groups tend to exonerate the parties' actions in the loss of trust in politics in general, while they consider that both the parties and the institutional framework have little importance in the generation of mistrust in parties.

The ideological distance with the party represented by the MPs is not a decisive variable in the explanation of the causal factors of the lack of trust. However, contrary to the hypothesis formulated initially, those with a greater ideological distance from the average of their own party tend to attribute greater responsibility to external factors in the explanation of the loss of trust in parties, although this result is only significant at $p < 0.10$. This result can be explained, in part, by the low variability of the ideological distance, in so far as the ideological positions of the representatives of each parliament group are relatively homogeneous.

As regards the hypothesis of the effect of political professionalization, the results show that the number of terms in the parliament has a negative and significant effect on the internal factors in explaining trust in politics in general. Likewise, those MPs who have more professional experience prior to politics perceive that the lack of trust in parties can be explained by the operational dynamics of the parties, since the effect of the number of years of professional experience prior to politics has a positive and significant effect on the internal factors that explain the lack of trust in the parties. These results suggest that the higher the degree of political professionalization (greater number of terms in parliament and less previous professional experience), the lesser importance is attributed to the internal

factors explaining the loss of trust both in politics in general and in parties.

Based on the fact that the MPs holding leadership positions in parliamentary groups, and those with most political experience, attribute least importance to the factors generating mistrust, a divide can be established between insiders and outsiders within the parliamentary groups. The former are less likely to identify the reasons for mistrust in politics and in parties, which could be interpreted as a defense of the status quo. The latter, on the contrary, are more likely to indicate the reasons driving the mistrust, which would indicate a greater willingness to act on these reasons.

9.4 THE PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

In this section, MPs' and citizens' perceptions of corruption are analyzed with a view to understanding the similarities and differences between them. In the case of Spain, the effect of scandals on citizens' perception of corruption has been examined, as well as how this perception reinforces mistrust and institutional indifference (Jiménez 2004; Jiménez and Villoria 2012). Likewise, the electoral repercussion of political scandals has also been analyzed. According to Jiménez and Caínzos (2004, 2006), the influence of scandals on the voting decision of an individual voter depends on three groups of factors: the type, seriousness and media coverage of the scandal; the economic and political context in which it occurs; and internal aspects of the voters, such as their moral principles, their political preferences, the assessment they make of the political and economic situation and their previous party identity. In this respect, analyzing the wave of scandals in the 1990s, Sánchez-Cuenca and Barreiro (2000) concluded that citizens perceive cases of corruption affecting the party contrary to the one they voted for more critically, and minimize the government's responsibility over such cases when this is run by their party of preference. Likewise, these authors reveal that, although the appearance of corruption cases linked to the government could cause a reduction of trust by the electorate, the attitude adopted by the government towards the scandals takes on even more importance (Sánchez-Cuenca and Barreiro 2000, p. 78).

The first important point when analyzing the perceptions of citizens and MPs is that the former express a much more negative perception of corruption in Spain compared to other European countries. Thus, while

55% of citizens believe that there are more cases of corruption in Spain than in the rest of Europe (CIS study 2930), only 22% of representatives consider the same (Table 9.4). Unlike the citizens surveyed, the majority of MPs (72%) perceive that the problem of corruption in Spain is similar to that present in other European democracies, which could indicate a certain minimization of the scope of corruption among Spanish MPs.

This is reinforced when the data are analyzed by party affiliation. MPs belonging to the two major parties and with more power both on a national and regional level, especially the PP (79%), consider to a greater extent than the rest that corruption problems in Spain are similar to those in the other European countries. Similarly, citizens who voted for the PP or the PSOE in the last elections tend to perceive a lesser scope of corruption in Spain than voters of IU (United Left) and other parties. In light of these data, it can be stated that the affinity to or membership of the major parties minimizes the importance citizens and MPs give to corruption in Spain compared to the rest of Europe.

Table 9.4 MPs' perception of the importance of corruption as a problem compared to other countries in Europe (in %)

	<i>More important than in other European countries</i>	<i>Similar</i>	<i>Less important than in other European countries</i>	<i>Total</i>
Party				
PP	16	79	5	100 (238)
PSOE	19	74	7	100 (230)
IU	44	50	6	100 (18)
Other parties	48	51	1	100 (75)
Parliament				
Congress and Senate	17	77	6	100 (181)
Andalusia	16	78	6	100 (49)
Catalonia	30	68	3	100 (37)
Galicia	19	76	5	100 (38)
Basque Country	47	45	8	100 (38)
Other parliaments	23	71	6	100 (218)
Total	22	72	6	100 (561)

Source: CIS study 2827

Furthermore, MPs were asked what anti-corruption measures they considered most important. Transparency in the financing of parties (52%), education in democratic values (42%), and the establishment of harsher sanctions for corruption crimes categorized in the Penal Code (38%) were the three measures most cited by MPs (Table 9.5). However, those anti-corruption measures that would potentially most affect the MPs themselves, such as the hardening of the incompatibility system of political representatives, or the reduction of the urban development competence of town councils—which would affect those participating in municipal governments—are the measures least cited by MPs, with percentages of 15% and 16% respectively.

It is paradoxical that transparency in financing is indicated as the main measure to end corruption in Spain, bearing in mind that the law regulating party funding was reformed in 2007,³ shortly before the interviews on which this study is based were conducted. This legislative reform was theoretically directed towards reducing opacity in this sphere and was passed

Table 9.5 Opinion on what are the two main corruption control measures by MPs (in %)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Party							
PP	47	11	39	29	39	21	7
PSOE	54	16	39	25	44	12	6
IU	68	21	26	22	36	9	13
Other parties	59	19	37	16	44	12	5
Parliament							
Congress and Senate	50	11	36	19	49	22	7
Andalusia	46	7	37	25	49	16	9
Catalonia	54	14	37	33	30	19	9
Galicia	56	18	33	18	35	20	7
Basque Country	55	29	27	25	42	12	5
Other parliaments	54	16	44	31	36	10	5
Total	52 (292)	15 (82)	38 (214)	25 (142)	42 (233)	16 (89)	6 (36)

Source: CIS 2827

Note: Multiple-choice question (maximum of two answers). (1) Ensure true transparency in the financing of the parties; (2) Harden the incompatibility system of political representatives; (3) Harsher sanctions for corruption offenses that are categorized as crimes; (4) Establish effective control systems within the parties; (5) Education in democratic values and in respect for the public domain among citizens in general; (6) Reduce the urban development competence of town councils; (7) Other

after various failed attempts on account of a lack of agreement between the formations represented in the Congress. In fact, the Political Parties Finance Act 2007 (LOFPP) was finally passed without the support of the main opposition party at the time, the PP.

Taking this into account, two types of reactions should be expected from the MPs in response to the question about the measures of controlling corruption: on the one hand, a generalized support from PP MPs of the need to make financing more transparent and, on the other hand, less attention from the PSOE and the other parties that supported the reform of the cited law in 2007. Since it had been passed by these same parties, the LOFPP would contribute positively to the transparency of the financing system. Nevertheless, the data in Table 9.5 contradict this argument revealing a greater concern to increase transparency in financing among MPs from the IU (68%) and the PSOE (54%), than in the case of those from the PP (47%).

The fact that half of the MPs who voted for the law in Congress and in the Senate (Table 9.5) consider that, indeed, true transparency must be ensured in the financing of the parties indicates that it is a lack of trust in the reach of the LOFPP that leads MPs to understand that the opacity in this sphere must end.

9.5 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has shown that MPs are aware of the deterioration of the image citizens have of political activity and parties, despite them having a moderately positive perception of the way in which politics work in their respective autonomous regions. Additionally, MPs tend to reveal that the mistrust in parties is due particularly to internal factors in the parties themselves. In addition, there are few differences per political party or parliament, except in occasional aspects. It has also been observed that both MPs and voters point to corruption cases as the most important factor when explaining the loss of trust in politics in general and in parties.

Despite this, MPs, especially representatives of the PP and PSOE, tend to minimize the scope of corruption in Spain compared to the perception of citizens. This can be explained by the fact that, by being the parties with more political power across the country, they are also the parties most affected by corruption scandals over time. This would make them perceive the importance of such scandals, and therefore the scope of corruption in general, in a less critical manner. The MPs of all

parties do agree that transparency of financing should be the main measure to reduce the incidence of corruption in Spain. They also consider the LOFPP passed in 2007 to have a very limited scope as regards transparency.

The main hypothesis of this chapter is that the perception representatives have of the reasons for the discrediting of political activity is conditioned by their position within the parties and their professional career expectations outside of politics. The results show that MPs with a greater influential capacity within their own parliamentary group attribute less importance to internal and external factors in the explanation of mistrust in parties, since they feel more questioned than other MPs by these criticisms. On the contrary, those who have more previous professional experience, and those who have spent fewer terms in the parliament, tend to attribute greater importance to internal factors in the explanation of mistrust in political parties.

The results indicate that the proposals to renew or act on the factors causing political mistrust are less likely to emerge from more experienced MPs or those who have more influence within the parliamentary groups, than from those MPs who do not belong to the leadership of their group or from those who have longer professional experience prior to politics. These results also reveal a certain difficulty for the parties in solving the problem of political mistrust, in so far as awareness about the factors that bring about mistrust is lower precisely in leadership positions.

NOTES

1. The variable takes the value of 0 for individuals who do not declare having had a known profession before entering politics (students and inactive individuals).
2. For the models presented in Table 9.3, logarithms of the ideological gaps were taken, since the distribution of the original variable had a very defined negative asymmetry.
3. Organic Law (OL) 8/2007, of 4th July, on the financing of political parties. This law was reformed in some aspects by the OL 5/2012, of 22nd October and by the OL 3/2015, of 30th March.

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National and Regional Identity

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10.1 IDENTITY

One of the most important phenomena in Spain's recent history is the expansion and transformation of collective identities. After several decades of centralized government, the democratization in Spain ran parallel to the country's decentralization as it became a semi-federal state (Lijphart 1999, p. 189) or one of imperfect federalism (Moreno 1994). The progressive construction of a state made up of different autonomous communities (*Comunidades Autónomas*) paralleled the recognition and promotion of regional identities, to such an extent that different studies have highlighted (albeit with territorial variations and differing intensities) the consolidation of regional and dual identities (combining Spanish and regional identity) to the detriment of an exclusively Spanish identity (Moreno 1997; Herranz 1996, de Rafael 2005; Moral 1998; Díez Nicolás 1999). This phenomenon is to be expected in a context of federalization that, for some authors, is not necessarily detrimental to the unity of the country (Linz 1989).

However, no previous studies have analyzed the collective identity of Spanish members of parliament (MPs). A snapshot of their identitarian

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attachments could help to explain, to some degree, the strategies and political actions developed within (and by) political parties in Spain. Ultimately, collective identity is a Durkheimian social fact of the highest order, which orients political actions (Jiménez and Navarro 2015).

The core premise of this article is that collective identity is the representation of a group of people who generally live in a specific territory, and which is shared by its members and recognized by agents outside of the group (DiMaggio 1997, p. 274). As such, collective identities are social facts with unique characteristics: they are contingent, they can be transformed over time, they are rooted in so-called markers or “domains of identity” (language, religions, etc.), they are not exclusive, and they might or might not be turned into a platform for political claims and protest (Coller and Carrillo 2014). In other words, collective identities are constructed artifacts. As such, attention must be paid to their triple dimension. Firstly, their construction and evolution, a task that has fallen to historians (Álvarez Junco 2001; Morales et al. 2013). Secondly, their principal components, domains and markers on which representation is based, a task that has fallen to anthropology and sociology (Kohn 1966; Barth 1976; Tejerina 1992; Alonso 1994; Hierro 2015; Álvarez et al. 2018). And finally, their extension, significance and use as a platform for political claims and protest, aspects tackled by sociology and political science (Pérez-Agote 1989; Miley 2006; Coller 2006; Hierro 2013; Linz 2008).

This chapter focuses on the third dimension, whereas the next chapter provides a comparison with the population. In order to detect the extension and social foundations of collective identities, the classic question posed by Juan Linz to ascertain identity through surveys provides a useful tool.¹ Contrary to the assumption that “territorial” and “national” identities are mutually exclusive, Linz’s question allows identification to be graded and nuanced through the collective referent (“more Spanish”, “more regional”) and the combination of two collective referents (Spanish and regional) through dual identities.

As can be seen in Table 10.1, looking at Spanish MPs as a whole group, it can be concluded that the large majority (67%) embrace a dual identity mixing the Spanish and regional referents, although a certain inclination is observed towards regional identities (20%), which is to be expected in a federal or quasi-federal state in which self-governing communities or regions enjoy increasing political weight and are emerging with force as collective referents. Exclusive identities (“only Spanish” or “only regional”) are in the minority among MPs (with just over one tenth), as can be seen in Table 10.1.²

Table 10.1 Collective identities (three categories), according to political party (in %)

	<i>Fundamentally Spanish</i>	<i>Dual identity</i>	<i>Fundamentally regional</i>	<i>Total</i>
PP and UPN	22	75	3	100
PSOE	7	78	15	100
IU	0	44	56	100
CiU	0	8	92	100
ERC	0	0	100	100
PNV	0	0	100	100
Other nationalist parties	0	0	100	100
Other non-nationalist parties	6	40	54	100
Other regionalist parties	17	17	66	100
Total (N)	13 (72)	67 (380)	20 (112)	100 (563)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: The original question on the scale is: "Which of the following statements do you most identify with? 1 = I only feel Spanish, 2 = I feel more Spanish than (Asturian, Galician, Basque, etc.), 3 = I feel equally Spanish and (Asturian, Galician, Basque, etc.), 4 = I feel more (Asturian, Galician, Basque, etc.) than Spanish, 5 = I only feel (Asturian, Galician, Basque, etc)." The Spanish identitarian referent encompasses the first and second categories, whereas dual identity is constructed on the basis of the third category, and the fundamental regional position is constructed using the fourth and fifth categories

10.2 THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF IDENTITY

The study of socio-demographic variables offers an initial approach to understanding the social foundations of identity, allowing us to glimpse certain differences that are relevant in the population of Spanish MPs. In general terms, Table 10.2 shows that the Spanish identitarian pole is supported by slightly different characteristics than the regional identitarian pole. In the first, there are significantly more men, older people, those with a university education, immigrants (or children of immigrants), people from the services class, Spanish-speakers, more conservative people, and residents of more densely populated areas. In the regional pole, we are more likely to find women, younger people, also people with university qualifications, natives (and with native parents), from the middle and working classes, speakers of non-Spanish languages, people with more left-leaning tendencies, and residents of less populated areas. As for dual identity, the social profiles are more diluted.

Table 10.2 Identity according to socio-demographic profile (in %)

	<i>Fundamentally Spanish</i>	<i>Dual identity</i>	<i>Fundamentally regional</i>	<i>Total</i>
Gender				
Male	15	67	18	100
Female	8	69	23	100
Age				
Under 35	4	70	26	100
From 35 to 50	9	68	23	100
Over 50	18	66	16	100
Education				
Secondary or lower	9	75	16	100
Diploma/technical engineering	8	71	21	100
Degree/advanced engineering	15	65	20	100
Postgraduate	7	66	27	100
Native of autonomous community				
Yes	9	65	26	100
No	28	62	10	100
Native parents				
Both	10	66	24	100
Only one	18	60	22	100
Neither	13	72	15	100
Parents' social class				
Services class	16	61	23	100
Middle classes	10	65	25	100
Working class	9	68	23	100
Mother tongue				
Spanish	11	72	17	100
Regional language	3	40	57	100
Place of residence (number of inhabitants)				
Fewer than 5000	6	76	18	100
Between 5001 and 20,000	4	69	26	100
Between 20,001 and 100,000	9	76	16	100
Between 100,001 and a million	17	64	19	100
More than a million inhabitants	36	45	20	100

(continued)

Table 10.2 (continued)

	<i>Fundamentally Spanish</i>	<i>Dual identity</i>	<i>Fundamentally regional</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ideology				
Left (1–2)	4	51	46	100
Center-left (3–4)	5	66	28	100
Center (5)	13	72	15	100
Center-right (6–7)	23	71	5	100
Right (8–10)	27	61	12	100
Total	(N)	13 (72)	67 (380)	20 (112) (563)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Notes: “Mother tongue” refers only to self-governing communities with joint official languages. The profession of the father was considered when constructing “parents’ social class”, divided into the following categories: services class (professionals, managers, executives and major employers), middle classes (non-manual workers, services workers and small business owners), and working class (manual and farm workers). More details are provided in Chap. 1. All relationships are significant at 0.01 with the exception of education and parents’ social class, which are not significant. The variables gender and native parents are significant at 0.05

When we consider socio-demographic variables, dual identity is the most frequent choice among MPs (except in the category “regional mother tongue”) although with different intensities. According to the data in Table 10.2, there is a statistically significant relationship between gender and collective identity, although this is possibly spurious in nature, as we will see later on.³ Men tend to identify with the pole of the Spanish identity category (15%) to a greater extent than women (8%), who are usually situated on the regional pole with greater frequency (23%) than men (18%).

Unlike gender, it is not surprising that age has a significant relationship with collective identity: the older the MP, the more they identify with the Spanish pole of identity, in comparison with younger MPs, who are more frequently positioned on the regional pole. Even so, younger MPs are also more likely to proclaim a dual identity (70%), as shown in Table 10.2. One possible explanation for this association lies in the “generation effect”⁴: respondents of a similar age have been exposed to the same historic events and, therefore, to a similar socialization. *Ceteris paribus*, ideology and territory can shape the differentiated behavior of the age variable. In other words, an MP under the age of 35 has been socialized within a democratic Spain and the State of Autonomous Communities, and s/he is more likely to have developed a regional identity than an MP who has been socialized during Franco’s regime (over the age of 35), and who might present a greater tendency to develop a fundamentally Spanish identity.

According to the theory of primordialism, birth within a specific territory shapes the development of collective identities via socialization and experiences (Geertz 1973). A primordial collective identity focuses on given “domains of identity”, such as origin, religion and language, in contrast to “civic” identities that articulate loyalties to a shared legal order (citizenship) which underscore the role of voluntariness and will in the construction of identity (Bluhm 1973). The combination of cultural heterogeneity in Spain and its progressive federalization means that the development of regional identities could foreseeably be more frequent than the development of a purely Spanish identity when taking into account place of birth. Consequently, being an immigrant (or having immigrant parents) could make it more likely that an individual will be located on the Spanish pole of identity or in the category of dual identity, to the detriment of the fundamentally regional identity. The data in Table 10.2 indicate a statistically significant association between place of birth and identity, showing that, whereas natives tend to be positioned more frequently on the regional pole of identity (26%) and dual identity (65%), among immigrant MPs the opposite is true: although dual identity is still the most frequent category (62%), they are more like to choose the Spanish pole of identity (28%) than natives. The expected relationship was also observed when the parents are native. Even though dual identity is more frequently observed among all the groups, the regional pole carries greater weight among MPs with two native parents (24%), than among those with only one native parent (22%) or none (15%). Similarly, the Spanish identity is less common among MPs with two native parents (10%) than among those with only one or no native parents (18% and 13%).⁵

Language is usually understood as a vehicle for identity, and in certain areas the mother tongue can become a cultural and identity domain (Moya 1984, p. 20; Tejerina 1992, p. 53; López-Aranguren 1995, p. 67), although it is also understood that the mother tongue does not necessarily tie an individual to a specific identity (Linz 1975, p. 370; Anderson 1983, p. 74; Hobsbawm 1990, pp. 59–63; Coller 2006). Among Spanish MPs, the mother tongue is linked to identity. In Table 10.2 we see that the differentiated behavior between Spanish-speaking MPs and those whose mother tongue is Galician, Basque or Catalan (including the dialectal varieties of Valencia and the Balearic Islands). For the former, dual identity is most frequently observed, followed by regional identity. However, people whose mother tongue is not Spanish develop a preference towards a regional identity that is even greater than dual identity. The linguistic

factor—speaking the regional language—is the only element that fosters regional identities among MPs, pushing them to higher levels than dual and Spanish identities.

With regard to MPs' place of residence, a certain degree of variability can only be observed when the respondents live in large towns and cities (particularly with over one million inhabitants). MPs who live in small towns and villages usually display a preference for dual or regional identity. When there are over 100,000 inhabitants in their town or city, Table 10.2 shows a polarization of identities to the detriment of dual identity, which still is the identity embraced by the majority. Whereas having a mother tongue other than Spanish fosters regional identities, an urban residential context seems to foster Spanish identity, but not to the detriment of regional identity, rather of dual identity instead.⁶

Different studies highlight the relationship between identity, ideology and voting tendencies (Blas 1989, 2013; Aguilar and Sánchez Cuenca 2008; Bonet et al. 2010), so that, for widely explained historical reasons (Álvarez Junco 2001; Moreno Luzón 2013; Dardé 2013), whereas conservative segments have developed an inclination towards a Spanish identity complemented with a dual identity, the left has also developed an inclination towards regional identities.⁷ The data given in Table 10.2 confirm this link between ideology and identity. Positions that lean more towards the right account for a higher proportion of people who are closer to the Spanish pole of the identity, and a lower proportion of people with a more regional identity. The categories of “left” and “center-left” on the other hand concentrate higher numbers of regional identities.

In order to complete the information about bivariate relations presented in previous analyses, and to measure the effect of each variable whilst controlling the other factors reflected in the previous tables, two logistic regressions were performed, combining multivariate analysis with the variables included in Table 10.2.⁸ The first column of Table 10.3 shows the coefficients of a model that compares those with a dual identity (reference category) with those who have a fundamentally regional identity. The second model uses the same reference category and compares these individuals with those who proclaim a fundamentally Spanish identity.

By combining the variables in a single model, gender and parental origin cease to be determining factors in the identity of the MPs surveyed. In other words, when other alternative variables are considered, gender and the native or non-native status of the parents no longer explain why some

Table 10.3 Coefficients of the logistic regressions for dual identity vs. fundamentally Spanish identity, and dual identity vs. fundamentally regional identity

	<i>Model 1:</i>		<i>Model 2:</i>	
	<i>Fundamentally regional (vs. dual)</i>		<i>Fundamentally Spanish (vs. dual)</i>	
Constant	-2.25 (0.70)	***	-2.21 (1.03)	**
Gender				
Female	0.13 (0.24)		-0.41 (0.33)	
Age (ref: over 50)				
From 35 to 50	0.00 (0.35)		-0.96 (0.73)	**
Under 35	-0.30 (0.36)		1.58 (0.71)	
Education (ref: secondary)				
Diploma	0.49 (0.45)		0.14 (0.64)	
Degree	0.47 (0.38)		0.91 (0.52)	*
Postgraduate	0.94 (0.49)	**	0.33 (0.82)	
Native	0.62 (0.35)	*	-0.90 (0.32)	***
Native parents (ref: both native)				
One native	-0.32 (0.62)		0.61 (0.57)	
Neither native	-0.16 (0.30)		-0.27 (0.40)	
Parents' social class (ref: services)				
Middle classes	0.15 (0.31)		-0.49 (0.43)	
Working class	0.10 (0.26)		-0.59 (0.35)	*
Ideology (1 = left; 10 = right)	0.01 (0.01)		0.03 (0.01)	***
<i>N</i>	455		396	
Log-likelihood	478.68		313.41	
Nagelkerke R squared	0.04		0.21	

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: * $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$. Typical errors shown in parenthesis

MPs proclaim a dual identity and others do not. However, the other relations established previously are confirmed in Table 10.3. Younger, native, working class, left-leaning MPs are least likely to identify with Spain and more likely to identify with their respective autonomous community. In contrast, older, non-native, more conservative MPs embrace more Spanish identities over regional ones. An MP under the age of 30, with self-proclaimed left-leaning views (three on the ideological position scale), with postgraduate studies, working class parents, native, and with native parents, has a 7.9% chance of proclaiming a fundamentally Spanish identity, 67% of maintaining a dual identity, and 29% of being characterized by a fundamentally regional identity. However, a man over the age of 50, with right-wing political leanings (eight on the ideological position scale), with a university degree, parents in the services class, non-native with non-native parents, has a 16% chance of having a fundamentally Spanish identity (double the percentage of the previous hypothetical case), a 76% chance of developing a dual identity, and 6% chance of having a fundamentally regional identity (almost five times lower than the previous hypothetical case presented).⁹

Calhoun (1994) refers to the bidimensionality of collective identities, which combine “difference” and “equivalence” in their relationship with other groups. Collective identities thus indicate the differences that separate its holders from other human groups, but they are also characterized by an element of equivalence with other “nations” or groups belonging to a sphere of peoples and cultures. Hence the importance acquired among certain peripheral nationalist spheres by the expression Europe of Nations, where their region, different from Spain, would occupy a position under equal conditions, equivalent to other “nations”.

In this regard, Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001) indicate that collective identities can nestle within one another when the person understands that they are not incompatible with one another. These incompatibilities emerge when it is perceived that local (regional) identities hinder inclusion in larger groups, whereas, in other contexts, broader identities can be interpreted as a threat to the survival of local identities (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001, p. 760). MPs from Spain’s PP (conservative) party almost certainly understand regional and Spanish identity to be complementary in terms of exclusion/integration, whereas nationalist MPs would probably interpret this combination of identities to be incompatible.

10.3 IDENTITY, NATIONALISM AND MODEL OF STATE

Some of the correlates of collective identities might be at the root of some political behaviors. Regional collective identity could be associated with a high level of nationalism or regionalism, and lead to a political stance that is more or less favorable to decentralization. However, such an assumption does not always hold true, as the data in Table 10.4 show. This section analyzes the link between collective identity and the degree of nationalism, regionalism and centralism of the MPs interviewed. Although one might expect to find strong relationships between these variables, the previous literature bears witness to the complex relationship established between dual identity and nationalism (Coller 2006). It is interesting to know the extent to which MPs with a dual identity and with fundamentally Spanish and regional identities position themselves with regard to nationalism and regionalism, Spanish nationalism, and the desired degree of centralization for the State.

Table 10.4 shows the average values for these variables according to the collective identity of the MP.¹⁰ As expected, MPs with a fundamentally Spanish identity display lower average values for peripheral nationalism and regionalism (1.9 and 4.0 respectively), and also the lowest average level of desired autonomy (5.4), whereas their average value for Spanish nationalism is the highest (5.6). The opposite is true of MPs whose identity

Table 10.4 Mean values for nationalism, regionalism, and the desired degree of centralism and autonomy, according to the collective identity of the respondents

	<i>Fundamentally Spanish</i>	<i>Dual identity</i>	<i>Fundamentally regional</i>
Regional nationalism	1.9 (2.1)	2.7 (2.1)	6.9 (3.3)
<i>N</i>	67	362	108
Regionalism	4.0 (2.6)	5.5 (2.3)	5.3 (4.0)
<i>N</i>	68	373	96
Spanish nationalism	5.6 (3.2)	4.6 (2.6)	1.7 (1.9)
<i>N</i>	69	368	106
Degree of centralism	5.4 (1.7)	6.5 (1.7)	9.0 (1.5)
<i>N</i>	72	379	108

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: Standard deviations from the mean values are given in parenthesis. All the questions were formulated as follows: "In relation with your Autonomous Community, on a scale of 1–10 on which 1 signifies 'minimum nationalism' and 10 'maximum nationalism', where would you position yourself?" The variable "nationalism" was changed to "regionalism", "Spanish nationalism", and "centralization of the state" according to the question

is fundamentally regional, who situate themselves in positions that are further away from Spanish nationalism (1.7), and closer to nationalism and peripheral regionalism (6.9 and 5.3 respectively). A similar observation can be made for those who would seek a higher level of decentralization for their autonomous communities (9.0).

The main advantage of the “Linz scale” of collective identity is that it makes it possible to combine regional and national identities, by also including a category for dual identity. So what happens with MPs who proclaim a dual identity when they are asked to situate themselves on a scale that does not permit such duality? MPs with a dual collective identity behave similarly to MPs with an exclusively Spanish identity in terms of their low levels of nationalism (peripheral and Spanish, with average scores of 2.7 and 4.6 respectively), although they resemble MPs with an exclusively regional identity to a greater extent in terms of their high level of regionalism (5.5). In other words, MPs with a dual identity (the most numerous groups among Spanish MPs) are far from any type of nationalism, regional or national, although for them, their identity is fundamentally linked with their region.

Table 10.4, as well as providing the standard deviations from the mean, also gives a dispersion indicator within each group.¹¹ Even though the relationship between collective identity and nationalism/regionalism is as expected, the analysis of said statistic highlights another aspect. MPs with a fundamentally Spanish identity are not more homogeneous within this group on account of their high levels of Spanish nationalism, but instead because of their low levels of peripheral nationalism. Similarly, MPs with a fundamentally regional identity are more homogeneous on account of their low levels of Spanish nationalism. In other words, there are important variations in terms of levels of peripheral nationalism between those who feel more identified with the region and in terms of levels of Spanish nationalism among those who identify more with Spain. This highlights the fact that collective identity and nationalism are phenomena that may be decoupled and not necessarily associated (Coller 2006, 2013; Álvarez et al. 2018).

10.4 SENTIMENT AND IDENTITY

The social basis of identity show the elements that make certain people with certain characteristics feel closer or further apart from the collective referents. However, they do not indicate whether this identification is relevant, or which substantive elements are the fabric of the collective

referent, an aspect that has been largely neglected by the social sciences. The notion held by MPs of Spain and what it means to be Spanish or from their region could have a direct impact on many of the policies they support in their chambers, particularly those that are closely related with the articulation of the State set against a background of territorial tensions. In accordance with this assumption, it is worth asking the question: how do MPs perceive the notion of Spain? And what about their region? Do sentimental or civic elements play the greater role?

MPs were asked what it means to them to be Spanish. This is an open question that was in the end closed through the option of eleven possible categories, as shown in Table 10.5. They are similar categories to the ones obtained when asked what it means to be from their region, which are shown in Table 10.6. López-Aranguren (1981) states that national identification is articulated through three dimensions: one pertaining to perceptions, another to explanations, and a third that takes the form of aspirations, which are “activated” accumulatively so that, in order for a level pertaining to explanations to emerge, there must be an adequate grounding in the sphere of perceptions. Responding to the importance of perceptions in nationalist identity, Table 10.5 analyses the dimension of perception

Table 10.5 Meaning of being Spanish, according to political party (in %)

	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Remaining parties</i>	<i>Total</i>
Language	2	3	0	0	0	2
Shared history	29	25	5	2	27	24
Spain as a nation	12	4	0	0	0	6
Feelings of pride	27	10	4	3	4	16
Citizenship	10	22	53	32	39	20
Spain, plurinational	2	5	17	4	3	4
Place of birth	5	7	4	2	4	6
Spain as a country	9	14	0	2	0	10
Something imposed	1	1	0	15	10	3
A way of being... (demonym)	1	3	0	0	0	2
Do not identify with	2	5	16	40	13	8
Total (<i>N</i>)	100 (218)	100 (207)	100 (18)	100 (51)	100 (18)	100 (513)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: The respondents were asked: “What does it mean to you to be Spanish?”

regarding what it means to be Spanish, and Table 10.6 does the same regarding the perception of what it means to be from a particular region (Andalusian, Galician, or Catalan).

In both cases, there are three elements that reflect a certain civic dimension (shared history, citizenship, and Spain as my country), another more essentialist aspect (language, nation, way of being), another more linked to feelings and sentiment (pride) and a set of options that mark a certain distancing (something imposed) or innocuousness (place of birth). As a whole, according to this classification, the majority of MPs (54%) share a civic vision of Spain and distance themselves from essentialist conceptions. Respondents who relate the idea of being Spanish with the sphere of feelings instead of specific cultural, territorial or political factors are less likely to develop a strong nationalistic identity (Coller 2006, p. 121).

In the case of the Spanish identity, the largest proportion of MPs (24%) understand that for them, Spain is related to a shared history, roots, shared

Table 10.6 Meaning of being from a specific autonomous community, according to political party (in %)

	<i>PP</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Remaining</i>	<i>Total</i>
Language	5	10	8	18	6	8
Identity	33	44	41	41	16	38
Link to Spain	9	1	0	0	0	4
Feelings of pride	26	15	6	19	34	21
Territorial characteristics	4	1	0	0	11	3
“The place where I live”	7	9	0	3	6	7
Belonging to a nation	5	6	6	15	21	7
Autonomous community where I was born	6	7	8	0	0	6
Service to citizens	2	1	8	0	0	1
Specific qualities (cultural mix, <i>noblesse...</i>)	4	6	23	4	6	5
Total	100 (108)	100 (151)	100 (10)	100 (43)	100 (14)	100 (399)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: The respondents were asked: “What does it meant to you to be ...(demonym)?”

culture, in other words, the elements that unite, which are common to others. This idea is most frequently chosen among MPs from the conservative PP (29%), and also the socialist PSOE (25%). This understanding of being Spanish is followed, with 20% of the total, by the notion that understands being Spanish in terms of citizenship, of legal binding to a territory, and sharing a set legal order. This idea of being Spanish is especially intense among MPs from the left-wing IU party, and also among nationalist parties, although probably for different reasons. In the case of IU, the way of understanding what it is to be Spanish seems to lean towards republican citizenship. The following chapter will show how this hypothesis is congruent with the fact that 64% of MPs from IU interpret Spain as “the State of which I am a citizen”. For nationalist parties, this response might simply be an emotional distancing from the notion of what it means to be Spanish, representing it in legal terms only.

For a notable 16% of respondents, being Spanish is associated with sentiment and feelings (pride, in this case), which are difficult to rationalize in the way that specific qualities such as shared history or citizenship could be. Ten percent of MPs understand that the referent “Spain” is their country, a declaration away from essentialism, but which maintains the non-emotional link with the collective referent.

Furthermore, as suggested by Álvarez Junco (2013) and Juliá (2013) in their analyses of recent history, essentialist positions of the collective identity are in the minority when language or nation are not mentioned (only 8% of the whole) as ideas associated with the referent “Spain”. MPs are able to decouple language from Spanishness, especially in a context in which there are several Spanish languages (Catalan, Galician, Basque, and Castilian), and none appears to be linked sentimentally to the Spanish referent.

When analyzing what is understood by “being” from their autonomous community (being Catalan, for example), we see that on this occasion the modal category is once again “identity”, grouping 38% of the total MPs (Table 10.6). This is the preferred option for left-leaning MPs (PSOE and IU) and nationalists, observed less frequently for the PP and the other parties. Contrary to the Spanish identity, there is a relevant sentimental dimension in the meaning and significance of the regional referent to the extent that “a feeling of pride” is the second most important category (21%). MPs from the conservative PP party display a particular preference for this option (26%), and members of IU show the least preference (6%).

10.5 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter examines in depth the collective identity of Spanish MPs, analyzing the social foundations, the differences between the political parties in this regard, the relationship with different forms of nationalism, and the notion of Spain held by MPs. These are relevant issues in the symbolic universe of citizens, but their study becomes even more important among people who, with their decisions, can modify the structures of State in order to mold them in accordance with their idea of Spain.

Collective identities are not monolithic or necessarily mutually exclusive, so we can find forms of identity that converge, and different identities nested within one another, such as Spanish identity and that of any of Spain's autonomous communities (Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). In order to measure "fundamentally Spanish", "dual", and "fundamentally regional" identities, the well-known question about identity formulated originally by Linz was used.

The majority of MPs (67%) proclaim a dual identity, although the rest are more likely to lean towards "regional" than "fundamentally Spanish" positions. Significant differences are observed depending on the political party. The most important national parties in Spain, PP and PSOE, are characterized by higher levels of Spanish identity than the other parties, including IU, with a tendency towards more regional identity positions. Among the nationalist parties, the Spanish identity is inexistent, and the dual identity is very much in the minority.

When analyzing the social foundations of the forms of collective identity advanced by Spanish MPs, the results of the logistic regression show that, controlling for the other variables inserted in the model, there are no statistically significant differences between men and women. Age is not a significant variable for the case of the regional identity, but it is for the case of the Spanish identity, as younger MPs are less likely to lean towards the Spanish identity than those over the age of 50. Level of education influences the identity of MPs, to the extent that the possession of university degrees increases the possibility of aligning with regional identities instead of the dual identity. In turn, holding a degree increases the probability of embracing a dual identity, as opposed to those with a secondary education, who are more likely to position themselves within the Spanish identity pole. Place of birth is also an important variable. Being a native of the autonomous community increases the likelihood that s/he will embrace the regional identity in comparison with the dual identity. Ideological

orientation is a significant variable in the case of the Spanish pole of the identity, but not for the regional one. Having right-wing political views increases the likelihood of maintaining the Spanish identity.

By studying how forms of collective identity correlate with Spanish nationalism, peripheral nationalism, and regionalism, we observe that MPs with a dual identity are characterized by their low levels of peripheral and Spanish nationalism, although their scores on the regionalism scale are as high as those of MPs with an exclusively regional identity.

It should be noted that the referent “Spain” is fundamentally associated with the idea of shared history and the notion of citizenship, reinforced by the perception that Spain is “my country”. However, it also has a relevant sentimental dimension (“pride”). Essentialist perceptions of the referent “Spain” (generally associated with a single language or the idea of the nation) are very much in the minority among MPs. However, the regional referent has a much stronger sentimental dimension among MPs since it is associated with the idea of “identity” and “pride”, but interestingly it bears little association with the idea of language or nation.

NOTES

1. A genealogy of Linz’s question can be found in Coller (2006).
2. The disaggregated frequencies for the variable “collective identity” can be found in Coller et al. (2016, p. 189)
3. To establish which relationships are significant, we are using the Chi-squared statistic, with $p \leq 0.05$.
4. Age (instead of cohort) would be the alternative explanation. The data available do not reveal which of the two variables explains this difference.
5. The percentages pertaining to MPs with “no native parents” must be taken with caution owing to the low number of MPs that meet this criteria ($n = 46$). By native parents we are referring to those who were born in the self-governing community in which their son or daughter is now an MP.
6. Considering the two Spanish cities with more than one million inhabitants (Barcelona and Madrid), 44 of the MPs surveyed were born in the first, and 42 in the second.
7. A general explanation of the phenomenon can be found in Touraine (1981). For the specific case of Spain, see Blas (1978, 2013).
8. The size of the town or city of residence has not been included since it does not refer to the characteristics of the MPs. Nor has the language of the parents been included, since only some of the respondents were asked about this.

9. To facilitate interpretability, these probabilities have been calculated on the basis of binary logistic regressions in which each form of identity opposed the other possible identities, instead of on the basis of the multinomial logistic regression of Table 10.4, which would have required the addition of a comment that probabilities were calculated only in comparison with dual identity (which is the reference category of that regression). Signs and statistically significant variables did not vary in the binary logistic regressions.
10. All of the mean values present statistically significant intercategorical differences.
11. This statistic allows us to observe when a group is very heterogeneous in a certain variable (high standard deviation), or, on the contrary, when those who make up the group are more similar (with a low standard deviation).

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National Identity and Political Representation: Rival “Top-Down” National Projects

Enric Martínez Herrera and Thomas Jeffrey Miley

11.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes the national identity of political representatives from Spain’s autonomous (regional) parliaments, the Spanish Congress, and the Spanish Senate. We compare the identity profiles of these political elites with those of the citizenry whom they represent. Our analysis is based on a conception of national identity as a sentiment, a feeling, a subjective attribute (Weber 1978; Anderson 1991; Linz 1973).

This survey of autonomous parliamentarians, Congress-persons, and Senators represents a substantial contribution to our knowledge about national identities in Spain. The research tool of the elite survey allows us to observe how questions of national identity are articulated and channeled in the political process. More specifically, it allows us to answer such important questions as: To what extent do identity conflicts exist in the upper echelons of different political parties? Are there significant differences between political representatives and the constituencies they represent?

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Like all subjective sentiments, national identity can be captured and measured through the instrument of the survey. Obviously, in operationalizing such a complex phenomenon we are forced to simplify. Even so, the advantages of surveys for analyzing national identity far outweigh the disadvantages. This is because surveys allow us to observe with a relatively high degree of precision how different ways of feeling (and perceiving) national identity are spread across different locations in constellations of material and social power relations. Surveys also allow us to describe the relation between different identities and other attitudes, as well as other patterns of political behavior. Moreover, surveys allow us to interrogate and to explain with statistical rigor, to adjudicate among different hypotheses and interpretations about the causes and consequences of different modes of identification.

Since the transition to democracy in Spain, many surveys have been conducted that include questions about national identity. In fact, Spain is probably the country where the most survey data has been accumulated in this regard. The vast majority of the data has been collected for the population as a whole. However, several studies complement this information by focusing on different key elites, especially elected politicians and bureaucrats. Given the salience of issues associated with nationalism in Catalonia, it is perhaps not surprising that the majority of such elite studies have it as their focus. These include: the survey by Matas (1996) of the bureaucratic elite of the *Generalitat*; the survey by Magre (1999) of Catalan mayors; the survey by Baras (2004) of Catalan party militants; and the survey by Miley (2005, 2006) of Catalan primary and secondary school teachers, city councilors, and members of the Catalan parliament. In addition to these, we have the analyses by Coller (2004, 2006) of members of the Valencian parliament.

The abundant research about national identity using general population surveys and elite surveys is thanks in no small part to the research agenda of the late Juan J. Linz, who from the mid-1960s produced a series of pioneering studies with FOESSA and DATA, and who, alongside some of his many students, would continue to pursue this agenda until the end of his life in 2013.

Surveys allow for measuring the diffusion of national identification and nationalist aspirations in different sectors of society. Moreover, the study of parliamentarians' attitudes and the comparison of their identity profiles with those of the theoretically "represented" help us avoid the fallacy of the "anthropomorphization" of regions with relatively successful

nationalist movements that, unfortunately, abounds in scholarly literature almost as much as in political discourse. So too does the use of such research instruments shed light on our understanding on the process of channeling and expressing or silencing different “identity” preferences and sensitivities in the public sphere.

Information about the profiles and opinions of political representatives can provide important insight into the functioning of parties as arenas and instruments of representation. Our elite survey data can thus be understood either (or both) as an operationalization of: (1) the positions of parties on a variety of salient issues; and/or (2) mechanisms that help to explain these positions.¹

Furthermore, the problem of the quality of democracy orienting this research has become all the more pressing in these times of economic and political crisis in Spain, when—according to a poll conducted by *Metroscopia* in February 2013—“three out of four citizens (74%) think that the Congress of Deputies does not represent the majority of Spaniards and an even higher proportion (80%) do not feel personally that they are represented” (Ferrándiz 2013).

Ever since the work of Robert Michels (1911), the oligarchic tendencies of political parties have often been stressed. Our survey of political elites helps diagnose the extent of such tendencies, since it allows us to measure the discrepancies between “representatives” and “represented” not only in terms of their social and demographic profiles, but also in terms of their subjective identities and other political attitudes and reported behaviors. Such measurements of the degree of “mimetic representation” provide good indicators of how widespread oligarchic tendencies within a given party are. They also allow us to observe the extent to which representative institutions have been captured by privileged groups and/or by hegemonic climates of opinion, and, inversely, the extent to which underprivileged groups have been excluded and ideologically dissident voices are silenced or can be heard.

Our data capture the relation between (1) socio-demographic profiles and (2) attitudes, and allows us to compare the relation between the two among political elites versus the general population. To what extent do representatives who come from disadvantaged groups remain loyal to the patterns of sensibilities and preferences of other group members? Conversely, to what extent do they adapt or assimilate into the hegemonic patterns of belief and behavior among advantaged groups? The elite survey allows for an empirical answer to these questions.

Our focus on the institutions of representation provides empirical evidence for a conception of the public sphere as an autonomous realm and, at the same time, a strategic space in the struggles for hegemony between different “national” and/or “nationalist” projects. They are crucial institutions where laws related to language, education and other policies associated with “nation-building” are approved. Furthermore, the range of beliefs expressed in these institutions frame the horizons or repertoire of legitimate opinions, those deemed acceptable by society. Once one understands that political “supply” does not necessarily reflect the underlying societal “demand,” parliamentarians emerge as a group capable of representing an autonomous, even vanguard, role in “nation-building” through their discourse, in which they shape (and reshape) “from above” hegemonic understandings in the collective imaginary.²

11.2 RELATIVE IDENTITIES AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF REPRESENTATION

The main indicator for measuring the distribution of different national identities or profiles among parliamentarians is their answers to a question about relative identifications. The question, which has been administered in hundreds of surveys to the Spanish public, offers five options: “Which of the following statements would you say best expresses your feelings? (1) I feel only Spanish; (2) I feel more Spanish than [of the autonomous community]; (3) I feel as Spanish as [of the AC]; (4) I feel more [of AC] than Spanish; (5) I feel only [of the AC].”

Table 11.1 displays the responses of the parliamentarians of Spain as a whole and those of the deputies of the parliaments of the three autonomous communities with the most successful nationalist movements: Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country.³ It also includes the responses of their respective general populations. It is not surprising that, among Spanish parliamentarians as a whole, the majority option, chosen by two out of every three representatives, is that of “as Spanish as” of the autonomous community of residence.⁴ Moreover, when we compare the patterns of identification among all Spanish parliamentarians with those of the general public in Spain, what is most remarkable is a certain underrepresentation of Spanish-leaning identifications. While one in four Spaniards in the general population feels “only” or “more Spanish” than of their autonomous community, the proportion of their representatives

who identify in predominately Spanish terms falls to one in ten. Undoubtedly, Spanish preferences (including exclusivism) are much less a residue of homogenizing and/or exclusionary conceptions of Spain than a consequence of the geographical mobility (internal immigration) of many citizens who change their region of residence in search of better life opportunities (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Thus, this difference is probably due to the fact that, in general, elites are emigrants to a lesser extent than the general population. However, the congressmen and senators in the sample ($n = 133$) are much more similar to the general population, since among them a fifth (18%) shows a predominantly Spanish identity (data not shown). Even so, the answer most often chosen by both, for the whole of Spain, is that of balanced dual (or “Solomonic”) identification.

The identification patterns of the members of the Catalan parliament are most striking. These patterns exhibit a rather exacerbated gap compared with the patterns observed amongst the general population in Catalonia. The proportion of Catalan parliamentarians who feel exclusively or predominantly Catalan amounts to fully eight out of ten, with nearly half reporting no identification with Spain at all. The corresponding proportions among the “represented” are very different: in 2012, a quarter

Table 11.1 Relative identities. Parliamentarians vs. citizens (in %)

	<i>Only Spanish</i>	<i>Spanish > AC</i>	<i>Spanish = AC</i>	<i>AC > Spanish</i>	<i>Only AC</i>	<i>(n)</i>
Spain						
Spanish population	19	7	56	12	6	2478
Spanish political elites	7	6	67	11	9	565
Catalonia						
Catalan population	6	5	39	25	25	2983
Catalan parliament	0	2	19	38	41	42
Basque Country						
Basque population	6	4	38	21	26	2898
Basque parliament	0	0	32	4	44	27
Galicia						
Galician population	5	5	66	20	4	3955
Galician parliament	0	2	65	19	14	43

Source: Estudios CIS 2827 and 2965

of citizens manifested a mostly Catalan identity, and another quarter rejected any identification with Spain. It should be pointed out that the proportion of the general population that registers predominately or only Catalan identities has increased dramatically since 2010, associated with the onset of secessionist campaign (Martínez and Miley 2011, 2013). Even so, the gap between the public and the Catalan political class remains huge, which provides an important insight into the dynamics of nationalist mobilization currently underway in the region.

In a similar vein, albeit to a lesser extent, in Galicia a certain disparity can also be observed. While a third of its autonomous deputies registers a predominately or exclusively Galician identity, this proportion scarcely reaches a quarter among the general public. Still, the situation in Galicia is very different from Catalonia, because both among parliamentarians as well as among the population at large, an overwhelming majority opts for a balanced dual identity, that is, “as Spanish as Galician”, the answer chosen by nearly two out of three both among representatives and among the general public.

The situation in the Basque Country is similar to that of Catalonia, although below, in a more detailed examination by parties, we shall observe some important differences. The proportion of those identify as equally Spanish and Basque is practically the same among parliamentarians and citizens, around 35%. Even so, the rate of exclusive Basque identification and, therefore, rejection of Spain, is nearly twenty percentage points higher among parliamentarians than among the citizenry (44% versus 26%). Moreover, while one out of ten citizens expresses exclusively or predominately Spanish feelings, no Basque regional deputy does so; and while 21% of the population declare they feel mostly Basque but also Spanish, only 4% of the representatives do so. Thus, the Basque Chamber also over-represents the most intense Basque nationalist sentiments.

In addition, it is worth noting that, in the general population, the patterns of identification are very similar to those that, in the wake of the recent secessionist surge, can be found in Catalonia, something that could never be said until very recently. Time series show a certain stability in the identity patterns of the Basque population, while Catalan nationalism has surged rather dramatically, especially among the “autochthonous” strata of the population (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2009; Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). We interpret the stability of

the patterns of identification among the Basque population as partly a result of the division and opposition between rival national projects articulated by Basque political elites (De la Calle and Miley 2008; Miley 2014), in contrast to the relative homogeneity and virtual hegemony that the Catalan nationalist project has reached among their Catalan counterparts. We shall see below more evidence in support of this hypothesis.

As Álvarez Junco (2001) has documented, since the end of the nineteenth century, diverse Spanish conservative movements have been quite successful in capturing the idea of “Spain”. The symbolic association between reactionary forces and Spanish nationalism had its apogee under Franco’s regime, but even today there remains a correlation between ideology and identification with Spanish nationalism. This is because the people and forces that identify with the political right tend to feel more attached to this nationalist ideal (at least outside of the Basque Country and Catalonia) (Martínez and Calzada 2010). However, this does not prevent a large majority from emotionally identified with Spain, a majority that spans the ideological spectrum and extends across almost all parties.

Our analysis pays special attention to the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, since these are the autonomous communities with the strongest nationalist movements, and indeed the main *raison d’être* of Spain’s quasi-federal “State of the Autonomies.” In Catalonia, we find quite considerable divergences between the patterns of identification among the members of the Catalan parliament and those of the voters across most political formations. Both on the whole and in almost all specific parties, the Catalan political class expresses a profile much more nationalistic than that of their constituencies. For example, while seven out of ten deputies of CiU (Convergència i Unió) express an exclusively Catalan identity, the proportion that rejects any identification with Spain among its own voters is only about a third (35%). In the same vein, while three out of four regional members of parliament (MPs) of the socialist PSC-PSOE (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya) register a primarily Catalan identity, only one in four of their voters do so (see Table 11.2).

Another noteworthy aspect is that the gap in identity profiles between the PSC MPs in the Catalan parliament and their voters is not reproduced in the identity profiles of the Catalan representatives of the socialist party in the Spanish parliament versus those of their voters in Catalonia

Table 11.2 Relative identities. Parties and citizens by parliaments (in %)

	<i>Only Spanish</i>	<i>Spanish > AC</i>	<i>Spanish = AC</i>	<i>AC > Spanish</i>	<i>Only AC</i>	<i>(n)</i>
Catalonia						
<i>Regional MPs</i>						
PPC	0	0	100	0	0	5
Other	0	100	0	0	0	1
ICV	0	0	0	60	40	5
CiU	0	0	0	29	71	14
ERC	0	0	0	0	100	6
Total	0	2	19	37	42	43
<i>PSC MP's and voters</i>						
PSC MPs at Catalan parliament	0	0	25	75	0	12
PSC-PSOE at Spanish parliament	0	11	67	22	0	18
Rest of PSOE MPs	4	4	78	15	0	215
Total PSOE MPs	4	4	78	15	0	227
PSC voters at regional elections	9	9	57	20	6	438
PSC-PSOE voters, general election	8	8	52	25	8	603
<i>Other constituencies</i>						
PPC	20	19	57	3	2	157
Ciutadans	11	9	65	14	1	50
ICV	2	3	33	41	20	181
CiU	2	1	27	35	36	803
ERC	0	1	7	28	65	251
Total	6	5	39	25	25	2983
Basque Country						
<i>Regional MPs</i>						
PP	0	0	100	0	0	8
PNV	0	0	0	0	100	15
PSE	0	0	92	8	0	15
IU	0	0	0	0	100	1
Other	0	0	100	0	0	1
Total	0	0	54	3	43	37
<i>Constituencies</i>						
PP	20	15	64	2	0	55
PSE	11	8	66	13	3	278
IU	4	0	57	29	10	49
PNV	3	1	22	37	37	442

(continued)

Table 11.2 (continued)

	<i>Only Spanish</i>	<i>Spanish > AC</i>	<i>Spanish = AC</i>	<i>AC > Spanish</i>	<i>Only AC</i>	<i>(n)</i>
Aralar	1	0	6	25	68	69
EA	4	0	0	33	63	24
UPyD	40	20	40	0	0	5
Total	6	5	40	22	27	1776
Galicia						
<i>Regional MPs</i>						
PP	0	4	83	13	0	23
PSdG	0	0	69	31	0	13
BNG	0	0	0	14	86	7
Total	0	2	65	19	14	43
<i>Constituencies</i>						
PP	7	8	70	14	2	1252
PSdG	4	3	67	20	4	781
BNG	2	2	41	39	16	406
IU	0	7	54	35	4	49
Total	5	5	66	20	4	3955

Source: Estudios CIS 2827 y 2965

Note: Spanish > AC: more Spanish than from the region; Spanish = AC: as much Spanish as from the region; AC > Spanish: more from the region than Spanish

(see Table 11.2). To the contrary, a high degree of “mimetic representation” can be perceived among the latter. The divergence between the profile of the socialist MPs in the regional parliament and that of their counterparts in the Spanish Congress and Senate is quite stark. While three out of four PSC regional MPs in our survey registered primarily Catalan identities, only one-fifth of PSC congressmen and senators interviewed expressed this type of identities.

At the same time, the contrast between the data from Catalonia and Galicia, as can be seen in Table 11.2, is quite striking, since, in the Galician case, the identity profiles of parliamentarians closely resemble those of their respective voters (with the exception of minority parties). Thus, for instance, the proportion of representatives of the PP that feel primarily Galician is substantially higher than in other regions, 13%, nearly the same as among its voters in the region. Among the representatives of the PSdG (Socialist Party of Galicia), the proportion that feel primarily Galician amounts to 31%, eight points higher than among its electorate, compared

to the forty-two points that separate “representatives” and “represented” of the PSC in the Catalan parliament.

In turn, as can also be seen in Table 11.2, the distance between parliamentarians and the electorate in the Basque Country, mentioned above, is mainly due to the lack of representation of the primarily or solely Spanish identities of the electorate in all parties, as well as a marked over-representation of Basque exclusiveness among the representatives of the IU and the PNV in comparison with their respective voters. In contrast, the PSE under-represents somewhat the primarily or only Basque identities of a part of their constituents, thus partially counterbalancing the distortion in the opposite direction of their adversaries.

It could be objected that it is a mistake to link the wide gap between the relative identities of the representatives and those of the citizens in Catalonia and the Basque Country with a distortion of “mimetic representation,” since representatives do not have to act, necessarily, according to their personal convictions. In principle, a representative can try to find out what voters are concerned about, what solutions they prefer and what their interests are in order to articulate these in the public decision-making process, and even disregard personal feelings. However, not all elected politicians conceive of their duty in such terms. In fact, many conceive of representation in the tradition of the “free mandate”, a normative ideal which gives representatives much more room to act according to their own convictions. In this tradition, politicians must have their own ideas, analyses and solutions to problems, and assert them, even if they do not agree with those of their constituents—and they should try, of course, to explain, discuss and persuade their constituencies of these views. In other words, many politicians reject “mimetic representation” as an appropriate ideal for democratic representation.

Table 11.3 displays very striking patterns in measuring the diffusion of different normative conceptions of representation among our interviewees. The survey asked them to choose between the “mimetic” and the “free mandate” notions of representation, and the positions they expressed are distributed in two practically equal halves between the “mimetic” option and the one that emphasizes leadership. Even so, the results are significantly different in the regional Parliament of Catalonia, in which the proportion that supports the “mimetic” conception drops to only 27%.

The broad rejection of the “mimetic” notion of representation among many “regional” parliamentarians becomes especially important when it

Table 11.3 Conceptions of representation among parliamentarians by relative identities (in %)

	<i>Only Spanish</i>	<i>Spanish > AC</i>	<i>Spanish = AC</i>	<i>AC > Spanish</i>	<i>Only AC</i>	<i>Total</i>
Catalan parliament						
Spokesperson for the electorate	0	0	50	26	18	27
Follow own ideas	0	100	50	67	71	66
Both	0	0	0	7	12	7
(<i>n</i>)	0	1	8	15	17	43
Galician parliament						
Spokesperson for the electorate	0	0	62	38	0	46
Follow own ideas	0	100	35	50	100	49
Both	0	0	4	13	0	5
(<i>n</i>)	0	1	26	8	6	41
Basque parliament						
Spokesperson for the electorate	0	0	31	0	58	49
Follow own ideas	0	0	70	100	42	51
Both	0	0	0	0	0	0
(<i>n</i>)	0	0	13	1	12	37
Spain (all chambers)						
Spokesperson for the electorate	47	47	52	43	31	49
Follow own ideas	50	53	47	53	62	49
Both	3	0	1	5	7	2
(<i>n</i>)	34	34	363	61	45	559

Source: Estudio CIS 2827

comes to collective identities, since here there is a wide gap between parliamentarians and citizens. When measuring the diffusion of the two conceptions of representation among parliamentarians from different identity groups, the rejection of “mimetic” representation as an ideal is especially noteworthy among those who identify exclusively with their autonomous communities. Once again the case of Catalonia is especially noteworthy, since while half of the few representatives of the Catalan parliament who identify themselves as equally Spanish and Catalan embrace the “mimetic” notion, this proportion decreases to only a quarter among those who identify primarily with Catalonia and to only 18% among those with an

exclusively Catalan identity. This suggests that members of the Catalan parliament consciously affirm the proactive leadership role they play in the Catalan “nation-building” process.

11.3 TERRITORIAL CONCEPTIONS AND SCALES OF ‘REGIONAL NATIONALISM’

At the beginning of the 1980s, Linz (1973, p. 99) defined Spain, in sociological terms, in the following way: “Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities.” In this definition, the distinction between *state* and *nation* is key. Following Weber, Linz has emphasized that, while the state is a “form of political organization,” the nation “means above all that *it is proper* to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups.” As such, the nation “belongs to the sphere of values” (Linz 1973, pp. 33–34).

We have measured the diffusion of different conceptions of Spain among parliamentarians by asking them directly: “What does Spain mean for you?” We offer them a choice among a variety of responses. Even though the choices do not reflect exactly the different conceptions referred to by Linz, they do cover a relatively wide spectrum, ranging from conceptions which imply emotional attachment and are clearly national, on the one side, to more instrumental, statist, or multinational conceptions, on the other. More concretely, the options offered were: (1) “it is a nation of which I feel a member”; (2) “it is something special, the fruit of history, that unites those of us who live here, but is hard to define”; (3) “my country”; (4) “the state of which I am a citizen”; and (5) “a state formed by various nationalities.”

Not surprisingly, these distinct conceptions are concentrated in different frequencies among different identity groups. Whereas “national” conceptions of Spain are predominant among those who feel primarily Spanish or even equally Spanish and from their autonomous community, statist conceptions prevail among those who identify predominately with their autonomous community.

It is also not surprising how unequally spread different conceptions of Spain are among representatives from different parties and electoral coalitions, as was seen in Chapter 10. While “national” conceptions of Spain are most prevalent among the representatives of the Popular Party (PP), “statist” and “multinational” conceptions are predominant among

representatives of CiU, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the United Left (IU). For their part, representatives of the socialist party (PSOE) are quite divided in terms of their conceptions of Spain.

The comparison in Table 11.4 between the conceptions of Spain embraced by members of the socialist party in the autonomous communities under examination here and those of the party as a whole is illustrative in this regard. More than 90% of the socialist deputies from the Catalan parliament, and almost 70% of their counterparts in the Galician parliament opt for “statist” and “multinational” conceptions of Spain, compared with only half of socialist parliamentarians across the country. By contrast, the concentration of different conceptions of Spain among socialist deputies in the Basque Country is similar to that of socialist party parliamentarians on the whole, thereby revealing a profile that is considerably more *españolista* than that of their counterparts in Catalonia and even Galicia.

Table 11.4 Conceptions of Spain: “What does Spain mean for you?” (in %)

	<i>Nation of which I feel a member</i>	<i>Something special, the fruit of history, that unites us</i>	<i>My country</i>	<i>State of which I am a citizen</i>	<i>State formed by various nationalities</i>	<i>Alien state</i>	<i>(n)</i>
PSOE							
Catalonia (PSC)	0	0	8	42	50	NA	12
Basque Country (PSE)	7	7	36	29	21	NA	14
Galicia (PSG)	8	8	17	17	50	NA	12
PSOE (all chambers)	9	8	33	29	22	NA	236
Parliaments							
Catalonia	2	2	12	41	43	NA	42
Basque Country	14	2	17	26	41	NA	42
Galicia	12	7	29	20	32	NA	41
Spain (all chambers)	21	10	31	21	18	NA	567
Catalonia	14	NA	36	19	23	8	1660
Basque Country	6	NA	22	16	44	12	499
Galicia	15	NA	63	13	8	0	654
Total Spain	13	NA	61	14	9	2	10,409

Source: Estudios CIS 2827 and 2965

The differences among elected socialist representatives in the three autonomous communities analyzed here help to explain the patterns that can be observed for parliamentarians as a whole. As Table 11.4 shows, whereas only 16% of elected representatives from the Parliament of Catalonia register a “national” conception of Spain, the equivalent proportion in the Basque Country is approximately double (one in three), though this is still much less than the proportion of representative in all of Spain, among the whole of whom fully six in ten conceive of Spain in “national” terms.

Unfortunately, in this case a direct comparison cannot be made between parliamentarians and citizenry, since the options offered in the most recent CIS surveys differ somewhat from the ones we offered to elected representatives. Even so, the five options given in the general population surveys are also classifiable on a spectrum from “national” to “statist” and “multi-nationalist.” They are: (1) “a nation of which I feel a member”; (2) “my country”; (3) “the state of which I am a citizen”; (4) “a state formed of various nationalities and regions”; and (5) “an alien state, of which my country does not form a part.”

For all of Spain, almost three out of every four citizens embrace a “national” conception of Spain, which is more than ten points higher than among their elected parliamentary representatives. In Catalonia, the differences between “representatives” and “represented” are especially stark, since nearly half of the general population in Catalonia registers a “national” conception of Spain, compared with less than one in five members of the Catalan parliament. In Galicia, the difference between “representatives” and “represented” is also large: whereas 48% of representatives conceive of Spain in “national” terms, the proportion among the general population in Galicia rises to fully 78%. Again the contrast with the pattern in the Basque Country is striking, since there, the proportion of the general public that conceives of Spain in “national” terms is somewhat *less* than the proportion among elected representatives to the Basque parliament (see Table 11.4).

Just as there exists a diversity of conceptions of Spain, so too are there a variety of ways of conceiving of the autonomous community in which a person lives. We have already seen how the vast majority of elected representatives, as well as a vast majority of the general public, identify to some degree both with Spain and with their autonomous community. However, it is important to stress that not everybody understands this dual identity in the same way. For the majority, such dual identities are

perceived and felt as “nested” identities (Herb and Kaplan 1999), in which the autonomous community is conceived in “regional” terms. Even so, for certain relevant minorities—and even local majorities in some autonomous communities—these two identities are perceived differently, in which the smaller scale is understood as a “nation,” often times imagined as a “political subject” or “demos” with an alleged “right to self-determination.”

In order to measure the diffusion of different conceptions of one’s autonomous community amongst parliamentarians, they were asked: “Generally speaking, what term do you prefer to use to refer to your Autonomous Community?” The possible answers cover a wide array of options, from clearly “regional” conceptions to clearly “national” ones, ranging from (1) region; (2) Autonomous Community; (3) nationality; to (4) country; and (5) nation.

Unfortunately, we cannot compare the answers of elected representatives with those of citizens, since the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* has not asked this question to the general public in recent years. Even so, the results for representatives are interesting in their own right. Not surprisingly, there are quite significant differences among distinct political formations, as there are amongst representatives in the whole of Spain, on the one hand, and representatives from the Catalan, Galician, and Basque Autonomous Parliaments, on the other. For all of Spain, more than seven out of every ten representatives conceive of their respective autonomous communities in more or less “regional” terms (with fully 61% preferring the constitutional term “Autonomous Community” and another 13% opting for the term “region”). Amongst the representatives of PP, this proportion rises to more than nine out of ten; while in IU it falls to less than half (see Table 11.5).

Yet again, the representatives of the Catalan parliament distinguish themselves by the intensity of their Catalan nationalism. Six out of every ten choose the term “nation,” while another 27% opt for the term “country.” The contrast with the parliamentarians of the Basque Chamber is again noteworthy, where the term most often chosen (44%) is “Autonomous Community,” and only one in three choose the term “nation,” while another 12% opt for “country.” In fact, the answers of representatives of the Basque parliament to this question resemble much more those of their counterparts from the Galician parliament than they do the Catalan representatives.

Table 11.5 Conceptions of the Autonomous Community among MPs of different parties (in %)

	<i>Region</i>	<i>Aut. Community</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Nation</i>	<i>(n)</i>
Spain (all chambers)						
PP (and UPN)	20	75	1	4	0	238
PSOE	10	63	8	11	8	238
IU	6	39	6	11	39	18
Total	13	61	5	9	13	568
Members of the Catalan parliament						
PP	0	60	0	40	0	5
PSOE	0	0	8	25	67	12
ICV	0	0	0	0	100	5
CiU	0	0	7	29	64	14
ERC	0	0	0	50	50	6
Other	0	100	0	0	0	1
Total	0	9	5	27	58	43
Members of the Basque parliament						
PP	0	100	0	0	0	8
PSOE	0	64	29	7	0	14
IU	0	0	0	100	0	1
PNV	0	6	0	19	75	16
Other 1	0	100	0	0	0	1
Other 2	0	0	0	0	100	3
Total	0	44	9	12	35	43
Members of the Galician parliament						
PP	0	66	5	19	0	21
PSOE	0	15	31	39	15	13
BNG	0	0	0	0	100	7
Total	0	44	12	22	22	41

Source: Estudio CIS 2827

The different postures taken by members of the socialist party in different autonomous communities are of particular interest. While the socialist deputies in the Catalan chamber are nearly unanimous in subscribing to more or less “national” conceptions, with two out of three opting for the term “nation” and another 25% choosing “country,” in the Basque parliament no socialist deputy opts for “nation” and only 7% choose “country.” By contrast, socialist representatives in Galicia are much more likely to opt for more or less “national” conceptions than are their Basque socialist counterparts, with 15% of Galician socialists choosing the term “nation” and another 39% answering “country” (see Table 11.5).

The comparison of the degree of “regional nationalism” among parliamentarians from the “historic nationalities” is further facilitated by answers

to another direct question, where we ask them to situate themselves on a scale of 1–10, where one signifies a minimum of Catalan/Galician/Basque nationalism and 10 a maximum. This measure provides more evidence of the level of hegemony secured by the Catalan nationalist movement in the political sphere, significantly higher than in the other two communities. At the same time, it provides more proof of the high level of discrepancy between the postures of the elected representatives and those of the “represented” in Catalonia. Indeed, the average of representatives of the Catalan parliament is significantly higher than that of Basque deputies: 6.63 versus 5.10. In fact, the average of Basque deputies is closer to that of representatives from the Galician parliament (4.48).

At the same time, the level of distortion of “mimetic representation”—in this case, the difference between the average registered by parliamentarians and that registered among the general population—is significantly higher in Catalonia than in the other two communities. In Catalonia, the average of representatives exceeds by almost one whole point that of the “represented,” while in Galicia and the Basque Country the average of representatives barely surpasses that of the “represented” (0.17 and 0.16, respectively).

The discrepancies in the degree of “regional nationalism” among the autonomous deputies of the socialist party in the three communities are again worthy of attention. The socialist representatives in the Catalan parliament register an average score of fully 5.91, compared with an average of 5.18 among autonomous parliamentarians of the PSdG in Galicia, and an average of a mere 2.31 among autonomous parliamentarians of the PSE in the Basque Country. Especially noteworthy is the gap between the profile of the representatives of the PSC and that of its voters in Catalonia. The average among the former exceeds that of the latter by fully 1.28 points. By contrast, the average Galician nationalism of the autonomous deputies of the PSdG exceeds that of its voters by 0.81 points, while the average Basque nationalism registered by autonomous deputies from the PSE is even less than that of its voters.

11.4 CONCLUSIONS

Starting from a conception of national identity as a feeling—that is, as a subjective trait—in this chapter we have analyzed the national identities of elected representatives of both the Spanish and the “regional” parliaments, and have evaluated the similarities and differences of these patterns in comparison with the citizenry they are expected to represent. In the

context of a political system in which competing national projects challenge the persistence of the political community—that is, the population and territorial contours of the polity—the analysis has assessed the extent to which parliamentarians channel and express citizens’ national feelings and perceptions in the representative institutions of the political system. As in any parliamentary democracy, the parliament symbolizes “national” sovereignty, and it is from parliament that other institutions of the polity are derived or depend to a large extent. Because the Spanish-wide *Cortes Generales* is a bicameral parliament, we have considered both the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.

Moreover, in the context of a federal political system (cf. Linz 1999), we have also studied the deputies of the “regional” parliaments, paying close attention to the three autonomous communities in which the project of a common Spanish polity faces the most intense and persistent challenges from political movements advocating different and even rival national projects. These projects have engendered aspirations for the right to unilateral secession and independent statehood. Indeed, during the last century of Spanish history, the existence of rival nationalist projects has given rise to considerable antagonisms, to disagreements in the formation of the general will, to difficulties of governance, and even to contentious politics and serious violence. Therefore, we have also investigated the stances of the elites of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia concerning national projects, evaluating the extent to which they contribute, together with the elite of the country as a whole, to the reproduction of the Spanish political community.

Half of Spanish citizens regard themselves as equally Spanish and from the autonomous community where they live. Such balanced dual identities have supplied a broad basis of legitimacy to the so-called “State of Autonomies.” Among all parliamentarians (“national” and “regional” combined), the proportion registering balanced dual identities rises to two out of three. Conversely, only 6% of the general population and 8% of the parliamentarians throughout all of Spain reject Spanish identity outright.

However, the political classes of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia reject identification with Spain much more frequently. Such rejection, which is particularly frequent among the representatives of the Basque and Catalan parliaments, deserves attention, for starters, because it carries a great potential for interterritorial conflict, generated by political leaders, affecting the fates of citizens, especially those residing in these three autonomous communities. But it also deserves attention

because, when the appropriate comparisons are made, it becomes clear that such rejection is much more widespread among the political elites than it is among the general population in these territories—especially in Catalonia, where the disparity between the patterns of identification between “representatives” and “represented” is starkest. This gap is large even when it comes to the voters of the explicitly nationalist parties BNG, CiU and PNV; however, in Catalonia, a similar gap can also be observed between voters and representatives for the socialist party, which for decades has portrayed itself to be federalist. An examination of various complementary indicators, such as ways of understanding Spain and these very autonomous regions, yield results consistent with this pattern.

All this reveals a much greater degree of “mimetic representation” among parliamentarians for Spain as a whole, and especially among representatives of the Spanish parliament, than among representatives of the Basque Country, Galicia and, above all, Catalonia. In other words, in terms of national identities and nationalisms, the representatives for all of Spain resemble their constituencies much more than do representatives for the Basque, Catalan, and Galician Parliaments. In this vein, the “regional” MPs of Catalonia have expressed a remarkably coherent position, by openly preferring a “free mandate” conception of representation in which parliamentarians judge what is best and then do their best to explain it to the voters, as opposed to a “mimetic” conception in which representatives must try to undertake the wishes of their voters. The former ideal is much more common among the “regional” MPs of Catalonia than among the parliamentarians of the country at large. In addition, the “free mandate” conception is much more frequent among representatives from Catalan and Galician nationalist parties than it is among Basque nationalists, who are much more similar, in this respect, to the profile of the average Spanish parliamentarian.

Faced with such findings, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is a relationship between the elitist, paternalistic and even “oligarchic” stance in the tradition of “free mandate,” with the policies of “nation-building” that have been pursued in Catalonia over the last three decades, policies which have been referred to with explicit expressions such as *fer país* (“making a country”), “linguistic normalization” and “national reconstruction.” Persistent postures and policies that have been successful in spreading “national” consciousness among increasingly broad segments of the population, and that since 2012, have come to include demands for unilateral secession at the center of the political agenda.

NOTES

1. There are other techniques for measuring the positions taken by political parties in their party programs exist, such as the one employed in *The Comparative Manifestos Project* and *The Regional Manifestos Project* (www.regionalmanifestosproject.com). These efforts are complementary to ours. In fact, our findings can help shed light on their database—by allowing us to measure levels of conflict and/or consensus within parties over different aspects of party programs.
2. For a review of the literature on top-down nationalism, see Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2009) on the role of parliamentarians, see Miley (2006, 2013, 2014) and Martínez and Miley (2010).
3. For a similar analysis of Andalusia, see Martínez-Herrera and Paradés (2014).
4. The figures that appear in this chapter concern the weighted samples for each of the universes to which the analysis refers (i.e. the set of parliamentarians from Spain, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, as appropriate).

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Ideology: The Reasons Behind Placement on the Left-Right Scale

Leonardo Sánchez-Ferrer

12.1 THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology is one of the most studied questions in social sciences. In previous decades it has been argued that political parties' ideologies have blurred and reflected fewer differences in their political foundations (Bell 2000; Lipset 2001; Dalton 2006). However, the concepts of left and right remain as vivid in political conflict as they were in the past and have not ceased to remain as a point of reference for political actors, as shown by the fact that it is still the most important single factor explaining citizens' vote (Thomassen 2005; Montero and Lago 2010).

In this chapter, the ideological distribution of members of parliament (MPs) is analyzed and compared with that of citizens, and the reasons of ideological self-placement on the left-right scale are explored. In previous Spanish research there are a number of studies that address the meaning of ideology, although most of them focus on citizens and not the elites. The factors that explain the location of Spanish citizens as left or right has been analyzed in depth (Maravall 1980; Sani and Montero 1986; Díez Medrano et al. 1989; Montero and Torcal 1990; Montero 1994b; Torcal and Medina 2002; Medina 2004, 2010; Torcal 2011) as well as the relationship

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between attitudes and preferences on public policy.¹ However, there are no empirical studies explaining the foundations of left-right placement of the Spanish MPs. This research presents the novelty of analyzing the ideology of Spanish political elites with data comparable to those obtained from the whole population.

Since Inglehart and Klingemann's study (1976, pp. 244–245) it has been established that self-placement of individuals on the left-right scale respond to three major factors: (1) the purely ideological or value-based factor, which considers that the scale reflects the principles and attitudes of the person concerning the main issues of society, (2) social-structural factor, which refers to the identities of the individuals based on their social class and religious beliefs, and (3) partisan factor, which points out that positioning on the scale is also the result of identification with a particular political party, and that such election would not respond as much to the values and principles of the person but to the perceptions they have of their preferred party (Huber 1989; Knutsen 2004; Freire 2008; Freire and Belchior 2011; Weber 2012).

The first component of the scale, related to values and political preferences, is the most intuitively obvious. Since the inception of the terms left and right in the eighteenth century, these have been associated with substantive ideological meanings (Bobbio 1995; Herreros 2011). There are multiple definitions of ideology, but they coincide in considering it as a more or less structured set of beliefs and values about society, politics and economics.² Ideology would thus constitute a construct that encompasses the individual's main values regarding social order and facilitates decision-making by simplifying the complexity of politics to fewer and simpler options.

As an expression of ideology, the left-right continuum is still problematic, since it consists of a one-dimensional scale while political and moral conflicts comprise multiple components. Nonetheless, it is assumed that self-placement on the scale may reflect, albeit roughly, a compendium of the individual's position on a number of major issues. Namely, the most important issues associated to left and right have been those related to the organization of the economy and the redistribution of goods, as well as the relevance attributed to the value of equality: theoretically, economic equality would be a priority for the left, while inequality would be more acceptable for the right (Downs 1957; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Lafferty and Knutsen 1984; Bobbio 1995; Gunther and Kuan 2007; Herreros 2011; Weber 2012).

The second component of the left-right divide, the social-structural factor, assumes that the position of the individuals in the social structure leads them to create identities associated with ideological concepts (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, pp. 245; Bartolini 2000, pp. 15–25; Freire 2006, pp. 361–362). There are two social factors that contribute the most to creating a left-right identity. On one side there is social class, the element that has been traditionally associated with the socio-economic cleavage (Freire 2008). On the other side there are the religious beliefs of individuals, which in many countries acquire considerable political salience and constitute one of the most important social cleavages (Sani and Sartori 1983; Huber 1989; Knutsen 2004; Freire 2006; Hellwig 2008). Although the secularization of modern societies has led us to consider that the religious cleavage has lost the relevance of other periods, it is also true that religious beliefs remain a crucial element to political identity and voting choice, especially when it is activated by the political elites (Cebolla et al. 2013: p. 2).

Other issues that have been associated with the left-right scale are the priority given to security over liberty (Herreros 2011), the contrast between tradition and modernity (Herreros 2011; Weber 2012) or the priorities regarding the satisfaction of material goods and values of self-expression, that is, aspects associated with the materialist/post-materialist cleavage (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Inglehart 1977) which would include issues such as the environment, (Mair 2002) gender (Evans 1993) or homosexuality (Medina 2010). What is indisputable is that the issues associated in this scale can vary from one society to another over time, so that left and right have distinctive meanings in each country and at each moment (Jahn 2011).

The partisan component of the scale suggests that the values of the individuals are not so relevant and that party identification may have a great impact on left-right self-placement. People get to create psychological and affective bonds with the parties, which leads them to adjust their position to the value they consider appropriate for their party, regardless of their actual opinions and attitudes on particular issues (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Klingemann 1979). In this way, left-right position would function more as a party identity tag than as a compendium of values and attitudes (Huber 1989; Freire 2008; Weber 2012).

Although numerous studies support the importance of the partisan component for all citizens, they do not seem to uphold this to the same degree for elites. In the seminal study of Converse (1964) it was established

that the political elites and the more educated citizens manifested attitudes that were more consistent and ideologically structured than public opinion in general. Political elites, thanks to their greater political knowledge, are more capable to interpret their position in ideological terms than the average voter and also present a greater coherence and structuring of their attitudes (Kritzer 1978; Arian and Shamir 1983; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Dalton 2013). Naturally, politicians also have partisan allegiances that influence their values and attitudes, but as they are more sophisticated political actors it is assumed that they are able to place themselves on the ideological scale in a way that reflects their personal opinions, not those of their party.

What seems obvious from the literature is that the three factors mentioned—social/structural, values and partisan—have different weights when configuring the position of elites and voters. In the case of the elites, it is likely that the values factor has a considerably greater impact than for voters. In the case of citizens, on the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the weight of the partisan factor is greater due to their lower levels of commitment and political knowledge (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1997; Freire and Belchior 2011, 2013).

As far as the social/structural factor is concerned, previous evidence is not as unanimous. On the one hand, certain studies propose that the social/structural factor has greater significance for the citizens than for the political elites, for the same reasons the partisan factor does (Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 12). On the other hand, it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that in certain societies and junctures, parties are especially divided around a cleavage and attempt to trigger it and make it more present in the political debate. In the case of Spain, several studies demonstrate the importance of religion as a basic element in shaping the left and right identity, as well as voting choice (Montero 1994a; Montero et al. 2008; Cebolla et al. 2013; Cordero 2014). Many of the debates associated with the ideological conflict of left and right are related to religion and the role the Catholic Church plays (such as religious teaching or Church funding) or to moral issues that have a religious implication (such as abortion and same-sex marriage). Moreover, it is a conflict that has been reinforced in recent years by political parties themselves (Cebolla et al. 2013; Cordero 2014), which raises the question of whether the political elite is more divided than citizens around this issue and more influenced by it when it comes to the left-right scale.

Therefore, the hypotheses that will be contrasted in the chapter are the following:

- Hypothesis 1: The weight of the social/structural factor in MPs is lesser than in citizens due to the former superior political knowledge.
- Hypothesis 2: The weight of the social/structural factor in MPs is greater in comparison to citizens due to their greater religious dissent.
- Hypothesis 3: The weight of the values factor is greater in MPs than in citizens.
- Hypothesis 4: The weight of the partisan factor is more significant in citizens than in MPs.

The remainder of this chapter is structured in three sections. The first is a brief description of the left-right averages and distributions of MPs and citizens. In the second the main empirical argument is developed, comparing the significance of the different explanatory factors of ideology in MPs and citizens in a series of OLS regression models, which will contrast the hypothesis mentioned above. Finally, the conclusions summarize the main findings of the research.

12.2 LEFT AND RIGHT IN MPs AND CITIZENS

Spanish citizens have tended to rank on average in a left of center ideological position, between 4.5 and 4.9 (on a scale of 1–10) since 1996, according to CIS barometers. In periods of electoral dominance of PP (People's Party), the average tends to be in the upper area of that rank, while in periods of dominance of PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) the average is closer to 4.5. The slight leaning on the left is the consequence of a large group of citizens in left of center positions (3–4) and another large group in proper center positions (5–6), while the other groups, left (1–2), right of center (7–8) and right (9–10) are much smaller than the previous two.³

Table 12.1 shows the average left-right positions of citizens and MPs, separated in a number of broad categories. The voters' mean is 4.8 and there are no significant differences between men and women, although there are considerable disparities between autonomous regions. The MPs that are most left-wing are in Catalonia and Andalusia (4.0 and 4.1 respectively), while those from the remainder of Spain (all regions except

Table 12.1 Average left-right self-placement of voters and MPs (1–10) by gender and party

		<i>Andalucia</i>	<i>Catalonia</i>	<i>Galicia</i>	<i>Basque C.</i>	<i>Other reg.</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>(N)</i>
Male	Voters	4.6	4.3	4.8	3.9	5.0	4.8	(1017)
	MPs	4.1	3.9	4.7	4.1	4.7	4.5	(344)
Female	Voters	4.8	4.2	4.6	3.9	5.1	4.8	(990)
	MPs	4.1	4.0	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.5	(225)
PP	Voters	6.3	6.5	6.8	6.5	6.6	6.6	(577)
	MPs	5.6	5.7	5.8	6.1	5.9	5.9	(243)
PSOE	Voters	3.7	3.4	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.7	(473)
	MPs	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.3	(235)
IU	Voters	3.3	2.7	3.0	3.6	3.0	3.0	(152)
	MPs	2.0	2.6		3.0	3.0	2.7	(17)
CiU	Voters		5.2				5.2	(53)
	MPs		4.9				4.9	(16)
PNV	Voters				4.8		4.8	(10)
	MPs				4.5		4.5	(15)
Otros	Voters	4.7	3.4	3.0	2.5	4.4	4.0	(192)
	MPs		3.1	3.1	3.0	3.9	3.5	(43)
Total	Voters	4.7	4.3	4.7	3.9	5.1	4.8	(1670)
	MPs	4.1	4.0	4.7	4.3	4.7	4.5	(569)

Source: Elaborated by the author from CIS 2827 and CIS 2930. Voters' party refers to the 2011 general election, which means that voters of a certain party may have chosen a different party in another election

Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country) are leaning more to the right (4.7). As expected, the most right-wing party is PP (5.9 on average), followed by CiU (Convergence and Union) (4.9), PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) (4.5), PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) (3.3), and IU (United Left) (2.7).

A noteworthy fact is that political representatives are more left-oriented than their constituents. This is true for the whole sample set and also for each of the autonomous regions, with the exception of the Basque Country. In the case of IU and the main nationalist parties (CiU and PNV) the difference is around 0.3 points. In the case of PSOE, the difference is 0.4 points, with a similar pattern in all the regions. More striking however, is the difference for PP, which in this case amounts to 0.7 points (5.9 for MPs and 6.6 for citizens), also running in a similar pattern in all the autonomous regions. This is a result consistent with previous research on political elites, which has also seen a slightly more right-oriented citizenship than its representatives (Dalton 1985, pp. 275–277; Hoffman-Lange 2008, p. 61).

Table 12.2 presents the ideological distribution of politicians and citizens and helps understand the discrepancies between them. It shows that the ideological distribution of voters is more dispersed than that of MPs, which is also consistent with previous research (Hoffman-Lange 2008, p. 60). For example, while 13% of PSOE voters are placed in far-left positions (1–2), only 7% of their representatives identified that way. Likewise, while 10% of PP voters are placed in far-right positions (9–10), no MP displays such right-wing values. In this way, it can be said that the party representatives better reflect the ideology of their average voters than those of voters positioned at the extremes of the distribution of each party.

In any case, the most conservative voters of all parties are ideologically less represented by their MPs, which is notably considerable for PP. Table 12.2 demonstrates that about 50% of PP voters are placed in right-wing values (7–10), but only 22% of their representatives are positioned like so (and among them almost all were positioned in 7). By contrast, while 77% of PP MPs declare themselves centrists (5–6) only 44% of their voters were placed in centrist values. The PSOE also underrepresents its right-wing electorate, as it highlights the disproportion between its percentage of centrist voters (twenty three percent) and that of MPs in centrist ideological positions (6%).

Table 12.2 Left-right self-placement distribution of voters and MPs (in %)

		1–2	3–4	5–6	7–8	9–10
		<i>Left</i>				<i>Right</i>
PP	MPs	0	0	77	22	0
	Voters	1	5	47	38	10
PSOE	MPs	7	87	6	0	0
	Voters	13	62	23	1	0
IU	MPs	35	65	0	0	0
	Voters	37	50	13	0	0
CiU	MPs	0	38	56	6	0
	Voters	0	30	51	17	2
PNV	MPs	0	47	53	0	0
	Voters	0	30	60	10	0
Otros	MPs	14	70	14	2	0
	Voters	19	40	36	3	2
Total (N)	MPs	5 (30)	46 (260)	40 (224)	10 (56)	0 (0)
	Votantes	10 (159)	33 (492)	40 (501)	14 (275)	4 (73)

Source: Elaborated by the author from CIS 2827 and CIS 2930

12.3 THE EXPLANATION OF IDEOLOGY

This section of the chapter will establish a series of explanatory models of the positions on the left-right scale of MPs and citizens, while considering the three factors: social/structural, values and partisan. The first factor includes variables related to social class and religiousness of people which, as we have seen in the introduction, give rise to the creation of social identities relevant to ideological positioning. Social class can be measured by the respondent's occupation and education level, as has been done in numerous previous studies, including some already mentioned (Freire 2008, p. 192; Weber 2012, pp. 107–109). However, given that the occupation of the vast majority of MPs falls within the categories of executives, professionals, and technicians and that they also have higher education qualifications (see chapter 1), it may appear to be more convenient to utilize the occupation and educational level of the parents as indicators of their position in the social structure at the moment in which political consciousness and the ideology of the MP was formed.

Religiousness can be measured through a scale of beliefs and practices, at the extremes of which are Catholics and believers of other practicing religions and, on the other end, are atheists and non-believers. The importance of religion as a basic element of left and right identity has already been established in the introductory section and this research confirms the evidence. Although the table is not presented for the sake of space, data show that practicing Catholic MPs are on average at 5.8, while atheists/indifferent are on average at 3.4, with non-practicing Catholics remaining at an intermediate position of 4.8. One fact worth noting is that left-wing politicians are significantly less religious than their voters (see chapter 1) while in the case of PP is the other way around: religious beliefs and practices are considerable more intense among their MPs than their constituents. This indicates that religious practice could be a more important element in explaining the left-right divide among politicians than among citizens. Given the intrinsic relevance of religiousness, in the statistical models that are proposed at the end of the section the social/structure factor splits into two components: social origin and class on one hand, and religiousness on the other.

The second group of variables are those related to values. Values are beliefs that prescribe behavioral norms and determine people's attitudes towards specific issues (Roekach 1973), such as the belief in economic equality or in environmental protection. In this chapter, two variables are

included in the value factor: the preference for economic equality and the position in a scale that trades liberty and security.⁴ As the first variable is concerned, we have already seen in the introduction that academic literature supposes that one of the most important characteristics that defines the leftist identity is the aim of reducing inequalities through government's actions, while rejection of this belief is associated with right-wing positions (Freire 2008; Medina 2010; Weber 2012; Freire and Belchior 2013).

The belief in egalitarianism is measured by the degree of agreement with the following statement: "The government should take actions to reduce income differences." This is an interesting variable because it directly tries to grasp the support of state's intervention to reduce economic inequality and does not simply refer to a general support for social policy. Data from the MPs' survey shows that those who most agree with the statement above are considerably more to the left than those who most disagree (the table with the data is not included for the sake of space). It also holds true within each party. For example, the PP's MPs who disagree with government intervention to reduce income differences are 0.4 points to the right of those who agree with that intervention. In the case of PSOE, the difference is 0.7 points. Although MPs of all parties tend to support some government intervention to reduce income levels, there is evidence that it may be a factor that explains left-right position.

The other variable included in the values factor is the respondent's position on a scale of 0–10 where the lowest score represents the highest preference for liberty and 10 the highest preference for security. Although the value of freedom can be associated with both the left and right (Herrerros 2011, pp. 25–33), the contrast between liberty and security (or between libertarian and authoritarian values) has often been considered an essential component of the ideological conflict (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005; Freire and Belchior 2013). Figure 12.1 shows the average location on the liberty/security scale of MPs based on their left-right position, which reveals a clear relationship between the two (Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.36**). The most right-wing MPs rank over three points more in favor of security than the most left-wing, which is an obvious indication that it might be an explanatory variable in the model.

The last factor considered is party identification. One may assume that in the case of MPs, ideological identity should precede integration into a party. However, it may be that some members of the political elite are not so ideologically coherent and, as explained in the theoretical section, their




Fig. 12.1 Preferences of MPs between liberty and security by ideology (Source: CIS 2827)

positions on the scale respond largely to attempts to accommodate the ideological perceptions of their parties. The introduction of the partisan variable in the model may serve to better fit the explanation and examine the strength of the other factors. If it happens that after introducing the party variable the significance of the model increases and the coefficients of the other variables are greatly reduced, it would be an indicator that left-right position also responds to party labels in the case of MPs.

All the factors considered have been incorporated into two OLS regression models, one for MPs and one for citizens. The dependent variable in both models is the position on the left-right scale and the independent variables have been introduced in four blocks that correspond with the three factors mentioned above, plus religious identity, which has been taken from the social/structural factor. Thus, the first block is the social/structural factor I (social origin and class) and includes, in the case of MPs, the educational level of both mother and father,⁵ the occupation of the father,⁶ as well as gender. In the citizens' model the variables are educational attainment, occupation,⁷ gender and age. The second block is the social/structural factor II (religious identity), which for both MPs and citizens incorporates the respondents' religious beliefs and practices.⁸ The third block is the ideological/values factor and it includes two variables: the degree of agreement with government intervention to reduce income inequalities⁹ and the position on the scale that trades liberty and security.¹⁰

The fourth block is the partisan factor, which includes party membership in the case of MPs and voting for a certain political party in the case of citizens. Only the five main political parties have been included: PP, PSOE, IU, CiU and PNV.¹¹

Table 12.3 presents the results of the four OLS models for MPs and Table 12.4 the data for citizens. In both tables the goodness of fit of the first model is very low, with an adjusted R^2 of 0.04 for MPs and 0.02 for citizens. Politicians who come from families of entrepreneurs or executives or whose parents are more educated tend to place themselves more to the right, as do the citizens with professional or business backgrounds. However, the explanatory capacity of the first model is weak, which suggests that social origin and class are not very important in the making of ideological identities of both MPs and citizens.

By contrast, the significance of the second model improves considerably for MPs (adjusted R^2 is now 0.42), which means that the religious practice of the politician explains an acceptable percentage of the variance. Practicing Catholics score one point more to the right of the scale than non-practicing Catholics (other social/structural factors remaining constant), while atheists and non-religious score 1.3 points more to the left. In the case of citizens the non-standardized coefficients are similar, but the fit of the model is much worse. The religious factor improves of the R^2 in 0.13, in contrast to the 0.38 improvement in the model for politicians. The data indicate that religious practice is a much more significant factor in the ideological position of MPs than that of citizens.

With the data presented so far, it seems that Hypothesis 1 should be rejected. The weight of the social/structural factor (including the religious factor) is stronger among MPs than in citizens—a result not too different from that obtained by Freire and Belchior (2013) in their study of citizens and political elites in Portugal, but conflicting with the literature which states that political commitment and knowledge reduce the weight of the social component (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1997).

On the other hand, the evidence seems to confirm Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the impact of the social/structural factor is higher among MPs than citizens because they are more divided by the religious cleavage, which is also confirmed in the aforementioned Portuguese study (Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 13). Research on the religious vote in Spain has emphasized the role that the political elite played in instigating religious conflict during certain periods, despite the process of

Table 12.3 OLS models explaining left-right self-placement of MPs

	1	2	3	4
Father's education	0.17** (0.18)	0.13** (0.14)	0.15*** (0.16)	0.07* (0.08)
Mother's education	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.00
Father manager or proprietor	0.40** (0.11)	0.30* (0.08)	0.22	0.11
Father professional	0.37	0.04	-0.05	-0.06
Father skilled manual worker	0.23	0.19	0.20	0.25** (0.08)
Father non-skilled worker	-0.52	-0.49	-0.46	0.15
Gender	-0.03	-0.11	-0.11	-0.01
Practicing member of Church		1.00*** (0.30)	0.86*** (0.26)	0.34*** (0.10)
Non-religious		-1.30*** (-0.43)	-1.04*** (-0.20)	-0.01
Economic equality			-0.26*** (-0.20)	-0.14*** (-0.11)
Liberty vs. security			0.16*** (0.18)	0.08*** (0.09)
PP				1.97*** (0.66)
PSOE				-0.15
IU				-0.85*** (-0.09)
CiU and PNV				0.97*** (0.15)
(Intercept)	3.71***	4.34***	4.49***	3.36***
R ²	0.06	0.43	0.51	0.72
R ² adjusted	0.04	0.42	0.49	0.71
R ² improvement	0.06	0.38	0.07	0.21

Source: CIS 2827

Note: The dependent variable is left-right self-placement on a scale in which 1 is far-left and 10 is far-right. As for codification of independent variables, see notes 5–11. Each model incorporates a group of variables as blocks: (1) Social-structural factor I (social background and class), (2) Social-structural factor II (religious practice), (3) Values factor, (4) Party. Non-standardized coefficients are shown. Standardized coefficients, if significant, are shown between brackets. The levels of statistical significance are: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$

intense secularization of Spanish society (Montero et al. 2008; Cebolla et al. 2013; Cordero 2014). In a recent study (Cordero 2014) it is argued that both the left and the right parties have striven to mobilize public opinion and include proposals concerning religious and moral

Table 12.4 OLS models explaining left-right self-placement of citizens

	1	2	3	4
Educational attainment	-0.08	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03
Managers and proprietors	0.86*** (0.11)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.49** (0.06)	0.20
Professionals	0.09	0.18	0.16	0.17
Skilled manual workers	0.16	0.10	0.06	0.07
Non-skilled workers	-0.19	-0.27	-0.21	-0.06
Gender	0.11	-0.13	-0.16	-0.10
Age	0.01** (0.08)	0.00	-0.01** (-0.06)	0.00
Practicing member of Church		0.80*** (0.15)	0.71*** (0.13)	0.37*** (0.07)
Non-religious		-1.43*** (-0.32)	-1.14*** (-0.25)	-0.45*** (-0.10)
Economic equality			0.23*** (0.10)	0.05
Liberty vs. security			0.20*** (0.23)	0.10*** (0.12)
Vote PP				2.08*** (0.49)
Vote PSOE				-0.54*** (-0.12)
Vote IU				-0.92*** (-0.14)
Vote CiU or PNV				0.82*** (0.08)
(Intercept)	4.51***	5.62***	4.08***	4.11***
R ²	0.03	0.15	0.21	0.51
R ² adjusted	0.02	0.15	0.21	0.51
R ² improvement	0.03	0.13	0.06	0.30

Source: CIS 2930

Note: The dependent variable is left-right self-placement on a scale in which 1 is far-left and 10 is far-right. As for codification of independent variables, see notes 7–11. Each model incorporates a group of variables as blocks: (1) Social-structural factor I (social background and class), (2) Social-structural factor II (religious practice), (3) Values factor, (4) Party. Non-standardized coefficients are shown. Standardized coefficients, if significant, are shown between brackets. The levels of statistical significance are: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$

issues in their platforms, especially since 2004, thus reviving the religious vote. The impetus attributed to religious conflict by major parties seems consistent with the notable presence of the religious factor in the ideological identity of the political elites.

The third model incorporates the values factor and elevates the explained variance to 0.49 among MPs and 0.21 (adjusted R^2) among citizens, with similar increases in both cases (0.07 and 0.06 respectively). The two variables in the values factor are significant in both regressions and follow the expected directions: the preference for government intervention to reduce economic inequality is associated with the left and the preference for security before liberty is associated with the right. This model predicts, for example, that an MP who fully supports active intervention of the government to reduce economic inequality would be located one more point toward the left than an MP who fully rejects such intervention. Yet, the values factor shows a similar impact on both citizens and MPs and therefore Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed. This result challenges the idea that MPs are always more ideologically coherent than citizens in value terms due to their broader knowledge and higher political sophistication, as it is argued by some scholars (Dalton 2013), or as evidenced in Portugal by Freire and Belchior (2013) who see a clear divergence between elites and voters.

The fourth and last model includes political parties in dichotomous variables and improves the explained variance in the MPs regression by 0.21 to an adjusted R^2 of 0.71. The gain in explained variance is noteworthy but still smaller than that obtained by the social/structural factor II (religious practice). Obviously, the introduction of the party factor moderates the explanatory power of the other variables, but nevertheless the condition of practicing believer and the two variables related to values retain a strong significance. On the contrary, in the citizens' regression it is the party factor that produces the higher gain of explained variance (0.3) and rises the adjusted R^2 up to 0.51. This indicates that the left-right positions of MPs could be solidly explained with variables prior to their party affiliation, whereas for voters the partisan factor is key to understanding their location in the ideological scale. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is confirmed, which sustains that the partisan factor is larger among voters than MPs, in accordance with previous literature. (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1997; Freire and Belchior 2013).

12.4 CONCLUSIONS

This research shows that Spanish MPs are ideologically placed to the left of citizens and, within each party, representatives are also located to the left of their voters. It is remarkable that barely any of PP's MPs represent

the most conservative voters of this organization. Similarly, very few of PSOE's MPs place themselves as their centrist voters.

Regression analysis of MPs' self-placement in the left-right scale shows that the social/structural factor explains by itself a large amount of the variance, due to the weight of religious identity. Although the belief in egalitarian values and the preferences in the liberty-security scale are also statistically significant in the models, they are less so than religious beliefs and practices. This confirms the importance that previous literature has attributed to religion in shaping political ideology and voting choice in Spain, but it goes further by proving that religion is more associated to ideology for MPs than for citizens. This finding differs from some already mentioned studies that argue that political elites place themselves in the left-right scale more in terms of values than according to social/structural factors.

Finally, there is evidence that the most powerful factor in the left-right placement of citizens is the partisan factor, clearly above the significance of this factor for MPs. In agreement with previous research, data shows that citizens adjust their ideological position far less than MPs in substantive and non-partisan terms. In this regard, this chapter proves that for the Spanish political elites the concepts of left and right are more than mere partisan labels, although they are better explained in terms of social identity than in terms of values or social beliefs.

NOTES

1. Also the impact of ideology on the vote, although the issue is not addressed here.
2. Ideology may be defined as a "belief system centered on a small number of basic principles" (Kritzer 1978, p. 485). A review of the definitions of ideology can be found in Gerring (1997).
3. In all barometers of CIS there is a relatively high percentage of citizens (between 15% and 20%) who do not place themselves on the ideological scale. By contrast, the percentage of MPs who do not position on the scale is only 2%.
4. As explained in the introduction, there are other issues that could have been included in this block, such as the materialism/post-materialism divide, but such issues were not easy to analyze with the available data and therefore a simpler model was chosen.
5. The educational levels of fathers and mothers are ordered into seven categories: "Not schooled", "Incomplete primary school", "Completed

- primary school”, “Lower secondary school”, “Upper secondary school”, “College” (up to three years of university education), and “Graduate and post-graduate.”
6. As for the father’s occupation four *dummy* variables are included: “Managers and proprietors”, “Professionals”, “Skilled manual workers” and “Non-skilled workers”; “Non-manual workers” being the reference category. The mother’s occupation has not been incorporated in the final model, since two thirds of MPs’ mothers were engaged in domestic work and the variable has not proved statistically significant.
 7. The respondent’s educational attainment is measured in the same seven categories as the father’s educational level (see note 5). Four *dummy* variables are included ordered for the respondent’s occupation: “Managers and proprietors”, “Professionals”, “Skilled manual workers” and “Non-skilled workers”; while “Non-manual workers” is the reference category.
 8. Religious beliefs and practices are measured by two *dummy* variables: “Practising member of a Church” and “Non-religious”; while “Non-practising member of a Church” is the reference category.
 9. The agreement with the statement, “The government should take actions to reduce income inequality,” is measured on a scale of five categories: “Strongly agree”, “Somewhat agree”, “Neither agree or disagree”, “Somewhat disagree” and “Strongly disagree.”
 10. Self-placement on a scale of 0–10, where 0 means preference for maximum liberty even at the expense of losing security and 10 means maximum security even at the expense of losing liberty.
 11. Four *dummy* variables are included, one for each of the three major political parties (PP, PSOE and IU), the other for the two main nationalist parties combined (CiU and PNV), leaving all the other parties as the reference category.

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The Organization of Spain: Ideology, Territory and Representation in the State of Autonomies

Sandra León, Fabiola Mota, and Mayte Salvador

13.1 THE TERRITORIAL MODEL IN SPAIN

In Spain, as in other countries in which decentralizing reforms were implemented following a dictatorship, devolution was associated with the deepening of democracy and the transformation of State structures, with the aim of modernizing them and improving their efficacy and control by closing the gap between public administration and citizens. At the same time, the creation of the State of Autonomies signified the institutionalization of regional self-government as a way of dealing with demands for autonomy and recognizing the differentiated realities present in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Linz 1985, p. 244; León 2013, p. 70).

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Spain's model of self-governing regions can be considered a variant of the compound State model, midway between the decentralized unitary State and a federation (Solozobal 1992; Moreno 1997; Aja 2001; Colino 2009). Regional parliaments have legislative capacity and the power to raise taxes to fund competences over which they have authority, and the laws they pass have the same rank and status as those drafted by national parliament for the whole of the country. However, unlike federate States, in which authorities and powers attributed to sub-State entities are the rule, and those corresponding to the federation are the exception, with this model, the aim is to define in precise terms the powers that correspond to sub-State entities, as well as those corresponding to the central government, also allowing for the possibility of shared powers.

In general terms, the development of the State of Autonomies has followed a model of competitive regionalism (Moreno 1997; Börzel 2002), fostered by competition between parties along the center-periphery axis and the ideological (left-right) axis (Lago 2004). This model—which encourages regions classed as historical nationalities to seek recognition that they are different, whilst the other regions are constantly trying to catch up with them—has created major centrifugal tendencies within the system. Furthermore, the territorialization of political parties, with the pre-eminence of nationalist and regionalist parties, and the need for national parties to compete with them at a regional level, has also contributed to the regionalization of the party system (Keating and Wilson 2009; Alonso et al. 2011).

Public opinion about the State of Autonomies has on the whole been very positive, chiefly associated with the implications of the decentralization of power in terms of creating greater proximity between public administration and citizens (Mota 2008, pp. 104–105; León 2013, p. 71). However, the economic crisis has transformed public assessments of the State of Autonomies and public opinion preferences about territorial organization. Since 2010, general opinion about the functioning and performance of the territorial model has declined, and preferences regarding the organization of the State have polarized. The result is that an increasing number of citizens want a different territorial model, but their preferred alternatives pull in opposite directions: on the one hand, a recentralizing tendency that seeks to diminish or do away with regional powers and authorities, and on the other, concentrated in Catalonia and the Basque Country, a bid for independence (León 2013, p. 275).

The abundant data on public opinion in Spain regarding the territorial model stand in stark contrast with the lack of information about the way in which Spanish members of parliament (MPs) perceive the State of Autonomies. The basic aim of this chapter is to fill this literature gap by analyzing the attitudes and preferences of MPs regarding different issues related with the current territorial organization of the State of Autonomies. To this end, in the next section we explore the assessments and preferences held by MPs from the main parties, focusing particularly on differences according to the political party's position in the territorial cleavage, and variations between regional and national MPs. The chapter continues with the testing of several hypotheses regarding variation among MPs within the two main statewide political parties, PSOE (the Socialist Party) and PP (the Popular Party or Partido Popular). Specifically, it will analyse separately for each party whether the heterogeneity of opinions between MPs can be explained according to the initial patterns of constitutional access to self-government in the region where they reside (fast or slow-track), or the level of representation within which they exercise their political activity (regional parliament vs. Congress and Senate).

13.2 DECENTRALIZATION AND COHESION

The literature on decentralization and federalism can be organized into two major areas: studies that explore the origins of federalism or the causes of decentralization; and research that focuses on exploring the consequences thereof. One branch within this second group explores the effects of decentralization on the organizational structure of the parties and on electoral competition in the different levels of government.

On the one hand, studies that explore the relationship between decentralization and the organizational structure of parties in federal systems show that in countries where regional governments hold greater powers over taxes and spending, and where powers are more clearly divided, such as Canada and the USA, the regional organizational structures of parties are more autonomous with regard to the national apparatus. In countries such as Austria and Germany, on the other hand, where the design of federalism is cooperative (in many matters the federal government legislates, and executive power is maintained at a regional level), the organizational structure of the parties concentrates greater power at the federal level (Rodden 2006; Rodden and Wibbels 2010; Thorlakson 2009).

In the case of decentralized countries such as Italy, Spain, Belgium or the UK, different studies have pointed out that the devolution of power in recent decades has resulted in centrifugation in the internal organization of the main statewide parties (León 2007, p. 193; Detterbeck and Jeffery 2009, p. 71; Fabre and Méndez-Lago 2009, p. 117; Swenden and Maddens 2009 p. 16). This means that power within these parties has been transferred from the national apparatus to territorial structures, and that regional leaders have gained power when it comes to determining the basic lines of the party manifesto and in the process of leader selection (Swenden and Maddens 2009, p. 16).

Studies that analyze patterns of electoral competition in federal and decentralized countries, on the other hand, show that, as decentralization increases, national parties are obliged to regionalize their discourse and even to accede to demands for further decentralization (Sorens 2010; Chhibber and Kollman 2004), especially in constituencies where they are competing with nationalist parties (Alonso et al. 2011). Electoral programs become territorially diversified as regional leaders adapt the party's electoral promises to the specific demands of the regional electorate (Detterbeck and Jeffery 2009; Mazzoleni 2009, Alonso et al. 2011).

This centrifugation of the organizational structure of statewide parties and low electoral contamination between regional and national elections results in a less integrated party system, in which national leaders have less capacity to impose discipline on regional politicians and to develop a coherent political agenda. Maintaining a cohesive political agenda throughout the entire territory is even more difficult for national leaders when there is greater independence between the national and regional electoral arena. Opportunistic temptations increase when the survival of regional politicians depends fundamentally on themselves (particularly when they hold responsibility for regional government, with broad competencies and powers in core politics, and they are accountable to their electors for the management of specific problems in their region) and not on changes in support for the party at a national level. Within this context, regional politicians have greater incentives to take their own stances and defend the interests of their territories, even if this would weaken the coherence of the party's discourse at a national level, and consequently, could damage the electoral prospects of the party at a national level (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009, p. 228).

In Spain, the consolidation of regional power has weakened the integration of the party system. On the one hand, the organizational structure

of statewide parties has become regionalized following the lines of the institutional structure of the State (Fabre and Méndez-Lago 2009), especially in regions in which electoral competition is dominated by non-statewide parties (Amat et al. 2009). Furthermore, this has been accompanied by diversification in the electoral programs of these parties in regional elections (Alonso et al. 2011). On the other hand, the amassing of important resources and powers in the hands of the regions has allowed for the appearance of regional electoral fiefdoms whose leaders have managed to survive electorally regardless of their party's changing fortunes in the general elections (León 2014).

However, there are currently no analyses that explore whether the transformation of the relationship between national and regional power in Spain's national parties is reflected in their parliamentary elites. In particular, we do not know the extent to which MPs representing a specific party think differently regarding essential issues such as the territorial organization of the State and whether these differences can be attributed to the region they are from or to the level of government where they exercise their activity (regional vs. national). The purpose of this chapter is to fill this empirical gap in the literature by means of two analyses. Firstly, a descriptive analysis will be provided of the preferences of MPs representing the major parties present in Spanish parliament and in the regional parliaments regarding issues related to the territorial model of the State. Secondly, a series of hypotheses will be analyzed regarding the differences of opinion observed within Spain's two biggest statewide parties (PSOE and PP). Specifically, this analysis shall examine whether the heterogeneity of opinions found among members of the same party with regard to the State of Autonomies can be explained by the level of administration in which the MP participates (regional parliament vs. Congress and Senate) or according to the self-governing region where the MP resides.

13.3 OPINIONS AND PREFERENCES REGARDING THE STATE OF AUTONOMIES

This next section analyzes the opinions and preferences expressed by Spanish MPs with regard to different aspects of the current territorial organization of the Spanish State, seeking to establish similarities and differences according to the MP's political party, the legislative chamber

where they work, and the type of autonomous region (historical nationality or other).

Firstly, how do Spanish MPs feel about the degree of political and financial autonomy enjoyed by their autonomous community? Analysis of three questions contained in the survey of MPs (regarding their degree of satisfaction with the level of devolution enjoyed by their autonomous region, its level of finance, and the aspiration to obtain a system of finance similar to the quota system or the economic pact used in the Basque Country and Navarre, respectively) confirms the division of opinions with regard to this first issue.

The results presented in Table 13.1 show that MPs are divided in similar proportions regarding their degree of satisfaction with the level of devolution achieved by their autonomous region: 54% feel that their regional administration is fine as it is, whereas 46% believe that their region has not achieved a satisfactory level of devolution. An even clearer majority, 62%, thinks that their region has not achieved a satisfactory level of finance, in spite of which, the greatest consensus is observed in the opinion that opposes their region aspiring to obtain finance through the *Cupo* system (the regional financing system that operates in the Basque Country), regardless of what happens in the other regions, an opinion manifested by 79% of MPs.¹ Therefore, we find clearly divided opinions regarding the degree of autonomy and finance aspirations of the region itself.

However, when examining the distribution of preferences according to parliamentary chamber, we see that MPs in the national legislative chambers are more satisfied with the level of devolution achieved by their self-governing region, 63%, than MPs serving in regional parliaments (with the notable exception of Andalusia). National MPs are also more satisfied with the degree of finance enjoyed by their region, 49% (with the single exception of the Basque Country). Finally, members of Congress and the Senate are largely against their respective regions obtaining finance through the *Cupo* system (86%) (once again with the exception of Andalusian MPs). In short, except for MPs serving in the Andalusian chamber, regional MPs express more favorable opinions towards greater territorial decentralization than MPs in the national legislative chambers. In particular, MPs in the chambers of Galicia and Catalonia are the most dissatisfied with the level of autonomy and finance attained by their respective regions, but only the latter aspire in the majority to obtain a quota system in their region (66% of MPs from Catalonia, as opposed to just 23% from Galicia).

Table 13.1 Opinions about the level of devolution and the finance of the region itself, by chamber and party (in %)

	<i>Level of devolution (1)</i>			<i>Finance (2)</i>			<i>Aspiration to Cupo system (3)</i>		
	<i>Fine</i>	<i>Not satisfactory</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>Fine</i>	<i>Not satisfactory</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>
Chambers									
Andalusia	68	32	100 (52)	33	67	100 (51)	13	87	100 (47)
Catalonia	22	78	100 (35)	33	67	100 (35)	66	34	100 (36)
Galicia	17	83	100 (36)	8	92	100 (35)	23	77	100 (33)
Basque Country	38	62	100 (37)	63	37	100 (36)	–	–	–
Other chambers	56	44	100 (216)	30	70	100 (220)	20	80	100 (173)
Congress and senate	63	37	100 (180)	51	49	100 (185)	14	86	100 (151)
Parties									
PP/UPN	66	34	100 (232)	30	70	100 (239)	10	90	100 (188)
PSOE	60	40	100 (233)	55	45	100 (235)	16	84	100 (191)
IU	21	79	100 (18)	26	74	100 (18)	34	66	100 (15)
CiU	0	100	100 (16)	0	100	100 (15)	93	7	100 (16)
ERC	0	100	100 (8)	0	100	100 (9)	100	0	100 (8)
PNV	0	100	100 (16)	14	86	100 (15)	–	–	–
Other nationalist or regionalist parties	2	98	100 (33)	23	77	100 (32)	78	22	100 (22)
Total	54 (300)	46 (256)	100 (556)	38 (214)	62 (349)	100 (563)	21 (92)	79 (347)	100 (439)

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: (1) "In light of the recent controversy about the levels of devolution attained by the Autonomous Communities, there are people who: (i) believe that regional government is fine as it is now; (ii) think that their region has not attained a satisfactory level of devolution. Which of these statements do you agree with the most?" (2) "In terms of finance, do you believe that: (i) your region is fine in terms of finance; (ii) your region has not achieved a satisfactory level of finance?" (3) "Do you think that your region should aspire to obtain a quota system regardless of whether other regions do?"

Furthermore, observing the distribution of opinions by political party, political representatives from statewide parties (which present candidates in all constituencies throughout Spain—PP, PSOE and IU, in the survey data) share opinions denoting greater satisfaction with the autonomy attained by their region than representatives of nationalist and regionalist parties (which only present candidates in constituencies in their territories—CiU, PNV, ERC, and other nationalist and regionalist parties, in the survey data). Among the representatives of statewide parties, major differences are observed between the preferences of MPs for the PP and PSOE, on the one hand, and MPs for IU, on the other, with the latter showing preferences that are closer to those of MPs for nationalist and regionalist parties. Whereas MPs for the PP are the most satisfied with the degree of devolution attained by their self-governing region (66%), MPs for the PSOE are more satisfied with the level of finance achieved by their region (55%), and the majority of MPs from these three statewide parties are opposed to their self-governing region accessing finance by means of the *Cupo* system (90% of MPs from PP, 84% from PSOE and 66% from IU).

It is important to note that preferences among parliamentary elites do not necessarily coincide with regard to spending and taxes. Spain's system of finance has traditionally been characterized by an imbalance between regional governments' powers over spending and taxes (much greater in relation to spending than in relation to taxes), which has placed the regional elites in a comfortable position from the perspective of accountability, since they assumed control over an important volume of resources without needing to pay the costs associated with having to ask citizens for taxes. Preferences for greater fiscal decentralization have frequently been concentrated in certain autonomous communities (particularly Catalonia, and to a lesser extent, and more recently, Madrid), and have been rejected by poorer regions, although these also assumed the devolution levels of "fast-tracked" regions following the Regional Agreements of 1992.²

Secondly, which preferences do MPs express regarding the model of organization and functioning of the State of Autonomies? The preferences of MPs regarding the degree of decentralization of the Spanish State were measured on a scale where 1 represents maximum centralization of State functions (giving all power to central government) and 10 represents maximum autonomy (giving all power to the self-governing regions without attaining nationalist independence). In this case, differences between political parties are broader than the differences between legislative chambers and between the regions. Regarding these last two variables, MPs

serving in the chambers of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia—the three historical nationalities—and MPs from these three self-governing regions, express decentralizing positions above the average, confirming the strength of the territorial cleavage in the preferences of MPs. As for political parties, representatives of nationalist parties clearly prefer the highest degree of State decentralization (ERC, other nationalist parties, PNV, CiU and other regionalist parties), whereas MPs for the PP and UPN parties exhibit a mean of 6 on the scale, lower than the total average for the sample of 6.9.

When studying the percentages of MPs who prefer an asymmetric State of Autonomies, a State in which current asymmetries are maintained, or a State in which existing asymmetries are increased, some interesting figures also come to light. Sixty four percent of the total sample would be in favor, regardless of differential circumstances and the treatment of nationalities, of all regions attaining the same level of power and being treated equally. Hence, preference for a symmetrical federal model is clearly prevalent among political representatives. In addition, only 22% feel that, given that certain autonomous communities are classed as historical nationalities, the existing asymmetries should be maintained, and a lower percentage, 14%, thinks that for this same reason existing asymmetries should increase. Observing the differences between legislative chambers, it is clear that the multilevel dynamic is less important than the territorial dynamic in explaining these results. Preference for the symmetrical model is the majority opinion expressed in the Spanish parliament and also in the parliaments of regions governed in accordance with section 143 of the Spanish Constitution, even higher in the Andalusian legislative chamber. On the contrary, opinions are more divided within the parliaments of historical nationalities, especially the Basque chamber, which is divided into three thirds with regard to this question, whereas the chamber in Catalonia is more homogeneous around the option of increasing asymmetries (66%).

The importance of territorial cleavages becomes even more evident when comparing preferences between the political parties. On the one hand, in nationalist parties (Catalan, Basque, and others), there is an overwhelming majority opinion to increase asymmetries—as the only means of guaranteeing recognition of the nationalist territorial distinction—whereas at the other extreme, statewide parties revealed clear majorities in favor of a symmetrical regional model (particularly the PP, where 82% of MPs stated their support for this option, but also the PSOE, with 62%).

The analysis of preferences regarding intergovernmental relations shows that the option preferred by the majority (68%) is for there to be a collective body that resolves conflicts between central and regional governments, in contrast to 31% who advocate bilateral relations. The territorial cleavage is also significant in this question, polarizing preferences depending on whether the party is a statewide party or nationalist. Seventy nine percent of representatives of the PP-UPN, 72% of the PSOE and 53% of the IU prefer a system of multilateral relations over the option of bilateralism, which is preferred almost unanimously by nationalist parties in Catalonia (ERC and CiU) and the Basque Country (PNV).

Thirdly, what do MPs think about a constitutional reform that would affect the territorial organization of the State? Do they feel it is necessary? In which aspects? For what reasons? In relation to these questions, the first figure that should be highlighted is the gap between those who believe the Constitution needs to be reformed—82% of the sample—and those who are in favor of reforming the territorial organization of the State: 53% of MPs when asked specifically about this option.

The effect of territorial cleavage is particularly evident when comparing chambers and territories, since the parliament of Catalonia, followed by those of the Basque Country and Galicia, display the highest percentage of MPs who believe that the State of Autonomies needs to be reformed. However, the options of constitutional reform and reform of the State of Autonomies only reach a similar level of approval among MPs from the Basque Country and Catalonia, whereas in the other legislative chambers, as in the other regions, there is a marked difference between preferences in favor of constitutional reform and of the territorial reorganization of the State. In fact, this difference between support for constitutional reform and a reform of the State of Autonomies seems to divide statewide parties clearly from non-statewide parties (with the exception of IU, which would be positioned among the later).³ These results prompt us to explore which aspects of the Constitution and the territorial political system Spain's legislators would reform.

Among the aspects MPs consider necessary to reform with regard to the Constitution, reform of the territorial organization of the State (31%) and of the Crown (30%) represent their main concerns, followed a long way further down by reform of the Senate (15%), electoral law (7%), and recognition of citizen rights (6%). Differences between the political parties are much more marked than among the parliamentary chambers, even though the contrasts between the latter are also important. The chamber

of Catalonia is the only parliament where the majority of its MPs believe in the need to reform the territorial organization of the State (55%), in particular showing preferences for recognition of territorial independence (15%) or greater federalism (13%). This corresponds to the fact that the nationalist parties of Catalonia—CiU and ERC—followed by the PNV (Basque Country) reflect the greatest consensus among their representatives regarding the reform of the territorial model.

At the other extreme, the reformation of the territorial organization of the State sparks less interest among MPs in the chamber of Andalusia, Galicia and the other autonomous communities regulated by ordinary statutes, with lower percentages than the sample average. Furthermore, MPs from national parties (PP, PSOE and IU) express lower levels of concern for territorial reform, but a higher percentage expresses the need to reform the Crown (especially the issue of succession, for socialists and conservatives, and the headship of State for MPs of IU). These results also seem to suggest the existence of a certain degree of discrepancy within the two main statewide parties regarding the direction of territorial reforms, which shall be analyzed in greater detail in the next section.

One final result to highlight is the lack of interest expressed spontaneously by MPs with regard to reforming the Senate. Not even the Spanish parliament perceives reform of the Senate to be an essential aspect of constitutional reform, since only 19% of MPs cited this matter spontaneously. However, when MPs were asked what should be done with the Senate, the option “turn it into a territorial chamber of representation” gained the unanimous support of 81% of the sample. However, the lack of concern regarding reforming the Senate seems to be justified, given that 79% of MPs do not believe it is possible to implement constitutional reform in territorial aspects of the State that would satisfy Basque and Catalan nationalists, which reflects widespread pessimism regarding the possibility of reaching an enduring political agreement regarding the territorial organization of the State.

13.4 TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGE IN THE PSOE AND THE PP

The results of the previous section suggest the existence of a certain degree of discrepancy within the two major statewide parties with regard to certain territorial questions. The aim of this section is to explore which factors might explain these divergences. Specifically, it will analyze the extent to which the heterogeneity of opinions within statewide parties can be

explained according to: (1) the level of government in which MPs exercise their political activity (regional parliament vs. Congress and Senate), and (2) the region they are from. On the one hand, MPs' assessments of the territorial model may vary depending on the type of institutional representation they hold. In a fairly non-integrated party system, in which regional elites have gained electoral independence and power within the organizational structures of their parties, the preferences of regional MPs regarding a more decentralized territorial model might possibly be more intense than those held by national MPs from the same party. The diversification of a party's electoral programs in accordance with the specific demands of each regional electorate and the exercising of regional power itself (the management of broad resources and policies) promote the differentiation of positions among regional MPs regarding issues related with the State of Autonomies. Hence, regional MPs can be expected to be more favorable than national MPs to any type of reform that would increase the power and resources of regional governments.

The second factor that might explain differences in preferences regarding the regional model between parliamentary elites from the same party is the region they are from. National and regional MPs from fast-tracked regions (that accessed autonomy earlier and with higher levels of expenditure powers) might well take up more regionalist positions than MPs from the same party who are from other regions. Two arguments might explain these differences.

On the one hand, fast-tracked regions have enjoyed a higher level of devolved power for a longer period of time than the other regions,⁴ which might have contributed to a growing differentiation between preferences regarding the territorial model expressed by MPs from these regions and those expressed by MPs from other regions.

On the other hand, greater variation in the vision of the territorial model held by parliamentary elites can be expected in regions where nationalist parties have traditionally dominated regional political forces (Catalonia and the Basque Country). The need for statewide parties to compete with these parties in regional elections has contributed to the regionalization of their electoral programs (Alonso et al. 2011), which could be reflected in the preferences expressed by regional MPs from these regions.

To explore the variation found in preferences held by MPs from the PSOE and PP regarding the territorial model, we have selected the questions from the survey that measure the desired level of self-government in

the region or the evaluation of reforms that imply greater self-government or greater capacity to influence decisions at a national level.

Specifically, we selected the following questions: desired level of autonomy on a scale from 1 to 10⁵; MPs' satisfaction regarding the level of devolved power attained by their region⁶; satisfaction with the finance attained by their region of origin⁷; desire for financial autonomy following the models of the Basque Country and Navarre⁸; and evaluation of the type of relationship preferred by the regions in their relations with central government.⁹ The independent variables used are regional MP¹⁰ and region,¹¹ classified into three categories: Andalusia and Galicia; Catalonia and the Basque Country; and other autonomous regions. The aim of this classification is to explore differences between fast-tracked regions and the rest, and to ascertain whether, within the fast-tracked regions, belonging to an autonomous region with strong regionalist parties entails significant differences from fast-tracked regions without nationalist parties (Andalusia) or where such parties are less prominent (Galicia). The reference category is "Other autonomous Regions".

Ideology was also inserted as a control variable.¹² Each analysis was conducted separately for MPs from the PP and from the PSOE parties, and the method of estimation used was OLS and Logit, depending on the type of dependent variable.

The results are exhibited in Table 13.2. Firstly, the data show that regional MPs in the PP have significantly more regionalist preferences than national MPs regarding the level of desired autonomy (model 1), level of devolved power (model 2), satisfaction with regional finance (model 3), and the extension of the Basque/Navarre model of finance to the other self-governing regions (model 5). Specifically, regional MPs in the PP are more in favor than their colleagues in the Congress and Senate of higher levels of autonomy and devolved power for their regions. Furthermore, regional MPs in the PP are more dissatisfied than national MPs with the finance attained by their region, and more in agreement with extending the Basque/Navarre model of finance to the other regions.

However, national and regional MPs in the PP have similar opinions regarding bilateral relations. The vast majority of them prefer there to be a collective body to mediate conflicts between State and regional governments (79%), as opposed to those who prefer bilateral relations between regional and central government (21%). In other words, it would appear that the role of bilateralism in intergovernmental relations generates a high level of consensus between MPs in the PP, regardless of whether they are regional or national MPs.

Table 13.2 Preferences regarding the territorial model expressed by MPs from the PP and PSOE parties, multivariate Models.

	<i>Autonomy (0-10)</i>		<i>Satisfied with level of devolved power (1 = Insufficient, 0 = Sufficient)</i>		<i>Satisfied with finance (1 = No, 0 = Yes)</i>		<i>Bilateral (0 = No, 1 = Yes)</i>		<i>Cupo system for all (0 = No, 1 = Yes or yes but with conditions)</i>	
	PSOE	PP	PSOE	PP	PSOE	PP	PSOE	PP	PSOE	PP
Regional MP	0.0401 (0.284)	0.670*** (0.229)	-0.0190 (0.345)	1.026*** (0.388)	0.649* (0.375)	1.089*** (0.361)	-0.222 (0.401)	0.147 (0.411)	0.406 (0.486)	1.048* (0.554)
Ideology	-0.0614 (0.143)	-0.0167 (0.141)	0.00537 (0.174)	0.0387 (0.174)	0.0263 (0.181)	-0.0244 (0.198)	-0.140 (0.210)	-0.0610 (0.194)	0.0940 (0.180)	-0.00139 (0.212)
Andalusia and Galicia	0.422* (0.251)	0.402 (0.248)	0.599* (0.340)	0.340 (0.319)	0.379 (0.342)	0.498 (0.436)	-0.419 (0.436)	0.524 (0.378)	-1.298** (0.636)	0.269 (0.395)
Basque Country and Catalonia	1.986*** (0.259)	-0.224 (0.435)	0.772** (0.391)	-0.613 (0.596)	-1.662*** (0.496)	-2.686*** (0.712)	0.592 (0.440)	0.214 (0.683)	0.479 (0.454)	0.0684 (0.677)
Constant	6.652*** (0.582)	5.592*** (0.861)	-0.720 (0.652)	-1.593 (1.071)	-0.474 (0.675)	0.429 (1.234)	-0.546 (0.765)	-1.264 (1.178)	-2.106*** (0.687)	-2.427* (1.333)
Observations	215	237	211	225	212	232	197	227	211	225
Method of estimation	OLS	OLS	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit

Source: Study CIS 2827

Note: Robust standard errors *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

In contrast, there are no significant differences between MPs in the PP from fast-tracked regions and the other regions, with the exception of MPs from the Basque Country and Catalonia, who are significantly more satisfied with the level of finance attained than the others.¹³

In the case of the PSOE, the results are very different to those of the PP. There are no significant differences between regional and national MPs, except with regard to satisfaction with finance for their region. Regional MPs from the PSOE are more dissatisfied with the finance attained by their autonomous community than national MPs, but the differences are only significant at 10%. However, differences between MPs from the PSOE across regions are significant. MPs from fast-tracked regions prefer greater levels of autonomy than the rest, and a higher level of devolved power. Preferences are more intense in regions where there are nationalist parties (Catalonia and the Basque Country). However, MPs from the PSOE in these regions are more satisfied than the rest with regard to regional finance. Furthermore, MPs from Andalusia and Galicia are less likely to be in favor of extending the Basque/Navarre system of finance to the other regions. These last two examples indicate that belonging to fast-tracked regions is associated with a lower demand for greater autonomy in finance or reforms in this area.¹⁴

13.5 CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the opinions expressed by Spain's political representatives with regard to the territorial model of the State shows that membership of a statewide or non-statewide party is the factor that most prominently accounts for differences between the preferences and opinions of MPs (as opposed to the region they are from, or the type of territorial chamber where they work as MPs). This is particularly noticeable in questions referring to the territorial model (degree of autonomy and territorial asymmetry) and the future of the State of Autonomies (constitutional reform of the territorial model). However, the influence of the multilevel political dynamic is important in opinions about the degree of autonomy attained by the MP's region, and national MPs in general are more satisfied with the autonomy achieved by their region than regional MPs are.

Regarding analysis of divergences within Spanish major statewide parties—PP and PSOE—the empirical evidence suggests that differences between MPs from the same party are more closely related with their level of representation (regional parliament vs. Congress and Senate) than with

the region they are from and, more interestingly, it shows that the results are different between the two parties. In the PP, differences can be explained exclusively by the level of representation held by MPs. The data show that MPs in the PP that belong to regional assemblies have a different vision of the State of Autonomies to that held by their party colleagues sitting in Congress and in the Senate, and these opinions are independent of the region where they reside or their ideology. However, there are no significant differences between MPs according to the region they live in (fast-track or slow-track). In the PSOE, on the other hand, the level of representation of its MPs is not important in explaining the diversity of preferences observed regarding the territorial model, but the region they are from is relevant. MPs from fast-tracked regions are more favorable to greater levels of decentralization (at a general level and with regard to the devolved powers held by their region).

Questions regarding the future of the territorial model of the State did not spark unanimous agreement among MPs. Ideological, territorial and multilevel dimensions interact with one another, tracing out a multitude of preferences and opinions regarding constitutional reform of the State of Autonomies, not allowing any relevant common patterns to be established. Furthermore, MPs are more likely to choose the non-response option when asked about such issues.

The possibilities opened up for future research are very broad since, prior to this project, there were no data available reflecting MPs' opinions on such matters. One possible future strand of research on this subject could be to analyze the extent to which the opinions of MPs about the territorial model change depending on whether their party governs at a central level or not. It is possible that demands for greater devolved power might intensify in regions ruled by a different party to the one in central office. This could be one possible interpretation of the results obtained for MPs for the PP. The satisfaction of regional MPs with the level of devolved power achieved in their region, with the finance received, or with the model of territorial organization in general might be lower when central office is held by a party other than their own. In this case, the preferences of these MPs would reflect concealed criticism of the management of central government regarding the issues of their region.

Another possible explanation of differences between the PP and PSOE in the nature (territorial or representational) of their internal heterogeneity is linked to the organizational structure of the parties. For example, the PSOE adopted a federal structure in 1979, in which the PSC is an

independent and federate party. This organizational structure might have contributed to intensifying the different preferences regarding self-government among MPs from different regions—above differences between MPs according to their level of representation. According to this argument, the greater organizational centralization found in the PP could explain why differences between MPs from different regions are not significant, whereas they are significant when related with the level of representation.

Finally, another strand of research to be explored in the future could be to study whether preferences regarding the territorial model are more intense among MPs from a party that governs in the region than among MPs who are part of the regional opposition. We may expect the demand for further levels of devolved power to be more intense among MPs who are part of the regional government, since these are the potential recipients of new resources and powers, than those who are in opposition groups within the regional parliament. Ultimately, the party affiliation of regional government regarding the political color of central government, or membership of the party that holds office in regional government, might contribute to provide a better understanding of the variation within the PP and PSOE and of why the explanatory mechanism that accounts for this internal variation is different between the two parties.

NOTES

1. Furthermore, 76% of the MPs stated they were against extending the quota system to all autonomous communities. The majority of MPs in the state-wide parties, along with CiU, oppose extending the quota system to all self-governing regions, with the PSOE having the highest proportion of representatives against this option (84%), a slightly higher proportion than PP-UPN (82%). In addition, only a majority of MPs for ERC (89%) and “other nationalist and regionalist parties” were favorable to the scenario of a federal State in which all autonomous communities would be financed using a quota system.
2. The fast-tracked regions are Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country. Furthermore, Navarre accessed greater levels of autonomy through the first additional provision of the Spanish Constitution. The Canary Islands and the Community of Valencia accessed autonomy through the proceedings stipulated by section 143 of the Spanish Constitution, but in 1982 it was guaranteed a high level of devolution equivalent to territories that had accessed autonomy through section 151 of the Constitution.

3. The two main national parties, PP and PSOE, are practically split down the middle in terms of those in favor (46% and 45% respectively) and against (54% and 55% respectively) reform of the territorial organization of the State, even though in both parties there is an ample majority of MPs in favor of constitutional reform (72% in the PP-UPN and 88% in the PSOE).
4. Following the Regional Agreements of 1992, the powers held by slow-tracked autonomous communities were made progressively equal to those on the fast-track. This process culminated in 2001 with the transfer of healthcare to slow-tracked autonomous communities. Therefore, the most important remaining asymmetries in the system pertain to the system of finance, since the majority of regions are financed using the common regime, with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre, where the quota system and the economic pact are applied, respectively.
5. Where 1 signifies all power for central State and 10 means all power for the autonomous communities while still ruling out nationalist independence.
6. A value of 1 was assigned to MPs who believe that their region has not attained a satisfactory level of devolved power, and a value of 0 to those who feel that regional administration is fine as it is.
7. A value of 0 was assigned to the response “fine as it is”, and a value of 1 was assigned to the response “not yet achieved a satisfactory level of finance”.
8. In this case, an affirmative response (yes) and affirmative but with conditions were assigned a value of 1, and a negative response was assigned a value of 0.
9. The option for bilateral relations between central government and the self-governing region they are from was assigned a value of 1, whereas the option regarding the existence of a collective body was assigned a value of 0.
10. Assigned a value of 1 if the MP belongs to a regional parliament, and 0 if he or she belongs to the Congress or the Senate.
11. Although the regions of Navarre, the Canary Islands and the Community of Valencia also accessed a greater level of devolved power than the other regions, the coding of the database is not able to identify MPs belonging to these regions separately, since they belong to the general category of “other autonomous communities”.
12. Coded from 0 to 10, where 0 is the extreme left and 10 the extreme right.
13. This result stems chiefly from MPs from the Basque Country.
14. For a further analysis of this issue, see León 2017.

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MPs Representing Nationalist and Regionalist Parties

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14.1 INTRODUCTION

The territorial cleavage between central and peripheral areas is one of the traditional divisive policies that shape the party system in Spain; and unlike others, such as the religious or class system, it seems to have retained equal or even greater force than it wielded in the first third of the twentieth century. Nationalist and regionalist parties are the most deeply rooted—although not the only—manifestation of the impact of the center-periphery axis on the Spanish political party system. This chapter describes the characteristics of this group of parties, as well as the orientations of their representatives. Whereas previous chapters focused fundamentally on the differences *between* the national parties, this chapter about the political elites from nationalist and regionalist parties will examine their differences with the former, as well as their differences from one another.

Since the foundational elections of 1977, a group of between five and nine nationalist and regionalist parties have secured representation in the

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Congress of Deputies (Spain's lower chamber), holding between 7% and 11% of seats. Comparative analyses have given very different labels to this heterogeneous group of political formations: "autonomist parties" or "ethnoregionalist parties" (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006; Tronconi 2009), or "peripheral parties" (Alonso 2012) are just a few of the adjectives used to encompass them all, even though each of these terms has different connotations. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we will refer to them as nationalist and regionalist parties, and we will use the generic term peripheral parties to refer to them all as a whole. The parties examined in this chapter include: PNV and Aralar in the Basque Country; CiU and ERC in Catalonia; BNG in Galicia; CC in Canarias; Nabai and CDN in Navarre; PAR and CHA in Aragon; PRC in Cantabria; PR in La Rioja; and UL in Castilla-León. We have not considered UPN and ICV within the group because, although these parties are anchored at a regional level, they usually form broader groups in Congress by allying themselves with national parties—PP and IU, respectively—and they vote in accordance with the party discipline of these groups.

Given the limitations of such observations, the analyses presented here only provide disaggregated data for the following parties: CiU, ERC, PNV and BNG; representatives of Nabai in Navarre, and of Aralar and EA in the Basque Country are grouped within the category of "Other nationalist parties", whereas the other cases (CC, PAR, CHA, PRC, CDN, PR, and UL) are grouped in the category of "regionalist parties". The limited number of cases considered only allows for an exploratory analysis of the hypotheses suggested in this chapter. However, the findings offer original and relevant empirical evidence to improve knowledge of nationalist and regionalist parliamentary elites in Spain.

The chapter is organized into two sections. The first examines the organization and conception of representation as understood by the different representatives of the peripheral parties in relation to national parties. Since these groups only compete electorally in certain areas of Spain, we have endeavored to verify the extent to which the regional level constitutes the main level of their respective organizations. In addition, this first section also examines whether these parties share other organizational traits that differentiate them from the majority parties. Finally, it looks at certain hypotheses about the way in which differences with regard to their relationship with institutional politics can in turn create differences in their respective organizational models.

The second section examines how the peripheral parties are positioned on the center-periphery axis, with regard to three dimensions: cultural, institutional and fiscal (Alonso 2012). These issues shall be examined in relation to the following questions: To what extent do the characteristics of a regional culture/language have an impact on differences in the preferences expressed by peripheral representatives in terms of language policy? And, given that three decades have passed since decentralization was implemented in Spain, have the Spanish peripheral parties tended to converge towards a more radicalized agenda in their demands for self-governance? Finally, the chapter is brought to an end with a section outlining our conclusions.

14.2 ORGANIZATION AND REPRESENTATION

A great many previous studies, applying a comparative approach, have sought to identify organizational traits that differentiate peripheral from the majority parties. With the exception of a greater propensity towards factionalism and division—which will be dealt with later—the results of these studies have thus far been inconclusive (De Winter and Türsan 1998; De Winter et al. 2006; Elias and Tronconi 2010).

This section looks at the organizational characteristics and the notion of representation, as it is understood by Spain's peripheral parties in two directions. Firstly, it shall examine the extent to which the responses of parliamentary elites from these parties reflect organizational traits and notions of representation that set them apart from national parties. And secondly, looking at their different relationship with institutional politics, it will also examine certain hypotheses regarding the differences we expect to find in their organizational models.

One primary question is the territorial level they are oriented towards, and where the party's organizational resources are concentrated. Since they are regional parties, the starting hypothesis is that the regional level constitutes, in the words of Deschouwer (2003 p. 216), the "principal" level around which nationalist and regionalist parties are organized (Elias and Tronconi 2010 p. 4).

Certain indicators confirm the greater relevance and orientation of peripheral members of parliament (MPs) towards the regional level. Faced with the question of which post of representation they would freely choose,¹ MPs from peripheral parties seem to be more clearly anchored in the regional level, since 43% responded that they prefer to be regional

MPs, in contrast to just 27% of representatives of national parties who expressed this preference. In the other direction, just 10% of peripheral representatives prefer to be members of Congress or the Senate, as opposed to 27% of representatives of national parties. When asked about whether they would have gone into politics had there not been regional level of government (only asked of regional MPs): 22% of nationalist or regionalist MPs in comparison to just 8% of MPs from national parties responded negatively. Along these same lines, the responses given regarding their outlook for the next ten years confirm their greater orientation towards the regional level: 19% (increasing to 33% among MPs for CiU) of representatives of peripheral parties see themselves in ten years' time sitting on regional executive bodies, as opposed to just 11% of representatives of national parties. In the other direction, 12% of MPs from national parties—in comparison to just 1% of MPs from nationalist or regionalist parties—see themselves in ten years' time as MPs in Spain's central government chambers (Congress and Senate). Finally, when asked about conflicts of interest between party and self-governing region, 34% of peripheral representatives in contrast to just 15% of MPs from national parties stated that they should prioritize the interests of their region, although representatives of PNV are an exception in this regard, as we will see later.

Therefore, as one might logically anticipate, the regional level predominates over the national level for nationalist and regionalist representatives in the majority of indicators examined.² Beyond their orientation towards the regional level, comparative literature has not identified genotypic traits in the organization of nationalist and regionalist parties with the exception of a certain propensity towards factionalism (De Winter et al. 2006 pp. 253–254). The reasons proposed by the literature to explain why factionalism is more recurrent among peripheral parties are vast. One primary factor would be tensions derived from the clash between more pragmatic positions and more maximalist positions in demands for self-governance. Secondly, among parties whose *raison d'être* is territorial/identitarian mobilization, it seems logical that levels of ideological dispersal on the left-right axis between its members and voters would be greater than in other groupings (Newman 1997). Finally, access gained by these parties to regional government usually acts as a catalyst for these internal tensions so that—not only within Spain—splits and divisions in this family of parties have become more frequent since the process of decentralization (De Winter et al. 2006 pp. 253–254; Elias and Tronconi 2010; Alonso 2012). This propensity towards factionalism is also easily identifiable

among Spain's nationalist and regionalist parties, since the majority have undergone splits and divisions at some point.³

This greater propensity towards factionalism is manifested in the way that representatives of peripheral parties give significantly greater relevance to factions in selection processes than MPs from national parties (3.7 as opposed to 3.1 on average, in the groups respectively).⁴ Although representatives from CiU (3.5), ERC (3.6) and regionalist parties (3.6) also give greater importance to factions than MPs from PP (2.8) and PSOE (3.3), there are more significant differences observed in the responses given by representatives of PNV (4.3), a party that has traditionally been characterized by a high level of factionalism (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas 2009; Pérez-Nievas 2010); and in the responses given by representatives of BNG (4.7) which at the time the interviews were conducted was undergoing a process of internal dissidence that eventually led to the creation of a new party, Alternativa Galega de Esquerda, around the leadership of Xose Manuel Beiras.

Moving on now to analyze the differences between the different peripheral parties, the literature has indicated that organizational models, within this and other families, usually depend largely on the party's level of evolution, so the crossing of different thresholds in the party's development usually brings new challenges, which parties tackle through organizational changes (Elias and Tronconi 2010, 2011). In this respect, Spanish nationalist and regionalist parties are—using the terminology of Pedersen (1982)—at very different points in their *life cycle* (such as obtaining parliamentary representation, or gaining electoral relevance with the capacity for leverage or coalition at the regional or national level, or access to government). Some of these differences are examined below.

Evidently, our case studies are different from one another with regard to their relationship with institutional politics: in this respect, CiU and PNV are clearly different from the rest for two reasons. Firstly, because both parties have led regional governments for an overwhelming majority of the period since their respective Statutes of Autonomy were approved, developing catch-all strategies that set them apart from other nationalist parties they are competing against in their respective self-governing regions (Barrio and Barberá 2010; Pérez-Nievas 2010). In this regard, the literature has attributed certain traits to the catch-all model such as less ideological rigidity, a greater predisposition towards commitment and agreement, greater professionalization of political activity, and finally, a reinforcement of the party's leaders over grass-roots members: this latter

trait is necessary for the rapid adaptation of the political offer in a changing electoral context (Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995). Secondly, CiU and PNV are also the peripheral parties with the greatest level of involvement in national politics, having contributed to sustaining minority governments, especially in the 1990s, and in the case of PNV, also during the governments of Rodríguez Zapatero. In this respect, CiU and PNV are part of the group of traditional and institutional parties in their respective party systems, as well as in Spanish politics as a whole. In contrast, ERC and BNG have also formed part of regional governments, but for much shorter periods of time, always as minority partners and in more unstable experiences. In addition, their contribution to the stability of national governments has been lower.

In fact, the evidence suggests that MPs from ERC and BNG seem to be effectively further removed from institutional politics; and furthermore, that closeness is clearer between representatives of CiU; whereas the evidence with regard to PNV is more ambiguous. For example, in the question about their prospects over the next ten years, overall, peripheral representatives seem to be further removed from a professionalized conception of politics, and 62% of peripheral representatives—in contrast to 48% of national representatives—believe they will return to civil society after this period. However, examining the disaggregated figure, this seems to be more a feature of less institutional parties with a more limited history of involvement in government: 75% of representatives of BNG, 73% of regionalist representatives, and 67% of representatives of ERC and ‘other nationalist parties’ see themselves out of politics in a period of ten years, as opposed to just 47% of representatives of CiU and 44% from PNV, whose responses in this indicator are close to those of MPs from PP and PSOE (42% and 52% respectively). Furthermore, if de-ideologization is a characteristic trait of catch-all strategies, peripheral parties as a whole move further away from this model: 36% of nationalist and regionalist representatives—as opposed to just 16% of representatives of statewide parties—indicate ideological affinity over other reasons for going into politics. This higher level of ideological commitment of peripheral representatives over national representatives is shared by all peripheral parties included in the sample, but it is especially so among representatives of PNV (47%), BNG (45%) and ERC (33%); and slightly less among MPs representing CiU and regionalist parties (25% in both cases).

With regard to predisposition towards reaching agreements, peripheral MPs are more likely than national party MPs to indicate the capacity to

reach agreements with other groups as a reason for joining their respective parties.⁵ As expected, representatives of opposition parties, in other words, MPs representing ERC (2.4) and BNG (2.5), are the least likely to rate consensus as a reason for joining their respective parties; whereas MPs from CiU and PNV are in an intermediate position (2.8 and 2.9 respectively); only MPs from regionalist parties are situated on the same point in the scale as statewide parties in this indicator (3.2).

Additionally, in accordance with expectations surrounding the differentiation between parties that are closer to institutional politics and the catch-all model (CiU and PNV vs. the others), we would expect to find differences not only with regard to the weighting of ideology and predisposition towards consensus, but also in the very internal distribution of power within the parties, with a reinforcement of party leaders over grass-roots members. However, as we shall see next, the data gathered from parliamentary elites do not reflect a differentiation between CiU and PNV vs. the other peripheral parties, but instead a significant difference between all peripheral parties vs. representatives of statewide parties. In any case, only CiU—but not PNV—shows greater proximity to a top-down model of power, more similar to that of the majority parties at a national level.

Firstly, there is a highly significant difference in the weighting given by representatives of peripheral parties as a whole to grass-roots members in the process of candidate selection (4.6 on average vs. 3.2 in statewide parties, on a scale from 1 to 7). The greater importance of grass-roots members is a trait shared by all peripheral parties, but it appears particularly strong among MPs for BNG (5.4) and PNV (5.2); and to a lesser extent among “other nationalist parties” (4.7), regionalist parties (4.5) and ERC (4.4). CiU is the most similar party to statewide parties, although there is also a certain difference in this case (3.9 vs. 3.5 for PSOE and 2.8 for PP: see Pérez-Nievas and Bartolomé 2016 p. 271).

Differences also become clear when we examine the importance given by MPs to the personal support of party leaders as a reason for recruitment, which once again is cited more frequently among national parties (3.4) than peripheral ones (3). Also in this case, MPs for PNV (2.4), BNG (2.7) and ERC (2.8) are set apart from those representing CiU (3.4) whose average score for this indicator is the same as for representatives from statewide parties (Pérez-Nievas and Bartolomé 2016 p. 274). Similarly, MPs for CiU more regularly cite the role of important figures in selection processes; and in this case to a greater extent than representatives of national parties (3.9 vs. the average score of 3 among representatives of

PP and 2.9 among representatives of PSOE (Pérez-Nievas and Bartolomé 2016 p. 271).

To conclude this section, it should be noted that, although the vertical power structure of PNV is more similar to peripheral opposition parties than to the other institutional parties (PP, PSOE, CiU), this party is significantly different to the rest in terms of the degree of party institutionalization (Panebianco 1990). For example, although party loyalty as a reason for recruitment does not set peripheral parties apart as a whole from national parties, this issue does set representatives of PNV apart (4.5 vs. 3.9 for the sample as a whole (Pérez-Nievas and Bartolomé 2016 p. 274). This is also made clear in the question about voting discipline⁶ in which representatives of PNV highlight the primacy of voting in accordance with the party line (29% in contrast to 11% of the sample as a whole). Representatives of PNV are also the only ones in the sample to express their opposition—in the majority of cases—to holding public positions and internal posts in the party (63% vs. 31% in the sample as a whole),⁷ which, taking into account the trajectory of this party, should be understood as a conception of the pre-eminence of internal posts over public posts, and not the other way round (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas 2009; Pérez-Nievas 2010). Finally—and perhaps most significantly—only 7% of PNV representatives in contrast to 34% of peripheral representatives prioritize the interests of the self-governing region over those of the party, which reflects the strong party culture present among representatives of this group.

In contrast, the level of party institutionalization within ERC seems to be lower than in other peripheral or national parties. MPs representing ERC most frequently state that an MP should always vote as their conscience dictates regardless of the party line (22% vs. 3% for the sample as a whole). Along these same lines, 50% of representatives of ERC state that in the event of conflict, the interests of their self-governing region should always take precedence over those of the party.

14.3 CENTER-PERIPHERY TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGE

The nature of the electoral competition exercised by nationalist and regionalist parties has drawn controversy in the specialized literature. They have often been characterized as ‘niche’ parties, charged with mobilizing on a single issue that is identified with their territory-identity (Meguid 2005; Gómez-Reino 2010). This chapter, however, looks at alternative

approaches that have recognized a high degree of complexity and multi-dimensionality in the center-periphery axis. In accordance with this idea, such an axis would be composed of different dimensions that transcend mere political confrontation around centralization-decentralization opposition (Rokkan and Urwin 1982; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006; Alonso 2012).

Alonso (2012 pp. 25–26) provides one of the most detailed analyses of the center-periphery axis, broken down into three dimensions: cultural, institutional and fiscal. This characterization is used here to analyze the stance of peripheral parties in order to classify the different case studies in each of these three dimensions.

14.4 THE CULTURAL/IDENTITARIAN DIMENSION

The *cultural* dimension is linked to advocating the preservation of the linguistic and cultural specificities of minorities concentrated in the different regions. Although linguistic specificity often accompanies peripheral parties, it is not a prerequisite. In this regard, the literature has argued the need for peripheral nationalisms to find a central value that strengthens the ethnic or identitarian bonds that unite the regional population over those of the population as a whole within the State (Conversi 1997). In the comparison between Basque and Catalan forms of nationalism, Conversi concluded that in regions in which the regional language is a majority prevalence and/or its knowledge is easily accessible—owing to its linguistic proximity with the State or national language—it is more likely that language will become the principal value of nationalism and, therefore, a central element in its preferences, as is the case in Catalonia. On the contrary, if the language has a minority usage—and therefore greater divisive potential among the regional population itself—and is harder to learn owing to greater linguistic distance with the State/national language, it is more likely that language will take on a more secondary role, as is the case in the Basque Country (Conversi 1997 pp. 162–182). In the cultural dimension, and in particular in its linguistic strand, the center-periphery axis would oscillate between two extreme positions: on the one hand, the preservation of regional culture through a complete segregation from the majority state culture vs. the complete assimilation of the regional culture into the majority culture (Alonso 2012 p. 25). Following the hypotheses set out by Conversi, we would expect peripheral representatives from Catalonia and Galicia—owing to

the greater dissemination of their minority languages and their greater proximity to the majority language—to place more emphasis on the linguistic dimension than representatives of nationalist parties in the Basque Country, for contrary reasons.

The results for the responses given about language show that, in self-governing regions with their own language (these questions were only asked in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre, Valencia and the Balearic Islands), there are important differences between the elites from statewide parties and those from nationalist parties in terms of linguistic origin.⁸ Whereas for 61% of nationalist representatives, their mother tongue is the language of their self-governing region, this percentage falls to 34% among MPs from statewide parties,⁹ a difference that is more marked among the parliamentary elite of Catalonia than from the Basque Country or Galicia.¹⁰ Differences between national and nationalist parties are even more discernible if we look at the question about which language MPs consider to be their own¹¹: whereas 63% of nationalist representatives consider the language of their self-governing region (other than Spanish) to be their own, this percentage falls to just 22% of representatives of statewide parties. Unlike the findings for questions about their mother tongue, nationalists from Catalonia and Galicia are much more similar in this indicator, in that a huge majority of them (93% of MPs for CiU, 88% for ERC and 100% of BNG) declare that they speak the language of their self-governing region in contrast to 69% of representatives for PNV and 75% of “other nationalist parties” (representatives of other branches of Basque nationalism in the Basque Country and in Navarre) who identify themselves as bilingual.

Figure 14.1 shows the preferences expressed by representatives regarding the regulation and presence of regional languages in different arenas and situations: public education, access to the civil service, work and employment, and bilingualism in public services. Except for the last indicator in which the differences between the preferences of representatives of statewide and nationalist parties are not remarkable, they are significant in the other three: 74% of nationalist as opposed to 47% of statewide party representatives think that in order to work in a self-governing region they must understand the language of that region; 81% (as opposed to 50% of statewide party representatives) believe that knowledge of said language should be a requirement to access the civil service; and 57% (vs. 28% of statewide representatives) stated that it should be the leading language in the public education system.




Fig. 14.1 Preferences regarding the use of the regional language in the self-governing regions (% of interviewees in agreement) (Source: CIS Study 2827. Note: Asked only of MPs in self-governing regions with their own regional language: Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre, the Balearic Islands and Valencia. The question was worded as follows: “I will read you a few opinions that are sometimes heard on the street. I would like you to tell me if you agree or disagree with each of them”)

Looking at the differences between nationalist parties, the preferences expressed by their representatives are fairly similar except regarding the use of the regional language as the sole leading language in public schools. Confirming our hypotheses, the results of the graph show that the centrality given by the different branches of Basque nationalism to the use of Basque in public schools: 31% of representatives of PNV and 33% from the category of ‘others’—Aralar, NaBai and EA—is significantly lower than among nationalists in Catalonia (75% of representatives from CiU and 67% from ERC) and Galicia (88% of MPs for BNG).

The differences between statewide and nationalist representatives—and among the latter group—are very similar when asked whether the use of the regional language in education should be regulated by a law for all, or whether it should be left to the decision of the parents¹²: 69% of members of peripheral parties as opposed to 43% of MPs for statewide parties think that the use of the regional language should be regulated by law rather than left to the decision of the parents. In this case, however, it should be noted that not only the preferences of IU-ICV (78%) but also of the socialists (67%) are more similar to those of nationalist parties, highlighting the cleavage in Catalan-speaking self-governing regions between the

PP (17% support regulation by law) and the other parties. Furthermore, the greater centrality of the issue of language for nationalist MPs in Catalonia and Galicia in contrast to Basque nationalist MPs is once again made plain in this indicator (only 44% of MPs representing PNV think that it should be regulated by law in contrast to 56% who believe it should be left up to the parents: Pérez-Nievas and Bartolomé 2016 p. 279).

14.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

The *institutional* dimension orders the preferences of the different parties according to the formal political status they are demanding for the region within the State. This dimension ranges from preference for the region to split away from the country to preference for a centralized state. As a specific aspect of this dimension, we have incorporated preferences for asymmetrical decentralization, circumscribed to the region(s) that the parties consider to be unique on account of cultural, linguistic reasons, etc., vs. the option of symmetrical homogenous decentralization for all regions that make up the State.

The *institutional* dimension is most closely linked to traditional debates about decentralization, and in this regard, two questions are raised. Firstly, there is a debate of increasing importance in the literature about whether federalism and the processes of decentralization in a general sense serve to accommodate national minorities, or, on the other hand, feed into separatism (Erk and Anderson 2010; Sorens 2010; Masseti and Schakel 2013): How do peripheral parties adapt to processes of decentralization that potentially empty their chief demand of content and invalidates their *raison d'être*? For the specific case of peripheral parties in Spain, how have these parties reacted to three decades of decentralization in Spain? Have their demands remained similar to those of three decades ago, or have they renewed their capacity to compete with national parties by radicalizing their agenda in the demand for self-government? When the process of decentralization first began in Spain, the Spanish peripheral parties presented a certain degree of variability in their demands for self-government and the model of fitting into Spain: CiU, at one extreme, was a clearly regionalist party, and left-wing *abertzale* parties, at the other extreme, were clearly seeking independence, a position that ERC was quick to take up. Meanwhile, PNV was ambiguous in its demands for self-government, and BNG was more radical when it started out in the 1980s, only to become more moderate later on (De Winter and Türsan 1998; De Winter

et al. 2006). Three decades after the State of Self-Governing Regions was rolled out, have Spanish peripheral parties tended to converge around a radicalized agenda in their demands for self-government?

The second question posited pertains to debates about the federalization of territorial organization and the options between a homogeneous or asymmetrical model of decentralization. Coinciding with the second wave of statutory reforms—and in particular with the debate about how Catalonia should fit in with Spain—questions regarding federalism and asymmetry have once again taken center stage in the political debate. More recently, PSOE has proposed a constitutional reform around a formally federal solution with a particular flexibility for Catalonia. But what is the position of the peripheral parties regarding this question? Whereas in Chapter 12, some of these questions were analyzed, examining the differences between PP and PSOE, this chapter focuses on the position of peripheral representatives, in order to ascertain whether their respective positions are closer to a federal/homogeneous pole or an asymmetrical model.

Our results confirm the initial expectation of homogeneity and convergence in the stance of the different peripheral parties and their contrast with the stance of statewide parties. Only MPs from regionalist parties differ slightly from the rest of the peripheral parties in some indicators—fundamentally in preferences regarding independence and self-determination—positioning themselves closer to statewide party MPs. Leaving regionalist parties to one side, the differences between representatives of the different nationalist parties are minimal, barely a matter of nuance.

Firstly, almost all peripheral representatives, nationalist or regionalist, agree that their respective regions have not achieved a satisfactory level of finance; and a vast majority—77% of representatives of CiU, 66% of ERC and 48% of PNV—believe it necessary to reform the territorial organization of the State (León et al. 2016 p. 259). On the centralization-decentralization scale, representatives of the peripheral parties also coincide in positioning themselves at the upper end of the scale, from an average of 9 for regionalist parties as a whole, to 10 for representatives of ERC, in contrast to the average of 6.5 for MPs from statewide parties (León et al. 2016 p. 252).

Representatives of nationalist parties also coincide in their preferences regarding self-determination and independence, setting themselves apart very noticeably from MPs for statewide parties, and in this case, also from

the regionalist representatives: 100% of MPs for the PNV and ERC parties, and 88% of MPs for the CiU and BNG parties would vote in favor of independence given the opportunity, as opposed to just 14% of MPs from regionalist parties, 12% of MPs for IU-ICV, and very marginal support among MPs from PSOE and PP.¹³

Along these same lines, Figure 14.2 shows preferences regarding a hypothetical referendum on self-determination, following on the trail of questions formulated by Juan Linz in his classic study of the Basque Country (Linz 1985). Peripheral representatives—with the exception of regionalists who are situated half way between the nationalists and the majority parties—present an almost unanimous front regarding the idea that the electoral body of said referendum should be the respective self-governing regions, at a huge distance from statewide parties, except for representatives of IU-ICV who argue more similar positions to the nationalist parties on this specific aspect. The positions between statewide and peripheral parties become more similar when asked about the criteria for counting votes in favor and votes against this hypothetical separation. However, the majority of nationalist representatives—more nuanced among MPs from PNV—believe that any separation should be decided in relation to votes cast, in contrast to the majority of MPs from PP-UPN, PSOE, IU-ICV and regionalist parties who, on the contrary, believe that the electoral census should be taken as the reference. Finally, when asked whether a simple or qualified majority should be considered in order to decide on the separation, a slim majority of peripheral representatives (51% vs. 49%) believe that this issue should be decided by a simple majority. However, this question divides the representatives of the different parties to a greater extent, and the option of a simple majority gains broad backing among representatives of ERC and PNV; whereas it splits representatives of BNG right down the middle, and is slightly in the minority among representatives of CiU. As in the previous indicator, regionalist MPs are closer in this respect to the statewide parties (Fig. 14.2).

Concluding this analysis of the institutional dimension, regarding the options between a homogeneous or asymmetrical model of decentralization, nationalist MPs maintain a majority and unanimous position in favor of asymmetry (95% of MPs representing CiU, 95% for ERC and 79% for PNV are in favor of an asymmetrical model, in comparison with just 18% and 31% respectively of MPs for PP and PSOE: see León et al. 2016 p. 254). In addition, 90% of peripheral representatives prefer regional governments to have bilateral relations with central government as opposed to




Fig. 14.2 Preferences regarding the criteria to decide on separation in a hypothetical referendum on self-determination (in percentage terms) (Source: CIS Study 2827)

the alternative option of a multilateral collective body (León et al. 2016 p. 256). In all these indicators, the preferences expressed by peripheral representatives differ very significantly from those of statewide parties (including MPs from IU-ICV who state very similar preferences to their counterparts from PP-UPN and PSOE regarding this dimension of decentralization). In light of the responses given by their parliamentary elites, it would seem that the proposal of closing the State of Autonomies around a federal formula does not offer a better fit for peripheral nationalisms from the regional model in place up until now.

14.6 THE FISCAL DIMENSION

The *fiscal* dimension refers to the distribution of taxation and spending capacity between the State and the regions, and it varies between the preference that all fiscal capacity should be in the hands of the regions and the preference that it should only be in the hands of central government (Alonso 2012 p. 26). Given that decentralization of spending is conceptually very different to the decentralization of revenue, peripheral parties might express different preferences with regard to the fiscal dimension depending on the relative wealth of the region. Although the majority of Spanish peripheral parties operate in relatively wealthy regions on the whole, some such as BNG and CC (the latter being included in the group of regionalist parties) are operating in relatively poor regions. Hence, following the expectation that nationalist mobilization will respond on occasions to a position of relative poverty (Hechter 1975) it is possible that the preferences of peripheral representatives in these latter regions could be significantly different to those of the rest, and ultimately further removed from demands for fiscal autonomy. In addition, there might also be differences owing to the fact that the Basque Country and Navarre already enjoy a much higher level of fiscal autonomy than the rest, through the economic agreements, as well as the centrality of CiU's demands for a similar financial arrangement for Catalonia in recent years.

A vast majority (over 80%) of peripheral representatives—including in this case regionalists—believe that their region has not attained a satisfactory level of finance.¹⁴ This perception, however, is also supported by a high percentage of MPs from statewide parties, especially within the PP party (70%), who share the majority perception that their regions have not attained a sufficient level of finance (León et al. 2016 p. 250).

Preferences regarding fiscal autonomy have been measured by means of two items about extending the model of fiscal autonomy in place in the Basque Country to other regions. The majority (88%) of peripheral MPs—more clearly among nationalists in Catalonia than nationalists in Galicia or regionalists—support the notion of extending the Basque model to their respective regions.¹⁵ However, the issue is more divisive when MPs are asked about extending the model to *all* regions: a possibility that sparks clear opposition among MPs for CiU and which, in contrast, MPs for ERC, BNG, “other nationalist parties” and regionalist parties support to different degrees. MPs representing PNV are divided into thirds between those who believe it should be extended to all regions (40%), those who oppose this measure (27%), and those who believe said extension should be subject to conditions (33%) (Pérez-Nievas and Bartolomé 2016 p. 284).

Ultimately, in conclusion, the evidence found to confirm the hypothesis that support for fiscal autonomy would be significantly lower among peripheral representatives from regions with a lower level of income is not very robust. Indeed, support for fiscal autonomy seems to be slightly lower among representatives from BNG and the regionalist parties (accounting for a good number of MPs for the CC party), but given the low number of cases, differences do not appear to be very conclusive.

14.7 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter provides an analysis of the characteristics, orientations and preferences of representatives of regionalist and nationalist parties in Spain. This analysis was conducted over two sections. The first examined the organizational characteristics and the understanding of representation held by MPs from peripheral parties. The second examined the position of the peripheral parties on the center-periphery axis, differentiating between its three dimensions: cultural, institutional and fiscal.

In the section looking at organization, as expected, it was found that regionalist and nationalist parties are structured to a greater extent around the regional level than statewide parties. We also found that nationalist and regionalist parties are characterized by the greater importance of grass-roots members in the selection of candidates and by a greater propensity to factionalism than statewide parties. Finally, we found that for a good number of indicators, the ERC and BNG parties respond more to an opposition party model, contrasting particularly with the CiU party, which

in this respect is closer to the two majority parties, PP and PSOE, than the other peripheral parties.

The second section showed that the importance given by nationalist parties to linguistic mobilization can depend on the characteristics of the minority language in comparison to the majority language spoken. In terms of language policy, representatives of nationalist parties in Catalonia and Galicia maintain positions that are less open to compromise with the majority language and freedom of citizen choice than the representatives of different branches of Basque nationalism. In addition, in the institutional and fiscal dimensions, we found surprisingly homogeneous positions between the different peripheral parties. In this regard, representatives of these parties appear to converge around an agenda that has become radicalized with regard to their position three decades ago, very notably in the case of CiU. With regard to questions of self-determination and independence—and to a lesser degree also in preferences for fiscal autonomy—only representatives of the regionalist parties maintain significantly different positions to the other peripheral parties.

NOTES

1. Politicians were offered different possibilities: “If you had to choose to be elected for one of these representative posts, and assuming the decision only depended on what you want or think, which would you choose?”
2. Linked to this result, we also examined the hypothesis that peripheral parties are more oriented towards the local level than national parties. However, this hypothesis is not confirmed with the exception of regionalist parties (CC, CHA) and only for certain indicators.
3. Perhaps the most important split occurred in PNV in the mid-1980s, which led to the formation of EA. However, CC and ERC have also experienced divisions over the past decade. At the time the interviews were conducted, BNG was also on the verge of dividing, on the eve of regional elections in Galicia in 2012. Finally, the CiU coalition split in June of 2015—after the interviews were conducted—following decades of stable electoral alliance.
4. “On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is little and 7 is a lot, I would like you to tell me: How much power do the following groups have within your party to select candidates for parliament.” The questions was measured on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is little and 7 is a lot.
5. The question was worded as follows: “In your case, why do you think you were offered a place on the electoral list or they accepted your offer to be included on the list? I will give you a series of criteria and I would like you to tell me whether, in your case, they were possessed a great deal, fair

- amount, some, little or no importance in offering you a place on the electoral list. Each reason for recruitment is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is no importance and 5 is a great deal of importance.”
6. The question was worded as follows: “Sometimes, an MP disagrees with the proposals of his or her party. In general terms, do you think that in this event, MPs should in principle (1) Vote with their party, (2) Register their opinion but accept the party line; (3) Abstain; (4) Ignore the party line and vote independently?”
 7. The question was worded as follows: “Some think that individual MPs should hold positions of responsibility within the party organisation. Others think this should not be so. In general, which of these two stances do you take?”
 8. Given that the battery of questions about language was only administered to MPs from regions with their own language, the category of “regionalist parties” was reduced to just two observations, and so it has not been included in the tables and graphs about language.
 9. The question was worded as follows: “Which language was spoken in your home when you were a child? (1) Spanish (2) Catalan, Galician, Basque, Valencian (3) Both languages (4) Other languages?” The option “bilingual” was not read out to interviewees. Only asked of MPs in regions with their own language: Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre, the Balearic Islands and Valencia.
 10. Forty one percent of representatives from PNV and 50% of those from BNG state that Basque and Galician are their mother tongue, in contrast to 87% and 100% of the representatives of CiU and ERC respectively.
 11. The question was worded as follows “Do you consider yourself first and foremost a speaker of (1) Spanish or (2) Catalan, Basque, Galician? (3) Bilingual?” The option “bilingual” was not read out to interviewees. Only asked of MPs in regions with their own language: Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre, the Balearic Islands, and Valencia.
 12. The question was worded as follows: “Do you think that the language in which education is taught should be (1) Regulated by law. (2) Decided by parents?” Asked only of MPs from regions with their own language: Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre, Balearic Islands and Valencia.
 13. The question was worded as follows: “Would you be in favour of independence for your region if you had the opportunity to vote on it?”
 14. This position accounts for an ample majority even among MPs for PNV. Only in the category of “other nationalist parties”, which encompasses other parties from the Basque Party and Navarre (Aralar, EA, Nabai), do the majority feel that their region has attained a satisfactory level of finance.
 15. The question was worded as follows: “Do you think your region should aspire to obtain the quota system regardless of whether others do?”

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Parliaments and the European Union

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15.1 INTRODUCTION

Public opinion in Spain has been traditionally pro-European (Strath and Triandafyllidou 2003; Powell et al. 2005).¹ According to the CIS (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Center for Sociological Studies), in 2010 almost 68% of interviewees held a positive opinion of the EU (European Union) (CIS 2010) and according to the 2010 Eurobarometer survey Spain remained one of the most EU-enthusiastic countries on the continent, despite the effects of the great recession of 2008, with 55% of Spanish citizens considering the Spain's membership of the EU was positive (European Commission 2011).²

Various explanations have been offered for Spanish public opinion's positive image of the EU, such as satisfaction at having been accepted as a member of a club of democratic countries after 40 years of Francoism or the huge transfers of EU money sent to boost the Spanish economy (Szmolka 2008). Nevertheless, it is still worth asking whether the process

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of Europeanization—the acceptance of norms, values, and regulations from Brussels by the member States’ populations—is also visible at the level of political elites (Norris 1997; Meehan 2000; Olsen 2002; Risse et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003). There are two approaches to asymmetric support for the EU represented in the scientific literature. The first is grounded in the socialization process of individuals, whilst the second stresses individuals’ selective ignorance of the day-to-day operation of European institutions.

The first explanation was proposed by scholars working on the concept of “ever-closer union” (Wessels 1996; Weiler and Wessels 1997). This functionalist interpretation views European integration as a process driven by member States’ need to satisfy the political, social and economic demands of their citizens.³ From this viewpoint, the management of European policies is based on a classically federal division of work between State and European administrations. This sharing of policy competence has favored the progressive merging of EU and national civil services and public officials. In short, problems and policies have gone transnational, hence national public administrations have followed suit. According to this functionalist framework citizens’ support for European integration is motivated by symbiosis between national interests.

But Europeanism can also be envisaged from a rather different point of view. “Permissive consensus” theories hold that support for the EU is based on citizens’ lack of precise knowledge about European institutions (Scharpf 1999; Bruter 2003; Shore 2000; Delanty and Rumford 2005). The permissive consensus framework envisages broad popular support for the EU as a vague, passive phenomenon based on misunderstanding of affairs in Brussels (McGowan 2008). In other words, people usually believe that the EU is a “good thing” representing an added value rather than a cost, but only a minority truly understand the complex dynamics of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament.

This chapter investigates the state of Spanish public opinion of the EU through analysis of the Spanish national and regional deputies’ perspectives on Europe. In other words, we asked what kind of relationship members of Spanish national and regional parliaments have with the EU. Initially our main hypothesis about answers to that broad question relied on the “ever-closer union” approach. At first sight this theoretical framework seemed the obvious choice in the Spanish context. As Spain is one of the European countries that benefits most from European financial transfers, one would expect the Spanish parliamentary to be very EU-oriented.

The final results, however, suggested a very different picture. Although members of the Spanish Parliaments (MPs)' opinion of the EU was generally positive, our data also demonstrated that the EU is virtually absent from their daily concerns. This was even clearer when MPs were asked about the possibility of becoming European deputies. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the relationship between the EU and Spanish parliamentarians is based on a so-called "permissive consensus" rather than on an automatic process of movement towards supranational "ever-closer union" between national political elites and European institutions. In other words, Spanish parliamentarians are aware of the benefits and relevance of the EU, but the dynamics of Spanish politics remain clearly national and regional.

The data on which this analysis relies were produced by the project *La elite política autonómica en España* (The regional political elite in Spain) led by the DASP research group (*Democracia y Autonomía: Sociedad y Política*, Democracy and Autonomy: Society and Politics). The first-hand data were complemented by analysis of reports published by the European Commission, the Spanish government and some Spanish regional governments. As is customary, national and regional newspapers along with scientific journals were reviewed.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first focuses on the institutional and economic relevance of the EU to Spanish politics. The second section assesses the degree to which Spanish national and regional members of parliament (MPs) have become Europeanized through analysis of (1) their connections to the rest of Europe, (2) the impact of the EU on their daily activities and political career and (3) their opinion of the role of Spanish and European parliaments. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.

15.2 THE EU AND THE SPANISH STATE

The EU is represented in Spain through several channels. Firstly, European regulation constrains domestic law. By 2013 Spain had already adopted and implemented 1641 directives that had a substantial impact on the national legislative process (for instance in the fields of competition and market, State grants or protection of consumers). Over the last 30 years national and regional parliamentarians have been obliged to incorporate EU rules into their own bodies of legislation and this has promoted the adaptation of the parliamentary process for managing and implementing European rules at the domestic level (for instance through the creation of

the Commission for the European Union at the Congress of Deputies and the regional parliaments' launching of an "early-warning system") (Cienfuegos Mateo 2001; Palau 2013).

Secondly, a series of research and regulatory agencies represent EU interests in Spanish territory like the European Parliament Information Offices, the Representation of the EU, the Europe Direct network and the various branches of the European Commission. Moreover, the EU has co-funded several facilities in Spain. These grants have been channeled through various organizations including the European Social Fund (1957), the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (1962), the European Regional Development Fund (1975), the Cohesion Fund (1993) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (1999) among others.⁴ At national level, the General Direction of Community Funds—which depends on the Ministry of Finance and Civil Services—manages the majority of EU grants in collaboration with the autonomous regions.

Thirdly, and most importantly, Spain has received a huge amount of European funds since it became a member of the EU in 1986. During the 2007–2017 program period, the total amount of European transfers to Spain amounted to 35,217 million euros (Dirección General de los Fondos Comunitarios 2007), of which 26,180 million euros were allocated to "convergence" regions (Andalusia, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and Galicia).⁵ This investment has boosted the growth of the poorest Spanish autonomous regions and as a consequence the gross domestic product per inhabitant (GDP/head) of most of them—except Extremadura—has reached 75% of the European average (the limit for receiving "convergence" grants) (Harguindéguy and Bray 2009). This means that since 2014 those regions have not been considered "convergence" territories. In fact, the expansion of the EU to include Eastern and central countries reoriented EU spending to new deprived areas. Statistically speaking, the depressed regions of Bulgaria and Romania are now poorer than those of Spain and Portugal.

In summary, the influence of the EU on domestic institutions and policies demonstrates the need to represent Spanish national and regional interests effectively in the European arena. For instance, the Spanish government and the regional executives have been working in close collaboration to avoid the loss of European grants to former Spanish "convergence" territories. This multilevel mobilization has resulted in an agreement to grant statutory recognition to "transition regions" whose GDP/head is between 75% and 90% of the European average. Although transition

regions must gradually adapt to the new method of distributing structural funds, they still benefit from EU solidarity.

15.3 STATE AND AUTONOMOUS REGIONS IN THE EU

As in all EU member States, at national and autonomous regional level Spanish interests are transmitted to the EU (Mazey and Mitchell 1993; Marks et al. 1996) through specific democratic mechanisms such as representative institutions like the European Parliament—in which 54 seats are allocated to Spain—the Council of Ministers and the European Commission: Miguel Arias Cañete has been European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy since 2014.

There are, however, other democratic mechanisms for gathering *first-hand* information and putting pressure on European actors. At the autonomous regional and national levels, EU matters depend more on regional executives than on members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In fact, the members of the autonomous governments participate in the Conference for EU-Related Affairs (CARUE) (Gobex 2013). This Conference, established in 1998 and reformed in 2004, is intended to resolve issues of competence that emerge from multiple sectoral conferences. CARUE is co-directed by the Spanish government and regional Spanish minister. Theoretically, agreements reached through CARUE are transmitted to the EU through Spain's Permanent Representation in the EU (*Consejería para Asuntos Autonómicos en la Representación Permanente de España ante la Unión Europea* in Spanish). Nevertheless, full equality between State and regional actors is not achieved, because both the information and the final decision are the exclusive preserve of the central State (Etherington 2012).

Since the Treaty of Maastricht came into effect, the Committee of the Regions—the successor to the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Powers—has attempted to increase the visibility of European regions in the capital of the EU. The Committee has a consultative role and is charged with informing the European Commission and the European Parliament about regional political issues. Spain has 21 representatives on the Committee—as does Poland—designated by the central executive for a four-year period. Germany has 24 representatives (i.e. *länder*), making it the most heavily represented member State on the Committee.

As well as these mechanisms, all the autonomous governments have representative offices in Brussels. The first regional office was created by

the Basque government in 1998. The central Spanish government appealed against its creation on the grounds that there was an overlap of competences with the Spanish Minister of External Affairs, but on May 26th the Constitutional Tribunal (case 165/1994) ruled that the Basque regional office fulfilled an informative function and was not putting any legislation at risk. The number of regional offices has multiplied since then.⁶

The Spanish Autonomies (or “regions”) participate multilaterally through the Council for European Municipalities and Regions (established in 1951), the Association of European Border Regions (1971), the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (1973) and the Assembly of European Regions (1985). Recently sub-State executives have been responsible for the creation of the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE) (1997)—promoted by various regional parliaments—and the Interregional Group “Regions with legislative power” (REGLEG) (2000). This activity highlights the autonomous deputies’ eagerness to increase their presence at the European level.

Lastly, there are ad hoc regional lobbies organized around common goals. For instance, since 2010 Galicia, Andalusia, Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura have established a pressure group in collaboration with 13 other European regions. The aim of the group is to secure its members’ position as net recipients of European aid, and to secure continuation of this aid despite the reorientation of EU spending towards new Central and Eastern EU member States. Regional networks such as this are officially known as CROWC (Convergence Regions on the Way to Cohesion). Their lobbying activity is supplemented by formal and informal social networking, which promotes communication among members. This issue will be discussed further in the following sections.

Up to this point, we have highlighted the impact of EU membership on Spanish politics, in particular the organization and the functioning of national and regional Spanish parliaments. The influence of EU membership is particularly clear in the increase in the number of specific institutional associations influencing the construction of Europe and the management of European legislation.

In the next section, we will focus on the Europeanization activities of MPs and their profiles and attitudes towards the EU. First, the concept of “ever-closer union” (Wessels 1996; Weiler and Wessels 1997) is predicated on the assumption that steady progress towards fusion of the public competences and the bodies of the European political class will lead to greater

interest and involvement of Spanish parliaments in European issues and institutions. However, from the alternative perspective of the “permissive consensus” hypothesis (Scharpf 1999; Bruter 2003; Shore 2000; Delanty and Rumford 2005; McGowan 2008) the lack of knowledge and interest in EU institutions may lead MPs passively to accept European integration.

15.4 THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

According to the “ever-closer union” theory, regional and central level participation in the implementation and management of European matters should have a broad impact upon the Europeanization of the profile and attitude of the MPs. In fact, previous research on the growth of formal and informal regional networks (Putnam 1988; Mazey 1995) showed that regional and central participation does facilitate negotiation, political understanding, coordination and management of mutual policies and the collection of information.

Assessing the degree of development of the Spanish MPs’ networks we asked MPs whether they had established contact with their European counterparts. The results show that 69% of respondents had established contact with other European member States in the last three years.⁷ Twenty-one percent of MPs meet with European counterparts—usually in Portugal, France and Italy—between one and five times per year. Spanish MPs also communicate with German and UK MPs.

In the light of these results it is worth asking what the social and political profile of MPs who are in contact with their European counterparts is (Favell and Guiraudon 2009). The bulk of them are from Partido Popular (PP)⁸ (35%), followed by the socialists (PSOE)⁹ (33%) and the representatives of Izquierda Unida (IU)¹⁰ (11%), but IU MPs are more likely to contact other European MPs than their PSOE and PP colleagues (48% vs. around 15%), followed by nationalist parties (Convergència i Unió, CiU: 43%; Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC: 33%).¹¹ This behavior may reflect highly internal division of the management of European and transnational issues among the two biggest political parties (PP and PSOE).

These results help us understanding the relationships between MPs and other European MPs. Breaking down these results, the variation of the

internalization of the chambers reveals a complex picture. At regional level, 22% of MPs of the autonomous Catalanian parliament make contact with other European MPs, but the corresponding percentages of Andalusian MPs (9%) and Galician MPs (4%) are lower. In the case of members of Congress and the Senate, 16% maintain connections with MPs from other countries. In summary, the bulk of MPs who establish contact with European counterparts belong to autonomous chambers.

We anticipated that younger MPs, born in a more international context, would be better equipped to make contact with other European citizens, because of their superior educational level or language skills. However, MPs aged 53 years and over were responsible for the majority of cross-national interactions (52%), followed by MPs aged between 38 and 52 years with 38%. The youngest group of MPs was responsible for only 10% of all cross-national exchanges. Thus, in contradiction of our expectations the oldest MPs are most active in inter-parliamentary cooperation. These results highlight the idea that the MPs holding the most prestigious positions and with the international connections are also the eldest.

Language skills, for instance, are crucial for inter-parliamentary relations. MPs who speak a foreign language are four times more likely to get in touch with an MP from another European country.¹² However, this percentage cannot be compared to MPs who studied abroad; since only 28% of MPs who worked abroad in academia contacted a MP from another European country.

These results seem to indicate that most contact with MEPs is by regional and national MPs with international experience and language skills, but further investigation is required. For instance, the politicians most likely to establish European connections are those at the start of their career, 34% of MPs who do so are in their first term and 35% are in their second. In other words, the ability to internationalize a position relies on parliamentary youth (Fig. 15.1).

Lastly, we investigate whether MPs' political profile shape the likelihood of contacting other European MPs. We observed that the MPs most likely to make contact with other European MPs are those holding a parliamentary position or belonging to a parliamentary group (e.g. spokesperson of a commission or group). In fact, 83% of MPs are in touch with other European MPs. This result supports the idea that the main goal for MPs in these positions is to build bridges between their organization and their context.




Fig. 15.1 Contact established with regional European MPs (Source: CIS survey 2827. Total (*N*): 100 (103))

In the light of this analysis of the European MPs' networks and in spite of the need for coordination of the mutual interests of MPs of member States, the MPs' parliamentary networks are not Europeanized. However, lacking stronger European networks is just a partial deficiency. As has been previously mentioned, there is a small number of MPs with a specific socio-politic profile more prone to establish these types of network. Contrary to the notion of "ever-closer union", our results highlight that more internationalized MPs (i.e. those who are spokespersons and polyglots) are more likely to be involved in management and coordination of European networks at regional and national levels.

15.5 A POLITICAL CAREER FAR FROM THE EU

Although initially the powers of the European Parliament were limited in comparison with those of the Commission and the Council of Ministers (Costa and Saint-Martin 2009), the relevance and legitimacy of the European Parliament has grown over the years and is linked to improvements in the democratic rules for electing MEPs since 1985, the increasing role of the Parliament in European decision-making (Mayoral 2011), and the persistent fight against misgovernment.¹³

Against this background, it would be reasonable for Spanish national and regional parliamentarians to consider the European Parliament as one more option for their political career. Nevertheless, only 4% of MPs surveyed were involved in EU issues as part of the day-to-day work in the national and regional parliaments. Moreover, only 1% had previously held a position in Europe, showing how irrelevant European political experience is to winning a seat in national parliaments. In fact, MPs are drawn mainly from the ranks of elected representatives at regional (37%), local (33%), and national (29%) level. To sum up, the European Parliament does not play a great part in the transfer and exchanges dynamics of parliamentary elites (Fig. 15.2).

This lack of interest in European politics is also evident in the political aspirations of Spanish parliamentarians: only 6% of them said they would choose a position at the European Parliament if they had a free choice of political body. Spanish parliamentarians would prefer to become regional parliamentarians (29%), mayors (31%), members of the Spanish Congress (18%) or city councilors (10%). This evidence contradicts those who argue that there is progressive Europeanization of political careers (Abélès




Fig. 15.2 Previously held elected positions (in %) (Source: CIS survey 2827. Total (N): 100 (484))

1992), showing that Spanish politics is largely played out at national and regional levels rather than at EU level.

Similarly, the European Parliament does not appear to be a very attractive institution to MPs, either because of the lack of opportunity to become MEP or lack of interest. Only 3% of them had actually chosen the possibility of working in the European Parliament over the next ten years. Briefly, despite the increasing relevance of the European Parliament and its policies to Spanish politics, it is still the case that MPs are rarely involved in EU issues. This is reflected in MPs' lack of interest in becoming an MEP. Overall, this evidence suggests a small degree of Europeanization of MP's political career preferences and incentives.

15.6 REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Since Maastricht the EU has been committed to involving diverse European regions in the EU policy-making process. One manifestation of this commitment was the creation of the Committee of the Regions. In the case of Spain, as we will see next, the opinion data mostly illustrate how difficult is for regional parliaments to participate in the EU political process. When they were asked how they view the role of the regional parliaments in the construction of the EU, the overwhelming majority of MPs (91%), regardless of party affiliation, claimed that regional parliaments are “a bit influential” or “not influential” (Fig. 15.3).

The limited role or influence of regional parliaments in EU politics acknowledged by MPs reflects the loss of power of regional parliaments relative to national executives and EU institutions. This process is particularly marked in Spain, where the presidentialization of national politics started in the 1980s (Biezen and Hopkin 2005; Picarella 2009), and has been reinforced and complemented by the centralization of European affairs. This process has put national governments in charge of representing and defending the national interest to EU institutions, such as the European Council, even in matters that fall exclusively under regional parliamentary competence (Morata 2010).¹⁴ Moreover, when MPs are asked about possible ways of increasing regional parliamentary involvement in EU policy-making, 63% were not able to offer any specific suggestions.

Furthermore, MPs are skeptical about the utility of the current “early-warning system”, established in 2004 following negotiations for an EU




Fig. 15.3 Opinion of the role of the regional parliaments in the construction of Europe (in %) (Source: CIS survey 2827. Total (N): 100 (493))

constitutional treaty. The early-warning system is meant to reinforce EU subsidiarity by providing a mechanism for national parliaments automatically to inform regional parliaments about EU issues that might affect their interest or competences (Ares Castro-Conde 2007). However, 68% of MPs think it is insufficient to increase the influence of regional parliaments on EU politics.

As regards regional parliaments' function as the "intermediaries" of European citizens' demands and interests, there has been some political discussion of proposals such as for the granting of voting rights for regional elections to EU citizens from other countries.¹⁵ Almost all MPs surveyed (84%) "strongly agreed" or "slightly agreed" with this measure. Finally, and as regards the role of the regions as "intermediaries" between their citizens and the EU, almost half of the MPs (48%) think that with respect to issues that are exclusively the competence of regional parliaments, the Spanish central government should transfer the capacity to negotiate directly with the European Commission to them.

By political parties and type of parliament, we can observe how European integration has modified the balance of power between national and regional governments. In this particular case, the impact of European

integration on the distribution of power is indicated by (1) sub-national organizations' loss of power as competences are transferred to EU institutions and, (2) the extent to which national governments in the European Council make decisions affecting regions' competences and powers (Morata 2010).

Table 15.1 shows the extent of support among “regional nationalist parties” (CiU, ERC and PNV)¹⁶ for the transfer of the capacity to negotiate with the EU to the regional parliaments to compensate for the centralization produced by the EU decision-making process. We can see, however, that only a minority of MPs belonging to national level parties (PP, UPN and PSOE)¹⁷ support this transfer of power although the IU is in favor.

Moreover, in Table 15.2, we might also observe how regional parliaments with high presence of regional nationalist parties (e.g. Catalonia, Galicia and Basque country) strongly claim direct bargaining power with Brussels in issues of regional competence. The other regional parliaments

Table 15.1 Percentage support, by political party, for the transfer of power to negotiate with the EU from central government to regional governments in issues of regional competence

	<i>PP and UPN</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>CiU</i>	<i>ERC</i>	<i>PNV</i>	<i>Other</i>
Yes	37	45	81	100	100	100	95
No	63	55	19	0	0	0	5
Total (<i>N</i>)	100 (228)	100 (214)	100 (22)	100 (21)	100 (11)	100 (21)	100 (42)

Source: CIS survey 2827

Table 15.2 Percentage support, by type of parliament, for the transfer of power to negotiate with the EU from central government to regional governments in issues of regional competence

	<i>Andalusia</i>	<i>Catalonia</i>	<i>Galicia</i>	<i>Basque country</i>	<i>Other regions</i>	<i>Congress and Senate</i>
Yes	41	84	73	58	56	32
No	59	16	27	42	44	68
Total (<i>N</i>)	100 (58)	100 (43)	100 (42)	100 (44)	100 (249)	100 (123)

Source: CIS survey 2827

also support this transfer of power, although less strongly, whereas the two national parliaments, Congress and Senate, are much more divided on the issue.

The evidence discussed in this chapter does not imply that Spanish representatives believe that their institutions are irrelevant to the construction of Europe. We would like to point out that their answers reflect two desires: first, a general desire to see Spanish national-level parliaments take a more active role in representing regional interests to EU institutions and second a desire for regional parliaments to increase their negotiating power and influence at EU level.

To conclude, the centralization of EU politics, which has empowered EU institutions and national governments, has given MPs a low opinion of the capacity of the regions and their parliaments to shape the construction of Europe. Regional parliaments are viewed as peripheral chambers that have little influence on EU policy-making.

15.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on the activities, profiles and opinions of Spanish parliamentarians with respect the EU. Our analysis has demonstrated that Spanish parliamentarians have a complicated relationship with the EU. Despite the EU's importance as a driver of Spanish political and economic development, the Europeanization of Spanish parliamentary elites is far from complete. Although the Spanish State and regional bureaucracies have increased their influence in this new political arena, Spanish political elites remain largely disconnected from the EU and this is reflected in the fact that less than a third of Spanish deputies stay in touch with their European counterparts.

Moreover, only a minority of interviewed parliamentarians envisaged the European Parliament as the next step in their political career. Most of the interviewees stressed that the "presidentialization" and "nationalization" of European affairs has strengthened the role of some national governments (such as that of Germany) and weakened the power of the European Parliament (along with the Spanish national and regional chambers). For this reason, the majority of deputies believes the influence of regional parliaments on European regional politics should be increased. In summary, the relationship between Spanish deputies and the EU is still limited. Despite the great importance of European politics to Spanish

affairs and Spanish involvement in the EU, the power of national and regional parliamentarians has been eclipsed by that of the executive.

From this perspective, the relationship between Spanish chambers and European politics is not consistent with the theory of “ever-closer union”, according to which MPs should be much more involved in European networks and should have a much more positive opinion of the European Parliament—at least as a potential political career move. Spanish parliamentarians’ interest in EU affairs has not increased in proportion to European investment in Spain, which means that the permissive consensus hypothesis probably offers a better explanation for our data. According to the permissive consensus framework, despite the increasing overlap and interconnection between national and European affairs, citizens are not necessarily more interested in European business than in domestic issues; their EU-enthusiasm is superficial and their real concerns are regional and national matters (Morata 2010).

The conclusion of this chapter is congruent with those of earlier studies of the Spanish political system and the rise of European policies. To a large extent, Spanish politics remains a multilevel system mainly based on two political arenas, national and regional (Ocaña and Oñate 2006; Harguindéguy and Bray 2009). The EU’s capacity to transcend this structure through new mechanisms of governance and participation is limited. Ensuring that public opinion recognizes the EU as a political arena of equal importance to national and regional ones remains one of the main challenges for the European project.

NOTES

1. The authors thank the members of the research group who helped to improve the quality of this chapter, especially Fabiola Mota, Mariano Torcal and Manuel Alcántara for their useful comments and suggestions.
2. The Eurobarometer question was: “Generally speaking, do you think that Spain’s membership of the European Union is positive?”
3. Such as free trade, the common currency, or the freedom of movement of European citizens.
4. Only Poland received more in absolute terms, at almost 52,000 million euros.
5. Regions whose gross domestic product per inhabitant is less than 75% of the European average.
6. Other examples of EU-Spanish regional offices are the *Delegación de Euskadi* for the Basque Country, *Delegación del Gobierno de la Generalitat*

de Catalunya for Catalonia, the *Oficina en Bruselas de la Fundación Galicia Europa* for Galicia and the *Delegación de la Junta de Andalucía en Bruselas* for Andalusia.

7. Seventy six percent of MPs did not respond to this question, a figure which seems to indicate that Spanish MPs do not consider this an important question.
8. PP: People's Party.
9. PSOE: Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.
10. IU: United Left.
11. CiU: Convergence and Union; ERC: Republican Left of Catalonia.
12. English and French are the foreign languages that the MPs speak the most (question I36).
13. In 1999, the European Parliament forced Jacques Santer's Commission to resign because of evidence of corruption among its members.
14. According to Poguntke and Webb (2005), presidentialization is based on the increasing globalization of politics and the necessity for quick and coordinated decisions in the face of global challenges, the relevance of media and the erosion of traditional allegiances. This has resulted in the personalization of electoral campaigns, the concentration of power in the national executives and the asymmetry of power between the leader parties and their militants.
15. EU citizens already have the right to vote in local and EU elections.
16. PNV: Basque Nationalist Party.
17. UPN: Navarrese People's Union.

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The Distant Politician?

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16.1 INTRODUCTION

Parliamentary elites do not usually look like the societies who elect them, although historically, political elites show a growing diversity in their internal composition—a result of the incorporation of new elements in representative institutions and party leaderships in modern democracies (Best and Cotta 2000; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006). One can speak of an opening of the institutions of representation as a direct result of the extension of political rights, societal transformations and positive discrimination politics. Even so, it is extremely difficult to find a political elite who is a mirror image of society. Typically, with temporal and geographical modulations, we find political elites who follow the model of agglutination as set

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forth by Putnam (1976, p. 38). Agglutination generates a parliamentary elite with education credentials, professions, and socio-economic status generally associated with economically privileged groups. In the power hierarchy, the members of parliaments (MPs) occupy a high position in so far as they are located in legislative institutions with the capability to affect the lives of citizens. Also applicable here is the law of increasing disproportion (Putnam 1976, p. 33), according to which, when we ascend the scale of authority, we more often find representatives of high social status groups. To what extent is this social distance from the citizenry also reflected in their opinions and behaviors?

16.2 GAPS WITH THE CITIZENRY

The twenty-first century Spanish parliamentary elite is not an exception to the patterns set forth in the preceding paragraphs. It is fundamentally comprised of males born in the autonomous communities they get a seat, of average age over 50 years, with a university degree and a profession related to the law (basically, lawyers) and teaching (see also Coller et al. 2014, 2016). Nevertheless, it seems that the regional MPs are more open than those of the *Cortes Generales* (Senate and Congress of Deputies) when it comes to the incorporation of women, young politicians and natives of autonomous communities. It is probable that most of the regional chambers are an entry point or the continuation of a political career, rather than a terminus. There are more reasons for this to be so in the chambers dominated by statewide parties, since it is they who can offer the longest political trajectories.

The majority of MPs are in a stable relationship (married or not) and have offspring, although this is less frequent in the central institutions of representation than in the regional chambers. Although the majority is from Catholic culture (only one-third consider themselves practicing Catholics), a large minority (40%) declares themselves indifferent, agnostic or atheist. There is an almost equal division of those who have studied in public or private educational centers; only a quarter have had the experience of studying abroad at some time, although three-quarters claim to speak foreign languages, especially English and/or French.

Spanish representatives usually have a social background of “service class” in the terminology of Goldthorpe and Erikson (1993), formed by administrators, directors, major employers and professionals (89% of all MPs belong to this social class with few variations by chamber). This pro-

professional group occupies the highest level of social stratification. The absence of the “intermediate class” (non-manual routine occupations, small businessmen and supervisors of manual workers) and, especially, of the “working class” (manual occupations with or without qualification) is the result of another tendency observed in all of the regional chambers and other European parliaments (Best and Cotta 2000; Collier 2008). This is due to a combined effect of two factors to which Weber (1946, p. 95, 97) calls our attention. On the one hand, the elective affinity between the political office and those professionals in law and teaching, which ends up attracting more people with these profiles to the political arena. On the other hand, and especially, the economic dispensability of some professions that works against salaried employees, and in favor of those who have seen their professions becoming part of the public sector (civil servants, as is the case of teachers, for example). The result is a parliamentary elite that is “high class” in common terms, although upward mobility is also common; therefore, almost half have more humble origins than those who have achieved professionally before dedicating themselves to politics. The other half have a service class background based on the class of their parents. Probably, and unlike the citizenry, this hardly heterogeneous internal class composition explains that social class has little to do with the MPs’ ideological positions.

At the margin of mobility, and still confirming the law of increasing disproportion, the social profile of all the MPs better reflects the structure of Spanish society than if one takes MPs grouped by party and compares them with their voters. There are notable differences that question the microcosmic perspectives of representation (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 94). For example, the gap between voters and their representatives is notable with respect to gender (especially in parties like IU and ERC) and age (especially in ERC and CiU), but also in education, where it seems that the parties on the left are closer to society than the conservatives, who more often have university qualifications. Religion also represents a certain rift between voters and representatives but in a curious manner: the voters of the left are usually more religious than the representatives they have voted for, meanwhile, in the conservative camp, the phenomenon is reversed: the representatives are usually more religious than their voters. This gap can be more relevant when one takes into account that religion appears as the best predictor of ideology among the MPs, above beliefs in equality or liberty, which also occurs with the citizenry (Montero 1994, Montero et al. 2008).

There are three relevant aspects of this gap to which attention should be drawn: ideology, collective identity and conception of political representation. Generally, the political representatives lean a little more to the left of leftist ideology than the voters, with the exception of the Basque Country. And this occurs in all political parties. In the Popular Party the ideological gap is the widest of all: approximately 10% of voters find no ideological reflection among their representatives located at the most conservative extremes on the ideological scale. This phenomenon is also observed in the PSOE, where a little more than one-quarter of its most moderate voters find no equivalent representation among the MPs, and in the United Left, where little more than one-tenth of the moderate voters do not match the ideological position of their representatives. In the nationalist parties the ideological fit seems to be more developed. This suggests that, at least in the major parties, the most conservative voters in their respective ideological segments find little ideological reflection among the elected representatives.

There is evidence that leads one to think that, at least in the case of the politicians, a certain ideological reproduction exists. The primary socialization influence—the political environment of the family—appears as the most relevant factor in explaining the ideological position of the MP. Family participation in politics is related also, although there are significant nuances: having relatives that served in the Second Republic generates slightly more leftist MPs, but having relatives linked to Franco's regime does not seem to have a clear effect on the ideology of the politician. This finding blends two similar studies on MPs which highlight a clear relationship between relatives linked to Franco and political party belonging (López Nieto 2004; Coller 2004).

The collective identity is another arena in which there is a certain gap respective to the electorate observed. Just over half of the voters place themselves in the dual identity category when asked for their identity referents (they feel as much Spanish as of their autonomous community), and two-thirds of their representatives also choose this option. However, when studying the Spanish pole of the identity, one observes that the gap is important insofar that the representatives tend to avoid this referent compared to the citizenry. And this is so to a greater extent and in greater frequency in Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia, especially in the latter. However, the Spanish identity is more frequent in the two major statewide parties (PP and PSOE) than in the rest. There is also a noticeably important gap in some political parties that play a vital role for the

future of the State of the Autonomies. Unlike what is happening in equivalent parties in other communities, a notable difference is observed in the case of the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC) between the regional MPs (leaning toward the Catalan identity pole) and their voters (oriented toward dual identity and with a considerable contingent inclined toward the Spanish pole).

The third relevant gap is that which references some aspects of the function of political representation. The MPs understand that they represent all of society (whether at the national or regional level). The citizenry also understand that this dimension exists, but notes with equal force (one-third of the people) that in reality the MPs represent their parties, something that the MPs themselves hardly ever consider (6%). In a similar sense, while for voters it is important that the MP prioritizes the interests of their constituency or region in case of conflict with the party position, for the representative the more preferred option is to be compliant and attempt to modulate the party position. However, this view should be tempered by the fact that 94% of MPs indicate that an MP should vote with the group (11%), or vote with the rest of the group while still expressing one's differing opinion (83%). On the other hand, while MPs are divided into two halves regarding the responsibilities of their representative function (responsiveness versus responsibility), for the majority of the citizenry (80%) the politician must take into account his or her constituents, committing to the responsiveness dimension of representation.

The gap between the citizenry and the parliamentary elites is usual and expected, although the variability of its magnitude depending on the issues and parties makes the interplay between politicians and citizens more or less complex. The differences are the result of electorates of socially diverse parties as befits *catch-all* models (Kirchheimer 1966), that is, parties that obtain votes in diverse social groups that are difficult to represent in the descriptive dimension spoken of by Pitkin (1967). The problem can be generated in political action when the gap is of such magnitude that the restoration of bridges between the citizenry and the politicians is very complicated. CIS surveys seem to reflect this scenario when for several years politicians, parties, government and politics in general gather a sufficient number of references to position themselves as one of the most important problems perceived by Spaniards.¹ This scenario is a breeding ground for disaffection toward the institutions, although negative views of politicians do not appear to have yet infected the perception of democracy as a form of government (Torcal 2014).

16.3 POLITICAL DISAFFECTION

There is a widespread disaffection toward politics that could affect the institutions of the political system in Spain. Despite not being an entirely new phenomenon (Maravall 2016), all indicators suggest that this disaffection has reached previously unknown levels. As it has been seen in the pages of this study, political representatives are no strangers to this problem, even though the image they have of the political functioning in their respective autonomous communities is moderately positive. It also appears clear that the MPs agree—in general terms and without distinctions between parties or chamber representation—that cases of political corruption are the basic reason that the citizenry has a disparaging image of politics in general and of the parties in particular. But they also point to the continuous tension of political life and the constant criticism of the media as other possible causes, while the lack of preparation for political office is the factor to which they attribute the least importance.

It can be said that the representatives' view is somehow academic or, at least, corresponds to the explanatory factors that the literature has identified as causes of political disaffection in a comparative perspective: corruption (Anderson and Tverdova 2003) and critical or highly polarized messages received by way of the media (Newton 2006). These views are also in line with the view the citizens have of this problem, since eight out of ten Spaniards, with little differences in terms of their ideological or partisan affiliation, indicate that corruption is the main reason why citizens do not trust politics. However, the citizenry is not inclined to identify media criticism as a relevant factor in the production of distrust in politics.

This agreement on the causes of disaffection breaks down when the dimensions of the corruption problem are assessed. While more than half of the citizenry signaled that corruption is more significant in Spain than in the rest of Europe and less than 10% think there are less cases of corruption in Spain, an ample majority of the representatives of PP and PSOE (almost 80% in both cases) think the corruption problem is as significant in Spain as in Europe. In this, they also differ from the representatives of IU and other parties, whose MPs also indicated in proportions close to 50% that corruption is greater in Spain than in the rest of Europe. This difference between majority and minority parties also transfers to the area of party financing legislation assessment. While PP and PSOE MPs appear divided in halves—one-half claims that the Organic Law on Financing of Political Parties of 2007 guarantees transparency in party financing and

the other half thinks otherwise—in the case of the representatives of IU and other parties, eight on every ten claim that the law does not guarantee the necessary transparency.

It should also be emphasized that different views of the cause of this distrust not only exist between parties but also within them and, more specifically, according to the position each MP occupies in his or her parliamentary group. In the analyses presented in Chapter 9, the causes of disparagement in politics and distrust of the parties were grouped into internal factors (dependent on each party's capacity to act) and external factors (those already defined by the institutional context and on which the parties cannot act directly). Causes among those first include corruption, lack of internal party democracy, lack of contact with the problems of the people; and included among the secondary causes are factors such as media criticism or the tendency toward bipartisanship of Spanish politics. In response to this classification, the MPs tend to apportion blame in similar proportions between internal and external factors, although they tend to consider that internal factors are more important in explaining distrust in parties, while external factors or institutional context are more important in explaining distrust of politics in general.

From the multivariate analysis, one also finds that those who have more ability to influence their respective parliamentary groups (measured through leadership) give less importance to internal factors when explaining the distrust in politics in general and in the parties. Another result in line with this notes that the more senior MPs (those who have served the greater number of legislatures in parliament) as well as those who have less extensive professional experience prior to politics attribute less importance to internal factors when explaining the distrust in politics and in the parties. In the opposite sense, the less senior MPs and those with more professional experience attribute greater importance to internal factors when explaining distrust in political parties. From these results it follows that the capacity for MP self-criticism is lower in the politically professionalized core of the parties. They also reveal some difficulties that parties' power centers find in being aware of factors causing political disaffection and, thus, implementing measures to fight it.

16.4 THE PATH TO PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS

Current policy action is framed in a context of a not yet systemic crisis that pivots on increasing public disaffection and continued perception of politics and politicians as a major problem. A difficult question emerges from

these circumstances: Why do some people dedicate themselves to politics? Where do political vocations—as well as the start of a career that leads to politics after a prior selection by diverse actors in environments that are also diverse—come from? Data from this study suggest that the motivation to be interested in and later dedicate oneself to politics stems from a socialization in which the MP was exposed to political debate in the family. In comparison to the citizenry, their political representatives come from politicized family environments. A second source of motivation is the direct example or proximity to political experience as almost half of the MPs (47%) have close relatives themselves devoted to politics. Thus, family discussion on and proximity to politics seem to be the two most important factors that drive people to devote themselves to politics; and this seems to be more prevalent often among politicians on the left than the right or center-right and with more intensity among women than men.

Although the vocation of public service is the most common motivation among Spanish MPs, it is certain that there are significant variations. It seems that among leftist MPs, participation in social movements (especially at university) is combined with ideological exposure and discussion of public affairs within the family. Among conservative politicians, family socialization and example are also combined with the mobilization of vocations in the professional environment.

However this vocation or motivation is insufficient in explaining why some people reach positions of representation and others do not. A look at the institutional incentives or the recruitment formulas used for parliamentary personnel selection is in order. Once the motivations and vocation for a person to lean towards the political function have been developed enough, one should answer the question raised by Matthews (1985, p. 32): “How do people become MPs?” The first step is the approach to or membership of a political party. Given that there are few independents in politics, this first step is almost a *conditio sine qua non*. Additionally, there are structural factors that facilitate or prevent people from reaching parliaments such as laws, the electoral and party system, or even the territorial structure of the State. But when these conditions are controlled, the party norms and procedures emerge as the basic elements for understanding how some people are selected and end up on the electoral list.

Nonetheless, this is only part of the phenomenon because besides the institutions (norms, regulations, proceedings) there is the real functioning of the organizations where decisions are usually made as a result of power games, multiple influences and other less visible factors that make the parties comply with Michels’ (1911) iron law of oligarchy. The majority of

people—especially regional, local or national leaders, in this order—enter electoral lists because either a leader or organ of the party offers a position to them. Although there are some differences between parties, the MP's perception is that their selection is centralized and, largely, depends on their knowledge of the constituency, their preparation, and in third place, on loyalty to the party or leadership, whatever the corresponding territorial level. A type of centralized and exclusive selection, based largely on merit (preparation, knowledge) and loyalty, has all of the ingredients to generate parliamentary groups in which the decisions are taken less by deliberation than by resorting to hierarchy (Cordero and Coller 2015). Or, at least, to the extent that one or the other criteria is favored for selection we can find tensions in the management of the parliamentary group: loyalty usually produces MPs who are more disciplined and more willing to follow orders, while preparation and merit can generate MPs more willing to deliberate and discuss. The former are more often found in the statewide parties and the PNV, as well among those who have lower educational credentials. The latter are usually among those with higher educational levels.

Presence in the chambers of representation can be another step in a political career or the beginning of a professional trajectory devoted to public affairs. The professionalization of political careers acquire a multi-level character in which people begin at the local level and have a diverse direction, but marked by the perception of the existence of a hierarchy of institutions of representation in which the Congress of Deputies seems to be on the cusp. In the communities with differentiated party systems (generally those in which their chamber of representation is usually the terminus of political careers, like the Basque Country or Catalonia), this hierarchy does not operate in the same way.

The way in which the political careers of the MPs develop indicates that the key area of political initiation is local. The data analyzed in Chapter 6 point to a hierarchical relationship in the structuration of political careers in Spain, so that a typical MP starts exercising representative posts at the local level to move to the regional parliament and finally to *Cortes Generales* (Senate and Congress of Deputies). On the one hand, the majority of MPs, regional as well as national, start holding positions of council member or mayor. However, the relationship between the regional and national level is not so clear. It is certain that a significant proportion of deputies and senators (around one out of every four) have held positions of representation in a regional chamber and only one out of every ten has made the transition in the reverse order (from the Congress or Senate to the

regional parliament). Though differences depending on the autonomous community are observed. In those regions in which the party system is more differentiated than the national (by the significant presence of nationalist parties) there will be less integration of political careers. And what is most striking, this lower integration of careers takes place not only in the nationalist or regionalist parties of these territories, but also affects the statewide parties in these regions.

Another factor pointing to the breakdown of the transitions from the regional level to the national one is the difference in political careers by age group. The youngest members of the *Cortes Generales* have previously served in regional parliaments in a significantly lower proportion than their elder colleagues. Even more pronounced are the differences in reverse. That is to say, the young regional MPs are much less likely than their elders to have been members of the *Cortes Generales*. And these differences are reproduced in all the parties with a similar intensity. Thus, the Spanish parliamentary system seems to evolve toward a dual situation in which the local level seems to be the beginning of political careers that later bifurcate toward the regional and national level with a relatively weak integration between the two. This could be explained by two trends of political life in recent decades. On one hand, the growing regionalization of Spanish politics. And on the other, the fact that regional parliaments have acquired a greater area of legislative competences making it necessary for MPs to specialize in a level of representation.

In parallel, there has also been a process of increasing professionalization of political representatives. Despite an immense majority (around 90% of MPs) having served in a profession before entering politics, it is significant that one out of every five have done so for a period of less than five years and that one-third among the latter have passed directly from student life to politics. This latest phenomenon is concentrated among the youngest MPs. In line with this trend toward professionalization, the majority of MPs also declare that they prefer to continue to occupy their representative post rather than any other.

16.5 ACTION IN PARLIAMENTS

Once a person reaches parliament there are two aspects that should be analyzed. On one hand, how to understand what his or her role as the citizen's representative is; on the other, how to carry out his or her representational activities within a parliamentary group. With respect to the first

issue, MPs divide into equal parts between those who favor a responsive dimension to representation with the others that favor the representative's criteria, although with the nuance that he or she is obliged to approach the voters and try to convince them of their arguments. It is about modulating public opinion. This view, curiously, is more common among leftist MPs, while among MPs of the center-right or right parties the more common position is that which comes close to that of the "transmission belt" of voters' desires. Belonging to a regional chamber or having a seat in the fast-track autonomous communities (those that obtained autonomy through article 151 of the Constitution) also seem associated to this position.

As analyzed in Chapter 8, four out of the eight modes of legislative representation described by Rehfeld (2009) have been found among Spanish MPs according to their views on three dimensions of political representation: as defense of the common good or as advancement of the interests of specific groups; the representative's source of judgment; and his or her responsiveness facing possible sanctions of the electorate. The MPs of PSOE usually fit in the group of "Burkeans" given that they usually adopt a posture of defense of the common good (not of special interest groups) according to their criteria (not that of the voters) and with less responsiveness to possible sanctions by the voters, which enables them to distance themselves from populist postures yet without being free to yield to the temptation. The PP-UPN and those of PNV usually fit in the category of "bureaucrats", not in the sense of functionary politician, but rather the politician who pursues the common good with greater reliance on voter views as to what is best for society, and rather unresponsive to sanctions of the electorate. The MPs of IU and "other nationalist parties" share characteristics of the "voluntary" politician, that is, of the person who attempts to advance the interests of a particular group in society or of their own constituents (the most disadvantaged, for example, or those that speak a particular language). Although they use their own criteria to select the interests they must promote, they rely on the electoral sanctions of the groups they represent or promote. The MPs of ERC and CiU are "Madisonians" in the sense that, just like the Burkeans and bureaucrats, they seek the common good, not particularly of a group they claim to represent, but by following their own judgment yet being highly dependent on the electorate's possible sanctions.

These different ways of understanding the role of political representation are not necessarily transferred to the MPs' individual actions in the chambers

as there they are subjected to operation in parliamentary groups. And this operation is marked by a high internal cohesion and discipline. Consistent with the literature that establishes a positive relationship between proportional electoral systems and parliamentary group cohesion (Fenno 1978; Sánchez de Dios 1996), the data analyzed in this book show that parliamentary groups in Spain are characterized by a high discipline. It is a feature that is repeated in all of the parliaments and parties without exceptions. Thus, a large majority of representatives (more than 90%) think that an MP who decides to leave his parliamentary group should renounce his or her seat. And this is also a widely shared view of the citizenry without major differences in terms of ideological or partisan affiliation. Similarly, in the case an MP disagrees with his party, approximately eight out of every ten representatives support that he or she states their opinion but abides by the discipline and ultimately votes with the party. Where voters and representatives do not coincide is in the manner of conflict resolution between party interests and the constituency the MPs represent. If such conflict occurs, the voters overwhelmingly prefer that the MP in question favors the interests of their province or autonomous community, while the majority of representatives (around 80% in all of the parties, with the exception of the minority parties) believe that the MP should try to influence the party to change its position. It seems understood, therefore, that not only is there high parliamentary discipline in the groups, but that the MPs themselves are supportive of the cohesive functioning of the groups.

This high parliamentary discipline does not necessarily translate, however, to vertical operation of the parliamentary groups. A majority in all parties support the position that decisions should be made after a general discussion as opposed to made by a few. However, notable differences between parties and representation chambers are perceived on this point. These differences suggest that the functioning is more horizontal (or participatory) the smaller the size of the parliamentary group; members of Congress and Senate indicate in a lower percentage that decisions are taken after a general discussion. Likewise, the vast majority of representatives of all parties consider that an MP has considerable autonomy, notwithstanding that he or she must follow general guidelines or consult group leaders before taking decisions. On this particular point similar differences are perceived depending on the size of the parliamentary group, which indicates that as the size of the group increases its management bureaucratizes, leading to the establishment of more visible hierarchies and greater division of labor.

The other relevant question is on the process by which leaders are appointed within parliamentary groups and this question raises three possible theories. The first is that access to leadership positions is conditioned by the position of power within the party. The second is that leadership is a matter of seniority, so that MPs who have served more legislatures in parliament are those who are more likely to occupy leadership positions. And finally there is the possibility that leadership is based on professional credentials other than politics, which would point to leaderships of a technical or technocratic character in the parliamentary groups. The data analyzed in Chapter 7 indicate that the second of these possibilities is clearly favored as most logical. That is to say, the longer MPs hold their representative position over time, the more their leadership within the group increases. However, having a power position in the party does not have an effect on the position of leadership that he or she occupies within the group, which is consistent with the fact that the majority of MPs occupy posts of different levels in the parties they represent. Furthermore, the effect of purely technical competency (measured by professional experience prior to the political one) has a negative effect on access to positions of leadership in the parliamentary groups. Instead, the MPs that have developed their professional careers within parties are more likely to access leadership positions. A final point worth noting about parliamentary leadership selection is that women MPs have less access to such positions than their fellow men.

16.6 MULTILEVEL DEMOCRACY AND PLURINATIONAL STATE

The role of political representation addressed in this book is involved in multiple levels: the regional, the national and that of the European Union (EU). On one hand, the status of the MP in a decentralized and plurinational State, integrated in turn in the supranational political structure of the EU, has led to an exploration of the views and preferences of MPs regarding the territorial model of the State, Spain's national (and nationalities) question, and their view of and participation in EU politics. On the other hand, a set of questions have been addressed: what are the differences in terms of attitudes and behavior between regional and national MPs, between those MPs working at parliaments of the fast-track autonomous communities (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia),

or between MPs of statewide or regional parties? These questions have been present across the board in most of the chapters of this volume, but have been subject to closer scrutiny in some of them.

First, the very existence of a political elite and a representative political function that integrates and links the level of regional, national and European democracy, is called into question by the results obtained. The concept of political representation set in three levels has no empirical translation in the views, attitudes and behavior of MPs; much to the contrary, they reinforce the widespread idea that the political game in Spain unfolds in a multilevel political space where there are only two political arenas, the State and regional governments. Little evidence is obtained on the hypothetical process of Europeanization of the Spanish MPs: there are few who declare maintaining contact with their European counterparts, very few that deal with European affairs in their parliamentary activity, even fewer who aspire to a seat in the European Parliament, and none of the individuals in the study sample had the European experience (MEP). These results corroborate the thesis that points to a process of centralization in the management of European affairs (Morata 2010) in favor of the executives, with the consequent reduction, even hollowing out, of the role of the national and especially regional legislatures in European politics. A paradoxical consequence is that we are facing a regional parliamentary elite that, at the same time that it expresses a clearly negative view with respect to the real influence of regional parliaments in the construction of the EU, it demonstrates a favorably open attitude toward the Europeanization of the regional voters, (granting the right to vote in elections to EU citizens residing in the country), which, taking into account the significant presence of EU residents in some regions, is a resounding expression of the pro-European sentiment of our MPs.

Secondly, having noted that the supranational parliamentary level is barely noticeable in the experience and political aspirations of Spanish MPs, the distinction between the *Cortes Generales* and the regional parliaments provides information on the multilevel nature of Spanish democracy. The research presented in this book has provided extensive evidence that proves that, in certain aspects, the MPs support different opinions, attitudes and preferences depending on whether they act in the national parliament or the regional legislatures. The differences observed, which are summarized below, constitute the clearest effect of the multilevel political logic on the Spanish parliamentary function and are attributable to the effect the political institutions and organizations themselves exert on the

attitudes and behaviors of the individuals within them (March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996).

On one hand, it is clear that MPs at both legislative levels express options and preferences that revert a greater concentration of power to their respective parliaments. Thus, we observe that regional MPs are more favorable than national MPs of ceding direct EU negotiating power to the autonomous communities in regional matters. In the same way, Senators and Congresspersons are more satisfied than regional MPs with the competencies reached by their autonomous community of origin and with the level of funding enjoyed by their respective community; at the same time they are reluctant to accept, in a greater proportion than the regional MPs, that their community obtains funding through the *Cupo* system or economic agreement (like in the Basque Country). In sum, the national legislative political representatives express preferences more consistent with the reinforcement of the status quo in the multilevel distribution of political power than the regional MPs, who are favorable to a greater territorial decentralization of power. However, we must highlight a particularly new finding of this research, and it is that this multilevel effect is not equally observed in the MPs of each of the two major political parties at the national level, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP). The results show that the PP MPs of regional assemblies have a different view of the State of the Autonomies than their fellow party members in Congress and Senate, and these opinions are independent of the region where they reside and their ideology. However, there are no significant differences between MPs according to regional community (fast-track or slow-track) in which they reside. In the PSOE, however, the level of representation of its MPs is irrelevant in explaining the diversity of preferences on the territorial model, but the autonomous community of origin is important. The socialist MPs from fast-track regions are more favorable to higher levels of decentralization (both generally and with respect to the level of competence of their regional community).

On the other hand, the observed differences also correspond, in part, to national identities and views on the very idea of Spain as a nation-state expressed by MPs at both territorial levels. The indicator of subjective national identity shows that two out of every three MPs shows a dual identity: they feel as much from Spain as from their own autonomous community. A widespread dual national identity has been considered by the literature (Linz 1989) as an indicator of the legitimacy of the State in the

autonomous communities. However, dual identity is lower, in favor of more or exclusively regional identities, among MPs of the “historic” (or fast-track) communities in relation to representatives of the national legislature and those of the regional chambers of “ordinary” status. This data, well-known in Spanish politics, leads to the observation of another territorial political dimension that better explains the MPs disparate preferences with respect to the State model than the simple multilevel distinction between the *Cortes Generales* and the regional chambers.

Therefore, thirdly, the obtained results show that the central-periphery cleavage emerges as the key divisive factor of the attitudes and preferences of MPs facing the territorial model of the State and the distribution of political power in a multilevel democratic system. This political divide draws a clear separation between the MPs of “historic” regional communities and the rest of the autonomous communities. The first are more favorable than the second to an asymmetric territorial model, they demand to a greater extent direct negotiations with Brussels in the areas of regional matters, and show less identification with Spain or a lower level of dual national identity than their colleagues in the *Cortes Generales* and the rest of the autonomous communities. In fact, in the parliaments of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country the proportion of representatives that declare exclusively nationalist identity (only of their autonomous community), is greater than observed in their respective populations, especially in the communities of Catalonia and the Basque Country. The observed gap between MPs and citizens’ nationalistic identity in historical communities has led to question the sociological or mimetic representativeness of the regional parliamentary elite, even the role of the *political entrepreneur* that this elite can play and that may account, to some extent, for the centrifugal tension detected in Spanish territorial politics (Torcal and Mota 2014). Nonetheless, this result reinforces perhaps the clearest and most robust conclusion of this research: political parties are the best predictor of MPs’ views and preferences where the national and territorial model of the Spanish State is concerned.

The analysis of MPs opinion with respect to the regional model shows that belonging to a statewide or to a nationalist or regionalist party is the factor that establishes wider differences between MP preferences and views. This is observed, specifically, on issues referring to the territorial model (degree of autonomy and territorial asymmetry) and to the future of the regional State (constitutional reform of the territorial model). Those nationalist party representatives contemplated in the study (CiU

and ERC in Catalonia, PNV, Aralar and EA in the Basque Country, BNG in Galicia and NaBai in Navarra) express a majority opinion in favor of the regional model's territorial asymmetry. Furthermore, 90% of the nationalist and regionalist party representatives prefer that regional executives relate bilaterally with the central government in face of the alternative option of a multilateral collective organ. Finally, a majority of them are also favorable to the implementation of a system of regional financing by *Cupo* or agreement in their own region, but are against it generally for the rest of the autonomous communities.

In sum, the preferences, opinions and national political identities of the nationalist and regionalist parties differentiate significantly from the state-wide parties with respect to the institutional political dimension of the State model (including the IU-ICV MPs who are most similar to their PP-UPN and PSOE peers). Furthermore, it is seen that the positions of MPs of the nationalist parties, and to some extent also the regionalist parties, seem to converge around an agenda regarding their positions that has been radicalized three decades ago, in a very remarkable way in the case of the CiU. That raises the dilemma, present in the theories of federalism (Erk and Anderson 2010), of whether the decentralization process in Spain has served to accommodate national minorities or, on the contrary, has fueled secessionist aspirations.

16.7 CODA

Engaging in politics in times of disaffection must not be easy. In some of the interviews undertaken in this research a certain feeling of weariness, of disillusion perhaps, came to light. It is not surprising then that nearly half of those interviewed (49%) indicate that in ten years' time they would no longer be dedicated to politics, but rather to their profession or family. Even so, more than half of MPs who have children (54%) would not mind if some of them entered political life, although almost one-third (30%) disapprove of this. When explaining political vocations, the suspicion of personal enrichment is always present, as well as the hunger for power, the desire to control. From within, as seems normal, things are seen differently. In the same way that not everyone is fit for practicing medicine or for woodworking, it seems that not everyone is fit for politics. And yet, it is one of the few occupations for which specific preparation such as mechanical, engineering, administrative or fashion design is not required. What, then, is necessary for a political career?

Although there are disparate opinions, those interviewed openly responded with two or three qualities they believe necessary to a person who wants to engage in politics. To some extent, these answers can be seen as a reflection of who the politicians are, or at least, how they see themselves. Neither convictions (ideology) nor education and knowledge occupy the first rank of their spontaneous mentions, but rather the fifth and sixth. The quality most agreed upon (48%) is that of “vocation and passion for politics”, willingness to serve, to compromise. The second group of qualities (37%) has to do with capability and perseverance: capacity for hard work, dedication, diligence, constancy, perseverance, effortfulness. Very close to this group, is a third (35%) that includes honorableness, honesty, integrity, factors that can be related to the effect of corruption on the public image of politicians. And in fourth place (30% of mentions) are some social skills that enable people to relate to others: empathy, sociability, personability, communication skills, listening, know-how and extroversion.

In view of the evidence available, we cannot judge if Spanish representatives fit these requirements or not. We suspect that many people will have already passed judgment in that respect. What does seem clear is that these four qualities mark a course of action for those who intend to engage in politics.

NOTES

1. In the May 2015 CIS (2015) barometer “Politicians in general, parties and politics” receive 18.8% of the mentions and “the Government and specific parties and politicians” 2.4% of the mentions. With 21.2%, politicians and parties rank as the fourth greatest problem in Spain preceded by unemployment (79.4%), corruption and fraud (with 50.8%) and problems of an economic nature (25.1%).

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