POLICING AND COMBATING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Royal Ulster Constabulary GC

NEIL SOUTHERN

Policing and Combating Terrorism
in Northern Ireland

Neil Southern

Policing and Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland

The Royal Ulster Constabulary GC

Neil Southern
Department of Psychology, Sociology
    and Politics
Sheffield Hallam University
Sheffield, UK

Cover credit: Roger Hutchings/Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

*This book is dedicated to my
wife Julie, and my children,
Emma, Benett, Bonar,
Christian, Brontë and Honor*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

List of Figures

Introduction

This book has been seven years in the making and focuses on the experiences of members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC (RUC) during the Northern Ireland conflict, otherwise known as the Troubles. There are a number of reasons for writing it. Firstly, RUC officers have an important story to tell and one that is worth documenting. Secondly, no serious academic attempt has been made to research the experiences of officers and their families. As such, the broader impact of terrorism on officers is little understood especially its familial effects. Thirdly, there is an academic leaning towards the study of terrorist organisations which has resulted in the serious neglect of the experiences of terrorists' victims. Lastly, considerable effort has been made by intellectual heavyweights to highlight what they perceive to be the iniquity of state terror without adequately acknowledging the fact that victimhood has been experienced by members of the security forces and their families. This book on the RUC serves to counter-balance scholarly orientations that are critical of the state and its agencies.

Certainly, the concentration on terrorist organisations rather than the agencies that combat them; the increasing interest in the phenomenon of state terror; and the neglect of the experiences of victims of terrorism, has created an imbalance in the academic literature which, it is argued, does a disservice to students' understanding (as well as that of others). In university seminar discussions, for example, some students are challenged when it comes to discerning morally between the categories of victim

and perpetrator whenever a distinction seems somewhat obvious. Given the nature of terrorism studies, fuzziness in students' understanding ought not to be an intellectual outcome with which a political science department is satisfied. An appropriate illustration of what contributes to students' puzzlement is academic opposition to the British government's counter-radicalisation programme, Prevent. Opposition has been played out across university campuses with some members of faculty resisting the programme's implementation. Indeed, the 'Together Against Prevent' campaign has attracted scholarly support which has ignited suspicion amongst students as to the purpose of the government's programme. This has shifted debate away from the responsibilities of citizenship, which unsurprisingly, includes students along with the rest of us. Given the fact that violent Islamic extremists see fit to target *civilians* of all ages and type, and that we are all potential victims, one might have expected a more supportive reaction from the educated class. In essence, terrorism studies has fallen under the influence of a left-wing sense of critique that ill-equips students when it comes to making a confident moral differentiation between those *choosing* to wage terrorism and those committed to combating it.

There are other factors which give rise to a blurry analysis of terrorism, which, in turn, renders students' understanding hazy. Accordingly, Conor Cruise O'Brien (1977) identifies a few tendencies which terrorist organisations benefit from and two are especially pertinent to consider. One of these is academic neutrality and professional detachment. This is a scholarly condition which manifests itself in a kind of paralysis when it comes to making a moral judgment. The other inclination is that of sentimentalising the terrorist as someone who is 'dedicated' or a 'misguided idealist'. O'Brien (1977, p. 66) suggests that these tendencies result in a critical focus that is morally misdirected: 'We have noted … a kind of neutrality, and a kind of sentimentality, as among the tendencies in democratic society which encourage the terrorist as he fights against that society.' These tendencies, O'Brien argues, are often:

> accompanied by an attitude of mind which might be identified as *unilateral liberalism*. This is the kind of liberalism which is sensitive exclusively to threats to liberty seen as emanating from the democratic state itself, and is curiously phlegmatic about threats to liberty from the enemies of that state.

While scholarly self-indulgence can afford to play around with some topics, this approach is not recommended due to the gravity of others. As any victim of a terrorist attack will tell you (if an effort is made to inquire), terrorism is not a topic to be treated lightly. It requires a serious-minded analysis in our social science classrooms with its effects on victims the principal consideration. Yet, as mentioned above, the story of the victim rarely surfaces in terrorism studies. This point has been made by Orla Lynch and Javier Argomaniz (2015, p. 1) who claim that 'Victims of terrorism … remain a peripheral topic in the broader debates on terrorism and a fundamentally under-researched subject in the academic sphere.' As a result, students' understanding of the human costs of terrorism is partial and therefore is a category which figures little in their moral evaluations of the phenomenon. This problem needs to be corrected: students and the rest of us need to be better informed about the effects of terrorism and this can only be achieved by diligent research work on victims. However, in addition to the ethical requirement to pay due respect to victims on the basis of their suffering, Alex Schmid (2012) suggests that victims' experiences can play a significant—but largely under-appreciated—part in helping to combat terrorism by undermining the process of radicalisation. This book makes a contribution to research on victims of terrorism by considering its effects on members of the RUC and their families.

The Provisional IRA (henceforth IRA), which drove the conflict in Northern Ireland forward, is referred to as a terrorist organisation. The approach reflects the fact that the IRA, as James Dingley (2012, p. xii) correctly argues, was 'recognized in national and international law as a terrorist organisation, and those members caught were convicted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.' The violent actions of the IRA justify the organisation being labelled terrorist. Premeditation rather than impulsiveness was the hallmark of its violence, which on a number of occasions, displayed a nasty sectarianism. Its 'legitimate' targets included retirees from the security forces; those who had resigned; civilians who worked for the police or military; and those who supplied them with materials. Politicians, prison officers, members of the judiciary, and civil servants were also targeted. If an individual happened to be in the company of a member of the security forces during a gun or bomb attack (wives, children, friends or neighbours) they were sometimes killed as well. These are the kinds of organisational traits that we associate with terrorism.

Beyond the patterns of actual violence, the IRA pursued its political goals by the threat of violence to the end of intimidating the unionist community into capitulation. Particularly in the early years of the conflict civilians feared being caught up in an explosion and for good reason as many individuals were injured and others killed in such circumstances. The randomness by which an individual could become a victim increased the psychological severity of the threat, which Michael Walzer (1977) warns, is the crucial factor in spreading fear amongst a population group.

The IRA was also involved in the terrorising of its own community as it substituted an unconstrained and often brutal method of 'law enforcement' for the RUC's rule of law approach. The organisation ruled its community in this fashion without a political mandate as it shunned the democratic process until 1981. From the early 1980s to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), also known as the Belfast Agreement, the party did politics whilst the IRA did violence. As the political wing of the IRA, Sinn Fein's emergence as the leading nationalist party came *after* the republican movement had signed up to the GFA. Despite the self-serving attempts by terrorists to rebrand the conflict, Northern Ireland was not a 'war' and there were no paramilitary 'soldiers'. Neither is it helpful to think of the conflict in terms of participating 'combatants' as this catch-all term fails to differentiate morally between distinct organisations. The IRA did not adhere to the doctrine of minimum force nor did it abide by a policy that released those whom it had taken capture. This point leads William Matchett (2015, p. 9) to comment that the 'Provisionals had a 100 percent record in executing, often after torture, all Security Force personnel taken prisoner, exceeding the figure of al-Qaeda in Iraq.' Neither did the organisation show the slightest concern regarding the 'return of the bodies of those murdered and disappeared by the IRA in the early 1970s' (McEvoy and Conway 2004, p. 559). This was a gross violation of the human rights of a grieving mother, father, wife or child. Therefore, in the light of the above points, the term 'terrorist' accurately describes the IRA and any writer who wishes their work to be taken seriously ought to label the organisation accordingly. For 30 years members of the security forces, whose role it was to protect the lives of law-abiding citizens, combatted a relatively small and politically unrepresentative group (the majority of nationalist voters gave their allegiance to the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)) whose use of terrorism as a mechanism for achieving their political goals endangered the lives of multiple categories of person in Northern Ireland.

In 2010 the author made contact with the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association (NIRPOA) seeking the participation of its members in a research project. The research aimed to explore areas of officers' experiences which had either been ignored or not comprehensively investigated in the academic literature. In order to capture in-depth these experiences qualitative methodologies were prioritised. Accordingly, the first focus groups and individual interviews with members of the NIRPOA took place throughout the province in 2011. During this period of research a focus group was also arranged with members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross Widows Association and an interview with the Chairman of the Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross Foundation. This initial period of fieldwork was supplemented by a range of interviews and focus groups with NIRPOA members in 2013, 2014 and 2017. Additionally, over twenty questionnaires were completed by women officers in 2015 and a further twenty-five members of the NIRPOA completed questionnaires in 2017. The questionnaires allowed for open-ended responses. Other organisations connected to the RUC participated in the research. In 2016 the author spent two weeks interviewing members of the Disabled Police Officers Association Northern Ireland (DPOA). In the same year the Wounded Police and Families Association (WPFA) became involved in the project. The WPFA is a smaller organisation than the DPOA but its members have sustained the same conflicted-related physical and psychological injuries. Further, the research has benefited from numerous points of contact with individual RUC officers outside of these organisations dating back to 2010. Research material provided by participants is used on an anonymous basis in order to protect their identities. All interviews and focus groups were audio recorded and quotations used in the book are verbatim accounts. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) also assisted the project and provided important statistical information.

All participants in the research are now retired but will be referred to throughout as 'officers'. Individuals of all ranks participated in the research including five Assistant Chief Constables. Most participants had long records of service having made policing their career. Some worked in specialist counter-terrorist units, both uniformed and not, but *all* of them were affected by the Troubles and the threat posed by terrorism. Importantly, so too were officers' families. A key aim of this book is to account for the impact of terrorism primarily on officers and their wives and children (it is acknowledged that officers' mothers, fathers and

siblings were also affected). Of course, not all officers were affected in the same way. Members of the DPOA and WPFA suffered physically and psychologically in a way that other officers did not and their sacrifice of a normal life has been much greater.

Chapter 2 considers the context within which RUC officers worked. Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society. It consists of two competing communities who fundamentally disagree over the country's constitutional status and this division has spawned serious political violence (Guelke 2012). Historically, the RUC was supported by one community but less so the other. The nationalist community, which rejected the creation of the state in 1920/1921, withheld its support from its institutions which did little to increase the number of Roman Catholic police officers. The hard-line republican element which exists within the wider nationalist community strongly opposed—sometimes violently—the state and the RUC. Policing is a reflection of a society's political and criminal conditions and so republican violence and its threat necessitated the arming of the RUC. This chapter explores the nature of ethnic conflict and how it affected policing in the province. It critically reflects upon the relationship between the IRA and its community in staunchly republican areas and touches upon the role of the United States (US) and the Republic of Ireland during the Troubles.

The threat that RUC officers encountered when they were on duty is addressed in Chapter 3. The threat existed in both urban and rural contexts. The Northern Ireland conflict lasted 30 years and during this time the RUC was subjected to gun and bomb attack. This resulted in the fortification of police stations to the point that they held no resemblance to stations elsewhere in the Western world. Armour-plating and bullet-proof glass was added to the vehicles in which officers patrolled. However, stations remained susceptible to mortar attack and the counter-terrorist customisation of vehicles offered little protection from large bombs.

Chapter 4 looks at the off-duty threat. A large percentage of officers were murdered whilst off duty and in circumstances which ranged widely. The means of death was usually gun attack but terrorists also used undercar booby-traps. These devices were normally attached to a car under the cover of darkness when it was parked outside the officer's home. Terrorists were unconcerned at the possibility of these devices harming the officer's family. The purpose of an off-duty attack was to exploit the vulnerability of officers as illustrated in the murder of some

policemen in front of their wives and children. Similar to members of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) but unlike British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland, RUC officers did not live in fortified barracks but in regular neighbourhoods which could suddenly have become the theatre of an attack. The chapter considers the practical counter-terrorist steps that officers took in order to reduce the risk they faced when off duty.

Chapter 5 assesses the impact of the conflict on officers' families. This is an under-researched topic in terrorism studies and sociological work on policing. Whilst scholarship makes clear that wives are affected by their husbands' work, the Troubles added a different and more challenging set of stresses to a relationship and the family unit. Due to the long hours that many officers worked they were unable to devote the time they would have liked to raise their families. Included in the discussion are the experiences of wives whose husbands were murdered by terrorists.

The physical and psychological injuries that officers sustained during the conflict are explored in Chapter 6. This is an extensive chapter because of the areas that needed to be studied and the significance that was placed on the 'voice' of participants being 'heard' in the discussion. The physical injuries were inflicted by means of gun and bomb attacks. Shootings as well as explosions resulted in limb amputation. Amongst a range of injuries, one participant is a single amputee having been struck by a bullet fired from a high-velocity rifle, another lost two legs in an undercar booby-trap explosion, and the effects of another bomb attack left an officer a triple amputee. These are battlefield injuries equivalent to those suffered by soldiers who served in high-intensity conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that the victims were police officers and not soldiers. How officers cope with their physical and psychological injuries is a key point of inquiry.

Women served in the RUC alongside their male colleagues. Their experiences of working during the conflict are accounted for in Chapter 7. The chapter examines a number of themes including how some women have been physically and psychologically harmed by terrorist violence. It was decided to address women officers' injuries in this chapter rather than include them in Chapter 6 in order to highlight the dangers that policewomen faced. Before the onset of the Troubles, the bulk of policewomen's time was taken up dealing with incidents which involved women and children but their roles soon expanded. Given the level of terrorist activity it is odd that female officers remained unarmed. Ironically, they were

issued with weapons the year of the first IRA ceasefire in 1994. This did not mean that women, before they were formally armed, could not use a gun as many received informal instruction from their male colleagues. Amongst other topics, the chapter explores women's attitudes towards carrying firearms and indicates the reasons why some wished to be armed and others not.

The final chapter examines the topic of victimhood and seeks to broaden the concept from its clearly comprehensible meaning in bereavement (addressed in Chapter 5) and the physical and psychological injuries accounted for in Chapter 6. As conceived of in this chapter, there is a conceptual correspondence between victimhood and a sense of alienation which has emerged since the signing of the GFA. Alienation captures officers' feelings of anger, frustration, dismay and powerlessness which have placed them at the margins of the political transformation. The Agreement released prisoners and set the scene for a commission that brought an end to the RUC. Further, victimhood is a contested topic and officers have become dismayed at the attempt by terrorists to lay claim to the term because of its moral capital. Officers feel that there is a concerted attempt on the part of Sinn Fein to sully the name of the RUC in an effort to escape condemnation for the fact that the IRA was responsible for killing more people during the Troubles than any other group. But in the opinion of officers, the struggle of such organisations as the NIRPOA to defend the RUC's reputation is a lonely one as they feel themselves politically abandoned by unionist parties. This chapter will be followed by a conclusion.

References

Dingley, J. (2012). *The IRA*. Oxford: Praeger.

Guelke, A. (2012). *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lynch, O., & Argomaniz, J. (2015). Victims of Terrorism: An Introduction. In Orla Lynch & Javier Argomaniz (Eds.), *Victims of Terrorism: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Study* (pp. 1–9). London: Routledge.

Matchett, W. (2015). Security: Missing from the Northern Ireland Model. *Democracy and Security, 11*(1), 1–43.

McEvoy, K., & Conway, H. (2004). The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of the Past. *Journal of Law and Society, 31*(4), 539–562.

O'Brien, C. (1977). Liberty and Terrorism. *International Security, 2*(2), 56–67.

Schmid, A. (2012). *Strengthening the Role of Victims and Incorporating Victims in Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism*. International Centre for Counter-terrorism Research Paper. ICCT: The Netherlands.

Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books.

The Challenges of Policing
in a Deeply Divided Society

Policing During the Conflict

Police officers are killed in the line of duty in every society. Often officers die as a result of a road traffic accident: they might be fatally struck by a vehicle whilst on foot patrol or die as a result of a fatal collision if on mobile patrol. One of the worst incidents which claimed the lives of a number of RUC officers was not a result of a terrorist attack. In October, 1980, five officers lost their lives when their Land Rover collided with a lorry in Belfast. With the exception of one terrorist attack during the Troubles, more officers died in this single event than any other. It should be added that the loss of five officers in a collision whilst on mobile patrol is unusually high irrespective of society. In politically stable societies officers normally drive around either individually or in pairs—that five officers were in an RUC Land Rover was reflective of the terrorist threat as these were safer vehicles in which to patrol. In another incident two years later, three RUC officers were fatally injured when, responding to an emergency, their vehicle crashed. The FBI refers to officers being 'feloniously killed' but the concept most often describes events which were not premeditated on the part of the killer. As Chris Ryder (2000, p. 2) discusses, premeditation was a central element of the killing of police officers in Northern Ireland: 'the murder of a policeman is rarely incidental to the crime as it is in nearly every other country; hatred of the police is all too often the primary purpose of the crime itself.' Premeditation, however, was clearly

evident in two fatal attacks on US officers in July, 2016, and which received widespread media attention well beyond the nation's borders. In Dallas five officers were killed and ten days later three policemen were shot dead in Baton Rouge. It is claimed that the 'events were revenge attacks for the killing of young black men by police' (BBC 2016). These attacks differ to attacks on RUC officers by the IRA and other republican groups during the Troubles. While the US shootings were deliberate attacks on law enforcement officers and the killers' intention was to take life, they differ to the systematic approach adopted by terrorist organisations which presents police officers and the state with a more sinister challenge. Law enforcement agencies in the US and other countries have not encountered a threat of this kind and therefore its challenges are little understood. Police officers in Northern Ireland were regularly targeted and murdered by the IRA, and to a lesser degree the INLA. The dangers which members of the RUC confronted resulted in the international policing agency, Interpol, stating in 1983 that Northern Ireland was the most dangerous place in the world to be a police officer (Ryder 2000).

The fatality statistics confirmed Interpol's claim and later killings of officers underlined it further. For instance, in 1985 the RUC buried 23 of its officers following terrorist attacks. This was the highest death toll in a single year equalled only by the number of officers who died in 1976. RUC fatalities in these years were closely followed by the 21 policemen who were murdered the year of the IRA Hunger Strikes in 1981. It is important that these statistics are not read simply as a quantitative source of data which is useful to social science research. Each death has left much grief in its wake. The victimhood experienced by the wife, mother or father, son or daughter of a murdered police officer is compounded by the sense that their loved one was killed whilst performing a necessary public service. They feel that their loved ones were courageous enough to don a uniform despite the terrorist threat (unlike those responsible for their deaths), and that the corporate identity of having been a police officer should not affect one's acknowledgement of the familial trauma and sense of human loss that each death has caused.

The statistics of RUC fatalities are sobering and demonstrate the impact of the conflict over a period of thirty years. The first officer was killed in 1969 and the last in 1998 (PSNI officers have also been killed by dissident republican groups). During this time 300 officers lost their

lives.[1] In addition to the protracted nature of the Troubles there were periods when terrorist violence was intense and certain incidents particularly tragic or callous. To gain a perspective on the intensity of the Northern Ireland conflict and the challenges that the security forces confronted it is useful to reflect upon its worst year: 1972. In this year the British Army lost 106 soldiers,[2] while 26 members of the Ulster Defence Regiment[3] and 16 RUC officers[4] were killed—totalling 148 members of the British security forces. Fatalities that year exceeded the number of British soldiers killed in any single year in the wars in either Afghanistan (108 soldiers died in 2009) and Iraq (53 soldiers died in 2003).[5] But these fatalities occurred in part of the United Kingdom and not a major conflict overseas with international involvement. The statistics confirm that 28% of officers were killed whilst off duty (this percentage does not include three off-duty officers, who although killed in IRA bomb attacks, had not been specifically targeted). An off-duty officer was killed in each of the following attacks: Oxford Bus Station 1972; La Mon House Hotel 1978; and Enniskillen Remembrance Day 1987. The percentage of officers killed whilst off duty is high and reflects the IRA's commitment to attacking 'soft' targets. James Dingley (1998) correctly argues that it was relatively easy to kill police officers which Robert White (1998) unimpressively attempts to challenge. To be frank, White adopts a silly position which is exposed when assessed according to Fintan O'Toole's forthright critique of IRA attacks (quoted below). As we shall see in Chapter 5, sometimes officers were murdered whilst in the presence of their wife and children, thus when their guard was well down. White would have done well to reflect upon the particular ease of killing officers when they were off duty before replying to Dingley.

---

[1] RUC Roll of Honour, available from http://www.royalulsterconstabulary.org/memorial.htm.

[2] British army fatalities, available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1972.html.

[3] UDR Roll of Honour, available from http://www.udrassociation.org/Roll%20of%20Honour/1982.htm.

[4] RUC Roll of Honour, available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/group/ruc_gcf/rucgcf_05_roll2.pdf.

[5] BBC statistics on military deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq, available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10629358 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10637526.

More officers were killed in shooting incidents than by explosions. With 63.3% of officers dying in gun attacks this was almost twice as high as the 36.3% who died in explosions. Nearly 6% were killed by means of undercar booby traps. One officer was beaten to death by a loyalist mob in 1997. As might be expected, the percentage of full-time regular officers to be killed was higher than other categories of officer. The fatality rate amongst regular officers was 67% but with 17% being members of the Part-time Reserve this was slightly higher than the 16% suffered by the Full-time Reserve. Of the officers killed 107 (35.7%) were aged between 18 and 29; 152 (50.7%) aged between 30 and 49; and 41 (13.7%) aged 50 and over.

In the light of these statistics the maintenance of morale was crucial. Morale is important to effective police work and as B. W. Gocke (1945, p. 215) commented over sixty years ago the term is 'used to express a person's state of mind with reference to courage, zeal, confidence, and similar qualities… It is the tenacity to stick to the job without tiring; to hold on without a breaking of spirit'. The RUC confronted much greater challenges to its morale than the policing context which informed Gocke's understanding of the term. The IRA intended its unyielding attacks to undermine police morale. It was hoped that officers would be reduced to an emotionally worn-down state by the constant killing and maiming of their colleagues to the point that the number of resignations would reach a critical mass and new recruits would be few in number. The security and political implications for Northern Ireland would have been enormous if this had been the effect of terrorist violence. Fundamental questions of sovereignty and constitutionality would have arisen had the province been seen as ungovernable. It was not the first time that republicans had adopted this strategy. It had been used successfully by the IRA against the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) from 1919 to 1921. The RIC's main strength was its local knowledge which posed a serious threat to the IRA's revolutionary project (Lowe 2002). As Andrew Silke (2016, p. 431) comments, a campaign of 'Direct violence, harassment, and intimidation mutated the RIC, so that by mid-1920 the organisation's real value in the struggle had largely been destroyed.'

Unlike the RIC, the RUC's capability to combat terrorism strengthened in all areas as the conflict progressed. In 1976, the policy of police primacy was introduced. This resulted in the RUC taking the lead in countering terrorism with support from the army. Despite the many challenges and difficulties which a protracted terrorist campaign presents, the RUC's morale held firm. If there was a message for the IRA that it

was unable to destroy the morale of policemen and women, it was the example of Newry station in 1985. In less than three months 15 RUC officers (including three women) were murdered by the IRA (another three officers died the following year bringing the fatality figure to 18) but policing structures did not collapse in Newry and the attacks did not destroy RUC discipline. There were no mass resignations of officers serving in the area; officers stationed elsewhere did not refuse to replace their colleagues who had been killed; and the severity of the attacks did not put an end to RUC recruitment. Rather, the story of Newry is that of police resilience which required a high level of morale. A former Assistant Chief Constable referred to morale as having a four-fold composition: leadership, discipline, comradeship and self-respect, and good support systems. His comments are instructive and are worth quoting at length:

> Firstly, good morale is impossible without good leaders at all levels. The RUC invested a lot of resources in selecting and training its leaders. Then there is discipline - this implies a sense of duty and helps to unite and bond officers. Much of the RUC effort in countering terrorism and disorder depended on team-working. A third element is comradeship and self-respect. This is a case of affection and trust. Maintaining good personal standards enhances comradeship and in turn increases pride and confidence in each officer to perform effectively. The camaraderie in the RUC was outstanding as members supported each other in common cause. Finally, equipment and supplies as well as effective medical/welfare systems are central to keeping morale high. The RUC, ably supported by the Police Authority, was generally in the vanguard of testing and acquiring up-to-date vehicles and equipment. Armoured Land Rovers/cars were central to giving protection and confidence to officers dealing with terrorism and disorder in urban areas while the provision of military helicopters was invaluable for transporting patrols in rural and border areas. (Email communication Assistant Chief Constable 30 August 2017)

Londonderry 5 October, 1968

The RUC was severely criticised for its handling of a Civil Rights march on 5 October in Londonderry, 1968. It is portrayed as a defining moment in the RUC's relationship with the nationalist community and which exposed the repressive character of the state. It is presented as something of a unique demonstration of police brutality when in fact there were other notable European (and US) examples in 1968 of

protestors being met with a robust policing response. Those opposed to the RUC used the incident to damage the reputation of the police and it became part of nationalist and republican anti-RUC polemic. However, this portrayal of the RUC is unfair. It is argued that there exist grounds for recommending a more balanced assessment of the events of that day based upon the law enforcement priorities of police officers who were duty bound to uphold a governmental decision. The decision banned the march from proceeding along its intended route in order to prevent the possibility of a violent confrontation occurring with loyalists. The marchers had deliberately chosen a route which took them into 'Protestant' territory which threatened a major disruption to public order. The Apprentice Boys—who did not parade in 'Roman Catholic' areas of the city like the Bogside or the Creggan because of sensitivities associated with ethnic territoriality—had notified police that they would be holding a march around the same time and in the same part of the city (Hennessey 2005). In order to avoid the threat of inter-ethnic violence, the Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig, 'made an order banning the Civil Rights marchers only from the Waterside and the walled city' (Prince 2012, p. 398) which left them free to hold their procession elsewhere in the city. The Londonderry ban needs to be put in context: the Stormont government banned *all* protests in Belfast for a 3-month period in 1966 because of the threat they posed to public order. The Belfast ban cut across sectarian divisions and in fact was introduced at a time when loyalist Paisleyites were prone to taking to the streets. At an operational level, the response of the RUC that day cannot be viewed in isolation of two points: firstly, the duty of the police to uphold the law as it had been determined by Craig, and secondly, the likely response of officers to their authority—and a ministerial decision—being challenged in an aggressive manner.

The broader context of that day is important. The Cameron Report (1969) acknowledged that the route chosen by the organisers of the march was one traditionally used by unionists and loyalists when parading in the city. Some of the organisations which took part were known for their republican opposition to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and were therefore antipathetic towards the Britishness of the Protestant community. The marchers intended to proceed to the area where the War memorial is situated within the old city's walls which happened to be the most symbolically important part of the city to unionists. The significance of territory and symbolic representation should not

be overlooked in an ethnically divided society like Northern Ireland if the negative reaction of unionists to the marchers' route is to be understood. The fact that the march consisted of republican elements added to unionist concern in case an act of symbolic desecration took place.

The Report also recognised that there was overlap in the membership of some of the organisations. This sent alarmist signals to unionists. Thomas Hennessey (2005, p. 388) describes the effects of republican involvement in the Civil Rights movement on Protestant perceptions: 'Protestants saw IRA stewards accompanying the marchers, they saw the Nationalists slogans carried by Catholic crowds and heard the Nationalist songs they sang; they perceived a Republican conspiracy' and that 'perhaps the dumbest decision of all' made by the movement was 'allowing IRA Volunteers to act as stewards on marches, as if that was what they were experts at.' The singing of republican songs was how Bernadette Devlin put it in Marcel Ophuls's (1972) documentary *A Sense of Loss*. In reference to the first Civil Rights march from Coalisland to Dungannon in 1968 she reminisced:

> We sat in the middle of the road in a large circle and we sang republican songs; old ones, songs my father had taught me, presumably other people's fathers had taught them and the myth of the nation, the myth of republicanism once more found a voice.

Understandably, such melodic trappings of republicanism—which is hardly in keeping with a supposedly non-sectarian organisation that is about Civil Rights and not constitutional politics—fuelled the suspicions of the unionist government that it was a republican Trojan Horse. At least black Civil Rights protesters in the USA had the sense to carry an American flag when presenting their case to society. Christopher Hewitt (1981) also addresses the theme of Protestant perceptions. He comments that the rise of the Civil Rights movement did not indicate a diminution of Irish nationalism in favour of a socialist outlook that was prepared to accept the existence of Northern Ireland. Rather, in Civil Rights meetings 'nationalist and Republican organizations and individuals were participants. IRA men played a significant role as stewards at meetings' (Hewitt 1981, p. 374). With regard to this republican element, it should be borne in mind that a 6-year terrorist campaign by the IRA to destroy the Northern Irish state (and which resulted in the murder of 6 RUC officers) had only come to an end in 1962 and so unionist memory of

this violent period was fresh. It is also likely that family connections played a role in generating Protestant suspicions: prominent Civil Rights activist and nationalist MP, Eddie McAteer, was a brother of leading IRA man Hugh McAteer. Moreover, the fact that the IRA had been active in Londonderry during the campaign and that the city was the key locale for terrorist organising in the wider area undoubtedly heightened Protestant sensitivities. Further, unionist concerns about a revamped IRA campaign surfaced in 1966 and not without justification as a series of republican commemorations to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising took place throughout the province. Interestingly, the unionist government did not impose a blanket ban on these commemorations. Whilst Margaret O'Callaghan and Catherine O'Donnell (2006) point to the government's awareness of the importance of managing its appearance before the gaze of Harold Wilson's Labour government, it also was a measure of Stormont's tolerance of a hostile minority tradition and reflects a political liberalism which undermines the oppressive and authoritarian picture of the state which republicans are at pains to paint.

The decision of the marchers to defy the ministerial ban put them on a collision course with the police which Simon Prince (2007) points out was a tactic employed by left-wing European militants of the period. These were radicals who wished to challenge the state in an attempt to expose the authoritarianism that they considered lurked at its core. They sought to agitate in order to provoke a response which would enable them to cry police brutality and heavy handedness. Prince argues that left-wing protestors, like Eamonn McCann and Michael Farrell, viewed Londonderry as part of a wider continental leftist struggle.

Television footage from the day records marchers walking up and forcibly pushing through a cordon of police officers. Many of the officers had their arms linked in an attempt to halt the marchers but to no avail. Understandably, this led to scuffles between the police and protestors and a standoff ensued. Prior to this, at the protestors' rallying point they had been informed by a senior RUC officer using a loudhailer that the ban would be enforced—so the police did not launch an operational surprise when marchers attempted to defy it. Had matters deescalated at this point the outcome would have been different but unfortunately the situation deteriorated. The police, as Prince (2007, p. 4) remarks, initially adopted a 'conciliatory stance … making no attempt to disperse what was an illegal assembly' but after 'Belfast leftists started to insult the police and hurl placards at the cordon, their bid to provoke the police

was not checked by the marshals as it had been in Dungannon.' As a result of about 'five minutes of being subjected to "Sieg Heil" taunts and a fusillade of missiles' RUC officers with batons drawn dispersed the protestors. The use of their batons by some officers was considered indiscriminate and the RUC roundly criticised but the physical and verbal behaviour of the marchers should not be ignored when evaluating police actions.

Aggressively breaking through police lines is never recommended irrespective of political regime. Police officers, the world over, would respond with force to their authority being challenged in such a fashion. The decision to break up the crowd *followed* the protestors' verbal abuse and hurling of placards and missiles at police. Indeed, when compared to policing responses to protestors in Paris and London in the same year, the response of the RUC was more light-handed than it was heavy. Film footage records unpleasant scenes of protestors in Paris being violently beaten by police, as is recorded uncomfortable scenes of mounted officers belonging to the Metropolitan police in London wading through protestors. Additionally, there are distasteful images of Metropolitan officers punching demonstrators in a brawl-like fashion. The London scenes were at odds with the British notion of the 'civilised bobby'. However, the scenes in the British capital carried another lesson which has been overlooked in analyses: the Metropolitan Constabulary was quite prepared to use a forceful style of policing if needed and hence the actions of RUC officers seven months later were not a unique product of Northern Ireland's militarised policing as some commentators would have us believe (Ellison and Smyth 2000). While no one would condone the indiscriminate use of an RUC baton or any other constabulary's baton for that matter, the images from these capitals were nastier than what occurred in Londonderry and so a degree of perspective is required. Certainly, RUC actions were not comparable to the aggressive actions of police officers in Chicago in 1968 when protestors were prevented from proceeding towards the site of the Democratic Party Convention (Kusch 2004). In addition to strongarm tactics, the Chicago police used tear gas. Neither are the actions of RUC officers comparable to US police officers in Alabama in 1963 when a combination of attack dogs and high-pressure water hoses were used to scatter black Civil Rights protestors (Spratt 2008). Many of the black protestors were high school students but this was of little significance to US police officers who were intent on crushing the protest. Whilst the RUC was criticised for its use of water canon on 5 October, it should be

acknowledged that water canon was first used in Northern Ireland against loyalist supporters of Ian Paisley on the Crumlin Road in Belfast in 1966 (Bew et al. 1979; O'Callaghan and O'Donnell 2006). A baton charge, as well as water canon, was part of the RUC's approach to controlling Protestant demonstrators that day. Indeed, O'Callaghan and O'Donnell (2006, p. 217) point to the willingness of the unionist government to revert to the Special Powers legislation in reaction to Paisleyite loyalists and restrict the potential of militant Protestants to mobilise at the level of street protests: 'Again, the level of anxiety surrounding the activities of Paisley and his followers is evident here and reflected in the decision to revert to the use of Special Powers legislation in response to extremist Protestantism.' These commentators also make clear how the policy decisions of the unionist government at this time were influenced by RUC intelligence reports—this does not paint a picture of a virulently partisan police force which was perched ready to respond to every opportunity to oppress the Roman Catholic community whilst ignoring challenges emanating from militant Protestantism. However, this sort of evidence is ignored in republican commentary.

To be fair to the RUC, its tactics on the 5 October were not confrontational but officers were reactive, as would be expected, when exposed to the kind of verbal and physical provocation outlined by Prince. The defiance of marchers was met by the determination of the police to uphold a governmental ban and the unlawful attempt to challenge the authority of the state by means of forcibly breaking through RUC lines was ill-judged. Prince (2007, 2012) presents a convincing argument that protestors were intent on a showdown with police and points to the combustible mix of left-wing radicals and republicans who wished to see the Northern Irish state destroyed. Indeed, the militant outlook of one of the leftist leaders, Eamonn McCann, was revealed when he was interviewed for a 1968 *World in Action* documentary about the Civil Rights protests. McCann's comments had an ominous tone to them: 'I make no bones about it, I don't want just to embarrass unionism I want to destroy it.' He continued: 'I'm not advocating violence' in Londonderry 'or anywhere else at the moment, I think it would be tactically lunatic to do so'[6] but then in a mood of irresponsible moral abandonment argued that if violence did occur blame would rest with the unionist government

---

[6] *Backs to the Wall*, World in Action, 1968. Available on YouTube from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhQAifiSwes.

and not those actually committing the violence. McCann's comments would seem to fit with Prince's argument that a radical orientation was characteristic of a number of Civil Rights protestors.

POLICING AND THE CHALLENGES OF ETHNIC TERRORISM

It is important to describe the context within which RUC officers and the wider security forces worked. The conflict in Northern Ireland is an example of what is referred to in terrorism studies as ethnic terrorism (Byman 1998), which is principally defined by its pursuit of a nationalist goal (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). The term captures the relationship between the ideological goals of a terrorist organisation and the national and territorial aspirations of a larger ethnic community. Those recruited to a terrorist group emerge from within this community thus sharing the ethnic identity of the wider group and may conceive of themselves as the community's defenders. Historically, the IRA has reaped the benefits of a shared ethnicity (Dingley 2012). Members of the IRA were formed in the same cultural mould as the nationalist community—raised in the same areas, attended the same schools, belonged to the same Roman Catholic chapel, had membership of the same Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) club or spectated at the same GAA grounds—which established the kind of kinship bonds that Hutchinson and Smith (1995) claim form the basis of an ethnic group. Also, republicans shared with constitutional nationalists certain ideological rudiments, namely, anti-partition, de-legitimation of the Northern Ireland state, and national irredentism. Ethnic commonality and a shared ideological outlook presented the security forces with counter-terrorist challenges.

Of course, the ethno-nationalist link between a terrorist organisation and its community does not mean that everyone within a community agrees with the methods which terrorists use to achieve their goal. It is also clear that not everyone chooses to join a terrorist group even though, as Martha Crenshaw (1981) points out, individuals may experience the same negative macro societal conditions. That only a few respond to these conditions by opting to become terrorists prevents a violent decent into a full-blown insurgency (Young and Gray 2011) with its greater security challenges and threat of political de-stabilisation. Of course, Crenshaw's observation needs to be balanced with the fact that it does not require a high level of terrorist activity to keep a sophisticated security complex in operation especially if attacks are geographically

spread. In this respect, a combination of terrorism's unpredictability and the security force's uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the next attack is all that is required to necessitate a comprehensive counter-terrorist response. Consider the following: when terrorists were relaxed at home and *planning* the next attack in Northern Ireland they were at work in the same way that the thousands of police officers and soldiers who were on patrol combating terrorism were at work too. The lesson is a simple one and it is this: doing terrorism requires a much smaller labour force and far less effort than doing counter-terrorism. In part, this helps explain the longevity of the IRA's campaign as well as that of other terrorist organisations.

The topic of ethnic terrorism in Northern Ireland raises interesting questions when it comes to competing narratives about the cause of the Troubles. Cillian McGrattan (2015, p. 942) asks whether the conflict was 'primarily structural in cause (that is, it was to do with colliding identities and ideologies and involved dynamics of repression-mobilization) or whether it was inspired primarily by individuals and groups of individuals who utilised those ideas to justify acts of violence.' In the light of Crenshaw's point about the limited effects of socio-political conditions on radicalisation i.e. the fact that relatively few individuals within a community join a terrorist group, suggests that responsibility for the violence of the Troubles rests less with structures and the communal masses and more with a violent core of individuals who drove the conflict forward regardless of its destructive consequences. But, importantly, this small group of individuals could not have done so in the absence of significant levels of communal support.

There are other angles from which ethnic terrorism can be explored. These help illustrate the connections between a terrorist organisation and a community. They also add a degree of empirical substance to the theory of ethnic terrorism which is helpful in terms of comprehending its meaning during the Troubles. An important example was the by-election in the constituency of Fermanagh-South Tyrone on 9 April, 1981. Voters had a choice between an IRA prisoner on hunger strike, Bobby Sands, and a unionist candidate. Clarity about what Sands stood for and the organisation to which he belonged meant that there was no ambiguity or confusion in the minds of nationalist voters. However, two days prior to the election a 29-year-old Protestant woman, Joanne Mathers, had been collecting census data in the republican Gobnascale area of Londonderry when she was ruthlessly murdered by an IRA gunman. The

nationalist community of the Fermanagh-South Tyrone constituency had two days to reflect upon this awful murder before voting. In this regard, the election was a test of moral conscience played out in the privacy of the ballot box as nationalist voters were given the opportunity to send a powerful message to the IRA that it was not prepared to condone terrorist violence. To the dismay of unionists in the constituency and across Northern Ireland, nationalist voters chose to support Bobby Sands who won the election the actual day that the young woman was buried. The result alienated unionists who felt betrayed, not by republicans in the constituency, but by their constitutional nationalist neighbours. It seemed that a mix of ethnic identity and political sympathy was a stronger influence on the electoral preference of nationalist voters than moral conscience. A further wounding was the fact that the election served as an example of ethnic mobilisation as nationalist voters flooded out to vote instead of abstaining. Abstention would also have sent a message to the IRA that nationalist constituents experienced revulsion at the murder. But Sands was neither abandoned in terms of the number of nationalists who turned out to vote nor in their choice of candidate. Adding to unionist dismay was the fact that three months later, Owen Carron, standing on an anti-H Block ticket, experienced a slightly higher level of support in a by-election that was triggered by Sands' death.

Fintan O'Toole makes reference to the murder of Joanne Mathers and uses it to argue that the IRA did not have a genuine claim to victimhood. In the context of the IRA hunger strikes of 1981 O'Toole said:

> The truth he [Bobby Sands] was taking was the truth that actually the IRA was not suffering. The IRA was not a victim in the Troubles. The vast majority of IRA killings were pretty safe for the killer. Their classic weapon was the car bomb: you set the bomb, you walked away from the carnage, you were safe. You walked up to somebody's door, you knocked on the door you shot somebody in the head and you ran away. You placed a mine on the road when a British army convoy was coming along and you did it by remote control - a remote control is not the warrior's honour.[7]

Certainly the depraved murder of Joanne Mathers was 'pretty safe for the killer' and one utterly devoid of any sense of the 'warrior's honour' but it did not sway nationalist voters. When attempting to understand the

---

[7] *Bobby Sands 66 Days*, Cyprus Avenue Films/Fine Point Films.

electoral dimensions of ethnic terrorism, which *at times* did emerge with significant consequences, the Fermanagh-South Tyrone parliamentary election is instructive. It took place only two days after one of the most shameful and sectarian republican murders of the conflict. For unionists, Sands exercised choice in his decision to kill himself whilst the Protestant woman—married with an infant child—was offered no choice by the terrorist who cruelly took her life.

The dimensions of ethnic terrorism were identifiable in other contexts. An interesting example was the use of black taxis in West Belfast. Usually buses facilitate a large urban community's transport needs. Typically, Belfast operated a regular bus service between the city centre and its outlying regions. However, the vulnerability of buses to repeated hijackings in certain areas sometimes resulted in the provision of an intermittent service or its periodic withdrawal altogether. This served the interests of the IRA which orchestrated riots and hijackings in the areas under its control and enabled the organisation to make financial good out of the operation of a fleet of black taxis. It is speculated that in addition to other fundraising schemes (Addison 2002) black taxis, which charged reasonable fares, were a significant source of income for the IRA (*News Letter* 2016). Drivers contributed a small amount of their weekly takings to 'the cause' and so were not shackled by an overly burdensome extortion racket. Taking a little from a large resource was a better strategy than demanding a lot from a resource pool which is smaller. A former Head of RUC Special Branch discussed the usefulness of these taxis from a logistical point of view:

> The taxis on many occasions were used wittingly or unwittingly to facilitate PIRA/INLA activities. A woman/man could transport weapons/incendiary devices in a taxi and if stopped and searched could claim that they knew nothing about the 'parcel' as it was in the taxi when they got in and they believed it had been left behind by some other passenger. The driver, of course, was 'unaware' that one of his passengers had left it in the vehicle, so unless there were forensic traces that linked the individuals to the parcel and its contents, everyone walked free. (Email communication former Head of RUC Special Branch 10 August 2017)

He added that taxis also performed an important pathfinder role: 'Others fronted the movement of explosive devices to the City Centre and used their brake lights to signal a checkpoint to vehicles behind. Some had

radios and used them on specific jobs to shift both paramilitaries and materials.' The use of a vehicle and its brake lights when scouting ahead of an IRA unit transporting weapons or explosives has been suitably discussed by a member of the organisation (Collins 1997). So, judging by the comments of a senior police officer, some black taxis may well have served the transportation needs of terrorists.

Ethnic terrorism also involves communal acquiescence which basically amounts to a community colluding with a terrorist group in different ways. IRA man, Eamon Collins (1997, p. 225) described the relationship in this way: 'We carried the guns and planted the bombs, but the community fed us, hid us, opened their homes to us, turned a blind eye to our operations'. It was the willingness of too many within the nationalist community to turn a blind eye to IRA violence which Seamus Murphy (1993) takes issue with. He is critical of the moral ambivalence shown towards IRA violence:

> Most Irish Catholics (and probably most nationalists) would state, if asked, that they don't support the IRA; yet there are undeniable causal links between nationalist culture and the IRA, and unmistakeable evidence that the IRA are not all that isolated from the Catholic nationalist community, at least in NI … Failure to stand in solidarity with the victims of the IRA is a kind of negative support of the IRA. (Murphy 1993, p. 281)

Murphy lambastes the role which a sense of historical injustice plays in shaping nationalist attitudes towards IRA killings arguing that 'IRA violence is a greater injustice than any discrimination suffered by Catholics in NI [Northern Ireland].' He calls for greater clarity in the moral reasoning of nationalists urging them to see the 'futility of trying to weigh discrimination against death' (Murphy 1993, p. 278). Whilst the moral scales—discrimination/killing—for measuring and evaluating nationalists' attitudes towards violence are correct and certainly drill down into the core of the issue the results were disconcerting. The fact that IRA terrorism had being raging for 25 years when the article was written points to the resilience of ethnic terrorism to moral challenges of communal self-examination.

The extent to which acquiescence reflects submission more than consent is difficult to determine but suffice to say that without a high level of communal *acceptance* it would not be possible for a terrorist group to operate successfully. The community in militant republican areas

tolerated the 'law' imposed by terrorists. Punishments were mete out for both normal and political transgressions (Monaghan 2004). Severe beatings or kneecappings were administered for anti-social behaviour like theft, joyriding or drug dealing. Knowledge of those who belonged to the organisation which carried out the punishments was widespread in close-knit communities. After all, those affected by anti-social behaviour had to report it to those who were part of the terrorist network. The reporting of an incident was accompanied by the expectation that it would elicit a response of one form or another—mild or severe. When the social control dimension of ethnic terrorism is explored it leads to the conclusion that a community was willing to subject its young people to the disciplinary procedures of an organisation, brutal as they may be. For those deemed guilty of the political offence of passing information to the security forces the punishment was often death and this sanction generally seems to have been tolerated too. This was the price that a community had to pay for its refusal to engage with the RUC. For those whose refusal was motivated by fear of getting on the wrong side of the terrorists, it is understandable (but perhaps some individuals in this category may still have complained about anti-social behaviour and so their complicity in punishment beatings cannot be ruled out). However, in contrast, for those who refused because they were hostile towards the police and passed on information about socially troublesome individuals, it is a clear measure of their active collusion with a terrorist group. Either way, the foundations of punishment beatings or the killing of informers were not shaken by a public outcry. An empirically focused analysis of the topic of communal collusion helps us identify how ethnic terrorism manifests itself in the social life of a community.

There are external dimensions to the debate about collusion and specifically the role of the United States and the Republic of Ireland during the conflict. An assessment of the US will be conducted first. In 1970 NORAID (Northern Aid) was founded in the US and has been described by Adrian Guelke (1996, p. 524) as the 'most militantly republican of all Irish-American organizations with an interest in the conflict in Northern Ireland.' The organisation was explicit in its support for Sinn Fein and the IRA and actively fundraised for the republican movement. Robert Finnegan (2002) claims that in the 1970s republican sympathisers in the US consistently sent weapons to the IRA which resulted in high velocity Armalite assault rifles being used against the security forces on the streets of Belfast and elsewhere. Ideological

sympathy also existed amongst US political elites. From 1974 the Irish National Caucus (INC) was an influential Congressional actor that looked at the Troubles through a nationalist lens. That its members were ignorant of the identity factors which generated ethnic conflict in the province was evident in the understanding of its most prominent member, Senator Edward Kennedy. Four years into the conflict the Congressman published an article in *Foreign Policy* in which he remarked that Ulster was Britain's Vietnam. He considered there to exist sufficient parallels between Northern Ireland and Vietnam to claim that the 'tragedy of Britain in Ulster is the tragedy of the United States in Indochina' (Kennedy 1973, p. 58). Kennedy either failed or refused to acknowledge the obvious contradiction in his approach, namely, the existence of one million Protestants with a resolute British identity to which there was no corresponding parallel identity-wise in Vietnam. The pro-nationalist disposition of people like Kennedy shared the same vision as the IRA but obviously differed in terms of the means by which the vision might be realised. However, the use of the INC as a platform for pushing a pro-nationalist agenda certainly did not harm the IRA as it delegitimised the ideological position of unionism which, in turn, undermined Northern Ireland's constitutional status as an integral part of the United Kingdom. The INC's assaults on unionism's ideological and constitutional position were at the same time under the violent assault of the IRA with devastating consequences for the security forces and civilians alike. Arguably, this was politically irresponsible of the Caucus when Northern Ireland had been plunged into crisis by republican terrorists. A more productive approach might have been to pressurise the government to clamp down on all forms of republican fundraising activities in the US where it was impossible to guarantee that monies were not being used to purchase weaponry. Further, when a US district court judge, Charles Haight Jr. ruled in 1981 that the 'uncontroverted evidence is that [NORAID] is an agent of the IRA, providing money and services for other than relief purposes' (Richey 1985) a more responsible approach would have been for the INC to call for NORAID to be banned. Given that the US was a crucial source of financial support for the IRA (Duffy 2001), William Matchett (2016, p. 247) asks: 'Should the proprietors of Irish-American bars in Boston and New York be prosecuted for financing terrorism?' A question like this creates a little dent in the bodywork of the US and Britain's 'special relationship'.

As a result of the INC's influence and that of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee on Irish Affairs which was established in 1977, the White House banned the sale of guns to the RUC in 1979. The decision was an embarrassment to the British government but the RUC did receive a shipment of guns during this period. This quantity of firearms had been requested previous to the ban but had not been sent by the State Department. However, the second request was denied by the White House (Thompson 2001).

Political journeys can be as torturous as they are unexpected. Members of the INC who were critical of counter-terrorism policy in Northern Ireland did not anticipate that the methods used by their own country to combat terrorism following the events of September 11 would be subjected to severe criticism. American citizens had been an ocean away from being affected by republican terrorism and seemingly light years away from grasping the impact it had on Northern Ireland's law-abiding citizens who simply wished to live in peace. But the dangers of Islamic terrorism immediately altered US attitudes. How, then, ought the US response to terrorism be evaluated? Shortly after the fall of Iraq the US military faced serious accusations of abusive and degrading treatment of detainees in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib. The emergence of shocking photos of prisoner maltreatment substantiated the claims (Hersh 2004). The photographic evidence was a source of embarrassment to the US government and discredited its military. While some terrorist suspects may have been roughed up during interrogation in Northern Ireland there was no parallel to the degrading abuses of Abu Ghraib.

The internment of terrorist suspects was introduced by the Northern Ireland government in 1971 and continued by the British government until 1975. Edward Kennedy (1973) was outraged at the imprisonment of suspects without trial and considered it a travesty of British justice. That internment was an attempt to combat the rise of IRA violence, which was provoking a violent response from the loyalist community (the Ulster Defence Association was formed in 1971), was not taken into account. Yet, when faced with a similar threat following September 11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq—spiralling violence, terrorist suspects hiding within a population group, lack of evidence to secure convictions—the US wasted no time in responding with Guantanamo Bay where those deemed a threat to US security would be detained without that which so irritated Kennedy viz. a trial. Associated with the US counter-terrorist response are terms such as waterboarding, extraordinary

rendition, and targeted killings. Supporters of these methods consider them necessary instruments in the War on Terror. It would seem that September 11 has brought the US to a peculiar juncture in its approach to countering terrorism. As a liberal democracy it finds itself confronting uncomfortable debates and tolerating awkward policies which the dangers of terrorism has rendered unavoidable. It has motivated what Richard Wolin (2002) refers to as the 'self-hating' and 'self-flagellating' American Left whose recurring nightmares of the Vietnam War have not ended. Of course, the Left's liberal sensitivities are easily pricked but it has the luxury of not having the duty to keep citizens safe in the real world. This is the world where exist the lethal dangers of bombs, guns, knives and vehicles driven with homicidal intent. Similar to the US government, the unionist government until 1972 and the British government thereafter was motivated by the same impulse to protect its citizens from terrorism. When evaluating the role of the US during the Northern Ireland conflict and in the light of American responses to combating terrorism since September 11 the following would seem to be worthwhile advice: a country ought to tread carefully in its criticism of a neighbour's counter-terrorist policies if, unlike its neighbour, it does not have to deal with a terrorist threat.

Henry Patterson (2012, 2013a, b) has researched the security dimension during the Troubles with regards to the role of Northern Ireland's border with the Republic commenting that without the 'strategic advantage given them by the border and Irish territory, it is doubtful if the IRA could have maintained their campaign at such a level for so long' (Patterson 2013a, p. 512). The British, Patterson (2012, p. 233) notes, 'remained perturbed by the threat to their security interests in Northern Ireland posed by the permeability of the border' which could not be remedied on a unilateral basis. Patterson's work highlights how the adoption of poor counter-terrorist polices on the part of a bordering state can frustrate the robust efforts of its neighbour.

Inadequate counter-terrorist policies or a half-hearted approach to the implementation of security measures can facilitate a terrorist group in a variety of ways. In the absence of a concerted and serious attempt to disrupt a terrorist network operating on its soil it is possible for terrorists to create training camps, import and then store weapons and explosives, plan and conduct cross-border attacks, and even regroup if the security forces in Northern Ireland are closing in. A similar, but less pronounced, situation pertained between Spain and France during the violent

campaign waged by ETA in the pursuit of Basque independence. Like
Northern Ireland and the Republic they also shared a border. ETA oper-
atives exploited French territory to stash weapons and escape from the
Spanish authorities. However, a change in French attitudes amounted
to agreement between both states in 1984 which altered ETA's for-
tunes (Jebb et al. 2006). Members of the organisation now found them-
selves being extradited to Spain thus ending the use of French territory
as a sanctuary of sorts (Harrison 1994). France's adoption of a firmer
counter-terrorist policy damaged ETA organisationally and restricted its
operational capacity, thus assisting the security efforts of its European
neighbour. In contrast, the Republic's interpretation of IRA violence as
political in nature created a legal loophole which aided terrorists escape
extradition. Timothy Duffy (1991, p. 312) uses the example of the
Republic's response to the extradition warrant which had been issued for
Dermot Finucane saying that the political offence clause enabled a 'con-
victed IRA terrorist … to walk away scot-free.' To those frustrated by
such decisions, the Republic was perceived as a place of refuge for terror-
ists. This perception was reinforced by the dismissal of Fianna Fail cabi-
net ministers Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey in 1970 for the part it is
alleged they played in a scandal which implicated them in the supply of
arms to the IRA in 1969 (RTE Archives). Martin Dillon (1990) devotes
a chapter of his book to this topic under the title 'Hidden Agenda' which
raises uncomfortable questions about the relationship between senior
politicians in the Republic and the IRA.

The reflections of Eamon Collins (1997) are enlightening and illus-
trate the usefulness of the territory of the Republic of Ireland to the
IRA's campaign. He frequently discusses the town of Dundalk in the
Republic which republicans had nicknamed El Paso. Collins accounts for
his many travels to the place on terrorist business including the planning
of operations and transporting weapons. Amongst his many comments
are those which refer to a fellow IRA man who was on the run and living
safely in Dundalk, and, reinforcing the British and unionist perception of
the town functioning as a safe haven for terrorists says: 'Rarely a weekend
passed in Dundalk without some sort of party for republicans' (Collins
1997, p. 165). Judging by Collins, Dundalk did not seem to be a place
where the Republic's security forces were dedicated to disrupting terror-
ist organisational structure.

Daniel Byman (2005) creates an interesting theoretical context
within which to assess the role of the US and Republic of Ireland in the

Northern Ireland conflict. Choosing to title his article 'Passive Sponsors of Terrorism', he argues that while 'Open and active state sponsorship of terrorism is blessedly rare' there are other, more subtle, ways a terrorist group can benefit from a state:

> this lack of open support does not necessarily diminish the important role that states play in fostering or hindering terrorism. At times, the greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorist's cause is by not acting. A border not policed, a blind eye turned to fundraising, or even the toleration of recruitment all help terrorists build their organisations, conduct operations and survive. (Byman 2005, p. 117)

Byman discusses the ambivalent attitude of the US government towards American support for the IRA and the political inertia which existed in addressing the problem until the mid-1970s. It was difficult for Ronald Reagan to project internationally an image of the US as tough on terrorism in the light of the country's political and practical usefulness to the IRA. Using the idea of a country being 'selective in its condemnation of terrorists' and applying a 'more permissive standard' to one group than it does to another, Alan Dershowitz (2002, p. 8), argues that some 'Irish Americans have assisted Catholic terrorists in Northern Ireland, while some have quietly admired their actions.'

That the concept of state-level passive support for terrorism deserves greater academic attention is suggested by the intriguing position adopted by the US and Republic of Ireland. This might be considered all the more pressing given that the events of September 11 (and a host of subsequent lethal attacks) have finally given terrorism a bad name in the US and beyond. Certainly, if a future truth commission was charged with conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation into all aspects of the Northern Ireland conflict the role of both states could not be ignored.

When RUC participants were asked if the Republic of Ireland and the US could have done more to assist in the battle against terrorism they invariably replied 'yes'. The US could have made a greater effort much earlier to interrupt the networks which supplied weapons to the IRA as well as support British extradition warrants. While officers recognised the assistance afforded by individual Gardai to the efforts they and the British army were making in border areas, they argued that the problem was a lack of political will to introduce tougher measures. Yet,

the Republic demonstrated how it was possible to deploy its police in order to enhance border security in response to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001. The Republic's Defence Minister, Michael Smyth, was critical of the measures Northern Ireland had adopted to contain the spread of the disease and said the 'regulations we have in force here seem to be much more rigorous and vigilant than those in [Northern Ireland]'. He continued: 'It is not our business to interfere, but this is an island matter. This disease has no respect for borders of any kind' (BBC 2001). Perhaps a jaundiced eye for irony might have pointed out that terrorists did not respect the border either and 'respect' was not encouraged because a stringent counter-terrorist policy by the Republic had not been adopted. The report, which covered the Minister's dismay did, however, state that 'Gardai carrying out checks at the border have been joined by more than 1,000 Irish soldiers from Dublin and existing border posts.' Why, unionists might ask, was the Republic's military not deployed in such numbers during the Troubles in order to complement the efforts being made in Northern Ireland? Given that the Republic's police were unarmed and the government did not wish to see it militarised, a sizeable support of its army in the kind of numbers mentioned above would have strengthened border security.

Ethnic terrorism in Northern Ireland had an ugly side, namely, sectarianism. Sectarianism adds a layer of destructive depth to a terrorist campaign. It makes it less troublesome to attack members of another ethnic community and helps create more 'legitimate' targets. For example, Protestant workmen are fit to be killed as was the case in 1992 when the IRA murdered eight men of this religion at Teebane simply because they were making repairs to an army base. Or, as happened in 1991, a businessman like John Haldane can be killed because his firm provides materials to the security forces. To these could be added: Tullyvallen Orange Hall (5 Protestants); Kingsmill massacre (10 Protestants); La Mon hotel (12 Protestants); Enniskillen (11 Protestants); and Shankill Road (9 Protestants). Robert White (1997, p. 28) states that individual republicans acknowledge there 'has been a sectarian element to the IRA—they do not deny events like the killing of the Protestant workers at Kingsmills—but they argue that sectarianism emanates primarily from the Protestant community.' Steve Bruce (1997) rejects White's non-sectarian thesis and plausibly argues that at their respective cores

republicanism and loyalism were equally sectarian. Sectarianism clearly featured in Eamon Collins (1997) discussion of the IRA gunman who operated in the gang to which he also belonged commenting that his 'hatred of unionists disguised his gut sectarianism' (Collins 1997, p. 129). The author refers to the anguish the gunman felt when it was discovered that faulty targeting had resulted in him killing an innocent Roman Catholic. However, Collins grew tired of the fellow's lamentations because no remorse was shown when he had murdered an ex-UDR soldier whom Collins did not consider a legitimate target. His reflections on the killer's very different reactions to both deaths caused him to ask: 'Did the fact that Hanna [murdered UDR man] was a Protestant make his death more acceptable?' (Collins 1997, p. 182). Collins's book provides an invaluable insight into the IRA and the source will be drawn upon a number of times in this analysis.

The theme of sectarianism is discernable in the 1983 documentary *Coming of Age in Belfast* in which unscripted comments provide us with a rare glimpse of the outlook of an IRA foot soldier. They expose an ugly sectarianism but the discussion between the interviewer and the participant develops in a way that reveals the correspondence between ideological conviction and terrorist targeting. The potential ruthlessness of the terrorist's perspective draws our attention to the challenges the security forces confronted as republican ideology was capable of breeding a fundamentalist-like mind-set that lacked critical reflection. The individual in question is presented as someone who has served in the IRA and been imprisoned. The individual (henceforth participant) admitted to having carried out a non-fatal shooting and was asked a number of questions related to his admission. The interview proceeded as follows:

Interviewer: 'Would you like to [kill someone]?'
Participant: 'I would: Brits, peelers [RUC officers], UDA, UDR, Protestants if I have to; I would kill Protestants.'
Interviewer: 'and it wouldn't matter what their lives are all about?'
Participant: 'No, they're against the people, they're against the IRA, they shouldn't be here; the best place for them is under the ground.'

The interviewer probed the topic with the participant and did so by presenting him with a hypothetical situation to gauge his response:

Interviewer:	'If, when you were in the IRA, if you were told to go down and plant a bomb in the emergency room … at the hospital would you do it?'
Participant:	'Yes, it would be done. I would put a bomb anywhere … yes, if I was told to do it I would do it.'
Interviewer:	'Now a bomb doesn't know the difference between a Catholic and a Protestant, how do you accept that?'
Participant:	'It's just a war on; it's just like any war, there's a war on, civilians have to get injured. It can't be helped.'

This is a harrowing sectarian rationalisation for the killing of Protestants if the participant deemed it necessary to do so. It is disturbing to think that when presented with the hypothetical targeting of the emergency room of a hospital the participant did not consider it morally out of bounds. Terrorist attacks perpetrated against hospitals are not unknown and have occurred in a number of countries throughout the world (Ganor and Wernli 2013). The IRA did not directly attack a civilian hospital during the conflict but it is important to note that in 1991 the organisation did bomb the military wing of Musgrave Park hospital causing considerable damage to its civilian wing. Two soldiers were killed and a number of others injured. However, the bombing not only resulted in military personnel being affected as the injured included 'a 5-year-old girl, who was badly burned' (*Los Angeles Times* 1991). Alexander MacLeod (1991) comments that the bomb was placed in an 'underground corridor near officers' quarters, but immediately adjoining a children's ward. Children as young as 14 months were caught in the blast, only yards from where the 20lb. Semtex bomb was planted.'

As Bruce (1997) mentions, the IRA often placed bombs in Protestant areas which C. J. M. Drake (1998, p. 69) comments 'show a high degree of disdain for the importance of the lives and livelihoods of ordinary Protestants.' These areas need to be conceived of as ethnic targets. Everyone in Northern Ireland was keenly aware of ethnic territory and so the bombers knew that an explosion in a certain area would cause disproportionate damage to Protestant interests. These facts lead one to the disturbing conclusion that there was a kind of insurance policy that accompanied the reality of ethnic territoriality and the IRA bombing campaign: if civilians happened to be killed in some of these explosions then it would be more likely that the fatalities would be Protestant and not Roman Catholic. The IRA's bombing of the Protestant town of Coleraine in June 1973 illustrates the point: 6 Protestants were killed.

Two of the victims were aged 60, one aged 70, two aged 72 and the oldest 76. Many more were left seriously injured. The attack could have inflicted worse devastation had the bomb detonated 15 minutes later when girls from a local high school would have been walking home (*Coleraine Times* 2008).

Sectarianism breeds an intolerance that expands the scope of terrorist operations and functions as a psychological safeguard against feeling remorse either for one's own actions or the killings committed by the organisation to which one belongs. Had the IRA been responsible for killing 6 elderly members of its own community the organisation's image would have been extensively damaged. The organisation regarded it imperative to maintain the support of its community which would have been threatened had it been responsible for the deaths of innocent Roman Catholics. The IRA was not dependent upon the support of the Protestant community to continue its campaign and this played a strategic part in the targeting calculations of the organisation. Hence, when deciding where to place a car bomb, the possibility of it causing fatalities amongst Protestant civilians (as was the case in the 1973 Coleraine bombing) was not subject to the same strategic restraints. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca's (2007) comparative analysis of ETA and the IRA would have been even better had this point been discussed. He argues that terrorist organisations calculate that in order to maintain the support of the more moderate elements in their communities they 'have to limit their potential offensive capacity and, accordingly, their tactics in the war of attrition will not be as violent as they could be' (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007, p. 301). This is correct but needs to be modified: it should be recognised that in bitter ethnic conflicts the possibility of harming innocent members of another ethnic group has a reduced influence when it comes to operational constraints or limitations. It is a shameful feature of ethnic terrorism that, for emotional or, indeed, pragmatic reasons, a hierarchy of value would seem to be attached to the deaths of innocent civilians both young and old. Of course, if the intention of the IRA in attacking Coleraine had only been to inflict an economic wound *without* endangering civilians, why not bomb the town during the night when the streets were clear of shoppers? The reason the IRA used incendiary devices which were timed to ignite during the night was less to prevent harm to individuals than it was to maximise the opportunity to cause more damage—less people around to detect the fire and notify the fire service and police. The question of why the IRA

did not use car bombs to destroy the centre of a town in the middle of the night can be asked in relation to one of the worst atrocities of the conflict, namely, the bombing in 1978 of the La Mon House Hotel. Why did the IRA not decide to bomb the La Mon when the premises had closed and not packed with patrons? 12 Protestants were practically incinerated due to the composition of the bomb. In relation to this bombing Kirk Simpson (2008) comments:

> During my extensive research with unionists and their attitudes to dealing with the past, the La Mon bombing has often emerged as 'proof' for sections of the unionist community that the Provisional IRA (PIRA) perpetrated a sectarian campaign of violence, and not an anti-colonial war as republicans have subsequently claimed. On an evening on which members of an Irish Collie Dogs Club were gathering for their annual dinner dance, the PIRA planted a devastating napalm-type explosive at the hotel.

The fact that IRA atrocities which claimed civilian lives were geographically widespread in their occurrence means that there was not a rogue brigade area that was inordinately vicious and upon which blame can be placed. This encourages us to focus attention on the organisation as a whole and the ideology which underpinned its operational tactics rather than its various units. Within the context of human rights, these attacks suggest that the lives of Protestant civilians did not count to the point that the possibility of injuring or killing them (as these attacks confirm) precluded this kind of targeting. In his masterful analysis of just and unjust warfare, leading ethicist of conflict, Michael Walzer (1977, p. 203), addresses IRA attacks arguing that 'contemporary terrorist campaigns are most often focused on people whose national existence has been radically devalued: the Protestants of Northern Ireland, the Jews of Israel and so on. The campaign announces the devaluation.' The Coleraine attack (and others) equates with Walzer's analysis.

Basically, the ethical case for using violence was one that terrorists in Northern Ireland could not make and therefore they chose to ignore it. This was especially so when the storm of the early 1970s had died down and the IRA settled into its 'long war' strategy. Firstly, the organisation was neither able to mobilise the nationalist people in Northern Ireland in mass insurrection nor rally to its cause the citizenry in the Republic of Ireland. This did not mean that a shared ethnic identity did not at times surface for we have observed this connection in the electoral

success of Bobby Sands (Sinn Fein repeated this success in 1983 when Gerry Adams won the parliamentary seat of West Belfast). Neither is it to suggest that the IRA did not have a sizeable level of support especially in republican strongholds, as some scholars argue that a factor in the 'intractability of the conflict' was support for 'paramilitary activity among the civilian population' (Hayes and McAllister 2005, p. 599). The awkwardness, as Richard English (2009) explains, in the relationship between the nationalist community and IRA violence, was caused by an eschewal of republicans' murderous campaign but at the same time experiencing the resonance of the IRA's main goal of national self-determination. However, in the main, the nationalist community of Northern Ireland chose to support the SDLP during the Troubles and not Sinn Fein leaving the latter unable to claim that it was the political representative of the nationalist people. Sinn Fein's marginal claim to representativeness undermined the morality of IRA violence inviting the question: in whose name was the violence carried out?

Secondly, and drawing upon Igor Primoratz' (1997) critique of the consequentialist perspective on terrorism, the IRA (and to a lesser degree smaller republican groups) could not demonstrate that terrorist violence would achieve the nationalist goal being pursued. There was no sign of the Protestant community going weak at the knees and succumbing either to actual terrorist violence or the threat of it. Unionist leaders were not requested by their constituents to negotiate with terrorists in order to improve their security. In fact the opposite was the case: tougher security measures were demanded. In terms of the psychological impact of terrorism, this is what Nehemia Friedland and Ariel Merari (1985) refer to as the double-edged sword effect viz. the attitudes in a target community harden in the face of attacks and it becomes more resistant to the goals terrorists are pursuing. In a similar vein, the relationship between exposure to terrorism and the emergence of exclusionary political attitudes has been identified in more recent research (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009). Further, if the IRA's onslaught in 1972 did not break the security forces or cause the British government's constitutional commitment to Northern Ireland to wilt, the reduced violence of the late 1970s and thereafter was less likely to have this effect. So, in the light of this, why was terrorist violence continued?

Thirdly, the IRA was unable to convince anyone but their most diehard followers that terrorism was the *only* instrument by which its goals could be achieved. In contrast, the majority of the nationalist community

voted for the SDLP and its constitutional approach to political change but the IRA chose to shun the exclusive use of politics. The decision to do so further undermined the notion that the organisation's violence had a basis in morality. Northern Ireland was not apartheid South Africa where the black majority was depoliticised; from 1971 an organised and goal-directed SDLP offered a non-violent alternative to terrorism and street violence. In a comparative analysis of both societies Padraig O'Mally (2000, p. 386) argues that the IRA lacked the moral credibility of the African National Congress's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe:

> The IRA, on the other hand, was not fighting a war of national liberation, did not enjoy widespread support in Northern Ireland and next to none in the South. At best, the IRA represented a minority (of nationalists) of a minority (republicans) of a minority (physical force hard-liners) in Northern Ireland, and was even more unrepresentative of the South's political proclivities. So while the ANC met the criteria for a just war, the IRA did not, and the IRA used innumerable occasions to employ unjust means in the pursuit of its unjust war.

O'Mally's grip on this point is solid and his analysis strips from IRA violence any claim to moral legitimacy.

The history of the Troubles is littered with the injury or death of men, women and children but the terrorist machinery continued to function and produce victims. During the course of thirty years, terrorists demonstrated their capacity morally to disengage (Bandura 2004) when it came to perpetrating extreme violence. Ideological conviction was effective in immunising terrorists against feelings of guilt: it helped minimise self-blame by providing the individual with a set of grievance-based ideas by which the need for violence was justified (if atrocities occurred these could be ideologically written off as regrettable aspects of conflict). So too was there a displacement of individual responsibility for causing harm as organisations like the IRA (or some other terrorist group) claimed responsibility for a lethal shooting or bombing incident. Membership of the organisation helped disperse the emotional pressure felt by the individual.

Roman Catholic Recruitment

Debate exists about the reasons for the low number of Roman Catholic RUC officers. On the one hand, the RUC is considered to be an organisation whose institutional ethos was alien to Roman Catholics and

therefore few wanted to join it. On the other hand, the threat of being especially targeted by the IRA for a traitorous ethnic act is thought to explain the lack of recruitment amongst Roman Catholics. This is a complex topic which concerns issues to do with cultural identity but also a genuine sense of fear. However, statistics made available to the author by the PSNI on Protestant/Roman Catholic recruitment to the RUC from 1990 to 1998 help inform the debate. The statistical information covered the last intake to the RUC before its incorporation into the PSNI. Most relevant to the inquiry are the number of applicants from both communities in 1998. In that year there were two intakes. The first recruitment drive occurred from 16 March to 9 April with advertisements placed in a number of media outlets and was shortly *before* Sinn Fein signed the GFA which committed the IRA to non-violence. In response to this recruitment campaign the RUC received 431 applications from members of the Roman Catholic community and 2134 Protestant applicants. The second period of recruitment for that year was advertised from 30 November to 17 December—seven months *after* the Agreement. Interestingly, whilst the figure for Protestant applicants increases slightly to 2312 which equates to an 8% rise, the number of Roman Catholic applicants jumps to 750.[8] This is a huge increase of 74% in applications from members of this community. There are two key observations to be made when attempting to interpret the increase in Roman Catholics wishing to join the RUC. Firstly, these applicants were applying to join the RUC and not the PSNI. The review of policing conducted by Chris Patten did not begin its work until the following year when it also announced its recommendations for reform. So, these potential recruits were not applying to join a police force whose structure, symbolism and recruitment policy had been altered. Secondly, the sharp increase in the number of Roman Catholic applicants is not likely to be explicable in terms of a softening of ideological attitudes within the republican community (which would seep out into the wider nationalist community) as Sinn Fein did not support policing and justice structures in Northern Ireland until 2007. Rather, the party had maintained a degree of hostility towards policing. Its decision to adopt a different attitude (BBC 2007) was pragmatic in character and a *sine qua non* to the restoration of devolved government in partnership with the Democratic

---

[8] Figures provided by the PSNI, 7 December 2016.

Unionist Party. Against this background, it is more likely that the considerable increase in Roman Catholic applicants reflects the fact that the terrorist threat had ended (although carried on by a small group of republican dissidents whose operational ability to kill and injure police officers was significantly reduced).

The IRA was keen to kill Roman Catholic officers in order to discourage others from joining. This served the republican movement's propaganda machine. The existence of a small percentage of Roman Catholic officers allowed Sinn Fein to assert that this was due to the RUC being a sectarian force. A former RUC Chief Superintendent, Brian McCargo (2001) reflects upon his experiences as a Roman Catholic officer and comments: 'It's true that if you get points for killing a police officer, you get double points for killing a Catholic police officer.' Compared to their Protestant counterparts, Roman Catholic officers encountered additional challenges when they joined the police (although these challenges were reduced for officers who had been raised in predominantly unionist areas such as North Down). For those officers who had been raised in nationalist or republican parts of the province and whose families still lived in such places the threat of being attacked by terrorists made family visitations very difficult.

The IRA planned attacks but they were also opportunistic. Hence, had an officer been spotted visiting his family by a member of the IRA or one if its sympathisers, it did not require much time to arrange a low-tech gun attack. Having off-duty RUC officers visit family in republican areas was an affront to the IRA. It challenged the ideological integrity of physical space which militant republicanism had sought to turn into 'no go' areas for the security forces whether on or off duty. Formerly, republican 'no go' areas ended with Operation Motorman in 1972 (Sanders 2013) and was an example of the willingness of the British government to engage with the IRA in terms of a hard power counter-terrorist strategy. But hard-line areas more or less continued to be 'no-go' when considered from an off-duty security perspective and because of familial connections this had a greater impact on Roman Catholic officers. Having said that, Protestant officers whose families lived in religiously mixed areas where terrorist activity was high had to take precautions during home visits. In many cases this meant less frequent visits home than a male or female officer may have liked. After all, terrorists were in the business of gathering intelligence on their local areas and this was passed on to other IRA brigade areas. In relatively small rural communities,

terrorists often possessed knowledge of the homes where a son or daughter, while not living there, was a member of the security forces who at some point would likely visit home. Accordingly, terrorists could take note of the distinguishing details of cars visiting a house when they are 'innocuously' driving past, cycling, jogging, or perhaps walking a dog. This brief period of intelligence gathering might well constitute the initial step in planning an attack. Time is on the side of the terrorist and information as to the coming and going of vehicles in a local area is not difficult to monitor especially if there are sufficient numbers of terrorists supported by a cadre of sympathisers. In small communities unknown vehicles standout and a description of the driver and the car is easily recorded.

The possible presence of off-duty officers in a hard-line republican area would have compromised the operational capabilities of the IRA. Also, having RUC officers in Roman Catholic family networks posed a threat to republicans in that officers were in a position to relay to RUC Special Branch any information likely to be of use in combating terrorism. The threat of being killed by the IRA and the burdensome security considerations which attended a family visit served to discourage Roman Catholics joining the police. The threat of one's family being treated as a social pariah because one of its members belonged to the security forces was an off-putting factor too. But these were not the only factors involved. Joanne Murphy (2013) acknowledges the real dangers which Roman Catholic officers faced but argues that widespread animosity for the RUC in the nationalist community was a more important factor in explaining the low number of Roman Catholic officers. She points to the SDLP's Deputy Leader, Seamus Mallon, who adopted a critical attitude towards the RUC. Mallon regarded the force as malignantly unionist in its culture and outlook which was unappealing to members of the nationalist community. As the voice of moderate nationalism, the SDLP's approach did little to encourage young Roman Catholics to become police officers. However, the notion that the low numbers of Roman Catholic officers was due to, as it were, an institutional or cultural sectarianism, has been rejected by Michael Gove (2000). Now a senior member of the Conservative party and cabinet minister, Gove then claimed the reason was due both to the direct threat of assassination by the IRA as well as the SDLP's unhelpful approach for which he blamed Party Leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner, John Hume. While the refusal of the SDLP wholeheartedly to support the RUC is undoubtedly part of

the explanation for the low number of Roman Catholic officers (Ryder 1986), the recruitment statistics quoted above suggest that concerns about personal security also need to be considered. The statistics indicate that when the terrorist threat was removed (or at least significantly reduced) following the signing of the GFA, many more members of the Roman Catholic community were prepared to come forward to join the RUC.

The facets of ethnic terrorism that have been explored in this section provide us with some idea of the counter-terrorist challenges the RUC confronted. The threats which officers experienced when they were on duty will be discussed in the next chapter.

References

Addison, M. (2002). *Violent Politics: Strategies of Internal Conflict*. New York: Palgrave.

Bandura, A. (2004). The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. In F. Moghaddam & A. Marsella (Eds.), *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions* (pp. 121–150). Washington: American Psychological Association.

BBC. (2001). *Irish Criticise NI Border Controls*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1200374.stm.

BBC. (2007). *Sinn Fein Votes to Support Police*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6308175.stm.

BBC. (2016). *RUC Memorial Plaque: Stephen Martin Admits' Mistakes Were Made*. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-35724317.

Bew, P., Gibbon, P., & Patterson, H. (1979). *The State in Northern Ireland 1921–72: Political Forces and Social Classes*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bruce, S. (1997). Victim Selection in Ethnic Conflict: Motives and Attitudes in Irish Republicanism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(1), 56–71.

Byman, D. (1998). The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21*(2), 149–169.

Byman, D. (2005). Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. *Survival, 47*(4), 117–144.

Cameron Report. (1969). *Disturbances in Northern Ireland*. Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Canetti-Nisim, D., Eran Halperin, E., Sharvit, K., & Hobfoll, S. (2009). A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53*(3), 363–389.

Coleraine Times. (2008). Forgotten massacre. Available from http://www.cole-rainetimes.co.uk/news/forgotten-massacre-1-1969928.

Collins, E. (1997). *Killing Rage*. London: Granta Publications.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics, 13*(4), 379–399.

Dershowitz, A. (2002). *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dillon, M. (1990). *The Dirty War*. London: Arrow Books.

Dingley, J. (1998). A Reply to White's Non-sectarian Thesis of PIRA Targeting. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(2), 106–117.

Dingley, J. (2012). *The IRA*. Oxford: Praeger.

Drake, C. (1998). The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(2), 53–85.

Duffy, T. (1991). The Law v. the IRA: The Effect of Extradition Between the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the United States in Combatting the IRA. *Penn State International Law Review, 9*(2), 293–337.

Duffy, J. (2001). *Rich Friends in New York*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1563119.stm.

Ellison, G., & Smyth, J. (2000). *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland*. London: Pluto Press.

English, R. (2009). *Terrorism: How to Respond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finnegan, R. (2002). Irish-American Relations. In W. Crotty & D. Schmitt (Eds.), *Ireland on the World Stage* (pp. 95–110). London: Routledge.

Friedland, N., & Merari, A. (1985). The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword. *Political Psychology, 6*(4), 591–604.

Ganor, B., & Wernli, M. (2013, October). *Terrorist Attacks Against Hospitals: Case Studies* (Working Paper 25).

Gocke, B. (1945). Morale in a Police Department. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 36*(3), 215–219.

Gove, M. (2000). *The Price of Peace: An Analysis of British Policy in Northern Ireland, Centre for Policy Studies*. London: Chameleon Press.

Guelke, A. (1996). The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. *International Affairs, 72*(3), 521–536.

Harrison, M. (1994). France and International Terrorism: Problem and Response. In D. Charters (Ed.), *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism* (pp. 103–136). London: Greenwood Press.

Hayes, B., & McAllister, I. (2005). Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 17*(4), 599–617.

Hennessey, T. (2005). *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

Hersh, S. (2004, May 10). Torture at Abu Ghraib. *The New Yorker*. Available from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib.

Hewitt, C. (1981). Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the Civil Rights Period: A Reconsideration. *The British Journal of Sociology, 32*(3), 362–380.

Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. (1995). *Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jebb, C., Liotta, P., Sherlock, T., & Beitler, R. (2006). *The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism*. London: Praeger.

Kennedy, E. (1973). Ulster is an International Issue. *Foreign Policy*, (11), 57–71.

Kusch, F. (2004). *Battleground Chicago: The Police and the 1968 Democratic National Convention*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Los Angeles Times. (1991, November 3). IRA Bomb at Belfast Hospital Kills 2 Injures 10. Available from http://articles.latimes.com/1991–11-03/news/mn-1584_1_hospital-kills-bomb.

Lowe, W. (2002). The War Against the R.I.C: 1919–21. *Eire-Ireland, 37*(3–4), 79–117.

MacLeod, A. (1991, November 6). British Grapple with IRA Move to Target Hospitals. *Christian Science Monitor*. Available from https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1106/06062.html.

Matchett, W. (2016). *Secret Victory: The Intelligence War That Beat the IRA*. Lisburn: Hiskey Ltd.

McCargo, B. (2001). No Regrets as a Catholic in the RUC. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1634688.stm.

McGrattan, C. (2015). The Stormont House Agreement and the New Politics of Storytelling in Northern Ireland. *Parliamentary Affairs, 69*(4), 928–946.

Monaghan, R. (2004). "An Imperfect Peace": Paramilitary "Punishments" in Northern Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 16*(3), 439–461.

Murphy, S. (1993). 'I Don't Support the Ira but…' Semantic and Psychological Ambivalence. *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 82*(327), 276–286.

Murphy, J. (2013). *Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

News Letter. (2016). Declassified Files: Black Taxi Terror Links Halted Public Transport Privatisation. Available from https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/declassified-files-black-taxi-terror-links-halted-public-transport-privatisation-1-7142169.

O'Callaghan, M., & O'Donnell, C. (2006). The Northern Ireland Government, the 'Paisleyite Movement' and Ulster Unionism in 1966. *Irish Political Studies, 21*(2), 203–222.

O'Mally, P. (2000). Northern Ireland and South Africa: Conflicts Without End, Guns Beyond Use. *Fortnight*, 386, 1–18.

Ophuls, M. (1972). *A Sense of Loss*. Switzerland: Cinema X, Societe Suisse de Television.

Patterson, H. (2012). The Border Security Problem and Anglo-Irish Relations 1970–1973. *Contemporary British History, 26*(2), 231–251.

Patterson, H. (2013a). The Provisional IRA, the Border, and Anglo-Irish relations During the Troubles. *Small Wars and Insurgencies, 24*(3), 493–517.

Patterson, H. (2013b). *Ireland's Violence Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations During the Troubles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Primoratz, I. (1997). The Morality of Terrorism. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14*(3), 221–233.

Prince, S. (2007). *Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

Prince, S. (2012). 5 October 1968 and the Beginning of the Troubles: Flashpoints, Riots and Memory. *Irish Political Studies, 27*(3), 394–410.

Richey, W. (1985, January 14). On the Trail of US Funds for IRA. *Christian Science Monitor*. Available from https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0114/anor1.html.

Ryder, C. (1986). Sir John and His Men: Tensions in a Critical Year. *Fortnight*, (234), 6–7.

Ryder, C. (2000). *The RUC 1922–2000: A Force Under Fire*. London: Arrow.

Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2007). The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 19*(3), 289–306.

Sanders, A. (2013). Operation Motorman (1972) and the Search for a Coherent British Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24*(3), 465–492.

Silke, A. (2016). Ferocious Times: The IRA, the RIC, and Britain's Failure in 1919–1921. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 28*(3), 417–434.

Simpson, K. (2008). *University of Ulster Human Rights Researcher Dr. Kirk Simpson Looks at Unionists and Their Perceptions of the La Mon Bombing*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/university-of-ulster-human-rights-researcher-dr-kirk-simpson-looks-at-unionists-and-their-perceptions-of-the-la-mon-bombing-1-1864407.

Spratt, M. (2008). When Police Dogs Attacked: Iconic News Photographs and Construction of History, Mythology, and Political Discourse. *American Journalism, 25*(2), 85–105.

Thompson, J. (2001). *American Policy and Northern Ireland: A Saga of Peacebuilding*. London: Praeger.

Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books.

White, R. (1997). The Irish Republican Army: An Assessment of Sectarianism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(1), 20–55.

White, R. (1998). Don't Confuse Me with the Facts: More on the Irish Republican Army and the Facts. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(4), 164–189.

Wolin, R. (2002). September 11 and the Self-Castigating Left. *South Central Review, 19*(2/3), 39–49.

Young, A., & Gray, D. (2011). Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and Its Application for the Future. *Global Security Studies, 2*(4), 65–76.

CHAPTER 3

The On-Duty Threat

Of the 300 officers who lost their lives during the Northern Ireland conflict approximately 71% were fatally wounded whilst on duty. Additionally, as Chapter 6 will discuss, the number of officers injured during the conflict ranges into the thousands with many sustaining serious injuries. Territoriality is a key concept for comprehending aspects of policing during the Troubles. It enables a distinction to be made between frontline stations which confronted a constant threat of terrorist attack and those that faced a considerably reduced threat. Accordingly, the territorial dimension to the dangers of patrolling can be understood in terms of anti-state areas posing a much greater threat to an officer's safety than pro-state areas. In other words, republican areas where the IRA or other republican groups operated were far more dangerous to patrol than loyalist areas. Yet it is not the case that pro-state areas presented no terrorist-related danger at all. Protestant paramilitary groups waged a violent campaign of pro-state terrorism (Bruce 1992, 1993) and therefore did not target members of the security forces, but the police interception of a fully armed loyalist hit squad which sought to avoid capture was a different matter. The murder of Constable Harron by the UDA in 1972 made this clear. Similarly, the deaths of Constables Victor Arbuckle in 1969 and Frank O'Reilly in 1998 illustrate the dangers of policing a riot situation in a loyalist area. Further, Part-Time Reserve Constable, Mildred Harrison lost her life in 1975 when she was fatally wounded in an explosion in the overwhelmingly Protestant town of Bangor. In this case, the UVF had targeted a Catholic-owned pub in

the town and the policewoman's death was not intended. However, the greatest threat to the security of officers existed in anti-state, republican areas.

Terrorist attacks took place in both urban and rural contexts and, although sharing the same threat, each presented different problems when it came to providing security. The urban terrorism of the Troubles was noticeably different from the more rural terrorist activity which attended the IRA's 1956–1962 campaign and presented particular challenges to the RUC (there were also differences in the violence of both rural campaigns). However, dealing with both kinds of attack demanded versatility on the part of the individual officer whose posting during a career may have included the cities of Belfast or Londonderry as well as a station located in a rural setting. Of course, policing in Northern Ireland was not all about counter-terrorism and thus different styles were required. The organisation had to ensure that its officers were trained to cope with civilian policing duties and others trained in specialist and militarised units whose purpose was to combat terrorism. Mark Urban (1992, p. 17) describes the challenge which the RUC confronted: 'The police faced the unenviable task of having to carry out ordinary duties such as regulating traffic, investigating petty crime or serving court summons while under lethal threat from the IRA.'

The RUC, as Ronald Weitzer (1985, p. 41) notes, has 'evolved over the past decade into a formidable, *militarized security force*.' This evolution was unavoidable as security developments reflected the nature and severity of the terrorist threat. A pertinent example of a more recent case of the militarisation of policing is post-September 11 New York and the introduction of Hercules teams by the city's former police commissioner, Ray Kelly. The unit has been described as an 'elite, heavily armed, semi-tactical police unit that appears out of thin air on a daily basis around the city' (French 2015). Their purpose is to disrupt terrorists' planning activities by appearing suddenly and unexpectedly at different locations. Their appearance is designed to intimidate terrorists and reassure the public that in the event of an attack it will be responded to swiftly and forcefully. A key difference between the militarised attire worn by members of the Hercules unit and RUC officers in the Divisional Mobile Support Unit (DMSU) and the more elite Headquarters Mobile Support Unit is the wearing of helmets rather than caps. The only occasion when RUC officers wore helmets was during riots. To have introduced on to the streets of Northern Ireland officers

in a brand of RUC helmet would have been a further step in the force's militarisation which the British government and RUC senior management preferred to resist for political reasons. A similar point can be made with regards to RUC Land Rovers In order to increase the protection of its occupants against rocket attack and drogue bombs, the sides of Land Rovers were armour plated. However, unlike army Land Rovers, the RUC's vehicles were not modified to facilitate the provision of top cover. Given that the army recognised the security benefits of having a soldier positioned—chest and head protruding from the top of the vehicle—in a way that afforded a 360 degree visual scouting of an area, arguably RUC patrols were less well protected. This would seem to be an unpleasant politics/security trade off which might have rendered an RUC vehicle a more attractive target for terrorists to attack. But it was a compromise that was consistent with the British government's criminalisation policy which attempted to depoliticise the conflict. This policy demanded that the RUC, supported by the military, combat terrorism in as normal a policing way as possible.

Terrorists struck by means of gun or bomb attack. The circumstances within which officers were attacked varied. They were targeted when on foot or mobile patrol. Officers were attacked when they were performing a normal beat or police duty, or when responding to an incident. Other fatal attacks took place when terrorists targeted a station by means of heavy duty weaponry, for example, rockets or mortars, or decided to use large roadside bombs or landmines against mobile patrols. There was a greater likelihood of a higher loss of life in bomb blasts: a 500 lb or 1000 lb landmine or roadside bomb has the capacity to destroy an armoured Land Rover or patrol car and kill its occupants, but the target remains a single vehicle and usually one carrying three to four officers. On two occasions four RUC officers were killed as a result of a static device detonating. The first attack took place in 1979 in the Bessbrook area when a passing RUC Land Rover was caught up in a massive explosion. The second occurred in Killeen in 1985 when a large roadside bomb concealed in a trailer exploded destroying an RUC patrol car and killing its four occupants. The attack has been connected with suspicions of IRA/Garda collusion (*News Letter* 2012). Alternatively, a mortar attack can be more lethal as evidenced in the IRA's mortaring of Newry RUC Station in 1985 when nine officers died. But while most fatal shootings involved one or two officers there were occasions when three officers lost their lives, for example, in Ardboe in 1977, and Newry

in 1986. These attacks indicated that terrorists were both prepared and capable of launching a gun attack on multiple officers. In the Ardboe case, officers were ambushed as terrorists opened fire at the back of their patrol car when it negotiated a turn in the road; in Newry, the policemen were gunned down whilst seated in their armoured car. Due to the heat of the day the vehicle's doors had been left ajar which enabled the attackers to haul them open.

Although some 'big' terrorist operations required careful planning and a degree of technical sophistication, others were more opportunistic in character and may have quickly been put in place in an attempt, say, to fire upon a vehicle checkpoint (VCP) or a foot patrol in or near to a republican area. The dangers of a snap VCP being set up in a militant republican district were highlighted in 1988 when Constable Clive Graham was fatally injured in a gun attack in the Creggan area of Londonderry (Toolis 1995). The use of VCPs will be discussed below. However, both the thoroughly planned and opportunistic type of attack were potentially lethal and required that officers not let down their guard. Of course, officers received training in terms of combating both urban and rural forms of terrorism but the organisation's approach to training its members developed over time. Creating a counter-terrorist skill set is itself a developmental process in that its increasing sophistication and effectiveness is, in part, a response to new challenges arising from the way terrorists conduct their operations. Whilst it is only by means of high grade intelligence that security forces can ultimately mount an effective counter-terrorist response (Kirk-Smith and Dingley 2009) there are lessons to be learned from each attack and added to a manual of best practice. As Georgina Sinclair (2012) points out, the RUC's (and PSNI's) experience of countering terrorism in conditions of ethnic conflict contains many lessons that have been exported internationally.

Officers benefited from short periods of training at an army base where they were exposed to simulated attacks in rural and urban settings. That the RUC responded to the need for a professional and well-trained force is recognised in the following comment:

> I think the organisation did the best it could. We're not the army. We all did regular training in both rural and urban patrolling. You went to Ballykinler and I remember distinctly going on several occasions as a section … and you stayed for a couple of days and you did whole scenarios

where you walked as a patrol around 'Tin Town' or drove around 'Tin Town' and then you did the rural element where you went out in the country … and they trained you in how to react in the event of attacks. So I think they did try really hard to train you as well as they could … to deal with all situations. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

'Tin Town' is a model town approximating real life proportions in Ballykinler army base which is situated in the South Down area. The 'Town' is designed to make urban training sessions as life-like as possible and the mock attacks are useful in illustrating the difficulty of combating urban forms of terrorism. The Camp's ranging countryside is obviously perfect for the provision of training in tackling rural forms of terrorism. This chapter considers the threat which officers encountered whilst on duty and explores their experiences. It also examines their counter-terrorist know-how and the measures they adopted in an attempt to thwart terrorist attacks.

The Urban Terrorist Threat

The challenges in combating urban terrorism have become evident in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq. For example, US soldiers became bogged down in Baghdad and struggled to adapt to a terrain which favoured the techniques used by their enemies (Carroll 2005). Neither were the dangers of the city restricted to being on patrol as military bases became prime targets (Craig and Wilson 2011). The security forces operating in some of Northern Ireland's urban centres confronted a threat that was the same in character, albeit not in the regularity of its intensity, to those experienced by troops in Baghdad. The added danger which RUC officers confronted was that of being approached from behind and shot dead at point-blank range. This happened on more than one occasion when a couple of officers walking the beat were gunned down.

The high number of RUC officers who were killed in urban contexts makes clear the dangers associated with policing this kind of environment. In terms of fatalities, Belfast was the most dangerous place to be stationed. However, as John Brewer (1990, p. 658) discusses, 'political violence occurs unevenly across the province…. The area of Belfast where the research was based … is not a high risk area.' Parts of Londonderry were considered high risk and the threat level was significant in places like Newry, Lurgan and Armagh. However, the IRA struck

in places where there had been little history of terrorism and thus the apparent safety of an area could suddenly have been shattered with lethal consequences.

Urban terrorism benefits from the characteristics of built-up areas wherein there are high levels of population (Marques 2003). As discussed in Chapter 2, if the possibility of endangering civilian life (especially the lives of Protestants in planned bombings) does not restrict the scope of terrorists then they can reap greater benefits from the urban terrain. The IRA's decision to explode 22 bombs in little over an hour in Belfast on 21 July 1972 demonstrated the length to which the organisation was prepared to go in waging its conflict in the city. Former First Minister of Northern Ireland, Peter Robinson (2012), points to the operational recklessness of the IRA on what has been named Bloody Friday making reference to the locations of the bombs: 'those responsible have yet to explain why bombs were placed in locations such as banks, bus stations, railway stations and in residential streets.' It is astonishing that only 9 people died in these attacks the youngest being Stephen Parker aged 14 whose father was a Protestant minister. The IRA's multiple attacks on Bloody Friday made it very difficult for the RUC to respond to the danger.

Patrolling in urban areas of high risk increased the unpredictability of police work. At the start of a patrol officers were uncertain as to what they may encounter. Uncertainty, of course, is experienced by officers elsewhere in the world but in the case of the RUC it was magnified by the terrorist threat. An officer said:

> You didn't know really when you went out on a patrol what you were going to face. Nine times out of ten the day was normal and you didn't face anything. On other occasions you could have come across explosions, colleagues being killed. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

High risk urban areas required army support to enable officers to discharge their duties. A policeman who served in Londonderry referred to his work with the army:

> I was in the mobile support unit and we did a lot of searches and we needed the army with us to give us cover – we did the searches and they provided us with cover, and, you know, the army did a brilliant job. You could not have operated without the army in those bad days … we needed

the army to help back us up. We needed the manpower and the RUC didn't have the manpower. All right, they built it up to about 13,000, but it still wasn't enough, they needed the army there, there's no doubt about it. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

In a place like Londonderry where officers were killed in gun and bomb attacks military support was necessary. House searches in a republican stronghold like the Bogside, the Creggan or Shantallow had to be well planned and carefully executed as they presented terrorists with an opportunity to strike. The involvement of the army in house searches provided security which allowed the police to attend to law enforcement duties as an officer pointed out: 'when you tried to investigate something you can't be watching your back and the army were highly useful for providing that' (East Antrim focus group 28 June 2011).

Urban settings provided the terrorist with multiple opportunities from which to launch a sniper attack at reasonably close range—street corners, alleyways, windows, doorways, behind garden walls—as well as provide cover whilst in retreat. An officer who was stationed in the small republican enclave of the Short Strand in East Belfast described the threat this way:

Take Mountpottinger, Short Strand, all the wee streets of houses, you could have been whacked [killed] at any time, whacked as in ambushed, killed and quite easily. There were that many streets they were open to any form of shooting attack and it could have been close quarter - over and done with very, very quickly. (Interview with officer 1, 29 June 2011)

Streets with rows of terraced housing greatly facilitate an escape route. It only requires that a terrorist secure access through three or four houses backing on to each other literally to be streets away from an incident in a very short space of time. This kind of spatial layout also assists the terrorist when it comes to passing the weapon on and ensuring that it is safely away from the firing point. Giving pursuit in this kind of context is fraught with problems as the firing point has first to be established and this is not easy where, for example, a shot may have been fired from a partially open window. If only a single shot has been fired this adds to the difficulty of locating the firing point. Although the adrenalin may be pumping following an attack, members of the security forces had to exercise caution when in pursuit in case they were being lured into an

ambush. Simply bashing down the door of a derelict house which had been used by a terrorist to fire on a patrol was to be avoided—the inside of the door may be booby trapped. This sort of security consideration understandably tempers what begins as a hot pursuit.

An RUC officer on foot patrol in a republican area in, for instance, West Belfast, would often be accompanied by around twelve soldiers. The patrol would be split into three groups with four soldiers in each. Two groups would have functioned as 'satellite' teams and provided security on both flanks of a central group which included the officer. At times a patrol of this kind would include more officers.

The urban terrain was used effectively by terrorists in a variety of ways. An officer discussed the control which terrorists were able to exert and the communal compliance they were able to extract. He referred to the mounting of attacks on the security forces in hard-line republican areas and the power of the IRA to ensure that residents left their doors unlocked in order to assist a fleeing gunman:

> They were controlled by terrorists to the point that they hadn't even got the freedom to close and lock their front door at night or their home would have been turned over and that comes from the snipping element … the community in [community's name] had to leave their doors open at night and this illuminates the risks in the city, right; they [IRA] do a snipe and they go and they've got a choice of going through any houses they want because the doors are open. Now, if one of those doors is closed, it doesn't take much to go next door but that house will be turned over for the door being closed and I have personal experience of that happening and the sadness of the family locking the door innocently - that wasn't accepted by the RA [IRA] and they came back to turn the family over - just rampaging the whole house. (Interview with officer 1, 29 June 2011)

The terrorists' utilisation of an urban environment in a way claimed by this officer would clearly present a serious challenge to patrolling.

Foot patrols in urban contexts were considered by some officers to be particularly dangerous. An officer who served in an area where there was a high level of threat discussed the challenges of this kind of patrol:

> A sniper was always your main worry because you can only do a foot patrol at a certain pace. You come to a corner – you're not going to go around that corner willy nilly so you're going to stop for a bit and survey, you know, have a look to see what's happening and you go round the corner

one at a time so you're going to be stationary and if there's any sort of cover or that, you're going to take up that cover and that's your fatal funnel as they say, like you know, that's where you're going to get dropped, there's always that potential and you're always looking around. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

In areas which were thought to be less high risk and where officers may not have had army backup, it was still necessary for them to approach matters with a counter-terrorist mentality. An officer referred to his experience of doing a two-man foot patrol in an area which was not considered to be especially dangerous:

Anytime you were out on patrol you were watching … If you were on a foot patrol, one of you was on one side of the road and the other was on the other. You were walking like a swivel constantly watching all around as you were patrolling and you were looking for vehicles that were driving slowly down the street to go past you. (Interview with officer 2, 29 June 2011)

The cost of failing to adopt the approach outlined above could have been severe because no area was threat-free. Army foot patrols and those conducted by members of the UDR did not take place in pairs and neither was the focus of soldiers distracted by having to attend to civil matters when patrolling—thus making it easier to maintain a higher level of combat readiness. Members of the public did not approach an oncoming patrol of heavily armed soldiers in order to report a theft that had just occurred or complain about a group of rowdy young people who were making a social nuisance of themselves farther down the street. But the demands of police work are different. Also, if two officers were on foot patrol it was natural for them to walk beside each other, however, this left them vulnerable to being attacked from behind:

The one I always used to worry about was foot patrols – on the beat because you were very vulnerable when you're walking and there were incidents, Lurgan being the classic one where the terrorists came up behind and shot the police officers and got away. (Interview with officer 2, 29 June 2011)

In this incident Constable John Graham and Reserve Constable David Johnston were approached from behind and murdered. Of course,

officers would not have patrolled in pairs in dangerous areas but the fact that there were times when the IRA murdered two policemen in a single attack by stalking them from behind only drives home the point about the vulnerability of officers in areas where the threat was considered to be significantly lower. Regular foot patrols were problematic because they often established a pattern. A former Chief Inspector explained:

> In Cookstown there were always a lot of dances at the weekend so you had to patrol down around the hotels and things like that. But, the opposition got to know that and would have expected you at a certain place and certain time, that sort of thing. (East Antrim focus group 28 June 2011)

The danger of establishing a pattern of this kind was demonstrated in Sion Mills in 1989 when terrorists, using the low-lying roof of a building, dropped a bomb on to the roof of a patrol car driven by Constable Stephen Montgomery fatally injuring him. An RUC patrol regularly waited outside the establishment where the attack took place in roughly the same spot in order to deal with anti-social behaviour. The patrol was engaged in normal policing duties as part of providing a policing service to the community. It is important to note that rowdiness and anti-social behaviour did not cease because there was a conflict in Northern Ireland and at times the policing approach established a pattern that terrorists exploited. The nature of policing means that officers cannot be militarised all of the time in the sense that they patrol in sufficient numbers and in a formation likely to discourage a terrorist attack. This incident, like many others, points to the challenging nature of performing normal policing duties in a context where the threat of terrorism looms.

Mobile patrols were also susceptible to terrorist attack notwithstanding the fact that officers may well have been in an armoured car or Land Rover. In anti-state urban geographies the army provided mobile support for the RUC. Mobile patrolling in areas regarded as especially dangerous was done in Land Rovers and was convoy-like in appearance. It was simply too unsafe for these areas to be patrolled by a single Land Rover. Accordingly, it was normal for two RUC vehicles with three or four men in each to be accompanied by two army Land Rovers with a similar number of personnel in each. However, if the security forces were called to an incident more personnel and vehicles were sometimes deployed:

> I mean at one stage if you were getting a call for example to Twinbrooke which became part of Lisburn's area, you'd have had two police Land Rovers, four military Land Rovers all going to the one call plus other military patrols satelliting as you went in, well that would mean upwards of twenty-four or thirty people are going to deal with one incident and we were just used to it. But it's a little bit daunting to have all these vehicles and all these people to go to what is a call that was normally, if we weren't in an area like that, would have been dealt with by two officers in a car. (Interview with officer 2, 29 June 2011)

Responding to a terrorist incident would have brought even more RUC and military personnel into an area and an army helicopter would likely have been hovering overhead. A security deployment on this scale illustrates the level of threat that existed to the security forces.

Being on mobile patrol in a high risk area could be an unsettling experience as this comment indicates:

> If you were out you were never really relaxed in the vehicle – if you were out in an armoured Land Rover, so if you were in the front, driver or observer, you could see out. If you were in the back it was a very claustrophobic feeling. You had your side parts that you could see out and the rear parts that you could see out but apart from that you're enclosed in the vehicle and it was very, very scary. People sitting in the back were constantly sitting looking out the back windows to make sure nothing was going on around. (Interview with officer 2, 29 June 2011)

Reduced visibility had a disturbing effect on this officer but was a necessary structural response in order to decrease the vehicle's vulnerability. Although reasonably well protected from gun fire, a Land Rover was at considerable risk in built up areas from rocket attack as well as drogue bombs, and in some cases, horizontal mortars. The fatalities suffered by the RUC from rocket attacks on Land Rovers made clear their lethal nature. Rocket attacks on Land Rovers claimed the lives of a number of officers and a horizontally fired mortar killed Constable Colleen McMurray when it struck the side of her armoured patrol car in 1992. Often the surviving occupants of a Land Rover or car attacked in this way would be left severely injured: loss of limbs; sight; or facial disfigurement. Although bulletproof, the windows of a Land Rover or car remained vulnerable to rocket attack or other forms of device causing explosive impact and a stationary vehicle enabled the terrorist to take

better aim. Decreasing the speed of a police or army vehicle in order to negotiate a corner also presented the terrorist with an easier target to hit. If, for instance, a DMSU Land Rover was stationary in an area for some reason it was usual for one of its occupants to disembark and protect the vehicle which would remain with its doors closed. An officer made a colloquial reference to the IRA's frequent use of rocket attacks in a specific area of Belfast:

> You take 'RPG-7 avenue' in West Belfast, was actually Beechmount Avenue. It was called 'RPG-7 avenue' because of the number of times a rocket's been fired. In the city in particular, I don't think you could even begin to quantify the volume of threat from the minute you walk out of the gate of the station. (Interview with officer 1, 29 June 2011)

This statement also says a lot about the way in which officers viewed the threat level the moment they began a patrol.

As touched on above, but deserving further comment, one of the disadvantages of the armoured police Land Rover and which made it dissimilar to the army variety was its inability to facilitate top cover. During the conflict it was not uncommon to observe a number of army Land Rovers travelling with an armed soldier protruding from the top of each vehicle. This technique, enabled by the design of military Land Rovers, greatly enhanced the visual capacity of the patrol itself. The soldier's elevation and unimpeded scope for a 360 degree observation of his environment were factors that terrorists would have taken into account when considering whether to mount an attack on a mobile patrol. The circular scanning potential afforded by top cover reduced—but did not totally eradicate—the terrorists' advantage at least to the point that they had less control over the attack. This form of mobile patrolling also meant that soldiers were in a better position for detecting an attack before it was launched and certainly better placed for returning fire. Terrorists were not ignorant of this fact and thus top cover can function as a deterrent. In comparison, the police Land Rover did not facilitate top cover and from a counter-terrorist perspective this might be considered a technical shortcoming.

However, if looked at in the light of the political situation in Northern Ireland, the absence of top cover on an RUC Land Rover is explicable. The British government wished to criminalise the IRA (and other terrorist groups) in an attempt to reduce their levels of recruitment

and isolate the organisation within its community. The government's attempts in this context were part of the Ulsterisation of the conflict which began in 1976. This included the principle of police primacy which resulted in the army providing a supporting role to the RUC which would take the lead in the fight against terrorism. The use of the police—as the civil and not military arm of the state—was a more consistent approach which attempted to paint the IRA as a criminal organisation. There were problems with this approach because it inevitably militarised the RUC, and in the context of this discussion, resulted in the use of heavily armoured Land Rovers similar to the military. Thus the vehicle had an aggressive appearance and to have added to this in terms of facilitating military-like top cover would have been out of kilter with the government's political strategy to undermine terrorism.

The terrorists' use of rocket propelled grenades and drogue bombs in urban contexts compensated for the fact that they were unable to use large roadside bombs or landmines. That these weapons were relatively lightweight and could be transported easily for use at short notice was advantageous. They helped reduce the threat of an explosion causing injury to members of their own community. To attempt to use large roadside bombs or landmines in an urban area posed too high a threat to civilians and therefore were favoured in rural attacks. To the IRA, it was operationally imperative that the killing or injuring of members of their own community be avoided. To have operated differently would have generated communal alienation and likely rendered the community less tolerant of the organisation. Simply put, the IRA, like other well-organised and broadly-based terrorist groups, need a community in which to live and within which to hide. From the IRA's perspective, however, the drawback of using rockets and drogue bombs was their lack of explosive power which reduced the potential deadliness of the weapons.

When on mobile patrol, the ability of the security forces to respond quickly to an attack in an urban environment was degraded by, for example, narrow streets. Should an attack take place, public vehicles and the presence of civilians can impede the speedy pursuit of a terrorist as a heavy vehicle, like an armoured Land Rover, is not easily manoeuvred. The urban structure itself can easily hinder a vehicular pursuit due to a mass of buildings, alleyways and cul-de-sacs which can be maximised by terrorists when making off after an attack.

When leaving and returning to a station, mobile patrols were vulnerable to attack. An officer described how a mobile patrol entered and exited the station where he was posted:

> Going into and out of a police station is the most vital point and the gates were opened up and you drove out in an armoured car like a bat out of hell, and you radioed to say you were coming back in again and the gates were thrown open and you drove in quickly. You didn't linger about because the station had been fired at a few times. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

If terrorists planned to attack a police vehicle when it entered or left the station then a static target (a problem when returning to a station) presented them with an easier target. A policeman whose station was located in an area known for its republican militancy mentioned how a set of traffic lights, which were in close proximity to the station, were controlled by officers on guard duty. When nearing the station a patrol would have radioed ahead in order to make those on guard aware of their approach. This ensured that the traffic lights were set at 'green' so the vehicle did not become stationary in a queue of vehicles. Of course, the deployment of foot patrols in the vicinity of a station in combination with mobile patrols assisted a returning vehicle. The narrow streets, long rows of terraced housing and alleyways in parts of Belfast and Londonderry may present a heavily armoured vehicle with some difficulties when it comes to manoeuvring, but these features of the urban landscape are less challenging to a foot patrol which can negotiate them more easily if in pursuit of terrorists.

Urban policing and combating terrorism was challenging during the conflict. For example, the political geography of Belfast prevented the RUC from adopting a single operational strategy. By way of example, there was an enormous difference between the operational approach adopted by officers in Tennent Street station situated in loyalist West Belfast, and that of Andersonstown station in republican West Belfast (and other stations located in republican West Belfast). During the conflict police operations out of Andersonstown necessitated a considerable degree of army backup, but it was possible for only two officers to conduct a foot patrol on the Shankill Road. The Shankill area did become more hostile toward the RUC following unionist disenchantment with the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This resulted in some officers'

homes being attacked by loyalists in different parts of the province (Gimson 1986) but the threat level to officers was of a different order to that which existed in republican parts of the city. That said, it would have been foolish for officers to have relaxed their guard when patrolling the Shankill in case the IRA decided to take advantage of the reduced security presence and strike across the peace line. Whilst parts of North Belfast were difficult to police, South and East Belfast presented fewer regular problems. In fact, with the exception of Mountpottinger RUC station in East Belfast, which policed a small republican community, this part of the city was relatively peaceful because of its pro-state population. The appearance of stations reflected the differences in the level of threat with much heavier fortifications in use in the more dangerous areas. While the urban environment discouraged terrorists from using mortars or large car bombs to attack a station (Andersonstown station had terraced housing backing on to it which could have been devastated by a wayward mortar shell) they were nonetheless susceptible to handheld explosive devices being hurled over the high perimeter fencing. There was, then, something of a danger in simply walking within what otherwise seemed a well-protected area as an officer mentioned: 'Well that's the strange thing about it, you see you had this false sense of security whenever you were inside there because of the fortifications around you' (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011). The perception of safety can be a dangerous deception.

The security and safety of officers who were based in stations which were situated in the centre of the city was less straightforward than those working in hard-line areas where the threat was unremitting. Generally, threat levels depended upon the proximity of a station to a republican area. However, the relationship, for example, between Queen Street RUC station in Belfast city centre and the threat of a terrorist attack was more complicated. Officers were expected to perform normal policing duties such as being on a two-man foot patrol around the city centre without military support. This was despite the fact that the station was relatively close to the republican Divis area where the threat was not insignificant. Blast bombs had been thrown at officers outside the station. The IRA had attempted to place an explosive device against the wall of the building adjoining the station in the hope that the explosion would devastate at least a portion of the station (Queen Street was an old station and had commercial buildings on either side which terrorists could exploit). The IRA had used this tactic successfully in 1971 when

it placed a bomb in the shop next to the police station in Chichester Road, Belfast. The explosion resulted in the death of an RUC Inspector (McKittrick et al. 1999). In 1990 the danger of working in this area became all too evident when two officers, Constables Harry Beckett and Gary Meyer, were murdered by the IRA as they patrolled in the vicinity of the station on foot. Two gunmen approached the officers from behind and shot both in the back of the head then ran away (Trotter 2010). Enhanced body-armour offers no protection to attacks of this sort and officers remain easy targets. A police Inspector who had served in this station pointed out that officers in Queen Street had been told not to patrol beside each other but instead for one to walk ahead of the other and at an appropriate distance. It was thought that by walking in this formation an attack on a two-officer patrol would be less easy to carry out. Yet, notwithstanding their method of patrolling, whether in single file or side-by-side, the presence of two officers in an area that had witnessed attacks on the station was not much of a deterrent to committed members of a terrorist organisation who could strike with the benefit of surprise. Classically, these shootings, like so many others waged against members of the security forces in urban areas, reflected the effective 'cover' that a busy Saturday morning with its predictable high numbers of shoppers affords to terrorists. Emerging from a crowd or appearing like another member of the public walking along a city centre street, helps terrorists launch an attack at very close range. Also, such a setting assists terrorists in making their escape by allowing them to filter back into a crowd. For instance, should other members of the security forces be present (either on or off duty) and able to draw weapons, their professional training constrains them when it comes to the actual returning of fire in case it endangers the lives of members of the public.

The murders of Constables Beckett and Meyer illustrate the menacing problem that officers confronted when they worked in areas that were deemed to be of insufficient risk to warrant either military support or a heavy militarised approach to policing duties; yet such areas were obviously not low risk. Without a constant threat of attack the requirements of civilian policing—attending to the day-to-day problems of the public—can perhaps give rise to a mood of complacency regarding one's safety. Drifting between briefings that alert officers to be watchful because intelligence reports indicate that terrorists might be planning an attack in the area, and others which make no reference to terrorist activity at all, possibly dims the security consciousness of officers. Certainly

an officer who served in the DMSU discussed how he preferred to be stationed in a high risk area because he felt that it equipped him psychologically to maintain a high degree of alertness and conditioned him physically to remain at a state of readiness. That the army often supported him in the role he did helped reduce his anxiety as he considered himself in the company of those who were better trained to respond to a terrorist attack. But in medium risk stations like Queen Street it is perhaps understandable that an element of complacency can enter the security equation. In a conflict situation soldiers only have to be soldiers when on duty, but RUC men and women had to attend to normal policing matters and perform a range of duties that were distinct from the militaristic side of counter-terrorist policing. This increased their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

The Rural Terrorist Threat

The level of threat to RUC officers working in rural contexts depended upon where they were stationed. Where Northern Ireland bordered the Republic of Ireland terrorist activity was high. As mentioned in the last chapter, the border with the Republic was useful to the IRA. There were many border crossings by road and the sprawling countryside made it easy for terrorists to journey back and forth. A lethal attack could be sprung by terrorists from the territory of the Republic at security forces in Northern Ireland. This was demonstrated at Warrenpoint in 1979 when two bombs detonated in the Republic killed 18 British soldiers (Jackson 2007). James Dingley (1998) points out that the closeness of the Republic allowed the IRA to launch an attack against the security forces and then speedily retreat across the border. This kind of jurisdictional hamstringing disrupted the pursuit of terrorists and plagued counter-terrorism in border areas. The constraint, however, reflected a key principle of international relations and one which must not be transgressed, namely, that no military (or police) incursions take place into the sovereign territory of a foreign state. Neither was this principle modified in any practical way as a result of the United Kingdom's and Republic's membership of the European Union (EU). To a degree this is not a new problem as reaching a coherent, joined up and agreed upon counter-terrorist strategy remains a challenge for the EU's member states (Bures 2011). Similar to high risk urban areas, their rural equivalent

required the army to support the RUC. An officer who was stationed in the border town of Strabane in the west of the province explained:

> As regards the army coming in – I harp back to Strabane again in '70/'71. We couldn't have done a beat patrol without the army, it was a shared beat patrol. We're out of the urban situation now, it is a border station, two police, three police couldn't have done a beat in '70/'71 if you hadn't the army with you. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

The situation which this policeman describes in the early 1970s did not improve until the end of the conflict which meant that the area was always considered high risk and so was mutually patrolled by the police and military.

When compared to the dangers of urban terrorism with its principal concern of a gun attack taking place at close range, or a hand-held device being thrown, the threat shifted to large roadside bombs and landmines:

> Rural patrolling, the bigger worry would have been a large landmine because you wouldn't have known that was there until it went off. Mobile patrols – vehicle patrols – you were worried about landmines. We were tasked numerous times to go out with the military to do route clearances where you were walking along and clearing routes for vehicles to follow after so you were aware that potentially things could happen. (Interview with officer 2, 29 June 2011)

However, the attempt to ensure that a route was clear had its own dangers. There was the possibility that a route-clearance team would come across a group of terrorists as they were lying in wait to detonate a bomb. Also, officers who had experience of route clearances were under no illusion as to the duration that a road could be considered safe:

> A road going to, for example, Cookstown to get to Pomeroy station, you'd have had to wait until the army cleared it or the DMSU would have cleared the road – that road was only clear until the patrol past – a bomb could have been planted five minutes later. (East Antrim focus group 28 June 2011)

But ensuring that a route was safe in order for security force personnel to use it was essential. An officer accounted for the security procedures that governed the way that he and his colleagues travelled to an army base:

> Whenever I was in firearms training we were driving up and down to Ballykinler … you always had to ring Ballykinler camp and find out what the safe route is for today, you know, they would be out in the morning and they would go down a road and scan all the culverts down that road. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

An officer who was based for most of his service in the Cityside of Londonderry discussed how he was often sent to the rural hinterland in order to patrol along the border with the Republic of Ireland. He pointed to the security procedures which applied to patrolling in a context where it was possible to encounter a terrorist landmine:

> At the start they used to send us round the countryside in Land Rovers which was a bit stupid, round the country roads in Land Rovers because there could have been landmines etc. but to move forward, when we went out we got dropped off in a PC van – plain clothes van - wearing camouflage and you're sitting watching the border at the Northern Ireland crossing points. You just adapted to your surroundings. When you came to an obstacle in the road you used to do a circle of it, looking for a command wire. Say you came to a wee small bridge, like you daren't take the chance of walking across the bridge or walking across the culvert. We used to do a road clearance … you came to a culvert you do your semi-circle and you're looking for a command wire. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

From the terrorists' perspective, the less populated rural context reduced concern about civilian casualties. This enabled the IRA to use large quantities of explosives which increased the likelihood of an attack killing the members of a patrol and seriously injuring others. A large amount of explosives was necessary when attacking an armoured army or police vehicle. It was not uncommon for 1000 lb of explosives to be used in a landmine attack. This quantity was capable of destroying a vehicle leaving a massive crater in the road. When executing this kind of attack the main point of concern to terrorists was a civilian vehicle traveling closely in front or behind their target vehicle or passing it at the same time that the bomb is detonated. Failure on the part of the terrorists to negotiate the passing of a car carrying civilians was demonstrated in July 1990. In this incident, a nun was killed as the car she was travelling in got caught in an IRA landmine explosion which destroyed an RUC car killing three officers. Additionally, by establishing their firing

point at a distance from the bomb increased the possibility of targeting the wrong vehicle. This was tragically illustrated in the case of the Hanna family in 1988 when an IRA explosion killed six-year-old, David Hanna, his mother and father.

The use of large bombs by terrorists in rural settings was countered by the security forces in the South Armagh region by stopping mobile patrolling. Instead, joint police and army foot patrols were deployed and members of the security forces were flown to border stations by helicopter from Bessbrook army base. The flight time from Bessbrook to Forkhill was around 10 minutes and to Crossmaglen about 15 minutes. Of course, the flight times may have varied slightly if intelligence suggested that there was a need to fly tactically in order to avoid a possible attack on the helicopter. The roads leading into South Armagh were deemed too dangerous for vehicular use leading to the area being nicknamed 'bandit country' (Harnden 1999). But getting to Bessbrook involved counter-terrorist planning as this officer who was once stationed in Newry makes clear:

> We'd have always given a lot of thought going from Newry to Bessbrook before we got the choppers out to the border. You had to make sure you weren't foolish and use the same route every morning, or time, or have a five vehicle convoy - you're going to send one out, wait for a different time and send somebody on a different way to the army camp because if you hadn't have given thought to that, well, you were advertising "come and hit me". (Interview with officer 1, 29 June 2011)

Gun attacks at close range were difficult for terrorists to carry out in rural surroundings. The countryside may have provided suitable cover but in the terrorists' calculations this advantage was cancelled out if the likely outcome of an ambush was a gun battle with the security forces. RUC officers stationed in border areas were usually younger than average, well-trained, normally fit, and mentally switched on in relation to the terrorist threat. Rural foot patrols allowed for a greater degree of concentration to develop because of an absence of the multiple distractions that are part-and-parcel of busy urban zones. Unlike urban areas, the absence of people in the rural context meant that there was no cover for launching a close-quarter attack on the security forces. For terrorists, the answer to these problems was to use snipers who attempted to fire

upon members of the security forces from a distance. The danger associated with this sort of attack was demonstrated in South Armagh in the 1990s when a number of soldiers and police officers were killed in long range shootings. The IRA unit responsible for these attacks was effective until its members were arrested in 1997. Although difficult if on checkpoint duty, when threatened by sniper attack the policy which officers and soldiers adopted was to avoid being stationary. They also reduced their physical size as a target by kneeling or lying down and taking cover behind appropriate objects in their immediate environment.

The rule of thumb when conducting rural patrols in dangerous areas was to take the least accommodative route, for example, walking across fields instead of journeying along a road. An officer who had experience of working in the Fermanagh area commented:

> You followed your training. You were wary, you didn't go through hedges at obvious points, you never used gates … you were just always very wary. I served a number of years on the Border – Belcoo – and I was present when a colleague was shot by a sniper, but like I say, you just followed your training, you know, you were a soldier at that time. You had army backup and you were expected to follow what they were doing, but again, you know, a soldier's trained different than a police officer, we still had our job to do on top of keeping your own personal safety. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

Choosing the least expected route or crossing was also important in an attempt to avoid falling foul of an anti-personnel device such as a pressure plate, which if activated, could have resulted in death or serious injury. It was not unusual for the survivors of such attacks to suffer limb amputation which ruined the individual's life as well as his career. Terrorists would anticipate the most likely point at which a police officer or soldier would attempt to jump over a river, go through a hedge or climb over a wall. It was infinitely preferable and safer to get a little wet, receive a tear to one's uniform or exert oneself climbing a higher section of a wall, than to trigger an explosive device. Basically, the rural environment became the terrorists' arena for planting bombs of different sizes and types. The serious problems which improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have caused troops in Afghanistan and Iraq (BBC 2006) was encountered by police officers and soldiers during the Northern Ireland conflict.

A key difference between urban and rural patrolling can be understood in the context of providing backup should a patrol be attacked. In an urban setting responding to a call for support was relatively quick. The many police stations and military bases located in Belfast and Londonderry, for example, meant that support, by vehicle or even on foot, could be provided swiftly. In towns, patrols could be equally supported without serious delay. However, a cautious approach had always to be taken in case terrorists intended to attack the members of the security forces providing support. In contrast, the remoteness of rural patrolling delayed the process especially in unfavourable weather conditions—foggy or seriously inclement weather could delay backup arriving by helicopter. Weather conditions could also play a part in the time it took to evacuate a badly injured officer from a border area. The army maintained a quick reaction force at Bessbrook and in normal conditions could have reached the injured officer with paramedic support in approximately 10 minutes. The officer would then have been taken by helicopter to the military wing of Musgrave Park Hospital in Belfast where there was a helipad, and rushed by ambulance to the secure wing of the Royal Victoria Hospital in West Belfast for specialist treatment. Rural patrols, then, were somewhat more isolated and a little less connected to the security and emergency network in the province.

Further Threats

While the fortification of the perimeter of stations afforded increased protection, this did not eliminate officers' vulnerability to attack. As mentioned above, handheld missiles could easily be thrown over high fencing but necessitated that an attacker get within close range of a station. Stations in republican heartlands made this kind of attack less difficult to carry out as the environment was easy to emerge from and merge back into. In comparison, rural stations were remoter and less susceptible to the lobbing of blast bombs although some, like Crossmaglen, were located in the town. The IRA developed its capacity to compromise the fortified perimeter of a station by developing home-made mortars. In response, RUC stations and army bases that were vulnerable to this kind of threat had their buildings structurally upgraded in order to withstand the blasts from mortar shells. While the IRA made use of mortars they were usually unsuccessful; shells often missed their intended target or failed to have fatal consequences. However, the lethality of

mortar shelling was evident in the attack on Newry RUC station in 1985 which resulted in the death of nine officers. In the attack one of the shells struck a portakabin within the station's compound which was being used as a canteen. Following this attack, stations that were thought to be under threat of mortar attack had their portakabins removed. The same year the IRA mortared the RUC Training Depot in Enniskillen but, unlike Newry, the attack resulted in no serious casualties. The following year, Reserve Constable, Desmond Dobbins, died shortly after being badly injured when a mortar shell exploded in New Barnsley RUC station in Belfast. At an operational level, the RUC attempted to counter this threat by introducing extra foot and mobile patrols in the vicinity around a station where mortars could be launched. These patrols became a regular feature of the general patrolling responsibilities of officers. The capacity to strike against the police and army by means of mortar shelling constituted an advance in the IRA's technical ability compared to the cruder nature of the car bomb.

When on patrol officers were conscious that bombs could be detonated by different means. When terrorists became more sophisticated in their bomb making know-how they moved toward forms of remote control detonation. This development removed the threat of a command wire betraying the whereabouts of a device. Both types of detonation, of course, demanded that terrorists keep visual contact with a patrol and so had to be in the vicinity of the bomb. The technical response of the security forces to counter the threat of remote control detonation was to provide patrols with equipment designed to jam radio signals. The kit was carried in the same manner as a backpack and it was important that all members of a patrol keep within the umbrella-like electronic cover provided by the device. Thus each member of the patrol had to be conscious of the actual distance they were from the individual carrying the equipment.

At an operational level, VCPs were an effective way to combat terrorism. These were used extensively throughout the Troubles. The RUC and army used two types. There were static VCPs which operated routinely at border locations and on the road leading to Aldergrove Airport. However, permanent VCPs meant a constant presence of members of the security forces and added to the danger of a terrorist attack. There was also the 'snap' VCP. The main benefit of this type of checkpoint was that terrorists could not predict where and when one might be set up. The unpredictability of a 'snap' VCP worked to the advantage of

the security forces. When stopped, a driver would be asked to produce a driving license by way of providing a form of identification. The driver might also be asked where they had driven from and their destination. Other occupants of the vehicle might well have been asked questions related to their identity and movements. This was an excellent opportunity to gather intelligence. Should a terrorist suspect be stopped then the details of those accompanying him—name, address, and general physical description—would also be noted. A fuller physical description of the occupants could be gained by simply asking them to get out and stand alongside the vehicle hence enabling estimations of weight and height. This information would then become part of a broader data bank of counter-terrorist knowledge of both old and new suspects. The possibility of encountering a 'snap' VCP was particularly worrisome when a vehicle was being used to transport weapons or bomb-making materials. In this respect, it was a tool of counter-terrorism that increased the chances of terrorists being intercepted and arrested.

An analysis of the tactics used by terrorists in Northern Ireland indicates the degree to which it was easier to target police officers than military personnel. Most notably, police officers could be lured into an ambush as a result of responding to a bogus call that a road traffic accident had occurred and which involved injuries (in a high risk area some officers took recourse to calling the local hospital in order to ascertain if an ambulance had been dispatched to the reported area) or that a house had been broken into. The murders of Sergeant Patrick Maxwell and Reserve Constable Samuel Clarke in November, 1975, graphically portrayed the vulnerability of officers to this kind of attack. On this occasion the RUC had been asked by the Garda to deliver a death message to a remote address in County Tyrone not suspecting that it was an IRA hoax. The seemingly 'official' nature of the request suggested to the RUC that it needed to be acted upon. When the officers approached the house in a Land Rover gunmen opened fire killing two and badly injuring one of the four-man patrol. That the army was not responsible for dealing with these kinds of incidents meant that they could not be targeted in quite the same way. However, it was also the army's duty to respond to reports of a suspicious device and some of these may have been phony and a setup. An Inspector who served in South Armagh referred to the response of the army to a report of a suspicious device:

In those rural areas where there would have been a serious threat, I mean, the army would fly over it and take photographs and develop them and look at them. Aerial photographs were used an awful lot in rural areas. (East Antrim focus group 28 June 2011)

The danger involved in attending to normal policing duties was discussed by an officer who spent many years working in 'B' Division which covered West Belfast:

Your life was in danger every day, every time you went out on duty. You had to be very, very careful to anything you responded to. You were always checking the calls out to make sure you weren't lured in – they'd [terrorists] have faked break-ins, accidents, it was anything at all if you were silly enough to go too quickly to them, you know, it really taught us to be very, very careful in 'B' Division, very, very dangerous, very dangerous. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

The officer went on to say that in an attempt to determine if a call was genuine some officers checked an address by driving past in their own vehicles and carefully observing the area. At other times officers would have contacted a person favourably disposed to the police and who lived or worked in the vicinity of the address that had been reported:

Well, if a call came in and you were a bit suspicious about it, some of the boys would have went out in their own car in civilian clothes and sort of checked around generally to see if it was a possible setup for you, you know, and then there were other times when there were certain people you could have rang and you know 'is it okay?' and they would have given you their opinion, you know, locals I mean … you built up contacts. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

This method of responding to a call was also pointed out by a Chief Inspector who was stationed in Cookstown:

In advance you'd have tried to get to know people that you could have rang, should it be the parish priest on some local person who lived in an area to try and confirm did something happen or was something going on … built up a rapport with people like that. I remember going to one murder down by the lough shore, eventually when I got there the BBC was

already there. I walked down with an army patrol because I wouldn't let the guys drive down because I thought possibly it was a 'come on' and it took me maybe about two hours to do that. You would have taken those sorts of precautions. (East Antrim focus group 28 June 2011)

These comments underscore the importance of establishing and maintaining good working relations with local members of a community. Building relationships with ordinary individuals requires time and cannot be established without trust. For trust to develop there has to be contact and this point highlights the important role of policing in counter-terrorism: the police are in a better position than the military to develop contact with local residents. Three reasons can be given to support this claim. Firstly, by virtue of the nature of policing, officers are more likely to be in actual contact with residents on a day-to-day basis thus facilitating relationship-building. Secondly, compared to the military, police contact with the public is more often unconnected to terrorism. This allows the less aggressive face of civilian policing to be observed which helps foster better relations. The opportunities which the police have for normal interaction with the public gives them a leg up on the ladder to win 'hearts and minds'. Thirdly, RUC officers served longer in an area than did soldiers who left the province after completing a tour of duty. This made it more difficult for the military to forge relationships with residents.

Policing an area for a number of years meant that officers were more familiar with its geography and the familial and social network of its community. It helped create an important bank of intelligence which soldiers drew upon especially when arriving in an area at the beginning of a tour of duty. Members of the UDR possessed a similar level of local knowledge particularly in rural contexts. During interview, a Sergeant remarked that when first stationed in Omagh one of his greatest assets in combating terrorism was the knowledge possessed by the members of the Part-time Reserve. The Part-timers had a reservoir of local knowledge which the Sergeant regarded as indispensable to fighting terrorism.

Irrespective of rural or urban setting, officers had to take precautions when responding to a call as a host of dangers could have awaited them. A policeman who worked in the region of Fermanagh discussed the practical measures he and his colleagues were used to taking:

> Well, there were things like two cars, one covering the other and maybe having your weapon in your hands and ready to bail out…just tightening your own thoughts up as you were approaching a scene or something like that. You would be thinking 'we'll not stop here, we'll not park the car on the road', you know, those sorts of things. Everything was different but you were thinking all the time the closer you got to something you were, I mean, more and more aware of 'what if?' or if I was a terrorist where would I be setting up a booby trap … always trying to put your mind, put yourself, in the mind of a terrorist: 'if I was doing it from the other side what would I be doing here now?' (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

In situations like these the terrorist has the advantage as they have time to plan the attack. The planning will involve a careful consideration of the anticipated responses of the officers when they arrive and will dictate where, for instance, a bomb is placed (and perhaps a secondary device), or where one or more gunmen are positioned.

Officers had to be alert to booby traps. Three attacks stand out by way of demonstrating the deadly nature of this form of attack. The first incident took place in 1976 and involved the recovery of a shotgun by the RUC following the search of the outbuilding of a house. The gun had been booby trapped. It was taken to Donegal Pass station and when examined by Inspector George Bell and Constable Neville Cummings exploded killing both officers. Sam Trotter (2010, p. 168) explains:

> It was while the gun was being "broken" to ensure it was unloaded that the blast happened. It was caused by an estimated 2oz of high explosives and turned an ageing shotgun, suitable for rabbit hunting, into a wartime grenade capable of killing two men.

The next incident involved the deaths of another two officers in Londonderry in 1987. This time the IRA fatally shot a prison officer in the car park of Magee College as he sat in his car. When Detective Inspector, Austin Wilson, and Detective Sergeant, John Bennison, were conducting an investigation of the crime scene a bomb which had been concealed in the prison officer's briefcase exploded killing both men. The third incident occurred in Belcoo in 1976. During a follow-up search of the spot used by a gunman to fire on the local RUC station, a booby-trap device was triggered leaving Sergeant Harry Keys and Reserve Constables Thomas Evans and Francis Kettles dead. A fourth officer, Constable Martin McCrorie, was blinded in the same incident.

Conclusion

Officers encountered multiple threats when they were on duty. A history of RUC fatalities highlights the different settings, circumstances and means by which policemen and some policewomen were killed. For uniformed officers not in specialist units, the very nature of policing meant that they were presented as easier targets for IRA gunmen. This is illustrated in the officers who were shot in the back of the head at close range. It was difficult to remain in a state of combat readiness when performing a beat duty in Belfast city centre or a town elsewhere in Northern Ireland. In this context, police officers are different to soldiers whose job entails readiness to engage the enemy. Although the province was not a high-intensity combat zone, soldiers' training equipped them for maintaining their focus for the duration of a patrol. They patrolled in tactical formation which offered more protection to the unit. Unlike police officers, they did not suffer the distraction of having to attend to civil matters. Neither did soldiers conduct two-man patrols as often was observed in Belfast during the Troubles.

Due to the targeting strategy of the republican movement, officers were not only concerned about being attacked whilst on duty. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 28% of officers were killed in off-duty attacks and this topic will be examined in the next chapter.

References

BBC. (2006). *IEDs: Iraq's Deadly Roadside Bombs*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4779437.stm.

Brewer, J. (1990). Talking About Danger: The RUC and the Paramilitary Threat. *Sociology, 24*(4), 657–674.

Bruce, S. (1992). *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S. (1993). Loyalists in Northern Ireland: Further Thoughts On 'Pro-State Terror'. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 5*(4), 253–265.

Bures, O. (2011). EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?. New York: Routledge.

Carroll, R. (2005). Elusive Sniper Saps US Morale in Baghdad. *The Guardian*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/aug/05/iraq.usa.

Craig, T., & Wilson, S. (2011). 5 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq. *The Washington Post*. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/more-violence-in-iraq-iraqi-us-soldiers-killed/2011/06/06/AGj8r7JH_story.html.

Dingley, J. (1998). A Reply to White's Non-sectarian Thesis of PIRA Targeting. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(2), 106–117.

French, G. (2015). How NYPD's Hercules Team Serves as a Model for Counterterrorism. *Policeone.com*. Available from https://www.policeone.com/swat/articles/51474006-How-NYPDs-Hercules-team-serves-as-a-model-for-counterterrorism/.

Gimson, A. (1986, April 19). When Loyalists Attack Officers. *The Spectator*, pp. 15–18.

Harnden, T. (1999). *Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Jackson, M. (2007). Gen Sir Mike Jackson Relives IRA Paras Bombs. *The Telegraph*. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1562283/Gen-Sir-Mike-Jackson-relives-IRA-Paras-bombs.html.

Kirk-Smith, M., & Dingley, J. (2009). Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of Intelligence. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20*(3–4), 551–573.

Marques, P. (2003). *Guerilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments* (Unpublished MA thesis). Available from www.fas.org/man/eprint/marques.pdf.

McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C., & McVea, D. (1999). *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

News Letter. (2012). *Concern After IRA Bombs Van and Police Base*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/concern-after-ira-bombs-van-and-police-base-1-3875641.

Robinson, P. (2012). Senior Republican's Shame at Bloody Friday. *News Letter*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/senior-republicans-shame-at-bloody-friday-28773180.html.

Sinclair, G. (2012). Exporting the UK Police 'Brand': The RUC-PSNI and the International Policing Agenda. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 6*(1), 55–66.

Toolis, K. (1995). *Rebel Hearts*. London: Picador.

Trotter, S. (2010). *Constabulary Heroes 1826–2009*. Coleraine: Impact Printing.

Urban, M. (1992). *Big Boys' Rules*. London: Faber and Faber.

Weitzer, R. (1985). Policing a Divided Society: Obstacles to Normalization in Northern Ireland. *Social Problems, 33*(1), 41–55.

CHAPTER 4

The Off-Duty Threat

This chapter explores how officers coped with the threat of a terrorist attack taking place when they were off duty and seeks to answer a number of related questions. How, for example, did officers attempt to improve the safety of their homes? How did the threat of an attack influence simple activities like the laundering of one's uniform or attending to one's garden? What counter-terrorist considerations were to the fore when, say, an officer's car required servicing or repair? How did officers negotiate travelling to and from work? Particularly if holidays were to be taken within Northern Ireland, how did security considerations influence the planning of a holiday and the conduct of officers when holidaying? In the context of counter-terrorism research, these questions might seem somewhat banal but this is far from the case. If we are to comprehend the social impact of terrorism on those directly threatened by it, these are the kinds of questions that need to be asked. This chapter accounts for the practical, everyday responses of officers to the off-duty terrorist threat.

In addressing these questions it will become clear how it was impossible for police officers to escape the dangers and threats associated with the conflict, thus increasing levels of psychological stress far beyond those normally experienced by police officers in other forces. Of course, if RUC officers experienced a higher level of work-related anxiety as a consequence of a terrorist strategy of off-duty targeting, it is likely that their families were negatively affected also. The impact of the conflict on officers' families will be addressed in the next chapter.

The IRA's strategy of targeting members of the security forces when they were off duty resulted in a situation which was unparalleled in terms of terrorist organisations operating at the same time. It is true that other organisations, like ETA, did kill officers when they were off duty but not to the same extent as the IRA. In Chapter 2 the grimness of the statistics were recorded: between 1969 and 1998, 28% of officers died in off-duty attacks. The high percentage reflects the emphasis the IRA placed on this form of targeting. Some attacks occurred when officers were travelling to work and others when they were travelling home after duty; some whilst an officer was socialising in one form or another; others when he had attended or was about to attend church; in the case of Part-time Reservists, attacks sometimes happened during their civilian hours of employment; officers were attacked and killed in front of their wives and children; and many attacks took place when officers were at home.

It is important to gain an insight into the character of an off-duty attack as it differed in significant ways to terrorist attacks that resulted in other RUC officers losing their lives. For example, some officers died when a bomb exploded in an urban context whilst police were attempting to clear the area of civilians. Others lost their lives in shootouts when, more by chance than design, they intercepted armed terrorists. Many officers were killed, too, as a result of planned and general attacks on police patrols where the officer's personal identity was not a factor in the planning of the attack. The off-duty attack, however, reflected a different and more sinister kind of targeting process. They most often signalled an officer out and were deliberately planned and carefully executed to maximise their lethality and minimise harm coming to the terrorist. As Russell Murray (1984, p. 28) points out, most attacks on members of the security forces has involved weapons which afforded the terrorists 'greater firepower than their victims … This has been the pattern even when the target was off duty and alone and armed, if at all, with only a pistol.' In order to reduce risk in an attack it was necessary for terrorists to gather intelligence on their target, perhaps over a period of weeks or possibly months, so that the attack could take place when their victim was most vulnerable and least capable of defence. In addition to gaining knowledge of an officer's home address and general movements, one of the main reasons for terrorists observing their target was to decrease the chances of the wrong person being killed in an attack, say, for example, an officer's neighbour. While not all negative news reportage is detrimental to terrorist organisations, which often stand

to profit from the communication of their violence to a wide audience (Schmid 2011), killing the wrong person was something the IRA wished to avoid. It is worth considering that during the targeting stage terrorists had the opportunity to observe the officer outside of work and out of uniform. Such opportunities afforded by the targeting process detract from the terrorists' argument that they were only attacking a uniform and not the individual wearing it.

Some off-duty attacks—shootings or undercar booby traps—took place at officers' homes. Others occurred when the officer was in the company of his family and was especially vulnerable. These were particularly callous attacks. For example, in Londonderry in 1979 the IRA murdered Reserve Constable, Stanley Wray, in the presence of his teenage son and daughter as he was about to attend a church service. The IRA repeated this kind of attack in 1982, again in Londonderry, when Inspector Norman Duddy was shot dead in front of his 13 and 15 year-old sons as he sat in his car having attended a church service (Doherty 2004). In 1981, Reserve Constable Alexander Scott, died when he was shot by the IRA as he and his teenage daughter left his wife's business premises in East Belfast (Trotter 2010). Further, in 1985 the IRA murdered Sergeant Hugh McCormac as he was about to attend Mass with his wife and three young children in Enniskillen (this murder will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). In addition to these policemen, in 1985 the IRA killed Patrick Kerr who worked as a prison officer. He was leaving Armagh Cathedral following Sunday worship and was accompanied by his wife and children at the time. Cardinal Tomas O'Fiaich condemned the murder in strong terms: 'Can anyone conceive of a greater crime than to murder a man in front of his family as he was coming from worshipping God?' (Summers 2009). Many members of the UDR were murdered in off-duty circumstances (McKittrick et al. 1999). Clearly, the IRA was not prepared to recognise a boundary between the private sphere where an officer is off duty and the public arena where an officer discharged his duties.

The off-duty dimension to terrorist attacks added to the dangers of policing and created a context wherein there were work-related stress factors over and above those experienced by members of other police forces. It is worth bearing in mind that RUC officers upon completion of their duties did not, unlike soldiers serving in British regiments (with the exception of members of the locally-recruited UDR) return to a fortified barracks that had its perimeter guarded and which was under twenty-four

hour military protection (Murray 1984). Instead, officers returned to their homes in regular neighbourhoods where they were expected to take on the role of husband and father. But because of the IRA's targeting strategy the home was considered a legitimate context for waging conflict and executing a lethal attack—it became an additional battlefield over and above the on-duty experience of conflict which was taking place on the streets of Northern Ireland. This had a negative effect on the ability of officers and their families to cope with stress. Due to the threat of a terrorist attack occurring, or perhaps one that had been foiled, many RUC families had to move home under the emergency Special Purchase of Evacuated Dwellings relocation scheme commonly known as SPED. In terms of terrorist planning, the key point to observe in attacks which took place at an officer's home was that it was a *static* point. Once terrorists knew their target's address it was then only necessary to know when the person would be at home for an attack to take place.

However, the IRA's strategy of off-duty targeting did not only have a psychological impact in terms of generating fear and anxiety amongst family members it also carried with it the real danger that they could be physically harmed. Indeed, there are a number of cases where the family or friends of members of the security forces, or civilians whose employment in connection with the security forces rendered them a 'legitimate' target in the eyes of the IRA, have either been killed or seriously injured as a result of an attack. The use of undercar booby traps threatened those who were travelling with the officer when it exploded. The following cases highlight the danger of this method of targeting: in 1978, Lesley Gordon, aged 10, died along with her father (who was a member of the UDR) when an IRA bomb exploded underneath the family car—the young girl's death was a tragedy; in 1982, Constable Gary Ewing and friend of the Ewing family, Helen Woodhouse, died when a booby-trap bomb exploded beneath the car they were travelling in. Former RUC officers and their families were also endangered: retired officer James Sefton, aged 65 and his wife of the same age, were killed in 1990 when an IRA bomb exploded beneath their car. Emma Anthony, aged only 3, received life threatening injuries in 1994 when an undercar booby-trap device exploded as her father drove their family car (Victor 1994). Her father, Fred Anthony, who worked as a cleaner in an RUC station, died in the attack.

The use of undercar explosive devices (and other victim-operated devices sometimes used by the IRA) raises questions about the status of an officer's family during the Troubles. They may not have been the

direct target but the *deliberate* act of planting a bomb beneath a car out-side a family home placed all its members in grave danger. The fact that terrorists did not provide a warning as to the existence of an undercar booby-trap device (this would have defeated its purpose) placed a police-man's family in a complicated category because they were indisputably put at severe risk. One conclusion that can be drawn is that the safety of an officer's family—as a civilian category—did not appear to figure greatly in the moral calculations of the IRA because many officers with families had their cars targeted at their homes. Off-duty members of the UDR with families had their cars targeted in this way also. This area of discussion extends the debate about the concept of 'civilian' in conflict zones, which is indistinctly defined during terrorist campaigns. When the term 'family' is used it is important to bear in mind that this could have included the mother and father of younger officers as well as their siblings.

The first officer to be killed when off duty occurred in 1972 (four off-duty officers were killed this year). However, this did not set a precedent as the willingness of the IRA to kill off-duty officers was evident in 1961 when Constable Norman Anderson was murdered. He had been return-ing to Northern Ireland having visited his girlfriend in the Republic when he was shot multiple times (Woods 1999).

The murder of officers when off duty reflects the danger of terror-ists having knowledge of the social habits, if not the precise movements, of their targets. The fact that places of worship have set times for their services meant that terrorists not only knew where an officer was very likely to be on a Sunday (similarly for mid-week services), but moreover, the likely time that he would be arriving and leaving. Thus, based on previous weeks if not months of intelligence gathering, a small IRA unit might choose not to risk following the officer the day of a planned attack but instead be parked in the general vicinity of the officer's destination. Attending church demanded that officers do what their counter-terrorist training tells them not to do viz. set regular patterns both in terms of time and movement. An officer made this clear when he discussed the IRA's attempts to establish his whereabouts:

> I took the Boys' Brigade and again you were setting regular times – the Boys' Brigade every Friday. The Provies [IRA] came to the actual church minister and started questioning him 'do you have a policeman on your staff?', 'where does he live?' They didn't get to me at home but they got as

far as the church and the Boys' Brigade. They had posed as policemen – 'we are police officers and we know you've a police officer on your staff' … and he [minister] thought this doesn't sound right; if they were police officers they wouldn't come to me asking about another police officer. So he then rang Strandtown police station and then I was called in and Special Branch were on it …. I had to stop it [Boys' Brigade]. At that time, I mean, they [republican terrorists] went into Darkley [Protestant church], they went into places of worship and just opened up [fired automatic weapons], there was nothing to stop them coming into a BB hall… in front of all those kids that I'd have been targeted. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

Yet it was difficult to avoid setting patterns when attending church or activities connected to a church as in the above example. Even the task of taking one's children to school was governed by time constraints and a fixed destination point. It was for this reason that some officers stated that they preferred their wives take responsibility for taking and collecting their children from school.

Although all members of the RUC were potential targets, members of the Part-time Reserve were particularly vulnerable to off-duty attack. They encountered the additional risk of being attacked during the hours of their civilian employment (a risk shared with part-time members of the UDR). During the conflict the Part-time Reserve was a fundamental feature of the RUC (Mapstone 1994). Although its members most often performed security duties, their role enabled regular officers and members of the Full-time Reserve to attend to other duties. However, in relation to targeting, terrorists were unconcerned whether an officer was employed on a part-time or full-time basis. As a consequence, part-time reservists were killed when delivering bread, driving a milk lorry, working in a shop, employed as a school bus driver, working as a traffic warden, or indeed when walking to their place of civilian employment (Macquigg 2011). In fact, during the period of the Troubles, the first officer to die in an off-duty attack was Reserve constable Raymond Denham who was shot at his civilian workplace in West Belfast in 1972. In 1980, of all the RUC officers who were killed whilst off duty five were members of the Part-time Reserve and the other a member of the Full-time Reserve. In total, 52 members of the Part-time Reserve lost their lives as a result of terrorism and in terms of sacrifice, the case of the Baggley family from Londonderry stands out. In 1974 the IRA killed part-time reservist, William Baggley, and only two years later the organisation murdered his

19-year-old daughter, Linda, who was also a member of the Part-time Reserve. She was shot a short distance from the site of her father's fatal shooting. The Baggley family paid a heavy price for their contribution to the maintenance of law and order.

Unlike those whose employment in policing was full-time, part-time officers experienced the challenges of attending to their safety when in their civilian employment. Regular officers and those in the Full-time Reserve worked with colleagues whom they knew had undergone a robust process of vetting before joining the police. In contrast, part-time reservists could have been working with individuals deeply sympathetic to the IRA and who would be willing to pass on information likely to endanger the officer. Indeed, some of their colleagues might have been in the IRA. A former part-time officer discussed his concerns: 'In my civilian employment I had, at all times, to be aware of colleagues—could they possibly have been setting me up for attack. I was issued with an undershirt bullet proof vest' (response to questionnaire, officer 3, 9 August 2011). This officer made use of flexi time in his civilian workplace in order to vary the times at which he arrived and left work—hardly a strategy for the faint-hearted.

Given the dangerous circumstances that prevailed, switching between the role of civilian employee and a police officer was not easy. Part-time officers were vulnerable because their normal work established patterns over which they had little control. They were also likely to be distracted whilst in their regular job which added to the ease of attacking them. These points raise questions about the wisdom of including a part-time dimension to combating terrorism and this holds for those who served in the part-time UDR many of whom were murdered whilst off duty. Committed and active terrorists in the IRA did not fight the state on a part-time basis. The counter-terrorist policy adopted by the British government resulted in terrorists having the time to gather information, plan, attack—often with fatal consequences—many members of the security forces when they were off duty. Although in many cases the security forces knew of an individual's involvement in terrorism there was no evidence to secure a conviction and so they remained dangerously at large. As discussed in Chapter 2, the US prefers to deal with this problem by detaining suspects without trial in Guantanamo Bay. However, the British government phased internment out at the end of 1975 following the victory of the Labour party in the 1974 general

election. The new Secretary of State, Merylin Rees, opposed the policy (Spjut 1986). Rees's retreat from using this instrument of hard power in favour of a softer political approach may have been motivated by a desire to prevent further alienation of moderate nationalism, which internment was considered to threaten. However, from a counter-terrorist perspective, the ending of internment did nothing to prevent the RUC coming under severe attack the next year—23 officers lost their lives in 1976 and the first to be killed took place the month following the end of internment.

The threat of an off-duty attack taking place at an RUC officer's home was troublesome for two principal reasons. Firstly, whilst on duty officers were conscious of the importance of remaining alert (given the nature of civilian policing which involves responding to the public's everyday needs this was not always easily achieved) but this level of alertness was difficult to sustain when not working. However, for some officers, the threat of being attacked seeped into all aspects of their off-duty life: 'My worst fear of being attacked at home was to be attacked whilst carrying out some task such as working on my car or in the garden. At such times your guard is down and the terrorist has the element of surprise' (response to questionnaire, officer 4, 2 October 2010). In addition to one's guard being down it was also less likely that a personal protection weapon would be near to hand should an attack occur. The officer also discussed how security concerns were factored into the simple task of attending to his garden: 'if working in the garden I would have had my wife on the alert in the background so that she was aware of any strangers coming into the street where we lived' (response to questionnaire, officer 4, 2 October 2010).

A second reason why the threat of an off-duty attack was troublesome was the danger it posed to the safety of an officer's family. As mentioned above, family members died in off-duty attacks. The means of death was not always undercar booby traps. For instance, in 1972 the IRA shot dead UDR man Thomas Bullock and his wife Emily (Kilpatrick 2014). Yet, the concern of officers is especially comprehensible given the IRA's frequent use of undercar explosive devices and the topic requires a little more discussion. Terrorists were prepared to put the family of an officer at risk when they placed a booby-trap device beneath a car especially when it was parked at the family home. It needs to be emphasised that

there was no guarantee that the intended target would end up the actual victim. The threat of an undercar explosion caused considerable anxiety when officers were on duty. Although they habitually checked their cars before using them, officers were concerned in case their wives failed to do so before going to work or taking their children to school. An officer discussed the concerns he experienced:

> Inevitably on occasions, because we were a one car family, I would be transported to work by one of my colleagues, and my wife would use the vehicle to drive our children to school. She was always forewarned to check under the car for devices. There would be occasions when she would forget, and this would fill me with fear and concern when on duty, thinking about their safety when she was driving the car to school. (Response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010)

That the home became a 'military' front—another sphere in which a terrorist might launch an attack—meant that the conflict was inescapable. This reduced the potential of the home to perform the function of recuperation following a stressful day at work especially if an officer was stationed in a dangerous area. Instead of relaxing off duty and emotionally unwinding it was necessary to remain watchful and alert. The unfortified homes of officers and the ordinariness of their neighbourhoods simply hid the danger that the off-duty threat presented.

The off-duty threat constituted a weak point in the individual's and organisation's response to combating terrorism. Although counter-terrorist policing became more sophisticated and officers became better armed and trained, it was more difficult to professionalise a response to the off-duty threat especially given that officers' families were part of the equation. The wearing of body armour, travelling in armoured cars and Land Rovers, operating from a fortified station and always having a firearm near to hand, were rudimentary aspects of policing and promoted officers' safety. Additionally, the knowledge that their colleagues were equally well trained helped equip officers psychologically to cope when working in a dangerous environment. However, their families remained vulnerable. This was a *systematic* threat that terrorists and their family members did not confront. Let us now explore how officers improved their everyday safety in response to the off-duty threat.

PRACTICAL COUNTER-TERRORIST MEASURES

Travelling to work and returning home after a shift was an activity which required careful thought. Threat levels ruled out the option of travelling to work by means of public transport although facilities—certainly to the main urban centres—were adequate. To counter the threat of an off-duty attack demanded that officers exercise as much control as possible over their movements thus making it more difficult for terrorists to plan an attack. Controlling a situation amounted to an officer choosing the time to depart for work and deciding the travel routes (these could quickly be changed at will). Public transport does not afford this level of flexibility as it operates according to strict timetables and predetermined routes. Of course, changing the departure time and using alternate routes were only effective to a point—such measures were not fail-proof ways of avoiding an attack. Some officers were attacked when travelling to work and some when they were returning home. Officers who lived in rural areas were often more at risk than their urban counterparts. It was easier for terrorists to lie hidden in an isolated or semi-isolated location than in a neighbourhood where a suspicious car or person was likely to draw the attention of residents. Country lanes bordered by hedgerows were natural sources of cover for terrorists and afforded them concealment for longer periods.

Officers took different safety precautions when driving to or from work. An officer discussed that at one point in his career he found himself travelling along with sometimes four colleagues usually in two cars. He considered this safer than travelling alone because it facilitated greater observation along the route and offered a collective response should an attack occur. However, the officer was mindful that this formation could have attracted the attention of terrorists in a town which was being used on a regular basis to travel through. Travelling in a rural context sometimes limited the opportunity for officers to vary their routes.

Most often, however, policemen and women travelled alone and it was considered vital to remain vigilant. Officers were conscious that when driving home from a police station they were at risk of being followed. Although an officer may have become suspicious of a car that either was following for too long a period or had been noted by the officer on a previous journey, it was also anticipated that terrorists might attempt to avoid detection by means of the following strategy:

> They would follow you to a certain point today and they would drop off and they would be at that point where they dropped off the next day waiting for your car and they would be in behind you travelling maybe a couple of more miles and they would drop off … and they just did it stage by stage, day by day until they got where you were going. That's how they did it. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

This kind of tactic was less easily combatted and required vigilance on the part of officers particularly when they neared their homes.

Alternatively, terrorists may have already gathered the necessary intelligence and been undetected when doing so. Thus it was necessary for officers to pay attention to vehicles that were travelling ahead and not only those travelling behind. The following comment makes this point and also refers to the standard approach to countering the possibility of terrorist surveillance when travelling by car:

> If I thought I was being followed by another vehicle I would have used such techniques as going round a roundabout twice, going through traffic lights as they turned to red in order to see if the vehicle kept following me. Another technique was to drive very slowly to see if the other vehicle kept following. It was also important to observe vehicles driving in front as the terrorist often knew your destination. If I became sufficiently concerned I would drive to the nearest security force base. (Response to questionnaire, officer 4, 2 October 2010)

Additionally, it might be deemed necessary to drive past one's home town, or house, or take a detour should an officer be concerned he was being followed.

Although alternative routes to and from work were taken, the location of some stations made it difficult to adopt a multiple route strategy and in any case there was no alternative to using the station's entrance when arriving and leaving. This made it all the more important that those on gate duty remain vigilant in order to detect suspicious activity and respond immediately to an officer who is seated in his own car awaiting entry. When reporting for duty, officers did not like having to spend any longer than was necessary to gain access to a station neither did they leave it at a snail's pace when going out on patrol:

> There were inherent dangers in Toomebridge because, as in all police stations I suppose, you went in and out of Toomebridge like a bat out of hell

in an armoured car. But whenever you came in your own car you didn't have the luxury of radioing ahead and letting them know that you were going to be sitting at the door, and you know, sometimes the guy in the sanger could have been out stretching his legs, you know, sometimes it could happen. Although having said that now, at shift change they would normally have been up in the sanger. But there were times whenever you weren't seen coming and you were actually sitting at the door there – you felt very vulnerable I can assure you. Coming home and going to work was always an anxious time. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

Having arrived at some stations, however, parking was another issue that raised security concerns. An Inspector referred to the lack of safety afforded officers who were stationed at Queen Street in Belfast city centre. He said:

There was a farcical situation when I served at Queen Street station in Belfast. We had to park outside the station on the road, clearly visible to all and anyone, on our arrival and departure. The shift system guaranteed my arrival and departure at more or less specific times. Attacks had and did take place on Queen Street station and the personnel arriving at the security gates that surrounded the 'security zone'. (Response to questionnaire, officer 6, 23 September 2010)

Although officers' cars would have been under the gaze of their colleagues who were on duty in the sanger, the parking arrangements did not in the least hamper the intelligence gathering efforts of terrorists. The danger of officers parking outside—but in the vicinity of—a station was evident in the death of Joseph Calvin in 1972 when terrorists attached a bomb beneath his car whilst it was parked in a public car park. The danger was further demonstrated in the deaths of David Dorsett and Mervyn Wilson and the serious injuries of two of their colleagues in 1973. The vehicle that the four officers were travelling in had been parked *outside* Victoria barracks in Londonderry. The IRA were able to plant an undercar device which exploded when the officers drove off. Richard Doherty (2004) claims that congestion within the station led the officers to use a public car park. He also claims that although the car park was under the observation of army personnel, female members of the IRA distracted the soldiers long enough for the bomb to be attached to the vehicle. Both incidents highlighted the need for officers' cars to be adequately protected when they were on duty and this required parking within a station's compound.

For security reasons, it was not permitted for officers to drive directly to some stations in their personal vehicles. As a result, officers would rendezvous at a station where the threat level was lower and then be transported in armoured Land Rovers to their actual station. An officer explained:

> If you were stationed at Woodburn you would have gone to Newforge, got on Land Rovers at Newforge and be ferried up … if you were going to Springfield Road you would have gathered at Grosvenor Road got into the Land Rovers, driven up to Springfield Road to relieve the section that was in there, they would have driven down in the Land Rovers so you'd have been ferried in and out. You certainly wouldn't have gone direct to the station. (Interview with officer 2, 29 June 2011)

Returning to the dangers associated with the use of undercar booby traps, an officer's car was a physical object that the terrorist attempted to use against him. If possible, putting your car in a locked garage at night was preferred instead of leaving it in the driveway or parked on the street. If garaged, this demanded that a terrorist break in and attach a bomb (negotiating a locked garage was an additional factor that was off putting). But it was not always the case that officers had a garage to use and rarer still that they had the use of a double garage. If a family had a single garage but more than one car then a vehicle had to be left in the driveway rendering it vulnerable. A policeman who encountered this problem said that his policy was to check all the cars owned by his family to ensure that a bomb had not been placed underneath the one used by his wife or children—an added stress but a necessary safeguard. However, if the car was to be used for travelling into town where it would be left for a period, then other precautions had to be taken. It was considered better to park the vehicle in as open a space as possible so that terrorists might be deterred by the thoughts of being detected by a passer-by. To counter the IRA's use of undercar devices that were activated by means of a mercury tilt switch, an officer ensured that his car was parked unevenly with one side slightly elevated on the kerb: 'I put one side up on the kerb to prevent the planting of tilt-switch bombs' (response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010). Checking beneath one's car is a conspicuous act. Therefore, parking with the driver's side opposite a wall rather than the open road or across from an uninhabited building was thought to be a pertinent security measure as it enabled the car to be checked without drawing the same level of attention. Officers used other

tactics when checking their cars in a public place. Sometimes they would appear accidentally to drop their keys, which when they bent down to recover them, allowed for a quick visual check of the car's underside. The wheel arch on the driver's side, which was also an area used by terrorists to plant a bomb, could be inspected whilst appearing to be checking the air pressure in the tyre. The costs of not checking for an explosive device could have been death or severe injury.

The terrorists' use of letter bombs posed a threat not only to the officer but also his family. The IRA attacked the security forces and the wider British establishment in this way. This is accounted for in the memories of Shane O'Doherty (2011) who was a key IRA letter-bomb maker. Although quite badly injured by a letter bomb he was constructing and so had some idea of the suffering it was capable of inflicting on others, it produced no empathy as he was responsible for making a series of these devices in the 1970s. Again, similar to the undercar booby trap there was no guarantee that in a family context the person to whom the booby-trapped letter was addressed would actually open it. Due to the relatively small amount of explosives that would be used in this kind of attack, the use of letter bombs reflected the willingness of terrorists to maim their victims by inflicting serious injury, rather than killing them outright. An officer discussed the danger of this type of targeting and his response to it:

> They were not a common terrorist method. I had limited variety of cor-respondence and therefore anything different or exceptional would have raised suspicions. No specific training, but there would be briefings on any new threat. Effectively it was to be aware of anything unusual, unexpected or suspicious, e.g. padded envelopes, larger envelopes with unaccounted for bumps or lumps. The family were warned not to open anything and I told [wife's name] to be suspicious of anything unusual or unexpected. (Response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010)

A similar approach was adopted by another officer:

> I had a very simple (and certainly not foolproof) method. A letter bomb, by its very nature, had to be bulky. The only bulky items I ordered by post I used both initials and my house name as well as number… If a parcel arrived addressed like that I was reasonably sure it was safe. If an unex-pected bulky envelope or parcel arrived I checked it out as closely as possible; looking for handwriting, postmark, smell, evenness of weight distribution etc. Unless I was more than concerned there was always that

moment of holding your breath and opening it by slicing it in the middle (never open in the expected location on the envelope where a trigger mechanism would be attached) with a razor blade to have a peek inside. Usually a letter bomb was relatively safe until moved out of the envelope - it was the movement out of the envelope that detonated it. (Response to questionnaire, officer 4, 2 October 2010)

Cars require servicing irrespective of who owns them. In the context of Northern Ireland it was necessary to choose carefully which garage to use. The murder of Detective Constable, Paddy McNulty, highlights this point. When arranging a service with a garage in Londonderry, he was recognised as a member of the RUC by an 'employee who was involved with the IRA' and who 'told the terrorists that a policeman would be leaving his car at the garage on the Thursday morning' (Doherty 2004, p. 135). Constable McNulty was shot dead when he arrived at the garage as planned. Officers would use mechanics that were known to be 'friendly' and sympathetic toward the RUC. Garages would usually be located in Protestant areas and mechanics may have been well known to officers for years. Ideally, from a security perspective, officers would leave their cars into garages that were owned by part-time members of the RUC Reserve or part-time soldiers in the UDR. In the case where a garage had a number of employees, it was also possible to seek the advice of RUC Special Branch before booking a service. It was important to remove anything from the car that might have identified the owner as a member of the RUC. An officer mentioned that he preferred his wife to take the car to the garage so that he was not visually identified with it. Following the completion of repair or service work another safety precaution was to collect the vehicle at a different time to the one that had been arranged. The best way, however, to reduce anxiety in this context was simply to *know* who was carrying out the work to the car. In order to have their cars serviced, officers may have had to travel greater distances than other members of the public and were less able to 'shop around' for better deals.

The problems associated with a simple—and for most people—taken-for-granted act like having a car serviced or repaired become clearer when set against a background of the efforts of terrorists to gather intelligence. An officer commented that before joining the police he had been employed as a car paint sprayer. He discussed his surprise when, after joining the police, it came to his attention that a former fellow

employee was under suspicion of IRA membership. This person did not come from a 'hard-line' area and although their religious affiliation was known, the individual's political views were never aired or discussed in the workplace. This gave the officer serious cause for concern because it was now a matter of common knowledge amongst his former workmates that he had joined the RUC. Given that he had not at this point moved house and his address was recorded with his former employer, added to his anxiety. This points to the simple ways that terrorists and their sympathisers can gather potentially life-threatening information about members of the security forces.

There were standard measures taken by almost all officers to improve the safety of their homes. Extra locks were fitted to the front and back doors. Security chains were used on doors but these presented their own dangers because, when used, they afforded a gunman an opportunity to shoot. Rather than rely on a door's security chain it was better to check, from a safe location like an upstairs window (or side window), the identity of a caller before answering or even approaching the door. Wives and children had to exercise caution when responding to the doorbell. Unwittingly, they could have been opening the door to a terrorist or could themselves have been shot by mistake—terrorists get nervy and panicky. Members of the IRA were keen to commit murder but they were keener to ensure they escaped having done so. The desire to escape can lead to recklessness. During the Troubles wives were also shot and injured when their husbands were attacked.

Outside the house it was standard counter-terrorist practice to fit security lights to the front and rear of the house which operated on the basis of an infra-red motion sensory system and came on when someone approached. The sudden activation of the light alerted officers to movement in the immediate area of their home. However, it was not uncommon for dogs and meandering cats to activate the light and give cause for alarm late in the evening or during the night. Before this kind of security measure became a familiar anti-criminal device used by the public, officers were aware that its use could generate suspicion amongst neighbours and those who were working or visiting in the street. This made it all the more important to live in what was regarded as a safe area and where the political orientation of neighbours (and those visiting them) was less likely to be anti-state. This was a greater concern for officers who lived in more rural areas to the south and west of the province where the local population may have had mixed attitudes toward the RUC and the security forces in general.

However, making one's home feel safer also had natural, simpler and non-technical, dimensions. For example, some officers felt safer with a thick and tall hedge, or series of bushes, around their garden than one that was open, although others preferred to remove hedges and bushes because it was thought this would afford terrorists a degree of cover for launching an attack: 'I ensured that hedges, bushes etc. were kept well trimmed to afford little cover to anyone who would have wanted to use them for cover' (response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010).

Some officers commented that if their home had two reception rooms—one at the front and one at the back of the house—the rear room was preferred to spend most time in. It was considered less easily approached in addition to being closed off to ordinary callers. Hence anyone spotted at the rear of one's property instantly caused alarm. But it was not always possible to detect a terrorist attack on one's home: in 1990 Inspector Derek Monteith was murdered by the IRA at his home in Armagh while his wife and three sons were in the house. He died as a result of being shot through a downstairs window. Not far from this shooting the IRA killed Reserve Constable, George Starrett, who also was shot through the downstairs window of his home. During daytime it was customary to keep blinds tilted so that the occupants of a room were not easily observed from outside (blinds would be closed when darkness descended and/or curtains drawn).

The cleaning of a police uniform was not a matter to be treated lightly. A uniform would only be cleaned using a recommended dry cleaners. This was likely to be an establishment that regularly handled police officers' uniforms or one where the members of staff were known personally. The safest practice, of course, was to use a dry cleaning firm where the owner had a familial connection with the security forces. Shirts could be washed at home but never placed outside to dry. An officer said that his 'uniform was always dried inside the house, either in the hotpress or tumble drier—never on the clothes line' (response to questionnaire, officer 3, 9 August 2011). Hanging police shirts outside on a clothesline was deemed too dangerous as this would have disclosed one's occupation. While officers may have known their neighbours' political attitudes they did not know the views of those visiting their neighbours' homes whether friends or workmen. Police officers, although living in areas that were regarded 'safe' or low risk, did not always divulge to their neighbours the nature of their occupation.

Generally, officers felt that the less people who knew they were in the police the better. Loose talk was to be avoided as a former policewoman commented: 'not with all cases but in quite a few cases—where people were shot or blown up at home—they always did a brave bit of talking themselves. It wasn't hard for people to find out where they lived' (interview with officer 7, 14 July 2010). Given the fact that officers' neighbours have relations, work colleagues, a circle of friends as well as their children also having friends, meant that there were potentially many channels by which information could travel.

While officers were most anxious that their personal details did not fall into the hands of republicans the thoughts of loyalists obtaining them caused distress also. Protestant paramilitaries had been known to attack the homes of police officers. The RUC's counter-terrorist focus on loyalist groups led to regular house searches for weapons and resulted in many arrests. This fuelled loyalist resentment. However, following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 tensions soared within the Protestant community and multiple protests and demonstrations followed. The RUC was in the frontline dealing with them. Officers' homes were attacked by angry loyalists using stones and petrol bombs. The author can recall the aftermath of a petrol bomb attack on a policeman's home in the loyalist Kilcooley estate in Bangor in 1986: although having lived in the area for many years the officer was forced to move house. Obviously, officers could not be certain if their neighbours harboured sympathies for loyalist paramilitaries. An officer described an incident which he was fearful could have endangered him at his home:

> I saw the policing of parades as a specific political move to distance the police service from the community who supported them. I could see the frustration in ordinary law-abiding citizens being provoked and the wedge it was driving in families, social circles and communities. On one occasion I was on one side of the barrier blocking a parade coming down the Ormeau Road and my next door neighbour was on the other. We exchanged greetings. It was a particularly physical exchange that day and in the back of my mind I worried if I would be targeted by the very law-abiding community who supported me. Not my neighbour but some other hot head who would have vented their anger on me, an easy target. That night I went over to see him. He had no bad feelings and I was re-assured. (Response to questionnaire, officer 6, 23 September 2010)

A combination of shift patterns, safety features around the house, the regular—although performed discreetly—safety checks on one's car before using it, and a good standard of living, made it difficult for officers to conceal their occupation from those who lived in the immediate and general neighbourhood. Whilst a coat could be worn over a police shirt, unless an officer changed out of uniform before travelling home, trousers and boots were less easily hidden and could be observed when getting out of a car. However, when home, some officers pointed out that they preferred to get out of uniform as quickly as possible in case someone called at the house.

That everyday social needs generated security considerations is illustrated in the context of, say, eliciting the services of an electrician, plumber, interior decorator or gardener. It was not the case that officers' wives could choose as they saw fit. Rather, it was necessary to ensure that the person commissioned to do the work posed no threat to their husbands' safety. Usually trades persons would be recommended and vouched for by other members of the security forces or members of an officer's family before their services were employed. This meant that it was not always possible to employ the services of the cheapest source. However, if the services of a tradesperson were to be used but the individual was not known personally or had not been recommended by a reliable source, then it was necessary to hide any item that might have connected their husband with the RUC. This was especially important when an officer was selling his house and prospective buyers, whose background was unknown, were calling to view. Of course, as well as removing RUC-related items a police officer may have asked an estate agent to show a viewer around his or her home. This approach avoided the possibility of being recognised by someone they may have come into contact with during the course of their duties. This affected officers who lived relatively near to where they were stationed and the most obvious examples being the heavily policed cities of Belfast and Londonderry. Accordingly, a female officer who lived in the Waterside area of Londonderry, but who served in the nationalist Cityside, made reference to the security concerns that arose when she was selling her house. She used an estate agent who was aware of her occupation:

> When we were selling our house in Londonderry the estate agent rang a couple of times and said 'Oh I'd advise you not to be about, I'm not so sure of these people that are going to view' that was twice the estate agent

rang, you know, and said that. Maybe they could have been in the IRA or something like that. Or you might have thought at that time that they [members of the IRA] would have come round to view just to see who was in the house. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

Attending hospital or visiting a patient was subject to security considerations particularly if it involved the Royal Victoria Hospital (RVH) in Belfast. The hospital is situated next to the republican Falls area in West Belfast which is an area of high risk. In 1981 the IRA shot and killed Reserve Constable, Colin Dunlop, when he was on security duty in the intensive care unit of the hospital. One respondent who served for twenty-two years as a police officer in West Belfast discussed the difficulties that he experienced when taking his son to an appointment in the RVH. He accounted for how he was verbally assaulted by a porter in the hospital whom he claimed was a known member of the IRA and someone he had once arrested and questioned in relation to terrorist activities. Another officer said that when he had reason to visit the RVH he preferred to sit in the car whilst his wife went in. However, when his father was once a patient in this hospital he decided to compromise his safety: 'When my father was taken into the Royal [RVH] I took the risk of being spotted, as at this time I was policing the area, visiting my father was more important' (response to questionnaire, officer 6, 23 September 2010). It might also have been the case that a hospitalised officer found himself in the same ward as a terrorist suspect:

One of our colleagues in Downpatrick [officer's name] was shot and he was in the Down Hospital and I went to see him and he said 'I want moved from here' and I said 'why?' He said: 'first of all if you look across the ward … there's a boy [man] there in the bed in the far corner, he's a terrorist, he's both his hands blown off when he was planting a bomb'. He said: 'I want to be moved to the military wing of Musgrave Park Hospital' and next day he was moved there. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

As discussed in Chapter 2, the IRA bombed the military wing of this hospital in 1991 so the officer was potentially safer elsewhere.

The manner of an officer's stay in hospital might have raised the suspicions of a terrorist sympathiser or an employee who belonged to a terrorist group:

> We were all in BUPA because having about 6,000 or 9,000 members we could dictate a reasonably good rate for BUPA and probably the same for other security forces, so this nurse who wasn't even on the ward knew that if there was somebody on a private ward, you're BUPA – 'oh, security forces' so it was giving the game away, so that maybe 8 times out of 10 you were security forces, you'd this big agreement with BUPA. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

This is not the sort of indicator that jumps to mind when exploring the nature of terrorist intelligence gathering.

Security considerations had to be borne in mind when taking a holiday. If holidaying in Northern Ireland officers were restricted to pro-state areas which were *de facto* Protestant and unionist. Nationalist areas, especially those with a republican element, were best avoided. Security calculations took place on a relatively small scale because of the province's sectarian geography as an officer pointed out: 'Places that Republicans were known to use as holiday resorts were avoided. For example, we visited Portrush and Portstewart on the north Antrim coast quite freely yet we seldom visited places like Cushendall or Waterfoot on the same coast' (response to questionnaire, officer 4, 2 October 2010). The same was true of caravan sites in that some were considered safe, or at least safer, and some not. Of course, well-established holiday and short-break destinations could become less attractive in the wake of a serious terrorist attack such as those which occurred in 1987 when the IRA murdered two constables in Portrush on 11 April followed by that of an Inspector in Newcastle on 20 April. If on holiday within Northern Ireland it was standard that a personal protection weapon be taken.

Not unexpectedly, officers were strongly discouraged from taking holidays in the Republic of Ireland. The border region was particularly dangerous and it was not unheard of for the IRA in South Armagh to set up a road checkpoint for publicity purposes. In 1990 the IRA abducted and later shot and killed Detective Constable Louis Robinson as he crossed the border following a fishing trip to the Republic. The organisation also killed two senior officers, Harry Breen and Bob Buchanan, in March 1989 shortly after they crossed back into Northern Ireland having met with their counterparts in the Republic to discuss security matters. An RUC Inspector commented upon his experiences of taking holidays in the Republic:

I always felt vulnerable going to the Republic. On one occasion, on the west coast town of Lahinch, I was questioned aggressively and closely by a man in a bar and felt I was about to be attacked just because I said I came from Bangor [town in Northern Ireland]. On other occasions I had people give me a greeting in Gaelic and I saw this as a means of categorising me. They may as well asked me what school I went to. (Response to questionnaire, officer 6, 23 September 2010)

Taking a holiday outside Northern Ireland was considered to pose fewer security problems. However, it was still necessary to remain cautious. England, whilst obviously safer than Northern Ireland, was an IRA target. The organisation also struck on the European continent when it killed three British servicemen in the Netherlands in 1988 and clearly had been planning an attack in Gibraltar the same year. In 1989 the IRA killed British serviceman Maheshkumar Islania in the former West Germany. His infant daughter, Niurati Islania, was also killed in the attack. This indicated that the organisation was quite prepared to broaden its terrorist reach. This altered the perception of Europe as a place where it was safe to relax which, of course, is the effect the organisation intended.

Notwithstanding the location of a holiday, it was common policy that officers not reveal the nature of their occupation to other holidaymakers. For some, this encouraged a more introvert approach which made socialising beyond one's family less likely. Officers who were prepared to socialise with other holiday goers were also prepared to be untruthful if asked what they worked at. This could present a problem in that an innocent follow up job-related question could put one in an embarrassing and awkward position. Accordingly, officers who had worked in jobs before joining the police would often refer to these occupations as their current one so that any further, or more technical questions, could be handled easily. Making this point an officer commented: 'If asked by someone what my occupation was I told them I was an engineer. As I was already a qualified engineer it was easy to answer any further questions which may have followed' (response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010). Another officer made use of a specialised role he performed to address the same issue:

On holidays vigilance in making friends was required just as constantly as at home for when you met someone socially it was never too long until they would ask what I worked at. For 6 years I was a lecturer in the Police

> Training centre and that made answering easy: I told them I was a lecturer. If they followed by asking 'what subjects', I told them I lectured in Law subjects. (Response to questionnaire, officer 4, 2 October 2010)

However, when taking a foreign holiday many officers preferred simply to avoid other holidaymakers particularly if they came from Northern Ireland. Perhaps many policemen and women appeared to be anti-social and unfriendly whenever their behaviour was conditioned by the terrorist threat.

The old Second World War adage 'loose talk costs lives' was as true of that war as it was of the unconventional conflict waged against Northern Ireland's security forces. The adage was intended to alert citizens to the possible danger of inadvertently passing on security-related information useful to one's enemy. Intelligence gathering is performed by many different people and is not the preserve of those who detonate bombs or pull triggers. Yet the individual passing of information to the active members of a terrorist group is indispensable to the killing process. Steve Bruce (1997, p. 68) makes an interesting point when it comes to the number of people who may have been involved in an attack:

> details of court cases often reveal that a very large number of people are involved in planning a murder. It may begin with a workmate who over-hears that a colleague is a reserve policeman. He passes that information to a friend who is known to be connected. He in turn submits the victim to the planners. Five or six people may have a hand in the planning and a similar number in the commission. One person stores the weapons, another steals the car, three or four people are involved in the shooting, another provides the safe house where the assassin changes clothes. Yet another disposes of the clothes. Another moves the murder weapon back to safe storage. It is not implausible that 15 or so people may have had a part in one act of political murder.

Bruce's figures may or may not be accurate but his point informs us that it was the wisdom of policing in a deeply divided society that officers keep their occupation undisclosed.

While parents, siblings, wider family connections and friends would likely know one's occupation, the decision of officers to inform their children had to be given careful consideration. Whereas the life experience of most adults enables them to assess accurately the extent and seriousness of a threat, children are less able in this regard. Children are, after all, proud of their fathers (and mothers) and the jobs they do.

However, officers risked compromising their security by telling their children what they worked at. This problem was acknowledged in the Patten Report (1999, p. 3): 'police officers dare not tell their children what they do for a living for fear of attack from extremists from both sides.' It is not surprising, then, that some officers kept secret their true employment at least until their children were sufficiently mature of age. Maturity was measured in terms of children comprehending the dangers that accompanied police work. An officer pointed out that his children: 'Were not aware of my job until they were old enough to understand that they ought not to talk about it with all and sundry. This required a great deal of trust on my part and a lot of maturity on the part of the children' (response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010).

The decision not to inform their children as to their true employment was not only motivated by security concerns. Other officers did not inform their children because they did not want them to worry each time they went on duty. This way it was possible to maintain a more normal home life and keep their children from experiencing unnecessary anxiety. Children had to find out at some point but until they were informed some officers found the deception an ethical challenge as one explained:

> I suppose the most difficult thing about being in the RUC was the fact that you could not under any circumstances divulge your occupation to ordinary civilians. The fact was that my own children thought that I was a fireman up until they were 12 and 13 years of age. The fear was that if they told school friends, then this information could be disclosed innocently or otherwise, to people who would wish to harm me and my family. Constantly telling lies about your occupation even in respect of routine matters such as applying for a mortgage, a hospital appointment, indeed anything where you were asked for your occupation, all were very difficult, and I regret to say, continue to this day. (Response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010)

The kind of ethical dilemma that is pointed to in the above comment was also to the fore in the answer provided by another officer who was highly decorated in recognition of his service to the RUC:

> Life was a contradiction for my children. I wanted my kids to have principles, moral values and honesty from an early age yet the first thing that I taught them was how to lie – 'don't tell anybody what your dad works at', you know what I mean, a total contradiction. (Interview with officer 1, 29 June 2011)

While some officers delayed informing their children as to their actual job, others thought it necessary to make them aware much earlier. The decision to do so was not easy and reflected the real dangers associated with an off-duty attack. A member of the DPOA said: 'My children always knew—they had to because of the security implications. They had to learn quickly—it could mean life or death' (response to questionnaire, officer 8, 21 September 2010). In similar fashion another officer said: 'Our children were made aware of what I did and were careful when answering telephones and replying to [a knock at] the door' (response to questionnaire, officer 9, 26 September 2010). Yet there were situations when officers became aware of the weight of responsibility that they were placing on their children's shoulders in terms of maintaining secrecy:

> I never hid from my children that I was a police officer but did tell them never to say what I did. I remember [son's name] coming home from primary school and telling me a man was giving a presentation. This man asked if any pupils had dads in the police. [Son's name] reassured me he did not put up his hand. The fact that this was the local Crime Prevention officer made no difference. This really brought home to me the ripple effect of what I did; all children are excited and proud to say what their Dads do. I found it upsetting. (Response to questionnaire, officer 6, 23 September 2010)

Unfortunately, the impact that the conflict had on the children of members of the security forces has not received research attention but the topic will be discussed in the next chapter. Without doubt, however, for those children who knew that their fathers and mothers were police officers and had a grasp of the dangers that accompanied the job, this knowledge would not naturally be associated with a normal and happy childhood experience.

Officers who had children confronted other problems with regards to an off-duty attack. Ideally, a personal protection weapon would be immediate to hand or quickly accessible if needed. Otherwise there was little point in having a firearm. Yet homes with young children do not make for good and safe armouries. A weapon left within the reach of a child whether because of carelessness, or momentary absentmindedness, could have had disastrous consequences. As a result either of not wishing, or, finding it a practical impossibility to carry a gun on one's person around the house, it was necessary that a weapon be put in a safe place.

However, it was a potentially lethal weapon and necessitated being placed above a kitchen cupboard or bedroom wardrobe so not in easy reach of young children. An officer described the added safety concerns that arose as a result of being a policeman and a father:

> I kept mine in a locked safe in the top of my wardrobe - it did hinder speedy access if required but a balance had to be struck between ease of access for me and ease of access for the curiosity of my children. Very often I would have carried it discreetly on my person. For that reason I refused to take a Ruger revolver as they were much bulkier than the Walther PPK pistol that I had. To balance access to protection I kept my PPW in a bedroom at the rear of the house and a shotgun in a safe at the front of the house. (Response to questionnaire, officer 5, 13 October 2010)

The whereabouts to clean one's personal protection weapon also had to be given consideration. While some officers cleaned their weapons at the station others opted to do this at home. The problem with performing this task at home was the fact that, for children, the regular sight of their father stripping down and cleaning a gun could easily give rise to a mood of inquisitiveness—extremely dangerous should a child manage to access the weapon (Figs. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).



Fig. 4.1 Cause of death

Status of Officers Killed

Fig. 4.2 Status of officers killed

Age Range of Fatalities


Fig. 4.3 Age range of fatalities

Number of Fatalities On Duty and Off Duty

Fig. 4.4 Number of fatalities on duty and off duty

CONCLUSION

The chance of an off-duty attack taking place constituted one of the most serious and difficult threats for RUC officers to cope with not least because the dangers of the job became pervasive. The home of an officer was unlike the homes of officers in other constabularies in the UK. This is to be understood both in terms of actual security features and the emotional mood of the home. Wives and children were negatively affected and this could not be avoided. The large number of officers who lost their lives in off-duty attacks (and many members of the UDR) was a grim reminder of the need to do so. Whether travelling to or from work, shopping, socialising, holidaying, pursuing a leisure activity, attending church, or simply being at home with one's family, there was no point at which officers could afford completely to let down their guard. To do so exposed them to greater risk. That a terrorist attack could kill or injure a family member—wife or child—prevented an RUC family experiencing the normality which the vast majority of people take for granted. In this respect, the cost of the Troubles has been emotionally high for the families of those who served in the security forces. The next chapter will examine in detail the impact of terrorism on officers' families.

References

Bruce, S. (1997). Victim Selection in Ethnic Conflict: Motives and Attitudes in Irish Republicanism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(1), 56–71.

Doherty, R. (2004). *The Thin Green Mile: The History of the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC*. South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword.

Kilpatrick, C. (2014). IRA Victim Hits Out at 'Sick' Hunger Strike Parade Through Derrylin. *Belfast Telegraph*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/ira-victim-hits-out-at-sick-hunger-strike-parade-through-derrylin-30434718.html.

Macquigg, J. (2011). *History of the RUC Reserve: 1970–2001*. Belfast: RUC George Cross Foundation.

Mapstone, R. (1994). *Policing in a Divided Society: A Study of Part-Time Policing in Northern Ireland*. Avebury: University of Michigan.

McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C., & McVea, D. (1999). *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

Murray, R. (1984). Killings of Local Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969–1981. *Terrorism: An International Journal, 7*(1), 11–52.

O'Doherty, S. (2011). *The Volunteer*. Durham: Strategic Book Group.

Schmid, A. (Ed.). (2011). *The Routledge of Terrorism Handbook*. New York: London.

Spjut, R. (1986). Internment and Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland 1971–1975: Ministerial Policy and Practice. *Modern Law Review, 49*(6), 712–739.

Summers, C. (2009). *Lives Lost to the Troubles*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7853266.stm.

Trotter, S. (2010). *Constabulary Heroes 1826–2009*. Coleraine: Impact Printing.

Victor, P. (1994). Family Mourns Its Third Ulster Victim. *Independent*. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/family-mourns-its-third-ulster-victim-1437754.html.

Woods, I. (1999). The IRA's Border Campaign, 1956–1962. In M. Anderson & E. Bort (Eds.), *The Irish Border: History, Politics, Culture*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

The Impact of Terrorism on Officers' Families

As noted in the Introduction, the effect of terrorism on victims is a neglected topic in terrorism studies. This is the case in analyses of the Northern Ireland conflict where the threat and impact of terrorist violence on members of the security forces and their families has been ignored. Indeed, more widely within social science, the sociology of policing in contexts of violent ethnic division has failed to explore comprehensively the impact of the occupation on officers' wives and children. Yet, as Janet Finch (1983) makes clear wives experience 'emotional labour'. Finch's term captures the supportive part played by women in the lives of men who are affected by their husband's job. As the title of her book suggests, these women are married to the job. We can conceive of this 'labour' as having a detrimental edge to it in forms of employment where there exist high levels of occupational stress such as policing (Kop et al. 1999; Collins and Gibbs 2003). Whilst policing is a dangerous and stressful form of employment regardless of context, it could be argued that occupational stress was magnified in the case of the RUC because of the additional dangers associated with terrorism (Brewer and Magee 1991; Majendie 1991).

The familial impact of the general stress associated with security-related jobs has received some scholarly attention. Susan Jackson and Christina Maslach (1982) studied the impact which stress has on police officers and their families in the US. They recognised that policing is an occupation which results in on-the-job stresses being 'taken home' with disruptive effects on the family—officers return home in different

physical (exhausted) and psychological (angry, tense, upset) states which impacts on family life. An important observation the authors made was that when work-related stress has an unpleasant effect on home life it can generate negative attitudes in family members towards the job. This can cause the family context to be one wherein the burned out officer is offered less social and emotional support. In turn, this can cause the officer to feel resentful of his work which can affect his behaviour whilst on the job. Research on the effects of other security-related jobs on family relationships has been conducted. Elaine Crawley's (2002) exploration of the relationship between prison officers and their families identified similar problems. Her interest lay in examining the 'difficulties, conflicts and tensions' prison officers 'face when attempting to move between their prison lives and home' (Crawley 2002, p. 277) and she highlighted the fact that the emotional and psychological dimensions of work are not confined to the place where work is done but have a 'spill-over' effect. The idea of a spill-over effect is relevant to this study but the concept needs to be viewed in the light of the terrorist threat that existed during the Northern Ireland conflict. When matters are viewed in this way it allows us to deepen Finch's concept of 'emotional labour'; broaden Jackson and Maslach's idea of stress being 'taken home'; and causes us to appreciate the greater weight of seriousness attached to Crawley's idea of 'spill-over'.

The support that wives afforded their RUC husbands occurred under abnormal and considerably challenging conditions. This was acknowledged when the Constabulary was awarded the George Cross for bravery and collective gallantry. During the award ceremony Queen Elizabeth II said:

> I also pay tribute to the part played by other, often unsung heroes. It has simply not been possible for officers' families to enjoy normal lives. Today's award recognises the very special contribution made by these families they have been a constant source of support, and have had to endure fear, intimidation and, worst of all, the pain of bereavement.[1]

As noted in the last chapter, the IRA targeted officers when they were off duty.

---

[1] Queen's Speech at the award of the George Cross to the RUC, 12 April 2000. Available from http://royalulsterconstabulary.org/gc2.htm.

However, it was also noted that off-duty targeting did not only have a psychological impact in terms of generating fear amongst family members, it also carried with it the real danger that they could be physically harmed. As a result, it is not difficult to conceive of how off-duty attacks gave rise to high levels of familial anxiety. Certainly, where attacks resulted in children being killed, severely injured, or deeply traumatised, they serve as examples of the disregard terrorists had for a particularly vulnerable group. While it is recognised that terrorist organisations are not signatories to international agreements which endeavour to establish ground rules for waging conflict, this does not prevent us from considering how some terrorist acts grossly violated basic principles of humanitarian law where it applies to the category of civilian.

Attacks in Northern Ireland demonstrated terrorists' disregard for such developments as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which informed by the humanitarian disaster of the Second World War, sought to protect civilians during conflict. Further, it could be argued that in the case of the use of undercar explosive devices the killing and maiming of civilians contravenes the *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of the 12 August 1949* which supplemented the 1949 Conventions. The Protocol was designed to provide clarification and add legal protection to civilians caught up in conflict. Similar to the use of anti-personnel mines, which has been deplored by the majority of states, undercar booby traps had an indiscriminate side to them. As discussed in the previous chapter, when terrorists planted the device there was no certainty that the intended victim would be the actual victim or the only victim. In other words, the terrorist could not be sure, in what otherwise may have appeared to be a discriminate form of targeting, that a civilian—a member of the officer's family—would not be killed alongside the officer or perhaps in place of the officer should another member of the family happen to be using the car when the bomb exploded. With regards to the 'means of combat' where a distinction between a civilian and non-civilian could *not* be clearly made chapter II, Article 51, point 5 of the 1977 Protocol outlawed them in the following way:

(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949)

In the last two decades violent acts which endanger children have been severely condemned by the United Nations (UN). The UN's *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (1996) referred to the concept of children as 'zones of peace' (Machel 1996). According to this conceptualisation children ought to be spared unnecessary encounters with violence and those engaged in violent operations ought not to plan and *target* in a manner that may result in children experiencing violent conflict directly—perhaps sustaining severe injury, or worse, being mortally wounded. Interestingly, the UN report was informed by a research field trip to Northern Ireland. The examples cited in Chapter 4 regarding IRA off-duty attacks on RUC officers transgresses the kind of protective principle which the international community has sought to establish for civilians generally, and since the mid-1990s, children especially. Such attacks allow us to conceive of officers' wives and children as conflict-affected women and young people but their experiences have received little research attention.

The dearth of material on the familial impact of terrorism can be viewed as part of a wider issue regarding the under-researched topic of the effects of conflict on women. In one sense this is unsurprising in that conflict usually occurs in a masculine framework and so can all too easily lead to a concentration on the role of males as aggressors or defenders, as warmongers or peacebuilders whilst women go less observed. Critical research in Northern Ireland has drawn attention to this issue. For example, Fidelma Ashe (2012) has highlighted how the predominant masculine culture in both unionist and nationalist communities has served socially and politically to marginalise women. She argues that the sidelining of women was not only a feature of Northern Ireland during the Troubles but is characteristic of the post-settlement period. Ashe's work encourages us to peer beyond the male-centredness of much research not least because gendered analyses can result in an incomplete picture being painted of a conflict setting. It could be argued that the marginality of women which Ashe points to is a problem which pertains to studies of women officers in the RUC and females in the security forces more generally.

By focusing on the families of RUC officers this chapter seeks to make a contribution to the scholarly understanding of the familial impact of terrorism. It also adds to critical examinations of the Northern Ireland conflict to the extent that it accounts for women's experiences. It casts light on the challenges and dangers that families encountered. The challenges were multifaceted and the dangers real. The image which emerges from the research is that of families existing at the level of vulnerability to terrorist attack.

The Experiences of Officers and Their Wives

A recurring theme raised by participants in the research was the constant need to minimise the possibility of being attacked by terrorists: important in this respect was limiting the number of people who had knowledge of one's employment in the RUC. Wives had a key role to play in concealing their husband's occupational identity as well as protecting significant details like a home address. The following comment by an officer's wife provides us with some insight in relation to the factors that wives had to take into consideration as a matter of daily routine:

> It's funny when you think about it and look back, I felt as if my whole life was living a lie – I lived a lie my whole live because I had to tell lies from the minute – maybe lies is not the right word but an exaggeration of the truth perhaps – you know every single time. I practically lived by my single name … you didn't give your proper name, nor did you give your proper address if someone wanted an address from you. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

The context within which the above comment was made was that of maintaining family security. The overriding concern of this woman was keeping her husband safe and this called for the concealment of aspects of her true identity from those whom she did not know or trust. Ideally, it was considered best to avoid situations where the topic of her or her husband's identity might be discussed. However, should this be impossible then security considerations were such that she was prepared to be evasive, deliberately misleading or simply untruthful. While this might be considered an understandable security response on the part of wives to the threat of terrorism it was not without its ethical problems. This was especially so for individuals who may have held deep-seated religious convictions which were incompatible with telling lies or exaggerating on the truth.

For a married officer, working in the RUC was not just challenging because it was dangerous it also involved working long hours. For the vast majority of officers it also meant working shift patterns. Rather than overtime being a matter of personal choice as it is in most jobs, it was often compulsory and the requirement to work extra hours frequently came on the basis of very short notice—a direct reflection of the unpredictability of terrorism. The regularity of working compulsory overtime adds up from one month to the next, followed by one year after another, and can end up an all-to-common feature over the course of a career.

Officers who joined at the outbreak of the Troubles saw their complete careers impacted upon by terrorism and its effects seeped into all parts of their lives. One effect of a combination of shift patterns and protracted overtime hours was the projection of wives into the lead role when it came to a number of familial responsibilities. The experience of wives as having an increased role in the raising of their families is suitably captured in the following comment by an officer's wife who refers to facets of her children's schooling:

> I went to parents' evenings. I went to teachers' meetings, I went to everything on my own. It was as if I didn't have a husband because he wasn't there. But I wasn't resentful of that because it was his job and that's what happened then. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

Although this comment points to the additional social duties that were placed upon a wife's shoulders it was responded to with a supportive attitude. The subtext of the comment is one of general acceptance and the remark 'that's what happened then' is underpinned by an acknowledgement that working in the RUC was a demanding occupation which affected wives too. In addition to working long hours, it was not uncommon for family life to be disrupted as a consequence of an officer having to spend perhaps three or four days away from home whilst on specific duties. For officers with young children, it was also not unusual for them to leave their home early in the morning with their children asleep only to find that by the time they returned in the evening their children were already asleep in bed. This resulted in a sense of emotional loss. An officer discussed a particular experience which has remained with him:

> My daughter was about five at the time and I gave her a wee peck on the cheek in her bed going out and she said: 'daddy are you coming in or are you going out?' five or six years old. So any bedtime stories were very precious to establish a bond or maintain a bond because you were away maybe three or four days at a time sometimes. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

Indeed, it was often voiced in the focus groups how officers felt that their job required a serious personal and familial sacrifice be made. Critical reflection upon the demands of their jobs has led some to realise that they lost out on a considerable amount of family time and at the

cost of a more meaningful paternal experience. Although not based on a scholarly piece of research, a survey involving 2000 parents found that the primary parental regret is spending too much time in work instead of with one's children (*Daily Mail* 2012). An officer lamented the amount of time he spent working and said:

> Now, when I think back – I would think about it now more than I would have at the time – it was a way of life at the time. I understood it, but looking back now I feel that probably my family actually missed out on quite a lot. In fact it's only now that I've retired that I've realised how much I have missed out on because I feel now that I have more time for them and we can sit down and have a conversation. There were times when I never, maybe a week went past and I never saw my children because with the way things were going on I was late – I didn't get home for tea and they were in bed maybe … the next morning I was up and away before they got up and went to school and there could have been a week at a time before I would actually have seen them and it's only now with reflection that I realise how bad it was. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

A similar point about a poor, if not punishing, work-life balance was made by another officer:

> In all honesty and I hate to say this, right, but this is the truth for many, not all policemen, but the workers as I call them, right, we were only lodgers at home. The family got from us when the RUC had finished and we went home to sleep. I remember my two kids … going in in the early hours of the morning just home from work didn't see them – my wife brought them up not me till [daughter's name] was nine. I didn't know her and I only started to get to know her when I was off, finished, working life over. But I remember going home maybe in the middle of the night going into her bedroom and kissing her cheek and saying night-night, sweet dreams and God bless and she repeated that back to me but I never saw her again maybe until the next night, same performance, some nights I didn't get home. (Interview with officer 1, 29 June 2011)

That retirement has presented officers with free time that they never experienced while the Troubles were raging caused some to say that they now found themselves more able to assist with the raising of their grand-children than had been the case with their own children. For the officer

who made the next comment it would seem that this fact serves as a form of compensation for his inability to participate as fully as he would have liked in the raising of his own children:

> My son is married now and when I look back to his infancy I seem to have spent very little of it with him. I mean I see my granddaughter now and I'm spending more time with her than I seem to have spent with my own son. In the last Troubles [1956-1962] my father was in the police then and I've very little childhood memories of him. Looking back, home life was dictated by the job. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

Due to the frequency of husbands being away from home there was an increased likelihood that wives would become the focus of their children's emotional attentions as an officer's wife explained: 'Their father was away from home a lot. They [children] didn't get to know him well until late in his career [so the] children were much closer to me' (response to questionnaire, officer's wife 1, 1 August 2011).

When officers' children were old enough to comprehend the dangers associated with the Northern Ireland conflict it was natural for them to worry about their father's safety. Watching a news report about a policeman or soldier who had been killed by terrorists was a sudden way of making known the severity of the conflict. Children of members of the security forces had to cope with the psychological stress of knowing that their father could be killed either on or off duty. Of course, in other countries where high crime rates and poor gun control legislation combine to render policing a dangerous occupation, officers' children of comparable age and maturity are likely to understand the dangers of policing. However, this kind of awareness is different to the situation in Northern Ireland where children knew that terrorists were dedicated to murdering police officers as part of their campaign of violence. An officer's wife pointed out the anxiety her children experienced because of this threat: 'The children were afraid that their Dad may have got shot or blown up. There were times that they thought that their Dad may never come home' (response to questionnaire, officer's wife 1, 1 August 2011).

Whilst it is true that other occupations can make similar demands on individuals and involve, for example, shift work and overtime, policing during the conflict was noticeably different in its disruption of family life. The most obvious difference and one which placed inestimable pressure on an officer's family, was the high level of danger that went with

working in the RUC. We addressed the nature of the off-duty terrorist threat in the previous chapter but let us consider it a little further. Given that all officers faced the possibility of being attacked in this way how did this affect their family life? In particular, how did the wives of officers respond to this type of threat?

The key lesson to be learned from an exploration of this area is that of the sheer—tentacle-like—reach of terrorism. It also brings to our attention how, for those threatened by it, terrorism has the capacity negatively to transform the *ordinary* aspects of people's everyday lives in a manner which effectively turns the irregular into the regular, and the abnormal into the normal. Significantly, this not only allows us to view the wider dimensions of terrorism in Northern Ireland but provides us with insight into the deeper effects that terrorism can have should an organisation decide to conduct its campaign in a way similar to that of the IRA. An officer's wife described the sense of threat that she experienced:

> Everybody felt they were a target wherever you lived whether your husband was on or off duty. Everybody worried and some more than others. I knew wives and mothers who were on medication, thankfully I managed without, but it was a worry that never went away and is still there to a degree. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

This comment points to how a policy of proactive and unrelenting terrorist targeting of security force personnel, irrespective of time or context, leaves little room for a lowering of one's personal or familial guard. Off-duty targeting meant there was no time or place in the province that could be considered either morally or operationally 'untouchable' to terrorists. Accordingly, the threat of terrorism not only had an impact on officers—whether on duty or not—but it affected their wives and the raising of their children. In this sense, counter-terrorism was not just a professional activity that officers engaged in during the normal course of their duties. Instead, when we take into consideration the experiences of officers' wives, a more detailed and informative picture emerges. For example, wives (children and other family members) had to become security minded, not because they wished to, but because their alertness to matters of security was actually an effective and necessary part of combating terrorism. Unquestionably, an officer's family's sensitivity to security needs helped contribute to his general off-duty safety.

Yet, although, as we shall see, this role was difficult and stressful it was one that wives were prepared to take on. Unlike other women in Northern Ireland who were married to men whose jobs were unrelated to the security forces, RUC wives were not free to discuss their husbands' occupation. Further, they played an important role in ensuring that their children did not disclose the nature of their father's occupation. The next comment provides us with insight into the enormous responsibility that was placed upon the shoulders of a child and the level of maturity which was required in order not to disclose what their father worked at:

> The responsibility that was put on, say, a six-year-old in certain areas in primary school that she maybe knew what the daddy did but daren't mention it. The responsibility of having to protect her daddy, not making an off-hand comment at six years of age and trying to make friends with her mates and all … tremendous. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

Wives had to exercise caution with regards to whom they let into their circle of friends. A person, for example, might well be likeable and possess pleasing personal characteristics but these were insufficient to strike up a friendship. Agreeable qualities had to be weighed against security needs which gained precedence. Before becoming a friend an officer's wife had to take into consideration the individual's family background, their sphere of friends, the area where they lived in case there was the possibility that, in one way or another, there was a terrorist connection. This was a problem that was more often encountered by officers' wives whose job, for instance in the civil service, attracted members of both communities and perhaps from diverse parts of Northern Ireland. Working alongside a colleague from a nationalist part of the province did not lend itself to striking up a friendship. Should a colleague reside in a known republican area then the chances of a friendship developing were extremely remote. Therefore, wives had to be very selective about who they got to know. As a consequence, these considerations militated against the wives of officers making friends easily. Often wives would say that friendships were confined to what was referred to as the wider police 'family' because socialising was simply too dangerous: 'You had to be very careful. You felt you had to be careful who you mixed with and we'd all say it came down to the police family in the end really' (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011). This 'family' served as a crucial means for

social interaction and was described as acting as a kind of release valve in terms of the pressures which prevailed during the long years of the conflict. Dinner parties were a regular occurrence but usually restricted to police families and were often held in one of the couple's homes; as were Tupperware and Pippa-dee parties frequently arranged between officers' wives. While officers' families did socialise outside of the home environment they often did so with other police families as an officer's wife discussed:

> Because of the overall security situation, that feeling of picking where you'd go for a night out was very much a must. You just didn't wander anywhere. You picked a night out and very often it was a night where you would meet up with other police families where you could relax for a couple of hours, particularly if it was some place where there was a security guard on and you could go in and relax. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

Social events such as these helped to develop and strengthen relationships between individuals and families. They functioned to establish the kind of bonding social capital that Robert Putnam (2000) recognises helps keep specific groups together and maintain group cohesion. An RUC widow, who lived in Londonderry at the outbreak of the Troubles, discussed the need for such social occasions and the importance of camaraderie amongst members of the police 'family':

> Everyone watched out for one another. We could trust each other. We helped each other with children and bringing them to the schools, looking after them generally or if someone had a hospital appointment they knew that they could leave the children with you and that they were safe until they got home and that. You had nowhere else to go. You had to make the most of the situation. But you needed those social gatherings with the wives just to keep yourself sane. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

This comment makes a number of points which highlight the significance of a social network—the police family—to the individual. Trust amongst individuals was confined to membership of the group. Social assistance, particularly in helping out with another person's children, was provided and the act reciprocated. The fact that officers (and their wives) may well have been posted in parts of the province far away from their extended family, meant that wider familial support structures were weak, for example, grandparental help with child rearing. The group helped

compensate for the social shortfalls associated with policing but it also performed a psychological role which the last sentence draws our attention to: 'you needed those social gatherings with the wives just to keep yourself sane.' In addition to the security concerns that prevailed and which made it difficult to establish friendships with women unconnected to the security forces, simply being in the company of those who shared a similar sense of anxiety and experienced the same kind of threat meant that individuals could be empathetic toward each other.

The provision of emotional support was also a vital function of the police 'family'. This was especially the case when tragedy struck as a result of an officer dying in a terrorist attack. As Mary Vachon and Stanley Stylianos (1988) have shown, strong social networks are fundamental in helping to reduce stress in a bereaved person. The police 'family' contributed to the recovery of a person suffering bereavement in two important ways. Firstly, by means of face-to-face contact with the bereaved, officers' wives offered immediate emotional support in the sense of companionship and comfort-giving. Secondly, inter-personal contact facilitated the longer-term social reintegration of the bereaved into the group. A widow whose own husband was killed by terrorists discussed the response of officers' wives to a woman whose RUC husband had been murdered early in the conflict:

> I remember distinctly many a night going round – there was a young woman widowed, she was the first one, Mary Gilgun, her husband, Peter, and David Montgomery had been killed on the 27 January [1972] in Londonderry on the way up to their station in Rosemount, and we would go over and visit Mary at night because she had an eight-month-old child. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

Officers were normally posted to parts of the province other than where they were raised and so the support which the police 'family' was capable of providing was vital. It was important, too, not least because the RUC's counselling service was not developed at the start of the conflict. The service found it difficult to cope with the kind of terrorist-related circumstances which can cause a victim suffering bereavement to experience emotional morbidity. This can be understood when consideration is given to the fact that terrorists planned their killings and shortly afterwards issued a statement by way of seeking to justify their actions. That an officer's death was responded to with ideological satisfaction not only by the terrorists, but moreover, amongst members of the

community who supported or had sympathy for them, is likely to have caused the bereaved greater emotional pain. It is interesting that the date of the double murder of these officers in Londonderry occurred three days *before* Bloody Sunday and makes clear that the IRA in the city was already goal-oriented and operationally equipped lethally to target police officers. The murders inform us that while the events of Bloody Sunday may have served to enhance IRA recruitment they were not a trigger to IRA attacks on the RUC in the city. Yet events three days later have over-shadowed the murder of the officers. Given that Peter Gilgun was aged only twenty-six (and David Montgomery younger still, aged twenty) when he died and that his wife had given birth to their child only eight months earlier, the social and emotional support that officers' wives were able to offer the young widow was undoubtedly of much benefit.

Certainly, the Belmont estate in Londonderry, which is located in the predominantly nationalist side of the city, had a considerable number of police families living there before 1969 and for a period thereafter. Due to the high level of terrorist threat these families eventually had to move out. The movement of police officers was part of a wider mass exodus of Protestants from this part of the city (Smyth 1996; Shirlow et al. 2005; Southern 2006). Despite the signing of the GFA in 1998, to the author's knowledge there is no account of a police family moving back nor is there any indication of former Cityside Protestants returning home.

During the early 1970s the army barracks in Londonderry was used as a venue for hosting social events, however, travelling to and from this location was not without its security concerns:

> You went up to the army barracks – up to the social clubs – they were the only places that you could frequent and feel comfortable in. But you had to be careful going in and out of them for you didn't know who was watching the gate. You know, you were taking a chance even driving through the gate in case somebody was going to take a pot shot. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

Once leaving the barracks an officer and his wife ran the risk of having their address identified by terrorists as a result of being followed home. It should be borne in mind how quickly officers' families were plunged into a conflict situation which gathered frightening pace in 1971 and 1972. The early years of terrorist activity gave shape to concerns about personal security and were a defining period that made clear to wives the dangers associated with their husbands' occupation.

Officers' wives were asked about the security considerations of which they had to be mindful. Interestingly, their responses highlight some of the rudimentary—less obvious and less recognised—features of what might be considered a home-grown comprehensive counter-terrorist approach. Counter-terrorism is about preventing terrorist organisations from achieving their objectives and so in the adoption of a broad definition of the concept we can begin to see the important role that wives played. Indeed, the comments of wives demonstrated how the frustration of terrorist goals can have a humbler dimension than that associated with high-level and sophisticated intelligence gathering, and militarised high-profile policing.

It is in the performance of activities which are commonplace to most people and are not given a second thought, that the abnormal circumstances created by a terrorist threat can best be observed. For example, if their husband was not at home then a cautious approach had to be adopted when responding to a knock at the door. Wives were concerned that by opening the door they could be presenting terrorists with an opportunity to take over their house as part of a plan to murder their husband upon his return. An officer's wife said: 'You didn't answer the door, at least I never answered the door. I went to a window and peeped out the blinds…. No I wouldn't have went to the door or even thought about it— you were warned, he had us well warned' (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011). The sense of fear which underpins this comment is not unreasonable. The ways in which officers and their families responded to the terrorist threat—effectively their counter-terrorist strategies—were as much conditioned by knowledge of terrorist attacks that had already occurred as they were by postulating about the 'ifs' and 'maybes' of terrorist strategy. In this respect the murder of twenty-four-year-old part-time member of the UDR, Margaret Hearst, in 1977, carried with it a harrowing warning for members of the security forces and their families. The IRA shot the young woman dead in a caravan parked outside her parents' home while her three-year-old daughter was asleep in the next room. The infant narrowly escaped death as a bullet struck a toy which lay beside her in bed.

Due to being married to a police officer, wives were constrained in where they could work. For instance, jobs located in republican areas or ones near to such areas were considered too risky. An officer's safety could be compromised if the colleagues of his wife gain knowledge of his occupation as they may have terrorist connections or sympathies. This was a problem that also extended to the children of officers and was remarked upon by an officer's wife:

We had to encourage our daughter to get a job at 'our end of the city'. If not some of her colleagues could ask her what her father's occupation was and we would not be happy having to ask her to tell lies. Also, even a home address could also make them suspicious. If for any reason her father had to collect her from work there was the chance he would be recognised and followed home, or even worse. (Response to questionnaire, officer's wife 2, 12 October 2011)

The territorial comment 'our end of the city' refers to the fact that the family lived in East Belfast which is predominantly Protestant and thus a part of the city considered to be safer than others. In addition to terrorists determining where an officer lived as a result of following either him, his wife, son or daughter on their journey home from work, the same information could be obtained from their employment records (providing a son or daughter lived with their parents). Of course, should an officer sometimes collect his wife from work (not always easy because most policemen did shift work) and by doing so set a pattern, then a terrorist attack could be planned outside her workplace or at some point on the route home. An officer's wife explained the security considerations that limited her options when it came to seeking employment:

You were careful of what you did. It was nearly always involved within the security areas anyway. You just couldn't do just anything…as going into work in shops or things. You just couldn't do it because you weren't going to give details of who you were and what you were and addresses and things like that. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

Considerations like these are likely to have had a bearing on restricting the income of some RUC families.

In the light of the terrorist threat it is unsurprising that officers' wives became vigilant and security minded. An officer's wife discussed how her security-mindedness operated when she was driving a car along with her husband:

I developed a sense of number plates. I actually developed that through the rear view mirror watching people's number plates and even now, even coming over here [venue for focus group], you know, I would still look at numbers and it's just something that's developed over the years and I would say, 'look, he's been behind us for a good length of time' and even until this day it's just like a sixth sense if you like. (Lisburn focus group 1 July 2011)

Another officer's wife pointed out how it was necessary to remain watchful in relation to cars driving into the cul-de-sac where they lived:

> Even the fact of strange cars coming into where you lived if you saw a strange car coming in any more than two or three times you had to jot down the registration number, the colour of it and if you knew the type of it. Then they would have had it checked out. We lived in a cul-de-sac and really it was only the cars of the people who lived there and maybe relatives that came in so when a strange car or a van or anything came, you were just on the alert right away. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

Yet, some wives seemed prepared to take on an even more active role in assisting their husbands and not only for purposes of maintaining a reasonably high level of general security. A wife of a former member of RUC Special Branch discussed how a family outing in the car on a Sunday afternoon might well have turned into something of an intelligence gathering affair:

> If you ask my children how they remember their Sunday afternoons they would say that their dad took them out for a drive, their mother sat in the front with a notebook down as far as she could and we past certain houses and I took down the numbers of cars – that was a Sunday afternoon outing for us. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

This comment points to how policing can be consuming and indicates how the job, at least for some officers, is one from which it is difficult to disengage. However, in this case, it seems to be one that the officer's wife found difficult to switch off from too. To assist in this way suggests that she actually took on aspects of her husband's professional identity and was favourably disposed to offering assistance when required—while not undermining the seriousness of the context, one would be forgiven for thinking that it adds a pinch of spice to Finch's idea of 'emotional labour'.

RUC wives were not the only ones in the family to contribute to an officer's safety. Children could also play a role and in a direct way. An officer accounted for how his two sons assisted in terms of keeping his home safe. He pointed out that he had not taught his children to be security-minded but that it was a disposition which had developed naturally. He said:

I have two boys and during the night-time they were always looking out through the window, if a car stopped, car lights came round. I wouldn't have to ask 'who's that?' they would just automatically peep out so it [the threat of a terrorist attack] must have been registering with them. I didn't tell them to keep looking out… They'd have been 12, 14. It was just normal for them. (East Antrim focus group 28 June 2011)

This comment alerts us to the adaptability of young people to the abnormality of a conflict situation but at the same time tells us that the home was not the kind of safe environment that all children require and deserve. As referred to above, it has been to the end of creating safe zones for children who find themselves in conflict situations that the UN has devoted much attention since the mid-1990s (Machel 1996). The sons' actions reflect their awareness of the danger that accompanied their father's job. Although these—anxiety-laden—circumstances would not be considered conducive to emotional well-being, the response of the sons illustrates how the threat had been normalised to the extent that their behaviour becomes part-and-parcel of household life. Peering from a window in an attempt to detect a possible source of threat, whether manifested in a strange car or not, was a role the sons performed in order to help keep their father safe. Research has been done on the effects of conflict on children in Northern Ireland (Smyth 2004; Connolly and Healy 2004). However, there has been no research done on the effects of the Troubles on the children of RUC officers or members of the UDR, so the long-term psychological effects of protracted exposure to the kind of stressors outlined in the officer's comment are unknown.

Concerns about security arose if an officer required medical treatment which resulted in a period of hospitalisation. Visitation by his wife (and children) was not a straightforward and uncomplicated matter especially if the hospital was situated in a nationalist area. As noted in the last chapter, due to its location the RVH in Belfast was considered a particularly dangerous hospital to visit. The IRA attempted to kill Nigel Dodds MP when he was visiting his ill son in the hospital's children's ward in December 1996 (McCartney 2012). The incident, and others, served to drive home the point that the hospital was not a safe place for members of the security forces, or their families, to attend. Yet the specialist treatment that was offered at the hospital often necessitated attendance by an ill or injured officer. When faced with this situation, wives had to give consideration to a number of issues which would have been unwise to ignore. A wife explained the concerns that she had when visiting her husband in the RVH:

> I wouldn't even eat in the Royal, and I used to go across to Fulton's fur-
> niture shop at lunch time – I walked over from the Royal just to get lunch
> because I wouldn't eat down in the canteen because you didn't know who
> was beside you, you didn't know who the cleaners were, you didn't know
> who the cooks were. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

Detectable in this comment is a deep sense of insecurity. Dissimilar to
stable societies where hospitals are safe and secure environments which
cater for the needy, the operation of terrorism in Northern Ireland was
such that it transformed this hospital into a place of fear. Indeed, the
comment serves as a pertinent example of the way in which terrorism
is capable of generating insecurity even though there is not an immedi-
ate discernible threat. It is enough for a person to be in a place where
it is conceivable that a terrorist attack *could* occur for them to become
anxious. The fact that visitors were suspicious of hospital staff in case
they were sympathetic to terrorists added to the problem. This tells us
something about the fear that terrorism is able to generate. The wider
the context within which it is possible for a terrorist attack to take place,
the worse the feeling of insecurity that is experienced by those who are
potentially capable of suffering at the terrorists' hands.

Of course, there is another side to the problems associated with hospi-
tal visitations. If an officer's wife had been hospitalised in an area deemed
generally unsafe for members of the security forces he faced similar con-
cerns. If the hospital had a strict policy on visiting hours and the officer
wished to visit regularly then he ran the risk of his movements establishing
a set pattern. This could have become dangerous in two particular ways.
Firstly, should terrorists be following an officer in an attempt to determine
his movements before launching an attack then the regularity of attending
a hospital at specific times could have presented them with an opportunity
to do so. Secondly, should a member of the hospital staff be a member
of a terrorist organisation or be prepared to pass information to someone
who was, then, once again, attending a hospital at particular times would
be useful to terrorists in their planning. In a response to a question about
how husbands and their wives addressed this problem a wife said:

> I was only ever hospitalised for the birth of our children. At that time we had
> a friend in the hospital who was a surgeon and he arranged for me to have
> a side ward where visiting hours were not restricted. It also afforded more
> privacy for my husband when visiting. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

However, there is the obvious danger of being recognised as a police officer (a particular concern to an officer who serves near to the hospital he has reason to visit) because a hospital is a social context which caters for all sections of the community. Should a terrorist or a terrorist sympathiser recognise an officer then his security was immediately compromised and a number of dangerous possibilities emerged. Firstly, the make, colour, and number plate of his car could have been noted by terrorists, thus assisting the targeting process; secondly, when returning home from a hospital visit he could be followed by terrorists, hence refining the targeting process more directly; thirdly, terrorists could attempt to murder the officer at some point when he was travelling to, or returning from, the hospital. In this context, the death of Constable John Proctor in 1981 is relevant. He was shot dead by the IRA as he left the Mid Ulster Hospital in Magherafelt having visited his wife and newborn son. The next comment by an officer's wife who had been hospitalised during the conflict is understandable: 'I was in hospital in Magherafelt and was very afraid when my husband was visiting. He didn't come at the same time each day' (response to questionnaire, officer's wife 3, 20 August 2011).

The threat to officers when they were off-duty meant that wives had to remain security conscious. Although some wives may not have been too aware of what, for example, to look for when checking for undercar explosives, others recalled the instruction they received from their husbands. The following comment by an officer's wife alerts us to the extent that wives were caught up in the conflict. It refers to how she had the onerous responsibility for ensuring that the car that was used to take her children to school was safe:

> The children weren't allowed to get into the car, they stayed in until I checked the car. My husband would have checked the car before he left then I had to check it again before I put the children in it to take them to school. My husband showed me what to do. He put the car in the garage and put the car up and we lay on the ground and he showed me where to look for something. He showed me certain places to look – looking for wires, looking for boxes, looking for things like that. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

However, she went on to say that following the murder of her husband in an IRA gun attack she found herself still checking the car before getting into it with her children:

> This was one of those things that I found after my husband was killed, I remember the first time after the children went back to school saying to them 'don't be coming out, stay there a wee minute' and I said 'what am I doing?', and I was down checking the car, same with the door, that went on for months afterwards, it was that much drummed into you that after he'd gone you were still doing it. It took a while for you to come away from all that. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

Captured in her phrase: 'it was that much drummed into you' is the potential deadliness of this form of attack and the serious way in which it was responded to by her husband who provided detailed instruction with regards to how the car should be checked. The regularity with which this counter-terrorist process was carried out was difficult to discontinue even though her husband had been killed. The comment tells us that officers and their wives could not afford to be negligent or slack in their response to the IRA's use of undercar booby traps.

Even though a family car had been checked by an officer before it was used this did not prevent wives experiencing anxiety. An officer discussed his wife's stress when she looked on as he drove their child to school:

> In the morning I took my daughter to school and my wife told me that when I got into the car and reversed out of the driveway, that was a big, big journey from the garage to the end of the driveway. No matter if you checked underneath it, done all the security things, you were never 100 percent sure. But I think about it now, my daughter wasn't aware, she was young. I was always aware. My wife looking out through the window was aware of it. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

In the case of a family owning two cars, some thought had to be paid in relation to which car family members would use. It was considered wiser that an officer restrict his use to only one of the cars for driving to and from work so that the other remained unknown to terrorists. An officer's wife commented:

> Taking the children to school was never much of a threat unless I had to use my husband's car – which would be easily identified. I used my own car which we tried to ensure he never drove to work in so as to retain its anonymity. (Response to questionnaire, officer's wife 1, 1 August 2011)

It should be borne in mind that one of the simplest ways that terrorists could gather basic intelligence about officers was by observing personal vehicles entering and leaving a police station. This officer's wife was aware that it was not difficult for terrorists to jot down the relevant details of a car and so she preferred that one car was never used by her husband when he travelled to work.

At the beginning of some marriages, wives lived with their husbands in the married quarters of RUC stations. These wives had a similar experience to wives who lived with their husbands in army barracks. When the conflict erupted, however, and attacks on police stations increased, it became too risky for a family to live in a station. An officer's wife discussed the dangers which she and her young children were exposed to when living in a police station in the early 1970s:

> I lived in a police station – Pomeroy police station – with a child of three and one of two months. There were different times when there was an attack on the station … the lights went out and you were in complete darkness because there were bulletproof shutters on the windows and we just went into complete darkness, you didn't even know what was going to happen next. And my instructions were to get my children out of bed and out of the cot and for us all to get under the bed … that was '71 to '73. Numerous things happened and there were a couple of murders while we were there and then they brought us out of the station. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

In another focus group an officer's wife reflected upon her experiences of living in the married quarters of a police station which was located in an area where terrorist activity was high:

> In' 69 when we were stationed in Newtownbutler we lived in married quarters and there were steel shutters on the windows and [husband's name] came down and said 'Don't go near the windows' and I said 'Why, what's the matter?' … and the next thing was I could hear these shots being fired down from the chapel into the station. So my young son, who was only about 9 months old and I got in underneath the stairs to hide. It reminded me of the war years when the sirens went off and you got in underneath the stairs. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

Stations in reasonably remote locations confronted the threat of the IRA launching a major attack. Indeed, the East Tyrone Brigade of the IRA adopted this strategy in the mid-1980s until the assault on Loughgall RUC station in May 1987. On this occasion a hard power security response resulted in the death of eight IRA men at the hands of the SAS. Given the threat that stations were under, the following account indicates how certain Sergeants may have thought that *all* those living in a station ought to be able to defend themselves should a terrorist attack take place:

> I was transferred from Omagh to Beragh at the end of 1976 and we had just got married in 1975. We moved into the married quarters – there were bars on the windows, steel shutters on the windows and she cried for about a week but the Sergeant was [Sergeant's name] and he really got her into the sense of what was going on. He took her up to [name of place] with a semi-automatic shotgun to show her how to use it if someone came to attack the station, just in case. So she got training from a Sergeant how to use a shotgun just in case the station got attacked and there were no police there, and that was her introduction to married life in the police. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

Many officers and their families were forced to move from their homes during the conflict. Sometimes homes were attacked and this necessitated a speedy move. In other cases, Special Branch may have obtained intelligence which indicated that terrorists were planning to attack an officer at his home. One course of action was immediately to rehouse the family. This was not the only option, however, and as will be discussed below, depended on the severity of the threat along with the officer and his family's views on evacuating their home. Should an officer wish not to move, a range of security provisions could have been added to the house. If a move was unavoidable, this caused both social and emotional upheaval as the family home literally had to be abandoned—often swiftly. While it is true that families did not move on the scale of a mass exodus and the process was supported by the RUC's SPED scheme (mentioned in the previous chapter), it was nonetheless a movement that occurred in the general circumstances of political conflict and a potentially lethal threat. These two factors cause us to reflect upon the move within the framework of what the UN refers to as the 'internal displacement' (UN 2004) of people due to conflict. Admittedly, the concept is used to account for large

movements of people in a relatively short period of time because of high intensity conflict. It is also acknowledged that this movement often takes place in the setting of the developing world where displacement causes a loss of livelihood rendering people particularly vulnerable. But when viewed from a different angle we can nonetheless identify similarities at the level of the basic factors which explain the *need* to move. Although the movement of RUC officers and their families took place in a context of low intensity conflict and did so over the period of the Troubles, it nonetheless serves as an example of 'internal displacement' which can be used to help broaden our understanding of the concept. The fact that studies of the Northern Ireland conflict have somewhat ignored the RUC families who had to move home because of political conflict (we might want to consider also the UDR families who had to move under similar circumstances) is unhelpful in this respect. Figures obtained by the author from the PSNI[2] confirm that between 1977 and 2007 there were 1389 officers (many with families) who moved under the SPED scheme—a small number of whom having to move after they had retired from the force. It is unfortunate that the PSNI do not have a record of moves before 1977 when the conflict is regarded to have been at its worst. A higher level of violence coupled with the fact that the IRA had been targeting officers when they were off duty since 1971, suggests that it is very likely the statistics would have been considerably higher. However, on the basis of the available statistics they equate to a significant number of people being socially uprooted and rehoused.

RUC families which had to move under the SPED scheme encountered various challenges. The vacated home had perhaps been lived in for many years and so the move came at an emotional and social cost. Where families had to relocate far away from their former home, children were especially disrupted in that, in addition to being rehoused, they had to integrate into a new school. There was a need for them to make new school friends as well as establish friendships in their new neighbourhoods. Of course, children who were mature enough to understand the circumstances under which the family had to move were not free to discuss this amongst a newly acquired and perhaps inquisitive friendship network. Instead, maturity dictated that officers' children adopt one of a number of coping strategies: being tight lipped, evasive, or untruthful. The problems that a move of this nature inflicted upon a police family were highlighted by an RUC widow:

[2] SPED statistics provided by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, 4 September 2015.

> We had to move under the special provisions for evacuating dwellings. Our neighbour, our next door neighbour, was murdered, he was shot dead – a retired RUC Reservist – in January 1991 and as a result of that we had to move out of our home and move to what was regarded as a safer area. My daughter was in primary six and had to change primary schools because it was deemed unsafe to continue to bring her to the [old] primary school. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

The move of this family to what was considered to be a safer area, however, did not nullify the threat as the widow went on to say: 'and we were in the house only a short time … when my husband was murdered in an undercar booby-trap bomb just outside our front door so that was a very traumatic experience for the whole family' (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011).

If intelligence indicated that there was the possibility of a general threat existing to an officer then his home could have been transformed by extra security features. But from the standpoint of the teenage children of officers, the security enhancement of a home may have given it a problematic fortress-like appearance—although distinctly different to an army base. A senior officer in Special Branch referred to his son's response to the physical changes to security that took place in his home when intelligence discovered that the officer was under a severe terrorist threat:

> I had to get security for my house. Full blown security, which was the fence round the back garden, the bulletproof glass, the reinforced front door, the cameras, lights, everything under the sun. My son was 16 and blamed a lot of the security on me, the job that I had. He said 'I'm living in a cage here'. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

Of course, the transformation of a home in the comprehensive manner described above makes clear to older children that their father's life is under threat. This realisation can have an unnerving effect. When officers' children were young it was less difficult to keep them insulated from the conflict but this became more of a challenge when they matured. The usual parental concerns that surrounded, for example, teenagers attending clubs and discos, were added to in the case of officers' children. It was possible that should others attending the same establishment find out the nature of their father's occupation they may have become abusive and hostile particularly if they came from a

republican background. By the 1980s and early 1990s city centre pubs and discos in Belfast attracted young people from across the religious and political divide. This concern, however, was not confined to the possibility of their children coming in contact with young nationalists or republicans but also those belonging to the loyalist community whose relationship with the police had deteriorated following the RUC's policing of Orange parades. It was also problematic because of the RUC's record of success at gathering evidence which resulted in the successful prosecution and imprisonment of members of loyalist groups. This generated considerable resentment for the police within hard-line loyalist communities as we observed in the last chapter. Thus, although RUC officers may have chosen to live in areas regarded as being reasonably safe, there remained three problematic issues regarding their children's safety. Firstly, their children may have decided—against the advice of their parents—to attend social venues in Belfast which attracted an ideologically mixed clientele. Secondly, although some officers' children may have chosen to avoid clubs in central Belfast in preference for those located in safer areas (usually local towns where they lived), these towns had their own hard-line loyalist elements many of whom could be found in the same venues. Thirdly, young loyalists from, say, militant areas in Belfast might have, and often did, attend night clubs in a place like Bangor which was home to many police families because it was regarded as a relatively safe area. Work-related problems like these and their effects on officers' children added to the normal parental stresses and strains which accompany raising children through the teenage years.

Murdered Officers and Bereaved Families

Although the Northern Ireland conflict caused difficulties for RUC families generally, the costs of violence were particularly painful for those wives (and children) whose husbands died as a result of a terrorist attack (similarly for the mothers and fathers, and siblings of murdered officers). Following the shock and trauma that engulfed families, widows were confronted with the difficult task of reconstructing their own and their children's lives. They found themselves trying to compensate for the loss of the children's father. Events that a husband and wife would normally have attended together became contexts that were difficult to negotiate socially and served to re-ignite a sense of loss as this widow makes clear:

> The secondary and grammar school years, I found it very, very difficult, in fact I had to stop going to parents' meetings – I couldn't cope with them, seeing other parents, the mum and dad coming in and those queues that you had … you had to join a queue and the other parents, you know, the husbands could go and join another queue but we'd to sit as individual parents and I hated that term 'single parent' because to me it had a different connotation you know, but that's what we were and we could only, you know, be there as the single parent, but, you know, it was very, very difficult. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

Key moments in the biography of parents' children are always significant. Moments of familial celebration which mark a child's achievement give rise to some of the most cherished and lasting memories. For example, following the successful completion of a university degree, graduation is a day filled with excitement and parental pride. But a key event like this can result in the resurfacing of the emotional pain associated with the loss of a husband. The next comment makes this point:

> My sons actually graduated on the same day and I thought how cruel that this was to happen – one at Queen's [Belfast] and one at Manchester – and again if there had have been another parent, as difficult as it would have been, one would have went to one and one to the other, and that was, never mind moral dilemma, it was just terrible. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

Context is important when it comes to recruitment into terrorist organisations. Being raised in a staunchly loyalist or republican area increased the likelihood of a young person joining one of the groups that held sway in the area. For RUC widows, keeping a watchful eye and exerting a controlling influence on their children when they reached teenage years was not unproblematic. A widow whose husband was murdered by the IRA discussed the concerns she experienced when her son got older. Specifically, she was fearful of him falling under the influence of loyalist paramilitary groups who might encourage him to seek revenge for his father's murder. It should be borne in mind that tit-for-tat killings were a regular feature of the Troubles and reflect a particularly nasty aspect of the country's ethnic conflict (BBC 1998). She said:

My children were quite small [when their father was killed], the youngest wasn't even at school so they've been brought up basically without their father. I had this fear of a certain element getting in on my son and saying to him 'oh they've killed your father, come on, we'll do something about it' and that was the most difficult thing for me. You know, those are the things that I don't think people realise your children went through … but this was a very difficult thing for me – the loyalist element coming in and guiding him. If someone had said: 'I know who did that', you know, that anger was in him to try and do something about it. (RUC GC Widows Association focus group 29 June 2011)

The concern expressed by this RUC widow stemmed from the social group that her son began moving in as he grew older. She worried in case those with whom her son associated had knowledge of the IRA's murder of his father and were able to exert a pathological influence over him in terms of seeking retaliation. The point is worth making that while, as discussed above, the police 'family' played an important part in catering for the needs of serving officers and their wives, it did not perform the same role for officers' children. The conflict may have overshadowed the life of a police family across the social spectrum but as children grew older they began to develop their own social networks. This development was a source of anxiety to officers and their wives who were aware of the potential harm that could befall their son or daughter because of the family's connection with the police.

While the conflict demanded that wives take seriously their role in helping to keep their husbands safe, there was always the possibility that tragedy could suddenly strike. As we have discussed, off-duty targeting meant that a murder attempt could be planned when an officer was in the company of his wife and family. In other societies, even those where policing is regarded as a dangerous activity, it might be difficult for officers to appreciate the familial anxiety which accompanies this kind of threat. However, our understanding is aided when consideration is given to the experiences of those who participated in this research project. Accordingly, the following comment makes us aware of the real dangers that families confronted. It was made by an RUC widow who, along with her three young children, witnessed her husband be shot dead by two IRA gunmen as the family were leaving their car in order to attend chapel. The tragic encounter, which was emotionally painful for her to discuss, shall be accounted for at length:

My husband was shot when we pulled up to go into church. He was shot dead in front of me and my three children. We stopped going to St. Michael's in Enniskillen because in those days the IRA were outside the church selling the republican newspapers and stuff and rather than get targeted we went out to a monastery. He was a very good singer and he was in the police choir and the Fermanagh Choral Society and he was asked to lead the singing in the church and by doing so he became a regular at one particular service and obviously … somebody recognised him and planned his murder and were waiting on us that morning we arrived at twenty past ten that Sunday morning. There was a man in a grey duffle coat with the hood up standing with his back to the wall and it was spitting rain and I thought – you know the way thoughts just jump into your head – 'what's he doing standing there and it's raining?' and as [husband's name] was locking the door my eldest son was standing just beside him, my youngest son was still in the car. The guy in the duffle coat fired a revolver which caused [husband's name] to fall to the ground it was the first shot that had hit him. And the gunman appeared out of nowhere carrying the AK 47 rifle and continuously shot into [husband's] body as he lay on the ground and the car was hit twice. I could have lost both my sons because they were so close to their father and my daughter was pushed into the crowd, into the doorway of the church, and it was the IRA that had killed him on church grounds. (Enniskillen focus group 27 June 2011)

This is a chilling account which speaks of the merciless side of the IRA's targeting strategy. The attack was premeditated; it was probably weeks if not longer in the planning. During this stage terrorists would have observed the officer in the company of his wife and children because they attended chapel as a family on a regular basis. So the fact that the officer was in the company of his family when he was murdered was not an accident—it was allowed for as part of the terrorists' killing design. Neither did the fact that the attack was to take place outside a place of worship dissuade the terrorists. Although wives were aware of the dangers associated with being married to an RUC officer, few, if any, would have anticipated that they (and moreover their children) would be present the moment their husband was killed. It is the kind of thought that a wife tries to put to the back of her mind because it is too distressing to contemplate. That there existed the possibility that this officer's wife and children could be seriously injured or killed in the attack—particularly with the use of an automatic weapon—did not suggest to the terrorists that the plan was too dangerous. However, when it came to courage and

resolve this widow was not found wanting. During the focus group she discussed her response to terrorism no later than the Sunday following her husband's death:

> I went back to the grounds the following Sunday because I couldn't allow the IRA to dictate to me the way that I was going to live my life or what church I was going to go to and I go there and I know that there are people in the congregation probably fingered [husband's name] - pointed the finger [passed information to the IRA]. (Enniskillen focus group 27 July 2011)

This is the kind of indomitable spirit that sends a powerful message to a terrorist organisation. The emotional challenges of doing so are likely to have been unimaginably difficult. Amidst her mourning she is prepared to adopt a stalwart attitude and attend the chapel where her husband was killed only seven days before. She believes that, in the same congregation, are the individuals who passed information to the IRA. The idea of fellow parishioners being involved in her husband's murder points to a particularly distasteful aspect of ethnic conflict. Although one or two people in the congregation—as passers of information—may have had a role in the killing of the officer, the RUC widow's behaviour constitutes a defiant reply to the terrorists that they would not 'dictate to me the way that I was going to live my life or what church I was going to go to'.

While families' *resolve* may be the same a family's *response* to a terrorist attack which claimed the life of one of its members may differ. It was not unusual for a wider family circle to have a number of members serving in the RUC but some nuclear families may have had a number of its members serving at the same time. This added to stress levels within a family. An officer discussed the death of his twenty-one-year-old daughter who was stationed in Newry (the officer's son also served in the RUC). Along with her three male colleagues she was killed in a massive explosion in 1985. The officer accounted for the emotional scar that the murder left on his wife whose coping strategy is that of geographical avoidance both of the vicinity where the murder took place as well as the station where their daughter served:

> My wife's in Banbridge at the minute [place of residence] she wouldn't even go to Newry or where [daugther's name] was killed. She wouldn't even pass on the road where she was killed at Killeen, wouldn't even go down that way. She just wouldn't go. (Coleraine focus group 28 June 2011)

This is an example of the legacy of the Northern Ireland conflict for RUC families suffering bereavement. The officer's wife's refusal to travel anywhere near to places with a connection to her daughter's professional career is a way of managing her grief. It is a coping strategy that has remained unchanged for many years and will likely remain so. People deal with grief differently and in this case it has, in part, a spatial dimension. In addition to the common triggers of grief such as a loved one's date of death, a birthday, a wedding anniversary, or a place regularly holidayed in (Bowlby-West 1983) we should not fail to recognise that there were other powerful triggers embedded in the protracted nature of the Troubles. The frequency of the murders of members of the security forces and the mediatisation of the attacks and funerals, served to re-ignite feelings of grief and cause experiences of trauma to re-surface in the lives of widows, children and the extended family network.

Radio or television broadcasts, which informed listeners or viewers that a terrorist attack had taken place, caused immediate distress if it was an area where a wife's husband was on duty. In the era before the introduction of mobile phones, communication networks were torturously slow. The wife of an Inspector described her feelings when news broke of a terrorist attack occurring in an area where her husband was serving:

> When terrorist incidents occurred in the areas where my husband was serving fear and worry set in until I knew my husband was safe. Whilst I was relieved, guilt feelings overwhelmed me as I realised the bad news went to the home of a wife or mother of the policeman killed or injured. I can recall many incidents. (Response to questionnaire, officer's wife 4, 5 March 2011)

She continued that some police families had suffered more than others and said:

> This was brought home to me one evening when visiting a police widow who did not answer the front door when I knocked, but came round the side of the house. When we went into the house she explained to me that her husband was shot at the front door and she herself was held at gunpoint. After that incident she could never open the door to anyone. (Response to questionnaire, officer's wife 4, 5 March 2011)

The death of a loved one is a traumatic event. It has implications for the physical and mental health of an individual. It also has implications for the well-being of the entire family (Stroebe et al. 2013) and as Kathleen Gajdos (2002) discusses, unaddressed grief and trauma can have an intergenerational impact with negative consequences for the family system. The conflict in Northern Ireland plunged many RUC families into a deep sense of grief: wives, sons/daughters, mothers/fathers and brothers/sisters found themselves first confronting trauma then struggling with the challenges of social and emotional readjustment. During the focus groups the emotional and social effects of the death of a loved one were explored. Widows discussed the impact of their husband's death on them and their children, but also referred to a further generational loss. A widow whose husband was murdered by the IRA at their home said:

> It's not only us and our children but it's transgenerational, you know. I've a little granddaughter as well and they're missing out on having a loving grandfather on our side of the family and, you know, tying that in with, you know, the impact, it's transgenerational. (RUC GC Widows' Association focus group 29 June 2011)

Earlier in the chapter we considered the way in which retired officers find themselves more involved in the raising of their grandchildren than was the case with their own children. Involvement in the life of grandchildren can offset feelings of guilt and compensate for a sense of emotional loss generated by officers feeling that they were absent in the raising of their own sons and daughters. However, the above comment refers to how an act of terrorism has resulted in the deprivation of grandparental affection in the grandchild's life.

Familial Support

That the Troubles caused hardship for RUC families and demanded that wives perform more conjugal roles than perhaps was the case in other families, it has not resulted in a mood of resentment or a spirit of downtrodden victimhood. Instead, the kind of steely determination which sustained families through more than a quarter of a century of terrorist violence—as well as personal tragedy for wives whose husbands were

murdered—was detectable in the defensive way in which wives spoke of their husbands' occupation. An officer's wife sought to make clear her attitude towards the RUC irrespective of the familial challenges and sacrifices it presented:

> You have to remember too that the wives were very proud of what their husbands were doing and to this day very proud of what they did and we're very happy to be associated with them and we just accepted that that was their life and that was our lives too. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

A similar degree of pride underpinned the comment of another officer's wife:

> We were so proud of them and what they were doing and I find more so when you look back now. When we were young and they were working and all, you accepted it. But when I look back at what [husband's name] did and what his colleagues did, we are very, very proud to be associated with them, very much so. (Bangor focus group 29 June 2011)

There are different experiential dimensions to conflict. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter women are often less visible than men in conflict situations. The phenomenon of terrorism and security responses to it are highly gendered themes which have a male focus that obscures women. From an analytical perspective this is problematic because women's experiences can be either ignored or inadequately documented. This creates a gap in the scholarly literature and amounts to a shortfall in academic knowledge. Yet certain categories of women did have a very different experience during the Troubles. There were women who served as police officers whose job was to maintain law and order and protect life and property. Other women played a part in the republican movement (Loughran 1986) as women are capable of doing in terrorist organisations (Gonzalez-Perez 2008; Hamilton 2007). Sometimes women are directly involved in extreme forms of violence as in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers (Hasso 2005). However, regardless of the role women perform in conflict—and some conflicts have a deeper impact on women than others—they are unable to escape its effects. This chapter has attempted to highlight the impact of the Northern Ireland conflict on the wives and families of RUC officers.

We have seen how the conflict caused officers' wives to restrict their social network and withdraw to the safety of their own families and that of the wider police 'family' simply because these were the two reliable contexts where individuals could be trusted. This social withdrawal was dictated by the security imperative to keep their husbands safe—a duty which wives responded to with serious-mindedness. We can begin to measure the emotional costs inflicted by this retreat when thought is given to the general rules of secrecy and evasiveness by which wives had to abide. Moreover, wives (and their husbands) found it necessary to encourage their children to adopt the kind of cautious attitude that underpinned much of their own behaviour. This amounted to a form of intuitive, home-grown, counter-terrorist instruction that was not to be found in the pages of a manual. Given that their husbands experienced high levels of stress because of the demands of policing in Northern Ireland many wives desired to shield their husbands from additional stress. This desire likely increased the level of stress wives experienced.

Interestingly, the material presented in this chapter suggests that RUC wives did not take on an identity that was separate from, and unconnected to, the professional identity which subsumed their husbands. The idea of subsumption is to be understood as an unavoidable consequence of the high level of terrorist threat which could only be escaped when a family took a holiday outside of Northern Ireland. The role of wives in this context reveals the familial side to counter-terrorism which was a reflection of the type of terrorism practised by organisations like the IRA. Simply put, if officers could be targeted whilst off duty then responding to this threat inescapably involved members of an officer's family. This fact considerably increased the anxiety normally associated with conflict for two principal reasons. Firstly, family members could have been caught up in a terrorist attack and we have accounted for the experience of an officer's wife who witnessed the murder of her husband while she and her three children were present. Secondly, a family member might unwittingly say or do something that could endanger the officer thus placing a huge burden of responsibility on the shoulders of a wife, a son or daughter, siblings, or a mother or father. These are sources of anxiety that the family members of, for example, soldiers serving in conflicts overseas do not experience. This informs us that, although some conflicts are considered low intensity, they can have particularly troublesome familial dimensions.

With regards to RUC widows whose husbands had been murdered, they faced the difficulties of emotional reconstruction whilst coping with the painful reality that an organisation had chosen to take the life of their loved one. Yet, despite the problems that family members encountered, the wives who participated in this research were committed to supporting their spouses in the job they performed as had been the widows. On the domestic front, they stood, as it were, shoulder-to-shoulder with their husbands and in so doing made their own contribution to helping to combat the terrorist threat.

CONCLUSION

In bringing this chapter to a close we might consider the following questions: what is instructive about our exploration of the experiences of RUC officers' wives? How does it improve our understanding of the broader dimensions of the phenomenon of terrorism and resistance to it? Firstly, the role performed by officers' wives highlights the familial response to terrorism that was required in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it speaks of the determination of women to remain supportive of their husbands. This required a willingness to maintain a high level of security consciousness (and ensure that their children did also). Thirdly, and importantly, it informs us of the inability of terrorist organisations to destroy the resolve of families notwithstanding the seriousness of the on-duty and off-duty threat. The members of individual families closed ranks. This does not mean that all marriages survived because some did not, nor does it mean that families came out of the conflict unaffected: if given the choice, few, if any, parents would prefer to raise their children in the kind of abnormal conditions which surrounded the raising of children in RUC families. The individual family located itself within the wider police 'family' which provided a social network that acted as a buffer to the effects of conflict. The glue by which this 'super family', as it were, was held together was the shared experience of the conflict and the fears and anxieties that it caused. When these three points are combined it provides us with some indication as to how RUC officers and their families were able to weather the terrorist storm. The tactics of a terrorist organisation is to use and threaten violence in order to increase levels of psychological insecurity in a population. Terrorists hope

to achieve their goals more easily by doing this. However, the women who participated in this research were not intimidated by terrorist activity to the point that they pressurised their husbands into changing their employment; as the wife of a disabled officer put it: 'I felt like wishing he had an ordinary 9-5 job (especially when I could not sleep and he had not returned home when expected) - no mobile phones then, but he loved his job and I never discussed with him whether or not he should leave' (response to questionnaire, officer's wife 5, 4 September 2010). On the contrary, instead of buckling under the terrorist threat wives displayed a stoical spirit and accepted the challenges that went with it. They had to cope with high levels of anxiety and tolerate patterns of familial disconnection that went with compulsory overtime and shift work. They also adjusted to social isolation and accepted the fact that the nature of terrorist targeting meant that the boundaries between home and work, job and family, did not exist. RUC wives, to use Finch's term, were 'married to the job' but its demands were greater than those experienced by other categories of 'wife' which Finch pays attention to and in this way our understanding of the concept can be deepened. The areas we have explored in this chapter constitute the domestic response to terrorism during the Northern Ireland conflict and inform us that an officer's family had a significant part to play in keeping the home front safe.

References

Ashe, F. (2012). Gendering War and Peace: Militarized Masculinities in Northern Ireland. *Men and Masculinities, 15*(3), 230–248.

BBC. (1998). *Tit-for-tat Murders in N Ireland*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/48753.stm.

Bowlby-West, L. (1983). The Impact of Death on the Family System. *Journal of Family Therapy, 5*, 279–294.

Brewer, J., & Magee, K. (1991). *Inside the RUC: Routine Policing in a Divided Society*. New York: Clarendon Press.

Collins, B., & Gibbs, A. (2003). Stress in Police Officers: A Study of the Origins, Prevalence and Severity of Stress-Related Symptoms Within a County Police Force. *Occupational Medicine, 53*(4), 256–264.

Connolly, P., & Healy, J. (2004). *Children and the Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Experiences and Perspectives of 3–11 Year Olds*. Available from http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/childrenandconflict.pdf.

Crawley, E. (2002). Bringing It All Back Home? The Impact of Prison Officers' Work on Their Families. *Probation Journal, 49*(4), 277–286.

Daily Mail. (2012). *Spending too Much Time at Work When the Children Were Young Is a Parent's Biggest Regret.* Available from http://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-2203025/Spending-time-work-children-young-parents-chief-regret.html.

Finch, J. (1983). *Married to the Job: Wives' Incorporation in Men's Work.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Gajdos, K. (2002). The Intergenerational Effects of Grief and Trauma. *Illness, Crisis & Loss, 10*(4), 304–317.

Gonzalez-Perez, M. (2008). *Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terror Groups.* New York: Routledge.

Hamilton, C. (2007). The Gender Politics of Political Violence: Women Armed Activists in ETA. *Feminist Review, 86*, 132–148.

Hasso, F. (2005). Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs. *Feminist Review, 81*(1), 23–51.

Jackson, S., & Maslach, C. (1982). After Effects of Job-Related Stress: Families as Victims. *Journal of Occupational Behaviour, 3*, 63–77.

Kop, N., Euwena, M., & Schaufeli, W. (1999). Burnout, Job Stress and Violent Behaviour Among Dutch Police Officers. *Work and Stress, 13*(4), 326–340.

Loughran, C. (1986). Armagh and Feminist Strategy: Campaigns Around Republican Women Prisoners in Armagh Jail. *Feminist Review, 23,* 59–79.

Machel, G. (1996). *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, United Nations. Available from http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf.

Majendie, P. (1991). N. Ireland Police Live with Constant Fear. *Reuters.* Available from http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-28/news/mn-1460_1_n-ireland-police-live.

McCartney, J. (2012). The DUP's Nigel Dodds May Soon Be Propping Up the Tories. What Does He Want?, *The Spectator.* Available from http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9506862/the-dups-nigel-dodds-may-be-about-to-hold-westminsters-balance-of-power-so-what-does-he-want/.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of the 12th August 1949. Available from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20 1125/volume-1125-I-17512-English.pdf.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Shirlow, P., Graham, B., Murtagh, B., Robinson, G., & Southern, N. (2005). *Negotiating Change: Sharing and Conflict Amelioration in Derry/ Londonderry.* Belfast: OFMDFM, Equality Unit/Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Smyth, M. (1996). *Two Policy Papers.* Londonderry: Templegrove Action Research.

Smyth, M. (2004). *The Impact of Political Conflict on Children in Northern Ireland*. ICR Institute for Conflict Research. Available from http://con-flictresearch.org.uk/reports/young-people/CCIC-Report-The-Impact-of-Political-Conflict-on-Children.pdf.

Southern, N. (2006). Reconciliation in Londonderry: The Challenges and Constraints Experienced by Protestant Clergy. *Peace and Change, 31*(4), 506–532.

Stroebe, M., Schut, H., & Boerner, K. (2013). Bereavement: A Family Affair. *Family Science, 4*(1), 1–3.

UN Report. (2004). *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. Available from http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html.

Vachon, M., & Stylianos, S. (1988). The Role of Social Support in Bereavement. *Journal of Social Issues, 44*(3), 175–190.

CHAPTER 6

The Experiences of Injured Officers

The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the risk posed to soldiers of sustaining a serious injury whilst on operational duty. Indeed, we are reminded of the effects of conflict-related injuries when news reports and documentaries bring to our attention the efforts of soldiers to reconstruct their lives in the wake of, for example, the loss of a limb or limbs, or adjusting to the challenge of blindness. The seriousness underpinning injuries of this kind is to be understood in terms of their permanent nature. These are major injuries which are physically life-changing and in many cases are accompanied by psychological problems. Of course, injuries may be less physically severe. These are injuries, which although life threatening at the time, are recoverable from with little, if any, permanent physical damage. Injuries can also be psychological in character and although less easily observed may be emotionally ruinous and incapacitating. The term Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is used to conceptualise this condition and also to categorise and treat those suffering PTSD symptomatology. The research underpinning this chapter has engaged with individuals who have been affected by conflict in the ways described above. This is because RUC officers, like the military personnel who served in Afghanistan and Iraq (and military who served in Northern Ireland) were under constant threat of a terrorist gun or bomb attack. Although police officers are not soldiers, their injuries are nonetheless comparable to the worst of injuries sustained by soldiers in the recent Afghan and Iraqi conflicts. However, in an international policing context, the volume and extent of the injuries suffered by RUC

officers as a result of terrorism places them in a unique category. This chapter addresses how officers have been harmed both physically and psychologically as a result of the Northern Ireland conflict. The research, in the main, is based upon a number of in-depth interviews arranged by the Disabled Police Officers Association Northern Ireland (DPOA). Members of the Wounded Police and Families Association also participated either by completing questionnaires or agreeing to a telephone interview.

Those who have been injured are ongoing visual reminders of the cost of conflict in a manner in which those who were fatally injured are not. Fatality figures are the principal measure of the cost of conflict. This, of course, is understandable as we equate death in the course of military action as constituting the supreme example of an individual's sacrifice. Hence, we speak solemnly of our war dead and treat with great reverence a 'roll of honour' to the fallen.

The injured, however, belong to a complicated category of victim. Conflict has not ended their lives but unlike their colleagues who came through a violent period unscathed, they have been seriously, and in many cases, irreparably damaged by it. The effects might be physical or psychological, or perhaps a combination of both. As injured victims they are a group which does not always fit comfortably with a society's post-conflict conditions. Whilst a peace accord such as the GFA can lay the foundations upon which to build a new society, the transition is not unchallenging for officers whose injuries anchor them (and their carers) in a violent past because of the effects they have on the present. In this sense the legacy of the past has a piercing meaning because it is personal and inescapable. Put bluntly, looking at one's facial disfigurement in the mirror as a result of a terrorist rocket attack or being bound to a wheelchair for the remainder of one's life because a bomb blast resulted in the amputation of both legs, makes for an altogether different experience of conflict and its impact. This is also true for officers who were damaged psychologically during the Troubles. All said, injured officers who participated in this research are connected to the conflict of the past in a unique way and constitute a distinct conflict-related group in the post-settlement period.

Placing an exact figure on the number of officers who were injured during the conflict is difficult. One of the problems relates to how we define and classify an injury. Simply put, to what extent should an officer be injured in order for the injury to be officially recorded as such? For

example, an officer could sustain an injury in a riot situation and require hospitalisation for a number of days or even weeks, but, fully recover and return to duty. The formal recording of this injury is justifiable in that it is related to the officer in the execution of his or her duties even though there may be no long-term physical—or psychological—effects. If injuries of this kind are taken into account then according to the Wounded Police and Families Association there were 10,594 officers injured between 1968 and 1998. This general figure is supported by the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC Foundation. Its website claims that over 10,000 officers were injured during the same period adding that 300 suffered severe disabilities. Statistics made available to the author from the PSNI are useful in terms of helping to cast some light on the number of officers who sustained major injuries. These are injuries which incapacitated officers in such a way that they were no longer able to perform the occupational role expected of them. Accordingly, approximately 2157 officers left the RUC on grounds of ill health and this figure corresponds to the period referred to as the Troubles, namely, from 1969 to 1998. Given the intensity of the conflict and its impact on the RUC, it is possible that factors related to the conflict could be responsible for some of these officers leaving because of ill health. But, the figure comes with a caveat: the figure will include a significant portion of officers whose poor health is unrelated to the conflict. Problematically, computer records commenced in 1988 and so a vast amount of data is stored in hard copy format. As such, the attempt to hone the injury-related figures in a detailed manner would be a mammoth task requiring a manual check of the file of each officer who left the force before 1988 (the PSNI are unable to undertake such a task and as the files contain sensitive personal information, Data Protection legislation would prevent the author being given access to them[1]). However, there are other figures which are of assistance in helping us refine our understanding of the number of officers who were medically discharged because of the conflict. These figures relate to the number of officers who are in receipt of Injury on Duty (IOD) pensions. The PSNI confirmed that, as of May 2016, 909 of the 2157 officers who left because of ill health are currently receiving an IOD pension (303 officers who left on grounds of ill

---

[1]Had a request been submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 it would have had an exemption applied under section 12(1) as the cost of complying would exceed the appropriate limit (18 hours).

health are now deceased but the PSNI stated that it is likely that many of them were in receipt of an IOD award). To be eligible for this award an officer will have sustained a serious injury resulting in permanent disability for which he or she was not responsible whilst in the execution of their duties. The injury can be psychological as well as physical in nature and both categories of disability are reflected in those who participated in the research for this book. Yet, similar to the caveat pertaining to the figures related to ill health and the termination of duty, we need to observe another: whilst an IOD pension serves as a *potential indicator* that it was awarded because of a conflict-related injury, it is not possible to be definitive. However, whilst recognising these caveats we also need to be intelligently interpretative with the available figures and set them against the violent background of the Northern Ireland conflict. Accordingly, it is important to bear in mind a number of points when handling the figures. Firstly, whilst 300 officers lost their lives because of terrorism it was the intention of terrorists to kill many more. Secondly, police officers were deliberately and systematically targeted by terrorists both on and off duty—the purpose of which was to kill them. Thirdly, by the measure of terrorist groups operating in different countries in the same era, Northern Ireland was exposed to a high level of terrorist activity—police officers were very visible, and in many cases, reasonably easy targets. Fourthly, the conflict was protracted and left officers exposed to serious danger over the course of 30 years. So, in the light of these facts it would suggest that a proportion of the 909 officers currently receiving an IOD pension is due to injuries sustained during the conflict. It is also conceivable that many of the 303 officers (now deceased) who retired from the RUC on grounds of ill health received this pension for conflict-related reasons too, thus giving us some idea of the likely sizable number of officers who might be regarded as having been *seriously* injured during the conflict.

This chapter explores the nature of the physical injuries officers sustained during the conflict and considers the ways in which some officers have been psychologically injured. The analysis is divided into three parts and will examine: firstly, the effects of explosions; secondly, the impact of shootings; thirdly, the psychological harm that violence has caused to officers.

Physical Injuries

Terrorists had a vast and sophisticated arsenal of weaponry by which to attack the security forces (Oppenheimer 2009). This resulted in severe injuries being caused to officers either as a result of explosions or shootings. In the case of explosions, terrorists used different varieties of explosive mechanism, for example, large roadside or culvert bombs, or perhaps smaller anti-personnel devices; mortars; rocket-propelled grenades; undercar booby traps; drogue and blast bombs. Gunshot wounds were caused by either high-velocity rifles or low-velocity handguns. The physical effects of both forms of attack are accounted for in the injuries and disabilities of those who participated in the research. The following accounts allow us to glimpse how officers have been physically affected by terrorist violence.

Bomb Explosions

In December 1978 the IRA parked a car in West Belfast. In its boot was a 56 lb bomb concealed in a beer keg. Initially, the car did not look out of place as it was parked in a street along with cars belonging to workers in a local factory. However, when the other vehicles were driven away the car raised the suspicions of a local person who reported it to the police. A Sergeant and four constables responded to the call. Although the officers were cautious, their approach to the car was conditioned by their experience of hitherto terrorist attacks involving a vehicle. The IRA frequently used car bombs but the devices were usually fitted with a time delay mechanism to destroy property and a warning given in order to clear members of the public from the vicinity (warnings were not always effective). Alternatively, if a car bomb was intended to kill members of the security forces then a command-wire would have been used (as was the case for other forms of anti-personnel device at this time). This physical connection leading from a bomb to a detonation point would have been searched for at a safe distance from the car (admittedly, a 'safe' distance is a relative term and depends on the size of a bomb and the kind of materials terrorists have used to inflict penetrating trauma at the moment of the explosion). As no warning had been given by terrorists and a command-wire could not be identified, the Sergeant took the lead in warily inspecting the car in order to determine if it was necessary to call the Army Technical Officer to the scene. When his suspicions were

raised, the Sergeant began to back away from the car at which point it suddenly exploded. The attack serves as an example of the initial advantage technical advances affords the terrorist and the catch-up nature of counter-terrorist agencies. In this case it was an advance in radio-controlled detonation. During interview the officer said:

> We knew that they [IRA] had been messing about [experimenting] trying to get a remote control detonation via radio signal and they couldn't - up to this point they hadn't got it to work correctly as a number of bombs had gone off, they had been set off by interference from other radios but it wasn't how they intended it. But on this particular occasion they finally got the thing right and when I was busy checking this car out and they [terrorists] realised that I had cottoned on there was something wrong here … they blew me up. They decided 'if we don't blow him up we are not going to get anybody here' as obviously my next move was to call the ATO [Army Technical Officer]. I was about two feet away from the car when it went off – it's not recommended - big bright flash, whoosh from the blast and the noise - huge rattling noise. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

Bomb explosions are capable of inflicting a variety of injuries on the human body (Cooper et al. 1983) and individuals caught up in an explosion may receive multiple injuries (Brismar and Bergenwald 1982). As Ralph DePalma et al. (2005) point out, trauma caused by explosions is to be understood in terms of primary, secondary and tertiary blast injuries. Primary injuries are caused by the blast wind and affect the air-filled organs such as the ear, lungs and intestinal track; secondary injuries 'occur when objects accelerated by the energy of the explosion strike a victim, causing either blunt or penetrating ballistic trauma' (Wightman and Gladish 2001, p. 665); and tertiary injuries are caused when an individual is physically displaced by the blast wind and collides with rigid surfaces causing either blunt or penetrating trauma (Stein and Hirshberg 1999). Fatal crush injuries caused by a collapsed building falls into the quaternary category. This was the mechanism that caused the vast majority of fatal injuries in the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. Crush injuries also figured in the deaths of Protestants in Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday in 1987. On this occasion an IRA bomb, which was hidden in a building, exploded without warning causing a gable wall to collapse on those attending the service (Brown and Marshall 1988).

Eleven Protestants were killed. In the case of the officer, the explosion caused traumatic amputation. As described by Lynn Stansbury et al. (2008, p. 44), traumatic amputations are 'acute amputations that occur prior to reaching definitive care and not as a result of failed limb salvage.' Accordingly, the officer immediately lost his right arm and leg in the explosion while the severity of tissue damage in his left leg required surgical amputation two days later. The officer was left a triple amputee with his body displaying injuries more consistent with those sustained by the military in battlefield conditions (Nelson et al. 2008) than a police officer. Although an explosion sufficiently powerful to cause traumatic amputation is likely to result in fatal injuries (Hull et al. 1994) this is not always the case—the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 left 52 civilians dead but resulted in limb loss in a large number of survivors (Patel et al. 2012) as did the series of bombings against civilians in Paris between 1985 and 1986 (Rignault and Deligny 1989). The officer said:

> I lost my right arm and my right leg on the Tuesday from the explosion and then on the Thursday they had to chop my left leg off because they were pouring blood into me and it was just coming back out of what was left of my leg. They tried to save the leg but it was too far gone [unsalvageable injury]. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

The officer received multiple pints of blood in the initial phase of his emergency treatment and was then put into intensive care where he was not expected to live. The explosion and the officer's close proximity to it was capable of producing sufficient metal fragments to sheer off his upper and lower limbs on the right side of his body. Metal fragmentation causing high-velocity penetrating debris was produced when the blast disintegrated the bomb casing (the beer keg) and the car itself. It is miraculous that the officer survived the initial explosion and the injuries it inflicted. The fact that the attack took place a short distance from a hospital is a matter of significance.

A delay in a seriously injured person receiving medical treatment increases the chances of mortality. This is as true of victims of terrorist attacks as it is casualties in road traffic accidents. Given the real life setting of the following comment, it captures the importance of immediate medical attention following a gun or bomb attack. In this case a fortuitous combination of factors played a vital part in the officer's survival:

> The whole world goes into slow motion and off you go flying through the air then you hit the street. I thought I was dying. I would have died in the street but there had been a number of coincidences: there were two nurses in the factory who were still on duty. An ambulance was going down the Springfield Road and the driver heard the bang, obviously, and diverted himself to the scene. So he arrived very, very quickly on the scene. A military patrol had also been sent to have a look at the suspicious car and they appeared round the corner immediately as it blew up. So we had military guys there who were trained in first aid. We had two nurses there who were first aid people and had an ambulance arrive remarkably quickly. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

It is unlikely that the factors which combined to help save the officer's life would have been present if the attack had occurred in a rural setting. The leading hospital in Northern Ireland for dealing with serious injuries is the RVH in Belfast. The scene of the explosion is approximately 1.4 miles from the hospital and takes about four minutes to reach by vehicle. As such the officer was able to access life-saving medical assets within minutes.

The fact that the officer was wearing body armour also increased his chances of survival.

> Had I not been wearing my flak jacket I'd have been dead. I'd have been cut in two. It is that simple. Pieces of the car's boot hit me in the side and penetrated to within an inch or so of my stomach so if the flak jacket had not been worn the pieces of the boot would have carried on slicing through me. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

This is a comment that can be made by many military personnel whose body armour played a vital part in them surviving similar kinds of attack, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq. RUC officers were issued with body armour which offered some protection from gun shots and projectiles caused by bomb blasts. While there have been advances in the design and material used in contemporary forms of body armour, protection is still mainly offered to the torso—as was the case with this officer's flak jacket—which leaves other bodily areas exposed to serious injury. Bishara Atiyeh et al. (2007, p. 204) make this point appropriately:

> The new armoured Kevlar vests composed of a multiple-layer mesh of woven fabrics that soldiers are wearing in the present war in Iraq … stops projectiles and bullet rounds, efficiently protecting the human torso, and have definitely saved countless lives. Unfortunately, the surviving victims

are often paying a terrible price and are left with serious mutilations and handicaps from burns and shrapnel wounds over body areas not protected by the vest.

However, it must be remembered that RUC officers were exposed to a greater chance of suffering a traumatic head injury than soldiers because they did not have the option of wearing a helmet when on patrol. To issue police officers with helmets would have been another step in the militarisation of policing that the British government was keen to avoid. Had police officers worn helmets, then with the exception of the uniform, they would largely have been indistinguishable from soldiers. From the publication of the Hunt Report in 1970, the goal of successive British governments was to demilitarise policing where possible but they were constrained in their ability to do so as officers had to be afforded protection from a variety of terrorist attacks.

The officer celebrated his 28th birthday the week before the attack and so for 38 years he has had to cope without his two legs and right arm. This has required considerable physical readjustment as it is no longer possible to perform the same simple tasks:

> My biggest problem is that I can't do much. I mean, if I want to hammer a nail in the wall I couldn't do it. I'd have to ask somebody else to do it and if they said 'I'll do it tomorrow for you' I get cross because I know that if I was fit I could do it now. This causes me a huge amount of frustration. But there is nothing I can do about it. They're [limbs] not going to grow back again, you know. You've got to make the best of what you've got and the fact that you are able to move at all. I am glad I can do as much as I can. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

The officer has been supported throughout by his wife. When asked about the effects his injuries have had on his wife he replied:

> It obviously has had a huge effect upon my wife because she is now left as head cook and bottle washer and all the rest of it for me. She didn't sign up to join the police; she got nothing out of it but a life sentence of looking after a cripple. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

The wives of injured officers encounter their own problems of readjustment as caregiving is not without its challenges. From being the wife of a healthy and fit man to caring for someone with a high level of dependence is a major transformation that many officers' wives have

experienced. Once an officer is discharged from hospital, caregiving responsibilities are chiefly taken over by his wife. These responsibilities are for life (or at least the lifespan of a marriage). Obviously, responsibilities which involve actual physical help become more difficult as individuals get older and this adds to the challenges of providing care. The officer described how the apparently simple matter of lifting a temporary replacement wheelchair into the family car presents problems for his wife:

> My wife is now pushing me around in a wheelchair at the moment because I can't even stand up. So, just for her to get this particular wheelchair into the back of the car because it is so much heavier than the custom-made one is a pain in the arse. She has now got inflammatory arthritis and she doesn't need to be hauling a heavy wheelchair into the back of the car. (Interview with officer 10, 6 April 2016)

It ought to be borne in mind that as wives age and begin to suffer ailments themselves, their ability to perform the same physical role is impaired. Other members of the family are likely to become involved and perhaps input from community health service providers.

As discussed earlier, the IRA and other republican groups used under-car booby-trap devices by which to attack members of the security forces. These devices were more frequently used in off-duty rather than on-duty attacks and posed a threat to the family of an officer. That this form of attack was sanctioned at the level of the IRA's leadership informs us of the terrorists' complete disregard for the safety of officers' wives and children. Given the frequency of this sort of attack at the home of an officer, it is astonishing that members of officers' families were not killed or injured. In November, 1981, the IRA chose to use this method of attack against an officer resulting in him sustaining major injuries. The officer discussed the attack which took place outside his home:

> I left my family home to go to work as normal. It was a cold and wet morning and the footpaths were wet. I was wearing a pair of newly creased trousers and didn't want to wet them by stooping down to check underneath my vehicle for booby trap devices. Also, my car was parked outside my house - it normally stayed in the garage but I was having windows fitted at the time. So I proceeded to start the car and drove down the hill about two metres and I heard a 'click, click' sound. Knowing immediately this was not a mechanical click I opened the door and attempted to

exit the vehicle. But it was too late, I was thrown into the air and I knew before I hit the ground I had lost my legs. I lay on the ground in excruciating pain. (Response to questionnaire, officer 11, 24 June 2016)

The immediate effect of the explosion was traumatic amputation of the officer's legs below the knee and a major injury to one of his arms. Given that the legs are an anatomical region with a high blood flow the officer's life was seriously endangered by the arterial damage caused by the explosion. Haemorrhage control is a major factor which increases the survivability of those suffering critical injury (Mahambrey et al. 2013) and as Alec Beekley et al. (2008) argue, the pre-hospital use of tourniquets on military casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom lowered the number of fatalities. It was, therefore, fortunate that the officer's neighbour was a nurse who was at home at the time. She rushed to the scene and rapidly applied tourniquets to the thigh region of both legs. The officer claims that the nurse's actions—using the ties of RUC officers who arrived at the scene as tourniquets—prevented extensive exsanguination and saved his life.

The officer discussed how his wife heard the blast inside their home and knew that her husband had been attacked. Before rushing to her husband she tried to prevent her son from seeing his father lying severely injured by telling him to remain in the house and call the emergency services. However, the incident had a negative effect on the son who was aged 22 at the time. Referring to his two sons the officer said:

My two sons were in their early 20s at the time of the attack and I can say the emotional turmoil it has caused them has been extensive. My older son has coped well to date but my younger son was not so lucky. He had to be counselled after the events he witnessed that morning and it has since come back to haunt him once again after suffering a stroke at 46 years old. All the memories of that poignant day have flooded back to haunt him and caused him emotional suffering once more. (Response to questionnaire, officer 11, 24 June 2016)

It is important to consider the context of the attack and the psychological consequences for the officer's wife and son. Terrorists, using an undercar booby-trap bomb, inflicted physical injuries consistent with those sustained by military personnel on the battlefield. In this respect, terrorists turned the home of the officer into a combat zone, exposing his family to danger as well as his wife and son to the immediate emotional aftermath of the blast—horrendous physical injury to a loved one.

It is certainly unusual for a wife to be exposed to the rawness of her husband's injuries in this manner. While car accidents can cause dreadful injuries which family members can witness, these, by definition, are not deliberately caused. Where major injuries are intentionally inflicted, as in military conflicts, family members will normally receive information from senior medical staff regarding the extent of their loved one's injuries. Evacuation and hospitalisation allows for a degree of adjustment to the tragic news and information of this kind helps reduce shock and assists with mental preparation before attending the bedside of the victim. These preparatory stages, which aid individual and familial approaches to coping, were missing in the case of the attack on this officer as his wife and son were present at the scene.

Wounds caused by gunshot or bomb blasts in conventional conflicts involve the risk of infection (Petersen et al. 2007). This is also the case in asymmetrical conflicts where terrorists' use of anti-personnel devices, like undercar booby traps or explosives connected to a pressure plate, threaten wounds with contamination. For example, an explosion involving a pressure plate can result in the rubber fragments of a soldier's boot or soil beneath which the plate is concealed, becoming embedded deep in a wound. Similarly, an undercar booby trap can cause particles of the car's seat as well as rusty metal fragments of the underside of the vehicle to become implanted in the wound area resulting in serious infection. Clothing fibres also threaten infection and require careful removal from the wound area. The officer discussed some of his other injuries: 'I also had debris from the bomb and car in various locations of my body such as shrapnel in my eyes and a spring from the car seat implanted in my buttocks' (response to questionnaire, officer 11, 24 June 2016) which had to be addressed once his life-threatening injuries had received attention.

The physical effects of the explosion dramatically altered the officer's life. They brought his career in the police to an end. He could no longer play rugby and found it difficult to participate in pipe band contests in addition to other recreational activities he previously enjoyed. With the use of prosthetic limbs he was able to walk again but the scope for mobility has decreased with age: 'Unfortunately, I am now wheelchair bound as I do not have the strength to use the prosthetic limbs.' The result of this is increased dependence upon his wife who took on the role of caregiver following the attack. The officer made clear the effect his injuries have had on his wife: 'Her life was destroyed along with my own. She couldn't

go to work. She had to care for me in every way imaginable and had lost her independence and the support of her husband' and added 'My sons had also lost their father as they once knew him' (response to questionnaire, officer 11, 24 June 2016). The officer points to the transformation of his sons' experience of their father. When the attack occurred this officer's children were older than the children of other injured officers who participated in the research. Other officers' children were either very young or were born post-injury and so had little or no memory of their father as a fit and able-bodied person. However, with older children it is to be expected that there exist particular challenges adjusting to, and coping with, the injury and permanent disability of a parent.

The officer discussed his sense of loss with reference to a number of emotional relationships which he feels his family have been deprived of:

> The terrorist attack has robbed my wife of a husband, my sons of a father and my grandchildren of a grandfather figure. I want to be out playing football and going for walks, but none of that I can do, thanks to a pack of cowardly terrorists. I have been robbed of the use of my limbs and my life as it was prior to the attack and my family has been robbed of the husband/father/grandfather figure that I would like to have been. As soon as my granddaughter was old enough to understand we just told her bad people had put a bomb under the car and granda had lost his legs as a result and my great grandson will be told the same. In all honesty, my life has been ruined. (Response to questionnaire, officer 11, 24 June 2016)

This comment is relevant when considering the targeting strategy of terrorist groups and their methodology of violence. The officer relays his disgust at the way he was targeted by referring to his attackers as a 'pack of cowardly terrorists.' The adjective 'cowardly' is intended acidly to strip from the actions of those who planted the bomb any sense of fairness in combat thereby denying to terrorists the concept of the 'courageous volunteer'. It constitutes a perspective on the Northern Ireland conflict which has profound implications for reconciliatory approaches as this person's sense of loss—and that of his family—is still emotionally raw. The IRA and other republican groups sought to justify the killing or maiming of police officers on the grounds that they were legitimate targets. RUC officers, however, have difficulties with the light in which terrorists wish their violence to be seen i.e. that they were only attacking the police uniform due to its symbolism and not the individual who wore it. But the comment encourages us to look beyond the uniform and the

legitimising construct of the terrorist, and consider the ripple effect of an attack across the generations of this family (and many others). In doing so we are informed of the multiple dimensions to a victim's identity and gain insight into the human cost of an attack on members of the security forces and their loved ones. Further, off-duty attacks at officers' homes paint a different picture to the one presented by terrorists as they consisted of a clear personal dimension—terrorists got to 'know' their victim as they gathered intelligence and carefully planned the attack.

Finally, less than two months after the attack and when the officer was recovering in hospital, he received news that the IRA had been responsible for the death of his nephew. The 19-year-old, whose car had broken down, was being given a lift by an off-duty UDR soldier. He had just gotten into the vehicle when an undercar booby-trap bomb exploded. The officer's nephew had no connection to the security forces. The family were tragically affected by this form of terrorist attack.

Mobile army and police patrols were under regular threat of attack from the IRA's use of rocket-propelled grenades. An anti-tank rocket launcher which is fired from the shoulder, the weapon's portability rendered it well suited to the urban environment. Amidst the rows of streets and alleyways of the urban terrain, it was not difficult for terrorists, operating on foot within a staunchly republican area, to transport the weapon to and from the scene of an attack. Often the targets of such attacks were police and army Land Rovers. Although armour-plated, the armour was weaker on the vehicle's two side doors to the front which were fitted with bullet-proof glass. However, an RPG-7 missile fired at close range is capable of penetrating armour. This was the case in 1994 when an RUC Land Rover was struck by a rocket in the republican Short Strand area of East Belfast. The rocket was fired from a distance of approximately 8–10 metres (the terrorists abandoned the weapon which was recovered by the security forces). There were three officers in the vehicle at the time and a Sergeant received life-threatening injuries in the blast:

> I was in the passenger seat, and they [IRA] fired an RPG-7 rocket at the Land Rover. It hit a foot above my head and exploded inwards and upwards. It took the back of my head off, and the ear and the nose. There was no cheekbone there. I was in a bad way. I was almost wiped out. (Interview with officer 12, 12 April 2016)

Attacks of this kind often resulted in the death of police officers and soldiers whilst the other occupants of the vehicle may have suffered the loss of a limb or limbs. As described by the officer, the 'inwards and upwards' explosion of the rocket created a massive blast inside the vehicle. Given that confined-space explosions are associated with a higher rate of mortality and more severe injuries than those that occur in open-air settings (Leibovici et al. 1996), it is amazing that the other two occupants were not severely injured, if not killed.

The force of the explosion brought the vehicle to a stop and disabled the radio. Normally, a Land Rover would have been accompanied by around six soldiers patrolling on foot who would have provided cover for the vehicle (whilst the vehicle provided mobile support for the foot patrol) but as the shift was about to end, and the vehicle was only being driven on the outskirts of the area, the officers were on their own. However, the explosion was heard in the local police station and a response team arrived quickly getting the officer out of the vehicle.

The effects of the explosion, however, were not the only concerns of the officer. Following the blast, a hostile crowd gathered and the officer became fearful that terrorists in the area would take the opportunity offered by the chaos of the situation and the physical incapacitation of him and his colleagues (one of whom was a woman constable who was unarmed) to attack again:

> We were in a hostile community and my concern there was that they [terrorists] were going to come over and finish me off. That was my fear. There was still a chance that they would have taken the gun off me and done [killed] me, absolutely. (Interview with officer 12, 12 April 2016)

The officer paid tribute to the actions of the local Roman Catholic priest in helping to keep the crowd at bay. As the attack took place near to the parochial hall the priest was one of the first individuals to arrive and approach the Land Rover to offer assistance. Upon observing the officer's injuries he began to give him the last rites but the officer commented 'I'm fine, I'm fine' which then led the priest to use his moral authority to keep the crowd back until the security forces took greater control of the scene. The officer's concerns are not irrational. The hostility of a republican crowd towards badly injured RUC officers whilst they received medical attention following a bomb or shooting incident

were not uncommon (Doherty 2004). Indeed, situations where people cheered at the sight of dying or severely injured police officers were a troubling illustration of the hatred which republican sympathisers harboured towards the police.

The officer was rushed to hospital for emergency treatment and fought to remain conscious on the journey. The visualisation of his two daughters aged four and six played a crucial part in preventing him from drifting into what he considered to be the dangers of unconsciousness. In a mood of intense emotion, the officer relived these life-threatening moments as follows:

> I remember in the back of the ambulance. I thought that I was on my way out. I couldn't breathe and there was an awful lot of blood. I'd been to many incidents before where people had just said 'Just lie back, relax and go to sleep' and I said 'Right, if you do that that'll be the end of you.' I purposely sat up and I could see my two children saying 'Lift me, Lift me.' It's them that got me through it because we're close. I could see them saying to me, 'You're needed here, don't go to sleep.' That's what got me through it. (Interview with officer 12, 12 April 2016)

The officer spent 48 hours on a life support system and was off work for a year. During this time he received reconstructive surgery on a number of occasions to the left side of his face which was damaged in the explosion:

> I ended up with a metal cage on my face. The whole side of the face was away down here, so they had to build it up with springs, plate and stuff like that in there. My cheekbones: they were all built up, so I had a steel cage on for eight weeks. (Interview with officer 12, 12 April 2016)

That there are negative psychological effects of cosmetic disfigurement is to be expected (Fukunishi 1999). Maxillofacial injury can be the result of accidents occurring in everyday life and spark off traumatic reactions in victims but such injuries can also be the product of inter-personal violence (Wong et al. 2007). Acts of terrorism are not accidental but rather deliberate in a way that often reflects careful and sinister planning. They are certainly examples of inter-personal violence but of a malevolent kind: terrorist-inflicted injury is not the product of violence which has erupted in the heat of the moment but is calculated with lethal intent. In addition to the physical challenges the officer encountered during his year-long

recovery, the site of the injury also had a psychological impact which resulted in social withdrawal. Injuries to the face are not easily hidden and so can significantly diminish an individual's body image. Although prior to the injury the officer and his wife were keen on social activities these promptly stopped as going out for a meal, for instance, invited curious stares from strangers. As a keen sportsman, the officer also struggled to regain his former level of physicality. He was only able to recover a small portion of the two-stone weight loss since the explosion in 1994.

The officer chooses to avoid the area where the attack happened and has never taken his wife and daughters to the location. Geographical avoidance is a coping mechanism by which disturbing memories are kept in check and is not an unusual response to a traumatic event. But avoiding an area in Belfast is not particularly difficult and indicates that some triggers of stressful experiences are more easily sidestepped than others. The emotional management of serious injury is more challenging if an individual can be reminded of it in routine behaviour. In this respect, facial disfigurement is a problematic injury because there is a constant threat of unwelcome thoughts being triggered by mundane acts as the officer describes: 'When I look in the mirror to shave, I can't help but see it' (interview with officer 12, 12 April 2016). The passage of time has helped reduce the negative effects of his reflection but he remains unable to sleep on his left side because of the reconstructive surgery as to do so is painful and causes sleeplessness.

The full physical effects of an injury are not always apparent either immediately or soon after an attack. Injuries can result in physical deterioration over a period of time which can eventually result in an officer being medically discharged. This is the experience of an officer who lost two of his colleagues when the IRA detonated a 1000 lb landmine in South Armagh on 18 May 1984. The bomb had been placed in a culvert running under the road. The officer was in the second of two armoured cars with his colleague whilst three officers travelled in the lead car.

As we were driving down the road there was a blue flash and black and yellow dust, muck and everything was being thrown about in the air. The last image I have of the car in front was seeing [officer's name] head coming back and smashing into the armoured glass. We ended up in the crater of the bomb and I ended up in the footwell of the police car, stuck. You can imagine [being thrown from the seat into the footwell] as we never wore seat belts in the police cars. (Interview with officer 13, 11 April 2016)

Seatbelts were not worn by officers in areas of high threat because of the need to be mobile, perhaps, to escape from a vehicle to take cover should an attack occur (or give quick chase to an attacker). Whilst police cars were bullet-proof and armour-plated, sustained and concentrated fire from a heavy calibre machine gun (or attack from a rocket-propelled grenade) would degrade its protective shielding. It was not unknown for the IRA to focus fire at the front of a police car to incapacitate its engine thus leaving its occupants highly vulnerable to subsequent attack. The officer freed himself from the car and rushed to the vehicle which had taken the full force of the explosion:

> All I wanted to do was get to the other car and it was lying over on its roof sort of and because it had humped over, it had warped the car. We couldn't get the armoured doors open because the frame of the car was warped. We managed to get the doors open and started to try and get them out. At this stage the army helicopter had arrived with medics on board. All I could think about was [officer's] wife and three kids. We all knew them. We were all very, very close and very, very friendly. I remember feeling 'I wish that had been me and not him' because of his circumstances. (Interview with officer 13, 11 April 2016)

The officer's back was injured in the attack which resulted in him being admitted to hospital six months later where he was placed in traction. He experienced back pain for periods thereafter which required constant medication but, in 1999, the officer suffered a seizure to his back and underwent surgery. In an attempt to explain the worsening of the officer's condition the surgeon suggested that vertebra, which had been crushed during the explosion in 1984, had eventually deteriorated leading to increased pain associated with pressure on the spine and decreased mobility. Obviously, the officer no longer can participate in sports or even recreational activities which involve a degree of physical exertion. However, how does an injury like this affect an individual in less obvious ways? How does it affect his relationship with his wife and children and his role as a husband and father? The officer was candid in his response to such questions:

> Well, it has put a lot of strain on my relationship with my wife. When I say 'put a lot of strain', it impacted sex life. I don't have any sensation really from the waist down. I don't get erections. I have had a long time of trouble with my bladder, wetting the bed during the night and things like that. I went from 13 stone to 23.5 stone. I developed type 2 diabetes. (Interview with officer 13, 11 April 2016)

His relationship with his children has also been affected:

> It just wrecked everything. I missed so much of my kids growing up and I wasn't able to help my son who developed a cannabis habit. My daughter, she and my wife had to run after me, doing everything for me - putting my shoes on. It's made me half a man. (Interview with officer 13, 11 April 2016)

Allison Holmes et al. (2013, p. 143) account for the 'profound and long-lasting' consequences of soldiers who have been injured in combat. These commentators point to the new roles which family members have to take on, and depending on the nature of the injury, these roles may be permanent as in the case of a wife who suddenly becomes a carer for a severely injured husband. Such consequences can be identified in the experiences of this officer and his family. Firstly, the attack did not result in limb loss, yet manoeuvrability is restricted. Secondly, the injury has had a major impact on intimate facets of his marriage even though bodily functioning was unaffected directly by the explosion. Thirdly, family organisation was affected as the officer's wife became a carer for her husband. Fourthly, the officer's children have been affected: his daughter supported her mother in performing caring roles for her father, and to a degree, the officer shoulders blame for his son's drug problem because his physical incapacitation prevented paternal support being available when needed. Fifthly, the comment 'It's made me half a man' draws our attention to the psychological damage the injury has caused to the masculine self-image of the officer who has become dependent on his wife and daughter. Lastly, the injury required surgery and constant reliance on medication for pain relief.

Due to the threat posed by terrorists police stations were fortified installations in Northern Ireland. This was especially so in areas where there existed a high threat of an attack. The structural appearance of stations in such areas was incomparable to police stations anywhere else in the world and the reason for this was simple. Police stations elsewhere were not attacked by rockets, mortars or massive bombs left in abandoned vehicles directly outside. To illustrate the nature of the threat: the vulnerability of officers inside the fortified perimeter of a station was exposed in the IRA mortar attack on Newry RUC station in 1985. Rockets posed a deadly threat also and were frequently used by terrorists. A rocket attack on Enniskillen RUC station in 1985 was primarily intended to take life and not result in injury. The officer caught up in this attack discussed his injuries and how the incident has affected his

life. At the time of the attack the policeman was performing the role of Duty Officer which involved dealing with queries from the public. It was simply a stroke of good fortune, rather than careful planning by terrorists, that a member of the public was not in the office when the rocket exploded. It was not only police officers who were to be found in RUC stations: ordinary members of the public had reason to enter police stations as well as individuals who were arrested for ordinary or terrorist-related crimes. So, with this in mind, attacking police stations could have caused civilian injuries. The rocket, however, was poorly aimed and the trajectory resulted in it exploding on the ground outside the building occupied by the officer. The force of the blast blew the policeman into the next room showering him with glass and debris. He suffered the effects of primary blast injury: 'I lost, according to the police doctor, 50 percent of the hearing in this ear' (interview with officer 14, 19 April 2016) but due to his sideward position when the explosion occurred the other eardrum was not damaged. As a result of the blast wind causing physical displacement, he suffered damage to his hip necessitating a hip replacement operation. The officer was hospitalised in the RVH for a couple of months and was placed under police guard.

In addition to the significant loss of hearing in one ear, the physical injury to his hip prevented him from participating in sports:

> I was on the RUC's tug-of-war team that won. We went over and beat the English teams and all, and we won the cup for the tug-of-war. I was the front man on the team, but that had to finish and any of the other sports. (Interview with officer 14, 19 April 2016)

The injury also affected his passion for pheasant shooting as walking over countryside and swivelling to shoot prey generated pain in his hip. As a consequence, the effects of the explosion were an end to the sporting and recreational activities he previously enjoyed.

Gunshot Wounds

More officers were killed as a result of shooting attacks than in bomb explosions. Some officers who were shot managed to recover from their injuries and return to work. The author has interviewed officers who were shot but whose injuries were relatively minor. However, it is noteworthy that whilst, comparatively speaking, the physical injuries may have been

minor, the attack itself caused considerable psychological damage to the victim. Such attacks usually involved low-velocity handguns which have a reduced wounding capability and require less medical treatment than high-velocity weaponry (Bartlett et al. 2000). Of course, it should be acknowledged that injuries caused by low-energy gunshot wounds can give rise to medical complications that require considerable treatment (Abghari et al. 2015). Obviously, low-velocity weapons can be lethal especially if injuries are caused to the vital organs such as the brain and heart (terrorists had a habit of approaching officers from behind and shooting them at point blank range in the head usually causing immediate death). A victim's recovery from gunshot wounds is dependent on the amount of tissue, vascular, bone and organ damage that has been caused and as Paul Dicpinigaitis et al. (2006, p. 139) discuss, damage to the body relates to a 'wide variety of factors including the bullet's diameter or calibre, as well as its shape, velocity, tumbling characteristics, and weight.'

The following discussion accounts for officers seriously injured in gun attacks and who did not recover well. Their experiences indicate the harmful effects of shootings which are perhaps not sufficiently recognised at a popular level. For example, there is a greater inclination to associate the amputation of a limb with bomb explosions yet attacks involving firearms have the potential to result in limb loss too. Our understanding of the effects of shootings is probably shaped by their representation in old western films where victims are often little affected when struck by a bullet. However, as we shall see, beyond the Hollywood portrayal, the laws of ballistics can have a devastating effect on individuals resulting in paralysation or amputation.

In 1980 the IRA attacked a border checkpoint. These locations were dangerous because of the predictable presence of the security forces. Reconnaissance in the planning of the attack was easy in that terrorists could simply use the crossing and make detailed observations. Whilst the soldiers were changing shift, an IRA unit travelling in a vehicle opened fire at close range with a high velocity Armalite rifle. An officer who was checking cars at an angle to the terrorists narrowly escaped death as bullets flew across his chest—some gouging flesh as they went—but his upper arm took the full impact of one with severe consequences: 'I lost my left arm up to the shoulder. The surgeons did their best to keep some of the arm there to accommodate an artificial arm but it didn't work' (response to questionnaire, officer 15, 22 June 2016). Amputation was unavoidable because of the extent of the injury. He was informed by

the consultant that if his arm had not acted as a barrier of sorts, or his torso had been angled more favourably to the terrorists, then he would have been killed. The fact that the officer, aged 28, lost his arm to the shoulder impacted upon his rehabilitation as an artificial arm could not be fitted to assist the process of 'normalisation'. This restricted physical capability which increased the sense of loss. The officer accounted for the effects of his injuries on sporting and recreational activities:

> The physical injuries had a great impact on me. I was very keen to carry on my sport of Judo when in the RUC, which of course wasn't possible when I lost my arm. I was also a keen fisherman, which I had to give up. My son is a very good and very keen fisherman and it is one of the downsides in not being able to enjoy the sport with him. (Response to questionnaire, officer 15, 22 June 2016)

A sense of generational loss is detectable in this comment. The officer and his son have lost out in terms of recreational interaction. This point encourages us to consider the possibility of emotional loss being relived at the grandparental stage in two senses. Firstly, the actual inability physically to respond to grandchildren in the same way as one's children could not be responded to. Secondly, the inquisitiveness of grandchildren creates a new set of circumstances in which injuries and their causal factors may need to be explained. The passage of time may make this experience less of an ordeal but perhaps for some victims it may trigger painful memories which they would prefer to avoid. Severe physical injuries are less easily hidden than those of a psychological kind and are likely to invite inquiry. Comparatively speaking, given that very few terrorists lost limbs in the conflict (some harmed themselves when bombs exploded prematurely) it is police officers who disproportionately encounter the challenges of physical impairment.

The officer went on to discuss the effects of the injury in more detail:

> It did have an effect on my family at a number of levels. My first son was born three weeks after I was shot. It was a very tough time for my wife and myself having to cope with a newborn baby whilst I was still trying to recover from my injuries. What was supposed to be a joyous celebration of life was marred by physical tasks involved in looking after a newborn baby and also my visits to the hospital, daily care and recovery. I had lost a lot of blood and a lot of weight which left me very weak. Physically, I found it hard to cope and psychologically it was almost worse, not being able to play my part as a new father. (Response to questionnaire, officer 15, 22 June 2016)

The injury threw the family into chaos. That terrorism robbed them of the excitement experienced by first-time parents is captured in the comment 'a joyous celebration of life was marred' as the officer had to attend hospital regularly for treatment and his wife found herself providing frequent caregiving at home. For any father who can recall lifting his child for the first time and holding it securely in his two arms, the emotional loss experienced by the officer can be appreciated. It is, therefore, not odd that reference is made to the psychological strain that was experienced at this time as a result both of his partial physical disconnection from his child and the early period of his recuperation from severe injury. The combination of these factors rendered him unable to 'play my part as a new father.' His wife's attention was divided between catering for the needs of their newborn baby and caring for her husband.

The officer returned to work within the year but no longer performed operational duties. Surprisingly, he was stationed in an area well known for its terrorist activity and high level of threat, which in the light of the policeman's traumatic experience and injury, was arguably a poor decision on the part of his managers. The officer had three children and has recently become a grandfather but there is a touch of sadness harboured by his wife. She is concerned that the physical limitations, which prevented her husband from participating more fully in their sons' upbringing and which caused emotional upset, will be experienced by him once again as his grandchild gets older.

An off-duty gun attack by the IRA at the home of a 29-year-old Roman Catholic officer in West Belfast in October 1971 resulted in horrendous injury. The attack was one of the early examples of the willingness of the IRA to strike at officers when they were off duty. Had the IRA been successful in this attack, the officer would have been the first off-duty fatality in the Troubles. Of the eleven officers who died at the hands of terrorists in 1971, all were on duty at the time. As referred to in Chapter 4, the first murder by the IRA of an off-duty RUC officer was in January 1972 when the organisation shot dead Reserve Constable Raymond Denham. However, the organisation killed three off-duty members of the UDR all in December 1971 one of whom was a Roman Catholic soldier who was shot dead in his home in the republican New Barnsley area of West Belfast. That attack was very similar to the one carried out on the officer who participated in this research.

The attack indicated the officer's vulnerability. A member of the IRA knocked his front door late in the evening. As the officer had gone to bed he peered from a bedroom window before coming down to answer

the door. At this point a terrorist opened fire resulting in a bullet hitting him in the head. However, the officer was not the only one endangered in the attack as lying in a cot beside him was his 6-month-old son:

> Kieron was a baby. All the time he was lying in the cot when I was injured. The blood from me flew over the baby. The first thing my wife thought was, 'There's something wrong with the baby,' natural for any mother. (Interview with officer 16, 7 April 2016)

This comment paints a picture of a horrific scene. It is difficult to comprehend the sense of terror experienced by the officer's wife when she thought, first that the baby had been injured, followed by the realisation that her husband had been critically wounded. The account allows us to glimpse the immediate effects of terrorism. Given that the attack required intelligence gathering and planning, it is likely that the terrorists knew the officer had a wife and baby thereby understanding that an attack on his home posed a threat to the safety of his family. If the targeting intelligence had been supplied by a neighbour of the policeman who was either active in the IRA or a sympathiser, then it is likely that the information would have included a reference to his family. After all, those involved in terrorism, like those who combat it, will endeavour to gain as much information as possible on a target. The aiming and deliberate firing of an automatic weapon at the bedroom window of a house demonstrates little concern for the safety of the officer's wife and child.

The attack occurred in a republican part of West Belfast not far from where the officer had been raised as a child. During interview he discussed how the police response to the incident was delayed because of a concern that it was merely a hoax call to lure them into the area where they would be attacked. Given the ideological leanings of the place, the attack could have been carried out by individuals who lived nearby or at least not far away from the officer's home. This fact is a particularly nasty feature of ethnic conflict which is intra-communal in the sense that it will have been executed by those possessing the same ethno-religious background as the officer. To those familiar with the Northern Ireland conflict it may seem astonishing that an RUC officer lived in this part of Belfast but the danger was less apparent at the time of the attack. The officer remarked: 'I had no idea this was going to happen for I am Catholic. I speak Irish. I thought that I was one of them and they wouldn't hurt me' and discussed how in joining the RUC he

thought himself to be setting an example for members of his community to follow: 'I thought I was leading a big string of people; a big string of Catholics but I turned out to be on my own' (interview with officer 16, 7 April 2016). The officer uses the language of ethnicity to convey his sense of communal belonging and does so by using two key markers of ethnic identity, namely, religion and language (Hutchinson and Smith 1995). As a member of an ethnic group he was of the opinion that this would serve as a form of protection. However, prior to the attack he patrolled the Short Strand area in East Belfast and was under no illusion as to the dangers which existed when he was *on duty* in a republican area: 'Whenever I was walking doing the beat in the Short Strand I was always looking over my shoulder in case somebody would pop up with a gun' (interview with officer 16, 7 April 2016). The officer's comments might appear paradoxical in that he was conscious of an on-duty threat but although living in a republican area did not feel threatened when off duty. Perhaps an explanation is to be found in the dynamics of conflict at this time. Firstly, we are encouraged to ponder upon the alarming pace of violence in 1971 which rapidly created hostile areas for members of the security forces. Territoriality plays a key role in the operation of ethno-national forms of terrorism. Certainly, the deep patterns of ethnic segregation in West Belfast, which Fred Boal (1969) identified before the outbreak of vicious inter-ethnic violence in August 1969, facilitated the rise of both loyalist and republican organisations. But, prior to August 1969 the existence of segregation neither gave rise to systematic sectarian violence nor attacks on the security forces. This was rapidly to change. Thus, the officer seems to have been overtaken by the suddenness by which hostilities took hold. Secondly, and importantly, the officer's comment suggests that he was unaware of developments concerning the IRA's targeting strategy and the organisation's willingness to murder officers whilst off duty. The IRA did not go to the officer's home that night to intimidate him into leaving the area by, for example, smashing the windows of the house or petrol bombing it. Rather, its members went to kill the officer having rejected non-lethal alternatives. Neither had the organisation attacked the home previously in order to warn the policeman that his presence in the area was no longer welcome. Thus, the attack was something the officer evidently did not anticipate, and as mentioned above, had the officer's injuries been fatal he would have been the first off-duty policeman to die in the Troubles. Undoubtedly, the attack on this officer and the fatal off-duty ones mentioned above encouraged members of the security forces to leave this part of Belfast.

The shooting left the officer a hemiplegic. During interview he said: 'Everything on my left side is gone. My left eye, my left arm, my left leg'. He spent four months in intensive care and nearly two years in hospital. For a number of years he lived in a modified bungalow until his marriage ended, which in no small measure, was blamed on his injuries: 'My wife left because, in fairness to her, I wasn't the man who walked down the aisle with her. When I came back I was, forgive the word, a cripple, which is a terrible bloody word.' His wife and young son went to live in the Republic of Ireland and so he is mournful in a number of ways:

> I regret it every night. I regret it all the time. I can't do things that I did when I was able. I can't go to the toilet on my own. I can't dress myself, which was no trouble before I was injured. I am not ashamed to say it, I'm a grown man, there's many nights I've cried myself to sleep, and I'm not ashamed to say it. You know the business: 'big boys don't cry' well that's not true. (Interview with officer 16, 7 April 2016)

The human story which unfolded in the wake of this terrorist attack is tragic—severe and permanent physical injury, emotional morbidity, and the ruin of a family unit. These are under-examined consequences of terrorist attacks.

On the 21 September 1972 two constables were injured in an IRA sniper attack when they were returning to Crossmaglen RUC station. They had been attending an incident which involved an attack on a British army unit. Both officers were shot but managed to make it to the station where they immediately received first aid. They were then rushed by ambulance to a hospital in Newry where one officer, aged 21, was quickly transported by helicopter to the RVH in Belfast. A bullet had shattered four of his lower lumbar vertebra and to this day three bullet fragments remain in his spinal cord. Exit wounds can cause serious injuries as the trajectory of a bullet can twist and turn. In the case of this officer, the exit wound is an ongoing complication, which requires daily dressing, as his body tries to expel the metal fragments: 'this has formed a sinus from the area creating a discharge, which has to be kept open, if it blocks that causes pressure on the spine and infection in the area' (response to questionnaire, officer 17, 20 May 2016). The attack left him permanently paralysed in one leg and in continuous pain for which he takes various forms of medication. The paralysis and pain combine to make walking difficult and when this is attempted elbow crutches are used to assist his balance.

The officer enjoyed playing football and cross country running but the injury brought participation in these sports to an immediate halt. He and his cousins were enthusiastic about stock car driving and would regularly race their car in meetings but this ended instantly also. However, although no longer able to participate, the officer attended events as a spectator but this was not without it challenges: 'I went to watch a few events, but it was so difficult to watch and not to be able to participate' (response to questionnaire, officer 17, 20 May 2016). As Aynsley Smith et al. (1990) argue, it is not unusual for injuries to result in emotional disturbance in sports people during their rehabilitation. The commentators' point about the negative emotional effects caused by temporary loss of health causes us to ponder upon the psychological impact of severe and permanent injury. There is a psychosocial dimension to the officer's last comment: he experienced emotional resignation because of the permanence of his injuries which resulted in social withdrawal and an end to spectating.

The attack did not only affect the officer and, in this respect, his story is particularly poignant. When his parents were informed that he had been injured they rushed to hospital. Whilst standing at their son's beside, the officer's mother suffered heart failure and dropped dead aged 48. The policeman was unconscious at the time and so was unaware of what had happened. The decision was taken not to inform him of his mother's death in case it endangered his recovery. This is a specific area of secondary victimhood that is little understood and which is unfortunate in the light of its harsh reality. The officer said:

> I was unaware for a few weeks that my mother had died of shock at my bedside. This is the one thing that I can never come to terms with; that she was a victim of what happened to me. The effect of this on my sisters and father was something we still can't talk about. Dad died in January, 2015, without us talking about the attempted murder and my mother's death. (Response to questionnaire, officer 17, 20 May 2016)

The family was deeply affected by the sudden death of their loved one. The coping strategy was to avoid talking about the tragedy (at least between the officer and his father and sisters). For 43 years the officer and his father did not speak about his mother's death (it remains undiscussed with his sisters). Of course, as George Bonanno and Stacey Kaltman (2001) discuss, responses to grief are varied with some individuals suffering over a short period of time whilst others may suffer for

many years (this family's suffering has lasted decades and is ongoing). Long-lasting grief, like this family's, points to a form of complicated mourning (Rando 1993). Therese Rando (1993, p. 47) suggests that individuals are at risk of experiencing complex reactions to bereavement if it is a 'sudden and unanticipated death, especially when it is traumatic, violent, mutilating or random'. Evidently, the officer's mother's death was random, sudden and unexpected and so complicated the family's grieving process.

Many officers felt they had missed out on a considerable portion of their children's upbringing because of the long hours RUC men and women worked. Overtime was compulsory and shift work compounded the problem. This is an understandable point of regret for many officers. However, it pales into insignificance when compared to the loss of physical interaction which injured officers experienced with their children. The officer accounted for the emotional costs of his injuries:

> Being unable to take part in family and leisure activities, unable to even bat a ball or go for a walk, this has meant that although we went places as a family, I usually waited [in the car] for them to return from the activities. This left me feeling very despondent and frustrated. I would have, having been a very active individual, loved to join in with my family. It has always been difficult to keep depression at bay, but I would not put that on to my family as well as the other problems we have to deal with. I feel that both myself and my children have missed out on being able to interact at so many different levels. I know that this has also impacted on my wife, as she tries to keep us all sane. (Response to questionnaire, officer 17, 20 May 2016)

The response conveys a profound sense of familial loss. As pointed out above, the officer enjoyed playing sport until he was injured but the comment informs us of how his injury restricted his interaction with his family when they were engaged in sporting or recreational activities. He chose to remain separate from the activities so as not to ruin his children's fun. The officer explained that it was the tendency of his four daughters to alter their play in order to accommodate his participation but he considered this unfair to them. Accordingly, in a situation where the family were attending, for example, the beach, he would stay in the car until his wife and daughters returned. He felt immensely frustrated when he looked at able-bodied fathers enjoying their children in a qualitatively different way but ensured that his emotions were kept concealed.

That the social isolation and loss of familial experience is lamented by the officer is expressed in the simple remark: 'I would have … loved to join in with my family.' Dealing with these numerous situations during his children's upbringing had emotional consequences and he found himself struggling to 'keep depression at bay' but refused to take anti-depressants. The officer praised his children for their supportive spirit whilst growing up as they recognised his physical limitations and accepted how it affected family life. Initially, his children were told that their father had been injured in a car crash until old enough to understand that the injuries were conflict-related and human-caused. Given that the violence of the Troubles was ongoing this helped his children accept the abnormal circumstances the officer's injuries created. But he has decided to internalise the depth of his regret at what terrorists have denied him and his children: 'I have always felt that they have missed out on having that extra contact with me, and I have always felt this deeply and don't talk about how badly this has affected me and still does' (response to questionnaire, officer 17, 20 May 2016).

On 17 November, 1981, the IRA attempted to kill a member of the RUC Part-time Reserve in Newry. The officer said that the person responsible for setting him up was a fellow employee who 'sat opposite me at my daytime job.' Intelligence gathering on part-time officers was an easy affair for terrorists. Perforce of circumstances these officers worked with a range of people in their civilian occupations. Work colleagues may have encountered an officer when he was on duty in the evening or at the weekend and this information could quickly spread in conversation—whether of harmless or sinister intent—throughout the workplace. The officer described the attempt on his life:

> I was shot six times by a member of the Provisional IRA in Newry. I had just got into my car when I saw a man aiming a gun in my direction. He fired six shots in total. The first shot was to the back of my head, the second through my upper right arm and into my right lung, the third bullet went into my spine and is still there, the fourth into my head and I lost the sight of my right eye. The final two shots got wrapped up in my clothing. (Response to questionnaire, officer 18, 3 June 2016)

The RUC man was extremely fortunate to survive the shooting. The terrorist likely left him for dead due to being shot in vital areas of the body.

The officer discussed the effects of blindness in one of his eyes:

> My injuries were such that my two favourite activities, darts and billiards, were out for me due to my sight being affected. Woodwork was my favourite pastime. I used to spend hours on my lathe making items which I usually gave to friends or relatives. I have tried to go back to the lathe work but get so annoyed when I cannot do fine work. (Response to questionnaire, officer 18, 3 June 2016)

The interests the officer pursued in his leisure time were more recreational than sporting which is important when it comes to understanding the broader effects of an injury. The limitations of a physical injury are often associated with an inability to participate in sports because they require a degree of athleticism rather than other activities enjoyed by an individual. The officer's children were aged 14 and 17 when the attack happened. The older child was studying for his 'A' Level examinations at the time and lost interest in school work. As a result, he did not achieve the required grades to go to university. However, when the officer recovered from his life-threatening injuries his son recovered emotionally, re-sat his exams and ended up a science teacher.

Londonderry, like Belfast, was a dangerous place for police officers to work. Officers had to remain vigilant whilst patrolling as the threat of a terrorist attack was always high. In September 1974, the non-fatal shooting of a policeman in the city brought to an end two-person foot patrols in the general area of the attack and were replaced with mobile patrols. This served the interests of the terrorists as mobile patrols reduced the opportunity for the police to interact with the residents of the area. The wider the gulf republicans could create between Roman Catholics and the RUC the better. The officer discussed his experiences of the attack:

> All of a sudden, 'whack', and I got hit straight through the flak jacket and there were another two or three shots and I can still hear them going past my ear, and everything started to go into a blur. My eyesight was failing and I walked about six yards, I reckon, and I had to go down, I couldn't see where I was going. I was coughing up big handfuls of blood. I thought I was going to die. (Interview with officer 19, 15 April 2016)

The bullet struck the officer in the chest. His colleague came to his assistance as he lay bleeding. A car stopped and its occupants, a husband and wife who knew the officer from patrolling the area, got out and attended to him using towels they were taking to a local convent. The officer said:

'she stood there, she said: "They'll not shoot you again, they can shoot us first" and the two of them stood in front of me. They were shielding me, you see, at this time'. The couple who came to the officer's aid and who shielded him were Roman Catholics. The man and woman were conscious that if they positioned themselves beside the policeman, terrorists would cease shooting in fear of injuring them. The officer also mentioned, however, that the occupants of other cars revelled in his injuries. A car stopped and a passenger gloated: 'Oh they've made a quare [extremely effective] job of that black [RUC] bastard' (interview with officer 19, 15 April 2016) before moving on.

The officer was off work from September 1974 to January 1976. He went from over 13st to just under 9st at his first weighing following the attack but eventually regained his normal body weight and returned to work on light duties. He was transferred to a station where the threat level was lower. The officer was hit with one round fired from a high-velocity Armalite rifle and his flak jacket offered considerable protection. However, the body armour caused the bullet to disintegrate into multiple pieces but with sufficient force to penetrate his chest along with fragments from the flak jacket. Despite surgery, it was not possible to remove all the shrapnel which continues to cause pain and discomfort in addition to making it impossible for him to undergo an MRI scan. He referred to comments made by a hospital consultant:

> I can't have an MRI scan. Mr. [consultant's name] was attending me for a shoulder problem and he sent me for an x-ray. He said: 'You'll never have an MRI scan, if you did that'll be you gone' because an MRI scan is highly magnetic and it would just whack all that out of you and tear everything with it, all the shrapnel. (Interview with officer 19, 15 April 2016)

The embedment of metal fragments in an injury site, particularly where they are close to critical bodily organs, can create complications when using MRI as a diagnostic procedure (Dedini et al. 2013). The location of the fragments in the officer's chest is thought to pose too great a risk to his heart for the procedure to be used.

Interestingly, the psychological effects of the officer's life-threatening experience can be considered mild as he neither suffered depression nor displayed symptoms of PTSD. He was determined to regain a high level of general fitness. Of course, the RUC man's injury was such that it did not present an insurmountable barrier to a strong recovery which

assisted the adoption of a positive mental response. Yet, that said, the officer made clear that the incident required a degree of psychological readjustment.

> You really relive that situation. I'm an easy going, care-free sort of boy but I've been through that situation a brave lot of times, you know. I was shot that day, but I've been through that shooting a right few times, afterwards, you know, and you have to try and get that sorted out in your head so that you can live with it. (Interview with officer 19, 15 April 2016)

The reliving of the incident and getting it 'sorted out in your head' took time. The officer discussed how the incident would resurface when he heard of a shooting either on the news or whilst at work. His memories of the attack were also stimulated 'when things go quiet, you tend to think back and this is the first thing that hits you right between the eyes: this shooting' (Interview with officer 19, 15 April 2016). However, the attack did not prevent him from returning to Londonderry in 1977 as he missed the camaraderie that existed amongst his colleagues. Neither did the incident deter him with regards to taking on more specialist duties as he became one of the first members of the RUC Mobile Support Units in the city. Thus, instead of the terrorist attack functioning to instil fear and undermine the officer's professional capacity it had the opposite effect. It emboldened him to become active in police work that focused on combating terrorism.

Psychological Injuries

The psychological consequences of stress in police work have received considerable scholarly attention (Abdollahi 2002). Some scholars view policing as an especially stressful occupation (Dantzer 1987) not least because coming into contact with traumatic events is part of the occupational role (Carlier et al. 2000). Areas of police work such as serious road traffic accidents, suicides, rapes, child abuse, or violent assaults can have a negative effect on officers. Ben Green (2004) notes the relationship between the stress of police work and the occurrence of PTSD claiming that the condition has an increased prevalence amongst police officers than the general public. Yet these scholarly assessments do not take into consideration the additional stressors associated with policing in a society where there exists a terrorist threat. However, Alastair Black et al. (2013)

make clear that a deeply divided society like Northern Ireland creates relatively unique problems for police officers. This point, for example, can be understood in terms of patrolling. In stable societies, one of the sources of chronic police stress is reported to be regular patrols in areas that are unsafe and require that officers develop coping strategies in order to prevent burnout (Anshel 2000). But there are additional dimensions to the concept 'unsafe' when considering areas that were patrolled by the RUC and these relate to terrorists' direct targeting of officers by means of a variety of potentially lethal instruments. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, lethal attacks also took place in 'safer' areas where terrorists took advantage of a less militarised policing approach and where there was not military support. Earlier in this chapter we accounted for the kinds of physical injuries officers sustained whilst patrolling hostile areas and this invites examination of the psychological effects of conducting regular patrols under very stressful conditions.

RUC officers were exposed to a range of violent and life-threatening situations. They also encountered various types of trauma such as the gruesome aftermath of terrorist incidents involving the death or serious injury of civilians or, as discussed above, actually being present when colleagues lost their lives. Surviving an attack that involves experiencing the death of a colleague, equates to the 'near-miss situation' of soldiers in conflict which Zahava Solomon (2001, p. 15) refers to as characteristic of combat that is 'especially pathogenic'. Experiences of this kind can vitiate the emotional resources which help an officer cope thus increasing his or her susceptibility to mild or severe forms of psychopathology. The problem of vitiation is likely to intensify the more officers are exposed to psychologically disturbing situations. It is not surprising that the majority of officers whose physical and psychological injuries are accounted for in this chapter served in areas where the terrorist threat level was high.

Officers experienced a dramatic shift in terms of safe and unsafe environments which demanded a significant mental readjustment before going on duty. Indeed, if stationed in a dangerous area in Northern Ireland there are similarities in the process of psychological readjustment—combat preparedness—to that experienced by soldiers in the pre-deployment phase of a conflict or going out on patrol if deployed in a conflict zone. This perspective helps us understand the dangers that RUC officers confronted. Once on duty, the police officer's 'combat' experience resembled that of the deployed soldier in the recent conflicts in the Middle East. The following points illustrate the similarity in the

experiences: both police officer and soldier travelled in armoured vehicles; body armour was worn by both; both were menaced by IEDs; sniper attack was a threat to both; each carried automatic weapons; the police station, similar to the military base, was susceptible to bomb or mortar attack; rocket attacks were a serious threat to both; RUC officers working in South Armagh were transported by helicopter; most importantly, as we have seen in this chapter, the police officer sustained injuries of equal severity to soldiers in the Afghan and Iraq wars. It is sobering to think that these were the experiences of police officers who also had to attend to the demands of civilian policing notwithstanding the terrorist threat.

The alteration of a police officer's environment was, of course, more quickly experienced than that of the soldier who is posted to Afghanistan or Iraq. For example, many police officers lived in North Down during the conflict as the population was overwhelmingly pro-state in its political outlook and thus a safer place for officers to reside. Yet, in approximately 1 hour an officer's environment could dramatically change from the relative safety of the home to being in the midst of a riot situation in hostile parts of West Belfast where police lines might be subjected to gun or bomb attack. Or, if stationed in South Armagh, the transition from a safe to unsafe environment could occur in around 2 hours where the officer shifts from the context of the home to patrolling the potentially lethal fields straddling Northern Ireland's border with the Republic of Ireland. A point of difference between an officer who was stationed in Crossmaglen in South Armagh, and one working in a hostile area in West Belfast, is that the former would not make the journey on a daily basis as he may have been away for one or two weeks at a time. The author has been advised of these times by officers who experienced this emotional transformation for prolonged periods of their careers. These officers lived in North Down but were stationed in the hard-line areas mentioned above. The constant need to negotiate the terrorist threat was unquestionably challenging and highly stressful. The accounts that follow provide insight into the ways the conflict caused psychological harm to officers.

A Sergeant who served in South Armagh and South Down during the 1970s was clinically diagnosed with PTSD in the latter part of his career and medically discharged. He described the deterioration of his mental health in terms of a process rather than the negative effects of a discrete traumatic event:

> Not one incident in particular more a series of incidents and remaining in a high state of alert 24/7 both on and off duty over a protracted period of time. In my case over 28 years of service in the RUC continuing into retirement. I believe my PTSD quietly emerged with me unaware of it, subconsciously accepting it as a normal state. I believe it first manifested itself in my attitude after I had served 25 years, over 21 of those in the rank of Sergeant. I started to feel hostility towards some of my supervisors who I saw as inept. I now know that I was on a collision course which eventually led me to telling my boss what I thought of him and a lot of those in positions above him… After two weeks I was sent to the Force Medical Officer who diagnosed PTSD and I was medically discharged. I told the FMO that when I joined the police I had a bucket full of tolerance then one day the bucket was empty (Response to questionnaire, officer 20, 1 July 2016).

While natural or human-caused disasters can cause widespread psychological impairment in a community (Rubonis and Bickman 1991; Galea et al. 2002) and single terrorist incidents such as the IRA's no-warning Enniskillen bombing can have major psychological consequences for survivors (Curran et al. 1990), PTSD symptoms also develop in more subtle and complex ways. In the case of this officer, PTSD progression was indiscernible because of constant exposure to a dangerous working environment for a long period of his service. The attempt to normalise his stress can be conceived of as a coping response which enabled him to remain operationally effective. But his response functioned only to slow the rate of psychological decline and not prevent it. Once he entered a critical period emotionally—after 25 years—his adaptive tactic of stress normalisation was no longer effective and his PTSD manifested itself in hostility and intolerance towards police management. The officer connects both a 'series of incidents' and the ceaseless need to remain alert both on and off duty to his PTSD. This corresponds to the findings of Naomi Breslau et al. (1999) who contend that previous exposure to trauma in the general population increases an individual's risk of PTSD. The comment also fits well with the conclusions at which Solomon et al. (1987) arrive in relation to the effects of combat stress on Israeli soldiers fighting in the 1982 Lebanon War. They identified a relationship between prior and subsequent combat experiences in terms of soldiers' emotional well-being and argued that those who had negatively experienced combat-related trauma in previous conflicts were more vulnerable

to the negative effects of stress when experiencing new conflicts. In essence, for this vulnerable group, previous experience of trauma did not strengthen their coping strategies but rather weakened them. Similarly, the officer's account points to the cumulative effects of exposure to trauma which resulted in an increase in his emotional vulnerability and diminishment of his coping capabilities—placing him at greater risk of negative stress reactions.

The officer's service ended in Belfast where he encountered the greatest threat to his life:

> Towards the end of my police service a colleague and I intercepted a gang of four IRA men who had just murdered two loyalists. We gave chase to their getaway car opening fire on them as they abandoned the vehicle in a republican stronghold. We then gave chase on foot but ended up surrounded by a large crowd of locals who we kept at bay by gunpoint. They had taken charge of our police car we had left to give chase. They were up close, screaming abuse and spitting at us… I managed to make a radio message for help and we were eventually rescued by the army and police… Police who came to the perimeter of the crowd actually saw two guns thrown from the crowd over our heads into the [name of river]. I believe that the head of the local IRA sent for these to take us out from the cover of the crowd. He was at the forefront throughout and I kept my Ruger revolver levelled on his chest about six feet away telling him to keep back and that I would use my gun. I would have had no problem killing him if he had rushed forward with the others to make a grab for us. I was fully aware of what had happened to the two army corporals a few years earlier when they were mobbed and lost their lives. (Response to questionnaire, officer 20, 1 July 2016)

By giving chase, the officers found themselves isolated in a hostile environment where they feared being overpowered. The officer was frightened of meeting the same fateful end as two army corporals who were brutally beaten and murdered by the IRA in 1988. A normal police patrol in this area would have consisted of two armoured Land Rovers and military backup and so the officers' isolation and encounter with an aggressive mob was extremely traumatic. This incident marked the end of the officer's career.

When exploring the topic of police stress it is important to consider the effects of performing particular roles or working in specialist units such as Special Branch or the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

While officers who worked in these units were not as vulnerable as their uniformed colleagues to the stress of patrolling in dangerous areas, their job had stress-related pitfalls. One of the stressors of the job was the nature of the contact officers established between themselves and the public. An officer who worked for many years in CID and who developed PTSD in the latter part of his service discussed his original ignorance of the term and the fact that it was a condition he did not know he was suffering:

> I did not know that I was suffering from PTSD until it was diagnosed by my doctor and psychiatrists. They put the name to it. All I knew for sure was that I was not able to sleep without nightmares and disturbed sleep pattern. I believe that it crept up on me over several years when thinking very deeply about particular instances. (Interview with officer 21, 6 April 2016)

Although an officer in CID and not Special Branch, he was allowed to handle a number of agents (informers who passed information regarding terrorist activities to the RUC). These were individuals whom he had come into contact with in terms of his criminal investigations and who could assist the police in combating terrorism. This kind of work required offers to meet agents outside of the police station and in so doing there was an element of risk. On one occasion a meeting in a public house proved to be life-threatening when an agent administered a drug to the officer's drink and drove him to a republican area where, the officer believes, he was to be murdered. The officer was deeply affected by the trauma of the incident:

> I feel that when I was 'set up' by a person who was passing me information … this incident played a big role in the onset of PTSD as I suffered nightmares and panic attacks for years over this particular incident. I would definitely have been killed that night if it had not been for the actions of myself for keeping my wits about me when the drug began to wear off and I realised the danger I was in. I was rescued by the army and members of the RUC. The person who tried to have me murdered was a republican and a member of a very violent faction of republicanism. He was known to be a very dangerous and unstable man. I believe he is now dead. I hope he is because I believe that I would still be at risk from him even today. As for other incidents which caused the illness, all I can say is that I attended the scenes of many murders, bombings and terrorist-related crime. (Interview with officer 21, 6 April 2016)

The officer discussed how his PTSD was manifested:

> I suffered from nightmares, sleep deprivation, insomnia and was drinking [alcohol] heavily. I was fearful and suffered panic attacks and headaches. I was not the same cheerful person I felt I had been. I was over anxious and worried. I also had severe neck and back pain. (Interview with officer 21, 6 April 2016)

The physical pain in his neck and back was not due to injury but were diagnosed as a reaction to high stress levels. The effects of PTSD have been examined by Eve Sledjeski et al. (2008). These commentators suggest that multiple traumas have a cumulative effect on physical health with serious implications for well-being, although in the officer's case his physical condition, whilst unpleasant, could not be described as chronic. Alcohol consumption was abused because of its avoidance effects; hyperarousal caused insomnia and panic attacks; and the officer's loss of cheerfulness in his personality reflected an emotional shift in mood. Re-experiencing in terms of intrusive recollections, took the form of nightmares which the officer found to be especially disturbing. Nightmares are a common PTSD symptom which can cause psychiatric distress (Campbell and Germain 2016). However, they have also been socially disruptive for the officer as he explained: 'because of my disturbed sleep pattern and nightmares I have struck my wife in my sleep as I believe I am under physical attack in my dreams'. This has caused the officer to sleep in solitude. The nightmares reflected themes and individuals related to the Northern Ireland conflict but had a complex twist which the officer found particularly unsettling:

> In my nightmares I dreamt that I had shot and murdered people. I believed that I had hidden guns and that I was shooting at police and army vehicles with terrorists known to me including [name of two individuals]. I dreamt I was moving the remains of persons I had buried as the police closed in to find them. I would remember the dreams the next day and even went to check on some of the locations I had dreamt off just to confirm that none of it was real. (Interview with officer 21, 6 April 2016)

The nightmares were troublesome. The officer was compelled to visit the locations that had featured in his dreams to ensure it was an illusory experience. Their twisted complexity was based on a role reversal which portrayed the officer as a terrorist. A professional diagnosis of the

officer's nightmares connected them to his PTSD. He was told that he had been profoundly affected by terrorist acts during the conflict which he had interpreted as senseless acts of violence. In a subconscious state he attempted to come to terms with unresolved issues to do with the trauma he had experienced. To get to grips with the senselessness of the violence that was responsible for causing his trauma required that he understand the perspective of the perpetrator. Accordingly, this resulted in his mind absurdly casting him as a terrorist.

The officer's condition has improved since his retirement from the RUC in 2001. However, he feels that his psychological problems are likely to remain. His coping strategy is, in part and when possible, to avoid experiences which he knows trigger an emergence of the condition. Avoidance is challenging given the multiple nature of the triggers and the spontaneous manner in which some can appear:

> Sudden loud bangs; the smell of Marzipan - homemade bomb mix smelt like that; sudden recognition of ex-terrorists in various places i.e. persons now released after the Good Friday Agreement walking the streets; passing places where I had attended some very serious scenes; television and news reports of the past killings and bombings; current murders by the republican and loyalist factions; it's there for life, you just have to try to cope. (Interview with officer 21, 6 April 2016)

Castlederg is situated in the far west of Northern Ireland and is only several minutes' drive to the closest border crossing. During the Troubles the town was attacked many times. Terrorists made good use of the nearness of the border to where they fled having committed an attack. The security forces were not permitted to cross into the Republic of Ireland even when in hot pursuit of terrorists. As discussed in Chapter 2, the border facilitated terrorist attacks and it is not surprising that there were many murders of members of the security forces in this area.

The town is mixed and unionists and nationalists live beside each other but there is a distinct territorial divide in the local housing estate which reflects strong support for the republican movement. This is best understood by the building of a controversial memorial to dead members of the IRA who lived in the Castlederg area (*Belfast Telegraph* 2013). The spatial dimension is important in understanding the impact of terrorism on members of the security forces who lived and worked in the area during the conflict.

An RUC Part-time then Full-time Reservist who lived in the town discussed the effects of PTSD. He was medically discharged from the force in 2002 when his was no longer able to work. For 19 years he had been a member of the Part-time Reserve but during the day he worked as a driver for a local firm which delivered goods along the border. Accordingly, he was exposed to the threat of an off-duty attack. However, the officer was recruited into the Full-time Reserve 'under threat'. This term indicated that there was a threat to an individual's life and that their civilian employment increased the likelihood of them being attacked. It was considered that working in the police full-time reduced the risk. The officer explained that he joined the Full-Time Reserve following a suspected IRA attempt on his life in 1991.

When the topic was raised with the officer he replied that he did not consider his PTSD to have been caused by a single event but rather a series of incidents to which he was exposed. He described how, when driving a car, he would attempt to deal with intrusive memories linked to the murder of members of the security forces:

> Post-traumatic stress came along - it just built up. I'd have been driving along the road and I'd have been counting the number of white lines between the telegraph poles: "One, two, three, four, five, six, seven or eight" that's the way I just tried to block out all the shootings and bombings here in Castlederg and you wouldn't have been concentrating on your driving doing that. Flashbacks about bombs going off and some of your best friends who were murdered - and they wouldn't have been on duty. Men were murdered at their own homes. A UDR man had been blown up and there were bits of his skin hanging in the bushes and I was sweeping it off the road. You just know that a human being has been slaughtered. I'd have been trying to cut that out; that's the way you had to combat post-traumatic stress. (Interview with officer 22, 18 April 2016)

The threat level in the area was such that the officer's family played a part in his safety. He discussed how his daughter, having left the house, would have returned home to inform him that she had spotted a stranger near to their home. From around the age of twelve, the officer's daughter frequently warned her father of potential danger as did his sons.

The policeman went on to account for the dangers of booby-trap bombs which had frequently been used by the IRA in the area. These devices had been responsible for killing a number of members of the

security forces. The officer said that his town 'was a dangerous place to live with a lot of booby traps in this area. The booby traps were very worrying' (interview with officer 22, 18 April 2016). To combat this threat required checking beneath his car for explosive devices. When his children got older and purchased cars he also performed the same checks on their vehicles. He showed his children photographs of undercar booby traps to focus their attention on the threat and explained where to check for them. When the car was locked in the garage he placed coins on the top rim of the garage door and ensured that they were undisturbed before next unlocking it. If the coins had been disturbed he knew the door had been tampered with.

Before joining the Full-time Reserve the business premises where the officer worked had emergency buttons linked to the nearest police station in case of a terrorist attack. However, when making deliveries he kept his pistol on the passenger seat of the lorry. He was always concerned because of the slow moving nature of the vehicle. The vehicle's speed was further reduced when having to negotiate twisting country lanes which provided a gunman with a perfect opportunity to attack. The officer remarked:

> While working doing deliveries in the border area I came across known and convicted terrorist families every day. My home was fitted with electronic gadgets, my vehicle had an undercar booby-trap detector device, and my place of work had a system linked to the police station where buttons could be pressed in four places at the location. (Interview with officer 22, 18 April 2016)

Following his medical discharge, he was unable to travel to areas where individuals he knew had been attacked by terrorists because it triggered emotional disturbance. He avoided these places for several years before making a recovery. Yet these were places where he had travelled to for many years during his civilian job when the threat to members of the security forces was high. In fact, he had travelled past these areas soon after fatal terrorist attacks had occurred and continued to do so for many years as his job dictated. The officer explained:

> It [PTSD] took over in that you wouldn't have driven past the places where murders and attempted murders took place. You would have avoided going to those places and originally I'd never have been scared to

go anywhere. For 19 years I was at work delivering fertiliser around these places. It must have been the memory of the people who were killed or injured. (Interview with officer 22, 18 April 2016)

It is interesting that the officer began to encounter avoidance issues in the post-settlement period. While it is true that republican dissidents posed a threat at this time, it was negligible compared to that previously posed by the IRA and, therefore, is unlikely to have been responsible for the policeman's condition. Rather, the officer's experience is consistent with those associated with delayed-onset PTSD. Geert Smid et al. (2012) have investigated this phenomenon in relation to civilian disaster survivors and claim that while some individuals may not satisfy the criteria for PTSD immediately, or shortly after, a disaster, problematic symptoms can emerge later. Delayed-onset PTSD has been associated with the experiences of military veterans (Horesh et al. 2011) whose symptoms appear when they return from battle. The officer seems to have suffered in a similar way. During the conflict he remained vigilant and ready to respond to a terrorist attack whether on or off duty. Despite the strain of maintaining this level of alertness he did not suffer excessive anxiety otherwise it is unlikely he would have been able to make deliveries in the border areas where many members of the security forces had been injured and killed (some of the victims had been from the Castlederg area and included the officer's uncle, as well as his acquaintances and friends). Translating theoretical accounts of late-onset PTSD to the Northern Ireland context, it would seem that the momentous transformation of the country's political circumstances, which brought the vast bulk of terrorist activity to an end and created a much safer environment for all and sundry, did not prevent the officer developing PTSD symptoms. The officer's case, which has been analysed qualitatively, corresponds with the quantitative findings of Alastair Black et al. (2013) whose research into levels of psychopathology among retired RUC officers concluded that a considerable number are affected by this condition. The commentators suggest that retirement can trigger, for example, PTSD, because it brings to an end the camaraderie officers experienced with colleagues and disrupts their social identity as a member of a constabulary they were proud to serve in.

Conflict-related trauma was not experienced evenly across the RUC. Therefore, in an attempt to describe how it existed as a problem for officers the following three points are relevant: *occasional* exposure to a

life-threatening situation which may have resulted in an officer or colleague being physically injured or psychologically harmed or both; *regular* exposure to the trauma of attending terrorist incidents and witnessing badly injured, mutilated or dead colleagues or civilians; and *constant* exposure to the unnerving possibility of being attacked by terrorists when on or off duty. Of course, the trauma of the Troubles compounded the usual trauma associated with civilian policing. For many officers the combination of various trauma and stress experiences eroded their coping strategies and rendered them vulnerable to forms of psychopathology. The depletion of an officer's emotional resources points to the grinding effects of terrorism.

One of the key symptoms of PTSD is avoidance of triggers that will re-ignite a traumatic experience. This is often associated with the avoidance of a location where a traumatic incident occurred. Physical avoidance is less complicated for repatriated soldiers than it is for RUC officers (and UDR soldiers). After deployment, for instance, Vietnam veterans returned home as have soldiers who served in more recent overseas conflicts. Military repatriation is a feature of inter-state conflict. However, Northern Ireland was an ethnic conflict which means that locally recruited members of the security forces continue to live in the society where they once combatted terrorism. Although immensely more peaceful, the society is still emerging from conflict. Therefore, there is an interesting ethnic conflict dimension to understanding the problem of avoidance as it differs from inter-state conflicts. This point can be looked at from a couple of angles. Firstly, the terrorist cauldron continues to simmer in Northern Ireland in that there have been troubling periodic attacks on members of the security forces by republican dissident groups (BBC 2016a, b). These incidents serve as conflict-related triggers which have an unsettling effect. Some officers are concerned that they may become easy targets in the dissidents' campaign and have responded by checking beneath their vehicles for booby-trap devices before using them. This activity psychologically transports, as it were, officers back to Northern Ireland's 'dark ages' and is best conceived of as a general problem experienced by officers. Secondly, although affecting fewer officers, there is an important observation to be made in relation to problems of spatial avoidance. Participants in this research were keen to point out that they avoid travelling to areas where they once served as failure to do so would spark upsetting memories. Hence, many officers who served in dangerous places like South Armagh, Londonderry and

West Belfast would seek to avoid them. However, an avoidance strategy is not difficult to adhere to given that officers were only stationed in such places and usually for only part of their career. In parts of the province where there were high levels of terrorist activity around the areas officers actually lived (parts of Fermanagh and Tyrone come to mind) this strategy is less effective. This is best illustrated by referring to the example of the officer from Castlederg: painful memories can be triggered in the town and its surrounding areas because of multiple terrorist attacks. As a consequence, the practical mechanisms for addressing the problem of avoidance are more complicated. But triggers are not only spatial or location-based in nature. There are human triggers: officers in religiously and politically mixed areas may often encounter known ex-members of terrorist organisations as they walk past them in the street, use the same shops, or access the same recreational or health facilities. These are dimensions of ethnic conflict which add a degree of complication to approaches designed to treat PTSD.

The symptom of avoidance can also suspend officers in a time warp which prevents them witnessing the post-conflict transformation of towns they may have once served in. The physical makeovers are symbolic representations of political change. A health professional working for the Police Rehabilitation and Retraining Programme described the problem of avoidance and discussed a simple strategy for addressing it:

> By avoiding those areas they also never realise how much those areas have changed, how much that community has moved on. Quite often, if we can, we will encourage them. Google Maps is a great thing because I can say: 'Why don't you look at Lisburn centre? It doesn't look the way it did the last time. The last time you saw it, it had just been blown up.' In his head that's the way it stays. It's frozen in time. It's about getting them to see it… If you avoid it, it just stays frozen in your brain the way it was. (Interview with Police Rehabilitation and Retraining Trust professional, 14 April 2016)

However, perhaps in the case of officers with dire memories of removing parts of dead bodies or assisting people with damaged limbs following an explosion, cosmetic improvements to an area in terms of flowerbeds and pleasant shop fronts can appear somewhat hollow.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the nature of the physical and psychological injuries officers sustained. In some cases officers have been living with the physical consequences of an injury for over forty years. These injuries can involve the loss of a limb or perhaps have resulted in an officer becoming a double or triple amputee. These are battlefield injuries normally associated with soldiers in a combat setting and not police officers. As officers have aged, their ability to cope with an injury has worsened. This is worth bearing in mind when considering the future of young British soldiers seriously injured in the Afghan or Iraq conflict. With youth and fitness on their side, their injury is not the problem it may eventually become. This realisation ought to be factored into long-term policy considerations designed to assist those with conflict-related injuries. The families of injured officers have also had to cope with their loved one's injuries. Many young wives suddenly became full-time carers whose physical ability to attend to their injured husbands also degraded as they themselves got older or perhaps suffered aliments. That those with long-term caring responsibilities are secondary victims of the attack should not be overlooked.

References

Abdollahi, M. (2002). Understanding Police Stress Research. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 2*(2), 1–24.

Abghari, M., Monroy, A., Schubl, S., Davidovitch, R., & Egol, K. (2015). Outcomes Following Low-Energy Civilian Gunshot Wound Trauma to the Lower Extremities: Results of a Standard Protocol at an Urban Trauma Center. *The Iowa Orthopaedic Journal, 35,* 65–69.

Anshel, M. (2000). A Conceptual Model and Implications for Coping with Stressful Events in Police Work. *Criminal Justice and Behavior, 27*(3), 375–400.

Atiyeh, B., Gunn, S., & Hayek, S. (2007). Military and Civilian Burn Injuries During Armed Conflicts. *Annals of Burns and Fire Disasters, 20*(4), 203–215.

Bartlett, C., Helfet, D., Hausman, M., & Strauss, E. (2000). Ballistics and Gunshot Wounds: Effects on Musculoskeletal Tissues. *Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 8*(1), 21–36.

BBC. (2016a). *RUC Memorial Plaque: Stephen Martin Admits' Mistakes Were Made*. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-35724317.

BBC. (2016b). *US Police Shootings: How Many Die Each Year?* Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-36826297.

Beekley, A., Sebesta, J., Blackbourne, L., Herbert, G., Kauvar, D., & Baer, D. (2008). Prehospital Tourniquet Use in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Effect on Hemorrhage Control and Outcomes. *The Journal of Trauma Injury, Infection, and Critical Care, 64*(2), 28–37.

Belfast Telegraph. (2013). *Planning Probe Focusing on Who Owns IRA Monument Site.* Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/planning-probe-focusing-on-who-owns-ira-monument-site-29535298.html.

Black, A., McCabe, D., & McConnell, N. (2013). Ten Years on, Living with the 'Psychological Troubles': Retired Police Officers in Northern Ireland. *The Irish Journal of Psychology, 34*(2), 93–108.

Boal, F. (1969). Territoriality on the Shankill-Falls Divide, Belfast. *Irish Geography, 6*(1), 30–50.

Bonanno, G., & Kaltman, S. (2001). The Varieties of Grief Experience. *Clinical Psychology Review, 21*(5), 705–734.

Breslau, N., Chilcoat, H., Kessler, R., & Davis, G. (1999). Previous Exposure to Trauma and PTSD Effects of Subsequent Trauma: Results from the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma. *American Journal of Psychiatry, 156*(6), 902–907.

Brismar, B., & Bergenwald, L. (1982). The Terrorist Bomb Explosion in Bologna, Italy, 1980: An Analysis of the Effects and Injuries Sustained. *The Journal of Trauma, 22*(3), 216–220.

Brown, M., & Marshall, S. (1988). The Enniskillen Bomb: A Disaster Plan. *British Medical Journal, 297*, 29 October, 1113–1116.

Campbell, R., & Germain, A. (2016). Nightmares and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). *Current Sleep Medicine Reports, 2*(2), 74–80.

Carlier, I., Voerman, A., & Gersons, B. (2000). The Influence of Occupational Debriefing on Post-traumatic Stress Symptomatology in Traumatized Police Officers. *British Journal of Medical Psychology, 73*(1), 87–98.

Cooper, G., Maynard, R., Cross, N., & Hill, J. (1983). Casualties from Terrorist Bombings. *The Journal of Trauma, 23*(11), 955–967.

Curran, P., Bell, P., Murray, A., Loughrey, G., Roddy, R., & Rocke, L. (1990). Psychological Consequences of the Enniskillen Bombing. *British Journal of Psychiatry, 156*(4), 479–482.

Dantzer, M. (1987). Police-Related Stress: A Critique for Future Research. *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 3*(3), 43–48.

Dedini, R., Karacozoff, A., Shellock, F., Xu, D., McClellan, R., & Pekmezci, M. (2013). MRI Issues for Ballistic Objects: Information obtained at 1.5-, 3- and 7-Tesla. *The Spine Journal, 13*(7), 815–822.

DePalma, R., Burris, D., Champion, H., & Hodgson, M. (2005). Blast Injuries. *The New England Journal of Medicine, 352*(13), 1335–1342.

Dicpinigaitis, P., Koval, K., Tejwani, N., & Egol, K. (2006). Gunshot Wounds to the Extremities. *Bulletin of the NYU Hospital for Joint Diseases, 64*(3&4), 139–155.

Doherty, R. (2004). *The Thin Green Mile: The History of the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC.* South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword.

Fukunishi, I. (1999). Relationship of Cosmetic Disfigurement to the Severity of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Burn Injury or Digital Amputation. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 68*(2), 82–86.

Galea, S., Ahern, J., Resnick, H., Kilpatrick, D., Bucuvalas, M., & Gold, J. (2002). Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City. *The New England Journal of Medicine, 346*(13), 982–987.

Green, B. (2004). Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in UK Police Officers. *Current Medical Research and Opinion, 20*(1), 101–105.

Holmes, A., Rauch, P., & Cozza, S. (2013). When a Parent is Injured or Killed in Combat. *The Future of Children, 23*(2), 143–162.

Horesh, D., Solomon, Z., Zerach, G., & Ein-Dor, T. (2011). Delayed-Onset PTSD Among War Veterans: The Role of Life Events Throughout the Life Cycle. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 46*(9), 863–870.

Hull, J., Bowyer, G., Cooper, G., & Crane, J. (1994). Pattern of Injury in Those Dying From Traumatic Amputation Caused by Blast Bomb. *British Journal of Surgery, 81*(8), 1132–1135.

Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. (1995). *Ethnicity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leibovici, D., Gofrit, O., Stein, M., Shapira, S., Noga, Y., & Heruti, R. (1996). Blast Injuries: Bus Versus Open-Air Bombings—A Comparative Study of Injuries in Survivors of Open-Air Versus Confined-Space Explosions. *The Journal of Trauma, 41*(6), 1030–1035.

Mahambrey, T., Pendry, K., Nee, A., Bonney, S., & Nee, P. (2013). Critical Care in Emergency Department: Massive Haemorrhage in Trauma. *Emergency Medical Journal, 30*(1), 9–14.

Nelson, T., Clark, T., Stedje-Larson, E., Lewis, C., Grueskin, J., & Echols, E. (2008). Close Proximity Blast Injury Patterns From Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: A Report of 18 Cases. *The Journal of Trauma, 65*(1), 212–217.

Oppenheimer, A. (2009). *IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity.* Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

Patel, H., Dryden, S., Gupta, A., & Ang, S. (2012). Pattern and Mechanism of Traumatic Limb Amputations After Explosive Blast: Experience from the 07/07/05 London Terrorist Bombings. *Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 73*(1), 276–281.

Petersen, K., Riddle, M., Danko, J., Blazes, D., Hayden, R., & Tasker, S. (2007). Trauma-Related Infections in Battlefield Casualties from Iraq. *Annals of Surgery, 245*(5), 803–811.

Rando, T. (1993). The Increasing Prevalence of Complicated Mourning: The Onslaught Is Just Beginning. *Omega Journal of Death and Dying, 26*(1), 43–59.

Rignault, D., & Deligny, M. (1989). The 1986 Terrorist Bombing Experience in Paris. *Annals of Surgery, 209*(3), 368–373.

Rubonis, A., & Bickman, L. (1991). Psychological Impairment in the Wake of Disaster: The Disaster-Psychopathology Relationship. *Psychological Bulletin, 109*(3), 384–399.

Sledjeski, E., Speisman, B., & Dierker, L. (2008). Does Number of Lifetime Traumas Explain the Relationship Between PTSD and Chronic Medical Conditions? Answers from the National Comorbidity Survey-Replication (NCS-R). *Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 31*(4), 341–349.

Smid, G., Van der Velden, P., Gersons, B., & Kleber, R. (2012). Late-Onset Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following a Disaster: A Longitudinal Study. *Psychological Trauma, Theory, Research, Practice and Policy, 4*(3), 312–322.

Smith, A., Scott, S., & Wiese, D. (1990). The Psychological Effects of Sports Injuries Coping. *Sports Medicine, 9*(6), 352–369.

Solomon, Z. (2001). The Impact of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Military Situations. *Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62*(Suppl. 17), 11–15.

Solomon, Z., Mikulincer, M., & Jakob, B. (1987). Exposure to Recurrent Combat Stress: Combat Stress Reactions Among Israeli Soldiers in the Lebanon War. *Psychological Medicine, 17*(2), 433–440.

Stansbury, L., Lalliss, S., Branstetter, J., Bagg, M., & Holcomb, J. (2008). Amputations in U.S. Military Personnel in the Current Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Journal of Orthopaedic Trauma, 22*(1), 43–46.

Stein, M., & Hirshberg, A. (1999). Medical Consequences of Terrorism: The Conventional Weapon Threat. *Surgical Clinics of North America, 79*(6), 1537–1552.

Wightman, J., & Gladish, S. (2001). Explosions and Blast Injuries. *Annals of Emergency Medicine, 37*(6), 664–678.

Wong, E., Marshall, G., Shetty, V., Zhou, A., Belzberg, H., & Yamashita, D. (2007). Survivors of Violence-Related Facial Injury: Psychiatric Needs and Barriers to Mental Health Care. *General Hospital Psychiatry, 29*(2), 117–122.

CHAPTER 7

Women Officers and the Conflict

Women were first recruited into the RUC in 1943. Gradually their numbers increased resulting in the formation of the Women's Police Branch. This was a distinct branch which most often dealt with crimes and issues related to women and children (women also performed traffic duties). Similar to the experience of policewomen elsewhere in the world RUC women's work was gendered. However, perforce of circumstances, the role of female officers was modified as the Troubles developed apace in the early 1970s. Policewomen found themselves performing duties previously undertaken by their male colleagues. The increasing integration of women into police sections led to the eventual disintegration of the Women's Police Branch in the early 1980s (Cameron 1993). The idea of integration, however, requires qualification as women officers were not fully integrated until 1994 when they were first issued with firearms. The topic of firearms will be addressed below. With the exception of John Brewer (1991), academic work on RUC women's experiences is scant although Margaret Cameron (1993) has written a very informative account of the history of women RUC officers. This is unfortunate because the Troubles created unique circumstances within which policewomen discharged their duties. The experiences of female officers is discussed in four sections dealing with, firstly, policewomen who were injured during the conflict; the debate about carrying firearms; women's off-duty experiences; and the role of the conflict in shaping relations with their male colleagues.

Terrorist Attacks Involving Women Officers

The fact that terrorists deliberately attacked RUC stations and vehicles by a variety of potentially deadly means distinguished RUC women from their contemporaries who served in other UK constabularies as well as policewomen elsewhere in the world. Female RUC officers confronted the danger of a terrorist attack when they travelled with their male colleagues in police vehicles. Although women were not posted to the live-in border stations and so would not normally have been part of a patrol in South Armagh or other border regions, they worked in stations which were susceptible to IRA mortar attack. However, if there was a requirement for a woman to be present for a particular operation in a border area, for example, the arrest of a female terrorist suspect, they would have been flown in.

Six RUC women were killed during the conflict but many were injured. Given the scale of terrorist attacks on police stations and mobile patrols it is astonishing that more policewomen were not killed. The first officer to die was Mildred Harrison in 1975 (she was the unintended victim of a loyalist bomb attack on a bar in Bangor). As we have noted in a previous chapter, Linda Baggley was murdered in Londonderry when she was shot at point blank range by an IRA gunman in 1976. The next officers to die were Rosemary McGookin and Ivy Kelly when an IRA mortar hit the portakabin situated within the grounds of Newry police station in February 1985. Only three months later Tracy Doak, along with three male colleagues on mobile escort duty, died in a massive roadside bomb near to Killeen, County Armagh. The last female officer to be killed was Colleen McMurray when her police vehicle was struck by a horizontally fired IRA mortar bomb in Newry in 1992.

Generally speaking, the IRA and other republican groups chose not to target women directly but, as mentioned above, the fact that policewomen could be present in an RUC station or travelling along with their male colleagues in a police car or Land Rover when it was attacked did not constrain the IRA. Thus, RUC women died in these kinds of attacks. The tendency of terrorists not deliberately to kill unarmed policewomen was likely informed by a desire to avoid damaging publicity. However, the research for this chapter also suggests that there were occasions when the gender of an officer did not figure prominently, if at all, when an attack was being launched. The case of Full-time Reserve Constable, Alice Collins, who was shot in the back and seriously injured outside

the Courthouse in Londonderry in 1997 (the IRA had called off its first ceasefire in 1996) serves as a case in point (Allen 1998). Officer Collins was distinctive because of the gendered nature of the RUC uniform: she was wearing her RUC women's hat which was smaller and dissimilar to the hat worn by males, but more significantly, she was dressed in a skirt. These distinguishing characteristics of apparel are very likely to have been observed by the sniper before pulling the trigger. The sniper fired from the corner of Palace Street/Bishop Street which is situated very near to the Courthouse and so had an unobstructed view of the officer. In the same vein, it did not matter to terrorists that a policewoman was one of four officers on foot patrol when they detonated a large remote control car bomb in Bangor, 1993. That the officers were patrolling on the other side of the street when the bomb exploded probably saved their lives. However, the female officer was seriously injured in the attack and had part of her leg amputated. It is highly likely that the IRA unit would have identified a female officer as one of the group moments before the detonation but were unfazed by the thought of killing or seriously injuring her.

The willingness of terrorists to kill or injure policewomen in their attacks is demonstrated in the following account of a female officer who participated in the research. Her example casts light on the injuries some policewomen sustained when, on the 18 August, 1988, the IRA detonated a bomb less than a metre from where she was standing. The officer had only completed her police training six weeks previously and along with two male colleagues was attending a reported break-in at a local petrol station. It was a 'come on' by the IRA to murder the officers who arrived to investigate. She was aged 26 at the time and said:

My colleagues went around to the back of the petrol station and I stood next to a small wooden hut. I knew this contained the air compressor for the station and it was always bolted. On this night it was unbolted which I thought strange. As I stepped back about a foot from it the next thing I knew there was this huge explosion and within a split second the ground beneath my feet exploded up towards me. I was pelted with concrete, wood, metal. I knew then the bomb had gone off in the dog box at my feet but I didn't realise how badly hurt I was until the forecourt lights illuminated my injuries. My uniform was ripped off me, I was black from head to toe and blood was pouring from my legs, arms and face. I had long shards of wood embedded in my legs. I heard a colleague radio for help

and yell to get an ambulance saying 'the girl is hurt bad'. I was so shocked I hadn't noticed until then that my left eye was gone. Within seconds I was bundled into another police car and we were speeding to Erne Hospital. I could see myself in the driver's mirror and it was then I knew things were bad. I remember telling my colleagues not to tell my dad because he would be so upset. (Response to questionnaire, officer 23, 27 August 2016)

The attack illustrates the difficult situation which officers confronted in the course of conducting their normal duties during the Troubles. What appeared as a normal break-in which would require only a typical crime response was in fact the context of an elaborate terrorist plan to kill police officers by means of a remote control device and an estimated 2.5 lbs of Semtex. The bomb left the officer with serious physical injuries:

My injuries consist of the loss of my left eye, loss of hearing in my left ear, burst ear drum which was mended last year, scaring to my face and legs, both legs covered in black - like a tattoo sleeve on both legs - which has faded a bit over the years but still very obvious. I have shrapnel in both legs and around my ankles. I have a prosthetic left eye which I bought myself at a London hospital as the NHS ones were not very good. The plastic eye is good and that helps restore confidence, but only to a point. (Response to questionnaire, officer 23, 27 August 2016)

She believes that members of the IRA knew that they were about to threaten the life of a woman officer before they detonated the bomb. The forecourt of the petrol station was well lit and a follow up investigation confirmed that the terrorists were watching from a distance of approximately 40 metres in direct line of sight of the female officer:

I firmly believe those who hid behind the wall and detonated the bomb knew I was a woman. They would have had a very clear vision of me getting out of the car and my male colleagues going round the back of the station. Once I took a step back from where the bomb was I came under a very bright florescent light of the petrol station roof and that obviously lit me up and they definitely knew they had me. They would have seen my full uniform - the skirt and distinctive hat but thank goodness I had my flak jacket on. I know they definitely were aware they were blowing up a policewoman. (Response to questionnaire, officer 23, 27 August 2016)

Had the officer not been wearing her flak jacket the explosion may have inflicted fatal injuries as a large metal fragment became lodged in the region which protected her chest. She required multiple follow-up operations on her eye socket, face and other parts of her body. In fact, the last operation was conducted on her eardrum in 2013—25 years after the incident.

The attack dramatically changed the policewoman's life. Blindness in one eye prevented proper judgement of a ball in racket activities and caused the officer not to participate in sport. This was difficult in that she had been a keen sportswoman prior to the attack but her injuries created a feeling of physical vulnerability especially on her left side. She also was concerned that participation in sports might cause injury to her remaining eye. Subsequent to the recent mending of her eardrum the officer has returned to swimming but still experiences embarrassment because of the dark blast marks on both legs. Had the officer been wearing trousers it is likely that the burn marks would have caused less cosmetic blemish. As Avinash De Sousa (2010) points out, acquired facial trauma can have serious emotional consequences and it is unsurprising that the officer's body image and social confidence was damaged. This affected her social life. She became introvert and was reluctant to attend functions or socialise in public settings preferring the company of family and a few trusted friends. This is not an uncommon social reaction in cases of facial disfigurement (Macgregor 1990). While new social encounters can bring back memories of the bomb attack, such encounters are now less challenging both because of the passage of time and the officer's response to the inquisitiveness of strangers:

> If I was attending a new hairdressers and they say 'Oh you've got a scar down the side of your face and you've got a scar in your hairline' I'd say 'I was in an accident' - I can't be bothered telling them. People aren't interested really, I don't think they are anyway you know. (Response to questionnaire, officer 23, 27 August 2016)

Psychological adjustment to her injuries was not without its challenges—to this day unexpected loud noises can trigger flashbacks to the explosion—but the process began when the officer was in hospital only a couple of weeks after the attack. Following a couple of tearfully intense days the policewoman refused to allow the attack to finish her career.

As a mark of success in overcoming physical adversity she determined that it was important to return to work one day before a year's passing of the explosion. However, the decision to do so was also psychologically significant in that the act constituted a milestone in her emotional recovery—by re-entering the public sphere of work it demonstrated that she had successfully come to terms with the physical effects of the explosion. The officer discussed the need for mental adaptation to her injuries as the key factor in her recovery:

> If I'd allowed the explosion to beat me it would've beat me when I was in Musgrave Park military hospital the week after because that was when everything hit me about what had happened to me. I cried for two days and then I thought 'to hell with this, I'm just going to get on with it' and that has been my attitude throughout all of it. Definitely, if you allowed these things to really play on your mind as some people have - because they can't get beyond it - I think it would really, really mess you up. But I just didn't want them [terrorists] to win because I think if they had have messed me up mentally as well as my face and my legs and everything, they really would have won. Which is why I was very determined to return to work - I was off a year less a day and I thought 'no, they're not going to keep me off a full year off my work, I'm going back on the 17 August, I'm not going back on the 18 August - I'm not going back on the anniversary of the bomb because I'm able to go back and I've beaten them' and I did go back to work before the full year was up. (Response to questionnaire, officer 23, 27 August 2016)

This comment points to the limits of terrorism as an instrument of fear. The explosion was a life-altering experience which caused permanent physical injury—loss of an eye; shrapnel embedment; and cosmetic disfigurement in terms of scarring and skin discolouration. As a result, it would not have been unreasonable to expect a poor psychological outcome. An indicator of a negative emotional outcome would have been the officer's pursuit of an Injury on Duty award. This would have resulted in early retirement but she refused to entertain the thought. In contrast, and although hospitalised, the officer generated an emotional counterbalance to terrorist-inflicted injury, namely *resilience*. In a thought-provoking article, experts discuss their understanding of human resilience. They recognise its complexity but point out that it is a quality which is identifiable in the capacity of trauma-affected individuals to

'move forward in an insightful and integrated positive manner as a result of lessons learned from an adverse experience' (Southwick et al. 2014, p. 11). The 'lesson' which the officer learned was that terrorists had wanted to end her career in the police either by death or serious injury. They failed in the former as she survived the attack and so the contest was for victory in the latter. However, this was a battle the officer was determined not to lose. She decided to measure her triumph by returning to work within a year of being badly injured. With a service record of 26 years the officer retired from the RUC in 2014.

On 25 May, 1976, an off-duty IRA attack on a Part-time Reservist left his wife, who was also a Part-time officer, fighting for her life. 1976 (and 1985) was not only the worst year for RUC fatalities but May was the worst month when terrorists killed six officers. The attack occurred when the policewoman's husband was being dropped off at his civilian employment. In this respect she argued that:

> It was a personal attack. It wasn't an attack on a police vehicle with us in it. I didn't always take him to work or collect him from work but I often did because at that stage we only had one car and I was teaching locally. We dropped our baby at the childminder - she would have been a year old the day after that on the 26 May '76 was her first birthday. (Interview with officer 24, 7 June 2016)

It was fortuitous that the officers' child was not in the car at the time of the attack as the policewoman sometimes left her husband at work and then drove to the childminder. It is unknown if the terrorists were aware that an infant *might* be present, but they had certainly observed the family's travel habits when planning the attack. In the light of the policewoman's injuries, however, had the child been present the consequences could have been catastrophic:

> There were three rounds of an Armalite rifle and we're talking an Armalite and you know what Armalites were designed for - to so badly injure troops that it took a party of other troops to bring them back to base. Because I was in the car I was not only struck by two high velocity bullets but the bullets also pierced the car and I was hit with shrapnel - some of which hit me in the eye. One of the bullets shattered my left shoulder blade. (Interview with officer 24, 7 June 2016)

As a mother, the injuries greatly restricted interaction with her young daughter:

> My wee daughter was a year old, she was still in nappies. I couldn't lift that child on to my knee. She had to be lifted for me for quite some time after I came out of hospital so that I could look after her and change her nappies. I couldn't get down on the floor and play with toys with her. I couldn't do the normal things. (Interview with officer 24, 7 June 2016)

The inability to interact fully with her child generated frustration and inflicted a sense of loss. Family members rallied round and provided support. Social support helps to protect an individual from experiencing poorer mental health outcomes (Cohen and Wills 1985) but in the case of this officer it did not neutralise the effects of trauma:

> Emotionally and psychologically I nearly went under. Because my daughter was so young they avoided taking me as an inpatient into what they called the early treatment unit - the psychiatric unit was called the early treatment unit. But they made me go there Monday to Friday as a day patient. (Interview with officer 24, 7 June 2016)

However, the lack of a comprehensive programme of treatment caused the officer to experience mental health problems of a more pathological type:

> It was the summer after I was injured. I remember my daughter was just a wee toddler and we went to a bed and breakfast for a couple of nights. We actually stayed in Portstewart at the harbour and it backs on to the headland there just above the harbour but we had walked up from the back of this B&B on to this big headland and [daughter's name] was with me - I had this distinct urge to throw myself off those rocks. I just thought I can't do this anymore and the only thing that preserved me was that my daughter had my hand and I can still feel her wee hand in mine on that occasion you know, and I remember coming down and being terrified that there was something in my head that wanted me to kill myself because I really knew I didn't want to do that. (Interview with officer 24, 7 June 2016)

The shock of the momentary experience of a suicidal tendency—counteracted by the presence of her young daughter—did not immediately alter a deep sense of despair but it forced the officer to address her

depression which resulted in a steady improvement in her emotional cop-ing mechanisms.

The physical injuries eventually ended the officer's two forms of employment. She was employed as a teacher in a college of further education where she taught domestic science. However, in 1978, she was forced to leave her job because of an inability to fulfil the physical requirements of the role. Her employment as a part-time reservist ended in 1981 when an examination of her injuries by the FMO ruled her unfit to work (she eventually was awarded an Injury on Duty pension). The officer strongly resisted being medically discharged when first assessed after the attack and was allowed to continue her part-time reserve work. But by 1981 the FMO deemed a medical discharge necessary. So, at the age of 29 the officer had lost both jobs and was directionless career-wise.

Despite her physical injuries the policewoman discussed how an encounter in a local shop doubled her resolve to remain in the RUC. It is the kind of reaction in a member of the security forces—a female officer who was both a wife and mother—which, interestingly, under-mines the terrorists' 'logic' in using terror as a strategic instrument. Instead of the attack terrorising the officer into resigning from the police it had the opposite effect:

> The day after I was discharged from hospital I went into a bakery and a woman said 'there's that policewoman I thought she'd died' and another woman said 'there's one thing sure, you'll never go back in the police you'll be afraid'. Well at that moment I swore before God that I would wear that uniform, that nobody would ever say that I was afraid. I came out of the shop and said to my husband 'I'll wear that uniform I will not have anybody say that I'm afraid'. (Interview with officer 24, 7 June 2016)

It was the physical injury (leading to the FMO's decision) and *not* the fear of being the victim of another terrorist attack that ended the officer's policing career five years after the attack.

If direct on-duty attacks against female RUC officers were uncommon then rarer still were incidents where the IRA targeted policewomen when they were off duty. However, although unusual, a participant in the research discussed how terrorists had attempted to kill her when she was off duty using an undercar booby-trap device. The attack, in February 1990, took place at the officer's family home which was near to the bor-der in west Tyrone. The device was discovered when she was about to

leave for night duty around 10:50 p.m. Due to severe storms in the area a power cut had left the area without street lighting. As the officer began to drive down her driveway the bomb fell off and was actually driven over by the car's rear wheel. The officer, monetarily puzzled, reversed the car only to see her mother, illuminated by the vehicle's headlights, pick up the bomb:

> At this stage mummy had come out of the front of the house to wave bye-bye. She'd come out and actually picked the bomb up. She didn't know what it was. We were having a wall built at the side of the house at the time and she thought that it was a small brick which had ended up in the driveway. I jumped out of the car and shouted at her 'Drop it. Get into the house!'. (Interview with officer 25, 16 April 2016)

It was not unknown for undercar booby traps to fall off vehicles. On this occasion the officer felt that the IRA had been watching her home and planted the bomb under the cover of darkness between the time she had driven the car from the garage, returned to the house, and then left for work—approximately 15 minutes. Accordingly, the officer's mother actually found the safety pin, which activated the device, in the driveway three days later. It is likely that this part of the bomb had been dropped by terrorists when fleeing the scene. However, the fact that the police-woman's sixty-year-old mother handled the device thinking it was a harmless object illustrates the potential ruthlessness of this kind of targeting approach and points to the terrorists' disregard for the safety of the officer's family. She claimed that the 'bomb under my car did not stay in place because the vehicle was six weeks old and all new vehicles are extremely well waxed underneath hence the magnet didn't stick to the surface' (interview, officer 25, 16 April 2016).

The attack had a profound effect on the officer's mental health in a way that on-duty attacks and related injuries did not. To illustrate the point: during her service she received burn injuries when the Land Rover she was in came under heavy petrol bomb attack in the Bogside area of Londonderry. Rioters threw multiple sweety jar bottles containing flammable liquid so it would seep into any gaps in the vehicle. They then threw lit petrol bombs to ignite the petrol-saturated Land Rover. The liquid which had seeped into the vehicle burst into flames inflicting burn injuries on the occupants. But the personal nature of the off-duty

targeting presented problems which were less easily coped with. It seemed that terrorists were intent on killing her regardless of her gender and the fact that the attack had endangered the officer's mother's life made this particular ordeal all the more traumatic. While the on-duty dangers had damaging effects on her psychological wellbeing they nonetheless were emotionally capable of repair, but the off-duty attack delivered a sledgehammer blow to the officer's emotional resilience. The difference with the off-duty attack was that it occurred when the officer was *alone* and *isolated*. The attack, which took place at her home, caused terror: she did not know how many terrorists had come to kill her and was fearful that they might still be in the vicinity preparing to strike again. In contradistinction, when on duty, she was surrounded by well-trained colleagues and should backup be required it was immediate. Consequently, she was diagnosed with PTSD and medically discharged from the force at the age of 36 feeling that her life was in tatters. In over 20 years of service she had served in the DMSU in Londonderry (the only woman in a squad of 32) becoming an advanced driver and hence was often chosen over her male colleagues if specialist driving roles were required. All said, she was an effective female officer who was used to patrolling in hostile areas but yet found it more difficult to cope with the off-duty attack because it was *personal* in nature.

The officer has never been able to explain the reason for the off-duty attack and no one has been arrested in connection with this crime. However, she made an appropriate point about the mechanics of counter-terrorism which may explain why some officers were more likely than others to be targeted whilst off duty viz. as RUC officers got to know more about the terrorists they were pursuing, the terrorists became aware of the identities of the most effective police officers combating terrorism. This can be understood in the context of the repeated arrests of terrorist suspects in a particular area. The officer described a situation when she and her three colleagues were taking a suspected terrorist on a one-hour journey to an RUC station in Belfast for questioning: 'I was driving and he [terrorist suspect] leant over from the back seat where he could see me in the mirror and said "I've just counted every tooth in your head", obviously making it clear that he would be able to recognise me in uniform, but more importantly, out of uniform' (interview with officer 25, 16 April 2016). Given the IRA's relentless targeting of police officers during the Troubles the comments of this individual

were not overly cryptic. Coping with this kind of threat is psychologically challenging not least because policemen and women did not live in police camps similar to the securely guarded barracks which facilitated the deployment of British soldiers during the Troubles. Officers lived in the community and in parts of County Tyrone and County Fermanagh these were religiously and politically mixed areas within which members of terrorist organisations also lived. Although officers were not stationed near to their homes (unless working in a part-time capacity where there was a greater likelihood of them serving near to home) it is important to recognise that a terrorist organisation is a network of communication. Simply being stationed, say, thirty miles from one's home did little to thwart terrorists if they wanted to discover an officer's home address. As mentioned in Chapter 2, once the make, colour and registration plate of an officer's private car had been noted (perhaps entering or leaving a police station) the information could quickly be passed around the terrorist organisation's different brigade areas. Officers whose home was in the west of Northern Ireland were especially susceptible to this kind of threat and it played a key part in compounding the psychological difficulties this policewoman experienced. Perhaps if she had lived in another part of the province or been stationed in less hostile areas, she may have had a considerably different experience and enjoyed a long service record. This possibility points to the vicissitudes of policing during the conflict where the kind of work officers did—especially in specialist units—and the areas they were stationed, had a significant part to play in their overall mental health. For this officer, being stationed in dangerous areas and performing demanding counter-terrorist roles resulted in her job ending prematurely. The on duty, and especially, off-duty attack, took their toll leaving her suffering from PTSD and feeling her emotions to be: 'Totally depleted. That is how I would have described it as a total depletion. It was like a reservoir of water and all the water had evaporated and you're left with nothing only dryness and cracks and complete emptiness' (interview with officer 25, 16 April 2016).

The case of this policewoman demonstrates that there was an exception to the terrorists' rule not deliberately to target RUC women when off duty, whilst certain on-duty injuries discussed above indicate that should women officers be present when an attack took place then the prospect of their death or serious injury would not cause terrorists to alter their plans.

WOMEN AND FIREARMS

Women were not armed in the RUC until 1994. This may seem remarkable given the high level of violence in the province and the fact that women had been injured and killed in terrorist attacks. Since the creation of the RUC in 1922 male officers had been armed with the exception of a brief period in 1970 when the Hunt Report unrealistically suggested that the force should be unarmed. Policewomen, however, had a different relationship to weapons dictated by an unfavourable attitude by senior female officers to them being armed. Joan Lock (2014) discusses the situation in which RUC women found themselves. She claims that if women had been armed it would have increased the chances of them being assassinated by terrorists. She also points out that the new policy of arming policewomen in Northern Ireland was influenced by the success of a sex discrimination case which was taken to the European Court of Justice in the 1980s. However, Lock's discussion of the issue fails to appreciate that women RUC officers had a complex relationship with firearms, which given the high level of violence in the country, is unsurprising. She also fails to recognise that while a formal policy prevented women being armed some female officers were issued with a Personal Protection Weapon (PPW) because of an off-duty threat. The irony of this situation is clear: some policewomen were better able to respond to a terrorist attack when off duty than they were on duty. Additionally, Lock refers to RUC women receiving no official training but this does not tell the whole story both in the sense that women did receive a brief familiarisation course in handling weapons as part of their training (Cameron 1993) and also that they were often informally trained in the use of firearms by their male colleagues. As we shall see, this brief course and informal training actually saved the life of a female officer and her badly injured male colleague who returned fire on terrorists following an ambush which left another male colleague dead. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to consider women officers' opinion with regards to carrying firearms.

Participants held differing views on whether they should be armed. The concept of armed policewomen has two dimensions: firstly, armed whilst on duty, and secondly, being routinely armed with a PPW like their male colleagues. Some women shunned the idea of carrying a weapon whilst others relished it and regretted being unarmed. Lock is correct in that policewomen were conscious that if they carried guns

this increased the possibility of them being targeted by terrorists as a participant pointed out: 'I felt rightly or wrongly, we were not targets because of the fact that we were not armed' (response to questionnaire, officer 26, 15 July 2015). Another officer made the same point: 'I actually did not agree with women carrying firearms. I think women would have been more of a target had they been armed during the conflict' (response to questionnaire, officer 27, 15 July 2015). Interestingly, this caused some policewomen to feel that by doing certain duties, for example, fixed-point traffic duty, they were helping to keep a male colleague safer in that static duties made officers vulnerable to attack.

One of the reasons why women preferred not to be armed was a concern that it would be less difficult for terrorists to dispossess them of a weapon particularly when they were off duty and unsupported by male colleagues. The threat of being robbed of their gun did not only exist in relation to republican terrorists but also loyalist groups. Paramilitary organisations require weapons and the easier they are to come by the better. For security reasons, police officers lived in unionist areas. Some lived near to loyalist strongholds where an attempted theft of a firearm was a possibility. The author has personal knowledge of a male officer who was set upon by a number of loyalists when returning home from duty late at night. On this occasion the loyalists attempted to steal his firearm. As it happened, the officer did not have his weapon with him at the time, but the incident indicates that policewomen's concerns were not outlandish. Compared to male officers, policewomen's lack of upper body strength rendered them less able to prevent a weapon being stolen: 'I wouldn't have liked to carry a firearm as I believed a woman would have been very easily overpowered and the firearm stolen' (response to questionnaire, officer 28, 15 July 2015).

In a situation where police were responding to an incident, female officers sometimes found themselves left in charge of a police vehicle as this was deemed safer for them because they were unarmed. This restricted the scope of their duties and burdened them with the responsibility of keeping secure a car or Land Rover despite not carrying a weapon. On occasions when leaving the vehicle, male officers would have left a firearm with their female colleague for protection but as this was not official policy it did not always happen. Policewomen, however, were vulnerable when left in a stationary vehicle in that, notwithstanding its armour plating, it was susceptible to rocket attack, and its windows to the blast from a drogue bomb—static targets made the terrorists' job easier.

Having women unarmed may have kept them from being directly targeted, but should an attack occur, it meant that they were reliant on their male colleagues for protection. This dependence ran against the grain of some women who wanted to take responsibility for their own safety. In the turmoil of a terrorist attack some policewomen were concerned that they might be left to fend for themselves but knew that they were inadequately equipped to do so. A policewoman said: 'Unfortunately, not all male colleagues inspired me with confidence that, should a situation arise where we were both in danger, they would remember about me!' (response to questionnaire, officer 29, 15 July 2015). Accordingly, some women felt that it was better to be armed and self-reliant. But RUC equipment for patrolling was gendered. Women officers originally only possessed a handbag when on patrol and in fact were not issued with the extendable baton until the mid-1990s. Policewomen, however, were resourceful and utilised the police torch or radio as a makeshift weapon when assisting their male colleagues in breaking up a brawl or subduing a person resisting arrest. But in comparison to this kind of violence, terrorist violence reflected a more intense pathology as its goal was to kill members of the security forces. An effective police response to these conditions required firepower which some policewomen were not happy to carry. Women also felt themselves to be a burden in the case of being attacked: 'There were times when I felt that my female colleagues and I added a burden of responsibility to our male counterparts who would have had to look after us as well as themselves' (response to questionnaire, officer 30, 15 July 2015).

Some policewomen also experienced anxiety as a result of being unarmed when they were off duty. An officer discussed her desire to be issued with a PPW when RUC Special Branch informed her that she was under threat of abduction by terrorists in 1972 but she was not offered a gun by the police:

> I would like to have had a Personal Protection weapon for my own security as in the early days I lived in a house with two other policewomen and there was a threat against me at that address from the IRA. We didn't have a firearm to protect us should an attack happen. I was just issued with a police radio to summon help but the problem was that the radio reception was useless within the property. The female Chief Inspector came out to visit me and her assurance was the IRA might abduct me but unlikely to kill me as it wouldn't look good for them. I wasn't convinced by this and made the decision to take annual leave, move house and apply for a transfer to another station. (Response to questionnaire, officer 31, 10 July 2015)

The officer, who worked in Belfast, moved house and was transferred to another station in the city. She believes that terrorists had gathered their intelligence having likely followed her home from the station where she worked. This would have been convenient as the station was situated near to a republican area. The officer did not drive at the time and thus travelled by bus to Belfast city centre where she had a fifteen minute walk to the station wearing plainclothes. When her shift ended she changed out of uniform and walked from the station to the city centre and then travelled by bus to her home in East Belfast. It would not have been difficult for terrorists to follow the officer on her route home. It was speculated that the IRA wanted to kidnap her in order to extract information about security force operations. The policewoman had been involved in the arrest of a prominent female terrorist prior to coming under threat indicating that the RUC had effective intelligence on the IRA in the Belfast area. It would have been easier for terrorists to abduct an unarmed female officer involved in this case than her armed male counterparts.

Some women officers did receive formal (as well as informal) training in the use of a weapon. The following example accounts for an officer who received official training in firearms in line with the requirements of her promotion to the rank of Inspector:

> I was promoted to the rank of Inspector in 1980. One of the jobs required to do in this rank was investigate disciplinary offences of accidental discharges of firearms. At my own request, but against the wishes of the hierarchy female officers, but backed by Personnel Branch I underwent the full firearms training programme with a batch of recruits. I was a fully trained officer long before females were armed. (Response to questionnaire, officer 32, 22 July 2015)

The officer went on to argue that senior policewomen's preference for women to remain unarmed was unrealistic and out of touch with the dangers that confronted both male and female officers alike. In an indignant tone she said:

> No one could stop me carrying a weapon if I thought it necessary to do so. I would have taken a long firearm [rifle] if I was on patrol especially on night duty. There were no handguns in the station to sign out. I think that policewomen were at equal risk to men and should have been allowed to

carry firearms the same as the men. The barrier to this was these so-called women of rank who were not out at the quarry face doing an equal job. (Response to questionnaire, officer 32, 22 July 2015)

Women also received informal training when it was considered necessary. A female Sergeant commented: 'Policewomen were unofficially 'trained' in how to use the firearms by their male colleagues, because should circumstances arise that our male counterpart should be injured or killed, at least we could use the weapon to protect ourselves' (response to questionnaire, officer 29, 15 July 2015). Obviously, the greater the level of threat that existed to police in a particular area determined the policing response. Women who patrolled with men were affected by the level of threat. If stationed in a republican area, women may have been expected to acquire additional skills in order to increase the general safety of the police unit when on patrol. A policewoman discussed her experiences of working in a small republican community in East Belfast. While not considered the most threatening of areas in the city, it was nonetheless a place known for its attacks on the security forces and so officers had to remain vigilant and ready to respond. She was part of a unit (which included military personnel) with responsibility for conducting house searches for weapons and bomb-making material. Given the threat level in the area and the unit's role she was shown how to fire a weapon:

I was trained, informally but under the close supervision of a firearms instructor in our section, in the use of firearms from 1977 - 1978, when we were formed into a small group to patrol a republican area. This meant that I had respect for firearms and would have been able to use one in the event of an emergency. The downside was that I also had to learn the basics of taking the firearms apart and cleaning them - less glamorous. (Response to questionnaire, officer 33, 15 July 2015)

Depending on the severity of the threat in an area, policewomen may have been issued with a PPW for their off-duty safety. This was not customary practice. There had to be a strong case for arming women in this way and so very few were issued with a weapon. An officer who was stationed in Londonderry when she left the RUC training depot and who lived in the city, recalled the factors that led to her being issued with a firearm. The context of the threat was the day after Bloody Sunday in January 1972 (and the murder of two police officers in the city three

days earlier). The officer remarked that when she left the house in the morning for work she was confronted with a mass of black flags flying from the surrounding houses and immediately felt threatened. She returned home and contacted her local station by telephone whereupon she was collected by a patrol car and taken to work. On arrival at the station she reported to her Sergeant and said: 'I need protection and he said "What's happened?" and I told him. He said "Well, you've done the firearms course so I can issue you with a gun." I had a personal weapon issued to me.' The policewoman considered it to be a necessary step due to feeling unsafe when off duty and said: 'I felt safer because I had it. It was just one of those things, you had to do it' (interview with officer 34, 25 June 2015). Although the officer carried the weapon with her at all times when off duty, it was locked away in the station when she reported for work. Hence, the officer patrolled unarmed in a dangerous city but, perhaps a little absurdly, was better able to defend herself when she was off duty. Arguably, this was an unreasonable position for women officers to be put in when working in such places.

If a case was to be made for arming policewomen during the Troubles then the events of 13 March, 1977, are relevant. On this occasion the IRA fired on a police car using high velocity weapons. The occupants were two male officers and a policewoman. A male officer, aged 18, and who was driving the vehicle, died in the attack whilst the other was shot in the arm and leg. The car careered off the road and overturned into a ditch. The terrorists sought to use the crashing of the car to their advantage and continued firing. The policewoman, aged 22, was only six weeks out of the police training depot and was seated in the back of the car. Along with her injured colleague she struggled out of the vehicle and both returned fire at which point her assailants fled. The officer discussed her memories of that day as follows:

> The events of that day are very vivid. We were in a soft-skinned patrol car and I was sitting in the back between the driver and the front passenger seat. The next thing something came through the window as if someone had thrown a stone at the car. I looked behind me and saw two men on the road with rifles and I turned around and said to my colleague 'drive on, please keep driving, keep driving'. I didn't know at this stage that he had been hit. He drove around the corner and then slumped over the steering wheel and we ended up down a ditch in a field with the car overturned on to its roof. I didn't realise that he had died because they [IRA]

were still shooting at us. My other colleague had gotten the guns out of the car and gave one to me. I think it was a machine gun and we just kept firing back and all of a sudden there was silence - just firing to let the terrorists know that somebody was still alive and were shooting back and the cowards that they are they fled away. (Interview with officer 35, 9 October 2015)

With the car having overturned radio communication was disrupted leaving the surviving officers feeling stranded. Members of the local community contacted the emergency services and help arrived at the scene. The policewoman had not learned to fire a weapon in her training at the depot rather her competence with a firearm was gained informally and undoubtedly helped save her life and that of her colleague. She explained:

I knew how to fire the gun because I had been a part-time reservist just a year before and the guys in my section showed me how. I had said a few times 'can I go up to the quarry and can you show me how to use your guns?' and I did that one day and that probably saved our lives. I mean it was unofficial, but they showed me how to use a submachine gun - not that I thought I was ever going to be in the kind of dangerous situation I ended up in. (Interview with officer 35, 9 October 2015)

The officer discussed the reason why her male colleagues were willing to provide the instruction: should they be injured in an attack their survival may depend on a female colleague's ability to use a weapon. The officer escaped the attack with a fractured arm and cuts and bruises. Although her physical injuries were relatively slight, the attack caused considerable psychological harm resulting in a nervous breakdown and six months in hospital. She returned to work but had not fully recovered from the incident and despite an interlude of many years became seriously re-traumatised in 1994 following the IRA ceasefire. The cause of her re-traumatisation was an interview she agreed to give for a local television report on the newly called ceasefire. The RUC asked if she would agree to the interview because of her experience of the IRA attack seventeen years earlier. However, when she watched the programme later in the evening it had a triggering effect. It brought to the surface aspects of the trauma that she had always kept buried despite having received psychological counselling. The officer referred to how she preferred to 'bottle up' her

feelings and not share them with others (including aspects of the attack with health professionals immediately after the incident) because she felt that no one could understand her emotions. Social sharing and the communication of traumatic experiences to others can have a beneficial effect on an individual's psychological recovery (Finkenauer and Rime 1998). The officer's refusal to reveal the degree to which she had been traumatised by the attack caused her emotional problems to fester.

When the ceasefire was called she had been promoted to Sergeant and was used to patrolling—unarmed—in a dangerous republican area in North Belfast. Her patrol consisted of another Sergeant and six male constables and around twelve soldiers. But after her re-traumatisation and the emotional challenges that followed in its wake, she received an Injury on Duty award and left the force. Due to her response to the terrorist attack she was awarded the Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct but for many years was unable to wear the emblem (a bronze spray of oak leaves) and discussed the reason why:

> When I got the medal I actually felt very guilty and I would never wear it or tell anybody I had it because I felt guilty that my friend and colleague had been killed. I thought 'why should I wear it?' and I didn't want to wear it because [colleague's name] didn't survive. (Interview with officer 35, 9 October 2015)

The officer suffered survivor's guilt. Her guilt at having survived while her colleague died constitutes a complicated response to a traumatic event (Juni 2016). It left her vulnerable to poor reactions when exposed to future stressful events (as happened many years later). When worn, the medal functioned as a magnet for observers who inquired as to the reason for the award. The officer found it psychologically difficult to account for the attack and so not wearing the emblem was the easiest emotional option until further professional treatment and effective counselling rendered her able—and proud—to wear it especially in honour of her murdered colleague. As a member of the ladies' police choir she has occasion to wear it during choral performances.

When it came to the question of firearms the problem women faced as a group was the lack of a shared view. Some women wanted to be *officially* trained and carry a weapon on duty. These women also wished, like their male colleagues, to possess a PPW for protection when off duty.

They regarded it as an equality issue as well as a matter related to increasing their personal safety—when women were armed in 1994 many felt that they were finally being treated as equals. However, other women preferred not to be armed. The reasons for this were basically twofold and have been mentioned above: firstly, some women were concerned that this would make them a direct target of terrorist attacks, and secondly, they did not want the responsibility of possessing a weapon because they felt themselves less capable of defending it should terrorists, or an assailant, attempt forcibly to take it. So, during the Troubles, the diversity of opinion prevented women cooperating with each other in a manner which might otherwise have been able to challenge the dominant view amongst senior police managers (including those in the Women's Police Branch) that RUC women should remain an unarmed part of the force notwithstanding the terrorist threat.

Having unarmed women officers on patrol raised serious questions for the authorities. While the policy may have averted direct terrorist targeting and so, generally speaking, placed them in less danger, what was expected of them should an attack occur? What practical response could a policewoman mount in a situation where their male colleague(s) was injured and armed terrorists continued in their attempt to take his life? Alternatively, what effective response could a policewoman muster in a situation where terrorists were endangering the lives of members of the public? In such an event the policy was more likely to reduce the policewoman to the level of a horrified onlooker than equip her for a professional response. The prospect of a situation like this occurring was deeply disconcerting to some male officers and is illustrated in the case of a policeman who discussed the reason why he refused to patrol with women officers in a loyalist area. When made aware of a loyalist threat to abduct him, he considered it too unsafe to serve with an unarmed female colleague because she was not in a position to offer meaningful assistance if the abduction was attempted. As a result, he only patrolled the area with fellow policemen. Other officers felt that because women were paid the same they ought to have carried weapons and been trained to respond to terrorist attacks. That women officers in the PSNI are routinely armed and issued with a PPW is testament to their competence at handling weapons. This fact suggests that the same skills could have been cultivated in RUC women during the conflict had a favourable policy been in place.

Off-Duty Considerations During the Conflict

Policewomen were concerned about their safety and that of their families when off duty. Their concerns were the same as their male colleagues albeit terrorists did not target them off duty (but we have identified an exception as in the case of the officer mentioned above). When it came to personal safety, female officers' considerations were shaped by the fact that they were a member of the RUC and not that they were a woman officer. Therefore, matters related to off-duty safety were treated seriously. A number of participants were married and had children during their police career. These women had to balance, not only work and family commitments, but being a mother in a conflict situation where it was necessary for members of the RUC to remain conscious of their family's safety. For policewomen who were mothers, their children were habituated in terms of security protocols such as not answering a knock at the door or discussing their mother's job with peers. Children also became used to seeing security practices being performed before, for instance, the family vehicle was used. An officer, whose husband was also in the RUC, recalled how her daughter responded when the child realised that a regular procedure in the family's safety routine had not been followed:

> We didn't have garaging for our cars so it was always in the back of our mind that there would be a booby trap placed under them. Our daughters got used to us checking under the cars and on one occasion I was rushing to get them to school and was forgetting to check when one of the girls reminded me. She was only about 8 or 9 at the time and she innocently made up a sign to stick on the steering wheel telling me to check under the car. (Response to questionnaire, officer 31, 10 July 2015)

Another officer discussed a comment made by her young daughter which she found upsetting:

> I have two children and am also married to a police officer. The Northern Ireland conflict definitely impacted on them. I can recall my daughter when she was about three-and-a-half years' old coming into the kitchen where I had prepared dinner and I had out her daddy's plate in the oven, and her looking at the plate and saying 'My daddy dead'. I just realised that I had the television news on and a funeral of a policeman had been shown in the news and she had picked up on it. The children to this day would tell me that they suffered. (Response to questionnaire, officer 32, 22 July 2015)

This is an interesting account of the officer's daughter's association of the symbolism of her father's occupation with danger. It is an association which the child found upsetting. That children of similar age to the officer's daughter are not ignorant of danger is a conclusion reached by Robert Grieve and Aileen Williams (1985) who studied levels of awareness in children aged from 3 to 6. Additionally, that televised coverage of the Troubles influenced children's awareness of conflict phenomena has been identified by Ed Cairns et al. (1980) who studied a group of 5–6 year olds. Although the officer's child is younger and at an earlier stage of conceptual development, the parent's story links her daughter's sadness to images the child observed on the television. The images resonated with the child's experiences. Police funerals attracted considerable media attention and were uniformed events. In addition to the role of television, the child's perceptions were shaped by the parental conversations of her environment. Set in the context of this RUC family, the officer's daughter was accustomed to observing the police uniform worn by both her parents. She was used to being taken by her father to a heavily fortified police station where multiple officers were on duty. Police officers in uniform occasionally called at the child's home. It is also likely that the child was present when her parents spoke in sorrowful tones of colleagues who had been injured or killed and was perhaps beside her parents when they watched the news of an RUC funeral—an event which was much discussed especially if the murdered officer had been known to her parents. As Alicia Lieberman and Patricia Van Horn (2008, p. 1) suggest: 'Small children are keen observers of parental behavior … children's inner lives are rich and complex, organized around their primary emotional relationships' which for this young child was a mother and father who worked in the police. However, this is not to claim that the child had a developed understanding of the dangers associated with police symbolism in Northern Ireland. Rather, it is simply to account for the policewoman's recollections of the negative connections her young daughter was capable of making and which the officer found saddening. To the policewoman it was evident that her daughter had knowledge of an environment that was not altogether safe and with which the child was able to associate threats that were emotionally disturbing.

Police officers confined their shopping to safe areas as members of the security forces had been killed by terrorists while shopping off duty. Policewomen, however, were more challenged in this respect than males whose wives could take on this responsibility. Many policewomen were

unmarried and so had to shop for themselves whilst those who were married found themselves with the responsibility for gathering the daily or weekly groceries. Shopping presented problems in that standing in long queues increased the likelihood of being recognised as a police officer and because of this officers did not normally shop in the area where they were stationed. A policewoman who was stationed in Lurgan discussed how she would do her shopping in the neighbouring town of Lisburn, approximately 14 miles away, where she was not known as a policewoman. The same policewoman when stationed in Strand Road police station in the Cityside of Londonderry refused to shop on this side of the city for the following reason:

> I did not shop at all on the Cityside as I would have felt too vulnerable. It would have meant leaving the car unattended in a public car park and trying to be discreet as I checked below it on my return for undercar bombs. (Response to questionnaire, officer 29, 15 July 2015)

Instead, she shopped on Londonderry's Waterside or in Coleraine which is around 30 miles away.

RUC women shared with policemen the wish to remain anonymous when shopping which was more easily achieved in a populated and busy place like Belfast than it was in the setting of a smaller town. Yet, although more cosmopolitan, Belfast was also problematic. Given the city's sectarian geography members of both communities travelled from their respective political areas to shop in the city centre where it was possible for officers to cross paths with members of a terrorist organisation:

> I occasionally went into Belfast city centre but on one occasion I was in a large store when I was recognised by an IRA woman whom I had guarded in the Royal Victoria Hospital. She was with two other men and they followed me around the store. I'm not ashamed to say I was petrified and I got off side. In those days there were no mobile phones to summon help and of course I didn't have a personal protection weapon. From then on I steered clear of Belfast. (Response to questionnaire, officer 31, 10 July 2015)

The guarding of the IRA woman related to her detention by police and during this period the individual obviously became familiar with the officer's face and was able to recognise her out of uniform. In this encounter the officer did not know if she had stumbled upon an IRA operation—perhaps involving more than the three individuals—which

could have put her life in danger. Furthermore, the fact that she was unarmed meant that the off-duty policewoman had no way of effectively protecting members of the public should a violent situation arise. The example illustrates the potential usefulness of a personal protection weapon in relation to the officer's safety as well as that of the public.

The choice of hairdresser was not treated lightly by RUC women and was a topic that arose during interview. It presented four problems. Firstly, it was the off-duty context where they spent most time in a public setting. Secondly, it was a place where conversations naturally develop between women customers as well as between customers and the hairdresser. Thirdly, officers found themselves in the company of fellow costumers whose identity they could not be certain of—nor whose presence could be anticipated—and who were in fact strangers able to overhear the topic of other conversations. Fourthly, officers were particularly vulnerable sitting back in a chair having their hair washed or spending time under a hairdryer. A certain salon may be considered a relatively safe place for policewomen to use but a change of staff could have raised concern about safety thus requiring officers to seek the services of another business. Hairdressing salons were sites where information not only flowed but was expected to flow easily. In fact, an individual's silence could have been interpreted as a sign that they had something to hide thus raising the suspicions of anyone with terrorist sympathies. As a result, policewomen used salons which were recommended by colleagues. Often the owner of the business would have a family member with connections to the RUC: maybe a husband, father, brother or cousin serving in the force, or likewise a father-in-law or brother-in-law. The example of RUC women's choice of hairdressers and informal patterns of recommendation, which would seem a matter of little significance to policewomen outside of Northern Ireland, constitutes an instructive sociological lesson in referral communication amongst a socially delimited group who possessed strong social ties (Brown and Reingen 1987). These ties were reinforced by a shared sense of being under threat and this rendered the information reliable and worth acting upon. The information was passed 'word-of-mouth' which as Jacqueline Brown and Peter Reigen (1987) argue is a vital form of communication in shaping people's (in their study it was consumers) behaviour. However, counter-terrorist considerations made it essential that the circulation of information remain at a micro level rather than be diffused to a wider out-group.

A MASCULINE ENVIRONMENT AND CAMARADERIE REDUCED MALE/FEMALE FRICTION

Joan Acker (1990) points out that gendered organisations present particular problems for women who find themselves confronting a bias which functions to the advantage of males. Policing is an obvious example of a masculine environment in that it is predominantly populated by males and reflects masculine values which prioritise the traits of physical strength and an aggressive attitude (Rabe-Hemp 2008). These values derive from a crime-fighting perspective on policing which views males as more effective police officers than their female counterparts because they are physically stronger, tougher, assertive and believed to be emotionally better able to cope with the challenging demands of police work (Kurtz 2008). Hence, Penny Harrington (2003), who was the first woman to lead a major police department in the US, refers to policewomen being under the 'microscope' where their every action will be 'scrutinised' by co-workers and sometimes by the public. Harrington's point can be traced back to earlier observations made by Evabel Tenny (1953) who painted a picture of the quandary women officers found themselves in. Tenny argued that the appointment of women within the police was viewed with suspicion and that they are subjected to the critical gaze of policemen who await them messing up whilst Theresa Melchionne (1967) pointed to the cultural bias that policewomen battle against and which precludes a fair assessment of their law enforcement capabilities. Policewomen, irrespective of society, have had to contend with social norms which look unfavourably at the idea of policing being an appropriate job for women unless it involves crimes against women and children. There was initial opposition from within the force to women's recruitment in the RUC in the early 1940s and before their eventual integration in police sections, women officers, by and large, performed duties of a gendered type (Cameron 1993). However, the passing of the *Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972* in the US and the United Kingdom's *Sex Discrimination Act 1975* followed by the *Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976* were legislative steps paving the way for policewomen's integration.

Male prejudice which considers females to be unsuited to police work can make policing occupationally challenging to women and it would be reasonable to think that the violence of the Troubles heightened the masculinity of the RUC and compounded the challenges confronted by

its female officers. Certainly, John Brewer (1991, p. 241) argues that the conflict created what he describes as the 'extreme Hercules-like masculinity of a Northern Irish police station'. But in comparison with policewomen in other British constabularies, the US or beyond, the Northern Irish conflict created unique circumstances which invite exploration as to how this affected the relationship between male and female officers. At one level, women RUC officers experienced a working environment that was very masculine and male dominated. But at another level, both male and female officers worked under the threat of a terrorist attack occurring which could have resulted in injury or death. This threat was something RUC men and women experienced in common and was a distinctive feature of the political situation in Northern Ireland. Of course, this is not to say that RUC women did not confront chauvinistic attitudes or at times did not collide with patriarchal barriers because undoubtedly they did. Rather, it is to consider how RUC women's experiences may have differed to policewomen serving in other forces because of the particularly dangerous policing conditions pertaining to Northern Ireland. Thus, given that both men and women experienced the threat of terrorist violence—in one form or another—as a shared stressor, what effect did this have on relations between male and female officers? Did the shared sense of threat help dismantle gender barriers or reinforce them? Did it promote or hinder camaraderie between policemen and policewomen?

That the conflict helped promote better relations between men and women officers was a view held by all participants. The following comments help cast light on the reasons for this:

> The camaraderie was fantastic during the Troubles. Due to the 'conflict' officers worked and socialised together and were a very insular group. I suppose you could say that it was safer to 'stick with your own'. Because of these tight-knit units, male or female it didn't really matter. Due to the dangers, the RUC had to ensure they supported each other and the more dangerous the area the tighter the unit, the better the camaraderie. (Response to questionnaire, officer 36, 22 July 2015)

The policewoman points to how the conflict blurred gender distinctions and indicates that the more dangerous the area then the less significant was an officer's gender. The key feature of 'tight-knit units' is mutual reliance. To function effectively in challenging circumstances,

each member of the unit had to have confidence in the ability and commitment of his or her colleagues when they were on duty. But off-duty factors also played a part in creating group cohesion to the benefit of on-duty requirements and reflected the social consequences of the conflict. For security reasons many RUC men and women preferred to restrict their friendship network to fellow police officers. A policewoman referred to the long hours officers worked and how this assisted the development of social bonds:

> I do believe it [the conflict] helped develop a bond as we had to look after each other in bad situations. We spent more time with our colleagues at work than we did our own families… I found that the 'harder' the station the more camaraderie there was. I experienced working in what was classed as harder, more dangerous stations and also in a softer area, and I much preferred working in a more dangerous environment because of the relationships formed and the comradeship. (Response to questionnaire, officer 31, 10 July 2015)

Given the masculine context of policing it would seem that women had a part to play in terms of ensuring that their gender did not cause fractures within a unit: 'I think because the policewomen did not see themselves as females first and police officers second, helped to maintain that bond—as we were just part of a team, which was what we wanted' (response to questionnaire, officer 29, 15 July 2015). This comment indicates a willingness to adapt to a masculine environment. The officer points to the importance of women's femininity not acting as a threat to the solidarity of a team—this was achieved by women not viewing themselves as 'females first and police officers second'. Alternatively, if a female preferred to see herself as a woman first and in a way which emphasised her femininity, this would likely have raised questions about her professional competence if called upon in a crisis situation. In the eyes of male colleagues, an emphasis on femininity would also portray policewomen as weak—physically and emotionally—which would have placed them in a subordinate role to policemen regardless of equal rank. Karen Rich (2014, p. 103) has attempted to describe the problematic situation policewomen can find themselves in by saying that they: 'may be referred to as … "pansy police" or "the bunny patrol" if they seem feminine'. A conflict setting, however, leaves little room for expressions of femininity and patrolling in threatening areas demanded a strong team spirit:

There was such a threat to one's own personal safety both on and off duty the relationship with colleagues was very important. At times you literally 'Get each other's back' and this requires trust. We all cooked and ate together during night duty wherever possible and I remember this as a really positive time. (Response to questionnaire, officer 37, 15 July 2015)

Policewomen gained the respect of their male colleagues by virtue of working alongside them in dangerous areas. As mentioned above, although women were not posted to border areas as these were live-in stations where young, usually unmarried, male officers would serve, they were posted in dangerous urban contexts such as West Belfast and Londonderry particularly the city's west bank or Cityside. It is important to bear in mind that in areas where there was a high level of terrorist activity and the security forces could expect to be regularly attacked, ordinary crime also occurred. Some of these crimes were serious in nature and left women and children as victims. The RUC adopted a gendered response to certain crimes resulting in female officers disproportionately dealing with those related to women and children. Policewomen were regarded as better suited to interviewing, for example, women rape victims. The 'emotional labor' that is involved in this kind of police work where an officer has to respond to a highly distressed citizen (Martin 1999), ought not to be overlooked but this is arguably not sufficiently acknowledged by many policemen whose principal view of policing is that of masculine crime fighting.

Women also worked in Juvenile Liaison and Community Relations branches. Admittedly, developing community relations work was difficult in areas of high threat but it was still attempted and the work of Juvenile Liaison was considered a necessary branch of policing. However, this work exposed women to danger. A female officer who worked in Juvenile Liaison in the Waterside area of Londonderry discussed how a simple visit to a republican estate to interview a child (in the company of his or her parents) who had committed a misdemeanour became a military operation: 'They [army] closed everything off [both ends of the street]. They went into the gardens. I had to park my car and go into the house. I felt protected and I felt safe because I knew I had the army with me' (interview with officer 38, 24 June 2014). The fact that the IRA had murdered both a policewoman and a female census worker in the general area where this policewoman was working underlines the high level of threat. The performance of duties in hostile and dangerous settings generated male respect for their female colleagues.

In stable societies the shift in policing philosophy away from a crime fighting model to one which places an emphasis on the importance of community relations work (Murray 2005) has enabled female officers to display their communicative and problem-solving skills. These are skills which value 'care, connection, empathy, and informality' and are part of the 'feminine voice' (Miller 1998, p. 157). They are thought to be skills which are well suited for dealing with citizens who may be 'angry, violent, afraid or depressed' (DeJong 2004, p. 3). For those who prefer a masculine and tough-minded approach to policing such skills are less respected. However, RUC women did not have the same opportunity as policewomen elsewhere to display their 'people' skills as it was simply too dangerous to conduct community relations work where it was most needed, that being in republican areas. Terrorists had taken advantage of the vulnerability of community relations officers—who usually worked on their own—resulting in some being killed. Female officers discussed how, if out on a foot patrol with male colleagues in a republican area (with military support) they would have been exposed to the same vehement anti-RUC abuse. In this sense, the gender of an officer was not a mitigating factor for those who were intensely opposed to the police.

The Troubles created circumstances for RUC men and women which were unlike those experienced by officers in other police forces. Certainly, the experience of officers in the US or the wider UK is not comparable as it did not involve exposure to a protracted terrorist campaign which threatened officers on and off duty. The close contact which created a sense of camaraderie was facilitated both by the long hours officers worked and also the fact that they would often socialise with each other when off duty. These two factors helped build social bonds that bridged the gender gap. The kind of social ties that were capable of developing were suitably discussed by a female Sergeant who had a number of men serving under her in the challenging Cityside of Londonderry.

> We worked all day together, you know it was a 24/7 thing practically, I mean I knew my section better than I knew some of my family… Fellows in my section, I knew their wives, I knew their children, I knew their sisters, I knew their parents, you know, they were just an extension of the family so whenever someone would have come in and said 'Oh the wife's pregnant' we knew, right, 7 months' time there's going to be a new baby. The new baby is going to be an honorary member of the section - part of the family. (Response to questionnaire, officer 29, 15 July 2015)

Perhaps in less violent and threatening circumstances relations between men and women RUC officers may have been less harmonious. This was suggested by a policewoman who said: 'because of the situation we found ourselves in I have no doubt that alliances and allegiances were formed which in normal circumstances would not have existed. We had little option but to get along and look after each other' (response to questionnaire, officer 39, 1 July, 2015). The officer's understanding of 'normal circumstances' relates to societies where policemen and police-women do not confront the threat of a terrorist attack. They are circum-stances where officers do not experience deliberate acts of violence which frequently left police officers either dead or severely injured. Instead, the conflict forced male and female officers to pull together into tight-knit units, which in the interests of operational efficiency, could not afford to be plagued by thorny problems of gender difference. The reality of a for-tified police station, an armoured Land Rover, pervasiveness of weapons and the wearing of body armour created a very masculine environment more akin to military personnel operating in conflict conditions. This experience was shared between male and female officers. Women's will-ingness and capacity to adapt to these militarised facets of policing and their acceptance that they could be killed or severely injured by terrorists in the line of duty, is likely to have encouraged greater male receptiveness of their female counterparts which promoted a spirit of camaraderie.

It is important to gain a proper perspective on gender relations in the RUC as Susan Martin and Nancy Jurik (2007, p. 70) argue that police-women's integration and operational effectiveness: 'challenges men's use of police work as a means of doing masculinity. Men strengthen their gendered identities through doing work that is labeled "masculine" and by fostering an image of their jobs as "men's work".' Helen Benedict (2009) makes the same point with regards to women soldiers in the US army whose presence is interpreted by some males as usurping their war-rior-like image. RUC women had a different experience. The violence of the Troubles prevented policing from being stripped of its masculine character as officers had to be both psychologically resilient and physically tough. Female RUC officers had to demonstrate their ability to adapt to the conditions of a very masculine environment and cope with the serious occupational hazards that police work entailed. In a sense, they underwent a process of masculinisation but this was more at the level of mind-set and depth of character as the institution persisted in its feminine preferences vis-à-vis its female employees. This was evident in women

being unarmed, continuing to wear skirts and having their police number prefixed with 'W' (denoting 'woman'). Women in the RUC adapted admirably to the challenges they confronted and their presence in police sections did not seem to undermine the spirit of camaraderie which was essential to the maintenance of organisational morale in the face of terrorist attacks. That RUC women were killed and injured during the conflict unquestionably earned policewomen the respect of their male colleagues.

Conclusion

This chapter accounts for RUC women's experiences during the Troubles. In some respects women had a different experience to men in the sense that before 1994 they were formally unarmed. However, we noted a few exceptions to this general rule. At an informal level women's familiarity with weapons and their ability to use them was a different matter. Policewomen in the RUC were often shown how to handle a gun by their male colleagues. This was deemed necessary for purposes of policewomen protecting themselves or male colleagues who were injured in a terrorist attack as one participant graphically discussed. Therefore, women's relationship with weapons was more complicated than it might appear. Yet, being formally unarmed kept women from becoming direct targets in a terrorist attack but as we have seen this did not protect female officers from being killed or injured in bomb attacks (the possibility of killing policewomen in a rocket or mortar strike did not deter the IRA from launching an attack). Opinions differed amongst policewomen on the question of carrying firearms and sensible arguments existed both for and against. However, it is likely that male officers would have felt safer had their female colleagues been armed. Despite being unarmed, RUC women patrolled alongside their male colleagues in many dangerous areas in Northern Ireland which is testimony to their courage.

It is important to bear in mind that women officers had a similar experience to policemen. A number of women lost their lives in terrorist attacks and others were badly injured. Similar to male officers, they suffered the psychological scars of conflict which left some struggling with PTSD symptoms. RUC women were required to pay attention to their off-duty safety which involved checking beneath cars for a booby-trap bomb; being careful where they socialised and shopped; restricting their friendship network; and remaining vigilant and cautious at all times. Like their male colleagues, they also experienced emotional loss when an act

of terrorism left a colleague dead or severely injured. Women were a necessary component of the RUC and although the gentler side of policing, they nonetheless demonstrated a resilience which refused to buckle notwithstanding the unremitting pressure of the Troubles. The conflict did not prevent these women joining the police nor did the experience of violence cause them to flee to safer forms of employment.

Lastly, while female officers possessed skills which enabled them to do an admirable job dealing with crimes against women and children, the conflict also demonstrated women's capacity to cope with the dangers and challenges of working in stations located in hard-line areas. Despite the dominance of their masculine environment women officers proved themselves able to gain promotion and give leadership to men not only with regards to normal policing functions but also in relation to counter-terrorist considerations. In other words, those women who participated in the research and who served at the level of Sergeant, Inspector or Superintendent were responsible for keeping the male and female officers who served under them unharmed during the conflict.

References

Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations. *Gender and Society, 4*(2), 139–158.

Allen, W. (1998). Grief as Cancer Kills Brave Alice. *Belfast Telegraph*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/imported/grief-as-cancer-kills-brave-alice-28296449.

Benedict, H. (2009). *The Lonely Soldier*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Brewer, J. (1991). Hercules, Hippolyte and the Amazons—Or Policewomen in the RUC. *British Journal of Sociology, 42*(2), 231–247.

Brown, J., & Reingen, P. (1987). Social Ties and Word-of-Mouth Referral Behavior. *Journal of Consumer Research, 14*(3), 350–362.

Cairns, E., Hunter, D., & Herring, L. (1980). Young Children's Awareness of Violence in Northern Ireland: The Influence of Northern Irish Television in Scotland and Northern Ireland. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19*(1), 3–6.

Cameron, M. (1993). *The Women in Green*. Belfast: RUC Historical Society.

Cohen, S., & Wills, T. (1985). Stress, Social Support, and the Buffering Hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin, 98*(2), 310–357.

De Sousa, A. (2010). Psychological Issues in Acquired Facial Trauma. *Indian Journal of Plastic Surgery, 43*(2), 200–205.

DeJong, C. (2004). Gender Differences in Officer Attitude and Behavior: Providing Comfort to Citizens. *Women & Criminal Justice, 15*(3/4), 1–32.

Finkenauer, C., & Rime, B. (1998). Socially Shared Emotional Experiences Vs. Emotional Experiences Kept Secret: Differential Characteristics and Consequences. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17*(3), 295–318.

Grieve, R., & Williams, A. (1985). Young Children's Perception of Danger. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 3*(4), 385–392.

Harrington, P. (2003). Advice to Women Beginning a Career in Policing. *Women & Criminal Justice, 14*(1), 1–13.

Juni, S. (2016). Survivor Guilt: A Critical Review from the Lens of the Holocaust. *International Review of Victimology, 22*(3), 321–337.

Kurtz, D. (2008). Controlled Burn: The Gendering of Stress and Burnout in Modern Policing. *Feminist Criminology, 3*(3), 216–238.

Lieberman, A., & Van Horn, P. (2008). *Psychotherapy with Infants and Young Children*. New York: Guilford Press.

Lock, J. (2014). *The British Policewoman*. London: Robert Hale.

Macgregor, F. (1990). Facial Disfigurement: Problems and Management of Social Interaction and Implications for Mental Health. *Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, 14*(1), 249–257.

Martin, S. (1999). Police Force or Police Service: Gender and Emotional Labor. *The Annals, 561,* 111–126.

Martin, S., & Jurik, N. (2007). *Doing Justice, Doing Gender: Women in Legal and Criminal Justice Occupations* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.

Melchionne, T. (1967). Current Status and Problems of Women Police. *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 58*(2), 257–260.

Miller, S. (1998). Rocking the Rank and File: Gender Issues and Community Policing. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 14*(2), 156–172.

Murray, J. (2005). Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities? *Police Practice and Research, 6*(4), 347–361.

Rabe-Hemp, C. (2008). Survival in an "all boys club": Policewomen and Their Fight for Acceptance. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 31*(2), 251–270.

Rich, K. (2014). *Interviewing Rape Victims: Practice and Policy Issues in an International Context*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Southwick, S., Bonanno, G., Masten, A., Panter-Brick, C., & Yehuda, R. (2014). Resilience Definitions, Theory, and Challenges: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. *European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 5,* 1–14.

Tenny, E. (1953). Women's Work in Law Enforcement. *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 44*(2), 239–246.

CHAPTER 8

The Experience of Victimhood

This chapter explores the meaning of victimhood from the perspective of those who served the state. It seeks to broaden the analysis from that addressed in Chapter 6 where victimhood relates to officers' physical and psychological injuries. It also extends the understanding of the concept beyond the bereavement felt by the families of murdered officers discussed in Chapter 5. In this respect, there is a correlation between victimhood and a feeling of alienation that is best conceived of as a complicated and problematic emotional condition experienced by individuals (Seeman 1959) but one which can be applied to a group sharing similar characteristics (Southern 2007).

Arguably, the academic discipline of transitional justice in Northern Ireland has neglected the experience of victimhood amongst members of the security forces and is a point which can be contrasted with the in-depth research that has been done on former terrorist prisoners (Shirlow and McEvoy 2008; Shirlow et al. 2010). This is unfortunate not only because such neglect results in a dearth of social science knowledge about the experiences of a particular group in a transitional society, but also because the security forces in Northern Ireland constitute a larger victims' group than that involving terrorist organisations. It should be borne in mind that more members of the security forces were killed and injured during the conflict (thus involving a greater number of security forces-related bereaved families and those with caring responsibilities for injured family members) than were killed and injured as members of terrorist groups. Further, responsibility for causing death during the

conflict rests mainly with terrorist organisations and as a consequence it is ethically necessary to listen to the stories of their victims.

The IRA bears most responsibility for creating victims. On this point Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister (2005, pp. 601–602) comment:

> Republican paramilitaries have been responsible for by far the largest number of deaths - 2,151 by mid-September 2001, or 59 percent of the total. Among the latter, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been the most active republican group, accounting for 1,780 deaths.

In contradistinction, deaths caused by the security forces amount to less than 10% (Hayes and McAllister 2005, p. 602) which can be broken down according to state agency. As such, David McKittrick et al. (1999, p. 1491) report that the RUC was responsible for a mere 1.4% of the killings, which according to Malcolm Sutton's index of deaths, corresponds to 55 deaths.[1] Henry Patterson (2008) states that the low number of deaths caused by the security forces is an unusual occurrence in conflicts of this kind and comments: 'unlike other struggles for national liberation in Africa and Latin America, it was the self-designated 'anti-imperialist' force that killed far more victims of the Troubles than did state forces' (Patterson 2008, p. 230).

In the light of the regularity of terrorist activity over a period of thirty years (involving the deliberate targeting of police officers and other members of the security forces), the percentage of RUC-related killings is a remarkably low figure for the following reasons: firstly, the RUC was heavily-armed in order to combat terrorism and therefore possessed the instruments of lethal force; secondly, its members were in a constant state of alertness due to their exposure to the threat of a terrorist attack occurring in hostile urban and rural environments; thirdly, there was the real danger of intercepting armed terrorists either on their way to commit a crime or making their escape following an attack and who would have preferred to shoot it out with police rather than be arrested. Eamon Collins (1997) writes of the times when, driving fellow armed IRA men, they expressed to him their willingness to shoot officers if they were stopped. The possibility of this occurring added tension to vehicle

---

[1] Malcolm Sutton, available from http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Organisation_Responsible.html.

checkpoints. Fourthly, its more specialist units were frequently involved in counter-terrorist operations; finally, vicious rioting was commonplace and the situation was at times exploited by terrorists to shoot or throw blast bombs at police lines in an attempt to kill officers—thus rendering the police/rioter encounter in Northern Ireland more dangerous when compared to riot situations in other societies. Against this backdrop, the low number of deaths attributable to the RUC points to the professional restraint of its officers and is a fatality figure that does not fit with the image republicans wish to internationalise of the Troubles.

Republicans seek to paint a picture of Northern Ireland as an oppressive state which was backed up by a lethal militarisation of a sectarian police force, but its efforts are undercut by the empirical facts. Had this been the case then it is not only likely that the number of terrorists killed would have been considerably higher—especially those at the higher echelons of the organisation and particularly in the IRA's Army Council—but the general number of RUC-caused deaths higher too as the oppressive state/sectarian police dynamic violently played itself out over the course of 30 years. Rather, the statistics demonstrate that terrorists and not the RUC (and not the security forces in general) were proactive at the level of killing and maiming. This can be observed when the status of those who died during the conflict is considered. Marie Smyth (1998, p. 36) presents statistics which outline the group affiliation of fatal victims and they read as follows: republican paramilitaries 10%; loyalist paramilitaries 3.2%; security forces from Northern Ireland 14.9%; security forces not from Northern Ireland 16.5% (bringing the total percentage of deaths of members of the security forces to over 31%—more than three times higher than the figure for republican terrorists); and civilians 53.5%. Accordingly, Smyth (1998, p. 37) comments:

> Combatants [members of terrorist organisations] directly involved in the armed conflict do not constitute the largest number of percentages of those killed. Civilians, or people who have not been in any armed organisation whatsoever, as well as the security forces, are people who make up the largest proportion of the fatal victims. Again, we can see how unequally victim-hood is distributed according to status in the conflict.

Smyth highlights the unequal experience of victimhood amongst groups: the death toll was higher for civilians and members of the security forces than it was for the perpetrators of violence, namely, the

terrorists. Marie-Therese Fay et al. (1999, p. 160) also make this point adding that 'fatalities amongst paramilitary organisations has been remarkably light.' Difference in the fatality figures (setting to one side the many casualties of terrorist bomb attacks which have inflicted horrendous injury on civilians and members of the security forces alike) draw our attention to a clearly quantifiable hierarchy of victims which serves as a challenge to arguments in favour of demolishing victim hierarchies. Smyth goes on to argue that in the post-agreement period there has been a tendency not to differentiate between victims claiming that this approach is associated with political progress but it is one which she rejects on a number of grounds (Smyth 1998, pp. 34–40). Yet, scholarly opinion differs on this point. Some commentators argue that to incorporate 'blame into the calibration of human suffering results in the morally corrosive language of a "hierarchy of victims"' (McEvoy and McConnachie 2012, p. 527). In making this judgment, the statistics Smyth draws upon and which she considers cannot be sidestepped when it comes to clarifying the meaning of victimhood, are not factored in. The problem with this position, however, is that it facilitates moral avoidance. By downplaying the importance of ascribing blame in relation to those organisations that unquestionably caused the bulk of human suffering, enables its members to escape having to accept moral responsibility for their actions. Smyth (1998, p. 40) points to the damaging social and political effects of this approach claiming that until there is greater acknowledgement by groups of the 'hurts and harms that have been done in their name … the peace process is lopsided, immature, unstable, and the process of reconciliation is impossible'. With the benefit of hindsight it can be said that these comments were prophetic in that, at the time of writing, the question of how best to address the legacy of the conflict, amongst other issues, remains disputed (BBC 2013).

The issue of victimhood has also spilled over into the academic realm with unpleasant outcomes and highlights the contentious nature of the topic. In this context, Aaron Edwards and Cillian McGrattan (2011) take issue with scholars whose research has focused on former terrorist prisoners. They claim that such research accommodates an 'anti-state terrorist critique' which 'reframes the agenda in favour of terrorists and against their victims' (Edwards and McGrattan 2011, p. 371). Whilst those whom they have criticised have replied in acerbic tones (McEvoy and

Shirlow 2013) the issue draws attention to the platform that academic research can afford former terrorists in terms of projecting their explanations for using violence. The point which Edwards and McGrattan make is worth considering as research outputs gain a readership; influence policymakers; and contribute to shaping both national and international opinion on the conflict. If research creates a base upon which former terrorists are able to launch explanatory accounts for their lethal and injurious activities without suitable reference to its effects on victims, then an ethical question does arise. Victims' stories are an appropriate counterbalance to romantic notions of militant ethno-nationalism that often have a seductive quality, which in the case of Northern Ireland, can be capitalised upon by republican dissident groups. The willingness and ability of these groups to kill in the post-settlement period has been demonstrated in multiple attacks on, and a number of murders of, members of the security forces (BBC 2017).

The act of blaming, of course, is an everyday occurrence which reflects a negative evaluation of an individual's conduct on the grounds that it violates moral standards (Alicke 2000). Political conflict increases the occurrence of moral violations as violence is regularly planned and systematically executed by certain groups. Hence it is to be expected that the act of blaming will feature prominently in a transitional society like Northern Ireland which has not dealt with the legacy of its violent past. This chapter explores RUC officers' perspectives on victimhood which is germane to the debate about the legacy of the conflict. Detectable in this perspective is the incorporation of blame into a sense of victimhood. Participants' comments focus on terrorists as perpetrators. Central to this perspective is the uncompelled decision of perpetrators to use violence which designates any claim to victimhood less deserving than those who suffered because of the perpetrators' actions. If perpetrators are to be considered victims then to participants they do not qualify as *innocent* victims. This is an interesting re-conceptualisation of the term victim and is undoubtedly influenced both by the law-and-order role performed by officers during the Troubles and the fact that, as the statistics indicate, the RUC was responsible for only 1.4% of deaths yet lost 300 of its officers. This chapter illustrates how a sense of victimhood is multi-dimensional and identifies developments which have given rise to a mood of alienation amongst officers since the signing of the GFA.

Victimhood: A Contested Concept

Victimhood is a contested concept in Northern Ireland. This is to be expected in a deeply divided society where perspectives on the conflict differ. It is also a sensitive topic which is capable of igniting strong emotions. A significant factor in the continued divisiveness of the concept is due to the governmental and inter-party failure to address effectively the topic early in the transition. Problematically, dealing with the legacy of the Troubles and the issue of victimhood was not addressed in a detailed sense in the GFA and can be contrasted with the lengthy portion devoted to the discussion of, for example, policing (with a view to potential reform). Acknowledgement of victims is mentioned in the Agreement: in the section dealing with *Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity* and under subsection *Reconciliation and Victims of Violence* it states: 'participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation' and that 'victims have a right to remember'. However, nothing was ventured beyond this by way of a detailed definition and as such constituted a weak point in the Agreement. This structural weakness has since been exposed in the acrimonious debate about who qualifies as a genuine victim. Perhaps the reason for the Agreement's impreciseness is the highly contested nature of the topic as it has been reported that some participants during the negotiations did not feel able to make further progress on the issue at that time (Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 2013).

That victimhood is a thorny topic was made clear in Sir Ken Bloomfield's (1998) report *We Will Remember Them*. The report was commissioned in 1997 by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, during the multi-party negotiations. On more than one occasion the report made reference to those who served the state during the conflict referring to the 'special obligation owed by the State to people killed or injured in the course of protecting persons or property' (p. 8) and the 'special responsibility … to address the concerns of those who had been killed or injured in the service of the community' and to this end senior management in the 'armed services, in the police' (p. 16) and other services were consulted during the research phase of the report. However, while the report pointed to the debt society owed to those killed or injured whilst serving the community it did not outline how the state's 'special obligation' and 'special responsibility' might manifest

itself. Arguably, one way in which the state may have recognised the role of the RUC, UDR and British army might have been in working towards a clear cut definition of victimhood, which for members of the security forces, would have made it difficult for terrorists to lay claim to the term.

A definition came eight years later in the form of *The Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006*. The Order interpreted a victim or survivor in a threefold manner: someone who has been physically or psychologically injured during the conflict; an individual who has 'substantial' and 'regular' caring responsibilities for an injured person; or someone left bereaved because of 'a conflict-related incident'. However, the Order's definition makes no distinction between victims and its failure to do so is problematic for RUC officers. They feel that it serves to lump together into a single category, individuals whose role in the conflict was fundamentally different as well as squeezing their relatives—carers for the injured, and the bereaved—into the concept without making a distinction. It is thought that this approach to victimhood generates conceptual ambiguity, which gives rise to the kind of complications in analysis that result in moral confusion. Officers resist most strongly any attempt to establish a moral equivalence between themselves and terrorists.

In contrast to the complications associated with official definitions of victimhood, officers adopt a more straightforward one. A woman officer described her understanding of the term in this way:

> Regarding 'victim', for me as a police officer, it implies someone who has suffered harm (physical or mental) or an injustice. A victim is someone who has had that harm caused to them - not by them. I cannot accept that people who commit various crimes, often creating more victims, are treated as victims themselves. I personally feel that paramilitaries (on both sides) have contributed to their own injuries, by being involved in crimes against the state and the people. That then means a difference with military and police victims, who, while being active in the Troubles, were trying to protect the state and the people from those crimes. (Email response, officer 29, 25 April 2016)

The comment begins by identifying the relationship between victimhood and the experience of harm, although having been harmed is not of itself a justifying factor in claiming victimhood. Rather, a strict qualification is established which creates a dichotomy between those who are to be regarded as victims and those who are not. To qualify as a victim

is dependent upon the part that an individual played in the conflict. Simply 'being active' during the Troubles does not result in an equivalence when it comes to claiming victimhood, in other words, it does not constitute a common denominator between groups on the basis of which victimhood can be conferred. The protective role performed by the security forces whose job it was to safeguard 'the people' as well as protect themselves from terrorist attack is contrasted with the harmdoing activity of paramilitaries. The contrast allows for a moral distinction to be made between those belonging to the law-enforcing/law-abiding category and a law-breaking group which is intent on causing harm. The Manichean-like standpoint is unaffected by ideological differences between the law-breakers, namely, that one is loyalist and pro-state (Bruce 1992) and the other republican and anti-state. Paramilitary violence renders loyalists and republicans equally deserving of condemnation as harmdoers.

The role of choice in the use of violence figured prominently in officers' responses to questions about victimhood and acted as a criterion by which to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate claims. The following comment is a neat expression of officers' feelings:

> Former terrorists were by choice terrorists. If they are victims then it was by choice. They could be terrorists and not be known as such in public, police officers were in uniform and easily identified as police officers. There are many other civilians who are victims of the conflict who were maimed physically and mentally without a choice. Many civilians lost their lives and the families had the grief and in some cases the hardship thereafter financially and being left alone to bring up a family. They had no choice in becoming a victim it just happened to them whereas the terrorist had a choice. (Response to questionnaire, officer 40, 4 April 2017)

It is a measure of the importance of choice in the debate about victimhood that the participant refers to the idea five times. The comment is premised on an uncomplicated question which structures the officer's moral calculus: if given the option, who would choose to become a victim? Arguably, this question is not given the thorough consideration it deserves when victimhood is discussed. Yet the obviousness of the answer ought to generate increased inquiry into the role of the perpetrator in an act which results in a person becoming a victim. Certainly, with regards to the security forces, a lack of material documenting the impact of terrorism on police and army victims has stifled the inquiry.

Victim or Survivor?: Officers' Viewpoints

The Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 was aptly chosen. It draws our attention to the alternative ways that those who suffered during the conflict see themselves and also how they wish to be seen by others—some view themselves as victims whilst others prefer the term survivor. This difference in self-perception and conceptual preference emerged when researching the topic with participants. While for some individuals self-labelling reflected a simple choice of terminology, for others it was an altogether different matter. The following comment was made by an officer who was discharged from the police because of conflict-related psychological stress and points to an important distinction between both concepts:

> I consider myself a survivor rather than a victim because I think that word victim gives credence to terrorists that they, the terrorists, have overcome and broken our spirits, defeated us even though they didn't kill us as intended. There's a certain kind of lightness and progressiveness in the word survivor. The word victim to me spells darkness! Especially now whenever IRA members are victims, nail in the coffin for me that. Survivor is bravery, courageous, not being absent from fear but triumphing over fear daily as we have to meet the people who tried to kill us. I think personally the word victim has been exploited and overgeneralised. (Email response, officer 25, 31 January 2017)

This quotation tells us of the functional value of the term survivor to the psychological coping strategy adopted by the officer. On this note, Nadim Almoshmosh (2016, p. 54) discusses the importance of an individual utilising personal resources when it comes to managing 'their own mental conditions' and developing their 'own problem-solving skills'. This approach to trauma self-management is observable in the officer's choice of the term survivor because it conveys defiance. The concept survivor is associated with the refusal to cave into terrorism regardless of the hardship it is capable of inflicting. It is linked to personal resilience and is identified as a psychological disposition which is useful to those officers who, as a consequence of living in religiously mixed areas in the west of the province, may come into regular contact with former terrorists. These are individuals who may once have attempted to harm officers during the Troubles. This is, of course, an

unsavoury feature of ethnic conflict that requires emotional adjustment in the post-settlement period. In contrast, the officer rejects the term victim for two reasons: firstly, because of its conceptual association with defeatism—to conceive of oneself as a victim is to recognise that, to some degree, terrorists achieved their goal. In this sense, the term victim is disempowering, which Huma Saeed (2016, p. 172) in her study of victimhood in Afghanistan claims is 'insulting [to some victims] and denies them agency'. Secondly, rejection of the term victim is based on the opinion that it has become contaminated as a result of former terrorists claiming to be victims also. This, as the officer puts it, was the 'nail in the coffin' as it has become a catch-all term which is incapable of moral differentiation. The officer's resentment of the use of the term victim by those once engaged in unlawful violence points to a conceptual battleground that exists in post-agreement Northern Ireland. This is often portrayed as a contest between ethnic groups (MacGinty and Du Toit 2007) but it is one that also involves members of the security forces who seek to prevent what they consider to be the misappropriation of the term victim by those who were responsible for inflicting harm through acts of terrorism.

The effects of former terrorists successfully appropriating the term victim were of concern to officers. Similarly, the preference amongst some officers for the term survivor instead of victim generated concern too as it is considered to pose a threat to an accurate understanding of the nature of the Northern Ireland conflict:

> To say that I as a police officer am a survivor, whereas the IRA member who killed is a victim to me turns everything upside down. Survivors, to me, are those who survived an accident, a disaster. Therefore I feel the word victim best suits the scenarios many officers faced more comfortably as these were no accidents. (Response to questionnaire, officer 41, 4 April 2017)

According to this comment, the rejection of the term victim in favour of survivor gives rise to a topsy-turvy representation of the conflict. It would seem that by officers choosing not to refer to themselves as victims it unwittingly affords a competitive advantage to terrorists in their effort to ensure that the least negative picture is painted of their conduct during the Troubles. An interesting distinction is made between victim

and survivor. The officer equates the concept survivor with accidental (natural or otherwise) misfortune where there was no human intent to commit wrongdoing. This is contrasted with the deliberateness of terrorist attacks which 'were no accidents' and where the objective was to cause harm. Given the injurious and deadly nature of the IRA's campaign, the decision to describe oneself as a survivor might downplay the trauma that was experienced by many officers. On this point another said: 'Victim quite rightly describes the trauma one went through. Survivor only suggests making it through without scar physical or mental' (response to questionnaire, officer 42, 4 April 2017).

Yet, survivor was the term favoured by other officers not because of its 'lightness' or 'progressiveness' as the participant above put it, but because it is considered to be more suitable given what befell colleagues:

> I have been a victim in that I have physical and psychological injuries, but I do prefer to view myself as a survivor. So many of my colleagues did not survive along with thousands of other victims. I have the privilege of surviving and I am so thankful to be alive, something that was denied all of those whose lives were terminated so cruelly as a result of terrorist attacks. (Response to questionnaire, officer 43, 4 April 2017)

In the same vein another officer commented:

> I suppose I am a survivor. I am still here to walk this Earth, whilst … 300 police officers who are not survivors and who can't work this Earth. I am a survivor in that I am still alive to tell the story, many, many are not. (Response to questionnaire, officer 44, 4 April 2017)

These comments inform us of the grim measure that is available when determining who qualifies as a victim. It is a term that is primarily reserved for those officers who were killed at the hands of terrorists. That usage of this measure can be multiplied—'300 police officers'—is clearly a lamentable fact but its tragic nature has resulted more in a life-affirming disposition than manifest itself in the kind of emotional debilitation associated with the guilt of having survived whilst others did not (Lifton and Olson 1976). This is not to suggest that some officers have not experienced what is referred to as survivor guilt. During interview, an officer discussed the guilt felt by her RUC brother who,

although injured, had survived an IRA gun attack in 1974 which killed an 8 month pregnant mother in Londonderry. A high velocity bullet struck the officer in the arm but passed through it hitting the woman in the head. The woman's five-year-old son and his younger sister were present in the car and witnessed the tragedy. The incident was one which the officer's brother is unable to speak about because of survivor guilt. While the terrorist is *solely* responsible for the young mother's death by carrying out the attack, the officer suffers what Samuel Juni (2016, p. 322) refers to as '*non-culpable guilt*'. This is to be understood in terms of the policeman not being culpable but nonetheless being deeply troubled psychologically because his uniformed presence in the area contributed to creating a context within which a gun attack could occur.

Exploration of officers' perceptions of the victim and survivor labels reveals significant reasons as to why one is preferred to the other. For some, the term survivor is used as a statement of defiance and to indicate that they remain unsubdued by terrorism. It reflects a grittiness of character, which while key to individuals pursuing their ambitions and achieving their goals in life (Duckworth et al. 2007), is also indispensable to coping with the negative challenges victims of terrorism encounter. To others, survivor is preferred because it is thought that the term victim ought to be used when referring to those colleagues who lost their lives in the conflict. Detectable in this outlook is a sense of simply being grateful that one has survived. On the other hand, there are doubts about the term survivor if its usage results in an inaccurate portrayal of the groups involved in the conflict. According to this opinion, by saying that one is a survivor instead of a victim presents an ineffective challenge to the terrorists' claim of victimhood and may, in fact, be a concept that unintentionally diminishes the actual sacrifice of RUC officers which is deserving of victim status. The responses of participants illustrate the conceptual battlefield that exists in contemporary Northern Ireland both in terms of the meaning of victimhood as well as which group has the right to lay claim to it. For officers, the association of the concept victim with an individual who was involved in terrorist activity is highly contestable. Let us consider other areas which have generated a sense of victimhood and a feeling of alienation.

Dealing with the Past: Eames/Bradley

In 2009 The Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) announced its recommendations on how Northern Ireland ought to address the legacy of the Troubles. The CGP began its work in 2007 and explored with individuals and organisations belonging to both communities how a shared—post-sectarian—future might be built. The report was eagerly awaited and confidence in the CGP's work was increased amongst members of the unionist community because of the participation of Archbishop Robin Eames. As the leader of the Church of Ireland, Archbishop Eames was a prominent and much respected figure in the Protestant community. However, a blend of consternation and anger immediately spread amongst some unionist attendees at the report's launch when its authors recommended that a payment of £12,000 be made to the nearest relative of *all* those who died during the conflict as a recognition of victimhood.

Despite the fact that some individuals died whilst engaging in terrorist activities and others were killed whilst serving the state (and civilians with no active role being the largest category), the report made no moral distinction in terms of the payment to the nearest relative. By way of example, the recommendation would have meant this in practice: the qualifying relative of IRA man Thomas Begley whose bomb killed 9 Protestants (two of whom were children) along with himself when it exploded prematurely on the Shankill Road in 1993 would receive the same payment as the closet relatives of the children who died. Unionists viewed this suggestion as preposterous and it was rejected by the Northern Ireland Secretary of State. It appeared as an absurd interpretation and application of the GFA's principle of parity of esteem to the context of victimhood. By not differentiating between victims the recommendation was considered to imply moral equivalence between victims and perpetrators and was strongly resisted.

Moral equivalence is a problematic idea because it suggests that there are no 'good guys' and no 'bad guys' in a conflict just competing factions (Rieff 1995, p. 152). A concept which accompanies this kind of outlook is that of 'combatant' which is favoured by some commentators on the Northern Ireland conflict. A concept such as 'non-state combatant' is employed in the service of objectivity and is a conceptual effort to

display a kind of even-handedness which is uncomfortable with the idea of academic analysis being judgmental. This approach is understandable as the pursuit of objectivity has long been a preoccupation in academia as well as the influential field of journalism (Muñoz-Torres 2012). However, these concepts fail to make a moral distinction between, in this case, police officers and terrorists and as such offer no resistance to the idea of moral equivalence. This is fine if scholars feel that no moral distinction ought to be made between the RUC and a terrorist group like the IRA but it is an analytical premise firmly rejected in this piece of work. A refusal conceptually to differentiate ignores or bypasses the reality of the quantitative statistics which indisputably identify republican organisations (and the IRA in particular) as those responsible for the most conflict-related deaths compared to the very low number attributed to the police. An instructive argument against the use of the term combatant has been presented by Wesley Clark and Kal Raustiala (2007) who are critical of the Bush administration in its labelling of Al Qaeda terrorists as 'unlawful combatants'. These commentators make a point that is applicable to other conflicts where terrorism features:

> By treating such terrorists as combatants, however, we accord them a mark of respect and dignify their acts…. Labeling its members as combatants elevates its cause and gives Al Qaeda an undeserved status. If we are to defeat terrorists across the globe, we must do everything possible to deny legitimacy to their aims and means, and gain legitimacy for ourselves.

Terrorists, whether of the Islamic or Northern Irish variety, crave legitimacy. However, the attempt to gain legitimacy is hampered by terrorists' violent methodology. So, concepts should not be used which may afford terrorists a degree of legitimacy that their brutal actions actually deny them. Neither should the idea of moral equivalence be treated without a degree of caution as its tendency not to differentiate in a conflict between 'good guys' and 'bad guys' fails to distinguish between groups which clearly bear a greater degree of responsibility for causing human suffering than others. With these points in mind, how did officers respond to the Eames/Bradley report?

The following comment conveys an officer's distaste of the report:

> I consigned that report to the trash bin. If I had been the nearest relative to a murdered police officer, and that is possible, as I had both a younger

brother and an older brother who were serving police officers … I personally would have had nothing to do with this blood money or pieces of silver. To have to know that this same money was being given to [the family of] terrorists who had been legitimately killed by the security forces who had just intercepted such terrorists after they had killed my brother, it makes a mockery of the situation. No, I would not accept such money as I would be accepting that the terrorist killed was on an equal moral and legal footing to my law abiding brother. This has to be on a par with the lunatics are running the asylum. (Response to questionnaire, officer 44, 4 April 2017)

The officer uses a hypothetical situation to expose what he regards as the moral flaws—the faulty ethical scaffolding—in the report's approach to recognising victimhood. By excluding a calculation based upon an individual's actions, the payment is considered to elevate the status of the terrorist which has an unfair outcome for the family of a policeman or woman. The reference to the payment as 'blood money or pieces of silver' points to a sense of betrayal in terms of the family of a killed terrorist receiving equal recognition to that of a murdered police officer. Similar sentiments of disapproval were expressed by another officer who is baffled as to why republicans and loyalists were included in the category of victim:

While I can understand how two decent, intelligent men could come to the general conclusion I am at an utter loss to comprehend how they failed to exclude persons, whether IRA or UVF, who were killed as a result of their own actions. If a member of a proscribed organisation had been targeted and assassinated while engaged in normal, peaceful and lawful activity I could have, perhaps, understood their inclusion. However, to include someone killed while planting a bomb or engaged in a terrorist attack beggars belief and, in my opinion, doomed the Eames/Bradley Report immediately. (Response to questionnaire, officer 45, 4 April 2017)

Determining the rights of a family in the case of a killed terrorist is not without its complications. Clearly, the authors of the report felt that terrorists' families had rights also payment-wise. But, for officers, this is contentious:

We are talking about the family of a terrorist by choice being compensated. The family may not have been aware in some cases but plenty knew of the involvement in terrorism. The recommendation was making the terrorist

equal to that of a police officer and it demeans the life of the officer who was killed. (Response to questionnaire, officer 40, 4 April 2017)

The officer considers it unethical to compensate a family which had knowledge that one of its members belonged to a terrorist group. While some families may not have known that, for example, a son or husband was a member of a terrorist organisation it is undoubtedly the case that many possessed such knowledge especially those families with a republican tradition. Ethno-national terrorism has a strong communal base and it is likely that the wider community knew who had membership of a terrorist group never mind an individual's family. Local communities, where there are high levels of terrorist activity, tend to be close-knit and are propped up by a number of families who are ideologically wedded to the cause. In such settings radicalisation is nurtured and part of a family's tradition, and if it is not, then there are often plenty of communal and peer group influences that can assist an individual in his or her decision to become a terrorist. Either way, the probability is high that many families knew one of their own was a member of a terrorist organisation. For the officer, this amounts to complicity and qualifies as collective guilt. Guilt is best observed from the angle that families may have possessed information, which had it been passed to the security forces—in the sense of an anonymous tip off about a pending attack—could have saved lives. This is the seriousness of the backdrop against which the officer's perspective needs to be viewed. Holding families to account for terrorist actions carried out by one of its members is a feature of Israel's counter-terrorist policy (Merari 2005) but not that of the British state. Referred to as 'collective punishment' Israel has a record of demolishing the homes of Palestinian suicide bombers and is a punitive measure used by the state as far back as 1967 following the Six Day War (Darcy 2003). In comparison, the officer's comment suggests that the families of terrorists should be subject to a mild form of collective punishment in the sense that they should be denied payment of the victims' award. However, it would be difficult to advance the officer's point at a policy level as it is impossible to determine the amount of knowledge families may have possessed.

Some officers were blunter in their approach to the families of terrorists: 'No relative of a terrorist should receive compensation. These men and women who involved themselves in terrorism waive all rights to

being treated as any kind of innocent victim' (response to questionnaire, officer 41, 4 April 2017). The term 'innocent victim' carves out a conceptual space within the wide sphere of victimhood which corresponds in meaning to the next quote where an officer wishes to create a similar space by referring to the 'real victims' of the Northern Ireland conflict:

> This would have been yet another slap in the face of the real victims of terrorism, and given the terrorist parity with the families of those murdered. Where would the justice or morality be in such a poorly thought out sop to terrorists? (Response to questionnaire officer 43, 4 April 2017)

For this officer, the Eames/Bradley proposal is devoid of justice and is morally hollow because it does not make a qualitative distinction between both categories of family. When attempting to understand officers' strong feelings about this topic it is useful to consider how this type of suggestion might be responded to in other contexts. For example, how might US soldiers respond to a recommendation that the closest relative of killed al-Qaeda operatives receive a payment in recognition of victimhood? What might the response be of Israeli soldiers to a recognition payment being made to the widows of Hamas suicide bombers? Might there be disquiet amongst the ranks of the Spanish police should a proposal of this kind emerge vis-à-vis the relatives of terrorists belonging to ETA? It is highly likely that any such proposal would be firmly resisted and that the response of RUC officers would be typical of the security forces in other countries. It was the duty of the security forces in Northern Ireland to combat terrorism and thus they generally had a different experience both of its threats and effects than most members of the public (with the exception of those caught up in a terrorist attack). Therefore, hard-line attitudes are to be expected.

These comments provide us with insight into the attitudes of RUC officers towards a major proposal that was intended to address the legacy of the Northern Ireland conflict and promote reconciliation. In 2012 Archbishop Eames spoke at a service in St. Anne's Cathedral to mark the 90th anniversary of the RUC's formation and said that the 'place of the RUC GC in the history of Northern Ireland is assured as our society has moved forward, even as we continue to see the scars so many lives still carry' (*Belfast Telegraph* 2012). Arguably, by 2012 the Archbishop was

able to gauge better the depth of these scars than he was in 2009 when he and Denis Bradley recommended the payment to those regarded as victims. This section adds a qualitative dimension—based upon the perspective of members of the police—to the spectrum of critics of the Eames/Bradley report.

Release of Prisoners

As Michael Von Tangen Page (2006) notes, the release from prison of those convicted of terrorist offences was a particularly unpalatable aspect of the GFA. Although unpleasant, Northern Ireland was not unique in this respect as a number of countries similarly affected by terrorism have had to confront this issue (McEvoy 1998). Neither was the GFA the only occasion when the question of what to do with political prisoners was raised but rather constitutes a key feature of earlier periods dating back to the formation of the Northern Ireland state (Baber 1998). The signing of the Agreement was followed soon afterwards by the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. The Act allowed for the appointment of Sentence Review Commissioners who subjected prisoner applications for release to a risk assessment (Dwyer 2007). Basically, with the arrangements for release legislatively in place, the qualifying factor was membership of a terrorist organisation whose political wing had signed up to the peace agreement. The architecture of a peace agreement, however, is the work of politicians and not police officers or other members of the security forces. As such, we have little qualitative insight into the views of those who were at the coalface of combating terrorism over the course of many years. Given that it was police officers whose job it was to obtain the evidence by which to convict terrorists, coupled with the terrorists' deliberate targeting of officers, the issue of prisoner release invites inquiry. So, how do officers feel about this part of the Agreement?

An officer who worked in CID referred to the prisoner release scheme as an act of governmental betrayal:

> I served in CID for 20 years and spent most of my time in the pursuit of terrorists, sometimes spending 15-18 hours daily in doing so, missing out on family life and seeing my children grow up. The Good Friday Agreement betrayed the people of Northern Ireland and did them a grave disservice. I felt betrayed and let down by my government. I was at the sharp end of things; and the consequences of the previous actions

of a large number of those released saw me having to wade through the carnage wrought and the grief brought. I now see some of these people strutting about my local town. What can bereaved families think when they witness what I see? (Response to questionnaire, officer 46, 4 April 2017)

The officer interprets this part of the Agreement as unjust. He refers to himself as having been at the 'sharp end of things' and someone who has witnessed the tragic 'consequences' of terrorist attacks. His experience of the conflict differs to most members of the general public in that his job demanded that he 'wade through the carnage' which terrorism causes. This is true because terrorists, unlike RUC officers and soldiers (and members of the emergency services) did not attend the scene following an attack and so did not experience its immediate aftereffects. In the case of IRA bomb blasts where civilians were killed or severely injured, terrorists shielded themselves emotionally from the direct aftermath as they quickly left the area once their bomb had been planted. This is a technique which helps psychologically to safeguard terrorists against the consequential horrors of their actions, thereby making it easier for them to remain committed to the cause. This is important to terrorists as it is likely their campaign will result in further atrocities. While Albert Bandura (2004) provides an interesting account of the psychological mechanisms which explain the moral disengagement of individuals in acts of terrorism, the simple social process by which it is ensured that one does not experience the immediate brutality of, say, an explosion should not go unrecognised as a contributing factor which enables terrorists to commit repetitious harmdoing. The terrorist, similar to members of the general public, gain only a second-hand and sanitised knowledge of the effects of an explosion and that follows the release of an official statement outlining the number killed and injured. This works well for terrorist groups as it is likely to help minimise remorse (at least for some members of an organisation who are susceptible to this emotion). It is the misfortune of police officers (and other first response units) to witness first-hand the devastation of an attack as they identify the dead and assist the injured. The officer who made the above comment finds it challenging to accept that terrorists who may have committed heinous crimes are entitled to early release because of a political deal. That some of the former prisoners should be 'strutting around' the officer's 'local town' conveys the close proximity of some perpetrators and victims in Northern Ireland. That they do so makes matters more difficult

and leads him to consider its effects at a vicarious level in terms of the feelings of those whom the terrorists have left bereaved.

The injustice of releasing prisoners was described by another officer in this way:

> This was a slap in the face of the innocent victims and for the security forces in Northern Ireland and sent out a clear message to terrorists that Britain was a soft touch. I have spoken to families of murdered members of the RUC and they are totally disgusted and wonder what their sons/daughters died for. (Response to questionnaire, officer 47, 4 April 2017)

This comment is critical of the negotiating line adopted by the British government which is considered to have been a pushover when it came to handling the prisoner issue. Certainly, as Daniel Mulvihill (2001) points out, the GFA's release scheme made no demands on prisoners that they demonstrate remorse for the harm they caused victims or that they denounce their membership of their organisations. Rather, victims and their families 'must sit by and watch the prisoners enjoy their freedom' (Mulvihill 2001, p. 253) and endure, what to them, does not seem like a just outcome. The officer's comment is sensitive, in particular, to the parental perspective: the release of prisoners is appalling to the mothers and fathers of RUC men and women who were killed during the conflict. He considers it difficult to reconcile morally the loss of a son or daughter who died in the service of the state with the early release of prisoners. In saying that it was a 'slap in the face' to innocent victims and families who were affected in this way, suggests that they regarded the scheme as an insult. The same can be said of the families of severely injured officers who undoubtedly harboured similar feelings of resentment when able-bodied prisoners walked out of jail to the applause of their supporters. Indeed, it was a common response from officers that those imprisoned for terrorist offences ought to have served their sentence as typified in the following comment: 'Those convicted should complete their sentence, there should be no parole or early release. The real victims get no early release' (response to questionnaire, officer 48, 4 April 2017). It is worth noting that opposition was mounted in the Republic of Ireland to the release of republican prisoners who had killed members of the Garda during the conflict (Von Tangen Page 1998, p. 80).

Yet, some officers were willing to accept that conflict resolution involves a degree of compromise. Compromise in deeply divided societies, however, is likely to be painful. This has proven to be the case in Northern Ireland. The next comment illustrates how the preference for the rule of law to be upheld in terms of prisoners serving their full sentence, can be tempered by a pragmatic recognition that some ground may have to be conceded in order to secure peace. This is a challenging perspective for officers to adopt because they have been professionally trained to think legally and not politically about addressing problems of illegality:

> My instinctive reaction says that they should have served their full terms out as they were legally convicted and sentenced. If, however, this was a game breaker, I can understand why this came about. However, it should have been made dependent on their organisation revealing the locations of the bodies of the 'Disappeared' prior to prisoners being released. (Response to questionnaire, officer 45, 4 April 2017)

While the comment acknowledges the need for pragmatism it nonetheless makes the release of prisoners conditional on information being made available to the authorities as to the 'bodies of the "Disappeared"'. This became a burning issue following the GFA. It concerned those who had been killed by republicans (mostly by the IRA) and buried in secret graves and the right of their families to have the remains of their loved ones returned to them. The abduction which received the most attention was that of widowed mother of 10, Jean McConville. In 1972 she was dragged from her home in front of her petrified children by members of the IRA wearing balaclavas and later murdered. Under sustained pressure, the IRA eventually admitted to the murder but insisted that she had been an informer for the British army—this claim was discredited following an investigation by the Police Ombudsman (*Guardian* 2014). The Ombudsman's report speculated that the woman had been murdered because she had offered humanitarian assistance to a British soldier who had been injured in an IRA attack near her home (Police Ombudsman 2006). In 2006 Gerry Adams accepted that the IRA's treatment of the bodies of those who had been abducted and killed had been wrong (BBC 2006). That the families may consider this to be a shallow recognition of wrongdoing would be understandable given that

it was made eight years after the GFA. Had disclosure of the graves of the Disappeared been linked to the release of prisoners, as the officer suggests, then it is likely the remains of the families' loved ones would have been returned to them much sooner. Of course, the release of prisoners could have been made conditional to progress being made on the decommissioning of terrorist weaponry and this may well have been a sensible option in the light of the political mess which the issue caused. Alternatively, as another officer suggested: 'The terms of their release should have been on very strict and provisional terms. They should have been asked to reveal in some way the part they played in the conflict' (response to questionnaire, officer 49, 4 April 2017) and, in so doing, truth would have at least accompanied the victimhood experienced by police officers and police families.

Clearly, officers hold views which are critical of the prisoner release scheme. A political settlement allowed hardened terrorists to walk free within a two-year period of the Agreement without any requirement to provide information as to their past deeds or as part of a structured approach to the decommissioning of illegal weaponry. Why the British government, in particular, did not make more of the prisoner release scheme as an opportunity to press the IRA (and other groups) to destroy its weapons is a question worth asking. It seems that Prime Minister Tony Blair was more prepared to allow terrorists to dictate the terms of the Agreement than to exercise authority over the more controversial parts of a peace process. This had the potential to inflict a deep sense of alienation amongst members of the security forces who systematically suffered at the hands of republican terrorists as well as the peaceful majority in both communities. For officers, the GFA's accommodation of prisoner release is not its most noble feature and it is unlikely that they would recommend it to the international community as a prime example of morally well-founded peacebuilding practice.

Political Abandonment

The GFA brought to an end the bulk of terrorist violence but the province remains ethnically fractured with sectarian attitudes still in place (MacGinty et al. 2007). It has been argued that a sense of alienation, multifaceted in character, has developed in the Protestant-unionist community (Southern 2007) and there is little indication that it has abated. The political structures designed to facilitate a new era based

on inter-ethnic power sharing have frequently been plagued with problems to the point that the Stormont Assembly has been suspended on a number of occasions. The ill-at-ease nature of Northern Irish society is reflected in the attitudes of RUC officers who are of the opinion that Sinn Fein, as the political wing of the IRA (Richards 2001), is using its position in the Stormont Assembly to advance an aggressive agenda intent on re-writing the history of the Troubles. This would be a version of history which portrays the IRA as a liberation organisation whose violence was justified. To achieve this goal requires that Sinn Fein sully the reputation of the RUC, UDR and British army. This is a new battlefront that has opened up in the post-settlement period and was not anticipated when the GFA was signed and voted on in the referendum.

Victimhood has moral capital and serves the needs of an ethnic community in a number of ways (Ferguson et al. 2010) but there are, of course, political advantages to be gained should republicans be successful so, in this respect, their efforts to seek legitimacy for their past violence are understandable. Sinn Fein is motivated to win more nationalist votes and eclipse its competition in the form of the SDLP but it is also keen to be warmly accepted at a European and broader international level. To achieve this, the party's reputation, which can be affected by its historical record, is a matter of significance. Thus, Sinn Fein's adoption of the 'Armalite and ballot box' strategy in 1981 (Hannigan 1985) is vulnerable to a tarnished party image if assessed by its violent effects on a range of victims whenever, as the strategy itself confirms, there was an exclusively political option available. The refusal to accept the *non-violent* political option raises serious questions about the morality of republican violence. While the nationalist community had, since the creation of the Northern Ireland state, the opportunity to contest and participate in British parliamentary elections, the electoral success of Bobby Sands in 1981 and Gerry Adams in 1983 confirmed that Sinn Fein had the potential to gain considerable nationalist support—yet it was decided to continue with terrorism. To utilise Michael Walzer's (1988) critique of the excuses offered to justify terrorism, republicans were not driven to terrorism as a 'last resort' nor did they use it in response to a 'supreme emergency', for example, a perilous existential threat that could not go unaddressed. The 'supreme emergency' excuse is, of course, inconsistent with the IRA's 'long war' strategy (O'Brien 1995) as this is an offensive approach to militancy based on careful planning and victim selection using comprehensive criteria which renders a variety of Protestants (and

some Roman Catholics) 'legitimate' targets. If the families or friends of these 'legitimate' targets happen to be killed or injured in, for instance, an off-duty attack, then so be it.

What is interesting about officers' views on Sinn Fein's efforts is that they are being performed largely without the opposition of unionist politicians. Accordingly, officers feel somewhat abandoned by elected representatives who are pro-Union as these two officers' comments indicate:

> Unionist politicians have done little or nothing to defend the reputation of the RUC! Like Nero, they seem content to 'fiddle while Rome burns'. Every lie, half-truth or innuendo uttered about the RUC should have been countered immediately and in the strongest possible terms. By failing to do so they have allowed the seed of doubt to sprout and flourish to such an extent that RUC officers are constantly defending their honour and integrity rather than the terrorists. (Response to questionnaire, officer 45, 4 April 2017)

> There is much more that they could be doing, not only for the RUC but the military as well. There is a concerted campaign by Sinn Fein to rewrite history and deflect blame for so many deaths by blaming the security forces. (Response to questionnaire, officer 43, 4 April 2017)

Another officer also pointed to the historical consequences of not ensuring that the Troubles are documented accurately and fairly. However, it was recognised that politicians need to win votes and that the electoral climate in Northern Ireland had shifted. Younger members of the unionist community are thought to be disinterested in the conflict and would perhaps be put off voting for a party which regularly refers to it:

> Some do, but they are few and far between. Are there votes in raking up the past? Maybe, maybe not. A lot of the younger voters in our province don't want to be constantly reminded of the past or the Troubles, they want to look to the future, to prosperity, to jobs, to wealth, to well being. It's a fine balance, but I do believe our politicians need to be involved in defending the reputation of the RUC, even if it is just to ensure that history is written 'PROPERLY'. (Response to questionnaire, officer 44, 4 April 2017)

While the capacity of western societies to display evidence of a shift in political values has been noted (Inglehart 1977), whether a post-conflict intergenerational shift of any electoral significance has occurred in the political values of members of the unionist community is a matter

of debate. It is much more likely that, as a deeply divided society, voter preference in Northern Ireland will continue to be dictated by the power of ethnicity (Horowitz 1985). Younger unionist voters may well prefer not to hear about the violence of the past but this does not seem to damage the popularity of Sinn Fein who markets itself successfully amongst younger nationalists despite the party's anchorage in legacy issues and its support for inquiries into the actions of the security forces during the Troubles. Certainly any unionist attitudinal shift would likely be re-calibrated in the case of a referendum on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland where the issue to be decided is straightforward and presented using the kind of uncomplicated wording which would ethnically focus the mind. The point in the officer's comment, which is consistent with the opinion of his colleagues, is the importance of history being recorded in a way which does justice to the efforts of the RUC.

A cynical interpretation of the behaviour of unionist politicians during the conflict and afterwards also figured in officers' responses: 'Politicians only care about the RUC and the plight of victims and survivors when they need votes. They care not about the plight and will gladly wash their hands of us' (response to questionnaire, officer 42, 4 April 2017) whilst another said:

> Unionist politicians do not see that there is anything to be gained by defending the RUC now that they no longer exist. When the RUC were being murdered it was good publicity for politicians to be seen at RUC funerals swearing unending support for the police. (Response to questionnaire, officer 47, 4 April 2017)

Another officer said that unionist politicians 'Could do more. But most of them seem to be focused entirely on their own careers. Not many speak out to defend the reputation of the RUC GC' (response to questionnaire, officer 50, 4 April 2017).

That unionist politicians, who were elected during the Troubles, should be motivated to defend the RUC out of a sense of gratitude is evident in the next quotation:

> Unionist politicians, they could and should be doing more to defend the reputation of the RUC. They seem to have forgot that a number of them have the RUC to thank for keeping them safe and well, as well as their families being guarded night and day whilst no one was guarding my family or my home. (Response to questionnaire, officer 51, 4 April 2017)

Unionist politicians (and others) received 24 hour protection during the conflict and the work of the RUC in this area was essential: politicians' homes were guarded and when travelling they were accompanied by officers in the personal protection unit who had been well-trained in counter-ambush techniques. Protection normally took the form of two officers working across a three 8 hour shift pattern. A pertinent example of the potential threat which existed to IRA targets who did not receive protection was the attack on the Head of the Civil Service in Northern Ireland, Ken Bloomfield. In 1988 an IRA unit placed four bombs at the front, rear and both sides of his home whilst he, his wife and teenage son were asleep upstairs (*News Letter* 2015). The intention was to demolish the house with Sir Bloomfield (and his family) in it but as a fortuitous consequence of only two of the bombs exploding, the house did not collapse and the Bloomfield family survived. In contrast, the homes of RUC men and women, as discussed earlier, were unprotected and vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The officer considers the security role that many of his colleagues performed to be deserving of recognition and that unionist politicians should be moved to offer greater defence of the service of officers during the Troubles.

The post-settlement relationship between members of the security forces and politicians is not always a good one. Interestingly, in his discussion of the work of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Hermann Giliomee (2003) refers to the tension which developed between the security forces and the National Party. Giliomee describes how some members of the security forces who testified before the Commission felt that their political representatives had deserted them. The unwillingness of politicians to mount a defence on behalf of its security forces caused ranker as successive National Party governments ultimately had control of the state's security policy. Of course, Northern Ireland, as a functioning liberal democracy, was certainly not an apartheid state. The recommendations of the Hunt Report of 1969 weakened the relationship between the unionist government and the RUC and the police were further distanced from political control as a result of the imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster in 1972. The RUC (and security forces more broadly) were held to account for their actions in a way the South African police force and army were not and so the reference relates purely to an empirical observation of post-agreement fraying occurring in the relationship between two parts of the state. However, the South African and Northern Ireland examples tell us that

in transitional societies the relationship between the security forces and the politicians can deteriorate as the former consider themselves to be abandoned by the latter whose priorities in a significantly altered political milieu have shifted. The remarks of officers also inform us that they expect more from unionist politicians if the currently dominant republican narrative (which seeks to demonise the RUC for political reasons mentioned above) is to be prevented from becoming the exclusive account of the conflict.

The Patten Report

The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland was established under the terms of the GFA in 1998. The Commission was chaired by former Conservative MP and last Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten. The 'Patten Commission', as it became known, consulted widely during its research phase and published its report in 1999. To the end of creating a new beginning to policing in a post-conflict era the report made 175 recommendations. The recommendations for change ranged from the practical to the symbolic but it was the latter that proved to have an alienating effect on many officers. Following debate in parliament, changes to policing was determined by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 which was debated and criticised by unionists as the bill passed through parliament.

Policing was a complicated loose end in the GFA. In others words, when the Agreement was signed one of its most contentious topics had been left unresolved. The Agreement stated that an 'independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland' (CAIN) but there was no guarantee that the Commission would reach conclusions that, from a unionist perspective, were favourable to the RUC. Yet, there was indication of the areas that the Commission would likely review and make policy recommendations on as its 'proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support' (CAIN') from both communities. However, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), David Trimble and his party colleagues, encouraged unionist voters to support the referendum on the Agreement despite police reform being an unfinished matter. As one

senior UUP negotiator told the author, the topic of policing regrettably had been 'kicked down the road'[2] rather than thrashed out conclusively during the negotiations. Had it been dealt with in the negotiations voters would have known what they were voting on. Policing was not the only issue that was left unsettled when the referendum took place. The decommissioning of terrorist weaponry was also unresolved and proved to be a thorn in the side of the UUP during the implementation of the Agreement (O'Kane 2007).

Patten's recommendation that the name and badge of the RUC be changed was met with strong opposition by the UUP (and Democratic Unionist Party). The UUP deeply regretted the 'decision by Her Majesty's Government to accept the more controversial recommendations of the Patten Commission. Ulster Unionists remain resolutely opposed to these recommendations, including proposals to abolish the proud name and insignia of the Royal Ulster Constabulary' (Baber 2000). A few months later, Trimble also threw his weight behind the UUP's position arguing that the commission had put together a 'shoddy document' and claimed Patten had 'based his recommendations on a flawed interpretation of the Belfast Agreement' (*The Telegraph* 2000). However, Trimble had created the space in the Agreement for the Commission to do its work and so was responsible for creating the framework within which a 'flawed interpretation' could be made. For those unionists who wished the name of the RUC to be retained along with its symbols, it was Trimble's handling of policing during the negotiations that was sloppy and resulted in a rear-guard challenge being mounted in parliament to Patten's proposals. Interestingly, forthright opposition to a change in the force's name emanated from the former leader of the nationalist SDLP, Lord Fitt, who said that it was the RUC which had prevented the province from descending into an anarchical state (Kallenbach 2000). Despite the protestations of unionists and elements within the House of Lords, the reforms outlined in the Policing Bill were pushed ahead.

Officers' responses were critical of the Patten Report. In the main, the critique revolves around the idea that the RUC was allowed to become a politicised part of the inter-party negotiations leading up to the GFA and ended up a sacrificial element not long into the post-agreement period.

[2] Interview with senior UUP negotiator.

It is a perspective that identifies the British government as a culprit in the process in that it was willing to accept a trade-off that unionists in Northern Ireland found unpalatable. Basically, the RUC was a dispensable part of the political deal if it meant the increased anchorage of the republican movement in the peace process. In other words, the priority was to keep the IRA from returning to violence. The issue had not been framed this way either in the GFA or during the period of the Patten Commission's consultation. The British government was keen to present itself as an honest broker and the debate about policing was largely portrayed as a matter related to greater representation of Roman Catholics and a recruitment process which engineered this outcome. That said, the comments which are included in this section provide an interesting insight into the emotional effects of policy implementation and indicate that officers retain a strong emotional attachment to the RUC.

The politicised nature of policing during the peace process and the pawn-like treatment of the RUC by Blair, was commented upon in a mood of disgust:

> The loss of the name and change of badge was plain and simply an act of appeasement by the British government and was an insult to all the families of officers who had been murdered or injured. The government and Tony Blair were willing to bend over backwards to try and get a peace deal with the Provos and if that meant getting rid of those who stood against the IRA then so be it. (Response to questionnaire, officer 47, 4 April 2017)

That the Northern Ireland conflict was a problem that the British government was tiring of accompanied the same sentiments as the above quotation:

> This was a sop and an act of appeasement to terrorists and the actions of a government who were only too glad to be rid of 'this wretched place'. At this time the terrorists were all but beaten and it was a gross insult to the memory of all members of the security forces and the law-abiding public who had to pay the supreme sacrifice. (Response to questionnaire, officer 46, 4 April 2017)

The comment that 'terrorists were all but beaten' suggests that they were on the back foot in terms of their battle with the security forces. It is a point that has been made by the former Head of RUC Special Branch,

Raymond White. White argues that the RUC won the 'intelligence war' which increasing hampered the IRA's operational scope but that the organisation's switch to politics through the activities of Sinn Fein presented it with an opportunity to continue with its campaign against the RUC but by means of a different medium.[3] White's claim about the RUC's intelligence triumph has been made by William Matchett (2016) who argues that RUC Special Branch inflicted a strategic defeat on the IRA which made the political option taken by Sinn Fein in the early 1990s more attractive. The problem, to which White alludes, is that the political side of conflict resolution offered the republican movement a pathway which they were encouraged to pursue. Efforts by Albert Reynolds and John Hume in the 1990s resulted in Sinn Fein increasingly entering the political sphere and being granted a degree of respectability from constitutional nationalism. The moves by constitutional nationalism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were augmented by the decision of President Bill Clinton to grant Gerry Adams a visa to visit the United States in 1994 much to the British government's dismay (Lynch 2003). For officers, as well as improving the fund raising capacity of Sinn Fein, this also played a crucial role in normalising perceptions of a party that was the political wing of a terrorist organisation which had been happy to reject democracy in favour of continuing with a murderous campaign. This was a platform that Sinn Fein gradually capitalised upon and it added momentum to the party's initial parliamentary success in 1981 and 1983. Little did Hume realise that his efforts to assimilate Sinn Fein and the IRA into constitutional politics would eventually result in the electoral demise of his party. The pathway available to Sinn Fein was closed to the RUC and thus, without sufficient political support from pro-state parties in Stormont, the Sinn Fein narrative could go largely unchecked. From the perspective of officers, Sinn Fein's electoral head of steam is giving rise to an analysis of the conflict that is becoming dominant. However, as mentioned above, dominance, in terms of narrative construction, is a step short of where the party would like to be. It is Sinn Fein's goal to turn a dominant narrative into an exclusive one which would squeeze out competing accounts of the Northern Ireland conflict. Operating within the heart of government, politics is the key mechanism by which the party's anti-RUC agenda can be progressed whilst policing

---

[3] BBC Spotlight programme *Spy in the IRA*, 2016.

organisations like the NIRPOA, the RUC GC Foundation, the RUC GC Widows Association, the Wounded Police and Families Association, and the DPOA spectate from outside Stormont on the political margins. It is thought that Patten offered republicans the opportunity to assault the RUC by the backdoor and which the British government was content to witness.

Judging by another officer, the government's willingness to see the RUC put to the sword was generated by destructive terrorist attacks aimed at infrastructure in England:

> The British government could not financially afford anymore 'mainland' bombs and only a small part of the overall deal with Sinn Fein/IRA was to shove the Royal Ulster Constabulary into the history books as fast as the British government could. Forget the good men who gave up their lives to keep anarchy off the streets, forget the tens of thousands of RUC full-time, RUCR men and women who not only lived a life 24 hours a day under threat, but also put on a uniform to meet head on the terrorist who sneaked behind the bushes like a coward. The change had to come about because Sinn Fein/IRA wanted it, or else more mainland bombs would follow. (Response to questionnaire, officer 44, 4 April 2017)

The IRA demonstrated its ability to carry out bomb attacks on the mainland since the early 1970s. Greater publicity could be gained from a bomb in London than one in Belfast. These two capitals were unevenly weighted in importance when it came to the amount of media attention given to a terrorist explosion. Northern Ireland's geographical remoteness played its part in psychologically distancing the likes of Londoners (and those elsewhere in England) from the human and structural costs of bomb attacks in the province. But an explosion in their 'own back yard'—London, Guildford, Birmingham for instance—focused mainlanders' minds on the IRA threat and the Northern Ireland conflict. It also concentrated the minds of the British government who wished to keep bombs off the mainland. The IRA's campaign of bombing England (the organisation did not conduct attacks in Scotland or Wales) came to an end in 1996 when in the February of that year a massive bomb destroyed the Docklands area of London killing two and an equally powerful bomb devastated the centre of Manchester four months later.

The next quotation connects RUC symbolism to a fervent sense of professional self-respect and casts light on why the Patten Report generated anger:

> This is a very emotive issue. The harp and the crown has been anathema to republican terrorists from time immemorial. The RIC was the first to stand against IRA violence and then the RUC. I will carry the pride of having served under the harp and crown to my grave. My family are proud of my service. Nothing, be it lies, innuendo or propaganda, will change that view. Removing the name and the badge of the RUC handed the IRA a victory that they could not achieve militarily. (Response to questionnaire, officer 45, 4 April 2017)

This comment encourages a question: why should the symbolic changes brought about by Patten be 'very emotive'? At the outset it should be acknowledged that, similar to military personnel, symbols matter to police officers. They are representative of professional careers which stretch for many years and to which individuals give the best years of their lives; yet there is more that is involved. The answer to the question is partly provided in the reference to republican violence and the counter-terrorist history of the RIC and RUC. The policing response to terrorism was costly in terms of the number of officers killed or badly injured in the different historic periods. Accordingly, the sacrifice of colleagues has imbued the symbols of the organisation with great value. Therefore, the officer wishes to convey that the sacrificial realities of combating terrorism have resulted in a dense set of emotions being compressed into the harp and the crown. Moreover, the confidence this officer has (and his family) in both the integrity of his police service and the professionalism of the organisation to which he belonged is resistant to the disparaging assaults of Sinn Fein.

The words 'appease' and 'sop' appear in the comments of two officers whose views are reflective of the sentiments conveyed above. The first quotation suggests that in its endeavour to find a solution to the conflict the British government was prepared to trample over any impediments. The RUC is thought to have been an obstacle to the extent that it was principally resented by Sinn Fein and the republican community. That terrorism had exacted a dreadful price upon officers and their families was of little moral consequence and was overridden by the political imperative to placate republicans. The second quotation questions the impartiality of Chris Patten on the basis of his poor record

on preserving British symbolism as a politician and diplomat. The first officer commented:

> The change of the name of the force - I believe it should never have been allowed and was purely to appease republicans. The badge should never have been altered for the same reasons. Northern Ireland was and still is part of the United Kingdom. Personally, after serving in the force for 30 years, going through all that happened during this time, the pain, suffering, terrorism, it very much felt like the government drew a line through it all and wanted to forget about everything we went through as police officers protecting our communities. (Response to questionnaire, officer 41, 4 April 2017)

The second officer said:

> Another sop to Sinn Fein. It was tried in 1969 in the Hunt Report without success. Patten Report, a failed politician, a person who for a long time had aspirations to lead the Conservative party, as a government minister in Northern Ireland took the London out of Londonderry, who refused to wear the Governor's uniform in Hong Kong and has always been 'looked after'. (Response to questionnaire, officer 52, 4 April 2017)

Patten's failure as a politician is measurable in the loss of his parliamentary seat in 1992 despite the Conservative party winning the general election that year so the officer's remark is not without substance. That the constituents of Bath cheered his defeat was a nasty electoral wounding (Brogan 2000). However, regardless of his rejection at the polls he was given a senior diplomatic role and became the last governor of Hong Kong in 1992 but decided to officiate out of British colonial dress (Flowerdew 1998). Previously, in 1984, Patten's support for the removal of 'London' from the Londonderry district council area generated bitter controversy and is mentioned by the officer as an indication of his unsuitability for tackling a sensitive topic which also involved British symbolism. Patten's review of policing is not considered by the officer to have been neutral because of his record in relation to British symbolism which did not indicate that they were particularly important to him. The issue draws our attention to the importance, in deeply divided societies, of individuals having as little problematic 'history' as possible in order to promote widespread public confidence in a process which results in key recommendations for reform in an area of serious inter-ethnic disagreement.

The Patten Report was not well received and as the above comments make clear the temperament of officers has not mellowed with the passing of time. The symbolic recommendations, more than the report's other recommendatory features, were difficult to accept. This can be explained as follows: as a result of the sacrifice of RUC officers—killed and injured—and the bereavement and emotional pain suffered by their families, the RUC's symbols had taken on a particular importance. By virtue of this sacrifice, then, the symbols had earned the right to be highly valued. Furthermore, the longevity of the Troubles meant that there was no short-cut to the earning of symbolic esteem and all officers were aware of the dangers associated with donning the uniform. Indeed, some officers had not long left the RUC training depot when they were murdered. Therefore, when assessed against the background of the human costs associated with policing during the Northern Ireland conflict we are better equipped for understanding the emotional context of officers' resentment of the Patten Report.

The elimination of the RUC brought about by Patten can be looked at in two ways: firstly, to indicate a new dispensation in policing that fits with a peacebuilding model favourable to Sinn Fein, the SDLP, the British government and that of the Republic of Ireland, and the Patten Commission, but not the unionist community which is the province's demographic majority; secondly, doing away with the RUC can be viewed as a way to eradicate reference to the organisation except as a phenomenon confined to the pages of Northern Irish history. The problem with this approach is that there is no contemporary RUC, operating in conditions free of terrorism, which can be taken into consideration when making judgments about the past. Instead, the Patten Report has locked the RUC in a specific period of history when terrorism rendered it impossible to provide a normal policing service. Overshadowed by the period of the Troubles, this seriously distorts the RUC's image and can result in unfair interpretations generated for propagandistic purposes to de-legitimise the force. In contrast, Sinn Fein is an ongoing phenomenon which has grown in confidence and political relevance since the GFA. This fact places the party at the centre of the power-sharing government where it exercises a sizeable influence on policymaking. This is observable in the party's keenness to raise legacy issues and its virulent adoption of a one-sided approach to the past which any sensible individual would know cannot be relied upon to paint an accurate picture of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, Sinn Fein's efforts are

comprehensible and reflect a degree of political savvy. For officers, in its attempt to denigrate the RUC, the aim of the party is to deflect attention away from the uncomfortable fact that the IRA was responsible for more killings during the Troubles than the security forces (and loyalist groups). The statistics cannot be skirted around or denied and are the actual source—rather than republican ideology or scholarly sources sympathetic to it—which researchers ought to draw upon when attempting to understand the past.

There is seldom a comfortable fit between ideology and facts and this is certainly the case when it comes to killings during the Troubles. Evaluations of the RUC and its role in the Northern Ireland conflict need to be made on the basis of the evidence and not politicised interpretations. Otherwise scholarly inquiries, whether wittingly or unwittingly, are participating in the repression of truth and hence make little contribution to progressing knowledge about the conflict. Jordan Peterson's powerful critique of ideologies is germane to this discussion.[4] He remarks metaphorically that 'Ideologies are low-resolution representations' which provide little actual detail, yet encourage rash and ill-thought-out condemnatory judgments with regards to their intellectual opponents. Committed followers of an ideology are also skilled at playing the blame game and reject evidence out-of-hand which does not sit comfortably with their ideological presuppositions. Peterson's focus is on the influence of neo-Marxist-based attacks on what are perceived to be oppressive aspects of politically stable western liberal democracies, however, his caution against simplistic ideologies is useful when studying deeply divided societies. These are societies where ideological conviction has developed a pathological side expressed in political violence and terrorist activity. In such societies, an even poorer representation of reality is provided by ideologies than the low-resolution variety to which Peterson refers simply because the stakes are higher.

According to RUC participants, republicans are concerned about their respectability and gaining acceptance at an international level and certainly do not wish to see a high-resolution image emerging with regards to their terrorist past. Dignitaries coming to Northern Ireland meet with Sinn Fein members as well as unionist politicians but republicans have

---

[4] Professor Jordan Peterson's interview on the Joe Rogan Experience, 28 November, 2016. Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04wyGK6k6HE, accessed 18 July, 2017.

a nasty skeleton in the cupboard which they prefer to keep concealed. At the expense of the SDLP, they also wish to attract support from a new generation of nationalist voters who have no actual experience of the Northern Ireland conflict and little understanding of the effects of republican violence. Without the aid of memory young nationalists are dependent upon mythology when it comes to constructing their ethnic values and political opinions, and this process renders them vulnerable to the formulations of dominant myth-makers. As the post-settlement South African case makes clear, a close and public inspection of the violence of the past can undermine the self-respect of a cultural community as well as be electorally damaging to the ethnic party that represents it (Krog 1998; Southern 2015). In an attempt by republicans to deflect attention from their role in the Troubles, their ideological instinct leads them to blame the security forces for the province's woes. But a fair-minded assessment of the facts—responsibility for killings and bombings—weakens republicans' efforts and leaves them exposed to a penetrating counter-critique. However, for this critique to maximise its effectiveness requires a degree of political assistance but, as discussed above, unionist parties' defence of the RUC is considered by officers to be poor when compared to the vibrancy of the republican agenda advanced by Sinn Fein both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. Put simply, associations linked to the RUC have a much weaker foothold in the construction of the post-conflict narrative about the violence of the past than does Sinn Fein. This problem is set to worsen: as members of, for example, the NIRPOA pass on, it diminishes the organisation's storytelling capacity. The same is true of the RUC GC Foundation and other organisations connected to the RUC. Essentially, the lifespan of these organisations is limited to the current generation of members, the majority of whom are aged in their 60s and 70s. Whilst the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association makes no mention of the RUC in its title and so can facilitate retiring members of the PSNI (as the regional branch of the National Association of Retired Police Officers), eventually retirees will have no experience of having worked in the RUC. Added to the problem is the fact that the relationship between the PSNI and retired RUC officers and their families can be delicate. This was illustrated in the uproar that followed the decision by PSNI Superintendent, Mark McEwan, to relocate a memorial plague to fallen RUC officers in Strand Road station, Londonderry (BBC 2016a, b). The seriousness of

the issue caused the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Theresa Villiers, to become involved and the controversy ended up being discussed in parliament (*News Letter* 2016). Although the PSNI apologised for the Superintendent's insensitive handling of the matter and the plaque was returned to its original location, the incident demonstrated the shift in organisational culture, which if left unaddressed, would have caused a serious rift between RUC-related organisations and the PSNI. For RUC officers, it also raised doubts about the willingness of the PSNI to be custodians of highly emotional aspects of the RUC's history.

The Patten Report's recommendation to change the name and badge of the RUC; tightly control the religious dimension of the recruitment process; and offer an attractive severance package for those officers who preferred to leave policing, may have been designed to make the PSNI more representative of, and acceptable to, both communities. However, it presented republicans with an ideological opportunity to inflict damage on the RUC which the award of the George Cross has not effectively counteracted. Regardless of the gallantry that the award reflected and which Queen Elizabeth II made clear in her presentational speech in 2000, the dispensing of the RUC worked to Sinn Fein's ideological advantage. It allowed republican ideologues to portray the RUC as an instrument of state oppression and thus de-value not only its counter-terrorist strategy, which equally investigated and charged loyalist paramilitaries resulting in a higher level of prosecution for murder than for murders committed by republicans,[5] but also the fact that it maintained order in a manner that prevented Northern Ireland from sliding into even worse levels of inter-ethnic violence during the darkest periods of the Troubles. Loyalist groups had stepped up their militant campaign in the 1990s without any sign of de-escalation. In fact, they were becoming more deadly during the final years of the conflict when their rate of killing exceeded that of republicans. Republicans used the early post-GFA period—facilitated by the dissolution of the RUC—to project an altered image of the conflict and the roles of organisations within it. That republicans were in government strengthened the narrative used to justify this image and to those members of the international community unfamiliar with the Northern Ireland conflict, Sinn Fein's political achievements afforded the story a degree of credibility. Terminology played a key part

---

[5] *Serving in the Royal Ulster Constabulary*, The Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross Foundation, p. 1.

in this re-imaging effort: the Troubles were reconceptualised as a 'war' and terrorists were rebranded as 'combatants'—loyalists also adopted these concepts as have respected members of the scholarly community been content to utilise the term 'non-state combatant'. The problem with these terms is that they do not adequately differentiate between the RUC/security forces and terrorist organisations. Officers regret that terrorists, who committed murder, caused severe injury, generated fear and orchestrated the systematic destruction of property, are referred to as a 'non-state combatant' whilst those charged with the task of combating these unlawful activities are presented by republicans as a causal factor in them. If left unchallenged, officers feel that these ideas will result in a serious distortion of the reality of the conflict which will be to the historic detriment of the RUC.

In defence of the RUC and its law enforcement role during the Troubles a written submission was made by the NIRPOA to the US diplomat, Richard Haass, in 2013. The document stated clearly the Association's firm opposition to any suggestion of moral equivalence between the security forces who upheld the rule of law and terrorists who were dedicated to its destruction. Haass, according to Ruth Dudley Edwards (2014), had been too sympathetic to the republican agenda when he took up George Mitchell's work during the Bush administration. He was, therefore, a poor choice during the Obama presidency to chair the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland which were designed to resolve a number of knotty issues. Against this background, it is understandable that the NIRPOA's submission made clear its principal concern that there would be 'no attempt to rewrite history in a way which seeks to imply some sort of moral equivalence between the police (and other elements of the security forces) and the terrorists'.[6] The submission indicated that the organisation was not prepared to sit back and allow the past to be ideologically reconstructed by republicans. Haass's diplomatic endeavours were unsuccessful and he beat a retreat to the US.

---

[6] NIRPOA's written submission to Richard Haass made available to the author, p. 3.

Conclusion

It is argued that research which is empirically grounded indicates 'many former policemen and soldiers have not yet reconciled themselves to the new dispensation in quite the way' that some scholars may think (Edwards and McGrattan 2013, p. 353). This chapter provides insight into the reasons why former officers and their families might continue to be alienated in post-agreement Northern Ireland and why a strong sense of victimhood abounds. Officers have a morally sound story about victimhood to tell and the facts of the conflict make it easy to articulate. The murder of hundreds of officers; the serious physical and psychological injuries numbering in the thousands; and the multiple families left in bereavement alerts us to the genuineness of the victim narrative. The problem, however, is that the RUC has found it difficult to project this narrative. Unfortunately, a lack of political support makes it difficult to reach wider audiences and otherwise excellent organisations which consist of retired officers are not the most effective springboards for this purpose. This is not an impediment suffered by those who would seek to discredit the history of the RUC. That victimhood from the perspective of the RUC and wider security forces has not received adequate research attention constitutes a gap in the knowledge bank of the academic discipline of transitional justice. This is unhelpful not least because Northern Ireland is presented as a prominent case study—with exportable lessons—when it comes to constructing conflict resolution strategies and formulating peacebuilding theories. Scholarly work on terrorist organisations and ex-prisoners needs to be accompanied by research on the security forces if an unfair and inaccurate understanding of victimhood is to be avoided. Currently, the perception of victimhood in Northern Ireland is considered by officers to be imbalanced in favour of terrorists and that the agenda has been politically driven forward by Sinn Fein without a consolidated defensive response from unionist politicians. This has only deepened the feeling of victimhood and alienation amongst officers.

REFERENCES

Alicke, M. (2000). Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame. *Psychological Bulletin, 126*(4), 556–574.

Almoshmosh, N. (2016). The Role of War Trauma Survivors in Managing Their Own Mental Condition, Syria Civil War as an Example. *Avicenna Journal of Medicine, 6*(2), 54–59.

Baber, M. (1998). *Northern Ireland: The Release of Prisoners Under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Bill* (Research Paper 98/65). House of Commons Library.

Baber, M. (2000). *House of Commons* (Research Paper 00/58). House of Commons Library. Available from http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP00-58/RP00-58.pdf.

Bandura, A. (2004). The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. In F. Moghaddam & A. Marsella (Eds.), *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions* (pp. 121–150). Washington: American Psychological Association.

BBC. (2006). *IRA 'Was Wrong' Over Bodies Issue*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/5170594.stm.

BBC. (2013). *Northern Ireland: Richard Haass Talks End Without Deal*. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-25556714.

BBC. (2016a). *RUC Memorial Plaque: Stephen Martin Admits 'Mistakes Were Made'*. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-35724317.

BBC. (2016b). *US Police Shootings: How Many Die Each Year?* Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-36826297.

BBC. (2017). *Timeline of Dissident Republican Activity*. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-10866072.

Bloomfield, K. (1998). *We Will Remember Them: Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner*. Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/victims/docs/bloomfield98.pdf

Brogan, B. (2000). Patten Loses Seat, Colony and Now Interest. *The Telegraph*. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1341844/Patten-loses-seat-colony-and-now-interest.html.

Bruce, S. (1992). *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, W., & Raustiala, K. (2007, August 8). Why Terrorists Aren't Soldiers. *The New York Times*. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/opinion/08clark.html.

Collins, E. (1997). *Killing Rage*. London: Granta Publications.

Darcy, S. (2003). Punitive House Demolitions, the Prohibition of Collective Punishment, and the Supreme Court of Israel. *Penn State International Law Review, 21*(3, Article 4), 447–507.

Duckworth, A., Peterson, C., Matthews, M., & Kelly, D. (2007). Grit: Perseverance and Passion for Long-Term Goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92*(6), 1087–1101.

Dwyer, C. (2007). Risk, Politics and the 'Scientification' of Political Judgment: Prisoner Release and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland. *British Journal of Criminology, 47*(5), 779–797.

Edwards, A., & McGrattan, C. (2011). Terroristic Narratives: On the (Re) Invention of Peace in Northern Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 23*(3), 357–376.

Edwards, A., & McGrattan, C. (2013). What We Talk About When We Talk About Peace: A Rejoinder to McEvoy and Shirlow. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 25*(3), 351–354.

Edwards, R. (2014). Sinn Fein Ally Richard Haass Was a Dumb Choice to Chair Northern Ireland Peace Talks. *Belfast Telegraph*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/columnists/ruth-dudley-edwards/sinn-fein-ally-richard-haass-was-a-dumb-choice-to-chair-northern-ireland-peace-talks-30392882.html.

Fay, M., Morrissey, M., & Smyth, M. (1999). *Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Costs*. London: Pluto Press.

Ferguson, N., Burgess, M., & Hollywood, I. (2010). Who Are the Victims? Victimhood Experiences in Postagreement Northern Ireland. *Political Psychology, 31*(6), 857–886.

Flowerdew, J. (1998). *The Final Years of British Hong Kong*. London: MacMillan Press.

Giliomee, H. (2003). *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Guardian. (2014). *Jean McConville Timeline: How a 1972 Murder Returned to Haunt Gerry Adams*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/03/jean-mcconville-timeline-murder-gerry-adams.

Hannigan, J. (1985). The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology in the Provisional IRA. *Social Problems, 33*(1), 31–40.

Hayes, B., & McAllister, I. (2005). Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 17*(4), 599–617.

Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. California: University of California Press.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Juni, S. (2016). Survivor Guilt: A Critical Review from the Lens of the Holocaust. *International Review of Victimology, 22*(3), 321–337.

Kallenbach, M. (2000). Peers Say Ulster Police Should Remain 'Royal'. *The Telegraph*. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1371579/Peers-say-Ulster-police-should-remain-Royal.html.

Krog, A. (1998). *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa*. London: Vintage Books.

Lifton, R., & Olson, E. (1976). The Human Meaning of Total Disaster. *Psychiatry, 39*(1), 1–18.

Lynch, T. (2003). The Gerry Adams Visa in Anglo-American Relations. *Irish Studies in International Affairs, 14,* 33–44.

MacGinty, R., & Du Toit, P. (2007). A Disparity of Esteem: Relative Group Status in Northern Ireland After the Belfast Agreement. *Political Psychology, 28*(1), 13–31.

Matchett, W. (2016). *Secret Victory: The Intelligence War That Beat the IRA*. Lisburn: Hiskey Ltd.

McEvoy, K. (1998). Prisoner Release and Conflict Resolution: International Lessons for Northern Ireland. *International Criminal Justice Review, 8*(1), 33–60.

McEvoy, K., & McConnachie, K. (2012). Victimology in Transitional Justice: Victimhood, Innocence and Hierarchy. *European Journal of Criminology, 9*(5), 527–538.

McEvoy, K., & Shirlow, P. (2013). The Northern Ireland Peace Process and "Terroristic" Narratives: A Reply to Edwards and McGrattan. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 25*(2), 161–166.

McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C., & McVea, D. (1999). *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

Merari, A. (2005). Israel Facing Terrorism. *Israel Affairs, 11*(1), 223–237.

Mulvihill, D. (2001). The Legality of the Pardoning of Paramilitaries Under the Early Release Provisions of Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement. *Cornell International Law Journal, 34*(1, Article 6), 227–256.

Muñoz-Torres, J. (2012). Truth and Objectivity in Journalism. *Journalism Studies, 13*(4), 566–582.

News Letter. (2015). *Declassified Files: Thatcher Wrote Personal Note to Bloomfield After Bombs*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/declassified-files-thatcher-wrote-personal-note-to-bloomfield-after-bombs-1-7138023.

News Letter. (2016). *Villiers Drawn into Row Over Movement of RUC Memorial*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/villiers-drawn-into-row-over-movement-of-ruc-memorial-1-7248870.

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. (2013). *Dealing with Northern Ireland's Past: Towards a Transitional Justice Approach* (p. 3). Belfast: Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

O'Brien, B. (1995). *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

O'Kane, E. (2007). Decommissioning and the Peace Process: Where Did It Come From and Why Did It Stay so Long? *Irish Political Studies, 22*(1), 81–101.

Patterson, H. (2008). War of National Liberation or Ethnic Cleansing: IRA Violence During the Troubles in Fermanagh. In B. Bowden & M. Davis (Eds.), *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism* (pp. 230–242). Queensland: University of Queensland Press.

Police Ombudsman Report. (2006). *Report into the Complaint by James and Michael Conville Regarding the Police Investigation into the Abduction and Murder of Their Mother Mrs. Jean McConville* (Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland).

Richards, A. (2001). Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the Peace Process and Democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(4), 72–89.

Rieff, D. (1995, November/December). Denying Moral Equivalence. *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 151–152.

Saeed, H. (2016). Victims and Victimhood: Individuals of Inaction or Active Agents of Change? Reflections on Fieldwork in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Transitional Justice, 10*(1), 168–178.

Seeman, M. (1959). On the Meaning of Alienation. *American Sociological Review, 24*(6), 783–791.

Shirlow, P., & McEvoy, K. (2008). *Beyond the Wire: Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland*. London: Pluto Press.

Shirlow, P., Tonge, J., McAuley, J., & McGlynn, C. (2010). *Abandoning Historical Conflict?: Former Political Prisoners and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Smyth, M. (1998). Remembering in Northern Ireland: Victims, Perpetrators and Hierarchies of Pain and Responsibility. In B. Hamber (Ed.), *Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition* (pp. 31–49). Derry/Londonderry: INCORE.

Southern, N. (2007). Protestant Alienation: A Political, Cultural and Geographical Examination. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33*(1), 159–180.

Southern, N. (2015). Conflict Transformation and Truth-Seeking: The Impact of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the National Party. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21*(3), 335–356.

The Telegraph. (2000). *Stop Patten's Sectarian Plan*. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/4253433/Stop-Pattens-sectarian-plan.html.

Von Tangen Page, M. (1998). *Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political Violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968–97*. London: Macmillan.

Von Tangen Page, M. (2006). A 'Most Difficult and Unpalatable Part': The Release of Politically Motivated Violent Offenders. In M. Cox, A. Guelke, & F. Stephen (Eds.), *A Farewell to Arms?: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement* (pp. 201–211). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Walzer, M. (1988). Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses. In S. Luper-Foy (Ed.), *Problems of International Justice* (pp. 237–247). Boulder: Westview Press.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

In bringing this piece of work to a conclusion a number of questions can be asked: what lessons can be drawn from this study of the RUC and the experiences of its officers during the Northern Ireland conflict?: what does the research tell us about the threat and impact of terrorism?: what does the inquiry encourage us to consider when debating security policy?

The example of the RUC indicates that a police force is capable of taking the lead role in combating terrorism. Police primacy was introduced in 1976 and resulted in the military functioning in a supportive role to the civil power. Inevitably, this resulted in the militarisation of the police as it took on frontline duties. At the same time, the RUC continued to provide a normal policing service to the people of Northern Ireland. The maintenance of normal policing was important for two reasons: firstly, the everyday policing needs of the population were catered for without ethnic distinction (this did not mean that the local population in a number of particularly hostile areas utilised the service, but it was nonetheless available to them). Secondly, the provision of a civilian policing service sent out a powerful political signal that terrorists were unable to render an area ungovernable never mind the country. The IRA ended its campaign without achieving a single 'liberated' area whether measured in terms of the size of a farmer's field or that of a residential back garden. In the 'bandit country' of South Armagh, where the terrorist threat was arguably most dangerous, this was a considerable triumph for the RUC and army. If South Armagh could not be 'liberated' given

the compatibility of the terrain to rural ambush, the terrorists' hit-and-run tactics, their extensive firepower, and the area's ethnic homogeneity and ideological hostility towards the security forces, then there was little chance of anywhere else in the province falling to terrorism. This was the line that the RUC, supported by the British army, was able to hold year in and year out during the conflict. Paul Wilkinson (2000) makes reference to the general resilience of liberal democracies in the face of a terrorist threat—the role of the security forces in South Armagh over the course of 30 years of violence may be regarded a specific case in point.

The example of the RUC also informs us that police officers are more vulnerable than the military to terrorist attack because of the nature of policing. On the one hand, officers often patrolled in pairs and were susceptible to being approached from the back and shot at point-blank range. They were in uniform and easily identifiable as a target. The wearing of a police uniform symbolises the authority of an officer to enforce the law but in Northern Ireland the visible presence of uniformed officers improved the public's confidence amidst the terrorist campaign. On the other hand, duties of civilian policing meant that officers could be lured into an ambush when responding to a hoax report of a road traffic accident or a burglary. Ambushes handed the initiative to the terrorists who were able to anticipate the route an RUC vehicle would likely take when responding to a call.

In addition to causing fatalities, a terrorist strategy which targets police officers by means of explosive devices will result in injuries comparable to those suffered by the military. As noted in Chapter 6, terrorist attacks have inflicted battlefield-like injuries on officers. British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland and members of the UDR have suffered the same injuries. These are injuries which are normally associated with high-intensity conflict zones involving the military—certainly they are not prominent in the public's understanding and memory of the Troubles. Severely injured police officers are an uncomfortable reminder of the dangers which policemen and policewomen encountered. A researcher's understanding of victimhood is greatly enhanced by spending time interviewing a double or triple amputee or someone who has been left facially disfigured by a terrorist attack. The problem with badly injured police officers or soldiers is that they easily slip into obscurity—as the conflict continues so does the public's attention; if it ends, people are quick to 'move on'. However, it is important to bear in mind that a negatively transformed life means victims do not 'move on' at the same pace

as those who have emerged physically and psychologically unscathed by conflict. By studying the experiences of severely injured RUC officers (and military personnel similarly affected) enables us to gauge the kind of challenges that young soldiers seriously wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq will confront later in life as the physical capacity to cope with injury declines. Knowledge in this context is useful to the design of healthcare provision.

The carers of injured officers are also victims. In the vast majority of cases these are officers' wives. During fieldwork the author was struck by the dedication of wives who perform these roles. Some officers were injured in the 1970s and so for over 40 years their wives have been performing a caring role. However, the physical ability of wives to attend to their husbands also decreases as they themselves get older. Due to the physical (or psychological) incapacitation of officers, their wives have shouldered a considerable responsibility for raising a family as many have had to cater for their badly injured husbands as well as their young children. Though they received legislative recognition as victims in 2006, carers are largely an unnoticed consequence of terrorist violence and barely figure in terrorism studies.

Victimhood is felt strongly amongst those suffering bereavement. The emotional loss of a husband and father murdered by terrorists anchors many wives and children in the past. At times wives and children have been present when a fatal attack took place. This was the most heartless aspect of the IRA's targeting strategy. We gained a glimpse of its cruelty in Chapter 5 where a widow discussed how she and her three children witnessed her husband being gunned down. These were premeditated and carefully planned off-duty attacks. Mark Urban (1992) refers to such attacks and comments that at the start of the IRA's campaign there had been qualms about attacking members of the security forces off duty as this seemed inconsistent with an organisation which claimed to be an 'army'. However, he points out that off-duty attacks were considered to have an intimidatory value which would cause members of the police and UDR to resign and depress levels of recruitment. That the IRA's strategy achieved neither objective is a measure of the resilience of those threatened in this way.

In the Introduction it was argued that victims of terrorism need to receive more scholarly attention. When ethically evaluated according to the *intent* of the perpetrator to cause harm and that his or her act is a matter of *choice*, leads to the conclusion that a hierarchy of victims exists.

This research does not support the idea that there is a single category of victim; there is not an equal entitlement in Northern Ireland to lay claim to victimhood; it is not morally corrosive to speak of a hierarchy of victims but rather an ethical recognition that victims ought to be categorised differently to perpetrators; and, all considered, a moral distinction needs to be made between terrorists and those who served in the security forces. The statistics tell their own story with regards to organisational culpability for lethal violence during the Troubles and the IRA outstrips the security forces in the context of blame. The RUC, as noted in the previous chapter, was responsible for a tiny fraction of those killed in the conflict but officers feel this has been lost sight of in the post-GFA era. Yet, facts related to culpability ought not be sidestepped or tiptoed around in the name of academic neutrality or a supposedly 'progressive' approach to dealing with the effects of conflict as they have an impact on victims (the Eames/Bradley report was a glaring example of this). The marginalisation of the experience of victimhood amongst members of the security forces and their families has done little to advance reconciliation. Rather, officers consider there to be a concerted attempt in the post-Agreement period to sully the name of the RUC in the interests of projecting a grossly distorted picture of the Troubles. This is a picture which attempts to locate the police and army at the centre of blame.

Police officers are quick to point out that when they went out on patrol it was not with the intent to kill someone. Whilst on duty their lawfully held firearms were seldom, if ever, drawn never mind used. Further, in covert operations where RUC guns were at the ready William Matchett (2016) makes the point that in 95.5% of these situations the outcome was the arrest, and not death, of terrorists. But officers are also quick to mention that this was not how terrorists approached their business. The sole purpose of a terrorist embarking on a course of action was to cause harm. If the target was a member of the security forces the purpose was to kill the individual or at least inflict the greatest degree of physical injury. This is how IRA terrorism worked and it was unpleasant. Motivational intent is an important distinction between the RUC officer and the terrorist.

At the beginning of their RUC careers officers took an oath to preserve life and property and in this context it is necessary to adopt a sense of perspective: the absolute vast majority of them worked within the law and were accountable to a management structure which operated in accordance with a disciplinary code. Terrorists, in contrast, were pledged to take

the life of targets; accept that their actions would likely endanger the lives of many people unconnected to the security forces; and were only held to account by fellow terrorists who were equally committed ideologues. This created a communicative arrangement which did not lend itself to producing self-critical feedback of any great moral worth—a member who is overly critical of the organisation's methods may not only be seen as a weak link in the terrorist chain but someone susceptible to disillusionment with violence and who perhaps might consider passing information to the security forces. These points stifled moral reflection and debate within the organisation about the perpetration of violence. The IRA was not subject to external scrutiny, unlike the RUC which was closely scrutinised by a range of actors some of whom might be considered unfriendly if not hostile. Arguably, no other police force in the world was subject to the same level of scrutiny. Also, the source of authority under which police officers and terrorists operated was radically different. The laws which governed the behaviour of RUC men and women were a reflection of a liberal democratic process where elected representatives—mandated by citizens to create laws—set the boundaries to policing. As the terrorist campaign gathered pace, emergency legislation was created to deal with the threat but the means for conferring police legitimacy was rooted in the principles and processes of parliamentary democracy. In contrast, the IRA was self-regulating and unaccountable to an electorate. These may seem obvious points of contrast which do not require discussion. However, on the contrary, these are the kind of organisational differences which are threatened with indistinctness when a morally ambiguous term like 'non-state combatant' is used and so such terminology should be resisted.

Richard English (2009) devotes the last chapter of his book to the question of how states should respond to terrorism. His analysis is informed by an authoritative understanding of the IRA which is drawn upon to chart the organisation's journey to the peace agreement of 1998. One of his recommendations is that we need to learn to live with the problem of terrorism. The recommendation is based on the reality that terrorism has an old history and its use is likely to be resorted to by disenchanted groups in the future. This is a fair point with regards to groups deciding to give terrorism a go by way of waging conflict. However, surely it would be an altogether different proposition to suggest that law-abiding members of a society should learn to live with terrorism as this would raise searching questions about the state's efforts to address the problem. The tragedy of learning to live with this kind

of problem is that an organisation's journey towards disintegration, or transformation into something political, may well be littered with the bodies of victims, a multitude of the bereaved, and thousands of the physically and psychologically injured. This is the lesson of Northern Ireland which only becomes truly comprehensible when an emphasis is placed on the victims of terrorism. That the conflict would result in a large number of victims was inevitable. This point allows a mild critique to be made of English's work: he argues '*where possible, address underlying root problems and causes*' (English 2009, p. 123) but offers no meaningful recommendation as to the security response in situations where it is not possible to accede to the demands of an organisation. This is *the* security challenge in contexts where an organisation is committed to murderous activity and seems to have plenty of scope for manoeuvre.

The IRA presented the state with three problems which had enormous implications for security policy. Firstly, it was not possible to agree to the IRA's demand that Northern Ireland be removed from the United Kingdom—this was a fanciful goal. Secondly, the organisation was ideologically inflexible and refused to compromise on its goal. This limited the options available to the Stormont government before its prorogation in March 1972 and successive British governments under conditions of direct rule. Thirdly, it pursued its goal by means of vicious violence which resulted in many innocent civilians being killed or seriously injured as well as members of the security forces. Confronted with a challenge of this kind how should a state respond? What is the duty of a state to its citizens in terms of making every effort to prevent terrorists turning them into victims? In essence, a state should never accept the normalisation of terrorism within its jurisdiction and ought to guard against the kind of poorly chosen comment uttered by the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, who seemed to imply that 'the threat of terror attacks are "part and parcel of living in a big city"' (*Independent* 2016). There have been few scholars as willing as Alan Dershowitz (2002) to come down hard on terrorism and his views are worth examining.

Shaped by the events of September 11 Dershowitz recommends that states get tough on terrorism. He argues that an organisation which is prepared to terrorise should never have its perceived grievances listened to never mind be negotiated with. For states to act differently only encourages terrorism. The message that Dershowitz (2002, p. 25) believes states need to send is that 'we will hunt you

down and destroy your capacity to engage in terror.' This is a rare, but welcome, bluntness in the field of terrorism studies. Given the gravity of the topic, Dershowitz' call for the use of hard power prevents the discourse on terrorism from becoming dominated by soft-power leaning scholars. Indeed, academic debate about effective ways of dealing with terrorism was overtaken by events in Sri Lanka in 2009. Scholars who are sceptical of a strong military response to terrorism have been forced to recalibrate their models following the Sri Lankan army's comprehensive defeat of the Tamil Tigers (a hybrid terrorist organisation with conventional and unconventional violent capabilities). Despite a barrage of international criticism to call off it military offensive the Government's political will held firm. The result was the delivery of a military blow from which the Tamil Tigers have been unable to recover—the state's action has eradicated the dreaded plague of the suicide bomber. Clearly, the Sri Lankan case informs us that the debate about military solutions to eradicating a terrorist threat is still alive and that in *certain* contexts a heavy militarised approach works. At the very least, events in Sri Lanka were a shot in the arm for those who favour hard power in dealing with the threat of terrorism. This, of course, does not suggest that the Sri Lankan model of hard power would be appropriate for other contexts. A crucial factor in the Sri Lankan government's decision not to call off its military assault was its ability to exploit the international hostility towards terrorism which sprung up following September 11. The tragedy tilted the balance of global sympathy in favour of the state and not the terrorist.

In the battle against the IRA and other republican groups, the British government did not benefit from an external environment strongly hostile to terrorism. The lack of a robust approach by the US and Republic of Ireland in dealing with the IRA and its various support mechanisms illustrates this point. If the Northern Ireland conflict had continued, it is highly unlikely that the IRA would have enjoyed the same level of open support in the US after September 11 and the global War on Terror. For example, a response other than a clampdown on NORAID's activities would have left the US open to the charge of gross hypocrisy and for reasons like the following: in coming to terms with the impact of suicide terrorism on their own soil, Americans (including supporters of republicanism in places like Boston and New York) would have recognised that the IRA was not opposed to forcing individuals to become

involuntary suicide bombers as in the case of Patsy Gillespie. In 1990 the IRA took Gillespie's family hostage and forced him to drive a truck packed with 1000 lb of explosives to a permanent army checkpoint near the border with the Republic of Ireland. Members of the IRA followed the bomb vehicle by car to ensure the driver did as directed. When the truck reached the checkpoint the bomb was detonated by remote control affording Gillespie no chance of escape. Roman Catholic Bishop, Edward Daly, condemned the attack as 'the work of Satan' (Clarke 2013).

Hard power was selectively used in Northern Ireland: internment, Operation Motorman, and Loughgall were examples of the state's willingness to use hard power in combating terrorism. In the case of Loughgall, eight heavily-armed IRA men were killed by the SAS when they attacked the local police station. Similar interceptions of IRA units followed the Loughgall incident but they were intermittent. Hard power requires a degree of political will. Although this will was reflected in unionist politicians' calls for the adoption of stronger measures against republicans, the British government favoured a political solution. This approach required more diplomacy than militancy. Thus, the use of hard power had to be carefully managed as its overuse threatened to alienate constitutional nationalism which the government regarded as central to a political agreement. But, the infrequency of Loughgall-like incidents might have other explanations. Perhaps, it reflected the limited supply of high-grade intelligence needed to carry out this kind of operation. However, could counter-terrorist steps have been taken to inflict harsher setbacks on the IRA and other terrorist groups?: the answer is probably 'yes'. Would this have been worthwhile?: 'yes' if one is of the view that a state's security policies ought to make clear that the cost of becoming involved in terrorism will be severe.

According to Dershowitz, clarity about the high costs of waging terrorism against the state is more likely to act as a deterrent than not. Alternatively, the cost of not making this point sufficiently clear may well be calculable in a high number of innocent victims. The fact that the IRA was well punctured with informers passing information to the state points to the potential usefulness of a stronger counter-terrorist approach as the commitment of many was far from absolute. Indeed, this points to the success of the penetrative skills of the state's intelligence agencies. These agencies had the unenviable task of countering terrorism within a rule-of-law framework and a context where the British government had not prioritised the use of hard power. This created a challenging

environment for agencies like RUC Special Branch and its military counterpart. By removing a hard-power instrument like internment, the security forces had to find other effective ways to counter terrorism. The objective became the prevention of terrorism by acquiring intelligence about the membership of terrorist organisations, and most importantly, their planning. Informers became key to winning the intelligence battle but this resulted in many difficult choices having to be made. There are no commentators from the Republic of Ireland as willing as the late Conor Cruise O'Brien to criticise the IRA and wrongheaded attitudes towards terrorism. His response to those in the Republic who were critical of the use of hard power in Northern Ireland was barbed:

> For those concerned know very well that if the IRA were to … start an offensive *down here*, in the Republic, internment would be introduced, before the death-roll reached fifty. Public opinion would approve the most ruthless measures against any of the IRA who might remain at large. The beating of suspects and a 'shoot to kill policy' would be routine, and public opinion in the Republic would have no fault to find with it, provided it worked, and the IRA was stopped from shooting and bombing people in the Republic. (O'Brien 1990, p. xvi)

O'Brien was a lonely voice in the Republic during the Troubles much like the lack of intellectual fellowship which gathers around Dershowitz' thesis.

Echoes of the critique of hard-power policies in Northern Ireland are to be found in the post-September 11 environment. They emanate from similar influential quarters and their recurrence deserves a brief comment. Empirically speaking, the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (and United Airlines Flight 93) was a watershed vis-à-vis the dangers of terrorism but the theoretical possibility of falling victim to an even worse attack—nuclear, biological, or chemical—generated legitimate concern (setting aside the nuclear threat, one has only to consider the outcome of a crude chemical attack on the Super Bowl involving a crowd of around 70,000. In addition to those killed and injured by toxic inhalation the number of those crushed to death would likely be considerable, especially amongst children, as terrified spectators frantically embarked on a stampede to escape). Understandably, this nightmarish possibility led to a Hobbesian shift in favour of security which did not go down well with left-wing scholars and civil liberty groups. However, these individuals and

groups have a shallow grasp of the complexity of combating terrorism. They display little understanding of the practical and moral challenges that are involved in minimising the terrorist threat. Indeed, they constitute a category whose critique of robust security measures is unrealistic.

There are three reasons why the arguments of the scholarly Left and civil liberty organisations are unconvincing. Firstly, it is a class of academic and activist that rarely engages with agencies which operate at the coalface of counter-terrorism and so their understanding of the challenges of security provision is limited.

Secondly, there is the problem of rigid ideological adherence. Influenced by what boils down to an Enlightenment belief that human nature is essentially good and a Marxist belief in the eradication of oppressive and corruptive structures of power as a panacea for socio-political ills, left-wing academics and civil liberty groups are ideologically opposed to arguments that are rooted in a less sanguine interpretation of human nature and its political potential. Their premise is flawed, namely, that if human beings display harmful behaviour the fault must lie with society, or its political structures, or be caused by malignant international influences. Emerging from this nest of ideas and values is an anti-state prejudice which manifests itself in varying degrees of conviction. However, the problem with this tendency is its muted criticism of terrorism. Another problem is its downplaying of individual moral responsibility in acts of violence. In part, the success of the Left in terms of influencing academic debate about security, is a reflection of the marginalisation of the victims of terrorism whose personal accounts paint a much nastier picture of terrorist groups and those who are content to join them. Terrorism is a painful illustration of deep inter-group fractures. It is a phenomenon which points to the flaws in human nature as the violence is particularly ugly, but the warped features of an ideology make the effects of violence tolerable to the perpetrator. It is naïve of the Left not to accept—in a way accepted by scholars of a right-wing persuasion—that the terrorist threat could become magnified. All that is required is for terrorists to gain access to more deadly weaponry and this is a disquieting possibility. However, instead of being open to evidence that suggests the need to adopt a firmer set of counter-terrorist policies, it would seem that the Left prefer to cling to their ideological climbing pegs even though the rock face may end up crumbling. A nuclear strike on a major US (or European) city would constitute a crumbling of sorts and its threat has been taken seriously amongst members of the security community (Allison 2004). The topic has also been the subject of a troubling Hollywood thriller: *Unthinkable* (2010) directed by Gregor Jordan.

Thirdly, terrorism is a sly beast. It creeps up unnoticed and all too easily drifts from public view as the media focuses the public's attention on another drama. A pertinent example of this process occurred in the UK in 2017. On the 22 May an Islamic suicide bomber murdered 22 people at the Manchester Arena. Many of them were young people who had been attending a concert. The incident received intense and widespread media attention. Only twelve days later the debate about how to deal with terrorism was further energised when another Islamic attack, this time in London, left eight people dead. At this time discussions about how to deal with terrorism appeared urgent and earnest. However, eleven days after the London attack the media switched the nation's attention to a tower block which had caught fire in London. The media's shift of focus was understandable as the fire resulted in many fatalities but during the transfer of attention the nation lost sight of the debate about how to respond to terrorism and it therefore petered out. This process serves the interests of the terrorist. With the exception of September 11, a single terrorist attack neither impacts on a sufficiently large number of people nor do attacks occur *regularly* enough to alter fundamentally our approach to the problem (although the lives of the primary and secondary victims of an attack will be profoundly affected but as they are relatively few in number the wider impact is limited). However, while September 11 honed Americans' understanding of the dangers of terrorism it did not deeply change the mood in continental Europe despite some countries experiencing deadly attacks. This has benefited the terrorists in that such attacks have not given rise to a consensus-driven hard-hitting Western response to terrorism never mind initiate a globally agreed upon strategy. In contrast, the demand of the unionist community in Northern Ireland for tougher security measures against the IRA was a direct reflection both of the *sustained* nature of terrorist attacks and the *constant* threat of others occurring. When exposed to a high and continual level of terrorist violence those affected by it will call for the adoption of harsher measures to deal with the problem. It is then the responsibility of the government to create a legal framework which will enable the security forces successfully to combat terrorism.

In closing, a few points need to be made. It is testimony to the RUC's role in countering terrorism and policing a deeply divided society that there is a demand overseas for RUC/PSNI and ex-RUC officers to share their experience with other policing agencies. This work is carried out by Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas. The cooperation speaks

of the professionalism of the RUC and is an example of the exporta-
tion of good policing practice elsewhere in the world. The RUC com-
batted terrorism on many fronts. Its balanced approach to dealing with
the problem is evidenced in the thousands of loyalists imprisoned dur-
ing the conflict. Most important of all was the force's commitment to
arresting the most dangerous loyalist, Johnny Adair. In the wake of new
legislation, the RUC gathered the evidence to arrest Adair on grounds
of directing terrorism. Moreover, Adair's team were also arrested
and imprisoned. Their imprisonment removed the greatest threat to
the nationalist community in West and North Belfast. Of course, the
RUC had a history of putting loyalist teams out of action in this area
and beyond: the arrest of Lenny Murphy and the Shankill Butchers in
the late 1970s made Belfast safer for members of the Roman Catholic
community. However, perhaps the RUC's most significant achievement
was the physical barrier of its own officers which kept apart two ethnic
blocs. Within each bloc were elements that detested the Other commu-
nity and celebrated the use of violence, but the fabric of Northern Irish
society was held together despite the upheavals of the Hunger Strikes in
1981 and Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. Yet, to this can be added the
force's ability to contain a serious and prolonged terrorist threat until a
political solution could be found. Although counterfactual speculation,
it is nonetheless worth considering the following questions as they help
us grasp the contribution of the RUC, not only to making the 1998
peace agreement possible, but maintaining Northern Ireland's position
within the Union: what might the future of Northern Ireland have been
if RUC morale had crumpled or the force had faltered at certain key
moments? It is very likely the problem of terrorism would have erupted
into larger outbreaks of ethnic conflict with lethal consequences. What
level of confidence would the British government have had in maintain-
ing a strong link between the province and the rest of the UK if the law
enforcement agency had collapsed? Undoubtedly, British governmental
resolve to maintain the constitutional relationship would have weakened.
What message would have been sent to the wider British community if
the Ulsterisation of the conflict had not been possible because terrorism
had rendered men and women unwilling to don the RUC uniform and

uphold law-and-order? In such circumstances it would have been argued that it was not the responsibility of the English, Scottish or Welsh to shoulder the burden and serious constitutional debates would have arisen which may not have favoured a status quo outcome. As we have seen, however, the counter-terrorist achievements of the RUC had its costs for both police officers and their families but the lasting legacy of the sacrifice is an enormous sense of pride in the accomplishments of the Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross. Therefore, when examining either the effectiveness of policing in combating terrorism or the ability of a police force to withstand decades of sustained terrorist assault, the RUC offers an unparalleled case study.

References

Allison, G. (2004). *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York: Henry Holt.

Clarke, L. (2013). Martin McGuinness Refuses to Condemn IRA 'Human Bomb' Attack in 1990 Dubbed the 'Work of Satan' by Catholic Bishop. *Belfast Telegraph*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/martin-mcguinness-refuses-to-condemn-ira-human-bomb-attack-in-1990-dubbed-the-work-of-satan-by-catholic-bishop-29733940.html.

Dershowitz, A. (2002). *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

English, R. (2009). *Terrorism: How to Respond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Independent. (2016). Sadiq Khan: London Mayor Says Being Prepared for Terror Attacks 'Part and Parcel' of Living in a Major City. *Independent*. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sadiq-khan-london-mayor-terrorism-attacks-part-and-parcel-major-cities-new-york-bombing-a7322846.html.

Matchett, W. (2016). *Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that Beat the IRA*. Lisburn: Hiskey Ltd.

O'Brien, C. (1990). Foreword. In M. Dillon (Ed.), *The Dirty War* (pp. xi–xvii). London: Arrow Books.

Unthinkable. (2010) [DVD]. Directed by Gregor Jordan. USA: Lleju Productions.

Urban, M. (1992). *Big Boys' Rules*. London: Faber and Faber.

Wilkinson, P. (2000). *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. London: Frank Cass.

Bibliography

Abdollahi, M. (2002). Understanding Police Stress Research. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 2*(2), 1–24.

Abghari, M., Monroy, A., Schubl, S., Davidovitch, R., & Egol, K. (2015). Outcomes Following Low-Energy Civilian Gunshot Wound Trauma to the Lower Extremities: Results of a Standard Protocol at an Urban Trauma Center. *The Iowa Orthopaedic Journal, 35*, 65–69.

Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations. *Gender and Society, 4*(2), 139–158.

Addison, M. (2002). *Violent Politics: Strategies of Internal Conflict.* New York: Palgrave.

Alicke, M. (2000). Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame. *Psychological Bulletin, 126*(4), 556–574.

Allen, W. (1998). Grief as Cancer Kills Brave Alice. *Belfast Telegraph.* Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/imported/grief-as-cancer-kills-brave-alice-28296449.

Allison, G. (2004). *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.* New York: Henry Holt.

Almoshmosh, N. (2016). The Role of War Trauma Survivors in Managing Their Own Mental Condition, Syria Civil War as an Example. *Avicenna Journal of Medicine, 6*(2), 54–59.

Anshel, M. (2000). A Conceptual Model and Implications for Coping with Stressful Events in Police Work. *Criminal Justice and Behavior, 27*(3), 375–400.

Argomaniz, J., & Lynch, O. (2015). *Victims of Terrorism. A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Study.* London: Routledge.

Ashe, F. (2012). Gendering War and Peace: Militarized Masculinities in Northern Ireland. *Men and Masculinities, 15*(3), 230–248.

Atiyeh, B., Gunn, S., & Hayek, S. (2007). Military and Civilian Burn Injuries During Armed Conflicts. *Annals of Burns and Fire Disasters, 20*(4), 203–215.

Baber, M. (1998). *Northern Ireland: The Release of Prisoners Under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Bill* (Research Paper 98/65). House of Commons Library.

Baber, M. (2000). *House of Commons* (Research Paper 00/58). House of Commons Library. Available from http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP00-58/RP00-58.pdf.

Bandura, A. (2004). The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. In F. Moghaddam & A. Marsella (Eds.), *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions* (pp. 121–150). Washington: American Psychological Association.

Bartlett, C., Helfet, D., Hausman, M., & Strauss, E. (2000). Ballistics and Gunshot Wounds: Effects on Musculoskeletal Tissues. *Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 8*(1), 21–36.

BBC. (1998). *Tit-for-Tat Murders in N Ireland.* Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/48753.stm.

BBC. (2001). Irish Criticise NI Border Controls. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1200374.stm.

BBC. (2006a). *IRA 'Was Wrong' Over Bodies Issue.* Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/5170594.stm.

BBC. (2006b). IEDs: Iraq's Deadly Roadside Bombs. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4779437.stm.

BBC. (2007). Sinn Fein Votes to Support Police. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6308175.stm.

BBC. (2009). *NI Troubles Legacy to Cost £300m.* Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7855035.stm.

BBC. (2009). *Reaction to Eames/Bradley Report.* Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7856590.stm.

BBC. (2013). *Northern Ireland: Richard Haass Talks End Without Deal.* Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-25556714.

BBC. (2016a). *RUC Memorial Plaque: Stephen Martin Admits 'Mistakes Were Made'.* Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-35724317.

BBC. (2016b). *US Police Shootings: How Many Die Each Year?* Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-36826297.

BBC. (2017). *Timeline of Dissident Republican Activity.* Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-10866072.

Beekley, A., Sebesta, J., Blackbourne, L., Herbert, G., Kauvar, D., & Baer, D. (2008). Prehospital Tourniquet Use in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Effect on Hemorrhage Control and Outcomes. *The Journal of Trauma Injury, Infection, and Critical Care, 64*(2), 28–37.

Belfast Telegraph. (2012). *Thousands Mark RUC Anniversary*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/thousands-mark-ruc-anniversary-28754627.html.

Belfast Telegraph. (2013). *Planning Probe Focusing on Who Owns IRA Monument Site*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/planning-probe-focusing-on-who-owns-ira-monument-site-29535298.html.

Benedict, H. (2009). *The Lonely Soldier*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Black, A., McCabe, D., & McConnell, N. (2013). Ten Years on, Living with the 'Psychological Troubles': Retired Police Officers in Northern Ireland. *The Irish Journal of Psychology, 34*(2), 93–108.

Boal, F. (1969). Territoriality on the Shankill-Falls Divide, Belfast. *Irish Geography, 6*(1), 30–50.

Bonanno, G., & Kaltman, S. (2001). The Varieties of Grief Experience. *Clinical Psychology Review, 21*(5), 705–734.

Bowlby-West, L. (1983). The Impact of Death on the Family System. *Journal of Family Therapy, 5*, 279–294.

Breslau, N., Chilcoat, H., Kessler, R., & Davis, G. (1999). Previous Exposure to Trauma and PTSD Effects of Subsequent Trauma: Results from the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma. *American Journal of Psychiatry, 156*(6), 902–907.

Brewer, J. (1990). Talking About Danger: The RUC and the Paramilitary Threat. *Sociology, 24*(4), 657–674.

Brewer, J. (1991). Hercules, Hippolyte and the Amazons—Or Policewomen in the RUC. *British Journal of Sociology, 42*(2), 231–247.

Brewer, J., & Magee, K. (1991). *Inside the RUC: Routine Policing in a Divided Society*. New York: Clarendon Press.

Brismar, B., & Bergenwald, L. (1982). The Terrorist Bomb Explosion in Bologna, Italy, 1980: An Analysis of the Effects and Injuries Sustained. *The Journal of Trauma, 22*(3), 216–220.

Brogan, B. (2000). Patten Loses Seat, Colony and Now Interest. *The Telegraph*. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1341844/Patten-loses-seat-colony-and-now-interest.html.

Brown, J., & Reingen, P. (1987). Social Ties and Word-of-Mouth Referral Behavior. *Journal of Consumer Research, 14*(3), 350–362.

Brown, M., & Marshall, S. (1988, 29 October). The Enniskillen Bomb: A Disaster Plan. *British Medical Journal, 297*, 1113–1116.

Bruce, S. (1992). *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S. (1993). Loyalists in Northern Ireland: Further Thoughts on 'Pro-State Terror'. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 5*(4), 253–265.

Bruce, S. (1997). Victim Selection in Ethnic Conflict: Motives and Attitudes in Irish Republicanism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(1), 56–71.

Bures, O. (2011). EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? New York: Routledge.

Byman, D. (1998). The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21*(2), 149–169.

Byman, D. (2005). Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. *Survival, 47*(4), 117–144.

CAIN website. *The Agreement*. Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm.

Cairns, E., & Wilson, R. (1984). The Impact of Political Violence on Mild Psychiatric Morbidity in Northern Ireland. *British Journal of Psychiatry, 145*, 631–635.

Cairns, E., Hunter, D., & Herring, L. (1980). Young Children's Awareness of Violence in Northern Ireland: The Influence of Northern Irish Television in Scotland and Northern Ireland. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19*(1), 3–6.

Cameron Report. (1969). *Disturbances in Northern Ireland*. Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Cameron, M. (1993). *The Women in Green*. Belfast: RUC Historical Society.

Campbell, R., & Germain, A. (2016). Nightmares and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). *Current Sleep Medicine Reports, 2*(2), 74–80.

Canetti-Nisim, D., Eran Halperin, E., Sharvit, K., & Hobfoll, S. (2009). A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53*(3), 363–389.

Carlier, I., Voerman, A., & Gersons, B. (2000). The Influence of Occupational Debriefing on Post-traumatic Stress Symptomatology in Traumatized Police Officers. *British Journal of Medical Psychology, 73*(1), 87–98.

Carroll, R. (2005). Elusive Sniper Saps US Morale in Baghdad. *The Guardian*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/aug/05/iraq.usa.

Clark, W., & Raustiala, K. (2007, August 8). Why Terrorists Aren't Soldiers. *The New York Times*. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/opinion/08clark.html.

Clarke, L. (2013). Martin McGuinness Refuses to Condemn IRA 'Human Bomb' Attack in 1990 Dubbed the 'Work of Satan' by Catholic Bishop. *Belfast Telegraph*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/martin-mcguinness-refuses-to-condemn-ira-human-bomb-attack-in-1990-dubbed-the-work-of-satan-by-catholic-bishop-29733940.html.

Cohen, S., & Wills, T. (1985). Stress, Social Support, and the Buffering Hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin, 98*(2), 310–357.

Coleraine Times. (2008). Forgotten Massacre. Available from http://www.colerainetimes.co.uk/news/forgotten-massacre-1-1969928.

Collins, B., & Gibbs, A. (2003). Stress in Police Officers: A Study of the Origins, Prevalence and Severity of Stress-Related Symptoms Within a County Police Force. *Occupational Medicine, 53*(4), 256–264.

Collins, E. (1997). *Killing Rage*. London: Granta Publications.

Coming of Age in Belfast. (1983). *WCVB-TV Boston*. Available from YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brnoYp1PLow.

Connolly, P., & Healy, J. (2004). *Children and the Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Experiences and Perspectives of 3–11 Year Olds*. Available from http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/childrenandconflict.pdf.

Cooper, G., Maynard, R., Cross, N., & Hill, J. (1983). Casualties from Terrorist Bombings. *The Journal of Trauma, 23*(11), 955–967.

Craig, T., & Wilson, S. (2011). 5 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq. *The Washington Post*. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/more-violence-in-iraq-iraqi-us-soldiers-killed/2011/06/06/AGj8r7JH_story.html.

Crawley, E. (2002). Bringing It All Back Home? The Impact of Prison Officers' Work on Their Families. *Probation Journal, 49*(4), 277–286.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics, 13*(4), 379–399.

Curran, P., Bell, P., Murray, A., Loughrey, G., Roddy, R., & Rocke, L. (1990). Psychological Consequences of the Enniskillen Bombing. *British Journal of Psychiatry, 156*(4), 479–482.

Daily Mail. (2012). *Spending Too Much Time at Work When the Children were Young Is a Parent's Biggest Regret*. Available from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2203025/Spending-time-work-children-young-parents-chief-regret.html.

Dantzer, M. (1987). Police-Related Stress: A Critique for Future Research. *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 3*(3), 43–48.

Darcy, S. (2003). Punitive House Demolitions, the Prohibition of Collective Punishment, and the Supreme Court of Israel. *Penn State International Law Review, 21*(3, Article 4), 447–507.

De Sousa, A. (2010). Psychological Issues in Acquired Facial Trauma. *Indian Journal of Plastic Surgery, 43*(2), 200–205.

Dedini, R., Karacozoff, A., Shellock, F., Xu, D., McClellan, R., & Pekmezci, M. (2013). MRI Issues for Ballistic Objects: Information obtained at 1.5-, 3- and 7-Tesla. *The Spine Journal, 13*(7), 815–822.

DeJong, C. (2004). Gender Differences in Officer Attitude and Behavior: Providing Comfort to Citizens. *Women & Criminal Justice, 15*(3/4), 1–32.

DePalma, R., Burris, D., Champion, H., & Hodgson, M. (2005). Blast Injuries. *The New England Journal of Medicine, 352*(13), 1335–1342.

Dershowitz, A. (2002). *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dicpinigaitis, P., Koval, K., Tejwani, N., & Egol, K. (2006). Gunshot Wounds to the Extremities. *Bulletin of the NYU Hospital for Joint Diseases, 64*(3&4), 139–155.

Dillon, M. (1990). *The Dirty War*. London: Arrow Books.

Dingley, J. (1998). A Reply to White's Non-sectarian Thesis of PIRA Targeting. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(2), 106–117.

Dingley, J. (2012). *The IRA*. Oxford: Praeger.

Doherty, R. (2004). *The Thin Green Mile: The History of the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC*. South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword.

Drake, C. (1998). The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(2), 53–85.

Duckworth, A., Peterson, C., Matthews, M., & Kelly, D. (2007). Grit: Perseverance and Passion for Long-Term Goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92*(6), 1087–1101.

Duffy, J. (2001). *Rich Friends in New York*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1563119.stm.

Duffy, T. (1991). The Law v. the IRA: The Effect of Extradition Between the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the United States in Combatting the IRA. *Penn State International Law Review, 9*(2), 293–337.

Dwyer, C. (2007). Risk, Politics and the 'Scientification' of Political Judgment: Prisoner Release and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland. *British Journal of Criminology, 47*(5), 779–797.

Edwards, A., & McGrattan, C. (2011). Terroristic Narratives: On the (Re) Invention of Peace in Northern Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 23*(3), 357–376.

Edwards, A., & McGrattan, C. (2013). What We Talk About When We Talk About Peace: A Rejoinder to McEvoy and Shirlow. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 25*(3), 351–354.

Edwards, R. (2014). Sinn Fein Ally Richard Haass Was a Dumb Choice to Chair Northern Ireland Peace Talks. *Belfast Telegraph*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/columnists/ruth-dudley-edwards/sinn-fein-ally-richard-haass-was-a-dumb-choice-to-chair-northern-ireland-peace-talks-30392882.html.

Ellison, G., & Smyth, J. (2000). *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland*. London: Pluto Press.

English, R. (2003). *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

English, R. (2009). *Terrorism: How to Respond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferguson, N., Burgess, M., & Hollywood, I. (2010). Who Are the Victims? Victimhood Experiences in Postagreement Northern Ireland. *Political Psychology, 31*(6), 857–886.

Financial Times. (2017). *Russian Government Orchestrates Mass Anti-terror Demonstrations.* Available from https://www.ft.com/content/4b6d8326-1a04-11e7-a266-12672483791a.

Finch, J. (1983). *Married to the Job: Wives' Incorporation in Men's Work.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Finkenauer, C., & Rime, B. (1998). Socially Shared Emotional Experiences Vs. Emotional Experiences Kept Secret: Differential Characteristics and Consequences. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17*(3), 295–318.

Finnegan, R. (2002). Irish-American Relations. In W. Crotty & D. Schmitt (Eds.), *Ireland on the World Stage* (pp. 95–110). London: Routledge.

Flowerdew, J. (1998). *The Final Years of British Hong Kong.* London: MacMillan Press.

French, G. (2015). How NYPD's Hercules Team Serves as a Model for Counterterrorism. *Policeone.com.* Available from https://www.policeone.com/swat/articles/51474006-How-NYPDs-Hercules-team-serves-as-a-model-for-counterterrorism/.

Friedland, N., & Merari, A. (1985). The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword. *Political Psychology, 6*(4), 591–604.

Fukunishi, I. (1999). Relationship of Cosmetic Disfigurement to the Severity of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Burn Injury or Digital Amputation. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 68*(2), 82–86.

Galea, S., Ahern, J., Resnick, H., Kilpatrick, D., Bucuvalas, M., & Gold, J. (2002). Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City. *The New England Journal of Medicine, 346*(13), 982–987.

Ganor, B., & Wernli, M. (2013, October). *Terrorist Attacks Against Hospitals: Case Studies* (Working Paper 25).

Giliomee, H. (2003). *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People.* Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Gimson, A. (1986, April 19). When Loyalists Attack Officers. *The Spectator*, pp. 15–18.

Gocke, B. (1945). Morale in a Police Department. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 36*(3), 215–219.

Gonzalez-Perez, M. (2008). *Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terror Groups.* New York: Routledge.

Gove, M. (2000). *The Price of Peace: An Analysis of British Policy in Northern Ireland, Centre for Policy Studies.* London: Chameleon Press.

Green, B. (2004). Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in UK Police Officers. *Current Medical Research and Opinion, 20*(1), 101–105.

Grieve, R., & Williams, A. (1985). Young Children's Perception of Danger. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 3*(4), 385–392.

Guardian. (2014). *Jean McConville Timeline: How a 1972 Murder Returned to Haunt Gerry Adams*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/03/jean-mcconville-timeline-murder-gerry-adams.

Guelke, A. (1996). The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. *International Affairs, 72*(3), 521–536.

Guelke, A. (2012). *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hamilton, C. (2007). The Gender Politics of Political Violence: Women Armed Activists in ETA. *Feminist Review, 86*, 132–148.

Hannigan, J. (1985). The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology in the Provisional IRA. *Social Problems, 33*(1), 31–40.

Harnden, T. (1999). *Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Harrington, P. (2003). Advice to Women Beginning a Career in Policing. *Women & Criminal Justice, 14*(1), 1–13.

Harrison, M. (1994). France and International Terrorism: Problem and Response. In David Charters (Ed.), *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism* (pp. 103–136). London: Greenwood Press.

Hasso, F. (2005). Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs. *Feminist Review, 81*(1), 23–51.

Hayes, B., & McAllister, I. (2005). Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 17*(4), 599–617.

Hennessey, T. (2005). *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

Hersh, S. (2004, May 10). Torture at Abu Ghraib. *The New Yorker*. Available from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib.

Hewitt, C. (1981). Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the Civil Rights Period: A Reconsideration. *The British Journal of Sociology, 32*(3), 362–380.

Holmes, A., Rauch, P., & Cozza, S. (2013). When a Parent is Injured or Killed in Combat. *The Future of Children, 23*(2), 143–162.

Horesh, D., Solomon, Z., Zerach, G., & Ein-Dor, T. (2011). Delayed-Onset PTSD Among War Veterans: The Role of Life Events Throughout the Life Cycle. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 46*(9), 863–870.

Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. California: University of California Press.

Hull, J., Bowyer, G., Cooper, G., & Crane, J. (1994). Pattern of Injury in Those Dying From Traumatic Amputation Caused by Blast Bomb. *British Journal of Surgery, 81*(8), 1132–1135.

Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. (1995). *Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford university Press.

Independent. (2016). Sadiq Khan: London Mayor Says Being Prepared for Terror Attacks 'Part and Parcel' of Living in a Major City. *Independent.* Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sadiq-khan-london-mayor-terrorism-attacks-part-and-parcel-major-cities-new-york-bombing-a7322846.html.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Jackson, M. (2007). Gen Sir Mike Jackson Relives IRA Paras Bombs. *The Telegraph.* Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/1562283/Gen-Sir-Mike-Jackson-relives-IRA-Paras-bombs.html.

Jackson, S., & Maslach, C. (1982). After Effects of Job-Related Stress: Families as Victims. *Journal of Occupational Behaviour, 3,* 63–77.

Jebb, C., Liotta, P., Sherlock, T., & Beitler, R. (2006). *The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism.* London: Praeger.

Juni, S. (2016). Survivor Guilt: A Critical Review from the Lens of the Holocaust. *International Review of Victimology, 22*(3), 321–337.

Kallenbach, M. (2000). Peers Say Ulster Police Should Remain 'Royal'. *The Telegraph.* Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1371579/Peers-say-Ulster-police-should-remain-Royal.html.

Kennedy, E. (1973). Ulster is an International Issue. *Foreign Policy*, (11), 57–71.

Kilpatrick, C. (2014). IRA Victim Hits Out at 'Sick' Hunger Strike Parade Through Derrylin. *Belfast Telegraph.* Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/ira-victim-hits-out-at-sick-hunger-strike-parade-through-derrylin-30434718.html.

Kirk-Smith, M., & Dingley, J. (2009). Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of Intelligence. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20*(3–4), 551–573.

Kop, N., Euwena, M., & Schaufeli, W. (1999). Burnout, Job Stress and Violent Behaviour Among Dutch Police Officers. *Work and Stress, 13*(4), 326–340.

Krog, A. (1998). *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa.* London: Vintage Books.

Kurtz, D. (2008). Controlled Burn: The Gendering of Stress and Burnout in Modern Policing. *Feminist Criminology, 3*(3), 216–238.

Kusch, F. (2004). *Battleground Chicago: The Police and the 1968 Democratic National Convention.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leibovici, D., Gofrit, O., Stein, M., Shapira, S., Noga, Y., & Heruti, R. (1996). Blast Injuries: Bus Versus Open-Air Bombings—A Comparative Study of Injuries in Survivors of Open-Air Versus Confined-Space Explosions. *The Journal of Trauma, 41*(6), 1030–1035.

Lieberman, A., & Van Horn, P. (2008). *Psychotherapy with Infants and Young Children.* New York: Guilford Press.

Lifton, R., & Olson, E. (1976). The Human Meaning of Total Disaster. *Psychiatry, 39*(1), 1–18.

Lock, J. (2014). *The British Policewoman*. London: Robert Hale.

Los Angeles Times. (1991, November 3). IRA Bomb at Belfast Hospital Kills 2, Injures 10. Available from http://articles.latimes.com/1991%9611-03/news/mn-1584_1_hospital-kills-bomb.

Loughran, C. (1986). Armagh and Feminist Strategy: Campaigns Around Republican Women Prisoners in Armagh Jail. *Feminist Review, 23*, 59–79.

Lowe, W. (2002). The War Against the R.I.C: 1919–21. *Eire-Ireland, 37*(3–4), 79–117.

Lynch, T. (2003). The Gerry Adams Visa in Anglo-American Relations. *Irish Studies in International Affairs, 14*, 33–44.

MacGinty, R., & Du Toit, P. (2007). A Disparity of Esteem: Relative Group Status in Northern Ireland After the Belfast Agreement. *Political Psychology, 28*(1), 13–31.

MacGinty, R., Muldoon, O., & Fergusion, N. (2007). No War, No Peace Northern Ireland after the Agreement. *Political Psychology, 28*(1), 1–11.

Macgregor, F. (1990). Facial Disfigurement: Problems and Management of Social Interaction and Implications for Mental Health. *Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, 14*(1), 249–257.

Machel, G. (1996). *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, United Nations. Available from http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf.

MacLeod, A. (1991, November 6). British Grapple with IRA Move to Target Hospitals. *Christian Science Monitor*. Available from https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1106/06062.html.

MacLeod, D. (2005). London: Past Terror Attacks. *The Guardian*. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/07/terrorism.july73.

Macquigg, J. (2011). *History of the RUC Reserve: 1970–2001*. Belfast: RUC George Cross Foundation.

Mahambrey, T., Pendry, K., Nee, A., Bonney, S., & Nee, P. (2013). Critical Care in Emergency Department: Massive Haemorrhage in Trauma. *Emergency Medical Journal, 30*(1), 9–14.

Majendie, P. (1991). N. Ireland Police Live with Constant Fear. *Reuters*. Available from http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-28/news/mn-1460_1_n-ireland-police-live.

Mapstone, R. (1994). *Policing in a Divided Society: A Study of Part-Time Policing in Northern Ireland*. Avebury: University of Michigan.

Marques, P. (2003). *Guerilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments* (Unpublished MA thesis). Available from www.fas.org/man/eprint/marques.pdf.

Martin, S. (1999). Police Force or Police Service: Gender and Emotional Labor. *The Annals, 561*, 111–126.

Martin, S., & Jurik, N. (2007). *Doing Justice, Doing Gender: Women in Legal and Criminal Justice Occupations* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.

Matchett, W. (2015). Security: Missing from the Northern Ireland Model. *Democracy and Security, 11*(1), 1–43.

Matchett, W. (2016). *Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that Beat the IRA*. Lisburn: Hiskey Ltd.

McCargo, B. (2001). *No Regrets as a Catholic in the RUC*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1634688.stm.

McCartney, J. (2012). The DUP's Nigel Dodds May Soon Be Propping Up the Tories. What Does He Want? *The Spectator*. Available from http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9506862/the-dups-nigel-dodds-may-be-about-to-hold-westminsters-balance-of-power-so-what-does-he-want/.

McEvoy, K. (1998). Prisoner Release and Conflict Resolution: International Lessons for Northern Ireland. *International Criminal Justice Review, 8*(1), 33–60.

McEvoy, K., & Conway, H. (2004). The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of the Past. *Journal of Law and Society, 31*(4), 539–562.

McEvoy, K., & McConnachie, K. (2012). Victimology in Transitional Justice: Victimhood, Innocence and Hierarchy. *European Journal of Criminology, 9*(5), 527–538.

McEvoy, K., & Shirlow, P. (2013). The Northern Ireland Peace Process and "Terroristic" Narratives: A Reply to Edwards and McGrattan. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 25*(2), 161–166.

McGrattan, C. (2015). The Stormont House Agreement and the New Politics of Storytelling in Northern Ireland. *Parliamentary Affairs, 69*(4), 928–946.

McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C., & McVea, D. (1999). *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

Melchionne, T. (1967). Current Status and Problems of Women Police. *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 58*(2), 257–260.

Merari, A. (2005). Israel Facing Terrorism. *Israel Affairs, 11*(1), 223–237.

Miller, S. (1998). Rocking the Rank and File: Gender Issues and Community Policing. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 14*(2), 156–172.

Monaghan, R. (2004). "An Imperfect Peace": Paramilitary "Punishments" in Northern Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 16*(3), 439–461.

Mulvihill, D. (2001). The Legality of the Pardoning of Paramilitaries Under the Early Release Provisions of Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement. *Cornell International Law Journal, 34*(1, Article 6), 227–256.

Muñoz-Torres, J. (2012). Truth and Objectivity in Journalism. *Journalism Studies, 13*(4), 566–582.

Murphy, J. (2013). *Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Murphy, S. (1993). 'I Don't Support the Ira but…' Semantic and Psychological Ambivalence. *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 82*(327), 276–286.

Murray, J. (2005). Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities? *Police Practice and Research, 6*(4), 347–361.

Murray, R. (1984). Killings of Local Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969–1981. *Terrorism: An International Journal, 7*(1), 11–52.

Nelson, T., Clark, T., Stedje-Larson, E., Lewis, C., Grueskin, J., & Echols, E. (2008). Close Proximity Blast Injury Patterns From Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: A Report of 18 Cases. *The Journal of Trauma, 65*(1), 212–217.

News Letter. (2012). *Concern After IRA Bombs Van and Police Base*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/concern-after-ira-bombs-van-and-police-base-1-3875641.

News Letter. (2014). *Government Papers: Unionists Told Nothing Wrong With Council Name Change*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/government-papers-unionists-told-nothing-wrong-with-council-name-change-1-5786992.

News Letter. (2015). *Declassified Files: Thatcher Wrote Personal Note to Bloomfield After Bombs*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/declassified-files-thatcher-wrote-personal-note-to-bloomfield-after-bombs-1-7138023.

News Letter. (2016). *Villiers Drawn into Row Over Movement of RUC Memorial*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/villiers-drawn-into-row-over-movement-of-ruc-memorial-1-7248870.

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. (2013). *Dealing with Northern Ireland's Past: Towards a Transitional Justice Approach* (p. 3). Belfast: Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

O'Brien, B. (1995). *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

O'Brien, C. (1977). Liberty and Terrorism. *International Security, 2*(2), 56–67.

O'Brien, C. (1991). Foreword in Dillion, M. *The Dirty War* (pp. xi–xvii). London: Arrow.

O'Callaghan, M., & O'Donnell, C. (2006). The Northern Ireland Government, the 'Paisleyite Movement' and Ulster Unionism in 1966. *Irish Political Studies, 21*(2), 203–222.

O'Doherty, S. (2011). *The Volunteer*. Durham: Strategic Book Group.

O'Kane, E. (2007). Decommissioning and the Peace Process: Where Did It Come From and Why Did It Stay So Long? *Irish Political Studies, 22*(1), 81–101.

O'Mally, P. (2000). Northern Ireland and South Africa: Conflicts Without End, Guns Beyond Use. *Fortnight*, 386, 1–18.

Ophuls, M. (1972). *A Sense of Loss*. Switzerland: Cinema X, Societe Suisse de Television.

Oppenheimer, A. (2009). *IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

Patel, H., Dryden, S., Gupta, A., & Ang, S. (2012). Pattern and Mechanism of Traumatic Limb Amputations After Explosive Blast: Experience from the 07/07/05 London Terrorist Bombings. *Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 73*(1), 276–281.

Patten Report. (1999). A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland. The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland.

Patterson, H. (2008). War of National Liberation or Ethnic Cleansing: IRA Violence During the Troubles in Fermanagh. In B. Bowden & M. Davis (Eds.), *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism* (pp. 230–242). Queensland: University of Queensland Press.

Patterson, H. (2012). The Border Security Problem and Anglo-Irish Relations 1970–1973. *Contemporary British History, 26*(2), 231–251.

Patterson, H. (2013). The Provisional IRA, the Border, and Anglo-Irish relations During the Troubles. *Small Wars and Insurgencies, 24*(3), 493–517.

Patterson, H. (2013). *Ireland's Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations During the Troubles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Petersen, K., Riddle, M., Danko, J., Blazes, D., Hayden, R., & Tasker, S. (2007). Trauma-Related Infections in Battlefield Casualties from Iraq. *Annals of Surgery, 245*(5), 803–811.

Peterson, J. (2016). *Interview on the Joe Rogan Experience*, 28 November, 2016. Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04wyGK6k6HE.

Police Ombudsman Report. (2006). *Report into the Complaint by James and Michael Conville Regarding the Police Investigation into the Abduction and Murder of Their Mother Mrs. Jean McConville* (Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland).

Primoratz, I. (1997). The Morality of Terrorism. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14*(3), 221–233.

Prince, S. (2007). *Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

Prince, S. (2012). 5 October 1968 and the Beginning of the Troubles: Flashpoints, Riots and Memory. *Irish Political Studies, 27*(3), 394–410.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of the 12th August 1949. Available from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/volume-1125-I-17512-English.pdf.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rabe-Hemp, C. (2008). Survival in an "all boys club": Policewomen and Their Fight for Acceptance. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 31*(2), 251–270.

Rando, T. (1993). The Increasing Prevalence of Complicated Mourning: The Onslaught Is Just Beginning. *Omega Journal of Death and Dying, 26*(1), 43–59.

Rich, K. (2014). *Interviewing Rape Victims: Practice and Policy Issues in an International Context*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richards, A. (2001). Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the Peace Process and Democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(4), 72–89.

Richey, W. (1985, January 14). On the Trail of US Funds for IRA. *Christian Science Monitor*. Available from https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0114/anor1.html.

Rieff, D. (1995, November/December) Denying Moral Equivalence. *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 151–152.

Rignault, D., & Deligny, M. (1989). The 1986 Terrorist Bombing Experience in Paris. *Annals of Surgery, 209*(3), 368–373.

Robinson, P. (2012). Senior Republican's Shame at Bloody Friday. *News Letter*. Available from http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/senior-republicans-shame-at-bloody-friday-28773180.html.

RTE Archives. *Haughey and Blaney Sacked in Arms Scandal*. Available from http://www.rte.ie/archives/2015/0506/699036-haughey-and-blaney-sacked-in-arms-scandal/.

Rubonis, A., & Bickman, L. (1991). Psychological Impairment in the Wake of Disaster: The Disaster-Psychopathology Relationship. *Psychological Bulletin, 109*(3), 384–399.

Ryder, C. (1986). Sir John and His Men: Tensions in a Critical Year. *Fortnight*, (234), 6–7.

Ryder, C. (2000). *The RUC 1922–2000: A Force Under Fire*. London: Arrow.

Saeed, H. (2016). Victims and Victimhood: Individuals of Inaction or Active Agents of Change? Reflections on Fieldwork in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Transitional Justice, 10*(1), 168–178.

Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2007). The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 19*(3), 289–306.

Sanders, A. (2013). Operation Motorman (1972) and the Search for a Coherent British Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24*(3), 465–492.

Schmid, A. (2012). *Strengthening the Role of Victims and Incorporating Victims in Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper. ICCT: The Netherlands.

Schmid, A. (Ed.). (2011). *The Routledge of Terrorism Handbook*. New York: London.

Seeman, M. (1959). On the Meaning of Alienation. *American Sociological Review, 24*(6), 783–791.

Shirlow, P., & McEvoy, K. (2008). *Beyond the Wire: Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland*. London: Pluto Press.

Shirlow, P., Tonge, J., McAuley, J., & McGlynn, C. (2010). *Abandoning Historical Conflict?: Former Political Prisoners and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Shirlow, P., Graham, B., Murtagh, B., Robinson, G., & Southern, N. (2005). *Negotiating Change: Sharing and Conflict Amelioration in Derry/Londonderry*. Belfast: OFMDFM, Equality Unit/Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Silke, A. (2016). Ferocious Times: The IRA, the RIC, and Britain's Failure in 1919–1921. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 28*(3), 417–434.

Simpson, K. (2008). *University of Ulster Human Rights Researcher Dr. Kirk Simpson Looks at Unionists and Their Perceptions of the La Mon Bombing*. Available from http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/university-of-ulster-human-rights-researcher-dr-kirk-simpson-looks-at-unionists-and-their-perceptions-of-the-la-mon-bombing-1-1864407.

Sinclair, G. (2012). Exporting the UK Police 'Brand': The RUC-PSNI and the International Policing Agenda. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 6*(1), 55–66.

Sledjeski, E., Speisman, B., & Dierker, L. (2008). Does Number of Lifetime Traumas Explain the Relationship Between PTSD and Chronic Medical Conditions? Answers from the National Comorbidity Survey-Replication (NCS-R). *Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 31*(4), 341–349.

Smid, G., Van der Velden, P., Gersons, B., & Kleber, R. (2012). Late-Onset Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following a Disaster: A Longitudinal Study. *Psychological Trauma, Theory, Research, Practice and Policy, 4*(3), 312–322.

Smith, A., Scott, S., & Wiese, D. (1990). The Psychological Effects of Sports Injuries Coping. *Sports Medicine, 9*(6), 352–369.

Smyth, M. (1998). Remembering in Northern Ireland: Victims, Perpetrators and Hierarchies of Pain and Responsibility. In B. Hamber (Ed.), *Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition* (pp. 31–49). Derry/Londonderry: INCORE.

Smyth, M. (1996). *Two Policy Papers*. Londonderry: Templegrove Action Research.

Smyth, M. (2004). *The Impact of Political Conflict on Children in Northern Ireland*. ICR Institute for Conflict Research. Available from http://conflictresearch.org.uk/reports/young-people/CCIC-Report-The-Impact-of-Political-Conflict-on-Children.pdf.

Solomon, Z. (2001). The Impact of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Military Situations. *Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62*(Suppl. 17), 11–15.

Solomon, Z., Mikulincer, M., & Jakob, B. (1987). Exposure to Recurrent Combat Stress: Combat Stress Reactions Among Israeli Soldiers in the Lebanon War. *Psychological Medicine, 17*(2), 433–440.

Southern, N. (2006). Reconciliation in Londonderry: The Challenges and Constraints Experienced by Protestant Clergy. *Peace and Change, 31*(4), 506–532.

Southern, N. (2007). Protestant Alienation: A Political, Cultural and Geographical Examination. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33*(1), 159–180.

Southern, N. (2015). Conflict Transformation and Truth-Seeking: The Impact of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the National Party. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21*(3), 335–356.

Southwick, S., Bonanno, G., Masten, A., Panter-Brick, C., & Yehuda, R. (2014). Resilience Definitions, Theory, and Challenges: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. *European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 5*, 1–14.

Spjut, R. (1986). Internment and Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland 1971–1975: Ministerial Policy and Practice. *Modern Law Review, 49*(6), 712–739.

Spratt, M. (2008). When Police Dogs Attacked: Iconic News Photographs and Construction of History, Mythology, and Political Discourse. *American Journalism, 25*(2), 85–105.

Stansbury, L., Lalliss, S., Branstetter, J., Bagg, M., & Holcomb, J. (2008). Amputations in U.S. Military Personnel in the Current Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Journal of Orthopaedic Trauma, 22*(1), 43–46.

Stein, M., & Hirshberg, A. (1999). Medical Consequences of Terrorism: The Conventional Weapon Threat. *Surgical Clinics of North America, 79*(6), 1537–1552.

Stroebe, M., Schut, H., & Boerner, K. (2013). Bereavement: A Family Affair. *Family Science, 4*(1), 1–3.

Summers, C. (2009). *Lives Lost to the Troubles.* Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/7853266.stm.

Sutton, M. (2002). *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland.* Online resource available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/index.html#append.

Tenny, E. (1953). Women's Work in Law Enforcement. *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 44*(2), 239–246.

The Telegraph. (2000). *Stop Patten's Sectarian Plan.* Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/4253433/Stop-Pattens-sectarian-plan.html.

Thompson, J. (2001). *American Policy and Northern Ireland: A Saga of Peacebuilding.* London: Praeger.

Toolis, K. (1995). *Rebel Hearts.* London: Picador.

Trotter, S. (2010). *Constabulary Heroes 1826–2009.* Coleraine: Impact Printing.

UN Report. (2004). *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.* Available from http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html.

Unthinkable. (2010) [DVD]. Directed by Gregor Jordan. USA: Lleju Productions.

Urban, M. (1992). *Big Boys' Rules*. London: Faber and Faber.

Vachon, M., & Stylianos, S. (1988). The Role of Social Support in Bereavement. *Journal of Social Issues, 44*(3), 175–190.

Victor, P. (1994). Family Mourns Its Third Ulster Victim. *Independent*. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/family-mourns-its-third-ulster-victim-1437754.html.

Von Tangen Page, M. (1998). *Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: Penal Policy in the Reduction of Political Violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, 1968–97*. London: Macmillan.

Von Tangen Page, M. (2006). A 'Most Difficult and Unpalatable Part': The Release of Politically Motivated Violent Offenders. In M. Cox, A. Guelke, & F. Stephen (Eds.), *A Farewell to Arms?: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement* (pp. 201–211). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books.

Walzer, M. (1988). Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses. In S. Luper-Foy (Ed.), *Problems of International Justice* (pp. 237–247). Boulder: Westview Press.

Weitzer, R. (1985). Policing a Divided Society: Obstacles to Normalization in Northern Ireland. *Social Problems, 33*(1), 41–55.

White, R. (1997). The Irish Republican Army: An Assessment of Sectarianism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 9*(1), 20–55.

White, R. (1998). Don't Confuse Me with the Facts: More on the Irish Republican Army and the Facts. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 10*(4), 164–189.

Wightman, J., & Gladish, S. (2001). Explosions and Blast Injuries. *Annals of Emergency Medicine, 37*(6), 664–678.

Wilkinson, P. (2000). *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. London: Frank Cass.

Wolin, R. (2002). September 11 and the Self-castigating Left. *South Central Review, 19*(2/3), 39–49.

Wong, E., Marshall, G., Shetty, V., Zhou, A., Belzberg, H., & Yamashita, D. (2007). Survivors of Violence-Related Facial Injury: Psychiatric Needs and Barriers to Mental Health Care. *General Hospital Psychiatry, 29*(2), 117–122.

Woods, I. (1999). The IRA's Border Campaign, 1956–1962. In M. Anderson & E. Bort (Eds.), *The Irish Border: History, Politics, Culture*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Young, A., & Gray, D. (2011). Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future. *Global Security Studies, 2*(4), 65–76.

Index