

International and Cultural Psychology
Series Editor: Anthony J. Marsella, Ph.D.

Kwang-Kuo Hwang

Foundations of Chinese Psychology

Confucian Social Relations

International and Cultural Psychology

For further volumes:
<http://www.springer.com/series/6089>

Kwang-Kuo Hwang

Foundations of Chinese Psychology

Confucian Social Relations

 Springer

Kwang-Kuo Hwang
Department of Psychology
National Taiwan University
Taipei, Taiwan
kkhwang@ntu.edu.tw

ISSN 1574-0455
ISBN 978-1-4614-1438-4 e-ISBN 978-1-4614-1439-1
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-1439-1
Springer New York Dordrecht Heidelberg London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2011941597

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden.

The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

*To My Mentors:
Anthony J. Marsella & Kuo-Shu Yang
Who guided me to the path of indigenous
psychology*

Foreword

Professor Hwang Kwang Kuo is a pioneer scholar in cultural psychology, the topical and methodological area of psychology concerned with investigating the cultural determinants of human behavior. Cultural psychology has been particularly interested in understanding and valuing the subjective experience of different ethnocultural groups, especially their cultural constructions of reality. Within cultural psychology, Professor Hwang has devoted much of his professional career to the study of indigenous psychologies. Within the past few decades, indigenous psychologies have become the topic of increased interest among non-Western psychologists, many of who studied in the West and returned to their countries only to be confronted with serious issues about the validity and applicability of the Western psychologies they had so diligently been taught.

Fathali Moghaddam, a distinguished Iranian-American psychologist who is currently a professor at Georgetown University in the USA, raised serious questions about substantive differences in the psychologies of the first, second, and third worlds, and the unbridled exportation of first world psychologies (e.g., North American, Northern European) to the developing nations. He noted the dangers of using concepts and methods that evidenced little sensitivity to the realities of the developing nations, and the possibilities that these nations required the development of their own psychologies (Moghaddam, 1987). Others (e.g., Sloan, 1995, Marsella, 1998, 2010; Pickren, 2009) pointed out the risks and potential destructive consequences of assuming that Western psychology was universally applicable. Professor Girishwar Misra (1996), an Asian Indian, identified the problem and its consequences:

The current Western thinking of the science of psychology on its prototypical form, despite being local and indigenous, assumes a global relevance and is treated as universal of generating knowledge. Its dominant voice subscribes to a decontextualized vision with an extraordinary emphasis on individualism, mechanism, and objectivity. This peculiarly Western mode of thinking is fabricated, projected, and institutionalized through representation technologies and scientific rituals and transported on a large scale to the non-Western societies under political-economic domination. As a result, Western psychology tends to maintain an independent stance at the cost of ignoring other substantive possibilities from disparate cultural traditions. Mapping reality through Western constructs has a pseudo-understanding of the people of alien cultures and has debilitating effects in terms

of misconstruing the special realities of other people and exoticizing or disregarding psychologies that are non-Western. Consequently, when people from other cultures are exposed to Western psychology, they find their identities placed in question and their conceptual repertoires rendered obsolete (Misra, 1996, pp. 497–498).

Within this context of discontent and questioning, Professor Hwang, a Taiwanese-born psychologist, trained in graduate school at the University of Hawaii in social and cultural psychology, began to explore the thoughts and writings of the ancient venerated Chinese sage, Confucius (551 BCE–479 BCE), with special attention to the role of Confucian ideas in shaping Chinese psychology across the ages. Professor Hwang's studies revealed the profound impact of Confucian thought for understanding Chinese psychology and behavior, even within the brief period of Communist and Maoist political domination. In a series of publications that now have important historical implications for psychology, Professor Hwang documented the relationship between Chinese psychology and behavior and Confucian thought, especially the critical role of relationism. Professor Hwang noted that Confucian thought places heavy emphasis on morality, context, and the nature of interpersonal relations. This recognition became the foundation for much of Professor Hwang's subsequent writings – writings that now find their first collected presentation in the West through this compendium of his thought.

Using the Confucian foundations of Chinese psychology, Professor Hwang argued persuasively that Chinese behavior patterns can best be understood and appreciated *not* by using alien Western psychology assumptions and tenets, but rather by grasping the embedded nature of Chinese behavior patterns within the contexts of their own historical and cultural traditions. Indeed, as Professor Hwang points out clearly, the reliance on Western psychologies to understand the behavior of non-Western people constitutes an egregious error that frames the behavior of non-Western people within a template that is not only limited in its validity, but also potentially dangerous in terms of the conclusions that are reached, and the decisions too often made under the guise of Western scientific hegemony.

Based largely on his careful research and scholarship of Chinese philosophical and historical traditions, Professor Hwang was able to develop critical insights into Chinese psychology that were soon recognized and appreciated by psychologists throughout Asia as alternatives to Western psychologies. In 2006, Professor Hwang joined Professor Uichol Kim (Korea) and Professor Yang Kuo-Shu (Taiwan) in an edited volume entitled, *Indigenous and Cultural Psychology* (2006, Springer SBM Publications). The volume included a wide array of contributions from various cultures (e.g., Chinese, Japan, Korea, Philippines), and it immediately became an essential resource for psychologists around the world concerned with developing psychologies that were appropriate and sensitive to their own historical and cultural traditions.

For years, Western psychology – largely rooted within North American and Western European scientific and professional cultures – was applied indiscriminately to non-Western people under the mistaken assumption that its principles and methods were universal. Western premises, assessment methods, and even diagnostic

and therapeutic interventions were not only transported around the world, but were also accepted by many non-Western psychologists as valid and reliable foundations for understanding behavior and for developing policies and procedures that were consonant with the Western views.

Gradually, however, and it was here that Professor Hwang's most important contributions reside, it became clear that Western psychology's assumptions and methods were a function of Western history and culture, and as such, were ethnocentric and biased creations whose worldwide acceptance was based on the powerful influences of Western political, economic, and military dominance. In other words, what became apparent was that Western psychology, in spite of all its appeals to universal validity because of its alleged "scientific" foundations and conclusions, was itself a cultural creation, and that its claims and applications were problematic because it was neither universal nor scientific. Tod Sloan, a Western, critical theory psychologist, captured the sociopolitical dimensions of this problem. Sloan (1996) writes:

... the major problem lies less in the theoretical limits of Western psychology, although these are serious, than in the social functions of Western psychology. As scientific psychology entrenches itself further in industrial nations, its function as a sociopolitical stabilizing mechanism has gradually become more obvious...psychological theory and practice embody Western cultural assumptions to such an extent that they primarily perform an ideological function. That is, they serve to reproduce and sustain societal status quo characterized by economic inequality and other forms of oppression such as sexism and racism. The core operative assumptions that produce this ideological effect both in theory and practice are individualism and scientism. (Sloan, 1996, p. 39)

The essence of "science" – an idea/concept/method much valued in the West – is ultimately about accuracy in describing, understanding, predicting, and controlling the world about us. But the problem is that Western psychology is often *inaccurate* when applied the behavior of non-Western people – indeed, it also has difficulty explaining behavior of Western people – because it too often decontextualizes behavior. The "decontextualization" of behavior, an approach often favored by Western psychologies that locate the determinants of human behavior within the human psyche and/or the immediate situation, fails to acknowledge that all human behavior carries with it the developmental and contextual influences of the culture of any individual or group.

The awakening of non-Western psychology to the reality that every culture – East or West – evolves its own unique psychologies appropriate to and consistent with their historical and cultural roots is the new reality in psychology. Each psychology deserves recognition, development, and application as appropriate as a function of careful scholarship and validation. Today, owing to the work of Professor Hwang and non-Western scholars, the study of indigenous psychologies has become a global movement. Indeed, even within the USA and Northern Europe, cultural psychologists are critiquing Western psychology's dominance and hegemony as reflections *not* of "scientific" legitimacy, but rather as an ethnocentric construction, often oblivious to its own cultural roots and determinants.

This volume, thus, constitutes a major advance for psychology as a global science and profession precisely because it addresses the historical and cultural foundations of all psychologies, even as it demonstrates the determinants of Chinese psychology and its explanatory power for Chinese and other populations. May the trend flourish and become the reality for psychology across the world.

Anthony J. Marsella, PhD, Coeditor
Wade E. Pickren, PhD, Coeditor
Cultural & International Psychology Book Series
Springer SBM Publications, New York, NY

References

- Kim, U., Yang, S., & Hwang, H.K (Eds.) (2006). *Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context*. NY: Springer SBM Publications.
- Marsella, A.J. (2009). Some reflections on potential abuses of psychology's knowledge and practices. *Psychological Studies*, 54, 23–27. National Academy of Psychology (NAOP) India
- Misra, G. (1996). Section in Gergen, K., Gulerce, A., Lock, A., & Misra, G. (1996). Psychological sciences in cultural context. *American Psychologist*, 51, 496–503.
- Moghaddam, F.M. (1987). Psychology in the three worlds. *American Psychologist*, 47, 912–920.
- Pickren, W. E. (2009). Indigenization and the history of psychology. *Psychological Studies*, 54, 87–95.
- Sloan, T. (1996). Psychological research methods in developing countries. In S. Carr & J. Schumaker (Eds.) *Psychology and the developing world*. NY: Praeger.

Preface

In order to provide an example for solving the difficulties encountered by the indigenization movement of psychology in non-Western countries, this book aims to construct a series of theoretical model on Confucian relationalism as *Foundations of Chinese psychology*.

The disciple of mainstream Western psychology (WP) emerged from Europe and America. It is rooted in Judeo-Christian religious-philosophical tradition, passed on through the Greek-Roman tradition, and passed to non-Western countries over the last centuries.

Because many scholars and practitioners have found that the imported WP is irrelevant, incompatible, or inappropriate for them to understand their own people, and because much knowledge generated by WP cannot be used to solve their daily problems, some psychologists began to develop indigenous psychologies (IPs) as a reaction to the dominance of WP.

Challenge to Indigenous Psychologists

The IP movement, however, soon encountered tremendous challenges. Most researchers of IP advocated for the bottom-up approach of building theories on the basis of local phenomena, findings, and experiences by research methods that are appropriate to their cultural and social context. They have conducted numerous studies, accumulated a lot of empirical data, and constructed many substantial theoretical models. But the idiosyncratic findings of IPs were often considered too fragmentary to be understood by outsiders of a particular culture, especially in competition with the dominant and widespread Western paradigms of psychology.

As a result, many indigenous psychology theorists suggested that findings of IPs may contribute to the progress of mainstream psychology, and thus, one goal of IPs was to develop a universal or global psychology. But, viewed from Popper's

(1972) views of evolutionary epistemology, it is philosophically impossible for indigenous psychologists to achieve the goal of universal or global psychology by using the inductive method or the bottom-up approach. The problems continued.

Historical Origin of the Problem

The difficulties encountered by indigenous psychologists all over the world can be traced to the early days of 1879 when Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) established his first laboratory in Leipzig to conduct experimental research on *Physiological psychology* by scientific methods (Wundt, 1874), while he studied cultural issues of *Völkerpsychologie* by historical methods (Wundt, 1916). Cultural psychologist Cole (1996) has indicated the origin of those difficulties:

In recent years interest has grown in Wundt's "second psychology," the one to which he assigned the task of understanding how culture enters into psychological processes ... My basic thesis is that the scientific issues Wundt identified were not adequately dealt with by the scientific paradigm that subsequently dominated psychology and other behavioral-social sciences ... culture-inclusive psychology has been ... an elusive goal. (Cole, 1996, pp. 7–8).

It is all right for Western psychologists to elude the cultural issues because most theories of Western psychology had been constructed on the presumption of individualism. But, it is necessary for indigenous psychologists in non-Western countries to address those difficulties.

Untangling the Link between Individualism and Universalism

In his book *Thinking Through Cultures*, Richard Shweder (1991) indicated that the main finding of a universalistic approach to cross-cultural psychology has been the repeated failure to replicate Western laboratory findings in non-Western settings. This is the crucial problematic situation faced by indigenous psychologists all over the world. With a careful examination over the historical origins, current problems and future perspectives of the IP movement provided by 15 contributors to an international survey conducted by Allwood and Berry (2006), the historian Danziger (2006) made a crucial comment to challenge all the indigenous psychologists:

Adherence to the ideal of "a universal psychology" seems almost as common as a rejection of the "individualism" of Western psychology. Yet, in the history of Western psychology, individualism and the search for universal laws have been closely linked: Psychological laws would be considered universal insofar as they applied to all individuals along a common set of dimensions. Is it possible to break this link between individualism and universalism, as the remarks of several contributors seem to require? (Danziger, 2006, pp. 272.)

Indigenous psychologists in non-Western countries are obligated to untangle the link between individualism and universalism. They are forced to address, to analyze, and to find solutions for the problematic situation without excuses.

Foundation of Western Science

I found myself devoted to the indigenization movement in the social sciences in the 1980s. It soon became apparent that the state of being colonized by Western academic hegemony is not specific to the field of psychology, but is a general phenomenon in all fields of social sciences. I realized that the fundamental barrier for Chinese social scientists was to make a genuine breakthrough in their efforts to establish autonomous social sciences. There was a need to understand the nature of Western philosophies of science, since these philosophies are a key to the ethos of modern Western civilizations.

Virtually all knowledge in Western colleges and universities has been constructed on the grounds of Western philosophy. To help young Chinese scholars understand the influence of Western philosophy of science, I spent more than 10 years writing a book entitled, *The Logic of Social Sciences*. This volume discusses different perspectives on the crucial issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology which have been proposed by 17 major representative figures of Western philosophy in the twentieth century. The first half of this book addressed the switch in the philosophy of natural science from positivism to post-positivism. The second half expounded the more recent philosophies in the social sciences, including structuralism, hermeneutic and critical science.

My experiences in Asian Association of Social Psychology since 1997, including serving president from 2005 to 2007, enabled me to recognize the limited understanding on Western philosophy of science among many social scientists in non-Western countries. Therefore, I decided to pursue this problem through my own research.

Construction of Scientific World for IP

In 2000, I was appointed as the principal investigator of the *Project In Search of Excellence for Research on Chinese Indigenous Psychology*. When the project ended in 2008, I integrated findings from previously related research into a book entitled *Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research*, published in Chinese in 2009.

In accord with the principles of cultural psychology: “One mind, many mentalities” (Shweder, et al., 1998), I advocated that the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is to construct a series of theories that represent not only the universal mind of human beings, but also the particular mentality of a people within a given society.

I elaborated upon the distinction between scientific micro-world and life-world, and used it to emphasize the importance of theoretical construction for the progress of the IP movement.

Because most psychologists of non-Western countries have generally adopted a position of naïve positivism, and assumed that Western theories of psychology represent *truth*, In Chapter 3 of my 2009 book, I compared the ontological, epistemological and methodological switch from positivism to neopositivism by taking *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Wittgenstein, 1922) and Evolutionary Epistemology (Popper, 1963, 1972) as two representative examples. I argued that theory is nothing more than a conjecture made by a scientist. The epistemology of neopositivism views scientific theory as an *approximation of the truth*, but not truth in itself.

Challenge the Individualism

I constructed a theoretical model of *Face and Favor* on the philosophical basis of scientific realism (Hwang, 1987), intending it to be a universal model that is applicable to various cultures. Later, I illustrated how the four kinds of interpersonal ties discussed in that model, namely, *expressive ties*, *mixed ties* and *instrumental ties*, as well as the *vertical relationship* between petitioner and resource allocator, correspond with Fiske's (1991) four elementary forms of social behavior, namely, *communal sharing*, *equality matching*, *market pricing*, and *authority ranking*.

Fiske is a psychological anthropologist. He argued that the four elementary forms of social behavior represent the universal mind in dealing with various kinds of interpersonal relationship which can be found in all cultures of the world. Viewed from this perspective, the Western ideal of individualism emphasizes and exaggerates only the relationships of *market pricing* or *instrumental ties*. It is biased in the sense that it neglects or ignores other kinds of interpersonal relationships. Based on the philosophy of structuralism, I have strong confidence that any theory constructed on such a biased presumption will suffer from a crisis of infinite regress, while a theoretical model of psychology which has been constructed on the deep structure of human mind will be more robust and durable for purposes of empirical examination.

I subsequently used my *Face and Favor* model to analyze the inner structure of Confucianism and discussed its attributes in terms of Western ethics. In the following chapters of this book, I construct a series of theories based on the presumption of relationalism to integrate findings of empirical research on the concepts of social exchange, face, achievement motivation, organizational behaviors, and conflict resolution in Confucian society.

Call for Scientific Revolution in Psychology

The Asian Association of Indigenous and Cultural Psychology held its first international conference on July 24–27, 2010 at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, where I was elected as its first president. In my keynote speech delivered

at its inauguration ceremony, I mentioned that Hendrich, Heine & Norenzayan (2010, a, b, c) from the University of British Columbia reported findings of their research in the journals *Nature* and *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, and indicated that 96% of samples of psychological research published in the world's top journals from 2003 to 2007 were drawn from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, which houses just 12% of the world's population. In fact, the psychological dispositions of such a WEIRD sample are unique.

Therefore, I criticized those theories of Western social psychology which had been constructed on the presumption of individualism as too WEIRD to be applied in non-Western countries. The mission of the Asian Association of Indigenous and Cultural Psychology is to initiate a scientific revolution by constructing a series of theories on the presumption of relationalism to replace the Western theories of WEIRD psychology so as to help people of non-Western countries solve the various problems they encounter in their daily lives.

An Example for Scientific Revolution

I have strong confidence that now is the right time to initiate scientific revolution in psychology. After the first international conference of AAICP, I developed a *Mandala Model of Self*, and I used it to write a book entitled *A Proposal for Scientific Revolution in Psychology* to illustrate my ideas. Any calling for scientific revolution needs examples to illuminate its feasibility. To provide an example for non-Western indigenous psychologists to understand the "scientific" revolution, and to establish their own indigenous psychologies, I decided to translate my book on *Confucian Relationalism* into English with a new title, *Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations*.

At this moment of introducing my works on IP to the English-speaking world in a more comprehensive way, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to three major contributors to my discourse on related issues. I finished my PhD training of psychology in University of Hawaii where Professor Anthony Marsella served as my mentor and colleague. Through his studies, he enlightened my consciousness about the cultural determinants of human behavior. Soon after I returned to Taiwan in 1976, another mentor of mine Professor Kuo-Shu Yang began to initiate the IP movement in Taiwan, which further stimulated my consciousness. I met Professor Richard Shweder at the 1999 AASP conference in Taipei. His works provided me with the most important principle of cultural psychology for solving the crucial problem of IP.

In addition to them, I would send my hearty thanks to Uichol Kim (Korea), James Liu (New Zealand), Susumu Yamaguchi (Japan), Girishwar Misra (India), Regelia Pe-pua (Philippines), Kwok Leung (Hong Kong), Faturochman and Kwartarini Yuniarti (Indonesia), and my colleagues of the IP group in Taiwan, who have made efforts with me in developing the IP movement in Asia.

References

- Allwood, C. M. & Berry, J. W. (2006). Origins and development of indigenous psychologies: An international analysis. *International Journal of psychology*, 2006, 41(4), 243–268.
- Danziger, K. (2006). Universalism and indigenization in the history of modern psychology. In A. C. Brock (Ed.), *Internationalizing the History of Psychology*. New York: New York University Press.
- Fiske, A. P. (1991). *Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations*. New York: The Free Press.
- Foa, U. G. & Foa, E. B. (1976). Resource theory of social exchange. In J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence & R. C. Carson (Eds.), *Contemporary topics in social psychology*. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press.
- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. (2010a). The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 33(2–3), 61–83.
- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. (2010b). Beyond WEIRD: Towards a broad-based behavioral science. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 33(2–3), 111–135.
- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. (2010c). Most people are not WEIRD. *Nature*, 466, 29.
- Huang, L. L. (1999). *Interpersonal harmony and conflict: Indigenous theory and research*. Taipei: Laureate.
- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), 945–974.
- Kuhn, T. (1969/1990). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lin, C. J. & Lin, F. Y. (1999). The process of coping with parent-child conflicts among junior high school students. *Indigenous psychological research in Chinese Societies*, 12, 47–101.
- Popper, K. K. (1963). *Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K. (1972). *Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shweder, R. A. (1991). *Thinking through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shweder, R. A., Goodnow, J., Hatano, G., LeVine, R., Markus, H., & Miller, P. (1998). The cultural psychology of development: One mind, many mentalities. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology: Vol. I. Theoretical models of human development* (pp.865-937). New York: Wiley.
- Wundt, W. (1904). *Principles of physiological psychology* (Trans. By E. B. Titchener). New York: Macmillan.
- Wundt, W. (1916). *Elements of folk psychology*. New York: Macmillan (Trans. by E. L. Schaub of W. Wundt, *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie*. Leipzig: Alfred Kroener Verlag, 1912).
- Wittgenstein, L. (1922/1961). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, with an introduction by B. Russell. trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Raul.

Acknowledgment

This book was written while the author was supported by grants from National Science Council, Republic of China, NSC 99-2410-H-002 -095, and Interdisciplinary Studies on Chinese Conceptions of the Person and the Self: Master Research, National Taiwan University, 99R50030-4.

Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations as well as its Chinese version entitled *Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research* were accomplished with research grants In Search of Excellence for Chinese Indigenous Psychology NSC 95-2475-H-002-001-PAE provided by the Ministry of Education and National Science Council, Republic of China, and Chinese Concepts of Person and Self in East Asia 96R5416-04 provided by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to some significant figures for their contributions to my academic career. I finished my PhD training in psychology with Professor Anthony Marsella serving as my master from 1972 to 1976. He enlightened my cultural consciousness during the age when the field of psychology was still dominated by the influence of behaviorism. Soon after I returned to Taiwan, another mentor of mine, Professor Kuo-Shu Yang, began to initiate the indigenization movement of psychology in Taiwan. His devotedness to the movement and his insistence on the positivistic approach urged me to think over the problematic situation faced by indigenous psychologists in non-Western countries. I met Professor Richard Shweder at the 1999 AASP Conference in Taipei. His works provided me with the most important principle of cultural psychology for solving the crucial issues in indigenous psychology. Their stimulation and encouragement have inspired me to accomplish this book; particularly, the long-term support provided by Prof. Marsella, the editor of the Springer book series on International and Cultural Psychology, has made my work available to the Western world.

I wish to express my indebtedness to my colleagues Prof. Mei-chih Li and Prof. Ruey-Ling Chu for their commentaries on an earlier version of this book, which I found invaluable for its final revisions. I have taken their advice and support, but I am fully responsible for my own views in this book.

I also wish to acknowledge Uichol Kim (Korea), James Lin (New Zealand), Girishwar Misra (India), Rogelia Pe-puo (Philippines), Kwok Leung (Hong Kong), Susumu Yamaguchi (Japan), Faturochman and Kwartarini Yuniarti (Indonesia), and my fellow IP group members in Taiwan, who have made tremendous contributions to the IP movement in Asia.

Several parts of the book are based on my previously published works, and I thank the editors and publishers in question for permission to use them. Chapter 5 is a revised version of the article, “The Deep Structure of Confucianism: A social psychological approach,” published in *Asian Philosophy*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2001), 179–204, which is incorporated by permission from the publisher, Taylor & Francis. Chapter 7 is a somewhat revised version of the article, “Two Moralities: Reinterpreting the findings of empirical research on moral reasoning in Taiwan,” published in the *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1 (1998), 211–238, which was granted permission from the publisher, John Wiley and Sons. Chapter 12 is a rewrite of the article, “Guanxi and Mientze: Conflict resolution in Chinese society,” published in *Intercultural Communication Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1997–8), 17–26, which was granted permission from ICS.

Author Background

Hwang Kwang-Kuo obtained his PhD in social psychology at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii. He is currently National Chair Professor at National Taiwan University, awarded by Taiwan’s Ministry of Education. He also serves as a National Policy Advisor to the President of Taiwan, Republic of China. Professor Hwang has endeavored to promote the indigenization movement in psychology and the social sciences in Chinese society since the early 1980s. He has published eight books and more than 100 articles on related issues in both Chinese and English. He is president of the Asian Association of Indigenous and Cultural Psychology (2010-), past president of the Asian Association of Social Psychology (2003–2005), and was the Principal Investigator of the research project “In Search of Excellence for Indigenous Psychology,” sponsored by the Ministry of Education, Republic of China (2000–2008).

Publications Related to this Volume

1. Hwang, K. K. (Ed.) *Easternization: Socio-cultural Impact on Productivity*. Tokyo, Japan: Asian Productivity Organization, 1995.
2. Hwang, K. K. (1995). *Knowledge and Action: A Psychological Interpretation of Chinese Cultural Tradition* (in Chinese). Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.
3. Hwang, K. K. (2009a). *Logic of Social Sciences* (in Chinese). Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.
4. Hwang, K. K. (2009). *Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research*. (in Chinese) Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.
5. A Proposal for Scientific Revolution in Psychology (in Chinese). Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.

Contents

1 The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology	1
The Emergence of Indigenous Psychology.....	1
The Development of Non-Western Countries.....	2
Transplantation of the Western Paradigm.....	3
Three Waves of Cultural Psychology.....	4
Modernization Theory	4
Research on Individualism/Collectivism	5
A Research Orientation of Positivism.....	6
The Third Wave of Cultural Psychology	7
The Indigenization Movement.....	8
Challenges to Indigenous Psychology	9
The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology.....	10
The Content and Structure of This Book.....	11
Philosophical Reflection	12
Constructive Realism	12
Philosophical Switch.....	13
Structuralism: Presuppositions for Theoretical Construction.....	14
People in Nature.....	14
Premodern Civilization	14
Unconscious Model	15
Deep Structure of Universal Mind.....	15
Empirical Research	16
Attributes of Confucian Ethics.....	16
References.....	17

2 The Modernization of Non-Western Societies:

A Perspective of Constructive Realism 21

The Evolution of Culture 22

 Formation of the Human Mind 22

 The Developmental Model of Body–Mind–Spirit 22

 Social Factors in Pedagogy 24

Constructive Realism 25

 Two Types of Knowledge 26

 Language Games 27

 Originative Thinking and Technical Thinking 28

 Substantive Rationality and Formal Rationality 29

 Participative Construction and Dominative Construction 30

 Two Worldviews 31

The Meaning of Modernization 32

 Evolution of Lifeworld 32

 The Coexistence of Modernity and Traditionalism 33

The Modernization of Chinese Society 34

 Philosophy Versus Wisdom 34

 The Chinese Cultural Tradition 35

 The Recapitulation of the Cultural Developmental Process 36

 The Lifespan Development of Body–Mind–Spirit 37

 Expert and Laypeople 37

Conclusion 39

References 39

3 Western Philosophy’s Concepts of Person and Paradigm Shifts 41

The Theoretical Attitude and Theoretical Wisdom of Aristotle 42

 Theoretical Attitude 42

 Theoretical Wisdom 42

Kant’s Theoretical Reason and Practical Reason 43

 Transcendental Idealism 44

 Steps of Knowledge Construction 45

 Criticism of Traditional Metaphysics 45

 Metaphysik der Sitten 46

 The Two Aspects of “Person” 47

 One Mind with Two Gates 47

 The Change of Western Philosophy 48

Wittgensteinian Solipsism 49

 Positivism 49

 Logico-philosophicas 49

 The Concept of Person in Solipsism 51

 Criticism of “Transcendental Self” 52

Popper’s Evolutionary Epistemology 52

 Evolutionary Epistemology 53

 Contrast between Two Concepts of Person 54

Post-positivist Epistemology	55
Hempel’s Logical Empiricism	55
Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program.....	56
Paradigm and Puzzle-Solving	57
The Trap of Naïve Positivism	58
Divergent Thinking and Scientific Revolution.....	59
The Epistemological Strategy for Developing Universal Psychology	59
Wundt’s Cultural Psychology	60
Declaration of Behaviorism	60
Logical Positivism	61
Operational Definition	61
The Contrasts Between Positivism and Postpositivism.....	62
Criticisms Toward Positivism	63
Concept of Person in Social Science	64
Strategies for Developing Theories of Indigenous Psychology	64
Solving the Problem Faced by Wundt	65
References.....	66
4 The Construction of the Face and Favor Model	69
A Critical Review of Social Exchange Theories	70
The Anthropologists’ Explorations.....	70
Homans’ Theory of Social Exchange	71
Blau’s Theory of Social Exchange.....	72
Thibaut and Kelley’s Theory of Interdependence.....	73
Adams’ Equity Theory.....	74
Critiques of Social Exchange Theory	74
Assumptions About Human Nature.....	75
Resources for Social Exchange.....	75
The Nature of Relationships in Social Exchange	76
Rawls’s Theory of Justice	78
A Critical Review of Justice Theory	79
Walster’s Equity Theory	79
Deutsch’s Justice Rule	80
Lerner’s Justice Motive Theory	80
Presumptions of Western Social Sciences	82
Kayser and Schwinger’s Theory of Intrapersonal Contracts	83
Greenberg and Cohen’ Analysis of Social Relationships.....	83
The Deep Structure of Social Relationships	85
Manifestations of the Relational Models	87
Theoretical Construction of Confucian Relationalism	88
The Classification of Interpersonal Relationships	88
Renqing and the Rule of Renqing.....	91
Justice Theory	93
The Norm of Reciprocity	93
Conclusion	95
References.....	96

5 The Deep Structure of Confucianism	99
Confucian Conceptions of Destiny	100
Four Approaches to Destiny	101
Separation of Destiny from Righteousness.....	102
Constructing the Way of Humanity by Understanding the Way of Heaven.....	103
The Confucian Model of Mind	105
The Mind of Discernment.....	105
The Mind of Benevolence.....	107
Ethics for Ordinary People: The Ethical System of Benevolence–Righteousness–Propriety (<i>ren–yi–li</i>).....	108
Procedural Justice: The Principle of Respecting the Superior.....	109
Distributive Justice and the Principle of Favoring the Intimate	111
The Deep Structure of Benevolence–Righteousness– Propriety (<i>ren–yi–li</i>).....	112
Benevolence: From the Intimate to the Distant	112
Righteousness: To Dwell in Benevolence and Pursue the Path of Righteousness	113
Propriety: Interaction in Line with Propriety.....	114
Self-Cultivation with the Way of Humanity	116
Fondness for Learning Leads to Wisdom	117
Vigorous Practice Leads to Benevolence.....	118
Sensitivity to Shame Leads to Courage	119
Jun zi (a True Gentleman) vs. xiao ren (a Narrow-Minded Person)	120
Confucian Ethics for Scholars: Benefiting the World with the Way of Humanity	121
Scholars Dedicate Themselves to the Way of Humanity.....	121
Serving the Sovereign with the Way of Humanity	122
Ethic of Autonomy.....	123
Person, Self, and Individual	125
The Equilibrium Worldview Model.....	126
Conclusion	129
References.....	130
 6 Paradigms for Studying Chinese Moral Thought:	
A Metatheoretical Analysis	133
The Imposed Etic Approach	135
Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Reasoning	135
Kohlberg’s Theoretic Rationale	137
Empirical Cross-Cultural Research	139
Empirical Research in Confucian Society	139
Rest’s Defining Issues Test	141

- Derived Etic Approach..... 144
 - Social Principledness and Social Humanism..... 144
 - Wilson’s Approach..... 145
- Comparison of Childhood Political Socialization 147
- Critique of the Imposed and Derived Etic Approaches 148
 - Interpreting Findings of Empirical Research..... 148
 - The Existential Phase of Development 148
- Indigenous Psychology Research 150
 - Ma’s Two-Parameter Moral Development Theory 150
- Empirical Research Using the Two-Parameter Moral Development Theory..... 152
- Conclusion 155
- References..... 156
- 7 Moral Thought and Moral Judgment in Confucian Society..... 159**
 - Introduction..... 159
 - Confucian Ethics for Ordinary People..... 160
 - The Benevolence–Righteousness–Propriety Ethical System 160
 - Five Cardinal Relationships 161
 - Positive and Negative Duties in Confucian Society..... 162
 - Positive and Negative Duties 163
 - Do Not Do to Others What You Do Not Wish to Have Done to You..... 163
 - Filial Piety: An Unconditional Positive Duty 165
 - Loyalty: A Positive Duty 166
 - Divergent Rationalities 167
 - The Moral Characteristics of Western Individualism 167
 - Properties of Confucian Ethics 168
 - The Confucian Dilemma..... 168
 - Adjustment of Confucian Ethics..... 169
 - New Culture Movement..... 170
 - The Gong De Movement 170
 - The Moral Thought and Judgment in Confucian Society..... 171
 - Moral Thought in Confucian Society 172
 - Moral Judgment in Confucian Society: Quantitative Research..... 177
 - Conclusion 182
 - References..... 184
- 8 Confucian Relationalism and Social Exchange 187**
 - The Strangificability of Confucian Ethics for Ordinary People 188
 - Fei’s Differential Order..... 189
 - Hsu’s Psychosociogram 190
 - From Relational Orientation to Confucian Relationalism 191
 - Relational Orientation..... 192
 - Methodological Relationalism..... 192

- Individual, Self, and Person 193
- Strangificability of Microworlds 194
- The Cognitive Structure of Role Relationships 195
 - Similarity Between Dyad Relationships 195
 - The Dimension of Closeness–Distance 197
 - The Dimension of Dominance–Submission 198
- Relationships and Resource Allocation 198
 - Resource for Social Exchange 199
 - Guanxi and Reward Allocation 199
 - Moral Obligation and Renqing 200
- Relationships and Social Exchange 201
 - Indebtedness and Role Obligation 201
 - Hierarchical Compensatory Model 202
- Intergenerational Exchange and Filial Piety 203
 - Daughter First Versus Son First 203
 - Prior Filial Obligation of Son 204
- Relational Context and Social Norm 205
 - Consistency with Relational Context 205
 - Obedience Versus Self-Assertion 206
- China and Japan: Comparison Between
- Two Confucian Societies 207
 - Relative Respectful Language in Japanese Culture 207
 - Nested Structure of Japanese Traditional Society 208
 - Iemoto and Hierarchical Order 209
 - Relative Honorific Expression and In-Group Modesty 211
 - Social Structure and In-group Modesty 212
- Conclusion 213
- References 213

9 Life Goals and Achievement Motivation

- in Confucian Society** 219
- Early Research on Achievement Motivation in Taiwan 220
 - Measurement of Achievement Motivation 220
 - Approach of Instrumentalism 221
 - Social-Oriented Achievement Motivation 222
- Criticism on Approach of Naïve Positivism 223
 - Positivist Approach 223
 - Logic of Verification 224
 - Advocacy of Holistic Theory 225
 - Follow-Up Type of Research 226
 - Criticism on Reductionism 226
 - Creative Imagination 227
- Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) Implicit Theory of Intelligence 228
 - Learned Helplessness Versus Mastery Orientation 228
 - Entity Theory Versus Incremental Theory 229

Performance Goal and Learning Goal	229
Methodological Individualism Versus Methodological Relationalism	231
A Theory of Achievement Motivation in Confucian Society	232
Achievement Goals in Confucian Society	232
Vertical Distinctiveness Versus Personal Goal.....	234
Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Motivation.....	234
Model of Multiple-Goals	235
Development of Self-Determination.....	236
Relationships Among Three Types of Goals	237
Self-Esteem and Face: The Attainment of Life Goals	238
Self-Esteem and Face.....	238
Types of Life Goals.....	239
Life Goals of University Students in Taiwan.....	240
Social Significance of Achievement Goal	245
A Comparison Between Two Types of Achievement Goals.....	247
Vertical Goal and Horizontal Goal.....	247
Academic Versus Talented Performance	248
Social Pressure and Personal Efforts	249
Effort Model and Ability Model	249
Social Demand and Effort Model	250
Effort Accounts	251
The Moral Significance of Efforts in Chinese Society	253
Two Types of Learning Models	253
Unconditional Positive Duty.....	254
Effort Model and Filial Piety	255
Moral Significance of Making Efforts	255
Motivation for Making Efforts.....	258
Conclusion	259
References.....	259
10 Face and Morality in Confucian Society	265
The Mystery of Face in Confucian Society	265
Early Exploration	266
The Cultural Origin of the Chinese Concept of Face	267
Lian and Mianzi	267
Confucian Ethics and Psychological Equilibrium	269
The Confucian Ethics for Ordinary People.....	269
Psychosociogram	270
Psychological Equilibrium.....	270
Seek Far for What Lies Close at Head.....	271
Face Saving and Face Maintenance	272
Morality and Losing Face in Confucian Society	274
Ethics of Divinity and Ethics of Community.....	275
Losing Face in Taiwan	276
Losing Face in Mainland China.....	277

The Personality Character of Face Orientation.....	278
Two Orientations of Face Concern	278
Making Face and Keeping Up Face.....	279
Face of Greater Self	280
Boundary of Self.....	280
Intergenerational Comparison of Face.....	281
Social Events of Having Face	282
Social Incidents of Losing Face.....	284
<i>Guanxi</i> and Emotional Reaction	284
Sharing Glory or Serving Relationships	285
Role Obligation and Achievement Type	287
Relational Other's Face Feeling.....	288
Comparison of Two Approaches for Studying Face Behaviors.....	290
Formality of the Situation	290
Face Dynamics in Organization.....	291
Conclusion: Limitation of Cross-Cultural Approach.....	292
References.....	293
11 <i>Guanxi</i> and Organizational Behaviors	
in Chinese Society	297
Pulling <i>Guanxi</i> and Avoiding <i>Gangqing</i>	300
Avoiding <i>Gangqing</i>	301
Domains for <i>Guanxi</i> Practices	301
<i>Guanxi</i> Practices Between Organizations.....	302
Cultural Differences in <i>Guanxi</i> Practices	303
Reciprocal Exchange	303
<i>Guanxi</i> and Relational Demography.....	304
Institutional Aspect of <i>Guanxi</i> Practices	305
Institutional Holes.....	305
Types of Business Organization in Chinese Society.....	306
Patrilinealism	307
Patriarchalism.....	308
Paternalism.....	308
Market Despotism.....	309
Monopoly (Oligopoly) Market	310
Strategies of Trust in Chinese Society	310
Kinship Trust	311
Emergent Trust.....	311
Customary Trust.....	313
Professional Trust	313
Institutional Trust.....	314
<i>Guanxi</i> Practices Between Organizations.....	314
Striving for Scarce Resource	314
Utilization of Interpersonal Strategies	315

Negative Connotations of Guanxi Practices	317
Information Asymmetry	317
<i>Guanxi</i> Practice Within Organizations.....	318
The Structural Links of Three Cultures in Chinese	
Family Business	318
Trust Based on Affection	320
Triple Model of Leadership	320
Cooperative Goals and Participative Leadership	321
Conclusion	322
References.....	323
12 Chinese Models of Conflict Resolution	327
Models of Conflict Resolution in Western Psychology	328
Dimensions for Classifying Conflict Resolution Styles	329
Empirical Research with Implanted Paradigm	330
Interpretation of Cultural Reductionism	331
Glasses for Seeing the World.....	332
Face Negotiation Theory.....	332
Individualism–Collectivism.....	333
Face Language in Chinese Society	335
Construction of Theoretical Models on Chinese	
Conflict Resolution.....	337
Models of Resolutions for Parent–Child Conflicts	337
Interpersonal Harmony and Conflict.....	338
Construction of an Indigenous Theory of Conflict Resolution.....	339
Stable Guanxi Network.....	340
Greater Self and One Self	340
Lian and Mientze	341
The Value of Harmony.....	342
Socialization for the Value of Harmony.....	343
The Construction of a Complete Model	344
Conflict Resolution Models within Vertical In-Group.....	345
The Construction of Vertical Relationship.....	345
Subtypes of Filial Piety	346
Forbearance.....	347
Dominating and Conceding	348
Indirect Communication	349
Taking Care of Others’ Face	349
Obey Publicly and Defy Privately.....	350
Conflict Resolution Models with Horizontal In-Group	
in Chinese Society	351
Giving Face	351
Bargaining and Compromise	352
Fight Overtly and Struggle Covertly.....	353
The Use of Strategies	354

Cooperative Goal	354
Realistic Versus Superficial Harmony	355
Cooperative Goals.....	355
Open Communication	356
Conflict Resolution Models with Horizontal Out-Group	357
Confrontation	358
Striving for Face.....	358
Mediation	359
Mediation Techniques.....	360
Severance	361
Research Tradition of Confucian Relationalism.....	361
Scientific Revolution.....	362
References.....	363
Index.....	369

Chapter 1

The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology

Abstract There have been three waves of large-scale academic movements in attempting to include non-Western cultures into psychological research, namely, modernization theory, research on individualism–collectivism, and the indigenization movement of psychology. In view of the difficulties encountered by most indigenous psychologists who adopted the inductive approach of the bottom-up model building paradigm, the author argued for an epistemological goal of indigenous psychology following the principle of cultural psychology: “one mind, many mentalities” (Shweder et al., *The cultural psychology of development: One mind, many mentalities*. Handbook of child psychology, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998); in addition, the author advocated for constructing psychology theories that may represent universal mind of human beings, as well as the particular mentalities of people living in a specific culture. Due to the fact that theories of modern social sciences have been constructed on the basis of the Western philosophy of science, indigenous psychologists in non-Western countries have to make three levels of breakthroughs for the sake of attaining such an epistemological goal: philosophical reflection, theoretical construction, and empirical research.

Keywords Indigenous psychology • Bottom-up paradigm • Cultural psychology • Philosophy of science • Inductive approach

The Emergence of Indigenous Psychology

In the 1970s, some psychologists began to engage in indigenous psychology research in areas such as India, the Philippines, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, indigenous psychological research has become the order of the day. The psychology indigenization movement originated with dissatisfaction with the transplantation of the Western psychology paradigm. Many non-Western psychologists decided to develop indigenous psychology because they recognized that

Western paradigms of scientific psychology are often irrelevant to or inappropriate for resolving problems encountered by local people in their daily lives.

Although this kind of dissatisfaction with academic colonialism is part of the more general response of non-Western social scientists to wholesale transplantation of Western paradigms, psychologists are often more sensitive to this issue because their subjects are human beings, and it is relatively easy for them to become aware of the inadequacy of transplanting Western paradigms in order to understand non-Western subjects within their local societies.

The Development of Non-Western Countries

The process of establishing modern social systems and their differentiation from people's lifeworlds are completely different for Western and non-Western countries. The modernization of Western countries originated from Western civilization itself, whereas the essential elements of modernization for non-Western countries have been transplanted outside of their traditional cultures.

This point can be illustrated from a wider perspective. Henry (1986) explained global cultural changes in terms of dependency theory, and argued that the patterns of cultural change in central and peripheral countries were roughly similar before the emergence of a world economic system. Religion was dominant in all cultural systems. Art, philosophy, and other practical areas of knowledge were all subordinate to its claims of truth. Religious symbols provided by priests were used to satisfy people's needs for identification. However, with the emergence of a capitalist world system, central and peripheral countries began to develop in different directions. Under the capitalist system of production, the new elites in the central countries gradually came to control the workings of their nations. They systematically connected scientific and producing activities, and established global trading systems. Traditional precapitalist cultural configurations became disorganized. Mythology, etiquette, and the religious metaphysical worldview were replaced by market rationality and instrumental rationality for systems of scientific production. The balance between the two life spheres organized by formal rationality and substantive rationality was destroyed. Subspheres organized by purposive-rational actions gradually overrode religious rationality and became the dominating form of cultural change in central countries.

While the dominating form of cultural change in central countries has become the process of formal and scientific rationalization, in peripheral countries, the leading form of cultural change is a structural and symbolic adjustment process aimed at facing and legitimizing the foreign cultural hegemony that makes their societies peripheral. Since capitalist peripheral societies have accepted their particular role in the global economic system, their functions of production are usually very narrow. Instead of producing by technical innovation in response to the demands of domestic markets, they usually produce a single product by the method of original equipment manufacturing (OEM) according to the demands of foreign markets.

As a consequence, the economic systems of capitalist peripheral countries produce the same products in an unchanging way. They mostly produce primary industry products with little modification or scientific innovation. The necessity for scientific research is decreased, the possibility for developing an autonomous scientific community is diminished, and it is difficult to institutionalize a creative research organization. All these factors may hinder the emergence of a new cultural pattern that is characterized by the rationality of formal science.

Transplantation of the Western Paradigm

Because the production equipment and operation techniques in peripheral countries are transplanted from central countries, technical knowledge need not be provided by the peripheral cultural system. It is unnecessary for peripheral cultures to rationalize their knowledge production systems scientifically. The main task of most peripheral countries' universities is to train technicians for maintenance and operation of their manufacturing systems, rather than to promote rationalization of their cultural systems. The research accomplished is also characterized by features of OEM. In Western countries situated at the center of the world academic system, the progress of various sciences and the progress of philosophy constitute a circle of mutual facilitation: The progress of science indicates the subjects for philosophical reflection, while the progress of philosophy stimulates the development of various sciences. The circular link between philosophy and science is broken in non-Western countries. When non-Western students go abroad to study in Western countries, most of them are eager to finish their studies and get a degree as soon as possible. Once they find an academic advisor, they usually follow the professor's paradigm and conduct similar research. Most non-Western students studying abroad are concerned with finding a research topic, learning a set of effective research methods, and finishing their thesis without obstruction. They usually focus their attention on research methods, rather than methodology, that is, they do not focus on the philosophical foundation of their research. They are eager to learn "science," but very few of them are interested in exploring the philosophy of science, which is the foundation of science.

After they finish their studies abroad and return to their home countries, most of them continue to conduct research with the same approach as they learned overseas. Very few of them pay attention to the change of thoughts in Western philosophy of science. They are not interested in thinking about the implications of these changes for the theoretical construction of scientific research. They prefer to find the latest hot issue in the top international journals and to follow the most advanced Western paradigm, expecting that their research findings will follow the trend of academic development in the West. Most of them adopt the Western theoretical model, translate Western instruments of measurement into the local language, apply Western research methods to local participants, and conduct research that is merely a duplication of Western research. As a consequence, social science research in

non-Western countries is comparable to non-Western industrial products, manifesting OEM features.

The accumulation of research findings of this type has led to great dissatisfaction among many intellectuals from non-Western countries. Some of them have been inspired by a spirit of anticolonialism to initiate an indigenization movement of social science in opposition to the domination of Western paradigms over the local scientific community. This feeling of anticolonialism is the most important reason for the emergence of indigenization movements in many non-Western countries. However, any academic movement that is inspired by a spirit of anticolonialism will encounter epistemological and methodological challenges. I discuss these challenges from a global perspective in the next Section.

Three Waves of Cultural Psychology

The psychology indigenization movement has been caused by the dissatisfaction of non-Western psychologists to the academic domination of Western paradigms. This can be illustrated by a historical review of how non-Western cultures had been conceptualized by main stream psychologists in their research. Since the end of World War II, there have been three large-scale academic movements which have attempted to incorporate non-Western cultural factors into psychological research, namely: modernization theory, research on individualism–collectivism, and the indigenization movement (Hwang 2005).

Modernization Theory

During World War II, most countries in Europe and Asia were seriously damaged, while the United States was fortunate enough to escape devastation. After the war, the United States quickly became a superpower in the economic structure of the capitalist world. Compared with people in other countries, Americans enjoyed the most modern way of life at that time.

In the 1960s, modernization theory began to emerge in the American scientific community. Modernization theory entails the belief that it is necessary to modernize the personalities, dispositions, and psychological characteristics of individuals in any society, including Western ones, in order to facilitate modernization of the state or nation. Inkeles (1966) of Harvard University was the first to advocate for the idea of “the modernization of man.” He conducted a series of empirical studies to identify the psychological characteristics of modernized people, developed an instrument for measuring them (Schnaiberg 1970), made cross-national comparisons of those characteristics with people from various developing countries, and studied the causes and consequences of becoming modern (Inkeles and Smith 1974). His research paradigm has been followed by many psychologists. From the 1960s to

1970s, numerous psychologists also tried to develop versions of the modernity scale for use in empirical research in various non-Western societies (Armer and Youtz 1971; Dawson 1967; Doob 1967; Guthrie 1977; Inkeles 1968; Yang 1981; Yang and Hchu 1974).

In the 1980s, modernization theory was bitterly criticized by the international scientific community. Many sociologists began to investigate the connection between individual and social modernization. They pointed out that the lifestyle of urban residents in the big cities of Latin America is highly modernized and similar to that in Western countries, even though their countries had not similarly progressed along the path of modernization, and in fact their politics and economics had deteriorated to a disadvantaged position in the world economic system. As a result of the rise of world system theory (Wallerstein 1979), the tide of research on individual modernity gradually ebbed.

Modernization theory is essentially an American-centered academic construction. It construes Americans as having the highest degree of modernization, and suggests that after experiencing a modernization process, people in other cultures may become as modern as Americans. This kind of discourse reflects not only the power structure of the international scientific community at the time, but also the domination of American culture through capitalism.

Research on Individualism/Collectivism

By the 1980s, the economic activities of Western European countries had mostly recovered from the damage of World War II. Of the Asian countries, Japan had become the largest economic power in the capitalist world system. Other areas of the Asian-Pacific rim had also achieved remarkable economic performance. Although the world economic system is still dominated by the United States, the scientific community of psychology has gradually shifted their concern to cultures other than that of the United States. The emergence of research on individualism/collectivism reflects this subtle change during this period.

Hofstede (1980), a well known Dutch organizational psychologist, was the first to conduct research on individualism–collectivism. When he was a director in the department of human resource management at IBM, Hofstede constructed a scale of 32-items to measure work goals or values. He administered this scale to equivalent, stratified samples of IBM staff in 40 countries, calculated means of their endorsement on the 32 work values for samples from each country, and created a correlation matrix amongst the 32 values of nation average. Four factors were thus obtained as a result of factor analysis: individualism, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Factor scores of the 40 countries were marked to show their positions on the map of space constituted by any two of these four dimensions.

Hofstede (1980) applied a social scientific method to show empirical mapping of the world's 40 major countries on these four cultural dimensions. His research instantly attracted great attention from the psychology community. Inspired by his

research, many psychologists began to conduct research on related topics in the following decades. The most remarkable work has been research into the dimension of individualism–collectivism. An intensive review by Oyserman et al. (2002) showed that psychologists had constructed at least 27 distinct scales in the last two decades to measure individualism–collectivism tendencies, and completed numerous empirical studies on related topics.

A Research Orientation of Positivism

Most researchers engaging in this sort of work generally considered collectivism as the opposite of individualism. They assumed that individualism is more prevalent in Western industrialized countries than in other countries, especially in contrast to the more traditional societies of developing countries. The social structure of Western societies shaped by Protestantism and the process of civic emancipation contributed to such psychological traits of individualism as individual freedom, right of choice, self-realization, and so on (Triandis 1995). The countries or ethnic groups that inherited a Protestant tradition should demonstrate more characteristics of individualism than the traditional cultures of non-Western countries. Therefore, the individualistic tendencies of European-Americans in the United States should be higher than other minority groups, and their tendencies for collectivism should be lower than that of other minority groups (Oyserman et al. 2002).

Researchers in this field mostly followed a positivist research orientation. They adopted the method of trait approach in psychology of personality, conceptualized individualism, or collectivism as a kind of psychological syndrome, and constructed various scales to measure the traits and to test their hypotheses. Some researchers attempted to induce theories after a certain degree of empirical data accumulation.

Psychologists studying individualism–collectivism have taken European-American psychological characteristics as a frame of reference to construct their images of other cultural groups. European-Americans are situated at one end of the dimension of individualism–collectivism with their cultural and psychological characteristics as coordinates of reference for other ethnic groups around the world. The latter are situated at different locations along the dimension, suggesting that their cultural identities are so vague that their own psychological characteristics can be understood only if they are described in contrast to Americans. Therefore, Fiske (2002) criticized previous individualism–collectivism research indicating that individualism is the sum of cultural characteristics by which Americans define themselves, while collectivism was formalized to show characteristics of the antithetical other in accordance with the American ideological understanding that “[w]e are not that kind of person” (p. 84).

Analysis by Oyserman et al. (2002) provides concrete evidence to indicate that early understandings of individualism and collectivism by psychologists represent

two different types of behavioral categories. They point out that, because there is considerable heterogeneity among conceptual definitions of collectivism and the contents of scales used to measure it, the cultural difference in this respect may reflect its multifaceted nature in the way of connections between an individual and others. After an intensive review of previous literature, they point out that.

American and Western psychology are infused with an understanding of human nature on the basis of individualism, raising the question of our ability to separate our current way of understanding human nature based on individualism from a yet to be developed approach of collectivism (pp. 44–45).

With a careful review and reanalysis of the data in previous literature, Schimmack et al. (2005) indicate that the conceptual definition of individualism is clear, instruments for measuring it are significant, and it is a valid and important dimension for measuring cultural differences. However, the definitions of collectivism are ambiguous and varied, and the validities of instruments that have been developed to measure it are undetermined. Therefore, they suggest that it is necessary for cross-cultural psychologists to reevaluate the meaning of collectivism.

In Chap. 4 of this book, I will intensively review previous literature and advocate for Fiske's (1991) taxonomy which classified the dyadic relationships of human beings into four categories, namely: authority ranking, communal sharing, equality matching, and market pricing. Then I will explain the relationship between my theoretical model of Face and Favor (Hwang 1987) and Fiske's taxonomy of social behaviors. Based on such an analysis, I will propose a series of theoretical models of Confucian Relationalism in the following chapters of this book to replace the individualism–collectivism research approach. Individualism has been a Western cultural ideal since the Renaissance which has been enriched and shaped gradually since industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. Following World War II, individualism was globalized and spread to many non-Western countries. Nevertheless, people of non-Western countries tend to display the orientation of Individualism only in their relationships with others of instrumental ties or market pricing.

Collectivism is a catchall concept which is flawed and should be replaced by Relationalism. However, the transformation from the approach of individualism–collectivism to relationalism implies a philosophical switch. It is unlikely for a psychologist to conduct research on Relationalism using positivist philosophy.

The Third Wave of Cultural Psychology

Because individualism is a Western cultural ideal, it has been applied everywhere in contemporary social sciences. Most theories of mainstream social science, including social psychology, have been constructed with normative presumptions of individualism. This is the most important motivation for the indigenization movements within psychology and social science which have sprung up in non-Western countries in past decades. In other words, the philosophical switch for transformation from individualism–collectivism to relationalism is necessary for the development of

indigenous psychology. I will elaborate my arguments in the following chapters of this book.

The Indigenization Movement

Since the end of the 1970s, some psychologists have begun conducting research of indigenous psychology in non-Western countries, such as Mexico, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and India. This trend attracted increasing attention from mainstream psychologists in the 1990s. The emergence of indigenous psychology can be understood as a search by non-Western psychologists for cultural identity in the power structure of the new world order.

In the beginning of the 1990s, the communist countries of Eastern Europe collapsed, and the long-lasting cold war between East and West that had persisted since the end of World War II came to an end. Many precommunist countries began to participate in the competition of the capitalist world market, especially the People's Republic of China, whose leaders have been devoted to economic reform since the mid-1970s. Chinese products now penetrate the world market. China's huge population also constitutes an attractive market for most international businesses. Globalization has become an inevitable trend, and the concept of multiculturalism has accordingly been proposed as globalization's opposite but matching concept. People need to understand people from different cultures, and yet they also need to seek their own cultural identities. As a consequence of frequent cultural contact, the possibility of intercultural conflict has also increased. Various types of interracial or international conflict have broken out in many regions around the world, and the clash of civilizations has become a core issue for human beings to resolve in the new age of globalization (Huntington 1997).

Indigenous psychology has emerged in this new power structure of world politics and economy. Generally speaking, indigenization movements have been initiated by non-Western psychologists in a spirit of nationalism and academic anticolonialism. They have argued that current mainstream psychology is basically a kind of Westernized or Americanized psychology. Both its theory and research methods contain Western ethnocentric bias (Berry et al. 1992). When the Western psychology research paradigm is transplanted blindly to non-Western countries, it is usually irrelevant, inappropriate, or incompatible for understanding the mentalities of non-Western people (Sinha 1984, 1986). Such a practice has been regarded as a kind of academic imperialism or colonialism (Ho 1993). By ignoring the fact that many Western theories of social psychology are culturally bound, duplication of a Western paradigm in non-Western countries may result in neglect of cultural factors that may influence the development and manifestation of human behavior.

Based on such reasoning, many indigenous psychologists have advocated "a bottom-up model building paradigm" (Kim 2000, p. 265) to promote "the study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural context that relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other resources" (Ho 1998,

p. 94), and that treats people “as interactive and proactive agents of their own actions” that occur in a meaningful context (Kim et al. 2000, p. 71). They perform a “scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its peoples” (Kim and Berry 1993, p. 2) in order to develop a “cultural-appropriate psychology” (Azuma 1984, p. 53), “a psychology based on and responsive to indigenous culture and indigenous realities” (Enriquez 1993, p. 158) or a psychology whose “concepts, problems, hypotheses, methods, and tests emanate from, adequately represent, and reflect upon the cultural context in which the behavior is observed” (Adair et al. 1993, p. 149).

Challenges to Indigenous Psychology

The indigenous psychology approach described above has been criticized by mainstream psychologists. For example, Triandis (2000) points out that anthropologists have used a similar approach for years, and that accumulating anthropological data with an idiosyncratic approach may not have much significance in terms of contribution to the development of scientific psychology. Poortinga (1999) indicates that the usage of the plural “indigenous psychologies” by many indigenous psychologists suggest an implicit restriction on the potential for development of indigenous psychology. The development of multiple psychologies not only contradicts the scientific requirement of parsimony, but also makes the demarcation of cultural populations a pending problem. If every culture has to develop its own psychology, how many indigenous psychologies should there be? How many psychologies would have to be developed for Africa? What is the optimal number of indigenous psychologies? What is the meaning of an indigenous psychology developed in a specific culture to people in other cultures?

David Ho, a supporter of indigenous psychology, advocated the development of an Asian psychology (1988), but also points out that if every culture develops its own psychology, another kind of ethnocentrism in reverse would arise. Poortinga (1996, p. 59) has similar criticisms, arguing that overemphasis on the nature and extent of differences in psychological functioning between people of different cultures may make indigenous psychology a kind of “scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise.”

Hermans and Kempen (1998) propose the concept of “moving culture.” This concept emphasizes the fact that cultures change over time, and suggests the perils of proposing cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society. When intercultural communications become so frequent that the whole world is a global village, can culture be regarded as internally homogenous and externally distinctive? If individuals are able to choose their own behavior, culture may have no necessary influence on the individual, and psychological traits and mechanisms would be incidental. The notion of regarding culture as a psychological system becomes less feasible. Instead of regarding culture as a stable system geographically located in a particular

area, it would be more viable to define cross-cultural differences in terms of specific ecocultural and sociocultural conditions (Poortinga 1999).

Poortinga (1999, p. 425) strongly suggests that “differences in behavioral repertoires across cultural populations should be understood against the background of a broader frame of commonness.” He argues that overemphasis on cross-cultural differences in behaviors and negation of important commonalities in psychological functioning across different cultures is not only “factually incorrect,” but also “theoretically misleading” (Poortinga 1999, p. 419).

The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology

In order to respond to these challenges, most indigenous psychologists have argued that the development of numerous indigenous psychologies is not their final goal. Rather, their final goal is to develop an Asian psychology (Ho 1988), a global psychology (Enriquez 1993; Yang 1993), a universal psychology (Berry and Kim 1993; Kim and Berry 1993), or a human psychology (Yang 1993). To achieve this goal, they have proposed several research methods or approaches, including the derived etic approach (Berry 1989; Berry and Kim 1993), the metatheory method (Ho 1998), the cross-indigenous method (Enriquez 1977, 1993), as well as cross-cultural indigenous psychology (Yang 1997, 1999).

The transition from indigenous psychologies to an Asian psychology, global psychology, universal psychology, or a human psychology, implies a significant change in philosophical assumptions. Indigenous psychologists must change their ontology, epistemology, as well as methodology if they want to attain this goal.

On this point, I strongly agree with Greenfield (2000), who delivered the following statement in her keynote speech to the third Conference of Asian Social Psychology in Taipei, August, 1999:

The incorporation of culture into mainstream psychology will not come from simply presenting data on group differences, no matter how exciting or dramatic these differences may be. My most important theoretical mission is to introduce the idea of a deep structure of culture. As in language, deep structure of culture generates behaviors and interpretations of human behavior in an infinite array of domains and situations. I believe that the concepts behind individualism and collectivism, independence and interdependence, a relational versus an individual orientation and so on are all indexing a common deep structure. (Greenfield 2000, p. 229)

The argument for the importance of universalism is supported by a distinction proposed by cultural psychologists to explain their fundamental view of human nature: one mind, many mentalities (Shweder 1996, 2000; Shweder et al. 1998). This phrase indicates that the psychological functionings or mechanisms of the human mind are the same all over the world, but that people may evolve various mentalities in different social and cultural environments. The goal of achieving a global psychology entails the expectation that the knowledge system constructed by indigenous psychologists should reflect not only the universal human mind, but also

the particular mentality in a given culture. Differences in behavioral repertoires across various groups should be explained against the background of a broader frame of commonality (Poortinga 1999). Indigenous psychologists should incorporate both cultural variation and cross-cultural commonalities into their research schemes. However, this goal cannot be achieved by the inductive approach advocated by those indigenous psychologists who insist on positivist philosophy. Closer examination of the terms *mind* and *mentality* reveals the reason an inductive approach is insufficient.

According to Shweder's definition, *mind* means "the totality of actual and potential conceptual contents of human cognitive process," and *mentality* denotes "the cognized and activated subset of mind" (Shweder 2000, p. 210). A *mentality* is owned or exercised by some group of particular individuals, so it can be a subject for research in cultural psychology. In contrast, *mind* refers to all the conceptual content that any human being might ever cognize and activate or represent. This universal mind cannot become the subject of research in cultural psychology. The reason is not difficult to understand. If indigenous psychologists want to achieve the goal of universalization with an inductive approach, they would have to carry out a very large-scale research program, traveling around the globe to investigate all indigenous psychologies. Moreover, they would have to take into account all that has been manifest in history and even what will be manifest in the future of each culture (Wallner and Jandl 2001).

Obviously this is an impossible mission. What the indigenous psychologists really can do is to assume that the deep structures of the human mind as well as its psychological functionings do not vary across different cultural populations, but that people living in different societies may develop various mentalities in response to diverse cultural contexts (Berry et al. 1992; Poortinga 1997). The goal of universal psychology or global psychology which *can* be attained by indigenous psychologists is to construct a series of formal theories which can reflect both the universal deep structure of the human mind and the specific mentalities of people in a given culture. This will allow us to understand the manifestations of people's mentality within their cultures in terms of a larger common framework.

The Content and Structure of This Book

How can we attain this epistemological goal of indigenous psychology? This issue is highly complicated. Since constructing the "Face and Favor" model in the early 1980s, I have devoted myself to the development of indigenous Chinese psychology. Following my appointment as the principal investigator for the "In Search of Excellence for Chinese Indigenous Psychological Research" project in 2000, I have paid close attention to issues related to this goal, conducted psychological research, and published a series of papers in attempts to resolve these issues. In the annual evaluations of the project's performance, examiners from the Ministry of Education and the National Science Council have always pointed out that each of my published

papers has its justified arguments. But, how can I integrate those arguments together to illustrate my advocacy for the development of indigenous psychology or indigenous social science?

This book entitled *Confucian Relationalism* is my response to this request. In my article *Constructive Realism and Confucian Relationism: An Epistemological Strategy for the Development of Indigenous Psychology* (Hwang 2006), I emphasized that three levels of breakthrough must be made for the sustainable progress of indigenous psychology: philosophical reflection, theoretical construction, and empirical research. This book contains 12 chapters, the first chapter elaborates the epistemological strategy of indigenous psychology with reference to the content of this book.

Philosophical Reflection

In terms of philosophical reflection, I suggest that indigenous psychologists need to consider a fundamental question: What is the importance of modernization for non-Western countries? It is significant that modernization theory has been popular in many social science fields in non-Western countries from the end of World War II until the late 1970s. However, this book does not take the personality psychology position. I have no interest in asking how to study, to measure, or even to develop the personality traits of modern man. On the contrary, I advocate that, as social scientists in non-Western societies, we should ask: what are the essential differences between the knowledge created by scientists after the Renaissance and the knowledge developed by various cultures throughout the history of humankind?

Constructive Realism

In other words, it is unlikely that we will find standards for modern man, but it is certain that we will be able to define what modern knowledge is in terms of the Western philosophy of science. In early 2000 I published a book entitled *The Logic of Social Sciences* (Hwang 2000). This book systematically introduced the ontology/epistemology/methodology proposed by 17 major Western philosophers during twentieth century. Its content is divided into five major parts (1) Positivism, (2) Postpositivism, (3), Structuralism (4) Hermeneutics, and (5) Critical Theory, with a final chapter on Constructive Realism as its conclusion. The Positivism and Postpositivism introduced in the first two parts of the book are philosophies applicable to natural science. Because most psychologists have defined psychology as a science, both of these two philosophies have frequently been used by psychologists. The paradigms of Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Critical Theory as discussed in

the latter three parts, are often adopted by social scientists. The Constructive Realism described in the final chapter is a philosophy of science advocated by Professor Dr. Fritz Wallner of the University of Vienna. In recent years, he organized the Vienna School, distinct from the Vienna Circle which was very active in the scientific community during the 1930s, with hopes to integrate developments in the philosophy of science since the twentieth century. Constructive Realism divides reality into three categories: Because *reality itself* cannot be understood by human beings, human beings can understand only the *lifeworld* constructed by a certain cultural group with their mother language and their history, as well as the *scientific microworld* constructed by scientists with their professional terminology.

It seems to me that the distinction between scientific microworld and lifeworld made by Constructive Realism is crucially important for us to resolve problems encountered while developing indigenous psychology. Nevertheless, the descriptions of these two worlds provided by Constructive Realism are not sufficient for us to attain this goal. Therefore, in Chap. 2 “Modernization of Non-Western Societies: A Perspective of Constructive Realism,” I compare differences of knowledge between these two worlds from five aspects: constructor of knowledge, ways of thinking, types of rationality, mode of construction, and functions of worldview, in order to describe the characteristics of modern knowledge which can be used to explain the modernization of non-Western societies.

Philosophical Switch

From this comparison and exposition we can see that the modernization of Western societies has emerged from the inner core of their civilization, while the modernization of non-Western societies is a consequence of transplanting the essence of Western civilization. In order to develop indigenous social sciences, social scientists from non-Western societies not only have to renounce the mentality of colonialism which is characterized by a blind transplantation of Western research paradigms, but also have to adjust their mentality from anticolonialism to postcolonialism (Hwang 2005). They must absorb the essence of Western civilization, and learn how to use the philosophy of science as a basis for constructing scientific microworlds which are applicable to their domestic societies.

Therefore, in Chap. 3 “The Concepts of Person and Paradigm Switch in Western Philosophy,” I cite the arguments of French philosopher Francois Jullien, to make a clear distinction between modern Western philosophy and traditional Eastern wisdom, and discuss the evolution of Western philosophy from the concepts of person implied in the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Popper. My discussion is focused on the major paradigm shift from Positivism to Postpositivism. Several important scientific philosophies appearing after the rise of Postpositivism are introduced in expectation that they may help psychologists from non-Western societies to grasp the rules of the game for constructing a scientific microworld.

Structuralism: Presuppositions for Theoretical Construction

Based on the Western philosophy of science, we can investigate the question: how to achieve the epistemological goals of indigenous psychology? In order to answer this question, we have to first clarify such questions as: What is structure? What is deep structure?

People in Nature

From the perspective of structuralism (Lévi-Strauss 1976), the formation and variation of cultural phenomena have evolved from the universal structure of the human mind. Human beings are a part of nature; human cognitions and behavior are profoundly influenced by nature. Nature is sensible. All phenomena in nature operate in accordance with objective rules. Those rules are connected with one another, so as to make the whole of nature a united entity over a long period of time. The stability of natural rules over time and their linkage across space have long-term influence on human beings, Human social lives are conditioned by the operation of nature.

For the sake of survival and prosperity, human rationality has to handle the various events encountered in a person's lifeworld in terms of bipolar cognitive dimensions so as to adjust to the environment. In view of the development of human culture, all human activities, including cognitions as well as actions, result from simulating various relations in nature. Nature is a system with steady, unchangeable, and mutually linked relations among its various components. The diversified social phenomena seen in a given society are manifested from an undetectable underlying structure that originated from the inherited capability of the human mind.

As a part of nature, from generation to generation people have gradually developed various sets of customs in their lifeworlds that are congruent with the natural order. These customs, rites, and various forms of life are the consequences of routinization, crystallization, or systematization of human practices in simulating nature. The network of relations between people and nature or between people and people is the structure.

Premodern Civilization

The premodern civilizations that evolved from primitive cultures were created unconsciously with a psychological mechanism in sync with nature. The creative mechanism of premodern civilization was neither rationality in opposition to nature, nor the process of evolution as described by historians, but the principle of maintaining homeostasis by simulating the operation of nature. Like the stability and certainty of the natural order, there exists a stable structure underlying every premodern civilization created by human beings. Various types of culture manifested in different historical stages are merely the independent performance of the same

inherited capability of human minds in different circumstances, like the fossils buried in different stratum of the earth sharing the same structure.

The human capability to simulate nature is manifest in the customs and social relationships of premodern civilization. The more advanced the society, the more progressed the civilization, and the more complicated the social relationships. Many linkages among people depart from the natural order, which makes recognition of the original appearance of some premodern civilizations difficult. The goal of structuralism is to reveal the fundamental structure of cultural relations which might be very complicated in appearance. These structures are the unconscious models of human rationality, which are a kind of autonomous model followed by human thinking. All of the empirical facts in human social life are a result of the arrangement and combination of these models.

According to structuralism, language is the basis of social structure. An individual who wants to connect with others, must first separate himself from others, and then exchange messages with others through a linguistic or symbolic system. The structure of language is the prototype of social structure. All social life and cultural activities are constructed on the basis of the deep structure of language. Use of language and social exchange behavior links people as a social entity, enabling them to depart from nature, and to form their own cultural systems.

Unconscious Model

With this understanding of the fundamental position of structuralism, I return to the context of this thesis, and explain the importance of studying the deep structure of a culture in indigenous psychology. From the perspective of structuralism, both the language games played by people in their lifeworlds and the microworlds of knowledge constructed by scientists have their own structures. But, there are tremendous differences between these two kinds of structure. In terms of Piaget's (1972) genetic epistemology, the structure of scientific knowledge is a conscious model constructed with formal operational thinking by an individual scientist with fully developed intelligence. In contrast, the language games played by people in their lifeworlds are constituted by the rationality of a cultural group under the influence of their collective unconscious over the history of their evolution. These language games originate from the deep structure of the culture, which is an unconscious model. People are unaware of it directly in their daily lives, but researchers may reveal the deep structure by using the methods of structuralism.

Deep Structure of Universal Mind

In accordance with Greenfield's (2000) point of view, the most important academic mission of indigenous psychology is to reveal the deep structure of culture, and transform it from unconscious structure to conscious structure by utilizing Western

social scientific research methods. Subsequently the mission is to then use cultural structure as a framework of reference to construct various theories of psychology, for conducting empirical research in the lifeworld of domestic society.

Chapter 4 “Theoretical Construction of Face and Favor Model” aims to explain my critique of Western theories of social exchange, equity theory, and justice theory, and to construct the Face and Favor theoretical model on the basis of philosophy of science. In this chapter, I want to emphasize that the theoretical model thus constructed may reflect the deep structures of universal human mind aimed at dealing with interpersonal relationships.

Chapter 5 analyzes the inner structure of Confucian thought with the Face and Favor theoretical model as a frame of reference. This analysis enables us to see that there exists an isomorphic relationship between the theoretical model of Face and Favor and the Confucian ethics for ordinary people. From the theoretical model of Face and Favor, we can see the universal human mind’s ways of dealing with interpersonal relationships. From the Confucian ethics for ordinary people, we can understand the specific mentality of people living in Confucian society.

Empirical Research

The theoretical model of Face and Favor and the Confucian ethics for ordinary people constitute the core of Confucian relationalism. Using Popper’s (1972) evolutionary epistemology, any scientist may construct a theory to explain a certain phenomenon in a particular domain. The theories constructed by different scientists for explaining the same phenomenon will compete with one another. Therefore, they must be examined through rational critique and empirical testing.

Attributes of Confucian Ethics

There are many psychologists who have used various research paradigms to study moral thinking in Chinese communities. Chapter 6 “Paradigms for Studying Chinese Moral Thinkings: Meta-Theoretical Analysis” is aimed to provide a critical review of previous research findings from these different paradigmatic perspectives. Chapter 7, “Moral Thoughts in Confucian Society” tries to analyze the attributes of Confucian ethics from my perspective of ethics, and to reinterpret findings of previous research done in Taiwan which could not be adequately explained by Western theories. The analysis of Confucian thoughts presented in this chapter is key to understanding the uniqueness of Confucian culture, which deserves our special attention.

Chapter 8 presents a series of empirical research which has been accomplished using Confucian relationalism. From a philosophy of science perspective, a scientist may construct a theory to explain a phenomenon in a given domain with a set

of specific presumptions. Previous theories and research paradigms proposed by Western psychologists were mostly constructed on the presumption of individualism. Based on the presumption of rationalism, a series of theories can certainly be constructed to serve as guidelines for empirical research on one hand, and to explain findings of previous empirical research on the other hand. Chapters 9–12 construct a series of minitheories to integrate findings of previous empirical research on achievement motivation, face, *quanxi*, and strategies of conflict resolution within Confucian society.

Following the same logic, a series of relevant theories of phenomenon in other domains of Confucian society can be further constructed. Through the efforts of this book, I hope we may not only achieve the epistemological goals of indigenous psychology, but also establish a research tradition of Confucian relationalism in social science.

References

- Adair, J. G., Puhan, B. N., & Vohra, N. (1993). Indigenous of psychology: Empirical assessment of progress in Indian research. *International Journal of Psychology*, 28, 149–169.
- Armer, M., & Youtz, R. (1971). Formal education and individual modernity in an African society. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 71, 604–626.
- Azuma, H. (1984). Psychology in a non-Western culture: The Philippines. *Psychological Bulletin*, 102, 272–292.
- Berry, J. W., & Kim, U. (1993). The way ahead: From indigenous psychologies to a universal psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 277–280). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Berry, J. W. (1989). Imposed etics-emics-derived etics: The operationalization of a compelling idea. *International Journal of Psychology*, 24, 721–735.
- Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dawson, J. L. M. (1967). Traditional versus Western attitudes in West Africa: The construction, validation, and application of a measuring device. *The British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 6, 81–96.
- Doob, L. W. (1967). Scales for assessing psychological modernization in Africa. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31, 414–421.
- Enriquez, V. (1977). Filipino psychology in the Third World. *Philippine Journal of Psychology*, 10, 3–18.
- Enriquez, V. (1993). Developing a Filipino psychology. In U. Kim & J. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 152–169). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Fiske, A. P. (1991). *Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations*. NY: The Free Press.
- Fiske, A. P. (2002). Using individualism and collectivism to compare cultures – a critique of the validity and measurement of the constructs: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). *Psychological Bulletin*, 128(1), 78–88.
- Greenfield, P. M. (2000). Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go? *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(3), 223–240.
- Guthrie, G. M. (1977). A social-psychological analysis of modernization in the Philippines. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 8, 177–206.

- Henry, P. (1986). Indigenous religion and the transformation of peripheral society. In J. K. Hadden & A. Shupe (Eds.), *Prophetic religion and politics* (pp. 123–150). New York: Paragon House.
- Hermans, J. M., & Kempen, J. G. (1998). Moving cultures: The perilous problem of cultural dichotomy in a globalized society. *American Psychologist*, 53(10), 1111–1120.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1993). Relational orientation in Asian social psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 240–259). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1988). Asian psychology: A dialogue on indigenization and beyond. In A. C. Paranjpe, D. Y. F. Ho, & R. W. Rieber (Eds.), *Asian contributions to psychology* (pp. 53–77). New York: Praeger.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1998). Indigenous psychologies: Asian perspectives. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 29(1), 88–103.
- Hofstede, G. (1980). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. London, England: McGraw-Hill.
- Huntington, S. (1997). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), 945–974.
- Hwang, K. K. (2000). *The logic of social sciences (In Chinese)*. Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.
- Hwang, K. K. (2005). From anticolonialism to postcolonialism: The emergence of Chinese indigenous psychology in Taiwan. *International Journal of Psychology*, 40(4), 228–238.
- Hwang, K. K. (2006). Constructive realism and confucian relationism: An epistemological strategy for the development of indigenous psychology. In U. Kim, K. S. Yang, & K. K. Hwang (Eds.), *Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context* (pp. 73–108). New York: Springer.
- Inkeles, A. (1966). The modernization of man. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth* (pp. 151–163). NY: Basic Books.
- Inkeles, A. (1968). *The measurement of modernism: A study of values in Brazil and Mexico*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Inkeles, A., & Smith, D. H. (1974). *Becoming modern*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kim, U., & Berry, J. (Eds.). (1993). *Indigenous cultural psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 1–29). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Kim, U. (2000). Indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology: A theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological analysis. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(3), 265–287.
- Kim, U., Park, Y. S., & Park, D. (2000). The challenger of cross-cultural psychology: The role of the indigenous psychologies. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31(1), 63–75.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1976). *Tristes tropiques*. London: Penguin.
- Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin*, 128(1), 3–72.
- Poortinga, Y. H. (1996). Indigenous psychology: Scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise? In J. Pandey, D. Sinha, & D. P. S. Bhawuk (Eds.), *Asian contributions to cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 59–71). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Poortinga, Y. H. (1999). Do differences in behavior imply a need for different psychologies? *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 48(4), 419–432.
- Poortinga, Y. H. (1997). Towards convergence. In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, J. Pandey, P. R. Dasen, T. S. Saraswathi, M. H. Segall, & C. Kagitcibasi (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology* (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 347–387). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Popper, K. (1972). *Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schimmack, U., Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2005). Individualism: A valid and important dimension of cultural differences between Nations. *Personality & Social Psychology Review*, 9, 17–31.

- Schnaiberg, A. (1970). Measuring modernism: Theoretical and empirical explorations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 76, 399–425.
- Shweder, R. A. (1996). The “mind” of cultural psychology. In P. Baltes & U. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundations of cognition* (pp. 430–436). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shweder, R. A. (2000). The psychology of practice and the practice of the three psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 207–222.
- Shweder, R. A., Goodnow, J., Hatano, G., LeVine, R., Markus, H., & Miller, P. (1998). The cultural psychology of development: One mind, many mentalities. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology*, 1 (pp. 865–937). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Sinha, D. (1984). Psychology in the context of third world development. *International Journal of Psychology*, 19, 17–29.
- Sinha, D. (1986). *Psychology in a third world country: The Indian Experience*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Triandis, H. C. (2000). Dialectics between cultural and cross-cultural psychology. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(3), 185–195.
- Wallerstein, I. (1979). *The capitalist world-economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallner, F. G. & Jandl, M. J. (2001). The importance of constructive realism for the indigenous psychologies approach. Paper presented at Scientific Advances in Indigenous Psychologies: Philosophical, Cultural, and Empirical Contributions. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Yang, K. S., & Hchu, H. Y. (1974). Determinate, correlates, and consequences of Chinese individual modernity. *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica*, 37, 1–37 (in Chinese).
- Yang, K. S. (1981). The formation and change of Chinese personality: A cultural-ecological perspective. *Acta Psychologica Taiwanica*, 23, 39–55 (in Chinese).
- Yang, K. S. (1993). Why do we need to develop an indigenous Chinese psychology? *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 1, 6–88 (In Chinese).
- Yang, K. S. (1997). Indigenous compatibility in psychological research and its related problems. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 8, 75–120.
- Yang, K. S. (1999). Towards an indigenous Chinese psychology: A selective review of methodological, theoretical, and empirical accomplishments. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 41, 181–211.

Chapter 2

The Modernization of Non-Western Societies: A Perspective of Constructive Realism

Abstract Based on Vygotsky's (1987) theory on the social formation of human mind, it is argued that the language games played by people of non-Western countries in their lifeworlds are distinct from those used by scientists in their professional works. A conceptual scheme was proposed on the philosophical basis of constructive realism to highlight the distinction between lifeworlds and scientific microworlds in light of their five aspects, that is, constructor, ways of thinking, types of rationality, modes of construction, and functions of worldview. Habermas' (Theory of communicative action. Vol. II, Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) theory of communicative action was used to explain the evolution of lifeworlds during the process of modernization. Jullien's (1998) distinction between wisdom and philosophy was cited to discuss the usage of Chinese cultural traditions by Chinese people in their lifeworlds, including Taoism, Confucianism, Legalism, and Martial School.

Keywords Constructive realism • Lifeworld • Scientific microworld • Formal rationality • Substantive rationality • Originative thinking • Technical thinking • Dominative constructive • Participative constructive • Worldview

In Chapter 1, I advocated that in order to attain the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology, non-Western psychologists must have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of their research. Based on Vygotsky's (1896–1934) theory of cultural development, this chapter will cite a body–mind–spirit model to account for human development and emphasize that an individual needs various kinds of knowledge at different stages of his lifespan. However, in modern educational institutions, people learn systems of knowledge which have mostly originated within Western civilizations. In order to illustrate the features of “modern” knowledge and its distinction from the cultural traditions of the non-Western world, a conceptual framework from constructive realism will be proposed to explain the modernization

of human beings in non-Western societies. By doing so, the author argues for the necessity of understanding Western philosophy of science in order to attain the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology.

The Evolution of Culture

Formation of the Human Mind

Vygotsky was the first psychologist to advocate for the social formation of the human mind. For Vygotsky (1981), the lifeworld of human beings is composed of people, materials, and symbols (knowledge system) with historical origins and social meanings which are culturally constructed. Every activity in the lifeworld is mediated by language and symbols. Language is the carrier of culture. It can be used as the principal psychological tool for mediating not only the external activities of human beings; but also the internal processes that can dialectically transform the functions of human minds into higher levels of development (Wertsch 1985).

The general genetic law of cultural development proposed by Vygotsky (1981) states that the cultural development of children occurs at two levels: first on the social level and then on the psychological level. It occurs during interpsychological communication that take place in interpersonal interaction. Meanwhile the occurrence of intrapsychological processes are able to transform the structure and function of the mind.

Vygotsky argued that the origin of higher mental function is located in neither the psyche, nor the neural system, but the social history outside of the organism (Luria 1976). Interpersonal social interaction is the foundation of all advanced psychological functioning. Language is the product of, as well as the principal instrument for, interpersonal interaction. For both adults and children, the most important function of language is to influence others through communication and social interaction. Language itself contains cultural and historical meanings. Vygotsky argued that “development” means the process of continuous interaction with others to create meanings through symbols in the cultural context (Wertsch 1985). Human beings participate in various activities by using language with social meanings and at the same time continue to develop their higher-order psychological functions.

The Developmental Model of Body–Mind–Spirit

From the perspective of contemporary development psychology, human development is a continuous process throughout one’s life, from birth to death. An individual has to acquire language tools of various natures to create different social meanings and to develop various psychological functions at different life stages.

The stages of an individual's development through one's life span can be illustrated by a developmental model of body–mind–spirit proposed by Chen and Bhikkhu (2003).

The body–mind–spirit model distinguishes three aspects of objective self encountered upon the introspective examination of one's own existence:

1. **Physical self:** This is one's self-consciousness focused on the functionings of self which originate from one's physical needs. Examples include eating when hungry, warming oneself up when cold, resting when tired, pursuing benefit, and avoiding harm. These physical needs can make one aware of one's own existence as an organism.
2. **Psychological self:** This is one's awareness of one's own psychological functioning. It originates from the process that occurs when an individual attempts to acquire social or material resources from the outer world for the sake of satisfying various physical or psychological needs. An individual has to learn various types of knowledge in order to control the outer world effectively, and thereby acquire a sense of self-efficacy.
3. **Spiritual self:** As a human being who is able to think, feel, act, and experience various domains of life, the spiritual aspect of self facilitates a comprehensive understanding of one's entire life, including one's personality, values, beliefs, and motives.

These three aspects of self correspond to the three levels of the body–mind–spirit model proposed by Chen and Bhikkhu (2003). According to the model, at the newborn stage an individual is aware of only biological existence. At this stage, a person's primary motive is to satisfy needs originating from the physical body. Other psychological functions remain undeveloped. Therefore, the body is located on the outermost circle of self, as shown in Fig. 2.1. The maturation of mental functions enables learning of various kinds of knowledge in order to control the outer world and maintain a state of equilibrium during adolescence. Once a person enters the adult stage, mind and body are fully developed, and it is expected that the functioning of physical and psychological activities is under the guidance of the person's values and beliefs. One's spiritual self, psychological self, and physical self may coordinate with one another, so that one feels that one's potential is fully developed with a sense of self-efficacy.

In the sunset stage of life, biological desires originating from the physical self slowly weaken. The need for spiritual cultivation may gradually increase. Individuals tend to spend more and more time with spiritual work and thinking about issues related to life and death. In the last stage, the physical self may fade gradually, while the spiritual self becomes more and more apparent and dominates the outermost circle of life.

This developmental model of body–mind–spirit can be viewed as a universal conceptual framework for understanding the process of psychological development in any culture. An individual may go through all five of these stages if, and only if, he does not encounter an accident that interrupts his life. According to Vygotsky's theory of cultural development, the second stage of development from childhood to




Fig. 2.1 A body–mind–spirit model of spiritual care. Adopted from Chen and Bhikkhu (2003)

adolescence is the most important stage for the formation of personality. In this stage, most children acquire knowledge and capacities in school which develop their minds. This learning experience has very significant implications for our understanding of how and why we should develop indigenous psychology. This point can be elaborated in terms of Vygotsky’s theory of cultural development.

Social Factors in Pedagogy

The research done by Vygotsky and his students indicates that after the Bolshevik revolution an obvious diffusion of knowledge occurred in children’s everyday thought processes.

The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 made Vygotsky aware of a qualitative jump or discontinuity between the language and values that students learn from their cultural traditions and families, and the values of communism and sciences taught by school teachers. He therefore argued that the developmental history of society may facilitate not only quantitative, but also qualitative transformation of the mind (Luria 1976).

In his book *Vygostky and Pedogogy*, Daniels (2001) suggests that Vygostky emphasized the mediation of social factors in pedagogy. While teaching, instructors always intentionally or unconsciously demonstrate the social value and political positions of the mainstream social class in their speech and behavior. This influences the pedagogical orientation and student’s psychological development.

Scientific knowledge and common sense originated from two different sources: the former came from the party and school, while the latter came from one's family environment. All of these messages may interact and transform each other in student's mind as a consequence of communication between the teacher and students. The spontaneous representation of knowledge may become more and more rich and abstract. It is impossible for science to eliminate prescientific thinking. On the contrary, common sense is a necessary mediator for a school child to assimilate both cultural and scientific representations (Luria 1976).

The problematic situation Vygotsky faced with respect to the pedagogy in Russian schools following the Communist revolution is very similar to that faced by non-Western psychologists in developing indigenous psychology. Generally speaking, before receiving formal education, children in non-Western countries have learned both their mother language and many related cultural traditions. As they begin school, they are taught modern knowledge which originates in Western culture. The children must use their mother language as an instrument to assimilate the new knowledge or to modify the structure of their minds to accommodate the new knowledge.

Vygotsky's major contribution is the development of a general orientation which includes educational activities into the theory of psychological development (Moll 1990). Though he keenly noted that there was an obvious discontinuity between the science and ideology taught by teachers at school and the language tools acquired by students at home, he never did any systematic analysis to distinguish the essential difference between these two types of knowledge. This distinction is fundamentally important for the development of indigenous psychology. Will thus discuss it in the next section.

Constructive Realism

Modern scientific knowledge is a cultural product that evolved within Western civilization following the fourteenth century Renaissance. As such, it is essentially different from the cultures and traditions of non-Western countries. In order to explain the modernization of non-Western countries and their need for indigenous psychology, in my article *Constructive Realism and Confucian Relationalism* (Hwang 2006), I highlighted the distinction between "lifeworld" and "scientific microworld" and described the differences between them in order to reflect on those issues from the perspective of constructive realism.

Since the 1930s when the Vienna Circle began its advocacy for logical positivism with its subsequent influence on the global scientific community, the philosophy of science has undergone many changes. Wallner (1994, 1997) was thus inspired to propose the philosophy of constructive realism in order to provide a foundation of interdisciplinary integration foundation for various apparently divergent sciences.

While constructive realism can be used to answer the controversial issues encountered by indigenous psychologists, it was not originally conceived with this

Table 2.1 Two types of lifeworld and microworld knowledge

	Lifeworld	Microworld
Constructor	Cultural group	Single scientist
Ways of thinking	Originative thinking	Technique thinking
Types of rationality	Substantive rationality	Formal rationality
Patterns of construction	Participative constructive	Dominative construction
Functions of worldview	Meaning of life	Recognition of world

purpose thus, it is necessary to make some revisions to the philosophy so that it may satisfactorily address these issues. Therefore, in my article “Constructive Realism and Confucian Relationalism” (Hwang 2006), I proposed a conceptual framework to illustrate the differences between the knowledge of the scientific microworld constructed by scientists and the knowledge used by ordinary people in their daily life. Here in this chapter, I will present the main arguments of constructive realism and my supplements. I will then utilize constructive realism to address the controversial issues faced by indigenous psychologists.

Constructive realism differentiates three levels of reality, the most important of which is called the *actuality* or *wirklichkeit*. The actuality or *wirklichkeit* is the world in which we find ourselves, or the given world that all living creatures must rely on to survive. The given world may have certain structures, or may function according to its own rules. However, humans have no way to recognize these structures or rules. No matter how humans attempt to explain these structures, the explanations, and therefore their comprehensions, remain a kind of human construction. The structures of the world, its temporal and spatial distances, and causal laws, are all hypotheses proposed by humankind.

Two Types of Knowledge

The world as constructed by human beings can be divided into two categories: lifeworlds and microworlds. These two constructions together constitute the world that human beings are able to understand, for they have been figured out by different ways of thinking supported by different types of rationality. The knowledge created within each construction results in different worldviews with distinct functions. These two worlds constitute two levels of constructed reality for human beings (see Table 2.1).

The first constructed reality is that of the lifeworld in which humans live. For the individual, a lifeworld is a primordial world in which everything presents itself in a self-evident way. Before human beings began to develop scientific knowledge, they tried to understand their daily experiences, and to explain, respond to, and delineate structures of their lifeworlds. These explanations and responses belong to a domain of prelogical, pretechnical, and preinstrumental thinking, and the richness of their roots lies in individual life experiences, which are flexible, penetrable, and yet

unbreakable. Human beings can neither exhaust the contents of their lifeworlds, nor go beyond their boundaries (Husserl 1970).

Lifeworlds exist inevitably at a particular point in history. The lifeworld's contents differ by historical age and culture. Economic crisis, war, and civil or political conflict may lead to drastic changes in the lifeworld. However, while people living in the same culture experience changes to their lifeworlds, their lifeworlds are constantly sustained by a transcendental formal structure called cultural heritage.

The second world construction is that of the microworld. Any scientific construction can be regarded as a microworld. A microworld can be a theoretical model built on the basis of realism, or a theoretical interpretation of a social phenomenon provided from a particular perspective by a social scientist. Within any given microworld, the reality of the given world is replaced by a second order constructed reality that can be verified by empirical methods.

Language Games

Language is the most important carrier of cultural heritage. It is also the medium through which lifeworlds are comprehended, analyzed, and recorded. As they interact in their lifeworlds people often use language to play language games. A language game is any kind of human practice or activity shared by people living within a given culture. Wittgenstein (1945/1958) first used the term in his later philosophical works in which he asserted that the world is made up of various forms of life, and that language is mainly constituted of various language games. *Forms of life* refers to patterns of thinking that manifest in cultural heritage, such as customs, folkways, institutions, and traditional practices. Language games are inevitably rooted in these forms of life. They are based on the observance of rules embedded in these customs and traditions. Any particular game has its rules and must be played according to those rules. However, the rules can change, and they do not necessarily specify every detail. While playing a game, people may formulate their own rules and may change them at any time (Wittgenstein 1945/1958).

The language used in daily life is an open system consisting of large, small, simple, or complicated language games. These language games are not necessarily consistent in form, but may be similar to one another in certain aspects, which Wittgenstein labeled family resemblance. The microworld of scientific knowledge constructed by scientists can also be viewed as a set of language games. However, the language games people play within a scientific microworld are distinct from those they play in their lifeworlds.

Vygotsky's (1986–1934) cultural psychology emphasized the importance of language tools. Though he was living in the same era as Wittgenstein, he neither mentioned the concept of language games, nor distinguished the difference between them. In fact, language of lifeworld can be regarded as a tool and language used in scientific microworld can also be treated as a kind of game. We may say that when Wittgenstein described the characteristics of language games, he was focused on

language used in the lifeworld; meanwhile, when Vygotsky proposed the idea of language tools, his major concern was the scientific microworld.

Though it is very hard to distinguish the lifeworld and scientific microworld by examining language games and language tools, these two worlds can be differentiated using other dimensions: knowledge of scientific microworlds are constructed by solitary scientists; while the language games being played in lifeworlds have been developed by cultural groups over the course of their histories (Wallner and Jandl 2001). In addition, the ways of thinking, types of rationality, modes of construction and worldviews in these two worlds are demonstrated in Table 2.1 in order to note their essential differences:

Originative Thinking and Technical Thinking

The lifeworld is the basis for constructing a scientific microworld, which is a completely new entity distinct from the lifeworld. The construction of natural science has been pragmatically motivated in order to control, exploit, and utilize nature. The scientific microworld is not the only thematic world that human beings have constructed. Guided by themes for different needs, human beings have also constructed the microworlds of ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Because each thematic world is constructed under the guidance of a certain theme with a particular way of thinking, all phenomena irrelevant to that theme are excluded. Therefore, each microworld bears a predetermined partiality and narrowness.

The language and thinking style used to construct the scientific microworld are essentially different from those of the lifeworld. People construct the natural language used in a lifeworld within a shared culture over a long-term period of time. In the initial stage of a particular culture, people concentrate on observing and contemplating the nature of every object within their lifeworld. They rid themselves of their own will and intention, and try their best to make all things manifest in the language they create to represent it. Heiderger (1966) labeled this way of thinking *originative thinking* or *essential thinking*.

Because people believe that the essential nature of an object can be presented in the word they have created to represent it, they eventually come to replace the object with the word and presume that the constructed reality is equivalent to the actual reality. When people make statements about a thing, they call it up as if its reality is wholly represented by the language, and the reality of a thing resides in language.

The language and way of thinking scientists use to construct theoretical microworlds are distinct from those used by people in their lifeworlds. Scientific knowledge is not obtained by contemplating the nature of things. Rather, it is intentionally created by scientists in order to fulfill specific goals. So it has a functional, compulsory and aggressive character that demands the most gain and the least cost. Such technical thinking can be considered a degeneration of Cartesian dualism. It has no interest in representing things in the objective world and making things

the object of knowledge. Instead, this type of thinking attempts to exploit natural resources, and to make them subservient to be utilized by human beings.

Technical thinking uses certain ground principles as a foundation, which is also called *metaphysical thinking*. The German term *grundsatz* and the Latin word *principium* both originate from the Greek word *axioma*, which refers to a valuable or very precious thing. In the domain of scientific propositions, *axioma* refers to the first proposition that is metaphysical. The meanings of other propositions must be understood in light of the axiom's fundamental meaning. Modern people calculate their thinking in reference to a ground principle. Their thinking is rational, and the ground principle serves as the foundation for this rational thinking. Only with such a ground principle can rationality perfectly display its essence (Heiderger 1974).

Substantive Rationality and Formal Rationality

What is meant by rationality? Is the originative thinking needed by people in their lifeworlds irrational or lacking in rationality? French sociologist Durkheim (1912/1965) argued that all social representations in any culture, including those of religion and mythology, are rational. All concepts and categories in a particular society are products of the social life of its members. Members of the collective share these concepts and categories, and people take them for granted. Only when people believe a concept is true, does it become true. According to Durkheim, religion, like science, tries to represent reality with a lexicon that aggregates things into categories and sets up internal connections amongst them. There is no fundamental difference between the language used in religion and the language used in science. The basic ideas of scientific logic originated from religion. Primitive religious thinking and modern scientific thinking are two stages of development in the course of history; the latter evolved from the former. Scientific thinking is nothing more than a more developed form of religious thinking.

Durkheim suggested that everything that is social is rational, and everything that is rational is social. From the perspective of insiders living within a given society, collective consciousness and social representations are rational, no matter whether they are related to religion, mythology, or science. In evaluating Durkheim's arguments, several further questions become evident: Is there any difference between the rationality used in the microworld and that of the lifeworld? Do the rationalities developed by various civilizations of the world share the same essence?

These questions can be answered by considering Max Weber's (1921/1963) works on comparative religion. It is well known that during his academic career Weber's work focused on causes for the rise of industrial capitalism in the modern world (Weber 1921/1963, 1930/1992). In order to analyze this problem, he proposed a set of contrasting concepts to highlight the unique features of Western civilization. Weber indicated that with the Renaissance of the fourteenth century, many west European countries experienced an expansion of rationalism in such fields as science, law, politics, and religion. He noted that, after the Renaissance,

European rationalism was uniquely characterized by its formal rational structure. This set it completely apart from the substantive rationality emphasized in other civilizations. Formal rationality emphasizes the calculability of means and procedures that can be used to pursue personal goals, and pays attention only to value-neutral facts. In contrast, substantive rationality refers to the value of ends or results judged from a particular position, and provides no clear-cut means or procedures to reach goals (Brubaker 1984). Only the few people familiar with the special means and procedures are able use them to pursue the ends or goals that substantive rationality defines as valuable.

Participative Construction and Dominative Construction

According to Weber's conceptual framework, all microworlds constructed by scientists contain the essence of formal rationality. In order to control and utilize nature, scientists construct different microworlds to study their subjects in particular domains. Each of these microworlds has its own specific goal. These microworlds are neither permanent nor absolutely certain. When the goal loses importance, or when people are faced with new problems, scientists must construct a new microworld to address these problems. Such scientific microworlds are products constructed by scientists who are conducting research in a specific domain and utilizing the Cartesian reasoning that emerged following the European Renaissance. It is essentially different from the way of constructing knowledge used by non-Western people in their lifeworlds.

This point can be illustrated with Levy-Bruhl (1910/1966) anthropological study of primitive thinking. Influenced by Durkheim's pioneer work, Levy-Bruhl focused on primitive people's collective representations as his major research subject. He indicated that the cultural system of any primitive people, including their mythology and religion, is constituted on a basis of the law of mystical participation (Evans-Pritchard 1964), which conceptualizes human beings as parts of an inseparable entity that can be viewed as a consciousness of cosmic holism (Taylor 1871/1929).

In a premodern or primitive culture, the collective representation constituted by the law of mystical participation would seldom be refuted by empirical experience. Tradition and authority protect the culture from challenges by antagonistic information. Members of the community usually experience collective representations with shared sentiment, rather than examining them with empirical facts. Moreover, although people are very sensitive to contradiction, they are not at all sensitive to the inconsistencies that arise within the collective representation constituted by the law of mysterious participation. In some premodern civilizations, submission to the law of mysterious participation is more powerful than elimination of contradiction. Using language as a form of social representation, people in many premodern cultures describe people and objects encountered in various situations with vivid adjectives. By doing so, they develop a rich lexicon in which the meanings of words

are not only flexible, but can also be reshaped with the variation of experiences, people, and objects. Levy-Bruhl believed that the most popular forms of thought in premodern cultures could never transform into the form of human thinking which accompanies modernity.

In premodern civilizations, people *participatively construct* the knowledge in their lifeworlds (Shen 1994) whereas the scientific microworlds constructed by Westerners using Cartesian dualism can be considered as products of *dominative construction*. Knowledges constructed in these two ways are completely different in nature and mutually incompatible.

Two Worldviews

The language games people play in both the lifeworld or the microworld entail a particular worldview. But, what is a worldview? In answer to this question, linguist Whorf (1956) argued that the mind must analyze and synthesize the vivid impressions presented by the changing world through a language system in order to process them. This language system contains a worldview. When an individual learns to speak, he must acquire a lexicon for classifying and naming things in the outer world, and a set of grammatical rules for describing and considering them. In other words, language shapes each person's specific worldview.

The worldviews in the lifeworld and the microworld are essentially different. People of a given culture gradually construct the worldview of their lifeworld over the course of history as they contemplate the nature of the universe. Walsh and Middleton (1984) indicate that the worldview in a given culture usually answers four broad categories of questions: Who am I? What is my situation of life? Why do I suffer? And how do I find salvation? A worldview not only describes human nature but also the relationship between humans and the world, as well as one's historical situation. It provides a diagnosis for problems and prescriptions for their solution.

The worldview in a microworld does not share these functions. In his lexicon theory, Kuhn (1987) indicated that the scientific lexicon is composed of a set of terms with structure and content, which constitute an interrelated network. Scientists use terms in the lexicon to make propositions in a theory to describe the nature of the world. In other words, theory and lexicon are inseparable. A theory can be understood only with the aid of its lexicon. Post-Kuhn philosophy indicated that there are two kinds of change in the course of scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1986), namely, change of word meaning, and change in the way of seeing the world. A change of worldview is implied in the change of word meaning. When a theory is changed, its lexicon will change with it. The microworld of a theory can be understood with its specific lexicon. Lexicons of successive theories may share some terminology, while some terms are specific to a particular lexicon. These specific terms are incommensurable, and cannot be translated into the lexicons of other microworlds.

Scientific lexicons inevitably include a system of taxonomic categories. When members of a scientific community are learning their lexicon, they use examples to

learn the stipulated descriptions of these terms, rather than learning definitions of the terms one by one. This systematic method for learning the stipulated terms and their related natural laws by group or set is called local holism. Scientific lexicons learned in this way contain a particular way of seeing the world. Members of the same scientific community must master the same lexicon, understand the meaning of each term, and share the same worldview in order to communicate with one another, think about the same problems, and engage in related research in the same scientific community. The microworld worldview provides no answers to problems related to the meaning of life. It is essentially different from the worldview of people's lifeworlds.

The Meaning of Modernization

The sharp contrast between the two types of knowledge in the lifeworld and microworld, constitute a conceptual framework that can be used to answer the questions posed in the introduction to this chapter. I begin with the first question: What is the meaning of modernization for human beings?

Scientists began to construct the microworld of scientific knowledge around the time of the European Renaissance in the fourteenth century. The evolution of social representations from the knowledge of substantive rationality to the knowledge of formal rationality is the consequence of a series of qualitative transformations which are discontinuous in terms of both content and cognitive structure (Hwang 2006). As microworlds developed, some of the language, rationality, and thinking entailed by these microworlds penetrated and became infused into people's lifeworlds. The transformation of substantive rationality and the penetration of formal rationality can result in drastic changes in people's social lives. However, the process of change may have different implications for Western and non-Western societies.

Evolution of Lifeworld

What is the general impact of the transformation of knowledge on human's social lives? This question can be answered with Habermas' (1978) theory of the differentiation of social systems from peoples' lifeworlds. Habermas pointed out that an individual's lifeworld is composed of three levels, namely: cultural, social, and individual. People sharing a certain cultural heritage also share the power of reinterpreting it; intersubjective communication may determine the interpretation of cultural tradition. Communication can help people to establish acceptable standards of behavior, identify with their community, and strengthen social integration. Growth and learning resulting from constant communication enables individuals to strengthen their capacity for action and helps them to maintain the integrity of their personalities.

During a society's evolution, some of its social systems can become differentiated from people's lifeworlds, causing people to live in two completely different

worlds. The differentiated systems are not only different from people's lifeworlds, but the two are also antagonistic to one another. The three functions of communication in an individual's lifeworld are: mutual understanding, coordination of action, and socialization. These functions of communication satisfy three kinds of social needs: cultural reproduction, social integration, and individual socialization.

In contrast to lifeworlds, the major aim of sustaining most social systems in modern societies is material reproduction, and the criterion for evaluating system evolution is the enhancement of social control. In order to achieve this goal of material reproduction, each system must be paired with the most efficient microworld of scientific knowledge. People working in the system have to use the technical thought entailed by the microworld to solve the problems they encounter in their tasks. Because of the replacement of originaive thinking with technical thinking, money and power replace the position of language in lifeworlds, and become the media for system integration. Seeking consensus through communication and coordination may also take into consideration the one-dimensional motivation of reward and punishment. Systems in the lifeworld are liberated from regulation by social norms, and become more and more autonomous. Finally, the new order of the social system begins to instrumentalize the lifeworld. Habermas (1978) calls this process colonization of the lifeworld by the system.

The Coexistence of Modernity and Traditionalism

The emergence of indigenization movements in non-Western countries cannot be fully explained by a spirit of anticolonialism. Another reason for the occurrence of these movements is the coexistence of traditional and modern cultures in the lifeworlds of non-Western people. This coexistence is a quintessential postmodern phenomena. Children learn traditional patterns of thinking and behaving by acquiring language in their lifeworlds. This shapes their personality orientation with originaive thinking. As they grow up and attend school, they begin to learn scientific knowledge which originated in the West. Knowledge from different origins with different natures becomes mixed in their cognitive systems, and helps them to deal with problems in different situations of their lifeworlds.

When adults in non-Western countries are engaged in production work in a social system, they are likely to use knowledge from a scientific microworld as well as technical thinking with formal rationality to solve the problems encountered in their tasks. It is a matter of course that this kind of knowledge may penetrate into lifeworlds of ordinary people through various channels of communication. However, for most nonprofessional laymen, though they may learn fragments of scientific knowledge and use it in their daily life, this kind of knowledge remains a type of common sense for them. It is very hard for ordinary people to utilize such knowledge systematically and engage in production work as a professional or expert does.

Because scientific knowledge is characterized by instrumental rationality, it is different from substantial rationality in nature. It can neither be used as a guide for an individual's value orientation, nor can it answer problems about the meaning of life. In many circumstances, it can not replace the knowledge one derives from cultural traditions, such as values, views toward life, philosophies about life, ethics, and morality. People in non-Western societies certainly use the various microworlds of scientific knowledge that they learned in school to engage in production work. They may also use the knowledge that they inherited from their cultural tradition to deal with problems in their lifeworlds.

Because of the coexistence of traditional and modern cultures in the lifeworlds of non-Western people, some non-Western psychologists have argued that the implantation of Western theory as well as the research findings obtained from replicating Western paradigms may not be compatible with the mentalities of local people. Findings based on transplanted theory may lack social or cultural relevance in seeking solutions to local problems. Therefore, a number of non-Western social scientists have tried to advance a movement for indigenous psychology. However, their advocacy has aroused debates not only within their own camp, but also with mainstream psychologists. In Chaps. 2 and 3, I analyze these debates from the perspective of Western philosophy of science, with an emphasis on constructive realism, which has some important implications for settling these debates. From my analysis, it is clear that the contents of the debates concerning the development of indigenous psychologies in Taiwan and other non-Western countries is essentially the same and can be solved with the same epistemological strategies.

The Modernization of Chinese Society

Having established an interpretation of the modernization of non-Western societies from the perspective of constructive realism, we are now able to discuss the modernization of Confucian societies. As I mentioned above, scientific microworlds are constructed by scientists on the basis of philosophy of science which is a product of Western civilization, and is essentially different from the knowledge prevalent in traditional Confucian society. In this section, I will first cite the French philosopher Jullien's distinction between philosophy and wisdom in order to elaborate on the difference between these two types of knowledge. Subsequently, I will explain the modernization of Chinese people in Confucian society in terms of a metaphor proposed by Wang Yang-ming.

Philosophy Versus Wisdom

In his book *Un sage est sans idée: ou l'autre de la philosophie*, French philosopher François Jullien (1998) indicated that Chinese traditional thought, including Daoism,

Confucianism, and Buddhism – are fundamentally different from that of Western philosophy. The teaching of Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist sages should be called *wisdom* instead of *philosophy*. Western philosophy is deduced using dialectical reasoning based on certain *a priori* concepts. The term *a priori* concept originates from the ancient Greek word *axiom* which Heidegger named the *principle of ground*. It is used as the first principle for deduction. On the contrary, Chinese traditional wisdom emphasizes “no speculation, no absolute definitude, no inflexibility, no selfishness.” There are no prior concepts, no fixed positions, and no individual self. All concepts proposed by the sages can be regarded as statements existing on the same plain rather than prior or posterior.

Because Western philosophy is deduced via dialectical reasoning on the basis of certain prior concepts, philosophers may develop philosophies on the basis of different presumptions. Therefore, there is a history of development in Western Philosophy. The explanations for certain things in a given domain made by different philosophers are often progressive, evolving step by step. In contrast to this, there is no history of wisdom. Nobody can write a history of the development of wisdom. A sage may say different words from different perspectives, but what he says represents an entire self-contained unit of wisdom, which could be interpreted again and again.

In order to think dialectically, Western philosophy requires a clear definition for each core concept, so that one can use them to and recognize the external world exactly. Philosophers can use various methods to examine the correctness of a proposition about objects in a given domain in order to approach the so-called “truth.” By contrast, sage wisdom is expressed in the form of sayings without fixed definitions. These can remind people to see through the “Dao” (way) of ordinary things or events that is otherwise frequently taken for granted. An individual may be inclined to ignore the Dao because his sights are so obscured by prejudice that he can see only one side of the issue. A sage’s words of wisdom may enable him to become aware (*Wu*, enlighten) of the entirety of things or events rather than learning a new framework for knowing the world.

The Chinese Cultural Tradition

Using Jullien’s distinction between philosophy and wisdom, we can see the essential difference between traditional Chinese and modern Western culture. In my book *Knowledge and Action* (Hwang 1995), I pointed out that one of the major purposes of Western philosophy is to pursue objective knowledge, whereas that of Chinese philosophy is to provide practical wisdom. In spite of the essential difference, it is possible for Chinese social scientists to construct objective knowledge about Chinese traditional culture by various methods as long as s/he is familiar with Western philosophy of science.

The most idiosyncratic legacy of traditional Chinese culture is the series of thoughts including Daoism, Confucianism, Legalism, and the Martial School as

well as Buddhism, which was imported into China around 65 AD. In *Knowledge and Action* (Hwang 1995), I analyzed the inner structure of Confucianism from the perspective of social exchange theory and structuralism. I then used it as a basis to interpret the development of Chinese cultural tradition from Daoism to Buddhism. According to that book, with the exception of the imported Buddhism, Daoism was the first Chinese cultural tradition to develop. It is said that Confucius asked Laozi, the founder of Daoism, about propriety (*li*), and developed his thoughts on the basis of benevolence (*ren*). One of Confucius's student, Mencius, elaborated his theory of righteousness (*yi*), while another follower Xunzi emphasized *li*. All three constructed a Confucian ethical system of *ren-yi-li*, while Legalism stressed laws, strategies, and power (*fa*, *shu*, and *shi*). Subsequently, the Martial School emerged. This sequence demonstrates the dialectic development of Chinese cultural tradition, within which the later schools inherited some previous thoughts and creatively developed their own ideas. This is what Laozi said in his words, "when the Dao was lost, its attributes (*de*) appeared; when its attributes were lost, benevolence (*ren*) appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness (*yi*) appeared; and when righteousness was lost, the proprieties (*li*) appeared" (*Dao-de-jing*, Ch. 38). We may further say that, "when the proprieties was lost, laws (*fa*) appeared; when the laws were lost, strategies (*shu*) appeared; when strategies were lost, power (*shi*) appeared." If even power did not work, the final solution was war.

The developmental sequence of these four schools also represents a process of secularization. Following this order makes an individual to become mediocre in lifeworld. However, Daoism teaches a person to revert to the authentic state of origin, so that one may be integrated into the Dao and thereby become extraordinary.

The Recapitulation of the Cultural Developmental Process

Under the influence of Daoism, Confucianism, Legalism, and the Martial School, the ontogenesis of an individual almost recapitulates the developmental process of cultural development. An individual may reexperience this process even over the course of one day and night. As Wang Yang-Ming (1472–1528 AD) said: "People may not be aware that they are experiencing all the history within one day. Before daybreak, they do not see, do not hear, do not think, do not work, and are as pristine as in King Fu-Xi's age. In the dawn, they feel as brisk and harmonious as in King Yao and King Shuen's age. In the morning, they act in good manners with proper order, just as in the Period Xia–Shang–Zhou. In the afternoon, their energy goes downward, and their social activities become complicated, as in the Warrior-States after Spring-and-Autumn Period. When the night falls, it is an empty world in which everything is tranquil. If an intellectual always follow his conscience and is not disturbed by his mental state, he can live as in King Fu-Xi's age."

What Wang meant by "King Fu-Xi's age," "King Yao and King Shuen's age," "Xia–Shang–Zhou Period," "Spring-and-Autumn and Warrior-States Period," and

“an empty world” roughly corresponds to ideal states of Daoism, Confucianism, Legalism, the Martial School, and Buddhism respectively. In spite of the fact that Chinese societies all over the world have transformed into industrial or commercial societies, Wang’s words still resonate in many people’s life. Viewed from the framework of Knowledge and Action, an individual may create a harmonious King Yao and King Shuen’s time in which he or she feels brisk after getting up in the morning and interacts with his or her family members according to Confucian ethics. In contemporary industrial or commercial society, various organizations have been established, and many people’s positions are situated within these organizations. Some workplace leaders may manage their organizations on the basis of Legalism in order to establish a social order like that in the Xia–Shang–Zhou Periods. Meanwhile, members of the workplace may take strategies from the Martial School to compete against each other inside or outside of the organization, just as people did during the Warrior-States after the Spring-and-Autumn Period. When they return home after work, they can revert to the authentic state of origin or the empty world in which everything is tranquil, which is the ideal state of Daoism or Buddhism, and thus dwell in King Fu-Xi’s time.

The Lifespan Development of Body–Mind–Spirit

Wang’s metaphor illustrates how an individual may recapitulate the ontogenetic process of traditional Chinese culture within one day. Furthermore, one may recapitulate the ontogenetic process across one’s life span as well.

In view of the developmental model of body–mind–spirit mentioned above, the person Wang Yang-Ming describes is an adult situated in stage 3 who has passed the chaotic stage 1 and the learning stage 2. His body, mind, and spirit are fully matured, so he can apply Chinese cultural wisdom to deal with others of various relationships in different fields.

When an individual ages, he may learn Qigong, Taiji Quan (shadow boxing), or Waidangong – which originated with Daoism – in order to maintain the equilibrium of his body–mind–spirit. He may also use Zazen, Buddha worshipping, or sutra intoning to calm his mind and spirit. Even if none of these practices remain useful, Daoist and Buddhist teachings can help him to face the end of life peacefully, just as Master Jikiouchikan said, “leaving everything and going, the way is plain.” That is what we mean by saying that the ontogenesis of an individual recapitulates the process of Chinese cultural development.

Expert and Laypeople

Regardless of the potential to recapitulate Chinese cultural development in one’s life, the influence of traditional culture should not be overestimated, and the impact

of Western culture should not be ignored. In the postcolonial era, globalization leads cultures to interact with one another more and more frequently. The postmodern society is characterized by “mutual penetration among moving cultures” (Hermans and Kempen 1998). It is very hard to find a self-sufficient and consistent cultural system in the life world (Eldridge 1999). There are many sets of knowledge that coexist within any individual’s cognitive system, some originate in the West, while others are inherited from their cultural tradition. For any given problem, people will tend to use the most appropriate knowledge to resolve the problem. However, they may not know what the origin of that knowledge is.

This phenomenon can be further explained with Vygotsky’s (1978) theory of cultural development. Since officials of the Qing Dynasty abolished the examination system for civil service in 1905, Chinese began to teach Western knowledge instead of Confucian classics in schools. Generally speaking, instructors teach language tools that contain not only instruments for problem solving but also wisdom for proper action in various domains of life. But even the teachers may not know how to differentiate knowledge from these two origins.

Viewed from the perspective of psychology, when an individual learns either a language game or language tool from his social environment, what he learns may become one of his personal implicit theories. Hong et al. (1997) terms these domain-specific cultural theories. In other words, the implicit theories originating in various cultural traditions are generally useful only in specific domains. In some domains, we may use scientific microworld knowledge for production work; in other domains, we may use our traditional cultural wisdom to deal with day-to-day problems. One of the major goals of indigenous psychology is to clarify which cultural theory is most likely to be used in certain situations.

It should be emphasized that scientists within modern society continue to construct more and more scientific microworlds in various domains. Compared with the past, the implicit theories that an individual may learn in school today are varied not only in quality but also in quantity. Generally speaking, the higher educational level an individual has, the more microworlds of knowledge he may learn, and the more likely he is to be able to solve problems in some specific domains via systematic thinking. Implicit theories about beliefs acquired from his cultural tradition may also change correspondingly.

The experience of receiving modern education may increase the efficacy of an individual’s cognitive capacity as well as his cultural beliefs in some domains. If an individual has received comprehensive formal education and is performing production tasks in certain social systems using knowledge from some kind of scientific microworld, his cognitive systems may become increasingly complex due to repetitive processing of relevant information that enables him to solve related problems better and better. Finally, he may become an expert in a specific field, and become able to use professional language tools to solve problems within that specific domain. Some may have special cognitive systems that enable them to describe their implicit theories clearly and thereby transform them into “explicit theories.”

Conclusion

This line of reasoning enables us to understand the mission of non-Western indigenous psychologists and indigenous social scientists. It should be emphasized that following contact with Western civilization, psychology research institutes including universities and graduate schools in most non-Western countries, were established according to the Western model. The literature cited in psychological research is mostly imported from the West and is characterized by its use of scientific microworld knowledge as mentioned above.

In every culture, one of the major human concerns is humans themselves. During the process of cultural evolution, humans have created a variety of “psychological” theories and concepts to help them deal with their daily problems. When Western psychology microworlds are translated into local languages, they may have tremendous discrepancies with the language of local “psychological” knowledge. Sensing this situation, some psychologists may initiate indigenous psychology movements in order to better understanding their own existence.

We should recognize that the construction of scientific microworlds is a product of modern Western civilization, while philosophy of science provides the rules for constructing scientific microworlds. In contemporary universities and research institutes, if indigenous psychologists are motivated to construct systems of knowledge characterized by features of the aforementioned microworlds in order to understand local people’s psychology, they must be familiar with Western philosophy of science. The next chapter will demonstrate that the main way for non-Western psychologists to develop indigenous psychology is to construct formal theories about the deep structure of the human mind on the basis of philosophy of science. This can describe universal psychological functions of human minds on the one hand, while on the other hand describing the particular mentality of people within a certain culture.

References

- Brubaker, R. (1984). *The limits of rationality: An essay on the social and moral thought of Max Weber*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Chen, C. Y., & Bhikkhu, H. M. (2003). *A model of spiritual care for hospice*. Paper presented in Conference on Functions of Religion in Psychological Rehabilitation after Disaster, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Daniels, H. (2001). *Vygotsky and pedagogy*. New York: Routledge/Falmer.
- Durkheim, E. (1912/1965). *The elementary forms of religious life*. New York: Free Press.
- Eldridge, J. (1999). Culture at work. In H. Beyan & P. Glavanis (Eds.), *Patterns of social inequality* (pp. 97–108). New York: Longman.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1964). *Social anthropology and other essays*. New York: Free Press.
- Habermas, J. (1978). *Theory of communicative action* (Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason, Vol. II). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1966). *Discourse on thinking*. New York: Harper and Row.

- Heiderger, M. (1974). The principle of ground. In T. Hoeller (Ed.), *Man and world* (pp. 207–222). II: Vol.
- Hermans, J. M., & Kempen, J. G. (1998). Moving cultures: The perilous problem of cultural dichotomy in a globalized society. *American Psychologist*, 53(10), 1111–1120.
- Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., & Sacks, R. (1997). Implicit theories and evaluative processes in person cognition. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 296–323.
- Husserl, E. (1970). *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy* (E. Husserl, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Hwang, K. K. (1995). *Knowledge and action: a social psychological interpretation of Chinese cultural tradition (in Chinese)*. Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.
- Hwang, K. K. (2006). Constructive Realism and Confucian relationism: An epistemological strategy for the development of indigenous psychology. In U. Kim, K. S. Yang, & K. K. Hwang (Eds.), *Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context* (pp. 73–108). New York: Springer.
- Jullien, F. (1998). *Un sage est sans idée ou l'autre de la philosophie*. Paris: Seuil.
- Kuhn, T. (1986). Possible worlds in the history of science. In S. Allen (Ed.), *Possible worlds in humanities, arts and sciences, proceedings of nobel symposium*, 65 (pp. 9–32). New York: W. deGruyter.
- Kuhn, T. (1987). What are scientific revolutions? In L. Kruger, L. J. Datson, and M. Heidelberger (eds.), *The Probabilistic Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 7–22.
- Levy-Bruhl, L. (1910/1966). *How natives think*, (L. A. Clare, Trans.). New York: Washington Square Press.
- Luria, A. R. (1976). *Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moll, L. C. (1990). Introduction. In L. C. Moll (Ed.), *Vygotsky and education: Instructional implications and applications of sociohistorical psychology*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Shen, V. (1994). *Confucianism, Taoism and constructive realism*. Bruck: WUV-Universitätsverlag.
- Taylor, E. B. (1871/1929). *Primitive culture*. London.
- Vygotsky, L. (1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. In J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), *The concept of activity in soviet psychology*. Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky* (Vol. 1). New York: Plenum.
- Wallner, F. (1994). *Constructive realism: Aspects of new epistemological movement*. Wien: W. Braumuller.
- Wallner, F. G. (1997). *The movement of constructive realism*. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller.
- Wallner, F. G. & Jandl, M. J. (2001). *The importance of constructive realism for the indigenous psychologies approach*. Paper presented at Scientific Advances in Indigenous Psychologies: Philosophical, Cultural, and Empirical Contributions. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Walsh, B. J., & Middleton, J. R. (1984). *The transforming vision: Shaping a Christian world view*. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press.
- Weber, M. (1921/1963). *The sociology of religion*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Weber, M. (1930/1992). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (T. Parsons, Trans.). London: Routledge.
- Wertsch, J. V. (1985). *Vygotsky and the social formation of mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Whorf, B. L. (1956). Science and linguistics. In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), *Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf* (pp. 207–219). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1945/1958). *Philosophical investigations* (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Chapter 3

Western Philosophy's Concepts of Person and Paradigm Shifts

Abstract Many philosophers have proposed various concepts of a person to describe how a scientist constructs his/her scientific microworld through research activities in the history of Western philosophy. This chapter first discussed the switch from Aristotle's distinction between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom to Kant's distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason; it then used Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and Popper's evolutionary epistemology to illustrate the dramatic changes from positivism to postpositivism in terms of ontology, epistemology, methodology, as well as concepts of a person. Some epistemologies of postpositivism, especially Hempel's logical empiricism and Kuhn's scientific revolution, were emphasized to criticize the inductive approach of collecting idiosyncratic empirical data by naïve positivism and to highlight the importance of theoretical construction for the progress of indigenous psychology.

Keywords Theoretical wisdom • Theoretical reason • Evolutionary epistemology • Logical empiricism • Naïve positivism

The first chapter of this book emphasizes that to develop indigenous psychology, non-Western psychologists need to find the deep structure of the human mind and construct formal theories to explain both its universal psychological functions and the particular mentality in a given culture. The second chapter of this book argues from constructive realism's perspective that the scientific microworld is constructed by single scientists. The activities used to construct scientific microworlds are very specific, and are products of Western civilization. In Western philosophical history, many philosophers have proposed various concepts of person to describe how scientists conduct the scientific activities that construct scientific microworlds. These concepts of person and the accompanying philosophy of science have gone through several obvious paradigm shifts. The solipsism advocated by positivism has had the most significant influence on scientific communities around the world, including those of non-Western countries. Since the rise of post-positivism, philosophers of

science have focused on the methodology of constructing scientific microworlds. This paradigm shift has significant implications for the development of indigenous social science. In this chapter, I describe several important concepts of person in Western history of philosophy and their influences on activities of scientific research. First of all, I discuss how Aristotle conceptualized the intellectual activity in the Greek cultural tradition:

The Theoretical Attitude and Theoretical Wisdom of Aristotle

In Greek, the terms *theorein* and *theoria* can be translated to English as contemplation. *Theorein* is a verb that literally means “to inspect” or “to keep ones gaze fixed on” (Ostwald 1962, p. 315). It is a kind of spiritual activity closely connected to rational wisdom. Through contemplation and observation, mind can be involved in exploring the truth of the universe.

Theoretical Attitude

Theoria is a noun. In terms of its literal definition, it is a kind of “theoretical attitude.” Originally, it referred to a Greek religious ritual. In this ritual, individuals would abandon the practical concerns of reality and try to maintain a transcendent attitude toward the world. It was an attempt to pass beyond the changeable and superficial world to discover hidden truths and lead human beings to develop more truthful and complete existences. *Theoria* itself is the ultimate goal that, unlike practical science such as ethics or politics, which aims to determine one’s actions or to produce practical products. “Under this situation, human beings become the detached spectators who simply intend to explore the truth of the whole creations instead of changing them.” (Ostwald 1962, pp. 315–316) Greek philosophers called knowledge of the reasonable world obtained using this method “theory” or “science, logos,” which is distinguished from *doxa* of relativity.

In Greek, there are two terms that can help us understand the meaning of *theoria*: *phronesis* and *sophia*. These two terms refer to “wisdom” in English and Chinese. However, the meaning is different from Chinese “wisdom.” In Chinese, “wisdom” means to completely manage the affairs in the world using sophisticated manipulation (Yang 2007).

Theoretical Wisdom

Aristotle provided a nuanced distinction between *phronesis* and *sophia*: *Phronesis* means wisdom in action and can be called “moral wisdom” or “practical wisdom.” *Sophia* originally meant technical or artistic knowledge and capacity.

It later evolved into scientific knowledge called “theoretical wisdom.” Aristotle indicated that: *Sophia* is the highest intellectual capacity that the human spirit can attain; in particular referring to philosophical capacity of studying nature for its own sake. “Theoretical wisdom” and “practical wisdom” refer to two kinds of totally distinct virtues: theoretical wisdom aims to explore eternal truth and does not involve specific objectives. Thus, it is considered ultimate wisdom. On the contrary, practical wisdom is instrumental or manipulative and aims to study how to achieve certain goals. It not only explores justice, responsibility and righteousness, more importantly, it also attempts to precisely control these characteristics and lead people toward righteousness to fully manifest one’s potential and individual characteristics.

Aristotle believed that both kinds of wisdom are extremely important. However, he also believed that the value of theoretical wisdom is higher than that of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is merely a tool used to achieve goals and is thus beneficial in leading us to toward and accomplishing these goals; however, its value can never exceed that of theoretical wisdom.

For Aristotle, developing theoretical wisdom in *theoria* is the activity best matching intellectual virtue. The most critical characteristic of theoretical wisdom is the fact that it is developed “for its own sake.” This nature allows people to enjoy superior wisdom and absolute happiness. It is not practical and utilitarian; instead, it is simply a voluntary and nonpractical spiritual activity. It is ultimate and obtaining truth is not the objective. Meditation itself is the goal. Becoming totally involved in contemplation allows one to reach a selfless state and become a “detached spectator.” In this way, human beings’ highest talents can be developed, and the beauty of life and principles of the universe can be absorbed.

Therefore, Aristotle (1962) clearly indicates in *Nicomachean Ethics* that, “... complete happiness consists in some kind of contemplative activity” and “happiness is some kind of study or contemplation.” This contemplation of *theoria* is totally different from meditation in the Eastern Buddhist tradition.

Kant’s Theoretical Reason and Practical Reason

Aristotle’s differentiation between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom marks the beginning of Western philosophers describing the intellectual activities of human beings’ study of nature. Since the fourteenth century Renaissance, the development of science facilitated some Western philosophers’ proposals of new concepts of person to describe the intellectual activities of scientists. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) developed the most well known of these concepts. In 1770, he published an article entitled “On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible worlds,” wherein he separated the domains that had been explored by human thought into a sensible world and an intelligible world (Guyer 2006; Wood 2005). The former is made up of the phenomena that can be perceived by human sensory organs. This is the field studied by natural scientists. The latter is the

field which cannot be perceived by sensory organs, and is the major concern of metaphysicians. Though the transcendent world cannot be sensed, it can be speculated upon.

For Kant, both of these two worlds are very important for human beings. He suggests that the activity of cognitive thought can be divided into two categories in terms of these two fields: theoretical reason aims to study the logical relationships among things in the natural world. It explores and ponders the sensible world to construct objective knowledge systems on the basis of one's personal experiences, so that human beings can understand causality from a mechanical perspective. Practical reason aims to deal with problems in the ontological sphere. It creates religious or ethical value systems in the intelligible world according to the demands of the human spirit and to guide human activities in the sensible world toward what Kant calls *ein Reich der Zwecke*.

Transcendental Idealism

Kant proposed Transcendental Idealism to explain why human beings can reorganize chaotic experience and phenomena into universal and effective scientific knowledge using theoretical reason. In order to elaborate on Kant's argument for Transcendental Idealism, we need to distinguish the difference between two terms: *transcendental* and *transcendent*. Transcendent means to transcend the empirical experience, metaphysical concepts such as God, the soul and the universe exist in the transcendent domain. In Kant's system of thought, the intelligible world belongs to this domain. Though things in the intelligible world cannot be touched via sensory experience, they can be understood through "practical reason" which is controlled by the human will.

"Transcendental" is a special concept in Kant's epistemology. In order to explain how human beings represent their experiences in terms of concepts, in *Kritik der Vernunft*, Kant (1781/1965) indicated that the objects as experienced by the subject through various sense organs are just phenomena. They are not *noumena* or things in themselves. Because of the limitations of sense organs, it is impossible for human being to recognize an object's thing-in-itself. There exists a transcendent distinction between them.

When the subject experiences a certain object with his sense organs, she/he has to synthesize her/his varied sensory experiences into a particular *form* to represent that object. Though the *form* is abstracted from one's experiences, it is transcendental. In other words, transcendental *form* and an individual's experiences of that object are inseparable: the *form* of an object determines an individual's experience of that object. This experience can enrich the content of the *form* of the object.

In *Kritik der Vernunft*, Kant demonstrated that objects in the universe are regulated by certain natural laws via the so-called transcendental deduction (Kant 1781/1965). The subject reorganizes his/her sensory experiences in the sensible

world into *phenomena* through transcendental principle of *form* to constitute the basis for recognizing the world. Thus, the transcendental principle of form is universal. It allows the subject to make certain effective judgments of the object. It is also the basis used by humans to construct objective knowledge about the object.

Steps of Knowledge Construction

Though universal and effective scientific knowledge is stated as transcendental propositions, there are three steps for an individual to unify the phenomena of experiences into precise scientific knowledge:

1. At the level of sensory experience, an individual must reorganize the phenomena of specific experiences recognized at different time sequences into a certain form by the mental capacity of apprehension.
2. At the level of imagination, an individual must reorganize the representation of experiences which has been filtered through the process of psychological apprehension. Reorganization of experiences through imaginary reduction enables the representation of experience to possess some transcendental characteristics.
3. At the level of transcendental apperception, an individual has to synthesize all the concepts representing his recognition of original experience to construct transcendental knowledge.

Transcendental apperception was the absolute epistemological assumption proposed by Kant for the sake of elaborating the objectivity, unification, and universal effectiveness of knowledge. It differs from psychological imagination: the latter is one's capacity to represent original experiences; while the imagination in transcendental apperception is the automatic creativity of the productive imagination of the human mind. It can transcend an individual's consciousness, enabling human beings to construct precise systems of scientific knowledge by transcendental unification of recognitions of their experiences with self-consciousness.

Criticism of Traditional Metaphysics

Kant suggested that the "thing in itself" belongs to the sensible world. It is the noumena or cause of phenomenon and the target for recognition by theoretical reason. Knowledge constructed by theoretical reason is effective only in the domain of phenomena. However, no matter how humans explore the universe using theoretical reason or how they expand their systems of knowledge, there are some issues about the origins of the universe that cannot be solved. Therefore, human beings may have strong metaphysical desire to develop a transcendent intelligible world by practical reason, and transform things in themselves (noumenon) into ideas in the intelligible world as the real causes of natural phenomena.

However, Kant suggested that it is wrong for traditional metaphysics to treat ideas as the target of recognition. In the section of *Kritik der Vernunft* that deals with transcendental dialectics, he indicates that traditional metaphysics contains rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology; their targets are *Seele*, *Welt* and *Gottheit* respectively. He suggests that those *Vernunft ideas* are *das Unbedingte*. That is to say, they are free concepts unrestricted by sensory experiences. Therefore, they possess no cognitive meanings and cannot be the target of theoretical reason. Ideas discussed in traditional metaphysics are illusory in the sense of experiences. The only effective metaphysics is *Metaphysik der Sitten* constructed by practical reason (Kant 1949).

Metaphysik der Sitten

Metaphysik der Sitten aims to seek the conditions of real Goodness as morality. Kant suggested that behaviors motivated by the will for Good should meet three conditions:

1. They originate solely from *obligation* rather than from an individual's utilitarian preferences.
2. Obligatory behavior is regulated by the principle of *will* without external motivations.
3. Obligation implies behavioral inevitability which is a consequence of respecting the principle of morality.

Kant suggested that all principles of morality are presented as categorical imperatives as distinct from hypothetical imperatives: the former being a transcendental formal imperative without empirical conditions. The universal Maxime is mandatory; it is an obligation for its sake that can be applied to any rationalists. The latter (hypothetical imperative) is a conditional statement which tells an actor the possible consequences of his behavior. For example, "if you want to be rich, you must work hard." The proposition states the relationship between a specific means and its goal without any moral implications. An individual is autonomous so long as she/he regulates her/his own behavior using the *will* for Good and practices obligatory moral principles of categorical imperative. On the contrary, behaviors following hypothetical imperatives are regulated by factors other than the *will* for Good, so they are heteronomous. According to Kant's formal conditions for Good, moral theories based upon hedonism and utilitarianism are all heteronomous without any universal or transcendental moral implications.

Kant suggested that autonomy of will is the ultimate principle of morality. The *will* of all rationalists is the legislator of universal moral law. When she/he practices the objective, certain, and universal principle of morality, she/he treats her/his own human nature and that of others' as the goal, instead of means. In order to demonstrate the permanent practicability of moral principle, Kant further proposed three criteria for pure practical reason: immortality of soul, free will, and the existence of God (Kant 1788/1963). The first criterion (immortality of soul) enables an individual

to permanently carry out moral principles; with the second criterion (free will), the will can be independent from the sensible world and human beings can make decisions according to moral principles in the intelligible world, while the third criterion (the existence of God) allows the unification of transcendent morality and permanent happiness. None of the three criteria can be demonstrated in the sensible world. However, they can satisfy the human desire for the unification of happiness and morality which is the ultimate goal of practical reason. In other words, the three ideas (soul, freedom, God) that are negated by theoretical reason – through the three criteria of practical reason – have been turned into the basic ideas of Kant's moral philosophy.

The Two Aspects of "Person"

By comparing Aristotle's and Kant's concepts of person it can be seen that the person Kant describes is an ideal image of intellectuals in the Western cultural tradition. He exists in two different worlds: he constructs systems of knowledge using theoretical reason for his survival in the sensible world; but he also creates a kingdom of morality using practical reason to highlight a rationalist's value of personality in the intelligible world. Kant elaborated on the differences between theoretical reason and practical reason on the basis of Aristotle's differentiation between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. Specifically speaking, under the influence of Western cultural tradition, Kant suggested that an intellectual must possess both knowledge and morality. He elaborated these two aspects of person in a more precise way, writing his epitaph as the master speaks of himself: "I look at the dazzling stars on the sky and ponder on the moral law in mind. The more I reflect on them, the more I find the admiration and awe" (Scruton 1982).

Viewed from a cross-cultural perspective, Kant's "three criteria of practical reason" as discussed in his *Metaphysik der Sitten*, including immortality of soul, free will, and the existence of God, are criteria for practical reason in the Western cultural tradition of Christianity. As such they may not directly apply to other civilizations. All civilizations have their own unique *Metaphysik der Sitten*, which constitutes their practical reason or practical wisdom for persons in those civilizations. This is the personhood that a person should follow in his/her lifeworld.

One Mind with Two Gates

My arguments also apply to Confucian civilization. In the Chinese cultural tradition the most influential forms of practical reason or practical wisdom mostly evolved from Taoist, Confucian and Buddhist thought. Thus, it is necessary and important to study the concepts of person in these three schools from a social science perspective.

In the field of philosophy, some pioneers have made these sorts of inquiries. The most significant is likely the work of Mou Tzung-san, the founder of Neo-Confucianism. Mou (1963) first wrote *Wit and Principles of the Abstruse* on the

basis of his study of philosophy in the Six Dynasties. He then produced *Nature in Mind and Temper* (Mou 1968) following research on the idealist philosophy of the Song and Ming Dynasties. He also published *Intellectual Instinct and Chinese Philosophy* (Mou 1971) and “*Phenomenon and Thing in Itself*” as comparisons Chinese and Western philosophy. With the publication of *Buddha and the Highest Wisdom* (Mou 1977), he studied the Confucian philosophy in pursuit of his academic goal of reconstructing the history of Chinese philosophy in terms of a Western framework.

In his book *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana*, Mou suggested that the Indian monk Chen Ti's (499–569) idea of *one mind with two gates* forms a common framework shared by Chinese and Western philosophy. From the *gate of life and death* one can explore phenomena in Kant's sensible world, whereas from the *gate of true thusness*, one may reflect on the noumena in the intelligible world. However, these two gates are valued differently in Chinese and Western philosophy. Western philosophy goes through the *gate of life and death* to develop epistemology, but it lacks interest in exploring the intelligible world. On the contrary, Chinese philosophy actively investigates the *gate of true thusness*, but their philosophers have been passive in studying empirical knowledge of the sensible world through the *gate of life and death*. In other words, Western philosophy has fully developed an ontology of phenomena instead of constructing an ontology of noumena. On the contrary, Chinese philosophy developed an ontology of noumena without paying enough attention to the ontology of phenomena (Mou 1975).

The Change of Western Philosophy

In ancient Greece the term philosophy meant a love for wisdom. Kant followed the ancient meanings calling it practical wisdom. After Kant, the rise of rationalism in the Western world attracted more and more Western philosophers to study how to construct scientific knowledge using theoretical reason, but they showed relatively weak interest in studying the practical wisdom of the Western cultural tradition. With the rapid development of science and technology the ancient meanings of philosophy gradually faded in the West.

This tide of change resulted in the rise of positivism in the nineteenth century. As mentioned before, Kant suggested that immortality of soul, free will, and the existence of God are the “three criteria of pure practical reason,” and the foundation of *Metaphysik der Sitten* (Kant 1788/1963). However, the positivists claimed to exclude all metaphysical issues from science with radical empiricism. The rise of positivism encouraged Western philosophers to think about how to study objects in the sensible world using theoretical reason to construct scientific microworlds on the basis of empirical experience, this became the philosophy of science (Hwang 2009).

In Chap. 2, I mentioned French philosopher Jullien's distinction between Western philosophy and Chinese traditional wisdom. In fact, the philosophy he defined is contemporary Western philosophy; his wisdom was neither theoretical wisdom nor practical wisdom as suggested by Aristotle. In ancient Greece philosophy and wisdom

were not clearly distinct. However, since the rise of modern science, scientists have created more and more scientific microworlds. This enables philosophers to reflect on the methods of constructing scientific knowledge and leads to progress in philosophy of science. Thus, Jullien was able to differentiate between Western philosophy and wisdom in East Asia.

Wittgensteinian Solipisism

It should be emphasized that in the development of Western philosophy of science several major schools of philosophy utilized their own unique concepts of person. These different concepts have significant influence on scientific research activities. I will illustrate my arguments by analyzing the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper, the representatives of positivism and post-positivism respectively.

Positivism

Following the fourteenth century Renaissance, many European philosophers including Berkeley, Hume, and Newton adopted the philosophy of empiricism and argued that scientific knowledge should be restricted to the domain of the sensible world. In the 19th century, French sociologist Comte first proposed the term positivism to denote a scientific epistemology and a historical worldview (Comte 1908/1957). So far as its epistemology is concerned, positivism took a position of radical empiricism arguing that scientific knowledge should be restricted to the collection of empirical facts and relationships between them so as to describe the world exactly. The legitimate scientific method should eliminate all metaphysical speculations and attempts to explain the nature by intangible entities.

In the early twentieth century, physicist Ernst Mach (1838–1916) proposed physical phenomenalism and advocated that phenomena are the only reality, the content of specific knowledge should be restricted to sensory experiences. The so-called reality behind phenomena is metaphysical; it is imagined by human beings and should be eliminated from the scope of science. Science aims to reveal the rules governing objects in the world via the experimental method. Once the primacy of experience is recognized and meanings of statements are restricted to the scope of experience, it would be unnecessary for scientists to seek an in-depth noumenon to support their concepts (Kolakowski 1972).

Logico-philosophicas

In 1922, M. Schlick was invited to lecture in Vienna. He held a seminar and organized the Vienna Circle. After the establishment of the Vienna Circle, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) published his famous work *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* in 1922.




Fig. 3.1 Relationships between World and Language

Its publication had significant influence on the following progress of Vienna Circle as well as international scientific community.

Tractatus Logico-philosophicus says, “the world is the totality of facts, not of things” (Ti1.1). What happens in the world is fact (see Fig. 3.1). Each fact is an event occurring in a certain time and space, and composed of various states of affairs for a certain things. Each state of affairs is a unit of a fact, which can also be called an atomic fact. Atomic facts combine to create the fact observed by people. Since atomic fact is the simplest structure and cannot be construed in terms of other facts, “atomic facts are independent of one another” (T2.061).

There is a pictorial relationship between proposition and fact: the language of proposition and the elements of fact not only have a one-to-one correspondence, but also have identical logical structures. Every language unit of a proposition corresponds and describes one atomic fact. They are fundamental units of a proposition, so Wittgenstein called them “elementary propositions.” One elementary proposition stands for one state of affairs. Whether they are true or false depends

on facts, but not on other propositions. The purpose of elementary propositions is to judge whether or not an atomic fact exists.

If an atomic fact exists, then the elementary proposition is true and it delineates a positive fact. If an atomic fact does not exist, then the elementary proposition is false and it describes a negative fact. The existence and nonexistence of atomic fact are all reality, a reality that includes both positive and negative facts.

A positivist, who takes the position of naïve realism in ontology, would argue that the facts that can be sensed by our sensory organs are the only reality. Thus, it is unnecessary for scientists to explore reality beyond the phenomena experienced by our sensory organs.

This is a position of radical empiricism. It states that the only reliable knowledge is what we learned from our sensory experience. It is unnecessary for human beings to construct ideal worlds beyond our sensory experiences using metaphysical thinking.

Metaphysical concepts beyond human sensory experiences cannot be stated in scientific language. Therefore, the seventh chapter of *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* states only one proposition: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

The Concept of Person in Solipsism

Actively advocated for by the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has had tremendous impact on the scientific community during the early and mid-twentieth century. However, while it has been widely appreciated, Wittgenstein’s work *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* has also been criticized at the peak of its popularity. The most noteworthy criticism is that which takes issue with the concept of person in early Wittgensteinian philosophy and the worldview derived thereafter.

As we mentioned before, Wittgenstein took a position of radical empiricism. He believed that reality exists only in sensory experience: the proposition exists on the side of thought (language), while the corresponding reality is on the other side of the world. A proposition describes a fact of experience, which for the perceiver is. This position pushed Wittgenstein into a solipsistic philosophy (Hanfling 1976), which argued that it is impossible to recognize the world without the assumption of a transcendental self:

“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (T5.6)

“...the world is my world...” (T5.62)

“I am the world. (The microcosm.)” (T5.63)

However, this “I” is not the thinking subjective in psychology, but a transcendental self termed the “philosophical self” by Wittgenstein:

“The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.” (T5.631)

The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the ‘world is my world’. The philosophical self is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, it is the limit, not a part of the world. (T5.641)

Criticism of “Transcendental Self”

Here we can see an obvious contradiction in *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*: early Wittgenstein philosophy excluded metaphysical concepts from the domain of science, but his concept of person argued that the philosophical self who does scientific research is not a human, not the object of psychological study, but a “metaphysical subject”!

Wittgenstein used eyes and sight as metaphors of “philosophical self” and the world: eyes can see anything in sight, but they cannot see themselves. Similarly, the “philosophical self” can observe and describe the world, but it cannot do so to itself. So Wittgenstein said, the metaphysical “subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world” (T5.632).

“Psychological self” and “philosophical self” see different worlds. For the former, “everything we see could also be otherwise; everything we describe at all could also be otherwise; there is no order of things a priori” (T5.634).

“Metaphysical subject” see another different world: “Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it” (T5.64).

“Philosophical self” is similar to the subject in Descartes’ philosophy of subject-object dichotomy. It is contrary to the world as object, and it observes the world with absolute objectivity. For “philosophical self” or “metaphysical subject,” all facts in the world are arranged in order according to strict logical rule and are not changed by human will:

“The world is independent of my will.” (T6.373)

“Even if everything we wished were to happen, this would only be, so to speak, a favor of fate, for there is no logical connection between will and world, which would guarantee this, and the assumed physical connection itself we could not against will.” (T6.374)

“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value.” (T6.41)

It can be seen that the world in Wittgenstein’s eyes is a world that is not altered by human will; it is an objective world where everything is as it is. Furthermore, in his opinion, “logic precedes every experience” (T5.552), as “if there were a logic, even if there were no world” (T5.5521). This logic is also independent of human will: “As there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical impossibility (T6.375).”

As a result, while describing the world, the person – as a psychological subject that is able to think and present (note that it is neither the “philosophical self” nor the “metaphysical subject”) – disappears.

Popper’s Evolutionary Epistemology

The disappearance of the psychological subject has significant implication for scientific activities. According to positivism, scientific activities can be divided into two parts: (1) validating the hypotheses (i.e., elementary propositions) by experimental

methods in the empirical world, and (2) constructing scientific theories by using logical inference with the validated propositions (Schlick 1936). It is illegitimate and unnecessary for a scientist to construct an ideal theoretical world to explain observed phenomena with his imagination by using metaphysical concepts beyond his sensory experiences.

Positivism focuses all scientific activities on the validation of hypotheses instead of the construction of theories. This may hinder the development of either social or natural science (Achinstein and Baker 1969). Many scientists in non-Western countries do not recognize the progress of Western philosophy of science; they blindly applied the philosophy of positivism, followed the Western research paradigm, and devoted themselves to the collection and accumulation of empirical data. Scientific research becomes an accumulation of trivial knowledges, which results in the underdevelopment of social science in non-Western countries. Using concepts of person implied in Popper's evolutionary epistemology as a contrast may enable us to recognize this point more clearly.


Evolutionary Epistemology

In 1934, Popper published his first book *The logic of Scientific Discovery* challenging the philosophy of Logical Positivism. Since the publication of its English version in 1959, he became well known in English world. Subsequently, Popper published *Conjectures and Refutations* (1963/1986) and *Objective Knowledge* (1972/1989) to elaborate his philosophy of evolutionary epistemology in detail.

Popper's evolutionary epistemology can be described with a scheme of four steps:

$$P1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$$

P means problem, TT means tentative theory, and EE means error elimination. In order to represent the general method of trial and error, TT can be changed into TS (tentative solution), and the scheme can be modified as following general form of the model (Popper 1972/1989:313):



Popper suggested that when the expectation of an organism is not fulfilled or one's original knowledge is hindered, one would try to propose a tentative solution or tentative theory to solve the problem. The tentative theory is not induced from one's experiences or empirical facts; it is deduced by rational and critical thinking. In other words, scientific research should begin from problems. When a scientist discovers that his original theories are unable to account for new experiences, he may propose tentative theories or tentative solutions, both of which may be either incorrect or not exclusively correct. Therefore, new theories or solutions must be

validated by examining phenomena in the empirical world, eliminating incorrect theories or solutions and retaining those that are not falsified. One might encounter problems and if so, the cycle should be repeated.

Contrast between Two Concepts of Person

Since Popper's evolutionary epistemology has been widely accepted by the scientific community, it has gradually become recognized that his academic advocacy is totally opposite to that of logical positivism in all aspects of ontology, epistemology and methodology. In the aspect of ontology, logical positivism adopts a position of radical empiricism and argues that the only reality is the facts experienced by sensory organs. All metaphysical concepts should be eliminated from the scope of science. In the aspect of epistemology, Logical Positivism assumes the position of a template theory and advocates that the only legitimate way for a scientist to recognize objects in the world is through their representations in his mind. However, how can a scientist match the representations in his mind with the structure of external world? The logical positivist methodology argues that it should be validated by a third party using an objective method. This constitutes the most contradictory issue of logical positivism: Who is the "third party" who can make the judgment when a scientist cannot do it by himself?

In order to answer this question, a logical positivist needs to construct an absolutely objective "transcendental self." Speaking more specifically, the *self* of *solipsism* as advocated by logic positivists is a philosophical self or metaphysical subject, it is neither psychological self nor the subject who can represent and think. In the process of scientific activity, the subjectivity of a researcher becomes "a point that cannot be extended outward and can even eventually disappear."

The concept of person in evolutionary epistemology is opposite to that of logical positivism. Its ontology and epistemology are similar to that of idealism in the Western cultural tradition. Popper argued that to explain the observed phenomenon or to answer an unsolved problem, a scientist has to construct a tentative theory with some metaphysical concepts that refer to noumena (or things in themselves) behind the phenomenon (Kant 1781/1965). The scientist must take a position and assume that the noumena are real; this can be referred to as *scientific realism*.

The deductive method Popper advocated for is not the traditional deduction grounded in axiomatic premises. Popper argued that the premises of deduction for a tentative theory of scientific conjecture should be repeatedly subjected to empirical examination. This method is called *deduction with examination*. Popper suggested, "our intellect does not draw its laws from nature, but tries-with varying degrees of success-to impose upon nature laws which it freely invents" (Popper 1963, p. 191). He strongly opposed the idea that scientific theory can be achieved by an accumulation of true propositions describing empirical facts. According to one of Popper's analogies, the water bucket of scientific theory will not be spontaneously full so long as scientists work hard to fill it with accumulated empirical

facts. Instead, theory is like a searchlight. Scientists must continuously bring up problems and make conjectures, so as to cast the light of theory on the future (Popper 1972, p. 431–457). If a theory records only previous findings, and nothing can be deduced from it except preexisting facts, what is the use of the theory?

Popper also opposed the principle of verification as advocated by positivists. According to Popper, a theoretical proposition cannot be verified, it can only be falsified by empirical facts contradicting the theory. Scientific theory is stated with general predications. However, empirical facts are individually experienced. No matter how many times a particular experience is repeated, it cannot verify a proposition of general prediction. For instance, no matter how many white swans have been observed, the proposition of general predication “swans are white” still cannot be verified, because our observations cannot include all swans. Therefore, scientists cannot *verify* theoretical propositions, only *falsify* them, or reserve them temporarily before they are falsified.

Post-positivist Epistemology

Viewed from the progress of Western philosophy, the solipsism implied in positivism is the most unique concept of person and reflects the Cartesian philosophy of dichotomy between subject and object. It assumes that the human being is a subject confronting the world. Scientists’ major task is to describe the world objectively. Popper’s evolutionary epistemology strongly opposes this position and advocates that science is a product of the creative activity of humankind. A scientist cannot passively await the accumulation of experience. He must be actively engaged in the tasks of criticism, creation and validation. These two philosophies hold different concepts of person, and they are thus totally different in their view of the role that a scientist should play in scientific activity. Other philosophers of science after Popper hold similar positions about the subjective dynamism of scientists in the process of theoretical construction. However, they have various perspectives on what kind of knowledge scientists should pursue and how to pursue that knowledge. In this section, I review several important philosophies of science that followed Popper and their epistemological advocacy to illustrate the implications of their epistemology for the development of indigenous psychology.

Hempel’s Logical Empiricism

When logical positivism was criticized, Hempel, who had participated in the Vienna Circle academic discussions in his earlier years, tried to modify it to address its shortcomings and proposed the new idea of logical empiricism. In his *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, Hempel (1965) proposed a deductive model or a model of

covering law, which stated that scientific explanation usually contains two kinds of statements, namely, general laws and antecedent conditions. Using these two kinds of *explanans* as the premises, a scientist can deduct a description of a particular phenomenon, which is called the *explanandum*.

This deductive model also highlights the difficulty of verifying propositions. In the deductive model, the general laws for scientific explanation are stated in the form of general predications. Because nobody can make unlimited observations, all propositions of general predication will eventually become meaningless.

Hempel also pointed out the difficulty of falsifying a hypothetical proposition. When scientists test a hypothesis, they must propose several auxiliary hypotheses that prescribe the antecedent conditions for its occurrence. Some of these auxiliary hypotheses are related to the scientific theory itself, and some to experimental design, instrumental equipment, or research procedures. A combination of all these conditions may lead to the occurrence of the phenomenon observed.

Scientists obtaining a negative result from research, rarely give up their general laws easily. Instead, they carefully examine their research instruments, reconsider the experimental design, or even repeat the experiment. These steps imply only consideration of whether there is anything wrong with the auxiliary hypotheses, indicating that it is not easy to falsify a hypothesis.

For this reason, Hempel (1965) argued that the target to be examined in scientific activity is not a sole hypothesis, but an entire theoretical system. Moreover, as a logical empiricist, Hempel (1966) also believed that theory is not obtained by induction. To him it was impossible for a scientist to induce theory from empirical facts. For example, Newton's law of gravity and Einstein's theory of relativity were not inducted from a collection of observed phenomena. Scientists created them using imagination to explain observations.

The transition from data to theory requires creative imagination. Scientific hypotheses and theories are not *derived* from observed facts, but *invented* to account for them. They constitute guesses at the connections that might obtain the phenomena under study, and at uniformities and patterns that might underlie the occurrence (Hempel 1966, p. 15).

Lakatos' Scientific Research Program

If a non-Western social scientist lacks understanding of the development of philosophy of science, he may exude naïve positivism, tend to derive research hypotheses following the most advanced Western paradigm, and indulge in research exhibiting convergent thinking instead of divergent thinking. When the whole academic community is dominated by the ethos of naïve positivism, it may manifest a cultural pattern characterized by low creativity.

On the contrary, if a non-Western social scientist understands the philosophical implications of post-positivism, when he encounters anomalies while following a Western paradigm he may begin to assume the task of developing a new paradigm; usually a very challenging mental exercise. This point can be illustrated by Lakatos'

(1978) philosophy of scientific research program. Lakatos was one of Popper's students. He advocated for the philosophy of sophisticated falsificationism in opposition to Popper's naïve falsificationism (Lakatos 1970), and argued that scientists would not easily give up the propositions of a scientific theory once they are falsified by empirical research as Popper predicted.

Because propositions in scientific theory usually contain conditional sentences stipulating *ceteris partibus* empirical refutation do not easily eliminate errors in theory. Examination of a theoretical proposition should be carried out under specific conditions, no matter whether an experiment or observation is used. When an empirical fact obtained from an experiment or observation contradicts the prediction of the theory, a researcher is unable to ascertain whether the contradiction was caused by theoretical mistakes or by experimental or observational features. The famous *Duhem-Quine thesis* indicates that a theory can never be refuted if it is protected with *auxiliary hypotheses*. In other words, as long as a scientist is able to use his or her imagination, *auxiliary hypotheses* may be proposed to attribute anomalies to other factors and to protect the core of the theory against falsification.

For a naïve falsificationist, when a proposition stating empirical research findings is in conflict with the theoretical hypothesis to be tested, the hypothesis is said to be falsified. For *sophisticated* falsificationists, a scientific theory T is falsified if and only if an alternative new theory T' is characterized with the following features:

1. T' accounts for more empirical facts than T;
2. T' shares the previous success of T, all the unrefutable contents of T can be covered by T';
3. Compared with T, T' enables scientists to make more predictions that can be corroborated by empirical observation and experimentation.

In other words, to falsify an old theory, a scientist has to be familiar with not only the methodology of hypothesis testing, but also the philosophy of constructing a competitive alternative theory. However, a scientific theory does not exist in isolation, but as part of a series of tightly inter-connected. Thus, Lakatos proposed *sophisticated falsificationism* and advocated replacing the idea of *theory* with a *series of theories*, called a *Scientific Research Program*. He suggested that the basic unit for examination in scientific research is neither a particular scientific proposition, nor an isolated theory, but rather a series of theories or a research program. The durability of scientific theory and its succession can be understood only when a series of scientific theories or a scientific research program has been taken into consideration.

Paradigm and Puzzle-Solving

The philosophy of post positivism implies a shift of focus in scientific research from hypothesis testing to theoretical construction. The philosophical shift has important implications for scientists in non-Western countries. This point can be illustrated by

Thomas Kuhn's (1969) concept of paradigm shift. In English, the term paradigm originally meant an acknowledged model that can be used repeatedly in similar situations. In Kuhn's (1969) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, paradigm means a well-recognized scientific achievement that can be utilized as a foundation to solve crucial problems in normal science by members of a scientific community.

Members of a scientific community usually conduct research on the basis of previous scientific achievements in normal science. The research is generally guided by a particular paradigm toward solving difficult problems in a specific domain. During this period, scientific research tasks mainly concentrate on articulating a paradigm to facilitate scientific progress. The results of such puzzle-solving are usually predictable. Though it is necessary to overcome various kinds of conceptual, methodological, or instrumental difficulties, problem-solving in normal science usually means achieving anticipated goals with new methods. The main motivation for a scientist to engage in research is his or her belief that the puzzle will be solved only if he or she is smart enough.

The Trap of Naïve Positivism

If a scientist in a non-Western country believes that scientific research means “careful verification of a hypothesis which has been boldly derived” from a certain paradigm developed by Western scientists and conducting empirical research in an indigenous society with an attitude of naïve positivism, he is actually engaging in normal scientific research. His research may fall into the trap of duplicating the Western paradigm if he lacks an understanding about the progress of Western philosophy of science.

According to Kuhn's (1969), in a normal science period, hypothesis-testing does not test the theory itself; rather, it is the individual scientist who is being tested. The goal of normal science is puzzle-solving. Puzzles are defined – by the paradigm that has been widely accepted by a scientific community – as problems for research. Therefore the fault of failure in puzzle-solving should be attributed to the scientist, not the theory.

The attitude of naïve positivism might be the most serious barrier to scientific creativity for non-Western scientists. Kuhn's (1969) indicated that empirical facts cannot be completely accounted for by any given paradigm. As a consequence of progress in normal science research, scientists may encounter some anomalies. An increase in anomalies means that scientists are unable to solve their problems using existing paradigms. If challenges posed by anomalies cannot be resolved by adjusting the paradigm, the crisis may urge scientists to develop a new paradigm to replace the old one. This process can eventually lead to scientific revolution.

When a non-Western social scientist adopts a Western social science paradigm to conduct empirical research in an indigenous society, he may encounter many anomalies that cannot be explained using Western theories. However, a scientist with a

belief in naïve positivism might be unconsciously attached to his paradigm, and unable to develop a new paradigm to challenge the existing one. On the contrary, he may modify his research methods in an attempt to resolve the anomalies, or even simply ignore them. The accumulation of empirical data for research of this type may show a feature of supplement or amendment to Western paradigm.

Divergent Thinking and Scientific Revolution

The limitations of research done from a naïve positivist perspective can be further illustrated by Kuhn's later philosophy. In his book *Essential Tension*, scientific research is characterized as composed of two types of activities: one is theoretical construction by divergent thinking; the other is hypothesis testing by convergent thinking.

Normal science research is usually convergent thinking on the basis of consensus about a particular paradigm that has been acquired by members of a scientific community through scientific education and subsequently reinforced by their professional research. Nevertheless convergent type research will eventually result in scientific revolution. In other words, divergent thinking is essential to scientific progress just as is convergent thinking. In order to facilitate the progress of scientific discovery, members of a scientific community have to give up their reliance on previous intellectual tools and research tactics and methods, change their beliefs and worldviews, and find meanings in another set of new beliefs and practices.

The old theory and paradigm must be reevaluated for the sake of establishing a new one. All the scientific discovery and innovation must be essentially revolutionary. Therefore, a creative scientist has to liberate his thinking and image all possibilities; this is a key feature of divergent thinking. Thus, convergent thinking and divergent thinking are two complementary forces pushing forward scientific progress, just like two wheels on a bicycle or two wings on a bird. Since these two modes of thinking are inevitably in conflict, it is essential to create a tension between these two forces for the continuous progress of science.

The Epistemological Strategy for Developing Universal Psychology

In this chapter, the advocacies of several major Western philosophers about how to construct scientific microworld are reviewed. When Western philosophy of science switched from Positivism to Postpositivism, their dramatic change in terms of ontology, epistemology, and methodology was emphasized. The change has very important implication for the progress of Western psychology as well as the development

of indigenous psychologies in non-Western countries. First, I discuss its impact on mainstream Western psychology.

Wundt's Cultural Psychology

Science in Germany has traditionally been classified as *Naturwissenschaft* (nature science) and *Geistwissenschaft* (spiritual science) by their academic community. *Naturwissenschaft* studies the law of physical world; while *Geistwissenschaft* concerns the cultural world created by human beings in history, which enables us to understand laws that guides human life, human development and human history.

Wilhelm Wundt, the first person in Western history of psychology who advocated for using experimental method to study psychological phenomena, well understood the difference between these two kinds of science. He believed that the subject of psychological research is individual's direct experience toward physical world rather than his/her indirect experience or higher level explanation of experience. Since an individual's experience can be observed only by oneself, introspection or self-observation should be the method of psychological research. If psychology wants to be an empirical science, subjects' introspection on states of their consciousness should be studied precisely just like the way physical objects are analyzed by natural scientists.

For this reason, Wundt (1873) believed that scientific psychology should be a combination of physiology and psychology. The former provides phenomena of organism that can be observed by our sensory experiences; the later enables individuals to know oneself from inside. Therefore, he called his experimental psychology as physiological psychology, and his first book on experimental psychology, which was entitled as *Principles of Physiological Psychology*.

In addition to using experimental method of physiological psychology to study fundamental psychological processes, Wundt also advocated for using historical method to study high-level mental processes. Because these processes have prominent effects in history and society, they need another kind of scientific study. Experimental methods is adequate natural science, while historical method for social science. On the basic of this reason, he began to write *Völker Psychologie* to analyze the psychological processes manifested in language, myth and custom during historical progress of German in 1900s.

Declaration of Behaviorism

Viewing from today's perspective, Wundt's *Völker Psychologie* is exactly the field of research for indigenous psychologies. However, Wundt believed that *Völker Psychologie* cannot be studied by the experimental method of natural science. By

the same vein of reasoning, the Behaviorism raised in the early twentieth century declared its affinity with Positivism.

In 1913, J.B. Watson published his famous article *Psychology as the behaviorist views it* and declared following statement unequivocally:

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation. (Watson 1913: p. 158)

Thus, he argued that as a science of behavior, which psychology should give up its concerns about consciousness. It can be proceed in terms of stimulus and response, habit formation and habit strengths etc., instead of such terminologies as consciousness, mental states, content of mind, introspectively verification, imagination, and the like.

Logical Positivism

Under the influence of scientism at that time, Wundt advocated for using precise experimental method to study consciousness, whereas Watson insisted on excluding consciousness from the domain of psychological research. The radical behaviorism proposed by Watson (1913) gradually gained dominant power in the field of experimental psychology and diversified into several types. In 1930s, psychologists were attracted by logical positivism, which earned reputation rapidly at that time, and considered it as a prescription for constructing psychology as a science. Logical positivists advocated for formal axioms of a theory and operational definition for each theoretical terms. They classified scientific languages into *observation terms* and *theoretical terms*. The former involve observable natural features of an object that can be observed directly such as length, weight, color and time, etc. Earlier positivists insisted that only *observation terms* could be involved in scientific propositions, but logical positivists noticed that *theoretical terms* are essential elements of scientific vocabularies. However, they proposed that to exclude metaphysical and religious languages *theoretical terms* should be transformed to *observation terms*.

Operational Definition

Physicist Bridgman (1927) believed that meaning of a *theoretical term* can be defined in terms of the procedure of connecting it with *observation terms*, which is called as *operational definition*. In mid 1930s, Tolman (1936) formulated his

Table 3.1 The contrasts of positivism and postpositivism in ontology, epistemology, and methodology

	Positivism	Neopositivism
Ontology	Naïve realism (radical empiricism)	Realism
Epistemology	(theoretical) View of truth	Approximate truth
Methodology	Verification	Falsification

psychology in terms of the philosophy of logical positivism, and called it as operational behaviorism. Psychologist Stevens (1939) brought operational definition into psychology, and named it as science of the science in belief that it will eventually make psychology an indisputable natural science. Hull (1943) was also enthusiastic in uniting American behavioral theories and Vienna logical positivism, so as to make American behavioral science a fully developed natural science. He committed himself to developing a formal, deductive, quantitative learning theory, with the hope that he might become the Newton of psychology. He firmly believed that his system follows to logical empiricism (Smith 1986). Based on the most rigorous logical inference predictions about actual behaviors can be logically deduced from a set of clearly stated formulas just like planetary motion was deduced from a set of physical laws by Newton.

In that time, almost all sophomore students majoring in psychology knew that it is a bad form of statement when mentioning “definition” without the adjective ‘operational’. You can get a scientific theory when constructs in hypothesis can be connected with scientific facts via operational definition (Koch 1941).

The Contrasts Between Positivism and Postpositivism

Nevertheless, with the rise of cognitive psychology and social psychology, psychologists gradually gave up their faith in operational definition. In 1960, Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution and postpositivism led by Popper’s (1963, 1972) evolutionary epistemology became very popular in world’s academic community, which made logical positivism an old-fashioned point of view. Philosophers of science even held a meeting to seriously discuss the legacy of Logical Positivism (Achinstein and Baker 1969, people gradually recognized the ontological, epistemological, and methodological contrasts between positivism and postpositivism (Hwang 2010). In order to illustrate the sharp contrasts between these two schools, their differences in these three aspects are listed in Table 3.1.

The ontology of positivists was affected by Cartesian dualism and Kant’s doctrine of separation between phenomenon and noumenon. They advocated for naïve realism and insisted the only reality is that which can be experienced by human beings through their sensory organs. All metaphysical concepts should be excluded from the domain of scientific research. It is unnecessary for scientists to seek for the ultimate cause that creates the objective world beyond sensory experience. Such radical empiricism makes them advocated for an epistemological view, which believed that

scientific theories represent truth. Therefore, they adopted a positivistic view of methodology and argued that “The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification.” (Schlick 1936)

Compared with positivists, postpositivism advocated for an ontology of realism, which believed that there exists a fundamental noumenon behind the phenomenon experienced by human beings. Though noumenon is real, it cannot be perceived by human beings. Therefore, scientists should make all efforts to speculate what it is for the sake of constructing theories to describe the objective world. Because theories are nothing more than speculations of scientists, the epistemology of postpositivist believed that theories do not represent truth, they are merely approximations to the truth. Therefore, their methodology advocated for falsification, which means that the major task of scientific research is to eliminate any kinds of possible errors within a theory by using dialectic thinking and empirical method to examine all important propositions of that theory.

Criticisms Toward Positivism

Nevertheless, the objects of research for both positivists and postpositivists are materials rather than human beings that act upon practical reasons according to Kant’s doctrine of philosophy. Therefore, Habermas (1968) indicated that all positivists are actually followers of scientism who believe that research of social science must use such scientific methods of natural science as data collection by observation and experimentation, model construction, and quantitative analysis, etc. This approach of research implies the naturalization of society, which regards social events and social phenomena as given facts. It is a kind of objectivism that regards external world as the source of knowledge and the ultimate field for testing the truth. This approach may eventually reify human beings as well as society (Keat 1986).

In the 1961 meeting of German Sociological Association at the University of Tübingen, Popper presented a paper on *Logic of social sciences*, Adorno from the Frankfurt School, served as his commentator, and Habermas proposed opposite arguments against his positivistic position. Debates between these two camps went on and lasted for about a decade. Popper repeatedly refused to admit himself as a positivist, but Habermas (1967/1988) argued that the supremacy of methodology and statistical models in social science may make social scientists overconcern with the way of adjusting to the research methods and statistical analysis, thus forget the value of humanity in social research and ignore the meanings and ability of human reflexivity.

Therefore, Habermas (1968) pondered on the way of human existence from the perspective of philosophical anthropology and emphasized the importance of social reality. Following his discussion on the necessity of human engagement in labor, interaction and communication, he analyzed the social domination emerging from these three types of social action. He argued that, based on these three aspects of human existence, one may develop three kinds of interests as well as motivations of life: technical interest, practical interest, and emancipative interest. Guided by

technical interest, human beings may engage in instrumental labor and utilize knowledge of analytical-empirical science, which takes nature as object of recognition. Guided by practical interest, human beings may engage in social interaction and communication and use historical-hermeneutic science with mutual understanding as its objective. Besides, human beings may engage in activities aimed to relieve from social dominance by using critical science under the guidance of emancipative interest.

Concept of Person in Social Science

The debate between Habermas and postpositivists has very important implication not only for indigenous or cultural psychology, but also for the development of social science. More specifically, though Habermas (1968) classified sciences into three categories, he still believed that the object of recognition for empirical-analytical science is nature. The objects of positivistic science are certainly materials within nature, but the objects of psychological study are human beings. The difference between materials and human beings exists in the latter's spiritual aspect. Stating in Heidegger's philosophy, human beings as Dasein are able to reflect on the meanings of their existence which makes them totally different from materials (Heidegger 1928/1976). In Chap. 2 of this book, I emphasize that people in every culture tend to consider their actions rational and full of wisdom when they act in accordance with cultural values prevailing in their liveworld. Nevertheless, it is impossible for materials as objects of positivistic science to make such reflections at all. Therefore, the study of human beings should not be done solely by using the method of empirical-analytical science. When conducting research of indigenous psychologies, researchers may ask questions, think, and seek for answers to their questions, while their subjects may also reflect meanings of their lives and values of their existence in responding to their questions.

According to Kant's separation between theoretical reasons and practical reasons, the indigenization of psychology means the study of human behaviors who act on the basis of a certain wisdoms for action or practical reasons under various contexts in their liveworlds by non-Western psychologists with their theoretical reasons. The objects of psychological research are not only actions of human beings but also wisdoms for action. If an indigenous psychologist wants to construct theories of indigenous psychologies, they must go further to trace back the cultural values contained in the wisdoms for action, the worldview that supports system of cultural value, and explain how this worldview may answer the fundamental issues of life.

Strategies for Developing Theories of Indigenous Psychology

In Chap. 1, I emphasize that the theoretical construction of indigenous psychologies must follow a principle of cultural psychology: "one mind, many mentalities

(Shweder et al. 1998)”; the theory must represent not only universal mind of human beings but also specific mentality of people in a given culture. In Chap. 4, I review previous literatures on social exchange and theories of justice in Western social psychology and illustrate how I constructed the theoretical model of Face and Favor based on the deep structure of social relationships. According to Habermas’ trichotomy of sciences, the theory of analytical-empirical science constructed in this way is aimed at studying the natural aspect of human social actions.

Using the theoretical model of Face and Favor as framework, we may analyze social actions of human beings in their lifeworld in any society. By the same token, we may use the same model as a framework of reference to interpret the social actions advocated by pre-Chin Confucian scholars. In Chap. 5, I described how I analyzed the inner structure of Confucianism on the basis of this model. Surely, this kind of analysis is a reification of value system (Hwang 2011), which constitutes a kind of scientific microworld that enables us to understand the specific mentality including wisdoms for action, cultural values and worldview when people take some kinds of social actions in Confucian society. This approach may help indigenous psychologists to conduct not only empirical research of analytical-empirical science, but also to explain ethical actions and moral reasonings in Confucian cultural context.

Solving the Problem Faced by Wundt

Several examples are discussed in Chaps. 7 and 8 to illustrate my arguments, readers can use them to compare with previous research paradigms mentioned in Chap. 6. Followed by the same ideas, a series of theoretical models on concept of face, organizational behavior, achievement motivation, and conflict resolution are proposed to integrate findings of previous empirical researches in each chapter after Chap. 9. Recently, I have published a book entitled *Self-discipline: Xiu-yang in Modern Society* which explains how to use these theoretical models to make social criticism.

If indigenous psychologists stick to the research approach of positivism without awaring of the epistemological limitation of dualistic separation between phenomenon and noumenon, they certainly will encounter epistemological conflict and contradiction with those researchers who take the research orientation of hermeneutics (Kashima 2005). Moreover, findings of their researches might be too fragmentary and too trivial to be understood if they insist on the collection of empirical data. However, if they adopt the research approach proposed in this book and explore the wisdoms and cultural values supporting an individual’s social actions and devote themselves to construct theories that represent not only the universal mind of human beings but also the mentality of people a given society, then we would be able to eliminate the barrier between analytical-empirical science and hermeneutics. According to Habermas’ trichotomization of sciences as depicted in his *Knowledge and Human Interests*, the scientific microworld constructed by

indigenous psychologists may satisfy three kinds of human interests and help to solve problems confronted by Wundt when he was writing *Völker Psychologie*.

References

- Achinstein, P., & Baker, S. F. (1969). *The legacy of logical positivism: Studies in the philosophy of science*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
- Aristotle (1962). *Nicomachean ethics*. (M. Ostward, Trans.). New York: The Library of Liberal Art.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1927). *The logic of modern physics*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Comte, I. (1957). *Discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme*. (J. H. Bridges, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1908)
- Guyer, P. (2006). *Kant*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Habermas, J. (1988). *On the Logic of Social Sciences* (translated by S. W. Nichol森 and J. Stark Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. (Original work published 1967)
- Habermas, J. (1968). *Knowledge and human interests*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Hanfling, O. (1976). *Thought and reality: Central themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy solipsism and the self*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Hempel, C. G. (1965). *Aspects of scientific explanation*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hempel, C. G. (1966). *Philosophy of natural science*. Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Heidegger, M. (1928/1976) "Ernst Cassirer: Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. 2. Teil: Das mythische Denken." *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 21, (1000–1012). Translated as "Book Review of Ernst Cassirer's Mythical Thought." In *The Piety of Thinking*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hull, C. (1943). *Principles of behavior*. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.
- Hwang, K. K. (2009). *Logic of social sciences (in Chinese)*. Taipei, Taiwan: Psychological Publishing Co.
- Hwang, K. K. (2010). Way to capture theory of indigenous psychology. *Psychological Studies*, 55(2), 96–100.
- Hwang, K. K. (2011). Reification of Culture in Indigenous Psychologies: Merit or Mistake? *Social Epistemology*, 25(2), 125–131.
- Kant, I. (1949). *The critique of practical reason and other writings* (L.W. Beck, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1785)
- Kant (1963). 1963. *Lectures on Ethics* (Louis Infield Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. (Original work published 1788)
- Kant, I. (1965). *Critique of pure reason* (N. K. Smith, Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Original work published 1781).
- Kashima, Y. (2005). Is culture a problem for social psychology? *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 8, 19–38.
- Keat, R. (1986). The Human body in social theory: Reich, foucault and the repressive hypothesis. *Radical Philosophy*, 24–32
- Koch, S. (1941). The logical character of the motivation concept. *Psychological Review*, 48 (15–38), 127–54.
- Kolakowski, L. (1972). *Positivist philosophy*. Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin.
- Kuhn, T. (1969). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (pp. 91–196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lakatos, I. (1978). *History of science and its rational reconstructions. The methodology of scientific research programmes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mou, T. S. (1963). *Wit and principles of the abstruse*. Hong Kong: Life Publisher.

- Mou, T. S. (1968). *Nature in mind and temper*. Taipei: Cheng Chung Book.
- Mou, T. S. (1971). *Intellectual instinct and Chinese philosophy*. Taipei: The Commercial Press.
- Mou, T. S. (1975). *Phenomenon and thing in itself*. Taipei: Student Book.
- Mou, T. S. (1977). *Budda and the highest wisdom*. Taipei: Student Book.
- Ostwald, M. (1962). Glossary of technical terms. In A. Nicomachean (Ed.), *Ethics* (pp. 303–316). New York: Bobbs-Merill Company.
- Popper, K. (1963). *Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K. (1972). *Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schlick, M. (1936). Meaning and verification. *Philosophical Review*, 45, 339–369.
- Scruton, P. (1982). Policing and institutional racism on Merseyside. In D. Cowell et al. (Eds.), *Policing the Riots* (pp. 21–38). London: Junction Books.
- Shweder, R., Goodnow, J., Hatano, G., Levine, R., Markus, H., & Miller, P. (1998). The cultural psychology of development: One mind, many mentalities. In R. Lerner (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology* (5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 865–937). New York: Wiley.
- Smith, L. J. (1986). *Behaviorism and logical positivism: A revised account of the alliance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Stevens, S. S. (1939). Psychology and the science of science. *Psychological Bulletin*, 36, 221–63.
- Tolman, E. (1936). Operational behaviorism and current trends in psychology. In Tolman (1951/1966). *Behavior and psychological man*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. *Psychological Review*, 20, 158–177.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1922/1961). *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, (D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Wood, A. (2005). *Kant*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wundt, W. M. (1873). *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann.
- Yang, S. Y. (2007). Forms and functions of wisdom in real-life contexts. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 49(2), 185–204.

Chapter 4

The Construction of the Face and Favor Model

Abstract In order to attain the epistemological goal of constructing a theoretical model to represent the universal mind for social interaction, this chapter reviewed critically the social exchange theories and justice theories proposed by Western psychologists. Fiske's (*Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations*. New York: The Free Press, 1991) research on the four elementary forms of human relations was cited to illustrate the complex structure of the human mind in establishing social relationships. Taking this as a reference, it is argued that Hwang's (*American Journal of Sociology* 92(4):945–974, 1987) Face and Favor model is a universal theoretical framework of social interaction, which can be applied universally. The four relationships proposed in his model, namely, expressive tie, mixed tie, instrumental tie, and the relationship between petitioner and resource allocator, correspond to Fiske's (1991) communal sharing, equality matching, market pricing, and authority ranking, respectively.

Keywords Social exchange theory • Justice theory • Face and Favor model • Expressive tie • Mixed tie • Instrumental tie

In Chap. 1 I mentioned that the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is to construct a series of formal theories based on the deep structure of the human mind. These formal theories can explain the universal psychological functioning and the mentality of people in a given culture. Because this book aims to construct a series of theoretical models on Confucian relationalism, this chapter will first critically review the social exchange theories and justice theories of Western social psychology from the perspective of the four relational models proposed by Fiske (1991) in his book *Elementary Forms of Social Life*. I will then explain why the theoretical model of Face and Favor is a universal formal theory that can be used to illustrate humankind's psychological functioning.

A Critical Review of Social Exchange Theories

Among various disciplines of Western social science, social exchange theorists have concentrated themselves on studying the nature of interpersonal relationships and social behaviors. Viewed from the social exchange theory perspective, most social interactions can be conceptualized as social exchange. As Engels said “Next to production, the exchange of things produced is the basis of all social structure. The final causes of all social changes... are to be sought not in men’s brains, nor in man’s better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production or exchange” (Engels 1880/1959, p. 90). Social exchange theories aim to study the processes and principles for exchanging psychological, social, and material commodities, or resources.

The Anthropologists’ Explorations

The exchange behaviors in human societies were first studied by anthropologists. For example, Frazer (1906/1919) studied cross-cousin marriages in Australian aboriginal societies. An individual lacking wealth but desiring to marry a wife can trade for a woman by marrying his sisters or daughters to another man. It is essentially an economically motivated transaction. Malinowski (1922) successfully separated two systems of transaction among Western Pacific island inhabitants. When a trade mission meets established trading partners on another island, the two groups get together and engage in the *Kula* exchange. The heads of these two trading groups exchange necklaces and armbands made of shells, they then continue the exchange with their own group members. Finally, everyone ends up with a necklace and an armband which did not originally belong to them. Malinowski argued that the *Kula* exchange is a symbolic or social transaction that aims to establish connections of friendship between the two parties. After the *Kula* exchange, people engage in another ceremony called *Gim Wali*, in which they exchange fish, taro root, and daily necessities with one another.

Mauss (1954/1984) examined the significance of exchanging gifts – including items of economic value, women, children, dances, feast, rituals, and military assistance – in a number of primitive societies. He indicated that the offer and receipt of these gifts within and between various societies appeared to be voluntary; in fact they were conducted under the regulations of social obligation.

Levi-Strauss (1969) further investigated the exchange behaviors within various aboriginal societies and indicated that exchanging goods has an important implication far beyond economic motives. Exchanges are often motivated by the desire to “gain security and fortify oneself against risks incurred through alliances and rivalry” (p. 76). Levi-Strauss therefore opposed reducing social exchange behaviors to economic principles and explaining social exchange with natural laws. He argued that, for social exchange, the relationship is more important than the things exchanged; the nature of goods exchanged is actually irrelevant for understanding the exchange relationship. The goods for exchange may be identical in many aspects,

but they may generate totally different meanings when they are assigned positions in the structure of reciprocity.

Most anthropologists emphasized the value of social exchange more than that of economic exchange in aboriginal societies. But, later social psychologists in constructing their social exchange theories generally assume that the individual is an “economic man” or “rational man.” We will review several social exchange theories to highlight this contrast.

Homans’ Theory of Social Exchange

Homans (1950) first adapted the inductive method of functionalism to write his book *The Human Group* based on the empirical data from his field study of five small groups. He argued that society is organized by many systems which are each composed of several small groups with longitudinal communication links. Therefore, the study of small groups can lead to comprehension of bigger group or even the entirety of human civilization.

In his book “*Social behavior: Its elementary forms*,” Homans (1961) changed from the deductive method and constructed his social exchange theory on the basis of the *operant conditioning theory* prevalent in the 1950s. He argued that all social interactions are governed by, and hence can be analyzed in terms of, the same operant learning principles as those which explain animal behavior. No new propositions are needed to describe and explain the social behaviors of human beings. These basic propositions are:

1. *Success proposition.* The more often a given act is rewarded, the more likely an actor is to perform it.
2. *Stimulus proposition.* If a particular stimulus has led to an actor’s behavior being rewarded in the past, the more similar the present stimuli to the past ones, the more likely the person will perform the same act to the stimuli.
3. *Value proposition.* The more valuable the consequence of a person’s action, the more likely s/he will perform the action.
4. *Deprivation–satiation proposition.* The more recently a reward has been received, the less valuable it becomes to receive any further unit of the reward.
5. *Aggression–approval proposition*

Corollary A: When a person’s action does not receive the reward expected, but instead is unexpectedly punished, he will be angry and is more likely to become aggressive.

Corollary B: When a person’s action receives the reward he expected, especially a reward greater than his expectation, or does not receive punishment when expected, he will be pleased and become more likely to perform the approved behavior.

6. *Rationality proposition.* In choosing among alternative actions, a person will choose the one for which the value of the consequence as perceived by him at that time (V), multiplied by the probability of getting the consequence (p) is the greatest.

Homans (1961) has differentiated *personal relation* from *impersonal relation*. He defines impersonal relations as when an actor engages in a *single exchange* with another for a *single reward* that is readily available elsewhere. On the other hand, the relationship is a personal one when an actor enters into *multiple exchange relations* to gain various rewards from a particular actor. However, Homans argued that because the exchange behaviors between different relations could be derived from the fundamental propositions stated above, it is unnecessary to include them in those propositions.

Blau's Theory of Social Exchange

In his book *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, Blau (1955) described how employees in worksites do favors for others in order to exchange respect, social approval, and other nonsubstantial rewards. Homans (1961) cited a large number of his arguments, and attracted Blau's attention to social exchange theory. This motivated Blau to write the book *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (Blau 1964), marking a significant contribution to social exchange theory.

At the microprocess level, Blau (1964) agreed with Homans (1961) that an individual's behavior is reinforced by the rewards it brings. But his theory is fundamentally different from that of Homans. First, he did not agree that all social behaviors can be conceptualized as social exchanges. He argued that an actor's behaviors is always goal-directed. One will conduct social exchange with others only when such an interaction may help him to attain his goals. In other words, exchange behavior represents only strategic accommodation to others for the sake of achieving one's own goal (Blau 1964, p. 5). Thus, it cannot embrace all social behaviors.

Second, he also opposed Homans' psychological reductionism. He argued that the microprocess of dyadic interaction is essentially different from the macrostructure formed by interrelated groups. Psychological reductionism can explain only microprocesses. Though the immediate reciprocation of reward may be important in the early stages of establishing a relationship, such *emergent properties* as trust and commitment may lead to adaptive stability and flexibility of the relationship without the expectation of short-term return or immediate compensation. "The psychological reductionism is limited for it ignores these emergent properties of social life and explains it exclusively in terms of the motives that govern individual behavior" (Blau 1964, p. 3).

Blau (1964) identified two fundamental social processes underlying interpersonal connections (1) *Intrinsic attraction* means the pleasure induced by the intrinsic characters of the relationship when one is relating to an attractive, witty, or similar other; and (2) *Extrinsic attraction* means the maintenance of a relationship for the sake of something owned by the other party. When an individual owns property or resources desired by others, he or she may have *social power* to influence the others.

He indicated that social exchange is fundamentally different from economic exchange in which the goods exchanged have clear market prices, the transaction is

regulated by explicit or implicit formal contractual rules that define the precise obligations incurred by both parties, and one may obtain his/her profit immediately following the transaction. In contrast to economic transactions, social exchanges will be judged by the subjective value of the goods or service, as well as the social approval obtained. A number of *unspecified obligations* exist for both parties (Blau 1964, p. 315). Therefore, social exchange entails reliance upon such emergent properties as mutual trust allowing one to make substantial investment.

Blau's analysis focused on behaviors within a social organization. His conceptualization of social exchange was based on assumptions about rational man or economic man. In examining phenomena such as group formation, the differentiation of power and status, group norm functioning, and higher-level group processes, he assumed that all individuals follow principles of rationality, reciprocity, justice, and marginal utility to proceed in social exchanges and to maintain the stability of social relationship.

Thibaut and Kelley's Theory of Interdependence

The theory of interdependence takes an extreme position in conceptualizing man as a rational being. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) designed a *game matrix* in which columns represent choices for one actor; and rows represents the same choices for another actor. Outcomes representing a composite of the rewards and costs to be received by the actor and the other for a particular combination of their choices are entered into each cell of the matrix. They conducted a series of empirical research projects by manipulating two kinds of variables in laboratory experiments. The *exogenous variables* are external to their relationship, such as the actor's needs and the resources controlled by the other. The *endogenous variables* are characteristics of their relationship such as previous history of dyadic interaction or the compatibility between the various alternatives the actors have to choose from.

Kelley and Thibaut (1959) assumed that both parties of a dyad are highly selective in seeking an interaction partner who will bring them the most satisfaction. In the interaction process, both parties will evaluate the outcome of their interaction on the basis of two criteria (1) the *comparison level*, or the outcome that one expects to receive in a given relationship, and (2) the *comparison level for alternative*. An actor may leave the relationship and interact with the alternative when the outcome falls below his comparison level, while the alternative provides a better outcome.

It is obvious that Kelley and Thibaut's theory deals with interaction between individuals with free will. If variations of an actor's behavior can affect the quality of the other's outcome, then s/he has *power* over the other. If the actor can affect the other's outcome regardless of what the latter does, then s/he has *fate control* over the latter. If the actor can use reward and punishment to manipulate the other's actions, then s/he has the power of *behavior control* over the other.

The game matrix was developed by mathematicians and economists as a method for studying models of rational choice. Thibaut and Kelley (1978) adopted it to the

field of social psychology and utilized it to study cooperation, competition, bargaining, social power, and interdependence in interpersonal relationships. All concepts in their theory were exactly defined by operational procedures in the laboratory and plentiful findings were obtained. Their experimental studies' findings, in combination with Adams' equity theory, directly give rise to justice theory.

Adams' Equity Theory

In the age when social exchange theories began to blossom, J. S. Adams (1965) published an article entitled "*Inequity in social exchange*" and proposed an equation regarding the attainment of psychological equity.

$$\frac{O_p}{I_p} = \frac{O_a}{I_a}$$

"O" means "outcome," "I" means "input"; "p" represents "the person" and "a" represents "the other." In the process of social exchange, if the ratio of a person's outcome and input is equal to that of the other, then the person may believe the exchange to be fair. On the other hand, if a person believes his ratio of outcome and input is more or less than that of the other, s/he may think that it is unfair and subsequently adapt various cognitive or behavioral strategies to restore psychological equity.

This equation contains many important social exchange theory ideas in a simple representation, including principles of rationality, reciprocity, and equity. Thus, this article's publication gave rise to equity theory study. In 1976, the journal *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* published a special issue entitled "*Equity theory: Toward a general theory of social interaction.*" The editors, Berkowitz and Walster (1976, p. xi), emphasized that it represented "a new mood of optimism... emerging in social psychology. Equity theory was developed in the hope of providing the glimmerings of the general theory that social psychologists so badly need."

At that time, some psychologists suggested that equity is a general theory and the principle of equity steers all human interactions (Walster et al. 1978, p.82). It can explain not only interpersonal relationships in the workplace, but also intimate relationships including love and marriage (Walster 1978b; Husemann and Levinger 1976), and even the stages of marriage breakdown (Lee 1984).

Critiques of Social Exchange Theory

The remarkable achievements of social exchange theory and equity theory fostered the development of justice theory. Generally speaking, justice theory has been constructed to address some of the weaknesses of social exchange theory:

Assumptions About Human Nature

Emerson (1981, pp. 31–32) indicated that there are three core assumptions shared by all social exchange theories:

1. Principle of rationality: A rational individual tends to take actions in order to acquire highly valued resources including money, goods, or social approval. Such actions are usually called rational acts, instrumental acts, or goal-directed acts.
2. Principle of marginal utility: The value of all useful (or valuable) resources follows the principle of satiation, value declination, or decrease of marginal utility.
3. Principle of equity: The benefit acquired through social processes should be returned with compensation of equal benefit.

The principle of reciprocity and the principle of equilibrium can further be derived from the principle of equity. All the assumptions these principles make are obviously cultural products of Western capitalism. Several questions might be raised from the perspective of indigenous psychology: do people living in non-Western societies hold the same assumptions about human nature? Do exchange behaviors in primitive societies as mentioned in previous sections follow the same assumptions about human nature? One may argue that primitive societies are too extreme cases to represent modern man. Nevertheless, many culturally specific systems of exchange exist in Chinese society, such as “drawing a rotary lot” to determine the order of getting a loan from a private loan association (Li 1993; Chuang 1980), or the enterprise networks which are prevalent in modern Chinese society (Young 1971; Kao and Chen 1989; Kao 1989; Peng 1989), possess both social exchange features and economic transaction functions. Are those social systems developed on the basis of previous assumptions about human nature?

Even if we focus merely on Western society without considering Chinese culture, do Westerners follow the same principles in exchanging all resources with others? Anthropologists have indicated the differences between economic transaction and social exchange. Homans (1961) and Blau (1964) also emphasize that both of these two kinds of exchange exist in Western society. What is the essential difference between these two kinds of exchange? Do they follow the same principles? What are the problems with Western theories of social exchange? These questions can be investigated from three aspects, namely the resources exchanged, the relationship between exchange partners, and Western cultural ideals.

Resources for Social Exchange

When social psychologists began to conduct laboratory experiments on social exchange theory, most of them followed the perspective of behaviorism regarding all valuable items, including money, goods, social approval, ... etc., as “rewards.”

This is a practice of reification that defines the meaning of being by having. It is a popular practice prevalent in Western capitalist society and may distort social reality. For example, Foa and Foa (1974, 1976, 1980) classified resources for social exchange into six categories: love, status, information, money, goods, and services. Each of these resources can possess different characteristics along two dimensions (see Fig. 4.1): “Concreteness” means the extent of abstraction for a certain category of resource; while “particularism” means whether an individual must acquire the resource from a particular social target. For example, the particularism of “love” is highest in Fig. 4.1, while its concreteness is situated in the middle. It means that an individual may obtain love from a particular social target, but not others. The particularism of “money” is lowest and its concreteness is also situated in the middle. It means that money can be used to exchange various resources with any social target.

In Foa and Foa’s resource theory of social exchange, the particularism dimension deserves our special attention. Many resources with high level of particularism, such as love and status, can be obtained from some particular target only. In other words, the relationship between two parties in the exchange should be taken into consideration in addressing the applicability of exchange principles.

The Nature of Relationships in Social Exchange

Social exchange theorists have conceptualized the social relationships of interactive parties in different ways. For examples, Homans (1961) distinguished between “personal relationship” and “impersonal relationship” in social exchange; Blau (1964) differentiated social exchange from economic transaction; Emerson (1981, p. 33) also classified social exchange actions into three categories:

1. Negotiated transaction: Two parties accomplish a transaction after a series of negotiation processes in which both of them are mutually contingent. For example, a seller and a buyer finally strike a real estate bargain after long-term negotiation.
2. Altruistic act: One party unconditionally offers the other party a resource without asking for any reward. The other party may or may not repay for his/her receipt. If the other party decides the quality or quantity of repayment in consideration of the donor’s contribution, it is named as “reciprocal transaction.”
3. Generalized reciprocity: One party unconditionally offers the other party resources that generate a series of interactions following the other party’s repayment. The two parties thus become long-term partners, and their reciprocal exchange relationship may not only trace back to the past, but also extend to the anticipated future.

When an individual engages in one of these types of relationships with another party, the exchange rules are obviously different. So, why do some Western social psychologists tend to believe that all social exchanges follow the same rules?




Fig. 4.1 The properties of six resources for social exchange

The answer to this question pertains to Western (especially American) cultural ideals. These are illustrated in Harvard University professor of philosophy John B. Rawls’ masterpiece *A Theory of Justice*.

Rawls’s Theory of Justice

During the times when the study of social exchange theory and justice theory attracted more and more attention from social psychologists, Rawls (1971) published a famous book entitled *A Theory of Justice* which reflects not only American cultural ideals, but also the American zeitgeist of the time.

Rawls conceptualized “justice as fairness.” His theory treated members of society as free and equal individuals who should enjoy fair treatment in society, and argued that the contract among them should be regarded as a choice of justice. A contract that meets the principle of justice is a result of rational decisions made by people in their *original positions*. This reflects a hypothetical construct in Rawls’ theory rather than a historical fact. Original position evolves from the *state of nature* concept in Rousseau’s *Social Contract*; but, it also differs from the *state of nature*.

Rawls argued that, in order to acquire a general, effective, and ultimate rule of distributive justice, when people negotiate to reach an agreement to distribute important resources amongst themselves, all parties participating in the negotiation must be situated in a position of equal status, and they must possess the capacity of

complete rationality, so as to reach a rule that guarantees maximum profits for each of them. Thus, the “veil of ignorance” and “the maximum rule” were conceptualized as the two main characteristics of a rational being situated in the “original position.”

Rawls advocated that though people are unequal in their original positions, they should be covered with a veil of ignorance regarding their actual positions. They should not recognize or even intend to know their social status, backgrounds, or the details of their wisdom, capacities and wealth. Because everyone is situated in the same position, no one benefits or suffers from losing out on his own situation in the process of choosing the justice principle, and no one can design a rule that is particularly beneficial for his own specific situation. Only the results of fair transactions and agreements meet the principle of justice.

The rationality of people in the original position has been referred to as *mutually disinterested rationality*. This is a type of thought and action which seeks one’s own benefit. In a situation where everyone is carefully calculating in an attempt to maximize their own benefits, anybody who harms another will certainly face consequences. Therefore, the most rational way to pursue one’s maximum benefit is to take care of one’s own benefit without hindering or damaging those of others’. In other words, in the process of pursuing one’s benefits and executing one’s plan, an individual needs to consider the worst situation first and rationally think about how to pursue maximum benefit in this situation. Rawls called this principle “the maximum rule.”

To illustrate his arguments Rawls adopted the game matrix developed by economists. His *Theory of Justice* reflects Western cultural ideals to the utmost. The Western cultural trait of individualism emphasizes the importance of the *independent self*. In pursuing the principle of justice, an individual may regard society as a generalized other composed of many individuals. Both parties to an interaction may stand at their *original positions*, covering their eyes with a *veil of ignorance*, and negotiate with one another in pursuit of their own maximum benefits with the premise of not hindering or damaging the other’s benefits.

However, the American cultural ideal of individualism is hardly applicable to non-Western societies. Moreover, it does not necessarily coincide with the social reality of American culture. Various justice theories may emerge when social psychologists attempt to eliminate their cultural prejudices and to study the issues of exchange and distribution in human society in a more objective manner.

A Critical Review of Justice Theory

Social psychologists studying justice theory further divide the concept of justice into distributive justice and procedural justice. Distributive justice is a way of resource distribution in a manner supposedly fair to group members. Procedural justice assess whether or not the procedure for determining a given way of distribution is fair. Though procedural justice issues should be settled before any substantial distribution so that social groups can maintain the equity of resource distribution.

Most of the time, people are more concerned with distributive justice. Only when distributive justice is called into question, is the issue of procedural justice raised for discussion (Thibaut and Walker 1975).

Walster's Equity Theory

The evolution of social science theory is a consequence of dialectical progress. Justice theories evolve from equity theories which themselves have been critically inherited and creatively reconstructed. Most equity theory psychologists assumed that the human beings are driven by biological needs which must be satisfied by acquiring resources from the external world. Social disputes are likely to occur when people are not restricted as they strive for resources. Therefore, various types of social contracts or rules are designed or developed to allow people to acquire long-term benefit through mutual cooperation. Such contract rules may be internalized by individuals through teaching, learning, and imitation and thus become *proper* ways for an individual to acquire rewards from the external world.

Walster et al's (1978) equity theory assumed that an individual would attempt to acquire desired resources in any situation. He is willing to follow rules of justice because (1) conscience may bother him otherwise; (2) he may worry about being punished if others discover that he breaks the rules; and (3) he believes that following rules and cooperating with others may allow him to acquire maximum benefit.

However, an individual would give up the rules if he believed that following rules would not bring him benefit. Thus, the first proposition of their equity theory is:

Proposition I: Corollary I: As long as people believe that they can acquire maximum benefit by fair means, they will do so. If people think that they can acquire maximum benefit by unfair means, they will still do so (Walster et al. 1978b, p. 16).

Deutsch's Justice Rule

Deutsch (1975) disagreed with the belief that all rules of distributive justice in human society can be summarized as equity rules. He further subdivided them into three types of rule: need rule means offering resources in accordance with one's needs. Equality rule allows every participant to share resources equally. Equity rule insists on distributing resources in proportion to everyone's contribution. Deutsch also assumed that human beings are "rational animals," in that they are willing to accept a certain justice rule because they can use it as an instrument to solve problems and acquire their desired goals.

According to Deutsch justice is valued because it can enhance social cooperation in order to increase individual welfare. Therefore, he assumed that "when economic productivity is the main goal, equity will be the most important rule of distributive justice," and resources should be distributed according to everyone's contribution,

in order to maximize the capacity of production. However, offering differential rewards according to productivity may lead to interpersonal jealousy. Equity will be the major rule of distributive justice “if promoting or maintaining friendship is the main goal.” By the same token, emphasizing equality rule or equity rule would become meaningless in taking care of the old, weak and disabled. Therefore, he indicated that when “individual welfare and promoting individual development are the mutual goal, needs will be the main distributive justice rule” (Deutsch 1975, p. 143). In other words, by properly following these rules people may distribute social resources in the manner that is most beneficial for individuals and for the whole of society.

Lerner’s Justice Motive Theory

Lerner (1981) strongly opposed the viewpoint that the rule of justice is an instrument for individuals to pursue maximum benefit. He argued that if justice is a useful instrument designed by human beings, it will be changed or abandoned once it ceases to help an individual or a society acquire maximum benefit. This is obviously not the truth. Throughout human history many people have preferred to sacrifice their own resources for the sake of justice. Therefore, Lerner cited Piaget’s (1965) theory of moral development and argued that understanding of and insistence on a justice rule is a consequence of interaction between one’s cognitive competence and his/her environmental conditions.

Lerner’s (1981) theory of justice motive indicates that early childhood development experiences enable individuals to acquire an organized construction of the external world which can help them assimilate new information instead of feeling helpless when faced with novel situations. In Western culture, individuals experience three prototypical relationships in their growth process. One’s personal perception, manner of treating others’ goal-oriented activity, and the outcome of resource distribution are essentially different for each of these three prototypical experiences (see Table 4.1). *Identity* means an individual’s earliest experience of an interpersonal relationship in which one may have a long-term experience of emotional sharing with others. In these relationships individuals depend on each other not only in goal-oriented activities but also in sharing identifying feeling. Thus, they may grow to care about one another’s welfare and distribute resources on the basis of need rule just as in interpersonal relationships within a family.

When a child grows up and interacts with others in various contexts, he may distinguish the difference between himself and others, and differentiate between unit and nonunit relations. An individual tends to classify others with “the same” characteristics as himself in the “we” category, and treat them by the “need rule.” He may create a sense of belonging with others of “unit relation,” be willing to cooperate with them, and distribute resources by the “equality rule.” Others who are in

Table 4.1 Prototypical experiences (Lerner 1981, p. 26)

Associated cognitive elements	Identity	Unit	Nonunit
Person perception	Same “me”	Similar “us”	Different “them”
Activity relation to goal	Vicarious dependency	Mutually facilitative convergent	Hindering divergent
Outcomes	Need welfare	Equality equivalence	More less

competition with oneself in pursuit of the same goals tend to be classified in the “them” category of. The typical individual tends to adopt the “equity rule” calculating gains and losses in distributing resources with those “nonunit relations.”

In the task-relevant acquisition process for achieving certain goals in each of these three interpersonal templates, an individual may engage in such emergent activities as vicarious dependency, convergent goals, or divergent goals.

Lerner indicated that a child who grows up in Western civilization has to learn the impersonal cause and effect connection between certain actions and their consequences. He should be able to analyze the effective and feasible actions needed to acquire certain valuable goals in a given situation. In order to attain this objective, a child has to learn two things: first, that he should treat other as occupier of a certain position instead of as an individual with specific personality (Lerner and Whitehead 1980, p. 229). Regarding other as a “person” or an occupant of a “position” has completely different implications. Regarding the other as a “person” means that s/he is a unique individual with some consistent personality characteristics. On the other hand, regarding the other as an occupant of a position means that their reactions or behaviors should be treated as consequences of some nonhuman process. Anyone who occupies the position will pursue the same actions in the same way. American culture is designed to encourage an individual to treat others as occupants of positions. If someone treats the other as a person in a critical and complicated social situation, it may result in social dysfunctions (Lerner and Whitehead 1980, p. 230).

Second, a child needs to learn various “personal contracts” by the logic of “if..., then...,” and come to believe that if s/he invests time and effort by postponing immediate satisfaction, s/he will acquire proper rewards. This is the prototype of personal experience with “equity rule.”

Presumptions of Western Social Sciences

Lerner’s justice motive theory enables us to see a unique feature of Western culture. The three prototypical interpersonal relationships experiences might be universal; however, treating relational others as the occupant of positions and learning so-called “personal contracts” are specific to Western culture. In an article entitled “Reflection on Some Presumptions of Sociology,” Yeh (1987/1991) indicated that

there are several presumptions in the sociological knowledge constructed mainly by European and American social scientists. First, social science concerns only activities during the period from an individual's birth to his/her death. It considers neither a "previous life" nor an "after life," but ordinary people's basic values and cognitive attitudes toward social relationships in daily life. These values and attitudes have become a basis for social scientific conceptual reconstruction.

The second presumption, satisfaction by possession, is derived from a deep concern about this world. It argues that all humans have their own desires. Society's major function is to provide conditions which allow individuals to satisfy their desires.

Yeh called the third presumption externalized structure. Because unsatisfied desires may lead to interpersonal struggle, it is necessary for society to have an authority to serve as a mediator for reconciling conflicts and maintaining social order. Its concrete form is the state or commonwealth which possesses sovereignty independent of any personal will.

These are not only the presumptions of Western sociology, but also the presumptions shared by all Western social sciences including social psychology. It is not difficult to find manifestations of these three presumptions in our review of various social exchange theories in the previous section. Lerner's justice motive theory highlights them more specifically. He attempted to figure out the connections between various types of interpersonal relationships and rules of justice. However, when mentioning different types of relationships, he emphasized that they refer to the occupant of a certain position in a relationship instead of a specific person. The connections between relationships and justice rules are determined by the so called externalized structure of a "social contract" or "personal contract." Lerner's theory obviously developed from within a Western cultural background. When transplanted into Chinese society, it should be properly modified so as to construct a theoretical model compatible with and suitable for a Chinese context.

Kayser and Schwinger's Theory of Intrapersonal Contracts

The theories related to distributive justice should be mentioned prior to discussing these questions. The theory of intrapersonal contracts proposed by Kayser, Schwinger et al. indicates that the common sense knowledge of naive social psychology including rules for dealing with ideal prototypes of interpersonal relationship can be used to manage social interaction in daily life (Schwinger 1986). The authors proposed five prototypes of interpersonal relationships and described them in respect to five dimensions: the actor's cognition and motive orientation, the nature of affection in relationship, the critical resource exchanged, typical direction of exchange and guidelines for exchange. These prototypes are shown in Table 4.2.

According to Table 4.2, the first three categories of interpersonal relationship: intimate, friendship, and exchange relationships, are almost the same as Deutsch's (1975) three situations for using justice rules or Lerner's (1981) three relationship

Table 4.2 The five prototypes of interpersonal relationships according to the theory of intrapersonal contracts (Schwinger 1986, p. 219)

Characteristic	Type of relationship				
	Intimate	Friendship	Exchange	Competitive	Fighting
Cognitive-motivational orientations of the actors	Intimate	Collective	Individualistic	Competitive	Aggressive
Affective relationship	Prosocial	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Very negative
Typical resources	Very positive	Universalistic, particularistic	Universalistic	Universalistic, particularistic	Particularistic
Typical direction of transaction	Particularistic	Giving	Giving and taking	Taking	Taking
Transaction principle	Giving	Equality	Contribution	Maximum difference	Maximum harm
	Need				

prototypes. Competitive and fighting relationships can be regarded as extensions of exchange relationships. Furthermore, based on empirical research findings, Kayser et al. listed the justice rules for distributing sexual categories of social resources (Foa and Foa 1974) in these three prototypes of interpersonal relationship in Table 4.3. This table shows that the rules used to distribute different resources are not necessarily consistent within relationship prototypes. This deserves our special attention. So, the table is provided here for careful examination.

Greenberg and Cohen' Analysis of Social Relationships

Viewed from the perspective of constructive realism, the first step for constructing a scientific microworld is to construct a proper taxonomy to classify the research subject. The taxonomy must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. All of the aforementioned justice theories attempted to classify interpersonal relationships according to various criteria and establish their taxonomies accordingly. Greenberg and Cohen (1982) tried to analyze the nature of social relationships among people. They argued that social relationships can be classified along two dimensions, namely intimacy and interdependency (Fig. 4.2).

Intimacy means the closeness provided by a social bond; interdependency refers to the participant's level of control over other's resources in social exchange (Greenberg and Cohen 1982, p. 444). Each of these two dimensions were further divided into high and low levels and four kinds of interpersonal relationships were thus constructed: spouses, friends, negotiators, and strangers. Their interaction will follow four different types of prevailing normative standards, namely mutual needs, equity, self-interested justice, and self-desire. The possibility of conflict within these four categories of interpersonal relationships as they struggle for resources are deemed as either high and low. The relationships among these variables are listed in Fig. 4.2.

The Deep Structure of Social Relationships

The aforementioned review indicated that justice theories have developed within Western culture and reflect interpersonal relationships in Western society. Transplanting these theories into non-Western societies may result in a discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed empirical phenomena. This problem can be illustrated with Fiske's works on the deep structure of social relationships (1991, 1992).

Following an intensive review of the sociology, anthropology, and psychology literature in his book *Structures of Social Life*, Fiske (1991) proposed four elementary forms of social life. The four relational models are:

Table 4.3 Transaction principles rated as just for different relationship and resource types: summarized results of various studies by Kayser, Schwinger, and Coworkers (Schwinger 1986, p. 221)

Resource type	Type of relationship (and corresponding interpersonal orientation)		
	Intimate (prosocial)	Friendship (collective)	Exchange (individualistic)
Love	Need	Need	Equality/contribution
Status	Equality	Contribution	Contribution
Services	Need	Need/Equality	Contribution
Information	Need	Need	Contribution
Goods	Need	Equality	Contribution
Money	Need	Equality	Contribution




Fig. 4.2 Prevailing normative standards in social relations characterized by levels of interdependence and intimacy (Greenberg and Cohen 1982, p. 444)

1. **Communal Sharing:** This is a relationship of equivalence in which people are merged together to achieve the goals at hand so that boundaries among individual selves are indistinct. They attend to membership of common identity, but not individuality. Their major concerns are superordinate goals beyond individuals, membership, and the boundary between the inside and outside of a group. Group insiders have feelings of solidarity, unity, and belonging. They strongly identify with the collective and think of themselves as an identical “we” in some significant aspects, instead of as an individual “I.”
2. **Authority Ranking.** This is an unequal relationship with transitive asymmetry. If the particular hierarchy includes three or more people, the individuals in this relationship construct each other as different in social importance or status. They can be ordered in a linear ranking, which may not translate across other ranking systems. Their ranking is associated with the extent of extending oneself, and is hierarchical with the high-ranking people controlling more persons, things, and resources. Highly ranked individuals are also regarded as possessing

more knowledge and mastery over events. People in successively higher ranks dominate greater numbers of subordinates, their authority confers certain privileges of choice and preference. The attention paid to them is asymmetric, with authority figures more salient than subordinates. Inferiors tend to show abeyance and loyalty to their superiors, whereas leaders are entitled to provide protection and support to their followers.

3. **Equality Matching:** This is an egalitarian relationship among distinct and individual peers, each of whom has equal social presence including shares, contributions, and influence. The one-to-one equality matching may manifest in turn-taking, in which everyone in relation takes the same action in temporal sequence. It may imply in-kind reciprocity, where people exchange resources they receive reciprocally giving back things of the same value. The meaning of “sameness” depends on how people conceive of their actions and entities involved, instead of their objective differences.

People in these relationships are supposed to be distinct and entitled with equivalent rights, duties, and actions, so they are in a sense interchangeable. These relationships entail matched contributions of the same kind and quantity. As distributive justice, it takes the form of even distribution into equal parts; all people get identical parts and are indifferent about their portions. In the case of conflict or assignation, this relationship requires-eye-for-an-eye retaliatory vengeance: if a person takes something, he has to compensate in equal measure, so that the exchange is balanced.

4. **Market Pricing.** This exchange relationship is mediated by the price determined in a market system. People evaluate others’ actions, services, and products according to the rates at which they can exchange for other commodities. The rates are indicated by monetary prices. Money is the most important medium in market pricing, and people can decide whether or not to trade with each other on the basis of this universal metric. Prior to making purchasing decisions, they can consider potential substitutes or complements, assess the temporal conditions of the market, and bargain with others out of self-interest. Ideally, any honest and capable person can participate in this relationship of exchange as long as they have some items for sale or they have money.

Manifestations of the Relational Models

In his book *Structures of Social Life*, Fiske (1991) carefully examined the manifestations of these four relational models and how their characteristics manifested in various domains of social life. In addition to reciprocal exchange, distributive justice, and contribution as previously described, the domains examined also included work, meaning of things, orientation to land, social influence, constitution of groups, social identity and the relational self, motivation, moral judgment and ideology, moral interpretation of misfortune, aggression and conflict, etc. This fact implies that these structures are derived from the same set of psychological schemata, or the universal deep structure of mind.

If these four relational models represent a universal deep structure of the human mind, they can be taken as a reference framework to critically examine the justice theories mentioned in the previous section. Compared with social exchange theory, justice theories do not advocate that equity is the only rule for social exchange. Instead they argue that people may process social exchange or resource distribution with others of various relationships by different rules. However, if we examine the relationships mentioned in previous justice theories, such as identity, unit, and non-unit in the justice motive theory (Lerner 1981); intimate, friendship, and exchange in the theory of intrapersonal contracts (Kayser and Schwinger 1982); and the married, friend, and bargainer in analysis of social relationships (Greenberg and Cohen 1982), all of them correspond to three of Fiske's four relational models: namely, communal sharing, equality matching, and market pricing, and the proper rules for exchange in each of these three relationship are need rule, equity rule, and equivalence rule respectively (Deutsch 1975). The other two relationships in Kayser and Schwinger (1982) analysis, competition and fighting, are emergent properties of these three relational models (Blau 1964). The "stranger" mentioned by Greenberg and Cohen (1982) can be ignored here because no stable relationship is established between strangers.

Such a comparison enables us to see the limitations of Western social psychology: Fiske's (1991) authority ranking is completely absent in the justice theories. All of them are constructed on the presumption that every individual is an independent entity with free will to choose the distributional rule which is supposed to be most the appropriate standard of justice. However, the exchange rule or distributional rule in relationships of authority ranking is determined by figures of higher authority. This kind of relationship contradicts the Western cultural ideal of individualism, so it is almost excluded from consideration when Western social psychologists construct justice theories.

Nevertheless, authority ranking is a very important relationship in non-Western societies. According to Popper's (1972) evolutionary epistemology, when there is a discrepancy between a theoretical proposition and the empirical facts or observed phenomena, it constitutes a scientific problem to be solved. In this situation, it is necessary for scientists to construct tentative theories or tentative solutions to solve this problem. In other words, facing such a problem, the mission of non-Western psychologists is to take into consideration the deep structure of the human mind regarding social relationships, including authority ranking, to construct universal formal theories, which can explain both the universal mind of social interaction as well as the culture-specific mentality of Chinese people in interaction.

Theoretical Construction of Confucian Relationalism

When I constructed the theoretical model of Face and Favor in 1970s, it aimed to elaborate the *renqing* rule in particular. Nevertheless, if we take the *renqing* rule as a special case of equality rule without considering Chinese cultural values in par-

ticular, then the Face and Favor model is a formal theory that meets the aforementioned requirements. This section will explain my arguments by presenting the major propositions of this model (Fig. 4.3).

The Classification of Interpersonal Relationships

In Fig. 4.3, within the box denoting the psychological processes of the resource allocator (RA), the rectangle represents various personal ties. It is first divided into two parts by a diagonal. The shaded part stands for the affective component of interpersonal relationships, while the unshaded part represents the instrumental component.

These two parts represent two universal components of interpersonal relationships (Benjamin 1974). For example, research findings on parent–child relationships indicate that a child perceives his/her parents' behavior in terms of two dimensions, that is, love versus hostility and control versus autonomy (Schaefer 1959). The first dimension is the expressive component; and the second one is instrumental. Some research on leadership indicate that a subordinate perceives his leader's behavior in terms of two dimensions: consideration and initiating structure (Halpin 1966; Stogdill 1974); other researchers indicate that it is composed of two dimensions, namely, task orientation and socioemotional orientation (Bales 1958; Fleishman et al. 1955). No matter how it has been labeled, consideration or socioemotional orientation belong to the expressive component; while initiating structure or task orientation is instrumental.

In my Face and Favor theoretical model, interpersonal relationships are classified into three categories according to their proportion of expressive and instrumental components; namely expressive ties, mixed ties, and instrumental ties. That classification of relationships also has some important implications which can be elaborated from different perspectives. Clark and Mills (1979) classified interpersonal relationships into two categories: communal relationship and exchange relationship. The former is the social–emotional aspect of interpersonal relationships; the latter refers to exchange relationships in the market. In fact, it is very hard to dichotomize social relationships in this way. Therefore, the Face and Favor model regards them as two components of interpersonal relationships, corresponding to the expressive component and instrumental component respectively, all the following three types of interpersonal relationship contain these two components with varying degrees.

1. *The Expressive Tie*

The expressive tie is generally a relatively permanent and stable social relationship. It can render an individual's feelings of affection, warmth, safety, and attachment. This kind of tie occurs mostly among members of such primary groups as family, close friends, and other congenial groups. Aside from the satisfaction of affective feelings, one can of course utilize this tie as an instrument to procure desired material resources; but its expressive component always claims precedence over its instrumental component. Generally speaking, the




Fig. 4.3 A theoretical model of face and favor (adopted from Hwang 1987, p. 948)

need rule is the rule governing social exchange and resource distribution between two parties with expressive ties. According to this rule, every member should do his best to satisfy the other party's need, and the recipient will in turn repay him with the necessary resources.

2. *The Instrumental Tie*

In the rectangle of Fig. 4.1, the instrumental tie stands in opposition to the expressive tie. With a view to attaining his material goals, an individual must establish instrumental ties with people outside his family. When an individual attempts to establish an expressive tie with other people, the tie is the goal in itself. But when one attempts to establish an instrumental tie, the relationship serves only as a means or an instrument to attain other goals. Thus, this relationship is basically unstable and temporary. This latter relationship exists, for example, between salesmen and customers, bus drivers and passengers, nurses and patients, and so forth. Both parties consider this kind of social interaction solely as a mean to achieve their own purposes. They do not even need to know each other's name, and, in this relationship, the expressive ingredient, if any, is very slight.

When dealing with people in an instrumental relationship, one always reflects on this in terms of social exchange theory: "How much reward can I obtain from the opposite side?" "How much cost must I pay in order to obtain the goal?" "Is my final benefit comparable to that of the other side's after the cost is subtracted from the reward?" (Homans 1961; Emerson 1976).

When interacting in terms of the equity rule, the expressive component is minimal. When this is the case an individual can make more objective decisions. If, initially, the consequences of social exchange seem unprofitable, one may bargain, refusing the initial proposal, or even completely break off the social exchange relationship without regret if the other party refuses to accept reasonable counteroffers (Adams 1965).

3. *The Mixed Tie*

Both sides of a mixed tie know one another and keep a certain expressive component in their relationship, but it is never so strong that participants in the tie could express their authentic behavior as freely as can members with an expressive tie. This kind of relationship, which has been termed a particularistic tie, occurs chiefly among relatives, neighbors, classmates, colleagues, teachers, and students, people sharing a birth place, and so forth (Fried 1969; Jacobs 1979).

Both sides of this tie have something in common with the other. Those who know one another constitute an interpersonal network, or reticulum, which has different degrees of complexity. From an onlooker's viewpoint, an individual may be simultaneously involved in several different groups and thus in many networks woven by particularistic ties. But, for each participant, one is situated at the center of a unique network composed of one's own particular social ties (Mitchell 1969; Kapferer 1969). Other people in this network also have their own reticulum of social relations; hence, the overlapping and intersecting of these reticula in an extremely complicated network of social relations.

Such interpersonal networks have a far-reaching influence on Chinese social behavior. Since the participants in a given reticulum are very likely to be familiar with one another, the duration of the mixed tie is its other main characteristic.

Interpersonal relationships with mixed ties are seldom based on a consanguineous background, so they do not necessarily last forever, as do expressive ties. But, the mixed tie can last as long as both parties see each other frequently.

Furthermore, mixed ties are quite different from instrumental ties in that in the latter, interpersonal relationships are characterized by universality and impersonality. Neither side may expect to meet the other again after the relationship's purposes are achieved, even though there probably is some chance of future contact. But the mixed tie has a particularistic and personal essence. Both sides not only expect that they will continue their connection, they also anticipate that some other people in their respective networks may know what is going on between them and may evaluate their interaction in accordance with their social standards.

Renqing and the Rule of Renqing

Because personal networks have these characteristics, each RA has to take the rule of *renqing* into account whenever he is asked to distribute a resource in a way beneficial to any other individual sharing the same personal network. In such a case, the RA may be caught in the so called *renqing* dilemma. If RA insists on the equity rule and refuses to give the petitioner (P) some special help, then RA is doomed to harm their relationship and may even mar his own *renyuan* (interpersonal attractiveness). Accordingly, under many circumstances, RA cannot help following the rule of *renqing* and giving P special consideration, especially when P is a person of power.

Thus, in Chinese society, many people like to make the best of the special qualities of mixed ties by showing a figure of power in order to impress others. This, they hope, will place them in a favorable position for any future allocation of some others' resources. The following discussion further explains the rule of *renqing*, the *renqing* dilemma, and the way in which Chinese seek to influence people using the *renqing* rule.

Generally speaking, the word "*renqing*" has three different meanings in Chinese culture. First, *renqing* indicates the emotional responses of an individual confronting the various situations of daily life. *Li-Chi* (Book of Ritual) says: "What is so-called *renqing*? It consists of happiness, anger, sadness, fear, love, hate, and desire; all of them are acquired at birth." In psychological terminology, a person who is versed in *renqing* is well equipped with empathy. If an individual can understand other people's emotional responses to various life circumstances – feeling happy or sad as others do, or even catering to their tastes and evading or avoiding whatever they resent – then we may say that such a person knows *renqing*. If, however, one is not sympathetic to other people's feelings or ready to help them when they are in need, then such indifference to people's emotional responses will certainly foster a reputation of not knowing *renqing*.

Second, *renqing* means a resource that an individual can present to another person as a gift in the course of social exchange. In Chinese society, when one has either happy occasions or difficulties, all of one's acquaintance are supposed to offer a gift or render some substantial assistance. In such cases, it is said that they send

their *renqing*. Henceforth, the recipient will owe *renqing* to the donors. By this, we see that *renqing* can mean a certain kind of resource that can be used as a social exchange medium.

Third, *renqing* connotes a set of social norms by which one has to abide in order to get along well with other people in Chinese society. This norm of *renqing* includes two basic kinds of social behavior: (a) Ordinarily, one should keep in contact with the acquaintances in one's social network, exchanging gifts, greetings, or visitations with them from time to time, and (b) when a member of one's reticulum gets into trouble or faces a difficult situation, one should sympathize, offer help, and "do a *renqing*" for that person.

The principle of forgiveness (*shudao*) propounded by the Confucianists is embodied in the maxim "Do not do unto others that which you would not wish done unto you" and by its converse: "Do unto others as you wish done unto yourself." However, the behavior of the recipient is regulated by another social norm which is proverbially expressed: "If you have received a drop of beneficence from other people, you should return to them a fountain of beneficence." This article refers to displays of these social norms as the rule of *renqing*.

One implication of the *renqing* rule is that, for the sake of maintaining interpersonal harmony with a group, when two or more individuals from the same social network work together, the RA tends to distribute the outcome of work to all coworkers in accordance with the equality rule, no matter how much actual input each one of them objectively contributed toward the completion. This occurs because people in a given interpersonal network may anticipate that they will continue to interact with others in the future and because distributing resources within a group according to the equality rule is an important method for preventing interpersonal conflict (Deutsch 1975; Leventhal 1976a; Shapiro 1975).

Justice Theory

Referring to the Face and Favor theoretical model, if we ignore the special meaning of "*renqing rule*" in Chinese culture, and regard it as a special case of "equality rule," then the classification of interpersonal relationships into three categories contains the main ideas of justice theory. Psychologists who are doing research with justice theory have found that an individual tends to use different standards of justice to interact with people of different relationships. Therefore, these researchers try to determine prototypes of interpersonal relationships and their related rules of justice. For example, Lerner (1981) classified one's experience of interpersonal relationships into three categories in accordance with one's sequence of development: an individual may share his emotional experience with others of identity relation throughout the period of his early age. When he grows up and interacts with many others, he has to differentiate unit and nonunit relations from one another: the former have the same or similar characters with oneself, such as age, sex, or location; while the latter are obviously different from oneself.

Individuals tend to use different standards of justice to interact with others of various relationships in different situations. In studying the connections between interpersonal relationships and norms of justice, psychologists found that though more than ten standards of justice could be identified in human society, they all take one of three elementary (e.g., Reis 1984): the “need rule” is used when an individual maintains identity relations with another and cares for that other’s development and welfare; the “equality rule” is mostly used when an individual regards another as “a human being” and emphasizes the maintenance of a harmonious relationship with him; the “equity rule” is used when two parties of interaction consider the role relation between them and emphasize the importance of work efficiency (Deutsch 1975; Greenberg and Cohen 1982; Lerner 1975; Leventhal 1976).

The Norm of Reciprocity

The Face and Favor model assumes that individuals tend to interact with others of these three relationships in terms of the need rule, *renqing* rule, and equity rule. When an individual interacts with people of these three relationships, he may calculate what cost he needs to pay for the interaction, how much the other may repay him, and what the outcome of their social exchange will be.

Gouldner (1960) has argued that the norm of reciprocity is a universal one. It has been accepted as a basic moral rule of social cohesion in most cultures (Levi-Strauss 1969; Malinowski 1922). Social relationships among human beings cannot be effectively established without a reciprocity norm. In Chinese culture, the rule of *renqing*, as well as the need rule and equity rule, can be viewed as a derivative of the norm of reciprocity (Yang 1957). The chief differences among these three rules lie in their applications to different domains of interpersonal ties, in their different ways of repayment, and in the varying time periods permitted between giving and repaying.

In instrumental-tie relationships, neither side in the social exchange expects to undertake any exchange of affection in the future. This allows both sides to estimate the relative value of resources under their respective control according to more objective standards and thus exchange resources in a fair manner. In the course of social exchange, when a participant gives a certain value of resource to the opposite side, the latter is supposed to repay its cost immediately. If there is any hint of procrastination, both sides should negotiate and agree in advance on the exact date of reciprocation.

In a typical Chinese family, which is an association of expressive ties, a social exchange based on the need rule also follows the norm of reciprocity. In the proverb “Foster your children to prevent misery in old age and hoard grain to prevent dearth,” we can see that typical parents expect their children to repay parental care. Of course, in this type of reciprocal relationship, the amount and kinds of resources used in exchange are unlimited and the date of reciprocation is quite uncertain.

When rearing children, parents try their best to meet the apparent needs and expressed demands of their children and rarely take specific note of the resource values expended. When the children sense the need to reciprocate, at some unspecified date, they follow the rule of “do as much as you can; take as much as you need,” and one can hardly assign a definite value to the resource exchanges or find a way to measure their comparative values. As far as the date of reciprocity is concerned, it is variable and quite uncertain, depending on the actual situation of the parents and the children.

The social exchange of resources in mixed tie relationships according to the *renqing* rule also coincides with the norm of reciprocity, but the method and nature of reciprocity differ from those of the equity rule and the need rule. In Chinese society, the rule of “a favor for a favor, an attack for an attack” is chiefly applied in mixed-tie relationships (Wen 1982). Such relationships are not as unavoidable as those with expressive ties, but people with mixed ties are still not ready to part from each other if they fail to agree on a rule of equity.

In order to maintain the affective component in the mixed tie, the participants have to remember the principle that “etiquette requires reciprocity” and follow the rule that “if one gives you a peach, you should requite his favor with a plum.” Whenever a participant in this tie is struck by poverty, disease, or some other difficulty that demands timely help from the other tie member who has a desired resource at his disposal, the latter, taking into consideration the possible reciprocation that the former may provide in the future, will help the distressed party to a certain degree.

The Face and Favor model classifies interpersonal relationships into three categories: expressive tie, mixed tie, and instrument tie. Expressive and mixed ties are separated by a solid line, implying a relatively strong psychological boundary between them. It is very difficult for an outsider to become a family member. Instrumental ties are separated from mixed ties by a dotted line, implying that the process of *la guanxi* (seeking *guanxi*) may enable a person with instrumental ties to penetrate the relatively weak psychological boundary and transform the relationship into a mixed tie.

Viewed from the perspective of symbolic interactionism, interpersonal relationships are not unchangeable. After a period of social interaction, strangers or two parties with instrumental ties may come to share mixed ties; similarly, two parties with mixed ties may evolve into a competitive relationship or fighting between enemies. Even a couple with expressive ties may become incompatible, decide to divorce, and become strangers henceforth. These changes can be regarded as emergent properties of a relationship.

Conclusion

Based on the four relational models of social life proposed by Fiske (1991), this chapter critically reviewed the social exchange theories, equity theory, and justice theories constructed by Western social scientists. It then argued that Hwang’s (1987) theoretical model of Face and Favor was constructed on the universal deep structure

of human minds and their social relationships. If *renqing* rule is viewed as a special cause of equality rule, then it should be a formal theory that can be applied to various cultures.

This is a very important argument which should be elaborated in terms of philosophy of science. As I indicated in Chapter 2, Heidegger (1966) distinguished humans' ways of thinking into two types: originative thinking and metaphysical thinking. Metaphysical thinking is also termed as thinking which has been used by scientists in constructing scientific microworlds.

According to Heidegger (1974), the metaphysical thinking can only be proceeded on the principle of ground, which means that everything must have a ground for its existence. It originated from the Greek word *axioma*. In ancient Greek, *axioma* means the most valuable and fundamental ground of existence which is the *physis* or natural state of being. Its value comes from the thing itself, as opposed to be given by human beings.

Since Leibniz (1646–1716) translated the term *axioma* as *principle of ground*, its meaning has been gradually changed to acquire a modern connotation: it means the first proposition for a system of propositions. In order to judge whether a proposition is true, a ground should be provided for the judgment. Nevertheless, the *principle of ground* itself is a proposition, too. Then, what is the *ground* for the *principle of ground*?

If a system of propositions has been constructed on the ground of nature (*physis*), it might be robust for examination. Nevertheless, if its *principle of ground* is an artificial one, the system may suffer from a crisis of infinite regress.

As it has been shown in this chapter, most social exchanges and justice theories of Western social psychology have been constructed on the presumption of individualism, which implies only an interpersonal relationship of instrumental tie or market pricing, and may suffer from a crisis of infinite regress. In contrast, the Face and Favor model has incorporated all four elementary forms of social relationship; theories constructed on the presumption of relationalism might be universal and more robust for empirical testing.

Hence the Face and Favor model is supposed to be universal and can be applied to any culture, why has *renqing* rule been emphasized particularly in Chinese society? We have to trace the Confucian cultural tradition in order to answer this question. In the next chapter, I will analyze the inner structure of Confucian classics with reference to the Face and Favor model.

References

- Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2). NY: Academic.
- Bales, R. F. (1958). *Task roles and social roles in problem-solving groups*. In E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), *Readings in social psychology* (3rd. ed., pp. 396-413). NY: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
- Berkowitz, L., & Walster, E. (Eds.). (1976). *Equity theory: Toward a general theory of social interaction. Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 9*. NY: Academic.

- Benjamin, L. S. (1974). Structural analysis of social behavior. *Psychological Review*, 81, 392–425.
- Blau, P. (1955). *The dynamics of bureaucracy: A study of interpersonal relations in two government agencies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Blau, P. (1964). *Exchange and power in social life*. New York: Wiley.
- Chuang, Y. C. (1980). A comparative study of credit association: An anthropological examination (in Chinese). *Thought and Speech*, 18(3).
- Clark, M. S., & Mills, J. (1979). Interpersonal attraction in exchange and communal relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 12–24.
- Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity equality and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis of distributive justice? *Journal of Social Issues*, 31, 137–149.
- Emerson, R. M. (1976). Social exchange theory. In A. Inkeles (Ed.), *Annual review of sociology* (pp. 335–362). CA: Annual Review.
- Emerson, R. (1981). Social exchange. In M. Rosenberg & R. Turner (Eds.), *Social psychology: Sociological perspectives*. New York: Basic Books.
- Engels, F. (1880/1959). Socialism: Utopian and scientific. In L. S. Feuer (Ed.), *Marx and Engels: Basic writings on politics and philosophy*. NY: Doubleday.
- Fiske, A. P. (1991). *Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations*. New York: The Free Press.
- Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of social life: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. *Psychological Review*, 99, 689–723.
- Fleishman, E. H., Harris, E. F., & Brutt, H. E. (1955). *Leadership and supervision in industry*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Frazer, J. G. (1906/1919). *The golden bough: A study in magic and religion*. London: Macmillan.
- Foa, E. B., & Foa, U. G. (1976). Resource theory of social exchange. In J. S. Thibaut, J. Spence, & R. Carson (Eds.), *Contemporary topics in social psychology*. Momstown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- Foa, E. B., & Foa, U. G. (1980). Resource theory: Interpersonal behavior in exchange. In K. J. Gerger, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H. Willis (Eds.), *Social exchange: Advances in theory and research*. New York: Plenum.
- Foa, U. G., & Foa, E. B. (1974). *Societal structures of the mind*. Charles C. Thomas: Springfield, IL.
- Fried, M. H. (1969). *The fabric of Chinese society: A study of the social life of a Chinese County seat*. NY: Octagon.
- Greenberg, J., & Cohen, R. L. (1982). Why justice? normative and instrumental interpretations. In J. Greenberg & R. L. Cohen (Eds.), *Equity and justice in social behavior* (pp. 437–467). New York: Academic.
- Gouldner, A. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review*, 25, 1976–1977.
- Halpin, A. W. (1966). *Theory and research in administration*. NY: Macmillan.
- Homans, G. (1950). *The human group*. New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich.
- Homans, G. (1961). *Social behavior: Its elementary forms*. NY: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Husemann, L. P., & Levinger, G. (1976). Incremental exchange theory: A formal model for progression in dyadic social interaction. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.), *Equity theory: Toward a general theory of social interaction. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 9*. NY: Academic.
- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), 945–974.
- Jacobs, B. J. (1979). A preliminary model of particularistic ties in Chinese political alliances: 'Renqing' and 'guanxi' in a rural Taiwanese township. *China Quarterly*, 78, 237–273.
- Kao, C. S. (1989). *Restriction and development of Taiwanese enterprise (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Linking Books.
- Kao, C. S., & Chen, C. H. (1989). Social order for the operation of Taiwanese enterprise: *renqing*, *guanxi*, and law (in Chinese). *Society and Economy*, 3 & 4, 151–165.

- Kapferer, B. (1969). Norms and the manipulation of relationship in a work context. In J. C. Mitchell (Ed.), *Social networks in urban situation* (pp. 181–240). Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Kayser, E., & Schwinger, T. (1982). A theoretical analysis of the relationship among individual justice concept, Layman's psychology and distribution decision'. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 12(1), 47–52.
- Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). *Interpersonal relations: A theory of interdependence*. New York: Wiley.
- Lee, L. (1984). Sequences in separation: A framework for investigating endings of the personal (romantic) relationship. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 1, 49–73.
- Lerner, M. (1981). The justice motive in human relations: Some thoughts on what we know and need to know about justice. In M. Lerner & S. C. Lerner (Eds.), *The justice motive in social behavior: Adapting to times of scarcity and change* (pp. 11–35). New York: Plenum.
- Lerner, M. J., & Whitehead, L. A. (1980). Procedural justice viewed in the context of justice motive theory. In G. Mikula (Ed.), *Justice and social interaction* (pp. 219–256). New York: Springer.
- Lerner, M. J. (1975). The just motive in social behavior: Introduction. *Journal of Social Issues*, 31, 1–19.
- Levi-Strauss, C. (1969). *The elementary structures of kinship*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Leventhal, G. S. (1976a). The distribution of reward and resources in groups and organizations. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 9) (pp. 91–131). New York: Academic Press.
- Leventhal G. S. (1976) "Fairness in social relationships." In: J.W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. Carson (Eds.). *Contemporary topics in social psychology*. pp. 211–239.
- Li YY (1993) The traditional Chinese worldview and modern enterprise behavior (in Chinese). Hong Kong, Suzhou: The 4th Conference on Modernization and Chinese Culture. October 9–18, 1993.
- Malinowski, B. (1922). *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mauss, M. (1954/1984). *The Gift*. Translated by Ian Cunnison. London: Cohen and West.
- Mitchell, J. C. (1969). The concept and use of social networks. In J. C. Mitchell (Ed.), *Social networks in urban situation* (pp. 41–50). Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Peng H. Z. (1989). The proprietor's guanxi and its transition in Taiwanese enterprise (in Chinese). Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Tunghai University.
- Piaget, J. (1965). *The moral judgment of the child*. New York: Free Press.
- Popper, K. (1972). *Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Reis, H. T. (1984). The multidimensionality of justice. In R. Folger (Ed.), *The sense of injustice: Social psychological perspectives*. NY: Plenum Press.
- Schaefer, E. S. (1959). A circumplex model for maternal behavior. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 59, 226–235.
- Schwinger, T. (1986). The need principle of distributive justice. In H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. Cohen, & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Justice in Social Relation* (pp. 211–225). New York: Plenum.
- Shapiro, E. G. (1975). The effect of expectations of future interaction on reward allocations in dyads: Equity or equality? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 31, 873–880.
- Stogdill, R. M. (1974). *Handbook of leadership: A survey of theory and research*. NY: The Free Press.
- Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). *The social psychology of groups*. New York: Wiley.
- Thibaut, J. W., & Walker, W. (1975). *Procedural justice: A psychological analysis*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Walster, E., Walster, G. W., & Berscheid, E. (1978). *Equity: Theory and research*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

- Wen, C. I. (1982). Repay and revenge: An analysis of social exchange behavior. In K. S. Yang & C. I. Wen (Eds.), *The sinicization of social and behavioral science research in China (in Chinese)* (pp. 311–44). Taipei: Academy Sinica.
- Yang, L. S. (1957). The concept of pao as a basis for social relations in China. In J. K. Fairbank (Ed.), *Chinese thought and institutions* (pp. 291–309). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Yeh, C. C. (1987/1991). *Reflection on some assumptions of sociology (in Chinese). Socio-logic of Institutionalization*. Taipei: Tungta.
- Young, John Aubrey, (1971). *Interpersonal Networks and Economic Behavior in a Chinese Market Town*. Ph. D. Thesis, Stanford University, Stanford.

Chapter 5

The Deep Structure of Confucianism

Abstract Following the principle of cultural psychology: “one mind, many mentalities” (Shweder et al. 1998), this chapter used Hwang’s (Am J Sociol 92(4), 944–974, 1987) Face and Favor model as a framework to analyze Confucianism and to explain how it accounts for the ethics of ordinary people, i.e., the ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–property, which emphasizes the principle of respecting the superior as procedural justice and the principle of favoring the intimate as distributive justice. Confucian conception of destiny requests everyone to cultivate oneself with respect to humanity, while it endows scholars with a mission to benefit the world with the way of humanity and urges them to utilize their knowledge to serve the community beyond their family. Both Confucian ethics for scholars and for ordinary people are supposed to be ideal which can be used as cultural theories for studying people’s mentalities on the psychological level in Chinese society.

Keywords Confucian conception of destiny • Ethics for ordinary people • Ethics for scholars • Self-cultivation • Way of humanity

In Chap. 4 of this book, the author critically reviewed Western social psychology social exchange theories and justice theories and explained how he constructed the theoretical model of Face and Favor on the basis of four fundamental relational models of social life. The author argued the formal theoretical mode meets the advocate of cultural psychology: “One mind, many mentalities; universalism without uniformity” (Shweder et al. 1998, p. 871). Specifically speaking, it represents the deep structure of social relationship in human mind. People living in different societies may develop different mentalities on the basis of this deep structure in responding to their sociocultural environments.

Under the influence of traditional Confucian culture, many Chinese (especially intellectuals) have developed the so-called Confucian mentality. In this chapter, in

order to elaborate the characteristics of Confucian mentality, I will analyze the internal structure of Confucian thought with a reference to the theoretical model of Face and Favor.

In Chap. 2 of this book, Vygotsky's (1986) theory of cultural psychology was cited to illustrate that materials taught by teachers in school may become "language tools" for students to solve daily life problems. Before the examination for civil service was formally abolished during the Qing Dynasty in 1905, in Chinese society the Confucian classics had been taught in old-style private or public schools. The sages' wisdom became the language tools used by students to deal with civil examinations; it could also enable the students to play various language games with others in the lifeworld.

With the abolishment of civil service examinations and the rapid changes within Chinese society caused by the impact of Western culture, the importance of Confucian thought for most Chinese people diminished accordingly. However, language is the carrier of culture. So long as the Chinese use their language, the wisdom and values of traditional Confucian culture might continue to influence their life-world behavior. In order to illustrate Chinese people's mentality within Confucian society, the author will take Confucian classics as materials for analyzing the inner structure of Confucian thought from the perspective of social psychology.

The deep structure of Confucianism is composed of five interrelated parts: conceptions of destiny, a model of mind, ethics for ordinary people, practical self-cultivation methods, and ethics for scholars. The Confucian Way of Humanity consists of two aspects: ethics for ordinary people, and ethics for scholars. Because Confucians believe that the Way of Humanity corresponds to the Way of Heaven, every person is obligated to practice ethics for ordinary people through self-cultivation. Confucians endowed scholars with the added mission of benefiting the world through the Way of Humanity. In this chapter, those components of Confucianism will be elaborated on one by one. Subsequently, their positions in Chinese cultural tradition will be discussed in terms of the worldwide model of equilibrium (Lee 1994a, 1994b).

Confucian Conceptions of Destiny

Throughout history, people of different cultures have conceived of various world-views. As I pointed out in my article *The discontinuity hypothesis of modernity and constructive realism* (Hwang 2000), a worldview helps to answer the questions that may be encountered in human existence, such as Where do I come from? Why I am in this life situation? Why do I suffer? And how do I find salvation? (Walsh & Middleton 1984). These questions arise as people begin to contemplate the meaning of life as they experience life changes such as the birth of children, aging, disease, or the death of loved ones. Answers to these questions determine one's ultimate concerns, and establish one's life goals.

Most philosophies that have had an impact on a given culture are established upon the presumptions of a specific cosmology, and provide answers to questions concerning the meaning of life. These philosophies thus have profound influence on the ultimate concerns of that culture's members. Confucianism is no exception. Confucian scholars term worldviews and the various questions they deal with *conceptions of destiny*.

In this section, I explore the ultimate concerns of Confucian thinking. After reviewing four approaches to destiny, I will focus on specific aspects of Confucian understanding, and the relationship between righteousness and destiny. The final part of this section will explore the cultural standards of values that shape the Confucian understanding of righteousness.

Four Approaches to Destiny

Destiny is defined as the vicissitudes individuals experience during their existence in this universe. Human understanding of personal destiny can be categorized into four theoretical conceptualizations (Lao 1968; Tang 1986): destiny is controlled by God, destiny is determined by the laws of nature, destiny can be transcended, and destiny is partially determined by biology and partially fulfilled through the practice of moral principles.

In the first conceptualization, humans conceive of a transcendent God who is the source of all human values and controls human destiny. Humankind should thus endeavor to seek and carry out the will of this God. This belief can be seen in the primitive religion of the Shang and Chou Dynasties in ancient China as well as in Christianity during the Middle Ages in Europe. People with this belief may convince themselves that they are agents of God's will, and that therefore no secular power can stop them from fulfilling their mission in life. They set about their missions without fear or hesitation.

In the second conceptualization, humans admit it is impossible to defy one's destiny, but do not perceive the existence of a sovereign master of the universe. Destiny is only the necessary and inevitable occurrence of facts. Human beings should try to understand the essential laws of facts and act accordingly. An example would be the rise of rationalism after the fourteenth-century Renaissance in Europe. Religious authority was greatly reduced during the Religious Reformation of the sixteenth century. As a consequence of disenchantment with the world, humanism was promoted. From the eighteenth century on, materialism, mechanicalism, and empirical science arose on the basis of this standpoint. During the Warring States period in China, Hsun Tze (289 BC to 288 BC) also adopted this viewpoint. This perspective acknowledges that an individual's destiny is subject to objective limitations. However, the limitations come neither from a sovereign master nor from the individual's self-awareness, but from the laws of nature.

The third conceptualization is based on the conclusion that human destiny cannot be influenced through individual self-awareness. Human beings should learn to

recognize destiny so that they can transcend it. For example, Buddhist teachings propose that one should accept the influence of nature. In Buddhism, believers are advised to pursue a state of Nirvana. According to a Chinese Taoist saying:

Hence a gusty wind cannot last all morning, and a sudden downpour cannot last all day. Who is it that produces these? Heaven and earth. If even heaven and earth cannot go on forever, much less can humans. That is why one follows the Way.¹ The Way never acts yet nothing is left undone.²

The fourth conceptualization of destiny is that of Confucius and Mencius. They argued that as a biological being, humans are bound to encounter the inevitable destiny of birth, aging, disease, and the end of physical life. On the other hand, as beings with a conscience and self-awareness, in order to fulfill their heavenly ordained mission or responsibility humans must actively put into practice moral principles that exceed personal interest.

Separation of Destiny from Righteousness

Confucius assigned events beyond human power to the domain of destiny, and what humans can master consciously to the realm of righteousness. Only through righteousness can a person fulfill his individual destiny. Consequently, Confucius felt that humans should focus only on the earthly affairs that they had the power to influence, and not concern themselves with supernatural events over which they have no power. “Give yourself earnestly to the duty to establish the standard of right and wrong in the human community, for it is earthly affairs that one should first learn to handle well.”³ Confucius acknowledged supernatural events, but did not dwell on them. His reasoning was that, “While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?” and “While you do not know life, how can you know about death?”⁴ “Humans should respect spiritual beings, but keep aloof from them.”⁵

Mencius maintained the conception of destiny that Confucius originated. He also believed that human nature is determined by heaven. He believed that only when people spare no effort in fulfilling themselves can they obtain true knowledge of their own heaven-ordained natures:

He who has exhausted all his mental constitution knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows heaven. To preserve one’s mental constitution, and nourish one’s nature, is the way to serve heaven. When neither a premature death nor long life causes a person any double-mindedness, he waits in the cultivation of his personal character for whatever issue; this is the way in which he establishes his heaven-ordained being.⁶

¹*Tao Te Ching*, Chap. 23.

²*Ibid*, Chap. 37.

³*Ibid*, Yung Yey: Chap. XX.

⁴*Ibid*, Hsien Tsin: Chap. XI.

⁵*Ibid*, Yung Yey: Chap. XX.

⁶*The Works of Mencius*, Tsin Sin, Part I: Chap. I.

People cannot necessarily impact their own personal circumstances such as time of death, poverty, or prosperity. They should therefore constantly strive to focus their mental energies on the practice of righteousness to develop their own heaven-ordained natures.

Mencius attributed a person's encounters with ease or adversity, or blessings or misfortunes, to destiny. However, what happens to a person may or may not be part of the person's ordinance of heaven. That is to say, the consequence of fulfilling moral duties is attributed to the ordinance of heaven, while the misfortunes that occur as a consequence of a person's self-abuse and self-abandonment is not attributed to the appointment of heaven.⁷

In the next section, I explore the cultural standards of values that shape the Confucian understanding of the role of righteousness. To provide context for a discussion of these standards, I first review Confucian scholars' ideas about human nature in the pre-Chin period.

Constructing the Way of Humanity by Understanding the Way of Heaven

The cosmology embraced by Confucians contains a view of the universe passed down from the Shang and Chou Dynasties ancient China. This view is best depicted in the Ten Wings (Appendix I) of the *I-Ching* (Wei 1968).

Vast is the 'great and originating power' indicated by *Khien*! All things owe to it their beginning. It contains all the meaning belonging to (the name) heaven. The clouds move and the rain is disturbed; various things appear in their developed forms. Complete is the 'great and originating capacity' indicated by *Khwan*! All things owe to it their birth. It obediently receives the influences of Heaven. *Khwan*, in its largeness, supports and contains all things. Its excellent capacity matches the unlimited power of *Khien*.⁸

This cosmology manifests three main characteristics. First, it assumes that the universe itself has infinite capacity for procreation. The endless flow and changes of the "myriad things in the universe" are caused by the encounter and interaction between Heaven and Earth. This understanding is not like the Christian view in the West, which sets aside a divine entity that surpasses the universe and created everything in it. Second, it assumes the change of all things in the universe to be cyclic.

The way of Heaven and Earth is characterized by its consistent change. Everything is going forth and coming back, its end is followed by a new beginning. The sun and the moon are always moving and shining in the sky, the four seasons are changing to foster the harvest, and the sages are consistently practicing their way to change the world. The nature of everything in the universe is revealed by watching its consistent change.⁹

The third point that this cosmology assumes is that all things in the universe have endless vitality. "The grand virtue of Heaven and Earth is to breed in an endless

⁷*Ibid*, Tsin Sin PartI: Chap. II.

⁸*I Ching*, Appendix I.

⁹*I Ching, Heng*, Chap. 32.

succession.” *Wei Chi*, the last hexagram in the *I-Ching*, emphasizes that “from an end there comes a new beginning.” The ideas of circularity such as “when things are at their worst, they will surely mend” and “adversity, after reaching its extremity, is followed by felicity,” are readily apparent in this cosmology.

Confucius was obviously influenced by the view of the universe outlined in the *I-Ching*. He expressed his thoughts in a conversation with Duke I of Lu.

Duke I asked: ‘Why should a *jun zi* (true gentleman) follow the Way of Heaven?’ Confucius said: ‘Because of its ceaselessness. For instance, the sun and moon circle around from east to west, this is the Way of Heaven. Everything in the universe always follows its rule of change, this is the Way of Heaven. Accomplishing everything without doing anything, this is the Way of Heaven. The accomplished thing has its significant feature, this is the Way of Heaven.’¹⁰

Inspired by natural phenomena such as the alternate illumination of the sun and the moon, the cycle of the four seasons, the gush of water from deep pools, and the ceaseless vibrant flow of rivers and streams, Confucian scholars of the pre-Chin period made the following insights: “To entire sincerity there belongs ceaselessness.”¹¹ “Without sincerity, there would be nothing.”¹² “It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can transform.”¹³ Based on these insights, Confucian scholars concluded that “sincerity is the Way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the Way of Humanity.”¹⁴ The order and reason within the human heart correspond to the order and reason in nature (Liu 1989/1992). Once entire sincerity is achieved, the nature of human beings and the Way of Humanity, which derive from the Way of Heaven, will emerge. Therefore,

It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist under heaven, and only he who can give its full development to his nature. Once able to develop his own nature, he can do the same for the nature of others. Once able to give sincerity’s full development to the nature of others, he can give their full development to the natures of animals and things. Once able to give full development to the natures of creatures and things, he can assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth. Once able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth, he may with Heaven and Earth form a union.¹⁵

This analogous deduction is not the type of theoretical reasoning Kant proposed (Kant 1781, 1788). It cannot be proven by any scientific method in the empirical world. It is a kind of practical reasoning that is specific to Confucianism, and sustains individuals in carrying out the Confucian way of personhood. According to this deductive reasoning,

¹⁰*Li Chi*, Chap. 27; Ai Gong Wen.

¹¹*Ibid*, Chap. XXVI.

¹²*Ibid*, Chap. XXV.

¹³*Ibid*, Chap. XXIII.

¹⁴*The Golden Mean*, Chap. XX.

¹⁵*The Golden Mean*, Chap. XXII

Heaven exists within humans. As humans bring out their internal virtue, they bring to light the Way of Heaven. Hence, although a human's life is limited, it may be channeled into the infinite and participate with Heaven and Earth (Liu 1989/1992).

Confucians believed that the Way of Humanity as revealed by their sages has a spiritual essence corresponding to the Way of Heaven. As biological organisms, individuals are destined by their congenital conditions. However, as human beings with moral awareness, they are able and obligated to practice the Confucian Way of Humanity, which corresponds to the Way of Heaven. Each person is endowed with the heavenly ordained mission of applying the Way of Humanity through the mind of benevolence, a key component of the Confucian ethical system. The next section of this chapter explores this component, the Confucian model of Mind.

The Confucian Model of Mind

In my book *Confucianism and East Asian Modernization* (Hwang 1988), I constructed the Confucian model of Mind (Fig. 5.1) through integration of Confucius', Mencius', and Hsun Tze's viewpoints on human nature. The model I constructed does not represent the ideas about human nature of any one of them alone. Each of them had a model of *consciousness* in human nature, while the Confucian model of Mind I constructed is a model of *unconsciousness*. My model is a second-degree interpretation proposed as a social scientist after integrating these three scholars' ideas, as opposed to their own first degree of interpretations of human nature (Schutz 1962).

The mind as understood by Confucians of the pre-Chin period has a bi-level existence. The *mind of discernment* observed by Hsun Tze is the cognitive mind that an individual possesses as a biological organism in nature (Bao 1986). The *mind of benevolence* (*ren shin*) is endowed with the ethical system promoted by Confucius and Mencius of *ren* (benevolence), *yi* (righteousness), and *li* (propriety). The two parts of this section explore these two aspects of mind in Confucian thinking.

The Mind of Discernment

Hsun Tze conceptualized humans as biological organisms, and human nature as the innate tendencies of biological individuals (Tsai 1984). The mind Hsun Tze spoke of is capable of cognitive functioning and thinking. For example, Hsun Tze said, "The mind is established in the central cavity to control the five senses—this is what is meant by the natural ruler (*T'ien-jiun*)."¹⁶ "When the mind selects from among the emotions by which it is moved, this is called reflection."¹⁷ "When my thoughts are unclear, then I cannot decide whether a thing is so or is not so."¹⁸

¹⁶*Hsun Tze*: Concerning heaven.

¹⁷*Ibid*, On the rectification of terms.

¹⁸*Ibid*, The removal of prejudices.




Fig. 5.1 Confucian ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety for ordinary people (adapted from Hwang 1995, 233)

In my Confucian model of Mind, I indicated that individuals’ psychological processes operate through the mind of discernment. In the figure, a diagonal corresponding to *ren* (benevolence) diagonally bisects the rectangle denoting *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships). The white portion of the rectangle represents the instrumental component of relationships and the mind of discernment. As a biological organism, humans are born with a variety of innate desires, such as “the fondness of the eyes for beauty, or of the mouth for pleasant flavors, or of the mind of gain, or of the bones and skin for the enjoyment of ease.”¹⁹ “[When] hungry he desires to eat; when cold he desires to be warm; when toiling he desires to rest; he wants what is beneficial and hates what is injurious.”²⁰ An important function of the mind of discernment, therefore, is to contemplate the proper ways of social interaction in an instrumental manner in order to acquire the resources needed to satisfy the individual’s various (biological) desires.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, On honor and shame.

²⁰ *Ibid*, That the nature is evil.

From the perspective of symbolic interactionism, instrumental behaviors based on personal desires such as the love of beauty, sound, flavors, and gain, reflect the impulse that the subjective self tends to follow. When humans act impulsively, social order may fall apart, so Confucians of the pre-Chin period set up principles of righteousness and propriety and framed laws and regulations.²¹ They established the Confucian ethical system of *ren-yi-li* and hoped to pass it on to individuals through the agents of socialization. The ethical system of *ren-yi-li* is employed as a regulation for interpersonal interaction in order “to straighten and ornament innate feelings and correct them, to tame and change those same feelings and to guide them.”²²

In Fig. 5.1, a solid line and a dotted line divide the rectangle denoting *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships) into three portions. These lines indicate that a continuous dialectical process exists between the impulses of the biological self and the social demands on the active self during interpersonal interaction. This dialectical process enables the entity to adopt the most appropriate rule for social exchange and act in accordance with propriety, so that the self may “go forth in the way of moral government and in agreement with reason.”²³ Hsun Tze maintained that this dialectical process is the function of the mind of discernment.

The Mind of Benevolence

Confucians of the pre-Chin period established their ethical system by constructing the Way of Humanity through an understanding of the Way of Heaven. According to the Confucian model of Mind, the mind of benevolence embodies the Way of Humanity (the arrangement of social relationships). This is illustrated in the following passage from the Ten Wings of the *I-Ching*:

Heaven and Earth exist; all [material] things exist. After all [material] things existed, there came male and female. From the existence of male and female there came husband and wife. From husband and wife there came father and son. From father and son there came ruler and minister. From ruler and minister there came high and low. When [the distinction of] high and low existed, the arrangements of propriety and righteousness came into existence.²⁴

This way of reasoning, when perceived in terms of Levy-Bruhl’s (1910/1966) concept as discussed in my article *The discontinuity hypothesis of modernity and constructive realism* (Hwang 2000), fully reflects the primitive thinking of mysterious participative law. In other words, in the *I-Ching* human beings are conceptualized as one of the myriad things in the world. The universe was composed of Heaven and Earth, corresponding to *yang* and *yin*. When males and females came into existence creating a social world, their unification gave birth to a second generation,

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*I-Ching*: The Great appendix, Section 1.

providing grounds for constructing social relationships between father and son, and sovereign and subordinates. The arrangement of social relationships between self and others (the Way of Humanity) therefore corresponds to the Way of Heaven.

The shaded section of the rectangle in Fig. 5.1 represents the expressive component of relationships. Here, the mind of benevolence moderates the expressive component and acts as the individual's moral conscience. It is exercised during one's interactions in various relationships. The practice of the mind of benevolence is proportional to the intimacy of the *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships with others).

Guidance for this *guanxi* is provided by the Confucian ethical system (*ren-yi-li*), which consists of two parts: ethics for ordinary people, and ethics for scholars. In the next section, I describe Confucian ethics for ordinary people, leaving description of ethics for scholars for later section.

Ethics for Ordinary People: The Ethical System of Benevolence–Righteousness–Propriety (*ren-yi-li*)

According to Confucian understanding, as biological organisms, humans are born with a number of innate desires:

There belongs to it, even at his birth, the love of gain, and as actions are in accordance with this, contentions and robberies grow up, and self-denial and yielding to others are not to be found; there belong to it envy and dislike, and as actions are in accordance with these, violence and injuries spring up, and self-devotedness and faith are not to be found; there belong to it the desires of the ears and the eyes, leading to the love of sounds and beauty, and as the actions are in accordance with these, lewdness and disorder spring up, and righteousness and propriety, with their various orderly displays, are not to be found. It thus appears, that to follow human nature and yield obedience to its feelings will assuredly conduct to contentions and robberies, to the violation of the duties belonging to everyone's lot, and the confounding of all distinctions, till the issue will be in a state of savagism.²⁵

Because of the innate desires of humans as biological organisms, Confucians of the pre-Chin period argued that humans should be regulated by the benevolence–righteousness–propriety (*ren-yi-li*) ethical system. Among classical Confucian works, the following passage in *The Golden Mean* best depicts the relationships among benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), and propriety (*li*) in Confucian ethics:

Benevolence (*ren*) is the characteristic attribute of personhood. The first priority of its expression is showing affection to those closely related to us. Righteousness (*yi*) means appropriateness; respecting the superior is its most important rule. Loving others according to who they are, and respecting superiors according to their ranks gives rise to the forms and distinctions of propriety (*li*) in social life.²⁶

²⁵*Ibid*, That the nature is evil.

²⁶*The Golden Mean*: Chapter XX.

The notion of loving others according to who they are and respecting superiors according to their rank indicates an emphasis on the differential order of interpersonal relationships. The above citation from *The Golden Mean* not only demonstrates the interrelated concepts of benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), and propriety (*li*), but also implies the dimensions along which Confucians assess role relationships in social interaction.

Specifically, Confucians propose that in interacting with other people, one should begin with an assessment of the role relationship between oneself and the other along two cognitive dimensions: intimacy/distance and superiority/inferiority. The former refers to the closeness of the relationship while the latter indicates the relative superior/inferior positions of the two parties involved. Once the assessment is made, favoring people with whom one has a close relationship can be termed *benevolence* (*ren*), respecting those for whom respect is required by the relationship is called *righteousness* (*yi*), and acting according to social norms is *propriety* (*li*).

This proposition of *The Golden Mean* has an important implication when examined with reference to justice theory in Western psychology, which divides the concepts of justice in human society into two categories: procedural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice refers to the steps that should be followed by members of a group to determine methods of resource distribution. Distributive justice is the particular method of resource distribution that is accepted by group members (Leventhal 1976, 1980).

According to Confucian thinking, procedural justice in social interaction should follow the principle of respecting the superior. The person who occupies the superior position should play the role of resource allocator. The resource allocator should then follow the principle of favoring the intimate in choosing an appropriate rule of resource distribution or social exchange. Righteousness (*yi*) in the Confucian model of Mind (Fig. 5.1), as well as the rule for social exchange in the psychological process of resource allocator refer to distributive justice.

As pointed out in my book *Confucianism and East Asian Modernization* (Hwang 1988), Confucian ethics are essentially status ethics. For ordinary people in society, Confucianism provides certain cultural guidance. However, scholars who are endowed with additional social and cultural responsibilities, are placed under higher demands by Confucian ethics. This section explores Confucian ideas of procedural and distributive justice with respect to Confucian ethics for ordinary people. Confucian ethics for scholars are examined in a separate section.

Procedural Justice: The Principle of Respecting the Superior

Confucians consider the relationships between father and son, sovereign and subordinate, husband and wife, elder brother and younger, and friends to be the most fundamental relationships in society, and have termed them *the five cardinal relationships* (*wu lun*). According to Confucianism, each pair of relationships in the five cardinal relationships has an appropriate type of interaction in accordance with the

relative superior/inferior positions as well as with the intimacy/distance of the relationship. In fact, it is along these two dimensions that Confucian scholars of the pre-Chin period evaluate the role characteristics of these five relationships, and propose the most appropriate ethics for each of them. For example, Mencius maintains:

Between father and son, there should be affection: between sovereign and subordinate, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between elder brother and younger, a proper order; and between friends, friendship.²⁷

Among these five dyadic relationships, Mencius most emphasized those between father and son, and between sovereign and subordinate: “In the family, there is the relation of father and son; abroad, there is the relation of prince and minister. These are the two important relations among men.”²⁸ These two relationships provide examples of the way Mencius determined the various ethical rules for different role relationships. For a son, his father is his most intimate relationship along the dimension of intimacy/distance, and also is his senior along the dimension of superiority/inferiority. As benevolence is the most highly valued virtue in Confucianism, Mencius advocated affection between father and son. For the person who is in the role of a subordinate, the sovereign falls on the far end of the dimensional continuum of intimacy/distance, as well as the far end along the dimension superiority/inferiority. As there is no intimacy to be attended to, Mencius proposed only righteousness between sovereign and subordinate. Similar principles may be applied in determining the various ethics for the other relationships.

The Confucians set up appropriate ethical principles for a given role relationship according to superior/inferior positions and the intimacy/distance of the relationship. This system can be interpreted in terms of Western psychology’s justice theory. When a person begins a social interaction with others, the dimensions of intimacy/distance and superiority/inferiority concerning the relationship between the two parties should be carefully considered in order to achieve procedural justice and distributive justice, respectively. After an assessment of superior/inferior status in the relationship, the principle of respecting the superior should be adhered to, thus determining who should play the role of resource allocator:

What are the things which humans consider righteous (*yi*)? Kindness on the part of the father, and filial duty on that of the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and obedience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of the husband, and submission on that of the wife; kindness on the part of the elders, and deference on that of juniors: *benevolence* on the part of the ruler, and loyalty on that of the minister. These are the ten things that humans consider to be right.²⁹

Although the interaction between every pair of the five cardinal relationships should be based on benevolence (*ren*), the values and ethics emphasized in these relationships differ due to their various role functions.

²⁷*The Works of Mencius*, T’āng Wān Kung, Part I: Chap. IV.

²⁸*Ibid*, Kung-sun Ch’āu, part II: Chap. II.

²⁹*Li Chi*, Chapter 9: Li Yun.

Specifically, the values that should be most cherished and emphasized in the relationships between father and son, sovereign and subordinate, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, and between friends, are respectively affection, righteousness, attention to separate functions, a proper order, and friendship. Except for the relationship between friends, the relationships are all vertical ones between superiors and inferiors. There are differences in status within each pair of the first four relationships as well as in the power available to them. For instance, the conduct of father and son should accord with the standard of righteousness where the father is kind and the son is filial. When the “ten things” do not exist, conduct is considered unrighteous.

These requirements do not constitute an exhaustive list of Confucian standards for righteousness (*yi*). For example, when one breaks a promise to friends, one will also be considered unrighteous. The reason the ten things of righteousness are specifically defined in *Li Chi* is that there exists a differential order within the five pairs of roles involved. In accordance with the idea of the ten things of righteousness (*yi*), persons who assume the roles of father, elder brother, husband, elders, or ruler should make decisions in line with the principles of kindness, gentleness, righteousness, kindness, and benevolence, respectively. And for those who assume the roles of son, younger brother, wife, juniors, or minister, the principles of filial duty, obedience, submission, deference, loyalty, and obedience to the instructions of the former group apply. The superior/inferior and sovereign/subordinate aspects of the relationships between the two groups are apparent, with the former being dominant and the latter subservient.

Distributive Justice and the Principle of Favoring the Intimate

After considering a role relationship along the dimension of superiority/inferiority, resource allocators should then choose an appropriate rule for exchange or resource distribution. As illustrated in the Confucian model of Mind, the Confucian ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety is used to make this choice. Proper assessment of the intimacy/distance of the relationship corresponds to benevolence (*ren*), choosing an appropriate exchange rule according to closeness of the relationship corresponds to righteousness (*yi*), and acting properly after evaluating the loss and gain of exchange corresponds to propriety (*li*).

In the Confucian model of Mind in Fig. 5.1, a diagonal bisects the rectangle corresponding to benevolence (*ren*). The shaded section represents the expressive component, and the white portion represents the instrumental component. This division implies that the Confucian idea of benevolence contains the principle of favoring the intimate. Instead of treating everyone with equal affection, the intimacy of relationships is considered and affection given accordingly. The same rectangle denoting *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships) is also divided into three parts (expressive ties, mixed ties, and instrumental ties) by a solid line and a dotted line. These parts are proportional to the expressive component. The solid line separating expressive

ties within the family and mixed ties outside the family indicates a relatively impenetrable psychological boundary between family members and people outside the family. Different distributive justice or exchange rules are applicable to these two types of relationships during social interactions.

According to my theoretical model of Face and Favor (Hwang 1987), the relationships between father and son, husband and wife, and elder brother and younger are ruled by expressive ties. In these relationships, the need rule for social exchange should be adhered to, and people should try their best to satisfy the other party with all available resources. The relationship between friends makes use of mixed ties, and follows the *renqing* rule. Between the ruler and ordinary people, there is scarcely any direct interaction, and ordinary people often have little choice but to obey the ruler. Confucians did not set up specific ethical principles for strangers beyond the five cardinal relationships. When individuals want to acquire a particular resource from someone with whom they have instrumental ties, they tend to follow the equity rule and use instrumental rationality.

The Deep Structure of Benevolence–Righteousness–Propriety (ren–yi–li)

Our discussion so far is supported by various passages in classical Confucian works. Benevolence (*ren*) is recognized as the perfect virtue of the mind and the ontology of moral principles that exceed personal interest (Hwang 1988). Righteousness (*yi*) and propriety (*li*) are derivatives of benevolence (*ren*), and extend to other secondary moral rules. Together they constitute the complex ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety. All major interpersonal relationships in one’s lifetime should be arranged with reference to the deep structure of this ethical system. To illustrate the significant features of Confucian society, it is necessary to expound upon the structural relationships among the three core concepts of Confucianism: benevolence, righteousness, and propriety.

Benevolence: From the Intimate to the Distant

Confucius defined *benevolence* as “loving *all* men.”³⁰ He believed that a person who truly knows how to love all people can put himself in another’s position. “Wishing to be established himself, [he] seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.”³¹ Confucius knew very well it is not easy to love all people. When people try to express love or benevolence to others during

³⁰*The Analects*, Yen Yuan: Chap. XXII.

³¹*Ibid*, Yung Yey: Chap. XXVIII.

social interactions, they often have to use some of their own resources. As people possess only finite resources, it is not realistically possible to lavish infinite benevolence upon others.

Confucius seldom praised individuals for being benevolent (perfectly virtuous). When asked, “Is someone perfectly virtuous?” his response was either “I don’t know” or “How can we know that?” One of the main reasons for these answers is the difficulty of truly loving all people. When Tsze-kung asked Confucius whether a person could be called benevolent (perfectly virtuous) if that person “extensively [confers] benefits on other people, and [is] able to assist all,” Confucius answered, “Is such a human considered merely virtuous? He can almost be called a sage! Even Yâo and Shun are still striving to achieve this.”³²

Mencius maintained that to practice the virtue of benevolence, one should start with service to one’s parents.³³ “There has never been a benevolent person who neglected his parents.”³⁴ “Of services, which is the greatest? The service of parents is the greatest. There are many services, but the service of parents is the root of all others.”³⁵ Only after fulfilling the duty of serving their parents can people then practice the virtue of benevolence to others in the order of intimacy.

Confucius proposed that

a youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, respectful to his elders; [he] should be earnest and truthful; [he] should overflow in love to all and cultivate the friendship of the good.³⁶

These directions suggest a sequence for performing benevolence. Confucians perceived filial piety as the root of all benevolent actions. “In carrying out the virtue of benevolence, one should first [bend] one’s attention to what is radical.”³⁷ That is, people should practice filial piety and the service of their parents, and thereafter pursue other benevolent actions.

Righteousness: To Dwell in Benevolence and Pursue the Path of Righteousness

Mencius shared Confucius’ view on righteousness and provided the most elaborate account of all Confucian scholars of the pre-Chin period. He often put his teachings on benevolence and righteousness side by side, and believed that the judgment of righteousness should be based on the concept of benevolence, which he labeled dwelling in benevolence and pursuing the path of righteousness.

³²*Ibid*, Yung yey: Chap. XXVIII.

³³*The Works of Mencius*, Lî Lâu: Chap. XXVII.

³⁴*Ibid*, King Hui of Liang, Part I.

³⁵*Ibid*, Lî Lâu: Chap. XIX.

³⁶*The Analects*, Hsio R: Chap. VI.

³⁷*Ibid*, Hsio R: Chap. II.

Benevolence is the human mind, and righteousness is the human path. How lamentable is it to neglect the path and not pursue it, to lose this mind and not know to seek it again!³⁸ Benevolence is the tranquil habitation of humans, and righteousness is the straight path.³⁹

Mencius also agreed that the performance of benevolence and righteousness should begin within the family. “The richest fruit of benevolence is this, the service of one’s parents.”⁴⁰

Yang Chu, a contemporary of Mencius, promoted the competing idea of “every man for himself.” He said that though he might have benefited the whole kingdom by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it. Another philosopher, Mo Ti, proposed the idea of universal love, suggesting that one should love others’ fathers as one’s own. Mencius criticized them.

Now, Yang’s principle is “every man for himself,” which does not acknowledge the claims of the sovereign. Mo’s principle is “to love all equally,” which does not acknowledge the particular affection due to a father.⁴¹

Yang’s and Mo’s propositions are contradictory to the Confucian principles of having the mind dwell in benevolence and of the differential order of love. Mencius denounced both of them as beasts.

Although Confucians maintained the idea of the differential order of love, and believed that the exercise of the Way of Humanity should start within the family, the performance of benevolence did not end there. Especially for scholars, who are endowed with more social and cultural obligations, Confucians thought the practice of the Way of Humanity should start within the family and then extend to other relationships along the differential structure of intimacy: “He is lovingly disposed to people generally, and kind to creatures.”⁴² “Beginning with what they care for, proceed to what they do not care for.”⁴³ This point has an important implication for the understanding of Confucian thinking and will be further examined in the later section on ethics for scholars.

Propriety: Interaction in Line with Propriety

No matter which exchange rule resource allocators use during social interactions, Confucians maintained that they should always heed the principle of propriety when choosing an appropriate response following the evaluation of loss and gain. Propriety (*li*) initially denoted religious etiquette in the Eastern Chou Dynasty, but lost its religious connotation and gradually became a tool for maintaining political and

³⁸*The Works of Mencius*, Kào Tsze: Chap. XI.

³⁹*Ibid*, Lî Lâu: Chap. X.

⁴⁰*Ibid*, Lî Lâu: Chap. XXVII.

⁴¹*Ibid*, Tang Wang Kung, Part II: Chap. IX.

⁴²*Ibid*, Tsin sin, Part I: Chap. XIV.

⁴³*Ibid*, Tsin Sin, Part II: Chap. I.

social order in the Western Chou Dynasty (Hsu 1963). The concept of propriety (*li*) contains three elements according to classical Confucian works:

1. Etiquette is the procedures or steps that should be taken in a ceremony, i.e., what participants should do during the ceremony. For example, there are detailed accounts of proper etiquette for occasions such as visiting the emperor, employing officials, funerals, and wedding in *Li Chi*, *I Li*, and *Chou Li*.
2. Utensils are the tools needed for completing a ceremony. These include carriage, clothing, flags, seals, bells, vessels, jade, and gems.
3. Titles indicate a person's status as well as the degree of intimacy of the relationship between the host and the participants of the ceremony. Examples are family titles such as father and son, and political titles such as Son of Heaven, feudal princes, and officials.

There are detailed accounts and regulations for both the titles (*ming*) and utensils (*chih*) that aristocrats were entitled to use under the feudal system of the Eastern Chou Dynasty. Confucius himself also stressed these regulations of propriety (Cai 1982). Chî Lû once asked Confucius about the priority of government, and Confucius replied that what is necessary is to rectify names. Chî Lû made fun of Confucius' obstinately observing the old rules, but Confucius responded: "If the names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried to success."⁴⁴

One time, Jonhshu Yuhsi rescued the commander of Wei, General Sun, in the battle between the states Chi and Wei. The prince of Wei intended to reward him with land. Jonhshu declined with thanks and instead requested to use the music band and carriage that only feudal princes were entitled to use when he paid visit to the emperor. The prince of Wei granted his request, for which Confucius felt sorry. He thought that it was better to have given more land to Jonhshu, and gave a lecture about not lending titles and utensils to others (Hu 1919).

Witnessing countless battles and annexations and the killing of rulers by feudal princes, Confucius responded: "'It is according to the rules of propriety,' they say. Are gems and silk all that is meant by propriety? 'It is music,' they say. Are bells and drums all that is meant by music?"⁴⁵

The superior person considers righteousness to be essential in everything. He performs it according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility; he completes it with sincerity. This is indeed a superior human.⁴⁶

According to Chu Tze's annotation, the righteousness emphasized by Confucius is the kernel of things. Confucius held that a superior person's mind dwells in benevolence. A superior person considers righteousness to be essential in everything, performs it according to the rules of propriety, brings it forth in humility,

⁴⁴*The Analects*, Tsze-lû: Chap. III.

⁴⁵*The Analects*, Yang Ho: Chap. XI.

⁴⁶*Ibid*, Wei Ling Kung: Chap. XVII.

and completes it with sincerity. When the mind of benevolence no longer exists and a person is without the virtues proper to humanity, the empty form of propriety and music do not embody any meaning. Confucius proclaimed: “If a human be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a human be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with music?”⁴⁷

Before the Shang and Chou Dynasties, propriety was the only restriction and regulation imposed externally. Confucius combined the concepts of propriety, benevolence, and righteousness and transformed the external ritual of propriety into a cultural psychological structure (Li 1985). He expected that humans, based on their benevolent minds could make moral judgments in line with righteousness after assessing the various role relationships in social interactions, and then act according to propriety. The integration of benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), and propriety (*li*) is the most significant feature of Confucian ethics.

Self-Cultivation with the Way of Humanity

The Confucian ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety constitutes the core of the Way of Humanity. The Chinese name for the Way of Humanity is *rendao* or *dao*. Human beings must cultivate themselves with the Way of Humanity in order to fulfill their heaven-ordained destinies. A delicate set of practices for self-cultivation was developed so that Confucian disciples could learn to cultivate themselves with the Way of Humanity. From the Son of Heaven down to the general masses, self-cultivation was the root of everything else.⁴⁸ Even the sovereign could not neglect cultivation of his own character.⁴⁹

The goal of self-cultivation is to apply the Way of Humanity through the five cardinal relationships. Self-cultivation requires enthusiasm about learning the Way of Humanity, practicing it with vigor, and shame when one’s conduct is contradictory to it.⁵⁰ These methods for self-cultivation are not virtues, but they constitute the essential process for achieving the three virtues, wisdom (*zhi*), benevolence (*ren*), and courage (*yung*).⁵¹ A person who is willing to assume the responsibility of self-cultivation is called a *jun zi* (true gentleman). People who do not accept this responsibility may be denounced as *xiao ren* (narrow-minded people).

⁴⁷*Ibid*, Pâ Yih: Chap. III.

⁴⁸*The Great Learning*, Chap. I.

⁴⁹*The Golden Mean*, Chap. XX.

⁵⁰*The Doctrine of The Mean*. Chap. XX.

⁵¹*The Analects*, Hsien Wān: Chap. XXX.

Fondness for Learning Leads to Wisdom

Confucius put great emphasis on learning and often mentioned it in his daily teachings. The *Analects* of Confucius begin with the saying, “To learn and in due time to repeat what one has learned, is that not after all a pleasure?”⁵² As he looked back on his life, Confucius said he had his mind set on learning at the age of 15, and ever since then has been learning without satiety and instructing others without becoming weary.⁵³ As a learned scholar, Confucius stressed that he was not born with his knowledge. He talked about learning and studying, saying, “I am one who is fond of antiquity, and earnest in seeking it there,”⁵⁴ and “[when] I walk along with two others, they may serve me as my teachers.”⁵⁵ Confucius recommended asking for information and not being ashamed to learn from one’s inferiors when encountering incomprehensible things. Commenting on his own attitude of acquiring knowledge, he said, “eager pursuit of knowledge makes one forget food, the joy of its attainment makes one forget sorrows and not perceive that old age is coming.”⁵⁶

A set of Confucian theories on learning is recorded in *The Golden Mean*. Confucian disciples are required to learn the proper ways of extensive study, accurate inquiry, careful reflection, clear discrimination, and earnest practice. Most importantly, if disciples encounter anything in what they have studied that they cannot understand, in what they have inquired about that they do not know, in what they have reflected on that they do not apprehend, on which their discrimination is not clear, or if their practice fails in earnestness, they should not give up easily. Instead, they should persevere with the spirit that “[if] other people succeed by one effort, I will use a hundred efforts; if another person succeeded by ten efforts, I will use a thousand,”⁵⁷ until what they strive to learn is crystal clear.

Confucius thought that spontaneous interest leads to the most efficient learning. “To prefer it is better than to only know it. To delight in it is better than merely to prefer it.”⁵⁸ Disciples should embrace the attitude of “learning as if you were following someone with whom you could not catch up, as though it were someone you were frightened of losing,”⁵⁹ and become “widely versed in letters.”⁶⁰ During the process of learning, one should “from day to day [be] conscious of what one still lacks, and from month to month never [forget] what has already been learned.”⁶¹

⁵²*Ibid*, Hsio R, Chap.I.

⁵³*Ibid*, Shū R: Chap. II.

⁵⁴*Ibid*, Shū R: Chap. XIX.

⁵⁵*Ibid*, Shū R: Chap. XXI.

⁵⁶*Ibid*, Shū R: Chap. XVIII.

⁵⁷*The Golden Mean*, Chap. XX.

⁵⁸*The Analects*, Yung Yey. Chap. XVIII.

⁵⁹*Ibid*, T’ài-Po. Chap. XVIII.

⁶⁰*Ibid*, Yung Yey: Chap. XXV

⁶¹*Ibid*, Tsze-Chang: Chap. V.

Disciples should strive to “reanimate the old and gain knowledge of the new.”⁶² Memorizing itself is not sufficient for learning. Confucius said, “He who learns but does not think, is lost. He who thinks but does not learn is, in great danger. If one only achieves the parts without comprehensive integration, learning will result in confusion.”⁶³ Confucius encouraged his disciples to abstract from the learning materials some fundamental principles so that they could “have one thread upon which to string them all,”⁶⁴ and then when he “[holds] up one corner it can come back [to him] with the other three” (Hu 1967). Students should apply and make use of what they have learned.

Vigorous Practice Leads to Benevolence

Confucian education consists mainly of instruction on its ethical system. According to Kant’s epistemology, the Confucian ethical system uses practical reasoning that can be acquired only through the process of realization and doing (Mou 1985), or knowing by practicing (Tu 1987), but not theoretical reasoning, which is necessary for constructing a system of knowledge on the basis of sensory experience. For this reason, Confucius stressed vigorous practice in his teachings. For Confucians, the purpose of learning is to apply knowledge in life (Yang 1983). Knowledge is useless when it can only be discussed and not implemented. Confucius demanded that his disciples “not preach until they have practiced what they preach.”⁶⁵ They should be “slow in word but prompt in deed,” and “only [speak] of what it would be proper to carry into effect.”⁶⁶

Mencius also stressed the practice of ethics. He thought that humans innately possess benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom.⁶⁷ These things are “the knowledge possessed by humans without the exercise of thought,” and “the ability possessed by a person without having been acquired by learning.”⁶⁸ The practice of the Way of Humanity should be as easy. If someone says, “I am not able to do it,” it is actually “a case of not doing” rather than “not being able to do.”⁶⁹ Any person who focuses attention on the practice of the Way of Humanity is able to become the same type of person as the Sage Shun.⁷⁰

⁶²*Ibid*, Wei Chang: Chap. XI.

⁶³*Ibid*, Wei Chang: Chap. XV.

⁶⁴*Ibid*, Wei Ling Kung: Chap. II.

⁶⁵*The Analects*, Wei Chang: Chap. XIII.

⁶⁶*Ibid*, Tsze-Lû: Chap. III.

⁶⁷*The Works of Mencius*, Kào Tsze Part I: Chap. VI.

⁶⁸*Ibid*, Tsin Sin: Part I: Chap. XV.

⁶⁹*Ibid*, King Hûi of Liang, Part I: Chap. VII.

⁷⁰*Ibid*, T’āng Wān Kung, Part I: Chap. I.

Hsun Tze, who believed human nature to be evil, did not agree that humans are born with a conscience. He thought that the Way of propriety and righteousness is learned from the sages or kings of antiquity. Nonetheless, he also put great emphasis on the practice of the Way of Humanity (*dao*). “Though the road (*dao*) be short, if a person does not travel on it, he will never get there; though a matter be small, if he does not do it, it will never be accomplished.”⁷¹

Sincerely put forth your effort, and finally you will progress. Study until death and do not stop before. For the art of study occupies the whole life; to arrive at its purpose, you cannot stop for an instant. To do that is to be human; to stop is to be a bird or beast.⁷²

As Kant suggested, the Confucian ethical system uses practical, but not theoretical reasoning. Confucian scholars insist that one must not only learn, but also practice the way of benevolence for one’s whole life. Practicing the Way of Humanity was a criterion for differentiating human beings from beasts.

Sensitivity to Shame Leads to Courage

The ethical system of benevolence, righteousness, and propriety entails the belief that people should feel ashamed when their words exceed their actions, and when they deviate from the Way of Humanity. Confucius said, “the superior human is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions.”⁷³ “The reason the ancients did not readily give utterance to their words, was that they feared lest their actions should not come up to them.”⁷⁴

Mencius also maintained that people should abide by ethics through action instead of with empty words. “A person may not be without shame. When one is ashamed of having been without shame, he will afterwards not have occasion to be ashamed.”⁷⁵

The sense of shame is of great importance to humans. Those who form contrivances and versatile schemes distinguished for their artfulness, do not allow their shame to come into action. When a person differs from other men in not having this sense of shame, what will he have in common with them?⁷⁶

Confucians assigned scholars different goals and standards than ordinary people. The conditions under which they were expected to feel shame also differed. For example, scholars were given the specific mission of benefiting the world with the Way of Humanity. The life goal for scholars is the actualization of that mission

⁷¹ *Hsun Tze*, Self-cultivation.

⁷² *Ibid*, An encouragement to study.

⁷³ *The Analects*, Hsien Wan: Chap. XXIX.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, Le Jin: Chap. XXII.

⁷⁵ *The Works of Mencius*, Tsin Sin, Part I: Chap. VI.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, Tsin Sin, Part I: Chap. VII.

instead of the pursuit of material prosperity. “A scholar, whose mind is set on truth, and who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not fit to be discoursed with.”⁷⁷ Confucius praised Tsze-lû for “[dressing] himself in a tattered robe quilted with hemp, and standing by the side of men dressed in furs, unashamed.”⁷⁸

However, the Way of Humanity does not require an unconditional acceptance of poverty. According to the Confucian ideal, the purpose of a person’s occupying an official post is to benefit the world with the Way of Humanity. When the country is governed with right principles, one should work for the government. In this case, poverty and a mean condition should be considered something to be ashamed of since they indicate a person’s inability to serve well in the government. On the other hand, when the nation is ill-governed, and yet a person gains wealth and honor from his official post, he should feel shame for “[standing] in a prince’s court, and not carrying principles into practice,”⁷⁹ and even for acquiring a reputation beyond one’s merits.⁸⁰

Jun zi (a True Gentleman) vs. xiao ren (a Narrow-Minded Person)

Confucians promoted self-cultivation by the means of love of knowledge, strenuous attention to conduct, and sensitivity to shame. The goal was to develop people into *jun zi* (true gentlemen) who abide by the Way of Humanity. The term *jun zi* originally denoted a person of nobility. Confucius changed the meaning and used it to denote a person with moral cultivation. It is this second meaning that is applicable in most of the passages in the *Analects* of Confucius. The concept of *jun zi* was often mentioned in Confucius’ daily teachings. For example, when Tsze-hsiâ came to follow Confucius, the Master said, “be a scholar after the style of superior humans, and not after that of mean humans.”⁸¹ Confucius constantly discussed the distinction between *jun zi* and *xiao ren* with his disciples.

Confucius attempted to illustrate the differences between *jun zi* and *xiao ren* from every perspective with the aim of guiding his disciples into living as *jun zi* (Kao 1983; Yu 1987). A *jun zi* is a human whose mind dwells on benevolence, and who is familiar with the ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety. He not only follows the principle of dwelling in benevolence and pursuing the path of righteousness in dealing with his daily life, but also humbles himself and abides by the virtue of propriety. Unlike a *xiao ren*, who focuses his eyes on the losses and gains of the secular world, the major concerns for a *jun zi* are the moral principles founded on the ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety. “The mind of a

⁷⁷ *The Analects*, Le Jin: Chap. IX.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, Tsze Han: Chap. XXVI.

⁷⁹ *The Works of Mencius*, Wan Chang, Part II: Chap. V.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, Lî Lâu: Chap. XVIII.

⁸¹ *The Analects*, Yung Yey: Chap. XI.

superior human is conversant with righteousness; the mind of a mean human is conversant with gain.”⁸² “The superior human thinks of virtue; small humans think of comfort. Superior humans think of the sanctions of law; small humans think of the favors that they may receive.”⁸³ “The superior human may indeed have to endure want, but the mean human, when he is in want, gives way to unbridled license.”⁸⁴ Confucius observed that a *jun zi*, who adheres to the Way of Humanity and whose mind dwells on benevolence, not only makes demands on himself, asking himself to actualize the ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety. He also “[seeks] to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and does not seek to perfect the bad qualities.”⁸⁵ Consequently, a *jun zi* can be completely at ease and free from perturbation. During interaction with others, he can be “affable but not adulatory,”⁸⁶ “catholic and not partisan,”⁸⁷ and display “a dignified ease without pride.”⁸⁸ These actions are in contrast to those of a *xiao ren*, who strenuously pursues personal interest.

Confucian Ethics for Scholars: Benefiting the World with the Way of Humanity

According to Confucian thinking, the tranquility, order, and harmony in society are founded on each individual’s moral cultivation. Therefore, every person has the responsibility of learning to become a *jun zi*. This responsibility and the self-cultivation of virtue are the fundamental demand Confucians made on people (Tu 1985). Ordinary people are required to practice the Way of Humanity in their family and community lives, but scholars, who are endowed with cultural missions, were given even higher standards of moral practice.

Scholars Dedicate Themselves to the Way of Humanity

Confucian ethics are status ethics. Confucians endowed scholars with the mission of benefiting the world with the Way of Humanity. Confucians expected their disciples to practice the principles, and not to use them as a means for enlarging their personal reputation.⁸⁹ Pursuit of the Way of Humanity has intrinsic value, and takes a lifetime to accomplish. Confucius said, “If a person hears the right way in the morning, he

⁸²*The Analects*, Le Jin: Chap. XVI.

⁸³*Ibid*, Le Jin: Chap. XI.

⁸⁴*Ibid*, Wei Ling Kung: Chap. I.

⁸⁵*Ibid*, Yen Yüan: Chap. XVI.

⁸⁶*Ibid*, Tsze-Lû: Chap. XXIII.

⁸⁷*Ibid*, Wei Chang: Chap. XIV.

⁸⁸*Ibid*, Tsze-Lû: Chap. XXVI.

⁸⁹*The Analects*, Wei Ling Kung: Chap. XXVIII.

may die in the evening without regret.”⁹⁰ Both Mencius and Tsang Tze expounded on this ideal of Confucianism.

The philosopher Tsang said, “The officer may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden that he considers it is his to sustain—is it not heavy? Only with death does his course stop—is it not long?”⁹¹

According to the Confucian ideal of governing with virtue, a ruler is obliged to govern his country in the Way of Humanity, so that his people can be bathed in benevolence. This is done, he must expand from making his own country prosperous with benevolence, to achieving the ideal of letting benevolence prevail in the world. Scholars play an important role in this process. Once given an official post, a scholar should adhere to the ideal of the Way of Humanity, serve the sovereign with the Way of Humanity, “practice his principles for the good of the people,” confer benefits to them, and even “[make] the whole kingdom virtuous.”⁹² The larger the scope in which a scholar exercises the Way of Humanity, the higher that scholar’s moral performance is. Confucians believed that leaders should cultivate themselves, manage their families, govern the nation, and bring tranquility to the world. In contrast, when a scholar’s desire for office is disappointed, he “though poor, does not let go his righteousness.” He should “[attend] to [his] own virtue in solitude,” and “[practice] [his] [principles] alone,” in order to “became illustrious in the world.”⁹³ Only by “holding firm to death [in] perfecting the excellence of his course,” and striving to be above the power of riches and honors, and beyond letting poverty and mean condition’s temptation to swerve from principle⁹⁴ can a person be called great.

Serving the Sovereign with the Way of Humanity

Confucians evaluate a person’s moral performance in terms of the degree to which he exercises the Way of Humanity when making moral judgments and taking moral actions. When a scholar obtains an office, he attains higher moral achievement as he extends benevolence to larger groups. As Chu Tze said, “A person’s benevolence is something like the vastness of water. It might be a glass of water, a brook, a river, or the ocean. The benevolence of a sage is certainly like the ocean.”⁹⁵ How a person’s benevolence is perceived accords with the size of the groups to which he applies benevolence. The more people he confers benefits on, the higher his moral achievement.

⁹⁰*Ibid*, Le Jin: Chap. XIII.

⁹¹*Ibid*, T’âi-Po: Chap. VII.

⁹²*The Works of Mencius*, Tsin Sin, Part I: Chap. IX.

⁹³*Ibid*, Tsin Sin PartI: Chap. IX.

⁹⁴*Ibid*, T’ang Wan Kung, Part II: Chap. II.

⁹⁵*A Classificatory Record of Chu Tze’s Word’s*, Vol. 33. (in Chinese).

Confucians proposed that “a person of virtue deserves to occupy an important position.” Just as scholars are obliged to extend benevolence, so are aristocrats and feudal princes who occupy higher social positions. Mencius said,

If the sovereign be not benevolent, he cannot preserve the throne from passing from him. If the Head of a State be not benevolent, he cannot preserve his rule. If a high noble or great officer be not benevolent, he cannot preserve his ancestral temple. If a scholar or common people be not benevolent, he cannot preserve his four limbs.⁹⁶

The sovereign, the Head of a State, and the high noble or great officer are people who occupy the highest positions in society. Mencius argued that when these people make any judgment concerning righteousness, they should have their decisions grounded in benevolence, lest they lose people’s hearts and, thereafter, their positions.

The virtue of benevolence is based on an individual’s love for the group or community he belongs to. A governor should make full consideration for his own group as he exercises his decision-making power to ensure that he will “gather and give what the people desire, and withhold what they dislike”.⁹⁷ Mencius suggested that the most important duty for a minister was to rectify what is wrong in the sovereign’s mind. According to Confucianism,

Let the prince be benevolent, and *all his acts* will be benevolent. Let the prince be righteous, and *all his acts* will be righteous.⁹⁸ Let the prince be correct, and everything will be correct. Once the ruler is rectified, the kingdom will be firmly settled.⁹⁹ The way in which a minister serves his prince contemplates simply leading him in the right path, and directing his mind to benevolence.¹⁰⁰

Based on benevolence for the group, a scholar may develop a relationship of equity with the sovereign in the course of his official duty. Mencius said to the king Hsüan of Ch’i,

When the prince regards his ministers as his hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as any other human; when he regards them as the ground or as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy.¹⁰¹

Ethic of Autonomy

This concept reflects the Confucian ethic of autonomy. In terms of procedural justice, Confucians advised that those who assume superior roles, i.e., father, elder brother, husband, elders, and ruler, should make decisions in line with the principles of kindness, gentleness, righteousness, kindness, and benevolence respectively. And for those who assume the roles of son, younger brother, wife, juniors, or

⁹⁶*The Works of Mencius*, Lî Lâu, Part II: Chap. III.

⁹⁷*Ibid*, Lî Lâu, Part II: Chap. IX.

⁹⁸*Ibid*, Lî Lâu PartII: Chap. V.

⁹⁹*Ibid*, Lî Lâu, Part II: Chap. XX.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid*, Kào Tsze, Part II: Chap. VIII.

¹⁰¹*Ibid*, Lî Lâu, Part II: Chap. III.

minister, the principles of filial duty, obedience, submission, deference, loyalty and obedience to the instructions of the former group apply. However, when the superior violates the principle of benevolence, Confucians encouraged the inferior to correct them. It is a general principle put forward by Confucians; they emphasized that one should fight against unrighteous behaviors no matter whom they come from:

In case of contemplated moral wrong, a son must never fail to warn his father against it; not must a minister fail to perform a like service for his prince. In short, when there is question of moral wrong, there should be correction.¹⁰²

According to Confucian ideas of the pre-Chin period, the father/son and sovereign/minister relationships belong to two distinct categories. When the superior in each of these relationships was engaged in morally wrong activities, the subordinate's reaction in making suggestions for correction was also different.

In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur.¹⁰³

This kind of unbreakable kinship bond does not exist in the relationship between sovereign and minister. If the sovereign becomes tyrannous and does not listen to admonition, the minister should react differently.

In his answer to King Hsüan of Ch'î about the office of high ministers, Mencius distinguished between relationships in which the high ministers are in the nobility, and therefore relatives of the prince, and those in which they have different surnames from the prince.¹⁰⁴ For those in the first category who have a blood connection with the prince, if the prince makes serious mistakes and does not respond to their respected admonitions, they should determine their course of action by considering the principle that "the people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next, the sovereign is the lightest."¹⁰⁵ They should supersede the prince as he might harm the state. On the other hand, the high ministers with different surnames from the prince have no inseparable connection to him. If the prince makes mistakes and does not accept their repeated advice, they can just leave the state for another one. If the emperor is tyrannical and does not practice benevolent government, then powerful chiefs of state should rise and "punish the tyrant and console the people." For example, in a famous dialogue with Mencius, King Hsun of Ch'I asked about a case in which a minister put his sovereign, named Chau, to death.

The king Hsüan of Ch'î asked saying, 'Was it so, that T'ang banished Chieh, and that king Wü smote Ch'au?' Mencius replied, 'It is so in the records'. The king said, 'May a minister then put his sovereign to death?' Mencius said, 'He who outrages the benevolence proper to his nature, is called a robber; he who outrages righteousness is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the cutting off of the fellow Chau, but I have not heard of the putting a sovereign to death, in his case.'¹⁰⁶

¹⁰²*The Hsiao Ching*: The duty of correction.

¹⁰³*The Analects*, Le Jin: Chap. XVIII.

¹⁰⁴*The Works of Mencius*, Wan Chang, Part II: Chap. IX.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid*, Tsin Sin, Part II: Chap. XIV.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid*, King Hui of Liang, Part II: Chap. VIII.

These quotations highlight the fact that the differential order of superior/inferior and sovereign/subordinate so emphasized by Confucians should be placed under the major premise that both parties abide by the Way of Humanity. When the sovereign violates the principle of benevolence, the subordinate is not bound to follow blindly. This is the most outstanding feature of the Confucian ethic of autonomy. The autonomy and self-government characteristic of political figures in Chinese history have drawn increasing attention from Sinologists of political culture (De Bary 1983; Metzgar 1977, 1981). It has been shown that they have their root in Confucianism. However, the role Confucians assign to scholars is to serve the sovereign with the Way of Humanity and to rectify what is wrong in the sovereign's mind. Whether a scholar can actualize the Way of Humanity depends on whether an opportunity of serving in the government is granted to him. Hence the monarchy becomes the precondition for a scholar to realize his ideal personality (Lei 1991). Paradoxically, a Confucian scholar who has been dedicated to the cultivation of his moral personality is unable to fulfill his moral goals and personality independently.

Person, Self, and Individual

In previous sections, we have discussed the five components of the deep structure of Confucianism from a perspective of social psychology. Viewed from the perspective of the concepts proposed by Redfield (1956), the materials for my analysis in this chapter are mainly the Confucian classics, they are the so-called great tradition for intellectuals in traditional Chinese society. They may have some connection to the traditions practiced by Chinese people in their daily lives, but they are not exactly the same. This point can be illustrated with the distinctions between person, self, and individual proposed by Grace G. Harris (1989).

In an illuminating article, Harris (1989) pointed out that though the concepts of individual, self, and person are frequently used interchangeably by social scientists, the meanings of these three concepts differ significantly. *Individual* is a biologicistic concept, defining human beings as creatures like any other living animal in the world. *Person* is a sociologicistic concept treating human beings as agents-in-society who take a particular position in the social order and develop a series of actions to achieve personal goals.

In order to view a person as an agent-in-society, the ways in which the individual follows a certain moral order, takes action, or reacts to others' actions in systems of social relationships should be investigated. From the perspective of a given society, all actions and claims made in support of its socio-moral order are consequences of public discourse. Persons who participate in social interaction will perform such a discourse with reference to the cultural logic, rules, and values, as well as to their own recognition of factuality. They analyze, label, and interpret each others' actions, thereby creating a stream of public discourse on the causes of action.

Anthropologists study accounts of personhood and the nature of agentic capacities in various cultures by examining the culture's structures or processes. The structural approach entails listing the array of approved social types in a given

society. Because social validation is a precondition for social value, the process approach studies the life cycles of various social types in an attempt to understand the agentic capacities being endowed in or withheld from individuals when they enter or leave a particular social type.

Self is a psychologistic concept defining human beings as the locus of experience, including the most important aspect of experiencing oneself as a particular identity. Western psychologists usually assume that an individual's competence in reflexive awareness creates a duality of self. The self as a subject integrates behavior and makes one distinctive from others, resulting in a sense of self-identity. The self as an object of awareness enables one to examine one's differences with other objects in the world, and to view oneself as a unique whole with a sense of personal identity.

Every culture has dominant ideas about the ontology of self: birth, age, disease, the end of physical life, the relationship between self and morality, and the relationships between self and others. All of these ideas and relationships constitute the concept of personhood in the culture. As a carrier of culture, the self is the meeting point between the individual and the social world. Each person lives in a variety of sociocultural contexts. Each of these contexts makes claims on the person by providing a framework of ideas and practices about "good" or "bad" persons (Markus and Kitayama 1994). As a result, individuals acquire various (sometimes conflicting) understandings of how to be a person. The self is an integrated locus functioning as the individuated interpretive framework for shaping one's thought, action, motivation, and emotional reactions.

Viewed from this perspective, it is not difficult to see that the great tradition of Confucian culture is not equivalent to the traditions practiced by Chinese people in their daily lives. Being an individual with the ability for cultural reflection, anyone may select what he needs from his cultural tradition in order to help him deal with problems encountered in his lifeworld. In the contemporary world, individuals often utilize means from other cultural traditions to deal with problems in their daily lives. I do not imply that everyone in Confucian societies will follow the same patterns of social behavior automatically. Moreover, the deep structure of Confucianism does not cover the full range of Chinese cultural tradition. Constructing the deep structure of Confucianism from the perspective of social psychology aims to provide an intellectual tool to conduct social psychological research in Confucian societies.

The Equilibrium Worldview Model

This point can be illustrated with the Chinese equilibrium worldview model. Using structuralist methods, anthropologist Li (1988, 1992) analyzed the folk religions, legends, and myths prevalent in Chinese society and constructed a Chinese equilibrium worldview model. The word *equilibrium* used in Li's model comes from the Confucian classic the *Golden Mean*, in which the term was used to mean "to reach balance and harmony." Li proposed that the most fundamental operating




Fig. 5.2 The World view model of Equilibrium (adapted and revised form Li, 1992)

rule in traditional Chinese cosmology is to seek balance and harmony between humans and nature, humans and society, and humans and ego. The most ideal and perfect states in traditional culture all aim at such a state of balance and harmony. In order to reach these ideal states, it is necessary to maintain balance and harmony within each of the three systems. The equilibrium worldview model is comprised of balance and harmony within each of the three systems. It is represented in the following chart (Fig. 5.2).

According to Li, the first level of harmony is harmony with nature. The idea of harmony with nature is consistent with the idea of unification with heaven in traditional China. It can be expressed in two aspects: time and space. In Chinese folk belief, harmony of temporality is manifest in the explanation of one’s fortune in life in coordination with cosmic time. Four pairs of signs represent the time, date, month, and year in which a person was born. The two characters of each pair are adopted from ten celestial stems and twelve terrestrial branches, and are usually called *eight characters*. The eight characters that represent one’s birth time may determine one’s life experience or fate (*ming*). To many Chinese, fate is determined at birth. In coordination with cosmic time, an individual’s life experience will take on various changes as a consequence of good or bad luck. In the traditional system of Chinese belief, fate is unchangeable, while luck can be changed with the aid of various forces. Seeking harmony with temporality is revealed in this changeable fortune.

The second aspect of maintaining balance with nature is spatial arrangement. Ideas of spatial harmony are constructed on the concepts of *yin* and *yang*, the five primary elements (*wu-hsin*), and the eight trigrams (*ba-gua*). The combination of these factors constitutes a belief in geomancy (*feng-shui*). For Chinese, the traditional belief in the harmony of temporality and spatiality can be said to be the most important framework for understanding the existence and function of the universe.

It can also be viewed as the fundamental rule for explaining why human beings exist in the universe.

Li's second level is maintaining harmony within the individual. Li (1992) divided this type of harmony into two parts: internal substantial harmony and external formal harmony. The former explains the harmony within the human body mainly by the dynamic equilibrium between the two opposing forces of *yin* and *yang*. Based on these concepts, a very complicated system of Chinese medicine and food has been developed. If an individual's body is basically cold, that person should consume more hot foods to keep in balance, while a person whose body is basically hot should consume more cold foods. If the body overheats, more cold food or medicine will be needed to keep the balance, and vice versa. The foods people should eat changes with the weather. More hot foods should be eaten in the winter, and more cold foods should be consumed in the summer to maintain the balance of cold and hot within the body.

The harmony of the external form is mainly represented in the use of one's name. To individuals in most cultures, their names are just signs or symbols. But in the traditional Chinese theory of naming, names entail a transforming force for the individual. Two aspects represent a person's name. The first is related to the five primary elements, the second is the number of strokes required to write one's name. Both show an individual's search for balance in external forms.

The third level of harmony exists in a person's social relationships. This type of harmony is the steadfast goal of the Confucian value system, which itself is the ethical foundation of social order. Traditional Confucian ethics emphasize the importance of two aspects: the arrangement of relationships among family members, and heredity and the continuance of the family system. The former entails a synchronic harmony in the lifeworld. Its value is manifest in such ideals as "benevolent father and filial son," and "righteous husband and submissive wife." The latter is a diachronic harmony in the social order. Both the dead and the living members of a family or clan are seen as a unit. Real harmony can be reached only when both of them are balanced and harmonious. There is a popular expression that illustrates the need to balance both aspects: having no male heir is the greatest one of the three major offenses against filial piety. Ancestor worship ceremonies in folk society also display the earnest Chinese desire for balance with the supernatural.

Viewed from the perspective of the equilibrium worldview model, the content of Confucianism mainly aims to maintain the third level of harmony, i.e., harmonious interpersonal relationships. Stated more clearly, though the deep structure of Confucianism contains conceptions of destiny, a model of mind, ways of self-cultivation, and so on, the contents of these components were designed to provide a substantive rationality for supporting the ethics advocated by Confucians. In order to understand other aspects of Chinese culture, it is necessary to expand our scope of research from Confucianism to cover Taoism, astrology, geomancy, and even Buddhism. This is a general requirement for us to pursue empirical research under the influence of Chinese cultural tradition.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the deep structure of Confucianism is analyzed in terms of structuralism based on my theoretical model of *Face and Favor*. The analysis demonstrated an isomorphism exists between the psychological processes of resource allocator in the *Face and Favor* theoretical model, and the Confucian model of Mind constructed by the author through the integration of the Confucian concepts of benevolence, righteousness, and propriety. Benevolence (*ren*), with its emphasis on differential order, corresponds to the expressive component of the relationship (*guanxi*). In judging *guanxi*, righteousness (*yi*) corresponds to the rule for social exchange, and propriety (*li*) corresponds to the overt behaviors resulting from the dialectical conflicts underlying the psychological process. Although the *Face and Favor* theoretical model may be applied to illuminate various types of social interaction within different social groups, consideration of the deep structure of Confucian tradition and the surface structure derived from it is indispensable if we intend to understand why Chinese place special emphasis on the need rule or the *renqing* rule (Cheng 1986; King & Myers 1977; Zai 1995). As we look into the deep structure of Confucianism with reference to the *Face and Favor* theoretical model, it is clear that this theoretical model can only illustrate *a part* of Confucian thinking, i.e., the part concerning distributive justice in ethics for ordinary people. Confucianism also contains a unique cosmology, conceptions of destiny, presumptions about human nature, and a theory of self-cultivation, which together form the background for understanding the benevolence–righteousness–propriety ethical system. In other words, disregarding cultural values, the *Face and Favor* theoretical model is applicable to the explanation of social interactions in various societies. Yet examining the reason for the emphasis on favor (*renqing*), relationships (*guanxi*), and face (*mientze*) in traditional Chinese society requires considering the corresponding benevolence–righteousness–propriety ethical system as well as the principle of respecting the superior advocated by Confucians. This kind of concept of distributive justice is not found in Western individualism. A further attempt to understand why Confucianism harbors such an idea of justice requires study of the Confucian philosophy of life and its complete context.

Whenever a topic related to Confucian tradition is discussed, structuralism should be considered. For example, when it comes to Chinese moral reasoning, almost all scholars agree that benevolence is the key concept with the greatest influence. It is true that benevolence is perceived as the transcendent ontology of morality and the perfect virtue of the mind in Confucianism (Mou 1975, 1985). However, some scholars maintain that benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), propriety (*li*), and wisdom (*chi*) are moral principles characteristic of universalism (Lee 1990; Yu 1987a, 1987b), while others hold that the actualization of benevolence should be in accordance with particularism and in line with differential order (Fu 1973). Inconsistency also appears in the results psychologists obtain through the use of Western assessment tools in their empirical studies (Fu & Lei 1991; Yang 1991). A satisfying explanation for this diversity of phenomena is possible

with a framework of a complete structure of Confucianism that captures the difference between ethics for ordinary people and ethics for scholars, and considers the role, status, and social condition of the person making moral judgments.

References

- Bao, Z. X. (1986). A critical review on the history of studies on Hsun-tze. *Essays of stepping forward* (pp. 128–164) (in Chinese). Si-Chuan People's Publisher.
- Cai, S. S. (1982). *System of Confucian thoughts*. Shanghai, China: Shanghai People's Publisher.
- Cheng, C. Y. (1986). The concept of face and its Confucian roots. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 13, 329–348.
- De Bary, W. T. (1983). *The liberal spirit in Neo-Confucianism* (H.-C. Li, Trans.). Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Fu, B. Y., & Lei, T. (1991). Studies on development of social thinking in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In C. F. Yang & H. S. R. Kao (Eds.), *Chinese people and Chinese mind: Development and teaching* (pp. 214–304). Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co (in Chinese).
- Fu, W. X. (1973). Philosophy. In X. J. Kao (Ed.), *Essays on contemporary American behavioral and social science* (pp. 317–334). Taipei: Student Bookstore (in Chinese).
- Harris, C. G. (1989). Concepts of individual, self, and person in description and analysis. *American Anthropologist*, 91(3), 599–612.
- Hsu, F. G. (1963). The emergence of the humanistic century with a focus on rites and the humanization of religion: Spring-and-Autumn period. *A history of the theory of Chinese human nature: Pre-chin period* (pp. 36–62) (in Chinese). Tai-zhong: Tunghai University.
- Hu, S. (1919). *History of ancient philosophy in China*. Shanghai: Commercial Publisher.
- Hu, S. (1967). The scientific spirit and method in Chinese philosophy. In C. A. Moore (Ed.), *The Chinese mind* (pp. 104–131). Honolulu: University of Hawaii.
- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), 944–974.
- Hwang, K. K. (1988). *Confucianism and East Asian modernization (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Chu-Lin Book Co.
- Hwang, K. K. (2000). The discontinuity hypothesis of modernity and constructive realism (in Chinese). *Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences*, 18, 1–32.
- Kant, I. (1781). *Critique of pure reason* (N. K. Smith, Trans.). NY: Humanities Press.
- Kant, I. (1788). *Critique of Practical Reason* (M. Gregor, Trans.). NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kao, M. (1983). Confucius' ideal of life. *Essays of studies on Confucian thoughts* (Vol. 1) (pp. 1–30) (in Chinese). Taipei: Li-ming Cultural Pub. Co.
- King, A. Y. S., & Myers, J. T. (1977). *Shame as an incomplete conception of Chinese culture: A study of face*. Hong Kong: Social Research Center, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Lao, S. G. (1968). *The history of Chinese philosophy*, 1 (pp. 66–79) (in Chinese). Hong Kong: Chung-chi College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Lee, I. Y. (1994a). Cultural China: The perspective of folk culture (in Chinese). *Chinese Studies*, 12(1), 1–6.
- Lee, I. Y. (1994b). *Traditional Chinese worldview and modern business behaviors*. Paper presented at the International Symposium on The Cultural China: Theory and practice (in Chinese), The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Lee, M. H. (1990). *Confucianism and Kant (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Linking Pub. Co.
- Lei, T. (1991). Chinese “ego” and “self”: Metaphysics and physics. In C. F. Yang & H. S. R. Kao (Eds.), *Chinese people and Chinese mind: Personality and society* (pp. 147–197). Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co (in Chinese).

- Leventhal, G. S. (1976). Fairness in social relationships. In J. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. T. Carson (Eds.), *Contemporary topics in social psychology* (pp. 211–239). Morristown: General Learning Press.
- Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H. Willis (Eds.), *Social exchange: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 27–55). New York: Plenum Press.
- Li, Y. Y. (1988). Ancestor worship and the psychological stability of family members in Taiwan. In K. Yoshimatsu & W. S. Tseng (Eds.), *Asian family mental health* (pp. 26–33). Psychiatric Research Institute of Tokyo: Tokyo.
- Li, Y. Y. (1992). In search of equilibrium and harmony: On the basic value orientation of traditional Chinese peasants. In C. Nakane & C. Chiao (Eds.), *Home Bound: Studies in East Asian Society* (pp. 127–148). The Center for East Asian Cultural Studies: Hong Kong.
- Li, Z. H. (1985). The reappraisal of Confucius. *Essays on the history of ancient Chinese thoughts* (pp. 7–58) (in Chinese). Taipei: Gu-Feng pub. Co.
- Liu, S. X. (1989/1992). A perspective on the relationship between humans and nature: A new explanation of the unification of heaven and human beings. *Confucianism and modernization* (in Chinese). Beijing: Chinese Radio and Television Pub. Co.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1994). The cultural shaping of emotion: A conceptual framework. In S. Kitayama & H. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture*. Washington: APA Books.
- Metzgar, T. A. (1977). *Escape from predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's evolving political culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Metzgar, T. A. (1981). Selfhood and authority in Neo-Confucian political culture. In A. Kleinman & T. Y. Lin (Eds.), *Normal and abnormal behavior in Chinese culture* (pp. 7–27). Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Mou, Z. S. (1975). *Phenomenon and thing-in-itself (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Student Bookstore.
- Mou, Z. S. (1985). *Moral idealism (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Student Bookstore.
- Redfield, R. (1956). *Peasant society and culture*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Schutz, A. (1962). *Common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action, Vol 1: The problem of social reality*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Collected papers.
- Shweder, R. A., Goodnow, J., Hatano, G., LeVine, R., Markus, H., & Miller, P. (1998). The cultural psychology of development: One mind, many mentalities. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology (Vol. 1): Theoretical models of human development* (pp. 865-937). NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Tang, C. I. (1986). *A theory of Chinese philosophy: Original Dao*, 1 (pp. 112–113) (in Chinese). Taipei: Student Bookstore.
- Tsai, S. S. (1984). *System of Confucian thoughts*. Shanghai People's Publisher.
- Tu, W. M. (1985). *Confucian thought: Selfhood as creative transformation*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Tu, W. M. (1987). On Confucian knowing by experiencing: The implication of moral knowledge. In S. X. Liu (Ed.), *Symposium on Confucian ethics*. Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophy.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). *Thought and language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Walsh, B. J., & Middleton, J. R. (1984). *The transforming vision: Shaping a Christian world view*. Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press.
- Wei, Z. T. (1968). A look for the origin of Chinese philosophy. In I. Chou (Ed.), *A critique of Chinese philosophical thoughts* (pp. 31–70). Taipei: The Buffalo Book Co (in Chinese).
- Yang, C. F. (1991). A tentative theory on the moral development of Chinese people from the perspective of self development. In K. S. Yang & K. K. Hwang (Eds.), *Chinese psychology and behavior* (pp. 1–47). Taipei: Laureate Pub Co (in Chinese).
- Yang, L. G. (1983). A study on the Confucian concepts of learning in the Analects. *Four essays on Confucianism* (in Chinese). Taipei: Linking Publisher.
- Yu, Y. S. (1987). The Confucian ideal of a true gentleman. In *A modern interpretation of traditional Chinese thought (in Chinese)* (pp. 145–165). Taipei: Linking Publisher.
- Zai, S. W. (1995). *Chinese views of lian and mian (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Laureate Book Co.

Chapter 6

Paradigms for Studying Chinese Moral Thought: A Metatheoretical Analysis

Abstract Granting previous empirical researches using Kohlberg's paradigm and Rest's (Manual for the defining issue test: An objective test of moral judgment development. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1974; Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1979) four-part model as examples of imposed etic approach, Bloom's (Social principledness and social humanism: A cross-cultural investigation into dimensions of politico-moral reasoning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1974; Journal of Social Psychology 101: 29–44, 1977) distinction between social principledness and social humanism, as well as Wilson's (The moral state: A study of the political socialization of Chinese and American children. NY: The Free Press, 1974) model of moral development as examples of derived etic approach, this chapter provided a critique on the limitations of etic approach for understanding Chinese moral thought. Ma's (Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies 7: 166–212, 1997) bi-parameter model of Chinese moral development was used as an example of emic approach for criticizing the bottom-up model building paradigm of indigenous psychology. The advantage of the current research strategy to attain the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology was discussed in the context of philosophy of science.


Keywords Imposed etic • Derived etic • Emic • Kohlberg's paradigm • Four-part model • Social principledness • Social humanism • Bi-parameter model

This chapter aims to review various paradigms of psychological research studying moral thought in Chinese societies in order to demonstrate the specific features of their epistemologies and methodologies from the perspective of philosophy of science. As indicated in Chap. 3, the language games which individuals play in their life-worlds to interact with others are inevitably rooted in their forms of life and have been profoundly influenced by their cultural traditions (Wittgenstein 1945). Viewed from the perspective of constructive realism, the purpose of indigenous psychological

research is to construct scientific microworlds for understanding people's ways of thinking and the patterns of behavior in their lifeworlds. There are many psychologists who have tried to use Western paradigms to study moral thought and moral judgments in Chinese society. Some of them – dissatisfied with this transplant style approach – have attempted to develop more appropriate paradigms by taking the specific features of Chinese culture into consideration.

Barry et al. (1992) indicate that there are three philosophical presumptions: absolutism, universalism, and relativism, underlying three main approaches of cross-cultural psychology: namely, imposed etic, derived etic, and emic. Many Westernized (or Americanized) psychologists ignore cultural differences and insist on the imposed etic approach, as well as the corresponding philosophical presumption of absolutism, by imposing a Western research paradigm to study psychology in non-Western societies. In order to overcome the difficulties caused by the transplantation of the Western paradigm, some psychologists take into consideration two or more cultures and adopt the derived etic approach to develop culturally fair research paradigms with universalist philosophical presumptions. In contrast to this, most indigenous psychologists use an emic approach. With relativistic philosophical presumptions, they use indigenous methods and research instruments expecting to develop substantial theories or models that are culturally specific to local people.

Scientists construct theories because they want to explain observed phenomena. In his *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, Hempel (1965) proposed a deductive model or model of covering law, which stated that scientific explanations usually contain two kinds of statements: general laws and antecedent conditions. Using these two kinds of *explanans* as the premises, a scientist can deduct a description of a phenomenon, which is called the *explanandum*.



Hempel (1965) advocated that the deductive model can be used for either explanation or prediction in scientific research. If a scientist observes a phenomenon (E) first, then tries to propose general laws (L) and antecedent conditions (C) for its occurrence, this is scientific explanation. In contrast to this, if s/he knows general laws (L) and antecedent conditions, and tries to devise from them a description about a phenomenon, then it is prediction.

Viewed from the perspective of the deductive model or model of covering law, when a psychologist conducts empirical research by either imposed etic or derived etic approach, s/he has to specify the antecedent conditions for observing a certain phenomena based on some general laws of a given theory. If s/he adopts the imposed etic approach by using the Western research paradigm to study the participants from

non-Western societies, s/he might find that many of his/her research findings cannot be adequately explained in terms of his/her theory. In many situations, the derived etic approach – which has been widely used in cross-cultural psychology – cannot solve this problem. In this case, indigenous psychologists may advocate for the emic approach to deal with this difficulty. I illustrate my arguments in the following sections of this chapter by reviewing previous research on Chinese concepts of morality.

The Imposed Etic Approach

As indicated above, the philosophical presumption of the imposed etic approach is “absolutism.” It assumes that the theories and research methods constructed by Western psychologists are universally applicable, and can be used without modification to study the psychology of people in non-Western cultures.

Among the research using the imposed etic approach, Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral development and its accompanying measurement instruments are the most well-known and widely used. Therefore, his research paradigm is discussed first. Findings of empirical research accomplished by following this paradigm are presented in order to illustrate the difficulties which might be encountered by this approach.

Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Reasoning

Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning was developed on the basis of Piaget’s pioneering works. In his book “The Moral Judgment of the Child”, Piaget (1932) advocated using structuralism methods to study the development of moral reasoning. From Piaget’s perspective, children’s moral reasoning evolves from the stages of heteronomy to autonomy. This development implies a transformation of structure as a result of cognitive maturity and synergetic interaction with people. In order to be emancipated from the restriction of authority and to acquire the cognitive schema of reciprocity, a child has to develop the cognitive ability to logically reason and to interact with his/her peer on an equal basis. The structural transformation cannot be accounted by social learning only. Social learning can explain only superficial behavioral changes, but not the development of deep cognitive structure.

(1) Stages of Cognitive Development

Following Piaget’s (1932) theory, Kohlberg divided moral reasoning development into three levels and six stages (1981):

1. The Preconventional Level

At the preconventional morality level, the external moral standard has not yet been internalized; the child obeys rules emphasized by authority figures in order to

avoid punishment or to be rewarded. He/she follows pragmatic morality, and actions that enable him/her to avoid punishment or obtain reward are considered right. Two stages are differentiated at this level:

Stage 1: Punishment-and-Obedience Orientation

During this stage, the child tends to judge right or wrong by the consequences of actions. If an action is unnoticed and not punished, he/she will never think that this action is “wrong.” On the other hand, the more severely an action is punished, the more “wrong” he/she considers the action.

Stage 2: Hedonism Orientation

In this stage, a child obeys rules because he/she wants to be rewarded or to satisfy his/her own needs. He/she may show concern for the views of others in order to obtain a reward from the other party. The conception of reciprocity is “we each have needs. For me to get mine satisfied, I will sometimes have to help you to get yours met.”

2. The Conventional Level

At the level of conventional morality, the child tends to obey social norms or maintain social order to get approval from others. He/she may understand others’ viewpoints and take them into consideration. Social approval and blame gradually replace reward and punishments and become the motivation for moral behavior.

Stage 3: “Good boy” or “Good girl” Orientation

For a child in stage 3, the goal of moral reasoning is to be considered a “good” child. Moral actions are acts to please others, assist others, or gain the approval of others. The basis for self-evaluation is the degree of approval from others.

Stage 4: Social Order Maintenance Orientation

At this stage, a child may consider the view of the general public, and comes to believe that law is a reflection of social order and it is therefore right to obey the law. Obeying rules or law is not done to avoid punishment, but out of the belief that rules and law are worthy of obedience.

3. Postconventional Level

At the level of postconventional morality, right or wrong is defined by a set of general principles of justice and may conflict with preexisting laws or orders. What an individual believes morally right may not conform with the law.

Stage 5: Contract, Right, and Democratically Accepted Law Orientation

In the “social contract” stage, an individual understands that laws aim to express the wishes of the majority and the values of humanity. It is a social contract for everyone to obey the law. If a law endangers human rights or dignity, it is unjust and should be challenged. Compared to this, a child in stage 4 usually does not challenge the existing laws and may raise doubts about those who do.

Stage 6: Individual Principles of Conscience Orientation

Moral reasoning is based on the principle of conscience chosen by an individual. These principles may be not as explicit as Moses’s Ten Commandments, and they may overshadow laws, social contracts, abstract moral principles, or universal

principles of reasoning (the principle of respecting individual's right). Reasoning at this stage enables an individual facing a moral dilemma to consider everyone's view and arrive at a solution that is accepted as "fair" to the majority of people.

Stage 6 is an ideal stage of moral reasoning. Very few people reason in this way, and Kohlberg believed it a hypothetical structure. Only a few people who have reached stage 5 are able to get to this stage. In fact, in the latest edition of his book on the measurement of moral reasoning, Kohlberg ceased trying to measure moral reasoning at stage 6 (Colby and Kohlberg 1984).

Like Piaget (1932), Kohlberg's theory assumes that an individual's cognitive structural development originates from the interaction between environment and organism, and aims to attain a higher level of equilibrium. Development is essentially a transformation of cognitive structure, every stage of development implies a distinct model of reasoning, which constitutes a hierarchically integrated order of structure, including characteristics of organized responses, rules of integrating empirical experiences, and practices serving functions of adaptation and equilibrium. During the development process of an individual, various models of reasoning form a sequence of order. Cultural factors may affect or limit the rate of development, but do not change the order of development.

Kohlberg's Theoretic Rationale

Kohlberg (1981, 1984) published two volumes of essays discussing the philosophy and psychology of moral development. In Chap. 2 of the first volume (Kohlberg 1981, p. 30), he cited the Platonic view of the nature of virtue, which advocates that virtue is ultimately one, not many. According to Plato, virtue always has the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture. This ideal form is called justice. Knowledge of "the good" is virtue, for one who knows the good chooses it. This kind of virtuous knowledge of the good is a philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal good, not simply opinion or conventional belief. People at different levels of moral development have differing knowledge of the good. Because many people know it poorly, the good needs to be taught. However, the teaching of virtue requires asking questions and demonstrating the correct way to behave, instead of simply teaching rules. The goal of moral education is to enhance people's inherent moral sense, not to teach them a body of specific moral rules or scripts.

Based on these assumptions, Kohlberg (1984) constructed his theory of moral development with reference to the logico-mathematical structures of Piaget's (1972/1981) theory of cognitive development. Piaget proposed that the development of cognitive structure originates from interactions between the maturation of the organism and the structure of the environment in which a state of equilibrium between these two systems is sought. The transformation of cognitive structure from one stage to another may result in a reorientation in the organization of the individual's modes of thought. Cognitive stages are continuously differentiated and hierarchically integrated to form a sequential order. An individual's development of

moral reasoning and modes of thought follows an invariant sequence. Cultural factors may facilitate or hinder the speed of development, but they cannot change the sequence. The principle of virtue appears in and unifies all stages of moral development, but only when one reaches the highest stage one's moral reasoning displays the pure form of principled virtue.

In his book *The Philosophy of Moral Development*, Kohlberg (1981) devoted Chap. 5 to illustrate the Western ideal of justice as reversibility. In laying out the conditions under which impartiality and fairness can be achieved, he cited Rawls' (1971) veil of ignorance concept. Rawls' theory proposes that the principle of justice can be attained only among competing claims made by participants who are negotiating from a veil of ignorance. Under the veil of ignorance, participants know neither their positions in society nor their places in the distribution of natural talents or abilities. Kohlberg adopted Kant's maxim of the categorical imperative as the principle of justice: Act so that the outcome of your conduct can be the universal will or act as you would want all human beings to act in a similar situation. The practice in which one person cuts the cake and a second person distributes it is a method of distribution that exemplifies this principle. Universal justice is the principle of the golden rule: "It's right if it's still right when you put yourself in the other place" (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 196–197).

In short, Kohlberg considered reasoning in accordance with the principle of universal justice to be the final goal of moral judgment that accompanies the development of cognitive capacity at different life stages. He used this principle as the criterion for evaluating an individual's moral reasoning. For instance, moral reasoning at stage 4 is characterized by a law-and-order or rule orientation. When an individual's capacity for moral reasoning has developed to this stage, there is a tendency to believe that making judgments on the basis of law and order is just. It is impossible for an individual at an earlier stage of development to make such a judgment. On the other hand, when an individual makes a law-and-order judgment, that person's moral development should be classified as stage 4 regardless of age. Based on this reasoning, Kohlberg (1971) made his famous claim for the cross-cultural universality of moral development:

"All individuals in all cultures use the same 30 basic moral categories, concepts, or principles, and all individuals in all cultures go through the same order or sequence of gross stage development, though they vary in rate and terminal point of development" (Kohlberg 1971, p. 175).

Snarey (1985: 202–205) indicated that Kohlberg's claim implies at least five empirical assumptions: (1) moral development research has been conducted in a sufficiently wide range of sociocultural settings to adequately justify the claim; (2) all persons in all cultures inquire about the moral domain and, in doing so, ask the same basic kinds of questions or resort to the same basic issues; (3) stage development among individuals is found to be upwardly invariant in sequence and without significant regressions, regardless of cultural setting; (4) the full range of moral stages, including the highest, should be found in all types of cultures; (5) all instances of genuine moral reasoning in all cultures correspond to one of the modes or stages of moral reasoning described by Kohlberg.

Empirical Cross-Cultural Research

In order to examine his theory, Kohlberg modified Piaget's clinical interview method of studying cognitive development and made it a systematic semiclinical survey. Because it requires a lot of professional skill to carry out the survey and it needs a thorough comprehension of the scoring system to analyze the data, the scoring system has been revised several times with different designations, such as: Sentence and Story Scoring (1958), Structural Issue Scoring (1971), and Standard Form Scoring (Kohlberg et al. 1978).

Kohlberg designed three sets of standard questionnaires for interviews. Each questionnaire contained three moral dilemmas related to the issues about life/laws, conscience/punishment, and contrast/authority. Some researchers have modified contents of the dilemma story, but the issues have remained unchanged. Snarey (1985) believed that though Kohlberg's questionnaires were not culture free at all; they were culture fair to participants from different cultures.


The claim of cultural universality has been examined by at least 45 studies in 27 cultural areas, including Western societies (e.g., England, Germany, New Zealand), non-Western societies that have influenced by the West (e.g., India, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan), and tribal or village folk populations (e.g., Ladakh Indians, Kalskagamuit Eskimos, rural Kenyan Kipsigis) (Snarey 1985). After a careful examination of the previous literature, Snarey (1985) indicated that, because stage skipping and stage regressions were rare, the invariant sequence proposition was well-supported.

Snarey also found that although the progress from stage 1 to stage 3/4 or 4 was virtually universal, the presence of stage 4/5 or 5 was extremely rare in all populations. Nearly all samples from urban populations or middle-class groups exhibited some stage 6 principled reasoning, but no tribal or folk cultural groups showed any postconventional reasoning upholding social constructs, utility, individual rights, or universal ethical principles. Moreover, much of the moral reasoning data from collectivist or communalistic societies either could not be scored according to the standardized manual or could not be explained in the context of Kohlberg's theory. Examples of this problem have been reported in the research of Israeli Kibbutz (Snarey 1982), Turkey (Nisan and Kohlberg 1982), India (Vasudev 1983), Papua New Guinea (Tietjen and Walker 1984), Taiwan (Lei and Cheng 1984; Cheng 1991), Kenya (Edwards 1986), and Hong Kong (Ma 1997).

Empirical Research in Confucian Society

Kohlberg's research paradigm was very popular in the international psychology community from 1970 to 1990. Many psychologists adopted his theory and method to conduct research on moral reasoning all over the world. There are also many psychologists who adopted Kohlberg's paradigm to test the hypothesis on cultural


Fig. 6.1 Percentage of moral reasoning at various stages by different age groups of Chinese subjects (adapted from Fu and Lei 1991, p. 238)



universality of moral development in Chinese societies. Kohlberg's dilemmas on life versus law, conscience versus punishment, or contract versus authority were translated into Chinese with minor adjustments for domestic culture. They were administered to Chinese participants in various development stages, asking a series of questions with responses evaluated in accordance with the standardized scoring system. Fu and Lei (1991) aggregated empirical data from several studies using this procedure (Fig. 6.1), and compared them with longitudinal data from American subjects collected by Kramer (1968) and Turiel (1974) (Fig. 6.2). Several trends emerge from a comparison of these two figures.

1. *Preconventional stage.* The obedience and punishment orientation of stage 1 and the instrumental purpose and exchange orientation of stage 2 consistently decreased in both Chinese and American samples. After age 16, both stages had disappeared in the Chinese sample, but some American subjects still used moral reasoning from these stages on. These findings suggest that the moral reasoning of Chinese children matured earlier than that of American children.
2. *Conventional stage.* The interpersonal accord and conformity orientation of stage 3 decreased continuously for the American sample, but the social accord and system maintenance orientation of stage 4 increased constantly and became the dominant stage in their later adolescence. The Chinese samples were different. Prior to age 14, there was no stage 4 thinking. Stage 3 increased from age 8 and became the dominant stage after age 13, reaching a peak of 90% usage at age 16. After that, stage 3 decreased quickly while stage 4 increased rapidly and became the dominant stage at age 18. Compared with their American counterparts, Chinese participants reached stage 4 of moral development later.

Fig. 6.2 Percentage of moral reasoning at various stages by different age groups of American subjects (adapted from Fu and Lei 1991, p. 240)



3. *Postconventional stage.* As found in previous research (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p.60), stage 6 thinking involving universal ethical principles was not empirically identifiable in either group, so it was dropped from the final analysis. Some of the American samples began to use a stage 5 orientation, valuing social contracts, utility, and individual rights after the age of 13, but the Chinese samples did not do so until age 20.

Although Kohlberg’s research method enables us to understand that the moral reasoning of Chinese children matured earlier than that of American children in their teenage years, their moral development in stages 4 and 5 was slower than that of American children. Kohlberg’s theory does not tell us the reason for this situation. Moreover, Cheng and Lei (1991) used Kohlberg’s paradigm and engaged in long-term empirical research in Taiwan. The data that they have collected demonstrates that it is very difficult to analyze the moral reasoning of many Chinese participants by using Kohlberg’s scoring system.

Findings of this kind enable us to see the limit of the imposed etic approach. As the Western paradigm is transplanted to Chinese culture, not only it is incompatible with the local culture, but also the collected data are difficult to explain. These problems caused by imposed etic approaches can be demonstrated with another example.

Rest’s Defining Issues Test

Rest (1979a) noticed the difficulties encountered by researchers adopting Kohlberg’s paradigm. He followed Piaget’s tradition, constructing the Four-Part Model of moral thinking and developing the Defining Issue Test (DIT) research instrument.

Like Kohlberg, Rest also differentiated two levels of moral thought: the deep structure level enables an individual to engage in moral thought from a unified perspective while the concrete moral thought level enables him to reach a specific conclusion. The organized system of moral judgment was separated into six stages, with the justice and progressive equilibriums used as the main concepts to define each stage. But Rest did not agree that the cognitive development necessarily progresses in sequence. A lot of research indicates that the conversion of cognitive structure is not a sudden process. Its reconstruction does not develop toward an integrated structure with a certain final model. In fact, it is a gradual conversion process with inconsistent stages.

1. Four-Component Model

Rest (1976) indicated that there are some fundamental differences between moral reasoning and moral conduct. He proposed a four-component model to account for the occurrence of moral conduct and its relationship with moral reasoning:

1. *Interpreting the situation.* For example, hearing the noise of a crying baby next door, one has to judge: Is it a case of child abuse or a mother placating her unhappy baby? Similarly, watching people moving during a battle, a commander has to judge: Are they guerrillas who are wearing plain clothes or nonthreatening civilians?
2. Figuring out what ought to be done in the situation: This component is closely connected to an individual's developmental stage of moral reasoning.
3. Deciding what one actually intends to do: An individual's personal values may affect his/her moral judgment at this stage.
4. Executing and implementing what one intends to do: This component involves an individual's will, ability, and persistence, which are all related to his/her ego strength and self-regulation skills.

In Rest's Four-Component Model (1979), components I and II are referred to, respectively, as social cognition and moral thinking. Social cognition is how an individual perceives the motivation of the people. The development of social cognition enables an individual to comprehend his/her social relations with others. Moral thinking deals with how an individual should treat others. The development of moral thinking enables an individual to solve his/her conflict with others in the most proper way. This is the main element of the rational social structure constructed by an individual in his/her relationship with society and other humans. It indicates ways to achieve goals. This plan is formulated in part III, an individual's decision-making process, in which an individual's motivation system may decide which plan to execute and which options to give up. The last part, part IV, refers to the external manifestation while an individual executes a plan.

Based on the Four-Part Model, Rest et al. (1974; 1979) constructed a standard DIT, which presents subjects with six stories of moral dilemmas. For each of these stories, subjects have to read a set of 12 statements defining the crucial issues about the moral dilemma, and then identify the four most important issues (Rest 1974,




Fig. 6.3 Means and SDs of P-index by Chinese and American students (adapted from Fu and Lei 1991, p. 235)

1976; Rest et al. 1974). Because the issues in some of the dilemma statements were defined in accordance with the principled moral thinking of Kohlberg’s stage 5 and 6, a score of principled moral thinking (P-score) can be computed for each participant by assessing the number of principled statements chosen by the participant across the six dilemma situations.

2. Principled Moral Thinking

Several psychologists have adopted Rest’s DIT instrument to collect data in Taiwan (Chen 1980; Gendron 1981; Sang 1980) and Hong Kong (Ma 1988; Ma and Cheung 1996). Fu and Lei (1991) aggregated findings of previous studies and compared the principled values of Taiwanese participants with their American counterparts; the results are listed in Fig. 6.3.

The mean difference between P-scores for the two cultural groups was small (only 1.7%) but significant ($t(1,645) = 3.93, p < .01$). The discrepancy between these two groups increased with age. It was 5.3% for high school students, and 6.8% for college students. The age trend indicates that the extent to which principled thinking was used in the Chinese sample increased more slowly than among their American counterparts.

This is an interesting finding that deserves our special attention. Compared with the findings of research following Kohlberg's paradigm, it is similar in that Chinese adolescents tend to use more stage 4 social order orientation and less of the "contract, right, and democratic law orientation" of stage 5. The so-called principled moral thinking means making moral judgments in accordance with the principles of universal justice. Viewed from the perspective of a "modern society," as the age of a "modern youth" increases, he/she is expected to use more "principled moral thinking." So, do those findings imply that Chinese participants may become less "modernized" as their age increases?

How can we explain such research findings? Because the DIT instrument was constructed on the basis of Western participants' responses to the standard questions, it is very hard to infer whether these questions have the same meanings in other cultural contexts. Moreover, the multiple choice format of the DIT does not allow the participants to respond to the dilemmas spontaneously, which is of crucial importance for understanding the participants' cultural background. These facts enable us to see the difficulties that might be encountered by the imposed etic approach.

Derived Etic Approach

Due to the aforementioned difficulties that may be encountered by using the imposed etic approach for understanding the psychology of people in a local society, some psychologists have attempted to overcome those difficulties by using the derived etic approach. These scholars adopted universalist presumptions for theoretical construction, and developed culturally fair instruments of measurement by taking into consideration both foreign and local cultures. Nevertheless, if a theorist has limited understanding of a local culture and uses a naive empiricist approach to develop a theory for a specific domain, the resulting theory can solve only definite empirical problems. Here, I would like to provide two examples to demonstrate my arguments: namely, Bloom's (1974, 1977) research on social principledness and social humanism and Wilson's (1974) study on moral and political thinking in Chinese society.

Social Principledness and Social Humanism

Bloom (1974, 1977) tried to conceptualize the specific features of moral and social thinking in Chinese society from a Western perspective. He defined two dimensions as bases for cross-cultural research on moral and social thinking. The first dimension is social principledness which deals with one's attitudes toward the legitimacy of legal and political institutions. An individual with high social principledness tends to examine the so-called correct behaviors defined by social legislation in

terms of his/her personal moral standards, and evaluates social demands with his/her own value system. He/she refuses to accept traditional values without thorough inquiry, follows his/her curiosity to seek the criteria for his/her moral judgments, and rejects assuming the responsibilities imposed by political authority.

Bloom's second dimension is social humanism which is an individual's sensitivity toward others' social actions and their implications. The individual's basis for judging social and political problems lies in his/her altruism, empathy, or sympathy for weakness that makes him/her unable to bear the suffering of others. A person with a strong tendency for social humanism would not defend any social or political actions that many cause the suffering of others, regardless of whether those actions are taken in the name of "correctness," "goodness," or "justice." S/he may not have feel obliged to inquire into the demands of authority, but s/he tends to feel that s/he is also a member of the group that might be influenced by certain policies, and is thus motivated to seek ways to alleviate the suffering of other members.

Based on this rationale, Bloom (1974) designed a "Social Principledess Scale" and a "Social Humanism Scale." Each item in the scale has four choices; the participant's responses to the items can be used to compute his/her scores on these two dimensions. Bloom assumed that these two dimensions of moral and social thinking are universally applicable to different cultures. According to him, in both Chinese and Western cultures, an individual tends to consider social and moral issues along these two dimensions. In order to test his hypothesis, Bloom collected data in Hong Kong, France, and the USA, analyzed them by factor analysis, and obtained a single factor for each scale. The internal consistency coefficients for Social Principledess Scale for participants from Hong Kong, France, and the USA were .71, .72, and .82, respectively; those for the Social Humanism Scale were .80, .82, and .83, respectively. The results indicated that these two scales measured two dimensions of social thinking with internal consistency in each culture. As far as the cultural differences were concerned, Bloom's (1974) empirical research indicated that the average score for HK participants in Social Principledness participants is .170; for France, it is .471, and for the USA, it is .429. One-way ANOVA showed that the differences among cultures are highly significant ($F(2,461)=81.82, p<.001$). The lower score of Hong Kong participants in Social Principledness Scale was explained in terms of the fact that the Chinese cultural traditions of obedience to authority and conflict avoidance (P.95) remain important in their political thinking.

Wilson's Approach

Along with Bloom (1974, 1977), Wilson (1974) also adopted the derived etic approach to study sociopolitical thinking in Chinese society. He conducted a long-term field study in Taiwan, used a specially developed instrument to compare the cultural differences among participants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and New York City's Chinatown, and published two books on the basis of his research, namely,

“Learning to be Chinese: Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan” (Wilson 1970) and *“The Moral State”* (Wilson 1974).

1. Model of Moral Development

Wilson (1974) developed his measurement instrument by using materials from sociopolitical thinking popular in Taiwanese society, and constructed his theory of moral development in an attempt to integrate the main ideas of both the cognitive development and social learning approaches. He advocated that the highest stage of moral development contains several internalized moral competencies: altruistic awareness, empathy, and personal responsibility.

Altruistic awareness is one’s ability to understand the claims of others. It has a cognitive component that enables an individual to adjust his/her actions in order to attain goals while still considering others. Empathy is a particular form of an affective relationship with others that involves the ability to take the place of the other emotionally. Its highest form is a state of sympathetic understanding and reciprocal interaction with others. Personal responsibility is one’s ability to accept the consequences of one’s decisions. It is based on one’s capability to make choices on the basis of one’s personal judgment independent from situational cues reflecting the influence of group or authority figures.

The development of moral capability may be influenced by some external factors, including affective manipulation, moral training, and autonomy training. Affective manipulation aims to make the child respect other’s viewpoints by inducing some specific types of anxiety in front of others, especially authority figures. Moral training emphasizes values that are necessary for an individual to be included in a particular social group, and that are rigidly unvarying in their applicability in order to maintain the social order. Autonomy training aims to develop one’s ability to behave in ambiguous contexts without relying on cues from social rules or other people. It involves a process of learning to act in terms of internalized notions of right and wrong that is essential for one’s willingness to be responsible for the consequences of such actions. Though there are individual differences in experiences with affective manipulation, moral training, and autonomy training, people living in a cultural group may share some common experiences that enable them to form similar values and behavior patterns, including the culture-specific types of moral beliefs and affective expressions.

An individual’s moral reasoning and moral judgment may progress to more mature stage as his/her age increases. Nevertheless, one’s moral ability contains not only the functioning of cognitive structure, but also ways of affective expression which are manifestations of one’s personality. Therefore, moral development reflects not only internal ability stage changes, but also the development of intelligence, empathy, and competence of self-integration. Those abilities are formed in the process of social learning and can be influenced by one’s sociocultural environment.

2. Heterocentrism/Autocentrism and Particularism/Universalism

Wilson (1974) constructed a measurement instrument for studying moral thinking on the basis of materials collected from his field research in Taiwanese society. There are two dimensions in his conceptual framework, heterocentrism/autocentrism and universalism/particularism. Heterocentrism is a tendency for

using cues provided by others as guides for one's own behavior while aut centrism is the tendency of using an internalized set of rules as ideal standards for one's behaviors. The meanings of these two terms have a generic relationship with the concepts of autonomy and heteronomy proposed by Piaget. However, Wilson (1974, p.128) emphasized that these two terms do not denote two stages of development, they represent two types of value orientation that may coexist within an individual, and are two discontinuous types of attitudinal disposition which are shaped by the cultural environment.

The second dimension is universalism/particularism. Particularism means that the standards of desirability for one's own behavior are provided by social agents of some specific relationships while universalism means that the standards of desirability for one's behavior are judged by general principles applicable to everyone. There is a high correlation between particularism and heterocentrism while universalism is related to aut centrism.

Comparison of Childhood Political Socialization

Based on this conceptualization, Wilson (1974) constructed two scales for his cross-cultural research, each item in these two scales describes a situation relating to politics. The participant was asked to choose one of four alternatives following each item. His/her tendency toward particularism/universalism or heterocentrism/autocentrism was, thus, measured. A large-scale research project was conducted to compare the effects of political socialization on third-, fifth-, and seventh-grade children from Taiwan ($n=335$), Hong Kong ($n=362$), America ($n=297$), and Chinatown (New York City) ($n=90$).

According to his model of social learning, Wilson (1974) assumed that an individual's value orientation and his/her internalized shame are shaped by cultural factors. Depending on the types of values emphasized during the social learning process, one may develop attitudes that are predominantly heterocentric or aut centric. The development of generalized aut centrism is related to the learning of universalistic values. Conversely, when particularistic values are emphasized in the role learning process, attitudes toward social issues tend to be predominantly heterocentric.

Wilson's research findings indicate that the mean percentage value of universal value orientation was 75% for children from Taiwan, followed by 72% for America, 69% for Hong Kong, and 61% for Chinatown. Their responses to four of the six questions on universalistic values were different significantly. The mean percentage values of participants' responses to the five questions about using general principles as action guidelines were 79% for Taiwan, 74% for Hong Kong, 72% for Chinatown, and 66% for America.

Generally speaking, the American children – supposedly influenced by the individual autonomy ideal and the cultural norm of general principles – do not score higher on the universalistic items than Taiwanese children do. This is of course contradictory to Wilson's hypothetical predictions.

Critique of the Imposed and Derived Etic Approaches

Interpreting Findings of Empirical Research

Though Bloom (1974, 1977) and Wilson (1974) were both studying sociopolitical thinking, their findings seem contradictory to one another. Bloom (1974, 1977) found that participants from Hong Kong scored lower on the “Social Principled Scale” than did Westerners; but they scored higher on the “Social Humanity Scale” than did Westerners. These findings seem familiar to those experienced with Chinese. However, Wilson’s (1974) research indicated that Taiwanese children do not always obtain a lower score on the universalistic items than American children. How can we explain such inconsistent findings?

It could be argued that these different findings can be explained by the different measurement instruments each researcher used. However, from the perspective of philosophy of science, if two measurement instruments are supposed to measure the same theoretical construct, similar results should be obtained by research projects using these instruments. So this explanation is not plausible. A more persuasive explanation takes into consideration the age difference between the participants of these two projects. The participants in Wilson’s (1974) research were third- to seventh-grade children while the participants of Bloom’s (1974, 1977) research were 21–25-year-old college students. The third section of this chapter points out that Fu and Lay (1991) reviewed research that adopted Kolberg’s paradigm in Chinese society and indicated that the moral thinking of Chinese children at the preconventional stage is more mature than their American counterparts, but that they are slower than American children to reach the fourth stage of “social-order maintenance orientation” and the fifth stage of “contract, right, and democratical law orientation.” Research following Rest’s paradigm also indicated that, compared with their American counterparts, Chinese participants tend to use less-principled thinking as their age increases. Viewed from this perspective, Bloom (1974, 1977) and Wilson’s (1974) research findings become understandable.

By doing so, we are explaining empirical research findings in terms of previous research results. We are unable to answer the aforementioned problems at a theoretical level. Pragmatically speaking, findings of empirical research should be explained in the context of a theory (Laudan 1977). If empirical facts cannot be explained by preexisting theories, the anomaly urges us to construct a new theory to solve the empirical problems. But what kind of theory may satisfy our cognitive interest in meeting these challenges?

The Existential Phase of Development

This question can be partially answered by Gibbs’ critiques on Kohlberg’s paradigm. John Gibbs was Kohlberg’s student. As a long collaborator of Kohlberg, he tried to revise Kohlberg’s theory in terms of Piaget’s phylogenetic perspective

(Gibbs 1977, 1979). He proposed that human development includes both “standard” and “existential” phases. According to Piaget, human intelligence is a holistic phenomenon encompassing social, moral, and logico-physical aspects. Its development follows a standard sequence, just like that of other species. The completion of physical maturation provides a foundation for the development of a second phase, which is unique to the human species.

Gibbs (1979) proposed four stages of the standard phase that correspond to stages 1 through 4 in Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. Along with the expansion of second-order thinking over the course of the adolescent years, there is a progressive ability for a person at the highest stages of standard development to apply a detached metaperspective to comprehend complex social systems as found in modern society. Furthermore, people in this stage may reflect on the conditions of their existence in the world. As a consequence of reflection upon one’s own existence, one may try to define a moral theory to justify one’s basic moral terms or principles “from a standpoint outside that of a member of society” (Kohlberg 1973, P. 192). Unlike the standard phase, no epigenetic change underlies existential development; therefore, it follows no necessary standard sequence. People all over the world show a wide variety in their philosophies of morality, science, and life. Normative philosophies provide material for meta-ethical reflections or second-order thinking when an individual is trying to define his/her own moral theory.

If Gibb’s (1997) argument that stages 1–4 are genuine stages of cognitive development is acceptable, then the differences between Chinese and American samples in the pre-conventional and conventional stages can be attributed to cultural differences in child-rearing practices (for example, see Ho 1986; Wu 1996). The findings partially support Kohlberg’s (1981) hypothesis that individuals in both cultures go through the same sequence of gross stage development, although they vary in their rate of development. This difference may reflect a contrast in divergent rationalities or normative philosophies rather than in cognitive development or maturation.

According to Kohlberg’s standard for moral thinking at the post-conventional stage (1981), an individual at stage 5 may be aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to one’s group, and should be upheld because they are part of a social contract. However, some nonrelative values like life and liberty must be upheld in any society regardless of the majority’s opinion. This standard clearly reflects the Western value of individualism that considers the human rights of life and liberty to be nonrelative values while collectivist values or positive duties toward specific targets are spurned as relative values.

What is the legitimate standard of moral thinking for Chinese adolescents as they reach the post-conventional stage? It would be difficult to answer this question by following the imposed etic approach. Imposing the legitimate standard hidden in Western theory on the Chinese participants may lead to a biased conclusion that the development of Chinese moral judgment is slower than that of their American counterparts.

From the perspective of philosophy of science, a scientific microworld is basically a second-order interpretation constructed by a single scientist to

answer either theoretical or empirical problems (Laudan 1977). If a researcher has limited knowledge of the local culture and adopts the naïve positivism's inductive approach in an attempt to construct a theory by collecting empirical data, s/he may take into consideration specific local cultural features and develop the so-called culturally fair research paradigm using the derived etic approach. This approach seems appropriate for cross-cultural comparison. In fact, it is often difficult to explain the inconsistent findings of empirical research. The limitation of this approach can be seen in Bloom (1974, 1976) and Wilson's (1974) research findings.

Indigenous Psychology Research

Now that we have established the limitations of the “imposed etic” and “derived etic” approaches, we are ready to discuss the indigenous psychology approach. In order to determine a legitimate standard for the moral thinking of Chinese adolescents, it is necessary to use the indigenous approach to construct psychological theories with serious consideration of the normative philosophies prevalent in Chinese society. Though the two indigenous approach research projects we are going to discuss in the following section adopt an etic approach, their philosophical assumptions are based on universalism, not absolutism. This is essentially different from the etic approach proposed by Barry et al. (1992).

Ma's Two-Parameter Moral Development Theory

Dien (1982) argued that Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development contains a Western conceptualization of human being as an autonomous moral agent able to make rational choice while the Confucian conceptualization of human being is more concerned with harmonious interdependent existence in the universe. The core concept in Confucianism is “*ren*,” its fundamental manifestation is filial piety, and the sentiment for one's clan can be expanded to larger circles including all human beings. She mentioned works by anthropologist Harumi Befu (1977) on concepts, such as “*on*” and “*gi ri*” involved in Japanese gift-giving behavior, and expected similar research to be conducted in Chinese society.

Based on this perspective, Ma (1997) indicated that many psychologists have criticized Kohlberg's theory for neglecting the affective aspect of moral development (Gilligan 1982; Peters 1971). Because Chinese moral thinking and moral judgment tend to emphasize both *qing* (humanity, benevolence, or human heartedness) and *li* (rationality), any theory of Chinese moral development should focus on the affective aspect more than the cognitive approach of the Western tradition.

1. Parameter I: Justice

Ma (1997), therefore, constructed a theory of seven-stage moral development which considered both the affective and cognitive aspects, and proposed two fundamental parameters for studying Chinese moral development. The cognitive aspect is represented by the first parameter of justice, constructed in accordance with Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) theory of moral development. The affective aspect is represented by the altruism and interpersonal relationship parameters. It is constructed on the basis of a series of research projects undertaken by Ma himself (Ma 1982, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1996). For each of these seven stages, there is a universal structure with both a Western and a Chinese substructure. The characteristics of the Chinese substructures are illustrated with ideas from Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism.

According to Kohlberg, justice is "a rational form of equilibrium between conflicting interpersonal claims," and a just solution to a moral dilemma should be "a solution acceptable to all parties who consider each as free and equal" (Kohlberg 1981, 1984). Kohlberg advocated for the sequence of moral development to be divided into six stages, forming a universal and invariant sequence in all cultural settings.

Ma agreed with Kohlberg's viewpoint that the sequential stages of children's cognitive development for moral thinking are universal. Nevertheless, in order to construct a theory of Chinese moral development, it is necessary to take into consideration another parameter, namely, "altruism and human relationship." In other words, the cognitive development parameter for moral judgment reflects the nature of a universal mind while the "altruism and human relationship" parameter reflects a specific mentality of people in Chinese society. The former is mainly determined by maturation, and the latter is subject to the influence of one's social learning experiences.

2. Parameter II: Altruism and Human Relationship

The altruism and human relationship parameter is concerned with one's affective orientation toward others. It involves voluntary behavior aimed to increase the recipient's likelihood of survival without expectation of his/her repayment; to help the receiver to maintain emotional stability; to promote the receiver to a higher level of cognitive, moral, and self-development; or to help him/her to achieve a new psychological ability to satisfy his/her needs for physiological equilibrium, safety, love and belonging, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow 1987).

By referring to the theory of cognitive development, Ma (1997) proposed a theory which differentiates seven stages of development for altruism, namely, (1) obedience and egoism; (2) instrumental purpose and opportunistic hedonism; (3) primary group affection and conformity; (4) golden mean orientation and social system; (5) utilitarianism and basic rights; (6) *ren* and universal ethical principles; and (7) natural harmony.

According to the hierarchy of human relationships (Ma 1997), the probability for an individual to offer to help another decreases according to relationship in the following order:

R1: First kin or close relationship

R2: Best friends or intimates

R3: Three kinds of special strangers

1. Strangers who are very weak, for example a blind person
2. The very young, for example a 6-year-old child
3. Social elite, for example those who have received a Nobel prize

R4: Common strangers

R5: People who are disliked or are enemies

Empirical Research Using the Two-Parameter Moral Development Theory

Here, an example may be provided to illustrate how Ma's Moral Development Theory can be used to conduct empirical indigenous psychology research. Under Ma's supervision, Tam (2003) constructed a "Moral Development Questionnaire" (MDQ) to assess a participant's (a) moral orientations and (b) moral judgment stages. This questionnaire contained two dilemmas: *On the Way to the Examination Center* and *Sea Liner Accident*. The two MDQ dilemmas were presented as follows:

On the Way to the Examination Center

Situation 1

Suppose you were a high school student. To study in university has been your ultimate goal since childhood. Today is university admission examination day. You are confident that you will perform well on the examination. However, on the way to the examination center, you find person X lying on the street. Although (s)he is still conscious, his/her head is bleeding. If you stop and help him/her, you will definitely not be able to make it to the examination, which would result in losing your chances for further study.

Sea Liner Accident

Situation 1

Suppose you were traveling by ship. An accident occurs that causes the ship to sink, and you end up in the sea. Although you can swim, you know that you can only sustain yourself for a short period of time. Fortunately, you see a helicopter flying toward you. A lifebelt tied by a rope drops down slowly from the helicopter. Suddenly, you notice that there is another victim X not far away from you who is also struggling in the sea, and also seems as if he/she cannot last long.

The MDQ measured moral orientations by asking participants to indicate on a 7-point scale (i.e., Definitely Yes to Definitely No), their likelihood of offering help to person X in the two hypothetical dilemmas, i.e., *On the Way to the Examination Center* (D_1) and *Sea Liner Accident* (D_2). Each dilemma had three situational variations: (a) the cost of offering help is high (S_1); (b) the cost of offering help is high

and there are bystanders nearby (S_2); and (c) the cost of offering help is low (S_3). Subjects were asked to show the possibility of offering help to X under particular situational settings.

Moreover, the identity of X also varied following Ma's (1985, 1989) hierarchy of human relationships, i.e., R_1 =First kin (father or mother); R_2 =Best friends; R_3 =Strangers who are very weak or very young, or who are members of the social elite; R_4 =Common strangers; R_5 =Someone you dislike or enemies. Therefore, subjects in the MDQ revealed a total of 30 moral orientations, i.e., 2 dilemmas x 3 situations x 5 human relationships.

To measure the moral judgment levels, participants with different academic backgrounds were invited to join an in-depth interview conducted by the researcher himself. They were first presented with the MDQ's two hypothetical dilemmas, and then asked to answer moral orientation questions that were exactly the same as those in the MDQ mentioned above. After completing the questions, the subjects were asked several further questions by the interviewer to investigate the reasons and justifications underlying their choices. Prototypic responses that could represent different moral judgment stages were extracted from the interview transcripts as reference material for constructing the test items.

In the MDQ, each situation was followed by a set of seven prototypic stage statements, asking participants to rate on a 5-point scale (From Very Great Importance to No Importance) how important each of the statements would be in deciding the answers concerning their choices to help or not to help. For example, in the moral dilemma *On the Way to the Examination Center*, Stage II and Stage V prototypic stage statements were represented by the two statements: Will people on the street reward me for helping X ? And Should I need to offer help to X without hesitation even if there are other people on the street that can offer help to X as well?

According to Tam (2003), the two measurements in the MDQ, i.e., moral orientation and moral judgment, measured two different aspects of moral development. Specifically, moral orientation represented a participant's first impression that comes to mind after reading the dilemma under specified situational settings. Moral judgment, however, represents how an individual justified or rationalized his or her decisions once they had been made. Because the MDQ was designed to ask a subject his or her moral orientation first and then his or her moral judgment, it is reasonable to suggest that the moral judgment itself might not necessarily be included in the moral decision-making process. However, the participants can still explain why they make this kind of moral decisions afterward. Tam (2003) believes that this questionnaire's design can exactly measure these two aspects of participants' moral development.

One of the study's main findings was a significant interaction effect between human relationship (R_i) and moral dilemmas (D_j) (see Fig. 6.3). Stated more explicitly, comparing the moral orientation scores between the two dilemmas *On the way to the Examination Center* (D_1) and *Sea Liner Accident* (D_2) for the five types of human relationship, the results indicated that D_1R_3 , D_1R_4 , and D_1R_5 were significantly lower than their corresponding indices of D_2R_3 , D_2R_4 , and D_2R_5 . However, insignificant differences were found between D_1R_1 and D_2R_2 . In other words, the participants were less likely to help an individual of remote relationship

Fig. 6.4 Helping tendency towards person of different relationships R_1 (First kin), R_2 (Best friends), R_3 (Weak stranger or social elite), R_4 (Common stranger), R_5 (Enemies) in two dilemmas D_1 (On the way to the Examination Center) and D_2 (Sea Liner Accident) (Adopted from Tam, 2003: 238)





Fig. 6.5 Helping tendency towards person of different relationships R_1 (First Kin), R_2 (Best friends), R_3 (Weak stranger or social elite), R_4 (Common stranger), R_5 (Enemies) in three situations S_1R_1 (high cost), S_2R_1 (High cost, with bystander) and S_3R_1 (Low cost) (Adopted from Tam, 2003: 239)



in a nonfatal situation than in a fatal situation. The difference disappeared if the help seekers were their parents or best friends.

Similarly, human relationship indices in the three situations were found to be significant (see Fig. 6.4). Alongside the main situation's effect, a consistent helping pattern, i.e., $S_3R_1 > S_1R_1 > S_2R_1$, was revealed in all human relationships. Although the helping tendency in cases when the cost of offering help was high (S_2R_1) was found to be significantly lower than that when the cost was low (S_3R_1) or when there were bystanders nearby (S_1R_1), the difference between S_1R_1 and S_3R_1 was insignificant (see Fig. 6.5). Therefore, the relationship between situational characteristics

and helping tendency was mediated by the human relationship factor, especially if the help seeker was first kin to the subject.

Conclusion

Hwang (2006) advocates that three levels of breakthrough need to be made for indigenous psychology to progress. The areas requiring breakthroughs include philosophical reflection, theoretical construction, and empirical research. This chapter has adopted the perspective of philosophy of science while critically reviewing previous theories about, and empirical research into, Chinese moral thought. The review enables us to see the limitations of the imposed etic approach and the derived etic approach.

Ma's research represents an emic approach of indigenous psychology. He constructed his two-parameter model of moral development from the perspective of developmental psychology. He proposed the most influential cultural traditions for Chinese moral thinking are Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. However, he does not detail the relationships between his two-parameter moral development theory and these cultural traditions. Furthermore, his model should be examined by empirical research of longitudinal rather than cross-sectional design.

Hwang (1995) constructed the Face and Favor theoretical model from the perspective of social psychology, then applied a structural analysis to the Chinese cultural traditions of Taoism, Confucianism, Legalism, and the Martial School, and insisted that different scientific microworlds should be constructed for each of these cultural traditions respectively. In previous chapters, I explained how the cultural tradition of Confucianism can be analyzed by this approach.

Tam's (2003) thesis attempted to provide an example demonstrating how to conduct empirical indigenous psychology research within Chinese society on the basis of Ma's theory. However, his research adopted a cross-sectional design rather than a longitudinal design. Findings of his empirical research can hardly be used to verify or falsify Ma's developmental model. Nevertheless, conceiving of the context of Hempel's (1965) deductive model of scientific explanation as stated in the beginning of this chapter, research findings of this type can be explained in terms of the Confucian ethics for ordinary people, one of the theoretical models of Confucian Relationalism.

The degree to which language and propositions within one scientific microworld can be translated into those of another is referred as "strangificability" by Fritz Wallner (1994, 1997). According to his constructive realism, any psychologist may construct a scientific microworld based upon certain presumptions. The scientific microworlds, thus, constructed have various extents of strangificability; if the language and propositions in some microworlds can be translated into the language of other microworlds, then they have a high extent of strangificability. However, if the propositions in a given microworld cannot be translated into the language of other microworlds, then their strangificaibility are thus limited. Though both Ma (1997)

and Hwang have adopted emic approaches toward indigenous psychology, they have constructed scientific microworlds with different extents of strangificability. I elaborate on these issues in more detail in the next chapter.

References

- Barry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Befu, H. (1977). Social exchange. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 6, 255–281.
- Bloom, A. H. (1974). *Social principledness and social humanism: A cross-cultural investigation into dimensions of politico-moral reasoning*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
- Bloom, A. H. (1977). Two dimensions of moral reasoning: Social principledness and social humanism in cross-cultural perspective. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 101, 29–44.
- Chen, Y. H. (1980). A revision of Defining Issue Test and its related research (in Chinese). *Journal of Education*, 1, 318–356.
- Cheng, S. W. (1991). A cross-cultural investigation of research on the development of moral judgment (in Chinese). In C. F. Yang & H. S. J. Kao (Eds.), *Chinese people and Chinese mind* (pp. 213–304). Taipei: Yuan-liu.
- Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1984). *The measurement of moral judgment, (Vols. I and II)*. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Dien, D. S. F. (1982). A Chinese perspective on Kohlberg's theory of moral development. *Developmental Review*, 2, 331–341.
- Edwards, C. P. (1986). Cross-cultural research on Kohlberg's stages: The basis for consensus. In S. Modgil & C. Modgil (Eds.), *Cognitive development and epistemology* (pp. 419–430). NY: Academic.
- Fu, P. Y., & Lei, T. (1991). Research on the development of moral reasoning in Taiwan and Hong Kong (in Chinese). In C. F. Yang & H. S. J. Kao (Eds.), *Chinese people and Chinese mind* (pp. 213–303). Taipei: Yuan-liu.
- Gendron, L. (1981). *An empirical study of the Defining Issues Test in Taiwan*. Unpublished manuscript, Fujen Catholic University, Taiwan
- Gibbs, J. (1977). Kohlberg's stages of moral development: A constructive critique. *Harvard Educational Review*, 47, 43–61.
- Gibbs, J. C. (1979). Kohlberg's moral stage theory: A Piagetian revision. *Human Development*, 22, 89–112.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). New maps of development: New visions of maturity. *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 52, 199–212.
- Hempel, C. G. (1965). *Aspects of scientific explanation*. NY: Macmillan.
- Ho, D. Y. H. (1986). Chinese patterns of socialization: A critical review. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *The psychology of the Chinese people* (pp. 1–37). Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Hwang, K. K. (2006). Moral face and social face: Contingent self-esteem in Confucian society. *International Journal of Psychology*, 41(4), 276–281.
- Hwang, K. K. (1995). *Knowledge and action: A social-psychological Interpretation of Chinese Cultural Tradition (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Sin-Li.
- Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In L. Mischel (Ed.), *Cognitive development and epistemology* (pp. 151–284). NY: Academic.
- Kohlberg, L. (1973). Continuities in childhood and adult moral development revisited. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), *Life-span developmental psychology* (2nd ed.). NY: Academic.
- Kohlberg, L. (1981). *Essays on moral Development (Vol. 1): The philosophy of moral development*. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row.

- Kohlberg, L. (1984). *Essays on moral development (Vol. 2): The psychology of moral development*. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row.
- Kohlberg, L., Colby, A., Gibbs, J., & Speicher-dubin, B. (1978). *Standard from scoring manual*. Cambridge, MA: Center for Moral education, Harvard University.
- Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., & Hower, A. (1983). Moral stages: A current formulation and a response to critics. In J. A. Meacham (Ed.), *Contributions to human development (Vol. 10)*. NY: Karger.
- Kramer, R. (1968). *Moral development in young adulthood*. University of Chicago, Chicago, IL: Unpublished manuscript.
- Laudan, L. (1977). *Progress and its problems: Toward a theory of scientific growth*. New Dehli: Ambika Publications.
- Lei, T., & Cheng, S. W. (1984). *An empirical study of Kohlberg's theory and scoring system of moral judgment in Chinese society*. Unpublished manuscript, Center for Moral Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
- Ma, H. K. (1982). *A study of moral development with special reference to psychological needs, human relationships and structures of judgment*. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of London.
- Ma, H. K. (1988). Objective moral judgment in Hong Kong, Mainland China, and England. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 19*, 78–95.
- Ma, H. K. (1989). Moral orientation and moral judgment in adolescents in Hong Kong, Mainland China, and England. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 20*, 152–177.
- Ma, H. K. (1992). The relation of altruistic orientation to human relationships and moral judgment in Chinese people. *International Journal of Psychology, 27*, 377–400.
- Ma, H. K. (1993). The relationship of altruistic orientation to human relationships and situational factors in Chinese children. *The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 154*, 85–96.
- Ma, H. K. (1996). Moral orientation and moral judgment of Chinese adolescents. In G. K. Becker (Ed.), *Ethics in business and society: Chinese and Western perspectives*. Heidelberg: Springer.
- Ma, H. K. (1997). The affective and cognitive aspects of moral development in Chinese (in Chinese). *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies, 7*, 166–212.
- Ma, H. K., & Cheung, C. K. (1996). A cross-cultural study of moral stage structure in Hong Kong Chinese, English, and Americans. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27*, 700–713.
- Maslow, A. H. (1987). *Motivation and personality* (3rd ed.). NY: Harper & Row.
- Nisan, M., & Kohlberg, L. (1982). University and variation in moral judgment: A longitudinal and cross-sectional study in Turkey. *Child Development, 53*, 865–876.
- Peters, R. S. (1971). Moral development: A plea for pluralism. In T. Mischel (Ed.), *Cognitive development and epistemology*. NY: Academic.
- Piaget, J. (1932). *The moral judgment of the child*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Piaget, J. (1972/1981). *The principle of genetic epistemology* (W. Mays, trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rest, J. R. (1974). *Manual for the defining issue test: An objective test of moral judgment development*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.
- Rest, J. R. (1976). New approach in the assessment of moral judgment. In T. Lickona (Ed.), *Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, and social issues* (pp. 198–218). NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Rest, J. R. (1979). *Development in judging moral issues*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rest, J., Cooper, D., Coder, R., Masanz, J., & Anderson, D. (1974). Judging the important issues in moral dilemmas. *Developmental Psychology, 10*, 491–501.
- Sang, W. Z. (1980). *The family factors and their influence on the development of moral judgment (in Chinese)*. Unpublished Masters thesis, National Taiwan Normal University.
- Snarey, J. (1982). The social and moral development of kibbutz founders and sabras: A longitudinal and cross-sectional cross-cultural study (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1982). *Dissertation Abstracts International, 43*, 3416b, (University Microfilms No. 83–02, 435).

- Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. *Psychological Bulletin*, 27, 202–232.
- Tam, K. K. (2003). *Situational influences on moral orientation and moral judgment of the Chinese people: Theoretical exploration and empirical validation*. Unpublished doctoral thesis manuscript, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong.
- Tietjen, A., & Walker, L. (1984). *Moral reasoning and leadership among men in a Papua New Guinea village*. Unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
- Turiel, E. (1974). Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development. *Child Development*, 45, 14–29.
- Vasudev, J. (1983). *A study of moral reasoning at different life stages in India*. Unpublished manuscript, University of Pittsburgh, PA.
- Wallner, F. (1994). *Constructive realism: Aspects of new epistemological movement*. Wien: W. Braumuller.
- Wilson, R. W. (1970). *Learning to be Chinese: The political socialization of Chinese and American children*. NY: The Free Press.
- Wilson, R. W. (1974). *The moral state: A study of the political socialization of Chinese and American children*. NY: The Free Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1945). *Philosophical investigations* (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.) Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wu, D. Y. H. (1996). Chinese childhood socialization. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *The handbook of Chinese psychology* (pp. 143–154). Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 7

Moral Thought and Moral Judgment in Confucian Society

Abstract A conceptual scheme was proposed to describe the features of Confucian ethics for ordinary people from various perspectives of Western ethics. The characteristics of Confucian ethics were discussed in contrast with Western morality of individualism. The impacts of the new culture movement in the May Fourth era on Confucianism and the implications of the Gongde movement for its modification in Taiwan were discussed. Empirical findings of qualitative research were interpreted in terms of some current conceptual schemes; results of some quantitative researches on cross-cultural comparison were presented to support the approach advocated in this book.

Keywords Positive duties • Negative duties • Unconditional positive duties • Divergent rationalities • New culture movement • Norm of reciprocity • In-group bias

Introduction

The previous chapter critically reviews previous research on Chinese moral thought and moral judgment. The author argues that both the imposed etic and the derived etic approach have their own limitations. Even the scientific microworlds constructed with an emic approach toward indigenous psychology may have various extents of strangifiability, which must be taken into consideration to increase the applicability of a particular microworld. In order to better integrate research findings, this chapter intends to extend the previously established scientific microworld, which was constructed upon various research fields.

Chapter 5 analyzes the inner structure of Confucianism. This sort of analysis enables us to see that the Confucian cultural tradition, especially the Confucian ethics for ordinary people, has profound influence on Chinese moral thought. Viewed in terms of Kant's (1797/1963) *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*, the Western

moral system was supported by Christian religious metaphysics. However, the Confucian moral system is established upon the Confucian cosmology and understanding of life. More specifically, although Confucian ethics for ordinary people may have direct influence on Chinese moral thought, it should be understood in the context of Confucian moral metaphysics, which is elaborated in the deep structure of Confucianism. In order to illustrate the differences between the theoretical models of “Confucian relationalism” constructed by the author and the emic approach of other indigenous psychologists, this chapter details Confucian ethics for ordinary people from the perspectives of Western ethics following the analysis of the deep structure of Confucianism in Chap. 5.

Confucian Ethics for Ordinary People

The Benevolence–Righteousness–Propriety Ethical System

In my book *Knowledge and Action* (Hwang 1995), I subdivided the ethical arrangements for interpersonal relationships proposed by the Confucian Way of Humanity into two categories: ethics for ordinary people and ethics for scholars. The former category, which should be followed by everyone, including scholars, is best described by the following propositions in *The Golden Mean*:

Benevolence is the characteristic attribute of a person. The first priority of its expression is showing affection to those closely related to us. Righteousness means appropriateness, respecting the superior is its most important rule. Loving others according to who they are and respecting superiors according to their ranks gives rise to the forms and distinctions of propriety (*li*) in social life. (Chap. 20)

This statement illustrates the crucial relationships among the concepts of benevolence, righteousness, and propriety (Hwang 1995). Confucius advised that social interaction should begin with an assessment of the role relationship between oneself and others along two social dimensions: intimacy/distance and superiority/inferiority. Behavior that favors people with whom there is a close relationship can be termed benevolence (*ren*), respecting others for whom respect is required by the relationship is called righteousness (*yi*), and acting according to previously established rites or social norms is called propriety (*li*).

Western social psychologists classify the concept of justice in human society into two categories: procedural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice refers to the types of procedures that should be used by members of a group to determine methods of resource distribution. Distributive justice is the particular method of distribution that is accepted by group members (Leventhal 1976, 1980).

Confucian ethics for ordinary people can be interpreted in terms of Western justice theory. Confucius advocated that procedural justice in social interaction should be based on the principle of respecting the superior. The resource allocator role

should be played by the person who occupies the superior position. In choosing an appropriate method for distributive justice, the resource allocator should follow the principle of favoring the intimate. Furthermore, from the Confucian perspective, it is righteous to determine who has decision-making power by calling on the principle of respecting the superior, and it is righteous for the resource allocator to distribute resources in accordance with the principle of favoring the intimate. It should be emphasized that the Confucian concept of *yi* (righteousness) is frequently translated into English as justice. However, the meaning of *yi* is completely different from the concept of universal justice in Western culture (Rawls 1971). *Yi* is usually used in connection with other Chinese characters like *ren-yi* (literally, benevolent righteousness or benevolent justice) or *qing-yi* (literally, affective righteousness or affective justice).

In an earlier article entitled “Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game” (Hwang 1987), I diagrammed the dynamics of Chinese social interaction. Confucian ethics for ordinary people can be mapped onto my theoretical Face and Favor Model (Fig. 4.1) in the following way: The expressive component in the relationship (*guanxi*) corresponds to the concept of *ren*. *Yi* is to choose an appropriate rule for exchange by considering the expressive component (or affection) between the actors. After careful consideration, the final behavior should follow the social norm of politeness (*li*).

In Fig. 4.1, a diagonal bisects the rectangle denoting *guanxi* (interpersonal relationship). The shadowed section represents the instrumental component, and the unshaded section represents the expressive component of the relationship. “Instrumental” refers to the fact that as biological organisms, people have a variety of innate desires. Usually, they must interact with others in an instrumental manner to obtain the resources required to satisfy these desires. The expressive component denotes interpersonal affection between two parties. The instrumental component mingles with the expressive component in all interpersonal relationships. There are three types of interpersonal relationships: Expressive ties describe relationships within the family, mixed ties include relationships with acquaintances outside the immediate family, and instrumental ties are established between an individual and a stranger simply for the purpose of acquiring a particular resource.

Five Cardinal Relationships

Emphasizing the principle of respecting the superior in procedural justice, and the principle of favoring the intimate in distributive justice constitutes the formal structure of Confucian ethics for ordinary people. While this formal structure becomes manifest in many types of interpersonal relationships, Confucians also make specific ethical demands for certain special relationships. Confucians have established five cardinal ethics for the five major dyadic relationships in Chinese society, proposing that the social interaction between members of each pair should be constructed on the basis of the Way of Humanity. However, each of the roles or functions in these

five cardinal relationships is distinctive, indicating that the core values that should be emphasized in each are also different:

...Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and subordinate, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between elder brother and younger, a proper order; and between friends, friendship. (The Works of Mencius, Chapter 3A: Duke Wen of Teng)

Three of these five cardinal rules were designed for regulating interpersonal relationships within the family (expressive ties). The other two relationships – friends and sovereign/subordinate – are mixed tie relations. It should be noted that, except for the relationship between friends, the remaining four relationships are vertical ones between superiors and inferiors.

What are the things which humans consider righteous (*yi*)? Kindness on the part of the father, and filial duty on that of the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and obedience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of the husband, and submission on that of the wife; kindness on the part of the elders, and deference on that of juniors; benevolence on the part of the ruler, and loyalty on that of the minister. These are the ten things which humans consider to be right. (Li Chi, Chapter IX: Li Yun)

In the passage above, which does not include a reference to relationships between friends, the idea that social interaction in these role relationships should follow the principle of respecting the superior is paramount. Stated more precisely, in accordance with the idea of “the ten things of righteousness (*yi*),” an individual who assumes the roles of father, elder brother, husband, elders, or ruler should make decisions in line with the principles of kindness, gentleness, righteousness, kindness, and benevolence, respectively. And for those who assume the roles of son, younger brother, wife, juniors, and minister, the principles of filial duty, obedience, submission, deference, loyalty, and obedience apply.

Due to their belief about the origin of each individual’s life, Confucians emphasized the value of a kind father and a filial son over and above the other “ten things.” When Confucians contemplated the ontology of the universe, they did not conceive of a transcendent creator as did the Christians. Instead, on the basis of Chinese cosmology, they recognized a simple fact: individuals’ lives are the continuation of their parents’ physical lives. Confucian advocacy for filial piety is premised upon this indisputable fact.

Positive and Negative Duties in Confucian Society

This section describes features of Confucian ethics in terms of the distinctions between perfect/imperfect and negative/positive duties proposed by Western scholars. The inadequacy of Western rationalism in understanding Confucian ethics is explored, and a revised system of concepts to denote the features of Confucian ethics constituted on the basis of interpersonal affection is proposed.

According to Nunner-Winkler (1984, p. 349), the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties was first introduced by Kant (1797/1963) in his *Metaphysik der Sitten*, and later elaborated on as negative and positive duties respectively by Gert

(1973) in his book *The Moral Rules*. Negative duties simply require abstention from action (e.g., do not kill, do not cheat, do not steal). They are duties of omission. So long as they are not in conflict with other duties, they can be followed strictly by anyone in any situation with regard to all other persons. In Kant's metaphysics of morality, they are termed perfect duties.

Positive and Negative Duties

Positive duties are usually stated as maxims that guide actions (e.g., practice charity, help the needy). They are duties of commission, but they do not specify which and how many good deeds should be performed and whom they are to benefit so that the maxim can be said to have been fulfilled. The application of any positive maxim requires the actor to take into consideration all concrete conditions and to exercise powers of judgment. Because it is impossible for an individual to practice any positive maxim all the time and with regard to everybody, positive duties are called imperfect duties in Kantian ethics terminology. In Western theory, perfect and negative duties are equivalent, as are imperfect and positive duties.

The theoretical analysis presented above is a meta-ethical reflection on the nature of the Western ethics of Rationalism. Trying to understand the properties of Confucian ethics with the same line of reasoning leads to a series of problems. According to Kantian reasoning, all ethical demands emanating from the Confucian Way of Humanity are imperfect duties. However, Confucians believe that the Confucian ethics for ordinary people entails both perfect and imperfect duties. This seeming contradiction is a crucial point in understanding the difference between Eastern and Western philosophies, so it should be elaborated.

The Confucian Way of Humanity consists of both positive and negative duties. The positive duty of benevolence means doing favors by giving various resources to others. But how can ordinary people with limited resources possibly practice the positive duty of benevolence toward all other people? Mencius proposed a rule of thumb: Take care of one's own aged parents first and then extend your care to aged people in general; look after one's own children first and then extend love to others' children (The Works of Mencius, Chap. 1A: King Hui of Liang). Mencius advocated hierarchical love, or love with distinction. Love one's parents who are the origin of one's life first of all, then extend love to other people in accordance with one's relationship (degree of intimacy) with them. Practicing this love with distinction accords with the Confucian ethics for ordinary people and represents virtue.

Do Not Do to Others What You Do Not Wish to Have Done to You

The Confucian Way of Humanity also includes negative duties as represented by the silver rule: Do not do to others what you do not wish to have done to you. The term "others" in this sentence denotes other people in general, including those who do not belong to any of the five cardinal relations categories. Putting this idea in terms

Table 7.1 Significant features of Confucian ethics from the perspectives of action, rationality, and affection

Concepts of Confucian ethics	Gert's perspective of action	Kant's perspective of rationality	Hwang's perspective of affection
Golden rule	Negative duty	Imperfect duty	Negative duty (Perfect duty)
<i>Ethics for ordinary people (Filial Piety)</i>	<i>Positive duty</i>	<i>Imperfect duty</i>	Unconditional positive duty
Ethics for scholars (<i>Loyalty</i>)	Positive duty	Imperfect duty	Positive duty (Imperfect duty)

of the Face and Favor model (Fig. 4.1), the principle of negative duties applies not only to interpersonal relationships consisting of affective ties or mixed ties but also to those involving instrumental ties.

The silver rule is a negative duty. It can be followed strictly by any person in any situation, so it should also be a perfect duty. However, from the perspective of Kantian ethics, all demands emanating from the Way of Humanity, regardless of whether they are positive or negative duties, are considered imperfect duties. Kant was a rationalist. He proposed a single categorical imperative applicable to all rationalists: Act so that the outcome of one's conduct is "the universal will." Principles derived from an individual's feelings, affections, dispositions, or preferences may not be universally applicable to others, and should be considered merely subjective principles. The fact that an individual following the silver rule must rely on personal feelings and preferences led Kant to include a footnote in his book *Metaphysik der Sitten* pointing out that this Confucian maxim cannot be a universal law, for it:

[C]ontains no basis for prescribing duties to oneself or kindness to others (e.g., many people would agree that others should not help him or her if they don't expect help themselves), or clearly demarcated duties toward others (otherwise, the criminal would be able to dispute the judge who punished him, and so on). (Kant, 1964:97)

This conflict exemplifies the inappropriateness of simply transferring constructs from a Western ethical system to a Confucian based system. The following section proposes a new system of concepts to discern the features of Confucian ethics of interpersonal affection with respect to perfect and imperfect duties.

The contents of the Confucian Way of Humanity can be classified into three categories on the basis of the moral agent's omission/commission of conduct: negative, unconditional positive, and positive duties (Table 7.1).

As discussed above, the silver rule is a negative duty that serves as life conduct principle (The Analects: Yen Yuan). So long as it is not in conflict with other duties, it can and should be followed by everyone in all situations.

In *Gung Sun Chou I*, Mencius emphasized that the silver rule demands that "it is unjust to win the world by conducting unrighteousness and killing the innocent" (The works of Mencius, Book II, Kung-Sun Ch'au Part I). This is exactly the Kantian argument: each individual has his or her own dignity and value. Unless they are to

be punished for moral reasons, we cannot sacrifice or use them to accomplish other purposes, even if it were to “win the world.”

Filial Piety: An Unconditional Positive Duty

Filial piety, the essential core of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, is a positive duty. It stipulates how people should act toward their parents. However, in the Confucian view an individual does not have a choice in deciding whether or not to be filial. Confucianism emphasize that one’s life is an extension of one’s parents’ lives, so doing one’s filial duty is clearly an obligation, and not behaving in accordance with filial piety is an unforgivable fault. Filial piety is not just a positive duty, it is an unconditional positive duty. According to Kant’s definition, since filial piety is a type of positive duty, it must be an imperfect duty; it cannot be a perfect duty. The correlation between positive and imperfect duties does not hold for Confucian ethics.

We can understand the essential nature of filial piety as an unconditional positive duty by comparing the Confucian discourse on loyalty and filial piety (Hwang 1999). A “benevolent sovereign with a loyal minister” is an ideal relationship advocated by Confucians. However, when a sovereign wants to behave in a manner contradictory to the principle of benevolence, what should a loyal minister do? Although Confucians proposed the principle of respecting the superior, and advocated social relationships including kind father and filial son, and benevolent sovereign and loyal minister, when a superior violates a moral principle, the subordinate should try to correct him.

In ancient times, if the Son of Heaven had seven ministers to advise him, he would not lose his empire, even if he were imperfect. If a prince had five good men to counsel him, he would not lose his country. If a father had one son to reason with him, he would not be engulfed in moral wrong. Thus, if a father contemplates moral wrong, a son must never fail to warn his father against it, nor must a minister fail to perform a similar service for his prince. In short, when there is question of moral wrong, there should be correction. How can you say that filial piety consists of simply obeying a father? (Hsiao Ching, Chap. 15: The Duty of Correction).

However, father/son and sovereign/minister relationships belong to two distinctly different categories. If the superior in each of these two social relationships is engaged in morally wrong activities, the subordinates’ reactions involving suggestions for correction will be different. Parents are the origin of one’s life; the blood relationships between parents and children are inseparable. Therefore,

If a parent has a fault, (the son) should with bated breath, and bland aspect, and gentle voice, admonish him... If the parent becomes angry and (more) displeased, and beats him until blood flows, he should not presume to be angry and resentful,... he should follow (his remonstrance) with loud crying and tears,... showing an increased degree of reverence, but without abandoning his purpose (Li Chi).

In other words, showing filial piety to one’s parents is an unconditional positive duty, which should be carried out regardless of parental actions.

Loyalty: A Positive Duty

The idea of unconditional positive duty merits closer examination. The attributes of filial piety can best be understood by looking at the sharp distinction between the Confucian discourses on the relationships of father and son and sovereign and minister. During the Warring States Period (403–221 BC), Confucians requested that everyone practice ethics for ordinary people, but they did not think that every ordinary person had an equal right to make judgments that could impact public opinion. On the contrary, they endowed intellectuals with a sense of mission to realize Confucian cultural ideals. In order for a scholar to occupy a high position in the government, he must be educated and thereby attain a desire to practice the Way of Humanity to the best of his ability. The larger the scope is in which one exercises the Way of Humanity, the higher one's moral performance. Hence, Confucians encouraged scholars to cultivate themselves, manage their families, govern the nation, and soothe the world.

During the Warring States Period, the sovereign of a state held the highest authority. According to the principle of respecting the superior, he also had the highest authority in decision-making. Therefore, Confucians believed that once a scholar became an official, the most important way for him to act on Confucian ideals would be to “serve (guide) the sovereign in the Way of Humanity.” Speaking in Confucian terms, serving the sovereign in the Way of Humanity shows loyalty, and the most important duty for a minister was to “rectify what is wrong in the sovereign's mind” (The Works of Mencius, Chap. 6B: Kao Tze).

The relationships between sovereigns and ministers are completely different from those of blood relatives. There was a time when King Hsun of Chi asked Mencius for advice about the office of high ministers. Mencius remarked that there is a distinction between a relationship in which the high ministers are in the nobility and are relatives of the prince, and those in which they have different surnames from the prince. For those in the first category who have a blood connection with the prince, if the prince makes serious mistakes and does not respond to their respected admonitions, the minister should supercede the prince if he might do harm to the state.

High ministers with different surnames from the prince have no inseparable connection with him. If the prince makes mistakes and does not accept their repeated advice, they can just leave the state for another one. If the emperor is tyrannous and does not practice benevolent government, then powerful chiefs of state should step forward and “punish the tyrant and console the people” (The Works of Mencius, Chap. 1B: King Hui of Liang).

It is obvious that, although acting as a benevolent sovereign or a loyal minister is defined by Confucians as a positive duty, a minister should take into account all the objective conditions to determine whether the sovereign deserves loyalty. In other words, being loyal is a typical imperfect duty in the Kantian sense, and may be considered a “conditional positive duty.”

The term “conditional” is somewhat redundant, because all positive duties are conditional according to the original definition. The redundant label is proposed here merely to signify the sharp contrast between conditional and unconditional

positive duties, the latter being a unique attribute of filial piety. Loyalty is labeled as a positive duty in Table 7.1.

Divergent Rationalities

Cultural psychologist Richard Shweder stressed that there are “divergent rationalities” in the moral domain, and that more than one rationally defensible moral code exists in the world (Shweder et al. 1990). Every rationally defensible moral code is built from two kinds of concepts: some concepts are mandatory – without them, the code loses its moral appeal. Some concepts are discretionary – they can be replaced or substituted by alternative concepts without diminishing their rational appeal. If a moral code is divested of all discretionary concepts, it becomes empty and its rational appeal is diminished.

The Moral Characteristics of Western Individualism

According to Shweder et al.’s analysis, there are three mandatory features in Kohlberg’s conceptions of postconventional morality: (1) The “abstract idea of natural law” implies that there are certain actions or practices that are inherently wrong no matter how much personal pleasure they might bring to us, and despite the existence of positive rules or laws that might permit their occurrence. (2) The “abstract principle of harm” states that a legitimate ground for restricting a person’s liberty is the intention to do harm to someone else. (3) The “abstract principle of justice” states that like cases must be treated alike, and different cases should be treated differently.

These three principles are widely accepted by moral philosophers and are candidates for moral universals. In addition to these three, there are at least six discretionary features of Kohlberg’s theory that are not accepted by all rational thinkers. Substitute concepts or principles can replace these features to construct another moral code. These features include:

1. A right-based conception of natural law. Dworkin (1977) proposed that all moral codes encompass personal rights, personal duties, and social goals, but they may differ in the priority given to these three concepts. Kohlberg’s postconventional morality is premised on the conception of natural rights, rather than natural duties or goals.
2. A natural individualism in the abstract. This principle advocates voluntarism and the individual over social roles or status.
3. A relative inclusive definition of a person or moral agent. This definition treats all human beings as moral equivalents and excludes all other nonhuman living things.
4. Defining boundaries. The boundaries around the “territories of the self” are defined as the realm worthy of protection.

5. A conception of justice as equality. This principle counts each individual as equal to one unit, and treats every person's claim as equal.
6. Secularism. Natural laws are defined as something human beings can discover for themselves without the assistance of revealed or handed-down truths about right and wrong (Shweder et al. 1990, pp. 145–150).

Properties of Confucian Ethics

Filial piety is a core component of the Way of Humanity. Confucians considered fulfillment of filial duty a mandatory natural law of ethics. In comparison with Kohlberg's postconventional morality, Confucian ethics for ordinary people also has several discretionary features that can be described with reference to Shweder's analysis presented in the Mandatory and Discretionary Concepts Section. (1) Confucians recognized that one's life is an inheritance from one's ancestors, and they never conceived of the existence of a Creator independent of human beings. Therefore, one's whole family is conceptualized as a "great self" (*da wo*), and boundaries of the self are extended to include other family members. The physical self is only a part of the great self, and it is the great self that the individual is obligated to protect against any threat from the outside. (2) The natural law of Confucian ethics was built on conceptions of natural duties and goals rather than on natural rights (Huang 1997). (3) Natural law was based on social roles and statuses rather than on a notion of the individual over and above society. Individualism is devalued in Confucianism. (4) Although Confucians considered every person a moral agent, moral performance was evaluated on the basis of how broadly benevolence was applied. Thus, all people were not seen as morally equivalent. (5) For this reason Confucians endowed scholars with the mission to practice the Way of Humanity when they had a chance to serve government offices. (6) Confucians strongly opposed secularism. They believed that moral principles could be revealed and handed down to ordinary people by a sage or prophet.

This comparison between Kohlberg's postconventional morality and Confucian ethics for ordinary people indicates that each has its own mandatory and discretionary features. They represent two rationally defensible moral codes or divergent rationalities. Put in terms of Max Weber's (1978) classification system, the former is a formal rationality, while the latter is a substantive rationality (Brubaker 1984). The question remains as to whether or not it is possible for two divergent rationalities to be in conflict with one another.

The Confucian Dilemma

The answer to the above question should be "yes." As discussed above, the abstract idea of natural law, the abstract principle of harm, and the abstract principle of justice in Kohlberg's postconventional morality are mandatory to most rational thinkers.

They are also accepted by Confucians. However, Confucians also conceptualize filial piety as a mandatory unconditional positive duty. This addition makes it very likely that these two divergent rationalities will be in conflict with one another. Several stories about this kind of conflict can be found in Confucian classics.

Duke Yeh boasted to Confucius: "In my state virtue was such that once when a father stole his neighbor's sheep, his son reported the crime to the state." Confucius replied: "In my state virtue was different from that, for a son would cover up his father's misbehavior, and vice versa." (The Analects: Tze-lu)

"Do not steal" is a universal negative duty, as the conduct of stealing violates the abstract principle of harm. But, according to Confucian ethics doing one's filial duty is a person's first priority. When these two mandatory principles are in conflict with each other, Confucius sided with the fulfillment of filial piety instead of not stealing.

The Work of Mencius also recorded a story about the resolution of a similar dilemma. A pupil once asked Mencius a hypothetical question: When Sage King Shun ruled the country and Kao-yao was his minister, if Shun's father Ku-sou had murdered somebody, what would have been done? (The Works of Mencius, Chap. 7A: Use All Your Heart and Mind). Mencius' answer represented a Confucian resolution to the moral dilemma. As a sovereign of the state, Sage King Shun should not forbid a legal officer from arresting his father who had committed a murder. But, as a filial son to his father, he could not permit his father to be punished. Mencius suggested he give up the post of sovereign and escape with his criminal father to a place beyond the reach of the law. To Confucius it seemed that such a resolution would be most appropriate. It is reasonable (*li*) on the one hand, and it protects both personal preference (*qing*) and laws of the state (*fa*) on the other.

This resolution might be challenged by a Kantian demand for universal moral judgment. What if everyone else did the same as the sovereign (Fu 1973)? This is an insoluble question in the substantive ethics of Confucianism.

Adjustment of Confucian Ethics

In traditional Chinese society, people may not have been fully aware of the problems inherent in Confucian ethics. However, when people's consciousness of human rights was raised by the importation of Western culture into Chinese society, the Confucian Dilemma brought Confucianism to a crisis. The invasion of China by Western forces that began in the nineteenth Century produced drastic changes in various aspects of Chinese society, including its economy, politics, and culture. Confucian ethics were no exception to this process. Confucianism was affected by several important Chinese social movements during the early twentieth Century, including the New Culture Movement and the Gong De (Public Virtue) Movement. These two events deserve attention because both resulted in adjustments to the structure of Confucianism.

New Culture Movement

During the early Republican years, President Yuan Shih-kai (term of office 1912–1916) attempted to restore the imperial monarchy. In pursuit of this goal, he ordered that the Confucian classics be studied in the educational system, and tried to establish Confucianism as the national religion, generating bitter debate among intellectuals. The controversy provoked strong criticism of Confucianism in the New Culture Movement, especially of the Confucian theory of the Three Bonds, which requires subordinates to follow the guidance of superiors in three major human relationships: father and son, sovereign and minister, and husband and wife. Proponents of the New Culture Movement argued that the request for submission precluded sons, ministers, and wives from having independent personalities, and charged that the Three Bonds concept was a “morality for slaves,” rather than a “morality for masters.” Confucian ethical requirements were even condemned as a “dinner set for eating humans.” The sociopolitical atmosphere of China at that time led young intellectuals to believe that “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy” from the West were the new saviors of the nation, and any cultural tradition that was contradictory to this new zeitgeist should be eliminated. The New Culture Movement soon evolved into a zealous totalistic antitraditionalism and radical iconoclasm (Lin 1979), and laid the foundation for the Cultural Revolution after the Communists took control of mainland China.

The Gong De Movement

The Gong De Movement also produced remarkable stimulation for the transformation of the Confucian ethical system. A historical study on this topic by J. S. Chen (1997) indicated that the concept of *gong de* (literally, public morality or public virtue) originated from the Japanese concept of *kotoku*, which emerged during the Meiji era. The concept of *kotoku* was used by Japanese to denote the moral responsibilities one has toward public interests and other individuals in society. It was introduced by Liang Qi-chao to his Chinese readers in 1902 as part of a campaign advocating sacrificing oneself for the sake of society. It emerged after the Chinese defeat in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War. In his interpretation of this idea, Liang emphasized an individual’s devotion to the general welfare of one’s nation. However, the collectivistic or nationalistic connotation of this concept soon weakened and its meaning became increasingly similar to its counterpart in Japan.

In 1963, after the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, an exchange student from America whose Chinese name was Di Renhwa, published an article in the Central Daily News. In it he cited many examples of his personal experiences in Taiwan to denounce the Chinese people for their lack of public morality. This article prompted a widespread response from Taiwanese society, and students at National

Taiwan University soon initiated the “The May 20th Social Movement for Self-Awakening.” J. S. Chen (1997) examined the concepts related to *gong de* mentioned in the mass media at that time. His analysis revealed that these concepts were generally used to discourage negative civic behavior or restrain citizens from damaging the public interest and interfering with the social behavior of others. They had nothing to do with social and political participation in the public sphere.

Both the Three Bonds Revolution and the Gong De Movement have significant implications for the transformation of the Confucian cultural tradition. As mentioned previously, procedural justice within Confucian ethics for ordinary people upheld the principle of respecting the superior, and distribute justice emphasized the principle of favoring the intimate. The Three Bonds are in fact manifestations of the aforementioned formal structure of ethics for ordinary people in the three sets of role relations between father and son, sovereign and minister, and husband and wife, with special emphasis on the principle of respecting the superior. The Three Bonds Revolution sought to de-emphasize the vertical quality of these three relationships, and to rearrange them in a more egalitarian way.

In addition to this shift in power relations, the Three Bonds Revolution also changed the principle of favoring the intimate. Viewed from the perspective of the Face and Favor model (Fig. 4.1), after people are liberated from their families, they have increasing opportunities to interact with persons with whom they have instrumental ties, and to follow certain universal standards in these interactions. *Gong de* is one kind of universal standard. Although it is essentially a set of negative duties that originated in the stimulation of foreign cultures, most of its ideas are compatible with the Confucian silver rule, and can be viewed as practical elaborations of that maxim.

The Moral Thought and Judgment in Confucian Society

The previous section provides a cultural and historical analysis of Confucianism’s development. On a psychological level, not every individual within Chinese society will fully understand these traditions or their evolution. This point can be illustrated with the distinctions between person, self, and individual proposed by Grace G. Harris (1989): *Individual* is a biologicistic concept, defining human beings as creatures like any other living creature. *Person* is a sociologicistic concept treating human beings as agents-in-society who take a particular position in the social order and develop a series of actions to achieve personal goals.

The analysis of Confucian ethics thus far has described the Confucian cultural ideas for guiding people’s social interactions. These core cultural ideas constitute the collective reality that is reflected in philosophical or ideological texts telling people what is good, what is moral, and how to be a person. They are transmitted to individuals through the social-psychological processes of child-rearing practices, educational systems, customs, and legal systems, and become the individual’s reality (Markus and Kitayama 1994). For instance, the moral development social

communication theory (Shweder and Much 1991; Shweder et al. 1990) advocates that to maintain the routine activities of social life, guardians of the moral order (e.g., parents, teachers, peers) present and convey to children powerful morally relevant interpretations of events through verbal exchanges in the context of daily life situations.

The collective reality, just like the collective conscience (Durkheim 1898/1953), can exist independent of any particular individual. Only a few cultural experts can explicitly state the meanings of core cultural ideas (Menon and Shweder 1994), while most ordinary people can only recognize and deliberate parts of their collective or individual realities. Once cultural ideas are articulated, they may become objects of consciousness and reflective thought, and form the basis for intentional acts.

Because the culture of contemporary Taiwan is a hybrid of Chinese tradition and foreign commercial civilizations, children grow up in an atmosphere of cultural pluralism, and may shape their self-ideals in terms of Western ideas of individualism. With this in mind, we begin an examination of the findings of previous research on moral reasoning in Taiwan.

Moral Thought in Confucian Society

Previous research using Kohlberg's paradigm to collect moral reasoning data in Chinese society has frequently encountered the problem of being unable to score subjects' responses according to Kohlberg's standardized scoring system. Most of these unscorable responses were related to the concept of filial piety and hierarchical love with distinction (Cheng 1991; Lei and Cheng 1984; Ma 1997). Lei found that the traditional Chinese values of filial piety and collective utility were misrepresented in criterion judgments given under Stage 3, and no examples were given under Stage 5. The misclassification was made in ignorance of the preeminent value of filial piety in Chinese culture. As a consequence, the selection of scorable interview judgments tended to concentrate subjects' responses into conventional levels (Lei and Cheng 1984:11). Lei also noted that a "judgment which resolves the dilemma between the fulfillment of filial piety and the commitment to personal principles has not appeared in the scoring manual" (Lei and Cheng 1984, p. 14). Lei did not systematically analyze the unscorable moral judgments, and felt it premature to make specific claims about the cultural patterning of the unscorable responses (Snarey 1985, p. 224).

In an article entitled "Cross-cultural investigation on development of moral judgment," Shall-way Cheng (1991) used four dilemmas to interview 160 undergraduate students at National Taiwan University. She analyzed the responses of 40 seniors, and classified the unscorable moral reasoning into two categories: filial piety and hierarchical love with distinction. She presented her data systematically and tried to interpret the findings:

Is the cultural significance of my data fully accounted for by my arguments on love with distinction stated above? Could my viewpoints be incorporated into the framework of Kohlberg's theory? I can not give a definite answer to these questions. (Cheng 1991, p. 365)

Cheng's assessment is quite illuminating, but not sufficient for providing a comprehensive interpretation of her findings. Her data are so valuable that a satisfactory reinterpretation is urgently needed so that they can make the contribution to the literature that they warrant.

As Shweder and Much (1991) suggested, the statements given by informants about their reasons for making moral judgments may seem "thin" and obvious, but analysis can discern their implied meanings by way of what Geertz (1973) called "thick description." The reasoning elicited by subjects is first-degree interpretation of moral judgments, while a researcher may make a second-degree interpretation from a particular perspective (Schutz 1967).

This section of the present chapter attempts to perform a thick description or second-degree interpretation of the unscorable data collected by Cheng (1991) in terms of my analysis of the structure of Confucianism. Using this analysis, the discursive data collected by Cheng (1991) can be reclassified and reinterpreted as follows.

1. Reasons based on love with distinction:

"We are related by blood; we share the same blood."

"An individual's life is meaningful only to those who care about him. If they don't care about him, his life is completely meaningless to them."

"Every life is precious. But, the meaning of every life is not the same to a person. In the case where one has to steal drugs for saving someone's life, one has to consider what the meaning of that life is to oneself. One may sympathize with an outsider, but genuine love should be reserved [for somebody whose life is more meaningful]."

"Living with close relatives, you certainly have affection for them. But, you can hardly have affection for strangers. Their existence is of no importance to you."

"When a close relative, for example, Mr. Chen's wife, is sick, he sees her painful situation every day. The strong external stimulation may elicit his concern about her. If she is not as close to him, his feelings may not be so intense. Intimacy of relationships is not unchanging; it is determined by frequency of contact." (Cheng 1991, p. 355)

In the statements presented above, subjects attempted to support the idea of love with distinction with various reasons, including blood relationships, the meaning of the other person's life to the individual, residing together, and frequency of contact. Those and other reasons can be used to support the idea that the affective component (love) should be different for distinctive relationships. This idea can be traced to the Confucian advocacy of extending benevolence from the near to the distant.

2. The Norm of Reciprocity:

"Interpersonal relationships are different in their intimacy and remoteness: Everybody has some dear ones who are more helpful, and many indifferent persons who never help him."

"Your close relatives have extraordinary devotion to you. Interpersonal relationships should be reciprocal and complementary. You have a heavier duty to repay those who gave you more. Of course you may do a favor for a stranger, but you certainly have a stronger

tendency to take care of those who go through life with you. Because I know him, our hearts already connected.”

“If you received more favors from them, you have a stronger moral duty to repay them. Interpersonal relationships should be reciprocal with each other.”

“I have been educated to love without distinction since I was young, but I found that I can not do so. Doing so is unfair to my close relatives.” (Cheng 1991, p. 356)

Reciprocity is a universal norm for social interaction in all human societies (Gouldner 1960). Confucian society is no exception to this pattern. An individual’s personal network of social relationships is constructed on the basis of reciprocal interactions. However, cultures vary in providing reasons for the necessity of reciprocating with others. In my article “Filial Piety and Loyalty: Two Types of Social Identification in Confucian Society,” I stressed that Confucians conceptualized an individual’s life as part of a great body (*da ti*), that is, one’s life is one’s family (Hwang 1999). Resource allocators in a family should do their best to satisfy the needs of others by following the need rule, while recipients are obligated to reciprocate favors. Parents are the origins of one’s life. As such, people have the utmost filial obligation to repay the unending debt to their parents. Compared with this obligation, one’s moral obligation to reciprocate with other family members may be decreased according to the affective component of that relationship. One should interact with acquaintances in one’s social network in accordance with the *renqing* rule, that is, one should help others when they are in need of assistance. When one receives a favor from another person, one should make an effort to repay. However, there is no moral obligation to fulfill a positive duty by doing favors for strangers outside one’s network.

3. Positive Duties and Negative Duties:

“A person has a limited capacity to help. One meets a huge number of people in daily life. If one has to offer the same amount of energy for moral duties to everybody, one will be exhausted.” (Cheng 1991, p. 358)

“Interpersonal affection emerges from mutual understanding through social interaction. The reason I am concerned about somebody is that I have affection for him. I don’t have any affection for a stranger. I don’t know him. I don’t understand him, so I am not concerned about him. I don’t have any duties to him. I won’t hurt him, but I don’t have an obligation to do anything for him.” (Cheng 1991, p. 355)

In the section of this chapter entitled Positive and Negative Duties, I discuss the distinction between positive duties and negative duties, as well as that between imperfect duties and perfect duties. I argue that the five core Confucian ethics require an individual to practice benevolence by giving various resources to a target who occupies a specific role, and that this is essentially a positive duty. The concept of public morality (*gong de*), largely consists of duties that are negative in nature. One subject in Cheng’s study mentioned the limits of resources under one’s control. “If one undertakes the same positive duties for everybody, one will be exhausted. Another subject stated his attitude toward strangers: “I won’t hurt him, but I don’t have an obligation to do anything for him.” In other words, he considered himself to have negative *gong de* duties toward strangers, but to have no positive duties to do anything for them.

4. Fulfilling One's Own Positive Duties:

"Strangers should have their own family members or friends do this for them. It is impossible for a person to take care of everything."

"You have your own family, you already shoulder responsibility for many people. You should not hurt them for the sake of saving a stranger."

"I don't think I have to help a stranger. He could disclose the whole thing to his family or his friends, and ask them to do this for him. I wouldn't have such a strong motivation to steal drugs for a stranger. But, I still hope he can survive. So I expect somebody to do this for him, somebody who is more appropriate, who has a strong motivation." (Chen 1997, p. 357)

The subjects did not think that they had positive duties to steal drugs for a stranger. But who does have such duties? The answer was the stranger's family members or his friends. In fact, this kind of answer also coincides with Confucian ideas. For example, Mencius said, "If all people would take care of their relatives and respect their superiors, the whole world would be at peace" (The Works of Mencius, Chap. 4A: Li-Lou).

5. Social Norms:

"Sometimes, we are willing to help a stranger. But, in your daily interaction with others, you may feel that most people advocate the idea of love with distinction, and you also learn similar ways of thinking. So, sometimes, it is not your choice. You are influenced by standards in the social environment or of others." (Cheng 1991, p. 359)

"Stealing drugs for a stranger – I think nobody will forgive this kind of behavior, nor will the law. They won't try to understand your motivation behind it, they won't accept that."

"To stay within a group, you should accept its rules of the game. If Mr. Chen loves his wife, the rules of the game may permit him to steal for her. But, no rule of the game will permit him to do this for a stranger." (Cheng 1991, p. 356)

Because the principle of favoring the intimate is a kind of social norm, some subjects recognize it as a standard in the social environment, a standard for most people, or a "rule" of the game. Stealing for a stranger violates this social norm, so it was unacceptable to the subjects.

6. Western Influences:

So far this analysis indicates that the unscorable data collected by Shall-way Cheng (1991) contains ideas originating from the deep structure of Confucian ethics for ordinary people that are being used to maintain social networks in modern daily life. Under the influence of Western culture, there were also a few subjects who opposed the idea of multiple standards for morality:

"The moral responsibility in one's mind should be universal and nonspecific to any target."

"I think a moral standard should be applicable to everybody. If it is not applicable to everybody, the moral standard itself is questionable."

"Double standards means no standard. Subjective morality may lead to confusion, it cannot maintain social order at all."

"Morality is not only a principle for regulating one's own behavior, but also a rule for maintaining social order. If we allow any case to violate a moral principle, it will become subjective or relative; people may have no intention to follow it."

“Human beings are created by God according to His image, so everybody is equal, because everybody is an image of God.”

“Love with distinction does not imply a morality with distinction. Love contains affection that emerged in a natural way, but, morality has an enduring property, that is, each person is a goal in himself. In the domain of morality, everybody should be responsible for his own behavior, everybody should be treated like a human being.” (Cheng 1991, pp. 359–360)

The influence of Western culture is quite obvious in these statements. They represent ideas of Western rationalism or individualism, which can be used to support universal ethical principles of negative duties. It should be stressed that negative duties such as “do not kill,” “do not steal,” and “do not cheat” have also long existed in Asian societies. However, under the influence of collectivism, when they come in conflict with the positive duties of Confucian ethics, the universal ethical principle of negative duties tended to take second priority.

Cheng (1991) interviewed three subjects about the story in which Shun’s father committed murder. One of the subjects analyzed the situation in this way:

As a sovereign, of course Shun should have had a comprehensive knowledge about the law of the state. He should understand that one of the most important responsibilities for a sovereign is to defend the dignity of law. But, he had a feeling of compassion for his old father. He could not prosecute his father according to the law under all circumstances, he could not fulfill his duty in the position. So he gave up the post and relieved himself from this responsibility. Apparently, he violated the law, but, in his mind, he followed a value that is much more important than law. You see, Shun never gave an order to prevent the arrest of his father, he just ran away. He would have thought that he would have been pursued and caught. If they had been caught and both of them were put in jail, I think even Mencius would not have opposed that (Cheng 1991, p. 363).

This subject stated that, in Shun’s mind the value of filial piety was much more important than that of the law. He preferred to have a common fate with his father. The statement reflects the Confucian viewpoint. But, not all subjects agreed with this viewpoint. The other two subjects had different responses to this same moral dilemma. One subject said:

I think it was a man’s natural reaction under such a circumstance. But, should everybody do the same thing? I think there is a room for discussion. Confucius would say “Yes,” because he is your father who gave birth to you! No one else can replace him! But, what would Mencius say, who preached love without distinction? What would Jesus say? I don’t know. I am thinking about this question. You know, before Jesus was crucified, he asked John to take care of his mother, he still had a special obligation to his mother who gave birth to his body. The obligation may come from a law that one should fulfill one’s filial duties to parents, it is important, very, very important (Cheng 1991, p. 363).

The subject tried to think over this problem from the perspectives of Confucius, Mencius, and Jesus. Finally, he affirmed the value of filial piety. Another subject admitted that he could not solve the dilemma:

I think moral judgments should take into account affection. However, love of a higher level should be refined and consistent with rational judgment. I think there is something contradictory in this, since I agree that moral affection and moral rationality occur simultaneously, but I believe in love with distinction. I don’t know. I don’t think I can solve this puzzle now (Cheng 1991, pp. 363–364).

Moral Judgment in Confucian Society: Quantitative Research

In the preceding section, qualitative data collected in an empirical study of moral thought in Taiwanese society are reinterpreted in terms of the theoretical analysis of Confucian ethics presented in this chapter. Quantitative research may also be interpreted with a similar analysis. We look to specific research projects below to illustrate this point.

Bestowing favor by giving various resources to another in accordance to the closeness of a relationship seems to be a universal principle applicable to various cultures. However, many scholars say that *renqing* is emphasized extraordinarily in traditional Chinese culture, while law is emphasized in imported Western culture. These two concepts imply a difference between particularism and universalism. The significance of this difference in emphasis is made clear through examination of moral behavior in Chinese and Western cultures.

Moral behavior can be classified into two broad categories, namely, practicing positive duties and not engaging in negative duties. Positive duties, or duties of commission, are supposed to be practiced by all people to all social targets. In both cultures, given the freedom to make the decision, a resource allocator will tend to allocate more resources to those of closer relationships. The difference between particularism and universalism in Chinese and Western cultures does not manifest in positive duties. Rather, it is with violation of negative duties, or duties of omission, that the difference is clear. People in particularistic cultures tend to make moral judgments according to their relationship with the party involved in the event. People in universalist cultures tend to make consistent judgments with the same moral standards for everybody. This argument is illustrated by a cross-cultural study comparing the moral judgments made by college students in Taiwan and the USA (Wei and Hwang 1998).

In the first part of the study, 194 Taiwanese and American college students were asked to evaluate the appropriateness of practicing 14 positive duties to different social targets. Their responses were subjected to factor analysis. Two factors were obtained, the Principle of Obligatory Devotion and the Principle of Reciprocity and Fairness. The factor scores reflecting subjects' evaluations of the appropriateness of applying each of these two factors are diagrammed in Figs. 7.1 and 7.2. Results indicated that both Taiwanese and American subjects tend to consider the intimacy of their relationship with the social target in judging their obligation to practice positive duties. They all agreed that the Principle of Obligatory Devotion should be applied to one's parents, spouse, and children without calculation of one's own interests (Fig. 7.1). By contrast, the Principle of Reciprocity and Fairness should be used to interact with unfamiliar friends, colleagues, strangers, and competitors (Fig. 7.2), or those with whom one has instrumental ties. In other words, both Taiwanese and American subjects were particularistic in the sense of practicing positive duties through consideration of one's relationship with the social target. The more intimate the relationship, the stronger the pressure for fulfilling one's social obligation.




Fig. 7.1 Taiwanese and American Scores for different social targets on the Obligatory Devotion factor (Adopted from Wei and Hwang 1998: 146)

These results are consistent with the findings mentioned above. Many empirical studies by Western social psychologists have shown that a person will perform many kinds of favors for a social target as long as the person has a sense of obligation toward the target. Further, the nature of the relationship with one’s relatives is closely connected to a person’s sense of obligation. People tend to have the strongest sense of obligation toward their parents and children, followed by relatives, and those who have relationships with one’s children, parents, or spouse. The sense of obligation elicited by distant relatives is on the same level as that of friends and neighbors, while a divorced spouse gets only the lowest obligation (Amato 1990; Cunningham 1986; Dovidio 1984; Dovidio et al. 1991; Waite and Harrison 1992).

The difference in particularism and universalism between Chinese and Western cultures manifests quantitatively but not qualitatively in the positive duties practiced toward different social targets. However, it is fully manifest in the negative duties that one is morally forbidden to do. In the second part of the study, Wei and




Fig. 7.2 Taiwanese and American Scores for different social targets on the Reciprocity and Fairness factor (Adopted from Wei and Hwang 1998: 145)

Hwang asked subjects to evaluate the extent of wrongness involved when a person violates negative duties toward different social targets. Responses to 20 items were subjected to factor analysis and three factors were obtained.

Factor 1 was labeled Violating the Law and entailed behaviors that either damage social order or are prohibited by the law. It consisted of six items including “giving a gift to bribe someone or being bribed,” “trying to be first and not standing in a queue,” “tax evasion,” “using insider information to make a profit in the stock market,” “littering,” and “mistreating one’s child.”

American subjects evaluated all behaviors described by items of this factor as having a higher degree of wrongness than did Chinese subjects, no matter who the transgressor was (see Fig. 7.3). American subjects gave the different social targets only minor differences in scores, while Taiwanese allocated scores that increased as a function of the remoteness of the relationship with the transgressor. In other words, American college students tend to adopt a consistent standard to judge the wrongness of illegal behaviors, regardless of relationships with the transgressor.




Fig. 7.3 Taiwanese and American judgment for different social targets of the wrongness of violating law (Adopted from Wei and Hwang 1998: 149)

However, Taiwanese college students tend to judge illegal behavior as more wrong when it is done by a person outside of his family, while they held a more lenient attitude toward the misconduct of family members.

Seven items had a high loading on Factor 2, Violating Family Ethics. These items included “cohabiting with the opposite sex without marriage,” “not holding a memorial ceremony for ancestors,” and “divorce due to incongruence of opinion between spouses.” These items are related to the maintenance of marriage and harmonious relationships within the family. A low score on this factor implied inability to fulfill positive duties to some specific social target such as a family member, rather than a violation of negative duties. From the perspective of Western ethics, this type of behavior entails a lack of virtue, but is not a sin.

Generally speaking, this category of behaviors was evaluated as more wrong by American than Taiwanese respondents (see Fig. 7.4). But special attention should be paid to implications of the interaction effects. Comparing the scores given to different social targets by all subjects, it is clear that offspring, spouses, parents, and family members belong to a group of higher scores, while scores for relatives,




Fig. 7.4 Taiwanese and American judgment of the wrongness of different social targets in violating family ethics (Adopted from Wei and Hwang 1998: 149)

friends, and colleagues are lower, and competitors and strangers were given the lowest scores. Because this kind of behavior only involves family members, if any family member ignores family ethics, whether intentionally or unintentionally, all other members may become victims. Therefore, it might be expected that people would hold a harsher attitude toward transgressions by other family members.

By contrast, if someone outside of one’s family transgresses, it is irrelevant to one’s own life, and it might even be unwise to offer criticism. People may thus be expected to hold a more tolerant attitude toward the latter. A post hoc comparison indicated that the difference in scores between Taiwanese and American respondents for evaluating the wrongness of a spouse reached a statistically significant level ($F=7.03, p<0.05$). Taiwanese students hold a harsher attitude than their American counterparts toward the case when one’s spouse violates the family ethics. In addition, the trend in the curve in Fig. 7.4 indicated that the scores given by these two groups of subjects are very close when violators are family members. But, when the violator is somebody outside one’s family, Taiwanese subjects gave a significantly

lower score than did their American counterparts. This fact implies that Taiwanese tend to hold a more lenient attitude when they find their friends, colleagues, or competitors violate family ethics.

Contents of items heavily loaded on Factor 3 concerned behaviors Infringing on Other's Personal Rights such as "misappropriating valuable goods lost by others," "smoking in a forbidden area," and "borrowing others' objects without permission." Content of items on this factor as with those of Factor 1 violates negative duties. Whereas most items on Factor 1 are related to a disruption of social order and are thus forbidden by law, most items on this factor depict behaviors that are simply infringements on the rights of a particular person. The domain of impact for each of these two categories of behavior is different. Moreover, behaviors related to Factor 3 infringe upon the rights of others in general, not on a particular category of social targets such as family members. Behaviors in this factor violate moral standards, but do not constitute a failure to fulfill one's obligations (Fig. 7.5).

The results of post hoc comparison indicated that there was no significant difference between Chinese and American respondents in evaluating the extent of wrongness when these behaviors were made by their parents ($F=0.54$, n.s.). But for other actors, the same behaviors were evaluated as more wrong by Taiwanese than Americans, and the discrepancy between scores given by the two groups increased as a function of the distance of the social relationship. In other words, the more remote the relationship between the actor and the respondent, the more strongly Taiwanese evaluated the conduct as wrong (Figs. 7.5).

Findings of this study have very important implications for understanding some fundamental cultural issues in Chinese society. Both Factor 1 and Factor 3 consist of items that are related to infringement on others' rights. Essentially, they entail violations of negative duties or duties of omission in Western ethics. Items in Factor 2 are related to failure to fulfill one's obligation to family members, which are positive duties or duties of commission emphasized in Confucian culture.

Comparison of the judgments made by Taiwanese and Americans of the wrongness of the second behavior category reveals that both groups tend to consider their relationships with the transgressors, and make different judgments regarding the same behavior, but Taiwanese tend to hold a more lenient attitude with their acquaintances. However, for conduct violating negative duties, American students tended to make consistent judgments no matter what their relationship with the actor, while Taiwanese students tended to make different judgments depending on the intimacy/remoteness of their relationship with the actor.

Conclusion

I generally agree with this claim: "One mind, many mentalities; universalism without uniformity" (Shweder et. al. 1998). People around the world may develop particular sustainable mentalities or ways of life in their own cultural communities




Fig. 7.5 Taiwanese and American judgment of the wrongness of different social targets in infringing on other’s personal rights (Adopted from Wei & Hwang 1998: 150)

established within the potential of a universal mind. Therefore, there may be multiple, diverse psychologies rather than one single psychology.

Contemporary psychology is a cultural product of Western civilization. Progress has been stimulated by the post-Enlightenment evolution of epistemology. In order to develop indigenous psychology in a given culture, it is necessary for an indigenous psychologist to be familiar with Western epistemology, and to use it as a conceptual instrument to study the symbolic and behavioral inheritance of a given culture. This is why, in past years, I developed the Face and Favor theoretical model to explain Chinese social behavior through realism (Hwang 1987), and subsequently used it as a framework to analyze the structure of Confucianism using structuralist methodology (Hwang 1995). In this chapter, I make use of pragmatism to apply the results of my previous works and Western psychological theories to reinterpret major empirical research findings regarding moral reasoning in Taiwanese society. It is hoped that this approach may further develop an indigenous psychology research tradition in Chinese societies.

References

- Amato, P. R. (1990). Personality and social network involvement as predictors of helping behavior in everyday life. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 53(1), 31–43.
- Brubaker, R. (1984). *The limits of rationality: An essay on the social and moral thought of Max Weber* (pp. 35–43). London: Geoger Allen & Unwin.
- Chen, J. S. (1997). The idea of *gongde*: History and conceptual reconstruction (in Chinese). *Journal of Social Science and Philosophy*, 9(2), 39–72.
- Cheng, S. W. (1991). A cross-cultural investigation of research on the development of moral judgment (in Chinese). In C. F. Yang & H. S. J. Kao (Eds.), *Chinese people and Chinese mind* (pp. 213–304). Taipei: Yuan-liu.
- Cunningham, M. R. (1986). Levites and brother's keepers: Sociobiological perspective on prosocial behavior. *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations*, 13, 35–67.
- Dovidio, J. F. (1984). Helping behaviors and altruism: An empirical and conceptual overview. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 17, pp. 361–427). New York: Academic.
- Dovidio, J. F., Piviavin, J. A., Gaertner, S. L., Schroeder, D. P., & Clark, R. D. (1991). The arousal: Cost-reward model and the process of interaction. In M. Clark (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology* (Vol. 12, pp. 86–118). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Durkheim, E. (1898/1953). Individual representations and collective representations. In D.F. Pocock (Trans.), *Sociology and Philosophy*, New York: Free Press, pp. 1–38.
- Dworkin, R. (1977). *Taking rights seriously*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Fu, C. W. S. (1973). Philosophy (in Chinese). In S. J. Kao (Ed.), *Essays on contemporary American behavioral and social science* (pp. 317–334). Taipei: Student's Bookhouse.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gert, B. (1973). *The moral rules*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gouldner, A. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review*, 25, 161–179.
- Harris, G. G. (1989). Concepts of individual, self, and person in description and analysis. *American Anthropologist*, 91(3), 599–612.
- Huang, C. C. (1997). Confucianism and human rights: A classical perspective of Mencius (in Chinese). In S. Liu (Ed.), *Confucianism and the Contemporary World* (pp. 33–55). Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: the Chinese power game. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), 944–974.
- Hwang, K. K. (1995). *Knowledge and Action: A Social-psychological Interpretation of Chinese Cultural Tradition (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Sin-Li.
- Hwang, K. K. (1998). Two moralities: Reinterpreting the findings of empirical research on moral reasoning in Taiwan. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 211–238.
- Hwang, K. K. (1999). Filial piety and loyalty: Two types of social identification in Confucianism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 129–149.
- Kant, I. (1797/1963). *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. (Trans. and analyzed by H. J. Paton.) New York: Harper & Row.
- Lei, T., Cheng, S. W. (1984). An empirical study of Kohlberg's theory and scoring system of moral judgment in Chinese society. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, Center for Moral Education, Cambridge, MA.
- Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equality theory? In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H. Willis (Eds.), *Social exchange: Advance in theory and research* (pp. 27–55). New York: Plenum.
- Leventhal, G. S. (1976). Fairness in social relationships. In J. Thibant, J. T. Spence, & R. T. Carson (Eds.), *Contemporary topics in social psychology* (pp. 211–239). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- Lin, Y. S. (1979). *The Crisis of Chinese consciousness: Radical anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth Era*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

- Ma, H. K. (1997). The affective and cognitive aspects of moral development in Chinese. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 7, 166–212.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1994). The cultural shaping of emotion: A conceptual framework. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture* (pp. 339–351). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Menon, U., & Shweder, R. A. (1994). Kali's tongue: Cultural psychology and the power of shame in Orissa, India. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture* (pp. 241–284). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Nunner-Winkler, G. (1984). Two moralities? A critical discussion of an ethic of care and responsibility versus an ethic of rights and justice. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), *Morality, moral behavior, and moral development* (pp. 348–361). New York: Wiley.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Schutz, A. (1967). *The Phenomenology of Social World*. Trans. By G. Walsh and F. Leherter. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Shweder, R. A., Goodnow, J., Hatano, G., LeVine, R., Markus, H., & Miller, P. (1998). The cultural psychology of development: One mind, many mentalities. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology (Vol. 1): Theoretical models of human development* (pp. 865–937). NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Shweder, R. A., & Much, N. C. (1991). Determinations of meaning: Discourse and moral socialization. In R. A. Shweder (Ed.), *Thinking through cultures: Expedition in cultural psychology* (pp. 186–240). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., & Miller, J. G. (1990). Culture and moral development. In J. Stiger, R. A. Sweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), *Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development* (pp. 130–204). Mew York: Cambridge University Press.
- Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. *Psychological Bulletin*, 97(2), 202–232.
- Waite, L. J., & Harrison, S. C. (1992). Keeping in touch: How women in mid-life allocate social contacts among kith and kin. *Social Forces*, 70(3), 637–655.
- Weber, M. (1978). Trans. And edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, *Economy and Society*, 2 Vols, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wei, Z. F., & Hwang, K. K. (1998). Positive duties and negative duties: A cross-cultural comparison of moral judgement between Taiwanese and American college students. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*. 40(2), 137–153.

Chapter 8

Confucian Relationalism and Social Exchange

Abstract In order to indicate the significant features of Confucian ethics for ordinary people which have been constructed in accordance with the current approach for attaining the epistemology goal of indigenous psychology, this chapter reviewed a series of theoretical models constructed by previous social scientists for describing Chinese social behaviors, including Fei's (*Peasant life in China*. London: Routledge & Kegan, 1948a, *Rural China* (in Chinese). Shanghai: Observer, 1948a) differential order, Hsu's (The Self in cross-cultural perspective. In A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos, & Hsu, F. L. K. (Eds.), *Culture and self: Asian and western perspectives* (pp. 24–55). New York: Tavistock, 1985) psychosociogram, Ho's (Relational orientation in Asian social psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 240–259). Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993, *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 1–16, 1998) relational orientation and methodological relationalism. It showed that the major propositions in the scientific micro-world of Confucian relationalism constructed in terms of the social exchange theory can be translated into the main ideas of previous models, but the reverse is not true. The advantage of the current approach was manifested in its heuristic function for stimulating a series of empirical research on the cognitive structure of role relationship; social norms for allocating resources to coworking partners of different *guanxi*; intergenerational exchange; accepting or rejecting favor requests in consideration of relational context; and even the use of modest language to express one's respect to other parties of different relationships in Japan and Taiwan.

Keywords Differential order • Psychogram • Methodological relationalism • Strangifiability • Intergenerational exchange • Respectful language • *Iemoto* • Hierarchical compensatory model • Indebtedness • Role obligation gender ideology model

In Chap. 4, I explained how I constructed the theoretical model of face and favor on the basis of the deep structure of interpersonal relationships in universal human minds. In Chap. 5, I explained how I analyzed the inner structure of Confucianism on the basis of the face and favor model.

Viewed from the perspective of constructive realism, the model of face and favor and the inner structure of Confucianism are both microworlds constructed by the author. They are synchronic structures, which exist all the time. Nevertheless, in the long history of their cultural evolution, East Asian people may have developed various language games of surface structure through metaphoric rules derived from the deep structure of their cultural tradition, which may be used to interact with others in daily life. According to Wittgenstein (1945/1958), different language games are often similar to or overlapping with one another in some of their characteristics. They represent particular forms of life in a given culture and enable us to see the specific features of that culture.


The cultural ideas supporting the language games might be transmitted to the individual via such media as myths, proverbs, mores, and customs, etc., and have some influence on his/her actions unconsciously. However, it is very unlikely that the actor is consciously aware of any model or structure. According to structuralism (Levi-Strauss 1976), the cognitive structure of a particular person in a given culture is called conscious model; the cultural structure in a specific domain constructed by social scientists for their particular interest of research is called unconscious model. In other words, human beings unconsciously create the complex structure of culture without necessarily recognizing it directly. Usually, this must be revealed to people through the reinterpretation of social scientists.

The Strangificability of Confucian Ethics for Ordinary People

Viewed from the strategy of linguistic strangification advocated by constructive realism (Wallner 1994), if the language of a given scientific microworld can be translated into another scientific microworld, the former can acquire all the academic achievement of the latter. On the contrary, if a scientific microworld cannot be translated into another one, it has no linguistic strangificability to the latter and they are incommensurable.

The theoretical model of face and favor constructed on the basis of the social exchange theory can be translated into the language of Fiske's model on four elementary forms of social behavior, which might be applicable to various cultures. Moreover, the deep structure of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, with underlying views of Confucian classics, is isomorphic to the theoretical model of face and favor – meaning the terms are interchangeable and can also be translated to each other. However, by analyzing the family resemblance of language games derived from the deep structure of Confucianism, we may see the specific features of interpersonal relationships in Confucian society.

Fig. 8.1 Fei's differential order. Adapted from Fei's (1948a, b)



My face and favor model as well as the Confucian ethics for ordinary people are all microworlds constructed by social scientists. In fact, there are many social scientists who have attempted to construct theoretical models to understand Chinese social psychology. In this section, I review Fei's (1948a, b) differential order, Hsu's (1971a, 1985) psychosociogram, and Ho's (1993, 1998) relational orientation and discuss their relationships with my works presented in this book. According to the philosophy of constructive realism (Wallner 1994), if a proposition in one microworld can be translated into the language of another microworld, its strangificability implies greater applicability of the first microworld. If it is not translatable, then the method or procedure of its conception should be further investigated. Here, we want to ask the question: what is the strangificability of the theoretical models of Confucian relationalism?

Fei's Differential Order

Fei (1948a, b) was the first social scientist to depict the features of Chinese social networks with the concept of differential order, as illustrated by the concentric circles in Fig. 8.1. In his popular work *Urban China*, Fei (1948a, b) said:

Individuals in a Western society of individualism are akin to wooden sticks, which may be bound together by their social organization in a bundle. The structure of Chinese society is like ripples caused by throwing a stone into a pond. Each person is situated at the center of a set of concentric rings of water, which extend to the edges of that person's social influence. No matter when and where one finds oneself, one is always situated at the center of this flexible social network. This structure does not reflect individualism; it reflects egoism. The Chinese are very egocentric, and all of their values are oriented to serve their own various needs (p. 24–27).

According to Fei's analogy, the Chinese social network binds people to others in their lifeworld. That is, people experience themselves as situated at the center of a network. The extent of intimacy with another is reflected by the relative position of that other person within the concentric circles of one's psychological field.

Hsu's Psychosociogram

Although the concept of differential order has been widely cited by social scientists in describing the features of Chinese society, it is actually only a rough analogy. Compared to differential order, the idea of the psychosociogram proposed by Francis L. K. Hsu (1971a) is more discerning in capturing the features of Chinese social psychology. Hsu is a famous psychological anthropologist well known to the international social science community. He has proposed several concepts for describing characteristics of Chinese society over the course of his academic career. In 1953, he compared the national character of Chinese and Americans using two concepts: situation-centeredness and individual-centeredness. Then, he elaborated the concepts of father–son axis, husband–wife axis, and mother–son axis as dominant kinship relationships for depicting significant features of Chinese, American, and Indian cultures (Hsu 1963, 1965, 1971b). He also proposed a psychosociogram to depict the socio-psychological character of Chinese people (Hsu 1971a).

Hsu's psychosociogram consists of seven irregular, concentric layers: unconscious, preconscious, unexpressed conscious, expressible conscious, intimate society and culture, operative society and culture, wider society and culture, and outer world (see Fig. 8.2). Layer 4 in Fig. 8.2 is labeled *expressible conscious*. It contains the feelings and ideas that individuals communicate to fellow human beings: love, hatred, greed, vision, and knowledge of the ways of doing things according to the moral, social, and technical standards of the culture. Layer 3 consists of significant others with whom the individual has intimate relationships, pets, cultural usages, and material collections. The individual's relationships with humans, animals, artifacts, and cultural rules in this layer tend to be "a matter of feeling rather than of usefulness" (Hsu 1971a, p. 26). In contrast, the individual may establish only formal role relationships with those inhabiting Layer 2 by considering "their usefulness to him rather than his feeling toward them" (Hsu 1971a, p. 26).

Hsu labeled the shaded area covering Layer 3 and 4 and partially covering Layers 2 and 5 as *ren*, and roughly translated this Chinese word to English as *personage*. The Chinese conception of *ren* is based on the individual's transactions with fellow human beings. It implies that one may maintain a satisfactory level of psyche and interpersonal equilibrium within the shaded area only by endeavoring to be *ren* (*zuo ren*) and learning to be *ren* (*xue zuo ren*). Hsu defined the process of maintaining a constant state by adapting one's external behavior to the interpersonal standards of the society and culture as *psychosocial homeostasis* (Hsu 1971a).

In *Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives* (Marsella et al. 1985), Hsu made a distinction between the Asian concept of *ren* and the Western concept of personality. He suggested that the concept of personality represents a Ptolemaic view of human nature, which is deeply rooted in Western individualism and regards the individual as standing alone against the world. In contrast, the Asian concept of *ren* locates the individual within a matrix in which each person must maintain relationships with others at a satisfactory level to ensure dynamic equilibrium. The Asian concept of *ren* more closely resembles a Galilean view of human nature, which recognizes that the individual is embedded in a social network. Hsu suggested that




Fig. 8.2 The psychosociogram of man. Adapted from Hsu (1971a, p. 25)

the concept of *ren* is more suitable than the concept of personality in understanding sociocultural influences on variations of human behavior. Likewise, Hsu suggests that the Galilean view of human nature is more appropriate than the Ptolemaic view.

From Relational Orientation to Confucian Relationalism

Fei's concept of differential order and Hsu's various concepts have made significant contributions to the understanding of Chinese social behavior. However, Fei is a sociologist, and Hsu is a psychological anthropologist. Their discipline-specific

methods of theoretical construction make it challenging for social psychologists to utilize their concepts in designing and conducting psychological research. The concepts of relational orientation and methodological relationalism proposed by psychologist David Y. F. Ho provide a better framework for studying Chinese social behavior. However, it should be pointed out that Ho (1993) himself emphasized that he developed these concepts “as a conceptual framework, not a theory” (p. 257).

Relational Orientation

Ho argued that the concept of relational orientation captures the spirit of Chinese social psychology and may be used to describe Chinese social behavior with greater precision than previous concepts, such as situation-centeredness (Hsu 1963), psychosocial homeostasis (Hsu 1985), collective orientation (Ho 1979), and social orientation (K. S. Yang 1981). Relational orientation not only has original features, but also specific distinctions from the individual orientation of Western psychology. Ho pointed out that interpersonal relationships have the historical mission of shaping the individual’s personality during early stages of development and of defining the meaning of an individual’s life. An individual’s life can be meaningful only through coexistence with others; life may become meaningless if one loses relationships with some significant others (Ho et al. 1991).

According to Ho, the self is not an independent entity in Chinese culture; Chinese people have no distinctive awareness of their own existence, uniqueness, direction, goals, or intention. Because there is no clear-cut boundary between oneself and others, the Chinese self can be termed the *relational self*. The relational self has an extraordinarily high sensitivity toward the existence of others. The experience of self and others in one’s phenomenological world is merged to the extent that they may be separated from the world to form a self-in-relation-with-others (Ho et al. 1991). After a careful analysis of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino cultures, Ho (1993) argued that we can also use similar statements to describe selfhood and identity in Asian social psychology.

Methodological Relationalism

Ho (1991, 1998) proposed the concept of methodological relationalism based on his concept of relational self. Methodological relationalism contradicts with the popular idea of methodological individualism, which advocates that no explanation of social phenomena can be complete without knowledge of facts about individuals, and, therefore, the basic unit of analysis for social sciences is the individual. A well-known example in defense of methodological individualism is Allport’s (1968, p. 3) classical definition: “Social psychology attempts to understand and explain how the thoughts, feeling, and behaviors of individuals are influenced by actual, imagined, or implied pressure of others.”

Opponents of methodological individualism argue that facts about individuals alone are inadequate in accounting for social phenomena. Facts and principles concerning social phenomena are not reducible to knowledge of individuals. They are emergent from the formation of relationships, groups, and institutions among individuals and are independent of individual characteristics. Furthermore, facts about individuals are in themselves to be understood only with reference to social contexts (Ho 1998).

Three brilliant figures in western social thought, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx, all share this position. For example, Durkheim (1895/1938) stresses in the most uncompromising terms: “Every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false” (Ho 1991, p. 85–86).

Ho argued that according to methodological relationalism, theorists need to conduct relational analysis and “consider how relationships are culturally defined before attempting to interpret the behavior of individuals” (Ho 1998, p. 3). Furthermore, Ho suggested that “the strategic units of analysis are not the individual or the situation alone but the *person-in-relations* (focusing on a person in different relational contexts) or *persons-in-relation* (focusing on persons interacting within a relational context)” (Ho and Chiu 1998, p. 353).

Individual, Self, and Person

Ho’s contention that theorists must consider how relationships are defined *culturally* in order to conduct relational analysis is significant. *Person-in-relations* and *persons-in-relation* are the two core concepts for constructing the research tradition of Confucian relationalism. As such, special attention should be paid to the concept of *person*. In my article “Filial Piety and Loyalty: Two Types of Social Identification in Confucianism” (Hwang 1999), I cited important distinctions among the concepts of individual, person, and self as delineated by anthropologist Grace G. Harris (1989). *Individual* is a biological concept, defining human beings as creatures like any other living animal in the world.

Person is a sociological concept treating human beings as agents-in-society who take a particular position in the social order and develop a series of actions to achieve personal goals. In order to view a person as an agent-in-society, social scientists should investigate the ways in which the individual follows a certain moral order, takes action, or reacts to others’ actions in systems of social relationships. From the perspective of a given society, all actions and claims made in support of its sociomoral order are consequences of public construction. Persons who participate in social interaction perform such a construction with reference to the cultural logic, rules, and values, as well as to their own recognition of reality. They analyze, label, and interpret each other’s actions, thereby creating a stream of public discourse on the causes of action.

Self is a psychological concept defining human beings as the locus of experience, including the most important aspect of experiencing oneself as a particular identity.

Western psychologists usually assume that an individual's awareness of and ability to reflect on oneself creates a duality of self. As the subject of such reflection, the self integrates one's behavior and makes one distinct from others, resulting in a sense of self-identity. As the object of awareness, the self enables one to examine one's differences with other objects in the world and to view oneself as a unique whole with a sense of personal identity.

Strangificability of Microworlds

Fei's (1948a, b) differential order, Hsu's (1971a, 1985) psychosociogram, Hwang's (1987) face and favor model, and Confucian ethics for ordinary people (Hwang 2001) can all be viewed as scientific microworlds constructed by social scientists for understanding Chinese social behaviors. Examining those theoretical models from the aforementioned concepts of *self* and *person*, we see that both the theoretical model of face and favor and Confucian ethics for ordinary people describe how an ideal "person" should interact with other persons-in-relations. When they agree to interact socially with persons-in-relations, in accordance with Confucian ethics for ordinary people, the phenomenology of his perceived social world may constitute either Fei's (1948a, b) differential order or Hsu's (1971a, 1985) psychosociogram. This is a sociological analysis of Confucian beliefs about how a person should arrange his interpersonal relationships with others. How an individual arranges the relationships with his self and others in daily life is an empirical question which can be answered by empirical research of psychology.

Comparing my analysis of Confucian cultural tradition with Hsu's works reveals that the father-son axis is a manifestation of the principle of respecting the superior. The Confucian ethical system of benevolence-righteousness propriety for ordinary people as depicted in Fig. 5.1 corresponds to Hsu's psychosociogram in Fig. 8.2. The shaded area of *ren* in Fig. 8.2 signifies the expressive component between the resource allocator and others. *Usefulness* denotes the instrumental component between the dyads. The intimate society of Layer 3 consists of expressive ties and mixed ties. The operative society of Layer 2 is composed of instrumental ties. When a Chinese person interacts with others by following appropriate rules for social exchange, the phenomenology of that person's social world might be perceived in the manner described by Hsu's psychosociogram or Fei's differential order. In other words, my theoretical face and favor model describes the state of psychosocial homeostasis with the precise terminology of social exchange theory, and my analysis of Confucianism enables reinterpretation of the psychosociogram in terms of Confucian cultural tradition.

The above analysis indicates that the major propositions of the face and favor model and Confucian ethics for ordinary people can be translated into the main ideas of Hsu's psychosociogram or Fei's description of differential order by considering the manifestation of Confucian ethics in the lifeworlds of Chinese people.

The ideas of Hsu's psychosociogram or Fei's differential order cannot be translated into any models of Chinese relationalism. Therefore, it may be concluded that as compared to Hsu's or Fei's conceptualizations, my theoretical models of Chinese relationalism in conjunction with their accompanying epistemology of constructive realism have greater strangificability.

The Cognitive Structure of Role Relationships

In the last section, I argued that both the face and favor model and Confucian ethics for ordinary people analyze how an individual should interact with other persons-in-relations at a theoretical level. My description of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, including the principle of respecting the superior and the principle of favoring the intimate can be viewed as the deep structure of Confucian ethics. When it is manifested in the five cardinal relationships, Confucians define different ethical requirements for persons in various role relationships. When Chinese interact with others in their lifeworlds in accordance with such ethical requirements, the phenomena of their perceived persons-in-relations may constitute such a figuration as described by Fei's differential order (Fig. 8.1) or Hsu's psychosociogram (Fig. 8.2). In other words, the maintenance of psychosocial homeostasis with other persons-in-relation is a consequence of practicing Confucian sociomoral order. This is a sociological analysis. We can better understand how an individual arranges his/her relationships with others in his/her lifeworld through empirical research of the psychological approach.

In Chap. 6, Hempel's (1965) covering model was cited to indicate how a scientist may use scientific theory to predict or interpret phenomena in the empirical world. In this section, a series of empirical research will be used to illustrate how quantitative research can be conducted to test hypothesis derived from theoretical propositions of Confucian relationalism with consideration of various antecedent conditions.

Similarity Between Dyad Relationships

Y. C. Chuang (1998) believed that if subjects were asked to determine the similarity of various role relationships without being provided any rules for judgment, results would be freed from the leading effect of a measurement scale and instead reflect participants' implicit cognitions, which are more spontaneous and more salient. Chuang adopted two different methods to explore the implicit and explicit cognitive structures of Chinese people for perceiving various role relationships.

To assess the implicit cognitive structure, he asked 87 elementary school teachers and 68 college students in southern Taiwan to judge similarity in terms of the norms for dyad interaction between each pair of 28 role relationships that were presented




Fig. 8.3 Two-dimensional representation of the implicit cognitive space for role norms (college students). Adapted from Chuang (1998: 244)

on a computer screen. The 28 role pairs included not only important role relationships within the family, such as father and son, elder brother and younger brother, but also teacher and student, friends, supervisor and subordinate. In addition to the traditional five cardinal relations, the pairs also included such important role relationships in modern society as employee and employer, neighbors, and strangers. These role relationships contained several representative categories along such dimensions as closeness–distance, dominance–submission, and heterosexual relationships. Each pair of roles was stated as the relationship between the actor and the target, with both combinations being distinguished separately. For instance, the father–son relationship was further divided into “father and son” and “son and father.”

Each participant had to make 378 (28*27/2) pair-wise similarity judgments. The two elements of each stimulus pair were presented on the left and the right sides of a computer screen. For instance, “mother to son” was presented on the left, and “father to son” on the right. A 7-point scale was shown at the bottom of the screen anchored with “should be completely different” at one and “should be completely the same” at seven. The data were analyzed with the individual difference

multidimensional scaling (INDSCAL) method, and two salient dimensions were obtained: closeness–distance and dominance–submission (Fig. 8.3).

The Dimension of Closeness–Distance

The first dimension was clearly related to the closeness–distance dimension of role relationships. For the college student sample, at the positive end of this dimension were role relationships that are close relations or core family members, such as mother–son (1.14), daughter–father (1.03), son–mother (1.00), and grandfather–grandson (1.03). The value on this dimension decreased according to the proximity of blood linkage. For example, the value of elder brother–younger brother (0.50) was less than that of mother-in-law–son-in-law (0.68), and that of teacher–student was (0.03). Most values of nonfamily relationships were negative, such as friend–friend (–0.06), neighbor–neighbor (–0.58), colleague–colleague (–0.93), superior–subordinate (–1.38), and subordinate–superior (–1.44). Exactly as expected, the value of stranger–stranger was ranked lowest on this dimension, implying that strangers are supposed to treat each other in accordance with the most distant norm.

The first dimension for the adult sample was also closeness–distance. Adults and college students located the 28 relationships along this dimension in a similar order ($r=0.79, p<0.001$), deciding appropriate role behaviors and attitudes toward others on the basis of differentiation between in-group kinships and out-group relationships. All kin relationships were located on positive end of the first dimension while most acquaintances or out-group relationships were negative. The degree of closeness–distance of some role relationships did differ slightly between adults and college students. For example, perhaps due to their working experience, adults evaluated supervisor and subordinate or employer and employee as closer than friends or colleagues while college students thought friends were closer than the other relationships. Adults, maybe because of their own experience as parents, tended to consider the closeness of parents toward children to be slightly higher than that of children toward parents while college students considered there to be no difference between the two. Compared with college students, adults evaluated the relationships of brothers, grandfather and grandson, neighbors, colleagues, friends, and strangers as more distant than college students did, perhaps because adults have a greater focus on the core family.

All participants generally followed the Chinese norm of reciprocity (*pao*) or the principle of equality matching on this dimension. College students and adults all believed that the degree to which “a father should care for or help his son” is nearly equal to “what a son is supposed to return.” Other relationships generally followed the norm of equal return, a specific form of equality matching. For instance, college students consider the closeness with which “a teacher treats his students” to be almost equal to “what a student is supposed to return.” Adults believed that the closeness of how “a supervisor should treat his subordinates” is nearly equal to the degree of closeness of “a subordinate toward the supervisor.”

The Dimension of Dominance–Submission

Dimension 2 clearly represented the dominance–submission aspect of role relationships. At the positive end of this dimension were the role relationships in which the actor should play the superior or authoritative role while the negative end reflected the inferior or humble roles. For example, in the student sample, father to son was 1.30, but son to father was -1.30 . Supervisor to subordinate was 1.27, but subordinate to supervisor was -1.35 . And, teacher to student was 1.38, but student to teacher was -1.70 . The same situation was found in the adult sample.

College students and adults located role relationships along the dominance–submission dimension in a similar way. The correlation coefficient was as high as 0.94. For the role relationships of father to son, father to daughter, mother to son, elder brother to younger brother, grandfather to grandson, mother-in-law to son-in-law, teacher to student, supervisor to subordinate, government to people, and employer to employee, both samples believed that the former were supposed to play the superior or authoritative role while the latter were supposed to play the submissive role. However, compared with college students, adults seemed to pay little attention to the dominative role of supervisor but insisted more strongly on the submissiveness of the subordinate. For instance, in the college student sample, the norm for “father to son” was 1.35 while son to father was nearly symmetrical at -1.30 . For the adult sample, the value of father to son was 0.99. However, son to father was -1.63 , a much more extreme negative number.

Cognitive norms for supposedly equal relationships, including neighbors, friends, colleagues, and strangers, corresponded to the expectation of equality. For marriage relationships, both the college students and the adults believed that couples should be mostly equal but that the husband has slightly more power. For the college student sample, the value of “husband to wife” was 0.45, but “wife to husband” decreased to 0.14. For the adult sample, the value of “husband to wife” was 0.81, but “wife to husband” only decreased to 0.59. Results of this research indicate that Taiwanese tend to perceive important role relationships along the cognitive dimensions of interpersonal closeness and dominance as advocated by Confucians, who support an ethical code that emphasizes respecting the superior and favoring the intimate. The behavioral implications of this cognitive structure are demonstrated in the studies discussed in the next sections.

Relationships and Resource Allocation

To understand the perception of role relationships among Chinese, one can investigate the social behaviors that are manifested during interactions with others of various *guanxi*. As I mentioned in Chap. 4, the face and favor model was constructed on the basis of social exchange theory. In order to present findings of previous research on this topic, it will be helpful to clarify what the resources for social exchange are.

Resource for Social Exchange

In their resource theory for social exchange, Foa and Foa (1976) classified resources that are frequently exchanged in social interaction into six categories and took the two *dimensions* of “concreteness” and “particularism” as coordinates for describing their properties (see Fig. 4.1). “Particularism” refers to a specific resource that can be exchanged with some particular social targets. Among the six categories of resource, love is located at the highest position along the dimension of particularism. This is followed by status, service, information, goods, and money. “Concreteness” denotes the extent of abstraction or concreteness of a particular resource. Service and goods have the highest extent of concreteness; status and information are highest in their extent of abstraction; while love and money are located between these two extremes.

Guanxi and Reward Allocation

As discussed, according to the universal Face and Favor model (Hwang 1987), a resource allocator is very likely to adopt different rules of social exchange for different people. The research described above indicates that Chinese differentiate relationships along the dimensions of closeness and dominance. Behavioral implications of these principles were addressed in Chu and Yang (1976) research on work contribution and reward allocation. They found that Taiwanese prefer to allocate rewards according to the equity rule when their own contribution is less than that of their coworkers. However, they prefer the equality rule for reward allocation when their own contribution is greater than their coworkers. Results of their study indicated that Taiwanese tend to consider the other person’s benefit in making decisions of resource allocation. However, the relationship between the allocator and the coworker was not specified in the study.

Leung and Bond’s (1984) cross-cultural study revealed that Chinese and Americans follow different norms of resource allocation for various partners. Compared to Americans, Chinese have a greater preference for the equity rule when interacting with strangers, and a greater preference for the equality rule with friends, especially when their own contribution is higher than that of the friends. These results suggest that the tendency for Chinese people to consider the other’s benefit is more tenable when interacting with acquaintances than with strangers, clarifying Chu and Yang’s earlier study. Similar results were obtained in Hui et al.’s (1991) cross-cultural study.

Zhang and Yang (1998) were the first to explore the relation between various social relationships and resource allocation using a methodology that examined reactions to certain scenarios. They divided 228 adult participants in Beijing into six groups and asked them to read a scenario and then answer some questions. The scenario described two individuals collaborating on a task for their company to obtain a 100¥RMB bonus upon completion. Their respective contributions to the

task were 70% and 30%. Each participant was instructed to assume the role of the high performer and divide the bonus for each of six cases in which the lower performing coworker was designated as a different relational partner. Coworker roles included parent, sibling, friend, colleague, casual acquaintance, and stranger. Each participant in five of the groups was instructed to allocate the reward to the possible six coworkers according to one of the following norms: *he li* (fairness), *he qing he li* (reasonableness), *renqing* (affection), *ying gai* (deservedness or ought to), and *gong zheng* (equity). The sixth group acted as a control group in which participants were given no specific instructions for their distributions.

Moral Obligation and Renqing

Results indicated that allocations under the control condition, the *he qing he li* (reasonableness), and the *ying-gai* (deservedness or ought to) norms did not differ. In other words, what Chinese individuals thought they would do in the situation offered by the researchers was consistent with what they thought they should do morally. What they thought they should do morally was to deal with the other person in a reasonable way by accommodating affective (*qing*) and rational (*li*) considerations. Thus, the *qing* (affection) component is excluded from both the *he li* (fairness) and *gong zheng* (equity) norms, which take only impartiality into consideration. Allocations under these *he li* (fairness) and *gong zheng* (equity) conditions did not differ. Participants' allocations of the first three conditions of *renqing* (affection), *gong zheng* (equity), and *he li* (fairness) are provided in Fig. 8.4.

Figure 8.4 displays the influence of Confucian relationalism on Chinese reward allocation. The relationship (*guanxi*) clearly has an influence on reward allocation. Although the six possible coworkers were described as making the same contribution, participants made quite different allocations corresponding to the closeness of the individual's *guanxi* with them. The closer the *guanxi*, the more they awarded the coworker. If the participant judged that a certain *guanxi* entailed strong obligation (such as a family member), they took the opportunity to do a favor for the person when asked to divide the reward. In contrast, if the *guanxi* implied a weak obligation (such as a casual acquaintance or stranger), they tended to make the distribution according to contribution, obeying the equity norm.

The influence of *renqing* and equity (*gong zheng*) on award allocation should be emphasized. According to the Face and Favor model (Hwang 1987), *guanxi* contains an expressive component with a tendency to consider the partner's welfare, and an instrumental component entailing a tendency to use others as instruments to gain personal benefit in all conditions of interpersonal interactions. Whatever the interpersonal relationship, the allocator may care more about the partner's welfare and give the other more reward when the cognitive principle of *renqing* is emphasized. Allocators consider both parties' contributions and allocate more reward to themselves when the cognitive principle of *gong zheng* is emphasized.




Fig. 8.4 Allocations for the six coworkers. Adapted from Zhang and Yang (1998: 262)

Relationships and Social Exchange

Bestowing resources with a consideration of the closeness of the interpersonal relationship is not a unique phenomenon existing only in Confucian societies but a common phenomenon found in many societies. For instance, Clark and Mills (1979) made a distinction between communal and exchange relationships. In communal relationships, such as those between family members, romantic partners and friends, people tend to feel that they are responsible for the partner’s welfare and desire to help the partner when he or she is in need. In contrast, in exchange relationships, such as those between strangers or those in business together, people do not feel any specific responsibility for other’s welfare. They may, however, offer benefits to each other under such conditions in response to favors received in the past or in expectation of receiving benefits in the future (Clark et al. 1987).

Indebtedness and Role Obligation

Many anthropological studies have revealed that the exchange relationships of giving and receiving are more common between kin than between non-kin. Mutual aid among kin was less conditional and less tied to reciprocity. The exchange of costly

and important gifts is much more frequent among kin than non-kin (Essock-Vitale and McGuire 1980, 1985). Allocating more resources to members of one's in-group seems a universal pattern of social exchange with only context-specific, cross-cultural variation (Van den Heuvel and Poortinga 1999). In his literature review, Cunningham (1986) indicated that the closeness of kinship is related to the willingness to provide aid and the expectation to obtain aid from others. Findings of empirical research comparing interactions between friends and strangers have also indicated that friends are expected to be more helpful to one another than strangers (Bar-Tal et al. 1979). In fact, friends are more helpful than strangers in many situations, except when the situation implies a threat to a person's self-image (Tesser et al. 1988; Tesser and Smith 1980). Friends are more likely to take the partner's needs into account when dividing money (Lamm and Schwinger 1980, 1983) while strangers more closely monitor contributions to joint tasks in similar situations (Clark 1984; Clark et al. 1989).

The helpful behavior among members of communal relationships may be due to an individual's felt obligations toward different social targets. Rossi and Rossi (1990) asked an adult sample to report their felt obligations toward different relatives in various situations and to record the intensity of the felt obligation. They found that people usually have the strongest felt obligation toward their own parents and children, followed by children-in-law, stepchildren, parents-in-law, brothers-and-sisters, grandparents, and grandchildren. The felt obligation toward friends is lower than that toward every kind of relative.

Such felt obligations are closely related to peoples' helping behaviors in their daily lives. Amato (1985, 1990) made a distinction between two categories of helping behavior: planned and spontaneous. Using college students and adults in the USA as subjects, his research showed that most helping behaviors in daily life were planned by the help givers and provided mainly to friends, family members, and other acquaintances in the organization. Helping strangers accounted for only a small portion of helping behaviors in daily life. Therefore, he concluded that helping behaviors in daily life are mainly manifested as a response to role requirements and determined by social relationships.

Hierarchical Compensatory Model

Cantor (1979) studied support given to the elderly and developed a hierarchical compensatory model that advocated support giving as a function of the closeness and primacy of the provider's relationship to the recipient. The most appropriate caregiver is kin, followed by significant others, and then a formal organization. Waite and Harrison (1992) studied the social contacts of 3,677 middle-aged women by analyzing data collected by the US Census Bureau in the National Longitudinal Study of Mature Women. They also proposed a similar hierarchical model from their research.

This phenomenon had been explained by many scholars in terms of sociobiology (e.g., Cunningham 1986; Essock-Vitale and McGuire 1980, 1985) or reinforcement theory (e.g., Clark et al. 1987; Dovidio et al. 1991). In other words, it seems that helping behaviors among close relationships are a universal phenomenon. How can they be used to explain the specific features of Chinese social behaviors?

Intergenerational Exchange and Filial Piety

Chapter 7 indicated that filial piety has been viewed as an “unconditional positive duty” in Confucian culture.

We may cite some cross-culture researches on intergenerational exchange between East and West to illustrate the specific features of filial piety in Confucian society. The hierarchical compensatory model advocated that these are a priority order for family members to provide support or help to their elders. When a member of prior order is unable to provide support or help, it might be compensated by other members of succeeding order (Johnson 1983; Shanas 1979).

Daughter First Versus Son First

In Western society, the sequential order for family members to support elders is spouse, daughter, and son (Brody and Schoonover 1986; Litwak 1985; Sherman et al. 1988). Daughters are expected to provide more assistance and time to senior parents. The gender ideology model indicates that males are generally socialized to provide economic support while females are socialized to take care of their parents. Findings of empirical research in Western society showed that American daughters provide parents more labor assistance in daily life, including transportation, caring, and food preparation (Matthews and Rosner 1988; Stoller 1983) while sons give more financial support to parents (Montgomery and Kamo 1989).

Nevertheless, both the hierarchical compensatory model and gender ideology model may not work when they are transplanted to Confucian society. Previous findings of empirical research on Taiwanese samples showed that sons provide parents more financial and labor assistance than daughters (Wu 1993; Lin 1993; Chen 1990; Hermalin et al. 1992). Moreover, the competing commitment model predicted that the children’s time left for parents might be decreased when they have to assume more sole obligations. The prediction was supported by research findings from Western society, which showed that married children provided less time and care to parents than unmarried children (Lang and Brody 1983; Matthews et al. 1989; Stoller 1983). However, empirical research in Taiwan obtained opposite findings: the married or working children provided parents more care than unmarried or nonworking children (Hermalin et al. 1992; Lin et al. 2003).

Prior Filial Obligation of Son

Findings of previous research showed that models of intergenerational exchange between parents and children developed from Western society cannot be applied to Confucian society without modification; the related phenomenon in Confucian society should be explained in terms of filial piety of Confucian relationalism. Results of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (Phase 5 Wave 2, 2006) showed that the intergenerational exchange of family labor and affection between adult children and their parents follows the principle of reciprocity while financial exchange between them corresponds with the need rule (Yeh 2009). In other words, the more family labor and affection parents provided, the more support their adult children gave in return, but financial exchange between generations showed the opposite pattern. When parents had greater need, adult children provided more.

The prior filial obligation of son in the frequency of providing parents financial and labor assistance was emphasized in the Confucian cultural context, which implies that sons should provide parents more support and care than daughters. But, the priority of filial obligation had been assumed by married children rather than unmarried children. In other words, compared with married daughters, married sons provided more financial and labor support to their parents because they were more autonomous in controlling their financial resource; but unmarried sons provided no more financial and labor support to their parents than unmarried daughters.

Further analysis to compare married female groups showed that there were no significant differences between the frequency of providing financial support to their own parents and that to their spouses' parents.

Results of analyzing frequency of providing financial aids also support the principle of long-term reciprocity. Compared with adult children of lower education, the well-educated children who had received more parental caring and investment tend to provide more frequent financial support to parents. However, those who received less financial aid from parents tended to provide more financial aid to parents as opposed to less ($r = -0.43, p < 0.001$). From the perspective of Confucian relationalism, the filial norm of long-term reciprocity is established on the grounds of the need rule, which requests the dyad to fulfill one's role obligation to satisfy the needs of the other party. The need rule may be used to explain the phenomenon of adult children having a higher frequency of providing financial aid to those economically inferior parents.

As for the frequency of providing parents housekeeping assistance, the two major factors are the co-residence of children with parents and the children's frequency of providing assistance to the parents. When the adult children are living with parents, the more frequent the parents provide housekeeping service to the children, the more frequent the children will provide labor assistance to them in return. However, if the children do not live with parents, and parents do not provide children labor service, the frequency of providing housekeeping aid to parents becomes relatively few. Generally speaking, the intergenerational exchange of labor service among Taiwanese people can be explained in terms of the need rule, the principle of reciprocity, and the prior filial obligation of son.

It should be noted that findings of this research were obtained by the second-hand analysis of data collected in the fundamental survey of social change conducted by the National Science Council. The questionnaire might have been designed by someone without a comprehensive theory in mind about filial piety and intergenerational exchange in Chinese society. It investigated and compared the frequency of sons and daughters providing parents money and labor service. In fact, it is the daughter-in-law who provides substantial labor service to her husband's parents in many cases. However, this situation was neglected in the original questionnaire. This oversight also urges the necessity of indigenous theory for conducting accountable empirical research in non-Western society.

Relational Context and Social Norm

Research on intergenerational exchange within family shows the limitation of Western theories of social exchange. Theories of social exchange or reciprocity developed in Western cultures postulate that when a person receives a favor from a resource allocator, that person feels a state of discomfort associated with the indebtedness (Chadwick-Jones 1976; Gouldner 1960; Roloff 1987). According to Greenberg (1980), the sense of indebtedness in social exchange is an additive function of the recipient's (i.e., the person making request) net benefits and the resource allocator's (i.e., the person doing the favor) net costs from the exchange. Individuals are socialized to experience the pressure to reciprocate as a function of received benefits and will try to restore the equality of the relationship (Greenberg et al. 1971; Greenberg and Frisch 1972).

Consistency with Relational Context

Although the norm of reciprocity and its accompanying sense of indebtedness may be universal (Gouldner 1960), the motivation to maintain equality in exchanges with others more likely reflects the presupposition of individualism embedded in Western culture. Individualism assumes that interpersonal relationships are established and maintained primarily on the basis of a person's costs and benefits in social exchange (Blau 1967; Emerson 1976; Homans 1961). In contrast, individuals in Confucian cultures are socialized to accept duties and obligations to others and to take appropriate action in accordance with their position within the social network. Han et al. (2005) indicated that though Confucian ethics emphasize the principle of respecting the superior (Hwang 2000, 2001), when an individual is requested to do a favor by an acquaintance, one's decision of accepting or denying the favor request is determined by the congruence of request and the relational context. When the content of a favor request is consistent with the relationship context

and the situation conforms to the dominant social norms of obeying or serving a superior, an authority-oriented cognitive framework may be activated.

However, if the request is inconsistent with the relationship context, a self-assertive cognitive structure might be primed. Psychological reactance may make the subordinate aware of the unreasonableness of the request and thus lead to a denial of the request.

Based on such inferences, they designed two questionnaires with different scenarios of favor requests, asked one hundred and eighty-two graduate students from six universities in Taiwan to serve as participants, randomly assigned them to either the professor or peer version of the questionnaire (44 males and 47 females for each version) to test whether they would react differently to requests from petitioners of vertical (i.e., professors) versus horizontal (i.e., classmates) relationships. The theme that fit the relationship context between professors and students was academic requests, such as entering data, conducting a statistical analysis, copying teaching material, etc. The theme beyond the interaction context between a student and a professor was requests focused on housekeeping, including cleaning, baby-sitting, shopping, etc.

Ten major points of concern were formulated with each scenario. Participants were asked to indicate whether they would agree to or deny the request. In addition, participants evaluated the importance of each of the 10 points of concern on a seven-point scale (1 = not important at all, 7 = very important).

Their results showed that participants were more likely to accept a favor request from a professor than from a classmate in the academic-related request (82.4 vs. 50.5%), $(1)2=20.737, p<0.001$. In the housekeeping episode, the percentage of participants who accepted the request did not have a significant correlations with the person making the request (professor=38.9% vs. classmate=33%), $\chi(1)2=0.689, p>0.05$.

Obedience Versus Self-Assertion

Participants' ratings of the importance of 10 points of concern for each scenario were analyzed by principal components factor analysis with a promax rotation. Four factors were generated for both scenarios: obedience to authority, self-assertion, anxiety about social rejection, and expectation for reciprocal repayment.

Because the importance of obedience to authority and self-assertion in the decision-making process is our main concern in this part of analysis, only these two variables of acceptance and rejection groups were compared using Scheffe's post hoc tests. The results indicated that participants in the acceptance group rated these two variables very differently from the rejection group. The acceptance group rated obedience to authority as more important than self-assertion, whereas the rejection group rated self-assertion as more important than obedience to authority.

In resource theory of social exchange (Foa and Foa 1976), asking help may imply a request of exchange for one or more kinds of social resource including love, status, information, money, goods, and service. Findings of this research may be

used to illustrate the fundamental advocacy of cultural psychology: “one mind, many mentalities.” The universal, innate mind of human beings determines the deep structure of their social behaviors, but each culture may shape the particular mentalities of people living in that culture, which allow them to play language games to exchange various resources with the appropriate cognitive framework in different relational contexts. Another example will be cited to illustrate that even people in different Confucian societies may develop different language games to exchange a particular resource.

China and Japan: Comparison Between Two Confucian Societies

Status is an important resource for exchange in the resource theory of social exchange (Foa and Foa 1976). Expressing respect for the status of an opposing party can be viewed as a social resource presented to others.

In languages of East Asian countries, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, an individual usually mentions members of one’s groups to outsiders in a modest way or title. For instance, “*bi-gong-si*” in Chinese means “*hei-sha*” in Japanese. “*회사* (pye-sa)” in Korean is “*bi-she*” in Chinese. However, the translation of all those terms in English only refers to “our company.” In European and American languages, there are no equivalent terms for “*bi-gong-si*”. People in European and American cultures do not degrade their own companies to be respectful.


Relative Respectful Language in Japanese Culture

However, a comparison between languages of various cultures in East Asia shows not only the similarity, but also the difference. The study of comparative linguistics indicates that the relative honorific expression is a unique characteristic of Japanese language among East Asian cultures. The honorific expression is changed depending on the relationships among speakers, listeners, and characters mentioned in the topic. For example:

There are manager X and subordinate Y in A company. When Y speaks to manager X or to an outsider Mr. Z, Y must change his honorific expression with regard to manager X. For example, Y should say “X部長ご覧ください (Manager X, please read over it)” instead of “X部長見てください (Manager X, please take a look)”;

Y should say “X部長お召し上がりになってください (manager X, please taste it)” instead of “X部長食べてください (manager X, please have a bite of it)”. However, when Mr. Z (an outsider) of company B calls to company A and Y picks up the phone for manager X, Y should have the following dialogue (Fig. 8.5).

Fig. 8.5 Relationship structure of relative honorific language



Z: 「Xさんはいらっしゃいますか?」 (Z: Is manager X here?).

Y: 「今Xはおりません。1時間後にもどります。」 (No, X isn't here now.

He'll be back in an hour).


The underlying parts denote the description in honorific expression. The net parts refer to standard description. In Y's speech, though the subject is the manager X, such honorific expression as "Mr." or "manager" is not used and the verb is not changed into honorific expression. Y must first recognize the address target (Z) belongs to in-or out-group. If the target is an outsider, the speaker should not use honorific expression in mentioning a member within one's group (manager X). Thus, Y does not express respect for X at that moment. In other words, Y has to judge if the target is in or out of one's group before judging the superior-subordinate relationship between Y and the subject. This is the structure of relative honorific expression.

Nested Structure of Japanese Traditional Society

In order to explain why Japanese has developed such a linguistic system of relative honorific expression, Daidouji and Hwang (2009) cited a theory proposed by Kizaemon Ariga, a Japanese sociologist, to describe the Japanese social structure. Ariga (1967) published an article entitled *Ooyake* and *Watakusi* on the basis of his intensive field work on traditional village families in Japan. *Ooyake* was translated into English as "public" whereas *watakusi* was translated as "private." However, Ariga (1967) suggested that their meanings were different in English and Japanese. In Western Europe's social structure, "public" is unique; all individuals are targeted toward the unique platform of "public."

On the contrary, *ooyake* in Japan is not "unique" but "plural." Taking a Japanese family as an example, the head is *ooyake* and other family members are *watakusi* (ワタクシ). In the higher-order social group that the head belongs to, the head becomes *watakusi* and there is a relative *ooyake* who is named as the "public person." Ariga proposed a family model of nested structure. The structural difference between Japanese traditional society and "unique public" in Western Europe was that the former incorporated families and intermediate groups to form a hierarchical structure of *ooyake* and *watakusi* (Fig. 8.6).

Fig. 8.6 The nest structure of traditional Japanese society



From an anthropological perspective, the nested structure of Japanese society was originated from a specific secondary group of *iemoto* in Japanese culture. Anthropologist Hsu (1975) argued that, in all kinds of human society, an individual’s life always begins within one’s primary group. S/he has to be socialized there for the sake of preparing to enter or to form a secondary group.

Iemoto and Hierarchical Order

The secondary group, which has profound influence on an individual’s behavior, is clan in China, caste in India, club in America (Hsu 1963) and *iemoto* in Japan. The rule of inheritance in Chinese culture is equal division of property among all successors, but it is primogeniture in the Japanese system of *iemoto*. The house of the family, most of the property, and the ancestral tablet are inherited by the first son to form the so-called *honke* while his younger brothers obtain parts of the property to constitute the *bunke*, which may submit either the heir or the *honke* of another family.

In urban areas, those brothers who are excluded by the official heir have to join *honkes* of other families to form their own secondary groups, which are called *dozoku* in Japanese. Members of a *dozoku* are not organized by individuals but by a corporate of one *honke* and several corporates of *bunke* with their heads of family.

The former is the super-ordinate group for constituting the *ooyake* while the latter are subordinate groups of *watakusi* without consanguineous relationships among them.

The Japanese *dozoku* is completely different from the Chinese clan system; an individual’s status in the Chinese clan is determined by one’s position in his kin system. When he moves to a foreign country, he may remobilize his relational ties with a distant relative so far as they identify their positions in the kinship network. The kinship ties might be kept implicit, but they cannot be denied.

In contrast to this, the Japanese *dozoku* emphasize the sameness of physical situations. All members have to participate in the economic, social, and ritual activities of *iemoto*. Eventually, it becomes a voluntary group organized by people of the same ideology, striving for the same goal, and willing to follow the same rule of regulation (Nakane 1967). In traditional Japanese society, various branches and schools for training the art of calligraphy, painting, archery, swordsmanship, song-singing, custom design or flower arrangement, as well as the *samurai* groups, are organized on the principle of *iemoto*.

The hierarchical relationships are extraordinarily emphasized in a *dozoku* of *iemoto*; *bunke*s are economically, socially, and ritually submissive to *bonke* and have to use special titles for addressing their relatives in *dozoku*. They call the head of *honke* and his wife *otousan* (father) and *okaasan* (mother) while the heads of *bunke* and their wives are referred to as *ozisan* (uncle) and *obasan* (aunt). Children of *honke* should be addressed as *aniki* (older brothers) or *onesan* (older sisters) by children of *bunke* no matter what their ages. More specifically, the usage of titles for addressing relatives is permanent. All heads and wives of succeeding generations to a *honke* are called *otousan* and *okaasan* by members of *bunke*, and their children are called *aniki* and *onesan* (Nagai 1953). *Dozoku* is characterized with the property of corporation; units of its members are subcorporates. Each unit of corporate has a position arranged in the network of *iemoto*, which can be transferred from generation to generation.

A Japanese individual has to be mindful of the addressing system of titles in traditional society and learn how to use cultural specific relative honorific expressions. Now, Japanese still use the relative honorific expressions to express the in-group modesty in consideration of their cognition about the in-/out-group and the super-ordinate/subordinate positions between the dyads in interaction.

The specific system of relative honorific expressions has evolved in the cultural background of *iemoto*. According to Hsu's (1975) theory, the major function for an individual to be socialized in primary group is the preparation for his entrance into the secondary group. Therefore, during the stage of early socialization, a Japanese child has to learn how to use the most appropriate honorific expression by judging not only whether one and another's address target belong to the same group, but also the distance/closeness as well as the existence of an "upper public" between them (Doi 1956).

The Chinese social structure is distinctively different from that of Japan. Though both Taiwan and Japan have been influenced by Confucian culture and the primary groups are family for both of them, the secondary group for Chinese adolescents to participate in is clan (Hsu 1963).

In contrast to the Japanese *dozoku*, which is organized on the principle of *iemoto*, both clan and family in China are organized on the basis of Confucian ethics for ordinary people. Li (2005) indicated that Confucianism provides abundant discourse about benevolence, righteousness, and courtesy for arranging the relationships between sovereign and minister parent and child, husband and wife, brother, friends, but, it almost says nothing about the operation of a community. Chen (1998) argued that between Confucian ethics system for regulating one's family and governing

a state, there is an obvious gap where no ethical norm has been established for community or society. Even contemporary Chinese societies are characterized with an obvious lacking of consciousness for community. Yeh (1982) advocated that Confucian ethics for five cardinal relationships has been internalized as collective consciousness of Chinese culture through long-term historical evolution. But, the so-called community ethics are imported Western ideas, which are supposed to be useful for constructing modern society by elites. However, they are too fresh to become stabilized cultural units in the Chinese collective stock of knowledge.

Relative Honorific Expression and In-Group Modesty

Linguistic research indicated that the relative honorific expression exists only in the Japanese language. Though the system of honorific expression is also used in neighboring Korea, Koreans use an absolute honorific expression that is used regularly for a specific person regardless of the address target or situations. Modern Chinese has neither the grammatical variation of honorific expression, such as Japanese or Korean, nor the grammatical rules of changing honorific expression depending on the distinction between in-or out-group. Thus, the Chinese linguistic habit in this respect is more similar to Korean (Chu 1989). Therefore, relative honorific expression is a unique linguistic habit in Japanese culture among East Asian countries.


Because East Asian cultures exist a norm of modesty expressing an in-group member to an outsider, in both Japan or Taiwan, an individual tends to describe his/her father modestly to a listener outside of one's family. However, in Japanese language of relative honorific expression, the extent of modesty in describing one's father should be constrained when the listener is a close relative. In contrast to this, the extent modesty should be strengthened when the listener is a distinct one. However, the situation is different in the Taiwanese language of absolute honorific expression. The extent of modesty in expressing an in-group member should not be influenced by the closeness/distinctiveness between speaker and the listener.

Therefore, it is hypothesized that the in-group modesty in Japanese culture is determined by the closeness/distinctiveness of one's relationship with the out-group listener. On the other hand, the in-group modesty in Taiwanese culture remains the same regardless of one's closeness/distinctiveness with the out-group listener.

Daidouji and Hwang (2009) designed two scenarios on the basis of this hypothesis. The character in the scenarios respectively described a superior third party (father/advisor) of in-group member to an out-group listener who is either close or distant to the character. Two groups of 86 participants of university students in Taiwan and Japan were respectively asked to evaluate the extent of modesty on a 4-point Likert scale when the speaker is describing the ability/effort/reputation/achievement of the in-group superior.

As it was indicated in Fig. 8.7, when the relationship between speaker and listener was distant, the Japanese participants endorsed a significantly higher in-group modesty ($m_2=12.35$, $SD_2=2.76$) than the situation where their relationship was

Fig. 8.7 In-group modesty evaluated by the Japanese and Taiwanese participants when the relationship between speaker and out-group listener is close or distant



close ($m_1 = 11.07$, $SD_2 = 2.55$) ($t = 5.36$, $p < 0.001$). However, the speaker's in-group modesty remained the same for Taiwanese participants ($t = 0.06$, n.s.), regardless if the relationship is distant ($m_2 = 10.44$, $SD_2 = 2.15$) or close ($m_1 = 10.28$, $SD_1 = 2.01$).

Social Structure and In-group Modesty

Daidouji and Hwang (2009) further inferred that, in view of the existence of higher-order *ooyake* in Japanese culture, when an external group involved an internal group with the same structure, the speaker's modesty in describing an in-group superior would be suppressed. On the contrary, in relational structure without higher order *ooyake*, the in-group modesty will be facilitated. On the other hand, the scenario with higher order *ooyake* would not influence the in-group modesty in Taiwanese culture. He designed another experiment in which there were two scenarios with and without a higher order *ooyake* to include two parties of interaction and examined its influence on the speaker's in-group modesty by the same procedure as the first research. Their hypothesis was supported by their research findings.

Daidouji's and Hwang's (2009) research has important implications for either cross-cultural psychology or Confucian relationalism. Previous psychologists usually treated modesty as an aspect of independent self and interdependent self, and they conducted cross-culture research with the approach of personality psychology (e.g., Heine et al. 1999). Though some cultural psychologists realized the importance

of language and frequently cited such concepts of either language game or language tool, they rarely studied the modesty of East Asian people from a linguistic perspective. Daidouji's and Hwang's (2009) pioneer research elaborated on the cultural differences between Japan and China from the perspective of social structure, which has remarkable implications for psychological research on Confucian relationalism.

Conclusion

Based on the theoretical models of Confucian relationalism, this chapter reviewed several important theoretical models on Chinese social relations constructed by previous social scientists, including Fei's (1948a, b) hierarchical order; Hsu's (1971a) psychosociogram, and Ho's relational orientation (Ho et al. 1991; Ho 1993). I argued that Confucian relationalism has greater strangificability than previous models constructed by other scholars. Based on Hempel's (1965) deductive model or covering model, this chapter explained how to derive hypotheses about relationships and social exchange from the presumptions of Confucian relationalism by considering various antecedent conditions for conducting empirical research of social psychology in Confucian society.

Even though Confucian relationalism has greater strangificability than other models and can predict or explain more new phenomena, Feyerabend (1978) who advocated for an anarchistic theory of knowledge, indicated that many ideas that had previously been fundamental principles in history have been proven to be mistakes, and many absurd ideas in history have become well-accepted scientific principles. Therefore, the temporary retreat of a theory, a viewpoint, or an ideology, should not be taken as an excuse for rejecting it.

In view of those facts, he advocated for the principle of tenacity and argued that an old theory should be retained even if it is refuted or denied by empirical evidence, because its content may contribute to our understanding about its opponent model. If we insist on the exclusion of a particular idea just because it is contradictory to a popular scientific viewpoint, principle, or theory, we may make a serious mistake by taking a temporary retreat of science as a permanent arbitration of contradictory issues. This is a regress rather than a progress of science. Feyerabend's (1978) suggestion deserves our special attention when we examine the dialectical relationships between Confucian relationalism and its contradictory or related theories.

References

- Allport, G. (1968). The historical background of modern social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology: Vol 1* (2nd ed., pp. 1–80). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Amato, P. R. (1985). An investigation of planned helping behavior. *Journal of Research in Personality, 19*, 232–252.

- Amato, P. R. (1990). Personality and social network involvement as predictors of helping behavior in everyday life. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 53, 31–43.
- Ariga, K. (1967). Heritage of feudal system and modernization. *Collection of works by Kizaemon Ariga*, No. 4 (in Japanese). Tokyo: Miraisha.
- Bai, T. S. (1993). Relative and absolute honorifics: A comparison of honorific in Japan and Korea (in Japanese). *Japanese language education around the globe*, No.3, (pp. 195-207). The Japan Foundation.
- Bar-Tal, D., Bar-Zohar, Y., Greenberg, M. S., & Herman, M. (1979). Reciprocity behavior in the relationship between donor and recipient and between harm-doer and victim. *Sociometry*, 40, 293–298.
- Blau, P. M. (1967). *Exchange and power in social life*. New York: Wiley.
- Brody, E. M., & Schoonover, C. B. (1986). Patterns of parent care when adult children work and when the do not. *The Gerontologist*, 26, 372–381.
- Cantor, M. (1979). Neighbors and friends: An overlooked resource in the informal support older parents and their children. *Research on Aging*, 12, 3–35.
- Chadwick-Jones, J. K. (1976). Distributive justice, injustice and reciprocity. In *Social exchange theory: Its structure and influence in social psychology* (pp. 242–276). NY: Academic Press.
- Chen, C. N. (1998). *The structure of traditional system and social consciousness: A historical and anthropological investigation* (in Chinese). Taipei: Asian Culture.
- Chen, Y. C. (1990). *A study on intergenerational mobility in Taiwan* (in Chinese). Master Thesis. Graduate school of Economy, National Taiwan University.
- Chu, J. H. (1989). A comparative study on honorifics between Chinese and Japanese (in Japanese). *Bulletin of General Education Division Kobe-Gakuin University*, 27, 121–130.
- Chu, J. J. & Yang, K. S. (1976). The effects of relative performance and individual modernity on distributive behavior among Chinese college students (in Chinese). *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica*, 14, 79–95.
- Chuang, Y. C. (1998). The cognitive structure of role norms in Taiwan. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 239–251.
- Clark, M. S. (1984). Record keeping in two types of relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 47, 549–557.
- Clark, M. S., & Mills, J. (1979). Interpersonal attraction in exchange and communal relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 12–24.
- Clark, M. S., Mills, J., & Corcoran, D. M. (1989). Keeping track of needs and inputs of friends and strangers. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 15, 533–542.
- Clark, M. S., Ouellette, R., Powell, M., & Milberg, S. (1987). Recipient's mood, relationship type, and helping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 94–103.
- Cunningham, M. R. (1986). Levites and brother's keepers: Sociobiological perspective on prosocial behavior. *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations*, 13, 35–67.
- Daidouji, S. & Hwang, K. K. (2009). The difference of in-group modesty between Japanese and Taiwanese. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 51(3), 341–358.
- Doi, T. (1956). Japanese language as an expression of Japanese psychology. *Western Speech*, 20, 90–96.
- Dovidio, J. F., Piviavin, J. A., Greatner, S. L., Schroeder, D. P., & Clark, R. D. (1991). The arousal: Cost-reward model and the process of interaction. In M. Clark (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology* (Vol. 12, pp. 86–118). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Durkheim, E. (1938). *The rules of sociological method*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press (Original work published 1895).
- Emerson, R. M. (1976). Social exchange theory. In A. Inkeles (Ed.), *Annual review of sociology* (pp. 335–362). California: Annual Review.
- Essock-Vitale, S. M., & McGuire, M. T. (1980). Predictions derived from the theories of kin selection and reciprocation assessed by anthropological data. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 1, 233–243.
- Essock-Vitale, S. M., & McGuire, M. T. (1985). Women's lives viewed from an evolutionary perspective. II. Patterns of helping. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 6, 155–173.
- Fei, H. T. (1948a). *Peasant life in China*. London: Routledge & Kegan.

- Fei, S. T. (1948b). *Rural China (in Chinese)*. Shanghai: Observer.
- Feyerabend, P. K. (1978). *Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge*. London: Verso.
- Foa, U. G., & Foa, E. B. (1976). Resource theory of social exchange. In J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. Carson (Eds.), *Contemporary topics in social psychology*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- Gouldner, A. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review*, 25, 1976–1977.
- Greenberg, M. S. (1980). A theory of indebtedness. In K. Gergen, M. Greenberg, & R. Wills (Eds.), *Social exchange: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 3–26). NY: Plenum.
- Greenberg, M. S., Block, M. W., & Silverman, M. A. (1971). Determinants of helping behavior: Person's rewards versus other's costs. *Journal of Personality*, 39, 79–93.
- Greenberg, M. S., & Frisch, D. M. (1972). Effects of intentionality on willingness to reciprocate a favor. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 8, 99–111.
- Han, K. H., Li, M. C., & Hwang, K. K. (2005). Cognitive responses to favor requests from different social targets in a Confucian society. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 22, 283–294.
- Harris, G. G. (1989). Concepts of individual, self, and person in description and analysis. *American Anthropologist*, 91(3), 599–612.
- Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? *Psychological Review*, 106, 766–794.
- Hempel, C. G. (1965). *Aspects of scientific explanation*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hermalin, A. I., Ofstedal, M. B., & Lee, M. L. (1992). *Characteristics of children and intergenerational transfers (Comparative Study of the Elderly in Asia Research Report No. 92-21)*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1979). Psychological implications of collectivism: With special reference to the Chinese case and Maoist dialectics. In L. H. Eckensberger, W. J. Lonner, & Y. H. Poortinga (Eds.), *Cross-cultural contributions to psychology* (pp. 143–150). Lisse, Netherlands: Swets Zeitlinger.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1991). Relational orientation and methodological relationalism. *Bulletin of the Hong Kong Psychological Society*, 26–27, 81–95.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1993). Relational orientation in Asian social psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 240–259). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1998). Interpersonal relationships and relationship dominance: An analysis based on methodological relationalism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 1–16.
- Ho, D. Y. F., Chen, S. J., & Chiu, C. Y. (1991). Relation orientation: In search of methodology for Chinese social psychology (in Chinese). In K. S. Yang & K. K. Hwang (Eds.), *Chinese psychology and behavior* (pp. 49–66). Taipei: Laureate.
- Ho, D. Y. F., & Chiu, G. Y. (1998). Collective representations as a metaconstruct: An analysis based on methodological relationalism. *Culture and Psychology*, 4(3), 349–369.
- Homans, G. C. (1961). *Social behavior: Its elementary forms*. New York: Harcourt Brace & World.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1963). *Clan, caste and club*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1965). The effect of dominant kinship relationships on kin and nonkin behavior: A hypotheses. *American Anthropologist*, 67, 638–661.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1971a). Psychological homeostasis and jen: Conceptual tools for advancing psychological anthropology. *American Anthropologist*, 73, 23–44.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1971b). A hypotheses on kinship and culture. In F. L. K. Hsu (Ed.), *Kinship and culture* (pp. 3–29). Chicago: Aldine.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1975). *Iemoto: The heart of Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1985). The Self in cross-cultural perspective. In A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos, & F. L. K. Hsu (Eds.), *Culture and self: Asian and western perspectives* (pp. 24–55). New York: Tavistock.
- Hui, C., Triandis, H., & Yee, H. C. (1991). Cultural differences in reward allocation: Is collectivism the explanation? *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 30, 145–157.

- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 92(4), 944–974.
- Hwang, K. K. (1999). Multi-paradigm approach: On the methodology of indigenizing social psychology (in Chinese). *Journal of Social Theory*, 2(1), 1–51.
- Hwang, K. K. (2000). Chinese relationalism: theoretical construction and methodological considerations. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 30(2), 155–178.
- Hwang, K. K. (2001). The deep structure of confucianism: a social psychological approach. *Asian Philosophy*, 11(3), 179–204.
- Johnson, C. L. (1983). Dyadic family relations and social support. *The Gerontologist*, 23, 377–383.
- Lamm, H., & Schwinger, T. (1980). Norms concerning distributive justice: Are needs taken into account in allocation decisions? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 43, 425–429.
- Lamm, H., & Schwinger, T. (1983). Need consideration in allocation decisions: Is it just? *Journal of Social Psychology*, 119, 205–209.
- Lang, A. M., & Brody, E. M. (1983). Characteristics of middle-aged daughters and help to their elderly mothers. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 45, 193–202.
- Leung, K., & Bond, M. H. (1984). The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 47, 793–804.
- Levi-Strauss, C. (1976). *Structural anthropology* (M. Layton, Trans). New York: Basic Books.
- Li, M. C. (2005). Relationship between self and others and the concept between public and private. In K. S. Yang, K.K. Hwang & C. F. Yang (Eds.). *Chinese indigenized psychology* (in Chinese) (pp. 447–479). Taipei: yuanliu Publisher.
- Lin, S. L. (1993). Social sources and needs of social support for the elderly: four social support models. In Wang, K. Y. (Ed.), *An investigation on Issues of Social Security* (in Chinese) (pp. 265–290). Jhia-yi: Institute of Social Welfare, National Chung Cheng University.
- Lin, I. F., Goldman, N., Weinstein, M., Lin, Y. H., Gorrindo, T., & Seeman, T. (2003). Gender differences in adult children's support of their parents in Taiwan. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 65, 184–200.
- Litwak, E. (1985). *Helping the elderly: The complementary roles of internal networks and formal system*. NY: The Guilford Press.
- Marsella, A. J., Devos, G., & Hsu, L. K. (Eds.). (1985). *Culture and self: Asian and Western perspectives*. New York: Tavistock.
- Matthews, S. H., & Rosner, T. T. (1988). Shared filial responsibility: The family as the primary caregiver. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 50, 185–195.
- Matthews, S. H., Werkner, J. E., & Delaney, P. J. (1989). Relative contributions of help by employed and nonemployed sisters to their elderly parents. *Journal of Gerontology*, 44, 36–44.
- Montgomery, R. J. V., & Kamo, Y. (1989). Parent care by sons and daughters. In J. A. Mancini (Ed.), *Aging parents and adult children* (pp. 213–230). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Nagai, M. (1953). *Dōzoku: A preliminary study of the Japanese "extended family" group and its social and economic functions* (based on the researches of K. Ariga). Ohio State University research Foundation Interim report, No. 7.
- Nakane, C. (1967). *Kinship and economic organization in rural Japan*. London: Athlone Press.
- Roloff, M. E. (1987). Communication and reciprocity within intimate relationships. In M. E. Roloff & G. R. Miller (Eds.), *Interpersonal process: New directions in communication research* (pp. 11–38). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Rossi, A. S., & Rossi, P. H. (1990). *Of human bonding: Parent-child relations across the life course*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Shanas, E. (1979). The family as a social support system in old age. *The Gerontologist*, 19, 169–174.
- Sherman, S., Ward, R., & Mark, L. (1988). Women as caregivers of the elderly instrumental and expressive support. *Social Work*, 33, 164–167.
- Stoller, E. P. (1983). Parental care-giving by adult children. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 45, 851–858.

- Tesser, A., Miller, M., & Moore, J. (1988). Some affective consequences of social comparison and reflection processes: The pain and pleasure of being close. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54*, 49–61.
- Tesser, A., & Smith, J. (1980). Some effects of friendship and task relevance on helping: You don't always help the one you like. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16*, 583–590.
- Van den Heuvel, K., & Poortinga, Y. H. (1999). Resource allocation by Greek and Dutch students: A test of three models. *International Journal of Psychology, 34*, 1–13.
- Waite, L. J., & Harrison, S. C. (1992). Keeping in touch: How women in mid-life allocate social contacts among kith and kin. *Social Forces, 70*, 637–655.
- Wallner, F. (1994). *Constructive realism: aspects of new epistemological movement*. Wien: W. Braumuller.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1945). *Philosophical investigation (G. E. M. Anscombe, Ed. & Trans.)*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wu, W. H. (1993). *A study on the relationship between caring the aged and social network (in Chinese)*. Master Thesis, Institute of Social Welfare, National Chung Cheng University.
- Yang, K. S. (1981). Social orientation and individual modernity among Chinese students in Taiwan. *Journal of Social Psychology, 113*, 159–170.
- Yeh, K. H. (2009). *Intergenerational exchange behaviors in Taiwan: The filial piety perspective. Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies, 31*, 97–141.
- Yeh, C. C. (1982). Structure, consciousness and power: A review on the concept of social consciousness. In Hchu, H.Y. & Hsiao, M. S. H. (Eds.) *Proceedings of Symposium on sociological theories and methods (in Chinese)* (pp. 1–60). Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Zhang, Z., & Yang, C. F. (1998). Beyond distributive justice: The reasonableness norm in Chinese reward allocation. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 1*, 253–269.

Chapter 9

Life Goals and Achievement Motivation in Confucian Society

Abstract The history of research on achievement motivation conducted by psychologists in Taiwan was reviewed to show the transformation from the implantation of Western instruments of measurement at an early stage, the development of indigenous instruments at a later stage, to the bottom-up model building approach advocated by some indigenous psychologists at recent. The weakness of empirical research with naïve positivism was criticized in light of postpositivism; moreover, a theoretical model for studying life goals and achievement motivations in Confucian society was proposed in contrast with the implicit theory of intelligence (Dweck and Leggett, *Psychological Review*, 95(2), 256–273; 1988). A series of empirical research have been conducted to demonstrate several main propositions derived from the current theoretical model addressing vertical distinctiveness and personal goal; intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation; three types of life goals and their significances in Confucian society; social pressure and personal effort in academic vs. talented performance; and the moral significance of efforts in Chinese society.

Keywords Achievement motivation • Implicit theory of intelligence • Vertical distinctiveness • Types of life goal • Intrinsic motivation • Effort model • Learning goal • Performance goal • Learned helplessness • Mastery oriented

This chapter presents a theoretical model of life goals and achievement motivation in Confucian society based on a critical review of previous research done by a community of Taiwanese psychologists from the perspective of a philosophy of science. As a result of emphasis rendered on education and academic achievement in Chinese culture, the history of research on achievement motivation done by Taiwanese psychologists is comparable to history of the community itself. Their research orientation on achievement motivation not only has been profoundly influenced by the USA but also reflects their understanding of the philosophy of social sciences at the time. Reviewing their research orientation on achievement motivation is almost the same as reviewing the research orientation of the community. Therefore, the first

section of this chapter will be dedicated to the review of studies on achievement motivation done by the community. Section 2 raises a scientific criticism on the research orientation of “naïve positivism” prevalent in the Taiwanese academic community.

When the mainstream philosophy of science switched from positivism to post-positivism, some Western psychologists committed to the construction of the achievement motivation theory. However, most non-Western psychologists have still adopted the approach of naïve positivism. They have attempted to derive some hypotheses from Western theories for the propositions to be verified. Section 3 discusses the cognitive approach of research on achievement motivation and introduces the implicit theory of intelligence proposed by Dweck and Leggett (1988), followed by a criticism on its presumptions from the perspective of neo-positivism. Section 4 describes a theory of life goals and achievement motivation in Confucian society constructed on the presumptions of Confucian relationalism. The following sections present empirical research accomplished by the author and his colleagues in the context of this theoretical model.

Early Research on Achievement Motivation in Taiwan

Research on achievement motivation done in Taiwan has profoundly been influenced by the USA. At the early stage of the twentieth century, Murray (1938) proposed the concept of “need for achievement” in his book *Explorations in Personality* and attempted to measure psychological needs with projective tests prevalent at that time. In 1955, Chu revised the *thematic apperception test* (TAT) developed by Murray (1943) in her bachelor thesis for the sake of applying it to Chinese school-aged children (Chu 1955). She also developed an objective test and scoring system of TAT with the expectation of using it as a standardized instrument applicable to Chinese children for measuring various psychological needs, including the need for achievement (Chu 1968a, b).

Measurement of Achievement Motivation

At that time, McClelland (1955, 1961) attempted to reinterpret Weber’s theory on the rise of capitalism in Western Europe in terms of psychology. Weber (1958, 1968) indicated the affinity of Protestant ethics with the spirit of capitalism and identified it as the ethos contributing to the rise of capitalism in Western Europe from a perspective of sociology. McClelland (1961) reinterpreted this phenomenon from the perspective of the socialization of children. Because the Protestant community in Europe emphasized independent training for children, it nurtured their strong motivation for achievement. At the same time, Atkinson (1958) proposed a risk preference model that differentiated achievement motivation into two components:

the pursuit of success and the avoidance of failure. Both of these consist of three factors: need, expectancy, and value.

Such theoretical progress spurred many American psychologists to develop various instruments for measuring achievement motivation and to conduct experimental research on related issues. This kind of zeitgeist had influenced Taiwanese psychologists at that time. Hwang (1967) first translated Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) into Chinese, which became a main instrument for studying psychological needs in Taiwan. The original EPPS adopted a format of forced choice which asked the subject to choose his/her preferred statement from two alternatives of each item. Because the ipsative score thus obtained can only be used for intraindividual rather than interindividual comparison, and because the factor of social desirability was not controlled, Hwang et al. (1978) changed the format of response to a six-point self-rating scale. Findings of their research showed that there were relatively high coefficients of correlation among the 15 psychological needs for both male and female participants, which were inconsistent with previous findings of low correlation among factors of the original EPPS scale.

Such problems are frequently encountered when Western instruments of measurement have been transplanted to non-Western societies. Kuo (1973) attempted to abandon the approach of whole-sale transplantation and developed an objective paper and pencil test for measuring the academic achievement motivation of school students by adopting items from scales of achievement motive developed by Entwistle (1968), Hartley and Holt (1971), and Russell (1969), which had been widely used in the Taiwanese academic community. According to a statistical analysis compiled by Yu and Yang (1987), 110 studies on achievement motivation had been accomplished in Taiwan up to the year 1990. The most frequently used instrument of measurement was the *Academic Achievement Motivation Scale* (about 48%) developed by Kuo (1973), followed by EPPS (about 18%) compiled by Hwang (1967), while scales or questionnaires developed by other scholars were used sporadically.

Approach of Instrumentalism

Generally speaking, the research interest on achievement motivation or need for achievement in Taiwan during the 35 years prior to 1990 had been devoted to neither verifying nor falsifying Western theories, nor constructing any indigenous theory to explain local phenomenon. Instead researchers paid much attention to the development of scales used to collect empirical data in the local community, thus manifesting a feature of instrumentalism and positivism. Some meaningful findings were obtained by this approach. For example, Kuo (1973), Cheng and Yang (1977), Lin (1978), and Lu (1980) administered Kuo (1973) *Academic Achievement Motivation Scale* to different groups of junior high school students and used three different scales to measure their self-concepts. All four studies revealed a similar trend that participants with positive self-concepts have stronger achievement motivation, while those with negative self-concepts are characterized with weak achievement motivation.

Most studies on students' academic achievement motivation at that stage were accomplished by professors teaching in a system of normal education. A central theme of their research was school factors that may have influenced students' achievement motivation. Findings of their research indicated that the achievement motivation of students has significant positive correlations with the teacher's more democratic style of teaching (in opposition to authoritarian or permissive style) (Wu and Chen 1978), teacher's self-reported fondness for students (Chen 1980), teaching behaviors including explanation and warmth for male students, as well as explanation and punishment for female students (Chen 1980). Such findings actually have considerably significant meanings. Unfortunately, Taiwanese psychologists at this stage neither devoted themselves to the development of any theoretical model from the accumulation of empirical data nor attempted to interpret findings of these studies in the context of local culture.

Social-Oriented Achievement Motivation

Yu and Yang (1987) are the first scholars who attempted to modify Western concepts and theories on achievement motivation. They conducted an intensive review over previous literature on achievement goals, achievement behavior, outcome evaluation, final consequence, and overall characteristic; and differentiated the social-oriented from the individual-oriented achievement motivation. They argued that individual-oriented achievement motivation emphasizes the attainment of self-defined goals and standard of excellence. It refers to an individual's dynamic psychological disposition to excel at certain internal goals or standards of excellence that are primarily chosen by oneself. The characteristics of one's behavior as well as the evaluation of behavioral consequence are also determined by the individual.

In contrast, social-oriented achievement motivation can frequently be found among people of non-Western societies with a traditionally collectivist culture, such as Japanese or Chinese traditions. It refers to an individual's dynamic psychological disposition to excel certain external goals or standards of excellence which are mainly assigned by significant others of one's group or society, such as parents, teachers, family, etc. The characteristics of an individual's behaviors and the evaluation of behavioral consequence are also determined by others of one's group or society.

Based on this conceptual framework, they systematically wrote 250 items referring to many scales of achievement motivation developed by domestic and foreign scholars, deleted the inappropriate items, compiled two sets of questionnaires for pretest, administered them to large samples of secondary school students, and subjected the data to rigorous item and factor analysis. Eventually they obtained two formal scales of 30 items each for measuring individual-oriented and social-oriented achievement motivation, respectively, and used them to investigate factors related to achievement motivation, including child-rearing practices and achievement behaviors (Yu 1991, 1993).

Criticism on Approach of Naïve Positivism

After using their scales to conduct empirical researches for more than a decade, Yu (2005: 672) proposed cogent criticism on previous studies of achievement motivation:

Their understanding of culture remained at a superficial level. They tried to reduce culture into several sociocultural variables, such as gender, educational level, social class, and age. The deep and abundant connotations of culture were ignored. As a consequence of conceptualizing culture as variables and classifying contents of achievement into categories, research on this topic was trapped by the dilemma of decontextualization, losing the most important support of ecological and practical validity. They usually conducted research for illustrating the cross-culture significance of achievement, then provided post hoc explanation for their findings. This type of research is actually a duplicate of cross-cultural study which neglects the participant's experience-near concepts and impedes the examination from the native's point of view (Geertz 1984). In other words, it follows the Euro-American tradition of positivism rather than the perspective of cultural psychology, so it deprives the poignant cultural and historical meanings of achievement.

Such criticism is very cogent. Yu's criticism on previous researches on achievement motivation has two focal points: positivism and reductionism. Both approaches are frequently used by psychologists in non-Western and even Western countries. Their popularity has significant implications for the development of indigenous psychologies in non-Western countries, which will be elaborated here.

Positivist Approach

In the 1920s, when Schlick (1882–1936), the organizer of Vienna Circle, read Wittgenstein's (1922/1961) book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he was so impressed that he tried all means to convince Wittgenstein to participate in the academic activities of Vienna circle, which made a major impact on all members of the group. Schlick began to promote logical positivism, which had a profound influence over all the scientific communities around the world.

In his philosophy of later stage, Schlick (1936) made a rigorous distinction between logical verification and empirical verification. When we are trying to state the meaning of an empirical proposition, we are actually describing the condition in which the sentence is true. This is exactly the method to verify or falsify the proposition. Therefore, he proposed the core doctrine of logical positivism: the meaning of a proposition is the method for its verification.

As a result of strong advocacy by professor Hai-Kwang Yin from the department of philosophy at National Taiwan University in the 1950s, logical positivism has had an enormous influence over the scientific community of Taiwan. Most natural scientists as well as social scientists unconsciously follow the approach of naïve positivism. They transplant popular research paradigms from the West, derive hypothetical propositions from Western theories, and engage in the follow-up research work of verifying propositions.

Professor Yin had published articles on *Introduction to Logical Empiricism* (Yin 1957, 1985c), *Recognition of Logical Empiricism* (Yin 1960/1985). He introduced operationalism in detail (Yin 1957/1985b) and discussed the model of covering law in his article “The Basis for Unification of Empirical Sciences” (Yin 1957/1985a). He also noticed that logical positivism had been transformed into logical empiricism. However, a careful examination over Yin’s works indicates that had noted neither the impact of Popper’s (1934, 1963) evolutionary epistemology on logical positivism, nor the essential difference between Hempel’s (1966) logical empiricism and the logical positivism that was advocated by the Vienna Circle at earlier stages.

As a German, Hempel (1905–1997) had participated in the academic activities of the Vienna Circle during the period 1929–1930 and earned his PhD degree from the University of Berlin in 1934. After the rise of Nazi power in German, Hempel and many well-known scholars exiled to the USA. He taught at Yale University, Princeton University, and the University of Pittsburgh in different periods, continued to accommodate the academic advocacy and criticism from opponent schools, and constantly revised arguments of his own theory. As a result, his ideas on many important issues significantly deviated from the doctrine of early logical positivism. Nevertheless, his revision on the logical positivism made his theory of logical empiricism prevalent in the USA, thus affected most scientific communities around the world.

In his *Philosophy of Natural Science*, Hempel (1966) made a clear distinction between psychology of discovery and logic of verification. Psychology of discovery is discussed in the next session. For the logic of verification, he reinterpreted the application of deduction model (also known as model of covering law, see Chap. 7) in scientific research. When he used the deduction model to examine the core doctrine of logical positivism, “the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification,” he found many problems with this standard of meaning.

Logic of Verification

Hempel (1966) pointed out that general laws in deduction model for scientific explanation are usually stated in terms of a universal sentence or a highly confirmed statistic probability sentence. However, because it is impossible for any human being to make an unlimited observation or examination, all propositions stated in terms of the universal sentence will become meaningless.

Based on such a perspective, Hempel (1966) proposed two logical formulas to indicate the asymmetry between verifying and falsifying a hypothesis. In the deduction model, the hypothesis derived from logical inference is usually stated in terms of a universal sentence or high probability proposition. Assuming H as the hypothesis that contains I stating a certain observable event:

If H is true, then I is true,
 But, empirical evidence indicates that I is not true,
 Therefore, H is not true.

This form of inference is known as reasoning by rejecting the posterior in logic, which is correct in deduction, so the logic of examination by rejecting a hypothesis is acceptable.

On the contrary, the formula of verifying a hypothesis in logical positivism is:

If H is true, then I is true,
 Because empirical evidence indicates that I is true,
 Therefore, H is true.

This type of inference is called the fallacy of accepting the posterior in logic, which is invalid in deduction. No matter how many times a hypothesis was supported by results of experiment, we are unable to draw the conclusion that it is true. Therefore, a hypothesis cannot be verified by favorable findings of an experiment.

Hempel thus argued that plain repetition of favorable evidence contributes little to reinforce the support of a hypothesis. The strength of verification can be increased by improving the accuracy of observation and measurement, creating more rigorous experimental conditions or providing different types and a wider range of evidence.

Advocacy of Holistic Theory

However, further investigation on this topic enabled him to find that the verification and falsification of a hypothesis in scientific research is not as simple as it was depicted by the aforementioned two formulas. Generally speaking, a scientist usually has to utilize several auxiliary assumptions for testing a hypothesis, which are the so-called antecedent conditions in the deduction model. Some of these auxiliary assumptions are related to the scientific theory itself; some of them are related to experimental design, equipment, or research procedure. The combination of all those factors enables the scientist to observe a particular event.

When scientist obtained a negative result for his study, it is not easy for him to reject his hypothesis. Usually, he will double-check his experimental equipment or instrument, carefully examine his experimental design, or even repeat his experiment again. All these steps are in fact examining a crucial question: is there any problem with those auxiliary assumptions?

It is really not easy for a scientist to reject his hypothesis. Hempel (1977) thus proposed a perspective of holistic theory and argued that the cognitive meaning of proposition in a theoretical system is a matter of degree which cannot be classified into the categories of either meaningful or meaningless. In scientific activities, what should be examined is not a single hypothesis but the whole theoretical system constituted by propositions relevant to the hypothesis.

Follow-Up Type of Research

A majority of social scientists (and almost all of the natural scientists) in non-Western societies are embedded with a mentality of positivism. They do not understand the reflection of Hempel's logical empiricism on positivism but assumed that "cautious verification of a bold hypothesis" is a guideline for conducting scientific research. They either took Western theory as truth to derive a hypothesis for conducting follow-up research or draw up several hypotheses from their life experiences and begin their research work regardless of any theory.

Scientific researchers in non-Western societies tend to ignore the reflection of ontology/epistemology/methodology in the philosophy of science, but they usually emphasize the importance of research methods. Most of them are well-trained in statistics and tend to show the characteristics of instrumentalism in conducting their researches. They may spend huge amounts of budget to purchase the latest equipment of measurement from the scientific advanced countries or imitate the practice of Western scholars to develop their own instruments of measurement according to the doctrine of operationalism. When psychologists try to develop psychometric scales, they may manifest the feature of reductionism criticized by Yu.

Viewing from the perspective of the philosophy of science, a social scientist has to state his positions for constructing a scientific microworld, including its domain of application as well as its level of analysis. He has to specify that his analysis has been done at the social-culture, physical, or psychological level. If he attempts to describe the phenomenon at a certain level with the language of another level, he may follow the way of reductionism just as Carnap advocated (1925/1963) in his famous work *The Logical Structure of the World*.

Criticism on Reductionism

Personality psychologists tend to follow the practice of reductionism when they are trying to measure some personality variables. They usually collect items from a particular domain of their own interest, develop scales or questionnaires for measurement, collect large amount of data, use the method of factor analysis to identify underlying factors, and claim that they are defining certain variables of personality through the doctrine of operationalism. Generally speaking, the more abundant the cultural implications of the personality variables in which they are interested, the more complicated and various the content of items used to measure these variables, the more likely they may encounter the problem of reductionism.

The measurement of achievement motivation done by Western psychologists can certainly be described as reducing culture into psychological variables. The psychological research as on modernity/traditionalism and individualism/collectivism discussed in the first chapter of this book are also trapped in reductionism. Though Yu and Yang (1987) had intensively reviewed previous literatures on achievement goals, achievement behaviors, outcome evaluation, final consequence, and overall

characteristics, they did not develop any theory to elaborate the complicated relationships among those five aspects. On the contrary, they still followed the traditional approach of personality psychology to dichotomize individual and society, and developed two scales for measuring individual-oriented and social-oriented achievement motivation, respectively. The formulation of a one-dimensional scale is certainly an approach of reductionism, but the development of a two-dimensional scale is also an approach of reductionism. I cannot see any methodological difference between them.

This approach of instrumentalism and reductionism which emphasizes the collection of empirical data, without paying much attention to the construction of theory, can be termed as naïve positivism. Supporters of this approach assume that theory can be emerged from the induction of repeated phenomenon. As long as the scientists are committed to the collection of empirical data, theory will eventually emerge from the data.

Creative Imagination

This point of view is strictly contradictory to that of postpositivism. In an article collected in the appendix of his book *Objective Knowledge*, Popper (1972) elaborated on two types of epistemology through the ideas of a bucket and a searchlight. The purported epistemology of the bucket is comparing the act of scientific research to pouring water into a bucket. Relentless efforts collecting empirical data will lead to the emergence of theory just as the water will eventually overflow from the bucket. Popper totally opposed this perspective. He strongly argued that scientific research is more like a searchlight rather than like pouring water into a bucket. A scientist must raise questions continuously, propose tentative solutions or tentative theory to his/her questions with rational thinking. By this way, the light of theory can be projected toward the future just as a searchlight.

The psychology of discovery advocated by Hempel (1966) is similar to Popper's ideas that the formulation of scientific hypothesis follows no guiding principle or procedure. It is unlikely for scientists to derive hypotheses or to draw theories mechanically through the method of induction. In his *Philosophy of Nature Science*, Hempel (1966) indicated that scientific hypotheses and theories are not induced from the observed phenomenon. They are created or invented by scientists for explaining the observed facts of their major concerns. They are essentially conjectures speculated by scientist to explain the connections among phenomenon or the consistent patterns hidden behind the phenomenon. The transition from empirical materials to theory requires creative imagination. Any hypothesis or theory contains a number of conceptual terminologies that are surely not contained in the observed phenomenon but are constructed in the brain of the scientist.

Understanding the perspective of theoretical construction held by philosophers of postpositivism enables us to see the limitation of instrumentalism and reductionism. After listing the five aspects of achievement motivation, if Yu and Yang (1987)

utilized the so-called rational speculation (Popper 1972) or creative imagination (Hempel 1966) to consider the attributes of variables related to these five aspects, they might be able to develop a theoretical model to elaborate the relationships among them. However, they did not adopt this approach. On the contrary, they combined together all five aspects, used them to develop two scales, and analyzed their data by methods of item analysis and factor analysis. Items with high correlation coefficients will certainly be grouped in the same factor and have high loadings on that factor. Results of factor analysis or item analysis may render legitimacy for this approach of reductionism, but the opportunity for further development of a theory is thus lost at the same time.

Dweck and Leggett's (1988) Implicit Theory of Intelligence

Accompanying the progress of postpositivism, many cognitive theories of achievement motivation have emerged since the 1970s as a consequence of the rapid development of cognitive psychology (e.g., Heckhausen 1977; Heckhausen et al. 1985; Kukla 1972; Kukla and Scher 1986; Nicholls 1984, 1987; Weiner 1974, 1985). Those theorists took into consideration a series of cognitive factors, including attribution, subjective probability of success and failure, personal value of behavioral consequence, personal evaluation of one's own competence, and one's willingness of making effort, etc. They tried to define attributes of each factor, constructed theories to elaborate relationships among those variables, and developed various instruments of measurement to examine their theories.

Learned Helplessness Versus Mastery Orientation

Viewing from the philosophy of evolutionary epistemology (Popper 1972), any psychologists may construct his/her own theory to compete with other theories. It should be noted that this is competition of a theory with another theory, rather than competition of a proposition with another proposition stating a particular phenomenon. We may use an example to illustrate my arguments.

Previous research done by Western psychologists has found that there are individual differences in students' responses to frustration caused by learning. Some late school-aged students may manifest a behavior pattern of "learned helplessness." They are over-concerned with the results of failure and thus feel frustrated, hesitant, and are unwilling to try challenging tasks (Diener and Dweck 1978; Dweck and Bempechat 1983). On the contrary, some students may adopt a "mastery oriented" behavior pattern. They do not feel defeated by failure but are willing to accept challenge and able to maintain a strong motivation for learning. Generally speaking, students with the behavior pattern of "learned helplessness" tend to attribute their failures to such uncontrollable and unchangeable internal factors as one's

own incapability and thus lost self-confidence for future success. On the contrary, the “mastery oriented” students tend to attribute their failures to such controllable internal factors as not working hard enough; thus, they are able to continue their work to pursue future achievement (Dweck and Elliott 1983).

Entity Theory Versus Incremental Theory

Based on her studies on behavior patterns of “learned helplessness” and “mastery oriented” students, Dweck proposed “implicit theories of intelligence” to explain the system of interpretation for achievement held by those with these two behavior patterns. “Implicit theory of intelligence” is an individual’s belief in intelligence which may lead to a particular pattern of perception, emotion, and behavior about one’s own learning activities. It can be broadly divided into two categories: entity theory and incremental theory. A child with “entity theory” believes that intelligence is an unchangeable potentiality; no matter how hard s/he works, one can never change one’s inborn quality of intelligence. On the contrary, one who believes in “incremental theory” may think that intelligence can be increased through personal learning. They affirm more on the value of hard work and are more willing to make strong efforts (Dweck and Leggett 1988; Chiu et al. 1994).

Because of the individual difference in implicit theory of intelligence, students may endow learning with different meanings, having different focuses when they are participating in learning activities, which may result in different task goals. The so-called “task goal” means the goal pursued by an individual when s/he is participating in learning activities in achievement-related situations. Child holding entity theory describes one’s own intelligence as fixed and treats learning activity as an examination of one’s personal competence. Thus, his goal of learning is to show one’s internal “entity of intelligence” in expectation to acquire a positive evaluation and avoid negative ones. This kind of task goal is thus called “performance goal.” The task goal of those holding incremental theory is to increase one’s ability and one’s competence about the task through the process of problem solving. Thus, they are oriented toward a “learning goal” (Hong et al. 1995, 1999, 2000).

Performance Goal and Learning Goal

Dweck and Leggett (1988) thus proposed a theoretical model to elaborate the relationship among “implicit theories of intelligence” (including “entity theory” and “incremental theory”), “task goals” (including “performance goal” and “learning goal”) and “behavior patterns of learning” (including “learned helplessness” and “mastery orientation”) (see Table 9.1). They indicated that students aligned with the “entity theory” would show a particular pattern of learning in relation to their

Table 9.1 Implicit theories, goals, and behavior patterns in achievement situation (Dweck and Leggett 1988)

Implicit theories	Goal orientation	Perceived present ability	Behavior pattern
Entity theory (intelligence is fixed)	Performance (goal is to gain positive judgments)	High	Mastery oriented (seek; challenge high persistence)
	Avoid negative judgments of competence)	Low	Helplessness (avoid challenge; low persistence)
Incremental (intelligence is malleable)	Learning (goal is to increase competence)	High or low	Mastery oriented (seek challenge that foster learning; persistence)

confidence level in learning the task. Because they view one’s ability as a fixed and unchangeable trait, those who have a strong confidence in their talents would maintain strong motivation and show a “mastery oriented” pattern of learning. However, for those students who are less confident, they would attribute their failure to such stable internal traits as lacking the proper task ability. When they encounter a difficult task, they would show a behavior pattern of “helplessness,” which is characterized by low motivation and an unwillingness to persevere. Those students aligned with the “incremental theory of intelligence” and “learning goal” may maintain a strong motivation and show a “mastery oriented” learning behavior regardless of their confidence level (Hong et al. 1995; Sorich and Dweck 1997). Speaking more specifically, the main difference between students holding these two types of implicit theories of intelligence lies in their confidence level when facing academic challenges or failures. Students with strong confidence are more likely to accept challenge, face failure, and learn from them. Students with weak confidence in their own ability tend to show a behavior pattern of “helplessness” when they believe that their competence is not malleable.

Students holding “performance goal” may have neither maladaptive systems of interpretation about learning nor negative effects of learning. Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996) further modified the theory and divided performance goal into “performance approach” and “performance avoidance” by proposing a framework of three task goals: “learning goal,” “performance approach goal,” and “performance avoid goal.” Students with “performance approach goal” tend to show active pursuit for success as their goal; those with “performance avoidance goal” set avoidance of failure as their personal goal. Results of research with this system of classification revealed that students with “performance avoidance goal” had more maladaptive patterns of learning, which might be caused by their lower level of self-confidence.

Methodological Individualism Versus Methodological Relationalism

Dweck and Leggett's (1988) theory of achievement motivation was aimed to explain why individuals pursue different task goals in the same learning situation. They proposed ideas about "implicit theories" as the key concept for answering this question and argued that an individual's "implicit theory" in regard to one's own intelligence may result in different concerns and motivate one to pursue a particular task goal. Based on this assumption, they attempted to construct a general model of "implicit theories" to elaborate relationships between social motivation, morality, and other external attributes, in expectation to study the influence of an individual's belief in one's ability of controlling one's certain traits on one's cognition, emotion, and behavior.

Viewing from the perspective of the Confucian relationalism (Hwang 2000, 2001), the general model of implicit theories was constructed on the presumption of "methodological individualism." It assumed that an individual is the locus of control for his action, and one's implicit theories on the malleability of his intelligence, morality, social, or other personal attributes may determine one's choice of personal goals and the accompanying cognition, emotion, and behavior.

In order to develop a theoretical model to study the achievement motivation and learning behavior in Confucian society, Dweck and Leggett's (1988) theory of achievement motivation may be used as a framework of contrast for reflecting on related issues. However, it is inappropriate to transplant their research paradigm into Confucian society without any revision. It is necessary for us to pave a new way by constructing a theoretical model on the presumption of "methodological relationalism" (Ho 1991), which is more adequate for explaining social behaviors in Confucian society.

In order to construct such a theoretical model, the dialectical psychology proposed by Vygotsky (1987) argued that the relationship between every cultural unit within a cultural system should be considered by means of dialectics with a perspective of "culture-as-a-whole," while each unit in the cultural structure still remains the basic characteristics of the whole instead of disassembling the whole culture into unrelated elements. This can be viewed as an "emic approach" advocated by cultural psychologists (Berry 1989).

Speaking more specifically, a culture of individualism emphasizes "right-based morality," which advocates that an individual has the right to choose his life goal. However, a culture of Confucian relationalism stresses "duty-based morality," which insists that an individual is obligated to negotiate with other "persons-in-relation" to determine one's life goal of great significance for the sake of maintaining harmonious relationships with others in one's social network.

A Theory of Achievement Motivation in Confucian Society

Based on this view, Hwang constructed a theory of achievement motivation in Confucian society (see as Table 9.2) on the basis of his analysis of “Confucian relationalism” (Hwang 2000, 2001). The first row of Table 9.2 classified related aspects of this model into achievement goal, belief in hard work as a virtue, perceived ability for the task, belief in hard work as a means for progress, internal motivation, external motivation, and behavior pattern. Though several variables involved in this model were derived from Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) theory, their contents had been redefined in consideration of specific features of Confucian culture.

Achievement Goals in Confucian Society

The left column of Table 9.2 classified achievement goals in Confucian society into “vertical distinctiveness,” “personal goal,” and “horizontal distinctiveness.” The so-called “vertical distinctiveness” is the life goal highly valued by the society, attaining this kind of goal generally implies a victory through severe competition and a high degree of social appraisal. “Personal goal” is the goal pursued by a determined individual because of one’s personal interest. The reason for pursuing this type of goal is due to one’s intrinsic motivation which is irrelevant to any extrinsic reward. So as the goal of “horizontal distinctiveness” implies the attainment of a certain goal which might be valued by one’s peer group, the goal of “vertical distinctiveness” suggests that an individual is encouraged to pursue it by the whole society.

Because significant others in one’s relational network may expect an individual to achieve a goal of vertical distinctiveness, under the influence of Confucian cultural tradition, an individual’s attitude toward being “hard working” may be divided into two categories : “belief in being hard working as virtue” and “belief in being hard working as a means for progress.” The former suggests that making the effort to pursue the goal of achievement is a kind of personal obligation. On the other hand, “not hard working” means the inability to fulfill one’s obligation “as a human being.” The latter suggests that an individual’s ability is malleable; one will certainly learn the necessary skills to accomplish one’s goal as long as s/he works hard enough and invests more and more time and effort.

Hwang’s theory of achievement motivation divided task goal into “learning goal” of intrinsic motivation and “performance goal” of extrinsic motivation and adopted a framework of three categories: “learning goal,” “performance approach goal,” and “performance avoidance goal.” In consideration of the particular culture of Confucian relationalism, “learning goal” was defined as increasing one’s ability of doing the task; “performance approach goal” was defined as “acquiring positive social judgment”; and “performance avoidance goal” as “avoiding negative social judgment.”

Table 9.2 A theory of life goals and achievement motivation in Confucian society

Life goal	Viewing effort as a virtue	Perceived task ability	Viewing effort as a mean	Internal motivation (learning goal)	Extrinsic motivation (performance goal)	Behavior pattern
Vertical distinctiveness	High	High	High	Learning goal: increasing competence Ambiguous	Performance approach goal: obtaining positive judgments Performance avoidance goal: avoiding negative judgment	Mastery orientated (accepting challenge, high persistence) Learned helplessness
Personal goal	Low	High	Low	Learning goal: increasing competence		Mastery orientated
Horizontal distinctiveness	High	High	High	Learning goal: increasing competence	Performance approach goal: obtaining positive judgment	Mastery orientated

Vertical Distinctiveness Versus Personal Goal

According to the theoretical model of Table 9.2, most children are encouraged to pursue the achievement goal of “vertical distinctiveness” in Confucian society. Pursuing this kind of goal is viewed as a student’s obligation. As long as the student works hard enough, his/her personal competence will certainly be increased. So long as an individual has strong confidence on one’s competence for a particular task and believes that s/he has enough potential to learn this task, s/he may take the increment of competence for this task as “learning goal” and obtain a positive social evaluation as the “performance goal.” Furthermore, s/he may show a behavior pattern of “mastery orientation” and persistently deal with various challenges in learning this task.

However, when an individual does not have confidence in his/her own ability to attain the goal of vertical distinctiveness; s/he feels that s/he is obliged to pursue this kind of goal under significant others’ expectation,; his/her task competence cannot be increased; s/he may suffer from an ambiguity of learning goal, set avoidance of negative social judgment as one’s “performance goal,” and even manifest a behavior pattern of “learned helplessness” by avoiding challenge and not being persistent in doing tasks.

The pursuit of “personal goal” is mainly out of an individual’s personal choice rather than social expectation. The reason for an individual to pursue this kind of achievement goal is, on the one hand, out of one’s own interest, and on the other hand, because s/he has the ability to do so. Therefore s/he is able to learn related skills diligently and manifest a behavior pattern of “mastery orientation.”

“Horizontal distinctiveness” can be regarded as an extension of “personal goal.” An individual may begin to pursue this kind of goal out of one’s choice. However, once s/he attains achievement in this regards, s/he may be encouraged by his/her peers, friends, or colleagues by future expectations on him/her. At this moment, one may believe that one can develop one’s potential to accomplish the goal of “horizontal distinctiveness” through personal efforts. In pursuing this kind of achievement goal, one may also set the increment of competence as one’s “learning goal,” the attainment of positive evaluation as “performance goal,” and show a behavior pattern of “mastery orientation.”

Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Motivation

The independent choice of goals is highly valued in such individualistic societies as North America, where the importance of one’s own interest in setting one’s achievement goals is highly stressed. For example, Deci and Ryan’s (1985, 1992, 2000) “self-determination theory” argued that a mature individual might be driven by intrinsic motivation for satisfying one’s own interests only. The process of action is actually the goal in itself. On the contrary, an individual’s act driven by such extrinsic motivation as external reward and punishment, restriction, social expectation, or

requirements, may distract one's intrinsic motivation. Therefore, extrinsic motivation can be regarded as an earlier form of motivation which would be transformed into an intrinsic one in one's later stage of development.

Nevertheless, the ideal values of Confucian culture are relatively different from that of individualistic culture. Viewing from the perspective of social psychology, a culture of individualism emphasizes an individual's independence and internal consistency of personality, whereas the Confucian culture of relationalism stresses one's role obligations and behavioral adequacy in the society, both of which are defined by social expectations (Hwang 1998, 2001).

Some research shows that behaviors of pursuing goals by people in East Asian society are determined not only by one's internal interest but also by social expectation. For example, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) took Caucasian and Asian children in US society (including American-born Japanese and Chinese) as participants and investigated how the choice of goal may influence an individual's achievement motivation and behavior in different cultural contexts. The results of their experiment found that Caucasian children's achievement motivation could be explained in terms of self-determination theory. They would have high motivation only in condition of "self-determination." Their performance, their preference for the difficult task, and times for dealing with challenge would all be increased. However, Asian American children had high motivation and performance in both conditions of "self-determination" and "in-group determination"; they even had stronger motivation and performed better in the condition of "in-group determination."

Model of Multiple-Goals

Findings of such research can be explained in terms of the theoretical model of "multiple-goals" (e.g., Lock and Latham 1990). Maehr and Braskamp's (1986) "theory of personal investment" proposed that motivation of learning behavior is determined by four kinds of universal goals: task goals aimed to increase one's own ability to accomplish the task; ego goals aimed to lead and to excel others in competition; social solidarity aimed to please others or to be concerned about others' welfare; and extrinsic goals meant to work for extrinsic rewards or social recognition.

According to the theory of achievement motivation proposed in this article (see Table 9.2), when a child is pursuing goals of "vertical distinctiveness" in Confucian society, significant others in his social network will constantly evaluate his or her performance (Chen and Stevenson 1989; Salili 1994, 1995; Salili et al. (2001); Stevenson et al. 1990; Sue and Okazaki 1991). While s/he is pursuing "learning goals," s/he tends to look for positive social evaluation and avoid negative social evaluation (Salili and Hau 1994; Salili et al. 1989). When one is competent enough to master the work and tends to have a behavior pattern of "mastery orientation" for dealing with challenges, one's extrinsic motivation for pursuit of "performance approach goal" would be stronger than that of "performance avoidance goal."

On the contrary, when an individual feels that s/he is not competent enough for the task, s/he would not only be uncertain about one's "learning goals" but also manifest a behavior pattern of "helplessness" with stronger "performance avoidance goals" than "performance approach goals."

Based on previous theoretical analysis, when children are pursuing goals of "vertical distinctiveness," their attainment of "learning goals" could not only acquire positive social evaluation but also avoid negative social evaluation. Thus, there must be a certain extent of correlation coefficients among the variables of "learning goal," "performance approach goal," and "performance avoidance goal." According to "self-determination theory" (Deci and Ryan 1985, 1991), the older the children are, the less influence of such extrinsic motivations as the acquisition of positive social evaluation or avoidance of negative social evaluation on their intrinsic motivations to achieve the "learning goals." The numerical values of correlation coefficients among these three variables would thus be reduced. Likewise, students with better grades tend to have stronger intrinsic motivations of studying. They might less likely be affected by extrinsic incentives. Compared to their classmates with inferior grades, the numerical values of correlation coefficients among their "learning goals," "performance approach goals," and "performance avoidance goals" should be relatively lower.

Development of Self-Determination

We may use findings of an empirical study done by Tsai (2003) to support our arguments. In order to study the "cultural significance of achievement motivation," Tsai (2003) took 332 first-grade students of junior high schools (170 males and 160 females) and 311 second-grade students in Taipei (189 males and 122 females) from two senior high schools as participants. The senior high school groups were divided into "senior high school group A" and "senior high school group B," which were schools with students of the best and worst parts of performance in the Joint Entrance Examination for senior high schools of Taipei. The participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire including such predictor variables as "goal orientation," "entity view toward intelligence," and Chinese "beliefs related to efforts," and such criterion variables as "strategy of self-handicapping," "preexamination idling," "attribution pattern," and "guilt feeling".

She adopted the "pattern of adaptive learning scale (PALS)" developed by University of Michigan as an instrument to measure "goal orientation." It consisted of five items of "learning goals," such as "one of my goals in class is to learn as much as I can;" five items of "performance avoidance goals," such as "it is very important for me to appear cleverer than other classmates in class;" and four items of "performance approach goals," such as "one of my goals is to prevent others from thinking that I'm not smart enough in class." The participants were asked to respond on 7-point scales.

Table 9.3 The correlation coefficients among three categories of achievement goals measured by PALS for each of the three groups of participants

	Learning goals	Performance approach goals	Performance avoidance goals
<i>Junior high school group</i>			
1. Learning goals	–		
2. Performance-approach goals	0.310***	–	
3. Performance-avoidance goals	0.215***	0.675***	–
<i>Senior high school group B</i>			
1. Learning goals	–		
2. Performance approach goals	0.249***	–	
3. Performance avoidance goals	0.155***	0.757***	–
<i>Senior high school group A</i>			
1. Learning goals	–		
2. Performance approach goals	0.117*	–	
3. Performance avoidance goals	–0.007	0.710***	–

Note: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Relationships Among Three Types of Goals

The correlation coefficients among these three categories of achievement goals for each of these three groups were listed in Table 9.3, respectively, which showed that there were extremely high correlations between “performance approach goals” and “performance avoidance goals” for all these groups of participants (0.675***, 0.757***, 0.710***, $P < 0.001$). The facts meant that expectations to get positive social evaluations and to avoid negative social evaluation in learning activities are two sides of an individual’s concern. Those who desire to acquire positive social evaluation would also try to avoid the negative social evaluation. The correlation coefficients between “learning goals” and “performance approach goals” for all three groups of participants (0.310***, $P < 0.001$; 0.248***, $P < 0.001$; 0.117*, $P < 0.05$) were, respectively, higher than that with “performance avoidance goals” (0.215***, $P < 0.001$; 0.155***, $P < 0.001$; –0.007, n.s.). The facts showed that when Chinese students are pursuing “learning goals,” they also seek for “performance approach goals” of acquiring positive social evaluation and attempt to avoid “performance avoidance goals” of negative social evaluation. However, the correlation coefficient between these two variables in “junior high school group” was higher than that in “senior high school groups;” that of “senior high school group B” was more than “senior high school group A.” Those facts meant that the older the children were the better their academic performance was, and their intrinsic motivations to pursue the achievement of “learning goals” and extrinsic motivations to pursue or to avoid social evaluation tend to be independent.

Self-Esteem and Face: The Attainment of Life Goals

“Face” is a core concept for understanding Chinese social behavior (Hwang 2006; Zai 1995). Under the influence of Confucian relationalism, “face” can be considered as a kind of “social-contingent self-esteem” (Ng 2001; Hwang 2006), which is a “self-image” experienced by an individual because of others’ evaluation in a specific situation (Chen and Stevenson 1989). When an individual or his related other receives positive or negative social evaluation with regard to their social or moral acts, s/he may have a sense of enhancing or decreasing “face” (Ho 1976; Hu 1944; Cheng 1986).

Self-Esteem and Face

According to the theory of achievement motivation in Confucian society (see Table 9.2), when an individual pursues a “personal goal,” he can satisfy his/her intrinsic motivation because s/he accomplishes his/her “learning goal” and thus improve his/her ability. When an individual pursues goals of “vertical distinctiveness,” s/he must first master the acts to attain this goal. Once s/he accomplished his/her “learning goal,” his/her intrinsic motivation is thus satisfied and his/her “self-esteem” may increase. When society positively evaluates an individual, and he/she attains his/her “performance approach goal” by fulfilling his/her extrinsic motivation, s/he may have the feeling of “having face.”

Based on such ideas, Hwang (2005a, b) conducted a study to illustrate the specific features of life goals in Confucian society by adopting and modifying the data collected by Kitayama et al. (1997), who conducted an interesting research to demonstrate how negative messages relate to self might influence Japanese’s self-esteem. They asked 63 students from Kyoto University in Japan and 88 students from the University of Oregon in the USA to describe the situations that can (1) enhance and (2) decrease their self-esteem. The former was defined as “success instruction situation” and the latter was “failure instruction situation.” They acquired 913 and 1,582 kinds of situations from these two groups of university students, respectively. From the eight combinations (culture X sex X instruction of participants), they used the method of random sampling to obtain 50 situations from each combination and had 400 situations in total to construct the questionnaire. Then they asked 124 American and 143 Japanese university students to carefully read each situation, imagine themselves in the situation and judge if the situation would enhance or decrease their self-esteem. If their answer was positive, they had to determine the extent of influence on their self-esteem on a four-point scale ranged from 1 (slightly) to 4 (considerably). The results showed that (1) for both Japanese-created situations and American-created situations, Japanese students argued that failure situations were more likely to affect their self-esteem than did the success situations. American participants revealed the opposite; (2) the extent of lowering self-esteem in failure

situations evaluated by Japanese was more than that of raising self-esteem in successful situations; (3) Japanese mentioned more self-derogatory situations, whereas Americans proposed more self-enhancing situations. Those research findings indicated that Japanese and Americans had the exact opposite direction of self-enhancement: the former were more sensitive to the negative information related to themselves than did the latter.

From the perspective of Confucian relationalism (Hwang 2000, 2001), individuals in East Asian society are involved in their relational networks formed by others having various relationships with them. One must fulfill certain role obligations toward significant others in one's lifeworld. An individual may experience many events of success or failure in one's life; some of them are related to one's role obligations, and some are simply personal affairs. The former may influence not only an individual's self-esteem but also his/her face feelings caused by others' evaluation (Su and Hwang 2003); while the latter of personal affairs might be more likely to influence one's self-esteem instead of his/her face feelings.

Types of Life Goals

Since participants in the study were students from Kyoto University in Japan and University of Oregon in the USA, Hwang indicated that the situations of success or failure might represent life goals pursued by university students in Western culture of individualism as well as their counterparts in East Asian culture of relationalism. If the classification of achievement goals in the theoretical model of achievement motivation in Confucian society (see Table 9.2) is acceptable, university students in Taiwan who have also been influenced by Western culture might pursue either the vertical achievement valued by Confucian society or "personal goals" out of one's personal interests. Those "personal goals" might be transformed into horizontal achievement goals, so long as their friends or colleagues support their pursuit.

If items related to "attaining/not attaining" life goals in Japanese and American situations collected by Kitayama and Markus (1999) are randomly sampled to develop a questionnaire, administered to a group of university students in Taiwan, used to evaluate the degree of enhancing or decreasing participants' self-esteem in each situation of "success" or "failure," and collected for analysis, the types of life goals in East Asian society might be revealed by factor structure of the achievement goals thus obtained.

In the Confucian culture of relationalism, an individual tends to endow more social value on life goals of "vertical distinctiveness" in comparison with other types of goals defined by the individual. During the process of one's socialization, one may internalize this type of goal and endow them with a high extent of personal value. Facing success or failure in pursuing these types of life goals, one might experience not only an intense enhancement or decrease of self-esteem but also a strong sense of having or losing face. Based on the assumption that people in Confucian society have a certain consensus for evaluating the value of life goals,

three other independent groups of university students were asked to evaluate the feeling of having or losing faces in each situation of “success” or “failure,” respectively, its importance to oneself and to one’s peer group. In addition to having university students in the first group evaluate “self-esteem,” the four groups of participants’ evaluations can be analyzed to obtain the personal value and social value of each situation and its influence on one’s personal self-esteem and feelings of face.

Life Goals of University Students in Taiwan

Based on this perspective, Hwang translated 400 Japanese and American situations collected by Kitayama and Markus (1999) into Chinese, eliminated items with a content related to social structure, randomly selected 100 items from items relevant to the “attaining/not attaining” one’s life goals, and used them to construct four scales for measuring the participants’ evaluations on the four aspects of each situation.

Participants of this research were 482 university students studying psychology related courses in National Taiwan University, including 209 males and 273 females. The method of group test was used to collect the data. Scores on items of “self-esteem scale” made by the participants of the first group were factor analyzed to classify the situations which might have an influence on one’s self-esteem. Finally, five factors were obtained. Among these five factors, three factors were related to “success situations;” two factors were connected to “failure situations.” Items in each factor were further rearranged according to means of “personal value” made by participants of a third-group. To explain the meanings of each factor, factors related to “success” were listed in Table 9.4. A careful examination of meanings of each factor in Table 9.4 finds that their meanings would be clearer if the items of factor I were separated into two parts after N46 “when I quickly learn a new skill,” and which were named as “self-efficacy” and “self-affirmation,” respectively. The meaning of each factor was explained as follows:

Factor IA: Personal Goal: “Self-Efficacy”

This is a kind of feeling of self-improvement when an individual attains one’s “learning goal” in pursuit of a particular goal of achievement defined by oneself. Participants with high scores on this factor have a feeling that they “have clear mind and plenty of thoughts,” “can understand difficult concepts,” “can totally understand a profound book,” “can understand the issues countered with my usual positions,” “can recognize one’s own change when having difficulties,” “can comfortably face oneself,” “can stand up for things I believe in,” “can make positive decisions for oneself” or “can make the best choice.” In addition, they feel that they are “physically energetic; they can run, walk, ride a motorcycle and swim,” “quickly learn a new skill,” “finish many things in one day” and are “constantly making progress.”

Table 9.4 Factor loading, social value, personal value of each item

Factor loading	Item	Self-esteem		Face		Personal value		Social value	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<i>Factor of self-efficacy and its impact on self-esteem and feeling of having face</i>									
0.75	N39 When I can comfortably face myself	2.07	1.40	1.49	1.69	3.54	0.69	2.50	0.80
0.54	N28 When I feel I make progress constantly	2.54	1.00	1.89	1.46	3.54	0.59	2.16	0.71
0.64	N57 When I make a difficult decision and I know I have the best choice	2.25	1.09	1.60	1.40	3.49	0.57	2.40	0.76
0.71	N58 When I have positive decision for myself	2.20	0.96	1.58	1.26	3.46	0.63	2.33	0.69
0.77	N40 I recognize my own change when encountering difficulties	1.60	1.83	1.52	1.41	3.41	0.70	2.57	0.85
0.65	N59 Being physically energetic, I can run, walk, ride a motorcycle, and swim	1.52	1.27	1.33	1.31	3.39	0.70	1.75	0.94
0.69	N38 When I read a relatively profound book, and I can completely understand it	2.23	0.95	1.67	1.39	3.30	0.71	2.19	0.83
0.49	N63 When I stand out for the things I believe in	2.21	1.06	1.80	1.31	3.29	0.68	2.35	0.72
0.67	N37 When my mind is clear and I have plenty of thoughts	1.84	1.09	1.53	1.31	3.28	0.75	2.10	0.88
0.45	N61 When I understand difficult concepts	2.13	1.14	1.84	1.19	3.22	0.65	1.86	0.70
0.74	N41 When I attempt to understand the issues countered with my usual positions	0.97	1.60	0.81	1.33	3.13	0.71	2.04	0.79
0.47	N34 I can finish many things in one day	1.99	1.22	1.53	1.32	3.13	0.81	1.75	0.84
0.46	N46 When I quickly learn a new skill.	2.20	0.95	1.80	1.34	3.02	0.78	2.17	0.57
<i>Factor of self-affirmation and its impact on self-esteem and feeling of having face</i>									
0.59	N52 When I involved in the fear to the forests	0.41	1.57	0.36	1.30	2.59	0.94	1.76	0.97
0.35	N60 When I wear the clothes I like	1.70	1.03	1.52	1.15	2.57	0.94	1.75	0.77
0.45	N55 When listening to music	0.58	1.08	0.54	1.11	2.54	1.06	1.63	0.72
0.66	N62 When I sit or walk under the sunshine outside	0.87	1.08	0.62	1.15	2.50	0.89	1.17	0.49
0.39	N24 When the plants I grow completely blossom.	1.45	0.98	1.09	1.26	2.48	0.92	1.62	0.82
0.41	N30 Finishing a long experiment	0.86	1.22	0.52	1.27	2.37	0.85	1.68	0.82
0.52	N49 Being a volunteer in the organization of human rights	1.34	1.10	1.11	1.18	2.33	0.77	2.02	0.71

(continued)

Table 9.4 (continued)

Factor loading	Item	Self-esteem		Face		Personal value		Social value	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
0.47	N35 When I prepare a great breakfast for myself	1.10	1.06	1.02	1.14	2.24	0.92	1.50	0.72
0.46	N54 I only make few mistakes when playing piano	0.58	1.79	0.43	1.86	2.18	1.00	1.83	0.85
0.33	N56 Raising pets	0.59	0.89	0.40	1.07	2.01	0.91	1.94	0.75
0.37	N47 When dancing	0.65	1.43	0.62	1.64	1.82	0.87	1.88	0.94
<i>Factor of vertical distinctiveness and its impact on self-esteem and feeling of having face</i>									
0.66	N8 When I am accepted by certain senior high school, university, or graduate school	2.98	1.08	2.85	1.13	3.66	0.57	3.10	0.70
0.86	N23 When I pass the entrance exam of the prestigious university	2.83	1.02	2.60	1.18	3.55	0.69	2.90	0.74
0.57	N1 When I reach my targets	2.62	0.89	2.14	1.29	3.55	0.63	2.34	0.60
0.74	N7 Passing various exams	2.61	0.99	2.44	1.23	3.47	0.67	2.66	0.77
0.34	N14 When I am completely independent, I do not have to dependent on my parents	2.12	1.46	1.64	1.41	3.40	0.75	2.36	0.87
0.58	N18 When I execute precisely a plan I arranged	2.26	1.02	1.82	1.25	3.36	0.64	2.09	0.70
0.64	N9 When I use the language of other countries to talk with the foreigners	2.66	1.10	2.46	1.49	3.33	0.72	2.48	0.97
0.63	N33 Performing well in an important test	2.57	1.00	2.23	1.19	3.29	0.69	2.39	0.84
0.43	N32 Publishing my own books	2.61	1.18	2.58	1.08	3.25	0.85	2.92	0.71
0.44	N15 When things develop according to my wish	2.05	1.18	1.33	1.32	3.25	0.73	2.21	0.92
0.74	N27 When I am employed by a first-class company	2.47	1.20	2.35	1.26	3.17	0.82	2.91	0.81
0.69	N25 When I win the rewards in the exhibitions	2.48	1.03	2.27	1.37	3.02	0.76	2.45	0.73
0.44	N2 When I think of certain difficult work I have finished in the past	2.43	1.00	2.03	1.31	2.99	0.77	2.14	0.79
0.45	N21 When the videos I edit have good results	1.90	1.02	1.71	1.03	2.76	0.74	2.20	0.59
0.51	N13 When I am chosen as the person in charge of certain organization	1.92	1.27	1.53	1.38	2.73	0.84	2.17	0.77
0.52	N22 When my name appears in the publication, even though simply for some tedious things	1.52	1.02	1.05	1.31	2.42	0.94	2.30	0.78

Factor of horizontal distinctiveness and its impact on self-esteem and feeling of having face

0.54	N29 When I wonderfully tag in the infield of the ground	1.92	1.17	1.97	1.19	2.48	0.89	2.28	0.77
0.32	N19 I properly cook a meal when camping	1.42	1.09	1.32	1.15	2.41	0.87	2.05	0.84
0.39	N5 When I feel I ride the motorcycle better	1.21	0.92	1.10	1.04	2.36	0.89	1.79	0.62
0.47	N12 I goal in the game of football	2.03	1.18	1.95	1.42	2.34	0.95	2.13	0.72
0.68	N3 I serve a ball and score when playing tennis	1.47	0.95	1.67	1.10	2.23	0.86	1.71	0.64
0.34	N53 When I quit smoking	0.74	1.05	0.83	1.23	2.17	1.19	2.51	0.77
0.69	N4 I have strike when playing bowling	1.67	0.92	1.85	1.14	2.06	1.00	1.70	0.65

Content of those items are related to situations when an individual feels that one can control one's personal capabilities to accomplish certain goals. This kind of feeling was named as "self-efficacy" by Bandura (1997). Therefore, this part of "personal goal" was named as "self-efficacy."

Factor IB: Personal Goal: "Self-Affirmation"

Most items of Factor I in this part were related to the concrete content of attaining certain personal goals and satisfying one's personal needs without involvement of others, such as "receiving salaries," "being comfortable alone," "sitting or walking under the sunshine outside," "listening to music," and "preparing a great breakfast for oneself." Though some of the items might involve others, their contents still were all focused on attaining a personal goal and an affirmation of self-value, such as "I will persist to the last minute and will not give up when joining the marathon," "I work as a volunteer in the organization of human rights," "when I wear my favorite clothes," and "when I have a great haircut." After careful observation and evaluation of the meanings of these items, they were confirmed as all having qualities of "self-affirmation."

Factor II: Vertical Distinctiveness

Content of items in Factor II were mainly related to the attainment of certain goals highly valued by society, such as "passing various examinations," "being accepted by certain senior high school, university or graduate school," "being hired in a first-class company," "winning awards in the exhibition," "being selected as the person in charge of a certain organization," "good result of video editing," etc. Attaining this kind of goal usually implies a victory in the process of severe social competition, it also means the possibility of being highly appreciated and admired by society. This can be regarded as typical "vertical distinctiveness" in East Asia society.

Factor III: Horizontal Distinctiveness

Most items in Factor III involved the attainment of certain goals pursued by an individual with potential support from a peer group, such as "feeling that one's skill of riding a motorcycle has made progress," "properly preparing a meal when camping," "having a shot in the soccer game," "performing a wonderful catch in the infield of the ball park," "serving a ball and getting a point when playing tennis," and "getting a strike when bowling." Those performances might be praised by numbers of a particular group identified by the individual; however, unlike items in Factor II, they were not goals which an individual might be encouraged to pursue by the whole society. Therefore, it was named "horizontal distinctiveness." The meanings of each factor were elaborated in accordance to the content of items in each factor.




Fig. 9.1 The participants’ evaluation on personal value and social value of four success situations

However, viewing from the theory of achievement motivation in Confucian society (Table 9.2), these four factors have much more complicated meanings which should be explained in terms of Confucian relationalism: among those four factors, “vertical distinctiveness,” “horizontal distinctiveness” and “personal goal” are “goals of achievement.” But, “self-efficacy” is an individual’s subjective feeling when s/he reaches his/her “learning goal” in pursuit of a particular goal of achievement. In other words, one may have a feeling of “self-efficacy” by accomplishing related “learning goals” no matter what goals of achievement s/he is pursuing. Since it is a subjective feeling accomplishing with the attainment of any goal of achievement, the participants believed that it was most important among the above four factors. The gap between its personal value and social value was most significant (see Fig. 9.1).

Social Significance of Achievement Goal

With an understanding of “self-efficacy” in Table 9.1, the meanings of the other three types of achievement goals in Confucian society can further be elaborated: “vertical distinctiveness” are goals highly valued by the society. Compared with the other two types of achievement goals (see Fig. 9.1), the participants agreed that attaining this type of goal would have both the highest social value and personal value. When one attained this type of goal, s/he could not only enhance his/her




Fig. 9.2 The participants’ evaluation about the influence of four success situations on their self-esteem and feelings of having face

self-esteem by satisfying his/her intrinsic motivation but also experience a feeling of having face caused by receiving external rewards or positive evaluation from the society.

According to the theoretical model in Table 9.2, “horizontal distinctiveness” possesses attributes of both “personal goal” and “vertical distinctiveness.” An individual’s choice of pursuing this type of goal is originally out of one’s own interest. However, when s/he attains this kind of goal, s/he might be praised by a small group of people who identify with this goal. Compared with “vertical distinctiveness,” goals of “horizontal distinctiveness” are merely affirmed by a few group members instead of the general public in society. Though some participants might endow “horizontal distinctiveness” with a high value, not all participants identified with this type of goal. Thus, the meaning of its “personal value and social value” was less than that of “vertical distinctiveness.” The variation of personal value (range of SD: 0.86–1.19) was also larger than that of “vertical distinctiveness” (0.57–0.94). The extent of enhancing one’s self-esteem and feeling of having face when attaining the goals of “horizontal distinctiveness” were not as strong as those of “vertical distinctiveness” (see Fig. 9.2).

Compared with “vertical distinctiveness,” “personal goal” is an achievement defined by an individual according to one’s intrinsic interest. Some people may endow it with high “personal value,” but some people may not do so. Therefore, the variation of “personal value” (0.77–1.06) is larger than that of “vertical distinctiveness” (0.57–0.94). In other words, participants tended to have a more consistent view of the “personal value” of “vertical distinctiveness,” but their views on “personal values” of “horizontal distinctiveness” and “self-affirmation” were much more distinct. Generally speaking, though participants endowed the affairs related to “personal goals” with more personal value (comparing with that of “horizontal distinctiveness”), they thought that social value of the former was less than that of “horizontal distinctiveness” (see Fig. 9.2). When they attained “personal goals,” the extents of enhancement of self-esteem and feeling of having faces were relatively lower than that when they attained goals of “vertical distinctiveness” or “horizontal distinctiveness.”

A Comparison Between Two Types of Achievement Goals

According to Lakatos, (1970) scientific research programs, once a scientist constructs a theory, other theorists may construct related theoretical models on the basis of the same core idea with a consideration of other aspects of his/her concern. Based on Hwang’s theory of achievement of motivation in Confucian society, Chen et al. (2009) derived a simplified conceptual framework of achievement goals. Based on the source of goal construction (Austin and Vancouver 1996; Bandura 1986; Gollwitzer 1993), it distinguished two major kinds of achievement goals: the source of construction for “vertical distinctiveness” (which was called “vertical goals” by Chen et al. 2009) is mainly derived from “social expectations on an individual”; while that for “personal goals” mainly came from an individual’s “autonomous interest.”

Vertical Goal and Horizontal Goal

Under the influence of Confucian relationalism, significant others in one’s relational network may expect an individual to attain certain achievement goals in accordance with the specific role played by the individual. Those goals are generally highly valued by society, pursuing these goals of achievement is supposed to be the fulfillment of one’s obligation. In other words, the content of these goals and its standard for excellence are mainly defined by the society. Though an individual should have obligation to work hard to pursue this kind of goal, s/he may not have intrinsic interest in doing so. The domain of those goals is specific to one’s social role and relatively narrow members of the same social role may compete with each other and compare their achievements for those goals. Thus, this situation is referred to as “vertical distinctiveness.”

Table 9.5 A conceptual framework for the basic types of achievement goal

	Vertical goals	Personal goals
Main source of construction goal	Social expectations	Self-interest
Freedom of selection	No choice (role obligation)	Self-choice
Significant others' expectations	High	Low
Social value	High	Low
Peer competition	Medium	Low
Implicit theories	Incremental theory	Entity theory

In addition to vertical distinctiveness, an individual in Chinese society may construct one's achievement goals according to one's intrinsic interest, just like anyone in a Western culture of individualism. The content of goals and its standard for excellence are defined by oneself according to one's own autonomous interest. Therefore, the domain of goals for one's choice is broad. These kinds of goals may not be valued by society or the significant others in one's relational network; for instance, parents and teachers may not have consistent expectations for a given individual. There are also "personal goals." When an individual pursues a goal that is affirmed by one's peer group with the same interest, this might become the individual's achievement of "horizontal distinctiveness."

Academic Versus Talented Performance

An example of empirical research may be cited to illustrate the difference between these two types of goals in Chinese society. For senior high school students in Taiwan, academic performance is usually viewed as a goal of vertical distinctiveness. Students are obligated to pursue this kind of goal. However, students may choose to pursue goals of talented performance according to their own interests, which are hardly valued or encouraged (Cheng 1997, 1998; Cheng and Wong 1996; Zeng 1999). Following this line of reasoning, Wang (2003) proposed a conceptual framework (Table 9.5) and indicated that cultural factors might play a crucial role in Taiwanese students acquiring these two types of goals. In order to distinguish the difference between goals of vertical and horizontal distinctiveness, she asked 396 high school students from 12 schools in Taipei to serve as participants in a questionnaire, which was designed in accordance to the theoretical framework described in Table 9.5. She studied the following factors (1) perception of the nature of academic performance and talent; (2) students' beliefs in one's general intelligence and specific abilities for academic performance (vertical distinctiveness) and talent performance (horizontal distinctiveness); (3) giving two stories of successful academic and talent performance, asking the participants to attribute their achievements to oneself or other factors; (4) the students' self-evaluation of their academic and talent performance in class.

Table 9.6 The participants' evaluation on eight attributes of academic and talented performance

	Academic performance	Talented performance	<i>T</i>	Prob > $- T $
Parents' pressure	3.8568	2.7653	13.2142	0.0001
Teachers' expectation	3.4033	2.6518	10.7097	0.0001
Peers' competition	4.2881	3.1362	14.8972	0.0001
Extra works after class	3.9272	3.9059	0.2309	0.8175
Self-choice	2.7329	3.5637	-8.9824	0.0001
Entering good schools	4.2340	2.7330	16.2290	0.0001
Interest	3.1232	4.7775	-15.7231	0.0001
Effort	5.2204	4.5991	6.4004	0.0001
Self-improvement	4.1371	3.8665	2.9292	0.0037

The students had very different perceptions on the achievements of academic and talent performance along the eight dimensions listed in Table 9.6, with the exception of one.

Compared with the pursuit of talent performance, students were more likely to be aware of expectations from parents and teachers and pressure from peers in setting up goals for academic performance. They might be sensitive to future benefits of academic performance. Because the establishment of academic goals was not out of personal choice, s/he might not really be interested in this goal. However, in order to attain this goal, one should make every effort to improve oneself and should be afraid of failing. If academic and talented performances were taken as vertical and horizontal distinctiveness, respectively, students had very different perceptions of them.

Social Pressure and Personal Efforts

When the participants' evaluations along eight dimensions of these two types of achievement goals were factor analyzed, two factors were obtained: social pressure (from parents, teachers, and colleagues) and personal factors (such as effort, interest, and extracurricular works) (see Table 9.7). Results of *T*-test indicated that motivation for academic performance was mainly derived from social pressure, whereas motivation for talented performance was originated from personal factors.

Effort Model and Ability Model

Findings of pervious research done by educational psychologists in Hong Kong (Hau and Salili 1991), Australia (Rosenthal and Feldman 1991), Korea (Kim et al. unpublished results), America (Sue and Okazaki 1990), Japan (Heine et al. 2001),

Table 9.7 Factor analysis of participants' evaluation on attributes of academic and talented performance

Items	Factor I: social pressure	Factor II: personal efforts
Parents' pressure	0.74764	
Teachers' expectation	0.71285	
Entering good schools	0.66314	
Peers' competition	0.65782	
Effort		0.77419
Self-improvement		0.67455
Interest		0.57965
Extra works after class		0.57550

and Taiwan (Stevenson et al. 1993) have shown that American students, teachers, and parents tended to adopt an ability model and attributed one's academic success to innate abilities. Since one's ability was fixed, a talented individual could be successful with one's talent. Therefore, it was unnecessary for him/her to work hard. By the same token, since it was difficult for an individual with inferior talent to learn new things, it was also unnecessary for them to work hard. On the contrary, students, teachers, and parents in Asian countries tended to adopt effort models (Hong 2001). They believed that an individual's ability was malleable. One could improve one's abilities through one's efforts. As long as one worked hard enough and invested more and more time, one could be successful in mastering one's studies (Stevenson and Stigler 1992).

Social Demand and Effort Model

Research by Cheng and Wong (1996) also supported their arguments; they pointed out that the idea of diligence, which is "the means by which one makes up for one's dullness," was deeply rooted in Chinese society. They believed that hard work could make up the inferiority of one's inborn abilities, and efforts might possess instrumental value for one's performance in pursuing goals of achievement. Chen (2004) utilized the 1997 data of a nationwide survey of social change in Taiwan. Results of a quantitative analysis showed that Taiwanese people tend to attribute career success to internal factors and believe that exerting efforts will lead to success. The results are very similar to findings of another similar survey conducted in 1992 (Hwang 1999). It also found that the teachers are more internal attributive than participants of other jobs, which indirectly showed that education may contribute to deliver the social value of internal attribution.

D'Ailly (2003) adopted 806 participants from high and medium levels of elementary school students in Taiwan and tested a hypothesis derived from "self-determination theory." The results revealed that there was a significantly positive

correlation between “extent of efforts” and “academic performance.” But, their “intrinsic interest” in academic activities was not only unrelated with “extent of efforts,” but also had a negative correlation with “academic performance.” On the contrary, such external pressures as “social value” and “parents’ expectation” had positive correlations with their “extent of efforts.”

Considering the conceptual frameworks in Tables 9.2 and 9.4 as well as findings of this empirical research, the pursuit for academic achievement had different meanings for the Western and Asian students. Compared with Asian students, Western students tend to pursue their academic performance in accordance with their personal choice. Their learning activities are very similar to Asian students’ pursuit of horizontal distinctiveness. On the contrary, Asian students’ pursuit of academic achievement considerably reveals their cultural uniqueness. They attempt to fulfill their role of obligations under the pressure of high social expectation. Their pursuit of vertical distinctiveness could hardly be understood by the implicit theory of intelligence proposed by Western psychologists.

Effort Accounts

Tsai’s (2003) research provided some materials which can be used to illustrate implication of the difference between “effort” and “intelligence” in Chinese society. In order to measure the participants’ entity view toward intelligence, she translated Dweck’s scale for elementary school students into Chinese (Henderson et al. 1994).

In order to measure Chinese beliefs toward effort, she designed two instruments of measurement. The first was through “effort as a merit” scale, which took into account such beliefs as “effort is a kind of virtue and important value which should be pursued by an individual.” The second was categorized through “effort as a mean” scale, which measured the participants’ level of belief that “an individual’s achievement would not be restricted by his inborn capacities but rather depends on his efforts.” Higher scores on the later showed that the participants tend to believe that an individual can solve all problems through effort and reach a standard of achievement as high as one desires regardless of the limitation of capacities.

The correlation matrix among the three variables “effort as a merit,” “effort as a mean,” and “entity view toward intelligence” are listed in Table 9.8 for the three groups of participants “junior high school group,” “senior high school group B,” and “senior high school group A,” respectively. Among each of the three groups of participants, there were significant and stable correlations between “effort as a merit” and “effort as a mean” (0.392^{***}, 0.334^{***}, 0.364^{***}, $p < 0.001$). In other words, those participants who believed that effort is a kind of virtue tended to believe that effort can increase one’s capacities regardless of their age. As it was indicated in Table 9.8, among the three groups of participants, there were negative correlations between “effort as a mean” and “entity view toward intelligence” (−0.426^{***}, −0.399^{***}, −0.250^{***}), which implied that those who believe in “effort as a mean,”

Table 9.8 The correlation coefficients among two views of efforts and entity view toward intelligence for three groups of participants

	Effort as a virtue	Effort as a mean	Entity view toward intelligence
<i>Junior high school group</i>			
Effort as a virtue	–		
Effort as a mean	0.392***	–	
Entity view toward intelligence	0.144	–0.426***	–
<i>Senior high school group B</i>			
Effort as a virtue	–		
Effort as a mean	0.334***	–	
Entity view toward intelligence	–0.209***	–0.399***	–
<i>Senior high school group A</i>			
Effort as a virtue	–		
Effort as a mean	0.364***	–	
Entity view toward intelligence	–0.033	–0.250***	–

Note: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

such as “diligence is a mean by which one may make up for one’s dullness,” are less likely to think that intelligence is unalterable. This point was similar to findings of previous research (Dweck et al. 1995; Levy and Dweck 1998). Speaking more specifically, those who believe that effort can lead to success are more likely to believe in “incremental theory of intelligence” instead of “an entity view toward intelligence.” However, the numerical values of correlation coefficients would be decreased with the students’ growth. The correlation for senior high school students with grades in advanced division was the least. In other words, comparing with the other two groups of participants, senior high school students with better grades tended to separate these two kinds of beliefs, and they did not believe that effort can change an individual’s intelligence.

In Table 9.8, it should be noted that a significant negative correlation between “effort as a merit” and “entity view toward intelligence” can be found only in “senior high school group B” ($r = 0.209^{***}$, $p < 0.001$). Both the correlation coefficients in “junior high school group” ($r = 0.144$, n.s.) and “senior high school group A” ($r = -0.033$, n.s.) were not significant. In other words, “effort as a merit” and “entity view toward intelligence” were two independent concepts without a stable correlation for the Chinese participants in Taiwan.

This fact has a very important theoretical implication. Viewed from the theory of achievement motivation proposed by Dweck and Leggett (1988), the students’ implicit theories of intelligence (so-called “entity view toward intelligence”) would influence not only their achievement motivation but also their learning behavior (see Table 9.1). However, according to the theoretical model proposed in this article (see Table 9.2), an individual’s beliefs related to “efforts” rather than one’s implicit theory of intelligence are crucial factors affecting his or her achievement motivation and learning behavior in Confucian society.

The Moral Significance of Efforts in Chinese Society

Why Chinese students tend to adopt effort model rather than Western model of ability? Tweed and Lehman (2002) compared the contrast ideals for learning from Confucius with that from Socrates and constructed a framework for organizing previous findings regarding culturally Chinese and culturally Western learners in a modern context. Socratic learning valued private and public questioning of widely accepted knowledge and expected students to evaluate others' beliefs and to generate and express their own hypotheses. But Confucian learning valued effortful, respectful, and pragmatic acquisition of essential knowledge as well as behavioral reform. Li (2002) used prototype methods to tap indigenous conceptions about cultural learning models as constructed by college students from the USA and China. She asked participants from these two countries to provide free-associated words and phrases that are related to learn/learning in English and *xuexi* in Chinese. She then asked the other two groups of participants to sort items from their own culture into groups based on similarity in meaning. Cluster analysis of these sorted groups produced two organizational structures of conceptions of learning.

Two Types of Learning Models

The US learning model basically views learning as a process by which individuals' minds acquire what is out there. Knowledge exists as more or less a neutral body (as embodied by the large number of school subjects) that the minds of individuals can acquire. The conceptual focus is on the distinction between this neutrally existing knowledge body and the internal characteristics of the individual that enable the person to acquire it. The internal learner characteristics include cognitive skill, intelligence, and abilities, on the one hand; and thinking, communicating, and active engagement in the learning processes, on the other. Motivational factors such as interest, curiosity, willingness, and commitment are also part of the internal makeup of a person that serves to facilitate the learning process.

The Chinese regard knowledge as something that is indispensable to their personal lives – something that creates meaning for their lives, without which human lives would be unthinkable. Knowledge includes not only the externally existing body but also social and moral knowing (Fwu and Wang 2002). The scientific agenda of knowing the world is not the ultimate purpose. Although the Chinese also endorse utilitarian benefits as part of their motivation for learning, individuals seek learning in order to cultivate themselves as a whole and toward the idea of self-perfection beyond the specifics of knowledge and utilitarian ends. Chinese beliefs about learning therefore seem to display a person orientation, which elaborates on personal causation of learning. As a result, knowledge is something that they must have. This need of knowledge and the seeking of it require that Chinese cultivate the desire to

learn, engage in lifelong learning, remain humble, and adopt an action plan of diligence, endurance of hardship, steadfast perseverance, and concentration. Unlike the Western mind orientation, the Chinese person orientation addresses the fundamental questions of what knowledge means to one as a sociocultural being, why one needs to learn it, what one needs to do to learn it and learn it well, and what would happen if one does not learn it. This kind of learning aims at breadth and depth of knowledge, the unity of knowing and morality, practical benefits for knowledge, practical benefits for oneself and one's family, and contributions to society.

This approach delimited the domain of learning and studied the topic without taking the social context into consideration. To the contrary, the achievement motivation theory of this chapter was constructed within the cultural context of Confucian relationalism, which may explain relationships among various variables, is listed in Table 9.2. By the same vein of thinking, we may discuss the meaning of making effort in Confucian culture.

Unconditional Positive Duty

Pursuing vertical distinctiveness in Confucian society represents an extremely unique cultural significance. In Confucian society, parents tend to expect their children to take the pursuit of vertical distinctiveness as their role obligation and make every effort to achieve vertical prominence. This kind of intention reveals not only cultural meaning but also psychological significance. In his article "Two Moralities," Hwang (1998) indicated that morality in Western culture of individualism is right-based as it emphasizes "negative duties" or "duties of omission." An individual should take "respecting other's right" as a fundamental principle for moral judgment. One is not allowed to violate others' rights intentionally. Once s/he violates this principle, s/he should be severely condemned. So far as "positive duties" or "duties of commission" are concerned, an individual has the "right to choose" and s/he may decide whether s/he is willing to do this kind of action by considering various subjective and objective conditions. Practicing "positive duty" is a kind of "virtue;" it is all right for an individual to choose not to practice it.

Morality in Confucian culture is basically duty-based. Since Confucians believe that parents and ancestors are "origins of one's life," it is a "positive duty" or "duty of commission" to show filial piety to parents. Unlike Western ideas of morality, an individual is obliged to practice this kind of positive duty. S/he should do one's best to fulfill filial deeds under any situation. Thus, Hwang (1998) called it "unconditional positive duty."

According to Hwang's (1999, 2001) analysis, Confucian ethics for ordinary people emphasize the values of "tender father and obedient son" in terms of parent-child relations. Parents must do their best to nurture and take care of their children while children must show their filial obedience by accomplishing the parents' expectations and fulfill their "unconditional positive duty" in return.

Effort Model and Filial Piety

Education is highly valued in Confucian society and studying is viewed as the noblest of human pursuits. Pursuing scholarly honor by studying is the goal shared by most people in the society. During the process of education, parents tend to encourage their children to study hard for their bright future and tell them that prominent academic performance may allow them to stand out in their work situations. They can thus occupy more superior social status and control more social resources. On the other hand, the children have inseparable connections with their parents and family members. If a child performs prominently, his/her parents and family members will be proud of him/her. They may even believe that his/her achievements can honor their ancestors. Thus, parents would usually ask the children to study hard, and children would also listen to parents and work hard in order to fulfill their filial duties.

In Confucian society, children's "hard working" nature and "good performance" are both indicators for the fulfillment of filial duty. Both hard work and prominent performance at school would usually be valued by the society. The children will thus continue to work hard in the future. On the contrary, if they do not perform well, people tend to think that they did not work hard enough, and they must put forth more effort. However, "effort" and "performance" have totally different meanings in Confucian society. "Effort" is a "process" for pursuing the goal, and it is a kind of internal and stable attribute which can be controlled by oneself. "Performance" is the "outcome" of pursuing the goal; it is affected by an individual's ability, task difficulty, and other external factors. Chinese usually encourage an individual to "do everything one ought to do and follow the destiny." For students, it means that if they study hard, they have already fulfilled their duties as students. As to performance, it is another story and may not necessarily be so important.

Moral Significance of Making Efforts

Fwu (2003) conducted an empirical research to demonstrate those arguments. She took 1,470 high school students from northern Taiwan as participants, including 652 junior high school students and 818 senior high school students, and used a questionnaire with scenarios as research instruments, which consisted of two independent variables: "effort" and "performance." The variable of "effort" was divided into "high effort" and "low effort," and "performance" was divided into "good performance" and "poor performance." Thus, there were four scenarios including "high effort – good performance," "high effort – poor performance," "low effort – good performance" and "low effort – poor performance." A between-subjects design was adopted. The participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire with one scenario in order to avoid the confounding that caused by different scenarios, and there were around 350–400 participants in each group. "High effort" in this research was



Fig. 9.3 Means of participants’ evaluation on the “fulfillment of duties” by students with different extents of efforts and performance

defined by the scenario in which the student actor will study lessons taught by teacher after math class and do practices in the textbook or reference and review the book at home. The definition of “low effort” referred to the student that “rarely reviews or practices lessons after school; s/he only reviews the textbook one day before examination.” The definition of “good performance” meant a grade in math exam which was “80 points” in senior high school and was “90 points” in junior high school. Poor performance referred to “30 points” both in junior and senior high schools.

The participants were asking to evaluate the actor in each scenario on a six-point scale for the following dependent variables: (1) Does the actor fulfill his duty in the scenario? (2) Is the actor in the scenario a good student? (3) Does the actor in the scenario make enough effort? (4) Will the actor keep on hard working in the future? (5) Is the actor in the scenario happy or sad?

In order to avoid the significant effect caused by a large sample, the strength of association was taken as an indicator of effect size. The results are shown in Figs. 9.3 and 9.4, respectively. Figure 9.3 indicated that high-effort group was regarded as having fulfilled more duties as a student than low-effort group, regardless of their performance.

Figure 9.4 showed that in comparison with low-effort group, high-effort group had a stronger tendency to be regarded as good students, regardless of performance. The trends in Figs. 9.3 and 9.4 are about the same. In other words, participants of this research endowed “efforts” with moral propriety. The students who had “made efforts” were viewed as good students having fulfilled their duties, regardless of their performance. On the contrary, the students who “did not make efforts” were not good students who neglected their duties, even though they might have had a good performance.

It is important to indicate that an individual’s efforts have become part of his/her personality in the participants’ cognition. According to Fig. 9.5, the participants had




Fig. 9.4 The average of the participants’ scoring on the “good students” of the students with different efforts and performance



Fig. 9.5 Means of participants’ estimation on the likability of “reviewing math at home” for students with different extents of efforts and performance

faith that the high-effort group will be more likely to keep on working hard at home after class than the low-effort group, regardless of their performance. Therefore, making an effort was viewed as part of one’s personality by most participants. Those who work hard will always be hard working, whereas those who do not work hard will show the opposite disposition. It will not be changed as a function of one’s performance.

Since “making an effort” was regarded by participants as a duty that a student should fulfill, they generally thought that any student who was evaluated as not “making an effort” or “not hard working enough” needed further improvement.




Fig. 9.6 Means of participants' evaluation on the "insufficiency of efforts" by students with different extents of efforts and performance

As shown in Fig. 9.6, the low-effort group was treated as less hard working than the high-effort group, regardless of their performance, while the high-effort group was less likely to be treated as not hard working enough.

Motivation for Making Efforts

The high-effort group would keep on working in the future regardless of their performance. They were viewed as good students who were always doing their best to fulfill their duties. In order to maintain a positive image as a "good student," one would keep on making efforts in the future. However, when the data of the high-effort group were further analyzed, it was found that motivations for sustaining a hard working attitude might not have been the same for students with good and poor performances. Students with good performance would keep on making strong efforts in the future as continuous efforts might be necessary to maintain their performance. Because they worry that "not to advance means to go back," they seek to become "better from good." Those with poor performance did not give up working hard because they might expect that "their performance will be improved if they make more efforts."

Regardless of performance, the low-effort group did not make their efforts on tasks which were controllable by themselves. Thus they were likely to be regarded as not being good students who had not fulfilled their own duties. Noticeably, the genius students with "low-effort and good performance" were popular among

Western high school students (Juvonen and Murdock 1995). However, they were not viewed as good students by Taiwanese high school students because they did not make enough efforts and did not fulfill their duties. Examining proverbs and folk stories popular in Confucian society, it can be seen that there are many proverbs or stories encouraging an individual to make efforts. For example, lessons in stories included “diligence is the means by which one makes up for one’s dullness,” “diligence strengthens the learning, and fun stops it,” “foolish elder moves the mountain,” “steady efforts can work miracles,” etc. However, there are relatively few proverbs related to genius. Even though there are some, most of them are associated with negative evaluation.

Conclusion

Hwang (2005a, b, 2006) argued that non-Western psychologists have to make three levels of breakthrough in order to attain real progress for the indigenization movement of psychology: philosophical reflection, theoretical construction, and empirical research. As the mainstream of the philosophy of science has been turned from positivism to postpositivism, Karl Popper (1972) proposed evolutionary epistemology and advocated that a scientific problem will occur when observation of phenomena or results of experiment is inconsistent with predictions derived from a theory. A scientist should attempt to develop a tentative theory or tentative solution to illuminate such a discrepancy.

This is a difficulty frequently encountered by non-Western psychologists who attempt to transplant Western paradigms of research to study social phenomena in their local society. In this case, it is necessary for non-Western psychologists to construct culturally appropriate theory with a consideration of their own cultural context and use them as guides for future empirical research.

This article revised several empirical researches which had been conducted in Chinese society by following Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) implicit theories of intelligence. It was indicated that many aspects of children’s learning behaviors in Chinese society could not be explained by their theory. Therefore, a theory of achievement motivation was proposed in their article, and a series of empirical research had been conducted to support the main arguments of that theory. It is expected that the approach provided in their article can be used as an example to illustrate the strategy to develop indigenous psychology in non-Western psychology advocated by Hwang (2005a, b, 2006).

References

- Atkinson, J. W. (Ed.). (1958). *Motives in fantasy, action, and society*. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
- Austin, J. T., & Vancouver, J. B. (1996). Goal constructs in psychology: structure, process, and content. *Psychological Bulletin*, 120(3), 338–375.

- Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: the exercise of control*. New York: W. H. Freeman.
- Berry, J. W. (1989). Imposed ethics-emics-derived ethics: the operationalization of a compelling idea. *International Journal of Psychology*, 24, 721–735.
- Carnap, R. (1925). *The logical structure of the world*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Chen, I. C. (2004). The attributions of success for teachers and people of other jobs in Taiwan (in Chinese). *Thought and Words: Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 42(2), 75–116.
- Chen, L. C. (1980). Relationship of teachers' preference to pupils' social status, achievement motivation and internal-external control construct. *Bulletin of Educational Psychology*, 13, 187–194.
- Chen, C., & Stevenson, H. W. (1989). Homework: a cross-culture examination. *Child Development*, 60, 551–561.
- Chen, Y. F., & Tjosvold, D. (2006). Participative leadership by American and Chinese managers in China: the role of relationships. *Journal of Management Studies*, 43, 1727–1752.
- Chen, S. W., Wang, H. H., Wei, C. F., Fwu, B. J., & Hwang, K. K. (2009). Taiwanese students' self-attributions for two types of achievement goals. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 149(2), 179–193.
- Cheng, C. Y. (1986). The concept of face and its confusion roots. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 13, 329–348.
- Cheng, K. M. (1997). Quality assurance in education: the East-Asian perspective. In K. Watson, S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), *Educational dilemmas: debate and diversity* (Quality in Education, Vol. 4, pp. 399–410). London: Cassell.
- Cheng, K. M. (1998). Can education values be borrowed? Looking into cultural differences. *Peabody Journal of Education*, 73(2), 11–30.
- Cheng, K. M., & Wong, K. C. (1996). School effectiveness in East Asia: concepts, origins and implications. *Journal of Educational Administration*, 34(5), 32–49.
- Cheng, H. L. & Yang, K. S. (1977). The effects of attributional process on achievement motivation and scholastic achievement. *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica*. 43, 85–127.
- Chu, C. P. (1955). A modification of TAT adapted to Chinese primary school children. National Taiwan University, unpublished B. S. thesis.
- Chu, C. P. (1968a). The remodification of TAT adapted to Chinese primary school children: I. Remodification of the pictures and setting up the objective scoring methods. *Acta Psychologica Taiwanica*, 10, 59–73.
- Chu, C. P. (1968b). The remodification of TAT adapted to Chinese primary school children: II. The application and evaluation of pictures. *Acta Psychologica Taiwanica*, 10, 74–89.
- D'Ailly, H. (2003). Children's autonomy and perceived control in learning: a model of motivation and achievement in Taiwan. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 95, 84–96.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). *Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior*. New York: Plenum.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In R. Dientsbier (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivatio* (Vol. 38, pp. 237–288). Lincoln: University of Nebraska press.
- Diener, C. I., & Dweck, C. S. (1978). An analysis of learned helplessness: continuous changes in performance, strategy and achievement cognitions following failure. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 36, 451–462.
- Dweck, C. S., & Bempechat, J. (1983). Children's theories of intelligence: consequences for learning. In S. Paris, G. Olsen, & H. Stevenson (Eds.), *Learning and motivation in the classroom* (pp. 239–256). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Dweck, C. S., & Elliott, E. S. (1983). Achievement motivation. In E. M. Hetherington (Ed.), *Socialization, personality, and social development* (pp. 643–691). New York: Wiley.
- Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social cognitive approach to motivation and personality. *Psychological Review*, 95(2), 256–273.

- Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C. Y., & Hong, Y. Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and reactions: a world from two perspectives. *Psychological Inquiry*, 6, 267–285.
- Elliot, A. J., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (1996). Approach and avoidance achievement goals and intrinsic motivation: a mediational analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70, 968–980.
- Entwistle, D. R. (1968). To dispel fantasies about fantasy-based measure of achievement motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 77, 377–391.
- Fwu, B. J. (2003). A study on students' moral value towards learning. *Annual report for project in search of excellence for reasearch on Chinese indigenous psychology*. Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University.
- Fwu, B. J., & Wang, H. H. (2002). The social status of teachers in Taiwan. *Comparative Education*, 38(2), 211–224.
- Geertz, C. (1984). Culture and social change: the Indonesian case. *Man*, 19, 511–532.
- Gollwitzer, P. M. (1993). Goal achievement: the role of intentions. In M. Hewstone & W. Stroebe (Eds.), *European review of social psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 141–185). Chichester, England: Wiley.
- Hartley, J., & Holt, J. (1971). The validity of a simplified version of Baddeley's three-minute reasoning test. *Educational Research*, 14, 70–73.
- Hau, K. T., & Salili, F. (1991). Structure and semantic differential placement of specific causes: academic causal attributions by Chinese students in Hong Kong. *International Journal of Psychology*, 26, 175–193.
- Heckhausen, H. (1977). Achievement motivation and its constructs: a cognitive model. *Motivation and Emotion*, 4, 283–329.
- Heckhausen, H., Schmalt, H. D., & Schneider, K. (1985). *Achievement motivation in perspective*. New York: Academic Press.
- Heine, S. J., Kitayama, S., Lehman, D. R., Takata, T., Ide, E., Leung, C., et al. (2001). Divergent consequences of success and failure in Japan and North America: an investigation of self-improving motivations and malleable selves. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(4), 599–615.
- Hempel, C. G. (1966). *Philosophy of natural science*. Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Hempel, C. G. (1977). Formulation and formalization of scientific theories. In F. Suppe (Ed.), *The structure of scientific theories* (pp. 245–254). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1976). On the concept of face. *American Journal of Sociology*, 81, 867–884.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1991). Relational orientation and methodological relationalism. *Bulletin of the Hong Kong Psychological Society*, 26–27, 81–95.
- Hong, Y. Y., Chiu, C. Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1995). Implicit theories of intelligence: reconsidering the role of confidence in achievement motivation. In M. H. Kernis (Ed.), *Efficacy, agency and self-esteem* (pp. 197–217). New York: Plenum Press.
- Hong, Y. Y., Chiu, C. Y., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D. M., & Wan, W. (1999). Implicit theories, attributions, and coping: a meaning system approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77, 588–599.
- Hong, Y. Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C. Y., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2000). Multicultural minds: a dynamic constructivist approach to culture and cognition. *American Psychologist*, 55, 709–720.
- Hu, H. C. (1944). The Chinese concepts of "face". *American Anthropologist*, 46, 45–64.
- Hwang, C. H. (1967). A study of the personal preferences of Chinese university students by Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. *Psychology and Education*, 1, 52–68.
- Hwang, K. K. (1998). Two moralities: Reinterpreting the finding of empirical research on moral reasoning in Taiwan. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 211–238.
- Hwang, K. K. (1999). Filial piety and loyalty: two types of social identification in Confucianism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 163–183.
- Hwang, K. K. (2000). Chinese relationalism: theoretical construction and methodological considerations. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 30(2), 155–178.
- Hwang, K. K. (2001). The deep structure of confucianism: a social psychological approach. *Asian Philosophy*, 11(3), 179–204.

- Hwang, K. K. (2005a). From anticolonialism to postcolonialism: the emergence of Chinese indigenous psychology in Taiwan. *International Journal of Psychology*, *40*(4), 228–238.
- Hwang, K. K. (2005b). A philosophical reflection on the epistemology and methodology of indigenous psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *8*(1), 5–17.
- Hwang, K. K. (2006). Moral face and social face: contingent self-esteem in Confucian society. *International Journal of Psychology*, *41*, 276–281.
- Hwang, K. Y., Cheng, H. L., & Yang, K. S. (1978). The psychological needs of junior high school students and their behavior problems. In Wen, C. I., Li, Y. Y., & Yang, K. S. *Problems of adolescence in social change* (pp. 61–75). Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (1999). Rethinking the value of choice: a cultural perspective on intrinsic motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *76*, 349–366.
- Juvonen, J., & Murdock, T. B. (1995). Grade-level differences in the social value of effort: implications for self-presentation tactics of early adolescences. *Child Development*, *66*, 1694–1705.
- Kitayama, S., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Yin and yang of the Japanese self: the cultural psychology of personality coherence. In D. Cervone & Y. Shoda (Eds.), *The coherence of personality: social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization* (pp. 242–302). New York: Guilford.
- Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. (1997). Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: self enhancement in the US and self-criticism in Japan. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*(6), 1245–1267.
- Kuo, S. Y. (1973). Analysis on psychological characteristics of underachievement students in public junior high schools. *Bulletin of Graduate Institute of Education Taiwan Normal University*, *15*, 451–534.
- Kukla, A. (1972). Foundations of an attributional theory of performance. *Psychological Review*, *79*, 454–470.
- Kukla, A., & Scher, H. (1986). Varieties of achievement motivation. *Psychological Review*, *93*(3), 378–380.
- Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levy, S., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Trait-focused and process-focused social judgment. *Social Cognition. Special Issue: Implicit Theories and Social Judgment*, *16*, 151–172.
- Li, J. (2002). Learning models in different cultures. In J. Bempechat & J. G. Elliott (Eds.), *Learning in culture and context: approaching the complexities of achievement motivation in student learning* (pp. 45–63). San Francisco, CA: Wiley Periodicals.
- Lin, B. J. (1978). Tennessee self concept scale and notes for its application in guidance. *Testing and counseling*, *6*, 406–407.
- Lock, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). *A theory of goal setting and task performance*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Lu, C. M. (1980). An analysis on the nature of self-concepts in elementary and junior high school students. *Psychological Testing*, *27*, 33–43.
- Maehr, M. L., & Braskamp, L. A. (1986). *Motivation factor: a theory of personal investment*. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
- McClelland, D. C. (1955). *Studies in motivation*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- McClelland, D. C. (1961). *The achieving society*. Princeton, NJ: Ban Nostrand.
- Murray, H. A. (1938). *Explorations in personality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Murray, H. A. (1943). *Thematic apperception test manual*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ng, A. K. (2001). *Why Asians are less creative than Westerners*. Singapore: Prentice-Hall.
- Nicholls, J. G. (1984). Achievement motivation: conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice, and performance. *Psychological Review*, *91*, 328–346.
- Nicholls, J. G. (1987). Conceptions of ability across the school years: Reflection on method. In F. Halisch & J. Kuhl (Eds.), *Motivation, intention, and volition*. Berlin: Springer.
- Popper, K. (1934). *The logic of scientific discovery*. London: Hutchinson.

- Popper, K. K. (1972). *Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenthal, D. A., & Feldman, S. S. (1991). The influence of perceived family and personal factors on self reported school performance of Chinese and Western high school students. *Journal of Research on Adolescence, 1*, 135–154.
- Russell, I. L. (1969). Motivation for school achievement: measurement and validation. *Journal of Educational Research, 62*, 263–266.
- Salili, F. (1994). Age, sex, and cultural differences in the meaning and dimensions of achievement. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*(6), 635–648.
- Salili, F. (1995). Explaining Chinese motivation and achievement: a socio-cultural Analysis. In M. L. Maehr & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), *Advances in motivation and achievement: culture, motivation, and achievement* (pp. 73–118). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
- Salili, F., & Hau, K. T. (1994). The effect of teachers' evaluative feedback on Chinese students' perception of ability: a cultural and situational analysis. *Educational Studies, 20*(2), 223–236.
- Salili, F., Hwang, C. E., & Choi, N. F. (1989). Teachers' evaluative behavior: the relationship between teachers' comments and perceived ability in Hong Kong. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 20*(2), 115–132.
- Salili, F., Chiu, C. Y., & Lai, S. (2001). The influence of culture and context on students' motivational orientation and performance. In F. Salili, C. Chiu, & Y. Hong (Eds.), *Student motivation: the culture and context of learning* (pp. 221–247). New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
- Schlick, M. (1936). Meaning and verification. *The Philosophical Review, 45*, 339–369.
- Stevenson, H. W., & Stigler, J. W. (1992). *The learning gap*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Stevenson, H. W., Lee, S., Chen, C., Stigler, J. W., Hsu, C., & Kitamura, S. (1990). Contexts of achievement: a study of American, Chinese, and Japanese children. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 55*(1–2), 221.
- Stevenson, H. W., Chen, C., & Lee, S. Y. (1993). Mathematics achievement of Chinese, Japanese, and American children: Ten Years Later. *Science, 259*, 53–58.
- Sue, S., & Okazaki, S. (1990). Asian American educational achievements: a phenomenon in search of an explanation. *American Psychologist, 45*, 913–920.
- Sue, S., & Okazaki, S. (1991). Explanations for Asian-American achievements: a reply. *American Psychologist, 46*, 878–880.
- Tsai, Y. M. (2003). *The culture-specific features of achievement motivation: Effort beliefs of adolescence in Taiwan*. Master Thesis, Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University.
- Tweed, R. G., & Lehman, D. R. (2002). Learning considered within a culture context. *American Psychologist, 57*, 89–99.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky* (Vol. 1). New York: Plenum.
- Wang, H. H. (2003). *Vertical vs. non-vertical pursuit of success: Student' perceptions, beliefs and attribution patterns in academic achievement and talent performance*. Paper presented at the 5th Biannual Conference on Asian Association of Social Psychology, Manila, Philippine.
- Weber, M. (1958). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. NY: Scribner's.
- Weber, M. (1968). *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weiner, B. (1974). *Achievement motivation and attribution theory*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning.
- Weiner, B. (1985). *Human motivation*. New York: Springer.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1922). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, with an introduction by B. Russell. (transl. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness). London: Routledge & Kegan Raul.
- Wu, W. T. & Chen, S. R. (1978). Teacher leadership behavior as related to students' expectation, achievement, and adjustment. *Bulletin of Educational Psychology, 11*, 87–104.
- Yu, A. B. (1991). A study on the construct validity of achievement motivation. In H. Y. Hchu (Ed.), *New discourses on social psychology* (in Chinese). (pp. 341–440). Taipei: Chuliu publisher.
- Yu, A. B. (1993). Is social-oriented achievement motivation (SOAM) different from individual-oriented achievement motivation (IOAM)? Further discussion of the relationship between motivation and behavior. *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 76*, 197–224.

- Yu, A. B. (2005). Achievement motivation and concept of achievement: Investigation on Chinese cultural psychology. In Yang, K. S., Hwang, K. K. & Yang, C. F. (Eds.). *Chinese indigenized psychology*, Vol. 2 (in Chinese) (pp. 665–711). Taipei: Yuanlin Publisher.
- Yu, A. B. & Yang, K. S. (1987). Social orientation and individual orientation of achievement motivation achievement motivation: conceptual analysis and empirical study. *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica*. 64, 51–98.
- Yin, H. K. (1957/1985a). The basis for unification of empirical sciences. *Collection of essays by Mr. Hai-Kwang Yin*, Vol. 1 (in Chinese) (pp. 283–288). Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Yin, H. K. (1957/1985c). Introduction to logical empiricism. *Collection of essays by Mr. Hai-Kwang Yin*, Vol. 1 (in Chinese) (pp. 223–282). Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Yin, H. K. (1957/1985b). Operationalism. *Collection of essays by Mr. Hai-Kwang Yin*, Vol. 1 (in Chinese) (pp. 343–374). Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Yin, H. K. (1960/1985). Recognition of logical empiricism. *Collection of essays by Mr. Hai-Kwang Yin*, Vol. 1 (in Chinese) (pp. 593–610). Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Zai, S. W. (1995). *Chinese View of Lian and Mian* (in Chinese). Taipei: Laureate Book.
- Zeng, K. (1999). *Dragon Gate: competitive examinations and their consequences*. London: Cassell.

Chapter 10

Face and Morality in Confucian Society

Abstract A critical review of previous literatures indicated that Chinese concepts of face can be differentiated into social face (*mianzi*) and moral face (*lian*). The face dynamism in Confucian society was explained in terms of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, which aimed to maintain one's psychosocial homeostasis either in dyad interaction or among persons-in-relation within one's psychosociogram. The main arguments of the current research were demonstrated by a series of empirical research on seeking help from afar for what lies close at hand; comparing episodes of losing face in Taiwan and mainland China; face concern in a personality orientation; intergenerational difference of face concern for two types of face events with relational others; and emotional reactions to two types of face incidents caused by others of different relationships. The predictive validity of the current approach was compared with that of the cross-cultural approach which attempted to explain face feelings in terms of cultural differences on the dimension of individualism–collectivism.

Keywords Social face (*mianzi*) • Moral face (*lian*) • Greater self (*da wo*) • Losing face • Having face • Psychosocial homeostasis • Face saving • Face maintenance • Ethics of community • Making face • Sharing glory • Serving relationship • Formality of the situation • Face dynamism

The Mystery of Face in Confucian Society

Since the early 1900s when Western contact with the East increased in frequency, many missionaries, diplomats, and travelers have attempted to describe their experiences in the Orient to the people in their home countries. Many mentioned the fact that Chinese emphasize the importance of face and felt it to be a key concept for understanding Chinese psychology and behavior (Gilbert 1927; Smith 1894; Wilehlm 1926). They advised that anyone who doesn't know about face would

certainly encounter trouble in dealing with Chinese people. They also agreed that it is difficult for Westerners to understand the Chinese concept of face because it implies meanings that are much more complicated than what they could narrate or comprehend (Gilbert 1927).

The principles that regulate “face” and its attainment are often wholly beyond the intellectual apprehension of the Occidental, who is constantly forgetting the theatrical element, and wandering off into the irrelevant regions of fact. To him it often seems that Chinese “face” is not unlike the South Sea Island taboo, a force to be abolished and replaced by common sense. At this point Chinese and Occidentals must agree to disagree, for they can never be bought to view the same things in the same light (Smith 1894, p. 17).

The reason why Western people think that the Chinese concept of face is so abstruse and difficult to understand is because they lack a profound understanding of the deep structure of Confucian culture. In fact, even a Chinese person might have the same feeling if s/he knows little about the deep structure of Confucianism. For example, during the period of May Fourth Movement, the famous writer Lu Xun, who had devoted his whole life to studying the national character of Chinese people and the reconstruction of Chinese culture, also said that: “What is going on about ‘face’? It is fairly not to think about it. When you think of it, you will get confused.” (Lu 1991, p. 126).

Early Exploration

In the 1940s, Chinese anthropologist Hu (1944) explained the meanings of many Chinese terms and phrases related to *lian* and *mianzi* that are frequently used in daily life. Inspired by Hu’s work, American sociologist Goffman (1955) studied face in interpersonal interaction. His book *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Goffman 1959) even became a sociological classic. Goffman defined face as the public-image people create, which enables them to receive and is also dependent on praise from others. In any social interaction, one of the participants may claim to possess some values praised by society, such as wealth, achievement, or ability. When others recognize this claim, the person gains face. If the claim is rejected, the person loses face. According to this definition, individuals do not have a constant presentation of face. An individual’s face varies with the situation (Goffman 1955).

Goffman’s work (1955, 1959, 1967) resulted in a series of experimental studies. Because an individual’s face is defined to a certain extent by changes in social circumstances, several psychologists conducted studies in which they deliberately arranged situations that would threaten the individual’s sense of self. Then they recorded the responses for further analysis. For instance, they asked university students to suck nipples, sing awkward songs in public, learn of their poor performance on an ability test, and made them frustrated in a negotiation process (B. R. Brown 1968, 1970; B. R. Brown and Garland 1971; Garland and B. R. Brown 1972). However, careful examination of Goffman’s work and the follow-up studies reveals

that what was actually studied were interaction rituals in American society, which are significantly different from ideas about *mianzi* and *lian* in Chinese culture.

American anthropologists P. Brown and Levinson (1987) further investigated the relationship between face and the language of politeness used in daily life. In their view, maintaining face is a kind of human need. Every competent adult in every society needs it and knows that others also need it. People are rational enough to realize how to use a specific language of politeness to express concern for face and to protect their own face from being threatened. P. Brown and Levinson separated face into two categories: *positive face* and *negative face*. *Positive face* referred to the need to be recognized or praised by others for a particular aspect, which allows one to value him/herself more highly. *Negative face* referred to the need for freedom of action and freedom from being obstructed or compelled.

Though P. Brown and Levinson regarded face as a universal need, the concepts of face in their discourse, especially the public image of independence emphasized by negative face, carry certain cultural values that are different from the concept of face in Confucian cultures.

The Cultural Origin of the Chinese Concept of Face

The German missionary Wilhelm (1926) who lived in China for 25 years was the first author to trace the cultural origins of the Chinese concept of face. He indicated that Confucianism and Taoism are the cultural roots of Chinese character. Confucian emphasis on harmony traditionally caused Chinese people to strive for what they deserved within the social order of their clan. This striving could result in two types of character – namely, *face loving* (*ai mianzi*) and *having no way* (*mei fazi*).

In the 1940s, Hu (1944) used an anthropological approach to analyze situations for using various words relevant to *lian* and *mianzi* in Chinese social life. She indicated that as shown in the ancient literature, the emergence of the term *mianzi* in Chinese verbal communication was much earlier than the term *lian*. Before the fourth century B.C., the term *mianzi* was symbolically used to denote the relationship between an individual and society. *Lian* has been used only in relatively modern times. It was first cited in the *Kangxi* Dictionary in a reference to the Yuan dynasty (1227 AD to 1367 AD). The term *lian* originated in northern China. It gradually replaced the physical meaning of *mianzi* (a person's physical face) in usage and then became endowed with the symbolic significance.

Lian and Mianzi

In daily usage, *mianzi* represents the kind of social reputation that is highly valued by Chinese. It is the kind of status that has been deliberately accumulated by a

person through effort and achievement and with pride during the course of life. In order to have this kind of face, one must rely on the social environment to obtain affirmation from other people. *Lian* is the social respect offered by a group to an individual with high morality. A person with *lian* would do what is proper no matter what difficulties were encountered and behave honestly in every situation. *Lian* represents public trust in the individual's morality. Once lost, an individual cannot function as usual in the group. *Lian* is not only a social constraint for maintaining moral standards but also an internalized force of self-restriction. *Mian* is more variant than *lian*. Everyone has only one *lian* but may possess a variety of *mian* in different social situations. The relationship between *lian* and *mian* was just like the difference between *personality* and *title* as emphasized by Confucianism. In reality, an individual has only one personality but may possess many titles.

Sociologist King (1988) indicated that Hu's distinctions between *lian* and *mianzi* can only be applied to northern China where Mandarin is used. In areas of southern China where Cantonese and Hakka are spoken, the term *mien* denotes the meanings of both *lian* and *mianzi*. King indicated that dialects in southern China, especially Cantonese, were developed earlier than Mandarin. Absence of the word *lian* in the southern dialects reveals that the concept of *lian* appeared later than *mianzi*. The meanings of *mianzi* and *lian* are blended in Cantonese.

Ho (1976) published an article entitled "On Concepts of Face" in *The American Journal of Sociology*. He discussed the differences between face and such concepts as status, dignity, honor, reputation, personality, and standards for behavior. He then proposed a definition of face:

Face is the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for himself from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social network and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned adequately in that position as well as acceptably in his general conduct; the face extended to a person by others is a function of the degree of congruence between judgments of his total condition in life, including his actions as well as those of people closely associated with him, and the social expectations that others have placed upon him. In terms of two interacting parties, face is the reciprocated compliance, respect, and/or deference that each party expects from, and extends to, the other party (Ho 1976, p. 883).

Ho indicated that his definition of face entails some essential differences between the Chinese concept of face and the Western concept (Chou and Ho 1993). Chinese face is tightly linked with vertical as well as close, personal relationships. Its operation follows a compelling principle of reciprocity. In contrast, Western face emphasizes the subjectivity of an individual. A person is not required to assume responsibility for the behavior of relatives or family members. Social interactions abide by the principle of reciprocity, but they tend to maintain the individual's autonomy.

Ho's definition of face highlighted some significant features of Chinese culture and aroused social scientists' interest in this issue, but it did not give a clear picture of exactly what the Chinese concept of face is. What are the specific features of the Chinese concept of face that are so hard to comprehend that they puzzle social scientists?

Confucian Ethics and Psychological Equilibrium

As a consequence of the emergence of the Indigenization of the Social Sciences academic movement, many Chinese psychologists (Chu 1989, 1991; Chen 1988; Chou and Ho 1993) researched the issue of the relationship between face and morality. In an article entitled “The Concept of Face and its Confucian Origin,” Cheng (1986) pointed out that the fundamental contents of face for Chinese are the five Confucian cardinal ethical principles.

Zai (1995) and Zou (1997) published books that have contributed much to the understanding of the Chinese concept of face. Zai pointed out that, although there is a rough connection between *lian* and morality and a rough connection between *mian* and social achievement, either *lian* or *mianzi* can involve morality in some situations, while having no connection with it in other situations. In other words, *lian* and *mianzi* cannot be differentiated on the basis of involvement with morality. What kinds of situations might tie *lian* and *mianzi* with morality? And in what type of situations do they have no link to it? In order to answer these questions, the special features of the Chinese concept of morality must first be identified.

The Confucian Ethics for Ordinary People

Chapter 4 of this book explains how I constructed the theoretical model of *face and favor* to elaborate on an individual’s social interaction with others of various relations in Chinese society. Based on this theoretical model, Chap. 5 explains how I analyzed the inner structure of Confucian thoughts (K. K. Hwang 1988, 1995, 2001). According to my analysis, the Confucian ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety for ordinary people emphasizes two fundamental principles for social interaction – namely, the principle of respecting the superior and the principle of favoring the intimate. When getting along with other parties in each of the five cardinal relations between father–son, brothers, husband–wife, friends, and sovereign–minister, an individual should recognize the role relationships between the dyad along two cognitive dimensions: the former is the superiority or inferiority of their status while the latter is the closeness or distance of their relations. From the viewpoint of the justice theory of Western social psychology, Confucianism suggests that, in situations of social interaction, the dyad has to decide who is the “resource allocator” according to the “principle of respecting the superior;” who has the power to decide the most appropriate way of resource distribution according to the “principle of favoring the intimate.” From the perspective of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, the Confucian value of *jen* (benevolence) refers to the closeness/distance of the relationship between the dyad; the Confucian value of *yi* (righteousness) refers to the choice of appropriate rule for social exchange; the value of *li* (propriety) displays the proper behavior for social interaction between the dyad (see Fig. 5.1).

In the model of “Confucian ethics for ordinary people,” the rectangle of *quanxi* is separated into two parts by a diagonal line. The gray part is called the “expressive component” while the blank part is the “instrumental component.” This means that the Confucian *jen* advocates the principle favoring the intimate instead of treating all men alike. The rectangle of *quanxi* is divided into three portions by a real line and a dotted line. They are respectively called expressive ties, mixed ties, and instrumental ties in reference to the expressive component contained in the *quanxi*. One should interact with them by different rules of social exchange; namely, need rule, *renqing* rule, and equity rule. The instrumental ties and the mixed ties are separated by a dotted line, which means that a dyad relation with an instrumental tie may become that of a mixed tie through the interpersonal process of *la quanxi* or reinforcing *quanxi*. The expressive ties within the family and the mixed ties outside the family are separated by a real line, which implies that Confucianism suggests an impenetrable psychological boundary between family members and outsiders.

Psychosociogram

According to the methodological relationalism proposed by Ho (1991), the Confucian ethics for ordinary people describe how an individual interacts with the others of various relations in Confucian society. When an individual interacts with others for a certain event according to the Confucian ethics for ordinary people, the perceived persons-in-relation constitute a psychosociogram proposed by Hsu (1971).

The idea of “psychosociogram” is extremely crucial for understanding the Chinese concept of face. From the biological perspective, everybody has a face. It is the most unique feature representing individual identity. In situations of social interaction, everyone tries to understand others by the messages revealed through their faces; they also try to create certain images about themselves in others’ minds.

From the social psychological perspective, “face” is the evaluation of one’s public image after an individual reflects his/her own actions in certain social circumstances (P. Brown and Levinson 1987). Because it is one’s self-identification in a special situation, it can be called one’s situated identity (Alexander and Knight 1971; Alexander and Lauderdale 1977; Alexander and Rudd 1981; Alexander and Wiley 1980). An individual may feel losing, maintaining, or increasing face based on recognizing others’ evaluation of his/her behavior in a certain situation. Thus, it can also be called “social contingent self-esteem” (K. K. Hwang 2006).

Psychological Equilibrium

An individual will certainly get involved in a variety of social events in daily life. Others involved in the social event constitute “persons-in-relation” (Ho 1991); his/her perception on his/her own relations with these persons forms the so-called “psychosociogram.” The number of “persons-in-relation” interacting with an

individual in a given event is variable, and the duration of their social interaction may be short or long. One's interaction with others of instrumental ties might be terminated at the end of that event. However, one's social interaction with significant others might result in stable and durable relationships. In this case, protecting one's face in order to maintain psychosocial equilibrium with these "persons-in-relation" becomes extremely important.

When an individual perceives that one's behavior might cause negative evaluations from "persons-in-relation," s/he will have a feeling of losing face and may take actions to restore his/her psychosocial equilibrium.

Seek Far for What Lies Close at Hand

Under the influence of Confucian cultural tradition, the most important social relations for Chinese are those with family members. How to maintain one's self image in front of family members becomes an important consideration for maintaining one's psychosocial equilibrium. For example, Han and Li (2008) research constructed two scenarios: the actor *Yu-chu* in one of them found that she was infected with "venereal disease." The same actor in another scenario had a "gallstone." She requested 69 adults (32 males and 37 females) aged over 21 to serve as participants and asked them two hypothetical questions:

1. *Yu-chu's* parents had paid close attention to children's education since they were young. All children in *Yu-chu's* family had good educational backgrounds and careers. *Yu-chu's* older brother (older sister) happened to be a general surgeon. Though *Yu-chu* did not study medicine, she had some classmates who became medical doctors, since she had studied in a well-known senior high school. One of them was also a surgeon.

In the case when *Yu-chu* has to seek medical treatment, assuming that all the following targets can provide the same treatment for *Yu-chu* and the extents of convenience are also similar, with whom do you think *Yu-chu* will choose for treatment? (single choice; please check with a "V" in)

- Yu-chu's* older brother (older sister)
- Yu-chu's* classmate in senior high school who is a surgeon.
- The surgeon whom *Yu-chu* doesn't know

2. Assuming you are the actor *Yu-chu*. If all the following three targets are capable of helping you and the extents of convenience are similar, whom will you seek for help? (Please check in)

- Your family member (older brother or sister...)
- Your friends or classmate
- The surgeon you don't know

Results of her research showed that, in situation when they "would not" lose face (gallstone), most participants tended to seek help from the "family member" (92%)

of expressive tie, and only very few of them chose to turn to the “friend (8%)” of mixed tie. However, no one chose “stranger” of instrumental tie. In the situation where one’s face might be threatened (venereal disease), most participants chose “stranger” (91%) of instrumental tie. Only very few chose “friend” (9%) of mixed tie, and no one chose “family member” of expressive tie.

When there were only two types of social targets (“family member” and “friend”) to choose from in the situation of “not losing face” (gallstone), the participants showed the same tendency as they did in situation where they had three kinds of targets as choices (see Table 10.1), either for the actor in the scenario or for themselves. In the situation that might threaten their face (venereal disease), the result of χ^2 fit test revealed that though slightly more participants selected “family member” than those who selected “friend,” either for “the actor in scenario” or for “oneself,” the difference was not significant.

Face Saving and Face Maintenance

Han and Li (2008) suggested that the main reason for Chinese to “seek far for what lies close at hand,” by looking for help from strangers in a situation that may threaten their “moral faces,” was that they intended to “save their faces” so that those circumstances that may lead to “losing face” would not be exposed to their acquaintances. In order to test this hypothesis, she asked participants to evaluate on a six-points scale three major factors for consideration when the “actor in the scenario” or “oneself” looked for help from different targets, including “face maintenance” (“it was better that this kind of event would not be exposed to the acquaintances” and “I wouldn’t feel losing face by this way”), “better help” (“because of my relationship with him (her), I would have better assistance” and “I could rely on his (her) professional capacities”) and “indebtedness” (“I would not have problem of owing favor to others afterwards”). After the participants chose the target from whom to request help, they had to respectively evaluate the importance of each factor for their selection of that target on a six-point scale (1 referred to “extremely unimportant” and 6 “extremely important”).

The results showed that the participants’ evaluation on the importance of “face maintenance” in situation of “losing face” (venereal disease) was significantly higher than that in which they “would not” lose face (gallstone) ($F(1,61)=379.96$, $p<0.001$) when there were “family member,” “friend” and “stranger” for choice. On the contrary, their evaluation on the importance of “better service” was significantly lower than the situation in which they “would not” lose face ($F(1,61)=291.25$, $p<0.001$). Nevertheless, their considerations of “indebtedness” did not show significant difference ($F(1,61)=0.712$, $p>0.05$) (see Fig. 10.1). In situations when they “would” certainly lose face (venereal disease) and there were only a “family member” and “friend” as options, the participants’ evaluations on these three factors including “face maintenance,” “better help,” and “indebtedness” did not show a significant difference.

Table 10.1 Percentages and numbers of people selected as “targets for seeking for help” and results of χ^2 test

Set of target for choice	Targets for seeking for help	Yi-chu's choice		Your choice	
		Gallstone	Veneral disease ^a	Gallstone	Veneral disease ^a
Three kinds of target	Family member	33 (92%)	0 (0%)	33 (92%)	0 (0%)
	Friend	3 (8%)	4 (12%)	3 (8%)	3 (9%)
	Stranger	0 (0%)	29 (88%)	0 (0%)	30 (91%)
	χ^2	62.13**		62.99**	
Two kinds of target	Family members	33 (92%)	21 (64%)	33 (92%)	19 (58%)
	Friends	3 (8%)	12 (32%)	3 (8%)	14 (42%)
	χ^2	7.95**		10.78**	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, $N = 69$

^aIn the case of “veneral disease,” the numbers of participants choosing friend and stranger among “three kinds of target” made by “Yi-chu” and the participants were slightly different. However, it did not reach a level of significance (4:29 vs. 3:30, $\chi^2 = 0.160$, $p > 0.05$). Likewise, the difference between choosing these “two kinds of target” also did not reach a significant level (21:12 vs. 19:14, $\chi^2 = .254$, $p > 0.05$)




Fig. 10.1 The factors for consideration in situation that “would” vs. “would not” lose face

The results demonstrated that when Chinese have to ask for help from a “family member,” “friend,” or “stranger” during an event that would not threaten their faces, they tend to seek help from the family member of the expressive tie. The sequential order of seeking help is from “close to distant,” or from “friend” to “stranger.” Nevertheless, in situations that may threaten one’s “face,” the order of seeking help is reversed to become “from distant to close.” They would rather seek help from a stranger of instrumental tie than a “friend” or “family member.” The reason that the participants adopted the strategy of asking-for-help “from far to near” is because having venereal disease means that an individual has violated sexual morality and might completely lose face in front of family members (Han and Li 2008).

This strategy may help an individual to maintain his/her face. However, violating sexual morality is not the only factor for Chinese to lose face. In Confucian culture, there are many other factors for an individual to have a feeling of losing face. This issue can be explained by the characteristics of Confucian ethics at the theoretical level. We will elaborate this argument with findings of empirical research to answer the following question: what factors make an individual lose face in Confucian society?

Morality and Losing Face in Confucian Society

In order to explain the difference between the obligation-based ethics of Confucianism and the right-based ethics of Western individualism, Chap. 7 described the significant features of Confucian ethics in terms of the distinctions between perfect/imperfect and negative/positive duties as proposed by Western scholars. I indicated the inadequacy of using Western ethics of rationalism for understanding Confucian ethics and proposed a revised system to denote the significant features of Confucian ethics constructed on the basis of interpersonal affection (see Table 7.1).

Based on the meta-ethical reflection on the nature of the Western ethics of rationalism, I argued that the contents of the Confucian way of humanity can be classified into three categories on the basis of the moral agent's omission/commission of conduct: negative, unconditional positive, and positive duties (Hwang 1998). As discussed above, the silver rule is a negative duty that serves as a principle of conduct for life (The Analects: Yen Yuan). So long as it is not in conflict with other duties, it can and should be followed by everyone in all situations.

Filial piety, the essential core of the Confucian ethics for ordinary people, is a positive duty. All people should act in a prescribed way towards their parents. In Confucian perspective, an individual does not have a choice in deciding whether to be filial or not. The Confucian view of life emphasizes that one's life is an extension of one's parents' lives, so doing one's filial duty is clearly an obligation, and not behaving in accordance with filial piety is an unforgivable fault.

Therefore, showing filial piety to one's parents is not just a positive duty, it is an unconditional positive duty, which should be carried out in spite of any fact one finds out about one's parents.

However, the relationship between sovereign and minister is completely different. There was a time when King Hsun of Chi asked Mencius for advice about the office of high ministers. Mencius remarked that there is a distinction between a relationship in which the high ministers are in the nobility and are relatives of the prince, and those in which they have different surnames from the prince. For those in the first category who have a blood connection with the prince, if the prince makes serious mistakes and does not respond to their respected admonitions, the minister should supersede the prince if he might do harm to the state.

High ministers with different surnames from the prince have no inseparable connection with him. If the prince makes mistakes and does not accept their repeated advice, they can just leave the state for another one. If the only emperor is tyrannous and does not practice benevolent government, then powerful chiefs of state should step forward and "punish the tyrant and console the people" (*The Works of Mencius*, Chapter 1B: King Hui of Liang).

It is obvious that, although being a benevolent sovereign and being a loyal minister are defined by the Confucians as positive duties for both roles, a minister should take into account all the objective conditions to determine whether the sovereign deserves loyalty. In other words, being loyal is a typical imperfect duty in the Kantian sense and may be termed a "conditional positive duty" or just "positive duty."

Ethics of Divinity and Ethics of Community

An examination on the significant features of Confucian ethics enables us to understand the factors that may make an individual have the feeling of losing face in traditional Confucian culture. Nearly half a century ago, American anthropologist Eberhard (1967) collected the fictions and publications (including books of righteousness) which had been popular in traditional Chinese society, analyzed the

stories recorded and allocated the sins in traditional Chinese society into four categories: sexual sins, social sins, sins against property, and sins against religion which almost included all “positive duties” and “negative duties” suggested by Confucian ethics. The stories he collected revealed that when an individual committed these sins, he and his family would encounter disdain from others. Even if his sins were not found out, after his death, he might go to hell and be punished by the king of Hell. These arguments reflect “ethics of divinity” (Shweder et al. 1997) constructed in traditional Chinese society after the combination of Confucian culture and Buddhism.

In her paper, “The threat to Face and its coping behaviors,” Chu (1991) conducted a survey on face issues in Taiwan. She asked a total of 201 respondents to describe an occasion on which they felt shame or loss of face. After sorting out the collected responses, she obtained a total of 110 situations that were likely to cause the feeling of losing face. Based on these cases, Chu developed a questionnaire and asked a total of 745 college students to assess the extent of losing face on a nine-point scale in each of these different occasions. Results were subjected to factor-analysis; four factors were obtained: ability and status, morality and law, reputation and esteem, and sexual morality. Two of them – the factor of morality and law, and the factor of sexual morality – are related to moral face. Comparing these results with research findings obtained by Eberhard (1967), it is apparent that Chu and Eberhard’s *sexual sins* correspond to the factor of sexual morality. The factor of morality and law corresponds to *social sins* and *sins against property*. The Eberhard’s *sins against religion* were not mentioned in Chu’s study. One probable reason for their omission is that Chu conducted her study from the viewpoint of Chinese concepts of face, which are rooted in the Confucian ethics of community (Shweder et al. 1997). Sins against religion are emphasized by the ethics of divinity for Buddhists. The latter may lead to a feeling of guilt or sin.

Losing Face in Taiwan

Some aspects of her findings deserve closer examination. First, the mean of subjects’ responses falls above 5.00 for all items in three of the four factors: morality and law, reputation and esteem, and sexual morality. But, only four items from the ability and status factor have an average value well above 5.00. These achievement-related items are (1) having good-for-nothing children, (2) being abandoned or dumped, (3) disclosure of personal secrets, and (4) being fired or laid off. These facts are serious social events that may cause a feeling of losing face but they are irrelevant to morality. In other words, for Chu’s respondents, a moral episode is more likely to cause a sense of losing face than an episode concerning one’s capability or status. This finding supports the argument that for Chinese, a moral episode can cause a sense of shame far stronger than achievement-related issues (Cheng 1986; King 1988; Zai 1995).

Secondly, in the factor of Morality and Law, the moral episodes that may result in a sense of losing face include not only a violation of negative duties such as stealing, robbing, and lying, but also an unwillingness to fulfill positive duties defined by family ethics of Confucianism, such as not educating children properly, violating female virtues, being failing to be respectful in filial relations, falsely incriminating friends, breaking promises, and abandoning one's wife. Those behaviors against sexual morals in the factor of sexual morality can also be classified under this category. From the perspective of Confucian relationalism, it is clear that all those behaviors are contradictory to the Confucian ethics for ordinary people within the family circle.

Additional episodes that may result in losing face include those that are contrary to public morality, such as defecating, spitting phlegm, throwing rubbish on the street, or talking too loudly in public. Other ways to lose face include betraying one's loyalty to a social group to which one belongs. For example, betraying one's country, accepting bribes, evading military service, spying for foreign powers, illegally making money, etc. According to Confucian relationalism, the latter categories of behavior violate Confucian ethics for scholars, which advocate extending the loyalty or commitment to one's family to the larger society.

Behaviors, such as not engaging in proper duties or work, fooling around, living as a bum, and leading an unproductive and pessimistic life, all have profound implications in the context of Confucian tradition. Because these behaviors imply a weakness in self-cultivation advocated by Confucianism, people who engage in them should feel a sense of shame as a result.

Losing Face in Mainland China

Some may speculate that Chu's 1991 study would have a different outcome if it is conducted in a different time and place. There are good grounds for this speculation as Zou (1997) made a similar survey of 192 citizens in the Wu-han area of Mainland China and did in fact obtain similar results. Zou asked his respondents to assess the extent of losing face in each of 30 given episodes. His respondents were mainly comprised of 120 college students, while the rest were political cadre, businessmen, and college professors. Zou used the technique of cluster analysis to analyze the data and consequently came up with four clusters defined as follows:

1. Behavior against morality

Any speech or behavior that violates social ethics and moral standards recognized by the public or any criminal action that violates the national laws should result in losing face to the person involved. In contrast, if one abides by the laws and acts with manners and integrity, one will gain face rather than losing it.

2. Incompetent behavior

If one cannot perform an important task successfully when one is believed to possess the capability of doing so, or one's performance is obviously lagging behind others in a certain aspect, the person involved will probably be liable to lose face.

3. Bad habits

Bad habits and disgraceful acts in daily life, such as spitting, not being hygienic, loosening one's belt while eating, doing up the wrong buttons, being argumentative over small amounts of money, swearing, or using foul language all lead to losing face. Being neat and tidy, elegant, generous, cultured, and polite will either maintain or gain face for the person involved.

4. Privacy being disclosed

In general, one will be highly ashamed of oneself if subjected to events such as accidental exposure of the body, invasion of privacy, or when evil thoughts or plans in one's mind are guessed by others (Zou 1997, p. 36).

Zou's and Chu's studies were not exactly the same with respect to the contents of the face episodes assessed. Further, one of the studies was conducted in Taiwan. It was separated in terms of time and space from the other, which was completed in mainland China. Nonetheless, both studies came up with similar findings despite the fact that they respectively adopted the methods of factor analysis and cluster analysis for analyzing their data.

In view of the Confucian ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety, propriety is emphasized in occasion of interpersonal interaction, where one should express appropriate respect to other people and receive respect from others at the same time. It is very hard for an individual with a record of immorality to earn respect from others, so does a person of low social status caused by one's personal characters. An individual showing disgraceful behavior or poor manners toward others might be deemed “uncultivated” and lose his/her face in front of others. Thus face in Confucian society is closely linked to one's status in his/her interpersonal network. Any factor that may damage one's status or anything that may sway an individual's status in his/her interpersonal network might make him/her feel a loss of face.

The Personality Character of Face Orientation

In the Chinese language, “having face/losing face” are one of the common terms related to face. There are still many other terms associated with face with different meanings. They are used differently in daily social interaction. For example, “have no face” and “thick-skinned” are accusing terms used upon others while “losing face” turns the condemnation toward oneself. If one has a strong sense of morality yet carries out misconduct that violates the moral standard, once the misconduct is exposed in front of the public, one may feel “losing face” to face others.

Two Orientations of Face Concern

In order to maintain one's status in his/her interpersonal network, an individual in Confucian society has to passively protect one's own face from loss and also to actively adopt every action to promote his/her social status and step up the

importance of the face. Yet, the needs to protect face and the motive to win face are the result of socialization for an individual; there are considerable individual differences. In general, one who is “thin-skinned” is more likely to feel “losing face” when one’s misconduct is exposed. On the other hand, one who is “thick-skinned” is less likely to have such a feeling. Even if they carry out immoral acts, they appear careless as if nothing had happened. Then, others may refer to them as “have no face.”

Similarly, one with high achievement motivation and high expectation for oneself in certain social scenarios would act “face-saving.” If one succeeds in social competition, one would feel “having face,” yet if one fails, one would feel “losing face.”

Since the degree of one’s disposition for *face saving* and *thick* or *thin face* relies on socialization experiences, insight on face can be gained through examining one’s characters of personality.

Chou (1999) adapted Arkin’s (1981) style of self-presentation and classified the face concern into two major face orientation types: protective and acquisitive. Protective face orientation protects the self from losing face. People with this orientation have five key characteristics: (1) concern for not losing face, (2) avoidance of public exposure, (3) sensitivity to negative evaluation, (4) conservativeness and caution, and (5) tendency for self-protection. Acquisitive face orientation motivates improvement of a person’s public image. People of this orientation also have five key characteristics: (1) pursuance of face, (2) ostentation, (3) risk taking and competitiveness, (4) desire for social acclaim, and (5) aggressive self-promotion.

Based on these concepts, Chou (1999) developed a Protective and Acquisitive Face Orientation Scale and administered it to 300 Singaporean adults. Her studies showed that these two orientations differ in their patterns of correlations with social desirability, achievement orientation, self-monitoring, social anxiety, and interpersonal relationships.

Making Face and Keeping Up Face

In Confucian society, an individual may feel “having face” because of one’s distinctive achievements in a certain field and promoted social status. However, some people who do not have actual accomplishments like to use some symbolic decoration, action, or language to show off a special position. We call these in Chinese “make face” or “win face.” Such behavioral tendency may be studied by psychological methods of personality. Chen (1988) developed a scale for measuring one’s face demands. It includes two subscales. The *Ai Mianzi* (face-loving) Scale is designed to measure the significance a person attaches to honorable episodes. The *Po Lianpi* (thin-faced) Scale is aimed at measuring a person’s sensitivity to disgraceful episodes. Chen also developed the *Shi Mianzi* Scale to measure a person’s carefulness about virtual face. It includes two subscales: the *Zuo Mianzi* Scale (Making Face Scale) and the *Zheng Mianzi* Scale (Maintaining Face Scale). The former is an instrument for measuring an individual’s orientation towards exerting

effort to obtain the attention or admiration of others. The latter is for measuring a person's disposition to cover up weaknesses by passively using all forms of impression management.

In the terminology of Western psychology, *making face* (*zuo mianzi*) and *keeping up face* (*zheng mianzi*) can both be seen as a kind of impression management or face work. According to the impression management theory as proposed by Tedeschi and others (Tedeschi and Riess 1981; Tedeschi et al. 1971), the major objective of impression management is to maintain a consistency of self-image. But, according to Chen's (1988) conceptual analysis, the specific goal of *making face* or *keeping up face* is simply to gain virtual face and to obtain the appreciation of others, rather than to maintain a consistent self-image. With 412 Taiwanese college students as subjects, Chen's research indicated that the correlation between the students' *demand for face* and their ratings on the *Shi Mianzi Scale* (Virtual Face Scale) were as high as $r=0.46$ ($p<0.001$).

However, in Chinese society, being *face loving* (*ai mianzi*) or *wishing for face* (*yao mianzi*) may not only trigger actions for all kinds of *virtual face* (*shi mianzi*) but also make a person take actions to *compete for face* (*zheng mianzi*) or to pursue practical achievement. Chu (1989) also developed another scale on *demand for face* by measuring the impact of ability-related episodes that may cause a sense of *having no face* (*mei mianzi*) in the respondents. Out of 299 freshman students surveyed, the correlation between ratings for the *demand of face* and their *social-oriented achievement motivation* was $r=0.43$ ($p<0.001$). Compared with the findings of Chen's (1988) research, it is clear that in Chinese society, a person who is face-loving may strive for either real or virtual face. The former type of face means that the person can live up to the honor or title given; whereas the latter means the person does not necessarily have the competency to live up to the honor.

Face of Greater Self

The above-mentioned studies involve the face feeling caused by one's own personal ethics or achievement. We may call it the face of "one self." Nevertheless, the uniqueness of Chinese face is that an individual would take actions not only for the face of "one self" but also for the face of "greater self." The so-called face of "greater self" is again closely connected to Confucian ethics. We have mentioned previously that, in comparison with Western ethics of individualism, the major feature of Confucian ethics for ordinary people is emphasizing the core value of filial piety as "unconditional positive duty"

Boundary of Self

As stated in my earlier article, "Loyalty and filial piety: The two types of social identification in Confucianism" (K. K. Hwang 1999), the basic difference between

Confucianism and Christianity can be traced back to their fundamental discrepancy in explaining the origin of life. Christianity advocates the idea that each person is an independent entity created by God. An individual should strive to defend the territory of self that has been drawn around the immediate surface of the physical body. In contrast, according to Confucianism, individuals' personal lives are a continuity of their parents' lives, who in turn succeed their ancestors. As a result, an individual's family members, especially parents or children, are more likely to be included in the territories of one's self. The relationship between parents and children is usually perceived as a single body in the eyes of Chinese people. Family members are described as intimately as one's own flesh and blood. As a result, family members are especially liable to the feelings of "having glory or shame together" under the construction of the *greater self*.

According to K. K. Hwang's analysis, the Confucian ethics for ordinary people are constructed on the core value of benevolence (K. K. Hwang 2001). The Confucian idea of "filial duty" stresses the importance of "benevolent father/filial son." The parents should treat the children kindly and the children should make efforts to pursue vertical achievement to meet the parents' expectations. In Chap. 9, I reviewed a series of empirical studies and suggested that the parents in the Confucian society tend to encourage their children to pursue the "goals of vertical distinctiveness" approved by the society. When the children attain these kind of goals, they and even their parents will feel that they are gaining face. On the contrary, when the children fail in pursuing goals of vertical distinctiveness, the children and parents will both feel a loss of face.

Intergenerational Comparison of Face

Based on such reasoning, Su and Hwang (2003) used a paired comparison technique with 56 retirees and 54 college students to examine the extent of the feeling of "having face" arising from the moral or academic (or career) performance of themselves, their children (or parents), or their friends. The results are presented in Fig. 10.2. The same method was used to compare the extent of the feeling of "losing face" experienced when their own (or their family member's or friend's) immoral conduct or academic (or career) failure was exposed in public. These results are presented in Fig. 10.3. The scores in these two figures are the original means calculated using the paired comparison method (Thurstone 1927). The numerical values represent the extent of having or losing face for various incidents experienced by the participants.

As indicated in Fig. 10.2, the first two incidents that make retirees most feel they "have face" are when their children are morally upright (0.719) and successful in their careers (0.647). The next two incidents pertain to their own performance (0.495; -0.004), and the last two relate to their friends (-0.686; -1.116).

The order of the first two pairs for college students is opposite to that of retirees. Because college students hope to enter the job market soon, they most feel they




Fig. 10.2 Extents of having face caused by two types of event for retired group and college students

“have face” when they do well in their academic performance (1.312), followed by being morally upright (1.231). Next in importance is when their parents are morally upright (0.151) and successful in their careers (−0.087), and last is when their friends are morally upright (−1.026) and have a good academic performance (−1.581).

Social Events of Having Face

Comparing the data of retirees with that of college students in Fig. 10.2, several points should be noted. First, the distribution of incidents on the similarity scale for paired comparisons made by retirees (a) is more concentrated than that made by college students (b), implying that college students are able to make more distinct cognitive differentiations between the incidents than retirees. Second, being morally upright conveys more face than academic or career performance for all agents, except college students who indicated that their academic performance (1.312) is




Figure A: Retired Group




Figure B : College Students

Fig. 10.3 Extents of losing face caused by two types of incident for retired group and college students

more important than being morally upright (1.231); although, the difference is insignificant. The data reflect an important fact about Chinese face: in general, moral face is more basic and important to most people than social face earned through the achievements of oneself or one's family (Cheng 1986).

Third, one's own achievement and moral performance may make college students feel that they have more face than their parents, which reflects an individual orientation. In contrast, retirees have face more from their children's moral performance and academic achievements than their own, which reflects a social (Yang 1981) or relational orientation (Ho 1991; K. K. Hwang 2001). Since the university students are entering the work environment, they value the social faces acquired upon personal talent, capacities, or efforts; the retired older people have left the

work environment and no longer pay attention to their own distinctiveness. They will feel “having face” or “losing face” (of “big self”) because of the achievement of the persons with blood relationships.

Social Incidents of Losing Face

In regard to moral face, university students or retired people both value it. Moral face is the baseline for being an upright person, which should not be lost in any situation. Once it is lost, it is very hard for an individual to maintain a position in the community.

As indicated in Fig. 10.3, the incident that caused retirees the most serious feeling of losing face was personal moral deficiency (1.698). The next most serious was the moral deficiency of their son or daughter (1.229), personal career failure (0.54), and then failure of their son or daughter (0.508). Moral deficiency (−1.055) or career failure (−2.924) of a friend ranked lowest. The whole sequence reflects the differential structure of Chinese relationalism: individuals tend to maintain psychosocial homeostasis by arranging interpersonal relationships with others from intimate to remote (Fei 1948; Hsu 1971; K. K. Hwang 2000, 2001).

Though the mean scores reflecting the extent of losing face for various incidents were different for college students and retirees, the sequence was similar. The only exception was for college students, the moral deficiency of a friend (−0.108) brought a stronger feeling of losing face than the career failure of parents (−1.509). When a college student has a friend with a moral deficiency, s/he might be treated similarly to the friend, or even be similarly accused by others. But if a friend has poor academic performance, an individual might feel enhanced face through downward social comparison. Thus, this incident ranked lowest in the extent of making a college student feel the loss of face (−2.837).

Guanxi and Emotional Reaction

Because university students are preparing for the pursuit of careers, academic achievement is more important than being morally upright for them to feel they “have face.” In other words, with regard to the positive events allowing them to “have face,” social faces are more important than moral ones. However, moral face is the bottom line of the integrity of personality. Although an individual may not strive for it intentionally, s/he should be careful not to lose it in any situation. In other words, in terms of the negative events making people “lose face,” moral faces are more important than social faces.

Under the influence of Confucian relationalism, once a person experiences success or failure in affairs of either achievement or morality, not only the person himself but also those related to him will experience a sense of either gaining or losing

face, and the intensity of the feeling will vary as a function of the person's intimacy with the actor.

The aforementioned arguments can be illustrated with an empirical study. Liu (2002) asked 278 university students (150 men and 128 women) in Taiwan to read four scenarios about incidents of achievement or morality. The agent in the positive moral incident scenario helped a woman who fainted on the street to the hospital and saved her life. The agent in the positive achievement scenario was a student who had failed the Joint Entrance Examination required to gain admission to a university. The student eventually passed the examination and began graduate school through hard work over a long period of time. The agent in the negative moral incident was caught by the police while stealing from a store. The agent in the negative achievement scenario dropped out of school due to poor academic performance. Participants were divided into nine groups to evaluate the emotional reactions of those who have different relationships with the agent, including the agent's father, mother, older sibling, younger sibling, good friend, classmate, teacher, neighbor, or a stranger. Figures 10.4 and 10.5 illustrate the extent of happiness and shame experienced by people of these different relationships as evaluated by the participants in responding to the agent's positive or negative achievement and morality incidents, respectively.

Sharing Glory or Serving Relationships

A careful examination of Fig. 10.5 shows that according to the study participants' evaluations, the intensity of shame over the agent's negative achievement or morality incident as experienced by the nine roles can be classified into two categories. Those with intense shame reactions were family members, including father, mother, and siblings. Non-family members were perceived as having a lower degree of shame reactions. This group included good friends, classmates, teachers, neighbors, and strangers. In this group, the intensity of shame reactions experienced over the negative moral conduct of the agent by a good friend ($M=3.17$), classmate ($M=2.97$), or teacher ($M=3.10$) were significantly higher than those of a neighbor ($M=2.30$) or stranger ($M=1.80$). For the negative achievement episode, the intensity of shame reactions as experienced by a teacher ($M=2.07$) is higher than those of a classmate ($M=1.53$) or a good friend ($M=1.60$). The reason teachers may have more intense shame reactions is because they are presumed to be responsible for the agent's negative academic achievement. Failure of the agent in achievement would not bring a feeling of shame to classmates or good friends perhaps because the performance of the agent is not closely tied to their own self-identity.

A comparison between Figs. 10.4 and 10.5 shows two remarkable points. First, as predicted, incidents of positive achievement were generally evaluated by college students to be experienced with a more intense feeling of having face than incidents of positive morality (see Fig. 10.4). Incidents of negative morality were experienced with a more intense feeling of "having no face" than incidents of negative achievement (see Fig. 10.5). Second, for a positive incident of having face, the




Fig. 10.4 Relational other's intensity of emotional reaction to positive episode of an agent

intensity of emotional reaction experienced by acquaintances (including good friends, classmates, and teachers) was generally lower than that of family members. The difference was not so drastic as in the negative incident of having no face.

In other words, participants believed that acquaintances and family members might experience a similar intensity of face for one's positive incidents. When an individual suffers from a negative incident of having no face, family members may also experience a feeling of having no face, but acquaintances may sever relationships and thus will not experience a similar feeling of having no face. The pattern of emotional reactions reflects the Chinese conceptualization of family as a whole body sharing the experience of having face or losing the face. While one's acquaintances may share positive incidents, they do not seem to share the negative ones.




Fig. 10.5 Relational other's intensity of emotional reaction to the negative episode of an agent

Role Obligation and Achievement Type

Viewed from the perspective of Confucian relationalism, people of different relationships with the actor may have different expectations on the actor's performance, so they may have different face feelings based on the outcome of the actor's behavior. Their expectations are varied as a function of the nature of the event and their obligations to the actor. In their article "Goals of life, achievement motive, and value of efforts in Confucian society," K. K. Hwang et al. (2009) emphasized that there are two types of achievement goals pursued by students in Confucian society: "Vertical distinctiveness" are the goals approved by the general public in society.




Fig. 10.6 The interaction of relation type and distinctiveness type on a related other's feeling of face due to an actor's success

Significant others in one's personal network of relationships usually encourage the actor to pursue these kind of goals. Once the actor achieves the goal, he/she may obtain praise from the whole society.

"Horizontal Distinctiveness" refers to goals pursued by the actor out of one's personal interest. Though peer groups who have similar interests with the actor may also approve these goals, his/her significant others and general public in the society may not necessarily have similar values, and may not appreciate the actor's performance too.

Relational Other's Face Feeling

In consideration of these two types of achievement, Liang (2007) designed a series of scenarios and instruments of measurement. Every scenario had an actor and two related others. The actor received different outcomes in events of vertical or horizontal achievement. Participants had to evaluate face feeling of three types of related others, including parents, teachers, and classmates. There were four scenarios under every relationship type. The participants of the study were 90 students, 23 males and 67 females, who took general psychology at National Taiwan University. There were 30 students in every relationship type.

Face feeling by related others are compared in scenarios of success and failure as shown in Figs. 10.6 and 10.7. It can be seen that, compared with horizontal distinctiveness, performance in vertical distinctiveness goals will make parents and teachers feel a higher degree of "have face" or "no face" in the scenarios of success or failure. Schoolfellows, however, have a reverse effect of face feelings in the scenarios of success and failure.




Fig. 10.7 The interaction of relation type and distinctiveness type on a related other’s feeling of losing face due to an actor’s failure

In Chinese parenting, parents usually encourage children to pursue highly socially approved “vertical goals,” hoping to confirm a higher social status. However, for the “horizontal goals” that children personally feel interested, Chinese parents would not necessarily give the same support. Although Chinese have a notion “family as a whole,” compared with “vertical distinctiveness,” parents feel a lesser degree of “have face” or “no face” as a result of children’s achievement (Fig. 10.6) or failure (Fig. 10.7) in “horizontal goals.”

There is a definite role standard for interaction between teacher and student. Students’ distinctiveness in a vertical event would get approval from society and also is highly related to the role obligation of teachers. On the contrary, students’ performance in horizontal goals has nothing to do with the teachers’ role obligation. Compared with “horizontal distinctiveness,” teachers and parents show stronger feeling of “have face” or “no face” when the actor succeeds (Fig. 10.6) or failure (Fig. 10.7) in “vertical distinctiveness.”

Peers are the people who are in the same generation as yours; it is an independent relationship. Whether an individual would include or exclude the actor in the scope of “big self” entirely depends on his/her own choice. In peer relationships, an individual has to pursue “vertical distinctiveness” approved by society and, on the other hand, the recognition by the group an individual belongs to. To pursue vertical distinctiveness goals, s/he has to shoulder the pressure of social judgments and comparisons. As a whole, it is easier to cause severe competition among peers when pursuing achievement of vertical distinctiveness. It is easier to receive praise from peer groups when pursuing horizontal distinctiveness. Therefore, classmates would feel a higher degree of “have face” to actor’s horizontal distinctiveness than

to vertical distinctiveness (Fig. 10.6). Yet classmates would feel higher degree of “no face” on the failure of vertical achievement than on the failure of horizontal achievement (Fig. 10.7).

Comparison of Two Approaches for Studying Face Behaviors

This chapter adopts the research strategy of indigenous psychology advocated by K.K. Hwang (2004, 2005a, b, 2006) to construct a series of theoretical models on Confucian relationalism to be used as guidelines for empirical research in studying the connection between concepts of face and morality in Confucian society. This approach is very different from the cross-cultural approach of comparing East and West from a particular point of view.

Formality of the Situation

In his dissertation, Lee (1998) indicated that facework related to *lian* and *mianzi* is an integral part of daily activities and official functions of the Chinese people. The sensitivity to face-threat is heightened with the degree of formality of the situation. In informal situations, Chinese people may not be as sensitive to face-threats as on formal occasions.

Formality of the situation means the occasion in which persons are requested to interact according to their role relationships, and all parties are urged to fulfill their role obligations. Workplace, wedding or funeral ceremonies are examples of situations with high degrees of formality. The formality of social interactions will be increased when the two interacting parties get involved in interpersonal conflict and request the opposite party to fulfill his/her role obligation.

For Chinese living in Confucian society, the social situation for gift giving is an example of a formal situation. An empirical research by Bao et al. (2003) indicated that face consciousness and risk aversion are two cultural dimensions to differentiate the consumers' decision-making styles in the US and that of their counterpoints in China. Wong and Ahuvia (1998) argued that the cultural factors of personal taste and family face lie behind the practices of luxury consumption in Western and Confucian societies, respectively.

Park (1998) compared Korean and American gift-giving behavior and its related values. His research revealed that the characteristics of Confucian culture increase social pressure of gift giving so that people feel stronger face-saving and group-conformity motivation and show collectivistic values in their gift-giving behavior. In contrast, Americans project the individualistic characteristics and exercise more control in giving gifts.

Chapter 9 indicates that the dichotomous approach of individualism and collectivism adopted by cross-cultural psychologists has fallen into the trap of cultural

reductionism. What are the collectivistic values of Confucian culture? How can they influence consumer behaviors of Chinese people? Questions of this kind can hardly be answered by the research strategy of cross-cultural psychology. But, it can be explored by the indigenous approach of psychology. For example, Qian et al. (2007) investigated the gift-giving behaviors of consumer in the city of Tianjin during the Chinese New Year. They found that Chinese cultural values as a whole as well as most of its components investigated in this research had positive effects on the various gift-giving behaviors. However, the “face” component was found to affect only the importance attached to gift-giving, the amount given and the choice of brand.

Zhou and Belk (2004) analyzed upscale Chinese consumers’ understandings of global and local television and print advertising by using a reader-response approach, they found that the presence of global images and foreign appeals in advertising do not mean that local culture is becoming globalized, or the consumer values are changing accordingly. Instead, their research found two dialectic reactions by Chinese consumers. One side is largely driven by the desire for global cosmopolitanism and status goods for the sake of prestige face, whereas the other side is motivated by a more nationalistic desire to involve Chinese values that are seen as local in origin.

Face Dynamics in Organization

In addition to the consumers’ gift-giving behaviors, face dynamics in modern organizations is another topic that has attracted wide research interest from social psychologists. Hence the concepts of *guanxi* and *mianzi* are fundamentally important in understanding social interactions in China. They can be extended to study relationships between firms and government bodies. Buckley et al. (2006) suggested that foreign investors in China must be aware of these key concepts and must use their knowledge to establish better institutional connections with locally owned partners and government. Using these concepts to build trust lies at the heart of interactions with local stakeholders, including employees, local partners, and government.

Kim and Nam (1998) proposed face as a key variable that can explain much of the complexity of social interactions in Asian organizations. They argued that scholars have to go beyond that individualistic assumption about human behavior implicit in theories of organizational behavior in the West to better understand the richness of organizational behavior in Asia. In Asia, organizational behavior is better predicted by an individual’s external attributes such as face than internal attributes such as desires, emotions, and cognition.

However, face has not gained general acceptance as an important theoretical concept in the literature on Asian organizational behavior and management. A few exceptions have tried to understand it in the global and multicultural context without going into the depth of local culture.

For example, inspired by findings of research on concepts of face in Confucian culture, the organizational face theory proposed by Earley (1997) argued that “face”

is a reflection of the individual's struggle for self-definition and understanding for the sake of positioning oneself relative to others in a social setting. He presented a model of culture and face in the sense of self-presentation and social evaluation in which two general categories of face, *lian* and *mianzi*, are described in relation to the social exchange practices observed in various societies. *Lian* refers to a general attachment and enactment of social norms and morals. After attachment is affirmed, a key aspect of face becomes that of *mianzi* or social status (Earley 2001). In order to understand face across cultural boundaries, these two aspects of face should be explored by using two key concepts of cultural variation, individualism–collectivism and power distance.

The type of theoretical construction adopts an approach of reductionism which attempts to reduce particular social phenomena in various cultures into several universal dimensions for cross-cultural comparison. The usefulness of this approach can be illustrated by an example. Reporting bad news about one's task in an organization bears personal risks of losing face. In extreme cases, it may even result in unemployment. However, the reluctance to report bad news in time may contribute to failed project management. The need to preserve face is universal to all human beings, but it manifest differently in different cultures. In view of this fact, Keil et al. (2007) conducted a role-playing experiment in the US and in the South Korea to investigate the effect of culturally constituted views of face-saving on the willingness to report bad news regarding a software development project. A blame-shifting opportunity was chosen as the means to operational face-saving in a culturally sensitive fashion. Results showed that the presence of a blame-shifting opportunity had a significant effect on US subjects' willingness to report bad news, but the effect on Korean subjects was not found to be statistically significant. In the absence of a blame-shifting opportunity, no significant difference was observed between US and Korean subjects in willingness to report bad news.

Conclusion: Limitation of Cross-Cultural Approach

Viewed from the perspective of organizational face theory, findings of this research can be explained in terms of the variation of these two cultures along the dimensions of either individualism–collectivism or power distance. However, it should be emphasized that while any given theory may provide a particular perspective to see the world, it provides a sense of bias and distortion simultaneously. Over-simplifying dimensions for cross-cultural comparison can hardly explain some complicated cultural phenomena.

For example, A. Hwang et al. (2003) studied the relationships among face (*mianzi*), individualism–collectivism, feedback processes, and learning cuteness in 266 Hong Kong, 131 Singaporean, and 253 American participants from 18 to 44 years old. They found consistent positive relationships between individualism and desire to gain *mianzi*, but the mirror effect between collectivism and fear of losing *mianzi* was not found. Moreover, there was a consistent negative effect

between losing face and student question-asking in class as expected, but the positive effect between asking questions in class and gaining face was only found in the US sample. Asking questions outside of class was positively related to grades in the US sample. However, asking questions in class had a negative effect. In contrast, it was positively related to grades in Hong Kong. For Singapore, only checking with students outside of class had an effect on performance, but it was negative.

Results of this research indicated that selective effects of feedback found during learning were highly sensitive to cultural contexts. Nevertheless, if such findings cannot be explained in terms of the individualism–collectivism dimension, it can hardly be explained in terms of cultural variations in the dimension of power distance.

References

- Alexander, C. N., & Knight, G. W. (1971). Situated identities and social psychological experimentation. *Sociometry*, *34*, 65–82.
- Alexander, C. N., & Lauderdale, P. (1977). Situated identities and social influence. *Sociometry*, *40*, 225–233.
- Alexander, C. N., & Rudd, J. (1981). Situated identities and response variables. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management theory and social psychological research*. New York: Academic Press.
- Alexander, C. N., & Wiley, M. C. (1980). Situated activity and identity formation. In M. Rosenberg & R. Turner (Eds.), *Sociological perspectives on social psychology* (pp. 269–289). New York: Basic Books.
- Arkin, R. M. (1981). Self-presentation styles. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management: Theory and social psychological research* (pp. 311–333). New York: Academic Press.
- Bao, Y., Zhou, K. Z., & Su, C. (2003). Face consciousness and risk aversions: Do they affect consumer decision-making? *Psychology and Marketing*, *20*, 733–755.
- Brown, B. R. (1968). The effects of need to maintain face on interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *4*, 107–122.
- Brown, B. R. (1970). Face-saving following experimental-induced embarrassment. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *6*, 255–271.
- Brown, B. R., & Garland, H. (1971). The effects of incompetency, audience acquaintanceship, and anticipated evaluative feedback on face-saving behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *7*, 490–502.
- Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). *Politeness: Some universal in language usage*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Buckley, P. J., Clegg, J., & Tan, H. (2006). Cultural awareness in knowledge transfer to China: The role of guanxi and mianzi. *Journal of World Business*, *41*, 275–288.
- Chen, C. C. (1988). The empirical research and theoretical analysis of face in psychology. In K. S. Yang (Ed.), *The psychology of Chinese people* (pp. 7–55). Taipei: Chuliu Book Co.
- Cheng, C. Y. (1986). The concept of face and its Confucian roots. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, *13*, 329–348.
- Chou, M. L. (1996). Protective and acquisitive face orientations: A person by situation approach to face dynamics in social interaction. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
- Chou, M. L., & Ho, D. Y. F. (1993). A cross-cultural perspective of face dynamics. In K. S. Yang & A. B. Yu (Eds.), *The psychology and behaviours of the Chinese: Conceptualization and methodology (in Chinese)* (pp. 205–254). Taipei: Guai-Guan.

- Chu, R. L. (1989). Face and achievement: The examination of oriented motives in Chinese society. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 31(2), 79–90.
- Chu, R. L. (1991). The threat to face and coping behavior. *Proceedings of the National Science Council, Republic of China: Humanities and Social Science*, 1(1), 14–31.
- Earley, P. C. (1997). *Face, harmony, and social structure: An analysis of organizational behavior across cultures*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Earley, P. C. (2001). Understanding social motivation from an interpersonal perspective: Organizational face theory. In M. Erez, U. Kleinbeck, & H. Thierry (Eds.), *Work motivation in the context of a globalizing economy* (pp. 369–379). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Eberhard, W. (1967). *Guilt and sin in traditional China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fei, S. T. (1948). *Rural China (in Chinese)*. Shanghai: Observer.
- Garland, H., & Brown, B. R. (1972). Face saving as affected by subjects' sex, audiences' sex and audience expertise. *Sociometry*, 35, 280–289.
- Gilbert, R. Y. (1927). *What's wrong with China*. London: J. Murray.
- Goffman, E. (1955). On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction. *Psychiatry*, 18, 213–231.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. New York: Doubleday, Anchor.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to face behaviour*. London: Penguin.
- Han, K. H., & Li, M. C. (2008). Strangers are better than the familiar ones: The effect of “face-threatening” on Taiwanese choice of helper. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 50, 31–48.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1976). On the concept of face. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 81, 867–884.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1991). Relational orientation and methodological relationalism. *Bulletin of the Hong Kong Psychological Society*, 26–27, 81–95.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1971). Psychological homeostasis and jen: Conceptual tools for advancing psychological anthropology. *American Anthropologist*, 73, 23–44.
- Hu, H. C. (1944). The Chinese concepts of “face”. *American Anthropologist*, 46, 45–64.
- Hwang, K. K. (1988). *Confucianism and East Asian modernization (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Chu-Liu Book Co.
- Hwang, K. K. (1995). *Knowledge and action: A social-psychological interpretation of Chinese cultural tradition (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Sin-Li.
- Hwang, K. K. (1998). Two moralities: Reinterpreting the findings of empirical research on moral reasoning in Taiwan. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 211–238.
- Hwang, K. K. (1999). Filial piety and loyalty: The types of social identification in Confucianism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 129–149.
- Hwang, K. K. (2000). The discontinuity hypothesis of modernity and constructive realism: The philosophical basis of indigenous psychology. *Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences*, 18, 1–32.
- Hwang, K. K. (2001). Morality: east and west. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.), *International encyclopedia of the social and behavior science* (pp. 10039–10043). Amsterdam: Pergamon.
- Hwang, K. K. (2004). The epistemological goal of indigenous psychology: The perspective of constructive realism. In B. N. Setiadi, A. Supratiknya, W. J. Lonner, & Y. H. Poortinga (Eds.), *Ongoing themes in psychology and culture* (pp. 169–186). Florida: The International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology.
- Hwang, K. K. (2005a). From anticolonialism to postcolonialism: The emergence of Chinese indigenous psychology in Taiwan. *International Journal of Psychology*, 40(4), 228–238.
- Hwang, K. K. (2005b). A philosophical reflection on the epistemology and methodology of indigenous psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 8(1), 5–17.
- Hwang, K. K. (2006). Moral face and social face: Contingent self-esteem in Confucian society. *International Journal of Psychology*, 41(4), 276–281.
- Hwang, K. K., Chen, S. W., Wang, H. H., & Fwu, B. J. (2009). Life goals, achievement motivation and value of effort in Confucian society. In U. Kim & Y. S. Park (Eds.), *Asia's educational miracle: psychological, social and cultural perspectives*. New York: Springer.
- Hwang, A., Francesco, A. M., & Kessler, E. (2003). The relationship between individualism-collectivism, face, and feedback and learning processes in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 34, 72–90.

- Keil, M., Im, G. P., & Mahrng, M. (2007). Reporting bad news on software projects: The effects of culturally constituted views of face-saving. *Information Systems Journal*, *17*, 59–87.
- Kim, J. Y., & Nam, S. H. (1998). The concept and dynamics of face: Implications for organizational behavior in Asia. *Organization Science*, *9*, 522–534.
- King, A. Y. C. (1988). Face, shame and the analysis of Chinese behaviors. In K. S. Yang (Ed.), *The Chinese psychology (in Chinese)* (pp. 319–345). Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Lee, S. H. (1998). Facework in Chinese cross-cultural adaptation. *Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences*, *59*, 539.
- Liang, C. J. (2007). *The effect of guanxi, state of affection, and type of achievement on relational other's feelings of face*. Master Thesis, Department of Psychology, National Taiwan University.
- Liu, D. W. (2002). *Relational others' emotional reactions to negative episodes of agency evaluated by college students in Taiwan*. Unpublished master thesis, National Taiwan University, Taiwan.
- Lu, X. (1991). On "Face". In Editorial Office of People's Literature Publishing House (Ed.), *Complete works of Lu Xun* (Vol. 6, pp. 126–129). Beijing: People's Literature Publishing House.
- Park, S. Y. (1998). A comparison of Korean and American gift-giving behaviors. *Psychology and Marketing*, *15*, 577–593.
- Qian, W., Razzaque, M. A., & Keng, K. A. (2007). Chinese cultural values and gift-giving behavior. *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, *24*, 214–228.
- Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The "big three" of morality (autonomy, community, divinity) and the "big three" explanations of suffering. In A. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), *Morality and culture* (pp. 119–169). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Smith, A. H. (1894). *Chinese characteristics*. New York: F. H. Revell Company.
- Su, S. Y., & Hwang, K. K. (2003). Face and relation in different domains of life: A comparison between senior citizens and university students. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, *45*(3), 295–311.
- Tedeschi, J. T., & Riess, M. (1981). Identities, the phenomenal self, and laboratory research. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management theory and social psychological research* (pp. 3–22). New York: Academic Press.
- Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., & Bonoma, T. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private ratiocination or public spectacle? *American Psychologist*, *26*, 185–695.
- Thurstone, L. L. (1927). A law of comparative judgment. *Psychological Review*, *34*, 273–286.
- Wilehlm, R. (1926). *Die seele Chinas*. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing.
- Wong, N. Y., & Ahuvia, A. C. (1998). Personal taste and family face: Luxury consumption in Confucian and Western societies. *Psychology and Marketing*, *15*, 423–441.
- Yang, K.-S. (1981). Social orientation and individual modernity among Chinese students in Taiwan. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *113*, 159–170.
- Zai, S. W. (1995). *Chinese view of Lian and Mia (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Zhou, N., & Belk, R. W. (2004). Chinese consumer readings of global and local advertising appeals. *Journal of Advertising*, *33*, 63–76.
- Zou, B. (1997). *Chinese Lian and Mianzi (in Chinese)*. Wuhan: Huazhong Normal University Press.

Chapter 11

Guanxi and Organizational Behaviors in Chinese Society

Abstract The cultural perspective and institutional perspective on *guanxi* were combined to construct a theoretical framework for analyzing *guanxi* practices in five types of business organizations in Chinese society, namely, patrilinealism, patriarchalism, market despotism, paternalism, and monopoly. Those five types of organizations were classified along with a combination of three dichotomous dimensions. Based on the premise that *guanxi* practices are used to establish interpersonal trust, a conceptual framework was proposed to explain the features and domains for five prototypes of trust in Chinese society, and researches on *guanxi* practices between organizations were discussed with a special concern about its negative connotations. Various patterns of *guanxi* practices within organizations were analyzed to explain the organizational culture and leadership in Chinese businesses. The theoretical frameworks provided in this chapter may clarify several crucial issues related to the *guanxi* usage in Chinese society.

Keywords *Guanxi* practices • Cultural perspective • Institutional perspective • Patrilinealism • Patriarchalism • Paternalism • Market despotism • Information asymmetry • *Gao guanxi* • *La guanxi* • *Xinyong*

“*Guanxi*” is a key concept for understanding social behavior in Chinese society. For social scientists researching Chinese society, it is very easy to find a set of special terms related to *guanxi* that have been widely used by Chinese people in day-to-day social interactions. For instance, everyone has his own *guanxiwang* (social network). *Guanxihaw* means a person who has close relationships with powerful others. In order to achieve a desired goal that is within the power of a particular powerful figure to grant, one needs to utilize one’s *guanxi* with the powerful figure, or *la guanxi* (pull relations) with somebody in his social network; this is called *gao guanxi* (doing relations). This type of terminology suggests a distinctive social phenomenon, which may be internalized to constrain individual behavior and become a

well-known social fact. Its popularity has earned *guanxi* a status that leads foreign scholars and laypeople to utilize the untranslated Chinese word when discussing and explaining China.

The Cultural Perspective on Guanxi

UC Berkley held a symposium in 1998 inviting many scholars to discuss issues of “Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of *Guanxi*.” Following the symposium a book entitled *Social Connections in China* was published. In the introductory chapter Gold et al. (2002), the book’s editors, indicated that a growing body of literature on *guanxi* had emerged over the last two decades. This literature can be broken down into two groups with different perspectives: a cultural perspective and an institutional perspective. Scholars with a cultural perspective see *guanxi* as an essential element of Chinese culture, a phenomenon deeply rooted in the Chinese psyche. For instance, Pye (1968) and Solomon (1971) studied the political culture during the Cultural Revolution, both scholars emphasized Chinese people’s psychological dependency on strong personalized authority figures and their tendency to perceive society as a web of human relationships and associations. Consequently, they view the manipulation of human relationships as the natural and normal approach to accomplish most life goals.

In the period of 1970–1980, the economic miracles in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan earned them the title of the “Four Little Asian Dragons.” Redding (1990) studied the managerial style of oversea Chinese entrepreneurs and published a book entitled *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism*, in which he described how Chinese utilize social networks to do business and attempted to explain these practices in terms of the psychosocial legacy of China. Hamilton (1996a, b) subsequently coined the term “*guanxi* capitalism” to denote the distinct form of business practices derived primarily from the Chinese kinship system.

Why are the arrangements of interpersonal relationships so important for the daily lives of Chinese people? Tu (1981) analyzed the dynamic process between self and the networks of human relatedness in Confucian culture from a philosophical perspective; King (1985) examined the relationships between self and group in Chinese society from a sociological perspective. Both of them indicated that the cultural value of *guanxi* prevalent in Chinese society originated from Confucian cultural tradition. Mayfair Yang (1994) explicitly links the current incarnations of *guanxixue* (i.e., gift economy in contemporary China) to the ancestral forms of gift-giving and etiquette in her book, *Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China*. She devotes a full chapter to tracing the history of debates that originated from the opposing attitudes toward this issue held by two schools of philosophers, Confucians and Legalists.

An Institutional Perspective on Guanxi

According to the institutional perspective, though the *guanxi* phenomenon has become inextricably linked to Chinese society, it is the institutional conditions that have driven the emergence of the *guanxi* phenomenon. Viewed from this perspective, any perception of a particular Chineseness in *guanxi* is just an artifact of historical and institutional conditions. It is the shortage economy in a social system without a reliable legal infrastructure that forces Chinese people to secure various

life resources by relying on their social networks. For instance, Walder (1986) indicated that people have to use *guanxi* in the form of patron–client relations in state-owned business of contemporary China, because powerful officials controlled housing, nonwage benefits, and even promotions within the organization. Similar phenomena can also be seen in other socialist economies of shortage such as the Soviet Union. In considering of all those facts, Walder (1986) proposed a term: “communist neo-traditionalism,” by which he means to imply “traditional” as opposed to “modern,” or personal and particularistic as opposed to rational-legal. In Oi’s (1989, p. 228) analysis of rural politics in China, she concluded that the similar clientelistic politics can also be found in many different societies, therefore, *guanxi* behavior is “neither inherently Chinese nor traditional.”

Since the 1990s, many foreigners have swarmed to trade with or invest in China. Though the Chinese government has been attempting to promulgate and implement a set of regulations and laws, Chinese business practices still need to cope with the absence of a formal and reliable system of economic laws and regulations. The socialist legacy of a shortage economy combined with the subsequent problems derived from the coexistence of market system and distributive system create both the need and opportunity for using *guanxi*. Wank’s (1999) research in the Xiamen area revealed the existence of “symbiotic clientelism” between private businessmen and officials. Hsing (1998) interviewed Taiwanese and Hong Kong investors on the Mainland in order to study how *guanxi* operates in the foreign-investment sector of the reform economy. He found that maintenance of *guanxi* with other foreign investors is viewed as a defense against unpredictable Mainland Chinese. Guthrie (1999) argued that the capitalism practiced in China is like the “dragon in a three-piece suit,” it left many spaces for *guanxi* utilization. However, he believes that the emergence of a formal and reliable system of economic laws and regulations will diminish the importance of *guanxi* in Chinese society.

The Purpose of this Chapter

Several important implications can be drawn from this brief review: Most scholars who stand for an institutional perspective are political scientists or economists. They do not deny that Chinese cultural traditions have quite an influence on *guanxi* behavior. However, they believe that the construction of a rational political or economic system may reduce the utilization of *guanxi* in the public sphere. On the other hand, the background of scholars who hold a cultural perspective covers various fields of social science, including political scientists or economists, as well as anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers. They care not only about the construction of a rational political or economic system in the public sphere, but also the *guanxi*’s role in other domains. Hence they pay special attention to the influence of cultural tradition. Scholars from a particular background may see a specific various aspect of *guanxi*. How can we combine those viewpoints to construct a theory to illustrate Chinese *guanxi* behavior?

Chapter 4 illustrated how the Face and Favor model was constructed on the basis of my critiques of social exchange theory and justice theory. It is emphasized that the Face and Favor model can be viewed as a universal theory if the *renqing* rule is regarded as a special case of the equity rule. Based on this model, Chap. 5 analyzed

the inner structure of Confucianism and indicated that there is an isomorphic relationship between the Face and Favor model and Confucian ethics for ordinary people. The series of theories thus constructed can explain not only the universal human mentality about interpersonal relationships, but also the particular mentality for dealing with social interaction in Chinese culture.

Viewed from this perspective, culture is indeed responsible for the Chinese emphasis on *guanxi* and *renqing*. However, the institutional influence on Chinese *guanxi* practices should not be ignored. This chapter aims to review the empirical research as well as the conceptual analysis of Chinese *guanxi* that have been completed following the publication of Face and Favor model. There are six sections in this chapter. Section “Pulling *Guanxi* and Avoiding *Gangqing*” delineates the meaning of “pulling *guanxi*” in Chinese society from the perspective of the Face and Favor model. It is emphasized that Chinese *guanxi* practices can not be sufficiently understood if examined only from the interpersonal level. Thus, Section “*Guanxi* Practices between Organizations” focuses on the *guanxi* practices between organizations. Several controversial issues have arisen from different perspectives. For the sake of resolving these issues, a conceptual framework to classify various types of enterprise in Chinese society is proposed in Section “Types of Business Organization in Chinese Society,” so that the perspectives of sociology and social psychology can be synthesized to discuss the *guanxi* practices between organizations on the institutional level. Because establishing *guanxi* networks is mainly a strategy for organizations to increase interpersonal trust and to reduce environmental uncertainty, another conceptual framework to explain the models of trust in Chinese society will be proposed in Section “Strategies of Trust in Chinese Society.” The findings of previous empirical research will be reinterpreted in terms of these conceptual frameworks in Section “*Guanxi* Practices between Organizations.” Finally, the Chinese society leadership model will be taken as an example to discuss within organization *guanxi* practices in Section “*Guanxi* Practice within Organizations.” By doing so it is expected that we are able to reply not only to the culture and institution debates mentioned in Section “Pulling *Guanxi* and Avoiding *Gangqing*,” but also to most issues about Chinese *guanxi* practices in organizational psychology.

Pulling *Guanxi* and Avoiding *Gangqing*

The Face and Favor model classifies interpersonal relationships into three categories: expressive tie, mixed tie, and instrument tie. Expressive and mixed ties are separated by a solid line, implying a relatively strong psychological boundary between them. It is very difficult for an outsider to become a family member. Instrumental ties are separated from mixed ties by a dotted line, implying that the *la guanxi* (seeking *guanxi*) process may enable a person with an instrumental tie to penetrate the relatively weak psychological boundary and transform the relationship into a mixed tie.

Viewed from the perspective of symbolic interactionism, an interpersonal relationship is not unchangeable. After a period of social interaction, a stranger or two parties with an instrumental tie may form a mixed tie relationship; two parties with a mixed tie may evolve into a relationship of competition or fighting between enemies. Even a couple with an expressive tie may become incompatible, decide to divorce, and become strangers henceforth. Those changes can be regarded as emergent properties of relationships.

Avoiding Gangqing

In the Face and Favor model, I emphasized that the operation of *renqing* rule is established on the norm of reciprocity (Hwang 1987). A resource allocator has to pay some costs when he offers *renqing* by giving resources under his control to the petitioner, while the petitioner has to assume a sense of psychological indebtedness and the obligation of reciprocation. Viewed from this perspective, Chinese should have a tendency to avoid the pressure of requesting favor from others.

Chow and Ng (2004) conducted research in Hong Kong finding that classmates, peer groups, and friends of one's family are the basis for participants to develop intimate relationships. They unexpectedly found that participants had a relatively distinct psychological distance from their kinship and work colleagues. The larger *guanxi* network one has, the more face an individual owns. But, when participants encounter life difficulties and have to ask for help from others, they tend to ask for help from family members rather than outsiders. Nevertheless, the tightness of Chinese family shows an obvious tendency toward weakening.

Viewed from the Face and Favor model, when an individual encounters difficulty and asks for help from family members, his family members are obligated to help him in accordance to the need rule. If he asks colleagues or relatives outside his immediate family, they may provide the necessary help in consideration of the *renqing* rule. But, he may thus be indebted to repay the favor. So, he tends to keep a distinct psychological distance and avoid requesting favor from them. Hence, Chinese have a tendency to avoid requesting favors. So, what is the social context in which one does utilize *guanxi*?

Domains for Guanxi Practices

As I have repeatedly emphasized, the Face and Favor model is a universal formal theory which classifies interpersonal relationships into three categories without taking into consideration any specific role relationships in Chinese society. Yang (1995, 1999) classifies Chinese relationships into ascribed *guanxi* and interactive *guanxi*. She argues that interactive *guanxi* contains two dimensions: namely, an affective dimension and an instrumental dimension. Viewed from the Face and Favor model

and the perspective of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, so-called ascribed *guanxi* is defined by the role relationships in Chinese society, while the two dimensions of interactive *guanxi* correspond to the affective and instrumental components that constitute *guanxi* in the Face and Favor model. Researchers need to differentiate and define concepts clearly when they are constructing a scientific microworld, but the language used by people in their lifeworlds cannot be so distinctively defined.

For instance, Lau et al. (2005) interviewed 20 participants noting 34 *guanxi* in education domains and 38 *guanxi* in daily-life domains, they also theoretically derived 48 *guanxi* in family domains. They asked 101 university students to sort *guanxi* into these three domains, and to rate these types of *guanxi* on nine attributes including level of obligation, expressiveness, instrumentality, etc. The data was then analyzed using multidimensional scaling. Results showed that *guanxi* in the family domain consists of three dimensions, namely affectiveness, difference in seniority (*bei-fen*), and reciprocity. *Guanxi* in the education domain consists of affectiveness and hierarchical difference, while *guanxi* in the daily-life domain consists of affectiveness and instrumentality.

Multidimensional scaling can be characterized as “data in, dimensions out.” Its output depends on the input data. This research revealed that perception of *bei-fen* and hierarchical differences are significant features of role relationships within the domains of family and education, respectively. Furthermore, affectiveness, which had been referred to as *ren* in Confucian terminology, is the common component of *guanxi* in all domains. As for the instrumental component, it is implied in the reciprocal obligation in the family domain, it is not salient in the education domain, but it becomes very salient in the daily-life domain. In fact, the major domain for *guanxi* practices in Chinese society is neither family nor school, but the so-called daily-life domain within or between organizations.

***Guanxi* Practices Between Organizations**

The Face and Favor model analyzes *guanxi* practices at the social psychological level. Though it can explain how cultural factor may influence Chinese social behavior, it may encounter some limitations in explaining *guanxi* practices within – or between – organizations. These controversial issues can be illustrated by reviewing relevant research in the field.

Managerial or organizational psychologists are concerned about how a business can succeed using *guanxi* practices. Yeung and Tung (1996) indicated that the Chinese word for *guanxi* implies that connections with the right people are often more important business decision considerations than the price, quality, or after service of the tendered product. They conducted semistructured interviews with the leaders of 19 Chinese corporations and found most of them agreed that relationships possessing the “right” and “strong” *guanxi* are positively related with a firm’s long-term financial performance.

Cultural Differences in Guanxi Practices

Generally speaking, it is universal for businesses to pursue success by establishing *guanxi*. However, because some specific cultural factors may result in different concepts and expectations, the nature of *guanxi* is different in various cultures. In recent years, more and more Western people are aware that getting a competitive advantage through a *guanxi* network is the key to business success in China, but they agree that it is hard to understand *guanxi* in Confucian society from a Western perspective.

Tung and Worm (2001) collected data from forty Western European multinational companies with investment and operations in China, and examined (1) how large-scale European multinational business perceive the characteristics of *guanxi*; (2) the importance of *guanxi* for market entry and long-term success in China; and (3) how *guanxi* is built and maintained by European companies in China. The results showed that while European companies have been able to establish a presence in China, their moderate level of satisfaction with performance there can be attributed to their inability to build very strong and appropriate *guanxi* with relevant authorities.

Wood et al. (2002) conducted research including a ten-case preliminary field study followed by more intensive depth interviews with 40 Chinese business leaders. Results revealed complicated differences in the way *guanxi* is utilized in state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises. At first glance, it seems that cultural factors lead to differences in the way *guanxi* is utilized in state-owned and foreign-invested firms. Along this line of reasoning, the first question asked by Western researchers is how *guanxi* can be used as a mechanism for establishing corporate reputation in China.

Reciprocal Exchange

Standifird (2006) argues that *guanxi* can be roughly described as a type of social capital that is developed between two persons via a process of reciprocal exchange. The key to using *guanxi* as a way of establishing reputation is to develop a network of high-quality contacts while deliberately maintaining the discrete relationships that constitute the network. In order to establish themselves as reputable in China, an organization must have a multitude of its members participate in *guanxi*-based business practices. However, *guanxi* remains an individual's product, and it may become an organizational asset only to the extent that individuals are willing to use their *guanxi* to achieve organizational objectives.

Nevertheless, what are the differences between the ways in which Chinese practice *guanxi* and Westerners manage social networks? David Lo (2007) is a Chinese-American who has lived in Mainland China and Taiwan. He conducted qualitative interviews with both Chinese and Americans yielding 58 items for a questionnaire. He then took two independent samples of business school students from the United States ($n = 225$) and China ($n = 231$), and compared the differences between Chinese

guanxi practices and American networking behaviors. These differences included tendencies to engage in relationships, attitudes toward achieved versus ascribed relations, directness versus indirectness, and differences in business etiquette and time orientations. Chinese preferred ascribed relations when seeking jobs. Their business etiquette included giving gifts, hosting banquets, rendering small favors, and visiting people in their homes. Once necessary, they try to keep long-term interactions through indirect relations. In contrast, Americans were more direct when looking for jobs and working with the government. Their business etiquette included handshakes as well as exchanging phone calls, emails, and business cards.

Guanxi and Relational Demography

This type of research enables us to see the difference between Chinese *guanxi* practices and American social networking behaviors. In Western organizational psychology, relational demography is a comparable concept to *guanxi*. Since Pfeffer (1983) proposed this concept for organizational research, many Western psychologists have begun to investigate the influence of employees' demographic variables, such as age, race, sex, and tenure, upon their organizational behaviors. Tsui et al. (1995) reviewed relevant literature and reported different work experiences for those who are demographically similar to and those who are demographically different from others at work. The latter are less committed, less socially integrated in the work group, and more likely to leave the work group or organization.

Tsui and Farh (1997) compared the difference between Chinese *guanxi* and relational demography. The basis of *guanxi* is one's ascribed social and economic background, rather than physical attributes like age or sex. In addition to shared hometown or family, most *guanxi* is built on interpersonal interaction and the emergent affection, such as previous colleagues, classmates, neighbors, teachers or students, relatives, etc. These types of relationships cannot be observed directly; instead, they can be known only through communication with or introduction of the third party. In contrast to this, people who are demographically similar, such as those of the same age, race, sex, religion, or occupation, do not always interact with one another. Even though they may have more social interaction, it is their similar attributes that make them assume they have similar attitudes or values. *Guanxi* is mostly based on previous social interaction experiences, but most variables of relational demography are related to individual's present characteristics.

Based on this distinction, Farh et al. (1998) tried to study the differential effects of *guanxi* and relational demography on trust. They recruited 560 vertical dyads of supervisor and subordinate in Taiwan and 205 horizontal dyads of business executive and an important business connection (e.g., key customer, supplier, banker, government official) in mainland China as participants. Results supported the importance of both *guanxi* and relational demography for subordinates' trust in the supervisor (the vertical dyad), but only *guanxi* was found to be important for business executives' trust in their connections (the horizontal dyad). The results indicated

not only the cultural uniqueness of *guanxi* in Chinese society, but also the different process of between organization relationships versus within organization relationships, so the two should be discussed separately.

Institutional Aspect of Guanxi Practices

In last section, it was emphasized that Chinese tend to avoid the disturbance of using *renqing* at the individual level. The domain for instrumental utilization of *quanxi* is neither in the family, or school, but the so-called “daily-life domains” within an organization or between organizations. Here, we have to ask: why *guanxi* practices within an organization or between organizations are so important that managers of Western businesses tend to believe that they represent specific features of Chinese culture?

In both traditional and contemporary Chinese societies, there is a kind of social interaction within organizations in which the petitioner attempts to acquire a public resource under the control of resource allocator who has only the power of managing the resource and not its ownership. For example, an officer working in the government, or the manager of state-owned business after the 1976 economic reform of China, may face such a situation in allocating a public source.

For the sake of maintaining the fairness of resource allocation, or coping with challenges from the external environment, an institution may value efficiency over interpersonal affection. The establishment and implementation of legal norms may delegitimize personal ties and subvert formal institutional. In the process of organizational socialization, an individual needs to learn various anticorruption practices that are necessary for maintaining normal institutional operation. Viewed from a social psychology perspective, “practices against corruption avoidance” can also be called “practices of *ganqing* avoidance” (Kipnis 2002). When a RA is managing various public resources, he must endeavor to restrain the affective component of his interpersonal relationships, and handle things according to the formal regulated procedures in order to avoid of being trapped by *guanxi*.

Institutional Holes

While the legislative procedure in both traditional Chinese monarchy, and modern socialist China (Potter 1992, 1999), is essentially top-down, there are ambiguities in the laws and regulations that leave spaces for arbitrary interpretation by powerful officials. These are usually referred to as *institutional holes* (Bian 2002).

When P asks RA to distribute a particular public resource under RA’s control in favor of P, RA may follow the regulations of the organization (i.e., “equity rule” in Figure 4.3) in allocating the resource without considering the affective component in their relationship. In this case, P who is urgently in need of the resource under

RA’s control without any alternative may face a psychological barrier. He may beg for a favor from RA to get around this barrier, or he may ask a powerful third party to lobby RA. Because *guanxi* in daily-life situations is usually made up of multilateral social networks, the third party often has the power to control an important social resource in relevant social networks and may have influence over RA. When P mobilizes an intermediary to exert social influence to change RA’s attitude, RA has to consider not only the reciprocity which P may give him when he refuses/ accepts P’s request, but also the reciprocal action by the intermediary. This is reflected in the Chinese proverb “don’t see the aspect of Buddhist, but see the aspect of Buddha”; or “to beat a dog needs to see who the host is,” this is called “the third party effect” by sociologists studying Chinese social behavior (Lin 2002).

Types of Business Organization in Chinese Society

What business organization characteristics manifest when a Chinese owner operates his business and interacts with others using a Confucian mentality? A series of previous field studies indicate that most family businesses in Taiwan raise initial capital by utilizing clan relations. Their principles of organization are mutual cooperation in organization and formation of interorganizational relationships by social networks (Chen 1994; Greenhalgh 1988; Hsieh 1989; Ko 1993; Silin 1976). W. Y. Cheng (2003) reviewed previous research and indicated that there are several patterns of business organization in Chinese society. These patterns depend on two factors: the separation or combination of management and ownership in the enterprise, and the competition or oligopoly in its market environment. These two dimensions can be used to classify enterprises in Chinese society into four categories. Most Taiwanese enterprises are medium or small-scale family businesses operating in a free market. This type of organization is characterized by a combination of powers of management and ownership (Hwang et al. 2007). Most employees in the enterprise have some sort of clan relationship with the owner; sociologists refer to this as traditional solidarity. The operation of this type of organization is profoundly influenced by Confucian ethics, and rarely interfered with by state power. Though there is some traditional solidarity between the owner and the employees, the employees’ free market working conditions lack labor law protection. From the perspective of cultural anthropology, this type of business can be classified into two subcategories as shown in Table 11.1 below:

Table 11.1 Types of Business Organization in Chinese Society

Types of decision-making process		Traditional Authority (with traditional solidarity)	Professional Manager (no traditional solidarity)	
Power structure		Combination	Separation	
Market Environment	Free competition	Patrilinealism	Patriarchalism	Market Despotism
	Oligopoly	/		Monopoly Market

Patrilinealism

In cultural anthropology patrilinealism is an institution for inheritance of family pedigree and ancestral heritage. Though patrilineal family businesses are popular around the world, it is more salient within Chinese society. In Taiwanese medium or small-scale enterprises, most employees belong to the same family or are kindred with their employer (Orru et al. 1997; Hamilton and Biggart 1998).

In contrast to Euro-American enterprises which are constituted on the basis of individualism and contract engagement, Chinese enterprises tend to be structured on pedigree and interpersonal relationships (Chen and Chiu 1984).

According to the pedigree of patrilinealism, the father-owner of an enterprise tends to consign his management powers and his ownership to his own lineal heir, rather than to professional executives. Although Japanese enterprises also stress the value of family, because ordinary Japanese people did not have family names prior to the Meiji Restoration, they developed a system of singular inheritance: The succession may or may not be the owner's first-born child, he may even not be a blood relative (see Chapter 8). This obviously differs from Chinese tradition. The Chinese in Taiwan follow a system of equally allotting one's heritage to one's sons. Entrepreneurs wish to maintain their lineal inheritance, they also tend to set up new subcompanies for each son, so that each of them will be able to start their own lineal inheritance. Therefore, Taiwanese enterprises tend toward horizontal pluralization, rather than vertical integration (Hamilton 1996a, b).

Traditional social linkages are maintained in management decision-making levels. On the contrary, lower level employees and laborers are not necessarily kindred with the owner–manager, not to mention direct blood relatives. Employees within an enterprise tend to be treated differently depending on their level of intimacy with the owner. This constitutes the so-called “differential order.” Patrilinealism originated in traditional agricultural society, thus patrilineal enterprises often have to confront tough competition and challenges posed by modern free market societies.

Because the management of medium and small-scale Taiwanese family businesses has to utilize interpersonal relationships to encourage fatiguing long-term overtime work, business owners often “work with their employees, treat[ing] them like brothers and sisters.... They regard themselves not as business owner[s], but ... as workers as well, and work even harder and longer than their employees” (Hsieh 1989, p. 48). Taiwanese bosses often stand out as an example or role model, demanding employees abide by their own professional performance standards and that their subordinates take orders as guidance and criterion for work. Taiwanese enterprises thrive through men's devotions, rather than institutional rationalization (Chen 1994, p. 54–60). In such a situation, employees who are not the boss's family members tend to feel that their boss's demands are immoderate or unreasonable. When the enterprise grows to a stage of rapid expansion, it would be very difficult for it to maintain the employer–laborer relationships using a leading example of a core team without setting up an institutionalized reward system. In this case, the owner–manager usually has to adopt a profit-sharing strategy to attract workers (Ko 1993, p. 144).

Patriarchalism

Patriarchalism originally meant that the father or male elders exercised authority within a family or a tribe. According to Max Weber (1978, p. 1006–1069), dominance in patriarchalism is established on the basis of authority controlled by the patriarch within his own household. In comparison with the bureaucratic system, subordinates may be inspired by their conformity to social norms to support their superiors. But, the norms of the bureaucratic system are established on the legitimacy of expertise, while the norms in patriarchalism originate from tradition and loyalty to the patriarch. A patriarch's dominance is formed via his day-to-day life experiences and mutual dependency on others with whom he shares natural relationships without legal constraints (Weber 1978, p. 1006–1007).

The patriarchal labor system implies that the boss (proprietor/foreman) is obliged to ensure the welfare of his employees who are kin or friends (Deyo 1989). In Taiwanese medium or small-scale enterprises, they are “guaranteed employees” who have been recommended and recruited by other employees in that enterprise from their friends and relatives (Ko 1993). Viewed from Weber's perspective, consanguinity is a necessary condition for patrilinealism, but it is not necessary for patriarchalism. During the early stages of economic reformation following China's opening policies, the county and township enterprises were mostly controlled by local authorities such as government administrators or party cadres, and their employees often had family linkages or regional connections. This is exemplary of patriarchalism (Vogel 1989). Under the leadership of the local party secretary and village head, if a county or township enterprise successfully expanded and began to hire cheaper labor from outside, they were no longer under the protection of patriarchalism.

Paternalism

Paternalism can be viewed as a kind of beneficent patrimonialism. It is a sociological, but not an anthropological concept. It refers to the provision of welfare in exchange for employee obedience to authority in order to alleviate labor union pressure. This allows employers a more complete dominance over labor. This type of organization is mostly established in isolated company towns where a single business functions as a center (Ackers 1998). The business usually enjoys eminent prestige in that area, and its authority may extend from the laborer's work, to his leisure, religious, and private activity. Laborers may rely on the company not only economically, but also in their daily lives. Because the nature of the company is often very specific, the source of labor is limited, and its labor market is not open to free competition, but oligopoly. Owners may declare themselves a moral tutor, insisting on traditional work values and resisting labor union pressures. This opposes globalization trends seen in pluralistic societies.

From the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1990s, most state-owned businesses in Taiwan and China could be regarded as paternalistic organizations. Representatives of the state or government served as power figures with traditional male authority. A patrilineal or patriarchal family business certainly has to face the impacts and challenges of a free market; but a state-owned enterprise can monopolize the market and ensure long-term protection by exercising state power. Lifelong job security may provide assurances for employees. However, the traditional paternal authority may be insufficient to motivate worker morale and to manage the loose laborers. Chinese scholars Li et al. (1992) use the term “maternalism” instead of paternalism to describe the phenomena observed in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Owing to over-indulgences by the state, the state-owned enterprise is like a child spoiled by its mother. It enjoys not only the benefit of various privileges, but also the exemption of responsibility for acute loss under the partial protection of his mother (the state). Some state-owned enterprises may bargain with the government for beneficial tax rates, profits for submission to the government, and responsibility bonuses, performing “behaviors of showing pettishness as a spoiled child” (Li et al. 1992, p. 285).

Paternalism is characterized by traditional obedience to the employer in exchange for his taking care of the laborer’s welfare. The scope and extent of care are determined by the employer, and not negotiated by employees through labor unions. For the sake of showing respect to labor rights, the government may also support labor unions in state-owned enterprises. In this case, the enterprise has to learn how to coexist with the union, let it establish some beneficial functions, and provide assistance to the enterprise. Thus, the labor union may become a mechanism for employee participation. When an employer and laborer are in conflict, the government may spare no effort to mediate between both parties encouraging them to cooperate instead of compete. Because management and ownership powers are separated in this type of organization, manager status tends to be blurred; it is easy for the management and the labor to form a unity. Because state-owned enterprises occupy a dominant position in an oligopolistic market, their manpower can be exempted from market competition due to government influence and labor union protection. Thus, laborer’s rights of work are guaranteed to a certain extent. Nevertheless, due to globalization trends, governments have had to adopt Privatization strategies and state-owned enterprises are on the wane in both Taiwan and China.

Market Despotism

Market despotism and market monopoly are economic concepts, and are not generally dealt with by cultural anthropology. Market despotism means that laborers are completely conditioned by market competition, especially in labor-intensive industries where most of laborers are migrants from rural areas or foreign countries (Burawoy 1985). Most medium or small-scale enterprises utilizing market despotism, patrilinealism, or patriarchalism are situated in free market labor situations.

The most significant feature of market despotism is the separation between management and ownership. Under market despotism, there is a lack of the traditional solidarity between labor and employer. This creates a labor group without job assurance or a “super proletarian class” (Deyo 1989).

Market despotism is popular in high-tech enterprises, where it is labeled “Human Resource Management” (HRM). In order to deal with the pressure of internationalization, liberalization, and technique competition, and to relinquish the burden of a seniority-based merit system, life-time employment, or retirement benefits, HRM uses various strategies to strengthen the employer’s dominance over the laborers, including management by objectives, production circles, production committees, quality of work life projects, and performance-based compensation, such as piece-rate payment, working bonuses, profit sharing, lump-sum bonuses, etc. These strategies help employers resist requests for salary adjustment from labor unions and eliminate the opportunity for inefficient works to utilize guaranteed pay raises.

Monopoly (Oligopoly) Market

A monopolistic or oligopolistic market is controlled by large-scale enterprises with their abundant capital and exclusive technical ability and knowledge related to the market’s products or services. Large-scale enterprise laborers are also members of giant unions in European and American countries, and they usually enjoy the assurance of various welfare benefits (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Edwards 1979). After World War II, European and American transnational enterprises often split labor markets using monopolistic control and oligopoly market scenarios for the sake of raising profits, reducing labor costs, and dealing with union pressures. Many European and American transnational enterprises have invested abroad establishing branches of monopoly (oligopoly) markets in Taiwan and in Mainland China following the 1970s adoption of the open-door policy. However, brief product life cycles, fast technical changes, the liberalization, and globalization of trade, have combined to cause many large-scale Western enterprises to lose their oligopolistic superiority. As a result of frequent organizational mergers and large-scale lay offs, labor unions often have no power to resist enterprises, and oligopoly markets may gradually become market despotism.

Strategies of Trust in Chinese Society

Understanding different types of business organization in Chinese society provides a sound ground for us to explore the question: what is the objective for Chinese business organization to use various means to establish *guanxi*?

Lovett et al. (1999) suggest that *guanxi* refers to a Chinese system of doing business on the basis of personal relationships, and it represents the way that business is done throughout much of the non-Western world. Eastern and Western business practices may already be converging toward systems aimed at developing more complete models of trust to deal with the conditions of uncertainty that form our new economic reality.

Their arguments are correct. But, what are the more complete models of trust? In order to illustrate the specific features of interpersonal trust in Chinese society, Wang et al. (2006) classified trust strategies used in relation to different social targets in Chinese society into five prototypes: kinship trust, emergent trust, customary trust, professional trust, and institutional trust (as listed in Table 11.2). The applications and features of each type of trust are described as follows:

Kinship Trust

Kinship trust is established on the nonsubstitutability of kin relationships. Parent-child relationships in Chinese society endure eternally from birth to after-death. The perception of risk is neglected or even ignored within kinship. People sharing these relations take ethics and filial piety as norms for social interaction. They believe their parents and deliberately neglect risks even though knowing the potential danger clearly.

Emergent Trust

The term “emergent property” is adopted from Blau’s (1986) social exchange theory. Because both parties in the exchange are interdependent on one another and a stable relationship is maintained, properties such as mutual trust and promise may emerge between them. This kind of trust is constructed on the personal characteristics (including styles of doing things, morality, conduct, etc.) of the dyad over the course of a long-term interaction. It is thus called *emergent trust*. Close friends and lovers are just two examples. Their mutual trust is derived from a sense of belonging and affection. The trust can endure as long as they understand each other, do favors for each other, or share values with each other. They may even agree to make formal promises, so as to turn emergent trust into institutional trust.

It takes time to cultivate affective relationships. Due to the particularity of interpersonal affection, once emergent trust is produced, it has only partial substitutability. This can make the truster judge risk in a subjective way. The strength of obligation and their mutual expectations depend on the closeness of the dyad. In most cases, it is stronger than other types of trust that are not based in affection.

Table 11.2 Domains and features of five prototypes of trust

Trust strategy	Inside <i>guanxi</i> network			Outside <i>guanxi</i> network		
	Kinship trust	Emergent trust	Customary trust	Professional trust	Institutional trust	
Domains Basis	Kinship	Affection	Custom	Knowledge/ability	Interest/threat	
Mind mechanism	Guanxi	Belongingness/identity	Historical preexisting	Technical logic	Calculation	
Form	Life community	Promise	Public praise/experience	License	Contract/law	
Enduring	Prescribed ability	Reciprocation	Practice	Dialectic/analysis	Legalization/ethics	
Risk	Neglected	Judged subjectively	Judged mystically	Predictability	Relative objectivity	
<i>Features</i>						
Obligation or expectation	Strong	Strong/mediate	Mediate	Weak	Weak	
Substitutability	No	Part	Optional	Optional	Optional	
Duration	Constant	Long	Accumulated	Flexible	Changing	

Customary Trust

Customary trust and professional trust are based, respectively, on traditional social customs and modern knowledge. The differences between them can be interpreted in terms of the contrast between knowledge of the lifeworld and the scientific micro-world as described in Chap. 2 of this book.

Customary trust is rooted in primitive lifeworld. In order to explain their daily experiences, people often acquire substantial amount of knowledge from folklore, customs, and cultural legacy. This content is enriched by ordinary people's direct life experiences.

Customs are formed in the historical processes within a culture. They constitute the historical a priori episteme as named by Foucault (1970). The mode of being within the lifeworld defines what people perceive and regard as true in terms of ordinary sayings. It thus becomes a historical a priori conceptual framework as a suprastructure of the mind. Trust in this kind of episteme may be sustained through constant practices in folk society, but they can hardly be validated by scientific methods.

Customs are neither concrete nor absolute. Ordinary people of various cultural groups may have different sayings and interpretations. The risk and substitutability of customary trust are mystical, and cannot be calculated using logical reasoning or probability. There is no way to predict which custom one may accord with, or whether an individual in modern society will follow a custom or not.

Professional Trust

The basis for professional trust is the trustee's professional knowledge and competence. If he can resolve the truster's problem or crisis, the latter will have professional trust in the former.

Professional knowledge is the key to professional trust. Academic knowledge had been constructed by scientists and scholars in various fields as they have tried to understand, control, or predict lifeworld phenomena. In order to attain their goals, they use technical thought to engage in analysis and dialectic, they construct knowledge using academic language, and they enhance their efficacy to explain or to solve problems.

Professional trust in doctors, lawyers, or accountants is based on their professional competence, technique, and knowledge. Licenses issued by professional organizations also provide a basis for trust. Therefore, license issuing procedures are a necessary external form for professional trust. A truster may choose his trustee in accordance with his need. The less the truster feels obligated to the trustee, the more substitutable the trustee is.

Theories cited by reliable trustees are usually derived from mainstream academic thought, and they can estimate and control risk more precisely.

Institutional Trust

Institutional trust is based on the truster's calculation for maximum self-interest. It enables the truster to interact with nonspecific targets outside of his or her *guanxi* network, following written (e.g., laws) or unwritten (e.g., social norms and common values) rules. It is established on the basis of mutual benefit or detriment. Institutionalization leads the truster to expect that the trustee will follow the rules of the game (Hagen and Choe 1998; Nooteboom 1997; Rousseau et al. 1998). It reduces risks by providing written and unwritten rules, allowing the truster to believe that he can benefit by objectively understanding institutional situations.

The endurance of institutional trust depends on whether or not there is a legitimating process such as a public discussion on the basis of social ethics and values. Ethics and values are the common bond used by the public. For example, honesty in business, carrying out election promises, etc., are a necessary basis for cooperation between trusters and trustees allowing them to assume strangers are trustworthy without the luxury of evidence or facts (Uslaner 2002). Institutions are adaptable and changeable across time, and can be adjusted along with public opinion or reforms. Their external forms are norms of regulation, including written contracts and oral promises.

Guanxi Practices Between Organizations

The business type (Table 11.1) and social trust (Table 11.2) classifications provide a basis for us to explain the *guanxi* practices between organizations on an institutional level. We can consider a competitive or oligopolistic market environment first.

Any business organization needs various resources for its normal operation. When a certain resource is supplied by many firms in a competitive market, a manager can acquire resources by fair trading without utilizing *guanxi*. On the contrary, when a certain resource is controlled by a few suppliers or even monopolized by a single organization, a manager needs to utilize his *guanxi*.

This principle can be applied to any person's interaction with an organization. For example, after the economic reform in China, all sorts of different enterprises appeared. Competent technical college students can easily get a job, so they do not feel *guanxi* is as important in job seeking. However, incompetent students from disadvantageous educational backgrounds may think that relying on *guanxi* is very important for job seeking (Bian 1997, 1999).

Striving for Scarce Resource

It should be emphasized that organizations constantly need to obtain some important resources for their normal operations. Under these conditions, organizations must establish stable and long-term relationship with other organizations

that can provide the resources in question. In order to study the social foundation and organizational principle of Chinese businesses, Kiong and Kee (1998) conducted fieldwork in Singapore and Malaysia, focusing in particular on the inclination to incorporate personal relationships in decision making. They concluded that there are three key aspects of Chinese's preference for personalism, namely: personal control, personal *guanxi*, and interpersonal trust, or the so-called *xinyong*. In Chinese firms, economic decisions are not based solely on market considerations. Rather, they are embedded in the context of larger social relations and institutional forces which shape, reinforce, and challenge a set of behaviors or organizational structures. Personal control is affected largely by depending on people whom one personally trusts as this reduces risks and affords better business control.

Wang (2007) indicated that the operating mechanism of Chinese *guanxi* differs from that of Western "relationship marketing." *Guanxi* means personal and particular relationships, while relationship marketing means how a firm develops good connections with general customers so that people can trust it. The establishment and maintenance of *guanxi* is aimed at increasing personal *xinyong*, and favor mechanisms are the guiding rule as well as the mediator of increasing *xinyong* and long-term orientation.

Viewed from this chapter's theoretical models, when a corporation manager wants to initiate lending and trade relations, he has to reduce environmental uncertainty by maintaining a long-term and stable relationship with a particular organization. According to Table 11.2, if that organization has clear rules for cooperating with other firms, the manager as a truster, may have institutional trust in it. On the contrary, if there are no clear rules of cooperation, the manager needs to seek and establish *guanxi* through favor mechanisms so that the two organizations may cultivate emergent trust, that is, *xinyong* in Chinese terminology.

Utilization of Interpersonal Strategies

Viewed from the Face and Favor theoretical model, it is not easy to produce emergent trust and to maintain long-term cooperation with a party who shares instrumental ties from another organization. Zhu et al. (2007) collected and analyzed real cases of negotiation in Chinese and Australian cultures. They found that the success of initial meetings is a key factor in determining the success or failure of business negotiations; especially for Chinese, who tend to develop relationships or *guanxi* before the actual negotiations take place.

However, not everyone is able, or dares to use strategies to cultivate *guanxi*. Leung and Wong (2001) developed a 17-item scale to measure attitudes toward the utilization of *guanxi* and surveyed 164 negotiators who worked in Sino-Hong Kong businesses. The results of factor analysis revealed four factors: *Opportunism* measures a participant's willingness to rely on *guanxi* to look for business opportunities

in China. *Dynamism* represents one's belief that *guanxi* may provide dynamics for business in the Chinese market, and reciprocity is the dynamic for *guanxi* practices. *Business interaction* means one's preference to deal with business transactions by marketing rules. *Protectionism* notes the potential danger accompanying the benefits of *guanxi*, and emphasizes the necessity of taking some precautionary measures to protect oneself.

Cluster analysis was performed on the basis of participants' scores on these four factors. Results of cluster analysis classified the participants into three clusters:

1. *Preserver*. A preserver spends time in establishing his *guanxi* network in China but is relatively inactive in seeking opportunities for doing business. He puts a protective measure around himself that may install a larger psychological distance between his Chinese counterparts and himself. Because his Chinese counterparts need to spend a lot of time in understanding his business intentions, this type of character may cause his counterpart to perceive him as an outsider and the perceived transaction cost, at least from a psychological perspective, will be very high. As a result, the business transaction may not happen.
2. *Braver*. A braver expends considerable effort in activating *guanxi* dynamics and in establishing business interactions with his Chinese counterparts. He is anxious in looking for business opportunities. However, he might be too brave and neglect the legal aspects of business transactions, which should be viewed as necessary protective measures for both parties. As a result, his Chinese counterparts may be willing to establish *guanxi*, but may be conservative in establishing a long-term relationship with him, because the psychological transaction cost is perceived as too high.
3. *Wiser*. The wiser is an all-rounder in seeking business opportunities, initiating business dynamics, facilitating business transactions, and establishing protective mechanisms. He can be easily accepted as an old friend by his Chinese counterparts because of the smaller psychological distance between them, and the psychology transaction cost is thus perceived as relatively small. Business deals become easy and smooth in such a friendly atmosphere.

The most important factor revealed in this research is the *protectionism* which distinguished the wiser from the other two groups. Peng (2001) studied the strategies used to create or increase interpersonal trust in Chinese society and relations among those strategies. First, a sample of 109 participants aged from 16 to 63 years old, was presented with scenarios of isolated exchange or business cooperation, and asked to report the strategies they would use to enhance the trustworthiness of the target person. Next, a sample of 185 participants aged from 17 to 65 years old was asked to fill out a questionnaire evaluating the trust enhancement strategies in terms of necessity, popularity, effectiveness, and likelihood of being adopted. The results revealed that people pay more attention to affect-enhancing strategies of *guanxi* network management in long-term interpersonal cooperations than in one-shot exchanges; and a legal approach in conjunction with *guanxi* management can be used to enhance interpersonal trust.

Negative Connotations of Guanxi Practices

For any firm of business, establishing long-term *guanxi* with a particular institution or organization through the operation of *renqing* mechanisms may not have negative implications. Nevertheless, there is a kind of *guanxi* practice with negative connotations which should be elaborated on in terms of the other two dimensions in Table 11.1.

In Table 11.1, the power of management and ownership are combined in patrilineal private businesses. Their managers are usually the business-owners. He may adopt an authoritarian decision-making style on the basis of his self-interest, which should be viewed as rational. By the same token, a professional business manager in a monopolistic or despotic market tends to make decisions under the supervision of a board of directors. They may decide to establish long-term cooperative relationships with other organizations through the aforementioned *renqing* mechanisms, such practices also have no unethical implications.

However, in paternalistic state-owned businesses, or in patriarchal county and township enterprises, the manager has the power to manage important resources but does not own them. When he is allowed to make authoritarian decisions without any supervision, he may allocate the valuable resources under his control to a particular petitioner in return acquiring benefits for his own self-interest.

Information Asymmetry

Following economic reform, many small-scale entrepreneurs in China's emerging private economy need to seek trading opportunities with state firms. They may feel it necessary to cultivate *guanxi* with powerful state actors (Wank 1998; Hsing 1998). In this circumstance, private business managers play the role of petitioner, while managers of state-owned businesses are resource allocators. For instance, Xin and Pearce (1996) argued that – in a society with under-developed legal supportive system – managers of private businesses have a stronger necessity to cultivate personal *guanxi* than those from state-owned businesses. They interviewed managers from 15 state-owned businesses, 8 joint state and private ownership businesses, and 9 private businesses. Their results indicated that, compared with other types of businesses, private business managers tend to report that entrepreneurial relationships are more important to them, they have more governmental relationships, more trust in their relationships, are more reliant on *guanxi* for protection, and send out more gifts without immediate repayment.

A caution should be added about the social desirability effect of research on this topic. Because of the negative connotations implied in the term *gao guanxi* (doing *guanxi*), the information provided by petitioners and resource allocators may be asymmetric (Guthrie 2002). The petitioner argues that he has to rely on *guanxi* to secure a particular resource, but, managers of large state firms may believe that they are less influenced by *guanxi* and more scrupulous in separating public from private while dealing with public affairs (Guthrie 1998).

Furthermore, the same individual may have different opinions about the necessity of utilizing *guanxi* to acquire a particular resource in different social contexts. For instance, managers of enterprises are usually willing to admit that *guanxi* is important in cultivation of dependent lending and trade relations for reducing environmental uncertainty. However, they acknowledge that – for the greater good of the business – they have to avoid dependent economic relations with those whom they are socially connected to (Keister 2002).

Guanxi Practice Within Organizations

As I mentioned before, though the same *renqing* rules might be applied to strengthen *guanxi* within and between organizations, their targets, and goals are different. Here, I would like first to cite a conceptual framework to illustrate the specific features of the organizational culture of typical Chinese enterprises.

The Structural Links of Three Cultures in Chinese Family Business

Table 11.1 analyzed various types of business organizations in Chinese society from a sociological perspective. Generally speaking, a business may follow a certain type of organization: most private enterprises in Chinese society belong to the patrilineal type. However, under the influence of Confucian relationalism, when a private enterprise grows and becomes a large-scale business, its organizational style may become much more complicated (Hwang 1990). Owners of large-scale family businesses in Taiwan tend to adopt a differential management strategy and to manipulate their employees by judging their loyalty, competence, and the intimacy between them. As a consequence, several systems of owner–employee relationships may coexist in the company at the same time (Cheng 1995). Cheng and Lin (1998) indicate that business owners tend to choose family members and a few highly trusted insiders to occupy top level ownership and decision-making positions (see Fig. 11.1). The middle management team is also composed of a group of insiders appointed by the owner. In view of a member’s relationship with the owner, the organization may consist of three types of culture, namely, affection-oriented familial culture, the *renqing*-oriented hierarchical culture, and the instrument-oriented institutional culture.

Familial culture tends to overlap at the ownership and decision-making levels, the hierarchical culture overlaps at decision-making and management levels, while the institutional culture overlaps at management and execution levels thus constituting a structural link between three cultures (Cheng and Lin 1998).




Fig. 11.1 The structural link of three cultures in large-scale Chinese family business

W. Y. Cheng (2003) considered familial culture a manifestation of patriarchalism. Hierarchical culture is a manifestation of patriarchalism and paternalism, it implies that the owner/manager tends to interact with mixed-tie subordinates in terms of *renqing* rule in the Face and Favor model (Hwang 1987). Institutional culture insists on following rules and regulations without any consideration of owner/manager’s particularistic relationship with those involved in the affair, which is a consequence of the owner’s interactions in accordance with the *equity rule* with those he has instrumental ties with. Because a business owner has to consider not only his relationship with employees, but also employee competence, though the operation of large-scale family business may be influenced by familial culture, the *need rule* in that model cannot be applied without any modification.

The conceptual framework proposed by Cheng and Lin (1998) clarifies the relationships between the employer–labor systems and the familial inheritance systems constructed by cultural anthropologists. The patrilineal system is applicable only to employees who are descendants of the owner. Other employees may belong to other systems depending on the intimacy of their relationship with the owner. Ordinary labor may be hired from despotic or monopolistic markets based on the enterprise’s situation in the competitive market. Therefore, large-scale Chinese family businesses tend to manifest a specific organizational feature that is a hybrid of Eastern and Western culture.

It should be emphasized that the “relational targets” and “interactional rules” in Fig. 11.1 are depicted from the business owner perspective. Viewed from the perspectives of employees at other (management or executive) levels, anyone of the members within the organization may follow the *renqing* rule to cultivate long-term relationships with others. In fact, this is a universal phenomenon which can be found everywhere. Let us take employee hiring decisions as an example. Sue-Chan and Dasborough (2006) conducted cross-cultural research in Hong Kong and Australia. They found that friendship-based particularistic ties, specifically *guanxi* and mate-ship, can influence hiring decisions in both relation-based (Hong Kong) and rule-based (Australia) cultural contexts.

Trust Based on Affection

In other words, business organizations are likely to hire reliable employees through friendship-based particularistic ties in expectation of establishing long-term and stable relations with their coworkers-to-be. But, what kind of subordinates can earn the trust of his supervisors? Hu (2007) used a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ within-subjects design experiment to study the effects of *guanxi*, loyalty, and competence, the three key criteria for employee categorization. The experiment examined the trust attitudes of 217 Taiwanese and 132 American corporate managers. The results revealed that U.S. supervisors displayed cognition-based trust toward their subordinates, which is primarily based on each subordinate's level of competence and reliability; whereas Taiwanese supervisors displayed affect-based trust, based on the closeness of their relationship with the subordinate.

Viewed from the perspective of social trust in Chinese society (see Section "Types of Business Organization in Chinese Society"), cognition-based trust is equivalent to professional trust, and affect-based trust is the same as emergent trust. Cross-cultural research usually makes salient contrasts between cultures. At first glance, it seems that Chinese managers emphasize the emergent trust derived from *guanxi* practices more than American managers do. Wong et al. (2003) defined *guanxi* as the general quality of relationship between two people that determines the appropriate set of behaviors and activities they engage in. Based on this definition, they designed a 20-item multidimensional scale to measure *guanxi*, including the dimensions of social activities, financial assistance, giving priority to that person, celebrating special events, and mutual emotional support. They attempted to provide an operational definition as well as a measurement of the *guanxi* practices within Chinese organizations. Their research demonstrated its usefulness in predicting satisfaction with supervisors, and indirectly, organizational commitment.

Triple Model of Leadership

Nevertheless, it should be noted that while Chinese emphasize the affection component in vertical relationships between supervisor and subordinate, this does not imply that they neglect other aspects of their relationships. The triple model of leadership proposed by Cheng (1995) argues that Chinese supervisors tend to classify their subordinates in terms of their affective exchange, loyalty, and competence, and treat them accordingly. In one of their research projects, Cheng et al. (2002), examined the relative effects of these three variables on managerial behavior and the quality of dyadic relationships by investigating 173 leader-subordinate dyads from 6 manufacturing firms in Taiwan. Results showed that *guanxi*, loyalty, and competence were related to several outcome variables such as the supervisor's dyadic relationship managerial quality and the subordinates' satisfaction with supervision and job. In addition, their results showed that loyalty has a more significant and direct effect on most of the outcome variables than *guanxi* and competence.

Loyalty is a subordinate's attitudes, behaviors, and affection toward his supervisor, that may earn his supervisor's trust in him (Hwang 1999). Research findings indicated that, in addition to relationships with their subordinates, Chinese managers also emphasize the professional competence of their subordinates. All of these aspects are related to their reward allocation behaviors. Using a vignette approach of a four-factor within subject design, Hu et al. (2004) examined the effects of *guanxi*, loyalty, and competence, as well as their interactions with (private or public) allocation context. Results showed that subordinates who had a close relationship with the allocator, high loyalty, or high competence were rewarded more. Significant two-way interaction effects indicated that *guanxi*, loyalty, and competence interactively affected Chinese managers' reward allocation decisions.

However, the practice of *guanxi* should not violate procedural justice in which the supervisor allocates rewards to his subordinates. Chen et al. (2004) examined the effect of *guanxi* practices in human resources management on employees' trust in management in Chinese organizations from the perspective of procedural justice. Their first survey showed a negative effect of *guanxi* practices on trust in management, which was mediated by perceived procedural justice. In other words, the subordinates lower their trust in supervisors if they feel the manager's *guanxi* practices violate procedural justice. Their second empirical research project showed that the negative effect of *guanxi* practices varied as a function of *guanxi* bases: favoring a nephew or a hometown fellow lowered trust, but favoring a college schoolmate or a close friend did not. Perhaps these two *guanxi* bases imply different contributions toward the organization: a college schoolmate and a close friend may be helpful for achieving organizational goals, whereas a relative and a hometown fellow may get rewards for their *guanxi* at the cost of distributive justice.

Cooperative Goals and Participative Leadership

Viewed from the perspective of social trust proposed in Section "Types of Business Organization in Chinese Society," subordinate's work competence can enhance his supervisor's professional trust in him. In other words, though Chinese managers understand that *guanxi* is a lubricant for business activities, they emphasize the cultivation of affective ties within organization, but their first concern is how to achieve organizational goals by *guanxi*. Ramasamy et al. (2006) examined the relationship between interfirm knowledge transfers and three factors: trust, communication, and relationship commitment. Results of regression analysis indicated that trust and communication are the two main channels of knowledge transfer, while the purpose of knowledge transfer is to solve work problems so as to achieve organizational goals.

Viewed from this perspective, the Chinese *guanxi* system does not completely contradict Western leader-member exchange (LMX) theory. Hui and Graen (1997) investigated career-based leadership relationships in Western organizations as well as the family-based leadership relationships which are supported by Confucianism.

They suggested that these two components can be synthesized to create a third organizational culture of success in contemporary China.

Chen and Tjosvold (2006) surveyed 163 Chinese employees from various industries in mainland China about their relationships and the effectiveness of their participation with American and Chinese managers. Their results showed that cooperative, but not competitive or independent, goals helped Chinese employees and their foreign and Chinese managers to strengthen the quality of their relationships as measured by supervisor–subordinate *guanxi* and leader–membership exchange. Quality of relationships in turn enhanced effective participative leadership as measured by the opportunity for joint decision-making and the open-minded discussion of opposing views. They proposed that both the Chinese value of *guanxi* and cooperative goals may be important for overcoming obstacles and developing participative leadership within and across cultural boundaries.

Attaining cooperative goals via participative leadership means that work team members and their abilities are complementary with one another and they perform their tasks with maximum efficiency. Chou et al. (2006) examined 33 teams with a total of 206 team members (excluding team leaders) to explore the effects of intra-team *guanxi* and trust networks on individual effectiveness in Taiwan. *Guanxi* networks included nonjob, departmental, and past team networks, while trust networks included affective and cognitive trust networks. Results showed that *guanxi* networks could better explain members' effectiveness compared with relational demography, and different *guanxi* networks had different effects. The more central an individual's position was in the cognitive trust network, the higher the individual's effectiveness. The past team *guanxi* network of a team member displayed a positive effect on the centrality of cognitive trust network, while nonjob and departmental *guanxi* networks showed negative effects.

Viewed from the five prototypes of social trust presented in Section "Strategies of Trust in Chinese Society," occupying an important position in "cognitive trust network" means that one's work performance wins other teammates' professional trust so that he is able to occupy that position in his work team. As I have mentioned in previous research, it is an individual's *guanxi* network based on his past performance, rather than his irrelevant-to-work *guanxi* or departmental *guanxi* network, that decides one's position in his work team. In other words, although the favor and *guanxi* tradition are preserved in Chinese organizations, the organizations are quite work or ability oriented.

Conclusion

In his book *Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth*, Laudan (1977) argued that one of the main functions of scientific theory is to provide appropriate answers to problems. He classified scientific problems into two categories: theoretical problems and empirical problems. Generally speaking, any phenomenon which one feel is strange and in need of explanation can be viewed as

an empirical problem. We can say that an empirical problem is solved once an approximate statement of the problem can be derived from those theories. So, answers to empirical problems are construed by theories.

Since the publication of the Face and Favor model (Hwang 1987), many organizational or management psychologists have conducted empirical research on *guanxi* practices in Chinese society. Because the Face and Favor model focuses on Chinese dyad interactions from a social psychological perspective, it is not comprehensive enough to understand *guanxi* practices within and between organizations. Therefore, this chapter proposes a series of frameworks for types of business organizations, social trust, and leadership in Chinese society. By reviewing related previous research, we try to provide not only better explanations for *guanxi* practices within and between organizations, but also find solutions for empirical problems in this field using the theoretical breakthrough. We will make similar efforts in the next chapter.

References

- Ackers, P. (1998). On paternalism: Seven observations on the uses and abuses of the concept in industrial relations, past and present. *Historical Studies in Industrial Relations*, 5, 179–193.
- Baran, P. A., & Sweezy, P. M. (1966). *Monopoly capital*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bian, Y. (1997). Bringing strong ties back in: Indirect ties, network bridges, and job searches in China. *Am Sociol Rev*, 62, 366–385.
- Bian, Y. (1999). Getting a job through a web of *guanxi* in China. In W. Barry (Ed.), *Networks in the global village* (pp. 225–253). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bian, Y. (2002). Institutional holes and job mobility processes: *Guanxi* mechanisms in China's emergent labor markets. In T. Thomas, G. Doug, & D. Wank (Eds.), *Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and the changing nature of guanxi* (pp. 117–136). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Blau, P. M. (1986). *Exchange and power in social life*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Burawoy, M. (1985). *The politics of production: Factory regimes under capitalism and socialism*. London: Verso.
- Chen, J. X. (1994). *Inter-organizational cooperative network and life structure: Socio-economic analysis of medium and small scale business in Taiwan*. Taipei: Lian-Jing.
- Chen, C. C., Chen, Y. R., & Xin, K. (2004). *Guanxi* practices and trust in management: A procedural justice perspective. *Organization Science*, 15, 200–209.
- Chen, C. N., & Chiu, S. R. (1984). Basic patterns of business organization and traditional family system: A comparative study of Chinese, Japanese and Western societies. In K. S. Yang, K. K. Hwang, & J. R. Chuang (Eds.), *Chinese management (in Chinese)* (pp. 459–484). Taipei: China Time.
- Chen, Y. F., & Tjosvold, D. (2006). Participative leadership by American and Chinese managers in China: The role of relationships. *Journal of Management Studies*, 43, 1727–1752.
- Cheng, B. S. (1995). Hierarchical order and Chinese organizational behavior (in Chinese). *Indigenous psychological research*, 3, 142–219.
- Cheng, W. Y. (2003). Traditional solidarity, market and the specialties and generalities of the employer-employee relations in the East Asian firms (in Chinese). *Bulletin of Labour Research*, 13, 1–37.
- Cheng, B. S., Farh, J. L., Chang, H. F., & Hsu, W. L. (2002). *Guanxi*, zhongcheng, competence and managerial behavior in the Chinese context. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 44, 151–166.

- Cheng, B. S., & Lin, C. W. (1998). Differential Model of the Association and Chinese organizational behavior: An Exploratory Study of Taiwan Large-Scale Enterprise (in Chinese). *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica*, 86, 29–72.
- Chou, L. F., Cheng, B. S., Huang, M. P., & Cheng, H. Y. (2006). Guanxi networks and members' effectiveness in Chinese work teams: Mediating effects of trust networks. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 9, 79–95.
- Chow, I. H. S., & Ng, I. (2004). The characteristics of Chinese personal ties (*Guanxi*): Evidence from Hong Kong. *Organization Studies*, 25, 1075–1093.
- Deyo, F. C. (1989). *Beneath the miracle: Labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Edwards, R. (1979). *Contested terrain: The transformation of workplace in the twentieth century*. New York: Basic Books.
- Farh, J. L., Tsui, A. S., Xin, K., & Cheng, B. S. (1998). The influence of relational demography and *guanxi*: The Chinese case. *Organization Science*, 9, 471–488.
- Foucault, M. (1970). *The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences* (A. Sheridan-Smith, Trans.). New York: Random House.
- Gold, T., Guthrie, D., & Wank, D. (2002). An introduction to the study of *guanxi*. In T. Thomas, G. Doug, & D. Wank (Eds.), *Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and the changing nature of guanxi* (pp. 3–20). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Greenhalgh, L. Lawrence, A. T. & Sutton, R. (1988). Determinants of work force reduction strategies in declining organizations. *The Academy of Management Review*, 13(2), 241–254.
- Guthrie, D. (1998). The declining significance of *guanxi* in China's economic transition. *The China Quarterly*, 154, 254–282.
- Guthrie, D. (1999). *Dragon in a three-piece suit: The emergence of capitalism in China*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Guthrie, D. (2002). Information asymmetries and the problem of perception: The significance of structural position in assessing the importance of *guanxi* in China. In T. Thomas, G. Doug, & D. Wank (Eds.), *Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and the changing nature of guanxi* (pp. 37–56). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagen, J. M., & Choe, S. (1998). Trust in Japanese interfirm relations: Institutional sanctions matter. *Acad Manage Rev*, 23, 589–600.
- Hamilton, G. G. (1996a). Organization and market processes in Taiwan's capitalist economy. *American Journal of Sociology*, 96, 999–1006. Also in Orru, Baggart & Hamilton (Eds.) (1997), 237–293.
- Hamilton, G. G. (1996b). The theoretical significance of Asian business networks. In G. G. Hamilton (Ed.), *Asian business networks* (pp. 283–298). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Hamilton, G. G. & Biggart, N. W. (1998). Market, culture, and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the Far East. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 94, S52–S94.
- Hsieh, G. H. (1989). From labourer to boss: Social mobility in manufacturing industry of Taiwan. *Quarterly of Social Research in Taiwan*, 2(2), 11–54.
- Hsing, Y. T. (1998). *Making capitalism in China: The Taiwan connection*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hu, H. H. (2007). A comparative study of effects of Taiwan-United States employee categorization on supervisor trust. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 35, 229–242.
- Hu, H. H., Hsu, W. L., & Cheng, B. S. (2004). Reward allocation decisions of Chinese managers: Influence of employee categorization and allocation context. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 7, 221–232.
- Hui, C., & Graen, G. (1997). *Guanxi* and professional leadership in contemporary Sino-American joint ventures in mainland China. *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, 451–465.
- Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and favor: The Chinese power game. *Am J Sociol*, 92, 944–974.
- Hwang, K. K. (1990). Modernization of the Chinese family business. *International Journal of Psychology*, 25(5, 6), 593–618. Also in H. S. R. Kao, D. Sinha, S.-H. Ng (Eds.), (1995). *Effective Organizations and Social Values* (pp. 37–62). New Delhi: Sage Publications.

- Hwang, K. K. (1999). Filial piety and loyalty: Two types of social identification in Confucianism. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 163–183.
- Hwang, K. K., Cheng, W. Y., & Lee, Y. T. (2007). Confucian relation and Chinese organizational culture. In Y. T. Lee, V. Calvez, & A. M. Guénette (Eds.), *La Compétence culturelle: S'équipe pour les défis du management international* (pp. 141–158). Paris: L'Harmattan.
- King, A. Y. C. (1985). The individual and group in Confucianism: A relational perspective. In J. M. A. A. Donald (Ed.), *Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values* (pp. 57–70). MI: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan.
- Kiong, T. C., & Kee, Y. P. (1998). *Guanxi* bases, Xinyong and Chinese business networks. *Br J Sociol*, 49, 75–96.
- Kipnis, A. (2002). Practices of *guanxi* production and practices of *ganqing* avoidance. In T. Thomas, G. Doug, & D. Wank (Eds.), *Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and the changing nature of guanxi* (pp. 21–36). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ko, C. M. (1993). *The establishment, management and organization of small-scale manufacturing industry in urban Taiwan: A case of ready-made clothes (in Chinese)*. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Lau, K. H., Tung, A. W., Lv, X. W., & Yi, J. (2005). The conceptualization of Chinese *guanxi* of Hong Kong university students by using multi-dimensional scaling: An empirical approach. *Acta Psychologica Sinica*, 37, 122–125.
- Laudan, L. (1977). *Progress and its problems: Toward a theory of scientific growth*. New Dehli: Ambika Publications.
- Leung, T. K. P., & Wong, Y. H. (2001). The ethics and positioning of *guanxi* in China. *Marketing Intelligence and Planning*, 19, 55–64.
- Li, P. L., Jiang, X. X., & Zhang, Q. Z. (1992). *Transition of Chinese state-enterprises*. Jinan: Shangdong Press.
- Lin, Y. M. (2002). Beyond dyadic social exchange: *Guanxi* and third-party effects. In T. Thomas, G. Doug, & D. Wank (Eds.), *Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and the changing nature of guanxi* (pp. 57–76). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lo, K. D. (2007). An empirical investigation of emic differences between American networking and Chinese *guanxi* and a process model of building relationships for cross-cultural business interactions. *Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Science*, 68, 2049.
- Lovett, S., Simmons, L. C., & Kali, R. (1999). *Guanxi* versus the market: Ethics and efficiency. *Journal of international Business Studies*, 30, 231–247.
- Nooteboom, B. H. (1997). Effects of trust and governance on relational risk. *Acad Manage Rev*, 40, 308–338.
- Oi, J. (1989). *State and peasant in contemporary China: The political economy of village government*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Orru, M., Biggart, N. W., & Hamilton, G. G. (Eds.). (1997). *The economic organization of East Asian capitalism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Peng, S. Q. (2001). *Guanxi*-management and legal approaches to establish and enhance interpersonal trust. *Journal of Psychology in Chinese Societies*, 2, 51–76.
- Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational demography. In L. L. Cummings & B. N. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (Vol. 5, pp. 299–357). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
- Potter, P. B. (1992). *The economic contract law of China: Legitimation and contract autonomy in the PRC*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
- Potter, P. B. (1999). The Chinese legal system: Continuing commitment to the primacy of state power. *The China Quarterly*, 159, 673–683.
- Pye, L. W. (1968). *The spirit of Chinese politics: A psychocultural study of the authority crisis in political development*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Ramasamy, B., Goh, K. W., & Yeung, M. C. H. (2006). Is *guanxi* (relationship) a bridge to knowledge transfer? *Journal of Business Research*, 59, 130–139.
- Redding, S. G. (1990). *The spirit of Chinese capitalism*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

- Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, S. R., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *Acad Manage Rev*, 23, 393–404.
- Silin, H. R. (1976). *Leadership and values: the organization of large-scale Taiwanese enterprises*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Solomon, R. H. (1971). *Mao's revolution and Chinese political culture*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Standifird, S. S. (2006). Using *guanxi* to establish corporate reputation in China. *Corporate Reputation Review*, 9, 171–178.
- Sue-Chan, C., & Dasborough, M. T. (2006). The influence of relation-based and rule-based regulations on hiring decisions in the Australian and Hong Kong Chinese cultural contexts. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 17, 1267–1292.
- Tsui, A. S., Egan, T. D., & Xin, K. R. (1995). Diversity in organizations: Lessons from demography research. In M. M. Chemers, S. Oskamp, & M. A. Costanzo (Eds.), *Diversity in organizations: New perspectives for a changing workplace* (pp. 191–219). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Tsui, A. S., & Farh, J. L. L. (1997). Where *guanxi* matters: Relational demography and *guanxi* in the Chinese context. *Work and Occupations*, 24, 56–79.
- Tu, W. M. (1981). Neo Confucian religiosity and human relatedness. In G. de Vos & S. Takao (Eds.), *Religion and the family in East Asia* (pp. 111–124). Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Tung, R. L., & Worm, V. (2001). Network capitalism: The role of human resources in penetrating the China market. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 12, 517–534.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vogel, E. (1989). *One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Walder, A. G. (1986). *Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese industry*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wang, C. L. (2007). *Guanxi* vs. relationship marketing: Exploring underlying differences. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 36, 81–86.
- Wang, Y. W., Chen, L. C., & Hwang, K. K. (2006). The strategies of trust in Chinese society. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 25, 199–242.
- Wank, D. L. (1999). *Commodifying communism: Business, trust, and politics in a Chinese city*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society* (G. Roth & C. Wittich, Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wong, C. S., Tinsley, C., Law, K. S., & Mobley, W. H. (2003). Development and validation of a multidimensional measure of *Guanxi*. *Journal of Psychology in Chinese Societies*, 4, 43–69.
- Wood, E., Whiteley, A., & Zhang, S. (2002). The cross model of *guanxi* usage in Chinese leadership. *Journal of Management Development*, 21, 263–271.
- Xin, K. R., & Pearce, J. L. (1996). *Guanxi*: Connections as substitutes for formal institutional support. *Acad Manage J*, 39, 1641–1658.
- Yang, M. M. H. (1994). *Gifts, favors, and banquets: The art of social relationships in China*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Yang, C. F. (1995, April 6–9). *Psychocultural foundations of informal groups: The issues of loyalty, sincerity, and trust*. Paper presented at the 47th Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Washington, DC.
- Yeung, I. Y. M., & Tung, R. L. (1996). Achieving business success in Confucian societies: The Importance of *Guanxi* (Connections). *Organ Dyn*, 25, 54–65.
- Zhu, Y. X., McKenna, B., & Sun, Z. (2007). Negotiating with Chinese: Success of initial meeting is the key. *Cross Cultural Management*, 14, 354–364.

Chapter 12

Chinese Models of Conflict Resolution

Abstract Findings of empirical researches in reference to several models of conflict resolution constructed by Western psychologists were reviewed to demonstrate the limitation of imposed etic approach, some indigenous models were also criticized for their emic approach of naïve positivism. Based on the premise of methodological relationalism, it argued that a theoretical framework for managing conflicts with vertical in-group, horizontal out-group, or horizontal in-group people should consider the following aspects: (1) harmony maintenance, (2) personal goal attainment, (3) coordination strategies, and (4) dominant responses.

When a subordinate is in conflict with his/her superior in a vertical relationship, s/he has to protect his/her superior's face for the sake of maintaining interpersonal harmony. In this case, the dominant response may be endurance. If s/he wants to express his/her opinion, s/he usually uses the strategy of indirect communication. If s/he intends to pursue his/her personal goal, s/he may do so privately.

The conflict management strategies one may utilize in a horizontal relationship depend on whether the other party is an in-group or out-group member. When an actor is in conflict with an in-group member, they may communicate directly. In order to maintain a harmonious relationship, they may "give face" to each other and reach a compromise. When one of them insists on attaining his/her personal goal in spite of the other's feelings, they may struggle amid confrontations until the issue is resolved. On the other hand, if both of them insist on attaining their personal goals, they may treat each other as out-group members and confront each other. Meanwhile, they may disregard interpersonal harmony and strive to protect their own face. In order to resolve the conflict, a third party may be invited to serve as a mediator, and the relationship may be severed as a consequence of their conflict.

When a superior insists on the attainment of his/her personal goal disregarding feelings of his/her subordinate in a vertical relationship, the subordinate may also oppose him/her in reaction, leading to the severance of their relationship.

Findings of empirical researches were cited to elaborate the major propositions of the aforementioned framework.

Keywords Vertical in-group • Horizontal out-group • Horizontal in-group • Harmony maintenance • Goal attainment • Coordination strategies • Dominant response • Endurance • Indirect communication • Giving face • Confrontation • Protecting face • Mediator • Severance

Using the Face and Favor model as a framework for analyzing the inner structure of Confucianism, I have constructed a series of theoretical models to illustrate the social exchange, moral judgment, achievement motivation, face dynamism, and *guanxi* practices in this book. All of these models are related to normal social actions in Confucian society. It should be noted that the Confucian emphasis on the value of interpersonal harmony does not imply the absence of interpersonal conflict in Confucian society. Therefore, this chapter is aimed to discuss the Chinese models of conflict resolution in the context of previous chapters on Confucian relations.

Section “Models of Conflict Resolution in Western Psychology” of this chapter critically reviews the models of conflict resolution constructed by Western psychologists and examines previous empirical research that has been done in reference to those models to demonstrate the limitation of this imposed etic approach. Section “Face Negotiation Theory” discusses the face negotiation theory proposed by Ting-Toomey (1981) while Section “Face Language in Chinese Society” proposes a critique of this theory from the language game about the idea of face prevailing in Chinese lifeworld. Section “Construction of Theoretical Models on Chinese Conflict Resolution” presents the basic ideas from which Hwang (1997–1998) constructed his Chinese models of conflict resolution. Sections “Construction of an Indigenous Theory of Conflict Resolution,” “Conflict Resolution Models within Vertical In-Group,” and “Conflict Resolution Models with Horizontal In-Group in Chinese Society” elaborate details of Hwang’s theory from the three aspects of vertical in-group, horizontal in-group, and horizontal out-group, respectively.

Models of Conflict Resolution in Western Psychology

Strategies for conflict resolution can be defined as the ways of managing interpersonal conflict in attempt to settle or eliminate them as disputes occur. Many psychologists have proposed theoretical models to classify those strategies from different perspectives (see Table 12.1). For example, Blake and Mouton (1964) first proposed their dual concerns theory and constructed a managerial grid, which was composed of two orthogonal dimensions – concern for people and concern for results. The former dimension signifies the actor that is most interested in maintaining a harmonious relationship with other people while the latter indicates the actor whose major concern is the result of conflict resolution in one’s own interest. Combinations of various alternatives along these two dimensions constitute five styles of conflict management: (1) forcing: high concern for the result but not for the person; (2) withdrawal: lack of concern for both the person and result; (3) smoothing:

Table 12.1 Classification of conflict resolution styles by Blake and Mouton, Hall, Thomas, and Rahim

Blake and Mouton (1964)	Hall (1969)	Thomas (1976)	Rahim (1986)
Forcing	Win–lose	Competing	Dominating
Withdrawing	Lose–leave	Avoiding	Avoiding
Smoothing	Yield–lose	Accommodating	Obliging
Confrontation	Synergistic	Collaborating	Integrating
Compromising	Compromise	Compromise	Compromising

high concern for the person but not for the result; (4) confrontation: high concern for both the result and person; (5) compromising: equal concern for both.

Dimensions for Classifying Conflict Resolution Styles

Other theorists constructed their models by the same logic. Using the two dimensions of concern for personal goal versus concern for relationship, Hall (1969) constructed his grid with five conflict styles: win–lose, lose–leave, yield–lose, synergistic, and compromise. Thomas’s (1976) two-dimensional grid was composed of desire for one’s own concerns (assertiveness) versus desire to satisfy others’ concerns (cooperativeness) with five styles of resolution: competing, avoiding, accommodating, collaborating, and compromise. Rahim (1986) also proposed two dimensions of insisting on satisfying one’s own needs versus others’ needs to create five conflict styles: dominating, avoiding, obliging, integrating, and compromising.

By attempting to classify the observed styles of conflict resolution along various dimensions, psychologists were trying to find the social reality behind the phenomena. It seems that the terms used to denote the two dimensions for classifying conflict styles were different depending on the theorist’s major concern when s/he was constructing his/her theoretical model. In fact, those two dimensions both imply a worldview of dichotomy between self and other. They can be integrated to denote one dimension of assertiveness (Thomas 1976), which represents an actor’s desire for self concern about the results (Blake and Mouton 1964) of pursuing personal goals (Hall 1969) to satisfy one’s needs (Rahim 1986), and another dimension of cooperativeness (Thomas 1976), which represents the actor’s desire to satisfy others’ needs (Rahim 1986) because of his concern for relationships (Hall 1969) with other people (Blake and Mouton 1964).

If the two dimensions proposed by those theorists are essentially the same with different terminology, then the styles of conflict resolution as described in each theoretical model can correspond with one another (see Fig. 12.1 and Table 12.1).

From the philosophical viewpoint of constructive realism (Wallner 1994), though these theories use different terminologies to denote the same phenomena, those terms can be used interchangeably. A list of terminology for describing the five styles of conflict resolution may help readers avoid the potential confusion in comprehensive studies of empirical research done in the context of different theories.




Fig. 12.1 Two Dimensional Model for Classifying Styles of Conflict Resolution by Blake & Mouton, Hall, Thomas, and Rahim

Empirical Research with Implanted Paradigm

Several instruments of measurement had been developed on the basis of those theories and implanted to study styles of conflict resolution in Chinese society. For example, Tinsley and Brett (2001) argued that each culture had its norms or standards of appropriate behavior for resolving conflict. These culturally based norms may explain cultural differences in conflict management outcomes. They asked 94 American and 120 Hong Kong Chinese business students to complete questionnaires for measuring cultural values and conflict management norms. Findings of their research indicated that American managers were more likely than Hong Kong Chinese managers to resolve a greater number of issues and reach more integrative outcomes while Hong Kong Chinese managers were more likely to involve higher management in conflict resolution. Culture had a significant effect on whether parties selected an integrative outcome rather than an outcome that involved distribution, compromise, higher management, or no resolution at all.

Leung and Lind (1986) asked 60 Chinese and 66 American undergraduates to indicate their preferences for using adversary and nonadversary procedures of dispute resolution. Participants were requested to read a dispute scenario and description of these two procedures, rate the preference for each procedure, give reasons for their rating, and complete rating scales assessing their perceptions of each procedure on several dimensions. Results showed that American participants in general preferred the adversary procedure, and Chinese participants were in general indifferent about these two procedures. Chinese participants perceived the adversary

procedure as desirable for the potential for more control over the process. However, the confrontation and competitiveness inherent in this procedure might have mitigated their preference for it.

In addition to cross-cultural research, findings on intracultural research also drew similar conclusion. Ma (2007) investigated the Chinese conflict management styles and their impact on negotiation outcomes. His results showed that compromising and avoiding are the most preferred methods of conflict management in China while accommodating and competing lead to more satisfaction during business negotiation.

As a consequence of globalization, it is easy to see the postmodern phenomenon of juxtaposition of tradition and modernization in the changing Chinese society. The Chinese preference for conflict management styles may show some intergenerational variation, but its cultural pattern preserves the same tendency. Zhang et al. (2005) randomly assigned older and younger Chinese adults to evaluate one of four conversation transcripts in which an older worker criticizes a young coworker. The young worker's communication was varied across the transcripts to reflect four conflict management styles: competing, avoiding, accommodating, and problem solving. As expected, older participants favored the accommodating style over the problem-solving style. Young adults either preferred the problem-solving style to the accommodating style, as predicted, or judged the two styles as equally positive. Results of either cross-cultural research or intracultural research reflect similar patterns of Chinese preference for particular strategies of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, why do they prefer those strategies?

Interpretation of Cultural Reductionism

Holt and DeVore (2005) conducted a meta-analysis upon findings of 3,000 empirical studies. Their results indicated that individuals from cultures of individualism tend to use conflict styles of forcing (competing), while individuals from cultures of collectivism prefer strategies of compromise, problem solving (accommodating), and withdrawal (avoiding).

As indicated in Chap. 1, the research paradigm of individualism–collectivism has the tendency toward cultural reductionism, and it cannot always be used to interpret the observed phenomena in specific cultures. For example, Tang and Kirkbride (1986) used a questionnaire for measuring conflict handling styles in terms of assertiveness and cooperativeness to examine differences between 75 Chinese and 60 British government executives in Hong Kong. The findings showed that Chinese executives favored less assertive compromising and avoiding styles, while British participants formed more assertive collaborating and competing styles.

Westwood et al. (1992) argued that the different preferred conflict-handling styles may be traced to aspects of traditional Chinese cultural and traditional values. They mentioned several Chinese values that have relevance for organizational behavior – including harmony, collectivism, conformity, power-distance relationships, holism, face and shame, reciprocity, and *guangxi* – and concluded that

Chinese organizations are characterized by large-power distance, respect for authority, and strict hierarchical arrangements. Any intervention that challenges authority, threatens others to open up and confront conflict, or calls for a high level of self-disclosure is not likely to be met with an enthusiastic response. Because Chinese perceive the relationship to continue past the point of obtaining an agreement, they tend to be less openly assertive and emotional in conflict situations in order to preserve harmonious relationships (Kirkbride et al. 1991). Therefore, the Chinese conflict orientation may prevent the transfer of Western managerial practices and techniques to societies like Hong Kong.

Glasses for Seeing the World

Is this a plausible argument?

Some findings of empirical research support this position of cultural determinism. For example, Chiu and Kosinski (1994) investigated whether styles of conflict-handling behavior among the Chinese were partially affected by Chinese values. They asked 142 male Hong Kong Chinese and 124 male Caucasian American graduate business students to complete questionnaires containing two sets of dependent variables: (1) value dimensions of integration, moral discipline, human-heartedness, and Confucian work dynamism; and (2) conflict-handling behaviors, including compromising, competitiveness, avoidance, collaboration, and accommodation. The Hong Kong Chinese sample tended to emphasize Chinese values more than their American counterparts. They also tended to be less competitive and collaborative than the American participants in conflict-handling behavior. There was a strong inverse relationship between the presence of Chinese values and the degree of competitiveness in the course of handling conflicts.

Theories are glasses for scientists to see the world. Seeing through the lense of a specific theory, a social scientist can see what he wants to see; the world outside the theory is blurry and ambiguous. Yan and Sorenson (2004) argued that the dual-concern model might only partially account for choice of conflict management strategies in Chinese family businesses, particularly in families that are strongly influenced by Confucianism.

Westwood et al. (1992) indicated that it is important for us to understand Chinese conflict-handling styles in terms of harmony, collectivism, conformity, power-distance relationships, holism, face and shame, reciprocity, and *guanxi*, etc., but they didn't develop any theory to expatiate relationships among those concepts. So they can conduct only exploratory research with preexisting instruments of measurement.

Face Negotiation Theory

There are some psychologists who attempted to develop theoretical models to explain the role of such concepts as face in mediating the process of interpersonal conflict. In her face negotiation theory, Ting-Toomey (1994, 2005) classified concerns

Table 12.2 Classification of facework behaviors

Facework	Specific behavior
Dominating	Aggression
	Defend self
Avoiding	Avoid
	Give in
	Involve a third party
	Pretend
Integrating	Apologize
	Compromise
	Consider the other
	Private discussion
	Talk about the problem

for the idea of face during interactive situations into three categories: self-face concern, other-face concern, and mutual-face concern. An individual may display various faceworks in regard to three types of face concern: (1) dominating facework is designed to protect one’s face by attacking or threatening others; (2) avoiding facework implies a lack of desire to handle a conflict directly and instead preserving the relationship; (3) integrating facework denotes a concern for self and others’ face simultaneously (see Table 12.2 for the concrete behaviors of these three types of facework).

In order to study the effects of face and facework during interpersonal conflicts, Oetzel et al. (2001) administered a questionnaire to 768 participants (average age 21.54 years) from four nations – China, Germany, Japan, and the United States – and examined the influence of national culture, self-construals, power distance, and situational features (relational closeness and status) on three measures of face concern and 11 behaviors of facework. The major findings are: (1) self-construals had the strongest effects on face concern and facework with independence positively associated with self-face and dominating facework while interdependence positively associated with other- and mutual-face and integrating and avoiding facework; (2) power distance had small, positive effects on all three face measures of face concern and on avoiding and dominating facework; (3) individualistic, small-power distance national cultures had less concern for others’ face and a tendency to avoid facework while collectivistic, large-power distance national cultures were more apt toward dominating facework; (4) Chinese had more self-face concern and involved a third party more frequently than Japanese.

Individualism–Collectivism

In consideration of the influence of cultural values, Ting-Toomey and her colleague proposed that the dimensions of individualism–collectivism and power distance might determine the predominant conflict approach (Ting-Toomey 1985; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel 2001). In the case of individualism and small-power distance,




Fig. 12.2 Cultural values dimensional grid: four conflict approaches. Adopted from Ting-Toomey and Oetzel (2001)

an actor tends to adopt an impartial conflict approach; in the case of individualism with large-power distance, the actor prefers a conflict approach that allows for status achievement; in the situation of collectivism and small-power distance, one tends to follow the communal conflict approach; and in the situation of collectivism and large-power distance, one prefers a benevolent conflict approach (see Fig. 12.2).

Based on Ting-Toomey's (1988) face negotiation theory, Brew and Cairns (2004) investigated the association of types of communication (direct or cautious) according to types of face concern (self or other) and work status (subordinate, coworker, or superior) with performances for three conflict management styles (control, solution oriented, or nonconfrontational) with a sample of 163 Anglo-Australian and 133 Chinese university students who were working full- or part-time. Their results showed that: (1) as supported by the individualist–collectivist dimension model, Anglo respondents rated assertive conflict styles higher and the nonconfrontational style lower than their Chinese counterparts; (2) both Anglo and Chinese respondents preferred more direct communication strategies when self-face was threatened compared with the potential threat of others' face; (3) face-threat was related to assertive and diplomatic conflict style for Anglos while linked to passive and solution-oriented styles for Chinese. Although support was shown for Ting-Toomey's theory, the authors warned that, in such applied settings, workplace dynamic may have influenced power roles, making it difficult to make simple predictions based on only cultural dichotomies of individualism and collectivism.

Brew and Cairns (2004) indicated the restriction of cross-cultural psychology as reductionism is often required to make generalizations. For example, to elaborate on the interpersonal interaction in a multicultural work environment through face

negotiation theory, one must reduce the abundant cultural differences into the dimensions of either “individualism–collectivism” or “power difference.” For the convenience of cross-cultural comparison, the culture-specific faceworks in Chinese society had been classified into a framework of three categories. Nevertheless, can such a system of classification interpret the Chinese faceworks adequately?

Face Language in Chinese Society

There are many languages related to “face” used by Chinese people in their life-world. According to the later philosophies of Wittgenstein, some of those languages can be conceptualized as language games related to social interaction. Hwang (2005) has reviewed and interpreted the Chinese face languages in terms of the theoretical model of Favor and Face, including:

1. *Gei mianzi/Bu gei mianzi*

Giving face (gei mianzi) refers to instances when a resource allocator (RA) with higher social status publicly distributes certain resources under his control to a petitioner (P) to increase or maintain P’s reputation. According to the resource theory of social exchange (Foa and Foa 1976), there are many ways to give face, such as praising P’s talents or achievements in public to elevate P’s status, showing concern for P, adopting the ideas suggested by P, respecting the opinions of P, admitting the request of P by giving certain resources to P, etc. If RA rejects the request of P in public, suppresses P’s status, or points out that P has committed a moral infringement, or even condemns P, RA would be acting against the principles of giving P face and instead would likely cause P to have feelings of being without face (*mei mianzi*) or of losing face (*shi mianzi*).

2. *Zeng mianzi/Sun mianzi*

Another pair of related concepts is *zeng mianzi* and *sun mianzi* (gaining face and damaging face). An example of gaining face would be when RA assigns to P some kind of symbolic resources or responsibility in public to raise P’s reputation. The meanings of damaging face and not giving face overlap, but damaging face has a narrower implication that usually refers to a situation when RA intentionally discloses or exposes flaws in P’s morality or capability in front of others in a way that could cause potential ridicule or embarrassment.

3. *Jie mianzi/Kan mianzi*

Since face is something that may or may not be granted, it can also be borrowed. Such borrowing not only involves the two parties P and RA. *Kan mianzi* (to take someone’s face into account) involves a third party, O, who occupies a significant status in the respective psychosociograms of P and RA. Borrowing face (*jie mianzi*) means that O asks RA to make an arrangement that is in favor of P when allocating the resources. The relationship between the reputable O and the petitioner P will also be elevated as a result. If P can present evidence proving the support of O, such

as a recommendation letter, a business card, or conversation records, RA can then take the face of O into account when considering P's request (*kan O's mianzi*).

There are times when O can intervene in the interaction between P and RA and help P to lobby RA. O can say to RA, "*Kan wode mianzi* (please take my face into account)." Or, in an even more direct tone, O might say, "*Gei wo yi ge mianzi* (give me some face on this)." If O's request is accepted, O will have face and also owe RA a favor.

4. *Gu mianzi/Bu gu mianzi*

When thinking about giving P face, RA usually takes the relationship between them into consideration. Let's first examine relations with the vertical group.

In Confucian society where the principle of respecting the superior prevails, if the superior RA gives or increases P's face, P will most likely experience the positive feeling of *having face* or *being honored*. If RA does not give face or instead damages P's face, P still would not dare show negative emotions. Instead P will accept the poor treatment despite feeling bad or faceless.

There are times that a person with an inferior status can gain hold of particular resources and take on the role of RA. If a P with an advantageous position asks RA to reallocate RA's resources in favor of P, RA will be unlikely to refuse the request. As a matter of fact, it would be very difficult for RA to do so. If the inferior RA dares to take such a bold step so as to damage the superior P's face, then P will probably respond with the negative emotion of anger or even attack RA in return.

Values in Chinese society demand interpersonal harmony. People often follow the principle of praising virtue in public but admonishing sins in privacy in order to ensure harmony. No matter whether one is the superior or inferior, if one is good at social intercourse (*zuo ren*), one is usually also skilled in considering others' face. Such a person would add to others' face in public and have only private talks with those with whom he disagrees in order to avoid damaging another person's face. In contrast, a person who doesn't know the art of considering face will seldom give others face and may even damage others' face. In this instance, that person would likely be regarded as one who does not know how to behave in public.

5. *Supo lian/Da jia mei mianzi*

The opposite of *everybody has face* (*da jia you mianzi*) is *everybody has no face* (*da jia mei mianzi*). If O lobbies RA on behalf of P, and the relationship between O and P is so close that if RA turns against P, the result is the same as if RA turns against O. In this case, O might eventually become the petitioner and deem RA's behavior as *not giving face*. If O and RA turn against one another (*supo lian*) because of this and eventually clash with each other, the ultimate result is likely that everyone has no face (*da jia mei mianzi*).

6. *Liu mianzi/Fu yian mianzi*

In order to avoid the occurrence of this embarrassing consequence, even if RA does not fully agree to the request of P or O, RA should concede in some way to save face (*liu mianzi*) for P or O. However, sometimes when RA compromises in

this way, RA's intention is not necessarily to make this concession to O or P but rather to make a symbolic gesture of respect. Neither O nor P will feel uncomfortable with a mere symbolic gesture. The purpose of putting off face (*fu yian mianzi*) is to keep everyone on good terms, to maintain harmonious interpersonal relationships, and to preserve the psychosocial homeostasis of all parties involved.

From the perspective of philosophy of science, researchers may interpret those face languages in terms of a certain theory. This section elaborates those face languages in terms of Hwang's Face and Favor model. We can certainly classify those face languages in terms of Ting-Toomey's (1994) three categories of face concerns, but, by doing so, those face languages are separated from the context of *guanxi*, which is highly valued by Chinese people and significantly violates the fundamental position of Confucian relationalism. Then, how should we construct a theory of conflict resolution which is adequate for Chinese society?

Construction of Theoretical Models on Chinese Conflict Resolution

Models of Resolutions for Parent–Child Conflicts

Since the rise of indigenization movement of psychology in Taiwan, there are some psychologists who have attempted to construct conflict resolution models in Chinese society. For instance, Yeh (1995) proposed five models of resolutions for parent–child conflicts along two dimensions, namely “insistence on personal benefits” and “acceptance of parents’ demand”:

1. Self- sacrifice: when a child faces parent–child conflict, s/he will comply with his/her parents’ demand, and assume all responsibility and consequences to solve the problem by sacrificing one’s own benefit.
2. Utilitarianism: when an individual faces a situation of parent–child conflict, s/he will put one’s own benefit or goal as the first priority and compares the advantages and disadvantages of all possible solutions in order to adopt the most advantageous one.
3. All-embracing: when an individual faces parent–child conflict, s/he will do one’s best to solve the problem by satisfying one’s own needs on the one hand and meeting his/her parents’ demands on the other hand.
4. Avoidance: when a child faces a situation of parent–child conflict, s/he is not willing to undertake consequences of the problem and instead decides to escape from the problematic situation or do nothing.
5. Compromise: when a child faces a parent–child conflict situation due to the restriction of external conditions or personal experience, capability, and wisdom, s/he cannot immediately satisfy both parties at the same time. Thus, s/he adopts an eclectic approach of compromise to solve the conflict between two parties with open discussion.

Though Yeh claimed that his “models of parent–child conflict resolution” were an indigenous theoretical model, his theory involved only the “parent–child relationship” rather than other relationships. Comparing with other models in Table 12.1, it can be seen that his theoretical model was also constructed on the dichotomy between self and other. He conceptualized all models of conflict resolution as a combination of two dimensions, that is, insisting or not insisting on the attainment of personal goal and acceptance or rejection of the parents’ demand. Therefore, his five models of parent–child conflict resolutions were essentially the same as that suggested by other Western theorists.

Interpersonal Harmony and Conflict

As a response to the indigenization movement of Chinese psychology, in her book *Interpersonal Harmony and Conflict: Indigenous Theory and Research*, Huang (1999) proposed a general model of Chinese conflict resolution, which also consisted of two dimensions – namely, one’s own benefit or opinion and other’s benefit or opinion. The combination of these two dimensions resulted in four models of conflict resolution: fighting, negotiations, avoidance, and yielding. Each model of resolution was divided into three subtypes. For example, she suggested that “negotiations” was a win–win pattern of resolution which was the most ideal one. Negotiations can be divided into the following three subtypes:

1. Complementing each other: this is a win–win state in which both parties shift their attention from the immediate personal benefits to the long-term objectives or goals shared by them. Thus, conflict may be transformed into a state of positive competition that, through a mutual cooperation, facilitates the growth and development of both parties.
2. Eclectic compromise: when facing a conflicts, both parties “yield one step” to each other. They each lose and gain something at the same time, so it is called “eclectic”; both of them give up something from their original demand for the sake of harmony, so it is called “compromise.” Though two parties “are not satisfied, with this type of conflict resolution, they can still accept it.”
3. Negotiation: it is based on the consideration of personal benefits for each party of the dyad. After negotiation, both of them believe that they have maximized their own benefits through the agreement to solve the conflict.

Huang (1999) recognized that models of conflict resolution constructed by Western psychologists could not illustrate models of the complicated interpersonal conflicts in Chinese society. Thus, in addition to her four models of conflict resolution, she further developed three subtypes under each of them and collected plenty of cases in Chinese society by intensive interviews to elaborate each of her subtypes. However, her theory was still constructed on the presumption of the “self/other” dichotomy, and her theoretical model was essentially similar to Western theories of psychology (see Table 12.1). The only difference was that she treated “compromise” as a subtype of “negotiation.”

Construction of an Indigenous Theory of Conflict Resolution

However, how can we construct a theory of conflict resolution under the influence of the cultural tradition of Confucian relationalism?

In considering this question, we must emphasize as a core idea the “self/we-group” relationship instead of the “self/other” dichotomy. In other words, under the influence of Confucian relationalism, an individual is always living in a social network by which s/he is identified. When s/he is in conflict with other, s/he has to consider not only the other party’s benefit or opinion but also how to “maintain the interpersonal harmony within my group”?

Based on such reasoning, Hwang (1997–1998) modified the Western models, replaced the two dimensions in their schemes with “pursuing versus discarding personal goal” and “maintaining versus ignoring interpersonal harmony,” and she constructed a preliminary model of Chinese conflict resolution (see Fig. 12.3). The model assumed that an actor has to adopt a particular type of conflict resolution only when his opponent insists on attaining a personal goal that is contradictory to the actor’s goal. In such a situation, the actor has to ask himself two questions: “Do I want to maintain interpersonal harmony?” “Do I want to pursue my personal goal?”

If he gives up his personal goal for the sake of maintaining interpersonal harmony, he may choose the response of endurance. If he disregards interpersonal harmony and insists on pursuing his personal goal, he may confront the other party. If he attempts to maintain interpersonal harmony but doesn’t want to give up his personal goal, he may pretend to obey publicly while doing his own business privately. If he is concerned about interpersonal harmony and is willing to yield partially to




Fig. 12.3 A preliminary model of Chinese conflict resolution

his opposition, he may compromise with the other. If he decides to disregard either interpersonal harmony or attainment of his personal goal, he may spark a confrontation with the other, putting their relationship at risk.

Stable Guanxi Network

It should be emphasized that in this model the “interpersonal harmony” means not only the harmonious state with his target of conflict but also the harmonious state among other persons within his/his *guanxi* network. This point should be elaborated in the context of Confucian relationalism.

The Confucian ethics for ordinary people described in Chap. 5 can be viewed as a prototype of Chinese social behaviors, and it describes the ideal type of dyad interaction in Chinese society at a cultural level. As I indicated in Fig. 5.1, when RA is considering one’s *guanxi* with others, it is assumed that any of the interpersonal relationships are composed of an “instrumental component” and “expressive component.” The term “instrumental component” implies that one’s physical self was born with various desires that may motivate one to acquire some resources to satisfy his/her needs. In such a situation, one may use other as an instrument for acquiring a particular resource. The term “expressive component” was used to denote the affection between one’s social self and other party. Confucian urged that everybody should follow ethical norms for different social rules in order to maintain social order.

Regulating by the Confucian ethical system of benevolence–righteousness–propriety, Chinese live in a network of *guanxi* that is relatively stable for a certain period of time. In their process of socialization, they emphasize the importance of taking appropriate action to embed one’s position in the social network. Their selves tend to become a kind of interdependent self which is defined by one’s social role and relationships and which is drastically different from the independent self of Western people (Markus and Kitayama 1991).

Greater Self and One Self

It should be noted that interdependent self of a Chinese means his “social self.” So far as one’s “physical self” is concerned, his self is still an independent one, who still has to consider how to obtain various resources from the external environment to satisfy one’s needs. Nevertheless, as an influence of Confucian cultural tradition, Chinese conceptualization of an “individual” is very different from that of Western people. As a cultural product of Christianity, the self-contained individualism of Western civilization encourages an individual to define the boundary between one and other by the immediate surface surrounding one’s physical body (Sampson 1985, 1988). Conceived by the collective individualism of learned tradition, an

individual's "physical self" is independent from others, and his "social self" is embedded in a stable social network. The boundary of an individual's "social self" may be flexible enough to include other parties such as one's family members, one's friends, or one's colleagues, depending on who participates in the social episode and its nature. In this case, an individual's physical self is usually called "One self" while one's social self including others is termed as "greater self." These two concepts were named "small body" and "greater body", respectively, by Mencius.

Confucian cosmology adopts a holistic perspective that believes that change of any object in the universe is a manifestation of the encounter, transaction, and transformation between two opposing forces of *ying* and *yang*. Human beings are no exception to this rule. Confucians of the pre-Chin period established their ethical system by constructing the Way of Humanity (the arrangement of social relationships) through an understanding of the Way of Heaven, which is illustrated in the following passage from the Ten Wings of the *I-Ching*:

Heaven and Earth exist; all (material) things exist. After all (material) things existed, there came male and female. From the existence of male and female there came husband and wife. From husband and wife there came father and son. From father and son there came ruler and minister. From ruler and minister there came high and low. When (the distinction of) high and low existed, the arrangements of priority and righteousness came into existence.

From the Confucian perspective, marriage between husband and wife is not only a unification of two independent entities but also a combination of two opposing but complementary forces of *ying* and *yang* – with children as products of their unification. The creation of an individual's life is just the same as the creation of any object in the universe. Based on this kind of cosmology, Chinese tend to conceptualize the family as a whole and analogize it to a human body (the "greater body"). For instance, Chinese parents usually describe their children as their own flesh and blood while brotherhood is frequently described as the relationship between hands and feet. Therefore, family can be viewed as a prototype of the Chinese concept of "greater self."

Similar ideas can be generalized to other types of vertical relationships. For example, the chief of a government office in Imperial China was privately called the "dragon head"; his trusted subordinates were called *shin-fuh* (heart and belly), while their retainers and backkeys might be described as *jao-ya* (nails and teeth) by ordinary people (e.g., Sterba 1978). The same labeling system can also be used to denote roles occupying different positions in the power structure of a contemporary Chinese organization (e.g., Silin 1976; Walder 1983).

Lian and Mientze

When a group of Chinese is interacting with others for a particular social affair, the members may form impressions about every participant involved in that affair and arrange them along either a vertical dimension according to their relative role

positions or to the power structure of that social network (Bond and Lee 1981). An individual's awareness of his public image formed in others' minds is called his face, which can be differentiated into two categories: *Mientze* is determined by one's performance, and *lian* is related to one's moral conduct (King 1988). The greater performance one has, the higher position one occupies, or the more resource one controls, the greater *mientze* s/he has. *Lian* has nothing to do with one's performance; as long as one's conduct meets moral or ethical demands for his social role, he will have *lian* to face with others in his network.

An individual's small self has face as does his great self. When an individual is interacting with other parties in his network, all members of his/her in-group may evaluate his/her face along the dimension of either his/her performance or his/her morality. By the same token, when an individual represents his/her group while interacting with members of another group, others may also evaluate the face of his/her great self along these two dimensions. When the representative of a group exceeds others' expectations with his excellent performance, it also reflects positively on his group members. On the contrary, when s/he fails in the competition or when his/her scandal is exposed to the public, members of his/her group may experience feelings of losing face. Such Chinese sayings as "glorifying one's forebears," "glorifying one's household," "winning glory for one's fatherland," "losing our family's face," "having no face to go back home to see one's elders" are examples of the latter.

The Value of Harmony

Both Taoism and Confucianism require that the two opposing and complementary forces (*chi*) of *ying* and *yang* should be maintained in a harmonious state no matter what level they are operating on, such as universe, nature, society, or an individual (Hsu 1971; Li 1988, 1992). "Everything will be accomplished smoothly in a harmonious family"; Confucian advocated that internal harmony should also be treasured as the highest value within a family – just as it is essential to the smooth functioning of a system at any other level.

Such a value system was gradually formed and sustained by the agricultural ecology of traditional Chinese society, which was characterized by a high population density with relatively low social mobility. Bound to their residing area, the agricultural way of production enabled most Chinese families to obtain limited resources. In order to distribute resources among members of a group, it was necessary to emphasize the value of harmony (LaBarre 1945; Stover 1974). Nevertheless, once the value system was formed, it became the core of Chinese culture, which may resist to changes.

For example, Yang (1988) reviewed previous research on family that had been done in China mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her review indicated that what has been changed in the course of development in all three regions is the father/son axis structure. As a result of better education opportunities for the young, legal protection of

women's rights and female employment, the elderly (especially the male parents) may lose their economic power. They may have no say in children's marriage partner selection and unable to make stern decisions on family spending. However, one aspect of Chinese familism that has not changed across different sociopolitical regions is mutual dependence. In order to repay parents' continued nurturing and protection throughout their lives, the younger generations tend to try hard to fulfill the wishes of their parents and to support them in their old age. When any member of the family encounters difficulty in life, other members are obliged to provide necessary aid to him/her.

Socialization for the Value of Harmony

From the viewpoint of theoretical model of "Face and Favor: Chinese power game," these facts implied that Chinese still tend to use "need rule" to interact with family members of expressive tie. Such tendency to change in Chinese familism also manifests into changes of their value system. In one study on the modern transformation of Confucian values, Hwang (1995) asked 633 Taiwanese elites to evaluate the relative importance of a series of value items to (1) their parents and to (2) themselves. The results showed that, compared to their parents, subjects assigned less importance to value items related to emphasizing the value of family with a suppression on oneself, including "being a dutiful wife and loving mother," "having outstanding children," "having decedents for the sake of filial piety," and "maintaining precedence between seniors and juniors." This means that they devote less effort than their last generation to maintain the vertical power structure which is based on the father/son axis inside the family. However, the importance of "a pleasant family," "a happy marriage," and "harmony" to them were the same as their last generation.

The reasons for Chinese people to treasure the value of harmony mainly came from life experiences from their early socialization. Some cross-cultural research indicated that, in comparison with American (Sollenberger 1968), Israeli, Indian, or Ethiopian mothers (Ryback et al. 1980), Chinese mothers were less likely to allow aggressive behavior in their children. In another cross-cultural research, Niem and Collard (1972) asked Chinese mothers from Taiwan and American mothers from Massachusetts to record their disciplining of children's aggression over a 30-day period. They found roughly the same number of aggressive episodes from these two groups of children, but Chinese children were more likely to receive some form of parental discipline in response.

"Dutiful sons are the product of the rods," many Confucian scholars suggested that children must be disciplined by both methods of punishment and providing advice (Lin and Wang 1995). Much empirical research indicated that Chinese parents may use harsh physical punishment (Solomon 1971; Wolf 1970), withdrawal of rewards, or exclusion from the social life of the family (Sollenberger 1968; Niem and Collard 1972) to inhibit aggressive behavior of their children, depending on their social-class (rural-urban or subethnic variations); the primary goal of child-rearing practices is to maintain harmonious family or neighborhood relations (Bond and Wang 1981).

Fu et al. (2004) interviewed 27 cultural scholars in China about the concept of forgiveness and factors influencing the tendency to forgive in Chinese philosophy and everyday life. Most of them considered that preserving group harmony was the main reason for Chinese to forgive, but they discounted the personality or religions influences commonly reported in the Western literature. They adopted a Western forgiveness questionnaire together with measures of self-esteem, anxiety, impression management, and culturally appropriate constructs of face, relationship orientation, and harmony. They administered them to 336 college students and 432 teachers. Their results indicated that the two variables of relationship orientation and harmony had strong correlations with the tendency to forgive in both samples. Therefore, they concluded that willingness to forgive in China is influenced largely by social solidarity need rather than the individualistic personality variables or religiosity reported in Western research.

The Construction of a Complete Model

Previous sections illustrate that in addition to the attainment of one's personal goal, the actor in Fig. 12.3 has to consider the maintenance of interpersonal harmony within his group, rather than others' interests or others' attitudes.

Nevertheless, the five types as described in Fig. 12.3 are insufficient for describing conflict resolution processes in Chinese society. In order to provide a complete picture on this issue, it is necessary to take the Chinese interpersonal relationships into consideration. Based on my analysis of Confucian ethics for ordinary people, the relationships between two roles involved in interpersonal conflict can be differentiated into vertical and horizontal relationships. The Confucian cultural ideal assumes that all vertical relationships should be in-group relations, but horizontal ones might be either in-group or out-group. Therefore, there are three kinds of interpersonal relationships: vertical in-group, horizontal in-group, and horizontal out-group. Viewing from my theoretical model about Chinese power game, horizontal out-group must be a certain kind of instrumental ties while horizontal in-group should be expressive ties.

From the viewpoint of Western philosophy of science, most theoretical models constructed on the basis of realism are synchronic theories. But, a significant feature of interpersonal network in collectivistic societies is its temporal continuity. Though we can construct our theoretical framework about Chinese conflict resolution by taking conflict episode as unit of analysis, it should be noted that a conflict episode may last for a period of time, and the conflict resolution model which an actor adopts may also change from time to time. Therefore, when we want to construct a theoretical framework for managing conflicts with people of these three types of interpersonal relationship, it is necessary to consider the following aspects: (1) harmony maintenance, (2) personal goal attainment, (3) coordination strategies, and (4) dominant responses.

When a subordinate is in conflict with his superior in a vertical relationship, he has to protect his/her superior's face for the sake of maintaining interpersonal harmony. In this case, the dominant response may be endurance. If s/he wants to express his/her opinion, s/he usually uses the strategy of indirect communication. If s/he intends to pursue his/her personal goal, s/he may pretend to obey but do his own business privately.

The conflict management strategies one may utilize in horizontal relationship depend on whether the other party is an in-group or out-group member. When an actor is in conflict with an in-group member, they may communicate directly. For the maintenance of a harmonious relationship, they may "give face" to each other and reach a compromise. When one of them insists on attaining his/her personal goal in spite of the other's feelings, they may struggle with confrontations until the issue is resolved. On the other hand, if both of them insist on attainment of their personal goals, they may treat each other as out-group members and have confrontations with the opposite party. Meanwhile, they may disregard interpersonal harmony and strive to protect their own face. In order to resolve the conflict situation, a third party may be invited to serve as a mediator for intervention, and their relationship may be severed as a consequence of their conflict.

When a superior insists on the attainment of his/her personal goal disregarding feelings of his subordinate in a vertical relationship, the subordinate may also react to oppose him, and their relationship may also be severed.

These are the major propositions in the theoretical framework on conflict resolution in Chinese society. In the following sections, I will further elaborate these propositions by the three types of relationships stated above.

Conflict Resolution Models within Vertical In-Group

Before our discussion on vertical relationship, it should be emphasized that the Confucian ethics for ordinary people as described in previous section of this article is a formal structure which can be used to interpret social interaction between different roles. According to Confucian cultural ideal, such relationships as father/son, husband/wife, senior/junior brother, and superior/subordinate, should be arranged in a vertical way.

The Construction of Vertical Relationship

It was mentioned in Chap. 5, when the Confucian ethics of benevolence–righteousness–propriety for ordinary people are implemented at the different role relationships, they strongly emphasize the importance of five cardinal ethics and request those involved in the five dyads of role relations should follow the ethical principle: "between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign

and subordinate, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between elder brother and younger, a proper order; and between friends, friendship” (*Li ji*, Chapter Li-yun). But, as I mentioned in Chap. 5, the deep structure of Confucianism advocates both the principle of respecting the superior and that principle of favoring the intimate. In other words, any dyad interaction in real life may emphasize either the importance of respecting the superior in their role relationship or the reciprocity of favoring the intimacy based on the Confucian ideal of benevolence.

From the perspective of constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Gergen 1985), the relationships between people in daily life are constructed in the process of social interaction. Confucian ethical principles about the arrangement of role relationships can be interpreted in different ways. Furthermore, under the impact of Western culture, it is very likely that people may construct their relationships in a completely different way according to the resources held and the agreements made. For example, in a study of marriage violence in Taiwan, Chen (1992) divided her female informants into two groups on the basis of their experience in marriage violence. Among the group with violent experience, 65% reported that their husbands were more powerful in deciding family affairs; 18% said themselves were more powerful, and the rest got equal power. Among the group without violent experience, 50% got equal power, 30% perceived themselves as the more powerful ones, only 13% reports their husbands were more powerful. In other words, a couple may emphasize the principle of respecting the superior for maintaining the vertical relationship; another couple may advocate the principle of favoring the intimate and arrange it as an equal power one. The above statistics implied a higher probability of the experience of marriage violence for the family power structure arrangement of husband–superior/wife–subordinate, than that of an equal power one.

Subtypes of Filial Piety

Another example can be cited to illustrate my argument. The parent–child relationship is generally assumed to be the prototype of all vertical relationships in Confucian society. Lung (2000) asked college freshmen enrolled at the University of California, Los Angeles, to fill out a questionnaire to examine the nature and outcomes of parent–adolescent conflict and its resolution in Chinese American and Caucasian families. Her results showed that Chinese Americans experienced more conflict with their parents over issues pertaining to familial respect, homework, or leisure time. Caucasians reported more conflicts over drugs, drinking, and sex. Chinese American families exhibited more avoidance, guilt, shaming, and severe physical aggression while Caucasian families used more verbal reasoning and obliging strategies. Chinese American students perceived their overall family atmosphere as more hostile and angry than the Caucasians, and they also reported higher levels of depressive symptoms and more family dissatisfaction.

This is a typical cross-cultural research study. It compared each of the cultural groups as homogeneous ones just as other cross-cultural research reported in Section “Models of Conflict Resolution in Western Psychology.” We are likely to obtain a different conclusion if we construct indigenous theories to elaborate features of a specific cultural group. For example, the dual filial piety model proposed by Yeh and Bedford (2004) classified the filial beliefs in Chinese society into four categories – namely, nonfilial, authoritarian, reciprocal, and absolute. They asked 773 junior and senior high school students from Taiwan to serve as participants and studied the connections between child filial beliefs and the level of parent–child conflict. Their results indicated that reciprocal filial beliefs may have a practical role in decreasing self-centered conflict between parents and children while authoritarian filial beliefs may enhance the conflict.

The so-called reciprocal filial piety means that the parent treats child so kindly that the child heartily expresses filial attitude and behavior. It can be conceptualized as a manifestation of the principle of favoring the intimate in the deep structure of Confucianism. The dyad interaction between parent and child is arranged in such a way as to function as a horizontal relationship within a group. In contrast to this, the authoritarian filial piety is a manifestation of the principle of respecting the superior, which emphasizes the nature of a vertical relationship between the superior and the subordinate within a group. The former may enable them to interact in a harmonious way, while the latter tends to elicit parent–child conflict. In vertical relationships, including either parent–child or husband–wife relationships, the superior usually plays the role of RA in dyad interaction. If s/he insists on the principle of respecting the superior with greater power, what kind of behaviors may a subordinate have in response to this situation?

Forbearance

It was mentioned previously that Confucianism emphasizes the value of harmony. When one encounters a conflict with someone else within his social network, the first thing one has to learn is “forbearance.” The concept of “forbearance” (*ren*) has a profound cultural foundation in China (Lee 1994). All the philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism provide ideas for supporting the practice of “forbearance.” In its broadest sense, “forbearance” means to control and to suppress one’s emotion, desire, and psychological impulse. In Fig. 12.3, “endurance” means not only restraining one’s psychological impulse, but also giving up one’s personal goals in favor of maintaining a harmonious relationship. Moreover, there is another implication of *ren*; “perseverance” (*jian-ren*) means to obviate all difficulties to attain one’s final goal.

As I mentioned before, Confucian ethics for ordinary people proposed the “principle of respecting superior” as its procedural justice which advocated that decisions in social interaction should be made by the superior who occupies a higher position. In actual life, when a superior with power requests the subordinate to

follow his demands, usually the latter can do nothing but to obey. The subordinate who has his own goal may thus experience a feeling of strong conflict, but, under power domination of the superior, s/he tends to give up his/her personal goal by following the practice of endurance.

Dominating and Conceding

Zhang (2004) asked young adults to write down accounts of intergenerational communication in conflict situations in the People's Republic of China. Using the method of content analysis, he identified five major types of initiating factors that precipitated intergenerational conflict. Old-to-young criticism was most frequent, followed by illegitimate demand and rebuff. The least frequent initiating factors included young-to-old criticism and disagreement/generation gap.

Findings of this research represented typical facts in Chinese society. According to Confucian ethics for ordinary people, it is ethically legitimate for an old person to criticize a young adult's inappropriate behavior, so it was the most frequent conflict. However, it contradicts the principle of respecting the superior for a young adult to criticize an older one. The young generation has to forbear some or even all of his dissatisfactions if there is any, so this situation was the least frequent. This is a post hoc explanation on findings or empirical research in terms of the current theoretical framework. Results of another research study can be cited to support these arguments:

Chen et al. (2006) used the method of open-ended interview to collect items for constructing a questionnaire on the styles of handling superior-subordinate conflicts and administered the questionnaire to 254 employees from five organizations in China. Results of exploratory factor analysis indicated that there were three styles of handling superior-subordinate conflicts, namely, dominating, collaborating, and conceding.

Results of this research deserve our special attention. All research mentioned in the first section of this chapter adopted the etic approach by imposing the Western paradigm of research on Chinese participants. In contrast to them, current research adopted an indigenous approach from "bottom-to-top" without the implantation of the Western paradigm. It obtained only three factors rather than the five factors presumed in other theoretical models. Nevertheless, these three factors adequately represent ways for Chinese to handle vertical conflicts within a group: when the superior assumes an attitude of dominating, the subordinate tend to respond by conceding. This is the concept of *ying/yang* in Chinese cultural tradition as opposed to the Western structure of conflict that results from the dichotomy between self and other. On the contrary, if the superior assumes an attitude of requesting collaboration, the subordinate tends to respond by collaborating. This is a state described by The Taoist: "The two opposing components of *ying* and *yang* are operating on each other with a complementary force (*chi*) to maintain a harmonious state." The former represents the contradiction between *ying* and *yang* in result of following the principle

of respecting the superior in the context of Confucian relationism while the latter represents a harmonious state in result of following the principle of favoring the intimate.

Indirect Communication

Forbearance can not solve one's problem in many situations. When a subordinate disagrees with his superior's decision, a prior consideration of protecting his superior's face may inhibit him to express his disagreement publicly or directly. In this case, he may ask somebody in their social network to send his message to the superior.

I have said that Chinese are living in various kinds of social network. As it was indicated in my theoretical model of Face and Favor, relationships between any dyad may be regarded as either very close or only insignificant. According to an old Chinese saying, "do not talk too deep when you are not close enough with the other." When an individual believes that the expressive component of his/her relationship with the superior is not strong enough for direct communication, s/he has better to express his opinion through people close to the superior. For example, Silin (1976) studied the operation and leadership style of a large scale business in Taiwan by participant observation. He found when the top leader of the company spoke in public, the subordinates would never raise any question to challenge him or to injure his dignity. If they really believed that the leader's opinions were inappropriate, they usually asked people trusted by the leader to pass the message for them in private.

For example, Lin and Lin's (1999) research found that some junior high school students may mobilize their own brothers and sisters to request and force their father to make a concession:

If I ask my father, he would not allow me to buy it, if two or three of us ask him, I and my sisters telling him together, that should be worked, so we three ask him together, and use it together.

Liu's (1999, p. 181) research also found that a wife may ask her mother-in-law to help her change her husband's behavior. Certainly, some women may find that their husbands are good mediators between themselves and their mother-in-laws, but this kind of indirect communication might have negative side effects:

...when we just married, there are some problems between I and my mother-in-law when she is unhappy, she would tell my husband, my husband would pass on messages between us, sometimes it may make us to have more misunderstanding.... (Liu 1999, p. 187)

Taking Care of Others' Face

Confucian ideals advocated that all the vertical relationships within a family or a group should be constructed on the basis of benevolence (expressive component) to constitute a united whole. I also mentioned that whether an individual will develop

an in-group feeling of greater self with other or not is certainly a psychological matter. When an individual's relationship with a particular family member or a colleague is worsened and its expressive component decreased, outsiders may still perceive them as an in-group. In this case, they have to do their best to take care of other's face in front of outsiders and to maintain a superficial harmony so as to allow everybody to maintain his/her own face. For example, a male subject reported in Li's (1995) research:

Now they are living in their own way, and we are living in ours. Though we are living under the same roof, they sleep in that room, and we sleep in this room. We eat separately, my parents cook their food, my wife and I cook ours.... The two old parents still want to keep the superficial ethics. They are afraid of being scorned by relatives and friends. Though they blame me and accuse of my conduct against filial piety everyday, they still tell our relatives and friends that they have filial children. (Li 1995, p. 285)

Huang's (1996) research mentioned how a male employee working in a company "packages" his relationship with his supervisor:

I am able to 'package' our relationship. I will do anything to make outsiders get an impression that we get along quite well. Sometimes, I will respect his authority as a supervisor. So long as his requests are not very unfair, I will follow rather than resist them indiscriminately. When we are facing outsiders, I will stand at the same front with him and fight against outsiders. Because a department is a whole, we should maintain the vertical relation of up and down. This is a kind of work ethic. So I would make outsiders feel that I follow instruction. This is a superficial harmony. Don't let each other feel too embarrassing, it will be enough to maintain the 'public' part. Business is business. (Huang 1996, p. 262)

Obey Publicly and Defy Privately

In a power structure emphasizing a vertical relationship, when a subordinate has a conflict with the superior and knows that it is useless to argue with the dominant power, he may accept the superior's request in public but do his own business in private. In contemporary China, this pretending to obey is called "the superior has a policy to impose on, while the inferior has a trick to cope with it."

In imperial China, officials of local government usually used this strategy to deal with the endless orders and demands from the central government. According to a sociological analysis by Zou (1995), because the vast territory and the inconvenient transportation of imperial China, it is very hard for the central government to understand every detail of the locals. They tend to ask the local government to obey their orders regardless of local situations. Bounded by the Confucian ideology, the local government dares not to resist orders from the top, so they have to adopt the strategy of pretending to obey to deal with the superior.

In the daily life of Chinese people, the inferior in a power structure may use a similar strategy to deal with the superior. In her research on the contents and functions of Chinese interpersonal relationships, Li (1997) mentioned how a medical doctor's son used this strategy to deal with his father.

When he asked me to do something, if I had an opposite opinion, I would tell him that I didn't like to do his way before. But he had a bad temper. If you argue with him, he becomes tougher. Because it is useless to argue with him, now I say 'yes, yes, yes' to any of his requests, but I still do my own way. In any case, we won't talk more than a few sentences when we meet every day. My father is always busy. He sleeps till eleven to twelve o'clock in the morning and works at the clinic from 2 P.M. to 10 P.M. I do my own business in my room, I won't face him. (Li 1997, p. 23)

Conflict Resolution Models with Horizontal In-Group in Chinese Society

The horizontal relationship could be said to be the most important interpersonal relationship in contemporary societies where industrial and commercial activities are major ways of production. However, the arrangement of horizontal relationship was not the major concern of Confucian ethics. In the five cardinal ethics stressed by Confucius, only friends belong to the horizontal relationship. However, as I mentioned before, the arrangement of interpersonal relationship is constructed in the process of dyad interaction in daily life. Any kind of relationship can be constructed as horizontal relationship.

In my theoretical model of face and favor, horizontal relationships consist part of expressive ties and all instrumental ties. The reason for an individual to establish an instrumental tie with somebody else according to a particular formal role system is to acquire certain resources to satisfy his/her needs. Both parties involved in this relationship control some resources that are desired by the other party, so they can proceed to make exchanges with each other on a basis of equality.

In the "psychological process of RA" of Fig. 4.3, the instrumental ties and mixed ties are separated by a dotted line. It means that, compared with boundaries surrounding expressive ties within a family, the psychological boundary between these two kinds of relationships is relatively weak. The P may have an instrumental relationship of out-group to RA originally. Through the process of "pulling *guanxi*" or "reinforcing *guanxi*," P may penetrate the psychological boundary, get into the category of mixed ties, and become a friend of RA. On the contrary, the relatives or friends of mixed ties may become a kind of instrumental tie or come to a severance because of intense conflicts or estrangement of relationship between them.

Giving Face

Understanding the significant features of horizontal relationships, we may discuss the conflict resolution models listed in Table 12.3. According to my theoretical model of Face and Favor, when RA defines P as a member of his in-group who belongs to the category of mixed ties, they tend to interact with each other in terms

Table 12.3 A complete model of conflict resolution in Chinese society

	Harmony maintenance	Personal goal attainment	Coordination	Dominant response
Vertical in-group	Taking care of face	Obey publicly and defy privately	Indirect communication	Endurance
Horizontal in-group	Giving face	Fight overtly and struggle covertly	Direct communication	Compromise
Horizontal out-group	Striving for face	Confrontation	Mediation	Severance

of *renqing* rule and have to pay special attention to maintain others' face. If they disagree about something, they may communicate directly with one another to seek a solution that is acceptable for both parties. In such a situation, Chinese always say that "we are all brothers; it is needless to argue." In the process of negotiation, they may consider various options and ask the other to "give me a face." "Quarrel makes both sides ugly while concession enables both to have their own shares." In order to keep their harmonious relationship, they tend to concede and "give face" to each other. Therefore, both of them are able to "get off the stage" and compromise with the other party.

I argued in the previous section that a couple may construct their relationship either in a traditional vertical way or in a modern horizontal way. In the latter case, if there is a strong expressive component existing in their relationship, even if they argue about trivial matters in daily life, it would not hurt their feelings. Meanwhile, if one of the couple (usually the male) uses verbal or nonverbal communication to ask for compromise, "gives face" to the other, and enables her/him to "get off the stage," it is quite possible that their unhappiness would be eliminated. For instances, Li (1995) mentioned how a husband may dissolve the problem after quarreling with his wife.

I can't remember any specific case of quarreling with her. Each time we have a quarrel, I smile to her first, then she smiles, too.

When she was angry, I could not say anything to her... we may quarrel about something nonsense out of trivia. Finally, I keep quiet when she was angry. I would wait and talk to her when she was not angry anymore.

Bargaining and Compromise

This pattern of communication with a concern of giving face to the other party in consideration of maintaining in-group harmony can be said to be "bargaining," rather than "confrontation." Leung (1987) conducted cross-cultural research on the resolving procedure of interpersonal conflict that indicated that, compared with American subjects, their Chinese counterparts preferred bargaining between two sides and mediation by a third party to negotiate for a compromise. They relatively

dislike confrontation with each other and being judged by a third party, especially the process of inquisitorial adjudication, which requires the third party to collect relevant information and make judgment.

Tjosvold et al. (2001) indicated that high expertise and a competitive social context arouse concerns about defending one's position and challenging the opposing one in Western society. However, this is not the case in Chinese society. They conducted an experiment to explore the conditions under which people are motivated to engage in controversy. Their results indicated that Chinese university students in Hong Kong who expected to disagree with an expert, compared with those who did not expect to disagree with an expert, had less confidence, left less knowledgeable about their position, and selected an agreeable discussant.

From the perspective of Western culture, the relationship between an individual and an expert should be a horizontal one of equal status. However, for Chinese students, the expert may occupy a superior position because he controls more information power. Therefore, they were reluctant to disagree directly with someone with greater expertise. Furthermore, the professed pattern of interaction may be changed depending on the context of interpersonal relationship. For example, Chen (1994) asked 114 students of National Taiwan University to serve as subjects. His empirical research indicated that the subjects tended to choose conforming responses in vertical relationships with high expressive components; they preferred to accept the superior's authoritarian decision in vertical relationships with low expressive components. In horizontal relationships with high expressive components, they preferred the procedure of bargaining while in horizontal relationships with high instrumental components, they preferred the procedure of mediation. Chen's data provided remarkable support to the main propositions of this article.

Fight Overtly and Struggle Covertly

When one insists on the attainment of his personal goal without giving face to the other in a horizontal relationship, the other may be forced to yield for various reasons. In this case, their relationship may become worse and no longer consist of an expressive component anymore. When they meet with each other, they may pretend to take care of the other's face by some superficial forms of propriety. A cross-cultural research by Tinsley and Weldon (2003) indicated that American managers were more likely to choose a direct approach in response to the conflict, compared with the Chinese managers who were likely to use an indirect approach. Contrary to expectations, Americans were no more likely than Chinese to express a desire for revenge while Chinese managers showed a stronger desire to shame and to teach a moral lesson.

When two parties in a formal organization are required to negotiate for some controversial issues by their social roles, their dissatisfactions with each other may "emerge from under [the] table" and the "covert struggle" becomes an "overt fight,"

which may make their relationship worse. In Huang's (1996) research, an informant was the manager of a quality control department in a factory. The task structure at the working site made him conflict with the chief of the production department frequently. Though these conflicts were mediated by high rank administrators of the company, his attitudes were tough and the atmosphere was always at a tense deadlock. Although the chief of the production department apologized, and the conflict was solved temporarily, it remained an issue with lasting grudges in their minds.

He said, "After so many disputes, my requirement for quality is not loosened but more tightened. This is my responsibility. Beside quality, I also have my sensibility. Since he always makes troubles for me, I just want to have an eye for eye. Although I had some ideas to tease him, I never take the action. Actually, I always question him and this embarrasses him. Needless to say, I often exaggerate the products' degrees of danger to scare him." (Huang 1996, p. 260)

The Use of Strategies

In the process of a long-term fight, both sides may utilize various strategies to deal with the other overtly and covertly. Chinese also have a cultural tradition of using stratagems in daily life (Wang 1996). Stories about "thirty-six stratagems" are well known to many Chinese (Chiao 1981, 1985). As I pointed out in my book *Knowledge and Action* (Hwang 1995), the utilization of stratagems comes from military tactics of the martial arts school. Once the actor defines the opposite as an out-group member of instrumental tie or when the expressive component of a vertical relationship disappears, it is more likely for an individual to use strategic behavior. For example, in her study on relationship between mother- and daughter-in-law, Che (1997) reported an interesting case:

One day, hitting upon a sudden idea, she put her feet on a table and asked me to cut nails for her. You see, I never did this even for my mother, and she asked me to cut her nails! Her daughter was there, she didn't ask her to cut, but asked me! You see how I dealt with her.

Why you didn't reject her?

If I rejected, I will offend not only her but also everybody in our family. Because she said I couldn't bow down, I couldn't see. As her daughter-in-law, you can't reject. So, I said, where? Let me see. Because I always have my glasses on my eyes, if I cut you, you must be tolerant. Ha, I said it first, you must be tolerant. Then I cut, she said 'Oh!' I said 'Sorry, sorry, I can't see it!' Don't reject her immediately, otherwise she will ask you to do many things and tell your husband. (Che 1997, p. 53-54)

Cooperative Goal

In order to investigate the influence of culture and cohesiveness on intergroup conflict and effectiveness, Niber and Harris (2003) made cross-cultural comparisons among a group of United States and Chinese friends and strangers. Groups consisting of five members of the same culture engaged in a decision-making task.

Their results showed that, among U.S. participants, task conflict and performance results tended to vary together. U.S. strangers reported little task conflict or disagreements about fact and opinion and performed relatively poorly, whereas U.S. friends benefited from an uninhibited exchange of individual ideas and opinion for their performances. In contrast, Chinese participants reported uniformly high levels of intragroup conflict and experienced relatively low performance. Thus, they suggested that the advantage of task conflict, with which group members feel comfortable enough to freely express and exchange opinions and disagree with each other to achieve optimal outcomes, might be cultural specific. It is a phenomenon observed in some social situations of Western culture, but it is unlikely to happen in Chinese culture.

Realistic Versus Superficial Harmony

In her book *Interpersonal Conflict and Harmony*, Huang (1999) intensively studied the dynamic process of transformation among various types of conflict and classified the interpersonal harmony in Chinese society into two categories. The first, realistic harmony, is a state of dyad interaction with genuine cooperation and coordination. In the context of realistic harmony, people tend to perceive their relationships in a positive way. They tend to make more active, supportive, trustful, and spontaneous responses. On the contrary, when interpersonal conflicts occur to weaken their relationship both parties of a dyad still have to interact with each other within a given power structure, and they are forced to keep a state of superficial harmony by following the social manners. In a state of superficial harmony, people tend to perceive others in a negative way. They tend to be cautious, defensive, passive, and insincere in dealing with the opposite party. In consideration of the fact that the deep structure of Confucianism contains all elementary forms of social behavior, our question can be rephrased in terms of Huang's (1999) conceptual scheme. How can a RA who occupies a superior position in a group design a system of job assignment and reward distribution so as to transform the state of superficial harmony within the group into a state of realistic harmony?

The cross-cultural psychologists who adopted Western paradigm of research tended to conclude that Westerners are open and responsive while Chinese people avoid conflict and dealing with differences. Westerners are democratic while Chinese are autocratic. The democratic model of decision making with open discussion might not be applicable to Chinese society. Is this a plausible conclusion?

Cooperative Goals

My arguments can be illustrated with a series of research conducted by Tjosvold and his colleagues. Wong et al. (1992) interviewed 40 Chinese immigrants working in North American (Canadian) organizations and explored their response to

cooperative (rather than competitive or independent) goals. They found that those who developed cooperative goals in a conflict were able to discuss issues openly and mindfully. The constructive interaction helped them make progress on the task, work efficiently, and strengthen their work relationship and confidence in the future.

In order to understand how cultural values and other preconditions impact the cooperative and competitive management of conflict, Tjosvold and Sun (2001) asked 80 Chinese undergraduates to participate in an experiment to study the effect of communication (persuasive or coercive) and social context (cooperative or competitive) on several dependent measures of conflicts. Two participants and two confederates were involved in discussion about work distribution at each session. Results showed that persuasion communicated respect and helped the development of a cooperative relationship. In contrast, coercion communicated disrespect and helped to develop competitive relationships, resulting in rejection of the opposing view and negotiation.

Tjosvold and his colleagues (Chen et al. 2005; Chen and Tjosvold 2007) further interviewed Chinese employees from various industries in Shanghai on specific incidents when they had a conflict with their Japanese or American manager. Results of their research showed that a cooperative approach of conflict management, rather than competitive or independent approach, helped Chinese employees and their foreign managers develop quality relationships, improve their productivity (Chen et al. 2005), strengthen trust and commitment (Chen and Tjosvold 2007), and promote team effectiveness (Tjosvold et al. 2005). Thus, they concluded that cooperative conflict management may be an important way to overcome obstacles and develop effective leader relationships within and across cultural boundaries.

Open Communication

They also noted the importance of social face (Tjosvold et al. 2004) and nonverbal communication of warmth (Tjosvold and Sun 2003) in the process of Chinese conflict resolution. Understanding that social face has been used to explain the proclivity of Chinese to smooth over conflict, findings of their experiment and field interview showed that communication of warmth as well as confirmation of face may induce open-mindedness and redirect controversy as participants asked more questions and explored the opposing views. Moreover, though Western theory has assumed that avoidance is a largely ineffective approach, their empirical research indicated that Chinese managers and employees relied upon the other person, promoted task productivity, and strengthened the relationship with whom they shared a prior strong relationship and cooperative goals (Tjosvold and Sun 2002). Therefore, they argued that avoiding conflict can be useful and even reaffirm an already effective relationship if it is managed constructively with such technique as cooperative goals.

Findings of Tjosvold's research team can be interpreted in terms of the current theoretical framework, which conceptualizes intragroup harmony as a more important factor than the opposite party's opinion or needs for choosing an appropriate model of conflict resolution. As long as the realistic intragroup harmony is maintained within a cooperative context, Chinese people tend to value democratic leadership emphasizing horizontal relationships and to use open discussions productively (Tjosvold et al. 2001, 2006).

A group leader, who occupies a superior position in the vertical relationship, sets the cooperative, competitive, or independent goals. In the event that the group leader is unable to set up cooperative goals for the group, a dyad of either horizontal or vertical relationships may maintain only superficial harmony for driving certain competitive goals.

Conflict Resolution Models with Horizontal Out-Group

When the covert struggle emerges from under the table and becomes an overt fight, the outburst of conflict may make both parties in the conflict lose their temper. They may confront each other with some substantial goals or interests, and they may also find excuses to quarrel with each other to relieve their inner hostilities or tensions. This kind of conflict for "striving face" or "striving for vindication" was named "autistic conflict" by Western psychologists while the former was termed as "realistic conflict" (Holmes and Miller 1976).

For Chinese who emphasize the value of intragroup harmony, the perceived social distance may affect one's attribution and procedure. Chan and Goto (2003) asked 122 Hong Kong employees who reported having experience of intercultural contacts in their jobs to read a scenario of a workplace dispute involving a local employee and a superior who was either from Hong Kong, the United States, or mainland China. Then they were asked to imagine that they were the local employees in that situation and to complete a questionnaire that was designed to measure the relevant measures. Results of the social distance measure found that the participants were closest to fellow Hong Kong Chinese and were more distant with people from the United States and mainland China. Furthermore, differences in perceived social distance were associated with how they perceived the conflict situation, attributed responsibilities, and resolved the conflict if they were in such a situation.

Leung (1988) requested 192 undergraduates from Hong Kong and the United States and 144 nonstudents from the surrounding communities to read a conflict scenario and to indicate how likely they would be to pursue or to avoid the conflict. His results showed that, if the involved benefits were large and if the would-be disputant was from an out-group, Chinese participants were more likely to pursue a conflict than were Americans. In other words, the difference between in- and out-group is not a major concern for Americans when deciding if they want to pursue a conflict with a disputant. However, Chinese emphasize the distinction between in- and out-group. They value the importance of intragroup harmony, while they are more likely to pursue a conflict with a disputant from out-group.

Confrontation

There was a series of previous research that indicated that Chinese aggressive behaviors toward out-group members were very drastic, and they may attack the opposite by either public abuse or collective violence (Bond and Wang 1981). Ward (1965) interpreted this phenomenon in terms of the absence of peaceful modes of conflict resolution between out-group in Chinese culture. Even in situations where verbal confrontation is supposed to be requisite of a particular role relationship, they may use physical aggression instead of verbal debate. For instance, my book *The Whirlpool of Power* describes how legislators of different parties are engaged in power struggles in the arena of parliament since Taiwan adopted a democratic system Hwang (1997).

Kuo (1994) examined the argumentative strategies used in legislative question and answer sessions from parliamentary interpolations in Taiwan. He found that most questions from opposition legislators were designed to blame or criticize government officials, whose anticipation prompted them to become defensive. However, several combative officials did not respond to challenges or accusations with justifications or denials but with counteractions identical to the accusing questions in surface structure. Hostility in this type of adversarial dialogue was frequently conveyed by sarcasm. On the other hand, embarrassed officials occasionally offered conciliatory responses, including the invoking of shared wants and social memberships to get out of a specific predicament.

Striving for Face

It should be emphasized here that the so-called in-group or out-group in this article is mainly a psychological definition. When two parties are involved in an overt conflict, their relationship might be changed from in-group to out-group. In a power structure emphasizing “principle of respecting the superior,” when the superior of a vertical in-group ignores feelings of the subordinates and insists on the execution of his will, the inferior may react to fight against him, and both parties “tear off their faces” and confront the open conflict head-on. A case of conflict between a junior high school student and her mother reported by Lin and Lin (1999) can be used to show this point. In this case, a girl’s mother reproved her for talking with boys on the phone and delaying her dinner time. Her mother even pretends to beat her. The girl thinks she should not be blamed and her mother just transfers anger to her, so she says things in a different way on purpose in rebellion of her mother.

Mom usually became moody at certain time, my father also asked us not to offend her. But this is ridiculous, she has low moods, me too! Why’s that? So she should not provoke me, either... then I kept calling her names, I said: Funny! Who do you think you are? You think you can do it because you are my mom? If I have child, I won’t do this kind of things to her...

Then I stopped talking and just stood there, my mom and others were sitting, only I stood up firmly. My mom ordered me to sit down, I refused. I posed like this, like this to stare at her...I was very agitated, in fact I am not! Why she was acting so angrily, so I say things differently on purpose to against her, otherwise I would have no face, she ordered me to sit, so bad, then I really sit? (Lin and Lin 1995, p. 90)

Viewing from the conceptual framework in Table 12.3, the relation between mother and daughter is a kind of vertical in-group in which they should constitute a greater-self to outsiders and maintain each other's "face" in front of outsiders. Nevertheless, while they were involved in serious conflict, the daughter's self-consciousness was aroused. She used various symbolic actions to represent herself as an individual independent to her mother, just like a relation of horizontal out-group: "I stopped talking and just stood there, my mom and others were sitting, only I stood up firmly...my mom ordered me to sit down, I refused...so I say things differently on purpose to against her, otherwise I would have no face."

In Chinese society, the sense of "face" is usually aroused in the situation where an individual is aware of himself/herself. If an individual considers himself/herself and others as parts of a "greater-self," s/he usually doesn't have "face" awareness for himself/herself. Instead, s/he may pay special attention to the "face" of his/her "greater-self," which implies that s/he may take a position against others, thus resulting in a serious conflict with the other:

Then I shouted loudly. Ridiculous! I am your daughter, why you beat me? Why you beat me like beating animals? I was so angry at that moment, when my mom says a word, and I could retort ten more... yes, she was angry, but, I was angrier, it's really funny! I was really pissed off, then she wanted to beat me, I stood up and shouted to her. You beat ass, it's really hurt... I would say what I think is right, I would also admit what I am wrong, but have you ever thought that you are wrong when you beat kid's head like that. (Lin and Lin 1995, p. 90-91)

Mediation

When Chinese people get involved in intense conflict, a third party in their social network tends to intervene between them and to reduce the likelihood of spiraling violence (Brown 1977; Ma 1992). The mediator usually is someone who occupies a higher position in his or her network. His/her major job is to separate the opposing sides and to find a solution without any loss of "face" to either side (Bond and Wang 1981). In order to achieve this goal, s/he is likely to ask both sides: "for the sake of my face, don't quarrel anymore...stop the quarrel, or you will lose our face" (Zai 1995). If the mediator has sufficient face, then they may cease hostility without losing face because they can construe their peacemaking as protecting the mediator's face (Cohen 1967).

Mediation by third party's intervention has been used in East Asian society for a very long history, and it has become a formal social institution in many places. As a grass-roots tool for settling civil disputes without characterizing them as conflicts between blame-worthy adversaries, Xu (1994) described the origin, development,

and organization of people's conciliation in contemporary China in relation to other forms of intervention such as self-conducted, language assisted, administrative, and judicial conciliation in Chinese history. Similar systems can be found in Hawaii where the majority of people are from Asian cultures, such as Japanese, Chinese, and Korean.

Mediation Techniques

Ogawa (1999) explored the East Asian origin of face and facework historically, philosophically, and linguistically, studied the Hawaii model of mediation, examining the consequences of facework in the mediation process in the community. Wall and Blum (1991) interviewed 97 community mediators (aged 45–70 years) in the People's Republic of China and indicated the frequency with which they used 27 mediation techniques, including educate, gather information, argue for concessions, quote law, obtain forgiveness, etc.

Lee (2003) recruited 207 participants, including American, native Chinese, native Taiwanese, and native Korean students registered at Ohio university, and examined face-concerns and mediation techniques of an informal third-party in intercultural conflict management. As a result of principal component analysis, a factor structure of face-concerns emerged from the data; it consisted of concerns for the disputants' self-image, concerns for the relational harmony, concerns for feelings, and concerns for the third party's self-image. He identified 35 mediation techniques/tactics in his study, which can be classified into five large categories/themes along a continuum of the level of involvement/commitment of a third party in this situation – no involvement, passive mediation, disputants-active approach, mediator-active approach, and relationship-oriented approach.

Leung (1987) conducted a cross-cultural research with participants from Hong Kong and the United States. His results showed that the Chinese participants preferred bargaining and mediation to a large extent than did the individualistic American participants. The reason for the Chinese participants' strong preference for mediation and bargaining was that these two procedures were perceived as (a) granting the disputants process control, (b) capable of reducing the animosity between the disputants, (c) fair, and (d) favorable.

Of course, the mediator may or may not be a figure of justice or fairness without any bias. As it was indicated in Chen's (1992) research on 55 cases of marriage violence in Taiwan, a majority of female victims reported that their reactions to the violent treatment from their husbands for the first time were crying or keeping silence (25 cases, 45%); some of them bawled back (17 cases, 23%) or fought back (7 cases, 13%) while a few of them went back to their parents' houses (3 cases, 5%). It should be noted that even when the victims told their parents how they had suffered, their parents usually suggested that women should forbear that kind of treatment. Their parents-in-laws also gave them similar advice by saying that because their sons had long been like that and would never change, it would be better to follow the policy of "opening one eye, with another eye closed."

Severance

In the conceptual framework demonstrated in Table 12.3, the author adopts the approach of scientific realism to construct a microworld of theoretical framework in order to explicate interpersonal relationships and models of conflict resolution in Chinese society. Those models are “synchronic” in the sense that the author doesn’t take into consideration the change about interpersonal relationship along the dimension of temporality. In fact, one’s relationships with others in lifeworld are diachronic, and those relationships might change sequentially with the progress of a conflict episode.

According to the Confucian cultural ideal, the interpersonal relationships inside a family should be arranged on the basis of “benevolence” (*jen*), which was represented by the strong expressive component of the expressive ties in the theoretical model of Fig. 5.1. If the superior doesn’t note the change but keeps on imposing his/her will over the subordinate, the latter may not want to forbear anymore. The more serious the conflicts between them, the weaker the expressive component remains in their relationship. When there remains only the instrumental component, both sides may calculate carefully about their own interests in maintaining the relationship. Once they believe that divorce is beneficial to both of them, their relationship may be severed.

In Liu’s (1999) research, a wife mentioned her mother-in-law’s mentality about conceiving her middle-aged son to have extramarital relations:

My mother-in-law spoke three things, and my heart is dead. She said, man always the same, he play till he is old. When he is old enough, he will come back home. Another thing is what she told my husband: people play all their lives without having any problem, only you. The other thing she told me is: your husband did not spend money; the girl always has free tickets when she goes out. These words that my mother-in-law spoke to me really make me disappointed. I’m really very sad. We get along more than twenty years, you say this way. My husband always playing numbs, and begins to have that kind of life again. I feel this is not what I want. (Liu 1999, p. 168)

Finally, I give him an ultimatum, ask him to make a choice, you can only choose one, you can not own both at the same time. Man can do this, we women can choose our way of life as well. First I ask him a question: Do you want to maintain this marriage? No? It’s very simple to stop it! Because our children already grow up at this time, if I say I do not want to divorce, the whole situation is bad all the time, what can I do? You ask me to be a traditional woman, but you never request yourself, you are not qualified to require me. (Liu 1999, p. 168–169)

Research Tradition of Confucian Relationalism

From the viewpoint of Kuhn (1962), as he proposed in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, when a social scientist follows Western paradigms to do research in a non-Western society, s/he is destined to encounter a lot of anomalies which cannot be adequately assessed by his theory. However, because most researchers in the

scientific community are over-socialized by mainstream paradigms of Western social sciences and regard them as a means to approach the truth, it is the individual researcher, rather than the paradigm of mainstream social science, which is being tested in the stage of normal science. All the responsibilities of failing to solve a scientific puzzle should be assumed by the individual researcher, not the research paradigm.

Scientific Revolution

Nevertheless, the scientific community may face crisis when the frequency of encountering anomaly increases to such an extent that more and more scientists find that their paradigms cannot work effectively. The coming of age of scientific crisis may cause the scientific community to lose their confidence in traditional research paradigms and seek replacements, as a result, they may propose various alternatives to contend for attention at this stage.

The rise of the indigenization movement of psychology in many non-Western countries since 1980 can be viewed as the crisis encountered by the wholesale implantation of the Western research paradigm. When the request for change becomes more and more earnest, it signifies the coming of age for a scientific revolution. A scientific revolution implies a process in which old popular paradigms are replaced by new ones. Because a research paradigm is constituted by scientific theory, research method, and their philosophical foundation, a paradigm shift may cause changes not only in scientific theory, but also in the epistemology and methodology followed by the scientific community.

In the discourse of rationales for constructing theoretical models in this book, I consistently reflect on the ontology/epistemology/methodology of various approaches in contemporary psychology, with the expectation of calling the reader's attention to the paradigm shift from the Western psychology of individualism to Confucian relationalism.

Chapter 4 argued that the theoretical model of Face and Favor was constructed on the four elementary forms of social behavior that are supposed to be universal. Chapter 5 indicated that the Face and Favor model entails an isomorphic structure with the Confucian ethics for ordinary people. Their isomorphic relationships may be used to illustrate the arguments of "one mind, many mentalities" as advocated by cultural psychologists (e.g., Shweder). The Face and Favor model can depict the universal mind for social behaviors of all human beings, while the Confucian ethics for ordinary people enable us to understand the specific mentality for social actions of Chinese people. The findings of previous research on social exchange theories have been critically reviewed and creatively utilized to construct a series of models in Confucian Relationalism (Fu 1986). Viewed from the philosophy of constructive realism, many concepts of these two systems can be translated or back-translated from one system into another, as they are commensurable. Therefore, their relationship is an evolution one, not revolution.

Because the Face and Favor model was constructed with the four elementary forms of social behavior that are supposed to be for all human beings, the model constitutes the hard core for constructing a series of theoretical models on such topics as social exchange, moral judgment, achievement motivation, face maintenance, organizational culture, and conflict resolution. Based on the same reasoning, we may construct many more theories on social behaviors in related domains to form the research tradition of Confucian relationalism Laudan (1977). This, in my opinion, is the future direction for the development of Chinese indigenous psychology.

References

- Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality*. Garden City, NY: Double Day.
- Blake, R. R., & Mouton, J. S. (1964). *The managerial grid*. Houston: Gulf Publishing.
- Bond, M. H., & Wang, S. H. (1981). Aggressive behavior in Chinese society: The problem of maintaining order and harmony. *Acta Psychologica Taiwanica*, 23, 57–73.
- Brew, F. P., & Cairns, D. R. (2004). Styles of managing interpersonal workplace conflict in relation to status and face concerns: A study with Anglos and Chinese. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 15, 27–56.
- Brown, B. R. (1977). Face-saving and face-restoration in negotiation. In D. Druckman (Ed.), *Negotiations: Social-psychological perspectives*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Chan, D. K. S., & Goto, S. G. (2003). Conflict resolution in the culturally diverse workplace: Some data from Hong Kong employees. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 52, 441–460.
- Che, S. H. (1997). *Wondering in and out: The power relationship between the bride and her mother-in-law* (in Chinese). Unpublished Master thesis, Taipei: Soochow University.
- Chen, R. J. C. (1992). The nature, process, and influence of marriage violence in Taiwan (in Chinese). *Journal of Female and Sex*, 3, 117–147.
- Chen, S. W. (1994). *Social relationships and the choices of conflict resolution procedures: In a perspective of patterns of the properties of relationships* (in Chinese). Unpublished Master thesis, National Taiwan University.
- Chen, J., Chen, L., & Zhang, J. (2006). A research on the styles of handling superior-subordinate conflicts: Its questionnaire and analysis. *Psychological Science (China)*, 29, 926–928.
- Chen, Y. F., & Tjosvold, D. (2007). Co-operative conflict management: An approach to strengthen relationships between foreign managers and Chinese employees. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources*, 45, 271–294.
- Chen, Y. F., Tjosvold, D., & Fang, S. S. (2005). Working with foreign managers: Conflict management for effective leader relationships in China. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 16, 265–286.
- Chiao, J. (1981). A preliminary research of stratagems in Chinese culture (in Chinese). In Y. Y. Li & J. Chiao (Eds.), *Chinese people, society and culture*. Taipei: Shihuo Press.
- Chiao, J. (1985). A preliminary model of Chinese strategic behaviors (in Chinese). In K. S. Yang (Ed.), *Chinese psychology*. Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Chiu, R. K., & Kosinski, F. A. (1994). Is Chinese conflict-handling behavior influenced by Chinese values? *Social Behavior and Personality*, 22, 81–90.
- Cohen, J. A. (1967). Chinese mediation on the eve of modernization. In D. C. Buxbaum (Ed.), *Traditional and modern legal institutions in Asia and Africa*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Fu, C. W. H. (1986). *Critical succession and creative development*. Taipei, Taiwan: Dong-Da Publishing co.

- Fu, H., Watkins, D., & Hui, E. K. P. (2004). Personality correlates of the disposition towards interpersonal forgiveness: A Chinese perspective. *International Journal of Psychology, 39*, 305–316.
- Gergen, K. J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. *American Psychologist, 40*, 266–275.
- Hall, J. (1969). *Conflict management survey*. Rochester, NY: Technometrics.
- Holmes, J. G., & Miller, D. T. (1976). Interpersonal conflict. In J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. Carson (Eds.), *Contemporary topics in social psychology* (pp. 265–308). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- Holt, J. L., & DeVore, C. J. (2005). Culture, gender, organizational role, and styles of conflict resolution: A meta-analysis. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29*, 165–196.
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1971). Psychological homeostasis and jen: Conceptual tools for advancing psychological anthropology. *American Anthropologist, 73*, 23–44.
- Huang, L. L. (1996). *The harmony and conflict in Chinese social relationships: Theory and empirical analysis* (in Chinese). Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, National Taiwan University.
- Hwang, K. K. (1995). The contemporary transformation of Confucian values: Theoretical values and empirical research (in Chinese). *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies, 3*, 276–338.
- Hwang, K. K. (1997a). *The whirlpool of power (in Chinese)*. Taipei, Taiwan: Business Weekly.
- Hwang, K. K. (1997b). *Guanxi and mientze: Conflict resolution in Chinese society. Intercultural Communication Studies, 7*, 17–37.
- Hwang, K. K. (2005). Concepts of face in Chinese Society. In K. S. Yang, K. K. Hwang, & C. F. Yang (Eds.), *Indigenous psychological research (in Chinese)*. Taipei, Taiwan: Lanreate Book Co.
- King, A. Y. C. (1988). “Face”, “shame” and an analysis of Chinese behavior (in Chinese). In K. S. Yang (Ed.), *Chinese psychology*. Taipei, Taiwan: Laureate Book Co.
- Kirkbride, P. S., Tang, S. F., & Westwood, R. I. (1991). Chinese conflict preferences and negotiation behavior: Cultural and psychological influences. *Organization Studies, 12*, 365–386.
- Kuhn, T. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kuo, S.-H. (1994). Argumentative strategies in Chinese political talks. *Proceedings of the National Science Council, ROC Part C: Humanities and Social Sciences, 4*, 88–105.
- LaBarre, W. (1945). Some observations on character structure in the Orient. *Psychiatry, 8*, 319–342.
- Laudan, L. (1977/1992). *Progress and its problems: Toward a theory of scientific growth*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Lee, M. L. (1994). *The Chinese concept of Ren (forbearance): Theory and empirical analysis* (in Chinese). Unpublished master thesis, National Taiwan University.
- Lee, S. Y. (2003). The effect of culture and self-construal on face-concerns and mediation techniques of an informal third-party intermediary in intercultural/ interpersonal conflict. *Dissertations Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences, 63*, 3790.
- Leung, K. (1987). Some determinants of reactions to procedural models for conflict resolution: A cross-national study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*, 898–908.
- Leung, K. (1988). Some determinants of conflict avoidance. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 19*, 125–136.
- Leung, K., & Lind, E. A. (1986). Procedural justice and culture: Effects of culture, gender, and investigator status on procedural preferences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50*, 1134–1140.
- Li, Y. Y. (1988). Ancestor workshop and the psychological stability of family members in Taiwan. In K. Yoshimatsu & W. S. Tseng (Eds.), *Asian family mental health* (pp. 26–33). Tokyo: Psychiatric Research Institute of Tokyo.
- Li, Y. Y. (1992). In search of equilibrium and harmony: On the basic value orientation of traditional Chinese peasants. In C. Nakane & C. Chiao (Eds.), *Home bound: Studies in East Asian society* (pp. 127–148). Hong Kong: The Center for East Asian Cultural Studies.

- Li, T. S. (1995). The interaction process of couples: A preliminary investigation on young couples in Taipei (in Chinese). *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 4, 260–321.
- Li, M. C. (1997). *The properties and functions of Chinese important social relationship: Parents and Children* (in Chinese). Paper presented at the Vocational Class of Indigenous Psychology, National Taiwan University.
- Lin, Z. J., & Lin, H. Y. (1999). The process of coping with the conflicts between parents and children among junior high school students. *Indigenous Psychological Research*, 12, 47–101.
- Lin, W. Y., & Wang, C. W. (1995). Chinese parents' views about child-rearing: Disciplining or beating (in Chinese)? *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 3, 2–92.
- Liu, H. Q. (1999). A dialectic perspective on the process of conflicts between husband and wife. *Indigenous Psychological Research*, 11, 153–202.
- Lung, A. Y. (2000). Parent-adolescent conflict and resolution in Chinese American and causation families (cross cultural, intergenerational conflict). *Dissertations Abstracts International Section B: The Sciences and Engineering*, 60, 3571.
- Ma, R. (1992). The role of unofficial intermediaries in interpersonal conflicts in the Chinese culture. *Communication Quarterly*, 40, 267–278.
- Ma, Z. Z. (2007). Chinese conflict management styles and negotiation behaviors: An empirical test. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, 7, 101–119.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98, 224–253.
- Niber, R., & Harris, K. L. (2003). The effect of culture and cohesiveness on intragroup conflict and effectiveness. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 143(5), 613–631.
- Niem, C. T. I., & Collard, R. R. (1972). Parental discipline of aggressive behaviors in four-year-old Chinese and American children. *Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association*, 7, 95–96.
- Oetzel, J., Ting-Toomey, S., Masumoto, T., Yokochi, Y., Pan, X. H., Takai, J., et al. (2001). Face and facework in conflict: A cross-cultural comparison of China, Germany, Japan, and the United States. *Communication Monographs*, 68, 235–258.
- Ogawa, N. (1999). The concept of facework: Its functions in the Hawaii model of mediation. *Mediation Quarterly*, 17, 5–20.
- Rahim, M. A. (1986). *Managing conflict in organizations*. New York: Praeger.
- Ryback, D., Sanders, A. L., Lorentz, J., & Koestenblatt, M. (1980). Child-rearing practices reported by students in six cultures. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 110, 153–162.
- Sampson, E. E. (1985). The decentralization of identity: Toward a revised concept of personal and social order. *American Psychologist*, 36, 730–743.
- Sampson, E. E. (1988). The debate on individualism: Indigenous psychologies of the individual and their role in personal and societal functioning. *American Psychologist*, 43, 15–22.
- Silin, R. H. (1976). *Leadership and values*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sollenberger, R. T. (1968). Chinese-American child-rearing practices and juvenile delinquency. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 74, 13–23.
- Solomon, R. H. (1971). *Mao's revolution and the Chinese political culture*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Sterba, R. L. (1978). Clandestine management in the imperial Chinese bureaucracy. *Academy of Management Review*, 3, 69–78.
- Stover, L. E. (1974). *The cultural ecology of Chinese civilization*. New York: PICA Press.
- Sweeney, B., & Carruthers, W. L. (1996). Conflict resolution: History, philosophy, theory, and educational applications. *School Counselor*, 43, 326–344.
- Tang, S. F., & Kirkbride, P. S. (1986). Developing conflict management skills in Hong Kong: An analysis of some cross-cultural implications. *Management Education and Development*, 17, 287–301.
- Thomas, K. W. (1976). Conflict and conflict management. In M. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

- Ting-Toomey, S. (1985). Toward a theory of conflict and culture. In W. Gudykunst, L. Stewart, & S. Ting-Toomey (Eds.), *Communication, culture, and organizational processes* (pp. 71–86). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Ting-Toomey, S. (1988). Intercultural conflict styles: A face negotiation theory. In Y. Y. Kim & W. B. Gudykunst (Eds.), *Theories in intercultural communication* (pp. 213–235). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Ting-Toomey, S. (Ed.). (1994). *The challenge of facework: Cross-cultural and interpersonal issues*. New York: State University of New York-Albany Press.
- Ting-Toomey, S. (2005). The matrix of face: An updated face-negotiation theory. In W. Gudykunst (Ed.), *Theorizing about intercultural communication* (pp. 71–92). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ting-Toomey, S., & Oetzel, J. G. (2001). *Managing intercultural conflict effectively*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Tinsley, C. H., & Brett, J. M. (2001). Managing workplace conflict in the United States and Hong Kong. *Behaviors and Human Decision Process*, 85, 360–381.
- Tinsley, C. H., & Weldon, E. (2003). Response to a normative conflict among American and Chinese managers. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, 3, 183–194.
- Tjosvold, D., Hui, C., & Law, K. S. (2001). Constructive conflict in China: Cooperative conflict as a bridge between East and West. *Journal of World Business*, 36, 166–183.
- Tjosvold, D., Hui, C., & Sun, H. F. (2004). Can Chinese discuss conflict openly? Field and experimental studies of face dynamics in China. *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 13, 351–373.
- Tjosvold, D., Leung, K., & Johnson, D. W. (2006). Co-operative and competitive conflict in China. In M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, & E. C. Marcus (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution: The theory and practice* (2nd ed., pp. 671–692). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Tjosvold, D., Nibler, R., & Wan, P. (2001). Motivation for conflict among Chinese university students: Effects of others' expertise and one's own confidence on engaging in conflict. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 141, 353–363.
- Tjosvold, D., Poon, M., & Yu, Z. Y. (2005). Team effectiveness in China: Co-operative conflict for relationship building. *Human Relations*, 58, 341–367.
- Tjosvold, D., & Sun, H. (2001). Effects of influence tactics and social contexts in conflict: An experiment on relationships in China. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 12, 239–258.
- Tjosvold, D., & Sun, H. (2002). Understanding conflict avoidance: Relationship, motivations, actions and consequences. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 13, 142–164.
- Tjosvold, D., & Sun, H. F. (2003). Openness among Chinese in conflict: Effects of direct discussion and warmth on integrative decision making. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 33, 1878–1897.
- Walder, A. G. (1983). Organized dependency and cultures of authority in Chinese industry. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 43, 51–76.
- Wall, J. A., & Blum, M. (1991). Community mediation in the People's Republic of China. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35, 3–20.
- Wallner, F. (1994). *Constructive realism: Aspects of new epistemological movement*. Vienna: W. Braumüller.
- Wang, R. H. (1996). *The logic of using stratagems by traditional Chinese* (in Chinese). Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, National Taiwan University.
- Ward, B. E. (1965). Varieties of the conscious model: The fisherman of South China. In M. Banton (Ed.), *The relevance of models for social anthropology*. London: Tavistock.
- Westwood, R. I., Tang, S. F., & Kirkbride, P. S. (1992). Chinese conflict behavior: Antecedents and behavioral consequence. *Organization Development Journal*, 10, 13–19.
- Wolf, M. (1970). Child training and the Chinese family. In M. Freedman (Ed.), *Family and kinship in Chinese society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Wong, C. L., Tjosvold, D., & Lee, F. (1992). Managing conflict in a diverse work force: A Chinese perspective in North America. *Small Group Research*, 23, 302–321.
- Xu, X. Y. (1994). People's conciliation: A model of conflict management of civil disputes in China. *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, 5, 326–342.

- Yan, J., & Sorenson, R. L. (2004). The influence of Confucian ideology on conflict in Chinese family business. *Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, 4, 5–17.
- Yang, C. F. (1988). Familism and development: An examination of the role of family in contemporary China Mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In D. Sinha & H. S. R. Kao (Eds.), *Social values and development: Asian perspectives*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Yeh, K. H. (1995). Solution types in filial dilemmas and their various correlates. *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica*, 79, 87–118.
- Yeh, K. H., & Bedford, O. (2004). Filial belief and parent-child. *International Journal of Psychology*, 39, 132–144.
- Zai, S. W. (1995). *Chinese views of Lian and Mian*. Taipei: Laureate Book Co.
- Zhang, Y. B. (2004). Initiating factors of Chinese intergenerational conflict: Young adults' written accounts. *Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology*, 19, 299–319.
- Zhang, V. B., Harwood, J., & Hummert, M. L. (2005). Perceptions of conflict management styles in Chinese intergenerational dyads. *Communication Monographs*, 72, 71–91.
- Zou, T. H. (1995). *The reasons of obeying publicly and defying privately: A preliminary research of the action logic in traditional Chinese society* (in Chinese). Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, National Taiwan University.

Index

A

Absolutism, 132, 133, 148
Abstract principle
 of harm, 165–167
 of justice, 165, 166
Academic imperialism, 8
Academic performance, 237, 248, 249, 251,
 255, 282, 284, 285
Accommodating style, 331, 333
Achievement motivation, 17, 65, 219–259,
 279, 280, 330, 365
Actuality, 26
Adaptation, 135
Adversary procedure, 332
Affection-oriented familial culture, 319
Affective component, 88, 93, 171, 172, 305
Affective exchange, 321
Affective manipulation, 144
Affectiveness, 302
Affective righteousness, 159
Affective ties, 162, 322
Agents-in-society, 123, 169, 193
All-embracing, 339
Altruism, 143, 149
 and human relationship parameter,
 149–150
Altruistic act, 76
Altruistic awareness, 144
Americanized psychology, 8, 132
Analytical-empirical science, 63–65
Aniki (older brothers), 210
Anomalies, 56, 58, 146, 364
Antecedent conditions, 55, 132, 195, 213, 225
Anticolonialism, 4, 8, 13, 33
Antithetical other, 6
Apprehension, 45, 266
Ascribed relations, 301–302, 304

Asian psychology, 9, 10
Assertiveness, 331, 333
Atomic fact, 50, 51
Authority-oriented cognitive framework, 206
Authority ranking, 7, 84, 86, 87
Autistic conflict, 359
Autocentrism, 144–145
Autonomy of will, 46
Autonomy training, 144
Auxiliary assumptions, 225
Auxiliary hypotheses, 55, 56
Avoidance, 5, 143, 221, 230, 232–237, 279,
 305, 334, 339, 340, 348, 359

B

Balance and harmony, 125, 126
Bargaining, 74, 355, 363
Behavior control, 73
Benevolence (*ren*), 36, 103, 104, 106–111,
 114, 127, 158
Benevolent father and filial son, 126, 281
Benevolent righteousness, 159
Benevolent sovereign, 163, 164, 275
Body–mind–spirit model, 21–24, 37–38
Bottom-up model building paradigm, 8
Braver, 317
Buddhism, 35–37, 100, 126, 149, 153, 276, 349
Bunke, 209, 210
Bureaucratic system, 308
Business interaction, 316, 317

C

Cantonese, 268
Cartesian dualism, 29–31, 54, 62
Categorical imperative, 136, 162

- Central countries, 2, 3
Ceteris paribus, 56
 Chinese capitalism, 298
 Christianity, 47, 99, 281, 342
 Clientelistic politics, 299
 Closeness–distance dimension, 196–197,
 210, 269
 Code, 165, 166, 198
 Cognitive trust network, 323
 Collective orientation, 192
 Communal relationship, 88, 201, 202
 Communal sharing, 7, 84, 87
 Communist neo-traditionalism, 299
 Comparison level, for alternative, 73
 Competence, 80, 124, 144, 228–230, 233, 234,
 312, 319–322
 Competitiveness, 279, 332, 334
 Complete model, 310, 346–347, 354
 Compromise, 329, 331–333, 335, 338–341,
 346, 353–355
 Conceding, 349–350
 Concentric circles, 189
 Conceptions of destiny, 98–101, 126, 127
 Concept(s)
 of face, 64, 266–270
 of person, 13, 41–65
 Concern
 for personal goal, 331
 for relationship, 331
 Concrete moral thought level, 140
 Concreteness, 76, 199
 Conditional positive duty, 162–164,
 167, 203, 275
 Confrontation, 331, 332, 341, 346, 354, 355,
 360–361
 Confucian cosmology, 158, 342
 Confucian ethical system of *ren-yi-li*,
 36, 105, 106
 Confucian ethics for ordinary people, 16, 106,
 107, 127, 157–161, 163, 166, 169, 173,
 188–191, 194, 195, 210, 254, 269–270,
 275, 277, 280, 281, 300, 302, 341, 346,
 347, 349, 350, 365
 Confucianism, 35–37, 47, 64, 97–127, 148,
 149, 153, 157, 158, 163, 166–169, 171,
 183, 188, 193, 194, 210, 266–270, 274,
 277, 280, 281, 300, 322, 330, 334, 344,
 347–349, 358
 Confucian learning, 253
 Confucian maxim, 162
 Confucian model of mind, 103–107, 109, 126
 Confucian relationalism, 7, 12, 15–17, 69,
 87–94, 158, 187–213, 220, 231, 232,
 238, 239, 245, 247, 254, 277, 284, 287,
 290, 319, 339, 341, 364–365
 Confucian scholars, 64, 99, 101, 102, 108,
 111, 117, 123, 345
 Confucian way of humanity, 98, 103, 158,
 161, 162, 275
 Confucian work dynamism, 334
 Confucius, 36, 100, 102, 103, 110, 111,
 113–120, 158, 167, 174, 253, 353
 Consanguinity, 308
 Conscious model, 15, 188
 Constructive realism, 12–13, 21–39,
 41, 82, 98, 105, 131, 153,
 188, 189, 195, 331, 365
 Conventional level, 134, 170
 Conventional morality, 134
 Convergent thinking, 56, 58
 Cooperative goals, 322–323, 357–359
 Cooperativeness, 331, 333
 Coordination strategies, 346
 Cosmology, 46, 99, 101, 102, 125, 127, 158,
 160, 342, 343
 Covering model, 195, 213
 Creative imagination, 55, 227–228
 Critical science, 63
 Cross-cousin marriages, 70
 Cross-cultural indigenous psychology, 10
 Cultural heritage, 27, 32
 Cultural reproduction, 33
 Cultural universality, 136, 137
 Culture-as-a-whole, 231
 Culture-free, 137
 Customary trust, 311–312, 315
- D**
Das Unbedingte, 46
 Deduction
 model, 224, 225
 with examination, 54
 Deductive model, 55, 132, 213
 Deep structure, 10, 11, 14–16, 39, 41, 64, 69,
 84–87, 94, 97–127, 140, 158, 173, 188,
 195, 207, 266, 347, 348, 358, 367
 Deference, 108, 109, 121, 160, 268
 Defining issues test (DIT), 139–142
 Derived ethic, 132
 approach, 10, 132, 133, 142–148,
 153, 157
 Dialectic thinking, 62
 Difference in seniority, 302
 Differential order, 107, 109, 112, 123, 126,
 127, 189–191, 194, 195, 307
 Dimension
 of dominance-submission, 198
 of intimacy/distance, 108
 of superiority/inferiority, 108, 109

- Discretionary features, 165, 166
 Disenchantment, 99
 Dispute resolution, 332
 Distributive justice, 77–79, 82, 86, 107–110,
 127, 158, 159, 322
 Divergent rationalities, 147, 165–167
 Divergent thinking, 56, 58–59
 Domain of destiny, 100
 Dominant responses, 346, 354
 Dominating, 2, 28, 331, 335, 349–350
 Dominative construction, 26, 30–31
Doxa, 42
Dozoku, 209, 210
 Dual-concern model, 334
 Dual concerns theory, 330
Duhem–Quine thesis, 56
 Duties
 of commission, 161, 175, 180, 254
 of omission, 161, 175, 180, 254
 Duty-based morality, 231, 254
 Dyadic interaction, 72, 73
 Dynamic equilibrium, 125, 190
 Dynamism, 55, 316, 334
- E**
- Economic man, 71, 73
 Economic productivity, 79
 Economic reformation, 308
 Economic transaction, 73, 75, 76
 Edwards personal preference
 schedule (EPPS), 221
 Effort
 as a mean, 233, 251, 252
 as a merit, 251, 252
 model, 249–253, 255
 Ego goals, 235
 Egoism, 149, 189
 Eight trigrams (*ba-gua*), 125
Ein Reich der Zwecke, 44
 Elementary forms of social life, 69, 84
 Elementary proposition, 50–52
 Emancipative interest, 63
 Emergent properties, 72, 73, 87, 94, 301, 311
 Emergent trust, 311, 315, 316, 321
 Emic, 132
 approach, 132, 133, 153, 157, 158, 231
 Empathy, 91, 143, 144
 Endurance, 120, 254, 313, 341, 346, 349, 354
 Entity theory, 229, 230, 248
 Environmental uncertainty, 300, 316, 318
 Epistemological goal, 1–17
 Equality
 matching, 7, 86, 87, 197
 rule, 79, 80, 87, 91, 92, 94, 199
- Equilibrium, 23, 37, 75, 98, 135, 140, 149,
 190, 269–274
 worldview model, 124–126
 Equity theory, 16, 74, 78–79, 94
 Error elimination, 53
 Essential tension, 58
 Essential thinking, 28
 Ethics
 for ordinary people, 16, 98, 106–114,
 127, 157–164, 166, 169, 173, 188–191,
 194, 195, 210, 254, 269–270, 275, 277,
 280, 281, 300, 302, 341, 346, 347, 349,
 350, 365
 for scholars, 98, 106, 107, 112, 119–123,
 127, 158, 162, 277
 Ethnocentrism, 9
 Evolutionary epistemology, 16, 52–54, 61, 87,
 224, 228, 259
 Exchange relationship, 70, 76, 82, 86, 88, 89,
 201–203
 Existential, 146–148, 153
 Exogenous variables, 73
Explanandum, 55, 132
Explanans, 55, 132
 Expressible conscious, 190, 191
 Expressive component, 88, 89, 104, 106, 109,
 126, 159, 194, 200, 270, 342, 351, 353,
 355, 356, 363
 Expressive ties, 88–90, 93, 94, 109, 110, 159,
 160, 194, 270, 346, 353, 363
 External formal harmony, 125
 Externalized structure, 81
 Extrinsic attraction, 72
 Extrinsic goals, 233, 235
 Extrinsic motivation, 232–238
- F**
- Face
 and favor model, 11, 16, 69–94, 159, 162,
 169, 188, 189, 194, 195, 198–200,
 299–302, 320, 323, 330, 335, 365
 languages, 330, 337–339
 loving (*ai mianzi*), 267, 279, 280
 maintenance, 272–274, 365
 negotiation theory, 330, 334–337
 Falsification, 56, 62, 225
 Family resemblance, 27, 188
 Fate control, 73
 Father-son axis, 190, 194, 344, 345
 Felt obligations, 202
 Fight overtly and struggle covertly, 354, 356
 Filial obligation, 204–205
 Financial exchange, 204
 Firms, 291

First-degree interpretation, 103, 171
 First proposition, 29, 79
 Five cardinal ethics, 159
 Five cardinal relations, 159–160, 269
The five cardinal relationships (wu lun), 107
 Five primary elements (*wu-hsin*), 125
 Fondness for learning, 115–116, 222
 Forbearance, 349, 350
 Forcing, 270, 330, 333
 Foreign-invested enterprises, 303
 Form, 2, 14, 15, 27, 29–31, 35, 43–45, 53, 55, 61, 81, 86, 102, 114, 117, 125, 127, 135–137, 144, 149, 170, 192, 197, 208, 209, 225, 235, 298, 299, 301, 305, 309–312, 315, 343, 345, 365
 Formal rationality, 2, 26, 29–33, 166
 Forms of life, 14, 27, 131, 188
 Four component model, 140–141
 Four part model, 139, 140
 Frankfurt School, 63
 Free will, 46–48, 73, 87

G

Galilean view, 190, 191
 Game matrix, 73, 78
Gao guanxi (doing relations), 297, 318
Gate of life and death, 48
Gate of true thusness, 48
 Geisteswissenschaft, 59
 Gender ideology model, 203
 Generalized reciprocity, 76
 General laws, 55, 132, 224
 Geomancy (*feng-shui*), 125
 Giving face, 337, 338, 353–356
 Global psychology, 10, 11
Golden Mean, 102, 106, 107, 114, 115, 124, 149, 158
 Gong De movement, 167–169
Gongzheng (equity), 200
 “Good boy” or “good girl” orientation, 134
 Great self (*da wo*), 166
 Guanxi, 93, 104–106, 109, 126, 127, 159, 198–200, 284–285, 297–324, 330, 334, 339, 341–342, 353
Guanxi capitalism, 298
Guanxi phenomenon, 298
Guanxiwang (social network), 297

H

Hakka, 268
 Harmony, 91, 119, 125, 126, 149, 267, 330, 333, 334, 338, 340–341, 344–346, 349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 357–360, 363

 maintenance, 346, 354
Having no way (mei fazhi), 267
 Hedonism, 46, 134, 149
 orientation, 134
He li (fairness), 200
 Heterocentrism, 144–145
 Hierarchical compensatory model, 202–203
 Hierarchical love with distinction, 170
 Higher-order social group, 208
 Historical a priori episteme, 312
 Historical-hermeneutic science, 63
 Holistic theory, 225
Honke, 209, 210
 Horizontal distinctiveness, 232–234, 243–249, 251, 288, 289
 Horizontal in-group, 330, 346, 352–357
 Horizontal out-group, 330, 346, 354, 359–364
 Horizontal relationships, 346, 348, 352, 353, 355, 356, 359
 Humanism, 99, 142–143
 Human psychology, 10
 Human resource management, 5, 309, 322
 Husband-wife axis, 190
 Hypothesis testing, 57, 58, 195
 Hypothetical imperatives, 46

I

Identity, 8, 80, 84, 86, 87, 92, 124, 151, 192–194, 270, 285, 315
Iemoto, 209–211
 Immortality of soul, 46–48
 Imperfect duties, 160–164, 172, 275
 Impersonal relation, 72, 76
 Implicit cognitions, 195
 Implicit theory of intelligence, 220, 228–231, 251, 252
 Incremental theory, 229, 230, 248, 252
 Indebtedness, 201–202, 205, 272, 301
 Independent self, 78, 212, 342
 Indigenization movement, 1, 4, 7–8, 33, 259, 339, 340, 365
 Indigenous psychology(ies), 1–17, 21, 22, 24–26, 34, 38, 39, 41, 55, 59, 60, 63–65, 69, 75, 131, 148–150, 153, 157, 158, 183, 223, 259, 290, 365
 Indirect communication, 346, 350–351, 354
 Individual-centeredness, 190
 Individualism, 4–8, 10, 17, 78, 87, 127, 147, 165–166, 170, 174, 189, 190, 192, 193, 205, 226, 231, 235, 239, 248, 254, 265, 274, 280, 290, 292, 293, 307, 333, 335–337, 342, 365

Individualism–collectivism, 4–8, 292, 293, 333, 335–337
 Individual modernity, 5
 Individual-oriented achievement motivation, 222, 227
 Individual socialization, 33
 Individual welfare, 79
Inequity in social exchange, 74
 Information asymmetry, 318
 In-group determination, 235
 Inner structure of Confucianism, 36, 64, 157, 188, 300, 330
 Institutional holes, 305–306
 Institutional trust, 311–313, 315, 316
 Instrumental component, 88, 89, 104, 109, 159, 194, 270, 300, 302, 342, 355, 363
 Instrumentalism, 221–222, 226, 227
 Instrumentality, 302
 Instrument-oriented institutional culture, 319
 Intelligible world, 43–45, 47, 48
 Interaction rituals, 267
 Interdependency, 82
 Interdependent self, 212, 342
 Internal substantial harmony, 125
 Interpersonal conflict, 290
 Interpersonal harmony, 91, 330, 338, 340–341, 346, 357
 Interpersonal relationship, 16, 70, 74, 80–84, 88–90, 92, 93, 104–110, 126, 149, 158–160, 162, 171, 172, 188, 192, 194, 200, 201, 205, 279, 284, 298, 300, 301, 305, 307, 339, 342, 346, 352, 353, 355, 363
 Interpsychological communication, 22
 Intersubjective communication, 33
 Intimacy, 82, 88, 106–109, 111–113, 158, 171, 175, 180, 189, 285, 307, 319, 320, 347
 Intimate society, 190194
 Intrapyschological processes, 22
 Intrinsic attraction, 72
 Intrinsic motivation, 232, 234–235, 237, 238, 246
 Introspection, 59, 60
 Invariant sequence, 136, 137, 149
 Ipsative score, 221

J
 Job seeking, 304, 313
Jun zi (true gentleman), 102, 114, 118–119
 Justice rule, 79–82
 Justice theory, 16, 69, 74, 77–84, 86, 87, 91–92, 94, 97, 107, 108, 158, 269, 299

K

Kinship trust, 311, 315
Kritik der Vernunft, 44, 45
Kula exchange, 70

L

La guanxi (pull relations), 297
 Language
 game, 15, 27–28, 31, 38, 98, 131, 188, 207, 213, 330, 337
 tools, 22, 25, 27, 28, 38, 98, 213
 Law-and-order, 136
 Law of mystical participation, 30
 Laws (*fa*), 36, 167
 Leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, 322
 Leader-subordinate dyads, 321
 Learned helplessness, 228–229, 231, 234
 Learning goal, 229–230, 232–238, 240, 245
 Legalism, 36, 37, 153
 Lexicon, 29, 31, 32
 theory, 31
Li (propriety), 103, 269
Lian, 266–269, 290, 292, 338, 343–344
 Lifeworld(s), 2, 13–16, 22, 25–34, 36, 47, 64, 98, 124, 126, 131, 132, 189, 194, 195, 239, 302, 311, 312, 330, 337, 363
 Lineal inheritance, 307
 Linguistic strangification, 188
 Local holism, 32
 Logical empiricism, 55–56, 61, 224, 226
 Logical positivism, 25, 53–55, 60–61, 223–225
 Logos, 42
 Long-term
 benefit, 78
 interactions, 304, 311
 orientation, 316
 reciprocity, 204
 relationship, 313, 317, 320
 Love with distinction, 161, 170, 171, 173, 174
 Loyal minister, 163, 164, 275
 Loyalty, 86, 108, 109, 121, 160, 162–65, 193, 275, 277, 280, 308, 319–322

M
 Macrostructure, 72
 Managerial grid, 330
 Mandatory, 46, 165–167
 natural law, 166
 Market(s), 2, 7, 8, 72, 86–88, 177, 281, 299, 303, 306–310, 313, 314, 316, 318, 320
 despotism, 309–310, 314
 monopoly, 309, 314
 pricing, 7, 72, 86, 87

- Martial School, 36, 37, 153
 Masculinity, 5
 Mastery oriented, 228–230
 Materialism, 99
 May Fourth Movement, 266
 The Maximum rule, 77
 Mechanicalism, 99
 Mediation, 24, 354, 355, 362–363
 Mediator, 25, 81, 316, 347, 351, 362, 363
 Mencius, 36, 100, 101, 103, 108, 111, 112,
 116–118, 120–122, 160–162, 164, 167,
 173, 174, 275, 342
 Mentality, 11, 13, 16, 39, 41, 64, 65, 69,
 87, 97, 98, 149, 226, 300, 302, 306,
 364, 365
 Metaphysical subject, 51–53
 Metaphysical thinking, 29, 31, 51
 The Metatheory method, 10
 Methodological individualism, 192, 193, 231
 Methodological relationalism, 192–193, 231,
 270
Mianzi, 266–269, 279, 280, 290–292, 337–339
 Microprocess, 72
 Mind, 9–11, 14–16, 21–26, 31, 37, 39, 41, 42,
 45, 47–48, 60, 64, 65, 69, 86, 87, 94,
 97, 98, 103–107, 109, 110, 112–115,
 118–121, 123, 126, 127, 149, 151, 164,
 167, 170, 173, 174, 180, 183, 188, 205,
 207, 240, 241, 253, 254, 270, 278, 312,
 315, 343, 356, 365
Mind of benevolence (ren shin), 103
 Mixed ties, 88, 90, 93, 109, 110, 159, 162,
 194, 270, 300, 353
 Model(s)
 of covering law, 55, 132, 224
 of face and favor, 7, 16, 64, 69, 85, 87, 94,
 97, 98, 110, 126, 188, 194, 269, 344,
 350, 353, 365
 of intergenerational exchange, 204
 Modernization theory, 4–5, 12
 Monopoly, 309–310, 314
 Moral, 16, 42, 80, 99, 131, 157–183, 190, 238,
 268, 308, 330
 Moral
 judgment, 86, 133, 136, 140, 144,
 147–151, 157–183, 254, 330, 365
 order, 123, 170, 193
 training, 144
 Moses's Ten Commandments, 134
 Mother-son axis, 190
 Motive theory, 79–81, 87
 Mr. Democracy, 168
 Mr. Science, 168
 Multidimensional scaling, 196, 302
 Multiple exchange, 72
 Multiple-goals, 235–236
 Mutual-face concern, 334
 Mutually disinterested rationality, 77
 Mutual trust, 73, 311
- N**
 Naïve
 falsificationism, 56
 positivism, 56–58, 148, 220, 223–228
 Native's point of view, 223
 Natural laws, 32, 44, 70, 165, 166
 Naturwissenschaft, 59
 Need for achievement, 220, 221
 Need rule, 79, 80, 87, 89, 92, 93, 110, 126,
 172, 204, 270, 301, 320, 344
 Negative
 duty(ies), 160–165, 167, 169, 172,
 174–178, 180, 254, 275–277
 face, 266
 fact, 51
 Negotiated transaction, 76
 Nested structure, 208–209
 New Culture Movement, 167, 168
 Nirvana, 100
 Non-adversary procedures, 332
 Non-unit relations, 80, 92
 Normal science, 57, 58, 364
 Norm
 of modesty, 211
 of reciprocity, 92–94, 171–172, 197, 205, 301
 Noumena, 44, 45, 48, 49, 54
- O**
Obasan (aunt), 210
 Obedience to authority, 143, 206, 308
 Obey publicly and defy privately, 352, 354
 Objectivism, 62
 Obligation, 46, 70, 73, 112, 163, 172,
 174–176, 180, 200–205, 232, 234, 235,
 239, 247, 251, 254, 274, 275, 287–290,
 301, 302, 311, 315
Observation terms, 60, 61
Okaasan (mother), 210
 Oligopoly, 306, 308, 310, 314
 market, 310
 One-dimensional motivation, 33
Onesan (older sisters), 210
 One-to-one correspondence, 50
 Ontogenesis, 36, 37
 Ontological sphere, 44
 Ontology
 of *noumena*, 48
 of *phenomena*, 48

- Ooyake*, 208, 209, 212
 Open communication, 359
 Open-door policy, 310
 Opening policies, 308
 Operant conditioning, 71
 Operational definition, 60, 61, 321
 Operationalism, 224, 226
 Operative society, 190, 194
 Opportunism, 316
 Organizational objectives, 303
 Orientation, 6–7, 10, 24, 25, 33, 34, 65, 82–84, 86, 88, 134–136, 138, 139, 142, 145, 146, 149–151, 189, 191–195, 213, 219, 220, 228–230, 234–236, 253, 254, 278–280, 283, 304, 316, 334, 345
 Original equipment manufacturing (OEM), 2–4
Original positions, 77, 78
 Originative thinking, 26, 28–29, 33
 Other-face concern, 334
Otousan (father), 210
 Out-group, 197, 208, 210–212, 330, 346, 353, 354, 356, 359–364
 Owner-manager, 307, 320
Ozisan (uncle), 210
- P**
- Paradigm shift, 13, 41–65, 365
 Parameter of justice, 149
 Parsimony, 9
 Participative leadership, 322–323
 Particularism, 76, 127, 144–145, 175, 176, 199
 Patriarchalism, 307–309, 314, 320
 Patrilinealism, 306–309, 314
 Patron–client relations, 299
 Perfect duty(ies), 161–163, 172
 Performance
 - approach goal, 230, 232, 233, 235–238
 - avoidance goal, 230, 232, 233, 235–237
 - goal, 229–230, 232–234
 Peripheral countries, 2, 3
 Person, 6, 23, 41–65, 71, 98, 136, 158, 188, 242, 266)
Personage, 190
 Personal
 - contracts, 81
 - goal, 230, 232–234, 238, 240–247, 331, 340, 341, 346, 347, 349, 354, 356
 - goal attainment, 346, 354
 - relation, 72
 - responsibility, 144
 Personalism, 313
 Personhood, 47, 102, 106, 123, 124
 Persons-in-relation, 193–195, 231, 270, 271
 Phenomena, 14, 28, 33, 43–45, 48, 49, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 62, 73, 84, 87, 102, 127, 132, 192, 193, 195, 213, 259, 292, 299, 309, 312, 331, 333
 Phenomenological world, 192
 Philosophical reflection, 3, 12, 259
 Philosophical self, 51–53
 Philosophy, 2, 22, 41–65, 77, 127, 131, 189, 219, 339
 - of science, 3, 12–14, 16, 22, 25, 34, 36, 39, 41, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 59, 131, 146, 147, 153, 219, 220, 226, 259, 339, 346*Phronesis*, 42
 Physical phenomenism, 49
 Physical self, 23, 166, 342
 Physiological psychology, 59
 Political socialization, 144–145
 Positive
 - duty(ies), 147, 160–165, 167, 172–176, 178, 180, 203, 254, 274–277, 280
 - face, 267
 - fact, 51
 Positivism, 6–7, 12, 13, 25, 41, 48, 49, 52–63, 65, 148, 220, 221, 223–227, 259
 Postconventional morality, 134, 165, 166
 Post-hoc explanation, 223, 350
 Post-positivism, 12, 13, 41, 49, 56, 57
 Power (*shi*), 36
 - distance, 5, 292, 293, 333–336
 Practical interest, 63
 Practical reason, 43–48, 62, 64, 102, 116
 Practical wisdom, 35, 42, 43, 47, 48
Practices of ganqing avoidance, 305
 Pragmatic morality, 134
 Preconventional morality, 133
 Preference model, 220
 Preserver, 317
 Pressure to reciprocate, 205
 Primordial world, 26
 Principled moral thinking, 141–142
 Principle(s)
 - of equilibrium, 75
 - of equity, 74, 75
 - of favoring the intimate, 107, 109–110, 159, 169, 173, 195, 269, 347, 348, 350
 - of forgiveness (*shudao*), 91
 - of ground, 35
 - of justice, 77, 78, 136, 165, 166
 - of marginal utility, 75
 - of morality, 46
 - of reciprocity, 75, 175, 204, 268
 - of respecting the superior, 107–109, 127, 158–160, 163, 164, 169, 194, 195, 205, 269, 338, 347–350, 361
 - of universal justice, 142

Privatization, 309
 Problem-solving style, 333
 Procedural justice, 78, 107–109, 121, 158, 159, 169, 322, 349
 Professional trust, 311, 312, 315, 321–323
 Propriety (*li*), 158
 Protectionism, 316, 317
 Protestantant, 6
 Prototypical relationships, 80
 Psychological concept, 193
 Psychological equity, 74
 Psychological self, 23, 52, 53
 Psychometric scales, 226
 Psychosocial homeostasis, 190, 192, 194, 195, 284, 339
 Psychosociogram, 189–191, 194, 195, 213, 270, 337
 Ptolemaic view, 190, 191
 Public-image, 266
 Punishment-and-obedience orientation, 134
 Puzzle-solving, 57, 58

Q

Qing-yi, 159

R

Radical behaviorism, 60
 Radical empiricism, 49, 51, 62
 Radical iconoclasm, 168
 Rational cosmology, 46
 Rational man, 71, 73
 Rational psychology, 46
 Rational theology, 46
 Realism, 12–13, 21–39, 41, 51, 52, 54, 62, 82, 98, 105, 131, 153, 183, 188, 189, 195, 331, 346, 363, 365
 Realistic harmony, 357, 358
 Realm of righteousness, 100
 Recapitulation, 36–37
 Reciprocal transaction, 76
 Reciprocity, 71, 73–76, 86, 92–94, 133, 134, 157, 171, 172, 175, 177, 197, 201, 204, 205, 268, 301, 302, 306, 316, 333, 334, 347
 Reductionism, 72, 223, 226–228, 291, 292, 333–334, 336
 Relational demography, 304–305, 323
 Relational orientation, 189, 191–192, 213, 283
 Relational self, 86, 192
 Relationship marketing, 316

Relative honorific expression, 207, 208, 210–212
 Relativism, 132
 Religious reformation, 99
 Religious thinking, 29
Ren (benevolence), 103, 104
 Renaissance, 7, 12, 25, 29, 30, 32, 43, 49, 99
Renqing (*affection*), 200
 dilemma, 90
 oriented hierarchical culture, 319
 rule, 87, 90–94, 110, 127, 172, 270, 299, 319
Renyuan (interpersonal attractiveness), 90
 Resource allocator (RA), 88, 337
 Respectability, 268
 Reversibility, 136
 Right-based morality, 231
 Righteous husband and submissive wife, 126
 Righteousness (*yi*), 36, 103, 106–107, 109, 110, 114, 126, 127, 158–160
 Rule of *renqing*, 90–92, 301, 320, 353

S

Science of the science, 61
 Scientific ethnocentrism, 9
 Scientific explanation, 55, 132
 Scientific lexicon, 31, 32
 Scientific microworld, 13, 26–28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42, 48, 49, 59, 64, 65, 82, 132, 147, 153, 157, 188, 194, 226, 302, 311
 Scientific realism, 54, 363
 Scientific research program, 56–57, 247
 Scientific revolution, 31, 57, 58, 61, 364, 365
 Scientific thinking, 29
 Second-degree interpretation, 103, 171
 Second-order thinking, 147
 Secularism, 166
 Self-affirmation, 240, 241, 244, 247
 Self-assertion, 206–207
 Self-assertive cognitive structure, 206
 Self-construals, 335
 Self-cultivation, 114, 118, 127, 277
 Self-derogatory, 239
 Self-determination, 235, 236
 theory, 234–236, 250
 Self-efficacy, 23, 240, 241, 244, 245
 Self-enhancing situations, 239
 Self-esteem, 238–243, 246, 247, 270, 345
 Self-evaluation, 134, 248
 Self-face concern, 334, 335
 Self-identity, 124, 194, 285

- Self-in-relation-with-others, 192
 - Self-integration, 144
 - Self-observation, 59
 - Self-perfection
 - Self-sacrifice, 339
 - Sense
 - of indebtedness, 205
 - of personal identity, 124, 194
 - Sensible world, 43–45, 47–49
 - Sensitivity to shame, 117–118
 - Sentence and Story Scoring, 137
 - Sequential order, 135, 203, 274
 - Severance, 353, 354, 363–364
 - Silver rule, 161, 162, 169, 275
 - Single
 - exchange, 72
 - reward, 72
 - Singular inheritance, 307
 - Situated identity, 270
 - Situation-centeredness, 190, 192
 - Smoothing, 330, 331
 - Social capital, 303
 - Social-contingent self-esteem, 238
 - Social contract, 77, 78, 81, 134, 139, 147
 - Social exchange, 15, 36, 64, 69, 97, 187–213, 269, 299, 330
 - theory, 36, 70–72, 74, 75, 77, 86, 89, 188, 194, 198, 299, 311
 - Social humanism, 142–143
 - Social Humanity Scale, 146
 - Social integration, 33
 - Social learning approaches, 144
 - Social norms, 33, 91, 107, 134, 158, 173, 206, 292, 308, 312
 - Social obligation, 70, 175
 - Social order, 37, 81, 105, 113, 123, 126, 134, 142, 144, 146, 169, 173, 177, 180, 193, 267, 342
 - maintenance orientation, 134, 146
 - Social orientation, 192
 - Social-oriented achievement motivation, 222, 227, 280
 - Social principledness, 142–143
 - Social Principled Scale, 146
 - Social reality, 63, 76, 78, 331
 - Social self, 342
 - Social solidarity, 235, 345
 - Sociological concept, 193
 - Sociomoral concept, 123, 169
 - Sociomoral order, 123, 193, 195
 - Socio-political thinking, 143, 144, 146
 - Socratic learning, 253
 - Solipsism, 41, 51–54
 - Sophia*, 42, 43
 - Sophisticated falsificationism, 56, 57
 - Spiritual self, 23
 - Split labor markets, 310
 - Stage
 - regressions, 137
 - skipping, 137
 - Standard, 12, 33, 82, 87, 88, 90, 92, 99–101, 109, 117, 119, 133, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 153, 169, 173, 175, 177, 180, 190, 208, 222, 224, 247, 248, 251, 268, 277, 278, 289, 307, 332
 - form scoring, 137
 - State of affairs, 50
 - State-owned, 303, 308, 309
 - business, 299, 305, 308, 318
 - Strangificability, 153, 157, 188–189, 194–195, 213
 - Strategies (*shu*), 36
 - Striving face, 359
 - Structuralism, 12, 14, 15, 36, 126, 127, 133, 188
 - Structural Issue Scoring, 137
 - Structural transformation, 133
 - Structure of reciprocity, 71
 - Subjective dynamism, 55
 - Subject-object dichotomy, 52
 - Substantive rationality, 2, 26, 29–30, 32, 126, 166
 - Superficial harmony, 351, 352, 357–359
 - Super proletarian class, 309
 - Synchronic structures, 188
- T**
- Taiji quan (shadow boxing), 37
 - Taking care of others' face, 351–352
 - Talent performance, 248, 249
 - Taoism, 126, 149, 153, 267, 344, 349
 - Task goals, 229–231, 235
 - Taxonomy, 7, 82
 - Technical interest, 63
 - Technical thinking, 28–29, 33
 - Tentative theory, 53, 54, 227, 259
 - Thematic Apperception Test* (TAT), 220
 - Theorein, 42
 - Theoretical attitude, 42
 - Theoretical construction, 3, 12, 14, 16, 55, 57, 58, 64, 87–88, 142, 153, 192, 227, 233, 259, 292
 - Theoretical reason, 43–48, 64, 102, 116, 117
 - Theoretical terms, 60, 61
 - Theoretical wisdom, 42–43, 47, 48

Theoria, 42, 43

Theory

- 2, 21, 42, 69, 98, 132, 158, 188, 220, 269, 299, 330
- of interdependence, 73–74
- of intrapersonal contracts, 82, 83, 87
- of justice, 74, 77–78, 80, 92, 269
- of personal investment, 235

Thing-in-itself, 44

Three Bonds Revolution, 169

Totalistic anti-traditionalism, 168

Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 49–52, 223

Traditional metaphysics, 45–46

Transcendent, 42, 44, 45, 47, 99, 160

- Transcendental, 27, 44–46, 51–53, 127
 - apperception, 45
 - deduction, 44
 - idealism, 44–45
 - self, 51–53

Trust enhancement strategies, 317

U

Uncertainty avoidance, 5

Unconditional positive duty, 162–164, 167, 203, 254, 275, 280

Unconscious model, 15, 188

Unit relation, 80

Universal

- ethical principles, 137, 139, 149, 174
- moral law, 46
- psychology, 10, 11, 59

Universalism, 10, 97, 127, 132, 144, 145, 148, 175, 176, 180

University of Tübingen, 62

Unspecified obligations, 73

Utilitarianism, 46, 149, 339

V

Veil of ignorance, 77, 78, 136

Verification, 54, 57, 60, 62, 223–226

Vernunft ideas, 46

Vertical

- distinctiveness, 232–236, 238, 239, 242, 244–248, 251, 254, 281, 287–290
- goals, 247, 248, 289
- in-group, 330, 346, 347, 354, 361
- relationships, 321, 343, 346, 348, 349, 351, 355, 359

Vienna Circle, 13, 25, 49–51, 55, 223, 224

Vigorous practice, 116

Voluntarism, 165

W

Watakusi, 208, 209

Way of Heaven, 98, 101–103, 105, 106, 342

Way of Humanity, 98, 101–103, 105, 106, 112, 114, 116–120, 123, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 166, 275, 342

Western capitalism, 75

Wilhelm Wundt, 59

Will for Good, 46

Wirklichkeit, 26

Wisdom, 13, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42–43, 47–49, 63–65, 77, 98, 114–116, 127, 339

Wiser, 317

Withdrawal, 330, 333, 345

Workplace dynamic, 336

World system theory, 5

Worldview, 2, 13, 26, 28, 31–32, 49, 51, 58, 64, 98, 99, 124–126, 331

X

Xiao ren (a small-minded person), 118–119

Xinyong, 313, 316

Xunzi, 36

Y

Yi (righteousness), 103, 159, 269

Yin and yang, 105, 125