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NATO, Civilisation and Individuals

The Unconscious Dimension of International Security

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The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

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Preface

This monograph is a by-product of my doctoral dissertation. Although its content has been slightly transformed, its general approach and goals have remained the same: to offer a critical analysis of NATO within the field of Security Studies that engages with the connection between civilisation and individuals. Globally, the book provides an alternative reflection on the history of the Atlantic Alliance that is articulated around the psychosocial processes underlying the establishment of prevailing meanings in contemporary international security, that is, prevailing referent objects of security. Deeply inspired by the Braudelian notion of "unconscious history", it questions to what extent the seemingly natural evolution of NATO's referent object of security—what it aims at securing—may be framed by unconscious processes. By doing so, this work introduces the epistemological importance of an unconscious dimension to understand meaning formation and behaviour change in international security. In this sense, the role of perceptions, meaning formation, discursive representations and symbols is enhanced.

This research arises from the need to better understand the deepest behavioural and psychosocial implications of civilisation for security, in order to outline a critical view of discursive uses of civilisation by contemporary political actors, especially by NATO. In this context, the unconscious connections between civilisation and security, that is, all that lies silently in the normality of an apparent progressive evolution, allows us to critically challenge the prevailing contemporary assumption that Western security has evolved according to a sense that social relations follow a stable and linear evolution among essentially identical units. To that end, not

only does the book follow a long duration approach that allows for the historicisation and genealogical development of the idea of civilisation that is at the core of the Alliance, as it also interconnects human needs, narratives, and security arrangements throughout its evolution.

In all, the book seeks to contribute to critical security studies with two novel conceptual formulations: the "Civilised Subject of Security" and the "Individualisation of Security". The Civilised Subject of Security presupposes that the Western civilisation has consisted of a psychosocial process constantly producing civilised and secure subjects around the world. This conceptualisation encloses an unconscious dimension related to the ontological need individuals have for security, which draws on deep psychological and symbolic reasons, and without which they cannot be produced and reproduced as civilised subjects across space and time. Thus, this unconscious dimension of Western civilised subjects has been the thread holding the timeless meanings and perceptions of security that enables the West to dominate international security. The Civilised Subject of Security not only allows drawing the lines upon which to look at civilisation in a deeply critical way, as it also allows coping with the complex relations connecting the individuals' sense of identity, security perception, and broader social processes.

As for the Individualisation of Security, it is advanced as a transformative process of post-Cold War international security, through which Western civilisation has been upheld and continued in the field of international security. Thus, individual-centred security policies have been enacted as part of the civilising process of non-Western states, because they have sought to instil specific transformations of behaviour and security rationales that aim at producing secure civilised subjects out of the original North-Atlantic area. The Individualisation of Security has indeed produced an international discourse of discipline and normalisation, according to which a conduct that is respective of individuals should be natural for all states. For these reasons, the Individualisation of Security illustrates the extension of the civilising power through international organisations and, therefore, can be considered as another stage of the civilising process coming from the West. This is supported by a substantial discussion of NATO's military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

My first acknowledgement goes to André Barrinha, for believing this project was possible, pushing me to go forward with it, and for his overall guidance since the beginning of the writing of the dissertation that originated the book. For all this, he will always have my deepest gratitude.

I can never forget the impact and legacy coming from my Professors at Coimbra, where I spent so many years of my academic life, especially José Manuel Pureza, Daniela Nascimento, Paula Duarte Lopes and Maria Raquel Freire. Their teachings, as much their free spirit, formed and inspired me. I am also grateful for the advice, recommendations, and encouragement of the members of my doctoral jury, who also contributed to this endeavour with their generous enthusiasm.

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Finally, I am profoundly indebted to João, my partner in life, for his unconditional and untiring support, encouragement, and motivation, which really was most of the fuel I needed to complete this book. Family has my gratitude for constant love and patience.

Lausanne, Switzerland Sarah da Mota

Contents

List of Abbreviations

BH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEE	Central and East European
DoD	US Department of Defense
EU	European Union
IFOR	Implementation Force
IR	International Relations
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SG	Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA/US	United States of America
USSR	Soviet Union
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

CHAPTER 1

Seeking Alternative Connections Between Civilisation and Security

Discussing "civilisation" may seem archaic in 2018; and discussing civilisation in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a political and military alliance, may also seem little tangible in the present ever-connected globalised era, especially as the current form of the organisation has surpassed the original limits of a strictly north Atlantic territoriality. Still, civilisation is a powerful idea on the contemporary international scene, giving rise to many heated debates, in particular when issues of identity, culture, and security are at stake, for their frequent association with some degree of prejudice, stereotypes and domination. However, almost instinctively, when the leader of a nation, or international organisation, refers to a threat to civilisation, an alert is somehow sounded that echoes through the perception that something serious may be about to happen. With the reference to civilisation, our most inner individual dimension interconnects with a wider world of commonality, both in space and time, and questions arise about what it fundamentally means to be civilised.

Historically, alliances have been one of the most important manifestations of the balance of power (Morgenthau, 1948: 137), which may explain why the history of NATO has generally prevailed as a series of accounts on technical, organisational, diplomatic capabilities, and conjunctural politics. Evidently, NATO does not correspond to the traditional idea that alliances use to be temporary and last only as long there is a specific threat to combat (Wendt, 1994), as it has evolved from an alliance into a community, and from focusing on one specific *threat* to unspecific

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risks (Adler, 2008; Coker, 2002; Mozaffari, 2002: 30; NATO, 1991). In fact, it has managed to overcome its original compromise towards the safeguard of the *civilisation of its people* (NATO, 1949), up until the more contemporary policies committing to protecting *individuals* outside its original area of intervention (NATO, 2011). NATO's referent objects of security—what it aims at securing[1]—have silently changed, but to what extent this seemingly natural evolution may be framed by unconscious processes?

The modern narrative on Western civilisation has been confined within a static linearity of time and progress, which has influenced the conscious knowledge we have of NATO as the product of a normal evolution of a pre-existing civilisational identity. In line with a Foucauldian archaeological perspective (2000), the spatial and temporal context of NATO's emergence should be questioned in relation to how the past was appropriated, and through what kind of practices of domination and relations of power. To what extent may NATO benefit from the West's cumulated capital of domination in order to influence and control the field of international security? Yet, by uncovering what those practices of domination and power relations consist of, and how they have produced hegemonic knowledge, an essential unconscious dimension remains in the realm of what has been subjugated, i.e., of what has been dominated in order to naturalise the hegemonic content of knowledge. This phenomenon is in part illustrated by André Barrinha and Marcos Rosa (2013: 110), who show that security meanings in the context of NATO or the EU are appropriated by their members in such a way that they end up "translating a particular liberal understanding of security that is in many cases completely foreign" to their own security context. Put in other words, the naturalisation of knowledge implies that unconscious meanings have to be conveyed and seized through the narratives on Western civilisation.

This book attempts to humanise the history of NATO by enhancing the unconscious entrenchment of the concept of civilisation within Western minds. By doing that, it also seeks to humanise the very idea of civilisation and expose the epistemological suppression composing Western civilisation. Moved by a fundamental concern over how unconscious forms of knowledge have shaped not only collective perceptions and representations of the world and its history, the book builds up on the impact those forms of knowledge may have on the prevailing readings and practices of contemporary international security. It takes NATO to look into, question, and bring into light the relationship between civilisation

and individuals, ultimately enhancing the role of the unconscious dimension of international security. The overall objective is to understand in more depth the dynamics composing the still underexplored relationship within security studies, and more broadly within International Relations (IR), between the idea of civilisation and the place of individuality in it. It does so by making visible how the security of civilisation and the security of individuals have been (interrelatedly) conceptualised and practiced throughout NATO's evolution.

1.1 The Unconscious Question

In Western thought, the "ancient" unconscious can be traced as far back as the fifth century BCE in Greece, broadly understood as the "internal qualities of the mind that affect conscious thought and behavior", without the subjects being conscious themselves (Uleman, 2005: 3). Much later, during the eighteenth century, Enlightenment thinkers and their "project" of Modernity focused on developing human rationality through objective science, universal morality and law, with the ultimate goal of liberating individuals from the irrationalities of religion, myths, superstition, and from the arbitrary use of power (Habermas, 1998; Harvey, 1996: 12–13). This tradition assumes that individuals have a total control over their knowledge, and it has since then been very influential in Western thought, translating into an "exaggerated respect for the supposedly self-conscious rational individual, an idea we preserve by treating anything that is not part of consciousness as physical, an effect of the body" (Easthope, 1999: 5).

In the late 1800s, early 1900s, psychoanalysis emerges as a field articulated around the psychology of what is unconscious, by the hands of Sigmund Freud, and new forms of knowledge begin to be considered that remit to new ways of perceiving, inseparable of the social practices that were changing at the time. As Roland Gori further explains, Freud decisively transformed how men and women perceive themselves, understand and interrelate with each other. By uncovering the importance of unconscious processes, Freud altered the relationship between the subjects and language. A new hermeneutics is produced by the sense that language does not say exactly what it is saying, because it conveys a deeper signification superseding its immediate meaning (2017: 129). Today, although the Freudian psychoanalytic unconscious is the most widespread conception of the unconscious, it is viewed as a failed scientific theory "because

evidence of its major components cannot be observed, measured precisely, or manipulated easily" (Uleman, 2005: 5).

For the social sciences, inclusively, any psychological explanation of a social phenomenon is generally discarded, as "the materialism of historical explanation and the metaphysical idea of the unconscious are mutually exclusive" (Easthope, 1999: 135). Yet, in the critical enterprise of bringing into visibility the internal contradictions, tensions, distortions of the categories of mind constitutive of knowledge (Hegel, 1977), it is fundamental to stand for the non-acceptance of the prevailing order, on the basis that the order we know is "[b]y no means natural, necessary or historically invariable" (Devetak, 2005: 143). This calls for an interdisciplinary approach that is able to both bring forward the non-exempt relationship between knowledge and society, and transcend the materialism of historical approaches. This is why this book draws on a conception of the unconscious that is not limited to psychoanalytical formulations, but that is broadly conceived as including behavioural, cognitive, and social psychological elements related to the unconscious. In this sense, this book suggests, considering the role of the unconscious today allows individuals to understand, and possibly cope with, the apparent irrationality of their perceptions, or the apparent inexplicability of what they know, by acknowledging the role of reinforcement, memory, perceptual processes, affect, control and metacognition (Uleman, 2005: 5–6).

This book is very much inspired by historian Fernand Braudel's (1958) conception of "unconscious history" (*l'histoire inconsciente*), because it somehow reconciles historical materialism with the unconscious dimension of knowledge. Unconscious history, as Braudel defines it, passes on the sense of history that overcomes the duration of a single event in the most transcendent ways, and that carries with it some imperceptible meanings that travel across time, beyond the flashes of the greatest historical events: "Each one of us has the transcendent awareness of a mass history, whose force we recognise better than the laws or direction" (Braudel, 1958: 740).[2] There seem to be structures that are indeed "[s]o enduring that they remain for contemporaries part of the unconscious or the unknown" and its "[t]ransformation is so slow that it escapes their awareness" (Koselleck, 2004: 108).

This invisible and latent form of history suggests that we have an unconscious perception of who we are, and of what we are doing, independently of our specific temporal location. However, this unconsciousness relates mainly to the perspective of short duration, i.e., of "micro-time" (Braudel,

1958: 739), as short-term insights may veil our awareness in perceiving history more widely. This implies, on the contrary, that when we think of history in macro-time, or longer duration, the perception we have of it is rather conscious. There are indeed different complex layers composing the importance that history, as much as civilisation, conveys to the collective imaginary, and to the representations of international security. Each of these layers gives a critical and defining sense to the perception of who we are, where we come from, what we have done collectively as "Humanity", and where we would like to get to, both as individuals and as a part of the wider social world. In the context of NATO's evolution from an alliance with civilisational concerns to an alliance focusing on the security of individuals facing global risks, how can we process that passage of time, the progression of history, in terms of the values, ideas, and referent objects that matter the most to the Alliance?

1.2 Questioning NATO's Change

NATO is a political and military alliance, whose chief goals consist of the collective defence of its members. In the preamble of NATO's founding treaty, it is thus established that the Parties "[a]re determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO, 1949). The referent object of the Alliance's action—what is to be secured—is clearly collective, and united by a shared representation of history and civilisation. *Ab origine* and formally, NATO's *raison d'être* does not seem to depend on a conceptual category such as the *individual*. "Individual liberty" is indeed mentioned, but it still appears as a valuing principle of a collective referent object. "Civilisation" surges as the primordial referent of the defensive and protective mission that the new alliance was committing to (NATO, 1949). As in any other international organisation, NATO's mission and identity from then on would depend on the strength of the concepts, ideas and norms used to formulate its existence. Throughout sixty years of existence, NATO has crossed two distinct ideological eras, each one with a different influence on the geopolitical division of the world, and thus had to respond and adapt to deep questioning periods from the international community (Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011; Kay, 1998; Zorgbibe, 2002).

NATO is a political and military organisation that primarily surged to promote the defence and security of the "civilisation of its people". It is

noteworthy that NATO was not proposing to safeguard the *existence* of its people, but rather their very *attributes*, which it identifies as "liberty", a "common heritage", and "civilisation". If, to NATO, these very attributes precede the importance of the people's very existence, then the existence of the people ultimately depends on the safeguard of those attributes. Therefore, if the people of the North Atlantic Treaty see themselves deprived of their liberty, and if their common heritage and civilisation are somehow destroyed, will they cease to exist? One may assume that NATO's primal referent object of security, that is, what was decisive for the organisation to emerge, and what it aims at defending and protecting, consists of the attributes it identifies as being vital.

NATO's referent object of security consists of a metaphysical entity that overcomes all institutional models, boundaries, specific historical temporalities, because it refers to such a broad idea as civilisation. It refers in fact to a "civilisational identity" (O'Hagan, 2002). Although specific values such as democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are evoked, they do emerge in a position that is subordinated to that of civilisation as its foundation, as guiding norms for the execution of civilisational defence. Therefore, and in the light of the premise that security has become a metaphysical field (Burgess, 2011), characterising most of inter-institutional and interpersonal relations of the twentieth century, NATO constitutes an object of study of excellence. It is thus a product of the West, declaredly oriented at protecting the civilisation of the North-Atlantic people (NATO, 1949).

The starting conjectures informing this research are inspired by assumptions both on the West and on NATO that interrelate important questions of history, power, identity and knowledge. One is David Gress' *From Plato to NATO: the idea of the West and its opponents* (1998), according to which there has been a Grand Narrative of the West that is based on an "Allied scheme of history", explaining that when NATO was born, it cut off Eastern Europe from the West and ignored religion and any history that did not fit into the simple "Plato-to-NATO" scheme of constant improvement. Focusing on NATO's post-Cold War discourse, Andreas Behnke (2013) has assumed that NATO's persistence after the Cold War has depended on the Alliance's ability to discursively produce a geo-cultural space called the West. Another assumption of the same tone is found in Jacinta O'Hagan's conception (2002: 8) that NATO is the most prominent example of a formal alliance that uses and refers to the West as a "civilisational identity", that is, a broad form of cultural identity that goes

beyond geographical and temporal borders, beyond languages, ethnicities, religions, "[b]ut united by some elementary shared histories, traditions, values and beliefs", thus shaping perceptions, behaviour, priorities, norms (O'Hagan, 2002: 11–12).

These propositions have important implications. On the one hand, Gress points to the existence of a Grand Narrative in the West that is anterior to NATO, that comes from distant classical times, and that sustains certain forms of social relations based on "allied schemes" (Gress, 1998). When it comes to NATO's formation, this allied rationale translates into essentially exclusionary practices, meaning that other non-Western histories and identities were left aside in order to convey a sense of evolutionary improvement focused exclusively on the West as a motor of positive change. As a consequence, the prevailing contemporary knowledge about what the West is would be influenced by a sense that social relations in the West follow a stable and linear improvement among essentially identical units, of which NATO is the ultimate contemporary example. On the other hand, O'Hagan's (2002) conception of a civilisational identity of the West that is used and performed by NATO involves a series of metaphysical elements that compose a sense of community and membership, and transcend time and space. These may include multiple biological factors such as language or ethnicity. But on the international level, they unite into the same core of metaphysical bonds, to encompass shared representations of the world, values, beliefs, priorities, way of living, perceptions, symbols, modes of behaving and expectations (ibid.). These ultimately compose what Peter Burgess (2011) defines as security being a metaphysical system of values, a definition that is central to this book and that will be further explored in Chap. 3.

However, these universalistic expressions of Western commonality are problematic, as they convey an evolutionary linearity among a set of seemingly immutable, yet complex, factors. Indeed, it has been argued by Nuno Severiano Teixeira and Daniel Marcos (2016: 9–10) that the history of the Atlantic area shows that the Atlantic is "[s]till a heterogeneous and divided region", and that considering it otherwise would be "naïve", despite its increasing interdependence across time. Is the history of the West *that* predictable and constant that NATO could arise as a natural by-product of the conscious will and beliefs of all the civilised identities of the West? To what extent are the representations of Selfhood and Otherness that consistent?

Heidrun Friese (2006: 298) has referred to three complex dimensions composing the notion of "cultural identity": (1) the unchangeable structure of things, that which is seen to constitute the nature, or the essence, of things across time and historical transformations; (2) the relations human beings have with themselves and others, involving their intentions, actions, experiences, dreams and memories, although "selfhood" might have been cast throughout history; (3) the historical references to shifting relations between human beings, to concepts of belonging, and a common and shared (symbolic) world, values and language, an inclusive 'We' differing from an exclusive 'Them'. Put in other words, the civilisational identity as defined by O'Hagan (2002) and the civilisational sense of history as conceived by Gress (1998) are cultural, as they display the same basic feature of a transcendent sense of naturalness across time, defining both Selfhood and Otherness around a core of metaphysical elements. Globally, these considerations on the West do not bring much tangibility to the matter. More importantly, they reinforce the need to question the presence of an unconscious dimension in the perception of the West as a civilisation. To what extent does this unconscious dimension of knowledge, with its latent and invisible meanings, influence the contemporary sense of international security as conveyed by NATO?

In general, post-Cold War literature on NATO has focused on, and attempted to explain, the dynamics of its organisational change resulting from the end of the Cold War. The main concern has been to find whether the Alliance will survive in the future, and whether it has been able to maintain its pertinence as an organisation (Gärtner, 2003; Kay, 1998; Sjursen, 2004; Van Ham, 2001; Wallander & Keohane, 1999). Those analyses have explained NATO's change in terms of adjusting its identity for survival (Braun, 2007; Sjursen, 2004; Williams, 2007); of conceptual, strategic and operational adaptation in order to update its functions (Adler, 2008; Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011; Cornish, 2004; Gärtner, 2003; Rasmussen, 2001; Zorgbibe, 2002); of adapting its narrative as a way to manage the knowledge and image the world has of the Alliance (Behnke, 2000, 2008, 2013; Ciuta, 2002; Flockhart, 2012; Rasmussen, 2001; Williams, 2007); and finally of ideological adaptation and reaffirmation after the Cold War (Gheciu, 2005; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Stivachtis, 2010). To sum up, NATO's change has been observed in terms of the variations at the level of its identity; practice (security strategies, cultures and functions, and respective results); epistemology (through the narratives and discourses NATO discloses about itself); ideology (the principles, norms and visions of the world promoted by NATO).

Of course, none of these levels is taken autonomously, in that each one has an interdependent influence on the other. Indeed, none of the aforementioned authors approaches one of those levels without referring to one of the others. For instance, NATO's policy of identity projection—what it *is*—cannot be conceived without the practical dimension—what it *does*—in the sense its actions reveal its organisational identity. Similarly, a certain narrative used by NATO—the way it wishes to be interpreted or *known*—can hardly be understood out of its ideological context, through the *values* it endorses and defends for the world. For example, NATO's changing discourses and practices can be taken in articulation with a changed environment, representations of Western values, and the definition of new goals (Gheciu, 2005: 63). Equally, the analysis of NATO's past narratives can be intertwined with that of practices and action patterns to demonstrate how NATO has transformed from an organisation characterised by a "practice of talking" to one of "practice of doing" (Flockhart, 2012: 78–79).

As for the use of "civilisation" in literature on NATO, it is quite limited. Civilisation has been related to NATO as: (a) the broader identitarian bound and cultural category upholding the union of its members, through a symbolic power (Van Ham, 2001; Williams, 2007); (b) the main referent object of its defence and security policies (Behnke, 2008; Coker, 2002; Williams, 2007); (c) a criterion of membership and organisational belonging, through the application of an ideological standard of civilisation in the context of its enlargement policy and new strategic concept, which basically consists of liberal democracy (Stivachtis, 2010). These representations of civilisation can be considered as "culturalist", borrowing on Peter Jackson's terms in his critique of culture (2008). Obviously, concepts of culture can be found that are far from monolithic, such as in Clifford Geertz (1973) or David Campbell (1998), for example.[3] But Jackson's critique needs to be understood in the context of the "cultural turn" in IR, in which culture is used as an explanatory methodology that suffers nonetheless from either a lack of analytical rigour, or from a tendency to exaggerate the importance of cultural predispositions of collective and individual actors (Jackson, 2008: 155). Accordingly, the point regarding what is here understood as a "culturalist" view of civilisation is that it is plainly presented as something static, with no accounts of its evolution over time, mainly because it is conceptualised as being independent of its structural context (Jackson, 2008: 160).

As a matter of fact, these analyses of NATO take civilisation as a clear-cut notion implying that it is a stable variable, without offering a deeper reflection on its content. Although some studies on NATO have pointed to the Alliance's inherent Occidentalism and civilisational design (Behnke, 2000, 2008; Coker, 2002; Stivachtis, 2010; Whitman, 2000; Williams, 2007), they have been mainly referring to the ideological purposes of liberal democracy. Like "culture" in culturalism, the role and position of civilisation within NATO seems to be represented as a given, perpetuating monolithic and extendable causal relations, based on the production and reproduction of identities (Jackson, 2008: 161). This is to imply and perpetuate the idea that people and states have always been civilised both in time and manner. Put in other terms, this is to say that being civilised has always meant the same thing, involved the same normative attributes, regardless of the historical epoch.

There have been effective practical transformations within NATO that still require explanation and comprehension (Ciuta, 2002). Regarding the evolution of NATO's referent object of security in particular, that is the case for the "Individualisation of Security", which, this book argues, represents an important normative change that has significantly expanded NATO's field of action and circle of influence. However, this particular change has not been considered in most of the analyses on NATO's evolution. Mikkel Rasmussen's (2001) perspective of NATO as an agent of change, and as a modern and reflexive organisation that builds a Western consensus, is quite convincing, and would allow understanding the *how* and the *why* of almost any strategic, conceptual or practical change. Yet, this conception ends up being too loose, as it embraces almost everything NATO has decided to say and do after the Cold War.

In this book, NATO's primordial relation to civilisation is confronted to the most decisive and influential normative trend in post-Cold War international security, which it designates as the "Individualisation of Security". The expression *per se* should not be interpreted as a naïve or simplistic apology of the individual; it is rather used to describe the political process of transformative discourses and practices using individualistic valuations of human societies in relation to the state. As it will be seen, the Individualisation of Security consists of the new visibility given by political actors to a referent object of security other than the state, i.e., the individual. Progressively, the Individualisation of Security has re-oriented security policies and their related discourses and rationales from the state to the individual. Furthermore, it also expresses a tangible security practice, from the moment it determines how security policies are directed, involving

not only its referent object, as its subject of security as well (Booth, 2005; Walker, 1997).[4]

Conceptually, this trend emerging after the Cold War was associated to the notions of "human security", "humanitarianism", and "human development", because of the actions undertaken by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). These entities gradually internalised in their discourses and policies the idea that protecting individual lives should come first, or before the state (Kaldor et al., 2004; UNDP, 1994). Those notions were indeed very well received and adopted in the codes of conduct of many international organisations, NGO's, and foreign policies of some states such as Canada, Norway and Japan—in particular human security (Ramel, 2003; Suhrke, 1999). Along this line, in 2001, the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was also formulated in the reports of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001), and endorsed as a doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005 by UN member states. R2P has offered a more institutional expression to some unanimous yet non-binding premises articulated around the responsibility to protect the populations from top four inhumane crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This overall movement thus followed the norm "life cycle" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), as we may verify the emergence of the norm, its acceptance and internalisation.[5] Security was therefore *individualised* through a normative change in the way of thinking and practising security, by focusing on the argument in favour of protecting the individual in contexts of violence, repression, or persecution by a state.

Within NATO, the Individualisation of Security was put into practice since its military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) between 1992 and 1995, and opened a precedent for ulterior humanitarian interventions. This normative transformation was significant to the Alliance, and served the purpose of its institutional reinvention after the Cold War. With its intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO definitely reinforced the importance of individual security in its discourses, as well as human security and human rights. This represents a move from the idea of collective defence that prevailed in the strategic conception of NATO operations during the Cold War to global security (ICISS, 2001; Whitman, 2000).

More broadly, the Individualisation of Security suggests the rising of a cosmopolitan consciousness, in which the realisation of human interdependence, or interconnectedness, leads states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic

state. In theory, a new norm does not necessarily imply that it is automatically opted, for it must compete with pre-existing norms, in a political process in which forms of power and coalitions intertwine (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996). However, the life cycle of the Individualisation of Security indicates that there has been a transformation of behaviour in both individuals and international society, whereby humanitarian reasoning seems to have taken predominance in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in the period between the end of the Cold War and the international military presence in Afghanistan after 9/11, the Individualisation of Security has produced a general discourse of discipline and normalisation, according to which a political-military conduct respective of individuals was progressively assumed to be *natural* for all states.

In all, this book seeks to understand how two different referent objects of security—civilisation and the individual—relate in the evolution of an organisation that was created to uphold the security of Western states. How have these two substantially different referents cohabited throughout NATO's evolution? And to what extent does the Individualisation of Security inscribe and fit to NATO's civilisational character?

1.3 The Problem of Time

As Felix Ciuta (2002: 38) argues, NATO's evolution is sustained by a grand narrative on shaping European security, which functions as a "narrative shuttle" producing "accounts of linear evolutions" between events and their meaning. Accordingly, this suggests there is a problematic relationship between how time and change is treated, which is a theoretical question upon which this book is importantly grounded as well.

The critique of the treatment of time may be seen as a contribution to Critical Theory, in that it allows providing the future with a transformative potential, that is, with the emancipation from temporality. This is in fact a topic that Walter Benjamin (1973) persistently engaged with, by rejecting the Modern conception of time as linear progress. The past, which Benjamin calls "tradition", is always in danger of being appropriated for political purposes. That is why he saw documents of culture as documents of *barbarism*, in that the victors endowed with the legitimacy to write history *determine what the past means* (Benjamin, 1973: 257; Ferris, 2008: 132–133). In turn, the future is seen to offer something other than the extension of the same forms of social and political life (Stephens, 2009: 79). There are indeed blind spots and interpretive spaces regarding the use of

the idea of civilisation within NATO that are clearly related to this Modern tradition of defining dominant historical meanings, which this book seeks to uncover.

We may hereby rejoin Richard Ashley's (1989) position on Logocentrism as the hegemonic system of expressions of duality, which helps understanding that there are epistemological challenges inherent to Western culture that sustain this treatment of time and change. Ashley (1989: 261) exposes the influence of such logocentric tradition in binomes such as core/periphery, continuity/change, literal/figural, nature/culture, individual/collective, domestic/international, etc. He further explains that this logocentric tradition under Modernity tends to impose hierarchy, whereby one side of interpretation becomes sovereign for the participant, while the other is defined solely in relation to the former. Logocentric discourse thereby privileges one term only of the opposition (ibid.). While the privileged term is held as the source of truth and as a priority, the second is conceived as a deviation, complication, deterioration, accident (Ashley, 1989: 262).

This problem may be also verified more broadly in IR's difficulty to address the question of time. According to John Hobson, contemporary IR is "historophobic", in that it "[v]iews historical analysis as superfluous or exogenous to the subject matter of the discipline" (2002: 5). Hence, the instrumentalist and exogenous view of history that is generally used rather supports and confirms theories of the present, instead of rethinking theories and problematising the analysis of the present (ibid.). However, it has not always been like that. At the time of its emergence as an academic discipline, in 1919, IR comprised a body of knowledge that included history among other various disciplines, such as economics, sociology, law and moral philosophy (Hobden, 2002). But with the behaviourist revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, IR started privileging structure and space over time and context in analyses of world politics (Walker, 1989: 171 cit. in Vaughan-Williams, 2005: 115–116). This resulted in mainstream IR being reconstructed along asociological and ahistorical lines (Hobden, 2002). To Ashley (1989: 263), the consequence of not dealing with what he considers to be the "problem of history"—i.e., the impossibility of getting historical interpretation completely right—is that IR prefers to impose a representation that closes ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning, instead of projecting the uncertainty of historical meaning onto its object of study. Hence, the idea that time is regular, as meanings remain stationary independently of the time they represent.

More importantly, as a result of this aversion, insouciance, or superficiality towards history, two "illusions" arise, still with Hobson, which this book seeks to dismantle. On the one hand, the "reification illusion" consists in isolating the present from the past, making it appear as static, self-constituting, and autonomous; the present is represented as a reified entity, thereby obscuring its socio-temporal context (Hobson, 2002: 6). On the other hand, there is a "naturalism illusion" as well, meaning that the present is naturalised on the basis that it emerged spontaneously in accordance with natural human imperatives; the historical processes of social power, identity/social exclusion and norms that constitute the present end up lacking from historical analysis (Hobson, 2002: 6). Clearly, both these illusions may be verified in the treatment of NATO. As suggested earlier, civilisation appears as a *reified* product in NATO literature, and normative evolutions such as the Individualisation of Security are *naturalised* without further questioning how and why they surged.

In this context, it is hereby assumed that IR's approach of temporality, and of the meanings associated to it, has been rather rigid, which has too often limited our reflection of international phenomena to short duration terms. In turn, this shortness of sight has hidden the importance of unconscious meanings and their perpetuation in history, which is why phenomena related to civilisational issues have ultimately appeared in naturalised and unquestioned ways. Likewise, analyses on NATO have primarily focused on short and medium term changes, without referring to any longer-term pattern, such as the implications of civilisational defence. Therefore, it is a matter of reflecting on how a recent duration trend such as the Individualisation of Security fits into a longer-term objective—the civilisational heritage of the people in the NATO area. This book thereby suggests embracing time more critically, by adopting a view that is no longer focused on the immediacy of change, on recent institutional developments. Rather, it espouses longer processes of change and is more attentive to meaning and perception formation and their diffusion in time. This is a way of accompanying the evolution of ideas, and understanding how the temporal distance of original contexts may be eroded and dispersed through hegemonic meanings, thus turning into an unconscious, accepted and naturalised knowledge.

This is done in two interrelated ways. One consists in embracing time through a "long duration" framework—*longue durée* (Braudel, 1958). Once again, to Braudel (1979 *apud* Cox, 2002), different segments of social and human life have different tempos or timings. Economic change

operates at a different pace from art, architecture, or law, for example. Even though these changes may be related to each other, they are not synchronous. Consequently, the history of how mentalities evolve moves at a different pace from the history of material life, even if they both interact (ibid.). Under Braudel, these different histories and tempos contain three levels of time: (1) the level of immediacy, that is, the simple duration of events—*l'histoire événementielle*; it has no explanation, for it needs to be framed within the spatial and temporal context in which it occurs. (2) Conjunctures—*conjonctures*—represent an intermediary temporality, such as a protracted economic cycle, a persisting configuration of social forces, such as Fordism, social democracy, a scientific paradigm. (3) Long duration—*longue durée*—is a historical structure created by collective human activity throughout a large period of time; examples are language, moral code, and state system (ibid.).

Within NATO, short-term changes such as the move towards out-of-area interventions (as in Afghanistan and Libya) have coexisted with medium term changes (such as the adoption of new strategic concepts), and with long-term patterns such as the civilisational defence of the North Atlantic.[6] Temporality thus helps establishing a relation between the two referent objects of security that are at the core of this investigation—civilisation and individuals. On the one hand, the Individualisation of Security represents a medium term normative change, as a conjunctural paradigm of international security defined by NATO's different military interventions. On the other hand, the Individualisation of Security needs to be related to the Alliance's long duration objectives such as the civilisation of its people. Ultimately, by considering these three levels of temporality when analysing NATO, it will be possible to highlight how its historical evolution as an organisation occurred along with the evolution of mentalities, and perceptions of the world. Taken together, these perspectives will help reconstituting a much more complete and comprehensive analysis of NATO's referents of security.

Up to an important degree, some "history of the mentalities"[7] has been missing from our understanding of NATO's history, one that gives attention to mental structures, to ways of feeling and thinking, one that considers the importance of "the collective, symbolic practices, the unperceived mental representations" (Ricoeur, 2004: 192). This is not a history book though. It is a book on international security that incorporates to its best that missing sense of wider and more profound history, guided by the constant interconnection between the past, society, power and individuals.

The book thus keeps up with the aspect of social duration that is often ignored and misconceived by the social sciences in general, that is, with the perception of that antagonism between the instantaneous moment and the slowness of long time passing by—the "plurality of time" (Braudel, 1958: 726)—as much as with the "collective unconscious" where "mentalities function automatically, without their bearers being aware of them" (Ricoeur, 2004: 197).

1.4 The Argument

This research fundamentally aims at uncovering the unconscious knowledge underlying the fact that NATO originally offered to defend a precise civilisational identity, and has come to evolve into the protection of individuals in out-of-area countries. The goal is to understand the critical nuances underlying how two different referent objects of security—civilisation and the individual—relate in the evolution of an organisation that was created to uphold the security of Western states. How have these two substantially different referents cohabited throughout NATO's evolution? And to what extent does the Individualisation of Security inscribe and fit NATO's civilisational character? This is relevant as it remits to questioning and measuring the actual significance of doing security for civilisation and/or individuals. The priority given to any referent object of security should indicate what the priority is for any given organised society, which ultimately has also a direct impact upon how states and people behave at, and relate with, each other.

Approaching the civilisational dimension of NATO's relation to the Individualisation of Security does not equate to a Eurocentric manoeuvre that might reaffirm the conception of a prevailing civilisation, and influence the construction of security's subjectivity. Assessing the importance of civilisation in the constitution of security is a reflexive exercise at the cultural, social and historical levels, which helps enhancing critically the processes, forms of power, actors and discourses of civilisation. This is an enterprise that seeks to develop a critical historical account of how we came to be what we are, a reflection on our self-formative processes (Devetak, 1995), which is supported by a simple philosophical conviction that only through profound self-comprehension may human mind and history transcend its own frailties.

There are a series of key narratives on Western civilisation that act interrelatedly under NATO's authority and present history, narratives about

the West that sustain NATO's own narratives about values and security arrangements. Those narratives need to be deconstructed and denaturalised in order to unpack the closure and the subjugated knowledge they entail. Indeed, a critical perspective on this matter is likely to suggest that the idea of civilisation as defended by NATO in its original Charter is not necessarily to be held as a natural option to take for a regional alliance, or an international organisation of security. Likewise, the same organisation assuming that it has to protect the lives of individuals in out-of-area countries is not necessarily a given either, as its original compromise was towards the civilisation of its people. Did these two realities arise unconsciously? How do they fundamentally relate?

In order to establish that relationship between the two referent objects of security, short time lapse needs to be transcended, for it is not sufficiently comprehensive. As civilisation and its narrative are superficially approached in analyses on NATO, a long duration approach is needed to enhance the complex elements that have been silently anchored in the unconscious of the world. Because of the unseen meanings conveyed by the unconscious dimension of that knowledge, the concept of civilisation has nonetheless a strong analytical potential for the comprehension of NATO if it is approached in a deeper, more comprehensive, way. A focus on what Western civilisation entails and represents is required, along with a closer perspective on the historical roots, psychosocial dynamics, and norms used by Western civilisation in the course of its evolutive process. Despite its analytical decay, the notion of "standard of civilisation" is still a reality too (Gong, 2002; Stivachtis, 2010), as it also lies in the unconscious of the international realm.

Therefore, the argument of this book is two-fold:

1. The civilisation of the West has consisted of a psychosocial process consistently producing civilised and secure subjects around the world. An interdisciplinary conceptualisation of a "Civilised Subject of Security" highlights that the process of civilisation has relied on an ontological need individuals have for security that draws on deep psychoanalytic and symbolic reasons, and without which they cannot be produced and reproduced as civilised subjects through space and time. This makes the process of civilisation to inherently seek and depend on security. In this context, the process of civilisation is not to be understood as a rational and deliberate project of Westernisation of the world, but rather as a gradual movement of social adaptation

and survival, involving particular dynamics of power that rely on the symbolic stances of the unconscious. Thus, the unconscious of Western civilised subjects has been the thread holding the timeless meanings and perceptions of security that enable their subjectivity to advance across space and time.

2. The notion of a Civilised Subject of Security developing from the West to the rest of the world grounds the idea that the Individualisation of Security is the natural result of a linear evolution of international security. Ultimately, both processes lie in an unconscious dimension of knowledge. The need to deconstruct both these processes of valuation calls for a search for imposed meanings and controlled perceptions regarding the feeling of security of Western societies, in association with a sense of time and evolution. Therefore, the second interrelated claim is that NATO's particular endorsement of the Individualisation of Security has imposed and acted as a transformative process of post-Cold War international security, through which Western civilisation has been upheld and continued in the field of international security. Thus, individual-centred security policies have been enacted as part of the civilising process of non-Western states, because they have sought to instil specific transformations of behaviour and security rationales that aim at producing secure civilised subjects out of the original North-Atlantic area. The normative changes were internalised within the dominant patterns of military interventionism in a seemingly natural way. Ultimately, the Individualisation of Security serves an ongoing and open civilising process, in the continuity of a disciplining Western tradition.

Hopefully, substantiating this argument will contribute to the literature on NATO, Critical Security Studies and IR more broadly. It offers a historicisation of NATO as an institution of power and domination, consubstantiated by the dissection of its discourses on its referents of security from a long-duration perspective. Doing this on the basis of the "Civilised Subject of Security", which encompasses another historicising process that is anterior to NATO itself, the book goes through a journey of meanings across time, space and different planes of consciousness. Expectantly, this will help transcending historophobia and other illusions shaping knowledge within IR. Ultimately, so as to offer an actual critical contribution, the result of this book should be the reflexion of an undominated,

emancipated, scientific rationality. Well aware of our own social world and of our ties to it, the book should nonetheless be able to disclose the peculiar character of international security and emancipate its comprehension from temporal closure and ideational rigidity.

There is an important core of literature within international political sociology that has expanded and brought critical substance to the issue of denaturalising knowledge, which is particularly indebted—as much as this book is—to French sociologists Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu. The work of Bourdieu has been inspirational in security and NATO studies, in which different concepts and notions of his such as habitus and the field have been used. These are generally approaches that deconstruct and explore the role of culture as a dimension of power, and that focus on processes of exclusion that are intrinsic to international society (Adler, 2008; Adler-Nissen, 2013; Gheciu, 2005, 2008; Pouliot, 2010; Williams, 2007).

The approaches informing the methodological stance of this work are interdisciplinary, all concurring to the purpose of denaturalising knowledge by highlighting its unconscious dimension. The book thus applies different concepts of Bourdieuian sociology, psychoanalysis and social psychology to sustain a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that enhances the interrelations of discourse, knowledge and power. CDA generally deals with what knowledge consists of, how it is passed on, how its validity evolves, what function it has for the constitution of subjects and shaping of society, and its impact on the overall development of society (Jäger, 2001: 33).

Bourdieu's work offers a valuable contribution to the critical enterprise of denaturalising cultural forms of knowledge, and their automatic assumptions about society by highlighting how unconscious processes may shape social meanings. The notions of habitus, along with the "field", "symbolic power" and "symbolic violence", are the cornerstones of Bourdieu's critique of the cultural dynamics of domination. Bourdieusian notions thus rejoin Critical Theory, in that they dissect the apparent natural progression of social practices, through what he terms "constructivism structuralism" or "structuralist constructivism", a hybrid theoretical stance in which "[o]bjective structures, independent of the consciousness or the will of agents, which are capable of orienting or constraining practices and representations" intertwine with "[s]chemes of perception, thought and action which are constitutive of (…) habitus" (Bourdieu, 1989: 14). The idea of habitus, which is developed in more depth in Chap. 3 regarding

the Civilised Subject of Security, brings an incremental dynamics to processes of identity formation, through which one may conceive that social identity is a long-term cumulative and interactive phenomenon, and not the result of a singular, isolated, positivist evolution.

The "symbolic" dimension of power, which is central in Bourdieu's work, also plays a key role throughout the book, as it refers to the imposition of social meanings and representations of reality through struggles "[f]or the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly over legitimate naming" (Bourdieu, 1989: 21). In these symbolic struggles, agents resort to their previously acquired "symbolic capital", which is "[a] credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition" (Bourdieu, 1989: 23). Through symbolic power, structures of domination are thus legitimated, because they are represented as natural, so that social actors internalise them into a habitus, and therefore take them as normal and legitimate (Jackson, 2009: 110–111). In his reading of Bourdieu, Guzzini (2013: 81) additionally stresses that the capital encloses processes of cognition and recognition for the agents, in which a form of connivance between the dominating and the dominated is implied. Alienated from conscious consent, agents react following their habitus, which results in obedience, or "doxic subordination" (Guzzini, 2013: 82).

In this context, one of the major challenges of CDA is to make explicit the relations between discourse and knowledge (Van Dijk, 2003: 85). Discourses are a factor of power, because they are *agents* of knowledge, and are apt to *induce behaviour* and other discourses, and thus contribute to the structuring of the power relations in a society (Jäger, 2001: 37). The influence of discourse upon behaviour constitutes a critical point within CDA, hence the importance of language as a factor affecting thinking and action, with the power to influence "subliminally—'mechanically and unconsciously'—by constantly reiterated words and phrases, so that we come to act *unthinkingly* in ways that are required" (Southgate, 2005: 144). Empirically, CDA remits to structural relations of domination, discrimination, social inequality and control precisely conveyed by language, the latter being conceived as a social practice that is simultaneously socially constitutive and conditioned (Milliken, 1999; Nabers, 2007; Van Dijk, 1989, 1993; Wodak, 2001). But language is not simply to be considered under its oral or written expressions. The use of language and the choice of specific terms, to diffuse specific meanings is not innocuous, and involves cognitive approaches that explore the relations between meaning and knowledge.

Teun Van Dijk explicitly relates power to the control of both action and cognition, by stating that, except in the case of physical force, power presupposes the control over cognitive conditions of actions, such as desires, wishes, plans, and beliefs. In other words, social power operates through the minds of people, by "[m]anaging the necessary information or opinions they need to plan and execute their actions" (Van Dijk, 1989: 20). "Mental control" or "mind management" is crucial to the exercise and maintenance of power (ibid.), even if it is not always "bluntly manipulative", and may result from "subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear 'natural' and quite 'acceptable'" (Van Dijk, 1993: 254). Moreover, this dominance through mind management involves the influence on knowledge, beliefs, understandings, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms, and values, which is best searched for in discourse and symbolic control (Van Dijk, 1989: 23; 1993: 257).

In this sense, there are some complementary elements from political and social psychology that are consistent with both CDA and this book's inquiry over unconscious and silent processes that are helpful for the interpretation of discourses. As this study also searches for recurrent expressions in NATO's discourses that may indicate a deliberate attempt at influencing perceptions and induce behaviour and actions according to the particular designs of the Alliance, it is worth considering, for example, the role of *perceptions, beliefs, justifications* and *memory* regarding discourses on Western civilisation. These concepts can be used as conceptual tools in the discursive analysis of primary sources to enhance how meanings were allocated in relation to civilisation and security. *Perceptions* play an important role for the way the civilised habitus is expressed. They remit to the cognitive interpretations of the surrounding world and influence behaviour accordingly. Perceptions differ from interests, in that they define how a person makes choices, drawing on how (s)he see his(her) environment, on the assessment of information as compared to beliefs, to impressions, to the formation of images (Jervis, 1976: 8). Perceptions of the world and of other actors may surely diverge. It is always hard to determine which one is more accurate, also because perceptions depend on the information available to the actor (Jervis, 1976: 3, 7, 31). So as to complement and avoid misperceptions, Robert Jervis (1976: 31) proposes to observe how images of other actors are developed; what evidence political actors pay most attention to; what makes them perceive a threat? Hence, focusing on the actors' perceptions of Western civilisation and of the threats to Western civilisation may reveal how images of the civilised habitus are displayed, and to which aspects they give most importance to.

Beliefs express the critical role of emotion in rational or sensible thought. As cognition and affect cannot be separated according to the majority of psychologists, beliefs pervade every people's lives. They may convey commitment, faith, or urge others to do something (Jervis, 2006: 642–643). *Shared* beliefs are central to *belonging* as well, because people are motivated to maintain affiliations and bonds with others (Fiske, 2000: 305). However, some beliefs will not be found in explicit expressions, for they may be illegitimate or infamous, and thus make the political actor not eager to reveal them, even though he may be perfectly aware of them (Jervis, 2006: 645). Therefore, a mismatch may exist between what the decision-makers said they believed, and the decisions or statements they actually took during war, which makes it very difficult to "determine what people really believe" (Jervis, 2006: 647). Besides, it is not relevant whether a political actor really *believes* what he says when he mentions the historic importance of Western civilisation, for example. The fact he believes it or not does not explain the effects his appeal might have upon the world. "Beliefs themselves may, or may not, correspond to 'reality', but have no truth values unless discursively asserted" (Van Dijk, 2003: 85): what matters is what was actually said, that is, the words and content, regardless of why it was said. Personal beliefs and motivations do not influence the effect of what was said (Jackson, 2003: 235–236). In any case, beliefs appear as an important part of the civilised habitus, because they may reveal the level of commitment toward certain social meanings related to it. Given the emotional dimension of beliefs, the naturalised aspect of the habitus may be emphasised as well.

Justification as well is fundamental to legitimate an idea or some form of behaviour. People may seek justification for many different things, such as their own behaviour, feelings and thoughts, whether positive or negative—discrimination, aggressiveness, as well as their status or others'. "System-justification" refers to psychological processes that seek to preserve existing social arrangements independently of personal and group interest (Jost & Banaji, 2004: 391–392). At the state level, Martha Finnemore explains, interventions are justified with "shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other publics in other states" in an attempt to connect their actions to "standards of justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of appropriate and acceptable behaviour" (1996: 159). As consequence, she defends, by examining justifications, it is possible to figure out what those international standards are and how they any change over time (ibid.).

In turn, *stereotypes* are defined as the "widespread beliefs about social groups" that may characterise any system of separation of people into roles, classes, positions, or statuses (Jost & Banaji, 2004: 392–393). Stereotyped beliefs, in particular, are central to belonging, as people motivated to belong will "comply with perceived group norms regarding expressing or not expressing stereotypes" (Fiske, 2000: 306). Stereotypes also appear to be intrinsically connected to power, in a mutual reinforcing relation, because they exert control, maintain and justify the status quo (Fiske, 1993: 621). Besides, they Therefore, stereotyping under system-justification implies the use of widespread beliefs that tend to differentiate social groups in a seemingly moral way for the sake of the system. This form of processing information usually occurs in an ideological environment (Jost & Banaji, 2004: 394). Interestingly, in the case of "ego-justification" of aggressive actors, stereotypes serve to justify their own behaviour by delegitimising their victims; the latter are denied a human status, as when soldiers refer to the enemy as "savages" or "satanic" (ibid.). In general, justification is important to shed light on the status of the civilised habitus, in the sense it may indicate how the civilised is legitimated for preservation, or conversely how the uncivilised is de-legitimated.

Finally, *memory* is an equally useful concept to the analysis of the civilised habitus. In it, the realms of language, beliefs and history interconnect and provide the habitus its continuation in time: "Our new memory is both very new and very old, for it marries hip new linguistic practices with some of the oldest senses of memory as a union of divine presence and material object" (Klein, 2000: 129). Memory may thus represent socially or culturally shared, general knowledge, through social representations of historical events such as the Holocaust, or 9/11. This is usually used for the understanding of all meanings of discourse and for the construction of mental models (Van Dijk, 2003: 93). Memory is also the *locus* where individual psychic processes of remembering interplay with the social systems of symbols, practices, stereotypes, and language that compose collective memory (Klein, 2000: 130, 133). The relationship between memory and habitus may thus offer a sense of what has been preserved or lost from the civilised habitus.

As for the structure of the book, Chap. 2 starts by discussing IR's disciplinary connections with Western civilisation as a reflexive prelude that helps framing the different theoretical problems exposed earlier. Despite what seems to be an overall discretion of Western civilisation within the discipline, the chapter offers to review the evolution of IR and shows how

closely connected the discipline has been to the crises of Western civilisation in both individual and collective perceptions throughout the twentieth century. As it will be seen, the evolution of the discipline cannot be dissociated from the very evolution of Western society's own perceptions on its civilisation.

Chapter 3 proposes to individualise the approach of civilisation as a way to bridge the existing conceptual gaps regarding civilisation in security studies. After identifying the current limitations within the literature regarding the use of the concept of civilisation, especially within security studies, this chapter draws on a set of different conceptual and theoretical tools, mostly taken from sociology and psychoanalysis, to conceptualise the "Civilised Subject of Security". This Subject, it is shown, embodies civilisation in all its psychosocial dimensions that thus converge in a locus where the civilised habitus of individuals is unconsciously rooted in the ideas of power and security. Hence, the proposal that civilisation in the West should be seen as a complex process that is orchestrated by the production of civilised *ergo* secure subjects and societies, and that a civilised subject of the West has been forcefully a secure subject.

Chapter 4 proceeds by unpacking the connections between the standards of civilisation, the architecture of international security, and central notions of IR such as order and hierarchy. This chapter presents the notion of "standard of civilisation" and underlying processes, as a central development of international society that spread the secure status of Western civilised subjects across time, space and subjectivities and have continuously imposed a sense of order and hierarchy among members of international society. It will be thus possible to understand how civilised subjects were produced out of the original West through othering practices, in which the power relation between the figure of the civilised and the barbarian is omnipresent.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 approach in detail how NATO relates to civilisation as a referent object of security through a genealogy of the use of civilisation throughout the life of the organisation. While Chap. 5 looks into the Alliance's deep origins to understand the conditions leading to the adoption of a civilisational referent of security in 1949, Chap. 6 proceeds with its evolution during the Cold War. These chapters highlight how NATO has always been driven by, and represented itself through, a mission of civilisational protection that breeds both upon the unconscious stance of the civilised subjects of security, and upon the long-term symbolic capital of the West as a civilisational entity. With Chap. 7, which

presents NATO's broader post-Cold War transformations and their implications for the civilised habitus of Western security, it will be seen overall that NATO's civilisational referent of security has not been static, and has rather evolved through time, acquiring new conceptual and discursive shapes along the different international conjunctures.

Chapter 8 then elaborates in more depth on the Individualisation of Security as the chief evolution in the field of international security. It offers a conceptual, theoretical and practical analysis of the phenomenon, and articulates it with the Civilised Subject of Security. Chapter 9 analyses the specific relation between the Individualisation of Security and civilisation within NATO, and shows that the Individualisation of Security has been a tool used by NATO to produce Civilised Subjects of Security. Each of the three missions proposed—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan—concur to the argument that the Individualisation of Security ultimately represents another stage of the process of civilisation of the West. This should indicate whether the individual is the mere conjunctural continuation of a civilising process conducted by the West, in which civilisation still continues to be the ultimate referent object of security to uphold. Finally, Chap. 10 will recapitulate, and offer a final reflection on the main findings of this book.

Notes

1. The referent object of security consists of the designated object to be secured by a given security policy, deemed to be under threat. It may be either a global referent object, such as an economic regime or the environment, but also a specific community, state or region (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 12–13).
2. This is the author's own translation. In the original: "Chacun de nous a le sentiment, au delà de sa propre vie, d'une histoire de masse dont il reconnaît mieux, il est vrai, la puissance et les poussées que les lois ou la direction".
3. While Geertz (1973: 5) sees culture as a system of symbols and meanings imposing order on the social order, Campbell (1998: 221) defines it as a relational site for the politics of identity, and should thus be thought of in terms of performance.
4. The "subject of security" is the actual and practical recipient of a given security policy, independently of its referent object.
5. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 895–896) define the three stages if the norm "life cycle". First is "norm emergence", then "norm cascade", and third internalisation.
6. See namely the adoption of the Strategic Concept at the 1991 Rome Summit that focused on a wide enemy and acknowledged the need for long-range

institutional transformations (NATO, 1991). It also redefined and rebuilt NATO's identity after the Cold War, in the sense of a "community of democratic security" (Stivachtis, 2010). In 2002, at the Prague Summit, a new Strategic Concept was adopted to include issues such as counterterrorism, nuclear, biological, and chemical defence (NATO, 2002).

7. This is a reference to the French school known as *Les Annales*, emerging around 1929 with the journal *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*. Its founders, Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, defended the concept of mentality to oppose the passivity of historians confronted with a collection of facts (Ricoeur, 2004: 191).

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CHAPTER 2

IR's Disciplinary Connections with Western Civilisation

To Jacinta O'Hagan, IR has provided "[l]ittle assistance in thinking conceptually about what or who the West is", which she finds "intriguing" given its significance as a concept in international relations in general (2002: 1). Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth's edited volume *Uses of the West. Security and Politics of Order* (2017) is a recent input attempting to reverse that state of the art, offering different contributions that examine the West under various conceptual and empirical angles. By critically delineating the path of contemporary "uses of the West"—within NATO, foreign policy discourses towards China and Russia, among other issues—the book is enlightening of a Western subjectivity that is much more present than it is commonly and explicitly avowed in both academic and political circles. Yet, connections of the West to its civilisational content that discuss the very idea and meaning of civilisation still miss.

For this chapter, not only is the abovesaid absence of the West apparent, as it also appears quite paradoxical for several reasons. Keeping in mind the wider goal of providing a longer and deeper sense of history to denaturalise knowledge on civilisation, it is hereby important to observe how closely connected the evolution of IR has been to the evolution of the very idea of (Western) civilisation in both individual and collective perceptions. In fact, IR needs to be understood as a discipline, a source of knowledge, whose origin and *raison d'être* depend on the very *crises* of Western civilisation. As it will be seen, the evolution of the discipline cannot be dissociated from the evolution of Western society's own perceptions and increasing awareness on its civilisation.

S. da Mota, *NATO, Civilisation and Individuals*, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74409-4_2

It has been extensively demonstrated by John Hobson (2012), for instance, that international theory, which was developed both *inside* and *outside* the discipline of IR in the last twenty-five years, is for the most part a Eurocentric construct underpinned by various Eurocentric metanarratives since 1760. In fact, one of Hobson's central claims is that international theory has actually sought to "[p]arochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world politics" (Hobson, 2012: 1). Mark B. Salter has linked the civilised/barbarian dichotomy to European imperialism as well, to show how central that dichotomy has been to our understanding of international history and IR (Salter, 2002: 4). However, these West-related references, among others, are generally devoid of their civilisational content, in that the "civilisational West" remains unsaid and underexplored. So, how is it that IR does *not* address the civilisational West? Borrowing on Gerard Delanty (2003: 15), the underlying problem could be that the idea of civilisation has been negatively influenced by notions of cultural superiority, Eurocentrism, and even racism, either in old philosophies or in more recent arguments, such as Samuel Huntington's (1993, 1996) "clash of civilisations". The civilisational connotation of the West has been problematic enough to explain the overall discretion of the West within the discipline—although it is quite explicit in many critical approaches, such as post-colonialism.[1]

The emergence of the embryonic version of a discipline of IR after WWI appears as a direct reaction to the plagues of war. Embedded in a specific time and place, with the creation of the Woodrow Wilson chair in 1919 at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom, IR emerges as a reflection of postwar Western society (Bell, 2006: 493; 2009: 6; Wight, 2002: 27). Driven by the debates of the time about the relation between capitalism and war, and about the most effective ways of dealing with totalitarian state aggression (Ashworth, 2002: 33), the discipline of IR needs to be understood as the product of a Western endeavour in both ideational and material terms. By the time of WWI, the relation between nations and civilisation was transforming. Until then, the meaning of "civilisation" had been established as a universal and singular phenomenon around the world (Gong, 1984). As Prasenjit Duara (2001: 100) suggests, imperialist nations of the West used to invoke "civilisation" to justify their conquests in a civilising mission throughout the nineteenth century, based on Christian conceptions and on Enlightenment values as the sole criteria for proclaiming a state's sovereignty. *A posteriori*, and in

sharp contrast with the idea that the technological progress coming from Europe could only cause wellbeing, not only did WWI reveal "the materialism and destructiveness of Western Civilization" (Duara, 2001: 104), as it also unleashed a brutal disappointment regarding Liberalism in general and the fakeness of its ideas, its security, freedom, egalitarian and universalist culture (Gori, 2017: 41). Not only did WWI definitely disenchant the very idea of a civilising mission led by Western empires, as it also created a more reflexive generation of international theorists and political scientists, "a generation of disenchanted liberals, who saw capitalism failing, democracy faltering and were exceedingly sceptical of the capacity for the West to deliver the progress the nineteenth century had once promised" (Dunne, 1998: 26). Yet, the civilised/barbarian dichotomy was as central during WWI as it was in the interwar period, with the "frantic reassertion of the civilizing mission, embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations", and during WWII as well, with the barbarity of the Nazi rule and the West representing itself as fighting for the preservation of civilisation (Salter, 2002: 160).

In the midst of WWII, American political scientist Walter Lippmann expressed his worries that Western culture had been disappearing from educational systems since the beginning of the century, which had resulted in a new generation of "educated Western men" without the traditional Western wisdom that had built up the modern democratic state and Western civilisation: "[t]he prevailing education is destined, if it continues, to destroy Western civilization and is in fact destroying it […]" (1941: 184–185). Lippmann further defended that Western education should invest in its cultural tradition of morality and law, otherwise "alien and barbarous things" (1941: 186) would replace civilisation.

As international theorists of the 1930s and 1940s were dealing with both the aftermath of WWI and the proliferation of totalitarianism and imperialism across Europe, concerns with saving Western civilisation from decay happened in synchronicity with the very questioning of its core postulates and practices. This resulted in what Brian C. Schmidt sees as a "dubious dichotomy between idealism and realism" (2013: 17), patent in the ground-breaking work of E.H. Carr, for example, who introduced his *Twenty Years' Crisis* in 1939 with a fusional approach of IR theory integrating power and morality, meaning, realism and idealism. This kind of turn in IR theory is revealing of how strongly questions of interpretation and reflexivity perturbed Western intellectuals. It was obvious that the old international order issued by Western civilisation was permeable to

power-maximising moves like Nazism's, in consequence of which common perceptions and presumptions about international behaviour were now assumed to be barbarian before being civilised (Salter, 2002: 89).

After 1945, expressions of manifest Eurocentrist concerns such as Lippmann's took on a *subliminal* form, according to Hobson (2012: 10), who refers that many aspects and properties of the manifest were *hidden from immediate view* as decolonisation and the Cold War unfolded. This did not mean, however, that international theory did not pursue its reflection on civilisation. It was in the aftermath of WWII that the English School came out more vividly through the thinking and writings of E.H. Carr, Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, John Vincent and Hedley Bull, evolving across the Cold War, up until more contemporary scholars such as Andrew Linklater and Tim Dunne. Martin Wight's allegorical worldview in "The Church, Russia and the West" (1948), for example, depicted the Cold War as the final phase of the death of Christendom: "We are not well-meaning people doing our best; we are miserable sinners, living under judgement, with a heritage of sin to expiate", Wight argued (1948: 36). After the kind of questioning arising in the 1920s that posed Liberalism as an overall failed system of thinking and morality, reflexivity now surged at the individual and symbolic level, focusing on human nature's doomed morality and *psyche* as the root of all problems.

In fact, the kind of religious syntax surrounding the reflection on human nature is not exclusive to the English school; this topic was something in *l'air du temps* in the 1940s with Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian pacifist ideas as well. As soon as in 1932, Niebuhr argued that egoistic impulses of individuals translate into collective egoism in his book *Moral man and immoral society: a study in ethics and politics.* As a solution, Niebuhr suggested, among other things, that religion should be a dominant influence in the socialisation of man, because it leads to a spirit of contrition that can be useful to counter selfishness and antisocial forces in society. In *The nature and destiny of man. A Christian interpretation* (1941), Niebuhr actually pursued raising awareness onto the importance of understanding human nature in more depth, by defending that in order to understand the modern conflicts about human nature, it is necessary to appraise the modern characteristics of man in their "historic relation to the traditional views of human nature" that have informed western culture (1941: 5). Since the Renaissance, Niebuhr states, modern culture has advanced in the knowledge of nature, but has rather been confused in understanding man (ibid.). The emergence of such reflexivity regarding

human nature, patent in both Wight and Niebuhr, interestingly surge at a time when Freudian psychoanalysis was becoming increasingly popular among Western society. This ultimately shows the growing importance for the West to understand the connections between individual and collective behaviour, in close relationship to its very own civilisational crisis. As Roland Gori sees it, the very emergence of psychoanalysis is an anthropological attempt to heal psychical and social conflicts; it also initiated a symbolic revolution, in that it surged together with the "human and social sciences", the cultural and scientific revolutions, which are symbolic in Bourdieu's sense, because they are inseparable of news ways of governing, educating and healing (Gori, 2017: 62–63). Psychoanalysis, Gori continues, cannot be dissociated from this idea of a symbolic revolution in a modernity in crisis, a kind of hermeneutics of the subject and of the forms of power governing him (2017: 74–75). But the importance of psychoanalysis will be resumed later in Chap. 3.

Later in the 1980s, Bull and Watson (1984) questioned whether the diverse civilisations which had been brought together by the expansion of Europe have similar views about how to maintain order and belong to an international society, rather to an international system. Their view then was that a growing cultural conflict was developing together with an emerging cosmopolitan culture of modernity. The interests of non-Western states were now to be included, and a radical redistribution of power and wealth was needed, in a tension between order and justice (Bull, 1977: 316–317). Furthermore, still to the English School of IR, the notions of "global civility" or "civilizing processes in anarchical societies" have been rather important in relation to "social conventions, manners and habits, and related psychological traits and emotional dispositions that bring order to human affairs" (Linklater, 2007: 161, 163). Linklater has drawn on Norbert Elias' seminal work on the civilising process of Western civilisation (1989, 1990) to argue that "[t]he development of international society needs to be seen as part of a much larger transformation of social and political life over approximately the last five centuries" (Linklater, 2011: 2), highlighting the relation between the rise of a modern society of states and the so-called civilising process. Linklater's international society approach, characteristic of the English School, broadly presupposes that despite anarchy there is a society of states sharing common interests and values at the international level, which expanded from Europe to the rest of the world (Dunne, 1998; Linklater, 2007: 131, 137; Linklater & Suganami, 2006). This is an important contribution that counters the

usual isolation of the international from larger patterns of the social and political life (Linklater, 2011: 4), as he too thinks that the role of the civilising process is underexplored: "The question—which to the best of my knowledge has not received much attention—is how far the development of international society was linked with the broader civilizing process" (Linklater, 2011: 12). As the history of this school has already been largely documented by Tim Dunne (1998) and Andrew Linklater (2005), the central aspect to retain here is that this school's group of figures *explicitly* denote a deep concern regarding Western civilisation, each one in their own time, and some of them with more reflexivity than others—but all fundamentally dedicated to cosmopolitanism and pluralism as values to be defended by the West. They identified the problems and crises of Western civilisation, they questioned its practices and values, and claimed for the acknowledgement of the non-West.

During the Cold War, the idea that different civilisations could coexist was obscured by the bipolar tension between East and West, but the West still preserved its universalistic notion of civilisation (Cox, 2002: 3–4). At the end of the Cold War, the West arose with a renewed pre-eminence as an actual concern within IR. Francis Fukuyama (1989) tossed the discussion by pronouncing the "end of history", whereas the West was viewed as the provider of a universal model of human progress and development, and also of the rational state towards which the rest of humanity continuously evolves (O'Hagan, 2002: 1). But the most (un)popular argument of the post-Cold War world appeared with Samuel Huntington's view that a "clash of civilisations" would preconize that new era, in which world politics would be dominated by "cultural" conflicts "between nations and groups of different civilizations" (Huntington, 1993: 22). In this context, Huntington deemed the West was to be challenged and joined by non-Western civilisations as "movers and shapers of history" motivated by a "growth of civilization-consciousness" (Huntington, 1993: 23, 26), among other geocultural, economic and military factors.

Twenty-five years after the first formulation of his thesis, which was originally presented in a *Foreign Affairs* article, and later developed in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), very few other arguments have provoked so much controversy in IR literature as Huntington's. This "revival of interest in civilizations in international relations literature" is actually seen by Cox as a "false start", because Huntington's conception of civilisation is of a "finished structure with a political authority […] and a territorial grounding" (2002: 38). Among

many other reasons, the critiques seem to converge into the essential reifying culturalism of Huntington's argument, which does not fall into what civilizational theory is supposed to be, according to one major proponent of civilizational theory, Johann Arnason (2003). Hence, Huntington's very definition of civilisations is mostly culturalist, reasserting them as "strategic frames of references, not as direct protagonists of international politics", with the aim of liberating the "self-understanding and self-defence of the West from the constraints of ideological universalism" (Arnason, 2003: 11). A very interesting point is made by Chris Brown (2014: 56) as well regarding that protagonism of international politics, as he considers that the central element being reified by Huntington is *agency*, because neither civilisations as systems of ideas, nor individuals may clash at each other. As civilisations cannot authorise "individuals to clash on their behalf", "There are no authentic representatives of civilizations, although there are many who wish to claim this status" (ibid.). As a consequence, the real protagonist of Huntington's thesis is actually the West, in all its universalizing view of civilisations, promoting their very clash (Brown, 2014: 59).

At a pivotal moment of uncertainty in, and redefinition of, international relations, Huntington foresaw the challenges to Western hegemony as an impending threat, equilibrium as a mirage, cooperation as interest-driven, conflict as inevitable, inequality as fairly irreversible. Possibly "preoccupied with positing a new enemy that could restore a sense of purpose and direction to American foreign policy" (Falk, 2014: 9), Huntington chose to depict a world in which civilisation is processed in allegories, hovering over encapsulated time and identities, "immune to modern changes" (Arnason, 2003: 43). His "clash of civilisations" thesis thus prescribes the great divisions of contemporary society, and presents difference as inexorable. The possibility for change or emancipation appears irremediably doomed by fundamental cultural differences among civilisations, which also serves to sustain Western hegemony in the face of the impending transformations in the post-Cold War's balance of power and international order.

However, how to understand that the culturalism of Huntington's claims was so compelling and influential from the 1990s onwards? At such a critical moment for international conjuncture, the implications of his premises were profound in shaping the contemporary representations of civilisation(s). In fact, by exaggerating the political significance of civilizational identities at the expense of a continuing role of dominant sovereign states, Huntington's worldview provoked dangerous civilizational tensions

(Falk, 2014: 10), as the idea of clashing civilisations came to fuel and revive pre-existing binary narratives on Western civilisation that had been somewhat asleep during the Cold War. Among the many dissatisfied with Huntington's argument, Mark B. Salter has precisely suggested that, although the barbarian/civilised dichotomy largely faded away from the discipline until the end of the Cold War, post-Cold War IR theorising and thinkers show that it has come to actually divide the world into other stereotypes of civilised and barbarian, which is the real result of Huntington's "clash" argument (Salter, 2002: 157). In this sense, beyond the apparent ground-breaking promises of Huntington, the revival of civilisational narratives after the Cold War represent more continuity than change.

Moreover, the "clash of civilisations" may be understood within a broader context of the post-Cold War revival of culture that strongly contributed to shape civilisation-consciousness in Western discourses on international security across the 1990s and early 2000s. Michael C. Williams (2007) has demonstrated how, after the Cold War, the return of culture represents an appeal to the triumph of Western culture, of the universality of its liberal values, ideals and institutions. To Williams, cultural practices have been central in the transformations of the USA's and EU's security policies, as well as in NATO's evolution. The cultural dimension of security reveals as a new strategy, as a new basis for a new set of power relations, reproducing "[t]he habitus prevailing in Western security institutions […] where cultural and symbolic forms of capital became vital" (Williams, 2007: 40). To Stefano Guzzini, the post-Cold War debate about the "West" is rather connected to the revival of geopolitical thought. As he argues, that revival should not be understood as a "normal" consequence of the end of the Cold War, but rather as "[a]n answer to, or an easy fix for, the sense of dis-orientation and foreign policy identity crises which followed 1989" (2015: 5). In Guzzini's argument, not only are "re-identification" and politics of representation at the centre of the revitalisation of the "West", as they have negatively contributed to increased militarism and to the re-securitisation of international politics, and ultimately, to a "[v]ision of an exclusionary Fortress West" (ibid.). This highlights once again how closely connected the civilisational feature of the West, the symbolic signification of its identity, and its sense of security are.

References to Western civilisation in literature on NATO have been strongly influenced by that post-Cold War culturalist trend. This can be seen, for example, in Peter Van Ham's assessment of "[w]hether the cultural glue ostensibly keeping 'the West' together remains strong enough

to endure post-Cold War transatlantic tensions" (2001: 394), which takes Huntington's concept of civilisation as a conceptual basis. This rather exclusive focus on the post-Cold War period only results in a static, stable and self-reproducing view of civilisation, with the predominance of non-dynamic, essentialist, conceptualisations.

In the aftermath of WWI, the advent of the discipline of IR surges at a time of generalised crisis—social, economic, political, identity, symbolic. Questions of political and economic coexistence were at the top of international concerns, denoting the interest and the will to provide a vision for the world, of how it should be(come). The prevailing political and socio-economical models obviously mattered, since they influenced and produced determined effects on the existence of Western societies in particular. When IR first emerged, perceptions about the West were therefore an issue *à l'ordre du jour*, and concerns with world order and civilisational issues have always been present at different pivotal moments in the life of the discipline. It seems that its conceptual absence from scholarly literature results of a certain degree of cultural covertness, which Michael C. Williams (1998) identifies as the problem of "liberal sensibility". Accordingly, security policies have omitted identity issues because early modern liberalists saw them as a critical "source of violence and insecurity" and thus preferred to "marginalize them in practice, and to replace them with new forms of understanding and political action" (Williams, 1998: 205).

The widespread apprehensions during WWII that Western civilisation was failing to make its values endure, and the resurgence of the West in the 1990s, suggest that periods of war, political instability, moral and identity insecurity, may have a determining effect on the reappearance of the fear that civilisation, or civilisational world order, might be under threat. Although the universalist notion of Western civilisation apparently declined and became so unpopular that cultural issues were obliterated from the conscious realm of the politics of security, the West still needs to be considered as the main "ideal normative referent" (Hobson, 2012: 1) in world politics.

In all, the evolution and development of the discipline of IR is intrinsically related to civilisational concerns broadly defined, especially those of the West. The defining clashes of the discipline such as the Realism versus Idealism debate are the expression of the symbolic dilacerations within Western society between the old world's conservative order and the new possibilities of renewal, all aiming at the same fundamental goal of

maintaining Western values and culture, and ultimately status quo. They also assert a wider reflexivity and awareness of collective behaviour within Western society, a movement that increasingly questioned human nature and its mental structures, which is confirmed by the growing popularisation of psychoanalysis and the history of mentalities in the first decades of the twentieth century (Freud, 1961; Gori, 2017; Ricoeur, 2004: 188–197). Along the way, international theorists, among intellectuals of other fields, sought to dissect the prevailing universalist sense of civilisation, by enhancing the pluralist encounter and permeability of different civilisations (Bull, 1977; Bull & Watson, 1984). In all, this centrality of the West as a disciplinary life and death signifier has not translated into literature that deeply engages with, and attempts to interrelate, the importance of the idea of civilisation for the West and the security of individuals—that is what the next chapter is about to do.

Note

1. For one of the most influential works in post-colonial studies, see: Said, Edward W. (Said 2003 [1978]) *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.

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CHAPTER 3

Individualising Civilisation: The Civilised Subject of Security

After having reviewed Western civilisation's intrinsic relationship with the discipline of IR, and presented the insufficiencies and limitations of the existing conceptions of civilisation, this chapter proposes to individualise the approach of civilisation through a set of different conceptual and theoretical tools, mostly derived from sociology and psychoanalysis. What does civilisation consists of, and how is it related to conceptions of security? How does civilisation contribute to security? Have its meanings and representations evolved, or has it essentially remained the same through time? Narrowing down the idea of civilisation to individuals, it is argued, is a missing link for an improved understanding of the unconscious dimension of international security. This approach materialises into the conceptualisation of a Civilised Subject of Security, framed within the unconscious processes that compose the ontological relation between civilisation and security. Security, it is claimed, is the ultimate value giving an ontological sense to the process of civilisation, for its deep and metaphysical bonding character in human societies. In short, it will be seen that a civilised subject of the West has been forcefully a secure subject.

The concept of civilisation has no unanimous definition. Many authors from diverse fields such as history, sociology, cultural studies, or security studies, have attempted to defend their view of what civilisation means and entails by: (a) reconstituting the origins of civilisation as a term and idea, as well as its evolution through time (Braudel, 1989; Elias, 1989); (b) debating whether civilisation should be conceived in the singular or plural, i.e., whether we should think of one single civilisation as supreme and

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absolute condition or entity, or multiple interdependent civilisations that coexist (Arnason, 2003; Cox, 2002b; Delanty, 2006; Eisenstadt, 2003); (c) exploring the civilisational evolution of different regions of the world, as well as the criteria required in order to be considered civilised, that is, the prevailing "standard of civilisation" (Behnam, 2002; Bowden, 2002; Donnelly, 1998; Duara, 2001; Gong, 2002; Mozaffari, 2002).

Norbert Elias (1989, 1990) and Fernand Braudel (1989) provide two chief approaches that are very influential in contemporary literature on civilisation. Together, they provide a preliminary idea of some of the deepest implications of working on the concept of civilisation. To Norbert Elias (1989, 1990), the West has a collective consciousness of its civilisation that follows a sense of superiority developed by its elites since the eighteenth century. That collective sense of superiority arises from a Western society composed of politicised individuals who possess structures of *civilité* and *politesse*, i.e., good manners that were progressively acquired and that act as antecedents of the very term and idea of "civilisation".

The other influential work on civilisation is provided by Fernand Braudel's broader conception of civilisation as simultaneously a geographical space, a society, an economy, and collective mentality (1989: 39–43). This is connected to Bull's view that a common civilisation is at the basis of "historical international societies", in which some of the elements of civilisation are shared, such as a common language, epistemology and understanding of the universe, a common ethical code, among others. In Bull's sense, a common civilisation thus favours the foundation of an international society because communication, awareness and understanding are facilitated, as well as the functioning of common rules and evolution of institutions (1995: 15). Braudel also introduces an important element in his conception, which is temporality, with the argument that civilisations manifest both in short-term daily practices—as in a scientific discovery, a successful book, or going to the theatre—and in trends that remain longer in time, ending up being interiorised as unconscious and irreplaceable values. To Braudel, current civilisations are the continuity of a certain past that has been kept alive (1989: 39).

Civilisation is thus both a conscious and unconscious phenomenon, lying in complex ways between the conscious representation of a particular entity such as the West, and the unconscious knowledge, or interiorisation, of timeless values and perceptions by individuals and societies. As for NATO, when it evoked the defence and permanence of a civilisation in its founding treaty (1949), it was not only referring to the safeguard of a

shared historical past, of a series of political achievements, of a mentality, a specific vision of the world, a cultural and identity bound, as it was also referring to a normative *acquis*. In turn, this *acquis* is the contemporary result of a gradual evolution of persons and ideas, from the past to the moment of NATO's emergence as an organisation. Furthermore, by doing this primordial and defining reference to civilisation, NATO correlated another fundamental idea, that is, security (Coker, 2002). NATO's relation to civilisation is thus simultaneously one of *representation*, in that it embodies the civilisation of one region of the world, and also a relation of *operationalisation*, as a tool *of* and *for* civilisational defence.

If literature portrays civilisation as a cultural and identity factor, as a membership criterion, and as a concept related to the very referent of security, it is obvious that analyses on NATO's transformation and change have dismissed another dimension of analysis, that is, the civilisational factor. The concept of civilisation has an important analytical potential for understanding NATO in genealogical terms. By bringing more nuances to the relationship between the Alliance and the production of meanings for individuals, civilisation leads to a deeper comprehension of the extent to which the organisation's metaphysical *raison d'être* has an impact upon individuals and their representations of their own security. However, the approach of the very concept of civilisation needs to be deconstructed and denaturalised in a specific and comprehensive way, namely regarding what the Western civilisation entails and represents, its roots and dynamics, and the norms it uses in the course of its evolutionary process.

Within international security studies, civilisation has been rather underexplored as a conceptual possibility for critical thinking. In fact, the concept has been used to elaborate a critique that is more centred on NATO's designs that on the substance of the concept. As a consequence, the references on the conceptual articulation of civilisation with security do not abound. Brett Bowden's (2010) work is one of the few exceptions, as he proposes three different ways to conceptualise what he terms 'civilisational security'. One is the security of civilisations as inspired by Samuel Huntington's conception of the "clash of civilisations" (1993). This notion is thought in terms of stability and security of a given civilisation, as it is concerned with internal threats to the preservation of civilisational purity and identity, as well as with external threats such as the clash with other co-existing civilisations. The second conceptualisation consists of the *security that comes with* civilisation, i.e., the security provided and established *by* civilisation, such as the security of state sovereignty. Bowden

illustrates this nexus historically, with the external interventions and conquests of those considered barbarians, or uncivilised, by the Spanish in South America, the English in Scotland and Ireland, the Europeans in Africa. In the twenty-first century, this kind of interventions still occurs in societies deemed less than civilised, and to non-sovereign members of the civilised international security. The third is related to the survival and viability of 'Civilisation', given the global concerns that potentially threaten the existence of the whole Humanity, and other species. These are threats to ways of living, to our capacity to continue living on the planet and explore it, such as the nuclear holocaust, or more currently viruses and climate change (Bowden, 2010: 10–11).

The conception and role of civilisation have not been problematised enough in relation to security. As important interpretive spaces remain to be filled, some alternative perspectives remain to be taken in security approaches. One of them, consists, for example, in looking at civilisation as a historical process, that is, as "[t]he continuing evolution of the ways in which different groups of people perceive the world" (Cox, 2002a: 38). Another, suggested by Arnason, focuses on civilisational discourse and its impact upon collective identity as a way to understand the ideological uses of the civilisational argument, "[w]hether in terms of Huntington's 'ultimate tribes' or Wallerstein's identity-boosting images of the past" (Arnason, 2003: 51), for instance. Civilisation definitely needs to be more deeply engaged with, especially at the level of the perceptions, mentalities, and discourses associated with it, in order to denaturalise the knowledge of, and understand how it may impact upon identity, behaviour, memory.

3.1 The Civilised Habitus

Conceiving the notion of "civilised habitus" is the way hereby advanced to individualise the approach of civilisation. By looking into the concept of "habitus", most commonly associated with the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and complementing it with the work of Norbert Elias on the *Civilising Process*, it is possible to relate civilisation to deep psychosocial processes of identity formation. Hopefully, the notion of civilised habitus helps picturing how individual subjects acquire a perception of their existence as civilised subjects *vis-à-vis* an equally civilised society, in a mutually constitutive interaction between the sense of a civilised identity and broader social processes.

Bourdieu does not elaborate on a fixed definition of the concept of habitus, or of any other concept—such as field or capital—because he does "not like professorial definitions much" and rather defends the use of "open concepts" designed to be "put to work empirically", as a way of rejecting positivism (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 95–96). Yet, some images may be assembled to compose a fair illustration of the concept, which will be more vividly grasped hereafter with Norbert Elias. In Bourdieu's own words, habitus "[i]mplies a 'sense of one's place', but also a 'sense of the place of others'" (Bourdieu, 1989: 19). This notion is to break with the notion of rational agent, and to provide instead a logic of practice that illustrates a practical sense, a "sense of game" underlying social action (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 120–121). Put in other words, the habitus implies that the sense of the Self is interrelated to the sense of Otherness, presupposing an inner comprehension that social action is interdependent of others, and cannot exist in isolation. Through habitus, social agents perceive and classify the world in a seemingly orderly and routinised manner, by following a set of conscious and unconscious precepts that they continuously acquire throughout a life of social interaction, experience and learning. This continual process of interrelated inculcation and social learning gives habitus its legitimising and naturalising character, so that, "[t]hrough habitus, we have a world of common sense, a world that seems self-evident" (Bourdieu, 1989: 19).

Habitus has already been used in literature on NATO in several different ways for its potential to explain the logic of practice within institutions. On the one hand, Michael C. Williams uses it to formulate post-Cold War security as a "cultural field that emerged from within the habitus and institutions of security" (2007: 89), in which NATO was able to reinvent itself "by building upon its real historic foundations" (2007: 73). To Williams, this relationship can be understood as a Bourdieuian field, in that it is the product of "both the pre-existing field, habitus, and institutions, but also a consequence of forms of capital, power, and their related strategies deployed to reconfigure the field" (Williams, 2007: 90).

On the other hand, Emmanuel Adler (2008) and Alexandra Gheciu (2005, 2008) both illustrate the logic of habitus with the case of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Adler takes the habitus from a macro cognitive evolutionary point of view, as a form of "background knowledge" that leads the behaviour of practitioners in communities of practice such as NATO, which enables them to "share similar beliefs related to their practice, to entertain similar reasons, and to

act with common sense" (2008: 202). Gheciu takes this process further by identifying processes of habitus-building in the area of defence, more precisely regarding NATO's role as a socializing actor that defines, promotes and seeks behavioural change in new members—this point will be further explored in Chap. 7, focused on post-Cold War NATO. These postulates are used to understand the logic of *practice*, as they enhance the psychosocial dimension of a set of particular policies by NATO after the Cold War. Although they point to the behavioural transformation of individuals, either the practitioners', or the subjects' of enlargement policies, they still do not help figuring out more specifically how civilisation is incorporated by individuals. Therefore, attending to Williams again, if habitus is "both individual and collective, applying to all those who share similar positions in terms of their acquisition of a particular habitus and occupation of a similar position within the social field" (2007: 25), to what extent may civilisation be understood as a "civilised habitus"?

Drawing on Norbert Elias' work on the civilising process of the West, the notion of a "civilised habitus" enhances the psychosocial dimension of civilisation, by giving a conceptual shape to the predisposition of individuals to internalise and reproduce certain attitudes deemed civilised, in a way that is not entirely conscious. This does not mean that the civilised habitus is a natural, innate, tendency; it rather explains *how* social meanings connected to civilised behaviour may be *held as natural*. Globally, Elias' work denaturalises Modernity and simultaneously deconstructs the process by which Westerners came to be what they are through a duly contextualised historicisation of identity formation. Elias' work offers one of the most complete, interdisciplinary, dynamic and comprehensive understandings of the idea of civilisation in the West. In fact, his work has been profusely used in IR literature, in particular by the English School, regarding the role of civilising processes in the evolution of international society and the peaceful, or "self-restrained", coexistence of its members (Adler, 2008; Ikeda, 2010; Linklater, 2004, 2007, 2011; Linklater & Suganami, 2006).

In *The Civilising Process*, Norbert Elias exposes Western civilisation as a long-term process of pacification within Europe since the early Middle Age. His main argument is that the structure of man has become more civilised because humans are generally open to, and interdependent of, other persons (Elias, 1989: 49). In that civilising process of the West, the psychological changes and overall development of individuals appear interconnected with the social transformations related to the formation of the modern state, following a cycle of centralisation, competition,

monopolistic mechanisms, pacification, increased specialisation of social functions, and complexifying chains of interdependence (Smith, 2001: 3).

Although Elias considers that one essential step of the civilising process occurs when there is the *awareness* of civilisation—i.e. the awareness of one's behavioural, artistic or scientific superiority, which starts spreading to many other nations in the West, he does not think that civilisational change in the West is deliberate, or intentional (Elias, 1989: 100). It is not a rational and conscious process of individuals, because civilisation is not the result of human *ratio* or long-term planning (Elias, 1990: 187). However, with Elias, civilisation occurs within a particular order, and not in chaos: first, physiological functions, impulses and affections are relocated to the private and intimate realm. Then, the interdependence between individuals makes a compulsive and *sui generis* order to emerge; an order that is stronger than individual reasoning. This order of interdependence actually determines the course of historic change, and lies at the very origin of the civilising process (Elias, 1990: 188). Furthermore, Elias conceives *knowledge* itself as *a process,* as "[t]he learning process of humankind, not the learning process of an individual person who supposedly acquires knowledge starting from scratch" (Elias, 1991: 113). This process of knowledge, Elias suggests, actually translates into the concept of habitus, more precisely into a civilised habitus, presupposing that there are human dispositions that are "[e]ssentially the product of the internalization of the structures" (Bourdieu, 1989: 18) of our *civilised* world.

By observing historical facts and empirical material from the Absolutist period in Europe (sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries), Elias highlights the progressive evolution of specific attitudes and social patterns (1989: 50, 106–107). He locates the *civilité*, or *politesse,* as it was used *ipsis verbis* by French society from 1530,[1] with the success of Erasmus' treaty *De civilitate morum puerilium* on the children's civility of usages (Elias, 1989: 103). Erasmus' treaty approached the men's public behaviour and focused on the boys' instruction, defending that they should be inculcated with the right way of behaving in society, by not spitting in public, and the polite ways to look at people, dress, gesture, set the table, eat, or clean their noses (Elias, 1989: 106–107). This clearly reinforces the need for a civilised habitus to be established, remitting to Bourdieu's bodily dispositions that co-constitute habitus. As Elias shows, these attitudes evolved in the sense of self-restraining natural impulses for the sake of social decorum. With new forms of conducting and organising human relations in a way that is more self-centred and respective of the space of others, there is

a growing obligation of self-control, which restructures the whole society (Elias, 1989: 129–130). In this context, the development of a civilised habitus may be envisaged in the process of civilisation of the West, in that very "simple and circumscribed" human dispositions (Pickel, 2005) began to stabilise and were internalised into the unconscious of individuals, throughout a learning process that was first related to the bodily dispositions. Elias' psychogenetic approach clearly illustrates how the process of civilisation was initially related to this notion of physical embedment of behaviours, which is consistent with Bourdieu's view of habitus as both an open concept and process in a continual state of evolution. As a product of history, the civilised habitus also remains an "open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 133).

Besides the psychogenetic reconstitution, Elias also undertakes a sociogenetic approach that interconnects the civilising move of individuals with the development of a stable central state apparatus monopolising physical force within territorial limits (Elias, 1989: 52; 1990; Smith, 2001). In other words, alongside the civilisation of behaviour and restructuration of conscience, the civilising process of the West has also to do with the reinforcement of subjection, domination, centralisation and dependence underlying the formation of the state during Absolutism (Elias, 1990: 15). In fact, the Western process of pacification depicted by Elias requires that civilised persons have stable psychic systems of self-coercion. Then, in order to achieve that stability, monopolistic institutions of physical violence were needed. This revealed to be the only way of social modelling according to which the individual would be educated and habituated since his childhood to a constant contention, so he can act it automatically during his whole life (Elias, 1990: 191)—making it a habitus.

But habitus reveals itself only in reference to definite situations, in relation to certain structures, in order to produce given discourses and practices. Bourdieu says we should think of it as a "spring that needs a trigger" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 135). In this sense, habitus may be transformed and shaped by social interaction in order to (re)define the meanings conveyed by discourses and practices. In this context, it is worth assessing the development of the civilised habitus in relation to a definite field, that is, security. In what was a crucial change of the field of security at the time, Elias explains how warrior aristocracy slowly transformed into court nobility from sixteenth-century France, as long-generation of noble

knights and warriors was substituted with a class of paid officials. This newly emerged military class would devotedly serve and depend more on the central administrator, making the king's rule progressively independent of the individuals' will. This was a precondition for the pacification of a sovereign area from the centre (Elias, 1990: 17–19). More specifically, the monopoly of violence implied a more severe regulation of the threat men represents their peers. Therefore, physical violence was confined to the monopoly of a remunerated army and became excluded from the lives of other people. The constant pressure that individuals used to feel upon their lives was no longer an issue, for their behaviour was attuned since childhood vis-à-vis the presence of a military organisation in charge of dealing with that threat. Moreover, the monopolistic organisation of violence did not deter individuals from violence through a direct threat; it rather exerted a psychological pressure that acted through the individual's capacity of reflection. This is how the individual wielded actual coercion on himself, based on the knowledge he had of the consequences of his actions (Elias, 1990: 194). This depicts the passage from a very hierarchical and decentralised medieval society, with its great and small warriors ruling the West, to the formulation of internally pacified societies, armed to secure themselves from the exterior, from their pairs (Elias, 1989: 52).

This sociogenetic approach enhances another structuring layer of the civilised habitus process. The evolution depicted by Elias in the field of the military shows how the specific dispositions in terms of the functions of physical violence were acquired in close dependence of a central administrator, who monopolised the security and defence-related decisions in "exchange" for pacified societies. This vital social function of the administrator was internalised by civilised individuals, whose manners were evolving in the sense of self-restraint and pacification as well, and a collective habitus emerged and animated the action of state-related institutions and paid forces. Accordingly, the civilised habitus is composed of a conscious civilised Self that is self-controlled and that has interdependently evolved amongst a centralised and pacified society in the West. Therefore, the acquisition of a civilised habitus occurred together with the routinisation of the central administrator's social functions. A civilised habitus thus made the central state functions to become common sense, which could mean that a civilised habitus could be actually at the origin of, or be prior to, the very national meta-habitus Pickel (2005) stands for.

Additionally, with Michel Foucault's conception of power, civilisation may be related not only to semi- or pre-conscious processes of cognitive

internalisation (Bourdieu), and to the self-restraint and the awareness of social interdependence (Elias), but also to further-reaching processes of disciplining, suggesting that only through power may a simultaneously *civilised and civilising* subject be produced. As a consequence, it is possible to advance with the possibility that power makes the civilised to civilise, providing the civilised subject with a sense of agency. Of course, the notion of power and the analytical potentialities underlying it are not exclusive to Foucault, nor to any other author. Stefano Guzzini (2013) has stood in fact for Bourdieu's field analysis of relational capital when it comes to power, defending that Bourdieu provides the necessary tools allowing to combine the different features of power within a coherent social theory of power and domination. In this framework, Guzzini highlights, "[p]ower is only a means in the wider analysis of domination" (2013: 80) that is to be complemented by elements such as symbolic violence and the role of language in domination. Although symbolic violence and the role of language are equally important in our analysis of NATO, the next section will complement that with the role of the unconscious as a mediator between the two.

In the process of going deeper and "longer" into the dynamics composing the civilised habitus, the perspective of power helps understanding more specifically the phenomenology of this passage from identity to widespread, naturalised, knowledge. With Foucault (2000: 283), the "history of power" is related to how hegemonic meanings imposed as normality upon the behaviours and the habiti of individuals. As a matter of fact, the way this knowledge has been exercised, produced, and accumulated over centuries, but also institutionalised and made scientific, is actually bound up with power mechanisms (Foucault, 2000: 291; 2003: 9). A Foucauldian perspective illustrates the idea that Western civilisation descends in fact from a *longue durée* process of power relations, characterised by discipline, normalisation and subjectification of knowledge, which has a central role in the perpetuation and reproduction of the civilised habitus as it emerged in the sixteenth century. The philosophical focus of such an approach is not on power *per se*—seen as an asset of supremacy, or absolute position—but rather on how its exercise "[i]s a way in which some act on others" (Foucault, 2000: 340). Definitely, with Foucault, power is not a fixed possession, but a flow of relations, established by a set of practices, for "[p]ower is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay between the terms of that relationship" (Foucault, 2003: 168). Moreover, power is

most often intended to produce "discipline", a phenomenon that the French philosopher estimates to be characteristic of Western history, whereby the individual "[h]as been caught in relations of power, as that creature who is to be trained, corrected, supervised, controlled" (Foucault, 2000: xvi).

Now, attending to the psychosocial dimension of the civilised habitus, for example, one essential factor of the civilising process occurs at the behavioural level, with the self-restriction of human natural impulses, and the development of this carefulness toward the Other and toward the self-image of the individual when in public. Civilised individuals and communities would basically acquire, internalise and articulate the habitus of social decorum in terms of an unconscious self-control and restraint of violent impulses. This dimension of civilisation clearly conveys the elements of discipline and normalisation that are central in Foucault's conceptualisation of power. Hence, the process of civilisation implicitly shaped a "productive" power (Foucault, 2000), in the sense that a new signification for a new civilised subject is produced in order to discipline individuals. In other words, the psychogenetic process of civilisation ultimately tells us how a civilised subject behaves; how his body is controlled when he interacts with others; how, where and when his physiological functions are to be employed. The civilised individual thus detains a different form of knowledge of his Self, a new awareness, since he relates differently to his own body and to other members of society; he is self-disciplined and normalises his behaviour according to the codes of conduct of monopolistic and disciplining institutions. In *Discipline and Punish* (1995), Foucault illustrates the phenomenon in his analysis of the formation of disciplinary systems in the eighteenth-century Europe. As he explains, Western societies have exercised power on individuals through their national system of education and military formation, thus shaping their personality with repetitive and graduated exercises, inculcating constraint, self-development, and qualification in individuals interconnectedly (Foucault, 1995: 161).

Now, returning to Elias' civilising process, it was said that the centralisation of physical violence allowed the monopolistic institutions asserting the mutual dependency between the state and the people, as a more competitive environment was set amongst a population of individuals keen to be remunerated. The concentration of social functions within the state actually required it to increasingly delegate competencies to the people (Elias, 1990: 96). As a consequence, there was a growing concurrence amongst the people, because more people needed to attune their behaviour

to that of others (Elias, 1990: 189–190). Here, what Elias highlights as the interdependence of men converging into the authority of central institutions may be thought in terms of power relations between civilised subjects. In fact, if we focus on civilisation at the individual level, it is interesting to reflect on how Foucault conceives the "individual" in relation to power. To Foucault, the individual is no "[i]nert matter to which power is applied", but rather "one of power's first effects", functioning as a "relay" through which power passes after constituting him (Foucault, 2003: 29–30). Accordingly, under the action of power, a civilised individual is actually *civilising*, in the double sense that his individual process of civilisation is constantly on the move, and that he is also in a permanent inter-civilising relation with the Other. Put in other terms, through the individual, who is the first consequential materialisation of power, not only could the first psychological moves towards *civilité* emerge, as relations of interdependence could also intertwine and relay toward the centralisation and the pacification of society at the collective level. Therefore, the civilised individual who is member of a civilised society is also the consequence of power relations.

Introducing the idea of power as conceptualised by Michel Foucault to the civilised habitus offers an actual complement to the understanding of how a social-identitarian perspective of civilisation evolved into a normative and subjectifying concept. We can thus understand that power acts as a relaying force allowing the civilised habitus of individuals to act as a civilising force that produces "civilised-*ergo*-civilising subjects", which actually enables the civilisation to *proceed*, that is, to be both a transformative and durable *process*. Power shows the inherent relational dimension of civilisation, whereby its process is in constant interaction with the Other, but also with time and space. Through Foucauldian tools, one may deepen a dimension that is latent in Bourdieu and Elias, namely the productive, disciplining and relational dimension of power in the conceptualisation of civilisation.

3.2 The Unconscious Dimension of Security

At this point, we may assume individuals coexist in a web of interdependent cognitive relations, learning from each other, internalising and self-restraining certain behavioural predispositions and cementing them in the realm of the unconscious to the extent they do not necessarily make a conscious choice about those predispositions. Bourdieu thus helps denaturalising

the idea that assumptions about behaviour, or meanings of identity, may be innate, because they are in fact rooted in complex processes of learning, inculcation, and socialisation. Ultimately, through the civilised habitus, a form of knowledge is unpacked that is pre-conscious, because it provides individuals with a sense of predictability and stability in their social relations. In turn, this form of knowledge helps understanding in more depth the silent dimension of the meanings conveyed by the narratives on Western civilisation.

In the task of individualising the conception of civilisation, this section explores the unconscious dimension of security, so as to establish a relationship between the civilised habitus of individuals and security. This is done by proceeding in two parts. First, by elaborating on the idea that metaphysical security is an immanent condition for civilisation, it is shown that the process of civilisation inherently seeks and depends on security, for the civilised subject cannot otherwise be produced and reproduced. Then, this ontological relation, it is claimed, can be better understood by approaching the dimension of the unconscious with the help of psychoanalytic literature. This allows connecting the individuals' ontological need for security and the civilised habitus as an unconscious provider of security. This conceptualisation not only reveals how the security of the civilised subject is a necessary condition for the survival of civilisation, but also that a civilised subject is necessarily a secure one.

Fernand Braudel's work on civilisation (1989) contains both the material and ideational dimensions of civilisation that constitute a good starting point for thinking on the security-civilisation nexus. As it was seen earlier, Braudel proposes a wide conception of civilisation as an organism that includes a geographical area, a society, an economy, and a collective mentality, with the ability to continue and keep a certain past alive. As a geographical area, civilisation is linked to a locatable space, territory, climate, vegetation, animal species, to natural advantages and inconveniences that humanity manages to accommodate as basic conditions for their settling and development. In order to make that accommodation possible, a civilisation needs to dominate its own space, which implies both overcoming and conquering natural obstacles such as seas, deserts, mountains (Braudel, 1989: 23–29; 1993: 9 cit. in Arnason, 2003: 3). The physical dimension of civilisation has a natural relation to the idea of security: in order for any civilisation to arise and endure, the integrity of individuals needs to be secured in a given place. In order to survive, individuals thus need to control basic natural factors of their lives, and ensure they can keep those factors under stable conditions.

Therefore, the essential physical condition for the security of a civilisation precedes the very idea of civilisation. Individuals may appreciate physical security without forming a civilisation, i.e., security comes *before* civilisation. Recalling Elias (1990), for instance, we may observe that the social solidification of the civilising process occurred decisively when physical security was guaranteed and monopolised by a central state. In turn, the existence of civilisation precedes the existence of the idea of the West as a sociocultural category and as a particular civilisation. Fernand Braudel broadly defines the Western civilisation as being composed of the American civilisation (USA and Latin America), Russia and Europe—the latter being composed of a series of smaller civilisations (Braudel, 1989: 26).

Simultaneously, security is also metaphysical, which Peter J. Burgess (2011) has defended through his view of security as a "system of values". Burgess argues that security practices can only be achieved as a certain form of negotiating values. In his words, security always results of an *ethos* and an *episteme*, that is, of a valuing choice in terms of a philosophy of life, culture, individual and collective anxieties and expectations, concerning what may be sacrificed in the name of what is to be preserved. Security thus implies an identification of what we like, what threatens what we like, and presupposes that a campaign of normativity might be deployed in order to define what actions are to be undertaken, how much suffering is needed to prevail, and what sacrifices are to avoid the threat (Burgess, 2011: 1–5).

If, as Burgess states, a threat to security is implicitly linked to what has value to us, then security is a system of values, for "[i]t is linked to the possibility that what we hold as valuable could disappear, be removed or destroyed" (Burgess, 2011: 13). On the other hand, in a system of values, the perception of a threat is co-determined by the subject who feels threatened himself, in a sort of projection of the imminent catastrophe (Burgess, 2011: 14). Clearly, apart from the obvious security of the material dimension of civilisation, the metaphysical aspect appears to make a major difference. As "ways of thinking", civilisations embody a certain representation of the world; they are animated by a prevailing collective mentality that circulates through all the segments of society, that dictates the mainstream attitudes, and orients people's options, fears, and beliefs throughout generations (Braudel, 1989: 35). This actually corresponds to what Michel Foucault calls *épistémè*, that is, the overall framework of thinking that typifies a certain epoch and may brutally succeed to that of the previous period (Foucault, 1971). In this sense, a given civilisation may be framed within a particular *épistémè*. To Braudel, the collective mentality of a civilisation

constitutes the pillar supporting the remaining dimensions—geography, society, and economy—for it is the one that actually unifies a civilisation as a whole. For example, there can be a singular area where a society is sustained by a singular economy. However, if its members do not share the self-representation of that society, the civilisation ceases to exist as a (referential) idea.

As a consequence, there is a critical metaphysical element underlying the idea of civilisation that draws on a communion of values and attitudes, without which the continuity of a given civilisation is not possible (Braudel, 1989: 39). Contrarily to the physical security of individual human beings, the physical dimension of civilisation is not an autonomous condition; if there is no collective mentality to unify the civilised subjects, physical space alone becomes obsolete. The continuity of civilisation thus vitally depends on the security of its metaphysical content, of its values. Likewise, the constitution of the civilised subject is co-determined by the perception and evaluation of the existence of Otherness.

In this context, it is worth pursuing this reflection by exploring in more depth the substance of that collective mentality sustaining civilisation. As seen earlier, whether at the individual level, or at the state level, the civilised habitus crucially depends on routines, on a sense of stable predictability, hence the importance of *feeling*, or *perceiving*, security. This remits the civilised habitus to the concept of "ontological security", as it entails the routinized nature of social relations that helps people defining their identity, sense of agency and security; without this routine, people would live in anxiety (Lebow, 2008: 25).[2] And here, psychoanalysis offers an important contribution, not only for addressing the relationship between issues of anxiety, uncertainty, and security, but also to conceptualise the unconscious and its role in identity, knowledge formation and ultimately collective mentality.

In his thorough examination of the political, social and cultural conditions that gave rise to psychoanalysis in the 1890s, Roland Gori situates the appearance of the notion of "unconscious" in the late nineteenth century, when the *fin de siècle* brought the anthropological figure of an increasingly isolated individual, vulnerable and moving, searching for his roots, collective affiliations and identity references, amid urbanisation and massification (Gori, 2017: 75). In this context, liberal thought did not conceive the individual as completely free and responsible, because the rule of the unconscious, associated with the hysterical and possession, made the individual uncertain (Edelman, 2003 *apud* Gori, 2017: 69).

As a consequence, there was a growing awareness that through the power of suggestion, social influence, repetition, imitation and reciprocity, men can influence each other and obey to stimuli without voluntary consent (Gori, 2017: 93). Ultimately, Gori says, the emergence of psychoanalysis coincides with the appearance of new forms of knowledge, new ways of perceiving, inseparable of the social practices that were changing at the time (2017: 129).

Although much discussion can be withdrawn from psychoanalytic literature of authors like Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung or Ludwig Wittgenstein, the purpose here is not to enter into a debate on who developed the best psychoanalytic definitions of the unconscious. For the sake of our reflection, the objective is rather to explore the conceptual possibilities offered by key authors from that field, and their application to the case in hands. In general, though, it can be said that, by inducing the subjects to recognise as theirs various motives that were hitherto unacknowledged and which they would have never accepted at the beginning, psychoanalysis provides us with criteria or reasons which allow us to understand that "someone's behaviour was determined in a way that the subject was unaware of, by motives that were not conscious" (Bouveresse, 1995: 30). Accordingly, meanings can be either repressed from consciousness, in a form of temporary exclusion from consciousness, or radically excluded but yet still influencing behaviour (Bouveresse, 1995: 33).

In this sense, Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical approach of civilisation (1961) highlights the instinctual/unconscious human inclination toward aggressiveness as the main obstacle to the achievement of civilisation: "Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city" (Freud, 1961: 105). But while Bourdieu, Elias, and Foucault tell us that rational self-restraint of diverse bodily impulses is a stage of the disciplining process of civilisation at the behavioural level, Freud presents the evolution of civilisation as a *visceral* process that vitally *depends on* the struggle of aggressiveness/death and instinct/destruction versus love/life. In other terms, the evolution of civilisation could be "the struggle for life of the human species" (Freud, 1961: 104).

However, Freud is quite dubitative of the civilised status as an irreversible attribute. As Nicholas Lewin (2009: 26) reads it, Freud deems it is an exaggeration to think that most of human beings have transformed in a civilised sense, because the instinctive drives of their primitive psyche still

clash with the restraints of society. Individual stability is hardly achievable on the long term, because society imposes restrictive moral standards on the individual who is compelled to act in the sense of precepts that are not the expression of his instincts. This does not necessarily mean that Freud contradicts Elias' view that civilisation as self-restraint allowed for pacification. What is rather implied is that pacification is only superficial, or can be reversed by decivilising practices at any time because of that human instinctual propensity to aggressiveness. Jean Elshtain (1989: 53) also suggests that, convinced that the civilisation of the West created over time a non-combatant civilian culture, Freud sees self-restraining individuals as sources of psychological instability and hence of conflict, so war is to be seen as a decivilising activity producing neuroses. For example, in his first take on war, an essay entitled "Thoughts for the times on War and Death", Freud shows his disillusionment and his horror of war, as he also states that we should have known better all along (Elshtain, 1989: 56). In this sense, it seems Freud sees war essentially as an almost predictable failure of human nature.

Under Freud, the individuals' dependence on other people is described as the "fear of loss of love" (Freud, 1961: 107). Without entering into too much detail about Freud's definition of "ego" and "super-ego", it is thus the very threat with the loss of love, together with social anxiety, that causes individuals to internalise aggression. On a later stage, a tormenting sense of guilt may develop that may be fed either by the fear of an external authority (or by the fear of the super-ego). The severity of the super-ego, the demands of the conscience, is a continuation of the severity inspired by external authority, to which it has succeeded and has in part replaced (Freud, 1961: 105–106). In all, the threat with unhappiness, loss of love or punishment can be replaced by a permanent sense of internal unhappiness (Freud, 1961: 107). Interestingly, Ricoeur also sees in Elias' *Civilizing Process* the major presence of *shame* in the habitus of the West, which consists of "[a] regulation of fear in the face of the inner perils that, in a regime of civility, took the place of the external threat of violence" (2004: 208–209). Here, the importance of security is paramount. As the existential tension of the sense of guilt needs to be contained, and fear regulated in the face of individuals' inner conflict, security reveals as a metaphysical value that ensures both internal and external happiness. Therefore, as civilisation inhibits the instincts, and represses the ego in a juxtaposed relationship with aggression (Roach, 2008: 101), security is the ontological death and life signifier that responds to the insecurity and threat posed by the possibility of loss of love.

As a consequence, we understand in a much more nuanced way with Freud that individuals cannot be genuinely, irreversibly, civilised in the sense of an inner pacification, not only because self-restraint is contrary to their instinct, but also because they condition themselves to repress those impulses for the fear of loss of love and sense of guilt in face of society's authority. In this context, the feeling of security is a guarantee *against*, but also a *negation of*, the possibility of violence, death, and social exclusion. These conditions underlying the civilised habitus are what ontologically connects civilisation to security.

But how has this fragile relationship between the civilised subject and his inner pacification been maintained? Within the unconscious dimension, there is still one central element in this work, which may contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between the pacified and secure civilised subject, that is, individuals' dependence on symbols.[3] Psychoanalyst Carl Jung substantially worked on the role of symbols, myths, "archetypes" and their role in what he termed the "collective unconscious" (Jung, 1964, 2003). Those concepts are used interrelatedly, but they are not easily understood. Lewin (2009: 161), who makes an extensive analysis of Jung's work, deems he hardly systematised his definitions, in particular that of archetypes, and his writings even confuse the distinction between archetypes and symbolic image.

Yet, to Jung (1964: 20), a symbol is "a term, a name, or even a picture that may be familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning". Thus, a word or an image is symbolic when its meaning goes beyond the obvious and the immediate, as it entails "a wider unconscious aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained" (Jung, 1964: 20–21). According to this definition, symbolic meanings lie in the unconscious to the extent that their significance may involve hidden or silent meanings, which may be inferred, deduced, or even imagined beyond spontaneous interpretation of the sense: "Thus, part of the unconscious consists of a multitude of **temporarily obscured thoughts**, impressions, and images that, in spite of being lost, **continue to influence our conscious minds**" (Jung, 1964: 32; emphasis added). Jung explains that our perception of reality contains unconscious dimensions, because our senses react to real phenomena and translate them into our mind but, as every experience has a number of unknown factors, we cannot *know* the ultimate nature of objects and their matter. Likewise, there are certain events of which we may have not consciously taken note. Although they have happened, they

have been "[a]bsorbed subliminally, without our conscious knowledge" (Jung, 1964: 23). Although it seems we have forgotten certain things, these may not have ceased to exist; as the unconscious takes note of things we may not notice through our senses, they still influence our reactions to both events and people without our realizing it (Jung, 1964: 34). In this sense, symbols play a critical role in habiti, by influencing behaviour unconsciously.

Jung's overall conception of the unconscious is extremely pertinent to this work, as it offers the closest notion of the "unconscious" that is to be used in the next chapters. The unconscious meanings conveyed both by the civilised habitus, and by the hegemonic knowledge on Western civilisation are thus defined by their apparent disappearance from conscious representations but nonetheless *permanence in subliminal forms.* In this context, Jung goes further when he goes beyond the individual unconscious and formulated the notion of a *collective unconscious* to designate a set of factors that are common to humanity as whole. As he observed many people affected by the same types of problems, Jung found that these common problems could have their causes set so far in the past, that they had become "in-born characteristics of mankind"—which he called "archetypes" (Lewin, 2009: 102). Through this reconstitution of Jung's intellectual process, we may conceive that the problems afflicting individual lives are common to so many people that they can be transposed collectively as problems with historic origins. There is thus a part of the individual's psyche that is common to a whole generation and that is absorbed at an unconscious level (Lewin, 2009: 108).

Without digressing on the many different formulations of archetypes, it can be said that their role within the collective unconscious is to convey deep symbolic meanings through space and time. As put by Jung, archetypes create the myths, religions, and philosophies that influence and characterise whole nations and epochs of history (Jung, 1964: 79). Meant to be deep truths about the nature of the human mind, the universal psychic images arise from the deepest level of the unconscious (Lifton & Olson, 2004: 33). Archetypes can be very influential in the political arena, mostly in relation to the rise of psychological disruption, which can take the form of abnormal over- or under-valuations, provoking misunderstandings, fanaticisms, myth-formation, fantastic rumours, suspicions and prejudices (Lewin, 2009: 198). An example of archetype is the hero figure, which has existed since time immemorial; the universal hero myth refers to a powerful man or god-man who vanquishes evil and who liberates his people from

destruction and death (Jung, 1964: 73, 79). As it will be seen later, this archetype is very common and surges very often in political discourses.

Furthermore, the importance of symbols is doubly critical for the secure lives of the civilised subjects and for the continuity of the civilising process. According to Robert Lifton and Eric Olson (2004: 39), societies and social institutions may help mastering death anxiety for those who believe in them, by generating shared images of continuity beyond the life of each single person. This is achieved through "symbolic immortality", a particular form of symbolism that reflects man's connection "to all that comes before him and all that follows him", sustaining his everyday belief and attachment to "human flow, to both their biology and their history" (Lifton & Olson, 2004: 34). In this sense, immortality is a symbol that gives the Self a feeling of security through a sense of continuity that transcends his own physical life. Life is then attached to meanings that go beyond time and space. This is clearly consistent with the civilised habitus, and with Braudel's notion of unconscious history.

The conclusions regarding the role of the unconscious dimension of security for civilised subjects can be synthesised in two main assumptions. First, the process of civilisation has entailed a metaphysical dimension, sustaining the idea that security in civilisation is not an added value, or an accomplishment, but rather an immanent *sine qua non* condition. The existence of civilisation depends as much on the existence of civilised-*ergo*-civilising selves, as on the transformation of the uncivilised Other, because he/she ultimately represents a threat. Actually, as long as the subjects remain civilised, and maintain their civilised habitus, they do not have to pursue ontological security: a civilised subject is necessarily a secure subject, as the process of civilisation plays a continuous role in the provision of security to the civilised subject, and by extension, to the uncivilised Other.

Second, there are different psychoanalytic aspects to the individuals' relation to security. The ontological relationship between civilisation and security illustrates the rather complex, unconscious, connections between the civilised subjects and their security. With Freud, the binome of life versus death, the instinctual human inclination towards aggression and sense of guilt suggest that the pacification of self-restraining civilised individuals is fragile. Here, the sense of security follows the logic of self-domination, in order to prevent greater evils. However, this does not diminish the ontological role of security within civilised individuals, but rather opens the possibility for reverting the pacification of individuals

through de-civilising practices. Through Jung, the interrelated importance of (archetypal) symbols within the unconscious allows conceiving the human metaphysical demand for a sense of historical connection that goes beyond individual life. Ultimately, civilisation *is*, ontologically, security, and therefore, civilised subjects are implicitly secure subjects. In more refined terms, the civilised habitus is an unconscious provider of security, but it is neither irreversible, immutable, nor exempt from fears and anxieties. On the contrary, as the civilised habitus depends on the domination of the Self and its unconscious unknowns, the Civilised Subject of Security breeds upon the security that symbols may continuously provide him.

Notes

1. At that time, in France, *politesse* or *civilité* had the same meaning that "civilisation" would later have. It expressed the self-conscience of Europe's superior stratum, as compared to other strata deemed more simple or primitive. At the same time, "civilisation" characterised the particular behaviour through which that superior stratum distinguished itself from the simple and primitive people (Elias, 1989: 90).
2. Jennifer Mitzen (2006) has related ontological security to IR, and applied it to the state to explain the recurrence of conflict between certain states. Accordingly, states, like people, do not only seek physical security, but also ontological security. The premises of Mitzen's argument are that agents are rational, but that uncertainty threatens their identity, which leads individuals to the need of ontological security. The routines are supported and enacted by the state's foreign policy, which provides the individual with the feeling of security, through a sense of certainty that avoids his perception of surrounding chaos. In this context, routinized relations—either cooperative, or conflictive—are maintained between states in order to maintain a sense of agency and identity.
3. *En passant*, outside the field of psychoanalysis, even Elias has his own view of the importance of symbols. In *The Symbol Theory* (Elias, 1991), he sees symbol formation as being bound up with human survival in the social developments composing the blind evolutionary process of the human condition. Without symbolic representation, says Elias (1991: 3), the language of a society is not known by its members. More importantly, "The ability to control patterns of knowledge and speech in a society is usually a concomitant of the distribution of power chances in a society" (Elias, 1991: 6).

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CHAPTER 4

Standards of Civilisation: Architecting Security, Order, and Hierarchy

This chapter unpacks the different connections between the standards of civilisation, the architecture of international security, and central notions of IR such as order and hierarchy. After having conceptualised the Civilised Subject of Security of the West under his most inner psychosocial features, this chapter proceeds by approaching the notion of "standard of civilisation" and underlying processes as a central development of international society and security. Apart from conceiving that a civilised habitus evolved in the West as a psychosocial process, the case for a Civilised Subject of Security still needs to be framed within the process of how civilisation coped not only with the formation of an identity in relation to a specific social system, but also with the standardisation of a secure status across time, space and subjectivities.

Standardisation per se should be understood as a process that is endemic of civilisation for its crucial contribution to the normative dissemination and spatial-temporal advancement of civilisation. In the West, the role of standards has been critical to the empowerment of men, who imposed a change in human relations throughout the world, in particular with the Discoveries and ensuing colonisation. In fact, Western men dominated others regions of the world by establishing a barrier between them and the groups they colonised—and whom they considered to be inferior. As they extended their forms of society, they also spread their standard, in other words, their behaviour and institutions (Elias, 1990: 206). Enabled by the symbolic power and capital previously accumulated by the West, especially since the Discoveries, this process, it is argued, has security as a guiding

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principle, a natural rule, a metaphysical value. In other terms, security is the norm that made it natural for civilisation to become an international standard for international normative order and hierarchy.

Since at least the eighteenth-century, European diplomacy acted more intensively from within the royal courts circles to move toward the development of an international society inserted into a broader process of civilisation to be spread beyond Europe to the rest of the world (Linklater, 2011: 13). But it was more particularly since the nineteenth century that standards of civilisation have worked as organising principles of international relations, shaping the original architecture of international society and international security. As the Ottoman Empire was dragged into Europe's balance of power, China and Japan had do face an increasingly assertive and powerful Occident, and Africa was becoming an arena for the rivalries between the great European powers, a "classic" standard of civilisation emerged (Donnelly, 1998: 3–4). This "classic" standard of civilisation set the tone for the dominant conceptions of international security, by giving rise to particular conceptions of the Western state model as a secure political subjectivity across space (Devetak, 2005: 176).

The notion of "standard of civilisation" was first developed by Georg Schwarzenberger in the field of international law. Originally, it operated during nineteenth-century European colonialism as a legal mechanism aimed at establishing whether non-European states could ascend to the status of "civilised" in order to be recognised by international law (Bowden, 2002: 2). In this context, Foucault explains how the juridical thinking of the eighteenth-century French historian Henri de Boulainvilliers considers the figure of the "barbarian" as an essential counter-point to civilisation. Differently from the "savage" who is attached to a natural backdrop, the "barbarian" only surges "[w]hen civilization already exists, and only when he is in conflict with it", "[s]etting it ablaze and destroying it" (Foucault, 2003: 195). Therefore, the orthodox doctrine of nineteenth-century positivist international lawyers was that "[i]nternational society was a European association, to which non-European states could be admitted only if and when they met a standard of civilisation laid down by the Europeans" (Bull, 1995: 32). Positive international law did not explicitly include any civilisational test for membership in international society. However, the minimal criterion for considering whether a barbarian state was civilised or not, and thus fully recognised as a member of international society, required its government to be sufficiently stable to abide by international law, and whether "[i]t was able and willing to protect adequately

the *liberty and property of foreigners"* (Schwarzenberger, 1955: 220 cit. in Bowden, 2002; emphasis by Bowden).

What is striking under the classic standard of civilisation is how it actually came to implicitly architect a system of international security ruled by specific (legal) norms, in which the international sense of security was primarily destined to protect the integrity of Westerners overseas, whilst civilising other regions of the world. For instance, during the nineteenth century, Western powers came to establish special rights for the European, white and catholic minorities overseas (Donnelly, 1998: 10) in international treaties explicitly referring to the term "civilisation" as the will and aptitude of a state in protecting the life, propriety, liberties and rights—especially those of foreigners (Duara, 2001: 100). Among other things, this endowed Europeans settling in countries with no other European legal rule the liberty to commit acts of violence and injustice upon indigenous populations, which could only be controlled by annexation of the territory concerned (Gillen & Ghosh, 2007: 96).

Progressively, Gong shows, five criteria came to dominate the core of any state's standard of civilisation until at least WWI: (1) to guarantee basic rights such as life, dignity, propriety, freedom of travel, trading and religion, in particular those of the foreigners'; (2) to possess an efficient political bureaucracy, and be able to organise its self-defence; (3) to adhere to international law, including the laws of war, and to maintain an internal juridical system (publishing laws that guarantee justice for all in its jurisdiction, for both natives and foreign citizens); (4) to preserve diplomatic relations and be open to communication and exchange; (5) to abide to the common norms and practices of the civilised international society—slavery and polygamy were thus considered uncivilised and unacceptable (Gong, 2002: 80). So, implicitly, to be a civilised and sovereign member of international society was not only a matter of the states' political and legal obligations, as it was also a moral issue that equated their civilised behaviour to the values of Christianity and Enlightenment (Donnelly, 1998: 5; Duara, 2001: 100).

There is a clear relation between the standardisation of civilisation and both Foucault's "normalisation", and Bourdieu's "internalisation"—when speaking about habitus specifically. In fact, in the light of a civilised habitus moved by relations of power and by an ontological need for security, standardisation appears as a necessary element to make discipline effective, for it implies that the civilised behaviour and the awareness of a civilised status are stabilised and secured in a controllable and regular manner. Without

this normalisation, the new dynamics and relations of power could not constitute stages of a continuous progress, through centralisation and self-restraint, expanding over the centuries to build up the self- and hetero-awareness of an undisputable Western civilisation. As a result, discipline is *normalised*; it becomes natural and goes without saying. In this sense, a fundamental schism was established between the civilised Self and the uncivilised Other through the exercise of power, by establishing a "system of differentiation" (Foucault, 2000: 344). With Bourdieu as well, processes of "differentiation" have the effect of regulating conflict and reproducing structures of social domination (Jackson, 2009).

Effectively, and more intensively since the sixteenth century, the expansion of Western civilisation into Modernity revealed as a phenomenon in which European culture became central, and whereby the corresponding ideology and globalisation arose from a process of asymmetrical exchange—economic, political or cultural (Dussel & Ibarra-Colado, 2006). The influence of the West overseas enabled it to establish this standard of civilisation in a seemingly natural way. However, a particular form of symbolic violence may be considered in the conception of this process—one that is indeed distinct from the direct form of violence exercised in the context of colonisation during the Discoveries, in which physical subjugation was part of the civilisation of barbarians. Enrique Dussel (1993) has demystified the natural progress usually associated to Modernity, by conceptualising Western civilisation in terms of conquest, hegemony, subjectifying knowledge, and moral mission. Dussel explains how the Discoveries initiated a process of suppression, or non-acknowledgement, of the non-European, not only by resorting to violence in order to remove resistance or opposition to their approach, but also by spreading a narrative on the redemptive character of civilisation. This implied that the sacrifices and suffering imposed on the subjects of modernisation—the guilty barbarians, as Dussel refers—were deemed necessary and inevitable (Dussel, 1993: 74; 1995; Dussel & Ibarra-Colado, 2006: 496–497). For Immanuel Wallerstein as well, the conquerors claimed that their superiority was due to their innate qualities and performance. Their attitude toward the sub-humans (*Untermensch*) involved different approaches, from the negation of their basic humanity, to affirming the need to save their souls. In any case, the arguments used were always associated with a feeling of moral superiority (Wallerstein, 1993: 42–43). Thomas Bonnici (2000) has also enhanced the different processes of identification, objectification and submission present in the Portuguese discoveries. In Bonnici's accounts of

European colonisation, the natives are alienated from their culture, as their subalternity and powerlessness appear as a potentiality to be dominated, controlled, and disciplined (Bonnici, 2000: 53–56). As a consequence, there is an undeniable presence of symbolic power and capital within the West's achievement of the standardisation of its civilisation overseas. The conclusion of international treaties evidently rests on the possession of the social position and authority acquired previously during centuries of colonisation, when direct and symbolic violence subjected and subjectified the non-civilised into "civilised-*ergo*-Westerners". The apparent naturalness of the civilised habitus was decisively provided by the force of that symbolic capital. As a process aiming at securing the civilised habitus of the West *outside* the West, the standardisation of civilisation importantly depends on symbolic forms of violence, as these allow for a more structural and unconscious entrenchment of the civilised habitus into periods of time of *longue durée* and widespread spaces, than rough physical force. Whereas direct violence enables immediate subjugation, symbolic violence follows the logic of long-term pacification, interdependence and discipline of the subjects, and thus suits the logic of standardisation into the unconscious. In short, a standard of civilisation has not only defined the terms of acceptance and belonging to a community of both civilised members and those still to be civilised, as it has also established an orderly hierarchy between the civilised, scaling down to the most uncivilised.

The *standard* of a civilisation is thus revealing of its essence, its power, as well as the core elements that make it function as a living organism and prevail over other existing organisms, setting the boundaries of what it means to be civilised and uncivilised (Mozaffari, 2002: 27). A dominant standard, for instance, may be either *imposed* on others through unequal treaties, or even *interiorised and voluntarily accepted* through prevailing norms such as democracy or human rights (ibid.; emphasis added). Yet, the notion of "standard of civilisation" cannot be taken as a singular and linear expression of a phenomenon remained unchanged. As with the evolution of international society, standards have also evolved into different shapes, ruled by different norms. So as to understand the implications of this evolution, Gerrit Gong (2002) defines three helpful aspects that are inherent to any standard of civilisation. First, those who fulfil the requirements of a standard of civilisation in a given society belong to the *civilised* members of that society, while those who do not are left aside as *uncivilised* individuals. Secondly, the standards of civilisation are applicable to states, individual societies, state systems, or international societies of states.

Finally, the standards of civilisation derive from the acknowledgement that interactions between members occur at both the transactional and the normative levels. Now, regarding "norms", Gong says: "It is the aggregation of these normative values regarding international behaviour which reflect and shape, by whatever name, international standards of civilisation today" (Gong, 2002: 79).

An overview of how standards of civilisation have come to evolve across time suggests that, despite the different forms they may assume, they fundamentally serve the security of the West. This is only a preliminary suggestion, since the notion of standard of civilisation will be used again in the following chapters on NATO specifically. Evolving standards of civilisation, it is claimed, resemble a historical process of securitisation of the West that builds on the strength of its symbolic power. This enables the civilising force of the West to be secured and to evolve durably without saying. As different standards of civilisation came out with the growing interdependence among states and societies within the international scene, these have continuously worked as forms of power, and simultaneously legitimated certain knowledge and discourses about the world, thereby disciplining non-Western states.

After the initial conception of the classic standard of civilisation, many other standards have manifested throughout contemporary world history. Each standard has come to evolve into different norms and institutional shapes, and several authors have attempted to defend their own perspective on which standard of civilisation has come to prevail during particular periods of time. Notably, these standards are the expression of the life of different *fields*.[1] The mutually structuring relation between the field and the habitus is constitutive of action, as they both exemplify a continual process of reinstatement and transformation. A particular habitus is revealed and becomes active only in its relation to a particular field. The same habitus can thus lead to different practices and manifestations depending on the state of the field (Williams, 2007: 27–28). In short, the field is the specific arena in which actors compete over different forms of power, and that is essential for a particular habitus to develop. Therefore, one may envisage that the habitus of "civilised-*ergo*-civilising" subjects needs to evolve in specific fields of social action.

Human rights appear as one of the most critical fields of the twentieth century, in which social action and social habiti have been importantly determined by standards of civilisation. Hence, contrarily to constraining or prohibiting norms applying to states under international law, states

and organisations adhere to internationally recognised standards of civilisation in mutually constitutive relationships, each creating and shaping "the norms by which they understand their own behavior and identity" (Gong, 2002: 81). Self-determination, for example, which had come as a priority for the redesign of Europe after WWI, namely in US President Woodrow Wilson politics (Franck, 1992: 53), became the prevailing norm at the international level after WWII, eventually leading to decolonisation. As a consequence, the classic standard of civilisation definitely lost its prominence, and state sovereignty replaced it as the minimal common denominator for a civilisational status at the international level (Donnelly, 1998: 14).

Concurrently, humanitarianism was already developing since the mid-nineteenth century, closely associated with the work of the International Committee for the Red Cross, which later promoted the essential formulation of humanitarian law through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Barnett, 2005: 727). The emergence of international humanitarian law, and its more thorough development and implementation after WWII, strongly contributed to reappraise the classic standard of civilisation. The presence of the Nazi regime within the confines of Western civilisation had proved that a barbarian Other could coexist "at home", so human rights represented a new standard that was more inclusive and based on human commonalities (Donnelly, 1998: 14). Many international organisations have established international standards of non-discrimination and human rights that are deemed more universal than the classical standard of civilisation. This is the case of the UN, OMT, GATT, and especially regional regimes such as the EU and the Organisation of American States, considered more progressive (Gong, 2002: 82–84). However, the human rights regime appeals to a progressive liberal understanding of civilisation, which implies that the state is the main tool to make its citizens' rights effective (Donnelly, 1998: 14).

Along this line, democracy appears as another central standard of civilisation. Some authors actually defend that it should be the ultimate standard of civilisation ruling in state governments, especially in the light of their attachment to international society. Thomas Franck (1992), for instance, argues that the right of any state to be represented in international organisms, benefit from development, trade, and security programs must depend on its democratic validation. This is to say that democracy should be the standard of civilisation that grants a state its integration in international society. In relation to the international monitoring of

elections in sovereign states, Franck sustains nonetheless the need to "uncouple" it from a "[l]ong history of unilateral enforcement of a tainted, colonialist 'civilizing' mission" (Franck, 1992: 84). To David Fidler (2001: 148) as well, "Whether a government is democratic is now a pressing issue, and the test of democratic legitimacy is more far reaching that what the old standard of civilisation required". But it is now a matter of imposing a "liberal, globalized civilization on the world" (Fidler, 2001: 139). In his sense, states, international organisations, and nongovernmental organisations are using contemporary international law as part of "[a] liberal project of political, economic, and legal homogeneization seeking to foster a certain kind of human solidarity within Westphalian civilization" (Fidler, 2001: 149). To Brett Bowden (2002: 11), one of the most significant indicators that human rights and democracy are gradually becoming normative texts and practices is their ever-common appearance in the negotiations of intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN. Bowden even mentions the AGNU Resolution 52/513 of 21 October 1997 entitled "*Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies*" as an example of how this text naturally takes democracy as a standard, although "democracy" *per se* is completely either absent from the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In the case of NATO, Yannis Stivachtis (2010) argues that, although the historical standard of civilisation has declined, the standards of civilised behaviour remain, and shows how regional organisations like NATO and the Council of Europe have socialised the post-Soviet space. In his sense, a state's socialisation outside of the group it belongs to requires its acceptance of, and compliance to, the norms and practices that international society considers as civilised. By analysing the evolution of the standard of civilisation and its relation to the contemporary evolution of the idea of democracy and to the policy of democratic conditionality, Stivachtis observes how NATO and the Council of Europe have sought to civilise the socialist countries and the Soviet republics, by socialising them through Western values and norms related to liberal democracy. According to this logic, the enlargement process of these organisations is very similar to the mere continuation of old practices that were previously condemned internationally. Put in other terms, new concepts are used to describe old practices that continue the same (Stivachtis, 2010: 7). After the political failure of the original standard of civilisation, democracy was associated to "civilisation", having progress, development and modernisation as inherent features (Stivachtis, 2010: 12).

More recently, 09/11 having been branded as an attack on civilisation perpetrated by barbarians, war against terrorism was presented as a "civilization's fight" (Bush, 2001) that members of international society had chosen to rally to, in order to keep up the standards of freedom, progress, pluralism, and tolerance. In this specific case, a civilised member of international society would have to stand by the US-led war on terror, in yet another step further into a fresh, or resurrected, civilisational standard for the twenty-first century (Bowden, 2002: 14). But this question will be analysed later in more depth, in the context of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan (Chap. 9).

Seemingly, standards of civilisation in contemporaneity depend on particular normative and even linguistic options primarily adopted by states and international organisations. Standards have assumed different denominations, but have generally expressed ideas, norms, behaviours, and habiti developed within and by the West. However, the adherence to international norms such as human rights and democracy does not automatically imply that a given state effectively complies with them. The acquisition of the civilised status does not mean that there is an actual identity change, because only a fraction of the world is dictating the universality of the norm. There is no actual negotiation of values, and these only become an arena for power struggle. Like individuals, states may not really transform their identity and behaviour just because a determined standard of civilisation is prevailing in international society. As Donnelly (1998: 13) suggests, the most violent dictators of contemporary history like Mobutu or Pinochet were in practice accepted as civilised members of international society, which ultimately makes civilisation to lose all substantive meaning. Standards of civilisation may be as ontologically biased, as the exercise of classifying civilised members of international society is subjective. For example, Diamond (2002: 9–10 cit. in Bowden, 2002: 15) considers that only thirty countries in the world are effectively civilised in terms of their stability as advanced industrial and liberal democracies. Besides, twenty-four of the thirty countries are in Western Europe, and include the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel and Japan. This means that the vast majority of the countries of the world remains outside the fully civilised realm (ibid.).

In a world divided according to the levels of material well-being, with the dominance of two major world-economies—Eastern and Western—Mehdi Mozaffari sees the standards of civilisation and world order becoming regional, and security issues determining the quality and core of international relations (Mozaffari, 2002: 47–48). The major implication

underlying this view is that the regionalism of world order has been determined by the fact that security issues have been predominantly ruled by the West, in a struggle over civilisational power. Therefore, the notion that standards of civilisation govern the cohabitation of states is not as *démodé* as it could seem. Although the criteria may vary, they still point to the fact that particular West-originated norms are guiding the standards according to which states should behave—not only with other states, but also with their citizens. Moreover, despite the belief that contemporary civilisation should not be monopolised, and rather washed of any notion of hierarchy if the co-existence of peoples is to be successful (Linklater, 2011: 17), the existence of institutions such as the G's groups—G7, G8, G20, G77—may prove the opposite tendency. Hence, the greater the number of states involved in the denomination of the group, the least inferior is the state akin to feel by belonging to the group.

To sum up, standardisation is an important dimension of the process of civilisation, in that it has been decisive to its dissemination and to the subjectification of uncivilised Others outside the West as civilised, establishing a hierarchy among the (potential) members of a civilised international society. The classic standard of civilisation founded an extra-territorial legitimacy for the West to impose its norms in overseas nations, and regulate their behaviour as the political and social providers of certain rights. Over time, the standards of civilisation have evolved and continued in different fields. However, the sense of security is the one prevailing in the many contemporary standards of civilisation, namely the security of norms, values, and social models spread by, and/or from, the West.

The Civilised Subject of Security of the West evolved in both time and space, from the late-medieval kingdoms of Europe to the community of state-empires of the newly globalised world, thus adapting to new forms of socio-political organisation, and simultaneously spreading to non-civilised regions of the world. The difference, now, not only lies in the kind of cumulated power and symbolic capital interacting between the parts, as also in the recipient of civilising moves, namely, the state as a collective regulator and provider of secure behaviours.

Note

1. Recalling on the Bourdieusian definitions presented earlier, the field is a social world in which there is constant differentiation and struggle for power between actors who compete for various forms of material and symbolic power resources (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 97; Jackson, 2009: 108).

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CHAPTER 5

NATO's Deep Origins (1939–1949): Unbreaking the Civilised Habitus?

Inquiring over the "deep origins" (Haglund, 2004) of NATO's referent object of security should consider a period prior to 1945. Considering the immediate need to review, reconstruct, reinvent or restore the many lives, infrastructures, nations, identities and ideas, the main political and diplomatic exchanges, discourses and negotiations between the major actors and powers involved in NATO's formation certainly took place more intensively between the end of WWII and 1949. However, as this only occurred as a direct consequence of WWII, the 1939–1945 period is equally determining for psychosocial, geopolitical, philosophic purposes, among many others. In relation to the 1939–1949 period, to what extent did civilisation need to be upheld through a Western organisation of defence and security? In other words, was there a perception that the civilised habitus and the Civilised Subjects of Security were on the verge of being lost?

This chapter thus proposes to deconstruct the role of "civilisation" in the formation of the Alliance, by highlighting the antecedents leading to the need to safeguard the civilisation of the North-Atlantic people. It shows how WWII greatly destabilised the civilised habitus, and how, although it suffered a major breakdown, it did not collapse. For that, each of the upcoming sections will focus on the most significant manifestations and expressions of the civilised habitus by the major political actors involved in the process: (1) aggressiveness, as the lack of self-restraint, and the correlated use of the notion of "barbarism" to design the antinomy of civilisation; (2) the figure of the uncivilised through the Soviet Union;

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(3) the role of spirituality as a tool for discipline and self-restraint; (4) the rearrangement of postwar security and power through reinforced interdependence. Together, these different approaches show how the civilised habitus was reformulated, redefined and reasserted.

However, some cautions need to be made. The first regards the use of statements made by individual actors concerning Western civilisation. Even if those statements are used for methodological purposes, that does not necessarily imply that individual human beings are the only actors in any social situation (Jackson, 2003: 238). Furthermore, the facts, events and speeches that occurred during the period under study have a historical, cultural, economic, political and diplomatic background that may be traced to previous historical periods. That is why some references will be made to facts whose origins obviously belong to previous periods of time, while others—mostly anterior to WWI—may be lacking. All those episodes may also be interpreted from a multiplicity of angles: political, ideological, economic, psychosocial. Each of these dimensions may be approached from many different perspectives, and still seem insufficient or incomplete. This is to say the exercise proposed in this chapter is not to be a *total* one, but rather an attentive reflection motivated by an inter-disciplinary concern with the conceptual history of "civilisation" within NATO.

As Norbert Elias did in the *Civilising Process* (1989, 1990), manifestations and marks of the civilised habiti are better searched in the forms of discourse that prevail at the period of time under study. Hence, the critical influence of discourse and its respective language in spreading and disseminating social meanings and normative contents. It is in fact a premise of cultural psychology that nothing just "is", for realities are the product of the way things are represented, implemented, and reacted to in various taxonomic and/or narrative contexts (Shweder, 1990: 3–4). This is important for what regards the power of discourse in producing a reality, in which the need for upholding Western civilisation appears as vital.

5.1 World War II: Barbarism Unleashed

Discursive representations of barbarism, it is claimed, indicate the perception of a threat to the civilised habitus. As it will be seen, there are two interrelated aspects underlying barbarous behaviour and the breakdown of civilisation in WWII. One aspect of barbarism is related to human nature and the apparent resurgence of aggressiveness in individual behaviour, in

particular in the West, which suggests a retrocession in terms of self-restraint. As mentioned earlier, Freud (1961) was quite sceptical of humans' real propensity to non-violence, and considered it an illusion. To him, the natural instinct to aggression was only in a state of temporary and superficial repression. In his article "Why war?" (1932 cit. in Lewin, 2009: 25), Freud's psychology of aggression focused on phenomena such as the interactions between the individual and the crowd, the potential for social instability caused by the repression of instincts, the emotions involved with aggression and death, the psychology of hate, the suggestibility of crowds and their need for leaders. Amidst WWII, Freud (1940: 185 cit. In Lewin, 2009: 26) even considered we should include the influence of civilisation as a determinant for neurosis, as he considered the task to remain civilised harder than for the barbarian to remain healthy.

Another aspect of barbarism has to do with de-civilising practices at the state level, pointing to both a reversal of pacification and a perversion of the state's monopoly of the use of force. This is consistent with the idea of historian Herbert Butterfield (1950: 143–144) that the scale of atrocities happening in the modern world rather derives from modern technique and organisation, and not from any change in human nature. Taken together, both the individual and state dimensions of barbarism seem to contradict Elias' sense that civilised societies were pacified and had instinctually renounced to violence.

From 1939, the world was ravaged by a world war for the second time in less than thirty years. Memory of WWI was still vivid. It had left a traumatic effect, because a big-scale war had never been expected, and had even been deemed incoherent (Lasswell, 1948: 878; McNeill, 1982: 307). The "diplomatic culture" had been ruling, and people believed that any war would be civilised and spare civilian life (Elshtain, 1989: 57). WWI had also disenchanted the idea of a civilising mission of the West for all humanity. The materialism and destructiveness brought by the West were associated to imperialism and war (Duara, 2001: 104–105). When WWI ended, a strong reaction against bloodsheds set in, and most of the survivors assumed that war had been "[a]n atavistic aberration from the norms of civilized life" (McNeill, 1982: 308). In the two decades following WWI, the widespread belief that excessive violence had been eliminated made European societies ill-prepared for the rise of Fascism and the possibility of genocide (Linklater, 2007: 165).

To anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, one of the most influential of the twentieth century and founder of "social anthropology", the West was aware of its fragility, and self-confidence regarding its cohesion as a civilised

entity was undoubtedly shaken. In 1936, Malinowski accounted for the state of Western civilisation as passing through a very severe "stage of maladjustment", symptomized by abuses of power, the inability to create peace, and the "torpor of true religion" in detriment of tricked symbolism (1936: 449). Both as a consequence of WWI and of the increasingly unstable environment of the 1930s, war, militarism, the failure of peace, and the maximisation of power were all transforming many aspects of Western civilisation, including its self-perception and beliefs. Even after WWII, the multifaceted political scientist Harold Lasswell, who lived throughout both world wars and was much influenced by Freud in his own work on communication and propaganda, deemed there was an overall pessimism about the universal possibility of political cooperation, for war had become a "skeleton" that was no longer "kept in the closet" (Lasswell, 1948: 878).

In the interwar period, most European countries were thus in symbolic distress; economic problems such as food scarcity, unemployment, hyperinflation, the financial crash of 1929 were also symbolic failures of capitalism and liberalism because they revealed the insignificant character of money, the precariousness of legitimate authority, the moral and intellectual devaluation (Gori, 2017: 253). The psychosocial and historical conditions under which the rise of Nazism occurred are also well depicted by Norbert Elias in *Studies on the Germans* (1997), in which he outlines the conditions underlying the rise of Nazism in Germany. Elias traces the numerous ways in which the features of the German habitus, social structure and behaviour combined to produce the rise of Hitler, and finds that it was likely that Nazism could happen in Germany, and not in Britain or France. Elias shows that, after the successive defeats against invaders in the previous centuries (such as Louis XIV and Napoleon), the Germans' self-image was fragmented, and also aware of its relative weakness and low status in the rank-hierarchy of European states. This led to a nostalgic longing for a strong, heroic, leader, which reinforces the "onyric character of the German self-image", and to idealising the greatness of the past and the creation of a new Reich (Elias, 1997: 283–285). In the absence of symbolic bonds, Gori also explains, Nazism arose as a religion with its criminal rituals, founding myths, and deadly expansionist propaganda sustaining the communion of the masses with barbarous norms that seem delirious today, but that shaped a new collective imaginary in which the notions of comradeship and party give symbolic meaning to their existence and justify the submission to Hitler (2017: 254–258). Here, the

role of the unconscious in the self-image is evident; as Germans lacked the feeling of security, their national habitus was unstable and the subsequent anxiety can be seen as the motivation for the search for an ontological, symbolic, relation with the state that spares individuals from the painful experience of having to think and decide by themselves, specially as the symbolic system had failed (Gori, 2017: 263). This also translated into a form of "cultural imperialism", which Hans Morgenthau (1948: 40) defines as the subtlest and potentially the most successful of imperialist policies. Often present in totalitarian governments, cultural imperialism aims at the control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between nations, namely through the "persuasiveness of a superior culture and a more attractive political ideology", along with discipline, organisation, strict control and influence over thoughts and actions of citizens and foreign sympathizers (Morgenthau, 1948: 40–41).

It is interesting that in 1934, well before WWII, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had already perceived an eventual threat to the West coming from a new totalitarian regime. Back then, Churchill portrayed the German people as the "most powerful and most dangerous" people in the Western world having "reverted to the conditions of the Middle Ages" in the hands of a monstrous totalitarian regime "only less frightful than the Russian nightmare" (Churchill, 1934 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 193). This shows the evident association of different realms: the *collective identity* of a powerful and dangerous people of the West, whose *behaviour* seems to have retroceded to the time of the Middle Ages, to now form a monstrous totalitarian state that threatens the Western world. The retrocession to "the conditions of the Middle Ages" is a clear reference to the memory of a historical past, in which manners and self-constraint of interpersonal violence were less entrenched. Churchill's words mirror a situation that was in clear rupture with the past, as identity, history and politics intertwined to form the most Dantesque scenario possible for Western modernity. It is noteworthy that the only thing deemed worse than Nazi Germany by Churchill at the time was the Russian regime. Indeed, in the beginning of WWII, Nazi Germany was not the only uncivilised enemy. In 1940, after the Soviet Union invaded Finland, Churchill would state that as the "splendid Northern race" was "reduced to servitude", "no more mournful spectacle could be presented to what is left to civilised mankind", in a "return to the Dark Ages, when every vestige of human progress during two thousand years would be engulfed" (Winston Churchill, 1940 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 235–236). Here, Soviet Russia was represented as a "dull

brutish force" that crushed the remaining civilised mankind with the "mournful spectacle" of the invasion of Finland. The uncivilised Russia was depicted to unleash violence and lead the world back to the time of "the Dark Ages", in a reference remitting to ages of barbarism prior to Christianity, in a complete reversion of the idea of progress conveyed by Modernity.

With the outbreak of WWII, German pressure on Poland intensified and "civilisation" would be regularly at stake. Churchill expressed his view on the possibility of a war as a "struggle between Nazi Germany and the civilised world" bringing "measureless carnage and destruction", a situation to which "some system of human relations" should be brought in the future in order to contain the threat inherent to the instability of autocratic regimes (Winston Churchill, 1939 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 223). In this appeal to some kind of international organism that would be proactive in keeping democracy, peace and security, Churchill's words revealed a strong belief in the superiority of the civilised world if war was to occur.

On 30 September 1940, WWII was running, and for the second anniversary of the Munich Agreements, Churchill broadcasted to the people of Czechoslovakia, who had been living under the Nazi rule since the German occupation of Prague in March 1939. On the occasion, Churchill referred to their "martyrdom" in a battle that was the battle of "all nations who prefer liberty to a soulless serfdom", the "struggle of civilized nations" representing "man's instinctive defiance of tyranny" (Winston Churchill, 1940 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 271). Again, the battle was explicitly referred to as a collective battle of the civilised nations against the uncivilised. But here, the battle was also a metaphysical one, as the civilised victims were represented as martyrs being dominated by the uncivilised and "soulless" tyrants of Nazi Germany.

Also, recalling on a secret meeting of the Anglo-French War Council held in Paris on 31 May 1940, Churchill would later write that a "tragic but splendid end" of the "civilisation of Western Europe" would be preferable to an eventual victory of Germany that would reduce the Allied "to the status of vassals and slaves forever" (Winston Churchill, 1940 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 246). In his sense, the civilisation of Western Europe would be lost to servitude and ideological oblivion if Germans were to defeat Great Britain or France. To Churchill, a "tragic but splendid end" was preferable to such decay. It would have been a physical submission to the "status of vassals and slaves", and a loss of ideas and values as well. And this was a horrendous scenario for Churchill and Clement Attlee.[1]

According to Churchill, the level of resolution of the British people was seemingly unprecedented in "their history", which suggests that Germany might have represented the greatest threat to civilisation ever (ibid.).

The aforementioned quotes of Churchill are a selection of the most striking and unequivocal expressions of Western civilisation. Not only did they define the attributes and beliefs regarding Western civilisation, as they also portrayed the perceptions held on the uncivilised character of Germany and Russia. They were also grave and solemn words, in that the unprecedented character of war was said to represent a serious rupture with the historical past of the West. Churchill stressed how *ideas* were threatened and even equated the possibility of a "tragic but splendid end" for Western civilisation in very material terms.

Another perspective of the subject is well elaborated by philosopher Hannah Arendt. As a Jewish exile—she left Germany in 1933 to France where she worked for the immigration of Jewish refugee children into Palestine—her most influential and famous works include *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of Evil* (2006 [1963]), and *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1966), in which she profoundly reflects on the issue of Nazism and the Holocaust in terms that articulate the often-conflictive relationship between the individual and the collective dimensions of public life. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt noted that even though the "law in civilised countries" assumes that the voice of conscience should tell individuals not to kill, Hitler's commands demanded precisely the opposite. Nazism rather defied the "normal desires and inclinations of most people" (Arendt, 2006: 150). Adolf Eichmann's defence, Arendt retells, was that he had carried out "acts of state". Eichmann said he had never wished "the murder of human beings", and that he had acted alienated from his personal feelings and beliefs out of pure "obedience", a "virtue" that had been abused by the Nazis (Arendt, 2006: 247–248). Totalitarianism dictated that everything out of normality could be permitted and made possible, essentially because it suspends law and makes human beings superfluous (Arendt, 1966). According to Eichmann's arguments, who was an actor of barbarism under Nazi rule, the normality of civilised people is to refrain from impulses of violence and aggressiveness, while barbarous acts are an exception dictated by the state. In this sense, the Hitlerian rule altered that normality by establishing a regime of total control over people's behaviour, either acting individually, or collectively. Totalitarianism made barbarism possible, sustained by the individuals' habiti of discipline and interdependence toward the same

monopolistic state. Nazism ultimately proved that peaceful relations respective of different Others can be altered, and that civilised behaviour can be reversed under the action of a particular political regime.

In his study on the Germans, Elias also approaches the Eichmann case, stating that the main problem with mass murder achieved in the name of the nation, does not reside in the act of killing *per se*, but rather in its incompatibility with the highest standards characterising the most developed societies of our times. People of the twentieth century, Elias says, tend to see their time as if their standards of civilisation and rationality were well beyond the barbarism of old times and the least developed societies of today. Despite all the doubts about believing in progress, the image those persons have of themselves remains impregnated with that belief (Elias, 1997: 270). As war violated Western civilisation, and destroyed the old meanings of world order, the "classical" standards of civilisation—basic human rights, state capability to self-defence, international law, open diplomacy, civilised behaviour according to Christian and Enlightenment values (Donnelly, 1998; Duara, 2001; Gong, 2002)—had proved to be fragile. In terms of beliefs as well, Nazism had destroyed the faith in the civilised condition. The path of European social and political development of the previous five centuries was broken by Nazi de-civilising processes (Arendt, 1966; Bauman, 1989; Elias, 1997), as civilised states proved not to be immune to barbarism. As individuals, Nazis were not active participants of public acts of cruelty. Instead of direct aggression, they were seemingly required to play more passive roles in the bureaucratic processes of industrialised killings (Linklater, 2007: 165–166).

Although the mechanisation and massification of death developed in Nazi concentration camps could have had less direct effects on human psyche, WWII brought Westerners to the self-awareness that barbarism was possible in their society in two important ways. One was that their socio-political context could lead them to make things they would normally not do; the other is that they, as individuals, could also retrocede to barbarous behaviour, abandon themselves to impulses of violence, and lose their sense of empathy. The high level of organisation and industrialisation with which death was brought upon the victims of Nazism represented a threat to the interpersonal and interdependent ties developed among civilised members of Western societies.

It can be said that WWII led to a fundamental insecurity regarding the Westerners' own civilised Self and inherent habiti. Not only did they live

in a world of physical insecurity and destruction, as their most profound convictions about who and how they were had been shaken as well. Insecurity regarding Western capacity to self-control arose, because Nazism had proved to be able to de-civilise individuals. Man was insecure about himself, his humanity, his nature, and about his instrumental role in barbarous acts. But Man was also insecure about the state's monopoly of physical force. Through the mechanisation and massification of selective violence, Nazism proved to the world that the reversion of civilised individuals was tragically possible. It was not that human nature had changed, but rather that civilised subjects could be de-civilised by the state. As a consequence, self-images, representations, beliefs and justifications on Western civilisation were affected. After that, to whom would Westerners attune their behaviour to, in order to feel *civilised-ergo-secure* again? While Sect. 5.4 on security and power will return to this question later, the next addresses the role played by the civilisational factor in the process of changing justifications and perceptions regarding Russia, as another concurring ground for NATO's emergence.

5.2 The Never Civilised Soviet Union?

This section discusses the prevailing notion according to which the Soviet Union became an enemy of Western civilisation at the end of WWII. It focuses on some of the discursive manoeuvres about the Soviet Union by Western actors, to enhance the evolution of Western perceptions, representations and justifications regarding its wartime ally. This will reveal two interrelated things; first, the Western perception of a Soviet threat was no novelty brought by postwar circumstances, but rather a revival of past perceptions regarding who was uncivilised. Secondly, after WWII ended, major Western actors used de-civilising discourses in order to represent the Soviet Union as barbarian. This, it is argued, critically contributed to shaping NATO's justification for a civilisational referent of security. The change of perceptions regarding the Soviet Union was sustained by new justifications, creating new representations and beliefs. The civilisational elements of Western discourses on the Soviet Union reveal in fact how they actually worked as a tool that re-defined the conception of a civilised behaviour in the international realm.

The issue of how the Soviet Union's role evolved throughout the war certainly may be seen from other standpoints. Geoffrey Roberts (2005), for instance, has analysed the Soviet foreign policy before and after WWII

to show how Stalin's thinking, rhetoric, and policy evolved during the war and its immediate aftermath. To Roberts, there were continuities fraught with ambiguities in Stalin's policies, as he wanted to cooperate with the USA and Britain, whilst distrusting his wartime allies. Stalin wanted security, but his fears were rooted in his ideological presuppositions as well as his country's historical experience (Roberts, 2005: 43). But essentially, the shift from "tripartism to a more limited and traditional concept of peaceful coexistence was informed by perceptions of Western ideological animosity" (Roberts, 2005: 53). Regarding the changing position of the Soviet Union after WWII within the Western alliance, David Holloway has suggested that the use of the atomic bomb by the USA made Stalin both restrained and constrained, and also less cooperative (2005: 72). Although Stalin believed that the atomic bomb constituted a powerful new factor in international politics, he saw no immediate danger of war after Hiroshima. To Stalin, Holloway argues, atomic diplomacy seemed a greater threat, meant to inspire fear to those with weak nerves. Against this background, the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan were seen as attempts to put pressure on Russia and to weaken its influence in Europe (Holloway, 2005: 73). Regardless of the many other issues that might have influenced policy changes, either on the Soviet side, as on the Anglo-Saxon side of the wartime alliance,[2] the role played by perceptions was indeed central.

First, the fact Churchill spoke of a "Russian nightmare" in 1934 needs to be contextualised. Communism was no novelty; it was the political regime of the Soviet Union since the Bolshevik revolutions of 1917, and it had been vividly scorned by the West since its very beginning. William Blum (2004: 7) exposes how the anti-communist propaganda campaign had already made commonplace, in the *New York Times* of early 1918 and 1919, expressions such as "the Bolshevik assault on civilization", and testimonies of different Bolshevik brutalities, meant to depict Soviet Russia as the epitome of barbarism (ibid.). And so it seems Communist Russia had been uncivilised since its inception. In other words, civilisation had always been at stake with Bolshevism. Media of the late 1910s depicted a generalised behaviour of brutality, violence, homicidal manias, and slavery as something common to "every class". There was no self-control, order or discipline; the most basic impulses were being released in the streets. The picture could not be worse in content, and clearer in its message: Communist Russia was barbarous and a threat to civilisation.

From 1939 to 1941, a Nazi-Soviet pact ruled, during which Eastern European territories had been distributed between the two regimes. But in December 1941, an Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance was concluded by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Stalin. Besides the wartime alliance between the two countries, the agreement secretly settled a preliminary postwar order, according to which the Soviet Union's Eastern interests and territories would be recognised, including her right to Soviet military bases in Finland and Romania (Roberts, 2005: 45). The establishment of an Anglo-Soviet alliance against Nazi Germany drastically altered the perceptions about the Soviet Union. For the remaining years of WWII, the Soviet Union was indeed an ally of the West. Joseph Stalin presented this newly-found situation for Russia as putting the country in the best position ever; Russia had food, raw materials, industry, and allies with whom to "form a United front against the German invaders", enjoying the "sympathy and support of all the peoples of Europe" who now saw Russians as "their liberators" (Stalin, 1941). Joseph Stalin spoke to the Russian people and thus portrayed a country invigorated by its economy, and most importantly by the enjoyment of international support and alliance. At this time, Russia was another victim of Nazi Germany, like many others. It was threatened by Nazi troops and in actual physical danger of invasion. However, the country's resources were sufficient to allow it to be in a "good position". Stalin's confidence in Russia's superior status in comparison with WWI could indicate that Russia was better accepted by the Western allies, now morality was on their side: Russia could play a liberating role in a "just" war (ibid.).

This confidence was supported publicly by Stalin's pairs on the Western front. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1942) opportunely saluted the "superb Russian army" for its joint effort with the British against the Nazis, and paid tribute to both the "fighting men of Russia" and to the "fighting leaders" of the allies—Joseph Stalin among others like Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek (Roosevelt, 1943). British Premier's position on Soviet Russia was more mitigated, though. Churchill acknowledged the hate he had had of the Bolshevik regime, whom he "had regarded as the mortal foe of civilised freedom" eager to watch the West decay with indifference, as he was aware that this negative perception had only been appeased by the appearance of Hitler (Winston Churchill, 1942 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 317). However, Churchill still admired the "Russian dictator" on a more personal plane, for his intellectual capacities

in mastering rapidly complex problems new to him: "Very few people alive could have comprehended in so few minutes the reasons which we had all so long been wrestling with for months. He saw it all in a flash" (Winston Churchill, 1942 in Gilbert, 2012: 321). Despite this kind of personal or professional admiration and the acknowledgement of the implacable effectiveness of the Russian army (Roosevelt, 1942), Stalin was still seen as the "Russian Dictator". This suggests that Russia was indeed accepted as part of a broader war effort, but she was never perceived to *be like the West*. Therefore, antagonistic perceptions coming from the West were only on a temporary interlude, during which military cooperation occurred between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. However, that interlude did not imply that both parts attuned their behaviour and mutual perceptions. Actually, the representation of Russia by Churchill was mainly one of enmity and lack of trust. His statements prior to WWII had already showed that. As it will be seen next, ulterior developments of the relationship between Russia and the West would reinforce this idea.

As war had ended, George Kennan's "long telegram" of 26 February 1946 from Moscow to US Secretary of State George Marshall is held as one of the West's first conceptual justifications for the change of mood regarding the wartime ally (Gilbert, 2009: 18).[3] Besides the extensive and meticulous explanation on the challenges posed by the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology, the telegram is also rich in details that confirm the Western perception of the Soviet Union's latent connection to a civilised habitus. Importantly, Kennan's overall consideration of the Russian government is very often sustained by observations of a psychological nature, as if he was sitting from a therapist chair. Among many other aspects, he describes it as having a "neurotic view of world affairs", led by an "instinctive Russian sense of insecurity", which makes its rule "archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries" (Kennan, 1946: part 2). When comparing Soviet power to Nazism, for instance, Kennan deems the former to lack systematic methods and plans, "Impervious to logic of reason" and rather "sensitive to logic of force" (Kennan, 1946: part 5). Because of this essential irrationality, Kennan stands for an objective and non-emotional study of Communism in the manner a "doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual" (Kennan, 1946: part 5). As he further compares world communism to a "malignant parasite" feeding itself upon the problems of other societies and contaminating them, Kennan sees a diplomatic victory over Moscow

as a vital factor to "improve self confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit" (ibid.).

Not only do these selected perspectives compose a clear picture of how the Soviet Union was fundamentally perceived by Kennan, as they also epitomise how future representations of that country would be made by the USA. Therefore, it is worth deconstructing Kennan's most striking assumptions. First, Russia was deemed to possess a "sense of insecurity" that was so deeply entrenched at the level of instinct and tradition that it could actually be considered a habitus. The Russian habitus of insecurity would have pervaded from a historical past when the peaceful agricultural population strove to survive to their geospatial exposition to barbarous nomads. This long lasting and long evolving insecurity would thus be at the basis of a "neurotic view of world affairs" in contemporaneity. Then, according to Kennan, faced to materially developed and complex interdependent societies of the civilised West, only irrational fear arose from the Soviet regime, led by elites aware of their archaism, fragility and weak "psychological foundation". Hence, the lack of psychological assets underlying the reference to "impervious to the logic of reason" and the comparison of Russia to "an unruly and unreasonable individual" are counterpoised to her sensibility to the "logic of force". On the opposite side of the civilised spectrum, Kennan's words were simultaneously the self-representation of a self-contained entity resisting to emotional provocation, determined to behave in an objective and rational way, as a "doctor" would do. The civilised Self suggested by Kennan would therefore reinforce the basic traits of the civilising process: discipline, morality and community spirit, which is equivalent to the self-restraint of aggressiveness, interdependent social relations and symbolic power. Whilst contrasting with a civilised Self, all the demeaning representations of the Soviet Union essentially enhanced her uncivilised portrait.

The influence of Russian Communism in third countries was associated to uncivilised behaviour as well, as it is known that the Soviet Union was not respecting postwar dispositions accorded in Yalta and Potsdam.[4] Countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Romania were under growing influence of Communism, a situation which Winston Churchill depicted in one of his most famous and influential speech—popularly known as the "Iron Curtain" speech made at Fulton, USA—as a shadow falling "upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory" (Winston Churchill, 1946 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 370). In it, Churchill not only diffused uncertainty, obscurity, and insecurity regarding the designs

and behaviour of the Soviet Union, as he also established a strong parallelism with what the Nazi regime had just done in the recent past. Similar to what German Nazism had inflicted during the Holocaust, a "Russian-dominated" government was acting in a "wrongful" and "grievous" way, through "mass expulsions of millions". As with 1930s Germany, a threat of "totalitarian control" was being perceived by Churchill and transmitted to his audience. All these parallelisms to past events constitute a memory recall of a situation "undreamed-of", to which the world was certainly not willing to return to" (Winston Churchill, 1946 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 370–371).

In a decisive address to the British House of Commons, nearly one year before the NATO treaty would be signed, Ernest Bevin (1948b) stated that the Soviet Union "revealed a proactive policy of getting Communist control over Eastern Europe, and also in the West".[5] This provided enough fundaments for a renewed stereotype regarding the Soviet Union, as the Soviet ambition was advancing and invading. Soviet Russia was "not satisfied", and it was personified as an eager and thirsty entity. She would keep on seeking "satisfaction", according to a human logic of fulfilling natural impulses. In Trieste, so close to the centre of Western Europe, the West had "difficulties", and it seemed insecure about its capacity to stop a relentless Russia. Bevin also acknowledged that "International agreement" was an "experiment" that failed, and that "has only been a source of friction and bother" (ibid.). Bevin's general spirit when he spoke of the Soviet Union to the House of Commons suggested that there was no further effort to be made; the situation was presented as unchangeable and almost untouchable. It is not hard to imagine that at the time there was no actual way or will to engage in a new conflict, especially not with a gigantic Russia. The fact is that Bevin preferred a solution involving the "right use of power and organisation", and to "proceed swiftly" (ibid.). It is nonetheless interesting how Bevin recognised that individual Soviet representatives were "grand people to get on with" when "free to discuss on their merits". This suggests that Soviet individuals could be rational when acting individually, but guided by irritation when it came to their political instructions: "The military governors left to themselves could have settled far more than they did in Germany on the basis of Potsdam, if they had been permitted to do so" (ibid.).

Furthermore, when mentioning the six weeks spent in Moscow for the Conference of 1947, Bevin described an environment in which time was lost and negotiations ineffective, due to the nervous outbreaks of the

members of the meeting. Far from "rational", the meeting was "very wearying, and even difficult to keep one's temper at times" to Bevin (1948b). This reinforced the idea that the Soviet system de-civilised individuals because of the irrationality, lack of calmness, and negotiation barriers it inculcated to its members. Bevin's testimony stereotyped a country where self-containment of bad manners and instincts, good temper, and calmness did not occur. Likewise, Bevin's account of the West-Soviet relationship in November 1947 was very revealing. In Moscow, he depicted the insufferable mood of the Soviets and referred to "The flood of abuse against ourselves and the world by M. Vyshinskiin New York",[6] but also that all proposals and efforts at remaining stoic made by the Western powers were met by an essential Russian irascibility. This effort, Bevin compared it with the suppression of feelings children may experience at school when confronted to bullies (ibid.). This emotional containment by Bevin and other Westerners clearly remit to the self-restraint of impulses, which the Soviet Union was not doing. Russians behave like bullies, without the discipline inherent to the good manners of the civilised. After displaying the behavioural superiority of the West by not "answering back" to "almost every invective", Bevin was obviously tempted, but he felt like a schoolboy, as he was provoked but able to avoid violence and direct response through self-containment. The reference to matters of self-control, natural impulses, and bad manners is a clear manifestation of how the civilised habitus still pervaded the diplomatic and political arenas of post-WWII. As Hedley Bull puts it, any idea of international society that might have had any influence during some periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had been extinguished during WWII, making it unrealistic for the West and Russia to be bound again by common rules and cooperation in the "working of common institutions" (Bull, 1995: 38–39).

Barbarism had proved possible in the West under the action of Nazism. When exercised by a state, totalitarianism was its synonym. Russia had been a temporary ally, but was never considered civilised by the West. Before the war, she had been deemed a nightmarish tale of brutality for more than twenty years. At the end of the war, as Russia was on the victors' side, her international role and influence came out strengthened. However, her regime and leader remained unchanged. That is why Russian actions in many European states after the war were perceived as the marks of uncivilised behaviour again. To the West, Russia was displaying a spirit of continuity in relation to its pre-war behaviour. While Russian officials were characterised as uncivilised, Communism was represented as an ideology that de-civilised individuals at the collective level.

In conclusion, from the perspective of the uncivilised, Russia did not break the habitus but rather reinforced and specified it. The redefinition of a civilised habitus for secure Western subjects thus involved the redefinition of *who* and *how* the uncivilised was. Here, the uncivilised was personified by Soviet Communism. Its uncivilised character was not new; it had only undergone a period of interlude, during which it had been an ally of the West against Nazism. Uncivilised behaviour was perceived again after war, when Communism expanded across Eastern Europe. Despite an initial phase of harmonised objectives within the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, despite the military successes achieved together, despite Stalin's discourse of liberation and justness, uniformity had never been in question. Both sides were aware of their dissimilitude. The secret agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union of 1941 had already designed how and where postwar areas of influences would be shaped for Stalin's regime. Therefore, the West did not perceive the Soviet Union as civilised during wartime, as it rather returned to enhance its de-civilised character after, through renewed justifications and stereotypes, in order to reinforce the social meanings of what it meant to be civilised and not.

The following section focuses on the spiritual dimension of postwar civilisational discourse, as a particular unconscious element that provided further meanings to *how* civilisation was to be conceived.

5.3 A "Spiritual Union": A Tool for Self-Restraint?

This section addresses the very recurrent references to the "spiritual" made by major Western actors during and after WWII as a key element of the civilisational factor for NATO, operating at the unconscious level. While the revival of spirituality appears to be connected to the resurgence of Christian faith, it was also deeply related to the psychosocial effects of war. Hence, the reassurance of the Western civilised habitus through the spiritual factor was an important dimension of postwar discourses. In this context, and in conformity with the unconscious relation between the civilised habitus and security established in Chap. 3, it is argued that, apart from material reconstruction, the "spiritual" restoration appeared as a vital requisite for postwar international security.

Not only is the misery of the people material, as it is also, in the most significant ways, symbolic, moral, psychological and cultural (Gori, 2017:

158). Recalling on Carl Jung's central contribution on this subject, it is the role of religious symbols to give meaning to the life of man (Jung, 1964: 89). But "cultural symbols" may be used to express "eternal truths" as well, and they are in fact still used in many religions. These have gone through many transformations, in a long process of "[m]ore or less conscious development, and have thus become collective images accepted by civilized societies" (Jung, 1964: 93). These cultural symbols may evoke deep emotional responses in some individuals, and this psychic change makes them function in much the same way as prejudices for instance: "They are important constituents of our mental make-up and vital forces in the building up of human society; and they cannot be eradicated without serious loss" (ibid.).

What were the meanings underlying the conceptual and symbolic association of Christianity to Western civilisation? This section shows how the issue of spirituality surged in relation to the broken civilised habitus, as a central discursive aspect of NATO's deep origins. Evidence suggests that wartime de-civilising moves were attributed to the loss of spiritual values. Then, this void was somehow compensated by a stimulation of beliefs in order to serve the justifications and stereotypes about the uncivilised of the epoch. At the same time, the religious character of postwar discourses had the power to re-inculcate the need for individuals to discipline their behaviour and attune it to the moral authority of the state.

War and the massive scope for destruction brought by technological innovations had a strong impact on Western self-representations. In terms of beliefs, it can be said that faith had been lost on many different fronts. The Christian and Enlightenment values on which the nineteenth-century conception of Western civilisation was based (Duara, 2001: 100) lost credibility in the West. Martin Conway (2006) has made an extensive review of the state of Christian confessional beliefs at the time, and asserted these had suffered a major loss of influence since WWI. In 1939, any account of the influence of Christian churches in Europe would have been pessimistic, mostly due to the increasing number of authoritarian regimes. Christian churches, political parties and values had little influence, and had receded considerably over the twenty-five years since WWI (Conway, 2006: 151). War had given rise to a "militantly atheist communism", which was by the 1930s a durable and important influence in European politics. Forms of right-wing politics were also emerging that were separate or even hostile to Christian ideas. Therefore, the actual dominant

trend in 1939 pointed toward the "marginalization of Christian values in public and political life" (Conway, 2006: 152).

However, the reference to a "spiritual union" surged very often in post-war discourses, in close association with Western civilisation. It was in fact an important part of NATO's formative narrative. Spirituality, in particular that related to Christian tradition, had been present in Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime discourses (Churchill, 1940 cit. in Gilbert, 2012; Kirby, 2000: 389). Christian language and symbolism had played an important role in the discourses of political leaders, and continued to do so in the postwar context. In particular, the ideological critiques to Communism were very often sustained by spiritual arguments, on the ground that Bolshevism had been campaigning against the Russian Orthodox Church since 1917—in line with Lenin's belief that religion was a product of social oppression and economic exploitation (Shaw, 2002: 6). In 1946, Churchill blatantly implanted a religious identity into the issue by claiming that Communism constituted "a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization" (Churchill, 1946). The civilisation of the West, so often mentioned during wartime, was now referred to as a Christian civilisation as well, and communism was its opposite.

Likewise, the British press frequently denounced Communists as blasphemous murderers, along with their spiritual and sexual depravation (Shaw, 2002: 7). In the USA, Washington and the CIA developed a peculiar "missionary mentality", which later made the "godless Communism" a major theme of Cold War discourse (ibid.). President Truman's administration amplified the Soviet threat, in order to secure public and Congressional support from both parties. In this process, the narrative or the key discursive elements were presented in terms of "[a] crusade to save western civilization and Christianity from an atheistic Soviet Union" (Kirby, 2000: 388). After the war ended, beliefs and perceptions were rapidly transforming. The Soviet Union had been an ally of the West with the purpose of defeating Nazi Germany. This suggests their representation as uncivilised underwent a brief period of interlude, during which their behaviour was considered sufficiently civilised to be integrated in the struggle against barbarism. The reversal of that temporary situation clearly required a new justification after the war, which the spiritual narrative was able to do by appealing to people's beliefs.

Furthermore, the conception of a spiritual union was an important part of the justification-system used by the British Foreign Office to establish bonds with the American side of the Atlantic after the war. Moralist

language and religious imagery were used to attune the political objectives and identity to that of Truman's administration. Dianne Kirby (2000) has analysed the role of Christianity in the Anglo-American Cold War alliance, and explained in detail how the British Foreign Office built an "education campaign" after the war to prepare the audiences for the dissolution of the wartime alliance with the Soviets. The goal was to divulge a basic and sober doctrine that would not outrage the public opinion and political supporters, but would at the same time support the anti-Sovietism of the USA (Kirby, 2000: 395–396). The spiritual conception of Europe based on Christianity, introduced by Churchill years earlier, provided an ideological rationale for the British Church leaders to support the cause, and help ease the doubts regarding the socialist government in power (Kirby, 2000: 388): socialism was not synonym with atheism. This spiritualising move in Britain was thus emulating US President Roosevelt's construction of a "theology of war" in the struggle against German Nazism, and represented "an opportunity to resurrect the wartime alliance during which Hitler's possible conquest of Europe had unrelentingly been portrayed as a threat to Christian civilization" (ibid.). His successor Harry Truman also used many Bible references to appeal to the messianic convictions of the American people, whilst demonising the "godless" Soviet Union during the Cold War (Kirby, 2000: 389). However, still according to Kirby, the USA was not as able as Britain to draw the distinction between socialism and communism. Therefore, the British Labour government gradually changed its discourse and presented the Soviet issue in terms of personal liberty and democratic process, backed by an open commitment to Christian values and ideals (Kirby, 2000: 400).

Bevin formulated the idea of a "spiritual union" in softer terms, by refocusing on Western civilisation and the obligation to "organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent" to it, as "chief protagonists" of "some form of union in Western Europe, […] backed by the Americas and the Dominions" (Bevin, 1948a). To him, reinforcing the "physical barriers" was not sufficient; the need for a spiritual union was another vital dimension to revitalise Western civilisation (Bevin, 1948b). The power of ideas, values and norms would have to come chiefly in reinventing the behaviour of states after the war. Western states that "thought" alike were to unite. However, what was initially defended as the need for a "spiritual union" ended up as a call for the spirit of democracy. As exposed above, Bevin's reference to a spiritual union was in fact very political in its designs, as he associated to it ideas such as the compulsion of Western

protagonism; the suggestion of a geo-political alliance "backed by the Americas and the Dominions"; the "sovereignty" of Eastern Europe; the upcoming creation of an "organism". In fact, this political position was echoed by many Christian activists in the West, who "[b]elieved that the fight to protect theological freedom in the East would in turn help to revitalize democracy's own moral and spiritual values" (Shaw, 2002: 7). Therefore, the discursive association of religion with "liberty", "democracy", and "Western civilisation" became popular in Western culture, in sharp contrast with the "atheism, barbarism, and totalitarianism" of Communism (ibid.).

Apart from the discursive importance of religious references, religion had actually regained a central position in West European political life by the late 1940s. According to Conway (2006: 153–154, 158), not only were Christian values influential in shaping the Cold War spirit, as Christian churches and affiliated institutions were also important interlocutors in the increasingly complex interaction between state and society: "The panoply of established, semi-established or simply privileged churches gave European civic culture a durably Christian veneer and marginalised the power and even the visibility of Europe's other faiths" (Conway, 2006: 177). The issue of "marginalisation" is important here, for it suggests that Western symbolic power and capital inevitably concentrated in the particular realm of Christian meanings, representations and beliefs. That is why historian Herbert Butterfield was so sceptical about modern men's spirituality in his *Christianity and History* (1950: 118), in which spirituality is said to basically lock people in a "world of partial visions". Butterfield highlighted that an historical religion is geographically related to a specific location, and also that it has attributed certain meanings to certain historical events (1950: 120). In doing so, an historical religion also conveys a "certain doctrine about human life" and a perspective on the very "course of things in time" (ibid.). Put in other terms, it defines *how* and *when* life progresses. Further in Butterfield's line of reasoning, "Glib prophets" refer to the political actors who have in their hands the power to play on their monopoly of force and their moral authority upon the world, including that of threatening people "with the atomic bomb in case we are not good or refuse to do what they want" (Butterfield, 1950: 122). As war displays a "spectacle of sin and evil", the basic meanings of good and bad are ascribed to certain actors and the cause they defend, either the Anglo-Saxons, the French, the Russians or the Germans. Behaviour is inherently conditioned by the possibility of massive destruction (ibid.).

This is consistent with the discursive effects of "civilisation", as shown in previous sections. The major difference lies at the level of symbolic language. Fundamental meanings, representations, and beliefs concur to the same elements. The role of spirituality in postwar discourses on civilisation therefore served to reinforce the perceptions on barbarism, but at the more profound and emotional level of beliefs. As a consequence, two possibilities may be inferred. First, the language of religion managed to express symbolic meanings in a more primary and effective way, so that different countries—with different interests, objectives, traditions or ideologies—could unite in the same fundamental cause: to restore and perpetuate the civilised habitus. In parallel, that language was a powerful moral tool for reasserting the role of the state in disciplining both individuals and other states of the international society. The next section will assess how changes in the realms of security and power influenced the evolution of the civilised habitus in the West.

5.4 Rearranging Security, Repositioning Power: The Process of Rebuilding Interdependence Among the Civilised

This final section of the chapter focuses on how basic meanings of survival and security were redefined and reorganised in order to re-secure the civilised habitus of the West. Again, the argument is not that Western civilisation had been lost. Rather, meanings and relations of civilisation were reinvented or strengthened in some areas in order for the civilising process to continue consistently with the basic assumptions and values it had been conveying for centuries. It is shown that while Europeans felt insecure, the USA felt powerful and invigorated in her newly found role as a provider of international security. Not only did the USA provide material security though the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, as she also defined the ideological premises necessary for security to be attained. This was essentially a matter of redefining the terms and implications of *who was to be a secure member of Western civilisation if it was to survive*. As a consequence of the general security rearrangement, power and material means concentrated in the West, and interdependence grew stronger among the civilised members of the West.

Until WWII, international security had been institutionally defined by the League of Nations. The League had emerged as a consequence of

WWI to prevent another world conflict from happening again. But it had failed redundantly in providing the world with security or peace. In the 1930s for instance, Ethiopia had been invaded and hit by Mussolini's air campaign of gas mustard before the partiality and passivity of the League, and despite Ethiopian appeals to arbitrage and conciliation (Sélassié, 1936). While De Gaulle (1941) spoke of the League's "platonic charter" and failure in achieving real, practical and organised security, US President Roosevelt (1943) acknowledged the failure of the League's idealism and the consequent inexistence of a "decent" and "durable" peace between the two world wars. Far from a *mea culpa* by Western-European leaders, the victors of WWI, this is rather telling of how keeping the power through status quo policies was the option preferred in the peace settlement, in order to maintain the dispositions and distribution of power existing in 1918, at the end of the war (Morgenthau, 1948: 22–23). More concretely, after WWI, France maintained permanent alliances with several nations, which Morgenthau understands as a kind of "preventive balance-of-power policy" to maintain the Versailles status quo in case Germany would come back. In theory, Morgenthau continues, the League of Nations should have superseded the multiple alliances and counter-alliances occurring between both world wars with the principle of collective security. However, collective security reaffirmed the balance of power in form of "a universal alliance against any potential aggressor (Morgenthau, 1948: 142).

Alas the League of Nations' ineffectiveness culminated in a second world war. Against this background, the perception of an institutional capacity to provide international security as a collective good to be enjoyed by the whole community was very hesitating. Managing to maintain the security of interdependent units was the key challenge. Therefore, the task of retrieving international security was not only material, as it also depended on the redefinition of psychosocial factors related to confidence and commitment. It was a matter of reaffirming both material and symbolic power under new conditions. The spiritual dimension analysed in the previous section was one way of achieving that at the emotional and metaphysical level.

The new mental configuration in which power was to be reorganised is fairly illustrated by the idea of "compression of space". In geospatial terms, WWII was a "new kind of war", involving "every continent, every island, every sea, every air-lane in the world" as "endless battlefields" (Roosevelt, 1942). When war ended, the fact that only two of the greatest powers remained—USA and USSR—changed perceptions in profound ways.

Walter Lippmann (1944) defended at the time that international order in the postwar era should be based on a division of the world into three or four spheres of responsibility, within each of which a great power, or combination of great powers, would keep the peace. The preponderance of a great power would be recognised by small powers accepting its protection. Lippmann even envisaged four regional systems: the Atlantic system policed by the US and Britain; the Russian system; the Chinese system and eventually the Indian (Bull, 1995: 215). But to historian Arnold Toynbee (1954), the geospatial configuration of the world metamorphosed after WWII, in that the *Oikoumenê*—'Mankind's habitat'—expanded into the "[s]hape of a great helm pulled down over the face of the globe from the North Pole to the southern edge of the Southern Temperate Zone" (Toynbee, 1954: 483). Hence, the two surviving great powers were now in the position of "[s]imultaneously encircling and being encircled by one another" (Toynbee, 1954: 484). Between the two, a series of smaller war-torn European states remained on one side, and a vast ocean on the other.

Materially, the USA was in possession of the war's most decisive weapon and had used it over Hiroshima, Japan, to end the war: the atomic bomb. Its destructiveness was unprecedented; it had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T., and "[m]ore than thousand times the blast power of the British 'Grand Slam', which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare" (Truman, 1945). In historian William McNeill's words, "[w]ith the discovery of atomic explosives, human destructive power reached a new, suicidal level, surpassing previous limits to all but unimaginable degree" (1982: 360). Additionally, the issue of monopoly over the atomic bomb was obviously at stake, and provided the USA with the most "significant diplomatic advantage in postwar diplomacy" (Sherwin, 2005: 64). Together with its strong economy and currency, the atomic bomb became the "supreme symbol of America's strength", reinforcing her role as "the main deterrent to Soviet aggression" (Lundestad, 2003: 30–31). This is to say that the bomb concentrated in itself, and in its sole American possessor until 1949, the most radical power of a global death and life signifier. Furthermore, it represented a revolution for scientific knowledge and cooperation in all its magnitude, for Western civilisation had the knowledge of how to destroy humanity.

The geo-mental shrinking of the world, combined with the material concentration of the ultimate power over life and death, is revealing of how much the postwar strategic-political plane cannot be surveyed without

the psychological one—both material and "spiritual" forces were definitely at play (Toynbee, 1954: 490). In other words, material conditions had crucial psychological consequences. On the one hand, atomic technology hugely amplified American self-confidence and assertiveness in the final phase of the war and its immediate aftermath. When news of the successful atomic test of 16 July 1945 reached President Truman at the Potsdam Conference, US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson noted that Truman was tremendously pepped up, with a new feeling of confidence. Churchill even noted that Truman was a changed man after having read the report (Sherwin, 2005: 68). Less than three weeks later, the atomic bomb was unleashed upon Hiroshima. In his statement announcing the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima, Truman (1945) announced the USA were "prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground", adverting that if Japan did not comply with US terms, she could "expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth". Truman's words could not be clearer, as they reinforced the perception that the US was the most powerful state of the world at the end of WWII. The USA had the means to "obliterate more rapidly and completely" the resources of any country, and threatened to bring "a rain of ruin from the air" still unseen "on this earth". These terms were strong as they conveyed a theological sense of might that is only comparable to the acts of a religious god, so to speak. This kind of superiority was not only material and moral, as it also expressed the awareness of a "new era in man's understanding of nature's forces" (ibid.).

The spiritual discipline developed in postwar discourses by the USA was obviously backed by the possession of a technological device that could erase any city, region or even state from the face of the earth. This had quite extreme consequences, for there was a psychological imbalance in the world that was clearly favourable to the USA. Behaving under any term defined by an actor such as the USA was not as an option *per se*, but a matter of ultimate survival: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki […] became the symbols of a new American barbarism, reinforcing charges, with dramatic circumstantial evidence, that the policies of the United States contributed to the origins of the Cold War" (Sherwin, 2005: 68). But despite the barbarism, the Bomb also symbolised the American might, whilst accentuating the Soviet technological backwardness. This was a crucial, yet rather confusing, element in the war of nerves, or perceptions, between the two powers. It was also an incentive to look strong. Therefore, the Bomb had

a dual effect. On the one hand, it made the Soviet Union more restrained in its use of force, for fear of precipitating war. But it also made the Soviet Union less cooperative for fear of seeming weak (Holloway, 2005: 87).

In this overall postwar scenario, high levels of personal insecurities were to be expected (Lasswell, 1948: 895). As representations of the uncivilised were more vivid than ever, the belief in the possibility of barbarism, evil and total destruction was renewed. However, in the USA, the psychological effects of the two world wars were not felt as deeply as in Western Europe. To Toynbee, Americans had this "immunity from a living experience of war in their own country", which made it likely that the traditional aversion to militarism would be overcome if the American people were to be faced with the choice between submitting to the Russians or fighting them (1954: 518). Aside from this, the people of the USA were "distant from the troubled areas of the earth", making it "hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples" (Marshall, 1947).

Although insecurity was not experienced to the same degree by all the chief states involved in WWII, security was the objective of most of the Allies. For instance, security was a major goal in De Gaulle's ideological project since the beginning of the war. To him, liberation was above all about the way that any French might live, think, work and act in dignity and security (De Gaulle, 1941). Security was also Roosevelt's universal goal for the victory of peace, through "the enlargement of the security of man and throughout the world" (1943). Likewise, it was Bevin and Stalin's mutually acknowledged aim, to zeal for their respective country's security. To Bevin (1948b), it was an obligation for Britain to have security arrangements with France and other neighbouring countries, just like the arrangements the Soviet Union had with her Eastern neighbours. Moreover, the postwar reality required security to be rearranged according to new factors. In managerial terms, a critical innovation of WWII had to do with transnational organisation and growing interdependence. Arms production had become increasingly complex during the war, and started to involve more countries. As a consequence, no single nation could conduct war efficiently by itself (McNeill, 1982: 356). On the other hand, after the war, Europe could not be reconstructed "as the heart of Western civilisation" without the "domination and control of one great Power" (Bevin, 1948b). Does this mean European unity could only be sustained by the support of American hegemony? According to Ian Jackson (2009: 47), it was Britain and France that took the initiative of inviting the US

into the affairs of Western Europe, as they also sought to manage and orchestrate the American response to Soviet expansionism in the East. Jackson (2009: 48) also refers that the joint purpose of the three states was to build a new world order based on democracy, collective security, and commercial liberalism.

Economic growth was definitely the critical factor allowing for the "[r]econstruction of US-Western Europe interdependence, a process of financial and economic system of agencies and agreements, following the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944", which enabled "unprecedented levels of external interference in national practices", namely through the leading role of the US dollar as a currency for international trade (Teixeira & Marcos, 2016: 15). In this context of emerging financial globalisation, US President Truman developed, in March 1947, his doctrine of aid toward Greece and Turkey, which were being intensively approached by Soviet undertakings (Truman, 1947). Poverty and hunger appeared as critical threats to its stabilisation. The "Truman doctrine" instructed that $400 million would be channelled in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey. The justification advanced by the American President was that "[t]he seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife" (ibid.). Those countries were in such need, that their national integrity was at stake. Their survival depended on "modernisation". Therefore, aid was vital to resist subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures such as communism. In the case of Turkey, the "order" in the Middle East was also a crucial issue (ibid.).

In June 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall (1947) held a famous speech that initiated the post-war European Aid Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. In it, Marshall depicted to American audiences how European economy was totally ravaged and defended a policy "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos" (Marshall, 1947). As cities, factories, mines and railroads were destroyed, "[t]he breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete" (ibid.). This Plan had a crucial political and psychological importance, Lundestad says, as many "actually believed it had saved Western Europe", changing positively European perceptions of the US, and initiating a successful anticipatory effect upon European minds even before the supplies arrived (2003: 58). More importantly, Marshall's speech also established a relation between the collapse of European economy and civilisation, by stating that the

"division of labor [that] is the basis of modern civilization" was "threatened with breakdown" (Marshall, 1947). Had the civilised habitus been framed by a very material conditionality? Here, it is worth referring to the work of Norbert Elias (1990) once more, so as to elaborate on this seemingly unintended relationship between the division of labour and modern civilisation.

Elias (1990) demonstrates that the division of labour was an important part of the civilising process, in that the partition of tasks throughout society gradually amplified the interdependence between individuals and their central state authority. The increasing state monopoly over the military cannot be dissociated from the state monopoly over the economy, as they are both the key to a state's durability (Elias, 1990: 93). A monopolistic mechanism thus presupposes that the monopoliser—i.e. the state—accumulates resources and tasks that need to be distributed through an ever-growing number of persons, who become dependent on the state. Therefore, the larger the monopoly, the greater the division of labour will be in order to administrate it (Elias, 1990: 96). Elias concludes that economy and politics became fusional, mainly because creating and acquiring means of production and consumption involved very often the threat of, or the use of physical and military violence (Elias, 1990: 127). For all the warrior societies of the Middle Age, the spade was a natural and indispensable tool for acquiring means of production, as the threat of violence was an actual means of production (ibid.). However, the threat of physical violence was not the only form of economic struggle. The threat of social degradation, loss of economic autonomy, financial ruin and material difficulties were also part of the struggle between feudal houses. Hence, physical violence and economic violence acted as a whole, and social existence was the main purpose (Elias, 1990: 128–129).

This deeper contextualisation enables to understand that Marshall's concern on the state of the division of labour was related to the state of the civilised habitus. Not only did he recognise the need to recover the European economy, as he also defended that Europe should be duly repositioned in the international division of labour, so that the basis of modern civilisation would not be disrupted. Besides, when Marshall further expressed that the European farmer "[f]eeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization" (Marshall, 1947), some degree of social degradation transpired. Such a statement clearly mirrored the imminence of material insecurity.

Charles C. Maier (2005) has showed how American officials worked hard to cultivate an ideological consensus around the theme of "productivity". There was this notion that economic gains would relieve class conflict and minimise redistributive struggles (Maier, 2005: 221). In a context of discontent, starvation, and scarcity, which threatened to put Europe in a general state of strike, "[p]roductivity was the allegedly apolitical criterion that motivated recovery assistance" (Maier, 2005: 224). It also inhibited class conflict, by suggesting that the dividend of economic growth could reward both management and labour. Productivity could thus avoid political and social conflict, by adjourning basic struggles into "cooperative searches for optimal economic solutions" (ibid.).

Moreover, the perception of a "power vacuum" in Western Europe represented a serious risk of economic, social, and political disintegration (Weber, 1992: 644). And although contemporary statistics did not entirely bear Marshall's conclusion regarding Europe's poverty (Gilbert, 2009: 20), the Marshall Plan expanded Truman's doctrine to a wide program of recovery for Western Europe in America's most dedicated effort to reduce communist influence in Europe: "[g]overnments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States" (Marshall, 1947).

The Soviet reaction to the USA assisting Western Europe was basically formulated by Andrei Zhdanov's, a high-ranking Soviet Communist official responsible for international affairs, in his key postwar statement (Pons, 2001: 18). To the Soviet secretary of the Central Committee, two diametrically opposed camps were dividing world politics: the anti-democratic imperialist camp, and the anti-imperialist camp. While

> American imperialism was searching for markets for its goods and capital, and using economic aid to extort concessions from other countries and to subjugate them; it was building up its military power, stockpiling atomic bombs, and building bases around the world. (Holloway, 2005: 75)

At the end of 1947, the Soviet Union created the Cominform as a direct reaction to the Marshall Plan, which she deemed expansionist and imperialist. In organising the Cominform, Stalin rejected the idea that communist parties could act independently. On the contrary, he took steps to consolidate the Soviet position in Eastern Europe with a communist monopoly of power. In February 1948, this took a dramatic instance,

when communists who already formed part of the government seized complete control of their governments (Holloway, 2005: 76). Regarding the claim that US imperialism was rising during that period, Maier's argument is that "[h]egemony was in the cards", because the basic postwar inequality of resources made it forceful for any alliance to generate some sort of imperial structure (2005: 222). This idea is thought-provoking, in that it suggests how a monopolistic arrangement such as imperialism or hegemony could arise from a situation of fundamental insecurity and loss of interdependent social relations. At this stage, the most common perception was that Europe depended decisively on America's support regarding vital aspects related to the fulfilling of basic needs. Hunger thus established an ontological relation of security for survival. Only through this basic reassurance could the civilised subjects of Western Europe be civilising agents again. In order for civilisation to be resumed and continued, the civilised subject of the West had to feel secure again. Through economic assistance, but also thanks to its monopoly over the atomic power over life, the USA could emerge as the monopoliser in providing security to the West, and thus make the civilised habitus to continue, the civilising process to advance, as its protagonist.

The evolution from economic interdependence to security integration was quite immediate. 1947 had been the year of economic association between the USA and Western Europe. To Gilbert (2009: 20–21), this sequence of events initiated the propaganda campaign between the US and the Soviet Union; they were now enemies and the wartime alliance was dead. 1948 was a critical turning point in terms of security perceptions between the two great powers. Different perspectives may be held regarding that period. To the USA, the Soviet initiatives in Czechoslovakia and Germany in early 1948, and also the previous ones in Greece and Turkey, represented an expansionist move of the communist doctrine and a fundamental breach in the dispositions of the treaty, which deserved renewed attention given the importance of nuclear strategy and deterrence and the future of a divided Germany (Kaplan, 1969: 212, 217; Truman, 1947; Weber, 1992: 634). To Russia, America's demands and aid policies were acts of imperialism seeking to advance capitalist interests and not selfless pacific endeavours (Kaplan, 1969: 212, 217).

In 1948, Lasswell already reported that every social change of that time—evolution of population, death rate, production, scientific knowledge, movement across frontiers, movement of raw materials, products, machinery, foodstuff—was "weighed in the scale pans of power and

responded to accordingly" (1948: 877). Lasswell was obviously discussing the bipolar relation between the US and USSR—"[a] good crop in Western Germany is chiefly evaluated, not in economic or humanitarian terms, but according to its effect upon Soviet-American power" (ibid.). Seemingly, each side of the *Oikoumenê* was struggling for its area of influence, where each one could expand and secure its monopolistic power over ideas, ways of life, social relations, wealth, death and life signifiers, habiti. Therefore, each side was doing the same: reinforcing interdependence among a community of believers who were to converge into the authority of a central institutional model. Besides, WWII had only terminated, that civil wars and revolutions were already mirroring the possibility of "[a] new spectacle, the phenomenon of modern barbarism", which made the world feel "that the civilised world was dissolving" (Butterfield, 1950: 139). So, could the so-called "security dilemma" that eventually gave rise to the Cold War have been an "elimination contest" between the US and the USSR for the civilisation of Europe?[7]

Elias (1989, 1990) showed how stable monopolies of power were crucial for the pacification of modern societies. But the absence of a global monopoly of power has meant that relations between states have consisted of "elimination contests", in which political actors respond to security dilemmas (Linklater, 2007: 169). Regarding the question of a security dilemma between the US and USSR, Robert Jervis finds ambiguities in the basic concept of security, namely what "[t]he object of security is […] and what is needed to make states and individuals feel secure" (2001: 39). In a security dilemma, Jervis referred, both sides prefer to maintain the status quo to the risks of expansion. That is why, although there are certain elements of security dilemma in the Cold War, the root of the conflict is essentially a clash of social systems, and the goal of mutual security was therefore not attainable. To the Soviet Union, mutual security was not even a goal, because it served the status quo, against which Soviets were (Jervis, 2001: 58–60). Consequently, the security of civilisation, if it was to continue, did not mean that international security was to be reformulated so as to include both the West and its wartime ally. It could proceed without having Russia as another civilised Other. The preliminary suggestion here is that the main implication of this East-West opposition is not to be thought in terms of a clash of civilisations, but rather as a struggle among the self-restrained, as the "Cold War" probably represents the most civilised example of conflict ever known—this point will be further explored in Chap. 6.

The need for an US-Europe association for security was definitely raised by the Czech coup of February 1948, encouraged by Stalin. This also precipitated the Anglo-French initiative to form the West European Union (WEU) in March 1948 (Weber, 1992: 646–647; Jackson, 2009: 51). But on 22 January 1948, Bevin expressed the need to include other countries, namely from the Benelux, in the following terms: "We have then to go beyond the circle of our immediate neighbours. We shall have to consider the question of associating other historic members of European civilisation […]" (Bevin, 1948b). But Bevin also included other regions: "The United States and the countries of Latin America are clearly as much a part of our common Western civilisation as are the nations of the British Commonwealth" (Bevin, 1948b). And so did Bevin define Western civilisation as encompassing the American continent.

The Brussels Pact was signed on 17 March 1948, establishing a military alliance between Britain, France and the Benelux countries to form the WEU (Jackson, 2009: 51). Among other things, it set up a formal military body to coordinate defence activities; but this did not include the US. Formally, the WEU requested negotiations with the US on a North Atlantic Treaty in October 1948 and the US are said to have initially rejected the initiative of a treaty on the ground that the defence of Europe should be short-term, driven by the immediacy of the Soviet threat (Weber, 1992: 649). However, Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman (1983) have proved that secret negotiations actually took place in the Pentagon in March 1948, well before those dates. In fact, Wiebes and Zeeman showed that, contrarily to NATO's official historiography that situates the first negotiations in July 1948, security arrangements had already been discussed between the US and West Europe in Washington on March 1948 in utmost secrecy (1983: 351). Reportedly, in March 1948, French Prime Minister Georges Bidault requested Washington to strengthen both politically and militarily the "collaboration between the old and the new worlds, both so jointly responsible for the preservation of the only valuable civilization", but as France's objectives differed from the British in terms of leadership and structure, France ended not being represented in those secret Washington talks between US, the UK and Canada (Lundestad, 2003: 51). These talks between the three nations found an actual consensus on the wording that would lead to NATO a year later (Wiebes & Zeeman, 1983: 352). The "spiritual union" was taking form.

Throughout this chapter, the state of the civilised habitus around WWII was examined. First, the focus on the notion of barbarism (Sect. 5.1) revealed that Nazism disrupted the civilised habitus, by exerting such an oppressive power that it de-civilised the behaviour of individuals acting collectively. Extreme aggressiveness and violence were unleashed, and proved that the state had the capacity to reverse the civilising structures of Western individuals. The civilised habitus was destabilised and the civilised subjects of the West were made insecure about their very identity. Then, the analysis of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the concept of civilisation from the perspective of the West (Sect. 5.2) showed that Russia had been deemed uncivilised since WWI, but had temporarily been part of the Western alliance as another victim of Nazi aggression. However, after the war, new justifications and stereotypes from the West reinforced the idea of how the civilised habitus should not be, having the communist Russia as an ideological anti-model. After that, focusing on the relationship between spirituality and Western civilisation (Sect. 5.3) exposed both the wartime and postwar discursive role played by Christianity in the redefinition of the civilised habitus. Nazi barbarism had provoked an existential tension and a sense of guilt that was contained by theological representations of political realities. The security of the civilised subjects required their discipline to be reasserted at the unconscious level, which the state did by playing on spiritual metaphors and allegories.

Finally, power and security insights disclosed a new postwar reality (Sect. 5.4), in which technology played a central role. The geo-mental conceptions of the world shrank; power revolved around the two great powers that remained victorious after the war; and possessing the nuclear weapon was the main life and death signifier for the whole world. As a consequence, not only did material power concentrate in two poles and start a struggle for influence, as metaphysical power was also compressed. Fear and insecurity were the roots determining that the civilised habitus had to be reorganised through distinct poles of interdependent relations in order to be re-secured. This was achieved through the interplay of material security, hegemony, concentration of power, and struggles for monopoly.

To sum up, the civilised habitus was showing fragilities since WWI, and revealed much insecurity both at the personal and collective levels. These were definitely exacerbated by the conditions surrounding WWII, and the sudden occurrence of mass atrocities that deeply altered the perceptions

on Western standard of behaviour, and beliefs about human nature in general. This had a deep impact upon the unconscious, which can be seen by the way Western actors represented distress and insecurity, but also used religious symbols in their discourses on Western civilisation. In all, these conditions thus set the stage for NATO's emergence around a civilisational referent.

Notes

1. Clement Attlee succeeded Winston Churchill as Britain's Prime Minister (1945–1951).
2. See for instance the postwar negotiations on Germany (Roberts, 2005: 44), and others that will be further discussed in Sect. 5.4.
3. At the time, diplomat George Kennan was deputy head of mission in Moscow.
4. In Yalta, the three allies (USSR, Britain and USA) discussed the future of Germany, the borders of Poland and the spheres of influence in Europe. On Germany, the Three agreed on a division into four zones, occupied and administered by the USA, Britain, France and the Soviet Union Five months later in Potsdam, the Three did not reach any consensus on a peace treaty for Germany. Only vague understandings were issued about German reparations and the peace treaty. The Potsdam accords were then disavowed by the Western powers and the Soviet Union in 1946–1947 (Jackson, 2009: 49).
5. Ernest Bevin was the British Foreign Secretary between 1945 and 1951.
6. Andrei Vishinski was a Soviet diplomat, assigned as a permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations from 1945 to 1954.
7. A "security dilemma" presupposes that "in the absence of a supranational authority that can enforce binding agreements, many of the steps pursued by states to bolster their security have the effect – often unintended and unforeseen—of making other states less secure" (Jervis, 2001: 36).

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CHAPTER 6

NATO's Cold War Evolution: Civilisation from Referent Object to Standard

Within the broader part of this book dedicated to NATO's civilisational object of security, Chap. 5 explored the extent to which the civilised habitus of the West was in peril with WWII. This approach highlighted the West's overall state of insecurity at the time of WWII, which helped contextualising the deep origins of NATO's civilisational referent of security. After having outlined the wider conditions upon which NATO might have been fabricated as an organisation to defend the continuation of the civilising process, Chap. 6 analyses the evolution of the civilisational referent object of security from NATO's birth in 1949 to the end of the Cold War. How did the perceptions on Western civilisation evolve across the next decades?

Throughout its sixty years of existence, NATO went through two distinct ideological and geopolitical eras, as it also had to respond and adapt to serious questioning by the international community on successive periods (Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011; Kay, 1998; Zorgbibe, 2002). As NATO's discourses from the 1950s to the 1980s show, the Alliance evolved very aware of its time. In other words, NATO consistently displayed reflexivity in questioning its current pertinence in the world, what role it should play, what mission it should embrace. NATO has been constantly on the move, which compels to question NATO's referent object of security. If civilisation had proved to be a central concern in the deep origins and formation of the Alliance, then how did that concern evolve afterwards? Did it somehow attenuate, or did it continue under different shapes?

Quentin Skinner has analysed the issue of conceptual and rhetorical change, and adverted that the transformations we might chart are not

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necessarily changes in concepts, but rather changes in the use of the terms that express those concepts (1999: 63–64). He has in fact suggested two ways in which conceptual change can be mapped historically. The first is over *time*, whereby a particular normative vocabulary can be employed differently depending on the epoch. Some norm/behaviour may thus lose its sense in a society, and therefore the terms associated to it may become obsolete, or even disappear (Skinner, 1999: 64). The other way of conceptual transformation may be by *intensity*, meaning that this kind of change will reflect "an attempt to modify existing social perceptions and beliefs" (Skinner, 1999: 65). In this case, a society may eventually "alter its attitude towards some fundamental value or practice and alter its normative vocabulary accordingly" (Skinner, 1999: 66). As for the rhetorical change of concepts, Skinner argued these have to do with changing how a particular behaviour/norm is seen *morally*. For instance, an action previously regarded as commendable may come to seem condemnable, and inversely. As a consequence, all attempts to determine the correct use of normative vocabularies should be seen as ideological enterprises, because their application will "always reflect a wish to impose a particular moral vision upon the workings of the social world" (Skinner, 1999: 67).

In the light of Skinner's hypotheses for conceptual and rhetorical change, one may conceive the possibility that the representation of civilisation, or civilised behaviour, might have actually suffered modifications through time, depending on the social priorities of a given temporal period. On the other hand, they might also have incurred transformations of vocabulary for the sake of precise objectives such as changing collective behaviour regarding a precise issue. In this sense, the term "civilisation" or "civilised" may be replaced by other terms that fundamentally embody the same values, norms, behaviours, or status quo.

Furthermore, there are two temporal issues that are critical for this chapter, concurrent to the matter of conceptual change. One is NATO's awareness of time and future; the other has to do with the unconsciousness inherent to civilisation's structural great duration. Historian Reinhart Koselleck (2004) has worked on both these questions of time, explaining, on the one hand, how consciousness of time and future began to develop during absolutism and fundamentally characterises modern society (2004: 21–22). Koselleck highlights how a philosophy of historical process detached early modernity from its past, and inaugurated our modernity with a new future through the idea of progress. In the eighteenth century, the context was one where Church's traditional fixation on the End of the

World made time static, and political prognostication cyclical, through a philosophy composed of a mixture of rational "prediction and salvational expectation". But the idea of progress opened up a future where the predictable could be transcended, and new long-term prognoses could be made (Koselleck, 2004: 21–22). On the other hand, Koselleck points to the existence of structures that are "so enduring that they remain for contemporaries part of the unconscious or the unknown", in which case only social science or history are able to go "beyond the perceptible experience of given generations" (Koselleck, 2004: 108). These "[s]tructures of great duration", he explains, may escape our consciousness or knowledge, but can still be all the more effective "the less they enter as a whole into a single, empirically ascertainable event" (Koselleck, 2004: 112). Therefore, a structure of time/history is not attached to a single event; it lies outside the immediate consciousness of the event occurring.

In line with Skinner and Koselleck's propositions, this chapter develops two concurring arguments. First, throughout NATO's evolution, the idea of progress played an important role in the Alliance's deliberate representation of its role. Second, and in parallel, NATO's civilisational referent of security inherently framed the organisation within an unconscious dimension, because the time of Western civilisation is structural. Together, these two interrelated claims will illustrate how NATO's civilisational referent of security evolved in an open way because it is part of a long-duration structural time. Ultimately, the evolution of NATO's referent object will prove to be undergoing an open process, in which both conscious and unconscious perceptions about Self and time cohabit. In this sense, the civilised habitus of the West was continued at the level of a democratic habitus.

6.1 The Treaty: Making a New Standard, Continuing the Civilised Habitus

This section focuses on NATO's formative Treaty as a formal starting point in the Alliance's discourse. In it, the guiding principles and mandate of the Organisation were formulated, alongside a basic conception of the civilisation of the West. It will be seen that, although the security of the civilised habitus was central to NATO's formation, its Charter indicated that the Alliance was to be way more far-reaching in its purposes.

The charter of an organisation is a key element to a group's historic representation, as it contains the origin, the mission, and responses to new

challenges. It also defines rights and obligations for the group, and works as its *founding myth* (Malinowski, 1926 *apud* Liu & Hilton, 2005: 2). The charter also possesses a prescriptive dimension, in the sense it represents much more than a set of collective memories, or shared perceptions, and defines the general role of the group. Moreover, it legitimates the actions of the group as the right thing to do in conformity with its historic experience (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 2). Therefore, looking into NATO's Charter is a preliminary way of approaching how the concept of civilisation first entered the Alliance.

Right in the preamble of the Washington Treaty marking NATO's birth on 04 April 1949, it was stated that the Parties were

> [d]etermined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and **civilisation of their peoples**, **founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law**. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. (NATO, 1949; emphasis added)

This particular way of presenting itself was clearly not that of a traditional alliance. NATO's essential proposition was not to safeguard the physical and immediate *existence* of its people, but rather its *attributes* of "liberty", "common heritage", and "civilisation", which are far more entrenched in time. If freedom, the common heritage and civilisation preceded the very existence of the people, then the existence of the people, its *raison d'être*, ultimately depended on the defence of its attributes.

Expressing the belonging to the North-Atlantic Organisation in such terms suggested that the history shared by its members was that of a civilisation that had evolved according to precise ideals, now rooted in the consciousness of the people. In turn, the people recognised these ideals and acknowledged them as desirable parts of their lives. The Alliance thereby endorsed a structural entrenchment of values that were to be seen as natural. For instance, at the signing ceremony of the Treaty, on 4 April 1949, José Caeiro da Matta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, thus stated:

> It can be said that there is **now being repeated around the shores of the Atlantic**—and on a much vaster scale—the picture which the **ancient peoples** knew at the time when the **finest conquests of the human mind and the highest exponents of civilization** were centered in the small but fertile area of the classical world. (Caeiro da Matta, 1949: 479; emphasis added)

Through these words, Caeiro da Matta expressed a quite mythological view of the moment. The Atlantic was pictured in relation to the "ancient peoples" of a "classic world" that conquered "human mind", in a most probable reference to ancient Greece. Even though this position was not representative of all the members, Caeiro da Matta established nonetheless a connection to historical time, as if that moment was a sort of apotheosis of the contemporary evolution of Western civilisation. When the defence and protection of civilisation was evoked by the Washington Treaty, it was not only a reference to the protection of a heritage from a common historical past, to a series of political achievements, to a specific mentality and vision of the world, or even to a cultural and identity bond. It was also a reference to a normative *acquis*, and above all, it appealed to a particular habitus entrenched in the unconscious history of the West.

Hence, NATO's connection to civilisation not only reveals as a relation of *representation*, as it is also one of *operationalisation*. By establishing the association between the "civilisation of the peoples" and their specific geographical location in the "North Atlantic area", the Charter claimed to embody the people of a civilised region of the world. The relation of *operationalisation* was basically set from the moment the Treaty designed a military alliance to act as an instrument *of* and *for* the security of that civilised area. In other words, civilisation is actually present in both the ontology and referent object of security of the organisation.

Furthermore, the chief values and conceptions about social organisation and behaviour upon which the civilisation of the peoples is grounded were enumerated as "the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law". These are essentially the postulates of a "democratic alliance", which is an ideal-type security arrangement, according to Haglund, since it is shaped "independently of the existence of fear", based on a "perceived commonality of 'identity'" (2004: 226–227). This definition is interesting because it essentially questions whether it was actually fear of the Soviet Union that chiefly motivated NATO's creation. It also links the setting of a democratic alliance to a particular conception of security that has to do with identity and ideology. From this perspective indeed, if NATO is a democratic alliance, it should also aim at securing the "norms and values associated with […] liberal democracy" (ibid.).

In fact, the Treaty also made a material and economic assertion that widened the Alliance's scope for action within the civilised habitus, by stating that the Parties would contribute to further developing "peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions" and

"by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" through improved "economic collaboration" (NATO, 1949: art. 2). Free institutions were to be strengthened in a friendly environment, through an improved comprehension of the principles previously mentioned—"democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"—and through enhanced "conditions of stability and well-being". Whilst seeming little tangible, all these principles and ideas converged in reaffirming the predominance of a specific social model, that of liberal democracy. Here, it is worth recalling Marshall's formulation of an economic plan for Europe in 1947, as a policy fundamentally directed "against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos", with the aim of reviving a working economy in the world that enables the "political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist" (Marshall, 1947). The same reference to the "free institutions" made by NATO in article 2 of the Charter is not coincidental. Economic liberalism thus represented the material dimension of the Treaty, similarly to what civilisation implied in metaphysical terms, at a time of generalised reconstruction. Together, the material and immaterial dimensions aimed at fortifying the civilised habitus for the future, in continuity to what had been redefined and reasserted since the end of WWII by Western powers (see Chap. 5).

Conclusively, at the time of its creation, NATO's primary referent object of security when it referred to such embracing ideas as "civilisation" and "common heritage" was a metaphysical entity that seemed to overcome the Organisation's very entrenchment in time. Expressed as such, and together with the economic feature of the treaty and its temporal wholeness, the primary referent of security indicates that NATO was born out of a wide-reaching alliance. Contrarily to a security community, NATO was formulated as a collective organisation of defence intended to protect its members through the sharing of commitments and capabilities (Haglund, 2004: 231). The Treaty was also clear in establishing that the West preferred a specific formula: democracy, backed by a metaphysical argument uniting the peoples of the West. The principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law expressed in the Charter enclosed different historic temporalities, and were presented as the result of a long-term, continual and cumulative process of cultural acquisition and social learning. Past and future were thus connected. Besides, the liberal democratic model of social, political and economic organisation seemed to be the guarantor that the civilising process was not to be reversed again. Democracy would essentially bring security for states and individuals. Fundamentally then, the Treaty establishing NATO defined a precise

standard of civilisation. The liberal democratic standard uniting the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation defined how the civilising process of the West was to proceed, through particular socio-political and economic norms that ultimately strengthened and reinforced the relations of interdependence between the Allies.

6.2 The 1950s–1960s: "The Peril from Disunity"

The 1950s and 1960s were two very dynamic decades, during which the world was readjusting to newly instituted postwar circumstances. Caught between an "alternation between adjusting oneself to fit into society and attempting to asserting oneself" (Baumeister, 1987: 170), Western society showed significant signs of being struggling for its identity. That struggle often took the form of myth-making—especially in the literature of the 1960s—in which self-made schemes of coherence onto the world were sought (Baumeister, 1987: 171). In some important ways, NATO was no exception to that reality. Alexandra Gheciu very pertinently summarises the challenges of that time as an overall "effort to reinterpret the West" through "history (re)writing" and discursive construction of the Western community, as NATO's decision-makers had to deal with emerging tensions within the alliance, fuelled by anxious and unsecure allied elites and public (Gheciu, 2005: 54–55). Gheciu's view rightly emphasises issues of reinterpretation of the West, whereas elites needed to be reassured that a Western community was indeed possible. Achieving that would be a way to rewrite Western history, that is, write a new history in which Western nations would be able to coexist peacefully. To that end, NATO assumed the role of constructing discursively the idea that a Western community was real, to which the civilisational narrative played a critical role.

This section dissects in greater detail some of Gheciu's assumptions and shows how, during those decades, NATO early expressed the need for self-reflection, had to respond to several calls for transformations, defend itself from claims of uselessness, and reaffirm the purpose of its mission. Along the way, NATO attempted to re-temporise its organisational identity by formulating renewed justifications. Seemingly, NATO invented itself as it went. The repercussions for the broader civilising process were always present, though. It will be seen that this was a phase of consolidation for the civilised referent of security, which implied a reassertion of the Western elites' commitment towards a high degree of interdependence among the NATO members. Only through reinforced interdependence could the civilised habitus proceed and advance.

Contextually, Western partnerships underwent periods of difficulty during those years. Between 1955 and 1969, some key episodes destabilised the West, and even at a time when cooperation within NATO was supposedly the closest, Lundestad states, crises were continuous: West Germany rearmed in the early 1950s; Britain opted out of the European Economic Community; the Eisenhower administration refused to support British invasion of Egypt in 1956; under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union renewed confidence to challenge the US in European areas of influence, also thanks to the launching of the Sputnik space satellite, and the acquisition of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM); Khrushchev and US President Kennedy clashed in 1961 over Berlin, which resulted in confrontation in Cuba in 1962, and almost precipitated the world into a nuclear war; in turn, De Gaulle's ascension to power in 1958 not only brought the refusal of British membership in the EEC, as it also ended in France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966 due to the leader's scepticism that the US would jeopardise the future security of western Europe (Jackson, 2009: 53–56; Lundestad, 2003: 3–4).

The first challenge posed to NATO was the Korean War. In June 1950, when the communist-controlled North Korea invaded its pro-Western southern counterpart, concern grew for both sides of the Atlantic. Western Europe's fear was that the US would leave the continent unguarded against Soviet attempts to occupy West Germany, while it was too occupied containing communism in the Far East (Forster & Wallace, 2001: 111; Jackson, 2009: 51). The solution found to alleviate the US military burden was to rearm West Germany in order to contribute to Western Europe's defence (Pinder, 2009: 34). This adaptation by NATO members to the Korean War represented an organisational solidification in terms of threat perception, distribution of resources, and sharing of responsibilities and commitment. As a consequence, not only did the USA station troops permanently in Western Europe, as NATO forces were put under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in an integrated military structure. In practical terms, NATO proved to be an effective alliance that was extending its scope and membership to the Eastern Mediterranean by incorporating Greece and Turkey in 1952 (Forster & Wallace, 2001: 111).

However, NATO's military investment in Korea focused mostly on security operations, while other dimensions of integration were minimised, in particular economic integration (Maier, 2005: 225). Hence, in the early 1950s, the idea of a North Atlantic Community started to arise

up, first by political scientist Karl Deutsch, to whom "the complementarity of common values and high levels of responsiveness to each other's needs were much more important for the cohesion of the Atlantic community than was the common security threat" (Lundestad, 2003: 5). Against this background, a Declaration of Atlantic Unity first emerged in 1954 from the initiative of 154 citizens of Canada, USA, Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark. The Declaration claimed for a reinforced and broader integration. The delegation was composed of well-famed social figures, such as scholars, press editors, publishers, political representatives, diplomats, military officials, corporatists, members of the clergy, scientists, attorneys, judges, writers, and bankers, among others. At the time, the group expressed its concern that despite NATO's success in reducing the "danger of direct military attack in Europe", the "enemies of freedom" could divert their efforts and be supported by isolationist countries. There was the perception of an increasing "peril from disunity" (NATO, 1954). The final combined American-Canadian draft of the Declaration thus accounted for the belief that an "effectively integrated Atlantic Community" would be the best means to "meet the challenges of the times" and prevent their concept of civilisation from perishing, as defence needs now went beyond military requirements to include "political, economic and cultural aspects" of the lives of people (NATO, 1954: annex A). This perception is then reiterated with the words of NATO SG, to whom the Alliance was "the most challenging and constructive experiment in international relations ever attempted" (ibid.). Here, closer integration was clearly associated to a step forward in the civilising process. Without such step, there was the fear that the existing concept of civilisation could actually perish. Put in other terms, without deeper integration, or greater interdependence between NATO members, their civilisation could be at stake. Moreover, the self-representation of the Organisation as the most revolutionary and constructive *experiment* ever attempted in international relations was highly progressive. It implied that NATO had a very firm purpose of *transforming* the international system. In this sense, the 1954 Declaration of Atlantic Unity was not only a call for identity statement, as it was also a declaration of intentions regarding the execution of a precise vision of the world, in which Western lives were merging on the economic, political and cultural levels.

In 1956, non-military cooperation became indeed an explicit concern to NATO, when a Committee was put in charge of formally reporting on the subject. The text of the report communicated a general concern on

the Alliance's objectives and timely adaptation to contemporary reality. Indeed, the Report referred that, back in 1949, there was a "realisation—conscious or instinctive—that in a shrinking nuclear world" union among Atlantic and Western Europeans was necessary for other purposes that defence alone, namely progress and generalised cooperation (NATO, 1956: par. 12). The report interestingly stressed as well that this approximation resulted from a "feeling among the government and peoples concerned that this close unity was both natural and desirable" (ibid.). This position revealed that the Alliance had not only been born out of the need to defend Atlantic nations from a common danger, but also that progress, cooperation, and unity had been parallel requirements arising from "conscious or *instinctive*" realisations. The reference to "conscious or instinctive" visions at the origin of NATO, as well as the *naturalness* or *desirability* of a closer unity also gave a metaphysical sense to NATO's very existence. The sense of uncertainty regarding the consciousness, or instinctiveness, underlying the feeling of association is clearly used to elevate the transcendent bond unifying Western identities through space and time. In other words, NATO was said to result from both an immediate physical necessity, and an unconscious sense that uniting was the natural thing to do. However, only seven years later, other questions would "take on a new urgency", namely the need to ascertain whether NATO's needs and objectives had changed, whether its actions were adequate to the "altered circumstances of 1956", and most fundamentally whether "a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?" (NATO, 1956: par. 22). By questioning the pertinence of the Alliance in the absence of fear, the Report clearly implied that NATO had been born out of the fear of a common threat, and that such fear was not so evident in 1956.

Against the background of the obsolescence of fear, the Report nonetheless revealed "[t]he second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an **Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence**" (NATO, 1956: par. 28; emphasis added). Hence, in the presence of altered conjunctural circumstances, a longer-term vision of the Alliance was soundly claimed for "good and constructive purposes", sustained by "**deeper and more permanent factors** that the divisions and dangers of the last ten years" in what was a "**historical, rather than a contemporary, development**" (NATO, 1956: par. 35; emphasis added). These terms of the 1956 Report on non-military cooperation within NATO clearly state how the Alliance early manifested the

ambition to last, even after the original fear that seemed to have dictated its birth attenuated. They also convey a strong ontological sense of community, sustained by deeper and more permanent bonds than the contemporary *raison d'être* of the Alliance. Although expressions such as NATO's "deeper roots" and "real purpose" appear quite enigmatic, the reference to the ideas of instinct and naturalness still open the possibility for conceiving metaphysical and unconscious dimensions of civilisation. In fact, those expressions rather refer to the importance of the historical evolution and on-going development of the organisation, than to more episodic and contemporary changes. They reveal an awareness of time and future, and also suggest the presence of long duration structures remaining in the unconscious. Clearly, civilisations are "continuities", in the sense they depict a heritage from the past, whilst coexisting with short-term patterns (Braudel, 1989: 42). In the end, a civilisation is more than a given economy, or a precise society; it is rather a long-term achievement, i.e., what a group of men manages to preserve and transmit throughout generations, persisting across time (Braudel, 1989: 49). Without referring systematically to "civilisation" *per se*, NATO still expressed a vision of continuity, in which the essential values it sought to defend and secure actually seemed to transcend political models, or geopolitical divisions of the world. In this sense, NATO revealed a vision of Western civilisation as an open process.

In 1962, though, the Atlantic Convention renewed the initiative of 1954 to issue a second Declaration of Atlantic Unity. As for the first one, the urge in 1962 was essentially to extend the Atlantic Community to the political, military, economic, moral and cultural fields, and thereby "guarantee the security against the Communist menace" (The Atlantic Convention, 1962). The measures recommended among other things to "[d]efine the principles on which our common civilization is based"; establish an Atlantic High Court of Justice; agree on a NATO policy with respect to nuclear weapons; increase the volume and value of exports and promote special tariff concessions; make of the trade partnership between the USA and the EEC the basis of an Atlantic Economic Community, "open to other nations of the free world"; and to reconstruct the Acropolis as a symbol of the Atlantic culture. Beyond those tangible objectives, the Declaration also made reference to historical representations of what the *heritage of Western civilisation* was, situating its origins in the "[e]arly achievements of the Near East, the classical beauty of Greece, the juridical sagacity of Rome, the spiritual power of our religious traditions and the humanism of the Renaissance" (The Atlantic Convention, 1962).

Theses classical features, similar in tone to those of Caeiro da Matta in 1949, project the affirmation of an Atlantic identity that is the heir of a millenary "magnificent civilisation" and that has the power of morality and culture on its side to develop "the peoples participating in it" (ibid.). Yet, this position needs to be framed within the wider context of a Western crisis of identity during the 1960s.

After the gradual recovery initiated in the 1950s, the 1960s were a period of fragility for the West, during which radical movements arose to condemn centrist liberalism for its immoral, cynical and exploitative Establishment (Gress, 1998). Against the background of the Cold War, a trend of pessimism regarding the West was manifest. In James Burnham's *The Suicide of the West: an essay on the meaning and destiny of Liberalism* (1964), for example, the argument was that the West could not overcome the Soviet Union because it was too fragmented, too decadent, too soft, and not determined to assume a long-term struggle against a hostile enemy. According to Burnham, the reason for this weakness was liberalism itself, which had no answer to those who did not believe in its narrative of progress and common purposes. Thirty years after the interwar disillusionment with Liberalism we approached in Chap. 2 regarding the evolution of IR, it seems ideology remains the root for the self-destruction of the West. To historian William McNeill, in *The Rise of the West: a History of the Human Community* (1963), cultural change was understood as a never-ending process of interaction between societies, each equipped with its own package of skills, interests, and material conditions. This ideological context shows that issues of collective identity were still present at the time. Hence, the affirmation and re-affirmation of an Atlantic unity and identity, which was often put in historical and mythologising terms, as exposed above. Furthermore, those ideological conditions also reinforce the idea that the Cold War critically stood as a matter of geo-ideological struggle. The essential novelty of that "cold" struggle lied in the methods used by both the parties involved, namely diplomatic confrontation, ideological struggle, political, military and economic competition (Roberts, 2005: 54). Were not these methods the mark of a now more *civilised* struggle, in which aggressiveness and direct confrontation were managed and self-contained (hence its "coldness")?

In all, a sense of identity and purpose were pressing issues right from the initial decades of NATO's life. In a way that was aware of time and future, NATO associated a historical Atlantic identity with long-lasting purposes expanding out of military functions of defence. Elites asked

NATO for a deeper concept of integration, which was idealised as a total one. Politics, culture and economy thus formed a material and ideological whole that ultimately represented the advancing steps of the civilising process. However, NATO's official responses to such demands were not very emphatic. In 1967, the Harmel Report by the Atlantic Council was supposed to elaborate on the tasks NATO would face in the future in order to strengthen its capacity for sustaining a durable peace. The Report nebulously concluded that "[t]he Alliance is a **dynamic and vigorous organisation** which is **constantly adapting itself to changing conditions**" (NATO, 1967: par. 3; emphasis added). So, similarly to the openness of the civilising process, NATO managed to maintain its scope for action open and quite vague. And despite the seemingly unconscious dimension of its conduct of affairs, it appears that NATO always had the rather conscious sense of questioning its pertinence along the way in order to remain flexible and adaptable to external developments. Although NATO's organisational and identity crisis have been profusely analysed in reference to the post-Cold War period, questions of survival, pertinence, and projection into the long-term future were an important part of NATO's path early in the Alliance's life.

6.3 The 1970s–1980s: "The Pace of Change Is Accelerating"

After an initial stage, during which NATO attempted to stabilise its organisational identity and normalise its core values, the 1970s and 1980s were equally important to the Alliance's evolution. Throughout that period, many social movements, economic crises, ideological questioning, technological innovation, and political revolutions marked the international conjuncture. Based on that temporal stage, this section analyses how the concept of civilisation and the treatment of time evolved in NATO's discourses. As it has been seen so far, the representation of time in NATO's discourses contributed to give the Alliance a sense of civilisational purpose. But did the perception, representation, or beliefs in Western civilisation somehow alter? Or did they remain fundamentally the same? It will be seen that the two final decades of the Cold War were lived as times of imminent revolution, and introduced new "vocabularies" (Skinner, 1999: 63) in NATO's discourses about conjunctural change and norms.[1] Yet, change *per se* was dealt as it had been before. NATO's discourses on the state of

the Alliance during the 1970s and 1980s focused significantly on reaffirming its identity and usefulness; on referring to the glory of past deeds and achievements; on attempting to stabilise Soviet behaviour through the imperativeness to abide by international standards of behaviour. However, in the late 1980s, a gradual shift is observed at the level of the referent of object of security, namely towards the security of individuals.

In the 1970s, centrist liberalism suffered a second wave of attack especially directed at the liberal West, in association with economic crisis. According to the radicals, reason was not being used correctly by Western liberalism (Gress, 1998). The effects of such criticism could be seen in the increasing disillusionment with the superpowers (O'Hagan, 2002: 112), and also in the rejection of dominant models through civil rights activism, ecological struggles, and movements of resistance to "pure war" and to the invention of "crazier sorts of weapons, like the neutron bomb, and 'Doomsday machines'" (Armitage & Virilio, 1999: 37). Above all, this rejection was mostly related to Western capitalism. As it was becoming obvious that growth was not operative, and that the development of the Third World could not follow the prescribed stages of liberal progress, modernisation theory was increasingly challenged by alternative thinking such as Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system theory and "dependency theories", interested in studying relationships between developed capitalist states and underdeveloped countries (Harvey, 2001: 6, 73; Kramer, 2009: 67; Wallerstein, 1974; Zarakol, 2011: 92).

On the occasion of yet another Declaration on Atlantic Relations, approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19 June 1974, and signed by Heads of NATO Governments in Brussels on 26 June 1974, the members of the Alliance declared that the 1949 Treaty had been confirming their "common destiny", because their security had been maintained and their values preserved, which was the heritage of their civilisation, and ultimately enabled "Western Europe to rebuild from its ruins" (NATO, 1974: par. 1). This first paragraph of the Declaration resonates like an ancient chorus of the Alliance. What was first enounced as the "common heritage" of the members in the formative Charter of 1949 was now being established as a "common destiny" past twenty-five years of existence. "Destiny" remits to a certain degree of determinism as to how time develops and how history may be conceived and experienced. How could a "common destiny" be objectively validated? And, more importantly, what does that common destiny consist of? More than with the awareness of present and future, this form of assertiveness establishes a loose connection

between past and future, without focusing on the present once more. This is a rhetorical representation of time and its meanings. Besides, it naturalises the sense that time would evolve favourably for NATO members in order for them to fulfil their common destiny, regardless of what that destiny might be. Furthermore, the Declaration makes a positive balance of the state of security for the Allies, which most critically allows them to "preserve the values which are the heritage of their civilisation" (ibid.). The text does not need to specify what those values are, because perceptions on NATO were assumed naturally. The world now knew, or could imagine, that they would be related to NATO's formulation of Atlantic unity, Atlantic identity, Atlantic adaptation to changing times, i.e., *Atlantic overall openness* (see Sect. 6.2 on the 1950s and 1960s).

Finally, by referring to the WWII "ruin" of Western Europe, this Declaration of 1974 resorts to "memorialization", a traditional aspect of historical narratives reinforcing power (Foucault, 2003: 67). In this case, the memory of Western European misery is recalled to reinforce the idea that it is now in much better shape, thanks to the existence of the Alliance. This move ultimately strengthens the projection of NATO's organisational power. The historical narrative is evident; the Declaration refers more often to "shared representations of history" (Liu & Hilton, 2005)—either of the past or the future—than to contemporary events or, simply, to the present. The narrative reproduces and perpetuates the knowledge of Western history. Further, the same Declaration states that "[t]he circumstances affecting their common defence have profoundly changed in the last ten years": not only has the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union reached a point of "near equilibrium", as "the nature of the danger to which they are exposed has changed" (NATO, 1974: par. 4). This reference to the US-Soviet Union relationship is all the more revolutionary as, to quote Hedley Bull, even at the most vigorous point of the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet Union were "[i]nclined to speak to each other as heretics and outcasts beyond the pale, rather than as member states of the same international society" (1995: 41). However, this newly found equilibrium is not seen with much confidence or enthusiasm, as "vulnerability to attack" is said to remain (NATO, 1974: par. 4), yet for different ever-changing reasons. Seemingly, there is not a single stable element in all this security equation: circumstances affecting defence had been changing for ten years; the USA-USSR relationship was *nearly* equilibrated; vulnerability remained; danger was changing too. In other terms, insecurity was as much of an open process, as was NATO's discourse about

itself. Drawing on both open insecurity and an open alliance, NATO could represent itself as being able to encompass any evolving circumstance in the future. In other terms, no situation could constitute an exception, or an unpredicted event; Atlantic relations were predisposed to adapt and respond to any circumstance.

In 1974, the Declaration integrates more items and expands NATO's list of functions to the field of development. After recalling the members' dedication to the principles of democracy, human rights, justice and social progress as "the fruits of their shared spiritual heritage", it recognises the Allied countries' "duty to help the developing countries", especially in Europe, so that "every country benefits from technical and economic progress in an open and equitable world system" (NATO, 1974: par. 12). Whereas, in 1949, NATO's guiding principles were "freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO, 1949)—they were now replaced with democracy, respect for human rights and social progress, in a change of formulation that actually does not correspond to any conceptual change. Some vocabulary differs, but it essentially expands the conceptions of 1949 to the contemporary lexicon of the 1970s, and goes further by essentially enumerating spiritual values that are inherent to Christianism. "Human rights, justice and social progress", the "intention to develop", and recognising the "duty to help the developing countries" were all part of the 1970s conjuncture and problems related to the social concerns and ideological rejections exposed above in the beginning of the section. Therefore, recalling on Skinner's (1999) accounts, the Declaration rather represents a *rhetorical* change, in that NATO suggested and morally justified to help the developing countries outside the North Atlantic area, using an expression that is central to Wallerstein (1974): "It is in the interest of all that every country benefits from technical and economic progress in an open and equitable **world system**" (NATO, 1974: par. 12; emphasis added). In response to the social and intellectual trends of the time, NATO did define an agenda employing different terms, but it is an agenda actually connected to an international liberal ideology of intervention.

At the same time, the initiative of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was launched in 1973 and concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 with the general objective of improving East-West relations. The high representatives of 35 countries joined the Conference,[2] "Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to

peace" (CSCE, 1975: 2). The Accords adopted a series of principles and policies in the fields of security, disarmament, economics, science, technology, environment, education and culture, among others. Despite the goodwill of the Accords, and the environment of general détente lived at the time, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact maintained ambivalent policies: "as they held talks with the other side on the question of arms control they were simultaneously bolstering their military capabilities" (Jackson, 2009: 58). But the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 backlashed the détente. Entailing her first use of military force since the end of WWII, this was interpreted as an imposition of "its will on a non-aligned country of the Third World" that jeopardised international peace and stability, in violation of the principles of the UN Charter (NATO, 1980: par. 3). Ultimately, "The people of Afghanistan must be free to shape their future without outside interference" (ibid.). One notable and quite innovative element here lies in the reference to the people of a non-aligned and out-of-area country, whose freedom and sovereignty appear as an obligation in the eyes of NATO Ministers. The imposition of force by the Soviet Union upon Afghanistan was not consensual among NATO members. While it was a source of renewed conflict with the Soviet Union for the US Carter administration, the Europeans "[v]iewed Brezhnev's act as a defense measure and not a direct threat to the status quo in Europe" (Jackson, 2009: 58).

Nevertheless, NATO's reference to the USSR during the 1980s was quite contrasting. On the one hand, the Soviet Union was said to require its associates "to act as a bloc, in order to preserve a rigid and imposed system", to threaten to use force beyond its frontiers, and to have spent many resources to a massive military build-up. This was deemed excessive by NATO members, in the light of the Soviet "projection of military power on a global scale" (NATO, 1982: par. 4). To NATO members, on the other hand, international stability and world peace required "greater restraint and responsibility" on the part of the Soviet Union. This requisition was an appeal to civilised behaviour. But apart from self-restraint, responsibility was now added as a feature of civilised behaviour. This is why NATO set forth a "Programme for Peace in Freedom", aiming at preventing war, safeguarding democracy, promoting sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states: "On that basis, we will persevere in efforts to establish, **whenever Soviet behaviour makes this possible**, a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue, negotiation and mutually advantageous cooperation" (NATO, 1982:

par. 5; emphasis added). This expression reminds of Western discourse on Soviet behaviour in the 1940s. Just as in the condescending tone used in British accounts of Soviet behaviour at the post-WWII conferences, Soviet behaviour was still not held as a stable, predictable, and trustful element. Finally, the Soviet Union was explicitly called upon to "[a]bide by internationally accepted standards of behaviour without which there can be no prospect for stable international relations" and to join NATO "in the search for constructive relations, arms reductions and world peace" (NATO, 1982: par. 8). This was a clear formulation of a standard of civilisation, set as a precondition for international peace and stability.

Against this background, NATO did not miss the opportunity to reaffirm its identity by redefining its past deeds and the scope of its action. In 1982, NATO members declared that, although they had preserved peace for a third of a century, they were prepared for an adjustment of aims and interests "at all times", in a "partnership of equals, none dominant and none dominated" (NATO, 1982: par. 3). This move also balanced the relations among the members within the Alliance. As to NATO's mandate, it was progressively broadened, so as "to contribute to peaceful progress worldwide", by removing "the causes of instability such as underdevelopment […]", namely hunger and poverty (NATO, 1982: par. 5.e.). In line with the phase of détente, NATO performed a language of appeasement, but it did not refrain from reasserting its original role as an organisation of defence in the international balance of power. Despite the statement that it did not "aspire to superiority", it still did not accept that others should be superior to them, requiring the Soviet Union for a relationship of mutual respect of their "legitimate security interests" (NATO, 1983).

Near the end of the decade, NATO acknowledged that it was "A time for reaffirmation" that required the members to come together and "re-emphasise" their unity, as the current state of East-West relations was being intensively reassessed (NATO, 1988: par. 1). Regardless of the critical changes ahead, was "reaffirmation" not what NATO had been doing for forty years? In 1989, NATO SG Manfred Wörner[3] summarized NATO's forty years of existence by referring that "The narrative is a continuing one and the pace of change is accelerating", anticipating a major change in international relations (NATO, 1989b: 181). The perception that time was accelerating revealed a pressure upon the Soviet Union from the international system, ever since Mikhail Gorbachev was brought to office in 1985. Gorbachev introduced dynamic and promising signs of overture in the Soviet government through his many reforms. His

measures were critical to the securing of the Soviet economy, the opening of Soviet society, as well as to an active engagement with the West sustained by a vision that a unified continent could be possible in the future (Jackson, 2009: 59). SG Wörner's words in 1989 thus resonated like a preparation for "the Alliance's longer term objectives" of replacing "confrontation with cooperation outside the Alliance", especially at such a critical moment when it had the opportunity to set "a blueprint for shaping the future and a dynamic joint agenda for its progressive implementation" (NATO, 1989b: 181). Furthermore, the way NATO managed to take advantage of this favourable evolution needs to be highlighted as well. Indeed, the Alliance chose to emphasise in that moment its "patience and creativity in negotiations" as a critical factor allowing to set the "basic blueprints for East-West progress", led by stability, asymmetrical reductions, and transparency, among other things, in a singular "Western-inspired" initiative (NATO, 1989a: par. 11). The self-image of the Alliance's contribution to the encouraging state of affairs at the time is notoriously positive. Its role is perceived as fundamental in drawing up the "basic blueprints for East-West progress", which is revealing of NATO viewing itself as a model of behaviour for improving the world, and of efficacy in bringing military concepts into reality. The projection of such an identity is obviously favoured by the internal developments of the Soviet Union, but in the end the overall progress is said to be "Western-inspired".

Finally, on the eve of the Cold War's finale, Manfred Wörner appraised the state of the Alliance, by relativizing its past achievements, emphasising instead the on-going pace of change: an Alliance that is "on the move", constantly adapting to evolving challenges, and that remains open to longer term processes of change (NATO, 1989b: xii). He also referred to the need of a strong defence and the support of public opinion in order to manage "change with stability". But Wörner's ultimate recommendation on that occasion preconized that "As long as the NATO member states continue to build a stability and security whose benefits are enjoyed far beyond their boundaries, the future will belong to the Western democracies" (ibid.). To that end, other fields are progressively included in NATO's scope of action, such as the use of outer space, or the multilateral tariff negotiations (NATO, 1989b: 69). Overall, the last NATO SG of the Cold War revealed a strong belief in the future development of the international conjuncture, which is said to "[b]elong to the Western democracies".

The objective of focusing on NATO's evolution between the 1950s and the 1980s was to enhance how the civilisational referent of security

had evolved in the first decades of the Alliance's life. The fundamentals established by its 1949 Charter were principles deeply entrenched in historical time and in the consciousness of the members, as they were said to constitute the normative *acquis* of the North Atlantic civilisation—democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Drawing on these principles, the Treaty of Washington was also explicit in formulating a precise identity for a civilised geographical area. In other words, not only did NATO emerge as the connection between the past and the future of the North Atlantic, as it also ascribed a civilised identity to a specific physical space—that which is composed of the member nations. The surging of such an alliance recalled the world that the civilised habitus of the West was being revived, well defined and reorganised through the creation of an international institution aiming at defending it.

In a first phase, the 1950s and 1960s were a period of consolidation for NATO's identity. The appeals coming from external actors in the Declarations of Atlantic Unity of 1954 and 1962 demonstrated the extent to which the North Atlantic elite was demanding deeper integration within the Alliance, namely through the integration of other sectors than common defence. By the end of the 1960s, non-military cooperation was effectively put in practice. This search for reinforced interdependence manifested the fear that disunity could jeopardise the Alliance's purpose, and ultimately Western power. In other words, the civilised habitus was at stake, and this first phase essentially showed that the civilisational referent of security was being sorted out, reaffirmed and stabilised.

After that, the 1970s and 1980s composed a more stable period in the Alliance's overall discourse, whose action focused on equilibrating the relationship with the Soviet Union, mostly through increased control and reduction of nuclear armament. However, ideological challenges and conjunctural change were *à l'ordre du jour*. While the West was under strong criticism, NATO managed the numerous fronts of that change by insisting on the preservation of its core values, and by reaffirming its identity and usefulness by referring to past deeds and glory. Still, NATO also adapted to the politicisation of issues such as poverty and underdevelopment, and showed its intent of expanding its competences to those areas of action. The norms popularised during this period suggested that the international standard of civilisation assumed different shapes, depending on the different moral, political and economic requisites of the time. As the West was undergoing a phase of strong criticism, the discursive use of "civilisation" might have lost its relevance and utility. However, while East-West relations

were being tentatively improved by the Helsinki Accords of 1975, NATO did not miss the opportunity to highlight the issue of Soviet behaviour and to appeal to "internationally accepted standards of behaviour". This is to say that, without explicitly mentioning the need to safeguard the civilised habitus, NATO transposed that requirement to standards of behaviour already normalised on the international scene.

Notes

1. Skinner highlights not only how our "inherited normative vocabularies" can shape our moral and social world, as how we are capable of changing our world when we change "the ways in which these vocabularies are applied" (1999: 63).
2. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.
3. Secretary General of NATO from 1988 to 1994.

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CHAPTER 7

Post-Cold War NATO: New Ways and Reasons for Coexistence

The bipolar division of the world ended when the Berlin Wall fell, on 9 November 1989. Eastern Communism and Western Liberalism had competed for several decades after WWII, and the Wall had prolonged the general state of closure among European societies since 1961, both materially and symbolically. Now the most important enemy of the West had ceased to exist, the new political stance of Gorbachev altered the perceptions of Russia as an earlier barbarian Other (Lebow & Stein, 1994: 370–375). Within NATO, this turning point was expressed by the 1990 London Declaration, foretelling "a new, promising era", in which Central and Eastern Europe was liberating itself from the "walls that once confined people and ideas", to finally chose their own destiny, freedom, economic liberty and peace (NATO, 1990: par. 1). The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were no longer considered adversaries, and their representatives invited to establish regular diplomatic contact (NATO, 1990: par. 6–7).

In this sense, the end of the Cold War also represents a break from a certain temporality; a break from a different world that was to be maintained in the past, and from which Europe was liberating itself towards its new future and destiny. What remained in the past of the bipolar period had a strong role in the formation of memories and in the reinforcement of symbolic power. An important structural change was triggered, which opened the door for a "new ontology of world order" (Cox, 2002: 77). This event inspired the world with the idea that different systems of thinking and living could coexist pacifically from then on.

S. da Mota, *NATO, Civilisation and Individuals*, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74409-4_7

The implications of the end of the Cold War for NATO are evident. The Alliance had arisen to defend the North-Atlantic area from the ideological threat of the Soviet Union, and to deter any potential rival from using nuclear force against the Allies. Once that threat was no longer significant, NATO could have ceased to exist. But it did not. It continued, transformed, and even developed and grew exponentially in material and symbolic importance. To quote Geir Lundestad, NATO's success is rather remarkable when compared to other alliances in other regions of the world; its treaty has now lasted more than half a century, its membership is broader, popular support has been strong in almost all the membership countries over its entire period of existence (2003: 7). Faced with the evidence of NATO's continual existence after more than two decades, debating whether it should exist, and for what reasons, is not the purpose of this chapter. As it was seen in the last Sect. 6.3 NATO's self-reflexive discourse of the late 1980s already suggested a plurality of functions and tasks for the future. NATO had remained open to change, it had evoked the upcoming possibilities of structural revolution and did not show intent of self-dissolution, should that fundamental change occur. In 1990, the Alliance now intended to "be even more an agent of change" (NATO, 1990: par. 2). Definitely, the more traditional and Realist conception of an alliance could not be applied to NATO; and to understand its persistence, one has to accept that alliances may exist as security institutions that can develop many other purposes (Wallander, 2000: 705). Closure gave way to openness, both spatially and ideologically.

To Michael C. Williams and Iver Neumann (2007), NATO's persistence and power in the post-Cold War period derived from a cultural strategy sustained by a powerful political and cultural narrative that was able to overcome the limitations of a purely military representation of the Alliance. Through this cultural strategy, symbolic capital and power were exercised upon the East and, consequently, issues like the union of the West and the security of Europe could be addressed. This ultimately provided the Alliance with a logic of continuity (Williams & Neumann, 2007: 89, 91). Alexandra Gheciu (2005, 2008) has extensively worked on NATO's post-Cold War transformation, and highlighted the Kantian influence on the ideas and discourses dominating international security in that period. To Gheciu, Kantian premises reflect a general understanding of human nature that relies upon liberal actors committed to "discipline the irrational, violent side of themselves" (2005: 61). In this sense,

self-discipline lies at the centre of identity (re-)formation after the Cold War, and is therefore present in liberal democratic norms and institutions, morality, and overall peaceful coexistence (ibid.). In this context, all former enemy polities were deemed to possess "[t]he potential to learn liberal-democratic norms, and thus evolve into the kind of societies worthy of the full respect of/integration into the Western security community" (Gheciu, 2008: 82). Also, authors like Sonia Lucarelli (2005: 91–92) and Yannis Stivachtis (2010: 18) have already suggested that NATO's identity after the Cold War was reconstructed by essentially redefining what could be considered as appropriate and acceptable behaviour of outer participants. This was achieved by a whole narrative revolving around NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted in 1991, and the new mechanisms for cooperation and dialogue it implemented—such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

From the perspective of temporality and its symbols, NATO's persistence and continuity after the Cold War may be also seen as an institution that acts like a structure "through which to facilitate the sharing of images of immortalizing connectedness" (Lifton & Olson, 2004: 38–39). NATO had experienced two life-defining moment as an organisation; after WWII, it was born; after the Cold War, it revived. The end of an *era* in NATO's history did not represent the end of its *time*, as that era could be replaced with different "shared images of continuity beyond the life of each single person" (Lifton & Olson, 2004: 39). In this sense, one may envision NATO's continuity after the Cold War as a symbol of Western civilisation's own immortality.

As a consequence, reflecting on NATO as a security institution performing symbolic power, reinventing the boundaries of identity and behaviour, and looking into its many other purposes in face of a fundamentally new structural time appears to be much more constructive. This chapter takes on this historic change to analyse the deepest implications of this new era for NATO's civilisational referent. First, Sect. 7.1 approaches the conceptual dimension of NATO's immediate reinvention by analysing the New Strategic Concept adopted in 1991. This will allow outlining the main premises composing NATO's representation of a new security environment. Then, Sect. 7.2 will turn to the practical dimension of NATO's post-Cold War reinvention and highlight the importance of institutional practices to the continuation of the civilised habitus of the West. Here, Emanuel Adler's (2008) conceptualisation of "communities

of practice" and in particular of NATO as a "security community" constitutes an elemental premise to better understand the influence of practices upon standards of civilisation. This will ultimately allow conceiving, it is claimed, the practical development of NATO as a "civilising security community".

This chapter shows that, within its post-Cold War reinvention, NATO's identity has remained essentially the same regarding its representations of time. Besides, the Alliance's constant will to adapt to, and awareness of, change, shapes expectations and dispositions (habiti) about what NATO is willing to do to protect North-Atlantic communities from whatever unknown threats. The significance of NATO's core values has remained the same as well, but democracy has been reinforced through diverse practices of socialisation that act at the level of cognition and behaviour. Those new forms of socialisation consist of new ways of behaving for partners and candidates to membership, as they also entail new interdependent relationships. Moreover, the willingness to belong to NATO as a security community draws on the symbolic power of past memories and the fear of the loss of love as an ontological need for security. As a consequence, post-Cold War NATO set new rules of civilised behaviour, so that civilised identities could be attuned.

7.1 The New Strategic Concept (1991): Continuity Amidst the New (In)Security Environment

NATO's adoption of the new Strategic Concept in 1991 had a similar importance to that of its original Charter, because a new structural era opened, which required the Alliance to reinvent the organisation. NATO's clock had been reset to zero, and formulating a new Strategic Concept was as much a statement of intent and the display of a vision for the new era, as it launched the conceptual grounds and narrative support for that organisational renewal. The new Strategic Concept not only identified NATO's tasks, purposes and objectives, as it also portrayed the general conjuncture of the post-Cold War environment. It was obviously not a prescriptive move, but it certainly enacted and performed a representation of the world that would be influential for post-Cold War international security. Besides, this new Strategic Concept reflects the rupture with the Cold War's "interpretive disposition" that mapped responsibility for "evil"

in the Other, and responsibility for combating evil as a "burden of the self" (Campbell, 1996: 163). In this sense, the new conceptualisation of NATO's strategy reveals a redefinition of responsibility that is less of a burden, and rather more proactive and self-centred, while responsibility for evil has much more diffuse origins.

The most immediate and material effects of the new Strategic Concept regard the revision of the military strategy, which resulted in a substantial reduction of conventional and nuclear forces. This was felt especially in Europe, as the presence of US troops on European soil was drastically reduced, and European allies cut their own forces (Wallander, 2000: 718). NATO's reinvention has an evident European focus. Thus, the new Strategic Concept was deemed to arise from the "need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe" (NATO, 1991). The cause was that "developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in the future"; therefore, a "fundamental strategic review" was necessary (ibid.). As it was seen in the previous chapters, the representation of time has continuously played a central role in NATO's discourse. In this sense, it is interesting to note that NATO positioned its transformation in a parallel course to that of Europe's future. Future NATO would reflect future Europe, and vice-versa.

The new Strategic Concept contains four parts: the strategic context; objectives and security functions; a broad approach to security; and guidelines for defence. The first part on the strategic context is a display of general duality that is consistent with how NATO represents time since the beginning. While the end of the Cold War is positively connoted, this is simultaneously overshadowed by the uncertainty of the future. USSR's former satellites had recovered full sovereignty, the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, and former adversaries rejected the "ideological hostility to the West" (NATO, 1991: par. 1). The situation is best summarised by both the significant improvement of the "overall security of the Allies" with the disappearance of the "monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat" posed by the Soviet Union, and at the same time "a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance" (NATO, 1991: par. 5). The end of the USSR and its consequences were historic indeed; they had been expected and ambitioned since the late 1960s by the goals set out in the Harmel Report of 1967 (see Sect. 6.2), and they now made the Allies more secure.

However, although the disappearance of the USSR as the primary original threat is held as a favourable factor to the security of the Allies, it still opened a space of insecurity related to the uncertainty, to the vacuums of power that could have been left behind in the former Soviet states. And as the document proceeds with the definition of the "security challenges and risks" ahead, a clear rupture is made in terms of temporality, as they are said to be "different in nature from what they were in the past" (NATO, 1991: par. 7). Now, those risks were "multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional", making them "hard to predict and assess" (NATO, 1991: par. 8). As for what could possibly cause those risks, the document identifies the "instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes" (NATO, 1991: par. 9). But those tensions should not threaten the security and territory of members, provided they remain "limited". Yet, they could still "[l]ead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance" (ibid.). Regarding the nature of what could trigger NATO's military action, the document stated that "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context" (NATO, 1991: par. 12). Risks of a wider nature are identified as well, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, sabotage, and the "disruption of the flow of vital resources" (ibid.). To David Campbell (1996: 167), this process of threat diffusion can also be seen as *necessary*; the absence of a main antagonist upon which to formulate a foreign policy not only gave place to new dangers, as it also raised the need for new categories of meaning, new basis for knowledge and a new temporality.

The historic change and incoming uncertainties inherent to the end of the Cold War did not alter the fundamental purpose of the Alliance as originally set in the Washington Treaty. On the one hand, "the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity" (NATO, 1991: par. 14). These functions are to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, and based on the common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (NATO, 1991: par. 15). As for the fundamental security tasks, these are: to provide the "foundations for stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions"; to serve as forum for

transatlantic consultations; to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against NATO territory; and to preserve strategic balance within Europe (NATO, 1991: par. 20). On the other hand, the new environment "offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security" (NATO, 1991: par. 14). The novelty here lies in the *opportunities* offered to the Alliance to *frame a strategy*: "[t]he radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before", which requires a "broad approach to security" (NATO, 1991: par. 24).

After the Cold War, NATO's purpose was to remain essentially the same in an altered structural context. Even if the security tasks needed to be reasserted, they were still consistent with what NATO had been doing between 1949 and 1989. The validity of the Alliance's purpose and functions was said to endure, as if it was somehow indifferent to the new post-Cold War structural time. The very way of managing change is interesting. Although security changes were designated as *radical*, NATO remained the same, independently of time and structural changes; new times were rather seen as a new opportunity to set the dominant rules, and the Alliance's general posture was one of openness, multi-tasking, and preparedness. In this sense, the centrality of risk is also clear. The new Strategic Concept document contains fifty-nine paragraphs, and the noun "risk(s)" appears twenty-eight times. Far from initiating a new methodological approach at this stage of the book, that number fairly suggests there was a strong intent behind the use of "risk" to express the idea that uncalculated dangers were a significant plausibility in the new security environment.[1] The multiple references to risk in the new Strategic Concept thereby consecrate uncertainty. Actually, change and uncertainty both constitute a driving force for NATO, in that they define the need for its very existence. Here, the expression of "agent of change" is meaningful. It appears as a new *leitmotiv* in post-Cold War discourses and texts, and suggests NATO not only responds and endures change, as it also performs it by undertaking leading initiatives of security. NATO ends up defining what the post-Cold War security environment *is* or *can be*, by highlighting the many possibilities for insecurity. The next section on the institutional evolution of NATO after the Cold War will show how the Alliance has in fact managed change and uncertainty in order to maintain order and the status quo of the West, and thereby expand the area for potentially new civilised subjects of security.

7.2 "The Promise of Democracy Is for the Civilised Only": Setting the Standards for Partners and New Members

Past the conceptual dimension of NATO's post-Cold War reinvention, this section focuses on the practical innovation of the Organisation. This approach takes the PfP of 1994, and the Enlargement Process opened in 1995 as the two chief references of this practical transformation, for they constitute the most important vectors of social, normative and cognitive change within NATO after the Cold War. These two institutional developments contain indeed a critical dimension of symbolic power (Williams, 2007), as interactions between NATO and non-NATO countries were built upon relational dynamics affecting identities, habiti, representations and memories. Ultimately, those interactions can be seen as a newly updated standard of civilisation. As Williams and Neumann suggest, the according narrative emerging is one where there is no difference between members and non-members, for "[n]o adversaries are necessary, all states are potential members, and no states are necessarily adversaries" (2007: 76). Surely, this challenges the notion of what is "common" when applied to NATO as a security community; commonality in these cases is not linear, not natural, but rather conditional and accommodated. Although the overall benefits of the newly constructed relationship are mutual, the behavioral adaptation still reveals to be unilateral.

Emanuel Adler's (2008) work on "communities of practice" conceives NATO as a "security-community", and helps understanding the Alliance's evolution after the Cold War within a social constructivist logic that surpasses the monolithic debates on why a defensive alliance should persist after its seminal threat has disappeared. The main features of a community of practice such as NATO are that it structures consciousness and intention; it constitutes agency; it encourages the evolution or spread of social structures, namely by the acquisition of new material and organisational capabilities (Adler, 2008: 196). Therefore, adopting and sharing a new practice implied in processes such as new partnerships or memberships has transformative effects for the social structure. Furthermore, for a practice to be diffused, two things are essential: first, there has to be a numerical or geographical enlargement of the group of agents engaged in it; second, the agent adopting the new practice of a given community is the object of a learning process, in which meanings and identities are negotiated and

transformed (Adler, 2008: 196). And for a security community to expand, it has to transform non-members' identities (Adler, 2008: 205).

In a security community such as NATO, members share rational and moral expectations and dispositions of self-restraint, in particular the abstention from the use of force. "Self-restraint makes violence unnecessary, because within security communities people deal with conflict through compromise and through legal and diplomatic means" (Adler, 2008: 204). Adler owes part of his thesis on self-restraint to Norbert Elias, who referred to self-restraint as the key factor of civilising processes. From an analytical perspective, shared norms and values are indispensable for creating and maintaining a collective identity, but practices are indispensable for reproducing these values. From a normative perspective, both liberal democracy and self-restraint norms and practice enable the existence and expansion of security communities (Adler, 2008: 220). Therefore, conceiving a security community as a "community of practice" allows covering the role of collective meanings that are established in individuals' expectations and dispositions, as well as the importance of sharing rational and moral expectations and dispositions of self-restraint, which is consistent with the general civilisational approach of this work. Hence, each of these two institutional processes—PfP and enlargement—allows conceiving the impact of norms transfer, socialisation and learning process upon the civilised subjects of security.

Great emphasis has been put upon the reinforcement of the democratic conditionality throughout these institutional phases and documents (Gheciu, 2005; Lucarelli, 2005; Stivachtis, 2010). Although democracy obviously constitutes the ideological covenant of NATO's continual reinvention, the socialisation process and the interactions at play between the Alliance and both Partners and aspirants to membership are much more revealing of the broader move underlying the social dynamics of enlargement. The different institutional stages of the 1990s are a performance of power and knowledge in the civilising process of out-of-area countries.

7.2.1 The Partnership for Peace (1994)

The PfP is an initiative launched by NATO in 1994 aiming at promoting military cooperation between NATO members and non-members—these are, in other words, "countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all" (NATO, 1995a: par. 4).

The 1994 document establishing the PfP is the "expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved through cooperation and common action" (NATO, 1994: par. 2). In joining the PfP, NATO member states and others subscribing to it commit "to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law" (ibid.). The other states joining and subscribing cooperate with NATO in pursuing the following goals: transparency of national defence planning and budgeting; ensuring democratic control of defence forces; maintain capability and readiness to contribute to operations under UN and/or CSCE authority; develop cooperative military relations with NATO for joint planning, exercises, training in order to be able to undertake missions of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; generally harmonize and develop forces able to operate with those of NATO members (NATO, 1994: par. 3).

Through these objectives and activities, partner states develop a web of military and normative interdependence with NATO members. Not only do partners standardise their domestic policies in light of those of the NATO area, as they also commit to the same democratic guidelines. Consequently, a tradition of cooperation and joint work is built among members and non-members, which enables operational readiness in case of need (Wallander, 2000: 721).

The PfP was successful and became very popular. On the one hand, NATO's approach to partners is very practical and operational. For example, after an initial invitation to observe exercises, and once the military contacts prove fruitful, partner countries can request to participate and eventually assist in planning the exercises (Wallander, 2000: 721). On the other hand, NATO's way of communicating with the partners is directed towards individuals from political and administrative apparatuses of a partner country who share the same professional field—often the military—which facilitates the intensity and frequency of the contacts, and hence the socialisation and the transfer of norms (Lucarelli, 2005: 97). Moreover, although explicit teaching such as courses and seminars also occur, the area of technical advice is apparently a neutral way to reinforce NATO's position in bilateral relations. It does not take form of a teaching activity and is usually welcome as a state-to-state military cooperation (Lucarelli, 2005: 98).

However cooperative this institutional development may be, it still entails important features of the civilising process at the level of identity,

interdependence, symbolic power and the ontological need for security. Sonia Lucarelli (2005), for instance, explains that the PfP launched a "categorisation process", in which partner countries had to differentiate themselves from different out-groups through practices promoted by NATO itself. Within the Individual Partnership Programme, each partner country thus presents "its perception of its distance from the in-group" (Lucarelli, 2005: 92). This practice was strengthened, as the PfP was gradually ascribed a central role in enlargement, which NATO designates as the "self-differentiation process", to actually refer to the level of initiative and commitment put by the partner into the standardisation effort. The self-differentiation process may prepare possible new members, or facilitate transition to membership, but it does not guarantee membership (NATO, 1995a: par. 38). As all partners are expected to "decide themselves which opportunities to pursue and how intensively to work with the Alliance through the Partnership" (ibid.), it means each partner determines the level of commitment it dedicates to the Partnership; it works as a channel for self-demonstration. Active participation in the Partnership grants the establishment of "patterns of political and military cooperation", and enables partners to "become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance", through joint exercises, seminars, workshops, and day-to-day representation in Brussels and Mons (ibid.).

Within this process of socialisation, Partners are expected to "familiarise" with structures and procedures, deepen the understanding of obligations and rights implied by membership, develop democratic accountability and practices, demonstrate their commitment to "internationally-accepted norms of behaviour" (NATO, 1995a: par. 39). Commitment, the "partner's own efforts", meeting the "minimum standards", reinforcement and deepening of their Individual Partnership Programme, "distinguish themselves by demonstrating their capabilities" are elements "key to self-differentiation" (NATO, 1995a: par. 40, 41). This whole linguistic choice strongly suggests the inculcation of a learning process that is sustained by individual efforts at self-restraining, rationality, and self-improvement. It is really about civilising the Self in light of NATO's terms, code of conduct, rules, and standards.

NATO's "self-differentiation process" also contains symbolic elements of expiation, suggesting that the applicant partner has to demonstrate its capacity to self-reflexivity by identifying the fundamental differences that distance him from the North-Atlantic identity. It is implied that the partner country undergoes a process of acknowledging its difference as an

Other, categorising himself as a partner of limited commonality with NATO, at least originally. Although the PfP provides an arena for communication, and works on a soft conditionality basis, it still revolves around the construction of a common interpretation of the same norm (Lucarelli, 2005: 98). In this context, self-restraint norms are the key factors of democracy, in that they enable the expansion of the security community when related to issues of peaceful change (Adler, 2008: 198). Under NATO's conditions and democratic standards, the relationship issued by the Partnership is rather seized by the partner state that has to submit to self-restraint, than accommodated or tolerated by NATO members. The PfP thereby constitutes a community that non-members can join to develop liberal practices and learn to acquire self-restraint, in which meanings and discourses are negotiated under power dynamics (Adler, 2008: 206, 215). In other terms, non-members learn how to exercise ideological practices that capacitate them as civilised subjects. The PfP thereby entails a cognitive and behavioural change.

7.2.2 The Enlargement Process

The enlargement of NATO after the Cold War needs to be framed within the environment of "psychological euphoria" in which "material power, historical developments, the evolution of institutions and practices, norms and epistemic understandings were positively aligned" (Adler, 2008: 219). That environment marked decisively the wider European integration process in the 1990-decade. EU's Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, and initiated the ensuing course of the EU's own enlargement. General *alignment* was certainly enabled by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and mostly by the ideological homogenisation inside the *Oikoumenê*. The smaller war-torn European countries were no longer encircled by two opposing super powers. This situation provided Europe with the material and ideological freedom to gather and reunite under one same habitat. To the US Clinton administration at the time, admitting new members was a means of enlarging the zone in which wars do not happen. Therefore, NATO's extension eastwards could prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracies against future threats and thus keep the peace (Moore, 2002: 7).

In accordance with NATO's historic path line and general institutional overture to change, one may observe enlargement did not surge as that a radical development, although it was obviously not a natural or spontaneous development either. Originally, Article 10 of the Treaty already foresaw

what NATO terms its "open door policy"; Allied states remained open to membership of other European countries, and new members had joined the Alliance episodically in the past.[2] After the Cold War, creating the PfP was an initial step towards the possibility of enlargement to former Soviet countries. The enlargement process began to be introduced discursively more intensively from the autumn of 1995 after NATO's intervention in BH, as "an historic obligation to stabilize the area to NATO's east" aiming at the double benefit of reducing future risks to the Alliance's security and broadening the burden-sharing, or in other words, as an "enlightened self-interest" (SG Willy Claes, cit. in NATO, 1995b).

This was accompanied, in September 1995, by the publication of NATO's "Study on Enlargement", which did not take the form of an objective study *per se*—at least not as a scholar might envision it—but rather as a statement of reassurance through policy guidelines that confirmed NATO's intent of enlargement. The Study conceives enlargement as a tool contributing to "enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area", among other things by supporting and promoting democratic reforms, and "Fostering in new members of the Alliance the **patterns and habits** of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies" (NATO, 1995a: par. 3; emphasis added). Stability and security are the transversal referents in the whole document; they justify that NATO enlargement should also "Complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to new democracies in the East" (NATO, 1995a: par. 4). The enlargement of NATO is clearly held as one part of a wider "evolutionary process" that will strengthen Europe's stability and security (NATO, 1995a: par. 11). Furthermore, the basic principles and values of the Washington Treaty are profusely enounced as playing a major role for possible new members, and the PfP as a pivotal preparatory platform for future aspirants to NATO membership—as exposed above.

Two years after the publication of that study, during the Madrid Summit of July 1997, NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks. Their accession was completed on 12 March 1999. In April 1999, at the Washington Summit, NATO launched its MAP together with its newly revised Strategic Concept (NATO, 1999b, 1999c). On the occasion, seven countries immediately were invited to join the MAP, but their accession talks would only start in November 2002, and definite

accession occur in March 2004.[3] The MAP actually institutionalises the 1995 Study on Enlargement, in an ultimate "practical manifestation of the Open Door" (NATO, 1999a: *Implementation*, par. 1). Participation in the MAP occurs on the basis of invitation by the Alliance, self-differentiation, and does not imply any timeframe. It cannot be considered as a "list of criteria" for membership (NATO, 1999a: par. 3), because it presupposes the "aspiring countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address" (NATO, 1999a: *Implementation*, par. 1). The learning process underlying the MAP is also evident, as the level of experience is expected to be acquired over time, without any deadline, and to be cumulated towards other procedures duly scheduled on a case-by-case basis (NATO, 1999a: *Implementation*, par. 5).

Among other things, "aspirants" must conform to the basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy and individual liberty, but also—and this fairly retells the classic standard of civilisation approached in Chap. 4—to settle their international disputes peacefully, to pursue good neighbourly relations, and to abide by the rule of law and human rights (NATO, 1999a: *Political and Economic Issues*, par. 1, 2). As Stivachtis (2010: 14) puts it, the new standard of civilisation does not require states to achieve objective criteria, but rather that they become more like "us". Possible future members are also expected to "**describe** how their policies and practice are evolving […] and **to provide their views on**, and **substantiate** their willingness and ability to comply" with NATO's *acquis* (NATO, 1999a: *Political and Economic Issues*, par. 4; emphasis added). Again, the semantic choice of these provisions suggests that *aspiring* candidates need to do a critical exposé and profess their faith in their self-capacity to comply with the norms of NATO's *acquis* in order to "pass the test".

Alexandra Gheciu (2005, 2008) has extensively analysed the dynamics of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing practices drawing on sociology and social psychology. She explains the instantiation of those types of practices in NATO's interactions with Central and East European (CEE) political actors in the context of enlargement (2005: 77). NATO's position is not proactive, but rather reactive to the aspirants' line of conduct. Information about membership is provided, the rules and the benefits of compliance are clearly set, domestic actors are expected to decide whether or not they are willing to pay the price of compliance (Gheciu, 2005: 80). Accordingly, integration would be a matter of the candidate's own merit and self-discipline (Gheciu, 2008: 82–83). The goal of this type of

role-playing, according to social psychology, is to alter the behaviour of targeted individuals by having them adopt actively the role of another person. Like persuasion, it seeks to affect the understandings, attitudes and desires of the socialised, but it is different in that role-playing aims at changing their behaviour. To Gheciu, role-playing is a part of habitus-building, for the acquisition of new behavioural dispositions is an important part of the socialisation of individuals into the culture of a given social group (Gheciu, 2005: 95). NATO thus *guides* this process of becoming, by helping build self-disciplined, democratic states, change particular forms of behaviour and instil new common-sense understandings about security (Gheciu, 2008: 88).

Therefore, the good student is a civilised student in the becoming; besides conforming to the established set of principles, he also needs to be self-conscious of his own path in self-restraining. Performance is not enough; a future member has to undergo an ontological metamorphosis. Regarding the actual outcomes of that whole civilising process through socialisation, Trine Flockhart (2005) has analysed how international organisations operate norms-transfer through processes of socialisation and observed how these may produce quite different outcomes. Flockhart's analysis takes international organisations as socialising agents, and the CEE states as the socialized to show that similar efforts of socialisation from the part of the socialising agents have resulted in different outcomes for different states in similar situations (Flockhart, 2005: 43). According to her claim, the transfer of democratic norms may lead to changes in behaviour, identity and basic values of the socialised, *if* and *when* the transfer process is successful. Gheciu also claims the CEE have only adopted international norms if they correspond to their interest. When norm compliance entails too many costs for decision-makers, Gheciu finds, they will engage in the rhetoric of compliance, but avoid carrying out costly domestic reforms. When there is tension between international and domestic norms, compliance will depend on the strength of sanctioning mechanisms (Gheciu, 2005: 80).

What is important to retain is that such process is hardly totally successful and hence, the changes in behaviour, identity and basic values are often superficial, or apparent. Therefore, NATO politics of enlargement as exposed above still need to be seen from the perspective of NATO's own performance, agency and identity. Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (1999) have focused on the rationality of both EU and NATO's enlargement decisions, and claimed it has to be situated in a context of *a priori* and

changing meanings regarding the identity and norms of the West. As they suggest, enlargement "also involves incorporating what was previously the Other, i.e. including members from another type of order" because of the challenges of a post-Cold War "missing Other" on the one hand, and of incorporating members "whose notion of belonging developed in a different context" on the other (Fierke & Wiener, 1999: 726). Enlarging NATO thereby implies expanding the security-community to new members, new spaces, new cultures and traditions that were not part of the North-Atlantic's original nucleus. The issue of "incorporating" a former Other thus suggests that new members represent a sort of assimilated Self, developing new habiti. A new member has become "like us" but the notion of belonging has deeper ontological roots that defy the notion of order. The notion of belonging remits to the interdependent bond that develops towards the community, hence the challenge of "belonging anew". With Gerard Delanty (2003: 10), enlargement is not just about getting bigger, as it is crucially a matter of cultural transformation as well. Although his is a civilizational approach of the EU enlargement, the process is parallel to NATO's, and from a civilizational perspective it reveals to be a "[t]estimony to the historical condition of indeterminacy that comes with the entry of multiple forms of agency, temporal and the creation of new dynamics of social change and systemic integration" (Delanty, 2003: 16).

Against this background, and aware of all the implications underlying the membership accession we have seen so far, it is with some caution that one interprets that, for the Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, joining NATO and the EU was a "return to the roots of our culture and statehood", and that for the Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi Hungary's accession in March 1999, his country had "come home", "back in the family" (Moore, 2002: 11). Although there are obviously centuries of history behind these two countries' national identity that could explain the extent to which those statements are close or far from being accurate, the claim of membership as responsibility cannot be dismissed. In 1996, Former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes had said of the enlargement process that mere "security consumers" were not needed, but rather states who can bear the full responsibility of membership (Moore, 2002: 9).

Hence, joining the club after these self-realisation and self-education processes entailed the responsibility of not only respecting all the political, social and military commitments, but also implied the responsibility to

endorse NATO's narrative about the long-lasting North-Atlantic identity. The old bipolar configuration of responsibility for evil in the Other was replaced by another mental configuration of responsibility: one located in the proactivity of an enlarged community of security, in which identities, narratives, habiti were to be more homogenous than ever. An enlarged area of community and an increased influence also imply that new meanings were given to new relationships of interdependence. This ultimately required the regularisation of behaviours through a deep psychosocial learning process aimed at reinforcing self-restraint and civilised habiti towards a democratic regime of security.

Notes

1. The notion of a "risk society" was originally formulated by Ulrich Beck in *Risk Society: towards a new modernity* (1992), who explained that in consequence of industrial societies moved by progress, wealth accumulation, unlimited possibilities, there are now ecological, financial and technological risks threatening the existence of those societies.
2. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952; the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; reunified Germany to include the former Eastern part in 1990 (see NATO: http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en# [27 September 2017]).
3. On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia formally became members of NATO. Information on this particular accession available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm [25 March 2016].

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CHAPTER 8

The Individualisation of Security: A New Architecture for International Security

The analysis of NATO's post-Cold War evolution as a civilising security community in Chap. 7 showed the importance of evolving concepts and practices to the Alliance's continuity as a coherent collective identity that manages to maintain and reproduce its core values and objectives. From a normative perspective, the existence and expansion of NATO as a security community was enabled by both liberal democracy and self-restraint norms and practices (Adler, 2008: 220), and increasing consensus around those norms. Before that, Chaps. 5 and 6 also revealed the importance of values—material, spiritual or ideological—in sustaining the organisation's narrative on identity and pertinence.

Since its inception, NATO's enunciation of the core values guiding the Alliance has traditionally revolved around democracy and liberal ideas. In 1949, the Treaty referred to the "freedom, common heritage and civilisation" of the peoples, based on the *principles* of "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO, 1949). In 1991, the new Strategic Concept now referred to the "common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law" (NATO, 1991: par. 15), whereby "human rights" appeared instead of "individual liberty". With NATO's post-Cold War politics of enlargement, when conceiving the PfP for instance, the importance of values was still *à l'ordre du jour*, but exposed in relation to geography. To SG Claes (cit. in NATO, 1995b), the matter of values within the Alliance is "largely a matter of geography", meaning that the place where

S. da Mota, *NATO, Civilisation and Individuals*, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74409-4_8

people live is crucially related to their beliefs. NATO's long-lasting narrative on values has transcended national frontiers; with the end of the Cold War and the enlargement of NATO, values have thus proved to surpass geography (Bunde & Noetzel, 2010: 298).

The reference to values was rapidly broadened in a much more detailed manner: "Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership" (NATO, 1994: par. 2). From then on, the "shared democratic values" would be the most generic expression found in NATO's official documents regarding "values" (NATO, 1995a, 1999a, 1999b). The assumption is that the abovementioned principles constitute the all-encompassing set of democratic values. However, NATO's defence of values is closely related to how security is perceived, conceived, and performed. Therefore, by introducing the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights as a new set of principles to value, the Alliance assumed a more proactive position that is revealing of its concern for individual rights and for Human Security more broadly. This change was fundamental and critical for the Alliance's scope of action, as it played an increasing role in its conception of security and military activities (Moore, 2002: 16–17).[1]

This chapter focuses specifically on this significant incorporation of new individual values within NATO's discourse. It introduces the notion of "Individualisation of Security" to express that most decisive and influential normative trend of post-Cold War international security, which has progressively re-oriented security policies and their related discourses and rationales from the state to the individual. The expression "Individualisation of Security" *per se* should not be interpreted as a naïve or simplistic apology of the individual; it is rather used to describe the political process of transformative discourses using individualistic valuations of human societies in relation to the state. As it will be seen, the Individualisation of Security consists of the new visibility given by political actors to a referent object of security other than the state, i.e., the individual. Furthermore, the Individualisation of Security also expresses a tangible security practice, from the moment it determines how security policies are directed, involving not only its referent object, as its subject of security as well (Booth, 2005; Walker, 1997).[2]

Although relations of security are traditionally formulated and articulated from the state to the state, they have been, since the end of the Cold War, increasingly designed by the state to the individual, or the sum of the

individuals. As they manage how states behave towards individuals, international policies of security are possibly the most decisive for the becoming of human communities, for they remit to their physical survival, and to some extent to the possibility of choosing freely the way to conduct their lives (Booth, 1991, 2007). But after the Cold War, the individual also lies at the heart of the conduct of war and inaugurates a new conception of war, "one that sought to invoke humanity in its justifying discourses" (Jabri, 2007: 94). Indeed, individual insecurities have been persisting realities that arise in many cases from oppressive and persecutory state practices, often associated with dictatorial or totalitarian political regimes, or in consequence of the instability of failed states. The 1990s brought the notion of individual insecurity to increasing political and public attention, namely in the decision to use force in order to intervene on the international scene—although such trend may transgress the conceptual and political barriers of national and territorial sovereignty (Bellamy, 2004). In the late modernity, wars are definitely *interventionist* and have a constitutive role in forming and reconstructing identities, because they act on behalf of individuals, not states. Specifically, "war brings forth or establishes identity of the interveners and the intervened" (Jabri, 2007: 96).

As it was shown in previous chapters, the civilisational referent has been central in the formation and evolution of the Alliance at a more unconscious level. Against this historic and psychosocial background, the post-Cold War evolution towards a newly defined set of values needs to be questioned as it has important consequences for NATO's architecture of international security, and for NATO's relation to its civilisational referent. Hence, how are we to understand the *a priori* paradoxical relation between NATO's primordial civilisational referent of security, and the Individualisation of Security, as a normative change focused on an individual referent of security? In other words, to what extent does the Individualisation of Security fit into and correspond to NATO's civilisational purpose? This chapter thus takes the Individualisation of Security as a specific normative development, in order to observe how the evolution of international security relates to civilisational NATO and illustrate how this specific post-Cold War change can be understood in the light of the civilisational factor.

This chapter is composed of three sections. Section 8.1 outlines the main conceptual and philosophical premises that led to the Individualisation of Security. It shows that the Individualisation of Security consecrates security as a value-based system, which has problematic implications for

the civilising process. Then, Sect. 8.2 approaches humanitarianism as the practical manifestation of the Individualisation of Security. It highlights how humanitarianism deeply relies on power relations in the process of its institutionalisation in the political and military fields, which requires a critical stance as well for the consequence upon the subjects of security. Ultimately, this will lead to the preliminary conclusions on the implications of the Individualisation of Security for the civilised subjects of security.

8.1 The Individualisation of Security as the Consecration of a Value-Based System

Thinking of security in terms of individual human subjects seems to be the result of a liberal, natural and silent evolution (Tjalve, 2011). To Richard Cohen, for example, "individual security" is not only synonymous with the most popularised expression of "Human Security" and human rights, as it also stands "at the centre of any real international security system built around liberal democratic ideals" (Cohen, 2001: 7). In this sense, the Individualisation of Security would be the natural outcome of a particular ideology, that is, Liberalism. But this book arises precisely from the need to question natural and silent evolutions, in the search for imposed meanings and controlled perceptions regarding the security of individuals. So what are the fundamental ideas underlying this reorganisation of international security around individual needs? And how can that be related to the broader civilising process of the West and to the civilised subjects of security?

This section looks into the conceptual and philosophical path leading to that change of security mentality. Although this evolution is not exclusive to post-Cold War NATO, this allows shedding some light into the normative implications of doing security for individuals instead of states. Despite the favourable and seemingly positive evolution towards the making of more humane policies, the Individualisation of Security remains a philosophical, political and military phenomenon that deserves deeper reflection for further considerations on its role within the wider civilising process of the West. Questioning the genealogy (Foucault, 2000; Guilhot, 2011) of the Individualisation of Security hereby consists in mapping and reconstituting the process through which an individual-centred system of security has emerged and produced standardised effects.

The first point to be made is that conceiving security as a system of values inevitably establishes a relation between security and ethics (Burgess, 2011). Burgess has argued that security practices can only be achieved as a certain form of *negotiating values*. In other words, Burgess suggests, security always results of an *ethos* and an *episteme*, i.e., of a valuing choice in terms of a philosophy of life, culture, individual and collective anxieties and expectations, concerning what may be sacrificed in the name of what is to be preserved. Security thus implies an identification of what we like, what threatens what we like, presupposing that a campaign of normativity might be deployed, in order to define what actions are to be undertaken, how much suffering is needed to prevail, and what sacrifices are to avoid the threat. And above all, ethics and security must be considered as a whole, for they evolve according to the same logic or discourse on humanity (Burgess, 2011: 1–5). If, as Burgess states, a threat to security is implicitly linked to what has value to us, then security is a system of values, for "It is linked to the possibility that what we hold as valuable could disappear, be removed or destroyed" (Burgess, 2011: 13). In these terms, when NATO associates its post-Cold War mission to values such as human rights, it definitely focuses on the better way to preserve the individual. Accordingly, then, valuing the individual is the consecration of security as a value-based system.

However, thinking and practicing security as a system of values has deeper implications that need to be discussed. Philosopher Anthony Kwame Appiah (2007) suggests that values are in fact "*desires*", that is, important attributes that we want other individuals to possess. As he argues, "[w]hen we appeal to what we take to be universal values in our discussions with one another—the value of art or democracy or of philosophy—we're talking about things we want everyone to want" (Appiah, 2007: 21). In Appiah's sense, valuing democracy, for example, is to want everyone to live in a democracy. Thus put, values appear to be intrinsically imperialistic, as they entail an inherent tendency to wish that others adopt them, act accordingly, and think the way one deems to be the best for anyone. The underlying assumption behind such a will to universalise values is a belief that what is valued as being something good cannot harm the Other, which appears to be an essential feature of Liberalism as well. Liberal values thus seem to "[p]ossess a universal character" preconizing that "the spread of democracy and human rights is a basic condition for a peaceful world order" (Bunde & Noetzel, 2010: 303). In the light of this rationale, one has to consider whether a system of values might imply

some degree of assimilation due to that desire of projecting values, and thus constructing a commonality with the Other. Hence, there might be some paradox in this idea of a community of values. Peter Burgess also suggests values are universal from the community's point of view, but they are particular and situational from the moral communities' point of view. As abstract concepts, values are only significant if they are universally valid. In other words, if a given value is not a value everywhere and forever for the members of a community, then it is not a value. Nonetheless, the principles composing a consensual value for a community are not necessarily universal *de facto* (Burgess, 2011: 143). As a value cannot be absolute or universally valid, it ultimately may rely on its symbolic stance as well. Values can be symbolic when they function as ideal-type references. So, even if we are to assume that the individual is a consensual universal value, the characteristics shaping the individual may not be as consensual. The same holds for other values such as art or democracy, to borrow on Appiah's examples (2007).

So far, it has been seen that the Individualisation of Security as a value-based system implies the projection of the desires of the Self, which is a Liberal feature extending the project of Modernity. In this sense, the Individualisation of Security entails an ideological representation of what is valued as the best way to live for Others. Groups and individuals have always coexisted in a relation of signifying reciprocity (Booth, 2007: 226; Delanty, 2003). The evolution of the one has been accompanied by the evolution of the other; and their identities have been defined mutually. However, the value of the individual for society has not always been the same, and it is generally acknowledged that the affirmation of the individual as a value is the result of a process that has its deepest origins in the Christian religion (Dumont, 1983). Likewise, the importance of the individual in the provision of security by the state has not always been the same, and it is important to assess how the Individualisation of Security after the Cold War illustrates a shift from more traditional physical security to a precise value-based system.

Historically, from the Roman era to the Napoleonic period, going through the French Revolution, the conception of security has always been a good that fairly belongs to individuals, according to Emma Rothschild (1995). But this individual propriety has always coexisted with the notion of a collective good that is primarily achieved and executed by the state. Here, the idea of social contract, as initially formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century, presupposes that the

individual abdicates of a part of his freedom, and transfers the competence and the duty of preserving his security as a citizen to state agency (Rothschild, 1995: 60). Security is thus a matter of transferring loyalty and individuality in order to establish a bond of citizenship with the state. R.B.J. Walker formulates this relationship in terms of the abandonment of our "humanity" to the "greater good of citizenship": "Modern accounts of security are precisely about subjectivity, subjection, and the conditions under which we have been constructed as subjects subject to subjection" (Walker, 1997: 71). Accordingly, the idea of social contract would also imply transferring the individual's subjectivity; by abdicating his humanity towards citizenship, the individual sacrifices and abnegates a part of his Self, thereby turning into a "subject of subjection" in order to be secure. This is consistent with an important feature of the civilising process of the West discussed in previous chapters, namely that interdependent relations develop between the nation-state as a provider of security and the civilised subjects. Departing from the idea of the Individualisation of Security as an ideological liberal projection, this means the value of the civilised individual has been in fact previously possessed by state authority. In other words, the individual displays a subjectivity that allows the state to perform his security. Therefore, the Individualisation of Security contains an inherent presumption that security is to be brought to civilised subjects, when states fail to be civilised. In this sense, states may be the barbarians.

Throughout the vast majority of the twentieth century, the notion of state security prevailed, the state being the central referent object of international politics (Bilgin, 2003; Booth, 1991; Krause & Williams, 1997; Walker, 1997). After WWII, the idea of individual security was broadly consecrated by the developing field of human rights. As it was seen in Chap. 4, states broadly adhered to human rights and self-determination after WWII to make their civilised status credible in a newly decolonised world. However, during the Cold War, the notion of common security was preponderant, and the search for security was mainly a function of relations of force, enmity, state positioning, mutual survival, and was determined by the actors in possession of nuclear armament (Bilgin, 2003). Due to the possibility of nuclear annihilation, the idea of commonality basically consisted in insuring the physical survival of the Other for the sake of mutual survival. The ideological gap dividing the world at the time made the notion of commonality fairly restricted; the West was warding off the soviet Evil, and considered it an estranged reality with which it had nothing in common (Jervis, 2011: 34–35). Individual rights on each

side of that gap were not the primary concern of sovereign states struggling for their respective ideological power. Although the individual has never been absent from the idea of security, he was rather assimilated to it, as a merging part of the state. Individuals compose the state, and the prevailing idea has been traditionally that the security of the state implies the security of its citizens. During the Cold War in particular, the prevailing conception of state security implied staying out of the possibility of total destruction by another state, that is, the absence of a threat of annihilation in the most material and physical terms.

In the realm of social science, the more recent origins of the Individualisation of Security can be seen early in the 1980s, when Critical Security Studies emerged as a project aiming at developing a new thinking confronting the typical visions of the Cold War. In fact, the individual as a referent value of security arises within Peace Studies, having Johann Galtung's work as particularly decisive in distinguishing structural violence from personal violence (Bilgin, 2003: 204). During that decade, Peace Studies evolved around a conception of "positive peace" that focused on the well-being of individuals, a culture of peace, and social and economic justice. From then on, positive peace would be privileged in opposition to "negative peace", which conceived peace as the mere absence of conflict and war, and was thus representative of state security. This opening towards the notion of positive peace led to a widening of Peace Studies relatively to issues of health, economic well-being, environmental stability, and armament. This expanding view influenced the development of Critical Security Studies, and encouraged more comprehensive approaches within the critical project, oriented towards the security of individuals (Booth, 2007; Buzan & Hansen, 2010: 156–160; Krause & Williams, 1997; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 18; Wyn Jones, 1999).

In the public policy of international organisations as well, the UNDP report on human development introduced in 1994 the notion of "human security" in the UN system (UNDP, 1994). A decade later, the EU by its High Representative Javier Solana ordered a special working group a report on the doctrine of human security for Europe (Kaldor et al., 2004). Since then, "humanitarianism", "ethical foreign policy", "human development" and "human security" have been at the top of political agendas and international security policies. Seemingly, the semantic and normative loads associated to these notions indicate a movement of unprecedented ethicality within IR.[3] They are now common ground and integrate the

international lexicon of political agendas and policymaking (Chandler, 2008; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Ramel, 2003). Des Gasper and Oscar Gomez (2015) are quite critical of the human security discourse though; to them, its emergence in the 1990s was part of "revisiting and rethinking these 1940s post-Second World War themes, for the post Cold War era" (Gasper & Gomez, 2015: 102). The authors focus on how "personal security" transpired in the initial 1994 report by the UNDP as an "imperfect label", because the psychological dimension was missing (2015: 103). Ultimately, "the personal security 'lens' was an artefact to focus on a particular set of threatened values, but in practice it has largely been used to look at some particular types of threat" (Gasper & Gomez, 2015: 112). This is to say that individual-centred security policies and personal security are different things, and that valuing individual needs and insecurities in political agendas does not automatically imply that individual well-being is actually achieved.

Later in 2001, the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged for the first time in the reports of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001).[4] So as to give a more institutional expression to its nonetheless non-binding premises, R2P was endorsed as a doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005 by UN member states that unanimously agreed with their responsibility to protect their populations from the four most inhumane crimes, that is, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. As such, it is presupposed that failure in protecting gives the international society legitimacy to would act in formally sovereign states through various provisions set out in the UN Charter (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Piiparinen, 2012). Considering how humanitarian ideas have evolved since the 1990s, and how humanitarian interventions had already taken place prior to this "indoctrination"—as in BH, Kosovo, Rwanda, or Somalia—R2P appears to be more of the same. As its normative content basically postulated circumstances that had already been authorised for more than a decade, R2P may be seen rather as a political and rhetorical move (Chesterman, 2011: 282). As it will be seen in further detail in the next section, R2P reinforced the idea and the narrative of a cosmopolitan responsibility of the states towards their own citizens, as well towards the citizens of other states. Additionally, the adoption of R2P as a "doctrine" protects UN decisions from the critique of the eventual coerciveness against *de facto* states. That is why some authors such as Touko Piiparinen (2012: 388) and Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2011: 828) find that

Libya and Côte d'Ivoire constitute ground-breaking precedents of R2P, for they represent the first application of R2P in coercive campaigns against the consent of functioning states. Ultimately, by inculcating that sense of *responsibility* whilst presenting the possibility that external actors may disable state sovereignty, R2P also contributes to the standardisation of self-restraining practices.

Returning to the broader intellectual and philosophical movement of valuing the individual, Louis Dumont estimates it created an interiorisation of morality into each one's conscience. To Dumont, besides being an individual sample of the human species in every society, the "individual" is a moral being, independent, and autonomous, who carries supreme values fitting in the modern ideology and society, in opposition to the traditional ideology and society where the value lies in the society taken as a whole (Dumont, 1983). At the same time, valuing another individual other than the Self is necessarily a collective movement. In fact, after the Cold War, and in parallel with the rising globalisation, the thought of cosmopolitanism intensified. According to Anthony Kwame Appiah, cosmopolitanism is the equivalent of ethics in a globalised world, and encloses two ideas, which often clash with each other. The first is that we, as human subjects, have obligations towards persons other than our family and acquaintances; the second is that we value particular human lives, in respect of their legitimate difference (Appiah, 2007: xiii). Consequently, cosmopolitanism arises from a universal concern towards those who are at distance, whom we do not necessarily know or resemble, but with whom we share the same essential human nature. On this, Richard Cohen speaks of a "globalisation of concern" in an age of growing interconnectivity between states and peoples, whereby violations of the rights and security of individuals in third states have become a direct and immediate concern of the world community as if their own condition was also diminished in some way (Cohen, 2001: 8).

From the 1990s onward, the idea that the state is not the end of security *per se*, but rather just a means to attain it (Booth, 2007: 228) continued to be reinforced. The state appeared to be increasingly limited as an agent of security. NATO's revision of its Strategic Concept in 1999 may be understood in that very context. The addition of peacekeeping and conflict prevention activities to its military mission reflected its willingness to abridge state sovereignty in the name of human rights: "Security for the new NATO not only encompasses the rights of the individual; it ultimately

rests on the sovereignty of the individual rather than the sovereignty of the state" (Moore, 2002: 24–25).

The main conceptual findings on the Individualisation of Security point to the idea that, after the Cold War, international security was increasingly thought in terms of universalising values that sought to enhance human commonalities, especially human vulnerabilities. As a consequence, a cosmopolitan sense apparently flourished, highlighting the fundamental sameness between distant Others, and consequently inculcating a moral obligation, a responsibility to *care*, and act for their sake. This evolution depicts a fundamental search for the basic ideas that could bind people together after the bipolar struggle for ideology. Human rights became the standard of civilisation *par excellence*, and dictated that civilised states would abide by them domestically. The Individualisation of Security inspired states to self-restraint, hence to civilised behaviour towards their citizens. In this sense, the well-being of individuals was seen as a concurring goal to state sovereignty, and states lost their predominance in securing individuals to the governance of international organisations in the field of human rights.

The impact of the Individualisation of Security on international security is unequalled: thinking of security in ethical terms implies a series of valuing choices regarding the conduct towards Others, and regarding the management of the lives of Others; and these choices are closely related to a Western ideological tradition of Liberalism. The end of the Cold War logic of physical survival and ideological divide, together with the rise of a cosmopolitan sense, might have enhanced the moral conscience of the individuals' value as bearers of principles and ideals. Accordingly, the individual may be seen as the corporeal embodiment of ideology, as a receptacle of liberal values. From this perspective, protecting individual lives is to protect liberal values. International security has evolved as the result of a reflexive exercise of values, in that a threat to individual security actually represents a threat to the values underlying the system of international security and, at the same time, a threat to whom defends or bears these values. However, the Individualisation of Security does not only consist of ideational changes, because it is not limited to political agendas, guidelines and discourses. As the Individualisation of Security also depends strongly on ethical deliberations, on valuing choices, it has materialised into new ways of *doing* security, namely through humanitarian wars. The next section further explores the implications of *performing* the Individualisation of Security as a value-based system.

8.2 The Individualisation of Security in the Hands of the Military: Reproducing Civilising Power

This section approaches the security practices oriented towards the individual. It shows that the Individualisation of Security has altered the way military interventions are thought, justified, represented and executed. Put in other terms, behaviour in the field of war has changed significantly. Approaching the Individualisation of Security in these terms requires focusing on the political agents performing it, on the institutional dynamics displaying it, and on the kind of relations resulting from it. It is claimed that power is an ever-present element in the interactions underlying the Individualisation of Security, hence the importance of the relational aspects existing between states and individuals when individual-centred security policies are at stake. In this context, Michel Foucault's work on biopower and biopolitics (2003) is decisive to conceiving how the Individualisation of Security also fits in a balance of power, domination and control.

According to Martha Finnemore (1996: 155), patterns of military intervention cannot be understood out of the normative framework in which it occurs, because both the "[n]ormative understandings about which human beings merit military protection and about the way in which such protection must be implemented have changed" and state behaviour have changed. As seen in the previous section, normative understandings regarding the referent object of international policies of security effectively changed in the 1990s. Individual-centred ethics was increasingly shaping international security as a system guided by values. Accordingly, behaviour regarding security interventions was changing, as states redefined what the appropriated means and ends of any individual-centred intervention would have to be.

The new visibility of the individual as a central concern of international security may be framed within the practice of a new humanitarianism, or a "transformed humanitarianism" (Barnett, 2005). In contrast with an initially apolitical humanitarianism (Chandler, 2002), the scale, scope and meaning of humanitarian action expanded substantially in the 1990-decade. During that period, there was a political and financial intromission of some states into the work of humanitarian actors, which Michael Barnett (2005) considers revealing of the politicisation of humanitarianism and of the "civilian" object, through geopolitical, social, economic and also normative factors arising from a multipolar world.

David Chandler (2002, 2004) interprets this new humanitarianism from a critical standpoint, arguing that it is a *subterfuge* for Western states to assert their policies in a dominant collective system of international security. The moral argument is thus instrumentalised, and ethics exported to that field of action by a language of morality and ethics, instead of politics, introducing naturally the notion of "humanitarian intervention". Referring to the example of the intervention in Iraq in 2003, Alex Bellamy (2004) even sees that new humanitarianism as a source of exceptionalism that normalises humanitarian wars by a forced morality, to the detriment of the human condition. On exceptionalism, Scott Watson (2011) sees humanitarianism as a category of securitisation, and defends that humanitarianism rivals security because it legitimates urgent security measures. In this sense, humanitarianism represents a structured field of action, based on discourses and institutions capable of implementing urgent measures. Humanitarianism is theoretically distinct from the security logic of human security, for it gives priority to the concept of life and human dignity, as being above states' interests (Watson, 2011: 5).

The notion of humanitarianism prevails to describe individual-centred security policies, but it does not seem to be merely guided by cosmopolitan impulses. On the contrary, the views exposed so far enhance its politicisation, securitisation and even the possibility of serving the Western projection of power. This suggests the importance of inquiring on the actors who implement those policies, i.e., on the agents of humanitarianism. Emma Rothschild (1995) has found in the agency of individual-oriented security of the 1990s a political incoherence arising from the relation between the individual and the state. Although security is aimed by individuals, it can only be achieved by a collective or political process. But under the humanitarian pattern of the 1990s, the individual security in a given independent state depends on the intervention or agency of a foreign state in that independent state, interposing the sovereignty's sensitivities. This is why, Rothschild suggests, organisations like the EU, NATO, the Red Cross or the UN High Commission for Refugees have more power in assuring the personal security of an individual than any other local or municipal political institution (1995: 86). To us, the incoherence is only apparent, having in mind what has already been evidenced concerning the duality of values connecting the state and the individual. Valuing the individual as a referent of security policies does not imply that he is to pursue his security himself. Actually, the transfer of competences to institutions and external support when implementing individual-centred

security policies may be explained by the lack of self-capability and autonomy of human subjects (Chandler, 2001: 83). The difference now lies in the international governance of security matters; international organisations represent the most collective level of political organisation given the current global interdependence of the world. The creation of institutions watching over and ensuring the values of a community (Burgess, 2011: 144) is indeed a central element in the study of the Individualisation of Security. However, an important point is made by David Chandler, regarding how the moral or normative commitments towards human rights have legitimated the policymaking by less responsible elites in the realm of international organisations. Ethical decisions have not been democratic, because they are not assessed by the popular will, nor by voting, but rather by ethical committees representing the will of the Good and the great (Chandler, 2001: 85–87).

This perspective on decision-making raises an important question concerning the ethical motivations of the agents performing the Individualisation of Security. If the values guiding the action do not consist of cosmopolitan nor universal values because they do not represent the will of the majority, then what are the values guiding humanitarian decisions? In *From Kosovo to Kabul (and beyond): Human Rights and International Intervention* (2002), Chandler again argues that Western states sponsor and reinforce a new regime of human rights for internal political motives. To him, this new outbreak of humanitarian concern has to do with the need Western governments have to re-legitimate their moral purpose in an era in which liberalism cannot present itself as the best alternative to Communism. Chandler further states that after the Cold War it has been increasingly difficult for Western states to legitimate their policies for traditionally capitalist reasons, and they have in fact been pushed into the moral argument and to the exportation of ethics for two main reasons. The first is that it allows them to relocate the object of criticism on the outside, away from Western central governments. The second one is that, in foreign affairs, the governments do not have to match action and rhetoric the same way they do at the domestic level (Chandler, 2002).

The option to intervene, i.e., to use military force in order to protect the individuals of another state, is an arbitrary process. There is thus an underlying value deliberation made by international agents of security that is sometimes linked to the need of projecting ideological power. But according to the logic of humanitarianism, the ultimate value of such

pondering would be bare human life. However, if life is the value to be deliberated for an ethics of security, then the issue of *choosing lives* is called into question, as it remits once more to the states' ultimate power over life—similarly to what was shown in Sect. 5.4 on the possession of nuclear power as the main life and death signifier.

Michel Foucault (2003: 239–240) identifies the hold of power over life—biopower—as one of the key phenomena of the twenty-first century, in the sense that the state appropriated the biological dimension of man as a living being, and exercised its power over him as a species. Foucault (2003: 240–241) argues that we have evolved from a nineteenth-century premise that "took life and let live" to a modernity that intervenes in every sector of human life in order to "make live or let die". This particular evolution of power is not individualising, according to Foucault, for it is addressed to man as a species; this is what the biopolitics of human race consists of (Foucault, 2003: 242–243). Biopolitics has substituted the geopolitical problematisation of traditional security that had territorial sovereignty as a main referent object (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 283).

Drawing on Foucault's original formulation of the concepts of biopower and biopolitics, several authors have underscored other aspects and dynamics of IR also related to the individual. Mark Duffield (2008: 145–146), for instance, applies those notions to human security and development, and considers they are inherent to the liberal ideology, because they take human life as a referent object, and because they can only be achieved through the containment of the underdeveloped life's mobility. Duffield explains that containment is not geopolitical but biopolitical, since it functions as a barrier separating and reproducing the generic divide between the developed and underdeveloped worlds in terms of life opportunities, which he calls the "global life-chance divide" (Duffield, 2008: 147). Regarding R2P, for instance, Patricia Weber (2009) uses Foucault to argue that the ICISS constructed a notion of sovereignty centred on the right of the population to life, establishing a biopolitical system over the responsibility to prevent, protect, monitor, control and regulate non-Western human lives. Sovereignty was not only substituted by the idea of responsibility, as biopower was also instituted.

Against this background, the Individualisation of Security corresponds to a massification of power, in that it offers a wider sample of referents of

security to the agents' scope of action. But this leads to another critical question: what makes an individual more valuable than another for a given interventionist security policy to be adopted? This is a fundamental problem raised by Foucault, who questions how can biopower *kill*, whether by direct order, or by exposing both enemies and citizens, if its basic function is to improve life: "Given that this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die?" (Foucault, 2003: 254). Further along this line of reasoning, Foucault introduces the idea of state racism, which basically consists in distinguishing and ranking races. Accordingly, there is an equation, a deliberation that is exercised by state power in order to promote the survival of selected elements of the human species (Foucault, 2003: 255–256). In a biopolitical system, then, the imperativeness to kill—or let die—is only tolerable if it results in the elimination of the biological threat to the improvement of the human species, and not a victory over political adversaries. In a normalising society, racism ends up being a pre-condition making the killing acceptable. By "killing", Foucault also refers to indirect forms of killing, such as exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for certain persons, political death, expulsion, rejection, etc. (Foucault, 2003: 256). All together, biopolitical practices actually attempt to regulate life and the very conditions of death, and thus constitute a type of "truth" about the world (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 272). Accordingly, humanitarianist accomplishments also need to be thought as a discriminate process involving the management of the human species, which goes well beyond plain ethics.

In all, it can be said that implementing the Individualisation of Security has been fairly related to ideological and political reasons, mostly of the West. The post-Cold War period is rich in ideological motivations; notwithstanding the absence of Communism, all attentions were channelled onto Liberalism as a perfectible system. In contrast with the bipolar period, the politicisation, securitisation and ideologisation of how and where humanitarian intervention could occur fundamentally expanded the scope of military action. In this sense, humanitarianism has also implied that perceptions about security could have been affected unconsciously, or in other words, humanitarianism has thus affected the unconscious through symbolic meanings of life and death.

At this point, how can we relate the specific change of security mentality centred on the individual to the broader civilising process of the West? Firstly, conceiving the Individualisation of Security as the materialisation of a system of values show that security is ontologically linked to the

individual, in that it is a good designed for him and to be enjoyed by him. Even though national security has prevailed as the main referent object for most of contemporary History, security policies have ultimately preserved individual persons coexisting within states that detain the monopoly of the use of force. Ultimately, in a secure state, individuals should be secure too.

What has mainly changed with the end of the Cold War is the issue of agency, in that the idea of social contract connecting the citizen to his state has expanded to the competences of international organisations dedicated to international peace and security, such as the UN and NATO. There is in fact an altered subjectivity of the individual; not only does he embody a national citizen, as he is also representative of wider social groups and, implicitly, a member of the UN or NATO as well. Besides, there is also a normative transformation, which has to do with the assertion that the individual is a value to preserve; accordingly, the life of every individual has value, and the values of every individual compose world order. But paradoxically, the individual has also acquired a more collective dimension, because he embodies the commonality of ideological values unifying human groups. As a consequence, the need for international organisations to intervene militarily in sovereign states to protect individuals also suggests that the international community makes the assertion that the values of Others fail in assuring the security of individuals.

Secondly, when conceived as a military practice, the Individualisation of Security reveals that the moral argument for war does not necessarily mean that it arises from a cosmopolitan concern towards the protection of individual lives. Critical literature has been quite clear in equating humanitarian practices to demonstrations of power by institutions, motivated by liberal ideological purposes related to the perpetuation of some *status quo*. When approaching the Individualisation of Security under the perspective of biopower, it becomes evident that the biopolitical referent does not tend to be individualised, but rather massified in a depersonalisation of moral individuality. Critical works such as Patricia Weber's (2009) or Mark Duffield's (2008) have highlighted that biopower is also determined by ideological motivations of life containment and control. This form of power that is to be exercised over life thus determines its cessation or continuation, as well as the *way* it is to continue. The exercise of such power arbitrarily shapes the understanding of which values are the prevailing ones in human societies, and hence shapes the very understanding of the world. Therefore, when conceiving the Individualisation of Security, it is important to keep in mind that power does not apply merely to the living individual, but to the political and symbolic value of his life as well.

This individualising evolution of international security appears to be related to the civilising process in several different ways. On the one hand, the Individualisation of Security clearly arises from both psychogenetic and sociogenetic factors. While Elias identified the self-containment of individual impulses in human relations, as well as the centralisation of interdependence converging into the monopolistic state, the Individualisation of Security shows the rising of a cosmopolitan consciousness of the world whereby the interdependence between individuals make states or groups of states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. The Individualisation of Security thus implies a transformation of behaviour in both men and states in international society, mostly through the inculcation of responsibility, and through the establishment of new boundaries for appropriate behaviour regarding individuals.

On the other hand, it was seen that liberal ideology has played a continuous role in the process of conceiving security as a system of values that is to be projected to Others. Therefore, one may understand that the human rights regime appeals to a progressive liberal understanding of civilisation (Donnelly, 1998: 14). Moreover, through the institutionalisation of human security and R2P, among other humanitarian formulations, the Individualisation of Security has also produced an international discourse of discipline and normalisation: a conduct that is respectful of individuals should be *natural* for all states. For all these reasons, the Individualisation of Security illustrates the extension of the civilising power through international organisations and, therefore, can be considered as another stage of the civilising process coming from the West.

Notes

1. The next chapter, especially dedicated to NATO's missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, will approach this issue in more depth.
2. The "subject of security" is the actual and practical recipient of a given security policy, independently of its referent object.
3. As a matter of fact, those concepts and expressions were very well accepted and adopted in the codes of conduct of many international organizations, NGO's, and foreign policies of some states such as Canada, Japan and Norway—concerning human security, mostly—because they were rooted in positive and progressist moral values, as they also generated important financial support (Ramel, 2003; Shusterman, 2006; Suhrke, 1999).

4. The ICISS' formulation of R2P entails a three-fold conception of responsibility as (1) the state being responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens; (2) the state being responsible to the international community to fulfil this duty; (3) other states may intervene to protect a population in another defaulting state regarding the first two responsibilities (Weber, 2009: 586–587).

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CHAPTER 9

The Individualisation of Security Within NATO

Chapter 7 showed how NATO's post-Cold War evolution as a security community included significant civilising elements. These consisted of new socialising practices such as the PfP and the MAP, destined to a major transformative practice of the 1990s: enlargement. But enlargement procedures were designed following specific standards of civilisation that not only transformed the Alliance as an organisation by encompassing more members and a wider geographical scope, as they also required previous change and adaptation from aspiring members that had to undergo a significant learning process of self-restraint and subjection to democratic values. While those changes were rather endogenous within the context of NATO's more regional realm, Chap. 8 also showed a parallel process of transformation taking place on a much broader level. The Individualisation of Security took place on an international scale; as it has involved more widely international organisations, states, and individuals interrelatedly, it thus represents a major development in the field of international security. The Individualisation of Security has entailed the reformulation of security policies and the very conduct of war, and has reconfigured them around a different conception of life-valuation having the Liberal individual at its core. Therefore, to what extent has NATO as a security community been influenced by the Individualisation of Security as another stage of the civilising process? Or put from the perspective of a civilising security community, how does the Individualisation of Security within NATO contribute to the "combined effort of institutionalization of self-restraint" (Adler, 2008)?

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This chapter shows how critical the relation between the Individualisation of Security and NATO is. As a normative transformation of international security, the Individualisation of Security was in fact very significant for the Alliance, as it complemented and served the purpose of its institutional reinvention after the Cold War. Fundamentally, the Individualisation of Security also served the sustainability of NATO's civilisational referent. Therefore, the role of the individual referent of security is assessed in NATO's military operations in BH, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Despite their particularities and differences, each of these three missions is analysed according to the referent object of security, the justification advanced for the intervention, their formal mandate, their objectives, their normative principles, their self-declared results, followed by broader considerations on the civilised subject of security. A *caveat* needs to be made; these *will not* be exhaustive interdisciplinary analyses of the very complex conflicts at stake that review the wide scope of factors and dimensions involved. Instead of focusing solely on the *conflicts*, what is proposed is to focus on very particular aspects of the *missions* related to whether and how NATO has represented individual subjects of security and has related them to the civilising process. In this sense, for the sake of what is the main motivation of the book, many aspects of the conflict appear as very synthesised references, while others are absent, although they all possess an undeniable role in understanding the conflicts.

9.1 Bosnia: From "Denying Flight" to "Deliberate Force"

NATO's overall trajectory throughout the conflict in BH may be seen as a stairway leading to an ultimate geopolitical and military affirmation. Indeed, what began as a supporting mission of a strictly humanitarian presence by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), ended with an intensive bombing campaign and post-conflict presence on the ground. However, in conformity with the premises set out in Chap. 8 about the Individualisation of Security, NATO's intervention in Bosnia also shows that there is a wider context surrounding the humanitarian justification for NATO's involvement that allows for several considerations regarding the civilised subject of security.

The war in Bosnia was the consequence of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. After the fall of many Communist regimes in Central and

Eastern Europe, free elections were held in 1990 in all republics of the Yugoslav Federation. In Bosnia, as in other Yugoslav republics, these elections were won by nationalist parties that soon started to confront each other regarding the future of Bosnia. Populated by Bosniaks (43.8%), Serbs (31.4%) and Croats (17.3%), Bosnia became the object of territorial claims from the neighbouring republics of Croatia and Serbia. On 1 March 1992, 63.7% of Bosnian voters turned out for the self-determination referendum, with 99% voting for independence. The consociational mechanisms that ensured the institutional cohesiveness of Bosnia collapsed. On 6 April 1992, as the EU and the USA recognised Bosnia's independence, the Serbs proclaimed secession, sieged Sarajevo and rapidly violence extended to the whole country (Bougarel, Helms, & Duijzings, 2007: 4; Delpla, Bougarel, & Fournel, 2012: 2–3).

The events unfolding during the summer of 1992 definitely internationalised the Bosnian war. The most decisive was the mediatisation of four large prisoner camps—in Omarska, Trnopolje, Manjace, and Keraterm (Hansen, 2006: 104)—run by Serb Bosnian forces, which had been documented by non-governmental human rights organisations and Western media (Weisbord, 2010: 136). The public opinion was suddenly confronted with pictures of brutal violence that reminded of the barbarous concentration camps of Nazi Germany (Gutman, 1993). As a reaction, in August 1992, the London Conference was organized on behalf of the UN and the European Community, agreeing on a framework for peace talks in Geneva, and the Serbs conceded to letting the UN monitor heavy weapons in several cities (Hansen, 2006: 104). On 14 September 1992, the UNSC Resolution 776 declared the deployment of the UNPROFOR to Bosnia, which would become the largest peacekeeping operation ever taken by the UN, growing into 40,000 people by the end of 1994. With a traditional peacekeeping mandate, the force was not to engage in fighting, but to ensure a peaceful political settlement, delivering humanitarian aid, which required in many cases the permission of the dominant forces in the area, often the Bosnian Serbs (Hansen, 2006: 104–105).

Although UNSC Resolution 781 had banned all flight in Bosnia by military aircraft that were not assigned to UNPROFOR, the ban was largely ignored by Serb aircraft, and UNSC Resolution 816 later allowed for NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone with Operation Deny Flight. In that initial phase, NATO's contributions to UNPROFOR were strictly of enforcing UN embargoes in the Adriatic, monitoring the no-fly zones, and providing the UN headquarters with personnel and equipment to

(NATO, 1992b: par. 7). Since the beginning of Deny Flight, NATO displayed its preparedness and readiness for further steps in enforcing the implementation of the UN mandate authorizing all measures necessary to ensure relief, including appropriate measures in case of threat or harm of the UN personnel (NATO, 1992b: par. 10). When the situation actually deteriorated and, as "the operation evolved, UN authorised NATO to fly additional missions providing close air support to UNPROFOR soldiers on the ground, if requested, and to protect UN designated safe areas" (Beale, 1997: 2).

NATO's presence throughout the conflict in Bosnia may be seen in two different phases. The first phase taking place during most of the war's duration, from 1992 to early 1995, was largely dominated by the fragile performance of UN peacekeepers, a series of failed attempts at peace agreements,[1] the continuing reports of Serbian atrocities, and more than 370 UN peacekeepers taken as hostages (Hansen, 2006: 105–108). Here, NATO's role was essentially one of operational deterrence, though it flew more than 100,000 sorties (Beale, 1997: 2). In face of the increasing evidence of ethnic cleansing and the occurrence of large-scale massacres by the Serbs (Gutman, 1993), the traditional UN peacekeeping was considered to be failing (Bougarel et al., 2007: 5, 11; Delpla et al., 2012: 2–3; Wallander, 2000: 725).

After threatening Bosnian Serb forces of retaliation many times without taking it to the end, NATO ended up bombing for the first time in the history of the Alliance, on 10 April 1994, after an UNPROFOR soldier was killed by Serb artillery. The targets were a Serb mobile command post and a tank shelling the town from the position believed responsible for the UNPROFOR soldier's death (Beale, 1997: 25). However, the limits of NATO's airpower in the context of a peace operation with a humanitarian mandate came out many times during the conflict; NATO's airpower was unable to deter Bosnian Serb aggression or counter-attack. Its biggest airstrike so far had happened when 39 aircrafts damaged the Ubdina runway. In essence, "NATO's reputation was so severely tarnished that the entire alliance was threatening to unravel" (Beale, 1997: 29).

NATO's second more muscular phase in the conflict occurred in 1995, after the Srebrenica massacre. Srebrenica had been an UN-designated "safe area" for Bosniaks since 1993, but it had remained vulnerable, as only 7600 blue helmets had been deployed there by the UN. On 6 July 1995, the Army of the Republik Srpska (VRS) attacked the Srebrenica enclave despite its status as a safe area. As the Serb forces advanced without

being confronted by NATO aviation, General Mladic's soldiers entered the town, and massacred about 8000 Bosniak men during the following days, while the rest of the population of the enclave was expelled toward central Bosnia (Delpla et al., 2012: 6–7). In the words of Noah Weisbord (2010: 136), "Srebrenica became a disgrace for the post-World War II liberal internationalists […] without a principled doctrine on the use of force after the Cold War", which ultimately resolved Western powers to adopt humanitarianist doctrines.

Following Srebrenica, the shelling of Sarajevo's marketplace—another UN safe area—occurred for the second time on 28 August 1995. After the UN military commanders concluded "beyond any reasonable doubt" that the brutal mortar attack had come from Bosnian Serb positions, NATO commenced bombing on 30 August 1995 bombing, as a direct response. The proclaimed objective was to "reduce the threat to the Sarajevo Safe Area" and to deter any future attack to it or any other Safe Area (NATO, 1995a). The conviction of NATO SG was that this response to the mortar attack would contribute to attaining a peaceful settlement through diplomatic means. Here, deterrence was still the dominant rationale. Such NATO attacks were justified as responses to specific attacks from local parties, mainly Bosnian Serbs. This response initiated Operation Deadeye, and occurred under the provisions of Operation Deny Flight, jointly decided by UN Peace forces under UNSC Resolution 836, the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and the Force Commander, and in accordance with the NAC's decisions of 25 July and 1 August endorsed by the UN SG (NATO, 1995a). The initial strikes had begun on 30 August, but were suspended on 1 September to permit meetings between UN and Bosnian Serb officials. But on 3 September, the NAC considered the Bosnian Serb reply to UN demands was not a sufficient basis for termination of air strikes, so they reinitiated on 5 September. The objective on this specific occurrence was to attain "the compliance of the Bosnian Serbs to cease attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas; the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo, without delay; complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and NGO's and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport" (NATO, 1995b). Two weeks later, on 14 September 1995, NATO suspended operations when the Bosnian Serb forces largely complied with UN demands to cease attacks on the designated safe areas of Sarajevo, Gorazde and Tuzla; remove their heavy weapons from a 20-km exclusion

zone around Sarajevo; and open the Sarajevo airport and roads leading into the city (Beale, 1997: 31).

Although it can be said that NATO's objectives were set out in a "palliative" way, depending on how the situation evolved, Operation Deliberate Force represents the final culmination of a more coercive use of airpower. To Willy Claes, NATO SG at the time, this "first significant and sustained military operation in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance" was an example of the successful use of "limited force in the service of diplomacy" (NATO, 1995c). SG Claes thus elevated the Alliance above other organisations in the world for its effectiveness in the use of force, proving it was a pertinent and flexible instrument of security in the complex post-Cold war era (ibid.). From this summary and preliminary exposition of NATO's involvement in BH, one could assume NATO naturally participated with operational success in a post-Cold War conflict according to the new premises it had already anticipated in its new Strategic Concept of 1991. Despite the usual internal debate regarding decision-making and the most adequate balance of US and European contribution to the Alliance's intervention, the focus for the remainder of this section on the Bosnian war is on NATO's treatment of the individual referent of security and its framing within the civilisational narrative.

9.1.1 Civilising the Balkans, Civilising the Bosnians?

NATO's civilisational sense is continual, and its ensuing role within international society was put straightforwardly: "In Bosnia, **the Alliance served notice that the international community cannot continually be defied and all rules of civilised conduct abandoned with impunity**. NATO's intervention restored the credibility of the international community" (SG Claes, cit. in NATO, 1995d; emphasis added). By intervening in BH, the Alliance notified the world that civilised behaviour had to be upheld and barbarian behaviour punished. And by doing so, it also returned the credibility of international powers to intervene where they deem they must, in order to restore hope in the lives of Bosnian individuals. However, such a strong assertion cannot be stated and understood out a favourable context, i.e., there are a set of conditions from which NATO SG benefitted in order to proclaim such discourse. These conditions, it is claimed, are deeply related to the civilising process.

In what is considered to be the deadliest conflict in Europe since WWII, with an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 people killed, ethnic cleansing was

used by Serb and Croat forces and resulted in the displacement of more than 2.1 million people (Bougarel et al., 2007: 5). Claims that the Serb offensive was accompanied by successive waves of ethnic cleansing referred to the violence and expulsion of populations on the basis of ethno-national criteria, massive or selective executions, sexual violence, and the opening of camps (Delpla et al., 2012: 3). In the Bosnian war, ethnic cleansing was the critical factor determining that the international community became involved in a humanitarian case for intervention. Formally, the population was to be secured, and not the state.

Early in the conflict, NATO expressed the situation in former Yugoslavia as one of "carnage and lawlessness" (NATO, 1992b: par. 1). In its discourse, the primary responsibility for the conflict in BH was attributed to the leadership of Serbia and to the Bosnian Serbs: "Although all parties to the conflict have contributed in their own way to the present state of affairs, the main responsibility falls on the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) including the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]" (NATO, 1992a: par. 5). The Alliance also characterised the Serbian leadership and Bosnian Serbs by depicting their enactment of barbarous practices towards the Bosniak population: "[they] have sought territorial gains by force and engaged in **systematic gross violations of human rights** and international humanitarian law, including the **barbarous practice of *"ethnic cleansing"***. There is the systematic detention and rape of Muslim women and girls" (NATO, 1992b: par. 2; emphasis added).

Although NATO's public statements during the war focused more on the operational dimension of the intervention, there are intertextual and contextual elements that help framing NATO's discourse about the Bosnian conflict into wider considerations about civilisational representations. Conceptions of time and space, for instance, had a critical influence in the representation and understanding of the conflict as a struggle for civilisation (Behnke, 2008; Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006). The suggestion here is that NATO discourses decisively contributed to a geopolitics of morality, implying that spatial representations were articulated in ways that defined the representations of values at the same time. On the one hand, NATO's intervention in BH is indeed geopolitical. Faced to a deadly conflict on "Europe's doorstep" (Beale, 1997: 2), the foreign policy decision-makers pragmatically applied what Gearóid Ó Tuathaíl calls a "common sense geopolitics" (1999: 113–114), that is, an inherited geographical knowledge of the world that is taught in educational

establishments, part of national identities, widely disseminated by the media, and in some cases ethnocentric and stereotypical. In the case of BH, this common sense geopolitics served to appeal to a practical spatial sense of the world, and frame certain issues within a cultural discourse in order to give sense to certain dramatic events. On the other hand, this geopolitical dimension is related to wider socio-cultural representations of the Balkans with deep value implications. Andreas Behnke (2008: 39–40) has portrayed NATO's treatment of BH as a "civilisatory project" that reproduces the metaphysics of security as one cultural identity, in a process of rearticulating the relation between security and cultural identity after the loss of a constitutive Other—the USSR. Within the particular temporal and spatial framing of the Bosnian war, the West is the place of peace, morality and unity, while Bosnia is the space of conflict, immorality and fragmentation. Time and space are also structured to absolve the West from any involvement in the violence and conflict in Yugoslavia in general, and Bosnia in particular (Behnke, 2008: 34). As a result, the Western narrative on BH presents it as a fixed spatial identity, where only the immediate context of the conflict is considered, and where the main focus of violence comes from a Serbian faction, depicted as senseless, disruptive, with no political objective (Behnke, 2008: 34–35), hence irrational and barbarian.

Lene Hansen (2006) has valuably documented the issue through a thorough discourse analysis. Hansen shows how the humanitarianist discourse of Western Europe on Bosnia evolved around two basic discourses—from the Balkan discourse to the Genocide discourse. In the Balkan discourse, the war was constituted as the product of ancient Balkan hatred, which was violent, tribal, hating, and backward, and unable to break those patterns toward civilised and Western forms of behaviour (Hansen, 2006: 85). From this perspective, responsibility rested in the equal parties of the conflict themselves, and the West could not resolve it based on this essentialist assumption that the Balkans had a natural orientation towards some form of barbarity. The existence of such discourse on the Balkans nonetheless contraries the anthropological findings of Anders Stefansson (2007), who shows that the Balkans have a long history of longing for Europe, in the sense inhabitants want to be considered as "real" Europeans. As he explains, the idea of Europe in the Balkans has a heavy symbolic weight that makes people to value and "strive to behave according to the ideals of the educated, refined, cultivated, knowledgeable and highly bourgeois European citizen" (Stefansson, 2007: 62). But as

reports of Serbian atrocities reached the Western media, a counter-discourse emerged, centred on the construction of the war as genocide. This Genocide discourse placed responsibility above the civilisational difference between the West and the Balkans, and motivated the West to end its policy of inaction and act towards the victims of the conflict (Hansen, 2006: 85, 98, 111). The Balkan space was rearticulated as a space of three factions by "separating a multicultural and democratic 'Bosnian victim' from a 'Serbian aggressor'" (Hansen, 2006: 85). In this sense, the ethno-political emphasis of the conflict served as a spatial reference for the Western representations of the civilised Self and barbarous Otherness for its enactment of responsibility. Put in other terms, the representation of the Balkans as an uncivilised space was artificially transposed onto the characteristics and behaviour of its population.

An important factor contributing to that radical discursive rearticulation of space, time and identities was the recourse to collective memory and to historical references of the Holocaust and WWII within the Genocide discourse. In the Bosnian war, the use of these memory discourses had an important role not only in representing the civilised Self and the barbarian Otherness, but also in defining the civilised subject of security. Andreas Huyssen (2000) has showed that since the 1980s memory discourses had been intensifying, energised by the expanding debate on the Holocaust and by media attention on the anniversaries of events linked to the history of Nazism and WWII. In that context, Huyssen even suggests that by the end of the 1990s, there was a certain "globalisation of the Holocaust discourse" and memory. Accordingly, the Holocaust is held as the symbol of failure of the project of Enlightenment, and also as a proof of Western civilisation's failure to reflect on its constitutive ability to live in peace with difference and Otherness, functioning as a metaphor for other traumatic histories and memories in historically distant and politically distinct from the original event (Huyssen, 2000: 22–24).

In the midst of the Bosnian war, Roy Gutman's publication of *A Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-Winning Dispatches on the "Ethnic Cleansing" of Bosnia* (1993) accounted for the appalling conditions of prisoners, their summary executions, mutilation, gang rapes, torture. Through the testimonies of eyewitnesses, official statements and photos, the representations of the camps in Gutman's investigative work contained analogies with Nazi Germany, reinforced by the statement of human rights abuses of an unseen dimension in Europe since Nazism: mass deportation, forced marches, regime of starvation, executions, abandonment to the

elements (Hansen, 2006: 161–162). Still in 1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, Elie Wiesel, a Nobel Prize Winner and Holocaust victim, would address US President Clinton in the following terms: "Mr. President, I cannot not tell you something. I have been in the former Yugoslavia last fall. I cannot sleep since what I have seen. As a Jew I am saying that. We must do something to stop the bloodshed in that country" (Wiesel, 1993 cit. in Beale, 1997: 15). Therefore, the Bosnian war vividly reminisced collective memory of past atrocities and humanitarian failures, to reveal an enemy that it was moral to fight as in "[a] Second World War-like Holocaust" making "possible the pleasure of moral supremacy, and the consequent thrill of administrating righteous violence" (Ó Tuathaíl, 2006: 363).

As an alliance born from the scourges of WWII, NATO obviously benefitted from an important symbolic capital in that matter, which it did not miss the opportunity to recall the world. When depicting how European and Americans each considered the situation in BH, SG Willy Claes referred at the end of the conflict that to the European Allies, "the haunting memory of the Balkans as the powderkeg of Europe was paramount—hence the emphasis on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, and the desire to avoid an intervention", while for the Americans, the emphasis was "on the moral aspect and the desire to assist the victims of aggression" (NATO, 1995c). These were clear references to critical moments of history for both Europeans and Americans, to whom the Bosnian conflict evoked the memories of their different participations in the world wars. For the Europeans, it was WWI, born from the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in 1914. For the Americans, following a tradition coming from the Cold War, both world wars constituted a memory element in political discourses, which President Bill Clinton clearly reminded as an act of sacrifice leading to the triumph over tyranny:

> After World War I, we pulled back from the world, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred. After World War II, we continued to lead the world. We made the commitments that kept the peace, that helped to spread democracy, that created unparalleled prosperity and that brought victory in the Cold War. (Clinton cit. in CNN, 1995)

Through these timeless parallelisms, the moral legitimacy of Allied members participating in past conflicts was linked to that of the present. The underlying rationale is anachronistic, as it presupposes that what was

morally done by Western allies in the past shall repeat itself in the present or the future. Moreover, in combination with the timeless morality of the intervening parties, the conflict itself suffered from a particular play of temporality that is related to the very Balkanisation of the conflict. According to David Campbell, the understanding of ethnic and nationalist conflicts as the irremediable failure of human nature leads to the idea that "there is nothing that can be done in the present", but to repress, ignore or idealistically apply the logic of reason to resolve them (1996: 173–174). As he further explains, the conflict was represented with a "timeless quality" that blurred the understanding of its causes, because ethnicity and nationalism tended to be treated as *natural* developments of historical animosities and earlier conflicts, when in fact they can be thought of as "questions of history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals" (Campbell, 1996: 174). In this sense, a chaotic human nature and history would be at the origin of the Bosnian war, with its barbarous practices. In BH, identities appear diffuse, heterogeneous, decentralised; there are no Bosnian citizens that are representative of one single or homogenous identity. NATO refers to "Bosnians", "Bosnian Croats", or "Serbian Bosnians". The spatial entity NATO sought to preserve did not have a corresponding identity (Behnke, 2008: 35).

"Unfortunately, **we failed** to recognize the fact that **former Yugoslavia was not some side-show** but rather the main arena in which **the rules of the game for the post-Cold War security order were being established**" (SG Willy Claes cit. in NATO, 1995c; emphasis added). Whilst acknowledging the *failure* of the "we" in allowing that ethnic cleansing could still be possible on the margins of Europe, this statement also symbolises the West's assumption of a responsibility in failing at the civilising process of former Yugoslavia. Definitely, it could not be clearer in indicating the essential requirements of the civilising process: *post-Cold War security order*. BH represented a decentralised heterogeneous space that was the core challenge of the post-Cold War rearrangement of interdependence and order. Attempting to overcome these conditions by focusing on the Individualisation of Security was thus a step towards civilisation. For that, the post-conflict phase is critical for observing how NATO performed the psychosocial management of the Bosnian environment and subjects of security.

The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on 14 December 1995, with an immediate priority upon the human component of the conflict: implementing human rights, and enabling the return of all displaced

persons and refugees. But Dayton also redrew the boundary lines of BH and made official the existence of two separated entities within a single independent state: the Serb Republic, and the Muslim-Croat Federation (Hansen, 2006: 108; Price, 2002: 144). "In this way, the peace agreement endorsed the territorialisation of the constituent peoples of Bosnia and therefore also the main result of war and ethnic cleansing" (Bougarel et al., 2007: 6).[2]

Seemingly, after a "textbook demonstration of the use of limited force in the service of diplomacy" (1995c), to recall on the words of SG Claes, NATO's role in BH was to remain subaltern to that of international diplomacy. But Dayton created the Implementation Force (IFOR), a new international force of 60,000 troops under NATO command to "secure the peace" (Clinton cit. in CNN, 1995), which would be renamed the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) one year later. This provision gave NATO "complete control of military activity within the state", including competences that went well beyond that of military duties, such as monitoring security conditions for the electoral process, humanitarian missions, boundary-lines changes (Chandler, 2000: 44–45). In October 1995, NATO SG had already introduced the idea that a post-operation presence was necessary. The success of Deliberate Force as a permanent achievement in terms of security and stability needed to be complemented by a "NATO peace implementation force on the ground", in light of the continuing *responsibilities* to secure the peace and thus guarantee an independent Bosnia. NATO's presence was not to be indefinite though, as an exit strategy was supposed to limit NATO's mission in scope and duration (SG Willy Claes cit. in NATO, 1995c). In other words, NATO's military mandate had in hands the securing of a disposition of peace with important and complex socio-demographic dynamics.

In this context, and to overcome the "Overemphasis on institutional and electoral issues" and approaches from above found in some literature on postwar BH (Bougarel et al., 2007: 13), the discussion now turns to the subjects of security. How were the civilians in BH made secure? How did NATO protect and enhance their security? But also, who were they? This last question relates to the fact that NATO discourses during the conflict predominantly referred to the victims of ethnic cleansing as the main referents of security. In this sense, the Bosnian subject of security was represented as the Bosnian victim of Serbian violence. Lene Hansen (2006) brings interesting nuances to the conceptualisation of this Bosnian subject of security. To her, the Bosnian subject is a "dual subject": while

the leaders were the responsible because of their Balkanness, the innocent civilians were ambiguously located as both a product of the Balkans and distinct from their leaders, but without being civilised though. They were rather the result of a "negative difference to their Balkan leaders" (Hansen, 2006: 112). Hansen further explains that, because the civilians are held as non-political and non-military, as soon as they take action, they are moved from the privileged innocent space of civilians, to that of the political parties. As a consequence, the Bosnian subject is no longer embraced by the responsibility of the West and is depoliticised: "In short, the humanitarian responsibility discourse constitutes responsibility as applicable to a passive subject only" (Hansen, 2006: 113). From this perspective, the premise is that being an innocent civilian in BH is not an indicator of civilisation. He is just *not responsible* for barbarian acts because the leaders are, and he remains so as long as he remains passive. But he still represents the Balkans, a place of deeply entrenched uncivilised behaviour, hence his duality.

Furthermore, it is worth reflecting on some of the strategies NATO adopted and co-participated in BH after the conflict. One critical point is provided by Pascale Siegel (1998) in a study on the information activities in peace operations—commonly known as "psyop"—led by NATO in BH from December 1995 to 1997. Although it is an official NATO term, the expression "psychological operations" was not used. Siegel elaborates on how NATO planners implemented a campaign targeted at the local population of BH designed to shape attitudes and behaviour in favour of IFOR troops and operations. The campaign was called the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC) and it was conducted by PSYOPS forces according to NATO's specific doctrine for peace support psychological activities (Siegel, 1998: 67).[3] The primary mission of the PSYOPS Activities was to "deter armed resistance and hostile behaviour against IFOR/SFOR troops and operations" (Siegel, 1998: 79). Considered as the motor of socio-political change, the Bosnian population was shown how elected leaders should behave in a democratic country, in order to raise people's expectations towards their leaders (Siegel, 1998: 81). To that end, the operations consisted of diverse media and communication activities, including for example a newspaper, a monthly youth magazine, radio stations, television spots, but most importantly it entailed "step-by-step psychological processes to entice attitudinal changes" (Siegel, 1998: 72). This was achieved by exposing the local population to selected messages, specific sequences of ideas, to create an acceptable alternative course of action in the mind of the target audience. For instance, explanatory pamphlets would not

mention rejections or polemical statements by the leaders, because persuasion was deemed more important than informing (Siegel, 1998: 75–76). Although messages were presented in a specific sequence to obtain cumulative effects leading to behavioural change, IFOR and SFOR PSYOP campaigns were not adapted to the local populations' media consumption habits (Siegel, 1998: 76–77).

Another peculiar sector of activity performed by the SFOR has been explored by Monroe Price, regarding the management of memory by the SFOR and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) after the conflict, in what he considers to be one of the "most comprehensive possible catalogues of the exercise of authority" (2002: 151). As he explains, the OHR established a media strategy in BH to control and manage them in their communication process, which was based on the Allies' postwar experience in Germany, thus mobilising WWII memories against the broadcasters (Price, 2002: 150–151). The efforts led by these international organisations with military authority were to "change perceptions of the present through manipulation of a sense of history", to shape memory, to "reconstruct consciousness" (Price, 2002: 138, 144). In practice, to counter the local propaganda that emphasised the past hostility between ethnic groups and instigated fear of extermination, standards for existing stations were established, while other stations were closed down (Price, 2002: 142–143, 151).

Both the psychological operations led by the IFOR for shaping attitudes and behaviour through persuasion of local population in BH, and the management of memory by the SFOR and OHR appear as nothing but an artificial process of pacification through inculcated psychological mechanisms. These aim clearly at developing civilised habiti regarding self-restraint and acceptance in face of an international presence, as well as appropriate political expectations and standards. In this sense, the IFOR primarily assumed that the Bosnian population was lacking basic civilised habiti, preventing them from voting adequately for the "right" reasons and for the "right" politician. This can be seen as the IFOR performing an education in democracy for non-socialised partners. In relation to the management of memory, the Genocide discourse combined with the past historic references to WWII perpetuated a sense of guilt and served as constraining tools.

NATO's post-conflict military presence aimed primarily at internal stability for the realisation of free elections, security and democratisation. However, the two examples referred above point to an involvement that

overcame the mere military mandate, and rather encompassed sensible activities focused on psychosocial conditions of the local population. In this sense, the Bosnian subject of security for whom NATO acted under the SFOR is one that is on the process of becoming civilised, through the inculcation of democratic values that correspond to the liberal model of statehood. Clearly, identity issues in BH were rather immobilised in time and in the memories of the subjects, rather than reconciled, or made cohabitable on the basis of sharing and tolerance, while ideological models were actively being implemented into the psyches. Oliver Richmond (2014: 87–88) has critically enhanced how the state and peacebuilding processes initiated by the Dayton Agreement applied a "mainstream state-formation understanding of a power struggle between ethnic groups", which ultimately made BH more ethnically polarised, and its political agendas increasingly separatist, and not less. Richmond further emphasizes that the neoliberal model of statehood has been *unable* to reconcile pluralism, either ethnic or material, and rather been absorbed by the need to sustain a status quo world order (Richmond, 2014: 88). However, in the case of NATO, it does not seem to be a matter of mere *inability*, but rather of total lack of purpose. To quote David Campbell, "The West's inability to act in pursuit of a political goal in Bosnia stems from its unwillingness to make multiculturalism that goal", which would require opting for the highly-contested and controversed topic of plurality among Western nations (Campbell, 1996: 176). Could NATO's narratives and discourses about the war have focused on reconciliation through multiculturalism and plurality? Although this was an option, there is an ultimate fact about NATO that makes the hypothesis quite illusory, which is its intrinsic deficiency towards multiculturalism.

NATO is *not* multicultural; it transpires and proclaims the Western values whenever and wherever it has the opportunity to do so, as a defensive alliance that expands through civilising practices. It is important to stress that this is only *one* valuing choice among many possible others; opting for multiculturalism for instance could have had important repercussions towards the realisation of the "civilisational constellations" ambitioned by Gerard Delanty (2003), where the option of cultural and identity openness takes over closure. Instead, static notions of ethics, responsibility, identity and culture have prevailed and defined NATO's post-Cold War becoming. NATO's intervention in BH defines itself through what it was and essentially did: a gradually muscular intervention through airpower that ended a civil war to then help implement and stabilise the same basic

insecurities through a military presence involved in the psychosocial and ideological transformation of the local population.

Ethno-religious identity was portrayed as the main social divider in BH during and after the war, reviving many cultural stereotypes and giving them new meanings. But new socio-demographic and spatial issues arose after the conflict, calling the cultural representations into question and enhancing the complex reconciliation at stake between different identities. There is anthropological literature that has shown there are various other factors underlying socio-cultural cleavages to be considered in postwar BH (Bougarel et al., 2007). These involve, for example, wider Bosnian assumptions of a ranking among cultural mentalities placing urban as cultured behaviour, and rural as non-cultured, which contraries many studies that portray ethno-religious identity as the paramount social division in BH (Stefansson, 2007: 59–60).[4] Another example has to do with the intense longing for security of displaced Sarajevan Serbs, who have sought to re-visit Sarajevo after the war; their narratives and spatial practices illustrate the importance played by geography and imagined territorialities for transcending the ethnic boundaries previously erected (Armakolas, 2007: 98). Finally, the presence of Westerners and internationals working in postwar BH has seemingly complexified the identity issue, as they have created new physical and symbolic boundaries between themselves and the local society, reproducing prejudices about the lack of competence or the cultural deficits of the local population in their attempt to restore the authority of the Bosnian state (Coles, 2007).

In all, the outcome of the war resulted in complex socio-demographic conditions that aroused issues of perception regarding cultural and social hierarchy and also marginalisation. In that context, although the feeling of security for the Bosnian subject was crucial and constituted the primary motive for humanitarian intervention, NATO, among other international agents, made it secondary and contributed mainly to rearranging the conditions in which democratic statehood could be achieved. The individual referent of security that legitimated an international intervention in the first place was rather managed as the recipient of ideological policies, more than thoroughly secured as a humanitarian subject of security.

9.2 Kosovo: The "Allied Force"

In 1999, NATO SG Javier Solana referred that "the end of ideological confrontation" did not mean the end of violence and hostility (cit. in NATO, 1999a), as much as the end of a specific conjunctural time did not

mean the end of history. The time of ideological confrontation was rather replaced with a continuous history ruled by the same "scenes of cruelty and human suffering" from the past that seemed to make an "unwelcome comeback in the nineties" (ibid.). Seen from the perspective of security, the end of the "cold" bipolar insecurity did not mean renewed security. Instead, insecurity continued under different shapes, indifferent to time.

NATO's Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo fairly resulted from cumulated experience and discourses, both from its recent involvement in BH and from its forty years of existence, managed with a mixture of openness and closure, managed by both assertiveness and uncertainty, or an "assertive uncertainty". After Bosnia, Kosovo may be considered as the intervention that decisively made NATO to evolve into a key humanitarianist actor, moving up from sanctions enforcement, to limited and sustained air strikes, and finally to the deployment of a large-scale peacekeeping operation, which also called the Alliance to resolve on critical matters such as what role to assume as a regional crisis manager, how to justify intervention, how to produce an internal consensus, or how to use force in the service of diplomacy (Sperling & Webber, 2009: 494–495).

Kosovo was a province of the Serb Republic with a very symbolic importance to Milosevic's regime; with its numerous historical sites, and Serbian Orthodox churches, it was considered the cradle of Serbian civilisation (Lake, 2009: 104). Alex Bellamy has reviewed the trajectory of decline in the value of human life in Kosovo between 1974 and 1999, to show that after the 1974 Constitution, the Kosovar Albanians were widely portrayed as "inhuman savages, a gang of terrorists and rapists hell-bent on irredentism and genocide" (2000: 122). Bellamy further explains that as these views began to inform rulers in Belgrade, the Serbian leadership acted accordingly by stripping a whole community of its citizenship, political existence, basic rights, and identity, so that Kosovar Albanians were excluded from all forms of public life. After what Bellamy considers to have been years of dehumanisation of each group by the other, when the conflict broke out in 1998–1999, Serb paramilitary groups "committed atrocities on a massive and systematic scale, killing at least 20,000 Kosovar Albanians and maybe as many as 50,000" (Bellamy, 2000: 120).

Human rights issues in Kosovo had not been addressed at the end of the war in BH, and the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the 1990s aimed at using violence to overthrow the Serbian regime

(Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 98). In March 1998, Milosevic decided to crack down on the KLA and the Kosovar Albanians, and as the crisis unfolded in mid-1998, NATO planners and members started to consider the military options for dealing with the problem (Stigler, 2002: 127). In late February 1999 a final diplomatic solution to the crisis was proposed at Rambouillet (France), which consisted of an agreement requiring that the Yugoslav government permit NATO to monitor the safe return of Albanian Kosovars to the region. The conditions included the complete surrender of control over Kosovo, the transfer of Kosovo to NATO administration, an occupying force of 28,000 NATO troops with free movement throughout Yugoslavia, a final settlement within three years, and a referendum on the status of Kosovo within Yugoslavia (Lake, 2009: 105). But negotiations failed and Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet Agreement in March 1999, as he seemed to doubt of the Alliance's willingness to fight for Kosovo and of the credibility of its threats (Allen & Vincent, 2011: 15; Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 98; Stigler, 2002). On 22 March 1999, US special envoy to the Balkans, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, met with President Milosevic to discuss the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, and made clear to him that the consequences of his refusal to surrender control of Kosovo to NATO would be grave. To this, Milosevic responded: "Yes, you will bomb us" (Lake, 2009: 83). After this failure, as the Serbs launched "Operation Horseshoe" designed to rid Kosovo of its Albanian population in brutal ways (Bellamy, 2000: 121), NATO decided to use coercive air power to force the Serbs to make concession over Kosovo (Allen & Vincent, 2011: 8).

On 24 March 1999, the bombing campaign began to halt ethnic violence directed at Kosovar Albanians. OAF was launched on humanitarian grounds. It represents in fact the apotheosis of NATO's post-Cold War politics of humanitarianism, calling upon a collective consciousness regarding humanitarian interventions, mostly by overcoming the principle of territorial sovereignty and by challenging international law and the UN Charter on the topic of the non-defensive use of force (Falk, 2002: 68–69). Despite its humanitarian grounds, NATO's legal basis for intervention was very weak and contested, which makes it all the more unique. Formally, OAF was unauthorised by the UNSC, but justifiable and supported by some previous UNSC Resolutions directed at the Serb government, and general international law stating that military intervention against another state could be justified in cases of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, such as humanitarian distress on large scale (Roberts, 1999: 102–106).

UN SG Kofi Annan expressed at the time his disapproval of NATO acting without UNSC authorisation, whilst affirming the need for intervention as well. The arguments presented by Annan then were that state sovereignty had been redefined in that states were now understood as the instruments at the service of people, and that abusive states could not precede the people in the light of the renewed consciousness of individual rights (Moore, 2002: 20). This is all to say that NATO's intervention was legally acceptable, as long as the humanitarian reasons rose above all other considerations, which is an actual illustration of how "Liberal values perceived to be absolute prevailed over established procedural norms of the international community", thus legitimating the consensual decision of a security community of democratic states (Bunde & Noetzel, 2010: 305). In this sense, there is as an undeniable ideological stance in surpassing established procedural norms of the international community, which contradicts the idea, conveyed by NATO, that there is no ideological confrontation in the post-Cold War period. The difference here lies in the confrontation occurring at the level of areas of influence, to define realms of interventions in different cultural spaces.

In operational terms, OAF was strictly conducted through airpower. The threat of a ground occupation at Rambouillet had not produced many effects on Milosevic, which is why airpower is seen as the major means of deterrence and coercion in Kosovo, in addition to other economic and diplomatic pressures (Allen & Vincent, 2011: 3; Byman & Waxman, 2000; Stigler, 2002). From March to May 1999, the frequency and intensity of NATO strikes increased; with an average number of sorties per day climbing from 100 to 300, the target list also expanded to include dual-use infrastructure, such as bridges, communications, power-generating facilities and factories owned by regime members and supporters, which also had a real impact on the daily lives of Serbian population and economy (Lake, 2009: 106–107).

With a zero casualty conflict for the NATO forces, OAF branded a "Western way of war", one that "must not touch the West physically", which in Kosovo implied no troops on the ground, a fight from the air for minimum Allied casualties, followed by an actual occupation after the cessation of hostilities (Shaw, 2005: 77–78). Besides, it was also the affirmation of what James Der Derian calls a "virtuous war" for its "technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance—*with no or minimal casualties*" (Der Derian, 2000: 772; emphasis in the original). In fact, supporting Der Derian's

claim that virtuous wars are dominated by constant mediatisation that promotes "a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars" (ibid.), NATO's public management of the operation was unprecedented. OAF was so highly mediatised, that press conferences and briefings were conducted on an almost daily basis, either by NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea, by military commanders or the SG himself.[5] The media and the public could assist to the spectacle of NATO's intervention and accompany very closely its developments. This included, for example, considerations on the state of the weather in Yugoslavia (NATO, 1999c), as well as other communications focusing in detail on the pilots' preparation, performance, and management of timetables, thus providing a very technical, yet humanised, account of the process behind the attacks (Shea cit. in NATO, 1999e). Given the aforementioned legal conditions surrounding NATO's intervention in Kosovo, such detailed mediatisation may be seen as an ethical compensation through enhanced procedural transparency, ensuring some form of moral legitimacy.

9.2.1 The Ultimate Responsibility for Barbarity: History Repeating?

NATO's intervention in Kosovo thus consecrates much more emphatically than in BH the importance of individual security, human security and human rights into the Alliance's discourse and policies, backed by those of its most prominent members' leaders. However, the case of Kosovo still displays many discursive similarities to BH, intertwining discourses on the Balkans, responsibility, ethnic cleansing and memory.

There are many examples of the justifications advanced for the intervention early in the beginning of OAF. For SG Solana, the operation was "directed against the repressive policies of the Yugoslav government", whose leader President Milosevic was the sole responsible for the crisis, and which was "refusing to respect civilized norms of behaviour" in the late twentieth-century Europe (SG Solana cit. in NATO, 1999b). In the words of SACEUR General Clark (1999) as well, the responsibility for the conflict was sitting "squarely on Milosevic's shoulders", his regime being the sole source of hatred, brutality and suffering to the country and his people, with values coming "from an era of the darkest past" that had "no place in today's world". Allied leaders such as Tony Blair and Bill Clinton also agreed on Milosevic's responsibility and disclaimed the need to protect the lives of innocent people in Kosovo from barbarism and ethnic

cleansing, equating their action to the protection of values and interests, in a preventive act that had the experience of two world wars in a century as a central reference (Blair cit. in The Guardian, 1999; Clinton cit. in BBC, 1999).

The narrative surrounding NATO's intervention in Kosovo is quite consensual: the sole responsibility for the ethnic cleansing of innocent people from Kosovo lies in Milosevic, the barbarian leader with previous record of brutal wars in former Yugoslavia, who consistently refuses to abide by civilised norms of behaviour. Faced to that, the "we"—NATO members—acts to prevent history from repeating itself, that is, they act to prevent past atrocities of the two world wars from happening again, because the Balkans have this reputation of an uncivilised habitus that brings instability to the rest of Europe: "We act also because we know […] that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans **inevitably spills over into the whole of it**, and affects the rest of Europe too" (Blair cit. in The Guardian, 1999; emphasis added). But differently from Bosnia, this narrative focuses much more directly on Milosevic, insisting on the enemy de-responsibilisation, on the manipulation of the Serb state media, and contrasting it with the Alliance being under constant pressure of justification to the media and public opinion (Shea cit. in NATO, 1999c). A sort of role-play is thereby performed by NATO, in which a sense of moral pressure is delivered to transparently explain and justify each and every of its acts. This includes civilian casualties by the Alliance that are nonetheless promptly obfuscated by Milosevic's total lack of justification in front of the public, and responsibility in deliberately harming civilians (SACEUR General Clark, 1999).

In this context, other discursive tools may be found in NATO's narrative on Kosovo that have already been approached earlier, and which prolifically contributed to enhance the Alliance's symbolic power in humanitarian interventions, with a civilisational might appealing to the collective unconscious. One of them, for example, is the association to Christian values and to the spiritual authority of the Vatican, which Jamie Shea appropriately managed to recall in one of his briefings to the press when mentioning the atrocious numbers of ethnic cleansing (cit. in NATO, 1999c). Another more frequent reference, already verified in the case of BH, is related to the memory of WWII and the Holocaust. Here, discourse mixes Balkans, genocide and memory in a positivist approach of time that is best performed by the US Ally:

> **Sarajevo,** the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where **World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region**. […] Just imagine if **leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die.**
>
> **[…]**
>
> Two million Bosnians became refugees. This was **genocide in the heart of Europe—not in 1945, but in 1995**. Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve. (Clinton cit. in BBC, 1999; emphasis added)

President Clinton's words basically suggest that if it happened there once, it will happen twice. Andreas Huyssen has explained that the legitimation of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo largely depended on this reference to the Holocaust memory, mobilising a "politics of guilt in Europe and the United States associated with non-intervention in the 1930s and 1940s" (2000: 23). So again, and similarly to the discourses of the 1950s exposed in Sect. 6.2, and to those on BH as well, the values at stake in Kosovo transcended the specific period of the operation. NATO's long-lasting values were actually consecrated by OAF, at a pivotal moment in the Organisation's history. To SG Solana, as for other secretary-generals before him, the relevance of NATO's founding values was timeless, but 1999 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Alliance, and the reference to its founding year was highly symbolic:

> 50 years ago, the signatories of the Washington Treaty vowed "to safeguard the **freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples**, founded on the **principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law**." **These values are as relevant today as they were in 1949**. […] To stand idly by while a brutal campaign of forced deportation, torture and murder is going on in the heart of Europe would have meant declaring **moral bankruptcy**. **Now, as in 1949, we are called upon to demonstrate that values are not only something to be preached, but upheld**. (SG Solana cit. in NATO, 1999d; emphasis added)

Those values are in fact so vital that they needed to be defended from Slobodan Milosevic, the "brutal political leader" who "deliberately engineered hatred", a kind of hatred belonging to the past that was encapsulated in time and moved to the present by the hands of Milosevic. In this sense, defending those values was an enterprise equivalent to defending

the minority of Albanian Kosovars, who ultimately impersonate the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, as Solana insisted in his speech (ibid.). This has important implications, not only in face of the lessons drawn from a recent History—Holocaust of WWII—but also from a more distant past, an uncivilised time.

The year after OAF, at a time when revisionism was the Alliance's main challenge (NATO, 2000a, 2000b), symbolic references regularly empowered the civilisational narrative. NATO's new SG Lord Robertson would recall on the motives and accomplishments of the intervention by situating it spatially and temporally in "The last year of the twentieth century, in the heart of Europe, two hours flight from Paris, a few hours drive to Budapest, houses with satellite TV—and the savagery of the Middle Ages" (cit. in NATO, 2000a). In the time of modernity, the time of civilised norms, in the "heart of Europe", so close to civilised spaces of Paris and Budapest, Kosovo was perceived as a return to the "savagery of Middle Ages", a "regression to Europe's darkest days", where the vision of deportation trains meant a retrocession to both uncivilised time and behaviour (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000b). The savagery and the darkness of the crisis in Kosovo could nonetheless be countered by NATO the "saviour", in the persons of SG Lord Robertson and General Clark, the hero-like figures acclaimed by the children of Poklek, who could now go back to their new school, and speak in their native language again (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000a).

The postwar phase is much more expressive in the representation of the Kosovar subject of security, who is mainly related to the figure of the Kosovar refugee, but who is also dually constructed, as in the case of BH. Hence, the Kosovar subject of security is framed within a "refugee discourse" that was much more concerned with the containment of population flows than with their actual security. After Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms on 3 June 1999, the crisis was brought to an end, and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed to implement the peace settlement. KFOR's mission was to establish a military presence aimed at securing the overall environment in Kosovo, at the level of potential renewed hostilities, the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees, but also at providing initial basic civil administration and other non-military functions pending the arrival of international organisations and control the borders (NATO, 2009). Notably, the exit strategy for Kosovo was pondered quite differently from Bosnia's: "Crisis management in today's Europe means long-term engagement—I know of no

crisis that was resolved by debating exit strategies" (SG Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000b).

Now, the refugee discourse assumed two different shades. One may be verified before and during OAF in the discourses of Western leaders enhancing the high numbers of refugees (1 million) spread across Europe (The Guardian, 1999), threatening the stability of neighbouring countries (BBC, 1999). As for NATO, the refugees were referred to as the object of the intervention, with the priority of getting them back to their home, and were discussed in relation to the count of thousands of people crossing borders, to the living conditions at the camps, and to the reports of atrocities committed at them (NATO, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e). The second manifestation of the refugee discourse in Kosovo occurred *after* OAF, in which the figure of the refugee constitutes a criterion for measuring NATO's operational success: "At the end of the day, Serb forces were out, KFOR was in, and the refugees were home. This is as good a definition of success as you can get" (SG Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000b). Here, objective numbers were evoked: 1.3 million refugees and IDP went back to their home, 50,000 houses were rebuilt (ibid.). From then on, responsibilities were cast as the obligation to condition NATO's support "[o]n the progress made by the Kosovars themselves", who now had to understand "[t]hat is they who bear the ultimate responsibility for Kosovo's future" (ibid.). However, it is interesting to observe how both moments of the refugee discourse are interconnected in time. The initial focus upon the threatening aspect of refugees still mattered when it came to justify the intervention a posteriori, whereas *not* taking action would have "[g]uaranteed turmoil and undermined the security balance in Southeast Europe for years, if not decades", with million refugees stranding in neighbouring countries, spreading the conflict to all the continent (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000a). Retrospectively, NATO's discourse now mentioned the instability underlying the flow of refugees in Europe, as the potential for "ripple effects" and insecurity is equalled ("like") to the spread of "scattered refugees" (ibid.). This goes in the sense of Jim Whitman's (2000) argument that the unprecedented response to the refugee crisis in Kosovo was mostly motivated by a concern in containing the refugees within the region and in maintaining political support to the military campaign against Serbia, and not based on concerns with human rights. Very sceptical of any genuine humanitarian reasoning in Kosovo, Whitman refers that the issue of the Kosovar refugees had been a problem for the Italian government since 1997, which had even declared the state of

emergency regarding the public danger represented by the incoming flux of refugees from Kosovo, ending up repatriating most of them (Whitman, 2000: 167). Accordingly, there would be an undeniable biopolitical concern ruling the humanitarian rationale as well. Therefore, the Kosovar subject of security is restrained in the duality of his character as an innocent victim of an uncivilised political leader on the one hand (just like the Bosnian subject), and of his character as a biopolitical element threating the stability of a civilised European core.

Against this background, it is hard not to reflect on NATO's timeless narrative on values, and question how those values can be articulated with the biopolitical dimension of humanitarianism. When looking into SG Robertson's depiction of NATO's success in stopping a "profound evil", as a success of "our values, A success for the project of building a just and peaceful Euro-Atlantic community. A success for the safety and security of future generations" (cit. in NATO, 2000a), one is striked by its sound egocentrism. In fact, in the light of unsuspected humanitarian reasons, assessing Kosovo's "challenges of success" could have focused on the individuals' emancipation or security, for example. Instead, success was portrayed in terms of a fruitful projection of the values of the Self. The discourses on the refugees, framed in a duality of humanitarian and biopolitical concerns, elude the cosmopolitan appreciation of humanitarianism, and rather point to the political and symbolic value of individuals' lives in out-of-area countries to shape the understanding of which values are the ones that must prevail. In Kosovo, NATO could uphold its values, project them into the future of any other unstable neighbouring state, and continue the process of civilisation.

Similarly to BH, this process was equally sustained by psychological operations (PSYOPS). Although official material regarding PSYOPS is hard to find within NATO sources, the most frequent source of information in that concern is related to the US Ally's governmental and military sources. In the US, PSYOPS are only one element of the broader field of operations called "Information Operations", among others such as electronic warfare, military deception, operations security, or computer network operations (Romanych & Krumm, 2004: 56). Information Operations aspire to "[a]ffect or defend information systems, and influence decision-making", so they are a key contribution to the "commander's effort to achieve information superiority" (ibid.), which is particularly important in contexts such as Kosovo's, where the support of the population is rather divided between areas of cultural influence. But the PSYOPS

team specifically focused on "[i]nfluencing the attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of Kosovo's indigenous populace", by conducting loudspeaker and face-to-face operations, and producing "[h]andbills, posters, and other print products as well as radio and TV programming" (Romanych & Krumm, 2004: 59).

For example, in a US Department of Defense (DoD) report entitled *The creation and dissemination of all forms of information in support of psychological operations (PSYOP) in time of military conflict*, what may be seen as an official governmental-level definition of PSYOPS is expressed in these terms:

> [t]he goal of PSYOP is to **influence the behavior of the target audience**. This presumes that the goal can be accomplished by **influencing their perceptions**. Critical, of course, is the **theme of the message**. But equally important is the **packaging of the message**, which must be suitable for the target audience and the dissemination media of choice. (DoD, 2000: 23; emphasis added)

PSYOPS are presented as particularly successful in BH and Kosovo, namely radio broadcasts are considered to have worked acceptably, while TV broadcasts were not satisfactory (DoD, 2000: 7, 49). The report also identifies some weaknesses and shortcomings of US military PSYOPS forces in Kosovo, such as their Cold War-oriented structure, often antiquated equipment, and inadequacy of PSYOP planning support to the geographic CINC (DoD, 2000: 21). Indeed, during the campaign, many leaflets were launched from the air by NATO forces, some of which are partially transcripted hereafter[6]:

1. "No fuel, no power, no trade, no freedom, no future—Milosevic. How long will you suffer for Milosevic? […] Don't let Milosevic hold you hostage to his atrocities".
2. "Attention VJ Forces! […] Remain in Kosovo and face certain death, or leave your unit and your equipment, and get out of Kosovo now. If you choose to stay, NATO will relentlessly attack you from every direction. The choice is yours. NATO".
3. "[…] Thousands of innocent and unarmed people are feared dead. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing Milosevic's ***pogrom*** [sic]. Do not allow misguided patriotism to bind you to his atrocities. […] NATO remains resolved to Defend the Defenseless in Kosovo-Mehtohija".

These examples of NATO leaflets clearly portray Milosevic as the personification of the barbarous enemy, whose partisans may choose to follow or not, when faced to NATO's threat of relentless attack. The atrocities are perceived to belong exclusively to Milosevic, in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of his partisans. The innocent, unarmed, defenceless people NATO claims to be defending are not endowed with that possibility of choosing.

The case for PSYOPS in Kosovo reveal how, even after BH, the Balkans were not only perceived as a threat by NATO, as they also represented an opportunity for the West to play on its self-perception again, to project its values, to re-experience their validity and even superiority (Burgess, 2011: 123). The deep issues of cultural identity at stake in Kosovo actually recall what James Der Derian terms a "mimetic war", in which there is a struggle of perceptions, images and discourses, which imitates and represents characters of friendliness and enemy: "People go to war because of […] how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves" (Der Derian, 2009: 271). The centrality of perceptions, representation, and meanings is all the more evident as they indicate the importance of behavioural change for NATO's permanence in Kosovo. Hence, without the local belief that regime change was indeed necessary, and the corresponding enactment of democratic social practices, NATO could not solidify its argument for a protracted involvement in Kosovo. OAF did more than display NATO's force and assertiveness in defying and pressuring international law and public opinion; it operated at a deeper unconscious level. Not only did it mediatise intensively the mission for a reproduction of moral legitimacy and a dissemination of a particular representation of international security, as it also used PSYOPS to civilise the habiti of the local subjects in order to change their perception of their own security.

9.3 Afghanistan: Taking Command of ISAF

NATO's involvement in Afghanistan surges as a direct consequence of the post-9/11 US-led invasion. Since then, the Alliance has suffered an existential crisis, in part because of fundamental internal disagreements over the security interests at stake in Afghanistan (Sperling & Webber, 2009: 501). To Gheciu (2008: 79), this is in part because it has sought to redefine its role through a renewed effort to deepen and expand the Western security community via the promotion of liberal-democratic norms.

The attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Centre in New York are generally held as a paradigmatic event, comparable to the end of the Cold War, changing security in many parts of the world. Literature on the continuities and discontinuities provoked by 9/11 is so abundant and diversified that attempting to compile it has become redundant. In fact, borrowing on James Der Derian's words, "[t]here is very little about 9/11 that is *safe* to say. […] it is intellectually difficult and even politically dangerous to assess the meaning of a conflict that phase-shifted with every news cycle […]" (Der Derian, 2009: 264). However, critical aspects have remained as a legacy of 9/11 and its management by US foreign policy, which have broadened the study of IR and security studies to include more assiduously questions of risk, migration, ethnic profiling, securitisation, exceptionalism and biopolitics, among others (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Booth & Dunne, 2002; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Jackson, 2005; Neocleous, 2007, 2011).

Although elaborating specifically on international terrorism and on how 9/11 changed international security is not the goal of this section, those phenomena are nonetheless what prompted the political conditions that enabled NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. Put synthetically, the USA launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on 7 October 2001 with the help and support of a coalition of free-willing nations. Its immediate objective was to pursue those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, eradicate Bin Laden's network, and take action against the Taliban regime that sponsored him (Flockhart, 2012: 90–91). OEF was justified by the US according to a "[t]wo-track approach of national interest-based counterterrorism alongside so-called humanitarian relief efforts" (Holland & Aaronson, 2014: 8), which implied, primarily, that the language of national security sustained the need to avoid a second 9/11; secondarily, that the terrorist nature of the Taliban regime and its human rights abuses arose as an additional concern. There has been critical research suggesting that, despite US administration's claims that avoiding civilian casualties was a top priority, OEF launched such a fulminant campaign upon vulnerable civilians that the number of casualties only outdo the principles of justness, proportionality, morality and responsibility of the operation (Benini & Moulton, 2004; Conetta, 2002; Wheeler, 2002).

As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked for the first time in its history the Article 5 of its Charter, which not only meant that the attacks on the US represented an attack on all members of the Alliance, as "It also testified to our recognition that what had been attacked, in

addition to thousands of innocent people, were the values on which our societies are based" (NATO, 2001b: par. 1). In practical terms, this implied Article 5 could be stretched beyond territorial defence to include defence against terrorism, which involved increasing intelligence cooperation, overflight rights, deploying naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, and the provision of AWACS planes to the US (De Nevers, 2007: 37). On 8 October 2001, the day after the US and the UK began the military intervention in Afghanistan, NATO SG Lord Robertson expressed the Alliance's military support and readiness for consultation and defensive measures if necessary, and thus specified: "This operation is not directed against the people of Afghanistan. It is designed to strike against al-Qaida terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan" (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2001a).

Terrorism had been acknowledged in NATO's new Strategic Concept of 1991 (par. 12), and then recalled in that of 1999 (par. 24) as a risk possibly affecting the Alliance's security interests in the post-Cold War context, to which arrangements for consultation and response coordination already existed (NATO, 1991: par. 12). In this sense, and in the light of what has been seen so far regarding NATO's openness to change and management of conjunctural temporality, the novelty of NATO's performance within the context of the global counter-terrorist effort lies in a "[s]eemingly endless, but often exaggerated, narrative of NATO failure and decline" (Sperling & Webber, 2009: 501). The novelty rather resides in technical and operational issues, more than in real identity change. Indeed, after 9/11, the Prague Summit of 2002 inaugurated NATO's new "discourse of transformation" determining its ensuing narrative of adaptation to the changes of the twenty-first century, by "[t]ransforming NATO with new members, new capabilities, and new relationships with our partners" (NATO, 2002: par. 1), thus inaugurating "the most radical reform ever of the Alliance's internal processes and structures" (SG Lord Robertson, 2003). In Prague, Allied members also endorsed a new Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism as an official NATO policy (NATO, 2002: par. 4.d), which identified four military roles for Alliance operations against terrorism: defensive measures; consequence management in the event of an attack against a member state; offensive counterterrorism; military cooperation with non-military forces. Globally, NATO's military guidelines became more defensive and reactive than those of the US (De Nevers, 2007: 37–38).

From 2001, the Alliance was involved in "formal combat operations to remove the Taliban from power", with the US providing over 90 per cent of the sorties over Afghanistan, and delivering 99 per cent of the bombs (Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011: 298). However, NATO's military command in Afghanistan started in August 2003 in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a force assigned by the UN with the primary objective of enabling the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never become a safe haven for terrorists (NATO, 2015). The initial mandate of ISAF was restricted to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas from enemy combatants. But in October 2003 the United Nations Security Council authorized the gradual expansion of ISAF's mission throughout Afghanistan; ISAF missions and operational responsibilities expanded beyond Kabul, to provide security and reconstruction assistance throughout Afghanistan, and also to aid in the fight on terrorism, drugs and organised crime (Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011: 298; Sperling & Webber, 2009: 501). Although many security problems assoiled Afghanistan, ranging from crime and drug trafficking to terrorism, ISAF had rather a limited mandate that did not cover missions other than peacekeeping, so formally it did not have a *counterterrorist* mission (De Nevers, 2007: 54). Still, the command of ISAF implied NATO was the main entity responsible for security. In very practical terms, NATO assumed a central role in the global war against the Taliban, by assisting actively the reform of the security sectors not only of Afghanistan, but in Iraq as well. Since 2004, NATO has played a central role in training Iraqi security forces, involving the mentoring of Iraqi military officers, and their training at NATO facilities (De Nevers, 2007: 52). In Afghanistan, the same role was actively endorsed in 2006 as the mission was expanding territorially to the entire country, through further mentoring and equipping of the Afghanistan National Army and police, aiming at training 70,000 troops by 2010 (Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011: 299; Kay & Kahn, 2007: 171).

Furthermore, the overall situation in Afghanistan required a "comprehensive approach" involving more than military means, following the view that local security was contingent to reconstruction and development (Williams, 2011: 64). Specifically, the "comprehensive approach" was applied through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), consisting of joint civil-military teams designed to "[h]elp expand the legitimate governance of the central government across Afghanistan, enhancing security

through security sector reform and reconstruction efforts" (Williams, 2011: 68). Besides the provision of security, PRT's are directly involved in nation-building tasks, such as the construction of schools, hospitals and the digging of wells, thus forming a strategy for Afghanistan that combines security, governance, and development (Gheciu, 2008: 108).

Therefore, in terms of the referent object of security, although an international military presence in Afghanistan emerged primarily through OEF to basically defend US national security and arguably the international community from Al-Qaeda, NATO's referent of security within ISAF was formally the new Afghan government. In practice, such mission revealed very difficult. Afghanistan's endemic insecurity, and other factors such as the shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic changes, NATO's limited military capabilities and the very nature of the fight against terror limited NATO's role (De Nevers, 2007: 35). Even so, to Trine Flockhart, the NATO operating in Afghanistan is entirely different from the NATO of the Cold War; not only has the Alliance transformed from an organisation characterised by a "practice of talking" to a "practice of doing", as it also changed its narrative from "NATO bringing democracy" to "NATO bringing stability" in the case of Afghanistan (2012: 78–79, 83).

9.3.1 Terrorists Among the Civilised, or Civilisation Amidst Terrorism?

Regarding the particular relationship between NATO's presence in Afghanistan and the Civilised Subject of Security, a major factor defining the post-9/11 cultural and ideological zeitgeist needs to be considered, that is, the revival of Huntingtonian claims shaping discourses of civilisation versus terrorism. Ultimately, discourses on civilisation and terrorism thus construct the civilised subject of security as a de-politicised one in essentialist/anachronistic terms, and point to the ever-growing persistence of cultural configurations of security, even nearly twenty years after "the clash of civilisations" thesis emerged for the first time.

NATO discourses and narratives on Afghan subjects of security and civilisation need to be related to predominantly American intertextual elements. Individual security and civilisation in Afghanistan are indeed topics very dependent on US discourses and policies, which can be framed within two fundamental sets of interrelated discourses: the "civilisation discourse"; and the "terrorism discourse" (Jackson, 2007). The "civilisation

discourse" emerged as a rallying argument very soon after 9/11, more evidently in US speeches before and during OEF, and most prominently in the words of US President Bush, who very bluntly stated that

> This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. **This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight**. This is the fight of **all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom**.
>
> We ask every nation to join us. […] Perhaps the **NATO Charter reflects best** the attitude of the world: **An attack on one is an attack on all**. The civilized world is rallying to America's side. (Bush, 2001; emphasis added)

Civilisation was presented as a matter to of all of those in the world, who believe in progress, pluralism, tolerance and freedom. It is interesting that the US President referred to the NATO Charter and the NATO motto. In fact, their respective representation of civilisation is much alike: defending civilisation is to defend its values. However, when it comes to US foreign policy specifically, there is a strong neoconservative influence shaping perceptions of Otherness according to binary narratives of eradication of Evil, displacing complex or critical analyses of what happened and why (Der Derian, 2009: 265). Indeed, religious ideas plays a central role in neoconservatist ideology and discourse, and this relationship was cemented by interpretations of 9/11 as an apocalyptic contest between Good and Evil (Haynes, 2005: 404–406). To Michael C. Williams (2007: 92), the rise to prominence of neoconservatism in this period demonstrates a vivid relationship between culture and security, in which symbolic power remains essential. As a consequence, political conflict is transformed into cultural conflict that is dominated by identification, representation and rhetoric issues of how to represent American culture and values, and more fundamentally how to best defend America itself (Williams, 2007: 119). Williams' position clearly reminds that representations, values, and rhetoric not only pervert the sense of the political, as they are also part of an unconscious ideology that guides a larger and longer struggle of valuing a geopolitical unity—the US, in this case. This is also revealing of a symbolic struggle occurring within the American collective identity, through which there is a quest for reasserting identification and interdependence processes.

These perspectives on the role of culture put recent assertions of a global resurgence of religion into perspective. As 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror seem to have redefined world order in a much darker,

apocalyptic way, disrupting the very notion of normality, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger argue that world politics after 9/11 displays in fact much more continuity than change: "[r]ather than heralding a new era in world politics", 9/11 was merely "[s]ymptomatic of certain key aspects of world politics" that seem to have been forgotten in the aftermath of the attacks (2006: 539–540). The one thing that is new, according to them, is the *belief* that there has been a great change in the architecture of world politics, which is a delusion that has contributed to a very dangerous set of assumptions generating far greater insecurity than delivering security (Kennedy-Pipe & Rengger, 2006: 540). As a consequence, together with the role of cultural representations highlighted above, beliefs also play an important role in post-9/11 conceptions of security, and this is indicative of a feeling of insecurity regarding how to categorise and define Selfhood and Otherness. In this context, the "civilisation discourse", typical of the Bush administration, is significant, for it ultimately sets the terms of who is the civilised and who is the uncivilised, by defining what the appropriate conduct is and its opposite on a global scale.

In relation to the "terrorism discourse", Richard Jackson (2007) defines it as consisting of terms, assumptions, labels, categories, and narratives used to describe and explain terrorism. This discourse, Jackson says, has emerged as one of the most important political discourses of the modern era, alongside climate change, human rights, global poverty, and arms proliferation (Jackson, 2007: 394).[7] Furthermore, the "terrorism discourse" contains the discursive foundations of the "Islamic terrorism discourse", another strand composed of a series of oppositional binaries, labels and terms, such as the savage versus the civilised, the medieval versus the modern, the West versus the Islamic world (Jackson, 2007: 401). In this context, Dana Cloud (2004) has explored the role of widely circulated images of Afghan people in building public support for the 2001–2002 US war with Afghanistan. She argues that representations of women participate in the category of "clash of civilisations", which constitutes a verbal and visual ideograph associated with the idea of the white man's burden. Through "paradigmatic binary oppositions" that contrast the darkness of chaos and backwardness with the lightful modernity, Cloud explains, viewers are encouraged to "adopt a paternalistic stance toward Afghan women" in order to justify US intervention (2004: 291).

Furthermore, while this set of constructions concurs to the building up of memories of modernity-as-liberation, the actual motives for war are still

blurred by a discursive focus on the Afghan people depicted as the victim of a brutal imposition of religious practices leading to starvation, forced imprisonment, total absence of individual liberties (Bush, 2001). Accordingly, the Taliban leaders are the responsible for an irrational and barbarous conduct of the same kind as "the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century" such as fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism (ibid.). Bearing in mind that those leaders are also those who were supporting and harbouring a terrorist organisation, which motivated OEF, they ultimately represent both Evil for the civilised world and the Afghan population. As a consequence, the link between Islam and terrorism was established. To Mahmood Mamdani (2002), that connection became a central media concern following 9/11, resulting in new rounds of culture talks, and religious experience has turned into a political category, differentiating good Muslims from bad Muslims, rather than terrorists from civilians. Mamdani nonetheless questions the tendency to read Islamist politics as an effect of Islamic civilisation, and Western power as an effect of Western civilisation, because cultural explanations of political outcomes tend to avoid history and issues. Therefore, when 9/11 is placed in a historical and political context, terrorism is best understood as a modern construction (Mamdani, 2002: 766).

After this, how can NATO's role as commander of ISAF be understood in relation to the Afghans, as both subjects of security and civilised subjects? Since the beginning, NATO discourses as commander of ISAF employed a clear focus on its peace-supporting role towards the local subjects. When the Alliance took command of ISAF on 11 August 2003, NATO Deputy SG Alessandro Rizzo thus set the tone at the ISAF assumption ceremony, by reiterating the international community's commitment to "Afghanistan, to its people, and to its future" and by specifying NATO's role in it as one of *support* and *assistance* in the context of peace and security operations focused on the people and the principles they share with NATO itself—unity, freedom, human dignity and liberty (NATO Deputy SG Rizzo, 2003; emphasis added). On the same day, the Commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General Götz Gliemeroth (cit. in NATO, 2003) also insisted on the centrality of the Afghan people and the Afghan Transitional Authority for NATO's presence in Kabul. Interestingly, Lieutenant-General Gliemeroth's portray of the inhabitants of Kabul was clear in highlighting their "friendliness, openness and courtesy", as well as their understanding and "overwhelming support" of ISAF's mission there (ibid.), as rational, polite, civilised,

citizens. Yet, Gliemeroth still adverts about the "extremist minority" hiding behind the peaceful population, and about the need that "people do not have false expectations of ISAF", as the primary responsibility is ultimately theirs and their Transitional Afghan Authority (ibid.). Either Afghanistan, the Afghan Transitional Authority or the Afghan people are pointed alternatively as the recipients of the security that is to be *supported*—and not *provided exclusively*—by ISAF: "help", "support", "assist" are the recurring words used to depict NATO's role in Afghanistan. The ultimate objectives to be achieved in Afghanistan are set as "peace and security", "a secure, democratic structure", "a secure environment", but also the *values* of "unity and freedom and human dignity and liberty", which are the founding principles of NATO, presented as universally sharable. Moreover, when these statements apostrophise directly the Afghan population, they reassert NATO's role as one that is limited to mere support, in a way that also projects the responsibility onto that very people. This fairly illustrates Renée de Nevers' argument that NATO plays a "largely supportive role in US efforts to combat terrorism" (2007: 35), or Mark Neocleous' (2011) claim that NATO's performance in Afghanistan may be seen as that of a "police of civilisation", in which enforcement lies ahead of defence. Alexandra Gheciu is all the more assertive about that policing role, and about the idea of the civilian population being seen as "both the referent of security […] and the source of threat" (Gheciu, 2008: 108).

NATO's command of ISAF upholds the values of civilisation, with an emphasis on the *modern*, instead of the Western. Barbarism in Afghanistan appears to be conceived in relation to temporality, and not geography, which demises the influence of the geo-cultural agency of a civilising process in Afghanistan, so as to emphasise *content* instead, i.e., structures, institutions, norms, statebuilding. The issue of the duality of the civilian population, as both the referent of security and the source of threat, makes terrorism to intertwine with insurgency. In this sense, the Afghan subject of security is held by international forces on the ground as having both the potential for civilised behaviour when/if he inserts in that process of statebuilding peacefully, and the potential for terrorist activities. In this context of exacerbated duality, the role of PSYOPS has been central once again. At all levels within NATO and ISAF, Thomas E. Nissen asserts, the "information war, or the battle of perceptions, is just as important, if not more so, as the physical battle" because the real victory is about winning the local population, and not about the physical destruction of the Taliban (2007: 9).

Afghanistan is thus the theatre of a battle of perceptions, in which information is a critical tool used differently by the parts, creating fundamental asymmetry in the information war—in opposition to the kinetic dimension of NATO's progression. In this context of fundamental struggle for the dominating knowledge, information and psychological operations are indeed crucial.

According to Arturo Munoz (2012), who has extensively documented the US Information Operations in Afghanistan since 2001, PSYOPS were employed since the beginning of the US military intervention in Afghanistan to gain popular acceptance for the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the presence of foreign troops, and the creation of a democratic national government. His work refers to the basic Information Operations and PSYOP themes used by the US over the years, such as: *the war on terror justifies US intervention; coalition forces bring peace and progress, just like the Afghan government and the Afghan National Security Forces do; Al Qaida and the Taliban are enemies of the Afghan people; monetary rewards are offered for the capture of Al Qaida and Taliban leaders, as well as for turning in weapons; US forces have technological superiority over the Taliban; democracy benefits Afghanistan, and all Afghans need to participate in elections* (Munoz, 2012: 32). Likewise, NATO's "master narrative" in Afghanistan was regularly defined and reviewed by its Media Operations Centre, in a guidance document "[d]esigned to assist all those who play a part in explaining the situation in Afghanistan and the ISAF mission, but especially those who deal with the media" (NATO, 2008: 1), regarding how the main topics should be treated publicly, including the transfer to lead security responsibility, civilian casualties and human rights, why NATO is in Afghanistan, and the enduring issues of the mission. In October 2008, for example, some of the main headline messages to be disclosed were (NATO, 2008: 1–3):

- *Afghanistan remains NATO's number one priority. This is not an operation of choice, it is one of necessity. We are in Afghanistan for the long term under a United Nations mandate for as long as we are needed and welcomed by the Afghan people.*
- *The significant increase in security incidents this year is due to an increased use of asymmetric tactics by insurgents, an increase in the operational presence of ISAF and ANSF, and an increased freedom of action for insurgents operating from inside Pakistan. […]*

- *To minimise the risk of harming civilians COM ISAF has mandated his forces to take all measures deemed necessary to avoid the loss of life. These include directions on using airpower. A new methodology of civilian casualty reporting has also been established.*
- *It is important to emphasize that our actions are in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) (see Note 3). To this end, every opportunity should be taken to enable the Afghan authorities to articulate successes to the public.*
- *NATO does not use body counts as a measure of success.*

But despite an apparent initial success, disenchantment grew stronger with the Karzai administration as well as resentment against NATO and US military tactics negatively affecting local populations (Munoz, 2012: 1). Munoz refers to an ABC/BBC/ARD survey questioning Afghans on their opinions on air strikes, which suggested there is a strong tendency to blame the US, NATO and ISAF for harming civilians (Munoz, 2012: 41). So, how can NATO efficiently fulfil its supporting role as provider of security if local perceptions see its presence as harmful? One may conceive that, in such context, information, representations and perceptions might be so important in NATO's discourses. Although the ultimate goal of a civilising process in Afghanistan equates to statebuilding, the learning and socialisation processes basically focus on primary perceptions of amity versus enmity, security versus insecurity, terrorist activities versus inactivity. Those binaries ultimately compose the boundaries of civilised and uncivilised behaviour.

Finally, despite the revival of Huntingtonian claims, and the particularities of the discourses performed, the case of Afghanistan shares with BH and Kosovo an essential struggle for prevailing forms of knowledge and memory. It is a struggle unilaterally controlled by NATO, which strives for dominating the timeless values and symbols that are to be inculcated to local subjects of security. In that enterprise, the goal of security often appears secondary to the ideological stances of statebuilding processes. As an example, Lawrence Bartlett (2012) accounts for the appalling life of Afghan civilians at a time when NATO was discussing an exit strategy. Bartlett reports that, in 2011 alone, more civilians died (3021) than the total number of NATO troops killed in 10 years (3007). Besides, he also refers to the nearly 500,000 refugees as the highest number of the decade, which Peter Nicolaus, UNHCR's representative in Afghanistan, described

as the "biggest mistake UNHCR ever made", while acknowledging that the international community also failed to help the refugees return home and find means of earning a living and reintegrate society (Bartlett, 2012). In contrast with BH and Kosovo, the refugee issue in Afghanistan has not only been clearly dismissed, as it also shows the different biopolitical concerns involved in each case.

Notes

1. In 1993, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was the first attempt to solve the war, with the strong support of the foreign minister of the EU. In July 1994, a new peace plan was proposed by the Contact Group, composed of the USA, Russia, Britain, Germany and France, but it was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs (Hansen, 2006: 105–107).
2. For an extensive and critical analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, see David Chandler (2000) *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. London and Sterling: Pluto Press (2nd ed.). Chandler's title speaks for itself; it is a critique of the democratisation process in BH, as it was led and implemented by international agency.
3. See NATO, "Annex J: Peace Support Psychological Activities," Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, PfP UNCLASSIFIED, Brussels, 11 December 1995.
4. Anders Stefansson (2007) has focused on post-war Sarajevo and explored the cultural and social transformations experienced in the city after the departure of a large portion of the pre-war population and a massive influx of people displaced by war. He shows that pre-war inhabitants of Sarajevo portray themselves as strangers in their own city when faced to the arrival of what they consider to be "peasants".
5. This can be verified online with a timetable that speaks for itself: http://nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm [6 September 2016].
6. Some examples may be found and actually visualized on NATO's website http://www.nato.int/kosovo/leaflets.htm [29 September 2017].
7. Jackson's discourse analysis focuses on the relationship between textual and social processes, and it is particularly concerned with the politics of representation. His research is based on more than 300 written and spoken English-language 'Western' texts authored primarily between 2001 and late 2006, including: official speeches and documents of senior policy makers; books, articles and reports by major think-tanks, public intellectuals and journalists; and academic books and scholarly articles in the core terrorism studies and international relations journals (Jackson, 2007: 395–396).

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CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

Thinking of NATO in terms of survival has mostly meant to reflect on the Alliance's capacity to adapt to change. It is undeniable, the Alliance has proved to be adapting continuously; not only has it managed to transform itself in face of structural change, as it has also transformed the contexts in which it operates, and led the way to normative evolutions in the field of international security as a self-proclaimed agent of change. Simultaneously, NATO has also managed to keep some things timeless and unchanged, through recurrent and persisting narratives displaying the different shades of its civilisational purpose. In line with a logic of linear progress and constant improvement, the Alliance has remained aware of temporality, which it represents in very open and symbolic terms. In this sense, NATO belongs to, and feeds itself upon, the very narratives on Modernity that Critical Theory seeks to deconstruct. NATO is thus a historical and ideological product of Modernity.

But survival is also the matter of people. Amidst the permanence of change, as events and social phenomena emerge, evolve, or disappear, the importance of living, sentient, organisms cannot be dismissed, hence the need to individualise the very approach of civilisation in relation to security. By conceptualising the Civilised Subject of Security, it becomes possible to cope with the complex relations connecting the individuals' sense of identity, their perception of security, and broader social processes associated with the idea of civilisation. With the Civilised Subject of Security, different connections are established and converge: social cognition,

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sociological processes, behavioural transformations, power relations, symbolic representations, and psychological needs. All together, these connections help picturing how the Civilised Subject of Security has been in the West across time: a self-restrained individual who looks up to the state in search for the symbolic representations necessary to his feeling of security. Throughout the last five centuries, civilised subjects of the West have grown on the sense of certainty and naturalness those symbolic connections unconsciously provide them. As they cumulated this assurance within their collective learning process, they cumulated symbolic power, and were able to impose upon and dominate non-Western Otherness with the actual *belief* that behavioural and social norms from the West could only be beneficial. The West built upon that belief and that symbolic capital to assemble the preliminary system of international security that basically ensured that Westerners would be secure outside the West, which included the liberty to *believe* and *behave* as they did in the West. All of this also contributed to the cumulated security experience of the West through time, so it has come to be comprised in the civilised habitus of Westerners, as part of their unconscious history. What the existence of the unconscious structures of human mind suggest in this book is that the perceptions and representations of security are not the fruit of a conscious or voluntary choice of practices and meanings by the subjects, but rather the result of domination, disciplining and exclusionary practices, long-term processes of inculcation, and symbolic suggestions. That, in addition to the process of civilisation from the West, suggests that the security of some cannot be the security of all.

The defence of Western civilisation had a central role in NATO's original formulation of its referent object of security. In line with the general claim of this book that the civilisation of the West is not a natural, spontaneous or innate idea when conceiving international security, Chap. 5 showed that WWII made Western powers redefine the rules allowing the habitus of the Civilised Subjects of Security to be corrected and resumed. The civilised habitus of the West suffered a major breakdown because of WWII, but it was revived through different concepts and symbols such as democracy and spirituality, and through the representation of a specific stereotyped barbarian Other—the Soviet Union. The fundamental beliefs of Westerners about how civilised they really were, or about how uncivilised they could be, were strongly disrupted, which required a reassertion of justifications and symbolic meanings, in order to continue with the civilised habitus. The symbolic capital of the West had been destabilised as

a consequence of both world wars, and needed reassurance. In this sense, NATO's civilisational referent of security composes a fundamental part of its identity, a foundational principle, an original meaning.

By analysing the first four decades of NATO's life in those terms, Chap. 6 also showed that a sense of identity and purpose has always been a pressing issue since the beginning of the Alliance. Although NATO's organisational and identity crisis have been profusely analysed in reference to the post-Cold War period, matters of survival, pertinence, and projection into the long-term future were an important part of NATO's narrative early in its existence. In a way that is indeed aware of temporality and future, NATO has associated a historical Atlantic identity with long-lasting purposes that expand beyond mere military functions of defence. The short-term, event-related, dimension of WWII was overthrown by NATO's interplay with longer temporal references, which has also influenced its civilisational referent of security. Not only has NATO evolved in an open way because it is part of a long-duration structural time, as civilisation has also been represented and projected into the long-term future as part of a "common destiny", ascribing a sense of linearity and timelessness to the very idea of civilisation. The initial significance of the civilisational referent was sustained throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and the idea of civilisational unity was even reclaimed, as more integration, or interdependence, was demanded by Western elites. The civilised habitus of the West was still on the process of reassurance, because the perception of security was not definite, or stabilised. As the 1970s brought strong ideological criticism to the West, civilisation became more discrete in NATO's discourses. Instead, the Organisation's values and usefulness were persistently reaffirmed by referring to symbols of security and memories, fed by the references to past achievements and glory. But it also adapted conceptually, to include issues such as poverty and underdevelopment, thereby expanding the Alliance's competences.

The new structural era that opened with the end of the Cold War provided NATO with many opportunities to dominate the new architecture of international security. Across the 1990s, this was operated on two interrelated levels simultaneously. One occurred with a political and institutional reinvention centred on new ways of relating to non-members and to potentially new ones, by gradually assimilating them into the Alliance's narrative about collective security and identity. In both cases, this process entailed conditioned socialising practices and learning processes that increased interdependence and regularised behaviour

according to democratic standards, so that NATO's new partners and members would be ultimately perceived as civilised, but would also behave as such.

The final development of the argument suggested that intervening to protect individuals in out-of-area countries is not a natural or spontaneous evolution of NATO neither. This is rather part of a careful reinvention after the Cold War that is entrenched in broader conjunctural changes, but that is still inscribed in the continuity of NATO's narrative about change. The end of the Cold War left plenty room for the redefinition of a civilisational order; every belief, relationship, practice, justification, or stereotype of the preceding fifty years either ceased to be relevant, or needed to be rethought. In the new conjunctural context of the 1990s, multi-polarity was still virtual. Rules and practices were expected to transform, because the locus of symbolic power was now uncertain. At a deeper level, as Robert W. Cox (2002: 76) puts it, the assumptions upon which prevailing forms of knowledge were based were challenged, and a different set of problems arose to be confronted. During the Cold War, two competing forms of homogenisation were the only games allowed. In the search for a new basis of knowledge, a new ontology of world order needed to be found that allowed "[p]erceiving the historical structures that characterize an epoch" (Cox, 2002: 78). Although it seemed Capitalism, Liberalism and democracy had won over Soviet Communism, the post-Cold War period also liberated societies from old constraints, and could have represented a critical opportunity for renovating a world order based on enhanced multicultural dialogue as the "obscured diversity of the human situation" (Cox, 2002: 77) was suddenly more apparent. However, that period opened a latent ideological struggle for defining the rules that would dominate from then on. Rules and practices changed, because other elements transpired and rose above those of the previous period.

But the main post-Cold War conjunctural change in the field of international security during the 1990s was presented in Chap. 8 as consisting of the Individualisation of Security, a normative process through which Western civilisation could be upheld and continued. NATO has been a major actor in that process, as it strove and managed to be very influential in prescribing and putting in practice the new rules and practices of the Individualisation of Security. The main findings regarding the Individualisation of Security suggested that the valuation of individuals when formulating security policies, or deciding to intervene militarily in third sovereign states, has particular political and ideological stances related to the maintenance of the status

quo and world order, empowering in fact the agency of international organisations. The positive connotation of the Individualisation of Security as a system of values can be seen as a way to justify and sustain biopolitical arguments and practices destined to control and contain human life. The preliminary relationship between the Individualisation of Security and the civilising process was set in terms of an apparent rise of a cosmopolitan consciousness whereby the interdependence between individuals make states or groups of states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. The Individualisation of Security thus implies a transformation of behaviour in both men and states in international society, mostly through the inculcation of responsibility, and through the establishment of new boundaries for appropriate behaviour regarding individuals. The Individualisation of Security also produced an international discourse of discipline and normalisation, whereby a conduct that is respective of individuals should be natural for all states.

The Individualisation of Security constitutes another stage of the civilising process because it has expanded the civilised habitus to non-Western spaces, by normalising the rationale for military intervention, and by transforming the beliefs and behaviours about security. In BH and Kosovo, that rationale was articulated in terms of NATO's ethical responsibility to intervene in defence of civilians, mostly ethnic minorities, victims of barbarian practices such as ethnic cleansing. The Individualisation of Security thus contributed to NATO's civilisational narrative in both those non-member countries, through discourses representing a geopolitics of morality, through barbarian analogies and comparisons. They represented local time and space as stagnated entities, in contrast with the timelessness of the Alliance's values and moral authority. They also employed memory discourses referring to WWII and the Holocaust, powerful features of the Alliance's symbolic capital.

The Individualisation of Security as practised and performed by NATO is consistent with its original civilisational referent, for the security of the North-Atlantic area and wider ideological and normative influence have been upheld. But ultimately, it also transformed the dominant perceptions and fundamental beliefs of the twentieth century on war. From an aberration, failure and deviation of the civilised subjects, the justifications and memories of wars like those of BH, Kosovo or Afghanistan are likely to remain in the future as protective wars destined to secure innocent human lives from barbarian ideologies, either from the West, or from the non-West. This could be at the origin of how meanings of security can be unconsciously (and erroneously) shaped.

Throughout the operations, the importance of NATO's public speeches and justificatory discourse decreased. The initial mediatisation of Bosnia and Kosovo might have corresponded to an initial normalising phase, in which the effort to inform and shape public awareness was stronger. In each of the three interventions, behaviour change was a major objective, ultimately aimed at another interrelated goal: regime change. For that, psychological operations were put in practice through different approaches destined to induce behavioural transformations, such as radio and television broadcasts or air-dropped leaflets. With the Individualisation of Security, humanitarian and biopolitical concerns mixed, and produced discourses framing each of these countries as spaces of behavioural duality, where barbarism was always the original problem, and civilisation only possible under certain controlled circumstances and standards. Whereas BH and Kosovo's barbarism was represented in terms of a demonized leader and of essentialist ethno-political stereotypes, Afghanistan's barbarism was associated to both the possibility of terrorist insurgency and more basic battles of perceptions focusing on binary perceptions of amity versus enmity, security versus insecurity, terrorist activities versus inactivity. In each case, NATO's justifications, narrative on change and overall discourse on civilisation were very often framed within binaries of civilised and uncivilised behaviour, denoting the continual influence of Logocentrism under Modernity, as a hegemonic system of representing the world. The consequence of Logocentrism is, as Richard Ashley suggested (1989), that hierarchical meanings are imposed regarding the non-members of the Alliance, and the non-Western world more widely. In this sense, all that NATO does not consider civilised within international security—identities, practices, behaviour, norms—is conceived as an essential political deviation.

The consequences of this limiting form of thinking and representing the world are quite disturbing, for they enhance and revive the global potential for war. Vivienne Jabri (2007) actually speaks of a "global matrix of war" that is now constituted of two dominant sets of practices; one includes the wars fought in the name of humanity, legitimised by discourses centred on care, rescue, and human rights (as in Kosovo). The other includes war confronting an enemy deemed to constitute an existential threat (as in Afghanistan). Discursively, they are both framed "in terms of progress and civilisation, a battle for modernity itself" (Jabri, 2007: 136–137). Whereas war presented a decivilising potential for both states and individuals at the time of WWII, one may now think of how the Individualisation of Security contributed to its civilising nature. Ironically,

Alessandro dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda interestingly use the expression "civilisation of war" to allude to this culture—both civilian and military—"that has been produced by Western countries in just under two decades in relation to the conflicts with those who threaten (or are presumed to threaten) Western security" (Dal Lago & Palidda, 2010: 5). This definition, they claim, has nothing to do with either the stereotypical ideology of Western civilisation or the so-called clash of civilisations theorised by Huntington. Likewise, the intent of this work was rather to highlight the procedural possibilities inherent to civilisation as an "on-going process and a possible aim of action", quite in Elias' manner (1991: 82).

The ties connecting civilisation to security are now clear, as they both reveal to be central features in the historic development of Western society and its domination upon the rest of the world. With the resurgence of intolerance, conservative ideologies and what the public opinion deems as *irrational* leaders in powerful Western democracies dealing with social, economic and political problems perceived as coming from the outside, a crisis seems indeed to be attaining the civilisation of the West right now. In this sense, a crisis of Western civilisation is, before anything, a crisis that comes from within, because the symbols, the values, the social and moral priorities suddenly fall far from the normality we thought we knew, and political phenomena shock and surprise as the unexpected consequences of a lottery. But times of crisis have repeatedly called for re-thinking common assumptions, for questioning the validity of our knowledge, for self-reflexivity, hence the importance of appraising the influence of the unconscious dimensions of knowledge for minimizing the shock and the surprise, and for learning—once again—the lessons from the past, aiming for a better future.

The unconscious connections between civilisation and security have not been questioned by the Westerners themselves, for the symbolic capital of the West has remained largely undisrupted so far—although the current refugee crisis and Brexit from the EU may be increasingly challenging that. The feeling of security of the civilised subjects of the West should endure, as long as it is not unsettled by fundamental death anxieties coming from either their civilised space, or from what they perceive to be uncivilised Otherness. In this sense, the current policies of control and contention of non-Western lives by, and within, the West are likely to remain outside conscious history, doomed to oblivion, precisely because the Western perception of security is what needs to be upheld by Western elites if its cohesion as a civilisational entity is to endure. Hopefully, this book has revealed the epistemological potential of the concept of civilisation in making the domination and control of the unconscious visible.

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