MIDDLE POWERS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The Rise of Turkey

Edited by Emel Parlar Dal

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I dedicate this book to my two kids, my son Berkin and my daughter Dilara….

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Contents

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List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1

Profiling Middle Powers in Global Governance and the Turkish Case: An Introduction

Emel Parlar Dal

How does Turkey fit into the middle power category? What tools and multilateral channels does it use to pursue a middle power diplomacy at the regional and global levels? In looking at these questions, this book offers the perspectives of several authors on the theme of Turkey as a middle power, namely the regional-global connection of Turkey's middle power foreign policy, the components of its middle power multilateralism and its effects on Turkey's contribution to global governance, and finally its middle power avenues and means. Considering "middle power" to be a multicomponent and intermingled concept with material, behavioral, and ideational attributions, the book intends to scrutinize Turkey as a middle-ranked state that demonstrates both similarities and differences from other traditional and non-traditional middle powers.

The main rationale behind the book is to provide a comprehensive and conceptually rich analysis of Turkish middle powerhood at the regional, global, institutional, and behavioral levels. The chapters are predicated on an understanding that the renewed salience of the study of middle powers

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does not call for a simple repeat of a strictly defined research agenda from past eras. Therefore, the following chapters depart from the analytical assessment to pinpoint Turkey's institutional, material, and behavioral patterns that are connected to middle power concepts. Thus, the book fills the lacuna in the literature by offering a comprehensive and critical analysis of an emerging middle power's distinct and overlapping roles on both the regional and global scale, its institutional relations with international organizations, and its behaviors in global governance.

The Turkish case is illustrative in the sense that it has filled a range of roles as a regional, rising, and middle power, serving as both an asset and a risk for the country (Parlar Dal and Gonca 2014). Among its emerging peers, Turkey has long possessed significant advantages allowing it to take on an influential middle power role at both an ideological and, to a lesser extent, practical level (Sandal 2014; Parlar Dal 2014). However, its assumed roles as a rising or regional power and ascribed roles as a bridge between the North and South, and the intermingling of these, have contributed to the recent vicious circle observed in its relations with the West, which has served to make its middle power role more contradictory and less credible. The recent crisis observed in Turkey's relations with the West has placed serious constraints on the construction of Turkey' middle power identity in material, institutional, and behavioral terms. Equally, Turkey's relations with its eastern neighbors and other Middle Eastern countries are also important in terms of its emerging middle power diplomacy. Overall, Turkey as an emerging middle power is expected to pursue a balanced relationship with the Western world and developing nations with a strong commitment to international peace, democracy, human rights and open trade. However, as seen in the Turkish example, its deteriorating relations with the West and the East hinders Ankara's middle power role enactment, perceptions, and performance.

In the idealized conception of the middle power role, intermediary states work for the good of humanity and tend to act normatively as much as possible, thus differentiating themselves vis-à-vis other states. In short, middle powers need new agendas to act globally in every field of international politics to allow them the ability to act as both independent and engaged actors in their alliance with great powers. On the other hand, middle powers often seek to act as normative and democratic actors as a basis to allow them to establish balanced relations with great powers and to effectively engage with global governance policies, such as organizing

international summits and conferences at home and sending troops to conflict-torn countries and on peacekeeping missions. Consensus at the global level on the role of middle powers in safeguarding collective interests and values such as democracy, rule of law, free market economy, and human rights, as well as a perception of their role as a positive asset for enhancing multilateralism in international institutions by great peers, their peers, and other outside actors would allow middle powers to play more constitutive and bridging roles in global governance.

Based on this interpretation, this edited book is structured as outlined below. The first section delves into middle power foreign policy in the regional-global nexus with a special focus on Turkey. This part begins with a general overview of Turkey's foreign policy in the past, present, and future through two different chapters: the first focuses on the Southern dimension in Turkish foreign policy and attempts to assess the possible role that Turkey may play in the South-South cooperation, and the second deals with Turkey's multistakeholder diplomacy from a middle power angle. The second section addresses Turkey's internationalism in global governance with four contributions on Turkey as a middle power in the UN, G20, MIKTA partnership, and in the UN funding system. The third part examines Turkey's middle power avenues and means in four valuable contributions on Turkey's involvement in the development debates in the UN since the 1960s and its development cooperation policies from a comparative approach; its humanitarian aid strategies as a non-traditional aid donor; and its diversifying public diplomacy policies and tools in the last decade.

Regional-Global Nexus in Middle Power Foreign Policy

Revisiting the "Middle Power" Concept

Despite a mounting number of studies over the recent years, the concept of middle power remains theoretically and empirically understudied in the International Relations (IR) literature. A simple search in the Google-N-Grams reveals that while scholarly interest in middle powers emerged in the 1940s, attention did not begin accumulating until 2000,[1] mostly as a result of the growing number of scholars from middle-ranked countries studying middle powers (Cooper 2011). However, the concept can be traced back to even earlier times and was first used by the Mayor of Milan

to determine three different states by their sizes: *grandissime* (empires), *mezano* (middle powers), and *picolli* (small powers) (Wight 1978, 298; Ravenhill 2011; Yalçın 2012). Nonetheless, the term was first popularized among IR scholars by Organski in 1958, when he clustered states as superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers (Cooper 2011). Similarly, at the Congress of Vienna, the Versailles Peace Treaty, and the League of Nations, middle powers were also considered states with different international legal status. In his seminal work on middle powers, Holbraad cited other past usages in which middle powers were referred to as states materially less equipped than great powers, defenders of the balance of power, and providers of peace and order (Holbraad 1984, 3). However, the concept emerged more widely after WWII to describe Canada and Australia and their attempts to be recognized as a distinct class of states with distinct privileges within the post-war settlement on this ground (Robertson 2017). Status anxieties loom large over middle powers (Patience 2014), and this is true for both historical and contemporary cases. Thus, the concept became commonly employed by Canadian scholars and leaders (Higgott and Cooper 1990) as well as scholars and leaders from other potential middle powers (Cooper 2011).

These relatively early uses of the concept focused on the explicit power capabilities arising from the middle powers' material resources and their legal status in major global governance organizations. However, the newer uses of the middle power conception have become more about distinct diplomatic characteristics such as the active, creative, innovative, and entrepreneurial use of diplomacy, leveraging niche areas, coalition-building skills, and normative and abiding good international citizenship rather than coercion and exercise of power over the years despite the lack of an authoritative definition of the term (Robertson 2017).

Overall, the growing IR literature tends to conceptualize middle powers in terms of three common attributions: functional, positional, and behavioral (Cooper 2016; Chapnick 1999; Carr 2014). At the theoretical level, middle powers are often overlooked in mainstream IR theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism despite their long historical roots (Ping 2017). When these traditional approaches do assess middle powers, realists, liberals, and the English school depart from the positional attributions while constructivists focus more on the behavioral. Ravenhills noted that a definition of middle powers can be encapsulated with five Cs: capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition building, and credibility

(Ravenhill 2011). Yet, existing definitions vary from one scholar to another based on the specific meaning they attribute to the concept. As underlined by William Tow and Richard Rigby, no consensus has been reached on what exactly the term "middle power" refers to (Tow and Rigby 2011). Similarly, Sook-Jong Lee stressed that since the criteria for measuring middle-sized countries differ, it is difficult to define a country as such (Lee 2012). Table 1.1 summarizes the traditional/old-generation and non-traditional/new-generation definitions of middle powers with reference to their authors.

Overall, defining a middle power is a contested and complex endeavor in International Relations. Thus, finding a working definition can appear to be a futile exercise. Over the past years, studies which have attempted to create a working definition of a middle power have refined definitions by utilizing one of the above attributes, combining the existing definitions, or creating novel ones. That is, each study makes use of a selected definition of middle powers for its own purposes. The chapters in this edited book also employ their own working definitions in an eclectic manner by taking into consideration the existing categories of definitions of middle powers and their functional, positional, and behavioral attributes.

Within the mounting literature on middle powers, very few studies have focused on the regional-global power nexus in middle power diplomacy, and an increasing number of studies on the topic have dealt with the Asian context thanks to their focus on traditional middle powers such as Australia, Korea, and Japan and their relations with the United States and China (Beeson and Higgott 2014; Shin 2016). In the Turkish context, only a limited number of studies on middle powers and Turkey-as-a-middle power can be found (Yalçın 2012; Baba and Onsoy 2016; Parlar Dal 2014; Parlar Dal and Kursun 2017; Elik 2013; Onis and Kutlay 2013, 2016). Among these, three consider Turkey to be an emerging middle power country and empirically analyze the concept within the Turkish context at the regional and global level nexus within article-length works (Parlar Dal 2014; Onis and Kutlay 2016; Parlar Dal and Kursun 2017). In short, this book goes beyond these existing studies with the aim of filling the existing gap in the literature by approaching the Turkish case from diverse sets of perspectives over different issues.

Table 1.1 Middle power definitions[a]

Traditional/old-generation definitions of middle powers (until the 2000s)

Functional approaches	*Positional approaches*	*Behavioral approaches*
1. Many of the post WWII middle power imaginings were functional 2. Countries with special relations with post-war settlers, such as Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the Netherlands, enact functional middle power roles 3. Ravenhill (2011) drew attention to the aspiration of Canada for a privileged position in international institutions, which was central to Canada's sense of national identity in foreign affairs. Chapnick also underlined the functional understanding of Canadian post WWII foreign policy Chapnick (1999) 4. Functional roles can be extended to South Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, Poland, Finland, and Czechoslovakia. Here it generally overlaps with other functional categories such as balancer or pivot 5. A similar category noted by Cooper et al. (1993) is that of functional/geographic attributes and are states located between two great powers or power blocs, such as Turkey	1. Positional approaches depart from an objective ranking of the states by quantifiable factors such as GDP, population, military size, defense spending, resources, and industrial capacity, as well as immeasurable power sources such as national will and strength of leadership 2. This kind of classification departed from the realist understanding that middle powers are capable of exerting a degree of strength and influence not found in small powers Patience (2014). Holbraad's definition of middle powers as states that are significantly stronger than small powers but relatively weaker than great powers was also based on positional definitions Holbraad (1984, 4) 3. In this sense, these types of definitions focus on the hierarchical ranking of states. Chapnick (1999) calls this the "hierarchical model" 4. In addition to economic capacities, physical attributes, such as geography, location, and size, also matter for the definition of middle powers according to Cooper et al. (1993, 16–27) 5. Second-tier states, emerging states, rising powers, and regional powers are similar concepts in this sense	1. Behavioral approach departs from the argument that middle powers are supposed to have distinct diplomatic characteristic such as active diplomacy (the creative, innovative, and entrepreneurial use of diplomacy), niche diplomacy (the concertation of financial, human, and network resources on limited objectives), coalition building (working with like-minded states), and good international citizenship (a belief in the utility and necessity of cooperation to solve international problems). Inhibitor, mediator, or intermediator states are similar concepts in this sense 2. Wood (1988) argued that middle powers are those countries with leadership abilities (regional/subregional leadership or issue-based leaderships); countries with stabilizing, mediating, or counterbalancing roles; those seeking status by allying with great powers; or good citizens of the international community that follow the rules of the game 3. For Cooper et al. (1993, 16–27) normative middle power category included states acting as honest brokers or trusted mediators and behavioral middle power category as acting as a catalyst or an entrepreneur in regional and global matters. In this sense, middle powers are primarily defined by their behavior

Non-traditional/new generation definitions of middle power (after the 2000s)		
Traditional-based	*Mixed (or intermingled)*	*New definitions*
Ping (2005, 2017) refined the positional definitions Carr (2014) refined capacity-based definitions with a systemic impact approach Ikeda (2004) refined the positional definitions What Carr (2014) calls the identity approach, states' self-identification of middle power status, can also be studied under the label of behavioral approaches	Jordaan (2003) recognized distinct types of middle powers, including emerging and traditional middle powers Robertson (2006) employed functional-, positional-, and behavioral- based definitions Parlar Dal and Cooper (2017), Parlar Dal and Kursun (2017) and Onis and Kutlay (2017) also employed eclectic definitions Sandal (2014) used functional, positional, and behavioral attributes to address the Turkish and Brazilian cases	Patience (2014) discarded all definitions above and argued that historically there are three types of middle powers based on three characteristics/attributes: Concert of Europe, regional, and neo-Kantian middle powers. However, while the concert of Europe is a functional approach, Patience's characterization of regional middle powers focused on states seeking to cultivate regional groupings in response to security concerns, improving trade networks, and responding to the pressures of globalization. Neo-Kantian middle power is primarily a behavioral definition Sangbae (2009) defined middle powers as nodes in diplomatic networks by employing newly emerged research technologies

[a]This table is inspired from the recent classification made by Jeffrey Robertson in his 2017 *Australian Journal of International Affairs* article. Robertson, Jeffrey. "Middle- Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme". Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 4 (March 2, 2017): 355–370.

Middle Powers at the Junction of the Regional and the Global

Middle powers are caught between an impressive set of opportunities for global reach and the hold of a regional concentration. In many respects, this mix of roles (and identities) provides flexibility, allowing these nations to project the image of bridge building or straddling countries. Indeed, it can be argued that these two role conceptions, global and regional, are intermingled and complementary and thereby downplay self-contradictory effects and interrole conflicts. Yet, signs of tensions and stresses between regional and global roles are apparent in traditional and non-traditional or emerging middle powers (Jordaan 2003).

It is evident that an interconnectedness of internal/domestic, regional, and structural/systemic dynamics exists in the projection of regional and global roles by middle powers in a dialectical manner. A high degree of regional concentration may constrain the scope and form by which middle powers can play a constructive role on the global stage. This focus can be especially counterproductive when middle powers encounter long-lasting regional instabilities, which make it harder for them to efficiently diffuse their regional power to the international arena. Influential factors affecting the degree of middle power activism include the openness and geopolitical and economic features of the region in which the middle powers are located and the domestic and structural capabilities in upgrading their regional power status to exert greater influence on a global scale.

Another important question to be asked then is how do middle powers manage their dual regional and global roles through diplomatic practices and how do these different global and regional role conceptions of middle powers affect each other. On the other hand, interest in the practice of middle powers has taken on a new intensity in the twenty-first century. Faced with the challenge from a cluster of dynamic "rising" states and increasingly influential non-state actors, stark judgments have been made about the decline in status and influence of traditional middle powers. Yet, as illustrated by the creation of the MIKTA initiative, the middle power role and identity can also be a source of cohesiveness and opportunity (Schiavon and Dominguez 2016; Parlar Dal and Kursun 2016). If global affairs are moving toward an accentuated form of "multipolarity" in which power coalesces around a small number of dominant poles, middle powers may well be relegated to a subordinate role. However, under the assumption of a greater diffusion of influence, the position of middle powers could be enhanced if they can effectively navigate in an institutional environment

that exhibits signs of both concentration and fragmentation. The ascendancy of informalism signals a turn in global politics that rewards a broader set of actors at the apex of power, most notably opening up representation beyond the old Western establishment embedded in the G7. In the past eras, secondary actors had to make use of diplomatic skills from outside of power centers, as either critics or followers of systemically important countries. With the formation of the G20, some degree of an opening has been allowed. In conceptual terms, groupings such as of the BRICS and MIKTA countries can be viewed as part of the wave of informalization that extends through the G20 and, therefore, serve as a benchmark for how inclusive the nature of informalism will be. In addition, a more coherent construction of a collective identity is necessary. For instance, the transition of the BRICS from an understated diplomatic forum to a high-profile standalone summit process was predicated not only by the frustration about some aspects of the global system but also on the self-image of its membership as systematically important emerging countries that deserve greater recognition in that system.

From this perspective, accentuating a collective middle power identity, whatever the nuances between the individual middle power-states, has considerable value. Although the normative appeal of this construction can be overblown, a middle power role is the common reference point that can bind middle powers, both traditional or non-traditional, together in global governance and informal institutions like MIKTA. The image of middle power countries located in the middle between the G7 and the rising powers in the BRICS grouping in the G20 context underscores this point, with the opportunities available in terms of agency being able to leverage this diplomatic space countering structural constraints.

Still, despite these opportunities, MIKTA strains the concept of middle powers beyond the point of traditional recognition. Although all members of the MIKTA partnership are referred to analytically as middle powers, there is a huge discrepancy and sometimes contradiction in the treatment they receive through this framing device. On one side of the depiction, Mexico and Turkey as middle powers are predicated on a bridging or liminal role that goes hand in hand with a physical or geographical connotation about their physical location. On the other side, countries like Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico are generally categorized as non-traditional middle powers, separated from the traditional cluster concentrated in the global North. Moreover, while the middle power identity of these countries is given some privileged treatment, it has not excluded

other types of identification, most notably as regional actors with some distinctive normative traits. It can be claimed that some ambivalence in embracing a middle power role and identity is present in all of the non-traditional middle power-countries.

Furthermore, the inclusion of a cluster of middle powers in the G20 is a decisive break from the past as this category of countries has traditionally been excluded from exclusive international groupings most commonly associated with global summitry. On the other hand, the possibility of the middle power-countries leveraging their upgraded position to create an autonomous forum such as MIKTA constitutes an advance in terms of the legitimacy, and potentially the efficiency, of global governance.

Indeed, the major alternative to global informalization is a renewed emphasis on regional organizations. In the case of Mexico, this track means a concentration either on North America and the Americas via the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Pacific Alliance (with Chile, Colombia, and Peru). The core institutional connections at the regional level for Indonesia and Korea continue to be the ASEAN and ASEAN +3, supplemented by other initiatives such as the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative in the case of Korea. Australia has demonstrated bursts of leadership in the regional context by the ambitious Asia Pacific Community initiative.

In the first decade of the 2000s, Turkey demonstrated an ambitious strategy for extending its regional ties. Despite the growing tensions and uncertainties with the EU in the recent years, the latter continues to constitute Turkey's main institutional connection with its European neighborhood. During the first decade of the 2000s, despite very limited success, Turkey also aimed to increase its regional cooperation efforts through the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). Additionally, it has engaged in fostering sectoral cooperation, particularly with regional international organizations, by either taking a permanent observer state status or signing cooperation and amity agreements. For instance, Turkey obtained observer state status from the African Union, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), and the Arab League in 2005, 2001, and 2008, respectively.

At the same time however, middle power-states seem to be constrained in their ability to move beyond their immediate neighborhood without encountering huge risks. Although they want to go global, they face symbolic and material barriers in doing so. The crucial concerns for each relates to local issues, whether migration in the case of Mexico, security

and domestic/democracy-related problems in the case of Turkey, building ASEAN community values in the case of Indonesia, balancing the relationship with China and the United States in the case of Australia, or dealing with peninsular issues and the North Korean nuclear threat in the case of South Korea. In most of the non-traditional middle power cases, there exists domestic constituencies that prefer the regional option, clearly showcasing the contested nature of the middle powers as they stand at the junction of regional and global.

Middle Power Multilateralism in Focus

At face value, the middle power classification implies a class of actors in international relations that share some commonalities in several foreign policy behaviors. Notwithstanding "the elasticity, inconsistency, and subjectivity" (Cooper 2011) of the definition of the term, one of the middle powers' oft-heralded foreign policy behavior is their involvement in particular global initiatives and multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions for global problems is a common characteristic of middle powerhood, even though the term often refers to a diverse group of states. From both a theoretical and practical point, middle power multilateralism is, however, implicitly a "collective international role" because it departs from the notion that middle powers can only influence international relations effectively if they act collectively with other powers, and their collective action can occur at multilateral forums. In fact, this rudimentary attribute of middle powers requires further analysis of middle power multilateralism in several contexts. However, only a few studies genuinely deal with aspects of middle power multilateralism. One of these studies, coauthored with Andrew F. Cooper, argued that middle power diplomacy can be identified within three distinct waves (Cooper and Parlar Dal 2016). Accordingly, the first wave emerged in the immediate aftermath of WWII, in which middle power multilateralism were shaped via the United Nations and related bodies, and the traditional middle powers Canada and Australia were the main actors. The second period was shaped around the ad hoc activism of several other emerging middle powers within specific issue areas. Finally, contemporary middle power multilateralism began to gain ground within informal organizations such as the G20 and in the BRICS and MIKTA initiatives, and so on.

Nonetheless, the current international environment requires even further systematic analysis in the sense that multilateralism now follows a dual

and somehow contradictory path. First, it has become increasingly more informal. As Richard N. Haass points out, "in this era of international relations, we may need to start thinking less about formal international treaties and agreements and much more about what you might describe as coordinated national policies" (Haass 2009). Second, due to rising populist and nationalist tendencies in recent years, the US-led multilateralism has progressively lessened. Despite the multipolar management of the global political economy in recent years via complex power sharing arrangements, the United States' retrenchment in a number of multilateral fronts, the rise of strong protectionist/isolationist tendencies in the current American administration under President Trump and a smooth nationalist, and a bilateral turn in some other Western capitals seem to have made multilateralism functionally less efficient in terms of its output than in the past. In this age of uncertainty, where multilateralism retakes new forms within its in-between or in other term multi-bi practices, middle powers seem to envisage some difficulties in both engaging with the United States as the ex-champion of global governance and bridging the North and South as intermediate actors. The recent difficulties observed in the US-Canada NAFTA talks on trade is a good sign of the lessened maneuvering capacity and institutional power of the middle powers. Another example of the changing multilateralism of the middle powers is evidenced in South Korean's ups and downs in dealing with the North Korean issue together with its major ally, the United States. In the current international climate, middle powers seem to have restricted capacity in taking collective actions with some of their allies, particularly the United States. In short, today's international relations are becoming (i) more informal, (ii) more multipolar, and (iii) less multilateral for middle powers.

Assets

In an evolving international political environment constraining their "collective international role" in multilateral forums, middle powers continue to possess several assets that could provide them more room to maneuver, despite some setbacks to their expected middle power roles. The multilateralism of the contemporary middle powers can be assessed on the basis of four basic characteristics that help this cluster of states build coalitions and foster cooperation for greater collective good in the absence of the dominance of a hegemon: (1) a strong desire to contribute to global governance, (2) increased efforts to seek reforms and upgrade status in the

global governance system, (3) normative and ideational commitments to solving global problems, and (4) strong alignment with (or bridging between) the two fronts, the North and the South.

When it comes to the contribution to global governance, it can be argued that as the influence of the United States and other major powers diminishes across a number of global issues, middle powers have increased their bargaining powers and individual contributions to global governance. Another illustrative example of middle powers' contribution to global governance is their longstanding and significant influence in shaping the international trade regime (Higgott and Cooper 1990). As a second asset, contemporary middle powers have also outspokenly demanded meaningful reforms and more status within the existing multilateral institutions and openly engage in new multilateral forums using informal and flexible decision-making mechanisms if their demands are not met. In line with this, some middle powers, especially the non-traditional ones, pursue an assertive foreign policy behavior as part of their legitimation strategy in response to both international and domestic audiences (Sandal 2014). As a third asset, middle powers, both traditional and new, have strong normative and ideational commitments to bringing solutions to global governance-related problems. However, in some cases these commitments are more rhetoric based than policy oriented (Neack 2013). Additionally, middle powers, particularly non-traditional ones, have the capacity and ability to bridge the developed and developing worlds in pursuing delicately balanced relations with these two fronts.

Challenges

A central question is what are the differences expected in the multilateralism of middle powers and whether there is a gap between middle powers' rhetoric on multilateralism and their multilateral practices.

Middle powers have been confronted with several challenges while constructing their middle power diplomacy through tools and the implementation of distinct global governance strategies. In pursuit of their middle power diplomacies, middle powers have encountered challenges preventing them from properly carrying out their intermediary and managerial roles in global affairs. Among these challenges, four appear to be the most significant: (1) the emergence of an expectations-practice gap, (2) punching over their weight in pushing policies, (3) the existence of an imbalance between regional and global orientations, and (4) weak leverage in the face of great power politics.

The first challenge refers to the middle powers' lacking the capacity to establish a delicate balance between expectations about their multiple global roles and their actions on the ground. In general, "middle power" as a term has a positive connotation, which leads to the rise of outside expectations about the potential roles that these states may play in global governance. Here, the second challenge may also occur in certain cases when middle powers punch over their weight while engaging with global problems collectively with major powers. Their restricted power in major international organizations such as the UN does not generally permit them to concretize their promises given to both their domestic and international audiences. As mentioned earlier, in some circumstances, especially when serious crises or conflicts emerge in their own regions, middle powers may concentrate more on regional affairs than global ones, and this may make them passive players on the international scene. Middle powers are generally important regional actors in their respective regions, which can make them indispensable in regional conflict management as they are generally most affected by ongoing regional crises. However, if middle powers are conscious of the global and collective roles they have to play, the complementary role of their regional and global needs must be balanced. As a last challenge, one can argue that middle powers, both traditional and emerging, have generally been expected to pursue midway policies which would not jeopardize, in principle at least, the great/major powers or small powers' interests and priorities. In fact, middle powers, despite their increasing material, behavioral, and ideational powers in recent years still have weak leverage in the face of great powers. Their weakness emanates respectively from their material, ideational, and behavioral powers. In terms of behavioral power, middle powers seem to have more developed and sophisticated tools that make them unique and indispensable in the resolution of some global problems.

Making Sense of Turkey's Middle Power at the Junction of the Global-Regional, Institutional, and Behavioral

Turkish foreign policy identity has not embraced the middle power concept, and thus it has not been strongly appropriated by Turkish governments after the Republican era. Turkey's long-lasting domestic and economic problems associated with the rising security-related tensions of the Cold War era prevented it from projecting hard and soft power in the international system and launching a new foreign policy framework drawn

upon a middle power narrative. Of course, behind Turkey's reticence in redefining its status at the global level as a middle power or middle-ranked state lay its imperial past and the "grandeur politique" narrative inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Added to this weak conceptual foundation of middle power in Turkish foreign policy identity was the unwillingness of the Turkish political elite to employ the concept at the discursive level as a policy instrument. However, the end of the Cold War created new ground for the Turkish political elite to operationalize the middle power concept as both a new self-perception narrative and a power instrument which fit well with Turkey's post-Cold War era foreign policy orientation and ambitions. On the other hand, while the 2000s were marked by ambivalence in Turkey's middle powership and the vicissitudes of Turkey's middle power thinking, this period offered it a better climate in which to adopt a series of middle power behaviors in its diplomacy at both the regional and global levels. Derived from its gradually upgraded international position as a result of its increasing material capabilities over the last decade, Turkey's newly emerged middle power vision sought to support its international activism by enhancing its institutional power in both formal and informal international organizations and forums. Interested more in the functional aspect of the middle power rather than its ideational aspect, Turkey has also sought in recent years to take advantage of the three areas that may be assigned to a middle power vision in the international realm: its increasing international development cooperation activities, its growing economic influence, and its increasing interest in the G20- and MIKTA-like informal groupings. However, the changing security context of the Middle East in the shadow of the ongoing Syrian civil war and the rise of the ISIS threat in recent years has made it difficult for Turkey to actively operationalize the middle power diplomacy tools such as agenda-setting, niche diplomacy, networking, coalition building, mediation, and democracy promotion. Turkey's current foreign policy, which has been securitized as a consequence of the ongoing security threats emanating from its Middle Eastern neighborhood and its domestic environment, does not allow it to effectively enact a middle power role to promote democratic governance, internationalism, and human rights either inside or outside the country.

In this background, this book attempts to shed light on how a middle-ranked state such as Turkey has engaged in socially constructing a middle power identity in recent years using appropriate middle power diplomacy tools despite its weak middle power self-perception and decreasing leverage in regional and global affairs, as well as in its relations with its Western

allies, particularly the United States and EU. From a realistic and critical approach, it examines Turkey's middle powermanship from three complementary aspects: geographical, institutional, and behavioral. The book delves into Turkey's potentialities and challenges in projecting its middle power diplomacy. Generally conceived positively in IR studies, the concept of middle power may generate some positive assets for rising powers like Turkey as a complement to their active regional and global governance policies. Departing from this, the book scrutinizes Turkey as an imperfect middle power with a special focus on its regional-global nexus, its institutional engagements, and its behavioral functionalism.

Geographical-Geopolitical Approaches to Turkey's Middle Powermanship

In his chapter "Through a Glass Darkly: Past, Present, and Future of Turkish Foreign Policy", Richard Falk considers three major developments to have affected Turkey's international profile: the end of the Cold War, the electoral dominance of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, JDP), and demise of the Westphalian conception of world order. The chapter then briefly assesses specific dimensions of Turkey's evolving relationship with the United States, Europe, Russia, China, and the Middle East. Based on these three major developments, Falk presents an overarching analysis of the transformations observed in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the 2010s. In doing so, Falk compares the Davutoğlu and Çavuşoğlu periods in Turkish foreign policy and argues that, in terms of rhetoric, there was a change from "principled realism" to a more economic- and humanitarian-driven foreign policy understanding. In this regard, Falk explains how the recent trend or wish in Turkish foreign policy to work more closely with the non-Western world is perceived as a win-win pattern of diplomacy that would at the same time bolster Turkey's relations with the West and the EU. The author also draws attention to the fact that, although new dimensions have been added to Turkish foreign policy, Ankara has been reluctant or slow to address global issues such as nuclear disarmament and climate change, issues that should be the concerns of the "global citizen" that Turkey perceives itself to be. For Falk, the Turkish national situation, as well as the regional and global setting, is extremely uncertain and unstable at present, making the future even more unknowable than in the past. This can be partly appreciated as the

failure by political actors to find a sustainable and coherent post-Cold War geopolitical framework that accommodates a wider distribution of power and authority to non-Western political actors and takes due account of the rise of non-state economic and political actors, as well as civilizational identities, in settings of globalization, transnational terrorism, and more recently, nativism/migration. In his contribution, the author also claims that the quality of radical uncertainty has led most governmental actors of sovereign states to exhibit caution and flexibility in their various efforts to navigate the windy seas of global political life. In his final analysis, Falk concludes that, after some adventurous initiatives early in the twenty-first century, Turkey is no exception as it again pursues arrangements aimed at promoting stability and balance, although in the context of independence rather than through geopolitical dependence, alignment, and foreign policy passivity as in the Cold War period.

In "The Southern Dimension in Turkish Foreign Policy", Donelli and Gonzalez focus on how Turkey sees the South-South cooperation and with which foreign policy mechanisms it can contribute to this evolving cooperation among the Global South countries, an untouched theme in Turkish foreign policy literature. The authors claim that after the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed an unprecedented growth of what can be called "South-South" aid, which promotes horizontal cooperation based on the principle of equality, partnership, and mutual interest. Therefore, considering the rising prominence of the South-South Cooperation (SSC) in the foreign policy agendas of the emerging powers, the authors aim to examine the Turkish agenda for the global South. For the authors, while Turkey is not considered an actor of the Global South, the country has a unique geographical position and geopolitical background. Indeed, Turkey is geographically interlocked between the European and Asian continents, located at the crossroads of the Afro-Eurasia landmass. In this regard, the authors stress that due to this distinctiveness, Turkey has moved from its traditional "threat assessment approach" toward an "active engagement in regional political systems" in the last decade. Donelli and Gonzalez also argue that specifically, after the Arab upheavals of 2011, Turkey has moved toward what Fuat Keyman calls "moral realism" combining hard power-based military assertiveness and humanitarian norms. As part of this new agenda, Turkey has expanded its diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian networks toward different regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and adopted a multidirectional approach. In the eyes of the authors, these developments

reflect a new stance toward the Global South, particularly toward the Least Developed Countries (LDC), after years of disinterest, opening a new window for channeling Turkey's interests in the global political economy. As an overall assessment, the authors underline the fact that the interplay of external and domestic factors has shaped Turkish foreign policy's Southern dimension. The interaction between external dynamics such as the translation of power the emergence of non-Western powers and the consequences of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and domestic variables such as the dynamism of the Turkish economy and the ideology of the ruling political coalition as status-seeker, are central to a general explanatory framework. For Donelli and Gonzalez, the complex interactions of the abovementioned factors should be addressed by the central research question of their chapter investigating the place of the Global South in the late JDP foreign policy strategy. As a response to this question, the authors conclude that the roots of the Southern dimension should be found in the sizable changes in the distribution of resources in the global political economy combined with the needs of Turkey's economy and the ideological nature of the JDP government.

In the next chapter, Gürol Baba looks into "Turkey's Multistakeholder Diplomacy: From a Middle-power Angle". According to the author, global diplomacy has undergone serious changes since the 2000s. Not only did the term take on new names, that is, economic, trade, energy, public, health, cyber, coercive, science, corporate, and cultural, but more importantly also took several state and non-state actors on board. The literature refers to this amalgamated diplomatic practice as the multistakeholder model. In this practice, non-state actors are not only consumers of diplomacy but also producers of diplomatic outcomes. Multistakeholder diplomacy is not a complete alternative to the state-to-state, that is, the Westphalian way but is rather complementary. In this practical scheme, state and non-state actors utilize their resources to overcome certain limitations and deal with complicated policy issues/agendas. Although the multistakeholder functioning of diplomacy is fairly obvious in practice, the problem of defining and grouping non-state actors remains. This research accepts transnational civil society together with "for profit" national and multinational corporations as non-state actors. Additionally, in multistakeholder diplomacy, the rules of engagement between state agencies, NGOs, civil society, and industry are still in the process of developing. In the generation of diplomacy, Turkey acts as a "typical" middle power. As a good international citizen, it performs as a go-between for international

coalition building and creates regional bridging alignments with similar-minded middle powers or great powers. It also utilizes international organizations to amplify its influence. Via alignments within/outside international organizations, Turkey aims to bridge the gap between various actors relying on moral values and epistemic notions rather than ambition and aggression. Multistakeholder diplomacy is an extra layer to this modus operandi. As an emerging middle power, Turkey has been performing multistakeholder diplomacy in four major neighboring regions: the Middle East, Balkans, South Caucasus, and Africa. In short, this chapter analyzes how multistakeholder diplomacy can be a complementary extra layer or even a booster to middle power diplomacy. Turkey's efforts in the last decade have provided a clear example of what type of complex agendas can be approached with multistakeholder diplomacy when mere "emerging middle power diplomacy" is insufficient. In this sense, the chapter also elaborates the tools Turkey has utilized and which have been more practical and effective than the others.

Institutional Approach

The chapter dealing with the institutional approach to Turkey's middle powermanship belongs to Thomas Weiss, who identifies Turkey as a NATO member and long-time European Union (EU) aspirant and classifies it as a "rising" or "emerging power". For the author, all groupings of developing and industrialized countries should be interrogated and not merely applied and assumed to make analytical sense. In addition to Turkey, Weiss also addresses two other topics: global governance and the United Nations. As underlined by the author, this chapter invites readers to investigate several erroneous narratives: "that the Global South has had little impact on universal normative developments; that it was largely absent from the founding of the United Nations whose values came only from the West; that 'rising powers' is a meaningful analytical category; and that 'global governance' is a synonym for international organization and law with some non-state actors now in the mix". By locating Turkey in the international order considering North-South relations, global governance, and the UN, Weiss sets the stage for an analysis of Turkey as a middle power. For the author, the Southern agency as a source of global norms also merits a reliable context for analyzing Turkey on the world stage. After presenting the main dynamics behind the North-South relations, the author locates Turkey's position as akin to that of other rising powers. For

Weiss, Turkey can be portrayed as belonging to both the North and the South. Extrapolating from the Turkish case, Weiss argues that the portrayal of a country as emerging/middle/rising power depends on the context. Departing from this, Weiss explains how the analysis on global governance and the UN has neglected the dimension of non-state actors and how new studies need to go beyond the limited analysis of international organizations to understand the role of new actors such as Turkey. In the final analysis, the author concludes that there is a need to conceptualize changes in global governance to understand the durability of the systems and urges scholars to go beyond the ahistorical character of much contemporary social science in order to avoid only nation-/region-specific analyses and to provide longer-term perspectives.

In their chapter entitled "Turkey in the UN Funding System: A Comparative Analysis with the BRICS Countries (2010–2013)", Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kursun examine in detail Turkey's financial contribution to the UN system compared to the BRICS countries in order to reveal the main trends and preferences in Turkey's funding strategies in global governance, particularly in the UN. The authors depart by unpacking the recent transformations in financing the UN system and locate Turkey in this picture by comparing the latter with financing strategies of other rising powers, namely the BRICS countries. The authors explain the main rationale behind the empirical analysis of their study as the evident correlation between the rising powers' increasing interest in financing global governance and their institutional, diplomatic, and soft power in the international system. To reveal the broader picture, Parlar Dal and Kursun collect funding data of the UN system and adopt a statistical methodology (Global Governance Contribution Index and Voluntary Data Analysis) for comparing the amount of finance channeled by Turkey and the BRICS to the UN. In their empirical analysis, the authors reveal that Turkey was ranked in the bottom in financing the UN system compared to the BRICS countries and, in doing so, draw attention to the points that seem alarming for Turkey's funding strategies in the UN architecture. To the authors, the fact that Turkey does not seem to have a comprehensive UN policy also affects its UN funding strategies and renders it into an ambivalent nature preventing the development of a strong and reliable stance in global governance. Moreover, Parlar Dal and Kursun identify certain UN bodies to which Turkey prefers to channel the majority of its funding. The statistical analysis of the authors reveals that, if Turkey concentrates its funding efforts on agencies such as the UNDP, the

FAO, the UN, UNESCO, and the WHO, it could better locate itself among the rising powers in the UN funding system. In their final analysis, the authors conclude that there is a need to develop a common understanding between the UN and the rising donors, including Turkey, to channel the latter's efforts in multilateral funding with an eye toward improving functionality, efficiency, systematization, global burden-sharing, predictability, responsiveness, high levels of alignment, technical skills, and policy expertise in global governance.

In their chapter entitled "Assessing Turkey's New Global Governance Strategies: The G20 Example", Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kursun first focus on Turkey as an emerging middle power in the G20 with both potentialities as a bridge-builder between the Global North and the Global South and its limitations in terms of its performance in the group, as well as its increasing domestic and security challenges in recent years preventing it from generating sufficient impact in the international sphere. Departing from this, the authors attempt to conceptualize Turkey first as a status-seeking country and second as a G20 middle power with differing expectations in terms of geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy. Third, they attempt to assess Turkey's performance in the G20 as a middle power state in comparison with other G20 middle powers by making use of G20 compliance data set from 2008 to 2013 and the final compliance reports (from the 2014 to 2016 summits). In the final analysis, the author reaches the following conclusions: first, Turkey's "recent" activism in the G20, especially since 2014 in line with its 2015 presidency road map, goes hand in hand with its status mobility approach to global governance. Turkey's new status politics has the potential to closely accommodate the current multilateral environment's multiple designs in the form of informal institutions or ad hoc and flexible coalitions. On the other hand, the G20 also fits with Turkey's economic expectations at the highest level while its foreign policy and geopolitical expectations have been met at a respectively lower level. In terms of Turkey's performance in the G20, the author underlines the fact that Turkey has experienced difficulties in using its potentialities as a middle power and effectively operationalizing its global governance-related capabilities in the fields of mediation, conflict resolution, and institutional design. The authors stress that Turkey's compliance performance falls short of that of the other middle powers in the group, especially the traditional ones. A closer assessment of Turkey's compliance with the priority commitments of the last three summits (2014, 2015, and 2016) showcases a fluctuating trend in Turkey's compliance ranking, from

the third lowest in 2014 ahead of Saudi Arabia and South Africa to the fourth lowest in 2015 after Indonesia, South Africa, Japan, and Saudi Arabia and the second lowest with South Africa after Italy in 2016. Parlar Dal and Kursun conclude that, despite its lack of compliance with G20 summit commitments compared to other G20 middle power members, Turkey's bridging status between the North and South provides it a special role as both an institutionally accommodating and challenging actor, which may play a constructive role in strengthening the regional inclusiveness of the G20 and in reforming it institutionally.

In the next chapter entitled "Analyzing the 'T' in MIKTA: Turkey's Changing Middle Power Role in the United Nations", Gonca Oğuz Gök and Funda Karadeniz stress that it is agreed upon that today we are living in a transition period from the American-led world order to a post-American hegemonic one. This creates uncertainties about the governance of many issues as well as the emergence of new practices by the states to cope with them. For the authors, informal diplomacy can be regarded as one of the new practices with which middle powers find ways to maneuver to increase their voices in global governance. Given this background, in their chapter Oğuz Gök and Karadeniz analyze the emerging middle power role of Turkey and the MIKTA states with specific reference to the "ideational component" of the middle power role, which is classified in the literature as comprised of (1) material (positional), (2) behavioral, and (3) ideational factors. By conducting a comparative discourse analysis of UN General Assembly opening speeches given by MIKTA countries from 2000 to 2017 and examining their "role definitions" in the UN platform, the chapter seeks to answer the question of whether there exists an evolving "middle power role" adopted by Turkey and the MIKTA countries in the 2000s. Acknowledging Cooper's (1997) assertion that the classification of middle powers as a separate class of countries builds on not only their subjective identification but also the fact that this category of actors actually engages in some kind of middle power behavior, the chapter compares and contrasts Turkey's and the MIKTA states' discourses at the UN platform with their behavior in order to see the degree of parallelism as well as divergences between discourse and practice as action. The authors conclude that the country analyses demonstrate to a large extent the explanatory power of functionalist arguments regarding the emergence of the middle power role among the MIKTA countries. Secondly, they conclude that a reading of Turkish leaders' speeches in the UNGA between 2000 and 2015 showcases that, in terms of the ideational role, Turkish rulers

refrained from using the term "middle power" to describe Turkey's status and identity in the international arena. Turkey displayed considerable multilateral willingness as well as concrete diplomatic effort in the UN platform in line with middle power behavior during the 2000s. For the authors, these efforts have not yet easily generated international credibility of a genuine middle power role from its counterparts, given Ankara's some contradictory foreign policy approaches, especially toward the Middle East region, as well as the growing belief that Turkey's democratic credentials display a number of important deficiencies. This regional factor in turn has the potential to affect the realization as well as durability of its middle power role notwithstanding its acceptance from its counterparts. In the final analysis, the authors conclude that the MIKTA initiative offers significant opportunities for Ankara to rebrand Turkey's regional and global status.

Behavioral Approach

Senem Cevik looks into Turkish public diplomacy in her chapter entitled "Narrating Turkey's Story: Efforts in Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy". According to the author, nations manage their reputations and compete for a favorable global image in order to advance their interests in the international arena. This is because public opinion and perception about nations are critically important for a nation's global standing. As nations struggle to attain a positive reputation and image in the eyes of global audiences, they utilize their resources and best practices. One such resource nations have used in the attempts to communicate their brand has been their benevolence and global values that converge on development communication and public diplomacy. For the author, Turkey is not an exception and has tried to manage its reputation as an emerging country by communicating its national brand. On the other hand, the author reminds the reader that Turkey is a newcomer to public diplomacy and its steady economy, new foreign policy vision, and issues pertaining to its global reputation have been the drivers behind its growing interest in public diplomacy practice. At the same time, Turkey has had ambitions in regard to its global position. Consequently, as Çevik states, Turkey looks to its strengths in humanitarian and development aid to narrate its brand image. Today, Turkey highlights its "donor state" and "benevolent country" status. State institutions such as TIKA and AFAD are also practitioners of public diplomacy. These institutions use communication to deliver

development projects, carry the narrative of Turkey's development aid, and promote Turkey's development aid. Therefore, Turkey's foreign aid is part and parcel of its national brand. This chapter looks at the actors that narrate Turkey's national brand and the ways they narrate and promote their work to reiterate it. Çevik's chapter looks at how aid is instrumental in Turkey's national brand and also how its domestic dimension is a significant component of Turkey's public diplomacy practice.

Mehmet Arda, in his chapter "A Heuristic History of Global Development Governance Since the 1960s and Turkey", analyzes the Turkish position within development governance in a historical perspective. Development emerged as a major topic of discussion in international forums following the Bandung Conference of 1955 and gained prominence with the end of colonialism. Developing countries adopted a fairly radical and maximalist approach in the 1970s, and this met little resistance from developed countries given the economic and political climate. Turkey kept itself distant from the developing countries and attempted to secure its position among the Western bloc but with some isolated gestures toward the developing countries' position. The economic and political realities of the following decade imposed a neoliberal and non-confrontational development agenda. The 1990s introduced new issues into the development debate, such as the environment, and defined development as a multidimensional problem with both local and global concerns, requiring partnerships and involving a variety of actors. This process culminated in the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, which reintroduced basic concerns such as economic transformation into international development discourse, complementing the overwhelming importance given to individual welfare in the Millennium Development Goals of the 2000s. Turkey seems more comfortable with the cooperative approach than the confrontational one. Its actions are mostly in line with global priorities although domestic concerns seem to dominate.

Ferit Belder and Samiratou Dipama compare Turkey and China in terms of their aid to Africa in their chapter "A Comparative Analysis of China and Turkey's Development Aid Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa". As the authors state, today the African continent is on the verge of becoming the heart of development aid strategies of "old" emerging aid donors such as China and of potential newcomers such as Turkey. According to OECD statistics and state-based reports, both countries have increased their development aid to sub-Saharan African countries in recent years. Despite significant differences in the size, amount, and content of their aid

activities, their development aid strategies share similarities such as the lack of political preconditions and the centrality of bilateralism, even as traditional aid donors in the West offer criticism. In their chapter, the authors focus on the motivations, instruments, and geographical distribution strategies of the development aid policies of China and Turkey. In terms of motivations, the authors underline that the search for diplomatic support in international organizations is the key political motivation which drives both China and Turkey to increase their foreign aid. In addition to political motivations, the two countries have increased their interest in Africa for economic incentives such as China's search for natural resources and mega projects and Turkey's export-oriented approach to Africa and infrastructural investments. Ideologically, both enjoy operating in Africa by breaking normative pressure of the Western world. In particular, China offers African leaders its own way of development combining capitalism, authoritarianism, and development. In terms of instruments, while TIKA is the primary organization in Turkey entitled to frame strategies and organize the allocation of aid, in China the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Export Import Bank, and the China Development Bank are involved in the process of development aid policies. This multitude of actors is mostly the result of the intertwinement of China's economic enterprises and aid activities on the continent. Another point underlined by the authors is that unlike China, Turkey's development expenditures and its dimensions can be assessed in accordance with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards because of Turkey's OECD membership status. This also makes Turkey's development aid program much more compatible with global development aid standards. The authors conclude that the geographical distribution of aid preferences of China and Turkey differ as the latter's activities are largely focused on eastern Africa (mostly in Somalia) whereas China's engagement focuses on resource-rich countries such as Nigeria and Angola. In terms of ideological orientations, the authors conclude that both China and Turkey use anti-colonial discourse to gain more legitimacy for their expanding aid activities in several countries in the sub-Saharan region. Chinese and Turkish officials often announce that they aim to establish relations based on equality and mutual gains which are also the basis of the South-South cooperation logic. However, their short-term bilateral moves deprive them of having long-term strategies and poses risks for sustainability. This problem is much more notable for Turkey due to its fragile economic growth and domestic disputes.

In the next chapter, "Making Sense of Turkey's Development Aid Policies: The Comparison of Turkish and Indian Development Aid Towards Africa", Hakan Mehmetcik compares Turkish and Indian foreign aid and development assistance policies and practices in Africa to produce theoretically rich and practically applicable inferences for Turkey. A comparison of foreign aid strategies of these two countries is essential to understand what middle powers are doing and what are their strategies and motivations. The Turkey-India comparison is also particularly important for the evaluation of Turkey's decade-long efforts within aid and development assistance to shed light on some parts of the right and wrong practices of Turkey in this field which is becoming a niche diplomacy area for Turkey. To do so, the chapter deals with three analytical settings: ideological-strategic, geographical-sectoral, and institutional. As a matter of fact, foreign aid has been an instrumental tool for middle powers to extend their influence toward new countries and regions. Countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey have become important actors operating in their own interests in the field using their own methods, including significant changes in the institutional and political frameworks of traditional foreign aid. Compared to India, Turkey's African engagement is relatively new and is largely shaped by business goals and humanitarian aid rather than ideological and strategic imperatives. Turkey's characterization of its African policy as a historical, cultural, and humanitarian responsibility brings it back into the continent as a coordinator, provider of aid, and mentor. These differences on ideological bases can be deducted from the geographical focus of these two countries. One of the important lessons for Turkey from the Indian experience is the right balance between multilateralism and bilateralism in the distribution of foreign aid. Being less multilateral may be a matter of control, effectiveness, and speed, but it should be noted that working with multilateral institutions should be a priority for Turkey to become more organizationally effective and internationally visible in this area. The second important lesson for Turkey is the issue of institutionalization and professionalism in its aid and development assistance programs in order to extend the current success to the long run. Third, increasing the efficiency of stakeholders such as civil society and universities is of great importance in this context. Fourth, Turkey should offer more development assistance in technical fields to diversify its sectoral capacities and influence.

Conclusion

Middle powers are of course not standalone and idealized actors acting outside of the complex turn of events in the international environment. Today's age of uncertainty adds additional complexities to the expected/idealized and real roles and responsibilities of middle powers in terms of their motivation-action gap, capability-potential linkage, and interest-ideals nexus. The smooth bilateralization of international relations at the expense of multilateralization notwithstanding, the emergence of a security-oriented atmosphere in the international system seems to have changed the global governance environment of the middle powers ranging from the traditional to the emerging ones. The regional and domestic impasses of middle powers now seem to weigh heavily on their international and institutional stances. In the current climate of anxieties and uncertainties of global affairs, all states, from major to middle and from middle to small, seem to have turned more to the domestic realm than the international. Despite this, middle-sized states still show significant potentialities, particularly at the functional level, in generating middle power diplomacy in the field of coalition building, conflict resolution, and agenda-setting. However, the global ambivalences around the Trump Administration's "global/integrationist" and "liberal internationalist" outlook seem to have made it difficult for middle powers to manage world politics "from the middle". Given that today the United States gives the appearance of being bilateral rather than multilateral, protectionist rather than neoliberal, communitarian rather than cosmopolitan, and nationalist rather than internationalist; the middle character that allows middle powers to pursue balanced relations with the great and small powers seems to have been damaged compared to the past.

As a new development, the relationship of today's middle-ranked powers, conceptualized as the third wave of middle powers by Andrew Cooper (Cooper and Parlar Dal 2016), with the so-called great powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, has become more controversial than that of the first and second wave of middle powers. In this regard, the recent deterioration of Turkey-US relations is a good example of the growing clash of interests between middle powers and great powers. The case of Turkey also showcases how a middle power state can push its limits to challenge the great power which has long been its biggest traditional Western ally since the Cold War years.

Another new development regarding the changing nature of middle power diplomacy is the fact that the diplomacy pursued by this new generation has succeeded in adapting to the multipolar international order more rapidly than has generally been predicted. The increasing number of middle power states with a rising power status in recent years is simple proof of how these emerging middle powers would be receptive to the changes emanating from the multiplex nature of the shifting international order. The expansion of the "emerging group" among the middle powers is also a consequence of the diminishing of the gap between the developed and developing countries in terms of material power. The increasing number of emerging middle powers in recent years has also impacted their ideational contribution to the international system. The emerging middle powers, different from traditional middle powers such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea, seem to have been more skeptical and challenging of the West and the weakening of accommodation of emerging middle powers with major powers might finally end up jeopardizing the North-South relations. On the other hand, this paradoxically may also create new potentialities in the functionality of middle power diplomacy. The rising autonomy and independence of middle power states vis-a-vis the great powers may also lead to reinforcing their role as agenda-setters and initiative-takers in global governance.

It can be claimed that, as a third development characterizing the new generation of middle powers, they seem to have gained more consciousness of the importance of their concrete contribution to global governance organizations in order to increase their international image as responsible stakeholders. Given this, the third wave or new generation of middle powers, traditional or non-traditional, pursue "win-win" and pragmatic global governance policies vis-a-vis international organizations. Indeed, the contemporary middle powers' global governance policies are twofold. On the one hand, they pursue strong institutionalist policies making them more actively engaged in both formal and informal international institutions and this in turn has raised their awareness of their bargaining and reform-seeking capacities vis-a-vis the major powers holding permanent positions in international organizations. On the other hand, they have increasingly turned to regional and domestic policies in recent years. The increasing regional security challenges and domestic constraints, as seen in Turkey's case in the post-Arab Spring era, make it harder for middle powers to assume larger and constructive international responsibilities in global governance. In this regard, the regional-global gap

appears thus as an obstacle in front of middle powers which are generally expected to play more active roles in the global governance architecture.

As a new-generation, emerging middle power, Turkey seems eager to pursue middle power diplomacy despite its weak middle power identity and its limited middle power means. However, a possible deterioration in its relations with its traditional allies, the United States and the EU, may affect Ankara's middle power role conception, external expectations about its evolving middle power role, and its performance. Even a smooth change in Turkey's alliance relations with its Western partners may cause deviations in the pursuit of its middle power foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, its evolving middle power identity and consciousness about its capacity to enact a middle power role may open new horizons for its developing middle powermanship. In this regard, Turkey possesses significant potentialities in bridging the developed and the developing world and in bringing alternative solutions to global challenges alongside other middle and rising powers. While constructing its middle power identity, Turkey must also constitute its new international role on the basis of its developing material power as well as its ideational and democratic power. Turkey's stronger attachment to universal values and democracy would certainly contribute positively to its middle power identity in-the-making and transform it into a complete middle power state capable of establishing a delicate balance between its regional and global responsibilities.

Note

1. See the Google-NGram query for middle power and emerging power: https://goo.gl/hq8vkZ

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PART I

Making Sense of Turkey's Middle Power at the Junction of the Global–Regional

CHAPTER 2

Through a Glass Darkly: The Past, Present, and Future of Turkish Foreign Policy

Richard Falk

Introduction

There are three developments that have deeply impacted on Turkey's search for sustainable political stability, rapid economic development, and higher regional and international status during the early decades of the twenty-first century. First and foremost, the end of the Cold War gave rise to geopolitical confusion that is exhibited by an increasing fluidity of alignments and a partial reconfiguration of world order that reflects the as-yet uncrystallized global and regional power/authority structures that are still in the process of formation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline and discrediting of US leadership, the rise of China, turmoil in the Middle East, and the unmet *global* agenda of climate change and nuclear disarmament.[1] Turkey has struggled during this period to find a compass that will fulfill its foreign policy goals in a manner commensurate with its emergent stature as an important sovereign state with major engagements in the Middle East, Europe, and increasingly, with the rest of the world.

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Secondly, the electoral dominance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002 has supported the expansion of Turkish foreign policy ambitions and provided a continuity of leadership as personified to the world by the dominant political role played by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It remains controversial to characterize the political identity of the AKP, which affirms secularism while being accused of steadily increasing the public role of Islam in Turkish society as well as greatly weakening the checks and balances of a genuine republican polity. Regionally and globally, Turkey under Erdoğan has been a dynamic political actor, which is notable for efforts to resolve shifting tensions among principled commitments, ideological affinities, and pragmatic adjustments, sometimes accentuating its support of ethical and normative principles and at other times making pragmatic adjustments that seem to ignore or even contradict these principles. What is beyond controversy is the degree to which Turkey has become a more significant regional force and an innovative global actor during the period of AKP leadership, a country that can no longer be taken for granted as a passive and compliant member of the Western alliance as was the case during most of the Cold War.[2]

Thirdly, and most elusively, the framing of the world order should no longer be conceived mainly as the interaction of sovereign territorial states.[3] The Westphalian framework of state-centric world order continues to offer a first approximation for comprehending how power and authority are distributed in the world as well as how mutual interests of this society of states are protected and promoted via the lawmaking mechanisms of multilateralism.[4] The United Nations embodies this purely statist version of the Westphalian conception of world order, including a geopolitical component consisting of the permanent membership and right of veto accorded to the five countries that prevailed in World War II (also known as the P-5).[5] This blend of statism and geopolitics no longer seems either descriptive of the geopolitical landscape or normatively consistent with the ethical and legal principles of the post-colonial era. The rise of non-state actors in the form of transnational extremist networks, market forces, and civil society organizations challenges claims of statist hegemony, while the geopolitical fix represented by the P-5 appears more and more anachronistic, having been established more than 70 years ago at a West-centric time, when most of the Global South was still subjugated by colonial rule. Westphalian notions of problem-solving are also under stress due to the difficulties of promoting *global* public interests or human interests as these are understood in relation to such issues as climate change, nuclear

weaponry, regulation of economic globalization, response to natural and human generated disasters, and global migration.[6] The absence of stronger central institutions, in the form of a more autonomous UN, makes it virtually impossible to solve such global challenges on the basis of multilateralism, that is, intergovernmental negotiations that are dominated by the interplay of *national* interests. And the secondary approach to issues of global scope was a reliance on the benevolent role played by dominant states, which since the end of World War II, meant the United States.[7]

The underlying conceptual question posed is whether in view of these fundamental changes it would be better to think of the global setting as post-Westphalian rather than as the latest phase of the Westphalian world order. Or, alternatively, given the renewed surge of chauvinistic forms of nationalism throughout the world, it might be preferable to acknowledge the reasserted dominance of state-centrism by sticking with the Westphalian terminology or by choosing a hybrid label such as 'neo-Westphalian' (Falk 2004, 3–44; 2016). In this respect, classical Westphalianism in the period after the collapse of colonialism was weakened more by the rise of neoliberal globalization, and the growing influence of private sector corporate and financial forces, than by post-colonial geopolitical manipulations.[8]

This article will first consider these three major developments as bearing upon Turkey's international profile, and then briefly assess specific dimensions of Turkey's evolving relationship with the United States, Europe, Russia, China, and the Middle East. In this sense, the outlook taken here is late Westphalian, taking seriously the role of non-state actors and identities, but continuing to affirm the statist/geopolitical core of world order as still the best descriptive summary. The Turkish national situation, as well as the regional and global setting, is extremely uncertain and unstable at the present time making the future even more unknowable than in the past, which can be partly appreciated as the failure by political actors to find a sustainable and coherent post-Cold War geopolitical framework that accommodates a wider distribution of power and authority to non-Western political actors and takes due account of the rise of non-state economic and political actors, as well as civilizational identities, in settings of globalization, transnational terrorism, and more recently, nativism/migration. This quality of radical uncertainty has led most governmental actors of sovereign states to exhibit caution and flexibility in their various efforts to navigate the windy seas of global political life. Turkey, after some adventuresome initiatives early in the twenty-first century, is no exception as it again pursues arrangements aimed at promoting stability and balance,

although in the context of *independence* rather than earlier during the decades of the Cold War through geopolitical *dependence,* alignment, and foreign policy passivity.

The End of the Cold War, the Rise of the AKP, and the Search for a New World Ordering Conception

During the Cold War, the geopolitical dimension of international life was dominated by bipolarity, with each pole associated with the two so-called superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union. Alignments were remarkably stable, and when shifts were contemplated as when leaders came to power with a mandate of realignment or proclaiming independence, war and intervention were almost sure to follow. This was the experience of progressive leaders and movements in the West that dared to question the premises of the Cold War, and equally so for those in East Europe who insisted on sovereign rights or gestured toward leaving the Soviet bloc.[9] The exceptions were extremely rare, such as Cuba and Yugoslavia, and these societies paid dearly over time for the audacity of asserting their independence, supposedly the birthright of Westphalian identity, but overridden by the ideological overdrive of geopolitics in the Cold War era.

Washington reliably perceived Turkey as comfortable with its status during the Cold War decades, including its junior partner role as a respected team player in NATO that even allowed its territory to be used by the West to make extremely provocative deployments of nuclear weaponry close to the Soviet border.[10] During the Cold War, Turkey pursued a passive foreign policy even within its own region, reacting to neighbors in keeping with Cold War logic, consistently deferring to the priorities of Washington, and accepting its strategic role as a frontline state in implementing the overarching geopolitical priority of the West to contain and deter Soviet expansionism.

Even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Turkey maintained its same stance as during the Cold War until the ascent to governing authority of the AKP in 2002. The various secular leaders during this pre-AKP interim period were preoccupied with national issues, including the control of political Islam, the counterinsurgent war against the Kurdish challenge, and the search for a resolution of the conflict with Greece over

Cyprus. There was no significant questioning of deference to the United States or any exploration of the potential for a more activist Turkish foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War years with the brief, partial, and contested exception of the coalition leadership role enacted by Necmettin Erbakan, Prime Minister 1996–97, who controversially promoted closer Turkish ties with countries throughout the Islamic world and was accordingly coerced into resigning from government by an ultimatum of the Turkish armed forces.[11] The role of the Turkish military involved both a rigid adherence to political centralization and Kemalist secularism in internal politics and a willing subservience to the whims and policies of Washington with respect to foreign policy in the Middle East.

Without any basis for suspecting disruptive intentions, Turkey embarked on a more independent line of international behavior shortly after the AKP assumed control of the governing process. In fact, Turkey at first accorded its highest priority to gaining membership in the European Union without in any way disaffirming its NATO ties or its overall supportive role to the United States in the Middle East. At the same time, the AKP clearly posited ambitions to reestablish Turkey as a major influence and important presence beyond its territorial borders both for material reasons associated with economic development and for cultural and psychopolitical reasons taking a principal form of a revived motivation to assert regional primacy in the spirit of, but not the imperial manner, of its Ottoman glory days. More than anyone else in the AKP, Ahmet Davutoğlu articulated this post-Kemalist and post-Cold War approach to Turkish identity and its implications for Turkey's foreign policy, which was sometimes criticized by opposition forces as overreaching, alleging a crude revival of neo-Ottoman ambitions and embarking on a risky departure from the prudent Euro-American contours of Kemalist statism.[12] Davutoğlu's own ascent to power from Special Advisor to becoming the Foreign Minister (2009) and then Prime Minister (2014) was itself an indication that Turkey had become an independent international player in a manner that contrasted in some dramatic ways with geopolitical constraints operative during the Cold War. This contrast was acknowledged, even apparently welcomed, in the West. It won the approval of Washington as a congenial development that helped substantiate US claims that even in a post-9/11 atmosphere, it could have friendly and productive relations with a government led by devout Muslims.

Under Davutoğlu's leadership, Turkey became increasingly active on its own not only within the Middle East and especially in neighboring areas

that had previously been associated directly and indirectly with Ottoman Turkey but also in new regions that were completely new for Turkish diplomacy. These included peacekeeping initiatives in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Caucasus, and a variety of more innovative outreach initiatives, especially in Africa but also Latin America and parts of Asia. The independent line being pursued was dramatized for the West by shows of Turkish support for the Palestinian struggle that brought Ankara into direct conflict with Israel and helps explain the disproportionately critical attitude toward Turkey adopted by the world media.[13] This confrontation with Israel reached its peak, threatening war, in the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, when Israeli commandos boarded in international waters a Turkish ship, under the control of a civil society organization, participating in a humanitarian mission to break Israel's blockade of Gaza, resulting in the death of nine Turkish nationals.

Even more telling was the American reaction to an attempt by Turkey in cooperation with Brazil to forge an arrangement for the international storage of Iranian enriched uranium that would ease the crisis building up in the region with respect to Iran's nuclear program. There is some ambiguity and controversy surrounding the question of whether Iran and Brazil were acting fully on their own or with prior undisclosed authorization by the United States. In the latter construction of the events, the United States strongly expected Iran to be unwilling to reach any acceptable agreement concerning its nuclear program, and thus it was supposed, Iran's rejection of the Turkish-Brazilian proposals would strengthen the US-Israel advocacy of a more coercive approach based on escalating sanctions. When Iran unexpectedly agreed to an arrangement that seemed responsive to proliferation concerns, militarists and think tank strategists in Washington and Tel Aviv began voicing strong objections, claiming that Turkey and Brazil were operating 'outside their lane,' and thus inappropriately given the supposedly authoritative, unspoken ground rules of geopolitics.[14] In effect, Ankara was being told that salient issues of regional diplomacy, despite the end of the Cold War were to be treated as belonging to a geopolitical agenda to be addressed by policies shaped by Washington.

In some respects, Turkish support for the insurgency in Syria fell between the poles of deference and independence. On the one side, Turkey felt betrayed by the Assad regime in Damascus that failed to live up to its promise of political reforms, and on the other side, it was being pushed to take the lead in organizing an anti-Assad campaign by the United States, especially during the tenure of Hilary Clinton as Secretary

of State.[15] In any event, the Syrian policy five years later is seen on all sides as a costly failure of the Turko-American interventionary approach. In Ankara, much of the blame for this failure is assigned to the United States, especially considering the failure of Washington to appreciate better Turkey's objections to the use of Iraqi and especially Syrian Kurds (YPG) to put pressure on ISIS and Damascus, as well as failing to do more to share the immense economic and political burden associated with upward of three million Syrian refugees that have entered Turkey.[16] Compared to Europe, Turkey has handled this extremely large influx of Syrian refugees with empathy and skill and has not experienced up to now the kind of anti-refugee political backlash that has fueled a right-wing populist surge in Europe over the course of the last decade.

Since 2014, which can be viewed as post-Davutoğlu, the Turkish government seems intent on establishing a new set of diplomatic relations based on bringing Russia and even Iran in from the cold while not greatly harming its strategic, economic, and diplomatic alignments with Europe and the United States. Such equidistance diplomacy seems highly sensible from a Turkish perspective, but it does collide with the anti-Russian stands adopted by Europe and the United States in response to Russian moves in Crimea and Ukraine.[17] At first, it seemed that Trump's election as the next American president in 2016 would put Turkey and the United States on the same page when it comes to accommodating Russia. Yet Trump was prevented from implementing his apparent pro-Putin approach once he became president, due both to indications that Russia interfered in the American electoral process for Trump's benefit and the impact of the American deep state that was strongly opposed to all moves toward *rapprochement* with Putin's Russia, and instead, seemed to prefer a strategy of tension, if not a full-fledged revival of the Cold War.

What seems definite, however, is that Turkey, even post-Davutoğlu, is pursuing a far more independent course of foreign policy than it did during the Cold War. Such independence has probably been further encouraged recently by the 'wait and see' approach taken by the United States and Europe to the failed coup of July 15, 2016, which was regarded as a major disappointment, if not betrayal, by Turkey's elected government. These adverse impressions were reinforced by the harsh criticisms of Turkish crackdowns on those suspected of connections with the coup perpetrators that have led to a freezing of negotiations with the EU over Turkish accession and a very hostile perception of Erdoğan in the West. These developments have shaken the foundations of Turkish political

identity and have given rise to a range of speculations of a possible Turkish turn toward China as well as Russia, and even membership and active participation in Chinese-led economic organizations that do not include Western states.

Without notable effect, Erdoğan's Turkey has for several years taken the lead in expressing objections to the kind of geopolitical structure operative within the UN, being particularly opposed to the privileged position of the P-5, proposing reform of the UN along more strictly Westphalian lines that accords greater respect to the equality of states by abolishing permanent membership and veto power in the Security Council.[18] These Turkish proposals are far more drastic and transformative than the more frequent calls for an expansion of the P-5 to be more reflective of the present geopolitical hierarchy and more geographically and civilizationally representative. Such modest calls for UN reform propose adding India, Brazil, Nigeria or South Africa, and Japan as permanent members of the Security Council with (or more likely without) the veto. The reform package put forward by Turkey challenges the geopolitical dimension of the UN structure in a more fundamental manner, and for this reason alone, is unlikely to possess political traction.

Another challenge to Cold War arrangements is the rise to prominence of the BRICS, seen as a deliberate geopolitical move to upgrade the role of non-Western major states in directions at odds both with the UN structure, Cold War bipolarity, neoliberal unipolarity, and the hegemonic dimensions of US global leadership. China has been at the forefront of these efforts, spearheading and financing such institutional innovations as the Asia Infrastructural Development Bank with 46 members (including Germany, France, Brazil, and Iran) established in 2015.

It seems evident that a new geopolitical order has not assumed a definitive shape as yet, although it is also clear that the 'unipolar moment' that followed the Soviet collapse has passed, and that many countries now enjoy considerable space for political, economic, and diplomatic maneuver. There is likely to ensue a period where there is no coherent geopolitical structure, with various tendencies present, ranging from a continuing global war on terror to a second Cold War to a new set of alignments and rivalries associated with a rising China and newly assertive Russia.[19] Such uncertainty is accentuated by the Trump presidency, which has acted to inflame regional tensions with North Korea and Iran, raising risks of catastrophic warfare in two extremely unstable situations. How Turkey responds in such an atmosphere of radical uncertainty will challenge the

political imagination of its leaders and is likely to encourage adherence to Turkey's turn toward pragmatism and away from both ethical principles and ideological affinities.[20]

Legitimating a new world order depends not only on the actual relations of power and authority but also on the degree to which such an arrangement is perceived as fair and reflective of existing power relations by the leading political actors. Whether Westphalian-type thinking that reduces order to relations among territorial sovereign states can adequately capture the present historical moment in which a wide variety of non-state actors and networked relationships strongly influence behavior seems problematic over time.[21] It is also a period in which earlier democratizing and globalizing expectations are being modified, if not displaced, by the rise of right-wing populism and ultranationalism throughout the world, a dynamic that neglects the growing challenge to global well-being associated with inadequate responses to global collective needs.

Principal Relationships Reconsidered

The United States

The possible repositioning of Turkey's relationship with the United States casts a shadow of uncertainty over any assessment of what to expect in the coming years. At one extreme is a rather radical triangular relationship between Russia, the United States, and Turkey that strikes compromises on the difficult, persisting challenges in the Middle East, especially as pertaining to Syria and Iran. At one point, it seemed as if in Trump's 'America First' flexibility and Putin's overt bid for a working relationship with the United States based on mutual interests, Turkey would be a natural partner in working out an arrangement that successfully achieves a ceasefire in Syria, coordinating efforts against both Islamic extremists and political transition, and agreeing on a plan to uphold the Iran P-5 +1 nuclear deal.[22] Such cooperative diplomacy would now undoubtedly be opposed by the Trump White House and factions of the national security establishment in Washington, as well as by the all-powerful Israel lobby, and by the dogmatically anti-Erdoğan Turkish diaspora, including militant secularists and those linked to the Hizmet movement led by Fettulah Gülen. It now seems almost impossible for such a positive diplomatic process to emerge in the Middle East, given Trump's ardent reaffirmation of the special relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia, both with bellicose leaderships

intent on finding military solutions for political problems. Not only does such an engagement for the United States produce suffering and devastation throughout the region, but it also tends to produce expensive failures that are not acknowledged, and so the underlying policy persists rather than being repudiated.

There is also a distinct possibility that the continuing refusal of the United States to grant Turkey's request for the extradition of Fetullah Gülen could lead to serious tensions in the near future between the two countries. Especially, if Erdoğan and his associates are convinced that the US Government played an active role in July 15 failed coup, and the West continues to promote strident criticism of Turkish internal policies toward opposition elements, a real break in the alliance relationship would become a distinct possibility. Trump is notorious for his contradictory policy swerves, and recently at the UN, he seemed to go out of his way to praise the Turkish leader as both strong and a good friend of the United States.

If tensions between Turkey and the United States should arise in a context where Russia, the United States, and China have moved in accommodationist directions with each other, then a Turkish turn toward Asia, especially China and Russia could be expected. At present, although this might change overnight, there are good reasons to believe that a recalibration of US-Turkish relations in the Middle East will be able to produce a coordinated approach. In an important interview, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu somewhat optimistically insisted that "…we can again become two allies motivated by a common vision" ("FM Çavuşoğlu: Turkey, US Can Once Again Become Allies Motivated by Common Vision with Trump Administration" 2016).

Europe

Unless Europe's present posture toward Turkey, epitomized by official EU criticism of Turkish violations of human rights leading to the suspension of EU accession talks, is soon reversed, or at least moderated, there is a strong prospect of a further deterioration of relations, although not a disruption of trade and investment that remains vital for both sides. This deterioration would be further aggravated if the 2016 migration agreement between Turkey and the EU collapses, and large numbers of migrants again cross Turkish borders seeking to reach European destinations. As with the United States, there are strong strategic and economic reasons for the EU to do its best to avoid allowing strained relations with Turkey

to be an occasion for a real break that would weaken NATO, worsen the economic situation in Europe, and generate an atmosphere of radical uncertainty. At the same time, European hostility to immigrants, especially those from Muslim countries, could push the EU toward an even more confrontational posture with respect to Turkey and the Islamic world generally.

Russia

It is possible that if the hardliners in Washington prevail, and US relations with Russia do not improve, Turkey would be in a stronger position to maneuver, possibly either seeking continuity with the United States and cooperative problem-solving with Russia. If relations with the United States (and the EU) worsen, then it will be increasingly plausible for Turkey to think in terms of realignment, featuring Russia and China. Such a development would amount to a major modification in geopolitical structure even if no major rupture occurs. As Mr. Çavuşoğlu made clear, Turkey gains leverage elsewhere in the world to the extent that it establishes positive working relations with any of the major political actors.

China

If relations with the United States and the EU deteriorate, a turn toward China by Turkey is quite likely, with important strategic, economic, and diplomatic consequences. A closer relationship with Turkey would help China make its own transition from being a regional power in Asia-Pacific to becoming a global power. From Turkey's perspective, an upgrading of its relations with China would both give it more negotiating leverage in the West and help fulfill its ambitions to be more active internationally beyond its immediate neighborhood. It is possible that conflict patterns will lead Turkey to create positive relations with Iran as well as with China, creating a cooperative triangular set of relations among Ankara, Tehran, and Beijing. Such a scenario envisions a new geopolitical balance that is formed on the one side by the United States, Russia, and EU, and on the other side by a reconfigured BRICS grouping with Russia dropping out by achieving a primary identity through its positive relations with the West, and several countries, including Turkey, being considered. While this possibility seemed plausible pre-Trump, recent developments make it much more likely that China will adopt a more ad hoc, prudent kind of

approach that seizes opportunities when they emerge with no firm exclusions and possibly filling the normative vacuum created by Trump's embrace of a transactional approach to geopolitics, which can be understood as relying on hard bargains rather than idealistic goals or even the projection of national values.

The opposite dynamic is also possible, stemming from growing tensions between China and the United States, exerting pressure on Turkey to make a difficult choice. This kind of development once seemed more relevant at the advent of the Trump presidency, with its expected warming of relations with Russia and chilling relations with China over trade, monetary policy, and South Asian island disputes. But the intervention of the American deep state has all but reversed these expectations, and it now seems more probable that relations with Russia will become more antagonistic while those with China will be relatively stable, and might improve, especially if China and the United States acting together manage to defuse the crisis posed by North Korean nuclearism and Trump's apocalyptic bluster.

These conjectures are admittedly highly speculative but take account of the likely seismic changes in geopolitical identity brought about by the tsunami of right-wing populism sweeping the planet, climaxed by the electoral triumph of Trump and the British turning away from Europe by way of Brexit. Such views reflect a belief that the world order is almost certain to experience important discontinuities in the years ahead, although their precise character is impossible to predict with any certainty.

Middle East

Turkey seems currently to have three overarching objectives in the Middle East: first, to rely on diplomacy to lessen turmoil, especially near its borders, giving priority to agreeing on a Syrian ceasefire followed by a political transition process; so far, the diplomatic sticking point, pitting Russia and Iran against Turkey and the United States, with Israel and Saudi Arabia prodding behind the scene, relates to the role and treatment of Bashar al-Assad; second, to work with both Russia and the United States to defeat the Islamic terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq without discrimination, which means for Turkey the inclusion of the Syrian YPG as terrorist adversary along with Daesh (ISIS), al-Nusra, PKK; here the obstacle relates to the US support for the YPG as aspects of its anti-Assad and anti-Daesh policies; and third, to establish strong economic, cultural,

and political links throughout the Middle East, and to bolster its leverage in such other settings as Europe, Africa, and Asia. Turkey's optimal foreign policy goal is to work out cooperative arrangements with all major players in the region, including Russia, the United States, and Iran, on the basis of mutual interests, that is, in pursuit of a pragmatic foreign policy that is seemingly devoid of ideological priorities. If Turkey succeeds in implementing its approach to the Middle East, it is expected to have payoffs in other regions where it will be again taken more seriously as an effective political actor.[23]

Conclusion

It seems fitting to end by again quoting from Çavuşoğlu's comprehensive interview. Mr. Çavuşoğlu asserts that Turkish foreign policy should be "… multidimensional, proactive, economy-dominated and based on strong humanitarian principles." The stress on economy and humanitarian concerns does seem to echo the earlier Davutoğlu approach of 'principled realism' as the most desirable orientation of Turkey toward the outside world. Of course, as always, the devil is in the details, and the test of such an approach will be its treatment of concrete policy challenges. Given the rise of populist autocrats throughout the world, it may be increasingly difficult to give real meaning to humanitarian goals if priority is accorded to evolving a maximum range of positive relations with political actors near and far.

Çavuşoğlu also stresses, with a certain originality, the interactive importance for Turkey of working out a multidimensional agenda in its relations with critical regions bearing on global policy: "The better relations we have with Asia and the Middle East, the more powerful we become in our relations with the EU. Similarly, the better relations with the EU mean a more powerful Turkey in the Shanghai Five."[24] In this formulation, the historical context is seen as favoring win-win patterns of diplomacy, which may reflect more wish than reality.

Of course, such guiding principles will have to cope with the radical uncertainty of this period, when there is renewed pressure on earlier expectations associated with economic globalization. The populist surge, with its nationalist form of identity politics, is skeptical about the present global economic and security arrangements, seeking a greater protection for high-wage national economies and a smaller geopolitical investment in seeking to control the internal political development of foreign countries.

If Trump follows through on his renunciation of interventionist diplomacy, it may lead to reduced political violence in the Middle East and elsewhere. It could also lead to a degraded willingness to help countries confronted by poverty or harms arising from global warming.[25]

Finally, Turkey has been slow to give attention to such issues as nuclear disarmament and climate change. In this sense, it has emphasized Westphalian logic that does not appear to have the capacity to address post-Westphalian global challenges. In this century, these challenges are integral to the foreign policy of a responsible international political actor, and it is to be hoped that the Turkish leadership will accord more emphasis to issues of what might be called 'global citizenship' as well as to the opportunities generated by the changing geopolitical context.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington articulated the most basic challenge. It was premised on the expectation that the rise of civilizational identities will supersede statist identities and provide new fault lines generative of global conflict. See (Huntington 1993, 1996). If Huntington's conceptions had become dominant, then we would definitely redescribe the world order as post-Westphalian.
2. The period of exception was the presidency of Mohamed Mossadegh, an elected leader who championed Iranian nationalism, crossing a red line by nationalizing the oil industry, thereby generating a process that culminated in a CIA-facilitated coup in 1953. See narration and assessment of Stephen Kinzer, (Kinzer 2003).
3. One elaborate attempt to call attention to the need to accord a new legitimacy to state-centric world order is set forth by Kissinger. See (Kissinger 2014).
4. Although not discussed here, it is important to distinguish between Westphalia from 1648 to 1945 when it was primarily a European, Western framework, given a hierarchical character during the era of European colonialism and Westphalia since 1945, when the state-centric character of world order became universalized as a result of the collapse of colonialism. This has meant that geopolitics in the post-colonial Westphalia has not been as explicit as during the colonial era but also that its West-centric character has shifted away from Europe, centered in the United States, then shared with the Soviet Union, then asserted in a unipolar format, and now confused and complicated by the rise of China, the emergence of the BRICS, and the reassertion of Russia.

5. This embodiment of Westphalia in the UN Charter did not, at the outset, question the legitimacy of European colonialism nor did it acknowledge and recognize the significance of the role and relevance of non-state political actors.
6. Economists are more inclined to talk about the difficulty of promoting global collective goods in venues, including the UN, where political actors accord primary attention to the promotion of their distinct national interest.
7. For influential conceptualization of this supposedly benevolent leadership role associated with 'Great Powers' see (Bull 1977).
8. By 'classic Westphalianism' is meant not only a state-centric world order but also a West-centric world order.
9. These premises included the ideological postulates of capitalism. The US interventions in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973) were directed at nationalist governments that sought to mobilize indigenous resources to benefit the domestic population at the expense of foreign investment. Cold War rationales for these interventions were invoked, but the better explanations of these events relate to the radical nationalist turn in domestic politics.
10. Compare the political panic that the prospective deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba caused in 1962 that brought the world uncomfortably close to a nuclear war.
11. Turgut Özal, while prime minister in the period preceding the end of the Cold War (1983–1989) prefigured the kind of activism that Turkey embraced after the AKP came to power.
12. For an insightful and sympathetic interpretation of Davutoğlu's views, see (Aras 2009).
13. It is notable that the spark that ignited Turkey's tensions with Israel occurred in 2009 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, when the then Prime Minister Erdoğan had an angry exchange with Israel's President Shimon Peres about the latest Israeli attack on Gaza. Turkey's declaration of geopolitical independence can also be traced back to 2003, when it withheld permission to the United States to launch its attack on Iraq partly from Turkish territory much to the annoyance of the then neoconservative Republican leadership.
14. Such a reaction presupposes the legitimacy of geopolitical criteria for determining the appropriate outer limits of foreign policy on the part of ordinary or normal states, that is, those lacking a global geopolitical status.
15. This American anti-Assad push was part of its post-Cold War 'democracy promotion' geopolitics, centered in the Middle East, that contended that democracies are less inclined to fight one another and are more efficient participants in a neoliberal world economy. In the background, were political forces associated with Israel that seemed intent on breaking up anti-Israel

authoritarian regimes in the region, starting with Iraq and Syria. See a neoconservative report prepared by a group working with Benjamin Netanyahu entitled "Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm" prepared for Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem (Perle et al. 1996).

16. There are indications that Syrians are returning to Syria from Turkey to areas that have been cleared of Daesh domination, but it is unclear how extensive this process will be.
17. For an analysis suggesting that accommodation with Russia is increasingly favored by European political leaders and governments, see (Fisher 2016).
18. See, for instance ("Erdogan Thinks There Should Be No Permanent UN Security Council Members" 2016).
19. For an intelligent expression of this outlook, see (Kupchan 2013).
20. It can be argued that the Turkish approach to the Arab World after the uprising of 2011 epitomized a turn toward principle (anti-authoritarianism) and ideological affinity (sectarian support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Gaza, and Syria; solidarity with the Palestinian struggle). In the last several years, Turkey has followed a more pragmatic line, including normalizing relations with Israel at the partial expense of the Palestinians and even making overtures to Egypt despite the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood by the Sisi government. The pragmatic orientation does not pertain across the board. Erdoğan has recently reaffirmed his affirmation of the Palestinian struggle and supported UNESCO's criticisms of Israel's failures to protect Muslim sacred sites in Jerusalem.
21. Contrast Kissinger, note 1, who insists that there is no viable alternative at present to a universalized acceptance of the Westphalian framework with Falk, note 4, who argues that there is emergent for a variety of reasons, especially the declining historical agency of military power and the rise of non-state actors and transnational market forces, a 'new geopolitics' that cannot be usefully fit within the Westphalian framework. For global implications of networking, see (Slaughter 2004).
22. Putin's receptivity to such cooperative diplomacy was set forth in his annual address to the Russian nation. See (Higgins 2016).
23. This is the central thrust of the Çavuşoğlu interview, note 16, stressing interregional impacts of establishing positive relations in any important regional domain. See note 16.
24. For both quotations, see Note 16. The Shanghai Five are China, Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.
25. Overall, Trump's 'America First' apparent withdrawal from present levels of global involvement would likely be first felt in the Middle East, where the failed post-Cold War diplomacy of 'democracy promotion' and accompanying regime-changing interventions have been most tested. One major shift in American management of geopolitics after the Cold War was a

renewed strategic emphasis given to the Middle East as the region where energy resources, proliferation prospects, and Israeli security posed threats to vital interests of the West. In this regard, Europe, the former nexus of geopolitical commitment, was left to evolve on its own. This may change in the coming years as the European Union seems likely to be confronted by a series of difficult challenges.

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CHAPTER 3

From Mogadishu to Buenos Aires: The Global South in the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Late JDP Period (2011–2017)

Federico Donelli and Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi

Introduction

Turkey is geographically interlocked between the European and Asian continents, located at the crossroads of the Afro-Eurasia landmass. Despite the quest for security and autonomy being a constant in Turkey's diplomacy, the country has been a witness to movements and counter-movements in multiple directions based on external and domestic incentive and constraints. In this sense, systemic changes at the end of the Cold War produced a new scenario which offered a possibility to empower Turkey's role beyond the general Atlantic alliance and the NATO membership (Falk 2018). In line with the broader opportunities in the international political system, Turkey started to replace the traditional foreign policy with a new paradigm that fell in a crisis with the regional turmoil in the Middle East. However, issues such as economic cooperation, development, and humanitarian aid

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became increasingly relevant, and a broader agenda emerged in the international context, characterized by the reduction of the value of military power and territorial defense. The overemphasis on the security factors was slowly changing toward a more trade-oriented foreign policy at both regional and global fields. Turkey's foreign and security policy has moved toward a more Kantian approach, with emphasis on being active, cooperative, and constructive (Chiriatti and Donelli 2015). In the recent years, however, the foreign policy suffered a backlash in which hard and soft power elements have been part of the complex and sometimes unpredictable equation.

The interlocking tripod of power, wealth, and status helps to frame the Turkish foreign economic policy (Katzenstein 1978). In this tripod, the quest for wealth and status has required additional efforts in order to increase the engagement of new actors and non-traditional regions and thus lead beyond the regional limits of Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey has moved from its traditional "threat assessment approach" toward an "active engagement in regional political systems" (Kardaş 2012). After the post-Arab Spring crisis, Turkey is heading to a kind of 'moral realism' that combines hard-power-based military assertiveness with humanitarian norms (Keyman 2017). As part of this new agenda, Turkey has expanded its diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian networks toward different regions, including sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America, adopting a multidirectional approach. Turkey's multidirectionality is defined by the ability to project its influence and interests in different directions while it is open to all regions around the Turkish cornerstone (Danforth 2008). After years of disinterest, these developments reflect a new stance toward the Global South, especially toward the Least Developed Countries (LDC), opening a new window for channeling Turkey's interests in the global political economy.

Traditionally, Turkey has been focused on the 'West'—and thus, considered to be close to the 'Global North'—due to the fact that the identity-security nexus of their developmental profile was similar to its southern peers (Hale 2000, pp. 1–11; Deringil 1989, pp. 1–12). However, since the early 2000s, the 'new' Turkish foreign policy has incorporated non-Western foreign policy approaches, reflecting the increasing tensions in the strategic orientations among Europeanization, Eurasianism, and Middle-Easternism (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Öniş 2011; Kirişci 2012), highlighting the role of Turkey toward the Global South (Bayer and Keyman 2012; Özkan 2010, 2012). In this sense, the 'new' Turkey's activism in the Global South has opened a new space to expand its interests: the southern dimension.

Considering the rising prominence of South-South Cooperation (SSC) in the foreign policy agendas of the emerging powers, this chapter aims to enlighten the Turkish agenda for the Global South. The assertion is that the interplay of external and domestic factors has shaped Turkish foreign policy's southern dimension. In the case of the southern dimension, the interaction between external dynamics—such as the conveyance of power, the emergence of non-Western powers, and the consequences of 2008–2009 financial crisis—and domestic variables—such as the dynamism of the Turkish economy and the ideology of the ruling political coalition as status-seeker—are central to providing a general explanatory framework.

These complex interactions will be addressed by the central research question of this work: What is the role of the Global South in the late JDP foreign policy strategy? In order to answer this question, this paper postulates that the southern dimension should be rooted back to the sizable changes in the distribution of resources in the global political economy combined with the needs of Turkey's economy and the ideological nature of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, JDP) government.

As regards the southern dimension of the Turkish foreign policy, this paper is divided into two sections. The first section elaborates on a historical and conceptual scheme about the Global South's dimension of Turkish foreign policy. The other part explains the main features of Turkey's southern dimension through the analysis of two case studies: Turkey's opening toward sub-Saharan Africa, especially its involvement in the Horn of Africa, and the new approach toward Latin America. Finally, the goal of this work is to present the case of the foreign policy toward the Global South, showing how the southern dimension can contribute to Turkey's ambition of becoming a rising power in the context of shifting global governance.

Turkey's Southern Dimension: A Post-Crisis Orientation?

The trajectory of the Global South has been widely discussed since the Cold War by emphasizing South-South Cooperation (SSC). During the last three decades, many non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries have begun to redefine their role in global governance by intensifying their efforts to support various development activities undertaken

by countries in the Global South. As a result, the world has witnessed an unprecedented growth of what can be called 'South-South' aid, promoting horizontal cooperation based on the principle of equality, partnership, and mutual interest (Quadir 2013, pp. 322–323). The philosophy behind SSC emerges from the notion of mutual growth. The underlying principle is to support each other for a win-win partnership on all sides. Nowadays, emerging powers, particularly from the Global South, are perceived to become the agents of change (Chaturvedi et al. 2012), even if there is evidence that emerging powers do not always have a common vision of development and orientation to the Global South. They often pursue an active agenda based on their distinct conceptualization of development, which follows certain values such as social justice, environmental sustainability, democracy, and human rights. In other words, as Quadir (2013, p. 324) vividly argued, "new donors place emphasis on different sets of issues and themes that do not necessarily revolve around a core ideological premise". Foreign aid and development cooperation constitute a relatively small element within the global change, but it is a field that is revealing wider patterns and trends in political, economic, and cultural power (Woods 2008). Emerging powers behave systematically different from traditional ones, refusing to use the dominant language of official development, which tends to account for the hierarchical relationship between the North and South (Dreher et al. 2011). However, within the emerging powers' agendas, there are important differences which some authors (Zimmermann and Smith 2011; Walz and Ramachandran 2011) have categorized into three different groups or three distinct models: the DAC model, the Arab model, and the southern model. Even if Turkey is considered by Walz and Ramachandran (2011) as part of the first group, its current agenda shows the simultaneous presence of traits relating to all the three models.

Until recently, the literature about the Turkish strategic orientation has ignored this southern dimension. Indeed, a review of the key textbooks about the central events of the Turkish foreign policy shows that the 'Third World' or the 'Global South' is almost absent. Instead, with respect to the participation in the famous Bandung Conference (1955)—in which Turkey received strong criticism from Zhou Enlai and Nehru due to its pro-NATO position—Turkey did not take part in the 'Third World' network organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. These failed initial movements toward these alternative blocs caused a sense of distance and mistrust with the non-aligned countries. As

a result, during the international crisis in which Turkey was involved, such as the one in Cyprus in 1974, generally, these countries took positions unfavorable to Turkey (Arıboğan 2004, p. 410). Another interesting indicator of this general sense of distance between Turkey and the so-called Third World can be found in the United Nations. In the UN Regional Groups, Turkey is a member of both Western European and Others Group (WEOG) and the Asia-Pacific Group—formerly the Asian Group—but electorally it only counts for WEOG.

Similarly, there are only a couple of publications that explore the relations of Turkey with the Third World in the midst of the Cold War (Bölükbaşı 1988; Sönmezoğlu 1994, pp. 441–481), and—after the Cold War—with the Global South (Apaydin 2012). Actually, there is limited research about Turkey's position toward decolonization process, the links between Turkish social and political leftist movements and national liberation movements in the non-Arab world, and Turkish multilateral policy toward main topics of the Global South's international agenda before the JDP years. However, there is an increasing literature of comparative perspectives – as a positive trend – with the Global South, particularly with Latin America, in terms of developmental trajectories, crisis and neoliberal reforms (Öniş 2006; Bailey 2007), migrations (Escobar et al. 2006), the banking sector (Marois 2012), the role of the military (Pion-Berlin 2011), democratization (Wiltse 2015), and populism (Öniş and Aytaç 2014).

The southern dimension is not a new one but a secondary orientation in the foreign policy, and it can be represented historically with the tactical moves to gain support in the context of the Cyprus issue, the strategic perspective proposed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem in the late 1990s, and finally, the JDP's assertive foreign policy over a wide range of regions and sectors. This orientation has reacted differently to external incentives, especially when there is a cycle of economic stagnation or a political crisis which has an impact on the established powers, mainly the hegemonic ones. In this case, the orientation would search for a remodeling of the international economic institutions with the aim of empowering the middle- and low-income countries while at the same time attempting to expand the norms in relation to justice and equity in the liberal international order to achieve fairer treatment in world politics.

In the last few years, there has been a new interest on Turkey's increasing ties with the Global South in different regions and policy areas. Turkey's new policies toward Africa (Hasan 2007; Özkan 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014; Mbabia 2011; Wheeler 2011; Abdirahman 2013; Akpınar

2013; Bacik and Afacan 2013; Rudincová 2014; Donelli 2015; Kadayıfci-Orellana 2016), East Asia (Çolakoğlu 2012), and Latin America (Gonzalez Levaggi 2013; Gonzalez Levaggi and Ferez 2016; Akıllı and Donelli 2016) have gained the attention of experts and analysts while the significant developmental and humanitarian efforts in such diverse places as Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, and Haiti have raised the role of Turkey as a responsible partner in international efforts to achieve more effective results in the quest for regional and global governance.

The general orientations of the foreign policy are affected by the local-global nexus (Keyman and Gumüşçu 2014; Parlar Dal 2018), which has been channelized by the process of state-building. In the case of the southern dimension, it became empowered after two major events: the 2008–2009 financial crisis and the troubled aftermath of the Arab uprising. In this sense, Turkey has responded in two different ways. First, it tried to present itself as a regional order-builder to the surrounding regions, attempting to revive—at least from an ideational viewpoint—the historical and cultural boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. This strategy, heavily influenced by the JDP's conservative identity nexus, tried unsuccessfully to profit from the redistribution of political power in the region in view of the reluctance of the great powers to intervene—initially—in a large scale. Second, Turkey tried to expand its weight as a global player, taking advantage of the crisis in the established powers and of the need for new partners in the Global South, especially among the LDC.

Regional and global processes prompted the policy makers to search for an alternative path in world politics, focusing their attention on other regions such as Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. The impossibility to become a regional hegemon in the post-Arab Revolution scenario and the constraints of the traditional and the new Middle Eastern markets in addition to the stoppage of the EU membership process led to seriously investing more time and resources in alternative regions and to deepen the good practices in policy areas such as foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, and cultural cooperation, among others.

This southern route posits a normative and responsible stance as a middle emerging power by taking a more global and accountable approach to world politics, emphasizing the ways to overcome global inequality. By using a set of soft power tools, such as the use of peacekeeping troops, developmental aid, humanitarian activities, and public diplomacy, Turkey increased its role in regional and world politics reflecting a concern for justice with an "ethical foreign policy" (Bayer and Keyman 2012, p. 85).

Even if this dimension tries to avoid actions that could undermine the set of international norms, it underlines the changes in the distribution of economic resources, especially those related to a likely impact on their national economy. In an attempt to portray itself as a crucial partner for the LDCs, Turkey hosted the fourth UN Conference on the LDC (UN LDC) in May 2011 and framed this involvement conveying that "Turkey as a developing country has much success and experience to share with LDCs" (Korkut and Civelekoglu 2013, p. 194).

Besides the regional and global factors, ideological preferences of the political coalition, which are grounded on conservative principles with a pragmatic implementation, have defined this different route for the Turkish foreign policy. The increasing involvement in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America portrays examples of Turkish novel orientation toward the Global South.

Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in Turkey's Global South Agenda

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the era of globalization, Africa has become a key area where emerging powers aspire to raise their international relevance. The transformation of the global economy is the main reason that has generated an unprecedented demand for mineral and energy resources, which makes Africa a geoeconomic and geopolitical competitive arena (Korkut and Civelekoglu 2013, p. 191). In the last decade, Turkey has emerged as an alternative strategic and development partner for African countries, offering a fresh approach with arguably fewer strings attached than countries such as China and the United States (Cannon 2016). Since 2003, the dominant JDP has led Turkey into a new foreign policy activism (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012; Stein 2015; Göksel 2016) throughout but not only the former Ottoman lands by a mixed paradigm of constitutive material, that is, economic investments, (Kirişci 2009; Kutlay 2011; Tür 2011; Özdemir and Serin 2016) and discursive means—civilizational dialogue, honorable foreign policy, Turkish politics of grandeur, and humanitarianism (Demirtaş and Bagdonas 2014; Haşimi 2014; Çelik and İşeri 2016)—which carried a general restatement of Turkey's international role. Among the regions in which Turkey has expanded its presence is sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), an area traditionally outside of Turkey's sphere of influence. Indeed, Turkey

has always found an exclusive place for relations with North Africa, but only since the last two decades has it started to look toward those located below the Sahel. Traditionally, Turkish authorities have looked at these regions as secondary and peripheral to their interests. This predisposition started to change during the 1990s, when the progressive openness of the economy, the increasing global financial and commercial interconnection, and the search for new opportunities in the non-Western world provided a basis for the establishment of the Africa Action Plan (1998). Since 2004, Turkey has significantly increased its presence in the SSA through trade agreements and bilateral projects initiated by the Under Secretariat of Foreign Trade. After the Year of Africa (2005), Turkey has tried to portray itself as an active partner for development assistance, emphasizing its nature as a country in the middle, between the West and the East, but also between the (Global) North and the (Global) South. All efforts promoted by Turkey led to its appointment as *observer status* in 2005 and *strategic partner* of the African Union (AU) in 2008. Turkey has used its membership in multilateral organizations and other international fora to reach out to Africa, gaining credibility in Africans' eyes. During this period, business associations as well as other civil society organizations (CSO) have contributed to the growth of Turkish-African relations in a similar private-led approach, as that championed by the United States and the EU. At the same time, Ankara has multiplied its diplomatic representations with the number of embassies increasing from 12 (2009) to 39 (2017). A turning point in Turkey's engagement with SSA is represented by its efforts toward Somalia. Such a shift was intertwined with the growing deficit toward other regions, particularly Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Turkey has increased its involvement in SSA's issues after the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, when the instability of the MENA region together with the Turkish inability to drive such aftermaths of the Arab upheavals have frustrated Turkey's ambitions in its immediate neighborhood. Thus, the outbreak of the Somali famine during the Muslim Holy Month in 2011 gave Turkey an opportunity to reorient its foreign policy's priorities and to distract the Turkish public from regional failures. The defining moment of Turkish commitment toward Somalia was the visit of the current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which coincided with the opening of a privileged channel of humanitarian aid. Erdoğan's visit had a highly political significance because it reintroduced the Somali situation into the international agenda and paved the way for the intergovernmental organizations rapprochement. From this moment on, Turkey resorted to an international

leadership role in the region by stressing existing commonality of goals (interests) and norms between the African states and itself (Korkut and Civelekoglu 2013). Since then, Turkish involvement in Somalia represents a cornerstone of Turkey's emerging power foreign policy, a policy whereby it attempts to present itself as a relevant actor beyond its immediate neighborhood (Lough 2012). Turkey, in its phase of assertive humanitarian diplomacy, has been giving a largesse to Somalia as a means of launching a wider African policy. As Harte (2012, p. 28) states "with its unrivalled on-the-ground rebuilding effort and generous scholarship program, Turkey is using Somalia as the first great display of 'virtuous power"'. This policy has made Turkey an international player outside its own backyard, introducing it as a sizable player on the political issues related to the Horn of Africa which represents an important crossroads of interests and clashes (Bereketeab 2013; Ylönen and Záhořík 2017). The Horn of Africa is not only a gateway to the whole continent for the sale of Turkish goods but, from the Turkish conservative elite's outlook, it is part of the 'Greater' Middle East or the 'New Middle East'. According to this perspective, the Horn of Africa includes dynamics, tensions, and rivalries of the Middle East geopolitics. As a consequence, there is an ongoing securitization process of the whole region. In the Horn of Africa, Turkey's engagement has been characterized by a multifaceted nature: it has built major infrastructure projects, provided humanitarian assistance, financed scholarships, offered military training, facilitated political dialogue, supported institutional capacity-building, and given budgetary aid. As shown in the next section, however, Turkey has adopted a multitrack approach toward the Horn of Africa, while at the same time, Turkish NGOs adopted one-track actions and started to play a vital role in providing humanitarian aid. Almost all of these NGOs were established in the 1990s, mainly by the Islamic grassroots movement and, under the JDP's legislatures, have become important implementers of Turkish foreign policy (Atalay 2013; Çelik and İşeri 2016). Even though the Horn of Africa remains the main focus of Turkish policy in Africa, it is important to restate that Turkey's embassies have made strategic linkages with African officials also beyond the subregion as demonstrated by the last President Erdogan's tours in East and West Africa (Langan 2017).

From a Turkish perspective, the basic drivers have been a mix of identity closeness, the search for new markets, and the quest for status as a global actor. Turkey has tried to portray itself as an active partner for development assistance, emphasizing the SSC. Compared with traditional

DAC countries, Turkey has two favorable features in its relations with African countries: the absence of a colonial past that makes possible a 'clean slate' approach (Abdirahman 2013; İpek and Biltekin 2013),[1] and the existence of historical (Rudincova 2014)[2] and religious ties (Özkan 2013; Siradag 2015). Nonetheless, beyond the significant role of the JDP elite's preferences and interests, both political and economic dynamics at the international and societal level shape these uncommon interests in Africa. Literature about the topic agrees that there are diverse causes behind Turkey's opening up to Africa: firstly, difficulties in the European Union (EU) accession process; secondly, the search for new markets for Turkish products; thirdly, the look for greater operating autonomy from traditional Western allies; fourthly, the gain of political visibility and support inside international fora and, finally, the need for fostering sustainable economic development by imparting Turkey's managerial skills and technological know-how (Özkan 2010, 2014; Wheeler 2011; Donelli 2015). The nascent role of middle and great emerging powers in the international political economy, along with the increasing presence of non-Western actors such as China, India, and Brazil in Africa, provide some clues about the state-to-system linkages. At the same time, since the 1980s, the progressive changes of the political economy toward a more open and profit-oriented economy have generated extra incentives to search for new markets beyond the traditional ones. Since 2008, Turkey has pursued material gains, such as increased trade opportunities and investments, by convincing African states of their shared values and goals (Korkut and Civelekoglu 2013).

Furthermore, compared to other emerging powers that are active in Africa, Turkey gives a religious dimension to its assistance and, following the Arab model of development aid, it concentrates on African Muslim communities. However, religion appears as a tool rather than the driving force in most of the Turkish initiatives. Additionally, it is perceived as a legitimate basis for Turkey's involvement (Özkan 2013). Indeed, most of the works carried out by faith-based NGOs[3] are promoted as Islamic duties (Siradag 2015). The active role of the Turkish 'pro-Islamic' civil society is another distinctive feature of Turkey's presence in Africa (Donelli 2015, p. 41). The involvement on the ground of civil organizations has allowed access to local channels and agents that the state cannot or does not want to reach. The NGOs' ability to build a mutual trust on the field leads to the inclusive approach of all the conflicting parties during talks and negotiations (Achilles et al. 2015; Baba 2018).

A special place among the civil society organizations has been taken by the Fethullah Gülen movement, which Turkey refers to as the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) after the July 2016 failed coup attempt. Indeed, between 1994 and 2014, Turkish businessmen and NGOs affiliated with the movement had a special place in the formulation and practical implementation of Turkey's opening up to Africa. Nowadays, the consequences of the domestic political warfare between the Turkish state and the movement may partially affect Turkey's humanitarian and public diplomacy by damaging its fame in the region. Therefore, Turkey's official presence in SSA is an invaluable asset in the battle against the Gülen movement and its well-rooted networks in the region. Turkey's official engagement with several African countries will serve as the cornerstone of its efforts to keep gülenist propaganda and networks away from the region.

Finally, Turkey's African policy involves a normative element on behalf of a more egalitarian world politics, fostered by the narrative of Turkish officials during their visits. By criticizing the development policies of traditional donors, Turkey distances itself from them, emphasizing the novelty of its approach based on a mutually beneficial and sustainable partnership between donor and recipients (Murphy and Woods 2014, p. 10). During the 2015 Sustainable Development Summit, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu brought forward the Turkish policy on SSA as an example of the driving force for the positive outputs resulting from combining humanitarian and development assistance programs within a collective strategy. Turkey has become deeply concerned with all forms of human inequality that exists in the world, especially those forms that impact upon the dignity of the individual and the community (Davutoğlu 2012, p. 3).

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America had been an unexplored territory for the Turkish diplomats until their presence in the region in the early Republican years. This connection also seems to be a novelty for decision-makers and societal actors, especially the businessmen. The new economic environment, in addition to the high rates of economic growth thanks to the 'commodities boom' in Latin America, gained the attention of JDP officers, who started to perceive Latin America as the new space for economic engagement, even if the cultural and religious ties were almost non-existent.

During the Cold War, Latin America and Turkey were regarded as distant cousins with scattered contacts (Sochaczewski 2015). In spite of the fact that Turkey's relations with the region had roots in the late Ottoman Empire, geographical and cultural distances posed too high a barrier for bonding (Gonzalez Levaggi 2012). In addition to the geographic realities, social and political unrest during Turkey's transition from a world empire (Ottoman) to a republic state (Turkish) also weakened Turkey's relations with the region. Turkey has been present in the major Latin American countries since the first decades of the Republic, but bilateral and regional ties were fragile until the mid-1990s. This type of low-profile relationship prior to the 1990s, known as consent to resignation, was due to Turkey's dominant Western state identity during that period (Akıllı and Donelli 2016).

In 1992, Turkey received the first Latin American high-level visit from the Argentine President Carlos Menem. After that, the then-President Süleyman Demirel visited Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1995, opening a broad space for cooperation in several areas, from defense to trade including educational and technological cooperation, energy, and fighting drug trafficking, among others. These moves were then incorporated into the Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean in 1998. This trend was strengthened during the first years of the new millennium, when the high economic performances of several countries—Chile, Brazil, and Mexico—made Latin America more attractive to Turkey. Therefore, the region gained significant importance for Turkey, creating the conditions for further cooperation at different levels. As a middle emerging country, Turkey saw economic opportunities in the region, initially related to the purchase of primary resources and then—not so successfully—to the intention to export low- and medium-technology products, and to develop investments (Gonzalez Levaggi and Ferez 2016). Moreover, Turkey's role and membership in the Group of 20 (G20), in which three Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—are present, have improved the opportunities for strategic alliances beyond the Atlantic bloc (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018).

A new wave of activism started in 2006, which was declared the Year of Latin America by the JDP government in an effort to create links with the Americas to boost economic, social, and cultural relations. After that, several factors indicate that Turkey's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have improved significantly: the intensification of mutual official visits, increased mutual diplomatic representatives, and the growing

number of mutual interparliamentary friendship groups in Turkey's Grand National Assembly (TBMM). The number of high-level visits and contacts increased between Turkey and Latin America and the Caribbean countries (Gonzalez Levaggi 2013). Under the flag of South-South relations, Turkey and Latin American policy makers embarked on a flurry of cross-regional travels.

In the post-Arab Spring period, the negative economic and security consequences of the Syrian crisis and the progressively strained relations with the West pushed Turkey to diversify its efforts even more to reach global support and legitimacy for its foreign policy. Latin America was one of these spaces in which Turkish decision-makers have paid more attention. There were three events that shaped the regional ties: two official visits from the elected president Erdoğan to the region in 2015 and 2016 and the consequences of the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2017.

After his regional tour as Prime Minister in 2010, Erdoğan returned to Latin America five years later to visit Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico in order to strengthen political, economic, and cultural relations, while in 2016 he visited Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador with a broader agenda that covered issues from political dialogue to developmental assistance. Despite some controversy over Erdogan's declarations in Cuba about the discovery of the Americas and an isolated incident in Ecuador with the Presidential guards, the visits paid off to improve the Turkish presence and relative position in the continent as one of the emerging non-Western actors.

A strategic incentive to increase the engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean has been the ambition of the JDP government to become a regional power with global appeal. So as to achieve that aim, Turkey has rapidly expanded the official representation network, organized a quasi-interregional meeting with the CARICOM, opened the first TIKA and Anadolu Agency (AA) offices in the region, and also become an observatory member of the Pacific Alliance, the most dynamic economic regional organization in the Americas. Nowadays, Turkey holds *observer status* in the Organization of American States (OAS), CARICOM, MERCOSUR, and the Rio Group. The increasing presence of Turkish interest in the region has catapulted the Eurasian country to the second ring of extra-regional powers in Latin America next to India, Indonesia, South Korea, and South Africa.

In line with the goal of developing economic and trade relations, Turkey has signed economic and trade cooperation agreements with 13

countries in addition to other agreements covering economic cooperation, technical assistance, infrastructure development, and other topics. The trade volume between Turkey and Latin American countries reached almost $8 billion in 2015 and expanded up to 800 percent over the past decade. Moreover, Turkey signed its first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile in 2009, and it has begun FTA negotiations with Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia, aiming to reach a trade volume of $20 billion with Latin America by 2023, the Republic's centennial. Nowadays, these figures seem too optimistic as trade has been stagnant since 2012.

As in sub-Saharan Africa, but to a lesser degree, the main economic, societal, and state actors that have been an active part of the overall Turkish activity are present in Latin America. The presence of Turkish state and non-state agencies has increased only recently, for example, the Anadolu Agency started its regional activities in 2015, and Turkish Airlines commenced flights to four destinations in the region (Buenos Aires, San Pablo, Bogota, and Panama City). At the same time, TİKA opened two offices in 2015 (Mexico D.F. and Bogota), and it seems this would play a pivotal role in Turkey's opening toward the region thanks to several activities and assistance projects in the fields of agriculture, health, and education (Akıllı and Donelli 2016). Another economic actor that has been involved is the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) that has organized trade missions, binational trade councils, and round table meetings.

Finally, the more normative stand of Turkey's southern dimension in Latin America is seen in its relations with the Caribbean countries in which Turkey has offered humanitarian and developmental help not only to increase her regional leverage but also to acquire greater weight in global governance. In Turkey's perspective, the rise of a human-oriented diplomacy represents the beginning of a more enlightened foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu, the global system requires an approach based on a "critical equilibrium between conscience and power", and Turkey is determined to be a leader in establishing such an understanding on a global scale (Davutoğlu 2013, p. 866). This approach, which can help move beyond the hard power and soft power dichotomy, has reinforced a broader vision of the Turkish government and implies a growing presence of Turkey in a multipolar world, boosting its role into the global governance.

Finally, the nature of the regional agenda changed after the July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. The JDP government officially accused the Gülen movement of being responsible for the coup attempt. Since the

Gulenists have networks in Latin America too, the officials started to look closely at the activities of these groups in the region, as well as including this issue in the bilateral agenda to warn the countries of the region about the activities of these networks and exerting some pressure to limit their activities.

Conclusions

During the last two decades, Turkey has undergone major transformations. While the world's geopolitical balances are constantly changing, Turkey's have become more global than ever. Opening of official representations worldwide, a new wave of investments, and atypical developmental and humanitarian aid, far from the range of middle emerging powers, have marked the times of Turkey's global activity. Given the importance of international and domestic variables which have pushed Turkey into following unusual routes, such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, this article aimed to understand Turkey's agenda for the Global South. In this regard, it tried to argue that the advent of a post-Cold War political and economic scenario, summed up by the novel narrative promoted by the ruling JDP elite, helped to expand Turkey's strategic perspective formulated in the late 1990s. The case studies presented in this chapter—sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America—suggest that Turkey reconsidered its priorities in regional and global policy. This change symbolizes the shift in preferences from meeting the expectations of Western partners to securing Turkey's own national interests and ambitions as a rising power. Hence, the conclusion on this point is that Turkey's southern route is not an alternative to Turkish traditional (Western) and post-traditional ones (Anatolian), but it is complementary, aiming to acquire importance in global governance.

The Turkish southern dimension and its activity in the Global South have had two consequences. First, the new Turkish orientation intends to be a bridge between the developed and the developing world. The southern dimension has opened a new route for strategic projection, putting particular emphasis in soft power policies. Turkey's soft power has gained importance owing to the gradual involvement of new state and non-state actors along with the adoption of novel frameworks, such as cultural, public, and humanitarian diplomacy. Second, the southern dimension does not come without criticism, such as the excessive emphasis of identity over economy in certain countries of sub-Saharan Africa, an overinvestment of

resources in some unattractive African countries, doubts about the long-term sustainability of the extraordinary growth of official representations, and the replication of 'developed' attitudes toward developing states. Other factors beyond the Turkish intentions, such as the increasing tensions with the European Union, the United States, and the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, can explain this diplomatic setback better, but it seems that the expectations of the southern dimension have not reached their optimum yet. It seems that the southern dimension is still too narrow to transform the foreign policy from an 'isosceles' triangle into an 'equilateral' one.

Notes

1. The term was quoted by former President Abdullah Gül during a visit to Africa. By a 'clean slate', Gül was presumably alluding to the crucial fact that Turkey has never been a colonizing power in the region.
2. Turkish leaders emphasize these historical ties: "You are home, Turkey is your motherland, sixteenth century Ahmed Gurey fought occupying forces with Ottoman support". Opening remarks by Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu, Somali civil society gathering, Istanbul, May 27, 2012.
3. Turkish humanitarian NGOs are faith-based organizations. They are formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions (Berger 2003, p. 16).

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CHAPTER 4

Turkey's Multistakeholder Diplomacy: From a Middle Power Angle

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Introduction

Diplomacy, which is one of the major bases of international relations (IR), has been in constant change almost since its formative years. Diplomacy, in general terms, is a method and behavior/action for interaction (communication), which could also cover negotiation—consensus and compromise operating within a legitimate international order (Watson 1982; Lauren 1979; Leguey-Feilleux 2017; Kissinger 1994; Bjola and Kornprobst 2013; Thompson 1982; Hamilton and Langhorne 2005; Wang and Bao 2009; Berridge et al. 2001; Berridge 1995). The terms in this definition are familiar to any IR scholar, but almost none of them have stayed the same since ancient times (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Smith 2000; Hocking 1999; Hsu et al. 2015; Wang 2006; Saner and Yiu 2006; Saddiki 2006; Cohen 1988; Muldoon 1999; Diamond and Notter 1996; Barston 2012; Boutros-Ghali 1992; McGillivray and Stam 2004; Suss-kind and Ali 1994; Rana 2011; Cooper et al. 2008, 2013; Metzl 2001; Riordan 2003; Melissen 1999; Kerr and Wiseman 2013; Woolcock and Bayne 2003; Kickbusch et al. 2007; Eban 1983). Historically, the change in diplomacy could be

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categorized under three broad headings: (i) Bilateral—from the residential diplomacy of the fifteenth century to the classical European diplomacy of Westphalia system; (ii) Multilateral—from the nineteenth-century Great Power Conference platforms and the Concert of Europe to the twentieth-century global institutions with assemblies and councils; and (iii) Post-multilateral— as multistakeholder. In these categories, the changes occurred in the methods, actors, behavior/action, and platforms of negotiation.

This chapter focuses on the major features of multistakeholder diplomacy, particularly in terms of its forms, operation, and the significance of non-state actors (Hill 2003).[1] Secondly, it examines how multistakeholder diplomacy could be a complementary layer to middle power foreign policy options. Thirdly, Turkey's regional engagements in Africa, the Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus are examined to show how a middle power utilizes multistakeholder diplomacy to its increase its economic, strategic, diplomatic, and cultural clout.

Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Amalgamation of State with Non-state

Multistakeholder is not a standalone diplomatic modus operandi but more of a new negotiation approach which aims to bring several layers—local, national, global—and types of actors—state and non-state including national and multinational firms, NGOs, and international organizations—together for addressing, discussing, and contributing to complex international issues.

The main motto of the term multistakeholder is to emphasize the fact that non-state actors are no more merely the consumers of diplomatic outcomes but also their producers (Hocking 2006). This, in a way, aims to conceptualize the almost indispensable practical value of non-state actors in several domains of global diplomacy. In other words, today, non-state actors work hand in hand with state agencies in many diplomatic agendas. In this sense, multistakeholder diplomacy deals with how and under what terms and platforms the state-non-state interactions occur as well as to what extent they complement each other.

Regarding such complementarity, multistakeholder diplomacy is not a rival to Westphalian diplomacy. Official diplomats, in multistakeholder approach, work as mediators and brokers (Hocking 2006, 19). In this interaction, state agencies and representatives might still have a stronger influence, but they do not have constant monopoly over the issues being negotiated.

Multistakeholder diplomacy provides a multilayered communication via policy-oriented networks among state and non-state actors. Policy networks bring these actors with shared interests and enable them to exchange their resources via cooperation to achieve them (Stone and Nesadurai 1997). Globalization acted as a catalyst for the incorporation of public and private sectors (Hocking 2006) particularly with an increased speed of communication, which eased the formation of such networks. Policy networks lowered the barriers for sharing information to achieve quick diplomatic resolutions.

In multistakeholder diplomacy, there are multiple spheres of authority, which are led by governments or other stakeholders. These spheres combine three sectors: governments, NGOs, and business. All these sectors participate in negotiations/discussions for producing diplomatic output based on their expertise and interest. Official diplomatic practitioners do not have a monopoly over these outputs; they are more of facilitators and entrepreneurs. In discussions there is no "exclusive private club"; the networks are open and operating with multidirectional flow of information (Hocking 2006).

Multistakeholder processes have a participatory or democratic aspect. Parties who have an influence to affect and likely to be affected by a particular diplomatic output contribute to the decision-making (Assanvo 2006, 141). The aim here is to build trust between these parties, which is not only important for the production but also the application and sustaining of such output.

Application of multistakeholder diplomacy could be in many forms, such as Foreign Ministries liaising with domestic stakeholders including other domestic governmental agencies, businesses, media, NGOs, trade unions, and the private sector) in permanent or ad hoc consultations; performing such consultation on a formal or informal dialogue basis; enabling NGOs, academia, and business members to join with official representatives in international discussions; official agencies' support (material, financial, and institutional) to the abovementioned stakeholders, aid, and other types of humanitarian assistance through NGOs and other relevant interest groups; (Assanvo 2006, 142–143) official agencies' actions to carry out developmental and infrastructural investment projects with national and international business enterprises; and supporting international projects for "global good".

Multistakeholder diplomacy via supplying a wider discussion, representation, and problem-solving orientation provides several benefits

(Assanvo 2006, 143). Regarding the complex and diversified nature of today's global diplomacy topics, official agencies do not always have the required expertise, space or time, and manpower to deal with them. Wider representation from non-state actors creates a win-win situation for all sides. In addition to the expertise and space, non-state actors could even carry out the state agencies' job on their behalf. Throughout the process, the state agencies could benefit from the non-state actors' material and non-material resources. With these ingredients, more comprehensive negotiation processes are performed with a much more improved perspective of national interests. Such cooperation with non-state-led state agencies to be more transparent and their governance more multilayered and responsible.

Although it is out of the reach of this chapter, multistakeholder diplomacy has its shortcomings. Regardless of its practicality, it is facing the issue of the lack of well-developed rules. Dodds argued that 'a clearer definition of the role and responsibility of governments, as well as of stakeholders, and an agreement on the modes of interaction' is required for more effective operation of multistakeholder processes (Dodds 2000, 37).

One major problem behind this deficiency of rules is related to sovereignty. Non-state actors are internationally recognized sovereigns, which makes them less worried about confidentiality in diplomatic negotiations. A good example was the EU DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue, in which, the sovereignty issue made it 'difficult for the creation of consultation spaces where the actors feel comfortable and, sometimes, frustrations and misunderstandings arise' (Muguruza 2002, 13). These show that the practical and legal/conceptual frameworks of multistakeholder diplomatic relations do not totally coincide.

Multistakeholderism for Middle Power Diplomacy: A Practical Complementarity

The policy options for the middle powers in global diplomacy and the multistakeholder diplomatic approaches have interesting commonalities. Potentially successful policy options are usually the ones that are parallel to the very behavioristic attributes of the middle powers. These could be listed as non-ambitious, seeking stability and balance in the international system, quest for international coalition-building by being the "go-betweens", dealing with international issues through multilateral tendencies, rejecting significant revisionism of the international system,

seeking to reduce great power security dilemmas via regional and cooperative bridging alignments, and focusing more on low politics issues. Almost all of these options fall into the multistakeholder interactions realm due to either their content or multilateral action requirements. This makes multistakeholder diplomacy a supportive layer to be added to middle power foreign policies.

An unchallenging attitude of middle powers demonstrates that they are not after ambitious hegemonic roles; rather they quest for stability and balance. Because of this quest, orthodox or idealistic conceptualizations of middle powership denominated the middle powers as being more 'trustworthy' or 'good international citizens' (Cooper 1997, 7; Lightfoot 2006), that is, occupying a higher moral ground. However, this middle power attitude is more about pragmatism. Internationally or regionally, they usually search for stability and balance of power via diplomatic concert because these are the two basic situations where they can drive the most profit. They do not prefer tensions and crises; therefore, they endeavor to limit and manage them. Their understanding of international organizations and legal structures are also in the same vein.

As most of the multistakeholder diplomatic attitudes aim to serve compromised international interests of the various levels of actors, they would be an obvious contributor to becoming a good international citizen. Multistakeholder diplomacy is also a concert-oriented approach. It theoretically aims to bring various intermingling interests together for carving out a compromise-based solution, which has a preemptive potential to reduce the crises.

Middle powers generally seek to maintain international order via international coalition-building, by acting as international mediators and "go-betweens" and via international conflict management and resolution activities. This is more about the moral attribution of middle power policy options. In other words, it is an idealistic imperative that middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect international peace (Neack 1995, 225). It is difficult for them to be final decision-makers in international conflicts; therefore, they may try to influence the final decision through mediation among parties at various levels of international influence. Performing this moral duty within the framework of international organizations may empower middle powers' effectiveness throughout majority-driven decision-making processes.

Middle powers' emphasis on international organizations is also an indicator of their multilateral tendencies. They do not pursue their interests

unilaterally; rather they prefer to work through multilateral institutions or ad hoc groupings of like-minded states. They are more like 'local heavy weights that can employ great power tactics regionally' (Cooper 2011, 320; Evans and Grant 1991, 323; Fox 1977; Keating 1993; Jensen 1987; Wood 1988). Acting through multilateral institutions gives middle powers more of an opportunity to find and group with like-minded states in order to maximize their weights. Multilateralism increases their weights because great powers, in many international schemes, are subject to the majority rule for decision-making (Glazerbrook 1947, 307–318).

Multilateralism is the essence of multistakeholder diplomacy. The difference is that, in conventional middle power diplomacy, interactions happen mostly between state agencies. Today, not only multilateral platforms but also middle powers' diplomacies require the attendance of non-state actors. As a complementarity, non-state actors with shared interests and like-minded expectations would amplify middle powers' voice in international and regional arenas.

Middle powers are not particularly after revising the international system. Even though such revisionism may alleviate the great power domination, which may open a wider maneuvering area for middle powers, they see this transformation as a destabilizer (Efstathopoulos 2011, 78; Neufeld 1995). Middle powers aim to contribute to international stability via consent-building measures. They seek for a more inclusive manner of world politics, where there is less polarization, crises, or coercion, and more pluralistic participation of countries with varying levels of power and influence. In such an inclusive system of interactions, middle powers can more successfully perform their "go-betweens" and conflict mediation roles.

Being a "go-between" enables middle powers to intermingle among great powers via grappling with great power alignments. As Spero claimed, this could help middle powers to influence and even reduce great power security dilemmas through regional and cooperative bridging alignments (Spero 2009, 148, 152–155). Bridging falls into the good international citizen attitude of middle powers in a way to lessen regional security dilemmas via alignment with all neighbors. These state-to-state linkages build closer ties to confine threatening alignment rather than play countries against one another, hide behind neutrality, or distance by non-alignment. Middle powers have the potential to bridge the gap between changes in material incentives of other powers and their impact on basic casual mechanisms and ideas of foreign policy decision-making (Ravenhill 1998, 312). As Glaser stated, middle power bridging depends on the notion that cooperative policies, not

competitive ones, best serve the security goals of adversaries; therefore, they should choose cooperation when its conditions prevail (Glaser 1996, 123). These bridging linkages, in this sense, rely on moral values and epistemic notions, not ambitious and aggressive alliance-building measures.

These set of middle power foreign policy options involve consent, inclusion, mediation, and stabilization. Multistakeholder options bring up varying level actors' varying consents by including as many relevant types of actors as possible. Due to the complexity of the issues multistakeholder diplomacy needs to deal with, it has to have a mediatory approach to stabilize any potential strain among various types of actors with varying influence.

Middle powers' lack of ambition affects their foreign policy focus. They focus more on low politics, which are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state but more about its welfare (Ward 1970, 46). Even if middle powers cannot detach themselves from high politics issues, they refrain from being their forerunners since it may result in being victimized among great powers' wrangling. The permanent and non-permanent membership structure in United Nations Security Council is an illustration of middle powers' level of effectiveness on international security. Low politics issues, on the other hand, such as peace, environment, and human rights, are less antagonistic. Since there is a more of a consensus on low politics issues among great powers, it is less possible for middle powers to be bypassed, purged, or victimized.

Low politics does not mean unimportant, insignificant, or unnecessary: on the contrary, with the end of the Cold War, economy, human rights, and environment-related issues have become very central. Increasing transparency in international affairs strengthens middle powers' trade-oriented relations via intraregional, interregional, and transregional interdependence association schemes. Even if they are not as economically developed as the great powers, their relative economic development may be attractive to the great powers to become economic partners rather than being military allies.

Low politics issues are still the most well-practiced realm of multistakeholder diplomacy. Non-state actors usually represent business, human rights, and environmental issues. In some instances of conflict resolution, that is, in Kosovo and East Timor, multistakeholder approaches contributed into UN peacekeeping and nation-building missions (Begoyan 2006). Yet most of their applications are still in low politics realms.

Allowing non-state actors in a non-patronizing manner would serve middle power interests in these multilateral and layered issues.

These policy options discussed above are not theoretically lucid. Middle power 'is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system' (Cox 1989, 825). They are constantly in contact and interaction with regional perceptions, economic development, and great power policies. That means these policy options should be constantly reexamined and reevaluated for possibilities for evolutionary change (Hawes 1984). This makes middle power policy options unforeseeable since they depend on a complicated ambience of perceptions, reactions, and interests. Yet one obvious result of the above discussion is that there are clear intersections between middle power foreign options and multistakeholder diplomacy. Not only in terms of content and focus but also in practical applications and potential contributions, multistakeholder application complements middle powers. Turkey's policies in its neighboring regions illustrate this neatly.

Turkey's "Multistakeholder" Efforts: A Practical Reality

Turkey's proactivity (Davutoğlu 2012; Dalay and Friedman 2013; Sözen 2010; Criss 2010; Falk 2013; Hatipoglu and Palmer 2014) in diplomacy is associated with Justice and Development Party's outstanding success particularly after the 2007 elections. An important figure in this change was Prof Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Foreign Minister later the Prime Minister and his well-proposed 'strategic depth' doctrine (Davutoğlu 2001). In a nutshell, the doctrine emphasized the importance of a multilayered, multilateral, and multifaceted foreign policy for Turkey. It also stressed the importance of non-state actors. As Meral and Paris (2010) claim, Davutoğlu

> has positioned Turkey in the center of events, ranging from engaging Serbia for peace in the Balkans, to negotiating between Sunni and Shiite factions in Iraq, to attempting to make peace between Syria and Israel, to boosting regional economic engagement by signing free customs agreements with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, to reaching nuclear and natural energy deals with Russia, to normalizing relations with Armenia, Greece, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Syria.

Turkey's "new" posture was labeled not 'not only a regional power, but also an actual or prospective "regional great power," a "pivotal middle power" that determines the fate of its region and has a critical role in shaping world order, a "pivotal regional leader," a "regional hegemon," or even a global power' (Bagdonas 2015, 310; Cornell 2013, 227; Ilgit and Taner 2013, 193; Hickok 2000; Erickson 2004; Mufti 2011, Cagaptay 2014, 133). In this reshaping, as Emel Parlar Dal states in the Introduction, Turkey performed an 'ambitious strategy for extending its regional ties' (Parlar Dal 2018, 9) in 'the post-Soviet space, including the sub-regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus; EU-Europe, including the Balkans; and the Middle East and North Africa, comprising the subregions of the Gulf, the Levant, and the Maghreb' (Bagdonas 2015, 317). Even if the Turkish academia categorized Turkish diplomatic moves in Africa, the Middle East, Balkans, and Central Asia as a soft power (Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010; Oguzlu 2007; Aras 2009; Özdemirkıran 2015), in the practical sense, most of these moves fall into multistakeholder diplomacy.

One major region Turkey has been utilizing for its multistakeholder diplomacy is Africa, more precisely sub-Saharan regions. AKP worked with small- and medium-sized Turkish businesses and faith-based Turkish NGOs to link with Muslim communities in Africa (Atalay 2013; Ozkan 2010). The latter used a language emphasizing Islamic values, religious duty, and obligations (Atalay 2013, 176–177). The Turkish government organized a new umbrella agency to administer the work of its stakeholders, called Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). In addition to administration, TIKA provides basic needs, that is, water and sanitation services, to reduce the human health-related crises. Providing water also supports religious NGOs work aiming to keep the Muslim communities together around religious duties, one of which is cleanliness in Muslim purification rituals (*abdest*). Moreover, Turkish Red Crescent constantly provides medical help in the region (İpek and Biltekin 2013).

The most obvious part of these engagements covered Somalian issues. Turkish government congregated non-state actors in international conferences in 2010 and 2012 to address the problems in Somalia. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs funded the events, but the attendees were mostly international private sector, civil society, women's groups, youth, and the Somalian diaspora (mfa.gov.tr). Similarly, Turkey hosted the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developing Countries (un.org) with a large participation from Turkish and African business and NGO groups. In 2012 and 2014, Turkey organized Turkey-Africa Media

Forums (sam.gov.tr; byegm.gov.tr) to bring the media aspects of non-state in Africa and Turkey for a better and more comprehensive cooperation. Almost 300 media representatives from 54 African countries attended.

Private individuals also took part in Turkey's multistakeholder activities in Africa. They operate as Honorary Consuls in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda (mfa.gov.tr). Their work is to develop trust between the various levels of Turkish and African countries' governance, which fits again into the multistakeholder diplomatic framework.

The Turkish government enabled several other NGOs' activities in Africa. Doctors of Hope(uhder.org), the Health Members Association(hiiraan.com), the Anatolian Support of Healthy Life Association (f5haber.com), and so on are some of them.

Turkish business circles have also been cooperating with their counterparts and Turkish state agencies in Africa in the last decade. A good example is the meeting series named Turkey-Africa Foreign Trade Bridge(s). The First Turkey-Africa Trade Bridge was held on May 8–9, 2006; the Second Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on 18–19 May 2007; the Third Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on May 13–15, 2008; the Fourth Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on June 3–5, 2009; the Fifth Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on November 4–5, 2010; and the Sixth Turkey-Africa Bridge was held on December 16, 2011 in Turkey (Ozkan and Akgun 2010, 540). In order to sustain these multistakeholder efforts, joint business councils were established in Nigeria, Tanzania, Mauritania, Ghana, Uganda, and Angola (deik.org.tr). The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and the Union of African Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture Professions congregated several times to find the right partnerships in connecting their respective trade and investment resources and to actively promote their multilateral activities and economic development (uacciap.org).

The Turkish government has opened so many channels for bringing several layers and types of non-state actors into its relations with Africa. Even if these interactions were initiated by Turkish state agencies, in time, non-state actors began to lift up their influence against state representatives particularly in business and human rights-oriented realms.

In the Middle East, AKP government performed a similar approach. The Middle East, which has been a real/perceived threat for Turkish policy elites has begun to be desecuritized (Aras and Polat 2008) by Ahmet Davutoğlu's ideational framework of 'zero problem' policy. Parallel to

Turkey's liberalization and aim to be a 'trading state' (Kirişçi 2011) civil society organizations and business associations were brought into diplomatic interactions.

Turkish business, with the help of the Turkish state agencies, entered into several contracts with state and non-state actors in the region. One important area of these interactions is Iran. Turkish state agencies with Turkish construction business invested in infrastructure in Iran (Bank and Karadağ 2013, 11). In 2007, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding for building 2200 miles of gas pipelines (one from South Pars and the other from Turkmenistan to Turkey) (Babali 2010, 151). In Iraq, due to the developing cooperation patterns between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government, over 50 agreements were signed on issues ranging from bilateral trade to security and from energy to water issues (Babali 2009; Babali 2010, 15). In Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, Turkish businesses invested in construction, tourism, energy, and retail businesses, which boosted up the bilateral trade volume to $10 billion (Tür 2011). Similarly, in Syria under the Bashar al-Assad reign, non-state actors worked on capital expenditure aimed to build a new transit route through Jordan and Iraq for domestic products to be carried into the Gulf states' markets (Tür 2011). Turkish-Qatari alliance is another formidable example. Construction of a Turkish military base in Qatar brings the two countries' defense industries to state and non-state level (milliyet.com.tr, 2015). Turkey has also signed Free Trade Agreements with Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Syria, and Egypt (European Stability Initiative 2009).

Turkish state agencies eased Turkish businesses, that is, Turkish Industry and Business Association and Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, access to the Middle East markets due to the diversified nature of Turkish exports, including industrial goods and their complementarities (Altunışık and Martin 2011, 596). In less than a decade, Turkish exports to the region have reached to $21 million (turkstat.gov.tr).

Turkey integrated its non-state actors, particularly from academia, into the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation meetings. Turkish state and non-state actors engaged in backstage diplomacy on the elections in Iraq for contributing to Iraq's democratic processes (Akyol 2005; İdiz 2005; basbakanlik.gov.tr). Turkish professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu's appointment as the general secretary of OIC was another multistakeholder effort by Turkey via integrating Turkish non-state actors into international organizations.

The Balkans has been another stage for Turkey's multistakeholder diplomacy. It contained almost every aspect of low politics, such as economy/commerce, cultural diplomacy, and media.

In economic realm, Turkey's trading state approach has found good reception in the region, which boosted the trade volume from $3 billion to $18 billion. Turkish construction companies' projects totaled up to $10 billion (TC Basbakanlik 2010) Turkish Under Secretariat for Foreign Trade established the Balkan Countries Working Group for further developments in commerce. Turkish state agencies have been trying to expand the path for Turkish businesses in the region. Turkish high-level official visits were accompanied by members of business associations, that is, Turkish exporters' union helped the abovementioned trade boost. Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria are the top three destinations for Turkey's exports, approximately 76% (Bechev 2012). In western Balkans, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia are the major partners of Turkish businesses (tuik.gov.tr). Turkish business ventures are quite diverse in the region. Koc Holding opened a shopping mall in Skopje, and Sisecam opened a glasswork factory in Targovishte (Bechev 2012; Mitrovic 2014).

For bringing more non-state actors on board, the AKP government opened cultural channels. In 2007, the Yunus Emre Cultural Centre was founded and opened 12 cultural centers in six Balkan Countries (yee.org.tr). Yunus Emre brought Turkish teachers, academics, and prominent authors for seminars and courses to the region. Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs started to organize regular meetings of the Eurasian Islamic Summit by inviting Islamic leaders from the Balkans in addition to several other countries from Eurasia (Oktem 2012, 88). The Directorate has been aiming to reduce the appeal of Wahhabi and Salafist groups via its continuous contact with Islamic groups' leaders in the region (Öktem 2011, 138).

Another group of non-state actors engaging with Turkish state agencies in the region has been the media. Partnerships between Turkish and Balkan media agencies in various towns have been addressing the issues of Balkan immigrants (Demirtas, 2015, 132). Turkish soap operas have top TV ratings in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Kosovo (thebulgariannews.com).

Last but not the least region is the Caucasus. Turkey's role in the region is more of a mediator, again via using an amalgamation of state and non-state actors. In the Minsk Group for the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Turkey worked on confidence-building measures through non-governmental

projects for increasing people-to-people interactions. Yet, Turkey's actions in the region have been curbed by Armenia, which does not see Turkey as a neutral actor (Dietzen 2011; Görgülü and Krikorian 2012). Another similar move was the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) Initiative in 2008. Turkey reiterated its vision in the region as building up a dialogue atmosphere and confidence among actors (Guzeldere 2009; Punsmann 2009). Yet, the initiative did not achieve concrete results due to the inconsistencies between Moscow and Yerevan on the one side and Tbilisi and Baku on the other (Devrim and Schulz 2009).

More practically, TIKA has been playing an active role in the region. TIKA, collaborating with Turkish businesses, has been investing in industrial infrastructural developments and health, as well as with academics in education, academic collaboration, and internship programs (Aras and Akpınar 2011, 56).

In the economic sphere, Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Council and Turkish Businessmen and Industrialist Confederation initiated the Turkey-Eurasia International Commerce Bridge aiming to create a free commerce zone covering the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and the Caspian Sea. In 2008, the Marmara Group Foundation organized the Eurasian Economic Summit hosting businessmen and senior economic officials from Turkey and regional countries. The volume of Turkey's commerce with Azerbaijan increased from $300 million to over $1 billion in a decade. Turkey is on the top of Georgian import and export rankings (Aras and Akpınar 2011, 56).

Turkey also ran several cultural projects in order to thaw the relations with Armenia. Turkey again worked with non-state businesses to refurbish the Akdamar Church, Armenian Church in Diyarbakir and in Ordu, and historic Armenian houses in Beykoz (ozurdiliyoruz.com). On September 6, 2008, a soccer game was organized alongside with presidential level visits. In December 2008, 200 Turkish intellectuals apologized for the "Great Catastrophe" that Ottoman Armenians suffered in 1915 (blog.milliyet.com.tr).

All these efforts in Turkey's neighboring regions illustrate how non-state actors have been almost an indispensable part of Turkish foreign policy proactivity. It is also a significant case for the operation of multistakeholder diplomacy. Turkish state agencies first eased these actors' access and then organized platforms for their operation. State and non-state actors together with their counterparts arranged new cooperation schemes. Thereafter, state agencies left the scene to the non-state actors.

Conclusion

Particularly during the 1990s, the increased interdependence between state and non-state actors led the latter to be more visible in global diplomacy. With the expansion in transnational capabilities in representation, negotiation, and providing policy inputs, multistakeholder diplomacy has emerged as a new term in diplomacy literature. The term aims to explain how non-state actors operate hand in hand with state actors. Although the rules of engagement in state-non-state interactions are still developing, there are several and obvious examples of multistakeholder diplomatic practices in trade, environmental, cultural, and human rights fields.

Multistakeholder diplomacy complements especially in middle power foreign policies in several realms. It aims to combine the interests of various levels of actors for carving out diplomatically viable and acceptable solutions. It also serves middle powers' multilateral efforts by bringing non-state actors with like-minded expectations and shared interests from various levels. Moreover, by bringing as many relevant actors as possible on board, it provides a comprehensive framework for mediation. Especially in low politics, multistakeholder approach merges non-state actors dealing with business, human rights, and environmental issues with state agencies on various platforms on which both sides could utilize each other's expertise, support, and human resources.

In the operation of multistakeholder diplomacy, as in Turkey's case, state and non-state actors do not always work all the way. Their domains are still separate. Non-state actors mostly act in low politics realm. In their interactions, state actors first ease non-states actors' access to the required issue and then organize platforms for their operation. If their counterparts have shared interest or like-minded expectations, they arrange for new cooperation schemes. Thereafter, state agencies leave the scene to non-state actors. Multistakeholder approaches in this sense not only take the burden off state agencies but also move global diplomacy from official to non-official approach.

Note

1. Non-state actors in multistakeholder diplomacy are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as non-profit voluntary citizen's groups; multinational corporations (MNCs) as profit-oriented business organizations operating for profit in three or more countries; think tanks and universities,

epistemic communities, or policy networks, as the groups of experts sharing views on the cause-and-effect of a phenomenon; trade union organizations, at the national or international level; international media organizations like the CNN and Al Jazeera; religious groups such as the Roman Catholic Church; transnational diaspora communities, that is, Irish and Jewish; local, national, internationally operating political parties; violent non-state actors such as armed groups, pirates, criminal organizations, and terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaida; and nationally and internationally prominent private individuals, that is, George Soros together with former political leaders.

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PART II

Turkey's Middle-Power Multilateralism

CHAPTER 5

Turkey, Global Governance, and the UN

Thomas G. Weiss

This essay's title has three topics that often generate as much heat as light; they thus merit being explored in an edited volume on Turkey's rise as a middle power on the world stage.[1] Turkey—a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and long-time European Union (EU) aspirant—also is usually classified as a "rising" or "emerging power." It is long past time to interrogate honestly geopolitical developments rather than regurgitate familiar tropes. This chapter situates Turkey's role by exploring the implications of the ongoing debates about North-South dynamics, global governance, and the United Nations.

South Versus North Theatrics: The Background for Turkey's Rise

Let us begin with long-held positions about the Global South's role in the normative structures that circumscribe both global governance and the United Nations (Weiss and Abdenur 2014), which provides the context in which to situate Turkey's rise and try to understand its significance for contemporary world order. The background noise is the customary "dialogue of the deaf" between representatives—governmental or academic—of

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the North and the Global South. Recent research shows the extent to which southern agency has been a genuine but essentially ignored source of global norms (Helleiner 2014). They consist not only of efforts to resist the imposition of Western values but also to articulate genuine southern voices and perspectives, including human rights (Jensen 2017). Whether or not the phenomenon of rising powers reinforces the North-South divide or increases the diversity of plausible policies and alignments within the international system, however, remains very much open to debate.

As such and equally important is the need to set aside the traditional and convenient narrative that the current UN system in particular, and post-World War II international society in general, was imposed by the West on the Rest. This topic requires revisiting according to other recent research (Plesch and Weiss 2015a; Weiss and Roy 2016). To be sure, deliberations occurred before rapid subsequent decolonization—50 states participated in San Francisco whereas today's UN membership is 193—and so it is tempting to simplify the founding narrative as the West without the Rest. However, the details of Imperial India's and China's contributions to early efforts to pursue war criminals and determine the post-war direction of assistance to refugees and displaced persons and of trade and finance, for example, complicate considerably this facile storyline.

More powerful countries, and especially the United States, had more say during international negotiations during World War II; that reality is always the case and hardly destroys the argument that multilateralism and international cooperation and perspectives mattered. Indeed, the wartime United Nations may have represented the "pinnacle" of global governance to date (Plesch and Weiss 2015b). Other voices from countries in what is now called the "Global South" were on stage and not merely in the wings, including 19 independent states from Latin America and others whose independence was more recent: three from Africa (Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa); three from Asia (China, the Philippines, and Imperial India); and seven from the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey).

By the 1970s, decolonization had proceeded apace, and two-thirds of UN member-states were in the limelight as erstwhile colonies; but the stage was set in 1942–45, and indeed by the League of Nations (Pedersen 2015). Throughout the war and the drafting and adoption of the UN Charter in San Francisco, less powerful states influenced the agenda and advanced their own interests and ideals. The Latin American emphasis on regional arrangements in the UN Charter's Chapter VIII was one such

result; and Chapters XI and XII regarding non-self-governing territories and trusteeship reflected the widespread views of recently decolonized states and other advocates of self-determination (see, for example, Raghavan 2014).

The shape and values of the wartime and immediate post-war United Nations were not simply dictated by the West even a generation before decolonization, although that view is conveniently trotted out when repressive regimes in the Global South would prefer not to be bound by many universal human rights or security agreements. Indeed, rapid decolonization is hard to imagine in the form and with the speed that it took place without multilateralism during and immediately after World War II, and of course by the United Nations in the decades since.

Twenty-first century discourse in many rising powers as well as in poorer developing countries accepts the Anglo-American mythology, often as a facile justification for distancing themselves from uncomfortable aspects of that "old order" and its 1945 institutions. However, a clearer appreciation of liberation in the context of wartime deliberations might provide the basis for a new "internationalist"—perhaps even a "post-national"—approach in which the definition of narrowly defined vital interests would expand to include consideration of a perspective that went beyond borders. Certainly, such an approach to global affairs is more suited to problem-solving than the us-versus-them template and predictable performances that characterize what customarily passes for international negotiations in various UN theaters (Weiss 2016).

Indeed, we are obliged to ask ourselves whether the notion of "rising" or "emerging" powers actually makes sense. Many, perhaps most, observers assume that it does. It may but also may not, for Turkey and for others in the category, depending on the context. Developing countries have joined forces at different stages in the international arena—including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)—to increase their voices. Over the past decade, a new twist has been added—the visibility of the rising or emerging powers. Among other things, this reality reflects their growing role as providers of development cooperation and their criticism of the existing architecture for global economic governance. Both individually and through new alignments such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), emerging powers are engaging more directly in key normative debates about how major institutions could and should contribute to today's world order. Supposedly, solidarity sustains these groups of wildly differing countries.

It is unnecessary to exaggerate either the shadow cast by the West, or what Amitav Acharya calls the "hype of the rest," to see that the role of rising powers in global governance is changing the landscape. Whether or not we choose to toss aside the host of labels—including multipolar, apolar, G-zero, and the list goes on—it is clear that his "multiplex cinema" is an apt image with a choice of plots (ideas), directors (powers), and action (leadership) available to observers under one roof (Acharya 2014, pp. 5, 6–11, 59–78).

The label of "rising powers," however, is neither carved in stone nor uncontroversial. The term refers to countries whose policy elites are able to draw on economic and other sources of power to project influence both within and outside their immediate neighborhoods, and that play a substantial role in the call for global governance reforms. This label and others—including "Global South" and earlier "Third World" as well as "North"—are problematic and should be contested. They reflect specific perspectives on development and historical experiences at specific moments in time; yet they supposedly apply across the board. Despite their analytical flaws and misleading connotations, however, they matter in international politics and in diplomatic and scholarly conversations because they are assumed to make sense.

But emerging powers encompass not only the BRICS but also a host of others including at least Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Nigeria, among others. Andrew Cooper aptly comments that "No one acronym has the field to itself" (Cooper 2010, p. 76). The BRICS seem an especially puzzling conglomeration that contains two permanent members of the UN Security Council: one a former superpower, and the other the world's second largest economy. Other mouthfuls include: BRIICS (BRICS plus Indonesia); BASIC (the BRICS minus Russia); IBSA (BRICS minus Russia and China); BRICSAM (BRICS plus Indonesia and Mexico); and MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey). We should not also forget the membership of several rising powers in the G-20 (South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) (Cooper and Thakur 2013) or the 3-G Coalition that exists as part of an informal variable geometry to get the G-20 to be more inclusive of non-member views (Cooper and Momani 2014).

These structures lend new weight to long-standing critiques of Western dominance over the global governance of economic and financial affairs including development, and perhaps provide a way to bridge the

North-South chasm or the West-versus-the-Rest divide. But they also provide a confusing array of labels that confound as much as clarify, which allow many who brandish them to hide behind a convenient ideological mask rather than to ask and answer tough questions. As a NATO member and EU aspirant, Turkey is on the margins of both the North and the South, which makes its position among rising or emerging powers even more confusing for an analyst.

In focusing on the very fluid category of emerging powers, we should single out mainly the more powerful countries that were once part of the conglomerate of the Global South—here, the "R" in BRICS is certainly the most puzzling inclusion. Indeed, for other purposes, analysts and diplomats argue that these countries still are members of the grouping of over 130 developing countries in the NAM, even if they have graduated from (or are close to doing so) from being recipients of official development assistance (ODA) to being net donors. Setting aside for the moment the questionable cohesiveness of any category, rising powers have been important players on the international stage. During the Cold War, configurations such as the G-77 worked to address what all developing countries perceived to be an unjust global economic system, a view that continues to characterize their position, however anomalous at present, as they have growth rates and per capita incomes higher than many countries in the West. For instance, the New Economic International Order (NIEO) and other proposals in a variety of contexts that were supposed to address asymmetries now appear especially hollow as Chad, Comoros, and China are mentioned in the same breath. Earlier, the space available for the G-77 was constrained by resistance from industrialized economies and bipolarity; those elements have been altered but now exist side by side with the vast disparities and the strained but apparent solidarity remaining within the Global South.

While it has been the case for some time, it has become increasingly obvious—in whatever label we eventually give to the post–Cold War period—that it is hard to generalize about the role of such rising powers as Turkey for at least two reasons. First, the deep structural changes within the configuration of the international arena, and especially the reality of a more multipolar order, has renewed debates about the need to update the architecture of global economic and financial governance. Second, some rising powers have become sources of finance for South-South cooperation, which they insist is distinct in principle and practice from more traditional development cooperation financed by the West. But is it really?

While the relevance of the rising powers to international development has increased, their efforts occur mainly outside of the United Nations, the place that nurtured decolonization and advocated for policies to address grievances of the developing countries. As a result, the world organization risks becoming more marginal as a result of the effort to pretend that all developing countries are still in the same post-colonial boat.

To state the obvious, Turkey's power—whatever the adjective placed before it—is akin to that of other rising powers, namely they are anything except homogeneous. Their political regimes, levels of development, ideologies, and geopolitical interests vary and diverge. They point to differing motivations even when they manage to articulate shared rhetorical claims in press releases. Rather than treating them as an undifferentiated block, it is necessary to parse how their policies and interests vary, as well as how their approaches and strategies change over time and for specific issues. We clearly require differentiation when we are speaking about small islands and climate change; or about the programs for least developed countries by the over 30 agencies, funds, and programs of the UN development system; or about the decision-making procedures in the Security Council or the Washington-based international financial institutions by poor or wealthier countries; or about attitudes toward authoritarianism by Turkey and China.

Debates About Global Governance and the United Nations

Contemporary thinking about global governance and the multistakeholders that has animated debates at the United Nations and elsewhere requires modification to reflect another analytical lens. It is necessary to consider the system of international organizations not only in terms of intergovernmental relations—the "First UN" of member states and the "Second UN" of international civil servants—but also the "Third UN" of non-state actors such as civil society organizations and private sector firms (Weiss et al. 2009).

There have been other periods when many of the countries that we now label as "rising" or "emerging powers" played visible roles within the international system and as members of the First UN; and for broader structural reasons, these windows of opportunity narrowed or even closed. The G-77-led NIEO led to proposals that floundered not only due to

resistance by the industrialized countries but also because the oil crisis and ensuing indebtedness and structural adjustment programs of the Washington Consensus era constrained the policy autonomy of non-oil-exporting developing countries. They shifted agency away from the UN and toward the Bretton Woods institutions. The salience of the BRICS and other groupings of rising powers must be understood in light of the specific historical circumstances of the post–Cold War period rather than treated as a timeless phenomenon not subject to oscillations and reversals. Indeed, research suggests that in some instances—for example, China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Curtis 2013)—there may not be as clear a break as commonly thought from previous Western patterns of investment and exploitation. The interests of all investors converge around stabilization and market-driven economic activities. More truth-in-packaging is in order because capital from Beijing or Boston seek the same returns.

Rising powers have long desired to expand their participation in the rule-setting processes of global governance, unwilling to be mere "rule-takers" but aspiring to be "rule-makers." However, "emerging economies appear to have preferred the status quo and working within existing institutions created by Western states," write David Held and Charles Roger. "Yet, as they grow in power and seek to ensure that their needs and values are reflected at the global level, their assertiveness and dissatisfaction with existing institutions may rise" (Held and Rogers 2013, p. 6). Robert Wade argues that "the standard narrative about an emerging new global political order shaped by 'the rise of the South' is misleading…the primary responsibility for mobilizing cooperation around those global commons problems remains with the Western states, which continue to hold the commanding heights" (Wade 2013, p. 81). The participation by rising powers in normative debates can take a variety of forms, from altering existing norms and proposing new frameworks altogether, to blocking proposals viewed as promoted by developed countries—illustrated by the BRICS's resistance to the effectiveness agenda of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Again, Turkey has been a long-time OECD member (since 1961) but finds itself on the margins (along with Mexico, Chile, Korea) in the club of the wealthiest and most advanced industrialized countries. As such, generalizations about the perspectives of the emerging powers toward norms or aid procedures are of limited value.

In short, we should be interrogating and not taking at face value the representativeness, objectives, and impact of various groupings of rising powers—indeed of other groupings across the Global South. Although a coalition such as the BRICS is responsible for a high-decibel-level rhetorical call to reform global economic governance, including making development cooperation more just and effective, the five member-states are also interested in opening up more space for themselves within the system. Their positions, even where they succeed in finding common ground, do not necessarily correspond to those of other developing countries, nor are they always willing or able to take on responsibility for claims by regional or subregional groups of developing countries. Other rising powers or emerging economies also may be more inclined to enter into a dialogue with traditional Western donors, even if such actions mean participating in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation led by the OECD and the UN Development Program. More significantly, poorer countries may not perceive BRICS's positions or those of other emerging counties to be aligned with their own interests. In addition, there is considerable political contestation by poorer countries of the claims by emerging powers to leadership roles, even within their own regions, suggesting that there are limits to which the grouping can mobilize support for its positions among other members, be they rising or falling, across the Global South.

In the context of the problematic character of the accepted narratives about the nature of the international system and the impact as well as composition of the club of rising powers, it is worth interrogating the meaning of "global governance." The term itself was born from a marriage between academic theory and practical policy in the 1990s and became entwined with that other metaphenomenon of the last two decades: globalization. James Rosenau and Ernst Czempiel's theoretical *Governance without Government* was published in 1992, (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) just about the same time that the Swedish government launched the policy-oriented Commission on Global Governance under the chairmanship of Sonny Ramphal and Ingmar Carlsson. Both set in motion explorations of what was dubbed "global governance." The 1995 publication of the Commission's report, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, (The Commission on Global Governance 1995) coincided with the first issue of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) journal *Global Governance*. This newly minted quarterly sought to return to the global problem-solving origins of the leading journal in the field, which

seemed to have lost its way. As Timothy Sinclair reminds us "From the late 1960s, the idea of international organization fell into disuse … *International Organization*, the journal which carried this name founded in the 1940s, increasingly drew back from matters of international policy and instead became a vehicle for the development of rigorous academic theorizing" (Sinclair 2012, p. 16).

The ever-evolving nature of the international system paved the way for a raft of works about growing global complexity, the management of globalization, and the challenges confronting international institutions (Cox 1994; Hart and Prakash 2000; Held and McGrew 2002). In part, global governance replaced an immediate predecessor as a normative endeavor, "world order studies," which was viewed as overly top-down and static, although many of the fathers and mothers of that period undoubtedly support the emergence of a multipolar world and rising powers. Having grown from the World Peace through World Law movement, the world order failed to capture the variety of actors, networks, and relationships that characterized contemporary international relations (Falk and Mendlovitz 1966; Sohn and Grenville 1958). It did, however, force us to think more expansively about how—as John Ruggie put it—the world "hangs together" (Ruggie 1998, p. 1) even if we overlook the lessons world order studies taught us about patterns of continuity and change, and of coherence and interconnectivity.

When the perspectives from world order scholars started to look a trifle old-fashioned, the stage was set for a new analytical cottage industry. After his archival labors to write a two-volume history of world federalism, Joseph Barrata aptly observed that in the 1990s "the new expression, 'global governance,' emerged as an acceptable term in debate on international organization for the desired and practical goal of progressive efforts, in place of 'world government.'" He continued, scholars "wished to avoid using a term that would harken back to the thinking about world government in the 1940s, which was largely based on fear of atomic bombs and too often had no practical proposals for the transition short of a revolutionary act of the united peoples of the world" (Baratta 2004, pp. 534–535).

The term "global governance" is not only ubiquitous—a Google search in fall 2017 resulted in nine million hits in less than a second—but also is used and abused by academics, pundits, and policy makers. While two decades ago it was almost unknown, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall quipped that a decade later it suddenly had "attained near-celebrity status… [having] gone from the ranks of the unknown to one of the central

orienting themes in the practice and study of international affairs" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 1). Its omnipresence and marquee status means that global governance has become an alternative moniker for international organizations, a descriptor for a world stage packed with ever more actors, a call to arms for a better world, an attempt to control the pernicious aspects of accelerating economic and social change, and a synonym for world government. This imprecision also has undermined its utility as an academic endeavor, which more recent work has sought to overcome.

My own analytical quest—in cooperation with Rorden Wilkinson in a number of publications (Weiss and Wilkinson 2015, 2014a, b, 2016, 2018)—has meant moving beyond rescuing the concept from a simple association with international organization and law, multilateralism, and what states do in concert with insufficient attention paid to the kinds of world order in which their interactions take place, and without reference to a host of other actors, principles, norms, networks, and mechanisms. In brief, our effort aims to understand better global complexity and the way that the world is governed. It also means that we take seriously the idea that global governance actors are not merely involved in the creation and preservation of the status quo; they are also agents of change. Hence, getting a better understanding of the drivers of change is an essential, analytical challenge.

Global governance sprouted and took root among academics and policy wonks in the 1990s to reflect the interdependence and rapid technological advances as well as the sheer expansion in numbers and importance of non-state actors, both civil society and for-profit corporations, which coincided with the end of the Cold War. The term came to refer to collective efforts to identify, understand, and address worldwide problems and processes that went beyond the capacities of individual states. It reflected a capacity of the international system at any moment in time to provide government-like services in the absence of world government. Global governance encompassed a wide variety of cooperative problem-solving arrangements that were visible but informal (e.g., practices or guidelines) or were temporary formations (e.g., coalitions of the willing). Such arrangements could also be more formal, taking the shape of hard rules (laws and treaties) or else institutions with administrative structures and established practices to manage collective affairs by a variety of actors—including state authorities, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, and other civil society actors.

Weaving persuasively together the various threads of global governance and the geopolitics of rising powers, including Turkey with its feet in several groups of countries, is a pressing task before us. This book marks the end of the beginning of that analytical journey.

Conclusion

The underlying message in trying to situate Turkey as a middle power is the necessity to move away from the largely ahistorical quality of much of contemporary thinking about the rising or emerging powers and global governance and the United Nations. Thus, it is essential to jettison some of the "gee-whiz" character of contemporary theorizing. The ahistorical quality of too much social science and international relations is remarkable [exceptions include; (Buzan and Lawson 2013; Buzan and Little 2000)]. One reason may be the premium international relations scholarship places on parsimonious theories and simple causal explanations. History can appear to complicate this pursuit of parsimony and causality, but dealing with the messiness of history is preferable to achieving elegant theory at the expense of understanding. Done well, history should make fundamentals clearer (Williams et al. 2012). Andrew Hurrell reminds us to eschew the "relentless presentism" that afflicts political science and international relations, (Hurrell 2002, p. xiii) a sort of inverse Alzheimer's disease: short-term memory is retained while the contexts that crafted these memories have slipped away. Coming to grips with what constitutes continuities or changes requires the longest possible historical perspective.

"History" is something that we introduce to students in the opening lectures of an introductory international relations class, but we tend to carefully cite or circumscribe it (Weiss and Wilkinson 2015, pp. 391–395, 397–406). We either cherry pick illustrations to treat history as an empirical treasure trove wherein we can find examples that fit our theories and models or can be made to fit the way that we choose to explain the world. Or else we concentrate so narrowly on concepts or particular issues that the lessons from studying broader historical phenomena are obscured.

As such, we need to better understand the dynamics of both inertia and movement. Debates about what drives change and what encourages continuity in global governance have typically been limited to privileging alterations in the distribution of relative power capabilities among states, identifying war and alternations in material power as markers of transitions, and perceiving intergovernmental organizations to be tenacious. We

should not throw out the state baby with our global governance bath water, but we should conceptualize changes—large and small, transformative and system-stabilizing—as a means to understand why systems endure or fade away, why they may change abruptly, or not at all. Harnessing knowledge for thinking about more stable and just world orders is certainly my acknowledged objective.

Part of this exercise involves enlarging the boundaries of time and space. Global governance, if it makes sense at all, is not merely a descriptor for a post–Cold War pluralistic moment but rather a legitimate set of questions about how the world is governed and ordered at all levels and in every historical period.

A growing number of historians argue persuasively that the history of any epoch cannot be properly understood merely in terms of separate national or even regional narratives but necessarily must encompass a wider perspective and context even if the geographic coverage is less than planetary (Loth et al. 2014). It is time for social scientists to follow suit but with the same type of longer-term perspective and in-depth transnational treatments that now are prized by historians.

Elsewhere, Wilkinson and I have argued that analyzing global governance from the earliest of human systems to the present day has a utility in helping us understand how and why we have ended up with today's world order (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014b). This realization flows from the necessity of asking across time: "How is the world governed?" It is in seeking answers to this question that we could be positioned to understand how global governance has changed, and thus to situate the role of rising powers in context. Craig Murphy aptly notes that, "no social scientist or historian is yet able to give a credible account of global governance over those many millennia" (Murphy 2015, p. 189).

It is, nonetheless, high time that we try. And thus, it behooves us to struggle to identify the impacts and possibilities—both positive and negative—of rising and emerging powers in global governance and at the United Nations. It is too facile to view Turkey and other comparable countries as moving in the right direction—indeed, in Turkey's case, we could well argue the opposite as it seemingly becomes ever more authoritarian and intolerant—or to imagine that global governance and the United Nations are irrelevant (Weiss 2018). Hopefully, the chapters in this book and others over the coming years will help clarify thinking—mine and everyone else's—about Turkey's role on the world stage, global governance, and the United Nations.

Note

1. This chapter draws on Thomas G. Weiss, "Rising Powers, Global Governance, and the United Nations," *Rising Powers Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (2016): 7–19.

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CHAPTER 6

Turkey in the UN Funding System: A Comparative Analysis with the BRICS Countries (2010–2013)

Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kurşun

Introduction

This chapter aims to locate Turkey in the UN funding system in comparison with its BRICS peers so as to investigate to which UN agencies and funds most specifically it has been contributing voluntary aid between 2010 and 2013. Departing from the assumption that states' pro-UN orientation, their willingness to expand their international role and responsibilities, and the outcomes of their funding strategies are reflected in their voluntary contribution to the UN and its special agencies, this chapter seeks to provide empirical evidence on the general tendencies, strategies, and preferences of Turkey's funding behaviour in the UN system compared to those of other rising powers in the BRICS grouping. Such a comparative perspective is indispensable in the sense that in recent years the funding behaviours of the rising powers has shifted increasingly from multilateral to bilateral leading to a significant gap between multi-aid and bi-aid allocations of these states. On the other hand, the great differences in the use of bilateral and multilateral aid by the rising powers clearly point

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to the lack of a policy framework aimed at maintaining a balance between their multilateral core and their earmarked, or, in other terms, multi-bi allocations.[1] Rising powers' diverging funding preferences, their willingness to exert both flexibility and control over their financial commitments, and the absence of awareness at state levels avoid them from putting quantitative targets for the balance between multilateral and bilateral aid.

Rising powers have witnessed a paradoxical trend in global governance in recent years. On the one hand, these states show a greater interest in bilateral funding through which they can strengthen their visibility in the international system as free-rider donors using their own decision-making and control mechanisms. On the other hand, they have become more and more engaged with the UN as a unique and the most effective global institution with "a good for all" mission. This has served to increase their awareness of the correlation between donor funding practices and the creation of influence in global governance and of the necessity for UN reform at the levels of bureaucratic and institutional design, decision-making, and funding. This is also the case for Turkey, which has gradually become an important donor in the field of development and humanitarian aid activities, most specifically over the last decade (Hausmann 2014). Turkey has already committed itself to appearing among the leading international donors both inside and outside the UN system (Hausmann and Lundsgaarde 2015). This interest in development aid also is in parallel with Ankara's increasing UN activism and its quest for flexibility in the global governance structure (Parlar Dal 2016). In recent years, other rising powers, despite serious domestic economic problems in some, have pursued a broader UN agenda including both a demand for reform and impact-seeking activism in some key UN agencies (Güven 2017). Turkey and its BRICS peers also expect to act as an influential player in the UN system and are increasingly aware of how efficient funding may positively influence states' institutional, diplomatic, and soft power in the international system.

In order to further investigate Turkey's position in the UN funding architecture, this study addresses this main research question: What is the relative position of Turkey in the UN funding system compared with its BRICS peers and, drawing on quantitative comparison, what are Turkey's main strategies, trends, and weaknesses in financing the agencies, programme, and funds of the UN system? Drawing largely on UN data, this study tests Turkey's financial contribution to the UN system as compared to its BRICS peers with the help of an integrated methodology using

Global Governance Contribution Index (GGCI) and Voluntary Financial Contribution Data. In doing so, this chapter accomplishes a methodological and an empirical task: first, it provides an integrated methodology to relatively compare country contributions to the UN system by modifying the existing GGCI and by incorporating the raw voluntary financial contribution data to its analysis. Second, it fills an untouched research gap in the literature with regard to Turkey's position in the UN funding system and presses for a rethinking of Turkey's financing strategies in global governance (Al 2016).

Given this background, this study builds its narrative on the following plan: the first part briefly discusses the current UN orientation of the so-called rising powers with a special eye to their UN strategies and their funding preferences. The second part situates Turkey in the UN funding system compared to the BRICS countries with the aim of providing a comprehensive understanding of the rising powers' funding policies and their changing approach to funding rule design. The third part considers Turkey's opportunities and challenges in acting as an efficient donor in the UN funding system. Here it looks at both the general deficiencies of the UN funding system and the existing possibilities for rising powers to increase the efficiency of their financial contribution to the UN.

Rising Powers in the UN: From Strategies to Funding

Over the last decade, the so-called rising powers, or, in other terms, developing states seeking international status and recognition, seem to have adopted a new multilateralism going beyond their borders and expanding their outreach in various international negotiations in many UN theatres. These rising powers, as defined by Thomas Weiss, can be explained as "countries whose policy elites are able draw on economic and other sources of power to project influence both within and outside their immediate neighbourhoods, and that play a substantial role in the call for global governance reforms" (Weiss 2016, 9). The growing role of the rising powers in global governance occurs at multiple levels, ranging from normative to institutional and from institutional to ideological. Coined by Amitav Acharya as the multiplex world order, the current international order is smoothly changing characteristics and dimension with the weakening role of the West at the expense of the increasing role of the rest

(Acharya 2017). Of course, in the "rise" of these emerging powers, the rapid and high economic growth of the latter compared to that of the traditional Western powers (Ikenberry 2015) played a central role and led to the redistribution of economic and political power on the global stage with various implications at the institutional level (Nel et al. 2012; Parlar Dal 2018). Another trend which may be observed in this new era marked by the emergence of a series of developing states with significant economic performance, is an increase in both the number of international institutions and their governing capacity in the changing global governance architecture of the twenty-first century (Alexandroff et al. 2010).

In line with this trend, it may also be argued that these new powers have gradually become more vocal in the UN, the major umbrella international organization of the international system, for the purpose of not only concretizing their reform demands but also achieving greater status and international recognition (Nel 2010). Thus, increasing attention has been turned to the activity and strong criticism of these emerging states about the existing international order (Hurrell 2013). The criticism of the latter has generally focused on the ongoing predominance of major Western powers in the decision-making mechanisms of major international organizations and on the bureaucratic and governing deficiencies of the UN.

On the other hand, the activism of emerging powers in the UN has also manifested itself in increasing voluntary funding to the UN and its special agencies in recent years. Paradoxically, the same trend was sought to be reversed by the major donor of the UN system, the United States, which has recently decided to gradually decrease its financial contribution to UN special agencies, starting with its funding to the WHO. On the other hand, the recent debates on the funding of the UN system showcases the strong necessity for the UN to adopt a comprehensive financing strategy rather than a single funding strategy. This shift from funding to financing also seems to be vital for the UN development system in particular in order to meet the requirements of the Agenda 2030. The current challenges the UN funding system faces point to the need to realize a broader reform of funding. What does this absolute need for funding reform mean for the rising powers seeking a more important say in the UN system thanks to the rise of their voluntary financial contribution to the UN and its agencies? Here it must be reminded that more than half of the UN total budget generally comes from earmarked contributions (53% of the total UN 2015 budget of US$ 48 billion), which means that the funding is tied to a theme or a country. While approximately 30% of the budget was

composed of assessed contributions which can be described as the price of membership or obligatory contribution in 2015, core funding, meaning voluntary contributions not tied to a specific country, was equal to 10% of the total UN budget ("Financing the UN Development System: Pathways to Reposition for Agenda 2030" 2017).

Departing from this, it may well be argued that the increasing trend witnessed in recent years in rising powers' voluntary funding, meaning core untied contributions and earmarked contributions, refers to a rise in their earmarked contributions. On the other hand, as seen in the 2015 UN budget, more than half of UN funding (about 60% of the total) has been used for operational activities for development (OAD) while 20% was for peacekeeping and the remaining 20% for norms, standards, policy, and advocacy. It can also be deduced from this picture that the rising states, which have become more and more eager to share the burden of financing the UN system with their Western partners in recent years, contribute most of their funding to the UN development system in the form of earmarked contributions. However, despite the fact that rising powers have considerably increased their burden-sharing in the UN system, their bilateral aid has also increased significantly in the recent years. This last point proves that rising powers prefer to pursue a dual track funding policy based on a mix of multilateral and bilateral aid. In this regard, it is probable that with the successful implementation of the funding to financing (F2F) model, rising powers may regain interest in providing multilateral aid to the UN system and shift some of their bilateral funding to the UN's multilateral funding system ("Financing the UN Development System: Pathways to Reposition for Agenda 2030" 2017, 48).

Along with the discussions of the voluntary contribution of the rising powers to the UN system, it must be noted here that their assessed contribution has also been on the rise as a result of the increase in their material capacities. Although the United States still possesses the largest share in assessed contributions to the UN system with 22%, the total share of the BRICS countries has been on the rise since 2007 (Table 6.1). As the most striking case, China's share in the assessed UN budget has dramatically increased and is currently larger than some traditional Western powers such as Germany and the UK (Sven Grimm, report, p. 55). Among the BRICS countries, as Table 6.1 shows, only South Africa's share has followed a declining trend starting from 2010. Similarly, although Turkey's assessed contribution had been on the rise between 2007 and 2013, the latest period starting with 2013 showed a declining trend from 1.32% to 1.01%.

Table 6.1 The share of Turkey and the BRICS in the assessed budget of the UN, 2007–2016

	2007	*2010*	*2013*	*2016*
Turkey	0.38	0.61	1.32	1.01
Brazil	0.87	1.61	2.93	3.82
Russia	1.2	1.60	2.43	3.08
India	0.45	0.53	0.66	0.73
China	2.66	3.18	5.14	7.92
S. Africa	0.29	0.38	0.37	0.36

Source: "Regular budget and working capital fund": http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/budget.shtml

It is thus of paramount importance to assess where Turkey stands in the current UN funding system. Does it follow the same trend as its rising BRICS peers? What are the commonalities and differences between Turkey's and the BRICS countries' funding to the UN in terms of trends, share, and policy preferences? The following section will shed light on Turkey's financial contribution to the UN system between 2008 and 2013 in comparison to its BRICS peers.

Locating Turkey in the UN Funding System Compared to the BRICS

Given the growing motivational and discursive orientation of the rising powers towards the UN system and the low number of methodological attempts made to do so, choosing a methodology for the measurement of the concrete sources channelled to this system to create a comparative picture is not an easy task. Among these, Hongying Wang and Erik French's Global Governance Contribution Index (GGCI) (2013) remains the most effective in providing a relative ranking for countries (Wang and French 2013). This paper applies the GGCI with some modifications and integrates a further assessment of relevant raw voluntary contribution data to its methodology in order to provide a complete picture of Turkey's position in the UN funding system. Since the aim here is to evaluate funding, our analysis focuses solely on the financial level although the original GGCI methodology also looks at the personnel and ideational contribution levels.

The GGCI calculates various control variables such as GNI and GNI per capita while ranking countries on the basis of their financial contribution to UN funds, programmes, and agencies to provide a relative comparison among them. This study compares six countries (Turkey and the BRICS) and ranks them between 1 and 6 with 1 representing the highest performer and 6 the lowest. The index looks at assessed and voluntary contributions to the following programmes, funds, and agencies under seven categories: drugs and crime (International Drug Control Programme); global health (Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, World Health Organization, UN Population Fund); poverty and humanitarian relief (UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, UN World Food Programme); environmental protection (Environment Programme, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, International Fund for Agricultural Development); human rights (UN Refugee Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF Participation, UN Development Fund for Women, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights); labour standards (International Labour Organization); and subscriptions (World Bank, IMF).

In order to substantiate the GGCI and scrutinize Turkey's funding strategies compared to the BRICS, this chapter further collects and analyses raw voluntary financial contribution data on Turkey's contributions to the 34 agencies, funds, and programmes under the UN system. All data and results used in this analysis were based on contributions made between 2010 and 2013.

Global Governance Contribution Index Findings

It must be noted that the GGCI gives proportional results in order to provide a comparative assessment by taking the material capacity of a given state into account. Thus, the findings below should be read with an understanding of how a given state transferred its material capacity to the financing of the UN system between 2010 and 2013, not in terms of the raw amount contributed. This is important in the sense that, as the material capacities of the assessed countries are different from each other, the GGCI findings allow for an understanding of Turkey's position in the UN financing relative to those of the BRICS. Table 6.2 presents Turkey's and BRICS' performance of transferring their material capacities to financing the UN system between 2010 and 2013.

Table 6.2 Comparative assessment of the financial contribution of Turkey and the BRICS to the UN, 2010–2013

	Turkey	*Brazil*	*Russia*	*India*	*China*	*S. Africa*
Drugs and crime	4	1	2	4	5	5
Global health	4.3	4.5	2	2	3.5	5.67
Poverty and humanitarian relief	4.5	1.5	4	2.75	4.25	4
Environmental protection	3.83	3.67	4.33	2	3	3.83
Human rights	4.4	3.1	2.7	4.1	3.6	3.3
Labour standards	6	3	2	6	4	1
Subscriptions	5.25	4.25	3	1.5	4	3
Overall assessment	4.6	3	2.86	3.19	3.91	3.69

Relative to GNI and GNI per capita

The authors have previously reported that in terms of the overall contribution, including at the personnel and ideational levels, to the UN system, Turkey ranked as the second lowest performing country among the BRICS in transferring its material potential to global governance. Analysis of the results of this overall picture have already revealed that Turkey's position among the other rising powers does not resemble that of an effective contributor in the UN. In addition to the negative image in terms of the overall contribution to the UN system, Turkey's position in the financial level is more alarming.

As seen in the GGCI outcomes, Turkey is ranked at the bottom of the group on the financial level (Table 6.2). Given the acknowledged relationship and correlation between effective financing strategies and more autonomy and higher say in the bodies of the UN, a deeper investigation of the financial level is needed to map how Turkey has lagged behind its BRICS peers in financing the UN system. As this study has clustered 18 different financial contribution titles into seven comprehensive categories, a summary of the two points to the striking fact that Turkey is ranked at the bottom of three categories: human rights, labour standards, and subscriptions. Similarly, Turkey is ranked third in the categories of drugs and crime and in global health and fourth in poverty and humanitarian relief and in environmental protection. A key point is that most of these categories match with Turkey's niche diplomacy preferences and aspirations, most notably global health and poverty and humanitarian relief. Such low performance in comparison to the BRICS in these categories may be explained by Turkey's attempts to construct an independent niche

diplomacy actorness in these areas. That said, it should be noted that a growing inclination to channel these efforts through the UN system would increase Turkey's visibility in financing strategies in global governance, as undertaken by the other rising powers.

As subscriptions, one of the categories in the financial level, is composed of assessed contributions, it must be remembered that after the implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms process in 2016, Turkey's quotas at the IMF and the World Bank increased considerably from 0.61 to 0.98 and 0.53 to 1.08, respectively. In parallel, Turkey's status in these organizations also increased as it became one of the 20 largest quota holders in the IMF and ranked second in terms of voting rights in its country group in the World Bank. Although Turkey's assessed contribution to these bodies and voting rights also increased as a result of the reform process, this does not give important clues about Turkey's financing strategies in the UN system since these are not voluntary channels but obligatory ones.

By the same token, the GGCI results reveal that Turkey's financing strategies in global governance tend to be channelled outside of the UN system. While this might be the case for all the actors involved in the financing of global governance, the Turkish case is striking in the sense that the imbalance between financing within and beyond the UN appears to be by and large non-proportional. For instance, a closer look at the subcategory of poverty and humanitarian relief, an area in which Turkey has exerted significant effort to build a niche diplomacy, bolsters this argument. As shown in Table 6.2, Turkey is ranked at the bottom of the group in terms of financial contribution to the agencies, funds, and programmes of poverty and humanitarian relief. The share of multilateral funding in Turkey's development assistance is approximately 2%, 44% of which was financed through the UN in 2014 while 98% of Turkey's development assistance is bilateral. As even Turkey's multilateral development financing strategies skew overwhelmingly towards non-UN mechanisms, the lack of balance between the UN and non-UN mechanisms of Turkey's financing strategies becomes clear.

Voluntary Financial Contribution Data Findings

To present the facts around Turkey's position in the UN financing system in a detailed way, Table 6.3, based on the voluntary financial contribution data findings, reveals the overall picture of the distribution of the voluntary finance channelled by Turkey to the UN system between 2010 and 2013.

Table 6.3 The distribution of Turkey's voluntary financing of the UN agencies, programmes, and funds, 2010–2013

DPKO	0%	UNFPA	0%
FAO	4%	UNHCR	1%
IAEA	3%	UNICEF	0%
ICAO	0%	UNIDO	1%
IFAD	1%	UNITAR	0%
ILO	0%	UNODC	2%
IMO	0%	UNOPS	0%
IOM	0%	UNRWA	10%
ITC	0%	UNU	0%
ITU	0%	UNWOMEN	1%
PAHO	0%	UNWTO	0%
UN	13%	UPU	0%
UN HABITAT	0%	WFP	1%
UN AIDS	1%	WHO	8%
UNDP	46%	WIPO	0%
UNEP	2%	WMO	0%
UNESCO	4%	WTO	0%

The total voluntary amount of Turkey's financial contribution to the 34 agencies, programmes, and funds of the UN listed in Table 6.2 was 139,532,663 USD, while Brazil's was 1,458,332,243 USD, Russia's 352,291,475 USD, India's 185,791,926 USD, China's 258,910,038 USD and South Africa's 70,344,705 USD.

An analysis of voluntary financing provides a broader perspective for understanding the main trends and the possible roadmaps for Turkey's financing strategies in the UN system (Table 6.3). Before scrutinizing the distribution of Turkey's contribution, a closer look at the diversification of the financing of Turkey and the BRICS provides important clues about Turkey's deficiency in diversifying its financing strategies. In this regard, Turkey was the least successful actor in terms of diversification and ranked first in only one body, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In comparison, Brazil was the leader in 13 bodies, India in six, Russia in five, China in four, and South Africa in two. Thus, since Turkey could not locate itself as a leading actor in more than one body in a comparative assessment with the BRICS countries, it is possible to argue that Turkey is still far from diversifying its financing strategies as a rising power.

A further illustration of Turkey's weak financing diversification is reflected in the number of bodies to which it has provided no voluntary contribution. As Table 6.3 shows, 19 of the 34 titles have zero percentage in Turkey's distribution of voluntary contribution to the UN system. On the other hand, Turkey's financing strategies in the UN tend to concentrate on some specific bodies related to its niche diplomacy areas and foreign policy priorities (Table 6.2). For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has the highest share with 46% in Turkey's voluntary financial contribution distribution, and it can be argued that such a high share is directly related to Turkey's increasing efforts to be an active and effective actor in international development cooperation. The fact that almost half of Turkey's voluntary financial contribution between 2010 and 2013 was channelled to the UNDP well demonstrates that since Turkey has been building an independent development cooperation network with the help of its own development agency TIKA, financing development cooperation and related activities under the UN is the most attractive source of financing for Turkey.

Due to Turkey's lack of diversification in its UN financing strategies, future financing strategies and selection of the most relevant agencies, funds, and programmes need to be reevaluated to better locate it with an eye to increasing its voice in global governance. In this regard, possible bodies include those to which Turkey's contributions are ranked above the BRICS: the UNDP, FAO, UN, UNESCO, and WHO. Therefore, the concentration of financing efforts in these bodies would provide Turkey a better position among the rising powers and could in turn help Turkey become more visible in global governance.

Can Turkey Gain Efficiency as a Rising Power in the UN System Through Funding?

Turkey's relatively weak funding in the UN system compared to its BRICS peers justifies the existence of a gap between its leaders' strong discourse of their country's global actorness and active international role in global governance and its relevant policies in practice. Turkey does not seem to have a comprehensive UN policy, including its funding to the UN system based on a specific roadmap and long-term strategy-based choices. This also makes Turkey's UN funding policy ambivalent and its priorities and trends as a donor of the UN system difficult to decode. On the other hand,

a country's funding choices and the ups and downs or stagnation of its funding of the UN's specific key policy areas clearly demonstrate in which diplomacy or niche areas it seeks to act as an active and efficient player (Bayram and Graham 2015). In this sense, as Table 6.3 in the previous section suggests, Turkey has most of its funding to the UNDP, followed respectively by relief and human development for Palestinian refugees, food and agriculture, health and education(science), and culture.

A closer look at Turkey's voluntary funding to the UN system in comparison with that of its BRICS peers showcases Turkey's relatively low voluntary funding to the UN system between 2010 and 2013. For instance, while Turkey's voluntary funding to the UNDP between 2010 and 2013 accounted for approximately 46% of its total voluntary funding, Brazil's voluntary funding to the same agency was 20%, Russia 3%, India 14%, China 39%, and South Africa 19%. These percentages clearly reflect the trend of distribution of the UN members' voluntary funding, meaning the sum of earmarked and core untied contributions. While the United States has sought to gradually withdraw from its leading diplomatic and donor role in the UN architecture by decreasing its funding to some key UN programmes, agencies, and funds, such as for peacekeeping operations, the WHO, and UNESCO, secondary states and middle and rising powers have greater room to fulfil this lacuna by constructing a new narrative for their expanding global role in the UN (Graham 2016). The United States' call on its allies and other Third World countries to share the burden of its financial contribution to not only the UN but also to other international organizations such as NATO appears to be a long-term policy informed by strict objectives aiming to decrease its UN funding budget in an important number of UN agencies and funds. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres has underlined, the United States' decisiveness in decreasing its UN budget would certainly create a negative impact on the funding of some key UN agencies such as the WHO, which are financially dependent on US contribution. On the other hand, the United States' burden-sharing policy in the UN could open up new opportunities for emerging countries to seek out upgraded status and new global responsibilities in the post-American international order. For instance, China's recent decision to increase its financial and personal contribution to UN agencies, most notably peacekeeping, may, in this regard, be seen as its willingness to strengthen its visibility and effectiveness in the UN architecture in general. The same path may also be followed by other rising powers not having UNSC permanent membership including India, Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey.

Despite the fact that the rising powers appear to be more committed and relevant to the UN in recent years as a part of their status-elevating policies in the face of the traditional Western powers, their preference towards bilateral over multilateral funding constitutes a real obstacle to their voluntary financial contribution to the UN. If properly convinced, it is probable that rising states such as Turkey may prefer replacing some part of their bilateral funds with multilateral ones to be accorded through UN channels. In line with this, it may also be advanced that in a post-American era, where the new American president, Donald Trump, has been reticent about playing a leading UN donor role, rising powers may assume a broader international donor role both inside and outside the UN. This would certainly make the rising powers more engaged with the organization, its multilateral mechanisms, and its current bureaucratic and funding challenges (Weiss and Abdenur 2014). Here it must also be kept in mind that almost all rising powers including Turkey prefer sending funds to countries in need through bilateral channels with the aim of exercising a more direct influence and pressure on the governments to whom they provide aid.

According to OECD data, the share of multilateral funding in Turkey's development assistance was 2% and only 25% of this amount was channelled through UN mechanisms in 2015 (Table 6.4). What is at stake is the fact that, despite Turkey's increasing development assistance in recent years, 98% of this aid has been realized bilaterally and only a quarter of its multilateral funding has been accorded through UN channels. Of course, Turkey is not the only country to adopt bilateral funding channels as a funding strategy. In recent years, most of the emerging powers have overwhelmingly used bilateral funding channels, including UN and non-UN

Table 6.4 The share of bilateral and multilateral funding and the share of the UN channels in Turkey and BRICS' development assistance

	Turkey (2015)	*Brazil (2013)*	*Russia (2015)*	*India (2015)*	*China (2015)*	*South Africa (2015)*
Bilateral	98%	44%	78%	94%	93%	20%
Multilateral	2%	66%	22%	6%	7.2%	80%
UN	25%	57% (2015)	36%	31%	89%	23%

Source: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4317041e.pdf?expires=1509609900&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=91A1745DD4768D5E4882A81265B98276

funds, and this imbalance between bi-aid and multi-aid needs to be redressed so as to make the UN more functional and effective as the major global governance organization. For instance, with the exception of Brazil (66% through multilateral channels) and South Africa (80% multilateral), it is possible to observe a similar trend in the development assistance practices of BRICS members which prefer channelling their funding through bilateral mechanisms (Russia 78%, India 94%, and China 93% through bilateral channels) (Table 6.4). What is more striking is that even in such a low percentage of multilateral funding, the share of UN channels, or through UN mechanisms, is not high with the exception of Brazil and China at 57% and 89%, respectively. Table 6.4 demonstrates that in addition to the existing low inclination towards multilateral channels, rising powers seem to be reluctant to use UN mechanisms in their development assistance practices (Russia 36%, India 31%, and South Africa 23% through the UN).

Like its BRICS peers, Turkey's underparticipation in global governance is the result of the motivation-contribution gap. Turkey's recent strong rhetoric with regards to its willingness to assume a greater role in global governance policies does not fully match its financial contribution to the UN (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016). The results achieved from the GGCI and from the raw contribution data have proven that the gap expands in the financial contribution at larger rates.

Conclusion

A closer look at Turkey's funding behaviours in the UN system clearly shows that Turkey cannot be considered an effective multilateral funding actor among the rising powers. Turkey is ranked as the lowest contributing country in terms of financial contribution compared to the five BRICS countries. As shown in Table 6.2, in terms of the ranking results of the GGCI between 2010 and 2013, Turkey is ranked at the bottom of the group for financial contribution to the UN. When categorizing financial contribution into 18 areas under the seven principal groupings of drugs and crimes, global health, poverty, human rights, environmental protection, labour standards, and subscriptions, Turkey was situated the lowest in the categories of human rights, labour standards, and subscriptions (Table 6.2). Similarly, Turkey was ranked third in the categories of drugs and crime and global health and fourth in poverty and humanitarian relief and environmental protection. What can be deduced from this picture is

the fact that Turkey shows a relatively better performance in the categories of global health and poverty and humanitarian relief, which have emerged as niche diplomacy areas during the last decade. Here, it can be argued that while Turkey has realized in recent years about the functionality of its multilateral funding to its niche diplomacy areas (Parlar Dal 2018; Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018), it remains an inefficient multilateral donor in the fields of human rights, labour standards, and subscription.

The rising powers' preference towards bilateral over multilateral funding has potential to ruin the UN's multilateral funding system in the upcoming years. It is of vital importance that the UN and the rising donors develop a common understanding of the advantages of multilateral funding such as functionality, efficiency, systematization, global burden-sharing, predictability, responsiveness, high levels of alignment, technical skills, and policy expertise. Here, of course the onus is mostly on the UN Secretariat and its agencies to demonstrate the comparative advantage and value addition of their multilateral funding channels compared to bilateral ones. In short, the UN should make itself more attractive, functional, and legitimate in the eyes of donor-countries, including the rising ones seeking a balance between funding and national priorities. A more integral strategy of multilateral funding must be adopted by the UN in order to convince the donor-states to shift their bilateral financial allocations to multilateral ones. Another important point to underline is that a more systematic UN policy is needed to substantially increase the core voluntary contributions of donor-states and make earmarked contributions as "core-like" as possible.

Departing from these empirical conclusions, the present study, by putting Turkey and the BRICS countries at the core of its narrative, draws attention to the transformative role of the rising powers in the UN funding system and concludes that a more comprehensive policy and academic understanding are needed, and more efforts should be devoted to providing a detailed picture of the role of the rising actors in the UN funding system. In this regard, three important points stand out from this study about the rising powers and the UN funding system in general.

First, in order to have a better understanding about the balance between the UN and non-UN funding mechanisms to which these actors channel their finance, there needs to be further mechanisms, tools, or programmes to comparatively track and measure the amount of assistance they provide. In the example of the OECD reports, South-South cooperation circles

(Quadir 2013) may pursue a similar policy of collecting and analysing the amount given by these actors and publicly releasing it for the sake of further analyses. Of course, the reluctance of some of the countries to openly report their assistance activities remains as one of the most important obstacles. However, once such a consensus could be achieved, it would become much easier to draft more transparent and coherent policy roadmaps for financing global governance more effectively.

Second, given the efforts of the rising powers on the ground to establish new mechanisms for funding projects around the world such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Abdenur and Folly 2015), it is obvious that convincing and encouraging them to channel their efforts back to the UN system becomes a much more difficult task as they pursue these institutional innovation policies for the purpose of developing more flexible mechanisms than the UN system, in line with their own understanding of multilateralism. What is needed here is an effort to render the projects funded by these new institutions and the UN system into a complementary character so that they would together create more effective results.

Third, although it would be wrong to argue that the rising powers abstain from contributing to the UN system, their existing interest in the system should be consolidated more strongly to accomplish the previously explained points. What lies behind these actors' loose interest in the UN system is directly related to the lack of a comprehensive contribution and follow-up approach. In other words, a shift to complement financing activities with on-the-ground responsibilities and effective roles in the implementation processes would reinforce their belief and interest in the system. Thus, only such a comprehensive approach that does not solely aim at attracting finance but also implementation and managerial roles would galvanize them to invest more in the UN system.

Last and not the least, in troubling financial times for the UN when the United States, the most important donor of the UN system, plans to decrease its funding to the system, rising powers like Turkey and the BRICS countries may enter the game as ambitious stakeholders of the UN system and develop a common framework for a reformed UN funding system with the aim of increasing multilateral funding of this organization. This seems to be of vital necessity for the rising powers to gain awareness about the importance of aid efficiency and about how bilateral aid mechanisms may trigger counterproductive outcomes. The UN funding system may only be reformed if such a common understanding and consensus emerges among its stakeholders.

Note

1. There are basically three types of funding in the UN system: assessed, earmarked (non-core), and core contributions. Assessed contributions are mandatory, and they are in the types of a subscription that countries have to pay. Earmarked (non-core) contributions are specified contributions in the sense that both the funding countries and the funded projects are evident. Core contributions are voluntary contributions, and they are not tied to a country or a project. In 2015, the share of these types in the UN budget was as follows: 53% earmarked, 30% assessed, and 10% voluntary ("Financing the UN Development System: Pathways to Reposition for Agenda 2030" 2017, 8).

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CHAPTER 7

Analyzing "T" in MIKTA: Turkey's Changing Middle Power Role in the United Nations

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Introduction

Since the 2008 financial crisis, changes to the global order have been explained using concepts such as the "post-Western" world order (Stuenkel 2016), "rise of the rest" (Zakaria 2008), "decentralized globalism" (Buzan 2011), "multiplex world" (Acharya 2017), "Pax Mosaica" (Narlikar and Kumar 2012), and "interdependent hegemony" (Xing 2016). As asserted by Keohane in *After Hegemony*, "cooperation is almost always fragmentary in world politics not all the pieces of the puzzle will fit together" (Keohane 1984: 246). This fragmentary cooperation can now be seen in the practices of middle powers. The decline in US hegemony, as differentiated from its power by Acharya (Kuo 2016), has provided middle powers

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room to maneuver (Xing 2016) at the regional and global levels by providing them with minilateral (Naim 2009) and informal gatherings to realize their diplomatic agendas. Accordingly, "informal diplomacy is becoming more important than formalized institutions" (Vezirgiannidou 2013: 635–651) in current world politics.

The new informal middle power grouping established by Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA) at the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2013 is one example of such informal gathering seen in global governance since the 2008 crisis (Engin and Baba 2015: 2). Most scholars have accepted MIKTA countries as emerging middle powers based on not only their material (positional) power, but also their behavioral and ideational aspects. Despite its newness, the MIKTA initiative has become the center of an increasing source of heated academic debate regarding the instruments, capabilities, and limitations of the new emerging middle power activism. Scholars have come to agree that, while the MIKTA partnership is in the early stages of development, this formation provides a significant test of the meaning and modalities of middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century, despite its limitations (Cooper 2016: 529).

This chapter attempts to analyze and compare Turkey's emerging middle power with that of the MIKTA states with specific reference to the ideational component of the middle power role, widely classified in the literature as comprised of (1) material (positional), (2) behavioral, and (3) ideational factors. By conducting a comparative discourse analysis of opening speeches given to the UNGA by Turkey and the other MIKTA countries from 2000 to 2017 and examining their role definitions in the United Nations (UN) platform, this chapter seeks to answer the main question of whether the MIKTA countries adopted an evolving middle power role during the 2000s. On which ideational factors were the MIKTA countries' middle power role built throughout the 2000s? To what extent did the MIKTA countries' social claims about themselves in global governance complement and contradict each other? What might be the limitations and opportunities involved in the future emerging middle power identity of the MIKTA partnership? Cooper's classification of middle powers as a separate class of countries (1997) builds not only on their subjective identification but also on the fact that they engage in some kind of middle power behavior. This chapter thus compares and contrasts Turkey's and the MIKTA states' discourses at the UN platform throughout the 2000s with that of their behavior in order to see the degree of parallelism as well as divergence between the two.

In order to do this, this chapter first conceptualizes the emerging middle power MIKTA states as third-wave middle powers and analyzes their role in global governance using the three defining features of the role of middle powers: (1) material (positional), (2) behavioral, and (3) ideational. Secondly, it specifically explores the ideational component of Turkey's evolving middle power role in the 2000s by conducting a discourse analysis of Turkish policymakers' statements at the opening sessions of the UNGA on three levels: (1) their roles in global governance, (2) attitude toward the international order, and (3) the nexus between their global and regional roles. Thirdly, the study looks at Turkey's evolving middle power role in the UN in comparison with the other MIKTA states based on the above analytical levels. The chapter concludes by discussing the limitations and opportunities of Turkey's evolving middle power role in the MIKTA partnership as well as the future of MIKTA's emerging common middle power identity in global governance.

Emerging Middle Powers (MIKTA) in Global Governance

During the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Francis Forde, spoke on behalf of a grouping of states including his own as follows:

> Outside the great powers there are certain powers who, by reason of their resources and their geographical location, will have to be *relied upon* especially for the *maintenance of peace and security* in various quarters of the world … Certain powers … have not only *capacity*, but also *will* to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world. (Forde 1945; Holbraad 1984: 61; emphasis added)

Following the establishment of the UN, states such as Australia and Canada aimed for a larger role in the international system as a function of their commitment to preserve the post–World War II (WWII) order. Defined as traditional middle powers or the *first wave* of middle powers, these states championed mediation, peacekeeping, and coalition-building roles aimed at preserving peace and security through international organizations, particularly the UN (Cooper and Parlar Dal 2016: 517). These states presented themselves as mediators of disputes and builders of bridges on a global scale in which they were thought to act as a catalyzer or a facilitator of the order (Nolte 2010: 892). During the 1970s and early 1980s,

a normative aspect was also incorporated into this new middle power role as these states began to develop links with the Non-Aligned Movement and strived to develop relations between Asia and the West (Manicom and Reeves 2014: 28). Jeffrey Robertson defined these explanations of the role of traditional middle powers as functional definitions since they are sought to be recognized as a distinct category and accorded distinct privileges as a function of their commitment to preserve and protect post-war settlements (Robertson 2017: 7).

In the 1990s, the middle power role was characterized by an inclination toward rule and norm creation as well as regime and institution building (Manicom and Reeves 2014: 28). This so-called *second wave* of middle power diplomacy embraced Canada's campaign against anti-personnel land mines, as well as the promotion of the International Criminal Court. In these examples, middle power *norm-building* stood in contrast with the attitudes of some major powers such as the United States as well as Russia and China (Cooper: 971). Thus, an important point of distinction between the first and the second wave of middle powers was their posture against the existing world order. First-wave middle powers tended to play a legitimizing role as the arbitrator and facilitator of the post-WWII political and economic structure, while the second wave was more inclined to refine the order by forming coalitions and pushing for reform (Cooper and Parlar Dal: 520).

Middle power activism transformed itself in the 2000s with the establishment of new groupings such as the G20 (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018a). States identified as the *third wave* or emerging middle powers are characterized by their exclusion from major groupings within the G20, such as the G7 and BRICS groupings. In this regard, countries such as Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia, despite being among the top 20 global economies, lack the capacity to compete for global leadership within the G20. These countries thus comprise a second-tier group and have formed an informal grouping known as MIKTA (Colakoglu 2016: 267–268). MIKTA countries first came together in 2011 and had an informal meeting on the margins of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in Los Cabos, Mexico, in February 2012. In the UN session in 2013, the MIKTA foreign ministers showed common interest in "strengthening multilateralism by supporting worldwide efforts for stability and prosperity, facilitating pragmatic and creative solutions to regional and international challenges and implementing the needed reforms in global governance structures" (Heenam: 72).

In April 2014, a joint opinion piece was written by the MIKTA foreign ministers defining the group's roles, interests, and goals in global governance. Notably, the foreign ministers presented themselves as follows:

> An informal platform of countries like-minded on many global issues, sharing core values such as open economies and democratic pluralistic systems as well as having common interest in strengthening multilateralism, supporting global efforts for stability and prosperity, facilitating pragmatic and creative solutions to regional and global challenges as well as implementing the needed reforms in global governance.[1]

MIKTA's aim was presented as contributing to the effective functioning of the multilateral order and addressing shortcomings of global governance. Significantly, MIKTA foreign ministers underlined that MIKTA emerged out of the "functional need" to cooperate, coordinate, and work together to overcome global and regional challenges. Last but not least, MIKTA foreign ministers specifically underlined the importance of regional ownership by arguing that MIKTA is comprised of important regional actors strategically located in their respective regions whose active contribution is essential for devising solutions to regional problems.[2]

MIKTA has become a significant middle power experiment bringing together traditional middle powers such as maturing middle powers Australia and South Korea and the emerging middle powers Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey (Öniş and Kutlay 2016: 6). In contrast to traditional middle powers which have stable social democracies and highest living standards, emerging middle powers' democratization is an ongoing process accompanied with low socioeconomic development (Jordaan 2003: 167; Nolte: 890).

Yet, terms such as traditional middle power, established middle power, and emerging middle power remain ambiguous. According to Robertson, defining and redefining the term is a "futile exercise".[3] As underlined in the introductory chapter by Parlar Dal of this book, review of the literature suggests that scholars to a large extent agree that the (1) material (positional), (2) behavioral, and (3) ideational factors define the middle power role (Chapnick 1999: 73; Carr 2014; Robertson 2017; Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016; Parlar Dal 2018). These different types of middle power definitions correlate with the prominent schools of thought on international relations at the height of their popularity. Material capacity definitions correlate with the dominance of realism in the post-WWII period until the

end of the Cold War, while the behavior and identity factors correlate with the revival of neoliberalism and the growth of constructivism in the post–Cold War period, respectively (Jordaan 2003: 10).

Firstly, designation as a middle power is based on a country's material capabilities. Middle power is characterized as neither a great nor a small power. Wight defines the material capabilities of middle powers based on their military strength (Wight 1987: 65; Reeves 2014: 28). However, no agreement has been reached as to which material attributes, such as geography, population, military spending, or diplomatic capacity, point to a middle power (Manicom and Reeves 2014: 28).

Secondly, scholars have underscored the behavior of middle powers when defining the term (Engin and Baba 2015: 2). According to Andrew Cooper, what distinguishes middle powers from both big and small states is based less on structural capabilities than specific and flexible forms of behavior (Cooper 2015a: 35). Conceptualized as middle power diplomacy, this behavior postures a tendency toward multilateral solutions to international disputes (Beeson 2011: 564). Cooper et al. (1993) defined middle power behavior in terms of the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to global problems, embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and adopt notions of good international citizenship to guide diplomacy (Cooper et al. 1993: 19–25). According to Gareth Evans, middle power diplomacy is characterized by niche diplomacy, which means concentrating resources in specific areas.[4] Conceptualized also as mission-oriented diplomacy, niche diplomacy refers to efforts by entrepreneurial states to act as a catalyst or leader on a given international issue (Manicom and Reeves 2014: 31). Middle power states typically adopt an activist style and interfere in global issues beyond their immediate concern (Jordaan: 167). They also propose innovative solutions to international issues, indicating their strong sense of internationalism (Schiavon and Domínguez 2016: 3). Middle powers see themselves as part of international institutions and aspire to improve these institutions (Wang and French 2013: 992). Although their interests may differ on an issue-by-issue basis, none advocate for the absence of rules for new challenges (Wright 2015: 20). Therefore, their common interest in a healthy international order is also an important defining criterion. Middle powers are generally supportive of the international order, and most were early supporters of the UN (Santikajaya 2016: 567). In addition, they are committed to orderliness and security in the world system realized through foreign policy niches of

their choice (Jordaan: 169). It is through the practice of such diplomacy that a state identity based upon "middle powermanship" emerges (Wilkins 2014: 158).

Thirdly, self-identity or the state's own use of the term middle power comprises its ideational middle power role (Carr 2014: 70–84; Robertson 2017: 7). James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves have pointed out this clear ideational component to middle powers. Countries such as Australia have classically identified themselves as such and have adopted foreign policy roles that reflect this ideational belief (Manicom and Reeves: 32). A country such as South Africa that is objectively best located as a middle power has shifted its own identity to align with the BRICS countries. Conversely, Indonesia, often viewed as a regional power, joined South Korea, Australia, and Turkey to form the MIKTA group (Cooper 2015a, b: 8). Adam Chapnick argues that "the concept of middle powerhood, upon which it depends for moral and political affirmation, is mere rhetoric" (Chapnick: 206). Middle powers recognize the value of the rhetoric. Efstathopoulos (2017) argued that functionalism is an instrumental treatment of the middle power concept in which a state adopts the middle power label to declare its desired role in international affairs. One should also note here that states can exhibit middle power behavior without endorsing the middle power concept. In fact, many states that proclaim major power ambitions actually follow a middle power foreign policy, while self-identified middle powers will often fail to meet the standards of an independent analytical framework of middle power behavior (Efstathopoulos 2017). Therefore, the classification of middle powers as a separate class of countries, such as MIKTA, in the hierarchy of nations stands not only on their subjective identification but on the fact that this category of actors actually engages in some distinctive form of activity (Cooper 1997: 7).

All in all, although these conceptualizations and definitions are still fluid, new middle power groupings such as MIKTA have the possibility of opening new areas of compromise to long-standing critiques of Western dominance over global governance institutions by providing a way to bridge the North–South chasm or the West-versus-the-Rest divide (Weiss 2016: 10). MIKTA has shifted attention to the possibilities of a third wave featuring some degree of middle power collective action (Cooper 2016: 530). Yet, MIKTA's functioning as an efficient middle power platform arguably depends on the construction of a common social identity as well as its acceptance as a legitimate grouping by external actors (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016: 626).

Turkey and MIKTA at the UN: Toward a Common Middle Power Role?

The role of multilateralism and strong sense of internationalism in Turkish foreign policymaking is hardly new. Since its establishment, the identity of the new Turkish Republic was defined by Mustafa Kemal as a "modern state which aims to coexist peacefully with international society of states" (Sander 1998: 141). Beginning with the early Republican era, Turkish rulers have chosen to act with multilateral institutions such as the League of Nations, the UN, the European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkey was one of the founding members of the UN and held non-permanent seats on the Security Council (UNSC) during the 1951–1952, 1954–1955, and 1961 (shared with Poland) terms. In its first term on the Council (1951–1952), Turkey served as the Middle Eastern Council member, occupied the Eastern European seat twice (1954–1955 and 1961), and has since run for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) seat (Sever and Gök 2016). Interestingly, Turkey is the only country to have been elected to the Council under all the groupings (Loraine and Daws 2014: 138), illustrating its in-between identity. Scholars and politicians have variously identified Turkey as a "cusp" state (Herzog and Robins 2014), "liminal state" (Yanık 2011: 59–114), "bridge" (Yanık 2009: 531–549), "world state" (Cem 2002), and "center state". Among these, middle power role has not been pronounced.

However, Ankara's behavioral denominators point to it occupying a middle power role since the early Republican period. In a study of Turkey's middle power behavior back to the diplomatic activism of the 1930s, Barlas (2005) argues that Turkey made every effort to use its diplomatic capacity successfully in the Balkans and Mediterranean by pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems and constructing coalitions with like-minded states in the 1930s (Barlas 2005: 464). During the Cold War era, despite some exceptional periods in the 1960s and 1970s when Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus, Turkey has generally pursued a peaceful multilateral diplomacy by remaining explicitly attached to the norms and decisions of the UN (Parlar Dal 2013: 715). Despite intense criticism toward the UN, the 1990s were also marked by one of Turkey's most active multilateral diplomacies in the UN since its establishment. Ankara strived to take a role in the restructuring of the post–Cold War regional and global order through multilateral platforms, especially in the UN, as it tried to play an active role in the solution of the Yugoslavian crises (Oğuz Gök: 87).

Analyzing Turkey's Middle Power Role Among MIKTA in the 2000s

Starting with the 2000s, Turkish rulers demonstrated an increasing willingness to adopt a leading role in both regional and global issues on the UN platform. Turkey's two applications for UNSC non-permanent membership in 2009–2010 and 2015–2016 showcased its growing enthusiasm to play a larger role within the UN platform in the 2000s. More importantly, with the establishment of MIKTA as an emerging middle power grouping in 2011, the concept of middle power has increasingly been used to define Turkey's position, identity, and behavior in current world politics despite limitations.

Material (Positional) Factors

In material (positional) capabilities, Turkey ranks fifth in GDP analysis, second in growth rate, and third in military spending and population (Table 7.1).

As seen from the table in terms of GDP, GDP per capita, economic growth rate, share of global output, and military expenditure, Turkey is positioned in the middle of the MIKTA grouping (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016: 617).

Behavioral Factors

Although Ankara did not directly endorse the middle power concept, AKP rulers openly declared their willingness to take a leading role in global issues in the early 2000s. The UN has become an important arena in Turkey's search for an increased role in regional and global governance (Sever and Gök 2016). In fact, Turkey expressed its willingness to take an active role in many fields of global governance through the UN as early as 2000 under President Ahmet Necdet Sezer:

> Turkey is determined to be more *actively engaged* in the endeavours of the reinvigorated United Nations *as we become stronger in diverse fields*, which range from democratic institutions to the economy, from disaster-preparedness to social and cultural development. (A/55/PV.6; emphasis added)

Accordingly, with respect to the second criteria, namely middle power behavior, Ankara undertook many initiatives to become part of international institutions and increase Turkey's visibility in many platforms on a

Table 7.1 MIKTA countries' material capabilities

	Gross domestic product (GDP), current prices Bn US$ (2016)	*GDP per capita int.US$ (2016)*	*Real change of GDP on previous year % (2016)*	*Share of global economic output % (2016)*	*Military expenditure US$ m. (2016)*	*Military expenditure by country as percentage of GDP (2016)*	*Population based on last census of MIKTA countries*
Turkey	857 (5)	24.912 (3)	2.9 (2)	1.7(3)	14.803 (3)	2.0% (3)	74.526.000 (3)
Mexico	1.046 (3)	18.938 (4)	2.3 (5)	1.9 (2)	6020 (5)	0.6%(5)	112.336.538 (2)
South Korea	1.411 (1)	37.740 (2)	2.8 (3)	1.6(4)	36.777 (1)	2.7% (1)	24.052.231 (4)
Australia	1.259 (2)	48.899 (1)	2.5 (4)	1.0(5)	24.617 (2)	2.0% (2)	21.727.158 (5)
Indonesia	932 (4)	11.720 (5)	5.0 (1)	2.5 (1)	8.183 (4)	0.9% (4)	237.641.326 (1)

Source: For economic data: Susana Garcia Diez and Daniel O'Donnel, *G-20 in Figures, Summit of the G-20 States in Hamburg 2017*, Federal Statistics Office of Germany, June 2017, p. 19. For Military Expenditure data: Stockholm Peace Institute, Military Expenditure Database, Data for all countries from 1988 to 2016 in constant (2015) USD https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD. United Nations Statistics Division, Population and Vital Statistics Report, Population, latest available census and estimates (2015–2016) Last updated 2 November 2017 Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/vitstats/serATab2.pdf

global scale, far and foremost the UN in the 2000s. For instance, the Alliance of Civilizations was launched in 2005 by the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Spain and was then adopted by the Secretary-General to become a UN initiative. Turkey underlined the importance of the Alliance of Civilization initiative in terms of contributing to global civilization based on globally shared common norms:

> [The Alliance] can make important contributions to shaping a *global civilization* based on *universal values* centered on *democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights, gender equality*, young people and media. (A/64/PV.5; emphasis added)

This approach has its echoes in the middle power behavior definition on initiating innovative solutions to international issues as well as strengthening the international institution in the preservation of order. Ankara adopted the role of promoting harmony among nations (A/58/PV.14) in the UN platform. Turkey convened a meeting in Istanbul between the EU and countries of the Islamic Cooperation Organization (ICO) in 2002. Both the NATO summit and the ICO's ministerial meeting were held in Istanbul in 2003. Accordingly, together with Finland, Turkey also launched the "Friends of Mediation" initiative in the UN in 2010, based on the argument that mediation has become an important area of the new Turkish foreign policy (Aras 2012). Turkey was also active in organizing UN summits and conferences throughout the 2000s on various issues. Turkey hosted the Istanbul Somalia Conference organized within the UN framework on 21–23 May 2010 at which the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon underlined Turkey's leadership on global issues in the UN platform:

> Turkey's leadership in world affairs in areas range from UN peacekeeping missions to diplomacy and Turkey *has earned the right to speak out*, forcefully, on issues of global importance. (Emphasis added)[5]

At the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul on 9–13 May 2011 in Ankara, Foreign Minister Davutoglu (2009–2014) announced Turkey's ambition to make Istanbul "a major hub for the UN on issues of mediation and peace" in 2012 (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 September 2012). The Istanbul Conference on Mediation in February 2012 also took place in Istanbul. Ankara displayed a willingness to initiate leadership in the organization of UN conferences on regional

issues such as the International Meeting on the Question of Jerusalem on 12–13 May 2014. Turkey also took part in the organization of the UN Seminar on Assistance to Palestinian People in Istanbul in May 2010 and hosted a Palestinian Ambassador's conference in Istanbul on 23–24 July 2011 (Sever and Gök: 1160). Ankara hosted the first-ever UN World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 in Istanbul. Among many, Turkey's UNSC non-permanent membership in 2009–2010 and its unsuccessful application for 2015–2016 were crucial in illustrating Ankara's increased preoccupation with the UN platform in the 2000s (Sever and Gök 2016).

An analysis of Turkey's initiatives in organizing these UN summits gives a clue as to the main niche areas in which it seeks to functionalize its middle power behavior. Among these, Ankara's efforts seemed to concentrate predominantly on the mediation, humanitarian assistance, and development cooperation fields (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016: 620). As early as 2006, Ankara demonstrated its willingness to take a leading role in development field in the UN platform (A/61/PV.17). Accordingly, in 2013, former President Abdullah Gül underlined humanitarian diplomacy as "the key objective of Turkish foreign policy" (A/68/PV.5). One of the defining aspects of Turkish foreign policy has become the increased role of development cooperation programs as evidenced by an expanding international aid budget in the 2000s (Oğuz Gök and Parlar Dal 2016: 81). In the 2016 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, with respect to the international contributions of government donors, Turkey was the second largest donor of humanitarian assistance in 2015, following the United States.[6] Turkey's increasing interest in global aid is also a result of its activism in the UN (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016).

Ideational Factors

Promoted Role

A careful reading of Turkish leaders' speeches in the UNGA between 2000 and 2017 showcases that, in terms of the ideational role of middle powers, Turkish rulers refrained from using the term middle power to describe its status and identity in the international arena. Rather, Ankara preferred to present itself to the international community as a "donor state" (A/61/PV.17), "humanitarian actor" (A/69/PV.6), "bridge" (A/64/PV.5), "responsible state" (A/67/PV.15), "promoter of harmony among civilizations" (A/58/PV.14), and "promoter of peace".[7] In fact, Turkey is the

only MIKTA country with a former imperial great power status. Therefore, it can be argued that the Ottoman legacy prevails in the mindset of AKP rulers' perception of Turkey's role in regional and global affairs (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016: 619).

Attitude Toward Order

A reading of Turkish leaders' speeches in the UNGA between 2000 and 2017 illustrates that Ankara took every opportunity to emphasize the crucial role of an effective UN in the preservation of international order as well as Turkey's commitment to strengthening multilateralism in its own foreign policy[8]:

> *Strengthening multilateralism* and the central role of the United Nations in the international system is a *fundamental aspect of our foreign policy.* (Emphasis added)[9]

This approach has its echoes in the definition of middle power behavior of strengthening international institutions in the preservation of order. In fact, the surge in the number of speeches given to the UN stands as testimony to Turkey's growing enthusiasm to play an active role within the UN platform in the 2000s, despite its limitations. In all, 12 speeches were recorded before the UN between 1990 and 2002, while this number more than doubled to 26 between 2003 and 2014 (Sever and Gök). During the September 2010 term, Turkey pursued an active presidency, organizing high-level meetings regarding the theme "Ensuring the Security Council's effective role in maintaining international peace and security" under the presidency of Abdullah Gül (S/2010/546). Throughout its 2009–2010 Council membership, Ankara aimed to become an agenda-setter in the UN by organizing many sessions. In the course of 2010, the UNSC adopted all 59 proposed resolutions, most of which were unanimously adopted (Aral 2009: 161). One should also note here that Turkey, like other middle powers, has maintained a sustained criticism of the UN system on the grounds of representativeness, justice, and equality. Ankara's normative criticism toward the current UN order during the 2000s is best symbolized in the recurring discourse that "the world is bigger than five".[10] Likewise, an analysis of Ankara's discourse at the UNGA between 2000 and 2015 demonstrates that Turkish rulers frequently raised the issue of UN reform before the body itself.[11]

Nexus Between Regional and Global Roles

An analysis of Ankara's narrative toward order demonstrates that, at times, it is quite unique from other middle powers in the sense that it perceives itself as a central power, developing the capabilities to conduct an autonomous foreign policy at both regional and global levels rather than as a middle power aims at strengthening the rules of the Western order per se (Wright 2015: 24). In this vein, Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era has been defined as striving to be one of the main actors in the construction of the new regional and global order. According to Foreign Minister Davutoğlu:

> [A]t the global level, we will aspire to build in a participatory *manner a new international order* that is inclusive of the international community at large. (Davutoğlu 2014: 100; emphasis added)

Similarly, Davutoğlu called for the "adoption of new values" (Davutoğlu 2010: 40). This new approach was also evident in Turkish rulers' role definition toward the region as being "active friendship and cooperation" compared with "passive good-neighborhood". According to then Prime Minister Erdoğan:

> [T]he problems of our region have global implications as well … We seek to move from a relationship of *passive good-neighbourliness* to one of *active friendship and cooperation*. (A/64/PV.5; emphasis added)

In fact, in practice, Ankara's contradictory foreign policy approaches in the 2000s toward the human rights policies of some Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and its silence toward the Sudanese government's human rights violations in Africa have been increasingly criticized on normative grounds as hypocritical (Özerkan 2009). During the Syrian crisis, Ankara was criticized for acting unilaterally, not respecting the sovereignty of its neighbors, and interfering in their internal affairs. Furthermore, Turkey's pro-democratization postures adopted toward events in the outside world, such as the Egyptian coup, do not easily generate international attention and credibility of a genuine middle power identity, given the growing belief that Turkey's democratic credentials display a number of important shortfalls in domestic politics and restraints on freedom of expression, as cited in Freedom House reports and suggested by the Press Freedom Index, as well as the lessening belief in the rule of law in recent years (Öniş: 216–217). Last but not least, intervention in

Jarablus in August 2016 as a part of its fight against ISIS is also considered by some scholars as the outcome of its nuanced middle power actorness, aimed at pursuing an independent foreign policy in the framework of its pre-existing alliance relations, notably with the West and the United States (Parlar Dal and Kurşun: 621). Therefore, one can argue that the growing gap between Ankara's discourse and behavior in recent years pushes the limits of the acceptance of Turkey's middle power role.

Acknowledging that the above examples are generally from the Middle East region, one should note that, unlike countries such as Mexico that are relatively isolated from geopolitics, or others such as Australia which have long-term challenges but few short-term threats, Turkey is very much at the center of regional crises, such as that unfolding in Syria (Wright 2015: 25). This regional factor in turn has the potential to affect the realization and durability of its middle power role notwithstanding its acceptance from its counterparts. The most recent voting on Turkey's application for UNSC non-permanent membership for the 2015–2016 term also illustrated Turkey's downgraded international profile in recent years as well (Sever and Gök 2016). On the other hand, one should also underline the fact that this huge regional agenda is not a regional given, but also consciously adopted by Turkish rulers while identifying their interest as well as their goals during the 2000s (Parlar Dal and Kurşun).

In this regard, the formation of the MIKTA partnership would help Turkey in its mission to define itself as a middle power by aiding it in the formulation of more realistic and reasonable goals (Çolakoğlu 2015). There has been an increasing scholarly interest in the analysis of the role of MIKTA countries' middle power roles, but the government lacks a comprehensive strategy for MIKTA and its middle power identity in the MIKTA partnership. The lack of genuine interest as well as a concrete plan and priority for instrumentalizing MIKTA initiatives from various sectors of government in 2017 also demonstrates that this is still a work in progress. MIKTA offers significant opportunities in rebranding Turkey's global status by opening up new ground for cooperation between the emerging and traditional middle powers and the major powers (Parlar Dal and Kurşun: 626). Even though Turkish leaders rarely adopt this role in their speeches, Turkey's foreign policy goals and means in the UN platform during the 2000s confirm Turkey's evolving middle power role despite distractions and limitations arising from its internal instabilities and regional developments (Parlar Dal and Kurşun). As one of its founding members, the UN will continue to remain at the center of Turkey's

increasing efforts to be a responsible actor in search of an effective, representative, and just international order.

One should note here that constraints to the strengthening of MIKTA identity arise from the other MIKTA countries as well as they face a wide number of distractions, internal instabilities, and conflicting identities (Cooper: 529–530). Therefore, considering the three defining factors, Turkey's contribution to the MIKTA initiative as an emerging middle power is neither negative nor positive, but rather incomplete. As yet, if a country as important as Turkey cannot be coaxed into strengthening the order, then it will be very hard for MIKTA to accomplish its goals (Wright: 26).

Turkey and MIKTA: A Common Emerging Middle Power Identity?

The main conclusions of a discourse analysis of speeches of MIKTA members in the UNGA between 2000 and 2017 are summarized in the two tables below:

As seen in Table 7.2, Turkey's direct reference to the middle power concept when defining its identity is weak relative to its MIKTA peers. On the other hand, Turkey's behavioral and material denominators are just below Australia and Korea, placing Turkey in the middle of the MIKTA states. Australia and South Korea are the most powerful actors within MIKTA and perform high in all factors. With the exception of material factors, Mexico ranks low among MIKTA countries as an emerging middle power in the making. Like Mexico, despite its high performance in material and ideational denominators of middle power role, Indonesia is the weakest actor among MIKTA countries in its behavioral component.

Similar to Turkey, Mexico did not explicitly refer to the middle power concept while presenting its role in global governance at the UN platform (Table 7.3). Rather, Mexico prefers to present itself as an "economic power" (A/63/PV.7) and a "multilateral" (A/65/PV.22) actor which has

Table 7.2 MIKTA's emerging middle power role

	Mexico	*Indonesia*	*Korea*	*Turkey*	*Australia*
Ideational	Weak	Fair	Strong	Weak	Strong
Material	Fair	Fair	Strong	Fair	Strong
Behavioral	Fair	Weak	Strong	Strong	Strong

Table 7.3 MIKTA countries' ideational role components

MIKTA country	*Attitude toward international order*	*Promoted role*	*Nexus between global role and regional role*
Indonesia	Soft revisionist Reformist	Bridge builder between developed and developing countries Agenda setter	Balanced role through accommodative leadership
South Korea	Soft revisionist Reformist	Bridge builder between developed and developing countries Agenda setter Convener Network power	Not balanced (regionally more limited)
Turkey	Soft-revisionist Reformist	Agenda setter Humanitarian actor Multilateral actor Rising donor Responsible state	Regional power role Not balanced (regionally more limited)
Mexico	Reformist	Bridge builder Economic power Multilateral actor	Not balanced (regionally more limited)
Australia	Conformist (integrationist)	Good international citizen Creative middle power Economic power	Not balanced (regionally more limited)

Source: The table is developed and first used by Awidya Santikajaya, 'Walking the Middle Path: The Characteristics of Indonesia's Rise', *International Journal*, 2016, Vol. 71(4), p. 570 for comparison of Indonesia with BRIC and middle powers. The writers adapted the table to all MIKTA country analysis

"global responsibilities" (A/63/PV.7) to strengthen the norms of the UN system. Among many, the center of its diplomatic discourse has been the bridge (A/56/PV.44) analogy. Mexico and Turkey's integrationist and reformist attitudes toward order were quite similar throughout the 2000s. Yet, these two states also underlined the independent and active role in regional global affairs reflected in the "Mexican moment" (Maihold 2016: 545–562) and "Ankara Moment" (Roy and Karadağ). Although regionally limited by the Brazil factor, Mexico has regional organization alternatives such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) created in 2011. However, like Turkey, there are doubts as to whether Mexico can be classified as a middle power (Maihold: 548–549).

In material factors, Australia ranks second in GDP and military spending and fourth in population and economic growth. Among MIKTA

countries, Australia is the only country possessing components associated with both middle power identity and behavior such as good international citizenship and middle power diplomacy (Table 7.3). A detailed analysis of Australian leaders' discourse at the UNGA between 2000 and 2015 illustrates that the recurring themes presented to showcase Australia's middle power identity were the following: "good international citizenship", "strong democracy" (A/55/PV.20), "responsible nation" (A/65/PV.16), "a voice for small and medium nations" (Teo 2017: 10), "creative middle power" (A/63/PV.10), "considerable power",[12] "strong economy",[13] and "top-20 nation".[14] Australia is well above Turkey as a complete middle power by virtue of its demonstrated capabilities, distinctive middle power behavior, and long-standing identity as a middle power (Çolakoğlu 2016: 278) (Table 7.2).

In material factors, South Korea ranks first in GDP, first in military spending, and second in economic growth. South Korea has described its position in the system using the concepts of "balancer", a "hub", "a middle power" (Mi-Kim), and "regional bridge" (Mi-Kim) (Table 7.3). South Korea and Turkey's attitudes toward order were both reformist throughout the 2000s. Like Turkey, South Korean officials underlined the themes of "inclusive multilateralism", (A/71/PV.16) "the role of effective UN for the international order" and "reform of the UN system to strengthen peace in the world", its contributions to "UN peacekeeping operations", and "humanitarian and financial assistance" to the developing world as a part of its "global responsibilities"[15] in the UN. The diplomatic discourse based on the "Global Korea" concept (Watson 2011) developed in the mid-2000s showed its will to increase its international influence through its "networking capacity" (Sohn 2015: 4) as a way to escape the limitations of regional security considerations on its middle power diplomacy. Unlike Turkey, Seoul showed its willingness to act as a bridge between developed and developing countries on the global development issue by sharing its experiences as a country transformed from "aid recipient to a donor country" (A/64/PV.3). It acted with convener and agenda-setter roles in international negotiations and multilateral platforms such as the G20 and the Nuclear Security Summit (Mi-Kim 2016: 5; Green 2017). As with Turkey, South Korea's middle power role lacked consistency due to the security limitations on its diplomatic posture in the 2000s.

Indonesia's material capabilities were lower than the other MIKTA members (Table 7.1). Like Turkey, Indonesia was more willing to become an influential player in the world in the 2000s by increasing its voice on

global governance issues such as sustainable development, disarmament, climate change, poverty, financial assistance for the less developed countries, and peacekeeping.[16] Jakarta presents itself as a "contributor to global partnership, global peace and security, and global prosperity" (A/72/PV.13) and aims to act as an agenda-setter and a bridge builder between developed and developing nations in areas of "global partnership for development" (A/61/PV.18) and agricultural and rural infrastructure reform (A/63/PV.14) in global economic governance. Like Turkey, Indonesia also has reformist goals to make changes to the UN system (A/61/PV.18). Unlike Turkey's ambitious regional role aspirations however, Indonesia has refrained from playing a leadership role and has defined its international posture through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Fealy and White: 92–100). The country wants to establish an institutionalized connection between its neighbors and various global platforms, and its regional leadership style is that of accommodative leadership, not power-based domination (Santikajaya: 569–586). Unlike South Korea and Australia, rather than relying on US-based guarantees, and unlike Turkey lacking any strong regional platforms to perform its middle power role, Indonesia seeks security through "ASEAN-centered regionalism" (Darmosumarto 2013).

Last but not least, one common point to be underlined is that since 2016, all MIKTA members have experienced various domestic political problems. South Korea struggled with corruption cases and a change in the presidency while Turkey dealt with difficulties in its Middle East foreign policy and the domestic political repercussions of the failed July 2016 coup d'état. Federal elections in Australia in 2016 and regional and upcoming state elections in Indonesia, together with the impacts of US President Trump's anti-Mexico campaigns in Mexico, forced policymakers in these nations to devote their energy to domestic politics (Çolakoğlu 2017). In other words, developments in all MIKTA states diverted attention away from the institutional empowerment of their cooperation within the MIKTA partnership.

Conclusion

Ikenberry asserts that "today's struggle is about voice", or the willingness of others to increase their say and presence in global governance, not to replace the neo-liberal economic order (Ikenberry 2016). These struggles need not necessarily be conflictual. Bremmer and Roubini claim that the

world of "G-Zero governance" (Bremmer and Roubini 2011) after US hegemony would be one in which no single country or bloc of countries had the political or economic power or the will to push an international agenda. They claim that in the G-zero world, intensified conflict on the international stage over important issues such as international macroeconomic coordination, financial regulatory reform, trade policy, and climate change should be expected. However, contrary to this argument, Stuenkel and Acharya assert that there is no clear reason that the post-Western order will necessarily be more chaotic or unstable than the status quo and that the elements of the old liberal order will survive by accommodating new actors and approaches in a "G-Plus World" (Stuenkel 2016: 277).

In the light of these debates on the current and future world system, it can be asserted that middle power diplomacy through informal venues presents a new road for cooperation under the post-hegemonic world order. The MIKTA grouping can be regarded as one example of such platforms. Each MIKTA state's middle power identity and adopted behavioral roles emerged out of different settings and developed with different dynamics. While Australia's middle power identity explicitly referring to its middle power role of preserving order emerged immediately following the WWII, Mexico's emerging middle power role owes itself largely to Mexico City's growing economic power and heightened competition with Brazil at both regional and global levels throughout the 2000s. Like Mexico, Indonesia's middle power role was based on its growing economic capacity and, especially after the Asian financial crisis, gained room to maneuver in the context of changing power balances in Southeast Asia with the rise of China and the declining hegemony of the United States. South Korea has established itself a middle power in its diplomatic statements for more than a decade, but, due to its geostrategic location and the security alliance with the United States, its middle power diplomacy is limited.

Turkey's middle power behavior goes back to the diplomatic activism of the 1930s, although Ankara did not directly endorse its middle power identity. The 1990s witnessed one of Ankara's most active multilateral diplomacies on various multilateral platforms in search of a peaceful solution to emerging conflicts, particularly the crises in the Balkan. In the UN, Turkey displayed a growing multilateral willingness and concrete diplomatic efforts in line with middle power behavior during the 2000s. Compared with the 1990s, regional ownership became a recurrent theme in the 2000s, and Turkish leaders strove to materialize their regional role in the Middle East as a springboard for the acceptance and realization of

an enhanced role in global governance institutions such as the UN. Ankara tested the limits of its regional influence in terms of creating followership as well as realizing real policy outcomes. In fact, these multilateral efforts do not easily generate international credibility of a genuine middle power role from its counterparts, given Ankara's contradictory foreign policy approaches, especially toward the Middle East region, as well as the growing belief that Turkey's democratic credentials display a number of important deficiencies. Therefore, this regional factor in turn has the potential to affect the realization as well as the durability of its middle power role, notwithstanding its acceptance from its counterparts.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that, with the exception of Turkey, all MIKTA countries have various regional platforms at which to display and strengthen their middle power role. Therefore, the UN has been and continues to be the only platform in which Turkey can consolidate its middle power role in global governance. The growing gap between Ankara's discourse and behavior in recent years has pushed the limits of acceptance of Turkey's middle power role. That said, the MIKTA initiative offers significant opportunities for a rebranding of Turkey's regional and global status within an emerging middle power identity.

All things considered, Turkey's contribution to MIKTA's newly emerging middle power role has been neither positive nor negative, but rather incomplete. Furthermore, middle power groupings such as MIKTA have been able to build coalitions that include not only like-minded states but also NGOs which can provide technical expertise, network politics, information, and transnational actorness on an issue area on global governance. The comparative analyses of this study demonstrated to a large extent the explanatory power of the functionalist arguments regarding the emergence of the middle power role of MIKTA countries. Therefore, further research should focus on the transnational dimension of Turkey's changing middle power role by focusing on the question of the interplay between NGOs and the government in the 2000s on various issues.

Notes

1. "MIKTA as a force for Good", *Daily Sabah*, April 24, 2014 (available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/25/mikta-as-a-force-for-good
2. Ibid.

3. Robertson argues that one should have a *pragmatic definition* of middle power. Thus, for Robertson, middle powers might be defined as follows: "[I]n the context of global governance in the 2010s, a middle power ought to be considered as a state with an interest in and capacity (material resources, diplomatic influence, creativity, etc.) to work proactively in concert with similar states to contribute to the development and strengthening of institutions for the governance of the global commons". See Robertson, p. 13.
4. Gareth Evans, "Middle Power Diplomacy", Chile Pacific Foundation, Santiago, 29 June 2011 (available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech441.html)
5. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34767&Kw1=turkey&Kw2=iran&Kw3=nuclear (accessed 8 July 2014).
6. 2016 Humanitarian Assistance Report (available at http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Global-Humanitarian-Assistance-Report-2016.pdf)
7. Ibid.
8. See various statements before the UN General Assembly between 2000 and 2017.
9. Statement by President Abdullah Gul at UN General Assembly Opening Session, 2005 (available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/516/22/PDF/N0551622.pdf?OpenElement) (last visited 10 August 2017).
10. President Erdogan's Speech before the UN Security Council, at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48825#.VNCVcZX9k5s (last visited 17 February 2015).
11. See various statements before the UN General Assembly between 2000 and 2017.
12. Speech by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 10 July 2006, "Should Australia think Big or Small in Foreign Policy?" (available at: https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2006/060710_bigorsmall.html)
13. Speech by Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, "Australia's Foreign Policy Interests in the Middle East" (available at: https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110222.aspx?ministerid=2).
14. Speech by Senator the Hon Brett Mason on behalf of Foreign Minister Julie Bishop (available at http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/foreign-policy-for-a-top-20-nation/).
15. See especially Statements of South Korean officials in UN General Assembly in 2016, 2014, 2013, 2010, and 2000.
16. See various Statements by Indonesian Officials in the UN General Assembly between 2000 and 2017.

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CHAPTER 8

Assessing Turkey's New Global Governance Strategies: The G20 Example

Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kurşun

Introduction

The G20 and the contributions of its members have become an increasingly debated research topic in recent years. As one of the main actors acting in the sub-institutional system of the Bretton Woods system, the G20 is a good illustrator of the changing nature of a less structured and more fragmented international order which allows rising powers greater room for maneuvering and international status. The ascendance of the rising powers has been the gradual process of peripheralization of world politics in recent years, with multiple power poles diffusing power from center to the margins of the international system. Of course, this decentering trend in world politics was initially approved of and supported by the previous American administration seeking to push emerging powers to share the global responsibilities which had previously been assumed mainly by the grand powers. In the current uncertain picture of world politics, it is still too early to know if the Trump administration will be as eager as the Obama administration to attribute greater roles to emerging powers. However, some clues as to the Trump administration's ideological, political, and economic perception of

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the rise in these states in the international sphere. For instance, a deeper investigation into post-Obama US–China relations showcases how the United States is still not ready to attribute a global leadership role to China and prefers to reframe a limited global and less internationally engaging role to the latter. The Trump administration seeks a classical "win-win" situation in its relations with emerging powers, and unless these political and economic relations are laid on this rational and pragmatic ground, the new American administration seems to be less cooperative with not only rising powers but also its traditional Western allies. Whether or not these ambivalent US policies will help rising powers become more visible and effective in the international order remains unanswered for now and should be further investigated and researched by scholars and international observes.

This uncertainty in the international order is also reflected in the G20 as an informal international institution where established Western, middle, and rising powers are equally represented around the same table making non-binding decisions. A special focus on the G20 as an influential group in general and on its middle power, traditional, and emerging members in search of status in the changing global governance architecture seems to be indispensable in order to understand with what geopolitical, economic, and foreign policy expectations the G20 middle powers approach this institution. In this context, while a complementary focus on emerging middle powers is also necessary, the current literature on global governance and the G20 is insufficient (Parlar Dal 2018). This chapter aims to fulfill this lacunae in the literature with its eye on Turkey as an emerging middle power in the G20 with both potentialities as a bridge-builder between Western and non-Western G20 members on the one hand and between G20 members and non-members on the other. Similarly, Turkey's limitations in terms of its performance in the group, as well as its increasing domestic and security challenges in recent years, preventing it from generating sufficient impact in the international sphere, should also be analyzed in depth.

In fact, the transformation of the G20 in the upcoming years and its ability to yield influence in world politics are highly dependent on the ambitious global governance agendas of its members. That said, as intermediary states, middle powers seem to be equipped with the necessary instruments to assume additional global responsibilities and increase the effectiveness of the institutions to which they have membership. Another contribution of this chapter to the literature will be the assessment of Turkey's performance in the G20 as a middle power compared with other

G20 middle powers by the use of first G20 summit data set for the period 2008–2013 and the 2014–2016 G20 Summits Final Compliance reports prepared by the G20 Research Group in the University of Toronto in association with the Center for International Institutions Research of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). The use of G20 summit compliance reports in the very restricted number of studies focusing on Turkey's G20 policies is very new and has not yet been a subject of research on Turkey and the G20.

As a topic, Turkey's role and practices, as well as its policies in formal and informal international institutions, have rarely been subject of research and debate among international relations (IR) scholars and international observers inside and outside Turkey (Öniş and Kutlay 2016). Turkey's presence in the G20 is less known than its memberships in other international institutions. In addition, Turkey's changing priorities and rising activism in recent years in terms of managing global governance architecture remain relatively unstudied. Of course, Turkey's rotating 2015 G20 presidency clarified its appeal to upgrade its status in the international system similar to that of other rising states at its rank. The 2015 presidency served as a training ground for Turkey, allowing it to test its strengths and limitations in the international sphere (Parlar Dal 2014). On the other hand, in both the IR literature and popular writing, less attention has been given to the role Turkey could display in the G20 today and in the upcoming years. Despite the fact that Turkey's successful G20 presidency has provided some clues about its growing interest in the G20 both as an institution and a process, during the two years following the end of its presidency, Turkey's actorness has turned rather passive, especially after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. Another reason behind Turkey's relative passiveness in the G20 seems to its growing security concerns mainly due to increasing threats from Syria and ISIS since 2015 (Parlar Dal 2017), leaving Turkey less preoccupied with global governance-related policies and preferences. In contrast, Turkish foreign policy has gradually become more security oriented, preventing it from pursuing its liberal and institutional objectives. In short, mainly due to the security and domestic challenges from the Syrian civil war in recent years, Turkey's global role and its global governance-related aspirations have increasingly become more in flux and contradictory compared with the first decade of the 2000s.

Given this, this chapter attempts to scrutinize Turkey first as a status-seeking country and second as a G20 middle power with different expectations in terms of geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy. Third, this

study attempts to examine Turkey's performance in the G20 as a middle power state in comparison with its peers in the same group by the use of G20 compliance data set from 2008 to 2013 and the final compliance reports of the 2014–2016 summits. Here, the main objective is to grasp the extent to which Turkey has met its commitments and in which areas between 2009 and 2016 compared with its middle power peers. This analysis also engenders an assessment of the main characteristics of Turkey's changing priorities, preferences, and adjustments in the G20's institutional sub-system.

Turkey's Quest for Status Mobility Through the G20

The most important rationale behind the status-seeking policies of middle powers can be best associated with their rising demand for recognition in international politics (Hurrell 2009). In parallel to the relative increase in their material and diplomatic capabilities, middle powers have sought to increase their position in international social status hierarchies by attributing to themselves nuanced foreign policy behaviors, most of which are related to global governance activism. Through different behavioral approaches limited with their material capabilities, middle powers strive for status in global governance to attain certain responsibilities and roles that in turn provide them with special rights and privileges (Paul et al. 2014, 34). In an era where the dynamics of diplomatic maneuver capacity hinges on the ability to enact more roles in global affairs than other states, middle powers have increasingly pursued status-seeking policies to reach a non-negligible, albeit limited, managerial role in global affairs to enhance their influence on the international stage.

International organizations have always been at the center of status politics in the perception of the middle powers. For a long time, the United Nations (UN) has been acknowledged as the main source and ground for status-seeking policies as it provides the most legitimate medium through which these status-seeking ambitious actors can enact their global activism by competing for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council or effectively participating in the agencies, programs, funds, and operations under the UN umbrella. However, after the emergence of a near policy consensus that there is a need for an enlarged, inclusive, and flexible platform for negotiation and determining road maps, the G20 rose to the occasion as the unique and most proper ground for helping middle powers pursue

their status-seeking policies, especially after the 2008 financial crisis (Cooper 2014). There are various reasons behind the middle powers' perception of the G20 as the most proper ground for status politics, but it could easily be argued that the most important reason behind this is the fact that the G20 gathers all the key actors of global hierarchy, whether established, rising, or middle powers, around the same table (Cooper 2013, 971). Its informal nature and flexible agenda changing from one summit to another in line with the interests of the host country (Cooper and Pouliot 2015) also renders the G20 as a more attractive platform for middle powers' status-seeking policies. Last but not least, the regional impasses faced by almost all middle powers force them to become more and more engaged with global governance-related policies, particularly in the last generation groupings and platforms such as the G20.

As an emerging middle power, Turkey's quest for status in the international system is not new. Since the early Republican era, Turkey has been in search for an elevated place for itself, especially in the Western world. The famous motto of its founder, Ataturk, which aims for Turkey to reach the level of developed civilizations, signifies the degree to which Turkey has been continuously attached to this ideal since the very beginning of its foundation. On the other hand, there is no need to say that the Ottoman legacy and the "grandeur politique" of the past also played an important role in its pursuit of the objective of increasing its international status and having recognized and acknowledged as a modern and developed Western country.

However, by the 2000s, the status-seeking strategy of Turkish foreign policy began to gain a global aspect whereby Turkey has incrementally strived for higher activism in global governance and international organizations, in the UN in particular (Parlar Dal 2016, 14–17). As one of the founding 50 signatory states of the UN charter, Turkey has willingly pursued a middle power status-seeking foreign policy in the UN. Turkey's election to the non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council for the 2009–2010 period, its candidacy for 2014–2015, and its mediatory role with Brazil in the Iranian nuclear issue in 2010 are the most recent examples of the existence of such an activism. However, Turkey has also recently attached greater importance to the G20 in its trajectory of status mobility as the other middle powers did. It is possible to argue that there are two important rationales driving Turkey's orientation to the G20 in its quest for higher status in global politics: *regional impasses* and *institutional weakness*.

First, regional challenges obliged Turkey to turn its face to the G20 as a part of its status politics as Turkey was unable to attain what it expected as a result of its efforts in the UN, especially during the Syrian crisis. In conjunction with the evolution of the G20 as a unique platform at which international crises can be directly discussed among leaders, Turkey has placed an elevated role to the G20 in its status-seeking policies as it had to face more regional challenges and needed to operationalize functional solutions through superior bodies. Second, Turkey does not enjoy the flexibility of institutional alternatives to be prioritized interchangeably as the other middle powers possess. For instance, most traditional and emerging middle powers are members of different regional organizations and have the backup option of benefiting from the networks and engagements in these regional organizations. On the contrary, Turkey's institutional alternatives are limited, and even in the existing ones, Ankara is unable to take the lead due to the multiplex characteristics of its neighboring regions such as Europe, the Middle East, and even the Black Sea. Therefore, in addition to the UN, the G20 remains the only and most advantageous institutional alternative for Turkey's status-seeking policies as a middle power in the international system.

Turkey's Expectations from the G20 as a Middle Power

Turkey was invited to the G20 in 1999 in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and has since participated regularly at meeting of the group's finance ministers and central bank governors. During its first low-profile years of its membership, Turkish leaders remained satisfied with its invitation to take part in the group among the largest 20 economies in the world. Turkey's accession to the G20 coincided at a time when Turkey's candidacy to the European Union (EU) was officially declared by the EU Commission after the Helsinki summit in 1999. Thus, the period following Turkey's membership in the G20 group was marked by its increasing European focus rather than its membership in another global governance institution. Turkish leaders' willingness to Europeanize their country thanks to a series of European reforms and harmonization packages was likely the ultimate goal of the country in terms of institutional engagements. The first years of the 2000s witnessed the rapid Europeanization of the country at the levels of policy, legislation, society, and culture, making it difficult for Turkey to shift its focus to the construction of a new role in

the international system as a middle power with expanding global and regional aspirations. Notwithstanding these limitations to an active role in the G20, Turkish leaders positively welcomed the obligations and responsibilities created by its presence in the group and acted in conformity the majority of the time with the group's actions plans and communiqués. In addition, Turkey adopted a welcoming stance against the demands of some member states in terms of reforming the international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota, and voting shares.

In the early years of its membership, Turkey aligned with the G20's macroeconomic priorities and global economic concerns. Since the mid-2000s, in parallel with its foreign policy activism in both regional and global policy areas, Turkish leaders became remarkably more conscious of the importance of the G20 in shaping the future architecture of the global economic governance. Indeed, Turkey displayed a compatible trend with the G20 agenda set by the middle powers in the previous years. Turkey shared the South Korean emphasis on development cooperation at the G20 Seoul Summit hosted by South Korea in 2010, agreed on increasing contributions to the IMF together with other emerging states in the group at the G20 Los Cabos Summit hosted by Mexico in 2012, and acknowledged the need for stronger economic growth at the 2014 Brisbane Summit hosted by Australia (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2016). In fact, Turkey's increasing macroeconomic performance and growth rates in the first decade of 2000 made it a more confident actor in global politics, and this has also served in reinforcing its position and bargaining in the G20 (Öniş and Kutlay 2013). Like other emerging states appealing an equitable representation in the global financial institutions, Turkey also made great effort to concretize the IMF and World Bank quota reform. On the other hand, in the first years following its membership in the G20, Turkey actively participated in the currency debates in the G20.

Geopolitical Expectations

Although the primary objective of the G20 is to reinforce international economic cooperation among its members and between the latter and the rest of the world (Luckhurst 2016), geopolitics has increasingly become a subject of concern for G20 member states aiming to overcome global challenges at a time where major powers' relations are fast evolving as a result of the changing redistribution in the world's economic and political power in favor of the so-called emerging/rising powers. The impact of the

continuing shift in the international system from West/developed North to the South or the Global South on great power politics together with the fast growing of regional and security-related challenges in the international scene in the last decade has gradually widened the G20's economics-focused agenda to one embracing geopolitics and security. After 2008 and the start of the G20's summitry, in particular the G20 "moved more from domestic political management, deliberation and direction setting into decision making, delivery and the institutional development of global governance within and beyond itself" (Kirton 2014, 45). With the broadening of the agenda since 2008, including security-related subjects such as terrorism, terrorism financing, irregular migration and refugees, money laundering, corruption, and chemical weapons in Syria, the G20 has enriched its mission and appeared as a global steering committee with multiple roles. In short, as a new multipolar foreign policy instrument through which major and emerging powers collaborate, the G20 is still far away from some of the tense security issues, and no compromise among its members has been reached to turn the group into an inclusive forum which would deal with preventing and finding solutions to international conflicts. As a matter of fact, a stronger economic cooperation among G20 members can be possible if only major powers and emerging countries commonly take responsibilities to tackle global challenges not delimited to the current macroeconomic instabilities, climate change, or migration-related problems (Jones 2016).

As indicated in the section above, Turkey's increasing regional impasses emanating from the security- and terrorism-related challenges of the deepening Syrian civil war led Turkey to search for alternative solutions for the rising threat of terrorism at its borders and to engage with broad new dialogue-creating mechanisms outside existing formal international institutions such as the UN. Turkey's rotating presidency to the G20 in 2015 came at a time when the rising ISIS threat began affecting the country inside and outside its borders. The proliferation of the Syrian war's security-related challenges has certainly increased Turkey's geopolitical expectations from the G20 (Al 2015). However, it seems that, despite its increasing geopolitical expectations from G20, Turkey's engagement in bringing international terrorism and regional affairs to the group's agenda remained low. For instance, compared with the Australian G20's presidency, Turkey's contact with non-G20 member countries under its 2015 presidency was less intense given the fact that Australia had organized G20 special representative visits to the various regions, including the Middle East (Larionova et al. 2017, 169). Nevertheless, the coincidence

of the 2015 Paris attacks with the G20's Antalya Summit in November 2015 led to the publication of a separate statement on the fight against terrorism, proving the extent to which international terrorism and its refugee dimension dominated the debates at the Summit (Trujillo 2015).

This shift of focus from growth and macroeconomy to the fight against terrorism and most specifically the economy–security linkage was also reflected in President Erdogan's speech emphasizing that the existence of a strong global economy is highly dependent on the existence of a global peace. Although regional problems and terrorism are not the primary scope of the G20's agenda, the Antalya Summit witnessed a series of discussions on these topics during both the summit itself and in unofficial meetings of the leaders carried out on sidelines. The same trend of discussing regional crisis on the sidelines of the G20 was also maintained in the following two subsequent summits respectively in 2016 and 2017, Hangzhou and Hamburg, respectively, increasing their geopolitical impact in the eyes of international society.

Aside from Turkey's emphasis on regional crisis and the phenomenon of the "fight against terrorism" during its Presidency, which may be seen as part of its geopolitical expectations from the G20, another aspect of Turkey's "geopolitical look" to the group may be seen in its selection of Azerbaijan as a guest country at the 2015 Antalya Summit in addition to the traditional invitation of Spain, two African countries, and the chair of ASEAN as guests. Turkey's choice clearly illustrates the extent to which it attributes a geopolitical identity to the G20 beyond its traditional economic identity on the ground of gathering the countries with whom it has so far pursued special relations. It is also important to note that as the continuation of Australian efforts to establish dialogue between the G20 and the Caribbean countries, it was only under the Turkish presidency that the G20 had its first direct consultation with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Similarly, under the Turkish presidency, the G20 energy ministers had a meeting with their African counterparts for the first time in G20 history. These examples are the most visible manifestations of the enlarged and extraregional geopolitical vision that Turkey attributes to the G20.

Economic Expectations

A closer investigation into Turkey's economic expectations from the G20 reveals that in recent years, Turkey has attempted to formulate its G20 strategy with an eye to global progress on three economic levels: *cooperation*, *governance*, and *sustainability*. Indeed, official documents and statements

published during the Turkish G20 presidency in 2015 were the most visible representation of the existence of such a three-faceted strategy ("Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015" 2014). In this regard, it is possible to argue that this three-faceted strategy has been laid out to making the utmost of the G20 not only as a global governance platform but also as an informal hub for further economic engagement.

Turkey's strategy and expectations at *the cooperation level* appear to be focused on enhancing the existing channels of economic cooperation and broadening the horizon for further expectations not only among the G20 countries but with the rest of the group as well. To that end, the possibility for further economic cooperation with low-income developing countries (LIDCs) has been one of the most important and novel discursive strategies of Turkey's economic expectations from the G20. In this context, Turkey has stressed that it shares the principle of strengthening the G20 as a platform ensuring that the global network of trade agreements is in rapport with each other and contributing to the further development of LIDCs. Most of the other Turkish expectations that can be evaluated under the cooperation level are shaped around the need for further macroeconomic policy cooperation among G20 countries. Drawing on the Brisbane Action Plan adopted by G20 countries in 2014, Turkey stresses the implementation of this plan with a special focus on the role of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as domestic economic growth targeted to improve gender inequality and youth employment. Here, Turkey places a special role on the role of public–private partnership as a cooperation strategy that has to be adopted and pursued in harmony among the G20 countries.

At the *governance level*, it is possible to argue that in the G20 Turkey has begun to share the basic demands of the same reformist agenda on the international financial organizations that has been pursued by other rising powers demanding an enhancement in the inclusiveness and representativeness of these institutions. However, it could also be argued that Turkey has been less vocal about its expectations from the G20 at the *governance level*, and after the beginnings of the implementation of the 2010 IMF reform agenda, Turkey has lowered its previous reformist discourse about international financial governance. In addition to the emphasis on reforming the international financial institutions, Turkey has also propounded its expectation regarding the international tax system with a specific focus on making it more inclusive by bringing the developing world to the G20 agenda on international tax regulation. Another Turkish expectation from

the G20 at *the governance level* was to regenerate new discussions and working plans in the group on anti-corruption and transparency in international business affairs.

The third level of *sustainability* in Turkey's economic expectations in the G20 is grounded on the financing of issue-specific areas of global governance with a specific focus on development cooperation and energy and climate politics. Turkey's main concerns in the G20 on these three most privileged issues have been related to the enhancement of the financing methods of the efforts exerted on these issues in order to provide a more sustainable architecture not only for the developed world but also for the low-income and the developing countries. In this regard, the sustainability of development cooperation policies comes to the fore in Turkey's discourse in the G20 since Turkey has several times expressed its emphasis on the need for development cooperation models that foster growth and capacity building at the same time. Although there has been an emphasis in Turkey's G20 policies on the sustainability of financing models behind development cooperation, it is striking that South–South model seems to not have attracted the attention of Turkish policy makers. With regard to the other two issue-specific areas of energy and climate politics, Turkey's G20 discourse on these issues has been built upon making the financing aspect of these issue areas more transparent for the sake of sustainability. Again, the access to energy and energy-related investments in the developing world has been an integral part of Turkey's economic expectations and strategies in the G20 at the sustainability level.

Foreign Policy Expectations

Apart from the already acknowledged fact that G20 provides the opportunity for states to sit around the highest and largest table to discuss global affairs directly at the leader level, Turkey's foreign policy expectations from the G20 as the most informal gathering of global affairs have been built upon the two pillars of *global governance activism* and *quest for institutional power*.

Turkey's foreign policy expectations from the G20 in terms of *global governance activism* show significant similarities with those of the other emerging powers in the group. Like its peers, Turkey's G20 policy may well be closely associated with its status politics and its quest to be internationally recognized as an internationalist and cooperative state seeking global stability, free trade-oriented policies, and good governance in the

changing international order. What is at stake for Turkey is its increasing commitment in recent years to the G20-type groupings under which states are equally represented and are not bound by strict institutional rules. Turkey's *global governance activism* propounded by its former foreign and prime minister Davutoglu's principles of proactivism and zero problems with neighbors (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu 2016) also fitted in well with the G20's inclusive and flexible approach to global governance. In line with its quest to be more active in global governance, Turkey's increasing efforts since the second half of the 2000s in niche diplomacy particularly in development cooperation also led to an awareness of the functionality and utility of the G20 in the eyes of the Turkish policy makers. Turkey's wish to be an internationally recognized niche diplomacy actor, most notably in humanitarian and development aid, also strengthened its engagement with the G20. In this regard, with the expansion of the G20's agenda in recent years from a purely economics-focused agenda to a wider global politics-focused one, Turkey seems to have acquired new horizons in global governance where it can actively contribute such as relations with least developed countries, women, children, and energy-related policies. In addition to these new policy areas where Turkey could play active and facilitating roles in the G20 grouping, additional room exists for Turkey to adopt new policy priorities in the field of international security, peacemaking/peacebuilding, and migration (Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018). The fact that the G20 is likely to go beyond its initial international political economy objectives in the upcoming years may also make Turkey politically more committed to the G20 while taking common positions toward global challenges. Linked to all these, it is possible to argue that Turkey's G20 engagement has so far been informed by a learning-by-doing process in global governance and that the Turkish 2015 G20 presidency provided greater understanding of its capabilities and weaknesses in terms of global politics.

The second pillar of Turkey's foreign policy expectations from the G20 is directly related to its *quest for institutional power*. Indeed, there has been a rising consciousness toward the functionality of the group with regard to its potential to be used for Turkish foreign policy to strengthen its institutional power, which remains weak at both the regional and global levels compared with that of other growing economies in the G20. Added to this is the gradual weakening of Turkey's regional power with the Arab revolts (Öniş 2014), most particularly the Syrian revolts triggered in late 2010 which forced Turkey to search for alternative international roles that

may help it surmount its regional difficulties. In this regard, its rotating G20 presidency in 2015 came at a time when Turkey faced the rising ISIS threat both inside and outside its borders and ended with Turkey's rising visibility and socialization in global governance. Its 2015 G20 presidency also made Turkey much more inclined to global governance-related themes such as women, children, development, and climate change on the basis of three predetermined objectives: inclusiveness, implementation, and investment for growth. However, in addition to the increasing challenges for Turkish foreign policy emanating from the rise of regional security threats, the negative impact of the 15 July 2016 military coup attempt on both Turkish domestics and foreign policy momentum is of vital importance with regard to the awareness of the lack of institutional power in global governance. However, all these developments did not in fact create a fertile ground for the continuation and enforcement of Turkey's proactive G20 policy which was very much in the making. Despite the increasing demand to portray the G20 as the most proper ground to increase institutional leverage, the rapid securitization of Turkish foreign policy together with the weakening of the country's democracy-related objectives at both the domestic and international levels prevented Turkey from realizing its foreign policy expectations related with its G20 membership. Due to domestic and regional conflicts, the post-presidency period was not a productive era for Turkey's G20-related commitments in terms of foreign policy expectations based on increasing its institutional power.

An overall assessment of Turkey's expectations from the G20 based on the three aspects of geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy shows that Turkey's potential in converging its broader expectations with its G20 objectives has become clearer during Turkey's G20 rotating presidency. Against the backdrop of the above-explained geopolitical, economic, and foreign policy expectations, it is possible to argue that Turkey can play a bridge-builder role between the developed and developing world as an emerging middle power equipped with multiple dialogue and mediation mechanisms in the G20. However, as Table 8.1 showcases, Turkey's economic expectations from its G20 membership seem to have more largely been met compared with its geopolitical and foreign policy expectations. On the other hand, Turkey's geopolitical expectations appear to have been the most weakly met ones among the three different types of expectations of Turkey in terms of its G20 goals.

Table 8.1 Turkey's expectations from the G20

	Geopolitical expectations	*Economic expectations*	*Foreign policy expectations*
Priorities	Regional security challenges (Syrian civil war, ISIS) International terrorism Economy–security linkage	Cooperation: LIDCs, trade agreements, SMEs, public–private partnership Governance: IFI's reform agenda, international tax regulation Sustainability: development cooperation, energy, and climate politics	Global governance activism: niche diplomacy such as development cooperation, humanitarian aid Quest for institutional power: G20 as an alternative source of institutional leverage
Degree of fulfilled expectations	+	+++	++

ISIS islamic state of Iraq and Syria, *LIDCs* low income developing countries, *SMEs* small and medium-sized enterprises, *IFI* international financial institutions
High +++, Fair ++, Low +

Assessing Turkey's Performance in the G20 in the Light of G20 Summit Compliance Data Set

The G20 summit compliance data set and the G20 Annual Summit Final Compliance Reports prepared collectively by the G20 Research Group at the University of Toronto and the Center for International Institutions Research of the RANEPA constitute the most comprehensive, accurate, and systematic data set on country-specific compliance with the G20 by issue area and by year. The compliance methodology and research which has been in use since 2009 appears as a unique set of scientific and accessible data providing transparent information on the performance of G20 members in this grouping. The Annual Summit Final Compliance Reports measure the progress of the G20 members in executing the priority commitments made at each summit ("G20 Annual Summit Final Compliance Reports" n.d.).

A comparative assessment of Turkey's relative position with regard to the compliance averages obtained from the G20 Research Center reveals

that Turkey has shown an appreciable improvement in fulfilling its commitments in the G20 compared with the other middle powers between 2014 and 2016. As Table 8.2 indicates, while the Republic of South Africa was the best performer in improving its compliance averages by 22% from 44% to 68% between 2014 and 2016, Turkey is ranked as the second-best performing middle power in the G20, with an 18% improvement in its compliance from 50% to 68% during the same years. However, apart from the relative improvement rates, the current results do not provide such a positive picture since, according to the results of the last report, compared with the other middle powers in the G20, Turkey shares the bottom rank with the Republic of South Africa with a 68% compliance average, 8% point less than its closest peer Mexico (76%). Another striking conclusion that can be drawn from Table 8.2 is that Turkey is the only middle power with a decreased compliance average between 2015 and 2016, while all

Table 8.2 Comparative assessment of compliance averages of G20 middle powers

	2014 Brisbane (%)	*2015 Antalya (%)*	*2016 Hangzhou (%)*	*2009–2016 (%)*
Turkey	50	71	68	57.5
Australia	79	82	89	83.8
Brazil	5.6	76	79	65
Canada	85	82	92	84.2
Korea	8.2	76	84	76.2
Mexico	74	76	76	69.9
South Africa	44	62	68	64.7



other middle powers in the G20 including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa either improved or maintained their compliance average. The most important result of the comparative analysis of Table 8.2 is that the overall average of middle powers' compliance during the past ten years of the G20 Summitry (excluding the first summit of Washington 2008 as the data are not available for some of the countries) indicates that Turkey is the most unsuccessful country with a 57.5% compliance average compared with the other middle powers. In this picture, Turkey's closest peers appear to be South Africa (64.7%), Brazil (65%), and Mexico (69.9%).

An overall look at Turkey's G20 compliance performance for the 2014 Brisbane Summit (calculated for the period between 16 November 2014 and 1 October 2015) shows that Turkey was only able to complete half of its commitments (50%). A further assessment based on Table 8.3 indicates Turkey had 5 specific issue areas in which it was able to fulfill its commitments out of 17 issue areas, 7 in which it was in partial compliance or work in progress, and 5 in which it was unable to fulfill its commitments. As shown in Table 8.3, Turkey performed well in taking action to complete the necessary steps in macroeconomics: investment; energy: clean technology; health: anti-microbial resistance; and development: tax administration and infrastructure. As Table 8.3 lists, Turkey was partially successful in completing to fulfill its commitments in macroeconomics: fiscal strategies; labor & employment: youth and social protection; health: ebola; gender; financial regulation; and development: aid for trade in 2014. In the areas of macroeconomics: exchange rates; trade; climate change; energy: fossil fuels; and development: remittances, Turkey failed to comply with it commitments.

Similarly, the 2015 G20 Antalya Summit Final Compliance Report illustrates that for the period from 16 November 2015 to 5 September 2016, Turkey showed an average performance of 0.41 (71%) on 17 priority commitments selected among the total of 113 commitments made at the 2015 Antalya Summit held on 15–16 November 2015 and ranked as the 18th among the 20 G20 members. Compared with 2014, Turkey's performance increased from a compliance percentage of 50% to 71%. This also shows that its rotating 2015 presidency raised Turkey's awareness of its 2014 Brisbane summit "limited performance" and forced it to make additional efforts for compliance with its commitments from the 2014 summit. Detailed analysis of Turkey's compliance performance indicates that Turkey has succeeded in complying with the 9 following commitments among the 17 priority commitments: refugees; macroeconomics: fiscal policies; ter-

Table 8.3 Turkey's issue-specific compliance performance per summit during 2014–2016

	2014 Brisbane	*2015 Antalya*	*2016 Hangzhou*
+1	Macroeconomics: investment Energy: clean technology Health: anti-microbial resistance Development: tax administration Infrastructure	Refugees Macroeconomics: fiscal policy Terrorism: FATF recommendations Development: aid for trade Development: tax administration Labor and employment: gender Labor and employment: youth Macroeconomics: SMEs Trade: multilateral trade system	Innovation Development: tax administration Trade: E-commerce 2030 agenda on sustainable development Migration and refugees Financial regulation: terrorism Knowledge diffusion and technology transfer Investment Corporate governance
0	Macroeconomics: fiscal strategies Labor and employment: youth Labor and employment: social protection Health: Ebola Gender Financial regulation Development: aid for trade	IFI reform: IMF reform Trade: anti-protectionism Terrorism: information exchange Financial regulation: information exchange ICT: digital divide Crime/corruption: asset recovery	Macroeconomics: growth policy tools Climate change Trade: anti-protectionism Employment: gender Financial sector reform agenda Base erosion and profit shifting Energy efficiency Trade: lowering trade costs
−1	Macroeconomics: exchange rates Trade Climate change Energy: fossil fuels Development: remittances	Energy: fossil fuel subsidies Development: remittances	Corruption Energy: fossil fuel subsidies

rorism: FATF recommendations; development: aid for trade and tax administration; labor and employment: gender and youth; macroeconomics: SMEs; and trade: multilateral trade system. However, it did not comply with fossil fuel subsidies (Energy) and remittances (Development). Turkey had partially compliant performance in IFI reform: IMF reform; trade: anti-protectionism; terrorism: information exchange; financial regulation: information exchange; ICT: digital divide; and crime/corruption: asset recovery.

A further assessment of Turkey's compliance cycle in the 2016 Hangzhou Summit (calculated for the period between 6 September 2016 and 7 July 2017) shows that Turkey's average commitment performance decreased from 71% in 2015 to 68% in 2016. An overall analysis of Turkey's categorical performance shows that it has full compliance with the nine following selected priority commitments: innovation; development: tax administration; trade: e-commerce; 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Migration, and Refugees; financial regulation: terrorism; knowledge diffusion and technology transfer: investment; and corporate governance, while it failed to comply with corruption and fossil fuel subsidies (energy) (Table 8.3). During the same period, Turkey had partial compliance or was in progress with eight priority commitments: macroeconomics: growth policy tools; employment: gender; climate change; trade: anti-protectionism; financial sector reform agenda; base erosion and profit shifting; energy efficiency; and trade: lowering trade costs. It can be observed that most G20 countries have not yet fully complied with their commitments in the following five basic issue areas: employment: gender; trade: anti-protectionism; migration and refugees; financial sector reform agenda; climate change; base erosion; and profit shifting, respectively.

It can thus be argued that Turkey's low average compliance score mainly comes from its partial compliance, or 0, score, not from its non-compliance (−1) scores. This demonstrates that Turkey has a working but incomplete G20 agenda, while the existence of so many 0 scores implies that Turkey has already launched initiatives regarding these commitments but has not yet acquired definitive results. Despite its relatively higher capacity stemming from its bridging role between the North and the South and the East and the West, Turkey appears to have executed a limited G20 performance with its extraordinary domestic and regional challenges in 2015 and 2016 in particular in addition to its lack of a substantial global governance road map.

What can be derived from the above-given picture of Turkey's performance between 2014 and 2016 is the fact that, compared with its G20 middle power peers, traditional, non-traditional, or emerging, Turkey is ranked as the second-lowest performing member following South Africa in both 2014 and 2015 and the lowest performing member together with South Africa in 2016. However, in 2015 it has considerably increased its compliance performance to 71%, narrowing the gap with the highest performing middle power states such as Canada and Australia to 11%. Nonetheless, in the overall assessment between 2009 and 2016, Turkey has the lowest average G20 compliance among its middle power peers.

Conclusion

As seen in this chapter, the increasing engagement of emerging middle powers with informal groupings like the G20 may open new avenues in geopolitical objectives, macroeconomics policies, and foreign policy choices. The IR literature attributes a nuanced role to middle powers as intermediary states with larger material capacity and flexibility than that of smaller states, mainly in the areas of mediation/conflict resolution between contrasting blocks, creation of niche diplomacy areas, institutional design, and promotion of regional affairs. In fact, the general perception of middle powers as regional powers with strong normative discourse and institutional and functional capacity increases expectations in relation to their performance and agenda-setter role in the G20 (Parlar Dal 2018). Since its entry into the group in 1999, as a G20 middle power with differing geopolitical, economic, and foreign policy expectations from the group, Turkey's performance has fluctuated despite its increasing engagement with the G20 in recent years.

In terms of its status-seeking posture in the international system, it may be argued that Turkey's "recent" activism in the G20, especially since 2014 in line with its 2015 presidency road map, fits in well with its status-mobility approach to global governance. Turkey's regional difficulties and its weak institutional power compared with other emerging and middle powers seem to have obliged it to pursue multitrack and multialternative global governance policies in recent years in different international organizations ranging from the formal to informal or global to regional (Parlar Dal 2018). In short, Turkey's new status politics has the potential to bring it closer to the new multilateralism and its multiple designs in the form of institutions, ad-hoc and flexible coalitions, and policies. On the other hand, the G20 as an important part of Turkey's integral global governance agenda also fulfills Turkey's economic expectations at the highest level, while its foreign policy and geopolitical expectations have been met at a respectively lower one.

As to Turkey's performance in the G20, it may be argued that it remains far from fully using its potentialities as a middle power and effectively functionalizing its global governance-related capabilities in the field of mediation, conflict resolution, and institutional design. When it comes to global governance policies, middle range states with their in-between global identities are generally expected to have larger flexibility and maneuverability capacities in bringing the North and the South closer. In this regard, despite its relatively low level of engagement with the group

in the first years following its adhesion and its incomplete compliance with the G20's annual commitments since 2008, Turkey gradually increased its consciousness about the possible outcomes and advantages of its membership to this group and the potential role the G20 could play in reshaping international politics in the favor of emerging powers in the upcoming years as a supporting institution.

However, as shown in Table 8.2, Turkey's compliance performance falls short of that of the other middle powers in the group, especially the traditional ones. Compared with 2014, Turkey increased its compliance with the priority commitments of the G20 significantly from 50% to 71% in 2015 (Table 8.2). This improvement is parallel with Turkey's increasing activism in the G20 in line with its 2015 rotating presidency goals and agenda and clearly shows how its presidency positively affected its engagement with the group. A closer look at Turkey's compliance with the priority commitments of the last three summits (2014, 2015, and 2016) illustrates a fluctuating trend in Turkey's compliance ranking, from third lowest in 2014 ahead of Saudi Arabia and South Africa to fourth lowest in 2015 after Indonesia, South Africa, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, and second lowest with South Africa after Italy in 2016.

Despite its lack of compliance with G20 summit commitments compared with other G20 middle power members, Turkey's bridging status between the North and South grants it a special role as both an institutionally accommodating and challenging actor. This attitude toward G20 can be seen both positively and negatively for Turkey's position in the G20 system and global governance since the G20 itself is an evolving entity which needs to be reformed over time on the basis of its members' and non-members' requirements about agenda-setting, regional representations, and non-members' participation. Middle powers such as Turkey may in fact play a constitutive role in increasing regional inclusiveness of the G20 and in reforming its institutional design with the aim of opening a new and more flexible multilateral space in the multiplex post-Western international system where emerging and developing states are equally represented in every sphere of international politics (Downie 2017).

Last but not least, Turkey's rising interest in the G20 may also positively impact its domestic and regional policies in an era marked by rising tensions with its allies and neighbors. If Turkey is able to fully comply in the policy areas in which it has not yet achieved real success, such as macroeconomics, financial sector reform, trade/anti-protectionism, energy efficiency, base erosion and profit shifting, employment, and climate change, it can easily

upgrade its position from a low-performing country to a high-performing country along with its traditional middle power peers Canada, Australia, and Korea.

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PART III

Turkey's Middle-Power Avenues and Means

CHAPTER 9

A Heuristic History of Global Development Governance Since the 1960s and Turkey

Mehmet Emin Arda

Introduction

Global governance aims to foster global public goods such as peace, human rights, health and sustainable development and provide a facilitating framework for policies and actions at the national level. The definition, or rather the interpretation, of development evolves over time, as do the scope and nature of global governance. Here, we define global development governance as global arrangements that open up alternatives for development policies and increase their effectiveness. In this chapter, it is restricted to global discussions and major decisions at the United Nations (UN) since the mid-twentieth century, directly related to development. These are reviewed, and the economic and political background is juxtaposed with contemporaneous circumstances in Turkey.

The UN had development as one of its pillars from its inception. Article 1 of its Charter states one of its principles as promoting "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development". The approach to this pillar was transformed roughly every decade since the 1960s,[1] evolving from mild guidelines to ambitious

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resolutions challenging the existing order, and to exhortations for partnerships. This evolution, which is observable in the objectives and targets of relevant decisions, reflects closely the solidarity and projection of power by developing countries. It is also the result of experience and a dialectical process. Effective global governance cannot be unilateral. It can only be achieved with negotiation and international cooperation. This chapter follows the phases of these negotiations and cooperation, related to development. A more general discussion is provided in "Turkey, Global Governance, and the UN" by Thomas Weiss in this volume.

The focus is on the guidance and inspirational role of the UN as a forum for deliberation and consensus building, not on the actual implementation of decisions. The deliberations and decisions at the UN reveal much about the aspirations of states at a given time, probably more so than the policies they actually employ. The latter are often circumscribed by global realities. Especially earlier in the period, for the developing countries, while aspirations were influenced by work undertaken at the UN, particularly by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, the policies they implemented often reflected the orthodoxy of Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI). Moreover, during the cold war, policies corresponded to the ideology of the main ally. As the North–South and East–West ideological divides narrowed and became blurred, so did the positions adopted in negotiations. Decisions are now taken after a less antagonistic process. This also coincides with the rise of middle powers which do not normally challenge the existing order and rely on negotiation and coalition building in order to exert their influence.

Just as global development governance underwent changes in form and content, Turkey's development policies and its conduct in global development governance changed over time with a fortuitous parallelism, influenced by domestic economic and political circumstances, including the influence exerted by the BWI during the frequent economic crises, rather than the global debate. Turkey's position towards the alliances at the UN, particularly developing country groupings such as the Group of 77, also evolved over time, along with the changes in its overall foreign policy. Most significantly, in the latest period, the emphasis by Turkey on proving itself as a trustworthy member of the West has declined, if not disappeared.

Up to the 1960s: Post-War Reconstruction

The establishment of the Bretton Woods Organizations was the major relevant accomplishment in the immediate post-war years, and they were mostly preoccupied with the reconstruction of Europe. Development became the centre of focus at the World Bank only later (Jolly 2006).

Concerning development-related action at the UN, the principal event was the Conference on Trade and Employment of 1947–1948 in Havana. The Havana Charter for International Trade Organization[2] signed by 34 developing and 19 developed countries was an important and comprehensive document. It was put only partially into operation as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 among 12 developing and 11developed countries. Very important parts of the Havana Charter, particularly Chapter III on "Economic Development and Reconstruction", Chapter V "Restrictive Business Practices" and Chapter VI "International Commodity Agreements", were left in abeyance, reflecting the reticence of the United States.

The Charter had recognized "that the productive use of the world's human and material resources is of concern to and will benefit all countries" and developed relevant guidelines. These called for cooperation and international investment as well as distribution of skills, arts, technology, materials and equipment for "facilitating and promoting industrial and general economic development, and consequently higher standards of living, especially of those countries which are still relatively undeveloped, as well as the reconstruction of those countries whose economies have been devastated by war". Although market economy and free trade are the essence of the system, under carefully spelled out conditions, such as in GATT Article XVIII on "Governmental Assistance to Economic Development", protective measures and governmental assistance were justified to promote the establishment, development or reconstruction of particular industries or branches of agriculture.

Turkey attended the Havana Conference but signed the Final Act only later. It became party to the GATT in 1951. Global economic governance was not a priority, nor did Turkey have strong ideological points to make.[3] It sought inclusion in the Marshall Plan and wanted security against the Soviet threat. Following a fairly successful import substitution experience before the war, agriculture was the mainstay of the Turkish economic development during the latter part of the 1940s and the early 1950s. Agriculture was also of key importance for domestic politics as multiparty elections had just been introduced in 1946 and the majority of voters were in rural areas. In those years, although internal terms of trade turned against agriculture, farmers' economic situation relative to other sectors improved owing to policies and measures that improved yields and production, largely compensating losses in relative prices (Boratav 2015). The issues covered at Havana seemed to be rather removed from these concerns to generate an active interest from Turkey.

An important juncture in the dynamics of global governance and, eventually, UN deliberations was the Bandung Conference (Asian–African Conference) of 1955, with 29 participating countries. It was an Asia-led affair. Only six African countries attended, mostly from North Africa. Gold Coast, under Nkrumah's leadership, participated, although it had not yet gained independence. This was not a universal conference, but it was instrumental in initiating a challenge to the dominant discourse of developed countries and their monopoly in shaping the development agenda. Participants condemned colonialism "in all of its manifestations" (meaning Soviet colonialism as well), challenging the dominant capitalist–socialist divide and initiating a developed–developing dichotomy. The possibility of a Socialist world view, unattached politically to the Soviet Union, emerged. This would flourish with the wave of independence and lead to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.

The Conference emphasized economic and cultural cooperation among the Third World[4] countries for reducing reliance on Europe and North America. The aspiration was to become a significant power and influence global governance. Although a regional bloc was not intended, "there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest". Poverty, fragile economies and "underdevelopment" in general, associated with colonialism, had been among the triggering factors behind the anti-colonial movement, but for some leaders such as Nkrumah, political independence rather than economic development was the overriding objective. In the French colonies, however, Senghor scorned Nkrumah's ideas as "too radical", and Houphouet-Boigny, a former minister in the French government, prioritized economic development which could be pursued within the economic system of the colonial master (Meredith 2005).

Many issues which would emerge in the 1960s at the UN, particularly during the establishment of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and later during the New International Economic Order (NIEO) debates, were covered in the Final Communiqué of the Asian–African Conference.[5] For example, it recommended stabilizing the international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and called for

> the early establishment of the Special UN Fund for Economic Development as well as the International Finance Corporation which should include equity investments. It encouraged the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to

> Asian-African countries and the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this would promote their common interest.

This was the period when Turkey, in the words of the then Prime Minister, was becoming "Little America". Investments in infrastructure with World Bank assistance were the linchpin of economic development. Turkey participated actively at the Bandung Conference, but its main mission seemed to be propagating an anti-Soviet stance rather than contributing positively to the emerging Third World solidarity. This attitude helped in condemning colonialism "in all its manifestations". Turkey, however, missed a realistic evaluation of the movement as expressed, for example, by the Brazilian observer who recognized the possibility for his country "of becoming one of the great world powers if it could relate well with the new countries of Asia and Africa" (Karam 2016). Although Turkey became a member of the Afro-Asian group in the UN, this comportment at Bandung generated scepticism among developing countries regarding Turkey's intentions. It affected negatively its standing and influence among developing countries and in global development governance at least into the 1980s. This was a more significant differentiation as compared with that underlined by Thomas Weiss in "Turkey, Global Governance, and the UN" in this volume.

Turkey used the Conference to show that it was an indispensible ally for Washington, that it could protect Western interests and that it could effectively counterbalance "the Communists". According to a telegram from the State Department to the US Mission in Ankara (cited by Baba and Ertan 2016), "[i]t seems doubtful that any other participant [than Turkey] would be willing and able to provide a forthright and effective anti-communist leadership". Nevertheless, in this period of staunchly pro-Western attitude and ambivalence towards the developing world, there was in 1957 an example of Turkish solidarity in the form of a clandestine armaments shipment to Algerians fighting the French, despite the danger of seriously offending a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally.[6]

1960s: Decolonization, Cold War, Rise of a Self-Confident Third World

Eight Bandung participants had become UN members between 1955 and 1960. In the 1960s when the UN expanded further by 15 members from Africa and 2 from Asia, developing countries started to influence strongly

the development agenda. This contributed to making development a central theme at the UN for the first time. The views expressed in the Final Communiqué of Bandung were introduced to the UN. They evolved continuously over two decades, culminating in the decision to establish a NIEO in 1974.

The most immediate developmental concern at that time was reducing hunger. In 1960, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN launched the "Freedom from Hunger" campaign. This was, however, only a partial response to the general concern about development. In 1961, with resolution 1710 (XVI), based on a proposal by the President of the United States, the General Assembly proclaimed the 1960s as the "UN Development Decade"[7] (Jackson 2007). During the Decade, developing countries would set their own targets of a minimum annual growth rate of 5 per cent. Accelerated measures to eliminate illiteracy, hunger and disease were called for. Various themes which would resurface in later years, such as "the utilization of resources released by disarmament[8] for the purpose of economic and social development", were included in the Resolution. There was also considerable emphasis on natural resources and commodities. The concept of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources" relating to issues such as exploitation by foreigners, expropriation and compensation, which still influences policy thinking, was introduced in the declaration contained in Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962.

The expectations of the Third World, however, were more substantial. To ensure that any international action to address development reflected their own concerns and perspectives, developing countries organized the Conference on the Problems of Economic Development, in 1962 in Cairo. Thirty-one countries from all developing regions participated as members and five as observers.[9] The Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries spelled out in detail what they thought should be done domestically and internationally[10] and brought more specificity into the Bandung Communiqué. In December, the General Assembly recommended that the UN system take into account the principles of the Declaration when dealing with economic and social development questions of developing countries. This was instrumental in the creation of UNCTAD, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in the following 3 years.

Turkey was not present in Cairo, distancing itself further from developing countries. It had applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, and the Ankara Agreement which established the framework for cooperation with EEC was under preparation. It would be signed in 1963.[11]

This additional focus on establishing itself as a Western country did not augur well for Turkey's solidarity with a potentially anti-Western group. Turkey did not identify itself with the former colonies, nor as a colonial power. It had never been colonized, and Ottoman Empire was not a colonialist.[12] Turkey's dissociation was categorical and did not exhibit the suppleness of some Latin American countries which "observed" the activities of Non-Aligned Movement while participating in the "Alliance for Progress" the US-led programme in their region (Karam 2016). In the early 1950s thanks to the Marshall Plan and bilateral agreements with the United States, and especially in the 1960s under the influence of the "OECD Consortium to Aid Turkey" (Kuchenberg 1967), Turkey was a preferred or even "privileged" member of the Western Bloc with access to considerable flows of foreign exchange. This allowed governments to pursue a flawed import substitution policy and ignore the necessary transformation of the economy towards foreign exchange-generating activities, laying the grounds for important problems (Boratav 2015; Akat 1983; Pamuk 2014).

The Turkish economy had moved away from the largely market-based agricultural development orientation of the early 1950s. The determining characteristics of the early 1960s were protectionism and import substitution under state planning, as well as freedom accorded to labour unions after a long period of suppression. These could have led to an affinity with the left-leaning developing countries, but in multilateral politics, this did not happen. Moreover, the primacy of the State Planning Organization gradually disappeared following the appointment in 1967 of Turgut Özal as its undersecretary.

The proclamation of the Development Decade was initiated by the United States, not by developing countries. This period was marked by a sense of technological optimism as evidenced by President Kennedy's analogy of accomplishing space travel and ending world poverty. "If the United States could commit itself to put a man on the moon before the end of the decade … it would certainly support the idea of improving the living standards of people in the poorest countries over the same period" (Jolly, cited by The New Manifesto). The book that shaped development economics in the 1960s, subtitled "a non-communist manifesto",[13] also purports a technocratic doctrine by aiming to replicate within more traditional societies the benefits of rationality and progress already experienced in the wealthier parts of the world (Reid-Henry 2012). The belief was that major development goals could be accomplished rapidly through commitment of resources and institutional will. This idealism would find its epitome during the next decade, not under US leadership but spearheaded by developing

countries. Nothing less than a "New International Economic Order" was proclaimed in the 1970s by several UN Resolutions which were opposed by the United States.

The outcome of the 1964 UNCTAD, which led to the establishment of the organization with that name, reveals the impact of a rapidly changing international political landscape on global development governance.[14] The results from Cairo shaped much of the 27 "principles" introduced by the developing countries "to govern international trade relations and trade policies". Thirteen principles were opposed by the United States which was alone in opposing "sovereign equality of states, self-determination of peoples and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries" as the base of economic relations between countries. Abstentions from other developed countries were mostly on principles which implied a responsibility for them, such as "economic development should be the common concern of the whole international community".

Turkey's position was generally in line with the developing countries, but it abstained on four general principles including one about trade preferences to be accorded to developing countries.[15] These abstentions reflected the ambiguity about its development "status" and concern that it would not be counted as a developing country. Its abstention on "doing the utmost by developed countries in regional groupings to ensure that this does not cause injury to exports from developing countries" can be seen in the light of its budding relations with the EEC. It also abstained on the allocation of resources freed by disarmament to development of developing countries and General Principle 15, which was a precursor to the designation of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—interestingly, during the 2000s, Turkey would become one of the main supporters of the LDCs.

During the 1960s, in the debates and negotiations at the UN, developing countries acted mostly in concert and displayed a fairly conciliatory approach. This was a synthesis between the reform minded and Marxist revolutionary world views within the group. The principal common objective was to break the dependency on developed countries, although different versions of dependency theory called for different actions, from systemic reform (Raul Prebisch, Arghiri Emmanuel) to revolution (Frantz Fanon, Andre Gunter Frank).

Discourse outside negotiations was more militant, fuelled by the Vietnam War which provoked a strong anti-American feeling. The 1966 Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (the Tricontinental Conference), held in Cuba, represented the extension

into the Americas of Afro-Asian solidarity begun at Bandung. It was totally ignored by Turkey. Whereas Bandung and Cairo were relatively modest affairs in which the various political currents in the Third World came together to articulate a minimum programme, the Tricontinental was radical and maximalist, explicitly attempting to align anti-imperialism with a wider challenge to capitalism, world economic order and governance.[16]

1970s: The Age of Maximalist Voluntarists

At the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm led by developed countries, development was not among principal concerns. Developing countries challenged the fundamental principles of the Conference and derided the proposed environmental reforms. As work towards a Special Session at the UN scheduled for 1974 progressed, however, development could no longer be ignored. In the 1974 Cocoyoc Declaration,[17] participants attempted to reconcile the grievances between first-world environmentalists and post-colonial leaders so as to synthesize a viable path to development and related aspects of global governance. This can be considered as the birth of sustainable development, the cornerstone of current development discourse.

The maximalist stance of the developing countries coupled with economic events such as the collapse of the Gold Standard, the rise in oil prices and the slump of world commodity prices in 1974 shaped global governance of development in the 1970s (Jackson 2007). The aim was to stop the perpetuation of an unequal relationship between developed and developing countries. This was a euphoric period of post-colonial victory when a voluntarist notion reigned "that the economic order could be changed through intergovernmental deliberations" and a NIEO could be established.[18] This, however, "not only underestimated the centrality of power but it discounted the possibility that the configuration of forces could very easily be tilted against the proponents of change" (Ricupero 2004).

The ultimate expression of the notion that global economic governance and the path of development would change by the adoption of resolutions was the sixth special session of the UN and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1974. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order [resolution 3201 (S-VI)] listed 20 principles on which the new order should be founded. It also adopted the Programme of Action [resolution 3202 (S-VI)], which contained proposals for reforming the international monetary system and financing the

development objectives of developing countries. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States [resolution 3281 (XXIX)][19] had been initiated by the third session of UNCTAD in 1972 (Jackson 2007). Not only the contents but also the titles of the resolutions are revealing of the mood of the day—take a solemn decision at the UN, if necessary with a majority vote, and things will happen.

Many of the aspirations of the developing countries contained in these resolutions were put into concrete terms in 1976 at the fourth session of UNCTAD. The UN agencies, particularly UNCTAD, embarked ambitiously upon work on the establishment of NIEO, considering this as their principal mandate. There was not much resonance of NIEO's calls for reform at BWI where developing countries did not carry sufficient weight.

Large fluctuations in commodity prices, surging for petroleum and falling for others, had important implications for economic development. International action to regulate markets was perceived as an important element of global governance by developing countries. Actions by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sent a warning to commodity importers, mainly developed countries, that producers could get together and create havoc in the markets. The result was an exceptional importance accorded to the fourth UNCTAD meeting in 1976 by developed countries with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attending in person and the United States putting constructive proposals on the table regarding the governance of commodity trade and other issues of importance to developing countries.[20]

The Turkish economy was still focused on the internal market but with a liberal approach. Public investments and enterprises were no longer considered as the engine of growth. They assumed the function of supporting the private sector (Boratav 2015). Subsidies shielded the economy from the shock of rising petroleum prices. The "additional protocol" with the EEC had entered into force in 1973, and ties with the West seemed reinforced. There was no economic or ideological incentive to participate actively in NIEO discussions. Nevertheless, a group of young diplomats in the Foreign Ministry were cognizant of the potential in global politics offered by closer relations with the developing countries assembled as G77 and a more active role in the process towards the eventual establishment of NIEO.

A meeting on NIEO was organized by the Foreign Ministry in 1978 in Istanbul, in cooperation with Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science. It brought together researchers, governmental representatives and major personalities from the UN. It was attended by the Foreign

Minister who was an academician rather than a professional politician or diplomat. The opening statement was read by Prime Minister Ecevit.[21] As a left-of-centre politician, his views were close to those of the proponents of NIEO. From then on, Turkish diplomats became more active in discussions on global governance within NIEO debate. Relations with countries members of G77and Non-Aligned Movement improved somewhat, particularly on economic issues, notwithstanding the negative impact of the 1974 intervention in Cyprus on these relations.

Turkey was an important raw material exporter, particularly of cotton among the 18 products identified for international action at UNCTAD IV. Production had doubled in each of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Although it is currently a significant net cotton importer owing to a vibrant textile sector, well into the 1970s less than one half of its production was consumed domestically. Demonstrating new interest in global governance in the context of NIEO, a study was commissioned in 1979. It assessed the implications for Turkey of the proposals regarding cotton being considered within the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) under UNCTAD auspices (Arda et al. 1980). This was to be an important basis for Turkey's powerful albeit short leadership among cotton-exporting developing countries in the early 1980s as the leader of the İzmir Group, negotiating at UNCTAD a new governance system for the international cotton economy (Sneyd 2011).

1980s: Vengeance of Liberalism

The developing countries entered the 1980s frustrated with the slow progress in the establishment of NIEO but with enthusiasm. Negotiations were continuing in the UN, particularly at UNCTAD, to improve global governance of development, and commodity prices had recovered from the depths of the mid-1970s. A UN code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations was in the making. Nevertheless, in 1984, the General Assembly stated that during 10 years since the call for NIEO, no progress had been made towards its establishment.

During the 1980s, not much was introduced into the UN concerning global governance of development, and what had started earlier mostly stalled. This was the decade marked by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, staunch free marketers. All attempts to introduce intervention into the global economic system, especially by developing countries with weak capitalist credentials, were strongly opposed. Developments in the

Soviet Union and the conciliatory policies of Mikhail Gorbachev in the latter part of the decade did not bode well for the anti-establishment militancy of the developing countries. Commodity prices again dipped, and debt crises plagued many developing countries, starting with Mexico in 1982. This had serious repercussions on developing countries' solidarity regarding reform in the international economic order.

What happened in the case of negotiations on commodities provides a good example (Mojarov and Arda 2004). UNCTAD Resolution 93(IV) of 1976, defining the IPC, mentioned 18 commodities of export interest to developing countries. A new international governance structure was to be devised for them including price-stabilizing commodity agreements. Developing countries pushed in this direction jointly and with vigour, in the case of cotton under Turkey's leadership. The mid-1980s however were marked by another sharp decline in commodity prices and the Latin American debt crisis. Market intervention as envisaged in IPC called for the operation of buffer stocks, and where they did not exist, supply restraint. Servicing debt, however, necessitated increasing exports for individual countries, even if this would lower commodity prices even further. This undermined the apparent solidarity among developing countries in negotiations on price-stabilizing commodity agreements. Many developed countries were against these arrangements anyway. Another important reason behind the decline in interest in international commodity agreements and international price stabilization was the collapse of the International Tin Agreement in 1985. Producers' organizations had also been set up in the context of market stabilization, for example, in the case of bauxite, copper and iron ore but also proved ineffectual in influencing market conditions. Market-based risk management moved to the centre of discussions.

The principal focus of development governance shifted from negotiated reform in the global economic system, as had been envisaged by developing countries, to debt relief and US-led initiatives such as Baker and Brady Plans. Many developing countries displayed a schizophrenic behaviour, with Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank and associated market-based policies being implemented at home while the diplomats at the UN insisted on the interventionist guidelines of UN Resolutions. In 1988, UNCTAD secretariat was castigated by some developing country delegates for suggesting that there could be more practical and effective avenues for international cooperative actions on commodities besides price stabilization.[22]

In this period, Turkey was liberalizing its domestic economy under International Monetary Fund surveillance, quite similar to many other developing countries. As a first step in 1980, prices of industrial products were taken out of public control. Later the scope of agricultural price support was narrowed and the financial system liberalized, assigning the price system bigger role in the economy (Akat 1983; Boratav 2015; Pamuk 2014). In 1987, Turkey applied officially to the EEC for membership. While liberalization was underway, Turkey also displayed the schizophrenic attitude of many developing countries, at least in the case of commodities at UNCTAD. İzmir Group of developing countries, during a brief but glorious life under Turkish leadership, vigorously negotiated market intervention, the establishment of buffer stocks for cotton and promoting research and development. Only the latter part was supported by the United States, the major player in the cotton market, which staunchly opposed market intervention. After much debate during the first part of the 1980s, where Nordic countries were active as friends of developing countries, negotiations fizzled out.

1990s: Social and Environmental Issues, Rise of Civil Society

Global development governance was transformed during the 1990s in terms of coverage and actors. As rivalry between the East and the West subsided, confrontation and rhetoric softened. Developed countries again shaped the agenda. "Sustainability" of development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions emerged as the central theme two decades after it was introduced to the international community. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round conducted under GATT promoted a cooperative attitude. Developing countries started to prepare a "positive agenda" on trade, in cooperation with UNCTAD secretariat, to improve the unsatisfactory aspects of the Uruguay Round. A more conciliatory approach was adopted towards the debt problems of "highly indebted poor countries". Even the strict principles of "Structural Adjustment Programmes" were evolving towards a softer "augmented" Washington consensus. Most of the action on global economic governance was at the World Trade Organization (WTO) where developing countries enjoyed special and differential treatment within a single system—rules were the same for everyone, albeit less strict for developing countries.

UN Conference on Environment and Development, the Earth Summit of 1992, was the most important event of the decade concerning development governance. The negotiation process carried over remnants of the former confrontational approach, the developing countries blaming the developed world with devising schemes for new conditionalities and protectionism. This was overcome. With Agenda 21, states "decided to establish a new global partnership" and committed themselves "to engage in a continuous and constructive dialogue". This can be considered as the first "modern" manifestation of development governance, foreshadowing Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It aimed "to strengthen national and international policies and multinational cooperation to adapt to the new realities" and enumerated policies and activities to be taken at the global, national and local levels, by international organizations, governments, civil society and business.[23]

Desiring to progress further towards an integrated approach to the wide-ranging economic and social issues dealt with by the UN, world hearings were held in June 1994 (Jackson 2007). The ensuing Agenda for Development [resolution 51/240], adopted in 1997, underlines the multidimensional nature of policies and measures for achieving a higher standard of life, encompassing the different aspects and related elements of development, such as peace, economic growth, environmental protection, social justice and democracy.

In this period, non-state actors, particularly civil society, became powerful participants in intergovernmental development debate. In this post-Westphalian system of global governance, decisions are taken by states, but the process became more inclusive. Earlier, non-governmental participation in negotiations was mostly confined to business representatives. Social, environmental and development NGOs, foundations and independent think-tanks flourished and started to play a significant role both as advisors to governments and independently, at times opposing the positions adopted by the governments of their home countries. International NGOs also prospered. This rise of the civil society organizations continued, in many instances interaction between them and states playing a predominant role in the formulation and implementation of international development policies.

"Live Aid", the benefit concert organized in 1985 to raise funds for the relief of the Ethiopian famine, can be seen as a turning point of civil society power, but the real weight of civil society was first felt at the Earth Summit in Rio. "More members of NGOs served on government delegations than ever before, and they penetrated deeply into official decision-making. They were allowed to attend the small working group meetings

where the real decisions in international negotiations are made".[24] Some 2400 representatives of NGOs were present, and 17,000 people attended the parallel NGO Forum. Turkey's Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who headed the Turkish delegation, visited the NGO Forum. Upon returning to the Conference site, during a chat with Turks attending the Conference as delegates or UN staff (as was this author), he said that he was impressed with the civil society and added, "We should support and listen to their ideas in Turkey as well". Whether this was done, and if so to what avail is open to discussion.

The most important change in development discourse in the 1990s was a gradual shift from the state towards the individual. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, following the Earth Summit, proclaimed explicitly that "Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development".[25] UNDP's Human development reports brought human beings further to the centre. In 1974, World Food Conference had sought ways to "resolve the world food problem within the broader context of development". The 1992 International Conference on Nutrition focused on nutrition and added non-food factors such as health, directly affecting individuals' well-being (Vos 2015).

With considerable difficulties plaguing the domestic economy, Turkey was not in a position to be concerned about global governance. It entered into a Customs Union with the European Union (EU) in 1996, foregoing to a large extent its autonomy in matters related to trade policy for industrial products. With its bilateral foreign policy becoming more multidimensional, Turkey tried to forge stronger relations with the newly independent countries of Central Asia and expand its economic links with sub-Saharan African countries. Turkish Development and Cooperation Organization (TİKA) was established in 1992, principally targeting the former Soviet Republics where Turkey tried to position itself favourably (Arda and Oğuz 2015). The priority issues were primarily regional, not within the purview of global governance. The international interest in the provision of global public goods, as manifested in Rio and Agenda for Development, was not an issue in this context.

2000s: MDGs, Partnerships, Middle Powers

MDGs, adopted at the Millennium Summit of 2000, defined the essentials of global governance in the new millennium. There is not much to be "globally governed" in MDGs, however, except the "global partnership" of MDG8 and its targets on "an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system", aid and addressing special

needs and debt problems. MDGs put the individual squarely at the centre of the development debate and assigned responsibilities to all stakeholders. They became the framework for international organizations, cooperation bureaucracies of most developed countries and developing countries, particularly those needing assistance. Development funds were easier to access in the context of MDGs.

In spite of their success in attracting attention to human problems in developing countries, and convincingly identifying priority targets, the MDGs, which were adopted in a period of relatively rapid economic growth, did not contain a framework or blueprint for action aimed at transforming economies and instigating a self-sustaining development process. The MDGs could be attained without any "development" or growth, if sufficient resources were available, regardless of source.

The guarded optimism of the 1990s about benefits to be obtained from globalization continued. The Fourth Ministerial of the WTO held in Doha in November 2001 took place under a global feeling of solidarity following the attacks on 11 September 2001. Its outcome was pretentiously dubbed "development agenda", and trade dominated the economic aspects of development debate. It permeated all aspects of the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterey in 2012. Among the 73 paragraphs of the Monterrey Consensus, 12 are specifically on trade and 15 others on "systemic issues" include trade.[26]

The intention by developing countries to radically reform global economic governance through UN resolutions was definitely over. As announced almost ten years ago in Agenda 21, the period downed "of a new global partnership for sustainable development". Partnerships dominated both conceptual and operational levels, involving international organizations, governments, private sector, civil society from developed and developing countries alike, and covering all aspects of development, from natural resource exploitation to health. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization are but two examples from the early 2000s. UN's Global Compact, another initiative born in 2000, aims to mobilize a global movement of sustainable companies and stakeholders to implement responsible practices, develop innovative solutions to address poverty and inequality, and support education, health and peace.[27]

Differences in the Rio and the Johannesburg Declarations on Sustainable Development, ten years apart, are revealing.[28] The former overwhelmingly addresses states which "shall" or "should" do certain things. The only "should" and "shall" in the latter concern transparency and attention towards

LDCs. In the Plan of Implementation of Johannesburg, "encouraged" replaces "should" as used in Agenda 21. Governments' responsibilities to their own citizens, good governance, in particular, became an integral part of global governance and international development discourse. For example, African Peer Review Mechanism was established in 2003 to self-monitor governance and socioeconomic development in Africa, and Mo Ibrahim prize, established in 2006, honours African executive leaders who have not only developed their countries but also strengthened democracy and human rights.

In the 2000s, new nexus of power for global governance emerged outside the UN, such as G20 (of which Turkey is a member) and BRICS. The groupings in the UN became more blurred, G77 solidarity waned further and variable coalitions formed on different issues. In spite of the survival of the G77, on some topics, it was difficult to identify a uniform voice for the developing countries. Some of them emerged as important providers of development assistance, and developed countries wanted them to assume responsibility for providing assistance. Developing countries, however, argued that this was the sole responsibility of the developed countries, what they did was cooperation for mutual benefit. Regarding development cooperation, Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action emanated from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) but established important principles in general. Busan Partnership agreement, in 2011, brought the developing country providers solidly into the system, while taking into account their specificities.

From 1998 to 2009, a somewhat parallel change took place in Turkish politics. The difference in economic philosophy between major parties narrowed considerably. Ecevit, the Prime Minister from 1999 to 2002, distanced himself from his party's "left of centre" politics of 1970s which sought "regime change" (Boratav 2015). The newly emerging Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) adopted a positive attitude towards globalization, abandoned the anti-Western and anti-globalization "national perspective" of its predecessor and came to power in 2002. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate to EU and accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005. The individual, rather than the socioeconomic and political system, was at the centre of development discourse in international forums, and under the influence of EU membership goal, individual rights and freedoms were being expanded and institutionalized in Turkey. Charities gained a big role in domestic redistributive actions which could have been better and more equitably organized through systemic improvements that also embraced universal principles of human rights.

Along with several other developing countries, Turkey emerged as a significant provider of Official Development Assistance. Cooperation was put in the context of solidarity based on historical connections and compassion, sometime based on religious affinity, rather than on third-world solidarity or international obligations. This allows it more leeway in using an "active, creative, innovative, and entrepreneurial" diplomacy emphasized by Parlar in the Introduction to this volume. Similar to global developments covered in Baba's article in this volume, "Turkey's multi stakeholder diplomacy: from a middle-power angle", Turkish civil society became an important player in Turkey's development cooperation, including in the form of educational institutions in many countries. Business associations assumed key roles in the conduct of foreign policy especially in non-traditional locations. They were even active in multilateral affairs such as the organization of the Fourth UN Conference for LDCs in Istanbul in 2011. These actions can be considered as some kind of "partnerships" in development, albeit with a somewhat liberal interpretation of the term.

2010s: Resurgence of the State's Role and Recalling Economic Transformation

In this period, the crucial event at the UN regarding global development governance has been the acceptance of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. They are at the basis of Resolution 70/1 of the UNGA on Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.[29] Progress towards SDGs is to be supported by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the third International Conference on Financing for Development, endorsed by the UNGA.

Although SDGs were accepted in 2015, they have dominated global development governance throughout the 2010s, including during their preparation. They are a synthesis between the early state cantered "economistic" approach to development and the MDG approach where economic development seemed to be the implied outcome of individuals' deliverance from constraints on their well-being and potential capabilities. SDGs have reintroduced into the discussion the role of governments and the fundamental requirements of sustainable development, such as a transformation of the economy and management of natural resources. Goals 8 and 9, respectively, include as targets "achieving higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation" and the promotion of "inclusive and sustainable industrialization".

Governments are to adopt policies to "achieve greater equality" (Goal 10) rather than letting the free market do the job. Similarly, funding from Enhanced Integrated Framework[30] considers diversification of the economies as a policy option to be supported rather than an outcome of free markets.

This resurgence of economic growth and structural transformation as central elements of development is evident in a comparison of the wording related to "productive capacities" in the Brussels and Istanbul Programmes of Action for LDCs.[31] In the former, agreed in 2001, the commitment is to build "productive capacities to make globalization work for LDCs". Productive capacities are assigned an almost subsidiary role while benefiting from globalization appears as the principal aim. In the latter, adopted at the Fourth UN Conference for LDCs organized by Turkey in 2011, the explicit purpose of "strengthening productive capacities" is to "achieve sustained, equitable and inclusive economic growth".

Recently, various multilateral and overlapping forums have emerged, such as G20, BRICS, MIKTA and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which basically serve the interests of their members, but also seem to rival the multilateralism of the UN in some areas, including international development governance and action. Nevertheless, the universality of UN and the "democratic" process where the weakest can express their views and aspirations gives it an unmatched strength in consensus building and influencing the thinking about development. The SDGs, reached through an inclusive process, are embraced not only by all multilateral organizations but also by G20, whose Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development commits itself "to further aligning its work with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development … including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development (AAAA)".[32]

In this period, Turkey embarked upon an increasingly self-centred "autonomous" approach in international, especially regional, politics, and relations with the EU started to sour. The crux of this new approach, as expressed by the then foreign minister (later prime minister), was to "determine our vision, set our objectives …. We might succeed or fail in our initiatives, but the crucial point is that we implement our own policies" (Davutoğlu 2012, p. 6). This emphasis on independence and apparent disdain about internationally set objectives, and even cooperation, is unlike the rational behaviour of middle powers seeking coalitions in international forums with like-minded states as evoked by Parlar in the

Introduction to this volume, or that of a typical candidate country of the EU, acting collectively for common policy goals. Nevertheless, Turkey's role in the Fourth UN Conference for the LDCs, the formulation of the Istanbul Programme of Action for the LDCs and in its implementation demonstrates an interest in multilateral development action.

In international development governance, the current discussion is not ideological but on specific topics under broad agreement and alternative priorities. The main issue is compliance with SDGs which cover developed countries as well. Until the Syrian refugees absorbed large amounts of Turkish development funds, a substantial portion went to the LDCs as called for by the international community. This was roughly in line with both the SDGs and the guidelines set in the Istanbul Programme of Action (TIKA 2016).[33] Additionally, there is considerable civil society cooperation, often faith based, but mostly in line with internationally accepted priorities.

Conclusion

Over the last six decades, the international community has used the UN as the main forum to shape the fundamental contours of its approach to development. BWIs may have dominated development policies at the country level, particularly at crisis times, but especially since the confrontational attitudes at the UN are over, the paradigm emanating from the UN has also been universally embraced. Intellectual debates and public policy discourse at the UN, which is concerned with a multiplicity of issues and not only economics, induce states to adjust their interests to be more inclusive of common concerns, influence the formation of new combinations of political and institutional forces at the national and global levels (Emmerij et al. 2005).

The thinking and negotiation at the UN have gone through a dialectical process arriving at a non-confrontational state. It is a synthesis between the objectives of global restructuring and global rebalancing (Mohanty 2015). It started with a totally state-oriented developmentalist approach, went through a period when the state was relegated to the background, another when individual empowerment was what mattered, and arrived at the current paradigm based on sustainable development, recognizing the roles of multiple stakeholders, at the global, country, society and individual levels. Nevertheless, there are issues, relevant to development, which are absent from the current agenda, including labour mobility, international rules on taxation, international competition rules and codes of conduct for multinational firms

(Ocampo 2002). The UN has the distinct characteristic of being truly global, but it is not equipped to use this advantage beyond the generation of ideas. The debate goes on, within and outside the UN, about whether and how to change this situation (CDP 2014).

Turkey's participation in global development governance has been shaped largely by domestic concerns and an identity problematique at the international level, rather than a careful assessment of the dominant topics and related concerns of the international community. This has been a factor preventing it from wielding a discernible global influence. Given that the current paradigm specifies multiple areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet as specified in Agenda 2030, namely people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership, the effectiveness of Turkey's participation will improve if it analyses seriously and holistically the requirements for progress in these areas as well as its comparative advantages, includes the findings in its discourse on development, joins international debates on this basis and emphasizes further the provision of global public goods besides bilateral concerns in its approach to development cooperation.

Notes

1. For extensive reviews, see (Jolly et al. 2004; Jolly 2013; Koehler 2015).
2. https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/E_CONF.2_78-E.pdf (All internet sources cited in this chapter have been accessed on 25 October 2017).
3. Argentina, for example, refused to sign, having staked a very strong anti-US position (Peterson 1964).
4. Although this term is not used any more, it was appropriate then.
5. Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung (24 April 1955), http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf
6. It was presented as a necessary act of solidarity stemming from historical ties with Algeria (part of the Ottoman Empire) and religious affinity. The sense that compassionate action is expected from Turkey, particularly by Islamic countries, and that it is Turkey's responsibility and duty to respond, permeates the philosophy of Turkish cooperation with developing countries to this day.
7. The proclamation of "development decades" became almost a routine action by the UN until the Fourth Development Decade 1991–2000.
8. This seems to be a rather optimistic statement at that period of ferocious arms race.

9. CIA Report on the Conference is entitled "The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference: An Analysis of Communist Strategy and Tactics" foreshadowing the later radicalization of the Third World. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R001000290045-0.pdf
10. http://repository.uneca.org/pdfpreview/bitstream/handle/10855/7151/Bib-47253.pdf?sequence=1
11. https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-turkeys-history-711
12. China which can be considered in a similar situation historically aligned itself very closely with developing countries.
13. Rostow, Walt Whitman (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press.
14. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Geneva, 23 March—16 June 1964 Volume I FINAL ACT AND REPORT E/CONF.46/141, Vol. I http://unctad.org/en/Docs/econf46d141vol1_en.pdf
15. The idea of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), allowing preferential tariffs for imports from developing countries, was proposed at UNCTAD in 1964 and adopted by GATT contracting parties in 1971.
16. http://www.tricontinental50.net/tricontinental-conference/
17. https://www.slideshare.net/SoloLosSoles/the-cocoyoc-declaration-5928386
18. In 1980, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also outlined the principles of a "new order" – New World Information and Communication Order.
19. http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/special
20. For statements https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/756E691101A1F4E1C1257CF90030A2C0/$file/TD-218-Vol.2.pdf
21. http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/yazar/7393-YAL%C3%87IN+DO%C4%9EAN/1978/7/11.xhtml
22. Professional experience of the author who was a staff member of UNCTAD between 1980 and 2006 is the basis of information in various parts of this chapter.
23. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf
24. https://agendatwentyone.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/understanding-ngos-non-government-organizations/ http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html
25. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm
26. UN Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development A/Conf.198/11New York 2012. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.198/11&Lang=E
27. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission

28. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/Johannesburg%20Declaration.doc http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf
29. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
30. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/if_e.htm
31. Respectively, http://www.un-documents.net/ac191-11.htm and http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/istanbul-programme-of-action/
32. https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2016-09-08-g20-agenda-action-plan.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
33. The mid-term review of IPOA and World Humanitarian Summit are significant UN events, relevant to international development governance recently organized by Turkey.

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CHAPTER 10

Narrating Turkey's Story: Communicating Its Nation Brand Through Public Diplomacy

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Conceptual Overview: Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication

Communication with the stakeholders and consumers is an integral part of communication activities within an organization. For that reason, organizations implement communication strategies to deliver their messages in order to attain their organizational goals. Organizational messaging includes the image and brand of the organization, which are communicated with external audiences. The process of crafting and communicating a favorable image is a strategic communication activity, which is defined as both 'the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission' (Hallahan et al. 2007, p. 3) and 'the systematic design and implementation of a communication initiative to achieve a pre-defined goal' (Zaharna 2010, p. 6). Although strategic communication generally deals with organizations, nations also seek to communicate with their internal

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and external audiences in attempts to gain a favorable image and persuade others in favor of their policies. In essence, strategic communication is planned communication campaigns (Botan 1997; Kunczik 1990) that aims to persuade other people to accept one's ideas, policies, and courses of action (Halloran 2007, p. 6). In this sense, public diplomacy is a method of strategic communication, as both public diplomacy and strategic communication are communication activities at their core (Farwell 2012).

Public diplomacy is an old practice, although the use of the term in the academic literature is rather contemporary. It embodies the communication flow of state and non-state actors with foreign audiences (Melissen 2007) and is defined as 'complex communication initiatives aimed at foreign publics and governments by other governments or non-governmental organizations in pursuit of policy goals and mutual learning' (Leonard et al. 2002, p. 8). Public diplomacy is a well-organized set of communication activities with an end goal of changing external behavior while also altering one's own behavior through mutual learning and listening (Cull 2008). Communications scholar Efe Sevin offers a working definition of public diplomacy as the informational exchange process taking place between states and non-state actors in foreign countries (Sevin 2015).

Public diplomacy, still a relatively new academic field, lacks a cohesive definition and draws from multiple disciplines (Gilboa 2008; Gregory 2008). Based on a communication understanding, there are two distinct approaches to public diplomacy representing the conceptual frameworks of this communication strategy at the strategic and tactical levels: information framework and relational framework (Zaharna 2007, 2010). These two currents are not mutually exclusive but are rather complementary. The information and relational framework are employed under unique conditions with each one having a different purpose. The relational framework highlights relationship building in attempts to solve communication problems and advance political interests. This conceptual approach views relationships as the primary goal and aims to produce stronger relations by way of circulating information. Consequently, the relational framework underscores communication problems as relationship problems. On the other hand, information framework of public diplomacy has an emphasis on the design and dissemination of messages in response to communication problems that hamper political objectives. According to this understanding, communication problems are rooted in insufficient, incomplete, or inaccurate information leading message content and delivery to be critical in countering misinformation. The core tasks of the information framework

are image projection and transfer of information in order to share a more desirable image. Therefore, the information framework encompasses initiatives such as propaganda, information campaigns, and media relations, with one of the core initiatives being nation branding and communication of nation brands. Public diplomacy is frequently used as a tool to assist nations in their international communication activities to build new narratives and craft a national image (Szondi 2008; Kaneva 2011). Within the contours of this chapter, which focuses on state actors in Turkey's communication initiatives in attempts to inform audiences, the concept of nation brand is analyzed from a communication lens. In this regard, Turkey's application of public diplomacy overlaps with the information framework, which has an objective inform and educate audiences. 'Turkey has a message and story to share', the motto of Turkish public diplomacy stems from the argument that Turkey's problems arise from being misunderstood. To illustrate, in a talk he gave in 2016, President Erdoğan asserted that Turkey's biggest problem was its inability to explain itself given the volatile region it is situated in (NTV 2016). The spillover effects of the Syrian war, Turkey's stance in respect to various Kurdish political processes in the region, and increasing restrictions of freedoms in the domestic sphere are some of the issues Turkey is working to address in the international arena. The failed coup attempt in 2016 particularly put an emphasis on narratives that Turkey adamantly sought to share with foreign audiences. Therefore, Turkey's public diplomacy offers a better explanation of Turkey that is grounded in the information framework, employing information campaigns, and communicating its nation brand (Kalın 2011). The concept and communication of this nation brand are important for a regional power such as Turkey which faces significant challenges in regard to its global standing and is otherwise still unknown to many people across the globe.

Communicating Nation Brands

There is a growing literature on the topic of nation brands since the inception of the concept by expert Simon Anholt (1998). Despite the number of studies on the subject, there is a lack of a clear definition of nation brand and its distinction from similar concepts such as nation branding, country reputation, and country image. These concepts are frequently used interchangeably because of their broad definitions and overlapping characterizations, resulting in porous interpretations. In order to better understand

the strategy behind the ways in which Turkey communicates its nation brand, it is important to distinguish between these concepts and their application within the public diplomacy literature.

A brand exists in the minds of the consumer and is 'the sum of an external observer's associations with the product or organization' (Anholt and Hildreth 2004, p. 33). A brand identity is the core concept of the product, while a brand image is the perception of the brand that exists in the mind of an audience just as reputation does (Anholt 2007, p. 5). In that regard, similar to that of brands, nations also convey certain images in the minds of other nations. People rely on their perceptions of places to make the decision-making process more efficient and a shortcut for an informed decision (Anholt and Hildreth 2004, p. 11). Therefore, a nation brand is influenced by previous knowledge and beliefs, the stereotypes of its people, and the prevailing social, political, and economic conditions (Fan 2010). Nation branding is described as the process of designing, managing, planning, and communicating reputations and creating a unique national identity in order to gain influence (Anholt 2007, p. 4). Sevin and Salcıgil White (2011) argue that nation branding 'is a competition for the hearts and minds of the people as well as for their wallets', and Kaneva (2011) offers a working definition of nation branding as 'a compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms' (p. 118).

While products can be branded and rebranded, nations cannot be branded if the brand identity does not match with the nation brand (Anholt 2015). Therefore, this chapter will follow the concept of nation brand instead of using the more mainstream iteration nation branding. Nation brand is intertwined with the notion of reputation, which addresses how nations are evaluated and perceived by others (Loo and Davies 2006). Nations manage their reputations and compete for a favorable global image in order to advance their interests in the international arena (Wang 2006). According to nation branding expert Wally Olins (2007), nations have historically tried to manage their reputations in efforts to create loyalties and gain influence in other countries (p. 170). Accordingly, Turkey is trying to manage its nation reputation by communicating its nation brand.

As nations struggle to attain a positive reputation and image in the eyes of global audiences, they turn to utilizing their resources and best practices. One of the resources nations have used in attempts to communicate their nation brand has been their benevolence and global values. For example, Canada has exceptionally communicated its refugee policy through the use of social media and celebrity Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Copeland 2016),

and Germany has maintained a positive image for itself during the refugee crisis, surpassing the historical negative perceptions emanating from the Holocaust (Wood 2017). While Canada and Germany highlighted their humanitarian assistance, the United States on the other hand has turned to development aid as an integral part of US foreign policy and US interests abroad (Pamment 2015). Both development communication and public diplomacy embrace social change through different means and thus have overlapping themes. In that regard, foreign aid and developmental assistance are considered public diplomacy activities (Lancester 2007; Pamment 2015) that are also utilized as resources in communicating nation brands. Turkey's efforts in delivering foreign aid are part and parcel of how it wants other nations to perceive its brand.

Shah and Wilkins (2004) distinguish between communication *for* development and communication *about* development. The former sees communication as an act that contributes to development, while the latter sees communication as discourses within the institutions that conduct the work. Communications scholar James Pamment provides a third layer of analysis, which highlights the communication component *of* development. This additional layer is interconnected to marketing and stakeholder communication. According to Pamment (2015), communication *of* development brands markets and promotes the aid activities to domestic and foreign audiences supporting the actor's image. Therefore, there is a component of development communication that emphasizes the process of communicating the activities that are taking place on the ground with key audiences.

Building on the intersection of development communication, this chapter will further look at the actors that narrate Turkey's nation brand and the ways they narrate and promote their work to reiterate Turkey's nation brand. An overview of Turkey's state-based foreign aid structure provides a detailed insight on how Turkey narrates and publicizes foreign aid in order to brand the country toward domestic and foreign audiences. This chapter will offer an analysis of how the three layers of development communication intersect for Turkey's public diplomacy.

The Drivers of Turkey's Public Diplomacy

Turkey is a relatively new actor in public diplomacy practice, and there are still misunderstandings about what Turkey's public diplomacy entails (Çevik and Sevin 2017). Nonetheless, Turkey has a plethora of resources such as its international broadcaster TRT World (Turkish Radio and

Television World), its aid agency TİKA (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı—Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), and its humanitarian assistance agency AFAD (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı—Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) to convey its messages (Sancar 2015; Ekşi 2014). These institutions also practice public diplomacy on the ground and were either established or strengthened under the consecutive Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments, thus leading them to have a strong political affiliation. These institutions were also established as a direct outcome of Turkey's active foreign policy, growing economy, and political ambitions in becoming a prominent regional actor, predominantly in the Muslim world.

There are a number of drivers behind Turkey's growing interest in public diplomacy as a strategic communication activity. First, Turkey has a steady growing economy, particularly during the second half of the 2000s (Kirişçi 2009; Atlı 2011). This economic stability has enabled Turkey to strengthen and establish new state-run agencies while simultaneously utilizing these agencies for its foreign outreach. Turkey's relative economic progress by extension increased its diplomatic presence across Africa (Özkan 2010), while the expansion of air travel routes has contributed to and, at times, initiated foreign aid and increased Turkey's soft power capacity (Selçuk 2013).

Second, a new foreign policy vision was put forth by former Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The doctrine, dubbed as strategic depth, articulated that Turkey is a regional power, a center country, and an order-instituting country building on humanitarian responsibility, including varieties of foreign aid (Davutoğlu 2012). As such, Turkish policymakers under the AKP government, such as Ahmet Davutoğlu (2013), have argued that Turkey's foreign policy was grounded in moral values drawing on historical responsibility. Furthermore, Kalın (2011) argues that Turkey's newly attained activism provides itself with the opportunity to offer new concepts and understandings in international relations. Furthermore, Kalın asserts that Turkey's soft power potential extends over the former Ottoman territories, representing the new geopolitical imagination. This articulation is represented in Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy paradigm, which imagines natural allies of Turkey where Turkey is both a central power (Özkan 2014, p. 127) and undertakes a strategic role in the global Muslim community (Murinson 2006). Due to the nature of this paradigm and its interpretation of Turkey as a successor of the Ottoman Empire in the broader Middle East, this

perspective envisions Turkey's responsibility to protect Muslim nations and peoples of the Middle East. Özkan (2014) argues that Turkey's policies toward the Middle East follow a Pan-Islamist vision. Therefore, an underlying reason for Turkey's foreign policy expansion and public diplomacy toward regions connected to the Ottoman heritage is ideological. Although Davutoğlu set forth a vision incorporating a long-term public diplomacy strategy, his departure from office and recurring political crises in regard to Turkey's foreign and domestic policies resulted in changes toward a more short-term tactical public diplomacy. In this regard, current public diplomacy, particularly post-coup attempt, reflects a shift to a more situational and reactive communication structure.

Third, Turkey recognized problems with its global reputation when facing international scrutiny over its historical policies vis-à-vis Kurds and Armenians being two major pressing issues challenging Turkey's reputation. Strained relations between Turkey and Armenia are a result of genocidal events dating back to the Ottoman era. Likewise, there has been a continuous conflict between the state structure and the Kurds since the Ottoman Empire that has resulted in massive internal displacements and violence that continue to this date. Both issues were slowly seeing some reforms in the social and political sphere predominantly from 2011 to 2015, and communicating these changes taking place within Turkey became one of the drivers for Turkey's public diplomacy. Therefore, Turkey's public diplomacy has had a dual global agenda: gaining global/regional presence and improving the country's reputation. These two agendas, strongly intertwined, have been incremental for Turkey to get its message out. Fourth, following the 2016 failed coup attempt, the Turkish state mobilized all efforts to inform foreign audiences in respect to the Gülenist network which is accused of being behind the coup attempt and is therefore recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey. As a result, Turkey's public diplomacy post-2016 has an additional layer of agenda, which is to inform and educate foreign audiences on this topic and share Turkey's official narrative. In fact, the crisis communication after the failed coup attempt overrides strategic communication where all state actors are assigned tasks to counter the Gülenist narratives. As a result, tools such as foreign and development aid are employed as carrots and sticks to undermine the Gülenist influence in regions where they are well established.

In order to fulfill its global agenda, Turkey has turned to utilizing its strengths: its humanitarian and development aid and these policies have been integral to Turkey's public diplomacy in hopes to brand the country

as a 'donor state' and 'benevolent country'. Initiatives to communicate this nation brand are also assisting Turkey in countering the Gülenist network. Turkey's governmental and non-governmental actors are implementing this holistic vision via a network of business organizations, relief NGOs, educational partnerships, memberships in international organizations, and international partnerships (Çevik 2015). Turkey's public diplomacy actors actively partake in communicating this brand and help shape a positive image of Turkey. Turkey has been using public diplomacy in order to be branded as a benevolent state building on its selective historical interpretation of Ottoman benevolence.

Additionally, domestic turbulences taking place in Turkey intensified the role the domestic dimension plays in Turkey's public diplomacy efforts. More than ever before, institutions and individuals who represent those state institutions rely on promoting Turkey's benevolence to the domestic constituency and demonstrate their activities in countering the Gülenist narrative. Consequently, Turkey's public diplomacy has become interwoven with public affairs resulting in the coalescence of foreign and domestic dimensions of communication.

Turkey the Benevolent Donor State and Safe Haven

There are three key layers to how development aid is employed as part of Turkey's public diplomacy. The first of these layers is communication for development, for example, humanitarian aid campaigns for Syria, Somalia, Palestine, and Myanmar have not only been a focal point of Turkish foreign policy discourse but also have contributed to Turkey's nation brand by receiving a significant amount of aid from Turkey. Turkey's Somalia campaign began in 2011 as the country was fighting famine and security issues, and its involvement in the Somalian drought drew the attention of the international community to this crisis. In 2011, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Somalia with a group of politicians and activists and has played a leading role in launching and promoting the majority of aid campaigns for Somalia (Haşimi 2014). Erdoğan's official visit to Mogadishu—the first by a leader outside Africa in 20 years—and his bold decision to open an embassy in Mogadishu have created a bandwagon effect, enticing other leaders to follow suit (Ali 2011), and Turkey was at the forefront of rebuilding Somalia by assisting with infrastructure projects and reinstating its diplomatic presence (Çevik and Sevin 2017).

The Palestinian cause has historically been very important for Turkey, although in the recent years under the AKP administration, it has received much more traction. Turkey has been actively seeking to raise international awareness on the plight of the Gaza blockade and Palestinians via emergency assistance (Kızılay 2015). Turkey's two most distinct humanitarian aid efforts vis-à-vis Gaza occurred during the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis between Turkey–Israel and the UN temporary membership status of Palestine. Throughout the tenure of the AKP government, Turkey has self-acclaimed itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause, at times deliberately employing an anti-Israel rhetoric to rally domestic voter base. Nonetheless, Turkey initiated a number of campaigns to assist Palestinians delivering humanitarian aid, for example, AFAD initiated its Palestine Campaign in 2014 after the operation and continues to deliver aid especially around religious holidays and TİKA operates in the region with a program coordination office in Jerusalem. Gaza consists of a large part of the work for both state agencies. And its political and historical significance for Turkey's current government can be seen in Deputy Prime Minister Veysi Kaynak's comments: 'Palestine and Gaza have a different meaning for us. Palestine holds a special place in the hearts of our people. We ruled Palestine under the Ottoman Empire, we have been flesh and blood. For hundreds of years, we were a symbol of justice and peace in Palestine' (AFAD 2017).

Myanmar and the plight of Rohingya Muslims have also been a focal issue for Turkey. Turkey has been actively involved in humanitarian relief for the Rohingya Muslims since 2012 through Turkish NGOs, including Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent) and state-affiliated agencies such as TIKA and AFAD. During a visit to Myanmar in 2012, Ahmet Davutoğlu, under the capacity of Turkey's foreign minister, spoke about Myanmar's Arakan Muslim population: 'Our trip to Myanmar and passage to Arakan will increase our visibility in ASEAN and in the globe. Turkey will reach a place where others cannot'. TİKA has also opened a program coordination office in Myanmar and has another office in Bangladesh that acts as a compliment to the work of the Myanmar office. In the first week of September 2017, a Turkish delegation including First Lady Emine Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, and TIKA President Serdar Çam visited the refugee camps in Bangladesh delivering the first batch of humanitarian aid.

Syria constitutes a key component of Turkey's assistance programs. Over the 6 years of the Syrian civil war, 6.5 million Syrians have been internally displaced, while 4.8 million fled to neighboring countries. Since the

onset of the civil war, Turkey had an open-door policy, and because of this policy, Turkey now hosts around 3 million Syrians, with around 2.5 million of them living in urban areas and others in camps. Overall, Turkey has spent 12 billion USD from its national budget for relief efforts (Çavuşoğlu 2016). As a result of its generous assistance predominantly going toward Syrian refugees, Turkey was named a top donor consecutively from 2013 to 2016 in the Global Humanitarian Index (GHA 2017). There are 24 temporary protection centers administered by AFAD in 10 cities (AFAD 2017), and the refugee camps in Turkey have been acclaimed as the best refugee camps (McClelland 2014).

The second layer is the communication of about development. Turkey's nation brand as a benevolent donor state and safe haven has been frequently employed in the discourse of Turkish political elite. To illustrate, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's words echo this discourse: 'By reaching out to all over the world, we, as Turkey, will give a helping hand as much as we can to whoever in need of assistance' (Tika Homepage 2017). Similarly, Turkey's Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım says: 'We have extended our helping hand to those in need of our assistance regardless of their language, religion or race. We stand with them today and tomorrow'. Both political leaders reiterate Turkey's solidarity with aggrieved nations and people while positioning Turkey as a benevolent state. Serdar Çam, President of Turkey's aid agency TİKA, in an op-ed argued that 'the real motive behind Turkey's growing humanitarian assistance and development aid in recent years is to spread this message of sincerity around the world… Turkey tries to reach out to the needy through its faith and sincerity without expecting anything in return or caring about self-promotion' (Çam 2017), and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, in an article for the World Humanitarian Summit, asserts that in respect to humanitarian assistance, Turkey is leading the way by setting an example and working to galvanize the international community toward action (Çavuşoğlu 2016). In addition, the concept of 'safe haven' has been carried and applied to other areas such as Turkey as a safe haven for investments (Milliyet 2017) which was demonstrated when Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, at an opening ceremony, reiterated Turkey's position as a safe haven for investors from Asia and Africa (Timeturk 2016).

The third layer is communication of development, which is about promoting development. Turkey's public diplomacy is constructed around the narrative of Turkey as a benevolent donor state and a safe haven for refugees. State-run agencies not only work on the ground to deliver aid

but also deliver the message highlighting Turkey's work in improving the lives of communities across the globe that are in need, such as those of the millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey. This articulation was emphasized by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anadolu Agency, and Office of Public Diplomacy during a photo exhibition titled 'Turkey: Safe Haven' in 2015. Turkish newspapers publishing in English such as the Daily Sabah (2017) or Turkey's international broadcaster TRT World (2017) also contribute to the narration by labeling Turkey as a safe haven north of Syria. Likewise, Turkish Heritage Organization, a non-profit with strong links with Turkey's current government, also argues that Turkey has been a safe haven for many communities including Jews, Arabs, Kurds, and Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus for generations. In fact, this manifestation holds true for Turkey's and its predecessor's, the Ottoman Empire, policies on the ground. From the fifteenth century and up through its demise, the Ottoman Empire welcomed millions of refugees, for example, one of the first asylum seekers were the Jews who were exiled from Spain and Portugal and who found a home in the Ottoman Empire since 1492. The Ottoman Empire became a permanent home for tens of thousands of Georgians, Crimean Tatars, and Circassians. During modern Turkish history, hundreds of thousands of people from the Balkans, Iran, and Arabs and Kurds from Iraq found refuge in Turkey. However, this narrative also has certain limitations since it omits the mass exodus of religious minorities from the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey.

The narrative of a benevolent Ottoman image has carried over and gained significant traction under the AKP government. Throughout consecutive AKP governments, development and humanitarian aid have been integral to Turkey's public diplomacy in attempts to brand the country as a 'donor state' and 'benevolent country'. The AKP government has utilized the historical Ottoman benevolence to depict Turkey's benevolent nation brand. For instance, General Directorate of State Archives published a booklet titled 'Cihan-Penah: Osmanlı'dan Günümüze İnsan Diplomasisi' (Shelter of the World: Humanitarian Diplomacy from the Ottoman Period to the Present) which was presented as gifts to foreign dignitaries and heads of state (Ay 2016).

Turkey has been providing humanitarian and development aid on the ground that is part and parcel of its foreign policy framework. Turkey's foreign policy framework requires the tools to actualize, narrate, and publicize this nation branding. Therefore, the three layers of development communication intersect in terms of agenda, actions, and narratives.

Existing and new governmental institutions have thus been serving the purpose of dissemination information on foreign aid, while simultaneously synchronizing efforts in correcting miscommunication problems. These efforts build a close-knit organizational structure that interprets public diplomacy from an informational lens. As the narration and promotion (about and of layers) are closely intertwined, the domestic dimension of Turkey's public diplomacy becomes a significant challenge to Turkey's public diplomacy and narrows Turkey's efforts down to the domestic debates.

Actors in Turkey's Development Aid

Actors and stakeholders providing development aid, in essence, are the narrators of Turkey's nation brand on the ground. These stakeholders live the brand and are at the heart of Turkey's strategic communication efforts. State institutions partake in crafting, narrating, and publicizing this story, which in turn reinforces Turkey's nation brand.

Humanitarian and development aid is part and parcel of Turkey's story, which necessitates a synchronized organizational structure among various state actors. There are a number of prominent state institutions that lead Turkey's humanitarian and development aid. Among these institutions, TİKA and AFAD are principal actors that this chapter will further elaborate on.

TIKA is the key agency that delivers and communicates foreign aid and was established in 1992 following the political vacuum in Eurasia and Central Asia created by the collapse of the Soviet Union with the objective of assisting the newly independent Turkic republics. TIKA's role in both delivering and narrating foreign aid is interconnected with Turkey's foreign policy aspirations. Murinson (2006) argues that Turkey's activism followed a neo-Ottoman agenda under the Turgut Özal leadership, which has been dubbed as 'strategic depth' under the AKP leadership. In hindsight, TIKA's establishment in the early 1990s was also a manifestation of policy objectives. Nonetheless, TIKA at that time was a technical aid organization that operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1999, TIKA was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office (TİKA Website 2016), which propelled the processes of TIKA becoming associated with the elected office.

Under the AKP government, TIKA has been transformed into a global aid agency in accordance with government policies. As an indirect result,

TIKA is currently utilized in promoting Turkey's image both domestically and abroad and provides aid across the world while simultaneously contributing to the information public diplomacy framework by way of communicating aid efforts. From TIKA's numerous social media accounts to its publications and news coverage, the agency acts as a cornerstone of promoting Turkey's nation brand domestically.

Nonetheless, TIKA's growing presence across the globe has been a marker of Turkey's public diplomacy narrative, building on the 'generous country' image and simultaneously operating as an instrument in building the nation brand. TIKA has 58 program coordination offices and operates in 170 countries in 5 continents. In 2015, TIKA's projects totaled 3.9 billion USD and were spread out between heritage conservation, education, and sustainable living. Among TIKA's work, the campaigns for Somalia, Palestine, and Myanmar received significant media coverage in Turkey.

AFAD, the main authority concerned with disasters and emergencies, works as an umbrella organization in Turkey, collaborating with other organizations (AFAD Website About Us 2016). AFAD focuses on post-disaster rehabilitation and works to oversee emergency humanitarian relief. AFAD has responded to disasters and emergencies taking place across the globe and has carried out humanitarian aid operations throughout the Arab uprisings in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria (Sancar 2015).

Prior to its global engagement, AFAD's work was based on rehabilitating the areas affected by the Marmara earthquake in 1999. In 2009, the organization was reshuffled and renamed as AFAD operating under the Prime Ministry, resulting in AFAD suffering from the same partisan structure that TIKA suffers from. AFAD's coordinator has been replaced over the years as consecutive AKP governments instituted different cabinets.

AFAD has been the leading agency in Turkey's Somalia, Myanmar, and Syria aid campaigns. As such, AFAD provides aid and promotes/markets the aid through various channels of communication. In doing so, AFAD joins efforts with other government agencies in creating and reinforcing Turkey's benevolent nation brand. To illustrate, AFAD President Mehmet Halis Bilden at the Habitat III conference held in Quito, Ecuador, reiterated Turkey's efforts in the Syrian humanitarian crisis by employing widely used concepts such as 'Turkey as most generous country', 'how to build a perfect refugee camp', and 'Turkey as the World's hand of conscience' (AFAD Website 2016). AFAD's most well-known campaigns have been to Syria, Somalia, Gaza, Pakistan, and Myanmar.

Conclusion

Turkey's status as a donor state and generous country has been covered extensively in Turkish media and, to an extent, in global media. Turkey provides extensive efforts in relieving the Syrian refugee crisis, and Turkey's insurmountable efforts in aiding Syrians to flee the civil war and seek refuge in Turkey have gained global appreciation, resulting in Turkey being ranked as a top donor country since 2013.

Although a significant proportion of Turkey's aid efforts go to the Syrian crisis, this chapter focuses on ways in which humanitarian and development aid is utilized as a public diplomacy tool to inform domestic and foreign audiences. Public diplomacy in Turkey is interpreted as narration and publicity in which promoting Turkey is intertwined with promoting government policies. Agencies, most of them reshuffled over cumulative AKP governments, are cornerstones of disseminating information in regard to foreign aid. State agencies not only narrate and brand Turkey as a generous country via sharing 'Turkey's story', but at the same time, they actively partake in delivering aid. As a result, state agencies are both actors and narrators of Turkey's nation brand toward a dual audience, domestic and foreign. In doing so, Turkey aims to expand its sphere of influence predominantly among other Muslim countries, correct miscommunication, and consolidate the domestic electorate base of AKP by utilizing rhetoric that borrows from a selective interpretation of Ottoman history. Hence, there are multiple motivations that factor in Turkey's communication with the public. Overall, with the aims to disseminate information, Turkey's public diplomacy practice fits the information framework that provides a functional degree of coordination among state agencies. Due to its rather informative structure, Turkey's public diplomacy is utilized as a defensive strategic communication tool. Turkey's public diplomacy, particularly that of foreign aid, contains a domestic dimension which aims to please the domestic constituency and play into the dominant political narrative in respect to the domestic political climate. Therefore, Turkey's public diplomacy framework is very complex that involves a combined set of short-term to long-term objectives while combining domestic and foreign audience dimensions. Nevertheless, foreign aid constitutes a major portion of Turkey's public diplomacy efforts in branding the country as a benevolent state and communicating the benevolent actions to foreign and domestic audiences.

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CHAPTER 11

A Comparative Analysis of China and Turkey's Development Aid Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Ferit Belder and Samiratou Dipama

Introduction

In parallel to their increasing roles in international politics, rising countries have begun to take on an active role in the international development and humanitarian aid landscape through multilayered foreign policy strategies. For these countries, foreign aid eases their quest for new allies in the Global South and boosts their regional and global power status in various ways. Unlike traditional methods, their aid approaches follow different models in accordance with countries' distinct historical paths, political priorities, and economic and ideological motivations.

This variety of development aid actors and models is particularly noticeable in the African context, which has always been a place of competition par excellence between great powers in pursuit of their economic, political, and cultural interests. However, with the entrance of new emerging powers such

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as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, the African continent has increasingly ceased to be the exclusive domain of traditional Western powers. Yet, existing research on this diversification has so far focused only on the 'old' emerging aid donors in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), namely China and India, leaving aside other 'new' emerging donors, namely Turkey.

The selection of China and Turkey as case studies aims to include one 'old', non-Western, large emerging aid donor in Africa, namely China, and one 'new', 'hybrid' and potential emerging aid donor in Africa, Turkey. This draws a more balanced picture of the issue of emerging donors in Africa. Indeed, although Turkey increases its total aid towards developing countries, it is not a traditional donor represented in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). As a non-DAC country but a member of the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Turkey sits between the Western method of development aid based mainly on the struggle against poverty and China's development cooperation model based on mega projects and industry. The few works that have been developed recently on Turkey's involvement in development aid in SSA have been descriptive with very few comparative perspectives. In response, this paper aims to fill this gap in the literature from a policy analysis perspective by undertaking a challenging approach containing a comparison between China and Turkey's development aid policies in SSA. This chapter also complements Hakan Mehmetcik's work in this book on the comparison of Turkey and India in terms of foreign aid, and both constitute a broader perspective of Turkey's role in the rising world (Mehmetcik 2018).

The focus on the South–South Cooperation (SSC) is due to the fact that this model of cooperation has occupied a prominent place in international aid effectiveness discussions, mainly with regard to their perceived potential to serve as an alternative to the 'failed' Western model of development cooperation in Africa and therefore as a more effective tool to boost Africa's development. Non-interference in domestic affairs, mutual recognition of national sovereignty and independence, respect for local characteristics and cultural identity, and sharing expertise and experiences are central principles of the cooperation model. In fact, these principles, which reflect the 'Bandung Spirit', re-emerged after the achievement of former undeveloped countries such as China without Western-imposed development prescriptions (Gray and Gills 2016).

Since Turkey and China are incomparable in the economic sphere, this paper attempts to assess their objectives, instruments, and outputs on the one hand and locates their efforts in the general context of the SSC model on the other. The rationale for our focus on SSA countries is threefold:

political, economic, and ideological. First, despite geographically sharing the same continent, North African countries have politically convergent priorities and interests from the rest of the continent. For example, Egypt is concerned with Middle Eastern issues rather than sharing the general concerns of other African countries. Second, North African countries represent the wealthier part of the continent and are among the largest 20 economies in Africa. Finally, SSA has emerged as a non-Western area of influence in the last decades for both countries. Although focusing on a small number of SSA countries might provide deep and satisfactory analysis showing Turkey and China's incentives or limits in any specific country, no specific country's case study was chosen as it would not give a broad comparative account for Turkey and China. Moreover, particular countries in the SSA region have already attracted attention for their significant role in Turkey or China's foreign policy agendas (e.g. Somalia for Turkey) (Özkan and Orakçı 2015: 344). With this in mind, this paper seeks to provide a more comprehensive insight into the nature and objectives of these two emerging powers in SSA in parallel with the debates about the SSC and their motivations, instruments, distribution, and sustainability. To this end, the study is organized as follows: the first part focuses on the motives of Chinese and Turkish development aid policymakers in Africa by critically asking if these countries have distinctive cooperation goals in SSA with reference to their historical engagement with Africa. The second part briefly introduces the variety of instruments used by China and Turkey in aid provision to Africa to underline the domination of state institutions organizing development aid priorities. The third part empirically analyses the distribution of Turkey and China's aid within SSA by showing their priorities and the selectiveness of the cooperation areas.

Assessing the Political, Economic, and Ideological Motivations Behind Turkey and China's Development Aid Policies Towards SSA

By not overlooking the significant differences in the content and size of Turkey and China's development aid, their political, economic, and ideological rationales are taken as a tri-fold explanatory framework for comparison. Our three categories reflect how assistance discourse and practices overlap with national interests in these broader areas. Cultural ties are an indispensable part of countries' ideological motives, whereas diplomatic incentives are represented in the political dimension. The military ratio-

nale is quite different from other incentives in two respects: first, military aid is not accepted as development assistance, and second, while SSA countries have several similarities in the context of development, it is unclear as to what extent their security orientations are compatible with each other. The political, ideological, and economic dimensions give meaning to the cooperation between emerging powers such as China and Turkey and the SSA countries, but the military dimension requires a look at complex regional security parameters which are not directly related to the content of this chapter.

Political Objectives

Since their independence, Third World countries have made up a majority of the nations in the United Nations (UN). Although never conceived as a third bloc and having significant differences between each other in terms of economic capacities (oil, natural resources, etc.) or organizational structures of state apparatus, in the 1960s, the relative autonomy of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) demonstrated to some extent the capacity of newly independent countries. Both Turkey and China sought the support of developing countries on various issues in the UN during and after the Cold War.

Since the Chinese Civil War of 1927–37, Beijing required diplomatic support for recognition in its competition with US-backed Taiwan. Beijing was able to obtain the right to represent China in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as late as the 1970s thanks to the large support of African countries. China continued to receive political support from Africa after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests despite international isolation and sanctions. Six African countries considered Tiananmen Square a domestic issue and invited the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to their countries (Sun 2014: 4). Similarly, Turkey's early attempts going back to the 1960s to establish relations with African nations were also motivated by the search for diplomatic support in the UN over the Cyprus issue. Unlike China, Turkey had a negative image in the eyes of many developing countries in the Third World, mainly due to its special alliance with the United States, whereas President Makarios of the Republic of Cyprus was an important figure in the NAM (Moran 2001). It was thus not surprising that the NAM conference in Cairo in 1964 ended with a declaration condemning Turkey's Cyprus policy (Köşebalaban 2011: 96). In order to bypass prevailing circumstances and explain Turkey's position regarding

Cyprus, Turkey sent seven 'goodwill delegations' to countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Fırat 1997: 191–192). However, these efforts did not achieve the intended results, and African countries voted against Turkey. Notwithstanding this foreign policy failure for Turkey, African countries demonstrated their role in providing legitimacy in the UN.

Since the mid-1990s, both countries became noticeably more active in Africa. In the 1990s, Turkey launched a multidimensional foreign policy by revisiting its historical, cultural, and civilizational identity (Yeşiltaş 2013). The 'African Opening' process led by İsmail Cem, the foreign minister of the coalition government between 1997 and 2002, could not be sustained due to economic downswing. The second wave of Turkey's African opening process took place in 2005 when Turkey's strategy towards the African countries yielded some political results (Afacan 2012). Turkey gained 151 votes (only two African countries voted against Turkey) for its election as non-permanent member of the UNSC for the two years between 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, Turkey was unable to achieve the same results for 2015 and 2016; Turkey's quest to become a significant global player thus requires outreach towards Africa and other developing countries. Turkey must make significantly more effort, whereas China's membership in the UNSC brings it political advantages for its relations with the African continent.

Ideological Motivations

The ideological dimension goes hand in hand with political aspirations. For China and Turkey, Africa represents a non-Western sphere in which they can consolidate their economic and political interests. While doing so, both states seek to avoid 'new-imperialism' accusations while proposing a 'mutual-benefit' discourse, which means that their development aid perspective contains idealistic and pragmatic aspects based on win–win partnerships. The leaders of both countries use the same language while addressing Africans on this ground. Former premier Wen Jiabao said at the World Economic Forum in 2011 "China had selflessly assisted Africa when itself was the poorest. We did not exploit one single drop of oil or extract one single ton of minerals out of Africa" (Timokhina 2014). Similarly, Turkish president Erdogan used the colonial-colonized dichotomy to distinguish his motivation from others: "Turkey has never had a colonial history. Our desire is to build cooperation on the basis of equal partnership, mutual respect and win-win principle" (Al Jazeera 2016).

Up to the 1980s, China's main interests in Africa were competing with Western and Soviet influences and isolating Taiwan (Dent 2011: 6). In those years, China was successful to some extent in obtaining legitimacy for its own model of 'communism' and in playing a leading role in the Third World through its ideology-oriented foreign policy until the free-market reforms of Den Xiaoping changed China's foreign policy preferences after 1978. Still, China's non-Western economic growth and development competed with the Western path to development. When China declared 2006 as the year of Africa, it announced a number of principles in its Africa policy, including 'mutual benefit' and 'common paths of development' (Dent 2011: 6, 7). These principles were designed to indicate the cooperative logic of Chinese African aid discourse. The Chinese model of aid does not require strict political conditionality or impositions upon recipient countries; it is drawn upon a multiperspective strategy aiming to use diplomatic, developmental, and business-oriented tools in a 'harmonious way' unlike the Western model of aid which is often linked with promises by recipient countries to improve domestic human rights and other benchmarks (Bräutigam 2011a: 135).

The intensification of relations between China and Africa reconfigures the Western model of international politics and knowledge (Power and Mohan 2010). The spread of the Chinese model of development to Africa based on political authoritarianism and economic capitalism can be seen as a successful deployment of soft power in the continent (Sun 2014: 2). However, its aid performance undermined liberal preconditions such as democratic rule or human rights and gave rise to allegations by Western governments of being a rogue donor operating outside the global governance rules and mechanisms (Bräutigam 2011b). Nevertheless, China views itself as having no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of African countries (Anshan 2007: 76; Condon 2012: 8). The function of non-interference here is twofold. First, it confirms China's anti-colonial discourse and does not pose an obstacle to China's business relations with other authoritarian regimes like Sudan. Second, it provides an alternative framework to the Western democratization model. However, its non-interference policy is vulnerable in terms of regime change and the removal of dictatorial governments in Africa and elsewhere (Power and Mohan 2010).

Similarly, Turkey's African policy does not contain any democratic prerequisites and, in this sense, lacks political conditionality. However, it has a strong ideological and cultural discourse and is closely associated with the country's ambitious foreign policy and global governance agenda. The rise of 'humanitarianism' and 'cosmopolitanism' in Turkish foreign policy

discourse in recent years is seen as part of Turkey's activism in Africa (Donelli 2015: 35). Inspired by the Ottoman model of spreading cultural, political, and religious influences abroad, Turkey's development policy also uses some religious motives in the African context. Turkish aid policy can be distinguished from the Chinese version by the role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mainly Islamic-oriented civil society groups that focus on education, infrastructure, and humanitarian issues. However, these organizations have their own agendas and do not directly take part in the development aid strategy in general.

The humanitarian dimension of Turkey's African initiative goes hand in hand with its political perspective. Turkey's then Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, visited Somalia in 2011 with his family to attract worldwide attention to the famine tragedy in the country and became the first leader outside Africa to Somalia in 20 years (Al Arabiya 2012). As stated by the then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, humanitarian diplomacy can be defined as a combination of power and conscience, and can be efficiently deployed in international crisis zones (Davutoğlu 2013). Humanitarian diplomacy is used to legitimize Turkey's efforts to build a new regional policy (Akpınar 2013). Turkey also uses its unique geopolitical position between the West and the East to avoid African criticism about its pro-Western foreign policies. Turkish officials refer to former Western colonialism in order to show to the African leaders and public the existence of a common fate between Turkey and African countries. On the other hand, Turkey's deteriorating relations with Western countries prevent Turkey enjoying this unique role, and as Emel Parlar Dal underlined in the introductory chapter of this book, it also confines Turkey's construction of its middle power identity (Parlar Dal 2018).

Economic Incentives

The African continent has generally been associated with poverty, underdevelopment, and other negative images. After the economic stagnation and low growth trend in the 1990s, most African countries achieved stable growth thanks to the global demand for oil and raw materials (Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2007). The 2008 global economic crises drove emerging export-oriented economies to expand long-term investments in Africa and find new markets. China announced its 'going out' strategy in 1999, which encouraged domestic firms to invest abroad (Michalowski 2010). In 1998, Turkey initiated its 'Opening up to African Policy', but the economic crisis in 2001 postponed its implementation until the AK Party period (Özkan 2010: 534).

Crude oil, raw materials, and natural resources represent a majority of Chinese imports from Africa (Sun 2014: 7). These are needed for China's manufacturing industries (Dent 2011: 42, Idun-Arkhurst and Laing 2007). Africa is also a growing market for Chinese commodities. Although Sino-African trade has steadily increased in recent years, it represents only small percentage (5% in 2012) of China's global trade (Sun 2014: 14). Nevertheless, China is one of Africa's biggest economic partners in terms of trade relations. China also aims to find new labour markets to transfer its own labour-intensive, less-competitive industries to other countries, including those in Africa (Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2011: 89). China is Africa's largest economic partner among the emerging countries, while other states including Brazil, Russia, India, Turkey, South Korea, and several others follow China in terms of increasing economic relations (The Economist 2008).

Turkey's economic investments increased in Africa over a decade from US$7 billion in 2005 to US$17.5 billion in 2015 (Hurriyet Daily News 2016). In addition to this significant increase, Turkey also searches for free-trade agreements with African countries. In this respect, Turkey views Africa as an emerging market opportunity for the growing investments of its small and medium business sector. It is important to note that the 2008 global financial crisis also forced Turkey to find new and alternative markets. Currently, a significant number of Turkish firms actively operate in a number of African countries, accompanied by a rising number of foreign investments (Özkan 2010: 536). Similar to the ideological factors, Africa represents also an area of non-Western sphere of influence in terms of economic gains for both countries.

Instruments of Turkey's and China's Development Aid to SSA

Whereas one main governmental institution is charged with formulating and implementing Turkish foreign aid projects in SSA, in the case of China, the tasks of formulating and implementing foreign aid activities are shared between many governmental actors whose duties can sometimes be overlapping. In the case of Turkey, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main state institution "responsible for coordinating Turkey's development cooperation with national actors, as well as with international organizations and bilateral donors" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). TIKA is represented in many African capitals such as Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Dakar, Mogadishu, Niamey, Nairobi, Dar Es Salam, and

Conakry (TIKA), and these offices are in turn considered to be regional representatives for coordinating and supervising TIKA's projects in the surrounding African countries (Özkan 2013).

In the case of China, the Chinese governmental organizations involved in China's external aid policy include the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), China Export Import Bank (China Eximbank), and the China Development Bank. MOFCOM is China's central ministry charged mainly with managing and supervising Chinese aid activities, granting zero-interest loans (MOFCOM). Within MOFCOM, the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (Department of Aid) is responsible for drafting and implementing annual foreign aid plans and budgets, as well as supervising foreign aid projects and continuing relations and negotiations (Law Library of Congress 2011). The Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation (Cooperation Bureau) mainly deals with the implementation of complete foreign aid projects (Law Library of Congress 2011). The MOFA "designs the general guideline for aid policy and controls the compatibility between aid and foreign policy orientation of China" (Defraigne and Belligoli 2010: 20). China Eximbank, established in 1994, is primarily charged with the funding and implementation of China's concessional loan programme (Bräutigam 2008: 14). The China Development Bank offers official loans at competitive rates, but concessional loans are only for larger projects (minimum 20 US$2.4 million) which involve the use of Chinese goods (minimum 50%) and services (Chinese construction firms as contractors) (Bräutigam 2011a: 205–206).

In addition to these institutional differences, another fundamental difference between Turkey and China's aid policies towards SSA is the increasingly important role played by humanitarian NGOs in the Turkish development aid sphere. However, these organizations have largely independent agendas from the comprehensive aid structure of the state. As regards the Turkish NGOs, the most outstanding one is the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), which mainly conducts humanitarian actions in countries affected by wars and natural disasters. Presently, IHH operates in nearly in 35 SSA countries (IHH 2016), and its on-the-ground activities range from cataract projects (Özkan and Akgün 2010: 542; Özkan 2013: 46) to water well projects and educational infrastructure buildings (Oruç and Köse 2007: 29), as well as the wide distribution of meats to impoverished Muslims in SSA during Qurban celebration (Shinn 2015: 15). Unlike Turkey's case, state institutions mainly achieve the coordination and implementation of China's aid programme in Africa, since the role played by Chinese NGOs

in aid projects is very marginal. Most of the NGOs intervening in Chinese aid projects are private companies used in the implementation of infrastructural projects (Ujvari 2012: 6).

Unlike Turkey, China does not adhere to the official Official Development Assistance (ODA) definition provided by the OECD and therefore has forged its own particular understanding of foreign aid which sometimes contradicts OECD definition such as the inclusion of military aid and debt relief in Chinese aid programme. This proximity of Turkey with Western aid donors makes it difficult to classify Turkey as a typical South–South development cooperation provider with the likes of China. Yet, despite this difference in their conceptualization of aid, both Turkey and China officially adhere to the five principles of the 2005 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness', namely ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability (OECD, Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action).

In addition, China and Turkey channel most of their aid to SSA through projects rather than direct financial support. They share with SSC providers the idea that their development path is a successful example that might inspire its fellow brothers in Africa. In a similar manner, from an aid-recipient country to a potential aid donor in the world, Turkey is generally presented as a country with "much success and experience to share with LDCs" (Korkut and Civelekoglu 2013: 194). And the main activities financed by TIKA in favour of development aid programme include "technical cooperation for development of institutional capacity and human resources in partner countries(…) providing training and advisory services in the fields where Turkey has a comparative advantage in terms of know-how and experience(…) donations for capacity building(…) financing of infrastructure projects such as irrigation, sanitation and transportation projects, as well as, the construction or renovation of schools, hospitals, architectural objects of cultural heritage, etc…" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Both Turkey and China provide assistance to poor countries in the field of infrastructure, technical cooperation, education, health, and so on, which will improve the development capacity building in beneficiary countries and lead them towards the road of self-reliance and independent development (Huang 2015: 27). Grants provided to the recipient countries generally take the form of "material assets provided for social projects such as hospitals, schools and housing and for material and technical support, education and training, and humanitarian assistance" (Jin 2010: 13).

It must be underlined that as typical South–South development cooperation providers, China and Turkey give preference to bilateral aid channels over multilateral aid channels. As Parlar Dal and Kursun clearly

demonstrated more than 90% of their funds were delivered bilaterally (Dal and Kursun 2018). For instance, Turkish bilateral ODA amounted to US$3 billion 502 million in 2014 against US$88.73 million for multilateral ODA in 2014 (TIKA 2014: 49–64). At first glance, Turkey's reluctance to transfer aid through multilateral organizations might be explained by the public diplomacy principle that Turkey is willing to operate in its relations with the developing world (Hausmann 2014: 16). On the contrary, Turkey wishes to enhance its global actor status which has pushed it to increase its participation in global issues such as development aid through multilateral cooperation with other countries and international agencies. In this context, Turkey has played an active role in global humanitarian issues through collaboration with multilateral donor agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Programme, and the Red Crescent. Indeed, in 2014, Turkey's contribution to multilateral organizations amounted US$88.73 million, and most of this contribution went to the UN and its implementing agencies with 39.3 million US (TIKA 2014: 49).

Similarly, an important part of Chinese aid is provided bilaterally to recipient countries. China's insistence on focusing on bilateral aid policy might be explained by its fears that a multilateral cooperation with Western donors and agencies is likely to jeopardize Chinese own values and conception of development aid and reduce Chinese autonomous action in reaching its political, economic, and cultural objectives behind the disbursement of aid. Nonetheless, China is aware of the dangers of being outside the 'Western' multilateral development aid architecture as well as of the necessity of being involved in multilateral actions with other actors in the field of foreign aid because multilateral aid cooperation not only shapes or limits national aid strategies but also gives countries a chance to speak about global developmental agenda (Sun 2015). The Ministry of Finance, in charge of formulating budget, accordingly allocated funds for multilateral organizations such as the UN, UNESCO, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, and so on (The State Council 2014).

Distribution of Turkish and Chinese Development Aid to SSA: Recipients and Motives

As a member of the OECD, Turkey regularly reports its development assistance flows to the DAC, which increases the transparency of its official aid data. Unlike Turkey, China's aid is generally criticized for lacking sufficient transparency because it has a wider and ambigious scope (Davies

2008: 1). As a response to the criticisms directed against the lack of sufficient information and transparency about Chinese foreign aid disbursement, the information office of the Chinese State Council issued a White Paper on 'China's Foreign Aid' for the first time on 21 April 2011. According to this White Paper, "China's financial resources increased averagely 29.4% in the years between 2004 and 2009 and by the end of 2009, China allocated 256.29 billion Yuan (around 41.5 billion USD), in foreign aid (Africa's share account for 45.7%)" (The State Council 2011: 3). The largest recipients of Chinese grants generally include those African countries with which China has diplomatic ties, even though they are wealthier ones such as Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, and South Africa (Bräutigam 2010: 17). In 2014, China released a second White Paper about its foreign aid, according to which China provided 89.34 billion yuan (US$14.41 billion) for grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans between 2012 and 2014 (Africa's share accounts for 51.8%) (The State Council 2014: 1) (Fig. 11.1).

Since there is no objective data to distinguish Chinese ODA and Other Official Flows (OOF) rates, it would be useful to take them together to understand Chinese priorities in the African continent. As we can see in Table 11.1 below, Ghana ranked first as the largest recipient of Chinese aid from 2000 to 2011, followed by Nigeria, Sudan, Mauritania, Angola, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea Cameroon, and South Africa, respectively.



Fig. 11.1 China's foreign aid in the years between 1950 and 2012. (Source: State Council 2011, 2014)

Table 11.1 Ten largest recipients of China's Official Finance to Africa (ODA and OOF) in billion $, 2000–11

Country	*Amount (billion)*
Ghana	$11.4
Nigeria	$8.4
Sudan	$5.4
Ethiopia	$5.4
Mauritania	$4.6
Angola	$4.2
Zimbabwe	$3.8
Equatorial Guinea	$3.8
Cameroon	$3.0
South Africa	$2.3

Source: Strange et al. (2013)

In addition to this, China undertook mega projects in African countries. Generally, very large projects with project size of US$1 billion are included into the rubric of 'megadeals', mainly in the energy sector. Countries that benefited from these largest projects were Ghana (2009 and 2010), Nigeria (2006), Mauritania (2006), Equatorial Guinea (2006), Ethiopia (2009), South Africa (2011), Angola (2004 and 2009), Zimbabwe (2004), Cameroon (2003 and 2009), Mozambique (2009), Mauritius (2009), Sudan (2003 and 2007), Zambia (2010), and Madagascar (2008) (Strange et al. 2013).

The priority given to the above-mentioned countries can be attributed to both political and economic reasons. It is widely acknowledged that achieving its 'One-China policy' constitutes one of the main political motives behind China's aid programme in Africa. The logic of this policy is to reward African countries that do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country (Davis and Woetzel 2010). Chinese aid is used to boost diplomatic relations, and this argument is confirmed by the MOFCOM which openly admits the effort to construct "some public institutions […] produced great political influences" (Cited in Dreher and Fuchs 2012: 12). The ten largest aid-recipient countries are among those who do not recognize Taiwan. However, the One-China principle does not imply that China does not provide aid to countries that recognize Taiwan; instead, these countries are not prioritized.

According to Davies, "Africa is important for China's policy agenda and the building of alliances" vis-à-vis the West (Davies 2007: 27). China also benefits from the support of African leaders in international institutions to

help prevent sanctions of its human rights record in the international fora (Lammers 2007). In return, China enhances the political weight of African countries within international organizations and uses its veto power in international instances to support some African leaders against the Western coalition. In illustration, China has consistently blocked the adoption of UN sanctions against Mugabe in Zimbabwe despite allegations of serious human rights violations. As mentioned above, African countries have supported Chinese representation in the UN over Taiwan (Davies 2007). Increasing support from some African countries will progressively increase China's popularity and in the long run pave the way for the formation of an axis of China's friends that would help achieve the Chinese aim of putting an end to the United States' unipolar World system and to "advance the Chinese concept of a multipolar world" (Ramo 2004).

China's external assistance to SSA is also part of this 'new scramble of Africa' motto. China also aims to take the big share in the low-cost extraction of African natural resources (oil, minerals, and timber in particular), which are crucial to sustain and fuel the rapid Chinese economic growth (Alden 2005; Tull 2006; Davies 2007; Naim 2007; Halper 2010, Lum et al. 2009). The fact that the Chinese MOFCOM is the head agency in the provision of bilateral aid clearly illustrates the pre-eminence of commercial motives in the architecture of China's aid (Lammers 2007). For instance, countries such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, rich with natural resources, figure among the top recipients of China's aid (see Table 11.1 above). Equally, natural resources are used as a guarantee by a given country, especially countries blessed with natural resources such as Ghana, Angola, and Nigeria, to obtain infrastructure loans from China on better commercial terms under the Chinese infrastructure-resource loans programme than likely from commercial banks (Bräutigam 2010: 16). Apart from the nature resources motives, China's aid projects in Africa also aim to serve as an entry point for Chinese companies into domestic African markets (Foster et al. 2008: 57). The majority of large Chinese projects are executed by Chinese contractors in the recipient countries, and delocalization can in the long term pave the way for the establishment of these companies in the recipient countries whenever new opportunities emerge.

Coming to the Turkish case, despite Turkey's attempts to create a 'One Africa' image erasing all geographical, religious, and ethnic differences, ODA flows illustrate the selectiveness of Turkish foreign policy. The majority of Turkey's African assistance went to SSA before 2012 (2011: US$211 million). In the last two years, the share to North Africa increased, while it declined proportionally to Sub-Saharan countries. The reason behind this is the special agreement between Turkey and Egypt in 2012 (Fig. 11.2).



Fig. 11.2 Regional distribution of ODA in Africa. (Source: OECD)

In line with its foreign policy activism in the Middle East, the Turkish government signed a protocol with the Egyptian Ministry of Finance to provide a loan of up to US$1 billion to Egypt (as a result the first portion of US$500 million of the loan given to this country in 2012 and the second portion of 500 million in 2013) (TIKA Turkish Development Assistance Report 2013). Conversely, the proportion of Turkish aid to SSA among all African aid remained stable after 2010. Given the worsening of the relations between Turkey and the new Egyptian government following the coup-d'etat fomented against Morsi, the implementation of this agreement has come to a halt. This could explain the tightening of the gap between North and South Africa in terms of development aid in 2014.

All 51 continental countries in SSA received ODA funds from Turkey in 2013; however, it must be kept in mind that most of these countries received a low amount of aid (under US$500,000) (OECD Stat 2013).

Figure 11.3 shows that the most significant Sub-Saharan African aid-recipient countries in the last three years were Somalia (US$684.91 million), Sudan (US$121.28 million), Niger (US$28.24 million), Mauritania (US$23.83 million), and Senegal (US$19.6 million). Most Turkish funds went to poorer and Muslim-majority countries, some with Ottoman-era connections such as Somalia and Sudan. In addition, most of these aid-recipient countries are located in the Horn of Africa, with the exception of Senegal, Niger, and, to a certain extent, Mauritania. This is certainly due to the region's high Muslim population and historical Ottoman-era ties.



Fig. 11.3 Total amount of Turkish ODA to Africa in the last five years. (Source: OECD Statistics 2017)

Somalia is a clear example of how development cooperation fits into the larger framework of Turkey's foreign policy, which comprises economic, military, and cultural cooperation as well as political support.

In sum, whereas the distribution of Chinese aid to Sub-Saharan African countries follows some political and economic motives, the distribution of Turkish aid to SSA is mostly grounded on cultural ties and recipient-need basis. Unlike the Chinese case where most of the largest recipients of its aid are at the same time the largest economies with generous natural resources, most of the largest recipients of Turkish aid are classified among the poorest countries in Africa with minimal economic and political strategic importance. This illustrates the fact that unlike Turkey's case where aid disbursement is mostly based on the needs of the recipient countries, in the Chinese case, the recipient-needs logic is not always at the core of aid disbursement's criteria.

Conclusion

Turkey and China have recently raised their status from aid-recipient to aid-donor countries. The emergence of Turkey and China as aid donors in Africa has also brought about some controversy as to their motives for providing this aid and whether this aid has been efficient in the African

context. This study has examined the differing objectives and policies of China and Turkey's development aid policies in Africa in terms of motives, strategies and instruments, and geographical distribution. It is clear that both countries have strong ideological, political, and economic interests in providing aid to Africa. In the Turkish case, the ideological discourse is based upon an emphasis on cultural, historical, and religious ties with the recipient African countries, explaining why the principal recipients of Turkey's aid in Africa are Muslim-majority countries with Ottoman-era ties such as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Niger.

In the Chinese case, no substantial Muslim connection exists. Rather, the strong emphasis on economic and political interests in the distribution of aid to African countries is notable. In this context, countries which did not have any diplomatic ties with Taiwan such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, and/or those with huge natural resources like Nigeria and Angola emerged as the greatest recipients of Chinese aid. In terms of instruments and strategies, the aid given by both China and Turkey was not provided through direct financial support, but through project support, including infrastructure construction, technical assistance, medical and expert teams, training, and scholarships. Both countries stress non-interventionism as the core principle of their aid policy framework. However, Chinese aid to Africa is more oriented towards strengthening economic ties in a win–win partnership through concessional loans, while Turkey's development aid is more humanitarian-oriented through the on-the-ground activities of humanitarian NGOs and TIKA.

Like most South–South development aid providers, Turkey and China do not have a coherent aid strategy that is carefully designed and implemented. Most of their aid activities are short-term project-based activities. In addition, Turkey and China consider their aid activities in SSA as a project based on the solidarity with fraternity of the African continent, which has been victim of years of colonial exploitation. The principle of solidarity, one of the defining elements of the Southern model of development cooperation, is particularly visible in Turkey's engagement in Somalia (Nganje 2014). The SSC also emphasizes the development and promotion of developing countries' self-development and collective self-reliance capacity (Huang 2015: 26). In this line, Turkey's development cooperation towards SSA is also based on the premise that the African people should find their own solutions to development challenges, known as the principle of "African solutions for African problems" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This explains why the implementation of TIKA's projects is done

in cooperation with "local staff and only a number of Turkish experts staying there for a limited time in a specific project" (Hausmann and Lundsgaarde 2015: 7). In the same manner, the importance of the term 'human resources development cooperation' was mentioned in the 2014 White Paper on China's foreign aid, to refer to "capacity-building measures, education and vocational training projects" (Stahl 2016: 11). In the area of agriculture for instance, China formed more than ten Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in SSA (Stahl 2016: 11) in order to share its own experience in the field of agriculture with the recipient countries and increase their production capacities.

This study assumes that despite significant differences between the content and size of development assistance and the outputs of the two countries' strategies in terms of their development aid, there also exist some commonalities in terms of political and economic objectives and foreign policy discourses. For both countries, Africa represents a non-Western area to consolidate their economic and political interests. Both avoid 'new-imperialism' accusations and rather put forward a 'mutual-benefit' discourse. In the final analysis, it can be argued that despite the existence of some deficiencies in the two countries' development aid policy and of the Western criticism about their unconditional development aid strategy towards Africa, Turkey's and China's aid is more pragmatic and might constitute alternative models to that of the traditional aid donors' development aid policy in Africa.

However, while the SSC has been presented as better situated to development logic, in our cases, the main actors of such cooperation are largely governments and government-supported organizations. While the instruments of aid vary, especially in the example of Turkey, the corrupted and authoritarian regimes in recipient country can be legitimized through the given aid. From this side, the unconditional character of aid may directly sustain corrupt regimes while criticizing hierarchical normative model of Western aid. The horizontal partnership shows the equality among developing countries and hides the fact that the material and ideational coalition makes undemocratic regimes much more resilient. This is largely because the referent object of development is the state itself in this dominant form of South–South partnerships. It also challenges the normative structure of the global order by underpinning the sovereignty of states again. Here, the absence of the participation of civil society from developing countries to the established aid regime or the emerging SSC is the main obstacle to a much more democratic cooperation. In this context,

Turkey and China represent two non-traditional aid donors with alternative development strategies constructed around their national interests. It is true that their aid strategies go beyond the hierarchical order of the Western style but prevent the emergence of a human-centred development approach by putting the ideals of modern world (sovereignty, independence, non-intervention) at the heart of the process.

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CHAPTER 12

Turkey and India in the Context of Foreign Aid to Africa

Hakan Mehmetcik

Introduction

The motivation behind how foreign aid is used as a policy instrument varies between countries and over time with it sometimes being a tool and sometimes a goal in their foreign policy agendas. The perception of foreign aid differs as well between individuals. Some define foreign aid as a part of the obligation of the rich to the poor and deprived, while others see foreign aid programs as replacing the colonial relations of the past (Schuftan 1983, pp. 33–49). Some argue that foreign aid is nothing more than wasted money and effort (Easterly 2007, pp. 328–332), while others underline the importance of the foreign aid in sustaining millions of people's lives, especially in the Middle East and Africa (Goldin et al. 2002).

There are several reasons that incentivize foreign aids in the social/humanitarian, economic/trade and political/security domains. At the social and humanitarian level, most countries offer direct external assistance to reduce the effects of wars, tragedies and crises. This approach can be seen as a response to the large number of people now dependent on foreign aid for basic humanitarian needs in parts of the world. While such

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urgent response to the humanitarian needs of the people is one part of foreign aid, developed countries also contribute to developing economies through development assistance programs to ease/solve technical and institutional problems that undermine local economies through poor governance and lack of accountability. This transfer of technical skills and manpower is one of the most needed types of help in many parts of the underdeveloped world. Foreign aid may also be an important driver of institutional and political reforms in recipient countries as aid is generally attached to specific conditions. In terms of economic development and future economic/trade dimensions, it appears that many countries opt for foreign aid and development assistance programs as a precursor to the creation of larger economic/trade relations with the recipient countries. There are studies analyzing the relationship between aid and trade flows from donors to recipients to address whether donors use aid to increase their trade with recipients or if the trade is a determinant of aid allocation decisions of donors (Osei et al. 2004, Woods 2008). Seen as part of the political/security domain throughout much of the Cold War period, foreign aid was often part of a wider policy to include fight against communism (Omoruyi 2017, p. 1); however, in the post-Cold War period, foreign aid is often justified as assisting the development and economic growth to reduce the possibility that the poor and uneducated might become involved with terrorist organizations (Pevehouse and Goldstein 2016, p. 208). Developed countries also try to contribute to developing economies through foreign aid to solve problems that have negative externalities that, in turn, affect them adversely such as immigration (Celements 2016). Overall, foreign aid decisions emerge from an amalgam of economic, political and altruistic intents in the social/humanitarian, economic/trade and political/security domains, and it is not always easy to understand why and how a country or a group of countries provide aid and development assistance. This is equally true for rising powers as well even though their engagement has often been characterized as one of an eco-politic approach to foreign aid policies.

Over recent years, foreign aid and development assistance have become important foreign policy tools for many of the non-traditional powers (Browne 2006). Countries, such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, have become important actors operating in the field, and their entry has also led to significant changes in the institutional and political frameworks of traditional foreign aid. Compared to the rising powers, Western countries have more advanced human and financial resources to organize a wide

range of foreign aid and development assistance programs. In this sense, the focus on delivering foreign aid through multilateral organizations is important for the traditional donor countries. Yet, many of the emerging powers opt for different approaches and institutions/organizations to conduct their aid and development assistance programs, many of which are organized on a bilateral basis. Today, new actors' aid and development assistance methods are quite different from strategies of Western actors. While Western aid is still largely conditional, meaning that a certain set of political and economic conditions are attached to the aid, the contributions of rising powers emerge in more flexible forms (Stokke 1995). This creates both more favorable alternatives in terms of the demands on recipient countries and reduces the dependence of these countries on meeting the expectations of the Western powers (Jerve 2016, pp. 1–3). Thus, the rising powers have more space to fill as they are often more welcomed than traditional Western powers. Especially the aid and development assistance policies and practices of China, India and Turkey can be categorized as belonging to this group of alternative aid models. These rising powers also provide aid and development assistance based on subject and scope rather than projects as many Western states do. Equally, it can be said that the foreign aid provided by these countries aims to create commercial interdependence even if political conditions are not attached. For instance, if China finances an infrastructure project in Somalia, it is often conducted by Chinese companies with a Chinese workforce.

Geographically, the pattern of rising powers' foreign aid overlaps with the geographies of these countries' trade relations. Thus, one of the most important motivations of rising powers to engage in aid and development assistance is that foreign aid often facilitates an entry point in the developing world to enhance trade relations as well as resource extraction. In this sense, one motivation of these countries to pursue large-scale aid and development assistance programs is competition with other rising powers. For example, China's growing interest in Africa and the rapid increase in its foreign aid to Africa are significant factors in leading to Japan and India to be more interested in this region. This emerging dynamic can be called domain competition between the emerging powers. These issues have led to claims that the foreign aid of the rising powers differs from the aid practices of the Western countries both in terms of size and method, and that these differences reduce the harmonization and effectiveness of total aid on a global scale (OECD 2016).

Among these rising powers, Turkey and India have become two important donor countries, even though, until recently, both Turkey and India were two net aid-recipient countries. Even now, according to the official OECD data, the total official development assistance received by Turkey and India are still increasing. Yet, these two countries are now able to give more than what they receive in terms of aid and development assistance. Moreover, both Turkey and India conduct their foreign aid and development assistance policies in very discrete and significant ways. In this sense, the comparison between Turkey and India provides grounds both for a theoretically rich and practically sound study into the dynamics of the rising power phenomenon in the field of aid policy. Therefore, the comparison of foreign aid strategies of these two countries is essential to understand what the rising powers are doing, what strategies and motivations they pursue and how they conduct their policies. The Turkey–India comparison is also a significant opportunity to evaluate Turkey's decade-long effort of using aid and development assistance to shed light on how effective some of the approaches adopted by Turkey have been.

Although there are a large number of scientific studies already done in this area for Western countries, such comparative studies on the development aid policies of emerging powers are limited. Further, both in wider studies of international politics and those that focus on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey and India are not among the states that are evaluated as peers and their policies are not analyzed in a comparative way. Thus, another distinguishing feature of this study is that it aims to fill this gap by examining these two states together in the same "rising power" category. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to examine the aid and development assistance policies conducted by Turkey and India in Africa comparatively. To do that, the chapter deals with three analytical settings namely ideological–strategic, geographical–sectoral and institutional. Over these three domains, similarities and differences of Indian and Turkish foreign aid policies will be discussed.

Rising Powers and Africa

There are many different reasons why the African continent is the focus of foreign aid of many diverse countries. While the level of inequalities and extreme poverty has been decreasing in South East Asia and Latin America, it has increased in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decades (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017). As the prosperity gap between rich and poor countries continues to widen, countries in Sub-Saharan

Africa, in particular, are becoming more marginalized from the international system. Yet, the most important problem of aid and development assistance to Africa is that flows of aid have somehow created a stagnant and corrupt system that extends, and is often normalized, across the African continent. Economic inadequacy, poor performance in education and health, corruption, poor governance, lack of basic institutions and non-democratic governments are among the most critical causes of Africa's dependence on foreign aid. However, these problems are not the entire picture, and the importance of African continent is increasing day by day especially in terms of political and economic potential. A study by the African Development Bank suggests that between 2010 and 2060, the per capita income will reach $5600 from today's $1667; the proportion of middle-class citizens will rise from 34% to 42%; and the average life expectancy of 56 years will increase to 70 years. With more than 1 billion inhabitants today, Africa is already home to 15% of the world's population and is expected to reach a population of 1.6 billion in 2030 constituting 19% of the world's population. For all these reasons, Africa is a dynamic and potent continent and a major market for rising powers.

Foreign aid is still one of the most important foreign policy tools for a power seeking to enter into the African continent. Until the late 1990s, this area was dominated by countries such as the United States, Germany, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Canada and other Western powers. By the end of the 1990s, Japan entered as a new actor (Kharas and Biau 2016, pp. 310–326). Collectively, over recent decades, these countries have become the leading countries in the field of aid and development assistance, especially when it comes to Africa.

While aid spending by the developed countries has increased, the development assistance fell significantly over the years (Anderson 2015). There are several reasons for this. Above all else, the changing economic structures and economic and financial crises confronted by the developed countries since 2008 meant that foreign aid was reduced by governments as an easy-to-cut item in such circumstances. Another imperative reason is that in many countries there is a growing argument that development assistance has failed in its current form and the continuation of this policy is a poorly conceived option. In other words, the argument that foreign aid harms more than it helps has become prevalent (Dichter 2003). Indeed, the net amount of foreign aid has decreased in spite of the increase in the number of actors, and despite this trend, the relative contribution of rising powers has increased. In this sense, BRICS countries as well as South Korea and Turkey have become vital actors in the field (Tjønneland 2015).

It is now widely suggested that Africa is experiencing a "New Scramble," thanks primarily to its oil, gas and other natural resources (Frynas and Paulo 2007). Besides its natural resources, the trade flows reveal that all rising powers, especially China, have significantly increased mutual trade relations with Africa. China's trade with Africa in the 2000s was $10 billion, compared to $200 billion in 2010. This figure is even larger than the sum of all European Union countries (Tralac 2016). A similar trend applies to other rising powers. For example, the volume of trade relations between Turkey and Africa was $5 billion in 2003, and it reached $25 billion in 2014. These trade flows emphasize how foreign aid has long been an important entry point to Africa. It is should also be underlined that the conceptual and rhetorical dimension of the rising powers' challenge to the classical hierarchical understanding of Western powers creates alternative ways to understand this field. In this context, especially the emphasis on South–South cooperation is highlighted, and the emerging powers emphasize cooperation and partnership toward common objectives rather than a hierarchical and conditional aid relationship (Quadir 2013, p. 324).

Comparison of Turkish and Indian Foreign Aid to Africa

Turkey and India are two similar countries in many aspects. First of all, as rising powers, both Turkey and India have substantially increased their respective economic and political influences in many places beyond their traditional reach. As their economic capacities increase, so their contribution to the global governance has also increased over the years. Foreign aid has, in this sense, become an important foreign policy instrument to expand their reach into the new found geographies. Indeed, development assistance constitutes an important pillar of the reactive foreign policies of these two countries even though these two countries are also still developing nations with high degree of poverty on their own soil. However, Turkey and India have both been transformed from a recipient to donor countries over the last decade. Even though they still receive some aid and development assistance, in particular in Indian case, if we compare the net foreign aid they receive and net foreign aid they give, they are both emerging donor countries. Further, both countries foster practices that differ from the existing foreign aid practices of the traditional donor countries. These practices serve more their own interests than that of aid effectiveness or collaboration and cooperation at the global level. India and Turkey are

also displaying similar tendencies in at least two important areas related to Africa: access to Africa's untapped markets and gaining African diplomatic support in the UN General Assembly (Dal and Kursun 2018). Besides these commonalities, India is more interested in energy security and competition with China, while Turkey uses Africa as both a practicing ground and legitimizer of its broader foreign policy ambitions. There are also number of other differences and similarities between these two countries when it comes to the aid and development assistance policies and practices. These similarities and differences can be empirically explored at three levels: namely (i) ideological and strategic; (ii) geographical and sectoral; and (iii) institutional.

Ideological and Strategic Level

India is not a newcomer to Africa. Ideologically, South–South solidarity is high on the agenda of Indian foreign policy, and foreign aid policies and practices are not exempt from this. India characterizes such assistance as development cooperation instead of foreign aid and sees them as a way of creating mutually beneficial partnership within South–South relationship context (Saran 2015). Historically, the continuing dominant role of India in the Non-Aligned Movement, the South–South dialogue and India's historical–ideological proximity with anti-colonialism are important ideological–strategic roots that have made India an active partner in the eyes of Africa. India deliberately uses such ideological ties for its advantage in the continent. In addition, India's private sector and strong civil society increase the effectiveness of its engagement with a range of African nations. Therefore, India's growing role in Africa goes hand in hand with historical precedent and present-day pragmatism from both sides. Thus, India's aid and development assistance is much more holistic and influential than many other rising powers in terms of ideological underpinnings.

India is also well on its way with the soft-power elements of its foreign policy in Africa. India has organized the largest ever India–Africa forums in 2015 to boost bilateral relations with the continent, which was also a showcase on the evolution of India's use of foreign aid policies. India's civil society and business sector have been working in African continent for decades. Indian proximity to the Western countries, democratic credentials, advances in engineering and software developments, and production and experience in providing services are all some of the soft-power tools that are deemed useful by African nations as a reason for seeking better relations with India.

Competition with China is widely characterized as one of the strategic factors that drives Indian interests of aid and development assistance at this level. South East Asia is the most important theater in the sense of competition between India and China. However, Africa's weight has been increasing as their quest for oil, markets, minerals, raw materials and influence has increased (Roychoudhury et al. 2015). Even though India tries to define itself as a partner to African countries rhetorically, the differences between India's and China's policy toward Africa are more in degree not kind (Mawdsley and McCann 2011). Yet, compared to China's vast vested trade and investment networks, India's African opening is still small and a developing project (Daouda 2015). China and India are two major emerging economies that look for opportunities to obtain the materials and resources required for the continued economic growth. Therefore, as a consequence of this framing of international politics, they are both heavily investing in Africa. However, this does not necessarily mean that Chinese and Indian interests are incompatible and conflicting in Africa (Yu 2016). However, Indian foreign policy swings between attempting to catch up with the Chinese in many issues and proposing a distinct foreign policy agenda on its own.

Africa has benefited from the competition between different actors in terms of gaining more room for flexibility and alternative to the condition-laden, asymmetrical relations with the Western countries. By the same logic, Indian and Chinese competition is beneficial for Africa as well. They have provided Africa with cheaper imports, investment and low-cost technology, while their resource diplomacy has provided the continent with new and visible forms of development cooperation and aid that are largely free of the terms imposed by Western partners (Cheru and Obi 2011, p. 12).

Africa is also important to India in terms of security due to the continent's strategic and geographic proximity across the Indian Ocean. Moreover, nearly 4500 Indian soldiers, which is the largest contribution among the United Nations (UN) states, are on the ground in Africa under various UN peacekeeping missions. Africa is also a key for India to sustain energy security by diversifying its energy sources. As a developing economy itself, long-term energy security for India influences India's African policy. Indeed, India is one among many with high-profile interests in African market and resources. Therefore, energy-related issues emerge as an important item in the context of India's African aid and development assistance programs. Just like China, or any other of the rising powers, India invests in mining, raw material extractions, trade and businesses,

ports, energy transfers and so on to support its overall expansion in the African continent. In addition, Indian pharmaceuticals companies, software firms and back-office outsourcing firms have made some of the biggest investments in Africa. In this sense, India's economic interest in Africa is not limited to energy-related areas, and, in consequence, India has become an important foreign aid-providing actor to Africa in the form of capacity building, education and cooperation on science and technology.

African activism in Turkish foreign policy goes back to the early 1990s, yet it has recently become a significant feature. In this sense, the project of Improving Economic Relations with African Countries announced in 2003 and the UN Security Council elections in 2009–2010 are two important events that accelerated the pace of engagement with Africa as a feature of Turkish foreign policy. Compared to India, Turkey's African engagement is relatively new. Turkey's African activism is largely shaped by business goals and humanitarian aid rather than ideological and strategic imperatives. Turkey's African connection is through humanitarian aid and other commercial activities that are done more often by private enterprises and civil societies rather than state. Turkish state institutions support these activities through official visits and agreements such as the establishment of industrial zones or visa waiving programs.

Turkish foreign aid in Africa is mainly in the forms of humanitarian aid, goods and services, and direct investment. Compared to India, Turkey has a relatively limited range of involvement, and the textile sector and construction firms are the main source of Turkish commercial investments. For example, in Ethiopia, as of 2013, Turkish textile manufacturers have become the largest employment-generating industry in the private sector (Ngwa 2015). Turkish small- and medium-sized enterprises are very active in construction and service as Turkish contractors are gaining footholds in the continent. Turkish businessmen are also working in information and communication technologies while Turkish Airlines is becoming prominent as a carrier to the region. When it comes to state-led activities, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has emerged as the most important institution in the field of aid and development assistance (Arzu Al 2016). In terms of TIKA projects, Turkey provides direct investments to improve production facilities as well as social and economic infrastructure. There is a certain degree of strategic coordination and unity in the context of the aid and development assistance programs conducted by different organizations such as Diyanet, TIKA, Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD), The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) activities, such as

IHH. Yet, these are not institutionalized. This stems from the fact that current Turkish government under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) shares ideological roots with many of the non-state actors who are active in Africa in the field of humanitarian aid and development assistance.

Even though there is no formal strategic document that determines the geographical orientation of the aid and development assistance, Turkey's foreign aid focuses on the sub-Saharan countries in Africa and the Muslim-majority countries, especially Somalia. In this context, it can be said that ideologically, the Islamic identity and the Ottoman past are decisive elements in terms of Turkey's foreign aid allocations in geographical terms (Hausmann 2014). Again, Turkey pursues a discursive commitment to the African countries at the global forums like G20 and UN and in return expects their support at the UN General Assembly. Thus, Turkey's foreign aid consists of a mixture of economic–political interests, idealist approaches and expectations of international status. Turkey does not follow a development aid strategy that exclusively prioritizes economic interests or only seeks opportunities for extracting natural resources like many other countries do. Turkey's characterization of its African policy as a historical, cultural and humanitarian responsibility brings it back into the continent as a coordinator, a provider of aid and a mentor. In this respect, there is a distinct and advancing Turkish aid and development assistance model in Africa that differs not just from traditional powers but also from other emerging powers in terms of both design and implementation (Ozkan 2017). Turkey has especially become an important provider of humanitarian aid, and Turkey's foreign aid policy makes humanitarian aid a niche area in wider Turkish foreign policies. Moreover, Turkey fosters a well-established non-development agenda when it comes to its relations with many aid-recipient countries through trade and investments.

Further, Turkey's development aid does not receive as much the negative response from the international community as China and India receive for their activities. Unlike other emerging powers, Turkey does not refrain from calling itself "net donors" in the international environment (Hausmann 2014). However, India, for example, avoids defining itself as a donor country, preferring to be characterized as a partner country within the South–South dialogue (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2012). Similarly, countries that are directly ideologically connected to the Non-Aligned Movement such as China, India and Brazil directly link foreign aid with South–South Dialogue, but Turkey characterizes only tiny parts of its aid in this sense, and does this very rarely. If Turkey's interest in the African

continent is to be characterized as having an interest-base, the political dimension of aid through gaining support of African countries' in the UN General Assembly is more prominent than economical dimension of increasing trade with Africa. Indeed, the election of UN Security Council member for the 2009–2010 term was an important experience for Turkey to comprehend African strategic value when it comes to UN General Assembly. Again, while rhetorically speaking of political concerns such as human rights, democracy and good governance, Turkey, unlike traditional Western donor countries, is reluctant to attach its foreign aid to any political or economic conditions.

Geographical and Sectoral Differences

Geographically, India's foreign aid policies have an obvious emphasis on a South East Asian connection. According to OECD data, between 2009 and 2015, India has directed more than 75% of its total bilateral aid to South East Asian countries such as Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar (OECD 2016). India is also a major donor for Afghanistan, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Overall, India's aid geography priorities lie in its immediate neighborhood (Malone et al. 2015, p. 177). However, historically, India has also enjoyed close economic relations with East African countries, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda in particular. The geographic proximity of East African countries to Indian Ocean provides advantage to foster closer relations with this group of countries rather than the rest of the African continent. However, Indian African reach is much wider than generally appreciated. One difficulty in determining the full extent of India's foreign aid geography stems from Indian use of the lines of credit via Indian Exim Bank. A line of credit allows foreign governments, banks or companies to import developmental and infrastructure projects, equipment, goods and services from India. Even though a line of credits is often an export incentive instrument, it has been counted as foreign aid in the Indian format due to the grant components up to 56%. Therefore, lines of credits are generally categorized as a special type of aid in Indian case. African share in this category has substantially increased since 2004 by receiving 72% of lines of credits given by Indian Exim Bank (Malone et al. 2015, p. 178). Thus, India has also built substantial relationship with East Africa particularly with Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Benin, Togo and Cote d'Ivorie. India's total trade with West African countries has risen well over 15-fold since 2003.

In consequence, India allocates a big share of its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa. In 2013, the figure was well over 16% of India's whole FDI, which is comparatively one of the biggest in the continent. Since 2010, India's export to and imports from Africa have increased more than 93% and 28%, respectively. India is now even a larger trading partner for Africa than many other Western countries including the United States and Japan. The numbers of Indians living in Africa has increased significantly over the years reaching 2.76 million as of 2015, which is 10% of the total Indians living overseas (Africa India Facts and Figures 2015).

Turkey's bilateral relations have weaker underpinnings compared to India's broad and bold engagements. But in recent years, Turkey has become more active in African continent. In 2008, the Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit was held in Istanbul, and, in the same year, Turkey joined the African Union as an observer member. The African Union has declared Turkey a strategic partner. Turkey has become a member of the non-regional member category of the African Development Bank. Since 2002, Turkey has increased the number of its embassies, from 12 embassies and 2 consulates, to 39 embassies and 4 consulates in 2015, making it the most represented country in the continent. Turkish Air Lines (THY) has increased its flight routes from 4 to 42 by starting flights to 38 new destinations in the African Continent, which makes it the substantial airlines in the continent. Second, the Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit was held on 19–21 November 2014 in Malabo, the capital of Ecuador Guinea. Since then, a number of bilateral and multilateral forums have followed from these early initiatives (Table 12.1).

However, Turkey's foreign aid is geographically concentrated in Somalia, Syria, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These countries cover approximately more than 40% of all Turkish aid and development assistance.

Table 12.1 Regional distribution of official development assistance of Turkey (2014, million dollars)

Middle East	2,500.4
Africa	383.3
South and East Asia	353.12
Balkans & East Europe	133.8
Far Asia	25.5
America	4.5
Oceania	0.5
Total	3,502

Source: TIKA (2014, p. 65)

Overall, the Middle East, due to Syrian crisis, has the biggest share in Turkish aid and development assistance. Second on the list comes Africa. In this respect, North and North-East Africa is the geographical focus of Turkish foreign aid policies even though almost every country in the continent has received small amounts of aid and development assistance. Turkish aid delivered to Africa increased by 67% over the last decade. In Northern Africa, a network of aid and development assistance programs was conducted particularly in Somalia and Sudan. Apart from Somalia and Sudan, Turkey's African foreign aid consists of distant and isolated programs. In this context, all the sub-Saharan African states have benefited from Turkey's foreign aid, albeit in small amounts (Hausmann 2014). In North Africa, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are important locations for Turkish aid and development assistance programs. But after the Arab Spring, Turkey's North African relations were damaged by an increasing rift between Turkey and Egypt. However, Turkey has engaged with over 131 countries in terms of aid and development assistance since 2002.

Turkey provides more humanitarian aid and assistance than India does in its overall foreign aid portfolio to Africa. This is a significant difference considering the population and economic size of these two countries. Over the years, Turkey's humanitarian aid has rapidly increased in the course of the Syrian exodus and, given Turkish commitment to Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey emphasizes humanitarian aid as a niche area within its foreign policy practice. India, on the other hand, opened up niches in the areas of human resource development, technical training, capacity building, energy cooperation, investments and the transfer of low-cost appropriate technology (Cheru and Obi 2011, p. 16). Therefore, at the face value, India makes more inroads that facilitate building long-term relations, while Turkey focuses on addressing immediate issues. Indeed, on a sectoral dimension, social infrastructure investments such as the construction of schools and hospitals and the provision of equipment, enhancing education facilities with material and staff, are important aspects of Turkish development assistance programs. Economic infrastructure investments come next. But, humanitarian aid has the biggest share in the Turkish aid and development assistance budget. This is a result of Turkey's demand-driven aid and development assistance strategy (Balcı and Göcen 2018).

India traditionally focuses on technical assistance in the area of development assistance. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Indian Economic and Technical Cooperation Program is the development program that India has relied on most since the 1950s. It should be noted that India has a very

strong network of non-governmental organizations, and these networks are used effectively in the context of development assistance. India is also investing heavily in capacity building and training in the context of development aid. India, for example, is linking hospitals and universities between India and Africa via electronic education with Pan Africa E-network project. Twelve Indian hospitals and 5 universities based in India provide electronic lessons and training to hospitals and universities in Africa. As has been stressed above, India uses lines of credit as a unique development assistance tool. The following is the distribution of such loans given by India Exim Bank on sectoral lines: 29% power energy, 14% engineering, 12% sugar planting fabrication, 11% roads and transportation, 10% agriculture, 6% rural electrification, 3% automobiles, 3% others, 2% cement, 2% construction, 2% technology and communications, 2% trains, 1% transport and shipbuilding, 0.2% aviation, 0.2% steel, 0.1% engineering and construction. As mentioned above, India's investment in the energy sector is notable in this distribution of loans and lines of credits (Kumar and Mahanta 2015, p. 5).

Institutional Differences

India has provided $1.4 billion in development assistance by 2014, and about 10% of this amount has been spent through multilateral organizations. Among these organizations, the International Development Agency (50%) and the UN (24%) are the two institutions with the highest share.

India is organizing about 90% of bilateral agreements for all the development aid it provided through the Development Cooperation Office, which is in the Ministry of Foreign Relations. In turn, assistance through multilateral organizations is organized through the Ministry of Finance. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program (ITEC), established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India, is the most important and long-term development program. However, assistance in the context of the "Special Commonwealth African Assistance Program" is also of considerable importance, especially when it comes to aid to Africa, which is coordinated with the UK (Mullen 2013). Similarly, there is a Bilateral Assistance Program for Neighbors and Emerging Countries. India is not a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and has a more flexible and decentralized structure than DAC members in terms of both the form of development assistance and the administration.

While the DAC members generally conduct a specific assistance program in the form of rules and regulations through an independent agency, and Turkey has adopted this example with the introduction of TIKA, India provides more decentralized development assistance through the above-mentioned programs administered by different ministries. Development aid decisions are thus taken by different ministries and conducted by different institutions using different programs. Therefore, India's biggest problem in terms of foreign aid is these institutional complexities. Further, competition between different ministries and agencies and the lack of a central coordination for assistance by different actors make the situation even harder to grasp. In 2007, India tried to establish the India International Development Cooperation Agency, which was then supposed to coordinate foreign aid across the number of spectrum and institutions, but it could not be established due to the domestic political debates. Instead, the Development Partnership Administration was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India in 2012 (MEA 2016). This unit has been made responsible for the coordination of India's foreign aid. In this respect, it is aimed at centralizing foreign aid in India (Mullen 2013).

It should not be forgotten that India also provides significant development assistance in sectors such as education and healthcare. For example, a considerable number of people are brought to the Indian universities for undergraduate and graduate education as well as technical vocational training.

According to the OECD data, Turkey conducts only 2% of the development aid amounting to $3.6 billion by means of multilateral institutions in 2014, while the rest is conducted with bilateral agreements. Among the multilateral institutions, development banks such as the UN, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank are the largest shareholders (OECD 2016). Turkey conducts a very significant part of its development assistance through the Turkish Development Coordination Agency (TIKA). Established in 1992, TIKA has been operating as an autonomous institution since 1999, de facto under the Prime Ministry. TIKA, which was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1999, became a more political structure after this date, and since 2003, it has become an important part of Turkish Foreign Policy establishment. Besides TIKA, institutions such as Turkish Red Crescent, AFAD, Foreign Turks and Relative Communities Presidency, Presidency of Religious Affairs, TOKI (Housing Development Administration), Ministry of Health and Ministry of National Education are among the prominent institutions when it comes

to foreign aid decision-making and implementations. TIKA works with other ministries according to its field of activities and receives expert and financial support from these ministries. For example, the Ministry of Health and TOKI are direct partners in the activities of TIKA, such as hospital construction, in other countries or AFAD and TIKA work together in implementing humanitarian relief mission. In fact, when OECD ODA statistics are taken into consideration, only 15% of the services provided in the ODA framework are financed by TIKA, while the majority come from other ministries and institutions. Therefore, most institutions conduct their own projects with their own budget, which limits the organization and application capacity of the TIKA.

The Under-secretariat of the Treasury plays an important role especially in determining and implementing grants and loans. In the context of development aid, the Treasury is also important in terms of financial contributions to these institutions related to multilateral development aids made through international institutions.

In accordance with the strategy chapter published in 2011, TIKA's task is the coordination, implementation and reporting of Turkey's development assistance. However, TIKA conducts many other projects outside traditional ODA activities such as cultural activities and renovations (Hausmann 2014). The priorities, working areas and budget of TIKA are decided by the Prime Ministry, and there is a state minister in charge of TIKA within the cabinet. The most important criticism for TIKA is that the lack of an institutional decision-making mechanism and procedure. Almost all TIKA-related decisions are under the direct control of the Prime Minister (Murphy and Sazak 2012, p. 1).

It should be noted that the involvement of NGOs in the conduct of Turkish foreign aid has been an increasing phenomenon. This is partly because many interested NGOs are ideologically coming from the same roots as the government of the AKP. This ideological solidarity and close personal relationships are the factors that increase consultation, cooperation and coordination in the field. Indian NGOs play also a prominent role both in the planning and organization of foreign aid.

Conclusion

Rising powers' weight and status in world politics is increasing in parallel with their rapidly growing economies (Gök and Karadeniz 2018). Among these rising powers, India and Turkey are two important actors who have made important strides in the field of aid and development assistance.

However, although there are some similarities between the two in terms of politics and practice of aid and development assistance, there are significant differences at the ideological–strategic, geographical–sectoral and institutional levels.

When it comes to Africa, both countries use aid and development assistance as an important foreign policy instrument to make inroads in the continent. In addition to commercial interests, India wants to increase its influence through the use of development aid to balance the influence of China in Africa and to preserve traditional South–South relations. Turkey is aiming both at diversifying its foreign markets and gaining support from African countries in the UN General Assembly. While India is acting on an ideological basis based on the Non-Allied Movement and South–South cooperation rhetoric, Turkey is trying to use a shared Muslim identity and the Ottoman past in its foreign policy toward Africa. While India has much broader geography in its development aid programs, Turkey is intensifying development assistance, especially in North and North-East Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. India offers more technical assistance along with direct access to loans and credits, while Turkey offers more economic and social infrastructure investments and stands out in the field of humanitarian aid. India focuses more on the energy field, pharmacy and back-office services, while Turkey concentrates on social and political infrastructures. In consequence, Turkey is in a better position in terms of perceptions of its aid agenda; India is more influential in determining the organization and strategic orientation of its foreign aid programs. Institutionally, Turkey shows strong coordination and cooperation capabilities across many spectrums and issues with all interested parties including NGOs, but it exhibits a weak professionalism in terms of decision-making, centralization, implementation and transparency. India has a less-centralized structure in terms of institutionalism and decision-making, which makes decision-making more fluid and less effective. Yet, it has a more successful organizational structure, including strategic goals and stakeholders such as civil society and universities. India conducts more of its aid and development assistance through multilateral cooperation compared to Turkey, yet both countries have relied more on their own institutional and organizational capabilities in implementing their foreign aid policies than by working through established multi-national bodies.

One of the important lessons for Turkey is to find the right balance between multilateralism and bilateralism in the conduct of foreign aid. Being less multilateral may bring advantages in terms of control, effectiveness and speed, but if noted in terms of both being more organizationally

effective and more internationally visible, there are advantages to taking part in multilateral institutions for Turkey.

The second set of important lessons for Turkey includes the issues of institutionalization and professionalism in its aid and development assistance programs, which would extend current success in this field toward a better long-run result. Turkey's foreign aid decisions are often taken as random and immediate political decisions. This causes a lack of strategic and long-term planning. For instance, a large part of the Turkish development assistance is in the form of grants, some of which are given in the form of loans. However, there is no established procedure for these loans, most of which are event-based. It can be expressed as both criticism and suggestion that Turkish aid and development assistance policies need to be professionalized as a foreign policy instrument. The first and foremost step forward in this direction would be to prepare a comprehensive strategy document outlining the major aims and capabilities in the field. Second, professionalization of decision-making procedures and full coordination among the institutions in line with the overarching strategy should be created. In addition, Turkish development assistance programs are far from clear and auditable. The mechanisms necessary to ensure that TIKA's programs are more transparent and auditable should be established. This will both make the aid more professional and increase the effectiveness of development assistance and facilitate the planning of development assistance programs for future periods.

Third, increasing the efficiency of stakeholders such as civil society and universities is of great importance in this context. Fourth, Turkey should deal with more development assistance in the technical fields to diversify its sectoral capacities and influence. Telecommunications, banking and white appliances are some of the sectors that Turkey should prioritize in Africa.

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