MEMORY POLITICS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

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MEMORY POLITICS, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT

Historical Memory as a Variable

Zheng Wang

Memory Politics and Transitional Justice

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The interdisciplinary fields of Memory Studies and Transitional Justice have largely developed in parallel to one another despite both focusing on efforts of societies to confront and (re-)appropriate their past. While scholars working on memory have come mostly from historical, literary, sociological, or anthropological traditions, transitional justice has attracted primarily scholarship from political science and the law. This series bridges this divide: it promotes work that combines a deep understanding of the contexts that have allowed for injustice to occur with an analysis of how legacies of such injustice in political and historical memory influence contemporary projects of redress, acknowledgment, or new cycles of denial. The titles in the series are of interest not only to academics and students but also practitioners in the related fields. The Memory Politics and Transitional Justice series promotes critical dialogue among different theoretical and methodological approaches and among scholarship on different regions. The editors welcome submissions from a variety of disciplines – including political science, history, sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies – that confront critical questions at the intersection of memory politics and transitional justice in national, comparative, and global perspective.

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CHAPTER 1

Historical Memory as an Omitted Variable?

Abstract This chapter introduces the main content and organization of the book. It outlines the difficulties of using historical memory as a variable for social science research. This chapter also discusses why the functions of historical memory are overlooked as an omitted variable and the reasons behind the lack of integrated research on historical memory.

Keywords Historical memory · Research methods · Variable

Mission Impossible?

In Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich's research on how Germany's past influences present policies, they found an interesting phenomenon: Even though collective memory is "the biggest factor mitigating the exercise of German power," it is "an element many political scientists usually avoid but any journalist working in Germany regularly sees in action."[1]

> The politics of collective memory—impossible to quantify, hard to measure with the methods of survey research, yet still very real—is a major ingredient of the political arena, the public discourse, and the policy setting in every country. It circumscribes the acceptable. It defines such key ingredients as pride, shame, fear, revenge, and comfort for a large number of a country's citizens. It is central to an understanding of the forces of nationalism.[2]

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Research methodology is indeed a major reason why political scientists usually avoid using historical memory as a variable in their research. There are concerns that historical memory cannot be researched scientifically because, in social life, the past does not exist as a hard, objective, or factual reality to be grasped and appropriated.[3] Historical memory is a fluid set of ideas often reshaped by time, emotion, and the politically savvy, not something solid, immutable, or truly measurable.

Not only a problem for political scientists, how ideational factors affect human behavior and social relationships have been one of the most bewildering puzzles for scholars in different disciplines. Progress in incorporating cognitive variables into empirical research on decision-making has been relatively slow and uneven.[4] Scholars who have struggled with this question list three factors that may pose difficulties to research that uses identity as a variable.

First, the existence of identity as a universal but largely implicit concept makes it difficult to isolate and understand.[5] This is because identities and perceptions are only one variable cluster within a rich and complex causal framework for decision-making; identities and perceptions influence, but do not unilaterally determine decision-making behavior.[6] Second, it is extremely difficult to find a one-to-one correlation between perceptions and behavior.[7] Third, when identities are measured, the techniques used (large-N surveys, interviews with policy makers, ethnographic field work) are typically not available to social scientists who study elites in closed or semi-closed states.

One of the important reasons why few scholars have used historical memory as a variable in their research is because it does not fit neatly in one specific academic discipline; the subject and its implications are scattered throughout many academic fields. Insights into its theories are strewn across diverse bodies of literature on anthropology, culture, history, literature, politics, psychology, and sociology. Each discipline cites its own reason for not attending to historical memory. In the field of history, Roudemetof argues that the discipline's tradition of seeking "scientific objectivity," has not until recently allowed the examination of historical writing in relationship to the articulation of collective memory.[8] In sociology and anthropology, the legacy of pioneers such as Emile Durkheim and Maurice Halbwachs were "eclipsed in mid-twentieth century by the more empirically oriented and positivist tradition of U.S. mainstream sociology."[9]

Does historical memory matter in international relations? To what extent, do collective memory and its social narrative influence a country's relationship with another state and with regional security? For mainstream international relations specialists, discussing how historical memory directly influences foreign policy behavior would likely be considered extraneous to serious analysis. Scholars may believe that historical memory matters, but only influences emotions or relates to the actor's psychology and attitudes. Others may think historical memory as a social narrative is mainly created and manipulated by political elites as a tool to mobilize people to work in their own interests. In general, ideas (including historical memory and other ideational factors) have been underestimated—if not entirely ignored—in the field of international relations.[10] This is because the most current and widely accepted systemic approaches to the study of international relations (IR) are realism and liberal institutionalism. Both approaches take rationalist models as the starting point and focus on how structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors. In such models, actors' preferences and causal beliefs are given. Most analysts who rely on such approaches have relegated ideas to only a minor role.[11] In this regard, as Ian Johnston has argued, the concepts of historical memory, even though not completely missing from transatlantic IR, are "theoretically and empirically among the least developed questions in transatlantic IR."[12] Furthermore, East Asian international relations in recent years have served to suggest that transatlantic IR theory faces "a major omitted-variable problem."[13]

However, the concepts of historical memory are not unique to East Asia IR. While exploring the sources, dynamics and structures of contemporary conflict, scholars of different regions have paid special attention to historical memory's power over human thoughts, feelings, and actions. For example, according to Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki, "the twentieth century history of Eastern Europe is a perfect laboratory to observe how the genuine or apparent remembrances of the past may aggravate current conflicts and how they themselves are modified in the process."[14] Victor Roudometof of the University of Cyprus believes that "the conflicting ethnocentric national narratives of the different sides have generated the Greek-Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute of 1990s."[15] And Irish historian Ian McBride writes that "in Ireland, the interpretation of the past has always been at the heart of national conflict."[16] From Europe to the Middle East, these case studies illustrate that many

intractable conflicts are deeply rooted in the involved parties' history and memory.

Objectives and Organization

This book is about conducting research on historical memory. It aims to contribute to the theoretical and methodological discussion concerning the use of historical memory as a variable to explain the political action and social movement. Definition and measurement are two main barriers to a more systematic incorporation of historical memory (and other ideational factors) as a variable in helping to explain the political action. Based on theories and research from multiple fields of study, such as political science, international relations, sociology, and conflict resolution, this book proposes a series of analytic frameworks for the purpose of conceptualizing the functions of historical memory. A series of questions are asked to define and/or measure whether and how the contents of historical memory serve as specific functions.

By creating the analytic frameworks for research, the author hopes to provide a model by which researchers can conduct a more rigorous study of historical memory. These frameworks can help categorize, measure, and subsequently demonstrate the effects of historical memory. Even though this research focuses on using historical memory as a collective identity, the framework can also be used for researching other types of social identity. The focus here is on understanding the function of historical memory in group identity formation and how historical memory influences actors' perceptions, interpretations, and decision-making processes. These analytical frameworks can be used to (1) help researchers determine which aspects of an event are worth considering; (2) generate research questions; (3) provide researchers the tools for analyzing empirical data; (4) guide categorizing and measuring the effects of historical memory.

The chapters of the book conceptualize the relationship between historical memory and national identity formation, perceptions, and policy making. The book also discusses the function of formal history education and social discourse in the formation of collective memory and national identity. It particularly analyzes how contested memory and the related social discourse can lead to nationalism and international conflict. The purposes of these analyses are to provide theory-based analytic frameworks

for determining the content and scope of historical memory, and for categorizing and measuring the effects of historical memory.

This chapter *Historical Memory as an Omitted Variable* introduces the main content and organization of the book. It outlines the difficulties of using historical memory as a variable for social science research. This chapter also discusses why the functions of historical memory are overlooked as an omitted variable and the reasons behind the lack of integrated research on historical memory.

Chapter 2 *Collective Memory and National Identity* analyzes the important function of historical memory in collective identity formation. Ethnic, national, or religious identities are built on historical myths that define who a group member is, what it means to be a group member, and typically, who the group's enemies are. These myths are usually based on truth but are selective or exaggerated in their presentation of history. This chapter provides frameworks to understand how historical memory can serve as a constitutive, relational, cognitive, and purporsive content for group identity. Each of these four types of identity content implies an alternate causal pathway between this collective identity and policy behaviors or practices. Particular questions are posed in an effort to measure the content and contestation of historical memory as a collective identity. This chapter also reviews the three main approaches to looking at historical memory in identity formation: primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism. As Anthony D. Smith has argued "no memory, no identity, no identity, no nation," it is this collective memory of the past that binds a group of people together.[17] On the national level, identity determines national interests, which in turn determines policy and state action. Understanding a group of people's collective memory can help us better understand their national interests and political actions.

Chapter 3 *Memory, Perceptions, and Policy Making* discusses how historical memory influences the actor's interpretation and understanding of the external world in a specific situation and the conditions where historical memory influences the decision-making process. Although history and memory are rarely by themselves the direct causes of conflict, they provide the "lens" by which we view and bring into focus our world; through the lens, differences are refracted and conflict pursued. The lens of historical memory helps both the masses and elites interpret the present and decide on policy. Frameworks are developed to conceptualize the function of historical memory as the lens and motivational tool.

This chapter also provides frameworks for conducting research to identify the functions of historical memory in policy making. It identifies three "causal pathways" when ideas can act as causal factors in influencing policy behavior: (1) as road maps and/or filters that limit policy choices and can also provide compelling ethical or moral motivations for actions; (2) when in the absence of unique equilibrium, they may serve as focal points that define cooperative solutions or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular groups; (3) once ideas become embedded in rules and norms—that is, once they become institutionalized—they constrain public policy. In order to discern whether historical memory acts as road maps and/or focal points in a group's policy and practice behavior, three groups of questions were designed to examine the three aspects.

Chapter 4 *Memory, Education, and Textbooks* analyzes the important role of school history education and social discourse in forming collective memories. The powerful link between collective memory and history is particularly salient in the educational system. Forging a country's collective memory is an integral part of nation building, and schools are the primary social institutions that transmit national narratives about the past. Through examples from different countries, this chapter analyzes the important functions of historical education and textbooks as (1) "the modern version of village storytellers," (2) authoritative narratives and "supreme historical court," (3) tools of ideology for glorifying, consolidating, legitimizing, and justifying, and (4) chronicling relations with others. History education is important to every country, democratic, and authoritarian. It not only has shaped the younger generation's understanding of their own country, but also deeply influenced their view of the outside world.

For the purpose of understanding a country, the orthodox research approach focuses on collecting political, socioeconomic, and security data and then conducting macro-analysis of institutions, policies, and decision-making. Such an approach, however, has critical limitations for understanding the deep structure and dynamics of the country. This chapter argues that to understand a country, one should visit the country's primary schools and high schools and read their history textbooks. A nation's history is not merely a recounting of its past; what individuals and countries remember and what they choose to forget are telling indicators of their current values, perceptions, and future objectives.[18] This chapter uses examples of history textbooks from China, Germany,

France, and Japan to discuss research methods of using history textbooks and social discourse as data and sources for research.

Chapter 5 *The Four Dimensions of Historical Memory* presents a framework to understand the functions of historical memory in different political and cultural settings. Because historical memory means different things in different regions and countries, it would be important for us to understand the contexts of historical memory. By measuring the levels of the high or low context of historical consciousness, political usage of historical memory, reconciliation between historically feuding parties, and openness and diversity of opinions regarding historical issues, it will help identify how historical memory affects a particular state and society. Different levels and compilations of these four dimensions would provide indicators to understand the function of historical memory and the level of potential conflict between different states.

Chapter 6 *Researching Historical Memory* focuses on methods of conducting research on historical memory, including how to use public opinion polls, textbooks, important texts, and documents (official speeches and documents, memoirs, etc.), and monuments and memory sites for conducting research to examine the functions of historical memory. It gives concrete examples from published books or research articles of how researchers from different disciplines have conducted research on historical memory. Particularly, it discusses discourse analysis and narrative analysis. This chapter also discusses research methods regarding perception and attitude, especially how to identify and measure the influences of historical memory in actors' perceptions.

Historical memory is indeed a very special subject of research. Because it functions as preconscious or subconscious patterns of thinking and ideas, collective memory is very often our "collective unconscious." As a group of people's national "deep culture," historical memory is not objective knowledge and very often cannot be explicitly learned. While the idea of historical memory shaping identity is generally acknowledged, scholars have not found effective means of measuring or analyzing its effects. This chapter also attempts to integrate the main points emphasized throughout the book, especially regarding conducting research using historical memory as a variable.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, historical memory has been a subject that many political scientists usually avoid, despite the fact that it continues to be a hot topic in daily newspapers, novels, and the performing arts.[19] This is because it is much easier to tell stories about

history than to measure the effects of historical memory in a society. Because of the research method challenges, issues of political memory are theoretically and empirically among the least developed questions. The author hopes that the frameworks and concepts developed in this book can serve as a useful manual for conducting research on historical memory.

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CHAPTER 2

Collective Memory and National Identity

Abstract This chapter analyzes the important functions of historical memory in collective identity formation. Ethnic, national, or religious identities are built on historical myths that define who a group member is, what it means to be a group member, and typically, who the group's enemies are. This chapter provides a few frameworks to understand how historical memory can serve as a constitutive, relational, and purposive content for group identity. Each of these types of identity content implies an alternate causal pathway between this collective identity and policy behaviors or practices. Understanding a group of people's collective memory can help us to better understand their national interests and political actions.

Keywords Historical memory · Collective identity · Types of identity content · Causal pathway

As a group of people's national "deep culture" and "collective unconsciousness," historical memory is not objective knowledge and very often cannot be explicitly learned. Some scholars may believe that historical memory matters, but only influences emotions or relates to the actor's psychology and attitudes. Some think of historical memory as a social narrative that is mainly created and manipulated by political elites as a tool to mobilize people to work in their own interests. However,

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these beliefs overlook the important function of historical memory as a key element in the construction of national identity.

This chapter conceptualizes the relationship between historical memory and national identity formation. As Anthony D. Smith has argued, the prime raw material for constructing ethnicity is history.[1] Ethnic, national, or religious identities are built on historical myths that define who a group member is, what it means to be a group member, and typically who the group's enemies are.[2] These myths are usually based on truth but are selective or exaggerated in their presentation of history. Historical memory as an identity content can shape or influence policy behavior in several ways. It could work as a constitutive norm, specifying rules or norms that define a group. Moreover, it constitutes references and comparisons to other groups, especially the ones with historical problems with the group. Third, it affects the way a group interprets and understands the world. Finally, it provides the group with the future roles and tasks to perform.[3] On the national level, identity determines national interests, which in turn determine policy and state action. Understanding people's collective memory can help us better understand their national interests and political actions. This chapter analyzes the important function of historical memory in collective identity formation. It also reviews the main approaches to looking at historical memory in identity formation.

Primordialism, Constructivism, and Instrumentalism

Since sociological constructivism's rise during the 1990s, not only have issues of collective memory and identity received more attention, but literature featuring political memory's role in group membership and identity formation has also risen.[4] Some scholars focus their research on exploring how ethnic, national or religious identities are built on historical myths that define who a group member is, what it means to be a group member, and typically, who the group's enemies are.[5] These myths are usually based on truth but are selective or exaggerated in their presentation of history. There are three main approaches to looking at the formation of group identity and the function of historical memory in this process: primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism.

Primordialists assert that collective memory and identity are formed based on the primordial ties of blood, kinship, language, and common history. In other words, memory is passed intergenerationally. As Gerrit

W. Gong writes, "Transferring from generation to generation, history and memory issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that chart the future in the name of the past."[6]

Constructivists, on the other hand, view identity as manufactured rather than given and emphasize that both ethnicity and identity are socially constructed. In *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Lowenthal argues that it is us, the contemporaries, who construct our past selectively and for a variety of reasons.[7] According to Maurice Halbwachs, who conducted pioneering work on collective memory, "collective memory reconstructs its various recollections to accord with contemporary ideas and preoccupations."[8] He uses the term "presentism" to emphasize the "use value" of the past for the solution of the present problems. In other words, the past is reconstructed regarding the concerns and needs of the present. Benedict Anderson argues that print languages laid the foundation for national consciousness by creating unified fields of exchange and communication.[9] According to Anderson, print capitalism (the book market, mass media, etc.) linked people in disparate regions to a larger, imagined national community. People learn their group's history not only from their parents or grandparents, but also from schools, history books, and mass media as well.

Instrumentalism explains motivational force behind the mobilization of ethnic groups. In promoting individual or collective interests, the past is often used "instrumentally"; history becomes a popular tool for competing elites to solidify power and gain popular support. A dominant group also typically manipulates ethnic categories to maintain power and justify discrimination against the other groups. Stuart J. Kaufman argues in his book, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*, that people are taught ethnic hatred, not born into it. Ethnic groups in current conflict have not hated each other for hundreds of years; rather people take events from their history and exaggerate them to suit the current narrative. Ethnic war is induced by ethnic leaders or activists utilizing symbolic politics and manipulating ethnic symbols to incite hostility against and pursue ethnic domination over other groups.[10] According to instrumentalists, a group's goals (such as increases in power or status) employ historical interpretation and narrative as resources for their political strategy.[11] State education, then, is a way to instill dominant social values with the aim of producing loyal citizens with a shared identity.[12]

Table 2.1 Three approaches to the formation of collective memory

	Formation of collective memory	*Features*	*Media*
Primordialism	Passed inter-generationally on the basis of the primordial ties of blood, kinship, language and common history	Inherited, cultural, difficult to change	Family stories, folktales
Constructivism	Reconstructed with regard to the concerns and needs of the present	Constructed and learned, change over time	"Print capitalism", school education, social media
Instrumentalism	Used as resources or instruments for interest groups for achieving goals and interests	Manipulated, political, change over time	Official narratives, propaganda, school education

Table 2.1 compares the approaches of primordialists, constructivists, and instrumentalists in terms of the formation, features, and media of historical memory. It should be noted that, however, the three approaches are not mutually exclusive.

Scholars also particularly discussed how past conflicts and the related collective memories have played important roles in shaping group identity. The more there is past conflict between groups, the more likely those individuals are judging one another on their group affiliation rather than on individual characteristics. When there has historically been conflict between groups, the individuals tend to judge one another not on individual characteristics but rather on group affiliation.[13] Additionally, conflict can assist generating and sustaining social identity; in other words, deep-rooted social identity may be a product of conflict at least as much as deep-rooted conflict is a product of clashing social identities.[14] The widespread blindness to this reverse process is largely due to the assumption that social identities are primordial, coded in a group's proverbial DNA.[15]

Whether through intergenerational indoctrination, the print media, educational systems, or conflict itself, historical memory plays a major role in identity formation. Identity is formed by experiences of both the individual and the society. It is important to know how these identities are formed to understand how they frame our understanding of the world.

The Chosenness–Myths–Trauma (CMT) Complex

Key historical events—both traumas and glories—are powerful ethnic or large-group markers. Certain struggles the group has endured, such as past losses, defeat, and severe humiliation, also shape group identity and bind the people together. Just as historical traumas can bring a group together, so can historical events instill feelings of success and triumph.[16] According to Johan Galtung, the three forces of chosenness (the idea of being the people chosen by transcendental forces), trauma, and myths combine to form a country's Chosenness–Myths–Trauma (CMT) complex, or a more evocative term: the collective megalo-paranoia syndrome.[17] Galtung's CMT complex is important for not only defining national identity but also helping us to understand how a large-group (i.e., ethnic) identity functions naturally and how it reacts in conflict.[18]

A sense of chosenness, or the belief in being selected by some transpersonal forces, such as God, Allah, or History, commonly exists in many cultures. Many groups and cultures believe they are chosen by transcendental forces and elevated above all others. For the ancient Chinese, for example, their strong sense of chosenness is evident in the many names they gave to their country. China is called *Zhongguo* in Mandarin Chinese. The first character *Zhong* means "central" or "middle," while *Guo* means "kingdom" or "nation." People believed that they lived in the center of the world. Another common name for China is *Shenzhou*, which can literally be translated as the "sacred land" or "the divine land." Chosenness is often related to a group's religious beliefs, and many groups believe that they are chosen, covenanted people, under God, with rights and duties (Fig. 2.1).

Vamik Volkan, a psychoanalyst of Virginia University, examines how individual identity is inextricably intertwined with his or her large-group (i.e., ethnic) identity, and how mental representations of historical events shape this identity. Volkan's research emphasizes the selective process of historical memory, either as trauma or as glories. He identifies a "chosen trauma" (the horrors of the past that cast shadows onto the future) and a "chosen glory" (myths about a glorious future, often seen as a reenactment of a glorious past) as elements in the development of group identity.[19]

Volkan's research shows chosen traumas and chosen glories are passed down generationally by parent/teacher–child interactions and a group's ceremonies dedicated to specific triumphs or trauma.[20] Enmity passes from one generation to the next when traumatic events are absorbed



Fig. 2.1 Chosenness–Myths–Trauma (CMT) complex

into a group's identity; though later generations never experienced the events, they share its suffering. Over time, chosen glories become as heavily mythologized as chosen traumas.[21] Chosen glories increase the self-esteem of children associated with them and link the children with their group and each other.[22]

Past victories in battle and great accomplishments of a technical or artistic nature frequently act as a group's chosen glories, as virtually every large group has tales of grandeur associated with it. The shared importance of such events, whether recent or ancient, real or mythologized, helps to bind the individuals in a large group together.[23] Myths about the past and present glories usually lie at the center of each country's identity education.

While large groups may have experienced any number of traumas in their history, only certain instances remain alive over many years. A group's "chosen trauma" consists of experiences that come "to symbolize this group's deepest threats and fears through feelings of hopelessness and victimization."[24] It reflects the traumatized past generation's incapacity for mourning losses, connected to the shared traumatic event, as well as its failure to reverse the injury to the group's self-esteem and humiliation. A group does not really "choose" to be victimized and subsequently lose self-esteem, but it does "choose" to psychologize and mythologize—to dwell on and exaggerate—the event.

Both chosen glory and chosen trauma are important ethnic or large-group markers. However, as Volkan has argued, whereas chosen glories merely raise the self-esteem of group members, generational transmission of chosen traumas provokes complicated tasks of mourning and/or reversing humiliation. Such traumas initiate much more profound psychological processes, as chosen traumas bind group members together more powerfully.[25] Understanding chosen trauma is a key to discern the process of generational transmission of past historical events and the formation of group identity. Feelings of shame surrounding past traumas can lead victims to both over-exaggerate current threats and incite strong feelings of desire for revenge. The beliefs of history and memory thus often motivate the escalation of conflict and the course of its development. Sensitivity to old grievances (closely connected with the nation's historical memory and its "chosen trauma") could also render the country prone to tantrums at even the slightest international offense, real or imagined.

Past traumas can sometimes also be used as a mode of validation of the idea of chosenness. A group of people may feel that since they have suffered so much, there must be a deeper meaning to that suffering, to be revealed in a positive, even glorious future. As Johan Galtung suggests, new traumas are then expected for the future, with a mixture of fear and lustful anticipation of self-fulfilling prophecies coming true.[26]

Many scholars have used the models of CMT complex and chosen trauma versus chosen glory in their research. For example, modern historical consciousness in China is powerfully influenced by the "century of humiliation" from the First Opium War (1839–1842) through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. Many Chinese perceive this period as a time when their nation was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists. Scholars on Chinese affairs have highlighted the special significance of this part of history and the sense of trauma in shaping national identity and social discourse in China.[27] Zheng Wang has particularly used the CMT complex as a main analytic tool for understanding Chinese historical consciousness and nationalism.[28] Specifically, as proud citizens of the "Middle Kingdom," the Chinese feel a strong sense of chosenness and are extremely proud of their ancient and modern achievements. This pride is tampered, however, by the lasting trauma seared into the national conscious because of the country's humiliating experiences at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism from 1840 to 1945. After suffering a humiliating decline in national strength

and status, the Chinese people are unwavering in their commitment to return China to its natural state of glory.[29]

Identity as a Variable

Many scholars have paid special efforts to use identity as an independent variable to explain political action. Some scholars believe that the two issues hampering systematic incorporation of identity as a variable in explaining political action are definition and measurement:

> There is not much consensus on how to define identity; nor is there consistency in the procedures used for determining the content and scope of identity; nor is there agreement on where to look for evidence that identity indeed affects knowledge, interpretations, beliefs, preferences, and strategies; nor is there agreement on how identity affects these components of action.[30]

A collective identity is defined as a social category that varies along two dimensions—content and contestation. This definition is based on theories of actions, such as social identity theory and role theory, as well as past research in this area.

The content of identity may take the form of four non-mutually exclusive types: constitutive norms, relational content, cognitive models, and social purpose.[31] When constitutive norms are present, the norms of a collective identity specify rules for group membership (categorization) and accepted attributes (identification). Constitutive norms organize actions in ways that help define the interests of groups.

Relational content, on the other hand, focuses on the relationships people have with others. Collective identities are always partially relational—composed of comparisons and references to other collective identities from which they are distinguished. The relational characteristics of collective identities include exclusivity, status, and hostility. It determines the extent to which one social identity excludes the holding of another (exclusivity). If you are a member of group x, you are not allowed to be a member of group y. Relational characteristics create the relative status of an identity compared to others so that group x is identified as superior to group y. This superiority/inferiority dichotomy raises the level of hostility presented by other identities. The creation of in-group identity will tend to produce competitive behavior with out-groups or lead to the devaluation of out-groups.[32]

A collective identity's content can be cognitive, explaining how group membership associates with how the world works and describes the group's social reality and allowing interpretation of the world. The cognitive model, which explains how group ontology forms collective identities, explains how an individual actor's worldview is shaped by collective identity and how a group interprets the world. Identity thus determines the values of material and social incentives for specific actions and influences the evaluation of actions based on the incentives.

Finally, a group's collective identity may be purporsive if the group attaches specific meanings and goals to its identity—this is similar to the idea that who we think we are determines what we want. As a result, identities encourage actors to act in accordance with and interpret the world through lenses relating to group purposes. The group's identity also gives socially sanctioned roles for its actors to perform; actions are not performed and results are not derived based on the preferred outcome, but rather from fulfilling the role allowed by identity.

Therefore, the four types that make up the content of identity, policy behavior, or practices have an implied causal pathway between them and collective identity. Collective identities have at least one type of content, but many have more or even all four (Table 2.2).[33]

The content of identities is neither fixed nor predetermined, but rather the outcome of a process of social contestation. Much of what we think of as identity discourse is the controversy over the meaning of a particular collective identity. Specific interpretations of the meaning of an identity are sometimes widely shared among members of a group and sometimes less widely shared. At a minimum, contestation can be thought of as a matter of degree—the content of collective identities can be more or less contested. When a society experiences certain circumstances, such as external threat, for example, contestation over identity may drop dramatically.

Table 2.2 Types of identity content

Types of identity content	*Functions of historical memory*
Constitutive norms	Specifies norms or rules that define group membership, and the interests of groups
Relational comparisons	Conducts comparisons and references to other identities or groups
Cognitive models	Affects the way group members interpret and understand the world
Purporsive content	Provides the group socially appropriate roles to perform

Social identity theory is one of the most influential contemporary theories of group behavior. The theory explains how identity emerges from the processes of social categorization and comparison and how it influences intergroup relations. This theory is based on three central ideas about intergroup behavior: categorization, identification, and comparison.[34] We categorize objects to understand them and people in order to understand our social environment. We identify with groups that we see ourselves belonging to. By this, we mean that people think of themselves in terms of "us" versus "them" or in-group versus out-group. A positive self-concept is part of normal psychological functioning.

Social identity theory, instead of focusing on an individual within a group, examines how collective identity and esteem impact an individual (or the group within the individual). Group membership and in-group identities lend individuals positive self-identity and esteem. Instead of regarding themselves as individuals, they identify more so as "group members" and participate in "collective action," sharing common interest and fate with others in their collective identity. There are cultural differences in in-group identities; normally if the culture is more collectivist, people identify with and differentiate their own group from others.[35]

How people respond to negative social identity is also explained by social identity theory. Tajfel and Turner consider two belief systems on how individuals respond to negative social identity.[36] "Social mobility," a belief that society is flexible and permeable, allows for individuals the opportunity to transition from a specific, negative in-group to a better one. By hard work, immigration, talent, or another factor, an individual dissatisfied with his/her current standing believes it is possible to favorably change groups. At the other extreme, "social change" is based on the belief that group boundaries are impermeable, individual attempts to change certain aspects of the comparative situation in order to achieve favorable in-group comparisons. Social change strategies include social creativity (such as finding new dimensions of comparison and redefining the value attached to attributes), social competition (direct competition with the out-group in order to achieve actual changes in the status of the groups), and social action (such as social protest, social movement, and revolution). Group members' desire for positive social identity can also provide contending leaders with the basis for social mobilization of mass support.

Based on the above-mentioned theories and concepts, I have developed an analytic framework (see Table 2.3) for studying historical

Table 2.3 Historical memory as a collective identity

Norms & Models		Research Questions
Constitutive Norms	**Categorization**	Does the content of historical memory specify rules that determine group membership?
	Identification	Does the content of historical memory help to define the group's fundamental characteristics and attributes?
	Pride, Trauma & Self Esteem	Does the content of historical memory constitute the basis of the group's pride, glory, trauma and self-esteem?
Relational Norms	**Social Comparison**	Does the content of historical memory help to specify to whom this social group compares themselves with and who the group's enemies are?
	Social Mobilization	Does the content of historical memory provide political leaders and elites with the basis for mobilizing mass support?
	Social Mobility & Change	Is the content of historical memory a source of group members' social mobility or social change?
Purposive Norms	**Social Purpose**	Does the content of historical memory define group purposes?
	Role Identity	Does the content of historical memory provide actors socially appropriate roles to perform?

memory. A set of questions is asked to identify whether and how the content of historical memory serves as the different types of identity content—constitutive norms, relational content, and social purpose. By creating this framework for research, I hope to provide a model by which researchers can conduct a more rigorous and replicable study of historical memory. This framework can help categorize, measure, and subsequently demonstrate the effects of historical memory.

The first section of this framework identifies whether historical memory serves as constitutive norms for the group's identity; if a collective identity serves the role of constitutive norms, the identity should: categorize how one is a member of a group; identify why that is so; and comprise of an element of group self-esteem and myth. To examine historical memory's role with a group's identity construction, these questions will act as a measure to what extent historical memory serves as constitutive norms:

1. Does the content of historical memory specify rules that determine group membership? (e.g., Who is a group member?)
2. Does the content of historical memory help to define the inherent characteristics and attributes? (e.g., What it means to be a group member?)
3. Does the content of historical memory constitute the basis of the group's glory, trauma, and self-esteem? (e.g., specific historical events that shaped a group's identity)

These questions help researchers determine how to measure the effects of historical memory by defining and categorizing concepts and research targets.

The framework provided by the second section is for identifying historical memory as relational norms and its sub-concepts: social comparison, social mobilization, social mobility, and social change. By using several questions based on these concepts, researchers can investigate historical memory's influence in each category and formulate inquiries specific to their own projects.

1. Does the content of historical memory help to specify to whom this social group compares themselves with and who the group's enemies are?

2. Does the content of historical memory give political leaders and elites the basis for mobilizing mass support?
3. Is historical memory a source of group members' social mobility or social change?

The third section contains questions for measuring whether and how historical memory serves as purposive norms through defining group purposes and/or providing socially appropriate roles to perform.

1. Does the content of historical memory define group purposes?
2. Does the content of historical memory provide actors socially appropriate roles?

This framework mainly addresses three types of identity content. Even though many collective identities are comprised of all three types, a research project may focus only on one of the three types if needed. If a researcher wants to study the role of historical memory in one group of people's membership identification, the researcher can focus on the first type of identity content and use this part of the framework to guide this research. In general, this framework suggests a road map for research: When examining the role of historical memory in constructing a group's identity, we should find out what role historical memory plays in the process of this group's categorization, identification, self-esteem, and role identity.

These conceptualizations provide an analytic framework for systematic research of the functions of historical memory. Whether it is exploring the impact of historical memory, group dynamics, or ethnic unity, these questions are useful as a guide to categorizing and measuring the effects of historical memory. Based on these frameworks, when examining the role of historical memory in a given group's policy behaviors or practices (such as foreign policy and conflict behavior), we are able to first find out what role historical memory plays in the formation of group identity, particularly what roles historical memory play in the process of this group's categorization, identification, and comparison of identity.

As discussed, historical memory can also serve as cognitive content of identity providing interpretations, frames, lenses, and analogies for groups to categorize and understand the world. This function will be discussed in the next chapter.

Notes

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CHAPTER 3

Memory, Perception, and Policy Making

Abstract This chapter conceptualizes how historical memory influences the actor's interpretation and understanding of the external world, especially in a specific situation such as a crisis or conflict. A few frameworks are developed to conceptualize the function of historical memory as the lens and motivational tool, and the conditions where historical memory influences the decision-making process. This chapter also discusses research methods regarding perception and attitude, especially about how to identify and measure the influences of historical memory in actors' perception.

Keywords Historical memory · Perception · Policy making · Conflict

Humans have a limited capacity to organize and analyze data.[1] Consequently, we must rely on simplifying mechanisms to process (code, store, and recall) the massive amounts of information we encounter in our daily lives. Frames are shortcuts that people use to help make sense of complex information. Often, these frames are built on underlying structures derived from beliefs, values, and experiences. These differ across cultures and nationalities. In addition, frames often exist prior to conscious decision-making and can affect subsequent decisions. Consequently, the nature of how and when frames are formed, factions are separated not only by differences in interests, beliefs, and values, but also in how they

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perceive and understand the world, both at a conscious and subconscious level.

One way human beings make sense of new situations is by comparing them to previous experiences stored in memory. The history of a people profoundly influences the perception they have of the world around them, and historical memory often functions as important information processors. Historical memory influences actors' interpretation and understanding of the external world and a particular situation. This often leads actors to endow practices with group purposes and to interpret the world through frames defined in part by those purposes.

This chapter discusses how historical memory influences an actors' interpretation and understanding of the external world, particularly during a conflict and the conditions where historical memory influences the decision-making process. A few frameworks are introduced to conceptualize the function of historical memory as the lens and motivational tool. This chapter also provides frameworks on how to conduct research to identify the functions of historical memory in policy making.

Framing and Reframing

Collective memory is of special importance during a seemingly intractable conflict. According to Bar-Tal, the beliefs of collective memory fulfill the epistemic function of illuminating the situation of conflict. He considers four important themes which collective memory influence the perception of the conflict and its management:[2] (1) Collective memory can justify the outbreak of the conflict and the course of its development; (2) In intractable conflicts, a group's beliefs of collective memory present positive images of the group itself, as the group engages in intense self-justification, self-glorification, and self-praise; (3) The beliefs of collective memory delegitimize the opponent; (4) A group's beliefs of collective memory present its own group as being a victim of the opponent.

In the context of a conflict, we create frames to help us understand why the conflict exists, what actions are important to the conflict, why the parties act as they do, and how we should act in response. During the evolution of a conflict, frames act as sieves through which information is gathered and analyzed, positions are determined (including priorities, means, and solutions), and action plans developed. Depending on the context, framing may be used to conceptualize and interpret, or to manipulate and convince.[3]



Fig. 3.1 Historical memory as a lens

As some scholars suggest, frames are built upon an underlying structure of beliefs, values, and experiences.[4] Strong collective memories of past conflicts are often important sources of frames. In addition, frames often exist prior to conscious processing of information for decision-making and affect subsequent individual decisions. Disputants often construct frames that differ in significant ways. Thus, disputants are separated not only by differences in interests, beliefs, and values, but also in how they perceive and understand the world, both at a conscious and preconscious level.[5]

Although history and memory are, rarely by themselves, the direct causes of conflict, they provide the "lens" by which we view and bring into focus our world; through this lens, differences are refracted, and conflict ensues.[6] The lens of historical memory helps both the masses and the elites interpret the present situation and decide on future policies.[7] The existing literature suggests that each party to a conflict or dispute has its own unique understanding of the sources of conflict and relevance of various issues. This includes the opportunities and risks associated with different choices.[8] Each of these factors can be considered a set of lenses through which the various parties view the conflict and form the basis of their actions.

Figure 3.1 provides an intellectual map that conceptualizes the function of historical memory as a lens and its relationship with perception and behavior. Each party to a conflict or dispute has their own perception and understanding of the sources of conflict, the relevance of various issues, their priorities, and the opportunities and risks involved with different choices.[9] This assemblage of factors can be considered as a set of lenses, or conceptual frames, through which the various parties view the conflict. Differing conceptual frames held by the parties involved in a dispute form the basis on which they act.

Historical memory can affect the way actors come to understand and interpret the outside world and incoming information. Socially shared images of the past allow a group to foster social cohesion, to develop and defend social identification, and to justify current attitudes and needs. During conflicts, leaders often try to evoke memories of past traumas to spur people to action and make the group more cohesive. Historical enmity thus acts much like an amplifier in an electrical circuit.[10]

The lens of historical memory influences both the masses and the elites to interpret the present and make decisions on policy. For example, in Zheng Wang' book *Never Forget National Humiliation*, the author provides detailed accounts on how a deep historical sense of victimization by outside powers, a long-held suspicion of foreign conspiracies against China, and the powerful governmental education and propaganda campaigns on historical humiliation have worked together to construct a special Chinese "culture of insecurity." Thus, this culture of insecurity has become the frame by which the Chinese interpret present-day events, and influences their reactions and demands to rectify perceived humiliation.[11] Interpretations of history often force unprepared and caught-off-guard governments to deal with internal and external challenges to conventional views of memory and history, especially when dealing with sensitive issues of national pride and international honor.[12] Conflict resolution can be profoundly difficult in these situations.

Scholars have noted that collective memory and history often become tools for elites and states to mobilize mass support. For instance, political elites often use past traumas for implementing their goals; this is especially true in moments of crisis when people tend to more fervently cling to the past. If a group's identity is challenged, undermined, or even shattered, memories are often used and manipulated to reaffirm group bonds and reinforce a sense of self and community.[13] Jerzy Jedlicki analyzes two ways "a vivid historical memory fans the flame of current animosities:"

> First, it does so through the process of sanctification of some historical events that transforms their dates, places, actors and relics into powerful symbols, and the stories into unifying myths. Secondly, a memory of collective wrongs and losses suffered in the past from another nation, but also an awareness, however dim, of one's own nation's responsibility for wrongs done to other peoples, burden the present conflict with strong resentments and make it appear to be either a historical repetition, or a historical redress.[14]

The link between historical memory and the rise of nationalism is essential to note because myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage are what gives nationalism its power. Perhaps even more importantly, it is the way by which these idealizations of the past can be rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intellectual elite.[15] An important indicator that identity violence may be forthcoming is nationalist (or religious) myths justifying hostility against another group. These myths are evident in national media, school curricula, official government documents and speeches, popular literature, and history. The more hostile the myths or ideology, the more likely violence is to occur.[16]

There is also a significant link between historical memory and political legitimacy. This link is best evidenced by the attempt of nationalist movements to create a master commemorative narrative that emphasizes a common past and ensures a common destiny.[17] Political leaders often use historical memory to bolster their own legitimacy, promote their own interests, encourage a nationalistic spirit, and mobilize mass support. The politics of memory has proven to be central in the transition to democracy throughout the world.[18] Perceptions of the past are essential in both de-legitimating previous regimes and in grounding new claims to political legitimacy. By shaping collective memory, governments can uphold their own legitimacy and find reasons to topple that of others.

Collective memory is of special importance during a seemingly irresolvable conflict. It influences people's approaches to conflict and its management in several ways. Firstly, it can justify the outbreak of the conflict and the course of its development. If you believe you have been historically wronged, you are more likely to engage in conflict. Secondly, in intractable conflicts, a group's beliefs of collective memory present positive images of the group itself, as it engages in intense self-justification, self-glorification, and self-praise. A history of victimization and endurance can help build a group's self-esteem as the group members begin to see themselves as the progeny of a longline of survivors. Thirdly, the beliefs of collective memory delegitimize the opponent. A group's memory of previous wrongs will keep the members from seeing the conflict through their opponents' eyes. Finally, a group's beliefs of collective memory present its own group as being a victim of the opponent.[19] These four influences create an inextricable web which often keeps groups engaged in conflict.

Framing and reframing are also vital to the conflict management and reconciliation process. Analyzing the frames people use in a given conflict

provides fresh insight and better understanding of the conflict dynamics and development of said conflict. More importantly, with the help of reframing, stakeholders may find new ways to reach agreements.[20] Thus, the processes of reconciliation, negotiation, or joint problem solving can be seen as the processes of reframing. Reframing may pave ways for resolving, or at least better managing, a dispute.

An important reason why many deep-rooted conflicts find it challenging to realize reconciliation is because reframing a group's collective memories is so difficult. Scholars ask whether it is possible to reframe the past for the purpose of promoting reconciliation and peace.[21] As discussed before, a group's collective memory has been in formation for a long time. This memory has been shaped and influenced by many factors including the state's manipulation, social narratives, school education, and popular culture. It's probably easy for people outside to say that a group of people should "move forward" and to forget the past grievance for the purpose of reconciliation and maximizing the current common interests, however, for the group themselves, historical memory of past trauma is actually the key elements of constructing their national identity. A new narrative or national story of the past conflicts is first not easy to be created, and then the change of "stories" and "narratives" would almost mean to re-create a nation and would take a very long time. It is not realistic to expect a brand-new master narrative or national story to be created out of nothing.

Analogy is a cognitive process of transferring information or meaning from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another (the target). Historical memories provide individuals a reservoir of shared symbols and analogies that may be enlisted to define contesting social groups.[22] These analogies often help reconcile conflicting incoming information in ways consistent with the expectations of the analogy. Historical memory can be easily activated when an out-group's mischievous behavior causes suffering of the in-group. Leaders do not merely justify policies using historical analogies, but also an essential component of the decision-making process. In *Analogies at War,* Foong Yuen Khong shows historical analogies are also used as an essential basis for information processing in political decision-making. Historical analogy can infer that if two or more events have one similarity, they may have another, "AX:BX:AY:BY–because event A resembles event B in having characteristic X, and A also has characteristic Y; it is inferred that B also has characteristic Y."[23]

Analogy plays a significant role in problem solving, as well as decision-making, perception, memory, creativity, emotion, explanation, and communication. These historical analogies often form the basis for foreign policy and political propaganda. Scholars have also discussed how US policy makers routinely resort to historical analogies. Khong's research examines how American policy makers, from World War I to Operation Desert Storm, continually emphasize "lessons of history" when debating whether or not to go to war.[24] There have also been comparisons made between the Iraq War and Vietnam War,[25] and an increased discussion about the different responses America had to the 9–11 attack as opposed to Pearl Harbor.[26]

Political elites also use historical analogies to persuade and influence opinions. For example, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in January 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Abe said that rising tensions between China and Japan today were similar to the competition between Germany and Britain before World War I. According to Abe, a "similar situation" existed in both cases because strong trade ties were not sufficient to overcome strategic rivalry.[27] Obviously, he wanted his audience to view modern China as being as dangerous as Germany in 1914.

A number of factors affect the strength of historical analogies, including the relevance of the known similarities, the amount and variety of the examples in the analogy, and the number of shared characteristics among the things being compared. For example, today's China and Japan indeed share some similarities to Britain and Germany before 1914, such as close economic ties and security rivalries. At the same time, the size, amount, and level of the economic ties between the two groups of states during the two periods of time have significant differences. Furthermore, the basic structure of the world has changed from one of imperialism to one of globalization. Also, although modern Japan undoubtedly shares many similarities with pre-war Japan, the country's political institutions, decision-making structures, society, and foreign relations have all experienced dramatic and fundamental changes. Thus, many so-called similarities are actually incomparable and irrelevant.

It is therefore irresponsible for scholars to spread various historical analogies and "lessons of history," and it is dangerous for political leaders to use historical analogies to mobilize support. These ready-to-use analogies could make people believe everything is doomed, and therefore not make strong efforts to uphold peace and to create new opportunities for reconciliation.

As Tidwell suggests, "Without a good sense of history, no conflict can be understood in a meaningful way for resolution. The importance of history cannot be over-emphasized."[28] In many deep-rooted conflicts, past problems become the ghosts for current realities and frequently affect current relationship. Historically, poor relationships and suspicions between two sides initially impede constructive discussion.[29] When an emergency happens and when decision makers are under pressure to make decisions, especially when an incident has caused one side's sufferings (e.g., casualties and injuries), history and memory (through historical analogies and cognitive processing) are easily activated and play the greatest role during the selection and rejection of policy options. They exert their impact by influencing the assessments and evaluations policy makers must make in order to choose between alternative options.

Three Causal Pathways of Beliefs

In their book "*Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework*," Robert Keohane, Judith Goldstein, and their colleagues examine the role of ideas in foreign policy formation and present a method for analyzing how ideas explain political outcomes. They define "ideas" as "beliefs held by individuals" or "cognitive content of collective identity."[30] As discussed before, collective historical memory often solidifies the ideas a group holds about its members and its adversaries.

Keohane and Goldstein identify three "causal pathways" in which ideas, including those constituting historical memory, can influence policy behavior: when ideas serve as road maps, as special equilibrium, and when ideas become institutionalized.[31] Because individuals often have incomplete information when evaluating policy, the ideas and belief systems that individuals hold, therefore, become important elements in the explanation of policy choices. When faced with the uncertainty of policy making, beliefs and ideas can function as road maps in three ways. An actor's interpretation or judgment of the scenario may be influenced by his or her ideas, limiting the options available to them by excluding variables or rejecting information that could lead to an alternative course of action. Here, ideas are limiting policy choices by filtering out alternatives. Ethical or moral justifications for action are also strongly influenced by one's beliefs and ideas. And, finally, behavior is guided by ideas and beliefs stipulating casual patterns.

Second, ideas can contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium. Ideas may serve as focal points that define cooperative solutions or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular groups. When political actors must choose between outcomes with no "objective" criteria on which to base choices, ideas often focus expectations and strategies. Political elites may settle on a course of action on the basis of shared cultural, normative, religious, ethnic, or causal beliefs while other policies may be ignored. Ideas or identity can act as causal factors in influencing policy behavior by coordinating cooperation and group cohesion; however, they can also contribute to outcomes by the opposite way—causing conflict and disorder.

Third, once ideas or beliefs have become institutionalized, they constrain public policy.[32] The term *institutionalization* is used here to denote the process of embedding particular values and norms within an organization, social system, or society. Once these ideas are institutionalized, they can have lasting impact for generations to come. When institutions intervene, the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations. In this sense, ideas can have an impact even when people no longer genuinely believe in them as a principled or causal statement. Furthermore, once a policy choice leads to the creation of reinforcing organizational and normative structures, the policy idea can impact the incentives of political entrepreneurs long after the interests of its initial proponents have changed.[33]

In summary, ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends–means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions. In order to find out whether the ideas of historical memory act as road maps and/or focal points in a group's policy and practice behavior, specific questions concerning the three aspects need to be answered.

These questions are outlined in Table (3.1). The first group of questions is for the purpose of identifying whether the particular beliefs of historical memory play the role of road maps for response and behavior in conflict and uncertain situations. Based on the conceptual framework presented before, ideas and beliefs serve as road maps in three ways: (1) influencing actors' interpretation and judgment regarding the situations; (2) providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for actions;

Table 3.1 Three causal pathways of collective memories

Causal Pathways		**Research Questions**
Road maps	Information Processing & Decision-making	Does historical memory influence actors' interpretation and judgment, such as functioning as a filter that excludes other interpretations or limiting policy options for response?
	Motivation & Mobilization	Have political leaders used historical memory to mobilize mass support and/or justify hostility against another group? Does historical memory provide ethical or moral motivations for actions?
	Guideline	Does historical memory stipulate causal patterns to guide behavior under conditions of uncertainty?
Equilibrium	Cooperation	Does historical memory act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of a group?
	Conflict	Does historical memory cause any conflict or constitute any difficulties to the settlement and resolution of the conflict?
Institutionalization		Have the beliefs of historical memory become embedded in political or social institutions and become institutionalized?

(3) stipulating causal patterns to guide behavior under conditions of uncertainty.

The second group of questions examines how the beliefs of historical memory serve as focal points or glue that coordinate cooperation and group cohesion, or whether they contribute to outcomes by the opposite way of causing conflict and disorder. The third set of questions is about whether or not historical memory has become embedded in political institutions and has been institutionalized.

This analytical framework can not only be used as an integral whole for more systematic research, but can also be divided into several components to focus on particular aspects of historical memory issues. For example, one could use this framework to study how the Polish collective memories about the Katyn Forest Massacre in 1941 influenced the way some current Polish interpret the recent plane tragedy in April 2010. Or, a researcher could use these questions to design a research on how the memory of imperialist bullying in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced the Chinese understanding about the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 8, 1999. The potential research questions could include the following: (1) Did the content of historical memory provide sources of frames, lens, and analogy to interpret the specific event? (2) Did the beliefs of historical memory function as filters that limit choices by excluding other variables and contrary interpretations that might suggest other choices? (3) Did the beliefs of historical memory play any role in limiting, curtailing, and creating policy options for response?

This chapter examines the role of historical memory in perception, interpretation, and decision-making processes. Also included in this analytic framework is a discussion of how memories of past injustices functioned as filters, limiting choices by excluding other interpretations and options. The content of a collective identity can be cognitive. Functioning as a collective identity or collective belief, historical memory affects the way individual actors understand the world. The cognitive content of historical memory provides a source of frames, lens, and analogy to interpret the outside world. In deep-rooted conflicts, past relationships and problems, perception gaps, and psychological barriers have become obstacles for reconciliation or even normal relationship.

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CHAPTER 4

Memory, Education, and Textbooks

Abstract The powerful link between collective memory and history is particularly salient in the educational system. This chapter analyzes the important role of school history education and social discourse in forming collective memories. Through examples from different countries, this chapter analyzes the important functions of history education and school textbooks as "the modern version of village storytellers," authoritative narratives and "supreme historical court," tools of ideology for glorifying, consolidating, legitimizing, and justifying, and chronicling relations with others. This chapter also discusses research methods of using history textbooks and social discourse as data and sources for research.

Keywords Historical memory · History education · History textbook Social discourse

The powerful connection between collective memory and history is particularly salient in the educational system. Forging a country's collective memory is an integral part of nation building, and schools are the primary social institutions that transmit national narratives about the past.[1] Most countries have placed great emphasis on teaching their national history.[2]

This bond consolidation is particularly evident at the time of political transitions. As Evans suggests, "seldom does history seem so urgently

Z. Wang, *Memory Politics, Identity and Conflict*, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62621-5_4

relevant or important as in moments of sudden political transition from one state form to another."[3] From postcommunist East Europe to East Asia and to South Africa, political transitions have often generated the publication of new or rewriting the previous school history textbooks.[4] What is the relationship between history education and the formation of national identity? What are the implications of the uses and abuses of national history for political purposes? What role does history education play in political transition and foreign relations? An exploration of these questions would provide a unique and important approach in the study of world politics.

This chapter analyzes the important role of school history education in the formation of collective memories. For the purpose of understanding a country, the orthodox research approach focuses on collecting political, socioeconomic, and security data and then conducting macroanalysis of institutions, policies, and decision making. Such an approach, however, has critical limitations for understanding the deep structure and dynamics of the country. This chapter argues that to understand a country, one should visit the country's middle schools and high schools and read their history textbooks. A nation's history is not merely a recounting of its past—what individuals and countries remember and what they choose to forget are telling indicators of their current values, perceptions, and even aspirations.[5]

History Education and Collective Memory

The manipulation of the past provides the opportunity to mold the present and the future. Some scholars have contended that collective memory and identity are formed on the basis of the primordial ties of blood, kinship, language, and common history. As Gong said, "Transferring from generation to generation, history and memory issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that chart the future in the name of the past."[6] However, people learn their group's history not only from their parents or grandparents. According to Mehlinger, school textbooks are "the modern version of village storytellers," because they "are responsible for conveying to youth what adults believe they should know about their own culture as well as that of other societies."[7] In Mehlinger's opinion, none of the other socialization instruments can be compared to textbooks in their capacity to convey a uniform, approved,

and even official version of what youth should believe. Podeh suggested that a state educational system constitutes a major instrument for socializing young people to society's dominant values—the goal being that the successful completion of this task will turn young people into loyal citizens and will help instill a shared identity.[8]

Many existing literatures on the politics of memory have focused on the role of history education in the formation of group membership and identity. For example, Halbwachs believes that it is collective memory that binds a group of people together.[9] Hein and Selden took the view that "history and civics textbooks in most societies present an 'official' story highlighting narratives that shape contemporary patriotism."[10] Podeh argued that both the school system and students' textbooks become "another arm of the state, [or] agents of memory" with the aim to ensure the transmission of "approved knowledge" to the younger generation.[11] Thus, as Apple and Christian-Smith argued, textbooks function as a kind of "supreme historical court" whose task is to decipher, from all the accumulated "pieces of the past," the "true" collective memories, those that are appropriate for inclusion in the canonical national historical narrative.[12]

History and memory can also be used "instrumentally" to promote individual or collective interests. In their struggle for power, competing elites often use history as a tool to mobilize popular support. Ethnic categories can also be manipulated to maintain the power of a dominant group and justify discrimination against other groups. According to Apple and Christian-Smith, though textbooks pretend to teach neutral, legitimate knowledge, they are often used as "ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political and social order."[13] The selection and organization of knowledge for school systems is an ideological process that serves the interests of particular classes and social groups. Ever since the rise of the nation-state in Europe in the nineteenth century, history textbooks have been used by states as instruments for "glorifying the nation, consolidating its national identity, and justifying particular forms of social and political systems." Many studies in the West have demonstrated that ethnocentric views, myths, stereotypes, and prejudices often pervade history textbooks.[14]

The manipulation of the past often entails the use of stereotypes and prejudice in describing the "other." Carried to the extreme, stereotyping and prejudice foster what Podeh called "delegitimization"—the "categorization of groups into extreme negative social categories which are

excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values."[15] Hein and Selden took the view that history lessons not only model behavior for citizens within their own society but also "chronicle relations with others."[16] The stories chosen or invented about the national past are invariably prescriptive, instructing people how to think and act as national subjects and how to view their relations with outsiders. Depending on how the stories portray the relations with others, textbooks can distribute hatred between two civilizations.

With the 1990s rise of sociological constructivism, more attention has been given to national identity. In addition to some scholars' assertions that blood, kinship, and language foster group identity, constructivists acknowledge common history and collective memory are also important to determine a group's identity. According to Pennebaker, powerful collective memories, whether real or concocted, can be at the root of conflicts, prejudice, nationalism, and cultural identities.[17] Smith expounds that historical myths are what define an identity (ethnic, national, or religious) and determine group membership and what membership entails.[18] Bell points out that the focal points of the majority of literature on memory and politics are how national identities are constructed, reproduced, and contested.[19]

Constructivists maintain that identity is not a given but socially constructed. The group does not just rely on familial units to transmit the manufactured group identity; education and textbooks play an important role in transmitting national narratives. History textbooks especially are major components in constructing and reproducing national narratives.

Some scholars have conducted detailed case studies examining how various countries deal with the history and memory issues in their education systems and how different sides' conflicting national narratives have generated conflicts. For example, according to Soh, Koreans harbor a deep sense of victimization in collective memories of their checkered historical relationship with Japan, which, in turn, has generated a nationalist vehemence to vanquish Japan's ethnocentric representations of bilateral and regional events in history textbooks.[20] In his *International Security* article, Ienaga presents examples of how war, militaristic values, and episodes from Japan's past have been presented to Japan's schoolchildren since the 1920s.[21] According to this research, Japan's textbooks have taught generations of its children that war is glorious and have concealed many of the sad truths of war.[22] In another essay, Tomoko

Hamada compares three Japanese middle-school history textbooks and one officially approved textbook of China in their descriptions of Japan's colonization of Asia (1937–1945). This study indicates that the Japanese textbooks tend to employ formulae for describing the nobility of failure, while Chinese textbooks adhere to the conventional hero folktale with such functional units as endurance, struggle, and ultimate victory.[23]

Because history and memory can be manipulated to promote individual or collective interests, and because elites often use history to mobilize support from their people, Kaufman argues that people are taught ethnic hatred, not born into it.[24] Ethnic war occurs as a result of symbolic politics in which ethnic leaders or activists use emotional ethnic symbols (including historical memory) to promote hostility toward other groups and pursue ethnic domination.

Political legitimacy and historical memory have a powerful, unique bond. Their connection is particularly noticeable when nationalist movements create master narratives that emphasize a common group heritage to promote their political aspirations.[25] Scholars have particularly discussed how states and elites have used history and memory as resources and instruments to conduct political mobilization. As noted earlier in this chapter, Apple and Christian-Smith's research shows that even though textbooks are supposed to be neutral, factual accounts, they are often "ideological tools" a group employs to promote beliefs and legitimize specific political and social order.[26] Bell argues that transitions to democracy owe their transitions to politics of memory as a key component of its success. To legitimize or delegitimize previous regimes, grounding new claims in the correct perception of the past is essential.[27] Zajda points out that the Soviet Union's collapse necessitated the rewriting of school history textbooks to legitimize the new regime.[28] In more recent years, Putin's government has been restoring patriotic education reminiscent of the former Soviet Union's to rebuild Russia's injured self-esteem after the drastic political change.

As already noted, history textbooks are often pervaded by ethnocentric views, myths, stereotypes, and prejudices. Podeh's research on history and memory in Israeli educational systems suggests that Israeli or Palestinian textbooks, as well as views instilled by educators, are significant to the continuing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Initial Israeli textbooks, from the 1950s through the 1970s, were important to establishing and normalizing the new national society and as a result, employed a historical narrative "replete with bias, prejudice, errors, misrepresentations, and

even deliberate omissions."[29] A distorted image of Arabs was presented to its readers by utilizing stereotypes that aided in reinforcing Arab "otherness" in Israeli society. Mehlinger's observation that school textbooks "are responsible for conveying to youth what adults believe they should know about their own culture as well as that of other societies" is important because it showcases that no other social instrument has the power of a textbook to convey an authoritative, trusted version of what a society's youth should believe.[30]

Some scholars have taken the view that history and civics textbooks in most societies present an "official" story highlighting narratives that shape contemporary patriotism.[31] Cole and Barsalou, for instance, show that political leaders and citizens across the different levels of society all have vested interest in retaining simple narratives that flatter their own group and promote group unity by emphasizing sharp divergences between themselves and other groups.[32] They are highly resistant to inclusive histories that present the other side's point of view which may cast their own group in a negative light. This need to reshape history, then, is what triggers this constant reinterpretation of a group (and an enemy) identity. Schools and textbooks play an important role in transmitting the "approved knowledge" to the society's youth.

The Internet has also made studying history easier by providing today's young people with a wealth of easily accessible information about historical events online. Internet chat rooms have provided a forum for facilitating dialogue of past historical traumas and events. Whenever there is an important anniversary coming up, Internet users would post their comments and initiate discussions about these events. According to Gerrit Gong, modern digital and Internet technologies enhance memory and the implications of history and memory.[33] With an expanding global network and an intimately personal reach, such technological advances have made strong contributions to historical memory, as "they bring together images and sounds that give remembering and forgetting issues surprising intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance."[34] In this digital age, forgetting past traumas has become even more difficult.

History Textbooks, Conflict, and Reconciliation

In her book *Discourses on Violence*, Vivienne Jabri challenged the "orthodox" theories on the sources of conflict and war. She believes "orthodox" theories are inadequate to fully understand violent conflict, as they focus

too much on how violent conflicts break out rather than the social conditions that promote violent conflict. According to Jabri, the phenomenon of violent conflict cannot simply be understood through analyses of leadership and decision making; it is necessary to uncover the continuities in society which enable conflict and give it legitimacy.[35] Jabri argues that violent conflict is a social institution that is reproduced through social and political discourses, which convey legitimacy to it. When a collective identity is defined through exclusionist language, under certain circumstances, this might provide grounds for stereotyping. The implications of constructing group identity based on an opposition to another group are of central importance in understanding the processes that legitimize violence. The enemy created through this process becomes the legitimized target of discrimination and violence. The point that Jabri makes is that exclusionist discourse of violent conflict is not confined to the battlefield but exists prior to it.

As we have examined throughout this chapter, history textbooks have been regarded as major components in the construction and reproduction of national narratives. History education is not purely for distributing the different "scholarships" of history, nor is it entirely free of political influence. Studies on how China, Korea, and Japan deal with historical issues in their education systems have yielded troubling messages. History textbooks and history education in these three countries have become a source of the same type of exclusionist discourse that Jabri described. The assumption that history is about "our ancestors" is also quite common in East Asia, which is certainly different from conceiving of history as about how people in the past lived and coped—whoever they may be. However, when history textbooks are compiled based on the assumption that they should be about "our ancestors," they are often imbued with ethnocentric views, stereotypes, and prejudices, making it difficult to avoid glorification or demonization of particular groups. History textbooks have thus become the sources of controversy and conflict.

When people use different criteria and approaches toward their own national experiences and the historical activities of other groups, it inevitably creates inconsistent narratives of history. Two countries may describe the same historical event very differently in their respective history textbooks. Historically conflicting countries are particularly sensitive about how specific parts of their history will be narrated and taught in the other country. When a country discovers that their "historical truths"

have been denied or distorted through the writing of others, this may lead to expressions of anger and hostility.

On April 5, 2005, the Japanese Education Ministry approved a new junior high-school textbook titled *Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho* (New history textbook) written by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. This move ignited immediate outrage among some Asian countries, especially South Korea and China. Critics have charged that this organization has been using history textbook revision to minimize Japan's culpability for its wartime actions.[36] According to critics, the textbook provides a distorted and self-serving account of Japan's colonial and wartime activities. One example is its description of the invasion of the Korean peninsula as an unopposed annexation, necessary for Japan's security.[37]

In Seoul, two South Koreans, Park Kyung-ja and Cho Seung-kyu, used weed clippers and a knife to chop off their fingers outside the Japanese embassy to protest Japan's claims to a group of desolate islands that South Korea insists as part of its territory; the new textbooks emphasized the legitimacy of Japan's claim to these islands.[38] Outrage was also fierce in China. On April 9, 2005, an estimated 10,000–20,000 Chinese demonstrators marched to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, throwing stones at the facility. The next day, 20,000 demonstrators marched in two cities in southern Guangdong Province, and protestors attacked a Japanese department store in Shenzhen.[39] Two weeks after the textbooks were approved, anti-Japanese protests broke out in over ten Chinese cities. In each case, protesters chanted slogans and burned Japanese flags. People carried banners with slogans reading: "Japan must apologize to China," "Never forget national humiliation," and "Boycott Japanese goods."[40] The protests are considered the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations in China since the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1972. They are also the largest protests against any country since 1999, when the USA destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the conflict in Kosovo.

Indeed, historical issues and the interpretation of the past have been the major barriers for true reconciliation between China, Japan, and South Korea. The controversy surrounding history education and the adoption of history textbooks in East Asia has been an issue of much debate among scholars of many different disciplines.[41] To a great extent, the memories of past conflicts have come to shape international relations in East Asia.[42] The controversy surrounding history education and the adoption of school history textbooks in East Asia raises the question of

why history education and history textbooks in particular are important enough to fight over. The battle over history education and history textbooks has certainly not been limited to Asia. Many studies have indicated that both are actually "common" phenomena that exist between many countries engaged in deep-rooted conflicts.

One of the most debated historical issues between China and Japan is the Nanjing Massacre. For Chinese people, it is a national trauma that they will never forget. Chinese people believe that there were more than 300,000 people executed by the Japanese military after they conquered the city in December 1937. The figure of 300,000 victims is the official Chinese estimate and is also the number that Chinese students have been taught by their history textbooks. The official middle-school history textbook uses many photographs, statistical tables, eyewitness accounts, and personal anecdotes to recount this incident. It provides very detailed accounts of how people were executed on a massive scale at various execution sites, and how their bodies were disposed of by the Japanese military. Numerous films, novels, historical books, and newspaper articles about the "Rape of Nanjing" have been produced in China, especially in the 1990s after the patriotic education campaign.

However, if you have a copy of the 2005 version of *New History Textbook*, published by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, you will find that there is no mention of the "Nanjing Massacre" or "Nanjing Incident." There is only one sentence that refers to this event—"they [the Japanese troops] occupied that city in December." In context, it reads:

> In August 1937, two Japanese soldiers [and] one officer were shot to death in Shanghai. After this incident, the hostilities between Japan and China escalated. Japanese military officials thought Chiang Kai-shek would surrender if they captured Nanking, the Nationalist capital; they occupied that city in December. But Chiang Kai-shek had moved his capital to the remote city of Chongqing. The conflict continued.[43]

The editors of the book added a footnote here, which makes the first, and only, direct reference to "The Nanjing Incident:" "At this time, many Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by Japanese troops (the Nanking Incident). Documentary evidence has raised doubts about the actual number of victims claimed by the incident. The debate continues even today."[44] According to Yoshida's research, only two of the seven middle-school textbooks used in Japan in 2002 gave numbers

for the controversial death toll of the Nanjing Massacre, while others used more ambiguous terms such as "many" and "massive" to describe the casualties, in an effort to avoid the domestic challenges from Japan's right wing.[45]

When the same historical event receives such different treatments in the textbooks of the two countries, it is not difficult to understand why the contents of history textbooks could trigger massive protests. Indeed, there is a feedback loop in China and Japan whereby the nationalistic history education stimulates the rise of nationalism, and the rise of nationalism provides a bigger market for nationalistic messages. At the same time, top-level leaders are not only locked into their individual positions, but they also frequently use historical grievances as resources for political mobilization.

Going back to Vivienne Jabri's theory, she proposes that preventing conflict means preventing the exclusionist discourse and symbolic politics by limiting opportunities in the short run and changing hostile myths and attitudes in the long run.[46] The best strategy for countries to become liberated from the past chosen trauma, if we follow Jabri's recommendation, is to introduce a new "peace discourse"—a discourse on tolerance, forgiveness, and reconciliation—to replace the current discourses on hatred and struggle. According to Jabri, since structure and actors are mutually constitutive, actors can work to change the conflict structure in which they operate. Actors can emancipate themselves from structure and enable the possibility of the creation of new discourses on peace, which could serve to institutionalize an environment of peace as a social continuity. As for conflict resolution and transformation strategies, Jabri implies that the traditional conflict resolution approach to violent conflict will not yield success until it deals with these long-term social causes of conflict. She favors long-term conflict prevention in the form of a new "peace discourse," calling people to use the "discourses on peace" to replace the "discourses on violence."

People fight over a history textbook's accuracy—telling the truth instead of portraying a cleansed narrative is important, especially if groups are undergoing reconciliation processes. According to John Paul Lederach, reconciliation involves the identification and acknowledgment of what happened (i.e., truth), an effort to right the wrongs that occurred (i.e., justice) and forgiveness for the perpetrators (i.e., mercy).[47] Reconciliation involves the creation of the social space where both truth and forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in which one must win out over

the other, or become envisioned as fragmented and separated parts. This is the approach taken by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).[48] According to Gibson's research, the truth-telling process has significantly aided the process of reconciliation and democratization in South Africa.[49]

If textbooks and other narratives of history become the source of conflict between different countries, then revision of these through joint writing naturally becomes the necessary method of reconciliation and conflict resolution. Basically, how well the new textbooks can reflect the critical truths about the past conflict becomes the crucial factor in determining how well history education can contribute to the process of reconciliation. Confronting the past has become an established norm for reconciliation and for countries undergoing transitions from violence to peace and from authoritarianism to democracy. According to Borer, truth telling contributes to the following elements, all of which are deemed to be constitutive of sustainable peace: reconciliation, human rights, gender equity, restorative justice, the rule of law, the mitigation of violence, and the healing of trauma.[50]

However, for many historical events, restoring historical truth is not an easy task. Yet, reconciliation does not mean unprincipled compromise. After sincere efforts in seeking consensus, the different sides may still hold different opinions and interpretations of a past event. It is the collaborative effort between the two countries that contributes to the process of reconciliation. As an essential step of seeking reconciliation, the cooperative writing of history could provide opportunities for two or more sides to confront their common past. Instead of providing only one side's story, history textbooks can also present two or more narratives of past events and let students weight the merits or fallacies of the differing historical presentations. By doing so, history textbooks can introduce students to the complicated process of reconciliation itself and enhance students' critical thinking skills. As Cole suggests:

> Revisions in the methodology, as well as the content, of history textbooks and programs can promote long term reconciliation by enhancing critical thinking skills, willingness to question simplistic models, empathy skills, and the ability to disagree about interpretations of the past and their implications for present social issues without resort to violence.[51]

By providing multiple perspectives, history education can avoid marginalizing and demonizing particular groups. Teaching could encourage

students to explore the variegated experiences of different groups affected by the violence. Teaching history thus can help students become engaged, responsible citizens. The process of joint history writing would surely involve the honest discussion and dialogue between historians from two conflicting states. This is an essential step for the two groups in seeking truth, justice, and mercy.

While people often discuss historical problems in the current tensions and conflicts, they normally only see history as a background issue for the current problems and thus refrain from taking any action. Most people also believe that it would take a long time to see any result from changes to the historical narrative and history education. Therefore, according to this view, it is impractical to address these issues as a part of the solution. This is actually an important reason why tensions and hostility between many deep-rooted conflicts have lasted so long. Without addressing the underlying roots of hostility, the two nations will be unable to build a normal relationship.

The reconciliation between two historical foes would largely depend on whether citizens of the two countries, especially the policy makers and educators, can realize that history education is not just one of the normal subjects at school; it plays an important role in constructing a nation's identity and perceptions. Without addressing this deep source and tough obstacle, it will be impossible for the two countries to find a path to sustainable coexistence. At the same time, if textbooks and other narratives of history can become a source of conflict, then history education reform and textbook revision should also be able to contribute to reconciliation and conflict resolution. Contemporary history of post-war reconciliation, from Franco-German rapprochement to US-Japan friendship, illustrates that former enemies can reconcile if they have the political will to do so.

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CHAPTER 5

The Four Dimensions of Historical Memory

Abstract This chapter presents a framework to understand the functions of historical memory in different political and cultural settings. By measuring the levels of high or low-context of historical memory, political usage of historical memory, reconciliation between historically feuding parties, and openness and diversity of opinions regarding historical issues, it will help identify how historical memory affects a particular state, society, or people. Different levels and compilations of these four dimensions would provide indicators to understand the function of historical memory and the level of potential conflict between different states.

Keywords Contexts of historical memory · Political usage of historical memory · Reconciliation

Differences in cultural context, national experiences, political ideology, and thinking patterns among nations of the world unquestionably lead nations to have divergent "sense of history." Even though historical memory indeed plays a universal role in all groups, for each specific nation, the issues, structures, and implications of historical memory are different. Historical memory means different things and plays different roles in different societies and countries, and they are influenced by the contexts of different political, cultural, and social systems.

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First developed by Edward Hall, the idea of "context" in a culture refers to the amount of commonly assumed information in a society.[1] Differences in the amount of understood knowledge can impact how a message is received. Normally, a "high-context culture" features more implicit communication. People in a high-context culture incorporate more of the "context" (history, tradition, customs, circumstance, etc.) into their communication. Therefore, the tools of communication are more complex and go beyond merely the words that are being said. A "low-context culture," on the other hand, features more explicit communication (based on the need for clarity in a heterogeneous environment). These people take very little of the "context" into account in their communication.[2] The concept of high and low-context culture introduces some interesting implications for inter-cultural communication. In terms of "context," there are also different contexts and dimensions of historical memory issues for different societies and countries. Edward Hall's work on cross-cultural comparison and cultural "contexts" has created a multitude of other areas for research in the fields of anthropology, culture, political science, and IR, and has been widely used in cross-cultural communication and negotiation training. Inspired by this idea, a question we should ask is: Can we also use "high-context" or "low-context" to describe the relative influence of historical memory in different societies and nations? If that is so, how can we measure and compare the "high" or "low" level of historical memory in different contexts?

This chapter addresses these questions. It proposes a framework to understand the functions of historical memory in four political and cultural contexts. By measuring the levels of high or low-context of historical memory, political usage of historical memory, reconciliation between historically feuding parties, and openness and diversity of opinions regarding historical issues, this framework (see Fig. 5.1) will help identify how historical memory affects a particular state, society, or people. Different levels and compilations of these four dimensions would provide important indicators to understand the functions of historical memory, including the level of potential conflict between two parties. Each of the four contexts will be analyzed in the following sections.

Historical Consciousness

Any discussion of history and memory naturally gives rise to some problems of definition and what aspects of history and memory the research will explore. According to *History & Memory*, a peer-reviewed journal



Fig. 5.1 Four contexts of historical memory

published by Indiana University Press, historical consciousness is defined as "the area in which collective memory, the writing of history, and other modes of shaping images of the past in the public mind merge."[3] The Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness (CSSH) at The University of British Columbia states: "Historical consciousness can thus be defined as individual and collective understandings of the past, the cognitive and cultural factors which shape those understandings, as well as the relations of historical understandings to those of the present and the future."[4] Halbwachs defines collective memory as an interaction between the memory policies—also referred to as "historical memory"—and the recollections—"common memory," of what has been experienced in common.[5] It lies at the point where individual meets collective, and psychic meets social.[6] Based on these definitions, we can see historical consciousness is how past, present, and future are thought to be connected, and how individual and collective, as well as the elites and the general public, are communicated for the sake of understanding the group's past and national experiences.

Scholars from several different disciplines have conducted research to analyze how historical memory issues reflect larger contexts and structures. For example, Gerrit Gong contends that the different "sense of history" between the USA and some other countries, particularly in Europe and Asia, can create divergent perspectives on issues of importance and eventually cause misunderstandings and misinterpretations during the USA's interactions with these countries.[7] For instance, the American tradition of continuing immigration gives the USA a diverse

"new-world identity," instead of a singular "old-world identity." Americans often look forward in ways that emphasize the future more than the past. However, in other societies, particularly some parts of Asia, people often look backward and use their past to define their contemporary relations and their future orientations. This is especially true in China and Japan. These different approaches to history and memory can generate a "clash of histories." For example, Gong believes the accidental US bombing of the People's Republic of China embassy in Belgrade on May 8, 1999 "forcibly demonstrated that in some matters of history, Chinese memory is too long while U.S. memory is too short."[8]

When Markovits and Reich say that the politics of collective memory is a major ingredient of the political arena, the public discourse, and the policy setting in every country, they are claiming the universality of the implications of history and memory.[9] Gong's assertion that "Chinese memory is too long while U.S. memory is too short" compares the differing impact of historical memory in the two countries.[10] From Peter Hays Gries's statement, "it is certainly undeniable that in China the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most other countries," we ascertain China has a higher level of "historical context" than that of most other countries.[11] Similarly, when Gong says "the U.S. has a different sense of history than most countries in Europe and Asia, in that Americans often look forward in ways that emphasize the future more than the past," we see he is assuming the USA is "low historical context" in nature.

Measuring the level of historical consciousness is certainly not easy, especially considering it is something we cannot quantify because collective memory means different things for different people, but there are some important indicators that can be used for observations and to determine the high or low level of historical consciousness.

First, we can identify whether there are major historical events that have a lasting and profound impact on a group of people. To understand the impact, researches can examine how a nation remembers the event in question. Ceremonies and anniversary events to commemorate or remember, especially those that are organized and promoted by the state, can be evaluated. As discussed in Chap. 2, key historical events are powerful ethnic or large-group markers. When a group has suffered past losses, defeat, and humiliation or achieved major victories and glories, the mental trauma or pride of these events may become part of its identity and a binding force for them. Historical memory can be linked to a

single event. While only a fraction of Americans actually witnessed the fall of the twin towers on September 11, future generations of Americans are undoubtedly becoming connected to this national trauma through its retelling in the news, family stories, films, and history education classes. In addition to singular events, a group's historical consciousness also often connects with a period of time when the nation experienced special hardship and trauma.

For example, modern historical consciousness in China has been powerfully influenced by the "century of humiliation" from the First Opium War (1839–1842) through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. Many Chinese perceive this period as a time when their nation was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists.[12] Similarly, the atrocities perpetrated on the Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II (WWII), and the subsequent creation of Israel, have left a strong historical perception of trauma and survival among its people. Because of the varied experiences of individual societies, such events give their people a unique historical consciousness. A people's sense of history can likewise come from formal education, established by influential leaders who manipulate history and memories to rally their citizens.

Russia's WWII experience provides another example. Over seventy years since the end of WWII, Russia celebrates its victory over Nazi aggression every year on May 9, Victory Day. The holiday commemorates the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in what Russia refers to as the Great Patriotic War, and the commemorations have become a source of national pride. The war deeply impacted Russia, as millions were killed and virtually no family was unaffected. The nature of the event was so impactful, and still so widely remembered to this day, with parades, speeches, and commemorative activities, that it has become the most celebrated holiday in Russia. The importance of this anniversary celebration provides a good example of a society with a high level of historical consciousness.

Another indicator is the significance of historical memory in determining group membership and national identity. Researchers could study whether a nation's history or particular historical events have been used to define group membership, group objectives, or group relations with other states. Research targets for this indicator include official government documents, such as a country's constitution, or specific national policies. As mentioned previously, trauma or achievements bind the people together and tend to produce an "us vs. them" outlook. The nation's

history is also the defining element of the present and influences what goals will be set for the future, especially when dealing with other states that may have been involved in the past event or are acting in a similar pattern preceding the event. For the USA, much of the domestic and foreign policy throughout the fifteen years since the 9/11 attack has been influenced by it and the resulting grief and fears it produced. After the attack, an often dogmatic "us vs. them" mentality of Western ideals versus terrorism/extremism developed and was addressed with different policies or military action.

Another indicator is whether there is much discussion or many narratives regarding these particular historical events. If there is a strong sense of historical consciousness, the past becomes an important source for current social discourse. The event or time period is memorialized or reinterpreted by emerging films, literature, and theater; these sources of entertainment can reinforce the existing cultural narrative or reexamine the event's role in the group's history. The group can also display historical consciousness by dedicating part of their living or public space through different mediums (such as sculptures, monuments, museums, shrines, or another form of memory site) to the past event. These different forms of memorializing an event or time period ensure it is not forgotten and gives people different ways to reflect on and be influenced by the specific idea or feeling each medium is intended to convey. They can be depicted not only in movies and TV, but also in more traditional and formal art as well. Many historical and climatic cultural events have been captured through paintings over the centuries, preserved for generations to see and identify with. Often these paintings were commissioned by government or church leaders to help convey a specific sentiment regarding the event's memory.

An important indicator is the position of history education in a state's education system and the curriculum it uses to teach younger generations about its history. The types of textbooks schools use, and other educational activities, such as field trips to culturally significant historical places, are targets for researches to study. Educational curriculum and textbooks can indicate a shared, collective memory, instilling a narrative to pass down the society's remembrance of an event or period of time.

Finally, a visible indicator of historical consciousness in a society is the significance of memory sites in national politics and social discourse. When a country utilizes many historical markers, such as monuments, museums, and sites, to commemorate historical events or people,

it shows a higher level of historical consciousness. The greater number and size of monuments, museums, and sites to project a story and remembrance of an event is crucial in telling how, and what, that country is trying to collectively say and recall about its history. The overwhelming size and grandeur of a memory site and museum such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, formally called the Memorial for Compatriots Killed in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Forces of Aggression, in Nanjing, China, give a good example of how a country aims to remember a particular event. The memorial's title gives an indicator of how important and what exactly the country's narrative on the event is. The way in which the memorial and museum depict the events of the invasion of Nanjing, with emotional visuals and strongly worded passages, makes it clear a master narrative and collective cultural viewpoint is being promoted.

The high/low level of historical consciousness may also relate to the different cultural patterns. Scholars of cultural studies agree that there are two main types of culture, collectivism and individualism. In a collectivist culture, there is more emphasis on community and the group as a whole; personal identity tends to be securely based on the state's identity. People are encouraged to have collective beliefs, including a "master narrative" of historical events. The group's educational systems, social discourse, and popular culture often reinforce the collective viewpoint and "master narratives." Because of this, a group with a collectivist culture often has a strong collective historical memory. Conversely, in an individualist culture, people are often encouraged to form their own judgments and have their own ideas. There are also collective narratives, but normally these narratives are not reinforced throughout society; rather, the society tends to have a higher tolerance for different opinions and openness for discussion. Individualist cultures typically do not have a strong, shared consensus regarding history.

Political Usage of Historical Memory

Memories are influenced by political and cultural forces. Governmental policies and social rules, as well as popular culture and social norms, influence the way events are remembered. The role of politics in shaping collective memory differs markedly from one country to another. Government leaders and those campaigning for political office often have the ability to frame or exaggerate historical events for their own benefit

in the political process. Different states use historical memory to create specific narratives to influence and mobilize support from the public. How governments or specific leaders structure or control a narrative on an influential historical event in their political messages can impact a society's emotions and the level of support the people are willing to give their leaders.

Indicators of such use of historical memory for political purposes can be seen in a political leader's employment of particular historical events and issues in their mobilization and their efforts in advancing their goals and narrative, and the frequency in which they do so. Political leaders (or aspiring political leaders) often use this type of rhetoric during elections and/or the distribution of official documents, stating their version of such events and history as an authoritative record to elicit a specific feeling and mobilize support to achieve their aims. These past events can become a focal point of political discussion or debate during elections or political transitions, validating or discrediting the leader depending on how the past is being interpreted. Politicians often evoke strong emotion through speeches talking about historical events. This is most often seen during political campaigns. Political leader's speeches, official documents from an administration or campaign, election campaigns themselves, and the message they try to convey are the key examples for the use of history in political mobilization.

A contemporary example of this is Donald Trump's campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again." Even though we consider the USA as a country of "low historical context," elections in the USA are environments where interpretations of past successes and current failings are offered with a promise to return to past successes. Both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump lambasted previous administrations' acceptance and promotion of trade deals; both recalled the manufacturing glory of the past and stated that the USA lost its place in the world because of trade deals, and, if elected, they would bring it back to its manufacturing glory and recreate lost jobs. The narrative espoused was intended to mobilize voters by resonating with many of the constituents' grievances and concerns.

Further indication of historical memory utilized for political purposes is the inclusion of a specific event's narrative as a major component of formal school education and curriculum. These master narratives and influence on education make up the next two indicators. The existence of a master narrative or official narrative regarding national history and

historical events is an indicator of the level of its political usage. There can be a devoted political emphasis on establishing a specific interpretation of history for the curriculum, ensuring a "correct" version of history which will shape the next generation's beliefs about the past, the group, the nation, the governmental leaders, and the world at large. "Correct" versions of history can include a group casting themselves as victims instead of aggressors, interpreting an event to minimize the harm the group has caused another group, or over emphasizing successes and accomplishments to legitimize regimes or current policies. These cleansed or embellished narratives in the educational system tend to reinforce the current regime and seek to cement a group's pride or humiliation regarding specific events and promote specific policies. The narratives developed are communicated through textbooks, writings, and government documents, such as a constitution, among others, which can all be used as targets of measurement for researchers. Researchers should pay special attention to the level of state influence on history education or other educational and ideological campaigns focusing on national history.

The existence of political taboos, or national myths related to historical events, is also an important indicator. Media can play a role in expanding, shaping, or pushing specific historical political agenda. Similarly, political protests and assemblies can be used to promote such an agenda. Strong emotions and beliefs can be brought out regarding these issues, such as the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Japan. Within Japan, the shrine is seen as a memory site that celebrates the past greatness of Japan's empire and memorializes its fallen soldiers. However, in the countries that Japan invaded, such as China and Korea, the shrine is seen as an emblem of violent imperialism and celebrated war criminals. Japan's leaders have been known to visit the shrine during certain national anniversaries; this political taboo works to heighten tension between these countries, dividing them in meaning and strengthening their own national narratives of what the shrine represents.

Reconciliation of Past Conflicts

Major traumas between countries and peoples play a very important role in the current status of historical conflicts. The source of a conflict, and the extent of the level of post-conflict reconciliation, largely influences

the current perceptions between two states on historical events and the lasting emotions created as a result of the incident. The reconciliation, or lack thereof, between the feuding states can help determine whether the past events play an important role or not. Lower levels of reconciliation between states cause continued conflict and the dangerous possibility of an escalation in the present day. This balance between trauma and healing has many historical models, showing direct correlation between the level of post-conflict reconciliation and the current status between the two feuding states.

There are several sets of indicators for researchers to pay attention to in order to measure the level of reconciliation between states. A normalization of relationship between historical enemies is an indicator of reconciliation. For a relationship to be normalized, there must be formal, official ties, free exchange of ideas, and ease of travel between the two countries. For example, the two Koreas have not broached reconciliation—they are still separate and there is no freedom of movement between them. Even though China and Taiwan started allowing civilian flights between them several years ago, they still do not formally recognize each other. In addition to normalization of relations with governments, there must also be forgiveness and mutual acceptance between the two societies at local levels. If there is any level of demonization between states, either one way or both ways, normalization of ties cannot be accomplished. It is difficult for two countries to maintain diplomatic ties if the people are largely against it due to unresolved historical grievances. If the social narrative (including public culture) or educational curriculum is still blaming the other party for the past conflict and still indirectly or directly encourages or fosters hatred toward another group of people, then reconciliation has not been completely reached.

Another indicator is grassroots level mutual acceptance and communication between two or more states. This can be studied in part by public opinion polls on the mutual impression of the other state by its people and exchanges of people between the states, such as student exchanges, tourism, marriages, and other education and civic exchanges. The high levels of post-WWII reconciliation efforts in Europe have created a greatly peaceful and progressive current relationship between the former belligerent Germany and its neighbors. While the traumas of war in Europe tore apart societies, the ability of these states to resolve past conflicts has enabled peace and alliances among historically hostile nations. Just the inverse can be seen in the lack of reconciliation over

historical conflicts in East Asia, with elevated hostility continuing between China and Japan in the South and East China Seas. The high level of reconciliation in postwar Europe likened to the low level of reconciliation in postwar Asia has led to differing feelings of victimization over time. The generational attachment to old conflicts and historical issues is directly correlated with the ability of states to reconcile their differences.

The Yasukuni Shrine issue shows a lack of the grassroots level mutual acceptance and communication. That Japanese politicians still often visit the shrine shows there is a fundamental lack of mutual acceptance and communication on the issue. What the Chinese and Koreans see as a symbol of war and violent suppression, the Japanese do not recognize as such. While they are aware the issue is sensitive, the Japanese population sees the shrine as a memorial for Japanese heroes; there is a distinct lack of communication and understanding that the shrine houses the graves of war criminals.

For reconciliation to occur, there must be a dialogue and a certain consensus reached between the two countries regarding what happened in the past, especially if it was violent. The consensus includes understanding what actually happened as opposed to a narrative, why it happened, and the responsibility of what happened to the involved parties. Whether it is an academic collaboration among history scholars, an accepted and shared understanding by different levels of society, or whether it has become part of the official dialogue between the countries, such as bilateral documentation, treaties, or a joint statement, who reached and how the consensus was reached is also important for indicating the level of reconciliation between the countries. For example, China and Japan, more than seventy years after WWII has ended, still have a major difference regarding basic facts about the war; the Chinese believe that approximately three hundred thousand were killed in the Nanjing Massacre, while many Japanese believe this figure is greatly exaggerated, some even doubt whether the massacre actually happened.

We can also pay attention whether there are joint programs for better relations and reconciliation. This includes joint history textbooks establishing a cohesive record of historical events between the states, dialogues, initiatives, and peace activities. These joint programs could help share both sides' experience of the war and give a better understanding between peoples and countries. Joint dialogues between academics, experts, scholars, and government officials are also a way in which to study this indicator. An indicator for the level of reconciliation between

two states is the media and social narratives portrayed on each side, measured by whether a state still demonizes the other in their social narratives of that country and the shared history.

We can gauge the level of reconciliation between two states over past conflicts by whether the aggressor has given an apology to the victim and, just as important, the victim accepts the apology. This can be indicated in part by the extent of how the two states differently interpret their common history and the high or low levels of differences over the common historical conflicts and traumas. This is further affected by the current inclusion of any historical symbols that may represent the history, conflict, and transgressions between two states with common past, and whether the two states have a good current relationship.

Openness and Diversity of Opinion

Depending upon the society's government and politics, many states have the ability to openly discuss history and different ideas. Points of view can be freely presented about these events, as an open society allows for any interpretation or opinion on sensitive historical actions. In open societies, with strong regard for and protections on freedom of speech, historical issues can be discussed and interpreted from multiple perspectives, while in less free states, a personal narrative that strays from that of an official account of history cannot be so equally shared or distributed.

Four key indicators can be viewed in order to measure the level of openness and diversity of opinion in a society. The level of freedom of the press and the diversity of opinions regarding historical events is the first indicator. Second is the level of divergence in public opinions on national history, the existence of debates, and the level of tolerance toward different opinions. Third, the level of freedom in choosing history textbooks can indicate the level of openness to different opinions. And fourth is the level of pluralism in media and popular culture toward national history reflection.

In societies that lack freedom of speech, the lack of openness with historical events can play a larger role. Often a society has a very strong explanation, or "master narrative," of an event or events, a voice that speaks louder than any other—a circumstance that may be put in place because of a lower level of tolerance to other opinions. This lower tolerance can be societal or promoted and enforced by the government. If it is governmental, then any opinions differing from the master narrative

are considered incorrect or even illegal. Voicing opposing ideas on a historical matter can be dangerous to members of a society if that message strays from the master narrative, an example being the incidents of the 1989 Chinese Student's Movement in Tiananmen Square. In addition to not allowing discussion or different perspectives on events, there are also topics that are outright ignored or even forbidden to discuss or distribute. For example, in Chinese education and public media, there is no mention of the Student's Movement or of the Great Famine in 1959.

Often openness and diversity are related to the type of government in a society. Democracies rarely have one dominate narrative on any given event because freedom of press and freedom of speech allow different opinions to flow freely. The press is not controlled by the government, allowing ease of print and distribution, and multiple perspectives are expected, if not outright encouraged. Wherein authoritarian regimes, the government can much more easily control this discussion and propel a master narrative because of the lack of openness and tolerance for diversified opinions. However, in democratic countries, we should also be mindful of whether or not there are hidden rules in expressing opinions regarding specific historical events.

Whether a society projects one master narrative of historical events, or whether there is a multitude of opinions on historical issues can indicate the level of diversity and openness a society has. The greater tolerance toward different and new interpretations of past events shows that a society possesses a higher level of openness and personal liberties. The level of divergence in public opinions on national history, the existence of debates, and the level of tolerance toward different opinions are the key indicators of this level of openness and diversity of opinions. To measure this, researchers can look to newspaper and other media reports to gauge their level of differing opinions and arguments. This also includes the level of pluralism in media and popular culture toward national history reflection. This indicator is measured by how the media and other arts' products, such as movies, TV, literature, and sculptures, depict events, how they are allowed to do so, or how far they go in depicting a variety of different ideas.

The education system, including textbooks, curriculum committees who select the books, what narrative or story the textbooks convey, and school policies can help determine the level of openness a society possesses. In many states, there is more freedom in the selection of educational materials and textbooks for schools, whereas in states like China

there is often just one authorized text for students, produced from official government-sanctioned press. This issue is not limited to authoritarian countries. Just because a state is democratic does not mean it automatically has a high level of openness regarding historical and memory issues. For Japan, a free and open society with a democratic government and protections of freedom of speech and press, there is a prevalent more conservative and constant narrative regarding WWII. Their level of tolerance to different opinions is relatively low compared with other democracies with significant historical memories, such as Germany.

As each of the four contexts can be evaluated in any combination of high or low levels, we should note that some countries may have a higher level in one or more contexts and much lower in another context. By measuring the levels of the high or low-context of historical memory, political usage of historical memory, reconciliation between historically feuding parties, and openness and diversity, it will help identify how historical memory affects a particular state. Different societies show that varying combinations of the four dimensions greatly impacts the importance of historical memory for a society and country. Different levels and compilations of these four dimensions will largely determine and help indicate the function of historical memory and the level of potential conflict between different states.

For example, high levels of historical consciousness and a high level of political usage, but low levels of reconciliation and openness to multiple viewpoints, such as is the case in China, show that historical memory plays an extremely important role in a given society. This combination also leaves much higher risk to generate new conflict between old enemies and aggressors in the present. However, if a country has a high level of historical context and high level of openness and diversity, high level of reconciliation but a low level of political usage, this would make the function of historical memory not that important or dangerous. We see this played out in modern Germany and France, as both states are open, diverse, and have gone through much reconciliation, but there is only limited political usage of their intertwined antagonistic history.

In Japan, a high level of historical consciousness and low level of reconciliation combined with a relatively higher level of openness and relatively lower level of political usage do not on its own merits suggest further conflict, but when merged with a state which fits the most dangerous combination of the four dimensions—such as China with high levels of historical context and political usage and low levels of openness



Fig. 5.2 Four contexts of historical memory: China as an example

and reconciliation—there is an increased chance of future conflict. In a society like China's, the function of historical memory is no longer just an influence on attitude, emotions, and psychology, but rather an important role for national identity that often plays a major role in the state's foreign policy making, directly influencing its international behavior (Fig. 5.2).

This chapter covered four dimensions of historical memory and how differing levels of each can be measured for research purposes—the levels of historical consciousness, political usage of historical memory, reconciliation of past conflicts, and openness and diversity of opinions. These four dimensions each carry indicators that help in identifying their prevalence, or lack thereof, in a country or people, and how those indicators give way to targets of measurement that allow for research into a specific country or society and how historical memory affects them, their past, present, and future. The likelihood of the past affecting a country's future is different for different cultures, such as those that have a high level of historical consciousness, and less likely for future-forward countries, such as the USA.

These indicators and targets set up a framework for researchers. The framework of the four dimensions of historical memory can be used as

guidelines for researchers to evaluate the function of historical memory in a society or state. Whether the impact of historical issues influences their current politics and national narrative, and just what that narrative is, these can be measured through a framework that allows for the depiction of different levels of the four indicators of a particular society. The indicators and research targets can help researchers to design their research project, and determine what data and information to gather for evaluation and measurements. This framework makes it possible to understand the functions of historical memory in four political and cultural contexts.

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CHAPTER 6

Researching Historical Memory

Abstract This chapter focuses on research methods of conducting research on historical memory, including how to use public opinion polls, school textbooks, important texts and documents (official speech and documents, memoirs, etc.), and monuments and memory sites for conducting research to examine the functions of historical memory. It gives examples from many published books or research articles with concrete examples of how researchers from different disciplines have conducted research on historical memory. This chapter also attempts to integrate the main points throughout the book, especially regarding how to conduct research using historical memory as a variable.

Keywords Research methods · Public opinion polls · Monuments and memory sites · Qualitative and quantitative divide

Introduction

This book discusses the challenges of conducting research on historical memory and facing these challenges. As mentioned in the previous chapters, identity and perception influence us, but they do not alone determine our behavior when making decisions. Identity and perception are only one set of variables within a rich and complex informal framework for explaining how we make decisions. It is extremely hard to find a direct, singular correlation between perceptions and behavior. Adding

Z. Wang, *Memory Politics, Identity and Conflict*, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62621-5_6

to the difficulty of understanding what extent identity and perception play in behavior, techniques used to measure identities, such as large-N surveys, interviews with policy makers, and ethnographic field work, are typically not available to social scientists who study elites in closed, or semi-closed states.

This book also takes the stance that definition and measurement are two main barriers to the more systematic incorporation of historical memory as a variable in helping to explain political action. Previous chapters of the book extensively discussed definition—how to better define historical memory in different contexts and in different functions—and particularly recommend using theory-based analytic frameworks for determining the content and scope of historical memory, and for categorizing and measuring the effects of the identities, ideas, or beliefs that make up historical memory.

The preceding chapters introduced several frameworks that can be used for researching historical memory. The use of analytical frameworks can be used in a multitude of ways in undertaking historical memory research. These frameworks can be used to help generate research questions, assist researchers in determining which aspects of an event or events are worth considering for their research, and provide the tools needed for analyzing empirical data. Researchers can then use these frameworks as a guide in categorizing and measuring the effects of identities, ideas, and beliefs of historical memory.

This chapter will further discuss measuring the effects of historical memory and introduce the author's and other researchers' explorations on how to research historical memory in different research projects. It discusses different research methods, including public opinion polls, comparative case studies, discourse analysis, and content analysis for data analysis and measurement, and addresses some pitfalls researchers should avoid when undertaking their work.

Bridging the Qualitative and Quantitative Divide

Historical memory as an individual's or society's ideas is challenging to measure and difficult to quantify, but that does not mean we cannot perform quantitative research on historical memory. There are many issues related to collective memory that can be quantified. For example, many researchers have been doing quantitative research on memory sites, because memory sites have a physical permanence that conversations

do not. When a group of people dedicate land in their capital city for remembrance of a major historical event the nation experienced, they often build monuments, sculptures, or a building for the specific historical event. These types of actions require a certain level of consensus within the group of people, need approval from the government, and take time to complete. The meticulous care in the process of designing a memory site—from deciding its location, esthetic form, and which texts will be included in it—gives much more weight to the message portrayed and provides more information, both qualitative and quantitative, about the group of people and their collective beliefs regarding their past experiences. When people as individuals, communities, or states use memory sites to recall important family, community, or national historical events, the memory sites offer researchers important indicators for understanding the individual or group's memories. Researchers can study the appearance of the memory site—if it has engravings, utilizes imagery, incorporates text, and its overall design esthetic—because memory sites are supposed to be permanent memorials, great care is taken in designing and building them. What is included or excluded in the final design often provides strong statements of its builders' sentiments, perceptions, and beliefs.

Museums and public monuments have played a crucial role in the formation of a national memory and identity throughout many societies. These memory sites provide rich information to understand how a group of people remembers past events. They are used all over the world as reminders of trauma and glory, as statements of historical facts and interpretations, and as tools for citizenship and identity education. Memory sites provide researchers opportunities for both quantitative and qualitative research. For researchers, these sites become a text in their own right—putting them into context of historical and cultural events helps interpret how people remember a particular historical event.

Qualitative researchers on memory sites can focus on the design of the site and the artistic mediums employed, such as text or images, to interpret the meanings. For instance, when Martin J. Murray analyzes monuments and memorials in South Africa, he particularly examined the apartheid Voortrekker Monument and post-apartheid Hector Pieterson Memorial to compare the different trajectories of society.[1] He found the Voortrekker Monument focused on celebrating white supremacy and the notion that the Boers were a chosen people in a new land. This monument shows how a nation founded an Afrikaner identity

based on a fictionalized myth of "early Afrikaner settlers as brave, virtuous, determined, and inspired by God-fearing righteousness, in contrast to Africans, who perform their appointed role as treacherous savages."[2] The Hector Pieterson Memorial, in contrast, remembers the painful past and lauds the struggle to create a just society. In 1976, thirteen-year-old Hector Pieterson was killed when police fired on protesting students during the Soweto uprising in South Africa. Sam Nzima's photograph of the dying boy being carried by another student while accompanied by Hector's sister became an iconic symbol against the apartheid government's oppression and brutality. On the left side of the monument is etched "In Memory of Hector Pieterson and all other young heroes and heroines of our struggle who laid down their lives for Freedom, Peace, and Democracy."[3] Through the comparisons of the two monuments and the stories behind their constructions, the author provides vivid accounts and deep analyses of the contrasting memories in the new South Africa and how the divergent collective memories present challenges to the country.

Collective memory is difficult to quantify, but the memory sites, including the number of these sites, the size, the budget allocated for construction, and many other factors, can be quantified and compared. For example, in Zheng Wang's research on Chinese collective memory about the so-called "century of national humiliation," when China suffered foreign invasions from the Opium War of 1840 to the end of World War II in 1945, he visited many memory sites that Chinese built, commemorating events during this time period. He used both quantitative and qualitative researches in his study and made connections with the data gathered from the different memory sites.[4]

The author conducted quantitative research on the constructions and renovation of memory sites from 1994 to 2004. During this period of time, China conducted a major ideology campaign called the "patriotic education campaign." An instrumental part of this campaign was governmental use of national history as a tool for the education of patriotism, and they conducted a project called the "patriotic education base." A significant component of this base consists of the memory sites recalling China's suffering during the century of national humiliation. In his research, the author collected data regarding how the government chose which memory sites in the national, provincial, and country level were included, how many new memory sites were built, how

Table 6.1 Memory sites in five Chinese provinces

	National level sites	*Provincial level sites*	*County level sites*	*People visited*
Beijing	9	88	500	250 million since 1994
Hebei	6	38	113	100 million since 1995
Jiangsu	11	154	800+	N/A
Jiangxi	9	45	268	Over 4 million in 2004
Anhui	6	71	257	N/A

many memory sites received funding for major renovation or restoration, and the budget allotted for these projects.[5] He also compared the building of the new memory sites with other periods of time. Table 6.1 gives the statistics of memory sites in five PRC provinces or centrally administered municipalities (CAMs)—Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui—more than 434 provincial-level sites and 1938 county-level patriotic education bases.[6] China has thirty-one provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally administered municipalities. The statistics from his research provide convincing evidence regarding how the Chinese government utilized memory sites and history education to strengthen the legitimacy of the ruling part in the post-Tiananmen and post-Cold War era.

As this example indicates, the quantitative data became a very important supplement to the qualitative research and provide a more comprehensive picture on how the government uses the past to serve present interests. Mixed methods research is an approach that combines quantitative and qualitative research methods in the same research inquiry. Such work can help develop rich insights into real-world phenomena that cannot be fully understood using only a quantitative or a qualitative method.

In recent years, it has become a tendency and more attractive for researchers to use quantitative methods for research. One important reason is because of publication pressure on scholars and the preference of academic journals for quantitative methods. However, we need to be cautious of the misuse of quantitative research. Good quantitative research should be based on good qualitative research, including a better understanding of the core concepts and their evolution.

Narratives Matter

While it has become increasingly popular for researchers to quantify and measure ideational factors and how they influence people's actions, some scholars prefer discourse analysis to study historical memory. They believe that social narratives provide the architecture for consciousness and action. Narratives structure the dynamics of conflicts, as well as the dynamics of conflict resolution. George Mason University's Center for the Study of Narrative and Conflict Resolution made the following statement:

> Stories matter—they are material. They have gravitas and this is particularly the case in the context of conflicts, where narratives anchor hatred and fear, justify violence, authorize colonization, and perpetuate social injustice. They are grave indeed.

Scholars of discourse analysis regard that discourse analysis—as it is understood in the social sciences and humanities, rather than its more specific form in linguistics—is "as much theory as method."[7] They view it as a way of approaching and thinking about a problem. It is not simply another methodological tool but a perspective that needs to be understood within a wider epistemological context.[8] Potter and Wetherell (1987) provide a good definition about the underlying assumption of discourse analysis:

> Social texts do not merely reflect or mirror objects, events and categories pre-existing in the social and natural world. Rather, they actively construct a version of those things. They do not just describe things, they do things. And being active, they have social and political implications.[9]

In other words, theorists of discourse analytic approach see language and social texts as central components in the production and reproduction of societies. It is also a mechanism of control in highly administered social systems that constitutes the public domain of political discourse and is the medium through which identity is constructed. Moreover, it is the medium through which contestations become manifest.

Discourse analysis has rarely been applied in a theoretically self-conscious way in comparative and international political analysis. However, scholars of the Harvard Identity Project regard that discourse could be especially useful for studying identity. They gave two reasons: (1) the one, perhaps universal, distinguishing feature of an in-group—what allows groupness to form—is shared modes of communication, in other

words, shared linguistic practices; (2) by using this approach, an analyst is supposed to be able to see beyond the specific language of a discourse in order to highlight deeper meanings that might otherwise be taken for granted by participants. Discourse analysis is useful for analyzing contestation around the content of particular identities, interpreting the manner and degree of consensus and disagreement among group members.[10]

With this in mind, we can say that discourse analysis is a preferred method to study historical memory and its role in external conflict. Remembering and forgetting are socially constituted activities.[11] Historical representation is a process of social construction of practices, including reflexive self-construction—representations enter and shape social processes and practice.[12] National narratives provide the architecture for the perceptions and actions of national policy makers, and memory and trauma are functions of the narratives that are anchored by experience and sewn into the culture. Conflict is the drawn-out process in which states struggle for internal and external legitimacy. Governments are often caught up in storylines they did not create, yet cannot change, and networks of social relationships, histories, and institutional processes limit the scope of the stories that can be told. Conflict, from this perspective, is a narrative process in which the creation, reproduction, and transformation of meaning is a political process. It is a struggle against marginalization and invalidation, a struggle for legitimacy, if not hegemony.[13]

Many scholars use critical discourse analysis for their research on historical memory. Critical discourse analysis includes a number of approaches for scrutinizing multiple forms of discourse including written, vocal, and different structures of language use, and it uses discourse language as a form of social practice. Different from text linguistics, critical discourse analysis attempts to review social-psychological characteristics of a person or group of people, rather than just text structure when trying to put discourse into social context. It does not limit its analysis to only the text or conversation, but can also include other methods of human discourse, such as performing arts, certain films, music, sculptures, and monuments and memory sites.

As discussed previously, collective historical memory can be defined as peoples' thoughts and beliefs, as such, it is often very individualistic and very hard to quantify. However, peoples' thinking and beliefs lead to actions, including conversation, writing, and other various activities. These actions provide data sources for researchers to study collective memory. There is significant data and resources available for researchers

to collect information on human discourse; however, some formats of discourse are more valuable than others for this type of research. Monuments and memory sites are one such example. It is easy for people to talk to each other, and disseminating or publishing written opinions can be done with relative ease, but when a group of people choose words for a monument or sculpture, it is a specific, conscious decision. Because of the highly selective nature of constructing a memory site, it gives researchers significant information on what a group's historical consciousness really is, and what they want the following generations to remember about the event. Using critical discourse analysis, researchers can put these texts into context, and through analysis of the historical context and the process of building memory sites, designing sculptures and monuments, they can then review the meanings of these actions.

Articles, books, and journals are published daily, but publications that carry more weight than these and serve as an important source for studying historical memory are history textbooks. History textbooks are different from other types of publications because they normally represent a more harmonious view among a group of people and their sense of history, and very often represent an official, or master, narrative of that group's history. The process for writing and selecting textbooks varies from country to country, but all textbooks serve to tell the younger generations about their country's national experience. Studying history textbooks reveals significant insight about a group of people's collective memory.

Although leaders and politicians are continually communicating through speeches and interviews, this type of communication does not always provide the best information about historical consciousness. However, variations of this type of communication can carry greater weight and become a valuable source of information for memory studies. For example, 2015 was the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II (WWII); Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe gave a speech on August 15th of that year. To prepare for the speech, Prime Minster Abe set up a thirteen-member committee a year before, carefully selecting famous scholars, historians, politicians, non-governmental organizations, and civil society members to comprise the panel. The group used one full year to prepare a thirty-minute speech. Before Abe's speech was delivered, the text was circulated among many members of government and academia for feedback.[14] This meticulous method for drafting a speech is indeed unusual, this speech therefore carries a lot of weight and becomes

greater than the words of just one person, and it represents a consensus viewpoint reached by the current government. In fact, ten years ago and twenty years ago, on the corresponding anniversaries with WWII's end, the sitting Japanese Prime Minister took the similar painstaking measures in preparing their respective speeches.[15] The different speeches by different Japanese leaders in different periods of time offer very important information on the changing attitudes, mindset, and reflect the opinion of the Japanese government toward the history of WWII. In fact, there are few better sources than these types of meticulously crafted speeches in understanding the attitudes and perceptions of the Japanese regarding WWII, and this group of people's reflection and understanding toward their own actions in the past. A critical discourse analysis can help put this type of speech into context. Furthermore, putting this speech into the context of regional politics, researchers can also study how regional countries that were victims of the war, such as China and Korea, respond to the speech.

Leaders always play an important role in shaping history. Leaders' accounts of the past, particularly their personal experiences in some historical events, therefore provide important information for memory studies. Many scholars research memorials dedicated to or commissioned by specific leaders or study memoirs, biographies, interviews, and writings of political leaders. Some leaders have the habit of keeping diaries. For example, the famous "Chiang Kai-shek Diaries" are the detailed and personal diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, the former Chinese leader during WWII, written between 1918 and 1972 in Chinese calligraphy. The seventy-six manuscript boxes of his diaries have been well protected and housed at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.[16] This kind of text is, of course, quite valuable for studying history and historical memory regarding China during times of war.

Many scholars also focus their research on performing arts and use discourse analysis through movies, music, songs, and other forms of media and artistic activities to decode how a group of people remember their past. In her book *Media and Memory*, Joanne Garde-Hansen states: "Media, in the form of print, television, film, photography, radio, and increasingly the internet, are the main sources for recording, constructing, archiving and disseminating public and private histories in the twenty-first century."[17] Performing arts and other media, then, are an important way to gauge how a society remembers its past and how emotionally they remember it. For example, Edward Bates uses film to

showcase how historical memory shifts over time by comparing two films depicting the Alamo and minorities: *Martyrs of the Alamo* (1915) and *The Alamo* (2004).[18] *Martyrs of the Alamo* has a harsher portrayal of Mexicans because of hostility toward immigration around 1910; *The Alamo*, though playing to stereotypes and subject to embellishment, has a more factual tone and is more inclusive to minorities than its predecessor.[19] Traumas, such as war or genocide, have a complex relationship with television and films.[20] Marcia Landy notes, "As these events become more and more remote, they are reexamined and invested with great importance and intensity by filmmakers, television programmers, novelists, and museum curators."[21] Various forms of media can capture, interpret, or redirect the way a society remembers its past.

Memories and perceptions are not something "over there" that we can see, hear, or touch; they are difficult to quantify, but they have indicators and the various social texts mentioned before provide us a wide range of data for research. Ignoring these important data sources and focusing only on quantitative statistics is a tragedy of research.

Researching History Textbooks

History textbooks are "gold mines" for researching a group's collective memories. As discussed, history textbooks can represent a master narrative regarding a country's history; the process of compiling history textbooks is different compared to individual books, articles, newspaper stories, and other scholarly works. Because a selected textbook's contents are normally agreed upon as a society's basic opinions, history textbooks carry more weight in determining people's understanding of events and their historical consciousness than individual books or other media publications.

A common method that researchers use for examining history textbooks is comparative case studies. The case study method allows researchers to focus their research on a specific textbook or a specific country during a specific period of time; comparative studies help researchers compare two countries' textbooks on the same historical events or textbooks used in the same countries during the different periods of time. Comparative case studies provide the variances in changes of narrative in different textbooks over time. The reason for the changes and the impact of them can often provide valuable information regarding a group's politics and collective memory.

For example, researchers found stark differences when they compared history textbooks covering the 1937 Nanjing Massacre in Chinese and Japanese middle school history books. Some comparative case studies were conducted examining detailed information about the selection of textbooks in the two countries, the textbook writing process, and the differing narratives. Some of the researches also used quantitative methods for comparison, for example, the number of pages in the textbooks from each country to describe the Nanjing Massacre and the level of detail regarding the event in the different textbooks.[22]

Additionally, in many countries, political change leads to changes in historical narratives, requiring a change of textbooks to update society on the new "correct" narrative. Because of this, some scholars conduct studies that compare the different time periods and how history textbooks give a differing account of the shift on the emphasis of a country's history. For instance, scholars conduct research to compare textbooks published in the former Soviet Union and contemporary Russia and the change of narratives regarding the country's history. Russia's textbooks after the fall of the Soviet Union provide very different narratives than those of the Soviet era and those of the Putin era.[23]

Another method some researchers use during their examination of textbooks and historical education is narrative analysis. In the narrative analysis, researchers focus on specific terms and keywords used to evaluate historical events, focusing on specific wording and descriptors of historical events, for example, whether a textbook is merely telling the story of a country's past or trying to glorify the past, or if the methodology puts more emphasis on telling what happened, regardless of the behavior in the past. Some textbooks aim to inform students about what happened in the past; the wording and evaluation tends to be objective and puts distance between the reader and the past; these textbooks are not seeking to make a connection to the reader. Some textbooks convey information about the history of "our ancestors," making a personal connection to the reader. By studying the wording and the emphasis placed on certain historical events, scholars can identify whether the textbook glorifies the past or just states the facts. Narrative analysis is a useful tool for understanding these sometimes-subtle details in textbooks.

Researchers should also note that historical education, school education, and textbook education all have their variances, and different time periods play a role as well. Researchers do not always consider the different systems of selecting history textbooks in various countries. For

example, comparing history textbooks between China and Japan is popular; however, though there are some local schools that more recently have started using their own, locally published textbooks, most Chinese schools use a unified textbook published by a national textbook publisher. Writing and selecting textbooks, with few exceptions, remains a highly united, centralized, controlled, government-conducted endeavor. Conversely, in Japan, the schools have more options to choose from, usually from seven or eight different textbooks, though they still must be approved by the Ministry of Education. Therefore, when researchers focus on a specific Japanese textbook, it is very important to find out the popularity of the text or its rate of usage nationally. For example, a Japanese textbook published in 2005 was highly controversial and incited protests in China and South Korea over perceived "white washing" of Japanese war crimes during WWII, but this textbook was only used by a very small number of schools—0.7% in comparison with other textbooks.[24] Researchers need to be careful, thorough, and objective in processing these variances.

Using Public Opinion Surveys

One of the major challenges in using quantitative studies of a group's perceptions is that people's ideas and beliefs are highly individualistic, but the research of historical memory is trying to find a collective identity and collective characteristics and qualities. It is challenging to use research based on individual respondents and apply it to group characteristics. It is not possible to conduct widespread, in-depth interviews to gather the needed data, and collective memory conceals many subliminal ideas and ideals, ideas and ideals that are difficult to draw out and are often very sensitive. If there is an official historical narrative regarding historical events, interviews about the subject can be tricky because of its sensitive nature or, depending on the issue, not even a possibility—in these situations, respondents are often cautious with their answers, especially if their answers differ from the popular or official narrative.

Public opinion polls can be an effective way to gather group opinions, perceptions, and beliefs. Because public opinion polls are usually conducted using a large number of respondents, even though individual responses are brief, the quantity of data gathered provides a broader view of common or group-specific opinions. Compared with one-on-one and face-to-face interviews, public opinion polls can be conducted online and

through social media. Although in the past there was an issue with online polls' validity and representation, this has become less of an issue in most places now as more people have access to and use the Internet. Even in developing countries such as China, Brazil, and Nigeria, each country's Internet population is over or close to the half of its total population.[25]

Researchers must be careful, however, when using public opinion polls as there are several issues that can negatively impact the data gathered. The first issue is that conductors of the survey—whether it was conducted by the researchers themselves, by hiring a public opinion poll company to conduct the survey, or by hiring individuals—can impact the quality of the results. If a public opinion poll is conducted by an organization, the organization's background can impact the results. For example, certain political parties or media outlets have a strong political bent; polls conducted by such an organization may have a strong bias; these polls also would be at risk for skewed results because those taking the poll would likely hold similar ideas and beliefs to the organization.

In China, for instance, the *Global Times* is a major media outlet, considered to have a stronger tendency toward nationalism. In recent years, the editorials and public opinion polls published by this newspaper have often been quoted by China watchers as evidences of China's foreign policy and public perceptions. However, we need to be cautious when using any polls conducted by a newspaper with tendencies toward specific opinions. Compared with opinion surveys conducted by a neutral, professional survey organization, the results of these surveys are less reliable. It should also be noted that in China conducting a large public opinion survey including sensitive issues often requires special permission, thus making it more difficult for a neutral and professional organization to conduct a national survey. This is a major challenge for conducting research on ideational factors in closed or semi-closed states, when large-N surveys and interviews with policy makers are either not available or the results can be strongly affected by environmental factors.

It is important to know whether the public opinion poll uses a random selection of respondents, targets certain groups, and if it gathers sample representative of a specific group of people. National surveys should represent the diversity of its population, not just focus on one group or region. If the society has highly divided and contested identities and opinions, the sample selection becomes even more important. Some societies have major regional, generational, or cultural differences. For example, a poll conducted in Hong Kong has a large generational

perception gap regarding Hong Kong's relationship with China—including the different generational groups is important to present an accurate representation. Historical memory and people's collective memory are shaped by many factors—same age groups may receive the same education and have the same experiences within the same political environment. All of these can have a significant impact on people's perception and identity

The question design is also very important.[26] The wording of the questions can have a significant impact and can often mislead. As Dalia Sussman noted, "Certain differences are easier to spot, like biased or loaded wording or unbalanced choices. But the inclusion of seemingly innocuous phrases can elicit widely varying responses to questions that otherwise seem the same."[27] Often, for many of the interview questions, multiple answers are provided for the respondents to select, but the answer choices lack a neutral response, do not allowance for nuance, or fail to include an admission of needing more data. The flawed question design could easily garner a large support or against rate in favor of a certain opinion.

Another limitation of public opinion polls is that people's perceptions and ideas may change over time and could be influenced by particular events. Some opinion polls, which have been conducted consistently for a longer period of time, would be more valuable and provide more relevant information. A very impressive public opinion poll is conducted jointly by two Chinese and Japanese organizations targeting Chinese and Japanese citizens using the same questions and methods since 2005; this consistency over time provides valuable insights. The poll focuses predominately on the impression of the other country. The data gathered show that between 2005 and 2016 the two countries' citizens' mutual impressions have experienced a major transformation that corresponds with the changing relationship and rising tensions between the two countries. In 2005, only 37.9% of Japanese respondents held an unfavorable impression toward China, but this number increased over time; in 2008, it reached 75.6%; in 2011, it became 78%; and in 2014, it increased to a striking 93% (Fig. 6.1).[28]

Consistent polling for many years provides more accurate information and insight. Typically, this type of public opinion poll regarding impressions of another country only gives general impressions of the other country, but the Chinese–Japanese joint poll not only asks the impression each has for the other, but also for the reasoning behind



Fig. 6.1 The 10th Japan–China joint opinion poll

the impression. The survey was able to identify that the historical issues between the two countries have been consistently listed as one of the top reasons for a negative impression of the other. For example, in the 2014 survey, among the Chinese respondents, 59.6% listed Japan's lack of a proper apology over the history of Japan's invasion of China as the main reason for their negative impression. 52.2% of the Japanese respondents considered Chinese criticism of Japan over historical issues as their main reason for their negative impression. There are several other questions asked to identify the respondents' reasoning for their opinion of each other, including their views regarding the future trend of the bilateral relationship.

A public opinion poll conducted by a reliable organization consistently over a period of time with specific questions pertaining directly to history can be very useful when conducting research on historical issues. Another impressive public opinion poll has been conducted by the Taiwanese National Chengchi University regarding Taiwanese identity over the past twenty years.[29] A highly divided society, the Taiwanese people have very different opinions regarding their identity with mainland China; the poll questions whether the respondents consider themselves Taiwanese, Chinese, or both in trying to identify their main identity. After conducting the repeated survey for over twenty years from 1994



Fig. 6.2 Changes in the unification-Independence stances of Taiwanese (1994–2016)

to 2016, the statistics have become a rich and more reliable resource for studying the changing identity in Taiwan. Very often their statistics were used as an important indicator of presidential elections as identity issues are associated with particular candidates and orientations (Fig. 6.2).

Researchers should be cautious when utilizing survey and public opinion polls as these methods can be inconclusive due to poor question design. The design and structure of the research question are extremely important. For example, an article the author reviewed included a public opinion poll being conducted in several high schools in China that asked students to determine their own level of patriotism. It is not possible to gain accurate and comparable information for a question posed this way.

In summary, the use of public opinion polls is an important and useful way to conduct quantitative research on collective memory and identity and can provide valuable information that qualitative research cannot. Using both types of research together, the quantitative can provide valuable supplementary data that can solidify the findings of the qualitative research, and provide much a much more rigorous and scientific research method for the issue of historical memory.

Conclusion

A recent survey indicates that in the field of international relations there exists a "strong bias" in favor of quantitative methods. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt made the following comments on the trend:

> Although fewer than half of IR scholars primarily employ quantitative methods, more articles published in the major journals employ quantitative methods than any other approach." Indeed, "the percentage of articles using quantitative methods is vastly disproportional to the actual number of scholars who identify statistical techniques as their primary methodology.[30]

This survey also found that the recent APSA job postings in IR reveal a strong preference for candidates with methodological expertise and hardly any job postings for theorists. This trend "may explain why junior scholars are increasingly trained to use statistics as their primary methodological approach."[31]

In recent years, interest in using quantitative research to study historical education, collective memory, and nationalism has also grown. However, quantitative research must be employed carefully.

As mentioned before, there are two significant barriers of conducting research associated with using identity as a variable: definition and measurement.

As the first step of good research, researchers should clearly define the main concepts and variables being studied. For example, in different countries, there are differences in defining nationalism. Any research into nationalism should have a clear, precise definition regarding the research's specific focus in terms of what it defines as nationalism. If any research is trying to quantify and measure nationalism, then having a clear definition of nationalism with measurable indicators is the first step. Within the past few years, the author has reviewed several manuscripts on nationalism, historical memory, and historical education submitted to different peer-reviewed academic journals; a common problem with some of the submissions was a lack of clear definition.

Especially with measuring the formation of people's ideas and beliefs, there are significant challenges inherent with research on ideational factors. It is difficult to measure a specific textbook or education's impact on a group of people and their perception on political attitudes. For example, there is a lot of research trying to ascertain how historical education can correlate with a group's national historical sentiment or nationalism. The major challenge is the difficulty identifying a one-on-one correlation; people's perceptions and attitudes can be influenced by many different factors. While historical education can be an important source for young people's perceptions and attitudes, it is only one of many sources. Students can also be influenced by their family, by popular culture, and varying supplementary studies. Scholars should avoid attempting "mission impossible" in trying to find something that is not possible for any type of research to identify, and should refrain from attempting to ascribe correlation. Because of this challenge, the research design becomes imperative.

As discussed in this chapter, good quantitative research provides a solid foundation for reliable qualitative research; without a good understanding of the core concepts, a clearly established definition, and precise time period factored into the research, it is impossible to design good quantitative research.

Notes

1. Martin J. Murray, *Commemorating and Forgetting: Challenges for the New South Africa* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 72.
2. Murray, *Commemorating and Forgetting*, 79–80.
3. Murray, *Commemorating and Forgetting*, 99.
4. Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
5. Ibid., 104–110.
6. Ibid., 107.
7. Norman Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis As a Method in Social Scientific Research," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 121–138.
8. Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroger, *Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for Studying Action in Talk and Text* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), xiv.
9. Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, *Discourse Analysis and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behavior* (London: Sage Publications 1987), 6.
10. Rawi Adbeal et al., "Identity as a Variable," *Perspectives on Politics* 4: 4 (2003), 13–16.
11. Jonathan Potter, "Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Approaches," in *Hand book of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences*, ed. T.E. Richardson (Leicester: BPS Books, 1996), 125–156.
12. Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 123.
13. "Narrative Research Methods," accessed February 26, 2017, http://cncr.gmu.edu/narrative-research-methods.html.
14. Zheng Wang, "The Rocky Road from Normalization to Reconciliation: China-Japan Relations on the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II." In *Contested Memories and Reconciliation Challenges: Japan and the Asia-Pacific on the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II*, edited by Tatsushi Arai, Shihoko Goto and Zheng Wang, 5–19. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015.
15. Ibid.
16. "Chaing Kai-shek Diaries," accessed February 26, 2017, http://www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/chiang-kai-shek-diaries.
17. Joanne Garde-Hansen, *Media and Memory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 1.

18. Edward L. Bates, "Exploring Historical Memory in a Community College Survey Class," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 30: 4 (Summer, 2011), 39.
19. Bates, "Exploring Historical Memory," 40–42.
20. Garden-Hansen, *Media and Memory*, 52.
21. Marcia Landry, ed., *The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media* (Rutgers University Press, 2000), 1.
22. See for example: Joshua A. Fogel, ed., *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan Besieged: The Textbook Controversy," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 9: 2 (1983), 297–301.
23. See for example: Miguel Vázquez Liñán, "History As a Propaganda Tool in Putin's Russia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43: 2 (June 2010), 167–178; Joseph ZajdaRea Zajda, "The Politics of Rewriting History: New History Textbooks and Curriculum Materials in Russia," *International Review of Education*, 49: 3 (July 2003), 363–384.
24. Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*.
25. "Internet Users by Country (2016)," accessed February 26, 2017, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/.
26. See for example, George Gallup in "The Qintamensional Plan of Question Design" presents a method to frame questions while avoiding six criticisms typically associated with public opinion surveys (such as lack of knowledge, question wording, and reducing more complex questions to 'yes' or 'no' responses). *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 11: 3 (1947), 385–393.
27. Dalia Sussman, "Opinion Polling: A Question of What to Ask," *The New York Times*, February 27, 2010, accessed February 10, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/weekinreview/28sussman.html.
28. "The 10th Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll," accessed February 26, 2017, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5317.html
29. "Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06–2016/12)," accessed February 26, 2017, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167#.
30. Colin Wight et al., "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing is Bad for International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19: 3 (2013).
31. Daniel Maliniak et al., "International Relations in the US Academy," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011), 439, 453.

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