

Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience

Edited by
Cornelia Navari



Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience

Cornelia Navari
Editor

Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience

palgrave
macmillan

Editor
Cornelia Navari
University of Buckingham
Buckingham, UK

ISBN 978-3-319-67497-1 ISBN 978-3-319-67498-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017960418

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Glasshouse Images/Alamy Stock Photo.
Cover Design by Tom Howey

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Hans J. Morgenthau is generally considered a political realist and the transmitter of continental *Realpolitik* into American letters. But he has also been claimed as an idealist, as a constructivist, and as an ethicist. Some of these claims make sense if we understand that Morgenthau was trained as a lawyer in the German historical tradition during the time that German legal realism was struggling to contain the challenges to the Weimar Republic's constitutional structure and the crises that confronted it. Others can be made sense of if we understand that—self-consciously a "European"—he was continuously adapting his ideas to an American audience and, in the process, being socialized into an American experience. This volume illustrates the "Americanization" of Morgenthau.

The project was inspired by the English translation of Morgenthau's 1933 *La Notion du 'Politique'* (*The Concept of the 'Political'*), undertaken and edited by Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, which appeared in 2012. That text, somewhat obscure to the Anglo-Saxon reader, requiring extensive editorial annotations and with a truncated concept of the political, stands in sharp contrast to the bold, articulate, and crystalline presentation of politics as the quest for power that appeared fifteen years later in *Politics Among Nations.* At that point, Morgenthau had been ten years in America, the most recent four years at the University of Chicago, in the department dominated by the behavioral approach of Charles Merriam, doyen of American political science and advisor to presidents. During the same period, America had thrown off the shackles of isolationism and had committed itself and its formidable power to the defeat of Nazism and to the reconstruction of world order. It is difficult to imagine that Morgenthau's

experience of these different (but not unrelated) Americas did not affect his thinking about politics, his theoretical ambitions, and his conceptual framework.

The effort to explore the relationship between Morgenthau's America and his theory of politics was initiated at the 2014 International Studies Association conference in San Francisco, for which a panel on "Morgenthau in America" was organized, each presenter addressing one of Morgenthau's major works, from *Scientific Man* to his Viet Nam writings. The initial findings made it clear that a process of evolution had occurred in Morgenthau's thinking and that the major stages had to do with his ambitions as a public intellectual determined to bring the political wisdom of Europe to an America enthralled (he trusted not permanently) with scientific rationalism. It was also clear, however, that in the process he himself was forced to take on some American attitudes, not least in order to make his ideas palatable in a gradually less alien political culture. Those papers, collected together into a roundtable on "Morgenthau in America" for the journal *Ethics and International Affairs* (2013, 30:1), have been revised and extended here, and a chapter added on Morgenthau's legacy.

The reader will recognize the method as "ideas in context". It eschews influences over long time spans, including intellectual influences, in favor of close attention to text, intent, and immediate context—in Morgenthau's case, political and institutional. Of intellectual influences, there can be no doubt: Reinhold Niebuhr, Kenneth Thompson, Carl Schmidt, and E. H. Carr appear, often in their own words, and the presence of others (Treitschke, Meinecke and Weber; George Kennan and William T. R. Fox) can be detected in the formulations themselves. Morgenthau's influences are evident in the texts, appearing and disappearing as appropriate to the argument of the time. The method does not elicit an essential Morgenthau but rather a theorist grappling with a variety of problematics at different times who returns to the same intellectual roots but from different perspectives and with different purposes. The chapters highlight the major stages in the evolution of Morgenthau's political ethics and his political science.

Buckingham, UK Cornelia Navari

Contents

Morgenthau in Europe: Searching for the Political 1
Felix Rösch

Scientific Man and the New Science of Politics 27
Hartmut Behr and Hans-Jörg Sigwart

Politics Among Nations: A Book for America 55
Christoph Frei

The National Interest and the 'Great Debate' 75
Cornelia Navari

The Purpose of American Politics 95
Richard Ned Lebow

Vietnam Writings and the National Security State 115
Douglas B. Klusmeyer

Morgenthau in America: The Legacy 143
Greg Russell

Index 169

List of Contributors

Hartmut Behr is Professor of International Politics at Newcastle University (UK). His work includes studies in political theory, International Relations Theory and sociology of knowledge of the discipline, difference and "otherness", and Critical European Studies. His most recent books include: *A History of International Political Theory* (2010), *Hans J. Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political* (2012, together with Felix Rösch), and *Politics of Difference* (2014). He is Principal Investigator of the Leverhulme-funded research network on "Critical Theory Meets Classical Realism".

Christoph Frei is Associate Professor of Political Science and Academic Director of the International Affairs and Governance Program at the University of St. Gallen. His professional experience includes multi-year stints in France, Hungary, and the United States. His research interests focus on political culture (France) and the history of political thought (Rousseau, Jasay). In the context of International Relations, Frei is the author of *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (2001).

Douglas B. Klusmeyer is an associate professor in the Department of Justice, Law and Criminology and an affiliate faculty member of the History Department of American University, Washington, DC. His research interests include immigration and citizenship policy, international political theory, and legal history. His most recent book (with Demetrios Papademetriou) is: *Immigration Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany* (2013).

Richard Ned Lebow is Professor of International Political Theory in the War Studies Department of King's College London, Bye-Fellow of Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, and the James O. Freedman Presidential Professor (Emeritus) of Government at Dartmouth College. Among his recent publications

are *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* (2010); *Why Nations Fight: The Past and Future of War* (2010); and *The Politics and Ethics of Identity* (2012), winner of the Alexander L. George Award for the best book of the year by the International Society of Political Psychology.

Cornelia Navari is Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the University of Buckingham and Honorary Senior Lecturer at the University of Birmingham (UK). With reference to the history of thought, she has written *Internationalism and the State in the 20th Century* (2000), *Public Intellectuals and International Affairs* (2013), and "Europe's Public Intellectuals" in the *Handbook on European Foreign Policy* (Sage, 2015). She has edited *Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs* (2013) and, with Daniel Green, *Guide to the English School of International Relations* (Wiley, 2014).

Felix Rösch is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University. He works on encounters of difference in transcultural and intercultural contexts at the intersection of classical realism and critical theories. He has published amongst others with the *Review of International Studies*, *Politics*, *European Journal of International Relations*, and *International Studies Perspectives*. His most recent books include *The Concept of the Political* (2012), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations* (2014), and *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview* (2015).

Greg Russell holds a PhD (1987) in Political Science from Louisiana State University and is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma. He has published numerous articles and books on the American diplomatic tradition, including *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft*, *John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy*, and *The Statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt: The Duties of Nations and World Order*. He is working on a manuscript entitled *Elihu Root, International Law, and the World Court.*

Hans-Jörg Sigwart is a senior lecturer (Akademischer Oberrat) at the Political Science Institute of Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. His research focuses on political theory, its relation to social theory, and the history of political ideas. His publications include *The Wandering Thought of Hannah Arendt* (2016), "The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism", in *The Review of Politics* 75 (2013), *Politische Hermeneutik. Verstehen, Politik und Kritik bei John Dewey und Hannah Arendt* (Königshausen & Neumann, 2012), and *Das Politische und die Wissenschaft. Intellektuell-biographische Studien zum Frühwerk Eric Voegelins* (Königshausen & Neumann, 2005).

Morgenthau in Europe: Searching for the Political

Felix Rösch

In 1929, Hans Morgenthau passed his doctorate with a thesis titled *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen* (*International Jurisdiction: Its Nature and Limits*) at the law faculty of the University of Frankfurt and began pursuing a *Habilitation* with the aim of becoming a law professor at a German university. At that moment, little indicated that Morgenthau would become one of the most well-known and controversial political scientists of the twentieth century, but it was then that Morgenthau laid the foundation for his future career. In the early 1930s, Morgenthau began what turned out to be his most decisive intellectual reorientation: transcending the legal positivism that he predominantly encountered in international law, he began focusing on political science. By the time he arrived in the United States, this reorientation was thoroughly accomplished in his mind, as he stressed in a letter to the British-American academic and reporter Ronald Hilton from October 1937 that 'my chief scientific interests … lie in sociology and political science'.[1]

During these last years in Europe, Morgenthau wrote extensively, much of which remained unpublished. Two works from this time stand out. The first one is a small book of less than 90 pages that Morgenthau (1933) had typed after finishing his doctoral thesis: *La notion du "politique" et la*

F. Rösch (✉)
Coventry University, Coventry, UK

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_1

théorie des différends internationaux (*The Concept of the Political and the Theory of International Differences*). The second one is a lengthy manuscript from 1934 entitled *Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen* (*On the Purpose of Science in These Times and on Human Destiny*). Underappreciated and little known in the ever-growing literature on Morgenthau and classical realism at large, this manuscript and the small book on the concept of the political, only recently translated (Morgenthau 2012)[2] provided the foundation for a series of publications throughout his life in which he ferociously and even polemically defended a normative role for 'science' (*Wissenschaft*[3]) in modern societies against the backdrop of the rise of positivism (Morgenthau 1938, 1947, 1972). Most famous among them is Morgenthau's first book in the United States, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Behr 2016). Indeed, 40 years later, he based the first part of *Science: Servant or Master* on it (Morgenthau 1972: xxi), indicating that he 'never went much beyond what he had basically said and formulated' during his time in Europe (John Herz 2005: 25).[4]

Morgenthau wrote these works during a time of great personal turmoil. In Frankfurt, the legal philosopher and former Weimar Republic Minister of Justice Gustav Radbruch was not impressed by Morgenthau's efforts, as he indicated in a letter to his colleague Karl Strupp from 25 June 1929. The rising anti-Semitism in German academia further hampered Morgenthau's academic ambitions and he eventually had to transfer to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in 1932 (Frei 2001: 42–43). But the situation in Geneva was not much better. His *Habilitation* was only deemed satisfactory by the university after a positive intervention by the jurist Hans Kelsen; and his income had dwindled as anti-Semitic German students refused to attend his lectures (Morgenthau 1984: 353–354). Since the situation in Geneva had become unbearable, he sought employment in the United States but neither the Academic Assistance Council nor the Rockefeller Foundation, to which he appealed, offered help. His fiancée, Irma Thormann, even wrote a desperate letter to her former professor in Berlin, Carl Landauer, asking him to help Morgenthau in securing a position in the United States. At the beginning of 1935, when Thormann wrote the letter, Landauer was lecturing at Berkeley. His discouraging reply reached her two months later (Landauer 1935), when Morgenthau was on his way to take up a position at the recently established *Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y Económicos* in Madrid. Shortly thereafter, however, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil

War also vitiated this option, forcing the Morgenthaus into an odyssey through Europe before finally immigrating to the United States in 1937.

Morgenthau's restless life in Europe presaged the larger developments that were about to shatter the entire world. As he wrote shortly after the Nazis gained power in Germany, 'the air, in which we dance has changed and the ground is shaking. What used to be accepted by everyone turns into a matter of dispute and therefore into a matter of scholarly concern' (Morgenthau 1934: ii).[5] The rise of fascism throughout Europe Morgenthau understood as the tangible political effect of fundamental metaphysical deficiencies, and made him question the role and scope of science.

These two concerns of Morgenthau, the crisis of modern societies and the purpose of science, would bring him to formulate an ethics of responsibility in later years and to support a reflective, democratic dimension in foreign policymaking. They remained the core concerns of his work, and the political events that led to them formed the backdrop of his worldview. Morgenthau, like many other émigré scholars, was a 'traveler between all worlds' (Puglierin 2008: 419)[6] meaning that Morgenthau in America cannot be understood without having knowledge about Morgenthau in Europe.

The Crisis of Modernity and the Loss of Values

Classical realism, as we find it in early-twentieth-century political thinkers like Herz, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt, developed in conjunction with critical thinkers like Herbert Marcuse and Eric Voegelin as a critique of modernity (Rösch 2013a, 2017; Sigwart 2016; Behr and Williams 2017). Perhaps modernity's most outspoken critic among this group of often European émigré scholars, however, was Morgenthau. In the 1940s, when he was appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Kansas City, he began publishing a series of texts (cf. Morgenthau 1940, 1944, 1947, 1949, 1955, 1960, 1972, 1973; for more, see Behr 2016) in which he did not promote a conservative, belligerent worldview, but, as Vibeke Schou Tjalve (2008, 2009; Tjalve and Williams 2015)[7] has so eloquently detailed, expressed concern that modernity turned liberalism into an idealistic ideology or 'Wilsonianism', as he preferred to call it, that endangered democracies through silencing dissenting voices (Morgenthau 1951: 4, 1952a: 2).[8] The personal experience of the downfall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of anti-Semitism, and,

later, the Shoah (Klusmeyer 2009; Rösch 2013b) made Morgenthau and his fellow émigrés sensitive to even subtle 'temptations of unfreedom' (*Versuchungen der Unfreiheit*), to use Ralf Dahrendorf's (2008) term. An episode from 1935 that was for Morgenthau (1984: 363–364) so important that he even recalled it decades later is illustrative. At a soirée in Karl Neumeyer's[9] house in Munich, guests remained largely indifferent to the news of a Jewish lawyer being murdered, although most of them considered themselves to be against Nazi rule.

At the heart of his critique of modernity was Morgenthau's discomfort with scientism and the rising 'scientification' (Behr 2010: 197–209) of everyday life, which he would experience on both sides of the Atlantic. This was evident already in his sojourns through Germany, Switzerland, and Spain. Morgenthau (1932, 1934, 1936), then still the international lawyer and not yet the political scientist, repeatedly disputed the possibility of a 'pure theory of law'. Morgenthau disagreed with legal positivists like Kelsen who tried to distill the 'basic norm' (*Grundnorm*) by separating legal systems from the sociopolitical life-worlds in which they were created (see Jütersonke 2010: 83). For Morgenthau, a legal system had to be 'realistic' by taking 'sociological aspects of law' into account, as he noted in a letter to the Spanish jurist Rafael Altamira.[10] Although the pure theory of law was a necessary theoretical exercise, a realistic legal theory had to transcend Kelsen's legal positivism, or else it could contribute nothing to the solution of contemporary political problems, of which the most important were the increasing nationalism and fascism in Europe (Morgenthau 1932).

In America, Morgenthau would face a different intellectual environment, but one in which the belief in the scientific prospects of positivism was even stronger. After its entry into the First World War, the United States was in need of analytical frameworks to support its efforts 'to make the world safe for democracy', as Woodrow Wilson put it. Until the war, the United States had pursued a largely isolationist foreign policy which meant that it had little experience in dealing with conflicts that European states faced regularly. Hence, '[w]ithout a tradition of international involvement, the Americans were forced to rely on the Enlightenment ideology of reason and its 19th century successor, positivistic science, as the key to effective, rational practice in international relations' (Molloy 2003: 72; see also Tickner 2011). Consequently and in contrast to Continental European humanities, American social sciences in general and political science in particular were designed to endorse change (Jackson

2014: 274–276). This development would culminate during the 1950s and 1960s, when behavioralism reigned supreme. (It is therefore not without irony that Morgenthau spent most of his career in Chicago, at the very center of this behavioral turn, and he was probably right to assume that the 'Merriam fraction' (Morgenthau 1984: 370–371) would not have been in favor of his tenure had he published *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* before receiving it.)

Morgenthau understood scientism in terms of a loss of values both in the scholarly world and society at large. As Hans-Jörg Sigwart (2016: 75) would argue in relation to American behavioralism, scientism allows political scientists to pursue a value-free so-called liberal science of democracy, freeing them of having to provide a theoretical framework for their normative world views. In other words, 'when you take your ethics for granted … all problems emerge as problems of technique' (Hartz 1955: 10). Morgenthau never fully explained what values he was specifically speaking of (one chapter in his manuscript *Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen* (*Suicide with a Good Conscience*) (1930c: 41–52) promised to elaborate them). Christoph Frei (2001: 167) argues that Morgenthau envisioned values similar to the ones that the German sociologist Helmuth Plessner proposed, among them empathy, peace, tolerance, democracy, and liberty; and it seems probable that Morgenthau had these in mind (cf. Rösch 2015b; Reichwein 2015). But already evident in *The Purpose of Science* (1934: 37, 51), was his conviction that a lack of values endangers the political, as they are the necessary prerequisites for humans to be able to act. In a later publication, Morgenthau (1963: 421) explained this connection as follows: 'Our knowledge of what justice demands is predicated upon our knowledge of what the world is like and what it is for, of a hierarchy of values reflecting the objective order of the world.' Since values have disappeared in modern societies, people can only decide what is 'convenient and what is not, but [they can no longer judge] between good and bad' (Morgenthau 1934: 30). In other words, the inability to judge renders people incapable of acting, and thereby deprives them of the ability to contribute to the construction of their life-worlds.

To avoid depoliticization in modern societies, values have to be reestablished. In 1934, Morgenthau postulated that this could be achieved only through individual contemplation (Morgenthau 1934: 79). Yet, people lack the will and the strength to endure the solitariness of contemplation. Attempting to rejuvenate the human ability to act through contemplation is for most humans a daunting task because they fear that through

self-reflection their commonly held assumptions might be shattered (*Erschütterung der Seele*) (Morgenthau 1934: 74). It is this aspect that Morgenthau considered to be the basis of human tragedy. Since Richard Ned Lebow's study on *The Tragic Vision of Politics* (2003), the tragic element in Morgenthau's thought has repeatedly attracted scholarly interest (cf. Gismondi 2004; Rengger 2005; Klusmeyer 2009; Chou 2011; Kostagiannis 2014), but the contemplative aspect of it has received only limited attention (Rösch 2016).

In *On the Purpose of Science* and other writings, Morgenthau laid out a complex set of reasons for the human limitation. Since people are created in the 'image of God', they have a 'vision of perfection and try to attain it' (Morgenthau n.d.: 2). However, humans are tied to a specific time and space, and can never accumulate absolute knowledge—hence, perfection is impossible (Morgenthau 1934: 64). Realizing the futility of their ambitions and out of fear of being incapable of bearing the vacuity of their existence, people renounce their quest. Instead, they imagine a reality in collectivity that soothes their fears. As Hugo Sinzheimer (1932), a well-known labor lawyer during the Weimar Republic, noted in a letter to his former clerk Morgenthau shortly before the Nazis gained power in Germany: 'The political metaphysics and the belief in miracles, i.e., the absolute fear of reality, blurs the mind of Germans'.

Drawing on the work of the sociologist Karl Mannheim, Morgenthau (1934: 54–55) saw in the fear of facing a meaningless life the cause for the rise of ideologies throughout Europe. As Sigwart (2013: 413) has recently argued:

> The main objection of the realist critiques against the liberal zeitgeist is that it is based on particular forms of 'wishful thinking' and on (mostly pseudo-religious) moral and political 'illusions' that systematically eclipse the actual realities of social and political, and also of intellectual, life.

However, ideologies are not deliberate attempts to create an illusion of reality and to purposefully disorient people. Rather, they are the product of frenzied, collective processes in order to provide ontological security. In the course of these processes, the full scope of human meaninglessness is concealed. As Morgenthau (n.d.: 2) put it in a later unpublished manuscript: 'Being imperfect and striving toward perfection, man ought not to be alone. For while the companionship of others cannot make him perfect, it can supplement his imperfection and give him the illusion of being perfect'.

The Limitations of the Nation-State

Toward the end of his life, Morgenthau delivered the first Council on Religion and International Affairs lecture on Morality and Foreign Affairs. During the following discussion, he postulated that 'we are living in a dream world' (Morgenthau 1979: 42). Although the nation-state is still the dominant form of human association globally, it is 'no longer [a] viable economic, political, or military unit' (Morgenthau 1979: 34). Earlier, the ostensible vindicator of the national interest had also characterized the nation-state as a 'blind and potent monster' that ultimately had to be replaced by a world state (1962a: 61).

In part, these concerns related to specific developments in the postwar period.[11] But it was not a new idea. He had already argued in *Suicide with a Good Conscience* (1930c) that the nation-state was politically unsuited to counter the loss of values in modern societies. Instead of providing the ground for a value reorientation, the Westphalian system of nation-states promoted a belligerent world view, and was actually discouraging political debate. As a consequence, nationalism was emerging to fill the value gap.

The basis for his analysis of nationalism derived from his 'toying with Freud' as he records in his memoirs (see also Schuett 2010). In a short paper from 1930 on 'The Origin of Politics in the Nature of Man' (Morgenthau 1930a), he laid out two human drives—the drive for self-preservation (*Selbsterhaltungstrieb*; hunger) and the drive to prove oneself (*Bewährungstrieb*; love), and nationalism satisfied both. The former drive is more fundamental because the preservation of one's life is the central concern for humans. It focuses on human survival and is manifested, for example, in the pursuit of food and shelter. The latter drive is intended to gain awareness of one's strengths and capabilities: 'everywhere where the human being strives to show what he [and she] can do' is the drive to prove oneself' (Morgenthau 1930a: 6). Particularly challenging situations satisfy this drive: they require overcoming obstacles by mastering nonroutine situations, evoking the appraisal of others. In doing so, one's identity is assured (Morgenthau 1930a: 26–27, 31–32). Pursuing the latter drive in international politics thereby increases the possibility of international conflict. (*Politics among Nations*, arguably Morgenthau's most famous contribution, might be read not as a promotion of this belligerent system of nation-states, but as its critique.[12])

Morgenthau had already encountered this impenetrability of the state in Kelsen's writings (Jütersonke 2010) and used it to stress that under the

current system only one organization can claim sovereignty within a given territory. To transcend the shortcomings of the nation-state, Morgenthau would eventually argue for the creation of a world state (see Scheuerman 2011). However, to be able to create a world state, a world 'community' had to be first realized. If citizens were not willing to give their loyalty to a world state and preferred to remain emotionally attached to their nation-state, no attempt at establishing institutions for a world state could be successful (Morgenthau 1948:344; also Speer 1968: 215; Fromkin 1993: 84). To transcend national sovereignty, a world community has to be established, first through traditional forms of diplomacy.

Eventually, Morgenthau hoped that a compromise-enabling community might be established, based on common understanding, trust, and loyalty among people, a position he would argue in the introduction to the reprint of David Mitrany's *A Working Peace System*:

> [A]n international community must grow from the satisfaction of common needs shared by members of different nations. International agencies, serving all peoples all over the world regardless of national boundaries, could create by the very fact of their existence and performance a community of interests, valuations, and actions. Ultimately, if such international agencies were numerous enough … the loyalties to these institutions and to the international community of which they would be the agencies would supersede the loyalties to the separate national societies. (Morgenthau 1966a: 11)

Initially skeptical of international organizations like the United Nations and forerunners of the European Union, the achievements of the late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (Morgenthau 1970b) and the insights of Mitrany's functionalist approach (see Ashworth 2014: 221–225) would make Morgenthau more open to international organizations as means to provide the grounds for shifting loyalties to a world state (Morgenthau 1962a: 75–76). International fora would allow the representatives of different countries to recognize commonalities, while being sensitive enough to accept those conditions and experiences which separate each culture.

In Search of the Political

Developing these fora required for Morgenthau the reestablishment and support of the political realm, as this realm is central for the formation of any liberal and peaceful association. From the time of the preparation of

his doctoral thesis at the University of Frankfurt (Morgenthau 1929) he devoted much of his intellectual life to the elaboration of the political.

His conceptualization of the political came from a variety of disciplines—sociology, anthropology, *Staatslehre*, and macro-economics (*Nationalökonomie*) (Gangl 2009a: 14); and many well-known scholars like Kelsen, Plessner, Hermann Heller, and Rudolf Smend had contributed to this debate. However, it was particularly Carl Schmitt's contribution that dominated the debate in Germany during the late 1920s and early 1930s, and that was to deeply influence Morgenthau. Schmitt's *Concept of the Political* first appeared in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik* in 1927 and later as a book in 1932 in which he most clearly elaborated the problem of sovereignty that the decline of the nation-state had brought about (Gangl 2009b: 39; also Morgenthau 1948).

Schmitt's intention was to strengthen the position of the state against the backdrop of a modernity that had shaken sociopolitical cohesion and atomized people in their search for identity. These which Schmitt (1932: 66) identified as 'neutralizations and depolitizations' caused by a 'plurality of loyalties' (Schmitt, in Gangl 2009b: 37) resulted in role conflicts that hindered people in developing clear responses in times of crisis. By identifying, however, '[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions and motives [as] that between friend and enemy', Schmitt (1996: 26) made it clear that conflicts are inherent to human nature, and that peaceful relations between people could at best exist only temporarily. As Udi Greenberg (2014: 216–217) notes, '[t]he ultimate objective of the state was [therefore] to mobilize the nation for victory in potential conflicts … Any institution that sought to eliminate or even regulate political tensions, such as the League of Nations, was fighting human nature'. Introducing the political as a matter of intensity, Schmitt aimed to help people transcend their role conflicts, (re)focus their loyalty on the state, and provide guidance in times of crisis. Even though he did not conceive of the political as intentionally belligerent (Gangl 2009b: 44), Schmitt (1930: 42) established the political as a 'move of capture' (Bigo and Walker 2007: 735) by stressing people's 'duty to the state' (*Pflicht zum Staat*). In doing so, Schmitt hoped to provide voting masses with a common identity (Gangl 2009b: 42–43).

As an early career researcher at universities in Frankfurt and Geneva, Morgenthau took inspiration from this conceptualization of the political (cf. Pichler 1998; Koskenniemi 2000; Brown 2007; Scheuerman 2007;

Rösch 2013c; Greenberg 2014). However, Morgenthau not only criticized Schmitt personally for his sympathies for National Socialism, he also took a very different stance on the political. Contributing to the debate on legal positivism through the perspective of international law, Morgenthau (2012: 86) identified two different types of conflicts which he labeled disputes and tensions ('legal and political disputes'; *Streitigkeiten* and *Spannungen*). While the former can be resolved legally in the international realm through such institutions like the League of Nations and later the United Nations, the latter cannot. Tensions of a political nature are those that Morgenthau saw as evoking intense emotional responses. They may express themselves indirectly in the form of legal disputes (Morgenthau 2012: 128), but seeking for rational solutions through a legal contract would not settle the underlying tensions. Indeed, as Morgenthau (2012: 134–135; italics in the original) summed it up in the conclusion of *The Concept of the Political*,

> parties *are not in a position* to submit *political* disputes … to the decision of an international legal body, even though these disputes could in themselves be susceptible to a legal solution. For the international legal body would then have to adjudicate, in addition to the dispute, the tension which is at the base of the dispute, and the body does not possess norms susceptible to general application with which to make such a decision.

Understanding these two types of conflicts, Morgenthau agreed with Schmitt's basic assumption that the establishment of (inter)national institutions could not settle tensions on the international level and that the political is a spatio-temporal precondition for these institutions. However, he disagreed with Schmitt's attempt to find solace in a reaffirmation of the nation-state. For him, the political could not be separated from other societal realms through the development of simple binaries, as Schmitt had attempted. This is because the political is 'a *quality*, a tone, which can be peculiar to certain objects, but which does not by necessity attach itself to any of them' (Morgenthau 2012: 101; italics in the original). In his dissertation, Morgenthau (1929: 67) had defined '[t]he concept of the political [as having] no once and for all fixed substance. It is rather a feature, a quality, a coloring which can be attributed to any substance … A question which is of political nature today can have no political meaning tomorrow'. Hence, any part of life can be absorbed in the political by turning into a source of tension on which people, states, or any other form of community may disagree.

Certainly, when people temporarily come together to pursue their interests these tensions can lead to violence, but Morgenthau hoped that such violent outbreaks could be avoided if the resulting antagonism of interests can take place freely in what Galston (2010: 391) would later characterize as 'arena[s] of contestation'. The resulting 'discussions', the term Morgenthau (2012: 126) used in *The Concept of the Political*, he intended to be understood as something like speech-act processes intended to gradually align human interests toward a common good. Of course this does not avoid violence *per se*, which is why Morgenthau (2012: 123) conceived of 'discussions' as elastic. Morgenthau believed that expressing their interests while considering the positions of others supports people in peacefully aligning their interests.

At the same time Morgenthau, like other scholars in the 'political studies enlightenment group' as Ira Katznelson (2003: 132) called a group of American intellectuals most of whom had arrived as émigrés in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, had an almost paradoxical concern about mass democracy. Having experienced the downfall of the Weimar Republic, Morgenthau was cautious about the capacity of communities to avoid the descent into violence when compromise is unavailing. Encountering 'apoietic situation[s]', to use Reinhart Koselleck's (in Friedländer 1993: 57) term, in which people face 'the necessity of making comparisons as well as the need to leave these comparisons behind', Morgenthau (1966b: 79) gave scholars a vital social role:

> The intellectual in general, and the political scientist in particular, to be true to their mission, must be committed in a dual way. They must be committed to the objective truth, and they must be committed to the great political issues of the contemporary world. They must descend into the political arena not on behalf of government or any other political interest but on behalf of the objective truth as they see it.

Being committed to truth, however, did not imply that scholars possessed absolute knowledge that only had to be passed on to other people. This is because for Morgenthau the limits of one's own perspective cannot be transcended.[13] As Morgenthau's thinking partner Arendt (1990: 103) put it in a series of lectures given at the University of Notre Dame during February 1954:

> Philosophy, political philosophy like all its other branches, will never be able to deny its origin in *thaumadzein*, in the wonder at that which is as it is. If philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the everyday life of human affairs, were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy they would have to make the plurality of man, out of which arises the whole realm of human affairs … the object of their *thaumadzein*.

In order to avoid these pitfalls, scholars have to act in the political realm through what can be best described as a Socratic maieutics, or dialogue. People and communities at large should be assisted in formulating their interests by encouraging the establishment of dialogues among them. In this process, scholars have to act as facilitators of the political by asking people questions about themselves, their life-worlds, and their relations with(in) these life-worlds. Through reflecting on these questions people gain awareness about their interests, helping them to become critical citizens. Eventually, a forum is created in which the political can re-evolve, rather than telling people 'the truth'.

The Stranger in America: Immanent and Transcendent Science

Like Francis Lieber's *The Stranger in America* (1835), Morgenthau was a German émigré jurist who would establish an outstanding career as a political scientist in his new home country. Still, he bitterly complained in private correspondence that he was often misunderstood by his American colleagues. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann (2015: 21), one of Morgenthau's doctoral students in Chicago, noted that 'throughout his life Morgenthau suffered from the misjudgment of being an apologist of power politics'. The text of *On the Purpose of Science* can help us understand why.

In the manuscript, Morgenthau laid out two ways for science to deal with the lack of values and the subsequent depoliticization in modern societies: it could pursue either an 'immanent' or a 'transcendent' strategy (Morgenthau 1934: 2). However, Morgenthau concludes that the first strategy—immanent science—is not a viable option to deal with the crisis of modernity because values do not play a role in this kind of science. Immanent scientists only engage in empirical, policy-oriented studies that do not question the sociopolitical and cultural life-worlds they are operating in. As a consequence, immanent science sustains the sociopolitical status quo; instead of offering a critical corrective, 'science [turns] into an

ideological doctrine of justification' (Morgenthau 1934: 55). For Morgenthau (1934: 12–13), a value-free science was positively dangerous to politics because science would lose its societal function of supporting people in their quests to make decisions and engage with their peers. The extensive criticism of behavioral sciences that Morgenthau offered in this manuscript anticipates the more substantial, often polemically presented concerns that he would repeatedly voice in the United States (cf. Morgenthau 1938, 1959, 1964, 1966b).

In all of these texts, Morgenthau grappled with the political idealism that he would encounter in the United States, an idealism that 'promised to replace the quest for knowledge with knowledge proper. It claimed to have superseded Socrates …with a system of knowing which made ignorance … a mere quantitative shortcoming' (Gellman 1988: 248). While Morgenthau might initially have hoped to be able to transcend the scientism in American political science and thereby stem liberalism's descent into idealism, personal correspondence in the Library of Congress suggests that he increasingly became disillusioned. Certainly, the anti-communist persecution of intellectuals during the McCarthy era of the 1950s contributed to Morgenthau's doubts.[14]

To achieve a truly lasting contribution to American political science, Morgenthau would remain dedicated to the second strategy that he had elaborated in 1934. Indeed, transcendent science was the only viable option for Morgenthau. Science had to aspire to a metaphysics, but not in the sense of Mannheim's world postulate (*Weltwollung*)—a fixed, normative set of ontological assumptions. For Morgenthau, as he would expound in one of his first publications in the United States (1944), this would lead to attempts to reify assumptions through social planning. Rather, science as metaphysics meant for Morgenthau (1934: 69) that it had to act as 'an interpreter of the imaginable' (*Deuter des nur zu Ahnenden*)—making people aware of the myriad sociopolitical and cultural constellations that inform their specific life-worlds at a given time. In other words, sociopolitical reality is not given, but 'constructed' as Behr and Williams would postulate (2017: 10). As Morgenthau put it:

> Facts have no social meaning in themselves. It is the significance we attribute to certain facts of our sensual experience, in terms of our hopes and fears, our memories, intentions, and expectations, that create them as social facts. The social world itself, then, is but an artefact of man's mind as the reflection of his thoughts and the creation of his actions'. (1962b: 110)

For Morgenthau, most people seek ways to conceal their imperfection, so transcendent science has to be prepared to be marginalized in public. As Morgenthau (1955: 446–447) would put it in the mid-1950s:

> Political science which is true to its moral commitment ought … to be an unpopular undertaking … it cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard to certain vested interests – intellectual, political, economic, social in general. For it must sit in continuous judgment upon political man and political society, measuring their truth … By doing so, it is not only an embarrassment to society intellectually, but it becomes also a political threat to the defenders or the opponents of the status quo or to both; for the social conventions about power, which political science cannot help subjecting to a critical – and often destructive – examination, are one of the main sources from which the claims to power, and hence power itself, derive.

As they become aware of the intellectual and physical limits of human existence, Morgenthau argued, people should not give in to them, but should engage with these limits, learning to accept human fallibility.

This willful engagement with reality, to allude to Michael Williams's (2005) term, rested on Morgenthau's reading of Mannheim's seminal *Ideology and Utopia*, where Mannheim had laid out the spatio-temporal conditionality of knowledge. Mannheim's concepts allowed Morgenthau to argue that, although absolute knowledge and consequently a universal objectivity are inconceivable, science does not have to concede to relativism. Objectivity is still possible, albeit tied to the specific sociopolitical and cultural constellations that inform individual perspectives (Morgenthau 1934: 20). Embracing this form of objectivity as an academic standard, however, requires from its bearers (self)reflexivity and intellectual modesty toward other viewpoints. This means that transcendent scientists have to be willing to constantly review their own perspectives in light of constantly changing sociopolitical and cultural constellations. This does not mean that scholars should not take a stand in favor of what they perceive to be the truth, as Morgenthau (1952b: 38) stressed in lectures on the Philosophy of International Relations during the early 1950s: 'What you [Morgenthau's students] are really saying – I regard this as a compliment – is that I have destroyed some of the illusions with which you came. This is the purpose of teaching – to confront people with the truth'.[15] However, taking a stand does not imply that the intellectual contributions of others are dismissed. Rather, they have to be carefully assessed and accepted as

legitimate attempts to provide meaning to life-worlds. Through these arduous, long-term processes, scientists can fulfill their societal role by reestablishing values through which society at large regains its capacity to act (Morgenthau 1934: 79–80). In other words, for Morgenthau, while immanent science faces the danger of providing the intellectual justification to enforce ideological constraints, transcendent science can reinstill in people the capacity to act, through which the political can be reestablished and sustained.

With *On the Purpose of Science*, Morgenthau (1934: 77) was promoting an elitist understanding of science and conceding a key societal role to an elite—a position in which we can clearly detect the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche. Without scientists, people would be incapable of regaining their ability to act, for it is only scientists who have the qualities to face human meaninglessness and transcend it. It was only after his relocation to New York in the late 1960s, taking up a position at the City College of New York in 1968, when he became acquainted with Arendt's democratic scholarship, that he modified this view. Scientists became no longer the sole guardians of the political in modern societies, but rather a part of a concerted effort by everyone to retain responsibility for their own life-worlds (Rösch 2013b). In this new scenario, scientists would take on a supportive role, helping people to formulate their interests and to develop empathy toward other potentially diverging viewpoints in public discourse (Klusmeyer 2016).

Conclusion

Before embarking to America, Morgenthau had produced the outline of a political ethics that asked for a shift in policymaking and even a reconsideration of its purpose in the direction of what Hannah Arendt would describe as 'discourse ethic'.[16] As she put it, 'what is important is not so much what public discourse is about as the way in which public discourse takes place' (Arendt in Benhabib 1993: 105). This ethic does not draw on 'ontological blueprints' (Ross 2013: 277) to create social laws in order to consolidate the current sociopolitical status quo (see Morgenthau 1934: 77). It criticizes policymaking that turns questions of politics into issues of administration and that seeks solutions to practical dilemmas in the establishment of extensive bureaucracies, rather than to engage with their contested nature.

Like many other of his manuscripts, *Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen* remained unpublished and *The Concept of the Political* soon fell into oblivion. Even when scholars engaged with the early European works of Morgenthau (cf. Link 1965; Amstrup 1978), these contributions remained largely unappreciated in the wider discipline until the English translation of Frei's biography was published in 2001. Morgenthau, however, picked up themes from these early interventions for later works such as *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* and *Science: Servant or Master?* With regard to his ethics of responsibility, the ideas developed in the manuscript anticipated a 'politics as applied ethics', similar to that in the writings of Raymond Geuss (2008: 9). Accordingly, dissenting positions need to be able to be voiced during decision-making processes. Furthermore, their development must be actively encouraged and sustained in the political realm.

In this way, policymaking becomes a process that requires politicians and the public to face dissent and eventually to seek compromises (Sigwart 2013: 431–432). It also implies that politicians have to take personal responsibility, for which Morgenthau (1930b) had found an early role model in Gustav Stresemann, a long-standing Weimar Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs and co-laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926. Outcomes of policymaking processes can no longer be disguised as scientific-technological preconditions, but must be acknowledged as compromises that have arisen out of complex, collective negotiations, in which politicians play an important role, as it is their task to collate the various interests in society. They also have to ponder these interests and then pursue policy decisions that benefit people the most.

To achieve this ethics of responsibility, science not only has to be transcendent, it must also have an educational mission (*Bildungsauftrag*) for society at large. In this, universities have a key role to play. Morgenthau criticized the bureaucratization of universities, which turns students into consumers of academic degrees (Morgenthau 1934).[17] Their educational mission, he asserted, is rather to provide continuous support for people to seize opportunities to embrace their responsibilities. This means that the educational mission of science lies in contributing to establishing political forums that provide the space for people to engage in discussions through which societal change can be initiated. It is for this reason that Morgenthau supported, for example, the Keneseth Israel Beth Shalom Congregation in Kansas City and the Adult Education Council of Greater Chicago, and participated in teach-ins during the Vietnam War (Klusmeyer 2016).

Notes

1. Letter to Ronald Hilton, 2 October 1937. *Morgenthau Papers*, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 26.
2. Throughout the chapter, I will refer to this English translation.
3. *Wissenschaft* (to create knowledge) comprises any form of systematic knowledge creation and thus also comprises humanities. *Wissenschaft* is not confined to empirically verifiable knowledge, as we find it in the natural sciences. It is in this sense that Morgenthau used the term 'science', and it is in this sense that it is used in this chapter.
4. Golo Mann, one of Thomas Mann's sons, came to a similar conclusion: 'of course, Morgenthau is now a hyper-American (*Hyper-Amerikaner*), but I would consider his thought to be very German' (in Reichwein 2015: 95).
5. All translations are by the author.
6. Given Morgenthau's odyssey through Europe, Walter Lacqueur's (2016: 59) self-characterization as a 'wanderer between several worlds' might even be more appropriate.
7. In this context, recent contributions by Duncan Bell (2009), Cornelia Navari (2016), and Richard Ned Lebow (2016) are also noteworthy, but note Ian Hall's (2011) dissenting view.
8. It is partly in this sense that realism can be understood as an 'intellectual moment of resistance' (Mark Philip in Bell 2017: 3).
9. Neumeyer was a law professor specializing in international private law at the University of Munich and from 1931 the dean of the faculty of law. Threatened by deportation into a concentration camp, he and his wife committed suicide in 1941.
10. Letter to Rafael Altamira, 22 November 1939. Morgenthau Papers, Box 3.
11. Most immediately, in 1979, the United States and many other countries faced an economic downturn due to the second oil crisis. The decreased oil production in the wake of the Iranian Revolution irretrievably destroyed the myth of a consistent economic rise to which numerous states under the Bretton Woods System had subscribed since the late 1940s. States could no longer control all the interrelationships of an increasingly globalized economy. Beyond the immediate economic crisis lay the development of nuclear weapons, which would profoundly affect Morgenthau's ideas. Like that of many of his coevals, including Herz, Karl Jaspers, and Bertrand Russell (for more, see van Munster and Sylvest 2016), he experienced a '[m]odern technology [that] … had spun out of control and a technological juggernaut threatened humanity with the historically novel possibility of mass suicide' (Morgenthau 1970b; Scheuerman 2009: 567). Nation-states had lost the ability to secure their territorial integrity and to guarantee the safety of their citizens. Borders became obsolete. In Morgenthau's (1966a: 9, 1970a: 61–62) sense, a border is reduced to an artificial line on

a map and the traditional concept of sovereignty that yielded exclusive rights to nation-states on the international level is rendered obsolete.

12. Hartmut Behr (2010: 211; Behr and Kirke 2014) has argued that *Politics Among Nations* was conceived as a counter-ideology not only to fascism and communism, but also to nationalism, pointing to the later chapters of the first edition. They are all reflections on the possibility of minimalizing international conflict by seeking out the potential of global cooperation (see also Rösch 2015a; Frei 2016).
13. To his students, Morgenthau (2004: 137) explained this as follows: 'I haven't come down from heaven to this chair and started to teach. I mean, obviously my mind has been formed by certain experiences. And naturally those experiences are part of my intellectual composition'.
14. Participating in the Rockefeller Foundation-funded conference on international relations theory in 1954 can therefore be interpreted to have been a 'gambit' in Guilhot's terms (2008, 2011) from Morgenthau's side and from the side of other like-minded émigré scholars. It was their ambition to oppose the scientism of the behavioral revolution and argue against it from a hermeneutic position (critical Rohde 2016: 115). But the 'osmosis' that Gerald Stourzh (1965: 61) spotted remained underdeveloped and their impact was less substantial than some of the vitas of these scholars would suggest (Greenberg 1992: 76).
15. Furthermore, in a letter to Arendt he reasoned that 'we are intellectual streetfighters … So if we don't make clear on which side of the barricades we stand we have failed' (in Rohde 2005: 50). Similarly in a letter to Paul Nitze dated 12 February 1955, Morgenthau wrote that 'we cannot assume to be able to look at the world scene form a vantage point which, as it were, lies outside this world. We stand on a particular spot within that world, physically, morally, and intellectually'.
16. For more on Morgenthau's ethic, see, for example, contributions by Molloy (2009), Klusmeyer (2009), Behr and Rösch (2013), and Sigwart (2013).
17. Morgenthau (1930d, 1938) also repeatedly engaged journalistically in this debate and his argument anticipates current discourses in the discipline as we find it, for example, in Sabaratnam (2015) as well as Berg and Seeber (2016).

References

Amstrup, Niels. 1978. The 'Early' Morgenthau. A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism. *Cooperation and Conflict* 13 (2): 163–175.

Arendt, Hannah. 1990. Philosophy and Politics. *Social Research* 57 (1): 73–103.

Ashworth, Lucian M. 2014. *A History of International Thought. From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations*. London: Routledge.

Behr, Hartmut. 2010. *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2016. *Scientific Man vs Power Politics*: A Pamphlet and Its Author Between Two Academic Cultures. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 33–38.

Behr, Hartmut, and Felix Rösch. 2013. The Ethics of Anti-Hubris in the Political Philosophy of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau. In *Religion and the Realist Tradition. From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back*, ed. Jodok Troy, 111–128. London: Routledge.

Behr, Hartmut, and Michael C. Williams. 2017. Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating 'Divides' in International Relations Theory. *Journal of International Political Theory* 13 (1): 3–17.

Behr, Hartmut, and Xander Kirke. 2014. The Tale of a 'Realism' in International Relations. E-International Relations. http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/13/the-tale-of-a-realism-in-international-relations/. Accessed 9 Oct 2017.

Bell, Duncan. 2009. Introduction: Under an Empty Sky—Realism and Political Theory. In *Political Thought and International Relations. Variations on a Realist Theme*, ed. Duncan Bell, 1–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2017. Political Realism and International Relations. *Philosophy Compass* 12 (2): 1–12.

Benhabib, Seyla. 1993. Feminist Theory and Hannah Arendt's Concept of Public Space. *History of the Human Sciences* 6 (2): 97–114.

Berg, Maggie, and Barbara Seeber. 2016. *The Slow Professor: Challenging the Culture of Speed in the Academy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Bigo, Didier, and R.B.J. Walker. 2007. Political Sociology and the Problem of the International. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35 (3): 725–739.

Brown, Chris. 2007. 'The Twilight of International Morality?' Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt on the End of the *Jus Publicum Europaeum*. In *Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams, 42–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chou, Mark. 2011. Morgenthau, the Tragic: On Tragedy and the Transition from Scientific Man to Politics Among Nations. *Telos* 157: 109–128.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. 2008. *Versuchungen der Unfreiheit. Die Intellektuellen in Zeiten der Prüfung*. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Frei, Christoph. 2001. *Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

———. 2016. *Politics Among Nations*: Revisiting a Classic. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 39–46.

Friedländer, Saul. 1993. *Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Fromkin, David. 1993. Remembering Hans Morgenthau. *World Policy Journal* 10 (3): 81–88.

Galston, William A. 2010. Realism in Political Theory. *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (4): 385–411.

Gangl, Manfred. 2009a. Einleitung. In *Das Politische. Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Manfred Gangl, 7–18. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

———. 2009b. 'Das Politische ist das Totale.' Carl Schmitts Bestimmung des Politischen. In *Das Politische. Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Manfred Gangl, 37–56. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Gellman, Peter. 1988. Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism. *Review of International Studies* 14 (4): 27–266.

Geuss, Raymond. 2008. *Philosophy and Real Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gismondi, Mark. 2004. Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity: *Kulturpessimismus* in the Theories of Max Weber, E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15 (3): 435–464.

Greenberg, Karen. 1992. Crossing the Boundary: German Refugee Scholars and the American Academic Tradition. In *German and American Universities. Mutual Influences—Past and Present*, ed. Ulrich Teichler and Henry Wasser, 67–79. Kassel: Wissenschaftliches Zentrum für Berufs- und Hochschulforschung der Gesamthochschule Kassel.

Greenberg, Udi. 2014. *The Weimar Century. German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guilhot, Nicolas. 2008. The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory. *International Political Sociology* 2 (4): 281–304.

———, ed. 2011. *The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hall, Ian. 2011. The Triumph of Anti-Liberalism? Reconciling Radicalism to Realism in International Relations Theory. *Political Studies Review* 9 (1): 42–52.

Hartz, Louis. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America. An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Herz, John H. 2005. Letter to the Morgenthau Conference. In *The Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism: In Memoriam Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980)*, ed. Christian Hacke, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Kai M. Schellhorn, 23–28. Göttingen: V & R.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2014. Rationalizing Realpolitik: U.S. International Relations as a Liberal Field. In *Professors and Their Politics*, ed. Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, 267–290. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Jütersonke, Oliver. 2010. *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Katznelson, Ira. 2003. *Desolation and Enlightenment. Political Knowledge After Total War, Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl. 2015. Interview zur Rolle Hans Morgenthaus in der Fachdisziplin Internationale Politik (with Christoph Rohde). In *Macht, Recht, Demokratie. Zum Staatsverständnis Hans J. Morgenthaus*, ed. Christoph Rohde and Jodok Troy, 19–25. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Klusmeyer, Douglas B. 2009. Beyond Tragedy: Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Responsibility, Evil and Political Ethics. *International Studies Review* 11 (2): 332–351.

———. 2016. Death of the Statesman as Tragic Hero: Hans Morgenthau on the Vietnam War. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 63–71.

Koskenniemi, Martti. 2000. Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Relations. In *The Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International Relations and International Law*, ed. Michael Byers, 17–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kostagiannis, Konstantinos. 2014. Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State. *International History Review* 36 (3): 513–529.

Lacqueur, Walter. 2016. A Wanderer Between Several Worlds. In *The Second Generation. Émigrés from Nazi Germany as Historians*, ed. Andreas W. Daum, Hartmut Lehmann, and James J. Sheehan, 59–71. New York: Berghahn Books.

Landauer, Carl. 1935. Letter to Irma Thormann, March 25 (Leo Baeck Institute Archives, Hans Morgenthau Collection, Container 2, Folder 9).

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2003. *The Tragic Vision of Politics. Ethics, Interests, and Orders.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2016. Hans Morgenthau and *The Purpose of Political Science*. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 55–62.

Link, Werner. 1965. Die Allgegenwart des Machtkampfes. Über die Prämissen der Theorie Hans J. Morgenthaus. *Neue Politische Literatur* 10: 17–22.

Molloy, Seán. 2003. Realism: A Problematic Paradigm. *Security Dialogue* 34 (1): 71–85.

———. 2009. Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil. *Journal of International Political Theory* 5 (1): 94–112.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1929. *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen*. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag von Robert Noske.

———. 1930a. Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 151).

———. 1930b. Stresemann als Schöpfer der deutschen Völkerrechtspolitik. *Die Justiz* 5 (3): 169–176.

———. 1930c. Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen. Zur Kritik des Pazifismus und der neuen deutschen Kriegsphilosophie (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 96).

———. 1930d. Zur Krise des akademischen Unterrichts. *Frankfurter Zeitung* (March 9): 8.

———. 1932. Der Kampf der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre um die Wirklichkeit des Staates (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 110).
———. 1933. *La notion du 'politique' et la théorie des différends internationaux*. Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey.
———. 1934. Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 151).
———. 1936. Positivisme mal compris et théorie réaliste du droit international. In *Colección de estudios históricos, jurídicos, pedagógicos y literarios. Homenaje a D. Rafael Altamira*, ed. Silvio A. Zavala, 1–20. Madrid: C. Bermejo.
———. 1938. Das Problem der amerikanischen Universität. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (January 10): 5.
———. 1940. Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law. *American Journal of International Law* 34 (2): 260–284.
———. 1944. The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning. *Ethics* 54 (3): 174–185.
———. 1947. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*. London: Latimer House.
———. 1948. The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered. *Columbia Law Review* 48 (3): 341–365.
———. 1949. The Limits of Practicability in the Social Sciences. Section IV.B of the Steering Committee on the Social Science and Values Project Report (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 74).
———. 1951. *In Defense of the National Interest. A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1952a. What Is the National Interest of the United States? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282: 1–7.
———. 1952b. Philosophy of International Relations Lectures (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 81).
———. 1955. Reflections on the State of Political Science. *Review of Politics* 17 (4): 431–460.
———. 1959. The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations. In *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, ed. William T.R. Fox, 15–28. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 1960. The Social Crisis in America: Hedonism of Status Quo. *Chicago Review* 14 (2): 69–88.
———. 1962a. *Politics in the Twentieth Century. Volume I. The Decline of Democratic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1962b. *Politics in the Twentieth Century. Volume III. The Restoration of American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1963. On Trying to Be Just. *Commentary* (May issue): 420–423.
———. 1964. Modern Science and Political Power. *Columbia Law Review* 64 (4): 1386–1409.

———. 1966a. Introduction. In *A Working Peace System*, ed. David Mitrany, 7–11. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

———. 1966b. The Purpose of Political Science. In *A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods*, ed. James C. Charlesworth, 63–79. Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science.

———. 1970a. *Truth and Power. Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970*. London: Pall Mall Press.

———. 1970b. Der Friede im nuklearen Zeitalter. In *Der Friede im nuklearen Zeitalter. Eine Kontroverse zwischen Realisten und Utopisten. 4. Salzburger Humanismusgespräch*, ed. Oskar Schatz, 34–62. Munich: Manz Verlag.

———. 1972. *Science: Servant or Master?* New York: New American Library.

———. 1973. Macht und Ohnmacht des Menschen im technologischen Zeitalter. In *Was wird aus dem Menschen? Der Fortschritt—Analysen und Warnungen bedeutender Denker*, ed. Oskar Schatz, 47–60. Graz: Verlag Styria.

———. 1979. *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*. New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs.

———. 1984. Postscript to the Transaction Edition: Bernard Johnson's Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau. In *Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers, 333–386. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

———. 2004. *Political Theory and International Affairs. Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle's the Politics*, ed. Anthony F. Lang, Jr. Westport: Praeger.

———. 2012. In *The Concept of the Political*, ed. Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. n.d. The Significance of Being Alone (Leo Baeck Institute Archives, Hans Morgenthau Collection, Container 4, Folder 6).

Munster, Rens van, and Caspar Sylvest. 2016. *Nuclear Realism: Global Political Thought During the Thermonuclear Revolution*. London: Routledge.

Navari, Cornelia. 2016. Hans Morgenthau and the National Interest. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 47–54.

Pichler, Hans-Karl. 1998. The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics. *Review of International Studies* 24 (2): 185–200.

Puglierin, Jana. 2008. Towards Being a 'Traveller Between All Worlds'. *International Relations* 22 (4): 419–425.

Radbruch, Gustav. 1929. Letter to Karl Strupp, 25th June (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Container 48).

Reichwein, Alexander. 2015. Morgenthau, Vietnam und die Sorge um Amerika: Zum Staats- und Demokratieverständnis eines 'ziemlich deutschen' Realisten. In *Macht, Recht, Demokratie. Zum Staatsverständnis Hans J. Morgenthaus*, ed. Christoph Rohde and Jodok Troy, 95–139. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Rengger, Nicholas. 2005. Tragedy or Scepticism? Defending the Anti-Pelagian Mind in World Politics. *International Relations* 19 (3): 321–328.

Rohde, Christoph. 2005. Current Forms of Foreign Policy Realism in Morgenthau's Tradition—Reflections on Political Realism in Germany. In *The Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism: In Memoriam Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980)*, ed. Christian Hacke, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Kai M. Schellhorn, 49–69. Göttingen: V & R.

———. 2016. *Reinhold Niebuhr. Die Geburt des christlichen Realismus aus dem Geist des Widerstandes*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Rösch, Felix. 2013a. Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau. *International Politics* 50 (6): 815–829.

———. 2013b. The Human Condition of Politics: Considering the Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau for International Relations. *Journal of International Political Theory* 9 (1): 1–21.

———. 2013c. Entpolitisierung in der Moderne. Zur Zentralität des Begriffs des Politischen im Denken Hans J. Morgenthaus. *Zeitschrift für Politik* 60 (4): 430–451.

———. 2015a. Die staatskritischen Potentiale des klassischen Realismus in *Politcs among Nations*. In *Macht, Recht, Demokratie. Zum Staatsverständnis Hans J. Morgenthaus*, ed. Christoph Rohde and Jodok Troy, 175–191. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

———. 2015b. *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2016. Crisis, Values, and the Purpose of Science: Morgenthau in Europe. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 1–9.

———. 2017. Unlearning Modernity. A Realist Method for Critical International Relations? *Journal of International Political Theory* 13 (1): 81–99.

Ross, Andrew A.G. 2013. Realism, Emotion, and Dynamic Allegiances in Global Politics. *International Theory* 5 (2): 273–299.

Sabaratnam, Meera. 2015. Staging a Battle, Losing the Wars? International Studies, 'Science' and the Neoliberalisation of the University. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (3): 975–979.

Scheuerman, William E. 2007. Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond. In *Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams, 62–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2009. Realism and the Critique of Technology. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22 (4): 563–584.

———. 2011. *The Realist Case for a Global Reform*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Schmitt, Carl. 1930. Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat. *Kant-Studien* 35: 28–42.

———. 1932. *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Munich: Duncker & Humblot.

———. 1996. *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schuett, Robert. 2010. *Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations. The Resurrection of the Realist Man*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sigwart, Hans-Jörg. 2013. The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism. *Review of Politics* 75 (3): 407–432.

———. 2016. Strömungen der US-amerikanischen politischen Theorie. In *Handbuch Politik USA*, ed. Christian Lammert, Markus B. Siewert, and Boris Vormann, 73–92. Wiesbaden: VS Springer.

Sinzheimer, Hugo. 1932. Letter to Hans J. Morgenthau, 11th March (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Container 197).

Speer, James P., II. 1968. Hans Morgenthau and the World State. *World Politics* 20 (2): 207–227.

Stourzh, Gerald. 1965. Die deutschsprachige Emigration in den Vereinigten Staaten: 1933–1963: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politische Wissenschaft. *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 10: 59–77.

Thormann, Irma. 1935. Letter to Carl Landauer, January 18 (Leo Baeck Institute Archives, Hans Morgenthau Collection, Box 2, File 9).

Tickner, J. Ann. 2011. Dealing with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39 (3): 607–618.

Tjalve, Vibeke Schou. 2008. *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace. Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2009. Realism and the Politics of (Dis)Enchantment. In *Political Thought and International Relations. Variations on a Realist Theme*, ed. Duncan Bell, 177–194. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tjalve, Vibeke Schou, and Michael C. Williams. 2015. Rethinking the Logic of Security: Liberal Realism and the Recovery of American Political Thought. *Telos* 177: 46–66.

Williams, Michael C. 2005. *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scientific Man and the New Science of Politics

Hartmut Behr and Hans-Jörg Sigwart

In 1946, there appeared Hans Morgenthau's *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* and, in 1952, Eric Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics*, two classical representative texts of émigré scholarship in the USA. Many of the major questions and problems in Morgenthau's oeuvre also figure prominently in Voegelin's writings. The two thinkers seem to share a general "parallel theoretical interest", as Morgenthau himself noticed in a letter to Voegelin in 1953.[1] Although this casual remark apparently did not lead to a deeper conversation between them or even to a substantial mutual consideration of their major writings, it nonetheless deserves closer scrutiny. While there are obvious differences between Morgenthau and Voegelin in the breadth of their philosophical scope and historical framework, they do share a number of major concerns. Both thinkers were convinced, to begin with, that political science and theory, in order to be able to properly understand its subject matter and to live up to its political and intellectual

H. Behr (✉)
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

H.-J. Sigwart
Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_2

responsibilities, must assume an uncompromisingly realist perspective.[2] In line with this realist accent, both strongly argued, furthermore, for a historical and anthropological foundation of political science.[3] And both shared a distinctly critical perspective on the positivist epistemological and methodological foundations and the "scientistic" underpinnings of modern social sciences. Besides these common topics and concerns, it is also the similar "transatlantic" socio-cultural context in which both reflected on their theoretical questions when writing their major studies in the 1940s and the following decades which makes their comparison particularly interesting. Written by two émigré scholars who were trying to locate themselves within, and to make sense of, the cultural environment of post-War American society and academia, both authors' writings reflect their peculiar situation inhabiting two sometimes crucially different semantic and cultural contexts.

In the following we argue that a parallel consideration of some of the common topics both authors dealt with and of their common intellectual background can help to shed light on their intentions, styles of theorizing, and self-perceptions as political thinkers. When read in comparison as two critical, sometimes deliberately polemical, but also genuinely self-reflective oeuvres, Morgenthau's and Voegelin's writings turn out to represent two partly similar, partly different understandings of realist social critique and, in more personal terms, of the social and intellectual role of the émigré as a scholar and a social critic in a time of intellectual and political crisis. To bring out the similarities and differences between their positions, the problem of modern scientism can serve as an exemplary topic, because both authors' reflections on this subject matter are closely connected with their self-perceptions as critical thinkers and more or less explicitly related to their personal background as émigré scholars. Before we focus on these questions in the second and third sections below, we first discuss this background itself.

The Émigré Experience

Morgenthau's *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* was developed from a lecture on "Liberalism and Foreign Policy" that he gave in 1940 at the New School of Social Research in New York as part of a lecture series on *Liberalism Today* and appeared in 1946, one year after he received tenure at the University of Chicago. The monograph demarcates the beginning of Morgenthau's career in the United States, to which he had emigrated

nine years earlier. The text also reflects Morgenthau's place between two academic cultures: his language in *Scientific Man* partly stems from, but also tries to leave behind, his European academic socialization and to adjust to the American cultural environment—a task which was obviously not accomplished easily and posed some difficulties. Although essential parts of the text were written already in Germany before Morgenthau's emigration, the book clearly reflects his bewilderment about American political and academic culture and, as he perceived it, its cheerful and naïve optimism about the betterment and progress of politics, society, and humanity in general. Due to this background, *Scientific Man* is in large parts written in the style of a pamphlet; it is an attempt to hammer home certain philosophical positions—positions that were largely unpopular in the US social sciences in the 1940s (and later). More explicitly than his later and more influential books, *Scientific Man* articulates essential aspects of Morgenthau's intellectual self-perception, his understanding of his own role not only as a philosophically inspired political scientist, but also as a public critic of his time and "his" societies, both in Europe and America.

Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics* ([1952] 2000) goes back to a series of lectures held at the University of Chicago, hence at Morgenthau's home university, in the summer 1951. It appeared a year later in the prestigious Walgreen Foundation Lecture series, the same series in which Leo Strauss' *Natural Right and History*, Robert Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, and Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* were originally published. In the book Voegelin unfolds a neo-classical and genuinely realist theory of representation which focuses on the crucial role of certain speculative anthropo-ontological cultural narratives and symbolizations within the political self-interpretations of societies and on a determined critique of the peculiar forms which such narratives assume in modern societies.[4] On the basis of a broad analysis of the Western history of ideas from antiquity to the present, the study for the first time presents Voegelin's renowned thesis that the essence of modernity consists of an immanentist ideology of worldly self-salvation in which a "gnostic" undercurrent pervading Western history eventually attains social dominance and fully unfolds its politically destructive potentials.[5] The book established Voegelin's reputation as a genuine intellectual voice in political philosophy and as a determined critic of modern progressivism. Similarly to *Scientific Man*, the *New Science* in large parts uses the pointed language and style of a polemical pamphlet to bring across its uncompromisingly critical message. And also the

New Science, like *Scientific Man*, conceptually and empirically reflects its author's two-sided Central European and American background.

In terms of the disciplinary history of political science, both books are part of the phenomenon of European émigré scholarship in the United States in the mid-twentieth century. This peculiar discourse not only substantially shaped the American and international theory debates of the time (see Söllner 1996; Gunnell 1993), but in turn arguably also influenced the perspectives of those scholars participating in it. The position of the émigré posed unusual challenges, pragmatic as well as intellectual ones. It required some kind of intellectual self-localization within the new social and political environment and an idea of how to actively relate to this environment as a scholar, in terms of conceptual language, criteria of relevance, and theoretical self-understanding. What kind of intellectual role was there to play for a European émigré within US society and academia? What kind of theoretical questions did the "American experience" raise, perceived from the perspective of the European émigré? Which contributions, both to the dominant scientific discussions in the US academic community at the time as well as to the major problems occupying the American public in general, could be derived from the émigrés' European academic background and from their immediate experiences with totalitarian movements and regimes?

The problem of how to reflect upon and answer these questions pervades the discursive field of émigré scholarship. Its margins may be marked out, as John Gunnell suggests, by the opposite exemplary cases of Paul Lazarsfeld on the one hand who, understanding himself as a positivist, 'had found himself uneasy' in a European atmosphere 'dominated by philosophical and speculative minds' and for whom, as a consequence, "assimilation" to the American social sciences 'was in many respects relatively easy', and Theodor W. Adorno on the other hand, whose Marxist theoretical orientation and emphasis on a fundamental "critique of culture" proved to be barely compatible with American society and social science (Gunnell 1993: 183 f.). As Gunnell's characterization indicates, the attitude toward the academic field in the US, particularly toward the theoretical and methodological foundations of the scientific mainstream within the social sciences, and especially within American political science at the time, is a decisive factor in the process of the émigrés' intellectual self-localization. And while the émigrés 'were hardly monolithic, there still is a striking uniformity across a broad spectrum of the émigré experience and perspective that was in sharp conflict with the values of American social science' (Gunnell 1993: 185).

Where can Morgenthau and Voegelin be placed within this field? To which extend did their attempts of intellectual self-localization within émigré scholarship influence their realist perspective in *Scientific Man* and the *New Science*? In the case of Morgenthau's book, this influence is quite obvious. It is discernible, for instance, in the study's peculiar style of argumentation. While *Scientific Man* addresses many significant themes, such as political ethics and questions of reason, rationality, and science, the book is not a profound philosophical discussion of them. This is puzzling, especially for an author whose preceding writings had addressed similar questions in much greater depth and who, in these writings, devoted much time to conceptual and terminological differentiations.[6] This raises questions about the purpose of the work and Morgenthau's intention and self-localization.

Morgenthau was fully aware of the explosive nature of many of his arguments, critical as they were of positivist scholarship in International Relations (IR) that was dominant at the time in the USA and especially at the Political Science department at Chicago that was a positivist hub of the discipline. As he wrote in a letter in 1946, he was relieved that the book appeared *after* he got tenure because he assumed that he would never have obtained tenure after its publication (Morgenthau 1984). To understand the book, one should remember that at the time of its writing Morgenthau was experiencing a deep cultural shock from his move from Europe to the United States and was still haunted by the trauma of his European experiences.[7] In America, moreover, he found himself caught between the epistemologies of European humanities and their *geistesgeschichtliche* traditions and American positivism. This was the same kind of positivist political thinking and scholarship that Morgenthau had already experienced in Vienna and that he had heavily criticized in his *Habilitation* (1934) with regard to Hans Kelsen's "pure theory of law"[8] and German *Staatsrecht* in the Weimar Republic that he was familiar with from his studies at the universities of Munich, Frankfurt, and Geneva. Now he was encountering it again, but on a much larger scale—in a nation that had just emerged victorious from World War II and was at the height of its political and military power.

Further, there are a comprehensive studies of Morgenthau's intellectual influences[9]; what can be learned from these is the major influence of European intellectual thought on his work, particularly the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. His stark opposition to Carl Schmitt and Hegelianism is also well

documented. More immediately, there was Reinhold Niebuhr, whom he met in Chicago in 1944 and with whom he formed a lifelong friendship. These, as well as the lack of influence of Max Weber (there is almost no mention of Weber in his entire oeuvre and none in *Scientific Man*), can be inferred from his published and unpublished writings, his references, and his private notes and correspondence.[10] And having witnessed the fall of Weimar Germany, Morgenthau was convinced that positivism could not deal with, much less negotiate, *political* questions for which he regarded the individual human being as the ultimate ontological reference. It was exactly this "human factor" (as he called it some years later in his *Six Principles of Political Realism* (see Behr and Rösch 2012: 38–42)) that positivism ignored and, much worse, *deliberately deleted* from political science. Ultimately, Morgenthau believed, this would lead to depoliticization and political apathy of the sort deeply implicated in the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism.[11] And now he observed similar tendencies in the country that would be responsible for securing a postwar settlement—a prospect that disquieted him profoundly,[12] especially as he was personally relieved to have found a new home in the USA after fleeing the Holocaust.

One can compare, then, the disruption and inner conflict evident in *Scientific Man* with the unsettling experience of critical theorists coming from Frankfurt to Los Angeles and encountering American consumerism (of which Marcuse's 1964 book *One-Dimensional Man* may be the starkest expression).[13] Similar to the Frankfurt theorists, Morgenthau argued against the political naïveté of idealism and liberalism[14] in that both theories ignored or downplayed the influence of interests and power in politics and were blindly optimistic about the progressive betterment of political society and human beings. There are several other works by Morgenthau that make these arguments and that are more reflective and profound than *Scientific Man*.[15] However, *Scientific Man* most clearly, explicitly, and fiercely communicates his various fears about these issues.

Voegelin not only shared many of Morgenthau's early scholarly interests, for instance, a marked interest in the philosophical and epistemological tradition of German "Geisteswissenschaft" and a distinctly critical interest in the German and Austrian discourse on the foundations of "Staatslehre" in general and in the work of his teacher in Vienna, Hans Kelsen, in particular.[16] He also shared Morgenthau's critique of the idealistic traits particularly dominating the Anglo-American liberal discourse at the time. His account of the post-War situation was strongly influenced by his personal experience

with European totalitarianism, especially National Socialism.[17] As a consequence of this experience, Voegelin had attained an astute awareness of the dangers and aggressiveness of totalitarian ideologies and a resolute readiness to fight any kind of ideological worldview, no matter whether right- or leftwing. This anti-ideological attitude on the one hand resulted at times in oversensitive exaggerations and a lack of differentiation in Voegelin's assessments of current developments. On the other hand, it enabled him to sharply identify the problematic tendencies of the *zeitgeist*, especially those latent affinities between the totalitarian mass ideologies and some distorted variants of radical progressivism which prevailed in many Western societies.

To be sure, Voegelin's perspective on the Anglo-American democratic societies and their political cultures in general was clearly positive. Contrary to Morgenthau and to most other émigré scholars, Voegelin was already well acquainted with the American society's political and academic culture when arriving in the USA in 1939, due to two years he had spent at American universities as a Rockefeller fellow in the 1920s.[18] This early American experience, and particularly the experience of the profound differences between the American and the European (especially the German and Austrian) societies and cultural self-perceptions, was not only a source of irritation, but also and above all a source of intellectual inspiration for Voegelin. In retrospect, he considered this early American experience and the insight 'that there was a world in which (the) world in which I had grown up was intellectually, morally, and spiritually irrelevant', to be of the utmost importance for his scholarly career. 'That there should be such a plurality of worlds had a devastating effect on me. The experience broke for good (at least I hope it did) my Central European or generally European provincialism without letting me fall into an American provincialism' (Voegelin 1989: 32). Consequentially, the American tradition of thought, especially authors like William James, John Dewey, George Santayana, and John R. Commons, although Voegelin's account of them was often critical, became important sources of inspiration which he already in the 1920s merged with his reading of European social and political philosophy and which he incorporated into the development of his own understanding of political theory.

The *New Science*, written some 20 years later and demarcating an important step within this intellectual development, is written in the same European-American spirit. At the same time, the book also reflects the social and scientific situation at the time of its publication and Voegelin's specific position within it, which was different from that of his early first encounter

with American culture. Similar to Morgenthau's *Scientific Man*, the *New Science*, being Voegelin's first major monograph written in English and published in the USA, can be seen as the real beginning of his scholarly career in the United States and the beginning of his "growing reputation" as an internationally recognized author (Hollweck 2007: 3 f.). The book is the result of a rather long working process the beginning of which can at least be dated back to the late 1930s when Voegelin, right after having arrived in the USA, started writing a *History of Political Ideas.* The aim of this project, which occupied Voegelin for more than a decade, was to write a comprehensive introductory textbook with the potential to compete with George Sabine's standard *History of Political Theory* (1937)[19] and to serve as an entry ticket to US academia. Instead of accomplishing this aim, the project resulted in a vast, highly original, but overall loosely composed and fragmentary manuscript of some thousand pages. Due to various substantial shifts of Voegelin's philosophical perspective, the manuscript remained unpublished.[20]

The *New Science* draws from this material, summarizes the theoretical position which Voegelin had reached by 1950, and pointedly articulates its critical implications. Instead of rendering the originally intended introductory textbook which would meet the demands of the US academic and college market, however, Voegelin's efforts with the *New Science* had resulted into something quite different. Rather than a textbook, the study is an intellectually engaged, highly critical, and often deliberately polemical pamphlet which, much like Morgenthau's *Scientific Man*, was primarily intended as a calculated intellectual provocation of the US academic discourse at the time, despite the fact that it still carried the subtitle "An Introduction".

As such, however, the study did receive broad attention, and not only in the professional political science discourse, but even in the general public. According to an influential review in *Time Magazine* in March 1953, the book, by offering 'a fascinating explanation of the modern intellectual crisis' and a 'quest through the history of Western thought for the culprits responsible for contemporary confusion', was immediately applicable for an engaged journalistic critique of "current events", such as the current state of the Cold War, the erroneous US foreign policy in Korea or toward the USSR in general, the problem of McCarthyism, and the overall failure of the USA 'in explaining itself to the world', due to its propagandists' inclination 'to talk about automobiles, bathtubs and pop music' instead of 'the great truths of Western culture' and 'the institutions of freedom that reflect those truths'.[21]

In reading the *New Science* as an immediate intervention in the US political debates of the day, while clearly giving it a conservative political spin, the quoted *Time* review set the tone that dominated large parts of the general reception of the book and its author, both in the USA and internationally. Such a deliberately "loose, truncated",[22] and synoptic reading is undoubtedly oversimplifying and misrepresents the complexities of the *New Science*'s more substantial philosophical arguments. That it nonetheless quite accurately catches important implications of the book is suggested by the fact that Voegelin himself was surely surprised by, but also approved of this immediately practical perception of his study. In his letter to *Time Magazine* responding to the review, Voegelin notes:

> I would not have thought that my *New Science of Politics* would attract your attention. It is a severely theoretical work, and it makes no concessions to popularity. That a magazine which is meant for the general readers should try to mediate problems of such complication is indeed extraordinary. And I can only compliment you on your courage. Moreover, your attempt has been splendidly successful. You have seen what probably not too many will see, that the theoretical propositions are applicable to the concrete questions of our time … I am sure your article will help even professionals in the field of political science to understand the pragmatic value of my analysis. (Voegelin 1953: 8)

This comment quite accurately reflects Voegelin's multi-layered motivation, especially regarding his critical intentions. As to the general public, the *New Science* may be more accessible than Voegelin's comment is ready to concede, although his surprise about the public attention it received was surely sincere. Still, the study offers itself not only for a "popular", but also for a "partisan" reading, its broad historical perspective and philosophically demanding language and argumentation notwithstanding. The *New Science* is undoubtedly written in the style of a pamphlet and meant as a public intervention aiming at imminent developments and social phenomena which Voegelin held to be of crucial importance for the present situation.[23] With its combination of an uncompromising critique of modern progressivism, idealism, and scientism with an equally uncompromising plea for a theoretical revival of the classical tradition of political philosophy, the *New Science* turned out to be perfectly applicable especially for promoting conservative causes in the heated American public debates and controversies of the early 1950s.

The study is much less accessible, on the other hand, in terms of its genuinely scientific integrability or academic accessibility, as it were. In this respect, Voegelin had apparently more or less completely abandoned his original intention. Regarding his relation to the US academic discourse, by 1950 he had obviously decided, as the *New Science* clearly indicates, to interpret and play the role of the émigré scholar in terms of polemical confrontation and intellectual provocation rather than in terms of disciplinary integration and constructive critical dialogue. The reference to the "professionals in the field of political science" quoted above is more telling and actually more equivocal than it might appear at first sight. It singles out a group of readers from whom Voegelin surely expected resolute rejection rather than immediate approval. For Voegelin, the epochal intellectual crisis he diagnosed in the *New Science* was not confined to Central Europe, but affected also the Western democracies. For Voegelin, the academic field, particularly the professional social and political science discourse of the 1950s, displayed the symptoms of this crisis most clearly, also in the USA.

Among the major targets of his criticism were, similar to Morgenthau's, the new variants of scientism allegedly dominating US political science at the time. Although it is not as elaborately addressed in the *New Science* as in *Scientific Man*, the critique of modern scientism also for Voegelin served as a major theoretical battlefield on which the role of the émigré scholar and the critical confrontation with the scientific mainstream in US academia it implied was to be enacted. In both cases, a closer examination of this field can therefore help to further clarify the way in which both thinkers understood this role. Above all, it can clarify to which extent and in which sense this understanding in both cases is interwoven with substantial theoretical reflections of fundamental philosophical questions. Finally, it suggests that Morgenthau's critique, when compared with Voegelin's, tends to neglect certain political implications of the problem of scientism and is therefore not fully aware of the power dimensions *of* and *within* the scientistic movement itself.

The Critique of Scientism

It is safe to say that while *Scientific Man* is a polemic writing of mainly assertive and insisting character, other early writings of Morgenthau are more informative on the theoretical foundations of his critique of scientism as we find in those writings more elaboration of this position.[24] These are

in line with his main propositions in *Scientific Man* and hence we can formulate that his critique of scientism emerges from and culminates in a European understanding of political science as *Erfahrungswissenschaft*. From this position he then criticizes—in a quite undifferentiated way, as most of the reviewers of *Scientific Man* have, too, stressed[25]—*all* philosophical positions that would build their ontological, epistemological, and methodological apparatuses on *a priori* positions that are neither grounded in historical studies or human experience and the interpretation of both, respectively. This relates to three philosophical commitments which Morgenthau dismisses as they were underpinned by scientific assumptions about universality and objectivity of knowledge and political agency.[26]

First, he is critical of rationalist approaches a la Descartes's "*Cogito ergo sum*" that aim to overcome the limitations of human knowledge through the construction of knowledge of the external world out of ostensibly indubitable principles possessed inherently by the mind itself. This kind of rationalist knowledge would claim invulnerability to any kind of skepticism and is supposed to represent the basis of all further knowledge about the world. Morgenthau promotes a position that is critical with this epistemological paradigm and its *a priori*, experience-independent claims and assumptions about the world. Political realism in Morgenthau is hence an anti-Cartesian position which recognizes the mind-independent existence of an empirical world and human agency within this world.

Second, Morgenthau is also averse to an empiricism which would base knowledge and beliefs about the (political) world on merely sensually conceived impressions and which would rely, in its assertions about the existence, constitution, and character of the world, on (ostensibly) mind-independent, *data bruta*—that is, methodologically on quantification and measurement of social and political phenomena—built on the hope that through inductive logic there may be some kind of spill-over from data collection to knowledge and meaning.

And third, Morgenthau's epistemology, because it recognizes the mind-independent, however spatio-temporally qualified status of things real, 'strips mind of its pretensions, but not of its value or greatness … Realism dethrones the mind, [and at the same time] recognizes mind as chief in the world' (Alexander 1960: 186). We here further recognize an anti-idealist position against the belief in a 'world in which there exist only minds … According to [this theory] … the world of objects capable of existing independently of a knower … is … rejected' (Holt et al. 1960: 154–5). Politically speaking, and in sharp contrast to Morgenthau's position,

idealism would presume the fabricability and plasticity of the world and the calculation and plannability of political strategies therein without, as he argues, taking into account to a sufficiently high degree the concepts of power, interest, and morality, and the "factual", but empirically divergent political constellations which these concepts make cognizable.

In his dismissal of all three positions, Morgenthau is quite uncompromising as he fiercely argues that all attempts that do not operate on an *erfahrungswissenschaftliche* foundation would depoliticize, dehumanize, and degenerate politics and the study of politics through abstract and technocratic formula.[27] Finally, he regards scientism as destroying the foundations of humanity and promoting the illusion of progress through social engineering, according to Morgenthau characteristic for US social sciences and positivism of his time and for Western modernity more generally.[28] *Erfahrungswissenschaft*, on the opposite, recognizes perennial forces that penetrate political reality, but require for their understanding context-specific explanations and hermeneutic methods. This becomes most obvious in a discussion of power, interest, and morality that Morgenthau pursues throughout his oeuvre, that is, however, most prominently conducted in his "Six Principles of Realism" (second edition and onwards in *Politics Among Nations*).

He here argues, and this nicely summarizes the meaning of *erfahrungswissenschaftlich* as a historiographic and interpretivist approach to political science, that power, interest, and morality would be the most helpful and appropriate concepts to study politics, but that their meaning would run the whole remit of human societies historically and culturally. Thus, the concepts are epistemologically universal, but ontologically they take on very different meanings across human history and cultures.

These are the major aspects which together form the more substantial theoretical background of Morgenthau's critique of scientism as articulated in *Scientific Man*. They show that this background mainly consists of *epistemological* reflections on the peculiar form of knowledge and insight which according to Morgenthau is constitutive for a truly realist political science but widely neglected, misunderstood, or twisted in progressivism and scientism.

In order to fully understand Morgenthau's perspective, however, it is necessary to bring out more clearly the significance of one of the conceptual emphases of Morgenthau's argument that were just mentioned, namely the conception of power underlying his critique of scientism. A closer consideration of this aspect renders the surprising insight that Morgenthau, although he stresses the significance of power as a social and

political factor, does not really focus on power as an analytical concept of his critique, that is, on the power of knowledge itself. Moreover, the concept of power he applies in *Scientific Man* turns out to be a grossly simplified, reduced version of the more differentiated conception he puts forth in some of his earlier German and French writings (see more below). As a consequence, Morgenthau particularly fails to bring out the immediately political implications of the epistemological emphases of his critique of scientism and their inherent connection with phenomena of power and domination. This analytical gap of his critique clearly comes to the fore when we juxtapose his account of scientism with Voegelin's analysis.

In Voegelin's interpretation, scientism 'has remained to this day one of the strongest gnostic movements in Western society' (Voegelin [1952] 2000b: 192). In an article on *The Origins of Scientism* published in 1948 in *Social Research*, one of the major journals publishing émigré scholarship at the time (see Gunnell 1993: 180), Voegelin most pointedly articulates his critique of this movement. The article deals with the formation of physics as a modern scientific discipline as it unfolded historically in the discourse among Isaac Newton, some of his followers and some of his philosophical critics. According to Voegelin, Newton's theory of physics, or more precisely, a peculiar interpretation of it is one of the disciplinary places of origin of scientism. His analysis of this process anticipates a number of aspects of the conceptual framework of Thomas Kuhn's ([1962] 2012) classical study on the history of modern epistemology and applies them in terms of a radical critique of scientism. Voegelin argues that during the discursive formation of physics as a discipline, certain theological underpinnings of Newton's perspective were transformed into the constitutive dogmas and functional theoretical taboos of the new science. On the basis of this theologico-scientific transformation, some of Newton's scientific conceptions successively attained the function of unquestioned core premises of the new "paradigm" of physics as a "normal" science (to use the Kuhnian terms). Above all, Newton's concept of "absolute space", which at first had served as a philosophically rather weak and merely heuristically justified assumption, was turned into the core assumption of physics as a scientific discipline (Voegelin 1948: 467 ff.). Voegelin stresses that this Newtonian concept of space, although it was philosophically untenable already at the time of its original formulation, served as the unquenstioned premise of the modern scientific discourse until the early twentieth century when it was finally corrected by Einstein.

What Voegelin's genealogy primarily tries to bring to fore, however, are not merely these epistemological fallacies and unquestioned dogmas, which add some interesting aspects to Morgenthau's identification of the

epistemological characteristics of scientism. More importantly, Voegelin exceeds this analysis of scientism's problematic epistemology by examining its immediately social and political implications, or more precisely by examining the contra-intuitive manner in which the epistemological aspects of the story are intimately related to 'the social relevance of scientism as an intellectual attitude' (Voegelin 1948: 464). According to Voegelin, the process and constellation of early physics as an emerging modern scientific discipline must be understood as a social and political phenomenon, as entailing a practical logic which cannot be contained to the disciplinary field of physics or any other kind of scientific discipline, not even to the academic field in general. The scientistic logic is an inherently expansive logic which unfolds dynamics that effect society as a whole. It is this "social relevance" of the diagnosed Newtonian epistemological fallacies which turns scientism into a highly dynamic movement with far-reaching political consequences, and which makes 'the advance of science after 1700 (…) the most important single factor in changing the structure of power and wealth on the global scene' (Voegelin 1948: 485). Since this "advance of science" is not merely a scientific, but also a social and political development, its consequences are highly ambiguous. It is accompanied by the general victory of "utilitarian rationality" as the socially dominant form of reasoning and eventually by the "cancerous growth" of this utilitarian rationality in society in which 'the rational-utilitarian segment is expanding so strongly in our civilization that the social realization of other values is noticeably weakened' (Voegelin 1948: 486).

But why did 'what Newton had to say in his definitions of space' have such an 'immeasurable effect on the formation of political ideas' (Voegelin 1948: 493) and so 'profoundly affected the political and economic structure of the western world' (Voegelin 1948: 484)? According to Voegelin, it is precisely the epistemological and philosophical weakness of certain scientistic assumptions which are the 'sources from which the movement draws its strength'. During the transformation of Newton's physics into Newtonian scientism, 'a process which we may call the transfer of pathos from a special pursuit to the existence of man' (Voegelin 1948: 490), the epistemological fallacies, so Voegelin argues, reveal their genuinely political functionality; they turn out to be necessary fallacies, because they serve as the crucial political "sources of scientistic effectiveness" (Voegelin 1948: 464). In other words: The scientistic world view's lack of philosophical plausibility is but a symptom of its prioritizing of popular effectiveness and its discursive power.

Insofar as the scientistic world view claims to be of "paradigmatic" value not only in science, but in society at large, it reveals itself as a political rather than a scientific or philosophical movement. The 'prototypical result of a theoretical victory for the philosopher and a social victory for the scientist' (Voegelin 1948: 464) which the debate between the early Newtonians and their critics had sheds light for Voegelin not only on a surprising outcome of a theoretical debate, but, more importantly, on the general 'relations between power and the advance of science' (Voegelin 1948: 484) and hence on the socially and politically repressive undercurrent of scientistic progressivism. It reveals an immediately practical logic of power and domination and the idea of an ever closer interconnection between knowledge and power as the core principle of scientistic epistemologies. Seen from this perspective, the "scientific revolution" of scientism turns out to be a social and political phenomenon from the start, a quest for power and domination rather than for truth and knowledge: 'The advancement of science and the rationality of politics are interwoven in a social process that, in the perspective of a more distant future, will probably appear as the greatest power orgy in the history of mankind' (Voegelin 1948: 486; see also 488).

When seen against the background of this pointed thesis of a power-oriented epistemology and a practical logic of domination through knowledge and discourse as the core principles of scientism, it is fair to say that Morgenthau's critique of the same intellectual movements neglects important aspects of the problem. His work does deliver an analysis of power in politics, but does not link power to knowledge and/or knowledge movements, that is, concretely to the movements he so vehemently criticized. As a consequence, he does not point explicitly to the political and academic power games *of* and *within* these movements. He occasionally alludes to these problems or at least touches upon the question of the reasons for the "social effectiveness" of scientism,[29] but without elaborating these questions. While Morgenthau's plea for a power-oriented political theory was aimed against the unrealistic naïvety of the various idealistic and progressivist movements he criticized, he himself seems to have overseen the close connection between the epistemological emphases of his critique with certain power phenomena, and therefore also the latent but crucial role of power within these very movements (a role which was only concealed by their allegedly naïve, optimistic rhetoric).

This neglect may be no mere coincidence, but rather the result of a surprisingly narrow and simplified conceptualization of power itself which

Morgenthau applied in *Scientific Man*—a simplification, by the way, which was to become the conceptual model for his further works. As noted above, *Scientific Man*'s origins go back to a talk Morgenthau gave in 1940, just seven years after publication of his French book, *La Notion du "Politique"*.[30] Why is this important? Because, simply and bafflingly, in *Scientific Man* and in *all* further English writings, published and unpublished, Morgenthau ignores the important distinction that he meticulously made in *La Notion du "Politique"* between "pouvoir" and "puissance"—that is, between an analytical, empirical concept of power as domination and a normative concept of power as the capability to act and to enact something politically.[31] What were two cautiously distinguished concepts just a few years earlier became conflated into one term, the English "power", and this despite the possibility of expressing this distinction in English (as the word "puissance" exists in the English language). Even if not commonly used, the word was available to Morgenthau, especially since he wrote using an English dictionary in the first years after his arrival in the United States.[32] Still, in his English writings Morgenthau omits and ignores this terminologically and philosophically important distinction that he learned primarily through his reading of Nietzsche, who distinguished between *Macht* and *Kraft*.

We suspect that a continuation of this differentiation (which resembles the more recent conceptual distinction between *power over* and *power to*) would have enabled Morgenthau to link his sociology of political power to a sociology of (the power of) knowledge and hence to include those aspects into his perspective which were emphasized by Voegelin. Instead, the conceptual collapse of "pouvoir" and "puissance" into merely "power" was read, however wrongly, as an only *realpolitik*-dimension in his thinking, and such he was wrongly received by the majority of US political science. This leads us back to the personal background of Morgenthau's as well as Voegelin's critique.

Self-localizations

It is quite obvious that Morgenthau's reception in the USA was particularly colored by his language of power. Usually, the IR narrative holds that, as a "Realist", he would have conceptualized power as a bellicose, aggressive, and, if need be, canny domination (here, a certain reading of Machiavelli's *Prince* is often mistakenly associated with Morgenthau[33]). The reception and influence of his work in general and of *Scientific Man* in particular might have been quite different had he continued to

conceptually contrast the two types of power outlined above. And one can easily imagine very different trajectories in IR theory in general, and in the scholarship on Morgenthau's political thought more specifically, had he made this distinction—one which he admits in private correspondence he should have made.[34]

As to his self-perception and self-localization as a scholar, it almost seems as if his conceptual neglect of the connection between power and knowledge is reflected in his personal relation to the academic field and in the course which the reception of his work took. Regarding the latter, Morgenthau was made the founder of a paradigm in IR theory which in its further development left behind most of those conceptual and theoretical questions which he had emphasized as crucial aspects of his understanding of political realism. It would surely be going too far to interpret his complaints about certain misreadings of his texts during this process as naïvety about academia as a power field. But there is not much published evidence that Morgenthau perceived his role as an émigré scholar, too, in terms of academic power games among schools and camps of thought, competing over influence and resources, trying to establish themselves against others, and at times also promoting peculiar political interests and worldviews.[35]

Voegelin, in contrast, seems to have been fully aware of the fact that his critical analysis of the power-oriented epistemologies of scientistic movements had immediately practical implications for his role as an academic in general and as an émigré scholar in particular. He seems to have consciously decided to simply reject to seriously participate in what he perceived as academic power games and as the kind of politicization of scholarship which his analysis indicated as a major symptom of the modern intellectual crisis. Instead, he chose to enact the role of the critic in terms of self-distancing and provocation, at times thereby approaching the attitude if not of a general "cultural", then at least of some kind of a "scientific pessimism". His historical analysis from 1948 outlined above, for instance, ends with a deeply pessimistic diagnosis of the current situation. He stresses that scientism's 'destructive effects defy repair in any visible future' (Voegelin 1948: 490) and concludes:

> That in the end, through Einstein, the foundations of physics were revised (…) is an important event in the history of science, but it has, for the moment at least, no visible social or political importance. The damage of scientism is done. As a philosophical friend aptly phrased it, the insane have

> succeeded in locking the sane in the asylum. From this asylum no physical escape is possible; as a consequence of the interlocking of science and social power, the political tentacles of scientistic civilization reach into every nook and corner of an industrialized society; and with increasing effectiveness they stretch over the whole globe. There exist only differences, though very important ones, in the various regions of the global asylum with regard to the possibility of personal escape into the freedom of the spirit. What is left is hope – but hope should not obscure the realistic insight that we who are living today shall never experience freedom of the spirit in society. (Voegelin 1948: 494)

This radically pessimistic diagnosis—which, by the way, shares astounding conceptual parallels not only with Kuhn's later historical epistemology, but also with Michel Foucault's analyses of the relation between power and knowledge in modernity[36]—articulates the results of a theoretical analysis of broad tendencies within long historical developments and processes. But it can surely also be read in more personal terms, as articulating Voegelin's perception of his time and personal environment and of his position within it. It undoubtedly reflects traits of his genuine interpretation of the émigré scholar's position from which the *New Science* as a public intervention is written. From this interpretation's perspective, American society and academia might have been primarily perceived by Voegelin as a region within the global asylum which provided, in contrast to most other regions, most favorable possibilities of "personal escape into the freedom of the spirit"—a difference of the utmost importance from Voegelin's point of view, and surely one of the most valuable traits for him of the émigré existence.

In terms of active practical self-localization, this peculiar kind of freedom may be reflected, for instance, in a certain serenity Voegelin demonstrated especially in his relation to the academic community surrounding him, an attitude which often resulted in an ironic, sometimes almost a philosophical caricaturist's perspective.[37] This ironic, somewhat equanimous attitude did not suggest complete "inner emigration" as the logical consequence of the émigré's position. To the contrary, it did imply specific obligations regarding the social role of the critical political thinker.[38] Realistically perceived, however, among these obligations, according to Voegelin, the integration of his work into the mainstream of the academic discourse could not have the highest priority. They rather entailed the duty to seize the freedom of the émigré's position for critical

intellectual provocations, to think and write, maybe for a more or less "distant future" or, as his motto to the *New Science* puts it, to let posterity 'know we have not loosely through silence permitted things to pass away as in a dream' (Voegelin [1952] 2000b: 76), and to otherwise contribute to the potential revival of a "science of substance" (Voegelin 1948: 463) which Voegelin, despite his pessimism, considered to have a real chance in some "regions" of the contemporary scientific discourse.[39]

In the case of Morgenthau, these commitments show a lifelong continuity and coherence and indeed one may speculate whether he—very much opposite to Voegelin who was certainly the more serious and profound thinker—has given up to communicate his philosophical positions to US academia and public, even if in the form of polemical provocations, especially after mainly negative reviews of *Scientific Man* in the first years after its publication,[40] and rather focused his work from the 1950s onwards mostly on commentaries on US foreign and domestic and international politics. At least we do not observe new philosophical findings and positions in his work after his theoretically most productive period in the 1940s and 1950s.

We can thus observe that *Scientific Man*, despite all its ambivalences, is significant as a review and critique of the political-philosophical landscape of the mid-twentieth century, as well as of the discipline of International Relations during this time. Classical realism—of which Morgenthau's was the most prominent voice—was arguably *opposed to* what became mainstream IR theory.[41] Moreover, Morgenthau both anticipated and antedated many important commitments that became popular and that would be emphasized many years later in "poststructuralist" IR.[42] Third, vital impulses for the foundation of American IR came about more in terms of how Morgenthau was perceived and (mis)read, rather than from what he actually said and wrote.[43]

Regarding their concrete practical consequences, both Morgenthau's and Voegelin's ways of personal interpretation and enactment of the role of the émigré scholar had ambiguous results. Obviously, neither Morgenthau's nor Voegelin's intellectual interventions successfully negotiated or built bridges between a European *geistesgeschichtliche* orientation and US social sciences. Their uncompromising and polemical reactions to the behaviorist and positivist currents in US academia themselves contributed to defeating the purpose of a constructive synthesis, if it ever was on their mind and objectively possible. In the end, it was not them who decided about the peculiar way in which their thought was integrated into

the broader academic discourses. Both works were often instrumentalized to foster intellectual ends and projects which surely did not completely correspond to their own major concerns, interests, and theoretical priorities. Voegelin's attempts to avoid being made an icon of a rather narrow political conservatism were only partly successful, and often had the result of a certain marginalization of his oeuvre, despite its general recognition as an eminent, classical contribution to twentieth-century political philosophy. Morgenthau was made a classic in IR theory "for the wrong reasons" and as such often reduced to a quotable academic figure. Both did not decide to be read this way. But it is fair to say that both, in their peculiar modes of intellectual self-localization, in a way unwillingly helped to prepare the ground for just these kinds of intellectual co-options. This, of course, does not hinder a fresh reading of their works or a reconsideration of the most substantial of their theoretical contributions.

Notes

1. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1953), "Letter to Eric Voegelin", 10th June (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Container 60); see also Rösch (2014a: 6).
2. This is not to ignore that there are, of course, important differences between Morgenthau's "classical" and Voegelin's "spiritual realism". On the latter see Gebhardt (1981).
3. On the anthropological foundations of Voegelin's political theory see Braach (2003); on the significance of anthropological arguments in Morgenthau see Morgenthau himself (1930); also Williams (2004).
4. See Eccel and Godefroy (2016) and Sigwart (2016).
5. On Voegelin's Gnosticism thesis see Opitz (1999), Hollweck (1999), and Vondung (2016); for a distinctly critical interpretation of Voegelin's thesis see Versluis (2006: 69–84).
6. Published and unpublished, in German, French, and English. This terminological and conceptual thoroughness is most explicit in his doctoral and post-doctoral ("Habilitation") thesis and two unpublished manuscripts written in German; see Morgenthau (1929, 1930, 1934a, b).
7. See hereto also the paper by Felix Roesch in this volume, his analysis of Morgenthau's "Erschütterung der Seele" as well as Morgenthau's odyssey through Europe to flee the anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Europe.
8. Morgenthau (1934a), Jütersonke (2010).
9. Amstrup (1978), Barkawi (1998), Brown (2007), Cesa (2009), Frei (2001), Koskenniemi (2000), Lang (2004), Mollov (2002), Molloy (2009), Rice (2008), Scheuerman (2007b), Schuett (2010), Tjalve (2008), Wong (2000).

10. Morgenthau was sometimes ignorant of bibliographical precision in his references as well as sloppy when it came to historical details—a painful experience that I and my co-editor Felix Roesch had to undergo when editing his 1933 book "La notion du politique" and preparing the first English edition (as *The Concept of the Political*). On the other hand, Morgenthau was a "paper saver" (Frei 2001: 4), and a shell that had hit Morgenthau's apartment in Madrid in 1936 did not destroy his papers, which he only got back after years to his great relief as he confessed to Rafael Altamira on March 5, 1945 (HJM-Archive 3). His private notes and correspondence are a valuable source to reconstruct his political thought; we also find here no significant reference to Max Weber. This observation stands in stark contrast to Turner and Mazur's argument of Morgenthau as a Weberian methodologist; see Turner and Mazur (2009).
11. See Morgenthau's *Concept of the Political* where this is strongest; also to Fritz Ringer and the problem of the Weimar Mandarins (Ringer 1969); also this anti-positivist argument is similar to, but much earlier than, however, completely ignored by post-structuralist authors, see, for example, Edkins (1999).
12. See here most explicitly in *Scientific Man*, Chapter One, "The Challenge of Fascism", p.6 onwards.
13. Morgenthau's later oeuvre follows Marcuse with regard to consumerism, modernity, nuclear weapons (the "political-industrial-military complex" more widely), and mass society (see, for example, Morgenthau 1973, 1977).
14. Morgenthau is politically committed to the idea of liberal society and liberalism (see Hall 2011), but criticized liberal idealism as an epistemological position. More on this, see Behr (2013) and Behr and Roesch (2012).
15. Like "Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law", 1940; "The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning", 1944; "The Scientific Solution of Social Conflicts", 1945; "Reflections on the State of Political Science", 1955; "Modern Science and Political Power", 1964.
16. See Voegelin (1925, 1927, 1932).
17. See more elaborately Sigwart (2005: 187 ff).
18. On Voegelin's early intellectual biography see Sandoz (2000), Cooper (2009), and Sigwart (2005).
19. See Voegelin's juxtaposition of his hermeneutic methodological principles with those applied by Sabine in Voegelin ([1944]2000): 162 ff.
20. It is published now in the volumes 19–26 of the *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*.
21. The quotations are from the Article "Journalism and Joachim's Children" in *Time*, March 9, 1953: 57 and 60.
22. Ibid.

23. See especially the final chapter of the *New Science* (Voegelin [1952] 2000: 220 ff.).
24. See above footnote 6; also Morgenthau (1940, 1944, 1945).
25. *Scientific Man* received wide reviews in important history, law, philosophy, economy, and political science journals, some of which were devastating (such as Nagel 1947) and even those who were in agreement with Morgenthau's main arguments (such as Frank 1948) dismissed his polemic style, overgeneralizations, and radicalness; see also Graubard (1948), Anderson (1947), Simon (1947), Fainsod (1947), de Visme Williamson (1947), Briggs (1947), Bryson (1947), Desch (1947), and Gooch (1947).
26. See for further discussions also Behr (2013), Holt et al. (1960), Lebow (2003), and Scheuerman (2007).
27. See especially chapters V and VI in *Scientific Man*; also Morgenthau *On the State of Political Science* (1955).
28. See hereto more specific Morgenthau (1944).
29. See, for example, Morgenthau (1946: 19 f., 29, 35 f., 53 ff). Likewise, we find an important reference to the sociology of knowledge of Karl Mannheim and an argument in Morgenthau (in 1955) for a culturally situated form of knowledge analysis and knowledge production; from both it would have been a possible step to conclude the power of knowledge and to a sociology of the power of knowledge.
30. English as *The Concept of the Political* (2012).
31. Morgenthau utilizes the distinction in his German writings, foremost his PhD thesis, where he writes about "Macht" (in the meaning of "pouvoir") and "Kraft" (as "puissance"). For an excellent discussion of both concepts of "power", see Rösch (2014b); also Morgenthau, "Love and Power" (1962).
32. Correspondence between the author and Morgenthau's daughter, Susanna, and son, Mathew, in 2010 and 2011 during the preparation of *The Concept of the Political*.
33. Morgenthau's reading of Machiavelli can indeed be seen in "The Machiavellian Utopia", Ethics 55, no. 2 (1945), pp. 145–47; on Machiavelli, see, among others, Behr, A History of International Political Theory, ch. II.2.1.
34. Letter to Michael Oakeshott, May 22, 1948 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Container 33).
35. We do have, however, some utterances by him in private correspondence that indicate critical awareness of respective institutional dynamics as in the above referenced letter to Michael Oakshott, but also to Karl Gottfried Kindermann, then professor on international relations at the University of Munich.

36. These parallels regard not only the astute focus on the conceptual implications of the modern understanding of "space" (see Foucault 1984) and the close relation between knowledge and power especially in modern science (see, for a summary of Foucault's perspective on this relation, Rouse 2003), but also the pointed critique of the "scientistic-utilitarian dream" of a prison- or asylum-like organization of modern society which Voegelin, like Foucault, finds most clearly articulated in the work of Jeremy Bentham (Voegelin 1948: 494, Fn 48).
37. The most expressive articulation of this attitude can be found in a letter Voegelin wrote in 1976 to the organizer of a behaviorist conference at the University of Southern California on "the ethics of behavior control" to which he had also invited Voegelin, who at the time was fellow at Stanford University. According to the invitation letter the conference focused 'on voluntary, reversible, non-addictive methods of producing "artificial" happiness, goodness, and increased human capacity through chemical and electrical stimulation of the brain, biofeedback, sleep and memory enhancement, operant conditioning etc.' and on the attempt to 'produce genuinely new insights and ideas regarding the technologies of experience and behavior control and their legitimate use by individuals in a democratic society'. Voegelin's response a few months later expresses his gratitude for the opportunity to witness "behaviorists in action" and contains a highly ironic, partly even sarcastic eight-page experience report. The report sketches quite the same constellation as his historical analysis of the "Origins of scientism" three decades earlier, including the diagnoses of a fundamental "reductionist fallacy" as the constitutive premise of the scientistic worldview, of the merging of knowledge and power as its epistemological core principle, its protection against critique by discursive 'tactics of prohibiting the use of philosophical language', and the inevitable outcome of a 'more or less abject submission of the representatives of Western intellectual and spiritual culture to the demands of the ideologists' (Henry Clark to Eric Voegelin, December 3, 1975, in: Voegelin Papers, Hoover Archive at Stanford University, Box 9, Folder 17.). Eric Voegelin to Henry Clark, February 21, 1976 (ibid.).
38. See also Gebhardt (1997).
39. On these regions and Voegelin's understanding of "substantive science" see Voegelin (2007: 142 ff. and 193 ff).
40. See above footnote 26.
41. Here it appears that Morgenthau got celebrated (as well as critiqued) by many for the wrong reasons; see Behr and Roesch (2012: 29, 30).
42. See Ashley (1981), Behr and Roesch (2012), and Levine (2013).
43. With regard to this, see his letter to Michael Oakshott from May 22, 1948, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Container 33) as well as Behr (2009, 2010).

References

Alexander, Samuel. 1960. The Basis of Realism. In *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. R. Chisholm, 186–222. Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe.

Amstrup, Niels. 1978. The "Early" Morgenthau. A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism. *Cooperation and Conflict* 13 (2): 163–175.

Anderson, William. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 250: 135–136.

Ashley, Rick. 1981. Political Realism and Human Interests. *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (2): 204–236.

Barkawi, Tarak. 1998. Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic Studies. *Review of International Studies* 24: 159–184.

Behr, Hartmut. 2009. Misreadings in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and Neo-realism. Co-authored with Amelia Heath. *Review of International Studies* 35 (2): 327–349.

———. 2010. *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2013. Common Sense, Thomas Reid, and Realist Epistemology. *International Politics* 50 (6): 1–15.

Behr, Hartmut, and Felix Roesch. 2012. Introduction. In Morgenthau, Hans J. *The Concept of the Political*, translated from the French by Maeva Vidal, edited and with an Introduction by Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, Foreword by Michael C. Williams. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave.

Braach, Regina. 2003. *Eric Voegelins politische Anthropologie*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Briggs, Herbert W. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power. *The American Journal of International Law* 41 (4): 981–982.

Brown, Chris. 2007. "The Twilight of International Morality?" Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt on the End of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. In *Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams, 42–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bryson, Lyman. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power. *Ethics* 57 (3): 215–217.

Cesa, Marco. 2009. Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 11 (2): 177–191.

Cooper, Barry. 2009. *Beginning the Quest. Law and Politics in the Early Work of Eric Voegelin*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Desch, C.H. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs. Power. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–)* 23 (3): 378.

Eccel, Daiane, and Bruno Godefroy. 2016. Eric Voegelins Theorie politischer Repräsentation. In *Staaten und Ordnungen. Die politische und Staatstheorie von Eric Voegelin*, ed. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, 221–238. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Edkins, Jenny. 1999. *Poststructuralism and International Relations. Bringing the Political Back In*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Fainsod, Merle. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power Politics. *The American Economic Review* 37 (3): 440–442.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. Space, Knowledge, and Power. In *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, 239–256. New York: Pantheon.

Frank, Jerome. 1948. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power Politics. *The University of Chicago Law Review* 15 (2): 462–478.

Frei, Christoph. 2001. *Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Gebhardt, Jürgen. 1981. Erfahrung und Wirklichkeit—Anmerkungen zur Politischen Wissenschaft des spirituellen Realismus. In *The Philosophy of Order. Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics*, ed. Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba, 332–344. Stuttgart: Klett.

———. 1997. The Vocation of the Scholar. In *International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Eric Voegelin*, ed. Stephen A. McKnight and Geoffrey L. Price, 10–34. Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press.

Gooch, R.K. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs. Power. *The American Political Science Review* 41 (2): 335–336.

Graubard, Mark. 1948. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power Politics. *Isis* 38 (3/4): 267–268.

Gunnell, John G. 1993. *The Descent of Political Theory. The Genealogy of an American Vocation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hall, Ian. 2011. The Triumph of Anti-Liberalism? Reconciling Radicalism to Realism in International Relations Theory. *Political Studies Review* 9 (1): 42–52.

Holt, E.B., et al. 1960. Introduction to the New Realism. In *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. R. Chisholm, 151–185. Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe.

Hollweck, Thomas. 1999. Das gnostische Wesen der Moderne: Die Zukunft einer These. In *Eric Voegelin: Der Gottesmord. Zur Genese und Gestalt der modernen politischen Gnosis*, 144–159. München: Fink.

———. 2007. Editor's Introduction. In *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. Vol. 30: Selected Correspondence 1950–1984*, ed. Thomas A. Hollweck, 1–17. Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press.

Jütersonke, Oliver. 2010. *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koskenniemi, Martti. 2000. Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Relations. In *The Role of Law in International Politics.*

Essays in International Relations and International Law, ed. Michael Byers, 17–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. [1962] 2012. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lang, Anthony F., Jr., ed. 2004. *Political Theory and International Affairs. Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle's the Politics.* Westport: Praeger.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 2003. *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levine, Daniel. 2013. Why Morgenthau Was Not a Critical Theorist. *International Relations* 27 (1): 95–118.
Mollov, M. Benjamin. 2002. *Power and Transcendence. Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience*. Lanham: Lexing.
Molloy, Seán. 2009. Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil. *Journal of International Political Theory* 5 (1): 94–112.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1929. *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen*. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag von Robert Noske.
———. 1930. *Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Container 151).
———. 1934a. *La Réalité des normes. En particulier des normes du droit international. Fondement d'une théorie des normes.* Paris: Félix Alcan.
———. 1934b. *Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Container 151).
———. 1940. Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law. *American Journal of International Law* 34 (2): 260–284.
———. 1944. The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning. *Ethics* 54 (3): 174–185.
———. 1945. *The Scientific Solution of Social Conflicts, Approaches to National Unity*, 419–443. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life.
———. 1946. *Scientific Man vs Power Politics.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.
———. 1955. Reflections on the State of Political Science. *Review of Politics* 17 (4): 431–460.
———. 1962. Love and Power, *Commentary*, published by the American Jewish Committee, pp. 247–251.
———. 1964. Modern Science and Political Power. *Columbia Law Review* 64 (4): 1386–1409.
———. 1973. Macht und Ohnmacht des Menschen im technologischen Zeitalter. In *Was wird aus dem Menschen? Der Fortschritt—Analysen und Warnungen bedeutender Denker*, ed. Oskar Schatz, 47–60. Graz: Verlag Styria.
———. 1977. The Pathology of American Power. *International Security* 1 (3): 3–20.

———. 1984. Postscript to the Transaction Edition: Bernard Johnson's Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau. In *Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers, 333–386. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

———. 2012. *The Concept of the Political*, translated from the French by Maeva Vidal, edited and with an Introduction by Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, Foreword by Michael C. Williams. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave.

Nagel, Ernest. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power Politics. *The Yale Law Journal* 56 (5): 906–909.

Opitz, Peter J. 1999. Die Gnosis-These—Anmerkungen zu Eric Voegelins Interpretation der westlichen Moderne. In *Eric Voegelin: Der Gottesmord. Zur Genese und Gestalt der modernen politischen Gnosis*, 7–35. München: Fink.

Rice, Daniel. 2008. Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A Friendship with Contrasting Shades of Realism. *Journal of American Studies* 42 (2): 255–291.

Ringer, Fritz. 1969. *The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890–1933.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rösch, Felix. 2014a. The Human Condition of Politics: Considering the Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau for International Relations. *Journal of International Political Theory* 9 (1): 1–21.

———. 2014b. Pouvoir, Puissance, and Politics: Hans Morgenthau's Dualistic Concept of Power? *Review of International Studies* 40 (2): 349–365.

Rouse, Joseph. 2003. Power/Knowledge. In *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. Gary Gutting, 95–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sabine, George H. 1937. *A History of Political Theory.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Sandoz, Ellis. 2000. *The Voegelinian Revolution. A Biographical Introduction*. 2nd ed. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers.

Scheuerman, William E. 2007. Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond. In *Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams, 62–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schuett, Robert. 2010. *Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations. The Resurrection of the Realist Man*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sigwart, Hans-Jörg. 2005. *Das Politische und die Wissenschaft. Intellektuell-biographische Studien zum Frühwerk Eric Voegelins.* Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

———. 2016. Mitwelt und Seinsordnung. Zum erfahrungswissenschaftlichen Disput zwischen Eric Voegelin und Hannah Arendt. In *Staaten und Ordnungen. Die politische und Staatstheorie von Eric Voegelin*, ed. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, 195–219. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Simon, Yves. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power Politics. *The Review of Politics* 9 (4): 506–508.

Söllner, Alfons. 1996. *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration. Studien zu ihrer Akulturation und Wirkungsgeschichte*. Opladen: VS Verlag.

Tjalve, Vibeke Schou. 2008. *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace. Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Turner, Stephen, and George Mazur. 2009. Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist. *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (3): 477–504.

Versluis, Arthur. 2006. *The New Inquisitions. Heretic-Hunting and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Totalitarianism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Visme Williamson de, Rene. 1947. Review of Hans J. Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. *The Journal of Politics* 9 (1): 115–117.

Voegelin, Eric. 1925. Reine Rechtslehre und Staatslehre. *Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht* 4: 80–131.

———. 1927. Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law. *Political Science Quarterly* 42: 268–276.

———. 1932. *Staatslehre als Geisteswissenschaft*. Manuscript. Voegelin Papers, Hoover Archive at Stanford University, Box 53, Folder 7.

———. [1944] 2000a. Political Theory and the Pattern of General History. In *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*. Vol. 10, ed. Ellis Sandoz, 157–167. Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press.

———. 1948. The Origins of Scientism. *Social Research* 15 (4): 462–494.

———. [1952] 2000b. The New Science of Politics. An Introduction. In *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*. Vol. 5, ed. Manfred Henningsen, 75–241. Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press.

———. 1953. Response. *Time*, April 20, p. 8.

———. 1989. *Autobiographical Reflections*. Baton Rouge/London: Louisiana State University Press.

———. 2007. *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. Vol. 30: Selected Correspondence 1950–1984*, ed. Thomas A. Hollweck. Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press.

Vondung, Klaus. 2016. Gnosis und Apokalypse als Interpretamente der Moderne im Werk von Eric Voegelin. In *Staaten und Ordnungen. Die politische und Staatstheorie von Eric Voegelin*, ed. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, 115–134. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Williams, Michael C. 2004. Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 58 (4): 633–665.

Wong, Benjamin. 2000. Hans Morgenthau's Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (2): 389–409.

Politics Among Nations: A Book for America

Christoph Frei

Introduction: A Book for America

On 11 December 1941, under the impact of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hans Morgenthau wrote a friend: "The events of this week have made me feel more intensely than ever before, on the one hand, the futility of my present occupation [at the University of Kansas City—CF], and, on the other, the duty to put whatever faculties I may have at the disposal of the community."[1] Eager to do his share, he tried to enlist in the army but was rejected on physical grounds. He was also turned down by state and federal government agencies, though he had become a naturalized American citizen and even though he had passed the bar examination in Missouri for the very purpose of increasing his chances. But he was not sorry, on the contrary. He had always hoped to be able to avoid a change of profession and to make a useful contribution to his original field of expertise. "I should be glad to do research which would contribute something worthwhile to the solution of the problems with which this country is at present confronted."[2] Desperately seeking an academic position at the time, Morgenthau wrote letters to over a hundred universities in the country. It was not until August of 1943, however, and with an appointment at the University of Chicago, that he was able to start making good on his

C. Frei (✉)
University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_3

pledge—and to do so as a scholar. From just 1946 to 1951 alone, he published six books and thirty-four articles, in addition to numerous commentaries and reviews.[3]

When introducing *Politics Among Nations* to his readers in the fall of 1948, he was explicit about the volume's ultimate purpose. His book was neither "disinterested" nor did it mean to offer "knowledge for its own sake." Even though the war was over, the author meant to render both a real and practical service to his fellow countrymen. A series of factors had "completely reversed" the geopolitical status of the United States. It now held a position of predominant power in the world, and hence of foremost responsibility. Therefore, "the understanding of the forces that mold international politics and of the factors that determine its course has become more than an interesting intellectual occupation. It has become a vital necessity" (Morgenthau 1948: 7–8).

Much like the earlier *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (1946) and the later *In Defense of the National Interest* (1951), *Politics Among Nations* (1948) was written specifically for an American audience—one that was meant to include students of international politics as well as practitioners in the foreign policy community. As the author saw it, the United States was ill-prepared for the challenges that lay ahead. Historically prone to over-optimism, Americans were likely to get the answers wrong on fundamental questions. They suffered from a peculiar disease that had its origins in mistaken philosophical assumptions and thus extended to all realms of thought and life. Typical symptoms such as legalism, moralism, and perfectionism were easy to detect, and in each of these "isms" Morgenthau recognized an intellectual fallacy, which he set out to correct.

In those years, he thought of himself not only as an analyst but also as a doctor who could cure that peculiar disease by having recourse to the full spectrum of therapeutic options. While *Scientific Man* had been the result of an intense confrontation with modes of thinking that were diametrically opposed to his own, and whereas *In Defense of the National Interest* would focus on foreign policy and practical applications, *Politics Among Nations* offered the core concepts and central theses of Morgenthau's mature international relations theory. Upon publication in September 1948, the treatise was promptly adopted as a textbook for foreign policy and international relations courses at Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, and Yale. Ninety colleges throughout the United States would follow suit within seven months. By 1955, 40,000 copies had been sold in the United States alone, and by 1968 sales would reach 160,000.

Clearly, then, *Politics Among Nations* did reach its intended American audience. But is it an American book—and if so, to what extent? The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, this comprehensive inquiry best illustrates the consistent way in which Morgenthau made use of conceptual components that he had himself developed or adopted into his work prior to his arrival in the United States. Based on the evidence, it is, in fact, fair to say that the basic structure of the book as well as its broad line of argument was ready by 1938. On the other hand, communicating legal and political theory as developed in Europe to an American audience required both adaptation and the inclusion of examples and sets of experience that were familiar to it. While there is little ground for imagining that Morgenthau (in his mid-forties by 1948) would reinvent himself in the process, it is equally implausible to assume that the process would have no impact on the author and his work. In what follows, I will first address the distinctly European origins of *Politics Among Nations* and substantiate the claim that the basic structure of the book was ready ten years prior to its publication. In a second step, I will shed light on how concepts and components adopted in Europe were gradually enlarged and amended at the University of Chicago. Moving on from context to text, I will then recall the book's main line of argument and conclude by complementing the contextual picture, including Morgenthau's assessment of his own contribution.

Twenty Years in the Making

Morgenthau's early academic endeavors developed out of an active rebellion against the sort of scientific work he encountered at German universities, and particularly in the law faculties, first as a student, then as a doctoral candidate, and finally as a young scholar in his own right (Amstrup 1978; Frei 2001; Gangl 2009; Jütersonke 2010; Rösch 2015b; Frei 2016). While the proponents of the dominant positivist school of jurisprudence were determined to keep it clear of all political or sociological entanglement, a growing number of scholars held that political and social aspects should be incorporated. Among them were established scholars such as Rudolf Smend, Carl Schmitt, and Hermann Heller. Several alternative approaches surfaced, all of them aiming to unshackle German *Staatslehre* (conceived at the time as an inclusive blend of public and international law) from the narrow cage of legal reasoning. This great debate provided the backdrop for Morgenthau's early work. The self-imposed challenge before him was to develop nothing

less than his own theory of the state, one "grounded in experience," as he put it in his inaugural academic lecture, held in spring 1932 before the law faculty of the University of Geneva (Morgenthau 1932a: 28).

The text of that lecture, polemical in tone and programmatic in content, not only outlines where the young scholar stood at the time, but also what he intended to accomplish in his chosen field, that is, a theory "grounded in experience" to grasp the reality of the state as well as the reality of relations among states. Morgenthau was eager to do better than old-fashioned positivists who had withdrawn from reality; to do better also than those rival innovators who had "stopped midway." Driven by such ambitions, he set out to explore new territory, "to introduce new elements," "to place theory on a new foundation." All of these terms appear in a "work plan" written a few months after the inaugural lecture offered at Geneva (Morgenthau 1932c).

There is no need to dig any deeper into Morgenthau's early books and manuscripts in the present context. Suffice it to say that the energy the young legal scholar invested in incorporating *extra-legal* elements increased over time. By the mid-1930s, his conceptual framework—a theory grounded in experience—was beginning to take shape, even though its components were still scattered about in various papers. Compared with both his doctoral dissertation (1929) and his Habilitation (1934), heuristic priorities were conspicuously changed. In the "political" conceived as an innate human impulse, and in "politics" conceived as a struggle for power, Morgenthau had by now found "the linchpin of all endeavors in this world," "the raw material of the social world."[4] For the purpose of understanding the social arena both within and among states, the analysis of politics henceforth had to precede the analysis of legal and other normative constraints. Politics was the primary natural and ubiquitous social phenomenon, whereas endeavors to contain and restrain politics were bound to remain contingent and precarious.

Seeking power, but also seeking peace: the dyadic architecture of Morgenthau's 1948 theory of international relations first shimmers through here. Note the European context, however. In fact, from every published and unpublished manuscript that the young scholar wrote between 1929 and 1937, straight lines lead to attempts at either *analyzing the struggle for power* (politics in its sources and manifestations) or *understanding normative systems and social mechanisms to keep that struggle within tolerable bounds*.[5] Two permanent features of humanity's collective drama had thus captured this young scholar's full attention. And yes, both

of them would return many years later in the subtitle of *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

We are well advised to remember that for Morgenthau, understanding these issues went beyond an intellectual exercise. They touched upon the core of his personal existence. By the end of 1934, he was homeless, jobless, and without financial resources. On the strength of his experience and observations, he was convinced that the worst still lay ahead. All expectations that international law in general and the League of Nations in particular might play a more positive role were being shattered with brutal consistency. By the spring of 1936, Morgenthau (then in Madrid), saw with frightening clarity the prospect of politics unleashed, freed once again from effective normative constraints. What lay ahead was another war at worst, a precarious balance of power at best: "The very existence of international law today depends exclusively on this equilibrium" (Morgenthau 1935a: 827). In light of such prospects, there was a dire need for accommodation in the short run (read "diplomacy") and for structural transformation in the long run (read "world state" conceived as a rational desideratum). Any reader familiar with *Politics Among Nations* will recognize these postulates. Back in 1934 and 1935, however, the various components of Morgenthau's framework were still without formal connection, just loosely tied together, in his words, as a *théorie réaliste* (1936: 20).

But how eager he was at the time to interlock the various components of his framework so as to bring them all into play! "The project occupies myself since the beginning of my scientific activities," Morgenthau wrote upon arriving in the United States in 1937 (Frei 2001: 208). In fact, he had promised a comprehensive synopsis as early as 1933, and kept reiterating this promise in subsequent years—"malgré la misère de l'époque" (Morgenthau 1933a: 9, 1934a: 141). The self-proclaimed character of the project as a *summa*, drawing on a broad range of earlier contributions, is conspicuous throughout. To offer just one example: "The project I hope to realize with the aid of a fellowship I have been working on since 1927 [i.e., the beginning of the dissertation project—CF], and all my preceding publications touch upon one or another of the problems with which this project deals" (Morgenthau 1938b). Thus the synopsis in question was to be neither a theory of international law nor a theory of politics. Rather, it was meant to be a comprehensive, interdisciplinary theory, one grasping the workings and mutual dependencies of politics; of moral, social, legal norms; and of ideology in the context of an anarchic system of nation states (thus already 1933a: 9).

An outline dating from summer 1938 and written in broken English unmistakably contains the basic features of what was to become *Politics Among Nations*. Ten years prior to publication, the author had an approximate—not a detailed—architecture of his great synopsis in mind, and this architecture did include a main, broad line of argument as well as a number of essential building blocks (Morgenthau 1938a: "Plan for Work"). By then, many of these key components already had a history of their own. Based on Morgenthau's early writings, it is possible to trace them one by one. They include the concept of the political and politics in general (1929a, 1930a, 1930b, 1932b, 1933a); the notorious triad of maintaining, increasing, and demonstrating power (1933a); the policies of status quo, imperialism, and prestige (1933a); the function of ideology (1929a, 1930b, 1932b, 1933a); political limitations of power: the balance of power (1933a, 1934a, 1935a); normative limitations of power: ethics, mores, and law (1934a, 1935a); the effectiveness of international law and international morality and world public opinion (1934a, 1935b, 1935c, 1937); the limits of the judicial function in international relations (1929a, 1933a); sovereignty and anarchy (1934a, 1935a, 1937); the limited potential of international organization (1929a, 1933a, 1933b); peace through transformation, the world state (1934a); and peace through accommodation, diplomacy (1929a, 1929b, 1934a).

As seen from the 1938 outline: whereas they were dispersed in Morgenthau's previous German, French, and Spanish writings, all of these components would come together in *Politics Among Nations*. The foundations of Morgenthau's "théorie réaliste" (1936: 20) had been laid out and gradually developed in Frankfurt, Geneva, Madrid, Bolzano, and Paris. Beyond his doctoral dissertation on *Internationale Rechtspflege* (1929a), the more important analytical works include: Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen (Manuscript, 1930b), Der Kampf der deutschen Staatslehre um die Wirklichkeit des Staates (Manuscript, 1932a), *La notion du politique et la théorie des différends internationaux* (1933a), Die Wirklichkeit des Völkerbundes (1933b), *La réalité des normes* (1934a), and *Théorie des sanctions internationales* (1935a).

From Theory to Textbook: Finalizing the Manuscript

"I expect to complete the project in one year," the expatriate refugee had written in his 1938 "Plan for Work." Why, then, did he take so long to finish unfinished business after arriving in the United States? A first reason

relates to difficult personal circumstances. From 1937 up until 1943, Morgenthau and his wife were struggling to survive one day at a time, first in New York City (1937–39), then in Kansas City (1939–43), where a huge teaching load turned Morgenthau into a slave of sorts. Only in Chicago did he find at last what he had been denied in years of involuntary wanderings, that is, an orderly existence built on permanence. In the ensuing period, a favorable environment and his renewed capacity to focus combined to set off a productivity that stood in sharp contrast to the plodding drudgery of the preceding years.

A second reason for taking more time relates to his great project itself, to the manner it evolved in the new context. For years, Morgenthau had deemed his comprehensive synopsis to be a follow-up to his earlier contributions. As such, it was meant to be a sophisticated theory, an interdisciplinary social science *avant la lettre*, so to speak, addressed to an academic community of cognoscenti. But in the United States, the European scholar was confronted with a target audience whose intellectual and experiential horizon differed sharply from his own. His publisher Alfred A. Knopf immediately conceived the projected volume as a textbook for students and held that it was to be formatted and marketed as such. Independent reviewers, too, recommended adapting the material to the structure and style of a textbook (Rösch 2015a: 177; Rohde 2004: 203).

At first, Morgenthau held out against the idea, but came around once he learned more about the target market (or, in academic terminology, the theoretical environment). Other authors had undoubtedly made substantial contributions: Frederick Schuman with *International Politics* (third edition, 1941); Nicholas Spykman with *America's Strategy in World Politics* (1942); and, most recently, Edward H. Carr with *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (second edition, 1946). In terms of scope, of substance and systematic reach, however, none of these contributions came even close to what Morgenthau had in mind. "There is indeed an urgent need for a textbook in the field which does not try to comment on current events (…), but which endeavors to lay down the basic principles which control the relations of nations with each other," he wrote in February 1945.[6] The further he advanced with his own project, the more confident Morgenthau became in light of the sheer scope of his own theory. "This book will differ from the traditional textbooks in the field as an automobile differs from a horse and buggy," he wrote to his editor Roger Shugg over at Alfred A. Knopf's. "I am sure that the book will receive the audience which both of us want it to have."[7]

It is worth noting both the authors and "the field" mentioned by Morgenthau when discussing the quality of scholarly contributions preceding his own. In this crucial respect, his new academic environment had an undeniable impact on Morgenthau. Back in Germany he had started out as a jurist. Over the ensuing years he would gradually turn into a *Wirklichkeitswissenschaftler*, a passionate searcher of reality keen on grounding theory in experience. At the University of Chicago, Morgenthau found and adopted not only a new institutional home but also a suitable professional identity, that of the political scientist.[8] In terms of the German jurist's academic acculturation, his identification with political science rather than jurisprudence is more than a minor detail. Its early origins notwithstanding, *Politics Among Nations* was meant as a contribution not to legal scholarship, but to what we call international relations theory today.

Prior to publication, much work remained to be done both in substance and form. To be sure, much substance was ready. *Politics Among Nations* includes countless passages that are merely modified passages as translated from earlier works. Morgenthau's well-known narrative around "politics as a struggle for power" is but one example that goes to show how the author was able to make use of ready-made components in putting the manuscript together. The respective passage offering a typology of political action in *Politics Among Nations* (1948: 53) is really an English translation of the corresponding passage in the original version (Morgenthau 1933a: 61). Other examples are legion.

In most instances, however, preparing the manuscript went beyond mere reformulation, as it entailed expansion and the inclusion of genuinely new material. Relevant post-1938 developments had to be incorporated. In this regard, notable examples include the United Nations (latest attempts at "international government"), UNESCO (attempts at building "world community"), or the more recent evolution of the global balance of power (toward bipolarity). Step by step, the conceptual framework that the European scholar had brought along was thus updated, amended, and, above all, illustrated everywhere with elements from diplomatic history, but also from military, social, and economic history. Adapting demanding, abstract material to college students required the inclusion of examples that were accessible, if not familiar to them. Finding and fine-tuning such examples, in turn, required time-consuming research. In the initial stages, valuable help was provided by Alfred Hotz. "The main burden of assistance," however, fell upon Kenneth W. Thompson "who

brought to his task an extraordinary measure of ability and devotion," as Morgenthau put it in the foreword of *Politics Among Nations* (1948: Foreword, vii). Wherever possible, references were made to Anglo-Saxon and American authors. While it is worth mentioning that this "process of Americanization" (Jütersonke 2010: 183, Shilliam 2009: 194) entailed anglicizing German sources, it should also be recognized that not all (!) components of Morgenthau's "théorie réaliste" as developed in Europe were of specific German origin in the first place. Think of legal theory, for example, where Morgenthau's authorities had always included French and British scholars, from Adhémar Esmain down to Hersch Lauterpacht.

At Chicago, the draft manuscript developed through a peculiar kind of assemblage. The assembly line reached from various libraries to Morgenthau's office, thence to the classrooms of the Chicago campus and back to the office. "Miss Mary Jane Beneditz made a stenographic transcript of the lecture given in the Winter Quarter of 1946 as well as of the class discussions. Her intelligent and painstaking labor made available the only written record of those lectures" (1948: Foreword, vii). Without that written record, Morgenthau acknowledged, the task could never have been completed in such a short period. Less than two years after the publication of *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, the heavy new manuscript was submitted to the publisher. The book's main title, *Politics Among Nations*, was adopted upon suggestion of political scientist and Chicago colleague Charles M. Hardin, whereas the subtitle was the author's own, well-considered choice: *The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

Text I: Power—or What You Would Expect

Morgenthau's *magnum opus* has gone into eight editions and remains in print some seven decades later.[9] Its publishing success notwithstanding, the book received a remarkably one-sided reception within the field of international relations. Whereas Morgenthau himself had fused empirical and normative concerns (and thereby refused "to divorce knowledge from action," 1948: 7), his real or alleged Realist disciples would soon follow Kenneth Waltz's lead in systematically eliminating normative issues from the proper confines of inquiry. Normative political theorists, in turn, tended to either accept a seriously truncated reading of *Politics Among Nations* or ignore it altogether. As a result, Morgenthau became the "unhappy founding father of an influential but normatively numb Realist research paradigm" (Scheuerman 2009: 102). And for many in the field, he still stands tall as a

commanding but somewhat forlorn figure, cast in one piece and distinguished by a single-minded commitment to power as the essence of international politics—power backed by, and backing up, interest.

At first sight, that status may seem well deserved. The very structure of *Politics Among Nations* conveys a strong first message, in that heuristic priority goes to what Morgenthau calls the "raw material of the social world" (1948: 50). Against the false hopes of an excessive historical optimism, against the simplifications of a naïve legalism, he upholds the permanence of political forces and the autonomy of politics. While the innate human aspiration for power is the constitutive source of the political realm of life, the struggle for power is its most distinctive feature in a broader social arena that comprises families as well as nations. Throughout the entire book, Morgenthau moves back and forth between domestic and international levels so as to hammer home a central message: political forces are equally at work on all levels of social interaction. What (usually) sets intra-national relations apart from international relations is the extent and effectiveness of various constraints acting upon politics.

A full first third of *Politics Among Nations* is devoted to mapping "politics" both within and among states. The author sets out to search for typical patterns of individual and collective behavior in the political realm, including that ubiquitous inclination to disguise aspirations for power by means of ideology. To account for insurmountable difficulties in quantifying power, Morgenthau puts emphasis on its psychological dimension. One by one, he takes up both material and immaterial components of national power. He goes on to demonstrate that balances of power are both natural and stabilizing side effects of political action on all social levels. And all the while, Morgenthau argues against false hopes that the unpleasant reality of power can ever be done away with. As the political impulse is anchored in the human condition, politics is truly everywhere.

Across twelve chapters and 160 pages, Morgenthau thus confronts the reader with "power" in all its facets and colorations. More than once, his statements take on the hectoring tone of dogmatic positions. "It is sufficient to state that the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience" (1948: 17). That is how it is—period; skip nuances and subtle distinctions. The same author who as late as 1930 devoted a one hundred-page manuscript to the psychological roots of the drive for power clearly no longer feels compelled to provide elaborate proof for what he now regards as obvious. To those readers who are put off by such language and disposed to disregard the rest of the book, the

case may thus indeed be clear: here is a theorist who takes his stand on the darker side of the social drama and leaves it to others to side overtly with the angels.

It may be fair to presume that, confronted with such an overdose of "power," generations of American readers have put the book aside without taking the trouble to give it a comprehensive reading. What a pity, one is tempted to say, as a truncated reading misses out on conceptual extensions that open up a power-centered framework of analysis and render it into a broad, nuanced perspective. Morgenthau's notorious introduction to the political realm of life is, in fact, followed by an extensive effort at putting things into proportion. While human beings are intrinsically selfish, they also yearn for love and community. The very threat of a world where power reigns supreme "engenders that revolt against power, which is as universal as the aspiration for power itself" (1948: 169). Socialization in general encourages moderation. The normative source of such moderation is to be found in conventions and rules as evolved over time. "From the Bible to the ethics and constitutional arrangements of modern democracy, the main function of these normative systems has been to keep aspirations for power within socially tolerable bounds" (ibid.).

How effective are normative systems in constraining and pacifying international politics in the middle of the twentieth century? Throughout one hundred pages (167–263), Morgenthau addresses this question with remarkable diligence and makes the most of his European writings in the process. The title of his Habilitation in Geneva actually sets the tone for this entire section: *La réalité des normes* (1934a). Searching for the actual social impact of norms, Morgenthau does not concentrate on the content of specific prescriptions, but on the requirements for their psychological and social effectiveness. Effectiveness, he finds, hinges less on the content of norms than on the expected consequences of non-compliance. The real force of the law thus depends on the regular presence of sanctions, which in turn require the presence of superior power. In contrast to legal and institutional arrangements within states, Morgenthau concludes that international law is by necessity a weak form of law, as the decentralized structure of the international system prevents regular recourse to organized superior power (1948: 228 et passim).

Can morality and mores accomplish what is structurally beyond the scope of international law? Are there ethical precepts that have a reach beyond national borders, does there exist a public opinion with a global reach and impact? Morgenthau finds traces in the realm of human rights.

However, he views these traces not so much as promising starting points, but as mere left-overs of a European world with distinctive Christian and aristocratic ideals. That world is gone; its overarching moral unity has been lost. Instead of shared convictions, we are "today" faced with a multitude of mutually incompatible value system, as "the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations upon all other nations" (1948: 269).

At this stage, Morgenthau draws up a first, tentative balance sheet. In a time when the development of nuclear weapons lends new meaning to the notion of "total war," international politics lack effective restraints such as are commonly available within Western states. What remains is "a simplified balance of power, operating between two inflexible blocs" (1948: 305).

Text II: Morgenthau's Struggle for Peace

What can be done? In the last section of his inquiry, the author turns to "the problem of peace" (1948: 307–445) and offers a *tour d'horizon* that is as rich in material as it is timeless in substance. His discussion can plausibly be summarized along the lines of three specific questions.

First, what has been tried so far? The author begins by examining a series of conventional practices and scrutinizes them one by one on the basis of a functional criterion: to what extent can the respective technique keep destructive tendencies of international politics at bay? While *disarmament* may help reduce tensions and build confidence, it is powerless vis-à-vis the fundamental underlying problem: Men do not fight because they have arms, but they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight (327). *Collective security* is bound to fail, as great powers will hardly ever be willing to subordinate their national interests to the requirements of joint action. The *judicial settlement of disputes* cannot routinely prevent wars since the disputes that are most likely to lead to war cannot be settled by judicial means in the first place. No court, domestic or international, is equipped to remove *tensions* created by competing aspirations for either maintaining or overcoming a given status quo. Finally, techniques of *international government* (from the Holy Alliance down to the United Nations) will always be limited by the extent to which interests converge among the influential member states. Morgenthau's interim conclusion is that while all these techniques have something useful to offer, "no attempt" to solve the problem of international peace could have succeeded under the modern system of sovereign states (391).

Second, what would be the best solution in theory? Rather than throwing up his hands at this juncture, the author stubbornly continues his quest, and finally gets to the bottom of his argument. In comparing intra- and interstate levels once again, Morgenthau raises the following question: What factor making for peace and order exists within national societies but is lacking on the international scene? It is, the author goes on, the state itself. Sovereign state power allows for continuity in time and space; it affords a home to citizens; it guarantees the effectiveness of the law; it thus provides a space in which social, economic, and political change can occur without recourse to violence. The same cannot be said about change on the international level. If world peace is to rest on a secure (a logically sound) foundation, there is no substitute for the world state: no lasting peace without a monopoly of legitimate force. Even a global Leviathan, however, will not do: "Such is the great omission of Hobbes's philosophy" (397). Even on the lower plane, the power of the sovereign state is not sufficient to keep peace, as domestic peace is built on cohesive (moral, social) requirements that the state cannot bring forth on its own. On the higher plane, the same requirements apply. Hierarchies and force will never suffice. A global state can only develop on the basis of a community willing and able to support it. Yet, how to bring forth such a community where it does not exist?

In the absence of a quick fix, a complex secular process of building both community and statehood on a global level is Morgenthau's best hope. It speaks volumes about the man's intellectual openness and deep commitment to his quest that, once again, he goes out of his way in search of observable tendencies in international affairs that would at least enhance the possibility of new forms of political organization and agency. To offer just one example: Several years before the European Coal and Steel Community would see the light of day, Morgenthau explores—and warmly endorses—David Mitrany's functional approach "to create a community where none exists" (413). If new forms of political order are to be developed, Western Europe is the place to start.

Third, what is to be done? As international peace cannot be permanent without a world state, and neither a world state nor a world community can be established "under the present moral, social, and political conditions" (402), we must lower expectations, buy time, and work toward conditions under which it will at least not be impossible from the outset to build community and more effective institutions beyond sovereign states. For Morgenthau, that task translates into the mitigation of those political

conflicts that evoke the specter of war. Thus, *Politics Among Nations* ends with a passionate plea for "peace through accommodation"—to wit the restoration of diplomacy, and with it of the techniques that have controlled the mutual relations of states since time immemorial.

It is here that Morgenthau turns from theory to practice, from the best solution in the abstract to what can be accomplished in the concrete if pursued with prudence. It is here also that Morgenthau's help and advice for the United States takes a more specific form, moving on as he does from explicating the fundamentals of international relations to preparing the ground for "an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy" (420). Thus the author comes full circle to an opening remark: "To reflect on international politics in the United States […] is to reflect on the problems which confront American foreign policy in our time" (1948: 8). Making good on his self-imposed pledge to help, and, more fundamentally, living up to his self-ascribed mission as a scholar (see Rösch's contribution to this volume), Morgenthau ends up offering advice to a peace-loving nation: "two instruments," "three qualities," "four tasks," "eight rules" of diplomacy. Rather than focusing on concrete foreign policy decisions, he hopes to influence the reasoning underlying such decisions. Against America's inclination to engage in moral crusades, Morgenthau advocates level-headedness above all, to wit, extrication of political thinking from moralizing; alignment on the basis of mutual interests; a principled willingness to compromise even with presumed evil (the Soviets, too, have interests); and empathy perceived as a real, comprehensive effort at understanding the other side, so as to enhance the likelihood of compromise.

In his sober conclusion, Morgenthau readily admits that "there is nothing spectacular, fascinating, or inspiring in the business of diplomacy" (444). Still, prudent diplomacy is "the best means of preserving peace" in a society of sovereign nations. At the same time, "it is not good enough" under the conditions of modern war (445). Even the best diplomacy cannot itself give rise to the necessary structural changes that are required to counteract the destructive potential of modern technology.

Complementing the Picture

Morgenthau never once claimed to have discovered or charted new territory in *Politics Among Nations*. He did, however, take pride in the sheer scope of a systematic analysis that would (precisely) not content itself with a focus on power. While that entire first part of the book, suffused as it was with a

specific strand of German political thinking (Nietzsche, Weber, Schmitt on theory; from Ranke to Meinecke on the practice of Realpolitik), was perhaps the most vital counterweight to liberal *naïveté*, it was also the least original one.[10] Yet, as long as his readers would go on reading; as long as they would not "judge by a few hours' reading of the labor of twenty years," as long as they would "approve or condemn the book entire, and not a few particular phrases," Morgenthau felt that he was safe[11]—and in this assumption, he was probably not off the mark. "Knowing some of his earlier work and his reputation (sic), I did not expect to like Morgenthau," the noted economist and peace activist Kenneth E. Boulding wrote with perplexity upon reading and reviewing *Politics Among Nations* in 1964. "I was most pleasantly surprised." In light of the full narrative, Boulding commended the work "for its rich insights, and a constant attempt to give the student a feeling for the complex but nonrandom nature of the world social system" (1964: 66–67).

What did Morgenthau himself try to accomplish? While *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (1946) had dealt with social *philosophy*, to wit, with first and fundamental questions about the nature and destiny of man, *Politics Among Nations* was meant to introduce social *theory*. More specifically, what the author had in mind was an interdisciplinary type of political theory geared towards "the understanding of the forces that mold international politics and of the factors that determine its course." (1948: 8) In helping his fellow Americans, Morgenthau's ambition was to go beyond recent history and current events. His theory was to orient and guide action in a reliable manner. Hence, Morgenthau meant to identify timeless elements of social interaction so as to extract from them basic concepts and typologies. "Finding solid ground," is how he described this process in the first pages, "getting down to fundamentals" (1948: 4). Theory from this perspective was to be understood as congealed experience, built upon insights as distilled from the study of history, then tested and modified in light of never-ending observation of the here and now. In its natural ambition to transcend the confinements of time and place, theory had to focus, first of all, on the evolutionary make-up of human beings. From there, it would go on to examine the wider social sphere perceived as an arena where individual impulses and collective forces interact under the most diverse frameworks. In the context of his own theoretical synopsis as published in 1948, Morgenthau would end up offering a rather lean conceptual framework. Embedded in countless historical examples, here was his own best attempt at grasping timeless features of the social arena: power, ideology, political limitations of power, normative limitations of power.

His own aspiration for universal validity notwithstanding, Morgenthau fully recognized that every social and political theory is unalterably embedded in its own time. A phenomenon such as the sovereign state, for example, was in itself a product of specific historical circumstances and, as such, bound to disappear in line with technological and social innovation. More generally speaking: configurations of power are as historically contingent as are normative systems that societies bring forth to protect themselves. In the face of constant, though unnoticeable change, good theory will stand the test of time. Even good theory will, however, need adjustment once an epoch generates genuinely new forms (Morgenthau 1959, Guilhot 2011).

In his own time, Morgenthau did not recognize many fundamental novelties. Although revised on several occasions, the basic narrative of *Politics Among Nations* thus remained remarkably unchanged. In preparing the second edition, released in 1954, the author added "six principles of political realism"—principles that basically restated ideas Morgenthau had previously endorsed without having consistently described them as Realist. In addition, he worked on the "elaboration," "clarification," and "refinement" of his framework, so as to take into account developments such as the increasingly visible processes of decolonization and European integration. No further substantial changes were introduced later on. The year 1960 thus marks the end of theoretical emendations: the third edition of *Politics Among Nations* contains only a few slight changes in emphasis, "while leaving assumptions, tenets, and theoretical structure intact" (Morgenthau 1960: iii). It was Morgenthau's honest conviction that he had done what could be done on the side of theory. "Many of the issues which are outstanding in international relations have been sufficiently researched, that is, we know about all there is to be known about them. The fact that they still await solution is due to political factors which require political solutions" (1963).[12] And by then, his book was becoming a classic.

It is plausible to claim that *Politics Among Nations* "singlehandedly initiated many generations of U.S. international relations students" into the field of International Relations (Scheuerman 2009: 102). In spite of Morgenthau's commanding position and influence, however, it is difficult to escape the impression that the man has been more often cited than read (Williams 2005: 82). More recently, the extent to which Morgenthau continues to be identified with caricatures of his theory, or credited with positions he never held, has itself become the subject of academic research (e.g., Behr and Heath 2009). Is it possible that his *magnum opus* has suffered the fate of other classics? Morgenthau's writings at any rate have

become quarries where, by dint of selective appropriation, many help themselves to suitable blocks and all find the ones that fit their needs. Against the backdrop of an increasingly motley spectrum of interpretations, the best and perhaps the only way of doing justice to Morgenthau's work is unchanged. It involves both stubborn reliance on primary sources and the cultivation of comprehensive rather than selective reading.

Notes

1. Morgenthau to Frederick S. Dunn, 11 December 1941, The Papers of Hans J. Morgenthau (hereafter referred to as *Papers*) Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Box 16.
2. Ibid.
3. As author: *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (1946), *Politics Among Nations* (1948), *In Defense of the National Interest* (1951); as editor: *Peace, Security, and the United Nations* (1946), *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (1950, with Kenneth W. Thompson), *Germany and the Future of Europe* (1951).
4. Such expressions are first present in Morgenthau's Diary, entry of 30 May 1930; the reference to the struggle for power as being the raw material of the social world will return in *Politics Among Nations* (1948: 50). All of Morgenthau's private papers are today in the safekeeping of the Leo Baeck Institute in New York.
5. Even the extensive manuscript "Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen" (On the Meaning of Science at This Time, and on Man's Destiny, 1934b) is embedded in long reflections on the current state of the interplay between politics and an ever more precarious reality of normative restraints.
6. Morgenthau to James Putnam, 5 February 1945 (Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Box 37).
7. Morgenthau to Roger W. Shugg, 6 June 1947 (Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Box 121).—Six years later, Morgenthau would proudly report that his work now had "more adoptions than all other textbooks taken together and more than twice as many as its nearest competitor, which is Schuman (i.e., Frederick Schuman's International Politics—CF)." Letter, Morgenthau to John Hawes, 15 October 1953 (Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Box 126, Folder "Correspondence").
8. On the very first page of *Politics Among Nations* (1948: 3), Morgenthau quotes with almost palpable enthusiasm an observation offered by Grayson Kirk: "The political scientist is moving into the international field at last."

9. Following the first release in 1948, Morgenthau personally edited the following five editions: 1954, 1960, 1967, 1973, 1978. The 1985 edition was supervised by Kenneth Thompson; the 2006 edition by Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton.
10. A point well made by Angelo Panebianco (2010: 225).
11. In the Preface to the second edition of *Politics Among Nations* (1954: viii), Morgenthau thus quotes from the plea that Montesquieu made to the readers of *De l'esprit des lois* (1748).
12. Morgenthau to Raymong Platig, 29 March 1963 (Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Box 11).

References

Amstrup, Niels. 1978. The "Early" Morgenthau. A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism. *Cooperation and Conflict* 13 (2): 163–175.

Behr, Hartmut, and Amelia Heath. 2009. Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz, and Neo-Realism. *Review of International Studies* 35 (2): 327–349.

Boulding, Kenneth. 1964. The Content of International Studies in College: A Review. *Conflict Resolution* 8 (1): 65–71.

Carr, Edmund Hallett. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.

Frei, Christoph. 2001. *Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

———. 2016. Politics Among Nations: Revisiting a Classic. *Ethics & International Affairs* 30 (1): 39–46.

Gangl, Manfred. 2009. Einleitung. In *Das Politische. Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Manfred Gangl, 7–18. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Guilhot, Nicolas. 2011. *The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jütersonke, Oliver. 2010. *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1929a. *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen*. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag Robert Noske.

———. 1929b. Stresemann als Schöpfer der deutschen Völkerrechtspolitik. *Die Justiz* 5 (3): 169–176.

———. 1930a. Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen. Zur Kritik des Pazifismus und der neuen deutschen Kriegsphilosophie (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Box 96).

———. 1930b. Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 151).

———. 1932a. Der Kampf der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre um die Wirklichkeit des Staates (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 110).
———. 1932b. Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts Begriff des Politischen (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 110).
———. 1932c. Arbeitsplan ('Plan for Work'). Supplement to Research Grant Application (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 151, Folder 'Unidentified').
———. 1933a. *La notion du "politique" et la théorie des différends internationaux.* Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey.
———. 1933b. Die Wirklichkeit des Völkerbundes. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 2. April 1933, Edition 3.
———. 1934a. *La réalité des normes, en particulier des normes du droit international.* Paris: Felix Alcan.
———. 1934b. Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 151).
———. 1935a. Théorie des Sanctions Internationales. *Revue de Droit International et de Léglislation Comparée* 16 (1935): 474–503. 809–836.
———. 1935b. Die Krise der metaphysischen Ethik von Kant bis Nietzsche (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 112).
———. 1935c. Die Entstehung der Normentheorie aus dem Zusammenbruch der Ethik (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 112, Folder 'Ergänzungen zum Kennwort Metaphysik').
———. 1936. *Positivisme mal compris et théorie réaliste du droit international.* Madrid: Bernejo.
———. 1937. Kann in unserer Zeit eine objektive Moralordnung aufgestellt werden? (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 112, Folder 'Ergänzungen zum Kennwort Metaphysik').
———. 1938a. "Plan for Work" (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 25).
———. 1938b. Grant Application to the Guggenheim Foundation (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 98).
———. 1946. *Scientific Man vs Power Politics.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
———. 1948. *Politics Among Nations.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1951. *In Defense of the National Interest. A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1954. *Politics Among Nations.* 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1959. The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations. In *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, ed. William T.R. Fox, 15–28. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

———. 1960. *Politics Among Nations.* 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Panebianco, Angelo. 2010. Morgenthau: Political Theory and Practical Philosophy. In *Masters of Political Science*, ed. Donatella Campus and Gianfranco Pasquino, vol. 1, 223–237. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Rohde, Christoph. 2004. *Hans J. Morgenthau und der weltpolitische Realismus.* Wiesbaden: Springer.

Rösch, Felix. 2015a. *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2015b. Die staatskritischen Potentiale des klassischen Realismus in Politics Among Nations. In *Macht, Recht, Demokratie. Zum Staatsverständnis Hans J. Morgenthaus*, ed. Christoph Rohde and Jodok Troy, 175–191. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Scheuerman, William E. 2009. *Hans J. Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Schuman, Frederick. 1941. *International Politics.* 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

Shilliam, Robbie. 2009. *German Thought and International Relations: The Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Spykman, Nicholas John. 1942. *America's Strategy in World Politics.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.

Williams, Michael C. 2005. *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The National Interest and the 'Great Debate'

Cornelia Navari

The concept of 'the national interest' first appeared, somewhat like thunder out of China, in the essay 'The Primacy of the National Interest' (Morgenthau 1949) as part of a forum in the Spring 1949 issue of *The American Scholar*.[1] It was presented alongside a piece by William T.R. Fox (Fox 1949), in what by the forum's title appear to be alternative principles for the coming American foreign policy. The forum was entitled 'The National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy'. As William Scheuerman observes, 'the concept of the "national interest" first takes on a special analytic status in this essay' (2009: 214). There, it is presented as a necessary corrective to what Morgenthau had already characterised in *Scientific Man and Power Politics* as legalism, moralism and sentimentalism in American politics, and as a more effective guide to foreign policy than the American tradition seemed able to provide. It established the distinction between 'realists' and 'idealists', as well as Morgenthau as the preeminent realist, and its appearance would launch what came to be known in academic circles as the 'first great debate',[2] initially on the requisites of American foreign policy. Reputedly conducted between realists and idealists, at the time the realists were as vocal in denouncing Morgenthau as were the 'idealists'.

C. Navari (✉)
University of Buckingham, Buckingham, UK

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_4

The foreign policy context is critical. It is the onset of the Cold War; there is growing public unease not only about Soviet intentions but American responses. Scheuerman stresses the role of the Russian atomic bomb explosion in August 1949 (but only made public at the end of September) and the vexed issue of the new demands of an atomic age. But the use of national interest in this way predated the August test—the forum was organised in late 1948, and was in response to the steady institutionalisation of the Cold War that had occurred through 1948 (the signing of the Brussels treaty, the decision to go ahead with Marshall Aid absent Soviet concurrence and the building of an Atlantic security pact; *American Scholar* editor Haydn referred in particular to the administration's claim of 'selflessness' in relation to Marshall Aid[3]). American responses to the Soviet Union seemed to be organised around George Kennan's 'Sources of Soviet Conduct', the article analysing the tendencies in Soviet foreign policy, which had appeared anonymously the previous year and which had recommended a 'policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world' (1947: 856). Morgenthau was uneasy about containment because, he would argue, it engendered an unnecessary degree of enmity between the United States and the Soviet Union (e.g. 1951a). Partly as a result, he had been invited by Kennan—then head of policy planning in the State Department—to join the team of State Department consultants advising on America's Cold War policy.

The invitation should have caused him wonder. He had only arrived in America in 1937 from a few provincial European postings, with few friends and none in a position to provide him with much help. In the Law Department at Kansas, he was a junior lecturer, relegated to an office next to the latrines. But he had been publishing steadily on themes related to America's post-War foreign policy (see Frei above). The invitation to replace Quincy Wright temporarily at Chicago and his securing tenure there in 1944 had led him to recover a good deal of his sense of himself (he wrote to Altamira that 'it is a stimulating atmosphere and I am very happy here'[4]). He had established contact with George Kennan, whom he had met in Chicago earlier that year, and who would assure him that he was 'being read with attention and respect'. The generally favourable reception of *Politics Among Nations* (PAN) led him to the reasonable belief that he had found an audience—the reviews were on balance positive and the sales more than encouraging. More to the point, he was not

satisfied to remain a mere academician. With the onset of the Cold War, Morgenthau had assigned himself a project—nothing less than to mitigate the growing divide between the United States and the Soviet Union.

His mantra would come to be labelled 'negotiation'. Morgenthau had underlined his commitment to the classic principles of diplomacy in 1946—in response to the coming United Nations—arguing against the emerging idea that, with the establishment of a world forum, traditional diplomacy had thereby become outmoded (Morgenthau 1946). He had carried the argument forward in PAN with an analysis of the role of modern warfare in relation to diplomatic practice, arguing that modern technology had obviated the use of war as a mechanism of dispute settlement, thereby increasing the importance of diplomacy. In PAN, he had also outlined the theory and practice of spheres of influence, presenting the division into political spheres as one method of balancing power, but more importantly as a way of limiting hostilities between powers (1948a: 135–136). By 1950, with the break-up of allied cohesion, he would openly advocate a negotiated settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union, based on the idea of spheres of influence.

The inspiration for the article appears to have been E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, the British diplomat-historian's excursion into the genre of statecraft (and destined to become a classic). Morgenthau had been handed the entire corpus of Carr's foreign policy works to review for the first issue of *World Politics*—it had appeared in August 1948 (Morgenthau 1948c), and his, long, review is full of praise for Carr's analysis of the psychological and political roots of interwar 'idealism', the term Carr had used to characterise the liberal internationalists who had so strenuously defended the League of Nations and who had pledged themselves to 'pacificism'. The juxtaposition of idealism to the wiser councils of 'realists' was a central feature of Carr's analysis, and Morgenthau immediately adopted the distinction, thereby establishing the schema by which theories of international relations would be ordered (and a good deal of their history written) for the rest of the century. (His student Robert Osgood was the first to employ the schema, for his doctorate. It was published in 1953 as *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*.) But what particularly struck him—he repeated it twice—was Carr's designation of the requirements for 'effective political thinking'—that is, the political requirements for an effective foreign policy in a liberal age. These were, in Carr's formulation, 'a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment, and a ground for action' (1946: 89)

He had been puzzling the ‘right of moral judgment’ and a ground for action in the American context since at least 1940 when he had lectured on liberalism and foreign policy at the New School of Social Research, lamenting the effects of Wilsonianism on American foreign policy. Five years later, in a long and seriously considered article (Morgenthau 1945), he had reviewed the whole gamut of contemporary ethical responses to foreign policy dilemmas—utilitarianism, ‘perfectionist ethics’, the dual morality thesis and Kantian ethics—arguing that private no less than public morality suffered from the same limitation—the limited self as the referent in all action. In it, he had presented the doctrine of the lesser evil as the only ethical doctrine that made sense in foreign policy.[5] But it was a grim argument with which to counter America’s liberal idealism. (Morgenthau might have been influenced by *Nature and Destiny of Man* written by Reinhold Niebuhr, whom he would soon meet and with whom he established a firm friendship. Niebuhr (1947) returned the compliment with one of the few positive reviews of ‘Scientific Man’ calling it ‘an important little book’ and ascribing its neglect to the ‘prejudices and idolatries of a scientific age’.) Three years later, in a less ambitious piece (1948b), Morgenthau had contrasted the ‘universalist’ morality of the eighteenth century with the nationalist moralities that had emerged during the late nineteenth century and their consequences for international relationships, again, however, ending on a pessimistic note. The ‘national interest’ presented itself as the more positive idea with which to circumvent Wilsonianism: it provided a grounding for American foreign policy that was at once emotional, finite and possibly even moral. It was a ‘concession…to American liberal sensibility’ (Panebianco 2009: 227).

Morgenthau’s understanding of ‘national interest’ has been variously assigned. Christoph Frei (2001) places it with Meinecke and the continental Machiavellian tradition; Amstrup (1978), more accurately, with the German legal idea of *Lebensinteressen*, the technical term Morgenthau used for international claims in his 1929 doctoral dissertation. The latter term derives from German labour law, and Morgenthau was trained in labour law, serving in Frankfurt during 1931 as president of a labour court. ‘Life interests’ were those claims that related to the specific physical and mental condition of the worker, his body and mind, as opposed to the trade unionists’ proclivity for making extraneous political and managerial claims, considered less ‘vital’ to the worker. It would be translated into the idea of core interests.

But the critical question in 1949 was not the technical content of national interest, but rather its use as a guide or fundamental principle in foreign policy, and in this aspect there can be little doubt, as he tells us so himself. In the forum essay, he relates the idea directly to Alexander Hamilton's *Pacificus* and *Americanus* articles. Hamilton had set out a principled case for neutrality in the Pacificus letters, based on three principles: the duty of the executive to promote peace, the distinction between defensive as opposed to offensive war and the security consequences for the new Republic. In *Americanus*, intended to answer whether America should always place itself on the side of liberty (in this case to take the side of Revolutionary France), Hamilton had asked whether the 'cause of France be truly the cause of liberty' and whether the benefits to liberty of participating in the conflict were likely to compensate for the evils that the United States was likely to suffer as a result. Hamilton was Morgenthau's model, and he set his research assistant, at the time Kenneth Thompson, to collect similar instances of 'national interest' conduct, with the result that soon Disraeli appears on the scene, and instances of Jefferson, to be followed in quick order by Salisbury, Hume, Charles James Fox, Talleyrand, and eventually Niebuhr as well as some American statesmen (Bismarck was notably absent.) Their findings were published in 1950 as a set of readings entitled *Principles and Problems of International Politics*, under the joint editorship of Morgenthau and Thompson. The set was intended to demonstrate that acting in the national interest was a respectable tradition in American foreign policy and a well-established tradition in other, successful, foreign policies.

Morgenthau explained his preference for an Anglo-Saxon reading of national interest in his 1951 piece for the British *Yearbook of Foreign Affairs*, to be his third excursion on the subject. There, he castigated the Machiavellian tradition (of which Meinecke's was 'the classic account') as an 'a priori abstraction' and an essentially *philosophical* polemics, 'leaving the issue in the end where they found it [i.e. the practice of debating different principles in the abstract]'. Morgenthau implied this was a Continental habit, whereas in the English-speaking world the idea of national interest was reflected in actual decision-making and displayed 'a continuing concern with the successful conduct of foreign policy as the precondition for national greatness and survival'. And this had been due to Castlereagh [among others], holding 'with an unshakeable constancy… principles [that] were in no degree abstract or speculative' (1951a: 36).

Morgenthau is arguing that the Anglo-Saxon tradition, with its concern for palpable 'interests', had made of the national interest the grounding of a great, and as he would soon come to argue, principled foreign policy.

The argument, put briefly in those terms, did not immediately convince. Fox's reply, published alongside and entitled 'The Reconciliation of the Desirable and the Possible' declared that the national interest was impossible to determine without some explicitly declared set of value preferences, reflecting the grounding of American political culture in value pluralism. Fox had four years previously published *The Superpowers* (1944), identifying the new cohort of great powers created by the demise of Germany, and Morgenthau regarded him as a 'realist' and a sympathetic colleague, causing him to question Fox as an interlocutor.[6] But Fox was a 'native' realist—he was not opposed to the idea that the United States might have interests or that such interests might guide foreign policy. He was arguing that there was no independent grounding for an understanding of national interest and no objective way of determining one—at least not before a value orientation had been declared. Edgar Mowrer, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Deputy Head of the Office of Public Information for the war's duration and author of *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy*[7] echoed Fox in the subsequent issue, with an argument for 'the normal and sometimes inevitable choice between conflicting moral values' (1949: 376). Other responses reflected the continuing influence of Charles Beard's 1934 *The Idea of National Interest*, in which Beard had argued that there was no 'national' interest guiding American foreign policy, which was dominated, on the contrary, by sectoral interests.

The following August, the Soviets exploded their atomic device, and Morgenthau set to with the 'flurry of articles' documented by Scheuerman (2009: 70–71), analysing the implications for American diplomacy, moving quickly to offset claims that the Soviet test constituted a radical change in the East/West confrontation. He repeated his argument that technology had already obviated war as policy, of which the atomic bomb was merely the latest demonstration, arguing that it had only enhanced the significance of negotiations and diplomacy (Morgenthau 1950a[8]). The polemics brought him to the attention of the president of the University of Chicago, Hutchins, who, unlike his predecessor was not an enthusiast for the Merriam-style social science that dominated political studies at Chicago (represented by Quincy Wright in international affairs). Hutchins preferred more policy oriented studies, and he had in his gift the Walgreen lectures, given annually in the spring, and which were intended to

highlight critical issues in the national agenda. He proposed Morgenthau for the 1950 series, the lectures that became the text of *In Defense of the National Interest*. Morgenthau would use the lectures to ground his idea of the national interest and to spell out the basis on which the United States could negotiate with the Soviet Union.

For the ethical grounding, he took on board Fox's criticism—that 'the national interest' could not stand alone and needed a value referent. In the first lecture, to become chapter one of the book, he adjusted his argument. It was not merely that the founding fathers had supported (and accordingly authorised) the idea of acting in the national interest for the new republic. Not only was it the case, as the British in particular had most clearly and repeatedly demonstrated, that the idea had been instantiated in concrete policies. More importantly, the resultant policies were also *principled* policies. In the first of his Walgreen lectures, he claimed to have divined the true significance of the Monroe Doctrine, among other significant policies in the history of the Republic. Guarding the Western Hemisphere from Great Power rivalry was not merely an 'interest'; it rested on *ethical principles*, notably the 'moral postulates of anti-imperialism and mutual non-intervention' (1950b: 846). It was a policy in the national interest in that it provided the conditions for the 'safety and enduring greatness of the United States', but it was also a *moral* policy in that it rested on ethical principles. In the fourth of the lectures, he laid out his 'Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement', setting out the case as between the alternatives of 'Negotiation or War'. He outlined the possibility of, and negated, what in the event did occur—a cold war 'lasting perhaps for a generation' (1951b: 139)—and publicly put forward his argument for spheres of influence. The argument was that the Soviet Union was an imperialist rather than a revolutionary power, and that a stable international order was possible if a sphere of influence were accorded to it in Eastern Europe.

Whether the United States was gifted with the ability to deliver a spheres of influence agreement in 1950 is doubtful. A.J.P. Taylor, reviewing the book for *The Nation* in a piece provocatively entitled 'No Ideas and No Illusions' (1951), suggested that the tussle for Germany had obviated a spheres of influence settlement and that it was an illusion for post-War Europe. He also opined that ideas and illusions were different things, and that perhaps the best tool for the statesman in the opening skirmishes of the Cold War was to have a few ideas in his arsenal, a reference perhaps to the growing ideological aspects of the conflict, but also implying that

In Defense of the National Interest was short on ideas. (Morgenthau wrote to Max Beloff that Taylor had treated his work 'in the most irresponsible manner'.[9]) The other leading European 'realist' at the time was Raymond Aron who had already disputed the idea of spheres of influence in his *le Grand Schism* of 1948, naming Morgenthau as the major proponent of the idea. Aron had emphasised the ideological aspects of the superpower confrontation from its beginnings and had predicted a long stalemate. (The famous quote was 'War is improbable and peace impossible.') In the midst of preparing *Les Guerres En Chaîne* (to be translated as *The Century of Total War*), he introduced the idea of a national (or 'general') interest, but as an operative principle, not a moral guide, and one that could not be understood in terms of interests alone. There he posed the question, which echoed Fox, 'How are we to arbitrate the conflicts that affect ideologies?' A historical sociologist, he outlined two 'solutions', drawn from historical precedent. One, the 'conservative solution' and 'leading to fascism' is where, contrary to a 'general will', the national interest 'is defined by those very persons who rule the state'; the other solution, generally employed by the party in opposition, is 'to submit to the majority rule' (1954: 244–245). In short, it was a political strategy, not a moral or rational guide.

At home, and more damaging for the task Morgenthau had set for himself were two articles by Frank Tannenbaum, senior Latin Americanist and distinguished historian within the American academy, and a review by Carl J. Friedrich of both Kennan's and Morgenthau's books. Then at Harvard, Friedrich was the foremost theorist of the time on totalitarianism and, like Morgenthau, a German émigré. Seconded to Lucius Clay, Military Governor of Germany, he had almost singlehandedly moulded the democratic reconstruction of West Germany. He asked the appropriate question in respect of that role: Why shouldn't America use the 'broad and ideal goals that are part of the American heritage' as a sword, and not merely as a shield? Did the realists suppose that America's 'unprecedented rise to its position of world power is the work of incompetent "moralisers" without any sense of "realities"'? In what John Bew (2016: 214) would characterise as 'a classic reworking of the anti-realpolitik tradition', he argued that the 'logic of power cannot be divorced from the logic of justice and right' (Friedrich 1952: 227). Friedrich's was one of the earliest liberal arguments on the power of 'soft power', but his argument was that soft power was closely tied to and indeed dependent on hard power.

If Carl J. Friedrich was emerging as a liberal realist, Tannenbaum was emerging as the champion of liberal internationalism. The first of his fighting articles was on the 'American Tradition in Foreign Relations' and appeared in *Foreign Affairs* of October 1951; the second and more significant was entitled 'The Balance of Power and the Coordinate State' and won a place in the *Political Science Quarterly* of June 1952. Tannenbaum argued that balancing power was not in the American tradition, citing the Latin American and Western Hemisphere experiences, where the United States had not in fact played powers off against one another. In the second article, he presented an alternative model for American foreign policy, one that fulfilled Morgenthau's requirement for a principled policy and that did so rather convincingly. Tannenbaum's 'co-ordinate state' argued that the American tradition in foreign affairs derived from its unique experience with federalism, one that, transposed to the international arena, implied and demanded an 'equal dignity of all states', irrespective of wealth or power. As examples of 'federalism in international relations', he proffered the organisation of states in the 'American system', the Commonwealth, the Swiss Confederation, and the coming Atlantic Alliance. In the *Foreign Affairs* article, naming Morgenthau, he charged that policies based on the national interest and spheres of influence had 'ruined half the nations of the world…[and] always led to war and to national suicide' (1951: 47). (Morgenthau asked Armstrong, *Foreign Affairs* editor, if he could prepare a rejoinder, a request that Armstrong evaded.)

But a still more serious challenge in the policy context was becoming the scientific status of the concept. In June 1952, the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences organised a two-day conference on the subject of the ends of American foreign policy, entitled 'The National Interest: Alone or with Others', a clear bow to Morgenthau's growing influence, but attended by experienced practitioners. Abraham Feller, former professor of international law at Yale and head of the legal department of the United Nations was invited to address the issue directly. In the meantime, George Kennan, who had followed Morgenthau as the 1951 Walgreen lecturer (on Morgenthau's recommendation), had published his lectures under the title of *American Diplomacy*. It demonstrated clear deference to Morgenthau, aligning him with Morgenthau's realism. Feller addressed himself to both and charged that 'neorealism' as he called it consisted of little more than the 'mantras of diplomacy and negotiation',

and that it proposed no real end or objective to which policy should be directed. Diplomacy was a 'procedure', he declared, 'with no more substantive content than speaking or writing' (Feller 1952: 78–79).

A participant, Morgenthau had taken the opportunity to stipulate American interests, but only briefly. (These were first, predominance in the Western hemisphere, secondly, a European balance, and third an Asian balance—the latter in tatters, he claimed, because the administration was refusing to deal with the Chinese communists: 1952a.) His response to the critics (and to the mixed reviews of his and Kennan's books; see e.g. Kirk 1952) was to prepare a much more substantial account than anything he had attempted so far, addressing the charges of vagueness and the heterogeneity of interests, refuting Tannenbaum's 'co-ordinate state' and denying any serious role to the United Nations in producing peace, the latter reflecting the seriousness with which he regarded Feller's charges. But it was also to define precisely what was at the heart of a national interest. It appeared in the December 1952 volume of *the American Political Science Review*, entitled 'Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States' and is generally considered the definitive statement (Morgenthau 1952b).

The article evinces a serious attempt to give substance to the concept, opening with its place in significant debates in the history of American foreign policy and presenting the current debate as 'more fundamental to the understanding of American foreign policy' than any that had preceded it (1952a: 961). (Morgenthau drew heavily from Osgood's *Ideals and Self-Interest* for the detail.) He acknowledged that 'the argument [of elusiveness and lack of definition] has substance as far as it goes but … it did not invalidate the usefulness of the concept' (971). He made a new distinction between the 'logically required' and the 'variable', the first referring to 'the physical, political, and cultural identity [of the nation] against encroachments by other nations', and the second, or variable, as 'determined by circumstances'. He, moreover, acknowledged that 'the contribution that science can make to this field…is limited' and gave an account of the analytical steps that would have to be taken to produce a definitive understanding of a particular national interest at a particular time.

On the idea that America was a 'co-ordinate state' and that American federalism offered itself as a model for how to treat other nations, Morgenthau responded with an analysis of federalism that replicated almost exactly the classic *realpolitik* reasoning Treitschke had offered almost 70 years earlier—that in all federations, power tended to move to the centre. He declared that American federalism did not rest on any

principle of the equality of states, but rather on the actual superiority of the federal system of government and on its executive power: 'The political cohesion of a federal system is the result of superior power,' he declared (968). That America might, uniquely, escape power politics was, accordingly, an 'escapist fantasy'.

The reference to the 'physical, political and cultural identity' of a nation was the closest that Morgenthau ever came to defining a 'national interest', and it was the most satisfying of all his attempts, containing what are arguably the three essential elements of any enduring political community. The logically required were a physical presence and a political organisation, but Morgenthau went further and linked them to a common cultural identity. It was the reflection of an education dominated by the German historical school, but the association would come to be accepted by many political sociologists and state-builders in the age of nationalism. (It is reflected in the contemporary search for a 'common European identity' to underpin a 'European Community'.) In the event, it reflected his concern, to be treated in his coming work on *The Purpose of American Politics*, that America did not have a strong enough sense of national purpose to manoeuvre the Cold War. But he did not pause to defend his triad—he seemed content merely to stipulate it.

The analytical section focused on two sets of exclusions that should be exercised by anyone going in search of a 'national interest', and three guides. First, the interpretation by statesmen of their own acts 'must needs have a strictly subsidiary place'; secondly, prevalent popular 'fantasies', in America's case 'the fantasy of needless American participation in war, the fantasy of American treason and the fantasy of American innocence' needed to be rigorously excised. Following the excisions, the relatively permanent aspects of a national interest could be derived 'from three factors': the 'nature of the interests to be protected' (i.e. the particular features of the physical, political or cultural identity), the 'immediate political environment of their placement' (i.e. the threats to them) and 'the rational necessities which limit the choice of ends and means by all actors on the state of foreign policy'.

He had, however, some difficulty going much further. The argument descended into a ramble on the nation as a product of history, with its inevitable 'variable' elements (among which he named sectional and 'other-national' interests in the American case). There was staunch denial of the idea that the United Nations could represent a collective interest, following which the discussion moved towards aphorisms. These included:

(1) ‘a country which had been settled by consecutive waves of foreigners was bound to find it particularly difficult to identify its own national interest’; (2) ‘a rational order must be established among the values that make up the national interest’; (3) ‘the national interest of a nation which is conscious not only of its own interest but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter’ (975–979).

Such a conclusion was less than rigorous and was registered as such in what were destined to become two classic realist statements. The first was Arnold Wolfers’ ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’, which appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly* almost immediately. Wolfers argued that while the national interest did indicate a general direction of policy, in the sense of ‘demands that are ascribed to nations rather than individuals…beyond this, it has very little meaning’ (1952: 481). From Raymond Aron, it wrenched the ‘Quest for a Philosophy of International Relations’ written directly in response, which first appeared in the January to March 1953 issue of *Revue Français de Science Politique*. It is perhaps the first statement setting out a case for why a theory of international relations is required, and it was a pretty emphatic denunciation of Morgenthau and all his works.

The *Quest* acknowledged the importance of the debate that Morgenthau and Kennan’s books had unleashed, dealing as it did ‘with the very bases of any foreign policy [and] with the nature of states’. But it moved immediately to squash the idea that Wilsonian ‘idealism’ had been responsible for the weakness of the peace that had followed World War I or that idealism was in any way implicated in the war’s disasters. These were due rather to the ‘responsibility of events’; that is, to the protracted nature of the war and to the disintegration of the empires that had followed it. Beyond such ‘circumstantial reasons’ lay not idealistic illusion, but misinterpretations of reality. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill, at the end of the Second World War, had been convinced that a country ‘liberated by the Red Army was… going to be a Soviet satellite’ (Aron 1960: 80–81). So far as Morgenthau’s hopes for a negotiated settlement were concerned, these were false hopes, arising from ‘confusion between an eternal truth and a historical proposition’. Morgenthau had supposed that the diplomatic devices of an earlier age represented some natural order of things. Had the United States and the Soviet Union belonged to the same diplomatic culture and ‘to the same reasonable Machiavellianism’ that had characterised the ancient regime, a compromise of sorts might have been possible. But they did not. The division between East and West did not provide the foundations for a

negotiated settlement; rather, it was a stand-off, produced by conflicting notions of political order and political good. Finally, it was impossible to understand the national interest 'apart from ideological preferences' or to ignore 'the ideologies on which the number of its allies depend and which serve as weapons in the struggle' (1960: 80).

Left to his own devices, Morgenthau might have quietly let the whole matter of national interest rest where it was at the end of 1952, at best as an essentially contested concept, at worst in a conceptual limbo. In any event, three-power agreement on German reconstruction had sealed the fate of a policy of negotiations,[10] and he was soon to leave public service, quite determined not to serve power, at least not immediately. What intervened was not a 'great debate' or an intellectual awakening. It was a publisher with a nose for extended shelf life. Alfred Knopf, who had published *In Defense of the National Interest*, and who had provided Morgenthau with 'enthusiastic support and wise council'[11] wanted the concept of national interest incorporated into a second, revised, edition of PAN, to appear in 1954.

Morgenthau had been consistently reluctant on the question of a revised edition, particularly on the inclusion of new case studies, arguing to Roger Shugg, his immediate editor, that it would disturb an already coherent argument. He had partly relented in the midst of the Great Debate, writing to Shugg in November that he would consider revision and that he would 'start the book with a general simple explanation of the philosophy underlying it'.[12] This resolve hardened in the autumn of 1953, after a disturbing correspondence with Frank Altschul, of the Council of Foreign Relations. Morgenthau had written to Altschul asking for financial support for his Center for American Foreign Policy, established at Chicago following his appointment to the circle of State Department advisors. It was no more than a fishing expedition, asking for the possibility of support, but Altschul's response was a surprisingly emphatic negative, reporting the general view in the Council that 'the work of the center was less than objective and that its research was to a degree colored by certain profoundly held preconceptions regarding American foreign policy' (Altschul 1953). It appeared that the New York establishment was ganging up against the Chicago realists. In October following the correspondence, he alerted Gottlieb, his text editor, that he would be 'elaborating the basic philosophy of the book'.[13] Morgenthau would engage with his critics yet again, but this time with a statement that would underpin and secure political realism. This was the immediate origin of the Six Principles

of Political Realism that would appear as the first chapter in the revised 1954 edition of PAN.

But he did not forget about 'the national interest'. Indeed it became central to the new argument. It appears, briefly, in the First Principle as 'interests in terms of power' and more extensively in the Second Principle as 'the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics'. Morgenthau incorporated the national interest into the foundational argument of PAN by the simple expedient of subordinating it to power. In the first principle, he threw out the ethical aspects, and recast the national interest as 'interests in terms of power'. In this, now fifth formulation, the 'national interest' emerges simply as the acquiring, maintenance and expansion of a state's power. Secondly, it is the guide or thread to the analytical exercise. It was a brilliant idea, to bring power and interests together and to make one the measure of the other. The formulation solved the problem of the heterogeneity of interests. But it meant leaving behind the thick concept that he had originally aimed for. It was no longer a set of historical variables, no longer a moral guide, a *via media*, a synthesis of realism and idealism or a justification for negotiation. It settled down as one of a set of 'principles of political realism' and a somewhat redundant *aide de camp* in the realist quest for analytical rigour.

Over the next few years, there would be some efforts to sharpen the concept. On the analytical side, Karl von Vorys distinguished between 'ends interests' and 'means interests' for a State University of Iowa publication on concepts used in the teaching of international politics (1957) and he went on to publish *American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy* (1990) where he laid out a hierarchy of interests to guide US policy makers. Fred Northedge, professor at the London School of Economics would develop the idea of 'core interests' for his *The International Political System* (1976), identifying them with permanent tendencies in a foreign policy tradition.

At the rhetorical level, the concept of core interests came to be used frequently in relation to China, to signal those issue areas in which compromise with the rising power was not possible—notably Taiwan and Tibet. It also appeared regularly in American presidential addresses on the aims and requirements of American foreign policy. In his major foreign policy speech at West Point in 2014, President Barack Obama cited America's core interests as threats to 'our people, our livelihood …or when the security of our allies is in danger' (Seib 2014). The previous year,

addressing the U.N. General Assembly, he had described the United States' [end] interest in the Middle East as 'confront[ing] external aggression against our allies and partners'. The 'means interests' were 'the free flow of energy from the region to the world', dismantling terrorist networks, and impeding 'the development of nuclear weapons that could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, and undermine the global non-proliferation regime'.

In large part, however, the concept was overtaken by the search for scientific rigour, initially in the form of the 'decision-making' approach (Snyder et al. 1954). Partly out of a concern to render concepts usable by linking them to observable behaviour, students of decision-making argued that the national interest was inevitably composed of values (in their terms, composed of 'what people want', as Rosenau 1968 put it), and that it was not susceptible of objective measurement, even if defined in terms of power, and that, accordingly, 'the only way to uncover what people need and want is to assume that their requirements and aspirations are reflected in the actions of a nation's policy makers' (1968: 40). For these analysts, in other words, the national interest was whatever the officials of a nation sought to preserve and enhance. As the two leading spokesmen for decision-making put it, 'The national interest is what the nation, i.e., the decision-maker, decides it is' (Furniss and Snyder 1955: 17).

It gave way to interest group analysis, an approach no less damaging to Morgenthau's conception. In his increasingly influential *The Governmental Process*, David Truman had located the essence of politics in the controversies and conflicts deriving from the activities of interest groups. The role of government was primarily establishing the conditions for interest groups to act. In a keynote article for the *Journal of Politics*, Roy Macridis observed that what had been originally intended as one factor in politics had been 'elevated to a general theory' (1961: 25) and was now the prevalent approach to political analysis. It was largely in response to what he called 'interest group liberalism' that Stephen Krasner wrote *Defending the National Interest* (1978), in which he demonstrated the critical role that securing raw materials played in U.S. foreign policy and the role of 'statism' in determining raw material investments.

But Morgenthau never lost faith with the concept as a guide that could direct American power to purposes that were both rational and principled. He republished the 1952 version in the three-volume anthology of his writings, collected to accompany his political testament, *The Purpose of*

American Politics. His analysis as to why the United States should not go to war in Vietnam was based entirely on the 1952 concept: His argument was that the civil war in Vietnam endangered neither the physical, political nor cultural identity of the United States, while military engagement, if it did not touch its physical identity, endangered both its political and cultural identity (Morgenthau 1965). For Morgenthau, in the context of Vietnam, it was a limiting concept.

Nor did it entirely lose its association with broader aims. In 1994, Robert Jervis, summarising the importance of Morgenthau for American foreign policy, stressed the centrality of his concept of the national interest 'for what it denied: that states should follow either sub-national or supra-national interests'. Reporting the impression it made on him as a young scholar, it conveyed the idea that a nation could legitimately be considered to have concerns of its own, apart from the concerns of individual citizens or groups. More importantly, it allowed that 'the concerns of segments of the population' could 'legitimately be put aside' in favour of 'the wider good' (1994: 856). This is the doctrine of raison d'état, tamed to an American understanding.

Notes

1. *The American Scholar* is the Phi Beta Kappa magazine; originally for members of the society, it had become a venue for the presentation of intellectual debate on issues of national importance.
2. The term is an academic conceit: the actual 'first great debate' was in 1793 and concerned whether the fledgling republic should ally with revolutionary France in its external wars. For the disputed status of the 1950s 'first great debate', see Schmidt 2012.
3. Haydn to Morgenthau, 16 October 1948. *Morgenthau Papers*, Box 97, file 10.
4. Morgenthau to Altamira. *Morgenthau Papers*, Box 3, file Altamira.
5. 'To act successfully, that is according to the rules of the political art, that is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is necessarily evil but to act nonetheless is political courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment' (1945: 18).
6. Morgenthau to Moorehead, 8 December 1948. *Morgenthau Papers*, Box 97, file 10.
7. Published just before PAN, also by Knopf, Mowrer argued that Americans had to engage in power politics to protect their democratic institutions. The *Chicago Evening Mail*'s foreign correspondent in Europe in the run up to war was a social democrat and one of the founders of Americans for

Democratic Action; he illustrates the ease with which American liberals could be converted to power politics, so long as power was in the service of good causes.

8. Morgenthau joined Kennan and Bernard Brodie as the initial cohort of nuclear 'revolutionaries' who held that, as Kennan's 1950 memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged, the United States should treat nuclear weapons 'as something superfluous to our basic military posture—as something which we are compelled to hold against the possibility that they might be used by our opponents'; that is, as a deterrent; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d7, accessed 29 May 2017.
9. Morgenthau to Beloff, 9 January 1953. *Papers,* Box 7, file 13.
10. In a Declaration of 18 September 1951, the western occupying powers declared that they 'regard the government of the Federal Republic of Germany as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for the German nation in international affairs', forestalling any spheres of influence agreement.
11. In the Acknowledgments, p. vii.
12. Morgenthau to Shugg, 21 November 1952. *Papers*, Box 121, file 9; he was 'following the suggestions of some people whose advice I value'.
13. Morgenthau to Gottlieb, 26 October 1953. *P*apers, Box 126, file Second Edition Correspondence 1953–58.

References

Altschul, Frank. 1953. Altschul to Morgenthau, 16 September. Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, *The Papers of Hans J. Morgenthau* (referred to hereafter as Morgenthau Papers) Box 3, file Altschul.

Amstrup, Niels. 1978. The Early Morgenthau: A Comment on the Intellectual Origins of Realism. *Cooperation and Conflict* 13 (2): 163–175.

Aron, Raymond. 1954. *The Century of Total War*. London: Derek Verschoyle.

———. 1960. The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs. In *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, ed. Stanley Hoffmann, 79–90. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Bew, John. 2016. *Realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carr, E.H. 1946. *The 20 Years' Crisis*. London: Macmillan.

Feller, A.H. 1952. In Defense of International Law and Morality. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282: 77–83.

Fox, W.T.R. 1949. The Reconciliation of the Desirable and the Possible. *The American Scholar* 18 (2): 212–216.

Frei, Christoph. 2001. *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Friedrich, Carl J. 1952. How Enlightened Should Self-Interest Be? *Yale Review* XLI (1): 277–279.

Furniss, Edgar, and Richard Snyder. 1955. *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy*. New York: Reinhart.

Jervis, Robert. 1994. Hans Morgenthau, Realism and the Scientific Study of International Relations. *Social Research* 61 (4): 853–876.

Kennan, George. 1947. The Sources of Soviet Conduct. *Foreign Affairs* 25 (4): 566–582.

Kirk, Grayson. 1952. In Search of the National Interest. *World Politics* 5 (1): 110–115.

Krasner, Stephen. 1978. *Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Macridis, Roy C. 1961. Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis. *The Journal of Politics* 23 (1): 25–45.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1945. The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil. *Ethics* 56 (1): 1–18.

———. 1946. Diplomacy. *Yale Law Journal* 55 (5): 1067–1080.

———. 1948a. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Knopf.

———. 1948b. The Twilight of International Morality. *Ethics* 58 (2): 79–99.

———. 1948c. The Political Science of E. H. Carr. *World Politics* 1 (1): 127–134.

———. 1949. National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the National Interest. *American Scholar* 18 (2): 207–212.

———. 1950a. On Negotiating with the Russians. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 6 (5): 143–148.

———. 1950b. The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions. *American Political Science Revue* 44 (4): 833–854.

———. 1951a. The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy. In *The Yearbook of World Affairs 1951*, ed. George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, 12–36. London: London Institute of World Affairs.

———. 1951b. American Diplomacy: The Dangers of Righteousness. *New Republic*, October 22, pp. 117–119.

———. 1951c. *In Defense of the National Interest*. New York: Knopf.

———. 1952a. What Is the National Interest of the United States? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282: 1–7.

———. 1952b. Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States. *American Political Science Review* 46 (4): 961–988.

———. 1965. We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam. *New York Times Magazine*, April 18.

Mowrer, Edward. 1949. The Inevitable Compromise. *The American Scholar* 18 (3): 376, 378.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1947. Review. *Christianity and Society* 12 (2): 33–34.

Northedge, F.S. 1976. *The International Political System*. London: Faber.

Panebianco, Angelo. 2009. Morgenthau: Political Theory and Practical Philosophy. In *Masters of Political Science*, ed. Donatella Campus and Gianfranco Pasquino, 223–237. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Rosenau, James. 1968. The National Interest. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 2: 34–40. New York: Macmillan.

Scheuerman, William. 2009. *Hans Morgenthau, Realism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Polity.

Schmidt, Brian, ed. 2012. *International Relations and the First Great Debate*. London: Routledge.

Seib, G. 2014. Why 'Core Interests' Are the Key to Obama's Military Doctrine. *Wall Street Journal*, May 29.

Snyder, Richard, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 1954. *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tannenbaum, Frank. 1951. The American Tradition in Foreign Relations. *Foreign Affairs* 30 (1): 31–50.

Taylor, A.J.P. 1951. No Illusions and No Ideas. *The Nation*, September 8–15, pp. 96–97.

Vorys, Karl. 1957. The Concept of the National Interest. In *Some Approaches and Concepts Used in the Teaching of International Politics*, ed. Vernon van Dyke. Iowa City: State University of Iowa Press.

———. 1990. *American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger.

Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. 'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (4): 481–502.

The Purpose of American Politics

Richard Ned Lebow

Hans Morgenthau's *The Purpose of American Politics* was published in 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower administration and on the eve of the civil rights movement and military intervention in Vietnam. He certainly hoped to influence contemporary thinking about foreign policy and its connection to domestic politics and values. I suspect he was also writing more for a future audience and hoped to produce a book that would ultimately be regarded as a worthy successor to Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. There are many conceptual and substantive similarities in his approach. The following year, he began to collect previously written articles and essays, and to write short pieces, for a follow-on book, *The Decline of American Politics*, that would further support this ambition.

Overview

The Purpose of American Politics was Morgenthau's first attempt to author a book primarily about the United States. He explores opposing American political traditions and their implications for foreign policy. In the process, he comments on past and present domestic and foreign crises and the ways they are refracted by Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian understandings of the

R.N. Lebow (✉)
Department of War Studies, King's College London, London, UK

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_5

national purpose. Morgenthau is drawn to the Hamiltonian approach, which is realist in its assumptions. He is nevertheless sympathetic to Jeffersonian emphasis on freedom, which differentiates America, in his view, from other countries. The book represents Morgenthau's coming to terms with America: it lauds the purposes for which the country was founded. The overall argument of the book is nevertheless pessimistic. On the home front and abroad, Morgenthau contends that America has lost its sense of purpose. When read next to his *Scientific Man and Power Politics*, published in 1946, it reveals a significant shift in his intellectual and political orientations (see Behr, Chap. 2, in this volume).

The Purpose of American Politics is very much a book of its time in terms of the outlook of the author and the issues it addresses—the Cold War, and specifically, the missile gap, the economic challenge of the Soviet Union, alliances and foreign aid, and nuclear weapons and deterrence. This is equally true of the home front, where Morgenthau offers a version of 'the end of ideology,' voices optimism about closing the gap between rich and poor, and voices concern over growing materialism and corporate influence and McCarthyism. He portrays the Soviet Union as unremittingly aggressive and the United States as a beacon to the world. There is much discussion about inequality, but entirely in economic terms. The plight of African-Americans or women is never mentioned, and there is a passing reference to Native Americans as 'redskins' (Morgenthau 1960a: 134).

If Morgenthau is a man of his time, he nevertheless transcends parochial perspectives. He treats domestic and foreign policy as components of a holistic analysis. His book, while limited to America, is comparative in the same sense as Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, as it is deeply informed by his European upbringing and experiences. Like Tocqueville's account, its core arguments are rooted in political philosophy. Tocqueville and Morgenthau were motivated by personal and political objectives, and although both were concerned with the purpose of America, they produced different kinds of works. Tocqueville offers a profound analysis of America and its likely future, with equality and its consequences its central theme. It is a mix of optimism and pessimism. Morgenthau attempts to produce a similarly profound analysis, also on the theme of equality, but writes what has rightly been described as a jeremiad (Tjalve 2008). *Democracy in America* became what Thucydides would describe as a 'possession for all time.' *The Purpose of American Politics* sold well when published, but, contrary to Morgenthau's hopes, is read today by only a small number of international political theorists.

The title of the book captures its central theme: discovery and restoration of the national purpose. It is a Jeremiad in the sense that its author contends that something central to our lives has been lost, can be recovered, and that recovery can lead to a better future. It also resembles a Jeremiad in tone; it strikes a register somewhere between detached analysis and sermon.

At Home

Morgenthau laments that the purpose of America has been reduced to 'equality at home and safety abroad.' These goals lack substantive content and say nothing about 'the transcendent purpose' for which equality and safety are sought. America has a purpose—multiple purposes, in fact—that derive from the conceptions of order that motivated the country's early settlers and were encouraged by its natural environment. They are less substantive than procedural, and consist of 'a peculiar way of thinking and acting in the social sphere, and a peculiar conception of the relations between the individual and society' (Morgenthau 1960a: 19–21). Equality in freedom was the incentive that drove millions of Europeans to American shores. In lieu of fixed stations in life, people could achieve a status commensurate with their skills and hard work. They are also free to express their opinions and collectively to remake the social order in accord with their needs (Ibid: 23–40). Loyalty to this purpose constitutes the core of American identity, and distinguishes it from other countries where it is based on inheritance. Only in America, does a 'man' choose his country (Ibid: 56).

Freedom and equality do not guarantee a healthy polity. This requires individual dynamism and independence. Democracy can encourage or undermine it depending on the values and interests of the citizenry. The Janus-faced nature of democracy was evident to the authors of the *Federalist Papers* and to Tocqueville. Both warn of the tyranny of the majority. For James Madison (Hamilton et al. 2003: No. 10), this arose from majority passions that led to the trampling of the rights of the minority. For Tocqueville (2000: II, 209–10), as citizens become more equal and alike, they are less likely to follow blindly the opinions of another man or class. Their similarity with others gives them 'an almost unlimited trust in the judgment of the public.' The very equality that makes them independent of their fellow citizens, leaves them 'isolated and without defense against the action of the greatest number' (Ibid). In the absence of

meaningful debate, politicians who advocate unlimited expansion of popular power can easily mislead citizens. Instead of restraining officials, elections can become the vehicle for destroying real democracy.

Morgenthau offers a variant of Tocqueville's tyranny of majority and a somewhat different and more conservative remedy. American equality has led to what he calls equality without distinction. All opinions and cultural products are considered equal. The standards for excellence in politics, art, literature, and ethics are fast disappearing (Morgenthau 1960a: 237–43). The *vox populi* becomes the accepted arbiter of everything, and it often represents the lowest common denominator. Conformity becomes the most powerful social norm (Ibid: 61–63, 243–45, 249–52).

The standards Morgenthau wants to uphold were historically associated with traditional, even aristocratic hierarchies. In Britain and Germany, they sustained culture and respect for learning. Their negative features are well enough known to require no elaboration. Morgenthau was right in thinking that freedom and equality were central to the American purpose and self-definition of its citizens. The sexual revolution—which embodied both values—was just beginning when his book appeared. The civil rights movement was already underway. Commitment to freedom and equality would remove remaining restrictions on Catholics and Jews, go a long way toward alleviating formal and informal oppression of African-Americans, inspire feminism and the push for equal rights of every kind for women, and more recently, for homosexuals.

Morgenthau contrasts the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian traditions. Jeffersonians valued weak national government and considered it essential to preserve freedom. By contrast, Hamiltonians favored strong government as essential to security and economic development (Ibid: 77–83, 266–68). Morgenthau is a committed Hamiltonian, and restates the case for a strong government. It is essential for the kinds of reforms necessary to compete with the Soviet Union. Of equal importance, governmental intervention in the economy is critical to sustaining vertical and horizontal mobility. Instead, we are witnessing what he calls a 'new Feudalism.' This is the paradoxical condition of a government with increasing powers but with a corresponding decline in the power of those charged with governing by the Constitution. The decline is due to the fragmentation of power within government, especially in the executive branch, which has been divided and subdivided into a plethora of agencies. The president cannot supervise them effectively, and the Congress cannot supervise the executive. The result is government behind closed doors that gives excess power

to business and their lobbyists. It will ultimately produce inequality and reduce upward mobility (Ibid: 219, 274–92, 302).

Abroad

Morgenthau's analysis of the Cold War derives in part from the realist theory he developed in *Politics Among Nations* (1948a). It differs importantly from his *In Defense of the National Interest* in his depiction of the Soviet Union. In the earlier work, he expresses the hope that it could be confined to a sphere of influence. Now, he describes the Soviet Union as an 'imperialist' power intent on upsetting the territorial status quo. It is essential to balance against it and to work with other status quo powers, especially those most directly threatened, toward this end. The United States must maintain necessary conventional and nuclear forces to deter the Soviet Union or make war against it, if necessary.

Politics Among Nations was intended to offer general principles to guide foreign policy and its analysis. The application of those principles is always context dependent in a double sense. Context determines if they will be applied, and if so, how they will be applied (Lebow 2003: ch. 5). *The Purpose of American Politics* is all about context. Morgenthau believes that it is possible to check the Soviet Union, but worries that Americans lack the commitment to do so. He is also concerned that allies will exploit American economic and military aid for parochial ends and weaken anti-Soviet coalitions while increasing the risk of regional conflict.

Morgenthau's application of principles to case is revealing. Balancing can never be applied in an objective manner because it depends in the first instance on the identification of an imperialist power to balance against and other states possibly willing to do the same. Morgenthau has no doubts about Moscow's aggressive intentions; like other Cold War hawks, he treats—implicitly in his case—Khrushchev's Soviet Union as the successor to Hitler's Germany. Its goal is world conquest and its leaders are willing to use force, not only subversion, to achieve it. Given the ends communist leaders seek—and Morgenthau treats Russia, China and Vietnam as a monolith bloc—the United States must 'reshape our economic, educational, and governmental systems on radically new lines.' He calls for an 'unprecedented and concerted national effort' in a time of peace, without which successful competition will be impossible (Morgenthau 1960a: 166). This is because the communist adversary is 'in its totality, directed single-mindedly by a totalitarian government' (Ibid: 332).

There is no nuance in Morgenthau's depiction of the Soviet Union and no recognition that its leaders might have more limited objectives and be at least as keen as their American counterparts in avoiding war given their experience in World War II. Morgenthau fails to recognize or acknowledge that Soviet domestic and foreign policies underwent considerable evolution in the seven years since Stalin's death in 1953. Nor does he display any sensitivity to what John Herz called the security dilemma: how efforts by states to protect themselves against threats tend to confirm the worst-case fears of leaders of states whom their preparations are directed against, who in turn may act in ways to ratchet up tensions (Herz 1950).

Morgenthau's views on nuclear weapons became stronger since the development of the hydrogen bomb and the Korean War. He acknowledges that nuclear weapons create a novel situation for theorists and policymakers alike. American reliance on 'massive retaliation' has reduced the country's credibility to use its arsenal against another nuclear power because all-out nuclear war in these circumstances is tantamount to suicide. Overreliance on massive retaliation has reduced the country's ability to fight more limited wars or to take advantage of Soviet weaknesses. Despite the Eisenhower administration's proclamation of a 'rollback' strategy in Eastern Europe, Morgenthau complains, it stood by helplessly when Soviet tanks and troops crushed the East German uprising of 1953 and marched in to Hungary to do the same in 1956 (1960a: 167–77, 528–29).

A related and striking feature of the book is Morgenthau's scorn for the Eisenhower presidency. He alleges that Ike allowed government to fragment, undermining his own power to impose order and consistency on American foreign policy. He adopted the wrong standards for government by bowing to public opinion rather than holding fast to the national interest. He failed to rise to the challenge of the Soviet military threat and remained passive in response to Sputnik. Morgenthau advocates the kind of military buildup that the Kennedy administration would put into effect (Ibid: 206–09, 328–29).

World Order in 1960

The 'existential threat' that nuclear weapons pose to all nations cannot be addressed with the framework of sovereign states. The only solution is to transfer control of nuclear weapons to a supranational authority. This is, however, an ideal. American efforts to this goal, most notably the

Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal Proposal of 1946 and the 1958–1960 negotiations for a cessation of atomic testing, failed. The Soviet Union was unalterably opposed to supranational control of nuclear weapons, Morgenthau argues, because its leaders believe, not unreasonably, would put it at a comparative disadvantage. He urges American leaders to be more compromising in their demands and to accept tolerable risks when it comes to nuclear agreements and inspection on the assumption that half a loaf is better than none (Ibid: 171–77).

Morgenthau follows his treatment of the nuclear threat with a discussion of world order. Survival is a first-order priority but we need a reason to survive. Retreat into isolation is no longer feasible, so the purpose of survival must assume an important international dimension. America responded by applying its defining domestic principle of equality to foreign policy and treating its allies more as equals in lieu of establishing a hierarchical order. Application of this principle 'has resulted in disintegration and anarchy' (Ibid: 185). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a 'rather loosely knit' and 'stagnating' alliance. Foreign aid given to allies treated as equals merely strengthened the conservative political and military forces in favor of the status quo in these countries and allowed the communists to present themselves as favoring the forces of progress. Washington should use its power to impose its anti-imperialist tradition on these countries by using aid as a vehicle to bring about democratic change (Ibid: 188–96). He shows no recognition that such a policy might readily be condemned as neo-imperialism.

Morgenthau's preference for hierarchical alliances is motivated by a concern for credibility in Europe and democratic change elsewhere in the world. He fails to consider the downside of such alliances, of which the Warsaw Pact offers a prime example. His claim that the United States relates as equals to its allies because of its domestic experience and anti-imperialism tradition finds recent resonance in the claim of John Ikenberry (2001), who argues that the United States differed from previous hegemons, and from its Soviet rival, in establishing a more consensual system of alliances and economic arrangements in which it was merely *primus inter pares*. Unlike Morgenthau, Ikenberry regards this kind of restraint as a good thing. Morgenthau and Ikenberry alike have been criticized for overstating the case. Certainly, NATO and other American alliances were never as hierarchical as the Warsaw Pact, but the United States never hesitated in pushing its interests and at times acted unilaterally when it could not build a consensus for its policies. In the first decade of this century, the Bush

administration encountered serious criticism in Europe for this reason. It consistently acted unilaterally, seeking to exploit what its supporters claimed was a 'unipolar moment' to establish American hegemony.

Post-publication Interactions

Morgenthau spent the academic year 1959–1960 off campus, completing the manuscript and returned to teaching in the autumn of 1960. His *Politics Among Nations* was now widely used as a core text in American universities and Hans was at the height of his fame. Alfred Knopf, his publisher, regularly took him to Lutèce, recently opened by André Soltner on East 50th Street in Manhattan and known for its over-the-top menu. Publisher and guest succumbed to sautéed foie gras with dark chocolate sauce and orange marmalade. Morgenthau became an advisor to the new Kennedy administration and his publications appeared in *Foreign Affairs* and *Commentary*. He was on the Rolodex—a rotating mechanical device for storing names, numbers, and addresses—of journalists who wrote about foreign policy and elected officials, lobbyists, and intellectuals who tried to influence it. Hans reveled in becoming a public figure. He never said so but the attention and accolades he received were welcome psychological balm to the isolation and alienation he grew up with in postwar and very anti-Semitic Bavaria.

Morgenthau was ambivalent about his teaching and supervision; it took a lot of time that he could profitably use for writing and networking, but it also provided a forum for him to work out his ideas. I attended his undergraduate course in the autumn quarter of 1960, and did a graduate course with him that spring. In the autumn of 1961, Herman Finer, for whom I worked as a research assistant, went on medical leave, and Morgenthau picked me up. He was preparing the first of the three volumes of his essays, *The Decline of American Politics*, published in 1962 and intended to accompany *Purpose*.

One of my tasks for Morgenthau, as for Finer, was to read through the weekly Foreign Broadcast Information Service booklets prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. Both professors were recipients and found these reports useful, although for different things. Finer was interested primarily in Europe and the Middle East, and Morgenthau in the Cold War worldwide. I would put markers in reports I thought would be of interest to him and summarize what I thought was important about these entries, individually and collectively. Kennedy had become President in

January 1961. In the next 12 months the United States tested the first Minuteman missile; the Congo crisis began; Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress between the United States and Latin America. Eichmann was put on trial in Jerusalem, Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth, the Bay of Pigs invasion failed, Freedom Rides intensified, dancer Rudolf Nureyev sought asylum in France, and the Eritrean war of independence began. Dag Hammarskjöld dies in a plane crash in the Congo, the Soviet Union exploded a 58-megaton bomb and Kennedy sends helicopters to Vietnam in support of Diem.

The virtue of reports on these subjects to Morgenthau was their presentation of non-American perspectives not readily available in the elite press or elsewhere in the pre-internet age. Hans also had me check facts for him, another time-consuming task in those days. He would also try out his ideas for new articles and books in class. I would take extensive notes and present him with a transcript he would use as the starting point for a publication. This work was not exciting but gave me access to my boss, who was willing to chat and answer questions. I quizzed him about his theory and approach to contemporary foreign policy problems and he asked me my views. I realized quickly that what interested him in what I had to say was how it reflected the 'American take' on events or those of the student generation.

Three foci of our discussion are worth reporting. The first is civil rights. Morgenthau was a great believer in civil rights for intellectual and personal reasons. As a Jew, he knew first-hand the physical, economic, and psychological costs of discrimination. For Eisenhower it had an instrumental importance, that is, it makes America look bad around the world. For Morgenthau, promoting civil rights was an ethical responsibility and a litmus paper test of American values.

We discussed the civil rights movement and student involvement in it. He was pleased that I joined a group to lobby Illinois legislators about civil rights legislation but was of two minds about freedom riding. He recognized that progress was slow and that protests might accelerate it. But he worried about freedom rides provoking violence, especially in the South, and impeding progress toward civil rights. He gradually came around to supporting student activism, impressed by its non-violence and its ability therefore to confront white Americans with clear moral choices. Whenever I wanted to go off on a civil rights march, he gave me time off, insisting that my work could wait.

I questioned Morgenthau about his theory. Critics complained, and with justification, that it was both descriptive *and* prescriptive. 'Realism,' he insists in *Politics Among Nations*, is superior to 'idealist' approaches on both counts. It is more rigorous because its axioms are logically derived from its starting assumptions. It is empirically valid because 'the facts as they are actually lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them' (Morgenthau 1960b: 1). Morgenthau makes much of the latter claim, contrasting his theory with 'idealist' theories and related strategies that fly in the face of political reality. However, *Politics Among Nations* excoriates appeasers for not balancing against Hitler and thereby encouraging his aggressive designs. Morgenthau wanted his cake and to eat it too.

Morgenthau (Ibid: 8) dismissed this criticism; the purpose of theory, he patiently explained—and here I quote from his writings—was not an 'indiscriminate description of political reality,' but rather an attempt to develop a 'rational theory of politics.' The balance of power was 'an ideal system,' and in his more pessimistic moments, Morgenthau was willing to admit that it was 'scarcely found in reality.' Realism provided a benchmark against which actual policies could be understood and evaluated. For the same reason, it contained a strong normative element. It was a 'theoretical construct' of a fully rational and informed foreign policy that 'experience can never completely achieve,' but which can be used as a guide for making and assessing policy (Morgenthau 1963a: 49).

Morgenthau's rejoinder is far from satisfactory. He made unabashed empirical claims for his theory; and behavior at variance is anomalous. All social theories encounter anomalies, and the telling question is whether Morgenthau's theory provides a better account of international behavior than competitors. Morgenthau would insist on a second empirical criterion: the outcome of foreign policies at odds with realism. He maintained that 'idealist' policies failed to promote peace and stability. But two decades later, we shall see, he was equally critical of realist approaches, at the other end of the spectrum, that failed to recognize moral and practical limitations on power. Most of us would probably agree that appeasement, as practiced by the Western democracies in the 1930s, rewarded Hitler's appetite for aggression and helped to provoke a long and costly war. Woodrow Wilson's policies find more support in the scholarly community, although all but his most ardent supporters admit that he may have been naive in execution of some of his most important initiatives.

This problem could have been resolved—although never to the satisfaction of positivists—if Morgenthau had been true to his Kantian education and Weberian commitments. He drew on both to construct his theory. From Kant, he took the idea of the dialectic, which he used, as Clausewitz had before him, for purposes of exposition. His theory of politics represented the thesis—an abstract and parsimonious formulation of the phenomenon in question. The antithesis was what happened in practice—often at odds with the theory because of friction in the form of domestic politics, ideology, and less-than-wise leaders. The goal for Clausewitz, as it was for Morgenthau, was a synthesis—a choice of sensible policy options and their implementation, and combined with awareness of problems that could arise and forethought about how to address them. For Clausewitz, Gustavus Adolphus and Napoleon were geniuses because of their ability to pursue rational goals and minimize friction, thus achieving a synthesis. For Morgenthau, this was true of leaders like Talleyrand, and Bismarck, although he had serious qualms about the latter's project and its consequences.

From Weber, Morgenthau took the concept of the ideal type, which was how he conceived of the balance of power. It helped to explain politics, but was an abstract representation of it based purely on rationality. It provided a framework for studying politics because it was a benchmark against which to measure real world policy. The analytical question, following Weber, was not the expectation that it would guide policy, but studying why and how policy deviated from it.

Theory offered both an underlying description of international politics and a guide to foreign policy in the more immediate sense. But it was only the first step to creating explanatory narratives or policies. Success or failure would depend on context and leadership, and, of course, luck. I only realized decades later that Morgenthau fell into his descriptive-prescriptive can of worms as a result of his effort to escape another can of worms, the cultural one. He recognized how different American intellectual culture was from its German counterpart and worried that a theory with an elaborate metaphysical superstructure would be misunderstood and rejected by American readers. He may, of course, have made the right decision given the success of *Politics Among Nations*. But his attempt to be simple and phenomenological invited criticism from sophisticated thinkers.

Ethics and Politics

The third focus of our discussions, ethics, deserves a subheading of its own. In *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Morgenthau described three different views of public morality. The traditional approach of *Salus publica suprema lex* acknowledges that states could temporarily set aside normal, legal, and perhaps other norms as well to protect the republic. He somewhat inaccurately associates Machiavelli and Hobbes with this view, as well as the European tradition of *Realpolitik* (Morgenthau 1952). From the time of the Greeks, he notes, it was widely acknowledged that people were not allowed to act in the political sphere as they pleased. State actions had to conform to a higher standard of morality than simple interest. In modern times, two distinct strategies developed to reconcile private and public morality. Wilsonian liberalism sought to compel states to conform to the standards of private morality through the application of international law. This effort failed, as Morgenthau believed any such effort must, and helped to bring about the kind of aggressive behavior it was expected to prevent. Lenin and the Bolsheviks embraced a third strategy: they justified state actions in terms of the beneficial ends they were intended to achieve. Behavior at odds with conventional standards of private morality was legitimized with reference to a higher principle. Morgenthau dismissed this strategy as a perfidious sleight of hand because we can never know the longer-term consequences of our actions. The claim that the end justifies the means is nothing more than an attempt to escape moral responsibility (Morgenthau 1946: 151–68).

Here too, Morgenthau was implicitly relying on Weber, and admitted as much when I raised the latter's famous essay on 'Politics as a Vocation' and attempted to interpret his approach to ethics in terms of it. The ensuing discussion indicated that Hans had thought deeply about Weber's essay, which he heard the great sociologist deliver in Munich at the end of the First World War. He agreed with Weber that politicians sometimes had to use force, and other means that would not be acceptable in interpersonal relationships. Thus, the appeal of an ethics of responsibility to Weber. But its successful application required some understanding of the likely outcomes of one's policies in circumstances in which the social world was opaque, and the political world more so. Morgenthau thought Weber was deluding himself if he thought this possible, and may be why, we agreed, that Weber ended up making a pitch for some combination of the two ethics. Morgenthau is adamant that morality—defined in terms of the

conventions of the epoch—should limit both the ends that power seeks and the means employed to achieve those ends. Certain ends and means are unacceptable, he contends, because of the opprobrium that attaches to them. Morality puts the stamp of its approval on other ends and means (Morgenthau 1963a: 59).

Morality, like theory, has prescriptive and descriptive value. It defines a code of behavior that states *ought* to follow but not infrequently violate. It is descriptive in that foreign policy often conforms to the prevalent moral code, even when it conflicts with short-term interests or has power-related costs. States routinely 'refuse to consider certain ends or to use certain means, either altogether or under certain circumstances, not because in the light of expediency they appear impractical or unwise, but because certain moral rules interpose an absolute barrier' (Morgenthau 1948a: 174–75). Leaders also recognize that policies that reflect existing moral codes are more likely to gain leverage at home and abroad.

Morgenthau's commitment to ethical imperatives might appear puzzling in light of his rejection of Wilsonian liberalism and assertions that politics is about power. But he vehemently denied any contradiction, and criticized E. H. Carr for trying to divorce power from morality (Morgenthau 1948b). Wilson's error was not his concern for morality, but his failure to grasp the immutable character of human beings and the role of power in domestic and international politics. It is proper and realistic to be bound by moral constraints, but naive and dangerous to believe that morality, expressed through law and international institutions, can consistently restrain the pursuit of relative advantage (Morgenthau 1934 and 1935). Any analysis of international morality must 'guard against the two extremes either of overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics or of denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything else but considerations of material power' (Morgenthau 1948a: 174).

During the Vietnam War, Morgenthau made an interesting admission about the centrality of power in his theory of international relations. Politics was undeniably about power, but in the 1940s, he had emphasized it to the point of excluding other features of politics as a reaction to the liberal idealist emphasis on law and morality. This had been a strategic as much as an intellectual choice. In *The Purpose of Political Science*, he wrote:

> When the times tend to depreciate the elements of power, it [political science] must stress its importance. When the times incline toward a monistic conception of power in the general scheme of things, it must show its

> limitations. When the times conceive of power primarily in military terms, it must call attention to the variety of factors which go into the power equation and, more particularly, to the subtle psychological relations of which the web of power is fashioned. When the reality of power is being lost sight of over its moral and legal limitations, it must point to that reality. When law and morality are judged as nothing, it must assign them their rightful place. (Morgenthau 1966a: 77)

By the mid-1960s, the political culture of national security in the United States had undergone an about-face. The role of morality and law now needed to be brought to the attention of policymakers and theorists alike.

Following Kant and Hans Kelsen, Morgenthau (1934) treated law as a system of norms (*nomos*), and argued that international society had evolved to encompass a wide range of norms that states for the most part obeyed: 'The influence of civilization [has made] some policies that are desirable and feasible ethically reprehensible and, hence, normally impossible of execution' (Ibid: 176–77). *Politics Among Nations* (1948a) devotes a chapter to restraints on the use of violence that emerged since the Thirty Years War. These include the understanding that war is a struggle between competing armed forces, and not a contest between entire populations; conventions that protect prisoners of war and keep them from being tortured or killed; the prohibition of certain weapons, and limitations on the use of others; the responsibilities and rights of neutrals; and general acceptance of the view that violence should be restricted to the minimum level compatible with the goals of war. Laws and conventions also proscribe behavior (e.g., territorial violations, bugging embassies) in which states routinely engage. 'The protestations of innocence or of moral justification by which accusations in such matters are uniformly met' are, Morgenthau maintains, 'indirect recognition of the legitimacy of these limitations' (Morgenthau 1948a: 180). Morgenthau (1934) considered the twentieth century enigmatic in this respect; more new norms had been created by international treaties than ever before, but adherence to norms of all kinds had declined. International morality had reached its high-water point in the eighteenth century, and had receded subsequently in response to the rise of nationalism and the growing dependence of leaders on public opinion.

Morgenthau's concern for ethics undergirded his opposition to the Indochina war. He was an early critic of American intervention and equally skeptical of subsequent escalations. Beginning in November 1963 he produced a steady stream of articles for *Commentary* and *The*

New Republic as well as letters to the editors of the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* (Morgenthau 1963b, 1964a,[1] 1965a, b, c, 1966b, c, 1967, 1967a, 1968, 1968b, 1972a, b). Behind the scenes, he provided anti-war arguments to Frank Church, one of the principal Senate opponents of intervention. On 31 December 1964, Morgenthau (1964b) urged Church to pressurize the administration to seek a withdrawal by means of a neutralization agreement. In January 1967, he provided Senator Frank Church with a critique of a Department of Defense film justifying American intervention.

Morgenthau was deeply troubled that American policymakers had jettisoned idealism only to adopt European-style *Realpolitik*. Vietnam was being fought in the name of realism, but represented a perversion of that philosophy. Realism had a moral basis. It was not merely a self-serving justification for the status quo (Falk 1977; Raskin 1977). Morgenthau's opposition to Vietnam cost him the much-coveted presidency of the American Political Science Association; its right wing administrator mobilized pro-war professors to block his nomination.

In 1965, Morgenthau (1965d) published a book on Vietnam in which he excoriated American intervention on practical and moral grounds. He insisted that the use of military force to shore up an unpopular, oppressive government of absentee landlords was certain to fail. In a follow-on article (1968), he insisted it was an 'improvident and foolish use of power' that would inevitably lead to a 'serious loss of prestige.' A 'foreign power' has no business 'defending the status quo against a national and social revolution' (1969: 134–35). Morgenthau was particularly offended by Washington's military strategy. 'Counterinsurgency' was a 'mechanical connivance' that differed from traditional warfare in that it was directed against the population rather than identifiable armed forces. Military action aimed at the destruction of guerrilla forces entailed 'the destruction of entire villages, people and crops alike' (Ibid). His public statements and this book make clear how much his view of the Cold War had evolved.

When air and ground operations did not produce the expected results, Washington sent more forces, carried out more extensive air operations, bombed Hanoi and Haiphong and extended the ground and air war into the rest of Indochina. Morgenthau worried—needlessly, as it turned out—that such escalation risked a wider war with China and the Soviet Union. He was equally disturbed by the moral implications of escalation. If South Vietnam survived long enough, he conceded, the United States might compel the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese might halt their military

campaign in the South. But such a victory would not be achieved by breaking the enemy's will to resist, but 'by killing so many of the enemy that there is nobody left to resist.' Such a strategy was a perversion of Clausewitz, who conceived of killing in war as a means to bend or break an adversary's will. In Vietnam, 'killing becomes an end in itself.' The physical elimination of the enemy and victory 'become synonymous.' Hence, the 'body count,' however fictitious, became the metric of success (Ibid: 137).

Morgenthau warned that 'No civilized nation' could wage such a war 'without suffering incalculable moral damage.' The resulting opprobrium would be all the more severe because most of the world saw no military or political benefit that could warrant the kind of widespread, indiscriminate killing and destruction the United States was inflicting on Indochina. Such behavior stood in sharp contrast to American claims to be 'a novel experiment in government, morally superior to those that went before it,' and made a mockery of its claim to be 'performing a uniquely beneficial mission not only for itself but for all mankind' (Ibid: 137–38). Vietnam was costing the United States its *hegemonia*.

Morgenthau elaborated this theme in a subsequent article in *The New Republic* (1974) in which he accused the United States of trying to suppress the symptoms of instability rather than addressing its causes. Throughout the Third World, and especially in Vietnam, successive administrations had consistently supported the side of repression in an ongoing struggle over social, economic, and political reform. American leaders pursued short-term stability and the expense of the long-run instability of tyrannical rule. 'The United States has found itself consistently on the wrong side of the great issues, which in retrospect will appear to have put their stamp upon the present period of history' (Morgenthau 1974).

There was also a domestic component to Vietnam. Leaders of democracies are frequently pulled in opposite directions by state and political interests. Postwar American presidents had repeatedly mobilized public opinion to support foreign policies based on uncompromising opposition to world communism. Over time this strategy made the government the prisoner of the passions it had aroused and had compelled it to intervene in Vietnam. It threatened to destroy the give and take of 'pluralistic debate through which errors can be corrected and the wrong policies set right' (Morgenthau 1970: 40–44). There had been no meaningful public debate prior to American intervention, and once committed, it became impossible for the Johnson administration to extricate itself when its policy had failed. The decline of American democracy was at its core a problem of ethics.

In Retrospect

In retrospect, Eisenhower looks better than Morgenthau and other critics acknowledged at the time (Greenstein 1994). He ended the Korean War, shunned intervention in Vietnam, was never intimidated or unduly worried about the Soviet Union, refused to escalate the arms race in a dramatic way, and warned of the growing power of the military-industrial complex in his farewell address.

In the 1960s and 1970s Morgenthau came to sound more like Eisenhower. He became more concerned about the development of nuclear weapons and America's nuclear policy; and he spoke out against the arms race and the emerging nuclear strategies based on war fighting like those of Herman Khan, as opposed to existential deterrence. He became an advocate of restraint and criticized demonization of the Soviet Union. Above all, he was a vocal opponent of US intervention in Indochina, which he described as contradictory to American interests and traditions (Zimmer 2011; Campbell and Logevall 2009).

With good reason, *The Purpose of American Politics* is not a book that has endured. It fails to develop the links between the theory and practice of foreign policy in convincing ways. Its author would shortly disavow some of his key positions concerning nuclear weapons and strategy. His predictions were also off the mark. Despite the absence of supranational control of nuclear weapons, the superpowers avoided war, reached a series of arms control agreements, and brought their conflict to a peaceful resolution. NATO has not collapsed but prospered.

Morgenthau's domestic arguments fare only a little better. He is right in worrying about corporate influence, although the vehicle for the influence is just as much the result of the cost of campaign finance as it is backroom deals. In contrast to Tocqueville who understands contemporary trends and their possible futures, Morgenthau was relatively blind to the change going on around him and the social upheaval it would produce in the decade after his book appeared. This revolution can be described at least in part as a renewal of the American purpose in exactly the manner Morgenthau desired. Social change is always for better and for worse, and Morgenthau was only sensitive to the latter. This too would change, and very rapidly. He became a great supporter of civil rights and cut me slack as his research assistant to take time off to participate in civil rights demonstrations.

In his lectures and conversations, Morgenthau drew the parallel between the ill-fated Athenian expedition in Sicily and the United States

in Vietnam. Both failures were attributable to hubris and the lack of prudence it engendered. The biggest difference between the two conflicts, Morgenthau hastened to point out, was that Thucydides thought that a more serious effort by Athens to reinforce and support its military operation in Sicily might have resulted in victory. By 1967, Morgenthau was adamant that further buildups of American forces could not materially affect the outcome, and that the only way to end the war, in the absence of wise leadership, was through domestic opposition that would convince the Congress to halt funding for the war (Lebow 1963–1878).

Morgenthau saw obvious parallels in the methods and goals of ethics and international relations theory. Philosophers and theorists alike should search for underlying, universal truths through the study of history, and adapt them to contemporary circumstances. It is the task 'for every age, and particularly a scientific one, to rediscover and reformulate the perennial problems of political ethics and to answer them in the light of the experience of the age' (Morgenthau 1946: 146). In ethics as in politics, Morgenthau attempted to perform this service for his adopted country.

Notes

1. A rejoinder to an earlier article by Zbigniew Brzezinski in favor of military intervention in Vietnam.

References

Campbell, Craig, and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Falk, Richard A. 1977. Normative Constraints on Statecraft: Some Comments on Morgenthau's Perspective. In *Truth and Tragedy*, ed. K. Thompson and R. Meyers, 77–84. New York: Transaction.

Greenstein, Fred. 1994. *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 2003. *The Federalist Papers with Letters of 'Brutus'*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herz, John. 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. *World Politics* 2 (2): 171–201.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1963–1978. Conversations with Hans Morgenthau.

———. 2003. *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1934. *La réalité des normes, en particulier des normes du droit international. Fondements d'une théorie des norms.* Paris: Félix Alcan.
———. 1935. Theorie des sanctions internationals. *Revue de droit international et de legislation compareé*, 3e série, 16: 474–503 and 809–836.
———. 1946. *Scientific Man versus Power Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1948a. *Politics Among Nations.* New York: Knopf.
———. 1948b. The Political Science of E. H. Carr. *World Politics* 1 (1): 127–134.
———. 1952. 'Philosophy of International Relations,' Lecture Notes. *Hans J. Morgenthau Papers*, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 81.
———. 1960a. *The Purpose of American Politics.* New York: Knopf.
———. 1960b. *Politics Among Nations.* 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1963a. *The Decline of Democratic Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1963b. The Impotence of American Power. *Commentary* 36 (5): 384–386.
———. 1964a. Letter to the *Washington Post,* March 15.
———. 1964b. Correspondence with Senator Frank Church. 31 December. *Hans J. Morgenthau Papers.* Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
———. 1965a. To Intervene or Not to Intervene. *Foreign Affairs* 45 (3): 425–436.
———. 1965b. *Vietnam and the United States.* Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
———. 1965c. We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam. *New York Times Magazine*, April 18, pp. 61–73.
———. 1965d. Russia, the US and Vietnam. *New Republic*, May 1, pp. 12–13.
———. 1966a. The Purpose of Political Science. In *A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives and Methods*, ed. J.C. Charlesworth, 63–79. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science.
———. 1966b. Truth and Power: The Intellectual and the Johnson Administration. *New Republic*, November 26, pp. 8–14.
———. 1966c. Johnson's Dilemma: The Alternatives Now in Vietnam. *New Republic*, May 28, pp. 12–16.
———. 1967. What Ails America? *The New Republic*, October 22, pp. 17–21.
———. 1968. Bundy's Doctrine of War Without End. *New Republic*, November 2, pp. 18–20.
———. 1969. *A New Foreign Policy for the United States.* New York: Praeger.
———. 1970. *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970.* New York: Praeger.
———. 1972a. The New Escalation in Vietnam. *The New Republic*, May 20, pp. 9–11.
———. 1972b. Between Hanoi and Saigon: Kissinger's Next Test. *The New Leader*, November 13, pp. 5–6.

———. 1974. Explaining the Failures of US Foreign Policy. Letter to the *New York Times*, October 10.
Raskin, Marcus. 1977. The Idealism of a Realist. In *Truth and Tragedy*, ed. K. Thompson and R. Meyers, 85–94. New York: Transaction.
Tjalve, Vibeke Schou. 2008. *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000. *Democracy in America*, 2 Vols, Trans. and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Debra Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zimmer, Louis B. 2011. *The Vietnam War Debate: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Attempt to Halt the Drift into Disaster*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Vietnam Writings and the National Security State

Douglas B. Klusmeyer

In *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Hans Morgenthau (1946: 219–223) celebrated the noble role of the statesman, whose tragic destiny entailed accepting the agonizing moral burden of committing lesser evils as the inescapable price for securing the greater good. In this elitist vision, the statesman is primarily accountable to personal conscience rather than to the poorly informed, undisciplined judgment of any democratic electorate.[1] In focusing on the statesman's pivotal role, Morgenthau glossed over the ways the New Deal and the Second World War had transformed the institutional context within which American presidents made foreign policy.[2] As he shifted his attention to American policy toward Vietnam in the late 1950s and 1960s, however, his view of presidential leadership and the executive branch changed significantly. Morgenthau came to see the growth of the national security state and the unaccountable exercise of executive power as a twin threat to the foundations of republican government. His critique emphasized the 'moral corruption' and other pathologies of policymakers who were insulated within this state apparatus (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 364).

Scholars examining the evolution of Morgenthau's postwar thought have called attention to his shift from an elitist conception of statesmanship

D.B. Klusmeyer (✉)
American University, Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_6

to an increasingly republican one that emphasized the importance of the citizenry in the democratic process and identified the national interest with the common good (Gilbert 1999; Scheuerman 2009). Morgenthau's emergence as a prominent, fearless critic of US involvement in Vietnam has long been seen as a key part of this story (Rafshoon 2001; See 2001; Scheuerman 2009: 165–195; Zambernadi 2011).[3] However, in explaining this evolution, scholars have largely ignored a fundamental change in the historical context during this era: namely, the establishment of the permanent institutional apparatus of the national security state, as exemplified in the creation of a network of new national security institutions (Craig 2007; Zimmer 2011; Rösch 2015). This context provides essential background for understanding how many of Morgenthau's specific insights and critical observations fit into a broader story. Moreover, since he makes many broad empirical claims resting on impressionistic evidence in his criticisms of the executive branch's conduct of the war, examining such contexts is essential for assessing the merits of his claims.

Organized into five sections, this chapter begins by situating several of Morgenthau's major criticisms of the national security state within the broader developmental trends that scholars have identified. The next two sections focus on his general criticisms of American policy in the Vietnam War and the institutional pathologies in the policymaking process. The fourth section compares Morgenthau's criticisms of the American policy with those of Noam Chomsky in their 1972 debate over the national interest and the *Pentagon Papers*. The fifth section explores his growing concern over the decline of an ethic of responsibility among policymakers. The final section examines his criticisms of Henry Kissinger's conduct as policy adviser and statesman.

Morgenthau and the Entrenchment of the National Security State

Even before the Second World War, the concept of national security was displacing the older concept of national interest as a guide for foreign policy. The new concept emphasized the role of military preparedness and the need for stronger state institutions to coordinate policy. Rejecting isolationism as a viable option after the modern advances in communication, commerce, and transportation, it was also predicated on the view that the defense of freedom at home required meeting threats to it around the

globe (Stuart 2008). The growth of the national security state was reflected in the declining influence of traditional diplomatic methods in favor of a more militarized foreign policy and the growing prominence of the Department of Defense over the Department of State in shaping policy (Hogan 1998; Rosenberg 1993; Stuart 2008: 119–121). At the same time, government research funding for national defense purposes became a major source of revenue and employment for academic researchers and their host institutions from the late 1940s through the 1960s (Wolfe 2015). The integration of scientific and military elites into its technocratic administrative infrastructure, Morgenthau (1964: 1402; 1967) argued, means that 'the determination of foreign and military policies has become virtually free from democratic controls'.[4] During this period, Congress and the courts entrusted the executive branch with broad authority over the collection and use of intelligence information, which facilitated the massive expansion of the government's secrecy system (Moynihan 1998; Fisher 2006; Pallitto and Weaver 2007; Horton 2015). 'The function of that intragovernmental secrecy, whatever the intentions of its initiators and administrators might be,' Morgenthau (1964: 1403) concluded,

> cannot be the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of state secrets; if it were, it would cast doubt upon the reliability of the great mass of government officials, who while having been cleared for top secret information in general, are precluded from access to special secrets. Rather the function of this special secrecy is political. By protecting esoteric knowledge, it protects and enhances power.

Denied access to this expanding web of official secrets and unable to evaluate the scientific rationales invoked to support policy agendas, the citizenry in Morgenthau's (1964: 1386–1387, 1402–1408) view lost the capacity to provide meaningful inputs into the political decision-making process.

The growth of this secrecy system was accompanied by the introduction of loyalty programs and the intensification of (often illegal) domestic spying against perceived dissidents (Stone 2004, 2008; Schrecker 2008; Rosenfeld 2012; Weiner 2012). As the legal scholar Geoffrey Stone (2004: 12) has observed, 'the Cold War, which followed hard on the heels of World War II, marked perhaps the most repressive period in American history.' Morgenthau (1955) attacked the introduction of new security measures into the State Department for crippling its effectiveness, driving

away talented foreign service officers, inducing conformity, applying dubious standards, and providing weak guarantees of procedural fairness. When the CIA's involvement in the National Student Association (NSA) (among many front organizations that it and the NSA had created, financed, and/or coopted over several decades for propaganda and surveillance purposes) was exposed, he was also sharply critical of this kind of political subversion, which in his view proved counter-productive after it had been revealed (Paget 2015; Morgenthau 1970d).

The rise of the national security state considerably enhanced the power of the presidency and its capacity to act unilaterally. Morgenthau's evolution from an advocate for stronger presidential leadership to a sharp critic of the presidential abuse of power was consistent with a broader shift in liberal thinking in response to the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal.[5] However, this shift needs to be understood against a much longer trend of aggrandizement in presidential power. Critical of constitutional formalism and congressional dysfunction, progressives had championed this trend since the late nineteenth century. In the process, they had helped to weaken many of the traditional checks on presidential power. In the postwar era, the dramatic expansion of the White House staff enabled presidents to consolidate an increasing array of policymaking functions inside their office. As Morgenthau (1970e: 164) observed in 1966: 'Today the President's power sweeps all before it. The Supreme Court has become his ally, and Congress stirs but half-heartedly and ineffectually in bondage… What is so ominous in our present situation is not that the President has reasserted his powers but that in the process he has reduced all countervailing powers, political and social, to virtual impotence.' To appreciate why he saw Lyndon Johnson's and Richard Nixon's abuses of executive power as a threat to the republic's constitutional order, it is important to recognize how their conduct in office fits into this longer trend, which has transformed the structure of governance at the national level. An impressive array of congressional legislation enacted after Watergate[6] to impose new constraints on the exercise of executive power have proven much less effective than their advocates had hoped (Silverstein 1997; Olmstead 1996; Rudalevige 2005: 101–210). Many contemporary scholars on both the right and the left argue that this trend has continued to the present for better or worse (Rudalevige 2005: 211–285; Nelson 2007; Shane 2009; Bacevich 2010; Skowronek 2009, 2011; Posner and Vermeule 2010; Glennon 2015; Ackerman 2010).

The 'national security discourse' through which this transformation was explained and justified, the historian Michael Hogan (1998: 208) observes, 'was essentially a discourse in state-making.' Despite its successes, he points out, its state-building agenda did not go unchallenged. Its critics on both the right and the left drew on 'a discursive tradition that stretched from the Founding Fathers through the antiwar and antigovernment campaigns of the recent period' (Hogan 1998: 8). The development of Morgenthau's thinking from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s exemplifies this kind of critical response to policymaking in the national security state. In this era, he was one of several influential émigré German intellectuals, including Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich, and Karl Lowenstein, who expressed growing concerns about how the rise of the administrative state during the 1930s and 1940s threatened democratic governance and individual autonomy. As Anne Kornhauser (2015) has shown, their experiences with the collapse of the Weimar Republic, Nazi rule, and the postwar occupation of Germany had given them a distinctive vantage point from which to critically appraise the significant tensions between democracy and bureaucracy. Consistent with President Eisenhower's famous warning about the military-industrial complex in his 1961 farewell address to the nation (Avalon 2017), Morgenthau criticized a broader pattern of incestuous relationships that had developed between regulatory agencies, their congressional oversight committees, and the constituent groups subject to these agencies. Rather than impartially serving the public interest, he argued, the instruments of the administrative state have become prone to capture by powerful private interests (Morgenthau 1960: 204–205, 283–288). Since the American administrative state had been constructed as an emergency expedient, Kornhauser observes, to meet the crises of economic depression and the Second World War, its creators never needed to articulate a broader rationale for their innovations. Its subsequent defenders, she contends, have never been able to overcome these tensions or provide a compelling 'form of public justification, that is, of making political arrangements justifiable to the citizens who must live under them' (Kornhauser 2015: 11). Because the legitimacy of the administrative state was never secured, she contends, the door was left open for earlier liberal critiques of it to become radicalized during the 1960s (Kornhauser 2015: 8, 220, 223–230).

For Morgenthau, the American disaster in Vietnam was indicative of the pathologies in policymaking that had emerged with the rise of the national security state. By advancing a 'shift' of both 'material power' and

'the effective power of decision from the people to the government,' this rise posed an acute threat to the survival of the American form of republican government (Morgenthau 1967: 17). In his view, the growth of a vast secret infrastructure of government institutional networks whose decision-making processes, information collection, and core operations were not subject to public scrutiny was incompatible with the fundamental principles of rule by popular consent and rule of law in a free society.

Morgenthau's Critique of American Policy Toward Vietnam

For Morgenthau (1962a: 38–41, 52, 1973a: 8, 10), scholars have an overriding responsibility to truth, which (if heeded) is likely to lead them at times to challenge core assumptions and beliefs of their contemporaries. In developing his realist approach to international politics, he always insisted that includes a normative component. The roots of his opposition to American military intervention in Vietnam can be traced back to his critique of the 1947 Truman Doctrine and the national security policy framework it reflected. In cloaking the cause for rendering aid to Greece and Turkey as part of a global crusade against communism, Truman had bound the United States to the defense of 'free' people everywhere, a position that ignored the practical limitations of American power and resources. By sharply dividing the world between the forces of freedom and the forces of authoritarianism, the ideological rationale for this crusade obscured the geopolitical variables that differentiated particular cases from one another and clouded their relationship to specific American strategic interests. In short, by focusing on checking Soviet ambitions, the Truman national security policy framework inclined American decision-makers to reflexively prioritize military means over political or diplomatic ones in addressing policy challenges (Morgenthau 1956: 14–16, 1965: 55, 1970h: 420).

By the early 1950s, Morgenthau had already concluded that military means could not advance American security interests in Vietnam, and he warned that the national liberation movements would likely prevail in the long run. Siding with colonial forces or their puppet governments, therefore, placed the United States on the wrong side of history. More immediately, any prolonged engagement in this losing effort would drain American resources and would undermine the country's moral prestige by identifying

American policy goals with repressive action (Morgenthau 1965: 29; see also Morgenthau 1948: 50–60, 1951: 117–21, 208). As President Lyndon Johnson escalated the war, Morgenthau concentrated more of his energy on speaking out against it. Given the nature of the war, he contended that the victory the administration sought could only be achieved through the total destruction of the enemy, which would entail not only massive bombing but also a protracted and overwhelming deployment of American combat forces. In his view, the administration's determination to conduct a limited war in pursuit of a negotiated settlement would not only fail, it also demonstrated how poorly US policymakers understood the motivations of the enemy. Since victory was not possible, perpetuating the war was immoral and unjust. Coming to terms with this reality, however, would require facing up to some unpleasant truths, ones deeply at odds with conventional assumptions of US policymakers about the intrinsic goodness of American intentions and ideals (Morgenthau 1965: 20, 39, 91).

The Insular World of Elite Policymaking in the Vietnam War

In considering retrospectively how the experience of the 1960s had altered his understanding of policymaking, Morgenthau (1970a: 5) acknowledged his earlier mistake in expecting 'that if power were only made to see truth it would follow that lead.' But the Johnson administration's backlash against even the most distinguished critics of its Vietnam policy had shown this expectation to be naive. Government officials, Morgenthau (1965:18) concluded,

> are under a compulsion to protect at all costs, intellectual and moral, their imaginary world from contact with the real one and they must force themselves and the world to believe that their imaginary world is real, that their myths are the truth. For if they did not do that they would have to change their policies radically and in effect admit that they been consistently wrong for years and that they cannot be trusted with the fate of the nation. Thus disastrous policies consistently pursued serve the self-protection of those who have initiated or inherited them. We are here in the presence of an issue not of foreign policy or military strategy, but of psychopathology.

In his view, the growth of the national security state fostered a dangerously insulated policymaking apparatus. From inside this bubble, American

policymakers not only perceived the world through their own lens of power and authority, they also screened out any information and opinions that controverted their assumptions, such as those of journalists reporting from Vietnam (Morgenthau 1965: 17, 1973a: 7; Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 354–357, 359, 362, 364). The *Pentagon Papers*, Morgenthau argued, revealed that policymakers had lost the capacity for prudent judgment or critical thinking. Instead, they engaged in an 'endless bureaucratic repetition of certain clichés, certain stereotypes' without 'any attempt to understand the consequences of their action' (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 354).[7] Since their modes of expression concealed even from themselves the meaning of what they were doing, their techno-rational discourse shielded them from having to face up to the consequences of their actions.

This self-deception among policy elites, Morgenthau emphasized, went hand in glove with their systematic lying to the general public. While this kind of governmental deceit was hardly new, it had become increasingly sophisticated, owing to techniques of modern public relations and advertising (Morgenthau 1960: 266, 1965: 17). The executive branch developed new tactics to 'silence, discredit, or corrupt' dissidents through intimidation, vilification, and rewards (Morgenthau 1970b: 18). This manipulation of domestic public opinion, he argued, succeeded in undermining any effective democratic check on policymakers (Morgenthau 1970b: 20, 23–24, 1970c). However, as Morgenthau pointed out, even the most sophisticated public relations campaign will eventually lose its effectiveness as the gap between image and reality grows. When the public realizes that its government has been deliberately deceiving them, he warned, the result will undermine not merely support for a particular policy agenda but, more broadly, public trust in the governing institutions.

Morgenthau's criticisms of the insular bubble of elite policymakers are similar to those of his friend, Hannah Arendt. In her view, the *Pentagon Papers* illustrate the disturbing degree to which this elite had become divorced from the factual world of human experience and to which they were prepared to manipulate public opinion to serve their own ends (Arendt 1972, 2003[8]). Their original motives, she contends, were not imperialistic ones of seeking power and profit through global expansion but rather more defensive in seeking to protect the national image of the United States as an invincible superpower. Confident in their technocratic modes of analysis, they ignore basic facts of history, geography, and politics in developing their appraisals of potential threats and their policy

rationales. Blinded by old Cold War dogmas, such as the domino theory, they neglect the fact that the United States had no compelling national interest to intervene militarily in Vietnam. As a result, they have employed a massive means of violence vastly disproportionate to the actual stakes the United States had in the conflict's outcome. Employing a sanitized terminology, such as rural pacification and relocation, that is drained of all factual content to describe the aims and consequences of their policies, they shielded themselves and their audiences from the brutal realities of what they were doing.[9] The *Pentagon Papers*, she argues, betray a haunting fear of failure but primarily with respect to how it would damage the policymakers' own reputations and the standing of their president rather than how it might harm the nation as a whole. Morgenthau defended Arendt's analysis against Noam Chomsky's criticisms in their debate over the Vietnam War.

Debate with Chomsky over National Interest and the Pentagon Papers

Morgenthau and Chomsky were two of the most influential intellectual critics of the Vietnam War (Tomes 1998: 146). Both emphasized the responsibility of intellectuals to speak out against it and criticized academic scholars for their unwillingness to do so (Chomsky 1969; Morgenthau 1969: 155, 1970b). Because of Morgenthau's stature as an international relations scholar, the executive branch likely deemed his objections as posing a more serious challenge than Chomsky's, who wrote as an advocate outside his domain of scholarly expertise. While the former always insisted that his opposition to the war was grounded on impartial rational analysis of international politics, the latter regarded the 'problem of foreign policy' as 'essentially a moral one' (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 370). Morgenthau likely deemed Chomsky's anarchist-socialist idealism as exemplifying a moral approach to politics that ignored the fundamental realities of power. However, critics charged that Morgenthau's own arguments against the Vietnam War were driven more by moralistic passion than strategic analysis.[10] In addition, he was also vulnerable to the charge of utopianism in advocating the creation of a world government to supersede the nation-state system that could not meet the threat of nuclear war (1962b: 167–175; see also Craig 2007: 93–116). Both thinkers shared similar views on the filtering effects of the elite policymaking

subculture and the bureaucratic rationality informing that subculture. While they disagreed sharply over how the idea of national interest should be understood, their differences proved less substantive than portrayed in their debate.

In their debate, Morgenthau began from the premise that the national interest can be determined objectively as the supreme standard for guiding policy. While acknowledging that states may have many secondary national interests, the primary one entails protecting a 'nation's physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations' (Morgenthau 1952: 972). In the case of Vietnam, he argues repeatedly that the United States has no vital interest in the Vietnamese civil war, so it should not commit its prestige and resources to intervening in it. Having not recognized its limited stake in this war, he observed, the American government has employed excessive means to reach its objectives. It has, Morgenthau (1965: 20) writes, 'embarked upon a scorched-earth policy by destroying villages and forests, we have killed combatants and non-combatants without discrimination because discrimination is impossible. The logic of guerrilla war leaves us no choice. We must go on torturing, killing, and burning, and the more deeply we became involved in Vietnam, the more there will be of it.' The radical disproportionality between means and ends, he contended, makes this war effort not only bad policy from a political standpoint but also an immoral one (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 371). A superpower conducting this kind of savage war against a small, underdeveloped nation runs counter to its interests in the sheer expenditure of resources, damage to its global prestige, brutalizing its own troops, risking war with China and Russia, and dividing its own citizenry (Morgenthau 1969: 129, 131, 1970f: 401–402).

By contrast, Chomsky was deeply skeptical that any meaningful notion of national interest is analytically or normatively distinguishable from whatever the collective interests of the ruling groups in a political and economic system are (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 363). Terms like 'national interest,' he contends, are ideologically laden. While on the surface it appears to refer to the common interests of the society's members, in practice it is invariably tailored to the particular interests of the ruling groups (Chomsky 2002: 37, 2003: 147). When national interest is understood in this sense, then the US decision to intervene in Vietnam is rational and consistent with the American self-interest. 'The United States,' he explained, 'has strategic and economic interests in Southeast Asia that must be secured. Holding Indochina is essential to securing

these interests. Therefore we must hold Indochina' (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 336–337). For Chomsky, the US intervention in Vietnam must be understood as part of a global pattern of American imperialism driven by a relentless quest for new sources of raw materials and cheap labor, for new investment opportunities, and for new markets for selling goods and services (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 345). Because of the communist allegiances of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, its perspective victory posed an obstacle to this imperialist drive. In Chomsky's analysis, the goals of American foreign policy are never laudable.

Morgenthau rejected Chomsky's imperialism thesis as one-sidedly drawn and inadequately supported by the facts. By reducing politics to economics, the thesis presupposes in Morgenthau's view a dubious materialist determinism (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 355–357). It runs directly counter to his emphasis on understanding the dynamics of the political realm—based on the struggle for power—on their own terms. In addition, he criticized Chomsky for underestimating the role contingency plays, such as the character flaws of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, in influencing policy choices (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972: 356–357). He also defended his conception of the national interest as an objective standard. Without it, he contended, there are no authoritative criteria by which to assess the rationality of a policy, so one is left with the subjective judgments of rival partisans representing different parochial interests. More broadly, Morgenthau recognized that objectivity is more of an ideal to which scholars should aspire than an obtainable result. His use of it reflects his commitment to a model of scholarship that employs a rigorous rational method of inquiry, weighs rival perspectives fairly from a detached standpoint, and builds analysis from verifiable facts. He never equates scholarly objectivity with neutrality (Morgenthau 1962a: 38–39, 44–45, 52; see also Rösch 2015: 30–36, 152–153).

In his account of the policy debate over the Vietnam War, Louis Zimmer (2011: xxviii–xxx, 47–51, 78–81, 120, 144, 196) emphasizes the repeated failures of the war's supporters to seriously consider Morgenthau's national interest arguments as if doing so would have materially affected the course of the war. However, Zimmer simply accepts on their face Morgenthau's claims of the objective character of his concept without ever exploring its problematic aspects. Since his early formulations of this concept, critics have cogently argued that it hardly provides the clear determinative guide to foreign policy that he had imagined.[11] While there

is no need to retrace this same ground here, it seems worth pointing out that his normative understanding of the American national interest reflected the ideological currents of his era. For example, in contrasting the abstract generality of international norms with the concrete specificity of American national norms, Morgenthau (1951: 34) observed: 'What justice means in the United States can within wide limits be objectively ascertained; for interests and convictions, experiences of life and institutional traditions have in large measure created a consensus concerning what justice means under the conditions of American society.' In proposing this conception of national interest, he recognized the pluralistic character of American society that would seem at odds with his portrait of consensus. But, Morgenthau (1952: 985) contended, the United States has developed a sufficient institutional framework to prevent any group from gaining 'permanent supremacy' and to apply effective 'methods of genuine compromise and conciliation' to the competitive struggle among groups.[12] By invoking this notion of national consensus, he exemplifies a widespread view among postwar intellectuals (Pells 1985: 96–107; Purcell 1973: 251–266, 333–334; Horwitz 1992: 250–252). This view was promoted through the coordinated campaigns that government officials, corporate lobbyists, advertising executives, and other civic leaders during the 1940s and 1950s, who sought to construct this ideological image of a binding national cultural consensus (Wall 2008; Lears 1989).

For someone who emphasizes the struggle for power as the essence of politics, it is remarkable that Morgenthau (at least implicitly) joined hands with the postwar 'consensus' historians who stridently attacked their 'progressive' predecessors for their focus on class conflict and sordid power struggles in explaining American history (Novick 1988: 63, 320, 333–335, 439–440; Noble 1989). David Ciepley (2006: 194–228) argues that this pluralistic, consensus model was fashioned as an ideological counter-image of the totalitarian model identified with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Proponents of the former made virtues of what earlier progressive reformers had viewed as vices of American democracy, such as the corrupting effects of private interest group lobbying on policymaking. Despite their differences in content and purpose, it is not that big a step from Morgenthau's conception of the national consensus to the NSC 68's (May 1993: 23–82) ideological vision of national identity. At a minimum, the ways in which his definition of national interest here reflects the ideological currents of his era suggest that its utility as a means to decontaminate American foreign policy is more daunting than Morgenthau (1969: 242)

recognized. Moreover, as Zimmer (2011: xxiii, 54, 63, 85–87, 95, 125, 145, 152) documents, the supporters of the Vietnam War—both inside and outside the executive branch—invoked the idea of national interest to defend American policy when it served their purpose, which suggests it is just as open to partisan interpretation as any other foreign policy principle or concept.

While critical of the reductionist simplicity of Chomsky's approach, Morgenthau had argued earlier for the predominant influence that private interests exercised over government policy. 'Legislators and administrators,' Morgenthau (1960: 284) contended, 'tend to transform themselves into ambassadors of economic forces, defending and promoting the interests of their mandatories in dealing with each other on behalf of them.' In the 1970s, he came close to conceding one of Chomsky's key points. Pointing to the long-running consistencies of the broad outlines of US foreign policy, he contends that they do not simply reflect the enduring nature of American national interests but also that of the power structure in American society. 'Many observers have noted the paradox,' Morgenthau (1977: 50–51) wrote,

> that the new foreign policies on which the new administration is said to be embarking are to be executed by a group of men who are identified with the disastrous policies of the past, especially those in Vietnam…The answer lies in a characteristic of American politics which is rarely mentioned although it explains much which at first glance defies rational explanation. We are referring to the enormous staying power of the conservative element in American society. The concentrations of private power which have actually governed America since the Civil War have withstood all attempts to control, let alone dissolve them. They have survived all such attempts from Populism to the Great Society.

This claim marks a sharp departure from the case he had advanced originally for the national interest, when he expressly dismissed the possibility of any group ever managing to establish permanent dominance. The claim is reminiscent of the sociologist C. Wright Mill's (1956) depiction of the power elite, which he posed as a direct challenge to the consensus view of his scholarly contemporaries. However, he never explores how this permanent power structure may have systematically influenced American foreign policy (as Chomsky argued) and not simply by permitting elites to return to power after earlier failures in office. If policy elites are chosen by their

willingness to serve the interests of the powerful rather than the so-called objective national interest, it also raises the question concerning how would anyone committed to serving the latter ever rise in high office or be effective in it? This problem is compounded by Morgenthau's criticisms regarding the corrupting effects of government funding and recognition on academic scholars, because it calls into question the capacity of the academic community to offer impartial appraisals of the national interest as a corrective of the power elite's conception.

The Elusiveness of Responsibility and Accountability

Commenting on Richard Goodwin's book (1966) on American policy in the Vietnam War, Morgenthau focuses attention on Goodwin's two approaches to dealing with responsibility for terrors and failures. 'In the first version,' Morgenthau (1970g: 409) observed, 'responsibility cannot be assessed at all; in the second, it is so widely distributed as to be meaningless. Either it is nobody's fault or it is everybody's fault.' While critical of many aspects of American policy, Goodwin (in Morgenthau's view) could not bring himself to assign individuals responsibility because of the loyalty he retained from serving in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

For Morgenthau, the evasion of accountability and responsibility had become the hallmark of the policy elite. While never showing that earlier generations had honored a higher standard, he criticized the erosion of any ethic of responsibility among contemporary policymakers. This erosion had effaced the distinctions necessary for judging issues of responsibility, either with respect to the consequences of one's own conduct or to that of others. As a result of this systemic process, Morgenthau (1974a: 15–16; see also 1970f: 409) observed:

> Shame, the public acknowledgement of a moral or political failing, is virtually extinct. The members of the intellectual and political elite whose judgments on Vietnam proved to be consistently wrong and whose policies were a disaster for the country remain members of the elite in good standing; a disgraced former President moves easily into the position of an elder statesman receiving confidential information and giving advice on affairs of state. Thus the line of demarcation between right and wrong, both morally and intellectually, is blurred. It becomes a distinction without lasting moral or political consequences. To be wrong morally or politically is rather like a minor acci-

> dent, temporarily embarrassing and better forgotten. That vice of moral and intellectual indifference is presented and accepted as the virtue of mercy, which, however, as forgiveness and dispensation with the usual reaction to vice, supposes a clear awareness of the difference between virtue and vice.

His argument concerning the inversion of moral vocabulary recalls Thucydides' (1998: 130–132) analysis of corruption in his account of the civil war in Corcyra (see also Klusmeyer 2011b). This problem of corruption is compounded by the fact that policies are developed and executed without adequate democratic checks. 'Thus small elites within the executive branch,' Morgenthau (1964: 1401) wrote, 'can commit us to informal alliances and undeclared wars, they can choose military strategies and weapons systems—and what public debate exists is like the chorus of a Greek tragedy, praising or bewailing what has already been done.' From this standpoint, inadequate public scrutiny and democratic checks create a perpetual moral hazard problem, because the agents (e.g. policymakers) are insulated against being held accountable for their own failures by the lack of information that the principals (e.g. the public) have about how their agents have acted, so the penalties are seldom proportionate to costs of these failures.

Morgenthau's critique of the moral facileness of the American policy elite complements Arendt's analysis of the inadequacy of traditional conceptions of evil to comprehend a new modern form of criminality. While she developed her thesis initially in drawing implications from the Adolf Eichmann trial, its motifs also inform both her and his assessments of the *Pentagon Papers*. This new type of criminal, she contends, commits horrendous wrongs not from nefarious intent but from a failure to think through what they are doing in any critical fashion and an inability to see the world from any perspective apart from their own. They do not grasp the human costs of their actions because they think in terms of abstract categories, ideological templates, and statistics, so the factuality of what they have done is obscured from them. Confident that their intent was not malicious, they resist accepting any specific personal responsibility for wrongful conduct and its human costs. If they believe that their intent was good (which they often do), this difficulty is compounded. For Arendt, this type of wrongdoing is most characteristic of modern bureaucracies where decision-making and responsibility are widely distributed, so every individual is shielded from direct accountability for collective actions and their consequences (Arendt 2006: 252, 276–277, 286).[13]

Morgenthau on Kissinger's Practice of Statesmanship

The example of Henry Kissinger illustrates the problematic character of Morgenthau's ideal of the statesman. In many ways, the former secretary of state exemplifies the key attributes of this ideal. He brought to office a brilliant mind steeped in diplomatic history, well versed in realist theory. He also came with a deep distrust of the bureaucratic policymaking culture of government that fed his determination to operate as independently of it as possible. The realist concepts of national interest and balance of power have long been central to his strategic analysis, including the Vietnam War (Kissinger 2003: 12, 27, 133, 148, 269, 539, 562). Even when criticizing his policies, Morgenthau ranked him as one of the most knowledgeable and skillful secretaries of state in American history. While even more elitist than Morgenthau's ideal, Kissinger's model of the statesman shares significant affinities. For Kissinger (1957: 329)

> [t]he statesman is…like one of the heroes in classical drama who has a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its "truth". Nations learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act. But the statesmen must act *as if* their intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration were truth. It is for this reason that statesmen often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honour in their own country, that they always have a difficult task in legitimizing their programmes domestically, and that their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience.

In explaining this model, Kissinger emphasized the parochial character of the people, who cannot grasp (among other things) that principles of justice are mere bargaining chips in conducting international diplomacy. Since statesmen require sufficient popular support to sustain their policies, they must serve as educators to their people while remaining attentive to public opinion. His model then reduces the question of democratic accountability to an issue of legitimating policy agendas, because the people are presumed not qualified to judge either what is in their own best interest or the realities of international politics.[14]

In same year that Kissinger published his portrait of the statesman, Morgenthau (1957: 11) was lamenting the 'decline of democratic government in the United States' while calling attention to the indispensable roles that the citizenry and their political representatives play as a 'check on the government's version of the truth against their own.' The 'assumption of

democratic pluralism,' Morgenthau (1957: 11) argued, 'that neither government nor anybody else has a monopoly on the truth in matters political minimizes the temptation for government to impose its version on society by concealment and misrepresentation.' Even before he began his active opposition to the Vietnam War, he had concluded that the executive branch was routinely succumbing to this temptation.

While admiring Kissinger's many gifts, Morgenthau pointed repeatedly to a long record littered with failures in judgment and policy. He traces these failures from Kissinger's early advocacy of the strategic value of tactical nuclear weapons through his strategy for ending the Vietnam War. He criticized Kissinger's fundamental misapplication of realist concepts in his quest to build an enduring, stable international order while ignoring the underlying sources of change in that order. He also called into question Kissinger's character in his personal style of diplomacy and his willingness to sacrifice his convictions to maintain access to those in power. Morgenthau makes clear that the problem is not simply one of judgment but also character.[15] For his part, Kissinger seldom acknowledges mistakes. As his memoirs amply attest, he has displayed no contrition or remorse over the human costs of his conduct and policies.[16] He has been prone to attribute failures in his own policy strategy to others, such as the anti-war movement, Congress, the press, or the government bureaucracy. In his account of the Vietnam War, he referenced Morgenthau only once and never engages Morgenthau's substantive criticisms of the war (Kissinger 2003: 44). Moreover, Kissinger's 'confidence in his ability to judge consequences is so great,' Michael Smith (1986: 216; see also Gismondi 2007: 446–453; Epp 1997) aptly observes, 'that the ethic of consequences in effect merges with the ethic of intention.' This proclivity effaces the distinction Morgenthau (1946: 185–186) had emphasized between these two ethical approaches. In contrast to Morgenthau, Kissinger also seems to have never rethought his statesman ideal in light of any commitment to the principle of democratic pluralism.

Conclusion

In emphasizing the role of domestic politics and institutions in shaping foreign policy, Morgenthau raised an array of issues that can only be adequately addressed by investigating this domestic context. Part of that investigation involves not simply testing his arguments and claims against the historical record but also identifying continuities or discontinuities between his era and our own,[17] such as the militarization of foreign policy

and the accretion of presidential power in the American constitutional system (see, e.g., Curley 2015). Publishing in a variety of article formats, Morgenthau never organized many of his arguments and insights about how this domestic context affected policymaking during the Vietnam War era into a systematic, empirically grounded full-length study.[18] The impression that he was often writing more in a journalistic and even polemical fashion than in a scholarly one has doubtlessly limited their enduring influence. Therefore, it is not surprising that more recent scholarship on the imperial presidency, the national security state, domestic surveillance, and torture has largely ignored Morgenthau's legacy. While most of these critics do not seem to recognize that they are advancing arguments similar to those Morgenthau had made decades earlier, their critiques suggest the continuing relevance of his critiques of the national security state.

In *Why Leaders Lie* (2011), John Mearsheimer complains that few scholars have examined the role of lying in international politics. However, he curiously ignores Morgenthau's contributions to this subject.[19] In developing his analysis, Mearsheimer appears to work from a simple model: leaders lie for both good reasons and bad, though not as often as many of us may suspect. His approach assumes that leaders actually know the truth or accurately comprehend the factual reality of the case at hand; thus, his concerns are why leaders decide to lie in such instances and the consequences that flow from that choice.[20] Morgenthau, however, saw lying as part of the self-deception, willful blindness, and moral atrophy of policymakers within the institutional context of the national security state. Unlike Mearsheimer, Morgenthau also underscored how habitual lying was but one of many tactics employed—including bribery, intimidation, and domestic spying—to manipulate public opinion and silence dissenting voices. This problem is compounded, Morgenthau (1972) observes, by the fact that officials routinely lie to one another even within the same branch of government.

Despite his emphasis on the irresponsibility and other moral inadequacies of policymaking elites, Morgenthau did not provide any guidance for developing new accountability measures or much hope for thinking that there are any feasible ones. As the United States remained mired in the Vietnam War, he also emphasized the importance of bringing to light the errors that led to such a debacle. 'When a nation allows itself to be misgoverned in such a flagrant fashion,' Morgenthau (1969: 139–140) observed,

> there must be something essentially wrong in its intellectual, moral, and political constitution. To lay bare what is wrong is not an idle exercise in *ex-post-facto* fault-finding. Rather it is an act of public purification and rectification. If

> it is not performed and accepted by the government and people alike, faults undiscovered and uncorrected are bound to call forth new disasters – perhaps different from the one we have experienced in Vietnam, but just as detrimental to the interests of the nation.

His call for 'public purification' seems inspired more by the example of classical tragic heroes, such as Oedipus, than by any careful assessment of the prospects for such a national self-cleansing. His expectation that political leaders should publicly acknowledge their errors ignores how partisan politics discourages such admissions for fear of giving adversaries an advantage. It also reflects the moralistic strain in much of his commentary on the Vietnam War as well as the stark limitations of a moralistic approach of which he was well aware. However, he may not have moved beyond these limitations because he could never envision any practical structural reforms to propose.

At their core, Morgenthau's critiques reflect a fundamental concern that the devices introduced in a late-eighteenth-century constitution to regulate the allocation and exercise of power have proven inadequate to control the national security state. As Stephen Holmes (2009: 323–331) has emphasized, government officials who cannot be effectively called into account to defend their policies against critics are less likely to be cognizant of biases and unwarranted assumptions in their judgments, because these judgments are never subjected to searching external scrutiny. Moreover, government officials are inevitably inclined to use this insulation from scrutiny to conceal their mistakes and underreport the costs of their policy choices. Beginning with his critique of the depoliticization of the public realm and the debasement of citizenship into passive consumerism, Morgenthau (1960: 197–215) came to emphasize the important role that public engagement and debate play in sustaining a republic's constitutional order and free government. In his view, their exercise of this kind of public freedom can potentially provide a check on the government's abuse of power, but he was hardly optimistic about this prospect.[21]

Notes

1. For incisive critiques of this approach to political ethics, see Warner 1991: 9–60; Gismondi 2007.
2. This neglect is especially noteworthy when one recalls that Harold Lasswell (1937, 1941) had been publishing influential studies analyzing the emerging clash between the 'civilian state' and 'garrison state.' The fear that the

United States might become a garrison state influenced postwar American national security (Hogan 1998: 28–29, 67, 72, 79, 112, 138, 150–151, 289, 335, 351–352, 464, 467). For a compelling monograph seeking to explain how the United States avoided this outcome in institutional and economic terms, see: Friedberg (2000). For a counterview emphasizing how militarization has shaped postwar culture and ideology, see Sherry 1995; Bacevich 2005.

3. Zimmer (2011) has written (by far) the most comprehensive overview of Morgenthau's role in opposing the Vietnam War.
4. Bacevich (2007) has reached similar conclusions.
5. The progressive historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1973), exemplifies this pattern. See, generally, Tatalovich and Engeman (2003); Rudalevige (2005: 19–100).
6. For Morgenthau's view of Watergate, see Morgenthau 1973b.
7. This formulation is strikingly similar to Arendt's analysis of Eichmann's thoughtlessness. See Arendt (2006: 48–49, 52–53).
8. I develop the comparison between Morgenthau and Arendt at much greater length in Klusmeyer 2009, 2011a. See also Rösch (2013).
9. Although Arendt makes no reference to George Orwell (1968), her point here shares strong affinities with the argument in his classic 1946 essay.
10. For example, Kissinger (2003: 44) focuses on this point in his comment on Morgenthau's opposition.
11. See, e.g., Scheuerman (2009: 78–100), Navari, In *Defense of the National Interest*, in this volume.
12. For a cogent counterpoint, see Smith 1997.
13. Morgenthau (1963) defended Arendt's controversial study of Eichmann.
14. In his history of postwar policy experts, Bruce Kuklick (2006: 229) concludes, 'They did their best work in constructing ways of thinking that absolved leadership of liability, deserved or not…the culture paid a pretty penny for the expertise, especially when so many intellectuals disdained a democratic public.' He does not exclude Morgenthau from this censure but bases his interpretation of his views primarily on his immediate postwar writings.
15. Morgenthau (1974b: 61) makes this relationship explicit in his assessment of Henry Kissinger's performance in office, observing: 'That ability to be "lucky" requires a quality of character rather than that of mind or of manipulative finesse. For the statesman, in order to be endowed with that ability, must be capable of separating his ego from his task, subordinating both to objective laws that govern the political universe.'
16. Asked at a public forum about his role in the Vietnam War, Kissinger dismissed any question of apology as 'highly inappropriate,' adding: 'I have

no regrets.' Quoted in Allen 2006: B5; also quoted in Zimmer (2011: xxiii).

17. For example, historians have found that the patterns of collaboration between academic scholars and the national security state were much more complex than Morgenthau had recognized. These historians have also emphasized that by the late 1960s, many universities had begun to sever formal relationships with government agencies in the face of mounting criticisms from the anti-war movement. As a result, policymakers have come to rely increasingly on in-house social science research or that of private consulting firms. Most of this research is not vetted by academic scholars and is not available to public scrutiny, which raises new questions which have only begun to be investigated (Rohde 2013).
18. In the last public assessment of presidential power in foreign affairs, Morgenthau (1983: 1–35) ignores his entire structural critique in returning to reflect on the timeless factors that shape its exercise in foreign policy.
19. He also ignores Arendt's contributions to it.
20. 'There is the possibility, of course,' Mearsheimer (2011: 16) acknowledges, 'that a person who thinks that he is telling a lie has his facts wrong and is inadvertently telling the truth. The reverse might also be true as well: a person who believes he is telling the truth might have his facts wrong. This problem, however, is irrelevant for my purposes.'
21. For elaborations of this view of public freedom, see Holmes (2009: 323–326); Villa (2008).

References

Ackerman, Bruce. 2010. *The Decline and Fall of the American Republic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Allen, Scott. 2006. Vietnam-Era Aides Cite the Lessons of a U.S. Defeat. Boston Globe, B5, March 12.

Arendt, Hannah. 1972. Lying in Politics. In *Crises of the Republic*, 3–47. New York: Harcourt Brace.

———. 2003. Home to Roost. In *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 257–275. New York: Schocken Books.

———. 2006. *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. New York: Penguin Books.

Avalon. Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp. Accessed 14 Mar 2017.

Bacevich, Andrew J. 2005. *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2007. Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of U.S. Civil-Military Relations since World War II. In *The Long Cold War: A New History of National Security Policy since World War II*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich, 207–264. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 2010. *Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Chomsky, Noam. 1969. The Responsibility of Intellectuals. In *American Power and the New Mandarins*, 323–366. New York: Pantheon Books.
———. 2002. "Containing" the Soviet Union in the Cold War (April 15–16, 1989). In *Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky*, ed. Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel, 37–41. New York: New Press.
———. 2003. On National Interest (January 28, 1977). In *Chomsky on Democracy and Education*, ed. C.P. Otero, 147–149. New York: Routledge Falmer.
Ciepley, David. 2006. *Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Craig, Campbell. 2007. *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Curley, Tyler M. 2015. Models of Emergency State-Building in the United States. *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (3): 697–713.
Epp, Roger. 1997. The Limits of Remorse: McNamara, Kissinger and the Ethics of Responsibility. *Global Society* 11 (1): 45–59.
Fisher, Louis. 2006. *In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds Case*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Friedberg, Aaron L. 2000. *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gilbert, Alan. 1999. *Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gismondi, Mark. 2007. Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity: Kulturpessismus in the Theories of Max Weber, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 15 (3): 435–464.
Glennon, Michael J. 2015. *National Security and Double Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodwin, Richard N. 1966. *Triumph or Tragedy: Reflections on Vietnam*. New York: Random House.
Hogan, Michael J. 1998. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Holmes, Stephen. 2009. In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror. *California Law Review* 97 (2): 301–355.
Horton, Scott. 2015. *Lords of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and America's Stealth Warfare*. New York: Perseus Books.

Horwitz, Morton J. 1992. *The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kissinger, Henry. 1957. *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22.* Boston: Houghton Miffin.
———. 2003. *A History of America's Involvement in and Extraction from the Vietnam War.* New York: Simon & Schuster.
Klusmeyer, Douglas B. 2009. Beyond Tragedy: Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Responsibility, Evil and Political Ethics. *International Studies Review* 11 (2): 332–351.
———. 2011a. The American Republic, Executive Power and the National Security State: Hannah Arendt's and Hans Morgenthau's Critiques of the Vietnam War. *Journal of International Political Theory* 7 (1): 63–94.
———. 2011b. Contesting Thucydides' Legacy: Comparing Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Imperialism, History, and Theory. *International History Review* 33 (1): 1–25.
Kornhauser, Anne M. 2015. *Debating the American State.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Kuklick, Bruce. 2006. *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lasswell, Harold D. 1937. Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State. *China Quarterly* 11: 643–649.
———. 1941. The Garrison State. *American Journal of Sociology* 46 (4): 455–468.
Lears, Jackson. 1989. A Matter of Taste: Corporate Cultural Hegemony in a Mass-Consumption Society. In *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War*, ed. Lary May, 38–57. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2011. *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press.
Mill, C. Wright. 1956. *The Power Elite.* New York: Oxford University Press.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1946. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
———. 1948. *Politics Among Nations.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1951. *In Defense of the National Interest.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1952. Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States. *American Political Science Review* 46 (4): 961–988.
———. 1955. The Impact of Loyalty-Security Measures on the State Department. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 11 (4): 134–140.
———. 1956. The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy II: Military Illusions. *New Republic* 134 (12): 14–16.
———. 1957. The Decline of America II: The Decline of American Government. *New Republic* 137 (26): 7–11.
———. 1960. *The Purpose of American Politics.* New York: Alfred A Knopf.

———. 1962a. *The Commitments of Political Science. The Decline of Democratic Politics*, 36–52. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1962b. International Relations. In *The Restoration of American Politics*, 167–175. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1963. Review of Eichmann in Jerusalem. *Chicago Tribune*, May 26.
———. 1964. Modern Science and Political Power. *Columbia Law Review* 64 (8): 1386–1409.
———. 1965. *Vietnam and the United States*. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
———. 1967. What Ails America? *New Republic* 157 (18): 17–21.
———. 1969. *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
———. 1970a. Prologue. In *Truth and Power*, 3–9. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1970b. Truth and Power (November, 1966). In *Truth and Power*, 13–28. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1970c. The Right to Dissent (August 1968). In *Truth and Power*, 40–44. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1970d. How Totalitarianism Starts: The Domestic Involvement of the C.I.A (March 1967). In *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970*, 51–55. New York: Praeger.
———. 1970e. The Summit of Power (March 1966). In *Truth and Power*, 163–169. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1970f. Johnson's Dilemma: The Alternatives in Vietnam (May 1966). In *Truth and Power*, 398–407. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1970g. Room at the Top (June 23, 1966). In *Truth and Power*, 407–411. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1970h. The Doctrine of War Without End (November, 1968). In *Truth and Power*, 416–425. New York: Praeger Publishers.
———. 1972. The Web of Falsehood. *The New Leader* 55 (24): 15–16.
———. 1973a. *Politics Among Nations*. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1973b. Nixon's Aborted Revolution. *New Republic* 169 (6): 17–19.
———. 1974a. Power and Powerlessness: Decline in Democratic Government. *New Republic* 171 (19): 13–18.
———. 1974b. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State. *Encounters* 43 (6): 57–61.
———. 1977. Defining the National Interest—Again: Old Superstitions, New Realities. *New Republic* 176 (4): 50–55.
———. 1983. Constraints on Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy. In *Problems and Prospects of Presidential Leadership in the Nine-Eighties*, ed. James Sterling Young, 1–35. Lanham: University of Press of America.
Morgenthau, Hans J., and Noam Chomsky. 1972. National Interest and the Pentagon Papers. *Partisan Review* 39 (3): 336–375.

Moynihan, Daniel P. 1998. *Secrecy: The American Experience*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Navari, Cornelia. 2017. In Defense of the National Interest. In *Hans Morgenthau and the American Experience*, ed. Cornelia Narvari. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nelson, Anna Kasten. 2007. The Evolution of the National Security State: Ubiquitous and Endless. In *The Long Cold War: A New History of National Security Policy since World War II*, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich, 265–301. New York: Columbia University Press.

Noble, David W. 1989. The Reconstruction of Progress: Charles Beard, Richard Hofstadter, and Post-war Historical Thought. In *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War*, ed. Larry May, 61–75. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Novick, Peter. 1988. *The Noble Dream: The Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950). 1993. In *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*, ed. Ernest R. May, 23–82. Boston: Bedford Books.

Olmstead, Kathryn S. 1996. *Challenging Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Orwell, George. 1968. Politics and the English Language. In *The Collected Essays, Journalism Letters of George Orwell, Volume IV: In Front of Your Nose, 1945–1950*, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, 127–140. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich.

Paget, Karen M. 2015. *Patriotic Betrayal*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pallitto, Robert M., and William G. Weaver. 2007. *Presidential Secrecy and the Law*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pells, Richard H. 1985. *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*. New York: Harper & Row.

Posner, Eric A., and Adrian Vermeule. 2010. *The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Purcell, Edward A. 1973. *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Rafshoon, Ellen Glaser. 2001. A Realist's Moral Opposition to War: Hans J. Morgenthau and Vietnam. *Peace & Change* 26 (1): 55–77.

Rohde, Joy. 2013. *Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of Social Research During the Cold War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rösch, Felix. 2013. Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau. *International Politics* 50 (6): 815–829.

———. 2015. *Power, Knowledge, and Dissent in Morgenthau's Worldview*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rosenberg, Emily S. 1993. The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security. *Diplomatic History* 17 (2): 277–284.
Rosenfeld, Seth. 2012. *Subversives: The FBI's War on Student Radicals and Reagan's Rise to Power*. New York: Faux, Strauss and Giroux.
Rudalevige, Andrew. 2005. *The New Imperial Presidency*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Scheuerman, William E. 2009. *Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*. Malden: Polity Press.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1973. *The Imperial Presidency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Schrecker, Ellen. 2008. 'Mere Shadows': Security v. Liberty: The Early Cold War. In *Conflicts Between Civil Liberties and National Security in American History*, ed. Daniel Farber, 67–94. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
See, Jennifer W. 2001. A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955–1965. *Pacific Historical Review* 70 (3): 419–448.
Shane, Peter M. 2009. *Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sherry, Michael S. 1995. *In the Shadow of War: The United States since 1930s*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Silverstein, Gordon. 1997. *Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skowronek, Stephen. 2009. The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive. *Harvard Law Review* 122 (8): 2070–2103.
———. 2011. The Imperial Presidency Thesis Revisited: George W. Bush at the Point of No Return. In *Presidential Leadership in Political Time*, 2nd ed., 150–166. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
Smith, Michael Joseph. 1986. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Smith, Rogers M. 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stone, Geoffrey R. 2004. *Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime*. New York: W.W. Norton.
———. 2008. The Vietnam War: Spying on Americans. In *Conflicts Between Civil Liberties and National Security in American History*, ed. Daniel Farber, 95–114. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Stuart, Douglas T. 2008. *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tatalovich, Raymond, and Thomas S. Engeman, eds. 2003. *The Presidency and Political Science: Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Debate*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Thucydides. 1998. *The Peloponnesian War*. Trans. Walter Blanco, ed. Walter Blanco and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Tomes, Robert R. 1998. *Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954–1975*. New York: New York University Press.
Villa, Dana. 2008. *Public Liberty*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wall, Wendy L. 2008. *Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warner, Daniel. 1991. *An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Weiner, Tim. 2012. *Enemies: A History of the FBI*. New York: Random House.
Wolfe, Audra J. 2015. The Military-Academic-Industrial Complex and the Path Not Taken. In *Origins of the National Security State and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, ed. Mary Ann Heiss and Michael J. Hogan, 143–164. Kirksville: Truman State University Press.
Zambernadi, Lorenzo. 2011. The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau's Critique of American Intervention in Vietnam. *Review of International Studies* 37 (3): 1335–1356.
Zimmer, Louis B. 2011. *The Vietnam War Debate*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Morgenthau in America: The Legacy

Greg Russell

Political Science is an expanding discipline, with a proliferation of subfield specializations, and increasingly few works live past the generation of the author, much less earn the rank of seminal or classic contributions in generations to come. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* is the rare exception, prompting Robert Jervis (1994: 853–854) to observe that this weighty tome 'to a large degree made the field' and that 'scholars still cite his work, even if they have not read it recently…and even if their main objective is to attack it.' For Jervis, Morgenthau continues to be read, and remains relevant, 'because he had so much to say about so many timeless questions…[that] scholars find it impossible to avoid him' (Jervis 1994: 854). While previous chapters in this volume have analyzed the formative experiences and intellectual foundations of Morgenthau's worldview, often trying to disentangle the Anglo-American from the Continental dimensions, the emphasis here will be on his legacy and his influence upon leading American scholars and public figures of his day, in addition to some contemporary international thinkers. That influence registered differently according to time and issue, and in relation to different aspects of Morgenthau's complex personality. This chapter will consider the philosophical Morgenthau, the academic Morgenthau, and the public person, at different periods and in different environments.

G. Russell (✉)
University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8_7

The Philosopher in the Public Space

In the decades before and after World War II, the leading spokesmen of the American realist tradition exhibited a persistent philosophical and historical interest in the relation between power and moral purpose. Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, George F. Kennan, and Kenneth W. Thompson clearly rejected classical *raison d'état* as an appropriate standard for United States foreign policy. At the same time, however, they deplored the tendency of idealists and naïve moralists to sacrifice the prudent calculation of American national interest for the promotion of abstract designs and moral absolutes in international politics.

Among this group, Morgenthau was the leader and in important senses the guide. Not only did Morgenthau defy the trend of contemporary political science, where scholarship and public policy are increasingly distinct, he retained a lifelong concern that philosophy had a necessary place for any theoretical understanding of international politics as well as for probing the moral and political requirements for statesmanship. Holding that the very existence of power had a bearing on the expression of truth, Morgenthau restated the principles of Platonic and Aristotelian *episteme politike*. This 'political science' is not just one science among others; rather, it is concerned not only with the attainment and preservation of the supreme good for the individual 'but also for the whole people (*ethnos*) or city (*polis*)' (Kinneging 2009: 15). His primary concern as a political scientist was with 'the restoration of the intellectual and moral commitment to the truth about matters political for its own sake.' Against social and political pressures aimed at protecting the institutions and values of an established order, he (n.d. Statement by Hans J. Morgenthau on Political Science) warned his colleagues:

> If the political scientist cannot resist these pushes and pulls by repairing to the vision of the searcher for political truth, which the prophets exemplified, what will become of him as a scholar, and what will become of a society which has deprived itself of the ability to measure the conflicting claims of interested parties against the truth, however dimly seen?

His model and soon-to-be collaborator was the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Scholars still debate exactly who influenced whom and in what particular ways, but the relationship was critical to both at seminal moments in their respective careers. The two men first crossed paths at the University of Chicago, where Morgenthau had been teaching since 1943,

and Niebuhr was on a lecture circuit, his reputation approaching its zenith following the publication of the prestigious Gifford Lectures (1941–43). Morgenthau was familiar with, and had read, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* as well as *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (Rice 2008: 258). In *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Morgenthau (1946: 236) acknowledged that 'the books of Reinhold Niebuhr' had 'most illuminatingly treated' the subject matter of the concluding chapter, 'The Tragedy of Scientific Man.' For Morgenthau (1946: 40), Niebuhr 'repudiated the claims of rationalism in all its manifestations.' He likened Niebuhr's critique of modern rationalism to the position taken by Alfred North Whitehead (1926: 288–289), who called upon rationalism to 'transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration.' The fundamental point here is that 'the principles of scientific reason are always simple, consistent, and abstract; [while] the social world is always complicated, incongruous, and concrete' (Morgenthau 1946: 10). The relationship between the two would deepen considerably when George Kennan, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, brought Morgenthau and Niebuhr together (along with other realists like Arnold Wolfers) for a number of sessions between 1949 and 1950.

While Niebuhr (1965: 71) once described Morgenthau as 'the most brilliant and authoritative political realist,' the latter returned the compliment by judging his friend to be 'the greatest living political philosopher in America' and 'perhaps the only creative political philosopher since [John] Calhoun' (Morgenthau 1962c: 109). The extent to which Niebuhr's Christian Realism actually permeated Morgenthau's political thought remains something of an open question. Michael J. Smith (1986: 134) observes that Morgenthau secularized 'Niebuhr's insights…into a general theory of international politics.' Christoph Frei (2001: 111), parting ways with Michael J. Smith, argues to the contrary that Morgenthau essentially 'used Niebuhr's language to introduce his German intellectual heritage in an unobjectionable manner in America.' What Morgenthau was really up to in *Scientific Man*, in Frei's estimation, was 'rephrasing Nietzsche with slightly religious overtones' (2001: 111). Later in life, with a good deal of affectionate nostalgia, Niebuhr sent Morgenthau a brief letter in which he wrote, 'I am forced to ask whether all my insights are not borrowed from Hans Morgenthau' (Rice 2008: 257). Theologian Roger Shinn, who studied with Niebuhr at Union Theological Seminary and who also knew Morgenthau, emphasized that the relationship reached beyond the particular career paths of two intellectual giants. The rapport

between the two men demonstrated 'the possibility of communication between worlds of discourse [theology and politics] that are too often kept separate (Shinn 2003: 185–86)'

Despite their common rejection of liberal moralism and utopianism, as well as their intellectual camaraderie over the years, they had substantial philosophical differences (what Daniel Rice describes as 'various shades of realism') on power and the national interest (Rice 2008: 274–275). In a 1962 article entitled 'Love and Power,' Morgenthau saw the two impulses as organically connected and arising out of human loneliness. 'What love seeks to discover in another man as a gift of nature,' Morgenthau (1962a: 247) wrote, 'power must create through the artifice of psychological manipulation.' The problematic aspect of this formulation, from Niebuhr's point of view, is that the will-to-power, the *animus dominandi*, serves as both the beginning and end of self-identity (having turned to power to achieve what it could not achieve through love). Smith (1987: 136–137) notes that 'for Morgenthau the will-to-power is the starting point of analysis; for Niebuhr it is an aspect of the sin of pride which is itself part of a larger analysis.' Niebuhr connected power and unbridled self-interest to a deeper spiritual drama, beyond mere survival, where the will to power of the self actually finds its highest realization in 'self-giving.' In Niebuhr, the law of love is the 'essential' quality in man's nature by which he 'transcends himself indeterminately and can only have God rather than self for his end' (Niebuhr 1953: 129–130). Niebuhr (1965: 75) thought that 'in Morgenthau's realistic rigor to isolate the dominant motives of…nations [the lust for power] from the pretended higher one [the hypocritical pretense of a deeper loyalty to higher values],' he may have made the mistake of obscuring the important residual creative factor in human rationality. While Niebuhr held that the 'will to power' was an undeniable fact of experience as well as a perennial feature of human affairs, he discerned 'spiritual' depths in the will to power that extended its meaning (Rice 2008: 274). The question Morgenthau does not answer is 'whether or not there is anything in the anatomy of man, as a rational and moral creature, which prompts his embarrassment about the consistent self-regard of his parochial community and the consequent hypocrisy of claiming a higher motive than the obvious one' (Niebuhr 1965: 73).

Similarly, while Morgenthau championed the national interest defined in terms of power, Niebuhr (1953: 136) countered that 'a consistent self-interest on the part of the nation will work against its interests because it will fail to do justice to the broader and longer interests, which are involved

with the interests of the other nations.' He once responded to Morgenthau that little in the realist approach would be undermined 'if we define the moral ambiguity in the political realm in terms which do not rob it of content' (Rice 2008: 276 n. 71). Niebuhr was never comfortable with treating the national interest as a moral end in itself. Morgenthau's defense of the 'moral dignity of the national interest' seemed to Niebuhr (1952: 148) to be 'a preoccupation with our own interests [that] must lead to an illegitimate indifference toward the interests of others.' *Politics Among Nations* raised 'again the question whether a realistic interpretation may not err in obscuring the residual capacity for justice and devotion to the larger good, even when it is dealing with the dimensions of collective behavior in which the realistic assumptions about human nature are most justified' (Niebuhr 1965: 71). Morgenthau's fixation on the ideological gloss on power was, for Niebuhr (Rice 2008: 279), merely an affirmation 'that people, even nations, engage in this pretense because they are moral.' Niebuhr (Rice 2008: 279) explained that the 'pretense is not engaged in to aid the ally or defeat the enemy, but to convince the people themselves that they are behaving morally.'

Part of the problem of even recognizing and assessing the ethical content of Morgenthau's public philosophy follows from the fact, as Professor Jervis (1994: 867) observes, that he simply 'diverges from what most people associate with Realism' (Jervis 1994: 867). It has become almost commonplace for many scholars who apply moral perspectives to foreign policy 'to contrast their views with what they take to be Morgenthau's' (Jervis 1994: 867). Authors typically embellish their own positions by finding someone with whom to disagree; however, 'it will simply not do to use selected quotations to show that Morgenthau thought that international politics leaves no room for ethical considerations' (Jervis 1994: 867). Morgenthau explicitly renounced the ethical dualism of *raison d'état*, stating: No civilization can be satisfied with such a dual morality; for through it the domain of politics is not only made morally inferior to the private sphere but this inferiority is recognized as legitimate and made respectable by a particular system of political ethics' (Morgenthau 1945: 6). In one exchange[1] between Morgenthau and Niebuhr, Morgenthau was asked: 'Has ethics anything whatsoever to do with foreign policy in the practical sense?' His response deserves to be quoted in full:

> Of course it has. This is one of the old chestnuts that there are two compartments: one is foreign policy and the other is ethics. Neither I, nor you, nor

> anyone else can act without considerations of morality. Neither can a statesman. Surely the making of foreign policy, as a human act, is involved with moral decision. This is inevitable because man is a moral being—the statesman, too. (Rice 2008: 286)

While Morgenthau was often reluctant to follow the Niebuhrian inclination of treating the interests and power of nations within more inclusive structures of justice (Griffiths 1992: 53), he was certainly attuned to normative precepts that would guide the wise and prudent statesman who acts on the basis of an intuitive understanding of the 'tragic dilemmas' of foreign policy. William Scheuerman (2009: 88) argues that Morgenthau's defense of the national interest 'was also intended as a normatively minded contribution to political ethics.' As a brake upon both political hubris and ideological abstractions, the national interest properly conceived brought to the statesman 'a healthy sense of humility' and even allowed him 'to interpret the political world from the enemy's perspective' (Scheuerman 2009: 89). Morgenthau's ethical perspective on the national interest, Scheuerman (2009: 89) insists, incorporates 'the old fashioned virtues of humility, moderation, and prudence.' What is demanded of the statesman is 'a careful weighing of options, rigorous examination of their consequences, and an appreciation of the familiar paradox that even the best of intentions produce evil consequences, as well as a hard-headed consideration of the inevitable limits of one's action' (Scheuerman 2009: 89).

Morgenthau's profile of the statesman is replete with norms that serve to direct and judge interest, and that accordingly play a large role in the selection of national means and goals. In fact, the tragic predicament of the statesman inheres in the fact that 'the quest to tame the lust for power by strict moral mechanisms remained no less constitutive of the human condition' (Scheuerman 2009: 89). Even if there is no rationalistic or scientific model that can transcend the inevitable conflict between politics—the domain of power, and ethics—the domain of right, morality consisted in facing this fact squarely. Recognizing the presence of evil in political action, as Morgenthau (1946: 203, 218) did, does not dispense with the moral courage by which the statesman achieves an 'uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical' modus vivendi between the harsh realities of power politics and uncompromising, but imperfectly fulfilled, moral standards' (Brands 1998: 159–160).

Morgenthau's (1962a: 247) view of the relationship between morality and expedience is complex and full of tragedy, awash in the perilous crosscurrents of power and the longing for love. Understanding that

'mankind has at all times refused to forego the ethical evaluation of political action,' he acknowledged that 'political philosophy from the Greeks to our time has started with the assumption that man in the political sphere is not allowed to act as he pleases and that his action must conform to a higher standard than success' (Morgenthau 1946: 176). Political actors, 'however they may be guided by considerations of expediency, must pay their tribute to these standards by justifying actions in ethical terms' (Morgenthau 1946: 176–177). In one of the most important passages, from the first book he published in America, Morgenthau (1946: 177) wrote:

> The moves and countermoves in the struggle for power must be intelligible as a dialectic movement toward the realization of justice. However devoid of positive ethical significance the individual political act may be, it is bound to be less than completely evil and can never be without any ethical significance at all; for the necessity of justifying it in ethical terms carries with it the obligation for even the most cynical of actors to choose his measures so that they, however evil, will coincide at least at some point, however limited and superficial, with the standards of ethics and thus will lend at least color to the positive ethical claims. These claims may be false, but they cannot be completely and absolutely false, as long as the actor is concerned with the appearance of his act as just.…This curious dialectic of ethics and politics, which prevents the latter, in spite of itself, from escaping the former's judgment and normative direction, has its roots in the nature of man as both a political and a moral animal.…Man is the victim of political power by necessity; he is a political master by [moral] aspiration.

Any distinction between private and political action is not one between morality and immorality, but inheres 'in the degree alone in which the two types of action deviate from the ethical norm' (Morgenthau 1946: 195). Morgenthau (1946: 195–196) was quite clear that there 'is not one kind of ethical precept applying to political action and another one to the private one, but one and the same ethical standard applies to both—observed and observable, however, by either with unequal compliance.'

Morgenthau in Academia

Few were in a better position than Kenneth Thompson to observe the impact and unfolding of Morgenthau's career at the University of Chicago. Thompson served as a teaching assistant for both Morgenthau and Quincy Wright. These two luminaries, and their years together on the faculty,

constituted 'the golden age of international studies at Chicago' (Thompson 1977: 22). Even with Professor Wright's deep commitment to a science of international relations, as reflected in his *Study of War* and *Study of International Relations*, Thompson found 'that he and Morgenthau came out at similar or identical points, and this added to the tolerance he developed for philosophy and a type of thought that might have been incompatible with his own approach (1977: 23).' A prolific writer, and first-rate political thinker himself, Thompson received his PhD in 1950 and taught there (in Political Science) and at Northwestern University until 1955. Thompson admired, and was strongly influenced by, Morgenthau's steadfast commitment to philosophy for understanding politics and international relations. Moreover, Thompson (1977: 21) was impressed by Morgenthau's courage and persistence in justifying his lifelong concern in a department where the dominant group was in the field of public administration 'and where the views of Harold Lasswell and Leonard White had gone largely unchallenged.' With behavioral orthodoxy still in full bloom in the immediate aftermath of the Charles Merriam era (Merriam having retired three years before Morgenthau's arrival in the department in 1943), Morgenthau was requested to offer a course in *comparative public law*! Hoping perhaps to put their new colleague 'on the right track' (as Thompson recalled), criticisms of his approach in the department were somewhat offset by a general climate at Chicago relatively open to an interest in political philosophy. This intellectual interest was exemplified not least by University President Robert Hutchins (who had founded a committee to write a world constitution), and was attractive to 'leaders in the undergraduate college such as F. Champion Ward, David Reissman, Morton Grodzins, and David Meiklejohn' (Thompson 1977: 24).

Thompson (1977: 21) recalled the popularity of a class Morgenthau offered on Aristotle, in addition to a course entitled Philosophy of International Relations ('one of the earliest and most stimulating courses offered at the University of Chicago'). As acting chair of the department for a period of time, Morgenthau played an important role in recruiting Leo Strauss from the New School of Social Research to the University in 1949 (a relationship that over time had, according to Thompson, its share of ups and downs). Still it was in the classroom with students, as well as with junior faculty (Charles M. Hardin, Milton Rakove, Gerald Stourzh, George Liska, Tang Tsou, and Robert Osgood), where Morgenthau would have his greatest impact and find strong support. New students entering his class would follow a predictable pattern, often there in the

beginning 'to scorn and ridicule,' always inclined to interrupt to bolster their confidence in world government or international law, and suspicious of Morgenthau's 'Germanic way of looking at things' at a time when 'power politics was a dirty and forbidden word in the Chicago of his day' (Thompson 1977: 23–24). Morgenthau's success in the classroom was due less to his having exorcized the idealistic and ideological proclivities of his students and more to his ability to impart to them a philosophical framework to think more broadly about the interrelationship of human nature, power, law, and morality. Thompson (1977: 23) remembered that those idealistic students who arrived in Morgenthau's class 'left with moderate to evangelical commitment to his ideas.' As time passed, 'they began to see that his conception of international politics had coherence precisely because it was grounded in a coherent philosophy that was still evolving' (Thompson 1977: 23). What made for success among his students (a remarkable group who returned to Chicago after World War II) was a portent of his later contribution to international politics and political science as a discipline. His students would transmit and interpret his thinking to others, including Professor Wright; and if, in consequence, 'the principles he was propounding were subject to testing on many fronts' (Thompson 1977: 23), this only served to spread and strengthen them.

At the same time, however, Thompson (1977: 26) was also situated to understand that Morgenthau brought to his work not only 'all the strengths of the philosopher' but also 'some of the limitations.' He often wondered if his mentor, occasionally austere and single-minded in professional settings, might have increased support for his approach had he 'taken a somewhat conciliatory approach' to other theoretical and methodological perspectives in political science (Thompson 1977: 26). The double-barreled critique of scientism and rationalism in *Scientific Man* drew some rather deep and perhaps unforgiving intellectual lines in the sand. He passed up few opportunities to speak on the limitations of international law (especially in the company of international lawyers), not to mention the conspicuous shortcomings of quantitative political science. The occasional sharp tone could belie the famous remark of Walter Lippmann: 'You are not the harsh realist you are painted but the most moral man that I know' (Thompson 1977: 26). Finally, constructive diplomacy was not always Morgenthau's strong suit in the workings of his own department, whereby he 'was unsuccessful in building political coalitions' and 'was often puzzled and intrigued, rather than galvanized into action, by the political stratagems of colleagues and sometime friends'

(Thompson 1977: 26). Thompson (1977: 26) never forgot a familiar refrain: 'When you are thrown into a den of lions,' Morgenthau would say, 'either the lions will get you or you the lions.'

On Morgenthau's specific intellectual contribution to the subject, Thompson stressed the European heritage. According to him (1980: 88), Morgenthau transformed certain traditional European ideas to fit the American experience and formulated them in useful terms. He continued to rethink and restate these ideas to accord with the realities of American democracy, which he accepted and praised, particularly in his later writings. His achievement was more remarkable because he celebrated the uniqueness of American ideas and institutions at the same time that he defended without compromise what he called the iron law of international politics.

Of his influence on Thompson, the latter rated the influence of Niebuhr on his own work to be the more important (Rajee 2013: 21). But at Carnegie, when in the 1950s, Thompson convened both the American and British Committees on the Theory of International Politics, for the purpose of defining an approach to international relations that could guide sound foreign policymaking, it was to Morgenthau, Nitze, and Wolfers that he looked to serve as the core of the American committee.

The Public Policy Morgenthau

John Bew's excellent new book, *Realpolitik: A History*, offers the first comprehensive history of *Realpolitik* as a concept that moved from Germany into the mainstream of Anglo-American discourse. As Bew's work itself indicates, the idea is now enjoying something of a comeback, along with the 'return' of history, nationalism, and geography, following the brief-lived idealism and triumphalism of the end of the Cold War. Bew's original research (and extensive use of the Hans J. Morgenthau Papers) has the timely virtue (especially for this volume) of analyzing the rise of, and reaction to, American realism in official circles, in addition to evaluating Morgenthau's interaction with notable public personalities in the Realist school throughout the postwar years.

Morgenthau's work had come to the attention of George F. Kennan during the period when the latter served as director of the Policy Planning Staff (a Kennan creation) at the State Department. Having first met in 1948, and struck up a friendship, Kennan informed Morgenthau that he was 'being read with attention and respect by many who have responsibility

for the conduct of foreign policy' (Bew 2016: 210). Morgenthau's writing directly influenced the foreign policy thinking of Kennan, whom Morgenthau recommended for the University of Chicago's Walgreen Lectures in 1951. Kennan's lectures (subsequently published as *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*) drew extensively from many of arguments of Morgenthau's *In Defense of the National Interest*, and his later dissociation from military containment also followed Morgenthau's lead.

The resonance of his work, in his conversations with Kennan, was due in good measure to Morgenthau's 'strong conviction in the unique power of the United States' as well as (and perhaps ironically) a confidence that American idealism was 'much more robust and resilient than the traditions of German idealism (represented by such thinkers as Goethe),' the reputation of the latter having been trampled in the last hundred years' (Bew 2016: 211). Kennan heard an idealistic Morgenthau, who willingly drew on American exceptionalism, express the hope 'that America could lead the unification of Europe in a way that mirrored its own federal polity' (Bew 2016: 211). In a related vein, and unlike later *neorealists* whose theory privileges the structure of the international system over the role of domestic factors in explaining foreign policy behavior, Morgenthau's 'sense of balance in international relations grew out of his understanding of how the successful and stable states (chiefly the Anglo-Saxon ones) achieved *internal* equilibrium' (Bew 2016: 209–210).

Morgenthau eagerly sought out connections and exchanges with prominent public figures, partly because realists felt themselves under siege by a barrage of criticism (and often by German-speaking émigrés like Frank Tannenbaum, Carl J. Friedrich, and Peter Viereck) and partly because 'he believed that the case for a realist foreign policy could not simply be fought within academia' (Bew 2016: 217). And indeed, Morgenthau struck a deep nerve in Washington, where he was the one man 'to whom the label *Realpolitik* was most often appended' (Bew 2016: 208). Morgenthau's correspondence with Dean Acheson led the former Secretary of State in 1953 to admit that he 'was a follower of the Morgenthau line' (Bew 2016: 217). Both at the State Department, and in meetings at the Cosmos and Cosmopolitan Clubs in Washington, Morgenthau developed a friendship with Walter Lippmann, America's most influential political journalist. Lippmann praised his 'public spirit, courage and insight'; he also told Morgenthau that these qualities 'will assure you a place in history as one of the great mentors of our time, regardless of whether your advice will be heeded or not' (Bew 2016: 217). The two met and compared reviews of their works, and Morgenthau sent Lippmann books,

which he read. Although some in this early postwar realist coterie would over time develop important policy differences (as Acheson, Lippmann, and Kennan clashed over the Cold War and containment), the lines of communication sustained Morgenthau's hope that, as he once expressed to Kennan in 1954, the coterie could influence not just 'academic' but 'public thinking on foreign affairs' (Bew 2016: 217).

That hope would be realized not least in the work of Professor Robert Jervis, Columbia University political scientist and a leading expert on the role of perception and misperception in national security policy. He admitted to having 'relied heavily' on Morgenthau in his two books on nuclear strategy, particularly on Morgenthau's critique of American security policy during the height of the Cold War. He reckoned Morgenthau persuasive on the question of how nuclear weapons had altered the traditional relationship between force and foreign policy, in addition to the fatal error of evaluating nuclear weapons 'within the conceptual framework appropriate for conventional weapons' (Jervis 1994: 862). The existence of second-strike capability, the destructive power of the weapons, the difficulty of wartime communications, the hold of human emotions—all of these made of military victory a mutual suicide pact. Jervis (1994: 862) concluded: 'I think Morgenthau was correct to argue that one cannot understand policy alternatives or international outcomes without grasping the content, origins, and implications of alternative views about how nuclear weapons affect world politics.'

For Henry Kissinger, the importance of Morgenthau was not so much in his direct influence on policy but in his role as an engaged intellectual speaking truth to power and as an exponent of the tradition of Anglo-American realism, following on from others such as E. H. Carr. For Kissinger, speaking at his funeral (1980: 12), Morgenthau was more than a friend; he 'was my teacher.' They had known each other ever since Kissinger joined the faculty at Harvard in 1954 and 'remained in sporadic contact' during the latter's years of government service (Kissinger 1980: 12). They would see more of each other, and would remain very close, after Kissinger left office. Kissinger (1980: 12) realized how rare the opportunity comes when 'one can identify a seminal figure in contemporary political thought or in one's own life.' Morgenthau practically 'made the study of contemporary international relations a major discipline' (Kissinger 1980: 12). All who came after him and taught in the field, whatever differences might have existed, 'had to start with his reflections' (Kissinger 1980: 12).

In helping to define the theoretical boundaries of international politics in the United States, Morgenthau faced a formidable task, Kissinger (1980: 13) explained, (in what was no doubt also a self-reflection) because 'the temptation to treat the subject by analogy to our domestic experience was overwhelming.' In addition, there already was a well-developed literature on international law 'that saw international relations in terms of legal processes,' not to mention 'a pragmatic tradition of solving issues that arose on their merits' (Kissinger 1980: 13). Particularly problematic was 'the belief in America's moral mission that had produced both isolationism and, later on, global involvement' (Kissinger 1980: 13). America's historic moral convictions produced over time two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that American values are served best 'by perfecting democracy at home…acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind' (Kissinger 1994: 18). The second is that the nation's values impose on it and obligation 'to crusade for them around the world' (Kissinger 1994: 18).

Morgenthau's achievement, according to Kissinger (1980: 13), was 'to transcend all these disparate tendencies,' convinced 'that peace was a statesman's noblest objective,' while never believing 'that this yearning alone would avoid war.' His political credentials were unapologetically liberal. Yet he understood that liberal aspirations depended not just on simple affirmation 'but sufficient stability at least to enable man's humane aspirations to prevail' (Kissinger 1980: 13). The fundamental dilemma for any political leader is that 'moral aims can be reached only in stages, each of which is imperfect' and that 'morality provides the compass course, the inner strength to face the ambiguities of choice' (Kissinger 1980: 13).

Kissinger (1980: 13) shared Morgenthau's conviction 'that a proper understanding of the national interest would illuminate a country's possibilities as well as dictate the limits of its aspirations'; indeed, he adopted Morgenthau's conception as his own. In the 'heartland' speeches and in the third volume of his memoirs, he refers to it repeatedly and in terms recognizably those of Morgenthau, such as that the standard of national interest was more than a brake upon liberal internationalist fantasies. Morgenthau's defense of the national interest, that it 'saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly' of identifying 'the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe' (Morgenthau 2006: 12) is entirely recognizable in 'American Unity and the National Interest' which Kissinger delivered in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1975. Both Kissinger and Morgenthau rejected what Bew called the

'equation of political moralizing with morality and of political realism with immorality' (Bew 2016: 213). He also followed Morgenthau that there was an irreducible ethical core to the national interest, a kind of 'moral dignity,' not least because, as Morgenthau insisted, it demanded great caution and restraint in the exercise of power (Morgenthau 1951: 3–39).

Kissinger (1980: 13) said of Morgenthau, in the 1960s, that he 'proved that he was beyond the manipulation of military calculations,' opposing the Vietnam War as he did 'when it was still supported by fashionable opinion.' Their relationship would be tested. Just before Kissinger took his position as national security advisor in 1968, Morgenthau wrote to him to express his displeasure that Kissinger had not taken a strong and visible public stand against the war or signaled his intention to help bring it to an end (Bew 2016: 261). Kissinger recollected the 1966 debate the two of them had in on Vietnam in *Look* magazine. Morgenthau 'considered America over-extended, the war unwinnable [and] the stakes not worth the cost' (Kissinger 1980: 13). Kissinger (1980: 13) countered with the argument that 'the size of our commitment had determined our stake, that we had an obligation to seek our way out of the morass through negotiation rather than unconditional abandonment of the enterprise.' Against those who contended that America's credibility and prestige throughout the world would be undermined by an abrupt termination of military hostilities, Morgenthau wondered whether it is a boon to the prestige of the most powerful nation on earth to be bogged down in a war that it is neither able to win nor can afford to lose. Is not the mark of greatness 'in circumstances such as these,' he asked, 'to be able to afford to be indifferent to one's prestige?' (Morgenthau 1965: 70–71).

Not only did Morgenthau (1967: 18) deem the war politically aimless and militarily unwinnable, it also violated 'the very principles upon which the nation was founded and for which it has stood in the eyes of its own citizens and the world.' Vietnam, he wrote in 1967, 'was Metternich's war being fought by the nation of Jefferson and Lincoln.' Morgenthau, whose criticism of America's role in Vietnam dated back to 1961, was perhaps the first prominent political scientist to rise above the suffocating air of intellectual conformism within his discipline to expose what he considered to be the corruption of power and principle at the highest echelons of the United States government. The pressure upon intellectuals to conform flowed from what he described as an insidious academic-political complex, whereby the interests of the government are inextricably tied to the welfare of large groups of academics. Because of the money, prestige, and awards

that flow from government contracts with universities and private foundations, the academic 'enters into a subtle…relationship with the government, which imperceptibly transforms his position of independent judge to that of client and partisan' (Morgenthau 1970: 26). In a revealing passage testifying to the tragedy of both President Johnson and the intellectuals of America, Morgenthau (1970: 27) the political realist wrote:

> These intellectuals must maintain their own regard for the truth in the face of massive official disregard for it, which goes far beyond the necessities of the political game. The official pronouncements on President Kennedy's assassination and the Vietnam War could perhaps still be justified in terms of reason of state, although they have made civilized public debate with public officials virtually impossible. But it is a different matter to habitually play fast and loose with the truth, regardless of the public ends that might justify such a play and for the sole purpose of enjoying another dimension of power.

Kissinger (1980: 13) conceded that Morgenthau 'was right in his analysis' and 'probably in his policy conclusions as applied to 1966.' They both 'stuck to their guns' after Kissinger dealt with the problem three years later as a policymaker (Kissinger 1980: 13). Reflecting back on their debate, Kissinger (1980: 13) acknowledged that they 'shared almost identical premises.' Kissinger did not disagree that the United States was overextended, and they both sought a way out of the dilemma. 'Hans,' he said, 'wanted to cut the Gordian knot in one dramatic move; I choose a different route' (Kissinger 1980: 13). Interestingly, Kissinger (1980: 13) thought he and his friend 'were both in a way lonely among our associates.' Morgenthau is 'not correctly understood as a protestor'; on the contrary, he 'was a teacher trying to bring home to his beloved adopted country the limits of its power, just as earlier he had insisted on its central role' (Kissinger 1980: 13). Through all the disagreements, Kissinger (1980: 13) 'never ceased admiring him' or 'remembering the profound intellectual debt' that he owed him.

The Contemporary Morgenthau

Among more recent scholars, Robert D. Kaplan has drawn on the realism of Morgenthau in his 2012 book *The Revenge Of Geography: What The Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts And The Battle Against Fate*. Considering the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kaplan (2012a: 3) writes: 'Suddenly, we were in a world in which the dismantling of a man-made

boundary in Germany had led to the assumption that all human divisions were surmountable.' Following the triumph of the West in the Cold War, many (including Kaplan) believed that human agency and its various constructs—including human rights, free markets, democracy, science and technology, and even humanitarian intervention—would emerge as the most important forces shaping world events and would lead to freedom and prosperity across the globe. The years that followed, however, revealed a much darker reality: while many societies did become more democratic and prosperous, 'it would be a long and difficult struggle, with anarchy (in cases of several West African countries), insurrection and outright wickedness (in the case of Rwanda) rearing their heads' in 'the long decade between November 9, 1989, and September 11, 2001' (Kaplan 2012a: 5). In the new decade following 9/11, 'geography, a factor certainly in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990s, would go on to wreak unmitigated havoc on America's good intentions in the Near East' (Kaplan 2012a: 5). What Kaplan (2012a: 5) describes as the journey from Bosnia to Baghdad, 'from a limited air and land campaign in the western, most developed part of the former Turkish Empire in the Balkans to a mass infantry invasion in the eastern, less developed part in Mesopotamia, would expose the limits of liberal universalism, and in the process concede new respect to the relief map.' In short, the debacle of the early years in Iraq 'reinforced the realist dictum…that the legacies of geography, history, and culture do set limits on what can be accomplished in any given place' (Kaplan 2012a: 23).

Realism, Kaplan argues, is essential for a proper appreciation of the map, and in fact leads directly to it. He draws on insights from *Politics Among Nations* 'to set the stage' for his larger, more philosophical discussion about the relationship between human agency and determinism in the field of geopolitics (2012a: 24). His starting point is Morgenthau's argument that the world 'is the result of forces inherent in human nature' (2012a: 24). In order 'to improve the world, following Morgenthau's reasoning, one must work with these forces, not against them' (2012a: 24). The political realist is one who accepts the material at hand (however imperfect that material may be), who 'appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract,' and who 'aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good' (2012a: 24).

In 2003, a realist would have paid attention to 'Iraq's own history, explained through its cartography and constellation of ethnic groups, rather than to moral precepts of Western democracy, to see what kind of

future Iraq would be immediately capable of following the toppling of a totalitarian regime' (Kaplan 2012a: 24). After all, 'good intentions have little to do with positive outcomes, according to Morgenthau' (Kaplan 2012a: 24). Countering the contention of Paul Wolfowitz—that the invasion of, and regime change in, Iraq would end oppressive tyranny and improve human rights—Kaplan (2012a: 25) cited Morgenthau's reminder 'that the need to marshal popular emotions cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself.' Many neoconservative proponents of the war simply could not resist what Morgenthau described as the temptation 'to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe' (Kaplan 2012a: 25). It is one thing to know that 'nations are subject to the moral law,' but it is quite another 'to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations' (Morgenthau 2006: 12).

Kaplan (2012a: 26) observes that realism enjoyed something of a resurgence following the violence in Iraq from 2003 to 2007, and 'we all claimed for a time to have become realists, or so we told ourselves.' Yet, given how Morgenthau defines realism, is that really true? Kaplan's (2012a: 26) uncertain answer to the question deserves to be quoted in full:

> do most of those who opposed the Iraq war on realist grounds also feel that there is not necessarily a connection between democracy and morality? And, Morgenthau, who opposed the Vietnam War on grounds of both ethics and national interest, is the realist with whom we can all feel most comfortable. An academic and intellectual his whole life, he never had the thirst for power that other realists such as Kissinger and Scowcroft have demonstrated. Moreover, his restrained, almost flat writing style lacks the edginess of a Kissinger or a Samuel Huntington. The fact is, and there's no denying it, realism, even the Morgenthau variety, is supposed to make one uneasy.… Indeed, just beneath the veneer of civilization lie the bleakest forces of human passion, and thus the central question in foreign affairs for realists is: *Who can do what to whom?*

Christopher Layne makes another case—that Morgenthau's realism points to the need for restraint and self-awareness in American grand strategy. Morgenthau and other leading realists 'have always feared that a hegemonic grand strategy would lead to excessive interventionism and cause the United States to adopt both a crusading mentality and a spirit of intolerance' (Layne 2006: 203). Layne (2006: 259 n. 33) cites at length

Morgenthau's admonition that, when states claim universal applicability for their ideas:

> compromise, the virtue of the old diplomacy, becomes the treason of the new, for the mutual accommodation of conflicting claims, possible or legitimate within a common framework of moral standards, amounts to surrender when the moral standards are themselves the stakes of the conflict. Thus the stage is set for a contest among nations whose stakes are no longer their relative positions within a political and moral system accepted by all, but the ability to impose upon other contestants a new universal political and moral system recreated in the image of the victorious nation's political and moral convictions.

Morgenthau's prudential understanding of the national interest is important for he and others 'have warned that over-concentrated power, even an imbalance in America's favor, can have dangerous consequences; insisted that US strategy distinguish vital from secondary interests; and argued against US involvement in peripheral countries' (Layne 2006: 203). Yet, in ongoing foreign policy debates between advocates of American strategic internationalism and realist proponents of restraint, realists like Morgenthau have not fared particularly well precisely because they have often bracketed out values while leaning heavily on national interests and power.

Layne (2006: 203) calls on realists to 'shed their reticence to explicate the values underlying their policy preferences, because this reluctance allows their opponents to portray them—unfairly—as amoral (or even immoral).' Realists are well positioned, Layne believes, to address the normative dimension of national interest for two reasons. First, there is 'no single objectively true national interest'; Morgenthau himself refused to consider the national interest as a static, self-evident principle of statecraft whose formulation is immune from the complex interaction of domestic and external influences on foreign policy decision-making processes (Layne 2006: 203). Second, realists have understood that the United States would pay a price at home for overreaching abroad, that 'America's political institutions, prosperity, and social cohesion are best safeguarded by grand strategic restraint' (Layne 2006: 202). That is why 'Kennan, Lippmann, Morgenthau, [Robert] Tucker, and [Kenneth] Waltz opposed America's Vietnam policy, just as the current generation of realists took the lead in opposing the Iraq War' (Layne 2006: 203).

Few today have defended realist theory, or been more critical of recent American foreign policy, than John Mearsheimer[2] at the University of Chicago. Observing pictures of Morgenthau and Samuel Huntington in Mearsheimer's office, Robert Kaplan (who interviewed Mearsheimer for a feature in *The Atlantic*) reports: 'Mearsheimer reveres both men for their bravery in pointing out unpopular truths, and throughout his career he has tried to emulate them. Indeed, in a country that has always been hostile to what realism signifies, he wears his 'realist' label as a badge of honor' (Kaplan 2012b: 81). Mearsheimer (2017) offers this summary judgment of Morgenthau's legacy:

> Morgenthau is obviously a giant among IR scholars in the US and the world more generally. He was the dominant IR figure in the U.S. from 1946, when *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* was published, until about 1965, when the Vietnam War started and realism was pushed underground in the academy. No other IR scholar was close to him in terms of influence during those years, both inside and outside the academic world. He personified what it meant to be a public intellectual.

With the onset of the Vietnam War, 'Morgenthau's influence began to wane…because the searing hostility to that conflict on college and university campuses created a hostile environment for realism and security studies' (Mearsheimer 2017). The irony in this development, of course, is that virtually every prominent realist opposed the Vietnam War. Despite the national prominence of Morgenthau's opposition to the war, in Mearsheimer's (2017) recollection, 'students and faculty did not pay much attention to *Scientific Man* or *Politics Among Nations* during the Vietnam years, which ran from 1965–1975.'

The more likely reason why 'Morgenthau's star dimmed was that he was deeply opposed to modern science,' a recurring theme reflected in his writings (Mearsheimer 2017). Mearsheimer (2017) thinks his 'animus did not matter much before the 1970s, but it began to matter in a big way as the 1970s wore on and the social science revolution hit the IR field in full force.' His work 'was no longer put up in bright lights' and was judged methodologically unsophisticated by an increasingly quantitative and data-driven political science (Mearsheimer 2017).

Mearsheimer himself cannot remember reading Morgenthau as an undergraduate at West Point or as an MA student at the University of Southern California, although 'I do remember people talking about him and I knew that his name was associated with power politics' (Mearsheimer 2017). After

he arrived as a PhD student at Cornell in 1975, 'realism was beginning to make a comeback' (Mearsheimer 2017). His entrée to realism came, interestingly enough, through the International Political Economy (IPE) literature with its breakdown among realists, liberals, and Marxists. 'The two key realists we read were Bob Gilpin and Steve Krasner,' in addition to a piece by Waltz (not yet the seminal figure he would be after 1979) on economic interdependence and war (Mearsheimer 2017). Although Mearsheimer focused more on security than IPE at Cornell, 'there was no major realist figure in the security realm who we paid attention to' (Mearsheimer 2017). Aside from reading a chapter or two from *Politics Among Nations* for a graduate class, 'we did not pay it much attention' (Mearsheimer 2017).

Mearsheimer (2017) continues: 'I was well into my [doctoral] dissertation in 1979, when Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* came out and did not read [it] until 1983, when I assigned it for my first IR seminar at Chicago.' Neither Morgenthau nor Waltz 'had a significant influence on my thinking about IR by the time I received my PhD in 1980' (Mearsheimer 2017). Mearsheimer occasionally assigned chapters from *Politics Among Nations* over the years; at the same time, however, he does not believe Morgenthau had much influence on his thinking about realism, 'mainly because he is a human nature realist and I am a structural realist' and (since 'that difference is so huge') 'there just was not much reason for me to engage him' (Mearsheimer 2017). Waltz was a different story 'because he is a structural realist and I knew from early on that I disagreed with him in fundamental ways and wanted to challenge him' (Mearsheimer 2017). So it was Waltz, and not Morgenthau, who had a marked influence on Mearsheimer's thinking about international relations during the time he was developing his own theory of offensive realism. Still, Mearsheimer (2017) acknowledges, 'many of Morgenthau's substantive insights in his books are so smart that he is still paid considerable attention, especially in Europe.'

Where Mearsheimer (2005) did find intellectual commonalities with Morgenthau, and where he insisted that Morgenthau had led the way, was in their shared skepticism of the claims of 'bandwagoning,' and their opposition to wars in respect of bandwagoning. In 2005, he published a piece entitled 'Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism Versus Neo-Conservatism' where he argues that Morgenthau's criticism of the Vietnam War parallels his, and other realists, criticism of the Iraq War. According to Mearsheimer, the core of the neoconservative theory of international politics 'that moved the invasion of Iraq' consists of two strands. It has a power-based strand

'which emphasizes big stick diplomacy and a bandwagoning logic,' and an idealist strand that calls for 'spreading democracy across the Middle East and maybe even the entire globe' (Mearsheimer 2005: 3). With regard to Morgenthau, 'the critical issue is how he thought about the domino theory, which is based on bandwagoning logic and which was at the heart of the debate about whether to fight in Vietnam' (Mearsheimer 2005: 4). Morgenthau, like other realists, understood 'that we live in a balancing world and that the fall of Vietnam would not have had a cascading effect in Southeast Asia, much less across the entire globe' (Mearsheimer 2005: 4). Mearsheimer (2005: 4) finds it implausible that Morgenthau 'would have accepted the neo-conservatives' claim that invading Iraq would cause America's other adversaries to start dancing to the Bush administration's tune.'

Regarding the idealist strand of neoconservative theory, Morgenthau would be in synch with other realists in believing nationalism, not democracy, to 'be the most powerful political ideology on the face of the earth' (Mearsheimer 2005: 4). He consistently argued 'that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (the guerilla forces in South Vietnam) were motivated mainly by nationalism, not communism, and that they would invariably view American troops in their midst as colonial occupiers whom they would fight hard to expel' (Mearsheimer 2005: 4). Finally, Morgenthau understood 'that if the United States committed large-scale military forces to Vietnam, it would face a major-league insurgency that would be extremely difficult to beat' (Mearsheimer 2005: 4). In sum, 'the odds are that Morgenthau would have applied the same basic logic to Iraq, and "thus would have opposed the Iraq war as fiercely as he opposed the war in Vietnam (ibid.)."'

Morgenthau's Legacy

Upon the death of Professor Morgenthau in 1980, Robert E. Osgood (1980: 35), who first met Morgenthau as a graduate student before becoming one of his colleagues at the University of Chicago, lamented that the nation 'lost an outstanding figure in the intellectual history of its foreign policy.' In exhorting Americans to 'come to terms with the realistic management of power on the international stage,' Morgenthau 'left a lasting impact on a generation of scholars' (1980: 35), but one based on misunderstandings. Those persistent doubters who claimed that Morgenthau's international and political thought excluded ethics, and that his defense of

the national interest neglected purposes and values, 'simply missed the point' (1980: 35). Osgood argued that Morgenthau's critics overlooked the central theme of *The Purpose of American Politics* (1960): 'A nation must pursue its interests for the sake of a transcendent purpose that gives meaning to the day-by-day operations of its foreign policy' (Morgenthau 1960: 8). Morgenthau always believed, in the semi-anarchical arena of world politics, that 'moral sentimentality and self-righteousness are the true enemies of moral purpose' (Osgood 1980: 35). In writing about the moral dignity of the national interest, Morgenthau was always the consequentialist, insisting that abstract principles must be filtered through circumstances of time and place. Osgood thought that Morgenthau's most profound statement about the moral universe of the statesmen found expression in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (the book that Morgenthau would sometimes say was his best work):

> Neither science nor ethics can resolve the conflict between politics and ethics. We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny. (Morgenthau 1946: 203)

Osgood's 1980 appreciation of the significance of Morgenthau's life and scholarly career for American foreign policy thinking has surprising relevance for the world that the United States confronts in the twenty-first century. During the Cold War, Morgenthau's realism was a powerful rejoinder to that part of the American ethos that found expression in the militant rhetoric of anticommunism, the misuses of military power, and alliances throughout the developing world 'or the naïve formulas for containing revolutions' (Osgood 1980: 35). In fact, 'being more of a critic than a prophet,' Morgenthau was 'inspired by a mission that is never fulfilled' (Osgood 1980: 35). For, on the one hand, the United States remains 'exceptional among nations in the extent to which its citizens insist upon…justifying its actions according to moral principles inseparable from its national identity' (Osgood 1980: 35). That exceptionalism was grounded in the faith that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America's reverence for international law and democracy. On the other hand, Cold

War rivalries left the United States with the task of 'managing power in an environment inhospitable to these principles' (Osgood 1980: 35). Osgood (1980: 35), citing the inescapable tension between moral preferences and the imperatives of power, concluded that the shifts in policy by the end 'of a self-consciously righteous [Clinton] administration,' following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of American hostages in Iran, 'guarantees the enduring relevance of Morgenthau's mission' (Osgood 1980: 35). With the end of the Cold War, Henry Kissinger (1994: 18–19) affirmed Osgood's verdict on Morgenthau's lasting contribution by noting that the collapse of the Soviet Union was partly 'the intellectual vindication of American ideals and, ironically, brought America face to face with kind of world it had been seeking to escape throughout its history.' The emerging world order, one that the United States could neither dominate nor withdraw from, confronted America with 'the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities' (Kissinger 1994: 19).

Following World War II, the discipline of international relations represented an ad hoc mixture of scholarly pursuits ranging from international law and organization to diplomatic history and descriptive area studies. It was the lifelong achievement of one scholar-activist, Hans J. Morgenthau, to integrate political realism within the mainstream of American political science and help to establish international politics as an autonomous field of inquiry. The national interest defined in terms of power, the precarious uncertainty of the international balance of power, the weakness of international morality, the decentralized character of international law, the deceptiveness of ideologies, the requirements of a peace-preserving diplomacy—these were his legacies, set within a theory of international politics that drew in turn on general principles of politics.

In pursuit of that theory, Morgenthau's realism drew upon fundamental philosophical conceptions about man, nature, and politics. Rejecting many of the optimistic and reductionist beliefs of modern liberal thought, he argued that objective laws that have their roots in human nature govern the political realm. Stanley Hoffmann (1977: 44) correctly summarizes Morgenthau's intellectual contribution in the following terms: 'He was determined both to erect an empirical science opposed to the utopias of international lawyers and political ideologues, and to affirm the unity of empirical research and philosophical inquiry into the right kind of social order.' Against the wishful thinking and pious hopes of interwar idealism, Morgenthau developed a theoretical approach to international affairs that

both described national behavior and provided a framework for policymakers. 'The use of theory, then, is not limited to rational explanation and anticipation,' Morgenthau (1962b: 49) declared. 'A theory of politics also contains a normative element' (Morgenthau 1962b: 49). While Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, and other structural realists, have emphasized restraint and humility in the exercise of political power, the ancient virtue of prudence provided Morgenthau with a standard acknowledging the persistence of self-interest without sacrificing the practical moral requirement of adjusting self-interest to norms above the national community.

Notes

1. One of the most notable exchanges between Morgenthau and Niebuhr was published as 'The Ethics of War and Peace in the Nuclear Age,' in *The War/Peace Report* (7) 2 (February 1967) (published by the Center For War/Peace Studies, 3–8).
2. Mearsheimer's comments and judgments on Morgenthau's impact on the field of international relations, and upon his own work, are taken from a letter to the author (January 17, 2017).

References

Aristotle. 1962. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Bew, John. 2016. *Realpolitik: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brands, H.W. 1998. *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Frei, Christoph. 2001. *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Griffiths, Martin. 1992. *Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation*. London: Routledge.

Hoffmann, Stanley. 1977. An American Social Science: International Relations. *Daedalus* 106 (3): 41–60.

Jervis, Robert. 1994. Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics. *Social Research* 61 (4): 853–876.

Kaplan, Robert D. 2012a. *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*. New York: Random House.

———. 2012b. Why John Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things). *The Atlantic* 309 (1): 80–89.

Kinneging, Andreas. 2009. Eric Voegelin's Philosophy of Law and Ethics: A Critique. In *Religion, Politics and Law*, ed. Bart Labuschagne and Reinhard Sonnenschmidt, 15–30. Boston: Brill.

Kissinger, Henry. 1980. Hans Morgenthau. *The New Republic* 183 (5/6): 12–14.

———. 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Layne, Christopher. 2006. *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mearsheimer, John. 2005. Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism Versus Neo-conservatism. www.openDemocracy.net, 1–7.

———. 2017. John Mearsheimer to Greg Russell, January 17.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1945. The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil. *Ethics* 56 (1): 1–16.

———. 1946. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1951. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

———. 1960. *The Purpose of American Politics*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

———. 1962a. Love and Power. *Commentary* 33 (3): 247–251.

———. 1962b. *The Decline of Democratic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1962c. The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr in American Political Life and Thought. In *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic in Our Time: Essays by Paul Tillich, John C. Bennett, Hans Morgenthau*, ed. Harold Landon, 97–116. Greenwich: Seabury Press.

———. 1965. We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam. *New York Times Magazine*, April 18, pp. 61–73.

———. 1967. What Ails America? *The New Republic* 157 (18): 17–21.

———. 1970. *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–1970*. New York: Praeger.

———. 1978. The Roots of Narcissism. Hans J. Morgenthau Papers, Box 109, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

———. 2006 (1954). *Politics Among Nations*, 7th ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

———. n.d. Statement by Hans J. Morgenthau on Political Science. Hans J. Morgenthau Papers, Box 4, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1952. *The Irony of American History*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

———. 1953. *Christian Realism and Political Problems*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

———. 1965. *Man's Nature and His Communities*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

———. 1980. Hans Morgenthau's Foreign Policy Impact. *Chicago Tribune*, January 27, Section 3: 5.

Rajee, F. 2013. *Kenneth W. Thompson, The Prophet of Norms: Thought and Practice*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rice, Daniel. 2008. Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A Friendship with Contrasting Shades of Realism. *Journal of American Studies* 42 (2): 255–291.

Scheuerman, William. 2009. *Morgenthau*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Shinn, Roger L. 2003. Christian Realism in a Pluralistic Society: Interactions Between Niebuhr and Morgenthau, Kennan and Schlesinger. In *The Christian Realists: Reassessing the Contributions of Niebuhr and His Contemporaries*, ed. Eric Patterson, 177–199. New York: University Press of America.

Smith, Michael Joseph. 1986. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Thompson, Kenneth W. 1977. Philosophy and Politics: The Two Commitments of Hans Morgenthau. In *A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers, 21–31. Washington, DC: The New Republic Book Co.

———. 1980. *Masters of International Thought*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Whitehead, Alfred North. 1926. *Science and the Modern World*. New York: Macmillan.

Index[1]

A
Academic acculturation, 62
Academic Assistance Council, 2
Acheson, Dean, 91n8, 153
Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal Proposal, 101
Adolphus, Gustavus, 105
Adorno, Theodor, W., 30
African-Americans, 96, 98
Alliance for Progress, 103
Altamira, Rafael, 4
Altschul, Frank, 87
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 83
American cultural environment, 29
American experience, 33
American intervention, 108
American provincialism, 33
Americanus, 79
Anglo-American democratic societies, 33
'Another 'Great Debate', The National Interest of the United States', 84
Anthropological foundation, 28
Anti-imperialism, 81
Anti-realpolitik tradition, 82
Anti-Semitism, 2, 3
Aquinas, Thomas, 31
Arendt, Hannah, 3, 11, 15, 18n15, 29, 119
Aristotle, 31, 150
Arms control, 111
Aron, Raymond, 82
Atomic bomb, 76

B
Balance of power, the, 83, 104, 130, 165
Balancing, 99
Bandwagoning, 163
Basic norm, 4
Bay of Pigs, 103
Beard, Charles, 80
Behavioralism, 5
Behavioral revolution, 18n14
Behavioral sciences, 13
Behavioral turn, 5
Behaviorist, 45, 49n37

[1]Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refers to notes.

© The Author(s) 2018

C. Navari (ed.), *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67498-8

Beneditz, Mary Jane, 63
Bew, John, 152
Bismarck, Otto von, 105
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 105
Boulding, Kenneth. E., 69
Bretton Woods, 17n11
Brodie, Bernard, 91n8
Bush administration, 101–102

C
Carr, E. H., 61, 77, 107, 154
Castlereagh, 79
Central Intelligence Agency, 102
The Century of Total War, 82
Chicago, 76
China, 88, 99
Chinese communists, 84
Chomsky, Noam, 116
Church, Frank, 109
CIA, 118
Civil rights, 103
Civil rights movement, 103
Classical tradition of political philosophy, 35
Clausewitz, Carl von, 105
Clay, Lucius, 82
Cold War, 34, 76, 96, 123
Commentary, 102
Common European identity, 85
Commons, John R., 33
Concept of the Political, The, 2, 10, 11, 16, 60
Congress, 98
Conservatism, 46
Containment, 76
Coordinate State, 83
Core interests, 78
Council of Foreign Relations, 87
Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA), 7
Counterinsurgency, 109
Crisis of modernity, 3–6, 12
Critique of modernity, 3

D
Dahl, Robert, 29
Dahrendorf, Ralf, 4
Decision-making approach, 89
The Decline of American Politics, 102
Defending the National Interest, 89
In Defense of the National Interest, 81
Democracy, 97
Democratic change, 101
Democratic pluralism, 131
Descartes, 37
Deterrent, 91n8
Dewey, John, 33
Diplomacy, 77, 151, 160
Disputes, 3, 10
Division between East and West, 86
Doctrine, Truman, 120
Drive for self-preservation, 7
Drive to prove oneself, 7

E
Eastern Europe, 81
East German uprising, 100
Eichmann, Adolf, 129
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 103, 119
Émigrés, 4, 11, 12
Émigré scholars, 3, 33, 36, 43–45
Émigré scholarship, 27, 30, 39
Empiricism, 37
'Ends interests' and 'means interests', 88
Enlightenment, 4
Epistemological, 38
Epistemologies, 37, 39–41, 43
Equality, 97
Erfahrungswissenschaft, 37, 38
Erfahrungswissenschaftlich, 38
Erfahrungswissenschaftliche, 38
Esmain, Adhémar, 63
Ethics, 106, 147
Ethics of responsibility, 3, 16
Europe, 102

European academic socialization, 29
European Coal and Steel Community, 67
European émigré scholars, 3
European experiences, 31
European provincialism, 33
Executive power, 118

F

Fascism, 3, 4, 18n12
Federalism, 84
Federalism in international relations, 83
Federalist Papers, 97
Feller, Abraham, 83
Finer, Herman, 102
First great debate, 75
First World War, 106
Foreign Affairs, 102
Foreign aid, 101
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 102
Foreign policy, 79
Foucault, Michel, 44
Fox, Williams, T. R., 75
France, 103
Freedom, 97, 103
Frei, Christoph, 145
Freud, Sigmund, 7, 31
Friedrich, Carl J., 82, 119, 153

G

Gagarin, Yuri, 103
Geistesgeschichtliche, 31
Geisteswissenschaft, 32
German historical school, 85
German reconstruction, 87
Germany, 81
Gnostic, 29, 39
Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2
Great Power rivalry, 81
Grodzins, Morton, 150
Gunnell, John, 30

H

Hamilton, Alexander, 79
Hamiltonian, 98
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 8, 103
Hardin, Charles M., 63, 150
Hegelianism, 31
Heller, Hermann, 9, 57
Herz, John, 2, 3, 17n11
Hilton, Ronald, 1
Historical optimism, 64
Hitler, Adolf, 104
Hobbes, Thomas, 67
Hoffmann, Stanley, 165
Hogan, Michael, 119
Holmes, Stephen, 133
Holocaust, 32
Hotz, Alfred, 62
Human nature, 151, 165
Hungary, 100
Huntington, Samuel, 161
Hutchins, Robert, 80, 150

I

Idealism, 32, 35, 38, 77
'Idealist' approaches, 104
Idealists, 75
Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, 77
Ideal type, 105
Idea of National Interest, The, 80
Ideologies, The, 87
Ikenberry, John, 101
Immanent, 12
Immanent and transcendent science, 12–15
Immanent science, 12, 15
Immanent scientists, 12

Imperial presidency, 132
Inner emigration, 44
Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y Económicos, 2
Interest group analysis, 89
Interests, 38, 88
Interests in terms of power, 88
International Jurisdiction, Its Nature and Limits, 1
International morality, 108
Invasion, 103

J
James, William, 33
Jaspers, Karl, 17n11
Jeffersonian, 98
Jervis, Robert, 90, 143
Johnson, Lyndon, 118

K
Kant, Immanuel, 105
Kaplan, Robert D., 157
Karl, von Vorys, 88
Kelsen, Hans, 2, 4, 7, 9, 31, 32, 108
Kennan, George F., 76, 144
Kennedy, John F., 103, 128
Kennedy administration, 100
Kissinger, Henry, 116, 154
Knopf, Alfred.A., 61, 87, 102
Korea, 34
Korean War, 111
Kornhauser, Anne, 119
Koselleck, Reinhart, 11
Krasner, Stephen, 89, 162
Kuhn, Thomas, 39

L
Lacqueur, Walter, 17n6
Landauer, Carl, 2
Lasswell, Harold, 150
Lauterpacht, Hersch, 63
Law, 108
Layne, Christopher, 159
Lazarsfeld, Paul, 30
League of Nations, 9, 10, 59
Lebensinteressen, 78
Legal positivism, 1, 4, 10
Legal positivists, 4
Lenin, Vladimir, 106
Liberal internationalism, 83
Liberal realist, 83
Liberty, 79
Lieber, Francis, 12
Lippmann, Walter, 144, 151
Liska, George, 150
Lowenstein, Karl, 119
Lying, 132

M
McCarthy era, 13
McCarthyism, 34, 96
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 106
Machiavellian tradition, 79
Madison, James, 97
Mann, Golo, 17n4
Mannheim, Karl, 6, 13, 14
Marcuse, Herbert, 3, 32
Marshall Aid, 76
Massive retaliation, 100
Max Beloff, 82
Mearsheimer, John, 132, 161
Meiklejohn, David, 150
Meinecke, Friedrich, 69, 78
Merriam, 80
Middle East, 89, 102
Mills, C. Wright, 127
Missile gap, 96
Mitrany, David, 8, 67
Modernity, 29
Monroe Doctrine, 81

Moral crusades, 68
Moralism, 56
Morality, 38, 106
Morgenthau, Hans, 115
Mowrer, Edgar, 80

N
National interest, 75, 116, 144
Nationalism, 4, 7, 18n12, 85
Nationalistic universalism, 66
Nationalist moralities, 78
National security, 108
'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', 86
National security policy, 120
National security state, 115
National Socialism, 32, 33
National Student Association (NSA), 118
NATO, 101
Nazi Germany, 126
Negotiation, 77
Neo-conservatism, 162
Neo-imperialism, 101
Neorealism, 83
Neumeyer, Karl, 4, 17n9
New Feudalism, 98
The New Republic, 108–109
New School of Social Research, 28, 78
Newton, Isaac, 39
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 3, 32, 78, 144
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 15, 31, 69
Nitze, Paul, 18n15
Nixon, Richard, 118
Non-intervention, 81
Northedge, Fred, 88
NSC 68, 126
Nuclear arms race, 89
Nuclear weapons, 100
Nureyev, Rudolf, 103

O
Obama, Barack, 88
Objectivity, 14
Oedipus, 133
On the Purpose of Science in These Times and on Human Destiny, 2, 6, 12, 15
Orwell, George, 134n9
Osgood, Robert E., 77, 163

P
Pacificus, 79
Pentagon Papers, 116
Perfectionism, 56
Philosophy, 144
Plato, 31
Plessner, Helmuth, 5, 9
'Plurality of loyalties', 9
Political philosophy, 149
Political realism, 37, 43
Political science, 27, 30
Politics Among Nations (PAN), 7, 18n12, 76
Politics as a Vocation, 106
Positivism, 2, 4, 31, 32, 38
Positivist, 28, 31, 45
Positivist school of jurisprudence, 57
Poststructuralist, 45
Post-War American society, 28
Power, 36, 38, 40–44, 144
Principles and Problems of International Politics, 79
Progressivism, 29, 35
Prudence, 148
Purpose of American Politics, The, 90
Purpose of Science, The, 3, 5

Q
Quest for a Philosophy of International Relations, 86
Quincy Wright, 76, 80

R
Radbruch, Gustav, 2
Raison d'état, 147
Rakove, Milton, 150
Ranke, Leopold von, 69
Rationalist, 37
Realism, 45, 83, 104, 158
Realists, 28, 31, 75
Realpolitik, 106
Reissman, David, 150
Republican government, 120
Revolutionary power, 81
Rockefeller Foundation, 2
Rollback, 100
Rosenau, James, N., 89
Russell, Bertrand, 17n11
Russia, 99

S
Sabine, George, 34
Santayana, George, 33
Scheuerman, William, 75, 148
Schmitt, Carl, 9, 10, 31, 57, 69
Schuman, Frederick, 61
Science: Servant or Master, 2, 16
Scientification, 4
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 2, 16, 96, 115
Scientism, 28, 35, 36, 39–41
Second World War, 119
Secrecy system, 117
Secretary of State, 91n8
Shinn, Roger, 145
Shoah, 4
Shugg, Roger, 61, 87
Sinzheimer, Hugo, 6
Six Principles of Political Realism, 32, 87, 88
Six Principles of Realism, 38
Smend, Rudolf, 9, 57
Smith, Michael J., 131, 145
Social sciences, 28
Socrates, 13
Socratic, 12
Soft power, 82
Sources of Soviet Conduct, 76
South Vietnam, 109
Soviet Union, 81, 96, 99, 100, 126
Spanish Civil War, 2–3
Spheres of influence, 77
Spykman, Nicholas, 61
Staatslehre, 32, 57
Staatsrecht, 31
Stalin, Joseph, 100
State Department, 76
Statesman, 130
Stone, Geoffrey, 117
Stourzh, Gerald, 150
Strauss, Leo, 29
Stresemann, Gustav, 16
Strupp, Karl, 2
Suicide with a Good Conscience, 5, 7
Superpowers, The, 80

T
Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de, 105
Tang Tsou, 150
Tannenbaum, Frank, 82, 153
Taylor, A. J. P., 81
Technology, 80
Tensions, 9–11
Third World, 110
Thompson, Kenneth W., 62, 79, 144
Thormann, Irma, 2
Thucydides, 129
Time Magazine, 34
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 96–98
Totalitarianism, 33
Tragedy, 148
Transatlantic, 28
Transcendent, 12, 16
Transcendent science, 13–15
Transcendent scientists, 14

Treitschke, 84
Twenty Years' Crisis, The, 77

U
UNESCO, 62
U.N. General Assembly, 89
United Nations, 62, 83
United States, 81
University of Chicago, 28, 29, 55, 57, 62
University of Geneva, 58
University of Kansas City, 55
US academic discourse, 34, 36
USSR, 34
Utilitarian rationality, 40
Utopianism, 123

V
Viereck, Peter, 153
Viet Cong, 109
Vietnam, 90, 99, 103, 156
Vietnam War, 16, 107, 116
Voegelin, Eric, 3

W
Walgreen lectures, 80
Walt, Steven, 166
Waltz, Kenneth, 63
War, 108
Ward, Champion, 150
Warsaw Pact, 101
Watergate, 118
Weber, Max, 32, 69, 105
Weimar Germany, 32
Weimar Republic, 2, 3, 11, 16, 31, 32, 119
White, Leonard, 150
Wilson, Woodrow, 4, 104
Wilsonianism, 3, 78
Wilsonian liberalism, 106
Wolfers, Arnold, 86, 145
Wolfowitz, Paul, 159
World state, 59, 67
World War II, 100
Wright, Quincy, 149

Z
Zimmer, Louis, 125