

grand
strategies
of weak states
and great
powers



hanna samir kassab



Grand Strategies of Weak States and Great Powers

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palgrave
macmillan

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ISBN 978-3-319-70403-6 ISBN 978-3-319-70404-3 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70404-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017960407

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Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*I dedicate this book to the Upper Peninsula of Michigan:
America's best kept secret!*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the following people. First, my family: my father Samire, mother Hanane, sister Lea, and brother Elias. Thank you for all your support. I would not be in my current position without all of you.

I would like to thank my institution, Northern Michigan University, for giving me the opportunity to teach! I would like to thank the following people in my Department of Political Science: Carter Wilson, Jonathan Allen, Steve Nelson, and Tom Baldini. Thank you very much for the professional and social support! You all make my time here at Northern special!

Warm thanks to my mentor and friend Roger Kanet. I am very happy that we continue keeping in touch. This is the third book out of our dissertation; I could not have done any without your support, guidance, critiques, and advice. I do hope to continue working hard!

I would like to thank the reviewers of this book. I do not think the book would have been the same without their comments. To Max Lund: thank you so much for your fantastic editing work!

I would also like to thank Anthony Kevins for his excellent comments, as well as Sean Lynn Jones, Carter Wilson, and Jonathan Allen for their additions.

Thanks as well goes out to Jonathan Rosen. I look forward to many more practical books once my crazy theory building is out of the way!

Lastly, to the Upper Peninsula of Michigan to whom this book is dedicated: to the Yoopers, to the pasty, and to the sauna, I say YAH to DAH UP, EH?

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Introduction

This book proposes a theoretical framework examining the interaction of weak state and great power grand strategy within an international system of anarchy. Grand strategies are overall survival strategies of states. All states have grand strategies as all states seek or function to survive as independent political units. The survival threats to great powers and weak states are fundamentally different. Great powers pursue prestige against other great powers seeking the same. In a zero-sum world, this means undermining the other's power, position, and prestige. On the other hand, weaker states suffer from systemic vulnerabilities given their stark underdevelopment. Weak states trade whatever political power they have to a great power for aid or other types of economic assistance. This locks weak states into dependency and underdevelopment. If enough weak states support a particular great power, then that great power will become more powerful and prestigious over time relative to competitors. This forms world-systems' dependency networks based on trading political support for aid. Creating dependency networks described by the World-systems Approach is an essential transaction of systemic practice. Systemic practice is any activity that influences the distribution of capabilities and vulnerabilities across states. Orthodox balance of power theory, which only discusses bandwagoning, leaves out this systemically important behavior.

Within the anarchy of the international system, certain behavior considered evil domestically, like murder and exploitation, is prevalent. States with the capability to kill do so to protect themselves from others and this is acceptable. Western corporations may not be able to pay Western people US\$2 for a 12-hour workday, but they can in developing countries. Great powers commit evil to enrich themselves. This serves their interests in terms of power and prestige. For instance, we observe a number of interventions by great powers, all of which have been murderous, for the sake of acquiring power, influence, and prestige. Some examples include interventions by the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), and China in the affairs of weaker states. We also observe the importance of trade agreements and the phenomenon of economic aid given to weaker countries by great powers. The research questions then follow: why do great powers interfere in the affairs of weaker states? Why do great powers set out to dominate and exploit weaker states economically? In other words, why are weak states so important to great powers? What do they gain from intervention as well as production and trade agreements? Moreover, why does realism ignore these developments, none of which are new but have existed in force since the time of Thucydides? Finally, how can we circumvent the perceived inevitable decline into systemic war?

If we agree that great powers act in their interests, then there must be some benefit. For realists to say states “should not” intervene in the affairs of weaker states is normative and idealist. Why then do great powers fight over these weaker units? Why are the United States and Russia at odds over Ukraine, Syria, and declared spheres of influence and buffer zones? Hegemonic struggle is not simply over the construction of a system or the altering of its rules (Gilpin 1988). It is also not limited to besting a rival for the position of most powerful but also over winning leadership. The actors who must follow international rules within the system are a vital part of hegemonic competition. Weak states are important to great powers seeking systems manufacture. While it is advantageous to great powers to do so (as they benefit from the system they construct) systems financing is an expensive endeavor and may lead to overstretch. However, if one great power pursues relations with weaker states and increases in power and influence, it forces all great powers to compete for weak states support. Great powers benefit from weak state political support, resource control, and geopolitical domination relative to other great powers engaging in isolation or irresponsible, aggressive behavior. In fact, given anarchy, great powers and those who lead them must become serial killers and

psychopaths who murder for survival, paranoia, prestige, and even pleasure. Such interaction of powers great and weak result in patterns of behavior illustrating the competitive and evil nature among world-systems and the potential outbreak of systemic war. This book hopes to attack these questions by developing a new theoretical framework to explain these patterns as well as submit a framework to pursue multinational healing in an effort to avoid conflict.

To explain state survival behaviors, we must synthesize Structural Realism with Cognitive theory (to understand great power motivation) as well as World-systems Approach (to understand role of weak states). When great powers buy weak states, we are seeing the formulation of economic dependencies, core-periphery subjugation, for great power prestige. Great powers take advantage of the weaker state's need to survive given underdevelopment. Predatory, psychopathic behavior in this form allows great powers this control. World-systems Approach holds great explanatory power in this regard. If great powers trade aid for power, then weak states become part of a new international sub-structure. I conceptualize this sub-structure neoempire. Unlike a state, a neoempire is a collection of states that unify under one great power. Unlike empires of old, weak states can still exercise some autonomy, specifically overlapping core-periphery world-systems relationships, with other competing great powers. There is still some flexibility to engage other great powers unlike bandwagoning. I call this behavior playing the field. Competition continues in this regard.¹ Weak states do benefit by engaging in this parasitic behavior but they also become dependent in the process, never quite escaping weakness and underdevelopment.

Neoempire denotes domination by underscoring political/military elements as well as overall psychopathic behavior. Competing world-systems of dependency forms the Structural Realist international system due to the wealth and power gained from exploitation of weaker states. Studying great powers as states is outdated and obsolete. In the case of this book, the existing competitive international system (independent variable) contains dependency networks (intervening variable) constructed by great powers to explain prestige-seeking behavior (dependent variable).

The competition between neoempires is the new standard for studying hegemonic stability and instability, war, and peace. Hegemony usually leads to overextension as beneficiaries seek to alter the rules to further their own power. Studying changes in world politics is an ever-changing

endeavor that relies on context. It must be events-driven. Trying to understand the world as it alters from one form to the next requires theory building. A combination of psychoanalysis to understand motivation and cognitive conditions, Structural Realism to understand the role of power, and World-systems Approach to understand the route to power, may be the correct course of action for this time. Ultimately, this book seeks to contribute to the field of International Relations specifically theories of state behavior and grand strategy. Theories must explain events rather than force facts to fit theories. This book hopes to provide a frame of reference for contemporary hegemonic competition and the importance of weak states in anarchy. The ultimate goal would be to highlight the role of the economy in our capitalist world order combined with the need to expand power and control to defend prestige. I also end with a warning: given the capitalist need to expand, hegemonic war becomes inevitable. As ruling parties and elites seek to maintain control, they become slaves to economic production and growth. When hegemonies hit ceilings, gross expansionary measures, including war, may be taken. There may be an opportunity to stop this if the masses step in to return priorities to sustainable economic development. However, this may require the masses to seek out one another through dialogue to prevent elites from manipulating ancient nationalist tension. Forgiveness and reconciliation amid citizens might very well circumvent Thucydides trap.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Overview

The book hopes to contribute to the field of International Relations. The main theories focus solely on great power behavior, their grand strategies, and their ability to shape the international system. Weak states find themselves relegated to the sidelines even as they shape great power behavior and grand strategy. Scholars do so because they study them in isolation rather than systemically. Studying a weak state by itself, one understands that survival is not certain given a serious lack of autonomy and sovereignty. These units seem helpless in the face of threat both state and non-state, violent and non-violent. I agree. However, when we look at their interaction across world-systems, one gets a different sense altogether:

weak states tend to wheel and deal without the constraints of bandwagoning. Of course, some states, given their proximity and importance to the security of great powers, must bandwagon. Regardless, other states, if deemed unimportant, demonstrate a degree of unfettered autonomy that would make middle powers and great powers jealous (Kassab 2015).

Weak states have proved important to great powers. What else explains the constant interventionist policy by the United States, Soviet Union, and China in the past? The United States through the Monroe Doctrine made it a point to protect its sphere of interest, the states of Latin America, from the grasp of other powers. The Soviet Union used much weaker states of Eastern Europe as a buffer and intervened in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan adventure helped bring down the empire. After the failed American war in Vietnam, China also tried a failed intervention in Vietnam. The United Nation's Responsibility to Protect (R2P) exists because greater powers have an interest in safeguarding liberal global political structures and mechanisms. To add to this, a number of international regimes and institutions led by the United States since 1945 have existed solely to float a global economy by assisting weak states in their development agenda. China and other nations of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa) are now building their own banks and institutions, world-systems, to counter the United States' influence in regards to developing countries or weak states. Such patterns of behavior fit across the global board. While such involvement is incredibly expensive, the competitive nature of the anarchical international system forces great powers to engage in these capability-draining activities. If great powers do not, then others will fill that void gaining prestige.

Enough anomalies exist to warrant a separate theoretical explanation. For our understanding to truly blossom, I posit a move away from a great power specific lens to a total and grander systemic vision. For this to occur, we must incorporate the seemingly unbridgeable. We must begin to see great powers as not just a singular construct but part of a wider political unit that exists alongside weaker states. Considering the transactions that occur, borrowing from World-systems Approach, we may be able to understand further the forces that shape the international system's balance of power. The argument then follows: the state as the center of study of international relations has become increasingly irrelevant over the past seven decades. At one point, it was fine for a state to rely solely on internal mechanisms for economic growth. Once growth hits a ceiling, states must reach outward to ensure continued economic expansion.

Anarchy adds another variable: military power and competition. If one great power begins to expand outward, then other great powers must follow suite to keep up with power symmetry. Economic growth was never low politics. Wealth from economic relations can potentially translate quickly to military power. Here follows the contradiction of Hegemonic Stability Theory: powers rise within a manufactured system only to overthrow it. Seeking hegemony is like digging one's own grave. This dimension then follows: economic expansion forces other states seeking survival to expand. This was the reason for war discussed by Vladimir Lenin. Economic relations between great powers and weaker units of the world-system result in power acquisition for great powers. Hence, systemically, weak states are important to great powers to increase wealth and thus power and control.

Theoretical Framework

This book hopes to accomplish several tasks. First, it offers up a description of grand strategy today given the interaction of great powers and weak states and their diverse motivations of prestige and survival. Here, I am bold enough to assume the motivation of these actors. Their interaction forms an international system given diverse grand strategies. Great powers want to survive as great powers and seek prestige to be accepted and treated as great powers. Prestige is a “state’s reputation for having power, especially military power—and status—that is, a state’s recognized position within the international hierarchy” (Taliaferro 2006, 40). This is not a rational determination but a cognitive, psychoanalytical, and irrational one. These prestige-seeking units have international interests that eventually undercut other great powers leading to balancing behavior and eventual (or potential) conflict because, in the minds of these great powers, they deserve it more than others do. This explains why great powers act as psychopaths, killing, exploiting, and interfering in the affairs of weak powers. Their behavior makes little sense except at the systemic level as a part of systemic practice. Prestige-seeking behavior then, in standard structural realist language, is zero-sum; it means that great powers compete for prestige.

On the other end of the power spectrum, weak states are systemically vulnerable states in need of aid and resources to survive the fluctuations of the international system (Kassab 2015). Weak states are vulnerable to economic, political, and environmental and health disasters that come

suddenly. They also lack the resilience to deal with such shock due to lack of capability. As a result, prospect for long-term survival is inherently questionable. Lack of resources necessitates behavior that defies usual bandwagoning and can only be thought of within a new standard of behavior I call “playing the field.” Playing the field can be described as weak states engaging in parasitic behavior with great powers in conflict to extract as much benefit, such as aid and preferential trade agreements, as possible. This will assist in their survival needs as independent political units. As a result, this book will discuss the following:

Great powers seek security through balance of power both internally and externally to sustain prestige.

Great powers seek out weak states to maintain this prestige especially relative to the attention of great powers. This is traditional great power behavior with an element that considers relations with weaker units.

Weak states seek survival as independent political units given their inherent systemic vulnerability. As a result, they seek relationships with great powers on opposing ends of the balance of power.

Using great powers in such a manner does not come without a cost, as certain political favors must be traded. Behind these grand strategies are networks of elites that benefit from the exploitation of the global poor. When these networks come together, they create a new structure of the international system that goes beyond existing theories. Thus, the balance of power system today is different from before (nineteenth and twentieth centuries) due to the presence of so many weak states. Weak states become vital en masse to great powers. Without weak state support, great powers are denied serious influence in the international system especially within international regimes, organization, and other forms of global governance. There are some continuities, however. While different in the European, Westphalian sense, weak units of governance existed prior to decolonization. In the nineteenth century, Belgium colonized the Congo leading to considerable wealth. This forced a scramble for Africa given the immense material benefit of colonization and imperialism. This led Lenin to discuss his own theory of war due to the impending clash of powers in competition for international territory.

After some time, the colonized gained independence but were preyed upon by great powers in a bipolar world of the Cold War. Some weak states played their hand well like members of the Non-aligned Movement:

Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia are two examples. These states managed to play the field with great power counterparts. Lebanon and Cambodia pursued this strategy as well until their civil wars (Kassab 2015 studies these cases deeply). Weak states have more to gain if they play the field rather than remaining loyal to one great power. Sometimes, however, great powers force weak states to bandwagon because of perceived geopolitical importance vital to security. This is part of the logic of buffer zones.

While playing the field is a rational choice for weak states, they lock themselves in world-systems network of dependency (Jacobs and Rossem 2016, 377). This dependency keeps weak states weak or underdeveloped, and great powers strong. Great powers need weak states to rely on them, as such reliance is essential to feel like a prestigious, great power; and this is why great powers create these dependency networks. Weaker units must continue selling themselves to great powers to survive given short-term demands. Favor for favor, weak states play the hands dealt to them: selling their political autonomy for economic aid, and so on. Alone, this is altogether benign. Unified, weak states offer great powers political support and legitimacy at international institutions and other forums of global governance. Given their weak status, they present no real threat to any great power by themselves. Great powers fight for the control and affections of weak states to deny rivals. The international system then is not a chessboard. I posit that there is another game at play: Go. Go is a Chinese board game in which players seek control of the spaces on the board. The winner is the player controlling the most spaces on the board. The pieces are weak states; the players are great powers. In essence, neoempires make weak states vulnerable and exposed to exogenous shocks (e.g., economic shock) that perpetuate need for aid and other forms of help.

This book also presents a second theoretical construct, which I hope will improve our understanding of international politics and state behavior. The concept of neoempire illustrates the systemic behavior of great powers today. Moving away from the outdated and obsolescent concept of the state, neoempire hopes to explain the behavior of great powers together with weak states as an operative unit. Neoempires are political and economic subsystemic units of governance that operate within an international system. Great powers, through world-system dependency networks, encourage cooperation and subordination to accumulate power and wealth to protect global prestige. They function together not simply regionally, but are deterritorialized, meaning the units in question transcend time and space in their movement. Neoempires are bound by rules,

regulations, expectations, and sociopolitical and economic relations that encourage cohesion through economic transaction and political coordination. Neoempires are similar to empires without the overarching and obvious centralization of power. Empires differ from neoempires in that weaker units are allowed some freedom of movement but are somewhat bound by the policies of the major partner. The United States, Russia, the European Union, and China today pursue such relations. The United States, through politicized free trade agreements, are the writers of these contracts; weaker states are the consumers and followers in hope of gaining from these relationships, even as they grow increasingly dependent.

The United States and China specifically, from their behavior, are quintessential neoempires given their mutually parasitic relationship with weak states. Weak states enter into relationships with neoempires for the sake of their own economic development to survive the challenges associated with their endemic vulnerability. Great powers within the neoempire hope to gain further wealth and power from their world-systems to secure itself against competing great powers of other neoempire subsystems. The international system then transforms into a rivalry between neoempires with weaker states shifting their allegiances to world-systems at times within issue areas they gain the most advantage while maintaining good relations with former great powers.

Combining the book's two purposes then, I suggest that the international system is one made up of competing neoempires reflecting World-systems Approach. Competing world-systems continue to shape and reshape the international system's balance of power. Great powers are then motivated to accumulate power and wealth to further extend and ultimately protect prestige even at the expense of humanity. Go is played to accomplish this even as weak states are unreliable and disloyal. The game for prestige is exploitative yet expensive but aims for long-term domination. Such a psychotic and destructive system is continually in flux, as competing neoempires must incessantly fight for weak state support. Without weak states, great powers would lack the recognition and global leadership; what good is being a leader when one has no followers?

Here, I offer up a new construction of the international system that takes into consideration the coalescence of two grand strategies: prestige seeking and playing the field. Given the importance of weak states in anarchy to neoempires, we must consider the structure of the international system to be a balancing act between supranational bodies rather than a balance of power between states. The competition for weak states causes

this system due to the behavior of all involved components. Weak states increase the relative power and prestige of great powers or neoempires. This is inherently systems constructive behavior and must be considered in any theory of international politics and grand strategy.

Theory Building

Given the following, I put forward the following assumptions to build the theory:

1. The international system is defined by anarchy and psychotic behavior;
2. States are led by a network of elites and their domestic and global interests;
3. Great powers seek prestige primarily given competition with others;
4. Weak states seek economic development primarily to survive;
5. Political units behave to survive whether as independent states regardless of weakness or as prestigious neoempires. Survival is inherently normative to the actor in question;
6. Survival behavior creates systemic patterns of repeated psychotic conduct enforced by systemic practice/competition.

The theoretical expectation is that neoempires are emerging giving way to a new balance of power driven by world-systems dependency. Dependency is designed to maintain dominance over a country, or set of countries, for two separate yet interrelated material advantages: wealth and power. A great power cannot have power without wealth and cannot have wealth without power. While realists and Marxists alike tend to isolate which came first, both are incomplete. There is no divide between these two fundamental parts of domination; to say that there is ignores reality and ultimately political outcomes: imperialism its original and new sense. Imperialism at its core is “a relationship of a hegemonical state or nation under its control” (Lichtheim 1971, 10). Palma relates to this definition: “the essence of imperialism is domination and subordination and the concrete ways in which the sovereignty of lesser political bodies can be infringed may be manifested in very dissimilar manners as direct and visible as in colonialism, or as complex and diffuse as in a system of international relations of dependency which distorts the economic development of nations” (Palma 1978, 882). The matter of course is not simply a division

between economic and political power, but in its conjoining. For the great power, economic domination is for political purposes.

Neoempires are led by mechanisms developed by a network of elites ruling across states, great and weak, and legitimized by the consenting masses of great powers seduced by power and economic wealth. Elite interests are the main reason for the constant need to acquire further wealth and power. Economies must continue to expand economically or else elites may face political instability. The masses pressure elites to deliver to them high living standards. As of the time of writing (May 2016), populist leaders may be the driving force of international outcomes. The pressure to deliver continuous economic growth and expansion may serve to be the next source of international conflict. The pressure to expand may draw states into war. Borrowing from Lenin then, I will apply this book's theoretical contribution to try to predict the next hegemonic war. In addition, I seek ways to avoid such war through forgiveness and reconciliation reflecting South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

I shall discuss opportunities for weaker states in this system even as they exist within a systems exploitative environment. On one hand, the elites push for relationships of exploitation. They benefit from the power structures, which in turn hurt the masses of other states alienated from themselves and from the global exploited. Borders help keep the international working poor out and are desirable to elites and to the working classes living in great powers. Keeping people out protects states from unemployment, which is necessary to maintain domestic political stability and tranquility. Strong borders and militaries are therefore necessary to defend economic interests but also maintain internal stability and economic "prosperity" even as the masses of great powers are struggling to survive against increasing economic inequality (Stiglitz 2013). Wallerstein maintains "states in which core-like activities occur develop relatively strong state apparatuses which can advance interests of their bourgeoisies, less by protection ... than by preventing other states from erecting political barriers to the profitability of these activities ... states seek to shape the world market in ways that will advance the interests of some entrepreneurs against that of others" (Wallerstein 1984, 62). Since wealth and power, and therefore economic development and underdevelopment, are related, then the focus now becomes on the systemic nature.

Neoempire seeks to describe changes in standards and practices set by great powers since 1945 and the decolonization process. This concept attempts to capture or explain the reality behind great power/weak state

relationships of dependency. The conglomeration of great powers and weaker states will generate unequal benefits, which benefit the greater component of the singular unit. The great power in question will grow faster than other great powers in the system especially those neglecting weak states. Theoretically, competition for weak states will intensify over time as the gains from weak states become apparent. From this, we can derive a theoretical expectation we are seeing now: the balance of power will shift to great powers' subsystems that have better relations with weaker states even as they are exploited.

Hypothesis and Variables

To test the proposed theoretical framework and concept, I hope to advance and test the following hypotheses:

The more vulnerable the state, the more it seeks aid to survive.

The more powerful the state, the more it seeks prestige to protect its position.

While each unit in the system has a degree of each, it is important to note that weaker states possess more vulnerability than power and great powers wield more power than vulnerability.

Keohane and Nye (2011) define vulnerability as “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. Since it is usually difficult to change policies quickly, immediate effects of external changes generally reflect sensitivity dependence” (11). Further, vulnerability is thought of as “measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time” (13). Systemic vulnerability is what makes a weak state weak and may take many forms such as any “economic, environmental, political and social shocks, over which they have little, if any, control and their ability to resist and bounce back from the effects of such shocks” (Easter 1999, 403). Weak states lack serious power or ability to absorb or be resilient to these shocks which can be considered “events [that] are not the consequence of past policies, nor can present government policy or action allay their occurrence” (Ibid., 404). With development, states may be able to become more resilient to these shocks. Economic development allows for the better use of resources to deal with shock combined with a diverse economy that may be able to stand by itself in the anarchical international system. The more developed a state, the more powerful it becomes.

Power is the other variable in question. Morgenthau sees power as “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man ... power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another” (Morgenthau 1985, 11). For Waltz, power “is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units” (Ibid., 98). Capabilities comprise not only economic power, military power, material factors such as size of population and territory, and political stability, but also competence and reputation. In essence then, power is anything that dominates and controls the international system. International systems can be considered “an aggregation of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to a form of control” (Mundell and Swoboda 1969, 343). The most powerful definition of the role of great powers and systemic creation is the following by Keohane (1969):

A Great Power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive impact on the international system; a secondary power is a state whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in itself decisive, on that system; a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution; a small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system. (Ibid., 296)

Note as well in terms of comparing the pecking order that great powers are those that have power to shape the behavior of others while weak states on their own cannot. The point of contention and the reason for the book is to document that weak states do indeed have an impact on great powers given the systemic competition that occurs between great powers for their support.

Power and vulnerability are variables because these ebb and flow in their distribution across units. This is due to the dynamic of economic growth and development in the process of systems-creation, specifically competition over systems-creation. Gilpin describes this well in *The Theory of Hegemonic War* (1988). Uneven growth is “the driving force of international relations” (Gilpin 1988, 591). Uneven growth occurs when two states, one hegemonic and the other a potential rival or revisionist, have differences in growth. This means the hegemonic state grows economically

slower than the potential revisionist. Gilpin postulates that, “over time, the power of one subordinate state begins to grow disproportionately; as this development occurs, it comes into conflict with the hegemonic state. The struggle between these contenders for preeminence ... leads to the bipolarization of the system ... [which then] becomes a zero-sum situation in which one side’s gain is by necessity the other side’s loss” (Gilpin 1988, 596). This then pushes through serious changes in the international system’s distribution of power. This may eventually push actors toward war as the hegemon seeks to defend its position against the revisionist desire to change it. Gilpin describes stable and unstable systems:

A stable system is one in which changes can take place if they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby cause a war among them. In his [Thucydides] view, such a stable system has an unequivocal hierarchy of power and an unchallenged dominant or hegemonic power. An unstable system is one in which economic, technological, and other changes are eroding the international hierarchy and undermining the position of the hegemonic state. In this latter situation, untoward events and diplomatic crises can precipitate a hegemonic war among states in the system. The outcome of such a war is a new international structure. (Ibid., 592)

Thus, we can assume state economic power as tied to the issue of systemic creation or replacement, ultimately violent endeavors. The more developed a state becomes, the more powerful it is and the more it may want to seek to change the system to pursue continual growth. The more underdeveloped a state, the more vulnerable it is. Hence, economic development is at the core of the shifting balance of power.

Stated another way, the book’s hypothesis is if a state becomes more powerful or more vulnerable, it will behave accordingly to survive which is defined by the state’s grand strategy. Together, these grand strategies come together to create neoempires. I shall test my theoretical proposition using these hypotheses by specifically looking at relations between weaker states and the United States and China (Chap. 5) and between the European and Eurasian Unions (Chap. 6). In these chapters, I discuss the behavior of weak states as they play the field with the United States and China, the neoempires engaged in balancing act against one another. I do so to demonstrate the mutual need of weak states and neoempires as they seek their own grand strategies for specific ends.

Theoretical Expectation and Potential Predictability

What happens when great power and weak state grand strategies collide? It creates neoempires forming the international system. The formation of international systems hinges on the acquisition of capabilities. Great powers find weak states particularly important for the accumulation of power to defend prestige. The more powerful states become, the more they must engage members in the international system to acquire wealth and resources. A systems of exploitation is key. The United States and China, for instance, must be able to expand markets and have access to natural and human resources to expand further. Great powers create global economic systems to pursue power expansion. As a result, weak states become integral to the global balance of power.

The state itself is and always has been important to the study of politics and has been a key component of International Relations since the inception of the field. However, I suggest that we must look beyond the state to a new construct of neoempire. In today's world, we have a number of different neoempires operating against one another: the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union. This unit of study must be first conceptualized, an integral part of this book's major contribution. This book will use evidence to discuss how these units function and for what purpose.

This book will describe the foreign policies of great powers as they relate to underdeveloped countries of the world. Weak states have become increasingly important to great powers and their grand strategies over the years. Theories of international relations have not addressed these developments. International systemic practice of weak state competition has occurred in the past decade. The conflict over the Ukraine between the West and Russia, the fight between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Iraq, and the penetration of the US and Russian forces in Syria are powerful examples. Great powers fight for control over weak state spaces. Weak states form the majority of units within the international system and their relevance must be theorized, hypothesized, and tested. Great power behavior regarding weak states has been ignored; yet, it is a practice which existed since the Cold War and even before then in the example of the Melians and the conflict between the Spartans and Athenians in time of Thucydides.

Today, the United States must compete with China over weak state support as a systemic practice or else China may take over as world hegemon. This is to ensure balance of power stability and the construction of acceptable international norms and practices. World hegemony is a

two-way street: to be a leader you must have followers. This is to serve the prestige-seeking motivation of the great power. Protecting one's great power status and prestige is an integral part of great power survival and identity. This cognitive/psychotic factor may explain why great powers spend enormous amount of resources to protect their system. This may require the creation of a global forum for forgiveness and reconciliation. By refusing to fight in the wars of the elite through a common understanding across states and nations, the world just might be able to escape the Thucydides Trap.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Each chapter in this book will discuss different parts of the theoretical framework systematically. This introduction lays out the major theoretical contribution in the book briefly. As mentioned in the previous section, the world is constructed by an overwhelming desire of states to survive. Weak states hope to survive as independent political units in anarchy while great powers hope that their influence and prestige survives. While this certainly seems like a cognitive argument (in part it very well is), there is also a material foundation that must be understood. Assuming the cognitive and emotional need to exist in whatever form (as an independent state free from foreign influence or as a great power), every state possesses a grand strategy.

This book is divided into three parts. The first part is theoretical, explaining the assumptions constructing this new theory (Chaps. 2, 3, and 4). The second part applies the theory to two case studies. The cases serve to illustrate the explanatory power of the posited theory (Chaps. 5 and 6). The third applies cognitive theory, specifically psychoanalysis, to international politics, looking specifically at violence and forgiveness and reconciliation. In this final part, I dissect the human aspect of international relations giving further credence to the theory's realistic nature.

While this book may seem ambitious, I find it necessary to find new ways to combine different theories and perspectives to answer the age-old question of why states go to war. By combining these very different perspectives, I take the risk of taking on too much. However, in writing, I wanted this book to be one that accepts the challenge put forward by Robert Keohane in his article "International Organization: Two Approaches." In this article, Keohane highlights the weaknesses of rational

and reflectivist thought (393). Rationalists omit historical context while reflectivists tend to lack a research program. Apparently, reflectivists dare not put forward a thesis of what is, preferring the comfort of criticism and describing various problematics. Keohane encourages students to appreciate context as well as presenting coherent explanations of international politics. Further, both theories tend to omit domestic politics. This book, I believe, takes Keohane's challenge seriously by bringing in the individual's perspective (cognitive approaches) and incorporating it with two systemic (and rationalist) theories (Structural Realism and World-systems Approach). By presenting a theory of neoempire as a modern-day ontological unit of study existing from the psychopathic nature of elites running neoempire, I put forward a new research program relying on theory-building methodology to explain international politics of the twenty-first century.

Part I begins with Chap. 2. Chapter 2 will define the grand strategies of particular states. Great powers aim to strengthen their position in the world through prestige-seeking behavior. Prestige is understood as a psychological identity of great power exceptionalism. Great powers are in conflict over prestige-seeking behavior as survival as a great power, not simply as an independent state, is a matter of great concern. Conversely, weak states are particularly systemically vulnerable units in anarchy. Weak state grand strategy dictates survival by any means necessary. This causes playing the field breaking the bandwagoning expectation. Weak states submit their political autonomy to great powers and gain aid to enable their own survival. Great powers then wrestle for control of the board. This leads us to Chap. 3 and the supposition that the conglomeration of grand strategies results in a new international system constructed in terms of Go.

Chapter 3 continues to illustrate the intersect of great and weak power grand strategies by submitting a new concept to the field of International Relations: neoempire. Neoempire signifies the development of a new political unit that seeks to unite weak states under the banner of a great power. Led by a network of elites across involved states, neoempire signifies a shift from focus from states to consider new systemically creative actors that organize states into coherent economic and political blocs. These units organize production and trade into competing world-systems. The World-systems Approach provides an interesting lens to analyze state activity into this interesting new grouping. Neoempires are competing in their effort to create world-systems of dependencies that contest for power

and domination. This completion forms a new international system giving further perspective into the way Go works. Go is the sum of all grand strategies in the twenty-first century's structure of the international system.

Chapter 4 hypothesizes the contemporary international system. Great powers challenge one given the anarchical nature of the international system. These systemically dominant/creative units force one another into competition for leadership. This chapter will discuss the main mechanisms which make up the system, specifically structures, units, and transactions. The concept of systemic practice will give further illumination to mechanisms governing the international system. Reciprocity is at the core of this concept. I will use island building, soft power, interventions, and cyber-warfare as examples.

Part II—Chaps. 5 and 6—contains case studies which will test the posited theory in this book. Chapter 5 will discuss the foreign policy activity of the United States and China with regards to the developing world. The United States found developing regions particularly important during the Cold War and continues to be a powerful force economically and politically. China has increased its own presence in these regions beginning in the 1990s but has always been an important actor during the Cold War as part of the Non-aligned Movement. More recently, we have seen an increased interest in the developing world made manifest through the development of counter global development banking institutions. The battle between the banking institutions of Bretton Woods and BRICS seeks to generate world-systems dependencies to serve the prestige of leading great powers of the neoempire. These two powers, the United States and China, are continuing to compete in developing countries to create a political-economic bloc, a neoempire that serves its own power acquisition purposes.

Chapter 6 studies the conflict between neoempires currently organizing: the European Union led by Germany and the Eurasian Union led by Russia. The European Union was a project to end war between European states. After the Cold War, it expanded into space perceived by Russia to be sacred. This action forced Russia to create the Eurasian Union to strengthen its own position in a way similar to that of the European Union. Russia is now seeking to recover some of its lost space, which explains action in Ukraine today. This chapter will try to make sense of systemic competition between these two groups.

Part III begins with Chap. 7 which tries to give further meaning to neoempire motivations by discussing state behavior as driven by the individual. States locked into a structure of psychopathy conditions war and exploitation. War is ultimately a form of mass murder justified by the

psychopathic actor: the state. The environment of kill or be killed also expedites prestige seeking as a result of narcissism. This chapter connects great power war making activity with the analysis of motivations to understand the choices left to humanity.

Chapter 8 explores two options: war or peace. States within the system have two choices given systemic change: war or peace. This book began with the supposition that states are psychopaths and inclined to go to war. If states are left to their own devices this may indeed happen. The second option, peace, requires action from the grassroots. States as led by elites have failed to guarantee world peace. This chapter suggests social and economic stability embedded by the promotion of human development over extravagant, psychopathic prestige-seeking activity. Such focus may be able to avoid war. Here, I will explore the cognitive mechanisms, which result in such a decision. It will also explore the concept of forgiveness as a productive part of systemic practice. This will serve as this work's normative offering, imagining new forms of governance.

The book will conclude by summarizing the major arguments and scholarly contributions. All states regardless of power have grand strategies. Given survival concerns, states great and small act in accordance to one specific objective. The objective is of course survival as independent political units within an anarchical system. States of differing power capacities, or lack thereof, have different survival concerns, grand strategies, which drive their foreign policy. Great powers must be able to protect their global interests to ensure economic growth and balance against other great powers who threaten those global interests. Weak states, the majority of units currently in our international system, act to survive against their own threats to survival: underdevelopment. To acquire the resources necessary to survive, weak states go about engaging competing great powers to extract as much wealth as possible from preferential trade agreements and aid. Weak states are not accountable to any law of balance of power due to their inherent weaknesses making them non-threatening. A fundamental lack of power allows them to conduct good relations with most actors in the international system.

CONCLUSIONS

This book hopes to place international relations theory into contemporary context. The rise of China and other BRICS nations along with a slowly recovering United States and Europe present a challenge to long-term

peace, prosperity, and harmony. There are certain political and social mechanisms that push for constant economic expansion and this serves as a destabilizing factor. Economies must work for society and its overall health and welfare. The world is changing. The balance of power as theorized by respected academics over 30 years ago was once relevant. Today, weak states, even as they play the field, present a challenge to hegemonic order. World-systems dependency networks empower great powers to lead to acquire more power and prestige within anarchy. The structure today represents Go and great powers and hegemonic states must play the game or else be left in the dust. It is imperative that theories of today reflect world political context. Explaining offers a narrative or reasoning behind established and repeated patterns of behavior of actors. Predicting illustrates a variety of potential outcomes due to these patterns of behavior stemming from systemic constraints within the system (Ibid., 69). Fashioning a coherent theory of grand strategy for the twenty-first century will enable scholars to explain the makeup of the international system as a structural force and predict the likelihood of war. Putting together strategies to escape war, such as global dialogue on forgiveness and reconciliation, may be the beginning of a stable systemic order.

NOTE

1. Hence the neo for an altered conceptual vision.

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Theory Building

This section of the book submits a theoretical framework grounded in structural theories of international relations. The purpose is to provide a systemic foundation from which to describe the international system in the twenty-first century. It hopes to expound on the following assumptions:

1. The international system is defined by anarchy and psychotic behavior (the latter explained in Part III of this book);
2. States are led by a network of elites and their domestic and global interests;
3. Great powers seek prestige primarily given competition with others;
4. Weak states seek economic development primarily to survive;
5. Political units behave to survive whether as independent states regardless of weakness or as prestigious neoempires. Survival is inherently normative to the actor in question;
6. Survival behavior creates systemic patterns of repeated psychotic conduct enforced by systemic practice/competition.

Chapter 2 expounds on the first three assumptions. It will define the grand strategies of particular states. Great powers aim to strengthen their prestige-seeking behavior, while weak state grand strategy dictates survival by any means necessary. Chapter 3 then explains what happens when these grand strategies come together forming neoempire. Assumptions 4 and 5 are discussed here. Led by a network of elites across involved states, neoempire signifies a shift from states to consider new systemically creative actors that organize states into economic and political blocs.

Chapter 4 hypothesizes the contemporary international system expounding on assumption 6. Great powers challenge one given the anarchical nature of the international system. These systemically dominant/creative units force one another into competition for leadership. The concept of systemic practice will give further illumination to mechanisms governing the international system where reciprocity is at the center of analysis. These assumptions will prepare readers to understand the current behaviors of the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia. These behaviors are discussed and applied in the case study chapters in Part II of this book.

Grand Strategies of States in Anarchy: Prestige and Self-Determination

INTRODUCTION

State threats differ given power position or vulnerability in the international system. The aim of this chapter is to theorize the main motivations of states given specific threats to their survival. States function to survive against particular threats or else they will cease to exist. Great powers function to survive as great powers; so prestige and psychology play an important role in deriving these motivations. This means that these states may engage in psychotic behavior, killing, and exploiting others to maintain prestige. Since they are in competition with other great powers, prestige is a zero-sum game; to deny others prestige is to gain prestige for oneself. Conversely, weak states have little power and prestige to protect due to their existence as systemically vulnerable states. Weaker, more fragile states have less military issues to worry about and more economic, environmental, and health problems to combat (Kassab 2015, 2017). The inability to deal with these issues alone has more to do with their underdevelopment. In the case of great powers and weak states however, one fact does remain. Specific threats threaten their existence as independent and autonomous units; hence, survival is at stake.

If we assume that states function to survive, then it is possible to derive their motives. Therefore, states' motives are survival given threat. This chapter argues that the grand strategies of these states reflect state motivations. All states, whether weak or great, practice a grand strategy. Grand strategy is incorrectly associated with great power ambition, that is, the

conduct of domination. We must begin to see grand strategy as any state's strategy to protect their position in the system to achieve survival as independent political units in anarchy. While great powers may organize their resources and leadership to combat against military threats to protect prestige, weak states do the same in regard to their own survival threats be it economic, environmental, or political. Grand strategy is thus a consequence of specific threats to state survival.

Since all states face survival threats, it becomes clear that all states practice grand strategies in different ways. As a result, states with differing power capacities practice dissimilar grand strategies. In this chapter, I conceptualize the grand strategies of great powers and weak states, balance of power and playing the field, respectively. Balancing is the usual behavior of great powers seeking security against competitors hoping to undermine them. Playing the field is the quintessential weak state behavior, which breaks bandwagoning expectations, if weak states are not forced into such a humiliating position. The interaction of these grand strategies results in the creation of neoempires through world-systems. This then forms the international system hypothesized in Chap. 5.

GRAND STRATEGIES DEFINED

What are grand strategies? Do weak states practice grand strategy? This section will redefine grand strategy to understand a state's survival motivation. I will argue that all states have grand strategies. This will prepare for a discussion on specific grand strategies of states as they operate in an anarchical system.

As per usual in International Relations, most of the literature on grand strategy has a great power focus. To many scholars, grand strategy is limited to these actors and, more specifically, American foreign policy practices. This is incorrect for several reasons. First, it is not general enough to be considered a theory unless we limit our understanding of grand strategy to American grand strategy. Second, many scholars seem to consider types or practices of grand strategy before understanding first its aim. Take, for instance, Colin Gray's definition: "the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics" (Gray 2011, 13). The latter part of this definition "for the purpose of policy as decided by politics" remains vague and confusing. What is politics? What is the aim of politics at the international level? We can only assume that politics necessitates a defense of international interests.

A fine textbook definition of grand strategy can be considered “an overall vision of a state’s national security goals and a determination of the most appropriate means by which to achieve these goals” (Schmidt 2008, 164). Still, these “goals” remain unspecified. According to the author, there are three steps to grand strategy:

1. Determine security goals
2. Identify main source of threats (internal and external) to these goals
3. Ascertain key political, economic and military resources employed to realize national security goals (Ibid.).

Schmidt here realizes that these processes are replicable across states with dissimilar capabilities:

Foreign policy officials in all states go through a similar process, even though the resulting grand strategies tend to be quite different from one another ... it is also a function of the very different capabilities that states possess as well as a host of other factors determining national power, including their geographical size and location. Great powers, for instance, typically have a more expansive notion of security and proportionally face more (and larger) threats than weaker powers. (Ibid.)

Schmidt identifies that all states, both great and weak, conduct some form of grand strategy that seeks security against threats different to all states. This is praiseworthy as it breaks away from the American-centric understandings. Regrettably, Schmidt quickly departs from this more general, theoretical focus to return to American foreign policy and grand strategy with a historical rehashing of isolationism, liberal internationalism, and primacy. While this is of course expected, it contradicts Schmidt’s claim of replicability. Weak states and middle powers cannot practice primacy. They cannot pursue isolationism as they need others to defend interests and pursue goals. They certainly cannot pursue liberal internationalism as creating any system requires significant investment spent on coercion and consent. Only great powers have the ability to conduct this type of politics as described in the introduction. Their only choice would be to follow the liberal rules defined by someone else. The problem again is the focus on capabilities. It is not simply about different power capabilities but also a lack thereof, that is, systemic vulnerabilities. According to Schmidt, liberal internationalism explains systemic creative behavior: “As a liberal hegemon, America plays a vital role in maintaining international

peace that has direct benefits to both the United States and the rest of the world” (Ibid., 166). Primacy, on the other hand, “fundamentally seeks to preserve America’s position as the pre-eminent power in the international system ... America’s grand strategy should be one of preventing any future great powers from challenging the power of the United States” (Ibid., 167). It is utterly ridiculous to imagine states like St. Kitts and Nevis, Armenia, Lebanon, and Cambodia (Kassab 2015 case studies) practicing primacy or even setting up a liberal internationalist system; although they may cooperate within liberal internationalism. These cannot be considered grand strategies for all, just for the privileged few great power states in existence (for now). I would be so bold to say that these are not grand strategies at all. These systemic creative activities (except isolationism) can only be successful by great powers.

This admission brings up yet another problem: what is security? According to realist dogma, security (and security studies) “may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force [... and] the conditions that make the use of force more likely ... and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war” (Walt 1991, 212). Any serious scholar would have issues with this definition. In the twenty-first century, we now have a plethora of threats that can kill individuals. States only exist to protect individuals: “if the purpose of the state is to protect and express a cultural group, then life and culture must come high on the list of national security priorities” (Buzan 1991, 45). We do the field a disservice, therefore, if we limit our study to the military:

What exactly is the referent object of security when we refer to national security? If it is the state, what does that mean? Are we to take the state as meaning the sum of the individuals within it? Or is it in some sense more than the sum of its parts? (Ibid., 10)

Hence, it would be an irresponsible endeavor to open up our understandings of security to other threats if individuals are dying from environmental collapse, disease outbreaks, violent political groups, and the aftermath of cyber-attack. Weak states are more exposed to these non-state, non-military sources of death and chaos. These vulnerabilities are important to study as it forces great powers to intervene on their behalf to prop up the state and guard against global contagion. Grand strategy is much more than what we know: it is about the survival of the state as a unit of political

governance representing people. We thus need to build from scratch a general determination of grand strategy for all states seeking to protect national interests, whatever that means.

From this analysis, one can clearly see that grand strategy, like security, is just another contested concept in International Relations, a relatively new field that has yet to nail down its foundation. Scholarship stemming from the age-old problem, a sole focus on great powers, results in concepts and perspectives, is to blame. Clearly, grand strategies are ways in which states survive in an anarchical world. Resources are spent in an effort to neutralize threats. As Schmidt admits, threats are different to states in the international system based on their abilities or inabilities. The focus must be on a unit's relation to the system, not on the unit alone.

To expand on the subject of grand strategy, I would like to build upon Glenn P. Hastedt's definition. He understands grand strategy to be part of any state's objectives or aims:

Deciding goals is only the starting point for having a foreign policy. We still need to decide a course of action to realize those goals ... although strategy is often considered in a military context, it can also be much more than that. Grand strategy is concerned with harnessing all of a country's military, political, and economic resources so that they work together at the highest level to advance national interest. (Hastedt 2009, 25)

This definition is helpful to explain state behavior in terms of national interest. Since each state has its own national interest, we can build our understanding of weak state grand strategy. But what is national interest? National interest can be thought of in the realist sense, that is, in terms of survival. Morgenthau states that "interests [are] defined in terms of power: all states operate as such and this creates a rational and observable understanding of politics" (1985). Power is useful for protecting oneself against competitor states. For Morgenthau and other varieties of realists, power ensures survival. However, power as a control of man over man (Ibid.) generally lacks fluidity and descriptions of purpose. To part ways with these scholars, I estimate power as the ability to create an international system. Other states that lack power are systemically vulnerable states. This starting point generally limits the behavior of weaker states and encourages prestige-seeking activity of the more powerful.

It is here that we must offer a definition of power. As discussed in the introduction, power is much more than just military might, economic

power, and so forth (Waltz 2010). The root of power, and ultimately systemic construction, is economic development (Kassab 2015, 2017). Economic development allows states to use resources efficiently to promote further development. The more the states develop, the more they must extend control across states to protect national interests. Hence, the confusion for realists. The acquisition of power for the sake of further power and domination is not entirely accurate. Economic development provides the necessity to expand outward which then forces states to begin changing the rules of the system. Systemic ambition results in a state developing so much so that it requires a reorganizing of the international political system in its favor.

Connecting national interests to economic development, power projection becomes clearer. National interests must protect states' economic expansion to further development. The more a state develops, the more national interests it must then protect. It is here that a state's grand strategy becomes global and aggressive in nature. States with considerable power must now reorganize themselves to satisfy certain goals necessary for survival as an economically developed political unit with global interests. As a state begins to grow in size, prestige becomes important and worth defending. Blood and treasure toward continual expansion against competitors is the nature of international relations.

Grand strategy cannot be defined by a general outcome of expansionist behavior, but by the behavior of states defending interests either to survive or for prestige-seeking ambition. Therefore, great powers are doomed due to self-destructive behavior, which can be described as psychotic. Prestige-seeking rising powers will present a challenge to great and hegemonic powers who seek to defend their own prestige against rising powers. Even though rising powers benefit from the existing system, they will eventually seek to overturn the system risking war and possible self-destruction. Status quo powers as well will risk everything to defend their system and their prestige as well. These states will fight to the death if necessary to become or remain the hegemon. They do so for the prestige. This is regardless of the fact that hegemonic activity, like systems financing in times of economic instability, saps the power of the state's strength. Power ebbs and flows across the distribution of power across states because of these interactions. The psychosis of great powers then defines international politics and warrants further serious study.

Weak states are the primary benefactors of systems financing even as they conduct relations with the same competitors seeking hegemony.

From these positions, survivalist grand strategy is inherently different. Great powers and weak states can do different things due to their position in the anarchical system. Great powers will act against the other actors because of fear of supremacy and imbalances of power, while weak states, unfettered by such limitations, are free to pursue relations with a variety of states as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. In the following section, I hope to differentiate the grand strategies of states within the international pecking order focusing specifically on great powers and weak states.

GRAND STRATEGIES OF STATES GREAT AND WEAK

My complaint about grand strategy is its idiopathic nature, that is, its underlying causes are altogether unknown to scholars of international relations. We accept that states seek survival and this generates ways of accomplishing this goal. Yet, most incorrectly assume that threats to state survival are limited to the military. Since weak states have little to no militaries, the field ignores other threats by maintaining a military focus. Great powers are the ones creating the system and so other units are irrelevant. Non-great power units are part of the system given their impact upon the system; weak state behavior does transform the system en masse. As a result, the field has taken an altogether unwise course by assuming that only great powers have grand strategies. The literature then limits great powers with the choice either to create an international system that prolongs its power and influence or to remain isolated. What about non-military forces that undermine the international system? The current systemic destructive forces that exist in the world must be studied as they drain states, especially great powers that finance the system, of their power. Financial crises and contagion that weakened the United States and Europe in 2008, environmental and health crises and violent political/terrorist networks are systemically important yet are non-state in origin (Kassab 2017). If survival is our key assumption regarding state motivation, two important questions spring up: what are the main threats to the survival of states given their systemically powerful or systemically vulnerable position? Do weak states also have grand strategies?

This section will discuss the motivation of states, which is survival. Survival can be qualified for the powerful and the vulnerable as remaining independent political units operating in anarchy. For great powers, a bit more must be acknowledged, specifically its prestige-seeking and defending activity. The types of strategies used by states are dependent on survival

challenges. Great powers want to survive not simply as independent units within the system, but as the great powers they are now; they want to defend their greatness, their power, and their prestige. Weak states on the other hand simply want to survive against serious systemic vulnerabilities that undercut or challenge their survival as independent political units. The citizens of these states chose independence over colonialism and face serious challenges because of colonial legacies, one of which being underdevelopment. To understand grand strategy, we must first understand the survival threats of different states within the international system.

Balance of Power and Prestige

We tend to understand prestige as the reputation of greatness given the position of a state so great it begs recognition. Prestige in international relations, then, is the ambition of any power with the luxury of resources (or not if you are Iraq led by Saddam Hussein) to conduct operations that enhance wealth and position in the international system. In other words, prestige is a “state’s reputation for having power, especially military power—and status—that is, a state’s recognized position within the international hierarchy” (Taliaferro 2006, 40). Morgenthau discusses reputation as self-perception saying: “in the struggle for existence and power ... what others think about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the mirror of our fellow’s mind (that is, our prestige) rather than the original, of which the image in the mirror may be but the distorted reflection, determines what we are as members of society” (Ibid., 73). Great Britain and Imperial France, the United States, and the Soviet Union fit into this category. These states act in terms of the reflection of self. These states are then forced to behave to defend their reputation as prestigious members of the international system. Great powers then seek and defend spaces of interest deemed important to their status as great powers. To do otherwise would be humiliation and signal weakness.

Prestige-seeking behavior is ultimately unpredictable. On one hand, great powers seek prestige at others’ expense so much so that they go to war. On the other, prestige seduces great powers to overextend themselves, helping weak states with their problems even sacrificing capabilities that could have been put to better use. Prestige cannot then be understood in a rationalist sense, but only in a cognitive, psychoanalytical sense. Great powers identify themselves as great and must do great things like conquer territory, exploit people, fund hegemonic systems, or intervene in the conflicts of others. Great powers also seek prestige through

violence, specifically war with other great powers to prove greatness in victory. In this sense, prestige defies cost/benefit analysis. While realists argue that great powers should not intervene in the conflicts of others and respect the sovereignty and sphere of influence of other states, the fact remains that they do on all fronts. It is the weakness of greatness and identifying yourself as great.

Sometimes though, great powers do balance their power and prestige against one another. The Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century was a prime example when great power of Europe came together to ensure peace and stability. Structural Realist theory points to this arrangement as the ideal. Consequently, states seek preservation or survival as unique political entities. They do so by pursuing two main security strategies. The first is through internal efforts: military spending increases in manpower, armaments, and research and development. The second is through external machinations through the balance of power. States may choose balancing to survive by teaming up with others to contain aggressive, expansionist states, as Morgenthau remarks, “To maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of elements composing it” (Morgenthau 1973, 202). The balance of power occurs automatically in anarchy, as states seek to maintain independence in a self-help system.

Balancing and bandwagoning are alliance strategies of the balance of power. Given the capability, a state in the international system could decide to either join or bandwagon with a greater aggressive power. They may also seek to balance against an aggressive power with a number of other states (Mearsheimer 2001, 139). According to Realism, balancing contains the ambition of a great power by creating a defensive alliance (Ibid., 156). In terms of prestige, the goal of great power grand strategy, bandwagoning is the behavior designated for weaker states and a source of humiliation and a sign of weakness. Great powers are vehemently against bandwagoning for this very reason. Bandwagoning, then, goes against the existential quality of being a great power. This move requires a state to acquiesce its position as a great power by surrendering. Any prestige-seeking great power will not bandwagon. States rather risk everything and go to war than to bandwagon or submit to the wishes of an aggressor. Indeed, Morgenthau himself states “whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, its prestige—its reputation for power—is always an important and sometimes the decisive factor in determining the success or failure of its foreign policy” (Morgenthau 1965, 95). This may be a leading cause for systemic war as states historically tend to get caught to the Thucydides trap.

On the other hand, if a state is weak and vulnerable, then the focus is not prestige, having none, but survival as an independent political unit. A state with no military capabilities will exist for long in the face of a much greater belligerent power (Mearsheimer 2001, 163). Bandwagoning may be the best choice to ensure survival rather than be eliminated and annexation. Mearsheimer describes bandwagoning as the optimum choice for Bulgaria and Romania during the beginning of World War II. However, when a Nazi defeat became obvious, both weaker states switched sides (Ibid.). Belgium and the Netherlands, themselves weak states relative to Nazi Germany, tried to balance against Nazi Germany leading to their subsequent defeat. Thus, bandwagoning is clearly the option for the weak. Associated with humiliation, prestige-seeking great powers will not select this option.

In sum, according to the balance of power literature, power drives security and prestige concerns. Great powers matter because they construct the international system due to distribution of capabilities. This affects the forming of alliances. If there is a state growing in power, then that state would be seen as a threat to the others and they will act accordingly, that is, balance against it. Balancing involves creating an active coalition against the growing power in a defensive manner. This same literature emphasizes that weak states usually chose to bandwagon with the growing power, as they prefer not to risk angering the growing giant (Walt 1985, 29–30).

Playing the Field: Weak State Grand Strategy

Theoretically, weak states do not threaten the position of great powers in the international system. In other words, weak states, because of their lack of power, do not pose a threat to the balance arrangement. Since this is so, they possess the necessary autonomy that enables them to engage in behaviors unexplained by the theory. In this theoretical sense, fundamentally, weak states are freed from security constraints as illustrated by Waltz and are able to conduct themselves seemingly paradoxically. They can operate independently of great powers and pursue unprincipled, unscrupulous (but nonthreatening), and opportunistic economic development seeking relationships with a multiplicity of actors that may be at opposite ends of the balance of power (Kassab 2015). Weak states, systemically vulnerable and underdeveloped units of governance, are a relatively new invention. After World War II, many great powers, specifically France and the United Kingdom, had great difficulty keeping their global empire

together. After a few decades, weak states, seeking influence and more autonomy from the two reigning superpowers, decided to join forces to declare ambivalence toward the Cold War. The Non-aligned Movement was born specifically to declare willingness to conduct business between the two competing superpowers ([nam.gov](#)).

This grouping of nations that emerged out of decolonization is essential to this study. These states defined their interests in terms of welfare and development as seen in the above statement. Much more must be learned about this understudied coalition to determine how weak states defined by their vulnerability behave. Never, in modern history, have so many weak states come to existence in such a short time. Prior to this period, the world was dominated by empires and nation-states that spanned the world. The Non-aligned Movement is the quintessential definition of weak power interests: to fundamentally avoid great power competition and focus on development in the spirit of peace and cooperation ([nam.gov](#)). This movement desired to remove itself from great power conflicts, specifically the Cold War, to promote the principles of economic security within international relations (Alden et al. 2010). This was done to secure a neutral position to secure relationships with the conflicting poles. They did not balance or bandwagon; these terms were conceptualized by studying great powers. Rather, they engaged in their own specific behavior: playing the field. It would be interesting to conduct the process tracing to document their activities from their inception to now to see if weak states, given their vulnerability, play the field.

Being vulnerable gives weak states the ability to pursue welfare by playing the great powers off against one another to acquire aid with the lowest conditionality. This creates a competition for support within the international system between status quo powers and emerging revisionist powers as “the fear is that a new Beijing or Chavez consensus will replace the long-hallowed Washington consensus” (Woods 2008, 1). Thus, economic aid becomes a tool used by emerging powers to gain relative to the status quo. Weak states do not have to choose between status quo and emerging powers, but can do business with both to achieve maximum welfare. Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele in their 2008 coauthored article entitled “Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis” conclude that foreign aid is an instrument of power used “as an instrument to influence the voting behavior of recipients in the UN General Assembly” (155). Dreher et al., through use of regression analysis, show “strong evidence that US aid buys voting

compliance in the Assembly” (Ibid., 139). In this way, weak states surrender political autonomy for aid.

Playing the field is a pattern of behavior repeated in military terms as well. On November 3, 2016, the New York Times published an article entitled “Rodrigo Duterte Plays U.S. and China Off Each Other, in Echo of Cold War” (Fisher 2016). In it, the author describes how the Philippines is currently playing two powers against one another. Not an old practice, the author sees this behavior as a continuation of Cold War politics:

Mr. Duterte’s actions call to mind, for example, Josip Broz Tito, the Communist leader of Yugoslavia who broke with Moscow in the Cold War’s first years by declaring himself “nonaligned.” The United States rewarded him with economic aid; the Soviet Union, desperate to keep Tito from joining NATO, rewarded him with autonomy and shows of respect...Mr. Duterte, likewise, distanced himself from his American sponsors just enough that China, eager to win him over, offered him \$9 billion in low-interest loans and allowed Filipino fishermen to return to certain disputed waters in the South China Sea. Yet Mr. Duterte returned home to a country that is still protected by the United States military. (Ibid.)

Here we are seeing a behavior long ignored by theorists. Since its inception, the field of International Relations has been dominated by the study of great powers. Structural Realism is then extended to all other units with lesser capabilities. However, the international system impacts units differently, depending on the state’s power to construct the system or its inability to do so. The capabilities of great powers are of greater concern to others as power drives insecurity. Weak states are still constrained, but less so as their power is not enough to cause alarm (Kassab 2015). This fact allows them to behave differently. In certain environments, they do not balance or bandwagon. Rather, weak states have their own specific behavior which sometimes means associating with great powers that may be at odds with one another. This behavior is termed “playing the field.”

All great powers were once weak, fragile, and disorganized. They build up capabilities through the process of economic development and expansion as described previously. Weak states, however, are not concerned with world domination given current weakness. Rather given their vulnerability, weak states are focused more on the threats surrounding their vulnerability. Weak states desire economic development as a solution to their vulnerability emanating from external sources. Economic shocks like financial crises and its contagion, the onset of natural disasters, and health

outbreaks present serious challenges to weak states. For these vulnerable units then, “economic development presents a means to weather exogenous and endogenous economic, environmental, political and social shocks endemic to vulnerable states ... there is a clear dichotomy between these two concepts, vulnerability and development” (Kassab 2015, 66). Weak states thus define their national interests in terms of survival as independent political units regardless of serious challenges. They must defend these national interests by inventing grand strategies of their own. Hence, it becomes clear that the grand strategy of weak states must promote survival against threats, which include but are certainly not limited to non-military threats. Playing the field is my key concept of weak state grand strategy. It is a type of soft-balancing, but a less belligerent form as it seeks to maximize welfare rather than oppose strong states. One can define playing the field as a possible type of state behavior that is not alliance- or security-oriented. As said, weak states are motivated primarily by their search for economic well-being mainly from development. A secondary motive would be security which can be effectively buck-passed to more powerful states. Hence, weak states may not always balance and bandwagon; rather they have their own specific behavior which sometimes means associating with powers that may be at odds with one another.

Weak powers need great powers to assist in economic development and establishing security from state and non-state threats: drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental disasters, disease outbreaks, and so forth. Empirically, weak states have relied on great powers to serve this purpose giving reason for the plethora of military interventions and aid as well as economic and disaster relief. Intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health Organization exist for this reason. Weak states are weak because they are underdeveloped. Underdevelopment forces weak states to go looking for aid to further development. They need support to accomplish one main goal: survival against threats. They are unconcerned about prestige or military supremacy; these are luxuries only great powers can afford. While great powers fight hegemonic war knowing full well they may be able to survive in some way, weak states fear complete decimation from plague and poverty. Weak states are confident that if they are attacked, a great power may step in and save them. On the other hand, great powers have much more to worry about. Not only do they have to watch the rise of competitors and revisionists, they must also be able to keep allies (whom they can never fully trust) in line. Weak states clamor for great power assistance. More so, when assistance is given, weak states turn around and get closer to competitor states.

Table 2.1 State traits and motivations

<i>Great powers</i>	<i>Weak states</i>
Developed	Underdeveloped
Systemically resilient (creative)	Systemically vulnerable (destructive)
Prestige seeking	Survival seeking
Alliance oriented	Alliance breaking
Military based	Economically based
Security seeking	Security buck-passed

In summation, weak states define their grand strategy in terms of development given their inherent survival problems and their motivations. Their grand strategy can be termed “playing the field.” Playing the field is a type of soft-balancing, but a less belligerent form as it seeks to maximize welfare rather than oppose strong states. Great powers conversely desire to protect their great power status. These motivations I can only assume construct each of these states’ behaviors (Table 2.1):

If weak states do indeed behave in such a manner, then great powers are forced to change their game, from Chess and the strategic use of alliances to check their opponents, to the Game of Go. Here, the aim is not to “check” your opponent with alliances but to ensure that your pieces (weak powers) are used to block the advancements of other powers while increasing your own relative power. Being vulnerable gives weak states the ability to pursue welfare by playing the great powers off against one another to acquire aid with the lowest conditionality. This is also possible within the context of a concern for survival. This creates a competition for support within the international system between status quo powers and emerging revisionist powers. This will be the task of the following section.

GAME OF GO INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM EXPLAINED

Kassab (2015) introduced the idea that the international system is a reproduction of transactions between states of different power/vulnerability capacities seeking survival in anarchy. He argues that the international system is fundamentally a struggle for control of the international system through weak states. This section hopes to expand on this to prepare the way for Chap. 5.

Go is an ancient Chinese board game that has been played for thousands of years. The rules are simple and can be summarized in ten elegant words: “black goes first. Take turns placing one stone. Surround territory”

(usgo.org). Thus the aim is to control the board by placing white or black stones down on empty spaces. When the entire board is complete, including intersections, the stones are counted. The winner is the player with the most stones. Put simply:

A stone on the board has two to four vertically and horizontally adjacent intersections. Those which are unoccupied are called liberties. When a stone is placed vertically or horizontally adjacent to another stone of the same color, the stones are connected and form a single unit, and their liberties are counted together. When a stone is placed vertically or horizontally adjacent to another stone of the opposite color, it takes a liberty [unoccupied spaces] away from the other stone. When all the liberties of a stone or group of stones have been taken by the opposite side and no liberties are left, the stone(s) cannot remain on the board...At the end of the game, the winner is determined by counting stones and points. First, all the dead stones of both sides are removed from the board. Then one side's living stones are counted, including the vacant points enclosed by those stones. Vacant points situated between both sides' living stones are shared equally. A vacant point counts as one stone. The winner is determined by comparison with $180-1/2$, which is half the number of points on the board. If the total of one side's living stones and enclosed vacant points is larger than $180-1/2$, then that side is the winner. If the total is less than $180-1/2$, then that side loses. If the total is equal to $180-1/2$, the game is a draw. (www.cs.cmu.edu)

Kassab (2015) draws on this game by hypothesizing on the similarities between Go and the dynamics of the international system. By drawing on Gilpinian conceptions of hegemonic war as led by uneven growth, he understands the importance of the pieces to great powers and their struggle for power and security:

Exporting this game into international politics, the two players represent two large great powers; the board represents the international system as they see it. The vacant spaces represent weak states ... placing stones down to fill the vacant spaces represent attempts to control, or buy, weak states into supporting them politically. The effort can be overturned, if the other players makes the effort to connect the stones or spaces, to attempt to buy back the space or weak state. The winner is determined by the player controlling the most pieces, or, in the case of international relations, the great power controlling the [greatest number of] weak states ... [for instance] ... the great power that controls the weakest states at the UN General Assembly gets their resolution passed. (Kassab 2015, 119)

The theoretical assumption Kassab puts forward to understand systemic behavior in this regard is the following: “great powers defend their interests similarly, which results in competition” (Ibid.). This attitude is famously summarized by Reagan as he addressed instability in the Persian Gulf:

Our own role in the gulf is vital. It is to protect our interests and to help our friends in the region protect theirs. Our immediate task in the gulf is clear—and should not be exaggerated. It is to escort U.S. flag vessels, a traditional role for the Navy, and one which it has carried out in the gulf as well as in other areas...If we fail to do so—simply because these ships previously flew the flag of another country, Kuwait—we would abdicate our role as a naval power. And we would open opportunities for the Soviets to move into this chokepoint of the free world’s oil flow. In a word: if we don’t do the job, the Soviets will. And that will jeopardize our own national security as well as our allies. (Reagan 1987, [nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com))

To not help weaker states like Kuwait yields power and prestige to other great powers seeking their own prestige. Thus, great powers surrender influence to their great power competitors. Reagan, as a leader of a hegemonic state, gives us insight to how great powers behave. If great powers are indeed hegemons, then they must play a significant role in the defense of weak states. To recall, hegemons are those states powerful enough to create and maintain an international system. Charles Kindleberger states that “for the world economy to be stable, it needs a stabilizer, some country that would undertake to provide a market for distressed goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger 1981, 247). Hegemons thus afford public goods to extend its system and to do so is prestigious. Without weak states, hegemons simply do not exist.

Hegemons need other states to buy into, or consent to, their system of governance. This is made clear by contemporary aid strategies carried out by competing great powers, specifically China and the United States. Aid carries with it political conditionality that must be followed for further support. The following shows that given weakness (measured by the UN Economic Vulnerability Index which categorizes Lesser Developed Countries (LDC)) illustrates need for foreign aid because of proclivity to exogenous shocks like natural disasters, environmental disasters (natural and man-made), political instability and economic instability (Kassab 2015, 2017;

Easter 1999, 406; Guillaumont 2012, 11, 12). The higher the number, the more vulnerable the state. Weak states gladly receive aid from contending great powers (Table 2.2).

Hegemons are enslaved to weak states to deny the influence of other great power competitors. If we agree that great powers are locked in rivalry, weak states are integral to deny others influence and control. It is here that we must realize hegemons exist to ensure stability which requires them to finance the survival of weak states for their own long-term hegemonic existence. This means that, ultimately, hegemons need followers, weak state support, for the overall health of their system and their position as hegemon. Furthermore, if hegemons want to survive, they must continue to grow. For this to happen, great powers must build good relations with weak states across the board. Great powers need resource and engage in trade relations with weak states for these resources. Resources both natural and human are considered necessary for the survival of global business competition and the power and wealth of great powers. So important are weak states to great powers that great powers seek to lock them into dependency relationships within a neoempire (see Chap. 3).

Transactions Between Great Powers and Weak States: A Key Systemic-Creating Force

Consent here is key to hegemonic survival; without it, hegemons will descend into coercive tactics, which are expensive and prone to failure and overstretch. When weak states fall victim to drug trafficking (Colombia and Mexico), terrorism (Iraq and Syria), and war (Yugoslavia 1995, Saudi Arabia 1991), great powers end up footing the bill to bolster their power and prestige as well as deny that power and prestige to others. The terrible reality here is that great powers are forced to protect their international systems regardless of the costs. Again, consent is key to hegemonic survival; without it, hegemons will descend into coercive tactics, which are expensive and prone to failure and overstretch. Tied to the need to survive, as a hegemon, is the need for prestige. Hegemons and great powers like to be recognized as big important players. Great powers need weak states to satisfy this egoist necessity as part of any great power's *raison d'être*.¹

Table 2.2 Weak state aid recipients and their donors in 2011 (OECD 2011)

<i>Country</i>	<i>EVI as of 2012</i>	<i>OECD aid</i>	<i>US aid</i>	<i>PRC aid^a</i>	<i>Non- OECD</i>
Afghanistan	38.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria	26.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Angola	51.3	Y	Y	Y	Y
Antigua and Barbuda	41.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Argentina	25.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bahamas	48.8	Y	N	N	N
Bangladesh	32.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	29.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Belize	49.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Benin	36.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bhutan	44.2	Y	Y	N	Y
Bolivia	33.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Botswana	43.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brazil	21.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burkina Faso	37.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Burundi	57.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cambodia	50.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon	23.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cape Verde	35.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Central African Republic	35.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad	52.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile	31.2	N	N	Y	Y
Colombia	23.1	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoros	49.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congo	36.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa Rica	32.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cuba	37.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Côte d'Ivoire	20.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	47.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Republic of the Congo	35.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Djibouti	46.3	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominica	39.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominican Republic	24.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Ecuador	31.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt	18.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	31.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Equatorial Guinea	43.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Eritrea	59.0	Y	Y	Y	Y

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>EVI as of 2012</i>	<i>OECD aid</i>	<i>US aid</i>	<i>PRC aid^a</i>	<i>Non- OECD</i>
Ethiopia	33.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fiji	44.9	Y	Y	N	Y
Gabon	33.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gambia	67.8	Y	Y	N	Y
Ghana	28.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	45.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guatemala	24.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Guinea	28.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	60.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guyana	49.1	Y	Y	N	Y
Haiti	47.3	Y	Y	Y	Y
Honduras	30.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
India	21.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	22.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	40.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iraq	46.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	33.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Jordan	20.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	26.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kiribati	82.0	Y	Y	N	Y
Lao People's Democratic Republic	37.1	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	26.9	Y	Y	N	Y
Lesotho	45.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia	61.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	27.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Madagascar	38.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	51.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malaysia	22.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	55.2	Y	Y	N	Y
Mali	36.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	44.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	29.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	21.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mongolia	52.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	18.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	44.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Myanmar	45.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Namibia	39.1	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nepal	27.8	Y	Y	Y	Y

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>EVI as of 2012</i>	<i>OECD aid</i>	<i>US aid</i>	<i>PRC aid^a</i>	<i>Non- OECD</i>
Nicaragua	32.0	Y	Y	N	Y
Niger	38.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nigeria	38.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oman	35.2	Y	Y	N	Y
Pakistan	22.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama	27.1	Y	Y	N	Y
Papua New Guinea	38.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Paraguay	43.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Peru	28.6	Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	29.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda	47.3	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saint Kitts and Nevis	48.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Saint Lucia	37.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	38.6	Y	Y	N	Y
Samoa	51.1	Y	Y	N	Y
Sao Tome and Principe	46.1	Y	Y	N	Y
Saudi Arabia	25.5	Y	N	N	Y
Senegal	36.1	Y	Y	Y	Y
Seychelles	44.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	48.5	Y	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	30.6	N	N	Y	N
Solomon Islands	55.2	Y	Y	N	Y
Somalia	50.1	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Africa	26.0	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	26.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	44.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Suriname	70.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Swaziland	44.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Syrian Arab Republic	25.7	Y	Y	N	Y
Thailand	24.8	Y	Y	Y	Y
Timor-Leste	53.3	Y	Y	N	Y
Togo	35.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tonga	59.6	Y	Y	N	Y
Trinidad and Tobago	35.8	Y	Y	N	Y
Tunisia	20.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	12.4	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tuvalu	63.9	Y	Y	N	Y
Uganda	36.2	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Republic of Tanzania	28.7	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	34.9	Y	Y	Y	Y

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>EVI as of 2012</i>	<i>OECD aid</i>	<i>US aid</i>	<i>PRC aid^a</i>	<i>Non- OECD</i>
Vanuatu	46.8	Y	Y	N	Y
Venezuela	31.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Viet Nam	30.9	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yemen	38.5	Y	Y	N	Y
Zambia	53.0	Y	Y	Y	Y

Y Aid recipient, N Not an aid recipient

Table reproduced from Kassab (2015, 114–116)

^aMany thanks to Wenyuan Wu for finding this information: Wolf, C, Wang, X, and Eric Warner 2013 *China's Foreign Aid and Government Sponsored Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations and Implications*, The RAND Corporation, Washington, DC

The United States has been a unipolar hegemonic power since the fall of the Soviet Union. The disastrous and unnecessary war in Iraq as well as the 2008 Great Recession has brought its decline into question in absolute terms. In absolute terms, many see the rise of China as an existential threat to US hegemony (The Economist, April 21, 2014). The main fear is that China is growing too quickly in absolute terms: “China’s PPP exchange rate is now higher than economists had previously estimated using data from the previous survey in 2005: a whopping 20% higher...So China will be crowned the world’s pre-eminent country by the end of this year” (Ibid.). In relative terms, China is also advancing its own ambition at global hegemony, which directly undercuts and threatens the United States. This can be seen in the developing world and will be discussed in Chap. 5 but it is worth a brief mention here.

China is expanding its presence and influence globally through its sea posts; and weak states are benefitting, lining up to attract Chinese business and investment. The trade of course is that these countries have to allow China certain political benefits, which threaten the United States. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, China is to boast 23 seaports in Greece, Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar in the next few years (Page 2014, [wsj.com](http://www.wsj.com)). While many of these ports are used for trade and commerce, one in Djibouti “is expected to feature weapons stores, ship and helicopter maintenance facilities and possibly a small contingent of Chinese marines or special forces, according

to foreign officers and experts monitoring its development. Its cluster of low-rise concrete buildings and shipping containers, some with Chinese flags, offers the most tangible sign yet of China's strategy to extend its military reach across the Indian Ocean and beyond" (Ibid.). All of these states engage with the United States in terms of strategic alliances and aid packages. The United States maintains as much as 900 of its own seaports and military bases in 132 different countries, and the move by China is being interpreted as a threat to American supremacy (Vine 2015, thenation.com). Djibouti benefits from the investment as the country now has a new seaport. The United States also maintains a seaport in Djibouti. Djibouti's foreign minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, said in an interview that while it isn't in Djibouti's interests to alienate Washington, his country is "positioning itself in this big design China is putting in place." He pledged "to keep balance between those partners present here" (Ibid.). In this sense, Djibouti is playing the field as are the many states mentioned who are opening the door to Chinese investment, specifically lending part of their sovereign territory. The inter-relation of great and weak have been discussed in terms of mutual benefit. Weaker states make a rational calculation that given underdevelopment, they are better off being part of a great power's orbit (or a number of orbits) than going it alone. Rather than choosing one side, Djibouti is calculating the future of world hegemony as uncertain. As a result, it sees the benefit of engaging in friendly relations with all partners.

While many argue that China's rise is indeed "benign" or "peaceful," I question the possibility of such an outcome. China is practicing economic nationalism, a strategy used to accumulate power. As defined: "Economic Nationalism ... arises in part from the tendency of markets to concentrate wealth and to establish dependency or power relations between strong and weak economies" (Gilpin 1987, 33). Power is power: the false distinction between military and economic power must be seen as incorrect. Economic power can be just as confrontational and underscored by mal-intent as more belligerent forms of power. Power is ultimately about control, control of man over man as Morgenthau argues these many years. If power is about control, specifically the creation of international systems that further serve the power and wealth of systemically dominant or creative states, then we must agree that any distinction between military power and economic power is a fallacy. Liberalism of all variants does a wonderful job ignoring power abstractly and in real terms. To generate certain

behaviors, power must be used. Behavior can be produced by two sources of power: consent and coercion. Machiavelli's *The Prince* illustrates this poignantly as well as neo-Gramscian understanding of power (Cox 1981).

Economic exchange thus creates policy in the game of Go Grand strategy, and, as a result, the practices, which perpetuate power, drive repeated patterns of behavior. This is power as power enforces and reinforces patterns of behavior. Weak states are part of great power grand strategy as they are the pieces. Weak states need great powers to develop in a turbulent international system. Similarly, great powers engage in prestige-seeking behavior and balancing, not much unlike Kaiser Wilhelm II and classical European empires. Great powers today and the empires of old engage in this psychotic and destructive behavior. Such behavior is not only generalizable but also timeless, given the structure of the international system. This will be explained in the following two chapters.

CONCLUSION

Like any living organism, states suffer specific threats that impede function. States exist so that the people residing within these states can practice self-determination, a rather important norm since the Treaty of Westphalia. Some states, great powers, can practice self-determination unhindered by other weaker states even to the extent that they undercut the self-determination of others. Weaker states are sometimes forced to surrender some self-determination to great powers to get the aid necessary for development. This locks them into a relationship of dependency and, as a result, weak states may never escape underdevelopment. Great powers seem more than happy to lock weak states into such a relationship to exploit them and satisfy the need for prestige regardless of the cost. The transactions between great power and weak state grand strategy result in the international system looking like Go. There are two parts to this. The first is the construction of dependencies. The result is the creation of a new economic-political-social unit which aims to not simply enrich the wealthy but balance against one another. In the following chapter, we shall examine the interaction of these two types of states as they conduct systemically important transactions. We will also see how Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war fits into this and whether the world can escape the Thucydides Trap through dialogue.

NOTES

1. If, however, great powers do not need weak states, then why do great powers involve themselves in their domestic and foreign affairs? What is the reason for these interventions both military and non-military? Since hegemons defend weaker states, drug traffickers and international terrorist networks tend to target great powers as we have seen (Gerges 2005). In 1996, Osama bin Laden published the “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” where he encourages Muslims globally to “hit the main enemy who divided the ummah into small and little countries and pushed it, for the last few decades, into a state of confusion. The Zionist-Crusader alliances moves quickly to contain and abort any ‘corrective movement’ [jihadist movement within majority Islamic countries] ... utmost effort should be made to prepare and instigate the ummah against the enemy, the American-Israeli alliance, occupying [Saudi Arabia and Palestine, respectively]” (quoted in Gerges 2005, 31). The attacks on 9/11 were designed to weaken the United States in an effort to reduce its influence in the Middle East. This would then allow terrorists groups to then fill the void. Hence, if these violent actors are allowed to grow within a weak state, then it is only a matter of time until that state is taken over completely. Once hijacked whether by drug traffickers or terrorists, the weak state can be used to export its products and principles to other parts of the world causing further international destabilization.

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Balance of World-Systems and Neoempire

This chapter discusses the motivations of states as survival within anarchy. States of differing capabilities and vulnerabilities experience different threats and act toward a generalized need to exist independently. Using Structural Realism, we theorize about states' grand strategies given these threats. This chapter will incorporate World-systems Approach and Structural Realism to understand the importance of weak states in the grand strategy of great powers. Since great powers need to grow economically to continue to exert influence and gain power, the pressure to create dependencies of independent weak states becomes more and more pertinent. Creating dependencies is thus one of the international system's organizing principle due to the connection of wealth with power. Consequently, states are no longer as important a unit of governance but rather are superseded by a new unit of governance. This unit is a construction as designed by capitalist elites networked across states. Their behavior, as they seek to themselves grow richer, and as a result, the state more powerful, creates outcomes of war or peace. I label this unit neoempire. Neoempires are elite-led social-political-economic units that go beyond a single state, united through a network of elites that work together across borders to achieve wealth. Such behavior is necessary to protect prestige regardless of the cost to human life. Such psychopathic behavior is inherently the result of an anarchical structure of the international system.

This chapter will conclude by underscoring international political outcomes, that is, the behavior of great powers and their influence on the welfare of weaker units. Ultimately then, the concept of neoempire goes beyond the behavior of hegemonic great powers because it acknowledges the combined purpose of wealth acquisition and power acquisition. In a zero-sum world, such riches are accomplished by exploiting others, leaving them perpetually underdeveloped, vulnerable, and dependent. This is ultimately psychopathic behavior because people are worse off due to this prestige-seeking behavior. This is systemic theory in a more contemporary sense. As a result, this chapter will help us focus on the condition of the current international system.

WORLD-SYSTEMS AND THE NETWORK OF ELITES, THE PSYCHOPATHS OF NEOEMPIRE

States, led by a global network of elites, are wealth-seeking actors. The state protects property domestically but also internationally. Power is thus at the center of commerce and property rights, sometimes called the defense of national interests. Stephen Kinzer's book *Overthrow* is a remarkable study on the subject of American business interests and imperialism in Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Honduras, South Vietnam, Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Grenada, Panama, and Afghanistan. This is difficult to explain by a Marxist lens or by Structural Realism alone, but only by a combination of the two. In combining these two theoretical perspectives, we may begin to explain and understand the behavior of great powers. Today, China and the United States create dependencies to grow economically in their simultaneous and reciprocal search for power and control. To understand this, we must first understand the contributions made by World-systems Approach.

Dependency theory and World-systems Approach share similar historical context: the post-World War II decolonization era. These theories try to understand development and colonial domination after independence. Dependency theory provides an interesting explanation on the reasons for third-world underdevelopment and first-world development. Singer (1949) explains, in a reductionist way, the exploitative relationship between rich and poor states. There are three premises (Frank 1966):

1. Poor nations provide cheap labor and resources and import obsolete technology;
2. Wealthy nations perpetuate dependency through unequal trade arrangements;
3. Wealthy nations coerce smaller nations into these relationships.

These unequal terms of trade deteriorates a developing country's purchasing power as resources and profit leave for richer countries. This depends on Engel's law, which posits that people spend smaller percentages on food as their income rises. There is less income for developing countries producing primary goods. In other words, "terms-of-trade variation that takes place when peripheral countries rely on low-value exports of primary goods to countries of the center and high-value imports of manufactured goods from those countries" (Ortiz 2012, 175).

Dependency theory states that global networks of elites across states great and weak are the main benefactors of exploitative mechanisms; indeed, they create rules that serve their purpose. Dos Santos (1970) illustrates how weak states become victims to the exploitation by richer countries, causing permanent underdevelopment. Relationships between elites in both weak states and great powers formulate these policies and determine vulturine outcome. From Singer's analysis then, states are not the primary actors, rather it is the international division of labor that drives political-economic outcomes. Dependency then defines a weak state's external reliance on other well-integrated, or richer, more developed and economically viable countries. Dependency itself is force of power and control. It involves a more complex set of socioeconomic and political relations centering on incorporation of less developed societies into a global division of labor. This leads Singer to the reason for perpetual underdevelopment in the global south: "The peoples of the industrialized countries have not supported a higher standard of living in the prices which they pay the underdeveloped countries for their primary goods" (Singer 1949, 3).

Dependency theory is reductionist and its relational meaning does not look at structures of behavior in terms of power. Out of this critique grew World-systems Approach. The World-systems Approach incorporates a structural and behavioral approach over Dependency's reductionism. Global divisions of production and trade solidify the core's domination of

periphery and semi-periphery. Hence, the world-system is composed of three groups of states: the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery (Wallerstein 1974, 349). Core countries possess highly diversified and industrialized economies and are rich and powerful enough to set terms of trade for others. Citizens are usually high skilled and enjoy some union strength, although workers are still exploited. Core countries, like the United States, may be able to use their power to gain the most from free trade agreements. Peripheral states follow these agreements because they have very little power and wealth to force others to follow their preferences. Peripheral states are formerly colonized, recently independent but going through economic domination. They are not industrialized and depend on agricultural and light industry for growth and development. They may have a comparative advantage in cheap labor because of an over-supply of unskilled/uneducated human resources. They are also dependent on the aid of richer states to ensure their dependency in the future. This results in the exploitation of land and labor in countries like Guatemala, Bangladesh, and Malaysia (Ibid.). Finally, states of the semi-periphery are neither core nor periphery; they possess characteristics of each. These states may be dependent and poorer than core nations, but powerful enough to negotiate terms of trade. There may be an expanding middle class and, with enough time and luck, may become part of the core (Ibid.).

By grouping states into these categories, we may be able to appreciate their place in the world economy and their future performance. The semi-periphery fares a bit better and may emerge as a core state if core states suffer serious economic instability or depression. Such mechanisms are typical of the cyclical flow of liberal economies and have been for centuries (Wallerstein 2005). Research shows that

As the profitability of core-like processes decreases, these processes are relocated to the semiperiphery. Though this shift may underlie upward mobility for certain countries, especially in the semiperiphery, benefits do not accrue equally to all countries in the world-system. This process does not undercut hierarchy but sustains old forms of structural inequality. (Jacobs and Rossem 2016, 379)

This may explain why once semi-peripheral countries, like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), are rising out of the calamity of the 2008 financial crisis (Kassab 2015a).

Rising semi-peripheral states set up their own dependencies in what world-systems scholars call “networks.” Networks help boost power, specifically “systemic power ... in which resources are used to create dependencies” (Jacobs and Rossem 2016, 377). Hart and Jones (2010) describe how BRICS states are seeking to create networks to pursue wealth and power by using existing international institutions. World-systems then assist in the rise of semi-peripheral states taking advantage of capitalism’s contradictions of booms and busts. Chase-Dunn argues that core states must now exist alongside emerging semi-periphery states and overarching dependency mechanisms. He argues: “What is emerging is a multipolar interstate system in which the U.S. shares power with the existing core states and emerging powers from the semiperiphery (China, India, Brazil and Russia)” (2013, 175). These semi-peripheral states are not immune to them either, and so goes the continued flux of the world-system (Komsoly 2016). Out of this flux comes a new world-system, which will present a serious challenge to future global peace. Since wealth can translate into political and military power, the model does present an interesting explanation of international systemic creation, not only in a world-systems sense, but also, in terms of Structural Realism. Wallerstein (1984) determines systemic creation as part of “the political super-structure of the capitalist world-economy an interstate system within which and through which political structures called ‘sovereign states’ are legitimized or constrained” (Ibid., 60). His idea of the “world-economy” assumes a systems dimension in that “there exists an ‘economy’ wherever ... there is an ongoing extensive and relatively complete social division of labor with an integrated set of production processes which relate to each other through a ‘market’ which has been ‘instituted’ ... in some complex way” (Ibid., 59). Marx also explains how the economy shapes political life: “the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general” (Marx 1970, 20–1). This model shows how economics defines the international political system. To Marx, control of the economic base helps to manufacture political beliefs and institutions which would then, again, work to enrich the economic base, or whoever controls the means of production: the basis of economy.

Altogether then, the explanation that best illustrates systemic change is the tendency of great powers to compete with one another in the pursuit of dependencies within the world-system. In Chap. 4 (subsection *transactions*), we shall discuss the importance of these dependency networks as it relates to systemic change. Although Marx never intended the

object of study to be states, it is important to note that states, as the primary actor, will act in this way. States, led by elites, control the factors of production. As a result, they have enormous power to manipulate the state. Marx acknowledges this behavior: “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (Marx *The Communist Manifesto*). The power of elites in state behavior with regards international political-economic outcomes becomes clearer. Once one ties economic power to state/military power, we come to appreciate the close links between Structural Realism and Dependency theory. This will be explained further in the following section. As a result, there is a mutually reinforcing and reciprocal relationship between wealth and power, between the socioeconomic relations (base) and political order or superstructure. This then underpins a given order, sustains domination, and defends prestige. Great powers then pursue grand strategy by using their economies to structure the international economic order. This serves their interests in terms of prestige.

In summary, world-systems analysis underscores a core-periphery relationship led by elites in countries. Of course, the most benefit goes to the great power actor involved as a whole. As weaker components become weaker, they lose capacity to deal with systemic and internal threats. This then destabilizes weak states locking them into perpetual systemic vulnerability. It is then the responsibility of the great power to bail them out if it wants to remain a core state. From this, the ability to coerce and gain consent is intrinsically tied to one another. Wealth gives a state the ability to acquire capabilities. Wealth is the reason a state expands to pursue more wealth. Expansion requires power. Power is also the ability to withstand systemic shock given that wealth and development enables resilience. These matters will be discussed in the following chapter. For this chapter, I shall continue to elaborate on the intrinsic connection of wealth and power within anarchy.

Wealth Makes Power, Power Makes Wealth: Neoempire Development

In terms of survival, great powers must grow to combat the power of other states. To understand these dynamics further, we must turn to Robert Gilpin’s work. Gilpin argues that uneven growth is “the driving force of international relations” (Gilpin 1988, 591). Conflict is driven by

significant changes in the international system's distribution of power as a result of uneven growth. This may form the foundation for understanding contributing factors to war. Gilpin illustrates the dynamic of uneven growth and conflict by defining two types of systems—the stable and unstable system:

A stable system is one in which changes can take place if they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby cause a war among them. In his [Thucydides] view, such a stable system has an unequivocal hierarchy of power and an unchallenged dominant or hegemonic power. An unstable system is one in which economic, technological, and other changes are eroding the international hierarchy and undermining the position of the hegemonic state. In this latter situation, untoward events and diplomatic crises can precipitate a hegemonic war among states in the system. The outcome of such a war is a new international structure. (Ibid., 592)

As a result, stable or unstable systems are expedited by the law of uneven growth among the more powerful states within the system (Ibid., 596). The growth differential between competing powers will be the focus. Gilpin explains this: “Over time, the power of one subordinate state begins to grow disproportionately; as this development occurs, it comes into conflict with the hegemonic state. The struggle between these contenders for preeminence ... leads to the bipolarization of the system ... [which then] becomes a zero-sum situation in which one side's gain is by necessity the other side's loss” (Ibid.). The central focus of international relations must then be unequal economic growth. Uneven growth, that is long-term relative growth, directly influences a state's ability to project power and prestige and ultimately survival. In world-systems terms, if a semi-peripheral state rises out of its status to challenge a core state, then we may see conflict.

The system must be understood in economic as well as military power terms. Systemic change is a permanent part of any understanding of grand strategy since economic disparities impact a state's ability to project power and influence. This theoretical starting point will serve to undergird this book's major contribution. To make a convincing case, we must continue to build on Gilpin's contribution. In *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (1975) Gilpin contends that any state's economic and foreign politics is simply a reproduction of the interests of the national elite (Gilpin 1975, 4). He writes:

On the one hand, politics largely determines the framework of economic activity and channels it in directions intended to serve the interests of dominant groups; the exercise of power in all its forms is a major determinant of the economic system. On the other hand, the economic process itself tends to redistribute power and wealth; it transforms the power relationships among groups. This in turn leads to the transformation of the political system, thereby giving rise to a new structure of economic relationships. Thus, the dynamics of international relations in the modern world is largely a function of the reciprocal interaction between economics and politics. (Ibid., 22)

Gilpin here does sound like a Marxist but he makes it very clear that the state and its power, not elites or their multinationals, is the primary actor. He does specify, however, that economics is a major factor in political and military power accumulation. Economics fuels state power. The ability to project power will drive reciprocal action by others. Reciprocity means that power and wealth are mutually reinforcing. Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* would agree in that power is “defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities” (Waltz 2010, 192). Power “is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units” (Ibid., 98). To Waltz power can be economic, military, and other factors like size of population and territory, political stability, and competence. Since economic power is reciprocal to state power, changes in economic growth will lead to inequality of power. If one state grows faster than another, the faster growing state will become more powerful. If one state suffers economic decline relative to another, that state will become less powerful. If a once subordinate state grows faster, then that state will try to position itself to take on systemic leadership. The declining state will not be able to balance against a faster growing state, and, as a result, will become less secure over time (Gilpin 1975, 23). This is correctly demonstrated by the theory of mercantilism.

Mercantilism posits economic relations as conflictual in world politics. This is especially because states concern themselves primarily with the distribution of power across states within an anarchical system. As opposed to liberal economic theory, gains are distributed in a zero-sum fashion: “one group’s gain is another’s loss” (Ibid., 27). Therefore, economic relations must be made to work to accumulate state power (Ibid., 31). While states theoretically gain more through free trade due to comparative advantage (each producing what they are best at given natural endowments), states

can never fully be trusted. One state may be a trade partner one day and an enemy the next. China, for instance, has been seen in the past as a vital trading partner in the 1990s but now, in 2016, it is considered a serious hegemonic competitor. The current conflict over the South China Sea reflects this fact. Thus, as Gilpin himself concludes: “even though two states may be gaining absolutely in wealth, in political terms it is the effect of these gains on relative power positions which is of primary importance” (Ibid., 34).

To continue, in *The Political Economy of International Relations* (1987), Gilpin substitutes “mercantilism” for economic nationalism. These two conceptions are fundamentally the same, as they both highlight the reciprocal relationship between power and wealth. He builds on Jacob Viner’s work which also argues this point of view:

I believe that practically all mercantilists, whatever the period, country, or status of the particular individual, would have subscribed to all of the following propositions: (1) wealth is an absolute essential means to power, whether for security or for aggression; (2) power is essential or valuable as a means for the acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy; (4) there is long-run harmony between these ends, although in particular circumstances it may be necessary for a time to make economic sacrifices in the interest of military security and therefore also of long-run prosperity. (Viner 1958, 286)

From this description, economic interactions have the potential to be a destabilizing force in international stability. As a result, states are in direct confrontation for the fruits of globalization. War may break out if one power begins to decline with the simultaneous rise of another (Ibid., 72). The potential for war may be to change economic rules but also over control/access to markets, raw materials, or debt financing. Gilpin sees Lenin’s law of uneven development as the core cause of war:

the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is the calculation of the *strength* of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the *even* development of different undertakings, trust, branches of industries, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, if her capital strength is compared with that of the Britain of the time; Japan compared with Russia

in the same way. Is it ‘conceivable’ that in ten or twenty years’ time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained unchanged? It is out of the question. (Lenin 1939, 119)

Lenin’s law of uneven development establishes that wealth might be transformed into military power. Such is the principle driver of war (Ibid., 27).

From this explanation, it is apparent that wealth drives power; economics fuels power. This explanation is quite similar to the Marxist conception in that power drives wealth; politics fuels economics. In essence, these arrows are causal in the sense that one thing causes another to exist. In the social sciences in general, locating causality poses enormous difficulties. I contend that constitution is better suited for the social sciences rather than causality. Constitutive properties test the supposition that variables cannot exist independent of each other within the social world. This work thus argues that mutual constitution shapes the forces of wealth and power in international politics. World-systems Approach and Structural Realism is thus more similar than different as described in previous paragraphs. Both posit that the world is shaped by a direct attempt of states to expand power and influence through their various attempts as systems-creation. While Structural Realists argue that states systemic-creation is designed to pursue power, Marxists argue that class elites, not states, are the main mechanism of international politics. The only difference here is their ontology, which upon closer look is one and the same. For instance, scholarship shows that elites lead states (Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Hasen 2016; Mayer 2016; Stiglitz 2013). Studies show that the rich are interested in the functioning of the state, and, as a result, lead the state. If elites lead the state, then we can expect that their interests, and the interests of their friends, will also be served. Wealth and power are tied together: access to wealth and protection of such wealth is dependent upon military power. Military power is predicated on continued access to wealth. If sources of wealth are cut off, then military power will be weakened. Power projection, hence, is dependent on the mutual reinforcing collaboration of military power and wealth. Economic growth is a desirable outcome and, thus, the creation of world-systems dependencies today is less costly than the maintenance of classical empires. Weak states are allowed to negotiate between dependencies because of their unthreatening nature. As a result, we see the need for a new ontology of neoempire, that is, a sociopolitical-economic unit of governance that operates within a system of anarchy as defined by competition. This will be discussed next.

CLASSICAL EMPIRE AND NEOEMPIRE COMPARED

This book combines balance of power theory with World-systems Approach to understand how great powers compete over international system-creation. The behavior of states, whether great powers or weak states, is to survive. Survival depends on a state's ability to grow economically and this holds true for all states. Economic growth provides states with the tools to deal with threats both military and non-military (Kassab 2015b, 2017). Since this is so, great powers create dependencies in order to generate power. The result is a sociopolitical-economic block designed toward systems-creation. This section will describe the pressure of empire building from old style empires of the nineteenth century to the advancement of our new concept.

Classical Empire

Traditional empires of the nineteenth century harken back to ancient days when kingdoms branched out to incorporate large bodies of land containing resources and peoples (Hobson 2005, 8). All empires act in a generalizable fashion as they “have enough in common to be defined broadly as a particular kind of institutionalized setting for the extension of power. As a general phenomenon, empires extend relations of power across territorial spaces over which they have no prior or given legal sovereignty, and where, in one or more of the domains of economics, politics, and culture, they gain some measure of extensive hegemony over those spaces for the purpose of extracting or accruing value (James and Nairn 2006, xxiii). This definition highlights the reciprocal and constitutive (not causal) relationship between wealth and power. Colonialism is altogether different from imperialism and necessitates the transplanting of great power citizens into the spaces of others. While this is interesting, the focus of this argument will solely be the practice of imperialism.

Empires practice imperialism. According to John Hobson, the practice of imperialism has economic origins. As states acquire wealth from imperialism, they then acquire power and influence. This is essentially part of internal balancing as discussed in the previous chapter. If one state seeks empire, then other states will become more insecure and will eventually seek empire themselves. Thus, empires are in competition with other

empires. James and Nairn (2006) discuss the aspect of competition succinctly: “empires such as the British, French and German Empires of the nineteenth century, formed in the dominance of modernism, did not fade away at their edges but sought to draw abstract lines around colonized territories and demarcate zones of influence ... as they scrambled over each other to control the far-flung reaches of the globe, the conflict intensified as did the political ‘necessity’ of formalizing the control turned in a world-wide system of territorialized colonies” (xxv). This ultimately recognizes the systemic nature of empire building within anarchy: if states do not engage in imperialism (the act of empire building), then ultimately, they will be left less wealthy, less powerful, and increasingly insecure. Imperialism (and colonialism) must be seen not only as immoral but also as a regrettable part of international politics. This competition between empires can be illustrated through two systemically important events: the Scramble for Africa and the Boxer Rebellion in China. These two cases will be explored briefly now.

The Scramble for Africa began when Leopold II of Belgium announced his interest in the Congo in 1876. This sparked a European interest in the region as France and Britain began their own excursions into Egypt and the Sudan. These activities were of serious concern to other powers, such as the newly formed Imperial Germany. As a result, European states came together to discuss carving up the continent at the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). By 1902, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and King Leopold II of Belgium had completely occupied Africa in their specific spheres of influence (Gates and Appiah 2010, *Encyclopedia of Africa*). From this description, it becomes clear that expansion is a necessary part of survival given the systemic pressure of empire building. If tiny Belgium was allowed free reign in Africa, then the other European powers would lose out both absolutely and relatively. Belgium could then use its newfound wealth to continue expanding outward, both in Africa and possibly in Europe after enough power had been gained. Hobson summarizes the practice: “the economic root of imperialism is the desire of strong organized industrial and financial interests to secure and develop at the public expense and by the public force private markets for their surplus goods and their surplus capital. War, militarism and a ‘spirited foreign policy’ are the necessary means to this end” (Hobson 2005, 106).

In another episode of European Imperialism, the Boxer Rebellion represented an interesting, even progressive development of empire building. Just like the Scramble for Africa, a plethora of European imperial states (Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) along with Japan came

together to portion China. As spheres of influence were drawn up and put into practice, resistance movements sprang up but were eventually defeated. Given resistance by the Chinese, it was thought best for the Europeans to rule through a local leader. This rule by consent was an innovation that would ultimately be adopted by future versions, or adaptations, of empire.

In these two cases, empire served to generate wealth and power in the creation of dependencies. While Marxists tend to see this as just another stage of capitalism, it is much more than that. Empire building, in its classic and neo form, is a behavior driven toward the acquisition of wealth and power in an effort to attain prestige. As a result, other great powers will copy that behavior. If one great power begins to build an empire or create dependencies, then others will copy. Such is the pressure of anarchy and the existence of the security dilemma. John Herz writes:

Wherever such anarchic society has existed—and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level—there has arisen what may be called the “security dilemma” of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on. (1950, 157)

Thus, we must accept that empire building is ultimately a practice reflected by the notion of the security dilemma. This is reflected in the Scramble for Africa.

Empire building is a systemic practice driven by the notion of the security dilemma; the behavior demonstrated by one state will be copied by another state as security-seeking behavior. Herz understands the security dilemma as a form of competition between states seeking security within anarchy. Within this context, Hobson himself understood the competitive factor of empire. He writes:

The scramble for Africa and Asia virtually recast the policy of all European nations, evoked alliances which cross all natural lines of sympathy and historical association, drove every continental nation to consume an ever-growing share of its material and human resources upon military and naval equipment, drew the great new power of the United States from its isolation

into the full tide of competition; and, by the multitude, the magnitude, and the suddenness of the issues it had thrown on to the stage of politics, became a constant agent of menace and of perturbation to the peace and progress of mankind. The new policy exercised the most notable and formidable influence upon the conscious statecraft of the nations which indulge in it. (Hobson 2005, 12)

Even before the Scramble for Africa, European powers raced to gain territories in the new world after its so-called discovery in 1492. Samir Amin discusses this in depth in 1492, which identifies the date of which the world changes forever: “If I were required to pick a date to mark the birth of the modern world, I should choose 1492, the year in which the Europeans began their conquest of the planet—military, economic, political, ideological, cultural, and even, in a certain sense, ethnic” (Amin 1992, 1). This moment explains the European pressure for empire. If one country, Spain, was to benefit from the wealth of colonialism, then all states in Europe had to do the same. If they did not, then Spain could effectively annex Europe in its entirety. The function of states is survival and, as a result, all European states during that time must build empires. Other great powers of the time had to seek empires of their own as the prestige factor also played a significant role. Of course, Amin and others like him ignore this aspect of world politics taking capitalism as a unifying force. He writes “But the world in question is also the world of capitalism, a new social and economic system, qualitatively different from all previous systems in Europe and elsewhere” (Ibid.). Essentially the states of Europe use capitalism, to expand not only their wealth but also their power. This is an integral part of the international system as we shall see in the following chapter.

To illustrate, we must look at a common meeting point for competing great powers with the classical imperial framework: the continent of Africa and the area of China. Africa, with its boundless resources, both natural and human, presents a real opportunity for great powers seeking domination and prestige. Over a century ago, European powers raced to carve out areas of exploitation for themselves. This practice continues in the process we know as neoempire. While not as psychopathic as the past slaughter of millions of people in the old days of empire, today’s neoempires are grounded in acceptable norms and practices. This will be discussed in the following subsection.

Neoempire: United States and Soviet Union During the Cold War

Neoempire is a new unit of governance formulated after the horrors of World War II. Empire building in its traditional sense was no longer acceptable. However, great powers still had to accumulate wealth and power; prestige remained a necessary factor. The US-led Bretton Woods order and the Soviet Union's socialism were the first manifestations of neoempire. Weaker states, especially those of the newly independent developing world, were part of the neoempire created through coercion, consent, or a mixture of the two. Cold War politics thus can be understood through a neoempire framework as states around the globe had to conform to the new structure of the international system as formulated by the US- and Soviet Union-led neoempires.

To begin, the United States and the Soviet Union are neoempires because they behaved in similar ways due to the constraints of the international system. In their specified spheres of influence, both powers supported friendly ruling elites through economic and military alliances. Even before the war was over, these two great powers came together to divide Europe. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 attests to this. Walter Lippmann describes the interests of the soon be warring factors: "while the British and Americans held firmly ... the whole position in Africa and the Mediterranean ... and the whole of Western Germany ... they undertook by negotiation and diplomatic pressure to reduce Russia's position in Eastern Europe—which the Soviets had won because the Red Army had defeated two thirds of the German Army" (Lippmann quoted in Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 52). The United States was indeed unwilling to allow complete Russian domination in Eastern Europe because it was strategically important for the security of the Soviet Union. Stalin describes the necessity of Eastern Europe, specifically Poland: "for the Russian people, the question of Poland is not a question of honor, but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia" (Ibid., 55). Mistrust between the United States and Soviet Union only grew as both powers felt insecure given the usual law of the balance of power. More than just political domination, the neoempires of the United States and the Soviet Union sought control through their economic systems. The United States, for instance, even before the war was over, began to construct plans to dominate the world through economic institutions.

In 1944, 44 countries gathered at a hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, to plan the new world's monetary and banking system. The result is what we know today as the Bretton Woods regime. The institutions which were a manifestation of the regime served the interest of the United States to protect and ultimately prolong its power (Krasner 1983, 2). The primary purpose of the Bretton Woods regime was to maintain global long-term economic and political stability. Kindleberger understands this to be the role of the hegemon, that is, "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (Kindleberger 1973, 305). Stability was to be accomplished through the formation of two interrelated goals which would help facilitate economic growth: exchange-rate stability and economic autonomy of states. The regime's sole political and economic purpose was the promotion of liberal economic principles, specifically that of free trade. This was done to impart norms of cooperation among states. While economic growth and development were the main economic aims, the political goal was to ensure the longevity of the world capitalist system created and maintained by the United States.

Bretton Woods supplied a foundation for cooperation among states a feature lacking during the 1930s. Bretton Woods institutions, specifically the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), intended to rebuild a destroyed Europe and, more importantly, serve as an economic governance infrastructure. The political aim was to block or counter the perceived aggressive and expansionary foreign policy of the Soviet Union and specifically their style of communism. Due to this, we must conclude that the Bretton Woods regime system was a realist project, which assumed political and economic domination of the United States over any potential rivals. This power could only be accomplished through economic domination. As a result, the United States remained the main beneficiary as the original designer of the Bretton Woods system.

The Soviet Union also set up their own economic system of domination and came into conflict with the United States. The Warsaw Pact hoped to consolidate Soviet power through political and economic domination of Eastern Europe. The Soviet economic system, unlike capitalism of the Western world, abolished private property in favor of central planning. All property was owned by the state and was distributed to people equally. The Soviet economic system was an alternative to Western-led exploitation, colonialism, and imperialism. As a result, the great powers of the Cold War began to expand outward into the so-called third world.

Each wanted to bring in weaker parties into their sphere of domination. This would explain the plethora of proxy wars and direct military interventions that dominated the Cold War scene. Both the United States and the Soviet Union desired to increase their presence, not just to increase their power absolutely, but to deny that advantage to their opponent. Each of the now great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, constructed neoempires in their designated spheres of influence. While we understand the international system as bipolar during the Cold War given capabilities, we must appreciate the fact that there were also competing relationships of dependency.

While Soviet-style central planning was successful in some areas initially, it failed to provide the basic needs of people. The Soviet Union could not produce on the level of the United States and fell behind quickly. By the 1980s, people of Eastern Europe were pushing for reform and eventually won independence from the Warsaw Pact. Although the Bretton Woods system failed during the economic and political shocks of the 1970s, the United States still managed to maintain central control of its neoempire. Bretton Woods simply shifted focus by pursuing a *neoliberal* style economic system defined by the United States. Neoliberalism is an economic theory defined by limited government intervention contrary to Soviet-style, socialist economic principles; indeed, it was designed to push back against Soviet-style planned economies. Pushed by Bretton Woods institutions through structural adjustment programs, countries would not receive any loans until they adopted certain IMF structural adjustment programs. These programs were not simply economic but were also political regardless of their supposedly apolitical-economic position. They aimed at restructuring the world economy into something closely resembling an economic system modeled after the United States. Structural adjustments comprised of further reducing tariffs, deregulating the domestic economy including governance mechanisms like domestic interest and exchange rates, and the privatization of state-owned enterprise. This strategy became known as the Washington Consensus.

The Washington Consensus is summarized in ten principles: fiscal discipline, reducing public expenditure, liberalizing interest rates, liberalizing the exchange rate, tax reform, free trade, freedom of capital movement, privatization, property rights, and deregulation (Williamson 2004, 3). These principles seek to correct the deficits of the embedded liberal Bretton Woods regime. These reforms were adopted by the IMF as part of their structural adjustments program, which, as stated, were part of the

process of receiving a loan (*Ibid.*, 5). Many critics interpreted this, correctly I would argue, as an additional force of consent for American-led economic hegemony. This “Washington Agenda” exported an economic framework to ensure United States’ control for years to come. It provided the infrastructure necessary to consolidate the American-led neoempire designed to further fuel and fund the American drive for prestige as it continued to be in direct conflict with an ever-weakening Soviet Union.

In summary, the neoempire of the United States continues to be strengthened by its economic institutions established after World War II. These institutions exist primarily to defend the core position of the United States within a neoempire of its own creation. This position was possible due to American hegemony. The United States has, at least at the time of writing, used these institutions to block the advancement of any other great power. As a consequence, rising powers, specifically China, has led the creation of its own banking regimes in direct challenge to the American-led neoempire. This political-economic infrastructure will serve to formulate China’s own enrichment, and ultimately, through their own bilaterally established conditionalities, neoempire.

The move toward building competing dependencies led by great power neoempire became apparent with the formulation of blocs. The United States supported Western Europe not only through NATO but also through its newly formed Bretton Woods institutions and the Marshall Plan. Specifically, the Marshall Plan was not simply an act of kindness, rather, it was done for selfish reasons. The Americans needed trade partners to secure their wealth and position in Europe. This is for two reasons. First, without the Europeans, the United States would not be able to sell their products. Second, the worse-off Western Europe, the more likely citizens would move toward communism and thus the Soviet Union. To the Americans, this outcome had to be avoided.

On the other side of the balance of power lay the large and looming Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact. Stalin, determined to hold on to Eastern Europe which his army occupied, refused to hold elections or allow any Western representatives to travel through the area to observe the political environment (*Ibid.*, 68). Since there were no elections, Stalin set up puppet governments friendly to the Soviet Union, enemy to the United States, and death to those seeking alternative forms of governance. The same could also be said about those states within the American sphere of influence. In Greece, for instance, the United States

and Britain funded extreme right-wing parties against the communist party to ensure Greece's pro-West position. Taking a look at the next few decades, and extending our focus to the rest of the world, we see proxy wars springing as the United States and the Soviet Union battled for influence and wealth. To win a proxy war was to deny the competitor of victory. This is the product of anarchy.

The ultimate reason for the Cold War, then, was the mutual systemic need to create competing neoempires for the purpose of extending power and influence, and ultimately, to achieve security. George Kennan identifies the potential for conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union because of this system of competition. He does have a healthy respect for his enemy and tries to understand their perspective. I do think many of today's leaders have lost this helpful trait. In his *Long Telegram*, he tries to understand the fears and motivations of the Soviet Union. Kennan describes Stalin's perceptions to a delegation of American workers: "In the course of further development of international revolution, there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world" (Stalin quoted by Kennan 1946, 1). For Kennan then, the only way to avoid conflict was to recognize the Soviet sphere of influence, that is, its need to develop and defend a neoempire. The United States must recognize Soviet's need for prestige by allowing its free reign in Eastern Europe and to wait until the contradictions of the Soviet-styled neoempire system become too much to bear. As John Gaddis states: "one empire arose, therefore, by invitation, the other by imposition" (1997, 54), it was only a matter of time until the Soviet neoempire fell.

To all great powers then, there were two concerns that drove preservation of such status: military supremacy and economic preservation. Economic domination shapes political autonomy of states such as its energy or resources, which would then be used to enhance a great power's political position in the globe. Paul Kennedy isolates two necessary elements that held true for United States:

Although the United States is at present still in a class of its own economically and perhaps militarily, it cannot avoid confronting two great tests which challenge the longevity of every major power that occupies the "number one" position in international affairs: whether it can preserve a reasonable

balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and whether or not it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of ever-shifting patterns of global production. (Kennedy 1987, 514–15)

I would argue that this holds true for all states seeking to create or maintain great power status. Identifying economy and technology as the “base” of power is essential to understand this book's major theoretical contribution: that in order to survive as a great power, states must be able to economically expand through dependencies, creating a neoempire to maintain supremacy in the long term. Hardt and Negri note a new conception of global order which they label *Empire*. Empire is a decentralized and deterritorialized apparatus of power that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open expanding frontiers. NGOs are the agents of empire, the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order. Empire is simply the latest form taken by capitalist exploitation, the highest state of imperialism. Hardt and Negri argue that the United States is the center of the globe as the main projector of power and relations. This may have been true for the time. The authors also add that the United States would protect itself from rivals, especially China which may be the next superpower. However, this simply has not been the case. Working within global capitalism, China has broken out of the core-semi-peripheral relationship established by the United States. China, in other words, has went out on its own. It is here that we begin to understand the dynamics of neoempire as a political and economic unit existing in an international system of anarchy, states and economic transactions.

From this analysis, looking at the outcome of international politics, we can make a few conclusions. First, the international system remains in anarchy, and, as a result, the practices of states remain the same. The great powers that create the system still feel insecure, and, as a result, are forced to expand outward. Working within democratic norms of the post-war world, great powers recognize the sovereignty of other states to a point. Great powers still usher in weaker units within a neoempire. However, from their playing the field behavior, we see that weak states can break out of the neoempire and do business with other neoempires if they are smart. This leads to the second conclusion: that since the structure of the international system remains static, that is in anarchical and not hierarchical form, then imperialism and empire building still exists, not simply (or limited) to accumulating

wealth, but for power and security purposes. Hence, since the system has not yet changed, states and people have not changed. The world as John Hobson saw it in 1902 remains constant. It is as if what he wrote then remains true. Consider his words:

While producing for popular consumption doctrines of national destiny and imperial missions of civilization, contradictory in their true import, but subsidiary to one another as supports of popular Imperialism, it evoked a calculating, greedy type of Machiavellianism, entitled “real-politic” in Germany, where it was made, which remodeled the whole art of diplomacy and erected national aggrandizement without pity or scruple as the conscious motive force of foreign policy. Earth hunger and the scramble for markets were responsible for the openly avowed repudiation of treaty obligations which Germany, Russia, and England had not scrupled to defend. (Ibid.)

It can thus be understood that international politics can be theorized as competition between competing sociopolitical-economic blocks that hope to establish security for themselves using the tools of wealth and power. Systemic competition breeds constant repetitive action giving light to what we understand as repeated patterns of behavior. In the behavioral sense, actions are recurrent due to an independent variable type of systemic pressure.

By studying the contributions of the previous chapter, we can see the motivations/pressures of the units within neoempire, the great power and the weak state, as resulting in specific transactions:

1. Great powers seek/are pressured to grow internally and externally;
2. Weak states seek/are pressured to develop economically.

Great powers need weak states and vice versa, and so they come together to do business. Great powers buy political support from weak states and weak states use aid to develop given their systemic vulnerability. While weak states seek assistance in such a way, it still contributes to their underdevelopment. Corruption and other destabilizing features of weak states are still present. Weak states have little agency to actually improve, they simply want to survive. All states are constrained by this system as all states must behave in this way given the nature of the competition.

The result of all of this activity is a hierarchical model of international political governance. This model serves a specific function. Functional explanations focus on a path of determinacy (Isajiw 1968, 6). The focus

on determinacy is “placed in the attribution of collectivities” (Ibid., 6). Functionalism tries to understand the interdependence of variables like the interaction of wealth and power in international relations (Ibid., 10). This is what this book seeks to describe. Functionalism is deterministic due to repeated patterns of behavior that derive expectations. As a result, functionalism may lead to the development of a new ontology or object of study. I am labeling this unit as neoempire.

One of my major problems with the concept of empire is that scholars usually get stuck on a particular case rather than its structural form. For instance, many seem to focus on the United States, the Soviet Union, or Great Britain as an empire. They neglect the systemic practice of empire as simply a part of great power politics as they operate within an anarchical system. Neoempires are led by great powers who construct dependencies to further their position. This new unit of study is the result of the international system, a fundamental product of the interaction between competing world-systems forming neoempires. It is not enough to talk about well systems but rather new empires as a construct of the need to acquire power and wealth simultaneously.

The reason for developing this new concept of neoempire is twofold. First, given globalization, interdependence, and interconnectivity, the state has increasingly hallowed out. The state is losing much of its capacity to defend against non-military threats as evidenced in a previous work (Kassab 2017). Systemic vulnerabilities are distributed across states, which ultimately manufacture state behavior. Consequently, great powers find themselves increasingly defending the system they create and maintain their own dominance. This leads to the second reason as a result: the state itself is becoming increasingly obsolescent. Obsolescence means that the general usefulness of a concept, such as the state, has declined. It was once understood that states behaved to survive from military threats. Since there are now more states, and state autonomy has been further constrained due to systemic vulnerabilities (Kassab 2017), then we can further understand the need for a new concept to understand international relations outcomes.


Defined now, a neoempire is an object of analysis that uses both Structural Realist theory and Dependency theory to explain international political outcomes. Political power is at the center of economic relations as economic relations are at the center of political power. Neoempires recognize the power of the economy to protect and increase wealth and will act to defend and expand regardless. The elitist pressure to do so is as well

driven by competition for power in fear of losing power and prestige. States, unified by an international network of elites, strive to protect their wealth, not only in their home country, but abroad as well. Power is used to expand and protect wealth, and wealth is used to expand and protect power. The global superstructure and its base are tied together through the elite classes, but the consent of the population is needed for this to take place. As a result, elite networks across states act in defense of an international superstructure which is altogether important to maintain the international order. Thus, we cannot solely look at economic power OR state power as a main mover of international relations, but rather see them as a reciprocally related as Gilpin himself states. The network of elites is responsible for the described behaviors in this book.

Neoempires other than the United States do exist. In the past, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was such a unit. Today, China, Russia and its Eurasian Union, and the United States form the major neoempires in the twenty-first century. These states are building these neoempires, not solely for wealth but also for power and prestige. This neoempire-building process aims to balance against others or, in some cases, used to dominate (Fig. 3.1):

The core problem with any existing conception is the identification of causation. In the social world, locating independent variables is improbable, as no methodology exists to do so at this time. This will be discussed in the following chapter. Further, we must also understand the economic system of the great power will be pushed upon the weak state units within the neoempire. In other words, the *laissez-faire* style economy of the United States will be enforced by its power in developing countries. This is also being done by China, in that Chinese state-led developmental capitalism is in the process of being adopted as well. Ngaire Woods notes the “power shift occurring across the global economy” (Woods 2008, 1) especially with regards to China. China, among others, is now “giving aid on terms of their own choosing” (Ibid.). Moises Naim sees this as a focal point in Chinese foreign policy as:

Fig. 3.1 Mutual reinforcement/reciprocal relationship of neoempire in international systemic creation



China has backed such deals throughout Africa; its funding of infrastructure there has boomed from \$700 million in 2003 to between \$2 and \$3 billion for each of the past two years. Indeed, it is a worldwide strategy. In Indonesia, Beijing agreed to expand the country's electrical grid. Too bad the deal calls for building plants that use a highly polluting, coal-based Chinese technology. No international agency would have signed off on such an environmentally unfriendly deal. In the Philippines, the Asian Development Bank, which lends money at low interest rates to poor countries, had agreed to fund Manila's new aqueduct. It too was suddenly told that its money was no longer needed. China was offering lower rates and fewer questions. (Naim 2007)

Such a practice comes into direct conflict with American style neoempire:

The Nigerian government operates three railways, which are notoriously corrupt and inefficient. They are also falling apart. The World Bank proposed a project based on the common-sense observation that there was no point in loaning the Nigerians money without also tackling the corruption that had crippled the railways. After months of negotiation, the bank and Nigeria's government agreed on a \$5 million project that would allow private companies to come in and help clean up the railways. But, just as the deal was about to be signed, the Chinese government offered Nigeria \$9 *billion* to rebuild the entire rail network—no bids, no conditions, and no need to reform. That was when my friend [a World Bank representative] packed his suitcase and went to the airport. (Naim 2007)

China beat out the United States in that specific bid, gaining prestige relative to its major competitor. Hence, it must be understood that neoempire is a function of both power and wealth accumulation (economic unity).

The United States, given its systemic importance as a core member of the neoempire of its own creation, will affect all peripheral states if it faces the usual contradiction of capitalism, that is, its susceptibility to booms (inflation) and busts (recession). This again goes for China. Its problematic state-led capitalism may suffer from growth ceilings which will reduce investment in other parts of its developing neoempire. The same goes for Russia and its reliance on oil. The European Union is clearly teetering on collapse since the debt crisis of 2010. These shocks, most powerful being the 2008 financial crisis, come from developed states of the neoempire. This would lend further credibility to the idea of systemic vulnerability. Recalling our understanding of vulnerability discussed by Keohane and

Nye (2011) and other scholars (Easter 1999; Kassab 2015b, 2017), weak states are more exposed to systemic shocks such as financial crises because of their underdevelopment. Theories are closer than we think all stemming from powerful contradictions of socioeconomic relations.

Why Hegemony Is an Incomplete Concept

Neoempires are qualitatively different from hegemonies for two main reasons. The first is that states are still the primary actor, not class. States have the power to securitize and create social meanings and perceptions of people. Neoempire recognizes and encapsulates the nature of the international political system as neither a benign nor a malignant process; rather it describes expansion as a forced process of survival rather than domination or leadership. Hegemony denotes funding of a system in a productive fashion that development and economic growth that would ensure from its infrastructure is altogether beneficial. Neoempire denotes exploitation and the creation of dependency by the great power. Aid then solves two tasks by maintaining world-systems and gaining international consent. Take, for example, the findings from AidData:

AidData, a project based at the College of William and Mary in Virginia, keeps a huge database on official aid flows. Its number-crunching shows how much China appears to reward African countries that vote with it. The relationship is not a simple one (see chart), according to Brad Parks, a director of the organisation. China gives proportionally more money to poorer countries, for instance. But by and large countries that support China do better. AidData reckons that if African countries voted with China an extra 10% of the time, they would get an 86% bump in official aid on average. If Rwanda, for instance, were to cast its ballot alongside China 93% of the time (instead of its current 67%), its aid from China could jump by 289%. (The Economist, April 16, 2016)

Since the economic system of the great power will be adopted by the weaker states that make up the neoempire, then we must accept that all the systemic vulnerabilities associated with that economic system will be shared by all members of that neoempire as a consequence. When economic systemic shocks take place, for instance, the 2008 US financial crisis, all members of the neoempire will be exposed to it.

Further, hegemony does not emphasize wealth-seeking/power dynamic at the expense of other potential hegemons and, more specifically, weaker states while neoempire describes these notions. Neoempire combines Dependency theory with hegemonic theory to understand systems of exploitation from several great power locations. Hegemony does not examine the costs to weak states, considers itself either benign to others or malignant to other great powers competitors while neoempire sees these as natural parts of the international order. The concept of neoempire thus bridges the gap between realist understandings of hegemony and Marxist perspectives of dependency. Either concept is incomplete to understand the mechanisms that create the international order.

CONCLUSIONS

Gilpin's career underscored the importance of power and the state in international relations. Benjamin Cohen writes about Gilpin in his excellent book *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*:

As early as 1972, in his contribution to *Transnational Relations and World Power*, Gilpin had hinted at the logic of HST. Surely, he asserted, there was some connection between the exercise of power in the economic realm and the world of security. Colleagues who disagreed wondered if he might be a Marxist. But says the self-declared Vermont Republican, "I knew I was not a Marxist.... I read other things on the interplay of economics and politics, and then I discovered a book on mercantilism and said to myself: 'Ah! That's what I am!' I began to realize that you could have a realist view of world economics without being a Marxist." (Gilpin in Cohen 2008, 73)

I am the first to praise Gilpin for his work but I do believe he is committing a fatal error: his loyalties lie not in the pursuit of good theory, but rather a discomfort for the Marxist label. In effect, he, along with many other scholars in international relations, prays to a specific theoretical church. From this chapter, understand the close relationship between wealth and power and the connection between the state as a unitary ontological beginning and the elite class or Neo-Marxist theory. In the field of International Relations, Structural Realism and Neo-Marxist analysis are one and the same. Theories must be designed around facts and phenomena, not the other way around. Adding this book's hypothesis, we have an explanation that fits the known facts: we see the connection between wealth and power and, as a result, Structural Realism and Neo-Marxism.

To make sense of the world, we must look beyond the state and class systems. Ontologically, new actors that defy the function of states and classes must be developed. Neoempires exist today which construct the international system. In the next chapter, I hope to theorize on that matter by looking at great power behavior, specifically their construction of dependency. Dependency creation can be thought as intervening variables within an international system: a system operating within the international system if you will, for the purpose of power accumulation. Ultimately, this behavior satisfies the psychopathic need to acquire prestige regardless of the effect on humanity. Systemic war in the age of nuclear weapons will be disastrous for all parties, mostly the masses. Seeing that war of this magnitude does not serve their interests, this book will recommend the formulation of a global forum for forgiveness and reconciliation to escape global destruction.

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Systems-Creation and Competition

INTRODUCTION

States seek survival from threats specific to them (given power or vulnerability). In their search for survival, great powers function to gain or defend prestige while weak states function to develop. In such an environment, great powers and weak states come together to do business in defense of their interests through their particular grand strategy. Economic growth is essential to achieve survival for both groupings. Economic growth allows great powers to amass military power and influence while simultaneously providing weak states the resources to bolster their survival chances given systemic vulnerability. Under these conditions, great powers and weak engaging in political-economic transactions do so under the superstructure of neoempire. These are essentially transactions; transactions that play an important role in manufacturing the international system.

From these transactions, we see dependency as policy that intends to strengthen great powers at the expense of weaker states. Great powers intend to dominate the landscape by shepherding weaker states into these relationships given weak state vulnerability stemming from underdevelopment. All great powers do this as systems-creative behavior remains an essential part of systemic competition. This systemic practice is important to study if we intend to explain:

1. How power is distributed across states;
2. How the mechanisms of competitive state behavior (and ultimately the causes of war and conflict) pay into foreign policy.

With this in mind, this chapter will argue that dependency described by World-systems Approach is an example of contemporary international systemic practice. We shall examine the construction of the international system looking at agent behaviors and systemic practice, specifically, transactions, as the basis for twenty-first-century international politics. Unit behavior at the macro level forms a major part of systems-creation and must be hypothesized.

This chapter hopes to describe the process of systemic creation by developing further the idea of neoempire. In order to make sense of world-system, great powers prey on weak states, create exploitative systems for the sake of domination and prestige against competitors. This new unit of governance is called neoempire. The foundation of neoempire is the economic transactions that take place between great powers and weak states. Weak states are thus at the forefront of great power grand strategy which is reflected in the structure of the current balance of power. This new international system is reflected in the Chinese Game of Go. Go is a game played by two people (or great powers) for the control of the board (international system). The playing pieces are weak states, an essential component of controlling the board and winning the round. As the players buy up weak states support, more influence is acquired which is essential to security and eventually dominating the world. Prior to this, we must define what is meant by systemic practice. This chapter will bring further credence to the new ontological unit of study, neoempire, as great power behavior coerces others into similar patterns of destructive and exploitative behavior.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN GRAND STRATEGIES

Systemic theory provides an explanation of actor behavior based on a reproduction of expected unit behaviors over time. If a “system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” (Waltz 2010, 79), then we must first determine the composition of the “structure” and the “unit” as well as “interactions” before any attempt at systemic theory is made. This

section will determine the configuration of the current structure of the international system by first determining its component parts, by breaking down the system into three parts: the structure, the unit, and the unit interaction. This chapter determines interaction, specifically the transactions between grand strategies as survival strategies (see Chap. 2), as an important part of the international system as we know it in today's context. I break with the realist tradition (in several distinct ways but here specifically) by integrating World-systems Approach and supposing motivations of units. State motivations form an integral part of the international system given the stated transactions between great and weak states. Transactions are fundamental as states great and weak satisfy and achieve their own grand strategies whether domination and security (great powers) or economic development and bare survival against a multiplicity of threats (weak states). Once we understand that these transactions form an essential part of the international system, we can then theoretically explain the existence of a multiplicity of neoempire today and the way they balance against one another within a setting of competition within anarchy.

Structures

To understand structures, we must turn to the standard-bearer of systemic theory. Kenneth Waltz, the most prominent of structural theorists, relies heavily on Stanley Hoffmann's own work to determine the makeup of the international system. Hoffmann defines the international system as "a pattern of relations among the basic units of world politics" (1961, 90). Waltz does find this vague but tries to build on it. To Waltz, a structure "defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of the system" (Ibid., 81). Waltz gives prominence to great powers, or the "primary political units of an era, be they city states, empires, or nations" (Ibid., 91). The major units of the system, specifically their survival behavior, manufacture the structure. Great powers survive through their capabilities as distributed across the system manifested in a balance of power. States then balance internally through military buildup or externally through alliances (Chap. 2). It is this very behavior that generates a system according to Waltz and so nothing more should be studied. As a result, Waltz does seem to use structures and systems as one and the same when they are not. Structures form part of an overall system. In other words, the system is constructed, among other things, by a structure.

Waltz limits his systemic theory to descriptions of a structure formulated by the distribution of capabilities or security-seeking behavior of great powers. While this may seem enough for Waltz and other structural realists, it is not enough to understand what really produces or generates the international system, especially one in the twenty-first century. There are other parts of the system alongside a structure that formulate unit behavior. Structural Realism in its entirety becomes problematic because of its limited scope. If the core of structural analysis is the capabilities of great powers, then we must also be aware of phenomena that erode power.

A state can be drained of its power in several ways. War can impact a state's ability to project power, even the winning state like Great Britain and France after world wars I and II. States can be destroyed in an unwinnable arms race such as the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. These two examples are where structural realism poses the most explanatory power. However, states can decline through other state and non-state sources. A great power can decline from failed political interventions like the failed 2003 Iraq invasion, the 1979 Afghan war (or any Afghan invasion for that matter) as well as other expensive political endeavor: the war with Islamic State. These activities intend to project power but end up draining power leading to perceived or real relative-absolute decline. This then shifts the balance of power in favor of other states.

Other destabilizing sources include non-state threats like trying to neutralize criminal networks, terrorist networks, economic instability and chaos (2008 financial crisis among others since the 1990s), environmental and health vulnerabilities, and cyber-war (Kassab 2017). In sum, all of these sources of threat, these systemic vulnerabilities, grind down the power of states. Anything that erodes state power is part of the system and must be incorporated into systemic theory.

Great powers create systems using their capability. The problem for great powers is that they are doomed to support the system they create. This causes loss of power as great powers must maintain their areas of control by supporting the system to protect their position. In today's world, this means funding a system by solving its problems. These problems include protecting weak states, intervening on their behalf in many different ways such as providing funds during financial crisis (Peso crisis), providing troops and support against criminal and terrorist networks, providing funds to the World Health Organization during times of outbreak, and leading the way to slow climate change. Weak states rely on great powers for help as they lack the capacity to survive on their own. Great

powers must bailout these weak states or else the systemic vulnerability will spill over into other states, reaching into great powers. For instance, Islamic State takes advantage of the inherent weaknesses of states in the Middle East and South East Asia. This expansion may continue unless they are contained by great powers like the United States, Russia, and China, all who are the ultimate targets of the Islamic State. Weak states thus pose a unique challenge to great powers as their vulnerabilities, if left unchecked, may destroy great powers.

The idea of a system is really an analytical tool, which tries to determine causality. Isolating certain variables as independent is not a completely vain exercise regardless of the arbitrary nature of politics. The worst parts of history are those that appear suddenly, the black swan moments of the 2008 financial crisis, World War I, and 9/11. These events define our understandings of world politics even though, in the grand scheme, they appear as anomalies. While these black swan moments could not be predicted as they were happening, they dominate our focus only after the fact. In other words, it is only after the occurrence itself that we determine the system. We come to know the structure only after the event has happened. Further then, our understandings of the system may be determined by the occurrences or phenomena that transpire. We should leave understandings of the system as purposely loose as we must expect it to change over time. Waltz's critique of Hoffmann systems theory as vague is ultimately incorrect. If we assume the system as static, then we lose the ability to predict changes such as the end of the Cold War, an event realism fails to predict. I would argue that any systemic theory must underscore the transactions which can be ranked under unit interactions. Interactions between states can alter the distribution of capabilities across states. War is an interaction but so are trade and other economic activities.

How would system-creative behaviors play into current explanations of the international system? Structural Realism is limited to explaining great power security behavior, a very important part of today's international order. This was sufficient in Europe in the nineteenth century when there were only a handful of powerful states competing for survival and systemic problems were not considered as significant challenges to international order. Today, the majority of the international system comprises weak states which manage to cut deals with competing great powers. Playing the field as a grand strategy used by weak states complicates matters for Structural Realists and any theorists trying to develop systemic theory. Playing the field grand strategy, the interaction of powers great and weak,

results in patterns of repeated behavior. This begs the question: why do states behave in this manner? What forms the international system today? The transaction between weak and great powers resulting from hegemonic competition is a systemic force.

To apply our understanding of systems to this argument, that is, great powers construct neoempires to pursue power and prestige, then we must assume dependency plays the role of intervening variable. To recall, this book combines two theories to make this new argument. Intervening variables, or in this case, intervening systems, play a mitigating factor between an independent variable and a dependent variable. This behavior is underscored or defined by the power or capacity of the state or the unit. At the unit level thus, we see systems constructive behavior which can determine the makeup of the system given time and coherent strategy.

Units

In Structural Realist theory, units that compose the system are states. This is the same in this book. All states great, middle, and weak are part of the system. Different states can do different things given their power or capability. Weak states are not powerful or capable but are systemically vulnerable (Kassab 2015). This borrows from Neoclassical Realism. According to this theory, “an increase in relative material power will lead eventually to a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of a country’s foreign policy activity—and that a decrease in such power will lead eventually to a corresponding contraction” (Rose 1998, 167). This means that the more a state grows in size and power, the more interests it will acquire internationally. The more interests acquired internationally, the more it would have to defend those interests which would eventually be at the expense of other states. This has been discussed by Farid Zakaria in his most influential work, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role* (1998). In this book, Zakaria states that “over the course of history, states that have experienced significant growth in their material resources have relatively soon redefined and expanded their political interests abroad, measured by their increases in military spending, initiation of wars, acquisition of territory, posting of soldiers and diplomats, and participation in great-power decision-making” (1). Further, this then requires powerful states to be able to act to defend themselves and attack others given their interests. Hence “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international

system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities” (Rose 1998, 146). In the case of this book, dependency is the intervening variable that helps states grow in wealth and power. The wealthier a great power becomes, the more it seeks prestige through expansion; the military is integral for demonstrating prestige. Zakaria states “with greater wealth, a country could build a military and diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad; but it’s very aims, its perception of its needs and goals, all tended to expand with rising resources” (Ibid., 5). He builds on the supposition by Kennedy that “there is a very clear connection between an individual great power’s economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world empire)” (Kennedy 1987, xxii).

Neoclassical Realism was developed primarily to explain the range of state behaviors given capabilities. This results in different types of autonomy given varying capacity. Zakaria argues saying “state centered realism predicts that nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power” (Zakaria 1998, 38). Capabilities are thus a product of economic growth (Zakaria 1998). Emerging powers, like Russia and China, that grow more than status quo powers may seek to overturn, rather than engage with an existing system (Gilpin 1981, 94–5). This is because the status quo power, with its rules and regulation that serve the status quo, may block the emerging power’s advancement (described in Chaps. 5 and 6). Thus, to further acquire power or defend newfound power, emerging states must begin to engage in dependency creation to get the better of status quo powers. Power must be understood as “resources with which states can influence each other” (Wohlforth 1993, 4). Great powers act similarly as do weak ones. In other words: “the security policies of very strong states are different from those of very weak ones, and both differ from those of states that are neither very strong nor very weak” (Mandelbaum 1988, 2).

For neoclassical realists, capabilities form an intervening variable that affects the autonomy a state may wield within the international system. If capabilities are economically driven, then we must conclude that any exploitative economic system is an intervening variable within the international systems. As Neoclassical Realism posits, different states (defined by those with dissimilar capacities) will suffer from different and distinct threats. Gilpin would agree in that “a more wealthy and powerful state will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and powerful state” (Gilpin 1981, 22–3). From this, we need to understand the role that global economic systems, including the creation of governance

infrastructure and superstructure, play in the accumulation of power of states. Just like regimes, relationships of dependency are set up by great powers in order to project power and influence. As a result, if states compete, they challenge one another in similar ways. As a result, then, dependencies are intervening variables which facilitate exchange. Here, transactions between units come together which results in structural and ultimately systemic transformation.

Transactions

Transactions driven by dependence networks provide wealth and eventually power to great powers (who lead neoempires) operating within the framework of the international system. World-systems Approach posits that global divisions of production and trade solidify the core's domination through the other's dependence on it. This results in uneven growth relative to great power competitors. The core depends on the exploitation of peripheral countries that benefit from the center.

The systemic nature of transactions must be explained as they relate to the system. Since great powers act to gather wealth, and therefore power, from weak states, all great powers must again engage weak states for the same purpose. Extracting gains from weak states is not only essential for boosting power, but increases the chances of survival against other great powers. Thus, if a trendsetting great power, for instance, China, is gaining power and prestige in Latin America and Africa, then other great powers, especially those threatened by an ever-expanding China, must do the same. The consequence for other great powers is that they will be left weaker relative to others. Hence, the construction of neoempire for the sake of power and wealth goes beyond our contemporary explanations of great power behavior. States are not simply power seekers; they are led neither simply by the wealthy nor solely by security but by both. Today and maybe always, states are power-seeking actors who gain this power by creating class-to-class linkages with elites in other states. Simply put, wealth is power. In Go fashion, wealth is driven by the economic transactions. Money is the root of all power projection: an evil endeavor to others as it has the potential to destabilize the international system. Great power will be left in the dust if they do not repeat the power-seeking behavior other states do; dependencies are important in this manner. We see this in business. If a company does not do any research and development, it will be

left behind especially in a fiercely competitive environment. Go is an innovative practice itself as it is imperialism without murder (for the most part).

While many would believe dependency is reductionist, upon closer look, one may argue that it is systemic as it brings power and wealth to the rich regardless of it bringing with it continued poverty for the poor. This psychopathic and predatory economic and political relation is the reason for the systemic vulnerability of weak states. Large firms dictate to poor countries the kind of development that takes place. Elites in both countries fashion policies to facilitate the process. Land and labor are exploited with extreme wealth going to elites at the expense of the poor. Dos Santos writes: “trade relations are based on monopolistic control of the market, which leads to the transfer of surplus generated in dependent countries to the dominant countries; financial relations are, from the viewpoint of the dominant powers, based on loans and the export of capital, which permit them to receive interest and profits ... thus strengthening their control over the economies of other countries” (1970, 231). This forms the economic base of the global superstructure and is the cause of underdevelopment. The destruction of natural and human resources for the gluttonous prestige of a small number of states and people forms part of the psychopathic structure of international politics and has for centuries. As discussed in the previous chapter, systemic vulnerability describes the inability of states to handle crises on their own. Ebola in West Africa and Cholera in Haiti are two major examples that demonstrate the connection between relations of dependency and disease (Hirschfeld 2017). There are actually a number of interesting studies showing connections between dependency and increasingly poorer environments (Maynard and Ong 2016, 189). People are dying en masse in the developing world because rich countries continue to exploit weaker countries for their own gain, locking them into relationships of dependency. In the following case study chapters (5 and 6), the book will describe these instances. Later, this chapter discusses the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in forming dependencies in the world. In the twenty-first century, China is quickly taking on this role in Africa and Latin America (Amadi 2012, 192). China opened itself up to global trade and exchange in the 1990s and was exploited for its cheap labor. However, today, China has emerged as a systemically creative country, developing its own exploitative relationships. In essence, not much has changed since the end of World War II although some scholars tend to view the contemporary era of globalization as one of “super-exploitation” (Valencia 2014, 540).

The creation of international regimes, another intervening variable in the international system, also presents a way in which to structure behavior in an effort to reproduce transactions that benefit the core at the expense of the periphery. Regime theory (Neoliberal Institutionalism) is a theory of international relations that posits states as able to cooperate with one another to solve their common problems and attain absolute gains. This is because, as Keohane argues, states are rational egoists in that “they have consistent, ordered preferences and that they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility of those preferences ... [and] ... their utility functions are independent of one another” (Keohane 2005, 27). As such, states cooperate, not because it is the right thing to do, but rather to achieve their goals within a relationship of interdependence. This interdependence then influences and shapes state actions. Greater interdependence within the international system means that there is more concern for creating and maintaining cooperation in order to gain more. Regimes become an organism through which founder states cooperate to potentially gather wealth and thus power.

Unit interactions or transactions cannot be reduced to simple materialist conceptions. We must understand as well the social purpose of any regime. Political authority, as personified by regimes, embodies a combination of powers with an underscoring social purpose. There is an integral intersubjective quality and normative reason for the regimes. Normative structures must also be part of any systemic analysis. The very definition of a regime puts norms at the forefront of any regime theoretical analysis as they provide a set of explicit or implicit “principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge within a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983, 2). Regimes become an organism through which states can cooperate to potentially gather wealth and thus power. The creator of these regimes benefits more than others but the understanding is that all benefit absolutely. Waltz clearly states “structures encourage certain behaviors and penalize those who do not respond to the encouragement” (2010, 106) so, in addition, those outside the regime are punished for being “rogue.” We must thus recognize that norms and institutions, regimes and so forth, are all material interests of powerful nations who built them in the first place (Mearsheimer 1995).

Ultimately, the social/political role of regimes is to extend the shelf life of hegemons. He further argues that as a hegemony begins to decline in power, it needs to set up institutions and regimes to realize and maintain

hegemony. Even the policy of Chinese engagement during Clinton's years was not to make China into a democracy, but to preserve American hegemony through institutions by absorbing China and bringing it into the fold. On the surface, this may seem like a very Neoliberal Institutional idea, but it is very much grounded in realist thought as Susan Strange in her article *Cave! Hic Dragones* (1982) demonstrates. Regimes are just a way to preserve the hegemony of states. Hegemony serves a normative political purpose. According to Ruggie, regimes are constructed around a normative, social framework. According to Ruggie, the dominant interpretation of international power focuses strictly on power. Regime theory, for example, perceives regime construction as solely an exercise in the acquisition of power and problem-solving. Such interpretations of international regimes gloss over the dimension of social purpose; moreover, it is easier just to assume social purpose. Ruggie argues that power may predict the form of international regime but not its content. Therefore, to say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders and the regimes that serve them, it is necessary to look at how power and legitimate social purposes become fused to project political authority into the international order. Therefore, Ruggie characterizes the international economic order after the World War II, as "embedded liberalism," the intersubjective quality of regime, created by the hegemon. He argues that the regime may continue to function as long as its social purpose is commonly agreed upon by the actors, states. The regime, as an intervening variable, eventually breaks away from the power that led its creation and will not change when that leader ultimately weakens. It will continue to function as long as its social purpose is commonly agreed upon by the actors, states. Ruggie uses the persistence of the post-1945 economic order, which has seen a perceived decline in American hegemony; yet the Bretton Woods institutions and ideals continue to exist. If the social purpose is compromised, then the regime would be under threat. International systems thus go beyond our weapons and economy.

Norms and ideas form a superstructural core of state interactions because our determinations of friends and enemy will ultimately impact the way we interact. If states and their people base interactions on a Hobbesian understanding or war, then most likely the outcome will be conflict (Wendt 1999). The Lockean understanding is not as friendly as one may think either. These interactions are based on competition, not friendship. There will be a degree of animosity lurking behind interactions

and the process can quickly slide into chaos and conflict. We can see this clearly in the current discord in the European Union with Turkey and Albania and, similarly, between the United States and China. The United States and Russia have also altered the system based on their interaction, first, from one of enemy to that of friend, to competitor to the current state of potential conflict. During the Cold War, there was a clearly defined enemy between the United States and the Soviet Union as led by Moscow. Cultural exchange thus goes beyond our weapons and economy. It lies at the core of state interactions because our determinations of friends and enemy will ultimately impact the way we interact. If states and their people base interactions on a Hobbesian understanding or war, then most likely the outcome will be conflict.

It is indeed possible to have a friendly interaction based on understandings of soft power and mutual benefit. However, states can never remain friendly for very long. States in anarchy are always in competition. These are interactions based on competition, not friendship. There will be a degree of animosity lurking behind interactions and the process can quickly slide into chaos and conflict. We can see this clearly in the current discord in the European Union with Turkey and Albania and, similarly, between the United States and China. The United States and Russia have also altered the system based on their interaction, first, from one of enemy to that of friend, to competitor to the current state of potential conflict.

Synthesis

An international system is “an aggregation of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to a form of control” (Mundell and Swoboda 1969, 343). Realists of all varieties agree that power, the ability to dominate, through consent or coercion, is the force that constructs systems. As discussed, the economy is at the center of power. In this system, “actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests ... the particular interests that are most favored by these social arrangements tend to reflect the relative power of the actors involved” (Gilpin 1981, 90). The economic and social relations of this system is that of the market. Markets are formed from two elements: individuals and money, human resources

and financial capital resources. Structures thus encourage certain types of interactions between units. Waltz himself admits that “states are the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems” (Waltz 2010, 95). Waltz focuses entirely on the development of structures, an important endeavor, but altogether incomplete. There are at least three contributing factors to any system if we are going to consider “causality” of state behavior. Systemic theory must possess explanations of independent and dependent variables (Wendt 1999, 11).

This is the essence of systemic behavior: the transactions they encourage that benefit the core actor, the center of neoempire. To recall, international systems produce and reproduce actor or unit, in this case state, behavior. From this, we can understand transaction-seeking behavior is a manifestation of the system; it is a product of the system as well as an important part of the system. Is it realistic to state that reproduced behavior is part of the system? One could very well argue that there should be a clear separation between an independent variable and a dependent variable. While there is a definite clear-cut distinction in the natural sciences, the same cannot be said in the social sciences. For instance, Structural Realism argues that internal or external balancing is the product of an international structure based on capabilities. Internal and external balancing is, ultimately, an expression of capabilities (Table 4.1).

The international system can never be assumed as static over time. Of course, structures may change from a bipolar, unipolar, and multipolar collaboration, but under specific social, economic, and political circumstances, our understandings, units, and transactions may be altered. This then modifies our understanding of the system in its entirety. To understand the system, we must understand competitive behavior; we must appreciate that whatever one state does in anarchy, others may also do regardless of psychopathic, destructive, and altogether abusive behavior. The list of actions will include use of soft power strategies, military interventions, and even island building.

Table 4.1 International system composition, examples of differentiation

<i>Examples of structures</i>	<i>Examples of units/agents</i>	<i>Examples of interaction of units</i>
Bipolar balance of power	States	War and conflict
Unipolar balance of power	Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)	Economic transaction
Bipolar	People	Short-term friendly

SYSTEMIC PRACTICE AND THE DIFFUSION OF PSYCHOPATHY

Systemic practice which simply means strategies used to bolster or strengthen a state and weaken others are not limited to one actor. Anything that assists in the distribution or redistribution of systemic capabilities or vulnerabilities must be considered as potential strategies done by others. Producing dependency relationships to accomplish neoempire is an example of contemporary systemic practice. Systemic practices such as regime change, soft power tactics, and cyber-attacks (to name a few) can be used by any state pursuing power, prestige, and influence for the sake of neoempire. If one state does it, then all states can do it in anarchy. The issue here then is reciprocity: that which the United States, for example, does to others, it can be done to them and by others. Psychopathic actions then spread from one actor to the other within a system that expects states to be evil.

Systemic practice is reproduced because of the international system of anarchy and its competitive environment. This was noted in the film *Dr. Strangelove*. Russian Ambassador de Sadesky notes that whatever the United States does, the Soviet Union must also do.

There were those of us who fought against it, but in the end we could not keep up with the expense involved in the arms race, the space race, and the peace race. At the same time our people grumbled for more nylons and washing machines. Our doomsday scheme cost us just a small fraction of what we had been spending on defense in a single year. The deciding factor was when we learned that your country was working along similar lines, and we were afraid of a doomsday gap. (Dr. Strangelove 1964)

The movie does a good job reflecting state security behavior in anarchy. Certain strategies allow for increased power of states. Consequently, this means that states must meet their competitors on all fronts lest they be left behind. In Chap. 2, we discussed how great power and weak states trade off grand strategies to survive. This is an essential part of systemic practice to balance the gains from transactions against competitors. Any activity that increases power places enormous pressure on competing states. They must keep up by doing similar activities or suffer the consequences. The emotion of fear plays an essential role in this dynamic: fear of being made insecure due to lost gains. This is the essential part of international politics, or any form of politics as politics deals “with the allocation of scarce

resources, and since this means some people get things while others do not, it is not surprising that peoples' feelings are important in any part of any calculus" (Redlawsk 2006, 1). The following paragraphs will describe a few ways in which issues and strategies influence the distribution of power resulting in competition of systemic practices.

The first strategy discussed is at the center of this book, the construction of neoempire and the Go strategy. In Chap. 3, the history of the Scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century was noted. Today, a new scramble for Africa and Latin America is occurring between major powers of the contemporary international system. The *Economist* reports a three-way competition for Africa between India, China, and Japan (*The Economist*, August 13, 2016). Each country is bolstering its position in the continent to counter the other, not only economically through the building of infrastructure, preferential trade and aid agreements but militarily with the building of bases and arms sales. The report describes the realms of competition:

Still, India is deeply suspicious of China's presence in the Indian Ocean. A wide network of some 32 Indian radar stations and listening posts is being developed in the Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius, among other countries. This will enable India to monitor shipping across expanses of the ocean. It is also improving its ability to project power in waters it considers its own, and is arming friendly countries such as Mauritius. Among other things, India is building a naval and air base on Assumption Island, north of Madagascar and within easy reach of many of east Africa's newly discovered offshore gasfields. "It's the Indian Ocean, stupid," quips one seasoned commentator in mimicry of Indian diplomats on its power projection. "They say it's 'our near abroad'."

Japan has also been flexing its naval muscle but in a more limited manner. This month it pledged \$120m in aid to boost counter-terrorism efforts in Africa. It has been a stalwart contributor to the multinational naval force policing the seas off Somalia's coast. Sino-Japanese rivalry is fiercest in diplomacy and trade. Two prizes are on offer: access to natural resources and markets, and the continent's 54 votes at the UN. Much of the effort to win the former was pioneered by Japan in the 1990s, when it helped build ports and railways. Akihiko Tanaka of the University of Tokyo, a former president of the Japan International Co-operation Agency, says that for years Japan's aid to Africa was "qualitatively different" from that of other

rich nations in part because it focused on infrastructure rather than the direct alleviation of poverty. “We were criticised a lot,” he says. “Now there is an almost unanimous view that you need to invest in infrastructure.” (Ibid.)

There is much competition between these competing states as they rally to strengthen their neoempire against one another. The range of behaviors, specifically the use of military, economic (World-system dependency networks), and soft power strategies by each of the three great powers here, illustrates the competitive mechanisms which are reproduced in reciprocal fashion by the anarchical international system.

Another way states may copy one another is through interventions. The United States has intervened in the affairs of other states in pursuit of its own interests on many occasions. While this is not an acceptable behavior given its violation of sovereignty, it is a behavior. Should we expect other states to do the same? We can speculate that if North Korea continues its aggressive and globally destabilizing behavior, China may intervene not only to secure its borders but to prevent the United States from intervening. An intervention would make China worse off however, as the *Economist* reports:

But China does not want to overthrow Mr Kim. It worries that the collapse of a regime on its north-eastern border would create a flood of refugees and eliminate the buffer protecting it from American troops stationed in South Korea. About 90% of North Korea’s trade, worth about \$6 billion a year, is with China. It will continue to import North Korean coal and iron ore (and send back fuel oil, food and consumer goods) as long as the money is not spent on military activities—an unenforceable condition. (The Economist, May 28, 2016)

The problem for China is that, either way, the North Korean regime will remain a source of uncertainty and instability. The race to intervention may increase in urgency as Kim Jong Un becomes more and more unpredictable. In my estimation, it would be in Chinese interests to intervene to prevent American-Japanese-South Korean action on its southern border.

Systemic practice means reciprocity matters: if one state acts in a certain way, and does so without punishment, then other states will also do it. This means that there is the possibility for aggressive regime change if a state sees it in its interests to do so. If Russia and China try to engage

in regime change, it would certainly not be the first time: recall the Soviet Union action in Afghanistan in 1979 as well as its intervention in Georgia in favor of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and more recently in Ukraine in 2014. China also intervened in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1979.

Some may think that Chinese intervention may bolster its soft power. Soft Power (“the ability to affect others through the cooptive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye 2011, 21)) must also be considered part of systemic practice. Soft power can be utilized as a strategy to increase a state’s position through influence and prestige. While many may not consider China to be as influential as say Japan and the United States, I do believe the potential is there. Mingjiang Li’s edited volume (2009) on the subject illustrates the many strategies surrounding Chinese soft power to achieve goals in Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the world. R. Evan Ellis documents similar matters in his 2013 book entitled *The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement in Latin America*. Ellis understands the importance of soft power to facilitate China’s peaceful rise. As a result, it is safe to say that the belief in one’s own exceptionalism is part of the international system in a normative form; it not only defines state identity but is also a requisite for state action.

While China wants to portray itself as a peaceful panda, its behavior makes it seem like a dangerous dragon. China is building islands in the South China Sea to extend its influence and control of shipping straits and resources. These actions are seen as provocative by the surrounding states: Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. This island-building program and China’s so-called nine-dash line that carves out sovereignty of the oceans has been ruled as illegal by the international court at The Hague. However, China stubbornly continues with its aggressive stance. The *Wall Street Journal* reports:

Shortly after the ruling, China’s Foreign Ministry said China neither accepts nor recognizes it, declaring it “null and void” and without “binding force.” It said China would continue to abide by international law and “basic norms” governing international relations. China’s Defense Ministry said the decision wouldn’t affect its approach in the South China Sea and that it would “unswervingly protect the nation’s sovereignty, security and maritime rights.” (Page 2016, [wsj.com](http://www.wsj.com))

The United States voices their concerns:

The U.S. State Department urged China, the Philippines and other claimants “to avoid provocative statements or actions.” In a statement, spokesman John Kirby said the decision provides “a new opportunity to renew efforts to address maritime disputes peacefully.” (Ibid.)

What is more destabilizing is the notion that Chinese island-building practices may force other states to build island of their own. Crispin Rovere argues this in his *National Interest* article:

The U.S. must adjust its strategy and build its own islands in the South China Sea. This has multiple advantages over alternative courses of action, and is the only option likely to be effective long-term. Indeed, it is probably the only response that China will understand. In the wake of the PCA ruling, now is the perfect time. Washington should undertake land reclamation on behalf of the Philippines, and do so under the auspices that the matter has been settled under international law. (2016, nationalinterest.org)

Can we see island building as becoming a systemic practice? Such a question requires predictive capability that this work boasts through the assumption that great powers will compete by behaving similar as forced by the system through practice. Apparently, this has already begun. Vietnam is already conducting its own island building. Satellite photos point to Vietnamese building “120 acres of new land in the South China Sea, mostly at Spratly Island, Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island, and West Reef” (amti.csis.org, May 11, 2016). While Vietnam has nowhere near the power capability of China, it has directly challenged China to an island-building race in China’s declared zone of interest.

Systemic practice does not have to be that drastic or expensive; it may also be done through cheaper means. Cyber-warfare is an important part of United States’ power projection:

Obama has not attempted to remake the world in the U.S.’s image, despite what critics argue, and has focused on state to state relations and regional security dynamics. Like all defensive realists, President Obama recognizes that the U.S. has security interests, but he is not trying to project force around the globe and lead the U.S. into other wars like the neo-conservatives. Rather, Obama sees it best to project power strategically, through the use of drone strikes and other cyber technological innovations in order to secure

the state. Diplomacy and soft power are somewhat preserved through such use. As controversial as drone strikes are, they are not as provocative as compared to direct military strikes and the presence of occupying ground troops. (Kassab and Rosen 2016, 315)

Since cyber-war is a cheap way to intervene in the politics of other states, Russian involvement can be deemed acceptable due to the United States' practice of regime change. Ultimately then, anything that has been done for the purpose of power can be also done to powerful perpetrators. Nye defines Cyberpower as "a set of resources that relate to the creation, control and communication of electronic and computer-based information—infrastructure, networks, software, human skills ... cyberpower is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through the use of electronically interconnected information resources of the cyberdomain" (Nye 2011, 123). I have written on cyber-war and argue that given the cost-benefit dynamic of cyber-war, we can expect an explosion of cyber-attacks in the next few years:

[Cyber-attacks] are a cost effective way of neutralizing the enemy, more specifically, delaying Iranian nuclear capability and preventing all-out war in the Middle East. This, in conjunction with assassination of nuclear scientists, presents a seductive argument in favor of cyber-warfare. However, in many respects, I think this policy is not only unsustainable, but counter-productive and a product of short term thinking. That which we have done can also be done to us. The Iranians, with their own allies and invent, are also developing capabilities to respond to these attacks. On January 15th 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Iranians were doubling their efforts to infiltrate American banks. Firms like PNC Financial and SunTrust have been unsuccessfully fending off the attacks and are now calling on government assistance. Clearly, we have already entered this new age of warfare (Gorman and Yadron 2013, [wsj.com](http://www.wsj.com)). Certainly, we now live in a very different age. (Kassab 2014a, 70)

If one state does it, we must expect all states to do it. If one state engages in cyber-espionage, then we can expect all states to do so if they do exist in anarchy. If Russia is indeed interfering in the 2016 election in the United States, then it is because it has become an accepted practice of the international system. In other words, everyone does it.

To end this section, the core of systemic practice and any systemic theory is reciprocity: island building, soft power, interventions, cyber-war,

and so on, all make it acceptable for others to do so due to the idea of reciprocity. If one state acts to increase power, then all other states will follow suit or else they will be left behind: Power remains “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man ... power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another” (Morgenthau 1985, 11). As scholars, we must keep the definition of power loose and fluid to incorporate the technological innovation and sudden changes in the international system. If states do exist in anarchy, we must assume that they will borrow the same strategies. While this book focused on the construction of neoempire, the issue is ultimately gaining an edge on your rival. As long as things, events, or practices affect the distribution of capabilities, the relative power, and thus survival of states in the international system, it must be considered systemically important and worthy of study.

While these examples are destructive, self-destructive, and psychopathic in nature, Chap. 8 explains a more productive systemic practice. Forgiveness, if it becomes systemic practice, may assist in healing the wounds of people and may even forestall conflicts. It may be necessary to create a multilateral forum to facilitate this process. In a psychotic world where states seek relative over absolute gains, such a forum may help circumvent anarchy, war, and any traumatic behavior resulting from the international system, as we understand it today.

PUTTING THE PIECES BACK TOGETHER: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM REDEFINED

To understand international system today, we must first ask the question: are economic transactions, for example, world-systems dependency networks, an intervening variable? Transactions¹ in this light are ultimately part of international system. It helps fuel military power and position but not immediately. The root of power is the economy. The reason is simple: transactions translate into power and alter its distribution across states operating within the international structure. Recall the lessons of Robert Gilpin. Gilpin borrows from Lenin’s law of uneven development and “locates the sources of conflict in the advanced capitalist economies’ need to export surplus goods and capital and to engage in imperialistic conquest” (Gilpin 1981, 54). The interesting point to note is that these interactions are supposedly for the purpose of wealth. We can term this economic growth or economic development but specificities matter very little.

A state's economy can make or break its ability to project power in the short term and survive in the long term. Take, for example, the Soviet Union. Its demise was assisted by the proliferation of democratic movements across controlled territory. However, the state's inability to put down rebellions and keep up with Reagan's military spending led to its death. The Soviet Union's failure to grow economically during a time of technological innovation (the beginning of the computer age) made any attempt at survival futile. Another example is Nazi Germany. Once Hitler took on the Soviet Union and the United States, the war was over. Both these countries had seemingly limitless resources with populations driven to produce as much military equipment as possible. The Nazis found it impossible to compete especially given Hitler's constant interference in matters of production. Almost a century before, the United States defeated the Confederacy because their economy was more advanced, industrialized, and diversified. The first systemic war between Athens and Sparta is also similar. Given these examples, we must underscore the importance of the global economy in any state's quest for power, domination, and prestige.

Power is an essential part of the study of international relations. Their distribution across units manifested in the balance of power forms the structure. The balance of power restrains actor movement, specifically power-seeking, aggressive behavior. Through a series of alliances, whether voluntary (balancing) or bandwagoning (involuntary), states band together to insure some protection of sovereignty over territories they control. This ensures peace. If one state increases military power, then this results in an imbalance. Internal balancing, arms buildup of one state, causes an imbalance of power. A security dilemma (see Chap. 2) may result if competitor states can afford it. In competition, everything is a dilemma as states are locked in anarchical competition. If one state gains because they did something or use a particular strategy, other states will follow suit to gain accordingly; if they do not, they will be worse off relatively. What else could possibly explain an anti-imperial country like the United States and its own adventures of acquisition abroad (Zakaria 1998, 46–47)? We can only conclude that all act similarly to protect themselves and are forced into competition in an effort to survive, to remain dominant, or to become dominant. In today's world, the path to security within anarchy is through the economy. While this definition does not mention its centrality, the economy enables states to afford security. Attaining security can only be accomplished by spending scarce resources. This is not a cheap endeavor at all.

Does the Game of Go perspective fit into existing frameworks specifically Gilpinian understandings of systemic change? The first question is: will Go strategies feed into uneven growth mechanisms? These two features of international politics are tied to each other: competition for access to markets may require imperialistic conquest. This fact tells us that great powers actively involve themselves in the affairs of others, most likely weaker states, in an effort to best their opponents. Gilpin recognizes this conflict, specifically that “conflict among states over economic resources and political superiority is endemic in a system of international anarchy” (Ibid.). To be a great power and a hegemon therefore requires followers; this is an essential truth that one cannot be a leader without a base of support of followers. The drive for hegemony must then be understood not just in terms of leadership, dominance, and a system of rules creation but also those that submit to those rules. Go is part of this systemic creation. Conflict and systemic/hegemonic war must then be understood as the struggle for this sacred position. This struggle falls back to Gilpin’s position: “the process of uneven growth generates conflict between rising and declining states as they seek to improve or maintain their relative position in the international political hierarchy” (Ibid.). The center of this conflict is economic growth which would eventually produce political outcomes: success of one great power over the other. If this is indeed so, one must recognize the centrality of economic growth and the manufacture of economic, social, and political international systems of governance that would defend and protect the distribution of economic gains across states. Weak states are essential to this struggle and they must be utilized as they are within a neoempire.

In terms of systems, World-systems Approach concurs with the Go supposition. Great power players require weaker units to exploit. However, these theorists would like to think that there is one system of capitalism that supports a particular grouping of core states but this is simply incomplete. World-systems understand “the capitalist world system is divided into three tiers, those of the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. The essential difference between these is in the strength of the state machine in different areas, and this, in turn, leads to transfers of surplus from the periphery to the core, which further strengthens core states” (Brewer 1980, 165). Core states are indeed strengthened by global capitalist markets. However, the struggle for power and security among neoempires is indeed real. Further, any system that manufactures actor behavior must be enforced by all forms of power, military, economic and soft, to ensure outcomes serve the interests

of the hegemonic state. Since states are led by a network of political elites, neoempires are thus created to pursue and protect their gains. This systems-creative behavior is done by these elite-led states: “state power is the central mechanism since ‘actors in the market’ attempt to ‘avoid the normal operation of the market whenever it does not maximize their profit’ by turning to the nation state to alter the terms of trade” (Brewer 1980, 165). However, there can never be a single “core” grouping of states. Even in a unipolar world, states will resent others. A central tenet in international relations, given regularized patterns of behavior, is that there is always the struggle for power which drives security and insecurity, the very function of the state as it resides in a structure of the anarchical system. This is the central part of any international problem. A “hegemon” can never be a hegemon forever; they rise and fall. There is either a peaceful or a warlike transition given actor behavior. The drivers of economic growth, whether technological innovation, natural, or human resources, are the main center of actor behavior. Even without this, a revisionist state will always benefit from a system set up by another power. Hegemons are faced with an expensive ordeal in the need to create systems. This is ultimately the reason why no state or great power remains a hegemonic power for long. A hegemony is always vulnerable to overextension.

In summary, Structural Realism and World-systems Approach have something interesting to say about the construction of international systems. The metaphor of the Game of Go tries to underscore and unite these competing perspectives. The structural dynamic of competition in the Game of Go must be understood in terms of the creation of regularized patterns of state behavior. The important part becomes understanding how the different parts of the system work with one another, that is, the great and weak powers. Hegemonic state competition within this order is ultimately the focus of this book and is predicated on the dynamic of uneven economic growth. This book then builds on Paul Kennedy’s arguments:

There exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states and empires ... [t]his uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term impacts upon the relative military power and strategical position of the members of the state system ... economic prosperity does not always and immediately translate into military effectiveness ... nevertheless, the fact remains that all

of the major shifts in the world's military-power balances have followed from alterations in the productive balances and further, the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major great power wars, where victory has gone to the side with the greatest military resources. (Kennedy 1987, 566–67)

My addition to Kennedy's work is as follows: weak states are important to economic growth and political influence of great powers. Locking actors into Go transactions attests to the relevance of the concept of neoempire as separate explanations of balance of power and dependency are no longer adequate. Eventually, a balance may emerge in the form of neoempire given the political need replace reigning hegemony to further political power in the pursuit of systems-creation.

Today we have a new type of empire that sometimes refrain from the use of force. Force and control of others is an archaic and discouraged practice. Today, we have imperialism in the form of regime change. This was a fundamental part of United States and Soviet Union foreign policy during the Cold War. As a practice, it has survived as an integral tool of American foreign policy. I suppose that given that states compete in similar ways, other great powers like Russia and China may follow suite. Russian adventures in Ukraine may eventually result in such an act as well as in North Korea. It may be in China's interest to replace the increasingly unpredictable behavior of the Kim Jong Un government.

I am not naive enough to argue that there will never again be a reversion to classical empire. Norms, like power, can never be considered a permanent part of our existence. Morality is also a product of society's construction. If the need for empire is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998) given the actions of other states, we can very well see a return to ancient empire ambition. This understanding is borrowed from Chris Layne, as he argues the following:

Great power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in vacuum. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. The post-World War II international order is an American order that privileges the United States' interests. Even the discourse of "liberal order" cannot conceal this fact. This is why the notion that China can be constrained by integrating into the post-1945 international order lacks credulity. For US scholars and

policymakers alike, China's successful integration hinges on Beijing's willingness to accept the Pax Americana's institutions, rules, and norms. In other words, China must accept playing second fiddle to the United States. (Layne 2012, 211)

From this systemic explanation, I conclude that the history of the world is the struggle for empire (old or new form), specifically the accumulation of wealth and political influence upon the earth. If one power expanded, then all other powers would have to expand to survive. This required the expansion of markets and resources. From a systemic point of view, therefore, empires and neoempires exist because great powers seek survival. From ancient times in Egypt and Babylon, to Greece and Rome, empires had to expand to gain economically which would then translate into military gains. This is an inherent part of the structure of the international system of anarchy. If we look at the discovery of the Americas by the Spanish and the resulting conquest of the labeled "new world" by European powers, we understand the force of this structure as well. Napoleon's search for empire brought the states of Europe together in an effort to curb that behavior.

CONCLUSIONS

Great powers and weak states need one another for several reasons. The transactions that occur between more powerful units seeking hegemony and weaker units seeking development and survival create the international system as we know it. The specific motivations of states manifest themselves through grand strategies, which are remarkably similar across state of different cultural and historical contexts. International systems are formed from these patterns of regularized interaction. To understand these mechanisms, we must begin to see the economy as a function of power and power as a function of the economy. The formulation of superstructure/base is a product of a great power's drive toward hegemony. Here we see Go being played as two or more great powers fight for control of international system using exploitative economic relationships. As the players buy up weak states support, more influence is acquired which is essential to security and eventually dominating the world. The following two chapters shall illustrate these behaviors. The neoempires of China and the United States will first be compared, looking at the role of financial institutions the foundation of neoempire infrastructure. The second case

will highlight the growing confrontation between European Union and Eurasian Union neoempires, as they are led by the strongest states of those supranational institutions, Germany and Russia. The manifestation of competition between these two neoempires is similar, as the mutual need to create an international system goes back centuries. Another war now will be a continuation of history yet it will have a more destructive outcome. Chapter 8 will try to find a way to escape that path through global dialogue between the masses living in the major neoempires.

NOTE

1. Furthermore, are transactions between states systemic or reductionist? Reductionist theory emphasizes the interaction between units such as decision-making procedures, human nature, and psychology (Wendt 1999, 12). Reductionist theories simply underscore internal mechanisms of state as they generate behavior. Such theories are of course useful as they still seek out causality. Classical Liberalism (Wilson 2001) and Classical Realism (Carr 1978; Morgenthau 2005) both are reductionist theories, in that the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts. Debates on the essential nature of human beings, whether good or evil, dictate outcomes like war or peace. These theories are still particularly useful theories of study. Structural Realism is understood within a systemic approach rather than reductionist. The structure, the fundamental existence of anarchy within the international structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units. The state, the unit that operates within the structure, is stripped of all its internal factors. All that remains are state capabilities or power.

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Case Studies

The following chapters (5 and 6) will test the theory put forward in previous chapters. Chapter 5 will deliberate on the neoempire behavior of the United States and China with regards to the developing world. Specifically, the chapter will focus on international banking institutions. This systemic practice of domination through banking seeks to produce world-systems dependencies to aid prestige building. The United States and China will use developing countries against their long-term best interests due to their need to survive as prestigious actors ultimately reinforcing a destructive international system of competition and possible systemic war.

Chapter 6 examines at neoempires still under construction: the European Union led by Germany and the Eurasian Union led by Russia. After the Cold War, the European Union enlarged into Eastern Europe, territory historically important to Russia and Russian pride. Due to the power of systemic practice, Russia was forced to create the Eurasian Union. The Eurasian Union is designed to reinforce Russia's position in an effort to balance against the expansionary European Union. These two chapters will then illustrate in real terms the assumptions put forward in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4:

1. The international system is defined by anarchy and psychotic behavior (the latter explained in Part III of this book);
2. States are led by a network of elites and their domestic and global interests;
3. Great powers seek prestige primarily given competition with others;

4. Weak states seek economic development primarily to survive;
5. Political units behave to survive whether as independent states regardless of weakness or as prestigious neoempires. Survival is inherently normative to the actor in question;
6. Survival behavior creates systemic patterns of repeated psychotic conduct enforced by systemic practice/competition.

By discussing, in real terms, the egoist nature of neoempires, we will begin to appreciate the need to understand more deeply the psychology behind such movements. With that in mind, the third part of this book will discuss the cognitive motivation behind state behavior in their development of neoempires.

The Global South and the Neoempires of the United States and China

INTRODUCTION

This and the next chapter will illustrate through case study the patterns of repeated behavior described in Chaps. 2 through 5. This chapter will examine the struggle between the neoempires led by the United States and China. Chinese engagement in the 1990s hoped to strengthen American hegemony through institutions by absorbing semi-peripheral China and bringing it into the fold (Jacobs and Rossem 2016, 379). As Chinese economic power increased, so did its political need to be a dominant part of the international system to protect its international interests. The United States, rather than bringing in China into governance circles such as in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has blocked this aspiration. As a result, China along with other BRICS nations have come together to create new systemic banking institutions. These institutions are thus a product of competition for the purpose of power accumulation at the cost of the status quo neoempire of the United States. Ultimately, in the twenty-first century, emerging powers are neither seeking to destroy the current system nor working within established institutions as G. John Ikenberry expected. Instead, China is seeking its own neoempire through the creation of its own economic institutional infrastructure; it is seeking a global neoempire of its very own by ushering weak states into its world-system, moving from the semi-periphery to the core.

In this chapter, we will look at the practices of neoempire as done through the great powers of first the United States and China. The Bretton

Woods system and the following neoliberal consensus were set up to ensure US dominance and prestige for years to come by keeping states dependent on its world-system. China has undoubtedly benefited from this system. Nevertheless, it is now constructing its own banks, its own world-system network of dependents to challenge the United States outside of military confrontation. China is developing its own neoempire system of economic capitalist dependency of political support and domination to gain prestige for itself. China's coal and banking strategy is particularly interesting. Psychopathically, given its energy needs, China is setting up a neoempire predicated on a ready supply of coal and finance regardless of environmental and human costs. The new BRICS banks facilitate lending for coal-rich states to satisfy China's need for cheap energy. This directly challenges the United States, specifically President Obama's so-called War on Coal. The US banking institutions refuse to lend money to states seeking to develop their coal industries and China is setting in to fill that demand. This chapter will demonstrate these dynamics to illustrate the theoretical contributions in previous chapters.

BATTLE OF THE BANKS: GLOBAL POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND NEOEMPIRE

To understand why China and other rising powers of the BRICS conglomeration (Brazil, Russia, India, and to a lesser extent South Africa as Russia and China are the core of the BRICS; South Africa and Brazil to a lesser extent) are pursuing neoempire against the United States, we must understand the politics of the global banking systems. Banking systems form the infrastructure of neoempire because it helps create dependents. During the Sixth BRICS summit in Brazil (2014), BRICS countries announced the formation of the New Development Bank (NDB) (BBC News July 15, 2014). The Fortaleza Declaration 11th principle announced its prime intention:

we are pleased to announce the signing of the Agreement establishing the New Development Bank (NDB), with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies...Based on sound banking principles, the NDB will strengthen the cooperation among our countries and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development, thus contributing to our collective commitments for

achieving the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced growth. (“Sixth BRICS Summit—Fortaleza Declaration” *IV BRICS Summit 2014*)

The statement specified that the bank would hold US\$100 billion accessible for investment. This amount would be backed equally by founding members. Headquartered in Shanghai, the NDB, like any other financial regime or institution existing today, will inject capital into the system to fund development projects as well as facilitate economic transactions, stabilize world financial markets during crisis and contagion and also assist in strengthening cooperative mechanisms between member states. Said differently, the NDB will “help countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures, promote further BRICS cooperation, strengthen the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements” (Ibid.).

The Fortaleza declaration does communicate BRICS aspiration to function alongside traditional global banking institutions such as the IMF and World Bank; however, it opposes its reigning and unyielding political structure. The declaration describes the World Bank’s political structure as inherently anti-democratic. Article 19 specifically describes this dispute:

We welcome the goals set by the World Bank Group to help countries end extreme poverty and to promote shared prosperity. We recognize the potential of this new strategy in support of the fulfillment of these ambitious goals by the international community. This potential will only be realized, however, if the institution and its membership effectively move towards more democratic governance structures, strengthen the Bank’s financial capacity and explore innovative ways to enhance development financing and knowledge sharing while pursuing a strong client orientation that recognizes each country’s development needs. (“Sixth BRICS Summit—Fortaleza Declaration” *IV BRICS Summit 2014*)

The declaration attacks the Bretton Woods institutions by addressing its deficiency of legitimacy, by underscoring its undemocratic practices:

international governance structures designed within a different power configuration show increasingly evident signs of losing legitimacy and effectiveness, as transitional and ad hoc arrangements become increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of multilateralism. We believe the BRICS are an important force for incremental change and reform of current institutions towards more representative and equitable governance, capable of generating more inclusive global growth and fostering a stable, peaceful and prosperous world. (Ibid.)

The BRICS thus are persuaded that their institutions, specifically the NDB, is much more inclusive arguing: “We believe the BRICS are an important force for incremental change and reform of current institutions towards more representative and equitable governance, capable of generating more inclusive global growth and fostering a stable, peaceful and prosperous world” (Ibid.).

The BRICS accuse current institutions led by the United States as characteristically defective in design in the following ways. The root of their dispute stems from the history of their serving the interests of the United States. The main problem rests with the fact that these institutions simply do not allow for the transfer of power from state to state in times of transition. The hypothesis posited by Ikenberry (2011) is ultimately incorrect and very unrealistic. The IMF governing structure still reproduces the archaic political and power arrangement of the post-war era. Today, with the emerging BRICS powers, it becomes understandable that such arrangements be updated if these states are to work within already established governance institutions. The opposite is actually occurring today as the United States has explicitly obstructed any amendment or alteration of established governing structures. The BRICS mention IMF quota reform and their constant delay by the United States. For instance, in 2010, it was agreed that the IMF would restructure its quota system to integrate developing countries for the central purpose of “strengthening the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness” (“IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and Governance” November 5, 2010). Introduced in 2008, the reform request wanted to initiate a transferal voting power to developing countries. Of course, this would have required them to contribute more to the fund as part of the quota system:

As part of the far-reaching reforms, the Executive Board proposes completion of the 14th General Review of Quotas with a doubling of quotas to approximately SDR 476.8 billion (about US\$755.7 billion at current exchange rates) and a major realignment of quota shares among members. It will result in a shift of more than 6 percent of quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries and more than 6 percent from over-represented to under-represented countries, while protecting the quota shares and voting power of the poorest members. (Ibid.)

This would have thus increased the amount of funding available for developing countries. IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn cheered the reform stating: “This historic agreement is the most

fundamental governance overhaul in the Fund's 65-year history and the biggest ever shift of influence in favor of emerging market and developing countries to recognize their growing role in the global economy" (Ibid.). Yet, this restructuring has yet to be implemented. It has thus far been obstructed by the United States, the power most in control of the institution as part of its neoempire.

IMF voting rules reproduce institutional control for the United States. Voting is centered around a weighted voting scheme. Weighted voting means that the quantity of votes each nation enjoys is tied to the amount it contributes to the stabilization fund, its quota. Defined, the stabilization fund is a pool of currencies funded by members to support others during economic disequilibrium such as a balance of payments deficit. The quota, and therefore voting power, reflects a state's economic clout, and, as a result, the number of shares will effect a state's voting power. The conclusion is therefore that larger shareholders hold superior voting power and thus more global sway than smaller economies. For instance, the United States, because of its sheer economic size, has the most shares at the IMF and, thus, has the most power to shape the world's economic system. The following chart is a summary of countries and their voting power. Please note the difference between voting power and economic size (Table 5.1).

As seen, there is clearly some disconnect between economic size and quota/voting power at the IMF. For instance, China's GDP is considerably

Table 5.1 IMF voting shares by country (as of 2015)^{a,b}

<i>Country</i>	<i>Voting power (IMF)</i>	<i>GDP in USD</i>
United States	16.74	17,946,996
Japan	6.23	4,123,258
Germany	5.81	3,355,772
France	4.29	2,421,682
United Kingdom	4.29	2,848,755
China (PRC)	3.81	10,866,444
Russia	2.39	1,326,015
India	2.34	2,073,543
Brazil	1.72	1,774,725
South Africa	0.77	312,798
Tuvalu	0.03	38

^aIMF "IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors" *IMF*, accessed July 5, 2015 <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx#U>

^bWorld Bank "GDP for 2015" World Bank <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>

more than Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom but has less voting power. As a result, BRICS states are certain that status quo powers are to blame for delayed reform. Such a matter has serious implications for lawful political representation within Bretton Woods Institutions arguing that such arrangements are undemocratic. This is made clear in the Fortaleza Declaration, Point 18:

We remain disappointed and seriously concerned with the current non-implementation of the 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, which negatively impacts on the IMF's legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness. The IMF reform process is based on high-level commitments, which already strengthened the Fund's resources and must also lead to the modernization of its governance structure so as to better reflect the increasing weight of EMDCs in the world economy. The Fund must remain a quota-based institution. We call on the membership of the IMF to find ways to implement the 14th General Review of Quotas without further delay. ("Sixth BRICS Summit—Fortaleza Declaration," IV BRICS Summit, 2014)

Instead of adjusting their positions, status quo powers have effectively blocked the advancement of the rising BRICS states. Doing so is a provocation to BRICS powers. Growing frustration with the IMF, especially given changes in the power dynamic of the international system, may have led the BRICS to go out on their own, independent of Western world-systems, specifically forwarded by the United States. This institutional competition is altogether new and unexamined aspect of international relations.

While any development bank may seem like a benevolent endeavor, the purpose of the bank is for the BRICS to enhance their global economic and political influence especially since they have been deprived of it. Simply put: China developed its own institutions because it could not be a major IMF shareholder. Similar to the IMF, NDB voting arrangements will reflect the amount a state capitalized. Article 2 of New Agreement conditions: "the voting power of each member shall equal its subscribed shares in the capital stock of the Bank" ("Agreement on New Development Bank" July 15, 2014). For instance, China will pledge \$41 billion to the scheme allowing it the main voting power of 39.5 percent (Lee 2015, *Reuters*). The other founding states will portion the remainder and yet would have significantly more power and say than in the IMF. In another

BRICS-led banking institution and competitor to the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China will enjoy 26.06 percent of voting power (*The Globe and Mail*, June 29, 2015).

The new global bank competition can be summarized by E.H. Carr: “Where utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable sham, which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged, the realist performs an indispensable service in unmasking it ... [for] the ideal, once it is embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal” (Carr 1978, 93). In sum, the BRICS demand more of the international system given their rise to power. With increased wealth comes increased political interest and the need to escape the semi-periphery to enter the periphery. Further, they are seeking prestige through recognition within international institutions. Rather than working within already existing institutions, these powers will have more luck creating their own banks to project serious influence.

The NDB presents a new form of competition between international banks. Specifically, these institutions, as they do historically, will advance contending political interests of their majority stakeholders. One of these areas of conflicting interest centers around energy. While the United States and other Western states discourage the use of coal, developing states are seeking capital to fund coal-mining projects. Since China needs a constant and ready supply of coal to energize its economic growth and power, it needs to set up systems of dependence to fuel its coal needs. The NDB will fulfill this goal given that already existing institutions will not. Thus, these competitor institutions are part of Chinese neoempire.

NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK AND COAL: FINANCE, ENERGY, AND NEOEMPIRE¹

The creation of the NDB, along with the AIIB, will aim to finance development projects globally. Given the energy needs of China, I along with many analysts suggested the NBD would “boost financing for coal-fired power plants around the world” (Johnson 2014, *Foreign Affairs*). To what extent can this be determined today? This section will document the importance of the NDB to coal trade and production and its benefit to developing states looking to exploit its natural resources and one major consumer and neoempire leader: China. Status quo banks, like the World

Bank and the IMF, refuse countries seeking loans to use their finance to develop their coal industries. The NDB provides a great opportunity to side step these more environmentally conscious countries for acquiring growth.

In 2013, the United States launched a “war on coal” (alongside its many other fronts: drugs, terror, and poverty) even though 40 percent of the economy runs on coal (Grunwald 2015, *Politico*). This policy has been adopted globally in international institutions. In 2013, the World Bank announced they would no longer financially support the building of coal plants and other related infrastructure:

The WBG acknowledges the global challenge of balancing energy for development with its impact on climate change and will help client countries realize affordable alternatives to coal power. The WBG will provide financial support for greenfield coal power generation projects only in rare circumstances. Considerations such as meeting basic energy needs in countries with no feasible alternatives to coal and a lack of financing for coal power would define such rare cases. The “Criteria for Screening Coal Projects under the Strategic Framework for Development and Climate Change” will apply to all greenfield coal power projects undertaken in such exceptional circumstances. (World Bank 2013, v–vi)

The study cites the global rise of coal use in electricity generation and suggests cleaner alternatives like natural gas (Ibid., 15).

Anti-coal sentiments have been rejected by much of the developing world. India, for example, has announced its discontent with the policy. India was hit remarkably hard given this loss of funds for coal energy projects (Subramanya 2015, *Foreign Affairs*). An anonymous spokesman for the state remarked “When you have 1.3 billion people starved of electricity access and the rest of the world has created a carbon space, at this point denying funding is denying access to cheap energy” (Kumar and Munroe 2014, *Reuters*). These frustrations are shared the world over, especially those countries looking to take advantage of their natural resources and deliver energy inexpensively. While the World Bank hopes to discourage such environmentally harmful practices, Chinese-led banks have little qualms. Along with the NDB, the AIIB will take advantage of this void, enjoying a competitive advantage against the United States.

Continuing with the example of India, the Modi government will actually double coal output in the next five years. Such an ambitious plan would need investment in large quantity. Minister of Power and Coal

Piyush Goyal announced this plan, adding “This government would like to be cautious that we are not being saddled with something only under the garb of clean energy or alternate energy; something which the West has discarded and is sought to be brought to India” (The Financial Express, November 6, 2015). The funds, at this point in time, can only come from Chinese-led international institutions as analyst Rupa Subramanya points out: “Likewise, the AIIB, if it takes off, could power billions of dollars of much needed infrastructure development throughout the region without, presumably, all of the red tape and environmental and other regulatory hurdles that monies coming from the World Bank and western donors carry” (Subramanya 2015, *Foreign Affairs*). In 2014, the AIIB approved a \$900 million loan to help construct a coal fire plant in Pakistan (Kumar and Munroe 2014, *Reuters*).

China will continue to finance coal development in part because the country needs coal as well. As of 2012, China depended on coal for 81 percent of electricity production (Pederson 2014, *Breaking Energy*). However, the Chinese government has made the case that coal use for electricity production declined 2.5 percent in 2014. This is because of major investments in cleaner alternatives. The central government released a statement saying coal use “will remain at such a low level before 2020 given that the central government has already set the tone to curb air pollution” (Reuters, January 28, 2015). This may be incorrect as other data seem to suggest otherwise. According to Clean Air Taskforce’s Executive Director Armond Cohen, there other factors for this decline. The report says:

Half of China coal use is outside of the power sector, especially in heavy industry, which has reduced its coal use as exports fell in 2014 and government policies to remove subsidies from heavy industry took hold. Second, overall demand growth in the power sector reached a decade low but is expected to resume. Finally, 2014 was an exceptional hydro output year for China. The short-term blip does not undermine the general trend of continued upward trend in coal deployment in China’s power sector, which represents a growing share of China’s energy use. (Cohen 2015)

China’s need for coal is still ever present and is predicted to increase for the next two decades. China then benefits for two reasons. First, its institutions will win ground relative to status quo competitor banks and create access to cheap coal and other such resources. As cooperation between China and the developing world increases over time, the United States can

expect to lose influence. The United States will be the major loser if it does not reverse its policy on coal. Otherwise, it must present to developing states a cheaper and cleaner alternative to coal, and do so now.

Chinese behavior may seem immoral and psychotic given its destructive policies especially given climate change. Recent studies show that up to 4000 people die a day because of unclean air (Morales 2015, *Bloomberg*). However, it is important to note that the United States engages others similarly. Critics argue that historically the United States and the World Bank have long facilitated development projects that furthered American economic growth and power (Subramanya 2015, *Foreign Affairs*). As such, we can expect that as a systemic practice, the Chinese-led banks will do the same. Many argue that if it were not for the World Bank's energy policy on coal, there would be no need for the creation or patronage for the NDB or AIIB: "Had the World Bank resourced its capital base, had the World Bank done reforms that are due, and ADB also resourced the capital base, perhaps there would have been no need to set up the (new) bank" (Kumar and Munroe 2014, *Reuters*). Hence, we can expect these new banks to finance projects that serve the interests of the major shareholders.

World Bank policy on coal gives the NDB and the AIIB a competitive advantage. Developing states looking for investment for coal infrastructure will come to the latter for finance. As a result, the World Bank may decline in influence to the competitor's benefit. Chinese-led banks will not only grow themselves: China will have continual access to cheap coal. Since systemic practice dictate funding projects in the interests of donor states, coal reliance will only increase with time. Bretton Woods institutions should prepare for serious competition.

Today, coal is still widely used by many countries; moreover, since 2000, its use grew faster than other energy sources. A total of 76 percent of world coal production is consumed by five countries: China, the United States, India, Russia, and Japan; three of these are BRICS countries. Estimations conclude there is 861 billion tons of coal worldwide (*World Coal Association*, September 2, 2014). Given estimates and current use, there is enough coal to last 112 years as compared to oil and gas reserves: between 46 and 54 years (Thomson Reuters, September 6, 2014).

Coal's inexpensive nature, its wide versatility, linkage potential (industries resulting from by-products), and abundance present many advantages to today's economies. The countries making up the BRICS make full use of coal and all its benefits.

In the next section, I discuss coal use in the BRICS countries as a way to introduce the main section of the chapter: the proliferation of coal as a global energy source as a result of the rising power and importance of the BRICS countries. Specifically, China is the major benefactor. As part of its wider global ambition, coal is at the center of its neoempire.

CHINESE NEOEMPIRE: COMPETING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The BRICS is a term to contextualize the loose alliance of emerging countries growing in power and influence in both absolute and relative terms after the 2008 financial crisis. These states, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, all need access to energy supplies to pursue economic growth in a sustainable and dynamic way (*Geospatial World*, accessed September 6, 2014). Coal is particularly fundamental to the success of these countries, more specifically China. As an important part of their economy, these states must continue to invest in coal production and ensure that sources of coal are open for business, even if it means supporting other countries through aid and investment.

China in particular has the most voracious appetite for coal of the BRICS bloc and indeed the entire world. China depends on coal for 69 percent of its energy production; other sources like oil (18 percent) and hydroelectric power (6 percent) are dwarfed by coal (US Energy Administration 2011). China's demand for this resource far outstrips all the others: 50 percent of both the forces of global aggregate supply and global aggregate demand originate from within its borders (*Geospatial World*, accessed September 6, 2014). Hence, China consumes nearly as much coal as all the other countries in the world combined (US Energy and Information Administration, September 4, 2014).

In terms of global aggregates in 2012, China produced 46 percent of the world's coal, almost four times as much coal as the United States, its second largest producer. Consumption data is more astounding: China consumes 49 percent of world coal. To fill this gap, China imports coal. As a consequence, there is significant pressure on China to secure energy and continue to grow; not to mention pressure to avoid an energy crisis which would serve only to arrest growth (Watts 2010, *Foreign Policy*).

More importantly for future prospects, China's consumption of coal is expected to grow. There are efforts by China's leadership to slow down its coal usage in the next decade (Ibid.). China must, however, continue to

mine and consume coal for growing the economy in the short term. The economic environment at this very precarious time in their development and progress as an emerging power is palpable. In human terms, they need ready supplies of coal to provide energy for 20 percent of the world's population. A shift to gas is already taking place. On September 1, 2014, Russia and China began construction on a gas pipeline that would link the two countries (BBC News, accessed September 2, 2014). However, until the pipeline is fully functional, China will continue to make good use of coal; Chinese analyst Xiao Yunhan estimates that China's consumption of coal will likely double over the next ten years (Watts 2010, *Foreign Policy*). Hence, constant access to coal is fundamental to the success of China. Without coal, economic growth in China would suffer a serious setback. In this precarious position, China, like any great power, must create a dependency to promote coal production especially since US-led banks are discouraging such action.

The other BRICS members are also some of the top producers of coal. Russia and India join China among the top five coal producers (Oil Price, September 6, 2014). While the US coal production decreased (indeed, coal production in the United States is declining especially domestically (Otani 2014, *Reuters*)), China, India, and Russia are all expanding their production of coal. The need for cheap and available energy is vital to fuel continuing economic growth. One must conclude then, that the BRICS model of development is based on the use of cheap energy and the construction of its infrastructure. This may bring about a coal revolution, as poorer countries seek to build their own coal projects with BRICS investment. The same countries could also seek aid and loans for the purpose of development and may have to expand their own coal infrastructure to be considered attractive by the mentioned bloc.

As seen, coal is absolutely vital to the BRICS world-system. In particular, I highlight the importance of coal to China. While all of the BRICS countries produce and consume coal to advance their economic development, China best illustrates the chapter's proposition of systemic change because it is China that consumes more coal than it produces. To sustain its recent economic growth of, for example, 7.7 percent in 2012 (US Energy Administration 2011), and avoid an energy crisis, then China must continue to import coal from reliable sources. China must therefore continue to give other countries incentives to produce coal and it will likely do so by applying its economic and political influence. We currently see China exerting such influence in the underdeveloped countries of world such as

in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, China is creating a neoempire to compete, or balance, against the United States.

With regards to coal, we are looking at changing the system to favor the production and consumption of coal in the twenty-first century; we are talking about an energy revolution (really a return to coal) and China is the primary author of this systemic change. Systemic change, as previously mentioned, is defined as “the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interests ... the political system will be changed in ways that will reflect these underlying shifts in interests and power” (Gilpin 1981, 10). In the context of coal and its role in China’s world-system, there are several factors that may contribute to systemic change: Chinese external aid and investment are key to the overall process.

Today, the practice of Chinese aid is a major driving force of systemic change for the benefit of its neoempire. Chinese aid takes the form of concessional grants, zero-interest loans, and low-interest loans (Brautigam 2011, 752). By concessional is meant that the state and state institutions are in full control of the external assistance process. To elaborate, the foreign aid loan program is operated by China’s state-run Eximbank which combines economic matters with diplomacy, developmental practice, and business objectives (Ibid., 755). For example, to gain aid, states must first recognize the Peoples’ Republic of China over the Republic of China (or Taiwan). Therefore, the political motivations behind China’s economic aid practices are made apparent even before the external assistance is paid out.

Borne out of this concessional approach, Chinese assistance is made contingent upon its *Eight Principles*:

1. Aid from China to foreign states is for mutual gain rather than based on one-sided grants.
2. A “no-strings attached” relationship that respects the sovereignty of the aid recipients.
3. China will provide interest free or low-interest loans as economic aid with the option of delaying payment if necessary.
4. Aid is a means of assistance to assist countries develop independently rather than become reliant on China.
5. Projects are to provide quick results through small investments in order to give nations the ability to grow revenue.

6. China will provide Chinese manufactured goods at a competitive market price.
7. The Chinese will provide technical assistance and training.
8. Chinese citizens sent to work in various nations receiving aid will be paid at the level of their host country nationals working in the same field (Wenping 2006, 5).

While number 2 states that there would be a “no-strings attached” approach, there are certain expectations that stem from numbers 5, 6, 7, and 8. Chinese aid projects are conducted through bilateral negotiations with little to no transparency. In exchange for assistance, China gains access to resources through preferential agreements. Further, they gain through special trade agreements and commercial investments. The end results are large infrastructure projects which use Chinese manpower and cater to the interests of China: for instance, the production of coal. This is obvious in many countries, especially those of the African continent.

To further look into the political motivations of aid, Ngaire Woods, in her article “Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in developmental assistance” (2008), illustrates standard Chinese aid practice. She argues that China, along with other emerging donors, is “giving aid on terms of their own choosing” (Woods 2008, 1). Much of this aid goes to countries in dire need of it because of economic stagnation. Other countries, like Zimbabwe, need aid because of political isolation due to lack of democratic institutions (Ibid., 3). While OECD countries deny Zimbabwe aid because of its anti-democratic practices, China is not afraid to embrace the African country to gain from its vast coal mines. Many therefore posit that China is undermining global democracy to achieve its own goals. Moises Naim labels this “rogue aid” which is defined as “development assistance that is nondemocratic in origin and nontransparent in practice; its effect is typically to stifle real progress while hurting average citizens” (Naim 2007, *Foreign Policy*). Naim’s conclusions here can be borrowed to further understand the motivations of China with its global coal campaign.

It is important to note the application of World-systems Approach here. This theory seeks to explain underdevelopment by looking at economic relations between rich, core countries and poor, peripheral countries. This structural argument posits that elites of core or developed countries dictate the production and exportation of poor and underdeveloped countries through supply and demand. To apply this to the current international

political-economic context, China will use its capacity for demand to encourage states to produce coal for its own sake. Using this perspective, we can predict the growing importance of coal in the next few years. Currently, China is involved in a number of coal-mining projects globally: Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, the Ukraine, the United States, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (“International Chinese Coal Projects” sourcewatch.org, accessed September 4, 2014). In these cases, China has played a vital role in improving the coal industries of these many countries, even developed countries like the United States and Canada. The growing demand for coal is changing the world and the way it produces energy. As a result, China’s action plays an important role in facilitating coal’s rise. This makes China as well as coal use part of the systemic force of change. Thus, a new Chinese-capitalist system is constructed through an active strategy of global banking, trade arrangements as well as aid.

CORE-PERIPHERY DEPENDENCY NETWORKS IN CHINA’S NEOEMPIRE: PAKISTAN, ZIMBABWE, AND ZAMBIA

To demonstrate the theoretical connection between, China, coal and systemic change, I briefly mention three cases of Chinese external assistance that enable dependency with coal production at its core. Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and Zambia (and much of Africa as Johnson points out), all have difficulty producing energy for domestic use. Coal as a cheap and readily available fuel source becomes the answer; and China is there to assist these countries with coal development as it seeks to further its own national interests. Through these three examples, we see the dynamic of coal as a growing influence on world energy use.

To begin, Pakistan is a country experiencing an energy crisis. There are severe power outages, sometimes for up to 10–15 hours in a day. This is attributed to the spike in the demand for energy given increases in economic growth and development (Shaikh and Tunio 2014, trust.org). To help meet energy demands, the Pakistani leadership has chosen to develop its coal mines, especially the coal-mining fields of Thar. According to estimates, “Thar coal fields have estimated reserves of 175 billion tons. These reserves could be utilized to produce 100,000 MW of power for many decades” (brerecorder.com, accessed October 29, 2013). In August 2013, Pakistani scientist Samar Mubarakmand argued that such an endeavor

would be costly and that China, with its China Coal and Mining Technology University, would be an excellent collaboration opportunity. Mubarakmand also suggested partnership with the Chinese government given the tremendous expense (Bhutta 2013, *The Express Tribune*). In October of the same year, China Power International Holding announced that it would begin construction of ten coal-fired power plants in at the Thar coal fields, a project that would cost \$7.2 billion (brerecorder.com, accessed October 29, 2013). Currently, there are plans for even more coal-based power plants, up to 15 (Shaikh and Tunio 2014, trust.org).

There are, of course, environmental concerns over these matters, but, thus far, such concerns have fallen on deaf ears. Coal has been deemed the solution to the energy crisis and Pakistan. The economic benefits that come from coal production, especially the replacement of oil imports (US\$14 billion annually), has proven vital to the economic success of the country (Ibid.). In Pakistan, therefore, we see China is filling a need through coal production. While China does not currently import a major percentage of its coal from Pakistan (Pakistani coal production currently fuels 6 percent of the country's energy needs), this percentage is expected to increase as Pakistan's coal production increases with time.

Zimbabwe is also seeing a major development in its coal industry. Speculators and experts alike conclude that the country holds the second largest coal reserves in the southern African region (Ibid.). It, however, lacks the capability to produce coal for the global market. Its rampant underdevelopment, underscored by terrible hyperinflation is worsened by a dependence on oil imports. To correct this, Zimbabwean minister of Mining and Mine Development announced the beginning of an energy revolution, selling 20 mining licenses for coal production. However, given economic difficulties and lack of financial resources, rapid growth will take some time. For this, Zimbabwe reached out to the world. Given animosity toward the Western world as well, due largely to Western-backed sanctions designed to punish President Mugabe's anti-democratic tendencies, other states had to be considered by Zimbabwe (sourcwatch.org, accessed September 6, 2014).

Currently, there is competition between Japan (a major coal consumer) and China for access to the Zimbabwe's massive coal deposits (*The Africa Report*, January 3, 2013). Both China and Japan, through their state enterprises, began courting Zimbabwe in hopes of securing coal for future imports. In particular, it is said that Japan is seeking 15 million tons a year, but Zimbabwe can only produce 2 million tons a year. Hence, Japan has

promised Zimbabwe to help them produce the resource by financing the construction of infrastructure, like railroads (Ibid.).

Like Japan, China is also looking to gain a firm foothold in the country. Chinese coal firm China Africa Sunlight injected US\$600 million to help aid the industry. In return, it was granted a 100,000 hectare concession (Ibid.). From this, a coal project partnership between China's China Africa Sunlight and Zimbabwe's Oldstone Investments named "China-Africa Sunlight Exploration" was born (*China Aid Data*, accessed September 6, 2014). This large-scale, ambitious joint venture combines the Zimbabwean concession and Chinese financing of more than US\$2 billion as of 2013. The project should earn US\$1 billion a year upon completion. In all, the project hopes to assist Zimbabwe with its energy needs but also serve Chinese interests, securing a ready supply of the substance for many years to come.

Considering Zambia, the country has produced coal for many years now, since 1967 (KMPG International 2014). It has a proven reserve of 20 million metric tons. Prior to 2000, the country produced on average 214,000 tons of coal. However, by 2010, that figure withered to a mere 1000 tons. The mines needed investment to keep the resource moving (*miningweekly.com*, September 13, 2013). To add to this, Zambia at the time was suffering from an energy crisis. Mostly run by hydroelectricity, the state is looking to diversify its energy resources. To add to the urgency, other industries depend on coal to light their furnaces. The country reached out to global investors, like Singapore and China.

Currently, China enjoys a robust presence in Zambia especially in the mining sectors of cobalt, copper, and coal (KMPG International 2014). Naturally, this linkage injected some much needed financial capital, approximately US\$1.2 billion in 2010, from China to Zambia (Bearak 2010). This infusion helped the country produce 238,000 tons in 2011. By the end of this year, estimated coal production is set for 600,000 tons. Moreover, this production helped provide 25,000 jobs for Zambians (*miningweekly.com*, September 13, 2013).

Zambian production of coal through Chinese investment has not been free of challenges. Zambian workers accuse the Chinese of excessive cruelty and hazardous working conditions: "we do not have support timbers everywhere they need to be, and we have no masks to protect us from the coal dust," said Boston Sikalamba, 21, who was buried for several minutes by a cave-in this month. 'After the dynamite is set, there's nothing to do about the dust but breathe it, and if you are slow at your work, the Chinese

beat you” (Bearak 2010). Matters such as this led to a riot which ended in tragedy when hundreds of workers rioted against two Chinese managers. The managers, who did not speak English or Tonga, the indigenous language of Zambia, fired into the crowd wounding 13 (Wonacott 2012). While such events are quite tragic, the official statement from the Zambian government is “‘we’re an economy in transition, and we can’t afford to lose the cow that gives us milk today,’ said Labor Minister Austin Liato” (Bearak 2010). Today, Zambia’s coal industry continues to thrive from Chinese investment. Like much of Africa, Zambia needs Chinese investment to fund its wide array of projects for the sake of development. China knows this and will continue its activities to gain access to coal and other resources (Zambian copper and cobalt benefit from Chinese investment) for its own economic growth and development.

The power of Chinese aid to bring about the systemic change is indeed something to study in depth. It is only natural for China to pursue its interests in such a manner. Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and Zambia all gain from these relationships as well: their coal has a customer who holds a stake in their success. Systemically though, these three cases only serve to illustrate examples of what is occurring in the international system. In the next section, I will discuss the importance of Chinese aid in ushering in a world order funded by China and fueled by its demand for coal and other resources.

BANDWAGONING FOR PROFIT AND SYSTEMIC CHANGE: NEOEMPIRE BUILDING

As discussed, Chinese aid is predicated on preferential trade and treatment coupled with, most importantly for this chapter, special access to resources, specifically coal. Given aid, the demands associated with this aid will be welcomed by recipients given underdevelopment. This then, as Schweller argues, is a fundamental part of bandwagoning for profit. If China is perceived as the “wave of the future,” then it would be wise for weak and underdeveloped states to begin creating good, working relationships with China. Many of the world’s countries now make full use of Chinese aid in return for making the needed concessions. Table 5.2 documents all Chinese aid recipients (87 countries in total) for 2011.

Chinese aid is now global in reach. Of the 194 independent countries in existence today, 87 of them accept aid from China. In turn, each of

Table 5.2 Chinese aid recipients in 2011

<i>Country</i>
Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Côte d'Ivoire
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Iraq
Jordan
Kenya

(continued)

Table 5.2 (continued)

<i>Country</i>
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Lesotho
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Zambia

^aMany thanks to Wenyuan Wu for finding this information taken from Wolf, C, Wang, X and Eric Warner 2013 "China's Foreign Aid and Government Sponsored Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations and Implications" *The RAND Corporation*, Washington, DC

these countries supplies concessions in one way or another to the Chinese, as per established practice. In many instances, this is coal for securing energy sources for China to ensure continual growth. Such cases of bargaining are transforming the international system as certain practices, such as the use of a specific energy source, are taking hold.

Aid is not as benign as one might think. Rather, Chinese aid is perceived by the United States and the rest of the OECD as a threat to established norms and practices. Naim poignantly describes the perception of this activity:

What we have here—in states like China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—are regimes that have the cash and the will to reshape the world into a place very different from where the rest of us want to live. Although they are not acting in concert, they collectively represent a threat to healthy, sustainable development. Worse, they are effectively pricing responsible and well-meaning aid organizations out of the market in the very places where they are needed most. If they continue to succeed in pushing their alternative development model, they will succeed in underwriting a world that is more corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian. That is in no one's interests, except the rogues. (Naim 2007 *Foreign Policy*)

The activities of China and the other powers mentioned here do indeed undercut the development of global democracy; the Zimbabwean example is key. Zimbabwe's undemocratic ruling regime and the power of Robert Mugabe is given strength to survive another day because of these relations.

Considering loans, and bringing in the other members of the BRICS alignment, the creation of a BRICS development bank will only serve to assist countries construct their own coal mines. Keith Johnson of *Foreign Policy* argues that “the new bank would likely finance projects similar to those backed by the institutions it is modeled on” (Johnson 2014, *Foreign Affairs*). He cites Professor Kevin Gallagher of Boston University who suspects that the new bank would “put a premium on infrastructure and energy, which was the World Bank's model in the 1970s” (Ibid.). However, given the failure of the IMF to secure pragmatic economic growth due to the demands of the dreaded structural adjustment programs, the predicament of underdeveloped countries is understandable. For example, to deal with rogue states on a bilateral basis while making concessions is less difficult than to cut taxes and government expenditures.

The central purpose of this discussion was to illustrate the systemic power of China with regard to its neoempire. Promoting dependency with the purpose of filling its energy needs is at the core of its grand strategy. Seeing this power, and understanding its activities in terms of energy acquisition, China achieves two main goals: (1) bolster channels of economic growth; (2) secure access to political influence and prestige. In terms of Go grand strategy, China sees the importance of weak states in the acquisition of power and influence. It understands that weak states are in need development. China is willing to help them develop their own coal industries; and, in return, gain its energy resources. Transactions such as this create systemic practice. In the first few months of 2013, China imported 110 million tons of coal which represents a 25.6 percent increase compared to the entire length of 2012 (Juan 2013). China must continue to develop the coal industries of other countries to secure the resources needed to continue growth and to avoid an energy crisis. The end result supports this chapter's main argument: coal energy is a systemic force in the world. As coal use increases, then its importance will become an essential part of the new world order. China facilitates the use of coal mines in other countries for its own purposes. This is occurring especially in the developing world such as in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Pakistan and in many other countries experiencing energy crises. As a cheap and reliable fuel source compared to expensive alternatives, coal is a vital part of the economic geography. In this sense, underdeveloped countries can begin to grow their economies by way of coal development. China has proven itself to be a ready partner in helping these countries develop their coal resources. Unlike Western powers who advocate use of clean but unreliable and expensive technologies, China is willing to act quicker to produce energy more efficiently for these countries. However, as argued, this is not because of China's benevolence; rather, it is because China is acting in its own interests given its own energy needs. China needs to import the coal it needs, and aid will help encourage coal production in coal-rich countries.

Of course, Chinese practice here is simply a systemic practice of the Bretton Woods regime. To recall, Bretton Woods institutions served the interests of the United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union. The IMF and World Bank generated a political culture designed to perpetuate the power of its creator, the United States. Since the United States actively blocked China and other states from having more, say in the governance of those institutions, China decided to independently

pursue its own global banking regime. While the competition between great powers may seem dangerous, it presents a clear advantage to developing countries starving for financial capital. Much of my research involves the ways in which weak and developing states play off great powers against one another (Kassab 2015). The NDB operating alongside Bretton Woods will provide ample options for developing countries: if weak and developing countries prefer the conditions of one institution over the other, then that country has the benefit of choice. Choice and competition will create a structural environment that serves the interest of weak states. Competition between the two banking system will drive down the price of doing business: interest rates. It will loosen the demands for structural adjustment programs as well as other political demands demanded by great powers behind closed doors. In other words, institutions led by either the United States or China and Russia would have to contend for the attention, business, and long-term loyalty of weak states. Instead of the monopoly system which existed since 1945, states will finally have a choice with whom they do business. Developing countries, thus, have the most to gain from great power rivalry. No longer would countries seeking loans to develop have to deal with dreaded structural adjustment programs during the days of the Washington Consensus. If a deal is too expensive or demanding, the country would simply go, or threaten to go, to the other institution. This century surely belongs to weak states. However, we must bear in mind that if weak states are ushered into these neoempires, they will continue to be dependent, and, as a result, vulnerable to great powers. Weak states will have to continue to surrender some political autonomy to retain great power support. This is the root of neoempire as Chinese influence locks weak states into relationships which serve Chinese interests at their expense.

Regressive as coal dependence may seem given challenges from global warming, China has prioritized its economic security over human security due to climate change. Reliance on coal of this nature is shortsighted but it undercuts American domination, an important part of balancing against the United States. China, alongside the United States has signed the Paris Accords² which promises to curb climate change (U.S., China ratify Paris climate agreement September 3, 2016). Their appetite for coal has also decreased as well; 1.5 percent less in 2015 than the previous year (IER 2016) although official Chinese reports put the figure at 3.7 (Wong 2016, *nytimes.com*). This reduction in coal consumption

could be explained simply due to the oversupply of energy (Spegele 2016, wsj.com). The *Wall Street Journal* notes:

Building unneeded thermal power plants underscores the difficulties President Xi Jinping and other leaders face in effecting their pledge to downshift the economy to a more sustainable track. State-led investment is still a mainstay to generate growth, and, industry analysts say, local governments are valuing the short-term over longer term financial health. “Local governments are focused on regional jobs,” said Ranping Song, a China energy expert at the Washington-based World Resources Institute. “There’s no question” power overcapacity stands to get worse in the coming years. (Ibid.)

This statement points to this chapter’s main thesis: The issue we should focus on is not coal use, but the fact that China has not stopped its support for the building of coal-fired plants around the world. According to the Institute for Energy Research:

China’s coal consumption declined by 1.5 percent in 2015 according to BP in its Statistical Review 2016...However, this may not be the start of a trend as other countries are increasing their coal consumption—Poland, India, Australia, Indonesia—to name a few. And, this is especially the case when China—a country that consumes 50 percent of the world’s coal—is building coal plants. The combination of low-cost financing and low coal prices that are half the level of five years ago make power projects attractive in China and provide employment for its population, helping the economy to grow. Over the next two years, China will spend tens of billions of dollars on these projects despite lower power demand. (IER 2016)

Given this, as well as the investment strategies of the BRICS banks, we cannot expect coal consumption to slow despite the Paris Accords. Chinese construction of coal-fired plants around the world will continue to be the focal point of analysis as it continues to export its state-capitalist model abroad to further its competition against the United States.

China pursuing this coal strategy is ultimately psychopathic. It gives no thought to the serious and mounting pollution problem affecting the health and wellness of the world’s population. If we adopt a broadened approach to the study of security that is threats, objects, or complications that impede the autonomy of states and the degradation of human life

(Ullman 1983, 11), then China's coal use is indeed a threat to its own national security. There will be a time when the stifled populations of China will rise up against these policies. The demand for clean air will become very real once it becomes absolutely intolerable, when the costs (pollution) attributed to economic growth begin to outweigh its benefits. Until this time, coal use will continue because of the economic gains which, as explained, will lead to domination of the international structure. However, human suffering will eventually come to a tipping point resulting in protest and even revolution.

CONCLUSIONS

While G. John Ikenberry in "Liberal Leviathan" argues that it is better for revisionist or emerging powers to work within the established system's institutions, saying "The cost benefit calculation of rival would be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system" (Ikenberry 2011, 339). Who would have foreseen the creation of new systemic banking institutions aimed to inject competition for the purpose of power accumulation against hegemonic powers? Ikenberry misses an essential aspect of international politics: states are reluctant to surrender power and influence to their competitors. If the United States were to allow China and Russia more say in Bretton Woods banks, then they would lose influence and economic clout. This has occurred, and, as a result, the BRICS have built their own banks in an effort to construct their own neoempire. The resulting institutional competition is a new systemic feature as such power and influence means systemic power, that is, power to construct a world-system—serving Chinese neoempire. The result may seek to eventually undermine the United States. At this point, I would recommend the United States join Chinese-led banks for two purposes: (1) to assist in providing liquidity to developing countries and (2) to voice their interests along with their European allies who joined in 2015. This may not occur as the Chinese themselves may block their membership in an attempt to isolate a major competitor. In this sense, we see the formulation of a new ontology of neoempire. This is an essential and new feature of twenty-first-century politics. In the following chapter, I shall explore a similar battle between the European Union and the Eurasian Union. There is a similar battle over weak countries in Europe as major powers compete for security against one another using supranational institutions.

NOTES

1. Permission to reprint granted: “Energy and Systemic Change: The Rising Power of Coal” as it appears in *The Impact of Emerging Economies on Global Energy and the Environment: Challenges Ahead*, Bruce Bagley, Hanna Samir Kassab and Dina Moulioukova (eds), Lexington Books in this book.
2. Thanks to my Professor Bruce Bagley for his kind comments at the “Consequences of the Fall” 2016 Energy Conference at the University of Miami.

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Neoempires Under Construction: The European Union and Eurasian Union

The previous chapter looked at the competition between the United States and China with regard to competing blocks and the reciprocal threats felt by either neoempire. This book's second case study will provide an explanation for the growing tension between Russia and countries of the European Union. This chapter will test the theoretical contribution of the book by looking at the current conflict and ultimately neoempire. To understand the conflict, we must first see the creation of the European Union as well as the Eurasian Unions as neoempires. The European Union was created to sustain economic benefit and friendship among former enemies. This supranational body hoped to achieve something similar to the United States but as of today fails to advance further than currency union; a dangerous place to stagnate given the necessity of political/fiscal union to govern economic disequilibrium natural to currency unions. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the United States as well as the European Union acted in selfish and irrational ways that forced the then weak state, Russia, into a threatening position. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union expanded to include states historically either part of Russia or the Warsaw Pact. Countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (joined in 2004) were quickly ushered into the European sphere making Russia feel insecure. This episode was altogether humiliating for the once prestigious and powerful state. Simultaneously, Russia had to deal with rogue provinces like Chechnya who was having designs to leave the federation. Through war, Russia kept itself together even as the competitor

states went on their offensive. European Union leaders ignored Russian dissatisfaction and are now paying the price. Russia needed to curtail this expansion through its own supranational body as well as by force to recover lost prestige given European Union's own expansionist behavior. The Eurasian Union is designed to facilitate trade and exchange between member countries like Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. However, as argued throughout this book, such an endeavor can never be considered benign. The Eurasian Union is a neoempire, albeit regional, which hopes to balance against the European Union's own regional neoempire. Further, if states outside European sphere of influence desire to go too far outside Russian control, Russia will use its military as well as economic might to punish states and force them into union with Russia. Neoempire thus provides a grand appreciation for Russian action against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.

This chapter will describe the competition between neoempires under construction: the European Union and the Eurasian Union. The post-cold war climate offered the European Union and the United States to expand into Russian spheres of influence. Their unipolar moment was short-lived as Russia resurged with the presidency of strongman Vladimir Putin. States existing in a unipolar system will act or balance against the hegemon once enough power is accumulated. While no direct confrontation has been attempted, it has offered Russia the opportunity to grow given surrounding states' dependency on oil and gas. Under this system of dependency, Russia has been able to influence weaker states to protect and project power, prestige, and domination. This chapter will underscore these behaviors to analyze the future of European-Eurasian relations.

SUPRANATIONALISM AS SYSTEMIC PRACTICE: HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EURASIAN UNION

Systemic practice is state behavior that may bolster or strengthen a state and weaken others. Such action may be initiated by one actor and then imitated by others. Anything that assists in the distribution or redistribution of capabilities must be considered as potentially viable to others. Systemic practice was discussed in Chap. 5 and will be applied and tested in this chapter. I shall use the concept of systemic practice to illustrate the systemic importance of neoempires and the use of supranational bodies like the European Union and the Eurasian Union. The expansion of the European Union as an economic and political project forced Russia to

create a similar body. While the European Union still has a very long way to go, its very expansion (along with NATO) was deemed a threat to Russian prestige. Following suite, Russia, rather than conquer entire neighboring states, decided it would be better to copy or imitate the European Union. The Eurasian Union is then an attempt by Russia to block the encroachment of the European Union through a supranational body serving as peripheral to its own neoempire. These unions are forms of external balancing that increases the power and influence of the greatest powers, or cores, and shapes these unions.

The history of the European Union starts in 1992 with NATO. The treaty of Maastricht which brought the bloc into fruition could not have been accomplished without NATO backing. President George Bush underscored the subordination of the European Union to NATO: “we are pleased that our allies in the Western European Union ... decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO’s European pillar and the defense of the component of the European Union” (quoted in Sheetz 1998, 23). Kenneth Waltz goes so far as to argue that “the European pillar was to be contained within NATO, and its policies were to be fashioned by Washington” (Waltz 2002, 45). Hence, the European Union became an inherent part of the American unipolar moment after the death of the Soviet Union.

A unipolar international system is one where one superpower dominates all others. With no competitors to check or balance its aggression, the superpower can do as it pleases at the expense of weaker states. Creating the European Union was such a project. Little consideration was given to Russian reaction. The United States simply could not face the fact that its behavior could be considered aggressive given its self-identification as an exceptional power. The danger of such self-perception is that other states, like Russia, also consider themselves exceptional with certain rights and privileges in other areas of the world. The European Union and the expansion of NATO were understood by Russia as an American effort to erode its prestige. Taking full advantage of Russian weakness, the United States was trying to defend its superiority for years to come.

A major problem with unipolarity is that the superpower in question may overreach itself and create insecurity for others. Waltz understands this very dangerous situation and anticipates conflict: “balances disturbed will one day be restored” (in Ikenberry 2002, 4). This is what occurred. The European Union is a neoempire as led by the strongest European states, France and Germany, to enhance their power and position in continental

Europe. Weaker states were absorbed into this order because they saw it as in their interests to bandwagon with the winners of the Cold War. The so-called End of History meant the victory of the West against Soviet tyranny. Human rights and free markets were now on the agenda; how could this be seen as aggressive by others? The fact remains that it was. The European Union is also a German and French scheme for neoempire given the fact it goes way beyond economic domination and exploitation of weaker states. All of this was being done during a great period of difficulty for Russia. Russia in the 1990s was marred by serious economic and political challenges. Many worried that the Russian Federation itself could come apart. President Boris Yeltsin proved a weak leader. All of that was to change with his successor, Putin.

Putin has made it no secret of his hopes to restore Russian greatness. Upon taking office, he hoped to reassert Russian greatness. He wanted to turn back the hands of time for “the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (Putin 2005). This statement was a response to Russian influence being significantly undercut. In 2004, the European Union enlarged its membership for the fifth time incorporating traditionally Russian sphere of influence and former Soviet Union satellites: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined. NATO expansion also included these countries in 2004 but started earlier in 1999. Such moves only alarmed Russia, but their feelings of insecurity was ultimately ignored by the United States and European countries.

The benefit of such behavior became obvious very soon. The European Union became the world’s largest trading bloc with almost a billion people. This led Russia to build its own union called the Eurasian Union. According to Larive and Kanet, the Eurasian Union can be understood as an attempt by Russia to regain power and influence in traditional spaces before the Europeans take over:

The Eurasian Union is for the moment a movement toward economic cooperation among former Soviet states without democratic conditionality. The Eurasian Union stands as a tool with which to confront the West, and especially the EU, in its own game of institutionalized cooperation. It is a way to increase and anchor the position of Russia in the post-Soviet region. (Larive and Kanet 2013, 134)

The authors agree with the arguments made in this chapter that NATO and European Union expansion has been interpreted by Russia as a threat.

Russia's attempt to reclaim lost influence is borrowed from similar expansionary moves in its supranational body:

Putin has attempted to strengthen Russia's position in post-Soviet space by promoting economic and security integration. The Eurasian Union stands in the middle of a mix of new initiatives such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community and the Single Economic Space, all gravitating around Russia. According to Jeffrey Mankoff, this series of integration initiatives bring a new threat of "deepening dependence of neighboring countries on Russia that could compromise not only development but also foreign-policy autonomy." This economic bloc at the borders of another economic power could be at the heart of considerable tensions and competition for regional hegemony. (Ibid.)

Although this may seem clear, Russia sees the Eurasian Union as a peaceful force for good:

The Eurasian Economic Union is an international organization for regional economic integration. It has international legal personality and is established by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union.

The EAEU provides for free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, pursues coordinated, harmonized and single policy in the sectors determined by the Treaty and international agreements within the Union.

The Member-States of the Eurasian Economic Union are the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation.

The Union is being created to comprehensively upgrade, raise the competitiveness of and cooperation between the national economies, and to promote stable development in order to raise the living standards of the nations of the Member-States. (Eurasian Economic Union, <http://www.eacunion.org>)

In a sense, the Eurasian Union is thus a product of European Union and NATO expansion. Given the perceived benefit of constructing these supranational governmental bodies, Russia has determined it has much to gain from developing its own. This behavior is forced upon Russia due to systemic importance. Russia hopes it will benefit not only materially but also relatively, as it denies the European Union and NATO the ability to continually expand in an effort to contain Russia. Since economic power is connected to military power, we may also assume that Russia will only become stronger due to expanded influence.

In summary, the insecurity felt by Russia then has led it to conduct its own business in like manner; if the Europeans were going to expand, so would the Russians. This should be clear due to the mechanics of the international system and the practices that states copy from one another to survive. To be safe then, states must construct their own neoempire to balance against the neoempires of others.

The center of this conflict is over control of weaker units of the international system. It is hard not to make this conclusion as it seems these institutions are racing to control as many weaker units as possible to deny their competitors this advantage. These bodies are not solely for economic or political purposes, but achieve both simultaneously. The main effort is to degrade the influence of competing powers. The problem with these endeavors is that the prize is itself a burden. The weaker states of the European Union, Greece, Portugal, and even Spain, are undermining the health of the union. Weak states are the Achilles heel of the neoempire still under construction.

As of the time of writing, membership in the Eurasian Union remains small and manageable, unlike the grotesque bureaucratic monster that is the European Union. For now, Eurasian Union membership includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The Eurasian Union demands little of its members in terms of democratic institutions and it is not a currency union; it is a customs and single market. Russia benefits from this system because it is the biggest power and, as a result, remains at the core of this neoempire. The Eurasian Union is also a neoempire because it exists for political purposes: the balance against the forces of German- and French-led European Union and the American-led NATO. The Eurasian thus takes the best of the European Union while refraining from demanding too much in terms of democratic ideals, principles, and, of course, monetary systems.

WEAKNESS OF UNIONS: WEAK STATES, PLAYING THE FIELD, AND COMPLEMENTARITY¹

This section analyzes the role of weak states within the European and Eurasian Unions. I will argue that since weak states are by themselves unimportant, they are able to play the field and engage either conglomeration. However, since en masse weak states are important, each state must wisely balance its relations with greater powers in an effort to survive. Armenia does this very well and its behavior will be used to not only test

the framework but also understand the ideal workings of wise weak state behavior notably their foreign policy of complementarity. I shall also describe what not to do in the example of Ukraine. I will end this section by looking at the opportunity that Greece may have if the European Union continues to push it away. Greece may be able to approach Russia who will be more than happy for the opportunity to expand influence in the Mediterranean.

Ukraine and Armenia: Appreciating Constraints

To begin, we must first assume that weak states understand and even appreciate the constraints placed upon them in the anarchical international system. Indeed, great powers will do what they will and weak states will suffer what they must. However, this does not mean weak states are doomed to subordination. As mentioned, states, like Armenia, can engage contending great powers on opposite ends of the balance of power. A “balance” must be struck as weak states push themselves into competing neoempires for their own short-term benefit. Complementarity, the foreign policy doctrine of Armenia, strives to achieve this balance given their precarious geopolitical position. This section hopes to illustrate complementarity as it works within anarchy. Armenia has much to gain and suffers less dependency if it plays the field while not going too far into any patron-client relationship: “Armenia lacks resources and international clout to continue to pursue its ‘complementary’ foreign policy of maintaining good relations with the West, Russia, Iran and other major powers” (Mirzoyan 2010, 128). I shall define this practice briefly as a guideline for other states that are stuck in the competition between the neoempires of Germany and France in the European Union and Russia in the Eurasian Union.

Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine of complementarianism intends to “cultivate friendly relations with the world and regional powers—Russia, the US and Iran—[in order] to place Armenia into a network of relations that is based on convergent interests” (Weinstein 2004). This foreign policy doctrine aims to support Armenia’s economic development, while, at the same time remaining detached from great power rivalry (Pogosyan 2011, 196). For Armenia, positive relations with all parties are vital, not only to escape regional isolation due to its precarious geopolitical position but to assist in the country’s economic development (Ibid., 17).

Ever since Putin came to power in 2000, the world has seen a power growing in size and belligerence as a reaction to United States' unipolarity. Countries that surround Russia prefer to maintain a degree of autonomy, just like all countries do. Some, like Ukraine and Armenia, prefer to move closer to Western powers to benefit from multiple sources of investment, trade, and aid. In Ukraine, the country is divided over the decision to move closer to two seemingly opposing supranational bodies: the European Union versus the Eurasian Union. Armenia has already joined the latter after pressure from Russia on the president proved too much to bear. But does this necessarily mean that joining the Eurasian Union, an economic and political union seen as a successor to the Soviet Union, ultimately results in the end of relations with the West? This is the question that is fundamentally dividing the political intelligentsia of these countries. While we would like to think that Ukraine and Ukrainians should be able to decide which supranational bodies they wish to join, this is simply not an option. Also, while it is understandable that Russia resents NATO and European Union expansion, it is incorrect for Russia to think it could bully a sovereign nation into its sphere of influence. Such matters of right and wrong have little place in the realm of anarchy. Ukraine, too, must understand that its corrupt government basically gave the Russians the green light to invade, given Russian expressed need to protect minorities. All countries with Russian minorities must now correct any government inadequacies in this light. If not, they may eventually be invaded as Russia will use it as a pretext to invade and annex provinces.

On October 10, Armenia joined the Eurasian Union, much to the surprise of Armenians themselves. Many critics argue that signing such a document has limited the ability of Armenia to plot its own destiny that "Yerevan will enjoy the trading preferences for only several years and will eventually have to adopt the EEU barriers to trade with the rest of the world and the European Union in particular. They point out that Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan account between them for less than 25 percent of Armenia's overall foreign trade" (Arasbez October 14, 2014). Just because Russia can effectively dictate trade policy does not necessarily mean that Armenia will cease to exist as an independent nation. Armenia will still be able to conduct foreign policy and other relations. Tariffs to trade with other nations cannot increase, as this would violate the spirit of free trade and the WTO, of which Armenia is a member. Armenia will still be able to carry out cultural and language exchanges with Iran. Armenian communities around the world will still be able to visit their homeland. Armenia will

continue to maintain good relations with the United States, housing its biggest embassy in the world to date. All is not lost and the same will be said of Ukraine. The Armenian spirit is one known for the ability to play the field. These are survivors of the most terrible of times. Since 1991, Armenia has shown itself to be a savvy diplomat, engaging with countries that effectively hate one another: Russia, Iran, and the United States. This will continue for Armenia; it has to for Armenia to survive a state still at war with a resource-rich nation. This can also be expected for Ukraine if they are forced to join the Eurasian Union. While many wanted to join the European Union, this is an impossibility for now given Russian reaction. The international system is not one which dictates right and wrong. The need for prestige drives great powers to behave in unjust ways. It becomes necessary for relatively weaker countries like Ukraine to accept certain realities.

The reality of today is that Russia under Putin is making up for lost time. In my estimation, joining the Eurasian Union does not necessarily mean an end to a state's freedom to pursue outside relations. Countries that may face such a reality, like Ukraine, may have to make this decision. Such declarations of being ready for Total War is unrealistic, emotional, and silly. You can never be ready for Total War. Being realistic, Ukraine must recognize the situation with Russia is ripping it apart. Giving into Russian pressure must conjure up images of the past: the Soviet Union and even Tsarist Russia. Being denied sovereignty as a sovereign nation is honestly an unacceptable part of this entire ordeal and I sympathize with Ukrainians. Nevertheless, here are the facts. First, Russia is actively invading sovereign Ukrainian territory. The first loss of territory has been the Crimea. Second, Russia is now poised to take large chunks of Ukrainian territory in its eastern rump. Russian armed vehicles, tanks, and soldiers are now pouring into the separatist regions. Can the Ukrainians put up effective resistance? Sizing up military capabilities, Ukraine may not be able to carry out a long-term, drawn-out fight against Russia. Third, in more human terms, Ukrainians will face a cold winter given their dependence on Russian gas. Fourth, will the West come to the aid of Ukraine? As of today, the West is not legally obligated to intervene in this conflict, and they have not. Without this assistance, war cannot be a realistic strategy. A policy of containment would be a more effective strategy against ever-expanding Russia. Thus far, the Russian economy, its currency, and reputation have all taken significant damage. A policy of containment, which ensures Russia goes no further and assaults the economy, is the only

way to curtail the power. Combining these perspectives—that Ukrainian military action against Russia is foolhardy and that containment is a better policy—I submit that joining the Eurasian Union could be a way to satisfy the Russians, keep the country together, and prevent Russia from taking Kiev. Joining the Eurasian Union will not mean suicide for Ukrainian nationalist identity. Life will go on as it will go on for Armenia. If Ukraine joins the Eurasian Union, it would still be able to maintain relations with the West. The country will find a way to continue its own course using the tools of foreign policy and through civil society. Russia will continue to weaken economically as containment takes hold. With elections, citizens will hopefully choose another, more progressive leader who lives in the twenty-first century. Countries must continue to object Russian moves in Eastern Europe and to ensure that it does not gain any more footholds in other sovereign nations. The key to any country's success is the ability to adapt to the changing international environment. Only extremists think in absolutes. There is no reason whatsoever for Ukraine and Armenia to continue relations with any state in the international system. These countries will survive and thrive in the face of great power behavior.

While the European Union needs to progress to federalism in order to survive the challenges posed by monetary union, I suspect that Germany and France, the larger players, will not be in favor. Federalism means that great powers must surrender power to weaker units within the neoempire. This formulation is the antithesis to the original intention of great power pursuing neoempire: to increase their wealth, power, and influence. While this may be true for the European Union, it has yet to be seen in the Russian-led Eurasian Union. Democratic institutions in the European Union are decades old and have taken a life of their own. Weaker units in this neoempire may see benefit to federalism in this way. Conversely, the Eurasian Union has very little institutional basis. The Russian Federation itself is considerably larger than the other members, and, as a result, will conform quickly to any attempt at federation.

Greece As Europe's Trojan Horse

Unlike the Eurasian Union, the European Union was created to promote democratic ideals and economic cooperation after the death and destruction brought on by extreme nationalism during World War II. Economic cooperation would help create a common identity, a feeling that the peoples of Europe had a common destiny. The evolution of the institution is

indeed something to be admired. However, contradictions existing within its guiding framework may bring about its sudden conclusion; and it starts with weak states; it starts with Greece. We must begin with 1957 and the Treaty of Rome which based integration on coal and steel markets among participant countries like France and West Germany. Founders wanted to create a mechanism where individuals would perceive their economic interests and political identity as tied up with European institutions rather than with the state and nationalism. Integration would take place as a result of domestic political pressure to enhance regional institutions and have spillover effects into other areas of life. Economic integration would remove the need for an independent political economy. Conditions for expansion and spillover into other sectors of life would develop through free trade agreements, customs unions, common market, monetary union, fiscal union, and finally political union. Of course, we know that Europe has still no fiscal union and certainly no political union; it has only achieved monetary union. This has damaged the strength and longevity of a European identity and has created a political crisis. Supposedly, crises would help push integration, as founder Jean Monnet would remark: "crisis is the best mechanism for unity and further integration." As a result, integration has become prescription for everything: more integration is the answer to the problems of integration.

Integration spillover is the faulty conceptual cornerstone of the European Union. Framers did not consider that crisis, and power asymmetries within the union, may actually stall, or destroy altogether, integration. In other words, the current crisis is hindering the gradual process of integration which is needed for the union to survive. Driven fundamentally by a self-sustaining process by which one sector of integration spills into another, any thought of further integration is now over. The momentum has stopped altogether.

In 2015, Europe finally decided to kick-start the economy through quantitative easing. Many hoped that this would be able to give some much needed help to Greece. The buying of bonds would assist in lending and economic growth. However, there were limits to purchasing: Greece would be barred from the bond purchasing until further notice. This could not have come at a worse time as the Greek people were gearing up for an election. The Leftist SYRIZA party used this fact to enhance their Anti-European platform. Ultimately, they had a point which accounts for their astounding victory: Germany has been talking down to them for too many years. Europe has punished the Greek people instead of the

government that cooked the books and mismanaged funds which created this entire situation. Perceptions created out of these events showed European Union members, and the world, that the union is indeed not one of equals.

The other issue of interest is that far-right movements across Europe have been gaining popularity over the past few years. If the European Union fails to act to create better growth and solve the democratic deficit, there may be more withdrawals which may force Germany to take one hell of a haircut. The interesting fact in this almost eight-year-long drama is that it is the Germans, the very architects of austerity, who have the most to lose if Greece and other heavily indebted countries default. If Greece leaves the Euro and defaults, the country will be allowed to further restructure its debt. They may have to raise taxes further and cut expenditures, but at least they would have the monetary autonomy necessary to hopefully generate growth. Default would not change anything for Greece save one thing: they would deal a blow to the union which has squeezed them for years. Would this worsen the situation and force other countries to leave? Possibly. It is certainly too early to tell.

The other issue worth mentioning is the Greek/SYRIZA-Russian relationship that may serve to undermine the foreign policy of the European Union. The European Union must be able to present a united front against their expansionist neighbor. Russia needs Greece to establish a foothold in Europe and circumvent American and European sanctions and Greece needs financing denied by their European Union allies. Because of this, Greece is readily willing to sacrifice the autonomy of the European Union to gain any assistance. Hence, Greek interests and European Union interests are increasingly diverging while Greek and Russian interests are quickly converging. If Russian assistance to Greece proves successful, will other European Union countries join with Russia to reap similar benefits?

The European Union was invented to link states together, tie their hands together in community, and create interdependence in order to limit state autonomy which would prevent war. German economic power allows them to almost dictate economic policy to others. Because of the enthusiasm to unite monetarily, mechanisms to manage fiscal discipline, that would assist in the strength of the monetary order, were ignored and glossed over. Greece's fiscal mismanagement was not solely the failure of Greece; it was the failure of Europe.

The dynamic we are looking here is fundamental to this book. We are seeing great powers, Germany and France, and Russia, duke it out over control, influence, and domination of weaker states. While many may not

agree with statement with regard to the European Union, this is ultimately the case. Austerity programs hold Greece and other debtor countries hostage to German economic preferences. The Germans want their money back and they will place upon the Greeks burdens to ensure that. The Russians are doing the same in Ukraine and Armenia. Weak states of Europe and Central Asia are being fought over and, as a result, are constrained by forces beyond their control. The European Union and Eurasian Union are neoempires in their purest form. These international governmental bodies are vehicles for great power domination to further their power, influence, and ultimately prestige. At the center of these unions are those that benefit the most through access to markets and so forth. Further, the policies states adopt to stay in these unions serve the purpose of the greater counterparts. Such a relationship is ultimately a sham. Hence, expansion and systemic practice/competition determined the creation and management of supranational bodies as witnessed. It all started with the exploitation of Russian weakness by European Union/NATO expansion which drove the creation of Eurasian Union as a neoempire to balance against an encroaching NATO/European Union force.

Within this environment however, weak states may be able to extract gains by pursuing balanced relations with all powers. Just because states are part of these unions does not mean the end of the world for foreign policy. Armenia still conducts business with the United States even though it is part of the Eurasian Union as do other member states; the same goes for the European Union and the members of NATO as these also have productive relations with Russia. Russia sells oil and gas to European Union members who readily make themselves dependent on Russia. This is of course puzzling as dependence allows Russia a firm hand in Europe. Indeed, Russia has been using its oil and gas as a weapon against European Union states. This will be discussed in the next section. In essence, oil and gas as an integral part of the Russian dependency is created for the ultimate goal of balancing against European Union expansion.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA: NEOEMPIRE IN ACTION²

This section will analyze the way in which Russia uses its virtual monopoly in supplying oil and gas, in an attempt to politically dominate Europe. While focus has been placed on troop movements on the border of NATO/Russian spheres of influence, this book concentrates on political economy. The continuing conflict in Ukraine has proven to be a source of

Table 6.1 Percentage of countries' dependence for Russian energy (Factbox Reuters 2014)

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Percentage of Russian dependence (approximations) (%)</i>
Bulgaria	90
Czech Republic	66
Hungary	80
Lithuania	100
Poland	90
Slovakia	100
Slovenia	100

instability. Ukraine voiced its concern over Russia shutting off its gas taps and pipelines to Ukraine and the other countries of Europe. If this threat proves true, it would come as a response to growing European Union opposition against Russia due to its annexation of Ukrainian Crimea and continued Russian interferences in breakaway parts of eastern Ukraine. Many members of the European Union are dependent on Russia for much of their gas (Friar 2014). Table 6.1 illustrates this dependence.

There are many more indices to study these countries' dependence on Russia such as in terms of exports and finance. Reliance of this magnitude creates a tenuous situation within this political context. However, energy dependence in this magnitude also presents enormous difficulty for these countries as the biting cold of the fall and winter months are approaching. If Russia does act in this manner, there is the threat of humanitarian disaster. The threat is real as it would not be the first time Russia demonstrated its power in such a manner. In June 2014, Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine. The reason was that Ukraine failed to pay its gas bill of \$4.5 billion. However, this occurred within the context of the current conflict. Such acts would not just hurt Ukraine; it would hurt the European Union as pipelines from Russia feed into Ukraine and divert into other countries (Friar 2014).

Further, it must be noted that 2014 was not the first time Russia halted gas deliveries to other states as a show of force. In 2010, Lithuanian gas supplies fell drastically after a conflict over payment between Russia and Belarus led to Russia cutting gas supplies by 60 percent (BBC NEWS 2010). There have been other occasions as well; a list of some instances are illustrated in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Cases Russian pipeline disputes (Factbox Reuters 2012)

<i>Country(ies) affected</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Summary</i>
Ukraine	January 2006	Moscow halts supply of gas due to pricing dispute with Ukraine
Ukraine	March 2008	Pricing dispute with Moscow results in a halving of gas supply
Ukraine/EU	January 2009	Pricing dispute with Moscow results in complete stoppage, including Europe
Ukraine	April 2010	New pricing deal: lower price in exchange for extended naval base lease in Ukrainian Black Sea
Belarus	January 2010	Month-long quarrel results in negotiation
Belarus/EU	June 2010	Moscow cuts supply by 15 percent due to debt; EU supplies threatened
Belarus	November 2011	100 percent ownership of Belarussian pipeline in exchange for 40 percent price cut and \$10 billion for nuclear plant

Such action given dependence on Russia calls for drastic diversification of energy sources. The challenge for policymakers is the avoidance of civilian suffering and death from freezing (most of the above events take place in winter months). Interestingly, analysts are already drawing such conclusions: that coal and its use could be a viable alternative to Russian confrontational energy policy. Today, more than half of all coal exports from the United States go to Europe (Otani 2014). Given close ties to the United States, analysts expect coal exports to rise to fill energy gaps. Ernie Cecilia, chief investment officer at Bryn Mawr Trust stated in an interview with Reuters that “export demand will certainly increase, with the situation in Russia and Ukraine having a big impact on Europe with respect to natural gas” (Ibid.).

Threatened countries, and citizens of these countries with their energy supplies under threat, must begin investing in alternatives to oil and gas. In the short term, given the availability of coal as a cheap and versatile fuel source, states and peoples may begin a program of coal accumulation to prepare for the uncertain months ahead. Industries that run on oil and gas will ultimately be harmed as electricity is produced by these resources. Coal cannot hope to replace oil and gas unless the right infrastructure is installed. In the long term, these states must begin to invest in energy diversification. It is necessary that these be sustainable fuel sources: wind,

solar, and other forms of natural, readily available, or kinetic energies. Being 90–100 percent dependent on any power, especially a former oppressor, is both irresponsible and foolish.

To end this section, we must understand the context of this energy crisis. Relating back to the subject matter of this chapter, this conflict is simply a part of systemic transition as Russia is growing in power and seeking recognition as a great power. The United States, the European Union, and other major states must acknowledge Russia and respect its neoempire under construction. This means appeasing Russia, allowing the aggressor to gain territory and influence in its desired areas, even at the expense of other states. This may staunch President Putin's appetite for power and it may not. Russia may not cease its desire to expand, but for the sake of peace in Ukraine, a compromise must be found. As Mearsheimer argues "appeasement accomplishes this end ... by allowing the appeaser to demonstrate its good intentions and by shifting the military balance in the appeased state's favor, thus making it less vulnerable and more secure, and ultimately less aggressive" (Mearsheimer 2001, 163).

While the sanctions by the United States and the European Union against Russia target specific people, Russia's weaponization of energy actions target the people of Europe. Russian action of this sort does nothing but degrade the soft power of Russia, ruining its reputation in the world and reducing Russian economic growth during global recovery. In this light, European states must adopt drastic and unorthodox measures in the short term (stockpiling coal) and engage in pragmatic energy development and diversification in the long term, especially of the clean and renewable variety. Countries of Europe which depend on Russia for fuel must begin to diversify, and do so quickly.

The world is entering multipolarity as emerging powers respond with their own neoempire. Status quo powers must begin to expect and adapt to such change rather than set or normalize standards of behavior as demonstrated by Germany in the European Union. The conflict for neoempire in the Ukraine and wider Europe is only the beginning. Hence, I recommend that Western powers and their policymakers must now begin to recognize certain spheres of influence of BRICS countries. The West must begin to seriously compete for the affections of weak states and other middle powers; they must make it easier to acquire loans and produce clean energy more affordably, more reliably, and therefore more attractively than coal. The Eurasian Union is a far better supranational body because it is flexible and less demanding; the same goes for Chinese-led

banking institutions as explored in the previous chapter. European powers must back-off from their demands and rather use their economic power and soft power as a means to influence no matter the costs. The only way to fight the seduction of the Eurasian Union and Russia is the through these mechanisms lest weaker states bandwagon with Russia in full force. For instance, Greece may very well leave the European Union and sell themselves to Russia. Russia may then build military bases in Greece to further consolidate their neoempire, their power and position against Europe and the United States.

Another danger is the seduction of cheaper sources of energy for Europe. Once alternatives are provided to developing states as a feasible alternative to coal through a “carrot and stick,” soft power approach, then the West can expect to curb, not only coal use, but the political influence of BRICS countries. The benefits will be priceless and may include energy independence, clean air, the stabilization of states’ economies through the balance of payments, and a reduction of Russian ability to use oil and gas as a geopolitical weapon. The world will indeed be a more stable place to live.

CONCLUSION

The foreign policies of the European Union and the Eurasian Union are grounded in mutual disrespect for one another’s sphere of control. Conflicts over Ukraine may potentially spill over into war as either side continues to rattle sabers on their NATO-Russian border. While all of this could have been avoided by understanding Russian security needs, nothing can be done now to reverse events. Hillary Clinton, the 2016 democratic nominee for president, once said that Putin had no soul. Such disrespect for a world leader is ultimately foolish as it sends a destructive message. During the presidential debates, she often touted a need for a no-fly zone in Syria. Syria is the location for a number of Russian bases as well as a base of operation against Islamic State in the defense of Bashar al-Assad regime. A no-fly zone would force a war between the United States and Russia as the latter would not suffer itself to be dictated by anyone. Many often speculate about who would win in such a war. I would imagine China as any war between Russia and the United States would be long and drawn-out. By understanding Russian need for prestige in its protection of its neoempire (Russian bases in Syria may be used in a war with Europe), the United States can act in a more rational manner. Russia

and the United States could instead cooperate on containing Islamic State. Such a project, that is having a common enemy, may be able to socialize these two actors into peaceful settlement. Any policy grounded in anything less than respect can only be considered shortsighted and irresponsible. This of course requires mutual respect among great powers. However, given the cognitive identity of great powers, and zero-sum prestige, mutual respect is difficult to achieve.

The next section of this book will discuss in greater detail the psychopathic aspect of international politics. War, death, and destruction seem increasingly likely given neoempire's struggle for prestige, an altogether psychopathic enterprise. War in this day and age cannot be explained solely by any theory without a discussion on the cognitive identity of great powers as prestige seekers. I hope to highlight this fact next in preparation for this book's normative prescription: the creation of a global forum for forgiveness and reconciliation.

NOTES

1. The following section incorporates the following articles which have been published in the cited locations. Permission has been granted: Kassab, Hanna Samir 2015 "Fault of their own: Grexit, Russia and the EU" in International Digest, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/03/05/fault-of-their-own-grexit-russia-and-the-eu/> and Kassab, Hanna Samir 2015 "Freedom under pressure. Armenia and Ukraine in the new global system" in The Lithuanian Tribune, <http://en.delfi.lt/opinion/opinion-freedom-under-pressure-armenia-and-ukraine-in-the-new-global-system.d?id=67066492>
2. Permission to reprint granted: "Energy and Systemic Change: The Rising Power of Coal" as it appears in *The Impact of Emerging Economies on Global Energy and the Environment: Challenges Ahead*, Bruce Bagley, Hanna Samir Kassab and Dina Moulioukova (eds), Lexington Books in this book.

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Cognitive Theory

Part III is dedicated to cognitive analysis. Chapter 7 gives further significance to the concept of neoempire by focusing on the psyche of the individual. States trapped by the structure of psychopathy normalize and institutionalize war and exploitation. War is mass murder to satisfy a state's need to kill and neutralize enemies. It is a psychopathic act driven by a kill or be killed understanding of the international system. Such egoism is a form of narcissism on a grand scale.

Chapter 8 explores two options: war or peace. States within the system have two choices given systemic change: war or peace. If states are psychopaths and inclined to go to war, then systemic war may be a future outcome. The second option, peace, necessitates action from the grassroots. Historically, states as led by elites have been unsuccessful in securing world peace. This chapter proposes human development over wasteful, psychopathic prestige-seeking behavior. Such focus may promote peace. The chapter will also investigate the concept of forgiveness as a productive part of systemic practice. The conclusion delves further into the importance of theory building, specifically eclectic theoretical approaches of international relations.

States As Psychopaths; Theorists As Psychoanalysts: The Reason for War

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters conceptualize the international system as constructed by neoempires developed by great powers and their need for prestige. Great powers behave in such a manner because of the egoist nature of states. States lack the ability to consider the long-term ramification of actions done to their benefit at the expense of others. This is altogether evil. Hannah Arendt defines evil as the inability to “to think from the standpoint of someone else” (Arendt 2006, 49). According to classical realist theory, human nature is evil which causes states to be evil. States have the inability to not only consider even the existence of another state but kill in the pursuit their own security, power, and prestige, freely operating in anarchy. It is thus acceptable and even necessary for states to kill. As a result, domination, through either war or economic relations, is both acceptable and natural within the state system: “war is nothing but the continuation of political relations by other means” (Clausewitz in Carr 1978, 109); “war made the state and the state made war” (Tilly 1975, 42). Might makes right and the weak suffer what they must; these are eternal lessons passed along since Thucydides. If states are made up of individuals (see social theories of international politics: constructivism), then we must come to terms with the murders they commit. They are killers most efficient for two reasons: (1) their ability to organize the resources of neoempire to kill and exploit, keeping weak states weak; and (2) their ability to get away with mass murder and exploitation.

States are serial killers and psychopaths who murder for a variety of reasons: for survival, paranoia, for prestige of neoempire, and for pleasure. Michael Stone, a psychiatrist, created a methodology for understanding and explaining the many types of serial killers based on their action and the degrees of evil killers embrace (Stone 2009, 24). Stone devised a way of measuring evil based on ranked order known through degrees of human suffering inflicted upon a victim. Some serial killers are “more evil” than others and must be treated and discussed in fundamentally different ways. By asking a series of questions and meeting certain criteria, people who commit murder on a large scale, more than three victims, can be ranked in terms of social deviance. Killing is socially unacceptable to society at large and murder en masse is further outside of acceptable behavior. States, however, escape such judgments. States have legitimized war and humanity perceives it as just a part of life. States have made rules of war called international law that regulates it. However, international law simultaneously systematizes the conduct of war and legitimizes mass murder. Just as long as states commit murder, we find it acceptable. Of course, there are limits to how a state can kill and how many people can be killed. There must be justification for such action.

Laying out the assumptions, this chapter assumes states as individuals. Many theories already do this: classical realism and its supposition of human nature as the guiding principle of state behavior and constructivism, with postulation that states can be socialized as people. As a result, we can begin to understand the evilness that defines their action within a societal context, that is, within the domestic realm. I posit that scholars must extrapolate from Stone’s work and apply it to states especially in their ambition toward neoempire. Like Stone, we must ask questions regarding a country’s egoist foreign policy (Keohane 2005) and reasons for inflicting violence upon others for the purpose of self-preservation and prestige. This is similar to the action of serial killers because they meet their own self-satisfaction. Once the answers are tallied, we can have a better understanding of a country’s future intent, that is, whether or not a state is on a warpath and for what reason. Similar to that of psychoanalysis methodology and serial killers, Stone’s categories will help us better understand a state’s motive and drive, as multiple variables exist. These variables play a significant role in shaping the perception of the actors involved. More importantly, in terms of self-reflexivity, the scholar must also begin to question what they think is most relevant to the subject and why the person is convinced of such explanatory relevance.

THE STATE AS THE SUBJECT/PATIENT

The state is defined traditionally as the sole holder of the “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 2004, 33). Violence intends to control or defend a certain geographical territory from outside forces. Concentrating power in a centralized government is essential for security both within the state and outside.

Realism, a theory of international relations, boasts of a proud, timeless history going back centuries. They often speak of Thucydides and harken back to a grand tradition isolating power politics as the main mover of international politics. They tend to focus, especially with regard to discussions of human nature, on the contributions of Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. For these authors, human beings are inherently wicked creatures. In this regard, man must be made, or forced under the threat of punishment, to behave well. The statesman, the prince or the Leviathan, is held above the law to guarantee security and stability. Ethics are different for him because he defends the law and peace. If he must kill to defend these values then so be it; and it is good and right for him to do so.

In the instance of *The Prince*, Machiavelli offers up principles of statesmanship that every good leader must follow to survive. War and the constant study and preparation for conflict are the ultimate deciders of survival and longevity of the ruler and the state. Machiavelli writes: “A prince must therefore have no other thought or objective, nor dedicate himself to any other art, but that of war with its rules and disciplines ... it is such a powerful art that it will maintain the position of one who is born a prince ... princes who give more thought to luxury than to arms often lose their principality” (Machiavelli 2007, 56). Holding on to power in this respect is considered both virtuous and ethical; whatever must be done to accomplish this end is proper and good. The prince will be judged on whether he is able to hold on to his territory; and he must do what it takes to accomplish this goal even if it means using violence: “For there are cases in which people might think a certain path is valorous, but following it would be the prince’s ruin, while there are also cases in which a certain way might seem evil, but following it will result in the prince’s safety and well-being” (Ibid., 60). Thus, ethics is subordinate to politics, security, and the stability of the state.

Hobbes sees the benefit of a supreme ruler as a guarantor of stability and security. The Leviathan, the great biblical beast, must be free to act to ensure stability, even if it means using violence. The Leviathan orders

stability through absolute rule as a way to neutralize man's absolute freedom. The social contract agreed upon by all citizens of a certain territory is one that surrenders such freedom: "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all actions in like manner" (Hobbes 2005, 233). Without this, human kind is locked into an environment of anarchy: war of all against all. Hence, without the Leviathan, we live in lack, as Hobbes states:

whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same of consequent to the time wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently, no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor the use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is the worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. (Hobbes 2005, 226)

E.H. Carr in *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939* posits a theory of international relations citing Machiavelli's work. Like Machiavelli, ethics are secondary to politics especially in international politics as an ordering principle (Carr 1978, 226). He remembers Clausewitz's maxim: "war is nothing but the continuation of political relations by other means" (Quoted in Carr 1978, 109). Therefore, international politics, like all politics, is fundamentally a struggle for power and influence against competing states. States are considered units of power and, for Carr, any future international order will be tied to power. Carr understands power to be threefold: military, economic, and power over opinion (Ibid., 108). Power is politics and politics is the struggle for power.

The question for Carr then becomes: how do we know that a revisionist power, in Carr's case Germany, will cease its expansionary activities with appeasement? Carr and realists simply do not know. As mentioned, Carr recommends appeasement, that is, the recognition of a state's power and influence. As a result, Nazi Germany would gain power without war. Political change becomes necessary to the extent that there is a grievance

(Ibid., 209). Simultaneously, states must use their power to defend their own interests in their realms of interest. Hence, instead of recommending the full defense of the international order's status quo, Carr recommends a mix of force and appeasement that illustrates to aggressors that it would be in the best interest not to go to war. While this does make sense, the war of 1939 broke the policy of appeasement.

Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* takes on a similar approach to the study of international relations. He builds on the propositions of Carr by arguing against the relevance of ethics and morals as a guiding principle of state behavior. He dichotomizes the two reigning schools of thought. These two schools exist in stark contrast to one another. The first, liberalism, "believes" the world to be populated by people guided by "essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature" while the second, realism, sees humans as "imperfect" (Morgenthau 2005, 3). States are made up of such actors who, according to universal philosophic discourse, operate in such a way. These units pursue interests in terms of power autonomously; they will do what they must to gain power at the expense of others. Going against such endeavors, especially using moral principles, will only result in failure. The only way to constrain state behavior is to go pursue some balancing of interests as reflected in the balance of power system of governance. This way is proven to work as empirical evidence shows; the balance of power becomes a pragmatic solution to correct state behavior and to stop war (Ibid., 3).

From Machiavelli and Hobbes to modern-day theorists like Carr and Morgenthau, the world has come to accept the violence done by states to ensure stability for one group at the expense of others. War is a natural part of the international order and preparation for war is integral to insure that if war does happen, then the state will survive through power. Murder, while illegal within the state, is a necessary part of ensuring survival. These theorists develop a theory of realism as a critique of the idealism or morality of that day. Ethics within the state is very different from the warlike international realm. Politics between states is one in which power plays the role of an arbiter. Inside the state, there is order; outside the state, disorder (Walker 1990). There is therefore an institutionalized and acceptable double standard that many realists point to as necessary for security.

REALISTS AS PSYCHOANALYSTS AND DIAGNOSING STATES

Carr and Morgenthau are quintessential realists who purportedly illustrate the way in which states behave. Their study, based on the observation of facts, creates an understanding of this behavior based on repeated action. By isolating repeated action, we begin to see patterns, which then define not only the behavior of the state but the nature of the state itself. According to such literature, the state is indeed a belligerent unit of power that bases its needs before others. In doing so, the state becomes powerful in a perceived zero-sum world. The state is diagnosed as not only an egoist but also a narcissist, an actor that satisfies itself regardless of the damage to others. In this light, the theorist of international relations, therefore, is more than a theorist. Carr and Morgenthau are psychoanalysts. Rather than diagnosing an individual, the state is the object of analysis and study. Carr and Morgenthau are selected for this study because they are among the first to try to explain, or diagnose, the state and any resulting behavior. Both have similar ends in that they try to first explain the inner-workings of international politics, especially the reasons for war. They then provide recommendations to correct war. These authors fit well in the posited notion that theorists are psychoanalysts and the states are their subjects.

The job of a psychoanalyst is to provide to the subject an understanding of certain patterns of its behavior. Psychoanalysis presents a “general theory of individual behavior and experience ... enriched by the study of the biological and social sciences, group behavior, history, philosophy, arts and literature” (About Psychoanalysis, apsa.org). This field tries to gather a comprehensive understanding of the motivations of human beings, especially the factors outside of a person’s awareness, their unconscious thoughts, feelings, and experiences. There is a recognition that the past fundamentally shapes the present (Ibid.). The purpose of knowing this is to not simply explain outcomes, but to provide corrective treatment that would help to prevent the repetition of any self-destructive behavior that may result from past experience.

The purpose of psychoanalysis, then, is to become aware of the factors that shape human behavior. Emotions are the core of the structure of human behavior, and, as a result, determine human action and the reality constructed by human emotions (Kassab and Wu 2014). The seemingly natural is deconstructed to determine what in fact constitutes as abnormal behavior (About Psychoanalysis, apsa.org). Negative feelings such as anxiety, sexual impotence, and depression subtract from an individual’s ability to enjoy life (Ibid.). These feelings must be understood by the individual

who may need assistance given the seemingly unconscious manner that defines and constructs a person's reality.

To truly see the theorist as a psychoanalyst, we must first look at the purpose of the theorist as the theorist sees himself. Carr makes his purpose clear prior to launching into his main arguments as mentioned prior. Like any good psychoanalyst, Carr studies the behavior of his patient: the state and the individuals who make up that state. He writes: "Our first business, it will be said, is to collect, classify and analyze our facts and draw our inferences; and we shall then be ready to investigate the purpose to which our facts and our deductions can be put" (Carr 1978, 2). Like a scientist, Carr intends to deduce the nature of the state based on its behavior: "In the physical sciences, the distinction between the investigation of facts and the purpose to which the facts are to be put is not theoretically valid, but is constantly observed in practice" (Ibid., 3).

Morgenthau operates in similar fashion. He begins his book with the proposition that all theory must be "empirical and pragmatic" (Morgenthau 2005, 3). Like Carr, Morgenthau agrees that Realism must adhere to facts, that is, an explanation of how the world is. By knowing these facts, or laws as he puts it, then one can truly solve the issues at hand. The first two of his "Six Principles of Realism" provide for us a coherent understanding of his purpose. The first: "political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature" (Ibid., 4). He continues "In order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives" (Ibid.). Thus, the correct diagnosis of the state as led by the statesman must first be investigated. The natural laws which dictate such behavior must be acknowledged before any attempt at providing recommendations be attempted. This feeds into his second principles: "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power" (Ibid., 5). By underscoring the fact that states, through the statesman, act to gain power, as proven by the historical record, Morgenthau hopes to explain the occurrence of war. Hence, like Carr, the purpose of any theorist is to pinpoint these natural laws to first understand how states' behavior and their motivations unveil the unconscious laws embedded in the psyche of human nature that cause destructive behavior: in this case, war. Like the psychoanalyst, they study the statesman in great detail: "we look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversations with other statesman; we read and anticipate his very thoughts" (Ibid.).

More appropriate for our image of the theorist as the psychoanalyst is the second part of the theorist's function: the provision of recommendations to assist in the actor's ailment. Carr prescribes a degree of utopianism to curb the destructive behavior of states. To simply diagnose a state of its psychosis is not enough for both the theorist and the psychoanalyst. In this sense, they can be thought of similar given their aims and goals. The duty of any doctor—whether psychoanalyst, medical, or even the doctor of philosophy—is to somehow neutralize suffering. While a medical doctor or a psychoanalyst may prescribe medication, the international relations theorist, or political scientist, hopes to imagine ways to correct or curtail the destructive behavior of states using existing data. To isolate causality simply repeats what we already know. To figure out a pragmatic solution based on reality is the purpose of scholarship and the *raison d'être* of the theorists. Carr himself argues this: "The characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility" (Carr 1978, 12).

In a similar sense, Morgenthau wants to understand the way states behave to properly diagnose and treat any destructive behavior. He posits that the purpose of theory is to bring "order and meaning to a mass of phenomena" (Morgenthau 2005, 3). The purpose of all theory is to make sense of phenomena through explanation or through an investigation of an event and its sociopolitical-economic context. This holds true for Morgenthau as well. By understanding the motivations of states, we can better predict their behavior; and, in prediction, the statesman can prepare foreign policy to either facilitate or constrain the behavior. The diagnosis of states and their inherent behavior can then result in the administering of policy that would help provide international peace and stability. For Morgenthau, states must work within the environment and practice of states and their pursuit of power. To prevent war, states must balance against one another. Peace will only come through the maintenance of a power equilibrium that inhibits war. As Morgenthau states: "the aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power" (Ibid., 183). This system "signifies stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces" (Ibid., 184). He argues that empirically, the balance of power is a force for good in that it constrains destructive behavior of states and a cornucopia of other actors as described in other fields of study: physics, biology, sociology, and the study of domestic politics. By having checks and balances within a political system, the behavior of actors is constrained to the point that they are made to behave

in accordance to the benefit of the entire political system. In this regard: “the independence of the respective nations can rest on no other foundation than the power of each individual nation to prevent the power of the other nations from encroaching upon its freedom” (Ibid., 188).

In essence, theorists and policymakers must use the tools that construct the international system to ensure peace and stability in the world. In his own words: “to improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them” (Morgenthau 2005, 3). These theorists so want to see a peaceful world and so advise states to adopt productive policies, refraining from engaging in self-destructive strategies like knocking the balance of power from its equilibrium, seeking to overthrow an existing system, or not allowing a growing power to operate in its own sphere of influence.

EXAMINING SELF-DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR: THE SECURITY DILEMMA

In order to fully understand this, we must first understand what it meant by self-destructive behavior. States engage in self-destructive behavior in different ways, whether it is through pollution, failing to invest in human resources through the provision of health care and education, and so forth. Matters such as these hurt the state, but not to the extent as demonstrated by the quintessential realist problem: the security dilemma. The security dilemma is at the core of the state’s self-destructive behavior. Security in the international system is profoundly a zero-sum game. The security dilemma describes increased feelings of insecurity associated with increases in military expenditures across and among states (Ullman 1983, 140). If a state feels insecure, it may increase its military capabilities to feel more secure. However, such action will lead to similar responses and may even lead to increased tensions, balancing, and, at times, war. Such action is therefore irrational and counterintuitive, self-destructive if you will. Yet, states will continue to be self-destructive instead of practicing restraint or even use diplomacy to solve their issues. Hence, such action cannot be considered truly rational; it is self-destructive and counterproductive behavior reproduced by psychopathic actors. It is the duty of the theorist, if he/she is truly dedicated to the subject of International Relations, to first expose and describe this behavior and then investigate ways to curtail such destructive and seemingly inevitable outcomes. Like a psychoanalyst, the realist theorist tries to break the cycle using power; the cause of war is seen as the only pragmatic prescription.

Power in Carr's eyes is not simply an instrument of security, but is an end in itself (Carr 1978, 111). If power is an end in itself, then we can logically assume that states will forever compete for such power. In this sense, states can never quench their thirst for power; such hunger may never be satisfied. Power, under these terms and conditions, is a drug that states are addicted to, not only to survive but to dominate and escape domination. Power is sexy; it is seductive; it is the feature of world politics not because it is natural feature, but because states are psychopaths.

Morgenthau also expects states to behave in like manner. States define their interests in terms of power and will do so to dominate man: "power is control of man over man" (Morgenthau 2005, 11). States therefore go about their daily business with this end in mind, even as they try to overthrow other's control upon them. Morgenthau argues that states behave like this and resistance to such mechanics is dangerous to the survival of the unit of power. States must balance against themselves to ensure some kind of uneasy stability. For Morgenthau, the diagnosis then is that states and men are immoral creatures with no sense of right or wrong. The prescription: state behavior movement must be constrained for their own good, like a man in a straitjacket. States, in this sense, are psychopaths and must be made to behave well. Power is not simply the problem; it is the medication.

DETERMINING CRITERIA FOR THE PSYCHOPATHIC STATE: INCORPORATING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MICHAEL STONE

The study of psychoanalysis in international relations is hardly limited to esoteric Lacanian endeavors. Many scholars hailing from a variety of other theories make good use of psychoanalytical factors. Morgenthau writes that international politics is ultimately psychological question and greatly appreciates its impact given the main object of his study: the statesman (Jacobsen 2013, 394). To justify studying the state as a psychopath, one must remember that "psychoanalysts regard human emotional life as a continuum in which we share every feeling and impulse ... violent emotions are universal" (Ibid., 395). Since scholars of international relations assume that the images (the individual, the state, and the structure, see Waltz 1959) of study are interrelated as a social theory, we must conclude that all state action is human action and behavior. States are made up of individuals and individuals drive the state. States can also be studied as individuals.¹

The purpose of this section is to identify the extent to which states can be considered psychopaths by judging crimes that range of murder, rape, and other forms of destruction. While states are abstract entities, their crimes hurt real people. Recalling the starting point of International Relations as a field of inquiry that defines human nature and, as a result, the policies of states that come to define the practice of international relations, we have come to the conclusion that human nature is indeed evil. Nevertheless, what is evil? How can we measure evil? More importantly, what crimes are the most evil of all?

To answer these highly complex and inevitably controversial questions, we must go deeper into the study of psychoanalysis. For this, I must borrow from the field. Stone in *The Anatomy of Evil* (2009) dives boldly into this discussion. Evil, as can be expected, is quite the difficult concept to truly define. He provides a working definition: “evil is a word we apply to situations or specific acts that have the quality of horrifying or shocking whoever witnesses or hears about these acts ... evil, in other words, is reserved for acts that are breathtakingly awful: breathtaking, because the degree of violence, suffering, or humiliation imposed so greatly exceeds what would be needed to express one’s irritation or animosity or to subdue the victim” (Stone 2009, 21). From this definition, and a basic knowledge of history, it is then reasonable to conclude that states do evil. States use “violence, suffering, or humiliation” that is “imposed so greatly exceeds what would be needed to express one’s irritation or animosity or to subdue the victim” (Ibid.). The wholesale and senseless slaughter of men in World War I, the Holocaust, the wars in Yugoslavia, the ethnic cleansing of Armenians, the crimes against humanity and torture committed by the Japanese during World War II, and the crimes of any Cold War and post-Cold War conflict bring up images of evil both shock and terrify. Man does evil and, as a result, the state does evil.

What is worse is that man is evil, through the state, operates legitimately and unbridled; evil, through the state, makes it increasingly efficient through his organization toward neoempire. The state is a centralized and bureaucratic unit of government that supposedly combines the mentalities of people with a common purpose. Through this centralized and bureaucratic government, man can command with great efficiency the scarce resources to accumulate power at the expense of the globe and its inhabitants. With no constraint, the state can act on its more primal human instincts. The nature of man explained by Hobbes in *The Leviathan* combines the forces of free men into a confederacy, taking war of all against all into the external realm where no leviathan exists, with ruthless efficiency.

Table 7.1 Categories of murder as degrees of evil (in Stone 2009, 33)

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>
Justified homicide, not evil at all	Jealousy driven and other impulsive murders	Murder to get someone out of the way, without planning	Murder to get someone out of the way, malice aforethought	Serial murder, repetitive vicious acts, but without torture	Serial murder with torture the main goal

We must admit that due to organization of capabilities, states commit the gravest of atrocities; they have economies of scale to commit these offenses. One of these is murder and the human race has come to understand that murder is indeed evil. War, at its core, is mass murder which makes the state a serial killer. States are evil but there are degrees of evil. A state may kill in self-defense because it is perceived as a vital part of survival. States may also kill due to paranoia, delusions of grandeur, for prestige, and, in some cases, for sadistic reasons. Stone designates a variety of reasons individuals kill for, allocating categories in terms of demarcated motivations (Table 7.1).

Here, Stone compartmentalizes the highly complex subject of murder into a scale of evil that is used to describe the evil behavior of the state in all its self-destruction. States also hold similar patterns of evil behavior in terms of murder.

Out of these categories, Stone offers up a checklist consisting of 22 items dealing with the personality and behaviors of people. Each item reflects a given behavior or personality trait of a murderer. The murderer in question gets a score on whether or not the behavior applies “considerably, only a little or not at all ... 2, 1, or zero” (Ibid., 45–46). I will build on this checklist by altering the object from the human to the state. By doing so, we can see how evil a state really is given the amount of points tallied by the end of the investigation (Ibid.). The maximum score is 40 and any state that scores over 30 can be considered a psychopath. Lower scores, ranging from the teens to the twenties, establish a state to have psychopathic traits (Ibid.).² By doing this, we can better understand and even predict the future of states based on their historic behavior in the past and today (Table 7.2).

Stone created this scale based on biographies of serial killers like Ted Bundy and Richard Speck. These individuals did horrible things that shock

Table 7.2 Gradations of evil scale

Stone's gradations of evil scale for states

Killing in self-defense or justified homicide
 Category 1: Justifiable homicide

Impulsive murders in persons without psychopathic features
 Category 2: Jealous lovers, egocentric, immature people, committing crimes of passion
 Category 3: Willing companions of killers, impulse-ridden; some anti-social trait
 Category 4: Killing in self-defense, but extremely provocative toward the victim
 Category 5: Traumatized, desperate persons who kill relatives or others, yet have no remorse
 Category 6: Impetuous, hotheaded murderers, yet without marked psychopathic traits

Persons with few or no psychopathic traits: murders of a more severe type
 Category 7: Highly narcissistic persons, some with a psychotic core, who murder loved ones
 Category 8: Murders sparked by smoldering rage—resulting sometimes in mass murder

Psychopathic features marked: murders show malice afterthought
 Category 9: Jealous lovers with strong psychopathic traits or full-blown psychopathy
 Category 10: Killers of people “in the way” (including witnesses); extreme egocentricity
 Category 11: Fully psychopathic killers of people “in the way”
 Category 12: Power-hungry psychopaths who murder when “cornered”
 Category 13: Inadequate, rageful psychopaths; some committing multiple murders
 Category 14: Ruthlessly self-centered psychopathic schemers

Spree or multiple murders: psychopathy is apparent
 Category 15: Psychopathic, cold-blooded, spree or multiple murders
 Category 16: Psychopathic persons committing multiple vicious acts (including murder)

Serial killers, torturers, and sadists
 Category 17: Sexually perverse serial killers: killing is to hide evidence: no torture
 Category 18: Torture-murderers, though the torture is not prolonged
 Category 19: Psychopaths driven to terrorism, subjugation, rape, and so on, short of murder
 Category 20: Torture-murderers but in persons with distinct psychosis (such as schizophrenia)
 Category 21: Psychopaths committing extreme torture but not known to have killed
 Category 22: Psychopathic torture-murderers with torture as their primary motive.
 The motive need not always be sexual

and terrify (Ibid., 48). Numbers 1–8 really do not signify psychopathy even though the traits are certainly psychopathic. Numbers 9–22 are fundamentally psychotic and must be treated as such. The fact remains however that these are degrees of evil still horrible and are unacceptable in normal society.

The purpose now becomes translating this list from the individual citizen or person to incorporate the state. States do evil as Morgenthau and Carr remark. In order to supplant evil, one must become evil; one must evil. This is as Machiavelli, Carr, and Morgenthau call working with the forces of international politics, not against them.

STATES AS THE PSYCHOPATH OR HAVING PSYCHOTIC TRAITS

In this section, I will illustrate how states can be considered being psychopaths or having psychotic traits using Stone's Gradations of Evil Scale. By using Stone's contributions as a measuring stick, I will discuss specific instances of a specific state's behavior to explain and even predict outcomes. Each category can be taken in the form of a yes/no question, for instance, category 1: do states kill in self-defense? Yes, many states do indeed kill in self-defense and this is deemed a justified homicide by the state. Justifiable homicides may be political assassination of terrorist organizers without due process, for example. The world sees this as just because the evil act is ridding the world of a greater evil.

Categories 2 through 6 discuss murders without psychopathic features. Within these categories, we must consider whether or not states are jealous, egotistical, companions of killers, killing in self-defense as traumatized, desperate persons, and hotheaded persons? There are many states such as this but we can look at Israel and the United States as examples. The United States and Israel, like many states, are egotistical because within their national identity is narcissism. Both countries think they are the chosen people of God as presented in the essence of Zionism and Manifest Destiny.

Zionism is the ideology that advocates the creation and defense of a Jewish state as a solution to anti-Semitism (Cleveland 2004, 242). Those outside of this identity would ultimately be designated as a threat. Enemies would be met by extreme acts of violence as demonstrated by the foreign policy of Ben-Gurionism created by Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Israel, because it is surrounded by enemies, must counter every act of enemy aggression with an overwhelming, disproportionate response beyond what was inflicted (Ibid., 354). These policies must be done to preserve the Jewish nation and the land designated by God to his chosen people.

Manifest Destiny is "the belief that it was the destiny of the United States to spread across the continent ... [it] embodies the conviction that

Americans had a higher purpose to serve in the world than others. Theirs was not only a special privilege, but also a special charge: to protect liberty and to promote freedom” (Wittkopf et al. 2003, 28). The imperial drive to expand the United States was ultimately rooted in this notion of duty; it was their right to take the sovereign lands of others because Americans deserved it and would use it more efficiently (Nugent 2008, 234). More so, it was divine destiny, a “God sanctioned mission to fulfill” and this “formed a significant element in American Romantic thought” (Johannsen 1997, 10).

These ideologies, Zionism and Manifest Destiny, give prominence and supremacy to one set of people, or states, over all others. Both states, United States and Israel, like many, believe that their security is more important than others’, and that their position is of greater importance than anyone’s leading them to kill even with remorse: regret for collateral damage, for example. They are willing companions of killers even as they seek to protect themselves from killers: President Roosevelt’s famous quote in his defense of a right-wing authoritarian dictator: “Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.” The Israelis made league with Egypt and many other allies considered cruel such as extreme-right Maronite Christians. Further, the United States and Israel are both effectively traumatized: Israel during the holocaust and the United States in Pearl Harbor and 9/11. The traumatic events of 9/11 and the paranoia that followed created the Bush doctrine and its many adventures. Bush doctrine can best be described by its use of the power and force of the United States in order to remake the world as a preventative approach (Jervis 2005, 82). These policies are continued by President Barack Obama in an effort for such tragedies to never again happen. The United States and Israel can indeed be considered within this category.

To follow, categories 7 and 8 look at the extreme types of violence stemming from 1 to 6. The United States and Israel both follow in extreme circumstances: the United States in Iraq and its resulting casualties and mass murder; Israel in the wake of any attack by terrorist group and the overwhelming response as dictated by the still alive doctrine of Ben-Gurionism (Cleveland 2004, 354). So while the United States was warned to refrain from searching for monsters, it sees them all around the world and Israel will forever exist in a hostile neighborhood, perpetually resisting being pushed into the sea.

While categories 1–8 seem defensive, categories 9–16 seem to be done with a particular goal in mind: prestige, satisfaction, or glory. Countries

seeking these goals are fundamental aggressors or revisionists, seeking to expand territory or overturn the international political system using violence. Countries that are guilty of this are of a more psychotic variety. Current-day Russia and the warring countries of Yugoslavia come to mind. Both countries have killed because they feel threatened in a bogus sense. For Stone, this psychopathy is self-evident as the resulting violence shocked the world.

The war in Yugoslavia and the battle for land and prestige culminated in what is considered the worst case of violence since the end of World War II (Kaufman 2001, 165). Serbian leaders created a narrative of persecution which organized people to engage in morally reprehensible actions such as rape, mass murder even up to the point of attempted genocide (Ibid.). In an effort to gain territory and dominance of territories considered historically Serbian, Serbian nationalist president Slobodan Milosevic launched a campaign to convince other Serbians of the hostile nature of other Yugoslavian nations. These narratives helped solidify a cult of victimization that created a fear of extinction. This fear assisted in the organization of violence that aimed not only at survival but at dominance (Ibid.).

Considering Russia and its recent anachronistic nineteenth-century behavior can only be considered exceptionally egocentric. Russian leadership now seems to be rekindling its past glories, seeking territory it once held as its own: the Ukraine. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia indeed felt vulnerable against the growing power and influence of the United States and NATO in its traditional sphere of influence (Smith 2010, 99). The United States, given its own psychotic need for prestige (to be recognized as the leader of the so-called free world after the Cold War regardless of the cost to others; truly psychotic behavior itself), expanded beyond its need to remain secure. Given the current resurgence of Russian power, the country is now commencing a strategy of regaining its lost territory and influence from the United States. The zero-sum fight for prestige given the narcissist attitude of great powers has resulted in the conflict over Ukraine. Starting with Georgia in 2008, Crimea, and working its way westward, one can make the argument that perceived Russian inadequacy is driving its sudden expansion (Kassab 2014b, opencanada.com). For Russia to gain in this light, other countries must also lose. Currently, Ukraine is the main victim in this ordeal as its autonomy and sovereignty is impaired by a former colonial power. The resulting conflict has killed a great deal of people on both sides. This then coincides with category 11: that people

will be killed if they just so happen to be in the way. Category 14, the ruthless, self-centered schemer, that is Putin, ultimately engages in planned murder sprees to make Russia a few kilometers larger. Russia then kills for prestige given Putin's century desire for recognition after political collapse of the Soviet Union.

Russia and the countries of Yugoslavia, especially Serbia, have killed for the sake of prestige. Other powers, the United States and Israel, may just be paranoid powers seeking to correct every flaw in the system so they can feel safe. They kill for survival, or imagined survival. States do indeed kill to satisfy primal instinct to survive. There are other, more psychotic states, the ultimate mass murderers, the torturers, and the sadists. While the United States has been found guilty of torture and also ranks among such categories, but it is the states that torture for torture's sake is what is interesting for this section. Nazi Germany and the Islamic State are in fact actors who kill for pleasure and for purification.

Nazi Germany was a country led by the quintessential psychopath: Adolf Hitler. Under his command, many millions died to satisfy his desire to remain "pure" as a race. Terrorism, rape, and other forms of subjugation have been committed in the name of Nazism on people considered subhuman. Never before has the world seen destruction of this scale, culminating with the holocaust and the deaths of millions of people. Narcissism was the driving force that drove Hitler's Germany to war, and ultimately to its final defeat.³ Much of the policies initiated by Nazi Germany reflect categories 17–22. Considering category 17, many people of Germany were unaware of the horrors of the holocaust. German soldiers were shocked and appalled when they found out about concentration camps. Bodies were burnt 24 hours a day, 7 days a week as a way to dispose off the evidence.

Nazi Germany, and all its criminal activities, can be considered ultimately as a political doctrine with a primary motive of death and destruction for its own sake. This is described in Stone's category 22 and personified in the doctrine of Hitler. In Hitler's own words "If men wish to live, then they are forced to kill others. The entire struggle for survival is a conquest of the means of existence which in turn results in the elimination of others from these same sources of subsistence" (Hitler in Cohen 1967, 440). Survival of one is tied up in the death of another; and this is supposedly reflected in the natural world. Such a deviant understanding of human existence speaks volumes to the psychopathic Nazi ideal: "one is either the hammer or the anvil" (Ibid.).

Irrational, suicidal policies, like fighting to the last man, would bring the people of Germany to their knees and effectively split the country in half for over a half century. Another poignant example of suicidal tendencies and that of the psychopathic state is Islamic State. The Islamic State, a new phenomenon altogether, can also be understood in a similar way to Nazi Germany. First, it must be noted that the Islamic State desires something ultimately unachievable: the establishment of a caliphate across the Middle East and Africa (BBC News, September 26, 2014). To achieve this, members have engaged in mass killings in the most abhorrent of ways: decapitation, crucifixions, and mass shootings, sometimes televising the act for all to see. It is assumed that 8 million people are ruled under their strict interpretation of Sharia law. Women are made to wear veils and non-Muslims forced to covert (Ibid.). The brutality far surpasses that of al-Qaeda, forcing its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to speak out against it (Ibid.).

Integrally, the brutality does nothing except create insecurity and urgency in the region. It has led to coordinated action between the United States and Gulf Arab states; even ones who supported Islamic State initially (Qatar and Saudi Arabia, for example). Such airstrikes are degrading the capabilities of the Islamic State, which will soon eradicate it as a political force (BBC News September 23, 2014). The acts of the Islamic State can only be considered suicidal due to its fundamental psychopathic practices of violence and murder for its own sake.

From these discussions, one can now determine the goal of each category of state: the United States and Israel are irrational actors due to trauma; they want to survive given past experiences and may kill to prevent any further trauma. Serbia and Russia (and as said the United States) want prestige and build back an imaginary past; and they will kill for it. Lastly, states like Nazi Germany and Islamic State want to kill for the sake of killing. Their survival depends on these acts of violence and death.

By making these statements, we can explain state behavior, we can understand the context of their behavior, and, as a result, we can predict the future behavior of these actors. Armed with this knowledge, one can successfully provide policy recommendations in terms of power that would essentially medicate self-destructive behavior. For the United States and Israel, it becomes necessary to understand their respective trauma. Diplomacy here is essential to calm the concerns of these two actors. Between Russia and the United States and the warring states of Yugoslavia, only power can curb their appetite for prestige. To stop their expansion, recognition of greatness becomes key. Once countries like this are recognized for being great, their

desire to become great would effectively be quelled. For full-on psychopathic countries like Nazi Germany and Islamic State, war may seem like the only cure to their psychosis. Containment, a form of imprisonment, is a more feasible option if available given that violence only exacerbates the problem due to the spirit of martyrdom shared by both.

From these explanations, predictions, and prescriptions, therefore, we see the power of psychoanalysis. The theorist is the psychoanalyst of the state and the state system. These powerful explanations must be introduced in wider scholarship. The arguments made here simply want to begin a conversation with the rest of the field. As a first attempt, this chapter hopes to achieve the posited endeavor.

CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Since the beginning of recorded history, the world has seen 14,400 wars resulting in 3.5 billion deaths (Sheehan 2014, 216). In World War II, we saw large, industrialized, and methodical murder on an even more massive scale; such crimes culminated in the holocaust. The horrors of war are obvious; but in this respect, scholars have no answer to such murder. States, with their leaders, tend to justify these moves and citizens accept these justifications as natural and necessary for the ordering, the safety, and the security of our natural world. Our human experience throughout written history is that of war, not peace. The individual and the state must be constrained by evil forces and, somewhere in this mix, good will supposedly find a way. Peace is the absence of war and war is the tragedy that defines our existence; war is all we can offer ourselves.

This chapter hopes to start a new conversation about international relations from a psychoanalyst's perspective. We must come to see international relations theorists not simply as people who theorize, intending to explain, or understand world politics and outcomes through hypotheses generation and testing. Rather, the theorist is a psychoanalyst whose first priority is to underscore a "causal sequence of events" (Carr 1978, 11). This is to first diagnose the behavior of the state, to identify its unhealthy behavior. This is not a complex idea. States failed to cooperate in environmental matters, a subject of great importance to all people living on planet Earth. Kyoto was created to reduce carbon emissions through the human economic culture of capitalism. However, certain states refused to ratify the treaty because it was said to be against their economic interests.

This is at its core self-destructive behavior; and actors are determined to continue such behavior until such a time when the pains can no longer be tolerated. Kenneth Waltz, along these lines, refers to such an occurrence as the “tyranny of small decisions” borrowing from economics.

Alfred E. Khan posited that “if one hundred consumers choose option x, and this causes the market to make decision X ... it is not necessarily true that those consumers would have voted for such an outcome” (1968, 523). Waltz explains this as the fundamental natural fact that pushes states to negate cooperation. The international system is the cause for all the insanity, the predominance of short-term thinking all result in insecurity which then dictates international political outcomes. The psychosis is systematic and seemingly inescapable. Such a statement is not satisfactory for any doctor, however.

The second priority of the psychoanalyst is to then seek to change such inevitabilities. While liberals try to institutionalize good behavior through rules and governance, Carr and other realists see that states, given their environment, can only be constrained through power. Power is then the medication to a state’s dangerous addiction to power. Balancing and diplomacy, which recognize the power of others, limit the state in its own self-destructive acquisition, leading ultimately to the establishment of power optimization.

What must be recognized, therefore, is first how states behave and the formulation of their motivation; correcting state behavior through pragmatism. In Carr’s own words:

The complete realist, unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of the possibility of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality which he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. (Ibid., 12)

In all, Carr sees Political Science as a “science not only of what is, but of what ought to be” (Ibid., 5). By first diagnosing the condition that plagues the state system, then certain policies can be prescribed to actors to ensure that self-destructive behavior (the search for unlimited power) can be curtailed. In the next chapter, I shall consider the options neoempires now have: war or peace. Option one is surely expensive in blood and treasure while option two has promise. The choice seems obvious in that peace is the best for humankind. However, if elites make this choice, as they have done historically, war may be selected. This was the case in World War I, when elite made the choice to go to war for their own purposes of prestige and forestalling social change. The second option may be preferred if we switch ontology: non-elites, or the masses, may be able to make a better decision

given they have everything to lose. Exploring neo-Gramscian and working-class perspectives may thus shed some light on the future of the world. People must see themselves as one and the same in an effort to bring peace and stability to the world. Change may be possible but it will require serious work on the part of regular people. The key to better alternatives lay with democratic institutions, forums of dialogue, the protection of free speech, and organization with people residing across neoempires. In essence, then, the world is offered a wonderful opportunity to work toward a brighter future.

NOTES

1. This is similar to Alexander Wendt's understanding of the state and the social construction of state behavior (Wendt 1992).
2. I will not be doing this exercise in this chapter due to lack of space, but I will be illustrating particular categories given particular state behavior.
3. Of all the evil that man has done, nothing compares to the invention of the nuclear weapon and the theory of deterrence. According to scholars and policymakers, deterrence must be established to ensure international stability through Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) (Schelling 1960, 207). Deterrence then illustrates that peace can exist if the costs of conflict can be kept higher than its benefits. Weapons and battle tactics that make defense cheaper and offense more expensive is essential to achieve stability. As a result, it is believed that the Cold War never went hot because nuclear weapons helped achieve some uneasy equilibrium. Due to a state's second strike capability, one state can successfully *deter* the other from launching first (Waltz 1989, 626). Any action then becomes irrational as it would be suicide. Thus, once all parties understand that the costs of war far outweighs any potential benefit, then state action would thus be successfully constrained. As human beings, we have nothing better to offer ourselves than deterrence theory. It is the peace we deserve due to our evil nature.

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Two Choices: War or Peace

Neoempires are driven by elites seeking wealth, power, and prestige. If elite-led states are powerful through such behavior, then their multinational corporations will have access to markets and cheap resources. A network of elites helps reproduce world-systems dependency in this regard to enhance or protect a beneficiary's neoempire. As a result, elite-driven psychopathic foreign policy has led humanity down the path to war numerous times. In order to alter our course, the economy must work for the benefit of the masses, not for elites. To escape, the economy must be embedded, or reembedded, into society. It is thus the responsibility of the people of neoempires to pressure governments not to go to war with one another. We must not repeat the mistakes of World War I, when war was seen as a tool to forestall revolution. Rather, people must come together to ensure wealth is translated into human development rather than military and other forms of control. By analyzing the domestic mechanisms that make foreign policy, I will derive an internal argument for neoempire. Elite interests are the main reason for the constant need to acquire further wealth and power. Economies must continue to expand economically or else elites may face political instability. The masses pressure elites to deliver to them the good life. As of the time of writing, populist leaders may be the driving force of international outcomes. The pressure to deliver constant economic growth and expansion may serve to be the next source of international conflict. The pressure to expand may draw states into war. Borrowing from Lenin then, I will apply this book's

theoretical contribution to try to predict the next hegemonic war. I shall also discuss opportunities for weaker states in this system even as they exist within a systems exploitative environment.

MONEY IS POWER: THE PRODUCTION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS¹

Zakaria posits “state centered realism predicts that nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power” (Zakaria 1998, 38). Since states get their power from wealth, wealth and its systemic distribution become the center of analysis. He quotes Skocpol: “a state’s means of raising and deploying financial resources tells us more than could any other single factor about its existing (and immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state organizations, to employ personnel [etc.,]” (in Zakaria 1998, 93). To understand the links between a state’s economic capacity and its military power, we must begin to speculate on the human actors who create policy. If we see wealth accumulation as a driving factor of neoempire, then we must assume that the owners of capital play an important role. We will explore these links in this section.

To begin, Buzan (1991) makes the connection between individuals and states. He states: *national security* suggests that the nation, defined as “a large group of people sharing the same cultural, and possibly the same racial heritage ... living in one area” is for the purpose of protecting people (45). While this is indeed interesting, it is not altogether accurate as he omits the economic aspect. We must then insert into the equation property rights as well: “if the purpose of the state is to protect and express a cultural group [and its property rights], then life and culture [and property rights] must come high on the list of national security priorities” (Ibid.).

Recent books show the association of elitism and policy outcomes that serve select few at the expense of the masses (Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Hasen 2016; Mayer 2016; Stiglitz 2013). Stiglitz’s study illustrates the dangers of a widening gap between rich and poor in the fermentation of policies that inhibit social cohesion and stability. Elites have the economic clout to lobby the government to serve their interests. According to Stiglitz’s study (2013), \$3.2 billion was spend on lobbying (Ibid., 119). Such activities have led to the hallowing out of the middle class as policies do not cater to them but to those who are already well off. It is not too outrageous to

assume that lobby groups also construct foreign policy. From this, we can conclude that states are unitary actors as elites may be able to influence foreign policy more than other groups like the working poor. This is becoming increasingly true in the United States. This has been found true historically. Stephen Kinzer in his book *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* illustrates the power of the elite in foreign policy making. A total of 14 cases show that:

Throughout the twentieth century and into the beginning of the twenty-first, the United States repeatedly used its military power, and that of its clandestine services, to overthrow governments that have refused to protect American interests. Each time, it cloaked intervention in the rhetoric of national security and liberation. In most cases, however, it acted mainly for economic reasons—specifically to establish, promote, and defend the right of Americans to do business around the world without interference. (Kinzer 2006, 3)

American neoempire then and now remains a project for the sake of power and wealth accumulation. Elites who benefit from powerful states' expansionary policies run great powers like the United States. To make this argument, I borrow from Lenin and his understanding of imperialism but I try to update it given the theoretical innovations of the past 100 years. Written in 1916, Lenin's *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, shows that uninhibited capitalist expansion leads to war. The creation of neoempire may in fact lead to a balance, but only for so long. Capitalism requires continual enlargement. Spreading out in such a manner is not a sum-sum game, but rather will lead to uneven growth; and unevenness may lead to war at the systemic level if certain conditions prevail. These results are not only destructive but are self-destructive to warring states. Such outcomes are almost crazy as great powers send people out to kill and to be killed. Such massive body count, including civilian casualties, is completely irrational and psychopathic as the states' sole purpose is for the protection of people. Systemic war in today's context will destroy much of our natural world. The United States indeed has the most to lose as it risks its own system to defend its prestige. To recall, systems occur when "actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests ... the particular interests that are most favored by these social arrangements tend to reflect the relative power of the actors involved" (Gilpin 1981, 90). As seen in Chaps. 5 and 6, status quo powers set up international systems, or the more accurate concept neoempire, for their own benefit. Such systems

have embedded within them symptoms of psychopathy through systems of economic exploitation and murder.

Dangerous as well is as semi-peripheral countries join the core, they may themselves set up competing neoempire. Emerging powers may eventually seek to displace the very neoempire that brought them into the core. Systemic change may be due to anger and frustration of blocked progress or in fear of being attacked first. Robert Gilpin notes that “the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interests ... the political system will be changed in ways that will reflect these underlying shifts in interests and power” (Gilpin 1981, 10). Gilpin plots out the circumstances that lead to systemic war. He posits:

1. An international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system.
2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e. if there is an expected net gain).
3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
4. Once the equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established. (Gilpin 1981, 10–11)

Gilpin’s writing here does not answer the question of what variable or condition influences a violent or peaceful outcome. Building on Gilpin, I argue that anger and frustration facilitates the decision to go to war to push through systemic change. Empirically, decisions to go to war are made by elites who benefit from an expanding economic performance frustrated with politics getting in the way. Normatively, I do believe that if domestic political systems were truly pluralist, the masses across states would have more say and, as a result, outcomes could be different. This of course is very difficult to prove. In World War I, working classes went willingly to slaughter; they would rather kill one another than be defeated by

an outside enemy. In World War II, Nazi Germany blamed the French and British for their strife. The anger of the masses was used to justify war to redeem past wrongs. There is an important element of consent in this equation.

War is altogether acceptable and normalized form of projecting power and protecting influence. Reproduced patterns of acceptable behavior are products of a political system shaped by power in three forms:

1. Coercion
2. Money
3. Consent (ideology)

Governments as well as opinion leaders (members of the media, think tanks, etc.) produce these behaviors through a collaboration of these three forms of power. The process of systemic creation is solidified through public policy and the passing of laws which are difficult to overturn. This structure is then reproduced until it is termed “common sense” or as a part of national identity. This forms the source of Gramscian hegemonic cultural manufacture (Uluorta 2008). Money and American political culture help pressure the government to adopt laws that serve the interests of the wealthy. This is domestically systemic and cannot be changed easily as Uluorta points out: “consent is both constituted and re-constituted by the enveloping acceptance of the subject and subsequent sedimentation of an assortment of values, worldviews and morals that are supportive of established power relations” (2008, 246).

As a consequence, the options presented here may not be as clear-cut as I would like. However, I find it as an important way to introduce the discussion of systemic war. Systemic war is the struggle to create the system and violence is the way to achieve that prominent position. The following pages will explore factors, which may influence war and peace centering around the group of people making the said decision.

OPTION 1: SYSTEMIC CHANGE THROUGH WAR AND VIOLENCE

This book speculates on the future cause of war given trends in global politics and repeated patterns of behavior. Gilpin in many of his mentioned works throughout this book argues that war may become a viable option once marginal benefits exceed marginal costs. I agree, but a more

interesting answer could very well be found in the nature of humankind. Given the pressure to grow economically, a state may seek to go to war to protect economic gains, but what about the pressure itself? To understand this pressure, we must turn to the very idea of violence as a seductive option. Extending this, I hope to make a link between the act of violent communication and fear, and the resolution of that fear through further violence. Breaking the cycle of violence means that one or both sides must somehow stop responding to attack, turning the other cheek in effect. This is easier said than done due to internal pressure among groups being attacked. The following will illustrate these arguments further as we enter a period of international systemic change and domestic instability with the rise of the extreme right in the United States and Europe.

One of the most convincing arguments that elites prefer war to peace is President Dwight Eisenhower's Military Industrial Complex warning. In his own words:

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions...This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience...In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. (Eisenhower 1960, 1035)

Eisenhower sees two ways in which military industries may shape policy. First, the wealthier members of the industry become, the more influence they will have in government. Second, when states possess enormous arms industries, they may decide to use them instead of other less violent options, especially if they have more influence in government. Bad policies may result consequently.

As an answer, Eisenhower encourages the masses to provide a check on this behavior: "We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes...Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together" (Ibid.). Thus, from this

starting point, humanity has two choices: peace and war. The choice will be determined by whoever has power: the elite or the masses. Elites may lead the state to war because they have most to gain from foreign adventures such as remaking the international political order. Masses have the most to lose as they will be conscripted, suffer higher taxes, and so forth. Outcomes are thus determined by decision-makers.

World politics is defined by negative feelings toward other people. Nationalist, populist governments are elected to power because of their ability to latch on and manipulate these emotions. Gagnon argues that “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context in which ethnicity is the only political relevant identity...[B]y constructing individual interest in terms of threat to the group, endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize their population against the status quo” (1993, 132). This argument does neglect the fact that such hatred existed in the first place and simply was not dealt with adequately. Stuart Kaufman understands that people with already existing, deep and existential hatred can be easily manipulated. He cites a Serbian woman who expresses fear of Bosnian Muslims: “Do you see that field ... the Jihad is supposed to begin there ... my two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape” (cited in Kaufman 2001, 3). Kaufman analyzes the statement: “The fear expressed by this woman is manifest, but even taking that fear into account, such ridiculous accusations—a town in Bosnia to be the new Mecca?—can only be believed by someone already deeply prejudiced” (Ibid.). I would suppose that the thoughts of this woman is much more than hatred or prejudice, but maybe is rooted in a traumatic experience. Trauma is “an injury or disease caused by fright, helplessness or loss” (Levine 2010 in Fierke 2015, 134). Trauma is about memory and the transfer of a painful past to the present. It also involved collective memory that goes beyond the individual to incorporate one’s relationship with others (Ibid., 142). More important, trauma is “related to the understanding of the toxic effect of fear and violence on the individual mind. It denotes both a loss of agency and the relationship to a destructive social world even while constituting the individual as isolated” (Ibid., 143). The 9/11 incident posed a difficult question of how to make the United States safe. I believe decision-makers were not rational actors. They had to deal with the trauma of failing the American people. Vengeance and revenge are very natural human feelings

that have existed for centuries.² Although we have achieved much as a global society, we are still animals deep inside.

Violence and war as an institution was a common feature of human history since recorded history. World War I was only 100 years ago. In 1914, people rallied to war. Humans have evolved over millions of years. Humanity has been killing one another over interests during that time. It is not difficult to see that what we have achieved since 1945 can be easily ripped asunder. We would like to believe that:

Modern war is so expensive that we feel trade to be a better avenue to plunder; but modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war's irrationality and horror is of no effect on him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the *strong* life; it is life *in extremis*; war taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us. (James 1910, constitution.org)

Moreover, it is important to realize that while there was no direct conflict between great powers and their neoempires, during the post-war period, much of the Third World was locked in struggle, only worsened by American and Soviet involvement. As a result, we can explain away the false peace and sense of international security most liberals posit as our political reality. It is thus only a matter of time; if things continue as they are, there will be another grand conflict for world domination. As William James remarks: "History is a bath of blood" (1910, constitution.org).

Mahailo Markovic suggests the following: "violence has always been present in human history both in individual behavior and in social life, in both the 'legitimate' form [i.e., violence legally employed by the state] and as a means to promote social change" (Markovic 1974, 234). Understanding the contributions of Lenin, given the pressure to grow economically, war with states leading competing neoempires may be an inevitability. Do human beings find pleasure in violence? We should not of course. We are told that violence solves nothing. However, even the taboo of violence adds to its seduction. It conveys the idea that if violence was indeed used, the person may have deserved it. As described earlier, taboo against war and violence is a relatively new idea. The beginning of World War I was celebrated by young and old. The war would teach the enemy a lesson either side hurried to give. It was only after the war that people began to understand the severity of its destruction. There would be another war twenty years after followed by Cold War

divisions. The Cold War was a limited but global war as great powers saw the utility of outsourcing the conflict to third parties. Hatred and anger for the enemy manifested in violence.

What exactly is violence? What emotion is tied to violence and what emotion follows the act of violence? Further, if violence is a part of communication, what message does it hope to send? These are all questions integral to this book. To begin, Aristotle in *Rhetoric* argues that violence begins with anger. He defines anger as “an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends” (Book II, Chap. 2). To Aristotle, the idea of responding to an initial provocation is interesting as it points toward some form of communication. What is further illuminating is the emotion attached to the anger response. According to Aristotle, “It must always be attended by a certain pleasure—that which arises from the expectation of revenge” (Ibid.). Acting in anger is accompanied by an expectation of pleasure or relief. This is of extreme importance if we are to understand the reason for war. When state or terrorist threats arise, our inclination is to eradicate that fear by force quickly. Killing, the ultimate act of violence, solves our anger and fear. There is no time for reflection as to why the threat exists in the first place. There is little inclination toward any investigation into why Russia, for instance, lay claim to the Crimea or why the Islamic State exists at all. What does matter is the eradication of threats to one’s own life. The act of killing supposedly relieves anger, calms the spirit. This is ultimately the myth of violence as believed by people the world over. Violence is always answered by further, and even worse forms of, violence.

Violence is a shared feature of human personality and it demonstrates itself physically unlike other emotions. Seneca builds on Aristotle by generalizing anger as a common feature of human nature as well as understanding violent manifestations of anger. He writes: “no plague has cost the human race more dear: you will see slaughterings and poisonings, accusations and counter-accusations, sackings of cities, ruin of whole peoples, the persons of princes sold into slavery by auction, torches applied to roofs, and fires not merely confined to city walls but making whole tracts of country flow with hostile flames” (Seneca Sophia Project, 2). He does, however, contend with whether resulting violence holds pleasure. He wisely explains that committing violent acts is a source of shame. There is no honor in hurting others even to payback wrongdoing. Those seeking revenge get no respite and receives no glory (Ibid., 26). However, Seneca

seems to ignore the idea that violence is still sought after as a solace for anger. He encourages readers to “refrain from anger” but we still get angry from time to time. If we get really angry, there will be urges to do violence. Seneca’s normative arguments do little to describe the world as it was even then. He ignores how anger, and the expectation of pleasure, gives way to further destruction.

There is a wide literature that describes the dynamic of anger, violence, and pleasure. It seems like a natural and necessary part of our existence. From Aquinas’ Just War proposition to Fascism, Sorel’s myth of action, Jefferson’s need to water tree of freedom with the blood of patriots, Fanon’s use of violence as the ultimate equalizer, the destruction of monuments by Islamic State, Marxist communist revolution, Lockean understandings of the social contract, and the use of violence in revolutionary society, violence is seen as a necessary tool to accomplish goals. Many argue that violence has its usefulness establishing national security, social order, and property rights. Also, the state itself has been studied for many years as the “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 2004, 33). Hobbes and Locke understand the utility of violence and the threat of its use on social stability. For Hobbes, the sovereign may use violence to ensure stability while, for Locke, violence has a place in overthrowing an unjust sovereign. Even before, Thomas Aquinas conceptualizes the practice of war as being “just” under certain circumstances. Also, less obvious, violence is needed to defend peaceful society: invent a normative infrastructure from which all can behave a certain way. Inventing or shaping expected behavior is important for stability and predictability but such is an act of violence. Violence may also be seen as an expression of virtue. The 2003 invasion of Iraq can be understood in such terms. The United States wanted to make the world a better place by eradicating evil as an act of godliness. Justice as violence through punishment, social justice as an attempt to shape norms and acceptable behaviors make them into democracies whether they like it or not: act of violent catharsis to get back and also make sure it never happens again.

Violence as a tool will continue to be used because it helps people heal from trauma, makes them feel safe, and altogether assists in healing. Violence hopes to deal a blow to pay people back for violence. This is a regrettable part of our reality. Philosophers have long discussed the seduction of violence, a common tool of persuasion and catharsis for advocates of the left and the right.

If we are to understand this competition between neoempires and the prospect of world war, we must understand violence as a vehicle of communication. When we study violence, we usually focus on the impact on people and the environment. For instance, we study the effects of gang violence, the conduct of war, structural violence, and human insecurity. These are valid modes of inquiry. However, if we consider violence as a communicative device, we come to the realization that the reasons for violence are being ignored. This section will argue the following: that violence is a tool to forcefully communicate a desire to gain control, defend self-esteem, and, ultimately, demonstrate freedom. Violence remains a regrettable course of action, but that says little to the study of its use.

To understand violence, we must first appreciate the assumption that violence is a communicative device. Defined, communication “is held to involve some kind of transfer of information from one person to another or to a group of people” (Berger 1995, 10). Communication suggests a number of steps and participants: “a sender, a channel, a message, a receiver, a relationship between the sender and the receiver, an effect, a context in which communication occurs and a range of things to which ‘messages’ refer ... communication can be any or all of the following: an action on others; an interaction with others and a reaction to others” (McQuail and Windahl 1993, 5). The Lasswell Formula (1948) elegantly demonstrates the process of interaction illustrating the act of communicating and its effects (Fig. 8.1).

While Lasswell omits the element of feedback, it is assumed that communication will ultimately end in response. The Lasswell formula remains a simple method of introducing the concept of communication to a wider audience (McQuail and Windahl 1993, 15). Communication is thus the engagement of two or more people involving either or both verbal or




Fig. 8.1 The Lasswell formula (1948) taken from <http://communicationtheory.org/lasswells-model/>

non-verbal means. It relies on someone who is speaking and another who is listening under a preconceived context and association. Ultimately, the person doing the speaking hopes to convey an idea to the listener to either understand or act.

Sometimes, the speaker wishes to convince the receiver of a matter of importance but words will not suffice. In some instances, not all, violence becomes the answer for many feeling words are simply not enough. Most of our understanding of violence discusses impact, the final stage of the Lasswell formula. In doing so, we are forgoing explanations for the first step, the communicator. Why did the communicator choose violence? Is the communicator psychotic? Is the person afraid or disenfranchised? Why are some forms of, like war, violence acceptable to some, while others, terrorist attack and mass shootings, unacceptable? The victims are the same, after all. Looking at war, students of Politics see war as a rational course of action in anarchy.

There are many reasons for choosing violence. Essentially, violence transmits the desire to be heard. Violence sends a particular brutal message (states bomb enemies to “send a message”) to a recipient, an unfortunate target. However, like the Lasswell formula, many doing the violence tend to forget that there will eventually be feedback in a similar form: violence can only be answered with violence if a concerted effort to turn the other cheek is not made.

Terrorism can be considered a communicative device as irrational and futile as it may seem to those living in the West. It is obvious that when Islamic State, Hamas, or Hezbollah carries out an attack, there will be corresponding reprisals or replies by those on the receiving end of an attack. Israel, for instance, responds in kind to terrorist attack by closing checkpoints or bulldozing houses. This hopes to send a message that there would be costs to carrying out such attacks. Of course, these messages only bolster the resolve of those carrying out terrorist attacks in the first place. Violence is thus a never-ending conversation that answers blood for blood.

Of course, it is obvious that violence achieves nothing except reproduce and reinforce destructive standards of behavior. If violence is indeed a conversation, then replies will ultimately be violent. A counterforce will be present to absorb, repel, and destroy the initial force. It is a tale as old as time. No one really wants to negotiate with an enemy; one has to be coerced into doing so. No person, no problem is a much easier and satisfying outcome; or at least this is the perception. In the long term this really

does fail to achieve security or satisfaction as history shows “violence is apt, over the long term, to create more problems than it solves” (Brown 1975, ix).

Can violent acts be justified? In my view, violence is counterproductive. It may seem like a cathartic act in anger. However, after the deed has been done, the doer of violence must prepare for violent reactions, maybe even worse, that was originally done. Those seeking revenge may seek to visit a double helping of punishment. The example of the Islamic State poses an interesting conundrum. Islamic State has committed gross acts of barbaric violence that has shocked groups like al-Qaeda. They conduct mass executions in the form of beheading and setting persons on fire. They attacked civilians in democratic countries. Many in France and the United States respond in counterproductive ways: first by bombing the Islamic State in their controlled areas in Iraq and Syria, and second by advocating anti-democratic procedures in their democratic countries. Specifically, Donald Trump and Ted Cruz have argued for the surveillance of Muslim neighborhoods, called for a temporary ban on Muslims as well as calls to kill the families of terrorists and turn the desert into glass. The attitude can be summed up in terms of domination and utter control to “bomb the shit out of ’em. I would just bomb those sucks...I’d blow up the pipes ... there would be nothing left and you know what? You’ll get Exxon to come in there and in two months, you ever see how good these guys are ... and I’ll rig it and take the oil” (Donald Trump 2015, [youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=...)). If these policy suggestions were put into place, there would be no difference between the US government and Islamic State. Democracies must behave within the law as outlined by their constitutions. Arbitrary execution without due process and targeting people due to religion or ethnicity go against the constitution.

The case against violence is a difficult one to make. As an institution, violence organizes people under banners as they kill and mainly to preserve their own security. Violence is essentially about control of others. Power, whether military, economic, psychological, or legal, is about controlling the behavior of people to ensure one’s own survival. It limits the options of sovereignty of states and the human spirit. Perceptions of the intentions of state and non-state actors encourage specific actions including violence. As a result, we know peace as the absence of war. Deterrence and containment are the main mechanisms to establishing an absence of war. Other forms of violence, like structural violence, must be addressed so that the world could achieve its potential free of violence.

In periods such as the one we currently live in, systemic transition, much a hope may not be readily available. Given the dynamic of Gilpinian systemic change, and the anger brought on by the reluctance to cooperate, the likelihood of world war increases. Diffusing the situation then must be an important option during times of instability and uncertainty. One way to diffuse a situation, albeit unattractive, is appeasement.

Appeasement can be defined as “the policy of reducing tensions with one’s adversary by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement” (Rock 2000, 12). This means that appeasement is an attempt by states to diffuse a situation through negotiation and peaceful settlement. Paul Kennedy interprets the Munich appeasement through this lens: “the policy of settling international ... quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly very dangerous” (Kennedy 1983, 16). Appeasement may successfully delay a war so that states may prepare. The strategy may also be successful in socializing actors into friends; but I do wonder if this is indeed possible. Such a move would require courage in the face of criticism. Regardless, in times of transition, appeasement may be completely rational for the status quo to adopt. There is nothing wrongheaded about making space for a rising power and allowing it to operate within a sphere of interest. I have always been, and always will be, fundamentally against war until the last option is exhausted. Hence, Prime Minister Chamberlain was correct in his appeasement at Munich. Appeasement must be tried to show to the world that it was indeed attempted and the appetite for power was simply not sated. This will assist in identifying the “bad guy” and establishing moral superiority in any post-war environment. Appeasement does strengthen the resolve of aggressive states, but it absolutely must be done to further the aggressor/defender, good/evil dichotomy that we so often use to understand war and conflict. However, the problem is that appeasement means humiliation and weakness. It does nothing but cause more anger.

Moreover, the case for appeasement is perpetually linked to the Munich case which draws only one conclusion: that any attempt at appeasement will lead to war anyway. If states have exhausted all options, including appeasement, then war becomes a necessary tool to secure sovereignty and autonomy, survival, as independent political units. I propose the following strategy which uses the contemporary landscape. First, a state must effectively communicate that force, or counterforce, will be used. This can be

understood as a red line. Once the red line is drawn, this signals to an aggressor that there will be consequences if the red line is crossed. If the red line is not respected and no countermeasures are enacted, then the credibility of the state will be called into question.

If great powers seek prestige in anarchy, the likelihood of war remains. States have to work at keeping peace and work hard. States must maintain significant militaries to deter competitors, not to use them. However, given the very real issues at stake already discussed in previous chapters, there may come a time for war. This book hypothesized on the motivations for striking first from a materialist perspective, that is, defending economic growth and, as a result, the pursuit of power. Under what circumstances should states use violence to accomplish their goals of security and survival? Before I answer this question, states must never use their militaries under these circumstances:

1. To secure access to resources irrelevant to important survival priorities
2. To defend economic growth
3. As a portrayal of dominance
4. To export democracy
5. To remake the international system

Going to war under these circumstances is shortsighted and unattainable given the long-term material cost and cost to reputation. The argument is therefore the following: states can only go to war if all other options have been completely exhausted; including appeasement. Once appeasement fails, the next step is to attack and do so quickly. The first target must be communication. This can be done without military force but through a massive cyber-attack. A cyber-attack aiming at the major communication networks and electricity grids would destabilize the enemy state without bombing. Such a move would be cheap and effective for one main reason: the leadership may not be able to effectively communicate with troops on the ground. Armies would be left without their orders and most likely, movement would cease. Importantly as well is that the more technical weaponry would be rendered ineffective. This will include missile defense technology as well as other aircraft, tanks, and so on. At this point, the state can explore at least three options. Nothing more would be done if the other side withdraws. Otherwise, military strikes would begin that would strive to create distance between the two warring states. Targeting

supply chains, infrastructure, energy and ammunition deposits, transport systems will be vital. This can be accomplished using drones and may limit any civilian casualties.

A baiting strategy may be effective as well. The defending state can try to draw the aggressor into a fight it cannot win. There are three examples of this: Carthage and Rome in the Second Punic War, Napoleonic France and Imperial Russia and Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. A defending state may also bait an aggressor into a war with a third party. If the costs of continuing the campaign become more and more expensive, this may increase the likelihood of peace. The third option will aim at the vulnerabilities of an invading military by inviting overextension. Overextension presents an opportunity to the defender to make war incredibly expensive for the aggressor.

A defending state must also consider provoking invasion. Angering the enemy may cause irrational behavior that may benefit defending forces. Thus far, I have only discussed defending against an attacking state. A state should want to attack another state especially if other options are available. War is an expensive business so we must not consider it as an end in itself but as an extension of politics. International Relations as a field of study can itself be generalized as competition or conflict over interests. We sometimes get carried away by frustration if a power blocks our advancements or defense of interests. This is an altogether wrong approach which breeds hatred rather than respect. If we do not respect our enemies, competitors really, choosing to hate, it is easier to then demonize them and eventually go to war. This has been practiced since World War I. We tend to have no problem killing others for their difference. This begins when we lose respect for our competitors. If we do indeed to defend our interests, we must first respect our enemies. According to the *Long Telegram*, we must respect the power and prestige of our competitors. We must try to understand motivations and educating the public to understand the reality behind the situation rather than engage in negative propaganda wars and demonization. This is part of Kennan's message in the *Long Telegram*. He recommends the United States deal with Russia with respect, as an equal rather than direct confrontation. He states:

we must study it [the Soviet Union] with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and the same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual...We must see that our public is education to realities of Russian

situation...I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. (Kennan 1946, 10–11)

States will always be tempted to use their militaries to force particular outcomes. This is inevitable. When one has a hammer any problem becomes a nail. War may occur if evil prevails (more in following chapter). According to Hannah Arendt, evil can be thought of as the inability to “to think from the standpoint of someone else” (Arendt 2006, 49). Therefore, by not understanding the other, we condemn ourselves to violence. The following section promotes this idea of understanding and forgiveness of others in an attempt to forestall systemic war. Moving our object of study from the network of elites that manufacture neoempire and war to global mass movements searching for peace and human development, I will try to imagine the possibility of less violent outcomes.

OPTION 2: GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

I had an interesting trip to Britain in June 2016. I was there just in time for the BREXIT vote and, as I walked through the streets of London, I came upon a group of left-leaning activists. I took one of their pamphlets out of curiosity and to my surprise, they were for leaving the European Union. Their platform was simple: leaving the European Union would promote union strength and the overall bargaining strength of the working class. This seemed counterintuitive. I supposed leaving would drive wages down as demand for British-made goods would decline given ensuing socioeconomic uncertainty. Economics is not quite a science as it is an attempt at understanding the mechanics of prices and wages. Regardless, it occurred to me that maybe these leftists were trying to encourage an eventual crisis. In my mind, a leave vote would hurt the United Kingdom and may even facilitate the end of the United Kingdom and the European Union. Economic crisis is ultimately necessary to make the case for a more managed style of capitalism, maybe not full-on socialism but social democracy. Social movements from the left and the right are now declaring their objection to free and unfettered global economic markets given the human expense. Given the ontological construct of neoempire, the prospect of another systemic war is ever present.

The network of elites that seek wealth and prestige at the expense of the masses is major pillar of world politics. The center of such movement is the commodification of the material world specifically land and the individual. Polanyi argues that any attempts at commodification will have disastrous results leading to high costs for humanity:

in regard to labor, land ... such a postulate cannot be upheld. To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment indeed ... would result in the demolition of society ... robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. (Ibid., 76)

Seeing the destructive potential described here, it is the duty of persons worldwide to join and create a counter hegemonic movement loosely based on regulation, equity, and respect against the network of elites seeking their own ends. This should be done before another more powerful, more tyrannical force assumes the throne of world leadership. Immanuel Wallerstein points out:

We are in effect being called upon to construct our own utopias, not merely to dream about them. Something will be constructed. If we do not participate in the construction, others will determine it for us. (Wallerstein 1996, 106)

It is up to the global disenfranchised and intellectuals to forge together a movement that will enforce a world centered on the well-being of the individual over the state. This coalition would serve as the framework for establishing this new world order by decontextualizing the old order and forwarding a substitute. The movement's ideals will be based on the need for actors to come together and realize the unsustainable behavior of current practices, so that all can know that a whole new world is truly possible.

First of all, a counter hegemony is the formulation of alternate forms of state and society, taking into consideration those marginalized from current prevailing ruling institutions (Cox 1983, 162). This movement is developed by a "historical bloc" which is an association of progressive groups uniting to forward counter hegemonic ideals (Gill and Law 1988,

64). This cohesive grouping must be an open union based on objections to the status quo. Therefore, the counter hegemonic movement must associate and include a wide variety of anti-conservative groups: Marxists, environmentalists, feminists of all colors, people in the periphery, and disenfranchised conservatives. These groups must have one thing in common: the old order must be deposed to enforce political change. They must be wary of the transformismo threat. The transformismo is a political group bound by a broad collection of interests that support the current hegemony against the counter hegemony. It absorbs radical ideas and presents them as part of the traditional agenda (Cox 1983, 166). Gramsci saw the Italian Fascist party as the ultimate example. The Italian Fascist party took some socialist ideas and interwove them with a nationalist sentiment. Trump has done the same, taking anti-free trade ideas and rooting them into nationalist fervor. In order to counter this movement, Gramsci suggests a revolution, involving the reconstruction of the entire political order by organic intellectuals, aiming to erase the current hegemony (Ibid., 168).

The purpose of intellectuals, more specifically, organic intellectuals, is to develop, organize, and integrate those purposing the counter hegemonic movement. Organic intellectuals are those who purport long-term, structural change of sociopolitical organization (Ibid., 169). Constant interaction between these intellectuals and those involved in the coalition will ferment a tight bond that will stand against the transformismo's tide. Many nineteenth-century bourgeois intellectuals did this for their own interests which explains the current hegemony's ideals (Ibid.). This is a very crucial time for counter hegemonic ideas and responsibility for its proper representation falls upon these intellectuals. However, this is not the most important aspect of the new movement. This association should not ignore those most affected by the world's current condition.

The people on the periphery must be given a voice. They have the most to gain, as well as the most to lose at this most critical time. Samir Amin expounds on this point. He states very eloquently that "the world that was put in place beginning with 1492 remains ... a system based on capitalist exploitation and inequality of nations. The recognition ... constitutes the essential analytical precondition without which all the efforts toward a universal liberation of humanity will be in vain" (Amin 1992, 19). If, as Robert Cox points out, "capitalist hegemony is more consistent and embedded in the core countries than in the periphery" (in Gill and Law 1988, 78), intellectuals must become like microphones to the exploited,

giving them a voice. This method gives us insight to the most vulnerable, and by studying the most vulnerable we can create a more secure global society. This must become a new and popular idea and forms the core of our counter hegemonic movement.

The counter hegemony must deconstruct the very spirit of current hegemonic domination in order to reveal its failures and attract additional support. Many individuals who are involved in governments and global institutions, who understand the current hegemony's failure must come out of the woodwork and reveal the truth. They solidify the current hegemony with their silence. Martin Luther King Jr. forwards this ideal: "We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the vitriolic words and actions of the bad people, but for the appalling silence of the good people" (King 2005, 581). They must be convinced to follow the movement. Winning over moderate conservatives to the cause will give further credibility to the movement. For the collective counter hegemony to survive, open dialogue must be encouraged to delegitimize the declining hegemony.

Organic intellectuals must be able to infiltrate and deconstruct destructive sociopolitical practices and try to make a pragmatic and convincing case for serious change. This can be done only by scholarship, attacking the status quo using empirical data to reveal the rot. As Carol Cohn says: "The dominant voice of militarized masculinity and decontextualized rationality speaks so loudly ... it will remain difficult for any other voices to be heard ... until that voice is delegitimized" (Cohn 1987, 717). Destroying the hegemony must be done through enlightening discussion, illuminating the status quo's fallacies so all can be persuaded. If empirical research is understood as more than "that which can be observed," it would support critical theory and the new counter hegemonic movement (Maclean 1988, 309). As Karl Marx himself said "the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought" (quoted in *Ibid.*, 307). This will bring Marxism closer to the forefront of international relations (where it belongs) as a useful tool in establishing ideas of the counter hegemony.

Combining these factors, the counter hegemonic forces must unite into an unbreakable historical bloc and declare a war of position against the current hegemony (Cox 1983, 165). This war of position must be built within the current order. The formulation of new institutions, the promotion of dialogue between groups and the launching of deadly critiques against the dominant class will be the weapons of this movement. The countermovement will come to govern through gradual reform.

This should be done now, exploiting the current economic difficulty caused by the global network of elites. The world needs a new order based on social and economic stability embedded by the promotion of human development over extravagant prestige-seeking activity. In essence, we cannot continue to be strangled by an international system that predicts our own destruction. A paradigm shift must occur; power must be placed in humanity's hands and this process may begin with an individual's own choice to forgive.

THE POLITICS OF FORGIVENESS: A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILIATION

For some, forgiveness is the hardest thing to do. It feels so much better and simpler to wish death upon someone who has done you wrong. The same goes for getting back at someone and, in the case of war, killing as many of the enemy as possible. Writing on the eve of the 2016 election, I understand that many politicians seek to kill not only those labeled terrorist but their families as well. Not only is this a crowd pleaser but also, for many, the only solution to protect ourselves. The notion of forgetting 9/11 as Zehfuss (2003) argues is difficult for many. She argues that remembering 9/11 only reinforces a narrative of insecurity and leads to military involvement, repeating the 9/11 story elsewhere while simultaneously hiding United States' imperialist practices. The choices given in the previous chapter are difficult because it requires everyone to act against their emotion and thus against their "better" judgment. The desire for security and vengeance is an ever-present feature of our existence. However, forgiveness may help us move away from domination-seeking behavior to the recognition of other's spheres of influence.

Forgiveness can be understood in a variety of ways and remains a subject discussed around the world, among followers of different religions and followers: "Religious scholars of many faiths, philosophers, and more recently, psychologists, have grappled with the notion of forgiveness and have sought to delineate its boundaries" (American Psychological Association [APA] 2008). I am not going to go through religious texts. I am most interested in what the field of psychology has to say about the matter. The APA defines forgiveness as follows:

Forgiveness is a process (or the result of a process) that involves a change in emotion and attitude regarding an offender. Most scholars view this an

intentional and voluntary process, driven by a deliberate decision to forgive. This process results in decreased motivation to retaliate or maintain estrangement from an offender despite their actions, and requires letting go of negative emotions toward the offender. Theorists differ in the extent to which they believe forgiveness also implies replacing the negative emotions with positive attitudes including compassion and benevolence (8, 17, 23, 25, 26). In any event, forgiveness occurs with the victim's full recognition that he or she deserved better treatment. (Ibid.)

In many cases, people suffer from serious trauma which makes them easily manipulated by political leaders.

Trauma is a powerful force in world politics. Fierke argues that trauma may "lead to a consolidation of identity ... may harden the boundary separating that community from 'others' outside. In this respect, the traumatic experience constitutes a particular type of identity, that is, one that is aware of the disconnection from others, and, subsequently, fearful and hyper-vigilant for new threats" (Fierke 2015, 148). Being reminded of traumatic experiences in times of war and conflict traps people within a given time and space. People are locked into the horrible experience. Context is ignored and people measure acts in terms of that trauma. If this is so then people continue to exist inside their trauma and reproduce that trauma for themselves and others. In other words, within their trauma people act to reproduce their trauma. The person lives and relives the trauma and repeats it on others as circumstances permit. The world is left worse off. It is left to people to attempt to understand themselves and others (even those who did the persecuting) to break the cycle of traumatic violence. Having perpetrators and victims engaging in dialogue helps to accomplish this.

It takes considerable courage to go beyond one's traumatic experience. Healing depends on openly talking about trauma which may go against our better instincts. In the human mind, there exists a force called the ego-drive. This concept compels human behavior "toward self-preservation ... and group conformance, the development which is deeply rooted in biological constitution" (Hinsie and Campbell 1970, 251). As a result, people may not want to vocalize their trauma given the effort involved. Reconciliation may provide some relieve but it requires dialogue. Reconciliation can be understood as part of the forgiveness process but is entirely separate:

Some theorists view reconciliation, or the restoration of a relationship, as an integral part of the forgiveness process, and others as independent processes because forgiveness may occur in the absence of reconciliation and

reconciliation may occur in the absence of forgiveness. Nonetheless, forgiveness does have behavioural corollaries. Reductions in revenge and avoidance motivations and an increased ability to wish the offender well are features of forgiveness that can impact upon behavioural intention without obliging reconciliation. Forgiveness can be a one sided process, whereas reconciliation is a mutual process of increasing acceptance. (Ibid.)

Fierke's understanding of reconciliation may help fighting parties achieve healing but since it requires more parties, it may be a more complicated matter. I posit that forgiveness may be the first step toward recovery from trauma. Such an act may then pave the way toward reconciliation as people cannot be forced into reconciliation. Reconciliation has to be a voluntary act and a personal matter. Victims of trauma must be persuaded to believe that reconciliation is in their best interests. The APA argues that forgiveness actually has several health benefits with reconciliation being a by-product of forgiveness:

1. aids psychological healing through positive changes in affect
 2. improves physical and mental health
 3. restores a victim's sense of personal power
 4. helps bring about reconciliation between the offended and offender
 5. promotes hope for the resolution of real-world intergroup conflicts
- (Ibid.)

The APA finds the act of forgiveness as the route toward understanding and healing: "participants saw the essential aim of requesting forgiveness as promoting reconciliation between the two groups. They agreed that concessions should be made, if needed, to facilitate the process and agreed that both parties should make plans for the future to live in a more interdependent and cooperative fashion. The process of asking for intergroup forgiveness was, however, seen as distinct from the initiation of a commercial agreement, a military treaty, or a judicial procedure" (Ibid., 36).

To heal trauma, Fierke argues, is a difficult process that may require effort and courage. She cites the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission where victims of apartheid had face-to-face interactions with former oppressors. This came from the African concept of *Ubuntu*. *Ubuntu* posits that society and its individuals cannot be separated. Fierke argues that *Ubuntu* had much success to heal trauma: "the act of speaking publically of their suffering, the individual experience was situated in a larger social and political context, as part of a process of collective healing

and reconciliation” (Ibid., 149). Those who perpetrated violence were also given the opportunity to recognize their wrongdoing and request amnesty (Verdoolaege and Kerstens 2004, 77).

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission hoped to forestall civil war in the country’s struggle to adjust after apartheid (Verdoolaege 2002). Such dialogue actually helped South Africans to see past their traumatic experiences and work toward a better and brighter future. Although not perfect,³ dialogue assisted in the healing process, lifting the oppressed up to a higher level being recognized as equals. Other countries in similar positions like Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe and Uganda under Idi Amin did the opposite. These regimes punished white planters for their crimes. In both cases, whites had their land taken away. In Uganda’s case, whites were even humiliated. They were forced to carry Amin like slaves and bow. These countries and their people suffered under the reign of these governments. South Africa escaped these outcomes because they encouraged reconciliation and allowed bold alternatives.⁴ Admitting wrongdoing to gain amnesty was acceptable to victims because that is what they needed for healing.

Can we imagine a global truth and reconciliation commission? The creation of a multinational meeting place to help facilitate healing may be a necessary beginning. Modeled from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, people from all over the world can voluntarily meet to seek forgiveness for past conflict instead of repeating violence and trauma. Several groups of people may benefit from forgiveness in an effort to establish peace and stability with a perceived enemy in the world:

1. Israelis and Palestinians
2. Russians and Europeans/United States
3. Christian Lebanese and Muslim Lebanese/Palestinians
4. Sunnis and Shias
5. Colonizer and Colonized
6. Koreans/Chinese and Japanese
7. Black Americans and White Americans
8. Indians and Pakistanis
9. States of the former Yugoslavia

This list is by no means complete but we can expect that given the benefit from forgiveness, we may begin to see a better world where the individual is at the center of analysis. For the time being, we can only hope that

people behave in their best interests given the data. No amount of convincing will successfully persuade one to act in terms of forgiveness and eventual reconciliation. The individuals must be convinced of their own accord. If enough individuals consider this act as worthy of doing, then it may become a systemic practice. A global forum could therefore be created (by either governments or private individuals) to provide such an outlet for forgiveness and reconciliation.

Of course, there is an essential flaw in this analysis, one that is so powerful that it undermines the potential of this normative and untested proposal. The difficulty is, as Reinhold Niebuhr describes in *Moral Man and Immoral Society*: “individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own” (Niebuhr 1932, 1). Niebuhr argues that individuals “are endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind, the breadth of which may be extended by astute social pedagogy” (Ibid.). Niebuhr is arguing here that the individual is indeed likely to see forgiveness as in their interests if a logical case is made given a natural inclination toward concern for others. The problem for Niebuhr is when the individual is placed in a group: “but all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals who compose the group” (Ibid.). While individuals on their own may warm up to the idea of forgiveness and reconciliation, the idea gets more complicated moving up levels of analysis. The more people involved, the more complicated the matter making change less likely.

Niebuhr here wrote during the 1930s, when Nazism and Communism were taking hold of Europe. He noticed that the nature of people was different when alone versus in a group, and a rabid group at that. Needless to say it is unproductive to hold an entire people accountable for the sins of an entire group of people but this is irrelevant given group dynamics.

Under the right conditions, groups of people can do horrible things. Understanding that forgiveness can prove difficult, we must assume that the likelihood of conflict is profoundly greater. If the United States continues to decline, will other states like Iran, Russia (and other states in the global south, victims of the history of American interference) take action? My main concern is vengeance in this regard. I am often reminded of the

Hobbes quote: “For, as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself” (Hobbes 2005, 224). The main issue for the United States is that since 1945, it has engaged in primacy, making sure that no alternative ideological or political force emerges that would jeopardize their supremacy. If the United States declines (or continues to decline), the chances that other countries may take advantage of this violently is a cause for serious worry.

The simple conclusion is that whatever has been done by the United States in its pursuit of power and domination can also be done to them writ large. The topic of Chap. 5 summarizes this as systemic practice. But, is there any way systemic practice can translate into something positive and productive? Systemic practice is rooted in the act of reciprocity. Reciprocity of forgiveness and reconciliation for past conflict may lead to increased trust of the “other.” Increased trust may result in a redistribution of capabilities through economic development which could be put to better use in ways other than war, conflict, and national security. Peace, environmental sustainability, and the provision of human security in its purest sense as “safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being, characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to peoples’ rights, safety and lives” (Suhrke 1999, 269) is possible through systemic practice. Yet, as discussed, this can prove difficult given group mechanics.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

States and neoempires, as led by individuals, have a serious choice to make between war and peace. The choices we make have little to do with logic and reason and more to do with protecting our social position. Barrington Moore sees outcomes similarly when facing revolution. A revolution from above will have a different outcome than a revolution from below. He argues: “we seek to understand the role of the landed upper classes and the peasants in the bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading to communism ... the ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining the political outcome” (Moore 1993, xxiii). The people with power to make choices may result in a different outcome. There must be a serious attempt to ensure the economy works

for the benefit of the individual over military power and control. This choice will determine whether the world should see destruction or prosperity. History has proved that states, as power-seeking entities, do not seek peace; maybe if individuals banded together as discussed, the world could see new opportunity. I do hope for this outcome. Whether or not my hope can be translated to reality is another concern altogether. At his point, war may seem like the only natural option. States, as led by elites, are psychopaths. They care little about the suffering of others. Their egoist tendencies make pulling the trigger an attractive and empowering choice. This choice is not inevitable but, in an attempt to be realistic, we must try to answer the question of why states to go war.

NOTES

1. Thanks to Carter Wilson for discussing these issues as they relate to the 2016 United States' presidential race.
2. This section was inspired by a conversation with Carter Wilson.
3. Many victims did not get a chance to talk. Critics also saw perpetrators as escaping punishment.
4. Thanks to Samire J. Kassab for his help in this section!

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Conclusion

Previous chapters argue that states are psychopaths in that they behave with little regard for the self-determination and interests of other states. As psychopaths, states are evil because they, according to Arendt's definition, lack the ability to understand the position of others. If this is the case, then we can expect war as states, led by individuals, will kill to gain prestige and wealth even at the expense of long-term peace and stability. Consequently, forgiveness may be the most difficult task any society can do. While I have argued that violence is indeed cathartic in the short term, in the longer term, forgiveness is a better option for one's well-being and mental health. While the individual on their own may be forgiving, but operating in a society, the act may prove challenging. Exploring Niebuhr's work, specifically *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, helps us understand these challenges. The reason for conflict is competition, simply put. Competition is a systemic feature that forces destructive outcomes from time to time. Competition can bleed into war as politics itself is simply a struggle over who gets what, when, and how in a society (Lasswell 1936). As a result, war can never be fully eradicated regardless of power constraints or deterrence strategies. However, the conclusion of this book will discuss the omission of the human aspect of international relations theory in hopes of consolidating contemporary theory with human affect.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: STATES AND HUMANS

Since its beginning, international relations theory has concentrated on the study of great powers, their wars, and pursuits of peace. Classical and rationalist theories of international relations focus on great power behaviors and the way states interact. Reflectivist theories examine the inequalities of the international system and try to shift ontology toward the human. However, many of these theories do not offer a general explanation of how states may operate in a productive, problem-solving manner. States and people face real security and development challenges that must be addressed prior to the implementation of human security. There are significant gaps in many of these theories, but Structural Realism and dependency theory together are best suited to base this research due to the nexus of economy and power. This section will summarize the history of the field in order to justify this work's approach and additions to discourse.

Classical international relations theory argues that states, regardless of size, would enjoy stability and prosperity under free trade and democracy (Woodrow 2001). In realist terms, nations are selfish, power-seeking, interest pursuers. Liberal principles of cooperation and interdependence are unable to be perpetually implemented. Rather, the most powerful will always dominate, even at the expense of others. Weak states in particular are perpetually stuck within a Melian Dialogue (Carr 1978; Morgenthau 1948). These classical theories tell us much about interstate behavior and the many ways states go to war. However, they do not specifically describe patterns of repeated interaction stemming from independent variables.

By the 1970s there were innovations stemming from these classical endeavors that focused on structural explanations, rather than previously discussed reductionist attempts: Structural Realism (Waltz 2010), neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 2005), and the World-systems Approach (Wallerstein 1979). These theories center on great powers and their behavior as constrained within a system. Leaders of neoempire, great powers, are just as constrained as others due to the structural force of anarchy. Structural realists expect there to be an automatic balance of power as states check one another to survive (Waltz 2010; Walt 1985), while neoliberal institutionalism expect that weaker states cooperate since they do not have many alternatives (follow the regimes). The World-systems Approach assumes weaker, more peripheral states as appendages

to the West, constrained by capitalist domination, regimes, and laws (Wallerstein 1979). All three theories share common ground as they conceptualize about an abstract system. This system is an independence variable that manufactures unit behavior. As a consequence, structural theorists have ignored the possibility of interrelation between structural theories that hypothesize types of state behavior. It is thus very possible to have competing capitalist systems, led by great powers, which further generate state power, wealth, and influence. Causal chains in each theory is skewed leading to inaccurate conclusions such as the incomplete supposition that power leads to wealth *or* wealth leads to power. This is because wealth and power are treated as separate entities. Causality in this sense cannot be determined. Scholars must rather focus on constitutive mechanisms as wealth and power will shape and reshape one another. You cannot have wealth without military power to back it up and one cannot have military power without wealth to manufacture arms and replenish spent resources.

While human emancipation is a priority for neo-Marxists, they see the world as hindered by class structure that exploits and constrains human freedom. Neo-Gramscian theory (Cox 1981) and post-colonialism theory (Said 1978) practice a more normative method of analysis. Both theories look to unhinge the unseen superstructural and discursive hegemonic dominance of great powers to illustrate the struggles that shape the world and human existence. These theories seek to create discourse for themselves via organic intellectuals: persons who represent a social class and are themselves a product of that class and position in society. They are adamantly against any attempt at discourse from outside that class or reality. Discourse is the written manifestation of the writer's interests and thus "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (Cox 1981). Hence, these theories fundamentally attempt to speak from the perspective of weak and subjugated people to further their independence and emancipation from manipulation, power, and control. While I sincerely appreciate such reflectivism, these theories are not suited for conducting an investigation into systemic manufacture and even deny the possibility of knowing anything at all. Ultimately such theories, while they desire to steer the field away from great powers, offer no concrete alternative to mainstream theories. Gendered theories are similar in these attempts as well but try to understand the subjective perspective of women in relation to others in the world.

Gendered analysis, neo-Gramscian theories, and post-colonial theories all try to insert a human perspective into their analysis. I have tried to do this in Chap. 8 alongside a discussion on violence. The purpose was to show the choices we as a society have to make. The chapter makes a connection about humans and state politics to introduce the concept of forgiveness. In order to usher in systemic change, we must start from the individual. Any individual can harbor personal biases hindering global change. The state protects some at the expense of citizens of other states and state-less people providing security for those deemed legitimate by killing those others. It is even more difficult to separate the state from the individual as the construction of the citizen is the embodiment of statist theories.

The citizen is an integral, but ultimately subordinate part of the state. We must then try to understand the role of the individual as it relates to the state and the state system. Nyers puts forward the notion of the “essential citizen” and the “accidental citizen” (Nyers 2006, 21). The essential citizen is one who is an accepted member of society and nation, received by the state and other fellow essential citizens. Their rights are never retracted as they are perceived to have no threat to society. On the other hand, the accidental citizen is “deployed as a discursive means to unmake citizenship. It does so by conferring an unqualified enmity and danger to that which is identified as being accidental” (Ibid., 24). The entity in which persons are accepted or excepted from is referred to as the nation-state. Benedict Anderson, author of *Imagined Communities*, argues that the nation-state forwards the idea that everyone has a certain “nationality” that links them to a common community thus creating a very large family of persons who may never meet. Being a part of a nation or a nationality unites one person to millions, creating a body of citizens. This unification can take the form of a particular race, religion, ethnicity, or ideology (Anderson 1991, 7). Those who are a part of this made-up community will make up the state’s citizens. Anyone alien or outside the ideal citizen will corrupt the “essence” of the state. For Lynn Doty, the state is a manifestation of desire and force to control and create order, tame chaos, and construct security (Doty 2003, 1). From this, let us consider the nation-state as an imagined community, united by force to protect a certain group of people from the outside world.

The nation is represented by a sovereign who is the authority structure of the whole, the patriarchal figure of the state. Carl Schmitt defines the

sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception” (Agamben 2005, 1). The sovereign decides who lives and who dies. Bigo argues further that the state of exception is just a part of an overall, continuing mode of control, the dispositive, more specifically the banopticon. The banopticon is “rooted in the belief of the people (whether citizen or foreigner) that control will be only for the ‘others’ and that, if it happens to oneself, it is still a legitimate control for protection of self and society” (Bigo 2007, 6). Thus, he sees the state, led by the sovereign, as the ultimate force that defines the boundaries between inside and outside, who is innocent until proven guilty, and those who are plain guilty regardless: all which justify any democratic (for some) or undemocratic acts (for others) of the sovereign. He sees the state as an entity protecting some against others. These others are the target of the state’s persecutions. They are identified as the enemy, judged in an arbitrary manner by either the color of their skin or religion. As Bigo states, “in the Ban, the norm is the routine of the exception” (Ibid., 13). Thus, he describes the relationship between the state and those banned, revealing and undermining liberal democracy. This is done in the name of the state’s security, which is defined as the “preservation of the US as a free nation with fundamental institutions and values intact” (Fierke 2007, 18). This definition is taken from the United States’ security document from 1950, a crucial part of the Cold War. This means that the state must remain regardless of **any sacrifice**. Civil liberties become homo sacer: a life sacrificed for the state (Agamben 1995, 8). These citizens are excluded from their basic political rights, their zoe and become bios (bare life) while other citizens are secured their own zoe. The sovereign state is the author of these distinctions.

Barry Buzan (1991) argues “if the nation and the state coincide, then we can look for the purpose of the state in the protection and expression of an independently existing cultural entity: nation would define much of the relationship between state and society ... if the purpose of the state is to protect and express a cultural group, then life and culture must come high on the list of national security priorities” (45). We must be able to study some human traits in international politics. Considering states are psychopaths is one way, but what about other forms of love and forgiveness? Are we doomed to war due to our base survival instincts? Patterns of interactions thus show that most cases of systemic change will result in war. The prediction is that war is an inevitability sooner or later. If we see states as psychopaths, we can conclude the obvious choice to be made.

SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION AND GOALS

This book hopes to achieve five main goals that would benefit the field of International Relations and its subfields of security studies, international political economy, and foreign policy. The state of the field today is lacking. Theories no longer explain events as they occur. The level of predictability hence is stunted by theorists' loyalty to certain perspectives. This section will describe briefly the aims of writing this book.

The first task is to highlight relevance of weak states. Weak states are understudied and underappreciated in the field even as they make up the majority of the units in the international system. Kassab (2015d) discusses the role of weak states in great power grand strategy. He describes how weak states are an intervening variable in the dynamic of great power competition even as they break the bandwagoning expectation. This book hopes to build on this analysis by taking such systemic competition one step further. By incorporating Marxist theory, this book will discuss in a different light systemic competition by illustrating the relationship between wealth and power. Weak states play an integral role in bolstering great power systemic position in this regard.

This leads to a second task: to demonstrate major changes in the international system being ignored by hardcore theorists. Theorists of all varieties can be quite unintellectual. They force facts to fit into their little compartmentalized lenses and ignore anything that contradicts these facts. This book hopes to challenge theorists by contesting their view of scholarship. I therefore present a purposefully eclectic theoretical framework that combines the seemingly unbridgeable: American understandings of international political economy (realism) and British/Latin American explanations (Marxism). This divide has dumbed down students. This endeavor hopes to fill any gaps between perspectives and show that there is much to be gained from collaboration than division.

The third task will demonstrate the relationship between wealth and power as one and the same. Realism and Marxism sees one as subordinate to the other. This is incorrect as one cannot exist without the other. The system is created by powerful states putting forward rules and regulations using their wealth and power for perpetuating their wealth and power. Wealth is needed to create power and power is needed to pursue wealth. Elites of states the world over come together to set up such a system to preserve and extend their position. This can only survive through a *plata o plomo* strategy: gold or lead; states either submit to the tenants of the

most powerful or are punished. States and nations who do not fit must be made to do so giving a reason for great power proclivity toward intervention and interference. The ultimate task for any hegemonic or rising power must therefore be economic development as the root of power and wealth accumulation. Economic development allows for the best use of resources. Power resources are used to facilitate further economic development through open access to markets and resource inputs. Power promotes economic development and vice versa.

Connected to this is a fourth task: the unification of realist and Marxist international relations theory and the formulation of a new concept that helps explain international political outcomes: neoempire. Neoempire will be discussed as the twenty-first century's new political-economic and social unit of governance. Many that exist simultaneously as neoempires, as led by great powers, are part of great power grand strategy. Weak states are ushered into neoempires for extending the life of a hegemon or as a rising power-seeking hegemonic status. Weak states may be able to move freely between two or more neoempires without being punished due to their vulnerability hence the qualifying neo. This concept will demonstrate this work's ultimate argument: weak states exist alongside great powers and the need to continue hegemonic expansion and counter the hegemonic expansion of other states. International systems are created by this activity.

Fifth, this book will theoretically speculate on the future of war and conflict given domestic-international conjunction. If elites are driving expansionist behavior, then it will be a matter of time until great powers and their neoempires finally collide. What will cause this collision? This book argues that elites, desperate to continue accumulating wealth and power and maintain power against domestic masses, may decide war is the best option. Conflict to either bring revisionists to heel or weaken a status quo power may be thought of as in the best interests of decision-makers. What then will influence decision-makers given the demands of economic growth? This work will try to explain any eventual clash between great powers and their competing neoempires by expounding on the importance of populism to foreign policy elitist theory.

In all, this work puts forward a new theory of international relation that reflects twenty-first-century world politics. States are fundamentally different both in quality and quantity. Theories must be created to reflect changes in global political context. These five described scholarly contributions strive to make sense of these important changes. The next section hopes to further justify this book's contributions.

FINAL WORDS

The central purpose of this book was to illustrate the systemic power of economic domination to great powers. Great powers construct competing world-systems with the purpose of domination. This activity is at the core of grand strategy in the twenty-first century as it accomplishes continued economic growth and secures access to political influence and prestige. Weak states are central to this grand strategy in any great power's pursuit of power and influence. Weak states can take advantage of this by playing the field as they themselves are in need development. However, the neo-empire relationship locks them into dependence, condemning them to longer-term underdevelopment. Regardless, great power and weak states trade their grand strategies, balance of power and prestige, and playing the field, respectively, to survive. Transactions such as this create systemic practice as great powers compete to enhance their positions relative to one another within anarchy. As a result, the international system is continually in flux, as competing neoempires must fight for weak state support. Grand strategy transactions between great powers and weak states can be understood through the Chinese game of Go. Aid and preferential trade deals underscore these transactions which are systemically important because they influence the distribution of power across states.

Great powers fight to redistribute the balance of power in their favor. China and the United States, Russia and the European Union, struggle against one another to create neoempires. Neoempires are designed to generate dependency as a wider part of a great power's grand strategy. The great power will be able to exert power through this dependency. Dependency is designed to maintain dominance over a country, or set of countries, for two separate yet interrelated material advantages: wealth and power. A great power cannot have power without wealth and wealth without power. While realists and Marxists alike tend to isolate which came first, both are incorrect. There is no divide between these two fundamental parts of domination; to say that there is ignores reality and ultimately political outcomes: imperialism its original and new sense. While great powers seek to influence and shape the autonomy of weak states, they need weak states. Without weak states, these great powers would lack the recognition, prestige, and global leadership they so desperately crave; what good is being a leader when one has no followers?

This research posits that such behavior means there can be competing world capitalist systems within an international system balancing against

one another. Economic exploitation alters the balance of power in favor of its author or its core. Such alternations ultimately lead to systemic change making exploitation and dependency central to world political outcomes. Systemic change, as mentioned before, can be considered “the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interests ... the political system will be changed in ways that will reflect these underlying shifts in interests and power” (Gilpin 1981, 10). These efforts involve competition within realms of politics and social realms and must be incorporated in any study on international politics.

This competition leads to the book’s second theoretical construct. The state is an outdated and obsolescent concept. Neoempires are led by great powers to accumulate power and wealth to protect global prestige. Neoempires are political and economic subsystemic units of governance that operate within an international system. This concept illustrates the behavior of great powers together with weak states as an operative unit. The cases put forward in this book look at the behavior of the United States and China as well as Russia and the European Union within the neoempire framework. The illustrative case studies focus on competition for influence in an anarchical international system. The question remains whether or not great powers with their neoempires would engage in systemic war. It is very difficult for these elite-led units to break out of destructive patterns of behavior. It will take a real effort from citizens to ensure world peace. Given that states are psychopaths due to their evil egoism, we must assume in absence of counter hegemonic effort, without forgiveness and reconciliation, war between neoempires may be inevitable.

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